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FIVE

Models of Curriculum Planning

George J. Posner

How does one plan a curriculum? For many students of curriculum, the answer to this question constitutes a major goal of their studies. In this chapter, we will attempt to determine the ways educators have addressed this question.

Many students find answers to this question in the curriculum literature to be somewhat confusing. The so-called Tyler Rationale prescribes four “questions” that any curriculum planner must address;¹ Taba provides seven “steps” to follow;² Walker’s “naturalistic model” describes three “elements” of curriculum planning;³ Johnson’s “model” represents the curriculum as an “output of one system and an input of another”;⁴ and Goodlad’s “conceptual system” describes three different “levels of curriculum decision making.”⁵ What accounts for this wide array of answers to the question of curriculum planning? Or, alternatively, are they answers to different questions?

In this chapter, I argue that this wide variety of approaches to curriculum planning can be partially understood as a set of responses to different curriculum planning questions. We will examine answers to three different questions related to curriculum planning:

1. The procedural question: What steps should one follow in planning a curriculum?
2. The descriptive question: How do people actually plan curricula; i.e., what do they do?
3. The conceptual question: What are the elements of curriculum planning and how do they relate to one another conceptually?

In order to understand curriculum planning more fully, we must examine not only different curriculum planning questions, but also different curriculum planning perspectives. I maintain⁶ that one perspective on curriculum planning has dominated curriculum thought and, thus, influenced not only the answers to the three questions outlined above, but even the formulation of these questions. I then examine briefly another perspective that not only answers the three questions in radically different ways but also argues for the priority of other questions and, in particular, underlying ideological questions.

The Technical Production Perspective

The dominant perspective is best represented in Ralph Tyler's work. Tyler's rationale for curriculum planning has been a major influence on curriculum thought since its publication in 1949.⁷ It has been interpreted by most educators as a procedure to follow when planning a curriculum; that is, as an answer to the *procedural* question, what steps does one follow in planning a curriculum?⁸ Because of its importance, I examine its features.

Tyler suggests that when planning a curriculum, four questions must be answered. First, planners must decide what educational purposes the school should seek to attain. These "objectives" should be derived from systematic studies of the *learners*, from studies of contemporary life in *society*, and from analyses of the *subject matter* by specialists. These three sources of objectives are then screened through the school's *philosophy* and through knowledge available about the *psychology of learning*. The objectives derived in this way should be specified as precisely and unambiguously as possible, so that evaluation efforts can be undertaken to determine the extent to which the objectives have been attained.

Second, planners must determine what educational experiences can be provided that are most likely to attain these purposes. Possible experiences are checked for consistency with objectives and for economy.

Third, the planner must find ways that these educational experiences can be organized effectively. The planner attempts to provide experiences that have a cumulative effect on students. Tyler recommends that experiences build on one another and enable learners to understand the relation among

their learning activities in various fields. In so doing, attention should be given to the *sequence* of experiences within each field (e.g., mathematics) and to *integration* of knowledge across fields. Certain concepts, skills, and values are sufficiently complex to require repeated study in increasing degrees of sophistication and breadth of application, and sufficiently pervasive to help the student relate one field to another. The planner uses these *organizing elements* to provide the sequence and integration the curriculum requires.

Finally, the planner must determine whether the educational purposes are being attained. Objective evaluation instruments (e.g., tests, work samples, questionnaires, and records) are developed to check the curriculum's effectiveness. The criterion for success is behavioral evidence that the objectives of the curriculum have been attained.

The Tyler Rationale and, in particular, his four questions regarding the selection of educational purposes, the determination of experiences, the organization of experiences, and the provision for evaluation, have dominated thought on curriculum planning for nearly fifty years. Moreover, the publication of Tyler's syllabus represents not the beginning of its influence but, instead, a distillation of ideas derived from the founders of the curriculum field in the first quarter of this century.⁹ In fact, Bobbitt's seminal books on curriculum¹⁰ and, in particular, their focus on the development of specific objectives based on scientific methods, established the basic approach to curriculum planning continued by Tyler in his syllabus.

Since its publication in 1949, educators representing a wide range of orientations have turned to the Tyler Rationale for an analysis of the procedural questions of curriculum. Test-oriented behaviorists such as James Popham use it explicitly for the selection of objectives.¹¹ Course planning guides, such as those by Posner and Rudnitsky¹² and by Barnes,¹³ use elaborations of the Tyler Rationale as the basis for their handbooks. Even humanistic educators such as Elliott Eisner, who have spent considerable effort criticizing Tyleresque objectives and evaluation approaches, when it comes time to discuss procedure, revert (perhaps unknowingly) to a step-by-step approach that differs only slightly from the Tyler Rationale.¹⁴

Perhaps the major reason for the domination of curriculum planning by the Tyler Rationale is its congruence with our assumptions about both schooling and curriculum planning. Unquestioned acceptance of these assumptions even makes conceiving of an alternative to this basic approach impossible.

