

Teaching Material for the Course Political Anthropology

Course Code: SoAn 3101

Module Name: Legal and Political Anthropology

Chapter I

Introduction

Definition of Concepts

What is politics? Does politics exist in all societies?

Literally, politics comes from Greek word '*Politikos*' which relates to citizens. Politics is difficult to define. It can be defined as theory and practice of influencing people. Political process is public rather than private. Other character of politics is the use of power in its broader sense in which there is hierarchy of power.

Politics is everything that is at once public goals-oriented and that involves differential of power among individuals of the group in question. The study of politics then the study of processes involved in determining and implementing public goals in the different group concerned with those goals.

Power: the ability to exercise one's will over others.

Authority: the socially approved use of power.

Influence: is the ability to persuade others to follow one's lead.

Leadership: the art of motivating a group of people to act towards achieving a common goal.

Legitimacy: the acceptance of an authority, usually a governing law or a regime.

Discussion questions: is good leader created or born? What are qualities of good leader? What are types of leadership?

Therefore, if politics is defined broadly as competition for power over peoples and things, then it is clear that all societies have some sorts of political system. However, there can be a vast difference in what political organization look like and how they function. In a society that anthropologists have traditionally worked politics embedded with other sub systems like religion, kinship, age groups, etc... Under these sub systems there is manifestation of power & authority. Therefore, the manifestation of political power& authority in non-political institutions are the contributions of anthropologists for the comparative study of politics.

Briefs on political anthropology and political science

Political anthropology: is a sub-discipline within social anthropology which deals with different ways of assuming political power, prevailing political activities, political institutions and exploring political life of people across societies. It is also the study of political organizations& processes, power (its source), authority, control or influence over others. To illustrate well, the following are some areas that Political anthropologists explore:

- Comparative legal system
- Authority
- Leadership
- Political succession
- Legitimacy (is it legal, traditional or charismatic?)
- Levels of socio-political complexity: band, tribe(egalitarian), rank(chief), stratified(class) societies and nation state.
- Bureaucracy in complex societies; social group formation, social movements
- Colonization & post colonization

- Where does power come from? culture? economic institutions? Social institutions (kinship, religious); political institutions?

Hence, **Political Anthropology** develops itself to the study of law, order, conflict, government and power. It focuses on how power and social control organize, distribute and manage. It deals with power, authority and influence in social context. Power is the ability to exercise one's will over others. Authority is the socially approved use of power. Influence is the ability to affect the behavior of others without coercion or holding an explicit leadership status or office. In general, it focuses on the role of power on cultural context and vice versa. Political anthropology concerns the structure of political systems, looked at from the basis of the structure of societies

Political science is a social science discipline that deals with systems of government and the analysis of political activity and political behavior. It deals extensively with the theory and practice of politics which is commonly thought of as the determining of the distribution of power and resources. Political scientists "see themselves engaged in revealing the relationships underlying political events and conditions, and from these revelations they attempt to construct general principles about the way the world of politics works."

Political science draws upon the fields of economics, law, sociology, history, geography, psychology, anthropology, public administration, public policy, national politics, international relations, comparative politics, political organization, and political theory.

Although it was codified in the 19th century, when all the social sciences were established, the study of political science has ancient roots that can be traced back to the works of Aristotle, Plato and Chanakya which were written nearly 2,500 years ago. Political science is commonly divided into distinct sub-disciplines such as:

-) Comparative politics
-) International political economy
-) International relations
-) Political theory

) Public administration

Political scientists study matters concerning the allocation and transfer of power in decision making, the roles and systems of governance including governments and international organizations, political behavior and public policies. They measure the success of governance and specific policies by examining many factors, including stability, justice, material wealth, peace and public health.

Chapter II

Development of Political Anthropology

History of political anthropology

Reviewers of the short history of Political Anthropology distinguish several periods of development taking place in this new academic discipline. Firstly, they indicate a number of precursors including Montesquieu (1689 – 1755) as certainly the most important philosopher inspiring anthropologists who are interested in politics and the rise and the functioning of states. He influenced among others the American Lewis Henry Morgan (1818 – 1881) who is seen as one of the earliest anthropologists who combined an evolutionist vision on the development of human history with a great attention for political organization of societies. Morgan followed Montesquieu in projecting the evolution of societies through the three stages of savagery, barbarism and civilization. These early approaches were ethnocentric, speculative, and often racist. Nevertheless, they laid the basis for political anthropology by undertaking a modern study inspired by modern science, and in particular Darwin. In a move that would be influential for future anthropology, they focused on kinship as the key to understanding political organization, and emphasized the role of the 'gens' or lineage as an object of study.

The publication of the book *African Political Systems* (1940), edited by the British anthropologists Meyer Fortes (1881 – 1955) and Edward E. Evans-Pritchard (1902 – 1973), is seen as the start of modern Political Anthropology, the second phase in the history of this discipline. The book is a collection of eight studies (including contributions of the two editors) and written from the functionalist perspective. This perspective is substantiated and strengthened by a *Preface* by Alfred Radcliffe-Brown. In this *Preface*, Radcliffe-Brown, on the one hand, underlines the principles of his thinking by arguing again that Social Anthropology, as a natural science of human society, should systematically investigate the nature of social institutions. On the other hand, he states that political institutions are an aspect of the whole society and intimately related and interdependent with other aspects like economic institutions and kinship.¹⁶⁶ Moreover, *Every human society has some sort of territorial structure. This structure provides the framework, not only for the political organization but for other forms of social*

organization also, such as the economic, for example. The authors in the volume tended in practice to examine African political systems in terms of their own internal structures, and ignored the broader historical and political context of colonialism.

Radcliffe-Brown's forceful statement about the intimate relation between political power and other social relations and social institutions meant a fundamental shift in the anthropological analysis of power in society. Power was not seen any more as one of the possible social relationships in society but it could also be investigated as a crucial and decisive social phenomenon which shapes society.

The cradle of Political Anthropology stands in the school of functionalist thinking. The new branch of Anthropology grew successfully and a steady stream of studies was published on the day-to-day functioning of non-Western political structures, particularly in Africa. Functionalism provided Anthropology with a model for the comparative study of political systems. Methods of fieldwork were improved and refined and the discipline became a real empirical social science.

The functionalist principles, however, also caused heavy criticisms. Therefore, new approaches were introduced. Historical and economic perspectives on power and political organizations showed the complexity of social components in society. In addition, new theoretical perspectives such as "structuralism", "dynamic structuralism", and "transactionalism" have broadened the scope of analyses of political power and state formation.

Several authors reacted to this early work. In his work *Political Systems of Highland Burma* (1954) Edmund Leach argued that it was necessary to understand how societies changed through time rather than remaining static and in equilibrium. A special version of conflict oriented political anthropology was developed in the so-called 'Manchester school', started by Max Gluckman. Gluckman focused on social process and an analysis of structures and systems based on their relative stability. In his view, conflict maintained the stability of political systems through the establishment and re-establishment of crosscutting ties among social actors. Gluckman even suggested that a certain degree of conflict was necessary to uphold society, and that conflict was constitutive of social and political order.

By the 1960s this transition work developed into a full-fledged sub-discipline which was canonized in volumes such as *Political Anthropology* (1966) edited by Victor Turner and Marc Swartz. Over a very short period, Political Anthropology became a fully-fledged and respected branch of Social Anthropology. One can even say that Political Anthropology brought back the factor of power to the heart of society and reluctantly also to culture. By the late 1960s, political anthropology was a flourishing subfield: in 1969 there were two hundred anthropologists listing the sub-discipline as one of their areas of interests, and a quarter of all British anthropologists listed politics as a topic that they studied. However, political anthropologists continued to study processes at the level of the local, indigenous political relationships and systems in small-scale non-Western societies and presented an image of a more or less well-balanced conglomerate of political communities headed by a colonial authority.

Political anthropology developed in a very different way in the United States. There, authors such as Morton Fried, Elman Service, and Eleanor Leacock took a Marxist approach and sought to understand the origins and development of inequality in human society. Marx and Engels had drawn on the ethnographic work of Morgan, and these authors now extended that tradition. In particular, they were interested in the evolution of social systems over time.

From the 1960s a 'process approach' developed, stressing the role of agents (Bailey 1969; Barth 1969). It was a meaningful development as anthropologists started to work in situations where the colonial system was dismantling. The focus on conflict and social reproduction was carried over into Marxist approaches that came to dominate French political anthropology from the 1960s. Pierre Bourdieu's work on the Kabyle (1977) was strongly inspired by this development, and his early work was a marriage between French post-structuralism, Marxism and process approach. Interest in anthropology grew in the 1970s. A session on anthropology was organized at the Ninth International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences in 1973, the proceedings of which were eventually published in 1979 as *Political Anthropology: The State of the Art*.

From the 1950s anthropologists who studied peasant societies in Latin America and Asia, had increasingly started to incorporate their local setting (the village) into its larger context, as in Redfield's famous distinction between 'small' and 'big' traditions (Redfield 1941). The 1970s

also witnessed the emergence of Europe as a category of anthropological investigation. Boissevain's essay, "towards an anthropology of Europe" (Boissevain and Friedl 1975) was perhaps the first systematic attempt to launch a comparative study of cultural forms in Europe; an anthropology not only carried out in Europe, but an anthropology of Europe.

The turn toward the study of complex society made anthropology inherently more political. In a more direct way, the turn towards complex society also signified that political themes increasingly were taken up as the main focus of study, and at two main levels. First of all, anthropologists continued to study political organization and political phenomena that lay outside the state-regulated sphere. Second of all, anthropologists slowly started to develop a disciplinary concern with states and their institutions (and of course on the relationship between formal and informal political institutions). An anthropology of the state developed, and it is a most thriving field today. Geertz's comparative work on the Balinese state is an early, famous example. There is today a rich canon of anthropological studies of the state. Others started in the early 1990s a productive subfield, an "anthropology of borders", which addresses the ways in which state borders affect local populations, and how people from border areas shape and direct state discourse and state formation.

From the 1980s a heavy focus on ethnicity and nationalism developed. 'Identity' and 'identity politics' soon became defining themes of the discipline, partially replacing earlier focus on kinship and social organization. This of course made anthropology even more obviously political. Nationalism is to some extent simply state-produced culture, and to be studied as such. And ethnicity is to some extent simply the political organization of cultural difference (Barth 1969). Benedict Anderson's book *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* discusses why nationalism came into being.

The interest in cultural/political identity construction also went beyond the nation-state dimension. By now, several ethnographies have been carried out in the international organizations (like the EU) studying as a cultural group with special codes of conduct, dressing, interaction etc. Increasingly, anthropological fieldwork is today carried out inside bureaucratic structures or in companies.

The concern with political institutions has also fostered a focus on institutionally driven political agency. There is now anthropology of policy making (Shore and Wright 1997). This focus has been most evident in Development anthropology, which over the last decades has established as one of the discipline's largest subfields. Political actors like states, governmental institutions, NGOs, International Organizations or business corporations are here the primary subjects of analysis. In their ethnographic work anthropologists have cast a critical eye on discourses and practices produced by institutional agents of development in their encounter with 'local culture' Development anthropology is tied to global political economy. Many other themes have over the last two decades been opened up which, taken together, are making anthropology increasingly political: post-colonialism, post-communism, gender, multiculturalism, migration, not to forget the umbrella term of globalization. It thus makes sense to say that while anthropology was always to some extent about politics, this is even more evidently the case today.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORIES

Although political anthropology as a specialization within social anthropology did not appear until as late as 1940, and did not really kick in until after World War II, this is also true for most anthropological subject specializations. The ideal of a holistic anthropology only began to break down through the 1940s as increasing data and increasing numbers of professional anthropologists forced specialization. The development of political anthropology was part of this general process, which continues today, with ever-smaller subspecialties being delineated. However, the comparative study of politics in "primitive" societies dates to the very beginnings of anthropology.

Darwin's influence dominated the development of cultural anthropology in the second half of the nineteenth century just as it dominated biology. Much of the evolutionary theory emerging from this period was as primitive as the societies it sought to make sense of: evolutionary schemas were rigid and simplistic, there were endless arguments over whether the earliest societies were matriarchal or patriarchal, ethnocentrism ran rampant as Christianity and the Aryan race were seen as the apex of human progress, and customs were torn out of their cultural context and compared indiscriminately by armchair anthropologists who had never seen the savages that

were their subjects. However, it is easy to forget how perceptive many of these studies were. Whatever their faults, the evolutionists laid the foundation for modern scientific anthropology.

Prior to this period, the tradition that reached back to Plato and ran through Aristotle, Hobbes, Rousseau, and most philosophers of politics until (but not including) Marx was that government and politics were products of civilization, and lower stages were characterized by anarchy. One of the earliest to challenge this view with hard evidence was Sir Henry Maine, who, in *Ancient Law* (1861), postulated that primitive society was organized along the lines of kinship, was patriarchal, and was ordered by sacred proscriptions. Evolution was in the direction of secularization and organization based not on kinship but on territory—“local contiguity”—which formed the basis for political action.

Maine’s important insight that kinship could be a primary sociopolitical structure was developed by Louis Henry Morgan in *Ancient Society* (1877). Morgan had studied the Iroquois Indians of New York State firsthand and had been fascinated by their kinship terminology, which was very different from that used in Western European countries but similar to that employed in other parts of the world. His description and categorization of kinship systems was itself a lasting contribution, but before these could gain recognition they had to be couched in the type of theoretical framework popular at the time. Morgan developed an evolutionary sequence based on mode of subsistence, the stages of which he termed savagery, barbarism, and civilization. These grossly connotative terms actually translate rather well into their modern equivalents societies based on hunting-gathering, horticulture, and developed agriculture. Morgan, like others of his time, began with the postulate of the psychic unity of mankind—the belief that there was a common origin and parallel development all over the world—though he was unable to follow the idea to its inherently antiracist conclusions and assumed that the Aryans were naturally “in the central stream of human progress” (Morgan 1877: 533).

With his considerable sophistication in the analysis of kinship, Morgan was able to elaborate Maine’s inchoate ideas. Social organization began with the promiscuous horde that developed into kin-based units, organized along sexual lines: intermarrying sets of male siblings and female siblings (this was an early insight into cross-cousin marriage). In emphasizing the role of exogamy, he touched on the conception of inter-group bonds formed through marriage that

would become the alliance theory of French structuralists three-quarters of a century later. Progressive restriction of marriage partners led to the development of gens (clans) that joined to create increasingly larger units up to a confederacy of tribes. Sociopolitical structure at this level is egalitarian and is based on sets of interpersonal relations. (With the exception of the “promiscuous horde,” this is not a bad description of the Iroquois confederacy, although there is little reason to generalize to a universal evolutionary process.) The specialization of the political sphere does not appear until the full domestication of plants and animals creates sufficient surplus to lead to urbanization and private property. True government, then, is based on territory and property.

