Alexander R. Dawoody   *Editor*

Eradicating Terrorism from the Middle East

Policy and Administrative Approaches

Public Administration, Governance and Globalization

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Springer

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Introduction

The Association for Middle Eastern Public Policy and Administration (AMEPPA) is pleased to publish its second book in a series of studies on issues of Middle Eastern public policy and administration. This volume focuses on the subject of terrorism, and it includes 20 chapters categorized within two parts. Part I is an analysis of terrorism in the Middle East, and it includes nine chapters. Part II is case studies that includes countries in the Middle East struggling with terrorism, such as Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, Uganda, and Turkey, and it includes 11 chapters.

Chapter 1: Terrorism in the Middle East: Policy and Administrative Approach (Alexander Dawoody)

- The chapter looks at policy and administrative approaches in resolving issues of terrorism in the Middle East through sound governance. The chapter examines the social, economic, and political causes of terrorism in the Middle East, the rise of political Islam, and the variations in such a movement in manipulating regional and global interests/conflicts toward advancing their own agenda. In doing so, the chapter examines policy and administrative challenges in the Middle East and best scenarios in addressing the cause of terrorism as a function of public policy and administration.

Chapter 2: Monitoring and Disrupting Dark Networks: A Bias toward the Center and What It Costs Us (Nancy Roberts; Sean Everton)

- The goal of this chapter is to explore the analytic bias—how it is manifested, why it appears so extensive, and what unwitting limitations it imposes on our strategic options to counter terrorism. The authors use data from a study of the Syrian opposition network that was conducted in the CORE Lab at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey California.
- The original study sought to provide a window into the armed opposition units against the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad. This chapter proceeds as follows: it begins by reviewing the various strategies that can be used for disrupting dark networks. These can be broken down into two broad categories—kinetic and non-kinetic. The former uses coercive means for disruption, while the latter

seeks to undermine dark networks using subtler applications of power. Drawing on a previous analysis, the authors illustrate how some of these strategies can be implemented, while at the same time highlighting their own bias in that study toward central actors. The chapter then turns to an analysis of the Syrian opposition network, highlighting how a central focus can blind analysts to other important aspects of a network, in this case, elements that ultimately aligned themselves with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The chapter concludes with some implications for the future use of SNA to monitor and disrupt dark networks.

Chapter 3: Terrorism through the Looking Glass (Samir Rihani)

- It stresses that eradicating terrorism from the Middle East is a laudable aim that will obviously receive universal support. The chapter, however, presents six ideas that put the project and the wider concept of "terrorism" in a more realistic perspective. First, genuine terrorism is of moderate relative importance in terms of loss of life and security compared to other hazards. Notwithstanding sporadic attacks, the danger posed to Western societies in particular is minimal. Constructive international actions to build and not destroy societies merit a higher place on the agenda than obsessive "counterterrorism" based on military action. Second, most of the deaths attributed to terrorism in the countries where the activity is said to be rife have little to do with classic terrorism.

- State structures have been eroded, and deaths are caused in the main by warlords fighting over power and wealth and by those armed and funded by external powers to promote diverse regional or global interests. Civilians are not being killed primarily in pursuit of policy changes. There are hardly any remaining policies to change! Third, "terrorism" and "counterterrorism" exist nowadays in a symbiotic relationship.

- Terrorist groups exaggerate their grievances and "achievements" to attract recruits and funds. Those involved in counterterrorism need a perpetual enemy that is said to present a serious threat to security. This is especially necessary now that so many profit-seeking private companies are involved in providing counterterrorism services. Both sides thrive on publicity for terrorist actions. Evidence presented later shows that the use of force is often useless in eradicating terrorism. Fourth, groups seeking power set out to generate "group solidarity" based on tribal and religious affiliations.

- The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) offers ready schisms that are exploited by regional and global powers. The region, as a result, has become a battleground for pseudo religious wars. Raw recruits might be motivated by religious mania, but to their leaders religion is little more than a means to an end. Islam serves their purpose to perfection. Fifth, calls for improved governance and reforms aimed at effecting a social transformation are sensible and urgently needed.

- However, in the absence of effective state structures and in the presence of belligerent warlords and proxy wars, progress on these essential reforms is difficult. And, sixth, MENA has been the focus for intensive intrusion by regional and global powers for a very long time. Intentionally or otherwise, this intrusion has

produced instability that in turn led to violence, including terrorist acts. In the process, state power in most of the countries in the region has been compromised, in some cases to a point where it has virtually disappeared. This last point brings the discussion to a key issue. People in countries experiencing instability and terrorism are told, with some justification, "not to blame everyone else." However, "everyone else" are conspicuous by their presence and influence. This is nothing new. As Antonius reported, disturbances in Syria and the Lebanon in 1860 "provided the European Powers with a pretext to justify their meddling openly in the internal affairs of Syria—a precedent which they were to invoke constantly in the next fifty years." The process goes on. As a report from the Baker Institute for Public Policy stated, "…the United States has routinely supported policies that have increased instability when it advanced the country's other perceived interests in the region."

- Improved governance is often sought against powerful internal and external counterforces. The principal point argued in this chapter is that "terrorism" cannot be divorced from the above fundamental issues. There have been recent indications that the USA, as the leading power on earth, has come to the conclusion that wars are too costly as a means to pursue its national interests. The agreement with Iran on nuclear weapons, the settlement of the long-running dispute with Cuba, and efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Syrian situation have given hope for more constructive efforts to tackle MENA's numerous problems. This presents an ideal opportunity for governmental and nongovernmental organizations to explore innovatory ideas for the welfare of the region.

- Working within the above line of thought, the chapter ends by suggesting that the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and possibly other areas in Africa, might benefit from a UN-operated scheme similar to the Marshal Plan that was funded and managed by the USA to help in the reconstruction of Europe following WWII. In extreme cases, this might even present a possibility for UN direct management of certain countries for limited periods of time. Certainly, more military action by whatever authority is the least beneficial action that could be taken as past decades have amply demonstrated. Equally, reliance on present leaders to effect change is a forlorn hope. A change would not be in their interest. Revolutions and popular uprisings, similarly, would be quickly usurped as was seen in the Arab Spring.

Chapter 4: Reasons for Terrorism in the Middle East
(Serkan Tasgin; Taner Cam)

- The chapter focuses on the Middle East and terrorism as the two concepts have been mostly used together in terrorism literature and they became as if identical and synonym to each other. The Muslim world worldwide confronts a multidimensional crisis such as economic, political, educational, cultural, and social problems. Experts are right to claim that most of the radical terrorist groups stem from this region and terrorism is not only the consequence of these factors.

- Therefore, in this chapter, the authors approach the root causes of terrorism with a historic example of the first terrorist movement in this region, Kharijites

because it is necessary to understand the religious and ideological factors of radical groups which misinterpreted the religion and spread this twisted ideology. History is repeating itself by Kharijites in the seventh century and the neo-Kharijism represented by ISIS in the twenty-first century. The authors then focus on the chronic problems of this region such as authoritarian regimes, education, unemployment, and poverty which are easily manipulated by radical terrorist organizations. To end radical influence on youth, the authors recommend that real approach of religion toward violence and radicalization should be promoted by mainstream Muslims and human rights and democratic values should be nurtured in educational curricula.

Chapter 5: Impact of Islamophobia and Human Rights: The Radicalization of Muslim Communities (Vadim Atnashev)

- The chapter explorers the specifics of Islamophobia in Europe, mainly in several EU countries (the UK, Netherlands, France, Denmark) while using results of case studies in the UK. Special focus is on at-risk youth groups and measures to prevent and counter radicalization of the groups. Also, the chapter examines the current situation of Muslim communities in terms of the international human rights law, because it is evident that violations of human rights, including discrimination, racism, and xenophobia against Muslims, destabilize situation both in Europe and Middle East. In the Europe of today, there is a hazardous intertwining of two vulnerable factors: on the one hand, increasing political role of far-right parties and racial discrimination and on the other hand, the Muslim communities in Europe also face the process of radicalization and rise of intolerance.

Chapter 6: Information Technologies and Counterterrorism in the Middle East (Fatih Tombul; Hüseyin Akdoğan)

- Globalization with advanced information technologies, according to this chapter, has changed the life of the people in the world. When something occurs in one part of the world, other parts of the world can be informed easily within seconds. Current information technologies such as the Internet, social media, blogs, and news channels have enabled people to create virtual groups all over the world and to disseminate information easily. Most of the states, governments, and public and private institutions have been using the advantage of information technologies to serve their citizens and customers.
- Concurrently, criminals are also using the advantage of information technologies while committing crime. In other words, everything including crime and criminals has changed their structures to be compatible with advanced information technologies. Recently, lots of terrorist organizations have erupted especially in the Middle East, and their networks are spreading out with the use of technology. Most of the terrorist organizations have been using the technology for military training of their militants, preparation, and recruitment processes. Especially, the Internet is almost a virtual training slot for terrorist groups.

- Recent studies have revealed that the Internet serves as the library for the terrorist groups to provide instruction manuals and videos on technical and tactical areas such as making a bomb, taking hostages, and guerilla combat. As it has an appropriate space for interaction activities, potential terrorists use the advantage of the Internet as a forum for interactions and networking to learn how to make a bomb and send instant messages to the instructors teaching illegal issues. Thus, security forces in the face of all these developments should take the necessary precautions to fight against the terrorist organizations by standing one step ahead on the use of technology.

Chapter 7: Root Causes of Conflict and Terrorism in the Middle East (Sadık Kirazli)

- The author asserts that terrorism takes advantage of political, socioeconomic, territorial, ethnic and sectarian conflicts in order to advance its own agenda. Terrorism has always existed throughout the world. But, no place is nowadays more appropriate for the emergence of terrorist activities than the Middle East. The current global wave of terrorism, in many ways, was fuelled by events in the Middle East, particularly the enduring Arab-Israeli conflict and issue of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Addressing the motives and factors that give rise to terrorism and sustain it is often more effective than trying to combat its symptoms and effects. The chapter, hence, examines the roots or/and causes of terrorism in the Middle East as an approach in understanding the current phenomenon of terrorist acts and groups in the Middle East.

Chapter 8: Conflict Resolution and Peace in the Middle East: Prospects and Challenges (Ali Can)

- According to Can, the unresolved international conflicts over the years clearly indicate that current policies and practices in world politics failed in bringing peace to every part of the world. The failure of peace efforts in the Middle East was a major disappointment for the entire world, but its impact was mostly felt by the Palestinian and the Israeli people.
- The chapter depicts the prevailing process shaped mainly on the problematic relations between Israel and Palestine. After analyzing the dead ends in the peace negotiations, the challenges and prospects are presented by reviewing the literature and multiculturalism theory. The chapter proposes that reconstruction of the conditions that makes cooperation possible and effective between conflicted parties is necessary to evaluate the distortions that impede the dialogue and cause terrorism.

Chapter 9: The Changing Nature of Global Arm Conflict (Ozcan Ozkan)

- Based on this chapter and in the new era where the USA has remained the only superpower in the globe, the unipolar trend was only challenged by emerging new threats such as global terrorism. The transition period was not a peaceful one since the newly established states in Eastern Europe and some failed states

in Africa and the Middle East have seriously challenged security of the developed countries both in Europe and the Americas.

- On the other hand, some states in Africa and elsewhere had long lacked the colonial backing as a result of the decolonization process starting in the 1960s. After the end of the Cold War, some of these states were further left without support from either bloc. In this situation, many states have failed because of lacking political, economic, and authoritative capacity to meet their people's needs, triggering intrastate wars rather than previous interstate wars. The most important threat for both domestic and international stability came from asymmetric warfare including terrorism. Among them, the 9/11 attacks marked a new period in which transnational terrorism changed the nature of armed conflict greatly thanks to facilitating factors of globalization. In addition, the chapter alludes that advanced technology made conventional wars obsolete, triggering a revolution in military affairs.

Chapter 10: The Interplay between Politics and Policy in Combatting Terrorism : The Case of Lebanon (Hiba Khodr)

- This chapter is an exploratory study on the interplay between politics and policy in combatting terrorism in Lebanon. It aims at investigating the contributing factors to the absence of counterterrorism policies by analyzing the relation between the peculiar Lebanese politics and policy formulation in the country. Based on the three most widely used definitions of terrorism, this chapter starts by offering an operational definition of terrorism followed by a brief history of terrorism within Lebanon through the lens of what we conceive to be the two main factors or drivers behind terrorism in the country. This contextual description provides the background to enter into the discussion of the field of counterterrorism and what policies, if any, Lebanon is undertaking to counter these ever-persisting threats arising both from within its borders and just beyond.

- After briefly identifying the political, social, and economic factors that perpetuates terrorism in Lebanon, the chapter answers the following two key questions: What role do the Lebanese government and civil society play in combatting terrorist acts? And what are the main obstacles (political and administrative) that hinder developing comprehensive counterterrorism policies in the country? This is the first academic study that has investigated the interplay between politics and policy as it relates to domestic and transnational terrorism from a governance perspective. The analysis undertaken in this chapter lays the foundation for much needed future studies on Lebanon and the region's counterterrorism policies by identifying some of the participants, mapping out the process, and providing policy recommendations for a more effective and efficient policies.

Chapter 11: State Sponsored Terrorism and Its Effects on Lebanese Policy and Politics (Khodr M. Zaarour)

- How does state-sponsored terrorism affect Lebanese policy and politics? How does it affect the stability of fragile state? Does terrorism cause such weak or fragile government to fail prematurely, and/or does it enhance the probability

that such government will stay in office longer than it otherwise would? According to this chapter using a duration model on a sample of 53 Lebanese governments between 1943 and 2015, state-sponsored terrorism exacerbates the likelihood of government failure for some governments but not others. The main principal finding is that right-oriented governments are able to keep their hold on power more than left-wing governments when confronted with state-sponsored terrorism. However, both types of governments will most likely collapse when faced with the pressure of state-sponsored terrorism, and consequently, they fail to deliver adequate services to their citizens which leads to their erosion of public support and eventually collapse.

Chapter 12: Iran and Its Public Policy Against Terrorism (Hamid Reza Qasemi)

- According to this chapter, the appearance of terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, and al-Nusra Front is the culmination of terrorism. Iran, particularly after the Islamic Revolution, has been subjected to brutal terrorist attacks. Based on the facts and figures, only due to the terrorist group Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) attacks, more than 16,000 people have been killed. Additionally, the formation and activities of terrorist groups in recent years, especially in marginal areas and cross-borders, have caused many losses of life and property to the people and government of Iran. The chapter addresses the history of terrorism in Iran, followed by an investigation of terrorist threats against Iran while examining the concept of terrorism in Iranian laws and regulations. Then the chapter concludes with measures needed to be taken by Iran's national security to counter terrorism.

Chapter 13: Policy Initiatives that Steer Terrorism: A Case Study of the De-Ba'athification of the Iraqi Army by L. Paul Bremer (Ali Awadi)

- According to Awadi, a key objective of the US invasion of Iraq was to bring democracy to Iraq by severing all links with Saddam Hussein's toppled regime. As we have now discovered, however, this "de-Ba'athization" policy was terribly short-sighted and led to horrific sectarian fighting in Iraq, attacks on US troops when they were occupying the country, and eventually the rise of ISIS and other terrorist groups that are wreaking havoc on the region today. The chapter examines the complicated political, ethnic, and religious dynamics that exist in Iraq to examine why, rather than leading to peace, the dismantling of the Ba'ath infrastructure instead unleashed instability on the Iraqi people soon followed by utter chaos and incalculable suffering for the population of Iraq (and even outside its borders) that continues to this day.

Chapter 14: Assessment of Policy and Institutional Approaches to International Terrorism in Uganda (John Mary Kanyamurwa)

- The chapter asserts that Uganda is one of the countries that have suffered the consequences of international terrorism and remains among those targeted for more terrorist attacks. Different approaches have been formulated and implemented

to contain international terrorism and domestic collaborators in different countries particularly those who carry out vicious terrorist attacks such as the al-Qaeda, Taliban, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), al-Shabaab, Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), and Boko Haram in Nigeria, all of which seem to draw profound inspiration and moral courage from the Middle East terrorist groups.

- Using an intensive desk review methodology, the chapter establishes firstly that the major policy and institutional approaches employed include those which accentuate continuous efforts to design and execute antiterrorist legal instruments and establish specialist security, administrative, and legal agencies. Secondly, the policy and institutional approaches which have been developed and implemented in Uganda appear to have been underscored by recent successful operations against terrorist networks in East Africa as well as other strategies adopted against international terrorism. It concludes with the recommendations for security and legal responses, as well as successes/challenges for appropriate policy actions in responses to terrorism on national, regional, and global levels.

Chapter 15: Turkey's Struggle with the Kurdish Question: Roots, Evolution and Changing National, Regional, and International Contexts (Mustafa Cosar Unal; Fatih Mehmet Harmanci)

- According to the authors, the Kurdish question in Turkey is a deep-rooted issue that dates back to the Ottoman times. The most current and bloodiest Kurdish insurgency group, the PKK, caused not only a high volume of violence but also social and political instability in the recent political history of modern Turkey.
- To curb the PKK problem, Turkey employed a wide variety of countermeasures throughout the conflict. Embracing different paradigms as the conflict unfolded, Turkey's countering policies emerged as "iron-fist"-oriented intense securitization and repression and led to PKK's military defeat in 1993. Turkey then embraced accommodating, "motive-focused"-oriented policies to remove certain legitimate identity-related grievances after Ocalan's capture in 1999. Meantime, the PKK also employed significant shifts in its strategy, i.e., from a top-down military approach to a bottom-up politico military campaign, to coerce Turkey into a political concession in a long lasted tit-for-tat struggle. This study argues that, despite the military defeat, the PKK has been able to maintain its threat level during the entire span of the conflict that has culminated in Turkey's recognizing the stalemate and shifting to a conflict resolution paradigm in 2007. However, what led Turkey to commence a peace process toward a negotiated settlement has been, in addition to the perceived stalemate, the critical developments in the Middle Eastern Region, i.e., Arab Spring, Syrian Civil War, and, most importantly, the changing role of the PYD, a non-state Kurdish actor in Northern Syria, affiliated with the PKK, that would lead to power shifts among actors (both state and non-state) in the region.

**Chapter 16: Fighting Terrorism through Community Policing
(Ali Sevinc; Ahmet Guler)**

- This chapter examines the role of community policing in counterterrorism based on data collected from interviews with police officers working in the southeast region of Turkey. The case study shows that community policing programs provide effective ways of establishing trust between the police/state and citizens while overcoming bilateral prejudgments, increasing citizens' willingness to seek assistance from the police, and preventing young people from engaging in crime, violence, and terrorist activities. The results of the analysis indicate the positive role of community policing in decreasing insurgency among citizens and offer community policing as an alternative approach in the fight against terrorism.

Chapter 17: Money Laundering Activities of the PKK (Ozcan Ozkan)

- According to Ozkan, there are numerous terrorist organizations that use sophisticated methods to move their illicit funds through financial systems both at home and across the globe. The Kurdistan Workers' Party (Kurdish: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK), an ethno-nationalist terrorist organization rooted in Turkey but operating in various countries including Turkey's neighbors such as Iran, Syria, and Iraq, as well as in Europe, have benefited from similar kinds of terrorism financing activities for a long time.

- To finance its activities, it has engaged in terrorist financing methods and laundered its illicitly gained funds by cash couriers or front companies through which it collects money under the name of donation or aid particularly in Europe where its financial infrastructure heavily relies upon. The PKK has long been known to have engaged in various methods to find funding for its activities. While the main concern is not money itself for the group, financial activities have forced the PKK to find ways to maintain relationship with drug and weapon dealers as well as human traffickers from whom it takes commission charges. The financing activities of the PKK particularly in Europe make it necessary for the group to deal with financial management including setting up front organizations for money laundering. Using various kinds of NGOs and media organizations has allowed the PKK to engage in money laundering activities. However, since the organization prefers not to use open financial institutions to move the funds, and its illegal money usually comes in the form of cash, it is becoming harder for law enforcement agencies to track money laundering activities of the group.

**Chapter 18: Bullets for Ballots: Electoral Violence in Insurgencies
(Nadir Gergin)**

- In this chapter Gergin illustrates that political institutions are "weapons" in the struggle for political power. Insurgence take advantage of the election process in order to gain access to the political system. And this article is an attempt to explore the rationales of the insurgent/terrorist organizations to engage in electoral politics and electoral violence. The first section explores the importance of

elections for the insurgent. The second section analyzes election violence from several aspects and identifies actors and rationales of it. The third section deals with preelection violence and establishes a theoretical framework by explaining the reasons for pre-election violence and causes for changes in governance. And the final section focuses on the postelection and its main reason and electoral results.

Chapter 19: Is Democracy a Cure for Human Rights Violations? An Analysis of Macro Variables (Hüseyin Akdoğan; Fatih Tombul)

- It asks: Are democracy and a good economy a cure for human rights violations? The authors state that some studies answer this question positively and explain that democratic institutions can be developed in democratic states with good economic conditions. This, therefore, reduces human rights violations. Other studies answer this question differently; these studies explain that countries under democratic governments develop complaint mechanisms for their citizens. Therefore, citizens can enjoy these mechanisms and make their voices heard.
- The analysis presents some interesting findings in the correlation between human rights violations and population, economic development, crimes, the number of terrorist incidents, and democratic level of a country.

Chapter 20: Manufacturing Terrorism (Alexander Dawoody)

- The chapter focuses on terrorism in the Middle East and how it has evolved as a puzzle. It asks, how is it possible for few ragtag villains with little or no military and intelligence training (e.g., ISIS, Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, Al Nusra, Al Shabab, Taliban, and all other Islamist terrorist groups) to confront the forces of several states in the Middle East in addition to two superpowers (the USA and Russia) and yet keep winning by gaining territory, funding, and manpower? The chapter examines the hidden elements behind the terror groups and the suspected elements behind them.

The diverse topics in the book touch on various issues related to terrorism in the Middle East. However, it does not cover all aspects of terrorism, and this remains one of our limitations. Examining all aspects of terrorism in the Middle East is a vast and complex issue and requires a series of studies. We are hoping that this book can be one in such attempts in order to shed some light on this phenomenon and assist policy makers and public administrators pave the most effective means in combatting and eradicating terrorism.

AMEPPA condemns all acts of terror and any source that supports terrorism. The issues and analysis-based opinions addressed in these chapters, however, do not necessary reflect the official stance of the organization. AMEPPA's policy toward terrorism is outlined in two statements published in 2015. The first statement was issued on May 1, 2015, in response to ongoing mayhem committed by the criminal gang known as ISIS. It reads as follows:

"The Association for Middle Eastern Public Policy and Administration (AMEPPA) is a scholarly and professional network that is comprised of nonpartisan and nonsectarian members. AMEPPA is dedicated to promoting peace and prosperity in the Middle East and

across the globe through sound governance. The recent increase of violence and counter violence has compelled AMEPPA to issue a statement against all forms of terrorism. These acts are a manifestation of deeper structural problems that have been persistent without open dialogue to address the core issues.

A peaceful society requires all governments to implement public policy initiatives through, good governance and social inclusion of all minorities and people of all faiths. AMEPPA urges governments to apply rigorous and ethical measures through public policy as a means to encourage dialogue and promote civil society. AMEPPA is a community of academics and practitioners; our objectives are to respect human dignity and defend human rights, therefore we are against all forms of violence, hatred, and misrepresentation of any faith by any group of people. We condemn all acts of violence committed by organizations and governments against innocent civilians, places of worship, learning institutions, historical and archeological sites, and any forms of collective punishment. AMEPPA scholars collectively appeal for a new discourse in effectively addressing all of forms of violence by state or non-state representatives. AMEPPA's petition is adopted in the following principles:

1) A plea to governments and organizations to solve their differences at the negotiation table, not on the battlefield; and for non-interference in the affairs of other sovereign nations.
2) A call on governments of the Middle East and North Africa to adhere to the rules of law, social justice, end of government's oppression, respect for human rights, and a free and fair democratic process.
3) A request on governments to embrace minority faiths in their countries, and eliminate all forms of discrimination and stereotypes.
4) Appeal to governments and groups to refrain from funding, arming, or initiating terrorists as a means to promote their national or sectarian interests.
5) Economic, political, and social reforms are effective means to bring peace to nations and bridge governance with citizens, especially when the seeds of discontent among people are due to political corruption, poor education, poverty, lack of employment, and opportunities to live up to one's own potential.
6) Due to an increasing amount of violence being committed in the name of religion, we urge the intellectuals and theologians to reflect on the communal values of co-existence, social inclusion, fairness and equality as principle to enshrine all faiths.

Sound governance can only be established through mutual respect, unbiased actions, and honest discussion. Incorporating these measures will advance peace and prosperity for all citizens."

The second statement was issued on November 20, 2015, at the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris, France. It states the following:

"The Association for Middle Eastern Public Policy and Administration (AMEPPA) condemns the recent acts of terror in Paris, Sinai (Egypt), and in Lebanon. These continued atrocities have spread beyond Syria, Iraq, and Libya. Their goal is to cause havoc by killing the innocent, destroying precious artifacts and landmarks, and disrupt civil society. AMEPPA summons people of conscious to stand for peace and tolerance as we mourn the victims of these tragic events together.

We are united with all victims of violence, terror, rape and torture around the world and offer our sincere condolences to their families and communities. Terrorism is a plague on humanity and it should be fought, not contained by all of us in order to end these senseless acts of hate and intolerance. Terrorists' purpose is only to advance their political and ideological agendas through fear. As humans, we are all interconnected; if one innocent person is hurt, then all of humanity will suffer. Therefore, policies and actions should be directed toward peace and building a serene and cooperative global community.

Policies that are pursued for narrow self-interest at the expense of others or regard the innocent as mere collateral damage must be exposed and replaced with policies that serve humanity's interest as their core. Therefore, we condemn not only violent acts by terrorist groups such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda, but also the regime-changing acts that destroy states structures and capacities. The growing terrorist activity that destroys life, communities, and nations by proliferating terror must stop and all terrorist groups must be annihilated along with their supporting networks. Political leaders that support terrorism in any shape or form, private individuals that fund terrorism, and religious clergies that promote the ideology of hate and violence must all be brought to justice and charged with crimes against humanity. Let us make terrorism and its ugly face a thing of the past and never, ever allow it once again creep up again in the human community."

Terrorism is an ugly plague on humanity, and it is shameful that in the twenty-first century of human civilization we still have to witness such barbaric and heinous criminal acts. There is only one response to terrorism: It must be destroyed and wiped out of the face of the Earth utterly, completely, and by all means necessary. Anyone who supports or sponsors terrorism must be exposed and rejected from the human community. Laws must be enacted and enforced by all members of the UN to reject terrorism and the ideology that espouses it. Funding of terrorism must be eliminated, and those who fund terrorist ideology, groups, or acts should be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law, branded along with the terrorists that they support as criminals engaged in crimes against humanity. Roots and causes of terrorism must also be treated in order for this ugly phenomenon never to creep up again in the human communities.

Sadly and regrettably and for various reasons, the Middle East has been the hub for terrorism in the past decades more than any other place on Earth. Some of the reasons for such a curse are organic, rooted in the culture and history of the region. Other reasons are external with various political forces in the world manipulating the situation, often in forms of manufacturing the symptoms for their own selfish and narrow interests. Whatever the cause or manifestation, the innocents pay the price by falling victims to such ruthless and barbaric acts, with great damages inflicted on the infrastructure, communities, the state, antiquities, and religious sentiments and values.

For decades the state was the origin and tool of terrorism in the Middle East. Police regimes used fear, intimidation, imprisonment, ethnic cleansing, kidnapping, torture, mass deportation, censorship, and indoctrination in order to silence the opposition and enforce tyrannical regimes. Non-state actors increasingly became visible and start jumping into the play during the 1970s. The Cold War and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave the West an opportunity to manufacture Islamist terror groups (at the time they were identified as holy fighters or *Mujahedeen*), which later and after the Soviet's pulling out of Afghanistan went rough, breeding groups such as al-Qaeda, Taliban, Islamic Jihad, and various others.

Nationalist movements ironically in the past decades were regarded as terrorist groups by the West. However and due to circumstances and changing in tactics, they were recognized as representatives of the population by the very West that branded them as terrorist groups in the past. Examples of these groups are the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Iraqi Shiite militia, the Kurdish Peshmerga (fighters), the Iran Mujahedeen People Organization, and various others.

Perhaps non-state groups existed for quite some time, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt that was established shortly after WWI in hope of reviving the Islamic Caliphate. However, the group was not widely known in the West and Western media since its operation largely remained local. With few exception, such as when a pro-Western leader in the region is assassinated as it was the case with the assassination of Egyptian President Sadat in 1981, political Islam and groups associated with it remained, for most part, a local Middle Eastern concern left to the scrutiny of local security apparatus.

Foreign wars, invasions, and failed states, however, tipped the situation and turned what once was a regional and semi-controlled nightmare into an out of control global problem. The two Gulf wars and the failed states in Somalia, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Syria became a breeding ground of extremism that pushed the marathon of ugliness and crime from one extreme to another. Reactionary ideology of midlevel Islam that is perpetuated in the region through billions of petrodollar provides the ideological framework and justification for such barbarism at the expense of decency, normality, and civic virtues. Acts of terror were exported outside the Middle East, and Jihadists from around the world were allowed to pour in to the region in order to further give life to such cancer.

Terrorism is evil, and like any other evil in the history of man, it will be defeated. In order to do so, we must expose its bankrupt ideology and expose those who support and finance its murderous gangs or those who provide the routes and access for criminals from around the world to join these thugs. We must also expose those who claim to fight terrorism but in reality are profiting from it either through oil deals or phony militarism (such as enriching the military industrial complex and security surveillance and infrastructure in the name of containing terrorism). Finally, we need to educate our own people in the Middle East to critically evaluate our own past, heritage, and culture through an objective lens, reject the meaningless repetition and mimicking of unsubstantiated and questionable teachings shoved down our thoughts as unquestionable doctrines, and learn to respect life regardless of outdated norms and reactionary traditions. Respect for life includes that of women as we must have the bold courage to renounce and put to shame any source that degrade women and regard her as second-class citizens.

The road ahead of us is long and difficult, but the alternative of doing nothing or giving up hope to pessimism is worst. We must rescue our region from the worst in us in order to make the Middle East a safer place for all humanity.

We realize that no study can, in fairness, examine all aspects of terrorism because of the complexity of the issue and its roots, causes, and manifestation. However, this book is a modest attempt toward that goal. We hope that we are contributing, regardless of the limitations in our efforts, to the noble cause of eradicating this ugly phenomenon and deposit it to the trash bin of history.

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Part I
Analysis of Terrorism in the Middle East

Chapter 1
Terrorism in the Middle East: Policy and Administrative Approach

Alexander R. Dawoody

Introduction

The evolution of governmental systems after the creation of the modern Middle East post-WWI had witnessed many challenges, both internal and external. Western relations with these systems of governments were not based on their transparency, openness, accountability, efficiency, legitimacy, representation, or public service. Rather, they were based on Western interests in the region and often sacrificed the principles of public service for stability and security. Because of that, police state became the most pronounced aspects of these governments, equipped with corruption, nepotism, censorship, political oppression, deterioration of infrastructure, lack of service, outdated regulations and heavily ineffective bureaucratic system, poor planning and economic investments, increased poverty and unemployment, and heavy reliance on state machinery. With the world increasingly interconnected, especially after the proliferation of the Internet and social network, a phenomenon known as Information and Communication Technology (ICT), citizens in the Middle East were able to connect with others in the world, especially the expatriates living abroad, and started to shed off the information blackout imposed by their governmental systems. By learning about how other communities and societies lived in the world and other models of governments that were more representative, transparent, accountable, and effective, these citizens started asking for change. Two groups emerged as a result of such transformation:

1. A group that wants a change in governance to be more democratic and better engaged in building a prosperous civil society. This group is unorganized, spontaneous, and raw that later its peaceful revolutions in public squares became

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known to the media as the Arab Spring. Unfortunately and because of the newness and unorganized nature of the group it is easily manipulated by traditional opposition political parties that siphoned the group's sacrifices to accomplish political gains for these opposition parties.

2. Another group wants a change in governance that can return to the sixth-century Islamic Caliphate and the constitutionalization of the Sharia Law. Since such a concept is not shared by majority of citizens in the Middle East as most (including Muslims) regarded religion as personal affairs and not to be the foundation of governance, such a group resorts to violence in the form of terrorist acts in order to enforce its agenda.

This chapter examines the illness in Middle Eastern systems of governance that led to either peaceful revolutions or violent terrorist acts. The chapter also looks at Western involvements in the Middle East and the impact of such involvements both on governance in the Middle East as well as the reactions to their policies.

Today, more than ever, our people and the region of the Middle East as a whole are experiencing great challenges and threats not only to public affairs but to their existential identity and common sense in living peacefully without violence. Challenges have always confronting public affairs in the Middle East, especially after WWI and the formation of the current nation states at the aftermath of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Fromkin 2009). Today, however, these challenges are secondary to the clear and gathering danger posed by terror in destroying every normalcy in life and restructuring human dynamics based on complete and unwavering submission to fear. Such terror has now morphed from the periodic bombs and terrorist acts to state formation, from a condition depending on a state-sponsoring of terror to a terrorist state that has nothing in common with any other forms of governance in today's society (Dalacoura 2011).

Previous challenges to issues of governance and public administration in the Middle East stemmed from the inorganic creation of most Middle Eastern nation-states by colonial powers post-WWI (Sorenson 2013). Although such inorganic creation worked at other parts of the world, such as in India, Hong Kong, the Philippines, and others, in the Middle East, however, it became a source of problem. We may even suggest that such problems and the resulting failed movements to address them had given birth to the type of devolution that we are witnessing today in the formation of failed states and the organizations of terror (Lynch 2013).

Three movements emerged since the creation of the modern Middle East and attempted to deal with problems inherited by the inorganic nature of the region's creation, yet failed were nationalism, socialism, and political religious trends. Nationalism emerged by a new class of individuals that were educated abroad and exposed to Western bourgeoisie national ideologies. This class, later, was injected by military officers from poorer classes that seized political powers through military coups (Dawoody 2014).

Overall, the nationalist movement formed political organization espousing patriarchal nationalistic ideologies in order to lead the populous toward depended–independent local market. Puritanism, however, became the hallmark of such movement as it

institutionalized the cult of "Great Leader" through paranoid Hobbesian tendencies in order to govern by necessity that informed and free popular choice (Dawoody 2014).

Although the movement generated large support base, it eventually grew isolated and became unpopular because of its inability to resolve social problems through civic institutions, competent public administration, sound economic development, and individual freedoms (Dawoody 2014).

A second movement grew parallel with the nationalistic movement, espousing socialist ideology and challenging the first movement for control of public policy and political power. Although the Cold War gave some momentum to such a movement, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the movement's meaningless espousing of theoretical texts that were foreign to the social and cultural fabric of the region resulted in its bankruptcy. The movement today is nothing but a nostalgia and recital of outdated political dogma (Dawoody 2014).

The third alternative arrived in political religious trends, mainly in Political Islam which had developed at the aftermath of the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate. The purpose of the third movement was a return to the Islamic Caliphate and Sharia-based governance as salvation for the ills in Middle Eastern inorganic state and governmental structures. The third movement and due to opposition by nationalism and socialism, as well as the lack of popular support at its developmental stage, had shifted its tactics between grassroots campaign and violence. Gradually, the movement's violent manifestations took precedence, resulting in groups and organizations that vary only in their range of tactical application of violence (Lewis 2004).

Governance in the Middle East today, with the exception of very few, is experiencing a cocktail of authoritarian to marginal pseudo-democratic systems. Decades of manipulating governmental apparatus in order to siphon public resources for the benefits of the ruling oligarchies' grip on power created a system of dysfunction that exhibits corruption, infectiveness, nepotism, lack of transparency, lack of accountability, censorship, and oppressive police state (Dawoody 2013).

Within this trajectory public administration is trying to catch up by mimicking other models in the world while losing originality, innovation, and effectiveness that is particular to the region. Such incapacitation is disabling the effective role of public administration and rendering it as a separate entity that is tightly connected to the political branch and its whims than becoming a true guardian for the public interest.

Ironically, this was not always the case in the region that we call the Middle East today. Some 3500 years ago it was in this very region that the arts and science of administration were discovered, specifically by the scribes of Mesopotamia. Administration became a viable tool for the foundation of the first state in history, known as Akkad. Administration was also the main responsible element for the creation of writing, an instrument that early Mesopotamian scribes needed in order to record offerings to the temples (Van De Mieroop 1999).

Historic public administration in the ancient Middle East continued flourishing giving birth to many powerful empires, such as the Persian, Assyrian, Babylonian, Umayyad, and Abbasid empires. Because of such sophistication in administrative affairs, universities, libraries, hospitals, cities, irrigation systems, and military industries were created. Although governance was marred by sociopolitical conflicts

and often manipulated administration for the benefits of the ruling oligarchies at the expense of vast sectors within the population, the arts and sciences of administration were responsible for transforming the region into a center of important achievements in philosophy, science, music, poetry, and arts for more than five centuries (Leick 2003).

Regrettably, however, and particularly after the sack of Baghdad by the Mongols in 1258 and the destruction of most administrative systems of the Abbasid state, the Middle East as a region sunk into an abyss and the downward devolution continues to date (Kennedy 2006). Today, the region is involving communities of consumers, incapable of producing and heavily relying on outside goods. Oil, this double-edge sword, has produced massive wealth for the few and a heavily depended nonproducing system at the expense of a population that lacks in every basic need (Ross 2013).

The region's experiment with democracy, whether top-down as the one imported by outsiders such as in Iraq or through internal strives such as the Arab spring had failed as well. This is due to various factors, mainly our tribal and cultural tradition that emphasize collectivism at the expense of individualism, the absence of civic institutions on grassroots levels, the opposition of the clientele, and challenges posed by the three failed political movements (Maalouf and Beck 2014).

With the growth of a young generation that is increasingly feeling marginalized and disempowered, the lack of economic opportunities, and the near fading of hope in a better life, extremism is now emerging in the Middle East in an unprecedented way by offering itself as a new path capable of delivering of what the other three political movements or public administration had failed to deliver.

The extremist trend is manipulating lack of hope among the young generation by constructing an apparatus that disguises itself within a cocoon of existential sentiments and an illusional referentiality intended for as escape from reality and advancing a particular political agenda. Confronted by such a metamorphosis, outdated forms of governance are trying to clink into power by any means, including begging foreign military interventions so that the pariah state can continue.

This brings us to the equation: What should we in order to make a difference by addressing these challenges? What should we, as individual scholars, practitioners, and students of public service do in order to help our societies confront these threats?

Public administrators in advance and stable countries devote their work to resolving challenges generated by routine bureaucratic function. For us, however, such a thing is considered to be a luxury or chasing a mirage of make-belief reality. Not only we have to address the dysfunction of bureaucracy but also address threats of existential nature that is endangering the very core of our existence as people. We need to act as both guardians and advocates of the public spirit and assume the historic task of carrying out such mission effectively, timely, and tirelessly. We cannot allow the overwhelming challenges deter us from such a mission and must rise to the occasion by truly inspiring, leading, and making a difference even if the rewards are difficult to realize both now or in the foreseeable future.

To do so, we need to think outside the box, be innovative and organic, and arrive to solutions based on our collective and unique perspectives while learning both from our past, present, and other models. No longer can we only apply Western

models and inject them to our societies, especially when such models were either rejected or did not with our cultural and societal values.

Artificial suppression of volatility in the voices calling for change can be misguiding since it will push policymakers toward ignoring the observation of low-probability risks. Public administrators ought to avoid constraining change by allowing it take place without control or predictions and treat each societal need autonomously while interconnected with one another within a dynamic self-organizing function. For this dynamic to work, public administration must be flexible, unrestricted, nonhierarchal, and possesses a greater adaptability in the face of change. This means public administration in the Middle East must be:

1. Transparent
2. Operating out of mutual causality
3. Focusing on the present moment where adaptability proceeds and predictions or long-term planning may drastically alter in the "fog" of operation.
4. Pattern seeking by way of creative disequilibrium that enables an ongoing shifting into new structures
5. Paradoxically preparing for unexpected consequences and uncertain outcomes
6. Evolving by benefiting from the "butterfly effect"
7. Self-transcending in the sense of emerging out of the interactions of autonomous agents

In a world of uncertainty, we can no longer rely on a naïve confidence that long-term planning can be accurately traced to predicted results. Instead, the emphasis needs to shift to a much greater flexibility which prepares any current structure to respond adaptively to unprecedented changes (Dawoody 2012).

No longer are we able to assume that our experiments and observations tell us anything concrete about reality. Whatever reality is out there, it has fuzzy indeterminacy. in which entities separated by space and possess no mechanism for communicating with one another can exhibit correlations in their behavior (Overman 1996).

This nonlocal way of nature is characterized by a continuous flux shaped by the dynamic interplay of yin and yang and determined by a flow of opposite energies through which all trends eventually reverse themselves (Capra 2004).

With such an understanding, governance and public administration in the Middle East must be "network-alized" to capture multidimensional players, forces, and events. At the same time, governance and public administration ought to adjust and adapt according to the unpredictable changes in the environment in order to correspond with uncertainty. After all, it is not the strongest, the larger, or the most powerful that survives but those who are capable of adaptation.

The louts flower grows in the swamp, adapting to its surroundings by producing something that transcends the murky conditions and changing both itself and its environment. We can learn from the lotus flower and rise above the murky waters of our swamp by producing something beautiful and transcending.

Causes of Upheaval in the Middle East

If we look of the rise of terrorist groups associated with political Islam in and outside the Middle East we will be alarmed by their resilience, rapid growth, and continuous operations and employment of horrific measures in order to get their message across to the media. The same Information and Communication Technology (ICT) medium that became a tool for revolution (such as during the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria) is now becoming a tool to spread the message of terror and atrocities committed by political Islam, of groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Boko Haram, and Al-Qaeda in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Kenya, Somalia, Nigeria, Chad, Algeria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan of beheading and execution by burning victims alive, or terrorist acts in Europe such as in Paris, France with the killing of cartoonists at *Charlie Hebdo* magazine or in Copenhagen, Denmark.

To begin with, we need to differentiate between revolution and terrorism in the Middle East. Although both may share some common causality, the legitimacy issue, however, differs. Revolution by popular segments in demand of sound governance, better lives, and better future is justifiable and legitimate as a medium and forum for popular expression and for the manifestation of the public spirit. With the absence of democratic channels and viable opposition political movements, revolutions in the form of mass protests, demonstrations, labor strikes, and peaceful gatherings (such as the Arab Spring) are both necessary and required in order to keep governance as a legitimate source of public representation. If tyrannical governmental apparatus responded to these mass protests with violence (as was the case in Syria in 2011), then people have the right to fight oppression and defend their homes, families, and popular demands in front of an oppressive government. This is also emphasized by the American Constitution when legitimizing the arming of popular militia when government no longer democratically represents the will of the public.

In case of terrorism, however, there is no justification for terrorism under any circumstances. The main reason for this is that because terrorism does not represent the free will of the people; it is always based on violence to impose a narrow ideology on the majority; and it aims to end all forms of free expression, rights, and accountability. In essence, terrorism ends the legitimacy of the state and replaces it with the savage Hobbesian notion of a lawless society where only the strong survives at the expense of security, freedom, and rights. Hence, we are here to understand the causes of terrorism in the Middle East in hope of arriving to logical solutions that can treat such a cancer and ends its reformation over and over again. Table 1.1 presents the difference between popular revolutions and terrorism in the Middle East.

There are, however, some common traits between popular revolutions and terrorism in the Middle East. Table 1.2 presents these common traits.

Now, let us look at the causes for terrorism in the Middle East. Some of these causes are also responsible for popular revolutions, especially political, economic, and social paradigms.

Table 1.1 Differences between popular revolutions and terrorism in the Middle East

N	Popular Revolutions	Terrorism
1	Spontaneous	Deliberate and intentional
2	Lacks ideology	Ideologically driven
3	Inclusive	Exclusive
4	Peaceful	Violent
5	Lacks hierarchy and organization	Extremely hierarchal and organized
6	Open and transparent	Closed and secretive
7	Legitimate and justified	Illegitimate and devoid of justification
8	Yearns for a better future	Yearns to return society to the past
9	Employs public forums	Employs terror
10	Advocates for individual rights and freedoms	Against individual rights and freedoms
11	Based on exposing the truth	Based on proliferating lies and deceptions
12	Pro-women and minority	Misogynist, antiwomen, and antiminority
13	Believes in coexistence	Believes in confrontations
14	Seeks peace and feeds on nonmilitarization	Seeks wars and feeds on militarization
15	Wide	Narrow
16	Does not require (large) funding	Requires large funding

Table 1.2 Common traits between popular revolutions and terrorism in the Middle East

N	Traits
1	Middle Eastern governments as direct enemy
2	Use of ICT
3	Voluntary
4	Resentment of the West
5	Attracting the disfranchised among the youth
6	Has global support/advisories
7	Mobile and adaptive

Cause 1: Political and Economic Paradigm

Since its inception after WWI, the modern Middle East and the new countries that were brought to existence at the aftermath of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 (Fromkin 2009) were governed by isolated oligarchies, military juntas, and tribal chieftains that cared mostly about solidifying their position in power and enriching their lots than to care for the plights of ordinary citizens (Khoury and Kostiner 1991). Governmental apparatus, as thus, became tools of oppression creating massive, dysfunctional bureaucracies feeding on corruption, police state, censorship of information, nepotism, and lack of accountability, and transparency than to serve the public interest. In such an atmosphere, all forms of opposition were silenced and freedom of expression, gathering, and organization were met with political torture, imprisonment, and summary executions

(Lesch and Haas 2012). Internal and external enemies were created in order to justify the continuous imposition of Marshal Laws, suspending individual rights and prolonging governance by decree and in complete absence of participatory process. Ideological indoctrination was imposed in each aspect of daily life in order to normalize this abnormal trend. Such ideologies shifted from nationalism to socialism to political Islam (Dawoody 2014). The state and religion were interchangeable in order to persuade the citizen that an opposition of the status quo was an opposition to religious teachings and thus, God's will in enforcing complete obedience to the ruler (caregiver).

With the proliferation of mass media and the use of the Internet and ICT, ordinary citizens were able to have access to news and other source of information outside the official governmental-controlled and censored information networks (Howard and Hussain 2013). Not only that, ordinary citizens now were able to submit their own stories and news to the outside world by bypassing the official networks.

No longer governmental apparatus can imprison or torture a political dissident and be able to silence the news. Now, a picture can make it with a very fast speed to international news organizations and people around the world can learn firsthand on what is taking place in the farthest and remotest areas in the Middle East. Such a dynamic became a catalyst for the cyber revolution in the Middle East and provided a voice for the long absent opposition movement in the region.

Not only the disfranchised, the poor, and the unemployed used ICT as a medium for global self-expression and demanding better living conditions, but also revolutionaries hoping for better and more accountable and effective governance made use of the medium. Yet again, the evil twin of these just movements had also capitalized on such a trend: terrorism had joined the fray, manipulating ICT to spread its own messages of hate and terror. Each day the Internet, followed by traditional media networks that select the broadcasted news, became saturated with popular uprisings in the streets of Cairo, Egypt and Sana, Yemen as well as the beheadings of hostages by ISIS in Syria (Hassan 2015; Lappin 2010).

Terrorism went further to employ outrage, shock elements, and the extreme in order to capture the headlines in most leading international media outlets by simply posting a short video of a heinous beheading of hostages. The saturation later snowballed, as acts of terror continued shifting from one location to another (including mass murder in the streets of Paris) and from one heinous crime to another (slavery, forced migration, destruction of property, beheading, burning victims alive, stoning, severing arms and legs, and dumping victims from tall buildings). The more outrageous the act the most media coverage it got and the responsible terror group received more name recognition that it used for recruiting and financial support.

Cause 2: Absence of Viable Form of Expression

The absence of critical thinking, debates, and intellectual curiosity in the Middle East and the domination of repetitive, mundane, and nonthinking forms of schooling (perpetuated by the Madrasa system) which produced human parakeets that

know only how to recite religious texts instead of engaging in critical thinking, or governmental propaganda machines that produced a class of unthinking dependents is another cause for disfranchised segments of the society to seek alternative mediums in order to express their grievance. This is especially true when most brain power had migrated from the Middle East to the West due to economic, social, and political reasons.

The absence of viable political opposition that can lead public movement and demand political reforms created a vacuum that was readily filled by political Islam and its extremist wings. Mosques were employed as connective nexus to maintain an ongoing network supported logistically, ideologically, and politically in order to feed an antiestablishment development (Bokhari and Senzai 2013). This is due to centuries long of political oppression and tyrannical forms of governance. The absence of credible civic institutions that can be the advocate for public needs and act as guardian for public interests also contributed to the void and legitimized the need for an "alternative."

Cause 3: Wars and Foreign Involvements

France and Great Britain are responsible for the creation of the modern Middle East (Sorenson 2013). The inorganic nature of this colonial creation provided an environment for injustice to be institutionalized and for marginalization and alienation of the public to become the norms.

The psychology of the Middle Eastern man became a schism between yearning to learn from what the West had to offer and resenting the West for the mess it had created and forced upon a historically traumatized people to begin with. With the discovery of oil and the decaying of old colonial powers, the United States stepped into the arena, seeking to advance its economic and political interests, especially in the oil-rich areas in the region, at the expense of the withered masses.

Human rights were side steps as a price for national interests. Security and order became the mantra at the expense of democratization and individual freedoms (Migdal 2014). As a result, the United States supported tyrannical, reactionary, and nonprogressive regimes in the Middle East and on occasions directly interfering either militarily or through overt intelligence operations in order to support these regimes (such as the CIA's orchestration of the 1953 coup in Iran against a democratically elected government, the US military intervention to support the oil sheikhs of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and the military aid in access of two billion dollar per year to Egypt).

Even America's later adversaries in the region within the Middle Eastern regimes (such as Saddam Hussein and his Baath regime in Iraq), he and his tyrannical regime enjoyed unwavering U.S. military, financial, and political support when his actions were beneficial to U.S. interests, especially during the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–1988 (Hahn 2005). When Saddam gassed his Kurdish minorities in 1988 and killed more than 5000 civilians with mustard gas, the United States treated the issue as an inter-

nal matter. Only later when Saddam became U.S. enemy number 1 (for occupying Kuwait's oil fields and thus threatening U.S. economic interests) that the Kurdish massacre suddenly surfaced to the American conscious and Saddam was denounced for committing genocide (Charountaki 2010).

The two Gulf Wars led by the United States against the Baath regime in Iraq in 1991 and 2003, and the devastating United Nations imposed sanction on Iraq from 1991 to 2003 had resulted in more than three million deaths by Iraqi citizens, destruction of the infrastructure, malnutrition, epidemic and disease, poverty, unemployment, and institutionalized sectarian violence (Ismael and Ismael 2015). Today Iraq is a model for a failed state ridden by daily terrorist bombs, kidnapping, beheading, corruption, and a dysfunctional governmental system (Al-Ali 2014). Components of Iraq's ethnic and religious communities are fighting one another for control of power and resources: Sunnis against Shiites, Muslims against Christians, and Arabs against Kurds (Rayburn 2014). When governance is incapacitated and resolves conflict, and at best is part of the problem by fueling ethnic and sectarian violence when favoring one group over the other, the environment becomes ripe for terrorist groups, such as ISIS to capitalize on government weakness and manipulate the poisonous situation for its advantage.

Other areas that witnessed foreign wars in the region are no better and have similar results: Somalia, Afghanistan, and Libya. The long historic conflict between Palestinians and Israelis also contributes to the negative outcome, resulting in terrorist groups such as Hezbollah of Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza to be emboldened and strong.

After the Arab Spring on 2013 and the collapse of reactionary and tyrannical regimes in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Yemen, the environment was right for the emergence of true democratic and representative governments that can right centuries of wrong doings. Unfortunately and due to the absence of viable civic institutions, democratic opposition movements, and democratic traditions, these countries fell prey to political Islam, and the group of Muslim Brotherhood was able to ride the popular dissent for its own political advantage (Bradley 2012). However, once the incompetence of this power-hungry group became apparent to the public they soon were ejected from power and governance once again either returned to the rule by the old guard (as in Tunisia), the military (as in Egypt), or dissented into chaos (as in Libya and Yemen). Terrorist groups saw in the examples of Libya and Yemen a perfect swamp for growth, while engaged the old guard that returned to power in Egypt and Tunisia in almost a daily confrontation (mostly in Egypt since the Brotherhood had suffered the most lost).

In Syria, however, the Arab Spring took a different turn from the paths that had emerged in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. Although the popular uprising against the Assad regime remained peaceful for the first 6 months, the movement lacked international backing as it was the case elsewhere (Hokayem 2013). The peaceful movement soon turned to armed struggle by defected Syrian soldiers that called themselves "The Free Syrian Army" when offenses by the Assad regime escalated, including the use of chemical weapons against civilian population (U.S. Government 2014). Jihadist groups seized the vacuum created by the West's reluctance to support the Free Syrian Army in order to pour into Syria and utilize the situation for their advantage (Erlich and Chomsky 2014).

With Iran, Iraq, Russia, and Hezbollah of Lebanon backing up Assad both militarily and financially, the rich Arab oil countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait backed those are fighting against Assad (Hokayem 2013). As the violence escalated and nearly 120,000 Syrian were killed and another two million became refugees, Syria became a no-man land. The capital city of Damascus and a narrow strip around it remained under Assad's regime while the rest of the country was divided by fighting Jihadists: Groups such as Al Nusra, ISIS, and other emerged espousing the most reactionary and violent doctrine (U.S. Government 2014). Foreigners, including international relief agency workers and journalists were kidnapped to become the subjects of these Jihadists' hate and resentment of anything that was decent and normal.

In 2014 the Syrian civil war spilled into Iraq, capitalizing on the weakness of the wooden Iraqi army and the despised sectarian policies of its corrupt and incompetent government (Cockburn 2015). Supported by the local Sunni population who had suffered since 2003 under the Shiite-dominated government in Iraq, the Jihadist groups in Syria (namely ISIS) were able to build alliances with Saddam's former military officers and easily capture the provinces of Mosul, Salahuddin, and Anbar (Hassan 2015). Soon after, ISIS announced the rebirth of the Islamic caliphate and begun its terror campaign against the Iraqi Yazidis and Christians, destroying their homes, cities, and villages, killing their men, and raping their women. Only when ISIS fighters turned their attention to the Kurdish region that the West (headed by the United States) decided to intervene through air campaign in order to stop ISIS' advances (Cockburn 2015).

With ISIS' declaration of the caliphate and success on ground, support to its campaign by regional and foreign Jihadists grew. Within a short time ISIS gained more significance than Al-Qaeda and terrorists from around the world start pouring to its headquarters in Ar-Raqqah, Syria (Hokayem 2013). According to CIA latest estimate, nearly 20,000 foreign Jihadist had joined the terrorist groups in Syria and most had joined ISIS (CBS/AP 2015; U.S. Government 2014). Other terrorist groups in the region, such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia; Boko Haram in Nigeria, Mali, and Kenya; and the Islamic Dawn in Libya declared allegiance to ISIS, mimicking its signature terrorist behavior in capturing civilians, dressing them in orange, beheading them, and then broadcasting the taped videos of such barbaric acts on the Internet.

Cause 4: Failed States

Bad governments create bad policies that result in political crisis, stagnation, and some form of lawlessness and disorder. However, and for the most parts these crisis are manageable and can be placed under control (although through repressive and undemocratic measures). However, no government almost certainly results in chaos, disorder, and complete breakdown of societal order whereby the Hobbesian savage state of nature takes precedence and terrorist groups see a ripe environment for growth.

The Middle East, unfortunately and for a variety of reasons (that include wars, economic disparities, foreign intervention, tyranny, tribalism, lack of education, and poverty) is saturated with failed states that became the perfect swamp for the growth and spread of terrorism. Examples of these failed states are as follows:

(a) Libya: Caused by four centuries of Qaddafi's tyrannical regime, NATO's military intervention at the aftermath of the Arab Spring in 2013, and then pulling fast out of the country without helping Libyans build a strong government than can provide peace and order (Engelbrekt and Mohlin 2013). Today, the government in Libya is nothing but a runaway shadow of few individuals who are hiding in hotels while the country is torn between Jihadist terrorist groups supported by Qatar and Turkey who use these groups in order to force their own Islamist-driven political agenda on the entire region.

(b) Iraq: Caused by the U.S. occupation of Iraq in 2003, the dismantling of the state and its administrative apparatus, the institutionalization of quota and sectarianism in the new Iraqi Constitution, and the alienation, as a result, of its Sunni community. The disempowered Sunnis saw in Islamist terrorist groups a perfect vehicle to force their demand and return to power. Iraq today is torn between ethnic and sectarian violence with third of its land taken by terrorist organizations (Ismael and Ismael 2015). The central government is powerless, decapitated by corruption, political opportunism, incompetence, and militia (Al-Ali 2014). Ordinary Iraqi citizens are trapped between a government that represent the narrow views of Shiite militia and terrorist groups that represent a backward ideology that wants, through fear and terror, return Iraq to the seventh century.

(c) Syria: As stated earlier, Syria is now geographically divided based on regions. The capital city of Damascus and the Alawites strip near the Mediterranean Sea is under the Assad regime control. Dara and most of southern Syria is under the Free Syrian Army control. Most of the western region is under Al-Qaeda and Al Nusra control. Aleppo, northern Syria, Ar-Raqqah and part of the eastern region is under ISIS control. Northeastern Syria is under Kurdish control (mainly PPK fighters who identify Turkey as their arch enemy). With nearly 120,000 Syrian civilians are killed, two million are refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey, and nearly 20,000 foreign Jihadist making their way to Syria (through the Turkish borders, often with knowledge and permission of the Turkish authorities), Syria today is a failed state and considered the most dangerous place on earth. It is the hub that breeds terrorism and a magnet to continually attract future recruits. Paybacks for those who join the Jihadist groups include money, power, and women.

(d) Somalia: It has been a failed state since the collapse of Mohammad Siad Barre's government in 1991 due to tribal and military conflicts and the agony of civil war that lasted until 2006 (Lewis 2003). It was during this civil war that the world became aware of the famine caused by draught that was devastating the Somalia population. Warlords were hijacking international aid packages in order to solidify their power and control over the population (Fergusson 2013). The U.S. military attempt in guarding these relief efforts resulted in the disastrous downing of U.S. Black Hawk helicopter in 1993, and the killing and parading of the bodies of its pilots in the capital city Mogadishu (Clarke and Herbst 1997). In 2012, a weak

government was formed to restate the state's control and authority over a land that became disintegrated into three states: Somalia, Somali Land, and Putland, and a population terrorized by pirates known as Al-Shabaab (Hansen 2013), an off-shoot of Al-Qaeda who recently affirmed its allegiance to ISIS.

(e) Yemen: Long ruled by its strong military man Ali Abdullah Salih, this country that was forcibly united in 1990 after 8 years of civil war between its northern and southern parts (Brehony 2013) became the fourth country in the Middle East to witness the Arab Spring in 2011 after Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya (Lynch 2013). The demonstration continued to be peaceful despite military crackdown by Salih's regime. Eventually and after mediation by Saudi Arabia, Salih agreed to step down in 2012 to his Vice President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi (Rabi 2015). The government of Hadi, however, collapsed by a Shiite tribal group known as Al-Houthies (Salmoni and Loidolt 2010). Today, Yemen is one the strongholds of Al-Qaeda, and with Al-Houthy in power, the failed state is in full effect, pairing the way for organized terrorist groups (namely Al-Qaeda, since Yemen was the birthplace of its founder, Osama bin Laden) to force havoc on regional and world security, including maritime travels at the straits of Aden in the Red Sea.

(f) Lebanon: Although the best of all other failed states in the region, Lebanon, nevertheless, is a failed state and a hub for the largest legitimized terrorist organization in the Middle East: The Hezbollah. Not only Hezbollah paralyzes the Lebanese state, it is the Lebanese state (Worrall and Clubb 2015). No one is elected and placed in power, including the country's ceremonial Christian President, the Sunni Prime Minister, or the Shiite head of Parliament without Hezbollah approval. Hezbollah has its own military, institutions, members of cabinet, and members of Parliament and it dictates the country's domestic and foreign policy. Because of such paralysis, Lebanon is a de facto failed state (Levitt 2013). Today, Hezbollah is fully engaged (including sending armed men) to defend the Assad regime in Syria, making Lebanon and Lebanese-Syrian borders an open arena for conflicts and violence. Lebanon's proximity to Syria had always made it target for Syria's state-sponsored terrorism, including the assassination of its leaders, such as the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005 by Syrian intelligence and Hezbollah operatives.

(g) Afghanistan: The CIA used the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 as a recruiting round of Islamist Jihadists to fight the Soviet in the name of God and freedom. Once the Soviet, however, had left Afghanistan in 1989, the CIA packed its bags and left, leaving the Jihadists fight among themselves over the control of the country (Coll 2004). The fight and civil war continued until 1996 when an Afghani terrorist group named Taliban, trained and armed by Pakistan, took control of power in Afghanistan and established one of the most reactionary, misogynist, and repressive regimes in modern history (Tanner 2009). The Taliban hosted Osama Ben Laden and his Al-Qaeda network. After September 11, 2001 and when they refused surrendering Ben Laden to the United States, the Taliban were driven out of power by U.S. military and Afghanistan came under U.S. military control (Tucker-Jones 2014). This situation continues to date.

Although the United States allowed elections to be held for president and for an independent Afghani government to be formed, the U.S.-protected Afghani government lacks any real existence outside the capital city of Kabul. Hence, the President of Afghanistan is best known as the Mayor of Kabul. Most countryside is now back under Taliban control. This situation is making Afghanistan yet another failed state and a safe haven for terrorist groups such as Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

Cause 5: Tribalism, Misogyny, Sectarian Violence, and Minority Issues

An important cause for terrorism in the Middle East is the continuous domination of tribalism (Kamrava 1998). When individualism is crushed or undermined and decisions are made by tribal chieftains willingly and without question, tribal interests become more important than individual rights. If the state cannot fully satisfy such interests (when government, for example, is dominated by other tribes and thus has to respond to the dominating tribes' interests), the disaffected parties invite terrorist groups in order to advance its needs. This is, for example, is what is taking place in Mosul, Ramadi, and Fallujah in Iraq today. When the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad had systemically excluded Sunni tribes from sharing power, these tribes invited terrorists such as ISIS to force its demands. Only when these tribes realize that such an alliance with the terrorist groups may cause them their own autonomy these tribes may turn against their terrorist allies and expel them, as it was the case in 2006 when Sunni tribes in Ramadi and Fallujah joined U.S. General David Petraeus' Awakening groups and expelled Al-Qaeda from their areas (Mansoor 2014).

Another issue that can be linked to tribalism is the downgrading of women and persistence to disempowering her. This misogynist tendencies fits well with terrorist ideology and indoctrination, and by paralyzing half of the society while keeping the other half under tribal yoke, terrorism can find a fertile ground for its growth in the Middle East (Ali 2008).

Coupled with tribalism and antiwomen behavior is the growing societal rituals of enforcing sectarian divides, especially among the Sunnis and Shiites. The division between the Sunnis and Shiites in Islam is not recent and dates back to the early years of Islam, particularity after the Prophet Muhammad's death when the caliphate passed to his friend and father-in-law instead of his cousin, Ali. Muslims, however, kept the division and for the bulk of history restricted to religious rituals (Hazleton 2010). Recently, however, terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, as well as Shiite militia are using such divide for political reasons in order for one sect to have complete control of power at the expense of others.

Finally, the last element in these paradigms that feeds terrorism is the continuous denial of ethnic and religious communities' rights by the majority groups. As such, these minority groups become easy targets for terrorist groups to solidify the majority group's irrational yearning for absolute control of power (Hassan 2015). Because of this we witness, for example, anti-Yazidis tendencies and silence by the

larger group when ISIS expelled this ethnic/religious minority group from its historic homeland in Sinjar, Iraq, killed its men and raped its women (Cockburn 2015). The same is true with other minority groups.

Cause 6: Alienation, Identity Crisis, and Clash of Civilizations

Because of the clash between modernity and Bedouinism, few individuals feel alienated (Yasmeen and Markovic 2014). When they read about early Islam and the perpetuated righteous society as the Salafi movement is prescribing (Kabbani 2014), and when few of these individual are incapable of materializing such nostalgia in today's society, they increasingly become isolated and exhibit antisocial behavior (Cesari 2006; Saunders 2012). Such trends exacerbate when religious clergies in their daily and weekly sermons bedevil today's modern society and pay tribute to the past. Accordingly and especially among the young and economically deprived individuals who live in Western societies, such alienation creates an identity crisis. Then, when such individuals are introduced to Jihadist ideologies, they find themselves eager to join one of the various terrorist networks. Added to these individuals are others who exhibit instable emotional states, psychopaths, and sadists who hate society and want to inflict the most harm on ordinary people as treatment for defects in their ill personalities.

Cause 7: Political Islam and Dogma

President George W. Bush targeted political Islam by identifying it as Islamo-Fascism. However, the term was misused by the Neocons to brand Islam itself as the source of violence. Bush's detour to Iraq further emboldened the very Islamo-Fascism that he was trying to defeat.

President Obama embraced the so-called moderate elements in political Islam, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. He was hoping such faction can confront Jihadist ideology by offering itself as the mainstream Islamist group while isolating Jihadists as outliers. The Obama Administration placed its hope on the Muslim Brotherhood to replace deposed tyrants at the aftermath of the Arab Spring.

Unfortunately, the Muslim Brotherhood turned to be just as violent and as other extremist groups. In essence, the Muslim Brotherhood is the historical originator and genesis of such groups and it had given birth to them. They are no different today than 80 years ago when they were first formed at the aftermath of the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate. We can witness their recent atrocities in places such as Gaza, Egypt, Libya, Iraq, Yemen, and Syria.

There is no moderation in political Islam. All forms of political Islam are based on violence. Since political power is the ultimate goal of such movement, violence becomes the means to achieve its ends. Moderation, if existed, is only manifested for a short period of time before the true violence face of the movement appears. Moderation is applied only as a tactical measure, not as a strategy.

Is Islam Itself a Religion of Violence?

Most of Islamic teachings are peaceful. Yet, there are references in both the Quran (Islam's holy book) and the Hadith (the collection of Prophet Muhammad's statements) that condone violence.

Branding Islam as a whole as a religion of violence is simplistic and avoids the complexity of the issue. Islam, like any other religion, is neither a religion of peace nor violence. Targeting innocent Muslims who have nothing to do with ISIS or other terrorist groups is a form of Islamophobia and goes against the accepted norms for tolerance, human dignity, and human rights. Not every Muslim is a terrorist. Certainly, the terrorists that claim Islam as their religion have nothing in common with the core of Islamic teachings. They may find bits and pieces here and there in Islamic traditions that can rationalize their behavior and purpose, but that is contrary to the central teachings of Islam.

Considering ISIS, Al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups as the manifestation of Islam is the same of considering Jim Jones, the person who led a mass suicide of 909 men, women, and children in Jonestown, Guyana in 1978, or David Koresh, a person who led a mass suicide of 75 men, women, and children in Waco, Texas in 1993 as manifestations of Christianity.

Islam's teachings are complex mix of contradicting elements ranging from piety to doing good deeds toward others, to violence. A quick review of other religions, such as Christianity and Judaism will also reveal such tendencies.

Therefore, Islam is not unique in its mixed bag of goods in containing teachings of both peace and violence. In the Old Testament, for example, God ordered the Israelites (in Deuteronomy 20:17) to kill the Hittites, Amorites, Canaanites, Perizzites, Hivites, and the Jenusitrs and not to leave anything, including their animals, alive and breathing. In the New Testament (Matthew 10:34) Jesus says "Do not suppose that I have come to bring peace to the earth. I did not come to bring peace, but a sword." Therefore, there are contradictions in all religions. It is up to the individual, whether Muslim, Christian, Jew, Buddhist, or follower of any other religion to choose whether to be violent or peaceful.

It is true that nowadays most terrorism in the world claim connection to Islam. However, this does not automatically link Islam with terrorism. Yet, it is becoming fashionable, especially for right-wing politicians in Europe and the United States to brand Islam itself as the religion of violence. For an outsider, however, it is difficult to separate the two, especially when group after group of terrorists claim Islam as their inspiration. If we look at groups such as the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan; the mullahs and their regime of terror in Iran; the Shiites militias and Sunni extremists in Iraq; the terrorist groups in Syria (such as Al Nusra and ISIS, with the latter extending recently to Iraq); the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt; Hamas in Gaza; the terrorist militias in Libya; Boko Haram in Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger; Al-Qaeda in Yemen, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Kenya; Hezbollah in Lebanon; and Al-Shabaab in Somalia, we will learn that all subscribe to Islam.

So, how did these groups emerge in such large numbers, and why? Ironically, the origin of these groups is the making of the United States (and the CIA in particular).

The CIA created political Islam during the 1970s and continued supporting it during the 1980s in order to fight Communism and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Later, however, the American Islamist Frankenstein monster turned against it once the Soviet Union was no more.

Nevertheless, the United States benefited from fighting its Islamist Frankenstein. In doing so, it was able to justify the continuous spending in support of the military industrial complex, especially when the justification for such spending was suspended due to the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Political Islam and the Islamist Frankenstein provided the United States with the new bogeyman in order to keep building military equipment and keep funding corporations such Halliburton, Raytheon, and Lockheed Martin.

Political Islam and the Islamist Frankenstein themselves had also benefited from U.S. military confrontation by morphing from an insignificant and obscure political movement in the Middle East to a formidable force challenging the political establishment and gaining power in places such as Iran, Libya, Yemen, Sudan, and Turkey. It had also taken charge of Egypt in 2013 at the aftermath of the Arab Spring before it was ousted by the Egyptian military.

Is Islam an Intolerant Religion?

Regarding tolerance toward women and other religious and ethnic minority in Islam, there are various teachings and practices in Islam that both affirm and contradict such notion. Islamic history, for example, witnessed periods of tolerance that Jewish and Christian communities flourished under Islam while being persecuted by others. Yet, there were periods that witnessed the opposite.

The same can be said in regard to women. Women had achieved progress in the Middle East and continue to do so, but it differs from one country to another. Islamic history witnessed incidents where few individual women were highly regarded and achieved prominent leadership positions. Yet, at other periods women were the subjects of injustice, oppression, and persecution. Overall, oppression toward women is derivative from reactionary tribal customs that gradually and throughout the years had crept into Islam.

Is Islamic Law (the Sharia) Suited for Modern-Day Public Affairs?

Sharia Law involves a set of complex regulations, ranging from legalizing polygamy by allowing one man having four wives at the same time (if he chooses and treat all equally), to the beheading of condemned offenders, severing the hands of thieves, prohibiting alcohol and criminalize its use, considering female testimony in court weighing half of that of a man, to justifying the beating of a disobeying wife. Some aspects of Sharia Law may be suited for today's society, such as the concept of charity. However, criminal law in the Sharia and the treatment of women are not well suited for modern-day society. No man has the right to commit any violent act against his wife under any circumstances.

Women's testimony in court ought to be equal to that of a man. Not only that but also her place in society must be equal to that of the man. Regarding the concepts of beheading of offenders and the mutilation of body parts, such practices might have served well the mobile Bedouin community some 2000 years ago.

Today, however, and with the evolution of correction in criminal justice, such practices are considered to be barbaric, especially when the aim is to correct wrong behavior than punishing the offender based on the concept of an eye for an eye.

Is the Islamic Caliphate an Ideal Form of Governance in Today's Society?

The entire history of the Caliphate in Islam (with the exception of few short periods) has been a series of assassinations, possession of haram (concubines), slaves, eunuchs, massacre of other nations, corruption, and a lavish life style in elaborate castles for the Caliph and his wives and concubines at the expense of the massive poor. Three (out of four) Caliphs that immediately had succeeded the Prophet Muhammad were assassinated and their periods were governed by wars and social unrest. This then spilled over to the subsequent dynasties that followed with the added caveats of including harams and slaves. Therefore, reviving the Caliphate and its nightmare is a misguided nostalgia for a misperceived glorious past. There is nothing glorious about murder, assassinations, wars, massacres, and slavery.

Conclusion

As we had discussed earlier in the chapter, there are a number of reasons for the spread of terrorism in the Middle East (particularly terrorism associated with political Islam, such as Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Al Nusra, Boko Haram, Muslim Brotherhood, and Hamas on the Sunni-Muslim front and Hezbollah of Lebanon, the Shiite militia in Iraq, the Hothies in Yemen, and the Islamic Republic of Iran on the Shiite front). In summary, the primary reasons are sectarianism, lack of sound governance and economic opportunity, alienation and identity crisis, wars and trauma, the manipulation of regional and international conflicts, and the manipulation of violence-oriented teachings in Islam. While the rest of the world is eager to move forward through creativity and innovations in the arts and sciences, thereby affirming their humanity and respect to basic decency and rules of law, terrorism in the Middle East insists on returning humanity to the past, to the dark ages while lacking any positive contribution to mankind, and voiding of everything except in innovations in killings and mass murder. This cancer must be eradicated and rooted out completely so it would never creep back again to the community of man. Based on the understanding of the causal elements for terrorism in the Middle East, we need immediate, intermediate, and long-term approach toward resolving this issue.

Immediate Approach

A military offensive to forcibly remove agents of terror, killing them, destroying their training camps, and draining their financial resources ought to be the immediate response. This measure, however, is only a treatment of the symptoms. The treatment of the underlying causes of terrorism must arrive through other steps that will follow the immediate step.

Today, and in response to atrocities committed by ISIS, the United States is once again returning militarily to the Middle East. It is only a matter of time before the air campaign in Iraq and Syria leads to ground troop's deployment and the gradual sinking in yet another quagmire as it was the case with the disastrous Iraq War.

ISIS and its likes are barbarian criminals and they should be defeated. War alone, however, is incapable of defeating them. It is their twisted ideology that has to be defeated. In the past Communism was defeated because of democratic ideal and exposing the lies of Communism to people under its yoke. Ideas defeated Communism, not militarization or the Cold War. Hence, it is ideas that will defeat ISIS and its likes, not wars. Wars may bandage the symptoms and buy politicians few votes but cannot treat the underlying causes of the problem. Even if there was a best-case scenario that resulted in the defeat of ISIS through military campaign, would this be the last terrorist group that the Middle East or the world has to deal with? What if another terrorist group had emerged, what then? Does U.S. have to return again to the region and engage in yet another military campaign? Yesterday was Saddam's regime in Iraq as the target of U.S. war. Then, it was the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Then, it was Al-Qaeda in Yemen, Iraq, and Sudan. Then, it was Qaddafi in Libya. Now, it is ISIS in both Iraq and Syria. What is next? Yet again, if we briefly look at the consequences of U.S. military engagement in the Middle East we will discover the following startling results:

- Saddam (the person) was killed in Iraq but his Fascist Baath ideology and thugs still are causing havoc in Iraq. Iraq itself is a shamble of a country and a model for a failed state.
- Bin Laden (the person) was killed in Pakistan but his doomsday ideology and followers still are terrorizing the world and growing stronger in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Sudan.
- Taliban leaders were killed or imprisoned, yet their forces are reemerging in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The United States even had entered into negotiation with them to release one of its captive soldiers in exchange for five of their commanders.
- Qaddafi (the person) was killed in Libya but he has been replaced by thousands of terrorists who had turned Libya into a no-man land governed by chaos, terror, and mayhem.

On the surface, the rationale for justifying current U.S. military engagement against ISIS may sound reasonable, as it was the rationale for justifying previous U.S. engagements in the Middle East. All these justifications were based on the argument that it is

better to fight the terrorists in the Middle East itself instead of fighting them on the homeland. However, the way the United States went about doing it did not achieve the intended outcome of getting rid of terrorism and its causes. On the contrary, America had created more problems than before it had intervened. This indicates that the United States needs to think about other means for its intervention in the Middle East that can result in positive outcomes in eliminating the causes of terrorism, and this can only be done through engaging with people in the region in order to defeat the ideology of terror, ignorance, and intolerance by replacing it with the ideology of enlightenment, peace, inclusion, and respect for human dignity. In another words, enabling people in the Middle East respect and practice their faith but divorce it from politics. Political Islam must end, regardless of its orientation whether moderate or extremist.

All forms of political Islam are bad and must be eliminated by Muslims themselves and in cooperation with people around the world. Doing so is the only safeguard and means for defeating ISIS and its likes. This is the first component in treating the causes of terrorism in the Middle East. The other components are gradual reforms in public service to move governance to a sounder function, the building of a strong and prosperous middle class through effective series of economic development, investments, reforms, and regulations, and, encouraging and supporting Muslims to purge violence from their teachings.

Wars are bandages to temporarily treat a symptom. They are never a solution. Without treating the cause, the symptoms keep appearing. If not ISIS and Al-Qaeda it would be something else. Therefore, the United States (and the world as a whole) must engage the Middle East to create an environment that will foster reforms both in governance and religion. Only in doing so the world is able to finally burry ISIS and its likes once and for all.

Intermediate Approach

The second step must be taken in order to resolve the issue of terrorism in the Middle East is by addressing the political, economic, and social inequalities that gives rise to terrorism. This requires reforms in governance, creating the foundations for sound governance, providing jobs and economic opportunities, upholding the rule of law, protecting individual rights, minority rights, women rights and all other forms of human rights, ending tribalism, ending the failed states, ending ethnic and sectarian divides, and promoting a culture of respect, free exchange of thoughts and ideas, critical thinking and separating between religion and the state.

Long-Term Strategy

The Enlightenment Era had reformed Christianity and shifted it from a religion of Crusaders to a religion of peace and tolerance. Islam must do the same and shift from violence to peace by renouncing any teaching that calls for killing, oppression,

enslaving, subjugation, and indoctrination. Reforming Islam is the central part in destroying the ideological foundation for terrorism in the Middle East. Without reforming Islam terrorism will always finds some form of justification to its twisted ideology in the unchallenged and unreformed religious texts. This is easier said than done, especially when such attempts have been prevented for thousands of years not only by extremists but also by what is called moderate Islam, such as the Al-Azhar University. Many fear societal rejection, even by members of their immediate family, and even death if dared to attempt such a task. However, and in order to save Islam itself (as it was the case before by enlightened thinkers to save Christianity), this task must be done.

How to Resolve Issues of Violence in Islam?

In order to eliminate the Islamist Frankenstein (political Islam) with all its wings, whether moderate or extremists, Muslims ought to cleanse their religion from the teachings of violence that throughout the years had crept in Islamic traditions without any serious challenge from within. It took the reformist movement and the Enlightenment era in Europe to cleanse Christianity from its crusaders mentality and shifting more toward civic society and ethical conducts.

Islam, with the exception of few movements in its history that were violently suppressed and branded as heretic, Islam had never experienced such a cleansing and it needs to do so in order to rescue its peaceful core from the added pollution of preaching and condoning violence. Muslims throughout the world must not allow their religion to be hijacked by few extremists, and the traditions or teachings that call for violence must be purged from Islam in order to prevent the misuse of religion by those who want to do so for their own political gains.

Because of the persistency of contradictions with Islam through the years and the lack of serious challenge to question violent-oriented hadiths wrongly attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, violence somehow became accepted in the Middle East as part of its culture and religious practices, especially if such behavior was committed by insiders. However, outcry and condemnations quickly pile up if the same practice was committed by an outsider. Therefore, we see large condemnation for the Iraq War, Israel's military responses to Hamas in Gaza, or even toward the United States in holding it responsible for the idiotic film insulting the Prophet Muhammad in 2012, which resulted in massive demonstrations throughout the Middle East and the murder of United States Ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens. However, such an outcry is missing when the matter involves someone from within regardless of the atrocity. This is why we do not see a single demonstration in the Middle East against ISIS and its campaign of terror, including the beheading of the innocents, the pillage of Christian communities, and the killings and raping of the Yazidis. We also do not see any outcry toward the atrocities committed by the Assad regime in Syria, or before when Saddam gazed his own people in Iraq.

So, why such traditions and teachings of violence included in Islam? Why do Muslims allowed such deviated teachings be attributed to their Prophet without

even questioning the source and its legitimacy? The answer to this rests in the factor that Islam had relied on oral traditions for many years before it was able record its two main teaching sources: the Quran and the Hadith (the Prophet Muhammad's statements). Because of such oral tradition and the lack of verifiable means to trace the source accurately, special interests were able throughout the years fabricate what they saw fit in order to advance their own purpose.

The Quran, which Muslims regard as the literal words of God, was recorded in 656 AD, 24 years after the death of Prophet Muhammad. During these 24 years people relied on the Hafiz (those who had memorized the Quran) in order to have access to the holy book. Once the Hafiz started dying due to wars or old age, the need for recording the Quran became important.

The same is true for the Hadith (the Prophet Muhammad's statements). During the Prophet's lifetime the hadiths were memorized and transmitted from one to another orally. The oral tradition continued for several decades until the hadiths became saturated with so many fabricated statements wrongly attributed to the Prophet that in 854 and 874 AD two Persian scholars decided to record what "they" (the two scholars) accepted as the legitimate statements of the Prophet. However, for more than 200 years after the death of Prophet Muhammad there was no assured mechanism to authenticate the accuracy of the included statements. Because of this we see such a collection of shocking teachings that have become the main source of problem in Islam, from committing violence toward women, to beheading and committing violence toward Jews, nonbelievers and anyone perceived to be the enemy of Islam. Even the story of the Prophet's final marriage to 9 years old minor is stated in these collections, which in actuality is a fabrication wrongly attributed to the Prophet in order to justify a deviant social behavior that did not take place during the first years of Islam and surfaced decades after the death of the Prophet as a continuation of outdated tribal norms that Islam itself came to change.

The questioning of the authenticity of the hadiths that are collected by the two Persian scholars in 854 and 874 AD, however, is problematic despite some of these hadiths' contradictions and violation of the very core teachings of Islam. Any such an attempt is considered by Islamic clergies and religious institutions to be heresy, condemned even by death. Accordingly, the questionable hadiths continued unchallenged, consuming a large portion of Islamic rituals and traditions. It is these hadiths that give ISIS and its types their religious justification and leave ordinary Muslims in awe, not knowing if ISIS is truly following the Prophet's teachings or it is nothing but a terrorist organization. Some Muslims excuse ISIS for its barbaric acts by rationalizing them based on the notion that "this is how true Islam supposed to be."

For example, ISIS' expel of Christians from their communities in Iraq when ISIS took over Mosul in early June 2014 is justified by claiming that the Christians refused to pay the imposed tax on non-Muslims as stipulated by the hadith and thus they had to be forced evacuating and their belongings to be confederated.

Some Muslims justify ISIS's blowing of holy tombs and Shiites mosques in Iraq by claiming that these tombs were wrongfully worshiped by people, instead of worshiping God, and that the Shiite mosques were dedicated to Hussein, the Prophet Muhammad's grandson, instead of being dedicated to God.

As for killing Yazidi men and selling their women by ISIS fighters, some Muslims also justified these by claiming that the Yazidis as Devil worshipers and thus they ought to be killed according to the hadith and their women sold as war gains. The beheading of the Western journalists is also justified because of the claim that they were spies and hence, enemies of Islam, and according to the hadith it is justifiable to kill the enemies of Islam.

Regarding the barbaric practice of beheading, those same Muslims excuse it as a tradition handed down to Muslims by the Patriarch Abraham when he was trying to sacrifice his son for God. Ironically, some other victims of beheading in Islam include the Prophet Muhammad's own grandson, Hussein. Such misguided Muslims wrongly attribute the legitimacy of beheading to the Prophet himself based on a fabricated hadith that claims the Prophet had promised the people in Mecca (before he was victorious in overtaking the city) that they will be beheaded.

When comparing such a fabricated hadith with what had actually took place in Mecca once the Prophet was victorious and no one was ever harmed, one can realize that such a statement was never been issued by the Prophet. It was added later after his death in order for the blood-thirsty tribal traditions to continue.

Some Muslims, for example, claim that instead of condemning ISIS they ought to blame Western intelligence for creating ISIS, falling as such in the never-ending trap of conspiracy theory in always placing blame on outsiders for the ills of the region. True, many of the problems in the Middle East are caused by colonial powers and foreign interests. However, not all problems in the Middle East and the Islamic countries are caused by the West. Most of these problems are inherited within the region's own traditions and dynamics and people in the Middle East ought to look inward in order to find the causes for their problems and fix them.

Many Muslims also blame the problem of ISIS on the Shiite–Sunni divide, and particularly identify Iran and its hegemonial policies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, Gaza, and Yemen as the source of problem. So, on the surface ISIS appears to these Muslims as a natural consequence to Iran's policies by responding to Sunni grievances who were the target of such policies. The policies of the Iraqi Shiite government, a satellite of Iranian influence in the region, and its marginalization of the Iraqi Sunnis during the past 8 years, for example, had invited ISIS to the Sunni-dominated areas in Iraq in order to put an end to the persecution of the Sunnis. The same is true in Syria.

Influence in the region, and its persecution of the Syrian Sunnis, had also invited ISIS in order to put a stop to such a conduct. Therefore, resolving Sunni grievances in Iraq and Syria and involving them in governance, and ending Iranian interferences in other countries' affairs in the region will undercut the popular support for ISIS.

Others, Muslims and non-Muslim alike, blame U.S. inaction in Syria and its lack of support of the Syrian Free Army to topple the Assad regime during the past 3 years as a reason for the creation of a vacuum in Syria that soon was filled by ISIS and other extremist groups. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta also share such an opinion.

Since Islam has been hijacked by terrorists to justify political ends, Muslims need to rescue their religion by cleansing it from inhuman tendencies, even if such

tendencies were wrongfully attributed to God or Prophet Muhammad. Islam needs critical thinking and free exchange of ideas in order to save its soul.

Insistence on censorship and silencing opinions that question elements in Islamic teachings will only hurt the religion itself and allows bigotry to take hold outside the Islamic countries and for terrorism to flourish within the Muslim communities.

Islam must be purged from the polluted doctrines of violence, misogyny, and hatred. Critical thinking and freedom of speech and religion must be encouraged and protected, and the politicization of Islam must end in all its forms. No more Islamist Frankenstein. With such reforms the cause of Islamist-related terrorism will end.

We have a moral obligation to be involved and take a stand against evil in order to end its continuous formation. ISIS is an evil. However, the only way to fight evil is through enlightenment. There are those who will say that this is a Middle Eastern problem and has nothing to do with us. Others will say let us focus on our own problems by building the middle class and the economy here and we should not rush to aid the Middle East whenever it is facing a problem. To those I repeat what Dante has said in his book, Divine Comedy, "the darkest places in Hell are reserved for those who maintain their neutrality in times of moral crisis."

ISIS may be the Middle East's problem today. But it could be Europe or the United States problem tomorrow. If we do not support the innocents in the Middle East today from criminals such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda, the Assad regime in Syria, the mullahs of Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the secretion Islamist militia, who will support us tomorrow when we face a threat? For this, I conclude with a remarkable poem by Martin Niemöller, a prominent Protestant pastor who wrote the following during WWI in response to the atrocities committed by another evil-Nazi Germany:

> "First they came for the Socialists, and I did not speak out—
> Because I was not a Socialist.
> Then they came for the Trade Unionists, and I did not speak out—
> Because I was not a Trade Unionist.
> Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out—
> Because I was not a Jew.
> Then they came for me—and there was no one left to speak for me".

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Chapter 2
Monitoring and Disrupting Dark Networks: A Bias Toward the Center and What It Costs Us

Nancy Roberts and Sean Everton

Introduction

The interest in dark networks—covert and illegal networks (Milward and Raab 2006; Raab and Milward 2003) that seek to conceal themselves and their activities from authorities—has been long standing. Analysts have explored secret societies (Erickson 1981; Simmel 1906), criminal networks (Sparrow 1991), and price-fixing conspiracy networks (Baker and Faulkner 1993). And increasingly after 9/11, they have used social network analysis (SNA) as a tool to track and disrupt them (Carley et al. 2002; Koschade 2006; Krebs 2002; Magouirk et al. 2008; McCulloh and Carley 2011; Pedahzur and Perliger 2006; Rodriguez 2005; Sageman 2004).

In an early review of this literature (Roberts and Everton 2011), especially the strategies used to counterterrorism, we identified a bias toward the kinetic approach—targeting of terrorists for the purpose of neutralizing, capturing, or eliminating them and their supporters. As our program of research and operational experience evolved, we came to understand that the sole reliance on the kinetic approach was too limiting. The "one-size-fits-all" kinetic approach prevents analysts from exploring the subtleties of a situation and developing strategies to fit a particular context. We therefore identified and recommended a range of strategic options from the kinetic to the nonkinetic. We briefly review these options in section one to serve as a reminder that tracking and disrupting terror networks call for a more nuanced understanding of terrorism and the strategies to counter it.

As we expanded our exploration of terror networks, we uncovered another bias in our counterterrorism research. Although the choice of strategic options gradually expanded, the metrics and tools used to analyze these networks still were limited in

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scope. Analyses tended to focus on the removal of central nodes and brokers or the breaking of central ties and links among individuals, groups, or organizations. The pattern appeared to be widespread; the preferred metrics in counterterrorism had an analytical bias toward the network's center.

Our goal in this chapter is to explore this analytic bias—how it is manifested, why it appears so extensive, and what unwitting limitations it imposes on our strategic options to counterterrorism. We use data from a study of the Syrian opposition network that was conducted in the CORE Lab at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey California (Lucente and Wilson 2013). The original study sought to provide a window into the armed opposition units against the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad. This chapter proceeds as follows: We begin by reviewing the various strategies that can be used for disrupting dark networks. These can be broken down into two broad categories—kinetic and nonkinetic. The former uses coercive means for disruption while the latter seeks to undermine dark networks using with subtler applications of power. Drawing on a previous analysis, we illustrate how some of these strategies can be implemented, while at the same time highlighting our own bias in that study toward central actors. We then turn to an analysis of the Syrian opposition network, highlighting how a central focus can blind analysts to other important aspects of a network; in this case, elements that ultimately aligned themselves with the Islamic State of Syria (ISIS). We conclude with some implications for the future use of SNA to monitor and disrupt dark networks.

Generic Strategies

Our earlier research in counterterrorism explored two generic approaches to disrupting dark networks[1]: ***kinetic and nonkinetic*** (Roberts and Everton 2011). The kinetic approach involves aggressive and offensive measures to eliminate or capture network members and their supporters. Its objective is to target enemy combatants for the purpose of neutralizing, capturing, or eliminating them. The nonkinetic approach involves the use of restrained, noncoercive means for combating dark networks. It involves a more subtle and patient application of power by seeking to undermine terror networks "more through cooperation and collaboration with partners than through unilateral American action, more with the diplomatic and economic tools of national power than with the military, stressing inspiration rather than prescription" (Brimley and Singh 2008:313).

Two strategies emerge from the kinetic approach: *targeting and capacity building. Targeting* is U.S. led and capacity building is host nation led. Both can be pursued at the individual, group, and organizational (i.e., institutional) levels. For example, *person-level targeting,* often referred to as man-hunting (Marks et al. 2005), goes after individuals such as Saddam Hussein, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, or key al Queda and ISIS leaders in Syria and Iraq. *Group-level* targeting focuses on

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[1] Dark networks are defined here as illegal and covert networks (Raab and Milward 2003).

particular teams, groups, or a subset of a terror network. Examples include the roundup of specific groups fashioning IEDs in Iraq (Peter 2008), the disruption of the Syrian recruitment network bringing jihadists into Iraq (Felter and Fishman 2007), and the shutdown of the financial network supporting the Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) (Abuza 2003). Organization-level targeting puts the microscope on a particular organization to limit its activities or shutting it down. Examples include Malaysia's successful effort to close down Luqmanul Hakiem, a jihadist religious boarding school (Rabasa 2005) and its closure of the Al-Qaeda-linked Islamic NGO, Pertubuhan al Ehasan in 2002 (Abuza 2003).

Capacity building occurs when the U.S. military works "through, by, and with" indigenous forces to build their capacity to conduct effective targeting operations against common enemies as capacity building. Here, the focus is on training and advising others' security forces to become a professional force rather than pursuing a U.S.-led security strategy (Fridovich and Krawchuck 2007). Although some U.S. military references treat capacity building as an example of the indirect approach, we prefer to characterize it as kinetic because of its use of aggressive, coercive tactics. Operation Enduring Freedom in the Philippines in 2002 was one such example. Special Operation Command forces deployed to Basilan, a southern island, to advise and train the Armed Forces of the Philippines (Fridovich and Krawchuck 2007; Krawchuck n.d.; Wilson 2006). The outcome of this effort was to reduce the threat posed by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). By 2005, the armed strength of the ASG fell from an estimated 1000 in 2002 to somewhere between 200 and 400 in 2005 (Lum and Niksch 2006; updated 2009). Like the targeting strategy, capacity building can involve person, group, or organization targeting.

The nonkinetic approach, like the kinetic approach, can be U.S. or host nation led, depending on resources and capabilities. The intent is to secure the population's safety and support and undermine the enemy's influence and control. *Five strategies emerge from the nonkinetic approach: institution building, psychological operations (PsyOp), information operations (IO), rehabilitation, and tracking and monitoring*.[2]

The *institution-building strategy* promotes reconstruction in war-torn communities. It requires the active involvement of Civil Affairs forces that provide humanitarian and civic assistance and work in tandem with intergovernmental and interagency partners in the reconstruction process. The emphasis is on building healthy host government institutions of governance, rule of law, and economic development (Fridovich and Krawchuck 2007; Kilcullen 2009). Interestingly, contemporary just war theorizing sees institution building as a necessary criterion of what it means to fight a "just war" (Allman and Winright 2010).

The *psychological operations (PsyOp) strategy* involves the dissemination of information for the purpose of influencing the emotions, perceptions, attitudes, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign nationals (individuals, groups, organizations, governments) so that they are more aligned with US goals and objectives during times of conflict and peace (U.S. Special Operations Command 2003).

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[2] Our original article included only four nonkinetic strategies. A fifth was added to a later publication (Everton 2012).

Psychological operations also are employed to counter adversary propaganda and to sow disaffection and dissidence among adversaries to reduce their will to fight and ultimately to induce their surrender. One example was the UK's plan to split the Taliban from within by securing the defection of its senior members and a large number of their supporters. It followed from Gordon Brown's decision to put much greater focus on courting "moderate" Taliban leaders and "tier-two" foot soldiers who fought more for money and a sense of tribal loyalty than for the Taliban's ideology as well as from the U.S.' consideration of a divide-and-conquer strategy to peel away some lower level members of the Taliban and win back the population (Cooper 2009; Rubin 2011). The intent was to alter local jihadists' perception that partnering with al Qaeda enabled them to achieve their political goals. PsyOp approaches also include deception tactics that attempt to turn terrorists or subgroups within an organization against each other.

The *information operations* (*IO*) *strategy* uses integrated employment of electronic warfare and computer network operations to combat terrorism. Electronic warfare refers to any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the adversary. Computer network operations are one of the latest capabilities developed in support of military operations and stem from the increasing use of networked computers and supporting IT infrastructure systems by military and civilian organizations. Along with electronic warfare, it is used to attack, deceive, degrade, and disrupt information operations capabilities and to deny, exploit, and defend electronic information and infrastructure. Examples include the disruption of fund transfers, the monitoring of charitable donations, the detection of money laundering, black market activity, and the drug trade. Activities also include interventions to compromise terrorists' cell phone and online connections and the use of these platforms to locate jihadist leaders and their followers.

The *rehabilitation strategy* uses moderate preachers to counsel terrorists and to instill in them a more balanced view of Islamic teachings. Singapore's counter-ideological program founded by Muslim scholars who seek to "correct" the thinking of its detainees is one such example (Ramakrishna 2005, 2009, 2012). Established in 2003, the Religious Rehabilitation Group is an unpaid, all volunteer group of Islamic scholars who supplement their formal religious training with a year-long course in counseling. Even before counseling sessions can begin, both male and female counselors study the "Jihad Manual" that prepares them to counter terrorists' ideological distortions. Typically one counselor works with a member of the Singaporean Internal Security Department and a government psychologist on a particular detainee.

In 2005, counselors began working with detainees' families, especially the spouses, aided by the Interagency After-Care Group, which focused on the welfare of the detainees' families. The Interagency After-Care Group provides financial assistance, teaches wives skills and helps them find work, and ensures the continued education of the children by negotiating school fee waivers and providing them with pocket money. The Religious Rehabilitation Group also extends its influence into the wider Muslim community by giving talks, sponsoring fora, disseminating publications, and even hosting a website, the aim of which is to "immunize" the minds of Singaporean Muslims

against violent radical Islamist ideologies. In addition, the Singapore government is attempting to forge closer ties between Muslims and non-Muslims through the Community Engagement Program, Inter-Racial Confidence Circles in neighborhoods, workplaces, and schools. Similar rehabilitation programs also have been introduced to other countries such as Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.

Finally, the *tracking and monitoring strategy* draws on John Arquilla's (2009) insight that sometimes the best strategy is to do nothing at all. Not exactly nothing, but sometimes our information on a dark network can be incomplete, so rather than taking immediate action, it is better to track and monitor certain actors with the hope of improving our knowledge of the network, which will in turn improve the selection of strategies adopted down the road:

> In the successful strikes against al Qaeda affiliates in Singapore, Morocco and Saharan Africa, the key doctrinal approach was to wait and watch for a considerable period, then to swarm the targets simultaneously at their moment of maximum illumination. This strategic patience grew out of the understanding that striking at nodes *as* they were identified might actually reduce the ability to detect and track other cells in the networks in question. It is a curious doctrinal point about netwar: the more that is disrupted, the less may be known (Arquilla 2009:34).