Schooling is assumed to be a process whose main purpose is to promote or produce learning. Students are termed *learners*; objectives are conceived in terms of desirable learning; evaluation of the school's success is targeted almost exclusively on achievement test scores; "educational" goals are distinguished from "noneducational" goals by determining if they can be attributed

to learning;¹⁵ "curriculum" is defined (not by Tyler but by his followers, such as Goodlad) in terms of "intended learning outcomes."¹⁶ Thus, schooling is conceived as a *production system*, in which individual learning outcomes are the primary product. After all, if learning is not what schooling is for, then what could be its purpose?

Further, curriculum planning is assumed to be an enterprise in which the planner objectively and, if possible, scientifically develops the means necessary to produce the desired learning outcomes. There is no place for personal biases and values in selecting the means; effectiveness and efficiency in accomplishing the ends are primary. This *means-end reasoning* process serves as the logic underlying all rational decision making. Educational experiences are justified by the objectives that they serve.

This means-ends rationality is taken a step further when ends not only serve as the primary justification for means but also as the starting point in planning. After all, as this perspective rhetorically asks, How can one decide on educational means except by referring to educational ends? The use of a travel metaphor convinces planners that they must determine the destination before deciding on the route they should take and thus assume a *linear* view of means and ends.

This means-ends rationality leads to the assumption that it is a *technical* matter to decide such issues as instructional method and content, a matter best reserved for people with technical expertise about the methods and content optimally suited for particular objectives. As technical experts, they have the responsibility of disallowing their own values from clouding the objectivity of their work; that is, they try to keep their work value free. Even decisions about purpose are conceived as a technical matter based on specialized knowledge which experts develop, either from studies of learners and contemporary society or by virtue of their subject matter expertise. After all, who is better equipped to make these decisions than the people with the most knowledge relevant to the decisions?

I refer to views on curriculum planning that uncritically accept these assumptions as based on a *technical production* perspective. They are *technical* if they consider educational decisions to be made objectively, primarily by experts with specialized knowledge; they are *production oriented* if they view schooling as a process whose main purpose is to produce learning, in which the logic of educational decision making is based on means-ends reasoning. Furthermore, they are *linear* technical production models if they require the determination of ends before deciding on means.

The technical production perspective has served as a basis for a variety of models intended to guide curriculum thought (particularly when complemented with the assumption of linearity). I examine some major analyses of curriculum planning that accept the central assumptions of this perspective

but differ in important ways. They can be interpreted as answers to the basic procedural, descriptive, and conceptual questions of curriculum planning.

The Procedural Question

As a basic approach to curriculum development, the Tyler Rationale was used as a point of departure by many writers sympathetic to its general orientation. Some of these writers, most notably Hilda Taba, attempted to refine it by adding steps and by further subdividing each of Tyler's four planning steps.¹⁷

Taba

Taba's work represents the most detailed elaboration of the Tyler Rationale. Like Tyler, she explicitly accepts the assumption that curriculum planning is a technical (or "scientific") rather than a political matter.

Scientific curriculum development needs to draw upon analysis of society and culture, studies of the learner and the learning process, and analyses of the nature of knowledge in order to determine the purposes of the school and the nature of its curriculum.¹⁸ (Emphasis added.)

She argues for a "systematic," "objective," "scientific," and "research-oriented" approach to curriculum development, requiring "objectivity."¹⁹ She laments that

the tradition of rigorous scientific thinking about curricula is not as yet well established. . . . Curriculum designs are espoused on the basis of their concurrence with a set of beliefs and feelings, rather than by their verifiable consequence on learning or their contribution to educational objectives.²⁰

Her view of curriculum development "requires expertness of many varieties,"²¹ including

technical skills in curriculum making, mastery of intellectual discipline, the knowledge of social and educational values which underlie educational decisions, and the understanding of the processes of educational decisions and human engineering.²²

Like Tyler, Taba also accepts the assumption that learning is the ultimate purpose of schooling. Her focus on the selection and organization of "learning experiences," her preoccupation with learning outcomes and learning

objectives in her evaluation approach, her emphasis on learning theory in the selection of objectives, and the centrality of learning objectives in her curriculum development model all imply a learning-oriented view of schooling. As Taba succinctly states: "curricula are designed so that students may learn."²³

Her approach is more prescriptive than Tyler's regarding the procedure of curriculum planning. Whereas Tyler offers four questions that must be addressed, Taba forcefully argues for the *order* of her seven steps.

If one conceives of curriculum development as a task requiring orderly thinking, one needs to examine both the order in which decisions are made and the way in which they are made to make sure that all relevant considerations are brought to bear on these decisions. This book is based on an assumption that there is such an order and that pursuing it will result in a more thoughtfully planned and a more dynamically conceived curriculum. This order might be as follows:

- Step 1: Diagnosis of needs;
- Step 2: Formulation of objectives;
- Step 3: Selection of content;
- Step 4: Organization of content;
- Step 5: Selection of learning experiences;
- Step 6: Organization of learning experiences; and
- Step 7: Determination of what to evaluate and of ways and means of doing it.²⁴

Thus, Taba's model is not only a technical-production model but also linear.