Morgan is subject to most of the criticisms directed by later generations at the evolutionists (except, of course, that he was no armchair anthropologist, having studied the Iroquois firsthand), yet much of his thinking has been absorbed into modern anthropology, especially in relation to politics. Although anthropologists no longer distinguish kin-based from territory-based groups, Morgan’s emphasis on kinship as a primary medium of political articulation at the subsistence levels of hunting-gathering and horticulture was justified. Equally important was Morgan’s discovery of the gens as a corporate lineage in which decision making was confined within a group tracing common ancestry through either the male or the female line. Another lasting insight was his recognition of the egalitarianism of primitive society and the lack of a concept of private property. These latter ideas contributed to Morgan’s most significant influence: they formed the basis for Frederick Engels’s *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* ([1891] 1972), the Marxian view of the evolution of capitalism.

THE REACTION

Early twentieth-century anthropology was characterized by two fundamental changes: the rejection of evolutionary theory and methodology, and a widening hiatus between the anthropologies of the United States and of England and France. In the latter countries, the immediate repudiation of evolutionism was relatively mild, but there was a significant shift in new directions. This shift was based on the work of Emile Durkheim—in France leading to an increasingly cognitive structuralism that would culminate with the works of Claude Lévi-Strauss; in England leading to an emphasis on social facts (and a corresponding disregard for the

psychological aspect of culture) and a theoretical point of view dominated by the ideas of function and structure.

Georges Balandier's (1970) contention that specific, explicit political anthropology developed during the 1920s is true only to a point. Here we find certain lasting ideas: that all societies recognize territory that increases in population and in conflict lead to states, that class stratification is a key element in movement up the evolutionary ladder toward the state, and that the central element of the state is a monopoly of coercive power. Although these concepts were not developed in a systematic causal model, Lowie clarified a number of issues, asked some crucial questions, and presented anthropology with a fascinating challenge.

Unfortunately, the challenge was not taken up. The evolutionary phrasing of Lowie's book, despite his denials of unilineal development, must have seemed sadly anachronistic to his peers who had thought themselves done with this evolutionary nonsense once and for all. The beginning of political anthropology was also its end—until 1940.

THE BRITISH FUNCTIONALISTS

In England during the 1930s, two brands of functionalism vied for dominance: the psychobiological functionalism of Bronislaw Malinowski, and the structural-functionalism of A. R. Radcliffe-Brown. Malinowski, often considered the founder of modern fieldwork techniques for his extensive research in the Trobriand Islands, sought to interpret cultural institutions as derived from certain psychological and biological needs. Although he contributed little to political anthropology per se, his studies of law, economics, and religion—as observed in ongoing, rather than historical, society—cleared the way for the type of specialization that would later become commonplace. Malinowski's participant-observation method became the model for an entire generation of British fieldworkers whose intense analyses of African societies would establish political anthropology as a legitimate subdiscipline. However, it was Radcliffe-Brown's structural brand of functionalism that would ultimately come to predominate in England, where academic chairmanships at Oxford, London, or Manchester were close to the equivalent of theoretical fiefdoms. For Radcliffe-Brown, a society was an equilibrium system in which each part functioned to the maintenance of the whole (the obvious organic analogy was not avoided). Thus, there was a sense that societies were to be described from high above, to be mapped to

show how their various elements intermeshed. As we shall see, this approach is more a temporal than static that is, it does not really postulate an unchanging society or a society without conflict, but rather its focus is on those norms, values, and ideal structures that form the framework within which activity takes place.

Feeding this theoretical orientation, and feeding upon it, was the concentration of British research in colonial Africa. Much of the purpose of such research was to instruct colonial authorities on the social systems under their control, and this affected both the emphasis and the image of social anthropology. On the one hand, there was little recognition that the societies that anthropologists were studying were severely changed by colonialism, and by the Pax Britannica imposed by English guns. Also, there was a tendency to study chiefdom and state systems, some of which, like the Zulu, had been integrated partially as a reaction to the British threat.

These two trends, structural-functionalism and the African experience, came together in 1940 in a work that, at a single blow, established modern political anthropology: *African Political Systems*, edited by Meyer Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard. In their introduction, the editors distinguish two types of African political systems: those with centralized authority and judicial institutions (primitive states), and those without such authority and institutions (stateless societies). A major difference between these types is the role of kinship. Integration and decision making in stateless societies is based, at the lowest level, on bilateral family/band groups and, at a higher level, on corporate unilineal descent groups. State societies are those in which an administrative organization overrides or unites such groups as the permanent basis of political structure. This typology was later criticized as much too simplistic, but the detailed descriptions of how lineages functioned politically in several specific societies were lasting contributions. Social equilibrium was assumed, so that the major problem was to show how the various conflict and interest groups maintained a balance of forces that resulted in a stable, ongoing social structure. The integrating power of religion and symbol were also noted, especially the role of ritual in confirming and consolidating group values.

THE TRANSITION

By the 1950s, after a decade of gradual chipping away, the edifice of structural-functionalism was showing cracks in its very foundation. There was little sense yet of a complete repudiation of this paradigm, but there was a quite self-conscious sense that fundamental modifications were being made.

A major contribution in this direction was Edmund Leach's *Political Systems of Highland Burma* (1954), which signaled the shift to a more process-oriented, more dynamic form of analysis. In the Kachin Hills area of Burma, Leach found not one but three different political systems: a virtually anarchic traditional system, an unstable and intermediate system, and a small-scale centralized state. The traditional system and the state were more or less distinct communities made up of many linguistic, cultural, and political subgroups, all somehow forming an interrelated whole. This whole could not be supposed to be in equilibrium; there was constant tension and change within and between the various subsystems. In order to make sense out of all this, Leach felt it necessary "to force these facts within the constraining mold of an *as if* system of ideas, composed of concepts which are treated *as if* they are part of an equilibrium system" (Leach 1954: ix). Almost as crucial, Leach finally got political anthropology out of Africa and broke it free from the relatively cohesive, single-language societies to which it had been confined.

Meanwhile, Max Gluckman was also breaking new ground. In his chapter on the Zulu in *African Political Systems*, in *Custom and Conflict in Africa* (1956), and in *Order and Rebellion in Tribal Africa* (1960), Gluckman developed the theme that equilibrium is neither static nor stable, but grows out of an ongoing dialectical process in which conflicts within one set of relations are absorbed and integrated within another set of relations: cross-cutting loyalties tend to unite the wider society in settling a feud between local groups; witchcraft accusations displace hostilities within a group in a way that does not threaten the system; apartheid in South Africa, while radically dividing white from black, ultimately unites both groups within themselves. The Roman maxim "divide and conquer" is cleverly restated as "divide and cohere." Politically, this is especially evident in African rituals of rebellion in which the king must periodically dress as a pauper or act the clown, is symbolically killed, or is subjected to open hatred and obscenities

from his people. For Gluckman, such rituals are not merely catharsis; they are the symbolic reassertion of the priority of the system over the individual, of kingship over any particular king.

At this stage, both Leach and Gluckman are transitional figures, still rooted in the structural-functionalism of the 1930s and 1940s, developing ever more clever arguments in defense of equilibrium theory; yet at the same time they are taking a giant step toward a new paradigm. Gluckman, as founder and chairman of the anthropology department at Manchester University, was to see his ideas extensively elaborated by his students, known collectively as the Manchester School, a phrase that came to represent a new orientation to society based not on structure and function but on process and conflict.

THE NEO-EVOLUTIONISTS

Without a doubt, England dominated political anthropology during its first two decades. Meanwhile, in the United States, an incipient and quite different political anthropology was fermenting. Evolutionism, long banned by Boasian edict from the proper study of mankind, began a slow and not entirely respectable resurgence through the writings of Leslie White and Julian Steward. White (1943, 1959) developed a complex sequence leading through agricultural intensification to private ownership, specialization, class stratification, and political centralization. Much of this was elucidated at such a high level of generality that it left White open to the charge of merely resuscitating nineteenth-century unilineal theory, and Steward's (1965) use of the term *multilinear* evolution for his own theory only served to validate an unnecessary dichotomy.

Thus, in contrast to their English colleagues, American political anthropologists started with the idea of change on a panoramic scale in a context that was fundamentally ecological and materialist. White measured evolution in terms of energy efficiency and saw technology as a prime mover. Steward's cultural ecology focused on the cultural core, the subsistence and economic arrangements that largely determine social structure and ideology. The differences between British and American anthropology were vast, but can be overemphasized.

Political evolution became almost synonymous with political classification. The two major evolutionary works of the period, Elman Service's *Primitive Social Organization* (1962) and Morton Fried's *The Evolution of Political Society* (1967), were more taxonomic and descriptive than causal; the emphasis was on the characteristics of different levels of socio-cultural integration, rather than on the factors that triggered evolution from one level to another. Causal theories were hardly lacking, but these were derived from archeology rather than from cultural anthropology. Many notable archeologists devoted their careers to the processes involved in the evolution of state societies. These two trends, the archeological and the cultural, which originally ran parallel, came together in Service's *Origins of the State and Civilization* (1975). Although political evolution remained an ongoing field of study, it soon lost its position as the major focus of American political anthropology; process and decision-making orientations quickly crossed the Atlantic from England.

PROCESS AND DECISION MAKING

Max Gluckman had tentatively experimented with the analysis of "situations" involving individuals, in contrast to the usual ethnographic focus on group norms and social structures. Elaborating on this experiment, Victor Turner, in *Schism and Continuity in an African Society* (1957), followed a single individual through a series of social dramas in which personal and community manipulations of norms and values were laid bare. To Gluckman and Leach's emphasis on process and conflict was added a new element: individual decision making observed in crisis situations.

Structure and function became. The fact that conflict and accord, unity and disunity, might be two sides of the same coin, as Gluckman emphasized, was temporarily forgotten. The change from structural theory to process theory had its correlate in the dissolution of the false stability imposed by colonialism in Africa.

Although many of these ideas come together in such works as Swartz, Turner, and Tuden's "Introduction" to their edited volume *Political Anthropology* (1966) and Balandier's (1970) book of the same title, it would be a mistake to consider the process approach as a coherent theory. Much ethnography that emphasizes process continued to focus on the level of norms and

institutions. The decision-making approach, often referred to as action theory, was a somewhat separate subdivision of the less cohesive process orientation.

Process theory opened the way for a cross-Atlantic dialogue that was muted, at best, during the heyday of structural-functionalism. American leaders of political anthropology such as Marc Swartz and Ronald Cohen, who had shown only passing interest in evolution or evolutionary typology, joined the British in what constituted a truly international trend.

WOMEN, WORLD SYSTEMS, AND WEAPONS

OF THE WEAK

Although earlier perspectives and theoretical approaches continued throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, three strong new trends were evident. Perhaps the most important development was the emergence of a distinctly feminist anthropology. Although not specifically political, virtually all of the writers in the field were examining the relative *power* of women. Not only was the supposition of universal male domination challenged, but so were other anthropological assumptions, such as the Man-the-Hunter model of physical evolution. In addition to the expected cross-cultural statistical comparisons, two important theoretical schools developed within feminist anthropology—one analyzing the cultural construction of gender and the other, based on Marxist theory, examining the historical development of gender stratification.

POSTMODERNISM AND GLOBALIZATION

The 1980s and well into the 1990s was a period of ferment within anthropology. In what came to be referred to as a “crisis of representation,” critical theorists challenged many of the underlying assumptions of anthropological research and writing. Classical works of Boas, Malinowski, and Radcliffe-Brown were subjected to intense and unflattering scrutiny, castigated as imbued with unacknowledged subjectivism, colonialism, and Western bias. At the same time, postmodernism rejected the ostensible Enlightenment assumptions and values of anthropology, repudiating all grand theories as well as anthropology’s scientific pretensions. Drawing its inspiration and vocabulary from French philosophy and literary studies, postmodernists sought to redeem the marginalized discourses of the “subaltern other.” The struggle between postmodern and traditional anthropologists bifurcated the profession, splitting academic departments and leading

to struggles over the editorship of major journals. At the turn of the new century, a synthesis of sorts seems to be emerging, in which selected postmodern insights are being developed within a strongly empirical framework. For political anthropology, the re-conceptualization of the nature of power by Michel Foucault and others is requiring new modes of research and analysis.

Globalization, although inchoate in anthropological studies, may turn out to have an even greater impact than did postmodernism. The increasing flow of trade, finance, culture, ideas, and people brought about by the sophisticated technology of communications and travel and by the worldwide spread of neoliberal capitalism is forcing radical revisions in anthropological conceptions of culture, locality, community, and identity. The local and regional adaptations to these flows and the resistances against them are already becoming the stuff of a new political anthropology. Power in a globalized world is both more diffuse and more locally concentrated as decision making simultaneously shifts upward from states to multinational corporations and the World Bank and downward to community-level nongovernmental groups and ethnic organizations. The challenges of the future will be considerable for political anthropology, but as I hope this book will show, the sub-discipline is working from a substantive base.

Chapter III

TYPES OF PREINDUSTRIAL POLITICAL SYSTEMS

Societies in ethnographic records vary in levels of political integration. Societies classified into 4 principal types of political organizations: bands, tribes, chiefdoms, and states. With very few exceptions there are no political autonomous band or tribe or chiefdom in the world. They are incorporated in state political organizations.

A large antidevelopment literature has rejected classification on the grounds that it is a means by which a hegemonic West asserts power over the designated groups. In addition, current trends in globalization theory are not any more sympathetic to traditional typologies; the emphasis is on fluidity, hybridity, and change rather than the static structures designated by systems of classification. This said, classification has been a major focus of research since the beginnings of political anthropology; indeed, the foundational book, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard's *African Political Systems* (1940), begins with a typology.

However, a system of classification emerged between 1940 and 1980 that gained general terminological acceptance, providing a common vocabulary of political difference. However, even in such a recent typology there is a great deal of overlap with the classical designations shown here. Some of the social and economic characteristics that may reasonably be associated with each major political type. Any such chart must be approached with caution.