To summarize, in this section we have distinguished between two general approaches to countering dark networks: kinetic and nonkinetic. The former approach pursues aggressive measures designed to eliminate or capture network members and their supporters, while the latter employs neither bombs nor bullets but instead uses noncoercive means to counter networks and impair a combatant's will to fight. It includes activities such as the reconstruction of war-torn areas, the disruption of electronic fund transfer networks, information campaigns to win over the "hearts and minds" of local populations, efforts at the rehabilitation and reintegration of dark network members into civil society, and the tracking of certain members in order to improve our knowledge and understanding of the network.

Network Centric Counterterrorism Strategies

The above framework broadened our range of options to counter terror networks beyond the kinetic to the more expansive nonkinetic strategies. But no matter what the level of analysis or whether the strategies were U.S. or host nation led, a retrospective analysis of our research identified a pattern. We focused on the removal of central nodes and brokers or the breaking of central ties and links among individuals, groups, or organizations.

For example, in our examination of the Noordin Top network (Roberts and Everton 2011), we created two multirelational[3] networks—an operational network and a trust network. We then estimated four basic centrality measures (i.e., degree,

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[3] These multirelational networks are referred to as multiplex (multiple types of relational networks) that are combined and "stacked" together.

closeness, betweenness, and eigenvector) for the operational network at the individual level (metrics not shown). Figure 2.1 identifies the most central nodes of the operational network by varying node size by degree centrality.[4] We then described how a deception campaign—a non-Kinetic, PsyOp Strategy—could be waged against these central individuals "where the messages and observables (would) resonate the greatest" (Anonymous 2009:8–9).

We followed a similar path in developing a targeting strategy (kinetic) for the trust network at the individual level. The trust network, which consisted of the friendship, kinship, religious, and school networks, is shown in Fig. 2.2. As with the operational network, the size of the node reflects degree centrality. We then discussed the prospects for a targeting campaign given the distinct core–periphery structure of this network.


**Fig. 2.1** Operational network (degree centrality)

Fig. 2.2 Trust network (degree centrality)

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[4]Unless otherwise noted, we created the network graphs presented in this paper with the social analysis tool, *Pajek* (Batagelj and Mrvar 2015).

Despite our best efforts to develop and expand our strategic options, we kept returning to the use of centrality metrics to analyze the network and develop our strategies. This emphasis on centrality metrics is not uncommon. In fact, it appears to be the starting point for most analyses of dark networks (see e.g., Cunningham et al. 2013; Famis 2014; Gerdes 2015; Nash and Bouchard 2015; Patel et al. 2015).

What we wish to explore for the remainder of the chapter is what this pull toward the center may cost us. In the case that follows, we illustrate how centrality measures do provide important insights about the network's central nodes. However, we also learned the hard way that our bias toward the center can and does obscure other aspects of the networks that had equal and potentially more value.

The Case: Syrian Resistance Network

The year was 2011. The outbreak of rebellion and conflict against the Syrian regime of President Bashar Assad regime of Syrian prompted concerns over Syria's chemical weapon sites. Resistance groups against Assad were proliferating and some included Jihadists rebel groups. The U.S. was concerned that the Syrian arsenal of chemical and biological weapons would fall into the hands of jihadists. Thus, the U.S. government raised the question: Was it possible to distinguish among these rebel groups? Was it possible for the U.S. to identify and work with some of these rebel groups while at the same time minimizing and avoiding contact with the jihadists?

To answer this question, researchers (Lucente and Wilson 2013) gathered social network data on individuals, military units, and political organizations with ties to the Syrian Resistance movements. These were collected from a variety of social media sources, such as the Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube websites used by Syrian civil–military opposition elements, as well as a number of different reports from outlets such as the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) (Berman 2012; Bolling 2012; Holliday 2011, 2012a, b; O'Bagy 2012a, b, c), the Syrian National Council (2012), and Middle East Security Reports 2-6 (Sharp and Blanchard 2012). The research resulted in a multimodal network consisting of 133 individuals, 60 political organizations, and 59 military units,[5] a network graph of which is presented in Fig. 2.3 where red nodes indicate individuals, green nodes indicate political organizations, and blue nodes indicate military units.

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[5] The original researchers treated the multimodal data as what social network refer to as a one-mode network, which was technically incorrect since individuals are generally considered a different type of actor than political groups and military units. Ideally, they would have coded all of the data at the individual level using the leaders of the military units and political groups rather than the units and groups themselves. That granular level of data was simply unavailable, however, so the military units and political groups essentially functioned as "stand-ins" for the leaders of those units and groups. Thus, it is legitimate to treat and analyze the network as a one-mode network. The data have also been refined and cleaned since the original analysis, so the number of actors in the network is somewhat different. The network's structure remains essentially the same, however.

Fig. 2.3 Syrian resistance network (isolates hidden); node color reflects individuals (*Red*), political organizations (*Green*), military units (*Blue*)

Based on their analysis of the network's density and centralization, Lucente and Wilson concluded that it was federated network in that its units were "spread geographically throughout the operational battlefield," which provided them with a great deal of autonomy (Lucente and Wilson 2013:24). Quoting Patti Anklam (2007:67), they note that in a federated network, "the core network serves as the hub of multiple, relatively autonomous hubs" (Lucente and Wilson 2013:24). This is a possible interpretation, but Fig. 2.3 suggests a somewhat more complex story.[6] To be sure there are a number of actors on the periphery that are not tied to one another, but almost all have direct or indirect ties to either a central actor or a cluster of central actors (circled in Fig. 2.3). Thus, the network appears to be neither a hierarchy nor a federation but a mix of the two. Indeed, centralization analysis of the network yields mixed results. In terms of degree (2.81 %) and betweenness (6.81 %) centrality, the network's centralization is quite low, while in terms of closeness (66.94 %) and eigenvector (73.17 %) centrality, the network's centralization is quite high.[7]

More importantly for our analysis is that Lucente and Wilson focused on the relatively small and centrally group of actors (circled in Fig. 2.3) that appeared to function as brokers in the network, in particular those who lay "between the rebellion's political and armed opposition" (Lucente and Wilson 2013:24). There is nothing inherently wrong with such a focus since actors in positions of brokerage

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[6] This is not the same network graph presented by Lucente and Wilson (2013: 25, Fig. 2), which they generated using the graph drawing program, *Gephi* (Bastian et al. 2009). It shows the network as consisting of two main clusters separated by a central cluster of a small group of actors whereas here the central cluster is broken down into three separate but central clusters.

[7] The standard centralization algorithm calculates the variation between the centrality scores of all actors in the network with the highest centrality score in the network. See Everton (2012:152). Centralization indices were calculated with the social network analysis program, UCINET (Borgatti et al. 2002).

Fig. 2.4 Syrian resistance network (isolates hidden); node color reflects subnetwork

between insurgent groups should be of interest to researchers and analysts. However, by limiting our focus to only central actors we can blind ourselves to other elements of a network that may also prove to be important.

Consider, for instance, Fig. 2.4, which presents the same network, except now the color of the actors' nodes reflect the subnetwork to which they were assigned by the Louvain clustering algorithm (Blondel et al. 2008) as implemented in Pajek (Batagelj and Mrvar 2015).[8] As the figure indicates, the Syrian opposition network is far more complex than it initially appears. In particular, the Louvain algorithm identified 13 different subnetworks, suggesting that although some actors and clusters are more central than others (for example, the orange colored nodes located at the center of the graph), there are numerous subnetworks that may be worthy of analysts' attention. In particular, note the red colored subnetwork toward the top of the graph (circled). What is intriguing about this subnetwork is that it contains elements that often shifted their alliances but ultimately aligned themselves with the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS).[9] This fact, however, is completely lost if we only focus on the network's central actors. In other words, while focusing on a network's central actors can provide important information about the network, limiting ourselves to only central actors can obscure other aspects of a network that may have equal and potentially more value.

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[8] There are numerous social network analysis clustering algorithms that assign actors to distinct subnetworks based on the network's pattern of ties. In general, these algorithms assume that ties within a subnetwork are denser than across subnetworks. The Louvain method is a widely accepted clustering algorithm that has been implemented in numerous social network analysis packages. In Fig. 8 node color indicates the subnetworks to which the various actors have been assigned by the Louvain algorithm.

[9] This was determined by the names of the individuals, political organizations, and military units included in this subnetwork.

Implications

This brief analysis suggests several implications for the use of social network analysis to monitor and disrupt dark networks. First, the fact is that metrics, and in particular centrality metrics, tend to drive analyses of dark networks. Second, our use, some would say overuse, of centrality metrics then influences our description of the network and our visualization of its underlying structure. Third, much of this partiality for things central is a function of our visualization process that leads us to focus on what is central over what is not.

Centrality bias tends to drive analysis. The tendency for analysts to gravitate toward centrality metrics goes back at least to 1934 in Jacob Moreno's (1934/1953) classic study, *Who Shall Survive*?, in which he identified the sociometric "stars" of the networks he examined. Since then, centrality's properties have been repeatedly examined experimentally (Bavelas 1948, 1950; Cook and Emerson 1978; Cook et al. 1983; Emerson 1972a, b; Leavitt 1951), and social network analysts, such as Linton Freeman (1977, 1979), Phillip Bonacich (1972, 1987), Noah Friedkin (1991), and Steve Borgatti & Martin Everett (e.g., Borgatti 2005; Borgatti and Everett 2006; Everett and Borgatti 2005) have refined and expanded the measures of centrality, many of which are incorporated into current SNA software programs.[10] As we saw above, however, other methodological approaches, such as clustering algorithms, can be helpful for identifying aspects of dark networks that centrality metrics may not. This is not to suggest that social network analysts ignore these other metrics. They do not. It is just that these other methods do not appear to receive the same attention that centrality metrics do.

Leadership bias tends to drive interpretation. Our conceptual maps and cognitive schema predispose us to "see" some things and ignore others (Axelrod 1973; DiMaggio 1997; Rumelhart 1980). We see what our conceptual schemas "program" us to see. So if our metrics signal that centrality is important, we calculate centrality measures. Finding central nodes, our schemas predispose us to attribute agency and leadership to those nodes. Thus, we begin the search for leaders. So, as the case analysis of Syria illustrates, if we find a central hub, we immediately attribute agency and leadership to the hub. Instead of asking what the hub might represent, our immediate interpretation is that leaders are in the hub and they are important and should be the focus on our attention. We confound centrality with importance and importance with leadership, most likely a consequence of our "great man" theories of history (Carlyle [1841]/2013]; Hook 1950) and organizational studies that view leadership as a key determining factor in organizational performance (Karadağ 2015).

Visual bias tends to drive our focus. Another intriguing interpretation of our analysts' consistent and unfailing focus on centrality appears to be driven, at least in part, by a visual bias. Some recent research suggests centrality is important to our vision (Bindemann 2010). In laboratory studies of visual perception, observers of

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[10] For example, a recent version of UCINET (Borgatti et al. 2002) includes at least 23 different types of centrality measures, which is far more than the number of cohesion measures it estimates (11) and clustering algorithms it implements (12).

images of natural scenes presented on a computer screen look at the center of scenes first, which leads Bindemann to reject alternative explanations and argue that the findings demonstrate a "bias to the screen center that forms a potential artifact in visual perception experiments" (Bindemann 2010:2577). These experiments suggest a natural (and unconscious) tendency in all of us to focus on the center whether it is the center of a screen or the center of a network, suggesting that analysts may not be able to transcend their bias to what is central without consciously being made aware of it. Moreover, these three biases—centrality, leadership, and visual—reinforce one another. Unless monitored and challenged, they likely will continue to be unwitting premises on which we base our analysis of dark networks.

Conclusion

We began the chapter with a review of the various strategies that can be used for disrupting dark networks, which we noted can be broken down into two broad categories–kinetic and non kinetic. Next we turned to an analysis of the Syrian opposition network in order to highlight how the focus on a network's central actors can blind analysts to other important aspects of a network, in this case, the individuals, political organizations, and military units that ultimately aligned themselves with the Islamic State of Syria (ISIS).

This analysis led us to draw three important implications for the future use of social network analysis to track and disrupt dark networks: The first is that centrality metrics tend to drive the analysis of dark networks. However, as we demonstrated in this chapter, other methodological approaches (e.g., clustering algorithms) can prove helpful for identifying aspects of dark networks that centrality metrics may not. A second is that our conceptual schemas predispose us to attribute agency and leadership to central nodes and clusters. Instead of asking what these central actors might represent, our tendency is to assume that leaders are in the hub and thus should be the focus on our attention. Put simply, we confound centrality with importance and importance with leadership. Finally, we note that our tendency to focus on what is central appears to be driven, at least in part, by a visual bias. In laboratory studies of visual perception, observers tended to look at the center of images first, which suggests that in order to overcome their bias to that which is central, analysts have to be consciously aware of this tendency.

None of our observations and research suggest that social network analysts ignore metrics that identify key actors and clusters in a network. Our position is that analysts should not just limit themselves to centrality metrics and their interpretations, especially when examining complex distributed networks like ISIS. In the subsequent years from our initial analysis of the Syrian Resistance Network, we have learned how costly our centrality, leadership, and visual biases have been. As we view the carnage that ISIS has inflicted on people from Syria to France, we are once again reminded of people's limited ability to see and interpret what is. While it is not possible to eliminate our perceptual and cognitive

biases, at the very least we should be aware of our tendencies and be prepared to guard against them by employing SNA's expansive set of analytical tools to explore the whole network in all of its complexity.

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Chapter 3
Terrorism Through the Looking Glass

Samir Rihani

Introduction: Clarity and Objectivity in Place of 'Smoke and Mirrors'

Lewis Carroll, famous for his children books, wrote in 1871 'Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There'. Alice climbs into the mirror and enters a fantastic world full of perplexing features. Present accounts of terrorism are approaching the high standard of obfuscation set by Carroll's fairy-tale.

On the face of it, terrorism should be easy to understand: violent actions against civilian targets by extremist individuals and groups to intimidate states into changing policies and practices. However, the term has been used, overused, and abused, so often that it has lost much of its credibility. Despite the abundance of definitions, terms such as 'terrorism', 'terrorist' and 'insurgent', etc. are not convincing any more. Countries are put on or taken off the US list of 'states that sponsor terrorism' almost haphazardly. Professor Oppenheimer from New York University's Center for Global Affairs suggested, "Countries that wind up on the list are countries we don't like" (http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/01/united-states-outdated-terror-list-20141267333982434.html). The list in mid-2015 contained only a handful of countries; not impressive for a supposedly 'fearsome global threat'!

Reports from the United Nations itself cannot be taken on face value either. For instance, a draft list produced in June 2015 of armies and groups that kill and maim children in conflicts had to be amended to exclude both Israel and Hamas after pressure from the U.S. and Israel. The report had stated that "at

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least 540 children were killed, another 2955 wounded… by Israeli airstrikes". Hamas' indiscriminate rockets had also caused death and injury to children (Sengupta 2015).

The matter goes further than just lists. President Clinton, under the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, decided to support groups fighting Saddam's regime (http://nsarchive. gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB418/). Were these groups 'terrorist' organisations? That was certainly the view in Baghdad. Their activities, aimed at effecting policy changes, did kill innocent people. Or was the U.S. supporting 'freedom fighters', as it did in Afghanistan in the case of the 'Mujahedeen' who later evolved into Al-Qaeda 'terror organisation'? This old debate has not been resolved. Subjectivity and academic rigour do not sit well.

US Code (§ 2331) defines international and domestic terrorism as activities undertaken by individuals and groups, but excludes actions by states. The atrocity of 9/11 in New York and murders by Al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Taliban are examples that fall well within this definition. However, infringements by the Egyptian, Syrian, and Israeli governments against protesters, to cite a few examples, are excluded as acts of terrorism. Going further afield, was Pol Pot a terrorist? His Khmer Rouge killed a minimum of 1.5 million people in Cambodia (http://asianhistory.about.com/od/cambodia/p/Pol-Pot-Biography.htm). He is not a terrorist according to the accepted definitions of terrorism, but simply a tyrannical ruler who intimidated a whole nation into submission. There were acts during the Vietnam War that were difficult to distinguish from sheer terrorism, but they are also excluded from the standard definitions! (http://www.alternet.org/news-amp-politics/america-keeps-honoring-one-its-worst-mass-murderers-henry-kissinger).

To add to the confusion, anomalies multiply when it comes to individuals said to have been involved in terrorism. For example, four 'terrorists' were later awarded the Nobel Peace prize; Sean MacBride, Menachem Begin, Yasser Arafat, and Nelson Mandela (Schmid 2004). In recent years, 'terrorists' from the Irish Republican Army (IRA) have been rehabilitated and are now part of the government in Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom. When does a 'terrorist' stop being one?

Other pressing questions remain unanswered. Is terrorism acceptable under certain circumstances? Does it only become real terrorism when Muslims, especially those from the Middle East and Africa, are involved? Who decides? Terrorism is a global phenomenon but the 'World's focus' appears to be fixed primarily on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This cannot be explained by 'lack of information'. "In its 2013 Country Reports on Terrorism (issued in April 2014), the State Department stated that the majority of terrorist attacks in the Western Hemisphere were committed by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)" (https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21049.pdfLatin).

The key topic of terrorism is bedeviled, therefore, not only by definitional ambiguities, but also by subjective overlays imposed by regional and global geopolitical considerations. Remedies are difficult to formulate under these circumstances in which the problem cannot be described clearly.

Terrorism and Counterterrorism Are Two Sides of the Same Coin

The above focus on the Islamic and Middle Eastern dimensions has resulted in a number of peculiarities. That sector of terrorism has been elevated to the status of a global, rather than a local, matter of concern. Furthermore, it has turned into an issue that merits a multinational military response. The exaggerated scale and the associated military response have given birth to a counterterrorism industry which now embraces a large private sector element.

A serious matter that involves a complex mix of political, economic, historic, religious, and ethnic components has been oversimplified into a battle between 'good' and 'evil' to be settled through mainly military combat. Reconciliation and addressing underlying causes, as in the case of Ireland, South Africa, and Spain, are not on offer in this case. The way forward it was decided was clear: 'counterterrorism' driven by private/public forces deployed in far-off locations. The era of 'endless war' is here, as discussed later.

Several authorities on security and terrorism, including Professor Jackson (Centre for Peace and Reconciliation, Otago University, New Zealand), have challenged such myopic views of terrorism (Jackson 2008). He argued that actions by states and their agencies must be included in the way terrorism acts are reported and analysed. He added significantly, "…the terrorism label is applied almost solely to non-state groups opposed to Western interests".

George W Bush did much to promote current ideas about 'Islamic terrorism'. He identified the 'villains' in this way: "They hate progress, and freedom, and choices, and culture, and music, and laughter, and women, and Christians, and Jews, and all Muslims who reject their distorted doctrines" (Power 2004). That was in 2001. Viewed in that light, it was difficult to see how such awful people could be persuaded to change their ways. The 'War on Terror' became an obvious policy choice. That war did not yield tangible results. Twelve painful years later, in 2013, Michael Sheehan, assistant secretary of defence for special operations, told a US Senate hearing the war against terrorists will last at least 10–20 more years (Greenwald 2013).

The endless nature of the process was predictable and is now firmly established. This was recognised by the report from the Baker Institute for Public Policy mentioned earlier. Violent counterterrorism generates its own counter thrust. Some of the Muslims caricatured by Bush refused to change into Westernised model citizens. Their numbers multiplied. Western governments are supposedly perplexed by the increasing ease with which young people are being radicalised. Viewed dispassionately, the explanation is almost obvious. Destructive wars, drone attacks that sometimes kill innocent civilians and terrorists alike, and widespread destabilising 'counterterrorism' activities are powerful recruitment tools, especially when viewed by impressionable young persons. Radicalisation is made easy by 'counterterrorism'!

Doubts about the utility of military force as a means to eradicate terrorism are fully justified. Independent observers regularly highlight the harm of confronting terrorism as war. Britain's Archbishop of Canterbury, Justin Welby, for

instance, called for a more sensible approach in a speech in July 2015 and referred in particular to the negative consequences resulting from calls by some officials to 'kill' Islamic terrorists (Bingham 2015). Naturally, his views run counter to those advocated by the heavily privatised counterterrorism industry, but that is only to be expected.

The mutually reinforcing coexistence between terrorism and militarised counter-terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa (and other parts of Africa) is now unmistakeable and augments the concept of 'endless war'. Certainly in the case of MENA, this unhealthy partnership rather than 'terrorism' as such are the problems of the age that must be challenged forcefully and publicly.

The Blame Game in 'Terrorism'

Two principal actors feature high in the blame game: the USA and 'political Islam'. To a degree, both aspects are not fully right or totally wrong. An effort must be made to go beyond that simplistic formulation to understand terrorism and deal with it effectively.

The USA does not have a monopoly over creating conditions that encourage terrorism in MENA and elsewhere. For instance, to some Israelis most Palestinians are terrorists. "We do not negotiate with terrorists" seemed a moral standpoint that justified permanent stalemate. On the other hand, to some Palestinians most Israelis are terrorists. The futility of negotiation became a sensible policy that has lasted for decades. The outcome is a permanent state of mutual distrust and instability.

Other powers have had, and some continue to have, a role to play in instability and violence. The USSR invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 and groups soon emerged to resist the occupying forces. Leaders for these groups were recruited mainly from Muslim countries, and especially Wahhabi Saudi Arabia. Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and China, in addition to the US, supported the groups, which they called 'Mujahedeen'. (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12024253) That changed later when the Mujahedeen morphed into Taliban and al-Qaeda 'terrorists' leading to U.S. entry into Afghanistan in 2001. The USA was admittedly involved, but at that early stage it was presumably difficult to see where the process was to lead in future.

The Iraq war of 2003 and the uprisings in Syria and Libya were admittedly partly to blame for the emergence of intra-Islamic feuds and ultimately to the appearance of the Islamic State. However, IS was supported and funded by some Gulf sources and others from the region and beyond possibly in response to Iran's rise as a Shiite power. The same is true of those fighting against the Assad regime in Syria. Russia, Turkey, and others are closely involved in that conflict. Shiite Iran also supports the Assad government and in that context funds and arms groups in Syria, Iraq, and the Lebanon.

In truth, the terrorism phenomenon in MENA is not new and predates US emergence as the latest hegemonic power. As mentioned earlier, there was conflict in 1860 between Druze and Christians in Syria (which included The Lebanon

at the time) that resulted in some 11,000 deaths in Damascus and Beirut. The Ottoman authorities, it was said, encouraged the conflict, while France and Britain exploited it. There is nothing new there!

Muslim on Muslim violence is in full flow without any U.S. or other powers' intervention. To leaders of the Gulf States, for instance, anyone who challenges their right to rule is a 'terrorist' that must be eliminated at the first opportunity. At the time of writing, there were 'terrorism' wars raging in Yemen, Syria, Libya, and of course Iraq with or without US involvement.

Political Islam, largely cited in the blame game, is a rallying flag rather than a primary agent. If one is not too fastidious about facts, then the prevailing narrative on terrorism might seem plausible: Islam and conflict seem to be intertwined. This, however, leads to inevitable questions: is this caused by some intrinsic glitch in Islam that preordains Muslims to internecine vicious quarrels? Is this a recent development? Is it divorced from local, regional, and global geopolitics?

Even superficial analysis of these questions quickly dents the carefully constructed idea about the linkage between Islam and 'terrorism', to reveal a much simpler but no less worrying reality. Dr. Motadel, a Cambridge University historian, gave a vivid picture of intrigues in the Middle East by various powers; including Russia, the Ottomans, Britain, Germany, and the USA, utilising factions of both Christianity and Islam to gain power and influence (Motadel 2015). Several chapters in Antonius' 'The Arab Awakening' are devoted to detailed description of intrigues by Germany and Britain to entice Arab and Muslim leaders to declare Jihad on this or that side of the conflict in WWI. The USA is only the latest participant in this game.

But Motadel's and Antonius' thorough surveys are themselves incomplete. Cooley (2005:7–22) recounted a vivid history of conflict in the Middle East between ancient Sumerian, Assyrian, Babylonian, and Hebrew dynasties that predated Islam by centuries (Cooley 2005). Moving closer to modern times, the conflict between the Ottomans (now replaced by Sunni Turkey) and Persians (now represented by Shiite Iran) was both lengthy and brutal and it continues to this day. The animosity is, and has always been, about political and economic power using the two Islamic schools as convenient rallying causes. Political Islam is simply a convenient diversion.

British and French colonialists were new, relative latecomers, and US entry in the context of MENA's long history is only a recent development. Record of the British and French in the region was riddled with efforts to 'divide and rule' through accentuating religious and other fissures. As mentioned earlier, George Antonius published his book on 'The Arab Awakening' in 1938 and any serious researcher examining present day painful conflicts, wrongly treated as mainly terrorism, could not gain full understanding of the subject without reading that record (Antonius 2001b). Basically, MENA is a region that offers a kaleidoscope of ethnic, religious, historic, and social factors that cannot be redesigned quickly by the application of brute force, as the 2003 Iraq war amply demonstrated.

Admittedly, the US and its allies adopted divisive policies after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. They favoured Shiites and Kurds over Sunnis. The British during the twentieth century favoured Sunnis over Shiites. The principle was the same. Dr K Haseeb, a past

Governor of the Central Bank of Iraq, recounted that The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) set up to rule Iraq after that war "never used the term Iraqi people…[preferred] 'Kurds', 'Arabs', 'Sunnis', 'Shias', etc." He added that, "Of the different prime ministers who took office between 1920 and 2003, 8 were Shia and 4 were Kurds. Out of 18 military chiefs of staff, 8 were Kurds…Out of the 55 people on the 'Wanted List' that the occupying authority published, 31 were Shia" (www.globalcomplexity.org/DrHaseeb'slecture.htm). Despite all these facts, constant repetition entrenched sectarian divisions that now assail Iraq with widespread so-called 'terrorist' activity.

However, much of the divisive push was locally generated and could not have achieved traction without a receptive environment. Local leaders seeking power played an enthusiastic role in this destructive project. To blame the current turbulence wholly on external interference and on Political Islam is not only wrong, but would lead to equally mistaken prescriptions based on the military policies now advocated by the U.S. and Europe to the 'problem of Islamic terrorism'.

The current view of 'terrorism' in MENA asserts, wrongly, that Islam is becoming political. This is an odd viewpoint. Islam is and has always been political. There is nothing unusual or sinister about this. The position of Caliph has always been understood to mean 'ruler' in addition to any other religious connotations. Significantly, the schism between Sunnis and Shiites was from the start strictly political rather than doctrinal. Moreover, almost all religions are political. Judaism is accepted readily as an inevitable political feature of the State of Israel. Politics in Christianity hardly requires elaboration. Anyone in doubt about this should read the following Papal encyclicals:

Pope Leo XIII *Rerum Novarum* (1891): dealing with capital and labour.

Pope Pius XI *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931): focusing on reconstruction of social order.

Pope John XXIII *Mater et Magistra* (1961): addressing social and political progress.

Pope Francis in the latest encyclical (Laudato Si) issued in June 2015 "called for a new global political authority tasked with 'tackling … the reduction of pollution and the development of poor countries and regions'. His appeal echoed that of his predecessor, Pope Benedict XVI, who in a 2009 encyclical proposed a kind of super-UN to deal with the world's economic problems and injustices" (Hooper 2015). These are wise words that will be reflected in the concluding remarks to this chapter. Terrorism is not unique to Islam and it has little to do with religion; a point that merits constant repetition. The conflict between Muslim Sunnis and Shiites was and is over politics and power.

Researcher and author Karen Armstrong, for a time a Roman Catholic nun, wrote a history of Islam that highlights this very point perfectly (Armstrong 2001). 'Political Islam' is inappropriate as an explanation or motivation for 'terrorism' and violence in MENA and elsewhere. 'Politics' of the domestic and external varieties would be a more accurate interpretation. That again has to be understood to avoid reaching wrong conclusions.

Why Has Conflict, and Terrorism, Intensified in MENA Recently?

That is easy to answer. The region is undergoing changes of tectonic proportions that other areas in Europe and elsewhere have undergone in the past and with equally devastating levels of violence and pain. The changes are social, economic, and political. These are being given expression to some extent by a persistent drive by some factions and interests aimed at fragmenting a number of MENA countries beyond that achieved by the colonial powers at the end of World War I. Whether this is generated by desires from within or imposed by external powers is difficult to establish, but that does not alter the consequences much. Creation of the smaller units is presently mediated by focus on sectarian and ethnic divisions. As revealed after the 2003 war on Iraq, the civil war in Syria, and the chaos after the departure of Gaddafi from Libya, the concept of nationality in some parts of MENA, based on past borders, is under scrutiny. Domestic leaders eager to acquire power and wealth are not necessarily against the process. Five countries are expected by some observers to dissolve into 14 smaller states offering enticing opportunities for aspiring local leaders (Wright 2013).

Seen in the context of competing regional and global powers out to promote their agendas, fragmentation makes sense. Iran has interests in parts of Iraq and in Bahrain where Shiites comprise the majority of the population. It has an interest in Syria as it offers access to the Mediterranean. Saudi Arabia, some Gulf States, and Turkey have their own interests in the Sunni majority areas. The Kurds have understandable nationalist aspirations that they wish to bring to fruition. Once the desires of powers external to the region are added, the push to fragment becomes clear.

Clearly, there are many within the countries affected who believe in national unity and still recall the days when the borders were hardly questionable. Furthermore, there are others who strongly favour closer integration between Arab nations into one unit that would be a home for all ethnic and religious groups. On the other hand, fragmentation involves ethnic and religious cleansing on a large scale. It is far from clear which way the region would go. Hence, MENA is expected to be in a condition of utter turbulence for many decades while a new structure takes shape. Acts of violence, abuse of human rights, mass movement of refugees, and yes some terrorism are inevitable outcomes. At the moment, this depressing prospect seems unavoidable unless urgent and constructive action is taken to ameliorate the effects of what is going on.

It must be said that the project to fragment the region is not a secret conspiracy and the painful consequences are known and deemed to be acceptable to external promoters as well as to local beneficiaries. Several commentators have attributed the resulting chaos to US confused policies. Thomas E. Ricks' in 'Fiasco, as an example, mentions "deceit", "stupidity", and "total intellectual failure" and more besides (Ricks 2006). Others, especially authors from MENA, argue that subdividing Arab states into small ineffectual units is designed to promote Israeli interests. They often quote a document attributed to Oded Yinon titled 'A Strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties'.

Irrespective of intention, references to a 'New Middle East' have appeared repetitively in public pronouncements. Condoleezza Rice, US Secretary of State at the time, presented a vision of a 'New Middle East' in June 2006. (Karon 2015) Her statement was made in Tel Aviv at a time when Israel was in a full-scale attack on the Lebanon following similar action in Gaza. She explained that what was happening in Lebanon was simply the "birth pangs" associated with forces unleashed by "constructive chaos" that would propel the whole Middle East into a new era. The rest is history. Chaos, loss of governance, and associated proliferation of extremist groups that sprouted in the absence of states are now in full evidence in MEAN and other parts of Africa.

Evidently, Condoleezza Rice was unimpressed by the resulting turmoil and violence that in some cases was and is straightforward terrorism. If MENA were to be reshaped, then one cannot escape the inevitable (but seemingly acceptable) consequences. This is not an isolated viewpoint. Shortly after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the newly arrived administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Paul Bremer, had his first orders from Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defense, Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Wolfowitz, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense. The order was straightforward: dismantle the Iraqi army "even if implementing it caused administrative inconvenience" (Bremer 2006:39). "Constructive chaos" was on the menu and it was an inevitable and acceptable result! It is intriguing why there is so much fuss now about terrorism, Islamic State, etc. It must be underlined that new, and in some cases imported, local leaders participated in the process most enthusiastically. Viewed in this perspective, it is difficult to see what all the frenetic concern in the West about terrorism is about.

It was revealed in 2015 that dismissed senior officers of the Iraqi Army were heavily involved in the creation of the Islamic State (http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-state-files-show-structure-of-islamist-terror-group-a-1029274.html). Some of the officers and 'insurgents' were imprisoned together in Camp Bucca in southern Iraq after the 2003 invasion. There they planned their future activities. Among those held was one Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi later to become the leader of the Islamic State (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/-spisis-the-inside-story). It is fruitless to speculate about whether this was done through naivety or as part of an ingenuous conspiracy. The significant point for the present purpose is that an inevitable consequential conflict has erupted in Iraq as it arose in Afghanistan before and in Syria, Libya, and Yemen later on. Much of the predictable violence, of which there is plenty, has no relation to spontaneous 'terrorism' as understood traditionally.

Geopolitical reengineering exercised by external forces results in conflict, violence, and terrorism. Zbigniew Brzezinski, US national security advisor in president Carter's administration, made a telling observation in 2002 in this context: "It is as if terrorism is suspended in outer space as an abstract phenomenon, with ruthless terrorists acting under some Satanic inspiration unrelated to any specific motivation." He added, "The rather narrow, almost one-dimensional definition of the terrorist threat favoured by the Bush administration … has been both expedient and convenient" (Brzezinski).

The Washington Post expressed the situation well in April 2015: "The state as we know it is vanishing in the Middle East. Strife in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen, foreign intrusion from states within the region and outside it, and dreadful rule by self-serving elites have all contributed to the destruction of societies, infrastructure and systems of governance. Nonstate actors of all kinds, most of them armed, are emerging to run their own shows" (Barkey 2015). To call that terrorism is to miss the point completely. As stated earlier, terrorism is an outcome and not a primary phenomenon.

Remorseful Era of Endless War

The strong link between terrorism and counterterrorism that relies on military force, which now includes profit-seeking private sector partners, has an inevitable outcome: endless war. President Dwight Eisenhower warned in a farewell address to the American people in 1961 of the growing significance of the military-industrial complex. Having gained much power during the Second World War, the complex was in danger of being out of balance with the rest of government. Far from diminishing in importance, the complex has grown exponentially since 9/11. It has re-emerged as the military-industrial-homeland security complex. Growth is founded to a large extent on and driven by private sector participation. Naturally, this new complex is now on the lookout for new targets. It profits from terrorism, real or imagined. As the USA begins to count the costs (financial and others) of recent wars and attempts to move away from the path of formal wars, the outcome of the conflict in public policy terms between that and the needs of the companies involved in counterterrorism would assume critical significance to MENA.

The contest between the two policy options is on a huge scale. In the Prologue to his book 'Pay Any Price', James Risen provides a vivid picture of the colossal dimensions of the modern security complex. He wrote, "There were more than 1200 government organizations and nearly 2000 private companies working on counterterrorism, homeland security, and intelligence programs" (Risen 2014). He also reported that related wars since 9/11 cost an estimated $4 trillion. It is significant that Part III of Risen's book is titled "Endless War". Just as important, Risen made the statement that "The level of resources devoted to fighting terrorism still remains out of proportion to the actual threat level posed by terrorism" (http://www.truth-out.org/progressivepicks/item/27425-james-risen-the-post-9-11-homeland-security-industrial-complex-profiteers-and-endless-war). The scale of private sector entanglement became clear when it was found that US private contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan outnumbered US soldiers! Counterterrorism in MENA and similar locations is now an essential source of profits and employment. The debate between the administration and lobbies that support the security complex is expected to be on a monumental scale. The matter will assume greater force as the presidential election comes closer.

Profits come at a price. There is concern that young people are being 'radicalised' and taken to MENA and parts of Africa to commit acts of terror. The concern is that they might, if they survive long enough, go back to their countries of origin to undertake similar actions. The phenomenon is based on a number of requirements. First, some young people are sufficiently amenable for radicalisation that they are ready to leave their safe homes to go abroad to endure massive hardships in order to kill and be killed. Second, that radicalisers have a convincing case to sell. And finally, those behind the radicalisers have sophisticated organisation, sufficient resources, and influence that allow new recruits to travel freely to places of action that might be thousands of miles away. Something is fundamentally wrong for all the above requirements to be met! 'Counterterrorism' and the destruction and hatred it creates have a major role in making this possible.

Western countries are understandably worried about radicalisation despite all the money and other resources devoted to military counterterrorism. After years of that effort, the situation has gone from bad to worse. The war in Syria against the Assad government attracted more than 20,000 volunteers who came from many countries to join resistance groups and, later, the Islamic State. More than 3000 came from Western countries according to the National Counter-Terrorism Centre. However, early in the process those who went to fight against the Assad regime were virtually encouraged to go to Syria. Turkey facilitated their entry into Syria through porous borders and funding was forthcoming from certain compliant Gulf states! In the summer of 2015, the picture started to change. Behind the scenes discussions between the USA, Russia, and Iran seem to offer a glimmer of hope that a peaceful way forward might be found after years of pain for the Syrians, refugees that are now in full scale attack on Europe, and fear from returning 'jihadists'.

An intriguing dimension has been added to the story of terrorism. The Islamic State, supposedly a terrorist organisation hated by one and all, has all the characteristics of a functioning state. It buys and sells oil, runs courts of law of sorts, has it seems sophisticated local government departments, and has access to international banking services without much difficulty. Its fighters not only capture sophisticated weapons, but also manage to use them effectively! Intriguingly, the government in Baghdad sends money to IS to pay salaries and pensions of civil servants. Even more intriguing, a video released in 2015 purported to show the key supply road for IS between Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria open to traffic without it seems threat from Kurdish fighters or 'coalition' air forces! Nothing is certain when it comes to information about IS, but it is a mystery that IS is able to continue to move forces and materials almost unhindered. All this comes about despite the existence of a massive counterterrorism apparatus.

For the present, it seems Islamic State is able to continue to exist while billions are spent on actions designed to destroy it. It is possible to speculate that this fluid condition could last for years enabling remunerative counter measures; involving private sector providers, to continue to prosper into the future. Conversely, resolution of the Syrian crisis (presumably welcomed by Russia and Iran) might well present an opportunity to make some progress in Iraq in favour of reconciliation between different Islamic factions (possibly to be welcomed by Saudi Arabia and

other Gulf states). These speculations show that 'terrorism through the looking glass' is an obvious and justified concept: nothing can be taken on face value. Terrorism is a minor strand in a highly intricate multi-layered tapestry.

Terrorism, therefore, is not a simple activity but a complex system with many interacting elements. It is created and driven by diverse actions; most of which did not intend to generate such an outcome. Equally, its growth or decline would depend on actions that might not have an obvious link to counterterrorism. If the world community were prepared to accept actions that are now known to generate terrorism, then it is quite possible that the terrorism threat is not as pressing as governments' pronouncements make out. As suggested in the next section, this might not be an outrageous idea as terrorism, especially confined to a few far off locations, might be considered a serious but not critical threat. Conversely, if it is a key issue of concern, then tools that are appropriate for such complex phenomena should be adopted.

How Significant Is the 'Terrorism' Threat?

This is not an easy topic to consider rationally. Any death caused by violence is significant. Innocent people murdered or maimed by terrorist actions could not be dismissed as being numerically unimportant. Reasonably, every terrorist action, especially when it involves Western citizens, immediately hits the headlines with demands for action and promises of determined response. In addition, a few countries are being devastated by violence that includes a large measure of terrorism. Events in these locations are regularly, and rightly, in the news. Nonetheless, it is possible that the 'security industry' has a powerful incentive to exaggerate the threat globally. As mentioned earlier, terrorist groups welcome this publicity as it helps in fundraising and recruitment.

On the other hand, innocent people are killed due to many causes. In 2015, the co-pilot of a Germanwings plane killed 149 when he crashed the plane in what was thought to be an intention to commit suicide. After a period of genuine grieve and re-examination of procedures, travellers and airlines went back to their normal practices. Similarly, over one million people worldwide die in road traffic accidents. Cars and lorries are not banned from roads. Homicides in the USA cause infinitely more deaths than the very few killed by terrorist actions, by American citizens, and others. Guns are not banned as a result. By popular decision, they are accepted as desirable and acceptable. The loss, awful as it is, is assumed to be unavoidable. It is, therefore, possible to consider the death of innocent people rationally and to select appropriate countermeasures without turning the topic into an emotionally driven 'war'. More to the point, it is critically important not to allow the use of force to dominate the debate and divert attention from other more fruitful lines of action.

It is helpful to draw a clear distinguishing line between terrorism and lawlessness caused by competition over power by domestic and external groups in the absence of effective state structures. However, even reports that do not make that distinction suggest that in relative terms the high significance of the terrorism threat is questionable.

The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 2014 published for the Institute for Economics and Peace reported "Over 80 % of the lives lost to terrorist activity in 2013 occurred in only five countries—Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria. Another 55 countries recorded one or more deaths from terrorist activity" (http://www.visionofhuman-ity.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20Report%202014_0.pdf). The Executive summary to the report pointed out that terrorism is "… relatively small when compared to the 437,000 people killed by homicides in 2012, this being 40 times greater".

Apart from putting the terrorist threat into better perspective, the GTI report discussed correlation between terrorism and other factors: "From thousands of socio-economic, governance and attitudinal variables analysed, three groupings of indicators show a multivariate significant relationship with the GTI:

- Political stability
- Intergroup cohesion
- Legitimacy of the state"

Afghanistan illustrates the above links to perfection. Basically, lawlessness and instability are often loosely identified as terrorism. Anand Gopal penned a revealing book about Afghanistan: 'No Good Men Among the Living' (Gopal 2014). He chronicled events from the Soviet invasion in 1979 to recent times through the experiences of ordinary Afghanis. In the process, he exposed an entirely new facet to terrorism and counterterrorism. It seems that within months of the US invasion in 2001, Taliban leaders tried to surrender. Most handed their weapons to local tribal elders and to US authorities. On 7 December 2001 "…Karzai and the Americans occupied Mullah Omar [leader of the Taliban] home and announced the official end of the Taliban regime as crowds celebrated in Kabul and other cities across Afghanistan" (Gobal 2014:48). The terrorists had all decamped or abandoned the cause "yet US special forces were on Afghan soil with a clear political mandate to defeat terrorism…How do you fight a war without an adversary?" (Gobal 2014:109). The solution was simple. Without a strong central government, local entrepreneurs exploited the opportunity to make vast fortunes in contracts to US and coalition forces. In return, these warlords provided 'intelligence'; mainly information against their local competitors; even when these were supporters of Karzai and his government. This it seems suited US forces: ready supply of 'terrorists' were found, arrested, often tortured, and some eventually shipped to Guantanamo.

The situation could have been comical had it not been for the catastrophic effects on the individuals concerned and Afghanis in general. "Dr. Hafizullah, Zurmat's first governor, had ended up in Guantanamo because he crossed Police Chief Mujahed. Mujahed wound up in Guantanamo because he crossed the Americans. Security chief Naim found himself in Guantanamo because of an old rivalry with Mullah Qassim. Qassim eluded capture, but an unfortunate soul with the same name ended up in Guantanamo in his place. And a subsequent feud left Samoud Khan, another pro-American commander, in Bagram prison, while a boy [caught in the same raid] was shipped to Guantanamo" (Gopal 2014:138). At 12 years old, he was believed to be the prison's youngest inmate!

Donald Rumsfeld, US secretary of defence, described these people, including the boys, and other Guantanamo inmates as "hard-core, well-trained terrorists' and 'among the most dangerous, best-trained, vicious killers on the face of the Earth" (Astill 2004). Was Rumsfeld right? There was, and is, much killing and violence in Afghanistan and later in Iraq and Somalia, and now (in 2015) in Syria, Nigeria, Libya, and Yemen. The basic question is whether it is strictly terrorism. Certainly in Afghanistan from end of 2001 onwards, much of the fighting was between warlords driven by little more than the quest for wealth and influence with active participation by 'counterterrorism' agencies eager to find targets to fight.

Conditions in Iraq are almost identical to Afghanistan. Once the 2003 war was over and the Iraqi state, including the army, dismantled, the occupying authorities handed power over to a collection of people driven by thirst for power and wealth and, in some cases, a large measure of fanatical association with certain sects of Islam. In the resulting chaos, the Kurds used the opportunity to promote their national aspirations and Sunni Muslims sought to advance their own hopes. Islamic State in Iraq was a natural outcome. It is undoubtedly a terrorist organisation, but it is also a political entity. The two facets need to be disentangled and dealt with appropriately.

The situation after the 2011 removal from power of Gaddafi in Libya following active military participation by NATO, US, and other regional and European powers shows precisely the same traits. The pattern seems to remove admittedly awful leaders after which the military powers that brought about the change step aside and leave the stage to armed groups and militias to create mayhem as well as commit at times terrorist acts. There are at the time of writing two main factions in Libya. One controls Tobruk which is said to have the backing of Egypt and some Gulf states. Supporters claim they are fighting against Political Islam and fundamentalism. The other group controls the previous capital Tripoli and Misurata. Reportedly, Turkey and one or two Gulf states support this faction. In the absence of a functioning state, the field is open to armed gangs to fight it out. As always, there is no shortage of weapons (Ishaan Tharoor and Adam Taylor). Is what is going on in Libya terrorism or general lawlessness? Clearly, it is both but the terrorist angle is a secondary issue. It is futile to seek to solve the terrorist problem without first addressing the larger political economic problem.

Yemen is the latest addition to the list of failed Middle East and North Africa states devastated by military interventions, lack of state structure, and all-out war between heavily armed militias. This, as in other cases, presents a perfect environment for recruitment of impressionable young people to join the fight that in turn leads to acts of violence and intimidation and the growth of migrants and refugees fleeing the scene. The environment is ideal for some people to commit terrorist acts (Patrick Cockburn). At the time of writing, Europe is preoccupied with 'the problem of refugees' and 'the problem of terrorism' as if these are events in separate silos.

As stated earlier, any death or injury is unacceptable, but in relative terms terrorism's impact is low in comparison to other causes of death and injury. There continues to be some specific terrorist incidents throughout the world and these are concentrated in a few locations. For instance, the Park Palace Guest House in Kabul

was attacked in May 2015 and over ten people were killed in that incident. Similarly, Taliban terrorists attacked the Afghan parliament in June 2015 and one woman and one child were killed in addition to all the attackers. In the same month, Tunisia suffered a massive terrorist attack. On 17 August 2015, a bomb in Bangkok killed 20 and injured 120 people. Outbreaks of terrorist violence are also in evidence in Iraq, especially against religious targets. The same is happening in Nigeria and Somalia. As mentioned above, these are awful crimes (and are rightly being investigated energetically to find the criminals who committed them) but in relative terms they do not amount to much. They tend to deflect attention from broader issues that afflict MENA and some other parts of the world that merit urgent attention.

In the West, terrorist incidents and terrorist deaths are extremely rare. Attacks on the scale of 9/11 are unique. Beyond that event, 'Islamic terrorism' is hardly known. There are sporadic terrorist attacks, but these are almost wholly committed by local people and relate to domestic issues. They are significant by their infrequency. The picture in the United Kingdom is the same. There were a few 'Islamic terrorism' events, but these were and are insignificant when compared to actions by Irish and Scottish terrorists and these themselves have reduced to almost nothing in recent years (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_terrorist_incidents_in_London).

There have been numerous warnings from spokesmen and women in the US administration and its extensive security forces of widespread and dastardly terrorist attacks by operatives already in the USA. Actual attacks failed to materialise. One reasonable explanation, suggested Professor John Mueller, "…is that almost no terrorists exist in the United States and few have the means or the inclination to strike from abroad" (Mueller). Mueller added, "True, there have been no terrorist incidents in the United States in the last 5 years. But nor were there any in the 5 years before the 9/11 attacks, at a time when the United States was doing much less to protect itself".

Steve Chapman wrote, in 2014 in the Chicago Tribune, "Terror has fed the FBI's growth". He added, "We could win the war on terrorism. But end it? No danger of that" (The FBI hypes terror). That is now the dilemma facing the world in general and the West in particular. There is a consistent push to overplay the terrorist threat to aid the counterterrorism industry, but once the subject is looked at in a dispassionate objective manner the threat shrinks to a mildly serious but not critical issue. Conversely, there are massive problems of insecurity and violence throughout MENA and beyond. These problems are in need of urgent attention and solutions that must go well beyond the failed ones of military action, as discussed later.

To summarise: in 2013 there were about 10,000 terrorist incidents worldwide resulting in about 18,000 fatalities. Compared with other causes of death and injury, that might not be huge but the situation is undoubtedly unacceptable especially to those living in the few locations affected. Iraq accounted for 35.4 % of deaths followed by Afghanistan at 17.3 % and Pakistan at 13.1 % (http://www.statista.com/statistics/377061/countries-with-the-highest-number-of-deaths-by-terrorism/). The reader would have noted that these are the very areas where the U.S. and its allies have been waging military campaigns and more specifically a "war on terror" for decades! The parody of the chicken and the egg springs to mind here!

Terrorism, therefore, has to be seen in its proper perspective; away from the hype created jointly by terrorists and the vast organisations that have been created ostensibly to fight them. This and other features addressed in this chapter reveal misconceptions that tend to encourage more terrorism and consign present counter efforts to predictable failure. This has been obvious for years which prompted me almost 10 years ago, in November 2006, to post an article on my website titled 'Exploding the Myths of Terrorism' (http://www.globalcomplexity.org/general/exploding-myths-terrorism/). That article pointed out anomalies; relating to definition, scale, impact of counter policies, and factors that generate further terrorism activities. These points were being discussed even earlier than 2006 and they continue to be considered at present. The most pressing need at present is to identify and then discontinue domestic, regional, and global policies that introduce so much confusion into the important subject of terrorism.

Iraq's Inevitable Rise to the Summit

Iraq now occupies the unenviable top slot of countries afflicted by terrorism. It is instructive to trace its decline to that lowly position and to demonstrate the predictable inevitability of the whole process. The sorry saga demonstrates that it is possible to create terrorism where none was there before. This would seem to be an odd concept in a world where it is assumed that most people and governments are united in their antagonism to terrorism and terrorists. It is not suggested here that any particular government or group knowingly set out to create terrorism. The process is infinitely subtler and more indirect than that. At its most basic level, the activity concerns decisions that are deemed desirable for whatever reason, but which would have the effect of generating terrorist actions. These decisions were regularly implemented unhesitatingly as Iraq's recent history shows. A report titled 'Why Did the United States Invade Iraq? A Survey of International Relations and Foreign Policy Scholars' revealed the tangled web of uncertainties that still surround the motivations for the invasion (http://www-personal.umd.umich.edu/~atthrall/whyiraq.pdf). The report suggests that private sector organisations (and persons) that are now involved in counterterrorism were active in the decisions taken at that time.

Examination of the motivations and considerations that led to the invasion of Iraq by the USA and its allies including Britain is proving to be somewhat difficult. An inquiry; the Chilcot Iraq Inquiry, was set up in July 2009. Six full years later, the public in Britain is still waiting for its report. At the time of writing there is a backlash by people who lost loved ones in the conflict against the delay of publication by members of the inquiry. More recent information suggest the publication is set for Summer of 2016 (after the EU referendim).

The route by which Iraq, a country that presented hardly any terrorist activity previously, replaced Afghanistan at the top of the terrorism league was relentless. A sensible starting point would be the Gulf War (August 1990 to February 1991). The effects of the intensive bombing were immediately obvious even before the sanc-

tions that followed had time to bite. A UN mission sent to Iraq in early March 1991 to assess the damage reported that the country "has, for some time to come, been relegated to a pre-industrial age" (http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/reports/s22366.pdf). That is precisely what James Baker, as Secretary of State, had promised! The process of dismantling Iraq as a functioning entity was unmistakable. Every aspect of the factors that define UNDP's Human Development Index suffered drastic decline, including education, health, and employment. All Iraqis, with the possible exception of Saddam and his close associates, felt the impact. Antagonism against all invading forces was unavoidable. Iraq began to change from an outward looking country into an inward looking society focused on hate and injustice committed by foreign forces.

The next catastrophe was not long in coming. The UN Security Council imposed punitive sanctions on Iraq in 1991. They lasted until 2003. Their impact became indistinguishable from genocide, according to Denis Halliday who resigned in protest in 1998 as UN Assistant Secretary General (John Pilger). The sanctions, which were applied with brutal force, were comprehensive and included food and medicines in addition to almost everything else. Inevitably, babies and young children were the first victims. It is generally accepted that several hundred thousand children lost their lives as a result. Madeleine Albright, US ambassador to UN, said in May 1996 "we think the price is worth it". Iraqis were not so sanguine.

The crippling effects of the sanctions attracted concern not only from those outside the UN, but also from its senior employees. Halliday broke a long collective silence, but then Hans von Sponeck, who had succeeded him as humanitarian coordinator in Iraq, resigned. "How long", he asked, "should the civilian population of Iraq be exposed to such punishment for something they have never done?" Two days later, Jutta Burghardt, head of the World Food Programme in Iraq, resigned, as she could not tolerate what was being done to Iraqis by UN agencies.

The UN Security Council was accused of genocide, but it is possible to suggest that the UN became for a while a terrorist organisation. A whole civilian population was under attack in the hope that they would depose Saddam. However, to Iraqis at large hate and grievance were extended to include the UN. Shortly after the 2003 invasion, when Saddam's iron grip disappeared, the hotel that the UN Envoy in Iraq used as his headquarters was attacked, on 19 August 2003, by terrorists who killed him and other staff in the building. With the dismantling of the state and the army and the focus on sectarian divisions, the slide into violence quickly and surely descended to what is seen today. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, in issuing their order to their administrator in Iraq the senior Bush officials were aware their actions would cause "administrative inconvenience". Events demonstrated they were right. The 'inconvenience' involved violence and, at times, sheer terrorism.

To bring the Iraq saga up to date, one must mention the Islamic State. After the 2003 war on Iraq, Iran emerged as a regional Shiite power and some of its leaders saw Iraq as potentially little more than a province of the new Persian Empire. The government in Baghdad was in all but name part of the Islamic Republic of Iran. As expected, that produced a new crop of opposing Sunni fighters; including ISIL and its later incarnation as the Islamic State (IS). There is much evidence that this latter

entity was funded and armed by some regional powers. The new situation created its own conundrums. Is the Islamic State a terrorism organisation? Certainly, its practices are repugnant to say the least, but in a strict technical sense is it a group set up to resist Iranian Shiite expansion? Or is it an organisation founded to help topple the Assad regime in Syria? Or is it simply a terrorist group that must be attacked by one and all? Another mystery to be added to a rich crop of mysteries associated with seeing 'terrorism through the looking glass'.

The Iraq debacle shows that policy-makers sometimes know the consequences of actions that lead to terrorism and accept that outcome knowingly. This is not a new or isolated development. Brzezinski, President Carter's national security advisor, masterminded the US strategy to lure the USSR into Afghanistan and to arrange for a Mujahedeen led by Bin Laden to fight them. When he was asked whether he regretted the resulting mayhem and loss of life, he replied, "What is more important…The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet Union? Some stirred-up Muslims or the liberation of Central Europe…" (Gopal 2014) The same form of thinking clearly was in operation at various stages of actions in Iraq. The rest is history. The same approach was and is evident in Assad's Syria. Since 2011, over 300,000 people have been killed in that country of which about 12,000 were children, and millions have been wounded or rendered homeless. Syria is mounting the league ladder of countries devastated by violence and terrorism. History does repeat itself. It did not have a terrorist problem before, but now it does.

The fundamental choice is between treating the disease or the symptoms. Noisy concern about terrorism would only begin to be taken seriously when actions that are known to increase the probability of instability, violence, and hence terrorism are avoided. This seems an obvious suggestion. The opposite has happened for decades in MENA and some other parts of Africa. An explanation to this apparently surprising public policy aberration is clearly necessary to gain understanding of the confused subject of terrorism and how to address it.

Need to Address the Disease Not the Symptoms

An attempt at providing one possible explanation of the above policy failure has already been given in the form of the vast expansion of the military state security industrial complex and the role played by private businesses in that growth. This concept might seem somewhat extreme until one considers the considerable financial benefits accruing to some companies that are involved in the military and counterterrorism businesses. Pratap Chatterjee published in 2009 a revealing book; 'Halliburton's Army: How a Well-Connected Texas Oil Company Revolutionized the Way America Makes War' (Chatterjee 2009). "KBR has grossed more than $25 billion since it won a 10-year contract in late 2001 to supply U.S. troops in combat situations around the world…Today [2009], there is one KBR worker for every three U.S. soldiers in Iraq…" Pratap Chatterjee concluded, "So don't be surprised if the new LOGCAP contract, a $150 billion 10-year program that began on September 20, 2008, remains

in place, with some minor tinkering around the edges… KBR's army, it seems, will remain on the march". In 2015, Conrad Joseph Molden published an equally telling book, 'What Were the Consequences of the Iraq War Contracts: From Eisenhower's Warnings to Halliburton's Profits' (Molden 2015). War, and more specifically, 'war on terrorism' are lucrative. The temptation to help the process is very tempting.

The process since Chatterjee published his book has gathered momentum. The military state security industrial complex is growing fast in the USA and in Europe. And its activities, often by eager local invitation, are spreading far and wide. "During the fiscal year that ended on September 30, 2014, U.S. Special Operations forces (SOF) deployed to 133 countries—roughly 70 % of the nations on the planet—according to Lieutenant Colonel Robert Bockholt, a public affairs officer with U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM)… conducting missions ranging from kill/capture night raids to training exercises… Africa has, in fact, become a prime locale for shadowy covert missions by America's special operators" (Nick Turse). Both special operations units and terrorist groups have grown in step with each other from 2001 to the present.

The whole face of counterterrorism has been transformed with heavy reliance on military action by forces that include large elements of private sector contractors. Unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, have become commonplace and counterinsurgency operations (or COIN a practice abandoned since Vietnam) have been revived and armies have been extensively privatised throughout the twenty-first century (http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175998/tomgram%3A_william_astore%2C_america%27s_mutant_military/#more).

A policy that was tried and failed to counter the spread of drug traffic; 'Kingpin Strategy' by assassinating leading dealers is now applied in the counterterrorism effort. The US called it 'high value targeting' and the Israelis called it 'focused prevention'. Previously, the policy was applied in Vietnam as the 'Phoenix Program'. The assassination of Bin Laden was an example of this policy in action. However, such difficult operations sometimes end in failure or the death of innocent people. Such occurrences are widely reported and are added to the long list of real or imagined grievances. The strategies, based on the use of extreme force, have failed to deliver consistent results (http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175988/tomgram%3A_andrew_cockburn,_how_assassination_sold_drugs_and_promoted_terrorism/). The Global Terrorism Index reported in 2014 that terrorism is on a relentless increase despite these and other efforts (Ewen MacAskill). The upward trend was highlighted by the US 'Annex of Statistical Information: Country Reports on Terrorism 2013', published in April 2014 (The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism). The evidence points unerringly to the need to re-examine counterterrorism policies. However, there is no evidence that this is taking place and an explanation for this failure is not forthcoming.

Certainly, it is known that present actions are not yielding positive results. The 2015 National Military Strategy of the United States of America was published in July 2015 (http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/National_Military_Strategy_2015.pdf). Not unreasonably, it made the point that the USA is the greatest power on earth. However, in the first lines of the Chairman's Forward, the document

made a revealing point: "Today's global security environment is the most unpredictable I have seen in 40 years of service. Since the last National Military Strategy was published in 2011, global disorder has significantly increased… We now face multiple, simultaneous security challenges from traditional state actors and transregional networks of sub-state groups…" Clearly, the 'war on terrorism' and the various wars that the USA has been involved in have not succeeded in reducing general instability and violence let alone terrorism. On the other hand, there has been a massive expansion in the counterterrorism business.

The US National Military Strategy devotes much attention to what it calls Violent Extremist Organisations (VEOs), "led by al Qaida and the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)… strongest where governments are weakest, exploiting people trapped in fragile or failed states". The Strategy has a simple approach to such organisations: "to disrupt VEO planning and operations, degrade support structures, remove leadership, interdict finances, impede the flow of foreign fighters, counter malign influences, liberate captured territory, and ultimately defeat them. In support of these efforts, we are widely distributing U.S. military forces and leveraging globally integrated command and control processes to enable transregional operations". The focus is on winning a war. What should or could be done about 'weak governments' and how did they become weak? As the Strategy makes clear, that is the fundamental problem.

The US 2015 National Security Strategy published in February 2015, however, had a broader agenda: "…weak governance and widespread grievance allows extremism to take root, violent non-state actors to rise up, and conflict to overtake state structures…We prefer to partner with those fragile states that have a genuine political commitment to establishing legitimate governance and providing for their people… inclusive politics, enabling effective and equitable service delivery, reforming security and rule of law sectors, combating corruption and organized crime, and promoting economic opportunity, particularly among youth and women. We will continue to lead the effort to ensure women serve as mediators of conflict and in peace-building efforts, and they are protected from gender-based violence" (https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf).

The report goes on to say: "Sadly, this is not the case today, and nowhere is the violence more tragic and destabilizing than in the sectarian conflict from Beirut to Baghdad, which has given rise to new terrorist groups such as ISIL…Resolving these connected conflicts, and enabling long-term stability in the region, requires more than the use and presence of American military forces. For one, it requires partners who can defend themselves. We are therefore investing in the ability of Israel, Jordan, and our Gulf partners to deter aggression while maintaining our unwavering commitment to Israel's security, including its Qualitative Military Edge…" "We are working with the Iraqi government to resolve Sunni grievances through more inclusive and responsive counterterrorism strategy to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL".

The Strategy has been quoted at length as it does make good points, but its focus continues to go back to military actions and military partnerships. There is scant evidence that avoidance of actions that weaken states in the Middle East

and efforts to improve conditions, especially for younger people, are on the agenda. However, as discussed later, there is anecdotal evidence that a policy change for the US is in the air.

To go back to the past, it is not known whether Condoleezza Rice's 2006 comments about a 'New Middle East' and 'constrictive chaos' described a definite US policy or whether they were designed to put a positive imprint on a confused and erratic Bush administration dominated by a few war enthusiasts. Certainly, the Middle East and North Africa region was plunged into a state of lawlessness that does no one any good, with the possible exception of the leading terrorists and those set up to fight them and profit from that activity. It is of course incorrect to blame all the problems on the USA, but as the reigning world power it is responsible for some of the mayhem. "America is no mere international citizen. It is the dominant power in the world, more dominant than any since Rome. Accordingly, America is in a position to reshape norms, alter expectations and create new realities. How? By unapologetic and implacable demonstrations of will" (Charles Krauthammer).

Numerous books have described the end result of actions by the U.S., its agencies, businesses, and allies. These included 'The Three Trillion Dollar War' by Stiglitz and Bilmes, Losing Iraq' by Divid L Phillips, The Scourging of Iraq by Geoff Simons, 'Fiasco' by Thomas E Ricks, and 'Killing Hope' by William Blum, to name but a few. However, the book that comes closest to describing the linkage between flawed policies and actions and the resulting chaos and terrorism was written by Peter W Galbraih titled 'The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End' (Galbraith 2006).

These analytical records were mentioned because they seem to have had a beneficial effect that is, it must be said, in its infancy. The U.S. under the presidency of Obama has shown strong reluctance to enter new wars or to revisit past war zones to pick up the pieces. This is a major achievement taken in the face of constant clamour for more wars from certain quarters in the USA, influenced possibly by the powerful lobbies set up by the companies profiting from military action.

President Obama's reluctance to send more US troops into Iraq and other parts of MENA was and is unpopular for some in the USA. The policy is even more unpopular in MENA from which constant appeals for arms and troops are beamed at the US administration incessantly. Weak governments habitually look to outsiders to solve their local problems. Tellingly, and perhaps annoyingly to some, the response from the U.S. has been for governments to adopt more inclusive policies and ones that would address the thorny issue of better governance.

The US administration has taken other steps more recently that elevate the policy change onto new levels. To start with war was avoided in the Ukraine. Next discussions were initiated with Cuba that ended decades of hostility and resulted in reinstatement of diplomatic missions. However, the most dramatic step, which has major implications to MENA, was the P5 + 1 deal with Iran, masterminded by the USA and included the UK, France, China, Russia, and Germany together with the European Union. The deal addressed Iran's nuclear programme, but its implication went much further than that. In particular, the discussions revealed willingness for closer cooperation between the USA (and others) and Iran. Inclusion of

Russia was especially significant as it might affect attitudes towards the Syrian situation. It would seem that the scene might be set for actions that at long last try to address the disease in MENA, instability, etc., rather than the symptoms of the disease as experienced in terrorism.

Conclusion

To summarise the situation on the terrorism/counterterrorism front in MENA, many of the atrocities being committed in the region cannot be classed as 'terrorism' in the strict definition of the word: as acts of violence against innocent people designed to change government policy and practice. There are few discernible state policies left. Apart from widespread violence, corruption is the most dominant feature that is bankrupting the societies affected. Erosion of state power and the consequent virtual absence of governance impose a formidable package of punishing social and economic ills. As the Corruption Perceptions Index 2014 shows, too many parts of MENA are at the lower end of the league of corrupt nations (http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results). Corruption in Iraq in particular is now legendary. The association between violence, terrorism, and corruption is not accidental. They stem from the same fundamental conditions.

Most of the violence, including acts of terrorism, is between factions led by individuals driven by little more than the search for power and wealth. Their grip on power requires funds that are often acquired through corruption. On the other hand, their power makes it possible for them to accumulate even more wealth through more corruption. Moreover, their position at the top necessitates the use of force within their organisations and against others. That in turn often demands resort to terrorist actions. The situation in Iraq and in Syria at the time of writing demonstrates all these features unambiguously.

In their quest for power, leaders adopt classical expedients described by the Arabic Muslim historian and social commentator Ibn-Khaldun (1332–1406). He wrote a monumental book of many parts including an Introduction (Muquaddimah) that revealed the means by which dynasties, large and small, come into being.

The basic concept described by Ibn-Khaldun is based on the need to create 'group solidarity' (Assabiyah) through whatever means are at hand including family, tribal, and religious ties. The warring factions, often depicted as 'Muslim Terrorists' that have appeared in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere in the Middle East and Africa, closely follow that pattern. They affiliate themselves with various ethnic, tribal, and religious sects within Islam to attract recruits as well as funding from domestic and regional donors. In reality, Islam to them is little more than a convenient vehicle. As mentioned earlier, Anand Gopal described the concept perfectly in 'No Good Men Among the Living'. The same is happening at the time of writing in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, and increasingly in parts of Africa where state authority has weakened or disappeared altogether.

Western countries are not exempted from resorting to the same subterfuge. The controversial intelligence bill that passed the lower house of France's Parliament on 5 May 2015 illustrates the concept of using relatively minor transgressions against free speech to adopt legislation that restricts freedom of speech for a whole population. Support for the bill in Parliament was clear: 438 for, 86 against, and 42 abstentions. The bill when it completes its various stages will deprive French judges from oversight of activities by the intelligence gathering services. The bill was rushed through Parliament after the awful attacks on Charlie Hebdo and the kosher supermarket in Paris (http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/05/le-petit-probleme-with-frances-new-big-brother/).

The contention advanced earlier in the chapter that there might be an implicit partnership of interests between terrorism and militarised counterterrorism is admittedly open to debate. On the other hand, no such doubt exists about the fact that terrorism has been on the increase, while counterterrorism based on military action has been the policy of choice.

When a public policy is seen not to work, it should be reviewed without undue delay. When a policy produces negative results, it should be abandoned immediately. There is no indication that this is being contemplated, despite indications that the U.S. is veering away from all out war. This is intriguing to say the least. More to the point, it is worrying as it lends support to the possibility that counterterrorism, with private sector involvement, has become a profit-generating business. As mentioned earlier, this is just as regularly seen locally in MENA as it is when it comes to leading world powers. At an emergency meeting of the Arab League on 18 August 2015, for instance, one of the two factions ruling Libya asked Arab countries to provide it with arms in order to enable it to fight the other faction (ostensibly associated with Islamic fundamentalism)! The distinct possibility that that would mean an extension to the violence and civil war in that country does not seem to worry those concerned. A statement issued after the meeting urged member states to assist Libya. Fortuitously, the UN has imposed an embargo on arming any of the fighting groups in Libya. Asking for arms 'to fight Islamic terrorism' is a popular pretext, but hopefully the UN will stand its ground.

It may be thought that the correlation between increased military action and the rise in terrorism is a recent discovery that has not given decision-makers long enough to change course. That, sadly, is not the case. The linkage is nothing new. Chalmers Johnson, author of bestselling *Blowback,* wrote a comprehensive article titled "America's Empire of Bases" in which he stated, "from 1993 through the 9/11 assaults of 2011, there were five major al-Qaeda attacks worldwide; in the 2 years since then, there have been 17 bombings." (http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/176033/best_of_tomdispatch%3A_chalmers_johnson_on_garrisoning_the_planet/#more). Evidence for this association between military action and the growth of terrorism is plentiful.

It is appreciated that the temptation to go down the military route is a knee-jerk reaction that follows every terrorist incident. On the other hand, it is expected that wiser options would then be considered once the initial furore has bated. For too long, this sensible progression of policy making has not been in evidence. The focus on military action has prevailed and that option, as argued above, is now shown to be

counterproductive. If anything, it has become part of the problem. Modifications based on drones and assassinations have not yielded better results. What else can one do to mindless terrorists, driven by blind religious beliefs or historic grievances?

What Is to Be Done?

Readers hoping for a magic bullet that would eradicate terrorism should read no further. They will be disappointed. First, the existence of such a magic bullet is a cruel delusion. The arrival of thousands of foreign troops will make matters worse and not better. Arming and training domestic factions, including what remains of the national armies in the countries worst affected, will fuel endemic violence and instability. Second, certain locations in the Middle East traditionally associated with terrorism suffer from weak states, absence of governance, corrupt rulers, and warring factions. Terrorism is a by-product and not a primary feature. Dealing with 'terrorism' will only address the symptoms. The fundamental task is to tackle the disease; admittedly, a very difficult project for reasons explained below.

Readers are therefore reminded of a key point underlined throughout the chapter: a distinction must be drawn between incidental terrorism events on the one hand and endemic violence and lawlessness on the other, which creates opportunities for acts of terrorism. There is now general consensus that these so-called 'lone wolf' terrorist incidents are impossible to eradicate. Such events are not restricted to 'Islamic terrorists' and they are not limited to the Middle East or Africa. The U.S. and Europe are just as in danger of domestic 'lone wolf' attacks as MENA. Better surveillance coupled with public awareness seems to be the obvious lines of action and these are now well-developed and institutionalised in most countries. This by itself is subject to limits imposed by personal freedoms and what scale of inconvenience citizens would be prepared to tolerate. The process, furthermore, relies heavily on well-organised, multinational, and integrated police forces and legal codes to pursue and punish the guilty. These actions could not eliminate the threat completely, but they help to discourage the practice.

This book is intended to deal with terrorism in the Middle East; a worthy topic that is considered a global priority. The chapter sought to clarify the nature of this form of 'terrorism'. It was argued that in parts of the Middle East, widespread violence and lawlessness often present opportunities for terrorist acts. Through ignorance or design, an idea has taken root that somehow Islam and the Middle East predispose the region to acts of terrorism. The chapter sought to dispel this misconception not for the purpose of defending Islam or the region, but to introduce clarity and objectivity. This, it was thought, would help avoid reaching wrong conclusions about the actions needed to rectify current problems. Iraq was discussed at length to demonstrate how a country that had no record of terrorism previously could find itself at the top of the league of leading countries suffering from rampant terrorism.

The case of Syria and Libya is the same as that of Iraq. Looking at terrorism without seeing it in the context of the prevailing conditions of chaos, violence, and overwhelming intrusion by regional and global powers (some of which might well have been benign) is to miss the cardinal point entirely. Further military action and more arms and troops in the region have been shown to be a failed policy. As the situations in South Africa, Northern Ireland, and Spain have demonstrated unerringly, broader strategies based on seeking solutions to social, political, and economic problems and accommodations of the wider grievances that created terrorism need to be addressed. This, admittedly, is a difficult task to set. However, it has to be faced sooner or later.

Tragically, decision-makers, domestic and foreign, who currently seek to control matters in the Middle East, do not seem to accept this conclusion. Some profit from the prevailing chaos, lawlessness, and lack of governance. This applies especially to those in power at present. For various reasons, others are still wedded to the futile and often counterproductive military response.

Before discussing steps that could be taken to tackle prevailing violence and disorder, it is appropriate to outline other lines of action that would avoid further military action. There is, for instance, a 'do nothing' option. History suggests that societies, given sufficient time, find ways to repair themselves and overcome seemingly impossible odds. Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom in 'Duration of Civil Wars', a report produced for the World Bank's Development Research Group in 2001, explored the subject and concluded that sooner or later civil wars come to an end (http://economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk/12058/1/DURATION.pdf). Duration is affected by several factors, but general conditions in Middle East and North Africa would veer towards lengthy rather than short disputes.

Admittedly, the do-nothing option seems like a council of despair and would consign the communities involved to lengthy periods of at times awful suffering. The flood of refugees that endure massive obstacles and dangers in their effort to escape the horrors in their countries by seeking shelter in Europe is an indication of the level of desperation that has gripped the communities concerned. However, the option could not be discounted completely. In the darkest days of 2015, citizens in Iraq took to the streets and forced their hapless government to consider reforms that were thought most unlikely only weeks before. Nonetheless, the option is admittedly unattractive. Its significance lies in the certainty that history shows that even seriously unstable communities ultimately find a way forward.

Another option that seems more attractive, especially from an academic point of view, calls for actions to improve governance and other public policies including in particular focus on economics, education, health, and social services with specific attention to those actions that help younger persons. This is clearly a most sensible option and no one could possibly disagree with its intentions. Ultimately, action along these lines would have to be considered in any case. Difficulties in making progress along this path, however, are self-evident. Fundamentally, few functioning states remain in the countries most affected by violence and terrorism in the Middle East as well as North Africa. Who would mastermind and implement actions to enhance governance and other similar improvements? The competing factions in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen could be

expected not only to lack the ability to participate in such a potentially desirable project, but in all probability to be against it on principle. Success would spell the end to the warring groups and the dubious personalities behind them. Recent steps (August 2015) to implement minimal reforms in Iraq that had the considerable backing of the all-powerful Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani were little more than window dressing.

Another difficulty presents itself with this apparently sensible option: would competing regional and global powers accept a situation where their freedom to meddle and influence would be curtailed? And would the companies involved in counterterrorism and the security industry at large live with the diminution of business that settled and well-managed states associated with good governance and democracy entail? There is considerable doubt there.

It is patently obvious that present policies based on military power have failed and are counterproductive. Replacing these policies is difficult, if not impossibly hard. The policies are not simply a US preference. There is widespread belief, especially within the countries most afflicted by instability, violence, and terrorism, that military action is the most effective option. Leaders in these locations constantly ask for the U.S. to be involved militarily and to help equip and train national armies and religious and tribal groups. In practice, this is a recipe for more rather than less violence. In other words, it is not simply a matter of convincing the US administration to limit its military activities. This, in any case, seems to be quite possible at present as seen in actions and statements made by President Obama. The U.S. is not minded to be involved in new wars and that is a welcome sign and one that should be applauded as discussed below.

Realistically, the task of finding alternative policies to military action could not be achieved easily or quickly. An essential step in the process is changing minds by giving wide publicity to facts rather than misconceptions about terrorism in general and so-called 'Islamic terrorism' in the Middle East in particular. That is not an easy project, as the media in general have their own views on the subject. Confusion about the nature and scale of terrorism is endemic and occasionally created by interest groups to promote their particular agendas. At the best of times, it is a controversial topic that attracts strong opinions. Nowadays, Islam is constantly in the news, often with reference to terrorism. This association has coloured prevailing ideas. Although the long running Palestinian/Israeli dispute was the traditional medium of concern, in recent years attention has widened to include Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other locations of instability. Confusion has increased in step with that widening field. There is, therefore, a mountain to climb in seeking to bring clarity and objectivity into the debate.

The task of improving awareness and, hence, advocating alternatives to military action is not impossible and the effort would yield good rewards. This is possibly the most productive contribution that think tanks and nongovernmental associations could make. The Middle East has a number of active organisations; including AMEPPA (Association for Middle Eastern Public Policy and Administration), The Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies, and GRC (Gulf Research Center) and others. While these bodies do an excellent academic work, they could possibly extend their work to include a targeted campaign of better information (most certainly not propaganda) to create objective awareness of what makes the Middle East what it is at present.

In association with the above suggestion, it would be helpful for the organisations mentioned and others to recruit prominent people in the Middle East and beyond to speak out against more military action and in favour of other more subtle lines of action based on reconciliation and dialogue. This is not a difficult task as senior religious leaders, Islamic, Christian, and Jewish, have already contributed ideas to that end as mentioned earlier in the chapter.

Such contributions might be beamed at the UN with some benefit. Despite its tarnished image in the Middle East, the UN still retains enough credibility to be a major player in a new approach. The UN could act as an honest broker to bring antagonistic groups together to begin a dialogue. Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom demonstrated that what appears as an impossible hope might turn out to be possible given enough focus and determination. Ultimately, the UN might even contribute temporary managers to assist in filling part of the gap left by weak state structures. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, Pope Francis in the latest encyclical issued in June 2015 put forward such an idea. Pope Benedict XVI in the 2009 encyclical had already suggested the need for a super-UN to undertake that form of action.

Several thinkers, including the above Popes, considered equally imaginative steps. One such exciting concept would be to convince more prosperous countries; with UN help again, to organise a Marshal Plan type project to lift certain countries out of the deep troubles that afflict them. The focus would have to be primarily on education, health, and employment for younger persons. This is an ideal opportunity for personnel recruited through the UN to lend a helping hand. Think tanks and others in the region would be well-advised to build on these foundations.

The ideas presented above might seem unusual, timid, or far-fetched. People in the Middle East are enduring hardships that are historic in their magnitude and severity. Academics and practitioners have a duty to consider and suggest options that might help to lift the region out of its misery. At present, far too much pessimism and despair permeates much of what is being written about the area. This needs to be replaced by more constructive thoughts out of which at least some might prove useful. In dealing with such a complex set of conditions, there is no other way forward.

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Chapter 4
Reasons for Terrorism in the Middle East

Serkan Tasgin and Taner Cam

Introduction

The debate over the root causes of terrorism and radicalism in the Middle East is a complex and multifaceted issue. Relating terrorist activities to social, political, economic, religious, and cultural factors is profoundly complex. Some scholars focus on the counter-intelligence and coercive action against terrorism and radicalization in the Middle East, while some scholars focus on educational, social, and educational empowerment to stop radicalization and terrorism recruitment in this region (Taspinar, 2009). Therefore, in order to combat terrorism in the Middle East, it is crucial to understand the causes of terrorism.

Terrorist attacks toward the Turkish Embassy in Somalia, a mall attack in Nairobi, a church in Pakistan, a Shiite mosque in Iraq, and several attacks towards civilians in this region tell us that different interpretation, of the religion plays a big role in these terrorist attacks. The terrorists claimed that they conducted these attacks on behalf of Islamic law against non-Muslims or even Muslims whom they do not perceive as real Muslims. It is interesting that these new radical terrorists, called Neo-Kharijites, not only target non-Muslims but also target other Muslims whom they declare to be tekfir (non-believers) (Akyol, 2013). We chose this movement as the source of terrorism in the Middle East because they are considered to be the first terrorist movement and were the most radical stream in the Middle East in the 7th century. Their influences are seen now in the ideologies of ISIS, Al Qaeda, and Boko Haram terrorist organizations.

The social, economic, and educational circumstances of Middle Eastern countries is not adequate for preventing young people from radicalization and terrorism recruitment. However, these circumstances do not lead every young person to join

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terrorist organizations. Ideological and political factors play an important role in the region for joining terrorist organizations. The concept of radicalism perfectly reflects both political and ideological conditions and the mindset of people who are vulnerable to join terrorist organizations. In order to fight against terrorism, politicians, experts, and scholars should focus on radicalism. We know that not every radical turns into terrorist, however they are more vulnerable to join terrorist organizations. Therefore, early measures can be taken to avoid coercive measures (Taspinar, 2009). Radicalism can find sympathizers and acts of terrorism can be admired within these radicals. Terrorist acts can be seen as legitimate and there can be implicit support for it.

In terms of ideological motives, dying as a 'martyr;' fighting against an infidel enemy; protecting Muslim fellows; living in accordance with the teachings of Islam, where fighting and dying is emphasized; and trying to be immediately cleaned from their past sins, young people are easily attracted to radical discourses. These young people's religious knowledge is rudimentary and they only learn what they are told. The fundamental strength of radical groups is the misinterpretation of Islam in terms of their ideology. Along with contradictory facts about Islam, their misinterpretation of Islam attracts young people not only for faithful or ideological promises, such as being martyr, but also promises enjoyments such as women and money for life. As seen in ISIS, terrorists are paid salaries in cash and women hostages are given to them as gifts.

Regarding psychological motives of Arabs in the Middle East, we can say that young Arabs may perceive joining terrorist organizations as a response to Western humiliation against the Arab world because the Arab world has been exposed to continuous humiliation. For example, Palestine territories were handed over to Israel and the first Iraq invasion and killed more than 100,000 Arabs. Maltreatment of Arab convicts in Abu Ghraib prison during the second Iraq occupation not only humiliated the Arab world, but also took their selfconfidence. Gunter (2015) argued that US coalition prisons became recruitment centers for ISIS members. The Arab world did not unify or cooperate. In the end, the Arab people felt desperate because their governments were not strong enough to cooperate or unify against Israel or Western countries and there was nobody to take a stance against these actions (Laçiner, 2009).

Ayubi et al. (2009) have made a recent entry to the Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World on the Islamic State, in which they have explained the notion of the Islamic State beginning with the rise of Islam, then explained the juridical theory of the Islamic State by following the explanation of the modern ideological contributors to the establishment of Islamic State, ending the study with an analysis of contemporary Islamic States and their ideological bases. For instance, ISIS persuades its new recruits with its radical ideology. In fact, religion and ideology are the most important and attractive factors among justifications and reasons for terrorist attacks. That is, the existence of different, selective misinterpretations of specific verses of the Quran enables radical groups to pursue their political and ideological goals. ISIS is a continuity of kharijism, which is why it has been called neo-kharijism, as explained below.

(Neo) Kharijism

Neo Kharijism, that is the reflection of the Kharijism in the first period of Islam, can be seen as the most important source of terrorism in the Middle East. Similar to the Kharijites in the past, the current representatives of them, such as Al Qaeda, Al-Nusra, and ISIS terrorist organizations, interpret the Quran according to their own ideas, as well. They then brutally slaughter people who are mostly Muslim since they do not see them as true Muslims.

Kharijites are a former Muslim group, which turned against 4th Caliphate Ali after the battle of Siffin in the seventh century. At this battle, Ali agreed to make peace with Muaviye to end political disputes between them through arbitration and both sides agreed on stopping the war. However, over six thousand men from Ali's camp broke away because they claimed that the arbitration was against the Quran's principles and the leader of this group accused Ali of being non-Muslim. They claimed that arbitration rejected the Quran and the problem should have been solved by the Quran. They threatened to kill Ali. Six thousand men merged away after this incident, which is why they are called 'kharijites,' which means breaking away, merging away, leaving, or exiting. Their slogan was 'Islamic order in the world,' which is the same slogan of today's ISIS. They were the first group that broke away with a different understanding of Islam. Kharijites saw themselves as the sole representative of the true Islam. They easily claimed Muslims who did not think like them were infidels. This justified them in murdering and confiscating the properties of Muslims (Ünsal, 2015). A rigid, intolerant, unsympathetic, and alienating understanding prevailed in Kharijism (Ünal, 2014; Ünsal, 2015). Kharijites interpreted Quran ayahs (verses) according to their own views. They were an extremist and radical group. The uprisings of Kharijites, beginning during Caliph Ali Period, continued both under the Umayyads. They generally were suppressed under the Abbasids. After the Abbasids, Kharijites did not show any significant presence (Ünsal, 2015).

The first followers of and sympathizers of *Kharijites* came from displeased, dissatisfied youth, slaves, and marginalized people in the seventh century (Foss 2007) and it is not surprising that displeased youth in the Middle East and in Western countries is joining ISIS as youth joined Kharijites in the past. They propose that only salvation of Muslims is to go back to the teachings of Quran (but as interpreted by themselves) and *Sunnah*. However, their actions are direct opposition to their objective.

This group of people was described by Prophet Mohammed in his several hadiths. In these hadiths, Prophet Mohammad not only predicted the emergence of Kharijites but also called on Muslims to eliminate them (Kenney, 2006). One of these hadiths was, "They recite the Quran but it will never pass their throat (which means that they will not comprehend the Quran, they will not take it passed their throats and into their hearts). They appear to be Muslim but they stray from Islam as an arrow strays from the animal at which it is shot. If I am alive when this group comes, I shall destroy them like Allah destroyed Ad and Semud people (ancient cities of people mentioned in Quran). They are the worst of the creation. Those who fight against them and who oppose them are close to the book of Allah." In this

hadith, we hear a prediction that there will be groups stemming from the Islamic world who are Muslims, recite the Quran very well, but have nothing to do with the real teachings of Islam. One of the hadiths about (neo) kharijites was, "There will be many differences in my Ummah (Islamic world) but there will be only one group whose speech is often flowery but their actions are very terrible and have nothing to do with Islamic principles." Another hadith tells us, "Towards the end of time, there will be a group of young foolish men with foolish dreams, overzealous individuals. They will say good things but their belief and faith will not go beyond their throats and they will go out from their religion as an arrow passes through an animal. You will think your prayer is nothing when you look at their prayers. You will think your religiosity is nothing when you look at their religiosity. You will think your Quran recitations are nothing when you look at their Quran recitations. However, they have nothing to do with me. These people are the worst of my Ummah. Those who kill them (gets rid of them) are the best of my Ummah and shall be rewarded on the day of resurrection." As mentioned above, this group was described as the worst creation of his Ummah by Prophet Mohammed before they emerged.

From these hadiths, Kharijites were described by Islamic scholars explaining their signs. The first sign is that they will raise very popular, appealing Islamic slogans that will mostly appeal to common youth. They were described as having correct words, but their intentions were wrong. They used the Islamic slogans to mislead people. The second sign of this group is that they are extremely religious. They will have shaved heads and bulky beards. The third sign of this group is they will brainwash young people. They use specific hadiths and Quran verses which are misinterpreted to brainwash youth. Another sign is that they will appear towards to the end of time. They will appear from the East and they will emerge more than twenty times throughout the history (Ünsal, 2015).

The Characteristics of Kharijites

One of the most important characteristics of the Kharijites is that if a Muslim does not support their views about the interpretation of any ayah or hadith, he is to be declared an infidel (Ünsal, 2015). Then they were able to feel justified in confiscating the properties of that Muslim and killing him. Because of their heretical thoughts, many innocent Muslims were brutally slaughtered. This was also a reason to revolt against the authorities and states. It used to be seen as a pillar of their faith. They were so violent that they added one more pillar (jihad) to the five basic pillars of Islam. Moreover, they did not differentiate between civilian and combatants in their fight as ISIS and Al Qaeda. In Islamic law, civilians must not get hurt in battles. However, Kharijites not only killed civilian men but they also killed women, children and even infants and it was legitimate for their twisted ideology. However, violence against noncombatants such as women, clergy, and children is prohibited by the Islamic teachings and according to Quran, "One such principle is that taking the life of a single innocent is a crime against all humanity (Akyol, 2000; Canan, 1995)." Neo-Kharijites have the same ideology as former Kharijites because they

have the vision of a black and white world, which means that Muslims are with them or against them. Anyone who does not share this ideology or who criticizes them is automatically threatened. They are the first group of Muslims who used the excommunication process against other Muslim communities. If a Muslim commits sin, it is then justifiable to excommunicate those who do not share their way of belief. It is legitimate for them to fight and kill Muslim sinners (Ünsal, 2015). In fact, Kharijites did not actually interpret the Quran, instead, they confirmed and justified their own views and rights using the verses of the Quran (Ünsal, 2015). While they did not tolerate the slightest sin of any Muslim, some Kharijite groups could tolerate the sins of their supporters. However, most of them declared their supporters to be unbelievers when they committed a sin.

Demagogy and forcibly imposing their own views were some of the most favorite behaviors of them (Ünsal 2015). During any argument, they would not accept any opposing thought, even when people submitted evidence from the Quran or hadith. Due to these characteristics of Kharijites, Caliph Ali would give examples from the Prophet Muhammad's practices instead of telling the verses or hadiths during any discussion with Kharijites.

In their first period, Kharijites used to recite the Quran and pray but they could not internalize and understand the Quran correctly (Ünsal, 2015). They were sanctimonious and fanatical people. They despised other Muslims. Their rigid understanding of verses led them to declare other Muslims to be infidels. They murdered the fourth Caliphate Ali with a poisonous sword, attempted to assassinate several leaders in the society, friends of Prophet Mohammed and swore to kill all Muslims who did not think like themselves or obey and believe according to their beliefs (Akyol, 2014). Al Qaeda, ISIS, Boko Haram, and like-minded terrorist groups all carry on the ideology of Kharijism and that is why they are considered 'Neo-Kharijites,' the new followers of this twisted ideology.

Is That Neo Salafism or Neo Kharijism?

It is necessary to explain Salafism since most terrorist organizations (not linked to Shi'ism) operating in the Middle East tend to show themselves under the umbrella of Salafism (Ünsal, 2015). Thus, Salafism is used to explain fundamentalist thought. Nonetheless, Salafism is meant to be subject to Prophet Muhammad and the first three generations of Islam. The origin of Salaffiyyah, revived by Ibn Taymiyyah, was far away from terror (Bulaç, 2014; Ünsal, 2015). Salafiyyah thought root in the 12th century (Ünsal, 2015). Salafism was revived by Ibn Taymiyyah, later it was formed by ibn Abd Al-Wahhab, thus this sect is generally referred to as Wahhabi. Nevertheless; many adherents of Salafism do not use Wahhabism when they introduce themselves. Without jihadist Salafis, many of the Salafis are not linked to terrorism.

Tawhid (Unity of God) is one the most sensitive issues handled by the Salafis (Ünal, 2014; Ünsal, 2015). However, their understanding of Unity of Allah (God) differs from other Ahl al-Sunnah thought. For instance, Salafis deny tomb visitations

or worshiping at tombs, even worshiping at the tomb of Prophet Mohammad, because these acts are perceived as opposition to the Unity of God. ISIS, as the representative of jihadi salafism, destroyed one of the most ancient historical cities in Syria (Palmyra) just because they were landmarks of polytheism to them. ISIS also destroyed tombstones and shrines of descendants of the Prophet Mohammed in this city. ISIS also declared that one of their goals is to destroy Kaaba in Mecca and kill those who worship stones.

According to Salafis, ayahs about Allah (God) are not subject to any interpretation. Salafis do not declare other Muslim scholars who do not think about the attributes of God like them to be infidels, but they accuse them to be heretics instead.

Indeed, terrorist organizations claiming adherence to salafism in the Middle East are far away from Salafism as revived by Ibn Taymiyyah; however, their thoughts and acts are similar to the Kharijites' views and behaviors instead (Bulaç, 2014; Ünal, 2014; Ünsal, 2015). Today, Salafiyyah has become a common mindset linked to Sunni radical groups since some terrorist organizations identified themselves as Salafis. Like Kharijites, they display very intolerant and brutal attitudes toward Muslims and sometimes non-Muslims. They are closed to philosophy and they reject all kinds of different interpretations. They also try to justify their slaughters and suicide bombings by misinterpreting the Quran. They do not internalize the Quran and do not understand the spirit of Islam (Ünal, 2014; Ünsal, 2015). These Salafi movement fanatics believe that in order to solve the problem that Muslims and Muslim societies face today, strict practices of the earliest Muslims should be adhered to (Richards, 2002). They destroy holy places and the tombs in them. Their declaration of other Muslims to be infidels, similar to the Kharijites' methods. Akin to Kharijites, they are extremely tough when they proclaim Islam and invite people to Islam. Today, there are many Salafi groups who are not linked to terror as well. They may be doctrinally rigid; nevertheless, they are peaceful. Terrorist organizations claiming that they have Salafiyyah thought should also be separated from the first version of Salafism revived by Ibn Taymiyyah, because modern Salafis are closer to the Classical Kharijites in terms of their thoughts and actions. Thus, they should be called Neo-Kharijites.

Wahhabism was based on Salafism and they interpreted it more strictly in the 18th century. Ottomans struggled against Wahhabi beliefs and lost the control of Saudi Arabia. Wahhabis believe that Sufism is against Islam. They perceive prominent religious figures, such as Mevlana (Rumi) and Abdulqadir Geylani, as the enemy of Islam. Anyone who interprets Quran verses is considered to be a non-believer. Wahhabism is a way of spreading Islam with propaganda, as can be seen in the Balkans, Europe and Central Asia, which is aided by Saudi Arabia. They provide funding to some mosques that are perceived to be Salafi mosques, However, Wahhabism is also seen as a form of jihadism in combat areas (EGM, 2002).

Neo Khariji Terrorist Organizations: Al-Qaeda, Al-Nusra, and ISIS

Al-Qaeda's organizational structure and doctrine are based on Kharijism and its ideology is based on Salafism and Wahhabism (Bulaç, 2014). In early Salafiyyah thought there was no armed rebellion, terrorism, or killing of innocent civilians. From this point, it would be more appropriate to describe al-Qaeda as a Neo-Khariji terrorist organization.

Unlike Kharijites, the founders of Al-Qaeda are not poor and uneducated (Bulaç, 2014). They are well educated, rich and good at using technology. Some of them are former Arab Nationalists, Liberals or even Marxists. They slaughter many people including innocent civilians, Muslims and non-Muslims. They claim they commit these crimes in the name of religion, however killing innocent human beings is strictly forbidden in Islam (Canan, 1995; Ünal, 2008). Islam bans killing noncombatants, women, and children even during a war. Their brutal activities cannot be explained using Islam. Nevertheless, try to justify the slaughter by misinterpreting the Quran and using the examples the killings by the US and Israel in some Muslim countries.

Similar to Al-Qaeda, Al-Nusra is a terrorist organization having Salafi ideology but Khariji mentality (Bulaç 2014; Ünsal 2015). Al-Nusra operates in Syria as a branch of al-Qaeda. The militants of Al-Nusra massacre the Muslims who don't accept their views after they declared them to be infidels. They also confiscate their properties. They claim their own views to be the orders of Islam.

ISIS is the last may be not the least representative of Neo Khariji thought (Bulaç 2014; Ünsal 2015). Like Al-Nusra, ISIS has emerged as a branch of Al-Qaeda operating in Iraq and Syria. It is one of the most brutal and bloody terrorist organizations in the world. Al-Qaeda's current leader Ayman Zawahiri declared that ISIS's founder Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced ISIS's foundation without their knowledge (Ünsal 2015). Then, he declared that ISIS would only operate in Iraq. However, Baghdadi did not obey Zawahiri's order, like Kharijites did in the past. Baghdadi claimed that it was the order of God. The presence of many independent extremist groups in Syria stems from the Salafi approach based on Kharijism. ISIS accepts non-Muslim militants while the other Al-Qaeda groups reject it. ISIS justifies acceptance of non-Muslims by claiming that they need more warriors since they fight at many fronts. Although ISIS claimed that Shia is the enemy of them and their goal is to overthrown Assad, without minor skirmishes, they did not ever fight with Shia or Assad forces. However, ISIS fights against Free Syrian Army, Al-Nusra, PYD (the Syrian branch of the PKK), and Peshmerga. Almost all of the victims of ISIS slaughters are Muslims. ISIS militants are very intolerant against the Muslims who do not support them and accept their views. They declare the Muslims who do not accept their views to be infidels. Then they slaughter those Muslims and confiscate their properties as the Kharijites did in the past. The executions of non-Muslims are used to attract new militants especially among marginalized, uneducated, and radical youth by ISIS.

Although none of these terrorist organizations have Islamic characteristics such as peace, brotherhood, tolerance, and forgiveness; they claim they do everything in the name of religion. All of them are far away from the spirit of Islam. They only try to justify the results of their own views by misinterpreting verses and hadiths.

Political, Economic, and Educational Circumstances in the Middle East

Middle Eastern people live in situations where the literacy rate is low, inequality between men and women in many services is high, human right violations are prominent, rule of law is not accepted, and dictatorships are present in most countries (Onat, 2004). Relative deprivation is very high in the Middle East because globalization created awareness about opportunities in the minds of people. However, people are now aware of opportunities that they do not have access to or the right to due to the states' weak capacities. These circumstances create frustration, humiliation and victimization among Middle Eastern people who are mostly undereducated, underemployed and unemployed. Moreover, young Muslims learn about modern life in Western countries and they are caught between their strict religious tradition, which is imposed by political Islamic parties, and Western modernity (Taspinar, 2009).

Social, psychological, political, economic, and cultural factors all help to breed terrorism. When these factors come together, terrorist organizations can easily recruit young people. In this regard, we will mostly mention the fight against terrorism not the fight against terror in the Middle East. The fight against terrorism or radicalism needs to focus on maintaining social, educational and economic needs and empowering human development in that region. At the same time, the fight against terrorists can be implemented. However, the important part of this struggle is against terrorism and radicalism because security-oriented policies and operations against terrorists do not end terrorism (Laçiner, 2009, 2013).