Schwab

Joseph Schwab takes issue with several of Tyler's and Taba's views, including the focus on objectives, the clear separation of ends and means, and the insistence on an orderly planning procedure.²⁵ In order to characterize planning more appropriately, he offers curriculum planners the concept of "deliberation."

Deliberation is complex and arduous. It treats both ends and means and must treat them as mutually determining one another. It must try to identify, with respect to both, what facts may be relevant. It must try to ascertain the relevant facts in the concrete case. It must try to identify the desiderata in the case. It must generate alternative solutions. It must make every effort to trace the branching pathways of consequences which may flow from each alternative and affect desiderata. It must then weigh alternatives and their costs and consequences against one another, and choose, not the *right* alternative, for there is no such thing, but the *best* one.²⁶

Schwab's concept of deliberation is the centerpiece of this "practical" language for developing curricula. For Schwab, this practical language is preferable to the single-theory approaches that have dominated curriculum development. Single-theory curricula, such as a science curriculum based on Piagetian theory, a course on the novel as a source of vicarious experience, or a math curriculum based on set theory, are fundamentally flawed, according to Schwab. They are flawed in three ways in their reliance on a single principle or theory for curriculum planning.

1. *The Failure of Scope* . . . One curriculum effort is grounded in concern only for the individual, another in concern only for groups, others in concern only for cultures, or communities, or societies, or minds, or the extant bodies of knowledge. . . . No curriculum, grounded in but one of these subjects, can possibly be adequate or defensible.²⁷
2. *The Vice of Abstraction* . . . All theories, even the best of them . . . , necessarily neglect some aspects and facets of the facts of the case. A theory (and the principle derived from it) covers and formulates the *regularities* among the things and events it subsumes. It abstracts a general or ideal case. It leaves behind the nonuniformities, the particularities, which characterize each concrete instance of the facts subsumed. . . . Yet curriculum is brought to bear, not on ideal or abstract representations, but on the real thing, on the concrete case, in all its completeness and with all its differences from all other concrete cases on a large body of facts concerning which the theoretic abstraction is silent.²⁸
3. *Radical Plurality* . . . Nearly all theories in all the behavioral sciences are marked by the coexistence of competing theories. . . . All the social and behavioral sciences are marked by the "schools," each distinguished by a different choice of principle of enquiry, each of which selects from the intimidating complexities of the subject matter the small fraction of the whole with which it can deal. . . . The theories which arise from enquiries so directed are, then, radically incomplete, each of them incomplete to the extent that competing theories take hold of different aspects of the subject of enquiry and treat it in a different way. . . . In short, there is every reason to suppose that any one of the extant theories of behavior is a pale and incomplete representation of actual behavior. . . . It follows that such theories are not, and will not be, adequate by themselves to tell us what to do with actual human beings or how to do it. What they variously suggest and the contrary guidances they afford to choice and action must be mediated and combined by eclectic arts and must be massively supplemented, as well as mediated, by knowledge of some other kind derived from another

source. . . . It is this recourse to accumulated lore, to experience of actions and their consequences, to action and reaction at the level of the concrete case, which constitutes the heart of the practical. It is high time that curriculum do likewise.²⁹

Curriculum planning can be no more based on single theory than can other complex decisions such as choosing a spouse, buying a car, or selecting a president.

In order to repair these deficiencies of theory as a basis for curriculum planning, Schwab offers the "eclectic" as an approach to curriculum planning. Theory brings certain features of a phenomenon into focus, helping the curriculum planner to understand better that aspect of the situation. For example, Piagetian theory helps the planner understand the student's cognitive development. Curriculum planners trained in the "eclectic arts" not only can use theory to view phenomena, they also know which aspects of the phenomenon each theory obscures or blurs. For example, Piagetian theory obscures the social psychology and sociology of classrooms. Finally, the eclectic arts allow the curriculum planner to use various theories in combination "without paying the full price of their incompleteness and partiality."³⁰

In order to avoid the "tunnel vision" associated with any theory, Schwab recommends not only a deliberative method for curriculum planning but also suggests the participants in this process. According to Schwab, at least one representative of each of the four "commonplaces" of education must be included, i.e., the learner, the teacher, the subject matter, and the milieu. (Note the similarity with Tyler's three "sources.") In addition to representation of each of these four commonplaces, a fifth perspective, that of the curriculum specialist (trained in the practical and eclectic arts), must be present.³¹

Schwab's approach to curriculum planning accepts some assumptions of the Tyler Rationale and rejects others. Curriculum planning for both Schwab and for Tyler is a technical matter requiring expert knowledge. The representatives of each of the four commonplaces are to be experts in each commonplace. For example, the representative of "the learner" is to be a psychologist, not a student. Furthermore, the curriculum specialist is to be a trained expert in the arts of the practical and of the eclectic (as Schwab defines them).

Furthermore, Schwab's indictment of theory-driven curriculum development would lead to a general condemnation of any predetermined framework to be used as a starting point. Because theories and ideologies are both belief systems that reduce the educational planner's ability to discern the complexities of a particular situation and to consider alternatives, they must be avoided. Thus, Schwab, too, requires a nonideological posture for curriculum development.

