

Being, Relation & the Re-worlding of Intentionality

Jim Ruddy



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palgrave
macmillan

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ISBN 978-1-349-94842-0 ISBN 978-1-349-94843-7 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-94843-7

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016940568

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*In Memoriam: for Juan Antonio Mendieta Vanegas
and for Nathan Dinsel*

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Introduction

Since a quite helpful review of the first draft of this work has called attention to the fact that the work itself assumes a great deal about Husserl, and, in addition, since this work is based on what Edith Stein called her new “philosophy system,” and, finally, since this work presupposes what a number of classical philosophers, Eastern and Western, have said about the perennial and thorny problem of the *essential nature* of real and mental “relations,” it would be helpful to the reader to have such assumptions and presuppositions stated clearly at the outset. Such an introduction would be useful precisely because this book itself endeavors to be a logical introduction to a new eidetic science, called convergent phenomenology, whose infinitely-able-to-be-intensified-and-expanded “work area” is, through a higher *epoche* of the entire domain of transcendental subjectivity, discoverable as itself nesting at the exact hub-center of Husserlian pure consciousness.

The term, “nesting,” is here used advisedly. Indeed, the formal notion of a lesser science nesting within a more general science is presupposed throughout the following pages. In Western scholasticism, we find the creative conception precisely of subalternate sciences viewed clearly as nesting operationally within master sciences. Indeed, in the opening lines of *Contra Gentes*, Thomas Aquinas uses the striking example of the woodcraft of shipbuilding nesting effectually within the master science of piloting and ship navigation. We find a similar notion in Eastern scholasticism. Karl Potter, in explaining the manner in which, according to

the Samkhya system, the ontological realm of *tattva* nests in the empirical realm of the *bhuta*, uses the analogy, taken from linguistics, of how deep-structured syntactic and semantic elements come to rest within the surface structure of language itself.¹ Thus, the dense and obscure sutra-verses at the core of Eastern classical thought can be seen, operationally, as a flowering forth from the deeper roots of long months of ontologically oriented, oral instruction from a master thinker. More to the point, the word “nesting” is especially appropriate because of modern advances in computer programming according to which one computer program nests itself functionally within another more general program. James Case tells us that the language called Lisp is able to represent both data and programs in the same way, allowing and encouraging “the development of programs that employ other programs as subprograms.”² In line with Case, the backdrop assumption³ of this present book is that Edith Stein was, in the actual operation of her new phenomenological method, able to *represent to herself* both the frontal and data-like **objectivity** of Husserlian intentionality as well as the relation-like, programmatic and already-unified, co-referencing-utterly-beyond-itself **objectivity** of Thomistic *intentio*. Stein’s deliberate and hard-headed realism and her day-by-day familiarity with the authentically bracketed material of Husserl’s “science of essences”—as well as her own tireless ability to speculate theoretically and in great descriptive detail upon purely spiritual intellectual acts—enabled her to treat the above objective intentionalities of Aquinas and Husserl “in the same way.” She thereupon moved fiercely forward to constitute, at a greater depth, some all-encompassing truths within formal ontology that were as yet undiscovered precisely because these truths were operating like deeply embedded mainsprings at the phenomenologically describable core of all traditional, Husserlian-constituted truths.⁴ She was accordingly able to implant her new and expansive work area seamlessly within orthodox Husserlian phenomenology as a whole.⁵

Let us attempt to formally analyze what the sources of such seamlessness were. For the essential Chinese-box-like method of effectively nesting such *a priori sciences* themselves, one within another, must be thoroughly understood. Such a preliminary understanding can be helpful as a prelude to the founding of convergent phenomenology only if the *formative sources* of such seamlessly co-referenced functionality are brought out into the light.

Indeed, underlying and grounding the entire investigative attempt, set forth in the present work, to discover the primary and centrally embedded constitution (or, better, “*proto-constitution*”) of an entirely continuous, wholly logical foundation for convergent phenomenology itself (precisely as a purely a priori science), are *two guiding principles*, parallel to Stein’s new method, the one purely formal and the other purely material:

- A. On the one hand, the first and purely formal guiding principle has to do, because of the originative duality of being and consciousness, with a possible duality of structural form to be found in all a priori sciences *as such* at least at the most general conceivable level.
- B. On the other hand, the second and material guiding principle has to do with the “how,” in other words with the *way* human reason might proceed forward thus to finally attain insight into the aforementioned duality of structural form in order to eventually and fruitfully enter the new science itself.

A. *In regard to the first and purely formal guiding principle*, as is now well known, Heidegger pointed out to us that a pivotal forgetfulness of Being Itself lies in the trite and wholly obvious use of the simple word, “is.”⁶ Nevertheless, what this fundamental analysis of forgetfulness *itself* seems to forget is the fact that an even more dire and thoroughgoing forgetfulness lies in the trite and wholly obvious use of the simple phrase, “is toward...,” precisely because human object-consciousness, ensconced in the originative duality of being and consciousness, as both arise inter-dependently as already toward each other, is already shot through and through with its own co-referenced, back-and-forth⁷ relationality, a relationality that remains *itself* very often entirely forgotten and unexplored precisely as such object-consciousness moves forward toward pure subject-consciousness, *especially at the level of pure logic*, to nest its own founded intelligibilities within higher intelligibilities. Thus, the forgetfulness of the *adesse* of “is toward” (much more than the forgetfulness of the true meaning of the *inse* of the predicative copula) is *mutatis mutandis* much more deleterious both to logic and to ontology itself.

Few thinkers have realized this. One such modern thinker who did so was the formidable Indologist, Sara Grant. During her remarkable comparative study of asymmetrical (i.e. “real” toward but “mental” back in) relationality in both Sankara and Aquinas, Grant attempts to wake up all of modern thought, both Eastern and Western, to such disastrous

forgetfulness of the true nature of relation subterraneously hidden in the phrase, “is toward,” hidden, indeed, precisely as an astonishing “unity of reference” already out beyond itself toward something else. She tells us that it is “possible to reflect upon facts or situations involving extremely complex relations without paying formal attention to the nature of relation as such.” She goes on to explain: “[S]o in daily life, and even in highly-developed sciences such as microbiology, physics, linguistics, ‘questions of relation’ arise and are solved *in concreto*, without any need being felt to raise the basic question of the nature of relation *qua* relation.”⁸ This deeper forgetfulness of Relation Itself nesting within the forgetfulness of Being Itself is accordingly not as harmless as it may seem at first. The following indictment of Grant, not truly relevant to the core of her deeper comparative work, but nevertheless proclaimed in passing against all of modern thought, clearly assumes that such forgetfulness has had nearly irremediable effects on modern pure logic:

There is first of all the essentially relational character of all our thinking ... which naturally leads the human mind to assume that it knows all it needs to know about relation: We can handle relative terms with complete efficiency in ordinary life and in our more specialized pursuits, and this tends to conceal from us the vagueness of our thinking on the subject, and the imprecision of our language.

Grant maintains that the *minime ens* character of relation (rooted in the blatant fact that human object-consciousness always finds real relations—relations that actually exist out in the world—as already “in” and rarely recognizes that their whole essence, notwithstanding their *in esse* foundation, is simply to be “toward” rather than “in”) has been lost in the modern tradition:

There is further the extremely elusive character of relation-in-itself: *in itself*, as Pythagoras, Aristotle, Aquinas and Sankara have all noted, relation is not an objective reality in its own right—it simply represents *reference-to-another*. Moreover, it is grasped only by the intelligence, whereas we easily limit ourselves to the level of sense and imagination, reifying it into a “third thing” and cluttering up the world with a multitude of solidified abstractions, so blinding ourselves, however unintentionally, to the austere functional and dynamic structure of reality. So “similarity,” “fatherhood,” “youth,” “age,” “togetherness,” have no objective existence: there are only similar objects, fathers and sons, people older and younger than each other, people grouped together ... The effort to pierce through the appearances and grasp the

essential character of relation-in-itself demands an effort of pure intelligence few are prepared to make even when they are alert to the possibility.

In the West, those who did make the effort were indeed few. Jean Poinot, for one, claimed that, because of its special, *minime ens* character and because of its own odd, ethereal and austere intelligibility in its own right, an actually existent real relation out in the empirical world was a third kind of being,⁹ not able to be understood within the ontological formalism of either substance or of accident. In the East, the Vaisesikas even claimed that the functional nesting of accident within substance was so unique as to form a separate non-reciprocal category all its own called the *sama-vaya* relation.¹⁰ Yet the beginnings of an *actual sub-ontology* of relation that could, in its wholly realized form, embed itself in *metaphysica generalis* was not ever discovered or systematized. Aquinas came close to such a discovery when he divided relation into real, mental and asymmetrical.¹¹ This last feature of a real relation (that it was so minimally real solely in such a final, all or nothing sense that it was real solely as already out toward its term¹² but simply intentional back into itself) never became scientifically studied according to its own curiously non-reciprocal nature. It certainly was never formally systematized within pure logic itself as it should have been. If it had been, then *all a priori sciences* could have been divided into those that centered themselves in the *inesse* of Being constituted as *actus purus essendi* and those that centered themselves subalternately in the third level *adesse* of Being thereby proto-constituted equally as *actus purus essendi*, the latter sciences nesting themselves seamlessly in the former accordingly.

Because of such nearly impenetrable forgetfulness, all of this higher complexly layered formalism toward which we are now directing ourselves, which should have been attained at the height of pure logic itself, remained doubly obscure. Thus Kevin Wall, one of the few modern thinkers fully aware of what Aristotle, Avicenna, Aquinas, Poinot and Suarez said about such asymmetrical relations, assumes rightly that such subliminal obscurity colors all of modern thought—especially such thought’s own symptomatic blindness to the looming possibility of an innermost asymmetricality within relation itself. Wall tells us:

The tradition understood this relation as *intentional* and Husserl, following Brentano, and Heidegger, following Husserl, picked this up from the tradition. This is the real relation of the knower to the known and the lover to the beloved which relation, from this point of view, is at once action and

relation and quality. The reverse relation from the object to the knower and the lover is, in the tradition, rational and not real. Charles Hartshorne found this a fascinating distinction and was surprised at its sophistication and that it was in the tradition and had been forgotten.¹³

Having shown the formal guiding principle which has to do, because of the origivative duality of being and consciousness, with a possible duality of *structural form* to be found in all a priori sciences *as such*, let us turn now to the material guiding principle, dealing with the “how” of human object-consciousness.

B. In regard to the second wholly material guiding principle. This principle, as you may recall, has to do precisely with the actual *way* human reason might proceed forward thus to finally attain insight into the aforementioned duality of structural form and the manner in which, accordingly, one a priori science might rest within another. And here, by bringing to light what Edith Stein did in her new, free-floating phenomenology of essences,¹⁴ we find a simple, sixfold reasoning process founded solidly on the progressively layered structures of a straightforward and clear-cut analogy between the wholly ontological structure of Thomistic *intentio* as a purely spiritual and “immanent” actualization of what Aquinas refers to as the potential intellect and the scientifically investigated “self-clarification” of intentionality itself that we find in Edmund Husserl. Let us proceed through these six progressively deepening steps, one by one:

1. *First Step: The interiorizing of the analogia entis.* Edith Stein was able to move forward into her new area of relation-like (and simultaneously both Thomistic and Husserlian) objectivity to describe it with great clarity because she suddenly saw, with a penetrative flash of insight—and exactly *as a* Husserlian phenomenologist—the pivotal, forward and backward method of the origivative proportionality of the *analogia entis* of Aquinas as already there in her own ego-life *as freshly describable (prepredicatively!)* *within transcendental subjectivity itself*.¹⁵ Indeed, if this is not immediately understood about Stein’s seemingly miraculously unified method, nothing that she says in her entire philosophical systematics, together with the intelligibilities that she begins to unfold for herself, precisely as exfoliating in a newly focused fashion around the relational construct of finite-toward-eternal-being, makes philosophical sense. This burgeoning, relation-like objectivity that she starts to work with, or what the present author refers to, throughout this

book, as *adese* objectivity, especially according to its almost indescribable character of sometimes, and in special, formal cases, being real outward but merely intentional back into itself, stands forever in stark contrast to what one might call the *inesse* objectivity of traditional Husserlian intentionality, especially in respect to intentionality's paradigmatic reciprocity of act and object.

2. *Second Step: Behind the line of epoche.* Being a hard-headed realist Stein knew that doctrines, simply logically and deductively posted by Aquinas within his massive system and themselves never subjectively (or phenomenally) described, such as the potential intellect and the agent intellect, were ontological causes about which phenomenology, ensconced within its own neutral bracketing out of the real self and the real world, must, in an almost Wittgensteinian mode, remain forever mute and about which it could never utter even the slightest meaningful statement.
3. *Third Step: The subliminal force of the analogy; example, taken from Stein's descriptions, of species toward the real individual.* However, the straightforward and layered analogy between the *noemata/noeses* structures within transcendental subjectivity and the corresponding already co-referenced **potency/act** structures of Thomistic ontology (e.g. essence-toward-existence, genera-toward-species, species-toward-real-individual, matter-toward-form) remained in her mind as a kind of subliminal, guiding force. Stein thus saw the possibility of a deeper, yet still authentically Husserlian, constitution of both the non-reciprocal towardness of finite-toward-eternal-being (real out toward its target, merely intentional back into itself) as well as the non-reciprocal towardness of transcendental subjectivity to the *noemata* of sensible experience (again as a real *adese* out toward its target, yet merely intentional back into itself). Stein did not push forward to make these nested asymmetricalities of Relation Itself into objects for a new, albeit subalternate, phenomenology (as the present work itself claims to do), but she assuredly saw such asymmetricalities as grouped and constellated into an already-operable method within phenomenology itself. It helped her immensely through her complex search. Even within her ethereal formal ontology of species and individuals, she is able clearly to separate out the potential *adese* of individuals toward species and the deeper potential *adese* of the whole Being Itself toward the *actus purus essendi* as itself a non-reciprocal relation of two such potentialities to each other. Thus, after making

clear the formality of such constellated objectification, she goes on to declare: “We ought to ask how these two potentialities differ. One difference is that the relation between them is asymmetrical. One being viewed from the other appears as the real (*eigentlich*) at which the other aims.”¹⁶ Her careful and methodical use of the term, “real” here must function in her logical analysis as a wholly Husserlian usage or the entire phenomenological description itself simply falls apart. On the other hand, if we truly understand her new insight into both Being and Relation, a great mystery looms before us, much as if the plates and fault lines of an entirely new continent have finally settled into their own underground point of rest (thus allowing for an already-embedded series of astonishing discoveries). For the “real at which the other aims” is now being understood as a kind of “showing” where the usual intentional judgment-foundations of ordinary intentionality within general phenomenology make no logical sense whatsoever. In terms of the new a priori science of convergent phenomenology, such an individual, “real” entity is being proto-constituted as already toward the *actus purus essendi*, whereas the reverse is clearly not the case.