Poverty, ignorance, unemployment, and authoritarian regimes are the most prominent problems in the Middle East in regards to their effect on people's involvement in radical groups. These factors are important because Neo-Kharijites manipulate these chronic problems in the Islamic world and they claim that they are the defenders of truth, pure representatives of justice, fighters in the way of God, and deceive youth with the ideas of jihad, bravery, carrying out God's will, and challenging Western countries that exploit the Muslim world. They can only attract youth who do not have a true background in Islam and who are dissatisfied and displeased with the current situation of their homeland and the Islamic world (Foss, 2007; Ünsal, 2015). While these factors are not directly associated with joining terrorist organizations, they are easily manipulated in order to attract youth. We believe that these circumstances in the Middle East may have an effect on people's choice to accept radical ideologies as the only way to respond deficiencies in the region. These factors are explained briefly below.

Authoritarian Regimes in the Middle East

Hegemony means the power of one state over other states. In a global perspective, it also means controlling economic, cultural and political power and supremacy on a global scale. Therefore, a hegemonic state has global power over other states and the main concern of this state is to sustain its power and global order. Hegemonic

states also have power in international organizations and can direct these organizations according to its global interests (Gozen, 2004; Aktutun, 2004). In this respect, the U.S. is considered to be a hegemonic state in the eyes of Middle Eastern people. It causes instability in the region when the US supports authoritarian regimes.

US foreign policy towards the Middle East is mostly criticized for the support of Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes. The main purpose of the presence of the US military in this region is to access and control energy resources. Therefore, supporting these regimes means stability in the region. That is, repression of freedom of speech and human rights in these Middle Eastern countries prevented an uncontrolled rise against US interests in the region. People living in these countries blame the US for their undemocratic circumstances which curtail equal opportunities and human rights for average people. Therefore, considering the repressive conditions of these countries, there is less chance for any democratization efforts. However, support for authoritarian regimes caused a wave of religious extremism in which people found different interpretations of Islam to react against dissatisfaction and distrust against the US presence (Barzegar, 2005). Support of these corrupt, secular, dictatorial regimes paved the way for radical groups as the only alternative to the people who want to oppose these regimes. Moreover, uncertainty in the Middle East is misused by ISIS members for their own purposes (Gunter, 2015). Due to inadequate social and economic services within the Muslim states, some Islamic groups who favor radicalism and have a political agenda provide education, health, and social services in these areas and Muslims feel sympathy towards them. At the end, political Islam that is favored by radical groups "slowly evolves into a resistance movement against injustice, state oppression, and western support for repressive regimes" (Taspinar, 2009: p. 79). That is why ISIS declared the rise of caliphate as the only way for the salvation of Muslims from political chaos. ISIS declared that all rulers in Islamic countries are unbelievers and it is legitimate for them to fight against political leaders and whole nations to force them to join their organization.

Arab-Israel Conflict in the Region

US foreign policy has always supported Israel over other Middle Eastern countries and favored Israel's interests against Arab countries and Palestine. Financial, diplomatic and military support of Israel against Arab countries created resentment, humiliation, and hate in these countries (Barzegar, 2005). It is interesting that, although the Palestinian problem is the most prominent and manipulated problem in the region, the majority of the terrorist attacks were against Muslims, Christians or other religious and ethnic groups in the region. ISIS only launched rockets from Egypt's soil to Israel, which did not cause any damage. Formerly, the Al Qaeda affiliated terrorist organization, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, which has declared and pledged alliance to ISIS, took the responsibility for this rocket fire (Melman, 2015). Spokesperson of ISIS, Nidal Nuseiri has stated that although the group's central idea was the destruction of Israel, they had to fulfill six specific stages first before taking Israel. He also stated that before taking Israel, they had to weaken the US

both economically and politically via attacks on American soil and US interests in the Middle East (Halevi and Soffer, 2014). Moreover, ISIS shared a message via Twitter that they did not take orders from God to kill Jewish people. Their priority was to fight against a close enemy. This close enemy was hypocrite (munafik) and God ordered to fight against these hypocrites because they are more dangerous than infidels (Sabah, 2015). Most religious-based terrorist organizations' primary enemy was Israel. They were attracting their followers with this discourse. However, from their discourses, it is evident that the most prominent enemy for ISIS is other Muslims because neo-kharijism mostly targets other Muslims for not believing like themselves. Therefore, the Arab-Israel conflict is not a useful discourse for ISIS to recruit youth, unlike other radical terrorist organizations.

Poverty in the Middle East

Despite the increase in educational attainment in Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries, per capita economic growth in the region over the past 20 years has been relatively low. Compared to other countries in the developing world, Middle Eastern and North African countries collectively have relatively elevated poverty. The unemployment rate is quite high and will probably worsen because governments are not able to provide the necessary jobs. Unemployment and low wages affected the young generation in the region whose anger was fueled for political unrest (World Bank, 2007). Moreover, Richards (2002) stated that "the unemployment rate problem is the most volatile economic issue facing the Middle East. It encourages many relatively educated, young, urban residents to support radical Islamic political movements" (p. 31).

There has been debate on the relationship between poverty and terrorism. Some assert that poverty directly leads to terrorism, while some claim that poverty contributes to terrorism by supporting terrorist activities and politically motivated violence (Krueger & Maleckova, 2002). It is evident that socioeconomic instability and deficiency create anger and unhappiness and these factors may direct those people to join terrorist organizations in the Middle East. However, it is not enough to link a causation of terrorism to poverty. Poverty, unemployment and despair breed joining terrorist organizations (Stiglitz, 2002). In terms of economic integration in the world market, the Middle Eastern region is the least successful in the world (Laçiner, 2009). In this regard, it is mostly emphasized that terrorism is a response to political conditions and frustration, which is powered by low economic conditions (Krueger & Maleckova, 2002).

Sociologists assert that absolute economic deprivation does not lead people to joining terrorist organizations but relative economic deprivation does. That is, people may see some people living in wealth and prosperity and wonder why they do not have these opportunities. This type of thinking may lead to social deviance and joining terrorist organizations (Özerkmen, 2004). These kinds of people may easily be drawn into terrorist organizations to take revenge and fulfill their expectations. For instance, ISIS terrorists who were responsible for Diyarbakir and Suruc blasts

in Turkey, in which almost 50 people died, came from poor families from one of the Southeastern provinces (Adiyaman) in Turkey. His brother was also responsible for Ankara blast couple of months later. Experts warned that almost 200 young people from Adiyaman between 17 and 25 years old joined ISIS. Adiyaman is one of the least developed provinces in Turkey and young people suffer from unemployment. It has been found that ISIS gives a salary to new recruits and promises to continue. Therefore, earning money is reason to join ISIS in Turkey (Ibrahimoglu & Yazicioglu, 2015). A congressman, Umut Oran from Republican People's Party prepared a report about why young people from Adiyaman are joining ISIS. The most prominent factors are explained below:

- ISIS is giving almost $6000 to young unemployed people and imposing its political and religious agenda. Then, it continues to give $1200 each month.
- Due to high rate of unemployment in the city (one of the five cities which had the highest unemployment rate), many cafes became overcrowded and these places became the target of ISIS to recruit these frustrated young people (CNNTURK 2015).

As criminologists have pointed out, committing violent acts is overwhelmingly a youth phenomenon. Similarly, resorting to join radical organizations and adopting radical discourses is overwhelmingly a phenomenon of youth who are unemployed, underemployed and have few education opportunities who gather for political and ideological fulfillment of their radical goals (Richards, 2002).

Ignorance in the Middle East

Like poverty, ignorance in the Middle East also provides a breeding ground for radicalization (Taspinar, 2009). According to the World Bank report, despite the investments and some related educational developments in the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries, the educational achievements of these countries remain below than other countries which are at similar levels of economic development. MENA countries are still quite behind other similar countries in terms of secondary and higher education enrollment, distribution of educational attainment, and average number of years of schooling. Moreover, literacy rates are still quite below those of similar countries. Illiteracy rate is twice as high as in East Asia and Latin America. Distribution of education is becoming less equal over years (World Bank, 2007).

As stated above, ignorance in the Middle East can be seen as a factor which drives young people to join radical groups. However, there is a growing number of educated and middle class young people who favor radical groups. However, these young people have fewer employment opportunities and most of them are unemployed. They cannot express themselves and their expectations in political world due to repressive regimes of their countries. Radical groups who have a political agenda can be gateways for young, educated, unemployed, and frustrated young people (Taspinar, 2009).

The relationship between education level and engagement in terrorist activities is a controversial issue. Krueger & Maleckova (2002) examined the determinants of participation in Hezbollah in Lebanon and they found that education and poverty were not statistically significant predictors of whether people become martyrs for Hezbollah. This finding was also congruent with Palestinian suicide bombers. They were educated and from average income families. 27 Israeli Jews, who were responsible for planting bombs and the assassination of Palestinian mayors in the early 1980s in the Occupied Territories, also came from well-paying occupations and they were well-educated. Moreover, according to a survey of Palestinian people about whether they approve and support attacks on Israeli military and civilian targets, the results showed that they supported terrorist attacks against Israeli targets and the demographics of these people showed that they had higher education and came from higher living circumstances (Krueger & Maleckova, 2002).

If ignorance is not a significant predictor of joining terrorist activities in the Middle East, we can question how individuals become influenced by extremist propaganda, which drives them into terrorist organizations. This question leads us to the radicalization process of individuals in the Middle East.

Considering the economic and educational circumstances of the MENA countries, it is clear that youth who are poor, have limited education and few occupation opportunities, or are mostly unemployed or had jobs below their expectations and capacity, are more willing to join opposition movements in particular radical groups. For instance, the violent radical opposition in Egypt mostly occurred in Upper Egypt. The *Sa'id* (Middle and Upper Egypt) which is the poorest region of Egypt. When Sa'idis began to move into large cities, they also brought their radical ideas with them and radicalism became more visible in Egypt's large and developed cities (Richards, 2002).

Radicalization in the Middle East and New Collective Identity

Although globalization created many economic, social, and cultural opportunities, it did not spread homogeneously. Radicalization is a long-lasting indoctrination process that especially targets young people. Therefore, if social politics and investments are not supported, radicalization may be more apparent. The Middle Eastern region is plagued by unstable economic, political and social problems and therefore, neo-kharijism is gathering relatively large numbers of support throughout the Muslim world in a short amount of time (Myers & Stanovsek, 2014; Rodrik, 1998). With developments in technology, people have better and faster access to worldwide changes and developments. Therefore, people in underdeveloped regions can compare their situations with people living in other developed regions, which increase their expectations that may never be met (Kennedy, 1995). German writer Gunter Grass pointed out that in a new world order, there is no place for third world countries. He said that powerful countries declared war on terrorism, however terrorism, which stems from Middle East, is the product of anger turned into grudge against the dominant and arrogant attitude of Western countries, The US in particular (Giddens, 2000).

Taylor and Whitter (1992: p. 105) examined the collective identity in social movement communities. According to these authors, collective identity is the renaming of a group by group members in terms of their common interest, experiences, and ties. Group members' own identity is reshaped within the group identity (Friedman & McAdam, 1992: p. 157). Young and Sun (2003: pp. 208–209) assert that collective identity is developed by comparing themselves with "other." Terrorism activities regarding collective identity are perceived as similar to hate crimes because the target of hate crimes is selected not due to the individual's behavior, but his or her group identity. Hate crimes target members of religious, racial or ethnic groups in which economic deprivation was a crucial determinant (Fearon & Laitin, 2002). Moreover, in both hate crimes and terror activities, the aim is to wreak terror on a wider public than those directly affected (Krueger & Maleckova, 2002). There are some considerations that create a collective identity. These are explained below.

Feel of Injustice

Klandermans (1997: p. 17) states that if there is a big gap between the expectations of people and what they have, it creates anger. This situation is mostly observed in underdeveloped countries. New changes and development cannot be followed by the agencies and institutions in these countries and the expectations of the people cannot be fulfilled (Skocpol 2004). Due to imbalanced globalization, the gap between developed and undeveloped countries has widened and people living in undeveloped countries feel injustice due to economic deprivation. Western countries are wealthier and more developed compared to Muslim countries and Western countries can easily impose their cultural and social values on people in underdeveloped Muslim countries. Therefore, people in Muslim countries feel as defeated by Western countries because they are not equal to them. That feeling breeds injustice among these people (Hungtington 1968; Yegenoğlu 1996: pp. 115–116). Parallel to this argument, Taspinar (2009) stated that "Such radicalized societies are permeated by a deep sense of collective frustration, humiliation, and deprivation relative to expectations. This radicalized social habitat is easily exploited by terrorists" (p. 77). In short, not only people of Middle Eastern countries, but Muslims from all over the world, think that the West is not treating Muslims justly (Laçiner, 2009).

Responsibility for Injustice

When feelings of injustice occur among people living in deprived regions, they blame the "other" which is different than them. Anger toward the "other" creates collective identity. This "other" may be a country, ethnic group or religious group. That creates an us versus them feeling (Taylor & Whitter, 1992). When we think about the 9/11 targets, we can consider that terrorism targeted the imbalanced globalization represented by the twin towers and the American intervention in Middle East represented by the Pentagon. The western world was perceived as responsible

for injustice (Laçiner, 2009). However, today's radicalization does not only target Western people or values. Instead, they also target Muslims that they perceive to be false Muslims or hypocrites (munafik).

Consciousness Creates Collective Identity

The concept of consciousness represents the group's purposes and actions. Consciousness is transmitted to group members through media, internet, or in some places for religious gatherings (Taylor & Whitter 1992). If the enemy uses violence, the collective consciousness will approve of a violent response. People that share a collective consciousness believe that they can only change their deprived situation using violence. This will bring collective actions which will in turn increase the strength of collective consciousness. Terror incidents may be considered a collective action of these people (Wedel, 2001). People who are under radical influence hold different perceptions, conceptions, constructions, and justifications for terrorist attacks which generate consciousness.

Societies which adopt violent repertories, frames, scripts, and fundamentalist ideologies consequently become more likely to use violent means to pursuit their ideological and political goals. Repertories, frames, and scripts are broadly studied concepts in criminological and sociological studies which are congruent with terrorism studies. For instance, Harding (2007) broadly explained repertoire, frame, and script concepts in which he draws from previous studies as cultural concepts. The first cultural concept is repertoire where culture is seen as a tool kit of symbols, stories, and worldviews in which people use them to solve their problems or pursue their ideological and political goals. In other words, they are people's own beliefs, norms, and values. It is not a unified system but is a repertoire from which to draw. This tool kit not only results from individual interaction or beliefs but also from the culture through institutions such as school or media. Radical groups' ideologies have been publicized widely over the internet. The propaganda some of which are composed of videos and stories are widely shared over the internet and some other social platforms such as Skype, Ask.fm, Instagram, Tumblr, and Kik by radical groups to attract and allure the youth not only from Middle Eastern region but also from all over the world. Misinterpretation of Islam, Neo Kharijism, created new repertories for people which enabled and legitimized their violent behaviors against not only non-Muslims but also Muslims whom they believe that these "other" Muslims are not true believers and are hypocrites and therefore can be killed (Ünsal 2015). These neo Kharijites go to certain mosques or masjids where they learn and share their misinterpreted Quran verses. In these places, people who are exposed to radical ideology may turn into terrorists due to group radicalization where strong group pressure is exerted by group members and being martyr is idealized.

Frames and scripts were measured as two types of cultural objects in individual's or group's repertoire. Frame serves as lens for individuals in which they interpret events and therefore impacts how individuals react. They may allow cultural heterogeneity as well as repertoires. Individuals may have several contradictory frames that

they may deploy in different situations (Harding 2007). However, in radicalized groups, their point of views is almost the same due to sharing of same radical values. Their interpretation and perception of "other" is based on elimination or control of "other." Scripts provide cultural templates for the sequencing behaviors or actions over time (Harding 2007). They show how to solve problems and achieve goals. Scripts in radicalized groups perceive violence as the elimination of "other." For instance, Hegghammer (2006) examined the profile of 240 Saudi Arabian militants. Most of them were dead and some of them were apprehended and were in high security prisons. He stated that most of these militants came from regions that are socially or religiously conservative. They had also gone to Afghanistan to have training in Al Qaeda camps for at least 2 years. One of the interesting finding was that more than half of the militants came from Riyadh before they joined terrorist organization where high profile radical ideologues such as Nasir al-Fahd created the extremist community in this city. Saudi Arabia is the center for Wahhabi belief which can be considered as different interpretation of Islam and this belief is the official ideology of Saudi Arabia which is spread to other regions of the world with the help of oil-rich country, Saudi Arabia. *Neo Kharijites* mostly came from Wahhabi belief (Laçiner 2013). These kinds of places are best places where repertoires, frames, and scripts can be spread easily.

Collective Identity Regarding Joining ISIS in Iraq and Syria

Since the war in Syria broke out in 2011, thousands of young people came to Syria and Iraq to fight for the Islamic State, which attracted many young people for its cause. Most of the young people came from Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, Lebanon, and Morocco to fight for ISIS. Around 5,000 Tunisians came to the region while 5,000 more were stopped from leaving the country. 8,000 ISIS members came from Egypt, 2,500 members came from Saudi Arabia, 1,500 members came from Morocco, 1,500 members came from Jordan, and 1,700 came from Turkey. These countries are known for their undemocratic situations, poverty among citizens and repressive regimes. Moreover, the reason for joining ISIS in these countries is mostly for ideological and political reasons (Kirk, 2015).

There are also 2,500 foreign young members of the terrorist organization that came from Western countries such as the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Australia, and New Zealand (Kirk, 2015). The reason for coming from almost 81 countries to fight for ISIS is their faith. That is, they believe that it is their religious obligation to protect fellow Muslims from the enemy. They also want to take part in a battle against the 'infidel' enemy and die as a 'martyr'(Barrett, 2014). This belief is transmitted as propaganda through the internet and in some places by extremist religious pundits.

One of the most fundamental features of radical terrorist groups which have Salafi discourse such as ISIS is the exclusionist attitude towards other Muslims. For instance, ISIS declared Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood as non-Muslims. Considering the declarations of ISIS through their website, it is evident that they mostly emphasized the polytheism and targeted other Muslims (Bicer 2015).

Conclusion

It is important to examine and explore the root causes of terrorism, in particular radicalism in this region. This includes the lack of socioeconomic integration of Muslim societies into conventional society, learning radical discourses in a context of social structure, interaction among these people which produces radical violent behavior and justifies certain behavior due to the misinterpretation of religious thoughts and assuming that they are congruent with the radicalization process. Therefore, we may have a better understanding of the context that radicalization of these people occurs.

Muslims worldwide confront a multidimensional crisis that is economic, political, educational, cultural, and social. Terrorism is only a result of these intertwined problems. Middle Eastern countries are repressive and do not enable democratization for their people. Human rights and rule of law are not evident. Economic conditions depend on oil, they are not based on industry, and the economy of these countries is not as integrated into the global economy. The globalization of communication contributed to the spread of radicalism throughout Middle Eastern countries and other parts of the world, even Western countries. Authoritarian regimes in this region also failed to manage and successfully engage in the process of globalization (Laçiner, 2009; Richards, 2002). There is hardly anything that can be taken as an example from these Middle Eastern countries for people around other parts of the world. Overall, as Richards (2002) stated, "Today's Middle East finds itself mired in the modernization process," (p. 23) and radicals perceive the only solution to be the restoration of circumstances of 7th century Arabia. In order to realize this image, they believe radical terrorist organizations' religious rhetoric. The real approach of religion towards violence and radicalization should be promoted by mainstream Muslims in order to counter terrorist approaches and prevent the misinterpretation and misuse of religion. Islamic scholars from all over the world should gather and develop strategies against the ideology of Neo-Kharijism and denounce terrorism and violence in general. As Obama stated, ISIS is a cancer and it has no place in the 21st century. Therefore, all Muslims should join to combat this 'cancer.'

In order to fight against radicalization in the Middle East, motives that drive people into joining terrorist organizations should be explored. Western countries supported repressive regimes in the Middle East for their own national interests, therefore these repressive regimes withheld democratic systems for their citizens. These people had to live in an anti-democratic country where rule of law and human rights were not supported. People did not have many opportunities to look for their rights in democratic ways because they were forbidden. Therefore, these people were easily targeted by radical groups. By joining radical groups and sharing their values, they were able to take revenge from those countries that supported their repressive leaders. Radical groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS have a universal ideology which aims at withdrawing American forces from the Middle East and discontinuing American support to Israel. Therefore, Western countries in particular should revise their foreign relations with repressive regimes in the Middle East and

should help these countries to develop the human rights of their citizens (Güven, 2004: p. 1; FPIF Report 2001: pp. 5–6). Human rights and education should be promoted as the most basic of Islamic values. Human rights and education have a reciprocal relationship. That is, in educational curricula, human rights and democratic values should be nurtured. While most of the region's youth are under the influence of unqualified, radical figures that have radical, religious rhetoric, religious education is vital in order to eradicate these twisted ideologies. Laçiner (2009) pointed out, "a struggle approach lacking in social, economic, political dimensions is in fact not a struggle, but it delays and deepens the problem."

In order to break the terrorist recruitment cycle, extensive research should be conducted on the radicalization process which targets vulnerable people, methods of deception and the tools that are used for attracting and motivating prospective candidates. Understanding terrorists' mindset, their environment, family backgrounds, and peers are equally important factors to fight against radicalism in that region. Research on these topics will enable us to better understand the circumstances of individuals' motivations; their mindset, which in turn helps us to create policies to solve this problem.

There should be research on exploring pathways to radicalization and radicalization process. This will help policy makers to develop and implement intervention and prevention programs at the community level to eradicate radicalization and terrorism in the long turn.

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Chapter 5
Impact of Islamophobia and Human Rights: The Radicalization of Muslim Communities

Vadim R. Atnashev

Introduction

Modern terrorism is hard to be explained by a single or even multiple factors, since the problem is interdisciplinary and shall be studied from the perspective of multiple disciplines. Existing theoretical approaches to explain terrorism have not yet answered all the questions related to the problem. Even definitions and classifications of terrorism are not completed and generally accepted. Exploring forms of terrorism in the social, political, and ethnic conflicts, it is necessary to take into account the multidimensional nature of the phenomenon.

The present article scopes in analysis of some factors such as discrimination, racism, and xenophobia that provoke some Muslims from European states to take part in extremist and terrorist activities in countries of their residence and/or in the Middle East. The UN General Assembly has elaborated the draft Comprehensive convention against international terrorism. In its draft article 2, the definition of terrorism reads as follows:

1. "Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:

   (a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or
   (b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the environment; or

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(c) Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss,when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act"

Though transnational terrorism already existed in nineteenth century (first of all it concerns the anarchist terrorism), only at the turn of the twenty-first century it became globalized not only in the real world but also in the cyberspace. Unfortunately, global terror is increasing in attacks and deaths: terror attacks rose by more than a third from 2013 to 2014 (and doubled from 2012), while deaths nearly tripled from 2012 to 2014 (33,000 in 2014 against 11,133 in 2012 and 18,000 in 2013) (US State Department 2014).

Besides the local causes of terrorism in each country and region, there are common root causes. One of them is social and political injustice, another one is the belief that violence justifies the ends, when the force seems to be the only way (About Global Terrorism 2015). Indeed, in conflict zones all over the Middle East, high unemployment, insecurity, and lack of participation in local and national governance are widespread challenges, often turning into violence, including terrorist activity. In many conflict regions, young people below the age of 30 form the majority of the population. This youth is often faced with a dire socioeconomic environment. High unemployment, insecurity, and lack of participation in local and national governance are widespread challenges, often turning into violence. However, this is not just a regional process but is global one.

Violation of Human Rights and Terrorism

The Helsinki Summit 1992 Declaration of CSCE included the provision that terrorism is "threat to security, democracy and human rights" (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 2015).[1] Many international conventions on terrorism also stipulate a similar provision. Hence a practical question arises: do violations of human rights trigger and encourage terrorism?

In the sight of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, in recent years "the measures adopted by States to counter terrorism have themselves often posed serious challenges to human rights and the rule of law. Some States have engaged in torture and other ill-treatment to counter terrorism, while the legal and practical safeguards available to prevent torture, such as regular and independent monitoring of detention centers, have often been disregarded. Other States have returned persons suspected of engaging in terrorist activities to countries where they face a real risk of torture or other serious human rights abuse, thereby violating

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[1] Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (2015): Retrieved from http://www.osce.org/mc/39530?download=true

the international legal obligation of non-refoulement… Repressive measures have been used to stifle the voices of human rights defenders, journalists, minorities, indigenous groups and civil society. Resources normally allocated to social programs and development assistance have been diverted to the security sector, affecting the economic, social and cultural rights of many" (Human Rights Fact 2008:1).

One of the main reasons for discontent and protest among Muslim communities is discrimination, especially Islamophobic or anti-Muslims hate crimes that may be encouraged and legitimized. Discriminatory legislation result in social inequality in jobs, housing, social services, and negative media representation of Muslims. As John Esposito argued many years ago, "Islam and Islamist revivalism are easily reduced to stereotypes of Islam against the West, Islam's war with modernity, or Muslim rage, extremism, fanaticism, terrorism" (Esposito 1992:173). So far, these stereotypes have not only been maintained but also widely disseminated by mass media, unprincipled politicians, and racists.

Meanwhile in 2004, the Security Council adopted resolution 1566 (2004), in which it "called on all States to cooperate fully in the fight against terrorism and, in doing so, to prevent and punish criminal acts that have the following three characteristics, irrespective of whether motivated by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature" (Human Rights Fact 2008:40).

Nowadays, Muslims and immigrants have become the main object of hate and xenophobia in almost all countries of Europe. Many of them were and are refugees and migrants, considerable movement of whom was caused by "political turmoil, internal ethnic strife, the settling of historical grievances, and religious extremism in various countries around the globe" (War Crimes Program 2015).[2]

Hate Crimes

Hate crime is a message crime because it impacts on other members of the community who belong to the same social group of the person(s) attacked. Members of the group feel victimized so such crimes create a climate of increased fear and anxiety and can affect the victim's family, friends, neighbors, and the whole community. Further, members of other targeted groups are also reminded of their vulnerability to similar attack. On one hand, this leads to minority community members avoiding particular businesses, leaving their jobs or changing their traditional appearance and clothing, on the other hand leads to radicalization, direct confrontation, or going underground.

Hate crimes often produce social division and public unrest and have the capability to threat to public order and security. In many cases, when authorities and policy makers evade effective investigation and prosecution of hate crimes, they encourage perpetrators to freely continue such criminal activities and induce others to commit

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[2] War Crimes Program (2015). Department of Justice of the Government of Canada. Retrieved on http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/wc-cdg/prog.html

similar crimes. Due to the lack of protection from hate crimes, minority communities can lose confidence in law enforcement and government structures, and this leads to further marginalization.

Nevertheless, in many European countries the term "hate crime" has no legal status and legal act which uses the term. Even in the United Kingdom where the period between World War II and the late 1970s was one of the most viciously racist periods in British history, only in 1980s the British government turned its attention to the significant issue of hatred and minority victimization.

After the September 11 attacks in the USA, anti-Muslim rhetoric from different political figures and mass media created a climate that legitimized discrimination against the particular minority group. Such violation of individual and collective rights encouraged and provoked far-right extremist groups to commit hate and other crimes against Muslims.

Counterterrorism and Human Rights

The global counterterrorism campaign was based on the international legal norms but there were different human rights violations. While targeted sanctions against individuals suspected of involvement in terrorist activity may be an effective tool in a State's efforts to combat terrorism, such procedures pose a number of serious challenges to human rights.

In the specific context of counterterrorism, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has said that the principle of nondiscrimination is not capable of limitation since it has become a norm of *jus cogens*. This is reflected within various international and regional documents on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism.

It is important to note that in its general recommendation No. 30 (2004), the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has called on States to ensure that any measures taken in the fight against terrorism do not discriminate, in purpose or effect, on the grounds of race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin and that non-citizens are not subjected to racial or ethnic profiling or stereotyping. At the regional level, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) has asked Governments to ensure that no discrimination ensues from legislation and regulations, or their implementation, in the field of law enforcement checks (ECRI 2004). Finally, the European Union Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights has cautioned that profiling on the basis of characteristics such as religion, nationality, age, or birthplace "presents a major risk of discrimination" (EU Network of Independent Experts in Fundamental Rights 2003:21).

Islamophobia in European Countries

United Kingdom

The report fulfilled in 2011 by a research group for Islamic Human Rights Commission considered 29 categories of negative experiences when the respondents (data collected from 336 questionnaires) encountered implicit and explicit forms of discrimination and abuse in the United Kingdom. The 2011 Census revealed that the 2.7 million Muslim population was socioeconomically disadvantaged in comparison with the wider population. In recent years, increasing regularity of negative media representation of Muslims has constructed them as a furious and militant religious mob, which has led to increasing prevalence in the problem of Islamophobia.

According to the above-mentioned survey, considerable part of Muslims in the UK are often confronted with different manifestations of racial hatred, discrimination, and abuse. For example,

- 66.9 % of correspondents have witnessed policies affecting Muslims negatively;
- 63.1 % have heard racial remarks;
- 57.1 % have heard or witnessed Islamophobic remarks;
- 53.6 % have experienced direct verbal attacks;
- 50.3 % have experienced racial tensions in their cities and neighborhoods;
- 44.6 % have witnessed the passing of discriminatory policies;
- 41.7 % have experienced being ignored in public places;
- 41.4 % have experienced threats or unfair accusations.

Moreover, the top three highest frequencies that were experienced by Muslims in terms of frequency of occurrence are as follows:

- Witnessing negative stereotyping of Islam in the media (66.9 %)
- Being stared at by a stranger (44.4 %)
- Witnessing political policies affecting Muslims negatively (37.8 %)

The fact is that higher income respondents were likely to have experienced hearing racially offensive remarks or explicit instances of Islamophobia. It is worthy to note that Muslims who attend Islamic schools or living Muslim neighborhoods have low experiences of abuse and discrimination. Thus, if they live separately outside their community but not integrated in the local society, in the situation of discrimination and Islamophobia they can be radicalized and even provoked to acts of violence. Different manifestations of discrimination both active (due to actions on the part of society or of Muslims) and passive (due to inaction on the part of society or of Muslims) are the following:

- Hostile remarks being made about Islam (74.5 % of respondents)
- Negative stereotyping of Islam in the media (66.9 %)
- Political policies affecting Muslims negatively (66.9 %)
- Racial remarks (63.1 % heard or witnessed them)
- Islamophobic remarks (57.1 % heard or witnessed them)
- Direct verbal attacks (53.6 %)

- Unfriendly behavior on the streets (50.9%)
- Racial tensions in their cities and neighborhoods (50.3%)
- Frequent experiences of biased behavior (48.2%)
- Having witnessed the passing of discriminatory policies (44.6%)
- Having the religious beliefs questioned or disregarded (43.4%)
- Having experience of being avoided (43.2%)
- Having been laughed at or mocked (41.9%)
- Having experience of being ignored in public places (41.7%)
- Having experience of threats or unfair accusations (41.4%)
- Having experience of unfriendly behavior in their place of work or study (37.2%)

Among Muslims, there is no clear distinction between "radical" and "liberal" Islam as well as "traditional Islam," notably they reject the negative connotation of "radical" but without the imposition of "moderate" Islam as shaped by the government. The distinction between student activism and radicalism also is often unclear as demonstrate different surveys (e.g., Brown and Saeed 2015). Therefore, the categories are not simply binaries but relate to "degrees of alterity" (Tyrer 2010). As Tyrer (2010:105) observed, for Muslim immigrants, ultimately the "White man" decides who is an acceptable or unacceptable Muslim and determines who are tolerated "at given places under given conditions in a given ghetto."

Naturally, Muslims feel the sense of alienation and protest. Abbas and Siddique (2012) note how Muslim men and women use beards and veils as a sign of resistance against anti-Muslim sentiment but even these choices are perceived as a form of softer radicalization. In creating a nexus between universities and security, Muslim activity, even student activism (Tyrer 2010), is tainted with perceptions of extremism and terrorism that are propagated by mass media and state actors. Although radicalization narratives emphasize the individual radicalism, counter-radicalization policies usually include attempts to monitor and constrain not only individuals, but uppermost Islamic groups. Unfortunately, the policies are often connected with excessive enforcement. Young Muslims (and immigrants in general) are very sensitive to injustices against them or their community members, so they can support targeted groups because of solidarity.

For example, in April 2006, in the UK Hizb-ut-Tahrir members reignited the debate by protesting that they were falsely accused of being a terrorist group. Their actions were part of a campaign to have them removed from the National Union of Students (NUS) "no-platform" list but was reported as primarily about rising radicalization on British campuses. Although many Muslim students disagreed with Hizb-ut-Tahrir, they supported its right to free speech and further such support did not demonstrate that Muslim students are "influenced by a hardcore of extremists" (Khan 2006).

Meanwhile, the UK counterterrorism strategy, CONTEST, specifically in the Preventing Violent Extremism (PREVENT) section, views the signs and causes of radicalization as disenfranchisement, a search for identity at times of crisis, increasing religiosity and religious symbolism, implicitly some form of psychological weakness, and a connection with others holding such beliefs, including through virtual networks.

At the same time, young Muslims nowadays have to be more active outside of "parochial" Muslim concerns though their activism, especially students' one, will require more time and effort to develop in a more tolerant environment (Ramadan 2010). While there many of them are apolitical or afraid of the repercussions of being too "progressively radical," there are some who try to take charge of the situation.

Meanwhile, any prevention of extremism is not effective without dialog with vulnerable groups especially when they are not considered terrorist ones according to the international legislation and practices and when they can be potentially agree for a dialog. In general, there are traditional mechanisms to overcome misunderstanding in Islamic societies where there is a continuous insistence on the medium of dialog. In the United Kingdom the medium of dialog is illustrated by Muslim student organizations who hold Islamic Awareness weeks.

According to the survey of K.E. Brown and T. Saeed (Brown and Saeed 2015),[3] Muslim students' activism is framed as an "everyday" experience rather than a distinct subset of student protest activities. It is significant to note that their activism is framed around a clear understanding of Islam that is neither "radical" nor "moderate" in spite of mass media and politicians' practice of labeling. Such a position is based on "radical" tradition of student activism and basic liberal human rights such as rights to protest, of movement, association, and freedom to worship.

J. Edmunds argues that through their "realized citizenship" of networks and activism, young Muslim women are talking back to the state in a language that they cannot easily resist.[4] If even the liberal set of characters of "acceptable Muslims"— "moderate," integrated, educated—cannot be free from suspicion, all the more other less privileged Muslims have little space to escape the radical ghetto (Turner 2007; Tyer 2010). Thus, if the university is not able to provide tolerance, nondiscrimination, and mobility for all, there is no maneuver for "radicals" under the constraints of counter-radicalization discourse and policies.

Mistakes in Counterterrorism Policy

Extremist groups often use for their propaganda among Muslim communities in European countries different cases of the violation of Muslims' human rights and armed conflicts in the Middle East that Western states are involved in. In general, global terrorist listing regimes have enabled the adoption of counterinsurgency strategies that justify the targeting of whole populations in order to delegitimize and incapacitate nonstate armed actors.

The suppression of political claims with military offensives, targeted killings, mass incarcerations, and prosecutions undertaken in the name of counterterrorism, function as a form of conflict management. In contrast, conflict transformation norms of inclu-

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[3] Brown, K.E. & Saeed T. (2015). Op.cit.

[4] Edmunds, J. The 'New' Barbarians: Governmentality, Securitization and Islam in Western Europe//Contemporary Islam 6 (1), 2012. (pp. 67–84).

sive participation and engagement with the political claims animating the root causes of conflict are marginalized. For example, in listing Hamas and other organizations, Israel's allies have conferred their tacit support for such conflict management paradigms and endorsed military offensives and the use of counterterrorism measures against civilians.

Although the international community may view its counterterrorism policies as a judicious form of liberal democratic solidarity that conforms with their obligations to international law and UN Security Council Resolutions, its acquiescence to the human rights abuses meted out by Israel and some other states in the region may be having the effect of regenerating the "root causes" of the conflict and ultimately undermining the prospects for peace. Failed attempts to undermine the Islamists in the OPT, for example, have left many Palestinians (and their sympathizers) with such contempt for the MEPP that it is coming to be seen as aiding the occupation.

From the other hand, in many European countries, as well as in Russia, the banning of different Islamist groups has turned the entire *ummahs* into an object of security, and justified mass criminalization of nonviolent political formations or even civil society organizations. For example, many former ISIS militants of North Caucasus origin cannot return from abroad to Russia because of fear of tortures and repressions from the side of local authorities. For a long time, there was a policy of "extrusion" that stimulated leaving of young men for the Middle East without repatriation chances. However, Russia should study the negative experience of the Saudi Arabia's similar policy in the past.

Like in Turkey of 1993, "terrorism by Islamist groups has to be differentiated from the right to free speech and the free exercise of religion" (Toprak 1994:111). Another example is south-central Somalia, where many interviewees told that terrorist listing laws were making their peace building efforts increasingly ineffective and were exacerbating rather than resolving the complex conflicts in that region (Boon-Kuo et al. 2015).

On the whole, Islamophobic discourse is strengthened not only by xenophobic currents within mass media but also by the legitimization of intellectuals and political actors (Ekman 2015). It's not surprising that the legislation of some Western countries legitimizes such xenophobic approach. Typical example in this respect is the activity of ethno-nationalist and populist right-wing parties that influence and transform political discourses and policies on Muslims in Europe (Ferruh 2012). Odious populist politicians such as Wilders in the Netherlands and Kjaersgaard in Denmark have made Islamophobia their mainstream political program.

In Europe, Islamophobic currents affect the practices of the political mainstream, transform legislations, political decision-making, and policies on security and immigration specifically targeting European Muslims (See Fekete 2009; Cesari 2010). There, the Islamophobic actors emanate from:

1. Far-right and right-wing populist parties, such as the Danish People's Party, the Dutch Freedom Party, the Sweden Democrats, and the Swiss People's Party;
2. Street fighting movements, the most obvious examples being the English Defence League (EDL) and its various offspring;
3. Right-wing think tanks including various minor and explicitly Muslim-hostile constellations such as Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, International Civil Liberties Alliance, and International Free Press Society;

4. Intellectuals such as scholars, writers, journalists, and media figures who, to a varying extent, produce and distribute "knowledge" about Muslims and Islam (Ekman 2015).

Richardson reveals that British media are stereotyping Muslims, representing them as "culturally deviant… and as cultural threat," thereby fuelling anti-Muslim sentiment in society (Richardson 2004:232). Poole shows that British news media frame Muslims as a threat to the security in the UK and as a threat to British mainstream values. Moreover, the news media often claim that there are fundamental differences between Muslims and non-Muslims that create tensions in interpersonal relations, and that Muslims are "increasingly making their presence felt in the public sphere" (Poole 2006:101).

France

In France, there is also a significant increase in acts of Islamophobia. Collective Against Islamophobia in France (CCIF) registered 764 acts of Islamophobia in 2014, with increase of 10.6 % compared to 2013. However, the figures do not completely reflect the spread of Islamophobic rhetoric and ideology in the public space. Also in 2014, CCIF recorded 22 physical attacks or about 2 per month. Discrimination accounts for 77 % of all acts of Islamophobia, and 71 % of discrimination acts occur in public institutions and services (CCIF 2015). Unfortunately, women are the first who suffer, since they represent 81.5 % of the victims of discrimination.

The 2015 report of CCIF also points out that after the January events in France, there has been a sharp increase in acts of Islamophobia and the lack of government measures to contain them. Moreover, the French school is a hotbed of discrimination and the discourse of racism and Islamophobia.

Being French citizens or even born in France, many Muslims are daily blacklisted and are victims of contempt and hatred from the police agents. Many victims of discrimination by French police undergo a double injury: the physical and verbal violence and the systematic change status, from victim to culprit. CCIF concludes that in France, "racism and islamophobia are now clearly institutionalized and legitimized" (CCIF 2013). Political speculations about Islam and everything connected with the religion have become very popular all over the European region, especially in its northern part.

The Netherlands

A Dutch politician Geert Wilders is one who especially sticks out in this field. Wilders, who had previously lived 2 years in Israel and close to the Israeli right-wing, declares himself as a supporter of that country in the Middle East conflict. Wilders rejects any compromise of Israel with the Palestinians, considering the only solution is to rename Jordan in Palestine and deport there all Palestinians, that is, he

offers forced deportation as the only solution of the Palestine question, similar to the methods of Nazis. Wilders is the founder and leader of the "Party for Freedom" ("Partijvoorde Vrijheid") and the central figure of the anti-Islamic movement, both in the Netherlands and abroad.

G. Wilders is the author of the short film "Fitna," posted in the Internet on March 27, 2008 in Dutch and English languages. Then European Parliament President Hans-Gert Pöttering said the content of the film was "designed to offend the religious sensitivities of Muslims in the Netherlands, Europe and elsewhere in the world" (EurActiv 2008).

The Netherlands are of interest for a detailed analysis of the Muslim community's situation in the Northern Europe, because it is the only European country that conducts more or less open statistics on the number of Muslim residents in the state. The statistics without doubt reflect the actual demographic and social picture.

In the end of 2012, there was an estimate of 825,000 Muslims living in the Netherlands, representing 4.5 % of the Dutch population, and 450 mosques in the country (Central Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS) 2012). Citizens of Moroccan and Turkish origin account for about two-thirds of the total Muslim population. The main part of the Muslim community of Netherlands lives in the central provinces: North and South Holland, Flevoland, Gelderland, and Overijssel. On January 1, 2004, 5.8 % of the total population were Muslims, but partly due to the discrimination and right extremism activity against Islam, some Muslims have left the Netherlands. Within several years, the percentage of the Muslim population in the kingdom reduced from 5.8 (2004) to 4.9 % (2008) (CBS 2008).

Netherlands is the only Western European country, where there was an outflow of Muslims due to the political reasons and the religious segregation. The report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance established a causal relationship between the bad situation of Muslims in the Netherlands and the reaction of the Islamic community.

In its 2007 report, the Commission emphasized that "while civil society organizations, including Muslim groups, have welcomed anti-radicalization measures, they have consistently underlined that the corresponding decline in the attention paid to countering right-wing extremists has resulted in a marked strengthening of the latter's activities." In this connection, ECRI notes that "the extreme right is reported to be increasingly at the origin of racial violence and that anti-Muslim violence is an increasingly important part of this" (ECRI 2007).

The Commission stated that "the Muslims of the Netherlands have been the subject of stereotyping, stigmatizing and sometimes outright racist political discourse and of biased media portrayal and have been disproportionately targeted by security and other policies. They have also been the victims of racist violence and other racist crimes and have experienced discrimination" (ECRI 2007). However, more than 5 years later the situation did not improve drastically.

Moreover, like in some other EU countries, in the Netherlands, Muslims have been disproportionately targeted by the implementation of antiterrorism legislation. Therefore, civil society organizations have stressed that the public attention given to the measures aimed at preventing radicalization among youth of Muslim back-

ground has exceeded the scale of the problem. Legislation initiatives and other measures "increase the feelings of victimization and stigmatization among Muslims and reinforce the problem of discrimination or exclusion of Muslim women generally in everyday life" (ECRI 2013).

Thus, for an objective assessment of the radicalization processes and dissemination of extremism in European countries, it is necessary to conduct multifactorial analysis. It is able not only to detect direct and counter ties in the system of relations in the past decade, but also to take into account the long-term historical perspective, as well as political processes in the region being a part of the unique world process.

Denmark

In Scandinavian countries, especially Denmark, even Muslim institutes of civil society are under a cloud of suspicion and discrimination. Below is the case of "Muslim Council of Denmark" (MCD), a Danish organization. The MCD was founded in September 2006. It managed to combine the most active and initiative part of the Danish *ummah*. It is an umbrella organization representing 14 Muslim associations and communities with around 35 thousand members. The creation of the Muslim Council of Denmark reflected the new trend in Denmark: earlier, Muslim organizations presented only one ethnic group. However, MCD was able to become a representative platform that united associations and organizations of different ethnic origin and Islamic specifics. Most members of the MCD are Afghans, Pakistanis, Bosnians, Albanians, and Turkish.

"The Muslim Council of Denmark" stipulates the aim of its creation and its main mission are representation and unification of various branches and *maddhabs* of Danish Muslims. As time proved, the MCD has a positive attitude to and supports the public work aimed at the formation of an active and well-informed civil society. Such position and authority delegated to the MCD by a considerable part of Danish Muslims have encouraged both the local Muslim communities and the Danish authorities in negotiating. One of the organizations that is member of the MCD and acts on its behalf was engaged in project coordination and building of the Grand Mosque of Copenhagen, which was opened on June 19, 2014.

However, despite such a constructive and peaceful stance of the MCD, the Minister for Welfare Karen Jespersen in February 2009 stated that "leading members of the council are extremists who prefer a Qur'an based society instead of a secular democracy." That personal opinion of K. Jespersen attracted sharp criticism and had wide resonance but now her reaction seems predictable. K. Jespersen and her husband, Ralf Pittelkow, are owners and editors of the Danish online newspaper *Den Korte Avis* (DKA) that from January 2012 promotes the right-wing, antimigrant line. The majority of the DKA articles either directly or indirectly cast a negative light on Muslims and immigrants in Denmark (Islamophobia Watch 2015).

To reassure the public, the mayor for Integration in Copenhagen had to defend the city's collaboration with the council by saying: "It is dangerous if one demonizes

as big a group as the Muslim Council of Denmark represents. I do not have any reason to believe that Abdul Wahid Pedersen and Zubair Butt Hussain are extremists. It is problematic that we get a debate about extremism every time an organization tries to unify the Danish Muslims" (Euro-Islam 2015).

Unfortunately, 10 years after the beginning of the "Muhammad cartoons crisis," the situation of the Muslim population in Denmark has not improved. Moreover, anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant politics as well as anti-Muslim rhetoric in Denmark have been increasing over the last years. In terms of Danish legislation, two significant pieces related to terrorism have come into effect since 9/11. First, in June 2002, a package of laws (L35) was passed by the Danish parliament to combat international terrorism. The law gives police greater powers of surveillance, which can be used against Muslim individuals and groups. The law allows for the tapping and monitoring of emails without former permission of a magistrate, increased resources to use secret informants. It requires telecommunication companies and internet providers to record all internet traffic and mobile telephone communication.

Second, in June 2004, the Danish Parliament passed the so-called Imam Law, which would require religious leaders to speak Danish and respect "Western values" (US Department of State 2004). Although Danish constitutional law does not allow the mention of religion, the bill was widely viewed as being targeted at Muslims.

In 2001, the above-mentioned European Commission against Racism and Intolerance published its second periodic report on Denmark, which contained a number of well-documented critical remarks and recommended measure to eliminate both day-to-day discrimination and institutionalized discrimination against minorities in areas such as housing and the economy. The following is an excerpt from the report: "Problems of xenophobia and discrimination persist, however, and concern particularly non-EU citizens—notably immigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees—but also Danish nationals of foreign backgrounds. People perceived to be Muslims, and especially Somalis, appear to be particularly vulnerable to these phenomena.

Most of the existing legal provisions aimed at combating racism and discrimination do not appear to provide effective protection against these phenomena. Of deep concern is the prevailing climate of opinion concerning individuals of foreign backgrounds and the impact and use of xenophobic propaganda in politics. Discrimination, particularly in the labour market, but also in other areas, such as the housing market and in access to public places, is also of particular concern".

The Open Society Institute (OSI) reports note that the dominant political establishment, including the Social Democrats, and most media outlets, downplayed both the authenticity and validity of the report's criticisms (e.g., see Andersen et al. 2006). The only fully integrated Muslim communities in the Northern Europe are Finnish Tatars who among all other Muslim communities integrated as much as possible into the Finnish society (Eidemiller 2015:18). In some European states, destructive nationalist or far-right forces are gaining popularity. At the same time, the growing support for right-wing nationalist parties is considered to be a major challenge facing the European Union's stability and integration.

Thus, in the Europe of today we see a hazardous intertwining of two vulnerable factors: on the one hand, the combination of increasing political support for the

right parties, including ultras, with racial discrimination and Islamophobia; from the other hand, the Muslim communities in Europe also face the process of radicalization and rise of intolerance, to the extent of emigration (*hijrat*) to the Middle East.

The most common justification for their views, critics of Islam in Northern Europe are guided by predominantly negative experience, citing as an example the unconstructive policy against Islam and Muslims in other European societies. According to a researcher from Iceland K. Loftsdottir, in most cases, the negative experience is a manifestation of the justified response from the Muslim community on the erroneous state policy regarding them, as well as a catalyst for the most serious challenges in recent decades both in the states of Europe and outside the region. One of the main challenges is creeping racism, extremism, Islamophobia, and related intolerance.

Conclusions

A democracy is impossible without a well-developed civil society, which shall be free of control, especially of dictates of the state. Otherwise, it will be vain democracy that is in some countries called "sovereign democracy" or "guided democracy." In 1990s, "Asad's Syria and Mubarak's Egypt clearly reveal, one can have a viable, if not dynamic, civil society… without concurrently permitting the growth of effective or autonomous political organizations capable of challenging the hegemony of state power" (Entelis 1994:47). However, the events of 2000s in the both countries demonstrated the underdevelopment of real civil society institutions.

According to the International Center for Religion & Diplomacy (ICRD), "understanding and meeting the needs of at-risk youth throughout the world is not only personally transformative, but is perhaps the most effective remedy to violent extremism that communities can offer" (ICRD 2015). But with that end in view, this rule shall be also applied to all at-risk vulnerable groups of communities and population, both in Europe and in the Middle East. The urban underclasses, in a context of frustration and despair, can easily turn toward terrorism and crime (Göle 1994:41).

In an effort to prevent social conflicts and radicalization, multidimensional (political, educational, social, economic) approach seems to be particularly promising, though this requires long-term and trustful relationships. Besides, such work, especially with young people, shall always involve families, educational institutions, religious settings, communities, and authorities at the local or national level.

At this point let us repeat once again that the history of many countries and regions demonstrated that the more pressure, injustice, and discrimination occur, the more uncompromising struggle arises. If we recall the famous phrase of Martin Luther King, we can conclude that now is also the time to lift nations "from the quicksand of racial injustice to the solid rock of brotherhood," at least to one of peace and nonviolence.

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Chapter 6
How Do Terrorist Organizations Use Information Technologies? Understanding Cyberterrorism

Fatih Tombul and Hüseyin Akdoğan

Literature Review

Communication technologies have developed especially with recent technological advancement. The estimations by 2012 about the use of communication technology may tell us more about the importance of these technologies and how we are addicted to technology; it is estimated that 294 billion e-mails were sent daily, information that could be stored by 168 billion DVD was produced daily, and Netflix users watched 22 million hours TV and movie daily. Two-thirds of the world population had an internet connection and 20 % of them had a membership to social networks. Eighty five percent of the world population had cell phones and 15 % of them shop via their cell phones (Klimburg 2012).

Most of the governments had to take required safety measures to restrict or reduce the use of communication by terrorist organizations. These precautions include restricting, censoring the information coverage of the terrorist groups, finding the contents of the perpetrators of the terrorist groups, and taking the immediate actions to censor their media. However, the new media technologies led the terrorist groups to communicate easily and freely; that's why it is difficult to restrict the content of their communication (Weimann 2005a:380). The term "cyberterrorism" goes back to the 1990s when the National Academy of Sciences declared a report relating to the computer security mentioning "We are at risk. Increasingly, America depends on computers…Tomorrow's terrorist may be able to do more damage with a keyboard than with a bomb" (Weimann 2005b:131).

Attackers, formerly, were using the internet as a tool to satisfy their curiosity about technology and to explore security-related issues. These attackers were mostly young and their acts were commonly called "cybercrime." However, that

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Table 6.1 Examples of cyberterrorist attacks offered by respondents

Attacks on Estonia	The Russian cyberattacks on Estonia in 2007
Stuxnet, Iran	Stuxnet computer warm reportedly ruined almost one-fifth of Iran's nuclear centrifuges, 2010
Attacks on Georgia	The Russian cyberattack on a Georgian government website in 2008
India–Pakistan	In 2010 the Indian Cyber Army hacked into the website of the Pakistani Army, and the Pakistan Cyber Army hacked into the website of the Indian Central Bureau of Investigation
Anonymous	Anonymous hacking into the websites of the Boston and Salt Lake City Police Departments and threatening to release the names and addresses of police officers
Turkey, PKK collapsed Govt. network	The Turkish Ministry of Finance's website was hacked by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) (2011)
Zapatista spamming	The Mexican Zapatista group has shutdown Mexican police and other websites
Wikileaks	
Israel–Gaza	Following its air strikes on the Gaza Strip, Israel experienced more than 44 million hacking attempts on government and other finance websites (2012)
India (social networking)	During the Assam riots threatening messages and pictures were sent to migrant workers using social networking sites (2012)
Dalai Lama	A Chinese cyber espionage organization targeted the office of the Dalai Lama (2009)
Tariq bin Ziyad Brigades	The so-called here you have virus (the responsibility for which was claimed by the Tariq bin Ziyad Brigades for Electronic Jihad)
Aerospace	U.S. defense firm Lockheed Martin said it came under a significant cyberattack in 2011
Australian sewage leak	The Maroochy Shire cyberattack (2000)
Kyrgyzstan	The sustained cyberattack reported in 2009

Source: Jarvis et al. (2014)

situation has changed and nowadays attacks over the internet have been mostly used for industrial espionage and state-related issues. Attacks over the internet can cause a devastating harm that underattacked country may not use even a single conventional weapon (Brunst 2010). For instance, Estonia faced cyberattacks (denial-of-service attacks) in 2007 as a protest because of the removal of the Soviet war monument (Bronze Soldier monument) erected in 1974 in Tallinn. Most of the websites of the Estonian government, banks, universities, and newspapers were among the attacked websites lists. The government could stop attacks by blocking all international web traffic from the rest of the world (Richards 2009). Table 6.1 shows examples of cyberterrorist attacks which was prepared for a research by asking research respondents from different countries who have academic background on cybercrimes.

According to Weimann (2005b:131), the threat of the cyberterrorism has been inflated as there is no single event that the cyberterrorism caused a person to kill, although it is called along with the weapons of mass destruction. On the contrary to

Weimann's belittling of cyberterrorism, The US secretary of Defense, Mr. Donald Rumsfeld described the phenomena as an odd war that humankind had never met before. He quoted one of Al-Zawahiri's (One of Al Qaeda's leader) speech stating that "More than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. We are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of Muslims." After this Quotation, Rumsfeld said that;

> *Today we're engaged in the first war in history unconventional and irregular as it may be in an era of: e-mails, blogs, cell phones, blackberries, instant messaging, digital cameras, a global Internet with no inhibitions, hand-held video cameras, talk radio, 24-hour news broadcasts, satellite television. There's never been a war fought in this environment before (Ogun 2012).*

Public opinion about the cyberthreat seems parallel to The US secretary of Defense, Mr. Donald Rumsfeld's opinion. "75 % of global internet users believe 'cyber-terrorists' may, soon inflict massive casualties on innocent lives by attacking corporate and governmental computer networks" while 45 % of users agreed completely that "computer terrorism will be a growing problem" (Conway 2002).

However, the anxiety and the fear of the cyberterrorism rely on three components: psychological, political, and economic. First of all psychologically the cyberterrorism creates an unknown fear with the help of misinformation, more dangerous than the effect of the terrorist bomb, among public against to computer technology. In addition, mass media also helps to increase the fear among people with publishing the front news about the cyberterrorists' activities. As the fear is a crucial factor in terrorism, the U.S. State Department expresses terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience" (NCC 2006).

The distinction should be made before deciding whether the attack over the internet is against to IT systems to gain money, prestige, and reputation or it is against to human life. In the past, attacks against computer systems were evaluated less dangerous compared to conventional attacks such as bombs. One can think that the attack against computer system can only create harm to the computer but that perception has changed as most of the public and private institution heavily rely on the technology called supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. SCADA systems are used to control and measure the small systems as well as the complicated systems such as controlling the electricity, military and civil structures, and pharmaceutical products. SCADA enables the system to control remotely from a central location.

Thus, sensitive data follow on the ground, in the air, or in the water. Since it can be controlled remotely from a central location, cyberterrorists can damage whole systems by attacking the central location (Brunst 2010). According to Sieber and Brunst (2007), some of the SCADA systems are directly connected to the internet and some of them are connected inside internal network that is connected to the internet. Research studies revealed that 17 % of the SCADA systems are working

directly on the internet. This percentage shows how big threat all the countries have to be faced with cyberterrorism.

Some motivators exist behind the attackers who use the internet as a tool to commit crime. One of them is the independence of the location of the internet so that the attackers do not have to present at a certain physical place. Criminals can easily hide themselves behind the virtual world and also it is difficult to identify who carried out the attack. The connection type is not so important that a mobile, home, or internet café connection is enough for committing cybercrime. In addition, the speed of the internet is not a problem for attackers as they use the speed of the internet of the victim when they launch an attack such as denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks.

Anonymity of the internet is also another advantage for the criminals to commit crime by hiding their identity. In fact, the actor of the attacks over the internet can be identified normally by following the IP address of the attackers' computer. However, most of the attackers use different technique such as using proxy services or anonymity networks to hide them. Thereby, the attackers throw of the track and camouflage themselves as if they are attacking from another place where they haven't been before. Cheap cost feature of the internet is another side for criminals to prefer using the internet to commit crime. They don't have to invest too much money in an advanced computer since a moderate computer with an internet connection is enough to commit cybercrime. The advantages of the internationality of the internet are also used mostly by the criminals as a tool to commit crime. Countries have their own borders; however, the internet does not have a border as it connects all countries. As the rules regulating the usage of internet are not the same in all countries, the criminals have been using this discrepancy and seek ways to publish their illegal contents from the countries where the laws enable too much free speech (Brunst 2010).

It is not rational to expect that terrorist groups do not enjoy and benefit these inevitable advantages of cyberworld to communicate, propagate, and recruit. The cyberspace is also rapidly changing and developing in its inner world. Internet Protocol (IP) traffic had used to pass from wired devices until recent times. This virtual traffic has shifted to wireless and mobile devices, and by 2015 this kind of traffic will likely exceed the former wired devices. It is noteworthy to point out that the largest increase in terms of wireless IP traffic will probably take place in Latin America (48 %), the Middle East and the Africa (52 %) where there are a lot of unstable areas that terrorist groups love (Jones and Johnston 2013).

The main aim of the terrorists using the internet is to spread the fear, create the economic turmoil, provoke the opponents, and obtain the information. Understanding the attacks over the internet whether it is cybercrime or cyberterrorism is difficult to detect. That kind of cybercrime can be committed because of willingness to spread fear among the population or because of getting the information such as learning the automobile route of a political party leader for assassination to achieve the goal of terrorism.

Thus, a deep investigation is required to understand the terrorist attacks launched over the internet (Brunst 2010). There is no exact definition about cybercrime and cyberterrorism that is why it is difficult to make a distinction. Terrorist use of

computer to make propaganda, raise money, recruit new supporters cannot be defined totally as cyberterrorism. Cyberspace attacks should include terrorist element and activities such as results of killing or large-scale damage and the actions should be politically motivated in order to be called as cyberterrorism. Although politically motivated, hacktivism is different from cyberterrorism. Hacktivists generally use four weapons to attack. One of them is generating too much traffic through a defined website so that other user cannot reach the site as usual. In addition, the attacked website does not fulfill its normal function and with the help of the media reports politically motivated hacktivists gain the publicity. E-mail bombing, also called ping attacks, is another method for hacktivists to employ.

With that technique they bombards with thousand may be millions of messages at once to create an environment that the website or ISP cannot operate regularly. Third technique is the web and computer hacking that the hacktivists use to get the stored information such as communication and financial information on another computer. Moreover, sending viruses and worms to harm the computer and network systems is another method that hacktivists use. The interaction between hacktivism and cyberterrorism is hazy. Sometimes the action of the hacktivists such as attacking the network to damage the national infrastructure, for example, electric power, can be called as cyberterrorism (Weimann 2005b:135).

Some of the scenarios related to cyberterrorism such as attacking hydroelectric dams, traffic control systems, and power plants can be utilized by the terrorist organization against the countries. With these attacks, terrorist organizations aim to damage the critical infrastructures of the countries so that they can show their power to expose the fear among public and to gain support. Terrorist attacks on hydroelectric dams by gaining access to the control system can cause such a devastating harm that they can open the floodgates and cause damages to the areas and inhabitants behind the gates (Brunst 2010:67). Gleick (2006) states that the accidentally damaged dams in Banqiao and Shimantan in China caused the damage of other lower dams and at least 85,000 people died. Terrorist organization can be a source to increase the fear amoung public by attacking on traffic control systems. As in the attack of 9/11, the hijackers demonstrated how brutal effect they can cause to the airplane and airport control systems. Moreover, terrorist attacks on power plants such as attacking of nuclear power plants and military missile control center may cause devastating fear and danger in the society (Brunst 2010:67).

Justification of the Violence

Terrorist organizations use every opportunities including violence to accomplish their goals. Since the public are against to violence, they use four different strategies to justify the violence even on the net. The first argument they employ is "no choice" motive. In most of the terrorist webpages, terrorists attempt to convince the public that they are not against the peaceful solution but the violence is the last option

against to the enemies. For instance, Tamil Tigers insists that their use of violence is legitimate in as much as the Sri Lankan rejects the rights of Tamil minority.

The second argument for justification is to demonization and delegitimization of the enemy. They simulate as if they are the freedom fighters as their groups or people are in the hand of the enemy and their rights are being restricted by their enemies. In addition, they demonstrate some images showing that their people are being killed by their enemies thus the real terrorist is their enemies. The third justification of the violence is to emphasize the weakness. They use the argument that terror is the result of the weakness. The last but not least justification is to show how brutal action such as slaughter and genocide the authorities are acting against them conversely by avoiding how they victimize other people. The aim is to show the public how brutal action their enemies maintain against them (Tsfati and Weimann 2002:325).

Dissemination of Terrorist Content

The terms the internet and the terrorism seem to be different at first glance, but when they are combined the term cyberterrorism emerges. Cyberterrorism is more dangerous than the conventional weapon as it is used by the terrorists to disseminate the information to realize the act of terror and spread their beliefs and ideas. Moreover, it is an appropriate place for terrorist groups to propagate their points of view (Giacomello 2004). Rothenberger (2012) defines this information dissemination as Public Relations (PR). Apart from one-sided mass media such as TV, newspapers, and radio stations that terrorist groups had used before internet era, they are today gaining publicity via interactive social media as a crucial part of PR efforts.

Most of the terrorist organizations realized the effect of the mass media to reach the large audiences. They have been using different strategies and tactics to influence the public and their action is called media-oriented terror. Terrorists are aware of the fact that media is an important tool to gain psychological warfare. They can spread their terrorist activities and make propaganda on defined group of people. They work hard on the appropriate time, targets, and location in terms of media preferences to have more influence on people. Before any action or any attack, they make preparation to gain more support and to affect more people. They use visual aids for the media such as taped interviews and speech of the perpetrators. They use these kinds of tools on their own media such as TV, news agencies, newspapers, and websites (Weimann 2005a:384).

Dissemination of terrorist attacks can be defined as an amplifier of terrorist attacks and the impacts of these attacks. The impact of the attacks heavily depends on round-the-clock news services on mass media and internet (Duyvesteyn 2004:448). This has caused a paradigm shift in terrorist propaganda. The paradigm had been defined as "propaganda by deed" (Bakunin 1870) before the internet era and almost all of the terrorist organizations has accepted and employed this

philosophy of anarchists. However, the cyber era has been shifting this paradigm. The new paradigm is propaganda by deed over the net.

The preinternet era terrorist organizations had to completely rely on the effect and impact of their deeds, in order to publicize their deeds via mass media such as TVs, newspapers, or radio stations and reach their aim which is the carried message by the deed. Although the main aim is conveying the message to target audience by the deed, the message should have such an impact that attracts the attention of the mass media. However, in the internet era, attracting the attention of mass media is not a primary focus of the terror organizations and their deeds. Terror organizations today can post whatever they want via internet, YouTube, and social media. Mackinlay (2009) argues that these developments in cyberspace have brought the world including the terrorist organizations into a "post-Mao" era.

The technology is developing very fast that websites which allow only viewing information is called traditional web applications after the invention of social media. "Different from traditional web applications that allow only passive information viewing, these web 2.0 sites offer a platform for users to actively participate in and contribute to the content/service provided" (Zhao et al. 2011:3). The study of Qin et al. (2007) revealed that terrorist organizations have adopted new levels of web technologies as US government agencies. Moreover, their study proved that terrorists use more multimedia technologies on their website than the US government agencies. Moreover, they heavily use web forums in order to facilitate their communication.

Websites of the Terrorist Organizations

The existence of the cyberspace of the terrorist group has recently started to be told. Only 30 terrorist organizations, declared as foreign terrorist organizations according to U.S. antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 that had the webpage on the net. However, that number increased and approximately all terrorist organizations started to create webpages to prove their presence on the net by the end of 1999. It is the fact that the content of these webpages usually in English language and disseminate the information about terrorist organizations' political and ideological aims, leaders, founders, commanders, and some admired individuals.

Most of the webpages mention about the background and history of the organization, the activities done in the past. In addition, the contents emphasize not only the information but also the direct criticism against the enemies or rivals. On the other hand, the webpages avoid giving information about some brutal attacks that the organization carried out. Moreover, terrorist organizations emphasize two issues on the net: the importance of the freedom of expression and political prisoners. Thereby, terrorists aim to provoke the western audiences about how important the freedom of the expression and human rights to illustrate as if their action is legal in democratic societies (Weimann 2005a:386).

Apart from traditional web applications such as terrorists' websites, most of the terrorist groups have shifted from dealing with static websites to using interactive social networks, online forums, blogs, and media (Bockstette 2008). Almost 90 % of the terrorist activities take place on the social media, such as yahoo e-groups, paltalk, and bulletin boards. The forum sites that are prepared by the terrorists act as firewall to hide the militants' identities. They also enable users to contact the terrorist representatives to ask question or to learn something detailed. Nowadays all terrorist groups have forums in chatrooms, e-groups, you-tube created with the latest modern online format (Weimann 2009:46).

Terrorist websites aim to attract not only potential supporters but also their enemies. In addition, changing the international public opinion about the organization is also another target for terrorist websites. Terrorists use their websites offering some attractive items such as flags or printed t-shirts, videos, and audiocassettes to attract the supporters. Their slogans and use of local language is an important method to appeal the supporters. The activities of the organization and recent international politics are also detailed in their websites. They also give importance to the international public opinions. The terrorist groups sometimes held press conference and put into the websites to attract opinions of the international journalists. Doing so, they try to demonstrate their enemies as guilty. In addition, they want to change the international opinions against them to demoralize their enemy (Weimann 2005a:388). Rothenberger (2012) analyzed some of the eminent terrorist groups' use of cyberworld. Based on this research, some of the results of the analysis of terrorist groups' use of internet will be discussed as follows:

ETA (Basque Homeland and Freedom; Spain): Rothenberger's analysis reveals that ETA is very active in cyberworld. Not only ETA does broadcasts videos and use blogs, but the group switched their long run and confined newspaper GARA to internet newspaper. ETA even provides all of these internet actions in English and French subtitles. Twitter is the last cyberspace that ETA is active recently.

IRA (Irish Republican Army, Ireland): IRA used USB sticks and email platform to exchange information at the beginning of the cyber era. Currently, they are very active in almost all internet platforms such as broadcasting on YouTube, an internet magazine titled "An Phoblacht," facebook, and twitter.

Shining Path (Peru): Although the Shining Path once considered the media as a demon part of feudal and bourgeois system that they want to destroy, they currently have catch on the importance of new technologies like internet to reach their target groups. They now have accounts on social networks sites.

FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Colombia): FARC has a traditional website conveying their aims and their history. Through this website the terrorist group is directing its followers to several links which enable a network structure that recruitment and fundraising activities can easily be conducted. FARC also provides its web services with several languages.

LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Sri Lanka): Rothenberger (2012) portrays LTTE as a true master in cyberworld. They benefit numerous cybertools such as websites, forums, social networks, and blogs. These cyberactivities have ensured an international awareness about the group and provided the international

dissemination of their propaganda. Tamil Tigers have also used the cyberworld to recruit new members and fundraising activities.

Al Qaeda (The Basis, Arab World): Al Qaeda extensively uses the cyberworld for their aims. The eye-catching point in the group's websites is the antiwestern atmosphere. The terrorist organization largely uses the web for training and instructional manuals. Since the organization has large sympathizers and members all around the Arab world, they disseminate these kinds of materials via cyberworld.

Based on these aims of terror organizations using the cyberworld, one can categorize the most preferred reasons for terrorists to use internet as (1) information provision and information gathering, (2) financing, (3) networking, and (4) recruitment (Conway 2006:10).

Information Provision and Information Gathering

With information provision, terrorists can provide support by doing propaganda on the internet. It is an excellent place for them to gain psychological warfare. Over and above, they can give information related to the profile of their leaders and their ideology as propaganda. Spreading the disinformation over the internet is another option of the internet that is used by terrorists (Conway 2006:10).

Information gathering is another important resource for terrorists to use the internet. The information was stored in one or some locations in the past and thus it was difficult to get information comparing today. With advancement in the technology and development in the internet, one can easily reach and retrieve the information on the internet. In the same way terrorists can obtain vast amount of information on the internet as well. Data mining and information sharing are the two components that terrorist prefer to use in terms of information gathering.

Terror groups can get important information about defining and knowing the specific targets by data mining. They can not only get information from the webpages of terror groups around the world but also other institutions' official webpages such as obtaining the location and operation of nuclear reactors in any country. Furthermore, the members of the terror organizations can use the webpages to disseminate the information about how to make bombs or such other things by using information sharing channels (Conway 2006:18; Rothenberger 2012).

Social networking platforms are very suitable place to disseminate propaganda to the people from different age groups. Most of the internet users accept the people on different social media platforms as a friend without investigating who they are. Some of these users are terrorist seeking to obtain the information about the users. In addition, users of the social networking websites do not hesitate sharing their own identity and picture of themselves and their friends.

Thereby, terrorist groups can easily obtain the detailed information about the users even their hobbies and most visited websites. They throw the hook and they decide who will be the target based on these information. For instance, the twitter is an appropriate social networking tool that terrorist groups mostly use to share information.

Since twitter provides real-time update information about a place or a person it is an appropriate tool to use. When terrorist groups conduct ambushes they can obtain real-time information about logistics of a troop. In Addition, terrorist groups can use the twitter to activate an explosive device with the help of using twitter's real-time information. Last but not least, terrorist groups can get contact of the military personnel as if they are his/her friend with the help of the information that may be stolen identity of military personnel over a twitter account (Weimann 2009:48).

These advantages of the internet had been used before 9/11 attacks by Mohammed Atta who was one of the terrorists hijacked and terminated the planes. He acquired lots of information about U.S. flights by researching U.S. flight schools. He did these researches by online traveling from Hamburg to U.S. flight Schools (National Commission on Terror Attacks 2004:88).

Financing

Financing is a vital aim for the terrorists to use the internet. They are using the internet as a tool to raise funds for their activities. Since the internet enables interactivity so it is a best place to achieve financial donations. Thomas (2003:117) states that most of the terrorist organizations claiming they have affiliation with Islam (in fact they are not) gain lots of money via credit card fraud. There has been some evidence that some of the terrorist organizations have established e-business on the internet to raise money for their activities. For example,

InfoCom, Texas-based ISP company was accused of having some accounts in communication services and funds belonging to some terrorist organizations such as Hamas (Hinnen 2004). Terrorist groups also employ the charity organizations to raise money. At first glance it seems they collect the money for humanitarian purposes such as feeding, clothing, and educating the poor and illiterate but, in fact, they are using the money, collected over the charity organization, for their terrorist activities and supporting the militant groups. Raising funds from charities, chat rooms, and forums through the internet, Al-Qaeda is one of the leading examples employing cyberspace for financing. On the other side, sympathizers can donate to Irish Republican Army (IRA) via the organization's website with their credit cards (Weimann 2007).

According to Piper (2008:265) terrorist groups have emphasized using the internet for finance-related activities since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. They usually request funds by publishing the title such as "what you can do" or "how can I help." They search and monitor the visitor on the website and get contacted with the users who visited the site more than once. Additionally, terrorist groups use electronic money transfer and laundering as fundraising methods.

Moreover, terrorist groups employ online auctioneering for the money movement. That transaction takes places between two partners called smurfs on a fake item. One of the partner bids on the fake item and then other partner withdraw the money from auction house to avoid being detected. Furthermore, terrorist groups

can use online casinos for laundering and storing money. They open the bid system on online casinos to maintain the money activity herewith they store and hide the large amount of money. Drug trafficking is also another source for terrorist groups to gain money. They sell the fake drug and people buy them as if they are original prescribed drugs and money goes to fund Middle Eastern terrorism (Whelpton 2009:265).

Networking

The internet is also an appropriate tool for terrorist organizations to create networking that provide more flexible organization structure even if they have decentralized structure. Since the architect of the internet enables people to communicate more easily and with low cost, terrorists use the advantages of that feature to manage their supporters around the world. Terrorist groups find the internet as a suitable tool to coordinate internal and external groups and they can also create discussion groups with the help of the structure type of the internet from one center. Although they have different dispersed groups around the world, they can manage to create alternate communication channels on the internet (Conway 2006:14; Rothenberger 2012:12).

Arquilla et al. (1999:85) state that terrorists changed their networking designs from hierarchical to information age networks. Terrorist networks are connected to each other rather than standalone. They have more organized and decentralized structure. In addition, they follow and implement the latest technologies to provide perfect communication. Since there is not a single leader, command, or headquarters, even if the groups are small, medium, and large on the internet, it does not create a problem. Over and above, they may have multiple leaders to organize the groups. Weimann (2006:637) posits that terrorists not only use the communication feature of the internet inside the same terrorist organizations but also build the communication within the members from different countries. For example, terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Lebanon can exchange information with each other related to recent practical information, new developments, and trainings such as learning how to make bombs.

Recruitment

The web enables for an organization to gain members in terms of the recruitment in different ways. First of all, the web provides people more quick and easy information. Second, the web lets more people to know the recent event through the information bulletin. The last but not least, the web creates the opportunities for interactive communication so that members can have discussion in the discussion groups and participate in the debates. They can even get contact with the group

leader for more information (Gibson and Ward 2000:306). Terrorists may have been taking advantages of that feature of the web to recruit new members and may increase more support.

With the help of social networking and gaming sites, terrorist groups obtain information about user's skills, names, and interests to recruit. A social networking user, for example, in the field of chemistry and engineering can be easily targeted via looking at the information about a user's background information. Thus, they can be recruited as persons to make bombs. Furthermore, terrorist groups, searching the information in online gaming sites, can determine persons who have strong shooting ability that is the indicator of showing violent tendencies to use them for operation missions (Veerasamy and Grobler 2011:263). Schauble (2008) points that internet is more than a communication tool for terror organizations, it is an "advertising platform, distance university and virtual camp" (cited by Rothenberger 2012:10).

Conclusion

Information technology has changed the way of the information flow which in turn changed the struggle with terrorism. Moreover, a new term called cyberterrorism has emerged. Recent events have showed that terrorists are so familiar with the internet that they maintain their activities over the internet to prepare attacks, to communicate and disseminate the information. As Johnson (2008) stated that Cyberterrorism was not evaluated as a serious danger before the cyberattacks that caused devastating harm in Estonia in 2007. But after the Estonia attack, national organizations even NATO evaluated cyberattacks as the risk of a missile strike. Terrorist's use of the technology is so spread that former leader of Al-Qaeda stated in his speech after September 11 attack that "hundreds of Muslim scientists were with him who would use their knowledge ranging from computers to electronics against the infidels" (Weimann 2005b:146).

Nowadays, most of the public and private institutions heavily rely on the technology called supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. They can be controlled remotely from a central location. Thus, cyberterrorists can attack and take the control of all systems by attacking the central location (Brunst 2010). That probability shows how important and difficult to struggle with cyberterrorists in terms of law enforcement perspective. In addition, since the internet enables user anonymity, terrorist groups can perform their attack remotely and from safe locations without any risks related to defining their physical space. Moreover, the anonymity also enables terrorist groups to participate in the cyberterrorism all over the world as independent units.

On the other hand, law enforcement officers should provide a balance between the democratic values and security. If they only focus on providing security, democratic rights of the citizens may be eroded. Conversely, if they only focus on the democratic values of the citizens with undermining the security, cyberterrorists can abuse that rights and take the advantages of freedom.

Cyberterrorists have been heavily using the internet to disseminate the information, recruit, raise fund, and to spread their propaganda to the public. Most of the terrorist organizations have their website on the internet as it is cheap, easily established, and published. Terrorist organizations have adopted new levels of web technologies and they use more multimedia technologies on their website than government agencies. Moreover, they heavily use web forums in order to facilitate their communication.

Developments in the technology prove that future terrorists are grooving up in the digital world and they will be more dangerous than today's cyberterrorists. In addition, they use the advantage of the mass media as it enables freedom of press and freedom of the expression. Thus, security forces in the face of all these developments should take the necessary precautions to fight against the terrorist organizations by standing one step ahead on the use of technology. If they are behind the technology and try to struggle the cyberterrorist with the traditional method used in the past, it is impossible to be successful against the fight with cyberterrorists.

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Chapter 7
Root Causes of Conflict and Terrorism in the Middle East

Sadık Kirazlı

Introduction

Conflict and terrorism have always existed throughout the world. Conflict is inevitable in every society. It is "an expressed struggle between at least two interdependent parties who perceive incompatible goals, scarce resources, and interference from the other party in achieving their goals" (Wilmot and Hocker, 1998: 34). Terrorism is a kind of expressed struggle. It is "a response to a variety of subtle, interacting, ongoing, and changing psychological and structural factors manifested by perpetrators and audiences (victims, the public, the business community, government)" (Ross 2006:79–80). But, the Middle East is possibly the only region today popularly attributed to conflict and terrorism. According to the data that indicates the range of terrorist incidents by region between 1968 and 2005, most of the terrorist events occurred in the Middle East (see Ross 2006:56). The current global wave of terrorist violence, in many ways, was also fuelled by conflictual events in the Middle East, particularly the enduring Arab-Israeli conflict and issue of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In fact, over the past 70 years, the region has been a hub of tension and insecurity that are conceived in the context of global terrorism. Without political, socio-economic, territorial or ethnic and sectarian conflicts and problems, it is hard to find even one nation-state. But, no place is nowadays more appropriate for the emergence of terrorist activities than the Middle East.

The tragedy of September 11, 2001 in the United States was probably history's most deadly terrorist attacks. The suspects of the 9/11 events were identified as mostly residents of the Middle Eastern countries. Global terrorism is considered

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presently to be stemmed from the Middle East (Reeve 1991:3, see also Schanzer 2011: 97–99). Accordingly, an exploration of the correlation between regional conflicts and global terrorism is of great importance. While this tragedy has become a source of pervasive fear and loathing across the globe, it has also fostered a paradigm shift in dealing with terrorism. This new approach is to eradicate the root causes of terrorist acts even outside of their boundaries. In this regard, various methods and policies have been put forth to prevent and deter terrorism particularly after the US declaration "War on Terror" after the 9/11 events.

Terrorism is an enormously "complex and multicausal phenomenon involving the dynamic interaction between structures, organizations and agents, between grievance-formation and opportunity structures, and between leaders and followers" (Jackson et al. 2011:219). It covers a great diversity of individuals, groups and movements with miscellaneous factors. Addressing the motives and factors that give rise to terrorism and sustain it is often more effective than trying to combat its symptoms and effects. There are many studies on conflict and terrorism. The majority of these studies have focused on the various typologies and categories of terrorism while others have concentrated on the effects of terrorism. One instance for this is the study of Schmid and Jongman (1988) that they identified at least 50 typologies and ten common bases for classifications for terrorism. Nevertheless, a small, but recently growing, body of work has aimed to study the root causes of terrorism. Most explanations of causation factors for conflicts and terrorism fall into three categories: structural, psychological, and rational choice. Researchers have developed a general causal model or theory of the causation of terrorism (see Gross 1972; Crenshaw 1981; Johnson 2004; Ross 2006).

None of the theories is, however, alone sufficient to explain the root causes of conflict and terrorism, because each type of terrorism demonstrates dissimilar pattern of causation. This necessitates the development of a comprehensive causal model. In this regard, Ross (2006) developed a model by consolidating ten principal structural factors and five main psychological causes. Structural theories presume that the root causes of terrorism can be seen in the environment and the social, political, economic, and cultural fabric of societies. On the other hand, psychological theories attempt to identify and explain the mental processes of individuals and groups in order to understand what caused him or her to violently act. However, this process necessitates to interview participants, either in the field, in prison, or in other places where access is difficult or dangerous. Ross classified structural factors as "permissive" factors which create the conditions and "precipitant" things that immediately trigger factors. Both structural factors interact with each other to create an environment for terrorism. The permissive causes are divided into three factors as geographical location, type of political system, and amount of modernization of a society (2006:82–83).

Among these causes, modernization of a society is the most important factor that generates several factors for terrorism (see Crenshaw 1981:381). On the other hand, precipitant causes are the motivating or triggering factors. These factors are social, cultural, and historical facilitation (such as shared attitudes, belief, customs, habits,

myths, opinions, traditions, and values that permit the development of nationalism, fanaticism, violence, and terrorism); organizational split and development (within and among the moderate and more extreme wings of an already-existing terrorist groups); presence of other forms of political, economic, and social unrest; support from a variety of actors who facilitates terrorism; the failure of counter-terrorist organizations such as police, military, national security, and intelligence services; availability of weapons, explosive, and composite materials (as well as the knowledge needed to build them), and grievances (Ross 2006:83–86). Grievances are usually expressed as oppression, repression, coercion, and discrimination that are directed against a variety of individuals, groups, organizations, classes, races, and ethnicities. Therefore, among all these precipitant causes, grievances are the most motivating or triggering factor that leads an individual, group, or organization to engage in terrorist action.

Second part of Ross's model consists of psychological causes of terrorism. Psychological theories attempt to explain terrorists' behaviour and thus offer some insight into the causes of terrorism. Most prominent theories in the scholarly literature are psychoanalytical (Morf 1970), learning (Pitcher and Hamblin 1982), frustration-aggression (Gurr 1970), narcissism-aggression (Pearlstein 1991), trait (Russel and Miller 1983), developmental (Sayari 1985), and motivational/rational choice (Crenshaw 1990). According to Ross, none of these theories are enough alone to explain psychological cause of terrorism. Therefore, he consolidated these theories and offered an alternative approaches. These are five etiological factors of terrorism: the development of facilitating traits, frustration or narcissism-aggression, associational drives, learning opportunities, and cost-benefit calculations (2006:87–89).

These psychological motivations are affected by the structural factors. In the other words, structural factors are usually precondition for psychological motivations. Both make an integrated model to explain what motives and factors impelled individual or group to act violently. Motives are sharp-ended impulses "to acquire what is unfairly denied such as freedom, basic rights, and opportunities; to reassert identity, status, legitimate possession, where these are challenged or lost; to protect where an entity is threatened or ill-treated; and to restore where former rights, privileges, advantages have been denuded or taken away" (Whittaker 2004:51).

In the light of these theories of conflict and terrorism, particularly Ross's causal modelling, we set out to look for the root causes of terrorism in the Middle East. The examination of the motivations for terrorist acts is outlined under the following subheadings: (1) Legacy of colonial rule or independence movements, (2) Palestinian—Israeli conflict, (3) bad governance or corrupt regimes, (4) failure of economic development and socioeconomic deprivation, (5) Radicalism or theological justifications, (6) state terrorism, (7) foreign policy of the West, and (8) ethnic and sectarian conflict. A vast number of previous studies on conflict and terrorism in the region have mostly revolved around the Palestinian/Arab-Israeli conflict and rise of radical Islam. In addition to these two issues, this chapter will examine all potential causes that listed above.

Legacy of Colonial Rule and the Independence Movements

The first root cause of conflict and terrorism in the Middle East is considered as the legacy of colonial rule or the methods applied during the independence period. Recent turmoil and transition moving across the region has brought renewed attention to the politics of the region. The cause of much uprisings and conflicts has been in reaction to political systems and traditions which can be traced back to the colonial period. The ICOW Colonial History data set collected and maintained by Paul Hensel shows that most nation-states of the Middle East experienced various degrees of colonial administration, particularly during the latter half of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century (Hensel 2014). When the Ottoman Empire suffered a fatal loss after World War I, the Middle East was divided up by Italy, France, and England. Although political colonialism relatively short-lived in the region, it did not completely disappear. Its impact was immense and persists to the present-day. In fact, it was simply transformed into neo-colonialism, colonialism of a different form. Rather than controlling the newly established nation-states directly, colonial powers came to do so indirectly, mostly through colonial-inspired ruling elites and economic relations.

There is strong evidence that colonial legacies affect territorial conflict after independence, with conflict more likely after violent decolonization and in relations between former colonies of the same colonizer. In 1916, Mark Sykes representing the British government and Francois Georges-Picot from the French government designed and partitioned the main borders of essentially the Arabic provinces under Ottoman rule, known as the Sykes-Picot agreement. But, the resulting Middle Eastern states were often artificial creations. These states were ruled by the dominance of sectarian and ethnic identities and turned into places where the minority ruling communities were more equal than others. The impact of the division on the region's peoples was quite different, and much of the conflict in the Middle East is the result of this artificial division and insecurity of the artificially created states.

The built-in imbalances in the newly established states, particularly Syria and Iraq, spawned brutal dictatorships. Just as it did with Maronite Christians in Lebanon, the French pursued the similar policy with the Alawite minority in Syria. The French cultivated the Alawite minority, for example, as an ally against the Sunni majority, by recruiting and promoting Alawite soldiers in the territory's colonial army. Thus, it fostered their sense of identity as Alawites and brought them into conflict with other local ethnicities and religious identities. Since that time, this conflict has been turned to a state terrorism in the hands of the Alawite governments in Syria and lasted as a civil war.

The newly created borders did not correspond to the actual sectarian, tribal, or ethnic distinctions on the ground. Therefore, the failure of properly determined state borders has been the cause of the militarization of the ethnic and religious identities. Kurds, for instance, who have a distinct cultural, ethnic, and regional identity, live today within a district that is divided across Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Nationalist groups in the borders of these countries began to originate with an aim of establishing

a fully independent "greater" Kurdistan covering land in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey.

In this, undoubtedly cruel dictatorships that accomplished for decades in oppressing restive majorities and perpetuating the rule of minority groups has played a significant role. One instance of this is the modern Iraqi-Kurdish conflict that dates back to the end of World War I and the defeated of the unilaterally proclaimed—but short-lived—Kingdom of Kurdistan in Northern Iraq by British Mandatory Iraqi forces. The conflict that was turned into a state-terrorism was the result of the persistent suppressive governance of Iraqi dictatorial leadership. Since 1919, the series of revolts against the central authority of Iraq and wars between the Iraqi governments and the Kurds continued. For example, Saddam Hussein took a genocidal campaign, known as Al-Anfal, and ended with an estimated 50,000–200,000 casualties. Although the longstanding conflict lasted in 2003 with the US invasion of Iraq, tensions between the Kurdish autonomy, that gained a recognition from the new Iraqi government in 2005, and the Iraqi central government have continued.

The Kurdish nationalists get supports easily from those who have desired to preserve their cultural heritage and have opposed what they consider national and cultural repression. Until the recent years, for example, Kurdish minority of Turkey did not even have the right to speak its own language and educate its children in their mother tongue in schools (see Council of Europe 1992). The Kurdish population has long sought to have Kurdish included as a language of instruction in public schools. However, official policy of successive Turkish governments was to view the expression of a Kurdish identity as a potential threat to Turkish unity. That discriminative policy had paved the way for the nationalist terrorist organization Kurdistan Workers' Party, commonly referred to by its Kurdish acronym, PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê), based in Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan, to find domestic supporters. Since its emergence in 1978, the PKK engaged in terrorism for cultural and political rights and self-determination.

In contemporary Middle Eastern politics, borders have been the cause of much conflict and turmoil. This has not only included domestic conflict within countries, but also regional conflict involving Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and Egypt. The Aarsal, Deir El Aachayar, Kfar Qouq, Qaa, Qasr, and Tuffah between Lebanon and Syria, the Golan Heights between Israel and Syria, Shebaa Farms between Israel, Lebanon, and Syria or the Palestinian territories between Israel and Palestine are the main border conflicts among others in the Middle East. Particularly, the conflicts between Israel and its neighbouring Arab states often keep enmity alive and pave the way for terrorism-related violence in the region.

In addition, the colonial powers disrupted, fractured, and shattered the way of life in the Middle East that had evolved over many centuries of Ottoman sovereign. According to Milton-Edwards, many believed that "the colonial task could only be achieved if Christianity was resurrected, the humiliations of the Crusader kingdoms erased and the biblical obligation fulfilled" (2011:24). In this regard, colonial expansion was supported morally, religiously, and culturally in their "traditional entitlement" particularly by missionaries who were active in the region from the early nineteenth century.

This colonial task has manifested itself in a variety of ways and achieved with the revival of evangelical activity, missions, schools, libraries, charities, churches, and religious colonies in cities such as Damascus, Beirut, Cairo, and Jerusalem (Milton-Edwards 2011:24). French missionaries, for example, opened hundreds of schools to educate local students in the cities including Beirut and Damascus under the French control. These schools perhaps did not convert students to Christianity but would help shaping their minds and hearts in the light of the philosophy of colonial expansion. Schools seemed successful that new classes and social groupings emerged among particularly the urban elites of cities such Ankara, Tunis, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, and Algiers. This emergence was evident in the politics, literature, art, political thought, dress, social pastimes, and cultures of the region. Thus, the fabric of society was continuously refashioned or manipulated to suit western framework. So much so that this western-inspired "local elites supported the role of foreign forces in their countries" (Milton-Edwards 2011:25).

However, westernization of society was to mean secularization. Secularists tend to seek the ideology of promoting the secular political and social values as opposed to Islamic one. Westernization in Muslim societies was, therefore, often considered to contrast with Islamic values. It was the upshot of secularization process that some of the indigenous bonds of identity within Muslim societies, based particularly on religious elements, were slowly eroded or rearticulated within a western framework. However, this secularization has erupted into outright mistrust and conflict between two main lines of social division: secularist and traditionalist or Islamist. This polarization often eventuated as state (-sponsored) terrorism or religious terrorism. For example, Tunisia became one of the Muslim world's most secular countries. In January 2011, the secular opposition of the Islamists led to the overthrow of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who had been in power for 23 years. Similarly, the root causes of current political violence and terrorism in Syria and Iraq also go back to the colonial partitioning resulted in the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

In short, colonialism did not only shape the region in the European mould of political, economic, and social relations, but also had negative impacts after independence, with leaving their dependencies unsettled. The below listed root causes of conflicts and terrorism in the Middle East are also the legacy of colonialism. The colonial experience has altered or disrupted pre-existing socio-economic relations and patterns.

Palestinian/Arab-Israeli Conflict

The longstanding conflict between Israel and Palestine or Arab states is the second reason for terrorism in the Middle East. The root of the conflict is related with the colonial partitioning of the land of Palestine, encompassing modern-day Israel and Palestine, where it is considered as "holy" by the followers of all three Abrahamic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. All three religions have roots, communities and holy sites in that area. However, Jews claim that Palestine is a biblical

"Promised Land" for them. This "Promised Land" claim led them to keep their ties always with Palestine. As a matter of fact, this assertion led to a political vision of an ingathering of Jews to Palestine, called Zionism, and thus to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine in the latter half of the nineteenth century, when questions arose as to how to overcome growing tide of persecution and anti-Semitism in Europe (Milton-Edwards 2011:41).

After the World War I, Palestine became a mandate of the British Empire. When the British government became a keen supporter to the establishment of a Jewish national-home in Palestine, Jewish immigration to Palestine began and continued increasingly and rapidly. But the increasing number of Jewish migration to the "Promised Land" gave rise to Arab-Jewish tensions and development of the Arab-Israeli conflicts. Violence broke out between the Palestinian Arabs and Jews. As a result of the collisions between the sides, the newly formed United Nations, after the World War II, proposed a resolution plan to replace the British Mandate with an independent Jewish state, an independent Arab state, and a Corpus Separatum for Jerusalem. However, this plan has given the majority of the land to the minority Jewish people (See McDowall 1998:5).

Accordingly, while the Arabs rejected this plan and the existence of Israel, the Jews accepted it immediately, and on the eve of final British withdrawal, declared the establishment of "a Jewish state" in 1948. Upon this occurrence, the leaders of the neighbouring Arab states together with Jordan, Egypt, and the other members of the Arab League of the time commenced a military action against Jews resulting in the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. At the end of this war, the Jews were not only successful in creating their homeland but also gained additional territories that were expected to form part of the Arab state under the UN resolution plan. On the other hand, neither a Palestine state was established nor Jerusalem was internationalized. While one diaspora ended with the creation of Jewish homeland, another began for the Palestinian people. According to United Nations records, more than 726,000 Palestinian Arabs were evicted by or fled from advancing Israeli forces between 1947 and 1949 (see McDowall 1998:10). Thus, with the expansion of Zionism and the establishment of Israel state, the most intractable conflicts between the Jews and the Arabs emerged in the twentieth century.

Since then, Palestinian issue certainly forced Arab nations to unite against Israel. The skirmishes on the borders between Israel and neighbouring Arabs states continued throughout the early 1960s. In 1967, the armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan were defeated once again by Israel within 6 days, and the border of Israel was expended by further occupation of the Gaza Strip, West Bank and East Jerusalem, and the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. In modern times, Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories is the world's longest military occupation. But the crushing defeat of 1967 was turning point in the Arab–Israel relations. It led the Palestinians to realize that, as Milton-Edwards states, they could no longer depend on their Arab brothers for liberation and their fate rest firmly in their own hands (2011:118). Therefore, the Palestinians formed their national resistance movements such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Hamas for self-determination for their nation.

Since that time, Palestinian nationalists have involved through the strategy of armed resistance against Israel to get back their occupied land and to establish a Palestinian state. This armed resistance was often marked by acts of terrorism such as bombings, hijackings, and assassination abroad. Israel typically labels acts of Palestinians, including against its occupying military forces, as "terrorism".

However, Israeli state terrorism, especially in Israel, has been significantly worse than that of the Palestinians. Due to the murder of three Israeli yeshiva students, on July 8th 2014, Israel launched deliberately or indiscriminately a massive air and ground attack on Palestinians, including homes, schools, hospitals, industries and workshops, agricultural facilities, roads, water and sewage treatment plants, and the main Gaza electrical power plant. During the 7-week massive attack, according to the United Nations and other international agencies, some 2100–2200 Palestinians were killed, up to three quarters of them civilians, including more than 500 children, and about 11,000 were wounded; 100,000 people were left homeless and 100,000 buildings destroyed or damaged. In the course of the 7-week attacks, only 72 Israelis were killed, all but six of them military personnel (see Khalidi 2014: 5–15). That is not to say that the terrorism was justified. It is a fact that both Israelis and the Palestinians have resorted to terrorism at various times during the course of their long conflict. One party's violent attack could trigger a new cycle of conflict and further damage the prospects of a peace agreement between the two sides. Thus, the culture of hostility spread to all corners of the globe, wherever Israelis and Palestinians resided. Today, the Palestine-Israel conflict is potentially the most unpredictable and difficult to resolve.

Bad Governance and Corrupt Regimes

The legacy of colonial experience has had a lasting impact on Arab attempts of state-building and thus curved out the state system of the present-day Middle East. Taking a structural approach, Roger Owen identifies three state types which are common in the Middle East: the colonial state, the immediate post-independent state, and the authoritarian state (2004:13). Almost all Arab countries are ruled as monarchies or undemocratic regimes with very poor standards of living. Lack of opportunity for political participation has frequently been considered a cause of terrorism. People involved in violence including terrorism when other opportunities for political involvement are not available.

The decolonization and liberation of the states from their colonizers generally could not lead the establishment of democratic regimes. The independent movements ended mostly with the creation of the France or British-backed monarchs or military authoritarian regimes. In the post-independence period, regime changes continued with post-war Arab nationalist impulse or the role of the old colonizers or America in supporting the coups, revolts, and revolutions as a means to protect their

national interests in the region. The success of Arab nationalist movements in achieving independence at the level of nation-states encouraged some tendencies to promote the nationalist agenda to supranational levels. In this regard, the Free Officers Movement in Egypt under the leadership of Gamel Abdel Nasser led the *coup d'état* in 1952 in order to pursue a programme of pan-Arabism and the unification of Arab states. The growth of Nasser's power was simultaneous with the rise of Arab nationalist Ba'thism particularly in Syria and Iraq.

Although both the Egyptian and Syrian military regimes proclaimed the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958, the unification nationalism attempt short-lived. Following the demise of the UAR, series military coups particularly in Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Algeria, and Libya established military authoritarian regimes, which would have continued until recent years. Political pressure of these authoritarian regimes caused often domestic or internal conflicts that fuelled terrorism. Krueger and Malečkova (2003) consider political repression as a main cause for terrorism. In fact, the main cause behind the current political violence and civil war in Syria is concomitant with this fact.

Analysing terrorism across different states, James Piazza concludes that political issues are more important than other factors, particularly economic one. He observed that states suffering from unresolved, long-term political crises have a higher degree of terrorist activity (2009:416). Broadly agreeing with Piazza, Alberto Abadie (2006) assessed that political oppression is positively correlated with terrorism. Moreover, Rice (2006) observed that failed states and less democratic states breed more terrorism and serve as secure locations for terrorist groups. Among those in the Middle East, bad governance and corruption is two of the most common complaints. Tunisians, Egyptians, Yemenis, Libyans, and Syrians who ousted or are in the process of trying to oust their president all mention them as two of the reasons for uprisings.