Although technical in its reliance on experts, Schwab's approach rejects the constraints inherent in the clear separation of means and ends, insisting instead on a more flexible, varied, and iterative planning process. Deliberation is not characterized by specified procedural steps carried out in prescribed order.

The Descriptive Question

The problem with the Tyler Rationale, according to some writers, is that it does not describe what curriculum developers actually do when they plan a curriculum. Of course, none of the procedural models were intended to describe the actual work of practitioners. Nevertheless, the difficulties in implementing the Tyler Rationale suggest possible inherent weaknesses in its basic approach. Perhaps a more useable approach to curriculum planning can derive from an empirical investigation of curriculum development projects, particularly studies of notably successful ones.

Walker

Decker Walker's naturalistic model is based on this premise.³² This model consists of three elements: "the curriculum's *platform*, its *design*, and the *deliberation* associated with it."³³

The *platform* is "the system of beliefs and values that the curriculum developer brings to his task and . . . guides the development of the curriculum. . . . The word *platform* is meant to suggest both a political platform and something to stand on."³⁴

Platforms consist of "conceptions," "theories," and "aims." Beliefs about what is learnable and teachable (such as "creativity can be taught") and, more generally, about what is possible, are conceptions. Beliefs about what is true are theories; for example, a belief that "motivation to learn is primarily based on the individual's history of successes and failures." Beliefs about "what is educationally desirable" are "aims"; for example, "we should teach children to learn how to learn." In addition to these three carefully conceptualized and explicit types of planks in a curriculum's platform, two others are significant. "Images" of good teaching, of good examples, and of good procedures to follow, though not explicit, often are influential in curriculum decisions. For example, exemplary literary works, physics problems, and teaching techniques often underlie curricular choices.³⁵

In contrast with Tyler and Taba, Walker, like Schwab, prefers to view a curriculum not as an object or as materials but as the events made possible by the use of materials. It follows, then, that a curriculum's design can be specified by "the series of *decisions* that produce it . . . [that is] by the choices that enter into its creation."³⁶

The process by which design decisions are made is "deliberation," a concept borrowed directly from Schwab. Deliberation, for Walker, consists of "formulating decision points, devising alternative choices at these decision points, considering arguments for and against suggested decision points and . . . alternatives, and finally, choosing the most defensible alternative. . . ." Alternatives are compared in terms of their consistency with the curriculum's platform, and, when necessary, additional sources of information (or "data") are sought.

When planners resolve difficult decisions stemming from contradictions in the platform, they may preserve and accumulate these "precedents" for later situations, much as the courts use prior decisions as a basis for present decisions by simply citing precedent. Walker refers to "the body of precedents evolved from the platform" as "policy."³⁸ He thus distinguishes the principles accepted from the start (i.e., the platform) from those that evolve from the application of the platform to design decisions.




Figure 5.1. A schematic diagram of the main components of the naturalistic model.³⁹

Walker's model, like Schwab's, is less linear than Tyler's or Taba's and relegates objectives to a less central position in the curriculum development process. Objectives constitute only one type of one component (i.e., aims) of Walker's platform. There is, thus, no clear separation of ends and means. Walker's platform includes beliefs about both. Although he does not specifi-

cally mention ideological beliefs as possible planks in a platform, he does not preclude them. But, like Schwab, Walker's model leaves unquestioned the assumption regarding the primary role of experts. Surprisingly, Walker never raises the issue of the discrepancy between the platforms of the project director, on the one hand, and of the teachers or students who ultimately must negotiate the meaning of the curriculum, on the other hand.

As Walker himself points out:

While Schwab's view of curriculum making [and Walker's model which is based on it] is less linear and comprehensive and more flexible and dialectical than the Tyler rationale, the same kinds of questions that Tyler asks need to be addressed at some point in deliberation. We still need to ask what our purposes are and how we might achieve them; we still need to find out if we have done so in our particular setting. Schwab himself recognizes this, and so the dominance of the Tyler Rationale in thinking about curriculum making seems to be unshaken.⁴⁰

The Conceptual Question

Tyler begins his book by denying that his Rationale is "a manual for curriculum construction"; it does not describe "the steps to be taken . . . to build a curriculum."⁴¹ Instead, he regards his Rationale as one "conception of the elements and relationships involved in an effective curriculum."⁴² In fact, he concludes his book with an often overlooked statement:

The purpose of the rationale is to give a view of the elements that are involved in a program of instruction and their necessary interrelations. The program may be improved by attacks beginning at any point, providing the resulting modifications are followed through the related elements until eventually all aspects of the curriculum have been studied and revised.⁴³

Therefore, although often regarded as a linear procedural model, the Tyler Rationale is most appropriately viewed as a conceptual model. Just as Taba elaborated the Tyler Rationale into a detailed procedural model, Goodlad and Johnson have used Tyler's work as a point of departure for their own conceptual models.

Goodlad

John Goodlad, one of Tyler's students in a course using the Rationale as a syllabus, adopts virtually every aspect of Tyler's model in his own conceptual model.⁴⁴ He shares Tyler's concern with providing an account of rationality in

curriculum planning, attributing "human frailty" to any departures from the strict means-ends logic.