4. *Fourth Step: the proportional paradigm of “toward” and “in.”* Stein’s awareness thus grew that, resting within each intentionality spot-checked within transcendental subjectivity by Husserl himself, were both the interior towardness of act/object to itself and the wholly exterior towardness of the entire state of affairs outward toward that which held its intelligible “fullness” (what she often spoke of as “*Fülle*”) firmly in place. Her notion of such “being held” permeates her new formal ontology and almost miraculously deepens its power beyond the base formal ontology of Husserl. Let us try to theoretically “unpack” such a situation: Subalternate “relation” within pure analogy must finally come to rest and “nest” itself in the thoroughgoing essentialism and in the wholly formal and co-referencing *proportionality* of Relation Itself. In other words, Relation Itself is neither mental nor real and its essential (and already unified) referring-outward is itself neither relational nor non-relational but what the scholastics called “proportional.” In the last analysis, it is, if you will, both wondrously “towards” in its essence and wondrously “in” in its existence. Thus seeing it as *transcendent toward*, but merely *immanent in* is a seeing of it in its very own total, eidetic fullness. As a result, in Husserl’s final transcendental phenomenology, the aforementioned two-sided and

seemingly entirely reciprocal “relation” between *noemata* and *noeses*—described with inexhaustible and thoroughgoing scientific clarity by Husserl himself—not being able to be further elaborated through a deeper and more formal eidetics of both reciprocal and non-reciprocal **relation as it is in itself**, often is misinterpreted and has become currently subject to rather baleful distortions. A perfect case in point: It is hard to know precisely what Uriah Kriegel is talking about, when, in a recent book, he speaks of intentionality as possibly being *non-relational*.¹⁷ Oddly, his entire treatment mentions neither the scholastic concept of *intentio* nor Brentano’s and Husserl’s well-known revival of it.¹⁸ On the other hand, when current Husserlian scholars speak offhandedly of intentionality as relational (often as a consciousness of something), their interpretation frequently remains ambiguous; and it is seldom clear whether the intentional states of affairs spoken of are to be taken as being wholly mental, or as being wholly real, or neither, or both, or even as non-reciprocal (i.e. being perhaps real from one side out toward their transcendental object and then merely mental back again).¹⁹ As a result, the supreme unity of reference of intentionality itself *as such* is thereby left up for grabs. With Edith Stein we find, instead, in contrast to such almost-willful distortions, a refreshing clarity of expression: just as in Aquinas, the potential intellect is a pure towardness (what later scholastics called *respectus transcendens*) to the agent intellect and both are a pure towardness (*respectus transcendens*) to the *actus purus essendi*, so in Stein, the eventual, spiritual *objects* of intentionality, holding their own within transcendental subjectivity, are, even in their inmost proportionality with each other, already, in our new *adesse*-view of them, asymmetrically²⁰ outward toward the purely spiritual *acts* of intentionality because this “object/act” structure can be newly and more accurately described, at the inmost, embedded heart of transcendental subjectivity, as being already asymmetrically (and equally!) outward, in a final, definitive sense, precisely toward that selfsame *actus purus essendi* as it is in itself. Nothing can be both act and object in the same respect, but this very fact can be fully understood only from the higher viewpoint we have just disclosed. Quite forthrightly stated: If such a super-towardness toward God is there, it must be somehow already constituted—precisely by transcendental subjectivity—as there, purely and simply. Otherwise there can be no formally objective, third-level, *a priori* science of its own specialized, nested constitution within Husserlian constitution.

5. *Step Five: the actus purus essendi as a “grounding act of reference”; the real and fully human meaning of Truth-toward-Being.* At this stage of our layered analogies we come to a crucial assumption, an assumption that could be iconically formulated as the “is-toward assumption,” underlying the entire, now-lost-in-forgetfulness, logical-historical *foundation* lying at the base of the new science of convergent phenomenology that this work wishes to unfold for the reader. And that is the simple fact that relation, taken in its formal towardness (*adesse*) to its transcendent term, thus relation before it nests itself as being eventually real, mental or asymmetrically both, *is what gives supreme and final intelligibility to purely human “object-consciousness.”* For the human act of thinking is already utterly relative, in a purely formal sense, as act/object proportionality, within Relation Itself. Everything else, except for the *actus purus essendi*, (enter general phenomenology!) is relative only to essence: Thus the stage is set for bringing forward what Kant called the transcendental imagination into full descriptive clarity. In Aquinas, even the most immaterial of concepts must be necessarily grounded in the abstractedly lived-through, but hardly ever averted-to, *adesse* of a *convertuntur ad phantasmata*. This becomes in phenomenology a shadowy *adesse*-like fact: the fact that, in Husserl, even the most immaterial of intentional objects must be necessarily grounded in the miraculous passivity of interior time-consciousness as such or else everything falls away and the fulcrum-center of human object-consciousness is lost. This intricately layered truth, which was seen by Stein (who herself collated and wrote most of the *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Interior Time Consciousness* from Husserl’s short-hand notes)²¹ as crucially pivotal, makes eventual sense in the following pages of this book, as we proceed forward to found convergent phenomenology. And it makes sense only if the ancient eidetics of *real relation* (as an entirely grounded and entirely necessary “pivot-model” for intellectual Truth-toward-Being *as a systematics*) both in the West and in the East, is unearthed, revisited and clearly understood. The originative and prepredicative source of relation that can then be resurrected by us moderns from this lost eidetics, with its strange series of “consequences,” leads inevitably into the wholly formal/ontological ground of Relation Itself that must be freshly uncovered from Western and Eastern classical thought itself if ever convergent phenomenology is to find itself centering into itself as a true science. Some speculations on this very ground itself of divine “subject-consciousness” as fully

identical in every possible sense with the transcendent, yet somehow proportional, ineffability of the *actus purus essendi*, precisely in terms of what might be called a pure “grounding act of reference,” were first set forth in an article that the author wrote for the *Indian Philosophical Journal*. Here is the text, a text merely subsidiary to the main theme of the article itself:

In regard to the doctrine of real relation, which seems so much an oddity to the modern mind, it was held [by the ancients] that the act-side of the united process of Being could take the form of a pure, retentive character of a grounding act of reference for all relations able to be thought about or found in the real world. In terms analogous to motion, this grounding act was able to pass through both mental and real situations on its way to ground the relation itself within the extremes in which it was thereby grounded. It was due to this remarkable grounding act of reference that relations were not *in* any thing so much as they were *toward* something else. For relation did not inhere directly in a real thing but only indirectly in the qualities and accidents of a real thing. And because the reality of an accident was proportioned to inherence, relation was thus the least real, and, by that fact, the most obscure of all the categories. Thus arose an array of midway qualities of the formal nature of relation. They posed paradoxes from the start, for the relation was a riddle of absolute particularity that could not be generalized, because it had no direct inherence from which to abstract. Thus a relation was more “toward” than “in;” it did not move or change except if one left it alone and saw instead it [sic] own base of inherent accident altering. And finally, and most remarkable of all, relation was the one case where the mind could enter no farther into the exterior mystery of Being. More strictly speaking, the mind could sustain no more of its own relations outward to bring to a better focus the real relation it saw, because, in the ancient view, to relate a relation to anything higher than itself, either mental or real, was to fall into the utter abyss of an infinite regress. It was thus at this ultimate edge of the real relation itself where mental relations were at last exactly distinguished from real relations, because the ancients held that mental relations were able to be endlessly formed off to infinity by the mind sustaining them.²²

6. *Sixth Step: Following along Stein’s way to a new science.* This final step might take the form of a programmatic “word to the wise”: A beginning convergent phenomenologist, guided by these strictly layered analogies to which we are now directing our attention, should see herself as accordingly able to move even further forward along Stein’s way

(and even beyond Stein!) directly into the new science in question, precisely to the degree that she sees relation-like objectivity **as such**²³ as already likewise there, as somehow purely “constituted” *ad esse* objectivity, **in her very own ego-life**, and precisely *as freshly describable* (prepredicatively) **within that selfsame transcendental subjectivity**. In other words, in convergent phenomenology, the elusive and shifting proto-constitution of the free-floating transcendental imagination begins to move front and center. What were ghostly voices in the dark and emptied stage of modern thought, especially in regard to memory, perception, time consciousness, etc., now achieve sustainable “roles,” and begin to speak, with transcendent clarity, precisely about the greater reality that thereby holds them in place and gives them an undeniably personal voice.

Thus these originitive, sixfold steps above, straightforwardly assumed by the following work, lead inexorably to the discovery of convergent phenomenology as a new *a priori science*. If one keeps this in mind, it will become clear that, if a convergent phenomenologist doesn’t see this already-operational “nesting” of an (real-TOWARD-but-merely-intentional-IN) *asymmetrical relationality* of referred and wondrously interdependent, simultaneously forward and backward “proportionality” within the formal nature of human object-consciousness—and see this with unshakeable theoretical clarity *from the very first*—convergent phenomenology remains promissory for her only and, at base, nothing but a kind of wishful thinking.

This sixfold reasoning process in question, outlining an utterly new *epoche-within-epoche*, and grounded as it is (as “pivot-model”) upon a remarkable and clear-cut working analogy between Stein’s transmuted insights and the nascent foundations of the new science of convergent phenomenology within pure logic, will gain more and more of its own focused clarity as we move further inward into the very bedrock of the science itself.

Before we move in such a fashion forward, it would be well, nevertheless, to return to what was promised at the beginning of this introduction. There, in the opening paragraph, the reader was assured that we would give a clear presentation of precisely what this book has assumed from the labors of Edmund Husserl himself and from the traditional scope of the *a priori science* of phenomenology that he laid bare within what we have referred to above as human “object-consciousness.” Such a presentation

would be best aided by setting forth the very words of Husserl himself, and then indicating how the author's interpretation of what is being said has, *mutatis mutandis*, inspired the progress of the present work.

1. *First quotation: on synthetic interrelatedness.* Husserl tells us that, in trying to clarify types of consciousness—perceptions, memories, and so on—we cannot simply juxtapose such types or “be satisfied with a general phenomenological impression and with the evident differences between all types. Only when we understand them in their structural interrelatedness can we also understand how they function in synthetic interrelatedness.”²⁴ This is manifestly true as it stands. One might simply add that there is, furthermore, a hidden and altogether deeper (and, as Stein saw, non-reciprocal) interrelatedness of such types of thought that as such lies beyond any thing-like or thematic synthesis since this higher-level, formally relation-like interrelatedness is *already* being proportionally referred out toward its own absolute terms. A simple case in point: the logical principle of contradiction, as a pure *ratio*, can certainly be remembered, personified and asserted, and as grouped, juxtaposed modalities of judgment, such interrelatedness remains precisely at Husserl's level. At the level of asymmetrical *adesse* objectivity however (and thus on the “other side” of a further reduction that brackets out *inesse* objectivity) all such saturated modalities disappear and the self-same unsaturated structures—as pure towardnesses to the identical, ideal principle itself at the center of pure logic—remain as revealed by pure, intuitive description to be wholly non-thematizable towardnesses pointing utterly beyond themselves toward the ideal proposition in question. Their shifting-into-focus “being” is no longer *inesse* but *adesse*. As will be made clear, they are indeed ourselves, but timelessly so.

2. *Second Quotation: Standing inside pure logic itself.* If any one statement of Husserl's expresses the dedicated center of his entire scientific enterprise, it is the following quotation: “If we are busied with objects—and, in particular, if we are judging about them—we stand inside our own consciousness.”²⁵ Thus, in *Experience and Judgment*, his culminating work on pure logic, Edmund Husserl, working tirelessly at the ground level of the prepredicative sources of all possible, higher-level (and thus purely “formal”) judgment theories, discovered and began to exfoliate *the entire domain* of originative self-evidence, a primordial evidence itself supportively underpinning all formally true acts of judgment, and, accordingly, an evidence thereby able to charge such acts full of their own *final, directive*

meaning. His phenomenology accomplished this monumental task, once and for all, by the zigzag, *Rückgang*, forward-backward motion of tracing the genetic constitution of these nucleic sources, step by step, from deep within transcendental subjectivity, and then contrapuntally and radically “enworlding” these now-purified sources back within the heart of the *Lebenswelt* itself, thus grounding pure logic²⁶ for all time to come. Such a remarkable and thoroughgoing regression into (and final eidetic reenactment and replacement—at a much deeper level—of) the primal foundations lost by pure logic within the Western tradition required Husserl to rely to a certain extent on the thing-like paradigms of association theory. It was almost as if he were constructing a vast fugue and had to make sure each note was precisely in the correct place. Elaborating on such a musical metaphor: It was not for lack of effort, then, that such a scrupulously mirrored “counterpoint,”—concentrating, ideally, on thing-like notes rather than on the more ephemeral co-relational “phrasing” of these emergent themes themselves—to a certain degree missed describing²⁷ not only the actual surfacing music, but also a brief, final “coda” whereby all such themes can freshly speak for themselves in the interrelated choral-unity of *an ultimate apophansis*. The present work assumes that such a supreme apophansis, shifting and resolving all that is thing-like into all that is relation-like and setting forth relation AS relation, already resides and nests within the ultimate heights of pure logic itself.²⁸ Thus what this very special apophansis actually is (now newly being viewed from a drastically purified, wholly theoretical vantage point) could perhaps best be understood—even Husserlian-wise, and thus as already synthesized in noetic-noematic terms—as a primal and constitutive “re-worlding,” already being proto-constituted at the living core of pure consciousness, proto-constituted exactly as the universalized, signification content of the *actus purus essendi* as origivative evidence purely in Husserl’s sense. It can more thoroughly be described (not ontologically—since ontological statements, causally based, are never intuitive descriptions—but rather *phenomenologically* and therefore prepredicatively) as a positively receptive, action-less converging into itself—at the absolute center of the brimming fountainhead of the pure act of Being Itself—of the formal, wholly apophantic “axis” of pure logic as uncovered and understood, in its inexhaustible breadth and depth, by Husserl. Consequently, what the following pages intend to do is to locate and fix this emerging, newly self-conscious, actively judging apophansis within a viable work area in order to uncover it at the hub of pure logic, and thereupon describe it *as*

it is essentially, but now from a purely *adesse*, relation-like rather than an *inesse*, thing-like point of view. Thus placed, what we discover within it is what might be termed an ineffably definitive Apophansis of apophanses²⁹ that, itself, at last *and irreversibly*, can be seen as non-reciprocally directing itself *wholly beyond itself as a kind of part by part retrieval of the final Truth of Being Itself*. Truth can be in the wings only if Being Itself is already front and center. Truth IS only as *non-reciprocally itself* precisely as it is already toward Being. Truth, as all classical theories of judgment, both East and West have maintained, can only arise when the paradigmatic “self-toward-object” *suddenly brings part of itself forward, gift-wise, exactly as a newly unfolding self-toward-object*. That is the true meaning of Husserl’s words: “If we are busied with objects—and, in particular, if we are judging about them—we stand inside our own consciousness.” Thus that exponentialized, self-giving “stance” (in terms of what it suddenly “faces,”) is exactly what Husserl’s revision and enlargement of pure logic, as a perfectly phrased, and suddenly, formally modulated (and now newly able to stand forth and finally be fully “sung”) Apophansis of apophanses discloses. *Third Quotation: Other Phenomenologies?* “Perhaps there are different phenomenological disciplines, some eidetic and tied to absolute givennesses the others empirical and tied to ‘incomplete givennesses.’”³⁰ As we can see, in regard to the possible existence and achievability of other a priori phenomenological sciences besides the general phenomenology which he himself uncovered, Husserl is quite generous. *Fourth Quotation: The Adesse of Relative-to-Absolute Already Presupposed by the Phenomenological Reduction of Husserl*. Let us listen closely to the famous passage that spells out the shift necessary for the phenomenological work-domain of Husserl to be finally and productively achieved: In this passage, Husserl tells us that the sole task and service of phenomenology “is to clarify the meaning of this world, the precise sense in which everyone accepts it, and with undeniable right, as really existing (*wirklich seiende*). That it exists—given as it is as a universe out there (*daseiendes*) in an experience that is continuous, and held persistently together through a thread of widespread unanimity—that is quite indubitable. It is quite another consideration, although ...one of considerable philosophical importance, that the continuance of experience in the future under such form of universal agreement is a mere (although reasonable) presumption and that accordingly the non-existence of the world ...always remains *thinkable*.” Husserl then shifts, with an almost imperceptible finality, toward the definitive stance that he wishes the work area of his new science to achieve: “The result of

the phenomenological clarification of the meaning of the manner of existence of the real world (and, eidetically, of a real world generally) is that only transcendental subjectivity has the meaning of Absolute Being, that it only is non-relative, that is, relative only to itself; whereas the real world indeed exists, but in respect of essence is relative to transcendental subjectivity, and in such a way that it can have its meaning as existing (*seiende*) reality only as the intentional meaning product of transcendental subjectivity.”³¹ With what we have so far uncovered in regard to a resurrected, classical eidetics of relation, it might be helpful to proceed back into the remarkable shift now being singled out and ask *for the first time* what the recurrent phrase “is relative to” in Husserl’s famous lines can possibly mean in such a crucial context. What comes into the footlights is a stunning reciprocity, within which the now-deepening back and forth non-reciprocity of relative-toward-absolute shines out for the first time. For, have we not almost preternaturally rediscovered transcendental subjectivity caught in the very act of remaining within itself while yet proceeding utterly beyond itself toward something else? Let us try to get closer to such a prime rediscovery. At this utterly crucial point, the philosopher Henri Bergson might help. Bergson tells us that, in order to understand the infinitesimal moment—point of shift between dreaming and waking we must rely on the facts—the very things themselves involved. We must make of ourselves an experiment. The following is the experiment that Bergson offers us, taken from his own personal experience:

Now the dreamer dreamed that he was speaking before an assembly, that he was making a political speech before a political assembly. Then in the midst of the auditorium a murmur rose. The murmur augmented; it became a muttering. Then it became a roar, a frightful tumult, and finally there resounded from all parts timed to a uniform rhythm the cries, “Out! Out!” At that moment he wakened. A dog was baying in a neighboring garden, and with each one of his “Wow-wows” one of the cries of “Out! Out!” seemed to be identical. Well, here was the infinitesimal moment which it is necessary to seize. The waking ego, just reappearing, should turn to the dreaming ego, which is still there, and, during some instants at least, hold it without letting it go. “I have caught you at it! You thought it was a crowd shouting and it was a dog barking. Now, I shall not let go of you until you tell me just what you were doing!” To which the dreaming ego would answer, “I was doing nothing.”³²

The dream-self is thus “doing nothing,” at least in contrast to the miraculous “something” of the dog-identification. *What then of the famed, doing-*

nothing “neutrality modification” enshrined in the above words of Husserl? Before our very eyes the usual, median point of departure deepens endlessly into an ultimate point of departure. For can we not now catch this shifting core-occurrence of the wholly factual *adesse* thereby grounding the forward and backward phrases of “is relative to...” in its very act of self-constitution? What is being taken for granted is precisely the sheer obviousness of these pivot points of shift from relative to absolute. Does not this obviousness refract us completely away from the inmost core of what is actually being achieved? We have then but to turn forth from ourselves at higher level and ask: What immense but hidden fields of light will these assumed pivot points reveal to us? Has it never occurred to us why *nothing at all happens within the natural standpoint* when we shift into the phenomenological standpoint? ³³ Exactly for the same reason would one search in vain for convergent phenomenology within the traditional, reductive bounds of general phenomenology. Perhaps we had better, once and for all, take the same stand toward general phenomenology that Husserl himself took toward Kant. Husserl, of course, was well aware that, at the center of Kant’s work, Kant himself presupposed—and, and indeed, everyone contemporaneous with Kant presupposed—some obvious truths. These mega-obvious kinds of presuppositions must suddenly be accorded, as Husserl himself says, “their own universal and theoretical interest.” When we do so—as Husserl goes on to say about Kant’s unnoticed sources—“there opens up to us, to our growing astonishment, an infinity of ever new phenomena belonging to a new dimension, coming to light only through consistent penetration into the meaning- and validity- implications of what was taken for granted.”³⁴ A similar sense of growing astonishment greets us as well when we at last, through a further putting into brackets the entire realm of transcendental subjectivity as reciprocal *in esse*, move past the traditional, reductive portals of general phenomenology into the non-reciprocal *ad esse* of convergent phenomenology, suddenly viewed, in all its theoretical glory, viewed, if you will, as an immense, utterly novel, and—through the above nesting within itself of almost inconceivably general and transformative shift of attention—*suddenly illumined field of actual phenomenological work*. Looking back at the cluster of the facts themselves, nothing at all occurred within general phenomenology during the supreme shift and enactment precisely of our new science’s final, re-worlding-wise achievement of itself! *Fifth Quotation: On the Constitution of External Relations in Experience and Judgment*. Did Husserl ever arrive at the watershed division that we have

tried, in this introduction, to bring into focus within pure logic, between *in esse* objectivity, centering around intentionality, and a kind of third-level, *ad esse* objectivity centering around a relationality at once mental, real and asymmetrically both? We find in Husserl's *Experience and Judgment*, a direct attempt, by a tri-level schematization, to get to the final, utterly prepredicative sources of what he calls "external relations." In that work he concentrates on simple external perception as a prepredicative base for eventually understanding both judgment forms and primal original self-evidence not as a modal form of a logical judgment, but much deeper as a self-giveness within primordial consciousness. He divides such simple seeing of a perceptual object (contemplative perception) into three levels: (1) the level of simple apprehension or the lowest level of perceptual interest, such as the absorbed hearing of a sudden sound that arises and that completely saturates our perceptual interest; (2) the higher level of an explicative contemplation of an object that exfoliates out into a substrate and an arrayed determination of that substrate, yet still within the unity of a single object and its internal horizon of explicates; and (3) an additional level that expands to include the external horizon and its co-present objects. "In this way," he says, "in contrast to its internal determinations or explicates, *relative determinations* arise which display what the object is in its relation to other objects: the pencil is *beside* the inkwell, it is *longer* than the pen holder, and so on."³⁵ The question to ask is, are these relative determinations at least akin to what we might now, as convergent phenomenologists, be describing as "empirically real relations?" It would seem so. Husserl allows himself the possibility of finally constructing a pure theory of relations upon them, but they apparently remain, in themselves, decidedly real objects of external perception. This is what he says:

There are, therefore, different kinds of intuitive unity on the basis of which the relation-seeking contemplative regard moves back and forth between the object substrate and the object-in-relation; at one time it is the unity of the self-giving in a perception, at another a unity in which what is self-given is united with what is not self-given; and thus union, again, takes place in different ways. In accord with the type of this unity there will emerge a *specification of the forms of relational contemplation*. If, by this specification, we arrive at a breakdown of the basic forms of the act of putting into relation, a breakdown which exhibits relations and forms of relations which constitute themselves as categorial objectivities in the higher sphere and thus also exhibits the basic components of a theory of relations, then the result of our present study can obviously still not provide a survey of the totality of the

basic forms of relations but only of those which preconstitute themselves precisely in the sphere of simple receptive experience of individual objects of external perception. In the domains of objectivities founded at a higher level, and on the higher level of productive spontaneity, new specific forms of relation again emerge.³⁶

In this remarkable passage, the stage is set for a new theory of meant relations. The actors on the first two levels have vanished. Not even their ghosts remain, and the new activity itself is wholly *adesse*. Thus we can finally understand that Husserl definitely holds to the ontological position that empirically real relations do indeed exist out in the world of nature. In addition, he sees the consequent need for a purely formal eidetics of relation, but he hasn't yet penetrated into the actual towardness of these real relations, nor ascertained what such a towardness-character itself entails. An indication that he hesitatingly tries, in spite of his new insights, to remain at the thing-like or *inesse* level of analysis is that what he calls relational contemplation deals not primarily with the seen relational towardnesses themselves but, more broadly, with relational objects as able-to-be-reversed *independent* objects, rather than as, in convergent phenomenology, non-independent objects that have, themselves, more real, and yet still non-independent objects as their substrate. And, finally, in the above passage, Husserl, with a kind of final watershed instinct, distinguishes between the totality of all relational forms and the forms derived from the "sphere of simple receptive experience," but there is no indication whether he considers both or either of such forms themselves to be mental "forms" only, or whether one can, as in Poincaré's ultimate division, finally divide all relations whatsoever into mind-dependent and mind-independent. Did the *adesse* of empirically real relations ever come into Husserl's purview? I believe the closest that he came to describing any such towardness lies in the following offhand remark that he makes when he compares the second level of perceptual contemplation, the level of explication, to the third level wherein we see external relations. He says that in the second level "the internal determinations we apprehend, at the same time, as contained *in* the object, in partial coincidence with it; the relative determinations [*at the third level*], on the other hand, are never *in* the object but first come into being with the transition to the relative object, extending 'tentacles' toward it, so to speak."³⁷ In a Bergsonian mode of intuitive moment nesting within the very facts themselves, the word, "tentacles," cannot by any stretch of descriptive clarity be called a description of the structures of *inesse*-saturated intentionality *at any*

level. Thus, regarding the intuitively present exterior objects upon which it directs its formal attention, the new science of convergent phenomenology deals solely and exclusively with the proto-constituted essence of such “tentacles.” *Sixth Quotation: Concerning Actually Existing, Empirically Real Relations.* Out of the intense and primal craving for logical clarity, as Husserl tells us, humanity always wanted, even from ancient times, to suddenly see the world itself in a new light of interconnectedly posited truths, or “in the specialization of investigative interests, wanted to know some type of special unending-open region of the world.”³⁸ Note that he says region “of the world”; and, note also a possible connection to a turning toward “landscapes” of images rather than to a pivoting on a single image. Thus, if the world is primarily articulated in terms of its thing-like objectifications within the intentional act, such an interrelatedness as *actually out in this world* is lost to intentionality exactly to that degree. My point is that its intelligible “restoration” (or what this book calls a re-worlding) can only be finally uncovered and brought to light within the further reduction into a new eidetic science, since it is there alone that the transcendental imagination can then be accessed apophantically, and with any degree of descriptive clarity. *Seventh Quotation: A Return to the Mothers of Knowledge:* Since convergent phenomenology alone is able to move, with own descriptive force, from the *inense* of single images to the *adesse* of entire landscapes of interrelated images, it would be well to note that one of Husserl’s favorite metaphors for the purely constitutional, creative side of transcendental subjectivity is a landscape-like metaphor which he borrowed from Goethe. In Goethe’s famed, dramatic poem, Faust is given a key by Mephistopheles which allows magic entrance into the enigmatic and dangerously potent realm of the “Mothers of Knowledge.” Even in his high-flying notes for his London lectures, Husserl speaks of his new transcendental phenomenology as “the mother of all a priori sciences.”³⁹ Thus, once one has performed the *epoche* and entered the phenomenological realm, as Husserl expresses it in terms of Goethe’s striking metaphor, then one can

find the way to the Mothers of knowledge, to discover the realm of pure consciousness, in which all being originates constitutively and out of which all knowledge as knowledge of what is must draw its ultimate intelligible explanation. Then one makes the initially astonishing discovery that here one is not dealing with incidental instances of incidental forms of consciousness. Rather with such words as ‘perception,’ ‘memory,’ ‘expectation,’ etc.,

one is dealing with nothing other than the science of the formations of the essence of consciousness as such, as the science of the Motherly origins.⁴⁰

Clearly, what Husserl envisions as the dangerous realm of “the Mothers of knowledge,” as well as such a motherly realm’s incumbent science, is nearly identical with what we have been speaking of as the first material object of convergent phenomenology, namely the resting place of transcendental subjectivity suddenly viewed as the final towardness of human object-consciousness somehow coming to final rest in what might be called the “mother-ship” of pure subject-consciousness as it is in itself. In convergent phenomenology, the meaning-giving act that gives meaning to *adesse* objectivity at all levels reaches utterly beyond itself such that the **founded content** of such an act—namely, this or that shifting, asymmetrical relation that is discovered actually toward the realm of subject-consciousness to the exact degree that we see that only our own constructed mental-side of this or that relation is returning back from such a realm—has equally the power of becoming an “astonishing discovery,” especially when we see the lowest, most minimal, most astonishing “gift” of it lodged at the absolute center of our being: the **founded reality of our own ontic self** as being so “toward” Being Itself that it is consequently less than nothing “in itself.” Convergent phenomenology, in this view would then become the science of the proto-constituted formations of pure consciousness, a shifting, free-floating consciousness now viewed as already well on its perilous, shining way toward the *actus purus essendi*. *Eighth Quotation; The Metamorphosis of an Epitaph*. In a revealing remark while talking with his friends, Husserl declared (“in effect,” as Cairns tells us) that the problem of transcendental constitution “is, as I have said to Herrn Dr. Fink, none other than the problem of how God created the absolute world, and continues to create it, even as the transcendental Intersubjectivity creates its world.”⁴¹ Husserl here, in a kind of free-floating analogy (and almost in spite of his scientific bent of mind) touches upon an entirely open-ended and logical ground for introducing the theme of “God” into the science of phenomenology. If he had been spurred further forward by what Nietzsche most prized—a subterranean and purely Dionysian affirmation of the “way things are,”—Husserl perhaps might have caught himself up short and thereby dared to pass through the now-clearly-marked, reductive “gateways” of *adesse*, and, having finally seen an infinite depth of essential structures opening up before him, begun to describe the veritable and, indeed, utterly final “self-

constitution” of the self-same, nascent analogy between divine creation and transcendental constitution itself which he was at that very moment offhandedly expressing. Be that as it may, in *Signs*, Maurice Merleau-Ponty pronounced the following dauntless, haunting epitaph for Husserl touching into the whole span of Husserl’s life as a truly great philosopher: “At the end of Husserl’s life there is an unthought-of element in his works which is wholly his and yet opens out on something else. To think is not just to possess the objects of thought; it is to use them to mark out a realm to think about which therefore we are not yet thinking about.”⁴²

Our clarification of what the following pages assume from Husserl and from the lost tradition of a wholly *adesse*-like eidetics, has now come to an end. Let us now proceed to mark out a hidden realm of Husserlian phenomenology to think about which therefore we are not yet thinking about....

NOTES

1. K. Potter, *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy*, Vol IV, p. 94.
2. Case continues by asserting that “there is no limit to the number of programs that can nest, one inside the other, within a single master program.” See James Case, *Competition: the Birth of a New Science*, Hill and Wang (New York, 2007), p. 61.
3. One should bring Edith Stein’s philosophical method, and its expansion of Husserl’s formal ontology, to the fore at this point because her innovative, trail-blazing philosophical work gives credence to the founding, which this work accomplishes, of the new a priori science of *convergent phenomenology* precisely within the more expansive bounds of pure logic that she set forth.
4. Edith Stein indicated, in a letter to Ingarden, September, 1932, that she had finally mounted up into an expansive, utterly new, eidetic area of work, which she called her own special “philosophy system.” It was a system that at last enabled her to discover a radically new phenomenological “method within a method” that allowed her to survey the findings of both Husserl and Aquinas within the sweeping purview of a single, unified, intuitive, *purely theoretical* glance (see Edith Stein, *Briefe an Roman Ingarden, 1917–1938*, *Edith Steins Werke*, vol. 14W xiv, Freiberg, Basel, Vienna, 1991, letter 152, p. 226). It is, furthermore, important to note that, in a letter five months later to Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Stein had finally begun to perceive her special, high-altitude, co-relational eidetics (which was both

an utterly new “formal ontology” as well as a purely theoretical and yet purely personal attempt to, as she said, “get from phenomenology to scholasticism and vice versa”) to be *an originative phenomenological method as equally important to modern thought* as both Hartmann’s ontology and, of course, Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit*, a work which she had read and critiqued with the orthodox eidetics of her own and of Husserl’s traditional phenomenology firmly in mind (see *Edith Stein/Self-Portrait in Letters*, translated by Josephine Koepfel, O. C. D., *The Collected Works of Edith Stein*, Institute of Carmelite Studies Publications, vol. v, letter 135, p. 130f).

5. Those Husserlian scholars who dismiss Stein’s work as nothing but the non-phenomenological, theological musing of a partisan Catholic thinker simply haven’t read her writings.
6. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by Joan Stambaugh, State University of New York Press (Albany, 1996), p. 320.
7. Stein’s friend, Erich Przywara, speaks of this back-and-forth relation (a relation which, couched in the terms of a convergent phenomenology, would thereby be asymmetrical from its act side, symmetrical from its object side) when dealing with the formal structure of metaphysics *as such*, a structure which must, from the first, take into account the upsurge of the duality of being and consciousness that occurs in the center of human object-consciousness precisely at that point when such consciousness suddenly raises, as did both Aristotle and Heidegger, the question of being qua being. Przywara speaks of this relation as a purely formal foundation for what he calls a “creaturely metaphysics”:

It is creaturely according to its most formal object: because it concerns the suspended tension between consciousness and being (and not the *absoluteness* of the self-identity of either consciousness or being). It is creaturely, moreover and more decisively, according to its most formal method: because it proceeds according to the *in fieri*—becoming—of a back-and-forth relation (and not by way of a discrimination between self-sufficient unities). This creaturely metaphysics is the metaphysics that arises immanently from the most formal problem of metaphysics as such. Erich Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, translated by John R. Betz and David Bentley Hart, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. (Cambridge, UK, 2014), p. 124

8. Sara Grant, *Śāṅkarācārya’s Concept of Relation* (Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, [Delhi, 1998], p. 1.
9. That Poinset relational *adesse* to be a special kind of being, wholly diverse from both substance and accident as *inesse* is clear from the following statement: “Relation, on account of its minimal entitative character,

does not depend on a subject in precisely the same way as the other absolute forms [*of substance and accident*], but stands rather as a third kind of being consisting in and resulting from the coordination [in time] of two extremes.” Quoted in John Deeley, *Early Modern Philosophy and Postmodern Thought*, University of Toronto Press, 1994, p. 284.