First, no society should be expected to match all the characteristics of its type, Second, what it really shows is cultural complexity, and therefore it should not be assumed that politics is the primary determinant simply because the major headings are band, tribe, chiefdom, and state; if this book were about kinship, the headings might just as well be bilateral, patrilineal, matrilineal, and cognatic.

Third, it must be kept in mind that certain characteristics are better predictors than are others. Statistically, the strongest predictor on the chart is *population density* (which is not included, because increasing densities from band through state may be assumed).

Fourth, by its very nature, implies that each of these types is quite distinct from the others, whereas in reality they form points along a continuum.

Fifth, it should neither be assumed that a higher level of cultural complexity leaves behind all the characteristics of lower levels (reciprocity, e.g., is a significant means of exchange in all societies), nor that cultural complexity is simply additive (bilateral systems of kinship appear at both the simplest and most complex levels, but are replaced by unilineal kinship at the intermediate).

UNCENTRALIZED SYSTEMS

Bands

A major conclusion deriving from a 1965 Conference on Band Organization was that the term band, although still useful, was regularly applied to groups as diverse as those with an average size of 25, as well as those with 300 to 400 members, rendering the term virtually meaningless. It was also argued that the usual defining qualities of bands—seasonal scheduling, lack of centralized authority structures, and hunting-gathering economy—were not sufficiently restrictive to make these units automatically comparable (Damas 1968). However, in those few societies lacking agriculture, domesticated food animals, or dependable year-round fishing, there would seem to be only a limited number of cultural options available. Similarities in the social and political structures of such widely separated groups as the Canadian Eskimo and Australian Aborigines suggest that dependence on wild foods, the consequent nomadism, and seasonal redistributions of population fix the adaptive possibilities within relatively narrow limits. For this reason, the band may have been a normal mode of social organization in Paleolithic times.

The band form is extremely rare today; therefore, this classification is more historical than contemporary. Bands are typically small, with perhaps 25 to 150 individuals, grouped in nuclear families. Although there is a division of labor along age and sex lines, there is virtually no specialization of skills, with the result being that the unity of the wider group is, in Emile Durkheim's term, "mechanical"—that is, based on custom, tradition, and common values and symbols, rather than on an interdependence of specialized roles. A strict rule of band exogamy forces marriage alliances with other bands, and this wider group is typically also united by

bilateral kinship (traced equally through both parents). Lineages, in the sense of corporate descent groups holding territorial rights, would not be sufficiently flexible for the constant fluctuations of hunting-gathering societies.

Morton Fried (1967) categorizes such groups as egalitarian in terms of economy, social organization, and political structure. Distribution of food and other needed goods is at the simplest level of sharing; bonds are established within the band and between bands on the basis of on-going reciprocal relations. Political organization is also egalitarian to the extent that decision making is usually a group enterprise, and access to leadership positions is equally open to all males within a certain age range. Leadership, which is temporary and shifts according to the situation, is based on the personal attributes of the individual and lacks any coercive power. A headman or leader in a hunt cannot really tell anyone what to do, but must act as arbiter for the group, and perhaps as expert advisor in particular situations.

This least complex of political structures may be further subdivided into patrilocal, composite, and anomalous bands. The patrilocal type is based on band exogamy and a marriage rule that the woman lives with her husband's group. This type was so widespread that Elman Service (1962: 97) regarded it as "almost an inevitable kind of organization." Indeed, it has the advantage of band stability, because each group is constantly replenished over time by new members coming in from outside; but it also is capable of forming wide-ranging alliances through marriage and possesses considerable flexibility. The composite band was viewed by Service as the result of the collapse of originally patrilocal structures that were rapidly depopulated from disease and war after having come in contact with civilization. It is a group that lacks both band exogamy and a marriage residence rule and, therefore, is "more of an expedient agglomeration than a structured society." In the anomalous category are the traditional Basin Shoshone and the Eskimo, both of which had social structures so fragmented that they have been characterized as typifying the family level of sociocultural integration.

Decision making is generally informal

Leadership is not a question of bossing

The !Kung Bushmen

The NyaeNyae region of the Kalahari Desert in southwest Africa covers about 10,000 square miles, in which there are a number of small waterholes but no rivers or streams or other surface water except for some shallow ponds during a brief rainy season. Within this area, about 1,000 !Kung Bushmen (the ! represents a “click” in their pronunciation) lived in 36 or 37 bands. Although at the lowest level of technological development, relying on digging sticks and poison-tipped spears and carrying all of their meager possessions with them during their constant treks in search of food and water, they had adapted well to the extremely hostile environment. About 80 percent of the food was supplied by the women, who daily collected nuts, fruits, tubers, roots, and various other field foods. The remainder of the !Kung subsistence was supplied through hunting, which was exclusively a male occupation. Various species of large antelope provided most of the meat, although occasionally a buffalo or a giraffe was also killed. About 15 to 18 such large animals were killed by a single band in a year, and the meat was shared by the entire group.

Although there was no separate political sphere among the !Kung, a number of political problems had to be dealt with, such as the defense of territories, the protection and allocation of water, and public goals with regard to band movements and collective hunts. Each band claimed a territory that had to have a permanent source of water at a reasonable distance from sufficient vegetable foods for day-to-day consumption. Within such a territory would be sporadic fertile areas, such as groves of mangetti nut trees, clumps of berries, and special places where tubers grew in particular abundance; these were considered “owned” by a band and were jealously guarded. Incursions into another band’s territory occasionally occurred, especially during hunting expeditions, in which case violence might be threatened; but true wars were unknown.

Headmanship was passed on from father to son. The existence of hereditary political positions seemingly defies the principle that all adult males in a band have equal access to leadership. However, the headman’s authority was largely limited to control of field food and water; he planned the utilization of these various resources and had charge of the group’s movements from one area to another within the territory. Most of this was firmly established by custom, and important decisions were arrived at by group consensus, so that the headman position was, to

some extent, symbolic. Visitors had to ask his permission to partake of food or water within the band's territory, but custom dictated that all reasonable requests be granted. Headmanship brought responsibility without reward, and because it was the !Kung ideal that no individual should stand above another, such positions were seldom actively sought. The hereditary headman might or might not be the actual leader of the band. If he was too young or lacked leadership abilities, this role might fall to someone with more of the personal qualities of leadership, so that the position became nominal. Also, effective leadership shifted according to the situation; a person might be an exceptional hunt leader but have little authority over public decisions, such as when and where to move camp (Marshall 1967).

The Eskimo

Despite the vast territory inhabited by the traditional Eskimo—from Siberia to Greenland—they have been described as remarkably alike in their political and social organization. Environmental determinist arguments are especially tempting, for the Eskimo lived in possibly the most hostile humanly habitable regions on Earth. Their food resources—mainly fish, caribou, and seal—were seasonal and widely scattered, which would logically lead to low population densities, nomadism, and extremely fluid social organization based on small subsistence groups. The basic unit was the extended family, which could take advantage of bilateral kinship relations to join with other families in temporary bands or even villages as food supplies waxed and waned during the year. A household might comprise a family of 12, which subsisted alone part of the year but joined groups of up to 270 at other times. Leadership outside the household was elementary; even villages sometimes lacked a head-man, and what minimal influence might be possessed by an individual rested with the local shaman, whose authority was neither coercive nor uniting. Along the coast, the owner of a whaling boat had unrestricted authority over his crew during a voyage, and might, by the prestige of his wealth, maintain a loose chieftainship over a community; but even in this case, group unity was maintained not by government, but by conventionalized reciprocal obligations among kin. As with the !Kung, maintenance of order derived from the power of custom and public opinion (Weyer 1959).

Although this textbook view of the Eskimo was probably reasonably accurate for a majority of groups, there also existed a much greater diversity of social and political forms. Bilateral kinship was in some places replaced by corporate patrilineages; men's associations sometimes overrode kinship relations as decision-making bodies; there were large permanent settlements in some areas; and there were wide differences in types of leadership, from virtual chiefdoms to an absence of authority beyond the head of the family. Some of this variation was undoubtedly secondary, deriving from long contact with agents of Western civilization, such as explorers, whaling crews, traders, and missionaries. However, such diversity does suggest that the hunting-gathering adaptation permits a broader range of sociopolitical variation than is accounted for in conventional typologies (Damas 1968).

Tribes

When local community act autonomously but there are kinship group (such as clan or lineage) or associations (such as age-sets) that can potentially integrate several local groups into a larger unit, we say that the society has tribal organization. There are three basic objections to the concept of tribe: (1) it does not encompass a discrete group of societies that share common qualities; (2) it is not sufficiently different from other types, such as bands and chiefdoms; (3) it suggests a degree of social integration, or at least boundedness, that is often nonexistent (Helm 1968).

Why, then, is the term in use at all? There are both logical and empirical reasons. First, the term is a recognition that in sociopolitical complexity and evolutionary development, there must be a form that bridges the gap between hunting-gathering bands and centralized systems. Second, cross-cultural studies do reveal features in common to at least many of these groups.

Tribes are uncentralized egalitarian systems in which authority is distributed among a number of small groups; unity of the larger society is established from a web of individual and group relations. Because these groups rely on domesticated food sources, they are more densely populated and usually more sedentary than are hunting-gathering bands. As with bands, there is little political or economic specialization, except for a division of labor along age and sex lines, and there is no religious professionalization. However, according to Elman Service (1962), the defining quality of the tribe—that which separates it from the band—is the existence of pan-

tribal sodalities that unite the various self-sufficient communities into wider social groups. A sodality is simply a formal or informal association, such as a family group, a college fraternity, or the Boy Scouts. In tribal societies there are two types of sodalities: those that are derived from kinship, and those that are not. Kinship sodalities include lineages — groups tracing descent through either the male line (patrilineage) or the female line (matrilineage)—and clans, which are groups of lineages tracing common descent to an often-mythical ancestor. Nonkin sodalities include a host of voluntary and involuntary associations.

If tribes are viewed in terms of the types of sodalities that unite them, or in terms of who makes the decisions for the group, a number of subtypes immediately emerge. Even in cases in which other forms of sodalities are evident, kinship will almost invariably be an important element of social integration. One form of political organization based on kinship is the segmentary *lineage*—especially common in Africa—in which a number of autonomous village groups can join together in ever larger units for ritual purposes or to counter some threat. Many tribal societies are integrated by *associations*, which cross-cut kinship divisions. In age-set systems, the group initiated together at puberty will form a continuing sodality that takes on different functions as it passes through certain age levels—for example, if the group is male, they will form a warrior society as young men, and will become the governing body of the community as elders. In other tribes, such as the American Plains Indians, voluntary societies of warriors, clowns, or police may serve important integrating and decision-making functions. Although tribal societies do not have hierarchies of full-time religious professionals, religion may be extremely important, especially if it is tied to some sort of ancestor veneration, as is often the case in unilineal groups. In these societies, *ritual stratification* may be a key element of integration, as those responsible for major rituals assume decision-making leadership even in secular matters. In some tribes, *village councils* of elders will make public decisions, usually through a process of discussion leading to consensus. Finally, throughout Melanesia certain big men attain significant political authority through wealth, generosity, and courage in war. Although these leaders may exercise chieftain like authority, their position is inherently unstable, because it is dependent on their ability to buy followers through gift giving and loans. A bad crop, an inability to gather sufficient pigs for a lavish feast, or failure in battle can quickly

shift authority to a contender with better luck or skill. It is tempting to think of such a breakdown of subtypes as fairly covering the range of possibilities, but there are tribes that include elements from more than one subtype, and others that do not fit any of these forms. Why this endless profusion of subtypes? Perhaps the basic problem is in attempting to define tribe in political terms at all. Unlike band, chiefdom, and state, the concept of tribe really does not—and cannot—refer to a particular type of political organization, because there seem to be few structural, or systemic, limits on the variety of forms.

Societies with tribal political organization are similar to band societies in their tendency to beegalitarian. However they are food producers, high population density, local groups are larger and more sedentary than hunter-gatherers.

The Kpelle

Just how complex all this can get is illustrated by the Kpelle of West Africa. Their larger cultural group was fragmented into a number of self-sufficient communities, each with a hereditary “owner of the land,” but also with a council of elders that made decisions by consensus. Complementing the political power of these groups was the men’s secret society—secret in the sense that its symbols and rituals were not to be revealed to outsiders. This society, the Poro, held a supernatural political power that cut across lineage and small chiefdom boundaries and could thus unite the Kpelle into larger groups. Actually, the Poro extended far beyond the Kpelle, including a host of cultures in Nigeria, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, and Portuguese Guinea. It arbitrated in local wars and even united entire countries for common action in times of emergency. Thus, we find the centralization and hierarchy we expect from chiefdoms, the segmentary organization and pantribal sodalities common to tribes, and at least three of the subtypes—associational, village council, and ritually stratified—combined in the Kpelle (Fulton 1972; Little 1965).

The Nuer

The Nuer of southern Sudan, described by E. E. Evans-Pritchard (1940a, 1940b), provide a classic example of the segmentary lineage solution to the problem of tribal unity. About 200,000 Nuer lived in villages, cultivating maize and millet during the rainy season, herding cattle in

almost constant nomadism during the dry season. Their social system was fluid in the extreme, and individually they had a reputation for being fiercely independent. Although they lacked centralized authority, or any formal authority at all beyond the village level, they were able to join together in large groups to counter an external threat. Evans- Pritchard characterized the Nuer as “an acephalous state, lacking legislative, judicial, and executive organs. Nevertheless, it is far from chaotic. It has a persistent and coherent form which might be called ‘ordered anarchy.’”

The smallest corporate economic unit was the household, comprised of several patrilineally related men and their families. A group of these households might be clustered as a hamlet within a village. As one of these hamlets grew through the processes of birth, adoption, and immigration, it would inevitably fission, creating another group that might form a hamlet in a nearby village. These hamlets comprised a minor lineage, and several of them, spread between many villages, made up larger and larger units: major lineage; maximal lineage; and, finally, clan. A clan might include thousands of people and be spread throughout all Nuerland, creating a network of social ties that these highly mobile people could call upon as needed. Because clans were exogamous, marriage alliances established hundreds of small bonds with other clans.

Parallel to the segmentary lineage system, but not identical with it, was a territorial system. Each clan “owned” a certain territory that was, however, open to members of other clans; in fact, the owner clan did not form an aristocracy and might actually populate only a small portion of its territory. However, those moving into a village attempted to establish relations with an owner lineage through being adopted into it or through marriage.