However, Goodlad's major contribution to curriculum models is his elaboration of the Tyler Rationale, describing three levels of curriculum planning. The *instructional level* is closest to the learner. Curriculum planning at this level involves selecting the "organizing centers for learning"⁴⁵ (the stimuli to which the student responds), and deriving the precise educational objectives from the institution's educational aims.

The level above the instructional level Goodlad terms *institutional*. Curriculum planning here involves formulating general educational objectives and selecting illustrative learning opportunities.

The highest level Goodlad terms *societal*. Curriculum planning at this level is done by the "institution's sanctioning body,"⁴⁶ such as a school board. This body is responsible for formulating educational aims in order to attain a set of selected values.

Since Goodlad first proposed the three levels, his model has been substantially elaborated by extending them to include the state and federal levels.⁴⁷ The notion of levels contributes significantly to curriculum planning models by providing a technical production perspective on the question: Who should decide what in curriculum planning? This seemingly political and ethical question is thus answered as a technical question, that is, Who has access to the appropriate "data sources"?⁴⁸

Johnson

Mauritz Johnson's conceptual model evolved over a ten-year period from 1967 to 1977. His early (and most often cited) version in 1967 stipulated a definition of curriculum as "a structured series of intended learning outcomes," and carefully distinguished between often confused concepts, including curriculum development and instructional systems, platforms and theories, sources of curriculum and criteria for curriculum selection, curricular and instrumental content, curriculum evaluation and instructional evaluation, and education and training.⁴⁹ But he recognized that his 1967 model was incomplete: It did not provide for goal setting, instructional planning, evaluation, situational (or frame) factors, or managerial aspects. Johnson's 1977 P-I-E model (i.e., planning, implementation, and evaluation) provided this needed elaboration.⁵⁰ Although highly complex, it can be reduced to the basic claim that rational planning involves a planning, an implementation, and an evaluation aspect (the "linear technical" dimension), each of which can, in turn, be planned, implemented, and evaluated (the managerial dimension). Thus, one can plan, implement, and evaluate a given planning process, a given approach to implementation, and a given evaluation

strategy. Furthermore, all of these activities are governed by a set of natural, temporal, physical, economic, cultural, organizational, and personal "frame factors" that act as resources and restrictions on both curriculum and instruction.⁵¹

The basic P-I-E model, when applied to curriculum and instruction, results in five elements: goal setting, curriculum selection, curriculum structuring, instructional planning, and technical evaluation. The comparability of Johnson, Goodlad, Tyler, and Taba is clear.

TABLE 5.1

*Johnson's model compared with two other analyses of curriculum and curriculum development.*⁵²

Elements Johnson (1977)	Questions Tyler (1950)	Steps Taba (1962)
Goal setting	What educational purposes?	Diagnosing needs
Curriculum selection		Formulating specific objectives Selecting content
Curriculum structuring		Organizing content Checking balance and sequence
Instructional planning	What educational experience? How to organize educational experiences?	Selecting learning experiences Organizing learning experiences
Technical evaluation	How to determine whether purposes are attained?	Determining what and how to evaluate

Not only do Johnson's concepts correlate closely with Tyler's questions, Goodlad's data sources, and Taba's steps, but at a deeper level Johnson shares all the major assumptions of the technical production models. Johnson argues that the theoretical (i.e., understanding) and the ideological (i.e., advocacy) "exist in . . . conceptually distinct worlds."⁵³ Further, he claims that technology may be influenced by theory and research, but not by ideology. Like Tyler, Johnson disavows Taba's linear planning approach, but assumes a means-end logic underlying rational planning. Furthermore, like Goodlad, Johnson's concept of curriculum as "intended learning outcomes" makes clear his assumption of learning as the primary purpose of schooling.

A Critical Perspective

The works of Tyler, Taba, Walker, Schwab, Johnson, and Goodlad represent the dominant thinking in the curriculum field regarding curriculum planning. Although dissent is found among these works regarding specific aspects of the technical production perspective, I have argued that they share many assumptions. The same point regarding family resemblances and family squabbles might be made for another perspective that has emerged as a response to the dominant viewpoint. As might be expected, this perspective, termed *critical*, takes issue with each of the basic assumptions of the dominant view. This perspective is best understood by examining how it responds to each of the three questions posed by the dominant viewpoint. For this analysis, I focus on Paulo Freire's work.

Freire

Paulo Freire's criticism of schooling practices is captured by his analysis of the banking metaphor.

Education . . . becomes an art of depositing, in which the students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositor. Instead of communicating, the teacher issues communiques and makes deposits which the students patiently receive, memorize, and repeat. This is the "banking" concept of education, in which the scope of action allowed to the students extends only as far as receiving, filing, and storing the deposits.⁵⁴

The view of curriculum planning that follows from the banking concept of schooling is "that the educator's role is to regulate the way the world 'enters into' the students."⁵⁵ The curriculum planner's task is "to organize a process . . . to 'fill' the students by making deposits of information which *he* considers to constitute true knowledge."⁵⁶ (Emphasis added.) Thus, Freire is drawing attention to the dominant perspectives's assumption that those with special knowledge make decisions for and about those without that knowledge. This criticism echoes the view of Tyler's critics who claim that his Rationale embodies a "factory" metaphor in which the student is merely the raw material to be fashioned by the "school-factory" into a "product drawn to the specifications of social convention."⁵⁷ The critical perspective then, asks us to question the authority of experts in curriculum planning and urges a more democratic relationship between teacher and student.