10. It is the odd, sui generis asymmetricality of the *samavaya* relation that holds all scientific, a priori knowledge together. *Samavaya* “is a relational concept, but only of entities that are logically, coherently and necessarily inseparable. All particulars of quality and action, and all universals, are related to substances by means of *samavaya*.” Astonishingly similar to Poincaré’s all-or-nothing view of empirically real relations out in the cosmos viewed as offering us iconic models that are wholly indispensable for the *respectus transcendens* of scientific thought, so also, according to the Vaisesikas, if *samavaya* were not there, the back and forth cosmic unity-in-diversity-in-unity expressed by scientific thought would vanish utterly. Thus “samavaya underpins the interrelatedness of things in the world.” See *Perspectives of Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Hinduism*, by Jeaneane D. Fowler, Sussex Academic Press (Brighton, 2002), p. 115. Fowler follows William Halbfass in her interpretation. Halbfass tells us that the asymmetrical *samavaya* relation is “the cosmological and ontological foundation of the possibility and legitimacy of predication. It is, in a sense, the hypothesized, reified copula or the cosmic prototype of the copula.” See William Halbfass, *On Being and What There Is: Classical Vaisesika and the History of Indian Ontology*, SUNY Press (Albany, 1992), p. 149.
11. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa*, I, q. 28, art. 1, *corpus*.
12. That it is irrelevant that an asymmetrically real relation’s term, as well as its foundation, can be either finite or infinite, opened up a paradoxical array of odd qualities of non-reciprocity that themselves benumbed the mind of thinkers remaining within the merely two-leveled tradition of classical substance and accident.
13. *A Classical Philosophy of Art: the nature of art in the light of classical principles*, University Press of America (Washington, DC, 1982), p. 48.
14. In her treatment of the essences embedded in the *adesse* of finite-toward-eternal Being, especially in respect to the wholly asymmetrical relation of human object-consciousness to divine and created subject-consciousness, Stein never finally systematized such material into an eventual material ontology, but simply gathered this material around herself in remarkable, free-floating phenomenological descriptions. More than any other philosopher before or since, she saw all such *ordo universi* as *pure gift* which, if it ever vanished away, would leave the entire cosmos of the space-time world exactly as it was before. And among all twentieth-century philosophers, only Erich Przywara understood exactly how Stein’s new and radical free-

dom from idealistic systemizing had irreversibly changed Husserlian phenomenology itself. Thus he declares: “Seen in the context of all the historical idealisms (of an essential philosophy of essence) Edith Stein’s philosophy thus represents the complete unfettering of a ‘free, ideal world’ from the constraints of all ‘idealist systems’ (even those of a Husserlian ‘monadology’ ...). Inasmuch as she gives it the ‘form of freedom for the sake of a free world,’ Edith Stein brings about the definitive demise of an essential philosophy of essence; in a *free-floating essentialism*.” See Erich Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, translated by John R. Betz and David Bentley Hart, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company (Cambridge, UK, 2014), p. 599.

15. In regard to her remarkable and creative interiorizing of the *analogia entis*, Stein tells us: “Thus eternal and temporal being, changeless and changeable being, as well as nonbeing, are ideas that the intellect comes upon within itself, for they are not borrowed from elsewhere. Here a philosophy built of natural knowledge has its legitimate starting point. The *analogia entis* also, understood as the *relationship of temporal to eternal being*, already comes to light *at this starting point*.” Such an originative, nascent and “moving forward” (yet purely theoretical!) “relationship” of subject already out toward object is prepredicatively ensconced within what Stein called the *Ich-Leben*, and is freshly, as well as formally and essentially, **asymmetrical**. Our special concept of *adese* objectivity as being sometimes non-reciprocally real, would also lead us to such a conclusion. Edith Stein, *Potency and Act* (The Collected Works of Edith Stein), ICS Publications, 2009, p. 11. (Italics are my own).
16. Edith Stein, *Potency and Act*, translated by Walter Redmond, ICS Publications (Washington, DC, 2009), p. 55.
17. Kriegel thus considers “surprisingly plausible” a theory that “states have their experiential-intentional content not in virtue of their bearing any relation of intentional directedness to anything but rather in virtue of exhibiting a non-relational property of being-intentionally-directed-somehow.” Uriah Kriegel, *The Sources of Intentionality*, Oxford University Press (New York, 2011), p. xi. Such statements are not just baffling but also quite meaningless. For if one is blind to the ontic paradox of relationality itself as such, the utter contradictions of one’s supposed insights into relationality raise no further meaningful “problems.” Indeed, it is particularly hard to understand how such “blindness for intentionality” arises at all, given the crucial material that Aquinas, Brentano, Husserl and Stein have historically and theoretically uncovered precisely of intentionality’s quite specifically relational character. Futile talk such as Kriegel’s, that pretends to speak about the already intuitably clear and already-being-referred relational *directedness* of intentionality at its inmost essential core as if it

were actually not being pre-phenomenologically and pre-ontologically intuited—and *as if it were not there at all*—simply falls out of all recognizable meaning. Husserl himself would consider such theories outlined by Kriegel as simply absurd and self-canceling possibly since they go against the methodical and purified rules of Relation Itself as an object of formal ontology (see Dermot Moran, *Edmund Husserl, Founder of Phenomenology*, Polity Press (Malden, MA, 2005), p. 99).

18. Indeed, Kriegel's extraordinary double-talk becomes possible only if one has become habitually blind to the utter ontological—as well as epistemological—**contradiction** of “intelligibly” relating an already related state of affairs to some supposedly higher, but not yet known, related state of affairs. There can never be, either in reality or in consciousness, an actual towardness to another supposed higher actual towardness precisely because to actually posit such a “somehow” higher state of affairs is already to have wholly taken leave of the entire unity of reference that relation itself already is. Relation can only tell us about itself by being as such already unifying itself precisely as out toward its term *and this absolutely*. Otherwise there yawns before us an asymptotically endless possibility of higher relational *Sachverhalten*, and consequently, as we confront such an abyss, any immediate and meaningfully referred state of affairs at hand vanishes without a trace, leaving us with *nothing at all* (beyond our own mental aimlessness) to reflect upon or to discuss. Clearly Kriegel's supposedly plausible “solution” has not solved anything at all, and has left us even more in the dark.
19. The idea of both mental and real relations being scientifically treated within formal ontology, apart from their discoverable instances in worldly experience—and thus rather according to their own inmost definition and exhaustive divisions—harks back to the unexpectedly sophisticated—and purely formal—treatment that they received first in Aristotle. Aristotle (and Aquinas, following him) held that relation *as such* accordingly can be viewed, finally, as either wholly real or wholly mental or, indeed, asymmetrically real only outward and merely mental back into its foundational base. This present work is thereby putting into suspension all modern notions of relation and working with the now-forgotten, sedimented notions of relation as they freshly arose and became layered in early Western classical and medieval thought, and eventually passed out of all knowledge through the pseudo-logical bickering of Nominalism.
20. Asymmetricality of relation lies, self-explanatory, at the hub-center of all ancient and classical attempts at building up a systematic eidetics of relation in its purely formal nature. Aristotle speaks of both real and mental kinds of asymmetrical *pros ti* in *The Metaphysics* as follows: “Relative terms which imply number or potency, therefore, are all relative because their very essence includes in its nature a reference to something else, not

- because something else involves a reference to it; but that which is measurable or knowable or thinkable is called relative because something else involves a reference to it.” Aristotle, *The Metaphysics*, translated by W. D. Ross (Roger Bishop Jones, 2012), p. 78. A very thoroughgoing comparative summary of asymmetrical relations in both Aquinas and Sankara, as a sophisticated and layered analogy (between *tadatmya* and the *respectus transcendens*) is to be found in Sara Grant, *Śankaracarya’s Concept of Relation* (Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, [Delhi, 1998]. Part Three, Chapters 3 & 4.)
21. Edmund Husserl, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, translated by John Barnett Brough, Springer (The Hague, 2012), “Translator’s Introduction,” *passim*.
 22. See William [a.k.a. Jim] Ruddy, “Source of the Classical Category of Relation in Western Thought,” *Indian Philosophical Journal*. Vol. 10, 1974–75, pp. 50–51.
 23. Thus: rooted in a more inclusive and extensively purified sense of Husserlian–Thomistic objectivity, and stemming, in part, from the famed, asymmetrical *proxi* of Aristotle, the famed asymmetrical *ad aliquid* of Aquinas (which culminated in his full-bodied theory of the ineffable asymmetry of the *respectus transcendens*), as well as the famed non-reciprocal relation of identity (*tadatmya*) of Sankara.
 24. *Analyses concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic*, Translated by Anthony J. Steinbock, Kluwer Academic Publishers (Boston, 2001), p. 113.
 25. Edmund Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, translated by Dorian Cairns, Springer Press (The Hague, 1969), p. 111.
 26. And, consequently, expanding it out into an almost inconceivably vast field of work!
 27. When the word, “missed,” is used one should perhaps employ as an example the way a pianist can miss the heart of a performed piece, even if perfectly trained in the mechanics of producing it. She must finally allow “*cantabile*” to occur as here and now embodied in her heart and accordingly permit the music itself to start to sing within her. Donn Welton has understandably objected to the present author’s all or nothing characterization of Husserl’s treatment of relations, however, and he recently emailed the following comment: “If there is a point where I might differ it is with your emphasis on ‘the thing-like paradigms of association theory’ as eclipsing Husserl ability to deal with relations. It seems that his whole account of internal time is in terms of interconnections that are entirely relational. On my reading the ‘solidity’ of the now is dissolved into a field in which protention and retention crisscross.” One must agree with Welton up to a point. But it is never clear that the special, relational material that

Husserl is unfolding and describing is, at base, either mental or real. Kant saw pure reason as being nothing but relations, and certainly such relations were mental only. One would then naturally wonder: In regard to Welton's reading of Husserl's penetration into internal time-consciousness, what are the actual terms to which such crisscrossing relations are directing themselves especially since only the now-point formally exists? And who is doing the relating? Are such relations, formally viewed, somehow even more real than what they are crisscrossing? Or are such relations, as possibly objectifying themselves wholly toward something else, neither mental nor real *but simply themselves*? Are they perhaps real *solely as already asymmetrically out toward Being Itself*? Husserl undoubtedly unfolded a great and inexhaustible mystery at the core of what he called the "wholly passive" synthesis of internal time-consciousness. Yet it might be, on the whole, helpful to perhaps get even closer to it from a fresh angle.

28. We don't need either Russell's discredited set theory of classes, or Wittgenstein's mystic advancement beyond such a set theory, to understand the rational assumption of a final and glorified apophansis, itself ruling over all possible apophanses at the exact center of the transcendental imagination, itself suddenly viewed as a pure source of all ontological knowledge. In the silence before that shy grandmaster of *adesse*, Thomas Aquinas, begins his repetitive, entirely formal and even mind-numbing *Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, what shining, landscape-shifting images was he then, in that primal silence, marshaling, out of deluge, saving and turning images like the lifted animals on the rafts of Noah? For one might wonder precisely on what amassed, precipitous heights he wakes up at the start of his preface to the commentary, with the following words, simple words, radiant with a noetic finality unmatched in philosophical literature, words that all convergent phenomenologists should take firmly to heart: "When several things are ordered wholly out beyond themselves toward something else, then one of those several things must rule or govern and the rest of those several things must be ruled or governed." Let us then be forewarned: A subterranean turning to a single nested image can only be ultimately understood within the proto-constitution of an entire, free-floating *landscape* of images.
29. Thus: a super judgment that is able to unify all lower judgments that it here and now speaks forth within itself. As is evidently seen in the previous endnote, we, as convergent phenomenologists, following Aquinas' afore-said, remarkable opening statement to his *Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, must stand within ourselves and (much along the lines of a conductor of an orchestra as she stands forth to make all things new) at last proclaim in terms of *our own individual consciousness*: "When several things are ordered wholly out beyond themselves toward something else, then

- one of those several things must rule or govern and the rest of those several things must be ruled or governed.” Accordingly, within the high and purely formal province of what he called an “apophantic analytics” at the heart of pure logic, Husserl placed only *distinct* judgments and then asked a fundamental question: “*When, and in what relations, are any judgments—as judgments, and so far as mere form is concerned—possible within the unity of one judgment?*” See *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, translated by Dorian Cairns, Springer Press (The Hague, 1969), p. 64. As we shall see, this question cannot be finally answered unless an even more fundamental question concerning judgment and the self-same apophantic *interrelation* taking place within any governing judgment is once and for all asked of the entire field of pure logic itself. Logic, as Wittgenstein rightly remarked “must take care of itself.” See William [a.k.a. Jim] Ruddy, “Can the Judgment, ‘God is the Perfect Actualization of Pure Thought,’ Be Fulfilled?” *Indian Philosophical Annual*, Vol. 7, pp 126–139 (Madras University Press, Chennai, 1971).
30. Edmund Husserl, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* translated by Ingo Farin and James G. Hart, Springer (The Netherlands, 2006), p. 51, footnote.
 31. Edmund Husserl, *Ideas*, translated by W. Boyce Gibson, Routledge Press (New York, 2012), p. 21.
 32. Bergson, Henri, *Dreams*, translated by Edwin Emery Slosson (Published by B.W. Huebsch, 1914), pp. 45–7.
 33. Our groundbreaking meditation *a la Bergson* has seemingly gained us a new place fit for the laying of the foundation of our new science. Seeing the empirical and thing-like world suddenly as toward the Absolute Being of consciousness is a negative (a doing-nothing) out of which positively emerges the *inesse* of *intentionality itself* AS the absolute being of pure consciousness. Seeing the empirical and thing-like world AND BEYOND THAT the asymmetrically real, one sided-entering into Absolute Being that object-consciousness necessarily itself must become is a negative (a doing-nothing) out of which positively emerges *adesse objectivity as such, indeed* AS the absolute being of pure consciousness, wholly and in a new way, converged out beyond itself in absolute kind of quasi-transcendence beyond itself. *Inesse* as based on thing-giving intuition and *adesse* as based on relation-giving intuition, viewed thus as being equally actualizations of object-consciousness are thus rayed acts coming from the Transcendental Ego, but they are rayed acts of different sorts, each demanding a different eidetic science for a formal elucidation of their structure and content.
 34. Husserl, Edmund, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*, Translated by David Carr, Northwestern University Press (Evanston, 1970), p. 111–112.

35. Husserl, Edmund, *Experience and Judgment, Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic*, revised and edited by Ludwig Langrebe, translated by James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks, Northwestern University Press (Evanston, 1973), pp 104–105.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 155.
38. See Husserl, Edmund, *Analyses concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic*, Translated by Anthony J. Steinbock, Kluwer Academic Publishers (Boston, 2001), pp. 14–15.
39. See “Syllabus of a Course of Four Lectures on ‘Phenomenological Method and Phenomenological Philosophy’ ” translated by G. Dawes Hicks in *Husserl’s Shorter Works*, edited by Peter McCormick and Frederick Elliston, University of Notre Dame Press (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1981), p. 71.
40. (*Husserliana*, Vol. XII, p. 233). Quoted By James G. Hart in *The Person and the Common Life* (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992) p. 3.
41. Cairns, Dorian, *Conversations with Husserl and Fink*, Martinus Nijhoff (The Hague, 1976), p. 23.
42. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, *Signs*, translated by Richard C. McCleary (Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 160. Although it was rarely realized by modern thought until Stein began to reflect upon it, when Aristotle and Aquinas said that the soul is, in a way, all things, this similarly marked out for them an entire scientific domain of novel thinking precisely as an exciting new realm of actual work.

Convergent Phenomenology and *Adesse* Objectivity

2.1 THE OBJECTS OF THE NEW SCIENCE

This book maps out, for the first time in complete outline, an entirely new eidetic science lying deep within the theoretical matrix of Husserlian transcendental subjectivity. What is being thus plotted out and disclosed to view is comparable to an entire mountain range of able-to-be-investigated material, towering massively upward behind the already familiar, mapped-out mountains and valleys of traditional phenomenology.¹

Accordingly, guided by the tireless beginnings of the advanced *eidōs* already achieved by Husserl, we can only make progress by realizing that Husserlian phenomenology is, in a thoroughly elevated sense, already involved in the incremental advancements of the new eidetic science in question. “Convergent phenomenology,” as outlined in this work, can only begin its nascent forays out into its own newly describable material by realizing that, as it opens up toward such material, its originatively shaped “scope” is already as broad as the scope of transcendental phenomenology itself. Accordingly, such a new science can only launch itself out into the actual truth of the real by setting forth, once and for all—and at the heightened outpost of its very own point of departure—an equally infinite task for philosophy itself as such.