War and feuding were almost constant. By means of a process of complementary opposition, increasingly larger territorial groups could be united for such purposes. For example, two sections might be fighting with each other, but they would become allies if another group attacked either or both. To counter an even larger threat, all three former antagonists would join together. The political unity of the Nuer had to be defined situationally as increasingly larger units were assembled according to need, and then dismantled when the threat was gone.

The complementary opposition solution to the problem of tribal integration was especially adaptive for a tribe that intruded into an already occupied territory. This was the case with the Nuer, who had within historical times expanded into the land of the Dinka. Such a system, extremely flexible yet capable of forming a powerful united force, channeled expansion outward and released internal pressures in warfare against other peoples (Sahlins 1961).

CENTRALIZED SYSTEMS

As noted previously, a valid typology should designate systems, so that within any single category the determination of one or a few variables will predict others. The category of centralized political systems encompasses societies in which power and authority in here in one person or a small group. This is true by definition. By extension, however, it is possible to predict that these societies will tend to be more densely populated than are bands and tribes, will be stratified by rank or class, will have specialized social and occupational roles, will utilize more productive technology, will have economies based on centralized redistribution, and will be more stable in terms of ongoing sociopolitical groupings. Morton Fried emphasizes the basic inequalities of these systems relative to uncentralized systems: recruitment into political positions is no longer equal but may be based on membership in a certain class or in an elite lineage. Although unilineal descent groups may exist and even hold a great deal of local power, politics is no longer manifested mainly through kinship; political specialization appears with full-time politicians and an attendant bureaucracy.

Chiefdoms

Chiefdoms have some formal structure that integrates more than one community into a political unite with or without chief who has more than rank or authority than others. The chief and his family have greater access to prestige. The chief redistribute goods and direct public labor. Sometimes they used such a resource for priestess, army and political envoys. More densely populated and permanently settled than trib. Position of the chief sometimes hereditary and generally permanent.

With respect to social integration, the chiefdom level transcends the tribal level in two major ways: (1) it has a higher population density made possible by more efficient productivity; and (2) it is more complex, with some form of centralized authority. Unlike segmentary systems in which political units coalesce and dissolve according to the situation, chiefdoms have relatively permanent central agencies of government, typically based on collection and redistribution of an economic surplus (often including a labor surplus).

The position of chief, unlike that of headman of a band or lineage, is a position of at least minimal power—that is, the chief has access to a certain amount of coercion. The chief may be the final authority in the distribution of land, and may be able to recruit an army. Economically he is the center and coordinator of the redistribution system: he can collect taxes on food or goods, some of which will be returned to the populace, creating a new level of group solidarity in which a number of specialized parts depend on the smooth functioning of the whole. Even if the chief's position is not directly hereditary, it will only be available to certain families or lineages. Although actual class stratification is absent, every individual is ranked according to membership in a descent group; those closer to the chief's lineage will be higher on the scale and receive the deference of all those below. Indeed, according to Service (1971: 145), “the most distinctive characteristic of chiefdoms, as compared to tribes and bands, is . . . the pervasive inequality of persons and groups in the society.”

However, the chief by no means possesses absolute power. The aristocratic ethos does not carry with it any formal, legal apparatus of forceful repression, and what obedience the chief can command may derive less from fear of physical sanctions than from his direct control of the economic redistribution system. The chief's lineage may itself become exceptionally wealthy, but ultimately loyalty is purchased by constant bestowal of goods and benefits. Although there may be the approximation of a bureaucracy, offices beneath that of chief are not clearly differentiated, and when pressures build up, these lower bureaucrats can break away from the parent body and set up an opposition government. Thus, a chief walks a narrow tightrope between conflicting interest groups and maintains his position through a precarious balancing act.

Precolonial Hawaii

The eight islands of aboriginal Hawaii were under the domination of a number of rigidly stratified hereditary chiefdoms. The paramount chiefs were believed to be descendants of the gods and were so charged with *mana*—supernatural power—that even the ground they walked on could not be touched by lesser mortals. The chiefly personage was thus surrounded by an elaborate set of taboos, the breaking of which could mean a sentence of death. The chiefs were supreme economic, military, and ritual leaders, although most of these functions were delegated to a group of noble administrators and war leaders who formed the upper strata of society. There were two other levels below these administrators: lesser nobles and commoners. Each individual belonged to one of these strata, and the nobles were also ranked according to the order of their birth and their nearness to the high chief. The higher nobles, or lesser chiefs, were accorded a great deal of deference; for example, commoners had to throw themselves face down on the ground as they passed. In order to keep the chiefly line pure, the heir to the position of high chief was supposed to be the firstborn son of the chief and his firstborn sister (a form of incestuous endogamy that is also found in ancient Egypt and Inca Peru).

Lesser chiefs controlled allocations of land and water — the latter exceedingly important, because much of the productive land was irrigated. They also, de facto, controlled the communal labor of commoners. Tribute was paid to the high chief by the upper-level nobles, who collected from the lower nobles, and so on, down the line to the commoners. This tribute — or some of it — would be used in public works, mainly irrigation canals and warfare. Nobles also subsidized a group of professional crafts-men from the tribute till.

What kept these polities from attaining the status of states was partially the lack of differentiation of the political sphere; these were hereditary theocracies in which authority was still relatively undifferentiated from religion and kinship. Also, although a chief might hold life and death power over his subjects in some regards, the central governing unit by no means held a monopoly on this power, which was distributed among a number of lesser chiefs; nor was there any legal structure to administer such force. Finally, these governments were far from stable. Warfare was constant, and chiefdoms were regularly overthrown, in which case the entire noble class would be replaced by the conquering group (Davenport 1967; Seaton 1978; Service 1975).

THE STATE

For Elman Service (1971: 163), the distinguishing quality of the state, that which separates it from the chiefdom, “is the presence of that special form of control, the consistent threat of force by a body of persons legitimately constituted to use it.” Morton Fried (1967), on the other hand, emphasizes stratification: the state has special institutions, both formal and informal, to maintain a hierarchy with differential access to resources. This stratification goes beyond the individual and lineage ranking found in less complex societies; it involves the establishment of true classes. For Ronald Cohen (1978a, 1978b), the key diagnostic feature of the state is its permanence. Unlike lower order forms of political organization, the state does not regularly fission (i.e., break up into a number of smaller groups) as part of its normal process of political activity.

States are generally large, complex societies, encompassing a variety of classes, associations, and occupational groups. Occupational specialization, including a full-time political bureaucracy, unites the entire group in a web of interrelated dependencies. Because of the vast range of individual and class interests within a state, pressures and conflicts unknown in less complex societies necessitate some sort of rule of impersonal law, backed by physical sanctions, for the ongoing maintenance of the system.

The Pre-colonial Zulu

The Nguni family of Bantu-speaking peoples included about 100,000 pastoralists and shifting cultivators living in about 80,000 square miles of southeastern Africa. The basic residence unit was the patrilineally extended family. The largest permanent political unit was the clan, although several clans might temporarily form a tribe. Actually, these were classic chiefdoms, as described above.

During the early years of the nineteenth century, most of these independent chiefdoms were united through conquest into the powerful and highly militaristic Zulu state. To a great extent, this relatively undeveloped state owed its continuing unity to the threat of the Boers and British who were pushing at the edges of its territory (the British conquered the Zulu in 1887). Regiments of conscripted soldiers, belonging to the king alone, were stationed in barracks concentrated in the capital. The king not only had the power to command military and labor

service, but also collected “gifts” from his subjects, which made him the wealthiest man in the kingdom. In turn, he was expected to be generous in providing food and other goods for his people. He had a council of advisors whose recommendations, ideally, were followed. He was also the ultimate appeals court for cases referred from the lower chiefs’ courts, and he reserved to himself the right of passing death sentences (although the chiefs did not always respect this reservation). Individuals and clans were stratified according to their genealogical closeness to the king.

Thus, although inchoate and short lived, the Zulu state displayed many of the attributes of more complex states: it united a large number of disparate groups under a central authority; it claimed, at least in theory, a monopoly on the use of force; its power was allocated through a complex bureaucracy; and it maintained government by objective law. However, much of the old chiefdom stage remained—so much so that the people themselves seemed to think of the state as a glorified chief-dom. The state was essentially a collection of clans that were still relatively independent. Loyalties were inevitably divided between chief and king, with the people often siding with the local group. Chiefs retained day-to-day rules, including the right to use force to put down rebellions as long as the king was informed. The idea persisted that a bad king could be overthrown, just as could a bad chief, as long as the individual and not the system was changed; in fact, kingly succession was largely a matter of assassination or rebellion. Also, although there was definite social stratification, it was much the same as that of the Hawaiians (individuals and clans ranked according to their genealogical closeness to the king). In addition, occupational specialization was not much more developed than in the prestate period. In short, although definitely a state with regard to unification of a number of formerly autonomous groups under centralized government, the precolonial Zulu encompassed many of the aspects of the chiefdoms upon which it was based (Gluckman 1940; Service 1975).

Chapter 3

THE STATE

About 5,500 years ago, on the fertile floodplains of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers in what is today Iraq, there developed a type of society unique to its time. After millennia in which humans have gradually turned from migratory foraging toward seasonal settlements based on a few domesticated plants and animals, and then toward year-round farming villages, there came into being the world's first true cities, and with them a novel form of political organization.

The Mesopotamian state developed through a long series of adjustments to a particular environment and a specific set of social problems. In retrospect, however, the process seems almost inevitable, for similar adaptations are found leading to similar sociopolitical structures in Egypt, the Indus River Valley of India and the Yellow River Valley of northern China, Mesoamerica, and Peru. These “primary” states, although these six states appeared hundreds or even thousands of years apart, and there was minimal commerce between a few of them (such as India and Mesopotamia), each seems to have originated independently of the others. This poses a problem: if the state evolved autonomously not once but six times, can fundamental processes be discovered that were common to all? American and Dutch anthropologists have tackled the problem of the origin of the state with enthusiasm (the British and French tend to ignore evolutionary questions). Until recently, such theorists carefully distinguished the six primary states from secondary states (those that developed out of or through contact with already existing states). Because virtually all theories focused on the former, evidence was exclusively archeological. Today, some researchers have abandoned the primary secondary distinction for a typology that allows for the inclusion of recent states, such as the Ankole of Uganda, as long as they remained pristine. We will examine some of this important research later, but first we must look at the classical theories of state origins.

INTERNAL CONFLICT THEORIES

The doctrine that the state evolved through class struggle is implicit in many of the writings of Karl Marx. However, these ideas were not fully worked out until Frederick Engels' major work, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* ([1891] 1972), which was published

after his mentor's death. According to Engels, who borrowed heavily from American evolutionary anthropologist Lewis Henry Morgan, the earliest form of social organization was communistic: resources were shared equally by all and there was no strong concept of personal possession. Technological innovation gives rise to surplus, which allows for a class of non-producers to develop. Private ownership is simply a concomitant of commodity production. Once established, private property stimulates an inexorable chain of cause and effect that leads to an entrepreneurial class—owners of the means of production and buyers and sellers of human labor. This, in turn, results in differential access to resources, and thus to vast discrepancies in individual wealth. In order to protect its interests against the masses of active producers, who understandably want to share in their own production, the elite must erect a structure of permanent centralized force to protect its class interests. Given its time, this analysis is sophisticated and subtle. In it is found the perception that the primary means of economic exchange in band and tribal society is reciprocity, and that more complex systems involve concentrations of wealth and redistribution through a central agency, be it chief, king, or bureaucracy. Engels artfully applies Marxian materialism to long-term social evolution; the basic causes of change are held to be technological and economic, not ideational. There is also a clear recognition that social stratification is one of the defining qualities of the state.

Morton Fried (1967), who bases his evolutionary typology of political systems on the degree of individual access to resources and positions of prestige, offers a variation on the class-conflict model. Once true stratification exists, Fried notes, the state is already implicit because the maintenance of a class system requires that power be concentrated in the hands of an elite. By its very nature, this creates conflict within the society. Differential access to resources and the exploitation of human labor create pressures that are quite unknown in less complex societies. Conflict arising out of social stratification should not be thought of as the cause of state formation; rather, such conflict is merely a prior condition for the development of the state. Incipient social stratification is so unstable that a society that finds itself at such a stage must either disintegrate to a lower level of organization or continue its process of centralizing political power. In other words, once classes begin to separate themselves from hierarchies based on individual or kinship status, power must be fairly rapidly assumed by the privileged elite if the true state is to come into existence.

EXTERNAL CONFLICT THEORIES

In the Biblical version of social evolution, the development of cities is a direct result of Cain's primordial murder of his brother Abel. This idea, that states are born in blood and war, was given scientific respectability with the emergence of Social Darwinism in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Herbert Spencer, chief spokesman for the more violent interpretations of evolutionary theory, applied the idea of survival of the fittest mainly to individuals, but it took little imagination to extend this concept to societies. The stronger, more militaristic organizations would inevitably prevail over weaker groups, uniting them under a powerful centralized government with a monopoly on the use of force. Militarism alone, even without warfare, would be sufficient; merely the existence of an external threat that required a large standing army could push a loosely structured society in the direction of strong centralized leadership. Implicit or explicit in such theories, of which Spencer's was one of many, is the idea that state government is modeled on military organization in terms of its hierarchical structure and centralized control of physical force.

A nineteenth-century tendency to oversimplify and over generalize is evident in these theories, which are based on a gross misunderstanding of physical evolution. As we shall see, cross-cultural research does support the hypothesis that war and conquest are important factors in the development of some states, but there are two important objections to the theory that war is the *primary* cause: (1) a society can marshal forces only according to available levels of population and organization and, thus, warfare might be better viewed as a function rather than a cause of a given level of social integration; and (2) warfare among tribes and chiefdoms is more likely to prevent state formation than to cause it, because groups will simply disperse when threatened by a power greater than themselves.

This latter point is a salient consideration in Robert Carneiro's (1967, 1970, 1978) theory of environmental circumscription. Because warfare is virtually universal and usually has the effect of dispersing people rather than uniting them, conflict could only lead to centralization in particular situations. After examining primary-state development in both the Old and New Worlds, Carneiro notes that a common denominator is that they are all areas of circumscribed agricultural land; that is, they are bounded by mountains, sea, or desert. When there is no such

circumscription, population pressures on the environment can be expanded outward, and losers in a war can resettle in a new area. This is not possible in cases in which the only arable land is surrounded by unproductive land. However, the riverine valleys of coastal Peru—surrounded by sea, desert, and mountains—offer no such options. As the small, dispersed villages of the Neolithic grew and fissioned, the narrow valleys became increasingly crowded. Intensification of agriculture, through terracing, for example, would only solve the problem temporarily.

