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The Syntax of Imperatives in English and Germanic

Word Order Variation in the Minimalist Framework

Laura Rupp



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

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1
Imperatives and the Minimalist Program

1.1 Introduction

English imperative clauses are characterized by a cluster of syntactic properties which have long presented a puzzle for linguistic theories like the generative framework (Chomsky 1957 to 1998). These include the variable presence of a lexical subject, the distribution of the item *do*(*n't*), and restrictions on the use of the negation marker *not*. What makes the properties of imperatives particularly puzzling is that they seem non-uniform and even somewhat contradictory, both across different types of imperative structure and in comparison with the properties of other clausal types in English. This has meant that providing a principled account is not straightforward.

Within Chomsky's (1965) Aspects model, it was possible to derive imperative clauses transformationally from underlying structures by means of construction-specific rules such as '*You*-deletion' and 'Imperative Subject–Auxiliary Inversion' (Katz and Potstal 1964, Culicover 1971, Stockwell et al. 1973, among others). In his analysis of imperatives, Culicover (1976, p. 152) justified the postulation of a particular imperative *do*-insertion rule by stating that 'the imperative is an idiosyncratic construction in most languages, and the introduction of an ad hoc *Do* insertion transformation for the English imperative is not particularly unsatisfactory from the point of view of the general theory. [No attempt will be made to state the rule here because of its ad hoc nature and lack of theoretical interest in the present context.]' These earlier, transformational analyses obviously lost their appeal with the subsequent shift to a more restrictive

theoretical framework. Imperative clauses proved difficult to accommodate within the Government-Binding model of generative syntax (Chomsky 1981). This model, among other things, reduced the transformational component to a single movement operation Move-α, and it postulated the Projection Principle which demands that the argument structure of lexical items be preserved throughout the derivation. Consequently, imperatives became somewhat 'notorious' for not fitting the framework easily in so far as the construction received virtually no attention from generative researchers for almost a decade, with, to my knowledge, the exception of Beukema and Coopmans's (1989) work.

However, following recent theory-internal developments like the VP-internal Subject Hypothesis and an increase in the number of functional categories available, the English imperative has attracted interest again. A number of new efforts have been made to make sense of its syntax, which had previously seemed so utterly recalcitrant (Zhang 1990, Zanuttini 1991, Henry 1995, Platzack and Rosengren 1997, Potsdam 1996, Han 1998). These analyses will be examined in later chapters. As it turns out, several proposals that were put forward many years ago have been revived and reformulated in much recent research. Among these is the idea (going back to Cohen 1976) that in negative imperative sentences, the item *don't* is not an ordinary occurrence of the auxiliary *do* as it is in interrogative and finite declarative clauses, but a special negative imperative particle. To this extent, the picture of the English imperative has not changed significantly in fact, despite a good deal of work.

There are, of course, different ways of going about 'resistant' imperative data. One possibility is, indeed, to assume that they must arise from idiosyncratic specifics of the imperative. The other possibility is that the difficulty lies elsewhere. For example, the danger of focusing on just one language like English is that data there may be misleading or intransparent for independent reasons. Or, rather than seeking to make the English imperative data fit the current assumptions of a framework, one may take their very resistance to have potential ramifications for these assumptions. In this study I explore the second possibility. Among the main points I will make are the following. I will present a novel view on English imperatives in arguing that the determinant factor in their syntax is variation in the position of the subject. I will show that while this perspective may

not be immediately obvious, once it is adopted, it yields to a satisfactory theoretical understanding of the core facts about imperatives in English. It is true that the kind of variation I will be arguing for seems inconsistent with one of the two primary minimalist working hypotheses: the economy principle. I will argue that this need not necessarily be the case if the second, that of the central role of the interfaces, is fully exploited.

Further, whereas the syntax of imperatives in Romance and Balkan languages is well-documented (see, for example, Kayne 1991, Rivero 1994a, b, Rivero and Terzi 1995, Zanuttini 1991, 1994, Han 1998) within the Germanic language family, attention has been largely restricted to English (except for Platzack and Rosengren 1997). And yet, according to the Principles-and-Parameters model, apparently different rules for some syntactic constructions in different languages are merely an epiphenomenal effect of interaction between universal grammatical principles and particular parametric selections, along with some language-specific features. The syntactic properties of imperatives in different languages may hence shed light on one another, particularly within a closely related group. I have therefore chosen to add a small comparative study of the syntax of imperatives in some Germanic languages other than English.

The remainder of this chapter serves as an introduction to the study that is to follow. Section 1.2 summarizes some of the basic tenets of the Minimalist Program as outlined in Chomsky (1995a, b, 1998). However, rather than presenting a general overview, I will anticipate later discussion by focusing on the minimalist account of the displacement property of natural language. Section 1.3 provides a description of the syntactic properties that characterize the English imperative. Each subsection looks at a particular cluster of properties that will be examined in subsequent chapters, and points out the issues they raise for linguistic theorizing.

1.2 Theoretical framework: the Minimalist Program

The Minimalist Program (MP) takes the goal of explanatory adequacy one step further by aiming to reduce theoretical constructs to a bare minimum. To this end, Chomsky (1995b, pp. 385–6) formulates the following two research questions that are at the heart of the MP:

> (1) What conditions on the human language faculty are imposed by considerations of virtual conceptual necessity? (2) To what extent is the language faculty determined by these conditions, that is, how much special structure does it have beyond them? The first question in turn has two aspects: what conditions are imposed on the language faculty by virtue of (A) its place within the array of cognitive systems of the mind / brain, and (B) general considerations of simplicity, elegance and economy that have some independent plausibility? [. . .] To the extent that the answer to question (2) is positive, language is something like a 'perfect system', meeting external constraints as well as can be done.

In response to (A), Chomsky hypothesizes that there are two linguistic levels of representation only: the interfaces Phonetic Form (PF) and Logical Form (LF). Assuming these two levels is necessary on conceptual grounds because they provide instructions from the language faculty for the articulatory–perceptual and conceptual–intentional systems, respectively. Government-Binding theory (GB, Chomsky 1981), the MP's predecessor, in addition postulated two intermediate representational levels of D-structure and S-structure.[1] As these merely had empirical and theory-internal motivation, Chomsky concludes that they no longer have a place in the MP. With LF as the sole syntactic level of representation available in minimalism, GB core grammatical concepts and specific principles such as Binding should now turn out to be definable over this level, or ultimately derivable from well-formedness conditions on PF and LF representations or economy considerations. Johnson and Lappin (1996) have critically noted that while general notions of simplicity and maximal efficiency are undoubtedly desirable features of linguistic (or any scientific) theory, it is far from apparent that these are indeed properties of such biological systems as the human language faculty that is assumed by generative grammar. Chomsky acknowledges that such properties would be quite specific to this system. The language faculty (assuming it exists) is, however, unique among biological systems at any rate, though it remains to be seen whether the MP with significantly less means can attain similar levels of descriptive adequacy as GB theory.

The minimalist model of grammar is schematized below.

(1)



The language system comprises a lexicon, which stores the individual vocabulary items of a language, and a syntactic component which generates more complex linguistic expressions from the lexical input. Within the framework of the MP, lexical items are conceived of as collections of phonological, semantic, categorial and morphological features (though, clearly, not necessarily all of these – consider phonologically null elements, which lack phonological features at least). 'Abstract' functional heads, which are discrete elements in the lexicon also, similarly consist of feature sets. By successive applications of a binary operation Merge, the computational system combines syntactic objects into a larger structural unit.[2] Pure Merge can be considered an indispensable mechanism as it is essential for forming an interpretable LF object from a non-integrated set of lexical items.

The same is not at once clear for the observation that lexical items are commonly displaced from their position of lexical insertion. From the perspective of the MP, the operation Move seems an imperfection in optimal design, as moving an item is in principle less economical than leaving it *in situ*. (Note that I use the terms Merge/merge exclusively to refer to cases where a lexical item is inserted from the lexicon, though moving a lexical item also involves merger at the target site.) Still, Move is only an apparent imperfection if it can be shown to have motivation from properties of the interfaces. Standard minimalist reasoning is as follows. Lexical items are selected for syntactic computation with their features fully specified. Chomsky assumes an output condition termed Full Interpretation (FI), which requires that representations at PF and LF contain only material that is relevant to the interfaces and the systems they interact with. Thus, a PF representation is well-formed if it contains

all and only phonological features. Equivalently, an LF representation is well-formed if it contains all and only features that are semantically interpretable. A derivation which results in legitimate PF and LF representations satisfies FI and is said to 'converge'; a derivation which does not violates FI and is said to 'crash'. The requirement that phonological features must not appear at LF is ensured by the operation Spell-Out. Spell-Out so to speak strips the phonological features off the derivation, and sends them to the PF component. From the features that proceed to LF after Spell-Out has occurred, only those contributing to interpretation can ultimately be part of the LF representation (or the derivation will not converge). Among these are, for instance, the person, number and gender (φ-) features of DPs. Others, that is purely formal features such as Case, should arguably not be presented to the LF interface, but must be removed before the derivation terminates.

Chomsky suggests that the removal of features is done through the 'checking' of those features between lexical items and functional heads. Formal features hence require checking before the derivation terminates at LF because they are not interpretable there. Interpretable features may enter into checking relations to check off non-interpretable features but are themselves exempted from erasure after checking since they are legitimate LF objects. Note that this in turn implies that interpretable features need not be checked for they are to survive to LF in any event. In Chomsky (1995a, ch. 4) it was assumed that feature checking is to take place in the checking domain of a functional head and canonically involves strictly local Spec(ifier)–Head or head–adjunction configurations. These can be established when a lexical item is merged or otherwise, crucially, moved there. In short, the idea is that Move is not in fact a 'design flaw' but contributes to FI at the interfaces by making it possible for the checking of non-interpretable features to proceed.

Feature checking may in principle happen 'overtly' or 'covertly'. In Chomsky (1995a, ch. 4), this corresponded to respectively movement before Spell-Out, which typically has phonological consequences in the sense that it is reflected in the surface order of lexical items, and movement after Spell-Out, whose results are not apparent at PF. Whether movement occurs pre- or post-Spell-Out was in turn said to be dependent on the 'strength' of non-interpretable features. Feature strength has never successfully been correlated with a more

primitive notion, and Chomsky (1995a, ch. 4, p. 233) accepts that 'we put an end to evasion and simply define a strong feature as one that a derivation "cannot tolerate" [. . .]. A strong feature thus triggers a rule that eliminates it: [strength] is associated with a pair of operations, one that introduces it into the derivation [. . .], a second that (quickly) eliminates it.' A strong feature thus must be checked overtly since the earliest it can be eliminated is prior to Spell-Out. Features that are not strong (that is, 'weak' features), on the other hand, can await checking and erasure until LF. Chomsky (1995a, ch. 4) proposed that LF-movement for feature checking simply raises the formal feature that participates in the checking procedure, which takes along with it as 'free riders' other formal features which may be checked at the same time. He suspected that PF properties determine that pre-Spell-Out raising, by contrast, moves a lexical item's whole set of features (in effect, the lexical item itself). I will not repeat the complexities of his argument here.

Chomsky (1998) departs from these assumptions in a number of ways. First, he notes that extending established grammatical notions to feature raising yields a variety of potential complications, which makes him decide to dispense with it. Instead, he assumes that features can be checked under identity by a general operation Agree. Second, the problematic notion of 'strength' is, with respect to XPs at least, replaced by EPP-features. EPP-features by definition force substitution through Merge or Move in XP-positions not forced by the Projection Principle. While postulating EPP-features does not seem to me to be materially different from postulating strong features, and Chomsky (1998) is much less explicit about the nature of the feature triggering overt X^0-movement, the idea here is clear enough: Agree applies covertly, that is between a functional head and a lexical item 'in place', in the absence of features of the EPP-type.

In the MP, the difference in types of feature is held responsible for the kind of word order variation that is found among languages. This is often illustrated with classic examples from French versus English (Emonds 1976, 1978, Pollock 1989). For French tensed clauses, the verbal features of INFL (like [TENSE] and [AGR]) have been said to be strong, requiring that the verb be raised to INFL for checking. On the assumption that adverbs such as *souvent*/*often* are adjoined to the VP, as indicated in (2a) below, French V-to-I movement yields the order *V Adverb*. The reverse order in (2b) is ungrammatical. If INFL is

considered weak in English, there is no motivation for verb movement and checking is covert, leaving *Adverb V* as the only possible order (compare (3a, b)).

(2) a. Jean embrasse souvent Marie.
[$_{IP}$ Jean [$_{I}$ embrasse$_i$][$_{VP}$ souvent [$_{VP}$ [$_{V}$ t$_i$] Marie]]]
[3S.PRES.]

b. *Jean souvent embrasse Marie.

(3) a. John often kisses Mary.
[$_{IP}$ John [$_{I}$ [3S.PRES.]][$_{VP}$ often [$_{VP}$ [$_{V}$ kisses] Mary]]]
[3S.PRES.]

b. *John kisses often Mary.

Applications of both Merge and Move are thought to be conditioned by principles of economy. Economy of Derivation compares convergent derivations and favours the one that achieves the desired result and, in some or other sense, takes the least effort. The Last Resort condition on Move subsumes earlier postulated principles like Greed (Chomsky 1993) and Enlightened Self-Interest (Lasnik 1995). Last Resort determines that Move only applies if it results in the elimination of a non-interpretable feature of a functional head (on current assumptions, one of the EPP-type). Chomsky (1995a, ch. 4, pp. 253–4) suggests that Last Resort may in fact be part of the definition of Move. As such, Last Resort really would play no more role in economy considerations than, for instance, the c-command requirement (prohibiting syntactic lowering operations of any kind) does: 'It is meaningless to ask whether the conditions that constitute the definition of Move can be "overridden" for convergence, or to ask how economy considerations apply to them. [. . .] Violating them would be on a par with making an illegitimate move in a game of chess [. . .].' Last Resort rules out an example such as (4b) below for the reason that the non-interpretable Case-feature of *John* has been erased after checking by the embedded INFL, and therefore is no longer available to check nominative Case with the INFL of the matrix clause.

(4) a. ____ seems [(that) John is intelligent]

b. *John seems [(that) *t* is intelligent]

c. it seems (that) John is intelligent

(from Chomsky 1995a, p. 261)

Chomsky (1989, p. 14) notes that Last Resort predicts that there normally can be no optional movement:

> Notice that this approach tends to eliminate the possibility of optionality in derivation. Choice points will be allowable only if the resulting derivations are all minimal in cost [. . .].

For a derivation from the same numeration, one does not, however, expect moving a lexical item to vary with leaving it *in situ*, or moving it less far in the structure. This is because morphosyntactic features are in principle assigned every time a certain syntactic structure is created. Should they be of the type that force movement to occur, then displacement must be obligatory; if not, then displacement serves no purpose and should be impossible. Chomsky (ibid.) goes on to say that 'Any remaining examples of optional rule application would then have to be assigned to some other component of the language system, perhaps a "stylistic" component of the mapping of S-structure to PF. This may well be too strong a conclusion, raising a problem for the entire approach.'

In Chomsky (1998), the notion of 'closest c-command' takes over the work from previously postulated locality conditions such as the Head Movement Constraint (Travis 1984), Relativized Minimality (Rizzi 1990), Shortest Move (Chomsky 1989, 1993) and the Minimal Link Condition (Chomsky 1995a, ch. 4). The Closest C-Command condition imposes that a functional head is targeted by (or, on current assumptions, covertly agrees with) a suitable lexical item that is in its c-command domain and closest to it. On this assumption, '*Wh*-island' constructions like (5c) below are ungrammatical because the lower *wh*-expression (*to whom*) is further away from the matrix SpecCP than *which book*.

(5) a. They remembered [[which book]$_i$ [PRO to give t$_i$ to whom]]

b. [Which book]$_i$ did they remember [t'$_i$ [PRO to give t$_i$ to whom]]?

c. *[To whom]$_j$ did they remember [[which book]$_i$ [PRO to give t_i t_j]]?

(adapted from Chomsky 1995a, pp. 294–5)

Chomsky (1995a, ch. 4) continued to assume the principle of Procrastinate, preferring post-Spell-Out movement to movement before Spell-Out. However, Chomsky (1998) notes that with his abandoning of the concept of feature raising in favour of covert Agree, Procrastinate is no longer formulable in the same way. On the assumption that covert Agree can operate 'long distance', neither is there any longer a need to define checking domains.

Economy of Representation stipulates that each layer of syntactic structure is motivated.[3] Ever since Pollock (1989), a greater number of functional categories has been postulated, which was triggered off by his proposal to break up the GB INFL-node into separate T(ense) and AGR(eement) heads. Empirically, splitting INFL has the advantage of making more syntactic nodes available. This potentially may help gain a better understanding of certain grammatical phenomena like relative word ordering and the distribution of affixes, as for example Pollock (ibid.) and Ouhalla (1991) have shown. Chomsky (1989) took AGR phrases to provide a solution to a unified theory of Case, in which different Cases are uniformly checked in a Spec–Head agreement relation, between nominative DPs and AGR-S on the one hand, and accusative DPs and AGR-O on the other. In addition to T and AGR, scholars have argued for the existence of other functional categories including NEG(ation)P, ASP(ect)P, MOODP and MOD(ality)P, all of which may form part of the extended V-system (again, see Pollock 1989, 1997, Ouhalla 1991, and many others).

The question which Iatridou (1990) has raised is whether it is reasonable to assume that the entire range of possible functional projections is uniformly present in syntactic structures across clause types and across languages. Such a position may lead to saying that when an alleged universal category has no manifestation of any kind in a given type of clause (or language), it is still structurally present but without content, or that it contains a phonologically null head associated with some feature matrix. To push structural uniformity to the limit seems difficult to maintain in minimalism. Economy of Representation and FI conspire against the generation of truly empty nodes because these cannot be interpreted at the interfaces. The

implication is that different clauses may be more or less structurally complex in different languages.

In this context, the existence of AGRPs has been the object of some controversy. The main theoretical objection that has been raised is that AGRPs have no semantic content, which renders their presence in LF representations problematic. Tense and also Negation, Aspect, Mood and Modality are all semantically contentful notions. Agreement, by contrast, 'is generally thought of as a [grammatical] *relation* between two expressions, not a [semantic] property that one element has or does not have in isolation' (Lightfoot and Hornstein 1994, p. 6). This relation is explicitly expressed by Chomsky's (1998) operation Agree. If agreement is conceived of in this way, then there seems to be no a priori reason why the function of AGR(P)s 'to provide a structural configuration in which features can be checked' or to host 'strong features that force raising' (Chomsky 1995a, p. 351) could not equally well be fulfilled by other functional heads whose presence has independent motivation. Following Iatridou (1990), Chomsky therefore proposes to eliminate AGR-labelled phrases from the grammar to the effect that only meaning-bearing functional categories can be merged into a syntactic structure. He now assumes the basic format of finite declarative clauses to be as in (6) below, with no AGRPs.[4] If there is overt movement, the Case- and agreement (φ-) features of V, T and DPs are all checked under Spec–Head agreement. The DP-subject moves into the specifier of the finite T, which assigns it nominative Case. The DP-object (as well as the subject-DP of Exceptional Case-Marking constructions) is assigned accusative Case when it raises to the outer Spec position of *v*, an 'abstract' light verb that (in the spirit of Larson 1988) forms a verbal complex with the core V in transitive structures.

(6) $[_{CP}\ [_{C'}\ C\ [_{TP}\ DP_{subj}\ [_{T'}\ T\ [_{vP}\ DP_{obj}\ [_{vP}\ t_{subj}\ [_{v'}\ v\ [_{VP}\ [_{V'}\ V\ t_{obj}]]]]]]]]]$

I shall begin with the null hypothesis that there is a unitary INFL and simply label the highest 'inflectional' projection present IP rather than TP, except when discussing analyses which adopt a split-INFL. In the absence of overt object raising, I shall not refer to an outer vP-shell for simplicity of exposition. I assume that thematic subjects originate in SpecVP (along the lines of Kitagawa 1986, Kuroda

1988, Koopman and Sportiche 1991 and others), but I will only make this assumption explicit where the predicate-internal hypothesis bears on the argument.[5]

1.3 Summary of the data

This section outlines the syntactic properties of the English imperative that are the focus of the present study. It forms the basis of an inquiry into the syntax of imperatives within the MP framework, which is provided in later chapters.

1.3.1 Absence of T, Agr and C elements

Imperative clauses in English are characterized by the absence of overt tense and agreement markers. First, note that there are no morphological tense contrasts. Imperatives resemble infinitives but differ from finite declarative clauses in this respect:

(7) a. (You) stay / *stayed there!

b. We would like [you to stay / *stayed there]

c. You usually stay / stayed there.

As shown in (8a), another property of imperatives is that they do not occur with modal verbs. English modals have no non-finite forms and are commonly regarded as inherently finite elements that get generated directly under a finite INFL/TENSE head (Roberts 1985, Pollock 1989).

(8) a. *(You) must / can / may leave!

b. *We would like [you to must / can / may leave]

c. You must / can / may leave.

Not only do imperatives lack morphosyntactic indicators of tense specification that are characteristic of finite clauses, they are completely void of elements that are associated with INFL/TENSE. Infinitives like (9a), by contrast, have the particle *to*, for which it has been standard to assume that it is a realization of a non-finite INFL/TENSE (Chomsky 1981, Stowell 1982).

(9) a. We would like [you to go away]

b. (You) go away!

Imperatives neither show apparent signs of agreement marking. The examples in (10) below show that verbs have a morphologically bare shape, as they do in infinitives.

(10) a. (You) be quiet!

b. (Somebody) call my wife!

(11) a. I would like [you to be quiet]

b. I would like [somebody to call my wife]

(12) a. You are always very quiet.

b. Somebody regularly calls my wife.

The aspectual auxiliaries *have* and *be* can be used in imperatives, but these do not seem to be associated with an INFL head. Whereas they occur in front of negation in finite declarative clauses, a position which is identifiable with INFL, the opposite order obtains in infinitives as well as imperatives, where the auxiliaries, rather exceptionally in (standard) English, co-occur with *do*. Consider the examples with *be* in (13–15):

(13) a. You were not working when I got back.

b. *You did not be working when I got back.

(14) a. I would like [you to not be working when I get back]

b. *I would like [you to be not working when I get back]

c. *I would like [you to do not be working when I get back]

(15) a. *Not be working when I get back!

b. *Be not working when I get back!

c. Do not / Don't be working when I get back!

Finally, imperatives are never introduced by an overt complementizer. For root structures, this follows trivially from the fact that the lack of complementizers is a general feature of root clauses in English. Imperatives are not easily embedded but they can occur as 'indirect speech' complements from which a complementizer is obligatorily absent. This is illustrated by (16b).[6] (No such restriction is observed in the case of finite declarative and infinitival complements where complementizers must or may be present.)

(16) a. Hand over your driving licence!

b. The judge said [(*that/*for) hand over my driving licence!]

c. The judge said [(that) I should hand over my driving licence]

d. The judge said [(%for me) to hand over my driving licence][7]

In short, then, there is no clear indication of either the feature matrix of INFL or the presence of C in imperatives. This situation has been interpreted in different ways by scholars in the past. Zanuttini (1991), for instance, suggests that the clause structure of English imperatives contains an 'inert' INFL/AGR head (that is, an INFL/AGR head without content). Chapter 2 comments on such proposals and looks into the above facts from other possible perspectives. I will also briefly examine the syntactic status of the aspectual auxiliaries *have* and *be* and their distribution in imperatives. The proposed configuration is going to be the starting point of the present inquiry.

1.3.2 Subject realization

Perhaps the most conspicuous property of imperatives is that they may be used with or without a lexical subject.

(17) a. You be quiet!

b. Be quiet!

The range of lexical subjects that can be used in English imperatives is, however, somewhat restricted. In addition to the second person pronoun *you* which is most frequent, other possible subjects include

quantifiers and indefinite third person DPs (such as *nobody*, *someone*, and phrases introduced by *whoever*), partitive expressions with *you* and demonstratives (like *the tallest of you* and *those in the front row*), bare noun plurals (for instance, *truckdrivers* and *students*), certain definite nominal phrases (like *the boy in the corner*), and proper nouns (names).

(18) a. *Nobody* move!

b. *Someone* call my wife!

c. *Whoever took the money* return it immediately!

d. *The tallest of you* sit at the back!

e. *Those in the front row* stop giggling!

f. (*You*) *truckdrivers* keep to the right!

g. (*New*) *students* sign up at the front door!

h. *The boy in the corner* stand up!

i. *Chris* stand by the door and *Shirley* watch the window!

First and third person subject-DPs like the following, on the other hand, are normally excluded from imperatives:

(19) a. **We* / **I* go home!

b. **He* / **They* give it to me!

c. **A man* come here!

Examples such as (21a, b) below indicate that apparently 'subjectless' imperatives contain some kind of covert subject, since reflexives and reciprocals normally require antecedents that bind them in a local domain (Principle A of Binding Theory; Chomsky 1981).

(20) a. You behaved yourself.

b. *You said [John behaved yourself]

(21) a. Behave yourself!

b. Don't hurt each other!

Chapter 3 addresses the restrictions on admissible subjects in greater detail. I will examine the precise nature of the restrictions and inquire into their source. I will also attempt to determine the identity of the covert subject, and the way it is licensed in imperatives.

1.3.3 The nature of *do*(*n't*)

As for the formation of negative structures, English imperatives pattern with finite declaratives rather than with infinitive clauses in that the item *do*(*n't*) is used. The (a) and (b) sentences of (22) show that they mirror interrogatives with respect to the inverted ordering of *do*(*n't*) and the subject.

(22) a. Don't you try again!

b. Didn't you try again?

c. You didn't try again.

d. *I told you [to don't try again]

Despite this correspondence, imperatives otherwise behave quite differently from interrogatives. Contrary to interrogatives, inverted patterns are ungrammatical with the free negative item *not* (compare (23a) to (23b)), and (as the contrast in (24) illustrates) there is no inversion in affirmative imperatives. This seems to suggest that the two sentence types should not be treated on a par.

(23) a. Did you not try again?

b. *Do you not try again!

(24) a. Did you try again?

b. *Do you try again!

c. You try again!

Studies to date usually take well-established assumptions about the derivation of inverted interrogatives as a basis for analysis. In this way, many have come to the conclusion that the different behaviour of imperatives must have to do with idiosyncratic specifics of *do*(*n't*) in this clause type. Some researchers assign the auxiliary *do*(*n't*) an idiosyncratic syntax (Beukema and Coopmans 1989, Zanuttini 1991),

while others even propose that in imperatives the form *don't* is not a manifestation of the auxiliary at all but constitutes a specifically imperative negative particle (Zhang 1991, Henry 1995). The example (25a) below, however, demonstrates that *do* (*not*) is not invariably unattested but does occur in imperatives with a covert subject. Note also that *do* is used in emphatic and contrastive structures, as in (25b, c).

(25) a. Do not try again!

b. DO try again!

c. DO AT LEAST YOU have a go, even if the others won't!

Although it might seem that *do*(*n't*) exhibits rather peculiar behaviour in imperative clauses, I shall take issue with such special imperative-*do*(*n't*) analyses, and offer a systematic analysis of the status and distribution of *do*(*n't*) in imperatives in Chapter 4.

1.3.4 Word order variation

An interesting (but oft overlooked) fact about English imperatives is that in addition to *do*(*n't*) *Subject* sequences, they may also be conveyed with the reverse order *Subject do*(*n't*) in certain contexts.[8] (This observation was previously presented in Potsdam (1996), and credited there to Davies (1981).) For illustration, consider the following pairs of examples:

(26) a. *Don't you* go to the party!

b. *Don't one of you* forget to lock the door!

c. *Don't the people bringing cars* be late on Sunday!

(27) a. OK, *you don't* go to the party, then! (If that's what you want.)

b. *One of you don't* forget to lock the door!

c. *People bringing cars* don't be late on Sunday!

(28) a. (Bill, I'm begging you,)
DO YOU tell them she is innocent!

b. *DO EVERYbody* give it a try! (Not only some of you!)

c. *DO SOMEone* answer the phone!
(Anyone! As long as it stops ringing.)

(29) a. *You DO* tell them she is innocent!
(Or I'll never speak to you again.)

b. *Everybody DO* give it a try! (Don't be shy!)

c. *Someone DO* answer the phone! (I'm busy cooking.)

The availability of both orders is an exclusive characteristic of imperatives in English. In finite declarative clauses, the position of the subject is fixed before *do*(*n't*) (compare (30a, b)), while interrogatives uniformly have the reverse order from obligatory inversion of the auxiliary with the subject (compare (31a, b)).

(30) a. *You didn't* go to the party.

b. **Didn't you* go to the party.

(31) a. *Did you* tell them she is innocent?

b. **You'd* tell them she is innocent? (You'd = You did)[9]

On the intuitively natural assumption that inverted imperatives have an interrogative-type derivation, it looks as if the alternative order arises because subject–auxiliary inversion is optional (Davies 1981, Potsdam 1996). However, in Chapter 5 I shall argue that the syntax of imperatives differs significantly from interrogatives and attribute the word order variation to the flexible distribution of subjects in this clause type.

1.3.5 Constraints on the use of *not*

One of the most puzzling features of imperatives is the highly constrained use of the negative item *not* in the presence of an overt subject. Consider the examples below (which have been adapted from Potsdam, 1996, pp. 253–4):

I know I've done wrong but I can't survive on my own. Oh please,

(32) a. *Don't you / anyone* desert me!
b. *One of you don't* desert me!
c. *Don't* desert me!

(33) a. **Do you / somebody not* desert me!
b. **Do not you / anyone* desert me!
c. *Do not ALL of you* desert me!
d. *One of you do not* desert me!
e. *Do not* desert me!

Three observations can be made in connection with these examples: (i) while all types of imperative structure can freely be negated by means of *don't* (as in (32a–c)), (ii) negating inverted imperatives with *not*, which is comparatively rare anyway, yields acceptable results only in certain contexts (compare (33a, b) to (33c)), whereas (iii) structures in which the subject occurs sentence-initially or is covert are not restricted in this way.

Studies like Beukema and Coopmans (1989) and Potsdam (1996) suspect that the observed restrictions on the use of *not* ultimately follow from aspects of the syntax of *not* in imperatives. In Chapter 6, I examine these proposals before presenting an alternative account, which argues that the (un)availability of *not* is an artefact of the distribution of imperative subjects (and one which is based on the analysis of the syntax of subjects in imperatives provided in earlier chapters).

Chapter 7 examines the proposed analysis of English imperatives from a comparative perspective, and in the discussion in Chapter 8 I will explore any ramifications of the findings for the MP framework.

1.4 A final note

Standard works of descriptive grammar (such as Sweet 1892–98, Poutsma 1928–29, Jespersen 1954, Quirk et al. 1985) have defined imperative clauses according to a number of both morphosyntactic

and semantic/pragmatic properties. In semantic or pragmatic terms, imperatives might be characterized as expressions that constitute 'directives'. Directives are expressions which 'are primarily used to instruct somebody ([not]) to do something' (Quirk et al. 1985, p. 804). Within the language-philosophical tradition of Austin (1962) and Searle (1969, 1971), they realize the actual act of issuing a command, giving an order, making a request, forbidding actions and so on. Here are some examples:

(34) a. Shoot!

b. You tell me the truth!

c. Don't anyone touch those papers!

d. Do be patient!

There are otherwise similar constructions, like (35a–d) below, which do not immediately fit this description. Conversely, it is possible for clauses with otherwise different properties to be conveyed with the illocutionary force of a directive, as in (36).

(35) a. Have a cigarette!

b. Feel free (to take as many biscuits as you like)!

c. Don't tell me (that you have passed your driving test)!

d. Do come in and sit down!

(36) a. You will report to the Dean tomorrow.

b. Will you stop complaining?!

c. Could you (please) make less noise?!

d. Why don't you leave me alone?!

I would like to make it clear from the beginning that this study focuses on such imperative clauses as (34–35), which have the morphosyntactic properties described in the previous sections. I will not be concerned with directives of the type in (36).

2
Functional Categories in Imperative Clause Structure

The present chapter investigates the clause structure of English imperatives, aiming to determine which functional categories may be represented and what feature matrix they are associated with. After pointing out in section 2.1 a difficulty one at first encounters when looking into this matter, the discussion proceeds with sections 2.2 and 2.3 which respectively examine the standard clausal categories INFL and COMP individually. Contrary to what has sometimes been envisaged, I will contemplate the possibility that INFL is not an 'inert' head in imperative clauses, and suggest that a CP layer, if projected at all, might not be merged until after Spell-Out. Section 2.4 briefly discusses the syntactic status of the aspectual auxiliaries *have* and *be* (which combine with a participle to form perfect or progressive constructions) and concludes that a more recently postulated syntactic head, ASP(ect), is among the set of functional categories that comprise the phrase structure of English imperatives. The suggestions that are made with respect to INFL and COMP, and the evidence that exists for the presence of a structural level between IP and VP in English (which may be identified with ASPP), are of particular significance in the context of the analysis developed in later chapters.

2.1 The problem

A problem with establishing the phrase structure configuration for English imperatives is the apparent lack of clues that are usually appealed to. Following the tradition of Baker (1988), verbal affixes

(or verbal grammatical features in general) can be taken to reveal the existence and hierarchical order of ('split') functional categories like TENSE and AGR(eement) in syntactic representations. Recapitulating the data in Chapter 1, verbs in imperative clauses are completely void of tense and agreement inflections, however.

(1) a. (You) stay / *stayed here!

b. (You) be / *are quiet now!

c. Somebody call(*s) her!

Likewise, syntactic categories are typically associated with certain lexical material. It has been standard to assume that both English modal verbs and the infinitive particle *to* are functional elements that get generated under INFL. While English modals may be categorized as inherently finite INFL/TENSE-items (Roberts 1985, Pollock 1989), *to* is commonly regarded as a realization of non-finite INFL/TENSE (Chomsky 1981, Stowell 1982). Yet, as the following examples show, imperatives admit neither.[10]

(2) a. *(You) must / can / may leave!

b. (You) (*to) go away!

The syntax of auxiliaries like *have* and *be* may also indicate the presence of a functional category. When inflected, *have* and *be* occur before the negative element *not* (as, for example, passive *were* does in the finite declarative sentence (3a) below), where they are thought to occupy some INFL(ectional) head. As in infinitives, the aspectual auxiliaries have a morphologically bare shape in imperative clauses and follow negation like main verbs do in English. This observation is illustrated by the examples (3b, c).

(3) a. You were not hurt by what he said.
[$_{IP}$ You [$_{I}$ were][$_{NEGP}$ [$_{NEG}$ not][$_{VP}$ [$_{V}$ hurt] by what he said]]]

b. I believe [her (not) to (not) be hurt by what he said]

c. Do not / Don't be hurt by what he says!

Nonetheless, the fact that in (3c) negation is preceded by the item *do* suggests that minimally one functional projection above NEGP/VP is present in imperative structures. If this category is identified with IP, it remains somewhat difficult to determine the feature content of INFL since *do* is not overtly marked for tense or agreement, either. This situation has led to some agreement in the literature that *do*(*n't*) does not occur in INFL at all in imperatives (and might not even be an instance of the auxiliary *do*) but is inserted straight into a C-head. (I refer to Chapter 4 for further discussion.) A CP analysis of imperatives certainly has initial appeal given the word order correspondence between negative imperatives like (4a) and interrogative clauses (4b), which are widely believed to be CP constituents.

(4) a. Don't anyone answer the phone!

b. Didn't anyone answer the phone?

Otherwise, there is no evidence for a C-system in the clause structure of the English imperative because C is never filled by a complementizer:

(5) a. The judge said [(*that/*for) hand over my driving licence!]

b. *The judge asked [if hand over my driving licence!]

Thus, on the surface it is very much unclear what the feature specification of INFL should look like (or whether it has any), and what the categorial status of English imperatives might be (that is, whether they are clausal constituents of the category CP or lower). One way of accounting for the above facts would be to say that a syntactic head is structurally represented in the clause structure of imperatives but lacks content, or that it is only phonologically null but carries (covert) grammatical features. With structural parallelism abandoned in minimalism, another possibility is that imperatives fail to project functional layers which obtain in other clause types, or that they are only merged covertly as late as LF. All three possibilities have previously been suggested with respect to INFL. In what follows, I shall explore the second possibility. Specifically, I will show that despite the absence of indicators that normally signal agreement specification, such as verb morphology, it seems arguable that the imperative

phrase marker contains an INFL head which is specified for agreement (φ-) features.