The scope, then, of this new eidetic science, as J.N. Mohanty in his usual, clear and stylistically laconic fashion expresses it,² derives from the theoretical discovery of asymmetrical relations (themselves *actual* from one side outward, merely *intentional* from another side inward) hidden

deep within the hub-center of transcendental subjectivity, taken at its uttermost depth. “The result...” says Mohanty, “is ‘convergent phenomenology’ embodying the truth that Husserlian pure object consciousness points beyond itself to the pure subject consciousness of God as He is in Himself.” Mohanty, with his usual succinct clarity, is doubtlessly speaking here of a unique paradigm shift taking place *within the already-flattened plates and fault lines of traditional phenomenology itself*. Thus, as a kind of cosmic miracle, a miracle itself instigating a veritable upheaval of suddenly alive growth (in an area where further growth would seem to be not only problematic but, indeed, unachievable), the innermost living base of the eidetic science of convergent phenomenology is itself permanently, and even theoretically, established, for all time to come.

Consequently, as they move forward to reveal new horizons of philosophical work, the logical-transcendental origins of convergent phenomenology become akin to a germinating kernel, heading toward its own flowering, within a larger reach of already-established base-growth. It thereby heralds a new beginning—yet only within the pre-established limits of the absolute beginning that Husserlian phenomenology itself already accomplished.

Nevertheless, as thereby flowering forth radiantly from its own ground, precisely as widening the horizons of traditional phenomenology, this new science finds itself, as radical “ego-life,” standing upon its own field-work base of theoretical self-discovery—a base itself lying thereby at the primal depth of a departure itself already moving forward. It is, if you will, the first eidetic science in the history of human sciences that is, by its own formal nature, and dependent upon the very “facts themselves” which it has uncovered, already “on its way,”³ paradoxically, even before it emerged to reveal itself within transcendental subjectivity as such. Not without reason, then, can Mohanty proceed to describe the history of its beginnings, all the way back into the massive ontological systems⁴ of Aristotle, Aquinas and Sankara, as nothing less than “a new interpretation of Husserl...just on the verge of emerging.”

Mohanty accordingly sets forth the burgeoning origin of the science precisely in terms of a profound (and foundational!) discovery that itself nevertheless remains within the all-encompassing scope of traditional Husserlian phenomenology taken as such. Indeed, Mohanty even dares to declare, with a kind of primordial finality: “With this finding, the theme of ‘God’ is drawn into, and limits, transcendental phenomenology.”

Thus, convergent phenomenology, at the pivoting center of its innermost a priori nature, is oddly akin to a programming language morphing and developing like a germinal seed within a more general programming language, eventually altering and expanding the latter. Consequently, the primal claims of this new science (to uncover the entire ontic/ontological co-relationality of human-object-consciousness-toward-divine-subject-consciousness, even up and into the vast and mountain-range-like limits of the *actus purus essendi* itself as such) are claims that the present work seeks to establish at an ultimate, “ground-zero” level, somewhat the way that even the most ethereal and powerful of programming languages eventually must come to rest on the facts themselves, and thereby on its own physically shaped beginnings within the transistor-based “talk”—of zeroes and ones—of a computer’s primal (and certainly, at base, “humanly unthinkable”) machine language. Limits of intelligibility itself, set forth by intelligibility itself (beyond which, Nothing but pure act itself), are thus, in both cases, already at a zero level. Accordingly, emerging and unfolding its own solid domain of speculative work thus vitally and at one further remove from, and yet parallel to, the region of traditional phenomenology that Husserl called “pure consciousness,” convergent phenomenology, even as an inherent subset of such a region, nevertheless stands on its own as a legitimate and endlessly open field of investigative research. By “super-bracketing” itself inward and utterly and finally away from traditional intentionality and intentionality’s *in-esse* horizons, the *ad-esse* of the new science to which this book from the start inexorably directs itself, simply widens itself out into a purely formal “work-space.” Basing itself on its own foundational limits, there is, of course, by virtue of the very facts themselves, nothing mystical about it. Indeed, the hard-won and entirely phenomenological-theoretical workspace opened up at its native (and wholly non-mystical) zero-ground-level by no less an authentically Husserlian phenomenologist than Edith Stein herself—in *this very area*—stands monumentally as a perfect case in point, since such a workspace, together with the facts themselves shining forth within it, enabled her to move with perfect phenomenological ease from Aquinas to Husserl and back again.

The present set of layered investigations is written because these ambitious claims of convergent phenomenology to be nothing less than a vast and originative eidetic science, standing wholly on its own (and thus enhancing traditional, Husserlian phenomenology, transcending itself into a special [not yet even imagined] “field-character” of “suddenly making all things new” [as they upsurge from very beginnings of truth itself])

(which such a scientific *eidos* would thereby accomplish exactly as being itself already, from its base fulcrum point outward, toward the uncreated subject-consciousness of God as He is in Himself) must, *as such*, be honestly and finally (and *apodictically!*) justified before any such equally honest pieces of actual working-with-the-facts can be accomplished within it.

This is as it should be. Eidetic sciences, such as geometry and phenomenology itself, are autochthonous unto themselves. Thus, any orthodox, eidetic, a priori science must stand or fall specifically according to the wholly formal and self-given evidence of its very own native objects. Such must be the case as well in regard to this new science of convergent phenomenology toward whose sketched-out origins we are now directing ourselves, most especially as this science seeks its current, legitimate rank among all the other eidetic sciences.

Our task is therefore clear: a burgeoning science of the kind whose nascent groundwork we intend to found in this book, at least within an incipient outline of its own architectonic structures as they begin, from a single hinge of departure, to open themselves up in wider and wider horizons of research, can become, at its own lofty level, defined—in advance and in a preliminary fashion (yet already situated and even situated as already “nesting” itself, aerie-wise, at the heights of that selfsame pure logic that Husserl discovered)—solely in terms of the *actual objects* with which that science is itself presently and immediately concerned, standing, as it must, on its own indigenous terrain. This is the supreme goal of the first three investigative chapters of this book.

We are not completely alone in our attempts at such an elevated definition. Stein herself, as she entered, like a fierce and courageous explorer, into the radically new theoretically united domain of Thomistic–Husserlian objectivity that she suddenly discovered (and began to explore in all the vast contours of its own continental-wide freshness and growth), was nothing if not a pragmatic realist. She knew exactly what she was doing. Surveying the entire area opening up before her, she was nonetheless cautionary to the extreme. At the outset of her remarkable journey, she declared that “what establishes one specific scientific discipline as an intrinsically unified and coherent whole, setting it off from all the others, is its relation to a circumscribed sphere of objects. It is conditioned in its structure by this objective sphere and receives from it its rules and methods.”⁵ That she used the phrase “relation to...” in this context shapes our own more thoroughgoing search and provides a kind of forward-moving clue toward understanding convergent phenomenology itself, since such a

science deals wholly with relation-like objectivity, as opposed to the thing-like objectivity (specifically of Husserlian intentionality) that is the province of traditional phenomenology at its own level.

The wholly spiritual and yet wholly scientific objects (objects themselves not at all identifiable with “God Himself,” but rather, if you will, objects that, in essence, could be thereby called, instead, “already-toward-God”) that Stein insists upon from the very start must themselves be formally considered *ab initio* as already unfolding within an independent field that deals with investigations into formal subject matter *simply as it is*, accordingly dealing with it as an exfoliation of core material itself primordially, yet apophantically, prepredicative. Thus, it must set aside, in a subalternate and distinctive *epoche* of its own device, *all intentionality*, as already purified by Husserlian *epoche*, and especially the self-giveness of that self-same intentionality’s circumscribed grounding of predicative judgments. Using, as an evocative but outmoded analogy, the rather archaic, hierarchical matrix of the classic threefold character of object-consciousness (*simple apprehension*, and, infinitely higher than that: *judgment*, and, infinitely higher than that: *ratiocination*) found in Aristotle, Avicenna, Aquinas and others, one could say that convergent phenomenology (by virtue of the “proto-bracketing” of intentionality by the application of its very own hybrid-like, entirely specialized *epoche*) works, *mutates mutandis*, at the spiritual heights of the uppermost, ratiocinative layer *only*, thus with nothing to say, inside its special object-*field*, about its thing-like, directly predication-grounded base. Accordingly, in the final analysis, such a science must begin with an originative (and Greek-*Logos*/Latin-*ratio*-guided) exfoliation (and, indeed, *apophantic* exfoliation) of **purely descriptive pieces of scientific work**. This *wholly spiritual* state of affairs is a state affairs itself no different from that found in any other purely a priori science: any such eidetic science must arise *in principio* as a kind of static, eidetic “paleontology” (or, even better, an eidetic “botany”), before it becomes a genetic, and eventually a constructive, full-bodied eidetic “system.” In the present case, the presumed eidetic, but as yet not readily definable, “objects” of convergent phenomenology—hidden thus (hidden, that is because, at their nucleus, they are, within such an embedded core-level, merely *asymmetrically* actual) within a sub-region of general phenomenology (and settling, according to what we have called its hinged departure, into such regional objectivity as its base)—lay unnoticed and inaccessible to traditional forays out into the conventional terrain of intentionality itself, much the same way as the entire field of

transcendental subjectivity *as such*, with the thing-like, foundational subject/object base of wholly reciprocal, *non-asymmetrical* noeses/noemata actuality, remained entirely inaccessible within the natural standpoint until Husserl suddenly discovered it, and began to unfold its own *a priori* essentiality, with infinitely tireless care, at the beginning of the last century.

Even at this base-level of nascently “alive,” prepredicative origins, the “objects” of convergent phenomenology arise, according to their own eidetic vitality, and exfoliate out their own evidential self-giveness, within two conjoined material areas of what the Introduction introduced as *adesse objectivity*,⁶ available as being formally scoped out—and as finally unified—within the constitutive power of the sui generis, “proto”-transcendental-constitution of this very *adesse* objectivity itself within the elevated life of the Transcendental Ego, precisely as it re-worlds itself back into itself and foundationally toward that which is absolutely diverse from itself. As we shall see, this re-worlding, a re-worlding exactly proportional to (and here the analogy is crucially important) the re-worlding of both independently and non-independently referred signs in the wholly spiritual semiology of Poincaré, is *already being done* within the original *Lebenswelt* before the science achieves itself *as itself*. It can only be as a purely formal and constitutive re-worlding of the Otherness of itself (over against the Sameness of general phenomenology) that convergent phenomenology can truly find itself *theoretically* as thereby already on the wing, already heading out toward what—in an extended, Levinasian sense—we could dare to refer to as the very Face Itself of the *actus purus essendi*. Its constitution, now taken in itself as purely *adesse*-constitution, and seen anew as the sui generis constitution of an objectivity already, *by virtue of its now-fully-seen essence*, wholly beyond itself toward something else, remains, by that very fact, utterly diverse from traditional Husserlian constitution.

Of course, Husserlian constitution must formally enact its own objectifying force as a guidance for the proto-constitution of the base areas in question much as the general master science of navigation guides the sub-alternate sciences of planning, shaping and fitting, as separate arts, pieces of wood for a ship, where each piece newly fits into and strengthens all the other pieces.

Thus, if we achieve the material and now-fully-ordered buoyant clarity in this new science thereby, with how much greater force will the whole afloat enterprise of Husserlian phenomenology itself come shining into being for us, afloat within the infinite ocean of pure consciousness that Husserl began, by means of his final (and thus formally definitive

and thereafter perfectly workable) phenomenological reduction, so courageously to navigate and describe. The transformative shift within the lower science thus mirrors and makes more defined the transformative shift within the higher science. Nevertheless, it must be, for deeper, theoretical reasons, emphasized that *adesse* objectivity, precisely as the sole formal object of convergent phenomenology, should, at its own “dry-dock,” material level, of necessity be newly viewed as a purely “co-referential” (and thus relation-like, rather than a thing-like, [thing-like here, of course, in the sense that “intentional” already betokens thing-like]), objectivity. Intentionality, of course, especially as origivative base of all *inesse* predication, since it is already out into its meant object, cannot, in this same view, be co-referentially toward that selfsame subject-object synthesis or else it would immediately cease being what it already is in its own grounded, thematizable (and thereby predicationally fruitful) nature.

Adesse objectivity cannot be caught except as already “on the wing,” and thereby must be studied in itself alone and as finally remaining utterly neutral in respect to its eventually being either mental or real—and this both in regard to its (possibly infinite!) fundament-bases and its (possibly infinite!) target terms. Since we are thereby considering it solely in its own formal nature, all this talk about wholly transcendent relation-like objectivity, over and above the two lower levels of thing-like (and apprehensional and then judgmental) objectivity as defined above in the classical, and now outmoded, threefold levels of humanly intelligible objectivity, points to one single fact: convergent phenomenology as such, as heading outward with the **new *ratio*** of such full-bodied scientific clarity toward the *actus purus essendi* (and notwithstanding its subalternate character), thereby stands alone in its own independent arena of work. It is already, like Nietzsche’s ocean, infinite in all directions of the navigator’s compass. Exactly in its *scientific guise*, it is a cosmic gift of relation-like objectivity that need never have been there in the first place, and whose vanishing would leave the entire thing-like cosmos itself untouched.⁷ Less grandly expressed: such dual, co-referenced and eventually formally unified *adesse* objectivity, is, if you will, *already* a toward-ness rather than an in-ness. And although this special referring-beyond-itself state of affairs at the origivative core of *adesse* objectivity is, by human view, always “in” something, it is by nature, and according to its own quiddity or “whatness,” merely “toward” something else, and thus its entire essential nature consists in such proto-constituted “toward-ness,” rather than its attendant, foundationally-and-traditionally-constituted “in-ness.” And it is solely this special,

flowering-out-from-itself, alive and self-luminous “matrix” of towardness of *adesse* objectivity alone that must be exfoliated as *itself* meaning-giving, and thereby genetically exfoliated in a wholly sui generis transcendent “sense,” and, accordingly, as re-worlded back into the *Lebenswelt* (from which, as actual, already-heading-out-toward-God-Himself super-*ratiocination*, it originated), it must show itself forth from itself as already wholly apart from the encompassing transcendence of traditional intentionality (as both apprehensional “*Sachen selbst*” and as heading-already-toward-the-pure-self-awareness-of-predicational-judgment), together with intentionality’s own horizons, as uncovered and described by the indefatigable analyses of Edmund Husserl. There are parallels here. Enscenced within his ineffable asymmetry matrix of what later thinkers would call a *respectus transcendens* (which we are here viewing as human Truth already erupting and heading, through an ineffable mental relation of identity of Truth with Being, outward toward the purely spiritual Being Itself of Truth), Aquinas told us that “those things which are the cause of truth in other things are themselves most true”;⁸ Husserl, in his later phenomenology, finally stood where Aquinas stood, yet actually, and quite bravely, left all causal ontologies behind, and thereby went still further forward to *show us scientifically and once and for all* that transcendental constitution, as the ineffable interiority of pure consciousness as such, as already spiritually *in actu*, in an absolute sense constitutes *itself* (as *in esse!*) infinitely more than it constitutes the famed *Sachen selbst*. At the precise point where a Husserlian phenomenologist proclaims that what truly makes a “thing in itself” to be a “thing in itself,” is itself *infinitely more actively itself*, is the precise beginning point of convergent phenomenology as such. Phenomenology is now on the open sea, and, accordingly, what we are now speaking of as “proto-constitution” (a specific constitution of the towardness of all these already-constituted levels out beyond themselves) must then proto-constitute itself as already and formally *adesse* objectivity as a total towardness to Truth Itself (as inexplicably one with, and nevertheless merely *asymmetrically* identical with, Being Itself as *actus purus essendi*) in order that the very science we seek may finally come to rest within the expansive compass of its very own, ineffable exteriority. Otherwise the science itself fades and perishes. In other words, the matrix of towardness, with its nested asymmetry, that is the crucial, pivot-object of convergent phenomenology is nothing if not a moving image and centralized (and being-ordered-into-itself) *model* of purely formal towardness itself. As Poinset held: without our retuning to the very facts themselves and thus seeing (and

fully experiencing) *actually existing relations out in the world as workable models*, no authentic a priori science can ever hope to emerge as a finally authentic and finally truthful science. It would remain simply an inactive fiction of the dark art of the transcendental imagination. Convergent phenomenology, founded already in such bursting-forth already-worlded actuality, is thereby already advancing toward—and, indeed, already about to meet up with—the humanly and even temporally *anticipative* disclosure of Truth Itself, quite perfectly akin, as Stein was well aware, to Martin Heidegger’s own ontologically active sense of unveiled truth. Once the nervous ghost of an *inesse Dasein* vanishes, the Clearing of truth becomes a stage and, indeed, a glorified homestead for an *adesse Dasein* which is now not toward nothing but rather nothing toward Being.

