Studies in Public Choice

Daniela Giannetti
Bernard Grofman
Editors

A Natural
Experiment

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A Natural Experiment on Electoral Law Reform

Evaluating the Long Run Consequences of
1990s Electoral Reform in Italy and Japan

Springer

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For more than a decade, the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) at the University of California, Irvine (UCI), founded by Russell Dalton, has been sponsoring cumulative research on comparative electoral systems. One of its signature projects has been the set of five volumes and one journal mini symposium covering the major (families of) electoral systems listed below, discussing the following topics, respectively: the single nontransferable vote, the single transferable vote, mixed member systems, list PR systems, runoff systems, and plurality systems. Each publication has been the end product of a CSD conference held at UCI or in another country.

1. B. Grofman, Sung-Chull Lee, Edwin Winckler, and Brian Woodall (eds.), *Elections under the Single Non-Transferable Vote in Japan, Korea and Taiwan*. University of Michigan Press, 1999.
2. S. Bowler and B. Grofman (eds.), *Elections under the Single Transferable Vote in Australia, Ireland and Malta*. University of Michigan Press, 2000.
3. M. Shugart and M. Wattenberg (eds.), *Mixed Member Systems: The Best of Both Possible Worlds?* Oxford University Press, 2001.
4. B. Grofman and A. Lijphart (eds.), *The Evolution of Electoral and Party Systems in the Nordic Countries*. Agathon Press, 2002.
5. B. Grofman, S. Bowler, and A. Blais (eds.), Minisymposium on Runoff Elections. *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 27, 2008.
6. B. Grofman, S. Bowler, and A. Blais (eds.), *Duverger's Law in Canada, India, the U.S. and the U.K.* Springer-Verlag, 2008.

We regard natural experiments (such as those that arose from the independently caused, but rather parallel in structure, changes in electoral laws in Japan and Italy discussed in this volume), on the one hand, and laboratory and field experiments on voting methods, on the other, as powerful and complementary tools for developing a more realistic understanding of the independent effects of electoral laws.

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Chapter 1
Introduction: Long-Run Consequences of Electoral Rules Change: Comparing Italy and Japan

Bernard Grofman and Daniela Giannetti

In the modern era, representation is the hallmark of democracy, and electoral rules structure how representation works and how effectively governments perform. Moreover, of the key structural variables in constitutional design,[1] it is the choice of electoral system that is usually the most open to change.

We can identify three different approaches in electoral system research. One, associated largely with economics but also characteristic of the research agendas of a number of political scientists, involves the formal study of electoral system effects through the deductive method, using mathematical tools ranging from set theory, to topology, to statistics, to game theory to derive theorems about the properties of voting methods or about the equilibrium behavior of voters and parties. A second, associated largely with political science but recently also involving a number of economists, has a primarily empirical focus and looks in depth at how electoral rules have an impact on political outcomes, either by conducting large cross-sectional studies of real-world data, or focusing on particular cases – including before-and-after analysis of what happens when electoral systems change. A third, and more recent, tradition, inspired largely by work in experimental economics but also including political scientists, involves experimentation, either in the form of controlled laboratory experiments or in the form of in situ field studies. In each case, electoral rules are allowed to vary, and the consequences of different rules for outcomes are delineated. Experiments are usually designed to test expectations derived from either formal models of electoral rule effects or intuitions derived from observing how electoral rules appear to operate in various natural settings.

The chapters in this book fall largely into the second tradition. They are intended to take advantage of an unusual "natural experiment" in electoral system change. In the

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[1] These key modes of governance include the dimension anchored by (con)federal arrangements at one end and unitary forms of government at the other and the dimension of choice anchored by a unitary directly elected executive with strong powers at one end and a parliamentary system in which the executive is chosen by the parliament at the other.

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early 1990s, major electoral reforms[2] took place in both Italy and Japan. Each replaced a form of proportional representation (list PR in Italy and the single, nontransferable vote in Japan) with a mixed-member (MM) system. In Japan, the new mixed system was what is called in the electoral systems literature an mixed member majoritarian (MMM) system, that is, one without any linkage between the single member district (SMD) and the PR component. In Italy also the system behaved for most practical purposes much more like an MMM system than like a system in which outcomes in SMDs might be "compensated for" by what happened in the proportional component of the mixed system (i.e., what is called in the electoral systems literature an mixed member proportional (MMP) system). However, in one country, Japan, the MMD system put in place is still in place, with only relatively minor modifications, while in the other country, Italy, there was a reversion, after three elections, to a new electoral method – one that looked in some ways like the old PR system that was replaced in the 1990s but in other ways had a strong majoritarian flavor.

The power of this natural experiment to inform our understanding of electoral system effects is enhanced by the fact that these two countries, prior to their electoral reforms, had party systems characterized by a single party that had exhibited a long-term dominance for much of the history of the nation after World War II (i.e., Liberal Democratic Party [LDP] in Japan and the Christian Democrats [DC] in Italy) and were seen as similar in how "money politics" and "factionalized politics" had worked in each. Thus, by comparing the long-run consequences of electoral reform in the two countries we can learn more than if we looked at each country alone.

In the remainder of this chapter, we set the context for the analyses presented in this volume and provide a brief account of the origins of electoral reform in Italy and Japan, followed by a description of the most significant changes in the electoral rules in Italy and Japan since the early 1990s. This is an important first step in order to ensure that all readers understand the "big picture" before proceeding to examine details. Thereafter, we discuss both the expected and actual impact of changing electoral rules in both countries in a summary fashion, drawing both on earlier research and that contained within this volume. The final section of this chapter presents a road map of the book, whose chapters elaborate hypotheses about electoral law impact and trace out in detail the actual nature of the post-reform changes that took place in each country in a comparative perspective with respect to voter choices, party births and deaths, party cleavage structures, proportionality, coalition patterns, and so on.

Origins of Electoral Reform in Italy and Japan

Many effects of electoral systems are relatively well understood and predictable. For example, Reed and Thies (2001a, 172) made the important point that "Political scientists and politicians generally agree on which aspects of electoral systems favor

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[2] We deliberately use the term *reforms* to describe the changes in electoral rules in both Japan and Italy, but we are sensitive to the fact that not all electoral *changes* should be thought of as electoral *reforms*; for example, some may better be thought of as attempts by incumbent politicians or coalitions to cement or accentuate particular forms of partisan advantages.

larger and which favor smaller parties." But, they also noted that, during periods of flux in the party system, especially when parties merge and parties dissolve, it proves much harder to predict whether a group of voters will end up in a small party or a large party. They also said that such uncertainty "can produce rapid strategic shifts and strategic errors." Both in Italy and Japan, changes in the electoral rules were enacted by political elites in the context of divisions within the dominant party, changing patterns of party support, and party splits, thus making their consequences harder to predict.

In discussing the processes of electoral reform in Italy and Japan, the previous literature stressed both similarities and country-specific features. Among the common features, a series of corruption scandals involving political elites and increasing public dissatisfaction with the political system has been generally taken as a set of prior conditions that engendered the reform process. These may be interpreted as *inherent* features, or symptoms of political system failures, creating the preconditions for reform (Shugart 2005). In both countries, the electoral system was widely blamed for contributing to a lack of accountability of political representatives, absence of alternation of parties in government, clientelism, and corruption.

Italy (1947–1993)

Since the foundation of the republic in 1947, Italy had used an almost pure form of PR for electing both the Chamber (the lower house) and the Senate. For electing the Chamber, a two-tier list PR system was in place. The lower tier was based on 31 multimember districts within which seats were allocated by the Imperiali formula. Votes and seats not used in this tier were transferred to the nationwide upper tier, for which a further allocation of seats occurred using the Hare formula. Only lists that had gained both a full quotient in one of the districts and 300,000 votes at the national level were eligible for second-tier seat allocation. Voters had at their disposal three or four preference votes, depending on the size of the district. The electoral system for the Senate was partially different, but in practice it yielded the same proportional results (D'Alimonte 2005; see also the appendices in this volume).

The popular demand for reform ensured that the issue of electoral reform entered the political agenda. However, the process of electoral reform cannot be explained without looking at both institutional conditions and strategic calculations and incentives of political elites. The constitutional provision of popular referendum was a powerful weapon in the hands of the pro-reform political movement, led by a Christian Democrat (DC) party called Mario Segni. Given that in Italy referendums can only abrogate existing legislation, the changes were "sneaked in" by repealing existing rules for electing the Chamber and the Senate.

The 1991 referendum was successful in reducing to one the number of preferential votes available to voters for electing deputies to the (lower) Chamber. The 1993 referendum radically changed the rules for electing the Senate by abolishing the 65% threshold a candidate had to pass in order to be elected in single member districts. Both referendums were approved by an overwhelming majority of voters.

The results of the second referendum forced the Italian parliament to pass a comprehensive electoral law on August 3, 1993. This electoral law, drafted by a DC deputy called Sergio Mattarella, was a compromise among parliamentary parties (Katz 2001). While a mixed system appeared to be the most preferred option of most parties, the DC initial proposal had a stronger majoritarian component. Minor parties gained considerable leverage in the final compromise, with the result that the plurality component of the new law was seriously weakened. The largest opposition party (i.e., the former Communist Party, known at this point as The Democratic Socialist Party (PDS)) seems to have played no leading role in the legislative process as it lacked a clear stance on the question of electoral reform (Pappalardo 1995). In the end, only the DC among the larger parties voted in favor of the new law. The PDS abstained, while minor parties either abstained or voted against the reform (with the exception of the Northern League and part of the Socialist Party).

Japan (1947–1994)

Since 1947, Japan had used the single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system to elect the members of the House of Representatives. Under SNTV, each voter cast one ballot for an individual candidate. If the voter's first choice did not need the vote because the candidate was either a sure winner or a sure loser, the vote was wasted – it could not be transferred to the voter's second choice. Because the district magnitude was typically between three and five, a majority-seeking party was obliged to nominate at least two candidates per district. Because votes were not transferable, copartisan candidates competed directly for support. The main "pathology" of the Japanese electoral system was the intraparty competition it generated, which in turn was blamed for money-based and personalistic electoral politics (Reed and Scheiner 2001a, 155).

The history of electoral reform in Japan is marked by several attempts at reforming the system, even before the formation of the LDP in 1955. However, because the smaller parties were consistently able to win some seats under SNTV, they resisted attempts by the LDP to reform the system in a more majoritarian fashion, the direction always proposed by all Japanese governments led by the LDP between 1955 and 1993. In 1993, the LDP suffered a split and for the first time lost to a reformist coalition mainly composed of former LDP members. One of the coalition's main priorities was to change the electoral system. After an initial defeat in the Diet's upper house and an increase in single member seats at the request of the LDP, in 1994 the non-LDP coalition approved a new electoral system. As several observers noted, the split within the LDP and the consequent loss of its majority status created a new strategic environment that made electoral reform possible.

Actually, the reform enacted in 1994 was not very different from the one proposed by the LDP under the Kaifu administration in 1991. Both had 300 SMDs. The 1991 proposal had 171 PR seats and one national PR constituency, while the 1994 law had 200 PR seats and 11 regional constituencies. Given that smaller district magnitudes tend to favor larger parties, the anti-LDP parties ended up legislating for a system less attractive for themselves (see Di Virgilio and Kato's Chap. 2 in this volume).

To sum, both in Italy and Japan political elites were forced to change the electoral law in a way that seems only partially coherent with their electoral interests. This was because they both faced a choice between enacting some reform or no reform at all.

Continuing the Process of Reform?

While in the following decade the electoral system in Japan remained substantially untouched, Italy changed the electoral rules again in 2005. The issue of reform was kept on the political agenda by the leaders of the 1993 pro-reform movement. These reformers promoted two referendums in 1999 and 2000 whose goal was to abolish the proportional tier for electing the Chamber. However, these referendums had no impact on subsequent changes because both initiatives failed due to low voter turn-out in which minimum referendum participation thresholds were not attained. The 2005 electoral law was drafted and approved by the incumbent right-wing govern-ment majority just a few months before the election, with lack of consensus of any opposition party.

The 2005 electoral reform in Italy occurred within the context of a more structured party system, and after a "learning phase" had made the consequences of the previous electoral rules fully appreciated by all parties. One of the main effects of the 1993 electoral system was the formation of large pre-electoral cartels. The new law crystal-lized this element in a strong way, and at the same time it reduced the costs (in terms of seats allocated to minor allies) that larger parties previously had to face in the pre-electoral bargaining (see Di Virgilio and Kato's Chap. 2 in this volume).

Changes in the Electoral Rules in Italy and Japan

In this section, we briefly describe the main changes in the electoral rules in Italy and Japan (see the appendices for details). Because Italy has a "perfect" or sym-metrical bicameral system, a brief account of the rules for electing both the Chamber and the Senate is outlined next. Thereafter, attention switches to electoral reform enacted in Japan in 1994.

Electoral Reform in Italy, 1993

For electing the lower Chamber (630 members), Italy was divided into 26 multi-member constituencies (plus the small region of Valle D'Aosta, which always has only one seat). In turn, each constituency was divided into a number of single member districts approximately equal to 75% of the seats assigned to them. The remaining 25% were allocated on the basis of party lists and by PR using the LR-Hare formula.

Candidates could run in both tiers. All SMD candidates had to be endorsed by one or more PR list. The reverse was not true as PR lists did not need to endorse

SMD candidates. Voters cast two ballots: the first for a candidate in their district, the second for a list in their constituency. No preferential voting was allowed in the PR tier. The allocation of PR seats was a two-stage process as it took place first at the national level. In order to get seats, parties had to receive at least 4% of the national vote. Subsequently, seats were allocated to each party in the different constituencies. The plurality and PR tiers were linked in several ways. The most important of them was a mechanism of negative vote transfers (*scorporo*). With this vote reapportioning mechanism, for each plurality seat won a party saw its PR total vote at the constituency level reduced by the number of votes (plus one) received by the second placed candidate in the single member district where the party had won a seat. Only after the scorporo had been implemented were votes allocated into seats.

For electing the Senate, Italy was divided into 20 regional constituencies, two of which had no PR seats (Valle D'Aosta and Molise). Unlike the Chamber, the only candidates were those running in the 232 SMDs. Voters cast only one vote for an SMD candidate, and the 83 PR seats were assigned by means of a *repechage* mechanism on a regional basis. Each party's share of the list seats in a regional constituency was allocated to the "best losers" among its SMD candidates. The PR seats were assigned at the constituency level using the d'Hondt formula. While there was no legal threshold for participating in the distribution of PR seats, the d'Hondt formula combined with the small district magnitude of most constituencies made it hard for small- or medium-size parties or coalitions to gain PR seats. The scorporo reallocation rule also operated in Senate elections, for which it was used through subtracting from a group's total vote all the votes received by those candidates affiliated to the group that had won SMD seats in a constituency. Thus, there was a greater correction compared to the Chamber of the disproportionality associated with the plurality formula.

To summarize, the main differences among the rules for electing members to the Chamber and Senate had to do with to the ballot structure, the allocation of PR seats, and the mechanism of negative vote transfer.

Electoral Reform in Italy, 2005

The 2005 electoral reform abolished SMDs by reintroducing closed-list PR with a seat bonus. For electing the Chamber, Italy is divided into 26 multimember constituencies encompassing the whole national territory. A number of seats proportional to the population are assigned to each constituency, yielding a total of 617 seats (one additional seat in the small Valle d'Aosta regional constituency is allocated by plurality, and the remaining 12 seats are allocated by PR in the newly established "Overseas" Constituencies). To obtain seats, the following thresholds must be passed on a *national basis.*

- Minimum 4% for a party list.
- Minimum 10% for a coalition.
- Minimum 2% for a party joining a coalition that passes the 10% threshold. However, the best loser is also assigned seats.

Coalitions are formed by party lists that registered a common electoral platform and indicated a coalition leader (Article 14 of the Electoral Law). In short, to gain seats, parties have to pass a lower threshold if they join pre-electoral coalitions.

The mechanism for seat allocation works as follows: First, the total vote shares of coalitions and independent party lists are calculated at the national level, and seats are allocated proportionally to them. If a coalition or a party list obtains 340 or more seats, no seat bonus will be given. If a coalition or party list obtains a plurality but has less than 340 seats, it will be assigned additional seats to reach this number, corresponding roughly to a 54% majority. The remaining 277 seats are allocated proportionally to other coalitions and party lists.

After the number of seats due to a coalition has been established, seats are allocated proportionally among coalition partners. Only party lists that obtained at least 2% of the votes are assigned seats (seats are also assigned to the "best loser"). Candidates are elected according to the order that they appear on party lists (no preference voting is allowed).

In short, the mechanism described checks first if a coalition or a party list has obtained an absolute majority of about 54%. If this is not the case, a seat bonus is allocated to generate such a majority.

The electoral system for the Senate works in a similar way in 17 regional constituencies (in three regions different systems are used). The procedure is like the one for electing the Chamber, with important differences. Seats are allocated proportionally to coalitions and party lists that pass the relevant vote thresholds. These thresholds are (a) 20% for coalitions, (b) 3% for parties joining a coalition whose total vote share is at least 20%, and (c) an 8% threshold if a party decides to run independently or joins a coalition that does not pass the 20% threshold.

The main difference between electing the Chamber and the Senate is that seats for electing the Senate are allocated to coalitions and party lists at the regional level, and the seat bonus is attributed on a regional basis. The most important consequence of this provision is that there is no guarantee for a coalition or party list obtaining the largest number of votes at the national level to obtain an absolute majority of the seats in the Senate (see electoral results for both Chambers in the appendices for details).

Electoral Reform in Japan, 1994

The Japanese Diet has two chambers, the House of Representatives (the lower house), elected for a 4-year term, and the House of Councilors (the upper house), made up of 232 members elected for a 6-year term with elections for half of the councilors held every 3 years (see Appendix A, Table A.4 for details about rules employed for electing members to Japan's upper chamber).

The electoral system approved in 1994 changed the rules for electing members of the House of Representatives. It combined 300 seats from an equivalent number

of SMDs and 200 seats elected by PR from party lists in 11 regional multi-member constituencies (this provision was modified in 2000 by reducing the number of PR seats from 200 to 180). Constituency magnitude varies from 7 to 33 seats. Voters cast two votes: a candidate vote in an SMD and a vote for a party that registers a list of candidates in the region. The allocation of plurality and PR seats proceeds independently: Each party receives its "proportional" share in each list-tier district plus as many SMDs seats as it wins outright. For allocating PR seats, the d'Hondt formula is used.

The only connection between the two tiers is double candidacy. That is, a candidate may run simultaneously in an SMD and on a party list provided that the SMD is within the PR constituency. A candidate who fails to win in the SMDs might still earn a seat if ranked high enough on the PR list. This opens up various strategic possibilities for candidates and parties (Reed and Thies 2001b, 400–402; see also Chap. 4 by Di Virgilio and Reed in this volume). For example, parties can nominate several double candidates as the same rank of the PR list, with the tie broken by a best loser calculation, that is, awarding PR seats to those candidates who come closest to winning their SMDs. All dual candidates who share the same list position and who lose in their SMDs are reranked on the party list according to the ratio of their plurality vote total to their SMDs winner's vote total. A candidate's chances of being saved in the list tier is therefore a direct function of how close the candidate came to winning the SMD outright.

Expected Impact and Actual Consequences of Electoral System Change in Italy and Japan

There are four ways in which we commonly measure the impact of earthquakes: (a) magnitude on the Richter scale, (b) monetary value of property damage, (c) time lost from work, and (d) loss of life. Each of these can be thought of as having a corresponding aspect vis-à-vis the measurement of the impact of change in electoral rules: (a) formal magnitude of the change – from major change (e.g., in the voting rule family as in a change from plurality to PR); to more moderate change, such as change in district magnitude within an existing PR system; to seemingly more minor change in the details of the system as it may affect candidacies and campaigning (e.g., a change in campaign finance rules); (b) a post-change restructuring of the party system, with some parties going out of business or being severely damaged and (eventually) new parties coming into being; (c) time lost to figure out how a new system works; (d) retirements or defeats of incumbent politicians that can be linked to the consequences of electoral reform.

By the first of these measures, the changes in both Italy and Japan were major. In both countries, politics after World War II had been characterized by one-party dominance. In Japan, since 1955 the LDP continuously governed the country except for a short period between 1993 and 1994. In Italy, the DC ruled from 1948 to 1992 mostly through multiparty coalitions. In each country, electoral reform was expected

to move the country toward a two-party political system. More than 15 years have passed since these electoral reforms. In Italy, three general elections (1994, 1996, 2001) were held under the 1993 MM system, and two elections have been conducted since 2005 (i.e., the 2006 and 2008 general elections). In Japan, five general elections (1996, 2000, 2003, 2005, and 2009) have been conducted under the MMM system. More details on the results of these elections are given in the following chapters (see also the appendices). Here, it is enough to say that a major restructuring of the party system in the direction of two-party competition occurred in both countries.

In the case of Italy, the DC disintegrated and instead of a two-party system, what emerged was for the most part a two-bloc system. In contrast, in Japan the electoral system change did not initially erode the dominance of the LDP, and some of the most important of the changes in electoral competition in Japan occurring 15 years after the 1994 reforms cannot be clearly attributed to electoral law effects. This is not to downplay the fact that the main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), won a historical electoral victory in August 2009. Moreover, as Di Virgilio and Kato (Chap. 2, this volume) observe, in both countries "mergers, breakups, and the extinction of parties have been the rule since the beginning of the 1990s."

A two-party competition was also intended to be conducive to several effects, such as a decrease in party fragmentation and government instability in Italy or a move from candidate-centered to party-centered electoral politics in Japan. Here again, various indicators show that post-reform changes can only be partially traced back to changes in electoral rules. The most notable example is Italy. Here a reduction in the effective number of parties at the electoral level occurred during the 2008 elections. This was mainly the product of parties' choices where the electoral law was a constant. Prior to the 2008 election, unlike what they had done in the previous election, major party leaders refused to enter into coalition with certain very minor parties. Thus, these parties no longer could benefit from the electoral law provisions allowing a 2% threshold rather than a 4% threshold for parties within coalitions, and this decision by major party leaders helped drive a number of these minor parties out of existence. The options open to parties within the new electoral rules remained the same and determined what was possible, but strategic calculations changed as new information about previous and projected election results under the new rules became available.

In terms of the last measures, there has been a considerable difference in the impact of electoral reform in Italy and Japan, with a far greater impact in Italy than in Japan. But even in Italy, some "old wine" returned in "new bottles." After the 1993 electoral reforms, some lower- to middle-level political figures from the politics of Italy of the late 1980s were (eventually) able to win re-election as candidates of new parties. For this reason, some aspects of Italian political life did not really change. Of course, no electoral change, no matter how extensive, could alter every aspect of how politics works. In a similar vein, while in Japan there has been a move toward a more party-centered electoral politics, as the structuring of the opposition and the 2009 electoral swing showed, some relics of the past survive with no apparent purpose. This seems to be the fate of Japanese factions that had

been the main vehicle to organize electoral campaigns and structure voters' choice under SNTV (see Chap. 5 by Giannetti and Thies, this volume).

Overview of the Chapters

This book has four chapters dealing with particular impacts of electoral rule change. Each looks at data both before and after the electoral reform change within each country and at comparisons between the two countries. Each is co-authored by a specialist in Italian electoral politics (all from the University of Bologna, which has the largest political science department in Italy) and a specialist in Japanese electoral politics (either from a university in Japan or from one of the University of California campuses). Most important, each chapter is written in a genuinely collaborative way, with parallel treatments for each of the countries – not as two disconnected essays on Japan and Italy that just happen to have been glued together.

Aldo Di Virgilio (University of Bologna) and Junko Kato (Tokyo University) write on changes in party competition, especially negotiation dynamics to form pre-election coalitions and post-election cabinet formation; Daniela Giannetti (University of Bologna) and Naoko Tanaguchi (Teikyo University) write on the changes in structure of party support in terms of demography, ideology, and region; Aldo Di Virgilio and Steven Reed (Chuo University, Tokyo) write on candidate selection mechanisms; and Daniela Giannetti and Michael Thies (University of California, Los Angeles) write on intraparty politics. In addition, there is a fifth chapter, by Ethan Scheiner (University of California, Davis) and Filippo Tronconi (University of Bologna), that looks at anticipated and unanticipated consequences of electoral rules changes in the two countries.

To make it easier for the reader to follow the discussion while avoiding repetition of common points and the need to redefine widely used acronyms and terms in each chapter, the authors and editors have also provided three appendices with the electoral data used in common by all the chapters, with specification of electoral rules, listings of election results for both legislative chambers of each country, and information about government coalitions; a fourth appendix identifying the acronyms of the political parties in both countries; and a fifth appendix providing a glossary of basic acronyms and terms used in electoral systems research and some terms unique to Italy or Japan – terms that are found, usually without definition, in some or all of the chapters. In addition, we have provided a single combined reference section for the volume.

The chapters in this volume cumulatively aim to generate a clear picture of the nature of the reforms in each country and of the extent to which each has had a lasting impact. By taking advantage of a natural experiment about electoral law change in Japan and Italy, we can test theories about electoral system effects derived from rational choice models to see whether those models oversimplify a complex reality in ways that vitiate the accuracy of their predictions. By drawing on longitudinal data rather than the cross-sectional analyses common in the empirical literature on electoral system effects – analyses that may suffer from various kinds of selection bias

and omitted variable bias – we can look at causality much more directly. Taken in toto, the five other chapters in this volume answer the question of whether what were clearly dramatic changes in electoral rules in these two countries led to comparably dramatic restructuring of the political arena in line with the expectations of reformers or in ways that might have been anticipated but in fact were not. In short, no electoral change, no matter how massive, could change every facet of how politics operates.

In fact, despite the important parallels between Japan and Italy that make the two countries a natural project for joint study, similar electoral changes appear to have had very different consequences in each, some anticipated, some unanticipated. In each country, the reform was predicted to reduce political corruption, increase electoral accountability, and increase the connection between voters and their representatives. And, the reform was expected to move the country toward a two-party political system. But, in Italy, the DC fell apart, and the pieces were never put back together, while instead of a two-party system, what emerged was largely (although not entirely) a two-bloc, multiparty system, one seemingly further strengthened by the almost complete restructuring of electoral laws again in 2005. This system did, however, allow for alternation in office between two reasonably ideologically distinct, albeit multiparty, blocs. In contrast to the Italian case, Di Virgilio and Kato (Chap. 2, this volume) point out that "the dynamics of the Japanese parties are summarized by … the subsequent decrease in the fragmentation of the party system, and (c) the emerging dynamics of contestation for office between the LDP-centered and the DPJ-centered coalitions. These changes ushered in the formation of the first DPJ-centered coalition government after the 2009 general elections." However, as Di Virgilio and Kato also observe and as mentioned previously in this chapter, in both countries "mergers, breakups, and the extinction of parties have been the rule since the beginning of the 1990s."

To understand the consequences of institutional change, we must always be alert to the facts that "the devil is in the details," and that there are lingering effects of past practices that take time to wear off.

Predicting the consequences of electoral law change, especially when the changes are complex ones or in environments where there is great uncertainty about voter choices, is not at all easy and may lead to unanticipated consequences. As will be evident to the reader, the electoral law changes in Italy and Japan (especially the former) were incredibly complicated, to the point at which even specialists had trouble understanding or predicting the joint effects of the various provisions given the interactions among them. Projecting consequences is made even more difficult by the fact that the changes were also taking place at a time of great voter dissatisfaction with the existing political arrangements. In these two countries, we saw electoral law changes that looked identical in their broad features but turned out very different in their effects in practice, in part due to subtle differences in features, such as provisions for electoral coalitions.

As the chapters in this volume also demonstrate, to understand why similar reforms had such different effects in the two countries we must examine: how electoral systems are embedded in broader institutional and social arrangements; the complex interplay of political geography and political history; and the rational calculations

of political actors.[3] For example, Chap. 6 by Scheiner and Tronconi emphasizes the importance of understanding Japanese politics in terms of urban-rural splits and a clientalistic political style aided by the ability of the national government to bestow constituency specific rewards, while Chap. 4 by Di Virgilio and Reed highlights the dead hand of the past, in which practices in the post-reform elections in the two countries operated differently because the system that was being replaced was different in the two countries. In Italy, interparty bargaining was based in part on "party support as demonstrated in recent PR returns because the pre-reform electoral system had been PR." In Japan, in contrast, "local support for a particular candidate" was seen as important "because the pre-reform electoral system had been the single nontransferable vote in multimember districts (SNTV), a system that rewards the development of a personal vote."

While resting on the foundations of earlier theoretical and empirical work, we believe that the chapters in this volume provide substantial new insights into the consequences of institutional design because of the natural experiment on which they are based. With a handful of exceptions (e.g., France, New Zealand, and of course Italy and Japan), in established democracies the fundamental features of electoral law have been remarkably resistant to change in the post-WWII period. Thus, scholars in the past have been largely unable to take advantage of the insights drawn from "natural experiments" to study the consequences of the impact of electoral law.[4] This volume offers a major new contribution in this respect by studying how electoral laws operate as socially and politically embedded systems. In particular, the findings in this book offer invaluable cautionary lessons for those whose ambition it is to engineer particular kinds of political change by piecemeal or wholesale tinkering with electoral laws.

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[3] Also, as noted, it may take time for parties to learn how to optimize their choices. For example, prior to the 2008 election, unlike what they had done in the previous election, major party leaders in Italy refused to enter into coalition with certain very minor parties. Thus, these parties no longer could benefit from the electoral law provisions allowing a 2% threshold rather than a 4% threshold for parties within coalitions, and it helped drive a number of these minor parties out of existence. The options open to parties within the new electoral rules remained the same and determined what was possible, but strategic calculations changed as new information about previous and projected election results under the new rules became available.

[4] See, however, Colomer (2004).

Chapter 2
Party Competition Under New Electoral Rules in Italy and Japan, 1994–2009

Aldo Di Virgilio and Junko Kato

Introduction

The political history of Italy and Japan during the post-war period is strongly associated with two dominant parties: the Italian Christian Democrats (DC) and the Japanese Liberal Democrat Party (LDP). Notwithstanding this similarity, the electoral and party systems of the two countries differed. Italy had a fragmented and polarized multiparty system under proportional representation (PR), while Japan was known for the dominance of a single ruling party under the unusual single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system. However, in the 1990s, both countries experienced electoral system changes through the adoption of mixed electoral systems. Electoral reform was enacted first in Italy in 1993 and in the following year in Japan. Later in 2005, Italy switched from a mixed majoritarian electoral system (MMES) to a further "hybridized" electoral system, which gives a seat bonus to the party or coalition winning a plurality of votes, but in which seat allocation to coalition partners follows a proportional rule. In Japan, the MMES adopted in 1994 was changed as well, although in minor ways. For example, in the 1996 elections, the mixed system elected 300 MPs from single member districts (SMDs) and 200 from 11 PR districts; in the 2000 elections, the number of PR seats decreased from 200 to 180.

Changes in the electoral rules in turn affected the dynamics of party competition. In Italy, both the 1993 and the 2005 electoral systems promoted the formation of pre-electoral coalitions (PECs). In Japan, the plurality component of the MMES worked advantageously for larger parties, leading to a direct contestation between the LDP and the DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan). However, in both countries smaller parties retained incentives to keep a separate identity and gain representation under the new electoral rules. Moreover, neither Italy nor Japan has witnessed the re-emergence of a stable party system as was the case during the Cold-War period. Mergers, breakups, and the extinction of parties have been the rule since the beginning of the 1990s.

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This chapter focuses on the dynamic interaction between electoral system change and the electoral strategies adopted by parties in both countries. In the first section, some key changes in the electoral rules in Italy and Japan are outlined. The second section focuses on the pre-electoral strategies of parties, and the third discusses the electoral performance of parties in both countries in the decade under consideration. The fourth section deals briefly with the process of government formation and is followed by a concluding discussion.

Outlining Electoral System Changes in Italy and Japan

As noted, both Italy and Japan changed their electoral systems in the 1990s. Italy changed its electoral systems twice, in 1993 and 2005, whereas in Japan the electoral reform enacted in 1994 was modified slightly thereafter. The following section highlights the major changes in the electoral rules in both countries.

Comparing the 1993 and 2005 Electoral Reforms in Italy

The electoral reform in Italy in 1993 replaced the then-existing PR system with preferential voting (a form of open-list PR), which had been in place from 1948 to 1992. The mixed member system adopted in 1993 allocated 75% of the seats by plurality and 25% by PR. The 1993 electoral system has been used three times: in the 1994, 1996, and 2001 general elections. In 2005, Italy replaced the MMES enacted in 1993 by adopting electoral rules that give a seat bonus to the party or the coalition that gains a plurality of votes, whereas seat allocation to coalition partners follows a proportional rule.[1] The current system has been used twice: in the 2006 and 2008 general elections (see Appendix B for further details).

This section focuses on three key points regarding the 1993 and 2005 electoral reforms: (a) electoral system choice, (b) the role of PECs under the two systems, and (c) the differences among the rules for electing the Chamber and the Senate.

Electoral System Choice

At the beginning of the 1990s, the long-standing issue of electoral reform gained momentum within the media and public opinion. The demand for a change in the PR system was prompted by widespread disaffection toward parties (Morlino and

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[1]Before the 1953 national elections, the Italian parliament approved an electoral law according to which any party or alliance of parties gaining more than half of the total vote should have been awarded 380 of the 590 seats in the Chamber. The Christian Democrats and their allies narrowly failed to gain half the votes, and in July 1954, the former electoral law was restored.

Tarchi 1996) and increasing judicial investigation and prosecution of those involved in political corruption (Burnett and Mantovani 1998).[2]

Electoral reform was considered a panacea for all the pathologies of the political system. The reformers' goals were many and often incompatible, aiming for government stability and direct accountability of individual MPs to voters.[3] However, reformers agreed on using the popular referendum as a tool to force Parliament to adopt a new electoral system. In Italy, a referendum can only abrogate existing legislation, so changes were surreptitiously entered by repealing existing features of the Senate electoral law. By removing words and paragraphs out of the old electoral law, the referendum movement proposal would have abrogated the 65% clause (see Appendix A, Table A1b). In so doing, it would have transformed the PR system into one in which most of the seats would have been allocated by plurality. On April 3, 1993, Italian voters overwhelmingly approved the referendum that changed the electoral rules for electing the Senate (83% of the valid votes, i.e., a majority of the Italian electorate). The reform process was mainly driven by such referendum results. Parties bargained only about specific features of the new mixed system (single or double ballot, linkage between the plurality and PR tiers, or the threshold in the PR tier).[4]

Despite the introduction of a new electoral law in 1993, the issue of electoral reform was not erased from the political agenda. Two additional referendums were held in 1999 and 2000, aiming to abolish the proportional vote for the Chamber. However, neither referendum reached the quorum (50% plus 1) because turnout was 49.6% in 1999 and 32.8% in 2000.

In December 2005, the Italian Parliament enacted a second electoral reform bill. The process leading to electoral system change was very different from the one that had occurred in 1993. In 1993, electoral reform was mainly the product of an external constraint, whereas in 2005, it was the choice of the governing parties. In 1993, the party system was quasi-atomized, whereas in 2005 it was more structured. In 2005, new electoral rules were approved by the incumbent right-wing majority government despite the fact that the major opposition parties opposed the reform.

One may conjecture that the incumbent majority was pursuing three main goals. The first goal was to reduce the electoral costs of a very likely defeat, similar to the French electoral reform adopted in 1986 by Mitterrand. The second goal was to abolish the SMDs in order to win the electoral game in the most advantageous tier (PR). In 1996 and 2001, parties that joined the right-wing coalition gained more

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[2] In April 1993, approximately one-third of Italian MPs were under investigation for corruption (Ricolfi 1993).