2.2 INFL (AGR)

In the light of the lack of overt tense/agreement markers, a seemingly natural assumption to make would be either that the corresponding category INFL (AUX in earlier generative models) is absent from the structure of English imperatives (Culicover 1976, Schmerling 1977, Akmajian et al. 1979, Akamajian 1984, among others) or that it is associated with some other element as opposed to TENSE/AGR (as has been suggested by a number of researchers including Kiparsky 1963, Lees 1964, Culicover 1971, Stockwell et al. 1973, Ukaji 1978, Sawada 1980, and later Lasnik 1981, 1994). A proposal that has found many supporters in the past is that in imperative clauses INFL hosts an 'abstract' imperative morpheme/feature, which (in the spirit of Katz and Postal 1964) we may call [IMP]. Nothing much has been said about the precise nature of abstract [IMP]. It has primarily been used as a theory-internal syntactic device. In Zhang's (1990) analysis, for instance, [IMP] serves to drive movement in imperatives. In Chapter 4, however, I will argue that this movement is triggered by a different feature that is independently motivated (an idea which is in fact reconcilable with other assumptions Zhang makes). There thus seems no need to postulate an [IMP] feature for the sole purpose of deriving the effects of required movement. This is, of course, not to say that imperatives may not have some feature [IMP] with a different function (see section 2.3).[11]

In the wake of the split-INFL hypothesis, more recent studies (Henry 1995, Platzack and Rosengren 1997) have since assumed that while verbs do not inflect for agreement in English imperatives, the imperative phrase marker comprises an INFL/AGR head with φ-features (Beukema and Coopmans (1989) allocate these features to COMP). The main theoretical motivation that they offer for the presence of an INFL/AGR head relates to the status of the null subject of imperatives, which is discussed at length in Chapter 3. Zanuttini (1991), on the other hand, maintains that the absence of inflectional material is syntactically reflected in the clause structure of English imperatives by an 'inert' AGR projection that has no content what-

soever. From the current theoretical perspective, however, it seems hard to sustain the postulation of syntactically inactive categories. It is neither consistent with the principle of FI nor reconcilable with the concept of structural economy, which together dictate that functional heads are present in structural descriptions only if their presence is somehow motivated or contributes to interpretation at LF (Chomsky, 1989, 1995a, ch. 4).

Further, there are facts which are consistent with the presence of (imperative) φ-features in INFL (though these are evidently not associated with any agreement morphology). First, whereas verbs are not overtly marked for agreement in imperative clauses nowadays, this was different in older stages of the English language. Into the Early Modern English period (*c.*1450–1700), verbs had distinctive imperative forms, with no ending for the second person singular, as in (6b, d) (compare the non-imperative example in (6a), which shows -(*e*)*st*) and with a regular *-th* ending for the second person plural, as in (6c, e).[12]

(6) a. *Wherfore* ***criest*** *thou?*
why cry.2S.PRES.IND. you.2S.NOM.
'Why do you cry?'

b. *Boy, a boke anon* *thou* ***bryng*** *me!*
boy a book immediately you.2S.NOM. bring.2S.IMP. me
'Boy, you bring me a book immediately!'

c. *Fy on yow!* ***goyth*** *hence Out of my presence*
fie on you! go.2PL.IMP. hence out of my presence
'Fie on you! Now (you) get out of my sight.'

d. *O goddesse immortal!* ***Be*** *helping now, [. . .].*
o goddess immortal! be.2S.IMP. helping now, [. . .]
'O immortal goddess! (You) be helping now, [. . .].'

e. ***Bethe*** *ware sirs.*
be.2PL.IMP. aware gentlemen
'(You) be careful, gentlemen!'[13]

Conceivably, then, the apparent absence of subject–verb agreement in present-day English imperatives is only apparent. It might simply be ascribed to the 'accidental' fact that English, whose morphology

is well known to have become impoverished over time, lost the imperative inflectional paradigm. This loss does not *necessarily* imply that agreement features are now absent altogether.[14] Note that the ungrammatical variants of (1b, c) come as no surprise given that the *-s* inflection and the form *are* have always exclusively belonged to the paradigm of the present indicative.[15] This is to say that one cannot expect to find them in imperative clauses in the first place, or draw any inferences from their absence. The minimal pairs in (1b, c) only demonstrate that imperatives (no longer) show overt agreement marking, but they do not prove that INFL is not associated with some (imperative) φ-feature matrix.

In addition to this, subjects of English imperatives appear to bear nominative Case. On the face of it, the Case of subjects seems difficult to determine. This is because only a limited range of DPs can freely be used as the subject of English imperatives (see Chapter 3 for further discussion). Among these is the pronoun *you*, and all of them happen to be morphologically opaque. Yet historically, the form of the second person pronoun varied not only for number but also for Case (viz. singular *thou* (NOM) / *thee* (ACC), and plural *ye* (NOM) / *you* (ACC)). Earlier imperative data, like (6b) above, show unambiguously nominative forms.[16] Note also that some English native speakers (Andrew Radford, pers. comm.) allow for third person pronouns as subjects of imperatives, most favourably in conjunction structures or when accompanied by a modifying clause like (7) below. For these speakers, the pronouns must be nominative and cannot be, say, accusative.

(7) a. You stand by the door and *she* / **her* watch the window!

b. *He* / **Him* who carries the machine gun step away from the car!

The point is that nominative Case often seems to go hand in hand with agreement specification (as Chomsky already argued in 1981 and Schütze (1997) has shown more extensively). As for English, simple examples such as those in (8) show that an agreeing INFL (like an inflected auxiliary) takes a nominative subject, whereas the subject of a non-agreeing INFL (like the particle *to*) is accusative (or PRO).

(8) a. She / *Her [$_{I}$ is] watching the window.

b. I don't want [him / PRO / *he [$_{I}$ to] carry a machine gun]

If the idea that subjects of present-day English imperatives have nominative Case is correct, then this would hint at (covert) specification for agreement features on the INFL head and the verb (as Beukema and Coopmans (1989) have argued for).

While the reasoning cannot be but indirect due to the poverty of the current English morphological system, in view of data like the above we cannot immediately rule out the possibility that INFL in English imperatives carries imperative φ-features, which historically were spelt out by imperative inflections. In other words, it may be that historical and present-day English imperatives differ with respect to the phonetic realization of their (otherwise identical) INFL head only.[17]

2.3 COMP

While the nature of INFL in English imperatives has been characterized differently, most researchers agree that imperative clauses are full CP structures (Beukema and Coopmans 1989, Zanuttini 1991, Henry 1995, Potsdam 1996, Platzack and Rosengren 1997, among others). In section 2.1 I noted that this idea is based on (i) the observation that negative imperative sentences like (9a) resemble interrogatives with respect to the relative ordering of *do*(*n't*) and the subject; and (ii) the fact that interrogative clauses have long been analysed as CP structures involving I-to-C movement of the auxiliary.

(9) a. Don't anyone answer the phone!

b. Didn't anyone answer the phone?
[$_{CP}$ [$_{C}$ Didn't$_{i}$][$_{IP}$ anyone t$_{i}$ answer the phone]]?

However, in Chapter 4 I shall argue that a CP analysis of negative imperatives is potentially problematic. The observed inverted word order is therefore not necessarily an argument for the presence of a CP layer in the structure of imperative clauses.

According to Chomsky (1993) and others, the functional head C is the locus of illocutionary force, as in:

(10) I wonder [$_{CP}$ [$_{C}$ if] he has left yet]

Like TENSE (and unlike AGR), COMP is seen as a semantically contentful category. Within the framework adopted here this entails that COMP is inherently specified for interpretable features such as Chomsky's (1995a, ch. 4) feature [Q](uestion), which contribute to the sentence's interpretation and therefore survive to LF. That is to say, force-indicating features need no checking and (on the assumption that movement is motivated only by the requirement that non-interpretable features must be checked off for the derivation to yield a well-formed LF) hence do not trigger movement. In order to account for the fact that raising into C is, however, obligatory in (root) interrogative clauses (as shown by the ill-formedness of example (11a) below), Chomsky (1995a, ch. 4) stipulates that COMP in addition carries some strong feature. This feature can be checked pre-Spell-Out by a verbal element via Move when V raises and adjoins to [Q] (as in (11b)) or by a *wh*-element that moves into SpecCP (as in (11c)). In other configurations, the strong feature can be checked in a different manner through merger (as in (10) above and in (11d)).

(11) a. *Anyone has left?

b. Has anyone left?
[$_{CP}$ [$_{C}$ Has$_i$][$_{IP}$ anyone [$_{I}$ t$_i$] left yet]]?

c. Why has nobody left yet?
[$_{CP}$ Why$_j$ [$_{C}$ has$_i$][$_{IP}$ nobody [$_{I}$ t$_i$] left t$_j$ yet]]?

d. I wonder [$_{CP}$ whether [$_{C}$ C][$_{IP}$ anyone [$_{I}$ has] left yet]]

As movement to C does not occur in finite declarative clauses such as (12), we are led to the conclusion that declarative COMP is weak.

(12) He has not left yet.
[$_{CP}$ [$_{C}$ C][$_{IP}$ he has not left yet]]

Though FI does not require elements without a phonetic matrix to be merged in the overt syntax, if we follow Chomsky (1995a, p. 226) in assuming that Merge is costless in terms of computational effort, covert declarative C may enter the computational system early, that is, before Spell-Out. Still, Chomsky (ibid., pp. 292, 232) at the same

time argues that if computations are conceived of as uniform from the numeration to LF, with Spell-Out applying 'anywhere', the operations Select and Merge should be available during the course of the derivation, or even as late as LF, and subject to economy constraints like Procrastinate (ibid., p. 262). Chomsky notes that selecting an item with phonetic content after Spell-Out does not, however, obey FI because phonological features are not interpretable at LF, causing the derivation to crash there. He also dismisses embedding a covert element into some construction already formed on the grounds that '[any] such complication (which could be quite serious) would require strong empirical motivation. I know of none, and therefore assume that there is no such operation' (ibid., p. 248). One way of stating this would be to say that in the case of Select and Merge, Procrastinate is usually overridden for convergence, with, as Chomsky (ibid., p. 232) points out, the possible exception of a phonetically null item being selected covertly and merged at the root of the phrase marker for interpretation at the LF interface. Hence, he proposes that root finite declaratives which are not introduced by an overt complementizer might be IP constituents at Spell-Out, and merge with covert declarative C only later in the derivation (ibid., p. 292).

(13) $[_{IP}$ He $[_{I}$ has] not left yet]

Following Chomsky, we may assume that imperatives have an imperative (or directive) feature [IMP] in C. Given that C seems to never contain any lexical material, as the examples in (14) would suggest, we may extend his suggestion for (root) finite declarative clauses and posit that covert imperative (or directive) COMP is also merged covertly.[18]

(14) a. The judge said [(*that/*for) hand over my driving licence!]

b. *The judge asked [if hand over my driving licence!]

A different analysis of the syntax of *wh*-questions is offered by Belletti and Rizzi (1996, henceforth B&R). Recasting work by Rizzi (1991)[19] into current minimalist terms, they propose that A'-movement to SpecCP and subject–auxiliary inversion from I to C is regulated by Checking Theory in a fashion analogous to the A-movement operation to SpecIP, which enables INFL and the subject

to check features against one another in a Spec–Head agreement configuration. B&R assume that in interrogatives INFL has an interrogative ([WH]-)feature which must similarly be checked with the feature of an interrogative (*wh*-)element.[20] In case this checking requirement cannot be satisfied within IP (as in (15b) below, where SpecIP already hosts the external argument), the way to 'save' the structure is to raise both the I-constituent and the *wh*-expression into CP to ensure that they enter into the canonical Spec–Head checking relation:[21]

(15) a. Who said that?

b. What did he say?



Andrew Radford (pers. comm.) notes that B&R's analysis admits into the theory the possibility that illocutionary force features may occur in INFL. If we apply this idea to English imperative clauses, we might hypothesize that not C, but INFL hosts the imperative force feature [IMP]. This idea has some plausibility given the occurrence of *imperative* agreement inflections on verbs in the historical data that were presented in section 2.1. Assuming for the time being that subjects of imperatives occur in SpecIP (but see the discussion in Chapter 5), an example like (16) could then be assigned the following basic structure.

(16) You stay in your room!



With present-day English imperatives possibly specified for agreement, the assumption that imperatives contain an INFL head that carries the features [AGR, IMP] meets the minimalist requirement that only 'meaningful' functional heads are structurally represented if the representation is to satisfy FI at LF ([AGR]-features being non-interpretable). In the above structure, the subject has raised in order to check its Case, and the [AGR]-feature of INFL agrees with that of the verb. These features then disappear, whereas the interpretable feature [IMP] proceeds to LF, ensuring that the structure can be interpreted at the interface. Similar to the situation with *wh*-subject questions, and unlike the case of *wh*-complement questions, the requirements of Checking Theory could be satisfied without projecting a CP layer. As there appears to be no independent evidence for a C-node, English imperatives might according to this system, then, simply be IP structures, both prior to and after Spell-Out.[22] The proposed representation respects structural economy in that it does not contain any empty heads or functionless nodes, but involves only as much structure as seems necessary.

2.4 ASP(ect)

2.4.1 Aspect and imperatives

The notion of Aspect is semantically distinguishable from Tense. Tense locates an event in time *externally* by linking it to some independently determined reference point – ultimately the time of the utterance (Enç 1987 and others). Aspect specifies 'the different

ways of viewing the [*internal*] temporal constituency of a situation' (Comrie 1976, p. 3). In other words, Aspect refers to the way in which a situation is presented, for example whether it is portrayed as 'perfective' or 'imperfective'. Perfective aspect depicts the event viewed in its entirety; that is, without necessarily differentiating any of its internal structure such as beginning, middle and end (as in *Steve worked on his assignment*). Imperfective aspect, on the other hand, presents some internal portion of a situation (as in *Steve is working on his assignment*). Morphosyntactically, Aspect is typically realized by means of a verbal affix, or by periphrastic expressions, or a combination thereof (Comrie 1976, Ouhalla 1991). English, a language with a relatively poor aspectual system, only makes an overt morphosyntactic distinction for the 'progressive' (marked on the verb by adding the bound morpheme *-ing*, usually in combination with the auxiliary *be*). This is a particular instance of imperfective aspect, whose function is that of representing a situation as ongoing, or in progress. English does not overtly mark perfective aspect (rather, perfectivity is implied whenever the progressive marker is absent), but it has a specific construction (consisting of the auxiliary *have* + V-*n* / V-*(e)d*/*t*) known as the 'perfect', that is often subsumed under perfective aspect. Comrie (1976, p. 52) notes, however, that the perfect is in fact quite different from other aspects because it is not directly concerned with a situation itself but rather indicates the continuing present relevance of a past event. For illustration, compare the pair of examples in (17):

(17) a. I have lost my purse.

b. I lost my purse.
(yesterday, but somebody found it and brought it back today)

Whereas in the (a) sentence, there is an implication that the purse is still missing, any such inference is directly cancellable in (b).

With regard to imperatives, the use of the perfect auxiliary *have* has been judged ungrammatical or only marginally acceptable by several people (including Lees 1964, Bolinger 1967, Schmerling 1977, 1982, Akmajian et al. 1979, Akamajian 1984, Huntley 1984, Takezawa 1984, Zwicky 1988). According to Lees (1964), imperatives

do not admit progressive *be* either. The following sentences indeed strike one as anomalous in some respect:

(18) a. Have seen The Full Monty!
b. Have checked the facts!
c. Have opened a new bank account!

(19) a. Be waiting!
b. Be practising your multiplication tables!
c. Be faking a headache!

This is a somewhat trivial observation, though, because the anomaly of these examples can be given a straightforward account in terms of a purely semantic condition, and therefore need not have anything to do with syntactic restrictions on the availability of aspectual auxiliaries in imperatives. Note first that while the reference time of imperatives is typically the (immediate) future and on no account past, the time phase marked by the perfect covers a certain period in the past up to speech time but does not include a future moment, since the occurrence of an event cannot be anterior in the future:

(20) Vicky has opened a new bank account (*tomorrow).

That is, the temporal interpretations associated with the perfect and imperative clauses are in principle incompatible, and this could be the reason why the sentences in (18–19) seem quite impossible. The frequent reluctance to accept examples like (18a–c) is further relativized by Culicover (1971) and Davies (1981), who consider them fine when they are accompanied by some kind of temporal or situational modifier phrase, as exemplified in (21) below.

(21) a. Have seen the Full Monty before you die!
b. Have checked the facts before you start accusing people!
c. Have opened a new bank account by Friday!

Adding such modifying adjuncts has the effect that reference time is explicitly extended to the non-immediate future. That is, their presence causes reference time to be shifted away from speech time, which allows for a semantically coherent interpretation that the order conveyed may be acted upon after the moment of speaking yet must be realized before the time or situation specified.[23] Following the above authors, then, the perfect auxiliary *have* is not excluded per se but can be used in imperatives if the context sets up a time interval. Or, as Davies (1981, p. 28) puts it:

> [A perfect] imperative can [. . .] be used [. . .] provided it is possible to see some motivation for using the perfect. This is the case, for instance, where what is important to the speaker is not simply that the addressee do something, but that he have finished it before some particular time.

Progressive imperatives are odd for similar reasons and can be improved in a similar way. One can hardly order an action presented as progressive simply because it is not conceivable to require someone to be in the middle of doing something. Yet deferring reference time with adverbial modifiers grants that the order may be carried out after the time of the utterance, and given an appropriate context, the examples (22) make perfect sense:

(22) a. Be waiting for me on the corner at six!

b. Be practising your multiplication tables this evening!

c. Be faking a headache when she comes in!

In short, 'aspectual' imperative constructions are not strictly impossible. Acceptability judgements may be influenced by the context that is created, from which I conclude that any possible restrictions are extra-grammatical (that is, semantic/pragmatic) but not syntactic in nature.[24]

2.4.2 ASPP and the aspectual auxiliaries[25]

Aspect has been assigned the status of a functional head in its own right for English by scholars like Tenny (1987), Ouhalla (1991) and

van Gelderen (1993) as an alternative to regarding it as one of several features that are subsumed under the inflectional head INFL/TENSE along with tense features. One of the main arguments is that a unitary INFL analysis incorrectly predicts that it should be possible for tense and aspect morphology to be marked on the same verb, as indicated in (23) below.

(23) a. Football came home.

b. *Football comings/caming home.
[$_{IP}$ Subj [$_{I}$ *-ing* / *-s*][$_{VP}$ [$_{V}$ V] . . .]]

That is, subsuming Aspect under INFL together with Tense provides no explanation for the fact that Tense and Aspect are morphosyntactically dissociated. As the examples (24a, b) below show, if both occur, then in English-type languages the tense inflection must be realized on an auxiliary, whereas the aspectual affix is associated with the main verb.

(24) a. Football is / was coming home.

b. Football has come home.

Analysing Aspect as a syntactic head ASP distinct from INFL/TENSE, on the other hand, helps explain why tense and aspect markers occur independently from each other under a syntactic approach to morphology such as the one advocated by Baker (1988), who permits individual grammatical morphemes/features to each head a separate functional projection, as in:

(25) [$_{IP}$ Subj [$_{I}$ *-s*][$_{ASPP}$ [$_{ASP}$ *-ing*][$_{VP}$ [$_{V}$ V] . . .]]]

As indicated in (25), the location of ASP in tree structures is usually assumed to be higher than V but lower than INFL/TENSE. Bowers (1993) has shown that the distribution of adverbs constitutes an independent argument for the existence of an intermediate functional head between INFL/TENSE and V in English. Consider the following example (adapted from his work, p. 607):

(26) Mary certainly was (not) confidently playing the violin beautifully.
[$_{IP}$ Mary certainly was [$_{NEGP}$ not [confidently playing the violin beautifully]]]

If we assume that adverbial modifiers are X′-adjuncts (as Bowers does), then in the structure of (26) the speaker-oriented adverb *certainly* may be adjoined to the I′/T′-node and the manner adverb *beautifully* to a projection of V. It is not possible that the other manner adverb *confidently* adjoins to I′/T′ in the same way as *certainly* does, because it can be separated from INFL/TENSE by an intervening NEG head (*not*). Bowers argues that given that the two manner adverbs *confidently* and *beautifully* can co-occur but (as the next example in (27) demonstrates) are unable to exchange positions, *confidently* cannot be associated with the same node as *beautifully*, either. Rather, it must be attached to a different phrase in between INFL/TENSE (and NEG) on the one hand, and V on the other.

(27) *Mary certainly was (not) beautifully playing the violin confidently.

Further evidence for an additional functional projection to IP comes from the behaviour of particle verbs. Johnson (1991) proposes to analyse verb–particle constructions of the type illustrated by (28a, b) below (in which the verb may be separated from the particle) as involving movement of the verb to some pre-V head position, leaving the particle behind.

(28) a. John was looking up the reference.

b. John was looking the reference up.

Specifically, a comparison of the (a) and (b) examples of (28) suggests not merely that in (28b) the DP *the reference* has undergone overt A-movement – over the particle – into its Case-checking position (which we may take to be Spec*v*P following Chomsky, 1995a, ch. 4). It also suggests that the verb, too, must have been moved from its base position within the VP to some head higher up than *v*/V, since

it precedes, rather than follows, its complement. As Pollock (1989) and others have shown, main verbs cannot be moved to INFL/TENSE in the overt syntax. On the assumption that in (28), the auxiliary *was* – which carries the tense inflection – occupies the INFL/TENSE head, it follows that this kind of verb movement targets some intermediate functional head F, as indicated in (29).

(29) $[_{IP}$ John $[_{I}$ was$][_{FP}$ $[_{F}$ looking$_i][_{vP}$ [the reference$]_j$ $[_{v'}$ t_i up $t_j]]]]$

Bowers (1993) has given the target of this 'short verb movement', and licenser of a specific subset of manner adverbs, the label Pr(edicate), while Johnson (1991) neutrally termed it 'μ'. More recently, the head labelled F in (29) above has been identified precisely with ASP(ect) by Diesing and Jelinek (1995) and also Felser (1999).

The assumption that Aspect is an independent functional category which triggers verb raising is consistent with Checking Theory as outlined in Chomsky (1995a, ch. 4). While verbs are inserted into a structure fully inflected, the features associated with their inflections must enter into checking relations with, among others, the φ-features of DPs, and the tense and agreement features of corresponding functional heads. Aspectual features may likewise be optionally added to V along with other features as it enters the numeration, and later check with a matching aspectual head. Felser (1999) observes that data like those cited by Johnson (1991) show that short verb movement occurs independently of whether or not the verb carries an overt aspectual affix. Compare the examples in (28) with those in (30) below:

(30) a. We expected John to look up the reference.

b. We expected John to look the reference up.

She suggests that perfective aspect (as distinct from the perfect that is formed with *have*) might be manifested on the otherwise bare base stem as a zero morpheme/abstract feature, which is checked against an ASP head that is specified as 'perfective'. For sentence (30b), this would then yield the configuration shown in figure (31).

(31) We expected John . . .



As demonstrated by the examples in (32) and (33) below, short verb movement is also possible in imperatives.

(32) a. (You) be pouring out the champagne when he comes in!

b. (You) be pouring the champagne out when he comes in!

(33) a. (You) pour out the champagne now!

b. (You) pour the champagne out now!

Accordingly, we may take imperative clauses to have aspectual structure also.[26]

The idea that Aspect may act as an independent functional head in syntax has given rise to different hypotheses about the syntactic status of the aspectual auxiliaries *have* and *be* than the previously suggested main verb analysis (which dates back to Ross 1969) and stacked-VP analysis (of Akmajian et al. 1979) of auxiliaries. The latter two assume that the auxiliaries *have* and *be* are like main verbs in that they all head a VP, conforming to the abstract representation in (34).

(34) . . . [$_{VP}$ have [$_{VP}$ be [$_{VP}$ V]]]

These analyses have proved problematic in various ways and hence have been subject to much criticism. One empirical drawback of the analysis of auxiliaries as main verbs is that it has difficulty accounting for the important differences that exist between them. One difference is that contrary to auxiliaries, main verbs have semantic content. Auxiliaries further differ from main verbs with respect to a number of morphosyntactic properties: they can undergo inversion with the subject, they can be used in tags, and carry negation (characteristics known as the NICE properties). This is demonstrated by the examples in (35–37).

(35) a. Is John working hard?
b. *Worked he hard?
c. Did he work hard?

(36) a. John is working hard, is he?
b. *He worked hard, worked he?
c. He worked hard, did he?

(37) a. John isn't working hard.
b. *He workedn't hard.
c. He didn't work hard.

The major theoretical disadvantage of treating auxiliaries as main verbs is that they do not seem to participate in thematic relations; that is, they do not theta-mark their complement (or specifier). Since the property of assigning theta-roles is usually ascribed to lexical heads, their inability to theta-mark suggests that they should not be grouped with main verbs, and that they are generated outside the theta-marking domain of the VP (Ouhalla 1991).

Analysing ASP(ect) as a separate syntactic head on top of the VP potentially solves many of these problems, as it allows us to treat aspectual auxiliaries as functional elements. Tenny (1987) and van Gelderen (1993), for example, have suggested that progressive *be* functions as the head of an ASPP which selects a VP-complement

headed by V-*ing*, while Koopman and Sportiche (1991) propose regarding the auxiliary *have* as the overt realization of perfect aspect and generate it under ASP. Assuming this approach to be essentially correct, and given that in imperatives the aspectual auxiliaries appear to occur in a syntactic position lower than INFL at Spell-Out (as pointed out in section 2.1), I assume that they occur as the heads of an Aspect phrase. This gives us the following (partial) structure for a perfect imperative construction like (38).

(38) Do not / Don't have eaten everything before the guests arrive!



The syntax of *do* and subjects in imperatives, both of which have deliberately been left out in (38), will be addressed later on. Note that if we permit other functional heads to intervene between V and INFL, the set of potential specifiers available is expanded. Chapter 5 explores the possibility of the instantiation of a SpecASPP in the structure of imperative clauses.

The fact about imperatives that they combine *have* and *be* with *do* is a property which makes them unique among clause types in (standard) English and one that is as yet poorly understood. Compare the examples in (39), (40) and (41) (see also (38)):

(39) a. You were not working when I got back.
[$_{IP}$ You [$_{I}$ were][$_{NEGP}$ [$_{NEG}$ not][$_{VP}$ working when I got back]]]

b. *You did not be working when I got back.

c. You did not work on Sunday.

(40) a. We would like [you (not) to (not) be working when we get back]

b. *We would like [you to be not working when we get back]

c. *We would like [you to do not be working when we get back]

d. We would like [you not to work / (*to do not work) on Sundays]

(41) a. *Be not working when I get back!

b. Do not / Don't be working when I get back!

c. Do not / Don't work on Sundays!

As can be seen from these data, imperatives behave quite differently from finite declarative clauses (39a) but resemble infinitives (40a, b) in that *have*/*be* do not appear (before negation) in INFL at Spell-Out (see (41a)). On the other hand, they clearly differ from infinitives with respect to the occurrence of *do* ((41b) versus (40c)) (which in finite declarative clauses combines with main verbs alone (39b, c)). Under a raising analysis of *have*/*be* (Klima 1964, Jackendoff 1972, Emonds 1976, 1978), many researchers have assumed that the contrast between examples like (39a) and (41a) is most plausibly interpreted as indicating that the node/morpheme/feature that drives *have*/*be* raising in finite declarative clauses is absent from imperative structures (see, for example, Culicover 1976, Davies 1981, Lasnik 1981, Beukema and Coopmans 1989, and also Schütze 1997 within a somewhat different framework), or that the phrase marker of imperatives contains a null element which blocks this raising or renders it unnecessary (Stockwell et al. 1973, Henry 1995, among others). The fact that *do* occurs in imperatives has in turn been ascribed to some other morpheme/feature/operation/device that is not found in infinitives.[27] Apart from the fact that this kind of approach stipulates additional machinery, it is also incompatible with my earlier hypothesis that English imperatives are specified for agreement. If imperatives pattern with finite declarative clauses in this respect, there seems to be no apparent reason why *have* and *be* should not (have to) check φ-features with INFL.

Potsdam (1996, p. 108) slightly reverses the vantage point by stating that 'if [overt verb raising] is essentially absent in English, there is no actual expectation of seeing [overt verb raising]. The analytical burden is not to explain why auxiliaries don't raise in a particular situation, for example imperatives, but rather only to state why raising does occur in the one case.' [= finite declarative clauses LR] A solution along these lines has been offered by Lasnik (1994), who proposes that in finite declaratives *have*/*be* are of a different nature than in other clause types. His system allows him to treat finite declarative *have*/*be* (39a) as inflected items in the lexicon which check their features via raising, whereas imperative *have*/*be* are bare stems like main verbs, and must be associated with an 'abstract' [IMP] affix in INFL through a process of 'morphological merger'. He argues that morphological merger is impossible when negation intervenes (41a), hence the need for *do* (41b). Lasnik's account makes crucial use of a 'hybrid' approach to verb syntax, though, which I do not adopt. In the light of proposals to correlate the availability of verb movement with a certain richness of agreement morphology (Rohrbacher 1994, Vikner 1995 and others), one might suspect that the occurrence of *have*/*be* in the INFL head of finite declaratives could be related to the fact that (in particular) *be* has a wide range of different agreement forms in the indicative paradigm, as has been suggested by Kayne (1989). On this account, imperative/infinitive *have*/*be* would not occur in INFL because they are completely void of overt agreement inflections.

However, Rohrbacher (1994) has argued that this idea is untenable from a cross-linguistic point of view. He points out that Faroese *vera* 'be' has as much agreement morphology as its English equivalent yet follows negation, and that in African-American and Hiberno-English the habitual auxiliary *be* is not raised to INFL although it shows some overt agreement. Rohrbacher draws attention to the fact that Old English *beon* 'be' had two paradigms: one with irregular singular forms from which indicative *be* developed (the so-called *ar-* and (*e*)*s*-forms), while other manifestations of *be* developed from the second paradigm with largely regular singular (*beo-*) forms (see also Table 2.2 in note 15). He claims that in the course of the history of English, finite delarative *have*/*be* were reanalysed as INFL-elements as a result of which they are directly inserted into INFL, whereas other forms of *have*/*be* are generated below INFL/NEG (related suggestions have

been made by Akmajian et al. 1979 and Ouhalla 1991). Thus, it may be that the different distribution of *have*/*be* in finite declarative clauses and imperatives/infinitives does not result from a difference in verb movement, but arises because the auxiliaries originate in different syntactic positions (like INFL and ASP). As to the different behaviour of imperatives and infinitives with respect to the use of *do*, I take the relevant factor to be that in contrast to infinitives, imperatives have an INFL head that is specified for features which need checking (possibly φ-features). These features will have to be checked by *do* when *have*/*be* are prevented from raising there (for the precise conditions under which *do*-insertion is triggered in imperatives, see the discussion in Chapter 4).

Summarizing the discussion in this chapter, from a variety of data I have hypothesized that the INFL head of English imperatives is associated with an (imperative) φ-feature matrix. I further argued that imperative structures are arguably IPs at Spell-Out, and either lack a C-system altogether or have it merged covertly. I showed that there is evidence for the existence of a functional layer between V and INFL in English (whose head can be targeted by 'short verb movement' and licenses a (sub-)set of manner adverbs), which may be analysed as a projection of the syntactic category ASP(ect). I henceforth assume that the aspectual auxiliaries *have* and *be* occur in the head position of an ASPP in imperatives.

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3
(C)overt Imperative Subjects

The points made in the foregoing discussion are, as I will show, of particular significance to the analysis of the syntax of subjects in English imperatives as developed in later chapters of this study. The present chapter first addresses some matters concerning subject realization. Among these are apparent restrictions on available subjects and the status of the overt and covert subject of imperatives. Section 3.1 below introduces these issues and outlines the structure of the remainder of this chapter.

3.1 The issues

In Chapter 1 I pointed out that the range of DPs that can be used as the subject of English imperatives seems subject to some restrictions. While imperatives combine naturally with the second person pronoun *you* (as in (1a)) and regularly occur with the kind of nominal expressions exemplified in (1b–j),[28] first and third person DPs like those in (2) are practically impossible.

(1) a. *You* be quiet!

b. *Nobody* move!

c. *Someone* call my wife!

d. *Whoever took the money* return it immediately!

e. *The tallest of you* sit at the back!

f. *Those in the front row* stop giggling!

g. (*You*) *truckdrivers* keep to the right!

h. (*New*) *students* sign up at the front door!

i. *The boy in the corner* stand up!

j. *Chris* stand by the door and *Shirley* watch the window!

(2) a. **We* / **I* go home!

b. **He* / **They* give it to me!

c. **A man* come here!

In section 3.2 I give a detailed description of (im)possible subjects in imperatives. Most scholars assume that the relevant restriction can be stated in terms of the notion of 'addressee' (Bolinger 1967, Downing 1969, Stockwell et al. 1973, Downes 1977, Ukaji 1978, Davies 1981, Schmerling 1982, Zhang 1990, Potsdam 1996, Platzack and Rosengren 1997, among many others). While I agree that this view is essentially correct, the question is whether the source of the restriction is semantic/pragmatic or morphosyntactic in nature.

The specific semantics of (admissible) subjects in imperatives has in turn prompted some people to suggest that imperative subjects belong to a 'special' syntactic class. They have occasionally been treated as vocatives (Thorne 1966), while Platzack and Rosengren (1997) assign them the label *ImpNP* (Imperative Noun Phrase). These ideas have been discussed at some length in the literature and subsequently refuted by a large number of other researchers (Downing 1969, Levenston 1969, Stockwell et al. 1973, Schmerling 1975, Davies 1981, Beukema and Coopmans 1989, Zhang 1990, Henry 1995, Potsdam 1996 and others). They demonstrate convincingly that a clear distinction must be made between vocatives and imperative subjects, and that the subject of imperatives shows behaviour that is characteristic of 'prototypical' subjects. Section 3.3 provides further critical discussion.

The fact that the subject may be left unexpressed in imperatives, as illustrated by (3a–c) below, is perhaps the most well-known characteristic of this clause type.

(3) a. Be quiet!

b. Call my wife!

c. Stop giggling!

The following two questions form the heart of the discussion in section 3.4: (i) Do apparently subjectless imperatives have a (phonetically null but) syntactically active subject or not, and (ii) if they do, then what is the syntactic status of the imperative covert subject and how is it licensed? Whereas Bolinger (1977) and Davies (1981) assume that examples like (3) lack an external argument altogether, others have shown that there exists ample proof of the syntactic reality of a covert subject in imperatives (see, for example, Zwicky 1988, Beukema and Coopmans 1989, Zhang 1990, Potsdam 1996). However, different proposals have been made about the precise identity of the imperative covert subject, ranging from a variable associated with a discourse-bound null operator (Beukema and Coopmans 1989), PRO (Schütze 1997), to *pro* (Zhang 1990, Henry 1995, Potsdam 1996, Platzack and Rosengren 1997). The first two possibilities will be examined, and dismissed. I then go on to discuss and justify the claim that even though English does not otherwise allow for the *pro*-drop phenomenon, the covert subject of imperatives is best conceived of as *pro*. Concluding that a purely morphology-based theory of *pro* which has been proposed for Italian-type languages (by Rizzi 1986) cannot be extended to imperative clauses in English, Potsdam (1996) argues that the availability of the null pronominal can be said to follow from the core meaning of imperatives. Zhang (1990) and Henry (1995), by contrast, envisage that the content of *pro* might in fact be identifiable by morphosyntactic means. I will consider these proposals in section 3.4 and take up the matter again in Chapter 7.

3.2 Restrictions on available subject-DPs

It has often been claimed that the subject-DPs that are permitted in imperatives all bear a close relation to the notion of 'addressee' (Bolinger 1967, Downing 1969, Stockwell et al. 1973, Downes 1977, Ukaji 1978, Davies 1981, Schmerling 1982, Zhang 1990, Potsdam 1996, Platzack and Rosengren 1997, to name but a few).[29] The imperative subject par excellence is the second person pronoun *you*, as

illustrated in (4) below, which is identical to the addressee(s). (Many of the illustrative examples in this section have been borrowed from Downing 1969, Culicover 1971, Stockwell et al. 1973, Davies 1981, Beukema and Coopmans 1989, Zhang 1990 and Potsdam 1996.)

YOU

(4) a. (The others can go now but) *you* stay with me!

b. *You* be quiet!

c. Don't *you* call me again!

d. Don't *you* listen to them, John!
(You just do what you want to do.)

Imperatives with and without an overt subject are not strictly in free variation (as Schmerling 1975, Davies 1981 and Potsdam 1996 have pointed out). While sentences such as the one in (5) below are typically assigned a 'default' addressee interpretation

(5) Stay with me!

including *you* yields a contrastive reading (as it does in (4a)), or (according to Davies 1981) may serve to express impatience (in (4b)), or the authority of the speaker (in (4c, d)). In this connection Schmerling (1975) and Henry (1995) draw attention to the fact that *you* is often stressed in imperatives. Following Davies (1981), in general the motivation for using overt subjects is to provide such information like the above which is not conveyed by corresponding 'subjectless' constructions.

Beukema and Coopmans (1989) claim that imperative subjects other than *you* are virtually confined to quantifiers, while Levenston (1969) only allows for indefinite expressions like *someone*. A selection of examples is given in (6) and (7), respectively.

QUANTIFIERS

(6) a. *Nobody* move!

b. *Everybody* be there by five!

c. *All new members* please assemble at the rear of the hall!

INDEFINITES

(7) a. *Someone* pick up the phone, please, before it drives me mad!

b. *Whoever took the money* return it immediately!

Quantified subjects are used to specify some (sub)set of a group of addressees as the target of the directive, with *everybody* in (6b), for instance, serving to emphasize the speaker's concern that not just some of the addressees but all of them take the requested action. The presence of indefinites such as *someone* and *whoever* in (7a, b) indicates that the speaker is indifferent to (or is uncertain about) which of the persons addressed is to act upon his order. Indefinite DPs like *a man* in (8a) below seem quite impossible, presumably for the reason that they do not naturally receive an addressee reading. They become more acceptable when a context as in (8b) is created, from which we can infer that there is a group of boys and girls present.