Carniero subsumes these processes under the principle of competitive exclusion, derived from evolutionary biology. This principle states that two species occupying and exploiting the same portion of the habitat cannot coexist indefinitely; one must ultimately eliminate the other. In applying this idea to societies, Carniero observes that throughout history, chiefdoms have been united into states and states have gone to war to create larger states, with competition and selection increasingly moving toward larger and larger units. In plotting the decreasing number of autonomous political units in the world from 1000 B.C., Carniero predicts the political unification of the entire planet by about the year 2300. (However, the breakup of the Soviet empire and the tendency for the world community to intervene to halt interstate wars suggests that there may be countercurrents working against sheer hugeness.)

POPULATION AND IRRIGATION

From about 23000 B.C. until 2000 A.D., world population has grown from an estimated 3.5 million to over 6 billion and from a density of 0.1 persons per square mile to 124 per square mile (Campbell 1979: 462–63). The correlation between this increase in population and the rise of the state has been noted by virtually all evolutionary cultural anthropologists. Robert Carniero (1967) plotted the relation between population density and social complexity in 46 societies and found a significant statistical correspondence between the two variables. Although the correspondence held, at least loosely, for arithmetic density (i.e., the average number of people per square mile over an entire territory), a much stronger relationship is found when economic density alone is considered. Economic density is the relation between population and sources of production. For example, in Egypt, the vast majority of people are concentrated in a narrow strip of arable land on either side of the Nile. According to the early nineteenth-century economist Thomas Malthus, population is negatively checked by disease, famine, and war as it threatens to

outgrow the food supply. However, if this were the only principle operating, population growth would have stabilized at a much lower level than today's. Certainly, one possible response to population pressure on food supply is exactly the opposite of the Malthusian checks; the food supply itself may be increased through some sort of intensification of production, often involving the development of a new technology or the refinement of an existing one. Irrigation, terracing, fertilization, using animal labor, cultivating more types of crops, and exploiting previously unused lands can significantly increase the carrying capacity of a given territory. The resulting increases in population density require more complex forms of social and political organization. This correspondence between population and social evolution was most extensively elaborated by Ester Boserup (1965). In a slight variation on the theory, Michael Harner (1970) argues that population pressure is not only directly responsible for some form of intensification of food production, but also leads to unequal access to resources and subsequently to increasing social stratification.

The importance of irrigation to state formation was recognized as early as the writings of Marx and Engels, who noted that a major difference between small-scale agricultural communities and state societies was that the latter required the support of extensive irrigation systems. More recently, Julian Steward (1955) has emphasized irrigation as the fundamental mechanism of state development, because water control permitted sufficient agricultural intensification to create large population densities, and the construction of massive hydraulic systems required new levels of social organization, power, and coordination of labor. It was Karl Wittfogel (1957) who elaborated the hydraulic theory in such detail that his name is now associated with it. Neolithic farmers in the areas of primary-state development, such as Egypt or the riverin valleys of Peru, were dependent on flood irrigation; their fields were watered once a year and new soil was deposited by the annual flood. Flood irrigation is quite variable, however, and even in the best of times it provides only one crop per year. Slowly, farmers began to exercise control of the floods with dikes and reservoirs, preserving and taming the precious water that could then be released as needed through a network of canals. Early irrigation systems were small and primitive, involving only the labor of a few neighboring farms, but as the productive capacity of the land increased and the human population burgeoned, irrigation works grew in size and complexity. A group of specialists emerged to plan and coordinate the construction of these systems, and later

to control the flow of water. This group, whose hands now quite literally held the very life of the community, developed into administrative elite that governed despotic, centralized states.

Furthermore, in the American southwest and other areas, large hydraulic systems existed for centuries without political centralization. Finally, the theory has only the most tenuous application to secondary states, many of which possessed the most rudimentary irrigation. These objections may be beside the point. Marvin Harris (1977) has noted that Wittfogel's theory is not really about the origin of the state per se, but rather about the development of certain types of managerial systems. To postulate centralization of despotic power around the management of water supplies is not to deny the importance of population density, trade, warfare, environmental circumscription, and other factors that have had key roles in the increasing integration of society.

Harris, in *Cannibals and Kings* (1977), incorporates population pressure, hydraulics, and environmental circumscription into a complex argument in which social organization and ideology are viewed as the results of a society's technological adaptation to its physical environment. Harris begins by noting the main objection to population pressure theories; namely, that populations usually tend to stabilize comfortably below the carrying capacity of the land. Indeed, all societies have cultural means of supplementing Malthusian checks on population. Hunting-gathering groups maintained relative population equilibrium for tens of thousands of years, and the few such societies that survive today depend on balancing population to food supply. In all preindustrial societies, such practices as female infanticide, two- or three-year long taboos on sexual intercourse with a woman after she has borne a child, and prolonged nursing (which delays ovulation) serve to keep population in balance with food production.

Harris's argument, although appealing, is open to challenge. State development occurred so long after the end of the Pleistocene Era—thousands of years—that the relationship is tenuous at best. Population pressure on resources cannot, in every area that became politically centralized, be related to declines in productivity. Also, Boserup may be more correct in placing her emphasis on population growth rather than resource depletion. Even relatively minor changes in nutrition can radically alter the size of a population. Food supplies are quite elastic and can easily be affected either by a redefinition of usable food resources or by slight changes in technology.

As Harris and others have pointed out, population growth may indeed need explaining, but not very much explaining.

THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF LEADERSHIP

In *Origins of the State and Civilization* (1975), Elman Service proposes an integrative theory. After an extensive review of the rise of the six archaic primary states and a number of modern primitive states, he rejects all conflict theories. Warfare and conquest, he points out, are too universal in human experience to count as causes of a particular form of social organization, and “the only instances we find of permanent subordination from war are where government already exists” (Service 1975: 271). Arguments based on irrigation or other forms of intensification admit too many exceptions. In ancient Peru, for example, agricultural intensification was achieved through canal irrigation 1,500 years before the first truly urbanized state. The idea that population pressures create conflicts that can only be solved by centralized government is rejected partially on the grounds that such pressure could just as well lead to increased sharing.

These negative conclusions derive from a particular reading of the data; they would hardly be convincing to an ardent proponent of any of the theories rejected. Indeed, although it is conflict theory that is specifically rebutted, implicitly what is being rejected is cultural materialism. What Service has done is to shift the argument from ecological determinants to strategies of decision making.

Such leadership is unstable because it depends on an individual who may get sick, die, or simply run out of luck, and there is no normal method of succession. In order for a society to maintain the benefits of centralization, temporary charismatic leadership must be transformed into a permanent hierarchy. When this stage is reached, then a chiefdom has developed—the first true institutionalization of power, which is also an institutionalization of inequality. As this power center grows, so does the need of the newly developed ruling class to protect its privilege. One method of doing so, aside from the use of force, is to legitimize the power elite by connecting it with the supernatural, by giving it divine sanction. The use of force, then, far from creating the state, actually represents a temporary failure of the state to function responsibly by providing such benefits as protection, redistribution, and coordination of trade. Thus, “political evolution can be thought to consist, in important part, of ‘waging peace’ in ever wider contexts” (Service

1975: 297). It should be evident that this is not merely a shift of emphasis from population pressure, irrigation, or environmental circumscription, but rather a shift in the kind of theory offered. The “considerable exaltation” a leader’s successes could produce “in the minds of his followers” (Service 1975: 291) would be of little relevance to Robert Carneiro or Marvin Harris, who view whole social systems as reacting in survival terms to material environmental determinants. Service’s theory shifts the weight of argument from environment to cognition; that is, to the people’s perception of accruing benefits. Service also uses models based on cooperation and integration, whereas most other theories have held conflict and instability to be the fundamental conditions out of which the state develops.

Service’s point of view is refreshingly innovative, yet conflict and integration are definitely not mutually exclusive; all societies are involved in both, alternately and simultaneously. Similarly, societies are materialist and cognitive at the same time. Each perspective offers much in the way of explanation, but to claim exclusivity for one or the other is rather like claiming that a glass of water is half full rather than half empty.

SYSTEMS THEORIES

Few anthropologists today would hold to a single-cause model of the evolution of states. (It should be pointed out that those theories regularly referred to as unicausal — Carneiro’s, Wittfogel’s, and Boserup’s — are really singular only in emphasis.) All involve interactions between such factors as population, environment, technology, and irrigation. Synthetic models, like that of Marvin Harris, make these interactions more explicit. However, all such models are based on the idea that given certain pre-conditions, particular causes will lead to particular effects in a more or less sequential manner.

Unlike theories that designate specific causes, systems models are based on sets of principles, drawn mainly from physics and biology. These include negative and positive feedback, initial kick, system self-maintenance, and system self-development. *Negative feedback* is the process by which a stable system minimizes any deviation from equilibrium. Over generations, this human intervention caused genetic changes that allowed for increased dependence on these semidomesticated foods, and this led to more sedentary life-styles and larger populations, which in turn increased dependence on domesticates. This chain of events led eventually to the people

settling into year-round farming villages. Stable societies are self-maintaining insofar as they are constantly making small adjustments to changes in the physical and social environment. Once positive feedback processes are set in motion, a society becomes self-developing as population growth, agricultural intensification, urbanization, and political centralization feed on one another in constant circular causality. It should be noted that this is almost the exact reversal of the Newtonian principle that every action must have an equal and opposite reaction; with positive feedback, the most minute initial kick can, over the long run, lead to massive change. It is no longer necessary to explain the origin of the state as the effect of some equally momentous cause.

A number of different systems theories of political evolution have been developed. Some of these focus on environment and technology, whereas others employ a decision-making perspective. Common to all, however, is the idea that societies respond adaptively to many conditions. The goal of explanation, then, is not to pinpoint one or two factors that cause change in all cases, but to specify the processes by which social systems will alter their internal structures in response to selective pressures.

In any case, once the option is chosen, it will lead by a series of feedback loops to nucleation, stratification, differentiation, and centralization. *Nucleation* (roughly synonymous with urbanization) will become necessary for large cooperative labor projects; in turn, as people concentrate in relatively small areas, pressure on local resources will be aggravated, requiring further intensification of food production. Economic *stratification* develops as more productive farming techniques amplify slight environmental differences, so that a person possessing even marginally better agricultural land will become richer relative to his neighbors. These forces also promote *centralization* of decision making, because such concentration is more effective for planning large-scale projects and organizing labor. Farming becomes more *differentiated* as entire fields are turned over to a single crop in order to increase the efficiency of plowing and irrigation. A surplus of food ensures that some do not need to work as farmers at all, and this permits the development of craft *specialization*. Finally, each one of these factors stimulates the others. The model developed by Jolly and Plog uses many of the same elements as the so-called uncausal and synthetic theories. However, a major difference between this model and that of, say, Marvin Harris is that Jolly and Plog are much less specific about the actual train of events.

The processes, with which they deal, such as nucleation and differentiation, are abstract and can involve stresses deriving from any number of sources. Society is viewed not as a row of dominoes falling in a predictable pattern, but as a flexible, adaptive system making constant internal adjustments to various stresses. These adjustments modify the environment, which requires further adaptations of the social system in a self-developing process.

THE EARLY STATE: THE CROSS-CULTURAL EVIDENCE

The Early State (1978), edited by Henri J. M. Claessen and Peter Skalnik, brings together cross-cultural data on 19 formative states, ranging from Egypt in 3000 B.C. to the contemporary Kachari of India. The distinction between primary and secondary states is ignored. This omission is both deliberate and legitimate. So much emphasis has been placed on primary state development that the rich evidence of social evolution provided by other historical states—even those that developed with a great deal of autonomy—has been too often neglected. However, because most of the theories discussed here were originally applied almost exclusively to primary states, it is difficult to appraise Claessen and Skalnik's evaluations, based as they are on evidence drawn from a different set of societies.

In any case, this massive work offers a wealth of data and conclusions from a wide range of social systems that fall within the authors' definition of "the early state" as "a centralized socio-political organization for the regulation of social relations in a complex, stratified society divided into at least two basic strata, or emergent social classes—viz. the rulers and the ruled—whose relations are characterized by political dominance of the former and tributary obligations of the latter, legitimized by a common ideology. . . ." (Claessen and Skalnik 1978: 640). This definition, which summarizes many of the regularities found in the sample, supports the view that class stratification is a primary quality of the state, but it is not necessarily a cause, because differential access to material resources may exist long before the state comes into existence. Indeed, social stratification together with an economy that is capable of producing a surplus are considered predisposing factors without which the early state is impossible.

Four factors are singled out by the authors as directly causal: (1) population growth and/or population pressure, (2) war or the threat of war, (3) conquest, and (4) the influence of previously existing states. Most early states seem to have developed out of a combination of these, interacting with each other and appearing in no particular sequence. Wittfogel's (1957) hydraulic theory is not supported, since less than half the sample was clearly dependent on extensive irrigation systems. However, both Carniero's environmental circumscription model and Boserup's (1965) population pressure theory would be supported, but only if assimilated into some sort of systems model in which these factors are viewed not as primary causes, but as elements interacting with many other elements. One wonders, however, if systems approaches have really added that much to our understanding, because they mainly combine forces and processes that have been known for a long time. Essentially, what the systems theorists have done is raise the model of the evolution of the state to such a high level of abstraction that it is no longer easy to find exceptions to every generalization. Because of the resulting loss in specificity, one feels the need to fill in blanks in the model and reestablish the sense that what is being discussed are real human beings living, dying, warring, and struggling to make it against the odds. The generalizations must be taken back to the archeological digs, to the sad pottery shards and broken amulets and old walls of lost civilizations; back to the nascent states of Africa and India where kings and peasants contended in an eternal game of conflict and accord. Theory must hold a middle position in anthropology, for ultimately everything begins and ends in the field.

States

States are multi-community and multi-society in a territory

Centralized government has a power to collect tax, draft labor, and enforce law.

Permanent institution of legislative, executive, and judiciary

Use of or monopoly of using force

It exist in class society, fully stratified, commercial exchange, and foreigntrade societies.

All statehas specialized function of population control, fixed boundary, citizenship, judiciary law and procedure, enforcement military and police, and fiscal taxation.