[3] As Katz (2001, 104) pointed out, "While advocates of the plurality system often claimed that it would give Italians a direct choice between alternative majorities as in the UK *and* local choice and control over individual representatives as in the USA, they never countenanced the possibility that instead the result might be minimal personal accountability to local voters like in the UK coupled with minimal stability or coherence of majority as in the USA."

[4] This is a good example of a "path-dependent" institutional change. The SMDs formerly introduced in 1947 for electing the Senate operated as a constraint in devising the 1993 electoral reform.

votes in the PR tier; parties that joined the left-wing coalition gained more votes in the plurality tier (see Appendix B). The third goal was to ensure better outcomes for major parties by changing patterns of intracoalition bargaining. Under the 1993 electoral system, minor parties were able to extract disproportionate advantages in pre-electoral bargaining over candidacies (potential seats) in the SMDs; under the new electoral law, seats were allocated ex post on the basis of the votes actually gained by minor allies.[5] The role of minor parties is also crucial in explaining the evolving role of PECs before and after the 2005 electoral reform.

Preelectoral Coalitions Under the 1993 and 2005 Electoral Laws

The 2005 electoral reform abolished the SMDs and reintroduced a closed-list PR system with a seat bonus provision. The seat bonus, however, is allocated to the party list or the coalition that gains a plurality of votes. This marks an important change in the electoral rules because the formation of PECs achieved formal recognition.

The formation of PECs was one of the main consequences of the 1993 electoral reform. The 1993 electoral law, however, did not mention the coalitions as main actors in the electoral process; the 2005 electoral law did. Moreover, the 2005 electoral law created further incentives promoting the formation of PECS because it established lower thresholds for party lists that joined a PEC. Finally, under the 2005 electoral law, the translation of votes into seats occurs in two steps: the seat total (including the seat bonus) is allocated first to a coalition, then seats are distributed among the party lists that join the coalition.

Other features of the electoral law reinforce the role of PECs. For example, the law specifies that before the elections, parties must deposit their electoral platform and their label and indicate a party leader or, in the case of parties that have joined a PEC, the coalition leader. This feature suggests that PECs are seen as potential government coalitions.

Differences in Rules for Electing the Chamber and the Senate

Both the 1993 and the 2005 electoral reforms established different rules for electing the Chamber and the Senate. Under the 1993 electoral system, such differences concerned the ballot structure, the linkage between the PR and the plurality tier (i.e., the mechanism of negative vote transfer), and the electoral formula in the PR tier. Under the 2005 electoral system, the differences mainly concerned the seat bonus allocation. The seat bonus is allocated on a national basis for electing the Chamber and on a regional basis for electing the Senate (Di Virgilio 2007). Such differences in electoral rules are by no means irrelevant in a parliamentary system

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[5] For example, in 2001, to gain a seat, Forza Italia had to gain on average twice as many votes as the UDC. In 2006, such differences were greatly reduced. To gain a seat, Forza Italia needed approximately 66,024 votes, whereas the UDC needed about 67,233.

such as the Italian one in which a government needs an investiture vote in both Chambers. The 2006 general elections provide a good example of how differences in electoral rules for electing the lower and upper houses affected the electoral results and the process of "making and breaking a government." Because of the national seat bonus, the left-wing coalition gained a majority of seats (340–277) in the Chamber (the actual votes were distributed 49.81–49.74%). The right-wing coalition secured a majority of seats (155–154 seats) in the Senate (the actual votes were distributed 49.87–49.18%). Eventually, the left-wing coalition gained control of both chambers by winning four of the six Senate seats allocated to voters outside Italy. As a consequence, the coalition government (Prodi II) that formed after the 2006 elections had a slender majority in the Senate: and for this reason lasted 9 months. In January 2008, Prodi survived a confidence vote in the Chamber of Deputies but was defeated 156–161 (with 1 abstention) in the Senate.

The 1994 Electoral Reform in Japan

The 1994 electoral reform in Japan replaced the SNTV medium-size electoral district system in the House of Representatives (HR) elections. This system had been used since 1947 and existed for the entire period of LDP dominance (from 1955 to 1993). The MMES with SMDs and PR, which was enacted in 1994, has been used since the 1996 general election. The reform followed public outcry against political corruption and money politics. To secure plural seats in the medium-size districts (most of which had between 3 and 5 seats), the LDP candidates cultivated personal votes to compete with those from the same party in the same districts. The intraparty competition, which had nothing to do with policy differences, was allegedly motivated by personal votes and pork. Since the late 1980s, the LDP leadership was forced to respond to public criticism of political corruption and had to put electoral reform on the agenda despite opposition from its own legislators.

The LDP had a vested interest in the medium-size electoral district system under which its predominance was initiated, enhanced, and consolidated. In principle, intraparty competition under SNTV is expected to impose an extra burden on a plurality party that aims to secure a majority. During the prewar period, the medium-size electoral district system was used to weaken party politics, that is, to prevent any party from winning a majority (Kawato 1992). However, the LDP successfully adjusted to the medium-size electoral district system to secure multiple seats in the same district. LDP factions were considered key organizations that served to promote intraparty competition to win a majority while maintaining party unity (Cox and Rosenbluth 1994; Kohno 1997). The predominance of the LDP depended on a subtle balance between factional rivalries in its parliamentary party. Party unity was promoted by the distribution of the fruits derived from its incumbent status (i.e., official posts, budget allocations to constituencies, and so on).

In this regard, the idea of electoral reform imposed a strain on the LDP, and the dispute over the reform was an important reason for a major split in the LDP in

1993.[6] The LDP Diet members who had served one or two terms and had only a weak electoral support base were eager to tame public criticism by enacting electoral reform. However, LDP leaders and executives were reluctant to change the existing system on which their electoral support organization had long been based.

The electoral reform was enacted under the non-LDP coalition government formed after the 1993 general elections in which the LDP won a plurality in votes and seats but failed to recover the seats lost through pre-election defections. The newly introduced mixed system of the SMD and PR was not really desired by the LDP, which had succeeded in winning more than one seat in the same medium-size districts where other parties could win only one. At the same time, however, the reform did not work well for the non-LDP coalition parties. A prominent example was the SDP, the largest among the non-LDP coalition parties, which has shrunk to a minor party. The SDP was weakened by a major breakup immediately before the first election under the new system in 1996. In all subsequent elections, except in 2000, this party continued to lose support and seats.

In this regard, the introduction of a mixed system of SMD and PR constituencies was not a result of apparent intent or represented the interests of any party. Rather, the introduction of MMES in 1994 was contingent on the reform process. The number of SMD seats remained at 300, but the number of PR seats decreased from 200 to 180 following a revision of the electoral law in 2000. The LDP, which has returned to power in the general election of 1994 and in some of the following elections, has won a majority of the SMD seats but failed to win back a secure majority in the entire HR. As a result of the 1994 electoral reform, the two houses of the Japanese Diet now share a mixed system. The electoral system of the House of Councilors (HC) is a combination of PR with optional preferential vote and electoral district constituencies whose sizes vary from small to large, depending on the population of prefectures (see Appendix A, Table A2b).

Party Competition Under the New Electoral Rules in Italy and Japan

In both Italy and Japan, parties adjusted to the newly established electoral rules by introducing novel electoral strategies. Such adjustment to the new rules in turn resulted in changing patterns of party competition. In Italy, the emergence of two major PECs became the underlying pattern of party competition; in Japan, competition between the two major parties replaced the hegemony of the LDP between 1955 and 1994. One of the central themes within the electoral systems literature is that the effects of electoral rules are embedded in the context of their application (Sartori 1984; Bowler and Grofman 2000). Electoral system reform is critically important because it serves to

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[6] See Kato (1998), Reed and Scheiner (2003) and Saito (2009) for details.

define the overall pattern of subsequent partisan competition. More specifically, the fragmentation of the party system is an important factor in the comparison of the Italian and Japanese cases. High fragmentation has cultivated incentives among parties to form PECs in Italy, whereas in Japan the lower fragmentation has encouraged parties to form post-electoral coalitions for entering government and to maintain the governing coalition for coordination of party nominations in subsequent elections.

Formation of Pre-electoral Coalitions in Italy

The 1993 electoral system created strong incentives for strategic coordination in the plurality tier. However, such incentives operated in the context of high fragmentation of the party system.

In 1993, the party system was characterised by a high degree of flux. Parties were facing a crisis due to the long-term decline in support of their traditional electorate and the short-term effects of corruption scandals.[7] Before the 1994 general elections, the larger parties had disappeared, and all of the remaining parties contested this election with a reasonable expectation of participating in government. In such a context, running independently in the newly established SMDs did not appear to be a feasible option for any party, including those that could rely on a territorial basis of support, such as the Northern League in the north, the PDS in the "Red Belt," and the Christian Democrats (DC) in some areas of the south (see further discussion of the territorial basis of Italian politics in Giannetti and Tanaguchi, Chap. 3, this volume). In such a context, building PECs that endorsed common candidates in the SMDs was the only feasible option to maximize a party's chances of electoral success.

The electoral rules for electing the Chamber generated a large number of strategic options for political parties, as illustrated in Fig. 2.1. First, parties could devise an electoral strategy both in the plurality and in the PR tier, but they might also choose to run in one tier only. Second, in the plurality tier, parties might choose to run independently (as a third party) or enter a PEC. Third, parties might choose to run independently in the PR tier under their own party list or form a joint list to overcome the 4% threshold. Finally, in the PR tier, smaller parties could pursue a "pouching arrangement," that is, run their own candidates within the party list of a larger coalition partner. Rules for electing the Senate generated a less-complex set of strategic options. Because voters cast only one vote and the PR seats were allocated to the runners up in the SMDs, parties had only to choose how to run in the SMDs.

In the plurality tier, the building of a PEC was usually the preferred option. The coordination problem was a huge one. The cross-endorsement strategy implied selecting which candidate would have contested which of 706 SMDs (475 in the Chamber and 231 in the Senate). Both larger parties (i.e., coalition builders) and smaller ones quickly

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[7] See Giannetti and Taniguchi, Chap. 3, this volume

Fig. 2.1 Strategic options pursued by Italian parties under the 1993 mixed-member majoritarian (*MMM*) electoral system for the Chamber. Notes: [1]Communist Refoundation run only in the PR (proportional representation) tier in 2001 elections. [2]Social Christians, Socialist Rebirth run only in the plurality tier in 1994 elections; Network, PSdA, LAV, UL, List for Trieste, Liberaldemocrat Federation did the same in 1996 elections and UpR, the new DC, Segni Pact, PPS, New Sicily in 2001 elections. [3]As Northern League and Tricolor Flame in 1996 elections and DE, Italy of the values and Pannella and Bonino List in 2001 elections. [4]Such as Segni Pact in 1994 elections; Popolari per Prodi, Dini List, and CCD-CDU in 1996 elections; DL-the Daisy, Sunflower, and Whiteflower in 2001 elections. [5]Such as Go Italy in 1994 elections (accommodating CCD candidates) and PDS-SE in 1996 elections (accommodating Unitarian Communists, Social Christians, Labour and Social Democrat candidates)

learned how to play the game. Coalition builders seeking alliances with smaller parties granted them winnable nominations in the SMDs. Smaller parties bargained the price of their participation by threatening to join a rival PEC or to run independently. This process resulted in a continuous readjustment in the composition of the PECs, as summarized in Table 2.1. Moreover, in 1996 and in 2001 a pattern of candidate allocation known as "the proportionalization of the plurality tier" became the rule in the pre-electoral bargaining within PECs.[8]

PECs were also built in the PR tier. The strategy of creating a joint list was an important ingredient in the evolution of the architecture of PECs. First, joint lists were mainly created to allow smaller parties to overcome the 4% national threshold (even though in 2001 two of three joint lists failed). Second, joint lists became a useful device both to hide policy differences among coalition partners in the eyes of voters; and to reduce the number of partners bargaining candidacies in the

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[8] See Di Virgilio and Reed, Chap. 4, this volume; for further details, see Di Virgilio (2002, 2004); D'Alimonte (2005).

Table 2.1 Pre-electoral coalition (PEC) dynamics in Italy (1994–2001)

1994	1996	2001
PROGRESSIVE ALLIANCE PRC, Network, Greens, PDS, PS and AD	PRC and OLIVE TREE PRC, PDS-SE, Greens, Populars for Prodi, and Italian Renewal	PRC
PACT FOR ITALY PPI, Segni's Pact	LN	OLIVE TREE PdCI, DS, Sunflower and the Daisy
POLE OF FREEDOMS FI, LN, Reformers	POLE FOR FREEDOMS FI, CCD-CDU and AN	DE, IdV and Bonino List
POLE OF GOOD GOVERNMENT FI and LN	Tricolor Flame	HOUSE OF FREEDOMS FI, Whiteflower, LN and AN
		Tricolor Flame

Note: This is a schematic representation of the composition of PECs. Here only the PECs competing in the PR tier of the elections are considered. The total number of PECs participating in these three elections was greater because of (a) joint lists in the PR tier and (b) parties choosing to run solely in the SMD part of the election. The solid boxes indicate PECs and their member parties, while the boxes with dashed lines refer to parties not participating in a PEC

preelectoral negotiations. Third, the strategy of building joint lists in the PR tier transformed the structure of the Italian PECs into something like a nested Russian doll and anticipated important changes in the party system, such as the birth of the Daisy (Democracy is Freedom, DL) which later merged into the PD.

We now turn to the strategic options faced by parties in managing the linkage between the plurality and PR tiers. Two factors must be taken into account. The 1993 electoral rules established a provision according to which all SMD candidates had to be affiliated with up to five PR lists. Consequently, independent candidacies were not allowed. However, the link (*collegamento)* was flexible because SMD candidates and PR lists could run under different labels, and parties entering a PEC could maintain their own identity in the PR tier. Second, parties were able to strategize around the effects of the *scorporo,* that is, the mechanism of negative vote transfer aimed at penalizing the PR lists that endorsed candidates who gained most of the seats in the plurality tier. The trick was to set up "fake" PR lists (*liste civetta*) and affiliate candidates in SMDs to these fake lists in the PR tier. Consequently, the "real" party lists avoided being penalized with the negative vote transfer (scorporo) mechanism because this penalty was paid by the fake list to which each SMD candidate was affiliated. This was a loophole in the electoral law.

As noted, the 2005 electoral reform gave formal recognition to PECs. At the same time the coordination problem in the pre-electoral phase became easier as PECs were transformed into a mere collection of party lists. In other words, parties were no longer compelled to negotiate cross-endorsements in SMDs before the elections. Under the 2005 electoral rules, the strategic options of parties changed. Parties might choose between two main different strategic options: running under their own party list or under a joint list.[9] Each option could be pursued running independently or entering a PEC. Smaller parties entering a PEC could also run under a "pouching arrangement"[10] or run under a pouching arrangement *plus* under their own party list[11] *or* under a joint list.[12]

It is important to note that in the 2006 and 2008 national elections, parties adjusted to the same rules in very different ways. In the 2006 elections, PECs were all inclusive, as illustrated in Table 2.2. Two main catch-all blocs faced the 2006 elections, showing continuity with the trend started in 1996 under the previous electoral rules. Larger parties took advantage of the complicated system of thresholds established in the 2005 electoral law because they were able to attract minor parties joining the pre-electoral cartel. Actually, to gain seats, smaller parties have to pass a lower threshold if they join PECs (2% of the total votes rather than 4%).

In the 2008 elections, the larger parties again took advantage of the electoral thresholds by building "narrower" and more selective PECs. In so doing, previous allies running independently faced higher costs. This process was a consequence of party mergers on both sides of the ideological spectrum (see Table 2.2). As discussed in the next section, such a change in electoral strategies produced a dramatic change in electoral outcomes, seat allocation, and the shape of the party system.

Strategic Adjustments by Japanese Parties and Formation of Post-electoral Coalitions

We have just seen that in Italy the formation of PECs resulted from competition shaped by the electoral reforms of 1993 and 2005. Under the Japanese MMES electoral rule, the formation of PECs was never the basis for the strategic adjustment of parties. This dissimilar outcome may be attributed to differences in party fragmentation and the district electoral rules in both countries. This section clarifies the difference in Japanese and Italian electoral rules.

[9] For example, these joint lists included the Rose in the Fist and the Northern League-MPA in 2006 and the Rainbow Left (SA) and the Right–Tricolor Flame in 2008. In all these cases, parties joined common lists to overcome the electoral thresholds.

[10] For example, such parties were the Liberal Reformers, European Republicans (RE), Italian Social Democratic Party (PSDI), Republican Party (PRI), Sardinia Project, and Young Italy in the 2006 elections and the Italian Radicals in 2008 elections.

[11] Examples are UDEur, Italy of the values and Pensioners in the 2006 elections.

[12] Examples are the Northern League and MPA or the DC and New PSI in the 2006 elections.

Table 2.2 Party dynamics and preelectoral coalitions (PECs) in 2006 and 2008 elections

| LEFT BLOC IN 2006	
Communist Refoundation (PRC)	→ Workers' Communist Party
Italian Communists (PdCI)	→ Critical Left
Greens	→ Rainbow Left (SA)
Democrats of the Left (DS)	**LEFT BLOC IN 2008**
The Daisy (DL)	Democratic Party (PD)
Italy of the Values (IdV)	→ Italy of theValues (IdV)
Rose in the Fist	→ Socialist Party (PS)
European Democratic Union (UDEur)	
Pensioners	
RIGHT BLOC IN 2006	→ Union of the Center
Union of the Center	**RIGHT BLOC IN 2008**
MPA-Northern League	→ Northern League (LN)
Christian Democrats - New Italian Socialist Party (DC-NPSI)	→ Movimento per le Autonomie (MPA)
Go Italy! (FI)	→ Freedom's People (PdL)
National Alliance (AN)	
Social Alternative	
Tricolour Flame	→ The Right Tricolour Flame

Electoral coordination helps parties decrease uncertainty in competition over votes and offices. The LDP, for example, tried to cope with uncertainty by maintaining the same coalition partner (i.e., the Clean Government Party, CGP) from 1999 to the 2009 general elections, when it was ousted from power. The two parties formed a surplus majority coalition in the HR and a minimal winning coalition in the HC (Table C2 in Appendix C). The electoral system in the two houses belonged to a category that was a hybrid of the PR and district election systems and thus presented no problem for the electoral strategy of the party. A different power balance between the two houses has influenced the coalition strategy of the largest party – the LDP – and its relationship with prospective coalition partners. To maintain the coalition with the CGP, the LDP was willing to increase the PR votes for the CGP in exchange for the support of the CGP for the LDP candidates in SMDs (Reed and Kay 2009). The CGP/LDP coalition was much more fragile than the Italian PECs, in which electoral constraint has motivated parties to exchange (and maximize) votes. The coalition hinged on mutual benefits gained from the alliance. The electoral coordination of the coalition depended on their supporters' willingness to trade their votes between the two parties across the systems. Such coordination is often hard to accomplish, and "neither party can expect much more from the other" (Reed and Kay 2009). The absence of a direct constraint from the electoral system distinguishes the Japanese case from the Italian one. This is consistent with the ups and downs of the partisan power balance between the LDP and DPJ between the 2005 and 2009 general elections.

Electoral Outcomes and Government Formation in Italy and Japan, 1994–2009

The mixed electoral systems have brought unexpected consequences in electoral outcomes and office formation from SMDs and PR in both Italy and Japan. The following sub-sections specify these changes: the Italian bipolar competition with increasing party fragmentation as contrasted with the Japanese bipolar competition with decreasing fragmentation.

Five Italian Elections (1994–2008): Bipolarism, Party System Fragmentation, and Alternating Governments

From 1994 to 2006, three main trends in Italian politics are clearly observable: (a) the development of a bipolar pattern of party competition at the electoral level, (b) increasing party fragmentation at the legislative level, and (c) alternating governments. These trends were not immediately altered with the electoral system change that occurred in 2005. However, in the 2008 national elections, the strategies of parties exhibited an important change although the electoral system remained the same.

Fig. 2.2 *ENEP* (effective number of electoral parties) and *ENPP* (effective number of parliamentary parties) for individual parties (1976–2008) and electoral coalitions (1994–2008) in the Chamber

From 1994, strategic coordination in the SMDs determined the emergence of a bipolar pattern of party competition (Reed 2001). This pattern, however, depends on taking pre-electoral cartels as the unit of analysis. Whereas in 1994 the percentage of valid votes for third parties was 29%, in 1996 the percentage dropped to 16%; in 2001, it decreased to 10% (see Appendix B, Table B1). In 2006, under the PR system with a seat bonus, the percentage of valid votes for third parties was 0.5%. After 1994, both the effective number of electoral parties (ENEP) and the effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) decreased, as illustrated in Fig. 2.2. Taking PECs as the unit of analysis the ENPP remained the same in 2001 and 2006 (i.e. 2).

The bipolar pattern at the national level shows some important differences across districts and across time (Bartolini et al. 2004). Districts included in two of the three main geopolitical areas into which Italy is usually divided [13] were basically *noncompetitive*. In the north, with the exception of the 1996 elections,[14] right-wing candidates dominated in the plurality tier. However, in the 2001 elections, the

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[13] The north includes seven regions: Valle d'Aosta, Piedmont, Lombardy, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Trentino Alto Adige, and Liguria. The Red Belt includes four regions: Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, Marches, and Umbria. The south includes the other nine regions: Latium, Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily, and Sardinia.

[14] In 1996, the Northern League did not join any PEC. Its territorial concentration allowed the party to be competitive in many SMDs in northern Italy.

percentage of competitive districts increased from 15% to 31% (a percentage calculated over the total districts for electing both MPs and senators).[15] A similar trend was apparent also in the so-called Red Belt, where the percentage of competitive districts increased from 0.06% to 0.23%. The south has always been the most competitive area within Italy. In the 1994, 1996, and 2001 elections, more than 50% of SMDs in this area were competitive districts.

Until 2006, bipolarism in Italy had been fragmented. Party lists in the PR tier between 1994 and 2006 reveal that both the ENEP and the ENPP were relatively high (around five). In other words, in the period between 1994 and 2006 party system fragmentation was higher than in the previous decade.[16]

The 2008 elections mark a significant change in terms of party system fragmentation. Party mergers on both sides of the ideological spectrum led to the birth of two larger parties (PD and PdL). As illustrated in Fig. 2.2, party system fragmentation decreased dramatically (the ENEP dropped from 5.5 to 3.8 and the ENPP from 5.1 to 3.1). Moreover, as illustrated in Fig. 2.3, the proportion of votes for larger parties is very similar to the one that existed in the 1970s. It is hard to predict if this pattern will remain stable. In the 2008 national elections, the electoral strategies of parties contributed to minimize the differences in the electoral rules for electing the Chamber and the Senate as the right-wing coalition gained a higher percentage of seats in the Senate than in the Chamber (55.2% vs. 54.6%).

A typical feature of the Italian system from 1948 to 1992 was low interparty competitiveness, which allowed the DC to be included in each postwar government. The DC was able to form single-party majority governments and minority governments. However, from 1980 to 1992, the prevailing pattern was the formation of oversized coalitions, including the DC, the PSI, and some minor allies (Cotta and Verzichelli 2000). Up to the 1992 elections, coalition government formation in Italy followed a pattern rather common to other parliamentary systems, i.e., parties bargained their participation in government coalitions *after* and not *before* the elections.

After 1994, the dissolution of the DC and the introduction of the MMEs lead to the formation of PECs. Data about policy positions of the parties reported in Benoit and Laver (2006) showed that ideology was an important determinant in the formation of PECs of center-left and center-right. From 1996, parties that joined a PEC subscribed to a joint electoral platform and indicated a prospective prime minister. Following a general pattern (Martin and Stevenson 2001), such PECs also formed a government after the elections.

The so-called First Republic (1948–1993) was well known for the dominance of the same governing parties or coalitions of parties. After 1994, the composition of governments changed after each election. The prevailing type of coalition government

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[15] There are several criteria to classify "marginal" or "winnable" SMDs. According to the data reported here, a district is classified as marginal when the vote difference among the first and the second candidates is less than 8 percentage points (Bartolini and D'Alimonte 2002).

[16] See Di Virgilio and Reed, Chap. 4, this volume.

Fig. 2.3 Concentration index of votes and seats in the Chamber for two major parties

did not change because surplus majority coalitions continued to form (see Appendix C, Table C.1). However, government type is sometimes hard to identify because of continuous party change.

Governments did not last the entire legislature. From 1948 to 1992, the average duration of Italian governments was 13 months (Laver and Schofield 1990). Since 1994, the average duration has been 19 months. Many governments were inter-electoral governments. For example, in the period from 1996 to 2001, four inter-electoral coalition governments, including different coalition partners, were formed due to party switching and changes in the composition of parliamentary parties (Giannetti and Laver 2001).

The most evident change with the past is in terms of portfolio allocation. Formerly, portfolio allocation was strictly proportional to the legislative weight of coalition members; after 1994, an advantage ratio in favour of smaller parties is observable. Larger parties have had to make concessions to minor allies in terms of portfolio allocation to secure the survival of coalition governments.

Five Japanese Elections (1996–2009): Steps Toward Bipartisanship

In contrast to the Italian case, the dynamics of the Japanese parties are summarized by (a) the emerging bipolar competition between the LDP and the DPJ, (b) the subsequent decrease in the fragmentation of the party system, and (c) the emerging dynamics of contestation for office between the LDP-centered and the DPJ-centered coalitions.[17] These changes ushered in the formation of the first DPJ-centered coalition government after the 2009 general elections.

Electoral changes followed by changing coalition formation were closely related to the new partisan dynamics. The first election under the newly introduced mixed system was held in October 1996 when the major opposition party was the New Frontier Party (NFP), to which non-LDP coalition parties had merged in 1994 immediately after being turned out of office. The DPJ was formed immediately before the elections by defectors from the New Party Harbinger (NPH) and Social Democratic Party (SDP). The NFP, on its formation in 1994, had replaced the SDP as the second-largest party, but it disbanded in 1997. Since then, the DPJ became the major opposition party to the LDP. The rivalry between the LDP and the second-largest party formed the backbone of partisan dynamics under the guise of disorderly and extensive changes and reorganization of parties from the 1993 to the 2009 general elections (Fig. 2.4). From 1996 to 2005, four general elections were held, and party switching occurred between the elections. Both the electoral results and party switching changed the balance of power among parties. The electoral results often influenced subsequent party switching. For example, office-seeking legislative members tended to move to a near-majority party, expecting that their switching would help create a majority party. This logic explains quite well the rapid decline of the NFP after the LDP won seats close to the majority threshold (Laver and Kato 2001). At the same time, however, the office-seeking explanation cannot be applied to the DPJ, which started as a much smaller party than the NFP and has continued to increase in size in elections while preventing the LDP from absorbing all legislative switchers.[18]

Table B.2.1 to B.2.5 in Appendix B shows the number of seats and votes won by each of the parties in the 1996, 2000, 2003, 2005, and 2009 general elections. In the first three elections, the DPJ faired equally well in SMDs and PR districts,

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[17] There is a long list of the literature on the impact of the Japanese electoral reform, but all focused on the impact on candidates, parties, voters, and interest representation (Gallagher 1998; McKean and Scheiner 2000; Horiuchi and Saito 2003; Krauss and Pekkanen 2004) and have not yet considered the impact on overall partisan dynamics.

[18] The advantage of the DPJ against the LDP may be explained better with a policy-seeking explanation. Kato and Yamamoto (2009) have demonstrated that the policy positions of the DPJ, which were distributed widely from moderate left to moderate right, have attracted *policy-seeking* party switchers vis-à-vis the LDP, whose near-majority size attracted *office-seeking* party switchers.

Note: **Bold Date**= the day of general elections;   LDP = party in power;   Democratic Party III ★ = the major opposition party

Fig. 2.4 Reorganization of political parties in Japanese House of Representatives

whereas the vote share of the LDP was clearly larger in SMDs than in PR districts. A majority formation under the winner-take-all system prevented the LDP from losing power. The number of seats won by the LDP was close to a majority. However, the DPJ, which was the third party in the 1996 elections, continued to contest with the LDP in the first three elections under the new system. The landslide of the LDP in the 2005 general elections was an unexpected result of Prime Minister Koizumi's manipulation of the policy agenda in the snap elections. The LDP majority had been against Koizumi's dissolution of the HR and his hard line on the privatization of the postal service, but they jumped on the bandwagon as Koizumi's popularity among the public increased during the electoral campaign. However, after three short-lived cabinets, the reign of the LDP was terminated by the DPJ landslide in the 2009 general elections.

The MMES appeared to contribute to striking a subtle power balance between the LDP and the DPJ. A reduction in PR seats from 200 to 180 was expected to work for the LDP, but after the reduction, the DPJ fared quite well in the 2000 and 2003 elections. Because the DPJ has rapidly expanded its size since its formation, a majority of the DPJ legislators had not been Diet members when the electoral reform was enacted, and thus the party had no control over the reform. However, the non-LDP coalition parties that decided on the reform as incumbent parties also did not fare well under the new system. The SDP has continued to decline in size. The Clean Government Party (CGP), a member of the non-LDP coalition, which reorganized when the NFP broke up, became a coalition partner with the LDP in 1999, but participation in government did not contribute much to expanding its size. It is hard to argue that the electoral reform was fully consistent with the will of incumbent parties at the time of enactment or a result of strategic manipulation by any party in or out of office.

Partisan dynamics in Japan since 1993 have been completely different from what they were before 1993 or, more precisely, from 1955 to 1993 when the LDP substantially maintained a one-party government (except for very short interruptions) by winning a majority in general elections. The LDP has faced major opposition from parties that can aspire to be in office. Therefore, the LDP has sought suitable partners and tried to form coalition governments since 1994; notwithstanding a short period when the LDP formed a minority government (Table C.2 in Appendix C). The CGP allied with the LDP in October 1999 and after November 2003 became a steady partner when the Conservative Party (CP) merged with the LDP after the 2003 general elections. The governing coalition went hand in hand with the electoral coalition.

Meanwhile, coalition politics imposed a dilemma on the DPJ. Policy dynamics have shown an apparent parallel with strategic adjustments between the LDP and the DPJ. More specifically, the two major parties have appeared to shift their policy positions closer to each other. An analysis of expert survey data on party positions from 1996 to 2005 (Kato and Kannon 2008) reveals that the policy positions of the DPJ are widely distributed from moderate left to moderate right, and its center position has attracted a larger number of party switchers and voters than might otherwise be the case. The LDP has also shifted its policy position closer to possible coalition partners, such as the CGP, located at the center of the left-right policy dimension.

Consequently, both the LDP and DPJ have tried to shift their policy positions so that they could ally with small parties located on the moderate left and moderate right (Kato and Kannon 2008). The DPJ must distinguish itself from the LDP to appeal to voters for office. The DPJ legislative members have originally come from different parties with a variety of ideological positions. Maintaining the unity of a heterogeneous party has attracted support from a variety of policy positions. At the same time, however, the party is attempting to coordinate its policy positions with smaller parties resulting in a drift toward center–a process also evident in the LDP. In terms of forming a governing coalition, partisan dynamics in Japan have moved closer toward two-party competition in coalition bargaining.

From the 1990s onwards partisan dynamics have characterized the contest between the LDP and the second-largest party. This is consistent with differences in observed electoral support concentration indexes for the top two parties in Italy and Japan. Although the concentration indexes of the two major parties in Japan dropped in 1993, they maintained a level of 70%, which was the same as in the 1980s (Fig. 2.5). However, in Italy, the merger of parties resulting from the formation of PECs has increased the level beyond 70%. This occurred for the first time in the 2008 general election (Fig. 2.3). Estimates of ENEP and ENPP in Italy (Fig. 2.2) are almost twice as high as that observed in Japan from 1996 to 2005 (Fig. 2.6).


Fig. 2.5 Concentration index of votes and seats for two major parties (1986–2009)

Fig. 2.6 *ENEP* (effective number of electoral parties) and *ENPP* (effective number of parliamentary parties) for individual parties (1986–2009)

When there is low fragmentation of parties, larger parties do not have incentives to coordinate the candidacies in SMDs before elections. The lower level of fragmentation has therefore decreased the incentives for forming PECs. Larger parties have a comparative advantage against smaller parties in a winner-take-all system, but they tend to engage in turf battles against another larger party to secure their support base in as many SMDs as possible. Smaller parties, which are more penalized than larger parties in SMDs, have few incentives to form PECs.

Concluding Remarks: Similarities and Differences

This chapter focused on highlighting major changes in party competition in Italy and Japan after electoral system reform in the early 1990s. The electoral system change clearly affected party strategies in both countries. In Italy, the most evident effects of the change of electoral rules were the formation of PECs; and the emergence of a bipolar pattern of party competition at the electoral level. From 1994 until 2008, this feature coexisted with increased party fragmentation at the legislative level. The major consequence of the electoral system change in Italy was the emergence for the first time of alternating governments because coalition governments of center-right and center-left. This is also the feature that marks an important difference between Italy and Japan. In Japan, partisan dynamics after 1994

were remarkably different from previous times because the LDP had to seek a partner for a governing coalition and tried to form coalition governments. Competition between the two major parties in Japan has facilitated a decline in party fragmentation with party mergers, the extinction of small parties, as well as party switching to larger parties. The formation of the DPJ-centered coalition government after the 2009 general elections appears to usher in an era of government characterised by an alternation between administrations led by the two main parties (the LDP and DPJ). This seems to consolidate the dynamics of bipolarization after almost two decades of extensive party reorganization.

Italy and Japan adopted similar electoral reforms in the early 1990s when they had distinct partisan dynamics characterized by the presence of dominant parties. In the meantime, Italy adopted another electoral reform in 2005; and similarity in partisan dynamics of electoral competition and office formation have become more distinct in Italy and Japan. For this reason, electoral system changes have made an important difference to the nature of party competition, and party system dynamics and government formation in both countries. In this chapter, we have clarified the distinct logic behind partisan competition in elections and government formation that have eventually led to bipolarization in both countries.

Chapter 3
The Changing Bases of Party Support in Italy and Japan: Similarities and Differences

Daniela Giannetti and Naoko Taniguchi

Introduction

This chapter explores the link between electoral reforms and structural changes in the social bases of party support in Italy and Japan. Italy and Japan offer important case studies as they underwent significant electoral reform in the early 1990s as part of a more general process of political change. Both in Italy and Japan, corruption scandals and increasing public dissatisfaction with politicians resulted in demands for electoral reform. Electoral reform was seen as an institutional means of changing the system of political representation to promote alternation of parties in power, increase transparency and efficiency in government, and reduce the opportunities and incentives for corruption (Katz 2001; Reed and Thies 2001a).

Although Italy and Japan underwent electoral reforms at about the same time for broadly similar reasons, the structural causes and impact of such institutional changes have been different. For example, the structure of vote choice in Italy was most often explained with reference to three key factors: Catholicism, class, and region. In contrast, Japanese party competition has not been defined by religion or region; and socialism has only had a limited appeal for much of the post-World War II period. Within Japan, localized candidate-centered politics predominated. As for the impact of electoral reform on party strategies and political competition, in Italy changes in electoral rules have contributed to a reshaping of the party system and a substantial change in voting patterns; in Japan, the new rules also have led to a quasi-two-party system and have recently increased the possibility of alternation in power.

Therefore, comparing Italy and Japan represents an important opportunity to gain insight into how the structural bases for party support are linked with electoral reform. In this chapter, such links are discussed in terms of the concept of realignment as previous research has emphasized the importance of this theme. Realignment is examined here in terms of four criteria: (1) change in party dominance, for example,

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the Italian Christian Democrats (DC) and Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) no longer hold the important positions they once held; (2) variation in the sociodemographic support for the main Italian and Japanese parties during the postwar period; (3) evolution in the geographical clustering of support for parties; and (4) change in the ideological structure of party competition, for example, with the disappearance of old policy dimensions, emergence of new issues, or reversals of position on policy dimensions (see Merrill et al. 2008).