According to the 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International, an organization that acts as a watchdog for political and corporate corruption, for the Middle East and North Africa scored 84 %. Out of 177 countries listed on the study, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen come among the bottom eleven countries for corruption. Except Syria, other six countries secured their places in 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index. Syria ranked at 16. The most dangerous terrorist activities are associated often with these countries in the Middle East. These countries' regimes are frequently considered by al-Qaeda corrupt "apostate", and its ultimate goal is to overthrow and replace them with "true" Islamic governments. Poor governance fuelled the unrest and provided an enabling environment for the terrorist groups to recruit members. Furthermore, behind the Arab Spring uprisings were the problems that poor governance has caused.

Truly repressive states with very limited political participation or none have usually been able to prevent violence or have been able to quickly control it when it does occur. However, the weak states cannot effectively control or prevent violent acts; even they became a hotbed for dissident groups. Crenshaw and Gross state

that weaker states of all types provide opportunities for violence and terrorism, including weaker authoritarian states (2003:94; 1972:90). In Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Egypt where the state apparatus, which are badly designed, ill-conceived, and dysfunctional, the state system has failed and totally ceased to exist only to be replaced by mostly chaos. Bad governance in these countries has created a vicious cycle of corruption, poverty, and unemployment, leading to violence. It caused to emergence of dissatisfied and alienated groups. Dissatisfied and alienated or dissident groups in these countries took full advantage of social and economic weakness, governance deficits, and lack of effective services to recruit from marginalized populations.

Societies in transition particularly from a non-democratic regime to a democratic government can be also vulnerable. During transition, control mechanisms are weaker and security forces are frequently in disarray. The current Iraqi central government, for example, qualifies as weaker state, and also as political system currently in transition or at least in transition in the recent past. More than a decade in office and monopolizing power, after the US overthrow of Saddam Hussain's Ba'th regime, Prime Minister Nouri Maliki government has delivered neither security nor reconciliation and prosperity. The reconstituted military lacks a unifying identity and professionalism and is riddled with corruption. The failure of the government to equitably administer justice or deliver services and the shattering collapse of Iraqi security led to emergence of the ISIS among dissatisfied and alienated, even suppressed, Sunni Arabs. Seizing the opportunities created by the central government and expanding its activities to the neighbouring country, Syria which is another failed state, the ISIS established a powerful base which has yielded new recruits and treasurable financial and operational resources.

It is an essential of international relations theorists that weak and failed states are attractive bases for terrorists and criminals. The study of Kis-Katos, L`iebert, and Schulze (2010) supports this fact that weak or failing states are a hotbed for terrorism. They provide to dissident groups secure locations (safe havens) for planning operations and opportunities for resting and recovering between operations without fear of arrest. Iraq and Syria, for example, have been often blamed by Turkish governments to provide secure locations for the PKK. With the current chaos and disturbance, particularly Syria that has effectively ceased to function as state became a hotbed for dissident groups.

In a nutshell, the most important driver of violence and conflict in the Middle East today is weak or unconsolidated governance and corruption. State weakness tends to encourage alternative to identities such as sectarian, ethnic, or tribal identities to provide security and service for community. However, this could become a cause of violence as groups strike pre-emptively against perceived threats to their communities or pursue revenge. International human rights bodies each year report the millions of deaths that caused by state weakness or poor governance. From the early Spring of 2011 to April 2015, for example, the death toll in Syria where a country with no rules and no semblance of central authority, law, or security had risen above 310,000.

Failure of Economic Development and Socioeconomic Deprivation

The Middle East, including the North African oil-producing states, is the largest oil-producing region in the world (BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2015). This fact has created wealth for some states and made them often near total dependency on oil revenues. The region also contains some of the world's poorest states. But, not every oil rich country is able to pass along this wealth to the public. With crude oil reserves, Iraq, for example, ranks fifth in the world and third in the Middle East (Eia Beta 2014) although the official statistics have not been revised since 2001 as a result of military occupation and civil unrest. Iraq's economy is dominated by the oil sector; however, its oil wealth transfers into 503.687 US dollars per person, according to World Bank 2014 data.

The GDP per capita was last recorded at 2438.79 US dollars in 2014. The unemployment rate was 16 and population living in poverty is 25 % approximately (www.tradingeconomics.com). Other oil-rich countries in the Middle East are not different than Iraq's fact. Their vast oil wealth has not been transferred to the public in any meaningful way. Although the statistics indicate that a state appears rich, the distribution of income and wealth has been widening more or less steadily between rich and poor. Enormous oil rents are the means by which many governments in the region have usually entrenched autocratic rule that exists in the region. Therefore, most of oil-rich states' societies are today living in poverty line.

Most of the Middle Eastern states are not only rich with oil but also with gas and other resources. However, they have not been able to use their financial power for constructive development of their countries. They have failed to advance their societies. Although some state elites knew that their country's survival depended on policies of liberalization, they were unwilling to relinquish control over the economy (Ayubi 1995). The states who followed the policies of liberalization in economy did not also guarantee economic success. Economic changes bring greater wealth and statues to some group while other groups lose. During process of privatization, state elites redistributed national wealth, revenue, and funds to their own pockets. Schwarz (2008) points out that prevalent corruption, unjust distribution of wealth, poor planning of resource allocation, and misappropriation of state funds in economies are the chief reasons of poverty and high unemployment in the Middle East. Accordingly, the Middle East is considered economically "underdeveloped" region relative to the western world.

Economic factors have often been considered one of the basic causes of terrorism. Though most studies have failed to find a connection between poverty and terrorism, some have found a direct connection (Krueger and Malečkova 2003). It cannot be generalized that the poorest individuals routinely join terrorist groups even though some terrorist groups may attract the poorer elements in society. One group attracts a more middle-class following while other terrorist groups frequently draw upon cross-sections of the population in terms of economic well-being. There is no certainty that terrorist activity has to occur in the poorest countries of the

world or the ones with the greatest differences between rich and poor. Saudi Arabia, for example, is the world's second largest oil producer and largest exporter (Eia Beta 2014), and thus one of the richest countries in the region. It is enjoying an estimated per capita income based on purchasing power parity (PPP) that is currently 53,143.060 US dollars. However, the hijackers in the September 11 attacks were 19 men affiliated with al-Qaeda, and 15 of 19 were citizens of Saudi Arabia.

Osama bin Laden regarded as the founder of al-Qaeda was a Saudi Arabian, a member of the wealthy Bin Laden family and studied at university. That is why some researchers perceive terrorism as almost exclusively "security threat", claiming that most captured militants are neither poor nor uneducated. Similarly, Krueger and Maleckova (2003) observed that Israeli Jewish settlers who attacked Palestinians in the West Bank in the early 1980s were overwhelmingly from high-paying occupations. The support for violent attacks does not decrease among those with higher education and higher living standards. While poverty may have a connection with terrorism, it is indirect and complex.

Literature on income inequality and violence allows us to see that economic deprivation influences violence (see Alvarez and Bachman 2008; Hines and Malley-Morrison 2005). In fact, basic profile of the majority of high-profile terrorists who participated from the Middle East is a young man with some education, but they have a job below expectations or are most probably unemployed. For example, Yemen is one of the poorest countries with per capita income on average below 3500 US dollars (International Monetary 2015).

Due to the lack of job opportunities, many Yemenis go to neighbouring rich countries to work. For example, the majority of foreign workers of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, that are oil-rich but labour-poor countries and strongly dependent on migrant labour with about 80%, were drawn from Yemen, Palestinians, Jourdan, and Egypt (Findlay 1994:106). However, the political crisis or instability in a country affects migrant labour from capital-poor to capital-rich states and thus economic interdependency. During the Gulf crisis of 1990–1991, for example, around 700,000 Yemenis were repatriated from their jobs in the area. The deportation of migrant workers affected both Yemen and other countries, particularly Saudi Arabia. Redundant individuals are a potential target of terrorist groups and organizations. Probably for that reason, later on "Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have been urged to reconsider hiring Yemeni expatriate workers as way of helping its near neighbour tackle high unemployment (40%) and the vulnerable economic conditions of the country which, it is believed, provide a fertile breeding ground for supporting al-Qaeda and popular protest" (Milton-Edwards 2011: 98–99). Poverty may not be a direct cause of terrorism. But, having a job below expectations or the absence of opportunities relative to high expectations breeds grounds for terrorism.

Rotberg (2004) also argues that there is a link between poverty, poor governance, and state failure, and this combination provides a perfect breeding ground for militancy and subsequent instability. Similarly, Rice (2006) makes a relation between underdevelopment and economically and politically failed states and less democratic states. It has been assumed that individuals are driven to engage in political violence because of their economic circumstances or because of the economic circumstances

of the group they belong to. The emergence of Arab Spring and political violence in the Arab world were associated directly with social and economic injustices.

Many terrorist groups also cite social and economic injustices as justifications for their violence. Since 2011, Yemen has been in a state of economic chaos and political unrest; but before this crisis, the country has been already struggling with poverty, high unemployment, poor governance, and corruption. The wealth distribution became extremely skewed in the kleptocracy regime of President Ali Abdullah Saleh who has ended his 33-year rule by resigning in the face of political uprising in 2011. With the claim of many terrorists coming from Yemeni soil, Saleh's government has frequently come under international pressure to act against al-Qaeda, who became a part of the civil war that originated in 2011 with Arab Spring protests. Poverty may not have a direct role in the civil war, but it can help spur radicalization by reinforcing other sources of disaffection and can also increase opportunities for terrorism by hampering the ability of governments to effectively employ counterterrorism measures.

Radicalism and Theological Justifications

Religious radicalism or theological justifications is another reason for political violence and terrorism in the Middle East. Literature shows that basic profiles of the majority of high-profile terrorists involved in what came to be called jihadist terrorism are neither uneducated nor poor Muslims. So, the root causes of radicalism or religious terrorism cannot be explained only with the failure of economic development and economic deprivation. Becoming radical is not a sudden process. When economic, political, social, and cultural crises and conflicts combine and when people feel that they have been repeatedly humiliated, the appeal of radicalism becomes most seductive. All factors that determine radicalism should be paid attention equally.

In fact, religion is not a trigger factor of violent acts, but it is sometimes used in combination with other non-religious factors, and sometimes as the primary motivation in framing the conflict and providing institutional resources. The non-religious factors explained in this chapter that are the legacy of colonial culture, policy of Israeli government, bad governments or corrupt regimes, failure of economic development and economic deprivation, repression of authoritarian regimes or state-sponsored terrorism, double-standard foreign policies of the Western countries within or towards the region, or at least some sort of logical grievance can be combined with religious motivations and goals. For example, one or all of these factors, which are intertwined, can cause individual to be a suicide bomber. The researches reveal that the reason behind suicide bombings in the Middle East is associated mostly with bad governance or corrupt regimes, Israel-Palestinian conflict, and American foreign policy within and towards the region. Suicide bomber can either be religious or secular. If the bomber is religious and rationalizes his or her act with religion, then his action is considered as religious terrorism.

The underlying cause of religious extremism, violence, and terrorism is considerably the inappropriate interpretation of religious sources, particularly on the concept of "jihad". The perpetrators use religious scriptures to justify or explain their violent acts or to gain recruits. Particularly, the Qur'an can be vehicle and tool to legitimize violent acts. It could be read in various voices because literature shows that the Qur'an has no single kind of reading and interpretation from its revelation up until recent times. The model of text interpretation is divided into two types: contextual or historical and textual or ahistorical. Contextual interpretation of the Qur'an is an interpretation of the verses by looking at the historical revelation, looking at the present time situation, and then trying to combine these two conditions.

In contrast, the textual interpretation is to read the verses literally and ahistorically. This scripturalist approach produces only intolerant, rigid, and punitive religious attitude that grounds to fundamental and violent actions. Some scripturalists "offer a set of textual references in support of their exclusionary and intolerant theological orientation… They read Qur'anic verses literally and ahistorically and therefore reach highly exclusionary conclusions" (Abou El Fadl 2002:11). The jargon of this group is to "return back to the Qur'an and Sunnah". They interpret texts of these two sources without considering historical context and cultural background of the texts. For them, what Muslims need today is only to copy the tradition, habit, and detail of practice of Muhammad in its literal and puritan meaning in their daily lives.

The concept of jihad, for example, perceived by moderate (peaceful) Muslims as struggle through various ways, such as pens (education), with big efforts, technology, and so on. But for the scripturalist Muslims the jihad means *qital* (killing), struggle with weapons. In the other words, moderate Muslims have emphasized the inward dimension of jihad but not necessarily always in reference to warfare. Radicals or scripturalists have focused on the outward dimension in reference to warfare and jihad is frequently but incorrectly, translated as "holy war". The scripturalists blame moderate Muslims by escaping from the God's commandment and showing their cowardness. Hoffman argues that "religious terrorists are more lethal and indiscriminate, less willing to compromise, more radical and more fanatical than their secular counterparts, in large part because they are inspired by extreme religious beliefs which see it as their divine duty to kill God's adversaries. That duty executed in direct response to some theological demand" (2006:88). Muslims are the first victims of this group, as seen in the crimes of the so-called *Islamic State* (ISIS) and al-Qaeda and their affiliated groups.

ISIS, for example, is a Salafi militant group and follows an austere interpretation of Islam. The group considers those who do not agree with its interpretations as infidels or apostates. Thus, ISIS promotes religious violence, as part of their ideology. When their guiding principles and current implementations and practices are examined, the group roots to Wahhabism. By adhering to Wahhabi literalism, the same thought of the puritanical scholar Muhammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism, has now been revived by ISIS ideologues as the foundation of the "Islamic State". Although the rulers of Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states are now united against ISIS, the group circulates the Wahhabi images and ideology. They advocate returning the pristine purity of Islam of the Qur'an and Sunnah. But, ISIS appears to be a kind of untamed Wahhabism.

The group view Muslim states and societies as having fallen into sinful unbelief, and embrace violence and even the killing of those deemed unbelievers as essential to purifying the community of the faithful. In this regard, the officials and fighters of the Hamas of Palestine are deemed to be "unbelievers" who might deserve punishment with beheading for agreeing to a ceasefire with Israel. In fact, the United Nations report released in late 2014, found that ISIS had killed thousands of Muslims, both Sunni and Shia, between July 6th and 10 September 10th of 2014. ISIS also slaughtered numerous Sunni imams for refusing to swear allegiance to ISIS and beheaded other Sunni leaders for refusing to support the group. ISIS is not alone in killing Muslims who stand in its way.

Al-Qaeda has done the same in Yemen and engaged in even more brutal attacks on Muslims. The report, documented the people killed by al-Qaeda between 2004 and 2008, released in 2009 by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point found that only 12 % of the victims of al-Qaeda were the Westerners. This means that al-Qaeda had killed seven times as many Muslims as non-Muslims. Almost all of radical militant groups interpret the Qur'an and Sunnah, two sacred sources of Islam, in this way which then produce a rigid, literal, and intolerant attitude in their daily life towards the others. In fact, the two different groups, peaceful (moderate) and radical, could understand the same verse in two oppositional perspectives.

All radical or extremist groups in the Middle East have been motivated with religious objectives and have relied on violent attacks and terrorism in what they perceived as efforts to get their objectives. They used violence because they have sought policy changes within Islamic countries, changes in their political systems, and changes in the foreign policies of other countries. They have sought or seeking to reduce secular influences and to introduce more religious laws or to force the incorporation of more Islamic prescriptions into national legal codes, or to gain autonomy for their religion or greater rights for their group within a country where they might have been facing discrimination due to their minority position. Even, in order to achieve their objectives, suicide bombings could be justified. In this justification, the concept of martyrdom plays a significant role. The 2014 Global Attitudes survey of Pew Research Center (2014) shows that few Muslims in especially neighbouring countries of Israel think that suicide bombing or other forms of violence can be justified against civilian targets in order to defend Islam from its enemies Pew Research Center 2014. For the extremists, including ISIS and al-Qaeda and their affiliated groups, the target can both be non-Muslims and Muslims who are disagree with them or reject their ideology. They justify their brutally violent behaviours and actions with religious principles.

State Terrorism

Where a majority is subjected to tyrannical or despotic rule by a minority, the minority governing elites impose the sovereignty most likely by force or violence. Colonial powers within the states, artificially carved-out from the remains of the Ottoman Empire, established colonial administrations that recruited, educated, and

empowered minorities. When they left the region, they left the power in the hands of the minorities. But the power in the hands of those minorities turned to the brutal dictatorships that succeeded for decades in suppressing restive majorities and perpetuating the rule of minority groups. For example, the Alawite Assad family has ruled Syria since 1970 and currently resists leaving it even though the regime was collapsed down.

Similarly, Sunni Saddam Hussein came to power in 1979 and ruled Iraq until the US invasion in 2003. Saddam's rule was largely run by Arabs from Tikrit as his home region. Under his regime, Kurds, Arabs who were non-Ba'athist or non-Arab inclined, and most remarkably those of Shi'ite faith were persecuted. With the dominance of sectarian and ethnic identities, the leaders in Syria and Iraq turned their countries into places where the minority ruling communities were authoritatively more equal than others.

Power holders mostly in the Arab states, as Ayubi (1995) argues, are, to one degree or another, autocratic and engage in coercive measures against their citizens. In these authoritarian regimes, political participation is kept at a relatively low level because the system is basically elitist. The masses even belonging to the ruling elite do have a role to play, such as involving the demonstrations of support in elections, rallies, and carnivals for the activities and policies of the elites.

The ruling elite can include or exclude groups because of their religion or sect, language, tribe, ethnic identity, and the like. In many cases of the presidential system, elections are held with single candidates, and the presidents receive extremely high votes. This can be better illustrated with these examples: In Algeria, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika received 85 % in April 2004 and 90 % in the April 2009 elections; in Tunisia, Ben Ali garnered 94.5 % in October 2004 and almost 90 % in the April 2009 elections; in Egypt, Hosni Mubarak won 88.6 % of the votes in September 2005 elections; in Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh polled 96.3 in September 1999 and 77.17 % in September 2006 elections; in Iraq, Saddam Hussein won 99.9 % in a single-candidate election in 1995 and 100 % in October 2002; and in Syria, Hafez al-Assad received 99.9 % of the votes in February 1999 and his Bashar won 97.29 % in a special yes-no presidential referendum held in 2000 after his father's death. As seen in these examples, elections are held symbolically under the control of the President in order to serve as a safety valve, letting out the steam of change and reform demanded by populations.

Although numbers and types of parties and groups seem to be allowed to run in elections, presidential candidates running against the regime's leader are hampered by rules and regulations, even by death threats, so as to ensure the incumbent leader's re-election. None of the authoritarian Arab monarchies or presidential systems allows their parliaments to constrain their capacity for decision-making. Parliaments are filled loyal individuals who depend on the regime for their own positions. The king or president holds unchallengeable power. In order not to lose his control or power, the ruler keeps masses under suppression, and even do not hesitate to use violence, as practiced by aforementioned leaders.

In order to bring about changes in political leadership, policy changes, or changes in the political system, the Shiite majority groups in Iraq or the Sunni majority in Syria revolted against their despotic leaders. However, their attempts to challenge

the dictatorial regimes were put down without mercy in both countries. In 1982, for example, the Assad regime's forces crushed violently the Sunni uprising, demanding free elections, a more liberal economy and an end to Alawite dominance, and massacred between 10,000 and 20,000 people or more according to different estimates. Almost one decade later, Saddam's forces also crushed viciously the Kurdish and Shiite revolts following his defeat in the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and summarily killed about 500,000 people.

Since the disagreement on the political system and policy changes often have an ideological component, when governments attack their domestic opponents, clash takes places usually on ideological grounds. The current civil war between the Sunni and Shiite (Houthi) groups in Yemen occurs on the ideological ground. The conflicts and wars in Iraq and Syria have also an ideological component. Since the US invasion in 2003 the Shiite-dominated governments have ruled Iraq and discriminated against the minority Sunnis who are the former rulers of the country. When ISIS managed recently to seize Sunni parts of Iraq, people did not deprecated because ISIS were often seen by the local people as a lesser evil when compared to the Shiite-dominated governments. In the political crisis of Syria, Alawites backed President Bashar Assad against largely Sunni rebels because of the treat reinforced by ISIS who offered Alawites and mainstream Shiites a choice between conversion and death. ISIS found a support by the locals against the authoritarian governments and states. Prisons within the Sunni parts of the countries were the main target for ISIS and al-Qaeda brands to recruit supporters.

Despite the pro-democracy upheavals in the region, the Middle East, including North Africa, still remains the most repressive region in the world. These authoritarian regimes such as Ba'athist or Nasserist in the Middle East were the products of the legacy of colonialism. Both regimes remain a political force throughout the Arab world, but in a markedly different manner than in their heyday. The present-day Nasserist, for example, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who as military chief deposed a freely elected president in 2013, is rolling back freedoms won in the 2011 uprising (Arab spring) that toppled veteran autocrat Hosni Mubarak. He recently approved an anti-terrorism law that sets up special courts and protects its enforcers in the face of a two-year-long insurgency that allegedly aims to topple his government. This shows that the legacy of Nasserism continues to contribute to state violence and terrorism currently taking place in the authoritarian Sisi government. That was often also supported by their colonial powers for their national interests in the region.

Foreign Policy of the Western Countries

Modern Muslim antipathy towards the Western countries is more rooted in national liberation ideologies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries than they are in the Islamic tradition. Since the colonial period, the western interference in the Middle East was always competitive, with the French, Italian, and British struggling with

each other to secure their own national interests in the region. Thus, the impact of European colonial domination on the Middle East had sustained after the World War I. While the inhabitants of the region had struggling for independence, the US engagement had begun with President Woodrow Wilson's American support for their right to self-determination. The exact rise of American national interest and foreign policy within and towards the region had emerged in the years of the World War II and shortly thereafter. Many Arab societies of the region achieved their independence from the European colonial states. But, Arab societies and states in the post-colonial period had continued to struggle under the grip of authoritarian regimes supported by the West and chiefly the United States.

For the United States, foreign policy makers in Washington, D.C. have always outlined, as Milton-Edwards (2011:263–264) mentions, four major objectives that promote the basic national interests. The first one is primarily economic interests. The development of America's advanced industrial economy and growing dependency of this economy rely on oil. The experts predict that American energy consumption will grow while local oil production is likely to decline.

Therefore, this let the country increasingly to depend on the free flow of oil from the region where authoritarian regimes have prevailed. For example, the 4 year-Arab oil embargo that led by Saudi Arabia and other Arab states during the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict hauled the American economy into chaos. Similarly, when Saddam Hussein of Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the United States interfered in it because the Bush Administration perceived Iraq's invasion as a menace to American access to Middle Eastern oil. The Bush administration's invasion of Iraq in 2003 was also not associated with the promotion of democracy but rather with free flow of oil. States in the region, particularly who have authoritarian regimes, are also seen by the US military and arms experts as major consumers in terms of the armaments market.

By selling armaments, America supports friendly regimes against threats that emanate against them from elsewhere in the region. But, American supplied arms were used not only against the Soviet Union during the Cold War but also deployed internally against the threats from neighbouring states and its own citizens. The states, for example, Iran and Iraq, and Egypt and Israel, who fought each other or Iraq who used arms against its own citizens to control the masses have supplied the weapons mostly from America. If any of the authoritarian states in the region did not serve its national interest, the United States attempted a direct military intervention for regime change, by imposing liberal democracy from above. Iraq is the best example for this regime change.

The second feature of American national interest in the region is to maintain the American presence as dominant in the region against the Soviet or Russian expansionism, even if this means the instability in the region. The invasion of Iraq is the best example for this. After the 9/11 incident, American national interest is served by replacing Islamist expansionism with the promotion of liberal democratization or support of authoritarian regimes across the Middle East. For example, Muslim Brotherhood who came into office through democratic elections in Egypt was toppled down, with unofficial support of the United States, by a military chief who

worked with the overturned autocrat Hosni Mubarak, due to the new Islamist rulers exhibited an attitude to keep off a complete cooperation with the United States.

The third American national interest in the region is to support pro-western states and regimes. Through aid programmes to countries such as Egypt, and arms supplies and defence contracts to states such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, America have many allies from the Middle East. If these states or governments offer special advantages as an American ally, the United States does not often press for political restructuring of the country to enfranchise the elements, such the Shi'i Muslims in Lebanon, who have until recent decades been excluded. Its national interests often lead the United States to neglect local issues or the occurrence of dictators' human rights abuses. Recent events throughout the Middle East have demonstrated that earlier the US administrations have supported dictators in countries such as Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Egypt, who have blocked the development of democracy in their countries.

The final American national interest in the Middle East is the survival of Israel. The Cold War and the US rivalry with the former Soviet Union did have its more impact on the region. Their competition for "world power" resulted in the establishment of a series of "special relationships" with states in the region that would benefit their interests in the region. In this regard, America perceived Israel as a strategic ally and regional policeman in the Middle East, as Iran did before 1979 Revolution. In order to protect their national interests, the American governments did not hesitate to play double-standard policies, particularly on Israel-Palestinian issue. The US support for Israel, especially the support it gave to Israel's invasion of southern Lebanon in 1982 or of Gaza in 2014 triggered the anti-Americanism. Whenever the US supported Israel or took side, anti-Americanism intensified in the region and took a form of urging the boycott of American goods.

Antipathy is undeniably a central tenet of radical Muslim thinking that makes one of root causes of terrorism in the Middle East. Although Samuel Huntington and others attempted to explain this antagonism and radical thinking with a "clash of civilizations" thesis, Huntington's thesis does not suit to explain terrorism in the Middle East. The 9/11 events seemed to vindicate his theory. However, most Muslims in the Middle East and elsewhere condemned 9/11 attacks, and after the attacks Bin Laden's attempt to ignite a clash of civilisations fizzled out.

Muslim societies showed widespread resistance to Westernization and secularization enforced by their pro-western secular ruling elites. Shah Riza Pahlavi of Iran, for instance, imposed women to take off their headscarves and to wear western style clothes. Pahlavi's Iran was perceived by America as a strategic ally and regional policeman in the Middle East. It is argued that the reason behind the strong support of most women to 1979 Revolution and the rise of anti-Americanism in Iran was his enforcement on westernization and secularization of people.

In sum, the reason behind the Muslim attacks against the Western states is their double-standard foreign policies within and towards the region. The Middle Eastern people's humiliation grew while the West, particularly the United States, both strengthened Israel military against the Palestinians and other Arabs and armed the dictators in the Middle East during the Cold War in return for their often cruel sup-

port in the struggle against the Soviet Union. That support continued until recent time in different ways. While the majority of Muslims only pin the blame directly on the West, few radical groups engaged in violence and terrorism.

Ethnic and Sectarian Conflict

The current deadly spiral of horrific crimes and events in the Middle East, particularly in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Sudan has demonstrated clearly that they are in sectarian rhetoric and violence. In severely divided societies, one of the key objectives of ethnic and sectarian conflict and terrorism is to seek control of the power; in the other words, control of state itself. Groups who were tyrannized and politically excluded from the power seek control of the state in order to ensure that their needs are met.

The reason of the protests and uprising of Sunnis against the Alawite Assad regime in Syria was related with a struggle in control of the power. This conflict over the control of the state is often perceived as a zero-sum conflict, which means one group's gain is another group's loss. There is also a correlation between state weakness and increase of ethnic and sectarian conflict. When the state is incapable of affording basic security and services for its citizens, people logically turn their face to ethnic and sectarian communities, which play an outsized role in politics, which will protect them. However, this could become a cause of violence and terrorism as ethnic, sectarian, or tribal communities strike preventively against perceived threats to their groups or pursue retaliation. Further violence demonstrates a malicious cycle of state weakness and its illegitimacy, as exemplified in Syria and Lebanon. This let citizens to feel less secure and to identify more with ethnic or sectarian groups in which they feel safe.

Not a single day passed that we have not heard or read news reports about bomb explosions in the Middle East. Unfortunately, worsening violence and increasing polarization has led fighting to spill over from Yemen to Syria, Iraq to Sudan, and Egypt to Palestine. In the wave of Arab spring, people represented by a cross-section of Syrian society as Sunnis, Christians, and even Alawites called for general reforms in Syria. But the protest or uprising was soon hijacked by sectarian and geopolitical interests. In this, the Assad regime's role is undeniable. The regime has played upon the fears of minority groups to rally support from outside. While Shia militias first received the support from its ally Iran and Shia militants from Iraq and Lebanon, Sunni and Salafist groups had also the support from across the Middle East, predominantly from Lebanon and Iraq where Shia majorities had gained political power at the Sunnis' expense. Thus, the conflict has become increasingly regional in scope.

The Syrian conflict gave the region's Sunni Muslims an opportunity to regain geopolitical influence. The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran is more than a geostrategic power struggle. It is a fight between the Wahhabism and Shiism over

Islamic narrative. In many cases, the targets of violence can be members of the same religious community who either follow somewhat different practices or who do not follow the more extreme or fundamentalist version of the same religion.

Conflicts between Sunni and Shia or between Salafists and moderate Sunnis in the Muslim world are obvious examples of this phenomenon. Wahhabis and Salafists, for example, consider Shia or Alawite Muslims as apostates. By using anti-Shi'a rhetoric and anti-Iranian sentiment, Saudi Arabia has financed Salafist groups, in particular. The Salafists in Syria and Iraq have grown exponentially more powerful than the more moderate or secular groups. For example, ISIS has now become the strongest rebel group within Syria and Iraq. This outcome let intra-rebel rivalries in the region. Today, ISIS is not only fighting with the Alawite Assad regime's forces but also with the Sunni Free Syrian Army (FSA). Sometimes, the group is also reportedly fighting with other radical Salafist factions who refused to obey the Caliphate of ISIS. Virtually, Sunni Muslims reject ISIS's view of their faith and vision, pretty alien to actual Islamic tradition. Although ISIS was in itself an al-Qaeda breakaway, the group has explicitly rejected affiliation with al-Qaeda and often fights with al-Qaeda and its affiliation in Syria and Iraq.

The sectarian rhetoric has already escalated and inflamed tensions beyond the boundaries of Syria and Iraq. Shia populations in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have been involved in long-running protests movements since the Arab spring. That rhetoric also engulfed Sunni and Shia groups in Yemen into a dreadful civil war. In Lebanon, the Syrian conflict has strengthened sectarian clashes between groups in support of and opposed to the Assad regime. Even this sectarian violence between Alawites and Sunnis in Syria created some tensions between the same ethnic but different sectarian groups in Turkey because of the Turkish government's Syrian policy. Implying that the government's support of the Syrian opposition is based on its radical and international Sunni Islamic agenda, few of Turkey's Alawites did not hesitate explicitly to support the Assad regime. But the tension between groups in support of and opposed to the Assad regime is not same as occurred in Lebanon.

Based on the findings of Krueger and Maleckova (2003), the root causes of most conflicts and violence in the Middle East is associated with ideology, ethnic and religion. The Middle East witnessed that the targets of violence and terrorism are not only members of the same religious community but also members of different religious community. The civil war in Lebanon that took place years was related with religion. Fighting erupted first between Maronite Christians and Palestinian Muslims, and later included other sectarian groups. In most cases, minority ethnic or religious groups were persecuted or their basic rights were violated by other majority groups. Coptic Christians in Egypt became often a target of radical Salafist groups. In short-term interest, political leaders often play up sectarian differences, which can cause a long-running protest movements and conflict. Indeed, political conflict can be resolved, but once regional and external actors instigate ethnic and sectarian identities in their fight, it will be very difficult to alleviate the tensions. This threatens the stability of every state in the region, as experienced in the Middle East.

Conclusion

This study has shown that the root causes of conflicts and terrorism are enormously complex, multifaceted, and often intertwined. They resist simplification and easy categorization because causation is linked to effects, and effects, in turn, influence causation. The causes or roots of conflict and terrorism cannot be properly understood without understanding specific social, cultural, economic, and political contexts. Motivations and reasons for extremist ideologies and violence differ among individuals and groups, within and across the Middle East. Therefore, identification of the roots and causes of radicalism and terrorism have need of a comprehensive causal modelling.

In this chapter, we have attempted to examine root causes of conflicts and terrorism in the light of the model that Ross has developed. The appeal of radicalism and involvement in terrorism becomes most seductive when economic, political, social, and cultural crises and conflicts combine and when needs of individuals or groups are not met and people feel that they have been repeatedly humiliated.

Among the multicausal factors of conflicts and terrorism, the double-standard foreign policies of the Western countries within and towards the region are the primary reason behind the terrorist acts within the Middle East and against the Western entities in the region. Without showing a true commitment towards democracy and human rights, people in the region cannot be able to air their grievances freely and peacefully, and thus radical ideologies and violence will continue to flourish among the discontented people. The current conflicts, for example, in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Libya and political crisis in Egypt illustrate the region's extreme political and security risks. If one takes a simplistic view of motives and factors in those countries and others in the region, one is led to a simplistic and narrow set of counterterrorism and conflict resolution responses.

For that reason, motivations and causes need to be viewed through various perspectives. The absence of "one-size-fits-all" measures necessitate framing a comprehensive counterterrorism and conflict resolution strategy because only a long-term and multi-pronged strategy aimed at strengthening the institutional foundations of development, democracy, and security can achieve effective results.

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Chapter 8
Conflict Resolution and Peace in the Middle East: Prospects and Challenges

Ali Can

Introduction

Consisted of many countries with different religions and cultures, Middle East has always been the cradle to the conflicts throughout the history. Debates about building peace in the Middle East have been going on for decades. As clearly known, Arab-Israeli conflict consists of many controversial issues. Analyzing these issues necessitates focusing on the consequences rather than details of the process. Researchers studying on conflict resolution tend to overlook the interactions that led to the conflict. They mainly focused on leaders' decisions, state actions, and sporadic events rather than the structural, cultural, and social dynamics of the conflict. Therefore, studies on the Middle East have failed to develop effective comprehensive proposals that will restore the problematic relations in the region.

In the last few years, more researchers have focused on analyzing the effects of conflicts in the Middle East on both regional and global peace. These approaches have provided a detailed understanding about the structures, processes, and context beyond the long-lasting conflict in the Middle East. Recent peacemaking efforts depending on existing literature are mainly centered on dialogue and education among youth, women, and civil society groups (Agha et al. 2003; Kaye 2007). However, simple propositions are not enough to solve chronic problems.

The question that poses here is: What should be the philosophy and dynamics of world policies in order to reach sustainable peace in the Middle East? This question leads us to develop new approaches which are as precise and useful as those in mathematics and physics, and they can guide international relations and predictions. Precise and simple approaches can provide powerful inspirations to solve core inter-

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national conflicts. Peace is extremely difficult to construct in large segments, but not so hard on a small scale. Therefore, the first step towards peace must be the acceptance of "pure" communication with the "other."

This study depicts the prevailing process shaped mainly on the problematic relations between Israel and Palestine. After analyzing the dead ends in the peace negotiations, the challenges and prospects are presented by reviewing the literature and multiculturalism theory. Different approaches do not necessarily mean to discover totally new ideas. The age of the world is enough to reach every idea, and civilizations built on science and experiences provided too many insights about individual and social life. Developing new approaches, maybe, just means to generate new descriptions for similar cases. As Sandole stated, "different mappings of the same thing mean different realities" (Sandole 1993: 3).

The Course of the Conflict after the Six-Day War

The conflicts in the Middle East intensified with Israel's occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—two areas that are mainly populated by Palestinians at the end of the Six-Day War in 1967. Jewish extremists desired to build modern Israel over the land covering Gaza and West Bank. For this purpose, Israel allocated many places in those areas to Jewish settlers. It was believed that the victory in the war of 1967 was the beginning of messianic era. Thus, Israel has consistently increased its repressive occupation policies since then. The expansion of the Jewish settlements by Israel deliberately generated extensive violations of Palestinian rights (Zertal and Eldar 2004). Palestinians living in the occupied territories started a collective insurgency against Israel's policies. The Jewish settlements have been encouraged, while Palestinians have been forced by violent methods to leave from their lands.

Many regional and world leaders involved in the conflict resolution process to find a solution to the conflict following the initial clashes between the two communities. These attempts resulted with the Oslo Agreements, which ceased the violence for a while at the end of 2000. The long-lasting conflict between Israel and Palestine was temporarily solved at Oslo with the impact of domestic, regional, and international enforcements. They had to recognize each other and accept the norms and principles offered by international mediators. The three most crucial norms were cited in the UN Resolutions 242 and 338: The recognition of mutual rights and identities, the establishment of a just social, political and economic system, and the land to be determined via historic reconciliation and negotiations. However, Israel did not withdraw from the occupied territories. Contrarily, Israel has extended Jewish settlements in the land of Palestine. Israel wants to force Palestinian side to admit a one-state solution through settlement policies, checkpoints in Palestinian land, and harassment activities (Jadou 2009). These dominant and coercive policies breed radicalism and violence in Palestinian community against Israel. Palestinian radical groups resort to violence in order to get rid of Israeli intervention policies. These interactions, in turn, lead more conflict and pain for both sides.

The 2000 Camp David Summit reignited the polarization between the two sides. Each side blamed the other for the failure in peace negotiations. The deteriorated relations and the desire of international recognition lead Palestinians to start the Second Intifada. The clashes resulted with the death of 3200 Palestinians and one thousand Israelis negatively affected peace perceptions (Shor 2008). In a survey conducted after the second Intifada, over 70 % of Israeli Jews described Arabs in Israel as a security threat (Rouhana and Sultany 2003). The results of another survey conducted in 2005 have revealed the degree of hatred: over 75 % of Jewish respondents stated that they do not want to live with Arabs in the same building (Smooha 2010). The negative attitudes of Israeli people toward Palestinians resulted with a couple of legislations banning Arab parties from participating in 2003 and 2009 parliamentary elections (Waxman 2012). Especially the restriction policies toward the use of holy places by Palestinians closed the doors to the search for peace in the Middle East.

As a result of Israel's suppressive excluding policies, Palestinians have become more radical in their social and political orientation and focused on explaining Israeli violations around the world. These efforts have recently resulted with the hoisting of the Palestinian flag by the UN. The discourse of the conflict in the Middle East simply details the *framework* of Habermas' theory of "communicative action" that emphasizes autonomy and participation within the practice of everyday communication (Habermas 1984: 226). He indicates that "social pathologies can be understood as forms of manifestation of systematically distorted communication." The philosophy of communicative action is to evaluate the distortions that might impede the communication between conflicted parties and cause terrorism. The growing imbalance in every category in social, political, and economic life breaks the dialogue between Israel and Palestine and leads the weak side to use violence. The remedy for this problematic issue is a "pure and unconditional" tolerance which may lead the acceptance of the other with its differences (Borradori 2003). This may constitute an important progress towards the peaceful environment. The promise of practical cooperation through the policies of multiculturalism is the brightest hope for building sustainable peace in the Middle East.

Propositions of Multiculturalism

Global interactions make most of the countries in the world be open to diversity of peoples. When a society is consisted of people from diverse cultures, governing common life becomes much more sensitive issue to sustain peace and security. As Robert Putnam emphasized that in multicultural societies, "trust (even of one's own race) is lower, altruism and community cooperation rarer, friends fewer" (cited in Baber 2012: 12). Therefore, certain rules which are sensitive to cultural values and traditional diversities have to be settled so that social interactions develop in a peaceful environment. In order to find answers for these concerns, multiculturalism theory has been developed by social scientists.

Multiculturalism is a term referring to the recognition of equal rights for all citizens in a community consisted of diverse cultures. It is a philosophy of tolerating group differences and recognizing of identities through "group differentiated rights" (Kymlicka 1995). Culture enables individual autonomy and self-respect which allow individuals to feel themselves as equal members of the society. People are born in a specific culture that they do not have any chance to choose. Therefore, they should not be held responsible because of their cultural values and traditions (Anderson 1999; Kymlicka 2001; Scheffler 2003).

Different perceptions on multiculturalism lead to debates on its challenges and benefits. The most dangerous factor that may threaten a multicultural social system is that a culture sees itself superior to others (Parekh 2000). Events that cause massive destruction throughout history, such as colonialism, slavery, the Holocaust and violent communist activities, clearly show that self-righteousness only leads to terrible violence in which both parties lost. In the philosophy of multiculturalism, governments have to remain objective towards peculiarities of identities, cultures, and religion (Parekh 1997). Social solidarity would be strong, only if governments make and implement legislations to recognize and valorize cultural differences.

In multicultural societies, dominant groups usually try to be politically and economically advantaged over to other groups. States have to set rules that prohibit discrimination and provide equal opportunities to all people from diverse cultures. Constitutional and legal values serve as a catalyst for peaceful cross-cultural interactions in competitive socio-politic and economic life (Parekh 2000). Recognition of identities, respect for cultural, ethnic, and religious differences, and equal opportunities in social and political life are required for a secure society in harmony.

The multicultural nature of the Middle East was not quickly formed, and it will not be quickly changed. The traits of Hittites, Hebrews, Assyrians, Babylonians, Medes, Persians, Greeks, the Romans, Byzantines, Persians, Arabs, Turks, and many other civilizations can be seen in the culture of the Middle East. The area is also significant because it is the cradle for the three major monotheistic religions: Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. Social interactions involve the exchange of approval and various types of values shaped through diverse cultures, religions, and ethnicities. Traditions, customs, emotions, and various forms of value-oriented actions have brought out the concept of "other" (Merton 1968; Weber 1978).

"Othering" is a tool by which national identities are constituted. "Us" and "Others" are constructed images among individuals or groups who are included or excluded from one's own society (Anderson 1983). Even though multiculturalism increases individuals' civic attachment and sense of coexistence, the negative perception of multiculturalism by certain politicians and right-wing parties may encourage the sense of exclusion (Bloemraad 2011). The state authorities should be aware of that economic development, democratization, and cultural formations are the key points in the state–society relations. Policies of multiculturalism facilitate mutual gain and contribute to the sense of coexistence. If multicultural policies are supported by the authorities, greater civic and political cohesion might appear and prevent the feelings of exclusion.

Prospects for Conflict Resolution

The emergence of conflict is inevitable in consequence of social, economic, and political interactions. As clearly indicated in sociological literature, conflict is necessary for social change and development. Conflicts may be perceived as threat for identity, culture, or national existence; or it can be viewed as a tool which indicates problematic issues in the society. If we truly understand the nature of the conflict, we can find new opportunities to build more peaceful social life.

As early as the beginning of the 1900s, world leaders and activists have tried to find a solution to the conflict between the Israel and Palestine. None of the attempts succeeded in building peace in the Middle East. The sustainable peace depends on the fulfillment of the basic needs for security, development, and recognition (Zunes 1994). Hence, certain areas of interest should be strictly identified. Other areas should be free for the use of all members of the society. Attempts to live in peace in a multicultural society must go beyond peacebuilding efforts, and become a humanist movement addressing all the violations people faced within the society. Officials should be precise in their goals to set up peace in the Middle East. Conflicted parties should be convinced that to reach victory over the other increases grievances and stirs up new conflicts (Falk 1994). Victories based on the other side's sorrows instill hostility, not long-term peaceful relationships. A long-term peace process involves a sincere and excessive effort to convert adversaries into friends. Likely suggestions in peace negotiations, therefore, must include mutual gains for both sides.

Attracting public attention to economic issues and peaceful social life is an important option to efface deep-rooted hostility (Fisher et al. 1994). As seen in the establishment process of European Union, free trade in goods and services may provide a peaceful social environment in the Middle East. The events led to the collapse of the former Yugoslavia taught that "it is cheaper to negotiate in pain and frustration for 5 years, than to exchange bullets for five minutes" (cited in Shapiro 2013: 184). For this purpose, it was posited that Palestinian economy should be driven by market forces and led by private sector supported by public institutions. A free market system in which goods, services, and capital might be freely exchanged should be established. However, there is little hope for such a free market based Palestinian economy due to strict Israeli oppression. The wide income disparities between Israeli and Palestinian publics and the asymmetric pattern of employment preclude such a proposition.

After the end of Cold War, human rights and freedoms came into prominence in national and international arena. This rising trend has changed political motivations of nation states. As the primary concerns of nation states are acceptance and legitimacy, they have to comply with universally accepted human rights values (Finnemore 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998). With the policies based on fundamental human rights and freedoms, the wall in Berlin was brought down, the Velvet Revolution in Prague was generated, Milosevic from Belgrade was expelled, Shevardnadze in Tbilisi was dismissed, and democracy was brought to Kiev. Governments may first initiate human rights improvements merely as instrumental tactical concessions,

aimed at relieving pressures from the international community (Risse et al. 1999). Israeli policies are mainly based on the biblical concept "the chosen people." This way of thinking leads the politicians to justify their violent actions with the moral superiority of the Jewish people. Although this conception has always been part of Israeli nationalist policies, universal morality forces them to use human rights rhetoric (Gordon and Berkovitch 2007). The pressure on abiding human rights by international community brought only moderate promotion in Palestinian rights (Shor 2008). For Israeli politicians, the use of universal humanitarian language is a political tactic which provides political capital to them while Israeli settlers continue to harass Palestinian people. They believe that their mission of violating Palestinian rights is supported by Israeli public and state. Therefore, they have not changed their perception "A Jew does not expel another Jew."

The inherent power imbalance in Israel–Palestine conflict endangers the protection of Palestinian rights and international recognition of Palestine. Giving a universal status to holy places and setting international rules and principles to manage those places may ensure that both parties will preserve their basic interests and develop normal relations with each other. Palestinians are more ready to accept a mindful proposition than Israeli people because of the power imbalance. They are very thirsty to lead normal lives in their own land without humiliation and intervention. On the other hand, Israel—reliant on the military and political power—wants to close all the doors to peace and confiscate the whole land of Palestine. Current international politics prefer not to see Israel's violent activities towards Palestinians. Therefore, Israel keeps practicing its violent policies, which lead to more suffering and insecurity in the region.

Challenges for States and Civil Society

Consisted of many countries with different religions and cultures, Middle East has always been the cradle to the conflicts throughout the history. Discussing a vision of multiculturalism in the Middle East, power disparities, and confrontational relationships between Israel and Palestine must be taken into consideration. Building peace in the Middle East depends on the transformation of intolerant relations into mutually accepted policies (Falk 1994). Violent policies and practices have poisoned communal relations and led to lasting hostility in the long term. Interrelations between the two conflicted parties must depend on a symmetrical framework which references to the human rights and common religious tenets.

It is the fact that religions with the purpose of leading people to the morality have a potency to solve conflicts and sustain peace in the society. The famous 10 Commandments of Judaism and the concept of community sharing in Islamic belief may help to develop a multicultural system in which all diversities are melted for a peaceful common life. However, religious beliefs instigate hostilities rather than peace in the region, because the struggle between the two sides involves claims of sovereignty over the holy places in Jerusalem. People from both sides think that if

they compromise from religious and cultural values, their civilizations will collapse. Hence, they adhere to these values and always strive to protect them. Especially in conflicts in which religious beliefs come into prominence, civil society groups may play a significant role in the conflict resolution process by preparing a ground for mutual understanding (Kadayifci 2002). By using religious rituals such as forgiveness, integrity, personal responsibility, love, patience, and justice, religious actors strive not only to resolve the controversial issues, but also to build a sustainable peace.

Moreover, the historical and religious attachments to the sacred places in Jerusalem increase the severity of antagonism between Israel and the Arab World. Therefore, the issue of sovereignty over the sacred places must be the first issue in conflict resolution agenda. There are numerous studies advocating for the inclusion of the status of sacred places in conflict resolution process (Landau 2003). These studies also emphasize that the leaders should generate and disseminate inclusive historical and religious narratives to their people in order to develop mutual respect and empathy. The narratives may remind that these holy places have been a cradle for mutual respect and humanity for centuries by giving reference to the tenets of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.

The exclusion of civil society from the peace negotiations is the other significant reason of the failure of peacebuilding efforts in the Middle East. The support of civil society groups and nongovernmental organizations in various perspectives such as respect for diversities, education for democracy and human rights, and economics may facilitate the process of mutual understanding and tolerance. Studies on conflict resolution indicate that in cases involving directly or indirectly civil society groups, the reconciliation process is possible to continue much longer (John and Kew 2008; Walton and McKersie 1991; Rubin et al. 1994). The participation of civil society groups allows the general feeling of the community to be transferred to the reconciliation process. International agents must endeavor to convince the conflicted parties to develop mutually agreeable proposals on the major controversial issues such as strong support of human rights, interfaith dialogue and cooperation, economic and financial integration, and the empowerment of civil society groups that promote human rights and freedoms (Mason 2013).

The social interactions based on colonial structure in Arab communities negatively affect peace negotiations. Thus, educating people is required in order to eliminate the confrontational and destructive practices and to develop peaceful communication and interaction among the diverse communities of the region.

Conclusion

The lack of peace in the Middle East has deteriorated almost every category in social, economic, and political life. Living standards and freedoms have declined over time in Palestine as a result of Israeli closures. Societies adopting a strategy of inclusion (tolerant strategies) will produce unifying mechanisms that strengthen

social solidarity. Societies practicing a strategy of exclusion (repressive strategies), on the other hand, will be open to polarization in the population, which breeds conflicts between opposing groups (Kriesi 2004). Thus, peace negotiations must be sustained in a way which is far from any kind of conflict approach.

Building a multicultural two-state system seems to be the most reasonable option to promote democracy and pluralism in the region consisted of diverse cultures and religions. Each side must tolerate other party's different judgments and values. If the ideal principles of multiculturalism become reality, moving towards sustainable peace is much more possible.

This desired system has a potency to transform the conflicting perceptions into a mutual understanding and cooperation. State authorities and civil society groups should focus on the issues (economic development, education for democracy and human rights, the revival of cultural and religious values, and common use and protection of sacred places) that stimulate the desire of coexistence. After defining those issues, then, each party might revise their policies with a respectful and suggestive manner.

It is very clear that current socio-political picture in the region does not reflect such a cooperative framework. Education is the foremost issue that will provide remedies for the deep-rooted problems of region (Calleja 1994). However, education is not enough to transform the long-lasting hostility into cooperation. Both sides must admit that short-term gains obtained through the loss of the other side encourage long-term conflicts. The failure of the Oslo process clearly indicates that peace propositions must meet the interests of both sides. Thus, international actors should enforce the parties to develop a culture of peace (Mason 2013). Mutual respect and confidence are necessary for a secure social environment in which all groups meet their expectations and make plans for future needs. Without recognizing all communities and providing equal opportunities in economic and social life, it is impossible for a multicultural society to remain stable and vibrant by getting rid of violence and terrorism.

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Chapter 9
The Changing Nature of Global Arm Conflict

Ozcan Ozkan

Introduction

The nature of global armed conflict has been undergone tremendous change in the past three decades. Especially after the demise of the Soviet Union, the world entered into a new era. In this new era where the United States has remained only superpower in the globe, the unipolar trend was only challenged by emerging new threats such as global terrorism. The transition period was not a peaceful one since the newly established states in Eastern Europe and some failed states in Africa and the Middle East have seriously challenged security of the developed countries both in Europe and the Americas. On the other hand, some states in Africa and elsewhere had long lacked the colonial backing as a result of the decolonization process starting in the 1960s. After the end of the Cold War, some of these states were further left without support from either bloc. In this situation, many states have failed because of lacking political, economic, and authoritative capacity to meet their people's needs, triggering intra-state wars rather than previous interstate wars.

The most important threat for both domestic and international stability came from asymmetric warfare including terrorism. Among them, the 9/11 attacks marked a new period in which transnational terrorism changed the nature of armed conflict greatly, thanks to facilitating factors of globalization. In addition, advanced technology made conventional wars obsolete, triggering a revolution in military affairs.

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The Changing Nature of War

The process of globalization has been great impacts on armed conflict. Economic interdependence and spread of democracy in some parts of the world led states to form security communities, where war between them is becoming less and less likely. Kantian approach that democracies will not fight with each other showed the instrumentality of democratic peace theory for the last decade. However, this does not mean that democratic countries will not go to war with nondemocratic states to spread democratic zone of peace. The American decision to wage war against Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein in 2003 was partly due to this argument that a democratic Iraq without a dictator would be an example for others in the region toward a peaceful democratic region.

On the other hand, in some parts of the world wars are still present. As famous nineteenth-century strategist Clausewitz said, war is a continuation of political activity by other means. And, it is unlikely that it will disappear. The characteristics of war might change, but essential nature of war could not. Although the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet Union eliminated great wars between great powers, the political authority vacuum created by the demise of the Soviet Union and violent and brutal transition period of nondemocratic states toward democracy caused states disintegrate into civil wars and insurgency. In addition, temporary hegemonic control of the United States without a rival in the world together with Westernization attempts faced with cultural and political resistance that has showed itself brutally in many parts of the world (Viotti & Kauppi, 2010).

In a globalized world where communication and transformation technologies expanded worldwide, thanks to recent advanced tools like satellites, telephones, and the Internet, the notion of battlefield changed to such extent that cyberspace has become battlespace itself. While new arms technology allows states to launch long-range missiles in a far distance to the actual battlefield, this technology may also be used by terrorists to disrupt and devastate government infrastructures as well as to intimidate their enemies. Even if the great wars are not likely in the near future, a possible conflict on weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) may trigger an unprecedented warfare by using these weapons. For instance, the possibility of a nuclear confrontation is increasing as the practices of North Korea and Iran as well as terrorists attempting to acquire nuclear weapons is challenging the international peace. Mass media is also playing an important role in showing the brutality of war globally making it more understandable for the global audience and viewers (Allison, 2010).

The nature of war has been shifting in recent decades under the impact of globalization, eroding the autonomy of the state. International system, international law, norms, and rules are greatly concerned with how to prevent war. Formerly, after every great war, a new international system was formed to better deal with the possible causes and consequences of wars. After the 30 Years Wars, the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 first set up a system among states to prevent another catastrophic war. After the Napoleonic Wars, the Concert of Europe was set up in 1815 and played an important role in sustaining relative peace among states with realist balance of power and diplomatic tools. When the World War I broke out, the previous system collapsed and the post-war arrangements under the umbrella of League of Nations tried to reach a consensus in order to eliminate

future wars by the notion of collective security. However, this system backed by liberal thinking did not work well and consequently could not prevent the outbreak of another world war. The United Nations came into being with a distinctive authority to sustain international peace with its Security Council after the World War II. The UN system and Bretton Woods arrangements also gave priority to economic and social issues as low politics while maintaining military and security issues as high politics since both economic and social affairs are all important factors to leading to a war (Ferguson & Mansbach, 2004).

Realist and neorealist approaches giving priority to states and international system under anarchy dominated the post-war environment. Their supporters criticized the naïve propositions of liberalism which encouraged states cooperate rather than compete. Liberal and idealists proved to be inadequate when cooperation and interdependence did not prevent states to wage war against each other. With the beginning of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviets started an arms race. In addition, security and military blocs between the two powers led to a bipolar international system. Neorealist thinkers like Waltz argued that a bipolar world is one of the most stable kinds of international system since such system is easy to manage, and miscalculation is minimal. On the other hand, multipolar system is complex and more prone to lead to war through miscalculation and misperception. However, as far as nuclear proliferation is concerned, many including Waltz argued that more nuclear-capable states may be better than fewer and multipolarity is better than bipolarity since more uncertainty causes caution, and caution means following tried and true policies of the past that avoid deviations (Waltz, 1988).

It is argued that in the anarchy of international system, improving the means of defense and deterrence relative to the means of offense increases the chances of peace. Weapons and strategies that make defense and deterrence easier, and offensive strikes harder to mount, are believed to decrease the likelihood of war. This argument is shared by most of the nuclear-capable states or states seeking nuclear technology. Since the 1962 Cuban crisis and later the period of détente came with a time when striking was believed to lead to catastrophic consequences, nuclear arms race between great powers did not end up with a hot war. Rather, it led to developing smart weapons especially on the side of the United States which was known as Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or popularly as Star Wars.

This revolution in military affairs proved to be instrumental in the 1991 and 2003 Iraq Wars which gave the US-led coalition effortless victory, thanks to possessing these advanced weapons and satellite systems. In this environment, unconventional or asymmetric responses to great powers of superior capacity started to take place as seen in Soviet withdrawal of Afghanistan in the 1980s, Arab-Israel conflict from the beginning until today, Yugoslavia in the 1990s, and today in Afghanistan and Iraq where military and technological superiority are being challenged by insurgents and local militias with limited weapons and strategies but a novel and unstoppable weapon among others: suicide bombing. The 9/11 attacks as suicide bombing has marked the most complicated asymmetric assault to a superpower in history. This can be seen as the changing nature of armed conflict where high-tech wars between sophisticated and organized alliances were replaced by conflict of almost completely opposite character—low tech, local at planning but globally trenchant and deeply disorganized.

New Arm Conflict

Today, globalization not only causes a wide range of economic, cultural, social, and political change, it also affects the character of war. Gender started to play an important role in suicide bombings. Child soldiers are increasingly being used in African intra-state armed conflicts, in Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and in Afghanistan by Taliban forces. In some places, advanced states are willingly transferring some of its military functions to private authorities, creating a kind of "outsourcing of war" while these functions are being seized from the state by other actors like warlords in another part of the world. Indeed, more and more states are contracting out some military services to Privatized Military Firms (PMFs) which sell a great deal of war-related services to states in the logistical and security roles rather than direct combat as seen in the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq (Singer, 2004).

The concept of total war of twentieth century which involved the mobilization of whole population, economy, and military resources of the state seems to fade away but the total loss of both intra-state wars, civil wars, and terrorist attacks still remain very high as seen in Rwanda, Bosnia, Liberia, Somalia, and other places as well as in the 9/11 attacks.

War has long been seen as armed conflict between opposing states at least since the Westphalian state order, fought by uniformed, organized bodies of soldiers. In most cases, wars were regulated by different acts, norms, and rules. This is not the case today when intra-state armed conflicts have dominated the global agenda for the last 25 years. The driving force behinds these new wars is globalization process which has increasingly eroded the economic, political, and military autonomy of the state in some part of the world where disintegration of states and struggle for control of the state by conflicting groups have mostly ended up with intra-state violent armed struggle. As those states lose control, privatized and paramilitary groups gain access to weapons of the state or usually via organized groups dealing with arms trade.

This new armed conflict in which religion, identity, and culture play an important role is also reflected in Huntington's "clash of civilization." As opposed to his former student Fukayama who prematurely called early post-cold war era as "the end of history," Huntington never expected an emergence of a global civilization after the end of the Cold War. Even if there is increased interconnectedness between societies, the world would fragment into civilizational blocs and cultural and ethnic enclaves. According to Huntington, world politics is entering a new phase in which the fundamental source of conflict will not be primarily ideological or economic, but cultural. Although he concedes that nation-states will remain the most powerful actor, he contends that the principal conflicts will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. Particularly, the clash between the Western and Islamic states is likely to become more rather than less intense. Part of the reason is that the West is now at the peak of power in relations to other civilizations, and there has been a hostile reaction to this dominance by other civilizations (Huntington, 1993).

Other important reasons for the new armed struggle are poverty, overpopulation, crime, disease, and environmental degradation. In particular, the environmental degradation is increasingly becoming a major cause of conflict in certain areas of the world. One of the most prominent analysts on relations between environment and global conflict, Thomas Homer-Dixon, contends that wars and civil violence will often arise from depletion of resources such as water, cropland, forest, and fish (Homer-Dixon, 1999).

Finally, long ignored issue of terrorism gained priority in global arena. Neoliberal institutionalists and realists mainly focused on nuclear weapons for a long time, and terrorism was regarded as a secondary issue that required neither attention nor analytic rigor. This was changed after 9/11. Terrorism experts such as Bruce Hoffman had long been warning of the emergence of new and more lethal forms of terrorism including emergence of religious terrorist organizations even before 9/11. His main argument was that religious motivations combined with enhanced terrorist capabilities with new technological tools could indicate an even long, bloodier, and more destructive era of violence in the history. The 9/11 attacks proved Hoffman's assessment of changing nature of terrorism to be true (Hoffman, 2006).

Conclusion

The process of globalization has greatly changed the face of armed conflict. Some elements, though, still remains the same. While in some places armed struggle is continuing for promoting political activity, in other places armed conflict is occurring due to economic and environment scarcity concerns. The asymmetric threat of terrorism is increasingly affecting state behavior while the solutions to terrorism and armed conflict still remain inadequate. With the advanced technological capacities becoming more and more accessible to anyone including terrorists, the nature of threat has also gone global transcending boundaries. Terrorists' wish to acquire weapons of mass destruction underscores the gravity of the threat. As the character of conflict goes beyond the traditional borders of states so must the response. Multilateral arrangements by the United Nations and other supranational bodies to date have not addressed the issue adequately, but there is hope that new kinds of multilateral, regional, and international cooperation in all levels of political, economic, and cultural aspects as well as law enforcement and military cooperation between individual states can emerge to reduce the risk and casualty in the face of the changing nature of armed conflict globally.

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Part II
Case Studies

Chapter 10
The Interplay Between Policy and Politics in Combatting Terrorism: The Case of Lebanon (2011–2015)

Hiba Khodr

Introduction

Lebanon, with its peculiar history and fractious political environment, was susceptible to acts of terrorism prior to the outbreak of the 2011 Syrian Crisis and even before the Arab upsprings. Depending on who is analyzing its history, Lebanon's history has included either many or few instances of domestic terror. In addition, while most terror activity is domestic, the new threat facing the country, more recently, is primarily transnational in nature—mainly by groups such as ISIS (referred to also as ISIL or IS—the Islamic State) and *Jubhat al-Nusra* that have been crossing the border from Syria to commit acts of terror within the Lebanese territories.

Generally speaking, defining terrorism in the literature is controversial. Sandler's definition (2014) covers most of the agreed upon aspects of what constitutes terrorism: "Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate noncombatant victims." (p. 1). Terrorism, therefore, is a tool used by non-state actors to try to force societal change outside the normal channels of the political system. This definition covers any subnational group committing any act of violence against any target as long as it is politically motivated. The problem with applying this definition to Lebanon is that only recently have groups-mainly ISIS_operating inside Lebanon become truly

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"You have to be lucky all the time. We only have to be lucky once."-IRA (1984)

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subnational. It would be fallacious to call historical groups that have carried out terror attacks in Lebanon exclusively subnational.

For instance, The *Kataeb* political party controlled the presidency when their gunmen carried out the massacres at *Sabra* and *Shatila* Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut in 1982. Also, though *Hezbollah* has been implicated in numerous terror attacks, including the 2005 assassination of former prime minister Rafic Hariri, it is still a legitimate political movement with 14 seats in the Lebanese parliament during the last elections in 2014 and is part of "March 8" which represents one of the two main political coalitions in the country (Masters and Laub 2014)—the other one being "March 14".

Regarding counterterrorism, much of the literature about counterterrorism strategies, programs, and policies is based on how western countries, specifically the United States, fight terrorism. Because of these complications and the gap in the literature on counterterrorism in the region and in Lebanon, and given the complexity of Lebanon's political system as well as the overlapping states and non-states functions of some actors, this chapter uses a contextual view of terrorism and attempts to develop its own working definition of terrorism. This is done by giving a brief historical overview of the complications inherent in including domestic terrorism in that definition and focuses mainly on current transitional terror threats facing Lebanon today, specifically *ISIS* and *Jubhat al-Nusra*.

The chapter is an exploratory study on the interplay between politics and policy in combatting terrorism in Lebanon. It aims at investigating the contributing factors to the absence, though not total, of counterterrorism policies by analyzing the relation between the peculiarity of the Lebanese politics and the policy formulation in the country. After briefly identifying the political, social, and economic factors that perpetuates terrorism in Lebanon, this research will answer the following two key questions: *what role does the Lebanese government and civil society play in combatting terrorist acts?* And *what are the obstacles (political and administrative) that hinder developing comprehensive counterterrorism policies in the country?*

The background information concerning the definitions on terrorism are derived firstly from the British intelligence agency MI5 (MI5, ND); although this one purports that, it is not meant to be a globally recognized and accepted definition. The second was conceived at the 1998 *Arab League's Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism*, and is the leading definition used in the Arab world. Lastly, we use the definition that the United State's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) utilizes. Based on these three most widely understood definitions of terrorism, this chapter starts by offering an operational definition of terrorism followed by a brief history of terrorism within Lebanon through the lens of what we conceive to be the two main factors or drivers behind terrorism in the country. This contextual description provides the background to enter into the discussion of the field of counterterrorism and what policies, if any, Lebanon is undertaking to counter these ever-persisting threats arising both from within its borders and just beyond. It should be noted that, given the violent incidents that took place leading to the civil war and during the war as well as the factions that continue to perpetuate terrorism there was a unique tribunal formed in 2009 to deal with these cases.

The Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) functions out of Den Haag, the Netherlands, and has incorporated a codification for outlining terrorism itself.

In relation to the history of terrorism in Lebanon, we have defined two main factors that led to the development and the perpetuation of terrorism within the country. The first is the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, which created an exodus of a large number of Palestinian refugees to Lebanon. The refugees inside Lebanon, attached to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), played a large role in the events that led to the 1975 Lebanese civil war. The second is external forces such as Iran/Syria and Saudi Arabia's involvement in Lebanese politics. In addition, groups such as *Hezbollah* have grown to be a major player in political dynamics within the state. The efficacy of Lebanon's government remains a problem that has lent it the unfortunate status of being a failed state. The state apparatus is overrun by corruption and also exhibits other failures, given that the government maintains little legitimacy and sovereignty in the presence of non-state actors, such as *Hezbollah*, and constant foreign influence.

This is the first academic study that has investigated the interplay between politics and policy as it relates to domestic and transnational terrorism from a governance perspective taking the case study of Lebanon. The analysis offered in this chapter lays the foundation for much needed future studies on the country's, and the region's, counter-terrorism policies by identifying some of participants, mapping out the process and providing policy recommendations for a more effective and efficient policies.

Defining Terrorism: International and Domestic

Terrorist acts pose such a threat because they do not represent the free will of the people, it is always based on violence to impose a narrow ideology on the majority, and it aims to end all forms of free expression, rights, and accountability. In essence, terrorism ends the legitimacy of the state and replaces it with the image of a Hobbesian society, where society is lawless and only the strongest survive at the expense of security, freedom, and rights (Dawoody 2015). With the exception of the 1998 the Arab League definition, most definitions often used in respect to terrorism and counterterrorism are western-centered.

The *Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism* released a document in which terrorism is defined as: "Any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives of purposes, that occurs for the advancement of an individual or collective criminal agenda, causing terror among people, causing fear by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in danger, or aiming to cause damage to the environment or to public or private installations or property or to occupy or seize them, or aiming to jeopardize a national resource" (Arab League 1998, p. 2). While the security service of the United Kingdom (MI5) states that there is no generally agreed definition of terrorism internationally, and that definitions are made by individual nations and distinguish "international terrorism" and "domestic terrorism," the 2007 Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) that consists of an Appeals Chamber whose judges

argue that an international definition of terrorism can be found, despite societal differences. Based on reviews of state practice and *opinio juris*, terrorism consists of three key elements: "(1) the perpetration of a criminal act (such as murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking, arson, and so on), or threatening such an act; (2) the intent to spread fear among the population (which would generally entail the creation of public danger) or directly or indirectly coerce a national or international authority to take some action, or to refrain from taking it; (3) when the act involves a transnational element" (Scharf 2011). Nevertheless, widely accepted definitions are based off of those formed in nations such as the United Kingdom or the United States.

The most recent version outlined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines international terrorism as activities with the following three characteristics: "(1) Involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law; (2) Appear to be intended (a) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (b) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (c) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (3) Occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the USA, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum" (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2011). Terrorists have three main tactical goals: (1) they seek publicity in order to make their cause more widely known and prefer to undertake terrorist acts in cities, where they can be assured of media attention, (2) Terrorists seek to destabilize the polity as when the political system's legitimacy is eroded, the terrorists' chances of achieving their goal improve, and (3) they seek to damage the economy as they want to impost material cost on the population in order to make them yield to their demands; the more an economy is affected by terrorist acts, the higher is the terrorists' marginal benefit.

Counterterrorism: Theoretical Perspectives and Best Practices

As the threat of terrorism becomes more profuse and widespread affecting all nations regardless of their economic or political stature, it became necessary to both academicians and practitioners to explore what methods and approaches can be employed to counter these acts. Generally speaking, terrorist acts are a tried and true practice of steering attention to one's cause; actually, the attacks in New York City, 14 years ago, have redefined the field of counterterrorism in how governments respond to such acts and how terrorists continue to carry them out. Given the colonial and client state history of the Middle East after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the United States and major European countries have played a large role in the policies and calculations of Arab nations.

In order to avoid adopting solely western rhetoric and policies regarding the field of counterterrorism, it is important to uncover the range of literature on the subject from experts with experience in the regions that are most proliferated with terrorism.

With incidents compounding in late 2015, it is vital to note that "Empirical work on counterterrorism remains a relatively unexplored research field" (Drakos and Giannakopoulos 2009, p. 135). The author details two reasons for this claim, the first is that research is being hindered by data and is being properly classified in its own category—as it is often delineated to areas of crime and other illegal instances.

The second reason is the larger context of terrorism and how governments and other acclaimed experts believe that counterterrorism means through increased surveillance and military means can elude threats, yet military means cannot even begin to tackle a specific paradox; He raises the following question "would-be terrorists need to be radicalized enough to die for their cause; Westernized enough to move around without raising red flags; ingenious enough to exploit loopholes in the security apparatus; meticulous enough to attend to the myriad logistical details that could torpedo the operation; self-sufficient enough to make all the preparations without enlisting outsiders who might give them away; disciplined enough to maintain complete secrecy; and—above all—psychologically tough enough to keep functioning at a high level without cracking in the face of their own impending death" (Mueller and Stewart 2012, p. 88). Drakos and Giannakopoulos (2009) argue that there is an impediment to the adoption of a solid and objective counterterrorism performance measure.

While the study and accumulation of data for terrorism is large, the field of counterterrorism remains idealistic, in the sense that it is not yet effectively preemptory, but rather collective only after incidents have occurred and countermeasures have begun. The International Terrorism Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) organization classifies the logistical outcome of each terrorist incident in several categories and finds that the period of 1968–2003 had 12,569 recorded incidents, 1755 of which were stopped by authorities (14 %), and of that percentage, 23 % were stopped at the planning stage, and 36.7 % at the scene of the impending crime and 40 % after initiation of the crime taking place (Drakos and Giannakopoulos 2009).

With the nature of threats evolving and the places and ways in which terrorists carry out their crimes, authorities have to be increasingly more effective than the terrorists themselves. In reality, not every effort to commit a crime or an act of terrorism can be thwarted, as the most authoritarian of governments cannot prevent all attacks. For instance, when looking at the case of counterterrorism policies in Morocco, Kalpakian (2008) argues that a more accurate measure of counterterrorism should be "the government's performance in their ability to prevent attacks and disrupt terrorist cells before they engage in attacks" (p. 454). In the case of Morocco, they have been able to disrupt at least two major terrorist organizations, with nearly a third, by focusing on the origins of terrorism within the nation and not on over applying authoritarian measures to otherwise deter those that are already radicalized or in another mindset to commit acts of terror. The Moroccan authorities found that, with al-Qaida as a foundation, "the best method to combat Islamist terrorism is to disrupt the social networks that radicalize cohorts of young Muslim men in the West" (Kalpakian 2008).

His analysis is systematic in looking at the demographics of those accused, their ideology and interests, their targets and methods, justification and international links. The answers to these queries would assist in formulating policies that treated terror-

ism as a crime rather than as an ideological battle to be waged through the military means of a state and potentially its allies. While the measures come with their own criticisms, much like the USA Patriot Act adopted within the United States in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the government found these measures to be the most prescribed to address the threats. Reardon (2014) describes the western policy as paraphrasing Maslow's Law of the Instrument, "If your only tool is a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a nail." Unfortunately, this tends to be the rule when discussing counterterrorism strategies, particularly among political leaders, where all too often military or law enforcement approaches are the only instruments in the toolbox—the "hammers" for most countries. Byman and Shapiro (2007) highlight the importance of using the resources of allies such as the case of the CIA's multinational counterterrorist intelligence center in Paris, France. The center is considered a critical component of at least 12 operations, including the capture of one of al-Qaida's most important European operatives (Byman and Shapiro 2007).

However, the United States and Europe do not necessarily agree on policies or on the precise nature of the terrorist threat. In fact, there are also other instances of these allies disagreeing about the definitions of who is a terrorist such as the case of Hamas and Hezbollah. Byman and Shapiro (2007) note, "the EU as a whole, for example, has been reluctant to take steps to block the assets of charities linked to Hamas and Hizb'Allah in particular…and are hesitant to label such groups as terrorists because they fear the instability that might result" (p. 34). Furthermore, an official in the EU considers it a difficult issue to label Hizb'Allah as a terrorist organization. Despite the fact that Hizb'Allah has military operations that are deplorable to the international community, Hizb'Allah is also a legitimate political party in Lebanon; "…. Can a political party elected by the Lebanese people be put on a terrorist list? Would that really help deal with terrorism?" (Weisman 2005, p. 1).

Schbley (2000) looks at specific policies adopted by nations in regard to domestic terrorism by focusing on the case of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Given Hezbollah's international links and origins of support, the policies adopted toward this organization are also international and not exclusive to Lebanon. While domestic factors led a number of Lebanese Shi'a to be radicalized and organized due to Lebanon's low cultural pluralism, the aims of the group remain focused on liberating other oppressed populations such as the Palestinians. The author takes a quantitative approach to uncover the tangible reasons why those who have joined Hezbollah were convinced to do so. The findings concluded that wealth was a larger driver for those involved to commit terrorism than any religious belief or otherwise (Schbley 2000).

Other experts in counterterrorism maintain that in order to produce effective policies to combat terrorism, there must be a shift from neutral explanation to recommendations for counterterrorist measures; the latter only implicitly assumes the perspective of the United States and its allies in the so-called war on terror, and a "pronounced tendency to invoke the global dimensions of terrorism when it comes to combating it while eluding the global factors that contribute to structural violence that lays the ground for political resistance and terrorist agency" (Brunner 2007, p. 958). She further argues that the "oppressed Muslim" narrative needs to

be sidelined, as it does not paint a full picture of those who are carrying out acts of terrorism, especially when placing Islam as the core referent (Brunner 2007). The United Nations Counterterrorism Center, founded in 2011, was established within the CTITF Office pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Global Strategy and General Assembly resolution A/RES/66/10.

UNCCT aims to support United Nations efforts to implement the introduced counterterrorism strategy at both national and regional levels, promote regional cooperation against terrorism, and build Member States' counter-terrorism capacities. The organization found, "several conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, including, but not limited to, prolonged unresolved conflicts, dehumanization of victims of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, lack of rule of law and violations of human rights, ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socioeconomic marginalization and lack of good governance" (United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre CTITF and International Conference: Engaging Partners for Capacity-Building. Riyadh 2013, p. 7). Additionally, the organization and this particular conference also focused on improving the national, regional, and international legal basis to combat terrorism and harmonize counter-terrorism frameworks across national legislative systems from the regional perspective. They recommend that similar centers design model laws on counter-terrorism, on organizations and persons engaging in the support of terrorist activities in other states, on countering the financing of terrorism, and on operational investigation activity.

The development of model criminal codes on the matters related to terrorism is also necessary to build a comprehensive framework. The rhetoric of using an already well-established justice system, internationally and domestically, is emphasized again by Soufan (2008). Soufan, who has led the United States efforts in dealing with incidents related to September 11th, contends that the Achilles heel of America's policy against terrorism is its failure to counter the narratives that inspire individuals to become extremists and terrorists. Again, such in the case of Morocco, identifying the root causes that lead terrorists to their paths is where attention should be focused in countering terrorism.

As long as the ideological and sociological causes exist and go untreated, extremists will be able to attract new recruits, they'll keep producing replacements for those killed or apprehended and the battle will never end (Soufan 2008). Effective counterterrorism measures would be to include the communities involved rather than isolating them, as people are being recruited because of alleged local or tribal grievance, therefore it is community leaders who are the best messengers to counter that narrative. When it is a distortion of Islam, it is the duty of religious leaders to take the lead. Sometimes it is former extremists, who have taken the same path and have credibility, who can be the most effective messengers (Soufan 2013). Worldwide, we can see instances where such measures have been implemented and rendered to be effective.

The best CVE programs, such as Singapore's, accomplished in addressing communities that are in direct contact with those governments are attempting to deter from terrorism. They have a focused aim of reducing the pool of potential

recruits and the appeal of violence, and they target accordingly. When done correctly, CVE should not be an excuse for broad social work or for anthropological studies; it is a focused counterterrorism weapon. In 2011, in the interest of promoting the comprehensive and integrated implementation of the Global Strategy, participants in the United Nations Secretary-General's Symposium on International Counter-Terrorism Cooperation agreed that the appropriate response to terrorism is to increase cooperation, institutionalize collaboration, systematically share information and best practices and build capacities and capabilities across all sectors of national and regional setups in order to maximize practical steps and achieve tangible results.

Dawoody (2015) provides a comprehensive list of policy recommendations that includes the following actions and strategies: addressing the political, social, and economic inequalities, inducing reforms in governance, providing economic opportunities, upholding rule of law, protecting individual rights, minority and women's rights, ending tribalism, ending the failed states, ending ethnic and sectarian divides and promoting a culture of respect, free exchange of thoughts and ideas, critical thinking and separating between religion and state. He adds that a military offensive to first route out the current militants, such as destroy their training camps, take down their financial network, is highly recommended. While he agrees that this does not get at the underlying causes of terrorism because certain ideologies are spreading that cannot be retracted through wars, it might help in some specific situations. There needs to be other means to counter the ideology that breeds the fighters that are empowered to trade their lives for death. Defeating political Islam is another way to go as, "All forms of Political Islam are bad and must be eliminated by Muslims themselves and in cooperation with people around the world. Doing so is the only safeguard and means for defeating ISIS and its likes." (p. 21).

In addition, Dawoody (2015) observes that many Muslims also blame the problem of ISIS on the Shiite-Sunni divide, and particularly identify Iran and its hegemonic policies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, Gaza, and Yemen as the source of the problem. At least to the average Arab Muslims, ISIS appears as a natural consequence to Iran's policies of the Iraqi Shiite government, a satellite of Iranian influence in the region, and its marginalization of the Iraqi Sunnis during the past 8 years, and plays a role in putting an end to the persecution of Sunnis in the Sunni dominated areas in Iraq; the same is true in Syria. Therefore, resolving Sunni grievances in Iraq and Syria and involving them in governance, and ending Iranian interferences in other countries' affairs in the region will undercut the popular support for ISIS (Dawoody 2015). Finally, another area of cooperation lies in supporting agreed areas of cooperation in UN, Interpol, and other international efforts. These efforts generally involve very specific areas of action that do not present the same challenges as bi/multilateral, regional, or global agreements that have to deal with controversial targets and threats.

Terrorism Roots and Counterterrorism Policies in the Middle East

Today, the threats of internal terrorism and the propensity for rulers who survived the 2011 Arab Spring to use repressive methods to further consolidate their power has led to further police states whose systems remain dysfunctional, repressive, and censored. As we look at the Middle East today, we observe multiple states engulfed in civil wars and exacerbated by other states with their own interests in the outcomes. More and more, the borders drawn by British and French officials after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire are becoming increasingly problematic. States such as Iraq, Syria, and Yemen are heading in the direction of partition. Individual groups vying for independence are often doing so through means that fit within the definition of terrorism.

As central, albeit dysfunctional, governments fail to exemplify the needs of their entire population, offshoot groups are formed under the auspice of liberating a people within a territory. Such terror has now morphed from the periodic bombs and terrorist acts to state formation, from a condition depending on a state sponsoring of terror to a terrorist state that has nothing in common with any forms of governance in today's society (Dalacoura 2011). Within the region, unconventional and unexpected trends, moving further from liberal democracy, due to the unnatural way in which these states were conceived, are becoming more evident. This gives way to the formations of governments that are predominately authoritarian, often with few smatterings of democratic practices.

Today, the threats of internal terrorism and the propensity for rulers who survived the 2011 Arab Spring to use repressive methods to further consolidate their power has led to further police states whose systems remain dysfunctional, repressive and censored. This reality has deep roots in the artificial way in which these states were originally conceived. The origins of terrorism are rooted in constant wars, economic disparities, consistent foreign intervention, power struggles between the state and tribes, lack of proper education and unvarying poverty. While the existence of these conditions, and the degree of their intensity, varies from state to another in the Arab region, they remain a breeding ground for terrorism in any of these countries and have necessitated the development of counterterrorism policies in many of these countries. Thus far, 2015 has been a pivotal year for Arab states' antiterrorism initiatives. In the first 3 months of this year, a number of notable incidences seem to point to a turning point in how Arab states' governments will deal with terrorism in the coming years. Of course the challenges now are different than they were just a few years ago. The language denouncing terrorism is now totally unequivocal, as seen in the language from the program of the Muslim world league's conference against terrorism, held in Mecca in February 2015:

"These juveniles and fool dreamers provided the slanderers with what they have been dreaming of. With their reckless actions and careless audacity to spill innocent people's blood, they gave their enemies more than they have hoped to get. They have horrified under a banner adorned, falsely, by the testimony of monotheism

(Kalimat at-Tawhid). Accompanying their hypocritical claim, they shout there is no god but Allah, and Allah is great. To these zealots these are empty slogans without any substance" (Muslim World League 2015).

In the same month, the United States hosted a counter-terrorism summit in Washington, DC, featuring both foreign and domestic leaders to discuss strategies to combat extremism (Caulderwood 2015). Arab states, such as Jordan, were represented (World Bulletin 2015), though Lebanon declined an invitation due to the presence of Israel at the summit (Naharnet NewsDesk 2012). In March of 2015, the month following the Washington and Muslim World Leagues conference in Mecca, the Arab League's member nations focused on expanding their effort to fight terrorism in the region. UN General Secretary Ban Ki-Moon spoke to the League about the importance of peace in the region (UN News Centre 2015).

Following the beheadings of a large number of Copts in Egypt, Egyptian President Abdel Fatah el-Sisi told the official Egyptian TV channel that a pan-Arab military force and collaborative action would be necessary to defeat terrorism in the region (UN News Centre 2015). At the 2015 Economic Summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, el-Sisi likened the effort to an Arab-nation NATO (Hiel 2015). While the Egyptian government was active in pushing for a creation of such a force, it remains to be seen whether it will actually be created and whether or not Lebanon will be involved (Middle East Eye 2015). This was not the first time the Arab League tried to deal with extremism. Referring back to the 1998 *Arab convention on the suppression of Terrorism*, the framework agreement lays out the responsibilities of signatory states. States cannot finance or support terrorist activities in their territory.

The Arab League has also convened to assist the international community in lowering the likelihood that terrorists will acquire a nuclear weapon. All Arab League nations are party to the *Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty* (NPT) and have been critical of Israel's semi-secret nuclear program urging the Israeli government to allow IAEA inspectors and to work towards disarmament and eventually signing the NPT. In 2013 the Arab League threatened to boycott an international meeting to support the NPT in Switzerland due to Israel's continuing refusal to sign the treaty (Grossman 2013). While the origins of terrorism remain relatively common, the recent counterterrorism initiatives would have an impact and would be implemented differently depending on the dynamics of terrorism and counterterrorism in each country. Lebanon is certainly no exception.

Setting the Lebanese Context: Terrorism and Counterterrorism

Lebanon's policy-making dynamics as well as administrative practices are rooted in the sectarian sociopolitical culture of the Lebanese politics which has long been organized around political parties beholden to one or another religious faction. The structure of power in Lebanon after the war years is as follows: troika, council of ministers, the presidency, prime minister, speaker of parliament, parliament,

judicial branch, local government, the different political parties or coalitions, the confessional leadership, the media, trade unions, the opposition of current political divide, civil society, and Non-Governmental Organizations (Salem 2007). The parliament is elected based on confessions (Traboulsi 2007).

The main issue of Lebanese politics is no longer allegiance to the Lebanese State, rather to the scheme of power sharing inside the country, i.e., the political settlement. A broad consensus is constantly required to pass government decisions and laws. Despite the high number of political parties in the country, these have joined in two major coalitions since 2004: "March 8" and "March 14." In an attempt to dismantle the sectarian structure of Lebanese politics, the Taif Agreement, also known as the National Reconciliation Accord, had set a 50–50 balance between Christians and Muslims in the Lebanese parliament and reordered the powers of the branches of government; however, the two major features of the Taif Accord have not been implemented since its signing in 1989.

Lebanese politics and administration are still marked by sectarianism. Each of the country's major politicians represents mainly the interests of his/her own clan—Christian Maronites, Sunni Muslims, Shiite Muslims, or Druze. This practice is even extended to the appointment of public officials and managers. Lebanon entered the twenty-first century with its administrative, institutional, and infrastructure frameworks dating back to the post World War II era. Makdisi (2004) explains that Lebanon has been facing two types of issues that he defines as "political governance" and "socioeconomic aspects of development." Under the first, he highlights the ascending trend in corruption in the country confirmed by several international reports. With a free-market economy and a strong laissez-faire commercial tradition, Lebanon has come a long way since the conclusion of its civil war.

Nevertheless, the Lebanese have some negative attributes in regard to the economy as regional disparities in living conditions are significant. There is also a widely recognized need to reform the public sector and ameliorate public infrastructure—electricity, Internet and telecom, transportation, water, and waste are amongst the most pressing needs. The institutional framework for most sectors in Lebanon is characterized by predominance of state-related actors. Additionally, since the end of the civil war, a number of international institutions have been regularly involved in the country's public sector.

The inefficacy of Lebanon's government remains a problem that has lent it the unfortunate status of being a failed state. The state apparatus is overrun by corruption and also exhibits other failures given that the government maintains little legitimacy and sovereignty in the presence of non-state actors and constant foreign influence. Since 1982, the presence of Hezbollah's and their ability to manipulate Lebanese politics means that Iran has a basis for which to extend its interests. In opposition to that, Saudi Arabia has allied with former Prime Ministers and other groups, to resist Iranian incursions.

Lebanon's confessional system, one that was intended to represent all factions of the population, with a Christian President, Sunni Prime Minister, and a Shi'ite head of Parliament cannot be elected with Hezbollah's approval. With approximately a 27% population of Shi'ites in Lebanon, subjecting election's to Hezbollah's

approval is surely not representative of the Lebanese people. Lebanon's borders are porous and regional conflicts almost always affect Lebanon internally. Following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri on February 14, 2005, the Lebanese government agreed to participate in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) in Leidschendam, the Netherlands. Lebanon's cooperation was seen as complying with UNSCR 1373 (STL, N.D.) which urged all states to fight terrorism. After further bombings in 2005 the UNSC passed UNSCR 1595 (UNSC 2005), based on this the UN and Lebanon signed the agreement that created the STL in 2007 (STL n.d.).

This creation marked the first international court to pursue legal remedies in cases of terrorism. This was unique for Lebanon, as the court was obliged to utilize Lebanese law regarding the case of terrorism and not international or customary law. International treaties or customary law would only be utilized in the event an inconsistency or a gap in the Lebanese law arose. In conjunction with defining terrorism the purpose of terrorism should also be defined and they are described as the following, the ultimate aims of terrorism are—among others—the redistribution of power and property rights and the extortion of rents.

When investigating the causes of terrorism in Lebanon, there are multiple factors/events that had, and continue to have, an impact on the dynamics of terrorism in the country. These include, though not restricted to: first, the long-standing Palestinian presence since 1948 and secondly, the direct Syrian involvement as a result of the official request by the Lebanese government in 1976. The latter is the direct result of the Iranian's political interests and its constitutional mandate and had many implications. Iran's foreign policy allied the Islamic Republic with Syria as well as with *Hezbollah* within Lebanon, to serve as a counter weight to Saudi Arabia influence in the region. Iranian Constitution's article 154 states that the government "supports the just struggles of the oppressed against the oppressors in every corner of the globe" (Samii 2008, p. 35)—this of course would include the Shi'a population in Lebanon. The Palestinian influx to Lebanon, estimated to be around one million refugees, after the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948 had many serious repercussions; this made Lebanon an open ground for the influence of those allied with the Palestinian cause—sates and non-states actors. The Palestinian presence in Lebanon later led to the relocation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1970. This development has its political and social significance. Politically speaking, it changed the coalitional balance between the different political groups (i.e., Phalange Party and Amal Movement) and is considered a main trigger to the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990). During that period, Israel supported the Christian government led by Suleiman Frangieh (1970–1976) and then by Bachir Gemayel in 1982 who was assassinated 1 month after he took office. The challenge that the Christian coalition faced contributed to the occupation of Lebanon by Israel five times (1978, 1982, 1993, 1996, and 2006). These events were related to expelling the PLO from Lebanon and also sidelining Hezbollah later. The Syrian domination and occupation of Lebanon also led to the formation of resistance groups that participated in violence on the Lebanese scene. The event involving the assassination Hariri, thought to be at the hands of the Syrian regime and in coercion with

Hezbollah, is another incident. The Palestinian issue, or question as some scholars refer to, cannot be ignored as it played a large role in both the Lebanese Civil War and also in the establishment of Hezbollah, a non-state actor that has key terrorist incidents attributed to it over the last few years.

Building on that context and based on the mostly widely used definitions of terrorism and counterterrorism offered earlier in this chapter, the next section creates the framework that will then be filled by a modern history of terrorism in Lebanon and presents the ways in which the Lebanese government is addressing these specific acts. A thorough analysis of both the obstacles that the government faces and the available opportunities is followed by some policy recommendations for how Lebanon should move forward in order to secure its borders against expanding threats and to expunge those that come from within.

Opportunities and Obstacles

Lebanon's commitment with working in a bilateral framework to help fight terrorism was evident in a 2011 UN General Assembly report, which concluded the following: (1) Lebanon notes that its Council of Deputies approved the 1998 Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, and authorized the Government to ratify its Penal Code, as amended by law and (2) Item No. 11 of January 1958 defines, in article 314, terrorist acts as acts designed to create a state of alarm which are committed by means such as explosive devices, inflammable materials, poisonous or incendiary products or infectious or microbial agents likely to create a public hazard. Any terrorist act is punishable by hard labor for life and by the death penalty if it causes the death of a person or the whole or partial destruction of a building in which there are people, or when it causes the destruction, albeit partial, of a public building, an industrial institution, a ship or other installation, or the breakdown of means of communication or transportation. In 2001, 53 Law No. 318, together with its subsequent amendments, addresses money-laundering and financing of terrorism. Under this law, illegal funds include those derived from drugs and other activities, as well as terrorist crimes.

The law also establishes, within the Central Bank, the *Special Investigation Commission*, an independent, judicial entity, whose activities are not subject to the authority of the Bank. It is empowered to investigate money-laundering operations and oversees constraints against assets and the measures provided for in the Law 54. Lebanon regularly participates extensively in international cooperation to detect terrorist cells by exchanging information with relevant states through INTERPOL or other international legal institutions. In particular, Lebanon cooperates with Arab states in implementing the 1997 *Arab Counterterrorism Strategy*, as well as the 1998 Arab Convention on the *Suppression of Terrorism*. The Responsibility for investigating crimes or conspiracies of a terrorist nature and for pursuing, apprehending and bringing to justice their perpetrators, planners or participants rests with the Counterterrorism and Serious Crime Division of the judicial police unit estab-

lished pursuant to Law No. 17 of September 16, 1990, initially as an office and in 2008 as a division, within the Directorate General of Internal Security Forces. The *Counterterrorism and Surveillance Division* within the Ministry of National Defense has similar functions.

The Lebanese security apparatus has been successful in combating extremist and terrorist organizations and groups and has tracked down a large number of perpetrators of terrorist crimes. Through ongoing investigations, it is endeavoring to find other criminals who have committed terrorist crimes against humanity and the Lebanese people or on Lebanese territory and terrorists who are linked to regional and international networks (UNGA 2011). In March 2015 during a meeting at the Wilson Center concerning terrorism in Lebanon Machnouk, Lebanese Interior Minister, said the three pillars of fighting terrorism in the country were: national unity, professionalism of security forces and theological courage. He went on to argue that there needs to be a religious revolution throughout the region wherein religious peoples refocus on peace as their goal (Wilson Center 2015). Part of the problem that exists when addressing counterterrorism measures is the overall lack of knowledge amongst government officials regarding the main factors that lead individuals to carry out terrorist acts.

Meaningful counterterrorism policies cannot begin to be conceived of if the characteristics of terrorism are not first understood; this is also accompanied with a very complex political environment and history as well as institutions. In May of 2008, the Lebanese government shut down Hezbollah's telecommunications network leading to street battles and risking another Lebanese civil war (Worth and Bakri 2008a). Battles between the Sunni Future Movement and Shia Hezbollah almost spiraled out of control, though a political compromised was eventually reached (Worth and Bakri 2008b). There are also many active transnational terror groups currently operating in Lebanon including al-Nusra Front, al-Qaida in Iraq and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), as well as less active groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLO), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command, Asbad al Ansar, Fata al Islam, Hamas, Abdullah Assam Brigades, among others (US State Department 2013).

Understanding the risks of terrorism in Lebanon is impossible without understanding the context of Lebanese political institutions as was described above. While in the West, Hezbollah is seen as a terror organization, Hezbollah *cannot* be fitted with such a label—at least on a national level. Their position as a legitimate political movement and their place within Lebanese political life with 14 seats in the Lebanese parliament is too important, nuanced and ensconced to be considered simply a terror group.

Nonetheless, it is also important to note some of that worst acts in the below time line (Table 10.1) include acts that Hezbollah has been directly implicated in. In addition, among the three different ways that states can engage in the use of terror (governmental or state terror, state involvement in terror, state sponsorship of terrorism and extremism), the third is the one that describes the Lebanese situation the most. State-sponsored terrorism is a type of terrorism where government supports violent non-state actors engaged in terrorism. However, it remains difficult to categorize the Lebanese government as such mainly due to the pejorative nature of the

Table 10.1   Timeline of recent events (2011–2015)

19 October 2012: A VIBED (car bomb) detonates near Sassine Square in Achrafieh, Beirut. Killing 8, including the suspect target: Brigadier General Wissam al-Hasan, chief of the Intelligence Bureau of the Internal Security Forces (Naharnet Newsdesk, 2012)
9 July 2013: A VIBED detonates in Dahieh (Bir Al-Abed) causing over 50 injuries (Naharnet Newsdesk, 2013)
On **15 August 2013** a VBIED detonated in Dahieh causing 21 casualties (PressTV 2013)
23 August 2013: two coordinated bombings outside of two Sunni mosques in Tripoli killed 42 people (Holmes and Siddiq 2013)
19 November 2013: coordinated suicide bombings outside of the Iranian embassy in Dahieh kill 23 people (Bassam and Solomon 2013)
28 December 2013: Mohammad Chata a vocal critic of Hezbollah and a potential future prime minister assassinated by large blast in the Beirut Central District. The bombing also killed 6 others and wounded 71 (Abedine, Yan, and Basil 2013)
2 January 2014: A VBIED kills 5 and injured 77 in Dahieh, South of Beirut. ISIS claims responsibility (Holmes and Kalin 2014)
16 January 2014: a VBIED kills 5 and injures 46 in Hermel, Lebanon. Al Nusra front claims responsibility (Al Akhbar English, 2014)
21 January 2014: a VBIED kills 4 in Dahieh, Beirut (Lutz and Khraiche 2014)
1 February 2014: a VBIED kills 4 in Hermel. Al Nusra Front claims responsibility (Al Fakih and El Bashal 2014)
3 February 2014: A man wearing a bomb detonates it in a suicide terror attempt in a bus near Dahieh, Beirut. Bomber the only casualty (Muir 2014)
19 February 2014: two bombings in Dahieh, Beirut kill 8 and wound over 100 (Chulov 2014)
23 February 2014: VBIED in Hermel, Lebanon kills 2 and wounds 17. Al Nusra Front claims responsibility (Khraiche 2014a)
29 March 2014: A VBIED kills 4 soldiers in Arsal, Lebanon (Al-Fakih 2014)
20 June 2014: A suicide bomber kills 1 and injures 32 in Dahr Al Baidar, Lebanon (Khraiche 2014b)
25 June 2014: A suicide bomber wounds 11 in a Hotel in Rouche, Beirut as security forces attempt to arrest him (Khraiche 2014c)
19 September 2014: A bomb in Arsal kills 2 soldiers and injures 3 (AFP 2014)
12 November 2015: Two suicide bombers wound around 40 in Bourj-el Baraajeneh—a southern suburb in Beirut—claimed by ISIS (New York Times 2015)

term in general as well as the identification of particular examples, both that are usually subject to political dispute, particularly in the case of Lebanon. Also, to designate a country as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, the US Secretary of State must determine that the government of such country has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism; even though it might be often the case, Lebanon is not listed as a State Sponsor of Terrorism.

Furthermore, The 2011 Syrian crisis has changed the situation for Lebanon as the collective will to avoid another civil war after the 1989 Taif agreement ended the 15 years civil war in Lebanon seemed to disappear; the threats were no longer internal. Nasrallah's announcement in 2011 that Hezbollah would enter Syria to support the government of Bashar al Assad (Saad-Ghorayeb 2011) made Lebanon, and especially Shia areas in Lebanon, targets for the new transnational terror

groups formed from the old Al Qaeda (The Rise of ISIS 2014). The series of bombings in the Southern Suburbs of Beirut (Dahieh), bombings in the Bekka valley, and ongoing fighting in Tripoli are all directly related to the situation in Syria. Other recent bombings against prominent March 14 politicians have been attributed to Hezbollah and the Syrian government (The Daily Star 2014). The rise of ISIS and the presence of Jabhat Al Nusra militants in Lebanon, especially in border towns like Arsal in Bekaa and in Tripoli in the North remain the largest terror threat facing Lebanon (Karam 2014).