As an alternative to the curriculum-planning models associated with the technical-production perspective, Freire describes the "emancipatory" ap-

proach. Briefly stated, the approach emphasizes "critical reflection" on one's own "concrete situation."⁵⁸ In contrast with the banking method, Freire's "problem-posing"⁵⁹ method requires "dialogue"⁶⁰ in which teacher and student are "critical coinvestigators."⁶¹ They both

develop their power to perceive critically the way they exist in the world with which and in which they find themselves; they come to see the world not as a static reality, but as a reality in process, in transformation.⁶²

This "critical consciousness"⁶³ is developed in a series of steps. First, a team of educators helps the people in a particular place to develop "generative themes"⁶⁴ (e.g., culture, underdevelopment, alcoholism) that represent their view of reality. From this set of themes, a group of professional educators and nonprofessional local volunteers, through "dialogue," cooperatively identify themes to be used for the curriculum and develop instructional materials for each of them. Then the materials are used in "culture circles"⁶⁵ as the focus of discussions. The materials, including readings, tape-recorded interviews, photographs, and role plays, are designed to reflect characteristics of people's lives and, thus, to stimulate critical reflection about their lives. Ultimately this process leads to "praxis," action based on "critical reflection,"⁶⁶ the goal of Freire's pedagogy.

Although Freire's approach does, in fact, answer the procedural question with a step-by-step approach to curriculum planning, it conflicts with most of the basic assumptions of the technical production model. This approach takes issue with the authority of "experts" in curriculum planning decisions. "Dialogue" requires "critical reflection" by both teacher and student as "coinvestigators."⁶⁷ The problem-posing approach also requires dialogue with the "students" for the formulation of the generative themes to be used in the curriculum; "[t]his view of education starts with the conviction that it cannot present its own program but must search for this program dialogically with the people."⁶⁸

The "ideological pretense of the value-free curriculum decision"⁶⁹ is abandoned. Abandoning this pretense also undermines the assumption that curriculum development involves purely technical decisions. Thus, curriculum planning is not viewed as a technical matter, but instead as a political and ideological matter. The purpose of the process is for the people "to come to feel like masters of their thinking by discussing the thinking and views of the world explicitly and implicitly manifest in their own suggestions and those of their comrades."⁷⁰ Similarly, the end product is not a learning outcome but critical reflection and action upon reality. Of course, learning outcomes, such as ability to reflect critically, are desirable. But political action by the

oppressed aimed at their own liberation is the ultimate purpose. To reduce this approach to a set of intended learning outcomes would be to miss its point of political activism.

It is important to note that Freire is at once providing (1) a *descriptive* account of the way teaching and, by implication, curriculum planning is conducted, through the use of the banking metaphor; (2) a *procedural* model by which curriculum should be planned, that is, through the use of generative themes; and (3) a *conceptual* analysis of the fundamental elements of education and their relationships, through an analysis of key concepts including oppression, liberation, critical reflection, dialogue, problem-posing, praxis, humanization, the theme, codification, object/subject, among others.

Many other scholars approach curriculum planning from a critical perspective. They ask descriptive and conceptual questions which implicitly attempt to undermine the assumptions on which the technical production perspective rests:

1. What knowledge does the curriculum count as legitimate, and what does it not count?⁷¹
2. To what extent does the curriculum organization presuppose and serve to "legitimate a rigid hierarchy between teacher and taught?"⁷²
3. How does the curriculum enable the school to achieve its primary purposes of social reproduction and hegemony?⁷³
4. Who has the greatest access to high-status and high-prestige knowledge?
5. Who defines what counts as legitimate knowledge?⁷⁴
6. Whose interests does this definition serve?⁷⁵
7. How do the dominant forms of evaluation serve to legitimize curriculum knowledge?⁷⁶
8. To what extent is the schools' sorting function more significant than its educative function?
9. What are the features of the schools' hidden or implicit curriculum, and to what extent does this aspect of schooling mediate teaching the official curriculum?

Underlying these questions is a view that "power, knowledge, ideology, and schooling are linked in ever-changing patterns of complexity."⁷⁷ These questions implicitly criticize the view that schools and their curricula can, should, or do provide students with experiences objectively derived from or even primarily justified by a set of learning objectives and that the primary purpose of schooling is to facilitate learning in individuals. For those critical theorists concerned primarily with the hidden curriculum, the official curriculum is largely trivial in its significance when compared with implicit mes-

sages in the schools' rules and norms of behavior. To other critical theorists the official curriculum is significant not because of its explicit learning objectives, but because of the knowledge it legitimizes and delegitimizes, the effects of this process, and the manner in which it distributes this knowledge differently to different classes of students.