In the first section, we compare changes in party dominance in Italy and Japan since 1945. This is followed by an examination of the evidence on the sociodemographic bases for party support in both countries over the same time period. The third section looks at the geographical patterning of electoral behavior in Italy and Japan and change since 1945. In the penultimate section, there is an overview of the ideological structure of party competition with a focus on the emergence of new issues and parties. This is followed by a conclusion outlining similarities and differences between Italy and Japan in terms of realignment and electoral reform.

Change in Party Dominance

Italy and Japan have often been compared on the basis that they have both had dominant parties that controlled government for long periods of time (Sartori 1976; Scheiner 2006). The main difference between Japan and Italy was that while the LDP was able to form single-party governments from 1955 to 1993, the DC ruled as the largest party in coalition governments. Moreover, Italy and Japan were different for much of the postwar period because Italy had a strong second party (i.e., the Communist Party [PCI]), whereas the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) had only limited power within LDP administrations. Following electoral reforms, the LDP essentially remained the largest party in Japanese politics, even though for the first time in its history it had to form a coalition in 1996. In contrast, the Italian DC was dissolved as a party in 1994, although its factions survived in the new political environment (see Giannetti and Thies, Chap. 5, this volume).

The DC Party in Italy: From Dominance to Dissolution

The notion of a "dominant" party can be given a precise formal definition (Peleg 1981; Roozendaal 1992). First, only the largest party can be dominant; second, the largest party can be dominant only if its weight is equal to at least half the quota, in practice the number of votes that a coalition needs to win a majority; third, the largest party can form a minimal winning coalition with both the second or the third party while the second and the third party are not large enough to form a winning coalition among themselves.

Table 3.1 shows that the DC was a dominant party in Italy from 1948 to 1987 with just two exceptions. In 1964 and in 1976, the second and third large parties were

Table **3.1** Seat numbers of Italian largest, second, and third parties in the Chamber of Deputies,1948–1992

Parties	I legislature 1948–1953	II legislature 1953–1958	III legislature 1958–1963	IV legislature 1963–1968	V legislature 1968–1972	VI legislature 1972–1976	VII legislature 1976–1979	VIII legislature 1979–1983	IX legislature 1983–1987	X legislature 1987–1992	XI legislature
DC	300	260	275	259	260	263	263	263	226	234	206
PCI	126	142	140	166	166	175	220	193	177	149	107
PSI	53	75	86	94	62	61	57	61	74	100	92
Other	95	113	122	108	136	130	90	113	153	146	225
Seat total in the Chamber	*574*	*590*	*623*	*627*	*624*	*629*	*630*	*630*	*630*	*629*	*630*
Quota	*288*	*296*	*312*	*314*	*313*	*315*	*316*	*316*	*316*	*315*	*315*
Total seats of second and third party	179	217	226	**260**	228	236	**277**	254	251	**249**	199

Elaboration from data available at Italian Chamber of Deputies, http://www.camera.it
The bold numbers at the bottom of this table indicate when the second and third parties were able to form a majority.
The numbers in italics refer to the total number of seats in the lower chamber and the level of support required quota to have a simple majority.

potentially able to form an alternative coalition. Explaining the lack of coordination in opposition strategies requires looking at features other than size. It is well known that the capacity of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) to strike a pact with the PCI in order to break the monopoly of the DC was impaired by the pro-Soviet or "antisystem" stance of the latter (Sartori 1976; Strom and Mueller 1990). However, the year 1964 marks the start of a period of center-left DC-PSI coalitions (Verzichelli and Cotta 2000), while in 1976 the unprecedented electoral success of the PCI allowed the DC to form minority governments (with the external support of the PCI). In 1987, the DC finally lost its status as dominant party.

The trend in electoral and legislative party dominance can be shown using the effective number of parties (ENP). Figure 3.1 shows that from 1948 to 1976 the ENP in Italy was largely constant, approximately around four. This represents the era in which the DC was able to maximize its electoral support. Thereafter, from 1976 the ENP in Italy increased steadily until 1987 and then surged dramatically in 1992.

Examining the link between the ENP and changes in electoral rules, the difference between electoral and legislative ENP reveals that an increase in party fragmentation preceded the electoral reform of 1993. However, contrary to expectations, changing the electoral rules did not immediately reduce the number of parties. The expected reduction of parties at the electoral level only became visible in the 2001 elections. Even then, the effect was rather weak as the ENP declined to the level observed in 1992 immediately prior to the electoral reform. The loss of electoral and legislative dominance for the DC was not tied in with the 1993 electoral reform. The dominance of the DC appears to have declined from the late 1970s and accelerated between 1987 and 1992.

Fig. 3.1 Change in the effective number of electoral and legislative parties in Italy, 1948–2008. Note: Data taken from the online database of electoral indices associated with Gallagher and Mitchell (2005). The Eff Nv refers to the effective number of electoral parties, and Eff Ns denotes the effective number of legislative parties (Laakso and Taagepera 1979). The RRP is the relative reduction in parties, that is, Eff Nv/Eff Ns or the disproportionality index

To sum up, it seems that the DC was losing dominance before and not after the electoral reform of 1993. This evidence implies that changes in electoral rules may be interpreted as a consequence of the electoral decline of DC, whereby the party sought to preserve its dominant position by introducing electoral reform in a strategic manner. Even though the electoral reform in Italy was enacted under the pressure of a popular referendum, the new electoral rules were drafted by DC politicians and approved by a parliament still dominated by the DC political elites.

The LDP Party in Japan: From Dominance to Historical Defeat

In 1958, the LDP gained 61.5% of the seats in the first Lower House election after its foundation. Although gradually losing seats into the 1960s and 1970s, the LDP continued to win an average of 50% of the seats (Table 3.2).

A major factor underlying uninterrupted single-party majority governments of the LDP from 1955 to 1993 was the wide public support it received for both its foreign and domestic policies (Flanagan et al. 1991). The voters favored the pro-U.S. diplomacy of the LDP, as well as its focus on economic growth. The other major factor was the institutional effect of the single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system applied to the Lower House elections during this period (Cox 1996; Grofman et al. 2001; Reed and Thies 2001b).

As the LDP remained the sole governing power, the so-called iron triangle – the combination of LDP elites, bureaucrats, and business leaders – became entrenched (Muramatsu and Krauss 1987; Richardson 1997). Pork-barrel politics/clientelism based on a centralized government financial structure had become widespread, especially in rural areas (Scheiner 2006). But in the long run, as we describe in the following section, a declining rural population eventually weakened the electoral support base of the LDP. The appearance of the Clean Government Party (CGP, the Komeito) and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) also encroached on the votes that the LDP and the JSP had once obtained.

In the early 1990s, a number of corruption cases involving LDP members caused distrust among voters and culminated in a demand for political reform (Pharr and Putnam 2000). As the LDP failed to introduce political reform bills, including reform of the electoral system, some factions left the LDP. As a result, the party was only able to gain 43.6% of seats in the 1993 election. Factions defected

Table 3.2 The LDP seat share in national elections

Lower house (House of Representatives)										
1958	…	1980	1983	1986	1990	1993	1996	2000	2003	2005
61.5%		55.6%	48.9%	58.6%	53.7%	43.6%	47.8%	48.5%	49.4%	61.7%
Upper house (House of Councilors)										
1956	…	1980	1983	1986	1989	1995	1998	2001	2004	2007
48.0%		54.8%	54.0%	57.1%	28.6%	51.6%	34.9%	52.9%	40.5%	30.6%

As for the upper house elections, the figures show the results of reelection seats

from the LDP, and existing opposition parties (bar the Japanese Communist Party, JCP) merged to form a coalition government and enacted the political reform bills.

The LDP returned to power after the collapse of this coalition government, but now, coalitions with other parties were essential for them. The LDP sought coalition with its long-time rival, the JSP, and New Party Sakigake (NPS). This coalition gained 47.8% of the seats in the 1996 Lower House election, the first election under the newly introduced mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system, which combines single member districts (SMD) with proportional representation (PR).

Under the MMM system in Japan, the SMD component is more influential than the PR one (Reed and Thies 2001b). In the 2000 and 2003 elections, the LDP was once again successful in gaining about half the seats in the lower house because of (a) support from a new coalition partner, the CGP, and (b) fewer seats were allocated under the PR tier of the election. Furthermore, Junichiro Koizumi, President of the LDP and Prime Minister from 2001 to 2006, enjoyed huge national popularity (Krauss and Pekkanen 2008; Reed et al. 2009a). Especially in the 2005 Lower House election, MMM strongly operated in favor of the LDP, and they won 61.7% of the seats despite the fact that they won only 42.8% of the total votes.

At that time, some studies held the view that the effect of electoral reform on the Japanese party system, especially on the dominance of the LDP, was quite slow and limited, but they also pointed out that the new rule has led to a concentration of opposition forces in one block (Reed 2005; Baldini and Pappalardo 2009). Actually, the New Frontier Party (NFP), established in 1994, fought well against the LDP in the 1996 election. Although intraparty conflicts caused the NFP to fall apart, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was formed about the same time, gradually absorbing smaller parties. Thus, the DPJ gained a substantial number of seats in the 2004 Upper House election and eventually became the largest party after the 2007 Upper House election. Since this election, the Diet has been "divided," with the LDP holding the majority only in the Lower House and the DPJ holding the majority in the Upper House.

Like the DC, the decline of the LDP started long before the electoral system reform. Nonetheless, the new electoral system also allowed opposition groups to form a strong opposition party; therefore, Japan is now in transition from one-party dominance towards a two-party system.

Change in Sociodemographic Support Base of the Parties

Since the seminal work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), a vast literature has examined the link between social structure, political alignments and party systems. Conventional accounts suggest that Socialist and DC parties in western European countries mainly derived their electoral support from class and religious groups. More generally, the impact of social divisions on political behavior, and on voting choice in particular, has long been a central theme of political sociology. In recent years,

however, many have argued that social, economic, and cultural trends in postindustrial societies have weakened the linkages between cleavage groups (class, religion, race, and so on) and their traditional parties (Dalton 2002; Inglehart 1990; Franklin et al. 1992; Evans 2000; De Graaf et al. 2001). For instance, Dalton and Wattenberg (1993) claimed that "there has been an attenuation of the specific linkage between social class and electoral politics," and that "the religious cleavage is following the same pattern of decline as social class." Terms such as *realignment* and *dealignment* are widely used as ways of explaining changes in electoral behavior among social groups combined with a general decline in partisanship. Despite a vast amount of work in the scholarly literature, debate over whether traditional cleavages continue to divide voters remain unresolved as some scholars have argued that, despite significant changes in postindustrial polities, social cleavages as a whole remain an important source of voting alignments (e.g., Evans 1993, 1999; Manza and Brooks 1999; Brooks et al. 2006; Elff 2007). The aim of this section is to focus on changes in the group basis of party support identified in previous research in order to better understand the sources of change and stability in Italian and Japanese politics.

Italy: Change in Structural Bases of Electoral Support for the Parties

Early empirical analyses of cleavage voting in Italy highlighted the importance of religion and class as key determinants of party support (Poggi 1968; Barnes 1977, 1984; Sani 1973; Mannheimer and Sani 1987). According to Poggi (1968, 34) religion was the predominant structural influence on electoral behavior. The relationship between religion, specifically Catholicism, and party support was generally examined using survey-based measures of frequency of church attendance and voting choice. The survey evidence from the 1960s shows that Italians who went more frequently to (Catholic) religious services were much more likely to support the DC, as 80% of regular churchgoers voted for the DC in 1968, 74% in 1972, and 65% in 1985 (Sani and Segatti 2002).

Most research undertaken in the 1970s and 1980s found that religiosity was a stronger predictor of party choice than class. As Barnes (1974) noted, the Church was able to keep its influence over the working class in many areas of Italy. This pattern was particularly evident with regard to the relative levels of support of blue collar workers' for the center-right DC and the hard-leftist Communist Party (PCI). In the late 1960s, only 22% of manual workers voted for the PCI, while the DC was able to capture the vote of 53% of the workers, two-thirds of the self-employed middle class, and over half of the upper-middle-class vote (Segatti, Bellucci and Maraffi 1999).

Many scholars have argued that, in addition to religion and class, region was also central to the structuring of party support in Italy. This is not a *cleavage* in Rokkan's sense, given the lack of ethnic and linguistic differences, but rather a product of historical forces that marked a sharp difference between northern and southern Italy

in both economic and cultural terms (Almond and Verba 1963; Galli 1968; Putnam 1993). Research undertaken by the Cattaneo Institute in the 1960s partitioned Italy into four relatively homogeneous political regions: (a) the "industrial" northwest of Italy; (b) a "Catholic" white zone in the northeast of Italy; (c) a "socialist" red zone in central Italy; and (d) the socially conservative and economically deprived south. This influential regional schema represents one among many that have reflected a widespread agreement among scholars about the relevance of territorial differences in predicting party support. For instance, in the period 1953–1987 the PCI predominated in the red zone with an average vote of 38.5%, while the DC predominated in the white zone with an average vote of 51.5% (Cartocci 2006).

A common question in Italian electoral research since the electoral reform of 1993 has been the lasting relevance of the class and religion cleavages. Despite the fact that scholars use different data and methods, a general conclusion within this research is that the strength of the relationship between traditional cleavages and voting has declined over time (Sani and Segatti 2002; Bellucci et al. 2004; Corbetta 2006; Sani 2006). Looking first at class voting, whether class is measured in terms of self-identification or objective indicators, the impact of this factor has weakened throughout the postwar period, but nonetheless maintained some relevance up to the 1990s. By the end of this decade, furthermore, the importance of social position for voting seems to have resurged (Bellucci and Heath 2007).

Turning to religion, this factor is no longer a good predictor of vote choice as the percentage of regular churchgoers who voted for left-wing (44.6%) and right-wing party blocs (55.4%) in the 2006 elections was much more equal than in the past (Sani 2006). Results reported by Corbetta (2006, 421, 425) showed that individual-level vote choice models based on the three cleavage variables – religion, class, and region – correctly predicted vote choice in about 70% of the cases in the 1968, 1972, and 1983 elections but predicted between 56% and 61% of the cases in the 2001 and 2006 elections. The levels of explained variance (R^2) in these regression models was about .30 in the elections of 1968, 1972 and 1983; and declined to less than .10 in the elections of 2001 and 2006.

As noted with regard to the dealignment and realignment debate, scholars disagreed about the interpretation of the importance of class voting. According to some, the old divide between manual and nonmanual workers has been replaced by new divisions that determine vote choice such as employment in the public or private sectors or being an employee rather than self-employed (Diamanti and Mannheimer 2002; Biorcio 2006). Concerning the electoral relevance of religion, there is more controversy. As noted, data reported by Sani (2006) showed that a more or less similar percentage of practicing Catholics split their vote between the two main party blocs on the left and right. However, the same data for specific parties highlighted a different picture. For example, in 2006, 64% of churchgoers voted for the UDC (Union of Christian and Center Democrats a direct successor of the DC), a percentage similar to that obtained by the DC in the mid-1980s.

The electoral behavior literature emphasizes a declining trend in the loyalty of cleavage groups to political parties, with loyalty measured by the proportion of cleavage group votes cast for the party of interest. However, two primary sources

of cleavage decline other than loyalty should be taken into account: *size*, which is the proportion of the electorate belonging to a cleavage group, and *turnout*, which is the percentage of a cleavage group that voted in a given election (Manza and Brooks 1999; Best 2008).

Cleavage decline could be attributed to the declining size of traditional social groups given the fact that all Western democracies have experienced some degree of deindustrialization and secularization. Italy is no exception to this trend. The data show important changes in the composition of the labor force over time and a decline in church attendance since the mid 1970s (Sani and Segatti 2002; Pisati 2000). In postwar Italy, levels of voter participation were second only to Austria. However, after 1976, this high level of participation began to decline in line with trends in many other established democracies (note Franklin 2004). More specifically, abstention and the casting by Italian voters of blank ballots increased steadily from about 2% in the early 1980s to 18% in 1996 (Bardi 1996; Wellhofer 2001).

In summary, Catholicism, class, and region have all declined as structural determinants of voting in Italy since the 1960s. Much of this change, however, pre-dates the electoral reform of 1993. This is hardly surprising as the composition of social groups and their political alignments tend to change slowly, but such changes tend to have important long term consequences. The possibility that the shifting group basis of party support is a background cause of electoral reform is sometimes hinted at in the literature, but this awaits more rigorous analysis. Since the electoral reform of 1993 there is evidence of both dealignment, which is continued weakening of social cleavages, and of realignment, by which the religion, class, and regional cleavages have become associated with "new" parties.

Japan: Change in the Structural Bases of Electoral Support for Parties

It has been commonly understood that, under the "1955 system," the LDP was supported by conservative sections of Japanese society such as senior citizens, rural residents, self-employed, and those in managerial positions. Young people, urban residents, nonmanagerial office workers, and laborers, on the other hand, tended to support opposition parties. There also were a number of labor union and religious organization members who supported small- to middle-size parties (Flanagan et al. 1991).

A relatively large proportion of Japanese voters have been traditionally conservative, and these are the people who have more or less endorsed the long governance of the LDP. As discussed in the previous section, however, the dominance of the LDP had already been waning when electoral reform was enacted. With the ending of the Cold War the JSP (which later became the SDP) lost popular support. In part, this decline also stemmed from terminating a coalition with the LDP (1996–2000). From the end of the 1990s, the DPJ replaced the JSP (SDP) as the main opposition party. The DPJ lacks ideological cohesion because many of its

members come from various parts of the political spectrum such as the LDP and JSP. However, such an incoherent political ideology may allow the DPJ to become a catchall party because of its diversity (Scheiner 2006; Steel 2008).

The new electoral system was not the only factor that helped the DPJ gain wide support from the public. Rather, deteriorating national finances, the rapidly aging Japanese society, and the recent global recession all combined to push the DPJ vote up. Voters, especially rural residents who receive lower government subsidies than they once did; the elderly, who depend for their living on the government pension scheme and on national medical insurance; and youth under constant threat of unemployment – all have become greatly concerned about their future. These people are turning away from the new conservative reformers of the LDP because they know that their reforms do not benefit them. In an attempt to gain the backing from these voters, the DPJ adjusted its party platform to lean slightly to the left. The DPJ has also cast its manifesto in a way that lets the public know that the party is capable of governing. By 2006, voters had acknowledged that the DPJ was a viable government alternative (Ikeda 2007).

Here, we use surveys conducted in 1983 and 2005 by the Association for Promoting Fair Elections (APFE) and the data collected in 2007 by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) to examine the level of support for each political party across different social groups. According to the survey conducted after the 1983 Lower House election, which predicted a crushing defeat for the LDP, we can see a pattern of support that is typical of the 1955 system. In this election, those who voted for the LDP largely consisted of the over-60 age group, rural residents, and the less educated (high school graduates or lower). Other voters largely supported the JSP.

Another socioeconomic factor that is considered to be of political importance in Japan is whether the person has what in Japan is referred to as a *self-controlled* occupation (Miyake 1989). People with such occupations are the self-employed, including those in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries; business owners; management-level employees; and other professionals. People who lack self-controlled work are clerical-level workers, laborers, and those in service industries. The former category traditionally comprises a large number of LDP supporters, while many of the latter were opposition supporters.

Moving on to the 2005 Lower House election conducted under the new electoral system, we can see that the LDP won a sweeping victory, gaining a high level of support from voters, more or less regardless of their social position (Table 3.3). However, the same voters gave less support to the LDP in the 2007 Upper House election resulting in a major defeat for the party. Thus, electoral support for specific parties was no longer strongly based on social group ties. Before the electoral reform of 1994, the elderly, rural residents, less educated, and non-managerial occupations tended to remain loyal to the LDP even after it lost elections. These once faithful supporters switched to the opposition (DPJ) after the reform, contributing to major defeats for the LDP.

In addition to the LDP's support base becoming more fragile, these results show that the social structure of Japanese voting behavior has changed profoundly.

Table 3.3 The party support rate (%) in each sociodemographic group

	1983						2005					
	LDP	CGP	DSP	JSP	JCP	Ind.	LDP	CGP	DPJ	SDP	JCP	Ind.
Rural residence	63.6	2.8	13.6	4.0	1.3	13.4	48.1	2.5	17.7	2.6	1.4	26.8
Urban residence	38.8	9.9	15.4	5.9	5.3	20.2	37.9	5.3	19.9	1.0	4.7	30.6
60 years or older	67.5	4.4	8.1	4.4	2.4	11.9	53.8	3.7	20.3	2.6	2.8	15.9
Under 40 years	43.2	5.9	16.7	5.0	4.7	21.5	30.8	5.1	15.0	2.1	2.7	43.7
Less than college graduate	62.1	6.2	10.5	4.7	2.3	13.2	47.3	4.2	16.9	1.8	2.8	25.6
College graduate +	45.0	4.1	17.0	4.7	5.3	17.8	43.7	3.3	19.9	2.8	2.5	26.8
Religious group	33.0	50.5	5.5	1.1	0.0	8.8	30.8	38.5	11.5	3.8	1.9	13.5
Labor union	25.3	5.3	35.8	12.5	5.7	12.8	37.1	2.9	28.6	7.1	2.9	21.4
Self-controlled occupations	72.3	5.0	7.0	3.7	1.4	8.2	46.4	3.5	17.4	2.2	1.8	26.9
Other occupations	39.1	5.3	21.9	8.2	4.5	18.4	42.0	4.7	17.8	1.2	4.1	29.7

	2007					
	LDP	CGP	DPJ	SDP	JCP	Ind.
Rural residence	31.8	1.9	29.5	4.5	2.7	27.9
Urban residence	27.8	5.2	25.3	3.5	9.0	28.1
60 years or older	38.0	3.6	25.2	5.4	5.4	12.1
Under 40 years	15.9	3.4	22.0	2.3	4.9	49.6
Less than college graduate	32.5	4.3	25.9	2.9	5.6	28.2
College graduate +	22.5	2.6	26.8	5.9	5.3	34.7
Religious group	20.0	31.6	15.8	4.2	3.2	24.2
Labor union	15.7	1.0	32.4	5.9	8.8	36.3
Self-controlled occupations	39.4	1.2	25.5	4.0	3.7	24.2
Other occupations	24.1	4.4	27.6	4.2	6.1	32.5

Note: *LDP* Liberal Democratic Party, *CGP* Clean Government Party, *DSP* Democratic Socialist Party (an offshoot of JSP), *JSP* Japan Socialist Party (later Social Democratic Party, SDP), *JCP* Japanese Communist Party, *Ind* Independents (non-party)

Following the electoral reforms of 1994, the probability of alternating governments rotating between the LDP and new rivals such as the DPJ increased. Voters understand that, under the SMD system, a small shift of ballots can affect the election results; therefore, a change is easier to take place than under the SNTV system.

Change in Geographic Support Base of the Parties

The link between party organizations and their local electorate is a primary element in the ability of parties to attract votes in elections (Beck 1974, 1243). Within both Italy and Japan, the importance of region and constituency, respectively, have been key themes in explaining electoral outcomes. The implication here is that geography matters. However, within political science there has been debate over the importance of "contextual effects," where this term typically means purely spatial components of electoral behavior.

Agnew (1988; 1996, 134–138; 1997; Agnew and Shin 2008), in a number of studies of regional voting in Italy, has emphasized the importance of knowing the political geography of electoral choice. However, King (1996, 161) has argued, in contrast, that territorial effects stem from misspecified vote choice models in which it is individual-level characteristics rather than place of residence that are most important. Undoubtedly, the methodology used to identify regional contextual effects is very important; however, our discussion here is limited to reviewing previous research on the nature and importance of regional voting in Italy and Japan.

Political Regions in Italy

One method of evaluating the degree to which an electoral system is regionalized is to see how far the aggregate vote in each region identified is different from that observed at the national level. From this perspective, Italy is one of the most regionalized political systems in Europe (Caramani 2004, 58–70).

Much of the literature on electoral behavior in Italy since 1948 has consistently drawn attention to differences in party support using official data from the 20 administrative regions. However, as noted there is no definitive classification of political areas in Italy. This means that analyses of regional effects are not always strictly comparable because the definition of Italian political regions has often been subjective or dependent on the level of analysis. More recently, political geographers have used statistical methods to analyze electoral data derived from (a) 32 electoral districts, (b) 110 provinces, or more rarely (c) over 8,000 communes.

In general, the regional clustering of party support between 1948 and 1994 is most often summarized as follows: The northeast (or white zone) and south were dominated by the DC, while the PCI did best in central Italy (the red zone). Significantly, between 1963 and 1976 the two largest parties, DC and PCI, attracted

higher levels of the popular vote, and this resulted in a decline in the regional patterning of vote choice (Cartocci 1990; Diamanti 2003; Agnew 2002). The smaller Italian parties tended to have more localized electoral heartlands that were not always stable. For example, the initial electoral heartland of the PSI was in the northwest, but this switched later to the south. In the 1980s, the importance of regional parties grew with the emergence in Sicily of La Rete in 1990 and especially the Northern League (LN) in northern Italy from 1992 onwards.

Agnew and Shin (2007) have argued that in order to fully appreciate the change in party support surrounding the electoral reforms of 1994, it is necessary to study the geographical patterns of voting behavior. The essential argument here is that the realignment in Italian politics associated with the electoral reform in 1993 had two key features: (1) the electoral reform did not operate in the same manner across the entire country, and (2) the observed geographical patterns in voting are not "reflections" of underlying social cleavages. These scholars emphasized two broad patterns of electoral change. First, there was *party replacement,* which is defined as the "colonizing" of additional territory by a new party if an old one was weak; or the "mobilization" of voters by a new party through representation of new cleavages or issues. Second, there was *party substitution,* by which old parties are replaced by new ones. It is this process that is seen to have a distinctly geographical nature.

Focusing on the electoral performance of DC, PCI, and Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) between 1987 and 2001, Shin and Agnew (2007) showed that (1) party support was significantly spatially clustered for each of these parties for all elections between 1987 and 2001, and (2) different patterns of party replacement existed. Examination of the spatial correlation patterns for data at the provincial level ($N=110$, using the 1987 schema) across five elections reveals that support for the far-right MSI effectively switched to AN. Although the PCI split into PDS/DS and PRC, support for left wing parties remained largely constant in central Italy (the red zone) between 1987 and 2001. Although leftist parties have traditionally been weak in the northeast, strong isolated clusters of support suggest that the post-1994 Italian left made advances into some DC heartlands.

The situation regarding the fate of electoral support for DC following the electoral reform of 1993 is more complicated. Within the north of Italy, former DC support went to the LN at a time of progressive secularization and the perceived failure of successive DC governments to protect small business in areas such as Veneto. Elsewhere, between 1992 and 2001 the replacement by Forza Italia (FI) of DC was most striking where the DC traditionally did not do particularly well, that is, the northwest, and conversely it was weakest where DC was strong (i.e., the South) (Fig. 3.2).

The only place to show high levels of support for both the DC and FI was Sicily. However, in the northeast (the white zone) support for DC was already declining prior to the electoral reform of 1993, revealing that electoral change was already taking place. More generally, Shin and Agnew (2007) show that voters for the DC in 1987 contributed to a party replacement process, whereas the growth of LN occurred through mobilization of new voters and that of the FI through colonization of existing voters.

● : High values surrounded by high values   ◉ : Low values surrounded by high values

◉ : High values surrounded by low values   ○ : Low values surrounded by low values

Fig. 3.2 Geographical distribution of electoral support for DC (1992) and FI (1994, 1996, and 2001). The data in this figure represent local indicators of spatial association (Moran I statistic). Information about the degree and nature of clustering around each provincial unit in the maps was determined by the contribution that each province made to the overall level of spatial correlation observed. Positive spatial correlation ($p < .05$) is shown in this figure as sold black circles (high values surrounded by similar high values) or white circles (low values surrounded by low values). Spatial outliers (high values surrounded by low values or vice versa) are indicated by small black circles surrounded by a larger white circle and small white circles surrounded by a larger black circle. (Source: Agnew and Shin 2007, 2008)

The geographical evidence suggests that the impact of the electoral reform of 1993 not only contributed to a preexisting trend of change in the geography of electoral support but also shaped that process of change with the emergence of a new "menu" of parties in 1994. On balance, the electoral geography of Italy after 2001, when the effects of the electoral reforms of 1993 had stabilized, exhibits a pattern of relative continuity in regional party support.

Urban Versus Rural Areas in Japan

Japan has no strong regional basis for party competition at the national level. Certain political parties and politicians do have roots in a specific area, but such cases are limited. In Japan, the "regional" political cleavage is one between urban and rural voters. The geographic base of party support under the 1955 system can be summarized as rural areas supporting LDP and urban areas supporting opposition parties or having no specific party support. This difference may be attributed to the protectionist agricultural policies of the successive LDP administrations, which allotted substantial subsidies to rural areas and implemented policies that protected primary rural industries. Moreover, politicians in rural areas committed themselves to attracting government subsidies and investments to their areas. Furthermore, primary industries often based in rural areas regularly lobbied the LDP, as the ruling party, to implement protectionist policies. On the other hand, urban voters, who did not benefit from such LDP policies, either supported the opposition parties or became politically nonaffiliated.

An examination of the regional patterns in Japanese election results confirm this urban-rural divide. There are 47 prefectures in Japan, each of which is allocated a number of Diet seats according to its population. Prefectures with smaller populations tend to receive favorable apportionments, which itself is evidence of the rural bias of the LDP (Horiuchi and Saito 2003; Baker and Scheiner 2007). In what follows, we divide prefectures into three groups in terms of apportionment: small, medium, and large.

In the 1958 Lower House election (i.e., the first election after its foundation), the LDP tended to monopolize seats in less-populated prefectures (Table 3.4). As mentioned in the first section of the chapter, however, they tended to lose their rural strongholds because people left primary industries and moved to urban areas. In the elections in the 1980s, the LDP won a large proportion of seats in rural areas, even in the 1983 Lower House election in which the LDP was defeated. In 1993, when the LDP broke up, its support bases in rural areas also broke up, making the party less competitive in less-well-apportioned districts.

In the 2005 Lower House election, when Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi was credited with bringing a landslide victory to the party, the LDP won a large share of seats, regardless of geography, because a large number of urban voters

Table 3.4 LDP seat share in prefectures (Tokyo, Hokkaido, Osaka, and Kyoto)

Lower house (House of Representatives)					
Member size	1958	…	1983	1993	2005
Small	65.5%		57.2%	51.3%	73.3%
Medium	65.2%		57.9%	56.8%	70.3%
Large	59.6%		45.9%	38.5%	71.9%
Upper house (House of Councillors)					
Member size	1956	…	1983	1992	2007
1	76.0%		92.3%	92.3%	20.7%
2	46.7%		60.0%	63.3%	45.8%
3–5	45.8%		34.7%	30.6%	31.1%

As for the upper house elections, the figures show the results of reelection seats in the prefectural districts

now favored the LDP. This was partly because Koizumi, himself running for an urban district, switched the party policy to give more priority to urban than to rural areas. It was reasonable for Koizumi to make such a decision since the rural population was predicted to decline in the long-term. However, the bias of the prime minister in favor of urbanites caused disgruntled long-standing rural LDP supporters to leave the party.

As for the DPJ, although clearly positioning itself as an urban party until around 2003, the policy change by Junichiro Koizumi led it to place a higher priority on rural areas. In the 2007 Upper House election, the DPJ gained much popularity in rural areas by proposing a policy to support a minimum household income for farmers. The LDP as a result ended up gaining a low of 20.7% of the vote in less-populated constituencies. Thus, the previous pattern of rural voters backing the LDP and urban voters backing the opposition no longer applies. Both ruling and opposition parties must fight for constituency seats by adjusting their policies to suit urban and rural preferences.

In this way, geographic support bases changed at the same time as the reforms in the election system. This change may be said to have been affected by two factors. The first is a shift in the geographic support base, namely, the breaking up of the rural support base by the LDP. This occurred when, as noted earlier, defectors from the LDP took their supporters with them when they left the party. This caused a large-scale political realignment and can be seen as a "direct influence" of electoral reform.

Moreover, there is another factor that indirectly affected the shift in the geographic support bases of the parties. Both the LDP and DPJ modified their party policies after seeing how the other party defined its policy. Therefore, it could be said that the "indirect influence" of the electoral reform is that the new system has led to the DPJ gaining enough strength to compete with the LDP within single-seat constituencies. It should be noted, however, that the long-term decline of the rural LDP support base is mostly rooted in larger social and political trends where electoral reform has had little direct impact on this process of change.

Change in the Ideological Structure of Party Competition

In order to analyze changes in the ideological structure of party competition, spatial models prove particularly useful. Spatial models describe both the preferences of citizens and the policy positions of political parties or candidates in terms of a common space, modeling party competition as the search for optimal policy positions in this space (Downs 1957). The basis vectors of political spaces are typically interpreted in terms of *policy dimensions* such as economic left-right or social liberal-conservative. For instance, a "left-right" dimension or axis has been widely used by many scholars as part of the descriptive apparatus of party politics in western European democracies. The spatial approach is valuable because it allows one to analyze political change by examining (a) the changing salience of policy dimensions over time; (b) the changing policy positions of political actors along those dimensions; and (c) how new dimensions structuring the policy space are strategically created by political actors (Riker 1962).

A crucial exigency for spatial models is to rely on accurate estimates of the policy positions of political actors. Most of the extant literature relies on two types of sources: political manifestos and expert surveys. Content analysis of party manifestos is the most widely used method to estimate party positions. To date, the most complete data set has been created by the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), providing estimates of policy positions for many dimensions, countries, and years (Budge et al. 2001, 2006). Expert surveys are based on ratings of parties or candidates by politicians, political scientists, or other experts, usually based on a predetermined scale (Castles and Mair 1984; Laver and Hunt 1992; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Benoit and Laver 2006). These methods have different strengths and weaknesses.[1] In what follows, we draw from previous research and use original data to analyze change in the dimensional structure of the policy space in Italy and Japan.

The Policy Space in Italy

Early research used mass survey data (self-placement of voters) to give a single spatial representation of Italian politics, in which left versus right was an underlying dimension that included economic, social, and moral issues (Sani and Sartori 1983). Using a unidimensional account, Laver and Schofield (1990) located the DC in the center and the PCI and MSI on the opposite sides of the left-right spectrum. Even though left-right was generally assumed to be sufficient to characterize the nature of the Italian policy space, Laver and Schofield suggested that a two-dimensional representation would have been more accurate for theoretical reasons. However, Manifesto Research Group (MRG) manifesto data have proven difficult to use for this purpose because often the estimates for Italian parties are inconsistent with common knowledge (see Pelizzo 2003).

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[1] For a full discussion see Laver (2001).

The reconfiguration of the party system in 1994 with the entry of new parties and the disappearance of older ones suggested that a two-dimensional account was likely to provide a more accurate representation of the policy space. Using MRG data, Giannetti and Sened (2004) provided a two-dimensional account of Italian policy space for both 1994 and 1996. They suggested that the entry of a party such as the LN represented a change in the substantive content of the second dimension, interpretable as "institutional decentralization" or north-south rather than the social liberalism-conservatism. However, the interpretation of this second dimension was problematic despite consensus over the unique position of the LN (see also Ricolfi 1999).