The Lebanese Army has taken a proactive stance in fighting terrorism in Lebanon. Making large, and well publicized arrests (Barnard and Ghannam 2014), and trying to fight back in the lawless areas of the country. The fight is likely to continue until a point when Syria has a stable government capable of preventing lawlessness within its own borders. The Lebanese army was able to stop four days of fighting in Tripoli in 2014 (Mortada 2014). The ongoing battles in Lebanon seem to indicate a turning point for Lebanese political life. Having a common enemy is cementing support of Hezbollah within Lebanon's Christian minority as Lebanon pulled into war with ISIS (Leigh and Deeply 2014). On November 4, 2014, during Ashura, Nasrallah stated he would be willing to work with the Sunni Future movement to protect Lebanon (Naharnet NewsDesk 2014). However, no further development had bee seen in reality and the position of Hizb'Allah remains unchanged.

In the second part of 2015, Lebanon faced a number of unique challenges when it comes to fighting terrorism; some are conceptual while others are tangible. The Syrian civil war has affected internal security in Lebanon following Hezbollah's continuous support for Bashar al-Assad and his regime (US State Department 2013). These problems have not been helped by internal political struggles characterized by Lebanon's inability to elect a president. These are the very outcomes that a country experiences when the interests of regional powers have hijacked its political system. This is exhibited by the recent protests in Beirut, which originally arose due to what has been referred to as the "trash crisis."

This was one of the many incidents where Lebanon's ministers were unable to come to a unified decision due to political gridlock. The end result was trash piling up in street across Beirut pushing many residents into the streets in protest of the government's inability to provide such basic service. The social contract between the citizen and the state has been broken in Lebanon. The typical means of defining that contract include characteristics such as a citizen paying taxes in exchange for the government providing social services. The protests have evolved into citizens taking the streets asking for the abolishment of the current government and the institution of a system that is not subject to the same corrupt means as the current regime. The current Lebanese caretaker government is still influenced by the pro-Assad March 8th bloc, which continues to perpetuate instability in the region.

The political situation has not stopped agencies of the Lebanese government from cooperating with multilateral partners, including the Central Bank, ISF, and Lebanese Armed Forces (US State Department 2013). The political situation continues to make any progress unnecessarily difficult. Unfortunately, as long as the Syrian crisis continues, Iran would utilize Lebanon as a fertile ground from which

to help maintain control of Syria through Hezbollah. The porous border with Syria has made securing the country more difficult. Hezbollah uses some border towns to launch attacks inside Syria, while the rebel forces also attack Hezbollah back in these northern towns. Meanwhile, 25 % of people currently residing in Lebanon are Iraqi, Syrian, and Palestinian refugees, which have placed considerable strain on the government's resources (US State Department 2013). These factors cripple Lebanon's sovereign right to progress socially and politically.

Forsaking where Lebanon fails on counterterrorism successes, there are ways in which the government and security services are contributing positively to this field. Lebanon has had a long history of joining international efforts to combat terrorism. These include United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1559 (UNSC 2004), 1680 (UNSC 2006a), and 1701 (UNSC 2006b) that ended the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war. Lebanon is also a participant in the US Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA) joining in 2006. The focus is working with the LAF and the ISF on border security and capacity building (US Department of State 2013). Lebanon has had success in apprehending terrorism suspects as was seen in October of 2013 when the ISF arrested suspects in the Tripoli mosque bombings (Najab Mikati Official Website 2013), and the widely reported raid of a Beirut hotel where the ISF arrested 17 suspected members of ISIS (Moore 2014).

Additionally, given Lebanon's vast banking sector, Lebanon has also been proactively trying to stop the funding of terrorism. In 2013, Banque du Liban established a new compliance unit to help comply with the standards of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (Bank du Liban 2013a). Also in 2013, Bank du Liban issued circular implementing new regulations through the *hawala* system (Bank du Liban 2013b). *Hawala* is an informal system wire-transfer system that has been implicated for being one avenue terrorists use to move money from one person to another (El-Qorchi 2002). Lebanon's Special Investigation Commission has statutory authority to investigate and stop financial crimes including money laundering and the financing of terrorism (Special Investigation Commission n.d.). These measures are numerous and do amount to potentially effectively countering terrorism. However, the effects of these measures need to be carefully and empirically evaluated.

Conclusion: Policy Recommendations and Future Studies

Lebanon belongs to a wide group of states whose stability is being threatened by continuous acts of terrorism, both domestic and transnational. However, Lebanon maintains a certain peculiarity due to the somewhat unique relation between policy and politics, its position in the Arab World, and its long history of political turmoil and instability as well as the influence that other countries have on it. The analysis undertaken for the purpose of this chapter provides an interesting insight into the challenges that a country such as Lebanon faces in the development and implementation of antiterrorism policies.

Although the issue is not totally absent from the governmental agenda, and there is an obvious interest in formulating an antiterrorism policy in Lebanon, government efforts and actions so far have been modest, most of which have not been successful mostly due to a lack of consensus both definitional and procedural as well as an absence of political will. In fighting terrorism, the government continues to suffer from a host of problems. This chapter identified many main factors hampering development and implementation of antiterrorism policies; these include: sectarianism, corruption, lack of sound governance, and the politicization of administration. Other contributing factors include: the current Syrian crisis and the long-standing Palestinian issue in addition the presence of organizations—mainly Hezbollah that is considered by the international community as a terrorist organization while locally is part of the official Lebanese government.

There is an urgent need for proposing a framework that will take these challenges into consideration and that could be actually applied in order of improving the current situation. The recommendations below form some preliminary reflections meant to advise both local policy makers and the international community, and are mostly based on suggestions in the reviewed literature. While a military offensive could present itself as a policy option, this does not get at the underlying causes of terrorism as most of the terrorism groups we see these days are in fact more ideologies than organizations and cannot be retracted through wars. It has become necessary to develop other means to counter the ideology that breeds the fighters that are empowered to trade their lives for death—mostly dealing with political Islam and changing the religious discourse in the Arab World.

In addition, addressing political (reducing sectarian divide and tribalism), social (protecting individual rights, establishing a culture of respect and freedom of expression), and economic inequalities (providing economic opportunities), and initiating reforms in governance (reinforcing the rule of law, insuring transparency and accountability) are some areas that require immediate governmental attention. Moreover, cooperation of these countries that are threatened by terrorism lies in supporting agreed areas of cooperation in UN, Interpol, and other international efforts. Finally, the Lebanese government must also develop a system for monitoring potential terrorist behavior. This includes state surveillance and border protection as well as monitoring any importation of potentially dangerous material. The government must also enhance diplomatic security of foreign government representatives in their countries and create a database of suspected terrorists.

This chapter offers a better understating of some of the key facets of counterterrorism policies, or the lack of, in Lebanon by briefly identifying the key participants (their resources, role, and influence) and highlighting the policy determinants and challenges and emphasizing the political nature of policy choices made by government officials and other actors. It offers a set of preliminary findings that can be used to better understand the dynamics of counterterrorism policies in Lebanon specifically, and in the region in general. While these findings can be used as building blocks for a theoretical model that describes and explains the dynamics of such process, more case studies are necessary to generate conceptual tools for research in terrorism and counterterrorism that is indigenous to the region.

A comparative examination of policy approaches in relation to terrorism and counterterrorism would enrich our understanding of the process and increase our capacity to conduct political and policy analysis. In analyzing this specific policy area, policy determinants and drivers as well as challenges can be identified. Further explanatory studies that examine policy dynamics in each of the stages of the policy-making process in that policy area using the five-stage model in addition to comparative studies that identify cross-regional trends in policy choices and policy outcomes are needed. A systematic review of what we already know and what we now know is deemed necessary.

Early on in the Syrian armed conflict, and with so much of the tension in MENA centering on developments in Syria, a risk for the situation evolving into a wider conflict, spilling over to Lebanon, Turkey, and even Iran, was evident. The environment in the region is more dynamic than ever; more calls for containing terrorism threats and acts are spreading and religion has become a source of vibrant political competition. The countries in the region will need to implement policies that deal with these threats as well as address the underlying reasons behind it. Lebanon is first on the list.

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Chapter 11
State-Sponsored Terrorism and Its Effects on Lebanese Policy and Politics

Khodr M. Zaarour

Introduction

What are the political consequences of transnational terror attacks on a rather weak state such as Lebanon? While research demonstrates that transnational terror attacks have economic consequences such as reducing growth, we know less about how terror attacks affect domestic politics in fragile states. If terror attacks affect domestic politics, do these attacks affect all government institutions equally? To address one aspect of this broader question, I ask how state-sponsored terror events and their resulting casualties influence the durability of governments. Specifically, I examine whether state-sponsored terror attacks lead to governments failing prematurely or staying in office longer than they might otherwise. The research question examines how state-sponsored terrorism carried out by outside forces influences Lebanese government policies, politics, and durability.

My focus is whether state-sponsored terror events have an extraordinary influence on the ability of governments to not only survive but also able to deliver public services and maintain its responsibilities towards its citizens. Does the Lebanese government face greater risk of failure under the pressure of state-sponsored terrorism?

To do this, I develop and test a set of hypotheses related to terrorism and government turnover. The first hypothesis suggests that Lebanese governments are likely to fail prematurely in the face of a state-sponsored terror attack as the attack can be interpreted as a form of foreign policy failure, or a critical event. Thus, while terror attacks may be critical events for some governments, other governments are unlikely to fail given how the public perceives the incumbent and any potential governments that would form as replacements.

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Before proceeding to explain and answer these questions a more common definition of terrorism must be clearly introduced as a lack of definition of terrorism creates more problems than it solves and therefore, labeling an act as terrorist quickly becomes meaningless. In order to avoid the multitude of definition used for terrorism, a common definition will be used as a departure from the disagreements among commentators or analysts and partially because some definers seek to exclude groups that they support or to include groups that they wish to denounce. Political leaders and their sympathizers may also have different needs and agendas but, I decided to use a relatively neutral definition which recognizes the basic fact that terrorism is a tactic used by many different kinds of groups. My definition includes six major elements introduced by Alan Collins. First, there must be a use of violence or threat of violence, by an organized group to achieve political objectives. Such violence is directed against a target audience that extends beyond the immediate victims, who are often innocent civilians, while a government can be either the perpetrator of violence or the target. Then, terrorism as a weapon of the weak, it is considered an act of terrorism only if one or both actors are not a government and terrorism. While all of the elements are included, they are managed, controlled, and directed by a foreign state, and hence it is called state-sponsored terrorism.

State-sponsored terrorism and insurgency are asymmetric tactics applied to achieve broader political or other objectives and could create catastrophic consequences. To explain the complicating distinction of terrorism from insurgency is the fact that one person's insurgent, who might have local political sympathy or external support against an occupying power, is often another person's terrorist. Terrorism is designed to achieve a political objective by using violence against civilians to generate fear. Its objectives have evolved over time but the principle purpose of a terrorist attack is to destroy a target, as well as to create fear in an audience by perpetrating dramatic and shocking acts. The use of terror has been commonplace as a means of securing power and stability for governments. It is most often associated with a political objective and is intended to have a psychological repercussion beyond the actual target. Sean Kay further explains that state-sponsored terrorism is often conducted by organizations within a chain of command and most often perpetrated by a subnational group of non-state entity that seeks to overcome power disparities in order to shape a public agenda.

But does a fragile state or weak state allow foreign powers the flexibility to use terror against its rivals? How does such policy of state-sponsored terrorism affect Lebanese policy and politics? First, we need to explain and distinguish between a failed state, weak state, and a fragile state. First, what is meant by a failed state is a nation in which the government has lost political authority and control and is unable to fulfill the basic responsibilities of a sovereign state. A weak state is where social and political structures have collapsed to the point where the government has little or no control. Stability and prosperity are crucial pillars of a strong state but weak or fragile states have lost control of and much of its monopoly of violence as it find its legitimacy eroded greatly during times of periods of state-sponsored terrorism.

The problems that have led to the weakening and failure of states such as Lebanon can stem from a depletion leadership, global economic developments, and a whole host of local issues. This threatens the nature and stability of the governmental system, where local warlords make common cause with crime syndicates, where smugglers help finance perpetual violence, and where business investments and much humanitarian aid is deflected into the coffers of the warring factions. And, most grimly, civilians make the most accessible and lucrative targets. Violence in weakening or failed states, in short is where control over resources and territory relies on fear more than it depends on legitimate government.

What causes state failure? Can the symptoms be detected early enough and will the global community design the political determination to act on the recognition? Should outside powers unilaterally intervene, or should the global community design intervention mechanisms in order to prevent other states from using terrorism to advance their interests? David Carment, Stewart Prest, and Yiagadeesen Samy's collaboration highlights and explain the terms of "failed state" and "fragile state."

The authors suggest we should use the latter, which is more inclusive and perhaps also less controversial. Fragile states are on the brink of collapse in any one or more—of the three areas: effective and responsive governance, authority over people and territory, and capacity of the economy and resource mobilization. Fragile states around the world today that suffer from political, social, and economic instability, as well as from the lack of legitimacy of their authoritarian regimes. States can become vulnerable to a high degree of fragility and states that attack and abuse their own citizens and subjects are highly likely to suffer from irreparable social stress and economic decline.

Fragile states: is when a state suffers from weaknesses in multiple areas of political and social performance but is especially weak in economic capacity as declared by Trauschweizer and Miner. The definition of "fragility" the authors used was called Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) project (www.carleton.ca/cifp) rests upon conceptualizations and measures that are relative. Some states may be strong by certain measures and weak by others. But failed states are states that have typically fallen into complete collapse brought on by "manmade" calamity, such as civil war or a mismanaged economy, sometimes exacerbated by environmental degradation or natural disasters.

These states are, despite international efforts, utterly incapable of managing their political and economic space. Fragile states are states that are experiencing or have experienced large-scale violence and suffer from internal challenges to their authority structures. Lebanon's civil war which lasted from 1975 to 1990 became a failed state and heavily depended on Syria to keep the peace among the warring factions in two-thirds of the country as Israel maintained its occupied zone in southern Lebanon. During that period and since the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War, Lebanon found itself limited to defend itself against Israeli aggression, contain the Iran-Syria backed group and deliver public services.

Fragility is a measure of the extent to which the actual institutions, functions, and political processes of a state accord with the strong image of sovereign state, the one reified in both state theory and international law. The three core structural parame-

ters for understanding fragility are authority, legitimacy, and capacity. First, there is the development or economic capacity problem. "Capacity" refers to the potential for a state to mobilize and employ resources towards productive ends. States lacking in capacity may prove unable to respond effectively to sudden shocks such as natural disasters, food shortages, or refugee flows. They may not have sufficient resources to feed, clothe, and educate their population.

Due to the weakness or fragility of nation-states like Lebanon provide the possible links between foreign governments and terrorist organizations which will most likely have lethal consequences. No country openly supports terror groups but some governments look the other way as the group recruits, raise money, or control territory, while others try to exploit the presence of the group on its territory to extract concessions from the United States.

Nation-states can provide a wide range of backing to terrorist groups including recognition, sanctuary, arms, training, and money. States sponsor terrorists for a variety of reasons. The most important is a strategic interest: terrorists offer another means for states to influence their neighbors, topple a hostile adversary regime; counter US hegemony, or achieve other aims. Iran helped disrupted the Middle East Peace Process and creating a security dilemma for Israel and the United States by baking Hezbollah. Iran, Israel, and Syria have supported and continue to support opposing militants in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria because such support for terrorist groups is cheaper than developing conventional military capabilities which allow states to influence events far beyond their borders.

States reduce or end their support for terrorist groups due to the changes in their own goals because of outside pressure or change in the terrorist group itself. State-sponsored terrorism literally implies a state's use or support of terrorism against another state or against its own people. Lebanon has experienced the deadly coordinated violent strategy by Iran-Syria-Hezbollah where a long list of assassinated politicians, security officials, and religious figures opposed their policies. The Lebanese government unfortunately found itself incapable and often sidelined from executing public policies.

Since terrorism has essentially become an international phenomenon over the last three decades, the expression "state-sponsored terrorism" is now commonly used to describe a state's support of international terrorism. Any country that deliberately employs terrorism or aids and abets terrorist groups as an instrument of its foreign policy against another country is categorized as a state-sponsor of terrorism or simply a terrorist state. State-sponsored terrorism is not necessarily a specifically new international phenomenon, but its use for reasons to topple regimes, change the political map, and the consequences of its use are more lethal than ever before.

The quality of a nation's national security policy is affected both by the capacity of military forces and by the purposes to which they are directed. The stronger state has a much greater practical stake in the security of the weaker than has yet been recognized for reasons that have not yet been fully understood. In the realist paradigm, the nation-state is traditionally the central actor in the international system, and the quest for power is the key means to advancing security. Realists conclude that the key objective of states is survival, and power is the means to that end. States will thus calculate their interests in terms of power and the international situation that they face according to Sean Kay.

The diffusion of global power provides new avenues for states, substate groups, terrorists, and individuals strive to shape global security in their favor. But why state-sponsored terrorism? Steinbruner argues that conventional military conflict may no longer be the most useful way to win wars, and it could even be a liability if not used with precision (p. 207).

Hence, states turn to state-sponsored terrorism to gain leverage during future conflicts if and when they unfold as in the case of Iran nuclear deal. It is taken as evident that national security became an empty concept, and the only way to ensure a world without conflicts is to install collective security encompassing the whole planet. Victor Segesvary argues that the experience of World War II led the victorious powers to recreate an international organization, the United Nations, in a soon bipolarized world of alliances. This system was based on the assumption that states behave prudently and rationally—a totally irrational assumption he argues. Since states such as Iran which feels threatened by the United States and Europe, to ensure its survival, Tehran began to arm, train, finance, and guide armed groups in the Middle East and beyond which serve as its first line of defense.

An example of a once-collapsed state is Lebanon, which had disintegrated before Syria's intervention in 1990 provided security and gave a sense of governmental legitimacy to the shell of the state. Lebanon today qualifies as a weak, rather than failed, polity because its government is credible, civil war is absent, and political goods are being provided in significant quantities and quality. Syria provided the security blanket at least until its forced withdrawal in 2005, denies fractious warlords the freedom to aggrandize themselves, and mandates that the usually antagonistic Muslim and Christian communities cooperate.

The fear of being attacked preemptively by rivals, or of losing control of critical resources, is alleviated by Syria's imposed hegemony since 1975. Within that framework of security, the Lebanese people's traditional entrepreneurial spirit has transformed a failed state into a much stronger one. Although the phenomenon of state failure is not new, it has become much more relevant and worrying than ever before. In less interconnected eras, state weakness could be isolated and kept distant. Failure had fewer implications for peace and security. Now, states like Lebanon pose dangers not only to themselves and their neighbors but also to peoples around the globe as they provide the safe haven for terror groups who would use the government's weakness to plan, plot, and carry out attacks.

Preventing states from failing and resuscitating those that do fail are thus strategic and moral imperatives in an effort to rescue them from becoming a safe haven for terrorist organizations. Failure and weakness can flow from a nation's geographical, physical, historical, and political circumstances, such as colonial errors and Cold War policy mistakes. More than structural or institutional weaknesses, human agency is also culpable, usually in a fatal way. Destructive decisions by individual leaders have almost always paved the way to state failure. This outcome is troubling to world order, especially to an international system that demands—indeed, counts on—a state's capacity to govern its space. Failed states have come to be feared as "breeding grounds of instability, mass migration, and murder" (in the words of political scientist Stephen Walt), as well as reservoirs and exporters of terror.

The road to state failure is marked by several revealing signposts. On the economic side, living standards deteriorate rapidly as elites deliver financial rewards only to favored families, clans, or small groups. Foreign-exchange shortages provoke food and fuel scarcities and curtail government spending on essential services and political goods; accordingly, citizens see their medical, educational, and logistical entitlements melt away.

Corruption flourishes as ruling cadres systematically skim the few resources available and stash their ill-gotten gains in hard-to-trace foreign bank accounts. On the political side, leaders and their associates subvert prevailing democratic norms, coerce legislatures and bureaucracies into subservience, strangle judicial independence, block civil society, and gain control over security and defense forces. They usually patronize an ethnic group, clan, class, or kin. In the case of Lebanon, it is located in a rough neighborhood and sandwiched between Syria, Israel, and now an overextended Iran, the land of the cedars find itself divided and controlled by outside powers. As these two paths converge, the state provides fewer and fewer services.

Overall, ordinary citizens become poorer as their rulers become visibly wealthier. People feel preyed upon by the regime and its agents—often underpaid civil servants, police officers, and soldiers fending for them. Security, the most important political good, vanishes as terrorism and political assassinations rise.

Citizens, especially those who have known more prosperous and democratic times, increasingly feel that they exist solely to satisfy the power lust and financial greed of those in power and their allies. In the last phase of failure, the state's legitimacy crumbles. Lacking meaningful or realistic democratic means of redress, protesters take to the streets or mobilize along ethnic, religious, or linguistic lines as evident in the current rubbish crisis. Elected officials become paralyzed to effectively execute public policies. Such state failure threatens global stability because national governments have become the primary building blocks of order. Once the system comes to a halt, demonstrations spread, disorder rises, and threat to public safety and security poses a fertile ground for terrorism.

Certainly not all states are created equal. Their sizes and shapes, their human endowments, their capacity for delivering services, and their leadership capabilities vary enormously. More is required of the modern state, too, than ever before where each is expected to provide good governance; to make its people secure, prosperous, healthy, and literate; and to instill a sense of national pride. States also exist to deliver political goods—i.e., services and benefits that the private sector is usually less able to provide in weak states. Foremost is the provision of national and individual security and public order.

That promise includes security of property and inviolable contracts, an independent judiciary, and other methods of accountability. A second but vital political good is the provision, organization, and regulation of logistical and communications infrastructures. A nation without well-maintained arteries of commerce and information serves its citizens poorly. Finally, a state helps provide basic medical care and education, social services, a social safety net, regulation and supply of water and energy, and environmental protection. When governments refuse to or cannot provide such services to all of their citizens, failure looms and increase lawlessness and terror attacks.

Strong states control their territories and deliver a high order of political goods to their citizens and offer high levels of security from political and criminal violence, ensure political freedom and civil liberties, and create environments conducive to the growth of economic opportunity. They are places of peace, order, and productivity. In contrast, failed states are tense, conflicted, and dangerous, and they share the following characteristics: a rise in criminal and political violence; a loss of control over their borders; rising ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural hostilities; civil war; the use of terror against their own citizens; weak institutions; a deteriorated or insufficient infrastructure; an inability to collect taxes without undue coercion; high levels of corruption; a collapsed health system; rising levels of infant mortality and declining life expectancy; the end of regular schooling opportunities; declining levels of GDP per capita; escalating inflation; a widespread preference for non-national currencies; and basic food shortages, leading to starvation.

To add to Lebanon's ills, I must include the rising migration of tens of thousands for young Lebanese abroad in search of jobs and better lives. Failed states also face rising attacks on their fundamental legitimacy. As a state's capacity weakens and its rulers work exclusively for themselves, key interest groups show less and less loyalty to the state. The people's sense of political community vanishes and citizens feel disenfranchised and marginalized. The social contract that binds citizens and central structures is forfeit. Perhaps already divided by sectional differences and animosity, citizens transfer their allegiances to communal warlords. Domestic anarchy sets in. The rise of terrorist groups becomes more likely.

Due to the current status of weakness, Lebanon faced increasingly multiple challenges include its inability to provide security, develop a rudimentary local police force, patiently trained local administrators across departments, reintroduced legal codes and methods, or help to rejuvenate and regularize existing economies. But once stability and confidence have been at least partially restored, the transitional administration and international agencies can together focus on four primary and parallel objectives: jumpstarting the economy, restoring the rule of law, recreating political institutions, and rejuvenating civil society. The fundamental economic requirements also include establishing fiscal and macroeconomic stability, paying civil servants and police officers, and creating jobs. Without those accomplishments, a new probity, and a sense of coming prosperity, the local economy will languish and continue to rely on opium exports for cash. Crucial foreign investment, as well as aid from developed-world donors, will be conspicuously absent. As the hub of the banking industry in the Middle East, Lebanon has seen an outflow of capital to the Gulf, Europe, and North America.

The Lebanese legal system is cumbersome in adjudication and most court decisions are based on political association of the accused. The court system is in need of major reform but reintroducing the rule of law can be done in stages, over time, but citizens will mostly not support reconstruction efforts until they are certain that legal redress will be available. A functioning court system should be among the first political institutions to be reborn. A police force, a central bank, and the repair of roads and telephone networks to link cities and towns are also essential. Together, such initiatives will reestablish a sense that a new government exists and has begun to work for, rather than against, the people.

Police personnel, judges, bureaucrats, and parliamentarians will have to be trained or retrained. Defense forces have to be reconfigured and their chiefs reoriented. Strong local leadership cannot be assumed but must be nurtured and strengthened. In Lebanon, old political families continue to rule from behind the scene and will most likely oppose any major reform. However, sadly such political structure incapable of reform domestically, and it would take foreign pressure to make any real changes.

When a state fails or collapses, it destroys trust and mutilates its institutions. That is why sustained state rebuilding requires time and enduring economic and technical commitments by the local leadership and foreign powers. Rich nations must promise not to abandon Lebanon's state rebuilding efforts before the tough work is finished—before a failed state has functioned well for several years and has had its political, economic, and social health restored. State building trumps terror but as Lebanese history suggest, progress will only be made if foreign and especially neighboring powers do not stymie progress. If state building is done on the cheap, or if the big powers walk away from the failed states too soon and decide that the long slog of reconstruction is for others, then the real war against terror will not have been won.

So, does the weakness of the divided Lebanese government encourage state-sponsored terrorism where armed militias pose a serious challenge to that country's policies and politics? Lebanon was once called the "Pearl of the Middle East" due to its stability, economic and social development, vibrant tourism industry, and large foreign direct investments. Scholars and policy makers believed that once the civil war that begun in 1975 ended the state's monopoly of power, arms, policies, and decisions.

However, since the civil war which ended in 1990, that country has succumbed to decay of state power struggle and consequently became a fertile ground for armed groups carving their own regional autonomies. There is no doubt that there are numerous challenges to state building that arise after civil wars including risks of ethnic conflict, challenge to economic development, and regional instability. Do the Lebanese government's structurally weak institutions and divided elite constantly put that state in the center of regional rivalries and instability? Does that state's weakness prevents it from effectively protect its borders, channel ethnic, social, and ideological competition and hence erodes its effectiveness? Fragile or weak states are often characterized by massive economic inequities, territorial fragmentation, rise of militias, and violent competition for resources. Such loss of control usually creates a power vacuum for elements which could form and threaten the security and regional stability.

In approaching this concept of "failed state" as an empirical problem, I wish to challenge the commonly accepted idea that it is merely an effort to address the issue of state sovereignty. But, to find out whether the weak Lebanese state has demonstrated to be too ineffective to rein in armed groups that will not only challenge its authority, but drag that that tiny nation into conflict unable to control or win. Is this government too divided and weak that the government itself often finds itself at the mercy of armed wings of political parties? If the state is weak, fragmented, and fragile, I expect its loss of legitimacy, inability to militarily protect its borders,

maintain law and order throughout its territory, provide security, maintain monopoly on heavy weapons, and control armed groups. Hence, such society becomes too fragmented or weak state and becomes a fertile ground for violence which in turn negatively affects public policies and politics.

While it is true that Lebanon may have been ruined by 15 years of civil war, but it is far wealthier than its big neighbor, Syria; it enjoys a degree of political liberty; and, by the region's standards, its society is tolerant. Also, Lebanese are much better educated and Western oriented than many of the countries in the region. Under a power-sharing deal that ended the war in 1990, the central government is weak and rarely has one. Parliamentary elections have been delayed since 2013 for lack of an election law; and politicians have been squabbling over a new president and that position has been vacant since April 2014. Since this early July, the Lebanese government is facing a "rubbish crisis" where demonstrators from across the country have effectively shutting down government institutions, throwing a monkey ranch in the political process and preventing the current administration from executing any policies.

Socially and politically, Lebanon is divided by a number of different religions and sects, which makes state-wide government difficult especially when each of these sects heavily depends on a foreign patron. Shi'a Islam, Sunni Islam, Maronite Catholic, Greek Orthodox, and Druze are the largest of the 18 different religions or sects officially recognized in the country. At different times, Palestinian and now also Syrian and Iraqi refugees have been added to the already existing groups. Moreover, Lebanon is located in a complex region; where external forces especially Israel, Iran, Syria, and others try to influence internal politics tipping the balance of power in their favor often using terrorism including assassination.

In addition to the already divided society where mistrust have always ran high, Lebanon was heavily affected by the outbreak of the Jordanian civil war in 1970, after which Palestinian refugees, including members of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) were deported from the country and used south Lebanon as a base to launch attacks against Israel. Of course, the Lebanese government found itself militarily too weak to defend against Israeli aggression or control its territory in keeping the Palestinian fighters in check. In 1982, Israel conquered southern Lebanon for self-defense purposes. Israeli occupation worsened relations with the mostly Shi'ite community living in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah rose to prominence as an anti-Israeli occupation organization and was supported by both Iran and Syria.

After the civil war ended in 1990, all Lebanese sects agreed to give up their weapons—with the exception of Hezbollah, which considered it its duty to free the territories occupied by Israel. This militant group is more powerful than the government itself and has dragged Lebanon to wars several times with Israel and now in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen. It is Hezbollah with their allies with the open support of Iran and Syria which has prevented the Lebanese political establishment from electing president for over a year. Such control by one party violates the Lebanese constitution and increase the political and social tension in an already boiling region. This allows for a heightened insecurity and slows down government progress in offering social services.

The question remains, has the civil war in Lebanon really ended or are there some remaining unresolved issues? Despite the fact that the civil war is officially over, the problems in the Lebanese society that led to the war have not been resolved to this day, and the political atmosphere is still tense among the political groups and religious sects.

There have been no parliamentary elections since 2009; those due in 2013 were postponed because the parties could not agree on the reform of electoral law, and the presidency as stated earlier have been vacant since spring 2014. In addition, relations with neighboring countries are also still complicated, and their influence on Lebanese domestic politics causes concern. In 2005, Lebanon's former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated by what appears to be Syrian, Iranian, and Hezbollah involvement creating sectarian tensions.

Since the investigation pointed to Syrian involvement, riots broke out in the streets, calling for the withdrawal of Syrian troops. International pressure following this "Cedar Revolution" forced the Syrian military out of Lebanon. However, the Syrian influence on Lebanon's politics remains strong due to the pro-Syrian groups including Hezbollah, Arab Democratic Party, Baa'th Party, and others. To demonstrate their loyalties to Syria instead of Lebanon, they had sent fighters, money, and weapons to help bolster Al-Assad declining regime. The Lebanese government once again proved incapable of controlling local groups from interfering in other countries internal affairs.

Both Syria and Iran have close ties with Hezbollah, which helps to influence what is happening in the country. Syrian intelligence controls activity in the Beqaa Valley, and it is alleged that the president of Lebanon cannot be appointed without the approval of the Syrian and Iranian heads of state. Due to foreign especially Iranian and Syrian influence over Lebanon, Hezbollah decided to have several conflicts with Israel without the Lebanese government's knowledge or permission. The last major conflict between Israel and Hezbollah took place in 2006 which lasted for over a month and brought UN troops to be stationed in Southern Lebanon. It is precisely that loss of control by the Lebanese government that prompts Hezbollah to form its own policies with coordination of Syria and Iran and not its own government.

The problem is that Hezbollah controls southern Lebanon, the Beqaa Valley, and southern districts of the capital city of Beirut, where government police and military are not permitted to enter. Hezbollah operates like a state within a state and does not obey the central government, respect its policies or coordinate with it even when members of the government have positions in the cabinet. However, Hezbollah is extremely popular in southern Lebanon because it has also taken on social responsibilities, where the Lebanese government has been absent for decades. During the war in 2006, Hezbollah immediately sent builders to rebuild bombed-out houses and helped the local population in every way.

Hezbollah is difficult to control because it is an official political party represented in the parliament and has a strong support base among Shi'ites. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that is it considered a proxy of Iran and labeled as a terrorist organization by the United States, the European Union, and other states which aims to destroy Israel and has conducted several attacks against Israeli interests across the world.

Following the 2006 war with Israel, a wave of assassinations against Lebanese politicians including government officials with anti-Hezbollah stance gripped the country, but the government was unable to protect its own ministers. Mistrust in the government has been exacerbated by other unresolved security incidents, including the unsolved assassination attempt of MP Boutros Harb, a member of the "March 14" anti-Syrian and Iranian coalition.

On 7 May 2008, deadly clashes between armed wings of rival political parties broke out in Lebanon. The reasons for the deadly conflict was due to the government's decision to dismantle the telecommunications network operated separately by Hezbollah and to remove the security officer in charge at Beirut International Airport, who was believed to be affiliated with the same party, prompted this violent response. That evening, Hezbollah's secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, delivered a televised message, calling upon members of the Resistance to protect its telecommunication networks and to "cut off the hands" that threatens it (Kosmatopoulos 2012: 115). This threat was clearly directed at the powerless and incapable Lebanese government.

In the aftermath of the speech, armed groups were deployed around government buildings (Parliament and the president's office), residences of government figures (the prime minister and party leaders), and strategic streets in the capital and elsewhere in order to force the government to withdraw the decrees. After 3 days of battle between pro-government fighters and Hezbollah, the government conceded defeat. This was a victory of sort for the group, and it turned afterwards to assassinations and threats against the government and other political parties. So, the rule of the gunman and not the government's constitutional power is what works in Lebanon.

However, Christians, Sunni and Shia, who each make up roughly a third of the four million inhabitants, have found a way of rubbing along despite their divisions at home and the turbulence around them at least for now. But how long would this last as the civil war in Syria ranges on? Once again, Lebanon is, like other Arab states, a sectarian patchwork with different loyalties and perspectives. Its Sunnis share the fury of their Syrian co-religionists against the regime of President Bashar Assad; and its Shia share the fears of the minorities that support Syria's government. Although all parties have supporting and opposing views on the Syrian civil war, Lebanon did not fall into the abyss when Hezbollah entered the war to prop up Mr. Assad. The Lebanese government also survived when Syria's mainly Sunni rebels used northern Lebanon as a transit route for their arms. It has kept going despite the influx of more than one million Syrian refugees, now a fifth of the total population. Hezbollah's direct interference in the Syrian civil war against the wishes and permission of the Lebanese government has been a destabilizing force and invited more violence in Lebanon such as terrorist attacks.

The newest destabilizing factor is the jihadists who call themselves Islamic State (ISIS). They have grown increasingly assertive on the Syrian-Lebanese border bringing the Syrian conflict to Hezbollah's strong hold in East and South Lebanon. In August 2014, militants from IS and Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda's affiliate in Syria, snatched two dozen Lebanese soldiers and beheaded two of the captives in the northeastern town of Arsal. Also, on October 4th–6th Hezbollah clashed on the border with Jabhat al-Nusra an off shoot of Al Qaida, which was fighting to carve out a supply route.

The Syrian conflict has exploded into neighboring Lebanon. Infiltration and cross-border raids carried out by Syrian personnel have caused widespread chaos within the country. The Lebanese government is reluctant to send military troops to the Syrian border as a means of self-defense and citizens are losing faith in their government. Many fear that Lebanon is slowly turning into a failed state, which is usually defined by several key indicators already mentioned above such as loss of control of its geographical territory and the use of physical force, implosion of the structures of power and authority, and the internal collapse of law and order. The current political situation is pushing Lebanon to the collapse of the government and the rise of radicals as it experienced during the long civil war.

Lebanon's gradual loss of control over its geographical territory, the weakening of institutions of law and authority as well as the Syrian spillover one wonders if Lebanon is heading for failed state status again. The weak Lebanese government has led to repeated kidnappings, multiple Syrian incursions resulting in the death of Lebanese citizens, and the widespread use of weapons by non-state actors are just some of the indicators pointing to the slow meltdown of the country's public institutions. In response to the government's inability to protect its citizens from Syrian attacks individuals losing faith in their leaders deployed into the streets and erected multiple roadblocks to provide security for their communities.

"The security situation is definitely spinning out of control due to the government's disagreement on a unified security approach. Public institutions and the state are losing their credibility." (Global Forum) Many citizens wonder why the state is so hesitant to send military troops to protect its borders. Hence, many have lost faith in Lebanon's institutions, including the police, army, judiciary, and government. Such government failures could provide the fertile grounds for radical movements which could easily exploit the state's absence. But the government decisions remain slow in coming unless there is a clear consensus among all government figures.

But is Lebanon's governmental structure the cause of such weakness? According to Dr. Hillal Khashan, political science professor at the American University of Beirut said that "Lebanon is a soft state. There was an international decision to build the country in a way that the state will always have limited power in order for different communities to prevail." (Global Policy Forum) The Lebanese system has not worked well since its independence from France in 1943. Some scholars believe that since its inception, "Lebanon's system was not designed to work in the first place. It (experiences) phases of functionality and breakdown, without totally collapsing" according to Dr. Karim Makdessi (Global Forum). Throughout its short history, Lebanon's sovereignty has always been in the hands of foreign entities where each pulls the levers of power to their advantage during regional conflicts creating a breakdown and instability every few years.

Just how much of a failed state is Lebanon? Why is that the case? And, is it going to get better or worse with the crisis in Syria, Iraq, and now Yemen? Based on one of the criteria for weak states we set earlier including the military apparatus where the state should have a monopoly on at least on weaponry within a country is not a concept found anywhere in the Lebanese dictionary. Even after the end of the Civil War in 1990, non-state militias have maintained and even bolstered weapons stocks,

stashed in caches around the country and drawn on the slightest provocation by the government and other groups. Robert Springborg, Middle East program manager for the US-based Center for Civil-Military Relations, said that a failure by the Lebanese state to bring rogue arms under control was one of the biggest reasons Lebanon ranks among the world's most failed nations. "If you have a demanding definition of a state then Lebanon might not make it." As well as an inability to control its weapons, Lebanon also struggles to control its frontiers not only from Syria but also from Israel's hundreds of overflights and ground incursions which occurs almost on a daily basis. "A state that does not control its territory is not fully sovereign," Springborg said. The state is also unable to control illegal contraband such as drugs and arms because the system is based on who you know instead of the rule of law.

Other factor that hampers the Lebanese government's decision-making process is factionalized elites who have strong loyalty to foreign interests such as Syria, Iran, and others. Patrick Galey states that "when local and national politicians engage in deadlock and brinkmanship for political gain, this undermines the social contract." That is the leadership feel obligated to consult with foreign entities to make major decisions. Certainly, Lebanon's political arena operates according to few bosses, militias and families, and the government operates based on their consensus instead of the rule of law.

Simply put, the balance of power in Lebanon does not reside in government, but rather in the hands of a few party leaders who each seek influence over or manipulate a particular constituency, demographic or sect for their own personal advantage. Since the power resides with groups and not the government, Nadim Houry, deputy director of Human Rights Watch's Middle East and North Africa, said government and state security apparatuses were unable to protect most people from abuse or discrimination. "The basic function of the state—national protection—has been outsourced to non-state actors. The state does not protect people on its territory." (Galey) This is especially the case when those foreign interests resort to terrorism, assassinations, and other forms of violence and thus preventing the government from taking any strong action. Therefore, most Lebanese feel abandoned by the state and consequently, seek refuge and employment by joining a militia or support party bosses.

According to Robert I. Rotberg, "nation-states fail because they are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants. Their governments lose legitimacy, and the very nature of the particular nation-state itself becomes illegitimate in the eyes and in the hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens. (2012: 1) The impact of the Syrian refugees on Lebanon is providing a fertile ground for extremists and operates beyond government control. The refugees' situation is becoming increasingly more difficult as their money is now starting to run out and they have to start looking for the already limited jobs. Since refugees now make up a fifth of Lebanon's population, they are titling the demographic balance in favor of the Sunnis which many fear a possible risk a renewed civil war. As the Palestinian refugees tilted the balance of power in Lebanon in the 1970s and caused a civil war to erupts, the Syrian crisis serve as a reminder of another possibility especially if the Syrian crisis drags on already in its fifth year.

Once again, the government of Lebanon finds itself unable to provide benefits for the Syrian refugees or control them due to their large demographics. However, the government has caved to foreign pressure by allowing more Syrian refugees against the will of its citizens.

Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Hezbollah has covertly supported the government of Bashar al-Assad. Alongside Iran, Syria is the biggest supporter of Hezbollah, which is why the latter's troops are engaged in military activity on Syrian territory. Hezbollah is forced to help its supporters in Syria because Iran sends weapons to Hezbollah via Damascus.

However, the involvement in Syria has to some extent reduced Hezbollah's popularity in Lebanon because it is feared that it ruins the relationship with the local Sunnis who support the moderate the Free Syrian Army. Many find that supporting the already failed Assad regime is not worth the risk of a potential new civil war. At the same time, the Sunnis have become the largest community in Lebanon, as nearly three-quarters of the Syrian refugees are Sunnis. The Lebanese government once again finds itself too weak in controlling Hezbollah's military activities in Syria which also prompted the Islamic State (ISIS) to broaden its grip over the entire Levant area; its attempts to infiltrate Lebanon have intensified especially among the Syrian refugees. Attempts to invade Lebanon come mainly from the north and east, where the major Sunni cities are located and social tensions are more acute because of the number of refugees with arms and military training. Due to outside pressure and internal divisions and weakness, the Lebanese political establishment is unable to deliver basic services such as collecting rubbish, providing water, electricity, security, and electing president.

Government weakness and Hezbollah's involvement have led to bombings by radical groups in many parts of Lebanon including southern Beirut, where a large number of Syrian refugees live. The attackers carried out the bombings in retaliations to Hezbollah's military involvement in the Syrian civil war. The bombings have created negative feeling towards refugees in the local population but also blamed Hezbollah's military activities in Syria and the government for failing to provide security. Most of the bombings took place in poor areas of Lebanon where corruption, economic inequality, and unemployment create a favorable environment for extremist ideas to spread and violence.

If there is a silver lining to the Lebanese governmental crisis is that fear of the extremist movements has helped to create a truly inclusive coalition national government. The current but shaky government include the largest Maronite Christian political parties, moderate Shi'ites, Sunnis, and Druze all are active participates. Being in one government, the Sunnis and the Shi'ites are jointly responsible for the security and stability of Lebanon. Therefore, it is likely that tensions between the communities will decrease, but of course that would heavily depend on the Syrian crisis next door, Iranian and Saudi influence on the parties and Hezbollah's constant participation in foreign wars in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen against the wishes of the weak Lebanese government.

A united front is a good protection against the Syrian civil war being transmitted to Lebanon. However, it is hard to believe that the current government will last long

but, so far, they have managed to do well, even in potentially difficult situations. But, a united government is not by any means a substitute for a strong, legitimate, and sovereign state. Such polity must have the power to exercise monopoly on arms, decision-making, protect its territory and citizens from domestic and foreign entities, and the ability to provide basic services for its citizens. Without the above criteria, Lebanon will continue to be a fragmented nation which serves as confrontational stage for regional powers. Therefore, to move from a state of fragility, the Lebanese state could only be secured from regional crisis if it finds the political will to effectively develop its institutions and respond as one unified entity to its security concerns and political survival. Until then, this tiny Mediterranean nation-state will most likely remain at the mercy of its neighbors' threats and intimidations and that will negatively affect its policies and politics.

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Chapter 12
Iran and Its Policy Against Terrorism

Hamid Reza Qasemi

Introduction

From the beginning of the last quarter of the twentieth century, terrorism has been especially highly widespread in the world (Borine 2005: 115). According to the State Department of the United States during 1968–1982, almost 8000 terrorist acts were recorded. Other Facts and Figures show that from 1980 to 2002, around 4155 terrorist events have been occurred worldwide in which 3207 people have been killed that 48 % of deaths were in associated with suicide attacks (Pape 2003: 343).

But the harshest and most terrible terrorist attacks have been happened since 2000 so that from 2000 to 2004, almost 472 terrorist attacks were occurred with more than 7000 killed and tens of thousands injured were left in 22 countries including Iran. 11th September 2001 terrorist attacks, Madrid railroad bombing in 2004, the July 2015 bombings in London, suicide bombings in Bali, Indonesia, and the attack on the American hotel in Jordan are the most important terrorist attacks in these years (www. infoplease.com). New statistics show that just in 2011 more than 10,000 terrorist attacks occurred in 70 countries in which 12,500 people were killed (NCTC 2012: 9).

Besides, organized terrorist attacks in various countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Turkey have been left thousands of dead and wounded in recent years. Nowadays, the appearance of terrorist groups like al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, al-Nusra Front is the culmination of terrorism. Iran, particularly after the Islamic Revolution, has been subjected to the most brutal terrorist attacks then this country can be considered a victim of terrorism in the world. Based on the facts and figures, only due to the terrorist group Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) attacks, more than 16,000 people have been killed (www.infoplease.com). Additionally, the

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formation and activities of terrorist groups in recent years, especially in marginal areas and cross-borders has been caused many losses of life and property to people and government of Iran (Izadi and Dabiri 2013: 95).

In this chapter, firstly the history of terrorism in Iran will be reviewed, and then accompanied with the investigation of terrorist threats against Iran, the concept of terrorism in the laws and regulations of this country would be offered. Then following the characterization of national security of Iran, the Iranian government's adopted counter-terrorism policy will be described.

The History of Terrorism in Iran

The footprint of terrorism in the history of Iran has been observed in especially various forms of the politically and seizing power motivated assassination of kings and influencing governmental agents or as revenge out of their tyranny, with personal goals in individual and non-organized way, and in some cases, due to support and planning on the behalf of authorities of public power against the opposition leaders or ordinary opposites.

According to many westerners historically, the first organized terrorism nuclear in Iran after Sikaries Movement is the Ismailia fugitives led by Hassan Sabbah in the Seljuk period in the eleventh century which had conducted the terrorist acts in an organized way. Ismailis in a part of their history known as "new call" began with the leadership of Hassan Sabbah, during a hundred and seventy years, since 473–654 AH, adopted unique and not like the previous methods and measures to deal with government and opposition, which was the use of basic intimidation, basically, and planned as a political tool (Hakimiha 2011: 62–63). After the death of Hassan Sabah in 518 AH, one of his disciples, Kiya Buzurg Ummid Roudbari, substituted him and finally, in 654 AH Mongolian Hulagu destroyed the Alamut and abolished Ismaili dynasty.

Terrorism in the modern history of Iran starts with the assassination of Naser al-Din Shah Qajarin 1934, which was the beginning of wide developments in the history of Iran. In this period, travelling of political and business delegations and granting privileges to install and set up factories, the entry and spread of political thoughts of West in Iran, publishing night-letter, entry of the Kurdish, Caucasian and Armenian immigrants to Iran, and so on, turned to the origin of growth and the spread of terror and terrorism in Iran, and Naser al-Din Shah Qajar was the first victim of the internal conflicts (Bigdeli 1998: 71).

The next section of the terrorism history in Iran is related to Mozaffar ad-Din Shah Qajar period. In this period, due to raising the level of political culture influence in Iran from the European taught areas and consequently the development of social wisdom, the political vulnerability was increased. That is why on the eve of the Constitutional Movement, massive wave of terror was launched in the country. The phenomenon of terror was turned to a means in the hands of the oppression opposition to achieve their political goals. At the same time, Mozaffar ad-Din Shah issued the constitutional decree in 6th August of 1906 (Bigdeli 1998: 71). After

issuing the constitution decree and accession of Mohammad Ali Shah to the throne, and his opposition to constitutional principles, on the one hand governmental agents with the support of Russia launched a wave of assassinations of their opponents for the first time in history of Iran, and on the other hand, appearance and opposition of two political parties of Ejtemaiyun and Meliyun caused the extent of the wave of terrorism in Iran. At the same time, the assassination was entered its organized phase by the foundation of the sanctions committee (Hakimiha 2011).

As the experts mention (Raeen 1956), first person who built a bomb and made the bombing conventional in Iran was "Heydar khan Amu oghli" from the Baku residents who came to Tehran from Russia during Mozaffar ad-Din Shah Period. Haider Khan who linked with several terrorist organizations in the Caucasus, accompanying with some others established a committee called Sanctions Committee for the assassination of tyrants and enemies of the Constitution and freedom. Bomb explosion in the house of Alaud-Daula form government officials, assassination of Ali Asghar Khan Amin al-Sultan known as Atabak Prime Minister of Mohammad Ali Shah, assassination of Abbas Agha Sarraf Azerbaijani, attempted assassination of Muhammad Ali Shah in 1907, the assassination of Qavamul-Molk Shirazi ardent opponents of the Constitution, attempted assassination of Sheikh Fadlallah Nuri, and murder of Ayatollah Seyyed Abdollah Behbehani are the terrorist acts carried out by the Sanctions Committee. On 15th July of 1917, the committee members were arrested and killed by the authority of Vosoughod-Dowleh.

The 21th February of 1921 coup by Reza Khan Mirpanj and extinction of Qajar dynasty, Iran entered a new era of social crisis. To establish the authority and repression, Reza Khan ordered the assassination of a number of his opponents. The early years of the reign of Reza Shah was coincided with the densest periods of assassination in the modern history of Iran. The most important assassinations conducted by the order of Reza Khan are including, assassination of Mirzadeh Eshghi poet and director of the newspaper "the twentieth century," the assassination of the member of parliament, Ayatollah Seyyed Hassan Modarres, assassination of Vaez Qazvini director of the newspaper "Qazvin advice," the killing of Sardar Assad Bakhtiari, Colonel Mahmoud Khan Puladin, and Nosrat-ed-Dowleh (Bigdeli 1998). One of the active organizations in the field of terror during the Pahlavi period was the Tudeh Party of Iran. The assassination of Mohammad Masood, director of the newspaper "Today's Man" in 1947, and assassination of Ahmad Kermani director of "Illustrated Tehran" magazine are some of the terrorist acts of this party.

In 1344, three young Muslim intellectuals with the aim of toppling the Pahlavi regime, founded the "MEK" organization. The group, under the effect of suppressing the uprising of 15th May of 1963 and the failure of peaceful struggle, turned to armed struggle and enjoying the Latin American revolutionaries' patterns, then chose the urban guerrilla warfare fight to their struggles. In 1971, after the arrest and execution of some of its leaders, the activities of the organization shut down, but again some cores of it revived the organization and their armed activities (Khame'e 2002: 344).

In 1350, the "Organization of Iranian People's Fedaian" was formed out of merging the two Marxist guerrilla groups called "Jazani" and "Ahmadzadeh Puyan." The organization committed some of the terrorist acts, including bomb-

ings in the center of the gendarmerie headquarter, explosion in the city government building of Gilan, the assassination of Fateh Yazdi Tehran cotton factory' employer, and the assassination of several high-ranking military commanders of the army and gendarmerie (Bigdeli 1998).

With the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the overthrow of the Pahlavi regime in February 1978, approximately 150 political groups and more than 250 magazines and newspapers in different groups were active that the majority of them were against the revolutionary government (Hakimiha 2011). The start of terrorist acts after the Islamic Revolution can be attributed to the Furqan group; the members of this group targeted assassinations of influential intellectuals in the Islamic republic fixation, including Morteza Motahari, Mohammad Mofatteh, General Valiollah Gharani, Mahdi Iraqi, and attempted assassination on the life of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. The leader of the group, Akbar Goudarzi's arrest and execution, in 1359, caused the Furqan group to be fallen apart.

Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO) after the Islamic Revolution accused the Iran's leaders to compromise with America and requested them to launch a radical left movement for the liberation of Iran from the domination of America. Accordingly, from the June 1981, it adopted military and terrorist policy against the Islamic Republic. The organization initially tried to make the social and political space of Iran chaos due to bombing and because it failed to bring any success in this work, then it changed the orientation of his terrorist acts against Iran's head of state.

The explosion at the headquarters of the Islamic Republic Party (IRP) and death of Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, the head of the Supreme Court with 72 members of the party, including 14 ministers and 27 MPs, the killing of President Mohammad Ali Rajai and Prime Minister Mohammad Javad Bahonar, conducting 336 terrorist attacks from 26th August 1981 to December 1982, are some parts of the terrorist activities of the organization. The government's antiterrorist measures forced the organization to move in the summer of 1365 to Iraq and continue its terrorist acts in Iran under the fund, support, and advertising of Saddam. Because of the extent and intensity of terrorist operations of this organization, European Union and the American government put the MKO as a terrorist organization on the list of international terrorist groups in 2002 and 1997, respectively. With the outbreak of America's war against Iraq and changing of the regime in this country, MKO was forced to leave Iraq and now is counted as the most important terrorist group against the Islamic Republic.

Various Kinds Terrorism Threats Against Iran

One consequence of the terrorism spread is diversifying of its forms. So that different types of terrorism is in different categories are recognizable. Nowadays, terrorism is more varied than the last 30 years (Dordiyan 2003: 22). Nuclear terrorism, bioterrorism, terrorism, nationalist terrorism, political terrorism, narcoterrorism, religious terrorism, state terrorism, cyber terrorism, Agro-terrorism, chemical terrorism, etc. are the various types of terrorism. Figure 12.1 shows the typology of terrorism.

Based on the terrorism agents

- Individual terrorism (Lia, 2001)
- Organizational terrorism (Tavakoli, 2009)

Based on the purposes (Mahpishanian, 2009)

- Narcoterrorism
- Nationalist terrorism
- Political terrorism
- Religious terrorism

Based on historical basis

- Traditional terrorism (Nikfar, 2001)
- Modern terrorism (Fakohi, 2003)

Based on the incentives (Ghorbannia, 2004)

- Ideological terrorism
- Nation-oriented terrorism
- Revolutionary terrorism
- State terrorism
- Criminal terrorism

Conventional terrorism

- State terrorism (Ghazi, 2004)
- Cyber terrorism (Ghorbanian, 2003)
- Geo-terrorism (Afzali et al, 2011)

Unconventional terrorism

- Bioterrorism (OTA, 1992)
- Chemical terrorism (Dehghani, 2010)
- Nuclear terrorism

Fig. 12.1 The typology of terrorism

The Iranian government encounters different kinds of terrorism that each one is divided into branches. These divisions are quite different in appearance but in reality they are closely overlapping. Based on the typology presented in Fig. 12.1, the most important types of terrorist attacks that have happened in Iran or consider as the threats with a high probability of occurrence to the country are as follows: organizational terrorism, narcoterrorism, nationalist terrorism, religious terrorism, and various forms of modern terrorism.

1. Organizational terrorism: organizational terrorism is a type of terrorism in which a political, social or military, governmental or nongovernmental organization within the framework of organizational goals and for various reasons tries to remove the government or opposition elements. The majority of terrors during the history have been from this type of terrors. This kind of terrorism can be operated in the both national and international levels (Tavakoli 2009: 134). The most important terrorist organizations were announced and carried out terrorist acts as an organization in Iran, after the Islamic Revolution, are included: MEK, Organization of People's Fedai Guerrillas, Forqan group, Democratic Party of Kurdistan, Komalah Party, and Jundallah group. Of these cases, the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MKO) is considered as the most important terrorist organizations that has been operated the most terrorist acts in Iran during the 30 years after the revolution (Ismaili 2011). Also, the Jundallah group that has announced in recent years has done significant operations in the eastern regions of Iran, including the bombing in Zahedan in the years 2006, 2008, 2010, the bomb attack in Chabahar in 2010, the assassination of passengers on the road from Zahedan to Chabahar, and the assassination of Iranian border guards on several occasions.
2. Narcoterrorism: narcoterrorism signifies the violence carried out by drug dealers. Former president of Peru was the first one described this type of terrorism in

the 1983 in associated with the terrorist attacks against the antidrug police of his country. Narcoterrorism means terror attacks of drug dealers with the aim of influencing on the government policy and bypassing the law by regular threats and use of violence. Pablo Escobar, the Colombian drug dealer is one famous example for narcoterrorism (Mahpishanian 2009: 4). According to the United Nations (2014), Afghanistan, the eastern neighbor of Iran is the world's largest drug-producer and drug traffickers transit the drugs through Iran to Europe and other countries. Iran is the only country that has always been exposed to the drug threat of drug production in Afghanistan and has suffered the greatest losses in this area. Also, according to the United Nations and Drug Control Headquarters of Iran, the Islamic Republic is one of the most important victims of narcotics in the world and 2237 Iranian police officers were killed in the fight against drugs (Drug Control Headquarters: 1394).

3. Nationalist terrorism: nationalist terrorism is a form of violence in which militants and armed groups are pursuing the goal of making an independent government and put an end to the occupation of their country or an anticolonial movement for ending colonialism and achieving to independence. This term is also used to describe a group that seeks to establish an independent state in an ethnic and religious area (Mahpishanian 2009). Of course, it should be noted that there are remarkable disagreements in terms of nationalist terrorism. There is a view that does not consider the violence has been done in order to deal with the occupation and with the aim of liberating the territory of a country as terrorism. This type of terrorism applies in the case of those groups seeking to establish an independent state in an ethnic or religious region. Since the beginning of Islamic Revolution in Iran, many terrorist groups with separatist claims have been operated many armed and violent actions against the government and people, such as Kurdistan, Khuzestan, and East of the country, have done that, including the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Komalah, the Arab people group in the West, and terrorist groups like Jundallah, Ansaraladl and, … in the East of Iran can be noted. These groups do their acts to analyze the country and joint to the neighboring countries of Iran.

4. Religious terrorism: some sects believe that their deduction about the world and current developments is the purest vision, and consider others in the outside of their worldview totally false, so that they should be turned to the right way which is their religion or should be eliminated. Hence, the followers of such sects have to do violence to implement their own special ideas if their leaders feel its necessity. The violence raised by these actions characterized in the context of religious terrorism. This kind of terrorism only has accepted the leadership of its religion and suppresses other religions.

The violence of religious terrorism is unprecedented either in terms of its wide range of activities or its distinctive and deadly features, in the current era. In this type of terrorism, all those who turn to terrorism believe that their activities are something sacred on the behalf of God. In other words, religious terrorists commit their holy violence to protect the community and believe that heaven is promised to them. About 20 % of ter-

rorist groups have religious interests (Ghorbannia 2004). But the motive of these groups is actually political and religion is used merely as an instrument of legitimizing for Recruiting and use of members. In fact, to do violent actions, people require legitimizing mechanisms and religion could properly play this function. This has made the distinction between religious and political terrorism and also religion and politics realms difficult in the religious terrorist groups. Religious terrorism in Iran supported by many countries in the Middle East has been created fear and terror in the South Eastern and the Western parts of the country in recent years. Especially in Sistan and Baluchestan blew up a mosque, and a Salafist Group named "Tohid" assassinated some clergies and religious scholars of Shafi'i madhhab in Kurdistan as well as Shiite groups in 2009.

5. Modern terrorism: there are serious views about the nature of modern terrorism, particularly at the international level. Many believe that modern terrorism resorted to violent means with the aim of making the most wide material-human destruction to culture or from the Marxist view point the superstructure of the Western life and its symbol, America (Dehshiar 2003: 68). From this perspective, modernity is the agent a paradigm shift in terrorism and terrorist attacks such as the September eleventh incidents are the inevitable result of modernity (Fakuhi 2003: 80). Modern terrorism in a various ways and by taking advantage of new features and technologies which are the souvenirs of modernity, carry out its actions and achieve its goals to advance. As shown in Fig. 12.1, there are various forms of new terrorism in the world that some forms such as cyber terrorism, state terrorism, chemical terrorism, and Geo-terrorism has been experienced in Iran's history. They will be examined here.

   5.1. Cyber terrorism: cyber threats are relatively novel phenomena in recent decades, which have emerged along with the development of information technology and the extension of global communications via the extensive network of the Internet around the world, in a way that nowadays, cyber threats seem both important and challenging. By definition, cyber threats are events that affect the virtual environment naturally or by humans (either intentionally or unintentionally) or events operated through the virtual space or to somehow be related to it (CACI and USNI 2010). There are several types of cyber threats that the most important of them are cyber warfare and cyber chaos (Khalilpour Ruknabadi and Noor Alivand 2012). According to the American Federal Emergency Management Agency, cyber terrorism signifies the illegal threat and the attack against computers, networks, and information stored, when it is carried out to frighten and force the government or its people to achieve political or social objectives (Congressional Research 2008: 4).

   The Islamic Republic of Iran has repeatedly been attacked by both internal and foreign cyber terrorism. Banking network and sites have been victims of this kind of terrorism. The most important foreign cyber-attack are related to sending the Stuxnet and Flame viruses to Bushehr nuclear power and nuclear center at Natanz systems by foreign cyber terrorism in 2007 and 2010, respectively.

5.2. State terrorism: governments are the new phenomenon of international system; it means that to somehow it could be considered as the achievements of modern life and modernism. The entrance of this phenomenon to the terrorism issue has been caused a new kind of terrorism to be created which many call it as state terrorism. State terrorism is a kind of terrorism which government undertakes the leadership of terror, prepares an organization for it, pays its expenses, provides people by military training, and leads them inside and outside the community (Qazavy 2004: 59). Some cases, such as a state secret covert operation for stabilization or overthrow of another government that possibly may entail the assassination of leaders or special political and scientific characters, can be considered the true objective of state terrorism. These operations are usually carried out by the security institutions of a country in another country. Although these operations may do not entail the public fear aspect but they are considered as terrorism because of some kinds of not declared violence carried out with the aim of physical elimination of the elements from the opposite government and may be conducted in order to making public disruption and instability are considered as terrorism. According to the Time weekly news magazine, Israeli government operates three main types of terrorist actions against Iran that are including quietly sabotage, assassination of nuclear scientists, and noisy sabotage (Vick and Klein 2012: Issue). The best examples of state terrorism against Iran is assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists by agents of the Israeli state in which during some stages four Iranian nuclear scientists were killed. Table 12.1 indicates the details of these terrors.

5.3. Chemical Terrorism: chemical terrorism is one of the modern but unconventional terrorisms. The main character of this type of terrorism is use of chemical materials. Chemical terrorism means the targeted use of toxic chemical agents against human beings to inflict physical and psychological harm on them that in this way terrorists seek to take the joy of life and good living feel from people by inflicting the injuries, murder, and destruction of property of individuals (Dehghani Firouz Abadi 2010: 288). According to international law, application of chemical weapons is prohibited even in war. But during the Iran-Iraq war (1981–1988), Saddam Hussein's regime frequently used chemical bombs and weapons against the military and various Iranian citizens. Only in Sardasht, Iran, 110 people were killed and more than 5000 people were injured due to aircraft bombing of Saddam's army, on June 29, 1987. The Baath regime in Iraq in these attacks used three gases, including mustard, nerve (Tabun, sarin, and Soman), and Cyanogen against defenseless people (Borhanifar 2005). Also during the war, approximately 2600 killed and about 107,000 civilian casualties were left, due to chemical attacks of Saddam's army against Iranian civilians. Table 12.2 demonstrates Saddam army's different use from chemical weapons against the troops of and people in towns and villages of Iran.

5.4. Microbial terrorism (bioterrorism): bioterrorism means the abuse of microbial agents or their products, or to put it more comprehensive, the use of

Table 12.1 Details of assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists by the Israeli state (Hamshahri Online 2012)

The assassinated	Date, time, and place of assassination	How	Academic background	Resume	Terror agent
Dr. Masoud Ali Mohammadi	January 12, 2010 at 7:05 am, Gheytariyeh St., front of his house	Car bomb	Graduated from Sharif University of Technology at Ph.D. level in theoretical physics with more than 80 articles in scientific journals around the world	Distinguished Professor of Physics in Iran, Iran's representative to SESAME, Member of the College of Science, Research Assistant at College of Science	Majid Jamali Fashi linked to Mossad
Dr. Majid Shahriari	November 29, 2010 7–8 am, Around Artesh Blvd.	Car bomb	Graduated from Amirkabir University of Technology, Master's degree in nuclear engineering from Sharif University of Technology, Ph.D. in Nuclear Science and Technology University from Amirkabir University of Technology	Academic staff at the physics faculty of University of Amirkabir, Author of four books and several international articles in the field of Nuclear Engineering, Physics professor at Shahid Beheshti University, Iran's researcher at SESAME	In the follow-up
Fereydoon Abbasi Davani	November 29, 2010, 7–8 am, Velenjak in front Shahid Beheshti University	Car bomb		Distinguished Professor of Nuclear Physics, Former vice president of Iran, Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran	Yet to be determined, the attempted assassination
Dariush Rezaei Nejad	July 23, 2011, 12 pm, In front of the Department of Electrical Engineering of Khajeh Nasir Toosi University	Shooting	Ph.D. student in the field of power engineering at Khajeh Nasir Toosi University	Elite from Abdanan, Ilam province	German weekly Der Spiegel introduced Mossad as assassination agent
Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan	January 11, 2012, at 8:20 am, Ketabi square, Golnabi St.	Magnetic bomb	Graduate from Sharif University of Technology in the field of Chemical Engineering	Deputy of commerce at Natanz nuclear site	Yet to be determined

Table 12.2 Usage of chemical weapons by Saddam's army during the Iran-Iraq war (1981–1988)
(www.tarikhiran.ir)

Year	The number of usage	Chemical agent	Casualties
1980	4	Mustard gas	20 killed and 1 injured
1981	6	Mustard gas	101 killed
1982	12	Mustard gas	No statistics
1983	64	Mustard gas	No statistics
1984	No statistics	Mustard gas, Nerve, Blood, Chocking	40 killed and 2225 injured
1985	76	Mustard gas, Nerve, Blood, Chocking	77 killed and 11644 injured
1986	102	Mustard gas, Nerve, Blood, Chocking	102 killed and 4720 injured
1987	43	Mustard gas, Nerve, Blood, Chocking	442 killed and 9440 injured
1988	34	Mustard gas, Nerve, Blood, Chocking	No statistics

biological agents to intimidate or kill people and destroy animals or plants
(Karami 2007). Biological agents are strongly fatal even in small amounts,
and also they can be concealed and transported easily. They can be easily
prepared and used by people who have little education, and, more impor-
tantly, the distinction between a natural and epidemic outbreaks caused by
bioterrorism is not so simple (Shahhoseini 2015, www.elib.hbi.ir).
Investigations (Khaje Amir and Sharghi Dolatabadi 2012) show that Iran
has been subject to such terrorism in the decade of 2000. However, these
measures failed, but there is still the possibility of doing it again. In this
decade, epidemic, plant, animal, and vegetable diseases happened in Iran.
There are many similarities between chemical and microbial terrorisms.
Simple transportation, the capability of easily spreading, and many other
advantages of biological terrorism is true in the case of chemical terrorism.
This similarity is to somewhat that in many cases both types of terrorisms
are called chemical terrorism.

5.5. Geo-terrorism: research findings show that there is a significant connection
between geographical variables, such as topography, population, climate,
government holes, geographical location of places, ethnic, and religious
minorities on the one hand, and success or failure of terrorist activities, on
the other hand. Therefore, there is a new type of terrorism called "Geo-
terrorism." Geo-terrorism has been formed from two words of Geo which
means Geography and terrorism meant to create fear and horror (Afzali
et al. 2011). Geography has been noticed in three fields of location, space,
and land, and terrorism in three areas based on violence strategy, security,
and self-defense will be more considerable. Terrorist groups in different
geographical locations and spaces in either local or global scales apply their
violent strategies with its own reasons.

In Iran due to the presence of various geographical factors, such as high mountains, vast arid deserts, and dense forests, some conditions for the establishment of terrorist groups are provided, which sometimes is in accordance with terrorists demands, whether individually or in a group. It means that it can generate power or ensure the survival of terrorists to carry out terrorist activities. For example, the establishment of terrorist groups, like Jundallah, Ansaraladl, and …, in the southeastern deserts of Iran or use of mountains in western Iran for hiding by terrorist groups in order to conduct terrorist operations against Iran are some examples of Geo-terrorism. So we can say that even though the ideological and political factors may influence the incidence of terror, but on the other hand, occurrence of terror phenomenon could have also a geographical origin. As a result, the relationship between all geographical factors and conducting violent actions in Iran could be examined through two aspects of the relationship between terrorism and geographical location, and geographical factors influencing on terrorism. As another example, we can point out to ISIS treats due to neighboring to Iraq and geographical proximity to the conflict zone.

Another type of terrorism that may not be found in the presented categories is regional terrorism. This type of terrorism has appeared in two forms. First, it refers to the formation of groups, individuals, or governments operating the destruction of places or assassination of individuals beyond national borders and Second, regional terrorism in the form of covert and overt interference of governments in the internal affairs of other countries through financial and weapon support from insurgents and local dissidents in other countries.

The second type of regional terrorism has been found in Iran. One of the examples is financial and weapon support of Saddam Hussein's regime from Mujahedin-e Khalq organization (MKO) and their permission to residence and establishment in Camp Ashraf in Iraq for many years.

The Concept of Terrorism in the Laws and Regulations of Iran

Public tranquility preservation against delinquency and directing the natural human violence toward proved and legitimate ways are of objectives that governments try to achieve and take advantage of the penal system. Furthermore, the first effort of the public powers is to determine the rules that their importance justifies the penal sanctions. Another attempt is to determine criminal sanctions or punishments for such an abnormal behavior. No doubt the legislature in the detection of an abnormal behavior and its criminalization is obliged to observe the principles and framework (Hakimiha 2011).

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon, but new ways of its committing, its organization, and development of its risks to the security of human society caused the traditional sanctions in criminal law to deal with this phenomenon seem inefficient or incomplete. Thus, the need for criminalization of terrorism is more than ever.

The criminalization of terrorism means describing the terrorism independently and in accordance with the conceptual development of terrorism. Many terrorist acts such as murder, destruction of public property, and the abduction have been as normal punishable crimes from many years ago. But adoption of a good criminal policy at this time, in terms of domestic and international concern, is today's need of Iran (Habibzadeh and Hakimiha 2007).

Since the Iranian penal system has been affected of Islamic law, the criminalization in the areas of the core values of religion, meant to express, declare, and criminal legislation would be on legal offenses and penalties. The most important laws and regulations related to terrorism in Iran are as follows:

- Islamic penal code approved in 1991
- Penal code for the aircraft flight safety spoilers and sabotage in aviation equipment and facilities approved in 1970
- Law enacted in 1957 to punish the spoilers in Iran's oil industry
- Criminal act of the spoilers of water, electricity, gas, and telecommunication facilities approved in 1972
- Criminal act of industry spoilers approved in 1974

One of the crimes against the security of the community in the criminal law of Iran is "Moharebeh and spreading corruption on earth" that comes from the holy Quran, verse 33 of Surah Ma'idah. In this verse, God says: "Indeed, the penalty for those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger and strive upon earth to cause corruption is none but that they be killed or crucified or that their hands and feet be cut off from opposite sides or that they be exiled from the land. That is for them a disgrace in this world; and for them in the Hereafter is a great punishment."

Under the Iranian criminal system, terrorist acts are evidence of a criminal title of Moharebeh. In some Muslim countries, there is a difference between the crime "Baghy" and Moharebeh. The Qur'anic document of Baghy is in the verse nine of Surah Hujurat. In this verse, God expresses: "If two factions among the believers should fight, then make settlement between the two. But if one of them oppresses the other, then fight against the one that oppresses until it returns to the ordinance of Allah. And if it returns, then make settlement between them in justice and act justly. Indeed, Allah loves those who act justly." The Crime Baghy in the Islamic law is in the sense of revolt against the state or government and is known as political offenses and is different from the Moharebeh (Hakimiha 2011).

According to Rapoport (1992), a phenomenon which contains the following indices and common features could be considered as terrorism:

- Creating fear and panic. It is the first psychological perspective of terrorism that aims to sow fear in the hearts and achieving to given goals. In other forms of violence, creating fear and panic is not the main goal of the perpetrator, and it is considered as secondary goal, but the creating fear and panic in the victim and others is a primary goal in terror.
- Blind nature of assassination. Terrorist attacks naturally are carried out blindly so that they do not discriminate the men and women, children and old, and military and civilian.

- Assassination is Surprising and secrecy. Terror is based on the element of surprising and secrecy, and basically terror has been meant as unaware cache (غافـل کـش). Terrorist attacks are so sudden and secret then no one can predict when and where they would be happen. So the surprising factor provides terrorists the chance to choose their own time and place of attack.
- Political objectives. Terrorist operations usually aim to change the existing situation and achieve certain political purposes and violent acts which do not seek political objective cannot be count as terrorism.
- Organization. Terrorist operations are intensively and in very high level designed and organized.
- Violence. One of the main features of terrorism is violence. In fact, an operation that is not associated with violence, use of weapons, and the threat cannot be defined as terrorism. Therefore, the shooting of a burglar, strikes, and street demonstrations do not fit in the category of terrorism.
- Low participation. In spite of revolutions and riots in the streets that a huge number of people involved in it. In terrorist operations, usually a small number of people are behind the assassination.
- Public orientation. Although, participants in a terrorist attack are few, but the majority of people include in this measure. In fact, the terror agents expect their operation would have a wide reflection throughout the society.

Iran's Islamic Penal Code enacted in 1991 in the seventh has been investigated the crime Moharebeh and spreading corruption on earth and violence and corruption on earth and has predicted its punishments. Section 183 of the act defines the war crime Moharebeh as: "Everyone taking up arms to create fear and panic and depriving liberty and security of the people is an enemy of God (Mohareb) and spreader of corruption on earth." The similarity between the criminal title of Moharebeh and terrorism has caused the legislators to not spend criminalization of terrorism seriously.

Based on the general and traditional definitions, terrorism implies the committing of violent acts due to create panic among the people (Hakimiha 2011). This definition is very close to definition of Shiite jurists. Iran's judiciary in dealing with the perpetrators of terrorist acts has been included many of them in the Moharebeh title. In the Shiite jurisprudence sources, in the definition of Moharebeh terms are in a way that cover multiple behaviors as Moharebeh and corruption on earth. But Shiite commentators and jurists totally try to confine the examples of the verse 33, Surah Ma'idah (Moharebeh verse) along with strict interpretation. Shaykh Tusione of the greatest Shiite jurists in the book entitled Al-Mabsut after approval of the fact that all public jurists are unanimous on the subject of the verse as "road sector" puts his juridical opinion this way: "According to our religious narratives, the verse refers to anyone scares people with weapon, both at sea and on land, either in the city or in the desert" (Aghababaei 2007).

It is possible to adapt the behavior of the person or persons, who carried out terrorist acts with the provisions of the Islamic Penal Code regarding Moharebeh, but nowadays, terrorism is beyond the individual acts and has been organized, and those without straight interfering in the terrorist operation, play the technical assistance, financial,

intelligence, and leadership roles. Also, todays it is probable that terrorist acts be done without the use of weapons, so the traditional definition of Moharebeh may not be included these actions. Therefore, the government due to considering the legal gaps in the case of terrorism, prepared the "antiterrorism" bill, with consulting of experts from different parts, and presented it to Parliament in 6th December 2003.

The first article of the antiterrorism bill's proposal, affected of international documents such as paragraph "b" of article 2 of the Convention states of combating the financing of terrorism declares: "Committed and threatened crimes and violent acts through making people to feel frightened for influencing on the policy, decisions, and actions of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, other countries and the intergovernmental organizations, is considered a terrorist crime." This general concept includes several examples that the most important of them have been so far released in 13 international documents in the form of antiterrorism conventions or protocols.

According to the article 3 of the antiterrorism bill: "A terrorist crime assistant has been sentenced to the minimum prescribed penalty." According to the article 6 of the bill: "organizations, associations, NGOs, groups, and those allowed to commit terrorist acts or attempts to commit such crimes based on their constitution, statute, or procedural action, are considered terrorist groups, although the actions were committed by their members or fans." The article 21 of the mentioned bill has considered the criminal sanctions in accordance with the legal personality of terrorist groups. According to the article: "Terrorist groups will be liquidated and all their property, assets, and accounts, be confiscated in favor of the Islamic Republic in addition to the penalties appointed by the law."

Another innovation in the antiterrorism bill based on the needs of today's society concerning the responsibility of the terrorism crime is in associated with the role of governments in terrorist operations. In this case, due to the lack of penalties for states under domestic law, according to the article 19 of the bill: "if a terrorist crime is attributable to a foreign government or governments, so that in accordance with the internal rules of Iran raising the lawsuit against those foreign governments is possible, committed and relevant foreign government will be responsible for compensation in solidarity."

Iran's antiterrorism bill along with taking into account the relationship between Moharebeh and terrorism, in article 14 has predicted: "if the act was deemed to be Moharebeh, committed is included the punishable for Moharebeh." In the article 183 of the Islamic Penal Code, two criteria has been specified to achieve Moharebeh: first, taking up arms, and second the intention of creating fear and panic or the intention of taking people's liberty and security.

National Security in Iran

National security is a multidimensional position which is conceptually weak, from the definition viewpoint vague, but politically is a powerful concept (Khalilpour Ruknabadi and Noor Alivand 2012). According to definition, it emphasizes on the sense of freedom from fear or the sense of safety monitoring the physical and

mental security (Mandel 2000: 44). The national security of a community involved a wide area of issues so that it can be divided into five areas of military, political, economic, social, and environmental (Shakeri 2002).

Islamic Republic of Iran is a regional country with the international capabilities, have a world-class influences as well. Iran since the fall of the Shah's regime and the revolution, due to adopting the policy of "Neither East nor West" has taken an independent foreign policy of global issues. This policy accompanying with the extent of Iranian-Islamic civilization and the cultural and historical ties with the neighboring countries, in the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Persian Gulf countries, Pakistan, and the western neighboring countries, e.g., Iraq and Turkey to West Africa, has led the country to develop a strategic region and benefits the potential and actual facilities to expand bilateral regional and global cooperation.

The national Security of the Islamic Republic has been formed from the elements such as the role of acting as an independent and active player, energy resources, geopolitical status, ideological capacity, and scientific and technological capabilities (Mehrvarz 2011). Accordingly, Iran is one of the countries that terrorism is linked with its national security and is damaged of terrorism in the dual form. On the one hand, Iran is considered as one of the main victims of terrorism in the history of its independence, in terms of facing the charges of supporting terrorism, pays the price for its independence (Eftekhari and Shabestani 2011).

In Iran, the country's defense and security policies determines by Supreme National Security Council. The constitution has fixed the totality of the national security areas under this council and the organization is defines as: "The Supreme National Security Council is constituted in order to protect national interests and territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the Islamic Revolution (the Constitution, article 176)." According to the article 176 of the constitution, the council aims to protect religious and national facilities, including the national interests, the Islamic Revolution, the country's territory, and sovereignty.

According to article 9 of the constitution, the territorial integrity of Iran includes the maintaining geographical territory of Iran in land and sea, and no one is allowed to enter the smallest flaw to the territorial integrity of Iran. According to the article 156, national sovereignty means triple powers and the supreme leader. Therefore, Iran's national security based on the council's tasks is not only limited to the military and defense aspects but includes the new aspects of security, like the political, economic, social, and environmental aspects. Iran's national security from the traditional view, which is mostly based on the war and defense positions, in the constitution explicitly and implicitly, has a religious foundation. One indicator of national security is military security and the ability to defend against foreigners. In Iran's national security, the concept of "religious military" has been replaced by the national military. Based on this concept, the military security mission is not only to protect and preserve the borders, but also is the mission of jihad in the way of Allah and fight to spread the rule of the law of God in the world based on the defense and military readiness verse (Surah al-Anfal, verse 61). In the Islamic Republic, the defense subject to the Army is a Sufficiency duty and based on the legal principle of (Sufficiency duty) and the experience of Messenger in popular mobilization in early

Islam. In other words, the Islamic Republic of Iran's Military has the both national and religious backgrounds.

The defense subject generally has been discussed in Islamic political jurisprudence, and this feature has led to tying and combination of the national security issue to the "maintaining of Islam" at the time of the Islamic Republic of Iran establishment. Based on the Islam defense is obligatory upon two things: one is when Islam is in risk, and the other is the fear of jeopardizing the lives and property of the Muslim people (Shakeri 2002). According to this, Imam Khomeini regarding the defense subject says: "If the enemy enters the land of Muslims and the Muslim land's borders in a way to make destruction fear of the Islamic Reign and Muslim community, it is incumbent upon Muslims to defend against the campaign to any device … if there is the fear that the enemy will rule on Muslim lands and their land will be seized or Muslims will be captured, the defense must be considered in any way" (Khomeini 2011: 485). Mirzaye Naini, religious policy theoretician of constitutionalism, has another perspective of defense that its feature is matching the protecting of "Islamic Reign" with protecting of "the homeland and the Islamic country." Therefore, in his view, national security is obtained by the defense based on the religious obligations and provisions. Naini believes that the preservation of Islamic country from foreign intervention is equivalent to protect the Islamic Reign. So according to Naini's idea, national security is linked to the preservation of Islam issue.

Counter-Terrorism Policies

Counter-terrorism policies can be divided into three types: prevention policies, legal punishment policies, and repressive policies (Eftekhari and Shabestani 2011).

1. Prevention policies: these policies are of the oldest existing policies which are the base of the formation of 13 different conventions and UN resolutions to early 1990s. These policies have been followed to examine the roots of terrorism and have been always disputed. The disputes have been mostly between terrorist acts and liberation acts. One of the basic differences between Iran and the West in terms of terrorism is regarding to disputes on definition of terrorism and distinguish it from the acts of liberation. Based on the Quran, the MEK is a terrorist group and many of the terrorist operations in the past three decades operated in Iran has been done by this group so that about 16,000 people have lost their lives due to their terrorist acts, while the group is supported by Western countries. Instead, groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian are liberation groups and are fighting for the liberation of their homeland from Israel occupation. But from the perspective of the United States and Western countries, these groups are terrorists.

Preventive policy in the fight against terrorism has two types: in the first type which is more related to extralegal issues, rather than thinking about preemption against terrorism, the causes of the emergence of terrorism and how to overcome

these causes will be considered. This policy would be more sustainable and effective than other policies.

Codification and presentation of combating financing of terrorism bill in 2011 in Iran is in the context of this type of preventive policy. This bill that is totality passed through the number 2848 on 9th February 2012 has been developed by taking into account the international obligations contained in the 1999 convention of the United Nations and also the requirements of Security Council's resolution No. 1373.

The second type is in response to terrorist acts that are committed with the use of the first type. It is always possible that terrorist groups and organizations challenge the existing discipline by their avarice. In such cases, rather than adopting a passive and responsive position to terrorist activities, it should be tried to discover and neutralize terrorist activities through the approval of active measures. This policy especially has been very stressed after the emergence of the ability of terrorists to use methods and weapons of mass destruction.

One of the strategic documents in terms of combatting terrorism for Iran is the convention of the Organization of Islamic Conference which is one of the most important steps in this area. According to the second paragraph of third article of the convention, the member States are committed to the following notes:

- Preventing the planning, organizing, and executing terrorist crimes or starting the complicity in their countries
- Cooperation and coordination with other committed governments, particularly the neighboring governments
- Developing and strengthening the systems related to surveillance and inspection of transport, import, export, use of weapons, ammunition, explosives, and other means of aggression, murder, and destruction as well as the strengthening of cross-border and customs inspection
- Developing and strengthening the systems related to sentry and security of air, sea, and land border crossings to prevent infiltration through them
- Strengthening the systems to ensure health and protection of people, vital facilities, and means of public transport
- Further intensification of the protection, security, and the health of people, consular and diplomatic missions, international and regional accredited committed organizations in accordance with the conventions and rules of international law in this regard
- Promoting security intelligence activities and coordinating them with other committed government's intelligence activities for the purpose of detecting terrorist groups and organizations targets and neutralization of plans and exposing their risk domain to security and stability
- Creating a database to collect and analyze the data about the organizations, movements, groups, and terrorist agents (Bozorgmehri 2006: 52–53).

The Islamic Republic of Iran also has been presented its actions in the framework of responding to the United Nations Security Council's Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC) questions via numerous annually reports. The establishment of a working group to create a database related to the terrorist groups information,

dealing with the smuggling of weapons into the country, and collecting about 90,000 weapons, ammunition and military equipment of various kinds, intense monitoring on borders, applying more control to border movements and creating security headquarters along the eastern and western borders of the country, establishment and development of the security wall along the eastern border, and holding the international meetings regarding the global combatting against terrorism are some of these measures (CTC 2011).

2. The legal penalty policies: these policies emerged in the Third Committee of the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations. These policies, rather than being concerned about terrorism, have focused on human rights violations on the part of antiterrorism measures. The policy of imposing the legal penalties forbears the causes and context of it and focuses on the crime and its perpetrators.

Iran's Islamic Penal Code has determined the Moharebeh sentence for perpetrators of terrorist acts and as explained in the previous sections, based on the Moharebeh in the Iranian criminal justice terrorist must be followed, judged, and punished by internal, judicial, administrative, and police mechanisms. The investigation, prosecution, and detention are of the main mechanisms of criminal justice system.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, after the failure of the preventing policies and following the terrorist acts, tries to prevent the spread of terrorist acts by applying legal sanctions and also aims to resort to law and the strict implementation of it to fight with the effect that is terrorism. The most important actions in this area include:

- Criminalization of terrorism and legal punishment of terrorists. The antiterrorism law's bill has examined the criminalization, definition, and examples of terrorist crime in detail, with some instances of such as murder, death threats, attacks, and acts of violence resulting in death or serious physical harm against civilians, kidnapping, or illegal detention and kidnapping of people, any kind of conscious violent acts against the people who have international impunity based on the law, sabotage of public governmental or nongovernmental facilities and property causing a severe damage or disrupt the normal function, making a severe damage to the environment such as water poisoning and burning of forests, any kind of manufacturing, possession, acquisition, transport, theft, fraudulent gains, trafficking, carrying, holding, illegal development or accumulation of toxins, elements and chemical, biological and bacteriological materials, production, supply, trafficking, sale and illegal use of explosives, arms and ammunition.
- The legal protection of victims of terrorism and respect to human rights. Some of these policies include: support for victims of terrorism, according to the Algeria statement, support for victims of ordinary citizens in note 18 of budget bill in 2006, and protecting the rights of victims of violation of the diplomatic immunity of the Iranian government.

3. Repressive policies: these policies have emerged after the 11th September attacks and still they have dominated. These policies consider the elimination of terrorism as principle and due to introducing the terrorism as a criminal offense have

been allowed to fight against terrorism to the extent of killing or capturing its perpetrators. In the framework, the respect to human rights in the fight against terrorism is marginalized and can largely be ignored. In these policies, the approach to deal with the terrorism is more police, military, and intelligence.

In the framework of these policies, terrorism and fighting against it in the United Nations mostly is followed in the sixth committee and the Security Council, and all the Security Council resolutions on terrorism are in this format.

The Islamic Republic of Iran over the past three decades to suppress and destroy terrorist groups, such as the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Komalah, Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas, People's Mojahedin of Iran (MKO), terrorist group PJAK, terrorist group Jundallh, has used the repression of terrorism policies and on the basis of various documents, including the Organization of Islamic Conference Convention which has recommended the fight against terrorism in article 2, section b, has pursued his policies and in this way has suffered enormous human and financial costs.

In addition to the above-mentioned triple policies, another policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the fight against terrorism is the distinction between terrorism and Jihad. Jihad has three kinds; one initiating (primary) which is a sufficiency duty, the second the defensive which is an individual duty, and third War against the rebellious people (war with Baghat) that such as initiating Jihad is a sufficiency duty and also called the internal Jihad (Alipour 2010). From the perspective of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the initiating Jihad to call others to Islam must be conducted without charge and without violent acts and should be done only by speech. Because jihad is originated from the Quran and applying the surprise attack on atheists and unbelievers or, does not match with any of the verses of the Quran. According to the verse 62 of Surah al-Baqarah, the Prophet as the standard of Islam religion has duty to cherish other religions, even the star-worshipers: "Indeed, those who believe and the Jews and the Christians and star-worshipers who believed in Allah and the Last Day and did righteousness will have their reward with their Lord, and no fear will there be concerning them, nor will they grieve."

Based on the Islamic Republic of Iran view, all forms of Jihad are obligatory but initiating war when an infallible is not the ruler is not permissible. So all the arbitrary and initiating ways have been closed to individuals and there is no order to attack enemies, whether in their own country or in another country, unless they have attacked by enemies or atheists.

Jihad in all three types of it has a special place. Struggle and rebellion are signs of the development of society and it is not only limited to the field of battle and military campaign, but encompasses all areas ranging from intellectual, cultural, political, economic, and social. Jihad with Baghat is one of the Jihads which is like initiating Jihad is an individual duty. Baghat is called to such a Muslims have rebelled against the infallible leader of Muslims, like the Khawarij of Nahrawan battle (Jafari Langroodi 1985: 112). The rebellious or Baghat should be the Muslims who have protested against the Islamic lands ruler with weapons. This point reveals one of the most important differences between terrorist act and Baghi. It means that Baghi is only done by Muslims, but the terrorist act is a behavior that may be conducted by every one.

Another policy pursued by Iran in the fight against terrorism is combating against the misrepresenting of the concept of terrorism in the context of international relations. Some states are working to reverse the label of terrorism, and then it causes one of the great conceptual difficulties with respect to terrorism. The groups called terrorists, if they were not supported by some governments, combatting with them were much easier and conceptual challenge of their violent actions were fewer, but when some governments consider a group as terrorist while the others call the same group as martyrdom or freedom seeking group, regardless of what is the judgment of group about itself, indicating that the label and the label, it indicates that labeling and mislabeling both are done by the government and the law.

For example, the Palestine Liberation Front, the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Hamas, Hezbollah in Lebanon, all from the perspective of United States are terrorist organizations, while based on the policy of the Iranian government, these groups, are considered as liberation groups and resistance groups (Alipour 2010) and are supported. This policy in 1990 was turned to the "Support the Islamic Revolution of the Palestinian people" law and was approved. According to article 2 of the law, "Iran's government can found the humanitarian aid fund to support the Palestinian people and gather the help of Muslims and freedom-loving people of the world and spend it to support and strengthen the Palestinian refugees, the oppressed and fighting people of Palestine and the Intifada."

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Chapter 13
Policy Initiatives That Steer Terrorism: A Case Study of L. Paul Bremer's De-Ba'athification of the Iraqi Army

Ali G. Awadi

Introduction

When the United States led a multinational coalition into invading Iraq in 2003, the ostensible reason was to thwart the ambitions of Iraq's leader, the notorious dictator Saddam Hussein, to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Though no WMD were subsequently uncovered in Iraq, a parallel motive, always thinly veiled at best, was the ouster of Hussein from power and the toppling of his regime. This overthrow was accomplished militarily in very short order, as the United States was able to use technological superiority, particularly with air power, to great advantage. Hussein's army collapsed and organized resistance came to an end in the wake of the American-led onslaught.

However, once the initial military objectives were achieved and the regime was driven out, not surprisingly this created a tremendous power vacuum in Iraq (Mitchell and Massoud 2009). Hussein had ruled the country with an iron fist for decades. Using brutal tactics, he had very effectively suppressed any political opposition, monopolizing control over the nation's entire infrastructure. So what would become of Iraqi society now that he was gone? With no viable democratic institutions in place, how would the newly "liberated" Iraq recover from the foreign invasion and move into the future as a successful sovereign state with a credible government?

With the hindsight of more than a decade now available to us, it is clear that American planners, along with Iraqi opposition groups, did not investigate these questions adequately before giving the green light to invading Iraq. Chaos and terrorism

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were the result. We will begin by briefly analyzing the preinvasion history of Iraq, in order to give some perspective into the policy blunders that have led to unspeakable suffering for the Iraqi people, along with thousands of American casualties.

Historical Overview

It is impossible to understand Saddam Hussein, his regime and the aftermath of its collapse without some knowledge of the history of the Ba'ath party. The movement traces its origins to the 1940s when it was founded by two Syrian teachers, Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din Bitar and their stated objective was Arab unity, socialism, and the modernization of the Arab world (Terrill 2012). Their slogan was "One Arab nation with an eternal mission." What many Westerners may not realize is that this movement was not primarily religious. It viewed Islam as an important facet of Arabic culture, but Ba'athism itself was more of a secular ideology. Their aim was to infiltrate the military and other centers of state power. They succeeded in Iraq in 1968, in large part due to the efforts of a young revolutionary named Saddam Hussein.

By 1979 Hussein had consolidated his position within the party and within Iraqi politics and assumed leadership of the nation as its president. He had many years earlier befriended the movement's cofounder Michel Aflaq when both men were living in exile. He used the older man's patronage to his advantage, as he continued to consolidate his grip on power. Saddam skillfully used the Ba'ath party to gain control of the army and insulate himself from possible coup attempts. He later used Ba'ath party apparatus to help create and nurture a personality cult for himself. The party's actual ideology, however, had little to do with the personage of Saddam Hussein or for that matter any particular individual.

The hallmark of Hussein's leadership style was the instilling of fear. He ruled with fierce ruthlessness as head of one of the most totalitarian regimes in the world (Terrill 2012). By 2003, membership in the Ba'ath party in Iraq had reached at least two million. However, membership did not in any way protect any Iraqi's from Hussein's wrath if for even the smallest reason he suspected any person or group of disloyalty. In fact, attaining a degree of stature within the Ba'ath party could be fatal because Hussein would often purge those in the party who seemed to be growing too prominent, as he was concerned that such people or groups of people could eventually pose a political threat to him. Nonetheless, in the view of many outside observers, the Ba'athist era in Iraq was for all practical purposes synonymous with Hussein's reign. In reality, though, it was "leadership" from the barrel of a gun, with violent coercion ruling the land.

American Decision-Making and Policy Justification

American leaders, in deciding to invade Iraq, of course realized that once Saddam Hussein was ousted from power, a replacement government would need to be formed. But before that could happen, the U.S. and its allies installed what came to

be known as the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). It was led by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, who arrived in Baghdad in May of 2003, shortly after the cessation of major combat operations (though much additional fighting would ensue in the years to come). In addition to serving as the head of the CPA, Bremer was also George W. Bush's presidential envoy to Iraq. Bremer's very first major act in his new position was a May 16, 2003, order to "de-Ba'athify" Iraqi society. According to Bremer, he was told by Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith that such an order was absolutely essential to Iraq's rehabilitation (Terrill 2012).

However, how did American policy makers reach this conclusion? What was it based upon? Some thought that it would be similar to "de-Nazification" in Germany after World War Two. Furthermore, such a view does not take into account the very different circumstances of 1945 Germany and 2003 Iraq (Terrill 2012). First and foremost, though, Bremer and others were convinced that removing any remnants of Ba'athist influence from the new (still to be formed) Iraqi military was of utmost importance. To start this process, what was left of the Iraqi military would need to be disbanded. According to Bremer, in his 2006 book, "My Year in Iraq," he actually didn't have much of a choice in the matter because the Iraqi armed forces had, in effect, disbanded themselves. He also contended that the decision to disband the old army and form a new one (rather than recalling the existing military) was a wise move. Bremer states: "Iraq's new professional soldiers are the country's most effective trusted security force. By contrast, the Ba'athist era police force, which we did recall to duty, has proven unreliable and is mistrusted by the very Iraqi people it is supposed to protect" (Weiler 2009).

Indeed, there can be no doubt that the stranglehold that Hussein and the Ba'athist Party had over everyday life was all-encompassing. Members filled jobs at every level of the society and loyalty was not a request but a demand. Party members were bound to inform on their neighbors, coworkers, and one another. It was all part of Hussein's intricate network of control that he used to keep a tight grip on the reins of power (Stover et al. 2005).

There were other reasons for wanting to remove all Ba'ath influence from the "new" Iraq. Stover et al. (2005) assert that one of them has to do with the identification of Ba'athism with the Sunni branch of Islam. Saddam Hussein (though by all accounts not a man of strong religious convictions) was a Sunni, and the Sunni-dominated Ba'ath Party was therefore seen as a threat to the country's religious majority, Shia Muslims. This also influenced Bremer's decision to remove the top four ranks of Ba'ath Party members from their positions and ban them from future employment in state jobs (Stover et al. 2005).

Due to all of the ethnic tensions in Iraq between rival groups, Bremer and others believed that Iraq would be more stable and unified with all remnants of the Ba'ath era completely eradicated. Bremer claimed that most of the Iraqi Army was conscripted and displeased with their standing in the defense forces (Weiler 2009). The thinking was that not disbanding the Iraqi Army would simply cause chaos and make some people give up on the idea of freedom from an oppressive government.

It is indeed true that after decades of Hussein's repressive policies, a large segment of the Iraqi people disfavored the Iraqi military. Bremer stated that he believed, "the

Iraqi population viewed them as a tool of tyranny and dictatorship" (Weiler 2009). The nation's Shia population, of course, still vividly recalled how Hussein had brutally crushed their uprising after Operation Desert Storm a decade earlier. He slaughtered numerous Kurds as well, including with chemical weapons, and therefore, Bremer argued, the Kurdish people would also never accept a newly structured Iraqi Army (citing discussions on the topic with Kurdish representatives in the United States). "Retaining the old army would hinder the CPA's plans to move Iraq toward a future in which all ethnic and sectarian groups shared equally in the economic and political life of the country" (Weiler 2009). In other words, Bremer believed that disbanding the Iraqi Army was the only way to create a society that would no longer suffer from ethnic violence. This would of course later prove to be a very ironic prediction.