Thus, a critical perspective, although it attempts to provide answers to the procedural, descriptive, and conceptual questions, focuses on another question, a question that takes issue with a fundamental assumption of the technical production perspective: If all curriculum decisions are inherently ideological and political, and therefore an objectively based means-end rationality is itself an ideological pretense, then what is the mode of curriculum rationality?

Ideological Questions

Writers taking the strict technical production perspective attempt to produce ideologically neutral models. Johnson, for example, using ideas from Scheffler, draws a sharp distinction between definitions of curriculum (together with the models on which they are based) which are "programmatically (doctrinal)" and those which are "analytic" or explanatory.⁷⁸ He is clearly impatient with confusions of this sort that have plagued the curriculum field. Unfortunately, according to Johnson, various curriculum writers use their curriculum planning models as ideological "platforms" rather than as descriptions or explanations.⁷⁹ These platforms have exhorted educators to offer experiences "having a maximum of lifelikeness for the learner,"⁸⁰ "to develop individuals along lines consonant with our ideal of the authentic human being,"⁸¹ and to discipline "children and youth in group ways of thinking and acting,"⁸² to mention just three notable examples.

These ideological positions are to be avoided and even condemned, according to writers from the technical production perspective. They claim that it is up to the school, not curriculum theorists, to decide what purposes the school curriculum should adopt. Recall that Tyler's first question is followed by a set of technical procedures that any school can use to decide on its purposes. Thus, the rationality of curriculum planning from the technical production perspective is not based on a particular purpose, ideology, or doctrine, but on deciding that purpose objectively and systematically and then by using effective and efficient means for accomplishing it. Therefore, this perspective considers ideological questions to be a procedural step in curriculum planning, not questions to be answered definitively for all curriculum planning.

Critical theorists, however, disagree. Freire regards the development of a critical consciousness to be the only defensible pedagogical purpose. Giroux

agrees with Herbert Marcuse that curriculum planning must be committed to "the emancipation of sensibility, reason and imagination, in all spheres of subjectivity and objectivity."⁸³ Each critical theorist has his or her own ideology. Each agrees that the dominant perspective's pretense of neutrality serves to divert criticism of the dominant ideology.

Conclusion

The problem with studying a topic by answering a series of questions should now be apparent. The questions one asks and what one accepts as a legitimate answer channel the investigation. We have seen how this happens in curriculum models. Different models can be seen as answers to different questions or as different notions of legitimate answers.

Each of the two perspectives examined has made a contribution. The technical production perspective has provided a view of rationality in curriculum planning and has outlined what techniques a curriculum planner needs to master. The critical perspective raises our consciousness regarding the assumptions underlying our work in curriculum. By giving us ground to stand on outside the dominant approach, it has enabled us to examine critically the technical production perspective, to identify its blind spots, and to understand its political and social implications.

Study of curriculum models thus provides two necessary and complementary elements: curriculum development technique and a curriculum conscience. Knowing how to develop a curriculum is what I term *technique*. Being able to identify the assumptions underlying curriculum discussion, that is, understanding what is being taken for granted, is what I term a *curriculum conscience*. A curriculum planner without the former is incompetent ("but what can you do?") and without the latter is ungrounded ("merely a technician"). A "complete" curriculum planning model is not what the field needs. The field needs curriculum planners not only able to use various models but also aware of the implications of their use.

Notes

1. Ralph W. Tyler, *Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949).
2. Hilda Taba, *Curriculum Development: Theory and Practice* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962).
3. Decker Walker, "A Naturalistic Model for Curriculum Development," *School Review* (November 1971):51-65.

4. Mauritz Johnson, "Definitions and Models in Curriculum Theory," *Educational Theory* 17, 1 (April 1967):127-40. Also reprinted in Bellack and Kliebard, 3-19.
5. John I. Goodlad and Maurice N. Richter, Jr., "Decisions and Levels of Decision Making: Process and Data-Sources," in Arno A. Bellack and Herbert M. Kliebard, eds., *Curriculum and Evaluation* (Berkeley, Calif.: McCutchan, 1977), 506-16.
6. See similar arguments by Daniel Tanner and Laurel N. Tanner, *Curriculum Development: Theory into Practice*, 2d ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1980); William H. Schubert, *Curriculum: Perspective, Paradigm, and Possibility* (New York: Macmillan, 1986); and Decker F. Walker and Jonas F. Soltis, *Curriculum and Aims* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1986).
7. Tyler, op. cit.
8. Note, however, that Tyler himself disagrees with this interpretation. I discuss this matter further in a subsequent section.
9. See Kliebard's chapter 2 herein for a thorough treatment of recent curriculum history.
10. Franklin Bobbitt, *The Curriculum* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1918); and Franklin Bobbitt, *How to Make a Curriculum* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1924).
11. W. James Popham and Eva L. Baker, *Systematic Instruction* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).
12. George J. Posner and Alan N. Rudnizsky, *Course Design: A Guide to Curriculum Development for Teachers*, 3d ed. (New York: Longmen, 1987).
13. Douglas Barnes, *Practical Curriculum Study* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982).
14. Elliot W. Eisner, *The Educational Imagination* (New York: Macmillan, 1985).
15. This distinction is attributable to Mauritz Johnson, not Tyler, who avoided definitions in his book. See Mauritz Johnson, *Intentionality in Education: A Conceptual Model of Curricular and Instructional Planning and Evaluation* (Albany, N.Y.: Center for Curriculum Research and Services, 1977), pp. 47-48.
16. Goodlad, op. cit.
17. Taba, op cit.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 462-66.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 463.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 479.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 480.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