In what follows, we use expert survey data to explore (a) the changing importance of policy dimensions and (b) the changing policy positions of Italian parties between the general elections of 1987 and 2001. Expert survey data were collected by Laver and Hunt (1992) and Benoit and Laver (2006) using the same scales at two time points.[2] Following Laver and Benoit's analysis of party system change in western European countries (2007), the analysis includes parties that existed at both of these time points (i.e., *common* or *survivor* parties), parties that existed in 1987 but not in 2001 (*defunct* parties), and parties that existed in 2001 but not in 1987 (i.e., *new* parties) (see Table 3.5). Among the main reasons for using expert survey data is the fact that MRG only coded cartels rather than single parties in 2001, meaning that MRG data do not facilitate estimating individual party scores, whereas expert survey data do have this information.

Focusing on the changing importance of policy dimensions, data based on Laver and Hunt (1992) expert survey estimates (not presented) showed that in 1987 the most important policy dimension (average score for all parties) was pro- versus anti-permissive social policy (raw score 13.18), followed by clericalism (13.04), and foreign policy (i.e., pro- vs anti-United Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR); 13.05). In contrast, according to Benoit and Laver (2006) the most important policy dimension in 2001 was taxes versus spending (raw score 14.7), followed by immigration (14.3) and deregulation (14.3). The decentralization policy dimension was rated more important in 2001 (12.3) than in 1987 (11.51), while the opposite was true for the environment dimension (12.58 in 1987 vs 10.6 in 2001).

These data suggest that while the importance of economic policy increased over time, the social dimension became less important (12.9 in 2001). However, this interpretation can be reversed if immigration is considered an important social issue.

Turning now to policy positions, Table 3.5 presents estimates for "defunct," "new," and "survivor" parties along five core dimensions: taxes versus spending, social policy, deregulation, decentralization, and environment. This highlights policy change within the evolving Italian party system. It is also possible to estimate policy positions for the "electorate" for 1987 and 2001 as the weighted average of the policy positions of all parties, weighting each party score by its vote share in both elections. In effect, this assumes a simple model of proximity voting and uses this to compute the policy position of the mean voter. This facilitates

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[2] It should be noted that the expert surveys were undertaken in 1989 and in 2001, respectively.

Table 3.5 (formerly 12) Policy positions of the electorate and parties in Italy derived from expert surveys, 1987–2001 (standardized mean positions) (Laver and Hunt 1992; Benoit and Laver 2006)

Status	Electorate or party	Tax_87	Tax_01	Soc_87	Soc_01	Reg_87	Reg_01	Env_87	Env_01	Dec_87	Dec_01
	Electorate	*-0.16*	*0.64*	*0.37*	*0.22*	*-0.22*	*0.43*	*0.11*	*0.15*	*0.08*	*-0.06*
Common	MSI_AN	0.95	0.05	10.85	2.22	0.89	-0.28	0.83	0.26	1.48	0.83
Common	PCI_DS	-1.19	-0.09	-0.49	-0.53	-0.98	-0.22	-0.53	-0.04	-0.53	-0.06
Common	PCI_PdCI	-1.19	-0.18	-0.49	-0.63	-0.98	-0.29	-0.53	-0.28	-0.53	0.14
Common	PCI_RC	-1.19	-0.20	-0.49	-0.56	-0.98	-0.23	-0.53	-0.18	-0.53	0.25
Common	G_FdV	-0.56	-0.64	-0.76	-0.46	-0.36	-0.61	-1.54	0.01	-1.32	-0.21
Common	DC_Margh	0.29	-0.04	1.44	0.15	-0.04	-0.19	0.60	-0.03	0.52	-0.20
Common	DC_UDC	0.29	0.06	1.44	1.05	-0.04	-0.08	0.60	-0.02	0.52	-0.05
Common	MSI_MSFT	0.00	-0.61	0.00	1.74	0.00	-0.33	0.00	-0.17	0.00	0.68
Common	PR_LB (Lista Panella-Bonino)	-0.27	0.39	-1.07	-0.21	0.06	1.36	-1.36	-0.19	-1.15	-0.54
Defunct	DP	-1.48	0.00	-0.85	0.00	-1.61	0.00	-0.84	0.00	-0.66	0.00
Defunct	PLI	1.26	0.00	-0.10	0.00	1.23	0.00	0.89	0.00	0.48	0.00
Defunct	PRI	0.84	0.00	-0.20	0.00	0.74	0.00	0.80	0.00	0.08	0.00
Defunct	PSDI	-0.01	0.00	0.18	0.00	0.15	0.00	0.42	0.00	0.24	0.00
Defunct	PSI	-0.06	0.00	-0.32	0.00	-0.10	0.00	0.17	0.00	0.08	0.00
New	FI	0.00	2.13	0.00	0.07	0.00	1.67	0.00	0.52	0.00	-0.33
New	LN	0.00	1.08	0.00	0.82	0.00	1.03	0.00	0.23	0.00	-0.06
New	IdV	0.00	-0.77	0.00	-0.77	0.00	-0.60	0.00	-0.42	0.00	-0.45
New	SDI	0.00	-0.13	0.00	-0.51	0.00	-0.13	0.00	0.03	0.00	-0.39

The policy positions for the total electorate were derived from a weighted composite measure of the party positions using vote weights. Zero most often refers to missing data for defunct and new parties in 1987 and 2001, respectively. Standard scores were estimated using the mean score for a party minus mean score for all parties/standard deviation for the party score.

Fig. 3.3 Comparison of Italian party positions on increased services versus cut taxes (mean scores), 1987–2001. *Note*: "Defunct" parties are not shown for the sake of simplicity. For the same reason, only two of the new parties (FI and AN) are represented in the figure. For party acronyms, see Appendix D and text

exploring change in (1) the policy position of voters, and (2) the relationship of this with parties changing policy positions.

Looking first at the survivor parties, the general pattern in the estimates presented in Table 3.5 appears to be one of convergence toward the center of the policy space. This is particularly evident for the economic, environmental, and decentralization dimensions. There are also important party policy changes. For example, MSI-AN moved to the center on the economy (tax and spend) and on deregulation (state intervention and free market) but remained consistently conservative on the social dimension.

However, if account is taken of all parties present in both 1987 and 2001 with regard to one of the key policy dimensions, such as taxes versus spending, as shown in Fig. 3.3 one can immediately observe that two of the new most important parties (FI and LN) are on the right. This helps to place in context the move to the right of the electorate on this particular dimension. The evidence presented in this figure is important because it shows that the emergence of new parties following the electoral reforms of 1993 was associated with important shifts in the policy space of the entire party system.

The Policy Space in Japan

For Japan in the 1950s and 1960s, when the 1955 system was being established, self-defense was the main subject on which public opinion was divided. The conservatives believed that seeking a stronger alliance with the United States was the safest and the most realistic policy to defend the country. The leftists, on the contrary, advocated observing the pacific Constitution of Japan and upholding a neutral diplomacy because they feared that American strategies during the Cold War might require Japan to provide extended army bases and to rearm the country.

However, as the LDP consolidated its governing base by gaining support from conservatives, issues such as self-defense and the Constitution gradually lost their political significance for voters in large part due to strong economic growth. Divisions between ruling and opposition parties were mostly limited to opposition parties holding the LDP responsible for domestic problems, such as pollution and political corruption. By the 1980s, divisions between ruling and opposition blocs had shifted their focus from foreign policies to domestic issues and the standard of living, at least in the voters' eyes. In the late 1980s, the introduction of a consumption tax system became a major issue, with opposition parties, including the JSP, gaining much popularity by taking an opposing position on this matter.

There was a period of time in the early 1990s when foreign affairs were given emphasis again. This was the time the Cold War came to an end, the Gulf War broke out, and the discussion of sending Japan Self-Defense Forces abroad was on the political agenda. However, it coincided with a period when the JSP was in a coalition government with the LDP. Therefore, voters were unable to make a clear-cut decision over which party to approve. In recent years, new social issues have emerged, such as problems related to pensions and health insurance, as well as a growing level of unemployment.

In this section, examination of Japanese parties' policy positions will undertaken using mass survey data and expert survey data collected by Laver and Hunt (1992) and Kato and Kannon (2007). We describe the policy space by showing change in which issues appeared in the mass survey data and analyze the transitions in party positions using the expert survey data.

Figure 3.4 shows which issues voters considered important in the 1983 and the 2005 elections. First, looking at the 1983 radar chart, we notice that JSP voters expressed greater interest in policy issues than LDP voters; however, it should also be noted that LDP voters showed a greater interest than JSP voters in economic and agricultural policies. The JSP voters, on the other hand, showed a greater interest than LDP voters in areas such as welfare, taxation, education, political reforms, and constitutional change.

Turning to the 2005 radar chart, we notice that most voters were generally concerned about welfare policy; in contrast, popular interest in national defense and political reform was much lower. Even LDP voters, surprisingly, were less interested in national defense and agriculture. As for the SDP (former JSP) voters, we see in the bottom window of Figure 3.4 that their policy interests were very similar to

Fig. 3.4 The issues voters considered in Japanese elections

General Election 1983

Welfare · Economy · Agriculture · Constitution · Defense · Political Reform · Education · Tax

60.0% · 40.0% · 20.0% · 0.0%

LDP voters — JSP voters

General Election 2005

Welfare · Economy · Agriculture · Constitution · Defense · Political Reform · Education · Tax

60.0% · 40.0% · 20.0% · 0.0%

LDP voters — DPJ voters — SDP voters

those of JSP voters in 1983. Moreover, this evidence suggests that the emergence of the SDP appears to be associated with former JSP voters becoming increasingly interested in tax and welfare issues. With regard to DPJ voters, we notice that their policy interests ran roughly between those of LDP and SDP voters; their interest in economic policies was even somewhat higher than that of LDP voters, which suggests some anticipation of the likely benefits to emerge from the proposed economic policies of the DPJ.

It should also be noted that, in 2005, the general focus of the policy space shifted away from national defense and political reforms and moved to issues of welfare, taxation, and economic policies; and that LDP and DPJ voters showed a similar pattern of interest in economic and agricultural issues. This suggests that the competition

among Japanese political parties shifted from left-right to parties holding contrasting opinions on issues such as political reforms and security issues. Inter-party competition now focussed on each party's actual or expected political performances – more specifically, competition focussed on which party could make the voters feel that their quality of life had or would be improved.

To estimate change in party positions over time, we calculated the average score of party positions as evaluated by the experts in terms of five issues (tax cut vs public services, regulatory policy, decentralization, social policy, and environmental policy) and calculated distances among the parties using multidimensional scaling (MDS) analysis. The results are shown in Fig. 3.5. We may interpret dimension 1 as an economic left-right scale and dimension 2 as a social liberal-conservative scale. In 1989, the LDP adopted economic right and the social left positions, while the JSP, the largest opposition party, adhered to generally leftist positions on the social and economic dimensions. On the other hand, in 2005, the LDP adopted uniformly rightist positions, while the DPJ, the largest opposition, adhered to a centrist stance. Moreover, we can see that the distance between the ruling party and the largest opposition lessened.

The JSP, which once confronted the LDP as the largest left-wing opposition party, went into decline after the electoral reform of 1994 and subsequent political realignment, making ideological differences between Japanese parties less clear. The DPJ, which takes a more down-to-earth and centrist approach than the JSP, strengthened its political influence after the introduction of the new electoral system. Downs (1957) once predicted that two major parties would converge toward a centrist position under SMD plurality elections. While the new system is a mixed one, the change in political cleavage structure appears to be creating a political system characterized by two-bloc competition in Japan.

Fig. 3.5 The transitions of party positions in Japan

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the structural bases for party support in both Italy and Japan before and after the electoral reforms of the early 1990s using (a) a "top-down" approach emphasizing party strategies as shown in the analysis of policy positions in the preceding section, and (b) a "bottom-up" perspective which emphasizes the importance of structural changes in the electorate examined in earlier in this chapter. The overall goal of this chapter has been to place the electoral reforms in Italy and Japan implemented in the early 1990s within the context of the shifting bases of party support during the postwar period.

We turn first to the bottom-up perspective and the analysis of party dominance, our key findings may be summarized as follows.

For Italy, the evidence presented shows that the loss of electoral and legislative dominance of the Italian DC pre-dates the 1993 electoral reform; and may in fact have contributed to the change of electoral rules. The decline of traditional cleavages as bases for party support may also be dated before the electoral reform. However, with the electoral reform the opportunities for cleavage based voting expanded with the entry of new parties. For example, Catholics, former DC supporters, were able to choose among center left (La Margherita-DL), center right (UDC), or regional parties such as the LN. A similar process also occurred for class voting. In terms of geographic distribution of party support, the electoral reform did not alter in a fundamental way the regional clustering of voting behavior as the postwar political geography exhibited considerable continuity.

Turning now to Japan, the LDP has steadily lost its formerly dominant position. The new electoral system has triggered a shift from one-party dominance to a two-party system. The LDP experienced varying electoral fortunes after the introduction of SMDs. These dramatic changes were caused because even small changes in voting patterns can create hugely different results under the new electoral system. The support base of the parties seen under the 1955 system has now collapsed. Voting behavior does not differ much according to the voters' social status. Also, the geographic support for Japanese parties and especially the urban-rural divide has become less salient over time.

With regard to the top down perspective, which emphasizes the importance of party strategies, our focus has been on directly examining trends in party policy positions.

A general left-right dimension, including economic, social, and moral issues has been commonly accepted as a way of describing the main axis of party competition in postwar Italy. This general pattern did not change substantially with electoral reform, although there have been important individual party policy movements along the left-right dimension. While former "extreme" parties such as the PCI and the MSI changed their name and adopted more centrist policy positions, the new parties, such as the NL and FI, are very much on the right on the economic dimension.

Moreover, the fact that the NL has consistently adopted a nonconvergent strategy suggests that more than one dimension may be important in the analysis of party competition in Italy in the 1990s.

In contrast, the data for Japan shows that the ideological structure of party competition has clearly changed. This change is primarily associated with the disintegration of the LDP's dominant position following electoral reform and a realignment of the electorate. The demise of LDP dominance has resulted in a two-party system where alternating LDP and DPJ led governments may be the new pattern within Japanese politics.

Chapter 4
Nominating Candidates Under New Rules in Italy and Japan: You Cannot Bargain with Resources You Do Not Have

Aldo Di Virgilio and Steven R. Reed

Introduction

In the 1990s, Italy and Japan both adopted mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) electoral systems that combined single member districts (SMDs) with proportional representation (PR) (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001b). Political parties in both countries were thus faced with the novel problem of deciding who to nominate in each SMD. In both countries, SMD nominations were made through complex negotiations among candidates, parties, and coalitions, but the form taken by those negotiations were quite different. In Italy, nominations were allocated through a centralized bargaining process among the parties participating in a pre-electoral coalition (PEC). PECs allocated winnable SMDs to the participating parties in proportion to the overall contribution of the party to the national vote of the coalition. Italian parties thus "proportionalized the SMDs" (D'Alimonte 2005). In Japan, nominations were determined by decentralized negotiations at the district level between candidates and the central party headquarters. In Italy, there was a single national bargaining table for each electoral coalition, while in Japan there were 300 different bargaining tables for each party, one for each SMD. Why did the response to such similar problems differ so widely?

We propose a path-dependent explanation of these different outcomes produced by similar electoral systems. We argue that the nomination process was determined by the bargaining resources available to the parties and candidates in the first election under the new MMM system. Those resources were, in turn, determined by incentives embedded in the pre-reform electoral system. The main resource available to Italian negotiators was party support as demonstrated in recent PR returns because the pre-reform electoral system had been PR. The main resource available to Japanese negotiators was organized local support for a particular candidate because the pre-reform electoral system had been the single non-transferable vote in multi-member

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districts (single non-transferable vote, SNTV), a system that rewards the development of a personal vote (Carey and Shugart 1995). Over the decades since the end of World War II, political actors had developed the resources that were useful under the old system and had no other resources to use in dealing with the new system. Habits of the mind, applying and perhaps adjusting familiar decision rules developed under the old system to the new system, played some role in inducing differing responses to similar systems. The electoral systems were similar but not identical, and seemingly minor differences also played some role. The devil was sometimes in the details of the electoral systems. However, the inescapable reality was simply that you cannot bargain with resources you do not have. Of course, actors soon began developing new resources more appropriate to the new system, but that process would also take decades and was shaped by decisions taken in the first MMM election.

The chapter is organized as follows: First, we describe the nomination processes in the two countries. Next, we compare the countries with respect to the characteristic that most clearly distinguishes them, the mobility of SMD candidates in Italy and their stability in Japan. Then, we ask why the nomination processes under such similar systems differed so widely. We analyze differences in the details of the two electoral systems but argue that the difference was not to be found in the details but in the context, and that the context was determined by historical experience.

SMD Nominations in Italy

Over the course of the three MMM elections held after the 1993 electoral reform and before the 2005 reform (1994, 1996, 2001), Italian parties organized themselves into PECs. By the second election, the number of PECs had been reduced to two, although those two coalitions changed their labels and their compositions at each election. Both PECs allocated winnable SMDs to the participating parties in proportion to the overall contribution of the party to the national vote of the coalition. The process took place in five stages. The first four stages are inherent to negotiations over the electoral pact: (1) definition of the database needed to calculate quotas for each party; (2) classification of the SMDs into quality bands; (3) determining the number of SMDs to be allocated to each party; (4) allocation of specific SMDs to each member of the coalition (and subcoalitions). The final stage – (5) designation of the specific candidate for each SMD – was generally left up to the party that was allocated the particular SMD (Di Virgilio 2004).

By the second MMM election, both coalitions had effectively centralized their nomination processes, and SMDs rapidly reached the predicted equilibrium of no more than two viable candidates per district. This represented a remarkably rapid and thorough adaptation to the implications of Duverger's law. Bipolarity prevailed at both the national and the district levels (Reed 2001; Bartolini et al. 2004). Although remarkably rapid and thorough, the adaptation was neither immediate nor simple. Actors did not simply deduce the optimal strategy and implement it. It took time to learn how the system worked.

The introduction of the MMM electoral system was interwoven with the increasing degree of flux in the party system. Political parties that contested the March 1994 elections were not the same as those that had adopted the new MMM electoral system in August 1993. Less than 50% of the 1994 incumbents ran as candidates, and 21% of those were defeated. Of the 630 deputies, 449 were elected for the first time (Verzichelli 1995). Such a turnover was similar to the 1922 transition to fascism and the 1946 transition to the democratic republic. There were thus few reliable points of reference to guide the 1994 nomination process. It was impossible to predict who would win in each of the newly drawn SMDs. Each PEC had its own pre-electoral calculations, and individual politicians often had differing opinions. A high degree of electoral volatility was expected. Electoral strategies for the parties were defined only on the eve of the elections. This was true above all for non-left parties.

The parties of the left had already tested their coalition strategy at the local level in the 1993 runoff election for the mayor of Rome and other big cities. Eight left parties built a popular front much like a PEC. The 1994 PEC was constructed from regional tables and involved a great deal of internal struggle both among the parties participating in the coalition and between the national party leaderships and regional and local branches of each party. The allocation of candidacies within the PEC took place in 20 regional tables, but a national table controlled a number of "national nominations." From such a national table, the leaders of smaller coalition parties were parachuted into safe SMDs located in leftist strongholds of Emilia Romagna and Tuscany (Di Virgilio 1995).

Centrist parties struggled to define their electoral strategy and puzzled until a month before the March 1994 elections. A weak centrist alliance called Pact for Italy stood between the left and the right but had no geographically concentrated electoral base. The Pact for Italy had no truly safe SMDs and thus had problems finding enough candidates to run in all the SMDs. For centrist candidates, a PR nomination was more rewarding than an SMD nomination. The center PEC did not survive to compete in the second and subsequent elections.

Two PECs with a variable geography were established on the center-right: the Freedom Pole (*Polo delle Libertà*) in the north and in most of central Italy and the Pole of Good Government (*Polo del Buongoverno*) in the South. Both were led by *Forza Italia* (Go Italy!, FI), Berlusconi's business firm party. His main allies were the Lega Nord (Northern League, LN) in the Pole of Freedom and the *Alleanza Nazionale* (National Alliance, AN) in the Pole of Good Government. The bargaining process for the allocation of SMDs in the two right PECs was centralized and quickly defined. FI was running for the first time and had no incumbents or even candidates with their own power bases, so Berlusconi could select candidates largely at his own discretion. Thanks to the alliance with FI, the LN and the AN were certain to win more seats than ever and could thus easily nominate all of their incumbents and reward their rank and file with winnable nominations as well. Thus, a centralized agreement easily rewarded each of the three parties. FI generously rewarded its two main allies, above all LN. In a second step of the negotiations, FI allocated from its own quota safe SMDs and some top-level positions on its own PR lists to its minor allies such as *Centro Cristiano Democratico* (CCD).

Although the adjustment to SMDs was rapid, it was neither an automatic application of previous practice nor a rational application of optimal maximization principles. It was a learning process. The process thus was *varied* (each party performing with different timing and varied effectiveness) and *incremental* (strategies changed, indeed improved, after each round of elections). In the 1994 elections, PEC strategies were reactions to the anticipated effects of the new MMM electoral system in a fluid political environment. The revolution in electoral strategies was thus a dependent variable caused by the electoral reform. By the 1996 and 2001 elections, however, party electoral strategies also became an independent variable, and PECs had become independent actors, causing changes in Italian politics.

PECs copied from each other and their strategies converged. Parties of the left and center created a new center-left PEC (called the Olive Tree coalition in 1996 and 2001 and the Democratic Union in 2006) and adopted some of the 1994 center-right recipes: a coalition maker (the PDS, Democratic Party of the Left); a choice of a coalition leader (Romano Prodi); and a centralized nomination process at a national table. On the other hand, the new center-right PECs (called Pole of Freedom in 1996 and House of Freedoms in 2001 and 2006) abandoned the 1994 compensatory criteria and adopted a more proportionalized allocation of SMDs in both 1996 and 2001 elections. New parties were formed and entered the game. They were able to enter the game on an equal footing with established parties because they had demonstrated their vote-winning capacity in regional elections. These took place, in both 1995 and 2000, a year before each of the general elections and thus assumed the function of a dress rehearsal for the national elections and were employed as a means of estimating the strength of each party in the coalition.

The learning process is clearly indicated by the increasing accuracy of the ex ante calculations used to allocate winnable SMDs, as illustrated in Table 4.1. Parties increasingly came to the same predictions about which side would win a given SMD and were increasingly accurate in their predictions. By the third election, over three-quarters of the SMDs could be accurately predicted, which meant, in turn, that the coalitions could bargain over "winnable seats" with confidence.

By the 1996 elections, the learning process consisted more of an adaptation of the rules by the parties rather than in an adaptation of the parties to the rules. A number of technical tricks were devised, together with a "specialized" jargon (Di Virgilio 2002). For example, short or empty lists were called "sterilized" lists. In the 2001 elections, the center-left coalition classified SMDs in seven quality bands, and the

Table 4.1 The increasing accuracy of Single Member District (SMD) predictions in Italy

Chamber and Year	Percentage of predictions on which both coalitions agreed	Percent of agreed predictions proven correct
1996 (Chamber Only)	58.1	69.8
2001 (Chamber Only)	83.6	76.2
2001 (Both Houses)	75.2	76.9

Source: Di Virgilio (2004)

worst of them were "SMD nominations to be paid back in future negotiations." There were "zebra nominations" in which the PEC balanced nominees for the Chamber and the Senate by selecting candidates from different parties or with different characteristics, for example, one being known locally for being a mayor or a member of a local or regional council and the other unrelated to the local context. At the same time, PECs were increasingly able to select from among candidates linked to the local context. This was true above all for the center-left PEC in 2001, which nominated 11 mayors from midsize towns.

This panoply of possibilities gave the PECs enough options to solve complex bargaining situations and thus to combine a centralized nomination agreement for the allocation of the specific SMDs to each member of the coalition with party designation of the specific candidate for each SMD. Under the previous electoral system, the nomination process was characterised as "local involvement and central control" (Wertman 1988). After reform, there was *less* local involvement and *more* central control but also a significant degree of continuity. Central control was increased both by the fact that nominations had to be negotiated within the PECs and by the increased organization power of the central leaderships within the new parties. PECs were more important than parties for winning seats and winning control of the government, but party support remained fundamental to gaining a nomination. PECs controlled only a small quota of safe candidacies directly. These were managed by the prime minister's nominee, Prodi in 1996 and Rutelli in 2001 for the center-left.

Proportional allocation of SMDs to coalition partners required both centralization and candidate mobility among SMDs. All parties in an electoral coalition sat at a single table negotiating SMD nominations. While negotiations in both countries were indeed complex, negotiations in Italy took place at one table, while negotiations in Japan took place in each SMD, with the national party organizations playing only supplemental roles. The greater centralization of the nomination process in Italy explains why Italian SMDs approached the equilibrium of two candidates per district so much quicker than did Japan (Reed 2001, 2007).

SMD Nominations in Japan

The Japanese process was neither centralized nor systematized. Instead of a single national bargaining table for each electoral coalition, negotiations took place at the SMD level at 300 different bargaining tables for each party. Although all of these stories cannot be summarized in a coherent list of steps taken, we can describe general patterns, especially for the larger parties and especially for the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party). Compared to Italy, two points are clear. First, the Japanese process started with what was the last step of the Italian process: deciding which candidates should be nominated in a particular SMD. Second, the initiative lay originally with the candidates, not the parties. Parties had few resources with which to bargain, but each candidate had a well-organized personal

vote, some portion of which would be willing to follow them to another party or support them even if they did not get a party nomination. Candidates had this resource because it had proven to be the optimal way of campaigning under the previous electoral system. PECs played no role because they did not exist.

Once the SMD lines were drawn, each candidate determined to run in the SMD where their personal campaign organization was concentrated. Strong candidates would typically declare their intention to run in a specific SMD and then begin negotiating with their party, or perhaps with several parties, for the nomination. The candidates' bargaining position was determined by the strength of their local organization relative to the other candidates who wanted the same SMD nomination. Some candidates had sufficient local support to ensure that they would win their SMD under any circumstances. The party, most often but not always the LDP, simply nominated the "winning candidate" instead of assigning a candidate to a "winnable SMD." In other cases, only one candidate sought the nomination and was given it. Complexities arose when either more than one candidate or no candidate at all sought a particular SMD nomination.

Under the pre-reform system, parties had few bargaining chips to convince a candidate either to step down in favour of another (Reed 2009) or to run a losing race for the good of the party. The new mixed-member system provided parties with a new bargaining chip, the PR list nomination, and the parties used that chip to solve their SMD nomination problems.

In the Japanese MMM system, parties may nominate candidates at the same rank, with the ties broken by the SMD returns. When the results are tallied, candidates who won their SMDs are removed from the PR lists, and the SMD losers are re-ranked according to how close they came to winning their SMD. In theory, no one should be given a free ride at the top of the list, and no PR candidate should be excused from running in an SMD. However, parties have been forced to make exceptions. Candidates want a guaranteed list position, but to get one they must offer the party something in return. The nomination must be negotiated and a bargain struck.

In practice, both major parties nominate most of their SMD candidates in a single large tied clump in the middle of the PR list. We may call these "competitive nominations" because the SMD candidates are forced to compete for a PR seat. Those nominations above the clump may be called "negotiated nominations." These are "winnable PR list positions" that represent a bargain struck between the candidate and the party. Those below the clump are "token nominations" because they are given with no expectation that the candidate might actually win a seat. In Italy, "winnable SMD" seats were negotiated among parties in a PEC, but in Japan "winnable PR list positions" were negotiated between particular SMD candidates and their parties.

The LDP often has two candidates who want to run in the same SMD, both with some valid claim to the nomination and support in the district. The DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan) more often has a problem finding enough candidates to run in all the SMDs (Scheiner 2006). With fewer SMD nomination problems to solve, the DPJ has been able to use over 90% of their winnable PR nominations to reward SMD candidates. The LDP has been forced to make more exceptions. An analysis

of LDP negotiated nominations thus offers some insight into what the party values, what it is willing to trade for a winnable PR list position. We divide the negotiated nominations into SMD logics and PR logics.

SMD logics include, first, the simple problem of a district with two candidates in one SMD. The ideal solution would be to convince one candidate to run elsewhere, in an SMD where the party has no candidate. A candidate who leaves his or her home base, however, must begin building up a new base of support among voters who do not necessarily know his or her name. If the party simply ordered the candidate to move, he or she might well run in his or her home SMD as an independent, thus splitting the LDP vote and handing a winnable SMD to the opposition, something that did in fact often occur. To convince the candidate to leave his or her base, it proved necessary to compensate the candidate with a winnable PR nomination.

A second way of solving the problem of two candidates for a single SMD seat is a tag team arrangement (called a Costa Rica arrangement). One candidate runs in the SMD and the other candidate in the PR tier with a winnable list position. The candidates agree to campaign together and to take turns running in the SMD. This situation involved both cooperative and competitive aspects, similar in some respects to the relationship between cooperating parties in the two-round SMDs in France (Rochon and Pierce 1985; Tsebelis 1988). The only benefit to the party lies in preventing two candidates from running in the same district. The cost is a PR nomination that might have been used to reward SMD candidates who came close to winning their SMDs. Party headquarters has repeatedly announced its intention to eliminate tag teams but has repeatedly failed to do so.

A third type of SMD nomination problem is getting a candidate to run in an opposition stronghold. In return for running a hopeless race in the SMD, the candidate is often rewarded with a negotiated PR nomination. A more familiar problem is that of getting a candidate to stand down in favour of a coalition partner.

The final SMD logic is the category of "assassin", an exceptional and probably unrepeatable event that occurred in 2005. In an effort to "change Japan by changing the LDP," Prime Minister Koizumi not only refused to nominate any of the LDP Diet members who voted against his postal reform bill but also nominated candidates who supported postal reform in every one of the rebels' districts. These nominees were termed assassins because they were sent to defeat the LDP rebels. The strategy worked, giving the LDP an overwhelming victory in 2005, but failed to change the LDP. Koizumi's successor allowed the winning rebels back into the party and, where the LDP had a choice between nominating a loyal assassin SMD loser or a rebel SMD winner, they have almost always chosen to nominate the winning rebels.

We have divided the PR logic nominations into three categories. The first is group representative. In the PR tier of the House of Councillors, most nominations go to representatives of large interest groups. The LDP gives the group direct representation in the Diet in exchange for support from the organization. When first deciding who to nominate in the PR tier of the lower house, it seemed reasonable to follow the same logic as used in the upper house.

Table 4.2 The allocation of Liberal Democratic Party negotiated proportional representation nominations by logic (%)

Logic	1996	2000	2003	2005	2009
Personal base	60.0	41.0	35.1	17.1	18.2
Tag team	22.5	24.6	37.8	25.7	36.4
Strong opponent	5.0	3.3	10.8	14.3	18.2
Coalition cooperation	0.0	9.8	5.4	2.9	0.1
Assassin	0.0	0.0	0.0	28.6	0.0
Total SMD	*87.5*	*78.7*	*89.2*	*88.6*	*81.8*
Group representative	7.5	8.2	5.4	0.0	18.2
Personal popularity	0.0	3.3	0.0	11.4	0.0
Other reason	5.0	9.8	5.4	0.0	0.0
Total PR	*12.5*	*21.3*	*10.8*	*11.4*	*18.2*

The second PR logic is a candidate nominated for personal popularity in the hope that voters who like the candidate will vote for the party. It was Koizumi in 2005 who first systematically nominated popular candidates, and several of his assassins also fit into this category. Finally, there were several incumbents in 1996 who found themselves with no SMD and without sufficient clout to demand a tag team arrangement. Some of these candidates were given safe PR nominations until retirement. We categorized these as "other" and also included a few candidates for whom no obvious logic applied. These types of nominations were fundamentally "grandfather clauses" (i.e., exceptions that allowed the old rules to apply one last time) that have already disappeared and should never reappear.

Negotiated LDP nominations are categorized by logic in Table 4.2. With two exceptions, nearly 90% of the LDP negotiated nominations are used to solve SMD nomination problems. In the 2000 election, a large number of defectors returned to the LDP and the party awarded either them or the LDP candidate in the SMD with a place on the PR list, thus inflating the number of negotiated nominations. In the 2009 election, the total number of PR seats won by the LDP dropped from 76 to 55, and the smaller denominator inflated the percentage attributed to those candidates who represented LDP support groups.

Mobile Italian Candidates, Immobile Japanese Candidates

Theoretically, we would expect SMDs to promote the development of strong ties between candidates and their districts. This was the rule in Japan but the exception in Italy. We calculated the number of SMDs where at least one candidate ran in two or three consecutive elections. The results are displayed in Table 4.3. The contrast between the two countries could hardly be greater.

Over the span of the three MMM elections, less than 20% of the 475 SMDs of the Chamber saw at least one candidate contesting the same district in all three elections. Comparing stability of candidates between the first and second elections

Table 4.3 Single member districts (SMDs) in which at least one candidate ran in consecutive elections (%)

Location	1st–2nd[a]	2nd–3rd[b]	1st–2nd–3rd[c]
Italy	57.9	53.5	21.1
Italian South	68.9	59.0	30.2
Japan	96.0	93.3	79.3

Source: Italy, Di Virgilio 2002; Japan, calculations made by the authors
[a] 1994–1996 elections in Italy, 1996–2000 elections in Japan
[b] 1996–2001 elections in Italy, 2000–2003 elections in Japan
[c] 1994–1996–2001 elections in Italy, 1996–2000–2003 elections in Japan

to that between the second and third elections, we see that the trend was toward less, not more, stability. One would expect more stability from a simple inertial decision rule, one based on a default option of nominating a candidate in the same district unless there is some specific reason to nominate the candidate elsewhere. In fact, the exigencies of coalitional engineering produced many reasons to ask candidates to move. The makeup of PECs changed at each election, requiring the reallocation of SMDs among the parties, and that process usually required candidates to change districts. Any given SMD might become more or less "winnable" between elections, which would change its status in the negotiations among the parties in the PEC. Candidate selection in the SMDs was a distributive issue among coalition partners, and solving these problems required candidate mobility among the SMDs. Ties between incumbents and their district were simply not strong enough to override the centralized allocation process.

In Japan, almost 80% of the 300 SMDs saw at least one candidate who ran in the first three elections, and over 90% saw stability between any pair of consecutive elections. Indeed, most of these candidates running in consecutive elections were winners. Japanese incumbents have changed SMDs only under extraordinary circumstances and must be compensated with a safe PR seat when they do. In fact, these calculations actually underestimate the degree of stability for two reasons. First, districts with tag teams appear to have changed candidates, but neither candidate has moved to another district. Both remain firmly tied to the same SMD. Tag teams were developed precisely because the parties could not persuade either candidate to move. Second, many of the "new candidates" were the sons or daughters of the retiring candidate. Direct inheritance of a nomination, a Japanese tradition (Ishibashi and Reed 1992), hardly represents candidate mobility. In Japan, one could count the cases of truly complete candidate turnover on the fingers of one hand.

Rather than calculating the number of districts with complete candidate turnover, the more interesting calculation in Japan is the number districts featuring re-matches between the same two candidates in consecutive elections. Over 10% of districts saw the same two candidates finish first and second in the first three elections, and that figure for the first two elections was 30%, rising to 34% between the third and fourth elections. If one counted tag team members and relatives as

re-matches, both of those figures would increase. In Italy, one could count the number of re-matches on the fingers of one hand.

In Italy, candidates were mobile because each of the actors, coalitions, parties, candidates, and voters followed the script. With few exceptions, candidates accepted the SMD nomination they were given, and voters voted for the candidate recommended by their party irrespective of the candidate's own party affiliation. This was a script that Japanese actors would not, indeed could not, follow.