(8) a. **A man* come here!

b. ?*A girl* (among you) try to threat that needle!
(Boys are useless at doing that.)
(example adapted from Stockwell et al. 1973, p. 641)

That is to say that it does not depend on a particular DP alone whether or not it is felt to be OK as the subject of an imperative sentence, but also on the context in which it occurs.

As has been shown by many people in the past, the possibilities of subject realization in imperatives are not as restricted as this (Thorne 1966, Bolinger 1967, Downing 1969, Culicover 1971, Stockwell et al. 1973, Cohen 1976, Downes 1977, Davies 1981, Schmerling 1982, Zhang 1990, Potsdam 1996, Platzack and Rosengren 1997 and others). For illustration, consider the examples in (9)–(12), whose subjects often pick out specific members of the audience.

PARTITIVE EXPRESSIONS

(9) a. *The tallest of you* sit at the back!

b. *The pair of you* stop fighting and get back to work!

c. *The whole lot of you* get out of here at once!

d. *One of you* get the papers in my office!

DEFINITE PHRASES

(10) a. *Those in the front row* stop giggling!

b. *The boy in the corner* stand up!

c. *The De Boer twins* keep quiet!
(I do not recall asking you two anything.)

BARE NOUN PLURALS[30]

(11) a. (*You*) *truckdrivers* keep to the right!

b. (*New*) *students* sign up at the front door!

c. *People interested in the project* come and see me afterwards!

d. *Housewives* watch out for daily specials!

PROPER NOUNS / NAMES

(12) a. *Chris* stand by the door and *Shirley* watch the window!

b. *Rob* take the box and *Steve* the suitcase!

c. *Michael and Patrick* help me hold him, and *Bill* call the police!

Proper nouns are preferred in conjunction structures such as (12a–c) in which, as Downing (1969) and Davies (1981) argue, each name can be understood as designating an individual within a larger group of addressees. According to these authors (and Potsdam 1996), they are disallowed where it is more difficult to imagine an addressee reading, as in the case of (13) below.

(13) *John close the door!

The above data can be captured by the descriptive generalization that the referent of the subject of imperatives is either the addressee(s) or among the addressees (as indicated in Downing 1969, Stockwell et al. 1973, Ukaji 1978, Zhang 1990 and other studies). That this is true even of grammatically third person DPs is also evident from the examples below:

(14) The boy in the corner$_i$ stand up!
You$_i$ have not done your homework.
(example from Stockwell et al. 1973, p. 647)

(15) a. *Someone turn you into a frog!
Someone$_i$ turn you$_i$ into a frog!

b. Someone$_i$ turn him$_j$ into a frog!
(adapted from Downing 1969, p. 581)

(14) shows that grammatically third person DPs can corefer with the second person pronoun *you*, in which case (15a) would seem to be precluded by Principle B of Binding Theory (Chomsky 1981) which states that pronouns must be locally A-free (that is, the sentence apparently induces a reading in which *someone* and *you* are understood as referring to the same individual).

As the data below demonstrate, first and third person pronouns occurring in imperatives, by contrast, usually yield unacceptable results:

(16) a. **We* / **I* go home!

b. **He* / **They* give it to me!

Potsdam (1996) states that it seems reasonable to rule out (16a) on pragmatic grounds, simply because it does not make much sense to issue a directive to oneself. He suspects that the reason for the infelicity of (16b) is due to pragmatics: it remains unclear who the intended addressee(s) are supposed to be. He argues that his suspicion appears to be confirmed by the observation that otherwise infelicitous examples improve when the pronoun is accompanied by a modifier clause or placed in a context which identifies its referent, although he still judges examples like (17) and (18) to be at most marginally acceptable.[31]

(17) a. *He who carries the machine gun* step away from the car!

b. *She who tracked in mud* take her shoes off this instant!

(18) a. *You* make the dinner and *John* do the washing up! No? All right then, *he* cook and *you* wash up!

b. This next chess game, *you* be white and *he* be black!

From what we have seen so far, then, it appears that it is indeed a condition that for a subject-DP to be acceptable in imperatives, it

must be possible to ascribe it some addressee interpretation (without too much difficulty).

The question to answer is how this is best accounted for. Many of the works cited above assume that the restriction can be treated as a straightforward matter of the meaning or use of the imperative that it is normally directed at one or a number of addressees to get them to bring about an event. If this idea is correct, then the unacceptability of examples like (8a), (13) and (16a, b) need not have anything to do with the morphosyntax of imperatives. On the other hand, the restriction can also be accommodated by Zhang (1990) and Henry's (1995) assumption that the feature matrix of INFL in imperatives is restricted to [2ND] person. In this connection, note that while first person imperatives like (19) are bad, they are often said to be 'supplied' by *let's*-constructions of the type shown in (20) below.

(19) *We go home!

(20) a. Let's you and me go home!

b. Let's go to the beach![32]

The very fact that first person hortative constructions do exist might be taken to suggest that the unavailability of first person subjects in imperatives does not follow quite as automatically from semantics/pragmatics as it might appear at first, and that the source of the ungrammaticality of (19) is at least partly morphosyntactic. The reason could be that in imperative phrase markers, INFL is never specified for [1ST] person φ-features. The fact that third person pronouns ((16b), (17) and (18)), proper nouns ((12) and (13)), and indefinite DPs like *a man*/*girl* ((8a) versus (8b)) are (often marginally) possible as subjects of imperatives only if some special circumstances are met, follows if the INFL of imperative structures is never associated with a feature [3RD] person, either.

At first glance, felicitous imperative sentences with third person subjects (some of which are repeated here in (21) for convenience) seem to constitute counter-examples to this idea.

(21) a. *Everybody* be there by five!

b. *Someone* pick up the phone, please, before it drives me mad!

c. *The De Boer twins* keep quiet!
(I do not recall asking you two anything.)

Davies (1981) suggests that these DPs are allowed because agreement can be sensitive to both morphosyntactic and semantic properties. A way of stating this would be to say that under certain conditions morphosyntactic agreement is somehow 'overridden' by what we may term 'semantic agreement'. While the subjects in (21) above are all grammatically third person, some agreement relation would be established because semantically, they are understood to denote (a subset of) the addressees (= [2ND] person). This is not an unfamiliar phenomenon and perhaps similar to the effect in an example such as (22) below, where agreement may either be with the formal φ-features of the singular noun *Senate*, or according to the way the Senate can be conceived of (as consisting of a number of senators = plural).

(22) The Senate has / have decided not to impeach Bill Clinton.

Mike Jones (pers. comm.) has pointed out to me that it then remains to be explained why this kind of 'semantic agreement' would be restricted to imperative clauses, as shown by the ungrammaticality of (23) below.

(23) *If everyone behave yourselves, you can go to the park.
(addressing a group of children)

I will return to this point in Chapter 7.

One potential difficulty with the proposal that in imperatives INFL invariably contains the feature [2ND] arises from examples like the following, which demonstrate that they may in fact be used with subjects with a non-addressee character. Note that the conjoined subject-DPs *your friends* and *them* in (24a, b), respectively, and the family members referred to in (24c), are not directly addressed by the speaker and need not even be physically present at the time of speaking.[33]

(24) a. *You and your friends* get this mess cleared up right away!

b. *You and them* make a deal! I'm out of this.

c. Your family is going camping for a week?!
Well, *you all* have a good time!

However, as Zhang (1990) has argued, the behaviour of reflexive anaphors in such examples clearly indicates that (complex) subjects of this kind should nonetheless be considered grammatically [2ND] person overall.

(25) a. You and them make a deal! I'm out of this.
Go **** yourselves / *themselves!

b. Your family is going camping for a week?!
Well, *you all* enjoy yourselves / *themselves!

This is consistent with the definition of second person plural DPs adopted in Table 3.1 (note 29) that they refer to the addressee and others (excluding the speaker(s)), which does not necessarily imply plural addressees (that is, addressee + addressee). Still, little can be said against the apparent dissociation of grammatically third person subjects from addressee interpretation in examples like (26), where two imperative sentences are conjoined (an observation originally due to Bolinger 1967).

(26) *You* go for help and *the baby* stay with me!
**You* are too young to be on the streets at night.
She is too young to be on the streets at night.

Davies (1981) and later Potsdam (1996) have observed that the same point can be made in relation to the root imperatives in (27):

(27) a. *YOUR soldiers* build the bridge, General Lee!

b. *Your men* guard the front while we creep round the back!

c. *Those children of yours* keep out of my garden, or I'll set the dog on them!

Potsdam's (1996) conclusion is that the descriptive generalization that imperative subjects must always receive an addressee reading is too rigid to be applicable, and should be reformulated in such a way that it allows us to accommodate all of the examples discussed above including those in (26) and (27). He argues that this is precisely what his *control relationship* condition on imperative subjects enables us to

do. This condition in effect states that the person being addressed must stand in a control relation to the referent of the subject-DP of the imperative sentence, or must be semantically interpretable as relating to it. Where the subject's referent is identical to the addressee, or includes one or more of the addressees, the control relationship follows trivially, while the relation involved in (26) and (27c) can be characterized as one of social control (for example, between a mother and her children), and that in (27a, b) as one of superiority (between a general and his soldiers). Another way of stating this would be to say that in these examples, the addressee in a sense mediates between the speaker and the intended agent of the requested action, or to say that addressee interpretation is indirect. As such, none of them would strictly invalidate Zhang (1990) and Henry's (1995) idea that the English imperative clause instantiates an INFL head which is invariably specified as [2ND] person, with agreement either being determined morphosyntactically (subjects including *you*), or semantically – directly or indirectly (others). I will return to this and related points in Chapter 7.[34]

3.3 The status of the overt imperative subject

This section critically evaluates two proposals that have been made in the literature, which (taking account of the interpretative properties of subjects in imperatives) envisage that imperative subjects are not subjects in the 'ordinary' sense but can be analysed as vocatives (Thorne 1966) or should be regarded as constituting a category in their own right (Platzack and Rosengren 1997).

3.3.1 Against a vocative analysis

The previous section presented a survey of the kind of subjects that we find in imperatives. I showed that including an overt subject in examples such as (28a–c) is always 'meaningful', for instance, in that it has a contrastive effect or identifies the person(s) to whom the directive is specifically addressed.

(28) a. (You) stay here with me! (The others can go.)

b. (The tallest of you) sit at the back!

c. (New students among you) sign up at the front door!

In Downing's (1969, p. 575) terms, the so-called 'vocative' use of DPs as exemplified in (29) below is similarly 'to draw the attention of those addressed by naming or describing them'. Vocatives are characterized by a separate intonation contour, which is orthographically indicated by a comma. McCawley (1988) and others have taken this to suggest that they do not form a single syntactic constituent with the rest of the sentence.

(29) a. Those in the front row, we're about to begin.
b. Truckdrivers, the rule is to keep to the right.
c. The boy in the corner, didn't I say to stand up?

The examples in (30) show that DPs can also be construed with vocative intonation in imperatives.

(30) a. Those in the front row, stop giggling!
b. Truckdrivers, keep to the right!
c. The boy in the corner, stand up!

In the light of the fact that imperative subjects and vocatives serve a similar function, it would seem plausible to assume, as Thorne (1966) has done, that they can actually be subsumed under one and the same type of syntactic object. Schmerling (1975) cites examples like (31a, b) as evidence against a vocative analysis of imperative subjects, which she considers to be made up of a 'true' vocative (*the boy in the corner*) and a structural subject (*you*).

(31) a. The boy in the corner, you stand up!
b. You, the boy in the corner, stand up!

This counter-argument is not entirely convincing, for Davies (1981) notes that it seems possible for vocatives to co-occur in imperatives, as in (32).

(32) The boy in the corner, you lazy thing, stand up!

However, as Davies herself argues, apart from the fact that the co-occurrence of vocatives is rather restricted, an analysis which classifies imperative subjects as vocatives can hardly withstand the fact that they behave quite differently in a number of other respects (see also Downing 1969, Stockwell et al. 1973, Schmerling 1975, Davies 1981, Beukema and Coopmans 1989, Henry 1995, Postdam 1996). I shall limit the discussion to providing a brief contrastive overview of some of the major differences.[35]

Notice first that if the examples in (33) above are expressed without an intonation break, the resulting structures are all ungrammatical. In other words, vocatives obligatorily constitute a separate intonational phrase:

(33) a. *Those in the front row we're about to begin.

b. *Truckdrivers the rule is to keep to the right.

c. *The boy in the corner didn't I say to stand up?

This restriction does not apply to imperative subjects, however. In contrast to vocatives, they need not be followed by a pause. Compare the examples below:

(34) a. Those in the front row stop giggling!

b. Truckdrivers keep to the right!

c. The boy in the corner stand up!

Instead, the DPs in (34a–c) have the same intonation as subjects of finite declarative clauses like (35a–c), which casts doubt on the hypothesis that imperative subjects and vocatives are of the same syntactic type.

(35) a. Those in the front row stopped giggling at the end.

b. Truckdrivers never keep to the right.

c. The boy in the corner did not stand up.

In addition to this, scholars like Downing (1969), Davies (1981) and Potsdam (1996) have pointed out the following contrast between

the examples in (36) and (37), only the (a) sentences of which are coherent:

(36) a. That boyfriend of yours keep away from her!

b. *That boyfriend of yours, keep away from her!

c. *That boyfriend of yours, didn't I say to keep away from her?

(37) a. Nobody make a move!

b. *Nobody, make a move!

c. *Nobody, I think we should make a move.

After these authors, the ill-formedness of (36b, c) and (37b, c) illustrates a very general property of vocative expressions that they are exclusively used to address one or a number of individuals directly. In other words, the inability of the DP in (36) to serve as a vocative follows from the fact that it does not denote the addressee but the addressee's boyfriend, while the lexical item *nobody* cannot be used for addressing a person. By contrast, they are fine as imperative subjects, which, as I pointed out in section 3.2, need not strictly have addressee reference.[36,37] Moreover, just as there are DPs which make poor vocatives, we also find the reverse situation. That is, conversely there is a small number of DPs which may occur as vocatives but are not acceptable as imperative subjects. Consider the examples in (38) and (39) below.

(38) a. John, could you close the door?

b. John, close the door!

c. *John close the door!

(39) a. Vicar / Brother / Idiot, will you get out of my way!

b. Vicar / Brother / Idiot, get out of my way!

c. *Vicar / *Brother / *Idiot get out of my way![38]

(adapted from Davies 1981, pp. 326–8)

A third argument against grouping imperative subjects with vocatives can be derived from binding facts. Consider the following sentence pairs:

(40) a. Everybody$_i$ took out their$_i$ books.

b *Everybody$_i$ took out your$_i$ books.

(41) a. *Everybody$_i$, take out their$_i$ books!

b. Everybody$_i$, take out your$_i$ books!

(42) a. Everybody$_i$ take out their$_i$ books!

b. Everybody$_i$ take out your$_i$ books!

Observe first that in finite declarative clauses, third person quantifiers like *everybody* allow for coreference with the third person anaphor *their* only and cannot bind a second person pronoun (40). Second, the opposite is true in (41), an imperative vocative construction. Here, only *your* can be interpreted as referring back to the corresponding vocative QP. Interestingly, in its use as the structural subject of an imperative, the quantifier is able to bind *both* third *and* second person anaphors, as in (42a) and (42b) (a fact independently noted by Bolinger 1967, Cohen 1976, Ukaji 1978, Zhang 1990, Platzack and Rosengren 1997). The same holds for the examples in (43):

(43) a. The De Boer twins$_i$ behaved themselves$_i$ / *yourselves$_i$.

b. The De Boer twins$_i$, behave yourselves$_i$ / *themselves$_i$!

c. The De Boer twins$_i$ behave themselves$_i$ / yourselves$_i$!

Slightly different solutions have been offered for handling the somewhat exceptional phenomenon that some grammatically third person subjects may alternately be coreferential with third and second person anaphors in imperatives. Zhang (1990), for instance, suggests that imperative third person subjects are equipped with a [3RD] as well as a [2ND] person feature. Assuming that the feature [2ND] would optionally be added to them as they enter the numeration,

this account potentially has problems explaining how it is that this additional feature assignment is not an available option for those DPs which are impossible as subjects of imperatives. Otherwise, there would not seem to be any reason why sentences such as (44) below should be infelicitous. A way out would be to assume that third person DPs which can serve as imperative subjects have a second entry in the lexicon which lists them as intrinsically [2ND/3RD]. This is not a particularly desirable option, it seems to me.

(44) *A man come here!

Platzack and Rosengren's (1997) explanation is that in the following example (45), the two possibilities of anaphor binding arise because anaphors may either corefer with what they call the complex subject's formal head (*everyone*) or with its semantic head (*of you*). The separate binding relations that would thus be established are indicated below.

(45) Everyone of you write down your / their names!
[Everyone$_i$ [of you$_j$]] write down your$_j$ / their$_i$ names!

They say that the cases under consideration parallel the situation that is found in examples such as (46a, b), both of which they consider acceptable.

(46) a. (N)one of the policemen was afraid.

b. (N)one of the policemen were afraid.

In order to account for the alternation in (42a, b) (repeated below as (47a)), they assume that the QP-subject takes a covert *of you* complement. This assumption seems difficult to maintain for the reason that *everybody* (like a number of other third person DPs) is not always easily paraphrasable as a partitive expression, as Downing (1969), Stockwell et al. (1973) and Davies (1981) note. Example (47b) illustrates this observation.

(47) a. Everybody$_i$ take out their$_i$ / your$_i$ books!

b. Everybody (*of you) hurry up!

An essentially similar proposal has been made by Potsdam (1996). Analogous to what has been proposed with respect to subject–verb agreement, Potsdam suggests that the dual binding behaviour of imperative subjects arises from the combination of their formal feature specification and their interpretative properties. The coreference relation may either be established morphosyntactically ([3RD] person), or determined by the fact that they are assigned an addressee reading ([2ND] person). Consider in this connection also the following example from his study (p. 168) where *himself* relates to the intended male referent of the otherwise inanimate object *ham sandwich*.

(48) The ham sandwich at table nine just made a fool out of himself / *itself. (said by one waitress to another)

Potsdam observes that whether imperative subjects readily admit both patterns of coreference varies according to the φ-features they have and the reading that is involved. In the simplest case, they obviously do not bind third person anaphors if they are specified as [2ND] person (for example, *you* (*and them*) in (49a)), and they cannot be coindexed with second person anaphors if they denote something that is not open to (direct) addressee interpretation, as for the DP in (49b).[39]

(49) a. You (and them)$_i$ write down your$_i$ / *their$_i$ names!

b. [Those students of yours]$_i$ write down their$_i$ / *your$_i$ names!

In the case of vocatives, coreference is restricted to second person, which, Potsdam argues, must result from their semantics in that they always describe the addressee:[40]

(50) a. Sir$_i$, they have your$_i$ / *his$_i$ table prepared.

b. Dad$_i$, can we borrow your$_i$ / *his$_i$ car?

One might think, then, that the presence of a vocative is likewise the determinant factor in the choice of the anaphor for the examples (51a, b) below.

(51) a. Everybody$_i$, take out your$_i$ / *their$_i$ books!

b. The De Boer twins$_i$, behave yourselves$_i$ / *themselves$_i$!

However, notice that where vocatives co-occur with an overt subject, as in (52), the entities denoted by them need not necessarily be identical.

(52) General Lee, YOUR soldiers hand over their / *your guns![41]

Hence, we may follow Henry (1995) in assuming that the representation of an example like (51b) in fact looks as follows, where, for the time being, *e* merely indicates some non-specified covert subject. (Stockwell et al. 1973 express a related view.)

(53) The De Boer twins, [e_i behave yourselves$_i$ / *themselves$_i$]!

Given that according to Principle A of Binding Theory (Chomsky 1981), reflexive anaphors must be bound by the closest possible c-commanding antecedent, it appears that the imperative covert subject has an obligatory [2ND] person feature value. I will return to this observation in section 3.4, which investigates the categorial status of *e*. Summing up the discussion so far, I have shown that imperative subjects are semantically and syntactically distinct from vocatives. I conclude that it would simply be wrong to treat them on a par merely because they fulfil analogous functions.

3.3.2 Against *ImpNP* (Platzack and Rosengren 1997)

Platzack and Rosengren (1997, henceforth P&R) observe a fundamental semantic difference between the subject of finite declarative clauses and that of imperatives. In P&R's theory, this difference has a syntactic source, and it has led them to assign imperative subjects to a separate category. The following minimal pairs of sentences might help illustrate the difference P&R have in mind.

(54) a. You helped me.

b. You help me!

(55) a. Somebody opened the window.
b. Somebody open the window!

Following P&R, the second person pronoun *you* receives a different addressee interpretation in (54b) than it does in (54a): its referent is talked *to* by the speaker, rather than talked *about*. With regard to (55), note that whereas in the (a) example, *somebody* quite clearly refers to a specific person, it does not refer in this sense in (b) (a point previously made by Schmerling 1982, and also Yamakawa 1966). That is to say, imperative subjects appear to lack the deictic properties that are characteristic of subjects of finite declarative clauses.

Within the analysis of imperative sentences outlined by P&R, the semantic behaviour of subjects correlates on the syntactic level with the absence of certain functional categories from the imperative phrase marker. Adopting a split-C system on the model of Rizzi (1997), P&R assume that indicative (or: tensed) clauses instantiate a Finiteness Phrase (FINP) which expresses a specification of finiteness and selects an IP system. IP comprises a set of syntactic heads containing whatever properties are associated with finiteness, including a TP for tense distinctions. TENSE locates the event described by the verb on an 'abstract' time line, while FIN anchors the event in the time and space of the speaker's world. In P&R's system, FINP, whose FIN head carries the EPP-feature (the minimalist residue of the Extended Projection Principle of Chomsky (1981)), has the additional function of establishing a predication relation between subjects and predicates. When the subject of tensed declaratives substitutes in SpecFINP to satisfy the EPP, it enters into a Spec–Head relation with the FIN–TENSE–V complex, and in this way is 'made part' of the event referred to and given a referential value. On P&R's assumption that TENSE, and hence FINP, and thence the EPP-feature, are absent from imperative structures, it follows that imperative subjects will not be forced to raise and fail to be anchored to become deictic/referential expressions. P&R state that subjects of finite declarative clauses must therefore be distinguished from the corresponding entities in imperatives, and that the latter ought to be labelled *ImpNP* (for Imperative Noun Phrase) accordingly, which amounts to saying that they do not in fact have the status of subjects.[42]

P&R's approach allows them to account for certain word order facts observed in imperatives. Their idea that *ImpNP* does not surface in

(what in English is) the canonical subject position SpecFINP/IP is to some extent similar to the analysis of the syntax of imperative subjects defended in Chapter 5 of this study. Though the notion of 'subject' is no longer a primitive term in generative models (see McCloskey 1997 for discussion), Potsdam (1996, pp. 128–36) has shown that P&R's *ImpNP* does, however, participate in syntactic phenomena which are commonly associated with subjecthood.[43] Notice, for instance, that it behaves like the structural subject of finite declarative clauses in that it can be derived by passivization:

(56) a. He was caught speeding. (PASSIVE)
[He$_i$ was [caught t$_i$ speeding]]

b. Don't anyone be caught *t* speeding!

The sentences in (57) involve raising and unaccusative predicates like *appear* and *come*. Just like so-called verbs of temporal aspect (VTAs) such as *stop* (Newmeyer 1975), these predicates are believed to involve DP-movement to a subject position higher up in the sentence:

(57) a. You just appear *t* to be sick when your wife comes in! (RAISING)

b. Someone come *t* quickly! (UNACCUSATIVE)

c. Everyone stop *t* writing when the bell rings! (VTA)

Apart from undergoing the above displacement operations, DPs in imperatives are able to function as the controller of a PRO-subject contained within an adjunct modifier clause such as *before going home* in (58). This suggests that they are themselves subjects.

(58) Don't you forget to check the locks before going home! (SUBJECT CONTROL)
Don't you$_i$ forget to check the locks [PRO$_i$ before going home]!

Although I do find P&R's attempt to derive the interpretative properties of imperative subjects from syntactic representations very attractive, I see no compelling reason for treating them as a entirely

distinct category *ImpNP*. If, as under P&R's analysis, their particular interpretation can be explained in syntactic terms (as resulting from the absence of certain functional categories from the imperative phrase marker), it seems unnecessary to assume an *ImpNP* on semantic grounds. Furthermore, imperative subject-DPs show what we may consider subject-like behaviour with respect to the phenomena described above. Note also that the hypothesis put forward by the authors that imperative subject-DPs do not occur in the typical subject position SpecFINP/IP is not irreconcilable with the apparent occurrence of subject raising in imperatives. On recent views of clause structure, other functional heads (such as ASP, as discussed in Chapter 2) may intervene between V and INFL. This potentially expands the set of specifier positions, so that it might be possible that imperative subjects occur in a different position than SpecFINP/IP. (I refer to Chapter 5 for further discussion.) Like Potsdam (1996), I shall therefore maintain the generalization that imperative subject-DPs are 'normal' subjects.

3.4 The identity of the null subject of imperatives

Finally, I turn to the examples in (59):

(59) a. Be quiet!

b. Call my wife!

c. Stop giggling!

Bolinger (1977) and Davies (1981) are perhaps alone in assuming that such imperatives are truly 'subjectless'. Potsdam (1996) points out that one of the main theoretical arguments in favour of positing a covert subject is that one is needed in order to satisfy the requirement of the Extended Projection Principle (Chomsky 1981) that every clause contain a subject. Together with others, he has further shown that there is independent evidence for a (phonetically null but) syntactically active imperative covert subject (Lees and Klima 1963, Katz and Postal 1964, Bolinger 1967, Culicover 1971, 1976, Luelsdorff 1977, Zwicky 1988, Beukema and Coopmans 1989). This evidence includes the possibility of using reflexives and reciprocals in imperatives, as in the examples in (60) below.

(60) a. Tell a story about yourself!
e_i Tell a story about yourself$_i$

b. Give each other a kiss!

As Beukema and Coopmans (1989) argue, the imperative covert subject should hence not be considered an implicit argument analogous to the understood agent of passive structures, as these cannot function as binders:

(61) a. *A story was written about themselves.

b. *A kiss was given to each other.

Additional empirical support for the syntactic reality of a covert subject in imperatives is that it has observable syntactic effects of the kind that were discussed above (see Zwicky 1988 and Potsdam 1996):

(62) a. Don't be caught speeding! (PASSIVE)
[Don't e_i be [caught t_i speeding]]!

b. Just appear *t* to be sick when your wife comes in! (RAISING)

c. Come *t* quickly! (UNACCUSATIVE)

d. Stop *t* writing when the bell rings! (VTA)

e. Don't forget to check the locks before going home! (SUBJECT CONTROL)
Don't e_i forget to check the locks [PRO$_i$ before going home]!

Having established that an imperative covert subject must exist, let us briefly examine the standard inventory of phonetically null elements. Empty categories can be divided into those that are created by movement (DP-traces, variables) and those that are base-generated in argument positions via merger (PRO and *pro*). GB theory assumed that *pro* is Case-marked nominative by INFL/AGR, whereas PRO was taken to be restricted to ungoverned, and hence Caseless positions (as expressed in Chomsky's (1981) PRO Theorem, which excludes PRO from Binding Theory). Chomsky and Lasnik (1993) have recently proposed that PRO is actually specified for a special kind of 'null'

Case. Following Rizzi (1986), the two requirements that hold for all null arguments is that they must be formally licensed, and that their content must be identified so that they become interpretable at LF (Chomsky 1989). That is to say that they must receive a referential index. A null argument may either be coindexed with another element in or outside its own clause, or else be assigned an arbitrary index. *Pro* and PRO are subject to different identification mechanisms: whereas the reference of *pro* is determined by the φ-features of INFL/AGR, controlled PRO is identified by the closest c-commanding antecedent (otherwise, it has an arbitrary interpretation).[44]

Beukema and Coopmans (1989, henceforth B&C) take the position that the imperative covert subject is a variable. Assuming that, with the exception of *you*, only quantificational expressions may serve as subjects of imperatives (as in (63a, b) below), they suggest that the LF representation of all imperatives clauses is of the general form indicated in (64).

(63) a. Everybody be there by five!

b. You be there by five!

(64) $[_{IP}\ NP_i\ [_{IP}\ x_i\ [_{I}\ I\ ][_{VP}\ [_{V}\ V\ ](\ldots)]]]$

On B&C's account, QP-subjects such as *everybody* give rise to this configuration because they must adjoin to IP for scope purposes by an LF process of quantifier raising (May 1977, 1985). In an attempt to fit *you* into this picture, B&C suggest that the pronoun undergoes topicalization in the derivation of imperatives, an operation which has been argued to involve adjunction to IP also (Lasnik and Saito 1992). Taking the generalization one step further, they claim that imperative constructions like the following, which lack an overt subject, similarly have a variable in subject position.

(65) Be there by five!
$[_{IP}\ O_i\ [_{IP}\ x_i\ [_{I}\ I\ ][_{VP}\ [_{V}$ be] there by five]]]!

Here, according to B&C, the variable is bound by a null operator which has raised and adjoined to IP where it receives its referential index from the discourse, along the lines of a suggestion made by

Huang (1984) for null objects in Chinese. B&C's analysis seems somewhat problematic, however. First of all, I noted in section 3.2 that non-quantificational subjects other than *you* are in fact possible. As in the case of *you*, there is no independent motivation for assuming that these have the envisaged syntax of topics in imperatives. An empirical problem with B&C's view on the nature of the imperative covert subject has been pointed out by Henry (1995, p. 139, note 2). She critically observes that if their characterization were correct, we would expect the second clause of (66) below to be interpretable as meaning that everyone should write down their own names.

(66) Everybody$_i$ take out their$_i$ books!
After that, write down their names!
Everybody$_i$ . . . . . [O$_i$ [x$_i$ write down their$_i$ names]]!

Yet, although the quantifier would be an obvious and appropriate candidate to contextually identify the null operator, the sentence can only be taken to mean that the addressees are requested to write down the names of another group of people (= their$_j$). On a more general note, Rizzi (1994) has ruled out the mechanism of a discourse-bound operator (previously known as 'topic drop' after Ross 1982) in English on, among others, the grounds that English does not permit objects to be dropped. Thus, in B&C's analysis it is not immediately obvious why if the null operator can bind a variable in subject position, it cannot bind one in object position – in other words, why we do not find null objects in English imperatives.

In the light of the apparent inadequacies of B&C's (1989) analysis, and given that there does not seem to be any evidence for the presence of a DP-trace, there are two possibilities left to consider: the covert subject of imperatives is either PRO or *pro*. One reason why Potsdam (1996), contra Schütze (1997), argues that it should not be analysed as PRO is the following. Control is obligatory if PRO is c-commanded by a controller. Otherwise (that is, in the absence of a suitable controller), it may be assigned its index through arbitrary indexing. The unbound arbitrary reading of PRO is illustrated in (67).

(67) To lose is always disheartening.
[PRO$_{arb}$ to lose] is always disheartening

According to Potsdam (1996), the fact that the imperative covert subject cannot receive an arbitrary interpretation renders a PRO analysis untenable. The contrast between the examples in (68) illustrates his point.

(68) a. To lose one's temper is always stupid.
[PRO_{arb} to lose one's temper] is always stupid

b. Don't lose your / *one's temper!

I do not consider the absence of an arbitrary reading in 'subjectless' imperatives like (68b) above too serious a counter-argument to overcome. One could, for instance, attribute the absence of arbitrary control to the semantics/pragmatics of imperatives (see also Zhang 1990). What is more, 'conditional' imperatives can actually have a generic second person interpretation. Consider the examples (69a) and (69b) from Green (1975, p. 125) and Davies (1981, p. 412), respectively:

(69) a. Show that air pollution increases soil fertility and General Motors will love you!

b. Make one false step and the world never forgets!

Still, the fact that PRO is never Case-marked nominative and therefore mutually exclusive with nominative subjects (as shown in (70a) below) unequivocally excludes the possibility that imperative clauses contain a PRO-subject (as Davies 1981, Beukema and Coopmans 1989, Zhang 1990 and Potsdam 1996 also note). Recall that in Chapter 2, I presented some facts which suggest that the subject of English imperatives bears nominative Case.

(70) a. *You / *He to lose was disheartening.

b. For him to lose was disheartening.

(Small) *pro* occurs in nominative positions in classic *pro*-drop languages like Italian and Spanish. It is therefore not surprising that there is a fairly wide consensus in the literature that the imperative covert subject can be identified with *pro* (Zhang 1990, Henry 1995,

Potsdam 1996, Platzack and Rosengren 1997, and also Rooryck 1991, Beukema 1992 and Den Dikken 1992). I follow suit, despite the fact English is known not to admit *pro* in other environments, which is precisely what made Beukema and Coopmans (1989) dismiss it as the null subject of imperatives. As Potsdam (1996) notes, postulating *pro* in English imperatives might seem irreconcilable with the perspective (going back to Taraldsen 1980) that there is a relation between 'rich' subject–verb agreement and the availability of *pro*, to the effect that agreement inflections must be present in sufficient numbers for *pro* to be identifiable unambiguously. Given that (as we have seen) verbs in English imperatives are void of agreement morphology altogether, the occurrence of *pro* would seem short of a principled explanation.

Earlier analyses provided within a generative framework assumed that 'subjectless' imperatives are derived by a *You*-deletion rule which deletes *you* from the structure (Chomsky 1975, Kiparsky 1963, Katz and Potstal 1964, Klima 1964, Lees 1964, Arbini 1969, Culicover 1971, 1976, Stockwell et al. 1973), as indicated in (71).

(71) Be quiet!
~~You~~ be quiet

The idea that a sentence like (71) is created by *You*-deletion (in other words, that *you* is the underlying subject of every 'subjectless' imperative) later received much criticism (from Bolinger 1967, Luelsdorff 1977, Davies 1981 and others) on the grounds that DPs other than *you* can serve as the subject of imperatives. In the minimalist framework, deletion rules are incompatible with the constraint that elements which play a role at LF may not be deleted from a structure (Chomsky 1989). However, consider again examples like (72–74), which show that the covert subject of imperatives is indeed necessarily interpreted as identical to *you* ([2ND] person). It cannot be understood as anything else (Zhang (1990) and Henry (1995) have made related observations).

(72) Behave yourself / yourselves / *themselves!
⇒ pro_i (you) behave yourself$_i$ / yourselves$_i$!
⇒ *pro_i (everybody) behave themselves$_i$!

(73) *Turn you into a frog!
⇒ *pro_i (you) turn you_i into a frog!
(violation of Principle B of Binding Theory; Chomsky 1981)

(74) Everybody take out their books!
After that, write down $your_i$ / $their_j$ / *$their_i$ names!
⇒ After that, pro_i (you) write down $your_i$ / $their_j$ names!
⇒ *After that, pro_i (everybody) write down $their_i$ names!

It has long been acknowledged (by Jaeggli and Safir 1989, Huang 1989 and others) that 'rich' subject–verb agreement is neither a necessary prerequisite nor a sufficient condition for non-expletive *pro* to be permitted (as shown by languages like Japanese and German, respectively), and that other mechanisms of identification may exist. Adopting Farkas's (1987) flexible proposal that the content of *pro* must be identified (somehow), Potsdam (1996) proposes that the method of *pro*-identification in imperatives is semantic. *Pro* is uniformly identified as the addressee ([2ND] person) simply because the notion of 'addressee' constitutes part of the meaning of an imperative that the addressee bring about an event. (Bolinger 1967, Downes 1977 and Davies 1981 make similar suggestions for what they consider to be the 'understood' subject of imperatives.)

Zhang (1990) and Henry (1995), however, argue that a morphosyntactic explanation of *pro* in imperatives is not really as unfeasible as it might appear at first. Using the paradigms from Italian versus English in (75) for illustration, their proposal may be formulated in the following way.

(75) a. Io / *pro* parl*o* Italiano
I / **pro* speak_Italian

b. Tu / *pro* parl*i* Italiano
You / **pro* speak_Italian

c. Lui / *pro* parl*a* Italiano
He / **pro* speak*s* Italian

d. Noi / *pro* parl*amo* Italiano
We / **pro* speak_Italian

e. Voi / *pro* parl*ate* Italiano
You / **pro* speak_Italian

f. Loro/*pro* parl*ano* Italiano
They / **pro* speak_Italian

Suppose that highly inflected verbs as in Italian enter the numeration specified for distinctive features (*parlo*([1S]), *parli*([2S]) and so

on). Suppose further that the meagreness of agreement endings in English is reflected in the φ-feature matrix of verbs to the effect that verbs are underspecified (*speak*__([1/2S/PL]). In this sense, the morphological make-up of English verbs may normally not be transparent enough for the identification of *pro* to be achieved. Zhang (1990) and Henry (1995) propose that if, by contrast, the feature specification of INFL in English imperatives is restricted to [2ND] person, INFL can assign *pro* sufficient specific content, and it follows that the imperative is the only clause type that permits *pro*.[45]

Summarizing this chapter, I argued that there is little reason to think that imperative subject-DPs are really vocatives, or form a separate category *ImpNP*. Instead, I assume that they have 'normal' subject status. The syntax of imperative subjects will be investigated later in Chapter 5. I have discussed existing morphosyntactic and semantic/pragmatic approaches to the possibilities of overt subjects and the identification of the covert subject (*pro*) in English imperatives. I find the English data in themselves provide no compelling reason to choose for one of the two approaches, and will defer deciding on this issue until Chapter 7.