There are two forms of states:

Preindustrial, agriculturalist kinship

Industrial states, democratic and complex

Chapter IV

GENDER AND POWER

Although it is commonly accepted that what has come to be known as feminist anthropology or the anthropology of gender has passed through a number of stages, the specification of these is dependent on how detailed one wishes to be, and what aspects are emphasized. Very broadly, one might distinguish three overlapping phases in a distinctly anthropological view of women with regard to power and politics. The first “revolutionary” phase, which began in the early 1960s, is marked by the belated recognition of a pronounced male bias in ethnographic writing and anthropological theory. Interest in kinship and marriage ensured that women would be represented, but usually as passive and powerless adjuncts to husbands and fathers. The woman’s voice was muted, both in the sense that there were few in-depth studies that focused on the woman’s point of view and in the sense that there lacked a specific feminist theoretical viewpoint within anthropology.

In the second phase, interest in biological determinants faded, and the focus turned from women to gender. The anthropology of gender had two connotations absent from the anthropology of women. “Gender” was by definition cultural, distinguishing it from “sex” (although it would later be argued that sex, too, was socially constructed, because people have very different views and expectations about the physical body). Gender was also, by definition, relational—that is, it always involved the interaction between males and females.

The third phase is a fusion of three separate but related theoretical orientations: postmodernism, postcolonial theory, and globalization. A core theme of postmodernism is the rejection of grand theory, or met narratives—including such quintessentially Western orientations as Marxist cultural materialism.

Until the 1970s, the universal political subordination of women was one of the accepted fundamentals of cultural anthropology. E. E. Evans-Pritchard (1965: 54) observed that “in almost every conceivable variety of social institutions, in all of them, regardless of social structure, men are in the ascendancy. . . .” Donald Brown (1991: 91n) categorically asserts the “universal dominance of men in the public-political arena.” There remains a popular myth of primeval

matriarchy. This view is a survival of a nineteenth-century belief, most exhaustively articulated by. Para-doxically, some of the most influential researchers of the first generation of professional anthropologists in the United States were women: Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict, among others, were successful in turning the question of gender from biology to socialization and in establishing cultural relativism as a major tenet of anthropology.

The emergence of feminist scholarship over the last 40 years has challenged many of anthropology's fundamental assumptions while helping to fill out the record with new ethnographic data. Only a portion of this material is overtly "political"; that has to do specifically with group decision making and leadership. However, in a wider sense, most of it is political, because a dominant thrust of feminist scholarship has been *power*, especially the relative power of the sexes.

Although there is hardly any point on which all feminist anthropologists agree, one important implication is clear: gender can no longer be ignored; it must be considered as "an analytical category—which, like race, ethnicity, class or caste, tends to be crucial in the construction of both group identity and structures of power in society. . . ." (Morgen 1989: 8).

Man the Hunter versus Woman the Gatherer

Until the 1980s, the standard theory for the evolution of homo sapiens placed the emphasis on cooperative hunting of big game. The advantages of freeing the hands for the use of tools in killing and butchering resulted in bipedalism, which led to greater efficiency in hunting and an increased dependence on animal protein. In a complex feedback process, selection for new skills generated larger brains, which in turn brought about more cooperatively and complexly organized hunts. Larger brains meant longer periods of immaturity for children; women were saddled with protracted child care, which effectively prevented them from hunting or traveling extensive distances. Thus dependent, women were required to remain at "home base," foraging a bit and taking care of children, while men elaborated their tool kits and evolved incipient civilization out of hunting strategy.

Cooperative hunting of large game, which is claimed to be the initial kick in human evolution, could only have occurred *after* brain size had begun to increase. On the other hand, the

postulated pair bonding of one man taking care of one woman could only have taken place after the hunting adaptation was already well established. Initially, an increase in child dependency would have led to a pair bond between mother and offspring, not man and woman.

An alternative schema would give Woman the Gatherer at least equal weight in evolution with Man the Hunter. Gathering is hardly a simple process; it involves finding and identifying edible plants, a knowledge of seasonal variation, a good sense of geography and weather, the development of containers for carrying food (and babies at the same time), and the invention of tools and techniques for food preparation.

Biological Differences in Gender

Differences in gender are indisputable, although the existence of innate *behavioral* differences remains hotly controversial. There have been two basic perspectives: (1) the culturalogical school, which views the entire explanation in the socialization of children into role behavior proper to their cultures; and (2) the “prepared learning” school, which assumes a biologically based propensity to learn and to perpetuate role behaviors peculiar to each sex (Draper 1985).

Across-cultural study revealed that young boys are consistently more aggressive than are young girls, although in only 20 percent of the sample were boys actually socialized for aggressiveness.

The muscular strength of women is 55 to 65 percent that of men. Males seem to have higher energy potentials and females, lower metabolic rates. Early brain differentiation suggests diverse behavioral potentials by sex. Androgyny in girls (prenatal exposure to male hormones) leads to “tomboy” behavior.

Even muscular strength and endurance is strongly affected by environment; differences in performance levels in sports are narrowing rapidly as women receive training and encouragement similar to that of male athletes (Lott 1987).

Even if there are prepatterned behavioral differences between the sexes—males being more “agonistic” (aggressive, exploratory, hierarchical, and competitive) and females more socially “integrative” and “nurturant” (Parker and Parker 1979)—all behavior in humans is filtered through culture.

The debate over the biological bases of sexual stratification was ardently fought throughout the 1970s; presently it is pretty much a dead issue outside of sociobiology. Feminist anthropologists have gone on to more complex, and more fruitful, questions.

WOMEN AND POWER: THE CROSS-CULTURAL EVIDENCE

Although no matriarchies exist, the range of female statuses among prestate cultures is extensive. The three societies described below are more representative of the extremes than of the norm, but they do reveal how variable sexual stratification can be.

The Iroquois

Among the Iroquois, a confederacy of five culturally related “tribes” in the northeastern United States, women had higher status and more power than in just about any group known. This might seem odd, because the Iroquois were extremely warlike, exactly the type of group one might associate with a “male supremacist complex.” However, a number of factors contributed to the power of women.

The Iroquois were mainly observed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; thus, their society had already undergone considerable change due to contact with Europeans. Individual men or groups of men were away much of the time, often for a year or more, on extensive hunting or trapping trips, trading, or involved in warfare. Thus, in the local village units it was the women who maintained continuity. Women provided most of the subsistence, through shifting cultivation of corn, beans, and squashes, in addition to many wild foods. The society was both matrilineal and matrilocal. Matrons arranged marriages. When a man married, he moved into his wife’s longhouse, a large structure of bark and wood with many compartments connected by a central aisle. Each family in the lineage occupied a compartment, sharing a fire with several other families. Matrons presided over the lineage longhouses, so that a man had no power in the house in which he lived, and had to tread lightly lest he offend his wife’s female kin, who could expel him if they were so inclined. Hereditary transmission of titles, rights, and property were all in the female line. It was the women who had the power of life and death over prisoners.

However, according to Judith Brown (1975), it was neither women's contribution to subsistence nor matriliney that gave women their power; rather it was women's command of the economic organization of the tribe. Women not only controlled distribution of plant foods, both domestic and wild, but also handled the distribution of animal foods from the men's hunts. It was the women who preserved the meat and the matrons who distributed it. Women thus had the power to provision hunts, councils, and war parties. Apparently, they could, in some cases, hinder or prevent a war by withholding supplies.

As a result, women, although lacking official political offices, had great informal political power. The highest ruling body of the League was a Council of Elders. Hereditary eligibility for office passed through the women. Iroquois matrons could raise or depose the ruling elders, could attend the High Council, and could influence council decisions. They had occasional power over the conduct of warfare and the negotiation of treaties. When a chief died, the women held a meeting to select a new candidate; if the clan chiefs vetoed the selection, the women would meet again. Women also sent representatives to the public councils. Although the Iroquois can by no means be considered a matriarchy because men held all formal offices, the power of women was firmly institutionalized. It should also be noted that such power was not confined to the "domestic" sphere, but was equally evident in the public arena.

The Chipewyan

Almost at the opposite pole from the Iroquois were the Chipewyan of northcentral Canada. According to Henry S. Sharp (1981), women were severely "devalued" in this society; reputedly they were treated worse than in any other North American tribe. Historically, about 90 percent of the Chipewyan diet was from flesh, mainly caribou, but also moose, musk ox, small game, and fish. After contact with Europeans in 1715, they became increasingly involved in the fur trade, and by the end of the nineteenth century had adopted repeating rifles. The low status of women would seem to be related to a strong division of labor and to the insignificant contribution of women to the food supply. Men obtained virtually all of the food. Women, however, did contribute significantly to subsistence, because they had the job of processing the food, mainly

the long, arduous task of drying meat and fish. As in most foraging societies, some sort of sharing was necessary for survival, but this was not automatic. In difficult times, preserved meat and fish had to be “borrowed,” but such borrowing was antithetical to the masculine ethic. Thus, women were relegated this job, although borrowing bestowed no status. Women might have low status and be treated accordingly, but they were at the same time perceived to be possessors of great power. Such power, however, was of a negative sort. The roles of male and female were surrounded with complex symbolism. Men gained power through hunting, whereas women were potentially polluting, capable of destroying the efficacy of men’s magical materials. A menstruating woman, for example, could destroy the magic of a sled dog harness by stepping over it. “To be female is to be power,” observes Sharp (1981: 227), “to be male is to acquire power. Men *may* have power but women *are* power just by being women.” This symbolic power did not, however, translate into the ability to make group decisions or to lead.

The Agta

The mountain Agta of northeastern Luzon in the Philippines is the only known culture in which women routinely hunted large game. Centuries ago, all Agta may have been dependent on hunting, fishing, and gathering, although today the language group includes a great variety of lifestyles, including horticulture, farming, trading, and wage labor. The mountain Agta, who were least in contact with outsiders, ate animal protein almost daily. Wild pig, deer (both considered large game), and monkeys were commonly hunted with bow and arrow and machetes. Some forest plant food was also gathered, although the Agta preferred to trade for corn, cassava, and sweet potatoes.

There was a sexual division of labor, but it was modest. Both women and men participated in virtually all subsistence activities. In at least two Agta groups, women were active hunters who hunted frequently, sometimes with other men or women, but often alone. Women made their own arrows (although blacksmithing points was an exclusively male activity). Girls started hunting shortly after puberty and continued as long as they wished.

The anthropological belief that women never hunt big game is based on an ostensible incompatibility with childbearing and with nurturing infants. How was this solved among the Agta? Older siblings, grandparents, or other relatives might care for young children. Sometimes the father would take care of the children. Women did not hunt in late pregnancy and the first few months of nursing, but, despite the small size of the settlements, there were usually sufficient women available to hunt. Women were also more frequently, and more aggressively, involved in trade, mainly of dried meat.

No formal or institutional authority existed, and group decisions were based on consensus, which included, of course, the women. The Agta would appear to be at least close to a truly egalitarian culture (Griffin and Griffin 1981).

Agta culture thus challenges a number of assumptions about women's roles—not only the old truism about Man the Hunter, but also the new emphasis on Woman the Gatherer. It may be that female big-game hunting is unique to the Agta, but not necessarily; it is also possible that male-dominated anthropology has missed other cases in which women regularly hunted big game. Agta hunting does throw into question the assumption that childbirth and child care are a universal constraint on the range of women's activities.

Women's Power and the Distribution of Resources

Male dominance is often related to the division of labor by sex. Cross-cultural studies reveal that women are commonly assigned such tasks as food and fuel gathering, grain grinding, water carrying, food preservation, cooking, pottery making, weaving, basket manufacture, dairy production, and laundering — in other words, activities that can be performed near the home and involve monotonous operations that can be interrupted and resumed. Men are more likely to engage in activities that require travel, danger, and sometimes sudden bursts of energy, such as hunting large game, warfare, lumbering, trapping, mining, herding, fishing, and long-distance trade. Such division of labor seems to be more closely related to the demands of motherhood than to size, strength, or innate propensities. Tasks that are dangerous or remove women for long periods from home may be perceived as incommensurate with the demands of childbearing and child care (Coontz and Henderson 1986: 115; Dahlberg 1981: 13; Schlegel 1977: 35).

The division of labor by sex may become a basis of sexual stratification, but it cannot be the sole explanation. It has been argued that it is not the division of labor that determines the status of women, but rather women's contribution to the subsistence of the group. Cross-cultural studies, including different levels of social complexity, reveal that women contribute on the average about 30 to 45 percent of the food (Dahlberg 1981: 14–15). However, this can vary from women providing virtually none of the food (as among some Eskimos) to upward of 70 percent (the !Kung). Unfortunately, the “common sense” view that degree of contribution to subsistence determines status is wrong; cross-cultural comparison reveals no such pattern (Whyte 1979:169).

Ernestine Friedl (1975, [1978] 1990) hypothesizes that power does not rest on the contribution to subsistence per se, but rather on the exchange of goods outside of the family. It is control of public exchange, not control of domestic production, that is the key, because such exchange creates the obligations and alliances that are at the center of political relations. The greater men's monopoly is on the distribution of scarce resources, the greater their dominance is over women.

Among those groups in which both women and men hunt and gather communally, such as the Washo Indians of North America, women and men are roughly equal. In groups in which women and men each collect their own plant food, but men supply some meat, such as the Hazda of Tanzania, there will be a slightly greater tendency toward male dominance.

When this theory is applied to industrial society, it is obvious that jobs that do not give women control over productive resources do not garner power (although, it should be noted, this is also true of men's jobs).

Domestic/Public, Nature/Culture

The belated recognition that “male dominance” is neither a universal nor a singular characteristic, the same for all societies in which it is manifested, has led to a search for the structural and cultural factors that give rise to gender differences. Michelle Rosaldo (1974) noted that men often control the “public domain,” where the broader political issues of society are decided, whereas women are confined to a “domestic domain” largely concerned with the interests of their own families.

It is true that in preindustrial societies, women's activities are most often confined within the context of the family or the lineage. This can imply considerable power, however, especially in matrilineal systems in which inheritance of property takes place through the women and women run local lineage affairs. If matrilocality is combined with matrilineality, the man may have little power in the home where he lives with his wife and in-laws, as is the case among the Iroquois. Among the Hopi of the American Southwest, women control the lineage pueblos, so that men must exercise their authority through religion and community councils. This is certainly true in many societies, but the domestic/public dichotomy is by no means universal. Women often do exercise power in the public sphere — for example, queens and female prime ministers (however, it should be noted that the existence of a woman in an official position of power does not necessarily raise the status of all women in that society; more often, formal power by women serves only an elite group or maintains a patriarchy).