Table 4.3 also shows that the Italian south is somewhat more similar to Japan, suggesting a cultural component to the linkage between candidates and their districts. The few Italian cases in which the incumbent and challenger were both renominated in the same SMD in two consecutive elections were all found in the south. In southern Italy, the candidate/voter relationship is based on personal exchange, and the parties are weaker, making it more similar to Japan. Under the old PR system, personal vote was employed above all in the south. In Italy, the possession of a personal vote did not represent a bargaining chip for SMD candidates except to some degree in the south.

Was the Devil in the Details or in the Context?

If the Italian and Japanese electoral systems were so similar, why were the responses of the parties in the two countries so different? We have characterized the nomination processes as negotiations, but negotiations are based, in the end, on a "blackmail" threat: "If you do not do X, I will do Y." The standard threat in Italy was made by parties to PECs: "If you do not give us winnable SMD nominations, we will not join your PEC and might even join the rival PEC." The standard threat in Japan was made by candidates to parties: "If you do not nominate me in my preferred district, I will run as an independent and might even run for a rival party." The threats were different because the resources available to candidates and parties were different. In Italy, a candidate threat to run as an independent and in Japan a party threat to withhold electoral support were empty threats. Few Italian candidates had a personal support base capable of competing in an SMD without party support. In contrast, few Japanese parties had supporters who would vote according to party directives.

In Italy, independent candidates had some effect on SMD outcomes but only in the first election under the MMM system. Those cases were concentrated in the south and concerned a few influential incumbents belonging to the recently deceased government parties. Also, in 1994 PECs sometimes failed to prevent two candidates from the same PEC from running in one SMD. On the right, AN and CCD candidates ran against each other in 36 southern SMDs (plus the 12 SMDs in the Marches regions). On the left, Socialists and Progressives ran against each other in the Sicilian SMDs. These cases represent neither an independent candidate strategy nor a decision of a local candidate to challenge the PEC-nominated candidate. Rather, they represented a local struggle between parties within a PEC. In 1996, there was only one candidate winning on the basis of his personal vote running against PEC

candidates. This was a southern mayor, who won the SMD running on the PR list of his own party, created solely for the purpose of electing one man.

Some candidates tried to bargain with their party for a nomination if they had local ties, and a PEC might decide that local visibility would be a competitive advantage in a particular SMD and nominate a local mayor or a member of a regional parliament. In the end, however, local and regional party organizations mattered little, and candidates mattered even less.

In the 2000 election in Japan, the LDP formed a coalition with Koumei, Japan's religious party, and tried to convince some LDP to stand down. This strategy would have allowed LDP supporters to vote for Koumei, LDP's coalition partner, in 18 SMDs. This number was a far cry from the 94 seats it should have been able to claim on the basis of its contribution in the PR tier in this election. Of course, this Italian-style calculation is misleading in Japan because the LDP wins many fewer votes in the PR tier than in the SMD tier, and Koumei wins many more. In 11 of the 18 districts where the coalition was represented by a Koumei candidate, an LDP candidate ran as an independent against their coalition partners; Koumei won only two of these seats. In the seven districts in which Koumei did not face competition from an LDP candidate, it won five. Since then, Koumei has been able to claim only nine SMDs, mostly those they won in 2000. According to exit polls, in those districts where the LDP-Koumei coalition was represented by a Koumei candidate, only 38% of LDP supporters voted for a Koumei candidate in 2000, although that percentage rose to 56% in 2003 and to 68% in 2005 (*Yomiuri Shimbun,* September 12, 2005).

The only party in Japan that had the capacity to get its candidates to stand down and their voters to support a candidate from another party was Koumei, but it could get little in return. To maintain electoral cooperation, the LDP had to develop the capacity to exchange LDP votes to Koumei in the PR tier in return for Koumei votes to the LDP in the SMD. This exchange became increasingly effective until the 2007 House of Councillors election, when it seems to have fallen apart (Reed and Shimizu 2009).

Italian candidates could not credibly threaten to stand as independents, and Japanese parties could not get either their candidates or their voters to follow an Italian script. It was not a matter of preferences or incentives but of resources. Actors in one country sometimes tried to act like those in the other country, but when they tried, they failed.

Details That Might Contain a Devil

Although we argue that the fundamental differences between Italy and Japan were in the resources inherited from the previous electoral system, we must consider the counter-hypothesis that the devil was in the details of the electoral systems, that the broad similarities between two versions of the MMM system masked important differences. We find that there were several details that appear to

Table 4.4 Differences in some details of the two electoral systems

Criteria	Italy	Japan
Nomination per candidate	One SMD Up to 3 PR	One SMD Only one PR
Link between SMD and PR Tiers	Flexible (Up to five symbols per candidate. Independent candidacies not allowed)	Rigid (SMD party and PR party must match. Independent candidacies not allowed)
The PR Tier	No preferential vote Tied ranking not allowed	No preferential vote Tied ranking allowed

Note all entries refer to the Lower House only
PR Proportional Representation, *SMD* Single Member District

explain the differences in the nomination processes, the most notable of which are summarized in Table 4.4.

Three details seem to clarify some of the differences. First, independent candidates were allowed in Japan but not in Italy. This explains why there were many independent candidacies in Japan but not in Italy. Second, Italian candidates could run under multiple PR labels, while Japanese candidates could only run under one, and that had to be the same as the label used in the SMD. This would seem to explain the importance of PECs in Italy and their absence in Japan. Third, the Japanese MMM system allowed tied rankings on PR lists, which the Italian MMM system did not. This would seem to explain why tag teams were used in Japan but not in Italy.

We consider each detail in turn but argue for the path-dependent explanation. In each case, we make three arguments: First, the details themselves were, to some degree, path dependent. Second, the contrapositives, "if Italy had adopted a Japanese detail, the Italian nomination process would have looked more like that of Japan" or its converse do not necessarily hold. Third, electoral systems are not unmovable objects to which passive candidates and parties must adjust. Political actors display a remarkable degree of ingenuity in getting around bothersome details and have even been seen to amend the law when it suits their purposes.

We note that independent candidates were important in Japan but not in Italy. The simplest explanation is that the Japanese MMM system permitted independent candidacies, while the Italian MMM system did not. But, why did Japan permit independent candidacies? The answer is that independents played a large role under Japan's previous electoral system, and many of the legislators who designed the bill had run and been elected as an independent. Independent candidates were seen as a problem by party leaders, and reformers tried to disadvantage independents as much as possible, but outlawing them altogether was not feasible. The previous electoral system in Italy did not feature independents, so Italian reformers had no need to allow them. The explanation of this detail is thus path dependent.

Obviously, it is easier to run as an independent when it is legal to do so, and this detail thus surely made some difference, but there is no reason to believe the contrapositive that if the Italian MMM system had permitted independent candidacies, then Italy would have looked like Japan. First, independent candidacies were permitted in the Senate, but almost all of them failed. Second, even in the Chamber candidates could get around the law by creating "pseudoparties" designed to elect a single candidate. Italian voters did not follow the Japanese script and vote for the candidate instead of the party. If the Italian MMM system had permitted independent candidacies, it would have made some difference but not much because Italian candidates did not have the resources necessary to exploit such a provision. Of course, Italian candidates might develop new resources to take advantage of a new opportunity, but in the beginning, the devil was thus much less in the details than in the context.

Japanese candidates often used the tactic of creating political parties to get around restrictions on campaigning by independents and to give themselves a chance, however remote, to win a PR seat. Even if the Japanese MMM system had required candidates to belong to a political party on a PR list, it would have changed the form, but not the substance, of those candidacies.

Italian parties devised complex PECs to take an effective part in elections; Japanese parties did not. The most obvious explanation is that whereas Japanese candidates could run under only one label, Italian candidates could run under up to five. Italian candidates could therefore stand for an electoral coalition such as the Olive Tree without abandoning their own party label. They could also run under the label of a larger party in addition to their own party label, allowing small parties that could not cross the 4% threshold to cross that threshold under another label. None of these options were available to Japanese parties. However, the same arguments apply to this devilish detail.

Why did the Italian MMM system have the option of running on multiple lists while the Japanese MMM system did not? The answer is partially path dependent. This provision was not particularly novel in Italy because of its long experience with PR elections, but in Japan, the whole idea of PR, of winning a seat even though no one wrote your name on a ballot, was considered suspect. The idea of allowing SMD candidates to be nominated on multiple lists was never seriously considered.

Again, the contrapositive does not hold. If Japanese parties had been given the option of running SMD candidates under multiple PR lists, Japanese politics would probably have been significantly different, but it is hard to imagine the emergence of Italian-style PECs, particularly the centralisation that accompanied them in Italy, because Japanese parties, candidates, and voters would not have followed the Italian script. The closest thing Japan had to a PEC was the New Frontier Party (NFP) in 1996. The NFP was formed from the merger of several parties and ran under a single label, but the previous party identity of the candidate made a significant difference in the SMD outcome. Voters thus failed to follow an Italian script. PR votes could not be converted directly into SMD votes. Candidates would not have changed SMDs to suit the needs of a coalition. The immobility of Japanese

candidates was due to the resources at their command, not any detail of the electoral system.

When faced with the necessity of electoral cooperation, we imagine that Japanese parties would have found attractive the option of using a joint label in addition to their own party label. It would have solved their problems easier than the stratagems they actually devised. And, the LDP did, in fact, develop the capacity to trade PR votes for SMD votes, although it required three elections to become effective. Again, we conclude that the explanation for Italian PECs lies more in the context than in the details, especially in the short run. Japanese parties may have developed the capacity to produce PECs if they had the options available to Italian parties, but it would have taken them several elections to do so.

If Italian parties had to function under the Japanese MMM system, they would have found it more difficult to organize PECs, but Italy would still not have looked like Japan. Italian candidates would still have been much more mobile, obviating the need for using the PR tier to solve SMD problems. Flexible PR nominations proved to be a devilish detail only in Italy. It would not have been nearly as important in Japan. Context determines which details will prove important.

In Japan most SMD candidates also ran in PR, while few did so in Italy. In Japan, an increasing number of PR winners also ran in an SMD, while few did so in Italy (Di Virgilio 1997). The most obvious explanation is that the Japanese MMM system gave parties the option of using tied nominations to give SMD candidates a chance to win a PR seat and an additional incentive to campaign hard in their district, while Italian parties did not have this option.

The origins of the tied-rank provision are unclear, but it does seem to reflect SMD-centered thinking and an aversion to PR lists. It is hard to imagine what Italian parties might have done with such an option, if it were available, but it is clear that they could have gotten around the provision if they had so wished. Italian parties could have followed a "short-list" strategy, putting fewer candidates on the PR ballot than is allowed to encourage candidates in the SMDs to run effectively even in those situations in which they were "sure losers." This stratagem would have produced similar results to the tied-rank stratagem used in Japan. Italian parties did use this stratagem but not often, indicating that, at least initially, they would not have found the tied-rank provision particularly attractive even if it had been available. If the Japanese MMM system did not have the tied-rank provision, however, it would certainly have changed Japanese nomination procedures significantly, but it would not necessarily have made Japan look like Italy. The tied-rank provision proved a devilish detail in Japan but would not have been as important if it had existed in Italy.

Note that we have not discussed the varying proportions of SMD and PR seats in the two MMM systems. In Italy, the SMD tier accounted for 75% of the total number of seats, whereas that percentage was 60%, rising to 62.5% after 2000 in Japan. The proportion of seats allocated to each tier would seem to be an important detail, one that would certainly be entered into any large-n study of mixed-member systems, yet it did not explain any of the striking differences in the nomination processes of the two countries. One cannot predict which detail will contain a devil from the electoral system alone. You also need to know the historical context. Note

also that we are not arguing that details made no difference. We are only arguing that, if you want to explain the differences in nomination processes between the two countries, you are better off knowing the historical context than the details of the electoral system.

Electoral Systems, Political Context, and History

Most generalizations about the effects of electoral systems are correctly framed in terms of statements about equilibrium outcomes. A basic but often-overlooked fact is that it takes time to reach any equilibrium. For the first several elections, context is likely to be more important than the details of the electoral system. This is exactly what we find in our study of the nomination process under a MMM system in Italy and Japan. We point to one particular aspect of that context, the resources available to political actors, and argue that those resources were determined primarily by experience under the previous electoral system. Ours is thus a path-dependent explanation.

With the partial exception of our cultural explanation for why the Italian south was somewhat more like Japan than was the rest of Italy, we invoke no independent variables other than electoral systems. What we add is time. After 40 years under PR in Italy and SNTV in Japan, parties had reached something approaching the equilibrium for those respective systems. If the MMM system were to persist for 40 years without change, we would expect to see strategies approaching a new equilibrium. However, Italy has already changed its electoral system, rendering this prediction moot. Japan has made some minor adjustments to their electoral system, but evolution toward a new equilibrium had already became apparent in the fourth (2005) and fifth (2009) elections. Candidates had become more mobile, and the candidates' individual characteristics were overwhelmed by the popularity of their respective parties (Reed et al. 2009b).

Chapter 5
Electoral Reform and Factional Politics in Italy and Japan

Daniela Giannetti and Michael F. Thies

Introduction

Italy and Japan have often been compared on the basis of the fact that they both had a highly factionalized dominant party that maintained control of national government for long periods of time. While the Italian Christian Democratic Party (DC) was typically the dominant party in multiparty coalitions, in Japan the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was able to form single-party majority governments (Scheiner 2006).

An important theme in the party politics literature is the presence of similar types of factional activity in both the DC and the LDP. This was judged in part to be a consequence of the electoral system, especially in the case of Japan.[1] Moreover, scholars highlighted the role that factionalism played in structuring the intra-party distribution of the payoffs of office and, more particularly, cabinet portfolios and junior ministries in the DC (Mershon 2001; Kato and Mershon 2006) and the LDP (Leiserson 1968; Cox and Rosenbluth 1993; Cox et al. 1999; Boissou 2001). While the power and influence of factions were self-evident, the logic underpinning the behavior of factions has been the subject of debate.

For example, in the case of Italy, Sartori (1973, 1976) argued that DC factions were almost exclusively based on the pursuit of office. Other scholars have pointed out that DC factions had distinct policy positions as "they identified themselves along a left–right spectrum, justifying their alliances inside and outside the party in ideological terms" (Bettcher 2005; see also Mershon 2001). Many studies of the LDP factions in Japan concluded that they were the main vehicles for gaining votes and

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[1] There is an extensive literature on factional politics in Italy and Japan. For details see, Laver (2001), Browne and Kim (2003), Boucek (2003, 2005), Bettcher (2005), and Kato and Mershon (2006). On the impact of the electoral system in fostering factional politics in Japan, see Kohno (1992), Cox and Rosenbluth (1993), and Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies (2000); for Italy, see Pasquino (1972), Katz (1985), and Boucek (2005).

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office payoffs, with minimal policy differences among them (note, McCubbins and Thies 1997). However, later research by Thies (2001) showed that LDP factions took care to appoint junior ministers from different factions than their corresponding ministers, just as coalition-partner parties did in Italy after World War II. Such a finding suggests the existence of non-negligible policy differences between LDP factions.

It has proved difficult to resolve this debate of office versus policy seeking within the DC and LDP literature because of data constraints and the problems of making causal inferences in complex strategic environments. In any case, the most egregious features associated with the presence of a long-time ruling party played a strong role in paving the way for electoral reforms in the early 1990s and profound changes in the Italian and Japanese party systems.

In Italy, the almost-pure proportional representation (PR) electoral system of the postwar period was changed by the Parliament in 1993 under the pressure of a popular referendum to a mixed-member (MM) system for electing both the Chamber and the Senate, according to which 75% of the seats were allocated by plurality and 25% of the seats were allocated by PR. Japan moved from the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) to a MM system in 1994 for electing both the lower and upper house. Like the Italian MM system, the Japanese reform combined single member districts (SMDs) with a PR tier, and also as in Italy, one goal of this electoral reform was to change the nature of party competition and improve standards in public life.

In this chapter, it is argued that these electoral reforms provide an important opportunity to study how party factions evolve when the institutional and strategic environment changes. More specifically, the response of party factions to electoral reform has the potential to tell us things about the importance of office- versus policy-seeking motivations in understanding factional behavior.

In the next section, we outline how the DC party factions re-established themselves as independent parties, shaping electoral competition and government formation (and termination), and then how those post-DC parties faded after a further change in the electoral rule in 2005. Then, we review the evidence of the declining relevance of factions in the post-reform LDP and investigate possible explanations for their continued existence. The conclusion compares the fate of factions in Italy and Japan and offers some general lessons and suggestions for further research work.

From Factions to Parties: Electoral Reform and the Birth of Post-DC Parties in Italy

One of the most immediate and spectacular consequences of electoral reform in Italy was the disintegration of the DC along factional lines (Boucek 2005). In this respect, the electoral system reform acted as a catalyst for the demise of the DC in 1994 as the party had already lost its dominant position in 1992 national elections (see Giannetti and Sened 2004; Giannetti and Taniguchi, Chap. 3, this volume). Importantly, however, the DC did not so much shatter as splinter: The main DC factions survived intact and managed to be successful in the new political environment.

Most of them reestablished themselves into new (smaller) parties and began to play a crucial role in preelectoral and governmental coalitions. Here, we examine briefly the factions-cum-parties that ran party lists at least once in the national elections between 1994 and 2006. The main splits may be summarized as follows:

- In 1992, Mario Segni founded a movement advocating the reform of the electoral system through a popular referendum. Segni left the DC in 1993 and founded a party called Patto Segni in 1994.
- In 1994, the last National Congress of the DC was held. The party changed its name to PPI (Partito Popolare Italiano/Italian Popular Party). The same day, a faction led by Pierferdinando Casini split and founded a new party called CCD (Centro Cristiano Democratico/Christian Democratic Center).
- In 1995, a PPI faction split and founded a new party called CDU (Cristiani Democratici Uniti/United Christian Democrats) led by Rocco Buttiglione.
- In 1998, a legislative faction led by Clemente Mastella and called UDR (Unione Democratica per la Repubblica/Democratic Union for Republic), later UDEur (Unione Democratica per l'Europa/Democratic Union for Europe), was formed by MPs mostly elected to the CCD-CDU party list.
- In 2001, a new party called Democrazia Europea/European Democracy (DE), including members of the former DC (among them the life-tenured Senator Andreotti), was founded by Sergio D'Antoni.
- In 2004, the DCA (Democrazia Cristiana per le Autonomie/Christian Democrats for the Autonomies), sometimes referred to as New DC (Nuova DC), was founded Gianfranco Rotondi.

It is undeniable that the new electoral rules played an important role in the decision of factions to break away from the DC party. The MM system fostered the formation of large electoral cartels competing in SMDs. The CCD split of 1994 can be explained on the basis of the pursuit of a different electoral strategy, which led the party to join the right-wing coalition, while the PPI decided to run in the elections independently.

At the same time, the electoral system created incentives for small parties to merge as well, not only to pass the 4% electoral threshold in the PR tier, but also to gain power in subsequent elections. The main fusions between 1994 and 2006 were as follows:

- In 2002, the CCD and the CDU merged into the UDC (Unione dei Democratici Cristiani e dei Democratici di Centro/Union of Christian and Center Democrats), led by Marco Follini.
- In 2002, the PPI merged with the parliamentary faction I Democratici and the party Rinnovamento Italiano (RI), led by former Prime Minister Lamberto Dini, into a new party called Margherita-DL (DL- The Daisy).
- In 2002, DE merged into the UDC.

In what follows, we trace the formation of the post-DC parties in 1994 to their origins in specific DC factions; we use data about factional affiliation and the career paths of the members of the last National Executive Committee (NEC; 1989–1992) of the DC (see the Appendix to this chapter).

Between 1989 and 1992, the DC party was divided into five main factions as shown in Table 5.1. In summary, these were (1) a left-wing faction called *Sinistra* led by Ciriaco De Mita, whose size can be estimated to be around 37%; (2) a right-wing faction known as *Azione Popolare* that was approximately the same size and was led by Antonio Gava and Arnaldo Forlani; (3) the *Andreotti*, followers of party leader Giulio Andreotti, which had 17% support; (4) the *Fanfaniani*, followers of the leader Amintore Fanfani, attracted 3% support; and (5) the faction called *Forze Nuove*, followers of Donat Cattin, which had 7% support. The Eighteenth DC Party Congress had elected Forlani as party secretary with 85% of the delegate vote.

The Appendix of this chapter shows that more than three-quarters of representatives of the left-wing Sinistra faction in the DC NEC joined the newborn PPI. Of the NEC representatives from the right-wing Azione Popolare faction, 31% joined the newborn CCD party, including CCD founder and leader Pierferdinando Casini. The Azione Popolare faction included at the time DC party secretary Forlani, and prominent faction leaders such as Antonio Gava and Vicenzo Scotti. These people were accused of corruption and had to retire from politics, at least temporarily. Of the NEC representatives of the Andreottiani faction, 40% joined the CCD. Finally, the lone NEC representative from the Fanfaniani faction joined the right-wing party AN (Alleanza Nazionale/National Alliance), while all of the right-wing faction Forze Nuove entered the CCD. Thus, despite an overall dearth of data, it can be argued that the formation of post-DC parties had its roots in the policy-based differences that are known to have existed among DC factions.

Expert survey data about party policy positions collected by Laver and Benoit (2006) confirmed policy differences along the left-right dimension among the post-DC parties that formed between 1994 and 2002. In 2001, Margherita-DL was located at point 8 on the 1–20 left-right scale, while the CCD-CDU (later UDC) was given a mean 12.5 score by Italian political experts. In 2006, the policy positions of Margherita-DL (8.5) and the CCD-CDU (12.3) were not very different from 2001, while the UdEUR was located at 10.6 on the scale (Giannetti and De Giorgi 2006). To get a sense of these relative policy positions, it is important to look at the policy positions of the other largest parties in the system, such as DS (Democratici di Sinistra/Left Democrats) (6.0) on the left and FI (Forza Italia/Go Italy) (15.6) on the right. Policy differences among post-DC parties are key variables in explaining their formation.

Post-DC Parties and Electoral Competition

In this section, we focus on those DC factions that formed parties of their own and ran party lists at least once in the national elections between 1994 and 2006. The purpose of this section is to show how post-DC parties were able to successfully adapt to a changing political environment. The electoral performance of the post-DC parties is shown in Table 5.2, which gives vote and seat shares in an national election between 1994 and 2001 (Chamber of Deputies).

Table 5.1 Factional composition of the Italian Christian Democratic party, 1984–1989

DC factions	1984 National Congress	1984 National Council	1986 National Congress	1986 National Council	1986 National Executive Committee	1989 National Congress	1989 National Executive Committee
Sinistra (Left)	34.4	31.3	34.0	37.0	43.4	35.0	36.6
Fanfaniani (Fanfani)	6.7	6.3	5.0	5.0	3.3	3.0	3.3
Forlaniani (Forlani)	9.9	9.4	11.0	10.0	10.0	–	–
Center	–	–	26.0	24.0	23.2	–	–
Dorotei (Piccoli)	12.8	12.5	15.0	–	13.3	–	–
Dorotei (Bisaglia)	7.8	9.4	6.0	–	3.3	–	–
Scotti	3.3	3.1	2.0	–	3.3	–	–
Colombo	2.3	3.1	3.0	–	3.3	–	–
Andreottiani (Andreotti)	12.2	12.5	16.5	16.5	13.4	17.8	16.6
Azione Popolare (including Forlaniani, Dorotei, Scotti, Colombo)	–	–	–	–	–	37.0	36.6
Forze Nuove (Donat Cattin)	8.0	9.4	7.5	7.5	6.7	7.0	6.6
Other	3.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Source: Wertman 1988; Boucek 2003 and Baccetti 2007

Note that factions are arrayed from left to right (Mershon 2001). Data are incomplete. Percentages indicate size of factions. Percentages in the National Council column refer to the 160 members elected by Congressional delegates. Percentages in the National Executive Committee column refer to the members elected by the National Council: 32 in 1984, 30 in 1986 and 1989

Table 5.2 Vote (V) and seat (S) shares of parties following the collapse of the Italian DC party in national elections, 1994–2008 (Chamber of Deputies)

	1994			1996			2001			2006			2008		
	V	S	S/V	V	S	S/V	V	S	S/V	V	S	S/V	V	S	S/V
PPI	11.1	5.2	0.5												
Patto Segni	4.7	2.1	0.5												
Popolare per Prodi				6.8	10.5	1.5									
Margherita-DL							14.5	12.9	0.9						
UdEUR										1.4	1.6	1.1			
DE							2.4	0.0	0.0						
CCD		3.5													
CCD-CDU/ UDC				5.8	4.8	0.8	3.2	6.5	2.0	6.8	6.2	0.9	5.6	5.4	0.9
DCA														1.3	
Total	15.8	10.8	0.7	12.6	15.2	1.2	20.1	19.4	1.0	8.2	7.8	0.9	5.6	6.7	1.2

Note that vote shares refer to the proportional representation (PR) tier. Seat shares refer to the total percentage number of seats S/V denotes seat-to-vote ratio. In 2006, Margherita-DL, DS, and the Movimento Repubblicani Europei (MRE) ran under the common label Ulivo. CCD-CDU relabelled itself as UDC before the 2006 elections. There are no vote share data for Margherita-DL in 2006 as it ran under the Ulivo label, which also included DS and MRE. Similarly for 2008, there is no vote share data for DCA as it ran under the PdL label. Seat attribution calculated by the author on the basis of biographical information of MPs.

In 1994, the post-DC parties were strongly penalized in terms of their total seat share, with an Advantage Ratio (AR), or ratio of seats to votes won, of 0.7. This was mainly due to the fact that PPI and the Patto Segni ran in the elections independently, under the label *Patto per l'Italia*. They succeeded in getting only 33 deputies elected, mostly in the PR tier, because they were squeezed by the two large cartels. The CCD party adopted a much more rewarding electoral strategy, being able to elect 22 MPs under the FI label and forming a distinct parliamentary group immediately after the election.

From 1996 onwards, the situation was reversed. The PPI, which had joined the left-wing *Ulivo* coalition, was well rewarded in terms of seats (10.5%) given its vote share (6.8%). On the contrary, the CCD-CDU, a member of the right-wing cartel *Polo delle Libertà*, gained only 4.8% of the seats with a vote share of 5.8%. However, the overall advantage ratio for the post-DC parties for the 1996 poll was 1.20.

In the 2001 elections, the overall advantage ratio for the post-DC parties was slightly below 1.0 (0.96). Table 5.2 reveals that the advantage ratio for the Margherita-DL was less than 1.0. Moreover, DE, the centrist splinter of the PPI that contested the elections independently, was not able to gain seats despite obtaining 2.4% of the vote in the PR and 3.5% of the vote in the plurality tier. In contrast, the CCD-CDU had an advantage ratio greater than 2.0.

These electoral data show two things. First, post-DC parties were relatively successful in electoral competition, but only when they ran as members of large pre-electoral coalitions (note the poor performance of PPI-Patto Segni in 1994 and the failure of DE in 2001). Second, their advantage ratio in terms of seats was tied to the electoral success of the coalition to which they belonged, the left-wing coalition in 1996 and the right-wing coalition in 2001.

Post-DC Parties in Government

The 1993 electoral system created complex post-electoral dynamics in which the electoral cartels encouraged by the single-member plurality elections functioned "like highly indisciplined and factionalized large parties" (Giannetti and Laver 2001). The proportional element gave a clear indication of the relative strength of individual members of the electoral cartels, which in turn formed the basis of the post-electoral bargaining for government offices. In this context, the evidence presented in Table 5.3 shows that the post-DC parties clearly benefitted in terms of office payoffs.

In most parliamentary democracies, portfolio allocation tends to conform to a strict proportionality rule, or Gamson's law, according to which size is the most important determinant of bargaining outcomes (Warwick and Druckman 2006). Deviation from proportionality can be taken as an indicator of the bargaining power of political actors due to their central location in the policy space (Laver and Schofield 1990). Data about portfolio allocation to post-DC parties showed that the advantage ratio was always above 1.0, except in 1996, when the less-than-proportional number of ministers allocated to PPI was compensated by the fact the party obtained the prime minister.

Table 5.3 Portfolio allocation for parties after the Italian Christian Democratic (DC) Party, 1994–2008

Year	Governments (post-DC parties)	S_j contribution (%)	Share of cabinet posts (%)	AR
1994	Berlusconi I: May 11 to Dec 22, 1994 (center-right)			
	(CCD)	3.5	7.1	2.0
1996	Prodi I: May 18, 1996, to Oct 9, 1998 (center-left)			
	(PPI)	26.0	22.8	0.9
1998	D'Alema I: Oct 21, 1998, to Dec 18, 1999 (center-left)			
	(PPI)	20.0	23.8	1.2
	(UDEur)	8.2	9.5	1.2
1999	D'Alema II: Dec 26, 1999, to Apr 25, 2000 (center-left)			
	(PPI)	18.0	21.7	1.2
	(UDEur)	6.9	8.7	1.3
	(I Democratici)	6.6	13.0	1.9
2000	Amato: Apr 26, 2000, to Mar 9, 2001 (center-left)			
	(PPI)	18.3	17.4	0.9
	(UDEur)	6.6	8.7	1.3
	(I Democratici)	6.6	13.0	1.9
2001	Berlusconi II: Jun 11, 2001, to Apr 20, 2005 (center-right)			
	(UDC)	11.4	10.0	0.9
2005	Berlusconi III: Apr 26, 2005, to Apr 27, 2006 (center-right)			
	(UDC)	9.9	13.0	1.3
2006	Prodi II: May 17, 2006, to May 8, 2008 (center-left)			
	(Margherita-DL)	24.4	28.0	1.1
	(UDEur)	4.0	4.0	1.0
2008	Berlusconi III: May 8, 2008 to present (center-right)			
	(MPA)	2.3	4.8	2.0

Note in 2006, DS and Margherita-DL joined the parliamentary group L'Ulivo. The seat attribution to Margherita-DL has been done by the author on the basis of biographic information about the members of the Ulivo parliamentary group. Note the Dini government (January 17, 1995, to January 7, 1996) is excluded because it was a caretaker government.

AR (Advantage Ratio) = Actual share of cabinet posts (ministers)/S_j contribution. S_j is the seat share of party j divided by the total seats of the coalition

In 2001, the CCD-CDU was slightly underpaid in terms of government ministers (AR = 0.9). However, after a reshuffle that led to the Berlusconi III government in 2005, the UDC (former CCD-CDU) obtained one more minister, which brought the advantage ratio to equality. These findings again suggest that having a central location in the policy space was an important determinant of the capacity of the post-DC parties of extracting office payoffs disproportionate to their size.

Between 1996 and 2001, processes of splitting and regrouping of parliamentary parties had a dramatic impact on the "making and breaking of governments" (Giannetti and Laver 2001). Both the post-DC legislative parties UDEur and I Democratici played a major role in the postelectoral legislative dynamics. UDEur facilitated the emergence of the D'Alema I government after the fall of the Prodi I government in 1998. In this situation, UDEur was able to exact a substantial share of cabinet posts (AR = 1.2). I Democratici was able to affect the making and breaking of Italian governments as well. For example, when negotiating their support for the D'Alema II government, they obtained four important portfolios and a substantial proportion of the cabinet posts (AR = 1.9).

Post-DC Parties Today

In 2005, yet another new electoral law was approved by the incumbent center-right governing majority. One of the main features of the 2005 electoral system is a stronger incentive to form pre-electoral coalitions, as parties have to pass a lower threshold if they join such coalitions, and there is no disincentive for parties to run under their own label due to the abolition of SMDs. As a consequence, the contribution of small parties to cartels became greater in the 2006 elections and also gave them more power (by threatening larger parties to leave the cartel). After these elections, most of the minor parties improved their position in terms of votes. Focusing on post-DC parties, within the left-wing coalition UDEur ran under its own label and gained 1.4% of the vote. Within the right-wing camp, the CCD-CDU more than doubled its vote share to 6.8% (see Table 5.2).

The election results in 2006 gave a narrow victory to the center-left coalition in terms of votes cast. Table 5.3 reveals a distinct advantage for post-DC parties in terms of portfolio allocation. The Margherita-DL, which also got the prime minister, had an advantage ratio of 1.1. Among the minor allies, UDEur attained the best ratio in terms of portfolio allocation.

The Prodi II government was short-lived, however. Giannetti and De Giorgi's (2006) analysis of party policy positions following the 2006 elections highlighted that UDEur was located to the right with respect to the other members of the left-wing coalition, while the Partito della Rifondazione Comunista/Communist Refoundation Party (PRC) was located to the extreme left. These policy differences raised questions about the capacity of enforcing policy agreements by any coalition with such diverse policy positions once in government. It is worth noting that the defection of UDEur from the coalition resulted in the fall of the Prodi II government.

The 2008 elections generated very different outcomes from the previous one, keeping the electoral system constant. In essence, a merger on the left-wing (DS and DL merged into the Partito Democratico/Democratic Party [PD] just before the elections) prompted an overall change in the electoral and legislative party system. On the right FI, AN, and DCA ran under a common party list named PdL (*Partito del Popolo delle Libertà*/Freedom's People Party) and subsequently formed a unified parliamentary party. Political fragmentation decreased dramatically as the effective number of parliamentary parties in the Italian legislature dropped from 6.2 in 2001 to 2.6 in 2006.

Explaining the decision to move from pre-electoral coalitions to party mergers is beyond the scope of this chapter (see Golder 2006). We simply note that the post-DC parties that formed between 1994 and 2002 no longer exist as parties, with the exception of the UDC, which refused to merge into the PdL. This means that almost all post-DC factions now exist within larger parties. This represents a return to the pre-1994 pattern in the sense that larger parties are composed of distinct factional groups. With regard to the PD, the media portray intraparty politics as a revival of the *correnti*, an expression that in the past was used to characterize DC factions. The presence of identifiable factions within both the PdL and PD has important implications for party cohesion, and it is the subject of future research.

Japanese Electoral Reform and the Fate of LDP Factions

In 1993, Japan's LDP suffered a split, and its government lost a vote of no confidence. After the ensuing election, a coalition of long-time opposition parties and new parties formed from the LDP defectors took power, pushing the LDP into opposition. The new prime minister, Morihiro Hosokawa (himself a former LDP prefectural governor), staked the life of his cabinet on political reform, including a replacement of the SNTV system. The story of the electoral reform process has been recounted elsewhere (see, e.g., Reed and Thies 2001a), so we turn directly to its implications for the internal organization of the LDP, particularly its factions.

The most important change from SNTV was the elimination of intra-party competition: Districts now only elect a single MP and voters are no longer are asked to choose between co-partisan competitors. Accordingly, candidates have less need of the resources that factions traditionally provided. Access to the official party endorsement no longer requires balancing across factions. A candidate may run on the reputation of his or her party because there is now only one candidate per party, so expensive intraparty differentiation tactics are unnecessary, and factionally provided financing is less vital. Since LDP candidates no longer owe their election to factional bosses, they feel less compelled to support those bosses in leadership selection and other internal battles. The electoral reform loosened factional bonds. In this section, we describe three sets of effects: leadership selection, post allocation, and elections.

Leadership Selection: Choosing the LDP President

Since the 1994 reform, the LDP has chosen a new party president seven times. In contrast to the faction-controlled, pre-reform process, post-reform leadership selection has proceeded in ways that reveal the weakness of factions today. The first case occurred in 1995. The president at the time was Yohei Kono, who had served in the position since the party split in 1993 and was seeking a second term. He did what presidential aspirants had always done: He started bargaining with the various faction leaders, promising posts in exchange for support in the contest, and he managed to build a coalition of three factions that together controlled a majority of votes in the legislative party caucus. These three factions, then, were set to comprise the (temporary) party mainstream, while the two other factions left out would constitute the anti-mainstream.