4
The Syntax and Status of *do*(*n't*) in Imperatives

This chapter examines the syntax and status of the lexical item *do*(*n't*) in imperatives. There is a fairly wide consensus in the literature that in imperative clauses *do*(*n't*) has an idiosyncratic syntax to the extent that it is directly generated under COMP. Added to this, it has been proposed that the form *don't* should be regarded as a separate item from the identical form that is found in other clause types. Specifically, the claim goes that *don't* is not a 'normal' instance of the auxiliary *do* but a lexically unitary negative particle which is only used in imperatives. In section 4.1, I present the data which have given rise to these hypotheses. Section 4.2 discusses the way(s) in which scholars have implemented (what I will hereinafter call) the imperative-*do*(*n't*) analysis in their account of the English imperative. In section 4.3, I argue that there are in fact good reasons to think that *do*(*n't*) is nothing other than the last resort auxiliary in imperatives, and go on to point out empirically unappealing aspects of the analysis. The idea that *do*(*n't*) occurs in C is questioned in section 4.4, and the imperative-*do*(*n't*) analysis is shown to be theoretically problematic, too. Following the assumptions that were made in Chapter 2, I suggest that *do*(*n't*) is inserted into INFL in imperatives and does not occur any higher in the phrase marker.

4.1 The puzzle

The use and distribution of *do*(*n't*) have long defied generative analyses of the English imperative. As can be seen from the examples below, imperatives are like finite clauses (but unlike infinitives) in

that *do*(*n't*) is used to form negative structures. Observe also that negative imperative like (1a) pattern with interrogatives in respect of the linear order of *do*(*n't*) and the subject.

(1) a. Don't (you) try again!

b. *(You) not try again!

(2) a. Didn't you try again?

b. *You not tried again?

(3) a. You didn't try again.

b. *You not tried again.

(4) a. *I told [you to don't try again]

b. I told [you not to try again]

The standard assumption for English is that the surface position of (either thematic or otherwise 'expletive') subjects is fixed in SpecIP.[46] Inverted orders in interrogatives are commonly thought to arise from I-to-C movement (or: Subject–Auxiliary Inversion) as a result of which auxiliaries like *do*(*n't*) show up in front of the subject. Given the word order correspondence between (1a) and (2a) above, then, the minimal hypothesis is that essentially the same analysis carries over to negative imperatives (Davies 1981, Potsdam 1996, Han 1998, among others).

Apart from the question of why *do*(*n't*) should occur in C, an analysis along these lines faces the problem that this is as far as the similarity goes. Consider first the case of negative interrogative clauses. Assuming that the bound morpheme *n't* and the free element *not* are both independent NEG heads of a NEGP (on the model of Pollock 1989), negative interrogatives can be derived in the following two ways. Alongside the derivation of (5a) in which the auxiliary *do* carries *n't* along on its way to C, the alternative is to use *not* and raise *do* alone, as illustrated in (5b).

(5) a. Didn't you try again?

b. Did you not try again?

Hence, if imperatives were formed in an interrogative-type fashion, we would expect there to be imperative equivalents with *not*. This is not the case:

(6) *Do you not try again!

Another apparent difference between the two types of sentence is that *do* is obligatory in positive interrogatives, but ungrammatical in affirmative imperatives.

(7) a. Did you try again?

b. *Do you try again!

While slightly different suggestions as to how to interpret these contrasts have been made in the past, there is quite general agreement that the specifics of imperatives derive from the item *do*(*n't*). For example, Zhang (1990) and Henry (1995) suspect that in imperatives the form *don't* is not the auxiliary *do* but might best be analysed as a lexically unitary negative imperative particle (an idea originally put forward by Cohen 1976). As indicated in (8) below, Henry (1995) in addition posits with others (Beukema and Coopmans 1989, Zanuttini 1991) that imperative *do*(*n't*) is inserted in COMP.[47] This assumption accounts for the inverted word order in imperatives and it excludes *Subject don't* sequences, which have often been judged impossible.[48]

(8) $[_{CP}\ [_{C}$ Don't$][_{IP}$ you $[_{I}$ I$][_{VP}\ [_{V}$ try] again]]]!

Thus, the basic idea is that one of the most salient characteristics of the English imperative reflects a peculiarity in the behaviour of *do*(*n't*). Though assumptions vary somewhat from one imperative-*do*(*n't*) analysis to the other, proponents agree that the unique behaviour of *do*(*n't*) in imperatives makes all the difference. In the following section I briefly outline and comment on recent analyses of imperatives which assign *do*(*n't*) some 'special' property. I will show that none of them is fully convincing at any rate, before going on to cast doubt on the hypothesis that there is anything unusual about *do*(*n't*) at all in imperative clauses.

4.2 Against imperative-*do*(*n't*) analyses

Imperative-*do*(*n't*) analyses divide into two types: those which propose that in imperatives the auxiliary *do*(*n't*) has the idiosyncratic syntactic property of being inserted straight into COMP (Beukema and Coopmans 1989, Zanuttini 1991) and those which make the additional claim that the form *don't* is actually not a 'regular' manifestation of the dummy auxiliary *do* but a negative imperative particle (Zhang 1990, Henry 1995). In what follows they will be critically evaluated in turn.

4.2.1 Beukema and Coopmans (1989)

Beukema and Coopmans (henceforth B&C) assign English imperatives the feature specification [-TENSE, +AGR]. In an unsplit-INFL version of clause structure, they assume that [AGR] is a feature of COMP. Following Chomsky (1981), the [AGR]-feature is held responsible for assigning the subject nominative Case under government. Since, as is assumed in GB theory, a [-TENSE] INFL is not a governor, COMP will be the nearest node to govern the subject in imperatives and hence is able to assign it Case directly:[49]

(9) You open the door!



B&C ascribe the occurrence of *do*(*n't*) in negative imperatives to the 'potentially affixal status' of negation in English; *do* is needed to support an otherwise unbound affix. As illustrated in (10), they

suggest that the negative element *n't* raises to C in imperatives, after which *do*-insertion applies to provide a host for affixation. (B&C assume that (sentential) negation is situated in the unified INFL.)

(10) Don't you open the door!



While it has been argued that φ-features occur in COMP in so-called Verb-Second languages (by, for example, van Gelderen 1993 for Dutch), there appears to be no compelling reason to hold this for English generally or the imperative in particular. B&C do not explain why φ-features would not be associated with INFL, as is commonly assumed. They note that their account extends to a decomposed clause structure format on the model of Chomsky (1989) in which, I conjecture, the higher AGR-S head would assign Case to the imperative subject in SpecTP. The main difficulty with their account carries over, however. If there is in principle no need for *do* to occur in C/AGR for, say, Case reasons, it remains unclear why *do*-insertion would not simply target INFL/T to host the affix. One might ask whether there is any theoretical justification at all for invoking a seemingly ad hoc negation-to-C raising operation. Thus, the proposed derivation of negative imperatives seems theoretically flawed. On the other hand, if, as I suggested, *do* were inserted under INFL in (10), B&C would seem unable to handle the observed *don't Subject* order within the sort of configuration they envisage.

4.2.2 Zanuttini (1991)

Zanuttini's account of negative imperatives in English draws from her analysis of the syntactic characteristics of negation in Romance languages, which I will therefore sketch below for clarity.

Within Romance, we can differentiate between varieties in which the negation marker has, among other things, the property of always preceding the verb (as in Italian, Spanish), and varieties where, conversely, the finite verb is always followed by negation (as in Piedmontese, Valdotain). This contrast is illustrated by the following pair of examples from Italian and Valdotain, respectively.

(11) a. *Gianni* ***non*** *ha telefonato a sua madre.* (Italian)
John not has called to his mother
'John hasn't called his mother.' (p. 14)

b. *Lo film l'ëre* ***pas*** *dzen.* (Valdotain)
the movie was not beautiful
'The movie wasn't nice.' (p. 23)

Assuming that finite verbs invariably raise to some split-INFL head in Romance, Zanuttini distinguishes two structurally distinct NEGP projections: NEGP-1 and NEGP-2. NEG-1 selects TP as its complement and is therefore contingent on the presence of tense specification for its appearance so as to satisfy its complement-selection properties (as in (12a) below). NEG-2, on the other hand, is located lower down than TP in the structure and hence can occur irrespective of the (non-)occurrence of TP, as in (12b). Zanuttini categorizes preverbal negative markers, such as Italian *non*, as members of NEGP-1, and their postverbal counterparts (like *pas* in Valdotain) as members of NEGP-2.

(12) a. . . . . $[_{\text{NEGP-1}}\ [_{\text{NEG-1}}$ NEG-1$][_{\text{TP}}\ [_{\text{T}}$ T$]$ . . . . . $]]$

b. . . . . $[_{\text{TP}}\ [_{\text{T}}$ T$]$ . . . . . $[_{\text{NEGP-2}}\ [_{\text{NEG-2}}$ NEG-2$]$ . . . . . $]]$

Zanuttini argues that the configurations she envisages are evidenced by the syntax of negative imperatives in the languages concerned, which all (to some extent) know distinct imperative verb forms. The examples in (13) and (14) below demonstrate that in NEG-1

languages, morphologically 'true' imperatives cannot be negated. Instead, negative imperatives are conveyed by negating a verb form from a different morphological paradigm. Such constructions have been referred to as 'surrogate' or 'suppletive' imperatives. True imperatives in NEG-2 languages, by contrast, can be negated unrestrictedly.

(13) a. *Telefona!* (Italian)
call-2S.IMP.
'Call!'

b. **Non telefona!*
not call-2S.IMP.

c. *Non le telefonare!*
not her call-INF.
'Don't call her!' (pp. 64–6)

(14) *Feé-mè pas rire.* (Valdotain)
make-2S.IMP.-me not laugh
'Don't make me laugh.' (p. 68)

In other words, negation markers of the type NEGP-1 systematically fail to appear in the presence of verb forms which are unique to the paradigm of imperatives. By contrast, they can be used in clauses which are construed with the illocutionary force of an imperative but contain a verb in the morphological form of another paradigm (like the infinitive surrogate imperative in (13c)). NEGP-2-type negation markers, on the other hand, are not sensitive to verb morphology in this way.

Zanuttini's account of this phenomenon runs along the following lines. Zanuttini argues that 'true' imperative verbs in Romance languages have nothing in their form which corresponds to tense morphology. She then goes on to claim that the absence of a tense morpheme is syntactically mirrored in the absence of the functional projection TP in the clause structure of 'true' imperatives. The lack of TP in 'true' imperative phrase markers hence renders the inclusion of a NEG-1 head impossible, for its (TP) complement-selection properties will not be satisfied.[50] NEGP-1 can, however, be used in clauses which do comprise a projection TP and may be conveyed with directive force.[51] Further, the head NEG-2, which does not select TP as its

complement, is unaffected by the presence versus absence of TP, and it follows that NEGP-2 negation markers can freely be used to negate 'true' imperatives.

Let us now turn to English. Zanuttini proposes that English instances both NEG categories: NEGP-1 is headed by the bound morpheme *n't* (as indicated in (15a)) while the head of NEGP-2 can be identified with the use of *not* as in (15b).

(15) a. She certainly has*n't* talked to me.
She certainly $[_{\text{NEGP-1}}\ [_{\text{NEG-1}}\ [\text{has}_i]\text{n't}][_{\text{TP}}\ [_{\text{T}}\ t_i][_{\text{VP}}\ [_{\text{V}}$ talked] to me]]]

b. She has certainly *not* talked to me.
She $[_{\text{T}}$ has] certainly $[_{\text{NEGP-2}}\ [_{\text{NEG-2}}$ not$][_{\text{VP}}\ [_{\text{V}}$ talked] to me]]

Moving on to Zanuttini's analysis of English imperatives, recall that she closely links the (non-)occurrence of NEG-1 with the morphosyntax of tense. I pointed out earlier that imperatives lack morphological indicators of tense as well as agreement in English; the verb occurs in a bare form. Consider again examples like (16a–b):

(16) a. (You) be good!

b. Nobody move!

As I noted in Chapter 2, Zanuttini suggests that the absence of agreement inflections correlates with the presence of an 'inert' AGR phrase in the clause structure of English imperatives (labelled FP in diagram (18) below), which has no content. Bearing in mind Zanuttini's analysis of the syntax of Romance negative imperatives, the equivalent absence of overt tense marking should not similarly have a syntactic counterpart in the form of an 'abstract' TP layer, however, because the unavailability of negative 'true' imperatives in NEG-1 languages is crucially related to the absence of TP. On the present assumptions, we would otherwise predict that English imperatives cannot be negated by means of a NEG-1 head (that is, *n't*), either, contrary to fact.

(17) Don't (you) do that!

Zanuttini seeks to overcome this problem by saying that English imperatives are not 'true' imperatives in the sense that the verb forms occurring are not morphologically imperative but rather borrowed from another paradigm. Put differently, imperatives in English are expressions which are only imperative in their illocutionary force but do not constitute a morphosyntactically distinct type of clause, comparable to the 'surrogate' imperatives in Romance. Zanuttini's explanation of the fact that *n't* is available in the English 'imperative' is that the clause type it belongs to is specified for tense, hence projects a TP, which means that NEGP-1 is able to occur because its selectional requirements are met. The diagram below shows the structure and derivation of example (17) according to Zanuttini.

(18)



She assumes that the tense morpheme may either be in C or in the T head of a separate TP, which serves as the complement of NEG-1. Reminiscent of Beukema and Coopmans (1989), *do*-insertion then applies to allow the head *n't* of NEGP-1 to affix itself. The dummy auxiliary does not start out as the head of FP because this 'abstract' phrase hosts no verbal affix. (Zanuttini does not say whether she takes the subject to occupy SpecFP or the Spec position of CP/TP.)

The question that arises here is precisely which morphosyntactic clause type the English 'imperative' can be regarded as a manifestation of. Finite declaratives and infinitives do not seem worth considering because they both show overt indicators of a TP (past tense morphology as well as a present tense third person singular *-s* inflection, and the non-finite particle *to*, respectively). These are not found in imperatives:

(19) a Everybody (always) stays.

b. *Everybody stays!

(20) a. I told [everybody to stay]

b. *Everybody to stay!

Zanuttini's proposal is that the English 'imperative' is an instantiation of the (present) subjunctive in a root context, as indicated in the examples in (21).

(21) a. I insist [that everybody stay]

b. Everybody stay!

This hypothesis puts her overall analysis in an awkward position, however. In order to allow for the occurrence of the NEG-1 head in ('imperative') root clauses, it is crucial to presuppose the presence of a phonologically null tense affix in subjunctives. All things being equal, we would then expect that it should be possible to use *n't* in embedded subjunctives as well, with subsequent *do*-insertion. Zanuttini states that since the C-node of embedded subjunctives is filled by the complementizer *that*, there is simply no position available for *do* to be inserted into (which would leave affixal *n't* unbound, violating Lasnik's 1981 Stranded Affix Filter). However, it seems to me that if the basic structure of root and embedded clauses does not differ, there is nothing preventing *do* from being placed in NEG-1 if tense features were held by C. Alternatively, the auxiliary could move there after having been inserted into T, in the manner indicated in (22).

(22) I insist . . .



The problem is that this clearly yields the wrong result: the examples in (23) are both ungrammatical.

(23) a. *I insist don't that anybody stay.

b. *I insist that don't anybody stay.

In short, a problem Zanuttini's analysis of imperatives runs into is that it ultimately leads to an inescapable paradox. If one supposes that English imperatives are in fact root subjunctives with a null tense affix similar to 'surrogate' imperatives in Romance, the ungrammaticality of the embedded examples in (23) above is left unexplained. On the other hand, the alternative of categorizing the English imperative as a 'true' imperative is irreconcilable with the occurrence of *n't*, given the assumption that TP is missing from 'true' imperative phrase markers, and hence NEGP-1, or else her account of the syntax of Romance negative imperatives loses its footing. A possible way out is to say that in English the covert subjunctive tense morpheme can only license NEG-1 in (imperative) root configurations (not in embedded structures) but this seems a pure stipulation.

At a more general level, the point is whether there really are strong arguments for assuming the presence of two distinct NEGP phrases

in English (note, incidentally, that the Romance languages are said to have just one of them); in particular, for the existence of a second NEGP on top of COMP or an INFL(ectional) head. Zanuttini does not provide any independent empirical supporting evidence, and I know of none. From the perspective that *n't* is a separate lexical item, it arguably has a theoretically attractive aspect to it. The tree structure in (24a) below represents the 'orthodox' assumption that a (single) NEGP is located between V and INFL. Here, the procedure resulting in *n't*-affixation must be NEG raising to INFL. It is, however, not immediately obvious what type of features the I-head could possess which should attract *n't*. The configuration proposed by Zanuttini, which is illustrated in (24b), reverses the movement.

(24) a.



b.



Zanuttini's derivation would seem more readily defensible. For instance, one might argue that the NEG head *n't* carries an affixal [V]-feature of the kind proposed in Chomsky (1995a, ch. 4) which attracts the I-constituent. This said, I will later in this study assume a different approach to *Auxn't* forms which is incompatible with Zanuttini's treatment of *n't* and would remove the basis of her account of the inverted ordering in negative imperatives.[52]

4.2.3 Zhang (1990) and Henry (1995)

With INFL decomposed into a T and a lower AGR head after Pollock (1989), Zhang assumes that T assigns nominative Case to the overt imperative subject in SpecTP. Specifically, Zhang assumes that Case-assignment can take place under a Spec–Head agreement relationship, which will be established when AGR [2ND] raises to T, as indicated in figure (25).

(25) You go away!



Zhang takes *Subject don't/do not* structures to be totally impossible in imperatives, and concludes that this can only be attributed to the presence of *do*(*n't*) in T-AGR. Specifically, Zhang argues that in imperatives the auxiliary *do* is a 'non-agreement' element and as such disrupts Spec–Head agreement, preventing T from discharging its Case feature. Case Theory (Chomsky 1981) hence determines that overt subjects cannot occur in the presence of *do*. The null subject of imperatives, which Zhang takes to be *pro*, remains unaffected, however. *Pro* is licensed by T(IMP) and can be identified by the [2ND] AGR head regardless of whether or not *do* occurs, so Zhang maintains.[53]

(26) *pro* don't/do not go away!

From what we have seen thus far, one would expect not to find *do* at all in overt subject imperatives. The acceptability of (27b) below is then something of a surprise.

(27) a. *Do you not go away!

b. Don't you go away!

Deriving (27b) from T-to-C movement on a par with negative interrogatives is empirically hard to reconcile with the ill-formedness of the example in (27a), and in addition it is also problematic from the particular Case-theoretic perspective which Zhang adopts. Zhang's

solution to the dilemma is that the form *don't* in negative imperatives is in fact not a manifestation of the auxiliary *do* but a negative imperative particle.[54] The fact that *don't* may not have auxiliary status in imperatives does not in principle rule out the possibility that its pre-subject position is associated with C, rather like the auxiliary *do*(*n't*) in interrogatives. However, Zhang denies that there is any such parallelism and presents a set of data which would indicate that imperative *don't* is TP-adjoined. Some of these data concern topicalization. Examining the distribution of topics in an example like (28) below, Zhang concurs with Baltin (1982) and Lasnik and Saito (1992) that in embedded clauses topicalized elements are adjoined to TP (= IP). The (b) and (c) sentences show that the topicalized DP *this book* must follow the complementizer *that*, and cannot precede it.

(28) a. I believe that you should read this book.

b. I believe that this book, you should read.

c. *I believe this book, that you should read.

If *that* is in C and the subject in SpecTP, the topic must be adjoined to TP:

(29) I believe $[_{CP}\ [_{C}$ that$][_{TP}$ [this book]$_i$ $[_{TP}$ you $[_{T}$ should$][_{VP}\ [_{V}$ read] $t_i]]]]$

When we apply the test to imperatives, we find that the topic cannot be positioned after *don't*. What is grammatical is the opposite order:

(30) a. Don't (you) open that present until next week!

b. That present, don't (you) open until next week!

c. *Don't that present, (you) open until next week!

If the topic is adjoined to TP, as indicated in (31), it follows that the alleged particle *don't* does not surface in C but is, likewise, TP-adjoined in between the subject and the topic.

(31) $[_{TP}$ [That present]$_i$ $[_{TP}$ don't $[_{TP}$ (you) $[_{T}$ T$][_{VP}\ [_{V}$ open] $t_i]$ . . .]]]!

Zhang accordingly proposes that *don't*-imperatives have a syntactic representation like (32).

(32) Don't you/*pro* go away!



However, Potsdam (1996) (citing Radford, 1988, p. 530) points out that the argument is unpersuasive once we take account of topicalization in interrogative clauses. Example (33) demonstrates that interrogatives permit topicalized elements, which, with the auxiliary undergoing movement from INFL/Tense to C, must have been moved above IP/TP.

(33) That kind of antisocial behaviour, how can we tolerate in a civilised society?

The landing-site of topics in *root* clauses thus is not restricted to a position adjoined to IP/TP (as Lasnik and Saito (1992) note), but extends to adjunction to CP. (The fact that the topicalized DP *that kind of antisocial behaviour* precedes the *wh*-operator *how* in (33) above suggests that it has not moved into SpecCP). Note that it is in fact totally impossible to adjoin topics to IP/TP in root interrogative CP constructions:

(34) *How can, that kind of antisocial behaviour, we tolerate in a civilised society?

It appears, therefore, that in root clauses topics are adjoined to the highest accessible functional category present, which is CP in interrogatives and arguably IP/TP in finite declarative clauses like (35) (recall the discussion in Chapter 2).[55]

(35) That kind of antisocial behaviour, we cannot tolerate in a civilised society.

Following Potsdam (1996), Zhang's topicalization data as such cannot be considered as proof that *don't* is IP/TP-adjoined in imperatives. Note that as an alternative to the representation in (31), we may assume that (36) represents the structure of example (30b), where the topic is adjoined to CP by analogy to interrogatives.

(36) $[_{CP}$ [That present]$_i$ $[_{CP}$ $[_C$ don't] $[_{TP}$ (you) $[_T$ T]$[_{VP}$ $[_V$ open] $t_i]$ . . .]]]!

This leaves Zhang without any reason not to assume *don't*-placement in C. All that can be said is that the choice between adjunction to IP (TP) or CP should 'merely' depend on whether one ultimately decides to analyse imperatives as IP or CP structures on independent grounds (not vice versa). Potsdam goes even further in entirely rejecting Zhang's analysis. One of his objections derives from the phenomenon of VP-ellipsis. From a comparison of examples like those in (37), he identifies a syntactic condition that a VP can elide only if the INFL(ectional) head contains overt material (after Lobeck 1995, see also Bresnan 1976).[56]

(37) a. *John left, but Mary $[_I \varnothing]$ not __.

b. John left, but Mary $[_I$ didn't] __.

Consider now the examples in (38):

(38) a. *Jack started reading the poem, now Jimmy keep __!

b. Bill didn't tell Mom what I did, so don't YOU __ either!

c. Rick walked out of the lecture, but don't everyone else __, please!

(from Potsdam 1996, p. 178)

A sentence like (38a) conforms to the general pattern, but within Zhang's theory examples (b) and (c) should be equally impossible because *don't* is TP-adjoined and the T-head remains empty throughout the derivation.[57] The fact that (38b, c) are in fact grammatical could even be taken as an indication that INFL/Tense holds *don't* at least at some stage (a related observation has been made by Schmerling 1977). In sum, then, the analysis advocated by Zhang seems empirically and theoretically inadequate.

Offering an account very similar to Zhang's, Henry (1995) assumes that *don't* is a negative particle in imperative clauses, with the difference that she places *don't* in COMP, as shown in diagram (39). Henry's rationale for this proposal is that since (so she presupposes) the auxiliary *do* is normally inserted under T but imperatives fail to instantiate TP, they cannot form negative structures in the usual way by combining *n't*/*not* with *do*, and some other provision has to be made.

(39) Don't you hit your sister!



The difficulty with this analysis is that it is incompatible with the fact that *do can* occur in, for instance, null subject imperatives (like (40b)), a possibility which is not available in Henry's system.

(40) a. Don't hit your sister!

b. Do not hit your sister!

That is to say, Henry's approach is inherently contradictory. In overt subject imperatives, the auxiliary *do* cannot be used because its canonical insertion-site T is missing from the imperative phrase marker. However, this would leave occurrences of *do* in null subject constructions with no source. That being so, it would seem necessary to recognize that TP *is* present, which then renders the ungrammaticality of (any one of) the following examples somewhat of a mystery.[58]

(41) a. *Do you not hit your sister!

b. *Do not you hit your sister!

Henry does not address this (c)overt subject asymmetry in any detail.[59]

Summarizing, I have shown that each of the imperative-*do*(*n't*) analyses previously offered has its own particular difficulties. In the next two sections, I first question the hypothesis that *don't* is a negative imperative particle as opposed to a 'regular' form of supportive *do*, and then make the case that *do*(*n't*) is not positioned in COMP, but rather in INFL.

4.3 The status of *don't* in imperatives

To decide whether or not the form *don't* is special in any sense in imperatives, I shall first examine the possibility that it is in fact none other than the dummy auxiliary. As a starting point, I will briefly review the configurations in which the auxiliary *do* occurs in other clause types.

By the Economy Principle (Chomsky 1989 and later), the English-particular rule of *do*-insertion only operates as a 'last resort'. That is, *do* serves to satisfy a grammatical requirement, such as feature checking, which cannot be met otherwise. For interrogatives, it is said that *do*-insertion must apply invariably to check off some 'strong' verbal feature of C because verbs are immobile in the English overt syntax and thus unable to reach C before Spell-Out. This situation is shown in (42).

(42) a. *Tried you (not) again?

b. Did you (not) try again?
$[_{CP}\ [_{C}\ \text{Did}_i][_{IP}\ \text{you}\ [_{I}\ t_i]\ (\text{not})\ [_{VP}\ [_{V}\ \text{try}]\ \text{again}]]]$?

In finite declarative clauses, by contrast, *do* is confined to negative and emphatic structures, which implies that its use there is not driven by a strong feature. (43a–d) are illustrative examples.

(43) a. She (never) tries again.

b. *She does try again.

c. She doesn't/does not try again.

d. She DOES try again.

Pollock (1989) and Laka (1990), respectively, have proposed that sentential negation and emphatic affirmation are functional heads in their own right, situated between V and INFL. The received wisdom is that the reason why *do* is used in the presence of these heads (subsumed under the label Σ in (44) below[60]) is that they block feature checking between V and INFL.[61]

(44) $[_{IP}$ She $[_{I}$ [3S]$][_{\Sigma P}$ $[_{\Sigma}$ n't/not/EMPH$][_{VP}$ $[_{V}$ tries] again]]]

[3S]



In consequence, some non-interpretable features (such as verbal φ-features) fail to be checked, but these cannot remain in the derivation, and the only way to save the derivation from crashing at LF is to insert *do* in INFL. In non-emphatic declaratives, on the other hand, there is nothing stopping feature checking, rendering *do*-insertion unnecessary and hence impossible.

Observe now that *do*(*n't*) occurs in essentially the same environments in imperatives as it does in finite declarative clauses.

(45) a. Try again!
You try again!

b. *Do try again!
*Do you try again!

c. Don't try again!
Don't you try again!

d. Do not try again!
*Do you not try again!

e. DO try again!
DO AT LEAST YOU have a go, even if the others won't!

This patterning suggests that in imperatives, too, *don't* is simply the *do* of Last Resort *do*-insertion. (Potsdam (1996) comes to the same conclusion.) The examples in (45d, e) show that *do* is certainly not uniformly absent from imperatives. It is used in emphatic imperatives, and also co-occurs with *not* if the subject is covert. Disregarding, for the moment, the question of why (*do*) *not* is not fully available in imperative structures with an overt subject (an issue I will return to in Chapter 6), the fact that the auxiliary *do* does occur makes one wonder why there should be something unique about *don't* in imperatives. Specifically, why should *don't* be a negative imperative particle in contrast with all other instances of this form in the English grammar? A particle analysis of *don't* also has the theoretical drawback that it does not admit a parallel syntactic explanation of the occurrence of *don't* and *do* combined with *not* in imperatives. It in effect posits that imperative clauses have two different negative structures; one is simply equivalent to the ordinary negation structure, the other is unique to imperatives (similar considerations apply to emphatic *do*). Moreover, regarding *don't* in imperatives as a separate item precludes a uniform account of the syntax of *do*(*n't*) in this sentence type and finite declarative clauses. Briefly put, a particle analysis of *don't* seemingly fails to capture a number of potentially significant and viable generalizations. (Davies (1981) makes similar critical remarks.) I will therefore opt for the minimal working hypothesis that *do*(*n't*) is a canonical manifestation of last resort *do* in imperatives. That is, *do*(*n't*) functions as an auxiliary just as it does elsewhere.[62]

4.4 The syntax of *do*(*n't*) in imperatives

I turn now to the position of the auxiliary *do* in imperatives. The analyses according to which *do*(*n't*) is directly inserted into C in imperatives cannot easily be upheld in respect of Checking Theory and structural economy. Imperative-*do*(*n't*) analyses assume at least one functional projection FP between CP and VP in the imperative clause structure, whose specifier is filled by the subject. I have identified the functional head F with INFL in the diagram below.

Following the discussion in Chapter 2, let us assume that INFL is specified for (imperative) φ-features.[63]

(46) Don't you try again!



The point is that if *do*(*n't*) is not at any stage of the derivation adjoined to INFL, it is unclear how non-interpretable φ-features would be checked with the subject. On the assumption of Move/Attract (Chomsky 1995a, ch. 4), lowering the features of *do*(*n't*) by LF is, of course, not an option because of the c-command condition on the operation. If one were to allow for feature raising from INFL to *do*(*n't*) in C, or for INFL and *do*(*n't*) to Agree, the question still is why in imperatives *do*-insertion would not target INFL for φ-feature checking directly. The alternative would be to posit that the functional head F is structurally present but lacks content (as Zanuttini (1991) has done for AGR) and only provides a subject position. Given the VP-internal subject hypothesis, however, there is in principle no need to postulate a SpecFP. Since contentless heads are not interpretable at LF, the presence of an inert FP layer in the clause structure of imperatives in English is ruled out by economy considerations and the principle of Full Interpretation (FI).

It seems to me to be improbable that *do*(*n't*) occurs in C at all in imperatives anyway. I noted in Chapter 2 that COMP is regarded as a semantically meaningful category in being the locus of illocutionary force. Chomsky (1995a, ch. 4) assumes that interrogatives have a feature [Q] in COMP. Suppose that COMP in imperatives has an equivalent force-indicating feature, call it [IMP] (in the spirit of Katz

and Postal 1964). Given the presumed interpretability of [IMP], *do*(*n't*) would have to move to C in the syntax just in case [IMP], like [Q] in interrogatives, is accompanied by some strong feature (or the trigger for *do*(*n't*) to raise to C, rather than being left adjoined to INFL, is missing, in conflict with Last Resort). By this reasoning, however, we make the incorrect prediction that *do* should also be obligatory and occur before the subject in non-emphatic imperatives on a par with interrogatives (compare again (45a) and (45b) above). From the fact that *do*(*n't*) need not be resorted to in non-emphatic imperatives, I conclude that the use of the auxiliary in other configurations is not induced by a strong feature. I hence dismiss the possibility that *do*(*n't*) occurs in C in imperatives. Since on this view C would never contain any lexical material, we might even speculate that the English imperative phrase marker does not project up to CP until after Spell-Out, following Chomsky's (1995a, ch. 4) suggestion that Merge at the root is subject to Procrastinate.[64]

To conclude this chapter, I have argued that the imperative *do*(*n't*)-analysis does not altogether stand on solid ground. The hypothesis that the form *don't* is a negative imperative particle can hardly withstand the observation that the auxiliary *do* shows up in emphatic- and null subject imperatives. For, among others, this reason I suggested that *do*(*n't*) is better analysed as the dummy auxiliary. Further, I emphasized the fact that imperatives are clearly quite different from interrogatives with respect to the environments in which *do*-support is required. This difference is unexpected if, on the other hand, the auxiliary were to occur in C in imperatives, too, due to the presence of a strong feature. Potsdam (1996), who assumes a subject–auxiliary inversion analysis of imperatives, suggests that imperative COMP (optionally) has a strong feature that must be checked by a categorial feature Σ (on the model of Laka 1990). This feature occurs on *don't* and emphatic *do*, but does not occur on unstressed *do*. Potsdam states that 'This accounts for the fact that it is precisely these two which yield imperative inversion [to C LR] because these are the two instantiations of Σ. This also accounts for the observation that inversion does not take place when ΣP is not present' (pp. 267–8). In other words, Potsdam regards imperatives as differing from interrogatives only with respect to the feature that can check strong C, which 'happens' to be associated with *do*. Potsdam's proposal is based on the assumption that interrogatives and imperatives are of the same

category in the light of the fact that they have an inverted word order in common. Once we abandon the idea that imperatives are interrogative-type CP structures, it seems an unnecessarily complicated way of deriving the fact that imperatives are different from interrogatives but correspond to finite declaratives in that *do* is only used in the presence of one of the Σ heads. (Potsdam's account of the inverted ordering in negative imperatives will be discussed more extensively in Chapter 5.)

How are the imperative facts to be interpreted, then? An analysis which has suggested itself all along is that in imperatives, *do* has the same syntax not as in interrogatives (or the obligatory absence of the auxiliary in non-emphatic structures does not make sense) but as in finite declarative clauses (which is plausible since imperatives correspond to finite declaratives in all the relevant respects). Thus, *do* is inserted into INFL only where a negation or emphasis head intervenes between V and I so as to ensure that features can be checked, but the auxiliary is not forced to – and will therefore never – occur any higher than this in the imperative clause structure. The configuration I will henceforth be assuming for *do*-insertion in imperatives is as exemplified in (47) below (note that a possible covert CP-system has been left out for ease of exposition and that the position of the subject has deliberately been omitted here).

(47) Do not try again!



While there clearly are a number of details which must be worked out (these will be tackled in the following chapters), this analysis has none of the theoretical and empirical disadvantages associated with the imperative-*do*(*n't*) analyses. To recognize that with respect to the position of *do*(*n't*), imperatives pattern with finite declarative

clauses seems to be a step in the right direction. It now becomes an interesting question, though, why imperatives are nonetheless very much interrogative-like where the relative ordering of *do*(*n't*) and the subject is concerned. The pattern is shown in (48).

(48) a. You didn't try again.
[$_{IP}$ You [$_{I}$ didn't] try again]

b. Didn't you try again?
[$_{CP}$ Didn't$_{i}$ [$_{IP}$ you t$_{i}$ try again]]?

c. Don't you try again!
[$_{IP}$ [$_{I}$ Don't] you try again]!

If the suggested approach to *do*(*n't*) is right, the present analysis contradicts all former approaches. It cannot be that the inverted pattern derives from inversion of *do*(*n't*) and the subject (contrary to Potsdam 1996). Neither can it be that the order occurs because imperatives at least share with interrogatives the property that *do*(*n't*) is higher than INFL in the clause structure (contra Beukema and Coopmans 1989, Zhang 1990, Zanuttini 1991 and Henry 1995). Rather, the relevant comparison is with finite declaratives, and the source of the contrast appears to lie in a different syntax for the subject of imperatives. Viewing things from the present perspective, it emerges that the inverted word order in imperatives arises by virtue of the absence of subject-raising to SpecIP. The impression that there has been subject–auxiliary inversion is therefore illusory and the parallelism with interrogatives clauses does not in fact exist. Chapter 5 explores this hypothesis.

5
The Syntax of Subjects in Imperatives

The preceding chapter provided the configuration I will assume for an inquiry into the inverted *do*(*n't*) *Subject* order in English imperatives. To recapitulate, I argued that while imperatives pattern with interrogative clauses in this respect, there exists a fundamental syntactic difference between them which makes a parallel analysis unwarranted. In particular, the well-established assumption that in interrogatives the order is yielded by I-to-C movement of the auxiliary cannot be maintained for imperatives. My claim is that the auxiliary *do*(*n't*) does not occur any higher than INFL in the imperative phrase marker, which arguably projects a CP layer only as late as LF. To recognize that regarding this latter aspect of their syntax, imperatives in fact behave like finite declaratives completely alters the angle of inquiry. It now seems that the relative ordering must be understood as a difference between these two clause types in respect of the extent of subject raising. If, as is commonly assumed, the subject of finite declaratives is in SpecIP at Spell-Out, the implication is that the imperative subject does not raise as far as this:

(1) a. *You* didn't say a word.
[$_{IP}$ You [$_{I}$ didn't] say a word]

b. Don't *you* say a word!
[$_{IP}$ [$_{I}$ Don't] you say a word]!

The two questions that are the focus of this chapter are whether there is empirical evidence for the idea that the subject does not fill SpecIP in 'inverted' imperatives, and which position the subject might then

occupy instead. The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 sets out Chomsky's (1995a, ch. 4) proposal that in finite declaratives the subject occurs in SpecIP due to the presence of a strong [D] or 'EPP'-feature in INFL, which forces substitution in its specifier. This proposal in principle admits into the theory the possibility that subjects of 'inverted' imperatives occur lower. The hypothesis is empirically tested in section 5.2, initially confirmed, and qualified somewhat later. In section 5.3 I first inquire into the position of low imperative subjects. I then go on to show that English imperatives can also be conveyed with a non-inverted *Subject do*(*n't*) order, which I take to mean that imperative subjects may (or may not) be placed in SpecIP. This finding poses a problem for the standard minimalist account of the displacement property of natural language, which will be addressed in Chapter 8.