We have already traveled, with a kind of ultimate finality, far afield from the usual, typical books on Husserlian phenomenology, and, at this point, one may expect a stunned, but quite reasonable, skepticism on the part of orthodox Husserlian phenomenologists⁹; for both the startling notion of a kind of “proto-constitution” thus operative from deep within the general constitution of Husserlian transcendental subjectivity as well as the ethereal concept of a purely spiritual and purely ineffable “towardness-objectivity,” itself wholly neutral to whether it is, on the one side, rooted in a finite or infinite fundament, or, on the other side, targeting itself toward an infinite or a finite object, sounds almost impenetrably convoluted and obscure! Yet such notions are not as farfetched as they at first seem, as the following three cases indicate:

1. *The case of Emmanuel Levinas in regard to intellectual or spiritual being.* Levinas, within his pioneering investigative work into such trace-areas of intentionality as the semi-conscious region of “waking up from a dream,” speaks of discovering a kind of innermost soul-toward-the-exteriority-of-the-Other within the soul of Husserlian transcendental subjectivity as such.¹⁰
2. *The case of Maurice Merleau-Ponty in regard to living language.* Merleau-Ponty, describing the ineffable, unfolding fire of entirely incarnated language as already toward something beyond itself, tells us that “at every moment, beneath the system of official grammar which attributes a given signification to each sign, one can see another expressive system emerge which is the vehicle of the signification but proceeds differently.” And he brilliantly goes on to uncover and describe the towardness-beyond-itself of such a system as follows: “*Expression in*

this case is not suited point by point to what is expressed; each element is not specific and obtains its linguistic existence only from what it receives from the others and the modulation it introduces to the rest of the system.”¹¹ Thus, in such a view, we find, in the manner in which pieces fit together to form a now-floatable and fully seaworthy ship, the co-referred contours of an inner, *wholly relational* (and thus already formally *adesse!*) system emerging and showing itself forth from itself.

3. *The case of the finally purified eidetics of Edith Stein in regard to formal ontology.* One can, finally and at a more formal level entirely, rely for precedent upon Edith Stein’s extension of Husserlian formal ontology to include not only the special “something-about-which” at the upper, purified level of such a new, completely formal ontology (already established for all time to come by Husserl himself), but also expanding almost unselfconsciously¹² out further to include, as well, and in the most general conceivable sense (and at least subliminally driven by the discovery and interiorizing of potency-toward-act as already present in her ego-life) the even more universal notion of added ordering (of Relation Itself) suddenly (eidetic-wise) definable exactly as “something, already wholly outward toward something else.” Just as Stein saw all of being as prepredicatively divided in act and potency-toward-act, she also, at a deeper level, saw—and held to with a kind of theoretical ferocity—all of being including God, following Aquinas, as prepredicatively divided, through the high courts of the *respectus transcendens*, into toward-being (or *adesse*) and in-being (or *inesse*). Without this ultimate and all-encompassing vantage point located (vertically, as it were, like a held sword) within her extended formal ontology, her eventual everyday-like, epistemological division of consciousness into the formally *adesse*-like subject-consciousness of God and angels and the (utterly diverse) materially *adesse*-like object-consciousness of humans and animals makes no theoretical and, indeed, no *phenomenological* sense, and accordingly would undeniably render her phenomenology methodologically suspect; for then it would thereby appear to be unavoidably and subversively entangled within an alien maze of theological and ontological presuppositions wholly foreign to the Husserlian enterprise itself that she followed so faithfully. In dealing with Stein’s honesty of mind and her matter-of-fact clarity, such a point of strict phenomenological origins must guide every other interpretation of her system. I cannot emphasize this enough. One cannot in

truth believe and follow those phenomenological “purists” who off-handedly dismiss Stein’s later writings as willfully suspect in such a fashion. Such dismissal is akin to dismissing a brilliant geometer’s mature and systematic writings simply because of some personal religion to which she might have eventually adhered. For it is inconceivable to imagine that Stein could, after years of looking daily over Husserl’s shoulder directly at the actual, orthodox objects of transcendental phenomenology itself, wantonly subvert the entire science together with its theoretically intact eidetic unity, by deliberately, and with a kind of idiosyncratic, “theological” servility, altering and even warping phenomenology beyond its own honest and legitimate use. Rather, it was all of one piece. For as her full life showed, she was nothing if not a brave, honest, hardheaded, wholly down-to-earth thinker. She knew, as a matter of course, exactly what she was doing. And in the last few seconds of her life, as she neatly piled her nun’s habit next to her bare feet, and walked naked toward the gas houses of Auschwitz,¹³ she was also moving precisely toward the selfsame eternal being toward which, in her final writings, she had realistically—and unflinchingly—directed the high, intellectually expansive—and *adesse*-permeated—*ratio* of her own spiritual, *wholly theoretical* gaze. Not by the pathway of a nerveless and wistful *Dasein*, but by the pathway of a fiercely held and courageous *Dasein* did Edith Stein finally realize that she had indeed reached an eidetic territory itself utterly new, and could finally feel within herself that her fierce and newly convergent way of thinking was **making all things new**. For—because all humanized thinking is *in actu* already referred to the essence of Relation Itself, and because all else, except God, lies, as *in esse*, within the tenuous ideality and flat-plated “what-ness” of essence—it could then happen that, miraculously and in the last analysis: whichever way Stein moved forward with such carried fullness, her supreme rectitude of hard-headed realism could no more leave her alone than it could leave itself alone. It could *take care of itself*. And, everything else being equal, *she* did not look back. She was able to affirm the free-floating essentialistic ideality (and seeming un-substantiality) of her own new work area of converged towardness to God as being, as we shall see, “Nothing in,” “Everything toward.” *The pure act of being itself*—precisely at the innermost hub of her human mind’s own tenuous asymmetry—*had become her very life*.

Keeping these three cases of Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Stein in mind, and as radical as it might seem, this second, more inclusive, more universal and itself strictly *adese*, objectivity of Relation Itself must nevertheless forthrightly be defined, in an initial sense (and guiding our search for definitive truth by the aforementioned, emblematic, soul-inside-a-soul structure hinted at by both Levinas and Merleau-Ponty), must be defined, I say, as nothing other than *the forever-actively-constituting Transcendental Ego itself*, endlessly gaining in depth as it heads out beyond itself toward something else. Thus, the schema of “making all things new” takes on its own particular power. Even as transcendental, such an ego, unfolding as it now does at the inner departure point of the very science itself, is already, and inexplicably—and dialectically—a quantum jump ahead of itself. Thus, although the formal object of convergent phenomenology is one, as in any a priori science, there are nevertheless, because of the two aforementioned conjoined formal-ontological areas of “something-toward-something-else” and “something as such,” *two* material objects of the eidetic science in question:

1. The first domain of the material objects of convergent phenomenology is **pure consciousness itself** now radically and exclusively viewed as “something, toward something else.” (*Note: The present chapter, through a leveled series of methodological meditations, goes on to give us eventual scientific access to this first realm of objects, objects based upon the fundament-actuality and target-spirituality of intentionality’s own objects precisely as they come full circle and suddenly achieve completely identity¹⁴ with themselves in actu exactly as re-worlding themselves back into the Husserlian Lebenswelt*).
2. The second domain of the material object of convergent phenomenology encompasses: **real “towardnesses”—real relations,¹⁵** as (of course, in a now newly extended sense) “something as such,” i.e. wholly real and thus non-mental, non-logical (and thus, non-immanent!) relations that are, through their own unique transcendent givenness, able to be intuited exactly as they exist out in the real world of objective experience. To see such minimally real entities as nevertheless transcendently real *in se* is nearly impossible in our modern age. For, since the work of Russell, Frege and others, we now live and breathe in a philosophical milieu which dismisses (and distains as crude and primitive) the entire tradition, from Aristotle all the way up to Poinset in the West—and the general treatment of *sambhanda* all the

way up to the notion of *samavaya* in the East—of elaborating the ontological (and even ontic) *actuality* of real relations. For, unless the distinction between real and mental relations remains crystal clear both ontologically and phenomenologically, to go on to speak theoretically of some further relations as remaining intact within themselves while yet being real (as toward the Other) and mental (as back inside the Same)—and thus being wondrously both real and mental and yet remaining themselves single, integral and miraculously unified relations—makes absolutely no sense at all. Since modern thought has a prevailing “color blindness” to this classic tradition, a tradition stemming from the Greek *pros ti* of Aristotle all the way up into the Latin *ad aliquid* of Aquinas, it seems that we, as mere beginners in convergent phenomenology, must, as any sailor might, employ our own frail sail to proceed outward into this ancient, multicolored sea, taking a course courageously opposite the direct, gale-force winds of such a blinkered and intractably constructive thought (as, e.g. we find, pervasively, in the not-able-to-be-actually-spoken configurations of mathematical logic). We must become intensely aware that modern thinking on these matters ultimately and very often contemptuously rests its massive case entirely on the elaborately devised sophistication of quite obviously non-existent *mental relations themselves*, and thereby frequently and preemptively shuts itself off to the possible, vibrant, fully dimensional existence of actual relations outside the mind. (NOTE: Chap. 3, through a series of descriptive researches conducted midway between phenomenology and formal logic, gives us a hypothetical eidetic groundwork and thereby, moving forward, the eventual investigative access to this second realm of objects. Thus, Chap. 3 ultimately discloses that, in addition to living in intentional experience, we are, though rarely aware of it, also living constantly in a *sui generis* [and seldom, if ever, reflected upon] kind of experience, diverse from—yet grounded on—intentional experience, a special experience of empirically real relations. A great deal of Merleau-Ponty’s penetrative disclosure of perception’s miraculously organized syntheses seems to co-disclose an actual and yet wholly relational interdependence of intriguing *adesse* “play” between the subject of perceptual experience and the object of perceptual experience, indicating a third-level “*evanescence*” of pure towardness itself intuited beyond the *in-itself-ness* of intentional acts already here and there frontally and substantially embodying their corresponding intentional objects. From this disclosure of such experience and from the connective disclosure

of what I refer to as an “absolute intuition” of these empirically real relations [as ultimately and wholly seen in an intuitive “flash” {or simply not seen at all}], convergent phenomenology arises, from hypothesis to certainty, as a self-standing eidetic science [of the aforementioned special kind of experience] by force of a pure, logical necessity. For the work area of convergent phenomenology remains impenetrable unless it is first understood, by virtue of a supervening and hypothetical “theory” of such objectivity, that adesse objectivity, although, through human purview, always founded in something greater than itself, yet, more generally considered, is, in its formalized “towardness-aspect,” a wholly self-standing objectivity in its own right as toward something greater than itself. All this ethereal interplay of high-flying, sophisticated “ins” and “outs” of truths about adesse objectivity rests, together with all its sediment layers on the archaic but bedrock (and, if you will, “paleontological”) base of the classical treatment of real relations from Aristotle through Avicenna and Aquinas all the way to Suarez, as well as the crowning glory of the asymmetrical relation of identity called tadatmya by Sankara, at long last viewed as a genius logician in his own right. Indeed, Jean Poinsot, the grandfather of the field of modern semiotics (1589–1644), even considered empirically real relations to be a third kind of cosmic being miraculously grounding itself in the being of accidents (Husserl’s abstracta) somewhat the way that accidents grounded themselves in substantial being (Husserl’s concreta). The whole effort of this present volume is to disclose the inner and outer architecture of these connective truths, themselves hidden, forgotten and lost within the East–West tradition, with the rigorous and unencounterable theoretical clarity of any modern eidetic science. Here we are obviously following no less a philosophical authority than [as Stein called him] der Meister: Edmund Husserl—himself a tireless and steadfast mentor in this selfsame theoretical area. Does not he tell us with hard-headed, unadorned and almost preternatural intensity that “to every kind of experience a science of experience must be able to correspond”^{16?})

Since everything in the following pages depends on the ultimately verifiable actuality itself of that with which convergent phenomenology itself deals, let us try to define these two material “objects” more carefully.

1. *The First Material Object of Convergent Phenomenology.* Accordingly, first, we have the formally objective towardness of the entire field of transcendental subjectivity, newly viewed as infinitely and endlessly

deepening itself, according to its own, suddenly achieved ego-life, by, paradigm shift-wise, heading out beyond itself toward something else. However, in thus talking about the “being” of Relation Itself, we have thereby, like the exact, simple and straightforward moment one puts on 3-D glasses in a 3-D theater, reached the purview and pivot-point of a sudden, freshly dimensional, completely exterior “outlook” onto Being Itself. Accordingly, as the eidetic “center-stage” catches our attention, and as the neither mental nor real but simply the “towardness-character” of Relation thus comes into full and final focus according to its very own native objectivity, we have, indeed opened ourselves up onto a precipitous vista of philosophical clarity wherein, in which if wish to find solid ground, we must tread with utmost caution. For if Heidegger tells us that we have for centuries forgotten the meaning of Being, our new sense of a formal science of *adesse* implies the dire possibility that we have, in an infinitely more significant and even definitive sense, utterly forgotten the meaning of relational objectivity that spans the entire spectrum shift of real-into-mental-into-its-own-formal-towardness that is, as such, neither real nor mental but simply “toward” (i.e. toward the undeniable actuality of Being Itself as the *actus purus essendi*).

This spectrum shift is a paradigm shift in meaning that is, at its hub-center, a quantum leap forward, and thus a paradigm shift that itself shifts the base paradigm shift of Husserlian intentionality itself as such, that is, a shift that comes into perfect 3-D-like focus precisely as already moving intentionality forward toward something else exactly at the very point where intentionality suddenly shifts from the relative stance of the natural standpoint into the absolute stance of the phenomenological standpoint. But, wonder of all wonders, toward *what* is this now-being-moved, lower shift being thus shifted?

To answer this question, we must revert back historically to the paradigm of the actual achievement of the Transcendental Ego by Husserl himself. Descartes, as Husserl noted, reached such an ego, stood at its “gate,” as it were, but did not go forward to describe what he had found. He instead remained at the threshold and, immersed in a decadent scholasticism that had lost the asymmetrical, luminous center of the *respectus transcendens*, turned the strict hierarchy of subject-consciousness/object-consciousness on its head, thus using his prodigious find of the *ego cogito*, viewed in general, to erroneously “deduce” his new and lonely and, at

base, contradictory, system of purely “human” “subject-consciousness.” Husserl dared to tread forward thus describe this selfsame *ego cogito* in all its constitutive glory, yet he did so not as a Cartesian but as a suddenly thoughtful *scientist* moving forward into the absolute self-givenness of pure consciousness itself.

Moving further forward, what must happen now is that the Cartesian subject must right itself back into object, and the Cartesian object must right itself back into subject. In other words, what is currently needed, given the restoration of the frail human center of now-describable asymmetricality of *Dasein* (and given the spectrum of actuality that *adesse* objectivity becomes within itself at its uttermost limits) is to tread with even greater philosophical care forward to begin not to deduce but to honestly *describe* this very moving spectrum itself as already purely toward something else.

The word “tread” is used advisedly, and implies a treading with the utmost philosophical caution. For just as Husserl realized that his shift into the hidden country of the very constitution of the Transcendental Ego itself meant that he was treading along a precipice where each step meant philosophical life or death, so also should we be cautionary as well regarding our present, even more ethereal, journey. In our current search, to use a now familiar metaphor, we must therewith discover and use a new philosophical “GPS” to find passageway along such a fathomless divide, crossing precariously along the very fault lines of ontology itself. For although Husserl moved forward into the Transcendental Ego not as a Cartesian but as a tireless scientist, we must, with even more caution, move forward into the new area opening up for us (yes, even all the way up toward the divine reality itself!) purely as a tireless *Husserlian phenomenologist*. Husserl discovered “consciousness of...” He saw each intentional act as noetically “in,” yet somehow miraculously and thereby meaningfully (and, in the final analysis, noematically) toward the very thing-in-itself being thus intended. His central mantra was thus “to the things themselves.” We are now moving, within formal logic itself, precisely from “consciousness of...” to “consciousness toward...” Our new mantra to chant for our daring journey forward should now be, as we have noted before: “Nothing ‘in,’ everything ‘toward.’”