Ryutaro Hashimoto, from one of the latter factions, threw his hat into the ring, but rather than try to outbid Kono for the support of one of those would-be mainstream factions, he sought instead to undermine the internal discipline of those factions. He called for younger members of all factions to defy their leaders' marching orders and support the candidate most likely to lead the LDP back to majority status. He made explicit reference to the new electoral rules and argued that backbenchers no longer needed the sorts of resources that factions could provide. It worked. A cross-factional group of 52 younger politicians, including 24 MPs from the factions whose leaders had agreed to back Kono, threw their support behind Hashimoto. Kono withdrew, and Hashimoto was elected party president.

For backbenchers to defy their leaders' orders in a presidential contest as they did in 1995 was unprecedented, and in retrospect, it signaled the sudden end to decades of factional control over leadership selection. When Hashimoto resigned in 1998, factional leader Keizo Obuchi ran for the job, only to be challenged by his own factional lieutenant, Seiroku Kajiyama. This again showed the weakening of factional discipline; a fundamental principle of the old factional contract was that followers support their own leaders. Remarkably, after Obuchi won the job, his faction did not split, and neither Kajiyama nor his supporters were punished for their public insubordination.

Obuchi suffered a stroke in April 2000, and a hasty backroom deal led to the installation of Yoshiro Mori as party leader. Despite the extraordinary circumstances, many LDP MPs expressed their unhappiness with the lack of transparency or open competition, and after a year filled with frequent gaffes and plummeting approval ratings, the party prepared to dump Mori and hold another leadership election. This time, the candidate favored by most faction leaders was Hashimoto. In an effort to improve the image of the party, however, they allowed the 47 prefectural branches of the party to vote first, giving each prefecture three votes (for a total of 141), confident that Hashimoto would win enough of Diet members' 346 votes to waltz home with the victory. But, the prefectural round was a landslide for maverick Junichiro Koizumi, who promised sweeping reforms of politics and policy; he won 123 of the 141 votes (87%).

Faction leaders who had pledged support to Hashimoto allowed their members to vote freely, and Koizumi won the job. In similar fashion, the post-Koizumi choices of Shinzo Abe (2006), Yasuo Fukuda (2007), and Taro Aso (2008) were all open contests in which voting did not follow strict factional lines. Again and again since the electoral reform, factions have failed in their efforts to control the party leadership selection process.

Cabinet Appointments

During the reign of the LDP, cabinet formation was a factional game. For the first two decades of LDP rule, mainstream factions typically received a more-than-proportional share of cabinet and top party posts, as well as the most desirable ones. This advantage diminished over time, and after factional strife nearly split the party in 1980, all factions agreed explicitly to share the spoils more proportionally (Sato and Matsuzaki 1986). Throughout the 1980s, proportionality was the rule. What has happened since the electoral reform?

Junichiro Koizumi (2001–2005) famously announced that he would ignore factional balancing considerations in assembling his cabinets, and he clearly deviated from proportionality more than anyone before him, but he was not alone in the post-reform period. Between 1963 and 1978, the correlation coefficient between factional strength and factional cabinet presence averaged .789. Between 1978 and 1993, that number jumped to .903. Since 1994, the correlation coefficient has been only .734 (and only .607 for the Koizumi cabinets). Difference-of-means tests revealed that both differences are significant at the .05 level and are robust to various definitions of cabinet presence. The biggest deviation from proportionality is represented by Aso's cabinet (2008–2009), in which the correlation between factional strength within the parliamentary party and factional share of the cabinet is close to zero (r = .099).

Of course, the other guiding principle for cabinet appointments that became institutionalized during the period of LDP dominance was seniority. Typically, each LDP member would be first appointed to the cabinet in their sixth lower house term or third upper house term. Kohno (1992, 98) showed that deviations from this norm, measured as the number of first-time appointees who arrived early to the cabinet ("leapfrog" appointments) were rare as early as the mid-1960s and ceased completely by 1980. What about after the electoral reform? Table 5.4 extends Kohno's data to 2008. Clearly, seniority was not as sacrosanct as it was during the 1980s. The percentage of first- timers who were brought up "early" has increased markedly, although the raw number of first timers is small in some cabinets. The weakening of factional bonds, as well as the increased uncertainty about the LDP's hold on power after 1994, has freed party presidents to appoint talented younger MPs, even if doing so means that a mediocre-but-loyal party stalwart will have to wait longer or even give up cabinet aspirations.

Table 5.4 Seniority violations in Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) cabinet appointments

Prime minister	Date took office	No. of cabinets	No. of first-time ministers promoted	No. of leapfrog promotions	Share that were leapfrogs
Hatoyama	Nov 55	3	24	6	25.0
Ishibashi	Dec 56	1	13	4	30.8
Kishi	July 57	3	21	3	14.3
Ikeda	July 60	6	42	1	2.3
Sato	June 65	7	46	0	0
Tanaka	July 72	4	27	3	11.1
Miki	Dec 74	2	15	0	0
Fukuda	Dec 76	2	17	4	23.5
Ohira	Dec 78	2	28	2	7.1
Suzuki	July 80	2	17	0	0
Nakasone	Nov 82	5	60	0	0
Takeshita	July 87	2	21	0	0
Uno	June 89	1	11	0	0
Kaifu	Aug 89	2	23	0	0
Miyazawa	Nov 91	1	14	0	0
Two non-LDP Cabinets in 1993–1994					
Murayama[a]	June 94	1	10	4	40.0
Hashimoto	Jan 96	2	21	0	0
Obuchi	July 98	1	11	2	18.2
Mori	Apr 00	1	4	2	50.0
Koizumi	Apr 01	3	28	12	42.9
Abe	Sept 06	1	13	5	38.5
Fukuda	Sept 07	1	6	3	50.0
Aso	Sept 08	1	5	2	40.0

Source: The data through the Kaifu cabinets were taken from Kohno (1992, 98). Subsequent data were compiled by the authors from various issues of *Kokkai Benran*, *Seiji Handobukku*, *Seikan Yoran*, and *Asahi Shimbun*

[a]Murayama was the leader of the Social Democratic Party, but his cabinet was dominated by the LDP. The numbers in the table refer only to the LDP contingent

The strong norm (if no longer "rule") in favor of seniority might also explain why the decline of factional proportionality within cabinets was not more severe. Before the reform, the proportionality norm and the seniority norm reinforced each other. No faction wanted cohort "bulges," for fear that when the bloated cohort was elected for the sixth time, the faction would not be able to fulfill the promise of a cabinet chair given its proportional allotment of such posts. Thus, even after the 1994 electoral reform, the factions of the LDP were relatively similar in terms of age distribution. So, the expectation should have been that every faction would have had roughly the same proportion of "cabinet-ready" members (at least for first-time appointments), and if seniority were to remain a norm, a by-product should have been something close to factional proportionality, other things equal. The post-reform weakening of the proportionality norm described, then, occurred despite a seniority-based bias in favor of the status quo.

Factional Affiliation Decisions

If intraparty competition was the lifeblood of LDP factions, and if factions matter less or not at all for post allocation or leadership selection, then it ought to be true that fewer MPs even bother to join factions in the first place. Cox, Rosenbluth, and Thies (1999) showed that in the first MMM (mixed-member majoritarian) election in 1996, a record number of newcomers eschewed factional affiliation in their district races. Apparently, they decided that there was no reason to choose sides before even winning a seat because factional help in securing an endorsement and raising campaign funds was no longer essential.

Although it would be interesting to know if this choice of newcomers to postpone factional affiliation until after the first electoral victory persisted in later elections, we do not have the data to replicate the analysis for the 2000, 2003, and 2005 elections. But, we can note that the share of unaffiliated LDP members has been rising in recent years, and as of 2008 stood at 16.7%—an all-time high.

In summary, the 1994 electoral system change unraveled the basis of factional organization in the LDP. Before the reform, factions helped members with endorsements, posts, and money; and members would in turn support leaders' presidential aspirations or else follow orders concerning how to vote. Since the reform, the intra-factional exchange seems to have broken down completely. And yet, factions persist within the LDP. The question is why.

LDP Factions Today

As described, the number of factions within the LDP stabilized at 5 (or 4.5) by the mid-1970s. Nowadays, there are eight, with a larger-than-ever group of MPs who shun factional affiliation altogether. Accordingly, most factions are smaller than before the reform. So, why do so many LDP members still join factions? If factional affiliation is no longer the gateway to endorsements, posts, and money, then what purpose does it serve?

One possibility is that the LDP factions of today are more ideologically distinctive than in years past. No student of Japanese politics ever even attempted to produce the sort of ideological placement for pre-reform LDP factions that Italian scholars were able to create for DC factions. What about now? Today, the most important policy divide within the LDP is probably between reformist "liberalizers" and anti-reform conservatives (Kato and Kannon 2008). This divide was front and center during the Koizumi years, which culminated in his expulsion from the party of a handful of "rebels" who dared to oppose his reforms.

Unfortunately (for theory, anyway), there is no evidence that this internal cleavage has a factional flavor. As Table 5.5 shows, the postal rebels (so-called because the reform bills they sabotaged were designed to privatize and break up the postal system and its enormous savings and insurance arms) came from several different factions. When Koizumi ejected the rebels from the party prior to the 2005 general

Table 5.5 Factional distribution of "postal rebels"

Faction	Lower house opposed	Lower house abstained	Upper house opposed	Upper house abstained	Successful assassins
Hashimoto	16	3	5	2	1
Mori[a]	1	1	0	0	5
Kamei	12[b]	1	12	0	2[c]
Horiuchi	3	5	3	4	2
Yamasaki	1	2	0	2	0
Komura	0	1[b]	0	0	1
Kono	1	0	0	1	0
Unaffiliated	3	1	2	0	13
Total	37	14	22	9	24

[a]The Mori faction was the faction of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, so unsurprisingly, it included the fewest rebels and the most assassins
[b]Including the faction leader
[c]The Kamei faction became the Ibuki faction since Kamei himself rebelled and was resigned from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to form a new party

election, he handpicked new candidates to run against them in their districts; these people were quickly dubbed "assassins" by the press. The final column of Table 5.5 shows that the assassins who were elected (either by completing their tasks or else via the party lists in the PR tier) joined a variety of factions.

Further evidence comes from a survey of MPs' attitudes. While the survey was short, and with due caution about overinterpreting a null result, it revealed almost no examples of a statistically significant inter-factional difference on policy. On questions ranging from foreign policy and the trade-off between privacy rights and national security to pensions and taxes, there were no significant differences in the distributions of opinion across factions. Put another way, the overall range of opinion in the party was more or less mirrored within each and every faction (and among the factionally unaffiliated).

Table 5.6 shows just one summary piece of evidence, namely, members' self-placement along a 10-point, left-right ideological scale. The average self-placement within the LDP was at 6.03, one tick right of center, but the most progressive faction Kono's small group comes in at 5.14, while the most conservative group, Ibuki's, is only at 6.92. Note the last two columns, which show that the ideological range within each faction is wide; intra-factional differences clearly are larger than inter-factional differences.

Another possibility is that the factions of today might evince some sort of demographic difference. Because under SNTV every district contained multiple factions, factions could not have concentrated their membership in the same way as one or another Italian faction might have dominated one or another regional list. Now that the electoral system does not essentially oblige factions to share every district and thus end up as geographical clones, there is nothing to stop groups of MPs with regional or demographic commonalities from banding together.

Table 5.6 Ideological self-placement by faction, 2005

Faction	Number of respondents	Average self-placement (1 = progressive, 10 = conservative)	SD	Min	Max
Ibuki	13	6.92	1.66	4	10
Mori	43	6.47	1.81	1	10
Nikai	7	6.29	1.70	3	8
Yamasaki	22	6.09	1.93	1	8
Tanigaki	9	6.00	1.87	3	9
Horiuchi	26	5.96	1.93	1	8
Hashimoto	28	5.89	1.99	1	9
Unaffiliated	*73*	*5.79*	*1.97*	*1*	*10*
Komura	9	5.44	2.30	2	9
Kono	7	5.14	2.04	2	8
Total	237	6.03	1.92	1	10

Source: Boyd and Samuels House of Representatives Database (2008), which features the results of the 2005 Asahi Shimbun-Tokyo University Elite Survey (ATES) provided by Professor Ikuo Kabashima and his colleagues at Tokyo University

Table 5.7 Type of district by faction, 2005

Faction	Total SMD seats	Percentage of faction seats		
		Urban	Semiurban	Rural
Nikai	5	20	20	60
Tanigaki	9	22	22	56
Komura	8	38	13	50
Ibuki	13	38	23	38
Hashimoto	22	23	41	36
Mori	34	35	29	35
Yamasaki	15	33	40	27
Horiuchi	19	37	37	26
Unaffiliated	52	40	35	25
Kono	9	44	33	22
Total	186	35	32	33

Note the measure of urban-rural was compiled from government statistics on the percentage of population living in "densely inhabited districts (DIDs)" by Taku Sugawara of Tokyo University and publicly available at http://freett.com/sugawara_taku/data/2003did.html. These were matched with the factional affiliations of members from each district and are included in the Boyd and Samuels House of Representatives Database (2008), which features the results of the 2005 Asahi Shimbun-Tokyo University Elite Survey (ATES) provided by Professor Ikuo Kabashima and his colleagues at Tokyo University

But again, the data showed no such patterns (see Tables 5.7 and 5.8). The same is true of another potential organizing principle: age cohorts. The small Nikai group (which appeared after the 2003 election when the New Conservative Party merged into the LDP) was slightly older and more rural than most other factions, but again, the inter-factional differences were small. All factions contained a fair number of members from urban, semi-urban, and rural districts, respectively, and all included a wide range of ages.

Table 5.8 Average age of factions, 2005

Faction	Faction members	Average age	SD	Min	Max
Nikai	8	64.5	6.9	55	74
Yamasaki	27	59.7	8.3	37	69
Ibuki	17	59.3	11.6	32	73
Horiuchi	30	57.2	7.1	45	70
Kono	10	56.0	11.7	33	68
Komura	13	54.8	10.6	32	77
Mori	53	53.9	9.8	34	72
Hashimoto	35	53.9	9.9	31	75
Tanigaki	11	53.5	5.9	45	63
Total within factions	204	56.0	9.6	31	77
Unaffiliated	*92*	*47.2*	*10.5*	*26*	*81*
Total	296	53.3	10.7	26	81

Source: Boyd and Samuels House of Representatives Database (2008), which features the results of the 2005 Asahi Shimbun-Tokyo University Elite Survey (ATES) provided by Professor Ikuo Kabashima and his colleagues at Tokyo University

It seems that we can say a good deal about what post-reform LDP factions are not, and what they no longer do, but that leaves us with a bit of a mystery. Most likely, factions of today are merely vestigial, remnants of a time when they mattered and made sense, with only inertia and the absence of a compelling reason to dissolve to explain their persistence.

The last few years of the factional genealogy chart presented in Fig. 5.1 look much like the previous 50 years. There have been some factional splits and failed successions along the way, and there are now more groups than for the 20 years prior to the reform, but not much else has changed. Something not visible in the chart, but true nonetheless, is the fact that there has been little factional switching. Those MPs who choose to join a faction still tend to stay in it (or follow a contender for its leadership into an offshoot faction) throughout their careers.

Conclusion

The factional politics evident in dominant parties in Italy and Japan has fascinated scholars in their goal to identify institutional reasons for why two such different polities should nonetheless exhibit such similar styles of party politics. One institution that has attracted much attention has been the electoral system in which, in both Italy and Japan, different rules had the same effect: encouragement of intraparty competition. If this were the whole story, then the electoral reforms of the 1990s should have elicited similar consequences for factionalism in both Italy and Japan.

Fig. 5.1 Genealogy of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) factions, 1955–2008

In the case of Japan, the LDP was able to adjust to the new electoral rules and survived largely intact, while in Italy the DC disintegrated into its component factions almost immediately. Why were there such different outcomes from similar types of electoral reforms on similar dominant parties characterized by factions? One potential answer to this puzzle proposed in this chapter is that the DC and LDP were different in the degree to which factional behavior was driven by office- or policy-seeking behavior. Within the LDP, "factions of interest" predominated, while the DC factions had a significant policy basis.

Crucially, the electoral reforms led members of the DC to place greater trust in the likely electoral success of newly independent faction-based parties. In contrast, the LDP faction members decided that remaining within the party and its constituent factions was the best option for reelection and future access to the perquisites of office. In this chapter, our goal has been to show in a descriptive manner the different motivations prevailing within the DC and LDP and how the impact of an electoral reform provides a unique opportunity to study intraparty processes.

This research is of course just a first step. A crucial next step is to develop a more formal analytical framework to explore how changes in the institutional environment have a differential impact on factions of different types (i.e., office or policy driven). Such formal work would then form the basis for exploring dynamics of intraparty politics in different national settings.

Appendix Members of the Italian Christian Democratic (DC) party National Executive Committee (NEC) in 1989/1992 and their political roles in 1994 and 2002

Name	DC faction (1989/1992)	Role (1989/1992)	Offices in government	Legislatures I–XIV[a]	Party (1994)	Role (1994)	Party (2002)	Role (2002)
Bianco G.	Sinistra (Left)	1	M 1990–1991	V–XI, XIV	PPI	3: 1995–1997	DL	1
Bodrato G.	Sinistra (Left)	1	M 1981–1983, 1991–1992	V–XI	PPI	1		
Cabras P.	Sinistra (Left)	1		VI–XI	CS		DS	
Castagnetti P.	Sinistra (Left)	1	–	X, XIV	PPI	1, 3: 1999–2001	DL	1
De Mita C.	Sinistra (Left)	2	PM 1988–1989	IV–XI, XIII, XIV	PPI	1	DL	1
Elia L.	Sinistra (Left)	1	M 1993–1994	X, XII, XIII	PPI	1	DL	
Gargani G.	Sinistra (Left)	1	JM 1979–1984	VI–XI	PPI		FI	
Goria G.	Sinistra (Left)	1	M 1982–1987, 1991–1992; PM 1987–1988	VII–XI	1994[b]			
Granelli L.	Sinistra (Left)	1	M 1983–1988	V–XI	PPI		1999[b]	
Gullotti A.	Sinistra (Left)	1	M 1972–1979, 1986–1987	III–X	1989[b]			
Ladu S.	Sinistra (Left)	1	JM 1996–1998	XI–XIV	PPI	1	DL	
Sanza A. M.	Sinistra Left)	1	JM 1978–1983, 1987–1989	VI–XIV	PPI		FI	1
Tabacci B.	Sinistra (Left)	1	–	XI, XIV	PPI		UDC	
Cursi C.	Fanfaniani	1	JM 1992–1993	X, XI, XIV	–		AN	
Bonsignore V.	Andreottiani	1	JM 1992–1993	X, XI	CCD	–	UDC	
Cazzaniga S.	Andreottiani	1		–	CCD			
Evangelisti F.	Andreottiani	1	JM 1969–1976; M 1979–1980	IV–X	1993[b]			
Lima S.	Andreottiani	1	JM 1974–1976	V–VII	1992[b]			
Shardella V.	Andreottiani	1		X, XI	1994[b]			
Abis L.	Azione Popolare	1	JM 1974–1981; M 1981–1983	VI–XI	ᶜRet			
Bernini C.	Azione Popolare	1	M 1989–1992	–	ᶜRet			

Appendix (continued)

Name	DC faction (1989/1992)	Role (1989/1992)	Offices in government	Legislatures I–XIV[a]	Party (1994)	Role (1994)	Party (2002)	Role (2002)
Casini P. F.	Azione Popolare	1	–	IX–XIV	CCD	3: 1995–2001	UDC	
Cuminetti S.	Azione Popolare	1	JM 1979–1980	VI–X	Ret[c]			
D'Andrea G.	Azione Popolare	1	JM 2000–2001	XI, XIV	PPI	1	DL	1
Forlani A.	Azione Popolare	3	M 1968–1969, 1974–1979; PM 1980–1981; vice PM 1983–1987	III–XI	Ret[c]			
Gava A.	Azione Popolare	1	M 1980–1981, 1983–1991	VI–XI	Ret[c]			
Lega S.	Azione Popolare	1	Member of the European Parliament (MEP) 1979–1984	VI–XI	CCD			
Malfatti F. M.	Azione Popolare	1	M 1969–1970, 1973–1979	III–X	1991[b]			
Mongini R.	Azione Popolare	1	–	III–X	CCD		UDC	
Natali L.	Azione Popolare	1	JM 1955–1964; M 1966–1973	I–VII	1989[b]			
Scotti V.	Azione Popolare	1	JM 1976–1978; M 1978–1982, 1990–1992	V–XI	–		FI	
Zampieri A.	Azione Popolare	1		IX–XI	Ret[c]			
Fontana S.	Forze Nuove	1	M 1992–1993	–	CCD		UDC	
Leccisi P.	Forze Nuove	1	JM 1982–1983	VII–XI	CCD		UDC	

Sources: Affiliation of DC elite members is based on Baccetti (2007) and biographical information collected by the author. Role in the party (1989/1992, 1994, 2002): (1) NEC member, (2) party president, (3) party secretary

In the offices in government column: *M* denotes a minister, *JM* a junior minister, and *PM* the prime minister

[a]1948–1996

[b]Politician died in this year

[c]Politician retired

Chapter 6
Electoral Reform in Italy and Japan: Unanticipated Outcomes?

Ethan Scheiner and Filippo Tronconi

Introduction

During the 1980s and into the 1990s, citizens in Italy and Japan grew fed up with the politics of their country. The elite politician class of both countries faced problems of accountability and corruption. Finally, news of scandals in both countries in the early 1990s provided the impetus for substantial institutional change. By 1994, both Italy and Japan reformed the rules they used to elect politicians, with both countries instituting mixed-member electoral systems that provided simultaneously for a candidate-based single member district (SMD) tier and a larger seat magnitude proportional representation (PR) tier.

Hopes ran high that the new systems would address many of the most serious problems in those countries: With the reforms, observers in Italy hoped for real alternation in power and an end to the high levels of party fragmentation that helped debilitate numerous governments. In Japan, there was hope for the emergence of genuine party competition and turnover in office, as well as a decline in the highly clientelistic practices that dominated politics.

In many ways, the reforms proved successful, but a number of observers anticipated that the reforms would achieve even more and therefore were left disappointed by features of politics that remained unchanged. The changes to politics were substantial: Most notably, two-party (or two-candidate) competition at the district level became the norm in both countries, and alternation in power became common in Italy. On the other hand, under the new system in Italy, the party system remained exceedingly fragmented. And in Japan, single-party dominance remained in the House of Representatives (HR) – the legislative house in which reform was enacted – until 2009, and clientelistic politics still appeared to be widespread.

In this chapter, we examine the effects of electoral system reform in Italy and Japan, assessing whether and to what extent these outcomes (i.e., the lack of change

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in certain key areas of party politics) were in fact "unintended," "unanticipated," or even "unpredictable." We argue that it was unrealistic to expect so much from electoral reform for five principal reasons.

First, in general it is reasonable to expect outcomes that flow most directly from the incentives created by electoral rules, but the outcomes that many saw as a "failure" of electoral reform in Italy and Japan involved features of politics that flow only indirectly from electoral law. Second, electoral reform was ultimately passed by legislators who often had goals contrary to those of objective observers. Third, the focus of most analysis of the new electoral systems was on the "major" features of the new rules – in particular, the combination of SMD and PR tiers in one legislature – but each system also contained other, less-"high-profile" details that had an impact on politics. Fourth, electoral rules can have an impact on politics in numerous important ways, but for many of the "failures" of electoral reform, non-electoral system factors were at least as important. Fifth, considering non-electoral system factors, we find tentative, but provocative, evidence that the level of party competition might have played an important part in shaping some of the disappointing outcomes of reform in Italy and Japan.

Popular Discontent with the Previous Systems

In the 1980s and especially the early 1990s, there was great displeasure in both Italy and Japan with the lack of political accountability.

The Chamber of Deputies in Italy maintained a PR list system in which voters could use preference votes to alter candidate's positions on the party lists. The PR system helped fragment the party system, which in turn led to a long series of unstable coalition governments. Unlike closed-list PR systems, which tend to lead to greater attention on the parties themselves, the preference vote in the PR system in Italy personalized legislator-constituent relations. Elected representatives then helped maintain these relations through particularistic spending. And in this context, in large part on the basis of anti-communist appeals and clientelistic networks, the Christian Democratic (DC) Party was able to win a consistent plurality of the vote. As the party at the ideological center, the DC was part of every government during 1945–1992, and a DC politician was nearly always the prime minister.

In Italy, an odd combination of stasis and instability existed. The lack of stability of the coalition governments made it difficult to govern smoothly. But, at the same time, there was relatively little turnover in the parties making up the coalition, creating a sense of unaccountability (D'Alimonte 2005). On the other hand, the main opposition party, the Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party) (PCI), was not entitled to join the coalition government for international reasons.[1] And, as the leading parties became engulfed by corruption crises, popular anger toward the political system grew in the 1980s and early 1990s.

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[1] Given the loyalty of the Italian Communist Party to the Soviet Union and its refusal to explicitly accept Italian membership to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) until the mid-1970s, this party was constantly considered unfit to join government coalitions by the Christian Democrats and its allies. In Italian political jargon, this tacit agreement is referred to with the Latin expression *convenio ad excludendum*.

In Japan, the HR single non-transferable vote in multimember district system (SNTV/MMD) provided each voter with one ballot that they would cast for a candidate in a district, with each district typically holding between three and five seats. In each district, the top individual vote-getters – up to the number of seats in the district – would win office. Parties seeking to gain a majority needed to win roughly two seats per district, so a large party like the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had to run at least two candidates per district. The result was significant intraparty competition: Candidates highlighted their personal attributes and ability to deliver pork rather than broad-based policies. To maintain personal bases of support, candidates raised and spent exorbitant sums of money, as well as making a great show of providing their districts with public works spending.

Many associated the system with the long reign of power for the LDP, which began with the birth of the party in 1955. Power proved effective at keeping members of the LDP together, most notably giving government party members the opportunity to distribute state resources to their districts. Meanwhile, the opposition remained more fragmented. Moreover, rural areas, the greatest base of support for the LDP, received more seats per voter than the more competitive urban districts. With the LDP consistently winning a majority of seats, despite not taking a majority of the votes in the HR after 1963, the public associated SNTV/MMD with LDP dominance. With the money scandals of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the public grew tired of a system that seemed to promote the corruption of the LDP and a general lack of accountability.

Reform

In Italy in April 1993, a public referendum overturned the PR electoral system of the Senate, thereby putting pressure on elites to pass a comprehensive electoral system reform package (Katz 2001, 96). The package was passed later that year. A major effort was made to create a system of greater government stability and accountability; therefore, the focus turned to enacting a more majoritarian system. In Japan, voter displeasure with the system had grown from the late 1980s, and with the arrest of one of the leading politicians of the LDP in 1992, a number of LDP members sought to reform the electoral system. Party leaders blocked these moves, and as a result, a key group of HR politicians left the LDP to create new parties. New elections held in June 1993 led to an anti-LDP coalition government (which included the LDP defectors). In 1994, the coalition joined hands with the LDP to enact a new electoral system.

Both Italy and Japan introduced mixed-member electoral systems that provided voters with two ballots: one for a candidate in plurality-winner SMDs and one for a party list in PR voting.[2] The new Italian system put into place a 4% legal threshold of

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[2] We primarily refer here to the electoral system of the lower house (Camera dei Deputati). The Senate had a slightly different system, which included only a single ballot for the two tiers. See Appendix E for details.

representation in the PR tier; the system in Japan includes no threshold. Each system permits dual candidacies: Candidates can run in both the SMD and PR tiers simultaneously, and dual candidates who lose an SMD are eligible for seats in the PR component. The rule in Japan has attracted a fair amount of attention because of its "best-loser" component. That is, although dual candidates in Japan can be given specific preelection rankings, it is common for clusters of dual candidates to get ranked prior to the election at the same spot as one another on their party's PR list. In turn, those with a higher proportion of their SMD winner's vote total get better spots on the list and are therefore more likely to win a PR seat once ballots are tallied.

The reforms in Italy also permitted party "cartels" made up of coalitions of parties that would be determined *prior* to the election. A party that won under 4% of the vote in the PR tier might gain representation in some of the SMDs if included in one of the major coalitions. Individuals could run in SMDs as candidates for the coalition rather than a specific party.

What Happened After Reform?

In both countries, as a result of the reforms, accountability improved in important ways, but many observers were displeased with the continuation of certain features of politics.

In Italy, in conjunction with the death of the DC (owing to the widespread legal indictment of DC politicians for corruption), the new system encouraged parties to consolidate around two principal alternatives. First, as we discuss in greater detail in this chapter, the system clearly promoted the emergence of two-candidate competition at the district level. Second, combined with the rules promoting electoral alliances, the 4% threshold in PR made it advisable for small parties to enter pre-election cartels with larger parties. As part of the agreements, small parties were allotted a proportional share of "safe" SMDs. The cartels gave these small parties representation, the 4% threshold notwithstanding. For their part, major parties benefited by not having to face the risk of losing key votes to small competitors in marginal districts.

These cartels were, as D'Alimonte wrote, the "most important effect" of the new system (2001, 342) and led to regular and genuine turnover in office. The major alliances took turns at the reins of government as a result of election outcomes. The 1999 and 2004 European Parliament (EP) elections held in Italy under PR rules demonstrated just how important the new mixed-member system rules were. In the EP election, both center-left and center-right parties ran as separate entities (without any alliance) because they lacked the institutional incentives to consolidate (D'Alimonte 2001, 344).

Nevertheless, many Italian scholars were unhappy with important features of the system, and many observers were dismayed by outcomes that they had not anticipated (Bartolini et al. 2004; Bartolini and D'Alimonte 1996; D'Alimonte 2005; Morlino 1996). Most notably, there was general displeasure with the continued high levels of party fragmentation and the weak cohesion of coalitions. Even with the reforms, and

just as there were before, more than ten parties won seats. Also, cabinet fragmentation and instability remained high. In the 1994–2006 period, government coalitions included a number of parties ranging from four to nine, and cabinet duration, from an average of 11 months prior to the electoral reform, increased only to 15 months afterward (Cotta and Verzichelli 2007).

In 2005, the center-right government replaced the mixed-member system with one that offered voters simply one ballot for a party list and still allows parties to build pre-electoral alliances. The cartel that wins the plurality of the vote then receives 55% of the seats at the national level, with seats allocated proportionally within the coalition to each party with more than 2% of the vote.[3]

In Japan, the new electoral system led to some important changes, but great displeasure also remained as many of the outcomes that observers had most hoped for did not bear out. On the positive side, as we discuss, Duverger appears to be alive and well in Japan as district-level two-candidate competition appeared to come to fruition. Generally, SMDs created important incentives that led to a realignment of the party system: The opposition consolidated around a single party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), and the LDP and its small coalition partner (*Komeito*) coordinated to avoid competing at the district level. In turn, two-party competition between the opposition and LDP in SMDs became the norm (Reed 2005).

The consolidating influences of the SMD component of the new system was clearly critical to the ultimate success of the DPJ, but nonetheless, until 2009 – 15 years after reform was passed and only after five elections held under the new system – the LDP continued to hold a majority in the HR. Indeed, after four elections under the new system, the opposition was overall no more successful in the HR than it had been at its peak in the pre-reform period. Certainly, the post-reform LDP needed to enter into a series of coalition governments and relied in part on votes mobilized by its coalition partner, but aside from the brief period of party upheaval that grew out of the 1993 LDP split these coalitions were due most of all to the relative weakness of the LDP in the House of Councilors (HC), which scarcely changed its electoral system.[4]

Another positive shift – from the perspective of many observers of the Japanese system – induced by the reforms was the move toward broader-based campaigns founded on more parties that were more internally unified (or at least more centrally organized). To win the necessary plurality in an SMD – as opposed to the smaller share needed under SNTV/MMD – candidates in the new system developed broader bases of district support, extending beyond their small bailiwicks (Hirano 2006). Personal support organizations had always been central to candidates in

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[3]In the Chamber of Deputies, the mechanism is applied nationwide, whereas in the Senate (with powers equal to that of the Chamber), it is applied region by region.

[4]At the same time, it should be pointed out that when the opposition captured control of the HC in 2007, this created a far more difficult situation for the LDP within the legislature, reduced the standing of the LDP with the public, and therefore made defeat more likely in an HR election, as indeed occurred in 2009.

Japan, but with the introduction of SMDs these organizations came to cast their nets more widely and attempt to attract the support of more geographic areas and types of support (Krauss and Pekkanen 2004). Moreover, unlike the past, parties under the new system sought to attract voter support by means of general policy manifestos. From a different perspective, the electoral rule change also meant a change in the organization of the parties. Under SNTV/MMD, intraparty competition was widespread. and leaders had less control over the membership of the party. But, with the introduction of SMDs, party leaders gained greater control as only one candidate could realistically be nominated for a party in a given district. Intraparty competition and factionalism (especially in relation to district-level elections) declined.

Nevertheless, many critics of the old rules had hoped for even more change with the new and were therefore unsatisfied with the results (Reed 2001, 313). Most strikingly, campaigning continued to be highly candidate oriented, with substantial emphasis on pork barrel politics (see, e.g., Christensen 1998, 1003; Gallagher 1998, 225; Scheiner 2006).[5]

Why the "Unanticipated" Outcomes?

Electoral reform had been passed in Italy and Japan in the hopes of addressing myriad problems – most notably related to accountability and corruption – that they had faced under their previous systems. In many ways, the results of reform were as expected: Italy shifted from a system that rarely had real turnover in power, and therefore low levels of accountability, to one in which two blocs alternate in power. The Japanese party system came to consolidate around two general blocs and appeared to have helped broaden the appeals that many candidates make.

But, observers had hoped for more, and the lack of change in other key areas was not what the public had anticipated: The Italian party system under the mixed-member system remained fragmented, leaving coalitions unstable. The Japanese political system remained highly clientelistic, with substantial corruption. Moreover, LDP dominance for many years continued in the lower house.

We argue that these outcomes – or, more accurately, these features of politics that did not change – were unanticipated because of insufficient attention to five important issues, discussed next.

Treating as "Proximal" Effects Dependent Variables that Are "Distal" Effects of Electoral Rules

Rae (1971) distinguished between (1) "proximal" effects, which are based on a direct link between electoral rules and outcomes, and (2) "distal" effects, which are

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[5] See, among others, Reed (2005) for excellent discussions of the various effects of the reforms in Japan.

more indirect. Predictions based on the proximal effects of electoral rules are much more likely to bear out than those based on distal effects. For example, PR has a direct mechanical effect, ensuring that most groups receiving votes also gain seats. So, unless no cleavages exist at all in society, pure PR systems will tend toward multipartism. Reforms that seek to draw out outcomes and behaviors that are themselves a direct response to mechanical effects are likely to also occur as well but may occur more slowly (Shugart 2005, 36). For example, SMDs also have a direct mechanical effect: They provide representation only to the top vote getter in the district. However, there is also a psychological effect, which flows directly from the mechanical effect: Weak parties exit, and supporters of weak candidates vote for a more likely winner. The psychological effect does not usually occur immediately because it depends on actors gaining information about likely behavior and success under the system.