5.1 The EPP(-feature)

The ungrammaticality of a finite declarative clause like (2) below reveals the existence of a grammatical requirement in English that sentences have a subject. Where the argument structure of the verb does not force this, an 'expletive' element must be used.[65]

(2) *(It) seems that someone is watching him.

In GB theory, this requirement came to be known as the Extended Projection Principle (EPP). Chomsky (1995a, ch. 4) proposed that in the minimalist framework the presence of a subject is ensured if INFL has a non-interpretable categorial feature [D]. In Chomsky (1998), the feature has been recategorized as an EPP-feature. In English, it seems that the subject must specifically occur in SpecIP, as shown by the ill-formedness of (3a).

(3) a. *Is someone watching him.
[$_{IP}$ _ [$_{I}$ is][$_{VP}$ someone watching him]]

b. Someone is watching him.

As Chomsky (1981, pp. 27–8) originally put it: '[. . .] obligatory presence of [a] subject represents a particular choice for a certain

parameter of UG. English and French, for example, make this choice; thus we have [. . .] the base rule [S → NP INFL VP]. [. . .] In addition, there are choices with regard to ordering of elements.' In the Minimalist Program, the situation for English has been accounted for by saying that the [D]-feature is strong, or that EPP-features by definition trigger movement.

It has been argued that subjects do not in fact occur in SpecIP across all English clause types (Baltin 1995 for PRO) or cross-linguistically (McCloskey 1999, Carnie and Harley 2000 and references therein). A possibility naturally available in the system is to assume that the [D]-feature of INFL is weak, or the EPP-feature absent, in such cases.

5.2 The position of the subject in 'inverted' imperatives

This section, whose first part is largely based on Potsdam's (1995) and (1996) studies, seeks to establish empirically that the subject of imperatives may not move into SpecIP. With the predicate-internal subject position available, a particular strong piece of evidence would be obtained if it could be shown that the imperative subject remains *in situ* in SpecVP. However, Potsdam provides a number of arguments which seem to rule such an analysis quite out of the question. After having examined the behaviour of imperatives with respect to a variety of different syntactic phenomena, Potsdam remains somewhat undecided between a CP analysis of imperative *do*(*n't*) *Subject* sequences (with *do*(*n't*) positioned in C and the subject in SpecIP) and what he terms an FP analysis (with the subject situated in the Spec position of some additional functional projection FP above VP but below the inflectional head which *do*(*n't*) occupies). The particulars of *do*-support in imperatives made me reject the CP analysis in the foregoing chapter. In what is to follow, I shall argue that there are more empirical facts that speak against it, and that lend support to an (albeit differently set up) FP analysis.

5.2.1 Against a SpecVP analysis

With the subject occupying a position below INFL, a natural starting point would be to consider the possibility that in *don't Subject* strings, the subject follows the auxiliary because it is kept low in the VP, as indicated in (4) below.

(4) Don't you try again!



However, I agree with Potsdam (1996) that from all the relevant diagnostics it is evident that this cannot be the case (some of the examples below have been taken from his work). First, on the assumption that aspectual auxiliaries head a separate ASP(ect) projection outside the theta-marking domain of VP (Ouhalla 1991), the SpecVP analysis predicts that 'inverted' imperative subjects should appear to the right of them. The examples in (5) show that the opposite is true: they precede them.

(5) a. *Don't be [$_{VP}$ *anyone* waiting up for me all night]!

b. Don't *anyone* be [$_{VP}$ waiting up for me all night]!

c. *DO have [$_{VP}$ *one of you* checked the locks before we go]!

d. DO *one of you* have [$_{VP}$ checked the locks before we go]!

Secondly, the subject does not elide in VP-ellipsis constructions, which suggests that it is VP-external at Spell-Out.

(6) a. Bill didn't tell Mom what I did, so don't YOU __ either!

b. Rick walked out of the lecture, but don't everyone else __, please!

In addition to this, example (7) demonstrates that it is possible to strand quantifiers in imperatives, which (after Sportiche 1988) can be taken as an indication that the subject has been moved out of the VP away from the quantifier.

(7) Don't you ever both talk to me like that again!
Don't you$_i$ ever [$_{VP}$ [both t$_i$] [$_{V'}$ talk to me like that again]]!

Next, consider the passive examples in (8) below. Following Chomsky (1995a, ch. 4), who elaborates further a proposal of Larson (1988), all verb phrases comprise an outer vP shell headed by an abstract 'light verb' *v*, whose specifier hosts the external argument. A possible exception are unaccusative predicates, which do not assign an external theta-role. If we assume the same for passive participles, which lack an external argument, too, passivization can only involve DP-movement from the canonical object position to a position outside the VP.

(8) a. Everyone be checked over by a doctor!
Everyone$_i$ be [$_{VP}$ [$_V$ checked over] t_i] by a doctor!

b. Don't you be fooled *t* by her behaviour!

A final piece of counter-evidence derives from the syntax of adverbs. A speaker-oriented adverb like *certainly* may precede but not follow a VP-adverb like *completely* in the following examples, which shows that *certainly* does not attach to VP (after Bowers's (1993) restrictive assumption that different adverb classes are licensed by separate heads).

(9) a. Marianne has certainly completely solved the problem.
Marianne has certainly [$_{VP}$ completely solved the problem]

b. *Marianne has completely certainly solved the problem.

As (10b) below shows, imperative subjects can appear to the left of adverbs like *certainly*, once again indicating that they are not in SpecVP.

(10) a. Certainly everyone do at least the assigned problems!

b. Everyone certainly [$_{VP}$ do at least the assigned problems]!

In sum, a SpecVP analysis of subject positioning in 'inverted' imperatives seems inadequate.

5.2.2 Against a SpecIP analysis

Rejecting the SpecVP analysis, Potsdam concludes that in imperatives there must be *at least two* functional projections on top of the VP for the *do*(*n't*) *Subject* sequence to be derivable at all. If there were only

one, as in (11), the subject should *always* precede *do*(*n't*) since it was shown to vacate the original VP-internal position, but we have seen that this is not the case.[66]

(11)



Potsdam contemplates two alternative analyses which can in principle both handle the inverted word order while at the same time assuming subject raising. These are the CP analysis in (12a) and the FP analysis represented in (12b).

(12) Don't you say a word!



Under the CP analysis, inverted imperatives are effectively derived in the same way as their interrogative counterparts: the subject is moved into SpecIP and comes to follow *do*(*n't*) because the auxiliary undergoes I-to-C movement.[67] The FP analysis assumes no CP-layer but multiple split-INFL heads instead, which we may neutrally label FP-1 and FP-2. (Potsdam suggests that F-1 and F-2 may be identified with the categories TENSE and AGR.) Here, the surface order results when *do*(*n't*) raises to the head node of the functional projection which dominates the one whose specifier position the subject has moved into. The derivations are thus identical in relevant respects but they assume different functional heads. In an attempt to distinguish between them, Potsdam applies structural diagnostics which have been said to involve or, conversely, crucially not to involve C(P) (these would corroborate the CP and FP analysis, respectively).

Zhang's (1990) topicalization examples discussed in the previous chapter were found to be too inconclusive a criterion to prefer one of the analyses to the other. I concluded that in root clauses the topic is simply adjoined to the highest accessible functional projection present, which (trivially) is CP in the (a) and FP-1 in the (b) structure of (12). However, Henry (1995, pp. 68–9) draws attention to data involving 'affective' elements which seemingly falsify Potsdam's CP analysis and appear to favour the FP alternative. In finite declaratives, raising such elements (which include negative adverbial phrases like *under no circumstances* and *on no account*) to a sentence-initial position goes hand in hand with inversion of the subject and the auxiliary (with *do*-insertion in the absence of any other auxiliary), as shown in (13) and (14).

(13) a. They should open the door on no account.

b. *On no account they should open the door.

c. On no account should they open the door.

(14) a. They go away under no circumstances.

b. *Under no circumstances they go away.

c. Under no circumstances do they go away.

The very phenomenon of inversion occurring combined with the lack of a pause after the moved affective element suggests that we

are not dealing with topicalization, which adjoins elements to maximal projections, but with raising into SpecCP analogous to *wh*-movement.[68] Compare:

(15) a. The door, they should open.

b. Why do they go away?

This analysis seems to be reinforced by the fact that affective items and *wh*-expressions are mutually exclusive in sentence-initial position (as observed by Radford, 1988, p. 529).

(16) a. He would never ever trust Paul with such a mission.

b. Who would he never ever trust with such a mission?

c. Never ever would he trust Paul with such a mission.

d. *Who never ever would he trust with such a mission?[69]

Extending Belletti and Rizzi's (1996) analysis of [WH]-feature checking (as discussed in Chapter 2), one might assume that INFL may optionally be endowed with some kind of affective feature, which likewise triggers I-to-C movement and forces affective items to A'-move to SpecCP to establish a local relation for checking purposes.[70]

Note now that while such elements can be used in imperative clauses, the following examples suggest that there is no movement into CP.

(17) a. You close the door on no account!

b. *On no account you close the door![71]

c. *On no account do you close the door!

(18) a. Nobody go away under any circumstances!

b. *Under no circumstances anybody go away!

c. *Under no circumstances do anybody go away!

Evidently, this is a potential stumbling block to the CP analysis (12a) of *do*(*n't*) *Subject* strings because it derives the order from I-to-C

movement of the auxiliary over the subject in SpecIP. The FP analysis (12b), on the other hand, makes no reference to CP in accommodating the ordering, and can hence more easily be made to fit the data providing that it is assumed that imperatives fail to project a CP system at all (an idea I suggested in Chapter 2). Potsdam, in response, asserts that the CP analysis is not to be discounted too hastily. He notices that affective elements cannot be raised into SpecCP in *yes–no* questions, either, even though these incontestably form CP structures and instantiate movement of auxiliaries from I to C independently.

(19) a. Should anyone close the door on no account?

b. *On no account should anyone close the door?

(20) a. Can nobody leave under any circumstances?

b. *Under no circumstances can they leave?

In *wh*-interrogatives, the movement is arguably not feasible because the Spec position of CP is 'already' occupied by the *wh*-operator, which has raised there to satisfy the [WH]-feature of the moved I-constituent under Spec–Head agreement. A logical inference to make, then, is that the immobility of affective elements in *yes–no* questions is also ascribable to the presence of an element in SpecCP. Grimshaw (1993) and Roberts (1993) have indeed proposed that *yes–no* questions have a covert interrogative operator filling SpecCP. This assumption seems necessary for separate reasons; for instance, in order to account for the fact that *yes–no* questions admit polarity items where an overt c-commanding interrogative (or negative) expression is absent (as in (19a)). Potsdam applies this reasoning to imperatives and suggests that the examples under consideration can be ruled out on a par if we posit a covert imperative operator in the SpecCP of imperatives. He acknowledges that the alleged existence of such an operator is not empirically attested in English in a similar way, but makes the point that an explanation along the lines of *yes–no* questions would not necessarily exclude the occurrence of the auxiliary *do*(*n't*) under C in imperatives per se.[72] This possibility rescues the CP analysis and it is in principle compatible with the FP structure, too, once we assume that it does create a CP layer.

Potsdam's conclusion is that the data in (17) and (18) are much less decisive than they might at first appear and finds that it is really impossible to decide between the two analyses. He ultimately chooses to adopt the CP analysis 'on grounds of simplicity', because it allows us to provide a uniform account of surface inverted orders in imperatives and interrogative clauses, and it keeps structural complexity to a minimum.

However, I shall argue that suggestive evidence comes from hitherto unexplained scope facts (originally due to Schmerling 1982), which have as yet received little attention in the literature on imperatives. Consider the examples in (21) and (22), which illustrate a difference in scope between quantified subjects and negation in finite declaratives and imperatives.

(21) We all worked extremely hard over the past year, still *everyone didn't get a raise*.

a. = nobody got a raise — EVERY > NOT

b. = not everyone got a raise — NOT > EVERY

(22) I know all of you worked extremely hard over the past year, but *don't everyone expect a raise!*

a. ≠ nobody expect a raise! — *EVERY > NOT

b. = not everyone should expect a raise — NOT > EVERY

Though scope judgements may be subject to some variation, most of my consultants agree that the finite declarative example (21) can in principle be assigned two different readings; one in which the quantifier (QP) *everyone* has scope over negation (paraphrased in (a)), and one where negation has scope over the QP (paraphrased in (b)) (for some speakers, necessarily with focal stress on *everyone*). Significantly, the reading on which the QP takes widest scope is strictly unavailable for the corresponding imperative sentence. That is, example (22) cannot be understood in the sense of (a).

It has long been standard to assume with May (1977, 1985) that for QPs to take scope over other elements in the sentence, they must raise and adjoin to some appropriate XP at LF. A sentence like *every-*

one didn't get a raise, for example, would then be assigned the LF structure given in (23), in which the QP has adjoined to IP.

(23) $[_{IP}\ [_{QP}\ \text{everyone}]_i\ [_{IP}\ t_i\ \text{didn't get a raise}]]$

However, Hornstein (1995) argues that a separate rule of Quantifier Raising is no longer tenable in minimalism, and outlines a different approach to quantifier scope which aims to eliminate the rule from the grammar. He points out that on the assumption that movement only occurs for the sake of checking morphosyntactic features, there is little reason for an element to move to an A'-position unless it must do so for feature checking. This, Hornstein argues, applies to *wh*-elements, but is not obviously the case for quantified subjects. This said, Hornstein goes on to note that quantified subjects are to undergo movement from SpecVP to SpecIP at any rate to check features with INFL, and that this operation automatically extends their scope domain. This way, operator scope can simply be a function of A-movement. In other words, A-movement, triggered by the requirements of Checking Theory, may simultaneously serve to expand a QP-subject's c-command domain, thereby enabling it to take scope over the remainder of the sentence. Thus, lexical items that are not forced to raise (any further) by Checking Theory may be interpreted and assigned scope in the position they occupy in the syntax. Accordingly, an appropriate LF representation of the example sentence would look like (24) instead.

(24) $[_{IP}\ [_{QP}\ \text{everyone}]_i\ [_{I}\ \text{didn't}][_{VP}\ t_i\ \text{get a raise}]]$

Combining this idea with the 'copy theory' of movement (Chomsky's (1993) minimalist analogue of reconstruction at LF), the EVERY > NOT reading for the finite declarative sentence derives when at LF, the quantifier is interpreted in its surface position SpecIP, as in (25a). The NOT > EVERY reading derives when, as in (25b), the copy of the quantifier in SpecVP is interpreted.

(25) a. $[_{IP}\ \text{everyone didn't}\ [_{VP}\ t_{\sout{everyone}}\ \text{get a raise}]]$

b. $[_{IP}\ \sout{\text{everyone}}\ \text{didn't}\ [_{VP}\ t_{\text{everyone}}\ \text{get a raise}]]$

Now note that Potsdam's CP as well as his FP analysis (as expected, since they are derivationally equivalent in relevant respects) predict quite wrongly that negative imperatives are also ambiguous. In the higher C- or FP-1 position negation should always have scope over the QP, while the QP could take scope over negation from SpecIP or SpecFP-2 if the latter were 'LF-reconstructed'. Compare the (a) and (b) structures in (26) and (27):

(26) a. $[_{CP}$ don't $[_{IP}$ everyone $t_{\sout{don't}}$ $[_{VP}$ $t_{everyone}$ expect a raise]]]

b. $[_{CP}$ ~~don't~~ $[_{IP}$ everyone $t_{don't}$ $[_{VP}$ $t_{\sout{everyone}}$ expect a raise]]]

(27) a. $[_{FP\text{-}1}$ don't $[_{FP\text{-}2}$ everyone $t_{\sout{don't}}$ $[_{VP}$ $t_{everyone}$ expect a raise]]]

b. $[_{FP\text{-}1}$ ~~don't~~ $[_{FP\text{-}2}$ everyone $t_{don't}$ $[_{VP}$ $t_{\sout{everyone}}$ expect a raise]]]

One way of putting this is that, in a sense, the lack of scope ambiguity in inverted imperatives undermines neither the CP nor the FP analysis because they fail equally in this respect. As there are no apparent semantic reasons for the absence of the EVERY > NOT reading, we might follow Potsdam in accepting that it must also remain inexplicable syntactically and stipulate that, for some reason, wide scope readings do not exist for quantified imperative subjects. Clearly, this is not particularly satisfactory, and the obvious alternative is to take the extreme opposite view that scope facts in fact invalidate both analyses. I previously rejected the CP analysis on different grounds and I will therefore not consider it further. In Potsdam's formulation, the FP analysis cannot easily be upheld either. However, I shall argue shortly that a different version of FP analysis can in fact handle the scope facts. Crucially, for the EVERY > NOT reading to become available, negation must fall within the scope domain of the quantifier. In finite declarative clauses, a quantified subject c-commands, hence bears scope over, everything contained within I' from its derived position in SpecIP, which includes *do*(*n't*) under INFL. From the fact that the wide scope reading cannot be derived in 'inverted' imperatives, I conclude that while 'inverted' imperative subjects may be moved to an intermediate Spec position, there is no subject raising to SpecIP. This, I suggest, is the source of apparent inversion in imperatives. The next section explores the corresponding SpecFP analysis.

5.2.3 The SpecFP analysis

An explanation of the *do*(*n't*) *Subject* order which has subject positioning as the determinant factor is actually implicit in Potsdam's (1996) FP analysis. Notice that in the structure he suggests the subject of imperatives undergoes raising to SpecFP-2 (as in (12b)) whereas the subject of finite declarative clauses raises to the higher SpecFP-1. However, he leaves this feature unexploited (in the end opting for the CP analysis), and also his configuration cannot capture the observed scope restrictions in inverted imperatives. This is because the subject is raised to the Spec position of FP-2 whose F-2 head *do*(*n't*) is inserted into. Consequently, the subject has the trace of the negative auxiliary in F-2 in its scope after subject–auxiliary inversion. I would like to propose an alternative FP analysis which, while not involving subject–auxiliary inversion, accommodates the inverted ordering and achieves what is required with respect to the lack of scope ambiguity. Having concluded that there is subject raising out of the VP in imperatives, the SpecFP analysis assumes that in an example like (28), the subject has been moved only as far as the Spec position of some functional projection FP below the INFL(ectional) head.[73] This gives us the syntactic representation shown below.[74]

(28) Don't you say a word!



The way in which this FP structure differs from Potsdam's is that the phrase the subject targets does not contain the dummy auxiliary in the derivation. That is to say, under the SpecFP analysis the subject and *do*(*n't*) do not invert or 'cross paths', which (as will be demonstrated directly) creates the structural configuration that accounts for the lack of scope ambiguity in inverted imperatives. This of course raises, among others, the question of which concrete projection the FP phrase may be identified with, which I shall address in section 5.3.

Let us first re-examine the data that have been under consideration so far. As was pointed out above, the syntactic behaviour of topics and affective items in imperatives did not help arbitrate between Potsdam's CP and FP subject–auxiliary inversion structures. Since the data involved are not immediately relevant to subject positioning, the SpecFP analysis I have in mind is neither substantiated nor challenged by them. This merely adds weight to my earlier conclusion that the syntax of these items does not seem to constitute an appropriate tool by means of which one can make any significant structural distinctions. I have nothing to add to Potsdam's comments, except that they are fully compatible with the present analysis.

Let us then return to the fact that quantified subjects in imperatives can have narrow scope only. The phenomenon was illustrated in (22) and is repeated as (29) below for convenience.

(29) I know all of you worked extremely hard over the past year, but *don't everyone expect a raise!*
a. ≠ nobody expect a raise! *EVERY > NOT
b. = not everyone should expect a raise NOT > EVERY

I hinted before that the absence of a wide scope reading for the subject follows directly from the SpecFP analysis. If in (29) the subject has not raised all the way to SpecIP, it makes no difference whether the higher or the lower link of the chain is interpreted. The QP will always be in the scope of negation.[75]

(30) a. $[_{IP}$ don't $[_{FP}$ everyone $[_{F}$ F$][_{VP}$ $t_{\sout{everyone}}$ expect a raise]]]
b. $[_{IP}$ don't $[_{FP}$ ~~everyone~~ $[_{F}$ F$][_{VP}$ $t_{everyone}$ expect a raise]]]

One might wonder if the wide scope reading for the quantifier should not result at LF, because in the framework of Chomsky (1995a, ch. 4) it would require further movement than SpecFP to achieve, for instance, the checking of nominative Case between the subject and INFL. When, as under the SpecFP analysis of 'inverted' imperatives, this checking does not take place before Spell-Out, it must be done in the derivation to LF. Following Chomsky (1995a, p. 270), the corresponding covert raising operation is, however, not substitution (which, he argues, would violate the Chain Uniformity Principle because notions such as 'minimal/maximal projection' have no clear sense, and are hence not defined for isolated grammatical features). Rather, the subject's formal features adjoin to INFL. The LF representation generated by this procedure for a sentence like (29) would then be the following.

(31) Don't everyone expect a raise!



This LF raising arguably does not yield a wide scope interpretation of the QP-subject, however, because its semantic (quantifier) features, which need no checking, would not be carried along as free riders but remain *in situ* under the Spec position of FP. If these features are determinant in the relative scope of quantifiers, *everyone* in (31) will not take scope over *do*(*n't*) at LF from the I-adjoined position. This follows even more naturally on the assumptions of Chomsky's (1998) most recent model, whereby lexical items may check features in place under long distance Agree.

It is worth mentioning that the analysis of inverted imperatives pursued here is in its essentials similar to the derivation of expletive–associate constructions of the type illustrated in (32) below (Chomsky, 1995a, ch. 4, Felser and Rupp 2001 and others). In these constructions, the associate/thematic subject (*many students*) similarly does not occur in SpecIP, which is filled by the expletive (*there*). As expected under the FP analysis, 'inverted' imperatives and existential sentences behave alike with respect to scope restrictions on their QP-subjects.[76]

(32) There aren't many students waiting outside.
a. ≠ many students are not waiting outside *MANY > NOT
b. = not many students are waiting outside NOT > MANY



Potsdam (forthcoming) contends that this argument becomes unpersuasive once interrogatives are taken into consideration. As indicated in (33a, b) below, on the above assumptions one would expect that these should be ambiguous between a narrow and a wide scope reading for quantified subjects.

(33) *Didn't everyone get a raise?*
a. Did nobody get a raise? *EVERY > NOT
[$_{CP}$ ~~didn't~~ [$_{IP}$ everyone $t_{didn't}$ [$_{VP}$ $t_{~~everyone~~}$ get a raise]]]?

b. Did not everyone get a raise? NOT > EVERY
[$_{CP}$ didn't [$_{IP}$ everyone $t_{\sout{didn't}}$ [$_{VP}$ $t_{everyone}$ get a raise]]]?

In actual fact, the narrow scope reading given in (b) is the *only* possible reading of (33). This seemingly removes the ground for claiming that the absence of wide quantifier scope in 'inverted' imperatives reveals that the CP analysis is incorrect. However, I suspect that the possibility of forming negative interrogative clauses with *not* may play some role here. As in the case of (33), the derivation of (34) is predicted to result in scope ambiguity. Similarly but conversely, the example can only be understood as (a) with a wide scope reading for the QP.

(34) *Did everyone not get a raise?*

a. Did nobody get a raise? EVERY > NOT
[$_{CP}$ did [$_{IP}$ everyone t_{did} [$_{NEGP}$ not [$_{VP}$ $t_{\sout{everyone}}$ get a raise]]]]?

b. Did not everyone get a raise? *NOT > EVERY
[$_{CP}$ did [$_{IP}$ ~~everyone~~ t_{did} [$_{NEGP}$ not [$_{VP}$ $t_{everyone}$ get a raise]]]]?

That the QP and negation appear to be interpreted in their surface position in (33) and (34) could be related to the fact that in interrogatives, the respective negative elements (*Aux*)*n't* and *not* occur in different structural positions (above, hence taking scope over, and below, hence in the scope of, the subject in SpecIP). If the two interpretations are made available by the syntax, LF-reconstruction is arguably unmotivated. In the case of finite declaratives, reconstruction of the subject in SpecVP results in a different interpretation than that obtained if the QP is assigned scope in SpecIP. But in the case of interrogatives, the reading that would be obtained by reconstructing *do*(*n't*) is equivalent to the reading obtained by using *not*, so that there seems to be no interpretative need that motivates such reconstruction. Wide quantifier scope cannot be yielded in 'inverted' imperatives in a similar way because contrary to interrogatives, they cannot be negated with *not*. This contrast is not straightforward under an interrogative-type CP analysis, but will be shown to fit the FP approach.

Potsdam objects that this account necessarily gives up on the idea that all of the scope facts can be given a uniform explanation. I am

not sure that it does: reconstruction in negative interrogatives for scope purposes is only thought to lack motivation. Potsdam argues that with *don't*-interrogatives and *don't*-imperatives showing the same scope pattern, they must have identical CP-structures.[77] Though he does not explicitly consider quantified subjects, I infer that he would explain the scope contrast between ambiguous finite declaratives and non-ambiguous interrogatives/imperatives by assuming that unlike raised QPs , I-to-C moved negation cannot reconstruct. Consequently, the scope of *don't* in interrogatives/imperatives is fixed by its surface position in C. It thus seems necessary to allow for some non-uniformity in scope construals at any rate.

Potsdam (forthcoming) also uses the placement of (what he terms) E(xtent)-adverbs as a diagnostic for the position of *do*(*n't*) in inverted imperatives. Jackendoff (1972) noted that this class (which includes such adverbs as *simply*, *just* and *merely*) has the particular distribution of not occurring in a clause-peripheral position. For illustration, consider the finite declarative sentences below.

(35) a. She simply did not give them his address.
She [$_{I'}$ simply [$_{I}$ did] not give them his address]

b. She did not simply give them his address.
She did not [$_{VP}$ simply [$_{V}$ give] them his address]

c. *Simply she did not give them his address.
Simply [$_{IP}$ she did not give them his address]

(36) a. He just doesn't believe what she says.
He [$_{I'}$ just [$_{I}$ doesn't] believe what she says]

b. He doesn't just believe what she says.
He doesn't [$_{VP}$ just [$_{V}$ believe] what she says]

c. *Just he doesn't believe what she says.
Just [$_{IP}$ he doesn't believe what she says]

In the light of these data, let us assume that E-adverbs may be adjoined to I', or to a projection of V, but adjoining them to IP is not possible. As indicated in (37) below, the CP analysis and the FP analysis make different predictions with respect to the distribution

of E-adverbs in inverted imperatives. With *do*(*n't*) assumed to be in C, the CP analysis of inverted imperatives predicts that E-adverbs equally cannot occur clause-initially. The FP analysis, by contrast, predicts that this should be possible. If *do*(*n't*) is in INFL and the subject in SpecFP, the adverb is expected to show up in clause-initial position where it is adjoined to I'.

(37) a. $[_{CP}\ [_{C}$ don't$_i][_{IP}$ (*Adv) Subject $[_{I'}$ (Adv) $[_{I}\ t_i][_{VP}\ [_{V}$ V]]]]]

b. $[_{IP}$ (*Adv) $[_{I'}$ (Adv) $[_{I}$ don't$][_{FP}$ Subject $[_{F}$ F $][_{VP}\ [_{V}$ V]]]]]

Potsdam judges *E-adverb do*(*n't*) *Subject* order to be ungrammatical in an example like (38b), and concludes that only the CP analysis adequately accounts for the positioning of E-adverbs in imperatives.

(38) a. Don't you simply give them his address!

b. *Simply don't you give them his address!

However, the order seems fine in contexts like (39b):

(39) a. What can we do to make sure that we don't get fooled by her again?
Don't anyone just believe what she says!

b. What can we do to make sure that none of us is ever fooled by her again?
Just don't anyone believe what she says!

This makes me think that issues of scope may bear on the acceptability of *E-adverb do*(*n't*) *Subject* orders. I would await a more careful inquiry into the data before drawing any firm conclusions.

Summarizing this section, after earlier having argued that the auxiliary *do*(*n't*) only occurs as high as INFL in English imperatives, I inquired into the relative position of the subject in *do*(*n't*) *Subject* strings. I subscribed to Potsdam's (1996) conclusion that an analysis that leaves the imperative subject in its VP-internal position seems indefensible. Instead, I suggested a SpecFP analysis which assumes that the subject of 'inverted' imperatives moves to the Spec position of some functional projection FP below IP, from where it checks its

features with INFL. The SpecFP analysis is as viable as Potsdam's subject–auxiliary inversion analyses with respect to the behaviour of topics and affective items. However, the SpecFP analysis offers a solution to the lack of scope ambiguity in 'inverted' imperatives (a property they share with derivationally similar expletive–associate constructions), from which I concluded that it favourably compares to the analyses put forth by Potsdam. It seems that much of the confusion that imperative *do*(*n't*) *Subject* sequences have caused in the past is due to excessive importance having been attached to the superficial word order correspondence to interrogatives. This has led to the belief that imperatives are analogous CP structures, which I believe is mistaken. In this section I have argued that *do*(*n't*) *Subject* imperatives differ far more from *do*(*n't*) *Subject* interrogatives than one might expect. The ordering does not derive from inversion of the auxiliary with the subject, but arises where the subject is kept below *do*(*n't*) in INFL. This derivation merely has the effect of giving the illusion of subject–auxiliary inversion. To this extent, 'inverted' imperatives are only apparently inverted.

5.3 Subject position(s) revisited: optional movement

Towards the end of section 5.2 I established that unlike the subject of finite declarative sentences, imperative subjects may not be moved all the way to SpecIP but only as far as the Spec position of some other functional projection lower down in the structure, which I labelled FP for the time being. Though the SpecFP analysis appears to account for the relevant empirical facts reasonably well, it has as yet left two questions outstanding: What is the categorial status of the FP phrase? And why need imperative subjects not occur in SpecIP?

As for the identity of the FP phrase, what I specified as critical for capturing the absence of wide quantifier scope in 'inverted' imperatives is that the auxiliary *do*(*n't*) does not start out below the subject. The kind of FP projection we are thus looking for is one which does not trigger *do*-insertion; that is, a functional head which does not check features with the dummy (hence, as opposed to Potsdam (1996), crucially not a split-INFL head). The representation below illustrates the envisaged configuration.

(40) Don't you say a word!



A potentially suitable candidate that springs to mind is the ASP(ect) projection that scholars like Tenny (1987) and Ouhalla (1991) have postulated between V and INFL in English, since there is certainly no issue that the auxiliary *do* is associated with features of this kind. In Chapter 2 I noted the availability of aspectual imperative constructions, in which, under the present analysis, the subject is positioned before the aspectual auxiliary and, when present, after *do*(*n't*) in INFL.

(41) a. Have seen the Full Monty before you die!

b. Don't you have finished the work by the time I get back!
[$_{IP}$ [$_{I}$ Don't] you have [$_{VP}$ [$_{V}$ finished] the work . . .]]!

c. Be practising your multiplication tables this evening!

d. Don't anyone be waiting up for me all night!

Hence, we might identify the FP with an ASPP and provide an example such as (41b) with a structure that looks like (42), where the subject occupies SpecASPP.[78]

(42)



The fixed SpecIP positioning of subjects of finite declarative clauses has been formalized by assigning INFL a strong [D]- or EPP-feature. Following this assumption, the finding that imperative subjects may 'escape' this movement could trivially be ascribed to the feature being weak or missing from the INFL head in the imperative phrase marker. This guarantees only that there is no strict requirement that the subject is in SpecIP, however, and not its occurrence in, possibly, SpecASPP. On a feature-checking approach to displacement, this movement cannot be accounted for quite as easily since aspectual features (unlike, for instance, Case features) are not checked by DPs.[79] A way out is to stipulate that other functional heads than INFL may also carry a strong [D]- or EPP-feature.

What makes matters more complicated is that imperative subjects do not seem to be excluded from occurring in SpecIP. Davies (1981) and later Potsdam (1996) have noted that *Subject do*(*n't*) orders are perfectly acceptable in examples like those in (44) and (46) below. In their accounts, the two orders arise because subject–auxiliary inversion to C is only optional in imperatives. Under the present analysis, which has argued that the auxiliary *do*(*n't*) occurs in INFL,

this possibility must be due to the availability of different surface positions for the subject: whereas post-*do*(*n't*) subjects occur in the Spec position of an intermediate projection below INFL, pre-*do*(*n't*) subjects must occupy a higher node, which suggests that they have actually been moved to SpecIP in these cases.

(43) a. *Don't you* go to the party!
[$_{IP}$ [$_{I}$ Don't][$_{FP}$ you$_{i}$ [$_{F}$ F][$_{VP}$ t$_{i}$ [$_{V}$ go] to the party]]]!

b. *Don't one of you* forget to lock the door!

c. *Don't the people bringing cars* be late on Sunday!

(44) a. OK, *you don't* go to the party, then! (If that's what you want.)
[$_{IP}$ You$_{i}$ [$_{I}$ don't][$_{FP}$ t'$_{i}$ [$_{F}$ F][$_{VP}$ t$_{i}$ [$_{V}$ go] to the party]]]!

b. *One of you don't* forget to lock the door!

c. *People bringing cars* don't be late on Sunday!

(45) a. (Bill, I'm begging you,)
DO YOU tell them she is innocent!
[$_{IP}$ [$_{I}$ DO][$_{FP}$ YOU$_{i}$ [$_{F}$ F][$_{VP}$ t$_{i}$ [$_{V}$ tell] them]]]!

b. *DO EVERYbody* give it a try! (Not only some of you!)

c. *DO SOMEone* answer the phone!
(Anyone! As long as it stops ringing.)

(46) a. *You DO* tell them she is innocent!
(Or I'll never speak to you again.)
[$_{IP}$ You$_{i}$ [$_{I}$ DO][$_{FP}$ t'$_{i}$ [$_{F}$ F][$_{VP}$ t$_{i}$ [$_{V}$ tell] them]]]!

b. *Everybody DO* give it a try! (Don't be shy!)

c. *Someone DO* answer the phone! (I'm busy cooking.)

Variation in the position of the subject is strictly impossible in other clause types in English:

(47) a. You didn't go to the party.

b. *Didn't you go to the party.

(48) a. Did you tell them she is innocent?

b. *You'd tell them she is innocent? (You'd = You did)

Thus, it seems to be specific to imperatives that subject raising as far as SpecIP is not required, but an option all the same. The flexible syntax of imperative subjects would, however, appear to be in conflict with the principles of Economy that the minimalist framework assumes, in particular, Last Resort. Should an EPP-feature in INFL force movement to occur (in *Subject do*(*n't*) structures), then displacement must be obligatory or the derivation will not converge. Should there be no EPP-feature in INFL (in *do*(*n't*) *Subject* structures), then movement is unmotivated and must not occur, or Last Resort will be violated. In this sense, the apparently optional movement of imperative subjects is problematic. One could resort to saying that depending on whether the subject occurs in SpecIP or SpecFP, an EPP-feature is optionally present in INFL, or optionally weak. Such a statement of the facts is theoretically not particularly satisfactory because of its descriptive nature and lack of explanatory qualities. Chapter 8 presents a critical discussion of the standard minimalist account of the displacement property of natural language. I will examine whether the framework allows for a more principled account (and a better understanding) of why the position of the subject may vary in English imperatives.

6
Marking Negation

At the heart of this chapter is an aspect of imperatives which has as yet not been dealt with: the distribution of *do not*. I will demonstrate that the relevant data can (to a large extent at least) be derived from the analysis of the syntax of imperative subjects that was developed in Chapter 5. The discussion in this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.1 presents a description of facts pertaining to *do not* and indicates the problems they have raised for analyses of the English imperative. In section 6.2 I provide a critical overview of solutions that have been suggested in the past, arguing that they are not fully satisfactory. I then outline my own account in section 6.3, in conjunction with a detailed analysis of the derivation of negative imperatives.[80]

6.1 The puzzle

The distribution of *do not* is a long-standing puzzle in the literature on imperatives. The conspicuous absence of a systematic analysis is presumably due to the fact that the syntactic behaviour of *do not* seems somewhat contradictory at times, as I will show below.

We saw earlier that imperatives are like interrogatives to the extent that inverted orders occur with the form *don't*. This is illustrated again in (1). Observe that the syntax of imperatives further resembles that of interrogatives with respect to *do not Subject* sequences. While these are usually judged ungrammatical in both cases (as illustrated by (2a, b)), they are possible in comparatively rare examples like those in (3) ((a) and (b) are from Potsdam 1996, p. 254).[81]

(1) a. Don't you desert me!

b. Didn't you desert him?

(2) a. *Do not you desert me!

b. *Did not you desert him?

(3) a. I know I've done wrong but I can't survive on my own. Oh please, do not ALL of you desert me!

b. DO not YOU, of all people, insult me in this heinous and base manner!

c. Did not the whole group of sixteen travellers wish to desert him in the Amazon jungle that day?[82]

As noted in Chapter 4, imperatives otherwise contrast sharply with interrogative clauses in that orders in which the subject intervenes between *do* and *not* are totally impossible. Compare:

(4) a. *Do you not desert me!

b. Did you not desert him?