And this is exactly why we must tread with care. The primary reason for caution lies in the elusive character of the formal, yet not yet either real or mental, **towardness** that relation-like objectivity already is, and in the bare, flat, hard-won fact that its own formal essence lies definitively in its

co-reference outward, irrespective of whether it is outward toward God or toward the world or even toward the human mind itself (exactly as such a frail mind fashions [a la Frege and Russell, and perhaps even in the shadow of a benumbed, Nietzschean eternal return of the Same] purely mental relations endlessly along within itself). For when we speak of this super paradigm shift of new towardness, one thing must be radically understood. And that is the inescapable fact that, exactly as attempting to direct our fresh “3-D view” outward toward a new area of scientific investigation as a formal towardness, we are emphatically *not* talking here about the proverbial and quasi-reflective “towardness to its object” of ordinary Husserlian intentionality as “consciousness of...” Intentionality, viewed as ordinary, human intentional thought that is ecstatically out toward its own pure constitution of objective transcendence, and thus itself already resting *within*—and itself noetically, and yet wholly, identifiable *with*—its meant object, may thereby “live” (and, at least in a truncated, *in-esse* sense, live “reflectively”) in the actual and convergent “being-toward” of its *own* eidetic givenness, but it cannot—exactly because of the ultimately absolute nature of its own ecstatic (and purely actual) referral to that very selfsame object—reflect, in any full-bodied sense, on such formal, purely referential towardness in itself or “think” it in itself. Husserl’s orthodox phenomenological reduction cannot be achieved unless the distinction between *adesse* and *inesse* remains in the dark. For not only has such a reduction bracketed out its very own ontological actuality as a here-and-now upsurging psychic act within the world, but also, as normal reflection in the Husserlian sense must tell us, it is already wholly outside itself and in something other than itself. In other words, intentionality, as purely (and even *actively!*) a possibly thematizable *inesse* objectivity,¹⁷ describes itself, even horizontally and at its outer reaches, in terms of its already-active, already-frontal and thus already noetically embedded, noematic “object,” but never in terms of simply its own purely co-relational and purely formal towardness (viewed as an already (like a held sword) non-horizontal and co-referenced Relation *in actu!*) to something “beyond itself” *as such*. If it were indeed to erroneously attempt to extend itself out into such a purified “toward-a-further-towardness,” *then, in fact, such a super-phenomenal “reflection” on itself*, would be fatuously self-contradictory, since no entitative thing can be *actually and meaningfully* toward *another towardness*.¹⁸ Thus, this absolute aspect of intentionality, and the consequent **impossibility** of further—wholly *adesse* and wholly complete, and wholly returning into itself—**reflection** upon itself, which is itself, as asymmetrical to the core,

rarely brought into clear focus—even though it lies immanently and finally hidden away at the innermost core of traditional, or “pure” phenomenology—nevertheless remains a *purely unitive* aspect of intentionality, as equivalent, in part, to its forerunner: the famed scholastic formulation of *intention*, or “second intention.” This final disclosure—beyond which, “nothing”—can only mean (as the scholastics clearly saw) that the intellect *in actu* is nothing other than its very own object *in actu*.¹⁹ *Adesse* objectivity lives, breathes and settles into its own nature and becomes fully itself wholly in the shadow of this final, unitive truth.²⁰ *Inesse* is different than its object; *adesse*, as being indecipherably (and even uncountably as first “here” and then “there”) already wholly referred out beyond itself, is neither different from, nor the same as its relationally targeted object precisely because it is already, in its own non-thematizable, indecipherable nature, **wholly toward**, pure and simple.

The present chapter deals with at least one way in which such purely relation-like, proto-constitutive and purely unitive “thinking,” utterly diverse from all such ground-intentionality—and, indeed, from all such lower, generalized constitution of thing-like objectivity in its own essence (what I have called elsewhere “*in esse* objectivity”²¹)—is at last opened up for us, and thus how one can actually arrive at this special object—(namely, the “object” of pure consciousness itself, newly viewed no longer as merely “toward”-and-thus-“already-noematically-‘in’ ” an intentional object, but [and herein we move, centripetally and almost endlessly inward toward the living core depth of Husserlian pure consciousness] as, 3-D-wise if you will, already simply and formally toward “something beyond itself” as thus being, miraculously and precisely, what Stein viewed as phenomenology’s Holy Grail and spoke of as a pure “spiritual object only,” spiritual, that is, as the ineffable identity of **act=object IN ACTU**)²²—and claim it for the new science in question. Only thenceforward, through our forthrightly honest admission of the first material object of convergent phenomenology as being nothing other than pure consciousness newly viewed as gaining a soulful depth within itself by “soul-fully” (and thus in the center of its own ego-life) heading out beyond itself toward that which is absolutely diverse from itself, can we then begin to see through a retrospective, backward glance, the entire field of traditional intentionality at last appearing with an ultimate, stark finality, as already re-worlded back into itself as it actually is in reality (and thus newly and finally seen *at last* as spiritually and even transcendently alive within what Husserl called the natural standpoint) and no longer simply as it offers *itself* reductively

up within the purview of its own native (and now, through the origina-
 tive gates of purely Husserlian epoche, phenomenologically describable!)
 self-giveness. Intentionality's selfsame self-giveness, together with its
 various horizons, is, as such Husserlian gates swing open, all that *can*
 appear, in the last analysis, to the traditional, phenomenological gaze.
 Simply by looking more closely into this aforementioned state of affairs
 (as one might view a paradigm shift within a higher, now-fully-conscious
 paradigm shift) enables us to see, with transparent and fully dimensional
 clarity, the first material object of convergent phenomenology arising par-
 adigmatically into view with its *own* self-giveness. Stein helps us most by
 inviting us to walk along with her, falling into her own cautious tread that
 she assumes within her already co-referenced view of spiritual objectivity
 that she was viewing through the pre-ontological and phenomenologi-
 cal objects of Aquinas and Husserl. But here, even in such company, we
 ourselves must be doubly sure that we are still treading with philosophical
 caution. Acknowledging Edith Stein's astounding theoretical achievement
 as a purely Husserlian achievement is radically important in helping us
 to delineate at last the first material object of convergent phenomenol-
 ogy now being described. The endlessly deepening *Ich-Leben* which Stein
 claims (and dares to speak about) is simply not understood (or even seen!)
 unless it is seen as being entirely *adese*, already one within (and entirely
 identifiable as) a **pure and wholly spiritual asymmetrical towardness** to
 the *actus purus essendi* as it is in itself. She was too much of a hardheaded
 realist to have duped herself into a deluded and warped use of some imag-
 ined theological causality. But how can we ourselves avoid such delusion?
 We must accordingly fortify ourselves with a simple yet viable "mantra"
 for this remarkable journey: "Nothing in. Everything toward that which
 holds and moves me forward." Now we can see that the mirror of a deeper,
 more formal "method-mantra" for this new, now-infinitely-deepened
 Transcendental Ego to chant within itself is precisely: "real toward, but
 merely-intentional-*and-thus-unreal* back into itself again." This mantra-
 fact at the core of pure consciousness is (when we view it as a sudden re-
 worlding of lower-level intentional pure consciousness itself back into the
Lebenswelt) a human fact of core-existence almost endlessly more transient
 and fleeting than even the wavering, momentary and pitifully frail tempo-
 rality of *Dasein* as ultimately "exposed" and obsessively lamented-over by
 the dire poetics of Martin Heidegger. Such a mantra grounds us finally
 in our serenely coming to outpost rest, alighting ultimately within the
 central bare fact of all bare facts. Or to express it at its own level: In this

new dimension now opening up for us, we are humanly *even more timelessly, spacelessly nothing* than the eventually inscrutable *das Nichts* toward which *Dasein*, as already being-there, finds itself as thrown and scared and falling. Actual towardness—cosmic *adesse* itself—thereby beclouded elusively within Heidegger’s circuitous problematic, **ultimately itself forgotten**—must forever warp itself thereafter into nothing but a forlorn and misguided outpost whose only motion forward is an endless series of existential analyses with exactly the in-space, in-time frailty of *Dasein* at its supposed center. Yet the only *adesse*, which embodied human object-knowledge is able to see AS REAL is surprisingly not real enough to be in-space and in-time. Stein saw this ethereal towardness dimension of Relation at the same instant that she saw her own self’s way clear through this very dimension as it actually comes to rest and is held into itself at the crest of formal ontology. From talks the author had with Stein’s niece, Suzanne Batzdorff, he began to at last understand that Stein’s entire *Ich-Leben* cannot be appreciated or even comprehended unless we see it in the light of her steadfast love for her mother, a mother who never once ceased to hold her daughter close, even throughout her conversion to Catholicism and her eventual entry into the Carmelites. Edith Stein, even as hard-headed realist, finally saw herself as a person who loved her mother most of all in this world. She saw the *logos* of Husserl as asymmetrically equivalent to the supreme *ratio* of Aquinas. That very *ratio* was hers also. Perhaps that is why, in a chiding criticism of her formidable colleague Heidegger’s dire notion of *Dasein’s Verfallenheit*, she says that for a child being held by a strong arm to nevertheless live in a constant fear of falling can hardly be called a “rational” attitude.

Convergent phenomenology must, with equally hardheaded bare-fact realism, take care of itself. We are, as object-consciousness itself already outward toward God Himself, in fact, outward toward both the uncreated and the created subject-consciousness that holds us. And we thereby actually fall the very moment we once think falsely that we *are* simply left to ourselves.

In the final analysis, if the eidetic science of convergent phenomenology itself doesn’t *methodologically* SEE/USE this self-same, infinitely deeper, **already-held-close fullness of bare fact as nothing in itself yet everything toward something else**, SEE/USE itself as already toward, and thereby proceed—within its own (paradoxically time-less, space-less, endlessly change-less) paradigm shift—serenely

into itself (and, methodologically never look back!), the entire actual spread of investigative material that IS convergent phenomenology *as Transcendental Ego* remains, once and for all, a vague hope at best, and, in the last analysis, simply a giddy illusion.

2. *The Second Material Object of Convergent Phenomenology.* Secondly, we have the formally objective towardness of empirically real relations out in the world around us as “something about which.”²³ Chapter 3, painstakingly delineating this special kind of “luminously epistemological/ontological”²⁴ object, requires careful reading. Within its pages I attempt to disclose, once and for all, how Husserlian phenomenology, in the most fundamental cases, failed to grasp this bodily present *perceivability* of real relations out in the world, and thus failed, in certain areas at least, to originatively indicate exactly how their own relation-like objectivity, wholly apart from the ordinary *in esse* objectivity of intentionality as such, is able to be proto-constituted within transcendental subjectivity.

Modern philosophers often use purely mental relations so easily that they think they know all there is to know about relation itself. Keeping this reductionist stance in mind, what makes this final disclosure of *existent, non-mental* relationality so enormously difficult is the fact that empirically real relations are only minimally real in comparison, first, to the overshadowing and more full-bodied, bedrock reality of their own both foundational as well as targeted, exterior terms *in particular*, and, second, the frontal appearance-reality (itself circumscribed by the limit-concept of *Abschattungen* that Husserl uncovered) of all thing-like objectivity *in general*.²⁵ Thus, these ethereal-but-real, entirely *adesse* entities, no longer actual enough to be thematizably subject to such a limit-concept as *Abschattungen* (something whose whole frailty of being is already toward something else certainly cannot itself be perspectively viewed!), are already ontologically problematical, even within the natural standpoint, and often even more so in the ordinary phenomenological standpoint. Relations, in Husserlian phenomenology, are hardly ever disclosed within any description of empirical perception (the exception perhaps being Husserl’s talk of “external relations” in *Experience and Judgment*), since Husserl, profoundly versed in higher mathematics and, in part, influenced by Kant’s categories, typically considers relations to

be either conscious acts of relating (and thus *mental* rather than real), or “ideally existing” combinatory, yet still sign-based, objectivities seen entirely through categorical intuition (such as one discovers in the heady, constructive regions of set-theory). By contrast, in the complex, multi-leveled, and wholly *sui generis* view, such as one often finds as innovative “method” in the astonishing and inexplicably incarnate material uncovered in Merleau-Ponty’s descriptive work, of *perceived adesse* objectivity, suddenly taken at one further remove, to which we are now directing ourselves, empirically real relations are out in the world already and are not even discoverable “within” any doubling-up referring act of concrete intentionality-toward, since, as our new, Stein-inspired formal ontology shows us (and as our relentless method of tirelessly “searching forward” so as to formally preclude our *not being able to look back at ourselves in any ordinary, actually reflective sense* would seem to imply) nothing real can be toward another higher towardness without a self-contradiction, and thus without an ultimate meta-contradiction perhaps even direr than the so-called principle of contradiction itself. In other words, empirically real relations are indeed given to consciousness and meant by consciousness, but not given or meant within the noetic/noematic structure of concrete intentionality that founds them, and any attempt to thematize them by founding them further would entail either a thoroughgoing vanishing into less than nothing or else a thoroughgoing (and an endlessly futile and fatal and thus a drastically misleading) “relating” of real relations to real or mental relations ad infinitum, since such a further, self-deluded action is not a “relation” in any possible sense of the term “relation.” As we shall see, it is solely the eidetic science of convergent phenomenology at the outer limits of its own advanced, descriptive (no longer deluded) research into the phenomenon of empirical perception that thereby brings these real relations finally and absolutely to the fore and discloses how they are proto-constituted within transcendental subjectivity as third-level entities (beyond both *concreta* and *abstracta*): entities, thus, which are accordingly able to be meant *as such*—thus meant as *toward* in the new sense we have described: a sense thus vitally different from the lower towardness of the intentional acts that found them. Obviously, this lower towardness, as nothing but the further, last-ditch clarifying of intentionality itself as such, cannot ever come into view within traditional, or “general,” phenomenology.

2.1.1 *Appendix I: A Note on the Unity of Our New Science
and on the “Change-Neutral” “Towardifying”²⁶ that Real
Relations Themselves Achieve*

Why the two material objects, briefly sketched out above, of the eidetic science of convergent phenomenology (thus pure consciousness and real relations) can ultimately be two ways of viewing the same formal “object,” and why they coalesce, in a conjoined-viewing of their essence, into the purely formal object of convergent phenomenology *in actu* (thus already “airborne,” already in flight and “methodologically synthesized”) will be eventually established in Chap. 4 (which introduces the asymmetrical [real outwardly but, inversely, merely mental back into itself] character both of some real relations and of pure consciousness itself as prepredicatively, albeit *actually*, toward uncreated subject-consciousness). Suffice it to say here—following the principle that that all already-conjoined objects of a science gain their unity solely through the purely formal perspective according to which that selfsame science treats of them—that these two objects belong to the same science because their very essence is to be *toward*, purely and simply, and within the a priori limits of such a purely essential view, they have nothing whatsoever to do with the perfection or imperfection (and the ordinary, noetic transcendental constitution thereof) of that in which they inhere or the perfection or imperfection (and the ordinary, noematic transcendental constitution thereof) of that to which they direct themselves. We can even state, moving in a kind of fresh (and here and now coming-into-focus) quasi-analogy²⁷ between pure consciousness and real relations in the world, that these two material object-areas’ own “coming to be” in their term-foundation and their “passing away” from their term-foundation have nothing whatsoever to do with any changes going on, here and now, within such a thing-like (or, better, *in esse*-like) foundation itself. In a fresh and startling insight into real relations (an insight that became almost irredeemably lost within modern thought), Aristotle supports (and Aquinas eventually assumes and elaborates on) such a radical, all-or-nothing view of the entirely *change-neutral* character of empirically real relations according to the very aspect in which they refer themselves outward toward the thought-thinking-itself reality of Aristotle and the *actus purus essendi* reality of Aquinas. Practically, no modern exegete of Aristotle’s highly sophisticated ideas about real and mental relations really listens to him and looks over his shoulder when he undeniably points out to us that we can only truly understand an empirically real relation if we see that, when such a relation comes to a thing, that arriving relation does not posit any change

at all in the thing to which it comes but simply makes it to be toward something else.²⁸ As the above analogy shows, this special formal character of the essence of any real relation doesn't stop with real relation, viewed as such in the empirical realm to which we are now directed. Rather it spans the entire spectrum of Relation all the way up into (and within!) pure consciousness itself.²⁹ Otherwise, Aquinas' final, supreme positing of formally relational towardness within the *actus purus essendi* as it is in itself would not have been the exalted act of a creative genius logician (*as it, indeed, was!*) but simply a sad indication that Aquinas had finally taken leave of his own over-worked and beleaguered senses. Formal logic, with its own supreme and iconic detachment, simply follows this ontological passage, a self-referential passage which I have defined elsewhere as a unique "grounding act of reference," an act thereby passing beyond founded (thus essentialistic!) Truth-toward-Being into the very (existentialistic) exteriority of Being Itself.³⁰ Didn't Husserl, an equally eminent and tirelessly honest logician before all else, himself know in his inmost heart that absolutely nothing at all changed within his natural-standpoint consciousness whenever he entered the new realm of work that he so fortuitously discovered? So also the twofold material passage with which we are now concerned. This chapter eventually arrived at the unassailable truth that an eidetic science must stand or fall according to the wholly formal and self-given evidence of its native objects, and now we can begin to understand that such an irreversibly essential passage-wholly-beyond-itself character of relation to which we are now directing ourselves in this Appendix—newly considered per se—must guide any further attempts to clarify the formal and material objects of the a priori science of convergent phenomenology as such. *How can anything change in me, as newly being "in" me (what wishful thinking!), when I suddenly look utterly beyond myself toward that which is eternally and endlessly diverse from myself as Other?* Of course, such a wholly pivotal, wholly bracketing-out, and what we might now call "change-neutral" passage-character of *adesse* objectivity **as method** can only become ineradicably clear as eventual bare-fact-point-of-departure toward the wholly descriptive analytics of convergent phenomenology, prepredicatively "on the wing."