Outcomes founded on these effects are among the most reliable to flow from electoral systems, and we do in fact see them in both Italy and Japan. In both countries, changes in behavior at the district level follow as one would expect from electoral system theories. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 indicate the Laakso-Taagepera effective number of parties for the two countries in each election held under their mixed-member electoral systems. Based on the number of votes for each candidate, we determine the effective number of SMD parties in each district and then take the mean for all districts. We then do the same for the effective number of parties in PR ballots cast within each SMD. Expectations founded on proximal mechanical effects and psychological effects

Fig. 6.1 Effective number of parties in Italian single member districts
Note: Estimates are mean effective number of parties in each district

Fig. 6.2 Effective number of parties in Japanese single member districts
Note: Estimates are mean effective number of parties in each district

flowing from these mechanical effects would lead us to expect that (1) the number of parties in SMD balloting would tend toward two (Duverger's law), (2) multiple parties would appear in the PR tier of the system, and (3) the number of parties in SMDs would drop over time as actors gained more information about behavior in the system. Indeed, this is precisely what we see in Figs. 6.1 and 6.2. In both countries, the effective number of candidates in SMD balloting ultimately pushed toward two at the same time that a clear multiparty setting existed in PR. In Italy, there was a sharp drop in the number of candidates between the first and second election. In Japan, substantial realignment occurred between the first two elections, so the sharpest drop in the number of candidates did not occur until the third election under the new system.

Can we hold strategic voting by voters and strategic exit by candidates, parties and elites – fairly proximal effects of the SMD rules at the district level – responsible for much of this decline in the number of candidates? We examine this question by showing Second and First loser (SF) ratio patterns (see Cox 1997, and below for a definition) for Italy and Japan in each of the elections held under their new mixed-member systems. Duverger's law holds that, at the district level, the actual number of candidates in SMD balloting will decline toward two over time. As this occurs, there ought to be a decline as well in the number of votes cast for candidates who are less competitive – presumably those placing third or worse. SF ratios, which are the ratios of the votes won by the second loser (i.e., third place) to those won by the first loser (i.e., second place), demonstrate the extent to which this is true. Figure 6.3 provides a set of histograms that illustrates the different SF ratios for balloting within each SMD in Italy and Japan.

Fig. 6.3 Second and First loser (SF) ratios for Italy and Japan in the SMD and PR tiers

For comparison sake, we include SF ratios based on votes for candidates in SMD balloting (on the left side for each country) as well as the ratio of third place to second place votes for parties in PR balloting (on the right side for each country). The vertical bars indicate the SF ratio levels present in a large numbers of districts. As Cox (1997) discussed, SF ratio patterns that peak at the zero end of the figure are likely to reflect strategic behavior; that is, such a pattern is consistent with voters choosing to support only candidates who are competitive or weak candidates dropping out of the race.

The SF ratio patterns in Fig. 6.3 suggest that strategic behavior is at work here. As Fig. 6.3 shows, over time there was a sharp shift toward zero in the SF ratio patterns in SMDs. Of course, shifts of this kind could also be due to a shift in general levels of voter support for each party; they might simply prefer the second-place party to the third-place party in each district. The SF ratio patterns in PR balloting, the figures on the right side for each country, indicate that this was not what was at work here. In Italy and Japan, the SF ratio patterns shifted toward zero in the SMD tier but remained much farther to the right in PR. In other words, the second- and third-place parties received vote totals that were much closer to one another in the PR tier, where fewer strategic voting incentives existed, but moved apart in the SMD tier.

The coalition/alliance system undoubtedly helped bring about these patterns in Italy, but no such system exists in Japan. Despite this, the number of candidates in SMD balloting dropped sharply over time even in Japan. Indeed, if we exclude the Japanese Communist Party, which according to party policy until 2007 ran a candidate in nearly every SMD despite its inability to win any, there were on average in each Japanese SMD only 2.42 (2003) and 2.38 (2005) *actual* candidates, very close to Duverger's predicted two candidates per district and *less than* the average number of candidates running in each district in the pure SMD system in the US House of Representatives.[6]

An interpretation based on the work of Cox and Schoppa (2002), Ferrara et al. (2005), and Herron and Nishikawa (2001) might posit that many of the unanticipated outcomes in Italy and Japan have been due to a "contamination" effect that accompanies the simultaneous use of SMDs and PR in one system. For example, in SMDs within mixed-member systems, parties have an incentive to run candidates even if they would be out of the running because those candidates might help attract attention and votes in the PR tier. There can be no denying that contamination exists to some degree, but the Duvergerian outcomes noted in the SMDs of Italy and Japan makes clear that, for the most part, the proximal, district-level outcomes have been what one would expect in an SMD system. This is consistent with Maeda's (2008) finding of a general lack of contamination in Japanese SMDs.

In other words, in both Italy and Japan, the new electoral systems have had the proximal, district-level effects that one would expect, but the "unanticipated" consequences relate to more distal effects. In Italy, the fragmentation of the party system was in large part a result of fragmentation in Italian SMDs. However, the problem

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[6]In 2004, for example, there were on average roughly 2.5 actual candidates per district in the United States.

here is one of projection: We see, as predicted by Duverger, roughly two effective candidates per seat in each SMD, but multiple different parties (albeit most within a two-alliance structure) were contesting and winning SMDs throughout the country. It is at the nationally aggregated level that we see numerous parties in the SMD system, something that is not inconsistent with the proximal effects laid out by Duverger's law. In Japan, especially with the general pattern of two-candidate competition in SMDs, one-party dominance in the HR continues where what is most at issue is who wins seats and, not the proximal effects of electoral rules. Moreover, the other principal unanticipated outcome in the new system in Japan, the continued presence of clientelistic behavior, is also a distal effect of electoral rules, stemming directly from neither the mechanical nor psychological effects of the electoral rules.

The Reform Process

Prior to developing expectations about the likely impact of electoral reform, it is wise to consider just who changed the rules and what process was used to do so. As another contribution in this book develops this topic in depth (Di Virgilio and Kato, Chap. 2, this volume), here we limit ourselves to two short observations.

First, one should always be skeptical about the ability of political actors to control and predict the consequences of the electoral reforms they promote, especially under conditions of high party fluidity and volatility of voter preferences (Andrews and Jackman 2005). Second, in Italy and Japan the reform process was characterized by a number of failed attempts and long negotiations among parties with different interests and expectations. In such cases, the adoption of a mixed-member system has the appealing characteristic of compromising between opposite logics, making an agreement among the decision makers easier (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001a, 578).

In Japan, many in the LDP had long sought the introduction of a plurality system (Reed and Thies 2001a), in large part because of the strength of the party relative to other parties. A decisive role in the adoption of a mixed-member majoritarian system, though, was played by Komeito, a small party that expected to become part of a larger one in the new system. After the reforms, Komeito briefly joined with other parties to form one big party, but this new party had a short shelf life. Komeito was soon independent again and has sought since to weaken or eliminate the rules that it helped institute. In short, the support of Komeito for the new system was founded on an incorrect assumption that it would be part of a large force that could compete in SMDs.

In Italy, the reform process was initiated by a popular referendum, which changed the rules governing the election of the Senate. The parliamentary negotiations that followed resulted in a compromise between the DC, which advocated an SMD plurality system, and some of the smaller centrist parties, which insisted on a large share of proportionally allocated seats. Ironically, the minor parties were able to survive in the new system thanks to the proportionalization of candidates within each alliance *in the*

SMD tier of the new system (Bartolini et al. 2004, 11) but were generally unable to win PR seats because of the 4% threshold. As in Japan, the new electoral system had been adopted on the basis of an erroneous set of assumptions about its likely effects.

Insufficient Attention to Less-High-Profile Rules

In addition, most observers of the new systems in both countries based their expectations on the main change in the rules – especially the shift to a mixed-member system – but insufficient attention was given to the other rules that accompanied the new systems. In Italy, probably the most important was the rule that permitted parties to join together in alliances, keeping themselves simultaneously separate in PR but as a coalition in the SMD races. This rule made it relatively easy for alliances to allot SMDs proportionally to each party within them. This "proportionalized" the SMD tier and therefore led to substantial party fragmentation.

In Japan, a number of rules helped maintain the clientelistic system. The continued use of restrictive campaign laws (Christensen 1998) gave great incentives for clientelistic behavior. Moreover, at the time of the reforms little attention was given to dual-candidacy rules implemented. There had been high hopes that the PR rules would help push parties and candidates to focus on more nationalized, party-oriented behavior. But, the "best-loser" provision, which establishes that most SMD losers' ability to get a PR seat is dependent on how successful they are in their SMD race, gives numerous PR candidates and seat holders strong incentives to behave with their locality, rather than their party or even country as a whole, in mind.

Electoral Systems Are Not Sufficient Explanation

In addition, outcomes that did not match expectations were in large part a result of observers giving too much weight to electoral system-based arguments that missed the centrality of non-electoral system factors. That is, if many of the most important problems in political and party systems are not proximal effects of electoral systems, it is important to highlight and consider the non-electoral system factors that shape them.[7]

In Italy, the breakdown of the post-1945 party system brought about consequences that were logically independent of the electoral system reform. The disappearance of the DC, in particular, produced a wide array of small center parties. The fragmentation of the center of the political spectrum actually began *before* the electoral reform (La Rete – the Network – was formed as a splinter DC party in 1991

[7]For more detailed discussion of the insufficiency of electoral system-based arguments for explaining a number of factors of politics, see Scheiner (2008).

and contested the 1992 elections alone), and there is good reason to expect that the process would still have taken place under the pre-reform system. In addition, fragmentation occurred on the left, with the PCI splitting into a social democratic party, the PDS (Partito dei Democratici di Sinistra/Democratic Party of the Left), and a neo-communist one, Rifondazione Comunista, in 1991.

Another decisive non-electoral system element shaping the format of political competition was the general risk aversion of Italian political elites. The mixed-member majoritarian system adopted in 1993 allowed parties to build inclusive pre-election alliances without *forcing* them in this direction. In theory, large parties could have contested elections alone, but they would have run the risk of alienating small parties that might have siphoned off just enough of the vote in key competitive districts. Instead, the large parties took the safe route, which led to a *bipolar* competitive context rather than a true *two-party* situation. This context was quite different from the "riskless" one the parties found themselves in a number of years later. In 2008, after a new round of reform in 2006, victory by the center-right was widely assumed to be inevitable. The larger parties therefore had no difficulty giving up many of their alliances with small parties, and the system moved much closer to genuine two-partism.[8]

In Japan, non-electoral system factors played a critical role in maintaining LDP dominance in the HR. Scheiner (2005, 2006) suggested important ways that LDP success was due to the clientelistic and centralized governmental system in Japan. Japanese electoral politics emphasizes politicians' ability to deliver government benefits to their constituents, and government finances in Japan have typically been controlled by the central government. As a result, local politicians have strong incentives to, at a minimum, create close ties to and, commonly, to become members of the national ruling party, allowing the LDP to be even more dominant in subnational elections. In turn, the LDP long held a deep pool of local politicians who could mobilize voters for the party. Moreover, these local politicians made for "quality" candidates in races for national office.

In addition, much of the advantage of the LDP and the heavy emphasis placed on clientelistic politics in Japan has been a result of particular socioeconomic and sociodemographic patterns. In Japan, there is a significant divide between the urban and rural areas of the country. Rural areas tend to be founded on closer community ties and less emphasis on "issue" based politics, and incumbent politicians tend to have substantially greater advantages in rural areas than in urban. Moreover, rural voters tend to be older, less educated, and more likely to be employed in small businesses and protected economic sectors. Voters with these characteristics in Japan tend to be more likely to support clientelistic practices (Scheiner 2007), and, not surprisingly, therefore were more likely also to support the LDP, which had long protected rural areas and promoted such practices. As a result, Japan developed what Scheiner (2006) called two "parallel party systems": a rural party system that was heavily clientelistic and incumbent (and LDP dominated) and an urban competitive party system

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[8] This point is developed in greater detail by Di Virgilio and Kato, Chap. 2, this volume.

that was less clientelistic and more politically volatile. The LDP was so dominant in the 100 most rural SMDs in the country – winning roughly 75% of the seats – that it did not need to do especially well in the rest of the country and, yet, still maintain its control over the lower house (Scheiner 2006). Moreover, the importance of rural areas to the dominance of the LDP also gave the party great incentive to maintain the clientelistic practices that undergirded its success in the countryside. Amazingly, as we explain, it was the actions of an LDP prime minister, Koizumi, who took steps to undercut the clientelistic policies of the party, thus loosening many of the close ties of the party to the countryside in the 2007 HC and 2009 HR elections.

In this way, socio-demographic characteristics and socio-economic status play a critical part in shaping and maintaining both LDP success and the clientelistic system of Japan after the reform, but we would be overstating things to suggest that the electoral system was not at all significant. The importance of quality candidates is really only especially critical in candidate-centered electoral systems, such as that utilized in Japan. Also, the ability of the LDP to use rural seats to maintain its dominance was in part dependent on the low district magnitude electoral system that predominates in Japan today and gave the party a significantly higher proportion of seats than votes in the countryside.[9]

Nevertheless, the point here is that the electoral system was not the central piece in LDP dominance and clientelistic practices. Only when combined with other features of politics did the electoral system play an important role. And, with these features relatively unchanged, expectations of electoral reform leading to an immediate end to LDP dominance and clientelistic practices were overly optimistic.

Competitive Context

Finally, and we began to learn this from more recent changes under the newest electoral system in Italy, the competitive context, another non-electoral system factor, has also played an important part in shaping the unanticipated outcomes in both Italy and Japan.

Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) suggested that the degree of party competition plays an important part in shaping the types of politician-voter linkages. In particular, they argued that – especially in more highly developed economies – greater party competition leads to more programmatic (as opposed to clientelistic) politics. In this way, the lack of party competition in Japan may have helped support

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[9]We should be careful to highlight that we are not focusing on malapportionment here. Most systematic evidence suggests that the malapportioned districting system did not play a major role in promoting LDP dominance. Baker and Scheiner (2007) and Christensen and Johnson (1995) showed that, under SNTV/MMD, malapportionment rarely gave the LDP a majority of seats when a correctly apportioned system would not have done so. Moreover, under the new system in Japan, malapportionment was dramatically reduced, and although rural areas remain overrepresented, it does not appear that the current apportionment of seats gives the LDP many additional seats (Scheiner 2006, 31–63).

clientelistic practices (Scheiner 2007). It is noteworthy that the most serious period of shifting against the clientelistic system emerged under Prime Minister Koizumi (2001–2006), partly in response to the growing threat of the Japanese opposition. The DPJ became the leading opposition party of Japan in the late 1990s and soon used a campaign against the clientelistic system to achieve in 2003 the most successful HR election of any opposition party in the postwar period. In turn, Koizumi and the LDP responded, moving (in the face of significant resistance within the ruling party) to privatize the postal system, which had long been important to the rural clientelistic network of the LDP, and cut public works spending. The larger point here is that, no matter the shape of electoral reform, we were much less likely to see a reduction in clientelistic politics in Japan unless party competition increased first.[10]

The Italian case also suggests the importance of the competitive context in shaping the number of parties, but only with the new electoral system reforms in 2006 and a decline in the competitiveness of the election in 2008 were we able to see how this might be the case. In Italy, while electoral competition was intense and alliances needed every vote they could get, parties had a strong incentive to coordinate with most potential alliance partners. Given the permissiveness of the rules with respect to alliances, this helped maintain a large number of parties. The new rules instituted in Italy in 2006 still permit a large number of parties (provided that they join together in an alliance), but a decline in competitiveness has helped make for more of a two-party system (or at least a dramatic reduction in the total number). Given the fact that the Berlusconi bloc was expected by everyone to handily win the 2008 election, and given the high unpopularity of the large and fragmented coalition supporting the Prodi II government (2006–2008), the newly born Partito Democratico (PD) decided to run the 2008 elections alone, ultimately including the party led by a former anti-corruption judge Antonio Di Pietro as its only minor ally. In response, Berlusconi made a similar move, reducing the fragmentation and heterogeneity of the center-right camp: On the right, Forza Italia and Alleanza Nazionale proceeded to contest the election under a common list, allied with the Lega Nord in northern regions and the Movimento per le Autonomie in the southern regions.[11] The result was that in 2008 the number of parliamentary groups declined from 14 to 5 in the Chamber of Deputies and from 10 to 5 in the Senate,

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[10]Stressing the importance of party competition also helps understand the persistence of one-party dominance. It is of course tautological to suggest that competition can bring about an end to one-party dominance. But, our meaning here is somewhat different. As noted in another footnote, the introduction of greater strength by the opposition in the other legislative house of Japan, the HC, weakened the standing of the LDP in the public and placed it in a less-advantageous electoral position.

[11]In addition, the UDC (Union of Christian and Center Democrats), a former part of the center-right alliance, contested the elections alone. A cartel of leftist and ecologist parties ran alone as well and was unable to win any parliamentary representation.

and the share of votes won by the top two parties increased from 40% to an unprecedented (in Italian politics) 79%.

Conclusion

The electoral reforms passed in Italy and Japan in the early 1990s led to important changes in both countries. In both Italy and Japan, district-level competition became increasingly bipolar, as expected by Duverger's law. In Italy, as a result of shifting preferences of voters and pre-election coordination of parties, alternation in power has become the norm. In Japan, electoral coordination both within the opposition and among the governing parties has increased, moving the system toward bipolar competition also at the national level, albeit initially "haltingly" (Reed 2005).

There were, on the other hand, political outcomes that continued to disappoint observers. In Japan, the dominance of the LDP did not come to an end for more than 15 years, and political competition throughout most of those years was still based to a large extent on a personal and clientelistic style of campaigning. In Italy, party fragmentation remained high (at least until 2008), and government durability remains a question mark as a result of the large number of players coordinating within the coalitions.

Ultimately, the "unanticipated" nature of the outcomes was mostly due to unreasonably high expectations placed in the impact of the reforms. Indeed, as long as one does not force theory beyond its (perhaps still narrow) borders, extant electoral system theory offers a reasonably accurate prediction of the results that actually did obtain in both countries. Theoretical predictions that focus on the more proximal effects of the electoral systems find substantial confirmation at the district level in both countries. On the other hand, what reforms did not accomplish, or what they have not accomplished yet, are features of party politics that do not flow as a direct consequence of electoral rules or that are affected by factors independent of the most high-profile electoral rule changes. In Japan, factors independent of the electoral system had been central to both single-party dominance and clientelistic politics. Electoral reform by itself was unlikely to overcome these factors. In Italy, the use of SMDs in the mixed-member electoral system encouraged the promotion of bipartisanship at the district level. However, the rules promoting *alliances* of parties provided little incentive for the competitors in the different districts to join together as unified *parties* at the national level. With no strong incentives created for a *nationalized* two-party system, there can be little wonder that party fragmentation – and, hence, problems of cabinet duration – continued.

Perhaps most interesting, the analysis here also highlights the potential importance of party competition – another non-electoral system factor – in shaping the outcomes witnessed in both countries. Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) argued that party competition can increase the propensity of a country to engage in programmatic rather than clientelistic politics. If so, LDP dominance may have played a major part in the disappointing continuation of clientelistic politics even under the

new electoral system in Japan, and an increase in competition may lead to a decline in clientelistic practices there. In Italy in 2005, a new electoral system was introduced to replace the mixed-member system. Relative to the mixed-member system, this new system did not appear to give parties great incentive to consolidate, but a decrease in likely party competition in the second election under the new system in 2008 led parties to jettison potential alliance partners. The result was a decline in the effective number of legislative parties (from 5.1 in 2006 to 3.1 in 2008) and in the number of parliamentary groups (from 11 to 5) – the lowest numbers since 1953. Competitiveness has been given relatively little attention as a factor shaping the "disappointing" outcomes in post-reform Italy and Japan. Given the seemingly significant impact it had in both cases, we encourage future work to consider more systematically just how robust this finding is and what other areas party competitiveness might affect.

Appendix A: Electoral Rules

Table A.1 Electoral Rules for Italy's Lower House, 1948–present

Time Period	1948–1993	1993–2005		2005–present		
		Plurality Tier	PR Tier	PR with seat bonus national tier	Valle d'Aosta SMD	"Overseas" Constituencies
No. of seats / districts	630[1] / 32	475/475	155/26	617/1	1/1	12/4
Election rule	PR[2]	Plurality (FPTP)	PR[3]	PR with seat bonus[4]	Plurality (FPTP)	PR
District Size	1–54 (mean = 20)	1	1–11 (mean = 6)	617	1	1–6 (mean = 4)

Note that the acronym FPTP refers to First Past the Post plurality electoral system.

[1] The number of seats became 630 after the 1962 constitutional reform. Note the period of office is always 5 years or less if the parliament is dissolved.

[2] Imperiali quota and LR; preferential vote; threshold: one quota *and* 300,000 votes at national level.

[3] Hare Quota and LR; closed list; threshold: 4% of valid votes at national level.

[4] Hare Quota and LR; closed list; thresholds: 4% for lists running independently; 10% for coalitions; 2% for lists joining a pre-electoral coalition, except for the best loser.

Ballot structure
- Under the PR system (1948–1993), each voter cast one vote for a party list and could express a variable number of preferential votes among candidates of that list.
- Under the MMM system (1993–2005), each voter received two separate ballots (the plurality ballot and the PR one) and cast two votes: one for an individual candidate in a single-member district; one for a party in a multi-member PR district.
- Under the PR-with-seat-bonus system (2005–present), each voter cast one vote for a party list. A party list can run independently or join a pre-electoral coalition.

Allocation Rule
- Under the PR system (1948–1993), each district elected M members. Full quotas (valid votes/M+2) were allocated at district level, while LR seats were allocated in a nation-wide constituency.
- Under the MMM system (1993–2005), 75% of the seats were allocated in single-member districts by plurality formula, 25% of the seats were allocated in multi-member districts by PR using Hare quota and LR formulae. A mechanism of negative transfer of vote (*scorporo parziale*) operated to reduce the disproportionality typical of plurality elections by penalizing those parties that won seats in SMDs.
- Under the PR-with-seat-bonus system (2005–present), a seat bonus is attributed to the party list or the coalition gaining the plurality of valid votes if none of the competing lists/coalitions reaches the 54% of total seats. Through the seat bonus the winning party list/coalition gains the 54% of total seats. Twelve seats are allocated in the four "overseas" districts.

Table A.2 Electoral Rules for Italy's Upper House, 1948–present

Time Period	1948–1993	1993–2005		2005–present		
		Plurality Tier	PR Tier	PR with seat bonus regional tiers	Other regional tiers	"Overseas" Constituencies
No. of seats / districts	315[1]/232–19[2]	232/232	83/18[3]	301/18	8/2[4]	6/4
Election rule	"Super- majority"[a] PR[b]	Plurality (FPTP)	PR[c]	PR with seat bonus[d]	Plurality (FPTP); MMM system[e]	PR
District Size	1/2–48 (mean = 17)	1	1–12 (mean = 5)	2–47 (mean = 17)	1	1–2 (mean = 2)

Note that the period of office was 5 years unless parliament was dissolved earlier. The period of office was 6 years before the 1962 constitutional reform. FPTP refers to First Past the Post plurality electoral system.

Notes on number of seats and districts: [1] The number of seats was stabilized after the 1962 constitutional reform; [2] The region Valle d'Aosta elected one senator in one SMD; [3] The regions Valle d'Aosta and Molise didn't elect any senator in the PR tier; [4] The region Valle d'Aosta elects one senator in one SMD; the region Trentino-Alto Adige maintains the previous MMM system and elects six senators in the plurality tier and one in the PR tier.

Note on election rules: [a] 65% of valid votes in the 212 SMDs; [b] Within the 19 multi-member regional districts (d'Hondt formula); [c] d'Hondt formula, closed list; [d] Hare Quota and LR; closed list; threshold: 8% for lists running independently, 20% for coalitions; and 3% for lists joining a pre-electoral coalition; [e] Rules applied between 1993 and 2005.

Ballot structure
- Under the "supermajority" and PR system (1948–1993), each voter cast one vote for a candidate in a SMD. Candidates of the same party were linked within each multi-member regional district.
- Under the MMM system (1993–2005), each voter cast one vote for an individual candidate in a single-member plurality district.
- Under the PR-with-seat-bonus system (2005–present), each voter cast one vote for a party list. A party list can run independently or join a pre-electoral coalition. The region Valle d'Aosta elects one senator in one SMD; the region Trentino-Alto Adige maintains the previous MMM system.

Allocation Rule
- Under the "Super-majority" and PR system (1948–1993), candidates who got at least 65% of valid votes were immediately elected. The other candidates had their votes counted within their party list in multimember regional districts. In each regional district seats were allocated by the d'Hondt and LR formulae.
- Under the MMM system (1993–2005), 75% of the seats were allocated in single-member districts by plurality formula, the remaining 25% of the seats were allocated to the best losers in single-member districts proportionally to the votes gained by each party in each regional district. In each regional district, a mechanism of negative transfer of vote (*scorporo totale*) operated to reduce the disproportionality typical of plurality elections by penalizing those parties that won seats in SMDs.
- Under the PR-with-seat-bonus system (2005–present), a seat bonus is attributed at a *regional level* to the party list or the coalition gaining the plurality of valid votes if none of the competing lists/coalitions reaches the 55% of total seats. Through the seat bonus the winning party list/coalition gains the 55% of total seats. In the region Trentino-Alto Adige the allocation rules used under the MMM system (1993–2005) remains unchanged. Six seats are allocated in the four "overseas" districts.

Table A.3 Electoral Rules for Japan's Lower House of Representatives, 1947–present

Time Period	1947–1994	1994–present	
		Plurality Tier	PR Tier
No. of seats / districts	511[a] / 129[a]	300 / 300	180[b] / 11
Election rule	SNTV	Plurality (FPTP)	Closed-list PR
District Size	2–6 (mean = 4)	1	6–29 (mean = 16.4)
Period of Office	4 yrs, but subject to early dissolution	4 yrs, but subject to early dissolution	4 yrs, but subject to early dissolution

Notes on the number of seats and districts: [a] In the last SNTV election, there were 129 districts and 511 seats. These numbers changed over time, as occasional re-districting added urban seats and expanded the size of the chamber. [b] In the 1996 MMM election, there were 200 PR seats. This was reduced to 180 before the 2000 election.

Ballot structure
- Under SNTV, each voter cast one vote for an individual candidate in a multi-seat district. The voter was required to write out the candidate's name.
- Under MMM, each voter is allotted one vote for a candidate in a single-seat district *and* one vote for a party in multi-seat district.

Allocation Rule
- Under SNTV, each district elected M members. With a couple of exceptions, M was equal to 3, 4, or 5.
- Under MMM, the district tier uses plurality rule. The regional tier uses closed-list PR-d'Hondt.
- Under MMM, a district candidate may also appear on her party's PR list.

Table A.4 Electoral Rules for Japan's Upper House of Councilors, 1947–present

Time Period	1947–1980	1983–1998	2001–present
No. of seats and districts	152 prefectural,100 national list	152 prefectural,100 PR	146 prefectural, 96 PR
Election rule	SNTV, M = 1 to 4	SNTV, M = 1 to 4	SNTV, M = 1 to 5
District Size	SNTV, M = 50	Closed-list PR, M = 50	Open-list PR, M = 48
Period of Office	6 years (126 MPs elected every three years)	6 years (126 MPs elected every three years)	6 years (121 MPs elected every three years)

Sources: Manabe (2004); Rosenbluth and Thies (2007)
Note *M* denotes district magnitude. National district (*zenkoku-ku*), SNTV with M = 50. Starting with the 1983 election, SNTV was replaced with closed-list PR to elect the upper tier of the House of Councilors. Open-list PR was first used in the 2001 election.

Appendix B: Votes and Seats

Table B.1.1 Italy: Votes and Seats in the general election of March 27 1994 to the Lower Chamber of Deputies, MMM electoral system

Party/PEC	Single Member Districts			PR tier			Total	
	Votes		Seats	Votes		Seats	Seats	
	N	%	N	N	%	N	N	%
PRC			27	2,343,946	6.1	11	38	6.0
PDS			82	7,881,646	20.4	38	120	19.0
Network			6	719,841	1.9	0	6	1.0
Greens			11	1,047,268	2.7	0	11	1.7
PSI			14	849,429	2.2	0	14	2.2
AD			18	456,114	1.2	0	18	2.9
CS			5				5	0.8
RS			1				1	0.2
Progressive Alliance	*12,595,323*	*32.7*	*164*	*13,298,244**	*34.3*	*49*	*213*	
Others Left	159,760	0.4						
PPI			4	4,287,172	11.1	29	33	5.2
Segni Pact				1,811,814	4.7	13	13	2.1
Pact for Italy	*6,019,033*	*15.6*	*4*	*6,098,986**	*15.8**	*42**	*46**	
Go Italy			76	8,136,135	21.0	30	106	16.8
Northern League			107	3,235,248	8.4	11	118	18.7
Pannella List			6	1,359,283	3.5	0	6	1.0
UdC			4				4	0.6
CCD			22	2,646	0.0	0	22	3.5
AN			87	5,214,133	13.5	23	110	17.5
Pole of Freedoms	*8,767,720*	*22.8*	*164*					
Pole of Good Government	*5,732,890*	*14.9*	*129*					
Others Center-Right	*3,745,630*	*9.7*	*9*					
Total Center-Right	*18,246,240*	*47.4*	*302*	*17,947,445**	*46.4**	*64**	*366**	
SVP	188,017	0.5	3	231,842	0.6	0	3	0.5
Valle d'Aosta List	43,700	0.1	1				1	0.2
Ld'AM	45,842	0.1	1	59,873	0.2	0	1	0.2
Others	1,206,243	3.1	0	1,083,299	2.8	0	0	
Total	*38,504,158*	*100.0*	*474*	*38,717,043*	*100.0*	*155*	*630*	*100.0*
Turnout		n.a.			86.1			

Source: Italian Interior Ministry, Central Directorate for Electoral Services. Details of all election results are available from an electronic archive available at http://elezionistorico.interno.it
* These figures denote the level of electoral support for a PEC or voting bloc in the PR tier given their vote share in the SMD tier. Such data are estimates because these PECs or blocs only competed in the SMD tier.
Note that figures in italics are totals for PECs, electoral blocs or represent the overall election results. Explanations for all party acronyms are given in Appendix D.

Table B.1.2 Italy: Votes and Seats in the general election of April 21 1994 to the Lower Chamber of Deputies, MMM electoral system

Party/PEC	Single Member Districts			PR tier			Total	
	Votes		Seats	Votes		Seats	Seats	
	N	%	N	N	%	N	N	%
PRC			15	3,213,748	8.6	20	35	5.6
PDS-SE:			139	7,894,118	21.1	26	165	26.3
PDS			123			23	146	23.2
CS			4			1	5	0.8
Labor Federation			6			0	6	1.0
Unitary Communists			6			2	8	1.3
Network			5				5	0.8
Olive Tree Independents			3				3	0.5
Greens			16	938,665	2.5	0	16	2.5
PSdA			0	38,002	0.1	0	0	
Populars for Prodi:			66	2,554,072	6.8	4	70	11.2
PPI			52			2	54	8.6
UD			6				6	1.0
Prodi area			8			2	10	1.6
RI:			18	1,627,380	4.3	8	26	3.1
Dini List			8			3	11	1.7
Segni Pact			6			1	7	1.1
MDI			1				1	0.2
Italian Socialists			3			4	7	1.1
Olive Tree+Progressive	*16,788,470*	*45.0*	*262*	*16,265,985**	*43.4**	*96**		
SVP	156,708	0.4	3				3	0.5
Northern League	4,038,239	10.8	39	3,776,354	10.1	20	59	9.4
Go Italy!:			86	7,712,149	20.6	37	123	19.5
FI			81			37	118	18.7
FLD			4				4	0.6
PF			1				1	0.2
AN			65	5,870,491	15.7	28	93	14.8
CCD-CDU:			18	2,189,563	5.8	12	30	4.7
CCD			13			6	19	3.0
CDU			5			6	11	1.7
Pannella & Sgarbi List				702,988	1.9			
Pole for Freedoms	*15,027,030*	*40.3*	*169*	*16,475,191**	*44.0**	*126**		
Pannella & Sgarbi List	694,016	0.2	0					
Valle d'Aosta List	37,431	0.1	1				1	0.2
Ld'AM	82,373	0.2	1	72,062	0.2		1	0.2
Others	1,095,452	2.9	0	894,806	2.4	0		
Total	*37,295,109*	*100.0*	*475*	*37,484,398*	*100.0*	*155*	*630*	*100.0*
Turnout		82.9			82.9			

Source: Italian Interior Ministry, Central Directorate for Electoral Services. Details of all election results are available from an electronic archive available at http://elezionistorico.interno.it

* These figures denote the level of electoral support for a PEC or voting bloc in the PR tier given their vote share in the SMD tier. Such data are estimates because these PECs or blocs only competed in the SMD tier.

Note that figures in italics are totals for PECs, electoral blocs or represent the overall election results. Explanations for all party acronyms are given in Appendix D.

Table B.1.3 Italy: Votes and Seats in the general election of May 13 2001 to the Lower Chamber of Deputies, MMM electoral system

| Party/PEC | Single Member Districts | | | PR tier | | | Total | |
| | Votes | | Seats | Votes | | Seats | Seats | |
	N	%	N	N	%	N	N	%
PRC				1,868,659	5.0	11	11	1.7
PdCI			8	620,859	1.7	0	8	1.3
DS			104	6,151,154	16.6	31	135	21.4
DL-the Daisy:			54	5,391,827	14.5	27	81	12.9
PPI			32					
Democrats			16					
UDEur			5					
RI			1					
Olive Tree Independents			6				6	1.0
Sunflower:			17	805,340	2.2	0	17	2.7
SDI			8					
Greens			9					
Olive Tree	*16,314,379*	*43.8*	*189*	*14,837,839**	*40.0**	*69**	*247**	*39.2**
SVP	173,735	0.5	3	200,059	0.5	0	3	0.5
IdV	1,487,287	4.0	0	1,443,725	3.9	0	0	
Pannella & Bonino List	457,117	1.2	0	832,213	2.2	0	0	
European Democracy	1,310,119	3.5	0	888,249	2.4	0	0	
Go Italy!:			132	10,923,431	29.4	62	193	30.6
FI			127					
NDC			2					
UPR			2					
New-PSI			3	353,269	1.0	0	3	0.5
Northern League			30	1,464,301	3.9	0	30	4.8
Whiteflower:			41	1,194,040	3.2	0	41	6.5
CCD			24					
CDU			17					
AN			75	4,463,205	12.0	24	99	15.7
Independents:			2				2	0.4
Segni Pact			1				1	0.2
New Sicily			1				1	0.2
House of Freedoms	*16,915,513*	*45.4*	*282*	*18,398,246**	*49.6**	*86**	*368**	*58.4**
Valle d'Aosta List	25,577	0.1	1				1	0.2
Others	575,978	1.6	0	522,445	1.4	0	0	
Total	*37,259,705*	*100.0*	*475*	*37,122,776*	*100.0*	*155*	*630*	*100.0*
Turnout		*81.5*			*81.4*			

Source: Italian Interior Ministry, Central Directorate for Electoral Services. Details of all election results are available from an electronic archive available at http://elezionistorico.interno.it

*These figures denote the level of electoral support for a PEC or voting bloc in the PR tier given their vote share in the SMD tier. Such data are estimates because these PECs or blocs only competed in the SMD tier.

Note that figures in italics are totals for PECs, electoral blocs or represent the overall election results. Explanations for all party acronyms are given in Appendix D.