Potsdam (1996, p. 253) points out that (as with *don't*) it is, on the other hand, quite possible for *do not* to be combined with a clause-initial subject, which in fact parallels the canonical configuration in finite declarative sentences. Consider the following examples:

(5) a. I know I've done wrong but I can't survive on my own. Oh please, SOMEbody do not desert me!

b. SOMEone do not abandon the gate! The fight is not yet lost and we must maintain the security.

c. One of you don't desert me!

d. I didn't / did not desert him.

Examples (6a, b), finally, show that *do not* freely alternates with *don't* in null subject (*pro*) imperatives. Note that these examples do not allow us to determine the position of *pro*, however.

(6) a. Don't desert me!

b. Do not desert me!

These observations are summarized in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1

	Overt subject imperatives	*Null subject imperatives*	*Interrogatives*	*Finite declaratives*
don't Subject	yes		yes	
do not Subject	yes*	do not (pro)?	yes*	
do Subject not	no	do (pro) not?	yes	
Subject do not	yes	(pro) do not?		yes
Subject don't	yes			yes

*In certain contexts.

Irrespective of the specific assumptions that are made in each case, some (sub-)sets of the above examples are puzzling for every analysis of imperatives. The large number of researchers who presuppose that imperative clauses are structurally analogous to interrogatives (that is, are CP structures) potentially have difficulty finding an explanation of the fact that *do Subject not* strings are not permitted (as well as allowing for the possibility of *do not* structures in which the subject occurs clause-initially). By contrast, it is specifically the limited availability of *do not Subject* orders that is the most interesting restriction from the point of view of the present approach, which argues that imperatives are of the category IP (at Spell-Out), rather than CP, as hitherto conceived. Recall that the syntactic representation I am assuming for 'inverted' imperatives is the one exemplified in (7a), which appears to predict quite wrongly that the order should be fully derivable in the manner illustrated in (7b).

(7) a. Don't you desert me!
[$_{IP}$ [$_{I}$ Don't][$_{FP}$ you desert me]]!

b. *Do not you desert me!
[$_{IP}$ [$_{I}$ Do][$_{NEGP}$ [$_{NEG}$ not][$_{FP}$ you desert me]]]!

In what follows, I shall briefly outline and comment on how previous analyses have sought to accommodate the distribution of *do not* in imperative clauses.

6.2 Previous analyses

Several suggestions have been made in the past as to how the rather peculiar distribution of *do not* is best accounted for.[83] Some researchers (including Zhang 1990, Zanuttini 1991, Henry 1995 and Platzack and Rosengren 1997) have largely ascribed it to properties of *do*. A somewhat different solution is offered by Beukema and Coopmans (1989) and Potsdam (1996), who suggest that it results from the particular syntax of negation in imperatives.[84] Some of these proposals are discussed below.

6.2.1 Zanuttini (1991)

Recall from Chapter 4 that Zanuttini assumes the existence of two distinct functional categories (clausal) negation in English: NEGP-1, headed by *n't*, which selects as its complement (hence, is contingent on the presence of) the 'split' category TP, and NEGP-2, a projection of the other negation marker *not*, which occurs lower down in the tree structure (and therefore is not affected by the (non-)instantiation of TP). The structurally separate NEGPs are indicated in diagram (8) below.

(8)



Zanuttini adopts a pre-minimalist framework according to which functional heads host verbal affixes. On this view, the function of the last resort auxiliary *do* is to act as an affixation host for bound morphemes like *n't* where these would otherwise be left unattached. Since, so Zanuttini maintains, the category AGR is void of an agreement affix in imperative clauses (which is why she speaks of an 'abstract' phrase FP), *do* is inserted higher up into C/T and subsequently raises to NEG-1 to enable *n't* to affix itself, as in:

(9) Don't you read the newspaper!
[$_{\text{NEGP-1}}$ [$_{\text{NEG-1}}$ [Do$_i$]n't][$_{\text{CP/TP}}$ (you) [$_{\text{C/T}}$ t$_i$][$_{\text{FP}}$ (you) [$_{\text{F}}$ F][$_{\text{VP}}$ [$_{\text{V}}$ read] the newspaper]]]]!

Whereas Zanuttini provides extensive justification for including NEGP-1 in the phrase marker of imperatives in English, the head of the second NEGP receives much less attention. She rules out ungrammatical examples like (10) on the grounds that the use of *do* is unmotivated because *not* need not be bound.[85]

(10) *Do you not read the newspaper!

This account is not entirely convincing for various reasons. First, we would expect that (11) is grammatical without *do*, but this is incorrect since leaving out the auxiliary yields the following ill-formed example.

(11) *You not read the newspaper!

Secondly, Zanuttini's hypothesis is clearly too strong in that it precludes *do not* occurring in imperatives with a null subject.[86]

(12) Do not read the newspaper!

What is more, if, as Zanuttini claims, imperative structures comprise a (phonologically null but 'syntactically active') T-head, the distribution of *do not* in overt subject imperatives should arguably be much freer than she envisages. If T carries some (zero) tense affix, one would predict that *do*-insertion is obligatory to support this affix regardless of whether or not *n't* is present (a procedure which Zanuttini appears to assume herself in her discussion of the derivation of

don't Subject structures, as indicated in (9) above). An example like (13a) shows that this prediction is borne out. This, in turn, means that Zanuttini has to say that imperative subjects occur not in SpecFP but in the Spec position of CP/TP, or else she obtains the undesired result of excluding the possibility of *Subject do not* orders and allowing for ungrammatical *do Subject not* structures like (13b), as indicated in the accompanying tree structure.

(13) a. I know I've done wrong but I can't survive on my own. Oh please, SOMEbody do not desert me!

b. *Do you not desert me!



Zanuttini does not examine the syntax of subjects within her analysis, however.

In sum, Zanuttini's account of the ungrammaticality of (10) seems problematic both empirically and theoretically, and possible alternative solutions remain unexplored.

6.2.2 Platzack and Rosengren (1997)

In Platzack and Rosengren's (1997, henceforth P&R) analysis of imperatives, *do* serves the same purpose as it does in Zanuttini's, with the difference that they assign *do* the status of an imperative verb. To the extent that this difference reduces to a question of categorization, P&R face essentially the same dilemmas in their attempt to account for the syntax of *do not*. The configuration which P&R assume conforms to the abstract representation in (14), where *do* heads a VP of its own (situated between negation and the main VP) which has the subject as its specifier.

(14) (. . .) [n't / not [$_{VP}$ Subject [$_{V}$ do][$_{VP}$ [$_{V}$ V]]]]

P&R argue that negating an imperative by means of *n't* triggers raising of *do* for affixation (as in (15a)), but when *not* is used, raising is unnecessary, hence the deviancy of (15b).[87]

(15) a. Don't you go there tomorrow!
[[Do$_i$]n't [$_{VP}$ you [$_{V}$ t$_i$][$_{VP}$ [$_{V}$ go] there tomorrow]]]!

b. *Do not you go there tomorrow!
[Do$_i$ not [$_{VP}$ you [$_{V}$ t$_i$][$_{VP}$ [$_{V}$ go] there tomorrow]]]!

This account is not without problems, considering the fact that the *in situ* counterpart of (16b) is not grammatical (either):

(16) *Not you do go there tomorrow!
[Not [$_{VP}$ you [$_{V}$ do][$_{VP}$ [$_{V}$ go] there tomorrow]]]!

The authors' statement that apparently 'support *do* for some reason needs to precede the negation' (p. 41) lacks explanatory value, and it is also diametrically opposed to their previous claim that (15b) is ill-formed because nothing forces *do* to raise in the presence of *not*. Another question to ask is why if movement is not required in (15b) above, *do* precedes *not* in examples such as (17a, b)?

(17) a. Do not go there tomorrow!

b. SOMEone do not abandon the gate! The fight is not yet lost and we must maintain the security.

In order to account for the ungrammaticality of (15b) versus the grammaticality of (17a, b), P&R adopt Zanuttini's (1991) proposal that English has an extra position for negation, and posit that in the latter two examples, *not* is generated on top of the main VP and below *do* to derive the observed word order. The internal structure of these examples would then look as follows:

(18) (. . .) [$_{VP}$ *pro* / someone [$_{V}$ do][not [$_{VP}$ [$_{V}$ V]]]]

Like Zanuttini (1991), P&R assert that evidence for this distribution of *not* is provided by an example such as the following (from Zhang 1991, p. 365), which shows that *not* can simultaneously occur with *n't*.

(19) Don't you not listen to him!

P&R say that in certain varieties of English (19) can be interpreted as synonymous with (20a) below. This would suggest that we are dealing with two instances of clausal negation (analogous to, say, modern French *ne . . . pas*) and show that this second, lower position is indeed available for clausal *not*. They do not make explicit which varieties of English they are referring to, though, and where standard English is concerned, (20b) seems to me to express the only permissible reading for (19), which involves constituent negation.

(20) a. Don't you listen to him!

b. (Do) listen to him!

It is, however, difficult to imagine in what sense the examples in (17) would favour a constituent negation over a clausal negation interpretation, and one might wonder if there is any plausible reason for saying that negation occurs in different syntactic positions in (15a) and (17a, b), respectively.[88] Moreover, note that P&R must assume (as they do) that the subject of imperatives is merged in the Spec position of the VP headed by *do* so as to avoid deriving (21), where the alleged second option of *not*-placement is selected.

(21) *Do not you go there tomorrow!
(. . .) [$_{VP}$ you [$_{V}$ do][not [$_{VP}$ (*you) [$_{V}$ go] there tomorrow]]]!

It is otherwise not obvious why imperative subjects should not be substituted in the Spec position of the main VP.

From the considerations above, I conclude that P&R's account does not stand on solid ground but is empirically questionable and seems to have some theoretical weaknesses.

6.2.3 Beukema and Coopmans (1989)

In the light of the problems that are associated with the accounts discussed in the foregoing sections, a more promising alternative might be the idea that the syntax of negation (rather than that of *do*) in imperatives is the determinant factor in the distribution of *do not*. This is what Beukema and Coopmans (1989, henceforth B&C) and Potsdam (1996) suggest.

B&C take the basic structure of negative clauses in English to be as in (22) below. Recall that they allocate tense features and clausal negation markers to INFL, and agreement features to COMP. When specified as [+AGR] (as B&C assume for English imperative clauses), COMP assigns the subject nominative Case under (the GB notion of) government.

(22)



Basing themselves on the grammaticality contrast between examples like (23a) and (23b), B&C claim that English negation is potentially of an affixal nature, and in imperatives has the 'special' property that it must obligatorily be attached to a lexical host.

(23) a. *You not be foolish!
[$_{CP}$ [$_{C}$ C][$_{IP}$ You [$_{I}$ not][$_{VP}$ [$_{V}$ be] foolish]]]!

b. I insist [that you not behave foolishly]

The host for affixation can be provided for by inserting the auxiliary *do*. Unaware of the fact that *Subject do not/don't* orders are not strictly impossible, B&C conclude that *do*-insertion apparently does not target INFL, as indicated in (24).

(24) *[$_{CP}$ [$_{C}$ C][$_{IP}$ You [$_{I}$ do-not][$_{VP}$ [$_{V}$ be] foolish]]]!

What they are left with, then, is assuming that *do* is inserted under C, as shown in (25).

(25)



From this perspective, example (26) is ungrammatical in spite of the presence of *do* because the relevant locality requirement on affixation is not met.

(26) *Do you not be foolish!

The way to satisfy the requirement, B&C propose, is to raise *not* to C and adjoin it to *do*. Whereas a failure of *do*-insertion straightforwardly rules out (27) below, on this scenario it is somewhat surprising that example (28a) turns out to be impossible while (28b) is fine.

(27) *Not you be foolish!
[$_{CP}$ [$_{C}$ Not$_{i}$][$_{IP}$ you [$_{I}$ t$_{i}$][$_{VP}$ [$_{V}$ be] foolish]]]!

(28) a. *Do not you be foolish!

b. Don't you be foolish!

B&C hypothesize that this may be so because adjoining *not* to *do* has a 'branching effect' which causes nominative Case-assignment to the subject from COMP [+AGR] to be blocked. In other words, the idea is that in a configuration like (29) the subject cannot receive Case:[89]

(29)



B&C argue that in (28b), on the other hand, such a situation does not arise because *not* is 'truly incorporated' into *do*, yielding the form *don't*. This is to say that they suggest regarding *don't* as 'one phonological word' or 'one single negative verbal item' in C. Consequently, COMP [+AGR] is able to assign the subject Case freely. Diagram (30), which represents (28b), illustrates B&C's point.

(30)



Consider now what happens in imperatives with a null subject (B&C's null operator). On the assumption that the null subject is to receive Case, too, B&C's system predicts that we find the same pattern. However, no Case-violation seems to arise here.

(31) Do not be foolish!

The solution offered by B&C is to suppose that the null subject raises further into SpecCP, which sets up a configuration in which COMP [+AGR] is able to Case-mark the subject by virtue of being in a Spec–Head agreement relation to it. The corresponding derivation is exemplified in (32).

(32)



B&C remark that they cannot resolve the problem that SpecCP must be restricted to null subjects, as there seems to be no plausible reason why overt subjects should be excluded from this position. That *Subject do not* orders are in fact available might be interpreted as supporting evidence for their analysis:

(33) I know I've done wrong but I can't survive on my own.
Oh please, SOMEbody do not desert me!

At the same time, the analysis has a number of disadvantages. First, it does not make immediate sense to classify *not* as a ('potential') affix. B&C stipulate that in imperative clauses *not* must be associated with a lexical item, while admitting that it can be free in other clause types (like infinitives and the subjunctive in (23b)). They crucially rely on this premise to explain the occurrence of *do not* in imperatives and why an example like (27) without *do* is ungrammatical. Secondly, it looks as if the authors treat the entities *n't* and *not* as mere phonological variants, which raises the question how 'true incorporation' of *not* into *do* in the phonological component could possibly bear on Case-assignment in the syntax. For, among others, these reasons, I find B&C's account of the distribution of *do not* problematic. It is, nonetheless, similar in spirit to the approach defended in this study. The Case-theoretic explanation which they have in mind, and the role of negation in this, will be further pursued in section 6.3.

6.2.4 Potsdam (1996)

Yet another account of the particulars of *do not* is the one suggested by Potsdam (1996), who (as discussed in Chapter 5) argues for a subject–auxiliary inversion analysis of imperative *do*(*n't*) *Subject* structures of the kind that is assumed for interrogative sentences.[90]

(34) a. Didn't you desert him?
[$_{CP}$ [$_{C}$ Didn't$_i$][$_{IP}$ you [$_{I}$ t'$_i$][$_{NEGP}$ [$_{NEG}$ t$_i$][$_{VP}$ [$_{V}$ desert] him]]]]?

b. Don't you desert me!
[$_{CP}$ [$_{C}$ Don't$_i$][$_{IP}$ you [$_{I}$ t'$_i$][$_{NEGP}$ [$_{NEG}$ t$_i$][$_{VP}$ [$_{V}$ desert] me]]]]!

His major problem is that, unlike the distribution of *don't*, the syntax of *do not* in inverted imperatives is not identical to that in interrogative clauses. In contrast to imperatives, interrogatives occur with *do Subject not* orders where the auxiliary *do* is raised from I to C alone and *not* left in NEG. This contrast is shown in (35) below.

(35) a. Did you not desert him?
[$_{CP}$ [$_{C}$ Did$_i$][$_{IP}$ you [$_{I}$ t$_i$][$_{NEGP}$ [$_{NEG}$ not][$_{VP}$ [$_{V}$ desert] him]]]]?

b. *Do you not desert him!

Potsdam also notes that inverted affirmative imperatives pattern differently from interrogative clauses in that the auxiliary *do* is always stressed, a situation illustrated by the examples in (36) and (37).

(36) Did you try again?
[$_{CP}$ [$_{C}$ Did$_i$][$_{IP}$ you [$_{I}$ t$_i$][$_{VP}$ [$_{V}$ try] again]]]?

(37) a. *Do you have another go!

b. DO AT LEAST YOU have another go, even if the others won't!

c. DO EVERYone give it a try!

How, then, does Potsdam's system accommodate these differences which at first sight seem to contradict his previous assumptions? Examining data like the above, Potsdam suspects that the relevant restriction on imperatives is that raising *do* to C has a grammatical result only if one of the following conditions holds: if (i) *do* is associated with negation (as in (34b)), or (ii) emphatic stress (as in (37b, c)), but not when the auxiliary is, so to speak, 'unmarked' (as in (35b) and (37a)). He formalizes this idea by correlating the different syntax of *do* (*not*) in imperatives and interrogatives with the feature triggering movement to C in these clause types. Given that negation and emphatic affirmation are the two instantiations of Laka's (1990) Σ category, Potsdam suggests that in imperatives movement to C is driven by some strong feature of COMP which is to be checked by a categorial feature [Σ]. Potsdam labels this feature [IMP]. (35b) and (37a) are immediately ruled out as a direct consequence of this specific requirement: the auxiliary *do* cannot act as a checker of strong [IMP] as it is itself not specified for the feature [Σ]. Potsdam argues that the fact that, by contrast, *do not Subject* orders are possible in contexts like (38) fits his theory.

(38) I know I've done wrong but I can't survive on my own.
Oh please, do not ALL of you desert me!

Due to the inability of *do* to check C([IMP]), Potsdam suggests, *not* has adjoined to the auxiliary here and the resulting complex is then

moved to C. This procedure allows for checking to take place, rendering otherwise unacceptable *do Subject not* structures acceptable. The diagram in (39) below shows the derivation of example (38) according to Potsdam.[91]

(39)



These assumptions, then, derive the strict adjacency between *do* and *not* that is observed in imperatives. Potsdam argues that (among other things) the distribution of adverbs provides empirical support for his claim that *do not* forms a syntactic unit in imperatives. Note that an adverb like *normally*, which (as a comparison of (40a) and (40b) shows) does not adjoin to a projection of V, can occur either before or after *do not* in imperative clauses but, crucially, cannot separate the two items. This is illustrated by the examples in (41).

(40) a. He (normally) does not (normally) [$_{VP}$ quickly [$_{V}$ respond]]

b. *He does not quickly normally respond.

(41) a. Normally do not wait so long before responding!

b. Do not normally wait so long before responding!

c. *Do normally not wait so long before responding!

On Potsdam's account, the surface position of the adverb in (41a, b) varies according to whether or not the complex *do-not* adjunction structure undergoes raising to C (as indicated in (42a, b)). The ill-formedness of (42c) would prove that *do* cannot be raised separately across the adverb.

(42) a. $[_{IP}$ *pro* Normally $[_{I}$ do$][_{\Sigma P}$ $[_{\Sigma}$ not$][_{VP}$ wait so long$]]]$!

b. $[_{CP}$ $[_{C}$ [Do-not]$_{i+j}][_{IP}$ *pro* normally $[_{I}$ $t_i][_{\Sigma P}$ $[_{\Sigma}$ $t_j][_{VP}$ wait so long$]]]]$!

c. *$[_{CP}$ $[_{C}$ Do$_i][_{IP}$ *pro* normally $[_{I}$ $t_i][_{\Sigma P}$ $[_{\Sigma}$ not$][_{VP}$ wait so long$]]]]$!

The ordering *Subject Adverb not* is, on the other hand, fully grammatical in interrogatives (like (43)), which follows from the idea that interrogative COMP does not require checking by a feature Σ.

(43) Do you normally not wait so long before responding?
$[_{CP}$ $[_{C}$ Do$_i][_{IP}$ you normally $[_{I}$ $t_i][_{\Sigma P}$ $[_{\Sigma}$ not$][_{VP}$ wait so long$]]]]$?

Potsdam's reasoning is, however, based on the assumption that the adverb occurs in a pre-INFL position. As example (40) above shows, *normally* may also occur after negation. This implies that the *do not Adverb* order in imperatives need not necessarily result from movement, but may alternatively arise where the adverb is attached between ΣP and the VP. That is to say, Potsdam's data only show that adverbs cannot intervene between *do* and *not*, but they do not rule out the possibility that (44) represents the structure of (41b), which is essentially what I shall be assuming.

(44) $[_{IP}$ *pro* $[_{I}$ Do$][_{\Sigma P}$ $[_{\Sigma}$ not] (normally) $[_{VP}$ wait so long$]]]$!

In order to guarantee that *Subject do not* constructions are also possible, Potsdam's analysis stipulates that the strong feature [IMP] is only an optional feature and may be absent, thus removing the need for I-to-C movement. Potsdam assumes the syntactic representation of (45) to be the following, which corresponds to that of finite declarative clauses.

(45) SOMEone do not abandon the gate! The fight is not yet lost and we must maintain the security.



As Potsdam's account stands, its main shortcoming is that it does not suffice to explain the occurrence of the auxiliary *do* in *do not* imperatives. If nothing else is said, there seems to be no motivation at all for *do* other than that it serves to carry *not* to C in *do not Subject* constructions, so as to ensure that a checking relation between *not* ([Σ]) and [IMP] can be established. While the use of *do* as a bearer of the bound morpheme *n't* and emphatic affirmation is clearly justified, we may ask why *not* would first adjoin to *do* in INFL rather than moving up to C alone to check [IMP] directly. Why *do* is equally obligatory in non-inverted constructions (such as (45)) also remains largely unclear as, under Potsdam's analysis, the strong [IMP]-feature is absent there, and he does not identify an independent trigger for *do*-insertion in structures with *not*. In short, Potsdam does not offer a straightforward explanation of the fact that an example like (46) is ungrammatical.

(46) *SOMEone not abandon the gate!
The fight is not yet lost and we must maintain the security.

6.3 An alternative analysis

Potsdam notes that as a conceivable alternative to his complex subject–auxiliary inversion account of *do not Subject* sequences, the

word order is also derived when the subject remains VP-internal and *do* and *not* surface in their positions of lexical insertion INFL and NEG, respectively. (a) below, rather than his representation (b), would then represent the structure of example (47).

(47) I know I've done wrong but I can't survive on my own.
Oh please, do not ALL of you desert me!

a. $[_{IP}\ [_{I}$ Do$][_{NEGP}\ [_{NEG}$ not$][_{VP}\ [_{QP}$ all of you$][_{V}$ desert$]$ me$]]]$!

b. $[_{CP}\ [_{C}$ [Do-not$]_{i+j}][_{IP}\ [_{QP}$ all of you$][_{I}\ t_i][_{NEGP}\ [_{NEG}\ t_j]$
$[_{VP}\ [_{V}$ desert$]$ me$]]]]$!

Recall from the discussion in Chapter 5, however, that there exists abundant empirical evidence that subjects of imperative clauses are moved to some higher argument position, which renders this idea untenable. Yet if we allow for the possibility of other functional heads intervening between V and INFL, the set of specifier positions that could potentially host an external argument is expanded, so that it might be possible that the subject-QP in (47) occupies the Spec position of some intermediate functional projection FP above the VP and below NEGP, as illustrated by (48) below.

(48) $[_{IP}\ [_{I}$ do$][_{NEGP}\ [_{NEG}$ not$][_{FP}\ [_{QP}$ all of you$]_i\ [_{F}$ F$][_{VP}\ t_i\ [_{V}$ desert$]$ me$]]]]$!

In the previous chapter I presented independent arguments for considering this a valid account of the distribution of imperative subjects.[92] In this way, I reconciled the occurrence of inverted *do*(*n't*) *Subject* orders with the claim I made in Chapter 4 that the auxiliary *do* has the same syntax in imperatives as it does in finite declarative clauses. To recapitulate, the claim is that *do* is inserted into INFL only where an intervening Σ head interferes with the checking of features between V and INFL, and that the auxiliary does not occur any higher than this in the clause structure of imperatives.

Let us therefore re-examine the set of data that have been under consideration in this section. The FP analysis assumes that imperative *do not* structures have the following basic structure:

(49) $[_{IP}$ (Subject$_i$) $[_{I}$ do$][_{NEGP}\ [_{NEG}$ not$][_{FP}$ (Subject$_i$) $[_{F}$ F$][_{VP}\ t_i\ [_{V}$ V$]]]]]$!

As a beginning, the non-occurrence of *do Subject not* sequences (which poses an immediate problem for the CP analysis) is not unexpected. As a matter of fact, it follows directly from the proposed configuration for the trivial reason that a sentence like (50) cannot be assigned a legitimate structural description. There is no suitable (A-)slot between IP and the FP for the subject to be moved into, as indicated below.[93]

(50) *Do you not desert me!



The really pertinent question is why *do not Subject* strings are not invariably grammatical when the subject occurs in the Spec position of FP. Compare (51a) to (51b):

(51) I know I've done wrong but I can't survive on my own. Oh please,
   a. *Do not you desert me!
   b. Do not ALL of you desert me!

The FP analysis argues that subjects of English imperatives may or may not be raised to SpecIP. I assume that where the subject is raised no further than SpecFP (as in 'inverted' constructions), the checking of, for example, nominative Case between the subject and INFL(*do*)

happens covertly. The ungrammaticality of (51a) and many similar examples might then derive from some locality condition that the relation between two items that check features in this manner must be strictly local. In the framework of Chomsky (1995a, ch. 4), the features of the subject are to adjoin to INFL(*do*). Under some interpretation of Shortest Move or the Minimal Link Condition, it may be that this *head*-adjunction procedure fails where another syntactic *head*, like NEG(*not*), intervenes. On the assumptions of Chomsky (1998), an intermediate NEG(*not*) may block Agree between the subject in SpecFP and *do* in INFL (see Chapter 4, note 61 for some discussion). Thus, what I want to suggest is that structures like (52) are ruled out because *not* breaks the apparently necessary adjacency between IP and the FP for feature checking between the subject and INFL(*do*) to succeed.

(52) *Do not you leave me!



With regard to (51b), notice that the most natural reading of the example is not (a), but (b), which concerns constituent negation.

(53) I know I've done wrong but I can't survive on my own.
Oh please, do not ALL of you desert me!

a. I request that all of you not desert me.

b. I request that not all of you desert me.

In this function, *not* has a crucially different distribution. Whereas clausal *not* is a syntactic head in the structure of (52), the structure of (53) is as shown in figure (54), where constituent *not* is adjoined to the QP.

(54) Oh, please, do not ALL of you desert me!



Here, the requirements of Checking Theory can arguably be satisfied because there is no 'head' material intervening between the complex QP-subject and INFL(*do*). What seems to be crucial for *do not Subject* constructions to be felt acceptable, then, is whether or not *not* can receive a constituent negation interpretation. The acceptability of these constructions declines according to how readily such a reading is available. Where an appropriate context is difficult to construe, as in the case of (51a), *do not Subject* strings are judged to be bad.

We have seen that clausal *not*, on the other hand, can be used in structures with a clause-initial subject or a covert (*pro*) subject.

(55) I know I've done wrong but I can't survive on my own. Oh please,
   a. SOMEbody do not desert me!
   b. Do not desert me!

This contrast is more easily accommodated in a system in which pre-*do* and post-*do* subjects have a different distribution. As with finite declarative subjects, *somebody* in (55a) undergoes (further) A-movement into SpecIP, where it can enter into an 'ordinary' Spec–Head agreement relation with INFL(*do*). The presence of *not* hence does not affect the derivation.[94]

(56) Oh please, SOMEbody do not desert me!



The fact that negative 'inverted' constructions with *don't* are not restricted implies that in the derivation of (57), features *can* be checked covertly.

(57) Don't you desert me!

This, in turn, suggests that in *don't Subject* structures, INFL and SpecFP are adjacent. I take this to mean that the bound morpheme *n't* is not an independent NEG head, but that *Auxn't* forms rather are unitary elements in the lexicon, which get inserted into INFL directly. Note that this idea is consistent with the current minimalist assumption that words enter the computational system fully inflected. I propose that (57) has the structure in (58) below.[95,96]

(58) Don't you desert me!



Note that the proposed analysis neatly captures that fact that 'inverted' imperatives are restricted in the same way as expletive–associate constructions of the type illustrated in (59). Similar to what I propose for 'inverted' imperative subjects, it has been argued that the low thematic subject of such constructions has Case and φ-features to check with INFL (Chomsky 1995a, ch. 4, Felser and Rupp 2001). In addition to the lack of wide quantifier scope they share with 'inverted' imperatives, existential sentences are indeed sensitive to the *Auxn't* / *not* distinction, too.[97]

(59) a. *There is not anyone waiting outside.
[$_{IP}$ There [$_{I}$ is][$_{NEGP}$ [$_{NEG}$ not] anyone waiting outside]]

b. There isn't anyone waiting outside.
[$_{IP}$ There [$_{I}$ isn't] anyone waiting outside]

To sum up the discussion in this chapter, after having critically examined a number of previously suggested accounts which assign the syntax of either *do* or *not* an important role, I showed that the analysis of the syntax of imperative subjects developed in Chapter 5 provides a means for explaining the restricted distribution of *do not* in imperatives. The proposed account also makes crucial use of the different syntactic status of clausal and constituent negation. It offers a comparatively simple answer to the question of why *do not* is possible in imperative clauses only if (i) the subject is placed clause-initially or (ii) *not* expresses constituent negation, but cannot be used in 'inverted' structures. I first pointed out that under the present analysis, the ungrammaticality of *do Subject not* strings reduces to a non-issue to the extent that there simply is not a way for this order to arise. I went on to relate the (un)availability of clausal *not* in (non-)inverted constructions to the different distribution of post-*do* and pre-*do* subjects. I argued that negating 'inverted' imperatives with *not* (*do not Subject*) is impossible because an intervening NEG head blocks covert feature checking between INFL(*do*) and the low subject in SpecFP. The presence of *not* is of no consequence for the derivation of non-inverted imperatives (*Subject do not*), where the subject is moved into the higher SpecIP position and can check features with INFL(*do*) via Spec–Head agreement. I further argued that the reason why constituent *not* can be used in 'inverted' imperatives (provided that an appropriate context can be construed) is that constituent *not* does not constitute a syntactic head and hence does not interfere with checking. Treating negative auxiliaries as lexically unitary INFL-items was shown to help account for the possibility of *don't* in 'inverted' imperatives, and I concluded that the proposals put forward in this chapter find additional support from the fact that the distribution of *not* is similarly restricted in expletive–associate constructions.

7
Imperative Subjects in Germanic

So far I have worked with the hypothesis that English imperatives are specified for agreement, despite the fact that in this clause type verbs do not carry any agreement morphology. I based this [AGR] hypothesis on historical data, which show the previous existence of a distinct imperative inflection, and the apparent nominative Case property of the subject. The motivation for the hypothesis derived from the syntax of *do*(*n't*) in imperatives. My claim is that the auxiliary occurs in INFL where a Σ head intervenes between V and I. This suggests that INFL is associated with non-interpretable features, and among the features INFL typically is associated with is [AGR].

The [AGR] hypothesis ties in with morphosyntactic accounts of subject realization that have been suggested in the literature. Recall from Chapter 2 that Zhang (1990) and Henry (1995) argue that the imperative is the only clause type in English that admits *pro* because the feature matrix of imperative INFL is restricted to [2ND] person. This account is consistent with the possibility of grammatically third person subject-DPs providing that we allow for some mechanism of 'semantic agreement' operating in imperatives. I noted that it is true, though, that the facts of subject realization in English imperatives can equally be captured by an analysis which assumes no agreement marking but relies on the semantic/pragmatic notion of 'addressee'. In this chapter I will examine the [AGR] hypothesis from a cross-linguistic perspective, in which I was inspired by work by Bennis (forthcoming) on Dutch imperatives. Other Germanic languages that will be considered are Belfast English (Henry 1995), West Flemish, German, and Danish (Jensen 2002).

7.1 Dutch

7.1.1 Verb morphology

As Bennis (forthcoming) points out, Dutch has quite a complex second person system. There are four second person nominative pronouns: *jij* [2SG], *jullie* [2PL], *U* [POLITE] and the weak form *je*. The corresponding verb inflections in the non-past indicative paradigm are *-t*, *-en* and *-t*, respectively. The pattern is illustrated in (1).

(1) a. *Jij / Je **gaat** nooit vroeg naar huis.*
you go never early to home
'You never go home early.'

b. *Jullie **gaan** nooit vroeg naar huis.*

c. *U **gaat** nooit vroeg naar huis.*

One complication is that the singular inflection is absent in inverted structures, like interrogatives. Instead, the stem of the verb is used:

(2) a. ***Ga** jij / je wel eens vroeg naar huis?*
go you PART ever early to home?
'Do you ever go home early?'

b. ***Gaan** jullie wel eens vroeg naar huis?*

c. ***Gaat** U wel eens vroeg naar huis?*

The verb forms used in imperatives are usually identical to those in finite declaratives and interrogatives, with one exception. The verb *zijn* 'be' has a particular imperative form, which occurs with the same morphology. This is demonstrated in (3–5).

(3) a. ***Ga** jij eens naar huis!*
go-2S.IMP. you PART to home!
'You go home!'

b. ***Gaan** jullie eens naar huis!*

c. ***Gaat** U eens naar huis!*

(4) a. ***Wees*** *jij maar niet bang!*
be-2S.IMP. you PART not afraid!
'Don't you be afraid!'

b. ***Wezen*** *jullie maar niet bang!*
be-2PL.IMP. you PART not afraid!

c. ***Weest*** *U maar niet bang!*
be-2POLITE.IMP. you PART not afraid!

(5) a. ***Ben*** *jij wel eens bang?*
be-2S.PRES.IND. you PART ever scared
'Are you ever scared?'

b. ***Zijn*** *jullie wel eens bang?*
be-2PL.PRES.IND. you PART ever scared

c. ***Bent*** *U wel eens bang?*
be-2POLITE.PRES.IND. you PART ever scared

While Dutch is traditionally analysed as a uniformly Verb-Second language, more recently Zwart (1993) has argued that non-inverted orders reflect verb movement to INFL, whereas inverted orders reflect further movement to C. This debate does not affect Bennis's conclusion that in Dutch imperatives, the verb moves to C and INFL is specified for the feature [2ND], as long as we assume that the second person singular form covertly agrees with the subject. Note in this connection that different from English, this form is distinctive to the extent that the infinitive has an ending in Dutch (-(*e*)*n*).

(6) *Jij zal nooit eens vroeg naar huis* ***gaan*** / ****ga.***
you will never ever early to home go-INF.
'You will never ever go home early.'

7.1.2 Subject realization

Bennis (forthcoming) makes the interesting observation that the possibilities for overt subjects in Dutch imperatives are more restricted than in English. As shown in (7–8), only second person pronouns are possible. Using grammatically third person DPs as the subject of an imperative is ungrammatical, even if they are in principle amenable to an addressee reading.

(7) *Ga jij maar weg!*
go-2S.IMP. you PART away!
'You go away!'

(8) a. **Ga*(*at*) *iedereen maar weg!*
go-2S.IMP.(3S.) everybody PART away!
*'Everybody go away!'

b. **Zeuren kinderen niet nu!*
nag-2PL.IMP. children not now
*'Children stop nagging!'

c. **Letten zij op de eerste rij nu eventjes op!*
look-2PL.IMP. those on the front row now for-a-moment on
*'Those on the front row pay attention for a moment!'

d. **Pas*(*t*) *die jongen daar op!*
look-2S.IMP.(3S.) that boy over-there on
*'That boy over there be careful!'

Note, however, that the option available in Dutch is to use such DPs in a morphosyntactically different clause type which can be conveyed with the illocutionary force of a directive, like the infinitival clauses in (9a, b) or the participial constructions in (9c, d).[98] Potential relevant in this context is that these are generally taken to be unmarked for agreement.

(9) a. *Iedereen ophoepelen!*
everybody out-get-INF.
'Everybody get out!'

b. *Kinderen niet zeuren nu!*
children not nag-INF. now
'Children stop nagging!'

c. *Zij op de eerste rij eventjes opgelet nu!*
those on the front row for-a-moment on-look-PARTICIPLE now
'Those on the front row pay attention for a moment!'

d. *Die jongen daar opgepast!*
that boy over-there out-look-PARTICIPLE
'That boy over there be careful!'

Bennis notes that the weak pronoun *je* cannot occur in imperatives, which he ascribes to imperatives allowing for the weak variant of the pronoun to be *pro*. As for English, the behaviour of reflexive anaphors and other grammatical phenomena shows that *pro* can be nothing other than the addressee.

(10) *Geef jezelf / Uzelf / *zichzelf eens wat rust!*
give 2.REFL. / POLITE.REFL. / 3.REFL. for-once some rest
'Give yourself some rest for once!'

7.1.3 Subject syntax

Another interesting way in which Dutch imperatives differ from English imperatives is that the distribution of the subject may not vary but is fixed in a position after the verb (which I take to be SpecIP).

(11) *Ga (jij) nu (*jij) maar (*jij) weg*!
go-2S.IMP. (you) now (*you) PART (*you) away

The pronoun may occur in a right-peripheral position, as in (12a) below. Bennis (forthcoming) argues that examples like these do not constitute genuine cases of postverbal subjects, however, but rather instances of right-dislocation or vocatives. He observes that while full NPs can equally occur clause-finally in imperatives, they cannot occur in the canonical subject position. This suggests that they are not syntactic subjects and that the right-peripheral position is not a syntactic subject position. Similar reasoning applies to the example in (13a). Given that such examples admit NPs which otherwise cannot serve as the subject of an imperative, they might best be analysed as finite declaratives with directive force.