Bremer was not, however, alone in these beliefs. The Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld explained in a signed memo that the coalition would "actively oppose Saddam Hussein's old enforcers- the Ba'ath Party, Fedayeen Saddam, the Special Republican Guard, etc.—and will make it clear that the coalition will eliminate the remnants of Saddam's Regime" (Weiler 2009). The memo also provided ideas for what the United States would do to help Iraq for long-term recovery purposes. Moreover, the CPA thought it to be inconceivable and unjust to support, and more importantly, pay over 400,000 soldiers of the old Iraqi Army. They felt that it made no sense to give money to "an oppressive institution under the watchful eyes of the minority when the money was needed to assist impoverished people and crumbling infrastructure" (Weiler 2009).

Disbanding the Iraqi military, however, was, first of all, very risky. It left all security tasks—internal, border, critical infrastructure and facilities, bases, ammunition supply points, etc.—to the coalition (mainly the United States military), leaving a large void in Iraq's security (Weiler 2009).

Before the war, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and CENTCOM debated how many troops they would need for an invasion of Iraq. Military planners and commanders came up with an estimated amount of personnel needed for such a mission in Iraq: about 385,000 troops. The more troops, the less casualties. This was the reigning philosophy before the invasion of Iraq. As things turned out, the actual amount of troops sent to Iraq was far less than what many said was needed. In the end, a little more than 150,000 U.S. troops were deployed into Iraq to conduct Operation Iraqi Freedom (Weiler 2009).

Many of those opposed to the disbanding of the Iraqi Army point to a RAND study which focused on a "Phase IV" kind of mission like this one. They were able to calculate how many troops would be needed for such a mission and they posited an even larger number. The study asserted that the coalition needed 500,000 troops to adequately care for and secure Iraq's population of 25 million. That is 1 soldier per 50 Iraqi citizens (Weiler 2009). Given the limited size of the United States volunteer military, the ongoing war in Afghanistan, and several countries not wanting to participate in the invasion of Iraq, the power vacuum that would result from disbanding the Iraqi Army would seriously jeopardize the postwar environment (Weiler 2009). Warnings of this dangerous possibility went unheeded.

The Strategic Studies Institute in a report entitled *Reconstructing Iraq* written in February 2008 listed several different tasks that could have been assigned to the Iraqi Army upon a study of their capabilities or supplying them with the requisite equipment. Many agree with the study and believe that the Iraqi Army would've been able to accomplish numerous objectives with the help of equipment from the United States and other countries who supported their cause. Retired three-star general Jay Garner, who was appointed as the head of the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) for Iraq thought that it was imperative for the United States to work with the Iraqi Army in order to maintain stability in the country. He argued for incorporating much of the military rank and file into America's occupation force (Weiler 2009). Garner points to the fact that 80 % of the Iraqi population didn't like the American troops, showing why incorporating some aspects of the Iraqi Army into the coalition was so crucial. The Iraqi military was viewed as the "anchor" of the country that had remained intact through British occupation, a brutal Iran–Iraq War, and numerous coups. And while it was true that much of the Army's leadership consisted of high-ranking Ba'athist Party members, "at its grass roots it was not genuinely loyal to Saddam Hussein. The realist understood that the path to economic survival and employment was to be a Ba'athist regardless of tribe or religious sect" (Weiler 2009).

Another argument against the disbandment of the Iraqi Army is that it would leave a staggering number of Iraqi service members unemployed: 400,000. The Combat Studies Institute wrote *Warfare in the Age of Non-State Actors: Implications for the U.S. Army* in 2007. In this piece, they explain how service members who were used to years of fighting and violence would not know what to do or how to live as an ordinary citizen. They recognize the threat of having a huge number of unemployed service members. They note that this could potentially lead some to join different coups or violent groups which would be the complete opposite of unity (Weiler 2009).

When Paul Bremer had first arrived in Baghdad on May 12, 2003, he should have been aware of all of these problems. But it seems as though he failed to grasp the complexity of the situation. Making matters worse, Bremer (who had no military experience) did not thoroughly consult the generals, former generals, or even colonels about the disadvantages of dissolving the Iraqi military (Weiler 2009).

It would have helped to have taken history into account. A parallel could have been drawn from what occurred in Iraq back in the 1920s. Upon the collapse and defeat of the Ottoman Empire post-World War One, the United Kingdom controlled, and was entrenched in Iraq. In 1921, at the Cairo Conference, it was decided in the Treaty of Alliance that Britain would build, train, and equip an Iraqi army to protect Iraq's new monarchy (Weiler 2009). Fast forward some 80 years later, the United States went into Iraq, disbanded the Army, and hatred of the American troops among the Iraqi people followed just like in the 1920s with the Iraqi animosity and resentment toward the British troops. Should this not have been expected? The same type of control was again being put on the Iraqis in 2003. In 1932, and again in June 2004, the Iraqis were given formal independence, but the occupying army did not leave in either case. Paul Bremer, however, apparently didn't take any of these factors into account with his decision and policy-making.

The serious potential for sectarian religious conflict was apparently not sufficiently taken into account either. The Sunnis and the Shias had many disagreements regarding the shape of the "new Iraq." The Shias constitute the majority of Iraq's population, however, and not surprisingly had the most input when it came to the contents of the new Iraqi Constitution (Duhe 2009). The Sunnis had already witnessed the destruction of the Ba'athist party and felt as though democracy within Iraq might well be used to exclude them from the governing process (Duhe 2009). Many Sunnis were concerned with the American attempts to end all Sunni objections, leading them to believe that the United States wasn't giving them a true form of democracy, potentially replacing one form of oppressive government with another (Duhe 2009). Religious-based political parties started to emerge as a result and having a smaller share of the population made politics even more important to the Sunnis (Duhe 2009). Intense competition between several emerging political parties led to violence which in turn incited retaliation. Bigger attacks yielded even greater retaliation (Duhe 2009). The 2006 bombing of the al Askari Mosque resulted in about 165 deaths, leading the average death toll per day to spike from 11 to 34 (Duhe 2009).

Many saw the idea of Democracy in Iraq to be something that would never truly come to fruition. Various factions turned against each other while trying to establish some form of government. Rather than unity, the nation plunged into what some might describe as a state of civil war and sectarian intimidation[1] began to evolve. With the absence of strong authority, the goal of stability became elusive and local security in Iraq all but disappeared. Where they did not voluntarily disappear, local police officers were often removed either by the advancing coalition forces or by antiregime militias (Rathmell 2005).

It became increasingly difficult to maintain peace and general stability within the country with the proliferation of political parties and the upsurge of violence. "Power and authority in the Saddamite system had been too centralized to allow competent subordinates to emerge" (Rathmell 2005). With the breakup of Hussein's regime many disaffected individuals were attracted to violent groups, which of course led to further mayhem throughout the country. The regime had often praised their system for having so many people educated and for providing general access to markets around the world (Rathmell 2005). Of course, all of that changed when the regime was ousted from power and violent militias rushed in to fill the power vacuum. "The reality of Iraq's deteriorated and neglected systems meant that reconstruction of social and physical infrastructures was far more challenging a task than had been expected" (Rathmell 2005). The goal was to completely wipe out the old regime, but instead regime royalists were dispersed rather than destroyed during the invasion. Though disorganized at first, it was not long before disparate groups coalesced around opposition to the occupation (Rathmell 2005).

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[1] *Author's Note:* Sectarian intimidation is explained as an act, usually violent in nature, that is committed against another religious or ethnic sect for the sole purpose of inciting brutal actions against the opposing group. This intentionally perpetuates a nonstop cycle of attacks and retaliation, making peaceful solutions or compromises increasingly difficult to achieve.

Despite these escalating problems inside Iraq, there were many in the United States who agreed with the idea to de-Ba'athification policy. They maintained that the policy was simply not implemented well and that to give up on the policy would only lead to further chaos and instability within Iraq. Bremer stated that it had been, "poorly implemented" and hinted at minor modifications, for example, helping teachers who were often forced to join the Ba'athist Party simply to keep their jobs (Stover et al. 2005).

The mood among most Iraqis, however, was very different. Many former members of the Ba'athist Party were "on the streets with no jobs, no way to sustain their families, and most importantly no reasonable explanation whatsoever for situation they found themselves in" (Stover et al. 2005). The CPA and the IGC tried to fix all of the flaws in their approach in order to create a stable Iraq with jobs and economic opportunity for all. But in the real world of postwar Iraq, things did not work out that way. Charges of favoritism continued when it came to who was allowed to attain certain positions, which only increased the already simmering tensions within Iraqi society (Stover et al. 2005).

It is hard to dispute the many flaws with the process of breaking up the Ba'athist Party. According to Ali Feisal al-Hamad, director of implementation at the Higher National DeBa'athification Commission (HNDC), by November of 2003 the Commission had "reviewed, annulled, and provisionally returned 15,000 of the 35,000 individuals dismissed by the CPA to managerial positions" (Stover et al. 2005). This was a flaw that started to become evident; the fact that by trying to break up the Party, a large number of previous members had taken up positions trying to reassert their control. Now there were former Ba'athist Party members becoming involved with new political parties fighting for their cause; fighting that often meant violence. Many people in Iraq and some in the United States proclaimed that trying to completely rid Iraq of the Ba'athist Party was only leading to the emergence of new radical fighters. On the other side were Iraqi officials such as Prime Minister Ayad Allawi who called for the disbanding of the de-Ba'athification Commission and replacing it with a "more lenient judicial system" (Stover et al. 2005). Even Paul Bremer seemed to agree and took action to disband the HNDC. One day before departing Baghdad, he issued a memorandum paving the way for the disbanding of the HNDC as one of his final acts. Allawi has been in favor of stopping the de-Ba'athist process and has appointed a number of Ba'athists to senior positions—most significantly, in the military and intelligence apparatus (Stover et al. 2005).

That would seem to be a wise move, since trying to rid Iraq of all former Ba'athist members was a difficult, if not impossible task. The hunt spilled into the police department leading to the difficult times that the security forces in Iraq had to face. Simultaneously, 7000 Iraqi police officers were fired for former regime affiliations. Without their pride and with constant humiliation in a culture and nation where honor, *sharaf*, is a measure similar to wealth, a powder keg was bound to ignite (Tiefer 2007). Many different groups and individuals took advantage of the situation of less security and unity in Iraq which only intensified the general feeling of the populace that the United States was simply occupying them and not helping to rebuild the nation. Dejected colonels and generals were ready to lead the countless angry and disaffected men. Arms and ammunition were plentifully available, unguarded, and the motivation was abundant (Tiefer 2007).

The power of outside influence groups increased exponentially. Stories and accusations that fueled a great deal of anger in Iraq abounded. Global Arab groups promoted the myth that the reason the Iraqi Army had been dismantled was to keep the country weak and Israel strong (Hinnebusch 2007). Others asserted that the United States was only interested in Iraq's natural resources (i.e., oil) and had little concern for the security and the survivability of the nation and its people (Hinnebusch 2007). And the truth of the matter is, the coalition in Iraq didn't do very much to counter this kind of ideology.

With all of these factors and tensions in play the possibility of an insurgency had become almost inevitable. It was only a matter of time that more violence would occur. The conditions were created for an insurgency, and without the borders secured, foreign fighters infiltrated to assist (Pfiffner, US Blunders in Iraq: De-Baathification and Disbanding the Army, 2010). Many Iraqis were outraged after the United States decided to disband the Iraqi Army and found it to be simply insulting. The people of Iraq felt as though the United States had been unfair and that disbanding the Iraqi Army would only lead to further violence. Following Bremer's order to disband the army, 5000 protesting soldiers carried banners that read: "Dissolving the Iraqi Army is a humiliation to the dignity of the nation" (Weiler 2009). Criminal gangs and different groups spilled into Iraq leading to the challenge of controlling them with the absence of the Iraqi Army. The disbandment of the Iraqi Army compelled many to join the insurgency to fight the kind of humiliation that they felt at the time. A former Army officer who joined the insurgency stated he joined due to the "shame and humiliation at the dissolution of the army" (Weiler 2009). The number of deaths that the United States faced after the policies to get rid of the Ba'athist Party was stunning. The initial March to April 2003 casualty numbers were from the offensive, but in May 2003 following de-Ba'athification and the dissolution of the Iraqi military, the casualties quadrupled and then increased 750 % by the end of the summer (Weiler 2009).

When considering all of these problems, we must always keep in mind the multiplicity of religious ideologies in Iraq. Many tribes and different groups had their own idea about how to run the country leading to the growing fear that unity in Iraq was near impossible. A WorldOpinion.org poll shows 92 % of Sunnis thought it was acceptable to attack American troops, and overall, 61 % of Iraqis condoned the attacks (Weiler 2009). These are startling numbers. They show how relations between the US and certain groups in Iraq, such as the Sunnis in this case, have only worsened after the disbandment of the Iraqi Army and the Ba'athist party. Instead of a growing number of insurgent fighters against the United States, there could have potentially been cooperation between the United States and Iraq that may have led to security in the country.

Different strategies were suggested to quell the violence and restore order in Iraq. One plan called for an initial 40,000 Iraqi soldiers to be used with more added as required, and as U.S. troops redeployed home (Weiler 2009). Several plans were put in place and were ready to take off. Jay Garner and U.S. Army Colonel Paul Hughes had arranged for a U.S. company named the RONCO Corporation to conduct the process of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and

handle the registering of Iraqi military members for call-up and employment (Weiler 2009). These plans and several other complicated detailed missions started to come to light and were ready to be launched. But, CENTCOM's plan, for example, was never able to be executed. On May 6, 2003 the President and Secretary of Defense elected to dissolve ORHA and fire Jay Garner, replacing them with the CPA headed by Paul Bremer, who stopped the DDR process, the payment of the Iraqi military, and ORHA's plan to establish an interim government (Weiler 2009). Bremer also ordered the cancellation of elections in order to keep out anybody who could have threatened to bring back the old regime that Saddam had led in Iraq. He explained how he believed that people in favor of the old regime would slip through and win the elections leading Iraq to look like it had before that regime had been toppled. This hampered reconstruction efforts because areas of the country where military commanders were attempting to coordinate humanitarian assistance and infrastructure repair remained leaderless (Pfiffner 2008).

One major factor behind the kind of mind-set that Bremer had was the influence of people such as Ahmed Chalabi. He was a Shia and was reinforced by Kurdish exiles who saw disbanding the Iraqi military and a strong de-Ba'athification process as advantageous to their minority group (Weiler 2009). Chalabi was the leader of the Iraqi National Congress (INC). The INC was an Iraqi opposition group desiring the overthrow of Saddam Hussein (Weiler 2009). Many leaders in Washington liked Chalabi's rhetoric, due to his ability to produce Iraqi exiles with information regarding the internal operations of Ba'athist party and Saddam Hussein's regime. He was also very persuasive in leading the United States to believe that Saddam Hussein possessed WMD and that Iraq would treat the United States as "liberators" (Weiler 2009). This gave the leaders in Washington some sense of direction when handling the issues in Iraq. They had a man who provided them with great details that allowed them to start planning. Not everybody agreed with Chalabi however. Many in the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), CIA, and military commanders did not trust nor think he was a credible source, and believed his influence over the media and policy makers was dangerous (Weiler 2009).

Chalabi had made it clear that he supported de-Ba'athification and the dismantlement of the Iraqi Army and it seemed to have a big impact on key decision makers. Others had been advising the United States not to listen to Chalabi's rhetoric, but many in Washington liked what Chalabi had to say. In fact, when Jay Garner refused to give Chalabi a leading role in the reconstruction of Iraq, the Under Secretary of Defense of Policy, Doug Feith, screamed at Garner, accusing him of "ruining everything" and that he should "make Chalabi President of Iraq" (Weiler 2009).

The influence that this man had on some of the top decision makers at the time was quite evident. Zalmay Khalilzad was appointed by the President and Secretary of State to assist Paul Bremer in the formation of a new Iraqi government (Pavel 2012). Khalilzad differed from people such as Bremer and Chalabi. He supported setting up a new Iraqi government, but wanted to be more lenient regarding some of the terms. He favored a more tempered approach to heal the nation, and most importantly, he had nothing to gain (Pavel 2012). With Garner recently terminated, Bremer, the man who replaced him, felt as though Khalilzad had been wrong about

how to handle Iraq. And again, Chalabi was a major figure influencing several of the top decision makers at the time. Chalabi and Bremer, fearing unity of command issues, and a difference in opinion of postwar Iraq, secured Khalilzad's removal from the team at the shock and displeasure of the Secretary of State and National Security Advisor (Pavel 2012).

Concerning to some about the decision to disband the Iraqi Army is the fact that most people who studied the current situation in Iraq were against the idea. Furthermore, Paul Bremer claims that the President, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, NSA, CENTCOM, and CFLCC were all briefed on the decision and accepted CPA General Order Number 2. With certainty, the Secretary of State, NSA, CENTCOM, and CFLCC state that they in fact were not consulted (Pavel 2012). Bremer claims that he told President Bush about the plans to disband the Iraqi Army. Indeed, Bremer received a letter from the president which was full of his support for what he was doing in Iraq. But it seems to be more a generic letter of thanks and support than of approval. As of September 2007, the President (rather inexplicably) stated he did not know why the Iraqi military was disbanded or if he had approved it, but acknowledged it was not part of the original plan (Pavel 2012).

Many people bring up the startling fact that Bremer, Feith, Slocomb, and Wolfowitz (the people who gave the order to disband the Iraqi Army) had no military experience. In fact, not one military commander can be confirmed as consulted about the consequences or recall recommending the order prior to the issuance of the order. Indeed, commanders including General David Petraeus, the 101st Airborne Division Commander, protested the order twice without success (Pavel 2012).

Bremer wanted to completely end the payment of the Iraqi Army, but rethought this decision after significant protesting by Iraqi civilians and the military. On June 25, 2003, he decided to reverse course and begin paying regular Iraqi Army soldiers small stipends, but excluded Colonels and above. In 2003, the United States paid $250 million to former soldiers with hopes of ending the payments in 2004. But the Iraqi Army already distrusted the Americans and thought that they had fooled them into not fighting during the offensive just so they could subdue them after they occupied Iraq (Weiler 2009). Bremer commonly stated that the Iraqi Army had already started to disband, but there is evidence which seems quite contrary to this argument. For example, he ignored a meeting that Colonel Hughes, General McKiernan, and General Abizaid had held where prominent Iraqi leaders told them they could easily bring the army back (Pfiffner 2010).

Nonetheless, Bremer and Chalabi still argued that it would be too difficult to unite the Iraqi Army with so many ethnicities. They feared the army was too ethnically imbalanced and would be an obstacle to uniting the three major sects; Kurds, Shia, and Sunni. Perhaps, but this contention can be called into question with a closer look into the situation in Iraq. It also seemed to overlook the fact that only one-half of the major generals were Ba'athists, an even smaller percentage of the brigadier generals were Ba'athists, and only 8000 of 140,000 NCOs and officers were Ba'athists. Complicating the situation even more, Chalabi was under investigation for fraud and had never won an elected seat in Iraq, yet his ideas continued to exert a great deal of influence (Pfiffner 2010).

Indeed, in the upper echelons of power in the United States, many influential people offered various opinions at the time of the decision-making process that in hindsight (and even at the time) seem misguided at best. For example, the Secretary of Defense wanted a small occupation force that commanders knew was imprudent. The military planners adapted by planning to use the Iraqi Army to make up for the coalition shortfalls, and the CPA wanted to dissolve all things Ba'athist or resembling Saddam even if it was the only mechanism allowing the country to function (Pfiffner 2010). Some of the events that followed the disbanding of the Iraqi Army are startling and can't go without mention: a 60 % unemployment rate, humanitarian and essential services crises, 450,000 disenfranchised citizens with access to unsecured weaponry and ammunition, and international terrorists infiltrating the borders (Weiler 2009).

There is no way of knowing how things may have been different if different decisions had been made. The election process was certain to be turbulent under any circumstances, but with indigenous security forces from a strong Iraqi army, a representative government may have prevailed; instead, chaos ensued (Pavel 2012). The discontent with the decision to disband the Iraqi Army and to eliminate the Ba'athist Party as quickly as possible had, as we have seen, already been widespread even before the decision was made. This has led many to question why top decision makers decided to disband the Iraqi Army in the first place. New questions continue to rise as Iraq tries to move toward peace for the future within the country.

Consequences of the War

The undeniable consequences of the de-Ba'athification policy, and indeed of the Iraq War in general, are clear to see when we can now consider things with the benefit of hindsight. Was it worth it? Was it justifiable? The group Human Rights Watch pronounced, "Only mass slaughter might permit the deliberate taking of life involved in using military force for humanitarian purposes" (Roth 2004). They also point out how dangerous it is to order the invasion of a country without the approval of the UN Security Council because it "damages the international legal order which itself is important to protect rights" (Roth 2004). The watchdog group acknowledges that Hussein was brutal and ordered several killings by saying "we estimate that in the last 25 years of Ba'ath Party rule the Iraqi government murdered or 'disappeared' some quarter of a million Iraqis" (Roth 2004). They do, however, suggest that the killings ordered by Hussein had slowed by the time of the March 2003 invasion. "However, by the time of the March 2003 invasion, Saddam Hussein's killing had ebbed" (Roth 2004).

The Human Rights Watch further stresses the importance of considering whether or not humanitarian intervention is justifiable or not in any given situation. They bring up the 1988 Anfal genocide as one such example where intervention is acceptable. "There were times in the past when killing was so intense that humanitarian intervention would have been justified- for example, during the 1988 Anfal genocide,

in which the Iraqi government slaughtered some 100,000 Kurds" (Roth 2004). Nonetheless, they contend, "'Better late than never' is not a justification for humanitarian intervention, which should be countenanced only to stop mass murder, not to punish its perpetrators, desirable as punishment is in such circumstances" (Roth 2004).

Moreover, it has been argued that the American mission in Iraq was not carried out properly. Hundreds of thousands of troops were needed according to the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General Eric K. Shinseki, but only 150,000 were deployed. Human Rights Watch notes that the troops sent to Iraq were trained how to fight, not how to police, leading to the deaths of innocent civilians which gave them a reason to hate the U.S.-led occupation of their country and thus support the insurgency. "Troops trained in policing-that is, trained to use lethal force at a last resort-would have been better suited to conduct occupation duties humanely" (Roth 2004). The number of troops who had such qualifications was small, and the disbanding of the Iraqi Army and police ordered by Paul Bremer made things even worse, creating chaos in Iraq. The human rights group does acknowledge, however, that some groups did indeed have to be dismantled. "We recognize that security forces or intelligence agencies that had played a lead role in atrocities, such as the Special Republican Guard or the Mukhabarat, should have been disbanded and their members prosecuted" (Roth 2004).

Sheer statistics relate at least part of the story. Iraq lost 1.4 million lives as a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), saw 4.2 million additional people injured, and 4.5 million people become refugees (Swanson 2013). The number of air strikes is staggering. "The 2003 invasion included 29,200 air strikes, followed by another 39,000 over the next 8 years" (Swanson 2013). Furthermore, the amount of birth defects and people with cancer rose greatly, and the sewage system, the water supply, and hospitals started to crumble with no sign of repair. The total expense of the war was an astronomic five *trillion* dollars. To put that in perspective, the United Nations thinks $30 billion a year would end world hunger (Swanson 2013).

The average American citizen, however, was not well informed about these numbers. An Associated Press poll asked in February 2007 how many Iraqis had died during the war since 2003. Respondents, who knew almost exactly that 3000 U.S. troops had died, guessed 9890 (that was the median response) for the number of Iraqi deaths (Swanson 2013). This may be, in part at least, because the public likely does not understand just how much bombing took place in Iraq after the decision to invade. In fact, by April 15, 2003, according to the BBC, there had been 41,000 sorties, 15,500 strike sorties, and 27,000 bombs dropped (Swanson 2013). A large number of the bombs completely missed their targets, leading to countless deaths of innocent civilians. In fact, it has been estimated that 20–25 % of the 19,948 precision weapons used in the "shock and awe" attack of Iraq in 2003 completely missed their targets (Swanson 2013).

Some critics even believe that certain actions of the Bush administration warranted impeachment. Congressman Dennis Kucinich charges, "The U.S. military has engaged in collective punishment of Iraqi civilian populations, including by blocking roads, cutting electricity and water, destroying fuel stations, planting bombs in farm fields, demolishing houses, and plowing down orchards" (Swanson 2013).

Others have questioned just how "humanitarian" the entire mission was in the first place. Most of the money that the United States expended was geared toward U.S. security efforts, with a far smaller amount of money spent on reconstructing Iraq. Indeed, it was less than 10 % of what the U.S. continued to spend year after year adding to the damage, and most of it was never actually put to any useful purpose (Swanson 2013). It is also important to realize that it is very difficult to set up any kind of stable government, especially a fledgling democracy, when a country (Iraq in this case) is full of unrepaired destruction from war damage.

The intellectual damage inflicted on Iraq is truly mind-boggling. Much of the educated Iraqi population fled, dealing a huge blow to the nation's culture. Iraq had the best universities in Western Asia in the early 1990s, and now leads in illiteracy, with the population of teachers in Baghdad reduced by 80 % (Swanson 2013). Matthew Schweitzer talks about the current situation by saying, "In 2005, the UN determined that 84 % of Iraq's education institutions had been looted, burnt or destroyed. By 2008, the Iraqi Ministry of Education recorded 31,598 violent attacks against universities and schools across the country" (Swanson 2013). It is impossible to overstate the importance of such developments. Education helps people turn away from violent organizations that could potentially influence people with their extremist beliefs at a very young age. Many reports have also come out to describe what exactly children had to deal with after the invasion of Iraq. Studies have found that 14–30 % of Iraqi children are suffering from PTSD. However, there are only three child psychiatrists in the whole country (Swanson 2013). Also, many children age 0–14, including a large number of orphans, are working to earn a living. Many face problems with drug use and sexual exploitation, including sexual enslavement and sale abroad (Swanson 2013).

The bottom line is that every strata of society in Iraq has been suffering, some more than others, from the initial invasion right up to the present day. The Kurds, Sunnis, and Shia are locked in violent conflict and many different terrorist organizations, now including ISIS, have risen. The streets are filthy with garbage, and civilian houses continue to disappear. Democracy is something that many find to be almost not even existent in Iraq (Al-Marashi 2013). In fact, one might even think that Iraq has become a dictatorship again. Cockburn writes that, "the rule of Nouri-al-Maliki, Prime Minister since 2006, has become a near dictatorship with highly developed means of repression, such as secret prisons, and pervasive use of torture" (Swanson 2013).

Future Decision-Making

Clearly, the decision to invade Iraq, and the policies that were implemented in its aftermath, were seriously flawed and caused unnecessary, truly unspeakable human suffering on an extremely large scale. But what about the future? What lessons does the American debacle in Iraq teach us? Hopefully, future policy makers will realize that every nation is unique, with its own distinct political situation, history, and

religious/cultural circumstances. When the United States decides to get involved (militarily or otherwise) in the affairs of foreign nations, it needs to do so with far more preparation and analysis than it did in the case of Iraq. Policy makers need to understand that assumptions regarding the ultimate outcomes of our actions are often nothing more than shallow speculation.

For example, completely disbanding all of the apparatus of the Ba'ath Party and the Iraqi Army, on the surface may have seemed to have made a lot of sense. But what about the whole host of factors right beneath the surface? As we have seen, the U.S. seriously miscalculated the situation by failing to grasp the incredible complexity of the serious barriers to peace and unity that a post-Saddam Iraq would inevitably face. Foreign adventures (especially wars) are like a chess match: you always have to be thinking one step ahead of the game because you never know what moves may be coming up in the next round. It could be something that completely derails what you once believed was a foolproof strategy.

Conclusion

Foreign interventions present momentous challenges for American policy planners. First of all, it is nearly impossible to predict exactly what will happen. In the case of Iraq, things worked out very differently than expected. Many in the Bush Administration, including Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, asserted before the invasion that the Americans would be greeted as "liberators" by the Iraqi population. They assumed that since Hussein was so oppressive to so many of the Iraqi people that they would be grateful and welcoming to any outside force that deposed him. Of course, such a perspective was extremely shortsighted and simplistic. While it is true that it took foreign troops to oust the longtime, solidly entrenched dictator, that didn't mean that there would not be resentment by being occupied by "outsiders," especially by Westerners in a predominantly Muslim land.

Moreover, the planners did not seem to take into account the complicated religious and ethnic tensions in Iraqi politics, a country's whose modern-day political borders were established in the wake of colonialism. The Shia, Sunnis, and Kurds all were immediately thrown into a power struggle as soon as Hussein was no longer in place to hold it all together through his role as a strong man. As brutal as he was, these various factions were not engaging in open warfare against one another—for all intents and purpose a civil war—until after the invasion and toppling of the regime.

There was a tremendous power vacuum as well, and when the United States ultimately withdrew its troops, it was going to somehow be filled. Consequently, Iran now plays a key influential role in Iraq's politics. Iran is of course a major foe of the United States, so such an outcome would have been one of the last things that American policy planners would have wanted to result.

A policy such as "de-Ba'athification" clearly failed to acknowledge how things worked, on a very practical level, in Iraq. It paid no attention to the realities of Iraqi

society or how to reconstruct it once the old system was effectively destroyed. Completing military objectives without a workable plan for how to "win the peace" is not going to further America's interests or policy objectives abroad. In fact, it might set back the United States in a number of ways, as it could certainly be argued has happened in the case of Iraq.

In retrospect, when considering military intervention, it is crucial to take into account all of the possible new problems that might arise. Will there be a realistic timetable for withdrawal? Will further bloodshed continue once the initial combat is over? How will other nations, both friends and enemies, respond to America's actions? In the future, if the United States is determined to militarily engage in a foreign conflict, thoroughly knowing and understanding all of the complexities of that nation will be crucial to the success of the mission and the ultimate outcome of the policy.

The bottom line is that engagements on foreign soil inevitably lead to deadly humanitarian consequences that more often than not cannot be justified. Taking the time, effort, and resources to study the long-term effects of the "solutions" that we propose, in light of all of the various circumstances of the foreign nation in question, would be a much better approach. Ideally, it could perhaps even lead to a peaceful solution that bypasses what should be the ultimate last resort of going to war in the first place.

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Chapter 14
Assessment of Policy and Institutional Approaches to International Terrorism in Uganda

John Mary Kanyamurwa

International terrorism tops the twenty-first century security challenges that have raised critical global anxiety because of the increasing scale of its ferocity and threat to world peace, security, and development (Cameron 2014; Sandler et al. 2008). The furtive manner in which it is masterminded has, together with the vicious mode of its occurrence anywhere, anytime, made it the topmost cause of most recent callous and catastrophic consequences, including harmful, excruciating, and usually massive loss of life, property, and businesses of innocent civilians (Campos and Gassebner 2009; Krueger 2007). Various countries have been and continue to be exposed to the challenge of international terrorism at different times and in diverse ways. These countries have sought to combat terrorism using different policy and institutional approaches (Bundeshaus 2014; United Nations 2014; Zalman 2013; Simonsen and Spindlove 2007; Wolfgang and Jan-Michael 2005). Uganda has not been an exception in these efforts. The country is located in the terrorism-volatile zone of Eastern Africa (Kimunguyi 2010; Ploch 2010) and has been exposed to both domestic and international terrorism (Munyua 2013). This chapter addresses the responses to these two aspects of terrorism, but more profoundly assesses the latter.

Uganda's earliest exposure to international terrorism is traced to different insurgent groups that started springing up a year after the Museveni-led National Resistance Army (NRA) toppled the Okello Lutwa military junta in 1986 (Munyua 2013). First, notable among these groups is the Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a transnational terrorist group which for a long time operated in Uganda, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and currently Central Africa Republic where it still maintains terrorist hideouts. This group sprang up in

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1988 as a reinvigoration of Alice Auma Lakwena's Holy Spirit Movement that had been decisively repulsed by the NRA in 1987. The LRA started with a mission to establish a theocratic state in Uganda based on the Biblical Ten Commandments (Munyua 2013; Kisiangani 2011). Its ways of introducing this theocracy were logistically supported by the National Congress Party (NCP) regime in neighboring Sudan (Christian 2014). The execution of its mission involved the most heinous acts of terrorism, including raiding, ambushing, kidnapping, maiming, raping, defiling, planting grenades, bombing, beheading, and setting houses and other property ablaze; some of the well-known features of international terrorism (Wojciech and Lloyd-Jones 2012).

The LRA has been in existence for over two decades now and has caused a lot of ferocious consequences to innocent civilians in northern Uganda, South Sudan, the north eastern part of Democratic Republic of Congo, and Central African Republic (Briggs 2005). Kony's terrorism has so far claimed an estimated 800,000 lives (Munyua 2013). It has destroyed a great deal of property, has led to total collapse of many businesses, and left over five million people internally displaced, especially in northern Uganda, South Sudan, Central African Republic, and eastern DRC (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010; O'Kadameri 2002).

Second, Jamil Mukulu Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), sometimes also called the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) is another transnational terrorist group with operational bases in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This group was established in 1995 in the Rwenzori region, which is located between western Uganda and eastern DRC (Centre for Security Policy 2014, International Crisis Group 2012). The group has been terrorizing innocent civilians with a mission to introduce a Shariah-based theocratic state in Uganda (Kagenda 2014; Candia 2013). Third, at another level, the country also has in the recent past experienced other international terrorist attacks in the form of suicide bombers executed against crowds of innocent civilians as they watched the 2010 World Cup final of July 11, 2010 in Kampala (Munyua 2013). The attacks took place at two separate locations in Kampala, leaving 74 people dead and 70 others critically injured (BBC 2010). The al-Shabaab, a militant terrorist group based in Somalia with ties to al-Qaeda (based and operating in the Middle East), claimed responsibility for the attacks citing the rationale as retaliation against Uganda's involvement in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (Curtis 2013; Sciutto 2010). Of importance to this chapter is the verity that Uganda continues to receive threats from the above international terrorist groups (Museveni 2014; Barrabi 2014; Mueller 2014).

Such international terrorist threats have not been experienced by Uganda alone. Attacks have taken place in other countries, causing loss of life, untold suffering, and destruction of property (Gutfraind 2013). The worst terrorism affected countries in the region apart from Uganda include the neighboring countries of Kenya, Somalia, and Tanzania as well as others such as Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Libya, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia on the African continent.

Outside Africa, the most serious terrorist attacks have been recorded in the United States, United Kingdom, Spain, Turkey, Russia, and France among many

Total fatalities in terror attacks worldwide

Source: Global Terrorism Database   Note:Number killed is unknown in 6.2% of all attacks

Fig.14.1 *Source*: Burke (2013)

others (BBC 2015; Bundeshaus 2014; Cameron 2014; Hanna 2014). Far greater ter-
rorist occurrences have, however, been reported in the Middle East generally, and
specifically, in countries such as Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Israel, Pakistan, Turkey, and the
Palestinian Territories. Generally, the world has annually experienced the wrath of
international terrorism as the worldwide trend presented in Fig. 14.1 indicates.

Understanding the Concept of International Terrorism

The conception of international terrorism is, unfortunately, not uniform in all coun-
tries (Bakker 2014). Acts condemned by the attacked as terrorism are justified by
the attackers as deeds for fighting for freedom or for attaining just goals (Snowden
and Whitsel 2005). As a perpetrator, for instance, Himmler cited in Campos and
Gassebner (2009:1) considered terrorism as the best political weapon of cruelty that
commands respect based on instigating fear in the population. This concept is dif-
ferently defined in the national legislation of different countries (Miller 2013). The
universally acceptable and legally binding definition is still elusive. In fact, a scru-
tiny of the available definitions reveals that the meaning of international terrorism
depends on who defines it, the context under which it is defined, and the rationale
and political intention behind it (Bakker 2014). Notwithstanding this state of affairs,
current evidence indicates that international terrorism can ordinarily be best under-
stood from a moral perspective of terrorism as its mother concept.

Thus, from the moral perspective, terrorism is described as premeditated vio-
lence that occurs indiscriminately in opposition to a government, and not against
soldiers and those who govern but against noncombatants or innocent civilians and

their property (United States Institute of Peace n.d.). The violence is conceived to cause severe panic among citizens and to use this panic as a means of attracting and maximizing media attention first to the committed cruel deeds, then to the group committing the deeds and ultimately, to the goal for which the deeds are executed (Mackey 2009; Krueger). The goal may be political, ideological, religious or economic, or a combination of all these perspectives (Van Uma 2009). Terrorism is distinguished from a civil war and guerrilla warfare in that instead of targeting military bases, personnel, or combatants as the latter two do to attain their ends, it targets noncombatants or innocent civilians and their property to achieve the intended goals (Sambanis 2008). In Uganda, terrorism is defined as "any act of violence or threat of violence carried out for purposes of influencing government or intimidating the public and for a political, religious, social and economic aim, indiscriminately without due regard for the safety of others or property" (Anti-Terrorism 2002).

Terrorism can be domestic or international (Kisiangani and Nafziger 2007; Sageman 2004). It is referred to as domestic terrorism when it occurs in a country without any known external links or support (Yager 2010; Pape 2003). It becomes international terrorism when it is masterminded and executed in a country or countries by perpetrators in another country (Pastor 2009; Anti-Terrorism 2002, 2007; Krueger 2007). It is transnational terrorism when its perpetrators have many foreign bases from which they operate globally but clandestinely (Gutfraind 2013). International terrorism is executed in the form of cruel deeds and by covert state or nonstate actors, called terrorists (Pastor 2009; Krueger 2007). The terrorist activities cause very grave consequences; including harmful, excruciating, and usually massive loss of life, property, and businesses of innocent civilians (Krueger 2007; Martin 2003). Consequently, international terrorism is considered the topmost critical challenge to world peace, security, and development (Bush 2010). Not only does it pose a serious threat to national security but it is also a danger to the fundamental democratic values of society (European Union Counter-radicalization 2008). Effective containment of terrorism has therefore taken center stage in the global political discourse of the twenty-first century (Casale 2008).

Different approaches have been and continue to be developed and implemented to respond to diverse forms of terror. Some of these approaches are policy and administrative in nature (British Government 2009; Jenkins 2004). Policy approaches refer to ways of fighting international terrorism using action plans already laid down either legally, politically, or militarily (Eijkman and Schuurman 2011; Oldrich 2011; Council of the European Union 2006). Administrative approaches involve executive actions taken to combat international terrorism either by implementing enacted antiterrorism instruments or by taking economic, intelligence, or security-based managerial actions deemed swiftly appropriate to preempt imminent terrorism threats or to deal pertinently with perpetrators of terrorism, even when the actions do not follow any antiterrorism policy (British 2011; Choudhury and Fenwick 2011; Coolsaet 2010).

Developing and implementing policy and institutional approaches received more critical attention after suicide airliner hijackers committed horrendous terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, and suicide bombings in

Madrid, Istanbul, Moscow, and London (Jenkins 2004). The reason for this approach is in the very nature of terrorism which is essentially clandestine and which attacks anywhere without any prediction or warning. Thus, the policy and institutional approaches received even much more attention in countries that had been earmarked as targets by the masterminds of terrorism (Axelrod and Borzutzky 2006; White 2006). This chapter assesses the progress that Uganda has made in this respect. The assessment is rooted in the theoretical framework for international terrorism as presented in the next section.

Theoretical Framework for International Terrorism Response in Uganda

Responding to the challenge of international terrorism in a manner that can effectively combat it requires a thorough understanding of the theories that explain why and how it takes place. This understanding is vital because it provides the knowledge needed to develop and implement policy, administrative, or any other approaches needed to strategically contain international terrorism from its manifestations (O'Kane 2005). It should be noted right from the outset that several theories have been developed to explain why and how terrorism occurs. Those developed to explain the 'why' dimension include the political theories of anarchism and fascism, the philosophical theory of religion, rational choice theory, globalization theory, sociological theory, psychological theory, biological theory, and criminological theory, among others (O'Connor 2014; Nassar 2004). The theories that explain the 'how' dimension include the instrumental theory and the organizational process theory (Ruby 2002; Crenshaw 2001). A review of these theories reveals that those that provide a convincing rationale for the nature of international terrorism facing Uganda include the philosophical theory of religion, rational choice theory, instrumental theory, and organizational process theory of terrorism. These are therefore the theories which underpin the theoretical framework of this chapter.

First, the philosophical theory of religion was developed from the disciplines of theology, religious studies, and philosophy (Stitt 2003; Kraemer 2004). This theory advances a view that terrorism occurs because of a strong belief that God demands and approves of violence against infidels or nonbelievers in Islam (Feldman and Ruffle 2008). Infidels are all those people who do not believe in the God-demanded and approved cause; so destroying them with whatever means (including self-sacrifice means) does not offend but pleases God, who indeed, will abundantly reward such sacrifice (O'Connor 2014). The theory regards the cause for such destruction as sacred theocracy and that this cause combines a strong sense of vengeance for the past and hope for eternal opulent life after death (O'Connor 2014). Followers are recruited by convincing and indoctrinating them about some duty demanded by God and therefore fundamental to their faith, but was either abused, neglected, suppressed by infidels in the past, or has been ignored. Yet executing this 'holy duty' using any possible means is critical to obeying God and attaining His

promised eternal life (Stitt 2003). Recruits are indoctrinated to believe that what moralists (infidels) perceive as terrorism is what God requires of them.

The indoctrination is based on illustrations of violence erroneously presented as commanded by God but cited directly from the holy books (Bible or Koran). The main aim of the instruction is to replace recruits' fear of death with readiness for destruction or self-destruction based on apocalyptic thinking or eschatology (Ruggiero 2005). The recruits are further indoctrinated by manipulating theodicy to make what is morally evil appear to them as good or as part of God's plan (Ruggiero 2005). Terrorism from such indoctrination is therefore not only about extremism, fanaticism, or cultism (Ruggiero 2005). It is also about a militant and fundamentalist interpretation and application of the basic tenets of a faith (O'Connor 2014). In fact, the aims of the LRA in Uganda suggest that its formation was based on this very interpretation. The argument was and still is that God wants Uganda to be governed based on the Biblical Ten Commandments, but this government is suppressed by infidels in Uganda, and it was the duty of the LRA to use any means to liberate the country from the infidels (Green 2008; O'Kadameri 2002). Even the ADF/NALU uses the same rationale to make its case for introducing Shariah-based rule in Uganda.

Second, the rational choice theory postulates that terrorist groups and leaders are rational agents capable of strategic decision-making (Van Uma 2009). At a minor level, this theory maintains that the decisions are made to rationally maximize self-interest, but in a broad sense, the decisions are made to logically benefit not only an individual but also a group to which the individual is loyal (Hindmoor 2006). The latter case is what works for terrorist organizations. It is attained by indoctrinating recruits and members following the rationale of the organizational process theory. This theory is based on the premise that the fundamental purpose of any political organization is to maintain itself (Crenshaw 2001). A terrorist organization maintains itself by indoctrinating recruits and members to align their ambitions with its own goals and objectives (Victoroff 2005). The indoctrination is carried out by ideology based on provision and promises of tangible and intangible incentives that match with or even surpass recruits' and members' personal ambitions, and which, therefore, satisfy and keep them loyal to the organization and committed to the pursuit of its public ends (Victoroff 2005).

The public ends of a terrorist organization express themselves in terror deeds which cause maximum damage and pain to innocent humanity. Therefore, gaining members' commitment to them is tantamount to making the members carry out terrorism as a means of satisfying their personal ambitions as well as the goals of the organization. Incentives for loyalty and commitment are provided while promising pardon for repentance and severe punishment for defection to infidels, including eternal death as opposed to paradise (Snowden and Whitsel 2005). In general, following the rationale of the rational organizational process theory enables a terrorist group to maintain itself through recruiting and indoctrinating members to become rationally convinced that engaging in terrorist acts benefits them as individuals and their group equally. It ensures that the rational decisions made by all the individual members of a terrorist group become the aggregate rational decision of the group

(Enders and Su 2007). This theory is important to understand how to combat international terrorism from the perspective of changing the mind-sets of those who take rational terrorist decisions after being thoroughly indoctrinated with incentives that match or exceed personal ambitions and severe punishment for defection.

According to Lake (2002), the decisions of terrorist groups are expressions of instrumental rationality. Terrorists act strategically after calculating the value to gain from an action, the costs of the attempt and of its failure, the consequences of inaction, or the probability of success (Crenshaw 2001). This suggests that terrorist decisions are made following the instrumental theory of terrorism. Indeed, this theory postulates that terrorism is intentional and is not executed for the sake of it but as a means to a political end (Crenshaw 2001). The theory views government and terrorists as adversaries of each other, and the actions of one are intended to influence the political behavior of the other (Van Uma 2009). It takes terrorism as a form of violent coercion, an act of bargaining based on the power to hurt and intimidate as a substitute for the use of military force. The intention of terrorism is to produce a desired change in government's political position but not to destroy its military potential (Özdamar 2008). This intention is clandestinely pursued rationally and strategically (Rapoport 2004). In other words, the political or propaganda value to gain from a terrorist deed to commit is regarded as much greater than the cost, the status quo is intolerable or is full of desperation, the probability of success is high, the anticipated rewards are irresistible, even at the cost of life, and the opportunity to act is available (Garrison 2004).

The deed and its intention are masterminded with so much precision and concealment that both are accomplished in the same astonishing, sometimes simultaneous attacks on the target(s). Terrorists therefore realize their intention using surprise, destructive attacks that compensate for a weakness in military capacity. Indeed, with such attacks, it takes only one well-equipped and precise terrorist to cause widespread surprise and severe destruction of civilian life and property under the nose of an unprepared military giant. Surprise comes about as a result of the defender's lack of preparation, ignoring intelligence warnings of an impending attack, complacency, or lack of capacity to deal with the level of sophistication of attackers, or even as a result of the attackers hitting the target quickly and cheaply (Crenshaw 2001).

The rationale of the instrumental theory of terrorism is important in the fight against international terrorism. It reveals that terrorism does not occur without a political end to achieve. This implies that it can be fought by addressing the ends for which it is executed. The rationale also reveals that terrorists succeed by exploiting weaknesses in government preparation against them. This implies that increasing readiness and alertness to deal with terrorists minimizes the likelihood of their attacks. Terrorists act out of desperation. This suggests that addressing what causes desperation can help reduce terrorism. Terrorists translate their ideological goals into action when the opportunity presents itself. Avoiding creating these opportunities can therefore help prevent terrorism.

Generally, the theories whose rationale can help understand the nature of international terrorism facing Uganda and how it can be contained include the philo-

sophical theory of religion, rational choice, instrumental theory, and organizational theories. These theories therefore summarize the diverse types of terrorism that include ethno-nationalist, religious, ideology oriented, state-sponsored terrorism, and other types inspired to promote diverse causes. These are therefore the theories used in the theoretical framework to guide the arguments in this chapter.

Recent Developments in Operations of Terrorist Networks in East Africa and the Middle East

The death of al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, through a U.S. Navy's SEAL (Sea, Air, Land) raid on his base in Abbottabad, Pakistan, in May 2011 raised global hope that international terrorism would soon be contained (CNN 2014). This hope has however been dashed by the recent escalation in terrorism, particularly in the Middle East and East African region. The Council on Foreign Relations (2013) indicates that after the U.S. had declared its resolve to attack any government sponsoring terrorism, perpetrators changed tactics by shifting from dependency on state sponsorship to being nonstate actors operating as individuals and groups but mainly as dangerous terrorist networks. They now started taking more advantage of the porous borders and interconnected international finance, communications, and transport systems to reach their strategic targets all over the globe. Some of the terrorist networks began focusing more on influencing local or national political dynamics while others have remained seeking to promote desired global changes (Council on Foreign Relations 2013).

In particular, after beheading two U.S. journalists, James Foley and Steven Sotloff, the ISIS attracted global media hype as a brutal terrorist organization that had emerged in 2014 with a mission to establish a Shariah-ruled state between Syria and Iraq (Banco 2014). The ISIS is an opposing, autonomous and independent terrorist group whose operations are not in any way linked to the al-Qaeda group based in Iraq. Motivated by a fundamentalist Salafi ideology, the main al-Qaeda group, which is based in the Arabian Peninsula, continued to pursue a worldwide agenda. It focuses on fighting Western influence with a mission to replace this influence with a global theocracy based on Shariah law implemented by fundamentalist Islamic caliphate (Council on Foreign Relations 2013). With its base in the borderlands between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the al-Qaeda has spread its network in many countries in the Middle East, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, and others (Metzger 2014). It has also established branches and sought affiliates in other regions, including North Africa, Yemen, Southeast Asia, and East Africa (CNN 2012). Notable among the East African terrorist groups that have ties with the al-Qaeda is the al-Shabaab (Agbiboa 2014; Sciutto 2010).

The al-Shabaab had effectively occupied Somalia since the 1990s but without being recognized as a government (Chalk 2007). When the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) started attacking the al-Shabaab in 2007 to dislodge them

from Somalia and make the hitherto stateless country orderly and peaceful with a recognized government, the al-Shabaab began issuing threats to attack countries whose forces were involved in AMISOM (Sciutto 2010). Instead of taking offensive against AMISOM, the al-Shabaab resorted to typical terrorist tactics involving implementing their threats organizing suicide bombers and attacking strategic security positions. Driven out of its major urban bases, the al-Shabaab has now adopted a strategy involving asymmetric attacks intended to discredit and destabilize the nascent Federal Government of Somalia. They attack civilians in the Somali areas under AMISOM control (Botha n.d.). Their continued defeat and loss of territory in Somalia forced them to scale up and extend their terrorism to neighboring countries.

According to the Bureau of Counterterrorism (2013), the al-Shabaab launched an attack on Kenya in 2013 to retaliate the involvement of Kenyan armed forces in Somalia. Kenya's forces had in 2012 repulsed the al-Shabaab from the port city of Kismayo, which was this terrorist group's major source of revenue. The retaliation was made against the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, leaving at least 65 innocent civilians dead (Agbiboa 2014). The al-Shabaab had earlier in 2010 made attacks on Uganda to retaliate her pioneer involvement in AMISOM. The attack claimed 74 lives and left 70 people seriously injured (BBC 2010). Following the attacks, al-Shabaab began to be viewed as a threat not only to Somalia but to the entire East African region (Schwartz 2012).

With regard to the LRA, recent developments indicate that since its dislodgement from its bases in northern Uganda and South Sudan in 2006 through a Ugandan military offensive code-named Operation Iron Fist (Lacey 2002), it continued terrorizing civilians in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Kisiangani 2011). Even when LRA was attacked in 2008 in an offensive coded named Operation Lightening Thunder (consisting of a force jointly formed by Ugandan, Rwandan, and Congolese troops), its top leadership fled to Central African Republic (CAR) from it is still masterminding surprise terrorist attacks on innocent civilians up to date (Kisiangani 2011). The attacks involve retaliatory mass rapes, kidnappings as a means of recruitment (Christian 2014). By 2013, civilians totaling 325,931 had been rendered internally displaced (OCHA 2013). The data available at the U.S. Department indicate that LRA has since 2008 killed more than 2400 people and abducted more than 3400. The UN estimates indicate that over 380,000 people are displaced across CAR, the DRC, and South Sudan as a result of LRA terrorism (Aljazeera 2014a; Arieff and Ploch 2014).

As far as the ADF/NALU is concerned, recent developments indicate that owing to the significant losses this group suffered as a result of UPDF offensive in 2014 and the capture of Jamilu Mukulu in June 2015, it has been left dormant (McGregor 2014, Observer 2015). In recent years, the once poorly armed terrorists had relaunched their operations after replacing machetes and knives, on which they had relied previously, with machine guns, mortars, and rockets, which they had obtained from thousands of M23 rebels who were surrendering after being defeated by Tanzania which operated under UN auspices in the Nord-Kivu region (McGregor 2014).

According to Aljazeera (2014b), the ADF had established a network currently operating in around 15 camps in different locations across the east of Beni and west of Oicha. The network is highly organized with different bases for training, logistics, and command and control. It also has antiaircraft weapons (Aljazeera 2014b). It is currently spreading out into the nearby forests and stateless areas and has strong foreign connections and backing as well as alliances with local militias and a significant section of the local community. The resumption of terrorist activities by newly armed ADF-NALU terrorists constitutes terrorist activities. In fact, the several tribal gunmen, who were armed with machetes and spears and who attacked Kasese, Ntoroko, and Bundibugyo districts in July 2014, and killed civilians, military officers and policemen, were linked to the renewed operations of the ADF/NALU. The attack led to a loss of 93 people and property worth millions of shillings.

In general, recent developments in terrorist operations in East Africa and Middle East reveal that international terrorism has become more sophisticated, vicious, and therefore a more critical threat in these two regions. Terrorist groups have established networks by which they now are operating, killing thousands of civilians. In fact, the available statistics indicate that with other groups that operate outside the Al-Qaeda network and hotspots, international terrorists launched more than 8500 attacks in 2012, thereby killing nearly 15,500 civilians in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East (Burke 2013). The terrorist operations masterminded in the same year resulted into a 69 % rise in attacks and an 89 % jump in fatalities that had been recorded in 2011. Six of the seven most dangerous terrorist groups that claimed responsibility for the attacks have ties with Al-Qaeda. Evidently, diffusion of the pernicious threat of terrorism cannot be ignored and Uganda is not immune from it at all.

Institutional and Procedural Responses to International Terrorism

Procedural strategies are ways of dealing with international terrorism systematically following agreed guidelines, action plans, and methods (European Union Counter-radicalization 2008). These strategies include preventing, protecting, pursuing, and responding to terrorism (Public Safety 2011). According to HM Government (2012), prevention focuses on stopping people from turning to terrorism. The strategy addresses all forms of terrorism not only by actively stopping radicalization through challenging any ideology that supports terrorism but also addressing extremism or intolerance related to terrorism while encouraging community integration through community policing (OSCE 2014). Institutional and procedural responses also focus on protecting vulnerable individuals (such as giving startup capital or creating employment for the unemployed, monitoring internal activities of shadowy religious groups/fellowships), and dealing with factors which can lead

to radicalization and recruitment as well as supporting sectors and institutions (such as churches, mosques, and training institutions or schools) where there is a risk of radicalization (Saunders 2013; Llussá and Tavares 2008). It also involves using psychological disengagement as a method of providing rehabilitative or restorative assistance to those turning away from terrorism (Jones 2014), and setting laws against terrorism and communicating them to the public as a way of raising fear of the consequences should any person be caught joining terrorism (Blomberg and Rosendorff 2006).

Protection involves putting in place infrastructure, public awareness, and intense internal and international cooperation and intelligence services that reduce vulnerability to terrorist attacks (OSCE 2014). The infrastructure includes detectors and surveillance equipment such as street cameras, CCTVs, and others (Jones 2014). The protection strategy further involves maintaining highly sophisticated and strict immigration checks at the airports and border entry posts, minimizing porous borders, encouraging appropriate mail-handling procedures, recruiting staff or contractors after checking their identities so as to ease follow up, and protection of information by taking proper IT security precautions (Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2007). It further involves legislating laws that protect citizens against terrorism and changing the architecture of city and town suburbs to make them not easy targets for terrorists (Chong 2014).

Pursuit focuses on detecting and investigating terrorists and disrupting their support networks. This strategy involves intelligence and analysis operations focusing on detecting and identifying and dealing with terrorists, terrorist organizations and their supporters, their capabilities, and the nature of their plans (Public Safety 2011). It involves extensive collaboration and information sharing with domestic and international partners. It further involves countering terrorist financing by freeing their bank accounts or even closing the banks handling financial transactions linked to terrorists; hindering access to critical military infrastructure and explosives and to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear materials; and criminal procession through arresting and interrogating suspected terrorists, and sentencing those found guilty of the offense (OSCE 2014). The strategy further involves denying terrorists the means and opportunities to pursue terrorist activities. This involves mitigating vulnerabilities and aggressively intervening in terrorist planning, including prosecuting individuals involved in terrorist-related criminal activities, and making a country's national interests a more difficult to target by terrorists (Public Safety 2011).

Response deals with managing and minimizing the consequences of a terrorist attack (UK Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2012). This strategy involves developing local and national emergency response capacities, that is, capabilities that can effectively respond to terrorist activities proportionately, rapidly, and in an organized manner and to mitigate their effects so as to return to ordinary life as soon as possible (Public Safety 2011; Bennett 2007). Managing the effects involves ensuring the country is prepared for the consequences of a terrorist attack, that is, that it can carry out reconstruction of destroyed property, provide psychological and restor-

ative assistance to survivors, and support the bereaved with funeral and burial expenses (UK Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2012).

In summary, a critical look at the procedural strategies for countering international terrorism suggests that each is effective only when it is implemented not in isolation but using an interdisciplinary, all-inclusive, and multifarious approach. This implies that procedural strategies need to be implemented institutionally. They therefore need institutional strategies as a means of implementing them. Accordingly, institutional strategies are the administrative ways used to combat terrorism using systems or structures that support the execution of procedural strategies in a coordinated and reinforcing manner (Orttung and Makarychev 2006). These systems include the military, central and local government, banking, judiciary, legislature, police, education, health, religious, counseling, immigration, prison, media, nongovernmental, and other national and international structures (Murthy 2013). In fact, when each of these systems is not effectively utilized in the coordinated fight against international terrorism, no procedural strategy can achieve the desired end in an effective manner.

As illustrations, preventive strategies are best handled by educational and religious institutions since these are systems that can effectively discourage any ideology that supports terrorism (Berman and Laitin 2008). Pursuit strategies cannot be effectively implemented without the participation of the banking system in detecting and fighting money laundering for financing terrorism (Tsang 2009). Protection strategies can hardly be effective without the participation of international and national intelligence institutions as well as the media and community policing systems that can provide information needed to preempt terrorist attacks (Barrabi 2014). International and national military institutions are needed to dislodge the identified terrorists from their bases and/or to annihilate them (United States Department of State 2014). The police institution also provides fire brigade services and facilitates prosecution of suspected terrorism while the judicial, prison, and counseling institutions pass judgment, and keep and rehabilitate imprisoned terrorists, respectively (Abi-Saab 2002). The international Red Cross and health systems are needed to take care of responses such as emergency handling, provision of treatment needed by causalities of terrorism, and to stop drug abuse (United Nations 2012). The legislature enacts the laws and policies needed to guide what all other institutions are support to do in order to implement procedural counterterrorism strategies (Martínez 2008). Overall, institutional and procedural strategies have to work together in order to combat international terrorism in an effective manner.

All the institutions mentioned earlier exist in Uganda. However, while some of them are avidly utilized to counter international terrorism, others are yet to be effectively employed. Uganda's counterterrorism strategy relies largely on the military institution reinforced by international forces and on the police, judicial, and legislative system to a large extent (Kimunguyi 2010; Munyua 2013; Uganda Police 2013). A number of nongovernmental organizations are also involved in psychological disengagement of those captured or escaping from the control of terrorist groups (Young 2007).

In particular, the international military system is made up of IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) that fights the al-Shabaab terrorists using AMISOM (Schwartz 2012) and the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), a partnership formed in 2009 by Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda to fight terrorism from the region (United States Department of State 2014). According to Sarkar (2014), PREACT is U.S. funded and is implemented as a multiyear, multifaceted program designed to build counterterrorism capacity and cooperation of military, law enforcement, and civilian actors across East Africa. It uses law enforcement, military, and development resources to achieve its strategic objectives, including (1) reducing the operational capacity of terrorist networks, (2) developing a rule of law framework for countering terrorism in partner nations, (3) enhancing border security, (4) countering the financing of terrorism, and (5) reducing the appeal of radicalization and recruitment to violent extremism.

Another counterterrorism institutional strategy in which Uganda is participating at the international level involves a Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) funded by the U.S. from its base in Djibouti. The CJTF-HOA is a component of the wider U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), established in 2008. Other countries that participate in CJTF-HOA operations encompass Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Yemen, and the Seychelles and Tanzania (Ibrahim 2010). CJTF-HOA participates in fighting terrorism by providing logistical organization of transport and support to Ugandan troops in the AU peacekeeping force deployed in Mogadishu after the collapse of the fundamentalist Islamic Courts Union (Ibrahim 2010). Working with other superpowers such as the United Kingdom, CJTF-HOA is also providing counterterrorism training in Uganda among other countries, including Yemen, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya.

It is important to note that although other states have joined AMISOM, Uganda remains the leading contributor, providing over 6000 troops and police officers, mostly in Sector I around Mogadishu, Sector III around Baidoa, and in the Multinational Force Headquarters also in Mogadishu (Jowell 2014). Four consecutive AMISOM force commanders were Ugandan before the current commander was appointed from Burundi. In addition, around 2000 Ugandan soldiers, along with troops from CAR, DRC, and South Sudan, are part of a UN-AU Regional Task Force (RTF) targeting the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) (Jowell 2014). This is evidence for the significance of regional collaborative efforts to fight international terrorism since it knows no borders.

Internally, Uganda strengthened institutional counterterrorism strategy by forming the Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force (JATT) in 1999 to coordinate the Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence (CMI), Criminal Investigations Department (CID), Special Branch (SB), External Security Organisation (ESO), and Internal Security Organisation (ISO) in countering terrorism by collecting intelligence information that could lead to successful prosecution of terrorists (Schwartz 2012). The JATT was formed following the bomb attacks in Kampala City and Jinja Municipality largely blamed on the ADF in 1999. The media is also used to raise public awareness of how to report suspected terrorists and terror objects, and to use equipment

that can detect terrorism gadgets (Kaihura 2014). The institutions that are yet to be effectively linked to the fight against international terrorism in Uganda are mainly educational institutions and religious organizations (Athumani 2014).

Policy Responses to Terrorism in Uganda: Security and Legal Critique

Policy responses to terrorism in Uganda have largely been legislative and military in nature. They began with the enactment of the Amnesty Act (2000). The aim of this Act was to serve as a policy tool for ending terrorism by encouraging terrorists to voluntarily lay down arms without facing prosecution for crimes committed during their rebellion against the government. A scrutiny of this Act reveals that its functions include providing amnesty to rebels who renounce rebellion and give up their arms; facilitating an institutionalized resettlement and repatriation process; and providing reintegration support, including skills training for ex-combatants, and promoting reconciliation. The Act also establishes the Amnesty Commission as its implementer through issuing certificates of amnesty (Agger 2012).

Despite the benevolent terms of the Amnesty Act of 2000, some hardcore LRA and ADF terrorists stack to their gums. This was aggravated by the fact that Uganda started receiving terrorist threats after the 1998 simultaneous bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. This scenario culminated into efforts to develop a policy for countering terrorism (Munyua 2013). Consequently, the Anti-Terrorism Act, No.14/2002 was enacted. Part III of this Act makes terrorism and anything that promotes it capital offenses punishable by death. The specific punishable terrorist deeds include murder, kidnapping, maiming, or attack, whether actual, attempted, or threatened, on a person or groups of persons, in public or private institutions, official premises, private accommodation, or means of transport or diplomatic agents or other internationally protected persons. Other specified deeds include intentional and unlawful manufacture, delivery, placement, discharge, or detonation of an explosive or other lethal device, whether attempted or actual, in, into or against a place of public use, a State or Government facility, a public transportation system or an infrastructure facility, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or extensive destruction likely to or actually resulting in major economic loss.

Other terrorist offences specified by the Act included unlawful seizure of an aircraft or public transport or the hijacking of passengers or group of persons for ransom; serious interference with or disruption of an electronic system; and unlawful importation, sale, making, manufacture, or distribution of any firearms, explosive, ammunition, or bomb. Others are intentional development or production or use of, or complicity in the development or production or use of a biological weapon; and unlawful possession of explosives, ammunition, bomb, or any materials for making of any of the foregoing. In addition, the Anti-Terrorism Act 2002 states that any

person who aids or abets or finances or harbors, or renders support to any person, knowing or having reason to believe that the support will he applied or used for or in connection with the preparation or commission or instigation of acts of terrorism, commits an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to suffer death. The punishment is also prescribed for any person convicted in establishing, running, or supporting any institution for promoting terrorism; publishing and disseminating news or materials that promote terrorism; or training or mobilizing any group of persons or recruiting persons for carrying out terrorism or mobilizing funds for the purpose of terrorism. It should be noted that public awareness of the Anti-Terrorism Act (2002) is very low (Bajjwa 2014). Following this Act, the Anti-Money Laundering Act (2013) was enacted to strengthen the Financial Institutions Act (FIA) in fighting money laundering and financing of terrorism.

There are other important measures that involved ratification of not only eleven of the UN conventions against terrorism but also the 1999 Algiers Convention of OAU on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and the IGAD Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition Conventions and Interpol (Schwartz 2012). Uganda is also an active party to the U.S. counterterrorism policy that aims to go beyond law enforcement, intelligence, and military efforts that thwart terrorists to seeking shape and constrain the environments where terrorists operate (Ploch 2010). It is through being an active party to this policy that Uganda managed to have LRA rebels declared as international terrorists that should be hunted down and killed, or captured, indicted and tried before the International Criminal Court (ICC). These policy initiatives have produced some successes notwithstanding the fact that they are still facing challenges.

Challenges in Policy and Institutional Approaches to Terrorism

While it is a fact that Uganda has made appreciable progress in the fight against terrorism in the region between Central African Republic and Somalia, but especially in her own territory, the progress has been achieved while facing challenges (Ibrahim 2010). According to the Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (2012), the main policy challenge is the lack of an acceptable definition of terrorism in the IGAD subregion. Each country defines terrorism its own way, with some definitions criminalizing what others do not. The same source indicates that this challenge is complicated by language barriers, since some IGAD countries are officially English speaking while others are Arabic speaking and others are French-speaking countries. It is further aggravated by the fact that the definitions of terrorism of some IGAD countries focus on local groups that other states do not see as terrorist groups. This is also an institutional challenge because some countries even militarily support some groups that other countries consider terrorist. Uganda has, for instance, constantly accused Sudan of supporting LRA.

According to Schwartz (2012), another challenge constitutes lack of policy that adequately covers Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) needed by Uganda to deal with captured terrorists legally. The lack of MLA poses a challenge in the working relationship between the Attorney General as the central authority and the Director of Public Prosecutions when it comes to extradition and handling of requests for assistance and evidence submitted by foreign actors and the ability to submit Uganda's own requests to those actors. This challenge is aggravated by the weak criminal justice capacity that exists in every country in the respect of fighting terrorism. It is particularly acute in Somalia, the major source of terrorism threats, South Sudan, the youngest country, and others, especially in matters pertaining to interstate judicial coordination. According to Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (2012), the absence of this policy implies that IGAD countries cannot rely on each other's judicial systems to provide efficient, timely, and reliable evidence or extraditions. They therefore continue resorting to nonlegal methods of dealing with international terrorism, a tendency that has resulted into some countries conflicting with others.

Institutionally, there is still a weak interstate integration of policing cooperation into broader legal cooperation frameworks. States' participation in Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO) and Interpol to share police intelligence has not led to a more structured process of cross-border cooperation on the development of evidence (MLA) and the arrest of fugitives extradition (Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation 2012).

As far as fighting particularly the al-Shabaab terrorism is concerned, the main challenge is associated with the IGAD Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism (ICPAT). According to Kimunguyi (2010), the geopolitical and internal ethnic and religious conditions of Somalia are hindering the development of a successful security and counterterrorism agenda in the country. Islamic extremism that grew in Somalia since 1989 when the al-Shabaab were in effective occupation of the territory is another challenge preventing a proportion of the local population from welcoming liberation led by Westerner countries (Rosand et al. 2007). Geopolitically, the absence of Eritrea from the IGAD forum has a negative impact on the overall effectiveness of ICPAT. Uganda's participation in fighting al-Shabaab is also challenged by faint political will among most of the IGAD member states. Only few members are cooperating toward effective implementation of the pursued military counterterrorism strategy (Kimunguyi 2010), yet the full cooperation of all IGAD member states is crucial to winning the struggle against terrorism and to ensuring that other forms of transnational crime do not similarly jeopardize the IGAD subregion's growth, prosperity, and stability (Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation 2012).

There is still no comprehensive policy regarding how to deal with the highly porous borders of Somalia as far as fighting terrorism is concerned. Matters are complicated by Kenya's continued complacency to institutionally patrol and deal with its porous border with Somalia (Global Counterterrorism Cooperation 2012). This has made it possible for the al-Shabaab to launch successful attacks on Kenya and to continue posing a serious threat to the entire East African region (Ibrahim 2010).

Turning to the LRA, the Christian Aid (2014) indicates that one of the critical challenges faced in the fight against LRA terrorism constitutes the absence of trusted collaboration between military forces controlling the region in which this terrorism gets committed. The National Conservative Party in Khartoum does not allow African Union (AU) troops some of whom are Ugandan soldiers to cross the border into Sudan in pursuit of LRA commanders hiding in South Darfur. In addition, Ugandan soldiers in the AU task force in the CAR are not permitted to cross into DRC to dislodge LRA fighters who retreat and hide there (Christian 2014). Furthermore, there is no full range of state control in much of the eastern part of DRC. The military forces such as the FARDC (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo) that fight terrorists and restore security in this region provide a short-term and unsustainable solution when the government is not fully in control. They come, fight, and repulse the terrorists and leave. As if that is not enough, MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) has recently acquired aerial surveillance capabilities in the form of drones with cameras, they cannot penetrate forest canopies (Hellyer 2013). The ADF and LRA exploit these weaknesses as opportunities for reorganizing and launching terrorist attacks in the region while maintaining that they cannot disarm until the International Criminal Court drops war crimes charges against them (Long 2014).

According to Agger (2012), Uganda ended amnesty that had been granted to rebels surrendering or escaping from terrorist groups. This considerably lowered the chances of convincing terrorists out of the vice. Indeed, it was amnesty that had contributed considerably to success in cutting down the number of LRA fighters. Its removal is therefore a blow to curbing terrorism. Amnesty was removed because it was incompatible with norms of international justice (Agger 2012). The World Bank (2007) indicates that another challenge involves some banks in Uganda not cooperating as expected when it comes to prevention of money laundering and financing of terrorism in Uganda. In fact, some Ugandan banks have had to be closed as a result of being suspected to be involved in money laundering (Edopu 2004).

Generally, a number of challenges are still faced in the counterterrorism approaches used by Uganda singly and in collaboration with other partner states. The challenges occur in the form of legal and institutional weaknesses as well as in the way terrorism is conceived in the different partner states.

Discussion

The preceding review reveals that Uganda has responded to international terrorism using both internal and international policy and institutional approaches, and while facing a number of challenges internally and at interstate level, has made appreciable successes in terms of repulsing terrorists and foiling their plots. Internally, the policy approach Uganda has been using is essentially prescriptive. It involves enacting and implementing different acts of parliament, including the Amnesty Act (2000), the Anti-Terrorism Act (2002), and the Anti-Money Laundering Act (2013).

While this approach is necessary, the way it is applied in Uganda is not sufficient. Uganda uses it only in the pursuit strategy of countering terrorism. Its use in the prevention strategy is negligible because the level of public awareness of the enacted acts, particularly the Anti-Terrorism Act (2002), is very low. It is necessary to raise public awareness of the content of this Act, particularly the content of Part III of the Act, but this has hardly been carried out. The media need not be used to raise public awareness of only community policing, vigilant use of terrorism detectors, and encouraging the public to accept being checked for possible terror objects. The media needs to also be used to raise public awareness about the content of the antiterrorism act while putting more emphasis on the consequences suffered should a person get convicted of any offence specified in this act. This can help scare people from turning to terrorism.

The review also reveals that Uganda's fight against international terrorism is virtually devoid of using educational and religious institutions; yet these institutions are very important in implementing the prevention strategy of countering the nature of terrorism facing Uganda. Indeed, the review indicates that the LRA, ADF, and al-Shabaab perpetrate terrorism using what the philosophical theory of religion regards as the fundamentalist interpretation of religion. This implies that individuals can be prevented from turning to this terrorism through education and training that suppresses radicalization and extremism. It is therefore imperative that Uganda improves her fight against terrorism by using educational and religious institutions. Of course, the use of educational institutions presupposes development of curriculum content that can be imparted to learners in a manner that discourages them from joining terrorism.

The review indicates further that at the international level, Uganda's progress in the fight against terrorism is appreciable given the recorded contribution to the AMISOM that is countering al-Shabaab's terrorism in Somalia and in the East African region in general. The progress is however, constrained by policy and institutional weaknesses such as lack of policy that adequately covers MLA in the IGAD member countries. The lack of MLA constrains extradition and exchange of evidence needed in the courts of laws to secure a successful prosecution of terrorism suspects. A policy on MLA is therefore needed to facilitate any country fighting international terrorism to do so legally and expeditiously. Not only does the development of this policy need to focus on defining terrorism in a manner that is acceptable to all IGAD member states but it also needs to be reinforced by strengthening and synchronizing the criminal justice institutions of these countries. This will ensure that these countries rely on each other's judicial systems to provide efficient, timely, and reliable evidence or extraditions instead of depending on nonlegal methods of dealing with international terrorism. Better results will be realized through strengthening interstate policing institutions such as Interpol and border surveillance and protection agencies.

The religious extremism that has been growing in Somalia since 1989 when the al-Shabaab took its effective occupation suggests that the threat of terrorism is still prevalent in this country. Indeed, the theoretical review indicates clearly that extremism is a major cause of terrorism. This threat can however, be minimized through

systematic application of psychological disengagement and deradicalization using education and proper Islamic teachings. This is vital in ensuring that terrorism is completely erased from the minds of the Somalis who have been exposed to the fundamentalist view of their religion. IGAD member countries need to also increase and demonstrate their political will in supporting military countering of al-Shabaab terrorism.

Recommendations

The main terrorist response strategies in recent years have included the policy and administrative approaches. These approaches essentially mean policy guidelines for fighting international terrorism which scrupulously use action plans already laid down either legally, politically, or militarily to contain the terrorist threat. In the case of Uganda, administrative approaches have involved creation of new security agencies; executive actions taken to combat international terrorism either by implementing enacted antiterrorism instruments or by taking economic, intelligence, or security-based managerial actions to promptly forestall impending terrorism threats or to deal appropriately with perpetrators of terrorism in the antiterror courts established. The key message here is that since these approaches seem to have effectively averted terrorist activities in Uganda and abroad, they can be broadly be adopted by other countries in Africa and the Middle East.

The internal and international policy and institutional approaches used in Uganda to respond to international terrorism have resulted into appreciable progress. Not only has Uganda used a combination of these approaches to effectively defeat the LRA and ADF terrorism by repulsing these terrorist forces off her territory but also pursuing them up to the forests of CAR and DRC. The evidence presented therefore is essentially to underline the fact that the policy and institutional approaches can deliver results when followed meticulously. All countries big and small can meticulously design and execute the policy and institutional approaches to respond to terrorist threats with success.

Remarkable contributions in the fight and weakening of the Somali-based al-Shabaab terrorists have been made. This is essentially evidence that the fight against terrorism is not only for one country, but a well coordinated strategy involving well trained forces supported by regional and other international security organizations. Uganda is, however, facing internal and interstate challenges that need to be addressed in order to improve her contribution to the fight against international terrorism, especially in the African region but where the terrorists have intricate international linkages especially with the Middle East where evidence suggests they draw inspiration from. Uganda and many countries including those in the Middle East need to improve the role of educational and religious institutions to develop and implement an MLA policy while strengthening internal judicial systems and Interpol relationship with other countries participating in the fight against international terrorism.

All regional security groupings need to improve their political will in the area of supporting antiterrorism efforts through making necessary military, financial, diplomatic, and moral contributions.

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Chapter 15
Turkey's Struggle with the Kurdish Question: Roots, Evolution, and Changing National, Regional, and International Contexts

Mustafa Coşar Ünal and Fatih Mehmet Harmanci

Introduction

The Kurds overall have experienced, in their history, a (re)awakening of their national consciousness as a distinct community from the Arab, Turkish, and Iranian people for a thousand years (Barkey and Fuller 1998). In the late nineteenth and during the twentieth centuries, however, the Kurds of the Middle East (i.e., Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and Iran) have had trouble with their identity-related rights. A new national awareness has emerged globally due to the nation-state phenomenon of the cold war and post-cold war era. Within this context, the emergence of a new cycle of national awareness has particularly incited political oppositions among Turkey's Kurds (Van Bruinessen 1997). Yet, globalization has served as a catalyst for the awareness and consciousness of democratization and human rights, and it thus fanned political expectations among Kurds in Turkey. Such self-awareness has led to an irreversible political opposition due to the fact that, as Barkey and Fuller (1998, p. 5) puts it, "One does not readily unlearn learned ethnicity." Additionally, in the early 1970s, a "new left wave" emerged worldwide (after an anti-colonial wave) and is characterized as the third wave of modern terrorism (Rapoport 2004). The socialist ideology was combined with nationalistic and secessionist views in this wave of political violence (Van Bruinessen 1997), which has led to the bloody

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Kurdish insurrection that was reflected in the emergence of the Partiye Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK) in the early 1970s.

Turkey's recent history is already marked by intense political violence; however, it is predominated by the PKK insurrection. Since 1984, when the PKK officially commenced its guerilla fight against the Turkish Republic, roughly 40,000 people have lost their lives (Unal 2012a). To subvert the PKK insurrection, Turkey has resorted to different policy measures ranging from hardline policies, i.e., intense use of military action, establishment of provisional village guard systems (armed militia), forced evacuation of remote villages, proclamation of the emergency state, to soft-line policies, i.e., recognition of certain cultural and linguistic rights related to the Kurdish identity, repentance opportunities, return to home projects. While Turkey's responses toward the PKK were dominated by the "Iron-fist" paradigm of an enemy centric counterinsurgency approach until the 2000s, Turkey shifted to also applying population-centric policies that aimed to remove certain legitimate grievances with a motive-focused approach since then. It should be noted that Turkey has always conceptualized the PKK problem in the context of "terrorism" and framed its countermeasures in the context of "counterterrorism" simply to delegitimize and demonize the PKK uprisings, as well as legitimizing/justifying its use of force in its struggle against it.

The PKK conflict has seen a high volume of human losses. As a result of PKK attacks, 5478 civilians (including government staff, e.g., teachers, imams) and 6764 security force members were killed by the end of 2012, when the violence ceased, due to the latest resolution process (Unal 2012b). Turkey's countering strategies, dominated by the Turkish Army's military operations particularly until the early 2000s, led to the incapacitation of a total of 26,781 PKK militants. So, the total casualties (i.e., both killed and injured) for the overall conflict have reached up to 66,692 including civilians, security forces, and PKK members as shown in Table 15.1.

With regard to the aforementioned, Turkey's struggle against the PKK's protracted guerilla and terror fight against Turkey has yielded diverse policy measures throughout the conflict. And, more importantly, these policies have been promulgated based on the strategic interaction (i.e., tit for tat game) between Turkey and the PKK, as well as the national, regional, and international developments. Therefore, analyzing these policies in terms, not only of their impact on the PKK insurrection but also of their emergence and strategic interaction between the warring parties, represents a significant issue.

With this goal in mind, this study first provides the historical background and social constriction/emergence of the Kurdish issue and the PKK insurrection in Turkey; secondly, it analyzes the emergence and impact of policies that Turkey has adopted to curb the PKK problem. It also reviews Turkey's developing strategies to reduce and end PKK violence in the entire span of the conflict. In doing so, it discusses the main characteristics of the PKK and its strategic evolution as a response to Turkey's developing countermeasures (tit-for-tat game) as the conflict unfolded.

Table 15.1 Number of casualties (killed and injured) that resulted from the PKK conflict between 1984 and 2013

Casualties in the PKK conflict				
Security forces		Killed	Injured	Casualty
	Military	4989	11,440	16,429
	Police	355	3502	3857
	GKK	1420	2061	3481
	Total	6764	17,003	23,767
	Security force (%)	53.2	64.7	61.0
Non-combatants	Civilian	5478	9277	14,755
	Teacher	124	0	124
	Government staff	336	0	336
	Total	5938	9277	15,215
	Civilian and Gov. Staff (%)	46.8	35.3	39.0
Total casualties	% Total	12,702	26,280	38,982
		100	100	100
Incapacitated PKK militants				
PKK Members		Killed	Injured	Casualty
		26,781	929	27,710
		Surrendered/Capitulated	Captured (Alive)	Total numbers
		4811	6679	39,200
Casualties for overall conflict				
Grand totals		Killed	Injured	Casualty
		39,483	27,209	66,692

Finally, it discusses regional developments and the regional context and identifies how Turkey's stance toward the PKK issue has been influenced by regional dynamics. For this purpose, this study used multiple large-scale datasets from the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG), the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) Global Terrorism Dataset (GTD), Turkish Government's official datasets from the Department of Counterterrorism and datasets from the Department of Intelligence, Turkish National Police. Official government datasets reflect a longitudinal time series data that include official records of aggregate level violent incidences and reported casualties in annual observation points, covering the period from August 1984 (when the PKK officially declared its violent campaign in Turkey) to December 31, 2013. Institutional databases of ISVG and GTD covering 1984–2010, on the other hand, include incident level time series data on the violent incidents in which PKK-initiated attacks, incident types and location (geo-spatial) information can be separately analyzed.

Roots and History of the Kurdish Question in Turkey

Kurds are considered as a distinct ethnic community with their own culture and language and their nationalist (re)awakening dates back to thousands of years ago. They constitute the Middle East's largest ethnic minority without a state who inhabits in the territories of Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. The total population of Kurds in the region is around 30 million and the largest portion lives in Turkey (app. 12–16 million). The majority of Kurds is Sunni, and before they were Islamized by the Arab-Muslim invasions, Kurds were mainly Zarathustra, in addition to having Christian and Jewish communities (Olson 2013).

In fact, the problem of the Kurdish population's conflict with the government over the control of the southeast region of Turkey dates back to the Ottoman Empire (O'Neil 2007). Over the last two centuries, and specifically since the inception of the Turkish Republic, several Kurdish uprisings have occurred over territorial control of the southeastern Anatolia (Barkey and Fuller 1997).

Kurds lived under the rule of the Ottoman Empire (the dominant power in the region) since the early sixteen century (Van Bruinessen 1994). Having lost many of its territories in the early nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire strived to keep the Kurdish inhabited region and a series of Kurdish uprising occurred for independence, which were harshly quelled by them (Verdi 2004). When the Ottomans lost World War I (WWI) against the victorious allied powers (i.e., Britain, France, Russia, and eventually the USA), the map of the Middle Eastern region was reshaped and several new countries emerged from former Ottoman provinces (Black 2007) that have not become nations to this day (Fromkin 2001) due to the ethnic and religious heterogeneity. After the Allies' victory in 1918, the treaty of Versailles was signed on June 28, 1919, between the German and Allied Powers. On August 10, 1920, the Ottoman Empire, as the "Sick Man," signed the International Treaty of Sevres, which equaled the Treaty of Versailles that had granted Kurds autonomy and a prospect for an independent Kurdish State (Verdi 2004). However, Kemal Ataturk took power in Turkey and began an independence war in 1923. After freeing Turkey from the control and occupation of the allied powers of WWI, he abolished the sultanate and caliphate and established the Turkish Republic. This has culminated in Turkey successfully voiding the Treaty of Sevres. The success of Turkish independence led to the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 to replace the one signed in Sevres. According to the Lausanne Treaty, the Kurdish region stayed within the Turkish Republic's borders.

Approximately 25 Kurdish uprisings occurred throughout the Turkish Republic's modern history. The early years of the republic, in particular, were marked with significant Kurdish rebellions. These were mostly religious and tribal in nature (including a few Kurdish nationalist intellectuals). Among these, the Sheik Said's Rebellion was one of the most noteworthy. In February and March 1925, a revolt carried out by Kurdish peasants rapidly spread to the vast majority of Eastern Provinces in Turkey. The rebellion was led by Sheikh Said, a popular religious dervish, and supported by tribal leaders. Although the revolt presented more religious

(i.e., the abolition of the sultanate and the caliphate and secularizing state policies) rather than ethnic secessionist characteristics (Van Bruinessen 1994), it was later considered to be an attempt to establish Kurdish independence, given Sheikh Said's ardent nationalist approach and an exclusive Kurdish participation into the revolt (Olson 2013). The revolt was harshly quelled by the Turkish military in two months with 35,000 land troops and air force leading to a considerable number of fatalities (Verdi 2004).

The Turkish Republic's rigid policies toward the Kurdish issue continued throughout the one party era (1923–1950) in Turkish political history. Certain measures of liberalizations came about in the 1950s and 1960s with the Menderes administration, and Turkey's rigid Kurdish policy was relatively softened. After Menderes' deposition through military coup, the military elites strived to revive repressive policies. However, the more liberalized nature of the 1961 Constitution had already granted much wider civil liberties (especially in civil society organizations).

Along the same line, the Turkish left reemerged in the same cold war years, and the Workers' Party of Turkey (TIP) got involved in the Kurdish issue in the context of socialism (i.e., regional inequalities). The recurrence of Kurdish opposition and repressive state policies continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The nation-state phenomenon of the cold war and post-cold war era has resulted in the emergence of a new cycle of national awareness, which has incited political expectations and opposition among Turkey's Kurds (Van Bruinessen 1997; Barkey and Fuller 1998).

In relation to the cause of the Kurdish insurrections, some (for example, see Laciner and Bal 2004) stated that "Kurdishness" was an issue that was exploited for political reasons. They based their point on the difficulty of defining the Kurds as a distinct nation. This is what has been embraced by the Turkish state in their rhetoric in the Kurdish issue until the early 2000s. On the other hand, some (see, Barkey and Fuller 1998; Ergil 2000a; Kirisci and Winrow 1997; O'Neil 2007) cited the denial of certain individual rights of Turkey's Kurds as the main source of the long-standing grievances in the southeast region of Turkey. The latter approach has gained much prominence. Among these grievances, the consensus is that the unresponsive nature of the Turkish Republic's "nation state" themed policies, dating back to the one-party era between 1923 and 1950, appear to have contributed to the increasing consciousness of ethnic identity of Kurds in Turkey. Turkey's Kurds' principal grievance has been the denial of what many Kurds believed to be cultural and political rights (Ergil 2000a; Kirisci and Winrow 1997; Kocher 2002; O'Neil 2007). This is because the Kurdish issue had been viewed as a threat to the unity of the nation state and Kemalist structure of Turkish Republic, which has led to tough policies toward Kurds in Turkey (Van Bruinessen 1984).

Barkey and Fuller (1998) pointed to the lack of an identifiable locus of Kurdish policymaking within the Turkish state and argued that Turkish policymaking is heavily dominated by the elite circle of Turkish politicians and statesmen under the consensus that Turkey is a unitary state with a uniform national identity (Kim and Yun 2008; Kirisci and Winrow 1997). They further argued that "[such a consensus]

is strengthened by an ever-vigilant army that, in the past, has not shied away from expressing its [political] preferences or intervening." (p. 133). Yet, silence and/or noninvolvement of press, civil society, and political parties have led these unresponsive [to Kurdish people] policies to be fostered. Kim and Yum (2008) underlined Turkey's authoritative stance on uniform national identity and indicated that the emergence and development of the PKK is an outcome of the reactionary collision of emerging Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms. Ergil (2000a) asserted that the Kurdish upheavals throughout the 1930s led to the shaping of Turkish state policies in an authoritarian fashion. That is, policies at the time were preoccupied with the territorial integrity rather than "problem solving and reconciling differences [in the social context of the country]" as well as "neglecting the human and consensual dimensions of politics" (Ergil 2000a, p. 125).

The social unrest in the southeastern region of Turkey, fueled by the aforementioned state policies, was a precursor for the opposition of Turkey's Kurds in the mid and late 1970s. Young Kurdish intellectuals assembled and organized themselves around the notion of ethnic self-awareness under the liberal nature of the 1961 Constitution, which provided a wider scope of civil rights to the members of the society after the 1960 military intervention (Kirisci and Winrow 1997). Yet, the devastated socioeconomic conditions and perceived social and political injustice against the Kurdish minority living the eastern Anatolia have further contributed to fertile ground for Kurdish opposition (Barkey and Fuller 1998; Kirisci and Winrow 1997). In this context, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) emerged based on this long-known grievance about the denial of the cultural and political rights of Kurds (Gunter 2004; Kocher 2002; Rodoplu et al. 2003; Teymur and Smith 2008).

There have been two major viewpoints associated with two communities that have been predominant within the Kurdish issue. These are namely "traditionalist" and "socialist" approaches; the former seeks participation in all political, social, and economic aspects of governmental decision-making and power sharing, whereas the latter argues for armed struggle and seeks separation by all means. Kurds, sharing the traditionalistic view, achieved integration into the rest of the country in all aforementioned aspects and benefited from constitutional government and established civil and political rights (Ankara Papers 2004). The socialist (and extreme leftist) group, claiming to be under the colonization of the Imperialist Turkish State, preferred armed struggle against Turkish Republic. The major division between these two different viewpoints emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Ankara Papers 2004; Laciner and Bal 2004). The Kurdish awareness had been a consolidating factor within the socialist group, especially when military coups curtailed the mobilization of leftist movements (Ergil 2000b).

Following a military coup d'état in 1960, based upon political instability, military intervention ended and civil law was restored with the 1961 Constitution. The ruling party at the time, Democratic Party (DP), commenced a liberalization effort, especially in the eastern part of the Turkey (Kirisci and Winrow 1997). However, the Turkish Army believed that the liberalization that took place in the eastern part of the country had resulted in an increase in Kurdish national awareness and adopted policies similar to the ones from the one-party-era, such as the arrest of 54 Kurdish

notables who were members of the DP, and introduction of a law to ban the use of the Kurdish language and to name villages in Turkish rather than Kurdish (Ergil 2000a; Kirisci and Winrow 1997).

In fact, Turkey had already been facing intense political violence when the Kurdish dissent emerged. After the 1961 Constitution that is marked as the most liberal constitution in modern Turkey's history, many leftist extremist groups emerged (Cornell 2001). These groups were encouraged by the victorious popular examples of socialist movements in different areas across the world, such as Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, violent clashes arose between the ideological polar fronts of the leftists and rightist groups (Rodoplu, et al. 2003). Tensions between these groups in the late 1960s escalated and resulted in extreme political violence. These attacks were carried out against symbolic targets of all dominating ideologies, namely communism, capitalism, and nationalism. The violence took various forms, including gunfights between opposing groups on the streets and arsons against the embassies and assets of diplomats of certain countries (Z. Ozdogan and Ozdogan 2007). The prevalence and intensity of violence in the 1960s and 1970s constitutes the foundation of terrorist groups that are still active in modern day Turkey. These two decades were marked with intense social and political upheaval in the country (Z. Ozdogan and Ozdogan 2007; Rodoplu, et al. 2003). The movements of leftist students, nationalist groups, and religiously inspired groups took part in the social and political uprisings during the 1960s and 1970s. Subsequently, the failure of civilian governments to maintain political stability induced two military coups in Turkey during the 1970s and 1980s. By the mid-1980s, terrorist groups that took their roots from the conflict of the 1960s and 1970s resurfaced and regrouped their organizations. Between 1978 and 1982, for example, the intensity of terrorist violence in Turkey was striking: 43,000 incidents related to political violence occurred in the country, each resulting in fatalities averaging 28 deaths per day, according to the National Security Council Reports (Rodoplu, et al. 2003).

So, the notion of the PKK was brought up by a split group (from the leftists university association) at the Ankara Revolutionary Students' Association (ADYOD), in the Province of Ankara in Turkey (Ankara Papers 2004; Durna et al. 2008; Ergil 2000b). The socialist segment of Kurds rallied around the notion of ethnic self-awareness, and in 1973 the PKK, as an idea, was developed (Unal 2012a). From 1973 to 1975, preliminary activities establishing an ideological ground and gathering a core cadre to form an organization were continued under the leadership of Abdullah Ocalan. Following these events, Ocalan and his associates moved the PKK-oriented activities to the southeastern part of Turkey and founded the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) on November 27, 1978, in the village of Fis located in the province of Diyarbakir-Lice.

In the pre and post terms of the military coup of 1982, Ocalan and PKK members moved into Syria and continued their activities until 1984. During these years, the PKK engaged in intense training efforts for its members within the training facilities established in Syria. The PKK organized its first Conference and second Congress in the territory of Syria/Beka Valley (at the border of Syria and Lebanon).

The PKK officially started its warfare against the Turkish Republic with two violent attacks in Semdinli and Eruh of Hakkari Province on August 15, 1984 (Unal 2016a; 2016b). In the Eruh attack, one soldier was killed and nine were injured, three of whom were civilians; in the Semdinli attack, three soldiers were injured (Unal 2012a). Beginning in August 1984, PKK engaged in intense violent attacks against selected targets of state forces, government representatives and also indiscriminate attacks against Kurdish civilians, especially the villagers who voluntarily chose to be village guards working for the Turkish State.

On the other hand, the PKK was not the first extreme leftist Kurdish organization at the time. The Eastern Revolutionary Cultural Hearth (DDKO), created in 1969 by Kurdish intellectuals in Ankara, and the group "Rizgari" (liberation) gathered around the journal Rizgari and created in the early 1970s, are the two major Kurdish movements beside the PKK. However, these organizations apparently did not get as much attention as the PKK did from the Kurdish population living in Turkey (Ankara Papers 2004).

Emergence of the PKK Insurrection

The PKK planned to wage a protracted war (Kocher 2002) in the concept of "theory of people's war" as suggested by the Chinese Insurgent Leader Mao Zedong (Unal 2012a). Inspired by the Cuban revolution (emanated from rural villages to urban areas), the PKK defined itself as a socialist liberation movement (Durna, et al. 2008) embracing the Marxist-Leninist Doctrine (Ozdogan and Ozdogan 2007; Ankara Papers 2004).

The PKK aimed to establish an independent and socialist Kurdish state in the Middle East, which included territories from southeastern Turkey, northern Iraq, Syria, and Iran (Aktan and Koknar 2002; Ankara Papers 2004; Barkey and Fuller 1998; Kirisci and Winrow 1997). The PKK has modified its goal with its pragmatic periodical objectives, as conflict unfolds and the relative power balance changes.

The PKK was established by a very small group of people in 1978 but, over the years, the PKK developed into one of the most comprehensive organizations, with cross boundary ties within not only the neighboring countries of Turkey, but also in Europe (Ankara Papers 2004; Cornell 2001). It has subdivisions as well as numerous other suborganizations, each serving a distinct purpose. The PKK also systematically organized within the European countries (e.g., Germany, Holland, Italy) through front organizations to logistically and financially support its campaign (Rodoplu, et al. 2003).

The PKK emerged as a Maoist guerilla insurgent group. As part of its Maoist strategy, the PKK embraced the use of violence in two directions (Kocher 2002; Ozdogan and Ozdogan 2007). First, the PKK has used violence in guerilla warfare against Turkish security forces to weaken government authority in the region and to take territorial control of certain areas (Unal 2016d). Secondly, the PKK used targeted violence, especially in the outset of the process, on the Kurdish population to

force and gain support from the Kurdish people living in the region for creation of a liberation movement (Ankara Papers 2004, pp. 24, 25). In this regard, after declaring an armed struggle against the Republic of Turkey in 1984, PKK's strategy has centered on stationing in rural areas to wage their campaign in the form of guerilla insurgency. The PKK strategically stationed in rural areas in small insurgency groups because it was almost impossible for security forces to coexist and create security bases in and around every hamlet and small village in order to control the area. With this strategy, PKK basically aimed to establish and keep a rigorous link with the civilian population in order to perform political propaganda and also to force and intimidate the civilian population to gain their support for its goals (Unal 2016c).

Turkish Responses Toward the PKK and Their Evolution in Characteristics

Turkey's initial response to handle the issue was to employ intense securitization. First, to disrupt and counter the PKK insurrection, Turkish Army immediately deployed military forces into the southeastern region (hereafter the region) and commenced heavy military action to maintain the safety and control in the region beginning from 1984. Turkey got caught a bit off guard and Turkish Army's initial response was not designed to deal with the asymmetric warfare, rather it was in a regular army structure in a conventional battle (Unal 2016c; 2016d). Later in the process, Turkish Army's military doctrine was modified according to the PKK's asymmetric threat (will be elaborated later).

Secondly, just after a year, Turkey implemented a new legislation (no. 3175) through the amendment of Village Act of 442 and established the Provisional Village Guard System (GKK) in April 1985. With this, the Turkish military trained and armed volunteer villagers to guard their residents and villages against PKK militants (Aktan and Koknar 2002). The GKKs knew the ground conditions as much as PKK guerillas, they guard their villages effectively and helped military forces in counterinsurgency operations against the PKK guerilla groups.

The GKK system, by nature, constituted a crucial obstacle to the PKK's initial strategy of enforcing a liberation movement (social mobilization) in the concept "of people's war." That is, in the beginning, the PKK had announced its goal of creating an independent Kurdish territory in the region, and it needed the logistical and psychological support of almost the entire Kurdish population. However, the GKK policy changed the social-psychological balance against the PKK in the region, indicating that not all the Kurdish people support and corroborate the PKK and embrace its means and ends/goals. This has been considered to be dramatically important in the case of the PKK conflict, considering the importance of public opinion in ethnicity-based terrorism (Byman 1998; Crenshaw 1995) and related popular support in ethnic insurgency (O'Neill 1990; US Counter Insurgency Field Manual 2009).

Fig. 15.1 Number of casualties for GKK and civilians vs. military personnel (1984–1989)

Ocalan publically declared GKKs as traitors of the Kurdish Nation, and the PKK, beginning in 1986, carried out numerous violent raids and attacks specifically in the villages that volunteered to become part of the GKK system. The majority of the civilian casualties, following the attacks carried out by the PKK in the early years of the GKK system (between 1986 and 1988), was GKK members and their families (Unal 2014).