25. Joseph J. Schwab, *The Practical: A Language for Curriculum* (Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, 1970). A shorter version was published in *School Review* 78 (November 1969):1-24, and reprinted in several anthologies, including Bellack and Kliebard, op. cit., pp. 26-44.
26. Ibid., p. 36.
27. Ibid., pp. 21-23.
28. Ibid., pp. 25-26.
29. Ibid., p. 28.
30. Ibid., p. 12. Joseph J. Schwab, "The Practical 3: Translation into Curriculum," *School Review* 79 (1973):501-22.
31. Ibid.
32. Walker, op. cit.
33. Ibid., p. 22.
34. Ibid., p. 52.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., p. 53.
37. Ibid., p. 54.
38. Ibid., pp. 57-58.
39. Ibid., p. 58.
40. Walker and Soltis, op. cit., p. 51.
41. Tyler, op. cit., p. 1.
42. Ibid., p. 1.
43. Ibid., p. 128.
44. Goodlad and Richter, op. cit.
45. Ibid., p. 510.
46. Ibid., p. 510.
47. See, for example, Michael W. Kirst and Decker F. Walker, "An Analysis of Curriculum Policy Making," *Review of Educational Research*, 41, 5 (1971):479-509. Also reprinted in Bellack and Kliebard, op. cit., pp. 538-68.
48. Goodlad and Richter, op. cit., p. 506.
49. Johnson, 1967, op. cit.
50. Johnson, 1977, op. cit.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., p. 34.
53. Ibid., p. 9. Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (New York: Seabury Press, 1970).

54. Ibid., p. 58.
55. Ibid., p. 62.
56. Ibid., pp. 62-63.
57. Herbert M. Kliebard, "Bureaucracy and Curriculum Theory," in Bellack and Kliebard, op. cit., p. 613.
58. Freire, op. cit., p. 52.
59. Ibid., p. 66.
60. Ibid., p. 76.
61. Ibid., p. 97.
62. Ibid., p. 7.
63. Ibid., p. 54.
64. Ibid., p. 86.
65. Ibid., p. 113.
66. Ibid., pp. 52-53.
67. Ibid., p. 68.
68. Ibid., p. 118.
69. Henry A. Giroux, "Toward a New Sociology of Curriculum," in Henry A. Giroux, Anthony N. Penna, and William F. Pinar, eds., *Curriculum and Instruction* (Berkeley, Calif.: McCutchan, 1981), p. 106.
70. Freire, op. cit., p. 118.
71. Michael F. D. Young, "An Approach to the Study of Curricula as Socially Organized Knowledge," in Michael F. D. Young, ed., *Knowledge and Control* (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1971). Also in Bellack and Kliebard, op. cit., pp. 254-85; Giroux, op. cit., p. 104.
72. Young, op. cit., p. 36.
73. Ibid.; Giroux, op. cit.
74. Young, op. cit.
75. Giroux, op. cit.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid., p. 194.
78. Johnson, 1967, op. cit., pp. 4-5.
79. Ibid., p. 5.
80. Harold O. Rugg, ed., *The Foundations of Curriculum-Making*, 26th Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education (Part II) (Bloomington, Ind.: Public School Publishing Co., 1972), p. 18.
81. Robert S. Zais, *Curriculum: Principles and Foundations* (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), p. 239.

82. B. Othanel Smith, William O. Stanley, and J. Harlan Shores, *Fundamentals of Curriculum Development*, rev. ed. (Yonkers-on-Hudson, N.Y.: World Book Co., 1957), p. 3.
83. Giroux, op. cit., p. 106.

SIX

Multicultural Curricula: "Whose Knowledge?" and Beyond

Susan E. Noffke

At the 1991 meeting of the American Educational Research Association, a paper presentation by Violet Harris on, "Helen Whiting and the Education of Colored Children 1930-1960: Emancipatory Pedagogy in Action" included a rich description of an important educator, interesting in several ways.¹ First, there was a clear use of African and African American culture in the works that Helen Whiting developed. Having read about current efforts at an African and African American Infusion Project² and about Afrocentrism,³ I was struck by the similarity, at least at the level of addressing the current controversy, over whose knowledge ought to be in the curriculum. I had earlier come across work from the 1930s⁴ which seemed to be focused on developing curricula from a Native American perspective. I wondered how widespread such "multicultural" efforts were.

Two other aspects to Helen Whiting's work were also salient. Perhaps because of the gross inequities in funding for schools for African American children during the 1930s, or perhaps as a result of the influence of such progressive era educational work as the project method, unit teaching, or the idea of building curriculum from the world of the child, the work Harris