Female power could not be measured along a single dimension but had to be, at the least, broken into two independent categories: (1) female involvement in group decision making, and (2) politically important positions or organizations controlled by women. There was no significant overlap between these two categories; each emerged in different types of societies.

Women's control of organizations and positions of power was most closely correlated with socioeconomic complexity, and seemed to be part of a more general social and economic differentiation. However, such organizations did not necessarily proffer higher status or more power on women.

According to Engels, matrilineality (or "mother right") emerged out of a period of primitive anarchy and promiscuity. Engels saw this early matrilineality as egalitarian. Property, the basis of all power, was owned communally, so that no one had control over others. With the emergence of private property, men overthrew matrilineality and installed the patriarchal family, introducing differences of wealth both within and between families. Excluded from control of property, women found themselves in a subordinate position. Women produced only for domestic use, freeing men to produce for consumption by the group or for trade. Technology, which was controlled by men, exacerbated these inequalities. Thus, male control of private property resulted in female subordination.

As long as the public and private spheres were not differentiated, societies remained egalitarian. Thus, some precolonial horticultural societies, as well as foragers, were egalitarian. However, when goods began to be produced for exchange as well as for consumption, new economicities undermined the ties of the collective household. Control of production was removed from the hands of the producer, leading to exploitation. Women lost control of their own production, which was taken over by men. Because of the constraints imposed by childbearing, a sexual division of labor developed in which women became the small-scale producers and dispensers of services within male-dominated households. Women were effectively pushed out of the public arena altogether. With the rise of capitalism, sexual stratification became even more entrenched, because men, almost exclusively, control the means of production and thus can further exploit women as wage laborers.

Summing Up

The issue of male political domination and female subordination has been revealed to be far more complex than it originally appeared. This issue is no longer argued as fervently as it once was; most feminist anthropologists have moved on to other questions. If the larger issues have been left unresolved, at least a rough agreement emerged from this extended dialogue:

- The “Man the Hunter” myth of evolution can no longer be supported. Women had as much influence on the processes of physical evolution as did men.
- Whether there are significant biological bases for male and female differences in behavior remains controversial. However, even if there are innate predispositions — men being more “agonistic” and women more “integrative” — they are always filtered through culture and, in any case, they are an unlikely explanation for gender stratification.
- Neither “status” nor “male dominance” can be clearly defined cross-culturally. These concepts mean different things in different societies, and often there may be considerable variation among the subsystems of a single society.
- Even if, for analytic purposes, we hypothesize universal male political dominance, this is empirically questionable. There are many societies that have been sexually egalitarian, such as the mountain Agta, the Mbuti pygmies, the Bari, and the !Kung.

- Women's power must be measured along at least two divergent lines: (1) control of organizations and positions of power, and (2) involvement in group decision making. Each of these correlates with different factors in the society.
- Gender stratification cannot be predicted from division of labor or from women's contribution to subsistence. However, in many cases (but not all), there is a correlation between women's political power and the degree to which women control resources distributed outside the family.
- Postulated dichotomies that place women in the domestic domain and men in the public domain, or associate women with nature and men with culture, may have some value in analyzing particular societies but are *not* valid cross-culturally.
- As would be expected, matrilineality is more closely associated with female equality than is patrilineality. However, the marriage residence rule may be even more important; women who move into their husband's lineage after marriage may have to abandon their protected status as "sisters" to assume, almost entirely, a male-dominated status of "wife."
- Although there is no evidence for egalitarianism as a universal primary stage of political evolution, it does appear that the development of gender stratification is closely related to the emergence of corporate kin groups and the state. In each case, the removal of women from control of their own production appears to be a crucial factor.

Unit V

Dispute and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

1. What is the difference between Conflict and Dispute?

One way that is particularly useful, however, is the distinction made by John Burton which distinguishes the two based on time and issues in contention. Disputes, Burton suggests, are short-term disagreements that are relatively easy to resolve. Long-term, deep-rooted problems that involve seemingly non-negotiable issues and are resistant to resolution are what Burton refers to as conflicts. Though both types of disagreement can occur independently of one another, they may also be connected. In fact, one way to think about the difference between them is that short-term disputes may exist within a larger, longer conflict. A similar concept would be the notion of battles, which occur within the broader context of a war.

Following Burton's distinction, disputes involve interests that are negotiable. That means it is possible to find a solution that at least partially meets the interests and needs of both sides. For example, it generally is possible to find an agreeable price for a piece of merchandise. The seller may want more, the buyer may want to pay less, but eventually they can agree on a price that is acceptable to both. Likewise, co-workers may disagree about who is to do what task in an office. After negotiating, each may have to do something they did not want to do, but in exchange they will get enough of what they did want to settle the dispute.

Long-term conflicts, on the other hand, usually involve non-negotiable issues. They may involve deep-rooted moral or value differences, high-stakes distributional questions, or conflicts about who dominates whom. Fundamental human psychological needs for identity, security, and recognition are often at issue as well. None of these issues are negotiable. People will not compromise fundamental values. They will not give up their chance for a better life by submitting to continued injustice or domination, nor will they change or give up their self-identity. Deep-rooted conflicts over these types of issues tend to be drawn out and highly resistant to resolution, often escalating or evolving into intractable conflicts.

In general,

- A Dispute is a short-term disagreement while a Conflict is a long-term disagreement.
- Conflicts, unlike Disputes, cannot be easily resolved and the possibility of resolving them is very remote. In contrast, a Dispute can be resolved through judicial or other means.
- A Conflict refers to a broad area of issues and within this broad area specific Disputes can arise. Thus, Disputes may stem from a Conflict.
- Disputes can be easily resolved by dealing with the specific issue at hand and coming to a final determination. This is not the same with Conflict.
- Conflicts are more serious and sensitive in nature and very volatile in terms of resolution.

2. Stages of Conflict

Conflict exists everywhere. In a world where population is skyrocketing and opinion is vast, there is no way to avoid conflict. So what do we do? We learn to resolve conflict. The only way to resolve conflict is to, first, recognize conflict by understanding the stages of conflict. There are five stages of conflict and they can only be resolved by learning and understanding how to solve the issue.

These are the five stages of conflict:

Latent stage

In the “Latent Stage,” the first stage of conflict, people may be in conflict without being aware that they are in conflict. People have different ideas, values, personalities and needs, which can create situations where others do not agree with their thoughts or actions. This in itself is not a problem, unless an event occurs to expose these differences. An example of this could be that a server at a restaurant may have inputted an order incorrectly and the food being made for a table is the wrong food. The manager and table do not know this yet and conflict has not arisen

yet.

Emergence

At the emergence stage, conflict starts to set in as the parties involved recognize that they have different ideas and opinions on a given topic. The differences cause discord and tension. Sometimes it is called the “Perceived Stage” in which the people involved in a conflict become fully aware that there is a conflict, so the table has now been made aware and complained to management. Management will now go over to speak with the employee about it.

Escalation

If the parties involved in a conflict cannot come to a resolution, the conflict may escalate. When a conflict escalates, it may draw more people into the situation, heightening any already existing tension. Louis Kriesberg, the founding director of the Program on the Analysis and Resolution of Conflicts, describes the escalation stage as intense and notes that during this stage people pick sides and view their opponents as the enemy.

Escalation of conflict generally lasts a long time, but can also end quickly. Once conflicts escalate for awhile, participants often reach a stalemate: a situation in which neither side can win, but neither side wants to back down or accept loss either. Stalemates emerge for a number of reasons: failed tactics, depletion of available resources to fuel the conflict, or a reduction in support of the conflict by one or more of those involved. In other cases, the conflict has been latent for so long that the triggering event usually leads to a violent resolution.

During the “Felt Stage” stress and anxiety are felt by one or more of the participants due to the conflict, the manager does not enjoy causing conflict and the employee does not enjoy being under scrutiny.

Stalemate

Stalemate is the most intense stage and arises out of a conflict escalating. During the stalemate stage, the conflict has spiraled out of control to a point where neither side is in a position to defend their position; By this point, participants are not willing to back down from their stances, and each side insists that its beliefs are ultimately right. Even in a situation where a member of one side feels that there may be merit in the other and an unwillingness to admit it because of a need to protect interests and, as Kriesberg describes it, save face.

De-Escalation

Even the most intense conflicts calm down at some point, as one or more of the persons involved in the conflict realize they are likely to reach a conclusion if they continue with their unwillingness to look at the conflict from all sides. During this stage, parties begin to negotiate and consider coming up with a solution.

De-escalation inevitably arrives when the fuel is spent. It is impossible for conflict to sustain itself indefinitely and one side or the other will concede so that resolution may be reached. Once de-escalation is complete, the settlement, or resolution, phase begins where the dominant party to the conflict makes concessions to placate the non-dominant party. The key to this requires one to sacrifice a little to ensure conflict does not return. Usually when conflict is settled, neither party is truly happy, but neither party is still aggrieved. The important part of conflict resolution is ensuring that both parties can continue working or existing in harmony. If this cannot be achieved, then the conflict has not been resolved fully. The final part of the five steps of conflict resolution that can complete the process is peace-building. In conflict between only two people, it is much easier to maintain as long as both parties do as agreed upon. With groups it becomes more difficult, but never-the-less can still be done with good, strong leadership and trust-building. The easiest way to instill trust is to use intermediaries so that they may monitor the parties and police the situation. It must be agreed upon and mutually enforced to work effectively.

Settlement or Resolution

After hearing from all parties involved in the conflict, participants are sometimes able to come up with a resolution for the problem they are facing. As a business owner, you may have to work with the involved parties to settle the conflict amicably by shifting the focus to really important.

Peace Building and Reconciliation

If the parties reach a solution, necessary to repair the relationships that may have been damaged during the escalated conflict. Likely the participants used harsh words while in the midst of the conflict.

The final stage is the “Aftermath Stage,” which takes place when there is some outcome of the conflict, such as a resolution to, or dissolution of, the problem. When the manager corrects the mistake with the customer and takes appropriate steps to ensure the server is more careful in the future.

Most of the time, recognizing and addressing issues that cause conflict will lead to a fast and effective resolution. The problem lies in the fact that solutions are not always so easy. This is why it is important to recognize the signs of conflict as early as possible so that they may be addressed. People must be Democratic and address their differences of opinion openly and without fear of misunderstandings. If problems are not addressed then conflict can move from latent to “manifest”, “erupted”, or “emerging” stages of conflict.

With all of these ways to fight conflict and achieve peace one might wonder, “How is it that we are so prone to war?” The answer is simple. People are not educated in conflict resolution and negotiation enough to recognize conflict early or they just do not care. Let us hope that it is the former.

Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is generally classified into at least four types: negotiation, mediation, collaborative law, and arbitration. (Sometimes a fifth type, conciliation, is included as well, but for present purposes it can be regarded as a form of mediation. See

conciliation for further details.) ADR can be used alongside existing legal systems such as sharia courts within common law jurisdictions such as the UK.

ADR traditions vary somewhat by country and culture. There are significant common elements which justify a main topic, and each country or region's difference should be delegated to sub-pages.

Alternative Dispute Resolution is of two historic types. First, methods for resolving disputes outside of the official judicial mechanisms. Second, informal methods attached to or pendant to official judicial mechanisms. There are in addition free-standing and or independent methods, such as mediation programs and ombuds offices within organizations. The methods are similar, whether or not they are pendant, and generally use similar tool or skill sets, which are basically sub-sets of the skills of negotiation.

Classic informal methods include social processes, referrals to non-formal authorities (such as a respected member of a trade or social group) and intercession. The major differences between formal and informal processes are (a) pendency to a court procedure and (b) the possession or lack of a formal structure for the application of the procedure.

Finally, it is important to realize that conflict resolution is one major goal of all the ADR processes. If a process leads to resolution, it is a dispute resolution process.^[5]

The salient features of each type are as follows:

1. In negotiation, participation is voluntary and there is no third party who facilitates the resolution process or imposes a resolution.
2. In mediation, there is a third party, a mediator, who facilitates the resolution process (and may even suggest a resolution, typically known as a "mediator's proposal"), but does *not* impose a resolution on the parties.
3. In collaborative law or collaborative divorce, each party has an attorney who facilitates the resolution process within specifically contracted terms. The parties reach agreement with support of the attorneys (who are trained in the process) and mutually-agreed

experts. No one imposes a resolution on the parties. However, the process is a formalized process that is part of the litigation and court system. Rather than being an Alternative Resolution methodology it is a litigation variant that happens to rely on ADR like attitudes and processes.

4. In arbitration, participation is typically voluntary, and there is a third party who, as a private judge, imposes a resolution. Arbitrations often occur because parties to contracts agree that any future dispute concerning the agreement will be resolved by arbitration.

Benefits

ADR has been increasingly used internationally, both alongside and integrated formally into legal systems, in order to capitalise on the typical advantages of ADR over litigation:

-) Suitability for multi-party disputes
-) Flexibility of procedure - the process is determined and controlled by the parties to the dispute
-) Lower costs
-) Less complexity ("less is more")
-) Parties choice of neutral third party (and therefore expertise in area of dispute) to direct negotiations/adjudicate
-) Likelihood and speed of settlements
-) Practical solutions tailored to parties' interests and needs (not rights and wants,as they may perceive them)
-) Durability of agreements
-) Confidentiality
-) The preservation of relationships and the preservation of reputations

Country-specific examples

India

Alternative dispute resolution in India is not new and it was in existence even under the previous Arbitration Act, 1940. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has been enacted to accommodate the harmonisation mandates of UNCITRAL Model. Due to extremely slow judicial process, there has been a big thrust on Alternate Dispute Resolution mechanisms in India. While Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a fairly standard western approach towards ADR, the Lok Adalat system constituted under National Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 is a uniquely Indian approach.

Conflict Management: An approach to conflict whereby parties can develop protocols or arrangements for preventing disputes from occurring and pre-determine the range of appropriate responses to conflict should one arise. Conflict Management implies the ability to control a particular conflict or class of conflicts and the effects through either individual skill or institutional mechanisms. It combines conflict analysis with attempts to control the dynamics of the conflict to yield the most positive organizational and personal growth and change. This may involve the use of a variety of dispute processing and conflict resolution mechanisms.

Conflict Management System Design and Consultation: Conflict management design extends and applies theory and best practice concepts to the specific area of organizational conflict. Conflict management design draws from the full range of OD theory and practice, particularly systems thinking, change intervention design, search processes, relationship building, strategic redesign and implementation, and action learning for improved conflict management systems development.