(12) a. *Ga nu maar weg mijn kind / sukkel / man!*
go-2S.IMP. now PART away my child / fool / fellow
'Go away, my child / you fool / you fellow!'

b. **Ga mijn kind / sukkel / man nu maar weg!*

(13) a. *Jij gaat nu weg!*
you go-2S.PRES.IND. now away

b. *Iedereen / Die jongen daar gaat nu weg!*
everybody / that boy over-there go-3S.PRES.IND. now away

c. *Kinderen / Zij op de eerste rij gaan nu weg!*
children / those on the front row go-PL.PRES.IND. now away

7.1.4 The [AGR] hypothesis

Summarizing the observed differences between imperatives in Dutch and English: (i) verbs are morphologically marked for [2ND] person agreement in imperatives in Dutch, but not in English. (ii) Grammatically third person DPs may be used as the subject of English imperatives on the condition that they can be understood as the addressee(s). In Dutch, by contrast, such DPs can only occur as the subject of agreementless infinitival and participial constructions or agreeing [3RD] finite declaratives with directive force. (iii) There is variation in the positioning of the subject in English imperatives, whereas in Dutch imperatives subject position is fixed in SpecIP.

For reasons just mentioned, I earlier hypothesized that the INFL-node of present-day English imperatives contains a feature [2ND], the morphological facts notwithstanding. The assumption was made compatible with the possibility of grammatically third person subject-DPs by appealing to some mechanism of 'semantic agreement'. I acknowledged before that it is not apparent, then, why the mechanism should not be applicable to other types of clause, as the example repeated here in (14) shows.

(14) *If everyone behave yourselves, you can go to the park.
(addressing a group of children)

What is more, any attempt to derive the availability of the mechanism from some specific property of the imperative clause type will immediately be undermined by the Dutch data. Following Bennis's (forthcoming) line of thought, let us therefore assume the basic difference to be this: in Dutch imperatives, INFL has a specified [2ND] feature (which clearly ultimately follows from semantic/pragmatic factors), whereas in English imperatives, the inflectional head lacks φ-features altogether. The subject properties under consideration then fall out as follows. With INFL being specified as [2ND] person in Dutch imperatives, subject properties are determined by mor-

phosyntax: (i) the feature value of *pro* is restricted to [2ND] person (the addressee(s)); (ii) using grammatically third person DPs as subjects results in a feature mismatch, causing the derivation to crash; and (iii) the subject must be placed in SpecIP to check subject–verb agreement. With INFL lacking φ-features in English imperatives, subject properties are determined by the semantics/pragmatics of the imperative: (i) *pro* is always the addressee ([2ND] person); (ii) grammatical third person subject-DPs are possible as long as they, in some sense, denote the addressee(s); and (iii) subjects need not occur in SpecIP because there are no φ-features to check in INFL. (The question of why the EPP may not force the subject to occur there, and why subject position should vary at all, will be addressed in the discussion in Chapter 8.) Accordingly, the [AGR] hypothesis may be (re)formulated as in (15).

(15) *[AGR] hypothesis*
   a. where imperatives are [+AGR], we only find grammatically second person subjects and subject position is fixed.
   b. where imperatives are [–AGR], we find subject-DPs other than second person and subject position may vary.

In the following sections I will examine the [AGR] hypothesis from the perspective of a number of other Germanic languages.[99]

7.2 Belfast English (Henry 1995)

Henry (1995, pp. 45–80) examines the syntax of imperatives in two varieties of Belfast English, which she terms dialect A and dialect B. In both dialects verb morphology and subject realization in imperatives are identical to standard English. Henry reports that word order varies, too, though in dialect A to a somewhat lesser extent than in dialect B. Data from dialect A and B are given in (16) and (17), respectively.

(16) a. You go away!
   b. Go you away!

(17) a. You read that!

b. Read you that!

Henry argues that the *Verb Subject* and *Subject Verb* orders should equally be understood in terms of the scope of subject raising. To this extent, Belfast English seems to behave exactly like standard English.

In dialect A, inverted orders are only found with what Henry classifies as 'telic' verbs (that is, V(P)s denoting actions that have an endpoint). Consider the grammaticality contrasts in (18) and (19):

Dialect A

(18) a. *Read you that! (TRANSITIVE)

b. *Always laugh you at his jokes! (INTRANSITIVE)

c. Go you there! (TELIC VP)

(19) a. *Run you!

b. *Run you every day if you want to keep fit!

c. *Run you in the garden!

d. Run you into the garden!

Telic verbs have been argued to belong to the unaccusative class (see the references in Henry 1995), which lack an external argument. An argument for this is that dialect A also allows for inverted sequences in passive imperatives, like (20).

(20) Be elected you president before the end of the year!

There are different ways in which the *Verb Subject* and *Subject Verb* surface orderings could arise. As indicated in (21) below, it may be that in *Verb Subject* strings, neither the verb nor the subject is moved, while the *Subject Verb* order derives when the subject is raised from the canonical object position to a higher argument position. Alternatively, surface subject position may invariably be SpecIP, and the verb is in V in *Subject Verb* sequences, but moved to the C position in front of the subject in *Verb Subject* orders, as indicated in (22).

(21) a. $[_{IP}\ [_{I}\ I][_{VP}\ [_{V}$ Verb] Subject]]

b $[_{IP}$ Subject$_i$ $[_{I}\ I][_{VP}\ [_{V}$ Verb] $t_i]]$

(22) a. $[_{IP}$ Subject$_i$ $[_{I}\ I][_{VP}\ [_{V}$ Verb] $t_i]]$

b. $[_{CP}\ [_{C}$ Verb$_j]$ $[_{IP}$ Subject$_i$ $[_{I}\ t'_j][_{VP}\ [_{V}\ t_j]\ t_i]]]$

Henry provides evidence that the first analysis of inverted structures is correct. Note that where the imperative contains an auxiliary, as in (20) above, the subject does not occur after the auxiliary but after the main verb. Furthermore, the verb always follows S(entence)- and VP-adverbs, and the subject always immediately follows the verb. Adverbs cannot intervene between them, as the data in (23) and (24) show.

(23) a. *Run quickly you home!

b. Quickly run you home!
$[_{IP}\ [_{I}\ I][_{VP}$ quickly $[_{VP}\ [_{V}$ run] you] home]]

c. You quickly run home!
$[_{IP}$ You$_i$ $[_{I}\ I][_{VP}$ quickly $[_{VP}\ [_{V}$ run] $t_i]$ home]]

(24) a. *Go always you to school!

b. Always go you to school!

c. You always go to school!

This pattern suggests that the verb does not move from the VP in dialect A imperatives, and that the subject may or may not be left *in situ*.

In dialect B, the *Verb Subject* order is grammatical with all verbs – it is not restricted to unaccusatives.

Dialect B

(25) a. You read that book!

b. Read you that book!

(26) a. You do your best!

b. Do you your best!

This entails that here it cannot be that in inverted orders the verb remains in V and the subject in CompVP. Assuming that the lowest subject position is SpecVP for transitive structures, the first observation to make is that the verb must be outside the verb phrase. (Henry argues the verb to be C.)

Henry applies a number of diagnostic tests to determine where the subject is exactly in *Verb Subject* strings. Particularly revealing is the relative position of the subject with respect to weak object pronouns and S-adverbs. Note that verbs can precede S-adverbs in dialect B imperatives. The same is true of the subject (as illustrated in (27a)), though it is also possible to have the adverb intervening between the verb and subject (as in (27b)).

(27) a. Remember you always your homework!

b. Remember always you your homework!

Weak object pronouns may precede or follow the subject, which might be taken to demonstrate some form of 'object shift' occurring in dialect B. The pre-subject position is not available for non-pronominal objects.

(28) a. Give you it to the teacher!

b. Give it you to the teacher!

(29) a. Give you the book to the teacher!

b. *Give the book you to the teacher!

In relation to S-adverbs, the position of a weak pronoun is fixed, however; it must appear to the left of such adverbs. By contrast, the object must appear to the right of the adverb where it is a full NP.

(30) a. Make you them always a cup of tea!

b. *Make you always them a cup of tea!

c. Make them always you a cup of tea!

(31) a. *Make you your mummy always a cup of tea!

b. Make you always your mummy a cup of tea!

On the assumption that the weak object pronoun shifts to a position of the SpecAGR-O type, the two grammatical orderings in (30) must be due to variation in the distribution of the subject. Specifically, the subject must have been kept in SpecVP in *Verb Object Adverb Subject* structures like (30c), but raised in *Verb Subject Object Adverb* structures like (30a), and raised even higher in *Subject Verb* structures like the earlier examples (25a, 26a). Henry proposes that subject positioning may vary because the NP-feature of her AGR-S node is optionally weak in imperatives.[100]

7.3 West Flemish[101]

7.3.1 Verb morphology

West Flemish (WF) has two forms for imperatives: one with and without *-t*. Historical work by de Schutter (1997) indicates that *-t* was originally a plural ending. The two forms are nowadays in free variation to the extent that they can both be used with second singular, second plural and covert subjects.

(32) a. *Kom*(*t*) *gie* *ier!*
come-2.IMP you-2S.NOM. here
'You come here!'

b. *Kom*(*t*) *gunder* *ier!*
come-2.IMP you-2PL.NOM. here

c. *Kom*(*t*) *ier!*

As in Dutch, the verb stem is not used elsewhere (the infinitive ending in -(*e*)*n*, *kommen* 'to come'), which makes the form distinctive. Facts from negation suggest that this imperative form is 'finite'. As discussed in detail in Haegeman (2000, 2001 and earlier work), WF sentential negation is expressed by means of the negation marker *nie* 'not' or some other negative quantifier. In addition, WF negative sentences may contain a bound morpheme *en-*. Haegeman takes this suffix to spell out the head of a NEGP or a POL(arity)P, which is dominated by an INFL(ectional) node. The distribution of *en-* is subject to a number of restrictions. One constraint (demonstrated by the examples in (33)) is that *en-* is compatible with finite verbs and not with infinitives.

(33) a. (. . .) *da Valère dat us nie* (***en***-)*kuopt* /
that Valère that house not (en-)buy-PRES.IND. /
kocht.
PAST.IND.
'(. . .) that Valère does / did not buy the house.'

b. *Mee Valère dat us nie* (****en***-)*te* (****en***-)*kuopen* (. . .).
with Valère that house not (*en-)to (*en-)buy-INF.
'With Valère not to buy (not buying) that house (. . .).'

Haegeman argues this finite/non-finite asymmetry to show that *en-* is dependent on or gives rise to verb movement. She proposes that finite verbs move to INFL in WF, where they license *en-*, whereas infinitive verbs do not raise as far as INFL and hence cannot license *en-*. While in the above examples verb movement may be somewhat obscured by what Haegeman analyses as leftward remnant movement of the extended projection of the verb, raising is clearly observed in the data below. In so-called IPP-constructions, the finite verb may remain to the right of the IPP-complement (as in (34a)), but it must move in the presence of *en-* (as shown in (34b)).

(34) a. (. . .) *da Valère nie willen dienen boek kuopen*
that Valère not want that book buy
eet.
have-PRES.IND.
'(. . .) that Valère has not wanted to buy that book.'

b. (. . .) *da Valère nie* ***en-ee*** *willen dienen boek*
that Valère not en-have-PRES.IND. want that book
kuopen (****en-eet***).
buy (*en-have-PRES.IND.)
'(. . .) that Valère has not wanted to buy that book'.

Note that *en-* is not compatible with directive infinitives, but can occur with the two 'true' imperative forms, suggesting that the latter are both finite and raise at least as high as INFL.

(35) a. *Die liedjes nie* (****en***-)*zingen!*
those songs not (*en-)zing-INF.
'Don't sing those songs!'

b. (***En***-) *doe*(*t*) *da nie!*
(en-) do-2.IMP. that not
'Don't do that!'

In conjunction with the distinctiveness of the verb stem, we might interpret this to mean that both the stem form and the *t*-form of the verb are specified [+AGR] ([2ND]), similar to the apparent situation in Dutch imperatives. Given the inverted order and the Verb-Second nature of WF, we may also assume that the verb is similarly moved to C.

7.3.2 Subject properties

As for subject properties, WF imperatives likewise seem to pattern with Dutch imperatives in the relevant respects. Subjects of declaratives are often clitics, which may be 'doubled' by a stressed pronoun. With *pro* available as a weak form in imperatives, overt subjects are always full pronouns.

(36) a. (. . .) *dan-j* (*gie*) *nor us goat.*
dat-you (you) to home go-PRES.IND.
'(. . .) that you go home.'

b. **Goa-j* (*gie*) *moa!*
go-2.IMP-you (you) PART

c. *Goa* (*gie*) *moa!*
'(You) go now!'

Grammatically third person DPs are never grammatical in 'true' imperatives but may be fine in 'surrogate' constructions like directive infinitives.

(37) a. **Luster*(*t*) *iedereen een kee!*
listen-2.IMP. everybody for once

b. *Iedereen lusteren!*
everybody listen-INF.

c. **Loop*(*t*) *Jan moa!*
walk-2.IMP. Jan PART

d. *En Jan lopen!*
and Jan walk-INF.
'And Jan start walking!'

e. **Kom*(*t*) *dienen die doa stoat ier!*
come-2.IMP. the-one who there stands here

f. *Dienen die doa stoat ier kommen!*
the-one who there stands here come-INF.
'The one who is standing over there come here!'

Subject position is generally fixed directly after the verb, with one exception: object clitics may intervene. This, however, is not specific to imperatives, as the (b) example of (39) shows.

(38) *Doe*(*t*) (*gie*) *da* (**gie*) *moa* (**gie*) *nie!*
do-2.IMP. (you) that (*you) PART (*you) not
'Don't (you) do that!'

(39) a. *Doe et gie* (??*et*) *moa!*
do-2.IMP. it you (??it) PART
'You do it!'

b. *Ee-j et gie* (??*et*) *gezien?*
have-PRES.IND.-you it you (??it) see-PARTICIPLE
'Have you seen it?'

7.4 German[102]

Verb morphology in German imperatives compares to that in imperatives in Dutch. As illustrated in (40), the second person plural pronoun (*ihr*) is used with a verb form identical to the indicative [2PL] form. The third person plural pronoun can be used as a polite addressee form (*Sie*) and combines with the same plural verb form that occurs in the indicative paradigm. The verb form used with the second person singular pronoun (*du*) is again the verb stem, which is similarly unique to the imperative (compare: *gehen* 'go-INF.').

(40) a. ***Geh*** *du mal morgen hin!*
go-2S.IMP. you PART tomorrow there
'You go there tomorrow!'

b. *Du* ***gehst*** *morgen hin.*
you go-2S.PRES.IND. tomorrow there
'You are going there tomorrow.'

c. ***Geht** ihr mal morgen hin!*

d. *Ihr **geht** morgen hin.*

e. ***Gehen** Sie mal morgen hin!*

f. *Sie **gehen** morgen hin.*

The parallelism with Dutch is not complete, however. Platzack and Rosengren (1997) and Wratil (2000) note the possibility of *einer* 'someone' with the [2S] imperative form. My informants also judged *jemand* 'somebody' to be fine.

(41) a. *Geh einer morgen hin!*

b. *Mach mal jemand die Tür zu!*
Make-2S.IMP PART somebody-3S. the door close
'Somebody close the door!'

Other grammatically third person DPs are only acceptable in agreeing declaratives with directive force, though, as well as in agreementless directive infinitive- or participial constructions.

(42) a. **Beweg niemand sich!*
move-2S.IMP. nobody REFL.

b. *Niemand bewegt sich!*
nobody move-3S.PRES.IND. REFL.
'Nobody move!'

c. **Steh der erste auf!*
get-2S.IMP. the first-one up

d. *Der erste steht auf!*
the first-one get-3S.PRES.IND. up

e. **Hör alle mal her!*
listen-2S.IMP. all PART PART

f. *Alle mal herhören!*
all PART PART-listen-INF.

g. **Paßt die ganze Kompanie jetzt auf!*
look-2S.IMP. the whole company now out

h. *Die ganze Kompanie jetzt aufgepaßt!*
the whole company now out-look-PARTICIPLE
'The whole company be careful now!'
(example from Wratil 2000, p. 96)

As Platzack and Rosengren (1997, pp. 29–30) observe also, subject position is rather flexible, correlating in part, so it seems, with the intended focus of the sentence. Platzack and Rosengren (1997) note that this is not unexpected, however, given that the distribution of subject is generally relatively free in German (see, for example, Diesing 1992 and the references in Platzack and Rosengren's work).

(43) a. *Geh doch mal morgen DU / (*du) hin!*
go PART PART tomorrow YOU / (*you) there
'YOU go there tomorrow!'

b. *Geh du mal MORGen hin!*
'You go there TOMORROW!'

c. *Geh DU mal morgen hin!*

d. *DU* (?*du*) *geh mal morgen hin!*

7.5 Danish (Jensen 2002)

Jensen (2002) presents data from the mainland Scandinavian languages Danish, Norwegian, and two Swedish varieties. Since, as Jensen shows, subject properties in imperatives in these languages largely correspond, I will only give Danish here for illustration.[103] Danish can be said to have morphologically 'true' imperatives in the sense that the stem of the verb is only used in imperatives. Compare *løb* 'run-2.IMP.' to *løber* 'run-PRES.IND.' and *at løbe* 'to run-INF.'. Nothing other than second person pronouns are acceptable as the subject of an imperative, as the following examples show.

(44) a. *Køb du brød!*
buy-2.IMP. you-2SG. bread
'You buy bread!'

b. **Rejs allesammen sig op!*
raise-2.IMP. everybody REFL. up
*'Everybody get up!'

c. **Saet pigerne med kort hår sig til venstre!*
sit-2.IMP. the-girls with short hair REFL. to the-left
*'The girls with short hair sit to the left!'

Such grammatically third person DPs can be used as the subject of a variety of other clause types that may be conveyed with directive force, typically declaratives (which do not agree in Danish):

(45) *Pigerne sidder til venstre!*
girls sit-PRES.IND. to the-left
'Girls sit to the left!'

Second person subjects cannot be anywhere else than immediately after the verb in imperatives.

(46) (**du*) *Køb* (*du*) *brød* (**du*)*!*

From the data above I would conclude that there appears to be some cross-linguistic motivation for the idea expressed by the [AGR] hypothesis in (15), providing that distinct verb stems may have a specified feature [2ND]. Belfast English, West Flemish and Danish all pattern accordingly. The German data show a somewhat mixed picture and are not fully distinctive.

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8
Discussion

8.1 Motivating movement

In the Government-Binding framework (GB), the displacement of constituents is largely motivated by requirements of morphosyntactic licensing. Arguments like subjects are inserted into the low lexical domain of VP, where they receive a theta-role. Such morphosyntactic properties as Case, by contrast, are assigned by functional categories higher up in the phrase marker. The way to satisfy Chomsky's (1981) Case Filter that every NP has Case, therefore, is to raise the subject into the functional domain. While the Minimalist Program (of Chomsky 1995a, b, 1998) appears to maintain the essence of the GB account of movement, there seems to be some tension between some of the specific assumptions that the model makes, and a strict interpretation of the idea that movement is regulated by morphosyntax.

(1) In the GB framework, morphosyntactic conditions like the Case Filter held at S-structure. With the abandonment of this level in minimalism, the empirical domain of such conditions must now derive from properties of interface levels like LF. LF is not, however, a purely morphosyntactic level as S-structure was. The minimalist solution is the mechanism of morphosyntactic feature checking. Some morphosyntactic features like Case are not interpretable by the interface and must be checked off. In this sense, morphosyntax motivates movement. Ultimately, though, constituents are displaced to meet the principle of Full Interpretation imposed on the conceptually necessary interfaces.

(2) Covert licensing of morphosyntactic properties has taken on different forms in the past few years: LF-movement of syntactic expressions (Chomsky 1989, 1993), feature raising (Chomsky 1995a, ch. 4) and Agree (Chomsky 1998). The first two are covert analogues of overt Move and leave intact the idea that for morphosyntactic properties to be licensed, there must be some kind of displacement to a higher functional domain. This is quite different with Agree, which allows for the licensing of morphosyntactic properties over a long distance, that is, without any movement occurring. From this assumption, it seems to me, the original motivation for overt Move loses some of its footing.

(3) There are cases for which it is hard to avoid postulating arbitrary or circular features. For example, morphologically poor languages like English may lack overt manifestations of some of the features to be checked. Or, it is a common assumption that verbal φ-features are uniformly LF-non-interpretable, hence uniformly trigger verb movement. While this is clearly arguable for a language like English, it is much less obvious for typical *pro*-drop languages like Italian and Spanish, where these features seem to play a determinant role in the interpretation of *pro*. Also, there are some varieties of movement that do not seem to be related to morphology, such as the GB rule of Topicalization or Quantifier Raising. More significantly in the context of the present study, still, is that feature checking and Last Resort conspire against well-attested variation in the application of displacement (scrambling, for instance, being a case in point). One may resort to positing optionally present or optionally strong features, but these have very little explanatory power, serving a rather descriptive function.

Recent years have seen a proliferation of studies identifying relations between syntactic positions and semantic notions or discourse functions/prosody (Diesing 1992, de Hoop 1992, Rizzi 1997, Pinto 1997, Grimshaw and Samek-Lodovici 1998, among others). In this connection, Chomsky (1998, p. 36) notes that

> This line of argument might provide motivation for the displacement property, but it would remain to find the mechanisms employed to implement it. [. . .] [C]ertain semantic properties may involve dislocated structures, but we want to discover the mechanism that forces dislocation. Minimalist intuitions lead us to look

> at the other major imperfection, the uninterpretable inflectional features. Perhaps these devices are used to yield the dislocation property. But the latter might itself be required by design specifications. That would be an optimal solution [. . .].

Reinhart (1995, p. 2), though, warns that

> Many of the properties now encoded in the syntax got there in order to guarantee the correct interface with the systems of use. R(eferential), Q(uantified), F(ocus) are just a few examples. [. . .] Nevertheless, if the properties we encode in the [computational system] do not, in fact, belong there, we are bound not to get too far. Encoding interface properties has led to an enormous enrichment of the machinery. In many cases, the result is a highly baroque syntax, which, nevertheless, fares rather poorly in capturing the interface.

Together with others (like Barbiers 1995, Zubizaretta 1995, Costa 1998), Reinhart (1995) contemplates the possibility that movement may be directly motivated by semantic or discourse/prosodic factors, for instance, for a topic to escape the nuclear (focus) stress of a sentence or to create scope construals that are not available otherwise. This approach would in effect seem to be promoted by the very minimalist working hypothesis that the motivation for movement lies in properties of the PF and LF interfaces. Interface perspectives in particular seem to have a better prospect of accounting for optional movement as intended readings or discourse roles may vary from context to context. Optional subject raising in English imperatives, like any optional movement, violates Last Resort to the extent that the movement is not needed for convergence. Reinhart argues that a broader interpretation of Economy need not in fact be inconsistent with occurrences of movement which are not required by anything in the computational system, like movement not for feature checking. Where the computational system leaves room for optional movement, Reinhart's notion of Interface Economy permits a formally less economical derivation to achieve a certain interpretative goal that would not arise had displacement not been applied. The prediction is that optional movement is never really free, but conditioned by semantic or discourse/prosodic considerations.

This line of inquiry may be productive for a better understanding of the syntax of subjects in imperatives. In the next sections I will present some observations and proposals that have been made to this effect.

8.2 Non-raising to SpecIP

Recall that Platzack and Rosengren (1997, P&R) note that subjects of imperatives do not have the deictic reference of subjects of finite declarative clauses. The illustrating examples are repeated in (1) and (2).

(1) a. You helped me.

b. You help me!

(2) a. Somebody opened the window.

b. Somebody open the window!

In (1b), the subject is not talked *about* but talked *to*, while that in (2b) does not refer to a specific person as it does in (2a). P&R go on to observe another interpretative difference between finite declaratives and imperatives: the former constitute propositions with a truth value, the latter do not. This difference can be demonstrated with the following examples.

(3) a. Children ought to obey their parents.

b. Obey your parents!

While one may answer to (3a) by saying *Yes, that is true* or *No, that is not true*, answering to (3b) in the same way is not felicitous, *Yes, I will* or *No, I won't* being more appropriate.

In the light of these observations, P&R suggest relating the EPP to predication theory. Given that [PRESENT/PAST] Tense is central to a clause referring, P&R envisage that placing subjects in SpecIP has the interpretative effect of predicating a tensed event or situation of the subject, which makes the clause a proposition (similar to what Rothstein (1983, 1995) proposed in her Predication Principle). This analysis entails that subject of imperatives need not be placed in

SpecIP for EPP/predication reasons. This is not to say that substitution in SpecIP may not be forced by other factors (like φ-feature checking in Dutch imperatives) or be motivated differently.[104]

8.3 Optional raising to SpecIP

In Rupp (1999) I observe (as Davies 1981 and Moon 1999 have done) that the *do*(*n't*) *Subject* and *Subject do*(*n't*) orders in English imperatives are not strictly in free variation. Rather, there are particular contexts associated with each order. Consider again the examples given here in (4–7).

(4) a. *Don't you* go to the party!

b. *Don't one of you* forget to lock the door!

c. *Don't the people bringing cars* be late on Sunday!

(5) a. OK, *you don't* go to the party, then! (If that's what you want.)

b. *One of you don't* forget to lock the door!

c. *People bringing cars don't* be late on Sunday!

(6) a. (Bill, I'm begging you,)
DO YOU tell them she is innocent!

b. *DO EVERYbody* give it a try! (Not only some of you!)

c. *DO SOMEone* answer the phone!
(Anyone! As long as it stops ringing.)

(7) a. *You DO* tell them she is innocent!
(Or I'll never speak to you again.)

b. *Everybody DO* give it a try! (Don't be shy!)

c. *Someone DO* answer the phone! (I'm busy cooking.)

Applying work by Lyons (1977) to imperatives, Moon (1999, pp. 95–7) points out that negation can be construed in two different ways, which she terms external and internal negation. The two types of negation are indicated in (8) below.

(8) a. (external negation)
I say so – let it **not** be so – (that) *p*

b. (internal negation)
I say so – so be it – that **not** *p*

(9) provides contexts in which the different uses of negation emerge.

(9) (external negation ~ [Do invite John])
a. A: Can I invite John?
B. *No, don't invite John. He will ruin the party if he comes.*

b. (internal negation [Do ~ [invite John]])
A: What can I do to make sure that everyone has fun at the party next week?
B: *Well, first of all, don't invite John. And second . . .*

c. (internal negation [Do ~ [invite John]])
A: I'm not going to invite John to the party.
B: *Fine, don't invite him.*

Moon describes the relevant differences as follows. Imperatives with external negation express the speaker's rejection of a potential possibility or one that was explicitly presented in the discourse. In (9a), for example, the speaker forbids the addressee to carry out the proposed action. In imperatives with internal negation, the speaker either suggests that the addressee adopts a certain course of action (in (9b), that of not inviting John) or gives his/her consent to a proposal (in (9c), the proposal of not inviting John). Post-*do*(*n't*) subjects seem typically associated with external negation and pre-*do*(*n't*) subjects with internal negation. Consider (4a) and (5a) in the following context:

(10) We have decided not to go to the party.
a. *Fine, you don't go to the party, then!*
(internal negation [You do ~ [go to the party]])

b. **Fine, don't you go to the party, then!*
(external negation ~ [You do go to the party])

The discourse situation is such that it favours one of the two internal negation readings, namely that the speaker accepts that the

addressee will not go to the party. While (10a) is natural, (10b) is not. Consider also two other previous examples and the minimal pair in (12) from Moon (1999, pp. 102–3):

(11) a. *Don't one of you forget to lock the door!*
= None of you should forget (NEG > ONE)

b. *One of you don't forget to lock the door!*
= (At least) one of you should not forget (ONE > NEG)

(12) a. *Don't two people order the same thing!*
= No two people should order the same (NEG > TWO)

b. *Two people don't order the same thing!*
= Two of the addressees should order different things, but the rest may order the same (TWO > NEG)

The (a) and (b) sentences of (11) and (12) do not convey the same meaning. While the *do*(*n't*) *Subject* examples order that none of addressees forget or order the same thing, the *Subject do*(*n't*) examples order that one, respectively two, of the addressees not forget and order the same thing. As Moon puts it, whereas the (a) sentences forbid that the addressees do such and such a thing (external negation), the (b) sentences convey an instruction that the addressees (not) do such and such a thing (internal negation).

As previously discussed by Davies (1981), keeping the subject low may also serve to yield a contrastive effect. Compare:

(13) All right Jill. Start singing.
[Bill, not Jill starts singing]

a. *No, no. Don't Bill sing! It's Jill I want to hear.*

b. **No, no. Bill don't sing! It's Jill I want to hear.*
(example from Moon 1999, p. 104)

(14) I would like you to give it a try.
[Nobody dares to]

a. *Please, everybody DO give it a try!*

b. **Please, DO EVERYbody give it a try!*

(15) I would like all of you to give it a try.
[Only some present try]
a. **Please, everybody DO give it a try!*
b. *Please, DO EVERYbody give it a try!*

All of the above examples seem straightforward cases of interaction between subject position and the scope of negation or emphatic stress. If subjects of imperatives need not occur in SpecIP by the EPP or for φ-feature checking, Interface Economy should allow for the different interpretations to be effected in the syntax by keeping the subject low inside the scope of negation, or raising it outside NEG's scope.

8.4 Raising to SpecFP

In Chapter 5 I speculated that the intermediate subject position SpecFP for imperative subjects in English might be identified with the Spec position of an ASP(ect)P. This idea receives some semantic motivation from work by Flagg (2001) on differences in the use of overt subject imperatives and covert subject imperatives. One observation Flagg makes is that there is a restriction against overt subjects with certain predicates, exemplified by (16) versus (17).

(16) a. Keep doing your homework!
b. You keep doing your homework!

(17) a. Love your doggy!
b. *You love your doggy!

Flagg characterizes the contrast as one between stage-level predicates and individual-level predicates, respectively. She goes on to note that the felicity conditions for the examples in (16) differ. In a situation in which a child is sitting at the kitchen table doing homework when the doorbell rings, a parent can say (16a) as a word of encouragement if the child shows no sign of stopping as the parent goes to the door. (16b), on the other hand, is odd for this situation. But if the

child stops doing the homework, or even shows signs of being about to stop, (16b) becomes appropriate. Flagg argues that the felicity of using an overt subject depends in part on whether the event being ordered has a specific starting-point, which is generally impossible for individual-level predicates, and only true in the second context presented. She suggests that in such contexts, the subject might stay low because it is to be licensed in the aspectual domain.

8.5 Conclusion

The conclusion emerging from this study is that subject properties in imperatives in Germanic hinge on whether or not INFL is specified for the feature [AGR] ([2ND] person) in this clause type. While the syntax of English imperatives can in principle be accounted for on the assumption that the imperative clause type uniformly has a specific feature [2ND] across languages, cross-linguistic variation with respect to imperative subjects is better understood if English imperatives no longer have agreement specification. Where imperatives are formally marked [2ND] person (as in Dutch-type languages), subject properties are dictated by morphosyntax: (i) the specific feature [2ND] determines that the feature value of *pro* is fixed as [2ND] person; (ii) using grammatically third person subject-DPs is impossible (though they can occur in 'surrogate imperative' agreementless infinitives and participial constructions, or in agreeing [3RD] declaratives with directive force); and (iii) the position of the subject is fixed in SpecIP for φ-feature checking if not forced by the EPP (imperatives not constituting propositions). The absence of agreement marking from imperatives (as in English) allows for subject properties to be conditioned by the semantics/pragmatics of the imperative that it is normally directed at one or more addressees to get them to bring about a event. Specifically, (i) the interpretation of *pro* is restricted to the addressee(s); (ii) using grammatically third person subject-DPs is possible as long as they are amenable to an addressee reading; and (iii) the position of the subject may vary. Following Reinhart's (1995) notion of Interface Economy, the flexible syntax of imperative subjects does not violate Last Resort because it induces different interpretative effects for the resulting structures. Imperatives seem of relevance for the general discussion of what motivates movement in

the syntax. More careful study of the *do*(*n't*) *Subject* and *Subject do*(*n't*) orderings in English may reveal how robust the envisaged patterns are and whether any more can be observed. Current minimalist assumptions make the exact nature of the mapping between syntax and semantics/pragmatics a central issue, which deserves close scrutiny in future case studies.

Notes

1. See Haegeman (1992) for a comprehensive introduction to GB (also known as the Principles-and-Parameters Theory). The development of the minimalist framework from GB theory is documented in Chomsky (1995a), which contains a collection of primary literature. Chomsky (1995b, 1998) presents further elaborations. A brief introductory overview of the Minimalist Program is offered by Marantz (1995) and Atkinson (1996). Radford (1997a, b) provides a thorough minimalist introduction.
2. In the minimalist spirit, Chomsky (1995a, ch. 4) puts forth the Inclusiveness Condition which imposes that the output of syntactic operations must not extend the properties of the lexical items that form the input. One of its implications is that there is no place for the various bar levels of X-Bar Theory, which Chomsky abandons in favour of a system of 'bare phrase structure'. It is, however, still common practice to represent syntactic descriptions in the X-bar format, and I will do so accordingly.
3. Different variants of structural economy have been suggested in the literature, among which the principles of Economy of Representation (Chomsky 1989), Minimal Projection (Grimshaw 1993), Economy of Projection (Speas 1993), and Minimal Structure (Boskovic 1996). The basic idea is the same, however.
4. This representation assumes the VP-internal Subject Hypothesis, whose formulation has varied somewhat to the effect that the subject originates in SpecVP (Stowell 1983, Kuroda 1988) or that the verb and its internal argument(s) form a maximal projection and that the external argument is either adjoined to VP (Koopman and Sportiche 1991), or generated as the specifier of a separate head (Bowers 1993, Chomsky 1995a, ch. 4).
5. In GB theory, inflectional affixes do not occur on items in the lexicon as it is assumed in the MP, but they are inserted into functional heads and united with a verbal host only in the syntax. Where I refer to proposals made within the framework of GB, I shall speak of affixes instead of features accordingly.
6. The examples in (16) were suggested to me by Andrew Radford (pers. comm.). Note that (16b) cannot be considered an example of 'direct speech' because of the shift in the pronoun from second to first person, which is typical of indirect speech (Quirk et al. 1985). Compare (16b) with (ib) below, the latter of which is ungrammatical under the imposed indexing.

(i) a. The judge$_i$ said, 'Hand over your$_j$ driving licence!'

b. *The judge$_i$ said, 'Hand over my$_j$ driving licence!'

7. The symbol % indicates that the example is acceptable in only some varieties of English, American English in particular (Quirk et al. 1985).
8. Note that in Chapter 3 I shall argue that clause-initial imperative subjects should be distinguished from vocatives.
9. (31b) is ungrammatical if (as here) *'d* is an unstressed variant of *did*. It is grammatical if *'d* is a contracted form of *would*, which, however, is irrelevant in the present context.
10. It would seem that the modal *will* can occur in 'tag-imperatives' (Arbini 1969) as in (i) below. Within earlier, transformational models this occurrence of *will* was sometimes presented as support for the view that root imperative clauses are yielded by an operation which deletes the modal from their underlying structure (see, for example, Klima 1964, Katz and Postal 1964, Thorne 1966).

(i) Get me a cup of coffee, will you!?

However, this claim was later refuted by several researchers, who observed that the auxiliary in the 'imperative tag' is not restricted to *will* (Kiparsky 1963, Lees 1964, Bolinger 1967, Levenston 1969, Stockwell et al. 1973, Schmerling 1977, 1979, Akmajian et al. 1979, to name but a few):

(ii) Get me a cup of coffee, can('t) / could(n't) / won't / would you!?

Culicover (1971) notes that in such constructions, modals express degrees of politeness. This suggests that they in fact derive from requestive sentences like (iii) which have the illocutionary force of polite imperatives (Andrew Radford, pers. comm.).

(iii) Can('t) / Could(n't) / Will / Won't / Would you get me a cup of coffee?!

11. Lasnik (1981) assumes that [IMP] triggers *do*-insertion, while in Lasnik (1994) it induces a process of 'morphological merger'. Transformational studies commonly invoked an element [IMP] to ensure the (non-)application of certain transformations in imperative clauses. Analyses of imperatives which are incompatible with the restrictive Principles-and-Parameters framework will largely be ignored.
12. The history of English is usually divided into four periods: Old English (*c.*450–1050), Middle English (*c.*1050–1450), Early Modern English (*c.*1450–1700) and Present-Day English (*c.*1700–), with the beginning of each period marking a major morphological, syntactic or phonological change. The paradigm in Table 2.1 has been adapted from Lass (1992, p. 138) and represents the general conjugation of weak verbs in the London standard in the late Middle English period. Verbs add -(*V*)*d*- or -*t*- between the stem and past tense ending.

Table 2.1

	Present ind.	*Present subj.*	*Imp.*	*Past ind.*	*Past subj.*
sg. 1	-(e)	-(e)		-(e)	-(e)
2	-(e)st	-(e)	-∅	-(e)st	-(e)
3	-eth	-(e)		-(e)	-(e)
pl.	-e(n)	-e(n)	-e(th) (2nd)	-e(n)	-e(n)

13. The examples in (6) have been taken from Visser (1963–73), who cites the following sources for (a–e), respectively: (a) *c.*1479 Earl Rivers, The Cordyal (ed. Mulders) 92, 22 (p. 1550); (b) *c.*1450 Cov. Myst., Mary Magd. (Pollard) 1181 (p. 18); (c) 1460 Towneley Myst. ii, 204 (p. 16); (d) *c.*1402 Lydgate, Complaint of the Black Knight (ed. Krauser) 90, 628 (p. 1960); (e) 1480 Caxton, Chron. Eng. cxcvii, 175 (p. 16).
14. Just as, for instance, it is generally assumed that in the present-day variant of (i) below INFL carries (second person indicative) φ-features, even though they are not spelt out by an overt morpheme (any more):

    (i) ***Dost*** *thou love hawking?*
    Do-2S.PRES.IND. you love hawking?
    'Do you like hawking?'
    [1596 Shakespeare, *Taming of the Shrew*, Induction ii, 43. From Visser, 1963–73, p. 1552]

15. Table 2.2 is based on Lass (1992, p. 141) and presents the conjugation of *be* in south-east Midland dialects by the late fourteenth century. The imperative plural inflection *-th* eventually eroded, leaving only the form *be* as in the singular.