Table B.1.4 Italy: Votes and Seats in the general election of April 9 2006 to the Lower Chamber of Deputies, PR with seat bonus electoral system

Party/PEC	National Constituency			Valle d'Aosta SMD	Overseas "Constituencies"	Total	
	Votes		Seats	Seat	Seats	Seats	
	N	%	N	N	N	N	%
Olive Tree	11,930,983	31.3	220			220	34.9
PRC	2,229,464	5.8	41			41	6.6
Rose in the Fist	990,694	2.6	18			18	2.9
Italian Communists	884,127	2.3	16			16	2.5
IdV	877,052	2.3	16		1	17	2.7
Greens	784,803	2.1	15			15	2.4
UDEur	534,088	1.4	10			10	1.6
Pensioners	333,278	0.9	0			0	
SVP	182,704	0.5	4			4	0.6
Others	255,405	0.7	0			0	
ALD	-	-	-	1		1	0.2
L'Unione-Prodi	-	-	-		6	6	1.0
Democratic Union	*19,002,598*	*49.8*	*340*	*1*	*7*	*348*	*55.2*
Go Italy!	9,048,976	23.7	137		3	140	22.2
National Alliance	4,707,126	12.3	71			71	11.3
Union of the Center	2,580,190	6.8	39			39	6.2
Northern League-MPA	1,747,730	4.6	26			26	4.1
DC-NPSI	285,474	0.7	4			4	0.6
Social Alternative	255,354	0.7	0				
Tricolor Flame	230,506	0.6	0				
Others	122,487	0.3	0				
For Italy in the World					1	1	0.2
House of Freedoms	*18,977,843*	*49.7*	*277*		*4*	*281*	*44.6*
Latin America Italians' Association					1	1	0.2
Total	*38,153,343*	*100.0*	*617*	*1*	*12*	*630*	*100.0*
Turnout		83.6					

Source: Italian Interior Ministry, Central Directorate for Electoral Services. Details of all election results are available from an electronic archive available at http://elezionistorico.interno.it

Note that figures in italics are totals for PECs, electoral blocs or represent the overall election results. Explanations for all party acronyms are given in Appendix D.

Table B.1.5 Italy: Votes and Seats in the general election of April 13 2008 to the Lower Chamber of Deputies, PR with seat bonus electoral system

Party/PEC	National Constituency Votes N	National Constituency Votes %	National Constituency Seats N	Valle d'Aosta SMD Seat N	"Overseas" Constituencies Seats N	Total Seats N	Total Seats %
PDL	13,629,069	37.4	272	0	4	276	43.8
Northern League	3,024,758	8.3	60	0		60	9.5
MPA	410,487	1.1	8			8	1.3
PDL-LN-MPA	*17,064,314*	*46.8*	*340*	*0*	*4*	*344*	*54.6*
PD	12,092,969	33.2	211		6	217	34.4
IDV	1,593,532	4.4	28		1	29	4.6
PD-IDV	*13,686,501*	*37.6*	*239*		*7*	*246*	*39.0*
UDC	2,050,309	5.6	36			36	5.7
SA	1,124,428	3.1					
The Right /Tricolor Flame	885,226	2.4					
PS	355,575	1.0					
Workers' Communist Party	208,173	0.6					
Critical Left	167,664	0.5					
ALD				1		1	0.2
SVP	147,666	0.4	2			2	0.3
Italians from Abroad Association Movement					*1*	1	0.2
Others	762,430	2.0					
Total	*36,452,286*	*100.0*	*617*	*1*	*12*	*630*	*100.0*
Turnout		80.5					

Source: Italian Interior Ministry, Central Directorate for Electoral Services. Details of all election results are available from an electronic archive available at http://elezionistorico.interno.it
Note that figures in italics are totals for PECs, electoral blocs or represent the overall election results. Explanations for all party acronyms are given in Appendix D.

Table B.2.1 Japan: Votes and Seats in the general election of October 20 1996 to the Lower House of Representatives, MMM electoral system

Party	Single Member Districts Votes N	%	Seats N	Proportional Representation Votes N	%	Seats N	Total Seats N	Votes %	Seats %
LDP	21,836,096	38.63	169	18,205,955	32.76	70	239	36.4	47.8
NFP	15,812,326	27.97	96	15,580,053	28.04	60	156	28.0	31.2
NPH	727,644	1.29	2	582,093	1.05	0	2	1.2	0.4
DPJ	6,001,666	10.62	17	8,949,190	16.10	35	52	12.7	10.4
JCP	7,096,766	12.55	2	7,268,743	13.08	24	26	12.8	5.2
SDP	1,240,649	2.19	4	3,547,240	6.38	11	15	3.8	3.0
DRL	149,357	0.26	1	18,844	0.03	0	1	0.2	0.2
LL	672,328	1.19	0	453,606	0.82	0	0	1.0	0.0
NSP	376,336	0.67	0	963,471	1.73	0	0	1.1	0.0
Others	106,443	0.19	0	0	0	0	0	0.1	0.0
Independents	2,508,810	4.44	9	0	0	0	9	2.8	1.8
Total	*56,528,421*	*100.00*	*300*	*55,569,195*	*100.0*	*200*	*500*	*100.0*	*100.0*

Source: Japanese Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications
Note explanations for all party acronyms are given in Appendix D.

Table B.2.2 Japan: Votes and Seats in the general election of June 25 2000 to the Lower House of Representatives, MMM electoral system

Party	Single Member Districts Votes N	%	Seats N	Proportional Representation Votes N	%	Seats N	Total Seats N	Votes %	Seats %
LDP	24,945,807	40.97	177	16,943,425	28.31	56	233	36.2	48.5
DPJ	16,811,732	27.61	80	15,067,990	25.18	47	127	26.7	26.5
CGP	1,231,753	2.02	7	7,762,032	12.97	24	31	6.1	6.5
LP	2,053,736	3.37	4	6,589,490	11.01	18	22	6.2	4.6
JCP	7,352,844	12.08	0	6,719,016	11.23	20	20	11.8	4.2
SDP	2,315,235	3.80	4	5,603,680	9.36	15	19	5.9	4.0
CP	1,230,464	2.02	7	247,334	0.41	0	7	1.4	1.5
GoI	652,138	1.07	5	151,345	0.25	0	5	0.8	1.0
LC	1,071,012	1.76	1	660,724	1.10	0	1	1.5	0.2
Others	250,681	0.41	0	99,565	0.17	0	0	0.3	0.0
Independents	2,967,068	4.87	15	0	0.00	-	15	3.0	3.1
Total	*60,882,471*	*100*	*300*	*59,844,601*	*100.00*	*180*	*480*	*100.0*	*100.0*

Source: Japanese Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications
Note explanations for all party acronyms are given in Appendix D.

Table B.2.3 Japan: Votes and Seats in the general election of November 9 2003 to the Lower House of Representatives, MMM electoral system

| | Single Member Districts | | | Proportional Representation | | | Total | | |
| | Votes | | Seat | Votes | | Seat | Seats | Votes | Seats |
Party	N	%	N	N	%	N	N	%	%
LDP	26,089,327	43.8	168	20,660,185	35.0	69	237	40.5	49.4
DP	21,814,154	36.7	105	22,095,636	37.4	72	177	36.9	36.9
CGP	886,507	1.5	9	8,733,444	14.8	25	34	6.5	7.1
JCP	4,837,953	8.1	0	4,586,172	7.8	9	9	8.0	1.9
SDP	1,708,672	2.9	1	3,027,390	5.1	5	6	3.7	1.3
NCP	791,588	1.3	4	0	0	0	4	0.8	0.8
GoI	497,108	0.8	1	0	0	0	1	0.5	0.2
LC	97,423	0.2	1	0	0	0	1	0.1	0.2
Others	51,524	0.1	-	0	0	0	0	0.1	0.0
Independents	2,728,118	4.6	11	0	0	0	11	2.9	2.3
Total	*59,502,374*	*100.0*		*59,102,827*	*100.1*		*480*	*100.0*	*100.0*

Source: Japanese Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications
Note explanations for all party acronyms are given in Appendix D.

Table B.2.4 Japan: Votes and Seats in the general election of September 11 2005 to the Lower House of Representatives, MMM electoral system

| | Single Member Districts | | | Proportional Representation | | | Total | | |
| | Votes | | Seat | Votes | | Seat | Seats | Votes | Seats |
Party	N	%	N	N	%	N	N	%	%
LDP	32,518,390	47.8	219	25,887,798	38.2	77	296	44.2	61.7
DPJ	24,804,787	36.4	52	21,036,425	31.0	61	113	34.4	23.5
CGP	981,105	1.4	8	8,987,620	13.3	23	31	5.9	6.5
JCP	4,937,375	7.3	0	4,919,187	7.3	9	9	7.3	1.9
SDP	996,008	1.5	1	3,719,522	5.5	6	7	3.0	1.5
PNP	432,679	0.6	2	1,183,073	1.7	2	4	1.1	0.8
Nippon	137,172	0.2	0	1,643,506	2.4	1	1	1.0	0.2
Daichi	16,698	0.0	0	433,938	0.6	1	1	0.3	0.2
Other parties	1,557	0.0	0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0
Independents	3,240,521	4.8	18	0	0.0	0	18	3.0	3.8
Total	68,066,292	100.0	300	67,811,069	100.0	180	480	100.0	100.0

Source: Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
Note explanations for all party acronyms are given in Appendix D.

Table B.2.5 Japan: Votes and Seats in the general election of August 30 2009 to the Lower House of Representatives, MMM electoral system

Party	Single Member Districts Votes N	%	Seats N	Proportional Representation Votes N	%	Seats N	Total Seats N	Votes %	Seats %
DPJ	33,475,335	47.4	221	29,844,799	42.4	87	308	45.5	64.2
LDP	27,301,982	38.7	64	18,810,217	26.7	55	119	34.2	24.8
CGP	782,984	1.1	0	8,054,007	11.4	21	21	5.0	4.4
JCP	2,978,354	4.2	0	4,943,886	7.0	9	9	5.3	1.9
SDP	1,376,739	2.0	3	3,006,160	4.3	4	7	2.8	1.5
Minna	615,224	0.9	2	3,005,199	4.3	3	5	2.1	1.0
PNP	730,570	1.0	3	1,219,767	1.7	0	3	1.3	0.6
Nippon	220,223	0.3	1	528,171	0.8	0	1	0.5	0.2
Kaikaku	36,650	0.1	0	58,141	0.1	0	0	0.1	0.0
Daichi	0	0.0	0	433,122	0.6	1	1	0.2	0.2
Other parties	1,077,543	1.5	0	466,786	0.7	0	0	1.2	0.0
Independents	1,986,056	2.8	6	0	0.0	0	6	1.8	1.3
Total	*70,581,660*	*100.0*	*300*	*70,370,255*	*100.0*	*180*	*480*	*100.0*	*100.0*

Source: Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
Note explanations for all party acronyms are given in Appendix D.

Appendix C: Italian and Japanese Governments

Table C.1 Italian Governments, 1994–2008

Term	Cabinet	Coalition	Chamber of Deputies	Senate
May 10 1994 to Jan 17 1995 (226 days)	Berlusconi I	FI-MSI/AN-NL-UDC	SMC	SMC
Jan 17 1995 to May 17 1996 (486 days)	Dini	Caretaker government	-	-
May 17 1996 to Oct 27 1998 (876 days)	Prodi I	PDS-Greens-PPI-RI plus PRC[1]	MCG	MCG
Oct 27 1998 to Dec 12 1999 (423 days)	D'Alema I	DS-PPI-PdCI-Greens-SDI-RI-UDEur	SMC	SMC
Dec 12 1999 to Apr 25 2000 (119 days)	D'Alema II	DS-PPI-DEM-PdCI-Greens-SDI-RI-UDEur	SMC	SMC
Apr 25 2000 to Jun 11 2001 (398 days)	Amato II	DS-PPI-DEM-PdCI-Greens-SDI-RI-UDEur	SMC	SMC
Jun 11 2001 to Apr 23 2005 (1,414 days)	Berlusconi II	FI-AN-NL-UDC-NPSI-Independents	SMC	SMC
Apr 23 2005 to May 17 2006 (373 days)	Berlusconi III	FI-AN-NL-UDC-NPSI-Independents	SMC	SMC
May 17 2006 to May 8 2008 (691 days)	Prodi II	DS-Daisy-PRC-PdCI-Greens-IdV-SDI-PR-UDEur	SMC	MWC
May 8 2008 to present	Berlusconi IV	PDL-NL-MPA	SMC	SMC

Source: Authors' own elaboration from official data.

Acronyms on types of government, *MCG*: Minority Coalition Government; *MWC*: Minimum Winning Coalition; *SMC*: Surplus Majority Coalition. Note explanations for all party acronyms are given in Appendix D.

[1]PRC supported the Prodi I minority government but had no seats in the cabinet.

Table C.2 Japanese Governments, 1993–2009

Term	Cabinet	Coalition	HR[1]	HC[2]
Aug 9 1993 to Apr 28 1994 (263 days)	Hosokawa	SDP-JRP-CGP-JNP-DSP-NPH-SDL-DRL	MWC	MWC
Apr 28 1994 to Jun 30 1994 (64 days)	Hata	JRP-CGP-JNP-DSP-LP plus NPH[3]	MCG	MCG
Jun 30 1994 to Aug 8 1994 (40 days)	Murayama I	LDP-SDP-NPH	SMC	MWC
Aug 8 1994 to Jan 11 1996 (521 days)	Murayama II	LDP-SDP-NPH	SMC	SMC
Jan 11 1996 to Nov 7 1996 (302 days)	Hashimoto I	LDP-SDP-NPH	SMC	SMC
Nov 7 1996 to Jul 30 1998 (630 days)	Hashimoto II	LDP plus SDP-NPH[4]	SPMG	SPMG
Jul 30 1998 to Jan 14 1999 (169 days)	Obuchi I	LDP	SPMG	SPMG
Jan 14 1999 to Oct 5 1999 (265 days)	Obuchi II	LDP-LP	SMC	MCG
Oct 5 1999 to Apr 5 2000 (182 days)	Obuchi III	LDP-CGP-LP	SMC	SMC
Apr 5 2000 to Jul 4 2000 (91 days)	Mori I	LDP-CGP-CP[5]	SMC	SMC
Jul 4 2000 to Apr 26 2001 (296 days)	Mori II	LDP-CGP-CP	SMC	SMC
Apr 26 2001 to Nov 9 2003 (929 days)	Koizumi I	LDP-CGP-CP	SMC	SMC
Nov 9 2003 to Sep 21 2005 (681 days)	Koizumi II	LDP-CGP	MWC	MWC
Sep 21 2005 to Sep 26 2006 (370 days)	Koizumi III	LDP-CGP	SMC	MWC

Table C.2 (continued)

Term	Cabinet	Coalition	HR[1]	HC[2]
Sep 26 2006 to Aug 28 2007 (336 days)	Abe I	LDP-CGP	SMC	MWC
Aug 28 2007 to Sep 26 2007 (30 days)	Abe II	LDP-CGP	SMC	MCG
Sep 26 2007 to Sep 24 2008 (365 days)	Fukuda	LDP-CGP	SMC	MCG
Sep 24 2008 to Sep 16 2009 (358 days)	Aso	LDP-CGP	SMC	MCG
Sep 16 2009 to Jun 4 2010 (262 days)	Hatoyama	DPJ-SDP-PNP	SMC	MWC
Jun 8 2010 to present	Kan	DPJ-NPP	SMC	MCG

Source: Authors' own elaboration from official data.

Notes: [1] Lower House of Representatives, [2] Upper House of Councillors, [3] NPH was a non cabinet ally of the coalition government; [4] SDP-NPH was a non cabinet ally of the LDP until June 1998 when the coalition partnership dissolution of occurred; [5] On Dec 12 2000 the CP was dissolved and resulted in the creation of the NCP.

Acronyms on types of government, *MCG*: Minority Coalition Government; *MWC*: Minimum Winning Coalition; *SMC*: Surplus Majority Coalition; *SPMG*: Single Party Minority Government. Note explanations for all party acronyms are given in Appendix D.

Appendix D: Party Acronyms

Table D.1 Party acronyms: Italy

AD	Alleanza Democratica	Democratic Alliance
ALD	Autonomia Libertà Democrazia	Autonomy, Freedom, Democracy
AN	Alleanza Nazionale	National Alliance
CCD	Centro Cristiano Democratico	Christian Democratic Center
CDU	Cristiani Democratici Uniti	Christian Democratic Union
CS	Cristiano Sociali	Social Christians
DC-NPSI	Democrazia Cristiana-Nuovo Partito Socialista Italiano	Christian Democrats–New Italian Socialist Party
DL-the Daisy	Democrazia è Libertà-La Margherita	Democracy is Freedom–the Daisy
DS	Democratici di Sinistra	Left Democrats
FI	Forza Italia	Go Italy
FLD	Federalisti e Liberal Democratici	Federalists and Liberal Democrats
IdV	Italia dei Valori	Italy of the Values
LN	Lega Nord	Northern League
Ld'AM	Lega d'Azione Meridionale	Southern Action League
MDI	Movimento Democratico Italiano	Democratic Italian Movement
MRE	Movimento Repubblicani Europei	European Republicans' Movement
MSI	Movimento Sociale Italiano	Italian Social Movement
MpA	Movimento per le Autonomie	Movement for Autonomy
NDC	Nuova Democrazia Cristiana	New Christian Democratic Party
New-PSI	Nuovo Partito Socialista Italiano	New Italian Socialist Party
PCI	Partito Comunista Italiano	Italian Communist Party
PD	Partito Democratico	Democratic Party
PdCI	Partito dei Comunisti Italianio	Party of the Italian Communists
PDS	Partito dei Democratici di Sinistra	Democratic Party of the Left
PDS-SE	Partito dei Democratici di Sinistra-Sinistra Europea	Democratic Party of the Left–European Left
PdL	Popolo delle Libertà	Freedom's People Party
PF	Partito Federalista	Federalist Party
PPI	Partito Popolare Italiano	Italian People's Party
PPS	Partito Popolare Sardo	Sardinian Popular Party
PRC	Partito della Rifondazione Comunista	Communist Refoundation
PS	Partito Socialista	Socialist Party
PSdA	Partito Sardo d'Azione	Sardinian Socialist Action Party
PSI	Partito Socialista Italian	Italian Socialist Party
RS	Rinascita Socialista	Socialist Rebirth
SA	Sinistra Arcobaleno	Rainbow Left
SDI	Socialisti Democratici Italiani	Italian Democratic Socialists
SVP	Südtiroler Volkspartei	South Tyrolese Popular Party
UdC	Unione di Centro	Center Union
UDC	Unione dei Democratici Cristiani e dei Democratici di Centro	Union of Christian and Center Democrats
UDEur	Unione dei Democratici Europei	European Democratic Union
UpR	Unione per la Repubblica	Union for the Republic
UV	Union Valdôtaine	Valdotanian Union

Table D.2 Party acronyms: Japan

CGP	Komeito	Clean Government Party
CP	Hoshuto	Conservative Party
Daichi	Shinto Daichi	New Party Daichi
DPJ	Minshuto	Democratic Party of Japan
DSP	Minshu Shakhaito (Minshato)	Democratic Socialist Party
DRL	Minshu Kaikaku Rengo (Min-kai-ren)	Democratic Reform League
GoI	Mushozoku no Kai	Group of Independents
JCP	Kyosanto	Japanese Communist Party
JSP	Nihon Shakaito	Japan Socialist Party
Kaikaku	Kaikaku Kurabu	Reform Club-Kaikaku
LDP	Jiyu Minshuto (Jiminto)	Liberal Democratic Party
LL	Jiyu Rengo	Liberal League
LP	Jiyuto	Liberal Party of Japan
Minna	Minna no to	Your Party-Minna
NCP	Hoshu Shinto	New Conservative Party
NFP	Shinshinto	New Frontier Party
Nippon	Shinto Nippon	New Party Japan
NKP	Komeito	New Komeito
NPH	Shinto Sakigake	New Party Harbinger
NSP	Shin Syakaito	New Socialist Party
PNP	Kokumin Shinto	People's New Party
SDP	Shakai Minshuto (Shaminto)	Social Democratic Party

Appendix E: Glossary of Electoral System Terms

Alternative vote. One name for the use of the single transferable vote (q.v.) in a single-seat district. In the United States, this method is often referred to as the *instant runoff*.

Best loser rule. In mixed systems in which voters cast but a single ballot to pick a winner in the SMD tier (q.v.), with the vote shares of each party in the PR tier (q.v.) based on the total votes cast for their candidates in the single-seat elections, this is the rule that gives the *losing* candidates of the party who win the most votes the highest positions on the PR list of the party in order of their raw vote totals (or, perhaps, in order of their vote shares).
Bonus. *See* seat bonus

Closed-list PR. *See* list PR
Compensatory allocation. In mixed-member systems (q.v.) or in other systems that have multiple tiers of election, a method of allocating seats in higher tiers based on results in lower tiers; the method acts to increase the proportionality of seat outcomes to party vote shares.
Concentration index. Used in this volume to mean the share of votes (or seats) going to the two largest parties; more commonly used to refer to the Hirschman–Herfindahl index of concentration, which in the electoral context is the sum of the squared vote (seat) shares of the parties (*see* effective number of electoral parties, *see* effective number of parliamentary parties).
Costa Rica arrangement. *See* tag team arrangement
Cumulative voting (CV). An electoral rule in which voters have multiple votes to cast and are allowed to cumulate their votes on one or only a few candidates. There are many variants of cumulative voting, with perhaps the most common involving the requirement that all components of the allocation vector that sum to the number of votes each voter is entitled to cast must be integers.
CV. The common acronym for cumulative voting (q.v.).

Deviation from proportionality. A measure of the extent to which party vote shares and party seat shares are not identical. The two most common measures of deviation from proportionality are the Loosemore and Hanby (1971) index of

distortion, which is a function of the summed absolute differences between seat share and vote share, and the Gallagher index (Gallagher 1991), which is a function of the squared differences between seat share and vote share.

D'Hondt rule (for list PR, q.v.)**.** A proportionality rule in which we allocate seats to each party after an integer division of the vote share of each party, allocating seats to the parties with the M highest quotients of party shares, where M is the number of seats to be filled. Worldwide, this is the most common rule for specifying a proportional allocation. It is also a special case of what is called a *divisor rule*, that is, one in which the seat allocations go to the highest quotients obtained after division of party vote shares by a set of numbers. Other allocation rules include the Sainte-Laguë rule, in which the set of divisors are the odd numbers rather than the integers (see Balinski and Young, 1982, for more details).

District magnitude (M). The number of seats that are allocated to a given constituency (*see also* single member district and *multi-member district*)

Droop quota of votes (for list PR systems, q.v., or single transferable vote, q.v.). This is equal to $E/(M+1)$, where E is the size of the actual electorate and M is the number of seats to be filled.

Double-ballot mixed system. A mixed-member electoral system in which voters cast one ballot to determine the outcome of the single member districts (q.v.) in which they are located and a different ballot to determine the party share for the proportional tier (q.v.) of the mixed system.

Effective number of electoral parties (ENEP). This is a calculation of the Laakso-Taagepera (L-T; 1979) index for party vote shares. To calculate this index, we take the vote share of each party, square it, sum the squares, and then take the inverse of the sum so obtained. When all r parties have equal vote shares, the L-T index will be r. The L-T index is the inverse of the Hirschman-Herfindahl index widely used in sociology and economics; it can also be linked to standard variance calculations (see Feld and Grofman 2007). *Also see* effective number of parliamentary parties.

Effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP). This is a calculation of the Laakso-Taagepera (L-T; 1979) index for party seat shares. To calculate this index, we take the vote share of each party, square it, sum the squares, and then take the inverse of the sum so obtained. When all r parties have equal seat shares, the L-T index will be r. The L-T index is the inverse of the Hirschman-Herfindahl index widely used in sociology and economics; it can also be linked to standard variance calculations (see Feld and Grofman 2007). *Also see* effective number of electoral parties

Empty lists (also called short lists or sterilized lists). In the Italian mixed system (q.v.) adopted in 1993, a technical trick in creating party lists designed to avoid victories in the plurality tier (q.v.) costing a party seats in the proportional component of the mixed system (for details, see Di Virgilio 2002).

ENEP. The acronym for effective number of electoral parties (q.v.).

ENPP. The acronym for effective number of parliamentary parties (q.v.).

Hare formula (for list PR, q.v., or single transferable vote, q.v.). A proportionality rule in which we allocate seats to each party based on integer and greatest (largest remainder) fractional shares of total votes cast multiplied by the number of seats to be filled. *See also* Imperiali formula, d'Hondt rule, Droop quota, Hare quota

Hare quota of votes (for list PR systems, q.v., or single transferable vote, q.v.). This is equal to $E/(M)$, where E is the size of the actual electorate, and M is the number of seats to be filled.

Imperiali formula. *See* Imperiali rule

Imperiali rule (for list PR, q.v., or single transferable vote, q.v.). A proportionality rule used in Italy for list PR elections from 1956 to 1991, in which we allocate seats to each party based on integer and greatest (largest remainder) fractional shares of total votes cast divided by the number of seats to be filled plus two. *See also* Hare formula, d'Hondt rule, Droop quota

Instant runoff. *See* alternative vote

Laakso-Taagepera index. *See* effective number of electoral parties (ENEP), number of parliamentary parties (ENPP)

Limited voting. A system of voting in which voters in districts where there are M seats to be filled have only k votes to cast. One pole of limited voting occurs when $k=1$; this is the single nontransferable vote (q.v.).

List PR system. In the list form of proportional representation*,* voters cast a (normally single) ballot for a party list, and the number of candidates on each list who are elected is determined by the share of the votes received by each party. In closed-list PR, only parties are objects of choice, and the parties determine rank their own candidates so that a party that wins r seats will elect the top r candidates on its list of candidates; in open-list PR, voters may also affect by their vote choices (even if not fully determined) which individual candidates from a given party will be elected by indicating their preferences among candidates. Flexible-list PR is also sometimes distinguished from open-list PR in that in flexible-list PR voters have the option of either casting a simple list vote or voting for individual candidates whose preference votes may then place them ahead of the other candidates on the party list.

List tier. *See* proportional tier

M. A common acronym for district magnitude.

Magnitude. *See* district magnitude

Majoritarian voting rule. A voting rule in which a majority of the voters, if they are able to coordinate their votes, could determine all the winners within any constituency.

Majority runoff (two round). A particular form of runoff rule (q.v.) in which the top two candidates in the first round face off in head-to-head competition in the second round if no candidate received a majority of the votes in the initial round of voting.

Mixed-member electoral system (or mixed system, for short; with common acronyms either MM or MMES). Technically, simply one in which the electoral rule

is not constant across all constituencies, but the term is more commonly used to refer to electoral systems that include both constituencies in which voters vote for a single candidate and those in which candidates are elected by some form of proportional representation (see Shugart and Wattenberg 2001). In terms of converting votes to seats, there are two basic forms of mixed-member electoral systems: mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) (q.v.) and MMP (q.v.); and two basic forms of ballot: single-ballot mixed systems (q.v.) and double-ballot mixed systems (q.v.).

Mixed-member majoritarian (MMM). One of the two basic kinds of seat allocation in mixed-member systems (q.v.); the plurality component and the proportional component of the electoral rules operate essentially independently of one another. *See also* **MMP**

Mixed-member system. *See* mixed-member electoral system

Mixed system. *See* mixed-member electoral system

MM. An acronym for mixed-member system

MMD. The acronym for multimember district (*q.v.*). *See also* single member district

MMES. A general acronym for a mixed-member system (q.v.*)*, more specifically a mixed-member electoral system (q.v.); more commonly denoted as an MM system.

MMP. One of the two basic kinds of seat allocation in mixed-member systems (q.v.); the plurality component and the proportional component of the electoral rules do *not* operate independently of one another, so that outcomes in the plurality component may affect party representation in the PR aspect of the system. *See also* mixed-member majoritarian

Multimember district (MMD). A constituency from which more than a single legislator is to be elected. *Also see* single member district

Open-list PR (sometimes referred to as "PR with preferential voting," although that term is better used for the single transferable vote, q.v.*,* and related systems). *See* **List PR**

PEC. The acronym for pre-electoral coalition (q.v.)

Plurality election. A single member district (q.v.) election in which the winner is the candidate with the most votes regardless of whether this vote share is a majority of the votes cast. (Plurality elections may also be held in m seat multimember districts, q.v., in which case the winners are the m candidates with the highest votes. Elections using plurality in multimember districts are sometime called "plurality bloc elections.")

Plurality tier. In a mixed-member electoral system (q.v.), this refers to the single member district (q.v.) component of the mixed system in which elections are held under a plurality rule (q.v.).

Pouching arrangement. Applicable to the list form of proportional representation (q.v.) and to the list proportional representation component of a mixed-member electoral system (q.v.); this describes a situation in which one party gives seats on its list to members of another (smaller) party, usually in trade for other

favors, such as ones involving the single member district (q.v.) component of a mixed system. (*See* discussion in Di Virgilio and Kato, Chap. 2, this volume).

PR. The acronym for proportional representation (q.v.).

Pre-electoral coalition (PEC). This term usually refers to an arrangement in which parties agree to run on a given "coalition ticket" together or in which they indicate that each will refrain from running in single member districts where the other party has greater strength. Some electoral rules, such as the one adopted in Italy in 1993, formally recognize PECs in that they allocate seats based on the combined votes of PEC members. The 2005 changes in Italian electoral law further strengthened the role of PECs in Italy (see Appendix A and Di Virgilio and Kato, Chap. 2, this volume). Sometimes, however, the term *pre-electoral coalition* is used simply to refer to an arrangement in which parties announce in advance that they expect to be in the same cabinet coalition if they are successful.

Proportional representation (PR). There are several families of electoral rules that are intended to provide some level of proportionality in translating votes into seats. The most important of these are the list PR systems (q.v.), the single transferable vote system (SNTV; q.v.), and the single non-transferable vote system. Cumulative voting (q.v.) also can provide proportionality. While cumulative voting and SNTV are sometimes called semi-proportional since they require voter coordination to ensure proportionality, this is a quantitative rather than a qualitative difference between them and, say, list PR methods, so we treat both under the general rubric of PR; we reserve the intermediate category of semi-proportional systems for limited voting (q.v.) with $1 < k < M$. Because of the problem of rounding to an integer seat allocation, proportionality is almost never exact.

Proportional tier. In a mixed-member electoral system (q.v.), this refers to the proportional representation (q.v.) component of the mixed system. This is sometimes also referred to as the list tier.

Repêchage mechanism. For mixed electoral systems (q.v.), a sorting rule that determines how outcomes at one level are reflected at another level; for example, the best loser rule (q.v.) is a form of repêchage.

Runoff rule. A multi-election voting method in which some fraction of the highest vote getters on the first round advance into one or more further runoff rounds if no candidate obtains sufficiently many votes to be declared a winner. There are many varieties of runoff in use worldwide, with the most common the two-round majority runoff, also called the double-ballot system, in which the top two candidates advance to the second round if no candidate has a majority of the vote on the first round (see Grofman 2008).

Scorporo. The term used in Italy to refer to the negative compensatory aspects of the 1993 mixed-member system, such that "excessive" victories at the single member district level could cost political parties seats in the PR component of the system. (For details, see Appendix A; Di Virgilio and Kato, Chap. 2, this volume; and Katz 2001).

Seat bonus. A rule that gives to parties receiving more than a certain share of the vote (usually only the party receiving a plurality of the votes) extra seats in the

legislature. The 2005 changes in Italian election law created a seat bonus rule that was intended to ensure that there was a majority coalition. (For details, see Appendix A and Di Virgilio and Kato, Chap. 2, this volume.)

Sequential elimination rule. A runoff rule (q.v.) voting method in which the candidate with the fewest first-place votes (or possibly the one with the most last-place votes) is eliminated, and the balloting continues until some candidate gets a majority of the votes cast (*see* runoff rule).

Short list. *See* empty lists

Single-ballot mixed system. A mixed-member electoral system (q.v.) in which the same vote that is used to determine the outcome in each of the single member districts (q.v.) is also used to determine the party share for the proportional component of the mixed system. *See also* double-ballot mixed system.

Single member district (SMD). A constituency from which only a single legislator is to be elected. *See also* multimember district

Single nontransferable vote (SNTV). A method of proportional representation (q.v.) that is a special case of limited voting (q.v.) in districts with M seats to be filled ($M > 1$) where voters have but a single vote to cast. The threshold of exclusion for SNTV is identical to that of the most common (d'Hondt) form of list PR, namely, $1/(M + 1)$, that is, any set of voters that makes up at least $1/(M + 1)$th of the electorate of the district and is able to coordinate how its members cast their votes is guaranteed to be able to elect a candidate of its choice under SNTV.

Single transferable vote (STV). One of the standard methods of proportional representation (q.v.). Under STV, voters rank order the candidates: If there are M seats to be filled, any candidate who receives at least a *Droop quota* of votes (q.v.) is elected, and exactly $E/(M + 1)$ of the ballots (equals one Droop quota) in which that candidate is at the top of the preference rankings are removed from further consideration, where E is the size of the actual electorate, and M is the number of seats to be filled; the votes on the remaining ballots on which that candidate is at the top of the preference ranking are reallocated to the next-highest-ranked (still-eligible) candidate on that ballot. If that reallocation now gives some additional candidate a Droop quota, that candidate is elected, and we continue in this fashion as long as we can. If there are still unfilled seats, the candidate with the fewest first-place votes is dropped from eligibility and his or her votes are reallocated to the next-highest-ranked (still-eligible) candidate on the ballots of those who had the dropped candidate at the top of their preference ranking. This process continues until all seats are filled. (If there are some voters who do not rank sufficiently many candidates, their ballots may never come into play, so sometimes it may be necessary to elect the last candidates with less than a Droop quota.)

SMD. The acronym for single member district (q.v.).

STV. The acronym for single transferable vote (q.v.).

SNTV. The acronym for single nontransferable vote (q.v.).

Sterilized list. *See* empty list

Tag team arrangement (also called Costa Rica arrangement). In mixed-member electoral systems (q.v.), an arrangement (brokered by the national party) between two adherents of that party by which they agree to alternate with each other

between running in a given single member district (q.v.) constituency (normally one that their party can expect to win) and running on a PR list (normally in a position on the list that makes it likely that they will be elected). (The benefit to the party is that it prevents both from running for the same single member district, which could happen if one runs on the party label and the other runs as an independent, thus splitting the party vote and hence probably costing the party the seat).

Threshold. *See* threshold rule, threshold of exclusion

Threshold of exclusion. In any given electoral rule, the minimum share of votes a group of voters able to coordinate the votes of its members needs to guarantee election of at least one candidate of its choice. For example, for the d'Hondt rule (q.v.*)*, the threshold of exclusion is $1/(M+1)$, where M is the number of seats to be filled. However, only for the d'Hondt form of divisor-based PR methods and for single transferable vote (q.v.) and for single nontransferable vote (q.v.*)* is the threshold of exclusion always *exactly* $1/(M+1)$. With other PR methods, the threshold of exclusion is generally also a function of n, the number of parties receiving votes, except when $n=M+1$, when the $1/(M+1)$ is also found (see Table 1 in Lijphart and Gibberd 1977, p. 225). Within any given country, an M-seat district can be expected to have roughly M times the population of a single-seat district. Thus, if we are interested in the actual number of voters who must change their minds to affect election outcomes, then threshold of exclusion values need to be adjusted to take population differences into account across constituencies of different sizes (see Grofman 2001).

Threshold rule. In various forms of proportional representation (q.v.) and in the proportional representation tier of a mixed member electoral system (q.v.), a rule that denies seats to a party that fails to achieve some prespecified threshold of national or regional vote share or fails to achieve some necessary regional distribution of party success.

Zebra nominations. In bicameral legislatures where there are pre-electoral coalitions (q.v.), these are agreements among coalition members that balance nominees for the two chambers in a given region by selecting candidates from different parties for each chamber. (This term may also apply to the selection by a party, or coalition, of candidates with different characteristics for the two chambers, for example, one a local notable and the other not).

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