Conflict Prevention: Study and practice of means by which to prevent the incompatibilities of interests and behavior that constitute conflict. In this sense, conflict refers to the broader state of incompatibility that may or may not give rise to a dispute. Conflict prevention is more narrowly focused than Conflict Management and often involves structural adjustments such as legislation (for example, no-fault laws) or generic solutions (such as clarification of company policy or gender-sensitivity training).

Conflict Resolution: Study and practice of means by which to end the incompatibilities of interests and behavior that constitute conflict. In this sense, it refers to a professional field and academic discipline concerned with the nature of generic conflict (as opposed to a specific conflict) and with productive techniques to address conflict. Also, the term may be used to refer to an activity ("the parties are engaged in conflict resolution").

Dispute Management System (DMS): Institutionalized framework of handling disputes within an organization. The design of a DMS involves examining the causes of disputing within an organization and then creating a process for constructively managing disputes as they arise. Also called Dispute Resolution System.

Dispute Resolution: Study and practice of resolving disputes. Although the range of possible dispute-handling processes is quite broad, including war and avoidance, the field of dispute resolution is primarily focused on Alternative Dispute Resolution processes, especially mediation and arbitration.

Early Neutral Evaluation: A non-binding process, typically required under the relevant rules of court, wherein the parties and their counsel meet shortly after the initiation of a court proceeding and confidentially present the factual and legal bases of their cases to each other and a third-party lawyer experienced in the substantive area. The third party identifies issues, assesses the strengths of the cases, structures a plan for the progress of the case, and if requested by the parties, may encourage settlement.

Facilitation: "Facilitation" is the use of a third party neutral to help multi-party work groups accomplish the content of their work by providing process leadership and process expertise. Facilitation and mediation are similar, but in the most elementary way, they are drastically different. Facilitation is primarily used pre-conflict or at least pre-crystallized conflict.

Fact Finding: Fact-finding is a form of inquisitive dispute resolution in which an investigation is conducted by an appointed neutral third party. Evidence supporting the positions of the parties is gathered with a view to identifying and focusing attention on the major issues in dispute and resolving differences as to the facts surrounding them. The underlying objective of fact-finding is to generate insight into the opposing views on the issues in dispute. A determination is made as

to what are the facts of the issues and the extent of the reasonableness of the parties' positions in relation to those facts. A written report may be issued which typically is not binding on the disputants at this stage, but it may be used later in a different process such as arbitration. The written report may simply record the facts as found, or it may include recommendations for settlement. The recommendations are non-binding; otherwise the process would be better called arbitration. This technique is very often used to investigate allegations harassment or discrimination.

Mediation: Mediation has been defined as the use of a neutral third party to facilitate discussion about mutually acceptable options to resolve a dispute. There are many definitions of mediation but in the simplest form, mediation consists of assisted negotiation. The process can involve legal counsel. As in arbitration, the process can be court-annexed.

Negotiation: Any discussions or dealings wherein parties with opposing interests seek to establish areas of agreement, settlement, or compromise so as to manage and ultimately resolve their dispute. This does not include methods or resolution that entail arbitration or any judicial process. Negotiations can be principled. This occurs when the parties, rather than focusing on their "positions," deal with the underlying issues, seek to appreciate the needs of the other party, and try to achieve an agreement based on objective standards.

Ombudsperson: An independent person or office that deals with complaints against perceived administrative, governmental, or organizational injustice. Typically Ombuds have the power to refer disputes to the appropriate process, investigate and occasionally to publicize and/or monitor trends. Ombuds also mediate and may make non-binding recommendations. Ombuds may be characterized as organizational or traditional (i.e. the Ombudsman of Ontario) depending on the mandate and constituency served.

Partnering: Partnering establishes working relationship through a mutually developed formal strategy of commitment and communication. Originally designed to facilitate efficient completion of large construction projects, Partnering refers to process, which allows a group of individual to meet and relate as equals in order to gain mutual understanding of roles a responsibilities and to buy in to common goals. The facilitator moves the parties through a

structured process to identify, examine and prioritize potential challenges and to jointly develop a preventive dispute resolution mechanism. Partnering does not change contractual agreements, but may result in a mutually agreed Charter or guideline of collaborative objectives that defines the parties' preferred working relationship.

Unit VI

Globalization and politics

The rise of industrial state has led to what is referred to as global industrial or globalization, the impact of industrialization and its socioeconomic, political and cultural consequences on the non industrial societies of the world. Globalization created substantial interconnection between the western and non-western world. The globalization process began with the expiration of colonialism. Globalization continues to occur present through the including electronic communications, television and internet and expansion of multinational corporations into the nonwestern world.

Social scientists developed three basic models for the understanding of the process of globalization.

1. Modernization theory: Education and change in cultural values as a prerequisite for economic and social change. They also introduce as 1st, 2nd and 3rd worlds.
2. Dependency theory which developed with the critics of modernization theory; they view global change is a relation between the industrialists societies and underdeveloped pre-capitalist societies. They focus on the expansion of capitalist world economy and political dominating to underdeveloped world.
3. World system theory which divides the world into core, peripheral and semi-peripheral nations based on economic criteria. World change depends on interconnection among different societies.

Globalization has direct effect on non-state societies. Ever since industrialization began forgers, tribes and chiefdom societies have undergone rapid change. Among the negative consequences of globally induced change are depopulation, deculturation, disintegration of social communities, and in some cases genocide.

Not surprisingly, there is little agreement about what globalization means. In the popular mind, and among some academics, globalization suggests homogenization, usually Westernization, of culture; most anthropologists, on the contrary, tend to emphasize differentiation and fragmentation as expressed in nationalisms, ethnicities, and diaspora communities. Some take a skeptical, so-what's-the-big-deal approach, seeing globalization more as media hype than a real issue, whereas others consider globalization to be the most significant cultural, political, and economic force of our time. Some view globalization in evolutionary terms as part of the gradual process of the working out of the internal dynamics of capitalism, whereas others take the position that globalization represents something entirely new, a quantum leap from what has gone before. There are enough facts and statistics to support the gamut of opinion; thus, no resolution to these conflicts can be expected.

No matter how globalization is conceived, one must come to terms with the fact that the present phase of globalization is characterized by neoliberal economics. “*Neoliberal*” aside, this is a politically and economically *conservative* ideology of the free market that was given its popular articulation by President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at the 1983 economic summit in Cancun, Mexico. At the time, the economies of the vast majority of Third World countries, including the newly industrializing tigers of Southeast Asia, were characterized by extensive government intervention, state-owned industries, import substitution policies, price controls, subsidies on food and energy, laws strongly regulating multinational investment, and an emphasis on domestic development over integration into the world economy. The extremely rapid shift to neoliberal policies that took place mainly in the mid-1980s and especially after 1990 was, to a great extent, due to two major factors: the massive Third World debt crisis and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

A major contributor to the debt crisis was the oil price increases that emerged from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) takeover from British and American oil companies in retaliation for their support of Israel in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Enormous increases in the price of oil, combined with the promise of rapid economic development, led to extensive borrowing. Petrodollars flowing into the Middle East were recycled to private banks

and multilateral lending institutions that, in turn, spread the wealth generously at floating interest rates.

In order to keep from defaulting when the economic bubble burst in the 1980s, Third World countries turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for loans that would help them pay off the interest on the debt (forget ever paying down on the principle). This placed in the hands of the IMF the power to regulate Third World economies through “contingency contracts”; the money would be doled out as countries made the proper neoliberal “structural adjustments,” namely, selling off state-owned industries, doing away with subsidies and price controls, reducing tariffs, floating currencies, and opening investment to multinational corporations. In other words, economies shifted from a domestic focus to a global focus. Until 1990, the Soviet Union provided an alternate ideology, mostly for a small group of the poorest countries in the world, but the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic removed the last vestige of serious opposition to global neoliberalism.

Thus, the present phase of globalization might be defined as the increasing flow of trade, finance, culture, ideas, and people brought about by the sophisticated technology of communications and travel, and by the worldwide spread of neoliberal capitalism. Any anthropological definition would also have to include the local-level resistances and adaptations to these processes (Lewellen 2002).

Instruments of Globalization

There are many instruments by which globalization is being promoted and enhanced. But the most important instruments influencing this process are the multinational corporations and the new revolution of information technology.

- J) Multinational corporations are main instruments of globalization. They possess huge capitals and assets. As profit maximizers, they establish their factors in many developing countries where cheap workers and raw materials are found. Because of their size and their contributions to national economies in terms of taxes and employments, they influence decision-making processes in those countries. Once they established, none has the ability to stop them from withdrawing their investments or moving their capitals from

country to another whenever it is in their advantage to do so. In spite of their contributions, the given privileges are not without price. Their activities usually leave serious effects on many host economies; they even sometime create civil unrests. This is because these companies control not only markets, but also peoples (Wooldridge and Micklethwait, 2000).

- J) New Information Technology, which is a product of the industrial revolution, is another instrument of globalization. Its aspects, in particular the Internet and multimedia, remarkably contribute to the spread of globalization due to their rapidity, easiness and availability. In spite of its huge benefits, the revolution is still possessed and controlled by some advanced nations, which might use it as a means of cultural influence and informational hegemony.

Globalization and Political Anthropology

The influence of postmodern concepts of power have had a profound impact on anthropological approaches to globalization. Whereas previously, power was conceived as centered in the state or in individual leaders, globalization may be giving way to variants of Gramsci's notion of *hegemony* as deriving from consent of the people to domination by a ruling elite. This hegemony is usually considered to be Western, manifested through global institutions such as the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, the IMF, and multinational corporations. Such a notion is often explicitly or tacitly combined with a Foucaultian sense of surveillant disciplinary power that is inherent in discourse and suffused through social institutions, such as development organizations. Conventional views that power is a matter of state monopoly on the legitimate use of force are flatly rejected. Rather, the state and its bureaucracies are only intermediate points of a power that are suffused through society, embedded in knowledge systems and in the institutions that dominate such knowledge (Foucault 1977, 1980). Such subtle analyses may reveal previously unanalyzed sources of power, but also may tend to underrate, trivialize, obfuscate, or ignore altogether more conventional manifestations of blatant guns-and-money power.

There are several other ways in which globalization awareness is bringing about significant reconceptualizations of the subject matter and theoretical perspectives of political anthropology. Among the most important are:

- The increasing diffusion and distancing of power, which is becoming invested in the closed deliberations of global lending institutions, multinational corporations, policy-making councils, and trade organizations, none of which are accessible to popular input except via the street theater of protest.
- The decline of state-centered authority with a concomitant shift of power not only to such global groups as those above, but also to local, regional, and international nongovernmental organizations.
- The widespread democratization that has accompanied neoliberal economics, especially during the 1990s, when numerous individual and one-party dictatorships gave way to at least the simulacrum of popular participation. Such democracies, which often legitimize rather than challenge inequities of wealth and power, should not be expected to function in the same way as in countries with long traditions of parliamentary government.
- The emergence of ethnic nationalisms and other interest groups that have come into existence as adaptations to or defenses against globalization.
- The transnationalization and deterritorialization of power, as the “long-distance nationalism” of diaspora communities increasingly influences home policies.
- The emergence of powerful illegal politico-economic groups such as narcotics cartels and of only marginally ideological rebels, such as those focused on the diamond trade in Africa.
- The normalization of nonstate terrorism as a primary means of warfare. Some of these issues have been dealt with elsewhere in this book. Two issues are focused on here: the decline of the centrality of the nation-state and the deterritorialization of the state through the process of transnationalism.

The Decline of the State

Many anthropologists see, as a primary aspect of globalization, the decline or demise of the current state-centric system, in which dominant power is vested in national governments. Both multinational corporations and global economic institutions assume many of the powers over the economy once concentrated in state hands. Political scientist Samuel Huntington (1996) postulates that power is shifting from states to broad international “civilizations,” such as Western, Islamic, and Latin American. In addition, the growth of regional political and economic institutions—OPEC, North American Free Trade Agreement, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and the European Community—are further evidence of the ultimate demise of the state.

Transnationalism and the DE territorialized State

Transnationalism is a relatively new phenomenon that emerges from a flexible global labor market, from the technology for instantaneous communications such as satellite phone systems and e-mail, and the speed and relative inexpensiveness of long-distance transportation. Basically, transnationalism is the process of living across borders, in two or more countries at the same time. This gives rise to a curious form of hybrid identity in which assimilation in the country of settlement is no longer a goal; cultural maintenance within a diaspora community, reinforced by routine contact with the home country, can be maintained over generations. Most important, transnationals often continue to actively participate in their home country politics and may even occupy a protected niche of opposition against repressive governments as, for example, Chinese and Tibetan expatriate communities do in the United States.

The collapse of the Soviet Union has led to the US control of the global system and international relations. This provides the US with many opportunities to defend its own national interests globally and to challenge international legitimacy through marginalizing the role of the United Nations and ignoring the international law. Power and interests become the main characteristics of interstate interactions.

Some resistance on globalization

1. The development of nationalist, ethnic and anti-colonial movement in developing countries
2. The development of revitalization movement to resist globalization
3. The development of Islamic movement as revitalization movement

TOWARD THE FUTURE

The journey from Evans-Pritchard's *The Nuer* to postmodern studies of globalization is long and convoluted, but there is a certain logical inevitability to it. From its beginnings in relatively closed-system analyses of folk cultures, political anthropology has spread outward in every direction; there has been an increase in complexity and scope, in relation both to theory and to the societies studied. Predictably, this has led not only to greater breadth and depth in political studies, but also to increasing fragmentation. Once relatively cohesive, today political anthropology might be broken down into traditional (materialist, social scientific), post-modern, and synthetic theoretical approaches. Subject matter can be sub-divided into identity politics, the state, gender, war and conflict, leadership, postcolonialism, globalization, and probably much more. Although such fragmentation might be the bane of writers of overview works (such as this one), it is also a healthy sign.

Predictions of the future have the agreeable attribute of being almost always wrong. However, certain trends are in evidence. One major trend is that the best ideas of postmodern theory—the fluidity of culture, the permeability of boundaries, the situatedness of the ethnographic observer—are being synthesized with the social *science* demands of more traditional anthropology. Globalization is another inevitable trend; political anthropologists simply cannot treat power as they did in the past, as manifest at purely local or state level. Beyond that, world realities will determine the direction of the political anthropology of the future: terrorism and the response to it; global warming; the shifting role of the state; the emergence of new forms of political mobilization; and, most important, that which we cannot even foresee today. Whatever these realities may be, political anthropology has developed the found.