Table 2.2

	Present ind.	*Present subj.*	*Imp.*	*Past ind.*	*Past subj.*
sg. 1	am	be		was	were
2	art	be	be	were	were
3	is	be		was	were
pl.	are(n)	be(n)	be(th) (2nd)	were(n)	were(n)

16. According to Jespersen (1954), in the Middle English period the plural pronouns *ye* and especially *you* came to be used as a courteous form of addressing a single person under French influence (analogous to the use of *tu* and *vous*). Nominative *thou* and *thee* disappeared in standard speech in the eighteenth century.
17. Opinions are somewhat divided in the literature as to whether English imperatives are specified for tense. I will return to this matter in Chapter 7.

18. The obligatory absence of the three complementizers available in English might ultimately be reducible to properties inherent to these COMPs: one would assume that *if* is disallowed simply because it is an interrogative COMP and therefore incompatible with directive force, the property of *for* that it Case-marks DPs accusative would inevitably lead to a clash with the nominative Case of imperative subjects (recall the discussion in section 2.2), whereas *that* can be used to introduce tensed clauses/propositions, which imperatives are not. See Chapter 8 for further discussion.
19. In particular, his *Wh*-Criterion, which he adapted from May (1985).
20. The existence of such a feature is motivated by the fact that in some languages the verb has a special morphology in interrogatives (see Rizzi 1991 and references therein). Andrew Radford (pers. comm.) has pointed out to me that even English instances one example of this. The negative form *aren't*, which is normally used with second person singular and plural subjects, combines with a first person singular DP only in interrogative clauses (and interrogative tags):

    (i) a. I am (not) your best friend.
        b. You are (not) / aren't my best friend(s).
        c. Am I your best friend?
        d. Aren't I your best friend?
        e. I am your best friend, aren't I?

21. The idea that these structures involve an agreement relation is anticipated in Kuroda (1986).
22. To the extent that propositions are typically realized as CPs (as with finite declarative *that*-clauses), the idea that the C-system is missing from imperative clauses is consistent with the fact that they do not function as such. See Chapter 8 for further discussion.
23. Including *will* in (20) yields a similar reading, as in:

    (i) Vicky will have opened a new bank account (by tomorrow).

24. Similar to what has been said above in relation to Aspect, it has been claimed that the passive, stative predicates, and (certain classes of) adverbs are inadmissible in imperatives (Kiparsky 1963, Katz and Postal 1964, Lees 1964, Arbini 1969, Stockwell et al. 1973), but others (including Culicover 1971 and Davies 1981) have argued that in these cases, too, semantic/pragmatic factors play a crucial role.
25. This section draws in large part from Felser (1999), who presents a detailed discussion of the arguments for an independent ASP(ect) head and the syntax of auxiliaries. For other languages which have also been argued to instantiate the functional category ASP, see the references there.
26. Of interest in this context is that a language like Modern Greek overtly distinguishes between a progressive and a non-progressive imperative form, the former of which expresses duration (Phoevos Panagiotidis, pers. comm.):

(i) a. *Peze!*
Play-2S.PROG.IMP.
'Play (for a while)!' / 'Keep playing!'

b. *Pekse!*
Play-2S.NON-PROG.IMP.
'Play!'

Platzack and Rosengren (1997) report that Russian has distinct imperfective and perfective imperative constructions.

27. The (in many ways similar) accounts provided by Pollock (1989) and Zhang (1990) rest on very specific assumptions which I shall not attempt to reproduce. Platzack and Rosengren (1997) assume that rather than being an instance of the auxiliary *do*, *do* has the status of an 'imperative verb' in imperatives, and is 'special' in that it is the sole element that can check features there. This would account for the observation that *do* occurs invariably, that is, even in the presence of *have* and *be*. I will argue against their hypothesis in Chapter 4, however.
28. Thorne (1966), Bolinger (1967) and later Downing (1969) were among the first analyses of imperatives to recognize the possibility of subjects other than *you*.
29. As the term 'addressee' is going to play an important role in this chapter, I have presented the grammatical person system that I shall be assuming in Table 3.1 (adapted from Potsdam 1996) for reference. I refer to Potsdam's study for an in-depth discussion of discourse roles and further refinements.

Table 3.1

	Discourse role	*Grammatical realization*
first person singular	speaker	I, me, my, mine, myself
first person plural	speaker plus others	we, us, our, ours, ourselves
second person singular	addressee	you, your, yours, yourself
second person plural	addressee plus others excluding the speaker(s)	you, your, yours, yourselves
third person singular	neither speaker nor addressee	he/she/it, him/her/it, his/her/its, him-/her-/itself other D(P)s / N(P)s (e.g. John, John's)
third person plural	neither speakers nor addressees	they, them, their, theirs, themselves other D(P)s / N(P)s (e.g. the children('s))

30. The observation that bare plurals can be used as subjects of imperatives is usually attributed to Culicover (1971).
31. Speakers' judgements regarding such examples may vary (Andrew Radford, pers. comm.). Some consider them fine, especially in conjunction structures as with proper names.
32. *Let's*-constructions pattern differently from imperatives in a number of respects. For detailed discussion and earlier and more recent analyses of *let's*-constructions, see Costa (1972), Seppänen (1977), Ukaji (1978), Sawada (1980), Davies (1981), Tregidgo (1982) and Potsdam (1996).
33. The situation is similar with the following example provided by Schmerling (1982, p. 215), which may be uttered without an actual audience in sight (or earshot):

    (i) *Somebody* help me!

    One could perhaps think of such imperatives as being directed at any potential addressee.
34. In view of such data as discussed in this section, Jensen (2002) proposes that imperative clauses effectively have two subjects: a covert subject in the highest subject position, which is interpreted as the addressee, and (where present) an overt subject in a lower subject position, which is the intended agent of the verb. As illustrated in (i) below, the agent may or may not equal the addressee:

    (i) pro_i Don't you$_i$ / [those children of yours]$_j$ set a foot in my garden again!

    Jensen argues that this proposal is borne out by data like (ii) from Latin, where the agent is singular, but (as verb morphology shows) the addressees plural.

    (ii) *aperite* *aliquis* Latin (Plautus, Mercator 131)
    open-2PL.IMP. someone-SG.NOM.
    Someone open

    Jensen is currently exploring this idea in her PhD dissertation, which was not yet completed by the time of publication of the present study. A question that springs to mind is why (as far as I know) there are no languages in which the addressee and agent are both overtly expressed in imperatives.
35. A comprehensive overview of useful diagnostics that help differentiate between vocatives and imperative subjects can be found in Downing (1969), Schmerling (1975), Davies (1981) and Potsdam (1996).
36. The difference in interpretations available is further illustrated by (ia) and (ib) (adapted from Davies 1981, p. 344).

(i) a. Don't, my dear friends, feel obliged to leave!

b. Don't my dear friends feel obliged to leave!
(but the rest of you get out right now)

Whereas in (ia), *my dear friends* is understood to correspond exactly to the people being addressed, in (ib) the DP refers to only some individuals within a larger group (the speaker's friends as opposed to others).

37. As an imperative subject, *nobody* should not be understood as referring to an empty set of addressees but rather in the sense of *none of you addressees*.
38. Davies (1981) and Potsdam (1996) observe that bare singular nouns describing occupations, relations and so on, are excluded from the subject position of finite indicative clauses, too, which is illustrated in (i).

(i) *Vicar / *Brother / *Idiot got out of my way.

Thus, rather than patterning with vocative constructions, imperatives are like finite declaratives in this respect as well.

39. I refer to Potsdam's (1996) study for a systematic account of the preference for one or the other pattern in more complex contexts.
40. Potsdam (1996, p. 120) reports that the intimate link between vocatives and addressee reference had a morphological reflex in earlier stages of English (and that this is also observed in French (as noted by Downing 1969) and Irish). The example below from the Early Modern English period has a vocative in the focus of a relative clause, which contains a [2ND] person form of the auxiliary *be* (*art* 'are').

(i) 1602 O limed soul, that, struggling to be free, art more engaged! . . .

41. Potsdam (1996, p. 147) notes that imperative constructions in which a coreference relation cannot readily be imposed upon the vocative and the structural subject often sound odd, cf.

(i) a. Jack, you clean up this mess and stop blaming your sister!

b. Mia and Betsy, both of you help your mother with the preparations!

c. ?John, someone wash the dishes!

d. ?You in the red chair, everyone get ready to leave!

The only way to make sense of the examples (ic, d) is to force the reading that the referent of the vocative is being asked to make the subject's referent do something. The example in (52) above suggests that such structures are more acceptable when the vocative denotes an authority,

which, Potsdam argues, confirms his control-relationship hypothesis (as discussed in section 3.2).

42. This idea would be substantiated by the fact that there are languages which have lexicalized this difference to the effect that they use a distinct subject pronoun in imperatives (see Zhang 1990).
43. This list is by no means exhaustive. See Potsdam (1996) and McCloskey (1997) for a more extensive discussion of indicators of subjecthood.
44. I have adopted Rizzi's (1986) approach to null pronominals because it is perhaps the most standard. Other literature on *pro* includes Chomsky (1982), Jaeggli (1982), Rizzi (1982), C.-T. Huang (1984, 1989), Platzack (1987), Jaeggli and Safir (1989), Speas (1993) and Y. Huang (1995). Some of these works advocate theories of *pro* that differ somewhat from Rizzi (1986). An in-depth evaluation of the different approaches with respect to their merits and disadvantages would be far beyond the scope of this work, however.
45. It would seem that [2ND] person is not in fact restrictive enough, for if I utter a sentence like (i) below in the presence of Michael, Patrick and Bill, it is unclear whether I want one, two or all three of them to come.

    (i) Come here!

    Basing himself on work by Farkas (1987) and cross-linguistic data, Potsdam (1996) argues that recoverability of the feature [PERSON] alone is determinant in *pro*-identification, contrary to, for instance, Rizzi (1986) and Huang (1995), who argue that this concerns both [PERSON] and [NUMBER]. I will leave this matter unresolved.
46. This does not necessarily hold for all subjects. For example, work by Johnson (1991), Bowers (1993) and others suggests that the subject of infinitival ECM complements may raise into the matrix clause before Spell-Out to some position where accusative Case is checked – say, the specifier position of a light verb *v* (a similar idea is expressed by Felser (1999) for the accusative subject of perception verb complements). I will return to the syntax of subjects in English imperative clauses in Chapter 5.
47. Zhang (1990) claims that the imperative particle *don't* is adjoined to IP. This makes no difference to the objections that I will raise against the general approach in sections 4.3 and 4.4. Within an earlier generative model, Cohen (1976), Culicover (1976), Pullum and Wilson (1977), Sawada (1980) and Akmajian (1984) suggest that *don't* is base-generated 'clause-initially'. I shall refrain from discussing in any detail accounts of the syntax of *do*(*n't*) in imperatives which cannot be maintained within Chomsky's (1981, and later) Principles-and-Parameters framework, which also include the transformational analyses of Klima (1964), Lees (1964), Culicover (1971), Stockwell et al. (1973), Ukaji (1978) and Davies (1981).
48. As I pointed out in Chapter 1, *Subject do*(*n't*) orders are not generally excluded in imperatives (see the later chapters in this study for further discussion). This has, however, often gone unnoticed.

49. Broadly defined, a head α *governs* an element β if α c-commands β, but α does not govern β if there is a 'closer governor'. Thus, if δ governs β in (i), then α does not govern β even if it otherwise satisfies the conditions for government (Chomsky 1986).

    (i) . . . α . . .[$_{\gamma}$ . . . β . . . δ . . .]

    Whether the notion of government should be maintained in minimalism is currently a matter of some debate.
50. NEG does not always appear to play a determinant role in the category of the complement it combines with, which weakens the line of reasoning somewhat. To illustrate this point, compare the Italian examples in (i) (adapted from Zanuttini 1991, p. 74, note 13).

    (i) a. *Il fatto di (non) amare la musica*.
    The fact of (not) loving music.

    b. **Il fatto di io ami la musica*.
    The fact of I love music.

    c. *Il fatto che io ami la musica*.
    The fact that I love music.

    The grammaticality difference between (ia) and (ib) seems to show that it must be specifically the complementizer *di* which imposes the restriction that its complement cannot be tensed. The negative head *non* apparently has no bearing on this, which would imply that it does not have complement-selection properties of its own and is 'transparent' to those of other heads. See also Williams (1994), who suggests that English *not* lacks categorial features, and can take any complement [with possible restrictions determined by selectional requirements of the next highest head LR].
51. Zanuttini assumes that in the Italian example (13c), *-re* is a (non-finite) tense ending or that the infinitive verb otherwise carries a phonologically null tense morpheme.
52. Zanuttini (1994, 1997) has since made two different attempts to derive the syntactic properties of imperatives in Romance languages, in neither of which does the presence versus absence of TP play any role. She does not explicitly extend these analyses to English, however.
53. Chomsky (1981, p. 175) postulated a Case Filter saying that

    (i) *[NP α] if α has no Case and α contains a phonetic matrix [. . .].

    In order to allow for the co-occurrence of *pro* with *do*, Zhang assumes that T-AGR assigns Case optionally and that *pro* need not receive Case. Opinions have been divided as to whether or not *pro* has Case, however. Whereas, for example, Jaeggli (1982) takes *pro* to be Caseless, Rizzi (1982) and others associate *pro* with nominative Case.

54. This categorization would be substantiated by the fact that other languages, including Indonesian and Japanese, also have an (albeit distinctive) negative imperative marker. I refer to Schmerling (1977), Sawada (1980), Sadock and Zwicky (1985) and Zhang (1990) for relevant data.
55. Boskovic (1995) has also suggested that finite declaratives not introduced by an overt complementizer might in fact simply be IPs.
56. There exist examples (such as (i)) which appear to contradict this apparent generalization, though, in which case Potsdam's argument would seem invalid.

    (i) John left, and Mary [$_{I}$∅] __ too.

57. For Zhang's (1990) other arguments in support of *don't*-adjunction to TP (IP) in imperatives (which can also be found in Zhang 1991) and Potsdam's (1996) criticisms thereof and arguments against it, see these studies.
58. On a theoretical note, it is by no means clear that *do*-insertion should be associated with one particular category, and why the operation will not target any functional head with non-interpretable features, such as Henry's [2ND] AGR-node in structure (39).
59. Pollock (1989) and Platzack and Rosengren (1997) take an entirely different tack by analysing *do*(*n't*) as a specifically 'imperative verb'. While Pollock regards other uses of *do* in imperatives as the auxiliary *do*, he suggests that the form *don't* is a 'living fossil', closely related to the Old and Middle English causative verb *do* (a similar suggestion was made by Bolinger in 1967). The configuration Pollock proposes for negative imperatives resembles that of ECM constructions and is exemplified in (ia), where imperative *do*(*n't*) assigns Case to the subject of its infinitival complement. (ib) represent the structure Platzack and Rosengren put forward, in which imperative *do* heads its own VP and has raised to support *n't*.

    (i) Don't you go there tomorrow!
    a. . . . [$_{VP}$ [$_{V}$Don't][$_{IP}$ you [$_{I}$I][$_{VP}$ [$_{V}$ go] there tomorrow]]]!

    b . . . [$_{NEGP}$ [$_{NEG}$ [Do$_{i}$]n't][$_{VP}$ you [$_{V}$ t$_{i}$][$_{VP}$ [$_{V}$ go] there tomorrow]]]!

    Both analyses have some drawbacks. For instance, on Pollock's account the subject would be expected to bear accusative Case, which, as we may conclude from Chapter 2, is false (Zhang (1990) critically discusses Pollock's analysis at some length). The fact that the verb *do* in other uses does not take a VP-complement, and is unable to serve as an affixation host, renders Platzack and Rosengren's treatment of *do* in imperatives more exceptional:

    (ii) a. He did his homework.

    b. *He didn't his homework.
    [$_{IP}$ He [$_{I}$I] [$_{NEGP}$ [$_{NEG}$ [did$_{i}$]n't] [$_{VP}$ [$_{V}$t$_{i}$] his homework]]]

What the analyses have in common is that they 'work' at the theoretical cost of invoking a verb *do* that only occurs in imperatives. As will become clear shortly, I see no need to assume such an imperative verb.

60. Laka (p. 93) argues that (sentential) negation and emphatic affirmation belong to the same syntactic category, which she labels Σ, because the two are in complementary distribution. Compare:

(i) a. I didn't, as Bill had thought, go to the store.

b. I DID, as Bill had thought, go to the store.

c. *I DID not, as Bill had thought, go to the store.

Laka assumes that in sentences like (43d) Σ is filled by a morpheme (∅) whose phonological content is stress (see also Chomsky 1957). In (ii), which is only grammatical in American English, Σ would be lexicalized as *so*.

(ii) Tim never tried again, but Ivy *(did) so try again.

61. The apparent blocking impact of these items followed naturally from the perspective which assumed head movement and viewed movement from the point of view of the element moving: heads of phrases should move to the first head position up but this step is impossible when the position is already occupied and intervening heads may not be skipped (the Head Movement Constraint (Travis 1984), Relativized Minimality (Rizzi 1990), Shortest Move (Chomsky 1989, 1993)). It is not so straightforward under the operation of Attract (as envisaged in Chomsky 1995a, ch. 4), whereby, conversely, the features of a functional category X attract the nearest eligible Y features for feature checking. This seems to grant that movement may cross an intervening head Z when Z does not have features which could attract Y or could be attracted by X. There are a number of ways of ensuring the desired result. One possibility would be to say that an item like *not* attracts verbal features, and that these features cannot 'excorporate' out of the adjunction structure to be subsequently attracted by INFL. Alternatively, *not* could be said to carry features relevant to INFL which are attracted first because they are the closest, whereupon INFL can no longer attract the features of the verb (that is, Attract cannot apply twice). Neither scenario is very appealing because it is far from obvious what features *not* could have (or indeed whether it has any) which should enter into a checking relation with either V or INFL. Another possibility would be to say that (much along the line of Relativized Minimality) constituents attract the closest constituent 'of the right type' irrespective of the nature of its features (so that the INFL head attracts whatever kind of features the NEG head has), but the derivation is cancelled when no checking relation can be established. It is even less clear to me how the facts are supposed to fall out from Chomsky's (1998) notion of Agree, which allows for constituents to check features 'in place' over a longer distance.

62. Sawada (1980) and Akamjian (1984) assign all occurrences of *do* in imperatives particle status. Schmerling (1977) does the same for *do* (*not*), but notes that *do*(*n't*) shows the characteristics of the auxiliary *do*.
63. Note that I shall later suggest that negative auxiliaries of the form *Auxn't* (and, similarly, auxiliaries bearing stress) are unitary items in the lexicon. Accordingly, *don't* will hereinafter be represented as one lexical item, awaiting justification of this idea in Chapter 6.
64. It may, of course, be possible that imperative C was strong in earlier stages of English. According to Jespersen (1954) and Visser (1963–73), there are no attested examples of imperatives in which the subject occurs clause-initially from the Early Modern English period. As in interrogatives, the verb preceded the subject. Henry (1995) has argued for verb movement to C in imperatives in a Belfast variety of English, stating that 'it is indeed part of the local folklore that we speak English as it was spoken in Shakespearean times' (p. 7) Here are some of her data (p. 55):

    (i) a. Read you that book.

        b. Do you your best.

    Visser (1963–73) and Ukaji (1978) both provide a large set of diachronic data. An in-depth investigation and possible minimalist analysis of historical imperatives would be far beyond the scope of this work. I refer the reader to Han (1998).
65. (2) may be acceptable in 'truncation styles', as in:

    (i) What's going on?
    Seems that someone is watching him.

    See Rizzi (1994) for an analysis of such data.
66. I do not mean to say here that *Subject do*(*n't*) orders are strictly impossible in imperative clauses (see section 5.3). Note again that I analyse negative auxiliaries like *don't* as lexically unitary (*Auxn't*) items. I also assume that *don't* is directly inserted into INFL rather than being merged under NEG. That is, I assume that no NEGP is projected in this case. I refer to Chapter 6 for further discussion.
67. A subject–auxiliary inversion analysis of English imperatives goes back to Chomsky (1975), and has also been proposed in some form by Emonds (1970), Culicover (1971), Stockwell et al. (1973), Ukaji (1978), Davies (1981) and (for negative constructions) Schütze (1997).
68. Andrew Radford (pers. comm.) has pointed out to me that a SpecCP analysis is not entirely unproblematic given that negative inversion can take place after complementizers in an embedded clause like the one below. (One could perhaps avoid this conclusion by assuming some type of 'recursive' CP construction or a split-C system along the lines suggested by Rizzi 1997.)

(i) I assure you that never ever again will I trust a syntactician.

I shall, however, follow Henry's (1995) and Potsdam's (1996) key assumption that affective items raise into SpecCP for the sake of their argument.

69. Again, there are embedded examples which contradict the apparent generalization Example (i) below was offered to me by Andrew Radford (pers. comm.).

(i) She wondered why never ever before had such a situation arisen.

70. As the minimalist residue of Rizzi's (1991) NEG(ative)-criterion (see also Haegeman and Zanuttini 1991).
71. Andrew Radford (pers. comm.) notes that corresponding covert subject imperatives are in fact fully acceptable:

(i) On no account close the door!

72. Platzack and Rosengren (1997) argue for an operator *N* ('necessity') in imperatives. They assume that verbal entries in the lexicon carry a Davidsonian (1967, 1980) (see also Higgenbotham 1985, 1989) event variable, which is bound by an existential operator ∃ at LF. In declarative clauses, there is no other operator to take the existential operator in its scope, with the outcome that they simply have the meaning of the existentially bound proposition. In imperatives, on the other hand, the existentially bound proposition falls within the scope of the operator *N* which so to speak 'sets a norm' with respect to the event denoted by the verb. Platzack and Rosengren use the pair of sentences in (i) for illustration.

(i) a. You should visit your mother.

b. Visit your mother!

The declarative in (ia) states the necessity of the event by means of the lexical modal item *should*, whereas in the imperative example (ib), the necessity is not stated, but, according to Platzack and Rosengren, directly set by the operator *N*.

73. Whether or not INFL may be split up into separate TENSE and AGR projections is of no relevance to the SpecFP analysis. I shall continue to assume an IP phrase as I have done throughout this study.
74. Recall that I analyse *don't* as a lexically unitary item and assume the absence of a NEGP (I refer to the discussion in Chapter 6).
75. Andrew Radford (pers. comm.) notes that the imperative-*do*(*n't*) analyses, according to which *do*(*n't*) is directly generated under C above the subject in SpecIP, derive the same result. For reasons why I think these analyses should (nonetheless) be rejected, I refer the reader back to Chapter 4.

76. Felser and Rupp (2001) provide empirical evidence that nominative Case (and φ-) features are carried by the associate in Germanic languages, which suggests (contra Lasnik 1995 and Groat 1995) that the expletive (*there*) has no such features. This corroborates Chomsky's (1995a, ch. 4) assumption that checking of categorial features and Case (and agreement) checking are, in principle, dissociated.
77. Potsdam backs up his argument by showing that other I-to-C structures are similarly unambiguous. (i) involves Negative Preposing. Note that with *not*, the scope relation is again reversed.

(i) Only on Fridays doesn't everybody come. (NOT > EVERY only)

(i′) Only on Fridays does everybody not come. (EVERY > NOT only)

Mike Jones (pers. comm.) notes that in interrogatives, scope relations may be complicated by the interrogative operator, and that other CP constituents, like inverted conditionals, do seem to be ambiguous in fact:

(ii) a. *Hadn't everyone got a raise, they would all have gone on strike*
= If everyone hadn't got a raise, . . . EVERY > NOT

b. *Hadn't everyone got a raise, some employees would have felt undervalued*
= If not everyone had got a raise, . . . NOT > EVERY

Potsdam also argues that his CP analysis is superior to the FP analysis with respect to scope interactions between negation and quantified objects or adjuncts. On his assumptions, the CP analysis can – but the FP analysis cannot – capture the observation that interrogatives and 'inverted' imperatives only have a NEG > QP reading, whereas finite declaratives in addition can be construed with a QP > NEG reading. One of the examples that he cites for illustration is from Moon (1999).

(iii) *He didn't play football for many years*
= He played football for not many years NOT > MANY
= For many years, he did not play football MANY > NOT

(iv) *Don't you play football for many years!*
= You should play football for not many years NOT > MANY
≠ You should wait many years before playing football
*MANY > NOT

However, creating an appropriate context may make an apparently non-existent reading more apparent, as in:

(v) Concerned coach to player: Your injury is very serious. I am warning you. You have to be careful or it will only get worse. So, *Don't you play football for many years!* (Then we'll see.)

Further, my consultants did not fully agree with the way Potsdam judges some of the examples, and in particular found the interrogatives to be ambiguous. Since these judgements are not my own, I refer the reader to Potsdam's work.

78. In the absence of any overt aspectual markers (as in *Don't you say a word!*), I would assume that the verb has an abstract perfective feature and that the subject becomes the specifier of a perfective ASP head.
79. Though McCloskey (1997) has shown that cross-linguistically, there are actually very few low-subject constructions for which one can say that the subject remains in SpecVP, rather than being in some relatively low position within the inflectional layer.
80. Everything that will be said here in relation to the negative form of the auxiliary *do*(*n't*) can also be taken to apply to emphatic *do*, which I shall not, however, explicate in this chapter for reasons of clarity of exposition.
81. Potsdam notes that examples like (3a, b) and (5a, b) below may sound unnatural at first, but become more acceptable with appropriate stress and intonation.
82. The extent to which such interrogative examples are admissible is linked to the structural complexity (or 'heaviness') of the subject.
83. As before, I shall not consider in any detail accounts which are incompatible with recent versions of generative theory (like those by Culicover 1971, 1976, Schmerling 1977, Ukaji 1978, Sawada 1980).
84. Note that I have argued that these analyses are built on assumptions which are themselves problematic. The more general criticisms can be found in Chapters 2, 4 and 5.
85. Zanuttini contrasts (10) with (i) below, where, she argues, the NEG-2 head *not* can co-occur with *do* because *do* is needed independently owing to the presence of *n't*.

    (i) Don't you not do it!
    $[_{\text{NEGP-1}}\ [_{\text{NEG-1}}\ [\text{Do}_i]\text{n't}][_{\text{CP/TP}}\ (\text{you})\ [_{\text{C/T}}\text{t}_i][_{\text{FP}}\ (\text{you})\ [_{\text{F}}\ \text{F}][_{\text{NEGP-2}}\ [_{\text{NEG-2}}\ \text{not}][_{\text{VP}}\ [_{\text{V}}\ \text{do}]\ \text{it}]]]]]$!

    It may be disputed, however, whether *not* should really be subsumed under clausal negation here, or rather illustrates what is known as constituent negation, as *not* seems to be understood to negate the verb phrase alone (related views have been expressed by Stockwell et al. 1973, Cohen 1976 and Potsdam 1996). Zanuttini's NEG1/2 distinction is not designed to handle constituent negation, in which case this example would be irrelevant. Constituent negation is often regarded as an adverb, and (after, for instance, Iatridou 1990) we may assume that *not* is adjoined to the VP in sentences such as (i), giving us the representation shown in (ii).

    (ii) $[_{\text{NEGP-1}}\ [_{\text{NEG-1}}\ [\text{Do}_i]\text{n't}][_{\text{CP/TP}}\ (\text{you})\ [_{\text{C/T}}\text{t}_i][_{\text{FP}}\ (\text{you})\ [_{\text{F}}\ \text{F}]\ [_{\text{VP}}\ \text{not}\ [_{\text{VP}}\ [_{\text{V}}\ \text{do}]\ \text{it}]]]]]$!

86. Zanuttini acknowledges in a footnote that she is unable to account for overt and null subject imperatives on a par.
87. I pointed out before that *do not Subject* sequences may be acceptable in some contexts. I will return to this matter in section 6.3. The present analysis and that by P&R have in common that they are challenged by the restricted distribution of *do not Subject* as opposed to the non-occurrence of *do Subject not*, in contrast to most other analyses. In the model proposed by P&R, there is simply no possible structure corresponding to an example like (i):

    (i) *Do you not go there tomorrow!
    . . . . . [not [$_{VP}$ you [$_{V}$ do][$_{VP}$ [$_{V}$ go] there tomorrow]]]!

88. While in P&R's system *Subject don't* sequences are derived when both the subject and *do* raise out of the VP (as illustrated in (i)), they cannot extend this analysis to *Subject do not* strings for the reason that this would be inconsistent with the assumption that *do* does not undergo overt movement in the presence of *not*, which is necessary to explain the ill-formedness of example (15b).

    (i) One of you don't desert me!
    One of you$_{j}$ [do$_{i}$]n't [$_{VP}$ t$_{j}$ [$_{V}$ t$_{i}$][$_{VP}$ [$_{V}$ desert] me]]!

89. B&C do not explicate what they mean by the 'branching effect' of *not*-affixation. I conjecture that they assume that C [+AGR] does not govern SpecIP from within the head-adjunction structure, and therefore fails to discharge nominative Case. This is not, however, clear from standard definitions of government (Chomsky 1986). I further infer that B&C right-adjoin *not* to C because they consider it to be a suffix.
90. Following Zwicky and Pullum (1983), Potsdam takes negative auxiliaries like *don't* to be inflected items in the lexicon. Zwicky and Pullum provide a number of useful tests which help determine whether elements have the status of an affix or a clitic. They convincingly argue that *n't* is an affix and not a contracted form of *not*. One important way in which Potsdam's approach to *don't* differs from mine is that in his framework, *don't* is inserted into a NEGP where it checks (negative) features with the NEG head. I assume that NEGP (or Laka's 1990 ΣP) is not projected when negation (or emphasis) is realized on the auxiliary, for reasons that will become clear shortly.
91. In section 6.3 I will argue that this example does not, as Potsdam appears to assume, contain clausal negation but constituent negation, however. Notice also that under Potsdam's analysis it must remain inexplicable why the distribution of *do not* is restricted in the observed manner. One would expect that the complex [*do-not*] raising operation can 'save' all ungrammatical *do Subject not* structures, which it clearly does not:

(i) a. *Do you not desert me!

b. *Do not you desert me!
[$_{CP}$ [$_{C}$ [Do-not]$_{i+j}$][$_{IP}$ you [$_{I}$ t_i][$_{NEGP}$ [$_{NEG}$ t_j][$_{VP}$ [$_{V}$ desert] me]]]]!

92. I suggested there that the FP may be a projection of a syntactic category ASP(ect). Whether this extra functional projection is most appropriately labelled ASPP, or something else, is of secondary importance here. I will therefore stick to the neutral label F(P).
93. As Potsdam (1996, p. 243, note 1) points out, well-formed examples like (i) do not involve clausal negation but constituent negation.

(i) DO AT LEAST SOME of you not snub our guest!
[$_{IP}$ [$_{I}$DO][$_{FP}$ [AT LEAST SOME of you]$_i$ [$_{F}$ F][$_{VP}$ not [$_{VP}$ t_i [$_{V}$ snub] our guest]]]]!

94. I assume that *pro* in grammatical *do not* structures and overt subjects in grammatical *Subject don't* structures are equally in SpecIP, as indicated below.

(i) a. Do not desert me!
[$_{IP}$ *pro*$_i$ [$_{I}$ Do][$_{NEGP}$ [$_{NEG}$ not][$_{FP}$ t'$_i$ [$_{F}$ F][$_{VP}$ t_i [$_{V}$ desert] me]]]]!

b. One of you don't desert me!
[$_{IP}$ One of you [$_{I}$ don't] desert me]!

95. I hinted in section 6.2.3 that this account is, in a sense, reminiscent of the solution proposed by Beukema and Coopmans (1989) within a GB-model.
96. On this account, I have to assume that NEGP is absent from the phrase marker in this case, or else it should have some blocking impact on feature checking. This assumption may not be problematic in relation to Checking Theory, as any negative features carried by *don't* are arguably interpretable, and hence exempted from checking. As Andrew Radford (pers. comm.) has pointed out to me, it is true that it leads to different LF-representations for synonymous examples like (ia) and (ib), however. This is inconsistent with the idea that semantically equivalent expressions have the same structure at LF. I will have to leave this matter unresolved.

(i) a. Do not desert me!
[$_{IP}$ *pro* [$_{I}$ do][$_{NEGP}$ [$_{NEG}$ not] desert me]]!

b. Don't desert me!
[$_{IP}$ *pro* [$_{I}$ don't] desert me]!

97. As in imperative examples like (54), *not* in (i) below presumably expresses VP-adjoined constituent negation.

(i) There are not many students waiting outside.
[$_{IP}$ There [$_{I}$ are][$_{VP}$ [not many students] waiting outside]]

98. For a detailed analysis of directive infinitival- and participial constructions in Dutch, see Rooryck and Postma (forthcoming).
99. This raises the question of what triggers *do*-insertion into INFL in English imperatives if not [AGR]. Another potential candidate is a feature [TENSE]. There is some difference of opinion in the literature as to whether or not imperatives are specified for [TENSE]. The analyses of Beukema and Coopmans (1989) and Pollock (1989) posit a non-finite INFL/TENSE in the structure of English imperatives. Zanuttini (1991) assumes the presence of a TENSE node, but she remains agnostic on its feature content. The majority of researchers, however, take English imperatives to lack [TENSE] specification altogether (Culicover 1971, 1976, Stockwell et al. 1973, Ukaji 1978, Akmajian et al. 1979, Davies 1981, Lasnik 1981, 1994, Zhang 1990, Henry 1995, Platzack and Rosengren 1997 and others). What everybody does agree on is that imperatives are not associated with the finite [PRESENT/PAST] Tense that characterizes declarative clauses. Finite Tense has been argued to behave like a referential category (Partee 1973, 1984, Enç 1987) to the effect that it turns predicates into referring expressions, analogous to the function of determiners with respect to nouns. Platzack and Rosengren (1997) have pointed out that imperatives do not refer to the extent that they do not convey a proposition which is bounded in time and space (see also Huntley 1982, 1984, Schmerling 1982). The ungrammaticality of [PAST] imperatives (**Someone called my wife!*) (which arguably is also 'out' for the pragmatic reason that one cannot normally order events for the past) follows from the assumption that the imperative is not marked for finite [PRESENT/PAST] Tense, as well as the impossibility of using modal verbs, since these only have finite forms. Henry (1995, p. 70) notes that while some modals (like *may*) may be excluded at any rate because they are incompatible with directive illocutionary force, even those which are not cannot be used in imperatives (*You be able / *can swim before the end of the holidays!*). Culicover (1971, pp. 70, 76) describes the 'time' of an imperative 'as the time at which the speaker desires the hearer to perform the action described by the sentence', namely, 'the very immediate future or later'. Han (1998) has recently suggested that the INFL/TENSE head of imperatives contains a feature [UNREALIZED]. This ties in with an idea of Stowell (1982) that (certain types of) *to*-infinitives express an 'unrealized quasi-future tense' (a point originally made by Bresnan 1972, 1976). Compare *I hope [to be on time tonight]* to *Be on time tonight!* The fact that imperatives may be modified by time adverbials like *tonight* (or *now* and *tomorrow* in *You phone him now / tomorrow!*) would point to a 'tensed' INFL on the view that adverbial modifiers are licensed by the head whose projection they modify – temporal adverbs by INFL/TENSE, manner adverbs by V and so on (Marantz 1984, Bowers 1993). One might argue that whereas infinitives

check INFL/TENSE by means of the particle *to*, the absence of such an element from imperatives triggers *do*-insertion in the relevant contexts. While I consider postulating an [UNREALIZED] INFL in imperatives not indefensible, it is not immediately clear to me how such an assumption can be reconciled with the apparent nominative Case of the subject in imperatives, which is usually associated with 'finiteness'.

100. Henry (1997) discusses some changes in progress, arguing that the pattern is one of change from the unrestricted inversion dialect B (now largely found in older speakers of Belfast English), to the restricted inversion dialect A (found mainly in middle-aged and young adult speakers), to a variety in which imperatives do not occur with inversion at all (found most frequently in children and teenagers).
101. I am grateful to Liliane Haegeman (pers. comm.) for the West Flemish data.
102. I would like to thank Josef Bayer for help with the German data.
103. For a systematic analysis of imperatives in Scandinavian I refer to Jensen's PhD study (University of Oxford), which was not yet completed at the time of publication of the present study.
104. Platzack and Rosengren's explanation does not carry over to the apparent absence of the EPP in languages where non-raising to SpecIP is not specific to imperatives, as for postverbal subjects in Romance (Zubizaretta 1995, Costa 1998 and others) and VSO orders in languages like Irish (McCloskey 1999, Carnie and Harley 2000 and references therein).

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