Figure 15.1 portrays the trend of PKK attacks against the GKKs and their families against their attacks targeting security forces. As shown in Fig. 15.1, between the years of 1986 and 1988, the casualty level for GKKs and Kurdish civilians is much higher than that of security personnel. Only in 1987, the PKK carried out 15 different carnages in the provinces of Sirnak, Mardin, and Siirt, one of which is the carnage of Village Pinarcik (located in the Omerli district in the province of Mardin) that resulted in the killing of 30 civilians, 16 of whom were children, and 8 of whom were GKK members (Bal and Ozkan 2006).

Since the policy's adoption, the number of GKKs has ranged between 40,000 and 95,000 (Aktan and Koknar 2002). For example, in 2000, the number of GKKs reached up to 80,000 guarding around 400,000 people including family members (as cited in Simsek 2006).

Thirdly, Turkey was already under Martial Law, due to the 1980s military coup, but beginning from July 19th 1987 Turkish Parliament again granted a state of emergency in 11 provinces located within the southeastern part of the country that faced substantial PKK activities and violence (Alexander, Brenner, and Krause 2008; Kabasakal Arat 2007). The main purpose of the state of emergency was to maintain public safety and to restore public order through stronger control over the

region, by introducing tighter security measures at the expense of the civil liberties and constitutional rights. Emergency rule gave the OHAL governor special authority to exercise certain quasi-martial law powers under the rule of emergency law. These included authority to restrict press, to remove individuals from the area whose activities were considered detrimental to safety and public order, and to order evacuations of villages, censor news, ban strikes or lockouts, and abridge freedom of expression and association (Alexander, et al. 2008; US Department of State 2001). The emergency rule was implemented in 1987 and then gradually lifted beginning in 1994. However, the abolishment of emergency rule from the affected provinces did not result in a complete termination of the policy. Rather, it was converted into a relatively softer form, in which suspension of the constitution was somewhat lifted (Kabasakal Arat 2007; US Department of State 2001). In 2002, the emergency rule was removed entirely from the region (last four cities, Hakkari, Tunceli, Diyarbakir and Sirnak).

Lastly, because the PKK militants acquired certain supplies, shelter, and money from rural villages through "extortion/taxing" (Aktan and Koknar 2002) and the PKK conducted violent attacks in the form of raids, lootings, and burnings against individuals and/or entire villages that refused to support the PKK and joined the GKK system, Turkey adopted a policy to evacuate the inhabitants of remote villages and hamlets and resettle them into larger villages within safer and protected areas. Considering the nature of the geographical features and characteristics of the region, installing security bases in each small village was nearly impossible. Given the aforementioned factors that portray the elevated risk and insecurity, Turkish state officials intended to put an end to the physical contact and interaction between the PKK militants and civilian inhabitants and to maintain better control of the region. Turkish officials decided in 1992 to relocate these isolated hamlets into centralized villages in which the physical contact channels were highly restricted. This policy was applied to the rural villages and hamlets where the PKK militants were acquiring logistical support and new recruits. The implementation started in early 1990s and stopped in early 2000s.

According to the U.S. Department of State Report of 2001, 1046 villages and hamlets had been evacuated by 1994. Among these villages, the reason for the evacuation was economic for 34 of them, security for 75 of them, and PKK threat for the rest of 812 villages (US Department of State 2001). According to a national press editorial published in 2000 in Radikal, one of the national newspapers, and referred to by the emergency region government, the population in emergency rule areas was approximately six million people. Half of this population lived in urban areas, and the other half lived in rural villages and hamlets. By the year 2000, only 300,000 people in approximately 2000 villages were affected under the evacuation policy (Aktan and Koknar 2002). According to the U.S. State Department's Human Rights Report of 2001, a credible estimate of 380,000 to one million people were affected by the evacuations.

Government reports indicated that there had been an estimated 378,000 people migrating (outflow) between 1994 and 1999 from 3165 villages and hamlets located in the state of emergency provinces. Beginning in 2000, the government granted

official permission for thousands of evacuees to return their homes or consolidated villages and initiated resettlement efforts (US Department of State 2001). Only a small fraction of the total number of evacuees had returned by 2000, but the resettlement continued on. Estimating accurate figures on the forced evacuation is difficult because the pressure of the PKK conflict (PKK attacks and related security measures) caused out-flow migration from the region and altered the demography. For example, between 1990 and 1997 (the period during which the majority of evacuations occurred), the population of the urban provinces of southeastern Turkey under state of emergency (13 provinces) increased by 45 %, as compared with the general urbanization rate of 21 % for the entire country (Kocher 2002).

In the aforementioned regards, Turkey officially conceptualized the PKK insurrection as a domestic terrorism problem and applied military led security operations under the rubric of "Iron-fist" counterterrorism (Unal 2016d). Thus, the initial period of the conflict from 1984 to 2000, Turkey's repressive measures toward the PKK and related population continued. Turkey's overall approach was military led deterrence approach with security policies that were designed to increase the cost of engaging in PKK activity. Turkish paradigm throughout this period (1984–2000) was, in counterinsurgency jargon, enemy-centric that focused on incapacitation of PKK members and a total termination of the PKK insurrection (Unal 2011). With the declaration of state of emergency, special state security courts (designed to bypass certain civilian rule of law procedures), GKK system, and so forth, Turkey aimed to deter PKK violence by increasing the cost of terrorist activities—based on the rational choice theory as applied in the orthodoxy of criminology—in the region. These include raising the certainty and severity of the punishment and apprehension, by imposing heavier sanctions, increasing logistical complexity for terrorist attacks by tightening security measures in the potential targets (i.e., decreases the probability of success), increasing the threat of injury and death by conducting military operations and so forth (Dugan et al. 2005; Enders and Sandler 1993, 1999; Frey and Luechinger 2002; Kenney 2003; Korte 2005; Ross 1993).

The Turkish Army continuously conducted military operations by developing military doctrines that are more effective toward an asymmetric warfare, as the PKK pursued its activities. After switching from a regular conventional military structure to a counterterrorism unit structure in 1987, the Turkish military started to apply a "zone doctrine," in which Turkish battalions are scattered in the region in temporary bases to maintain a better control of the harsh terrain (Unal 2016d). However, following the application of this military doctrine, temporary army bases became easy targets for PKK attacks with large guerilla groups. In 1992, Turkish military shifted to "cordon and search" doctrine in which large-scale army units, based on intelligence (SIGINT mostly), caught the PKK militants in a big cordon and tightened the perimeter through searches until they engage and incapacitate PKK militants. The Turkish Army also used land aviation units (attack helicopters). The use of Cobra helicopters was especially effective against PKK militants who had taken advantage of the rough terrain and special ground conditions in the region that favor guerilla tactics. Military operations with this strategy were so effective that PKK's attempt to realize the second and third stage of the Maoist strategy (i.e.,

Fig. 15.2 Aggregate level of violent incidents and casualties that resulted from both PKK attacks and Turkish military operations (1984–2000)

strategic balance and attack) was clearly abandoned. It was the decisive phase of the conflict, and the PKK pursued territorial victory through its Maoist approach and the Turkish Army clearly defeated the PKK in military terms of conventional fight (Unal 2016c; 2016d).

Figure 15.2 plots the trend of aggregate level violence for the number of violent incidents and following casualties (due to both the PKK attacks and military operations) for the entire conflict. As shown in the figure, the violence level indicates a steep increase until 1994, when Ocalan, PKK's founding leader, acknowledged the PKK military defeat in one of his statements in the pro-PKK periodical "SERXWEBUN" Volume April, 1994. He stated that they would have needed at least 50 thousand guerillas against the Turkish Army (Ocalan 1994) when, at the time, the number of armed PKK militants ranged from roughly 11,000 to 13,000 (Unal 2014). Turkey's iron-fist approach was dominated by deterrence-based security policies that were designed to increase confrontation with PKK militants in the early years of the conflict and that resulted in an increase in PKK's violence until 1994 (Unal 2016a). Violence trend shows a decreasing drift from 1994 to 1999 when the PKK's leader Ocalan was captured in February and PKK declared its longest unilateral ceasefire to guarantee Ocalan's survival.

Figure 15.3 portrays only the number of PKK-initiated violent attacks. As indicated in the figure, PKK-initiated attacks started to decrease in 1992 as opposed to the aggregate level violence that shows a decrease from 1994 (Fig. 15.2). The reason for this difference was the Turkish Army's doctrinal shift (from "zone" to "cordon and search" doctrine) in its military operations from cavalry operations (land

Fig. 15.3 Number of PKK-initiated violent attacks in 1984–2010

aviation units) to attack helicopters in 1992. Put differently, PKK's direct challenge of Turkish State with the guerilla insurgent fight resulted in its military defeat and the initiative on the battlefield was in the hands of the Turkish Army in those years when warring parties fought for territorial victory (Unal 2016a).

The post-1994 period indicated a significant shift in terms of the overall characteristics of the conflict. Having perceived the military defeat, the PKK, in fact, acknowledged that they couldn't reach their overarching goal through their unilateral available means. From this point on, therefore, the PKK started to indirectly challenge the Turkish State as opposed to its direct fight. In its direct challenge until 1994, the PKK had engaged in a top-down approach to found an autonomous Kurdish state with unilateral military victory (Unal 2016a; 2016c). After 1994, however, the PKK first strived to survive its guerilla campaign until Ocalan's capture and then, starting in the mid-2000s, gradually leaned on a social and political campaign in a bottom-up approach to reach their modified goal (from secession to a certain form of self determination).

To understand this shift in the PKK's approach, the change in the PKK's use of violence or the variation in the characteristics of the PKK-initiated violence gives important hints. To illustrate, Fig. 15.4 portrays PKK attacks in the PKK-related areas (eastern and southeastern areas that were under emergency rule and predominantly inhabited by Kurds) and PKK's terror attacks in other (mostly western) regions, where the two trend slopes converge toward each other after 1994. To complement this, as plotted in Fig. 15.5, PKK's urban attacks show a proportionate increase and almost converge with rural guerilla insurgent attacks after the tipping point in 1994. Similarly, bombings as a more convenient incident type in urban terror proportionately increase and slope toward armed assaults (guerilla attacks) as

Fig. 15.4 Geographical locations of PKK-initiated violent incidents in the emergency rule provinces vs. other provinces (1984–1997)

Fig. 15.5 Number of PKK attacks in rural vs. urban areas

shown in Fig. 15.6. These all indicate the shift from directly challenging security forces in the southeastern region in order to exterminate and establish an autonomous Kurdish State, to indirectly and more asymmetrically coerce Turkey into a

Fig. 15.6 Trend of bombings versus armed attacks

political compromise by targeting civilians in western regions using more urbanized violence (Unal 2014; 2016d).

PKK also resorted to typical terrorist attacks considering its form and target location. Figures 15.7 and 15.8, respectively, portray PKK's suicide attacks and PKK attacks conducted in touristic places against civilians in the western metropolitan areas of Turkey. As seen from the figures, both trends indicate an emergence and increase after PKK's shift in its characteristics to employ violence following its military defeat.

To illustrate more on the PKK's resort to terrorism, civilian casualties occurred in emergency vs. nonemergency rule areas are displayed in Fig. 15.9. Nonemergency rule areas include all provinces in Turkey other than Southeastern and Eastern regions of Turkey, where the PKK claims independence, in order to identify PKK terrorist attacks (to spread the war and to break off Turkish Army's counterinsurgency focus in the region) in addition to its terror attacks toward civilians, besides its attacks toward non-compliant Kurds in emergency rule areas (Unal 2016c).

As shown in the figure, civilian casualties in western cities indicate proportionate increase after 1994. The PKK started to carry out systematic terrorist attacks toward civilians out of its focus area (where it claims independence) to sustain its campaign (survival/existence) and erosion of government authority. All these indicate PKK's *indirect* challenge after recognizing its inadequacy to reach its aim through its available unilateral means/strength (Unal 2016c).

While the PKK was in transition from a heavy military organization to a politico-military organization with supplementary use of indirect/strategic violence along with sociopolitical means, the State kept its rigid stance toward unilateral win through military means until the early 2000s (Unal 2016a).

Fig. 15.7 Number of suicide attacks carried out by the PKK

Fig. 15.8 Number of PKK-initiated violent attacks targeting tourist locations

Turkey adopted another policy to remove one of the long-lasting safe havens for the PKK and Ocalan. The PKK had been supported, sheltered, and/or tolerated by certain states. Among them, however, Syria was the most crucial one considering the level of its support. Syria served as a safe haven for the PKK members and leaders, including Ocalan, since the PKK's inception (Cornell 2001). To eliminate this

Fig. 15.9 Trends of civilian casualties in western vs. southeastern (PKK-related) areas

shelter for PKK militants, the Turkish Government put pressure on Syria to stop its support for the PKK (Larrabee and Lesser 2002; Middle East Digest 1999). Turkish state officials openly threatened Syria that its actions in favor of the PKK would bring a military response (Larrabee and Lesser 2002) and the Turkish military deployed troops to the Syrian border. Ultimately, on October 20, 1998, Turkey and Syria officials convened in the city of Adana and signed an agreement called "Adana Agreement." According to the agreement, the Syrian Government recognized the PKK as a terrorist organization and pledged to cease all aid and tolerance to the PKK (Middle East Digest 1999). During Turkey's military threat on Syria, Abdullah Ocalan was expelled from Syria before the Adana Agreement was officially signed. Subsequent to his expulsion, Abdullah Ocalan was captured by Turkish forces in Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, and brought to Turkey in February 1999.

Ocalan's incarceration had a significant impact on the PKK. Based on Ocalan's call, the PKK again shifted to a different course of action. They started leaning toward a more on political rather than military approach, and began to initiate and cease violence more strategically, when compared to the traditional Maoist fight for territorial control. The PKK announced its transformation during its 7th Congress held in 2000, by reiterating its longest unilateral ceasefire. The PKK abolished itself twice and, respectively, founded KADEK (Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress) during its 8th Congress in 2002, and renamed itself KONGRA-GEL (Kurdistan People's Congress) in 2003, officially embracing nonviolent means and revised/limited ends (Ankara Papers 2004; Bal and Ozkan 2006; Durna, et al. 2008). However, as Cline (2004) stated, the PKK just renewed itself with different names; its strategy and activities were identical to the previous ones. Between 2000 and 2004, the PKK focused only on political recognition as a legitimate and official

Fig. 15.10 Level of nonviolent pro-PKK public/civil disobedience events

representative body for Kurds in the international arena by accelerating its front activities in Europe backed with mass demonstrations in Turkey.

Low level of violence due to unilateral ceasefire 1999–2003 can be seen in Figs. 15.8 and 15.9 and the increasing trend of nonviolent pro-PKK's public events for the same period in Fig. 15.10. In doing so, the PKK aimed to coerce Turkey into a political compromise through international pressure. However, starting in 2002, the PKK was recognized as a terrorist organization by a number of European countries, United States, Canada, and Australia, as well as by the European Union (EU) as a result of Turkey's diplomatic efforts. Ocalan's death sentence had been commuted to life imprisonment in April 2002, and the PKK's, frustrated by its recognition as a terrorist organization, restructured itself and resorted back to violence (violating ceasefire in de facto manner) starting in 2003 as indicated in Fig. 15.9 (despite that the ceasefire was officially ended by the PKK in 1st June 2004).

The Justice and Development Party applied a new paradigm once they took office in 2002. Turkey shifted from a sole enemy-centric paradigm in which "iron fist" application led by Turkish Military was mitigated by a population-centric paradigm in which a motive-focused approach was applied. In that, certain legitimate grievances toward the Kurdish identity were removed as part of Turkey's efforts toward a full membership into the European Union (EU). Turkey started to handle Kurdish issue from a social perspective, rather than merely conceptualizing the problem as a pure terrorism matter. Particularly, this new approach showed in 2005, when Prime Minister Erdogan officially announced in Diyarbakir Province (predominantly Kurdish area) that the Kurdish problem is his own problem. It was the first time in the history of the conflict that the head of the government released a clear and official statement recognizing the Kurdish question by embracing the

long-standing grievances of Kurds, dismissed for too long by affirming that there was no "Kurdish issue," but rather a "PKK problem" (Unal 2016a).

The ruling AKP commenced a democratization process as Turkey sought full membership into European Union (EU). These efforts included certain civil right improvements (e.g., abolition of State Security Courts and Emergency Rule proclamation) that also cover Kurdish grievances (e.g., legitimization of the Kurdish language).

In September 2003, the Turkish Parliament passed law number 4963 to amend the Legislation number 2923, and legalized Kurdish as a dialect to be learned and taught in Turkey (public or private school education in a language other than Turkish is still banned). This amendment also included lifting certain restrictions on the use of the Kurdish Language, such as broadcasting and publishing in public and private media, and opening private training centers to teach the Kurdish Language (O'Neil 2007).

State security courts (SSCs) were established in 1973 according to article 143, within the Turkish Constitution of 1961. These controversial courts included military as well as civilian judges in their decision-making mechanism (Smith 2007). Additionally, the SSC conducted closed hearings and evidence collected through secret interrogations was admitted into the court. All these features of the SSCs are considered to be a violation of judicial independence and SSCs attracted criticism from the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). In 1999, the Turkish Government first excluded military judges from the SSCs and in 2004, dismantled the SSCs entirely (Turkmen 2007).

The Turkish Government has granted a number of repentance (Return to Home Bills) laws at different times (and covering certain periods) during the PKK conflict (Unal 2016b). These repentance laws were intended to create an opportunity for PKK militants to repent from their terrorist activities and to be able to return to their homes. The two most recent laws, the Return to Home Bill of 2003 and the Effective Repentance Law of 2005, were particularly important and offered a real opportunity for PKK members who wanted to return home (Unal 2016b).

The Government, in this period, hoped to reduce defiance/tensions in the region by removing grievances and in turn mitigating the support level toward the PKK. Despite this, military counterinsurgency operations have continued throughout, Turkish Military's leading role gradually evolved into a supplementary role. However, as shown in Fig. 15.8, aggregate violence indicates a steady increase from 2003 to 2009 when the AKP officially inaugurated a Democratic Opening Project (aka Kurdish Opening). The increasing violence trend in 2003–2009 has multiple reasons, one of which is the PKK's perception of decreasing popular support in eased tensions without getting anything in return (de-escalation and normalization of the process). Since violence is the only commodity for insurgents to mobilize popular support and political gain—through coercion—(Zartman 2006), the PKK responded with escalated attacks, rather than conforming to EU induced democratization efforts (Unal 2012b). The PKK's negative response is partly related to its frustrations after a long-lasting ceasefire (2000–2003), and they wanted to prove their power as a threat to Turkey. The main reason, however, is that as the dominant

character of the fight changed, so did the conditional dynamics of the conflict. The PKK shifted to more of a social and political confrontation to coerce Turkey into a political compromise (Unal 2016a).

In 2007, the PKK created the Union of Kurdistan Communities (KCK), which was designed as an umbrella organization to act as a quasi-state authority in economic, social, political/ideological, and self-defense realms as prep efforts for establishing situational/de facto autonomy in the region. As plotted in Fig. 15.10, nonviolent pro-PKK events indicate a steep increase after KCK's foundation in 2007. With the KCK, the PKK commenced a bottom-up approach to establish a situational autonomy. To back its campaign, in addition to its guerilla insurgent attacks toward army outposts/bases, the PKK mostly resorted to typical urbanized terrorist attacks, such as targeting civilians, extortion, kidnapping (businessmen, government staff, teachers) with the aim to create attrition with the legitimate government authority and thus reiterating the costly deadlock/stalemate (Unal 2016c). In that, the PKK targeted the state's *will* of fight with more asymmetry and indirectness as opposed to its fight during the confrontation phase, in which the PKK struggled to diminish the state's *capacity* to fight (Arreguin-Toft 2001). In the end, the PKK has managed to keep the conflict in the country's priority agenda and asserted urgency for a negotiated resolution.

Turkey shifted its major policy toward the PKK led Kurdish insurgency and started to employ a conflict resolution paradigm toward a negotiated settlement. What indeed made Turkey seek reconciliation is the opportunity cost of Turkey's stance in the international context. The potential power shifts in the regional context within the Middle East constitute particular importance. Turkey, in its diplomatic efforts, pursues a stronger/leading role for Middle Eastern countries as a democratic state with Islamic roots/values. However, the PKK problem constitutes a major obstacle and a risk due to the instable and highly dynamic conditions in neighboring countries of Syria and Iraq, as well as the role of Iran with its related Kurdish population. Conditional dynamics induce strong potentials for changes in Kurdish actors' role, strength, and impact in the region (Unal 2016a).

Within the aforementioned regards, reconsideration of the conditions in the PKK conflict led Turkey to realize the costly deadlock and opportunity cost of holding stalemate. Turkey's recognition of stalemate and costly deadlock resulted in Turkey's backchannel dialogues first with incarcerated Ocalan, and then with a PKK delegation early in 2007, later disclosed to the public as the Oslo meetings. Turkey recognized that no unilateral action/effort would be sufficient to win, and started taking the issue from a conflict management and then conflict resolution perspective, for a sustainable and durable peace (The Minutes of Leaked Oslo Meeting 2012).

Based on those backchannel talks with Ocalan, the Turkish Government officially commenced the Kurdish Opening—a.k.a. Democratic Opening or National Fraternity/Brotherhood Project—and made its resolving intention public in 2009. Along that line, Turkey inaugurated a state-run channel broadcasting in Kurdish and implemented certain economic projects. So, Turkey has switched from seeking unilateral solutions to reconciliation in the context of conflict resolution.

In fact, past attempts were made by the respective governments to initiate a dialogue with the PKK. All of these were covertly performed actions and did not go beyond being only an attempt in which respective governments took weak steps toward initiating a process of dialogue with either pro-PKK political actors (who can convey messages to the PKK leadership) or directly with certain cadres from the PKK leadership (from the PKK's political front organization) in Europe. However, these, e.g., President Ozal's peace initiative in 1993, remained premature attempts, due to many reasons that mainly relate unripe conditions pursuing unilateral victory (Unal 2016a).

In 2009, the AKP Government officially declared the Democratic Opening (aka Kurdish Opening) as the final step of this covertly managed process since 2007. However, the state's resolution attempts to remove grievances and employ peace rhetoric were interrupted with the arrest, on the ground of organic ties with the KCK, of numerous civilian Kurds including lawyers, activists, civil society members, and 53 members of the DTP. Subsequent to this failure in resolution process, Ocalan commenced a new era called "Strategic Lunge," through the use of the "All-Out People's War" strategy to develop a de facto autonomy in the region in March 2010. Violence rose again, as seen in Fig. 15.2, starting in 2010 and steeply increased in 2011. Following the interruption of the 2007–2011 resolution attempt, the government again strived to quell the PKK from mid-2011 to the end of 2012 (Unal 2016d). Only in 2012, a total of 1926 violent incidents occurred in which 131 members of security forces (107 soldiers, 24 police) and 13 GKK members were killed, while 239 PKK fighters were incapacitated. On July 14, 2011, the PKK declared "Democratic Autonomy" in the region and killed 13 Turkish soldiers. Declaration of autonomy by the PKK seemed to be a symbolic, premature, and hasty reaction to the blown off peace process.

However, conditions of both internal and external dynamics along with costly/hurting stalemate induced riper conditions and put more pressure on Turkey to tackle the issue. Therefore, Turkey reestablished its dialogue with Ocalan in 2012, which was cut off in mid-2011. The main reason for this has been the regional dynamics that have alerted an upcoming potential power shift, which signaled the urgency for a resolution. This was mostly because of regional dynamics that made the conflict conditions more complicated and out of Turkey's control.

A wave of radical change in the Arabian Peninsula/world, known as the Arab Spring, started in 2010 in Tunisia continued in Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, sparked flames into Syria on March 15, 2011, and turned into a bloody civil war. Turkey's diplomatic stance toward the Arab spring, and specifically toward Syria, is a separate discussion, however, the Baath regime of a close friend Syria had—in an evolving manner—become, for Turkey, a regime of repression to be subverted. The most important development for Turkey that came out of the Syrian civil war is the PYD's (known as the "Syrian PKK") gain of political and military power in an autonomous Kurdish area of the Northern Syrian territory. In summary, Turkey's effort at the beginning of Syria's civil war was to urge the ruling Bashar Assad Regime for constitutional reforms, but then, based on the first attempt culminated in a failure, Turkey began to seek and support a regime change in Syria in the autumn of 2011.

Turkey has sought to organize and unify dissident groups in Syria (recognized as legitimate representatives of Syrian people by the international community). Lately, Turkey has supported a solution led by international actors (i.e., United Nations based solutions or Arab League initiative), known as Friends of Syria, that held their first meeting in February 2012. The Turkish Government does not want a PYD (equivalent of PKK for Syria) controlled Kurdish area, officially denominated "Western Kurdistan" in the PKK jargon, in reference to PKK's initial aim to create a Kurdish State comprised of territories from Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey.

Along with important sociopolitical changes in Syria, similar shifts occurred in Iraq indicating a sectarian war (already in ethnicity based political separation) of long duration, which would impact the political climate in Turkey. The increasing threat of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the context it created in the region has not only led to instability in the region, but also to shifts in power relations in favor of regional Kurdish actors (e.g., the Peshmerga).

Nowadays, particularly the PYD's role against ISIS is a crucial factor in power shifts in the region. The PYD's role greatly affects the regional politics due to the increased support from the international community and the United States toward the PYD in its impact against ISIS's development in the Northern Syrian territory. However, such support toward the PYD and its increased power and control in the region equally irritates Turkey and dominates Turkey's foreign policy toward the Syrian crisis.

As is known, the PYD is not a recently emerged politico-military entity in the region after the Syrian Civil War, but it is strongly affiliated with the PKK given the PKK's original and overarching goal of founding a united Kurdistan that is comprised of territories and Kurdish population from Iran, Iraq, and Syria in addition to Turkey. The PYD has been known as the "Syrian PKK" since they pursued a pro-PKK agenda in Northern Syria. Therefore, Turkey is and has been implicitly and explicitly repugnant toward any Kurdish state in the region founded by the pro-PKK entities and ideology.

From a different perspective, while Turkey administers a peace process with the PKK aiming to lay down the arms and leading to the withdrawal of PKK fighters out of the Turkish territory, a powerful, internationally supported Kurdish autonomy would serve as an official safe haven for the PKK. Even expecting the PKK to leave the Turkish territory, as part of the negotiations, and totally lay down their arms and switch to nonviolent political means does not seem realistic, given the instability in the region of Syria and Iraq, considering particularly the PYD's role against ISIS, as seen in the Kobane issue. So, the situation in the Middle East in general, and what has been happening along Turkey's southern borders is likely to change incurring power shifts (Unal 2016a).

This, on one side, necessitates Turkey to solve its problem with the PKK to reduce the risk of importing the region's instability into Turkey; however, on the other side, it destabilizes the peace process that has been officially underway since March 2013. The PKK problem has become an issue that is critically interrelated with the developments in the region, rather than an issue that could be solved between sole decisions and initiatives of Turkey and the PKK. Put differently, the

prospects of the resolution process are conducive to regional developments, which are under the influence of many actors, both regional and international.

Given the central geo-political position, with regional dynamics that alert swift dramatic changes, the potential impact on the Kurdish issue in Turkey might be very profound, also considering the Kurdish population (app. 30 million) disseminated in a very much chaotic and instable Middle Eastern area, specifically in Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. So, the latest flame of developments in the Arabian Peninsula led to unstable conditions that were highly conducive to power/role shifts for the actors in the region. The latest process actually began in the last days of 2012 but declared during the 2013 Newroz celebrations in Diyarbakir Province in a direct message announced by BDP members.

Ocalan also made a call for a ceasefire and withdrawal of armed militants out of Turkish territory. Withdrawal started in spring 2013, but was interrupted shortly after (after 20 % withdrawal) by the PKK claiming government's inaction (toward certain reforms and continuation of KCK arrests) while ceasefire continued. In the latest Newroz, on 21 March 2015, Ocalan called for a more concrete step in the resolution process. He urged the PKK to hold a new and transformational Congress (just as the 7th congress for KADEK and KONGRA-GEL) to declare they would lay down their arms and shift to nonviolent political means in their campaign. Since then, the resolution process has been underway with certain incompatibilities and problems, which are beyond this chapter's scope.

Conclusion

While Kurdish dissent is a deep-rooted issue in Turkey that dates back to the Ottoman times, Turkey's recent history has been critically dominated by the PKK insurrection. Turkey, characterized as a "nation-state" model, responded with intense repression and securitization toward the PKK insurrection. All its macro level counterterrorism jargon and policies were designed to exterminate the PKK and incapacitate PKK militants. With a military-led effort in an enemy-centric approach, Turkey harshly quelled the PKK on the battlefield and overturned the PKK's Maoist approach for revolution. Next, Ocalan was captured and the Turkish Government misinterpreted the military defeat of the PKK and incarceration of its founding leader as factors that would lead the group's total demise in a gradual way.

However, all harsh responses have had collateral damages on the civilian society and the PKK's popular support and social engagement have increased (Unal 2012b). The PKK dramatically shifted to reaching its goal over indirect means, rather than a direct guerilla fight, attempted and proven unsuccessful in the pre-1994 period. The PKK engaged in a political campaign and its military effort was only designed to keep its threat on the government's agenda for reconciliation. With strong social and political engagement via its new umbrella structure of the KCK, the PKK heavily urbanized its activities and became more effective in challenging Turkey, compared to its sole guerilla approach.

The PKK conflict has been dominated by the domestic, regional, and international dynamics in the entire span of the PKK uprising, however, with varying scales in different periods/phases of the evolution of the conflict. In the initial period of the confrontation phase, between 1984 and 1994, the military fight had been the determinant factor and, except for the impacts of the Gulf War in 1991, this process had been influenced and limited by the domestic/national dynamics. Once the PKK perceived its military defeat in 1994, it realized that its unilateral available military means were not sufficient to realize its main goal in a top-down approach. The PKK gradually shifted to a bottom-up approach in which its "political" characteristics started to gain more prominence over its "military" role. After the PKK strived to survive against Turkish Army's intense military operation between 1992 and 1999, the main dynamics of the conflict were highly internationalized. After Ocalan's capture in 1999, the PKK strived to maintain political recognition in Europe and transformed and renamed (KADEK in 2002 and KONGRA-GEL in 2003) itself twice by ceasing and denying the use of violence, respectively. In that, PKK aimed to coerce Turkey into a political compromise through international pressure.

Later in the process, the PKK got back to national context and started to employ violence not for the territorial victory, as they did until 1994, but for forcing Turkey into a negotiated settlement. Between 2004 and 2007 PKK exploited violence to keep its threat within the government's priority agenda for political reconciliation. Turkey has perceived that despite the PKK's military defeat, ending or significantly marginalizing PKK violence is not feasible with its unilateral means. Once having recognized the costly deadlock and mutually hurting stalemate, Turkey engaged in a conflict resolution effort and commenced backchannel talks with Ocalan in Imrali Island, where he has been incarcerated since his capture. Since then, failing once in 2011, Turkey has been pursuing a negotiated settlement with the PKK (Unal 2016a).

What is really important is what factor(s) played the determinant role behind Turkey's paradigm shift. First, from heavy military action counterterrorism (Iron Fist) in 1984–2002 to a population-centric approach to focus on mitigating the motive by applying certain accommodative social and political reforms toward Kurdish identity. Secondly, in 2007 it shifted to conflict management and then, lately and finally, to resolution. In addition to the costly deadlock/stalemate, the opportunity cost and potential power shifts in the developments of the Middle East Region have been determinant factors for Turkey's effort. Particularly, the PKK and affiliated groups (PYD) that took on an effective role in the Syrian civil war against ISIS set the foundation for potentially being recognized as a legitimate international actor against the ISIS.

With all the aforementioned developments, the PYD's (aka Syrian PKK) controlling northern Syria has made the PKK a "territorial insurgency," which has provided a legitimate safe haven for the PKK in Northern Syria in addition to the ungoverned space in the Northern Iraq soil. Secondly, a negotiated settlement with the PKK has—to some extent—become beyond the Turkey's initiative with the recent developments in the region. However, recent developments such as the Syrian Civil War culminated in not only instability in the region, but also induced new roles and power shifts toward PKK affiliated Kurdish groups—holding de facto autonomy in

the northern Syria bordering Turkey's south—due to the international actions against the terrorist organization ISIS. With regard to these developments, the PKK embraced regional dynamics in its actions and the PKK's strategic moves are no longer comprised only of actions toward Turkey, but also towards the actors either within the region, or international actors that are influential in the region, i.e., USA, Iran, Assad Regime in Syria, the PYD, the KDP, and so forth.

As a result, countering a violent uprising is a complex phenomenon and the conception of what the threat/problem is equally important as how that uprising should be curbed. Despite the fact that the PKK raised a highly insurgent appeal, Turkey ignored such characteristics and for a long time implemented solely an iron-fist counterterrorism approach. What these policies have had an impact on, however, is not only the level of violence, as aimed by the policy makers, but also on the ethnic consciousness and popular support toward the PKK in a counterproductive (increasing).

This has enabled the PKK to remain in a long-lasting, prolonged insurgent campaign. As is known, long and protracted asymmetric fights tend to favor insurgents in development and then in coercing governments' into political concession, as demonstrated in the Turkish case. Turkey should have been much more attentive toward the population that is sympathetic to the PKK in order to decrease active and passive support, which in other words means implementing policies to remove legitimate grievances from the beginning while maintaining public safety, security, and order. To mitigate tensions and insurrection, a sensitive counterinsurgency campaign, including social and political reforms and programs, should have been adopted and security applications and level of use of force should have also been kept in a delicate balance, to avoid a counterproductive impact.

Recently, Turkey's struggle against the PKK has gained more prominence as it has the potential to influence and to be influenced by developments in the Middle East and international actors' foreign policies in the region. Turkey's Kurdish question is now more complex and multidimensional. More variables, initiatives, and power relations are involved, fact that, on one hand, forces Turkey to a resolution, and, on the other, induces certain parameters that destabilize the resolution process, as these recent developments induce interrelated power relations among various actors. Finally, dynamics among international actors and regional developments play the most prominent role in Turkey's Kurdish question, more than ever in its history, and they present a much higher complexity in solution, due to the increased number of parameters, actors, and power relations in the Middle East Region.

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Chapter 16
Fighting Terrorism Through Community Policing

Ali Sevinc and Ahmet Guler

Introduction

Terrorism is one of the most important issues for governments and their security organizations due to its political and dangerous nature for societies. To protect their countries and citizens, governments engage in tireless efforts to shape effective counterterrorism policies. Terrorism remains an eminent threat for societies, thereby keeping counterterrorism policies significant at the top of governments' agendas. Although counterterrorism policies have brought about new burdens for governments' budgets, policymakers continue to try to minimize terrorist attacks against their countries with support from their citizens. As key players of counterterrorism policies, law enforcement agencies adjust their policies and practices according to society's urgent needs. Terrorism, as an imminent threat for democratic societies and modern governments, has become the most important issue for law enforcement agencies since 9/11 and other terrorist incidents in Western countries in the beginning of the twenty-first century. All these tragic events have forced governments and their law enforcement organizations to shift their attention from local crime problems to national and even international crime problems.

Because of terrorism's immanency and urgency, counterterrorism policies have gained more importance and required more government resources in the last decade. Police departments have to adjust their policies and strategies according to the new era, which is commonly called "the war on terror era." Thus, police departments have started to prioritize counterterrorism policies rather than community policing

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programs (Friedmann and Cannon 2007). Community policing as a novel approach to traditional policing has brought several benefits to police departments in crime fighting. Police departments have started to implement preventive crime-fighting strategies in order to develop reciprocal relationships with communities, use problem-solving tactics, and cooperate with all stakeholders in the community. Being proactive against crime has created fewer problems and fewer complaints from community members, thereby resulting in better satisfaction and improved relationships with the police (U.S. Department of Justice 1994). Therefore, police departments have had to make trades between community policing and counterterrorism when deciding where to allocate their resources.

An ongoing debate in the literature focuses on the opportunity of using community policing strategies in the fight against terrorism. Although some researchers (Docobo 2005; Kelling and Bratton 2006; Morreale and Lambert 2012) argue that community policing strategies and tactics can assist law enforcement organizations in supporting homeland security policies, others (De Guzman 2002; Murray 2005) state that these two policies have different agendas and cannot be converged to benefit each other. Proponents of using community policing in counterterrorism state that police departments can benefit from community policing to prevent possible terrorist attacks by gathering intelligence and informing citizens to increase their awareness against suspicious activities in their community. On the other hand, critics believe that community policing has a different philosophy, which was created to solve local crime issues in the community; thus, it does not fit the goals of national counterterrorism policies. These critics believe that community policing can even create more problems in communities when used to respond to terrorism. Related to the dynamic discussion in the literature, we will present a case from Turkey where community policing is used to alleviate the terrorism problem in the southeastern region of the country. In this chapter, we will first briefly review the literature on community policing and counterterrorism and their joint applications in the field, then the research methodology, findings, and analysis of the case will be presented, along with a discussion of using community policing in the fight against terrorism.

Literature Review

Community Policing

As one of the contemporary policing approaches, community policing first emerged in the 1970s as "community policing" or "community-oriented policing." The community policing concept reached its popularity and became a widespread term used in the criminal justice field in the late 1990s. Community policing demonstrates an inevitable shift in American policing history. Political, economic, and social structures forced this change (Kappeler and Gaines 2009). In the 1970s, the Civil Rights movement was in full swing in the United States. People protested against the government, demanding equal rights for all people, regardless of race, ethnicity, or

gender, and an end to discrimination. In addition, intensive demonstrations related to the Vietnam War were taking place. When new so of the Watergate scandal broke, people lost their trust and confidence in the government. As a result, the confrontation between the police and people in negative conditions ruined the police and public relations and created an abyss (U.S. Department of Justice 1973). In addition, the technological developments in police institutions and crime-fighting applications weakened the face-to-face contact between police and the public. In order to find solutions to these problems, police departments started to adopt a community policing philosophy in their policies and practices.

Several studies were conducted to define the effectiveness of these new policing practices. Foot patrols were tested in Newark, New Jersey, and Flint, Michigan, while problem-solving projects were carried out in Newport News, Virginia, and Houston, Texas. The results showed that community policing practices decreased the public's fear of crime and increased the public's satisfaction with police efforts (Kappeler and Gaines 2009). In addition, positive developments took place in terms of police behavior toward the community, and police officers' morale and job satisfaction increased.

Trojanowicz (1983) described community policing as a new philosophy and institutional strategy aiming to form a new partnership between police and their community. According to this new approach, police and the community should work together to solve problems such as crime, drug addiction, fear of crime, social and physical disorderliness, and disturbances threatening individuals' quality of life. In this approach, people not only wait for police intervention, but also handle social security problems with police by taking the initiative personally and collectively. According to the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) 2011), community policing comprises four key elements: (1) community partnership, (2) organizational transformation, (3) problem solving, and (4) crime prevention.

Community policing has become one of the most prevalent crime-fighting strategies not only in the United States, but also in countries throughout the world (Dammer and Albanese 2013). Police departments in different countries started to use the novel policing approach in order to improve police–community relations to prevent and solve security problems cooperatively and collaboratively with the public.

The Problem of Terrorism

Terrorism has had devastating effects on people's lives psychologically, sociologically, and economically for several decades. It has continued to steal the lives and hopes of people. Today, terrorism threats go beyond the borders and do not discriminate against targets according to their religion, language, color, sex, or race. Ethnic terrorism is defined as systematic violence acts committed by any ethnic group(s) who aims to divide the society or separate part of the area and eventually create an independent structure (White 2013). Ethnic groups allege that they differ from the

majority in terms of race, religion, or culture (Alkan 2002). Regional ethnic groups in different parts of the world have mostly been fighting against state authorities to achieve national authority or possess an independent territory. After studying regions suffering violence and terrorist attacks, Yilmaz (2007) classified the reasons for ethnic conflicts according to seven factors: (1) the desire for the expression of ethnic identity, (2) discrimination (real or perceived), (3) the nature of the regime and social culture, (4) unfair distribution of the revenues and unfavorable economic conditions, (5) the collapse of the central authority, (6) historical traumas, and (7) international interferences.

Research conducted on Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a separatist terrorist organization in Turkey, shows that victimization psychology is one of the most prominent factors among the Kurdish people. Deprivations, poverty, grievances, and negative propaganda related to existing conditions have fostered a sense of discrimination and increased the sense of belonging to the ethnic identity. The greater the degree of victimization or historical traumas experienced, the stronger the influence of propaganda on ethnic groups. Similarly, a feeling of injustice, a feeling of exclusion, and inequalities have produced a sense of alienation among society (Ozdemir 2012). A study conducted on the Kurdish people in the city of Van revealed that a high unemployment rate raises sympathy for the PKK and incites ethnic-based separatist ideas among the Kurdish people (Okyar and Gunes 2012). In addition, some studies have stressed that the humiliation and mistreatment at the hands of security forces while in custody or in prison have strengthened the attachment of persons to PKK (Teymur 2007).

For terrorist organizations, permanent recruitment and acquisition of new members to the organization is vital for survival. They use all kinds of arguments and methods as long as they are in favor of them (Bal 2006; Koseli 2012). Terrorist organizations do not avoid speculation on controversial subjects or creating disadvantages in society. Alkan (2009) stated that PKK, like many other terrorist organizations, first connects with young people through friendships and domestic relationships. They then extend their interactions to include social and cultural activities. Finally, face-to-face interactions, qualified associations, and shares are applied. The PKK intensively uses the media, including social media, the Internet, and social club and unions in Turkey (Koseli 2012). Eventually, terrorist organizations try to entice the trapped cadets ideologically. This step is defined as "reconstructing identity" and "gaining a new belonging" (Alkan 2009).

Counterterrorism Policies

The literature defines two main policies in combatting terrorism. Two strategies are described under different dichotomies—namely, "war on terror–criminal justice model" (Crelinsten 2014), "hard power–soft power" (Nye 2011), "realism–idealism" (Sandole 2010), and "fighting against terrorist–fighting against terrorism" (Bal 2002). The frontline combat methods represent harsh and

repressive strategies intensively applied by the military, police, and intelligence services. Maltreatment, human rights violations, unlawful practices, and unsolved murders are very common in hard power policies. In fact, governments consciously close their eyes so as not to see antidemocratic applications. Struggles against terrorists or terrorist organizations are the focal point, and fighting the ideology of terrorism and the factors fostering and deteriorating the problem are neglected. Social, economic, political, cultural, and historical causes/arguments that are likely to trigger the terrorism are not considered. Both the terrorists and the sympathizers are categorized as "enemies." Each terrorist attack breeds new harsher security precautions or operations. Such hard power strategies usually lead to negative outcomes—that is, increasing terrorist activities—as the terrorist organizations use the illegalities as a tool for anti-propaganda against the community (Ekici 2010; Sandole 2010; Teymur 2007).

Sandole (2010) asserted that there are three ways to fight terrorism, focusing on the level of (1) symptoms, (2) relations, and (3) deep-rooted causes. According to Sandole, combatting terrorism today is performed based on the level of symptoms and considered within the frame of real politic. However, methods for the third category focus on the root causes of the problem. In other words, these strategies are an effort to dry out the swamp instead of fight the mosquitos (Bal 2006). The struggle against terrorism aims to reach a consistent and long-term solution. Instead of the military using repressive and harsh methods, the goal is to implement democratic reforms, legal arrangements, social and cultural initiatives, and economic investments (Cinoglu 2010). International initiatives also propose that governments remain a frame of universal standards, including transparency, accountability, human rights, and rule of law, when combatting terrorism and seek a national and international consensus by appealing to civil initiatives.

The best way to combat terrorism is by fighting against both terrorist organizations and the ideology of terrorism. By staying in a frame of democracy and following the rule of law, governments can establish Special Forces and equip them with modern equipment and high technology weapons under the title of counterterrorism. For example, governments can strengthen their intelligence services, use drones, take measures to cut the financial support of illegal organizations, and enact essential legislation for counterterrorism. Focusing exclusively on fighting terrorists is wrong while focusing only on fighting terrorism is inadequate and deficient given that the terrorist organizations will try to show soft power applications as weaknesses of the governments. Terrorist organizations try to introduce idealistic and excessively accommodating approaches as their success achieved through their fight (Bal 2006). Hence, there is a risk of losing community support for the government. Hard power strategies, as long as they remain in the frame of democracy, are a sort of insurance and a protective shield for long-term soft power practices. Nevertheless, combatting the ideology of terrorism (i.e., soft power policies) should be the priority of the governments. As defined by Nye (2011), smart power seems the best strategy in counterterrorism which requires the ability to combine hard power and soft power strategies effectively.

Community Policing in Counterterrorism

Under the soft power policies at the macro level, community policing is an extremely effective option at the local level. During the last few decades, as scholars have claimed that this philosophy gives more chances for police to counterterrorism, police practitioners have sought to conduct projects to confirm this idea. For example, Pickering et al. (2008) interviewed and surveyed police officers, community representatives, and ordinary citizens to explore the role of community policing in combatting terrorism in the state of Victoria in Australia. According to their results, most informants perceived community policing to be an important tool in counterterrorism. Citizens are satisfied with the works of multicultural liaison officers (MLOs) and believe that community policing programs improve the trust between the police and community as well as strengthen the legitimacy of police. People have also suggested that police should boost their cultural literacy.

According to Sandole (2010), a comprehensive approach that concentrates on the root causes of problem and involved multiple actors and functions is required to combat terrorism and violent acts. In this respect, the philosophy of community policing is a useful and effective tool that functions at the local level. In other words, community policing practices help police prevent security problems before coming off the hinges by controlling the heartbeat of the local community. Intelligence gathering via community policing does not involve the same risk as traditional and known methods as it is based on trust and community participation (Pickering et al. 2008).

Based on his study conducted with neighborhood officers working in large-, medium-, and small-scale police departments in the United Kingdom, Innes (2006) emphasized the role of community policing in being aware of local problems. Positive and warm relations between police and the community will impair the influence of slander and invalidate black propaganda put forth by terrorist organizations (Scheider and Chapman 2003). Community policing programs bring people—all relevant public and private sectors—around a platform. Hence, it helps police determine the risk factors, discuss the pertinent details, and find solutions collectively. Collective work also makes remarkable contributions to the stages of crisis prevention and crisis intervention into probable terror threats (Scheider and Chapman 2003). It is an effective aspect in combatting terrorism as it is an output that prevents alienation and strengthens partnership (Cinoglu 2010). In addition, the community policing approach accelerates democratic principles such as public participation, transparency, and accountability in daily life (Gozubenli 2008). Police under the civil control mechanism will be more careful about respecting people's fundamental rights and freedoms.

Hindering the recruitment process of terrorist organizations and eliminating the excuses that are likely to push people—particularly young generations—into the arms of the terrorist organization are at the heart of combatting terrorism. As the community policing approach prioritizes preventive measures, it concentrates on children and teenagers for programs (Alkan 2009). In addition, promoting

community participation by creating social cohesion and decreasing the fear of crime will facilitate efforts to abolish the main causes of terrorism (Scheider and Chapman 2003).

Several examples illustrate the positive results of the Turkish version of community policing programs implemented to fight terrorism. Dikici (2008) studied community policing projects conducted between 2002 and 2006 in Sanliurfa, one of the cities in southeastern Turkey. He found that 12 out of 50 parents with whom police experts intensively made contact persuaded their sons/daughters who were among the active armed militants to surrender. Fifty-five guttersnipes were saved from street and illegalities and guided to school or a profession by means of an educational project. Among 80 drug-addicted juveniles, 71 were recovered via another project. In general, crime rates committed by youths decreased by 57 %, and victimized youth rates diminished by 43 % from 2002 to 2006. Alkan (2009) mentioned one program involving intensive negotiations with parents of armed PKK militants; 64 militants capitulated as a result of the program carried out through 2006 and 2007.

The city of Diyarbakır in Turkey is at the center of the terrorism. Street demonstrations and violent acts have been intense in this city. In 2005, the community policing program aimed to ameliorate the relations between police and tradesmen in Diyarbakır. Police reached out to tradesmen via visits and serial meetings, listened to their security problems, and informed them about all kinds of threats. According to the results, in 2007, beyond the positive feedback from approximately 90 % pf the participants, two large extortions were solved, and demonstrations provoked by PKK were prevented. In addition, thanks to connections with the community policing programs, the number of emergency calls for police increased significantly (Gozubenli 2008).

Akbulut and Beren (2012) revealed that community policing projects raise the sensitivity of people who have attended any kind of activity. People start to take precautions not to fall victim to terror. They also stressed that community policing projects are a distinctive sign of the shift in Turkey's counterterror strategies, showing a transition from a splintered to holistic campaign as well as a shift from punitive-oriented strategies to exhilarative-centered strategies when combatting terrorism.

Community policing programs in counterterrorism have largely satisfied the police and security bureaucracy. However, it is not free from problems and criticisms. Not all police officers and divisions believe in the usefulness of the programs or support them. The lack of information and police officers' prejudices sometimes upset the applecart by mistake (Gozubenli and Akbas 2009). In addition, officers from other public sectors and the local community may not be fully ready to participate in the community policing programs due to previous negative experiences and fear of the PKK. Durna (2008) pointed out the lack of a comprehensive and systematic approach in community policing projects conducted to combat terrorism in general.

Research Methodology

This chapter uses a case study research methodology to explain the use of community policing strategies against terrorism in the southeast region of Turkey. According to Yin (2003), case study is an appropriate research methodology for conducting explanatory studies to get answers to the questions of "why" and "how." The data for this case come from two different sources: interviews and official documents and reports. Interviews were conducted to understand what police officers think about the role of community policing in counterterrorism; official documents and reports gave us an idea about the organizational perspective of the research subject.

In the current study, we sought to explore the effectiveness of community policing in counterterrorism from the perspective of police officers working in the southeast region of Turkey. We conducted semi-structured interviews with police officers from community policing divisions and counterterrorism divisions of police departments in the southeast region of Turkey. To define our sample, we used a snowball sampling strategy until we reached 37 police officers in the summer of 2012. Our interviews were mostly face-to-face, but seven interviews were done by phone. All the interviews were recorded after getting permission from respondents and then transcribed verbatim. During interviews, we generally asked open-ended questions to give respondents the opportunity to speak about the case. Most interviews took 30 min to 2 h.

In order to get a sense of the organizational perspective of using community policing in counterterrorism, we reviewed written records, official correspondences between divisions and departments, related fact sheets given by the respondents, and reports. More importantly, we analyzed community policing projects initiated by the city police departments in the last decades to understand how community policing activities were correlated with counterterrorism efforts in the region.

To analyze our qualitative data, we used coding methods explained by Strauss and Corbin (1998): open coding, axial coding, and selective coding. In the open coding, the researcher codes the emerging categories according to their properties and dimensions in order to conceptualize the data. In this first phase, we defined emerging codes in the data to group similar items according to their properties and dimensions. Meanwhile, axial coding is a process of developing and relating categories (Strauss and Corbin 1998:142). In the axial coding phase, we defined subcategories under the major categories by reading the notes again and again and reviewing the codebook several times in order to categorize the codes systematically. Finally, according to Strauss and Corbin (1998:143), selective coding is the process of integrating and refining the theory. In this last phase, we analyzed the codes again in order to find the core category in the last step of the coding process. This iterative process of data analysis provided us with a better sense when explaining the relationship between community policing and terrorism in the data we collected.

We encountered some limitations in this study. First, this study used data collected from interviews with police officers working in different cities in southeastern Turkey. This approach raises the issue of the objectivity of the data.

Therefore, readers should approach the findings as subjective understandings of police officers. Second, although this study included 37 interviews from different cities in southeastern Turkey, we cannot generalize the findings of this study to other police departments. Because of the nature of qualitative research, it is up to readers to assess the extent to which findings from this study can be generalized to other settings according to their knowledge and experience. Finally, being police members and having good connections in the TNP facilitated our access to police departments; it also bears the risk of going too native in our research. Therefore, the results of our research should be approached by considering these limitations.

Case Study

The Problem of Terrorism in Turkey

Turkey has been struggling with the problem of terrorism since the 1980s. The PKK was established by Abdullah Ocalan and his close friends in Diyarbakir in 1978. Adopting Marxist and Leninist ideologies, the PKK's main objective is to establish "Great Kurdistan" as an independent state stretching over the territories of Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran, where the Kurdish people live (Roth and Sever 2007). During the first years of its establishment, the PKK trained many Kurdish youths in order to increase the manpower of its militant army in the training camps located in southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq. In order to start a separatist campaign against the Turkish government, the PKK waged guerilla warfare tactics in the mid-1980s and tried to establish some authority over the Kurdish population living in southeastern Turkey. Initially, Turkish authorities were surprised and shocked by the PKK's insurgency movement, and Turkish security forces were not ready for this kind of guerrilla warfare. This initial shock and unpreparedness of Turkish authorities provided a tactical advantage for the PKK, whose members started to frighten and suppress people living in the region in order to dictate the organization's objectives and goals. Through its pursuit of offensive guerilla warfare and its blind terrorism tactics (White 2013), the PKK experienced relative success in its campaign, attracted more than 10,000 armed militants and sufficient financial resources for its activities in the first years of the 1990s (Alkan 2009). However, Turkish security forces gained some experience in fighting terrorism and started to develop different strategies and tactics against the PKK in the mid-1990s. Special forces in Turkish security organizations were established to fight terrorism, and modern equipment and weapons were provided by the government to ensure success in counterterrorism efforts. In order to reassert the government's authority in the southeast region, these special units carried out critical operations against the PKK targets, which forced the PKK to find different ways to continue their campaign, and they started using urban fighting tactics in terrorism, such as suicide bombings in Turkey's metropolitan cities (Bal 2006).

In addition to using the military in counterterrorism, the Turkish government adopted some diplomatic efforts to fight terrorism. Specifically, the Turkish government persistently urged the Syrian government to deport Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK's founder, who lived in Syria for more than 20 years between 1978 and 1998. Eventually, the Syrian government forced him to leave the country. With the imperative assistance of American intelligence, Turkish officials captured Abdullah Ocalan in Kenya and brought him to Turkey for trial in February 1999 (Rubin and Kirisci 2001). Although some terrorist attacks happened when Abdullah Ocalan was captured, the PKK started to change its strategy in 2000. Since the imprisonment of their leader and the new counterterrorism atmosphere in the world after 9/11, the PKK has adopted political strategies using less violent tactics to continue its campaign in the beginning of millennium.

However, the conflict started to heat up in 2004 because the PKK saw the American invasion of Iraq as an unprecedented opportunity to reignite the insurgency in the region (Marcus 2007). The PKK ended the ceasefire and regrouped its militants to start attacks. Returning to warfare increased the death tolls on both sides, and the problem became worse. In order to alleviate the chronic problem and find solutions, the Turkish government started to use soft power strategies to fight terrorism. After observing the ineffectiveness of using only hard power against terrorism, the Turkish government initiated several political reforms in major policy areas such as education, ethnicity, language, and human rights (Guler and Kula 2014).

The Turkish government adopted nine democratization packages to improve the human rights of its citizens. Most of the changes aimed to alleviate the problem in southeastern Turkey by giving more rights to the people demanding them living in this region. Major examples of reforms included ratifying the Kurdish language in public places, allowing the broadcast of Kurdish TV and radio, opening Kurdish language courses, and releasing Kurdish political figures from the prison (Ciftci and Kula 2015). In addition, the Turkish government made economic investments, initiated social projects, and enacted legal regulations.

Although police and military forces started to pay attention to their behavior in legal and democratic practices, the government created commissions and opened an investigation to disclose the unsolved murders that happened during the 1990s. All these efforts created a positive atmosphere in the region, and the PKK started to lose its ground among the Kurdish population.

To benefit from this optimistic environment, the Turkish government announced its new policy: "Democratic Opening." Several peace talks were realized between government delegates and Kurdish politicians to agree on a road map to solve the problems. Although these efforts were applauded by the European Union, the United States, and other international organizations, the pace of the process is still volatile and fragile. Based on progress made to date, success seems very difficult to achieve for both parties in the peace process and has even been halted by delegates.

In summary, we can divide the Turkish government's counterterrorism strategies against the PKK into three different phases (Durna 2008): reactive precautions, preventive precautions, and democratization projects. As previously explained, reactive precautions were developed during the early stages of the PKK, especially from its establishment of 1978 to the mid-1990s. Preventive precautions were initiated by

the government between the mid-1990s and the beginning of millennium. The last phase, the democratization projects, was launched to expand freedoms and improve human rights conditions in the country. As previously discussed, although different strategies were developed to respond to terrorism in southeastern Turkey, the conflict remains and peace talks between parties hang by a thread.

Community Policing in Turkey

Although some community-oriented programs in the Turkish criminal justice system date back to the 1990s, the idea of community policing as an official program first emerged in 2002 (EGM 2007). In order to gain full-membership, Turkish public organizations engaged in several twinning projects with the EU. In 2003, the TNP initiated a twinning project with Spain in order to improve its accountability, performance, and effectiveness. One of the main pillars of this project was community policing. As a result of this project, the TNP started a new community policing initiative that included essential changes in its structure, policies, and practices in 2006 (Gokkaya and Dogan 2009).

In addition to enacting community policing bylaws and creating a comprehensive action plan to implement community policing throughout the country, the TNP did extensive in-service trainings for police officers to prepare them for a mentality change in policing. In order to achieve success in the field, the TNP took an incremental approach to implement the change in community policing, starting with the establishment of new community policing units in ten city police departments as pilot projects in 2006. After making the necessary changes based on feedback from city police departments in the pilot project, the TNP completed its structural reform in community policing by disseminating the community policing initiative to its 81 police departments throughout the country in 2009 (Uluturk et al. 2014).

Although community policing started as a top-down initiative as a twinning project of the EU, it resulted in relatively successful outcomes, especially in reestablishing police and community relations, reducing crime, and decreasing fear of crime. City police departments have implemented several projects to find ways to create partnerships in the fight against crime (Gokkaya and Dogan 2009). These projects include community meetings; informative visits to schools, local businesses, and NGOs, and face-to-face interactions with citizens.

During these activities, while community policing officers get a chance to inform citizens about current crime issues in the community and effective self-crime prevention techniques, citizens also have the opportunity to discuss local security problems and share their concerns with police officers. Community policing officers also arrange social and sporting activities in their communities in order to create comradery among community members, develop better relationships between police and citizens, and find alternative ways to reach citizens. Furthermore, most city police departments' community policing units also join wedding ceremonies and funerals, attend business startup events, and participate in other community activities in order to share the happiness and sorrows of their community.

Although the community policing initiative has a nationwide application with the oversight from TNP Headquarters, it has created variations according to local needs of Turkish citizens. Community policing programs in the western part of the country focus on crime prevention, improved police–community relationships, and the reduction of fear of crime; in the eastern part of the country, they are designed to improve relations between police and community to reestablish trust and peace, decrease insurgency, and hinder radicalization among youth as terrorism is a critical phenomenon for the region (Yıldız and Sahin 2010). When TNP established community policing as a nationwide strategy in 2009, most city police departments in the eastern and southeastern parts of country interpreted this program as a new approach to handle the issue of terrorism. As briefly summarized previously, terrorism is the most important crime problem in the eastern and southeastern parts of Turkey.

City police departments have used community policing program as a window of opportunity in fighting terrorism. They started several community development programs using the funds allocated for regional social development from the government. Specifically, city police departments' community policing units in the region initiated several projects focused on juveniles and youths in order to prevent them from radicalizing terrorism and joining terrorist organizations. They initiated several activities, such as sports tournaments, sightseeing visits, social programs and conferences, seminars, and some courses aiming to improve school success, gain a profession, and enlighten the people while creating a positive relationship between the police and juveniles.

Moreover, some community policing programs were initiated to identify and assist poor people in order to gain the hearts of people living in the area. All these efforts by city police departments in the region built better relationships not only between the police and the community, but also between the government and its citizens. Citizens' perception of the police equates to their perception of the government (Dikici 2008). Thus, this case provides us with a valuable example for understanding the role of community policing in counterterrorism.

In the remaining part of this study, we will analyze the data collected during our research from the police officers working in city police departments' community policing units or engaging in community policing projects in the region. We will look at the case from the police officers' perspective and try to understand how they see the aims of the projects, the community policing efforts, and their results. The types of issues and problems that come into play when community policing is used as a strategy to fight terrorism will be also discussed to illustrate the role of community policing in counterterrorism.

Findings

This section presents the analysis of interview data collected from police officers working in the southeast region of Turkey. In order to understand the role of community policing in counterterrorism, we asked several questions of our informants related to their perception about how the community sees the state and the police,

how they see the conflict between the state and the terrorist organization, how police officers perceive the problem of terrorism, the role of community policing in counterterrorism, and what types of issues and problems arise when implementing community policing against terrorism.

Perceptions About the Problem of Terrorism

Police officers believe that the relationship between citizens and the government is very poor due to the terrorism in the region. Citizens do not trust their government because of mistakes made by public officials in the past. Government counterterrorism policies are perceived to be discriminatory, and the distrust between citizens and government has gradually worsened due to harsh and ill-defined policies in the past. Thus, police officers think that the most critical point in counterterrorism is to find ways to reignite the positive relationship between the citizens and the state.

According to the police officers, the problem is not specifically between the police and citizens, but rather between the citizens and the state. According to citizens' cultural understanding, the police are the state or the state is the police. Thus, police officers see their roles as representatives of the state and think they serve as the most visible apparatus of the state in the region. To police, their image is not positive. People have mostly negative images of the police; young generations in particular see the police as "rude, ruthless, swearers, beaters, fascists, and even the enemy of the Kurdish people."

Most officers believe that the negative image of the police can be repaired and improved through community policing programs, which serve as a catalyst to develop better relations or even try to understand each other. Emphatic feelings and mutual understanding between communities and the state are developed through community policing programs. Meetings in positive, sincere, and warm conditions will surely bring mutual understanding and then cooperation against terrorism. We will explain police officers' perceptions of the role of community policing in a separate section below.

Positive Perceptions of Community Policing

Police officers mentioned different activities of their departments under the community policing philosophy. When we analyze these programs, we can classify them as informative activities, family visits, tradesman visits, educational activities, social and sportive activities, and helping the poor. In informative activities, police officers try to reach youths—mostly students at schools—in order to provide information on topics such as crime prevention, drug addiction, terrorism, and self-development (e.g., career planning, job preparation, and good citizenship). Police officers visit families in their homes in order to create a positive connection between the police and the community.

During these visits, police officers try to understand the problems the families are facing in the neighborhood in terms of crime or other issues related to governmental services. Police officers also share their contact information with the family in case they need help in the future. In addition, police officers visit families whose children have joined a terrorist organization or run the risk of joining terrorist activities. Thus, police officers have the chance to engage in face-to-face interactions with family members to persuade families to call their children back from the terrorist organization or explain to them the risk of engaging in terrorist activities. Moreover, police officers visit tradesmen in their shops to share concerns related to crime and other issues. They give them brochures, pamphlets, and other informative papers to raise local businessmen's awareness of crime.

The other community policing activity is educational programs for youths. Police officers arrange courses for students in order to prepare them for university exams and other school exams. They also offer self-development courses on topics such as computers and foreign languages. These courses are held after school or on weekends and are free of charge for participants. Police departments contact city education departments in order to offer these courses for youth. Police officers think that most students who join these courses do not have the opportunity to participate in these kinds of activities due to financial hardship, and they become an easy target for terrorist organizations. These courses create opportunities for youth to stay away from illegal activities while assisting them to continue their education at the university level. Moreover, some of these courses are specifically designed to find a job after graduating from high school. Thus, youth participants have chances to develop skills and prepare themselves for the job.

Social and sporting activities are arranged by police officers to develop comradery and trust between the community and the police. The most often mentioned social activities were sightseeing tours for students; picnics; theater and movie shows; poetry, art, and article contests; reading contests; and planting trees with students. Sporting activities are mostly soccer tournaments among teams from the community, governmental agencies, and the police departments. Such activities have opened the possibility for out-of-town journeys, sister schools, and sister city practices. Thanks to these activities, both Kurdish teenagers and Turkish teenagers from eastern cities have had the chance to meet and understand each other. They are able to realize that all young people are a part of same homeland and can be friends. Hence, they break the prejudices promoted by terrorist organizations and build permanent friendships. They also see that their ancestors saved and established the same homeland together when they visit historical places where battle of independence took place.

The last activity mentioned by police officers is helping the poor people in the community. Police officers believe that one of the reasons that people living in the region join terrorist organizations is that they are poor and unemployed. When individuals are unemployed, they do not have many options socially and, thus, join terrorist organizations to get financial support. As a result, police officers try to help poor people develop better relationships with the community to prevent people from joining terrorist organizations due to financial hardship. Police officers deliver food,

clothes, school supplies, and other materials to poor people in their community through collaborations with other government agencies, NGOs, and local businessmen.

Police officers see community policing programs as a new way of reaching citizens who are resentful and disrespectful of the state. They believe that community policing can close the gap between citizens and the government by initiating contacts and connections with them. Community policing can assist in abolishing prejudice against the state in the minds of citizens, and citizens might change their biases if they see positive behaviors from the police. Community policing can even help eliminate propaganda tools used by terrorist organizations to justify their violent activities. If community policing programs reach all segments of society and can bring about changes in the minds of citizens, the problem of terrorism can be alleviated or even resolved.

When we asked our informants about the public's perceptions of community policing projects, they mentioned positive feedback. The police officers explained that citizens in their communities initially had negative views about the police due to the issues of terrorism in the region. When they started community policing programs, they started to see some resistance from community members in terms of engaging in activities due to mistrust and insecurity. However, as community policing practices were applied persistently over time, community engagement grew, and the programs started to serve as an icebreaker between the community and police.

The police officers believe that most citizens are happy with community policing programs and new police approaches even though they do not join activities and stay away from the police due to fears of retaliation and pressure from terrorist organizations. As one officer explained: *One day, a man came to the office and said "I came to thank to you because of your care for my girl at high school. However, I looked over my shoulder three times before coming into the police department to be sure I was not followed by the members of terrorist organization. I am patriotic, but I fear contact with you."*

In fact, terrorist organizations do not like the community policing approach because it works against their goals and objectives. Community policing programs create positive feelings and better relationships with citizens living in the region. Terrorist organizations cannot generate negative propaganda about the police because they lose most arguments against the police and the government. According to intelligence reports, community policing creates discomfort among terrorist members because they see the closeness between the community and the police, built through community policing, as a threat to their activities.

When we asked about the results of community policing, the police officers mentioned several positive results. First, community policing creates trust and better relationships with citizens. Thus, they can easily approach police when they have an issue related to any type of crime or problem in their community. According to the officers, community policing also reduces insurgency in the region. With the application of community policing programs, citizens—especially youths—are less likely to join riots against the government and they do less harm. The police officers explained the role of community policing in de-radicalizing people exposed to ter-

rorist propaganda and prone to terrorism. They said that the terrorist organizations generate negative propaganda about the government, mostly about the police. However, when people see positive behavior from the police, they start to question the credibility of the propaganda from the terrorist organizations.

Although police officers mentioned the quick gains, as previously explained, they also commented on the long-term gains. Most believed that they were investing the future through community policing programs. They said that the results of such projects will be harvested in the long run, when young generations have grown up in a positive atmosphere of policing in the region. Police officers stated that their efforts can be seen as building the groundwork and infrastructure that will serve as the basis for better relationships between citizens and the state in the future. Thus, in order to be successful in counterterrorism in the long run, community policing programs should be implemented consistently and systematically, without being affected by daily issues of terrorism in the region. This type of approach requires a broad vision, committed management, and a proactive policing mentality against terrorism.

Negative Perceptions About Community Policing

Despite the numerous positive perceptions about community policing among police officers, some negative perceptions were mentioned by the police officers as their own ideas or criticisms from their environment when doing their jobs. One commonly mentioned negative perception was seeing community policing programs as futile efforts against terrorism. Some officers explained that some of their colleagues had made comments about community policing such as "You are beating a dead horse." and "You make lots of efforts but they still throw stones and Molotov cocktails at the police." These criticisms mainly come from police officers' unfriendly working environment in the region due to terrorism. The problem of terrorism promotes an "us versus them" mentality among police officers that remains in their police culture.

The second criticism about community policing is the old argument of whether community policing is even a police job. Some police officers think that there are more important issues to deal with, such as terrorism, but police departments assign a number of police forces to community policing units. As some of our informants stated, "We don't have enough personnel to do our central missions but they put lots of officers in community policing" and "First we need to reestablish the authority in the streets, then we may think about community policing."

In the literature, the research about the acceptance of community policing in police departments shows some resistance among police officers against community policing, especially when first building programs. The level of resistance fades as police department managers put effective change strategies into place and persist in the continuity of community policing as a new strategy. In our case, police officers easily shift their focus from community policing to counterterrorism because of

the ongoing struggle between the security forces and terrorists in the region. Everyday conflict negatively affects the effectiveness of community policing and its success in the region.

The third criticism of community policing also parallels the findings in the literature: the establishment of community policing as a specific unit rather than an organization-wide philosophy. Some officers mentioned that, although community policing officers apply some programs in the community, police officers from other units do not know about their activities. As a result, they become isolated efforts carried out by a specific unit rather than an organization-wide strategy. Thus, some officers from other units behave against the community policing philosophy and make mistakes when interacting with citizens in the community. One officer commented that "one negative behavior takes away all positive results—unnecessary or excessive use of force, maltreatment under the custody take away lots of positive things we do." Most informants stated that all officers working in their police departments should work like a community policing officer in order become successful in counterterrorism efforts.

Conclusion

This case study shows that community policing as a crime prevention strategy can also be used in counterterrorism efforts in order to reduce insurgency against the state and create collaborative ways to work with the community against terrorism. Community policing programs provide opportunities to restore the relationship between the community and the state, which has been tarnished due to terrorism. By using community policing programs to reach fragile communities, police officers can share several success stories in creating trust between the police and community, reducing insurgent and dissident feelings among citizens and deradicalizing youths who have some type of engagement in terrorist organizations. As a result, this case illustrates the importance of community policing as a soft policing strategy in counterterrorism.

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Chapter 17
Money-Laundering Activities of the PKK

Ozcan Ozkan

Introduction

Money laundering has long been used by organized criminal groups and terrorist organizations, whose financial benefits have remarkably increased as a result of engaging in lucrative businesses such as drugs, arms, and humans trafficking to conceal the origin of their illicit funds. While money laundering may be traced back to the emergence of money itself, money laundering for terrorist purposes is not an old phenomenon. It has emerged by the rapid process of globalization, globalized nature of the terror threat, and increasing need for the legal instruments for financial activities both domestically and globally. A great deal of globalization process has taken place only after the second half of the twentieth century thanks to developments in technology and communication. Terrorist organizations and organized criminal groups alike have also gone global as a result of the rapid globalization for the last decades. Now, criminal groups and terrorist organizations can more easily use diverse countries for recruiting, collecting funds, organizing, propagating, and taking shelter. One of the main concerns of these organizations is to finance their activities. Although they can find little difficulty in getting money and funds for their operations, they have more difficulty in using the money for their acts since state-level, regional, and global instruments for countering the financing of terrorism have enhanced considerably as a result of tough measures set forth in multilateral agreements among states and international institutions. These measures have promptly necessitated terrorist organizations to use money-laundering techniques for their financing.

The fact that the financial markets have also been globalized has created new opportunities for both legitimate businesses and illegal organizations. Like

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everybody else, organized crime and terrorist groups, too, who wish to do business globally, have the opportunity to use open financial systems for rapid mobility of funds. Criminals thus take advantage of this mobility in order to launder the proceeds of their illegal acts and conceal their illegal wealth.

There are numerous terrorist organizations that use sophisticated methods to move their illicit funds through financial systems both at home and across the globe. The Kurdistan Workers' Party (Kurdish: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK), an ethno-nationalist terrorist organization rooted in Turkey but operating in various countries including Turkey's neighbors such as Iran, Syria, and Iraq, as well as in Europe has benefited from similar kinds of terrorism-financing activities for a long time. To finance its activities, it has engaged in terrorist-financing methods and laundered its illicitly gained funds by cash couriers or front companies through which it collects money under the name of donation or aid particularly in Europe, where its financial infrastructure heavily relies upon.

The PKK has long been known to have engaged in various methods to find funding for its activities. While the main concern is not money itself for the group, financial activities have forced the PKK to find ways to maintain relationship with drug and weapons dealers as well as human traffickers from whom it takes commission charges. The financing activities of the PKK particularly in Europe make it necessary for the group to deal with financial management including setting up front organizations for money laundering. Using various kinds of NGOs and media organizations has allowed the PKK to engage in money-laundering activities. However, since the organization prefers not to use open financial institutions to move the funds, and its illegal money usually comes in the form of cash, it is becoming harder for law enforcement agencies to track money-laundering activities of the group.

Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing

The term money laundering may be traced back to the 1920s when mafia groups in the United States showed an active interest in acquiring launderettes to launder the money derived from criminal activities and inject it into the legal instruments. According to a report of the World Bank and IMF on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, money laundering is the process by which proceeds from a criminal activity are disguised to conceal their illicit origins. In the same report, the financing of terrorism is defined as the financial support of terrorism or of those who plan, encourage, or take part in terrorist acts (Schott, 2006).

Money laundering is used for financing the activities of a criminal organization in a way that the organization can conceal the origin of the money in order to be immune from law enforcement control. Money laundering has also been used by terrorist organizations for a long time for financing their activities. In this regard, financing of terrorism and money laundering are interrelated. Both have similar objectives and characteristics as well as some differences. While money laundering includes laundering illicit funds in legal channels in order to conceal the origins of

the funds, terrorist financing includes both legally and illegally acquired funds for the support of terrorism. In short, while terrorism financing is aimed at providing funds to final destination, money-laundering deals with legitimization.

Profits made by organized crime and terrorist organizations need to be laundered to be used in the future. While terrorist organizations engage in money laundering for terrorism financing, for most of them money is not the primary goal since money is only used as a means leading to their ends. However, for law enforcement units, tracking money is of great importance. One of the axioms of many analysts in the security agencies is "follow the money" meaning criminals, and their networks can be more easily traced, uncovered, and disrupted. On the other hand, once the methods of terrorism financing are identified and traced by law enforcement agencies, it is more likely for terrorist organizations to go into bankruptcy and degenerate, which will consequently bring an end to most of their activities.

Offenses and Methods of Money Laundering

The major aim of money laundering is to inject the dirty money into the legal economy. While there are different kinds of methods of terrorist financing and money laundering, there are four general kinds of offenses related to money laundering set forth by the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the Palermo Convention), which contains a broad range of provisions to fight international organized crime:

1. *Conversion or transfer of proceeds of crime*: In this method, criminals try to convert financial assets from one type to another. For instance, illegally acquired cash money is used to purchase real estate, to sell criminally derived real estate, or to buy precious metals.
2. *Concealment or disguise of proceeds of crime*: This offense takes place where criminals intentionally conceal or disguise the proceeds of crime. This includes intentional deception of law enforcement units.
3. *Acquisition, possession, or use of proceeds*: In this section, in addition to those who provide illegal proceeds, recipients who acquire, possess, or use property have also responsibility.
4. *Participation in, association with or conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating, and counseling. (United Nations/Commonwealth Secretariat/International Monetary Fund, 2009).*

As to the offenses related to money laundering and terrorism financing, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) designated categories of offenses as such:

- Joining an organized criminal group and racketeering;
- Terrorism and terrorist financing;
- Humans trafficking and migrant smuggling;
- Sexual exploitation, including sexual exploitation of children;

- Illicit drugs trafficking and trafficking in psychotropic substances;
- Illegal arms trafficking;
- Illicit trafficking in stolen and other goods;
- Corruption including bribery;
- Fraud;
- Counterfeiting currency;
- Counterfeiting and piracy of products;
- Environmental crime;
- Murder, grievous bodily injury;
- Kidnapping, hostage-taking;
- Robbery, theft;
- Smuggling;
- Extortion;
- Forgery;
- Piracy; and
- Insider trading and market manipulation.

For above offenses, the FATF recommendations require financial institutions and nonfinancial businesses and professions such as casinos (which also includes internet casinos), real estate agents, dealers in precious metals, dealers in precious stones, lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals, accountants, and trust and company service providers to apply national measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, and in particular, in detecting and reporting suspicious transactions (FATF 40 Recommendations, 2003).

As to the process, money is laundered in three essential stages. *Placement* is the first stage in which illicit funds are separated from their illegal source and injected into the financial system. It also includes carrying of proceeds of crime, such as cash, across borders. *Layering* is the second stage where laundering the funds usually involves creating multiple layers of transactions that further separate the funds from their illegal source in order to make it more difficult to trace these funds to the illegal source. The last stage, *integration*, includes injecting the illegal funds into the legitimate economy so that criminals can use the funds without raising suspicion that might trigger investigation and prosecution (World Bank & IMF, 2009).

The PKK and Money Laundering

The PKK was founded in 1978 by Abdullah Ocalan who was caught in 1999 and is now serving his life sentence in Turkey. Turkey has been suffering from the PKK terrorism since 1979 when the terrorist organization first started its violent campaign in Turkey by an attempt to kill a member of the Turkish Parliament in his house. To date, it is responsible for nearly 40,000 Turkish citizens' deaths. One of the reasons why the PKK has remained capable of operating, recruiting, and carrying out terrorist attacks not just inside the country but also in Europe and elsewhere can be

attributed to the organization's capacity to survive economically by terrorism-financing tools and control a huge amount of money, circulating especially in narcotic and other areas. In addition, money-laundering activities of the PKK have also been an important component of its operations inside and outside the country.

The terrorist organization PKK has long been known to engage in terrorism-financing methods such as commission charges from all kinds of smuggling, extortion, and taxing. The drug dealing is considered as one of the biggest sources of the PKK (Lilley, 2006). Although the PKK is believed to control 80 % of the drug market in Europe, the organization usually deny any participation in the drug market (Laciner, 2008). This could be explained by two reasons. First, if the PKK is seen as a drug dealer it may lose its support in Europe. Second, if it engages in drug dealing this may lead its members to use drug, thus degenerating the relations within the organization. Therefore, except for taking commission charges from drugs and weapons dealers, the PKK claims not to deal with the narcotic production and distribution. Nevertheless, the PKK's engagement in all levels of narcotic trafficking was accepted by the international community including the US government. Given its significant involvement in international drug trafficking and money laundering, the PKK was recognized by the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) as well established in the production and distribution of a variety of opiate products and to be deeply involved in money laundering. The United States also designated the PKK as a narcotic kingpin in 2008.

In addition to drug dealing, the PKK's finance comes from many traditional and untraditional terrorism-financing methods. Among them there is the so-called revolutionary tax provided by Kurdish businessmen in Turkey and Europe. The PKK also engages in protection rackets targeting Kurdish owned businesses across Europe, where it collects millions of dollars annually from Kurdish businesses and individuals in Europe. In addition, the Kurdish Diaspora voluntarily provides funds to the organization through cultural associations and information centers such as Europe-based the Kurdish Employers Association, the Kurdish Islamic Movement, and the Kurdish Red Crescent, which also deals with money transfers through subsidiary foundations in Switzerland, Britain, Sweden, Belgium, Denmark, and Cyprus.

The accounts of former PKK members interviewed also revealed that the organization's funding comes from various sources including:

- Kidnapping,
- Commission charges from drug dealers,
- Charges in what they call the "organization's customs" from smugglers of weapons, fuel oil, cigarette, food, cattle, etc.,
- Forcefully taken revolutionary tax and donation from ordinary citizens, artists, and businessmen of Kurdish origin,
- Benefits of media outlets,
- Donation to charities and NGOs,
- Funds collected in social and entertainment activities,
- Direct funds from some states (state-sponsored terrorism financing), and
- Direct provision of weapons, trainings, bombs, and ammunition from various countries (Marcus, 2007).

Given the above-mentioned financial activities of the group, one can argue that the PKK has gone beyond a mere ideologically based terrorist organization since the PKK who claimed to defend the Kurdish rights in the region has walked away from a traditional politically motivated organization to a more complex and profit/ interest-based and economically driven criminal network. This inevitably leads the organization to engage in money-laundering activities. While the PKK commits offences of money laundering, it doesn't launder illicit funds in financial intermediaries as other organized crime groups do. Rather, the group prefers using cash couriers consisting of its armed units who carry the funds from different sources to the finance center of the organization in northern Iraq. Money involved in the PKK activities usually comes in the form of cash, which makes it harder for law enforcement agencies to follow the money. In addition, for the PKK, money is not considered as an end, but as a means to continue the fight and trade for supplies.

Like many other transnational terrorist organizations, the PKK has benefited from dealing with organized crime groups that engage in lucrative businesses such as illegal trafficking of drugs, humans, and weapons as well as money-laundering activities mainly in Europe. For instance, two PKK members were arrested in France in July 2006 for money laundering aimed at financing terrorism. At the end of 2005, three members of the PKK were arrested in Belgium and another one in Germany suspected of financing the PKK. In Belgium, the authorities seized receipt booklets indicating that the arrested suspects were collecting tax from their fellow countrymen.

The most prominent evidence that the PKK engaged in money laundering came out of the Sputnik operations in 1996 and in 2002. In the first Sputnik operation conducted simultaneously by the British Scotland Yard and the Belgian Police in London and Brussels, as well as in Germany and Luxembourg, it was revealed that the PKK was laundering the illicit financial gains from its drugs and weapons smuggling via the MED-TV Broadcasting Company, a media outlet and a screen corporation founded by a British citizen of Kurdish origin in 1995 and acting for the PKK. In that operation, the police were able to link an amount of $11 million seized from an account belonging to MED-TV to drugs, weapons, and human trafficking activities of the terrorist organization. The Belgian Police discovered that the PKK conducted its money-laundering activities through 15 different companies (Roth & Sever, 2007).

The case of MED-TV is very crucial to understand the money-laundering activities of the PKK in that it served both for the media propaganda for the group and as a legal company to launder the dirty money of the organization. When the members of the PKK had difficulty to launder their illicitly obtained money, they decided to open an account by the name of "Kurdish Association" in England and "Sweden Postal" in Sweden for sending money to the MED-TV under the disguise of donations and consolidations.

The second Sputnik operation conducted by the Belgian and the French police in 2002 revealed that a Paris-based company linked to the PKK involved in money-laundering activities. The PKK operatives detained in this operation confessed that money had been transferred to the PKK under the auspices of a company called the Kurdish Foundation Trust, which was located in the British controlled Jersey Islands, known as an offshore haven for international money laundering.

Another international police operation led by Belgian authorities and assisted by the Italian and French police was conducted against the PKK's operatives and companies in major cities in Belgium on March 4, 2010. The operation resulted in arresting many high profile PKK members including two of its leading figures, Remzi Kartal and Zubeyir Aydar who since October 2009 have been on a US list of drug traffickers suspected of using smuggling proceeds to fund the PKK (Houlton, 2010). The operation was based on the allegation directed against Roj TV—a successor to MEDYA TV which is also a successor to MED TV that was banned after the above-mentioned Sputnik operations—and chief operatives of the PKK in Europe regarding its involvement in the financial fraud and tax evasion as well as distributing PKK propaganda, educating PKK members, recruiting members for the PKK, human trafficking, counterfeiting, and racketeering. The operation in which 300 Belgian police officers as well as tax inspectors from the finance ministry participated was launched in coordination with Turkish intelligence, which provided Belgian authorities with information and evidence on the links between the PKK and its European operatives.

The PKK has often laundered illegal money under the name of donation or aid via the so-called business, cultural, children, and women associations in London, Frankfurt, Paris, Brussels, and other European cities in order to be spent for its television channels, weapons, explosives, militia training, etc. One of these organizations that provide money to the PKK in Europe is International Kurdish Businessmen and Employers Union (known as KARSAZ). The PKK acquired its arms and ammunition from the funds provided by KARSAZ which operates in Germany. The member companies of KARSAZ played an active role in laundering PKK's drug money to be sent to mainly the PKK camps in northern Iraq for purchasing weapons and ammunition.

The cross-border transportation of currency known as cash couriers has been often used by the PKK for laundering money. The money collected from donations and businessmen in Turkey and Europe is brought to the financial unit of the organization's military wing, People's Defense Force known in Kurdish as Hêzên Parastina Gel (HPG), in northern Iraq and Iran by the reliable cash couriers. On the other hand, using the banking system is rare in the case of the PKK. However, hawala system or other money transfer methods such as Western Union were used to transfer money from Europe to its supporters in different countries such as Armenia and Syria to finance the daily needs of the members.

Conclusion

It is no doubt that the PKK, just like many terrorist organizations, engaged in terrorism-financing methods. And it is evident that as a fundraiser not just in Turkey but also in Europe, the PKK and the PKK-affiliated entities have needed to launder the illicit money through legal channels if possible (as seen in the case of media and front companies), and illegal channels if not possible such as using cash couriers.

Beyond being a terrorist organization, the PKK has also acted like a mafia by dealing with organized crimes–mainly the drug market—and money laundering. The fact that the PKK has walked away from a traditional politically/ideologically motivated organization to a more complex and profit/interest-based and pragmatically/economically driven criminal network has made it difficult for the governments to dissolve the group by traditional counter-terrorism methods since the current members and would-be members consider the PKK as a profitable organization that they can get respect and power by controlling this huge array of financial activities. Therefore, the policy makers should pay much more attention to the economic development of the region as an incentive for the group's members to lay down arms and end the violent campaign in the region.

In this regard, the PKK, both as a regional and a global threat, not only harms the regional stability in the Middle East but also endangers the Western and international security by taking advantage of democracy and liberal economy. Therefore, it becomes very important to cut resources of the PKK by tracing illegal money transacted under the name of donations, aids, and fundraising, and by freezing the financial assets of its members while taking appropriate law enforcement measures in all countries they are operating. Given that the Achilles heel of any criminal organization is its financial survival, cutting lucrative businesses of the PKK will lead to degeneration and finally dissolution of the terrorist organization.

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Chapter 18
Bullets for Ballots: Electoral Violence in Insurgencies

Nadir Gergin

Introduction

Elections and political parties play an important role in democratic states. Political parties are indispensable components of a democratic political order and institutions serve as means to solve economic and social differences peacefully (Weinberg 1991). Geddes (1996) referred to political institutions as *"weapons"* in the struggle for political power (as cited in Finn 2000) because political institutions are vehicles to make trade-off among competing values and to establish the rules for obtaining power (Quandt 1998). Elections allow for the "peaceful" transfer of this power (Höglund 2009). Furthermore, they provide legitimacy through direct popular participation, and, in turn, legitimacy creates legitimate governments enjoying popular support for their policies (Elkit and Svensson 1997, as cited in Sisk 2008) and capacity for effective governance (Brown 2003, as cited in Sisk 2008). From this perspective, electoral process is an alternative way to violence because of being a means for governance (Fischer 2004). For instance, the Nicaraguan election in 1990 was the "first peaceful transfer of power from a revolutionary government to its opposition" (Rapoport and Weinberg 2000).

There are four important functions in democracies (Finn 2000): First, *"legitimating"* function by coupling political obligation with consensual participation. Second, *"integrating"* function by binding citizens and political parties to the state.

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Third, *"socializing"* function by teaching and transmitting democratic values to the citizens. Finally, *"transferring political power"* by providing a certain and conventionalized means (pp 52–53). However, at the same time, they are also vulnerable to political violence because elections are means of achieving or retaining political power and governance (Sisk 2008); and violence can be used as a tactic in political competition (Fischer 2004). This study focuses on this latest function and systematically explores how the insurgent organizations see elections, why they resort violence and how they can influence the election results.

The first section explores the importance of elections for the insurgent. The second section analyzes election violence from several aspects and identifies actors and rationales of it. The third section deals with pre-election violence and establishes a theoretical framework by introducing four main reasons of pre-election violence and five factors that could replace the government. And the final section focuses on the post-election and its main reason, electoral results.

Understanding the Importance of Elections for the Insurgent

Since the elections can provide insurgent political power and access resource, the insurgent has good reasons to engage in electoral politics. Namely, when political parties won the power, they will be able to organize campaigns, mobilize masses, and oversee policies (Rapoport and Weinberg 2000, p 28). In other words, the insurgent can intentionally use its political party to gain sympathy from not only its native or government's population but also from the international community. By this way, it can also make their armed struggle with the government legitimate. In addition, when the insurgent's political party took office, it would expand the pools of its supporters through providing benefits to them thus strength their loyalty. Furthermore, it could also destabilize the political system and even achieve self-rule or independence from the government (Weinberg 1991). These reasons include increasing "popular support for the insurgent"; "gaining legitimacy" and "respectability"; "increasing the pool of its resources and the role of its military wing."

Increasing Popular Support

Most scholars focusing on this issue point out the importance of participating elections in obtaining popular support for the insurgent thus broadening the movement and increasing the organizational resources to achieve insurgent's goals. The insurgent may emphasize the ethnic and culture differences and use political competition in calling for mobilization of large sections of the population because conflicts are commonly used to gain popular support for its political party (Höglund 2009, p 420).

Ginsberg and Weissberg (1978) purported that elections are not only means of popular control but also mechanisms for generating popular support for the govern-

ment and its policies as well. Taber (2002) argued that "*political mobilization*" is the first task of the insurgent, and Richardson (2001) pointed out the importance of electoral politics as a means for political mobilization. According to Richardson, the issue is two-fold: (a) First, electoral politics is used by the insurgent as a means of building popular support for the purpose of political mobilization, and (b) second, electoral results are considered as an indication of the success or failure of that effort because obtaining a seat in the national or local government is viewed as a success and reinforces the terrorist organization's influence over the population. For instance, till the Westminster election in April 1981, the IRA's political wing the Sinn Fein used to follow an "*absenteeism policy,*" which prevented their elected candidates from taking their seats in the parliament. However, the president of Sinn Fein Gerry Adams and others realized that by remaining isolated from the political negotiations, they cannot mobilize the population towards their political goals; therefore, they rescinded their absenteeism policy at 1986 Sin Fein conference (McAllister 2004, p 128).

Drake and Silva (1986) viewed votes as a "trade" to gain tangible benefits from the government. In order to get elected, the insurgent could pledge the delivery of resources to its supporters and once elected, through providing *"domestic rewards"* such as distributing resources and key positions of the government to its supporters (as cited in Boyle 2009, p 217), the insurgent would be able to win population on its own side, and consolidate its control over the population. Similarly, Höglund (2009) explains such mechanism through '*patron–client relationship*' for political power, in which the "protection, services, or rewards to the clients are provided by the patron." Due to this mutual benefit-oriented relationship, "clients," who are usually individuals of low status, become the patron's political followers. As a consequence of such relationship, since the political power is very important for the patron, and his/her followers, they can strive to keep the patron in power, even with violence (p 420).

Legitimacy

The insurgent may gain democratic legitimacy through elections (Weinberg 1991; Höglund 2009). The election outcomes may encourage the insurgent to demand secession and concessions (Rapoport and Weinberg 2000), thus would gain domestic and international legitimacy. On the other hand, when it happens, the loyalists of the government may oppose the insurgent group's demands and resort to violence against the insurgent and its supporters.

Respectability

A desire to gain respectability in domestic or international politics may lead the insurgent to end its violent activities and engage in electoral politics (Weinberg 1991).

Increasing the Resource Pool of the Insurgent

Weinberg (1991) found that terrorist groups with linkages to political parties are more successful in persisting and waging their armed struggle more than those groups lacking these linkages. He suggests that terrorist groups with political party links have an easier time in recruiting new members and obtaining logistical aids from the population (p 434). Furthermore, the presence of military wing makes it easier for the insurgent to return violence if it does not satisfy the election outcomes (Höglund 2009, p 420); therefore, it would be wiser strategy for the insurgent not to demobilize all of its armed forces.

Increase the Role of the Insurgent's Military Wing

Competition in elections may complement rather than replace the insurgent's military activities and reduces the risk of major splits within the organization over tactics (Höglund 2009). For instance, with 1981 election, the popular support encouraged the Sinn Fein, for the first time, to contest in 1982 Northern Ireland Assembly elections under the Sinn Fein. The Sinn Fein won 10.1 % in 1982 election; this percentage increased to 13.4 % in the Westminster election, (McAllister 2004, p 127). The insurgent IRA interpreted this results that they could fight an armed struggle and win the elections at the same time (O'Brien, 1999, p 126, as cited in McAllister 2004). In 1986, the IRA adopted an electoral strategy combined with a military campaign and sought to transform its military success that generated popular support into electoral success, which could be used to legitimize the continued use of threat of force (McAllister 2004, p 128).

Neumann (2005) describes seven reasons or advantages of the insurgent's participation in elections: First, it can exploit the democratic process to strengthen the insurgent's military wing. Second, insurgent's political wing may facilitate insurgent recruitment and radicalization by providing *"vetting mechanism,"* or providing a possibility of *"legalized fundraising"* (p 946). Third is to obtain official recognition and legitimacy. Forth is to mobilize the mass and broaden the movement—that is, to tap into resources and mobilize sections of community that had not been available previously, which Resource Mobilization Theorists name isolated adherents and constituents. Fifth, is to secure continuity both in terms of ideology and personnel. Sixth is to neutralize the government's military superiority. Finally, the insurgent can realistically assess consequences of the terrorism campaign and demonstrate its popular support with the election results.

For instance, as Neumann (2005) notes, when the IRA's political party Sinn Fein received a substantial vote share in 1981, Gerry Adams, the leader of the party, expanded its political wing, however giving importance to the political activities did not diminish the importance of military wing of the IRA and armed struggle, instead, it legitimized the armed struggle, demonstrated popular support for the IRA, advanced the movement. As Gerry Adam, the president of the Sinn Fein, stated

"Elections have helped to develop the party, and experienced bunch of political workers" (as cited in Neumann 2005, p 967). Furthermore, electoral success also gave the political wing a kind of veto power which would make any constitutional accommodation between the main moderate parties in Northern Ireland (Neumann 2005). By taking seat in the Irish parliament, they reached a political power to force a minority government to adopt a more intransigent manner vis-à-vis Britain and to refrain from introducing harsh counterterrorism measures in the IRA's most important areas (Moloney, 2002, as cited in Neumann 2005).

Election Violence

Election violence is as a special type of political violence. Dhanagare (1968) defines "election violence" as *"use of force in the struggle for scarce power positions and statuses between two or more individuals or political parties and their supporters" (p 151)*. Lewis (1964) focuses on the political rivals and defines the aim of election violence as to *"neutralize, injure or eliminate rival or rivals"* (as cited in Dhanagare 1968, p 151). Unlike Lewis, Fischer (2004) focuses on the electoral process and the electorates rather than perpetrators. Fischer defines election violence as a means to *determine*, *delay,* or otherwise *influence* the results of an election (p 6). Sisk (2002) stresses the *"election process"* and *"election outcomes"* and argues that election violence aims *to vitiate the elections* all together by undermining the integrity of the results, or *to influence voting behavior* through threat or intimidation (p 1).

Few studies on election violence have focused on the effects of terrorism on the election results and electoral process (Guelke and Smyth 1992; Neumann 2005; Kydd and Walter 2002; Bali 2007; Gassebner et al. 2008; Rose and Murphy 2007). Although the past literature provides some insights about under what conditions recourse terrorism and how it affects election results, it offers little information on how the election results affect terrorism in the post-election period. Furthermore, the scant existent literature on post-election violence usually explains from a "relative deprivation approach" and lacks a "resource mobilization approach." Thus, it is important to ask not only how the terrorism influence elections, but also how the election results influence terrorism as well.

Dimensions of Election Violence

Scholars (Dhanagare 1968; Fischer 2002; Sisk 2008) addressed and described various dimensions of election violence. These dimensions can be categorized under five groups (Figure 1): (1) Perpetrators; (2) Victims or targets of electoral violence; (3) Types of election Violence; (4) Time Periods, and (5) Aims or Motives of Election Violence.

Aims, targets, type of violence, and motives of the perpetrators are highly dependent on the time period of the election.

Fig. 18.1 Dimensions of violence

Perpetrators

Election violence can be committed by various actors. Dhanagare (1968) includes only individuals, political parties, and their supporters into his definition of election. Fischer (2004) expands them and divides the perpetrators into five categories*:*

Voter-Motivated Conflict

This type election violence occurs when voters challenge the state and claim unfairness in the election process. Massive cheating or fraud—such as conspiracies to bribe voters, tampering with ballots, fallacious counting, or other measures (such as releasing large numbers of prisoners to vote)—can be the stimulus for a voter (Sisk 2008). For instance, in Thailand elections on January the 6th of 2001, the voters believed that local officials were biased in their counting procedures therefore organized protests and burned police vehicles to disrupt vote counting.

State-Motivated Conflict

It occurs when the State initiates conflicts with electorates who challenge the results of elections.

Rival-motivated Conflict

Political rivals may conflict with each other for political gains. The Fischer (2002)'s study findings suggest that rival-motivated conflict is the most common election type but also most responsive to mediation among the others. Rival-motivated election violence may stem from history of intense rivalry among political clans, stark

competition for government posts that carry the potential for power and access to resources and state largesse (Sisk 2008). Sri Lanka elections of 2001 set up an example of a pre-election violence performed by the governing political party. As deSilva (2002) pointed out, in 2001 Sri Lanka elections, in Hambantota district of the Southern Province, a senior cabinet minister and his close associates sought to terrorize the electorate by attacks through armed groups on opposition candidates and their supporters (deSilva 2002).

Insurgent-Motivated Conflict

The insurgent capitalizes on the visibility of an election to promote the insurgency. Fischer (2002) found that insurgent-motivated conflicts are growing and the most difficult to prevent because of being unresponsive to governance or other electoral objectives, and seeking only to *disrupt, delay,* and *diminish the democratic process.*

A Combination of those Categories

Scholars include different actors into their definitions, but most of them conclude that election violence is a collective, purposeful, and instrumental action; so, if it is collective and instrumental, then it requires an extensive organization, leadership, and resources (Sisk 2008, p 13); because only with an effective leadership and organization, the rank-and-file can be bridged, logistical needs to carry out violent act can be created, and associational or population representation dimension can be generated. Thus, organizational resources allow the leaders and organizational structure to foment violence (Sisk 2008, p 13).

Although election violence can be performed by various actors, the insurgent-motivated conflict is the primary interest of this study. This type of violence requires an organization, leadership, and resources. Thus, both resource mobilization approach and relative deprivation approach can be useful to explain election violence.

Victims or Targets of Election Violence

Election violence includes various victims or targets. They can be people such as electorates, candidates, political party workers, places such as polling stations, offices party buildings, campaign materials, vehicles, or data such as ballot boxes; and victims can be resident in target ethnic, gender, geographical, or political "hot spot" communities (Fischer 2002).

Forms of Election Violence

Election violence can be committed through various ways. It can be *random* or *organized act,* or *threat* to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail, or abuse a political stakeholder or stakeholders (Fischer 2002). Types of violence may also include riots, demonstrations, terrorist campaigns, military coups, civil wars (Rapoport and Weinberg 2000, and p 33), abductions, direct or targeting killings, terrorist attacks on rallies, destruction of property and vehicles, and the like (Sisk 2008). Although there are various forms of election violence, for the sake of this study, we include only terrorist attacks as indicators of election violence.

Aims and Motives of Election Violence

Like other dimensions, aims and motives vary and highly depend on the time period of the election. In general, pre-election violence aims to influence *electoral process* and *election results* whereas the post-election violence generally stems from a relative deprivation caused by dissatisfaction with the election results.

Some scholars (Finn 2000; Rapoport and Weinberg 2000; Sisk 2008) pointed out the influence of fair democratic process on election violence. Rapoport and Weinberg (2000) argue that when the *"electoral process"* is fair, legitimate, and works well, the ballots can silence the guns, as the Namibia election of 1989 did end a 30-year war. Furthermore, if the parties accepted that winning possibility is too low and costs are too high, the elections can reduce the violence (p 18). Likewise, Finn (2000) argues that the *"election structures"* and *"rules"* are among the possible sources of election violence. Similar to Finn's argument, Hewitt (2000) argues that if certain groups or individuals feel that the political system is *"unresponsive*" to them, they become frustrated, thereby resort to violence (p 326).

To explain reasons for or motives of election violence, usually scholars focus on the benefits—political power, access to resources, etc.—that would be gained through the elections. In his analysis of election violence, Sisk (2008) emphasizes the *stakes* of political competition, *expectations* about winning and losing in election contests, and the *incentives* that the electoral process creates. He argues that election violence is most likely to occur: when the *stakes* of winning and losing valued political posts are very high and those political posts are scarce; when winning the elections is the key to livelihood for an entire clan, or ethnic group; depending upon the expectations, when the winning the elections are highly uncertain about the ultimate outcome of the electoral process, especially when margins of victory very close, they may resort violence to affect uncertain outcomes; or when losing the elections are almost certain, they may use violence to affect voter turnout through discouraging the opponent's supporter electorates; or when the losing elections are almost certain, they may use violence to prevent the election's success.

Time Periods

Höglund (2009) divides election periods into three periods: (1) Pre-election, (2) during the election, and (3) Post-election periods. Sisk (2008) includes even more time periods into the pre-and post-election periods. He divides election violence period into five time phases and defines most likely types and targets election violence: forms associated with the time phases. Phase I: The Long Run-Up to Electoral Events; Phase II: The Campaign's Final Lap; Phase III: Polling Day(s); Phase IV: Between Voting and Proclamation; and Phase V: Post-Election Outcomes and their Aftermath.

Scholars have used different time scales in analyzing the election violence ranging from 2-week periods (Dhanagare 1968) to 4 years (Berrebi and Klor 2008). Dhanagare (1968) used biweekly periods and focused on only 60 days period prior to release of the Fourth General Elections of 1967 in India. He divided the election period into four phases of 15 days. The fourth phase covers the election that started on February 15th and ends when most of the poll results were announced. His study mainly covers pre-election period and election days but excludes the post-election period. His study findings suggested that election violence increases as closing to the election day(s) and the violence varies across the constituencies. Sisk (2008) considered election violence time period as cycle, which often conceived of in terms of at least 1 year prior to an actual election event (Wall, et.al. 2006, as cited in Sisk 2008, and p 13).

Analyzing Dimensions of Election Violence in the Pre-election Period

Sisk (2008) divides pre-election periods into two periods: Phase I (long run-up to electoral events) and Phase II (the election campaign's final lap). According to Sisk, often the objective of election violence in the Phase I of the pre-election period—is to *affect the electoral process* and *to establish a dominant position within a particular district* by eliminating or threatening potential adversaries (p 14). Thus, it is highly selected rather than indiscriminate violence; the main targets are not innocent, or neutral civilians, instead *electoral process* and the *political rivals* are the most common targets. Therefore, common targets of violence in this period are incumbent state officials or emerging candidates from political parties (Sisk 2008, p 14).

During the Phase II—the election campaign's final lap—the pattern of violence shifts from incumbent state official and emerging candidates from political parties to potentially adversary electorates and candidates. The main common aim of the election violence during this period is *to intimidate* or *influence voters* through creating insecurity against opponent's potential supporters (Sisk 2008; Höglund 2009). As the Election Day approaches, the violence intensifies. Common types of violence in final weeks of the election include clashes between rival groups of supporters;

attacks on election rallies, candidates, bomb scares; attacks or intimidation of election officials; and attacks on domestic/international observers (Sisk 2008).

Empirical studies support this argument (Gergin 2012; Newman 2013; Aksoy 2014). Gergin (2012) conducted a longitudinal research on general and elections of Turkey and PKK terrorism in Turkey. He concluded that PKK's terrorist attacks gradually increase as closing to Election Day. Newman (2013) has reached the same conclusion. She conducted a cross-national research on electoral violence which includes 117 countries and covers 5537 terrorist events between 2000 and 2005 years. Her findings have suggested that terrorist violence increases relative to the election date and appears to be normally distributed around an election date. Aksoy (2014) conducted a cross-national research includes domestic terrorist attacks from Western Europe between 1950 and 2004. He found that approaching elections are associated with an increase in the democratic countries only with the least permissive electoral institutions.

Analyzing Dimensions of Election Violence during the Election Days

During the polling day(s), usually perpetrators cease their acts of violence when the voting begins (Rapoport and Weinberg 2000; Höglund 2009; Sisk 2001). However when election violence occurs on the Election Day, it commonly aims *to disrupt the polling* and *to limit turnout* and targets security forces, election administrators, observers; and materials such as destruction of ballot boxes (Sisk 2008). For instance on the Election Day, January 30th of 2005 in Iraq, the insurgents carried out 260 attacks that resulted in at least 44 people, including 26 Iraqi civilians, eight Iraqi troops, ten British servicemen, and one American soldier. Hundreds of the attacks were carried out at or near the polling stations. Furthermore, although there was a traffic ban on the Election Day, the insurgents sent at least eight suicide bombers on foot, wearing suicide vests, into voting stations (Can the voters build on success? 2005). Similarly in Sri Lanka presidential election of 1988, at least 46 people were killed on the poll day (Sunday Times, January 1, 1989, as cited in Amerasinghe 1989).

Possible Consequences of Violence in the Pre-Election Period and During the Election Days

There are four common consequences of the violence prior to the Election Day or during the election days: (1) Postponing or disrupting elections from taking place; (2) Effecting voter turnouts; (3) Forcing the candidates to leave from the electoral process; and (4) Influencing electorates' political preferences.

Postponing or Disrupting Elections from Taking Place

The insurgent may attempt to postpone or disrupt elections from taking place by resorting violence prior to or during the election days. This aim may stem from three main reasons: a fear of losing political power, opposing elections at all, and electoral system.

In some cases, a fear of losing power could lead the insurgent to undermine the integrity of elections (Rapoport and Weinberg 2000) and results in forcing the governments to abandon elections (Rapoport and Weinberg 2000; Höglund 2009). Or in other cases, elections or political system could be source of election violence. The insurgent may oppose to any sort of elections and view them as an *"illegitimate"* method to transfer political power, or oppose to the ruling system under which the elections are held; therefore it may try to prevent elections from taking place or postpone the elections (Höglund 2009). For instance, the Peruvian insurgent group Sendero Luminoso opposes the elections and even targeted other left wing groups that compete in the elections (Höglund 2009). Similarly, in order to disrupt the elections, insurgent groups in Iraq increased their violence prior to the Election Day. Within the first week of the new year which is just three weeks before the Iraqi elections of 2005, at least 90 people were killed across the country including Bagdad's governor, Ali Al-Haidari was killed along with six of his bodyguards (Ever bloodier 2005). Upon increase of the violence prior to the election, Ghazi al-Yawer, the president, Iyad Allawi, the interim prime minister, and some other high level political officials gave voice to possibility of postponement of the election by the United Nations. Chechen's pre-election violence in Russia is another example. The Chechen insurgents carried out bomb attacks just 2 days before the Election Day to disrupt the 2003 Duma elections in Russia. They exploded a bomb attack on a train resulted in more than 40 killings and over 150 wounded in Yessentuki station in Russia's southern fringe (Oates 2006). Although the insurgents often attempt to disrupt the electoral process, they rarely succeed in postponing or preventing the elections from taking place; however, their violent acts can be effective in influencing *election outcomes* through affecting voter turnouts, forcing the candidates to leave from the electoral process, and influencing electorates' political preferences.

Affecting Voter Turnouts

In some cases, the insurgent may intentionally employ violence against rivals' potential supporters to get them refrained from casting their votes due to fear of violence (Rapoport and Weinberg 2000; Höglund 2009; Sisk 2008). The aim of voter intimidation is to produce a self-imposed loss of freedom on the victim. If intimidated, the victim will vote or behave in a certain fashion (Fischer 2002). For instance, the insurgent LTTE and other extremist groups in Sri Lanka group usually resorts violence prior to the elections. Although Sri Lanka used to have high voter

turnout rates in the last nationwide election in 1970 (85.2 %), 1977 (86.7 %), and 1982 (81.1 %), due to high volume political violence that JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna or People's Liberation Front—the Sinhalese nationalist extremist organization) and the DJV (Deshapremi Janatha Viyaparaya or Patriotic People's Front launched three months before the elections, only 55.32 % of the electorates casted their votes in the Sri Lanka presidential elections of 1988 (Amerasinghe 1989).

According to Amerasinghe (1989), the main of this pre-election violence was to create fear that would lead to a compulsory boycott of the election by the electorate (p 349). For instance, in Matara in Sri Lanka, on the morning of the poll people were intimidated by a set posters warning voters that "the penalty for voting was death." Only and even after the security forces created suitable condition very small portion of electorates casted their votes (Matara 23.84 %, Moneragala 17.1 %, and others (Amerasinghe 1989). Similarly, Maoist insurgents, the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) imposed violent nationwide protests that resulted in only 20 % voter turnout across Nepal (Gobyn 2009). A similar strategy was implemented prior to Iraqi Elections of 2005. In order to intimidate the voters into not voting, the insurgent groups in Iraq launched a terrorism campaign before the election of 2005 that resulted in low turnout rate due to the fact that hundreds of thousands Sunni Arabs scared and did not cast their votes (Can the voters build on success? 2005). Chechen insurgent's terrorist attacks in a Russian constituency 2 days before the 2003 Duma elections in Russia succeeded too in discouraging the Russian voters and resulted in only 55.75 % turnout rate. As seen in the literature, violence prior to the election affects turnout rates, in most cases it lowers the turnout whereas in few cases, it increases the turnouts as Madrid terrorist attacks did in Spaniard Elections of 2004.

Forcing the Candidates to Leave from the Electoral Process

In some cases, by use of violence, the insurgent can successfully force the rival political contenders to leave the electoral process (Rapoport and Weinberg 2000; Höglund 2009), thus eliminate political rivals and win the elections. For instance, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) launched a violence campaign against the Oromo Liberation Front (OLS) that resulted in the OLF to leave the elections of 1992 (Pausewang, Trondvall and Aalen, 2004, as cited in Höglund 2009). Likewise, the LTTE, which is linked to the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), attacked the political activists of other political parties and local election monitors to force its political rivals to leave the elections. As a consequence of these attacks, several candidates from other political parties left elections (Höglund 2009). Similarly, in the 2005 Iraq elections, due to fear of terrorist attack, many political parties have not announced their candidates, and some parties, including the country's most prominent Sunni group, the Iraqi Islamic Party, did not contest the election (Ever bloodier 2005).

Influencing Electorates' Political Preferences

Winning votes through use of violence is neither a new technique nor only peculiar to insurgents. As Charles and Frary (1918) points out violence and intimidation were regarded as the most effective way of winning votes by 1715 and political parties carried on them for more than 150 years (as cited in Rapoport and Weinberg 2000). Sisk (2008) acknowledge the existence of efforts of coercive methods on gaining votes however and consider them as "*a form of election fraud*" (p 6).

The insurgent may resort to violence to win electoral support for its political party. There are a few quantitative studies investigating the impact of violence on election results (Kibris 2010; Unal 2012; De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca 2014).

Kıbris (2010) analyzed 1991 and 1995 Elections in Turkey and investigated how terrorist attacks effected government and other parties' vote shares. She found that Turkish electorate is highly sensitive to terrorism. The number of security force terror casualties has a significant negative effect on the percentage of votes the governing party/coalition receives. The vote share of right-wing parties increases with the level of terrorism voters are exposed to.

Unal (2012) plotted number of terrorist attacks and electoral support for the PKKK's political party between 1987 and 2007 years. He concludes that there is no clear relationship between the electoral support level for pro-PKK parties in national elections and the violence level. We argue that there are two reasons for not finding a clear relationship.

De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca (2013) investigated the relationship between ETA attacks and electoral support for its political party Batasuna. They found that ETA attacks have an effect on the size of its support community. When ETA kills members of the security forces, voters punish the Batasuna party electorally. In the case of civilians, it depends on the specifics of the various campaigns. Finally, they propose that when ETA kills informers and drug-dealers, the vote for Batasuna increases. ETA's killing of non-nationalist politicians, however, decreases Batasuna's vote share.

It is argued that in some cases terrorist attacks against civilians may suppress the mass mobilization whereas in other they may increases votes by that population (Sisk 2008, p 6). Therefore, under what conditions and how violence can affect election results should be investigated.

Discussion on Consequences of Violence in the Pre-election and during the Election Days

The pre-election violence may serve for various purposes and produce different outcomes in pro-insurgent areas than pro-government areas. If the insurgent is not strong in some constituencies, as Sisk (2008) argued, it may use indiscriminate violence against government's civilians where the insurgent is most likely to lose

the election in order to discourage electorates for voting; or target rival party candidates to force them to contest elections in pro-insurgent areas, or use selective terrorism against carefully selected government targets/combatants to increase its support among the insurgent's own population. Although existent studies on election violence provide valuable insights into election violence, there is still scant literature on this field and still many questions remain unanswered. Under *which conditions pre-election violence produce desired results is still not known clearly*; in some cases, it may backfire and be counterproductive at the ballot box. For instance, unlike presidential elections of 2005 in Sri Lanka, or 2005 Elections in Iraq, in East Timor, militia groups backed by the Indonesian army employed violence prior to the 1999 referendum in order to intimidate the electorates into not voting for the independence, however, contrary to their expectation, it generated a massive turnout (Rapoport and Weinberg 2000, and p 19).

Similarly, the 2004 Madrid Bombing just few days before the elections in Spain indicated that a successful terrorist attack can provoke a sharp change of mood in the electorate (A winning streak for Zapatero 2007) and can increase the turnout rates against governing party (Bali 2007). Furthermore, in some cases, as a response to pre-election violence, the electorates may punish the governing party and replace it whereas in others the governing party even increases its vote share even more than previous elections. For instance, Madrid bombings of 2004 in Spain just 3 days prior to the Election Day replaced the governing PP party with a soft party, the socialist PSOE party, whereas the terrorist attacks just 2 days before the 2003 Duma Elections brought a hard-line party, the United Russia. Furthermore, similarly, Hamas terrorist campaign from April to February of 1996 before the Israeli elections of May 1996 damaged the incumbent government and replaced the incumbent Labor Party government of Shimon Peres with the more hard-line government of Benjamin Netanyahu of Likud. As seen in the literature, the question of when or why the electorates would punish the governing party and replace the government with the election is still not clear. Given the existent literature, I propose five important factors that could be useful to anticipate whether the governing party would be replaced or increase its vote share as a response to pre-election period. These factors are the followings: (1) Position of the Governing Party on Terrorism, (2) Fault Factor, (3) Proximity, (4) severity, and (5) targets.

Position of the Governing Party on Terrorism

Terrorism prior to the elections affects the electorates' preferences and usually brings a hard-line government. Terrorism can change public opinion and in general this change is likely to favor the most right-wing and militaristic forces in the electoral arena rather than the advocates of international law, peace, and negotiations (Fishman and Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies 2005, p 13). Similarly, Hewitt (1990) suggests that usually majorities or pluralities in all countries favor hard-line policies. If the people believe that governing political party

does not have a harsh position on terrorism, they are more likely to vote for a more hard-line party and replace the current governing party. However, if the governing party is a hard-line party and has already harsh policies against terrorism, then other people who had not voted for it also would vote the governing party thus increase its vote share in the upcoming elections. Israeli elections of May 1996, February 2001, Spain elections of May 1996, and 2003 Duma elections in Russia, and provincial elections of 1988, and 2008 in Sri Lanka set good examples of it.

In Israel, Hamas launched a massive bloody pre-election terrorist campaign from February to April 1996 against the Israel. On 25th February 1996, a suicide bomber carried out a suicide bomb attack on a travel bus that killed 26 and injured 48 people. Another suicide attack on a travel bus was carried out on March the 3rd of 1996 and killed 19 and wounded 7 people. Other pre-election terrorist attacks occurred in Ashkelon and Dizengoff Center which killed 59 people (Suicide bombings scar Peres' political ambitions CNN, May 28, 1996). As the polls taken in mid-May indicated Peres was ahead by 4–6%, however due to these terrorist attacks, two days before the election Peres declined to 2%. (CNN, May 28, 1996). As a consequence, Labor Party government of Shimon Peres lost the elections (49.5%) and was replaced with a hard-line government of Benjamin Netanyahu of Likud (50.5%). Kydd and Walter (2002) examined the impact of Hamas's terrorist campaign and reached the same conclusion that these terrorist attacks damaged the incumbent government and replaced it with the more hard-line government of Benjamin Netanyahu of Likud in Israeli elections of May 1996 (p 280). Likewise, Bloom (2004) concludes that these attacks were intended to influence the election outcomes and as a consequence they brought a hard-line, the right wing Netanyahu government into power. The Hamas's next terrorism campaign against Israel began in December 2000, 2 months before the Israeli elections of February 2001. Again, the Hamas movement increased its terrorist attacks prior to the election. As a consequence, the terrorism campaign has again reached its goals and Barak lost the elections (Kydd and Walter 2002).

The Berrebi and Klor's study (2008) findings are consistent with the Kydd and Walter study (2002). They analyzed five national electoral data from 1988 to 2003 and examined two-way relationship between terrorism and electoral preferences by employing differences-in differences (DID) methodology. They found that terrorism has a strong impact on the electorate's political preferences. A terrorist attack regardless of where it was perpetrated increases the support of the right bloc of political parties, which have strict policies against terrorism; additionally, its electoral impact increases as it occurs closer to the elections.

Likewise, the governing party, the PSOE, lost the elections and was replaced with a more hard-line political party, the Partido Popular (Popular Party, here after the PP) in the Spanish general election of 1996. Barros et al. (2006) attributed this electoral turnaround to ETA's pre-election terrorism campaign. They suggested that the ETAs failed terrorist attacks against the Prime Ministerial candidate Jose Maria Aznar, and King Juan Carlos in August 1995 brought a more hard-line government, Popular Party. The PP presents itself as a party to control and eradicate the terrorism; according to Rigo (2005) 9/11 attacks in the USA had provided the PP an

opportunity to present itself a hard-line party through taking a strong position against the terrorism.

Chechen pre-election terrorism that killed more than 40 and injured more than 150 people in Russia brought a hard-line party too, the United Russia, pro-Vladimir Putin party with the largest number of votes and seats. Oates (2006) found that indirectly, Putin's position on terrorism was relevant in voting behavior because many of the participants perceived Putin as a strong, decisive leader, a man would "flush" the Chechen terrorists down the toilet (p 288).

In Sri Lanka, the bomb attack by the LTTE just 1 day before the provincial election of May 2008 election, which killed 11 and wounded 29 people, has brought a landline victory to the hard-line governing party, United People's Freedom Alliance or the UPFA. According to the UPFA General Secretary Susil Premjayanth, the electorates viewed the elections as the referendum on war against terrorism, and voted for their hard-line governing party, which they favored their counterterrorism policies (Ferdinando 2008).

As seen in these examples, usually pre-election terrorism brings a hard-line government. Thus, it is important to ask *why people vote for a more hard-line government.*

Most scholars (Höglund 2009; Michavila 2005; Indridason 2008) explain calling a hard-line government through an increase in personal security concerns. Pratkanis and Aronson (1996) propose that recourse to fear as a propaganda tool is most effective when: "(1) there is a serious shock; (2) a specific recommendation is offered to overcome the problem; (3) the proposed measures are perceived as effective to deal with the threat; and (4) the person who receives the message believes he or she can carry out the recommendation" (as cited in Michavila 2005, p 16). To put differently, a terrorist attack increases personal safety concerns, and people seek a political party that would effectively provide them the most secure environment.

Likewise, Gassebner et al. (2008) pointed out the impact of terrorism on increasing people's personal safety concerns thus affecting their political preferences. Their study examines the impact of terrorism on the replacement of incumbent governments by analyzing 800 elections in 115 countries and found that terrorist attacks increase the probability of government replacement after an election by revealing the government's incompetence of protecting its people from terrorism; furthermore, they suggested that this probability increases with the severity of the attack.

Höglund (2009)'s study stresses a relationship among pre-election violence, personal safety concerns and electorate's political preferences. Höglund suggests that electoral violence may polarize the electorate along conflict lines, thus lead to new outburst of violence, and replace the incumbent with a hardliner government, because when people feel they are insecure, they give more importance to law and order than the peace and reconciliation, thereby call alternative than call for reconciliation (pp 412–413).

Michavila (2005) examines how and why people support government's harsh countermeasures. Michavila argues that people concern more about their personal security than collective security, whether national or international, therefore to the

extent that a citizen feels that the state guarantees his or her own security, he or she supports the measures it adopts (p 17). Similarly, through analyzing the polls, Huddy et al. (2002) found that 9/11 terrorist attacks increased concern about their personal security among the Americans that they or a family member would become a general victim of terrorism. Furthermore, the attacks also increased their support for the government and its counterterrorism measures. Similarly, Indridason (2008) argues that terrorism may influence *electorate's concerns* about their safety, and such concerns influence the electorate's preferences. In other words, the electorates tend to cast their votes for the party that would provide more security, especially the ones who have been affected by the violence. Amerasinghe (1989) found pre-election violence carried out by extremist groups in Sri Lanka lowered turnout rates and those affected from violence voted against the opposition candidate, Bandaranaike, rather than governing party's candidate.

When the leftist insurgents increased their violence, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla took power in 1953 through a military coup in Colombia and number of killings under his tenure declined in the short run. And not surprisingly, the next year, in 1954, due to his initial success, the national assembly elected him as the president (Brauer et al. 2004). By the same token, since providing security of its population is one of the primary responsibilities of government, the electorate may hold the government accountable for its failure in securing and protecting its population against the terrorism. Thus, to Indridason (2008), depending upon their performance, it is reasonable to expect that the electorate reward or punish the political parties at the ballot box. By the same token, on the other hand, it is also possible that fear of terrorism may work both in favor of the insurgent. If the local population feels that the government is not capable of protecting the population and preventing terrorism, it may vote for the insurgent's political party, just to avoid from being a target of the insurgent terrorism, especially in the post-election period.

Although pre-election violence is more likely to bring a hard-line government, sometimes it may not always work that way. In few cases, it may defeat a hard-line governing party or lead the government to implement warm policies that the insurgent may favor. For instance, Madrid bombings, which occurred just three days before the Spanish General Election of 2004, replaced a hard-line government (PP) with a soft one, (PSOE). Or in others, pre-election violence may lead the new government to accommodate the insurgent's demands in return for a relative decline in political violence. For instance, in Colombia, when Liberal party candidate Cesar Augusto Gaviria Trujillo (1990–1994) won the elections and became president, he pushed the legislatures to replace the constitution of 1886, appointed a former guerrilla leader to his cabinet, pushed large-scale budget increases in social expenditures and moves that could be viewed as accommodating insurgent demands (Brauer et al. 2004).

As seen in the literature, only one dimension—*position of the governing party on terrorism*—does not explain the election outcome; therefore, there must be some additional dimensions in anticipating the consequences of pre-election violence and election outcomes.

Fault Factor

If people reach a conclusion that government's policies or programs attracted the terrorists to launch their terrorist campaign or carry out a terrorist attack, then they are more likely to hold responsible the government for the terrorist attack(s), and as a consequence, will punish the government at the ballot box by replacing it with another one, even with a soft one. Spanish general election of 2004 is a good example of this. Many international analysts and news media argued that if the ETA had been responsible for the Madrid bombings the election outcomes would have been very different than the current results because an ETA attack would benefit the incumbent party because of its clear accomplishment in combating terrorism. However, an attack by Al-Qaida would put the responsibility for the deaths on the governing party because of its support of the USA in the war in Iraq, which most of the Spaniards clearly opposed (Michavila 2005, p 4).

On 11th March 2004, just three days before the general elections ten bombs were exploded in three different trains in Madrid and killed 191 deaths and injured over 1500. Although polls indicated that the incumbent party, People's Party was supported by a majority of population in February 2004, the incumbent lost the 14 March election with 37.6 % of the vote while the Socialist Party (PSOE) received 42.6 % of the vote and won the election (Indridason 2008). The winning party PSOE gained three million new votes compared to the previous elections and as a consequence, won a total of 164 of the 350 seats, while the incumbent a hard-line PP party lost almost 7 % of its votes from the previous election and 35 of the 183 seats gained in 2000 (Chari 2004). Whether the Madrid bombings affected the unexpected election outcomes received a great attention from scholars (Chari 2004; Van Biezen 2005; Montalvo 2007; Bali 2007; Rose and Murphy 2007; Tures 2009). Almost all scholars agreed that the Madrid bombings affected electoral outcomes in various ways.

Bali (2007) examined the influence of Madrid bombings through individual level survey data and found that the Madrid train bombings of 2004 influenced the electorate's voting behavior not because of the population's weakness against terrorism, but because the terrorist attack increased the *turnout rate* in favor of other parties and issues regarding the incumbent government's policy on the Iraq war and mismanagement of the bombing investigation.

Chari (2004) views the Madrid bombings as a *catalyst* for change and as a reaction to governing party's foreign policy. He concluded that the terrorist attack coupled with the misinformation by the government and served as a catalyst to encourage the abstainers to vote against the governing party.

In addition to the government's support the war in Iraq, Rigo (2005) concluded that poor management of the terrorist investigation was perceived by the population as an attempt to manipulate the tragedy influenced the election (p 613).

Michavila (2005) analyzed published pre-and post-election polls and micro-data from the post-election poll by the CIS, based on 5377 door to door interviews. He categorized the most proposed reasons for the election outcomes under the following

four hypotheses and tested their influence: (1) a latent desire for a change of government; (2) the shock caused by the attacks; (3) a desire to punish the government for its position on the war in Iraq; and (4) a dual manipulation of information—by the government and against the government. The study findings suggest that the Madrid bombings had a decisive impact on the election results that is relatively small but a determining factor that changed the final result. Finally, he concludes that those four hypotheses are not exclusive, but rather complementary. The first three were necessary preconditions for the electoral turnaround and the last one reinforced the process. In other words, he argues that, without a latent desire for change, without the Spanish government's support for war in Iraq, and without the shock by the terrorist attack, the change would not have occurred (p 32).

Proximity

Scholars have argued that as terrorist attacks occur near to election time, its impact on the election results increases, whereas the farther away from the election, terrorist attacks lose impact (Dhanagare 1968; Bali 2007; Berrebi and Klor 2008; Gassebner et al. 2008). For example, in their study on terrorism and electoral accountability, Gassebner et al. (2008) examined terror events that occurred 2 years before the elections and found that they do not influence the election outcome; therefore, the authors concluded that the electorate is short sighted with respect to its voting behavior. Similarly, Berrebi and Klor (2008) found that the electoral impact of terrorist acts decreases the farther away the terrorist act occurs from the elections. Bali (2007) acknowledged the importance of the electoral proximity and suggested that if the Madrid bombings had occurred 3 months before the elections, the electoral outcomes may have been different today. In other words, due to the political competition and media coverage, if a terrorist act occurs near to election times, the government's performance becomes questionable and vulnerable thereby changing government at the elections by the electorate.

The other two factors that can affect the election outcomes are the (4) *severity* and (5) *targets* of the terrorist campaign. The more severe and bloodier terrorist attacks may generate the greater electoral impact on the elections; and indiscriminate terrorism usually generates greater concerns about the personal safety among the population.

To sum up, from the electorate's perspective, pre-election violence raises the concerns about the personal safety and these concerns dominates the voting behavior. In case of pre-election violence that is close to the election, if the governing party is a soft one, it is most likely that it will be punished at the ballot box because of being incapable of protecting its citizens against the terrorists, thus will be replaced with a hard-line political party in the upcoming elections. However, if the incumbent government is already a hard-line political party, then people would decide whether the government's policies or programs might have attracted the terrorists to carry out the attack. If the terrorist attack was carried out by a domestic

terrorist group, then it is most likely that the incumbent government would benefit from the attack because of its already known position against the terrorist group and harsh policies.

However, if the attack(s) were conducted by an international terrorist organization, then the population would look at its policies or programs that might lead the terrorist organization to choose that country to attack. If the governing population is held responsible for the terrorist attacks due to its poor or faulty policies, then it would be replaced with another one. This mostly depends on the perception of the population. The media, political rivals and other actors may be able to undermine incumbent government's credibility and increase its concerns about the incumbent government thus replace the government with the upcoming elections; or depending upon the conditions; capabilities and skills of the government, its allied media and other factors, if the blame can be attributed to other factors and public can be convinced, the government may even benefit the terrorist attacks and increase its vote shares.

In conclusion, pre-election has at least five dimensions. Therefore I argue that if the insurgent is rational, as many scholars acknowledge, then it should consider these dimensions; and carefully plan its terrorism campaign prior to the election. Otherwise, since the election is a zero- sum game, the insurgent would not only lose its popular support and fail at the ballot box thus deprive it from political and population's resources but also bring a hard-line government that would make everything harder. Thus it is important to ask *if pre-election violence brings a hard-line government, why the insurgent would use violence prior to elections; who actually benefits from pre-election violence: the government or insurgent? What are the rationales behind of it? In order to get desired outcomes, under what conditions would the insurgent resort to pre-election violence?*

Under the light of existent literature, if the primary goal of the insurgent is to increase support and votes for its political party, it would not attack against its native population, especially in its constituencies. Rather, the terrorism campaign would focus on combatants and governmental targets in its constituencies. However, if insurgent's primary aim is to damage the government and electoral process rather than winning elections, then terrorism campaign would focus on government's civilian population in non-insurgent constituencies. By this way, the insurgent may be able to increase the government's population's concerns about their personal safety and to lead the government's population to hold responsible the government for the attacks. Thus, as a consequence, in order to decrease personal security concerns among its citizens and secure a victory in the upcoming elections, incumbent government may sit the table and give concessions in favor of the insurgent. Because, in some cases, as Rose and Murphy (2007) point out, terrorist attacks on civilians may potentially lead to policy concessions if the government and citizens believe that the insurgent is motivated by limited policy objectives; so the government may prefer to make some policy changes in favor of the insurgent.

Additional benefit for and aim of the insurgent would be that even the elections usually brings a hard-line government, due to its possible harsh indiscriminate counterterrorism policies against the insurgent's native population, the insurgent's

population may alienate itself from the government; thus, the insurgent still would be able to increase its popular support in the long run and secure the next elections. As an example of such strategy, in November 2001 the Maoist insurgents, the CPN-M, intentionally escalated the conflict to force the government to drop their "democratic mask" and reveal their "true fascist role" in front of the Nepalese people and international people (Gobyn 2009).

Violence in the Post-Election Period

Various factors can influence violence in the post-election violence. They include *fraud in elections* (Sisk 2008; Fishman and Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies 2005), which often occurs when disputes over election results or the inability of judicial mechanisms to resolve disputes in a fair, timely, and transparent manner; *electoral system*—occurs especially when elections are seen as "zero-sum" events and "losers" are left out of participation in governance *(*Fischer 2004) or in winner-take-all systems may cause violence in fragile states because of not letting ethnic minorities to represent in the government due to a threshold that must be met across the country (Sisk 2008); and *election outcomes* (Amerasinghe 1989; Rapoport and Weinberg 2000; Boyle 2009; Finn 2000; Höglund 2009; Sisk 2008).

Most of the studies focusing on the post-election violence (Amerasinghe 1989; Rapoport and Weinberg 2000; Boyle 2009; Finn 2000; Höglund 2009; Sisk 2008) focus on election outcomes and explain it through a relative deprivation approach that is generated by dissatisfied election outcomes.

Electoral Outcomes

Most scholars have considered election outcomes as the main source of the post-election violence therefore conceived post-election violent events as quick and short-lived events that starts right or soon after the results are announced and ends in a short period of time, such as a couple of weeks. According to Rapoport and Weinberg (2000) usually, post-election violence occurs after the results are announced, as it did in Sri Lanka Elections of 1988 (Amerasinghe 1989). The election violence started as soon as the results of 1988 Sri Lanka presidential elections of 1988 announced (Amerasinghe (1989). As the Sunday Times (January 1, 1989) reported, 94 bodies were found just on the day. Furthermore, at least 260 people were killed within the 5 days and 417 were killed within 13 days in the post-election violence (as cited in Amerasinghe 1989, p 346).

Poor election outcomes have various negative meanings for the insurgent such as failure at mobilizing the mass (Weinberg and Eubank 1992), deprived of political power and its benefits (Sisk 2008; Finn 2000), loss of legitimacy. Without a correct

interpretation of election outcomes, post-election violence cannot be anticipated or analyzed accurately.

Weinberg and Eubank (1992) suggest that terrorist violence is the outcome of a small elite group of individuals who are frustrated by their inability to mobilize the masses; therefore, terrorism should be related to a frustrating decline in power, not an increasing parliamentary presence, because they may think their electoral appeals go *"unheeded"* (p 136). In other words, when the insurgent confronts the indifference of the population that it hopes to get its support and mobilize against the government, and its appeals for support are rejected by the electorate, it resorts to violence (Weinberg 1991).

Likewise, the Hewitt (2000) study on violence perpetrated by the White racists during the South during the civil rights period and by the Black militants in the late 1960s and early 1970s, found that timing of each outbreak of terrorism coincided with the decline of popular mobilization, rather than its high points. To Hewitt, unexpectedly poor electoral support at the ballot box may lead the insurgent to conclude that the entire electoral politics is a fraud and the population has been blinded to the insurgent's real interests (p 433). Furthermore, he concludes that groups lose in the elections, particularly if they lose *"consistently,"* are likely view violence as tempting option (p 343).

Similarly, Sisk (2008) and Finn (2000) views undesired election results as the main source of the election violence because of the insurgent's aims to retain political power or unwillingness to cede power. When the insurgent's political party lost the elections, it may frustrate its supporters thus lead to political violence (Finn 2000, p 53). As Boyle (2009) pointed out dissatisfied groups have powerful incentives to use violence against target population (Boyle 2009); thus, when the insurgent does not satisfy with the defeat at the ballot box, the insurgent may use violence against target population (Boyle 2009), or try to overthrow or alter the election outcomes (Höglund 2009, p 416). Depending upon the insurgent's interpretation of election results, the perpetrator can punish the electorates for not voting for its political party, or target government and its citizens. For instance, when the results of 1999 referendum indicated that an overwhelming 78.5 % of people voted for the independence of East Timor from the Indonesia, military-backed militias launched a violence campaign against the East Timorese population, foreign journalists, the UN staff, and Catholic clergy (Schulze 2001, p 77–78); as a consequence of this campaign, 70–80 % of the business district in Dili was destroyed; almost 50 % of houses in the capital city were burnt, and over 271,545 East Timorese were forced to leave to the West Timor (Crouch, p 155 as cited in Boyle 2009, p 225).

Scholars (Guelke and Smyth 1992; Neumann 2005; Berrebi and Klor 2008) have reached different conclusions in their research on the influence on election outcomes on post-election violence. For instance, Berrebi and Klor (2008) examined the influence of Israeli popular support for Israel's right block parties on Palestinian terrorism during the post-election period and found no evidence indicating a relationship. Perhaps, it would have generated greater insight for the proposed study if Berrebi and Klor had examined the Palestinian population's votes.

Guelke and Smyth (1992) examined this relationship between violence and relative decline in popular support for the IRA by using electoral data and concluded that relative decline in popular votes led the IRA to commit terrorist acts to increase its popular votes. They suggested that when its political party, the Sinn Fein, suffered a setback in the second direct election to the European Parliament and polled 10,000 fewer votes than the party had received in the Westminster election a year earlier, this failure led to dissatisfaction within the IRA regarding the priority given to the electoral contest.

Consequently, violence increased and most important was the attempt to assassinate the British prime minister at the Conservative Party Conference held in 1984 (Guelke and Smyth 1992). They suggested that the IRA carried out this attack in order to increase its popularity among the Irish population. However, effectiveness of resorting violence to increase popular votes is open to discussion. Neumann (2005) found that the IRA violence did not manage to increase its popular support in the long run. He found that in the long run, as its popular support declined the IRA violence declined too in the following 10 years and never has reached its death tolls.

Gergin (2012)'s study departs from the relative deprivation approach derived from dissatisfied election results and pointed out a new direction, which is a resource mobilization approach. He found that the vote share of the PKK's political party positively affects post-election terrorist attacks.

Weinberg (1991), McAllister (2004), and Neumann (2005) suggested that depending upon the conditions the insurgent may shift its strategy from violence to electoral politics or use both simultaneously. Neumann's (2005) study indicates that relative declines in vote share of the Sinn Fein started at 1984 European elections and lasted till 1989 local elections of Northern Ireland. In the following years after the 1989 elections, the number of IRA killings gradually declined. When the IRA declared a ceasefire in 1993, its political party Sin Fein received its highest vote share at 1993 local elections in Northern Ireland and European elections. Neumann attributes this electoral success to the IRA's ability to correctly read the changing dynamics of the movement and understand its electorates' opposition to violence. Likewise, McAllister (2004) suggested that Sinn Fein benefited from the ceasefire of 1994 and built itself a stronger personal base of support. In other words, Sin Fein's political constituents delegitimized the violence, and this opposition put a pressure on the IRA and limited its violence. Therefore, in order to keep popular support with its own side, the insurgent did not increase its violence to meet its electorate's demands thus succeeded in regaining popular support. Similarly, Weinberg (1991) points out the mutability of political conditions and suggests that given the appropriate circumstances the insurgent can replace the electoral campaign with terrorism campaign, the opposite, or both simultaneously. If the insurgent desires to acquire respectability in domestic and international politics and its violent activities have been to be ineffective, then it may pursue its political goals through participating in democratic electoral politics (Weinberg 1991).

The degree of attached importance to efficiency of violence to reach insurgent's political objectives varies with the time and may affect the insurgent's violence as

well. Similarly, Funes's study findings indicate that in 1989, 80 % of the Basque country people agreed that violence is unnecessary to obtain political goal. This percentage reached to 88 % in 1991 and in 1997. Unfortunately, how the ETA responded to this decline in its popular support level was not explained in the study. The terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 in the USA and March 11 2004 in Madrid have further reinforced strong opposition to any terrorist activity in Spain (Pallarés, Muñoz, and Retortillo 2006), as a consequence in order to not to alienate the population from itself and keep its popular support, the ETA decreased the number of its killings.

Discussion on Post-Election Violence

Much of the past literature on election violence primarily has focused on the pre-election violence and its effects on either electoral process or election outcomes. However, post-election violence has different dynamics and stems from different reasons than the pre-election or election day(s) violence. As Amerasinghe (1989) points out pre-election violence aims to *"obstruct"* electorates whereas post-election violence aims to *"punish"* them (p 347).

Much of the past studied has explained violence in the post-election period with dissatisfaction with the election outcomes, in other words, through a relative deprivation approach. Basically, these studies suggest that when a political party lost elections, they deprive from political power and resources, thereby these political parties or their supporters resort to violence because they do not want to loss political power and resources. Although this approach provides some insights about post-election period in cases where the insurgent's political party has lost elections or gained a poor success at the ballot box, it provides little information on post-election violence when the insurgent's political party has won the elections or increased its vote shares without gaining any seats. Because these studies mostly approach the elections only as a means of gaining political power and resources, therefore ignore the actual mean of the election results for the insurgent such as loss or increase of popular support and resources provided by the population.

Conclusion

There is a scant but a growing literature on electoral violence. And this study brings these dispersed studies together in a systematic way and attempts to establish a theoretical framework. Now, extant literature acknowledges that political violence increases as approaching the Election Day and terrorist/insurgent organizations benefit from electoral violence in many ways. Among others, may be the most visible election results. By use of electoral violence, it increases its political party's

vote share while decreasing the ruling party's one. In other words, the insurgent/terrorist organizations hit two birds with one stone.

However, although there are few studies providing some insights into the relationship between election violence and election results, still how election violence affect electorate's preferences should be investigated through empirical studies, because there might be many factors in different levels. Therefore, future studies should consider individual, local, national, and international level factors. By this way, governments and population can understand the rationale behind politically violent attacks and take some measures to minimize its negative effects. In order to do so, the government should increase terrorism awareness among its security forces and population and should implement some defensive policies to protect its forces, officials, facilities, and the population especially during the pre-election and post-election periods. Defensive policies include: increase of terrorism and security awareness in the security forces, officials, and population; target hardening; strengthening possible security weaknesses.

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Chapter 19
Is Democracy a Cure for Human Rights Violations? An Analysis of Macro Variables

Hüseyin Akdoğan and Fatih Tombul

Introduction

Human rights comprise all the rights and freedoms belonging to all human beings. People can benefit from human rights regardless of their language, gender, race, and religion. Every person has an equal right to benefit from them. Human rights generally aim to protect the honor of human beings and intend to develop their material and moral values. As Ishay (2004) states, human rights are the rights that an individual embraces essentially by virtue of being human. People are pleased as long as they are free to express certain behaviors in their lives. Likewise, people feel miserable when their behaviors are restricted or prohibited. In this context, human rights play a crucial role, as they ensure justice for everyone, help the development of the individuals' capacity, and try to promote the success of a wide range of society.

Human rights are earned by people when they are born, and they are not transferable and indispensable. Human rights were codified in the twentieth Century to prevent the same violations that happened in the past. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR or the Convention) is one of the agreements concerning human rights written during the twentieth century. ECHR is the agreement of members of the European council to secure and protect the declaration of human rights that was accepted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10th December, 1948. In that respect, the European Council's first step was signing the agreement in Rome in 1950 and it came into force as the European Convention on Human Rights in 1953. ECHR is different from other local and international agreements as it allows individuals to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights if their rights have been violated by the state.

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The ECHR starts with an introduction, and the first article opens with the "Obligation to respect Human Rights", stating that all high contracting parties are to "secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Sections of this convention". In the first section (article 2–18), rights and freedom under the protection of the convention are mentioned and also some prohibitions in the convention are explained. The second section of the convention (article 19–21) is related to the European Court of Human Rights' (the Court) establishment, rights, and working condition. The third section of the convention (article 52–59) relates to the implementation and coming into force of the convention.

In the first section (article 2–3) of the Convention, the first right is the right to life and the second is the prohibition of torture. The ECHR has also other articles to protect human rights, but the two aforementioned articles are so important that they represent the essence of being human. These two articles "enshrine some of the basic values of democratic societies making up the Council of Europe" (Salman vs. Turkey- 21986/93).

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States have changed the perception of people and policy makers regarding the concept of security and freedom. The day after the terrorist attacks against the United States, President George W. Bush vowed that "we will not allow this enemy to win the war by changing our way of life or restricting our freedoms." (NY 2001). This speech proved that the perception of the American people in relation to fighting against terrorism had changed. The US government put more emphasis on security rather than the freedom of the citizens. Although the government of the United States started to implement the counterterrorism measures to protect their citizens from future terrorist attacks, these measures have been often criticized for violating human rights.

Democratic countries allow their citizens to live in freedom and respect their rights, but especially the countries where a lot of terrorist activities occur are trying to set up a balance between freedom and security. Democratic countries and their security forces should act according to written regulations, so that they will not act against the law to maintain the stability as part of the rules of democracy and the rule of law. This leads to some inevitable questions: how is it possible to fight against terrorists, while they don't obey the rules when they take part in terrorist activities? How can security forces provide a balance between freedom of the people and their security? These questions are really hard to answer. If the security forces privilege security over freedom, then people's rights will be limited and violated. On the other side, if security forces over-emphasize freedom over security, this will make it more difficult to fight against terrorism, the cause of the loss of so many people's lives. The pendulum may swing to the security side in certain situations, and it may swing to the side of freedom other times. This swing depends on the regime of each country. The pendulum swinging to the side of freedom may be acceptable or desirable in democratic countries where "the rules govern". In these countries, it must not swing to the side of security. When there is a threat, such as terrorism, the pendulum must stop in the middle at a balance.

This study aims to analyze macro variables in different countries to find out the possible causes of Human Rights Violations. The findings may lead to the country's leadership and public authorities, so as to create more democratic governments

respecting Human Rights at all times. The second and third article of the European Convention on Human Rights, the right to life and prohibition of torture, will be presented initially in this article. Then, the literature on Human Rights violations will be investigated thoroughly. After the variables are introduced, the methodology and findings will be presented. Finally, the results of the analysis will be discussed and compared with the previous studies in the literature.

Right to Life

The right to life is the first of the human rights and it is an indispensable base in order for other rights to be realized. The right to life includes not being killed by public authorities. It also includes being protected by the public authorities in situations of risk and danger against the right to life. Thus, the state has the obligation in the face of both activities, as well as the passive precaution to protect the right to life (Kabaoglu 2002:272).

All the other rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals aim to ensure the right to life. The assurance of the right to life is, at the same time, the principle of "the right not to be killed" (Tanör 1990:27). That's why the right to life is generally discussed together with the death penalty.

The right to life is accepted as the major right and organized in international conventions and state constitutions. The right to life is regulated in the third article of the universal declaration of human rights. Likewise, the United Nations Commission for Human Rights also emphasizes this right and states that "The right to life is the supreme right from which no derogation is permitted even in time of the public emergency which threatens the life of the nation" (HRC).

The right to life in ECHR is organized in the second article as follows:

1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:

    (a) in defense of any person from unlawful violence;
    (b) in order to affect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;
    (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection."

The ECHR imposes both positive and negative obligations to the signatory countries. According to negative obligations, the state should refrain from any random deprivation of life. Erdogan (1996:150) states that negative rights are the rights that should be assured against the intervention of the state and the politics. These rights can be protected if the state does not intervene. The responsibility of the state at this point is only to apply regulations to easily ensure these rights. These rights can be

called protective rights. Right to life, personal security, freedom of thought, and protection of personal integrity can be categorized into these rights (Gülmez 2001:18). The obvious point in the convention is that the second article guarantees the right to life. On the other hand, the same article explains the circumstances in which the state has reasonable restrictions in terms of deprivation of life. Initially, the convention laid out some limits to the state in the implementation of lawful executions. With the tendency of the members of the European Council to believe that the death penalty is inhuman in practice and is not compatible with the values of the modern and democratic society, executions were restricted in case of war or of imminent threat of war by protocol 6 stating that "A State may make provision in its law for the death penalty in respect of acts committed in time of war or of imminent threat of war; such penalty shall be applied only in the instances laid down in the law and in accordance with its provisions". In addition, protocol 13 also stated that "The death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed".

The death penalty was removed from the convention. According to Golcuklu, Feyyaz, and Gozubuyuk (2000), signatory countries of the ECHR are responsible with the positive obligation that includes that a) the state should provide tangible measures to protect any life from any tangible danger, b) the state should ban the deprivation of life with dissuasive sanctions and prove to obey that rule. Basibuyuk et al. (2008) state that legislating the law that bans the killing of people does not mean that the state did everything for the positive obligation of the convention. Apart from that, the law enforcement forces should pursue a thorough investigation to find the criminal responsible of a person's death and should bring the criminal to justice. That action is also a part of the positive obligations for a state. Also, law enforcements' insufficient investigations have been evaluated as a violation of the second article of the convention by the Court.

Prohibition of Torture

Although some exceptions exist to the right to life in article 2, there is no exception or limitation for the prohibition of torture in the third article. Even in the 15th article of the convention regarding wartime or state of emergency, no exception is allowed.

The prohibition of Torture in the ECHR is organized in the third article of the convention as follows:

No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

According to Doğru (2006:73), absolute prohibition in article 3 means that even during wartime no one can waive that prohibition. The convention absolutely prohibits torture, inhuman treatment, and punishment, even in difficult conditions, such as fighting with organized crime and terrorism.

With the ECHR convention, it is accepted that the state has both positive and negative obligations. The negative obligation of the government officials regarding

the third article of the convention is to avoid any acts against the prohibitions that were stated in the convention. Moreover, the positive obligations of the state can be categorized as follows:

1. The protection of persons deprived of their liberty
2. The obligation to protect third parties from maltreatment
3. The obligation to do an effective investigation into the allegations of torture and ill-treatment (Kocabas 2009:80).

Literature Review about the Studies Investigating the Violation of Human Rights

Everyone expects that a state provide both internal and external security for the general good of society. Therefore, Henderson (1991a, b) explains that, depending on the situation, governments can use political repression. These conditions may include type of the government, inequality in society, and socioeconomic progress. Stohl and Lopez (1984:7) define political repression as "the use or threat of coercion in varying degrees applied by government against opponents or potential opponents to weaken their resistance to the will of the authorities". Some types of repression can be arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture. In addition, political repression can be different depending on the countries. According to McArthur (2010), crises create an environment that encourages the acceptance of some people including individuals in society and legislators to give authority to the executives. In this context, the leaders usually have a tendency to take power and use it to restrict the freedom of the ordinary citizens. If the leaders feel safe in terms of protecting their position of authority from any danger, they are less likely to violate human rights.

Davenport and Armstrong (2004) investigated the relationship between democracy and repression during the time period from 1976 to 1996. They claim that when a democratic system is in place, the violation of human rights by the authorities will diminish. They also examined why states violate human rights, and they explained that when political authorities demand and create some specific practices, political, economic, or cultural, or when they want to defend these practices from some certain threats, they use political repression. In addition, Davenport and Armstrong (2004) claimed that governments can use coercion both inside and outside of the country to overcome the ongoing challenge, when the leaders feel threatened from protests against them.

According to Dallin and Breslauer (1970), authorities diminish their use of coercion when some punishments or social control systems exist to prevent the authorities' repressive behavior. They also explain that citizens have been more influenced by the social control provided by democracy. At the end of their work, Davenport and Armstrong (2004) concluded that a threshold exists for domestic democratic peace in order to influence human rights violations. Below the threshold, the level of democracy has no concrete effect on the human rights violations. But when the threshold is

exceeded, the level of democracy diminishes the state repression. In other words, the authorities will not feel any constraints while using the political repression unless the threshold of democratic institutionalization is exceeded. Furthermore, the results of the study of Carey (2006), exploring the association between protest and repression, indicated that democracies are more accommodating than semi-democracies or autocracies in terms of accepting the opposition and showing less repressive behavior. The study also revealed that the countries with a democratic government show less hostile activities than countries having semi-democracies.

Regan and Henderson (2002) examined the relationship between democracy and political repression. The researchers use the term "political repression" referring to the US Department of State's definition and Universal Declaration of Human Rights' explanation, as the rights include "freedom from torture, arbitrary detention, imprisonment for political views, and political killings" (p. 125). They concluded that political repression is significantly and positively related to the level of threat. Threat against the regime can come in different forms, such as civil war, strikes, and riots. The researchers claim that when the leaders of the ruling party feel that the threat is approaching, then they are likely to use political repression. In addition, the study revealed that the level of threat has an effect on political repression as important as the type of regime. Another result of the study is that countries having intermediate level of democracy face more political repression in the case of controlling the level of threat. As an explanation, the researcher state that leaders in semi-democracies have the perception that their regime is vulnerable to the threats, and that's why they react to any threat so strongly. At the end of their study, the researchers concluded that a nonlinear relationship exists between democracy and repression. That is to say, repression is used more in semi-democracies than democracies or autocracies.

Ingersoll (2005) argues that domestic factors, such as level of economic development and population size, can affect the leader of the ruling party and lead him to use repression. As these domestic factors may create a reason for the people to be dissatisfied in relation to the status quo, the governments may see them as a threat and engage in violation against personal integrity rights. According to Mitchell and McCormick (1988), when a country is in good shape in terms of economy, then it will likely to have political stability, which will cause to respect human rights. Otherwise, if a country faces an economic crisis, that will cause political unrest, which, in turn, causes the state to use repression to maintain control. In addition, the researchers found that countries presenting a developed economy have a better human rights record than countries with a poor economy. Moreover, Ingersoll (2005) states that the satisfaction of the people related to the current authority will increase if there is a good level of economic development. In this regard, Henderson (1991a, b, p. 126) claims that

> Presumably even if the goods of society are not distributed equally and class lines remain distinct, a better-off society can afford to share some of the wealth with the masses, at least to a degree that will reduce conflict.

Ingersoll (2005) explains that it is not only poverty that is associated with the violation of individuals' physical integrity; it is also the weaker position of the people caused by poverty that promotes the government repression.

Testas (2004) explains that a positive relationship between human rights and good economic development exists. If the state has good economic policies in order to maintain the basic physical needs such as food and education, then democratic institutions are developed and people do not face a high degree of human rights abuse. On the contrary, economic collapse will cause the low level of democracy related to the violations of human rights. The researcher clarifies the relationship between development, democracy, and civil peace. According to him, higher living standards are positively related to the higher level of education, which in turn affects positively the perception of politics. In other words, individuals with a high level of education help to build more corporations-based politics. Likewise, a higher per capita income is connected to modernization, which facilitates information sharing, tolerance, and the decline of extremism and repression. Last but not the least, Testas (2004) concludes that democracy endorses civil peace, as it encourages the governments to act more efficiently which results in less violence among people. As the governments elected under a democracy perform more fairly in their administrative duties, the people feel less burdened. Also, democratic governments are recognized as legitimate, so people perceive political decisions as more acceptable. As a result, democratic governments will use less repression while dealing with the economic, ethnic, and religious issues.

This research is the second in the sequence that employs the same research design strategy, but analyzes the most current data that the ECHR revealed. The first one was published in 2008 and analyzed the ECHR's data between 1999 and 2006. Basibuyuk et al. (2008) conducted an OLS analysis to find out the macro variables that are associated with human rights violations in different countries. They employed the same dependent variable, namely HR Violations, in this current study with one difference, the time period analyzed covers the Court's decision on article 2 and 3 of the Convention. They used population, GDP Per capita, unemployment rates, number of terrorist organizations, democracy score, and number of crime incidents as independent variables in the analysis. Using the OLS regression analysis, they found that GDP per capita that reflects the economic development of a country, unemployment rate, and democracy score is negatively related to HR Violations. The number of terrorist organizations is positively related to HR Violations. The number of crime incidents is the only variable that has no relationship with the dependent variable. The current study is somewhat a repetition and advancement of the previous one. However, there are some basic differences. Therefore, the findings of the current study are going to be compared with the findings of Basibuyuk, Akdogan, and Karakus' study.

Landman and Larizza (2009) investigated the associations between inequality (land and income) and protection of personal integrity rights by using time as a reference—series data set that included 162 countries for the years 1980–2004. The researcher stated in his study that democracy is an opportunity for opposition groups, as they can find a way to voice their opinions under this system. He concluded that, not only high levels of national income, but also distribution of that income is crucial for protection of personal integrity. In addition, equal distribution of the economic assets, such as land, is also an important factor for the protection of personal integrity. The researcher also explained that not only political institutions but also economic institutions facilitating the distribution of the assets and development to all individuals in society are needed to prevent rights abuses.

Dreher et al. (2012) investigated the effect of globalization and economic liberalization on governments' respect for human rights in a panel of 106 countries over the 1981–2004 period. They suggest that economic freedom and globalization are two crucial factors that impact the governments' respect for human rights. The researchers followed the Poe and Tate's (1994) model positing that the level of democracy, economic development, and population are some of the determinants in the governments' decision to respect human rights. Besides, Poe and Tate (1994) claim that when the government is threatened, then the repression of human rights, such as imprisonment and torture, will be used as a tool by the government to overcome the issues. They also explain that grievances are solved in a peaceful manner in democracies, which allows an appropriate ground for parties to negotiate, unlike what happens in autocracies.

Since the public can find a way to express their opinions and complain about abusive actions in democracies, it is expected that democracies enable governments to advance human rights. In addition, Poe and Tate (1994) posit that countries with a high population present a scarcity of goods that can cause the conflict. Governments' coercive actions are expected in highly populated countries as more population causes a more elevated scarcity of goods. Moreover, intense population growth has led to the proliferation of young population, which in turn causes instability in the country. Based on the opinions of Poe and Tate (1994), Dreher et al. (2012) claim that both population growth and size are two important factors most likely to cause an increase in the coercive actions of governments. On one hand, they believe that social globalization also has a positive impact on a country's human rights practice. For example, the process of joining the European Union (EU) requires a number of steps including human rights and fundamental freedoms.

New members of the EU should fulfill some preconditions, especially in regard to human rights, in order to benefit from the membership. On the other hands, the new members are aware of the fact that they will face the European Court of Human Rights in case of abuse of any human rights. In other words, social globalization as in the example of the EU has an encouraging effect on governments to respect human rights. At the end of their study, the researcher concluded that when the variables (economic freedom, political, social, and economic globalization) are evaluated separately, all of the variables are positively associated with the physical integrity rights. On the other hand, when the variables are evaluated all together, only economic freedom and political globalization are positively related to the physical integrity rights.

Data and Study Design

This study examines the macro factors of countries affecting human rights violations. These violations are aggregated from the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights that found a violation of article 2 and 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights. Articles 2 (right to life) and 3 (prohibition of torture) "enshrine some of the basic values of democratic societies making up the Council of Europe" (Salman vs. Turkey- 21986/93).

The sample size of this study is 46, which includes the countries that accepted the judicial authority of the European Court of Human Rights. The map below shows the sample along with the number of violation decisions by the ECHR.

Map of HR Violations (articles 2 and 3)

As shown in the map, the leading country in terms of violation decisions is Russia with 1154 violations between 2006 and 2014. Turkey follows Russia with 543 violations.

Table 19.1 lists these countries by adding up the population in the calculation. When these violation decisions are re-calculated by 100,000 people, then the lists change. Russia goes down to number 6 in the list, whereas Moldova leads the list with 2899 violations per-10,000 people. Turkey falls down to number 7 with 767 violations per-100,000 individuals.

Measurements

This study employs Human Rights violations as the dependent variable. There are six independent variables used in the study; namely, number of terrorist incidents, democracy score, population, criminal offences, prosperity index, and human development index. Table 19.2 shows the variables used in this study and the sources of the data.

Human Rights Violations (The Dependent Variable)

The dependent variable for this analysis is the *human rights violations* in each county. The data were aggregated from the European Court of Human Rights statistics. Articles 2 (right to life) and 3 (prohibition of torture) are two vital articles for

Table 19.1 HR violations per 100,000

Table 19.2 Variables used in the analysis and source of the data

	Variable name	Source
1	Human Rights Violations	European Court of Human Rights
2	Number of Terror Incidents	Global Terrorism Database (START-2014)
3	Democracy Score	Freedom House
4	Population 2007–2014 average	United Nations Statistics Division
5	Criminal Offences Per 100,000 (2007–2011)	European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics (2014)
6	Prosperity Index	Legatum Institute
7	Human Development Index	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Table 19.3 Descriptive statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Articles 2 and 3 total	46	0	1154	61.09	187.664
HR Violations per 100,000	46	0	2899	335.98	527.685
Democracy Score	46	1.0	5.6	1.753	1.2416
Population 2007–2014 average	46	30,621	143,656,266	17,737,668.24	28,718,766.384
Number of terror incidents-2007–2013	46	0	1104	50.28	174.364
Criminal offences per 100,000-2007–2011	42	256	26,711	4373.69	4695.832
Prosperity index	42	−0.764	3.517	1.23481	1.358861
Human development index	44	0.663	0.944	0.83045	0.067323

the countries composing the European Union. These two articles "enshrine some of the basic values of democratic societies making up the Council of Europe" (Salman vs. Turkey- 21986/93). The violation decisions of the Court between 2007 and 2014 were aggregated from the Court's annual reports. Then, these two violations are summed up by state, in order to create the dependent variable called HR Violations.

Table 19.3 shows the descriptive statistics about the variables used in this study. The raw data about Human Rights violations are the violation decisions of the European Court of Human rights. The raw data are shown in the table as the articles 2 and 3 totals. These raw data are recalculated (per 100,000) in order to minimize the effects of the population. The dependent variable is HR violations per 100,000 and it is also shown in the table. The HR violations vary from 0 to 2899 where 0 represents no human right violation decisions and 2899 represents the highest number of violation decisions by the Court.

Democracy Score

The democracy score of the countries is derived from Freedom House. The political rights and civil liberties scores of countries vary from 1 to 7 according to Freedom House's freedom in the world report with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. This study takes the average of these two scores to create a democracy score of the countries. Based on this calculation, the democracy scores of countries vary from 1, representing the democratic countries, to 5, 6 representing the least democratic countries.

Population

The United Nations statistic division provides the most current population of the countries. This study employs the average population of countries between 2007 and 2014. The average population among the sample is 17,737,668. The most populous country is Russia with a population of 143,656,266, while the least populous country is San Marino with a population of 30,621.

Number of Terrorist Incidents

The number of terrorist incidents data are aggregated from Global Terrorism Database which was collected by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). The database defines terrorism as "*the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.*"(GTD Codebook 2014, p. 8).

The average terrorist incidents between 2007 and 2013 are calculated to create this variable. There are countries among the sample with no terrorist incidents such as Slovakia, Lithuania, Slovenia, and Luxembourg. Russia is the leading country in terms of terrorist incidents with a number of 1104 incidents.

Criminal Offences

Criminal offences data are derived from European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics. This set of data is recorded or reported by the police. The independent variable is created by averaging the crime statistics between 2007 and 2011. The average crime numbers are then proportioned by 100,000, in order to minimize the population's effect.

Crime offences vary from 256 to 26,711. The United Kingdom is the leading country in terms of criminal offences with 26,711 crimes.

Prosperity Index

The Prosperity index aims to measure prosperity of countries based on both income and well-being globally. The Legatum institute suggests using this Prosperity index instead of defining countries' prosperity solely based on their GDP. The Prosperity index is the combination of eight sub-indices, namely economy, entrepreneurship and opportunity, governance, education, health, safety and security, personal freedom, and social capital. Each of these sub-indices is formed of different individual variables and there are totally 89 individual variables. The Prosperity index of the countries in the sample varies from −0.764 to 3.517. Norway is the most prosperous country among the sample with 3.517 prosperity score, whereas Armenia has the lowest prosperity score.

Human Development Index

The Human Development Index (HDI) was created with the same idea based on which the prosperity index is created. HDI points out that economic growth alone cannot reflect a country's development. Based on this idea, three indices, namely a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable, and a decent standard of living, are taken into consideration to measure a country's development. These three basic indices are comprised of different individual variables.

Among this sample, Norway, again, has the highest human development score with 0.944 where Moldova has the lowest one with 0.663.

Findings

Bivariate Analysis

A correlation analysis is first conducted to see the relationships between each variable. Then, to explore the variables that can explain the human rights violations in the countries, Negative Binomial Regression analysis was used, since the dependent variable is a count variable with over dispersion of zeros.

Table 19.4 presents the correlation matrix which shows the bivariate analyses of the variables.

The Human Rights Violations variable, which is determined as the dependent variable of this study, has a statistically significant, positive relationship with the

Table 19.4 Correlation matrix

	Correlation matrix								
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	HR Violations per 100,000	r	1						
2	Democracy score	r	0.357[a]	1					
3	Number of terror incidents-2007–2013	r	0.171	0.484[b]	1				
4	Criminal offences per 100,000-2007–2011	r	−0.342[a]	−0.420[b]	−0.098	1			
5	Legatum prosperity index	r	−0.496[b]	−0.743[b]	−0.243	0.663[b]	1		
6	World Bank human development index	r	−0.553[b]	−0.768[b]	−0.140	0.581[b]	0.924[b]	1	
7	Population 2007–2014 average	r	0.010	0.281	0.723[b]	0.156	−0.064	0.018	1

[a]Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

[b]Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

democracy score based on the correlation matrix analysis ($r=0.357$, $p<0.05$). In other words, when the democracy level of a country increases, the HR Violations in that country also increase.

HR Violations variable has a statistically significant, negative relationship with criminal offences, the Legatum prosperity index and Human Development Index variables ($r=-0.342$ and $p<0.05$; $r=-0.496$, $r=-0.553$ and $p<0.01$ respectively). The Pearson r score between these variables tells us that human right violations decrease in a country where criminal offences increase. The HR variable also decreases when the prosperity index and human development index of the country increase.

The number of terrorist incidents is only significantly related with the population variable ($r=0.723$, $p<0.01$). The more populous the countries are, the higher the number of terrorist incidents.

The Prosperity index and the Human Development Index are the only two variables that have a significant and positive relationship with the criminal offences variable ($r=0.663$, $r=0.581$ and $p<0.01$ respectively). The more prosperous and developed countries have less criminal offences.

The Prosperity index has a positive and statistically significant relationship with the Human Development Index ($r=0.924$; $p<0.01$). It basically means that the prosperity level of a country increases when its Human Development Index level increases. The last findings of the correlation analysis also show us the possible multicollinearity problem with these two variables, Prosperity index and Human Development Index. This problem warns us that these two variables may measure the same thing. Since the further screenings also point to the same multicollinearity problem, one of the variables, namely the Prosperity variable, is excluded from the additional multivariate analysis.

Multivariate Analysis

Negative Binomial Regression Analysis[1] is used in this analysis since the dependent variable, Human Rights Violations, is a count variable with over dispersion of zeros (10 countries out of 46 have 0-zero count of HR Violations). Count models are log-linear models, and thus employing linear regression as a method of analysis for count models results in inefficient, inconsistent, and biased estimates (p. 217). Since there are 46 countries that accept the judicial authority of European Court Of Human Rights, the final sample is 46 (N=46).

The results of the negative binomial regression analysis predicting the expected number of HR violations are displayed in Table 19.5. The model included 46 countries that accepted the judicial authority of ECHR and examined the effect of social structural variables of countries, specifically the democracy score, number of terrorist incidents, number of criminal offences, population and human development index on the distribution of Human Right Violations.

According to the negative binomial regression results, four out of five variables have turned out to be statistically significant. These variables are: democracy score, population, terrorist incidents, and Human Development Index. On the other hand, the criminal offences variable is the only one that has turned out to be statistically insignificant.

Another variable that has been found to have a statistically significant and negative effect on HR Violations is the population variable ($\beta=-2.216$; $p=0.010$). This finding means that more populous countries tend to have a lower number of HR Violations.

Table 19.5 Negative binomial regression coefficients predicting the expected number of HR violations

Variables	β	SE	$p < IzI$
Constant	26.353	4.611	0.000
Democracy Score	−0.613	0.234	0.009
Population	−2.216	8.601	0.010
Terror Incidents	0.005	0.001	0.001
Criminal Offences	−8.602	4.238	0.839
Human Development Index	−23.721	5.268	0.000
N	46		

The Democracy score has been found to have a statistically significant, but negative effect on HR violations, which suggests that countries with a high Democracy score tend to have lower number of HR violations ($\beta=-0.613$; $p=0.009$)

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[1] Akaike İnformation Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) goodness of fit statistics are used to decide for the most suitable statistical method of analysis among Poisson Regression and Negative Binomial Regression that can be used to analyze count models. Based on these goodness of fit statistics, Negative Binomial Regressiion turned out to be the most appropriate analysis method.

The Human Development Index is the other variable in this study that has been found to have a statistically significant and negative effect on HR Violations ($\beta=-23.721$; $p=0.000$). These numbers suggest that highly developed countries in terms of Human Development Index tend to have lower number of HR Violations.

Number of Terror incidents is the only variable that has turned out to be positively significant in relation to HR Violations ($\beta=0.005$; $p=0.001$). Countries where terror incidents occur more frequently tend to present more HR Violations.

Finally, no statistically significant effect has been found for the variable Named Criminal Offences.

Discussion and Conclusion

The Human rights law is one of the vital elements of the rule of law, which is the fulcrum of any democracy. It implies the unique supremacy of law over everything and everyone. In Aristotle's (1981) words, "law should govern". From this perspective, it is believed that more democratic governments should take care of their citizens' human rights. However, the literature is not that straightforward. Previous research findings classify the democracy levels of the countries as democracy and semi-democracy (Carey 2006), semi-democracies, democracies, and autocracies (Regan and Henderson 2002). Semi-democracies are found to deploy more political repression, or more coercive actions than democracies. Davenport and Armstrong (2004) explain this relationship in a different manner. They claim that when the level of democracy surpasses a certain threshold, then the state does not deploy a coercive action, but under this threshold democracy has no effect on state repression.

On the other hand, Landman and Larizza (2009) state that democracy is an opportunity for opposition groups to make their voices heard; therefore, opponents easily and frequently apply to national and international Courts or bodies to claim their rights. Claiming rights in the presence of international institutions is not an option for non-democratic or autocratic countries.

The Democracy score of these countries is found negatively significant in relation to HR Violations in this study. This finding suggests that more democratic countries tend to have a lower number of HR Violations. This finding is compatible with the findings in the literature discussed above (Carey 2006; Regan and Henderson 2002; Davenport and Armstrong 2004).

Population size and growth are two variables taken into consideration in the state repression analysis. Population is generally related to coercive actions, suggesting that more population causes an increase in government coercion (Poe and Tate 1994; Dreher et al. 2012). Poe and Tate (1994) explain that in countries with a large population scarcity of goods exists causing conflicts. Governments' coercive actions are expected in intensely populated countries because of the scarcity of goods. Moreover, intense population growth has led to the proliferation of a young population, which in turn causes instability in the country.

Population has been found to have a statistically significant and negative effect on HR Violations in this analysis. This finding means that more populous countries tend to have a lower number of HR Violations. This result is not compatible with the findings in the literature. One of the reasons of this antagonism may be the sample of this study. The sample only includes almost all European countries and some others that accept the judicial power of the ECHR. European countries are not densely populated countries compared to others in Africa and Asia. They are also relatively developed and democratic countries. Since the sample of the other research includes different countries all over the world, they may find different results than the research conducted in the Europe.

Another variable considered in this study is the economy variable. Almost all of the research in literature proved that countries that have economic freedom and a developed economy generally also have a political stability which, in turn, leads to the respect of human rights (Mitchell and McCormick, 1988; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Testas 2004; Dreher et al. 2012).

The economy variable is measured in different ways in different studies such as, Per Capita Income (Mitchell and McCormick, 1988), Gross National Product (GNP) per capita (Poe and Tate 1994; Regan and Henderson 2002; Davenport and Armstrong 2004), Energy consumption per capita (Henderson 1991a, b; Davenport 1995), and GDP Per Capita (Basibuyuk et al. 2008).

This research differs from previous ones in terms of measuring the economy or the development level of countries. The Prosperity Index and the Human Development Index are two current indices to measure the prosperity and development levels of different countries. GDP per capita and GNP per capita have been used to measure a country's economic level or development level for years. These measures are criticized in terms of their ability to properly assess. The Prosperity Index of the Legatum Institute is the combination of eight sub-indices, formed by 89 individual variables. Likewise, the Human Development Index of the World Bank is the combination of three basic indices formed of different individual variables. Because of the multicollinearity problem, only the Human Development Index is used in this study.

The Human Development Index is found to have a statistically significant, negative effect on HR Violations, meaning that highly developed countries tend to have a lower number of HR Violations. Although the measurement of economic development is changed, the result stayed the same and is compatible with the findings in the literature. The more economically developed countries respect human rights more and present less HR violations.

The number of terrorist incidents is the only variable in this analysis which turned out to be positively significant in relation to HR Violations, factor that suggests that the more countries have to face terrorist incidents, the more likely HR Violations are to occur, as well. This finding may help us find an answer to the long debated question: is it possible to effectively fight terrorism in a democratic country? Is there a way to effectively defeat terrorism while respecting human rights? The findings related to the number of terrorist incidents and HR violations show that it is not an easy goal to accomplish. However, the findings regarding the democracy score prove that the antidote to terrorism and state repression is to respect human rights and the rule of law.

As mentioned earlier, this study is the continuation of an early research conducted by Basibuyuk et al. (2008). With some differences in terms of use of different variables, such as Human Development Index and using a different statistical analysis, this study somewhat extends this early research. The earlier one analyzed the ECHR's decisions of article 2 and 3 between the years 1999 and 2006; the latter analyzed the same count variables between the years 2007 and 2014.

The 2008 study found democracy, GDP Per capita, and unemployment variables as statistically significant. The direction of the relationship was negative. The number in the terrorist organizations variable showed a positive relationship with HR Violations. The last variable, namely, the number of crime incidents, had no relationship with HR variables. The similar variables used in both studies are democracy score and number of crime offences. However, economic conditions of the countries are measured in both studies with different measures, GDP per capita and Human Development Index, respectively. Therefore, these variables can be treated as similar, too. These similar variables produced similar results in both analyses, although the data period and the analysis technique are different. Number of terrorist organizations was used in the first study and the number of terrorist incidents in the latter. They both led to same results. These similar findings show the strength of the models and the data.

The data and the analysis for the 46 countries, most of which are in the European continent, and Turkey, where the two continents, Asia and Europe, meet, answer the question asked in the title at the beginning of the article. The question was "Are democracy and a good economy a cure for human rights violations?" The results of the analysis answer this question positively. Although there is some discordance relating to the impact of the democracy on state repression or HR Violations, this divergence is based on the level of democracy, not the impact on the HR Violations itself. Almost all of the research findings point out the effect of democracy on HR, but they differ in conceptualizing the level of democracy. Some scholars classify it as semi-democracy where HR Violations are relatively high, and democracy where there is a full respect of Human Rights and the HR Violations are very low. The consensus on the effect of high level of democracy on Human Rights should be read carefully by the administrators and leaders. Those leaders and administrators who want to ensure their citizens' rights should focus on developing their democracy levels. The citizens should also demand a more democratic government for their countries, in order to protect their freedom and Human Rights.

The findings of this analysis also suggest the impact of a good economy, prosperity, or human development in the country on freedoms and human rights. In this regard, social globalization would help countries boost their democracy level, economy and prosperity, and human development. One good example of social globalization in action may be the European Union. In the light of the examples presented by Poe and Tate (1994) and Dreher et al. (2012), the EU lists a number of requirements, including the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms. New members of the EU should fulfill some preconditions, namely the Copenhagen Criteria, and they should especially respect human rights in order to gain some economic and other benefits deriving from their membership. In other words, social globalization as in the example of the EU has an encouraging effect on governments to respect human rights. The EU tries to ensure these standards in the European continent

through some international entities such as the European Court of Human Rights. Countries in other parts of the world, like in the Middle East, would use the same development strategies as the EU. Social globalization may help these countries boost their democracy levels, economic conditions, prosperity, and human development levels, which, in turn, ensure more freedom, respect of Human Rights, and a better quality of life.

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Chapter 20
Manufacturing Terrorism

Alexander R. Dawoody

The United States: A Humble Beginning

The United States started as an agricultural country. Farming and citizen-farmers were the main principles in Jeffersonian democracy (Applebaum 1998). Educating the citizen-farmers through public funds in order to participate and safeguard the new agrarian-model in democracy sustained for the first decades in the history of the republic (Conant 1963). If the trend was to continue, the United States today would have been a much different country than the dominant force that is interjecting itself in most global affairs today, creating at times artificial conditions to support the needs of the vast-dependent American machinery on exploited resources.

As the young United States begun forming and its democratic system evolved, its main mode of production shifted, due to the influence of framers such as Alexander Hamilton toward manufacturing and financial capitalism (Ferling 2013). The creation of the First National Bank helped in such a transformation had gradually impacted all aspects of life and morphed the previous agrarian society into a financial-industrial country (Chernow 2005).

Simple exchanges of cattle and agrarian goods transformed to the financial stock market with its tentacles extending virtually to all aspects of the economy (Petram 2014). In essence, the stock market became the pulse of the newly emerged financial-industrial capitalist system that its collapse in 1929 had paralyzed the entire country, with millions losing their jobs, life savings, and property (Geisst 1997). The stock market's neared collapse in 2008 because of fraudulent transactions had also paralyzed the United States and the global economic systems associated with it. If the market was not rescued by public bailout, it would have dragged the entire American economy down with it in addition to many other economies in the world (Taibbi 2013).

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Wars and the Transformation of America to a Superpower

America's transformation to financial-industrial mode of production, however, was not the catalyst for its revolutionary evolution to a world power. Rather, it was a specific aspect within this mode of production that helped in providing the kick in the system's punctuated equilibrium. Such a kick was associated with the Military-Industrial-Complex (MIC) (Bacevich 2011). Financial-industrial capitalism, coupled with MIC were able to elevate what once was a self-sustained and isolated agrarian society into a superpower armed with sophisticated arsenal, nuclear weapons, space technology, and hunger for world domination. Innovation (especially in technology) helped securing America's transition to the status of a superpower and maintaining such position for a long period of time. As a result, the United States became the New Rome, with its economy, politics, media, and culture influencing the entire globe (Cohen and Wheeler 2015).

World Hegemony

The beast must be fed by any possible means, justified or not. This was the mantra of New Rome. Local resources, however, were not sufficient or abundant to feed the system and keep it operating (Chomsky 2004). Raw materials, sources of energy, and cheap labor had to be secured from abroad in order to maintain the system operating effectively while creating wealth not only for the upper class that supports the system with capital but also the middle class that acts as a base and consumer for the system.

To secure resources and labor for New Rome from abroad America's military, intelligence, and security apparatus had to be involved in worldwide operations in order to protect the global political environment that provided the means for resources to be feeding America's machinery without obstacles or interruptions (Ibid.). Coup d'états (such as the 1953 coup in Iran that toppled a democratically elected government), wars (such as the Korean, Vietnam, and Gulf Wars), assassinations (such as the assassination of the democratically-elected Chilean President Salvador Allende in 1973), invasions (such as the invasion of the Philippines in 1944, Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, Granada and Iraq in 2003), and other plots were orchestrated in order to sustain the global political environmental favorable for the needs of America's financial and economic systems (Grossman 2010).

American Citizens: Traits and Responses to Policies of a Superpower

On the local level and due to the spoils of America's global-dominated system, as well as the influence of the American media, most Americans, with the exception of the few, show little or no regards to the plight of others in the world and the damages created to other countries by their political, economic, and military systems.

Only when the American citizens are directly impacted by their government's actions around the world (such as causality of military adventures) will they raise concerns and start voicing objections. These objections, however, are not generated because of care and concerns for others but because of concerns for their own welfare and interests.

Often and due to the misguided influence of right-wing politicians and some media outlets many Americans shift the blames for the ills caused by their government's policies toward vulnerable populations within them, such as minorities and immigrants. Demagogues as such become popular, cashing-in on these misguided notions while sidestepping the focus of the real causes for the system's problems. Because of such shortsighted traits few outside the United States labeled such types of Americans as the "ugly Americans" (Burdick and Burdick 1999).

Pax-Americana

World wars and particularly World War II were profitable to the American economy and the Military Industrial Complex (MIC). After WWII, in particular, America's economy became heavily influenced by militarization. Militarism, as such became a job-creating phenomenon while peace translated into a formula for loss of revenue and economic decline (Parchami 2009). As such, engaging in wars and militarism, whether necessary or fabricated became a condition for economic prosperity in order to keep America's superpower status (Chomsky 2004).

Engaging in the two World Wars, the Cold War era with the former Soviet Union, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the two Gulf Wars were examples of involvements in necessary or manufactured wars in order to sustain America's military-dependent economy (Chomsky 2015). Fear-mongering, such as the Red Scare were cleverly employed in order to justify war-driven policies and indoctrinate the public for supporting such policies. Militarization and the MIC in particular became part of the American fabric and culture, with monument, holidays, films, literature, and special ceremonies dedicated to the glorification of wars and the system that produced it (Cohen and Wheeler 2015). The system, however, never presented as the driving force behind these tendencies and often portrayed as victim of aggressions by others. In a poly to defend the homeland symbolic patriotism was emphasized, wrapped in the culture of xenophobia and Pax-Americana.

Manufacturing the Islamist Bogyman

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the bogyman of the Red Scare was no more. A need for a new bogyman was needed in order to keep the fear alive and justify America's continuous militarization. This new bogyman arrived in the form of Islamic Jihadists, a creation of the CIA that was first introduced to Afghanistan in 1979 to fight Soviet troops there. Likeminded Jihadists in the Middle East were

more than happy to comply and join the fighters in Afghanistan, relying on centuries long of historic, cultural, and societal elements that gave rise to such groups, in addition to billions of petro-dollars supplied by the Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states (Madsen 2015).

The Jihadists later (after the Soviet leaving Afghanistan in 1989), directed their targets toward the United States and the West, blaming them for the ills of the Middle East and the obstacles for the establishment of the Caliphate. The situation was further exacerbated when American troops stationed in Saudi Arabia in 1990 in order to prepare for the first Gulf War against Iraq.

As such, Islamic terrorism was manufactured so that the bogyman keeps inflicting fear and requiring an orchestrated American response in form of militarism (packaged now as a war on terror). Hence, the world start witnessing the cesspool in the Middle East keeps breathing one group of terrorists after another, with each subsequent group surpassing its predecessor in inhumanity, crime, and atrocity.

Supporters of America's global domination, whether in the Middle East or other parts of the world, joined the orchestrated fray by provided logistics and justification for the so-called war on terror. Terrorism, however, was never targeted by the United States and its allies to be defeated and removed as a phenomenon. On the contrary, it was to remain alive so that American militarism and the proxy war on terror can continue. Without a bogyman, there was no longer a need to justify the continuation of such militarization, and without militarization America's status as a superpower would be greatly diminish.

Fighting terrorism, hence, was reduced to a mere "containment" of terrorism. It is no wonder that the President of the United States in 2015 stressed this point when addressing United States strategy toward fighting the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Brannen 2015). The President's former Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, further outlined the length of such policy as 30 years (Page 2014). 30 years of military spending and enriching the MIC was profitable for the machine, until another scenario (or bogyman) is developed in the future to replace the Islamist Jihadists.

It is also no wonder that America's ally in the Middle East, such as Turkey is providing access to Jihadists so the proxy war can continue regardless of the victims among average citizens in both the Middle East and around the world. Examples of such support is allowing Jihadists around the world join manufactured terror group in Syria through the Turkish borders and providing them with arms and logistics.

ISIS

One can witness the weakness in the American argument of fighting terrorism by observing the ridiculous American military bombings of ISIS in Iraq and Syria that since 2014. This campaign had resulted in minor damages to ISIS while costing the American taxpayers $6.2 billion up until January 2016 (U.S. Department of Defense 2016). Despite these daily bombing and air campaign, ISIS keeps growing and adding territories to its control. How is this possible if the so-called fight against terror was real and not a mere ploy for profits?

Another dirty element in this fiasco is oil. Since 2014 when ISIS took control of the oil fields and refineries in Iraq and Syria, it has been selling oil to the black market through Turkey, generating an average of $50 million per month. Such sum is making ISIS the richest terror network in history (Reuter 2015). If the so-called war on terror is real then why Turkey is allowing ISIS to sell oil through its territories and why the American military jets are not targeting ISIS oil shipments and refineries (Osborne 2015)? Who is buying ISIS' blood-stained oil and why the world is turning a blind eye on following such criminal enterprise?

During the UN sanction on Iraq after the first Gulf War in 1991, the United States was able to monitor every single barrel of oil sold by Saddam's government to the black market that was in violation of sanction. As a consequence, the United States and the United Nations imposed penalties on those who were buying oil from Iraq (Wallensteen et al. 2005). Why the United States as well as the United Nations do not do the same with ISIS's oil now?

ISIS is not the only terror group in the cesspool. There are other manufactured terror groups playing their role in this tragic comedy, such as Al-Qaeda, Al Nusra, Jaysh Al Islam, and many others. US allies in the Middle East have their own favorite groups within this cocktail (O'Bacy 2012). Some support ISIS, others support al-Qaeda, while the rest support Al-Nusra and Jaysh al_Islam. Billions of petrodollars are poured by Qatar and Saudi Arabia, for example, in order for the nightmare, rape, and murder of the innocents continues and terrorism appears as a legitimate bogyman requiring militarism and continuous wars (BBC News 2014).

The US media is also doing its part in perpetuating the myth, echoed by news channels sponsored by Middle Eastern petro-dollars, such as Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Al-Arab, al-Hayat, Al-Nahar, and others of yellow journalism networks. The aim is to perpetuate Jihadist ideology and promoting midlevel and anti-intellectual dogmas (Kirkpatrick 2014) while appearing as fighting them.

A particular school of thoughts that is promoted by billions of petro-dollars is the reactionary, the anti-human and anti-civilization Wahhabi ideology (Taleb 2015). It is this corrupt ideology and the class of clergy, politicians, media, and money in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states that enabled groups such as ISIS appear and for the United States to find its perfect bogyman (Butt 2015). Wahhabism, in essence, makes the manufacturing of terror a much easier task by providing the cesspool for breeding elements required for playing the role needed in the orchestrated war on terror.

The Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood was created in Egypt in 1928 shortly after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1924. Its main objective is to revive the Islamic Caliphate system and reject all forms of Westernized governments in the Middle East and Islamic countries. The groups utilized both charity and terrorism in order to advance its goals. Within the following decades the Muslim Brotherhood gave birth to all terror groups that we know today, such as Hamas in Palestine, the Taliban in

Afghanistan, the Taliban in Pakistan, Al-Shabab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria and Kenya, Al-Qaeda worldwide, Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya in Egypt, ISIS in Iraq, Syria and Libya, Al-Nusra in Syria, and Jaysh Al Islam in Syria.

The Muslim Brotherhood is suspected in being the creation of the British intelligence in post WWI in order to confront nationalist and leftist groups that were threats to British interests in the Middle East (Curtis 2015; Johnson 2011). Later in the years, it was supported by the United States in hope of replacing tyrannical regimes in the Middle East that lacked public support (despite the alliance of the tyrannical regimes with the United States. It is not surprising that the United States abandoned its decades long policy of directly supporting tyrants in the Middle East in exchange for supporting the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring in 2011 so that the Brotherhood can seize power and secure US interests while syphoning public anger caused by decades of US supports for Arab tyrants (Greenfield 2014). This was evident in US support of the mother of all terrorists in the Middle East (the Muslim Brotherhood) and its grab of power in Egypt in 2012. It was also apparent in US opposition of the Egyptian military ousting the Brotherhood from political power in 2013 and ruining US plans for this terrorist group's domination of power in Egypt and subsequently the entire Middle East (Kirkpatrick 2013).

Libya, Syria, and Iraq

The West and the United states directly interfered through NATO in removing the Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi from power in 2011. Subsequently, they surrendered the country to gangs of thugs of Islamic Jihadist (Attkisson 2015) so that law and order disappear, the United States and the West plunge Libyan oil freely and recruits continue for America's manufactured terrorism.

We are witnessing the same in Syria with US intelligence, supported by Saudi and Qatari petro-dollars and Turkish logistical aid are creating heavens inside Syria in order for terrorism to mushroom and flourish (Gartenstein-Ross and Barr 2016). Such act of Machiavellianism is conducted under the disguise of helping the Syrian people fight the Syrian dictator Bashar Al-Assad. In reality, however, it is manufacturing terrorism and providing the environment for its growth, devastating Syria as a country by returning it to the stone-age, while victimizing the population with nearly one million Syrian civilians killed and nearly two million dispersed as refugees (Danin 2015).

We see the US plot unfolding in Iraq as well with American prisons in Iraq (such as the Bucca prison) becoming suspected centers for training terrorists. An example of this is the case of Abu Bakir al-Baghdadi who was captured by US troops in Iraq in 2009, placed in Bucca Prison (dubbed as Jihadi University) and later release in 2004 to head the terror group ISIS (Narula 2015).

We also see the US puppet regime in Baghdad that was after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, ordering in 2014 its cartoonish army stationed in the city of Mousil in northern Iraq to surrender its American-made military equipment and leave so that merely 700

ISIS thugs on pick-up trucks can take over the city without a single fight (Habib 2014). How is it possible for the United States, the world's most powerful country, and the government that it had created in Iraq and spent trillions of dollars on arming, to be so paralyzed and helpless in front of 700 ISIS thugs taking over Iraq's second largest city? Only in America's manufactured reality-made terror movie such a scenario is possible.

Turkey

America supports the Islamist government of Erdogan in Turkey, not because Turkey is member of NATO but because Erdogan and his Islamist regime are partners in the ploy for manufacturing terror and feeding the American Military Industrial Complex. As such, the United States (Kolhatkar 2015) while using the human rights ticket to oppose its political enemies in the world is turning a blind eye to Erdogan's belligerent and continuous violation of human rights in Turkey, especially against the ethnic Kurds (Brashich 2016).

When an American puppet tyrants commits violation of human rights, such as in 1988 when then US alley Saddam Hussein bombed Iran and his Kurdish citizens with chemical weapons (Harris and Aid 2013), the United States suddenly becomes mute and forgets about such rights. This is true today with Erdogan is bombing the Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria while the United States hides its hypocritical call for human rights with utter silence.

America's support of the Islamists in Turkey is to sell the model to the rest of the Middle East. In its assessment, such a model can neutralize nationalist and leftist forces in the region, feed the bogyman of the manufactured Islamist terrorists, and safeguard America's interests in the region without appearing overly opposing Islam or supporting secular models of tyrannical regimes.

The Kurds

America has its own favorite Kurds. Those who are killed by US allies (such as Turkey) are expendable. However, those who are acting on promoting US interests (such as the two main Kurdish political parties in Iraq) are supported, at least for the time being (Karjeski 2015).

When America's "favored" Kurdish politicians violate human rights against their own Kurdish citizens, silence opposition, persecute political opponents, siphon public funds, engage in corruption, and clinch to power for decades (as it is the case with Barzani who is refusing to leave the presidency of the Kurdish region in Iraq despite the fact that his term has expired since 2013), America's support for these corrupt politicians continues (MacDiarmid 2015). Western and American media also present these corrupt Kurdish politicians as models for democracy and refuse paying attention to their corruption, tyranny, or violations of human rights.

Most Kurds in Iraq their salaries have not been paid by the Kurdish government since August 2015. Many Kurds in cities such as Solymania search for food at garbage dumps as they run out of saving. Kurdish students in the United States who were accepted in American universities on government scholarship by the Kurdish Regional Government in Kurdistan-Iraq had to abandon their studies and return home because they stopped receiving funds from their corrupt government. Some remained due to the generosity of few American universities that supported them by waving tuitions and providing them with housing and meal.

The saddest part in the Kurdish story is the tragedy involving the Kurdish religious minority of Yazidies who were living in the city of Sinjar. The Yazidies, despite the fact that they are Kurds, nevertheless they were sacrificed and manipulated by the Barzani gang in order to use their stories for embezzling arms and money from the West and the United States.

In 2014, the city of Sinjar was guarded by Barzani's militia (known as the Peshmarga). Overnight, however, and without notifying the city's Yazidi residents Barzani's Peshmarga cowardly sneaked out of the city, leaving it to the barbaric attacks of ISIS on the following day (Demir 2015). ISIS took over the unarmed city and its residents, massacred thousands of men and children, and kidnapped the women, taking them to ISIS-controlled cities of Mousil in Iraq and al-Rigga in Syria to be sold as sex slaves (Van Den 2014).

Barzani and his gang of thieves used the worldwide public outcry against ISIS crimes in Sinjar order to solicit money and arms from the West and the United States. He did get his wish ,and the United States and the West were more than happy to pour millions of dollars (in addition to weapons) on this corrupt thug in hope of fighting ISIS (Duff 2015). In return, Barzani used the funds and weapons to solidify his grip on power in Kurdistan, strengthen his conspicuous ties with Erdogan against the Kurds in Turkey and Syria, take-over the oil-rich city of Kirkuk in northern Iraq and lay the foundations for an independent Kurdish state as a fiefdom under his and his family's control.

As such, he shamelessly exploited the Yazidi tragedies to advance his ends and those of US interests (Durden 2015). Only when Russia shamed the UnS so-called war on ISIS and exposed its empty rhetoric that US jets eventually (and with hesitation) start bombing ISIS oil trucks in Syria and ordered Barzani to send his Peshmarga to retake Sinjar from ISIS in November 2015 in an orchestrated "ready for movie" type of scenarios. Not a single ISIS fighter was killed during this theatrical retake of Sinjar.

Questions Begging Answers

For those who still doubt that ISIS and its likes are American-manufactured terrorists, here are few questions that beg answers to prove the contrary:

- Hollywood type production of ISIS terror videos. It is highly unlikely that a group of ragtag thugs hiding in the desert or few isolated cities and villages are capable of filming, directing, and producing such high-quality videos. Even the film industries in Egypt and Lebanon that have more than 70 years of experience are incapable of producing such high-quality videos. How is it possible for few Jihadists who lack technical expertise, studios, and are supposedly on the run and under constant US bombardment produce such high-quality videos?
- All victims of terror in ISIS videos walk toward their death (often exercised in horrific means) while completely submissive and not expressing a single word of objection, anger or emotion. Is this realistic? Would someone walk to his death while utterly saying nothing and completely submitting to the terrorist executioner? What kind of Hollywood movie is this?
- ISIS terrorists are engaged in stealing historic artifacts from Iraq and Syria and selling them to outside private collectors. Where these transactions are taking place? Who is introducing the collectors to ISIS terrorists? Why no state or law enforcement agency following and prosecuting such international crime?
- Capacity for encrypted coding through social media, a capability that only intelligence agencies (such as the CIA) possess or highly technical manufacturers and companies.
- Inability of law enforcement to trace terrorist network online. Such agencies have the capacity to trace and arrest those who are engaged in crimes such as online children sex yet they seem incapable of tracing those who are engaged in recruiting and plotting terror.
- Financial transactions that exceed millions (mostly in petro-dollars from Qatar and Saudi Arabia), pouring to the terror networks in Syria, yet no law enforcement agencies is following such transactions or at least attempting to preventing them. What are the banks that are involved in countries and private donors sending money to the terrorist networks? Why do the United States and the West incapable of identifying and sanctioning these banks, especially when they are capable of tracing money used in Narco-trafficking or in violation of sanctions (such as banks dealing with Iran)?
- Who is producing thousands of ISIS uniform and flags? It is doubtful that these uniforms and flags are locally manufactured (such as in Mosel, al-Rigga, and other cities under ISIS control), especially when the terrorists had these uniforms and flags prior to taking over these cities and that such cities lack the manufactures to produce such large volume of uniforms and flags.
- Who is supplying the terrorist with weapons? It is one thing that ISIS captured most of the American-made weapons left by the escaping Iraqi Army in Mosel in 2014. However, where do ISIS terrorists keep getting an endless supply of ammunitions?

Conclusion

In his farewell address, President Dwight Eisenhower warned of the danger of the Military Industrial Complex and America's dependence on military-driven economy. His warning was true then as it is true now. The ongoing efforts by the United States to engage in wars, conflicts, and at times creating them in order to justify military spending is dangerous not only for America's democracy (or what had left of it) but also for world peace and humanity as a whole. This is in addition to the senseless victimization of millions who had nothing to do with such plots and paying the price with their blood, a concept that may rise to war crimes and is no different than crimes committed by the Nazis and Fascism.

America is cleaver in hiding its finger prints from the scenes of the crime. However, it cannot blanket common sense especially when all indicators point toward its involvement not only in hiding the crime but in its creation.

It is still unimaginable to many US citizens to accept the notion that their government is a culprit in manufacturing terrorism in order to profit a decaying system feeds on world domination and senseless greed. Those who dare to entertain such thoughts are either ridiculed as subscribers to the conspiracy theories or have some flimsy charges made against them, whether directly or indirectly (as it was the case with Sweden accusing WikiLeaks founder of rape in order to kill his message in exposing governmental abuse.

In today's interconnected globe, it is difficult continue with the same practices as the United States has been doing since WWII in order to remain a world power and continue feeding its Military Industrial Complex. This is especially true when other actors on the world stage, such as Russia and China are on to the US game and ready to expose it as leverage for balancing power.

Humanity and members of the human community must be armed with knowledge so that they will no longer be duped in becoming pons within the shameless blood game for profit.

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