2.1.2 Conclusion. The Grounding Character of the second to the fourth chapter of this Work

The second to the fourth chapter of this work therefore can be viewed as a layered series of groundwork investigations into the architectonic structures of the science of convergent phenomenology as it prepares itself to take

authentic flight from each of the various analytic investigations, by Husserl himself, into the intentionality of pure consciousness, particularly (and fruitfully!) his investigations into the extraordinarily difficult to understand (because mysteriously passive!) character of internal time-consciousness as it is in itself.³¹

The major purpose of these three beginning chapters is accordingly to bring the mountain-range-like structure of convergent phenomenology into view, at least in outline. Once this foundational work has been accomplished, Chap. 5 discloses pure consciousness at a deeper, asymmetrical layer, through a *sui generis* reductive discipline at one further remove from the traditional *epoche* and precisely through a radical extension of the concept of transcendental constitution according to the now-fully-developed and painstakingly delineated concept of the subalternate transcendental “proto-constitution” of *adesse* objectivity *as such*. We can then get a helpful bird’s eye glimpse of the proto-constitution of *adesse* objectivity *in actu*, as already ensconced creatively within the guiding power of Husserlian constitution itself *in actu*. Chapter 6 sets the stage for the constructive super-domain of convergent phenomenology which deals, at long last, with the re-worlding of intentionality as a entirely spiritual towardness now finally able to be phenomenologically spot-checked and described as a transcendence-within-immanence, much as Stein described divine and angelic “subject-consciousness.” And finally, after first contrasting Heidegger’s approach with the approach taken by the author, Chapter 7 bravely moves forward into the upper atmosphere of formal logic itself thereby to reveal the convergent Transcendental Ego as “Role.”

2.2 ON THE VERY POSSIBILITY OF THE NEW SCIENCE

In the summer of 1979, the author presented, to the University of Madras in Chennai, India, a doctoral thesis that contained not only the sketched outlines of a subalternate (but thoroughly Husserlian!) phenomenology called “convergent phenomenology”—as a new, hitherto undiscovered, eidetic science—but also a clarification of this new phenomenology’s two formal objects of investigation, in addition to some preliminary (and tentative!) reductive methods of approach.³² The present work builds on that earlier, rough-draft-like work. But where did this supreme confidence and this unsettling surety of scientific objectivity come from? A subalternate, wholly dependent eidetic science coming

into flowering birth within a more general, encompassing eidetic science? The very notion seems paradoxical—at odds with itself. It is like attempting to arrive, Kantian-wise, at the pure “form” of all possible eidetic systems of thought. And what poor, object-beleaguered human mind could do *that*? For, although some programming languages have developed, like interior kernels, within other programming languages, yet the firmly established eidetic sciences, such as, for example, geometry, are perennially and clearly aware of their own predefined boundaries. The notion that a fully eidetic science had been buried out of sight within the innermost heart of Husserlian pure consciousness seems farfetched at best, a supposed dream within another dream. And, even more pertinently, is not Husserlian pure consciousness, like its higher-flying predecessor, the “pure reason” of Immanuel Kant, wholly self-illuminating? Is it not, itself, conscious of itself in such a unitary fashion that nothing can take place within its borders that is not already suffused with its own evidential givenness and thereby immanently and irrefutably permeated with pure self-consciousness from the start? How can it be that an entirely eidetic, self-standing region of scientific investigation remained beyond the irradiating, spotlight scope of transcendental phenomenology itself, with its own self-illuminating, alert-and-final areas of eidetic research? Even the very possibility of convergent phenomenology seems entirely questionable from the outset. How are we to proceed?

It would be well, at this juncture, to ask how Edmund Husserl would have proceeded. In *Ideas*, in its initial chapters, Husserl conducted some pivotal meditations while yet remaining propaedeutically within the final foothills of the natural standpoint, meditations which, through their own candid and quite fearless force, led, in due course, directly up into the mountain-range-like realms of the intersubjectively verifiable phenomenological work that he fervently wished to share with the world. A book proposing to proceed even further into the supposed, outlying, even higher regions of an utterly new science (lying somehow, by one further remove, within the concrete hub-core of transcendental subjectivity *itself*) would do well to follow Husserl’s humble, tirelessly painstaking lead. Thus, the rest of this present chapter’s remaining sections will attempt to conduct the reader through a series of groundbreaking meditations on the first material object of convergent phenomenology (namely, the Transcendental Ego as already-toward...) that will progressively and finally set forth the eidetic foundations within pure logic itself from which

such a fresh phenomenology can eventually take flight as an authentic (and apodictically certain!) a priori science of pure consciousness as such. In this manner, the entire area of what we have been referring to as the first material object of convergent phenomenology will then come into shining focus.

We have characterized convergent phenomenology as a disclosure of the proto-constitution of relation-like objectivity (objects simply and solely “toward...”) in contradistinction to traditional phenomenology as a disclosure of the frontal, *inesse* constitution of thing-like objectivity (objects solely “already in themselves,” and thus eventually able-to-be-thematized objects “about which”). This subtle but utterly crucial distinction must be forthrightly understood. What is helpful for such understanding is simply to retrace Husserl’s scrupulous and methodical intentional analyses of the purified-by-epoche “transcendental imagination,” ranging from the contemplative and daydreaming-like fantasies of a mind at rest up into the almost entirely intellectually assimilated exemplar images used even at the rarified height of purely theoretical, conceptual thought itself. Setting aside the direct analogy in the East to the originative notion of *antah-karana vritti* espoused Bhāratīrtha-Vidyāranya, we find, over against Husserl’s own similar and radical forays out into such a perplexing, overgrown, wilderness-like arena of work, that Husserl himself as beginning philosopher had to revert back, at each step, and in a continuous methodological pre-set vantage point of “absolute clarity,” (a clarity unshadowed, indeed, by any ontic appearance of even a *phenomenological*-psychological method), to the heart and core of transcendental phenomenology as such, complete with all of its theoretical, and reductively-able-to-be-disclosed phenomenological “data” arrayed before him. And he defined such a final phenomenology once and for all when he told us with forthright candor in the following extraordinary dictum in *The Idea of Phenomenology*: “Every intellectual experience, indeed any experience whatsoever, can be made into an object of pure seeing and apprehension while it is occurring.”³³ Let us emphasize this curious phrase, “while it is occurring”—and let us ask, “What if that which is occurring, here and now, is not even real enough to be wakefully ‘in’ time—such as, for example, the filmy and strangely refractive experience of waking up from a dream and trying to remember it—such as we find quite extraordinarily pictured, layered and defined in the leveled view of sleep in Advaita Vedānta?” As we shall see in the following pages, there appears to be certain isolated, limit-case instances

where Husserl's forthright, purely presuppositionless, alert method of intentional description *itself* seems to explode, dissipate and eventually fall apart into isolated fragments right at the innermost core of interior time-consciousness itself. This is especially true of his treatment of the shifting, muddled line of demarcation between dreaming and waking. Our present attempt to bring some final intuitive clarity at last to these odd, partial descriptions (which, in their fitful, precarious flight, seem to hover, dissipate and fade especially in regard to such, as it turns out, eventual, yet quite provocative, "failures": failures thus to actually describe the reduced experiences of falling asleep and waking up—thus located at the remote limits of intentional analysis itself) proceeds upward, then, through penetrative and expository "levels" of what I have called groundbreaking, and thus foundational, "meditations," thus: propaedeutical set-pieces themselves centering in on the actualization of the emergent and almost-impossible-to-describe *pure consciousness* of such refracted and thus hybrid experiences.³⁴

2.3 SOME MEDITATIONS ON THE FIRST MATERIAL OBJECT OF THE NEW SCIENCE

Section 2.3 is divided into four-layered, wholly "meditational" sections: Section 2.3.1 proceeds up through the gate of the traditional epoche to the phenomenological standpoint and simply watches over Husserl's shoulder as he describes the imagination's production of dreams and daydreaming. Section 2.3.2 remains mostly within the phenomenological standpoint, and immerses itself in the instructive, groundbreaking phenomenological work of Ricoeur and Levinas, taking into account their startling, descriptive treatments of the lived-through occurrence of actually waking up from a dream. Section 2.3.3, basing itself on such treatments, bravely attempts to delineate a watershed division-line between all self-contained eidetic systems heading centrifugally into the Same and all self-contained eidetic systems heading out centripetally into the Other. At the close of Sect. 2.3.3, therefore, we will have arrived, at least propaedeutically, at the remote outpost of the science we seek and will accordingly be standing, as absolute beginners, before the gateway of convergent phenomenology itself. Finally, Sect. 2.3.4 situates us more securely within the very confines of the science itself, disclosed by the three preceding meditational exercises, by treating of some resonant, convergent themes of "incarnate

relationality” in the pioneering and tantalizing, later work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

2.3.1 *Meditations on What Husserl Himself Saw*

We have spoken of the immensely difficult and convoluted problematic of the emergence of the subalternate science of convergent phenomenology from within the greater, encompassing realm of general phenomenology (itself complicated further by the challenging notion of proto-constitution). Even if we had in hand a philosophical “GPS” to guide us through such a problematic, it would nevertheless be helpful to zoom out from such a located area and to thereby transplant ourselves within the huge, commonly understood watershed divide between, on the one hand, *purely real relations* which cannot be “looked into” and thematized (by “relating” such relations beyond themselves!) without losing precisely what we are looking at and thereby finding ourselves precariously at the precipitous edge of an infinite regress; and, on the other hand, *purely mental relations* which, because we *can*, at least in principle, reflect on our mind’s reflections ad infinitum, themselves enable us to endlessly spin out, toward infinity, mutually referential intelligibilities even around a single *inesse*, or *adesse*, “object.” Our current problematic of eidetic-science-within-another-eidetic-science thereby locates itself at this remote and expanded GPS outpost. As we move forward to stand at our new way station, our problematic, now written larger, can be metaphorically likened to catching what we might call a “dream-kernel” suddenly and preternaturally “causing itself” to emerge from within another dream.

Here we must pause. For how can we avoid being refractively duped by the perennial demons of Plato and Descartes? And since we are speaking of an infinite series of intelligibilities, akin to a nightmarish hall of mirrors, the demonic presentation of Nietzsche’s eternal return of the same comes unnervingly to mind. More helpfully put: How do we guide ourselves forward from here? We are certainly not at an utter impasse: Husserl himself, dealt with the odd, psychic construct of “dreaming within a dream” in his notes on the imagination. Relying on Husserl’s own tireless and unstinting honesty of letting appear what is already there, and letting it appear precisely according to the way in which it then and there appears, let us see what Husserl comes up with.

Oddly enough, in both the interrelated sequences where he treats of “dreaming within a dream,” he seems almost to shy away from what he

eventually finds. When we see this, we should helpfully recall that Husserl also, as a clear-headed and cautious logician, recoiled back instinctively from any kind of infinite regress. Thus, these two forms of recoil, these two forms of immediately “drawing back,” are not wholly unrelated to each other, as we shall see.

In his notes, Husserl begins, not by analyzing dream-consciousness, but by imagining himself transported, daydream-wise, to a remote area of Africa—thus to a place that he had never visited in real life. He says:

I “see” the bush, I see the wide, dry deserts, I “see.” The objects, the events, do not appear as here and now in the real sense; I am not now having perceptions. I am having phantasies [*Vorstellungen*]. Do I not thereby also have *phantasies of perceptions*? The events appear as not now, in that the appearances are taken as contents of perceptual experiences, though of perceptual experiences that I am not now having but into which I “transplant myself.” It is obvious that it cannot belong to the essence of “phantasy” that I phantasy to myself that I am perceiving—hence the phantasy that I am perceiving A cannot belong to the essence of the phantasy of A. For then an infinite regress would result.³⁵

He is thus trying to bring to the fore a morphed “transplanting” that, at the moment of being brought forth, seems to dissimulate itself in its native and primal confrontation with its own endlessly reflective passage toward something else: thus an evanescent transplanting in which the “from which” and the “toward which” are themselves *not yet clear*. We are thus in the position similar to that of a dreamer waking up and trying to remember a dream and finding that, even by pulling back veil after veil of imagined sequences, she can never remember the Origin and Final End of the dream itself.

A few pages later in these important notes on daydreaming, Husserl returns to this theme and imaginatively positions himself in the same remote Africa region, but—and this is highly significant—he is now no longer a bemused spectator, but much more vividly “on the move,” plodding along in the single file tracks of a safari expedition with the possibility of alternate “landscapes” of images opening up for him³⁶: “I rest from my march and give myself up to my phantasies; I think of centaurs and water nymphs in the world of the Greek gods. These phantasies are not taken as present phantasies but as phantasies that are themselves phantasied. Within the phantasy, a distinction is again made between reality and dreams (phantasy).” One response to what Husserl says in this para-

graph would be as follows: OK, but *who* is making this distinction? The distinction is “again” being made, but is it being made by the imaginary Husserl in the bush or is it being made by the actual Husserl in his chair in Freiburg? Or by neither? Or by both? Who is doing the convoluted “transplanting” here?

But look what happened: By our very inquiring into such a simple everyday matter, and by our persistent asking of simple questions, we ourselves suddenly seem to stand at the edge of an enormous abyss, heading out into the Absolute Unknown. Daydream? Reality? The perennial flow of our workaday phenomenological analysis is seemingly (and in a quite unstable fashion) in danger of becoming problematically trumped by a towering, never before seen, ontological transcendence of the highest order. Thus, in dealing with such fringe-areas, *the entire eidetic science of general phenomenology* seems to come up for grabs.

Husserl realizes that something has indeed become revelationally and, indeed, ominously close within this hazy, amorphous limit area of images within images, but he sees it not as a possible morphed, box-canyon kind of approach toward something else coming up from behind, but as an apparent contradiction to that which his earlier analysis has posited, namely that “phantasies of phantasies (modifications of the second degree) are *not possible*.” What comes next is astounding. He doesn’t even attempt to solve such an emergent, quite patent contradiction. What he pens instead doesn’t seem to be different from anything else he wrote in the thousands and thousands of unpublished pages of painstaking notes and comments. Yet, if we view it more closely, and, from our present outpost on the continental divide between real and mental interrelationships, zoom in on Husserl *himself*, the diligent Husserl ensconced upon his famous chair in Freiburg, it becomes perhaps the most unconsciously self-revelational of anything that he ever wrote. He says: “If I dream myself into the situation in which I dream myself as dreaming, or more distinctly, in which I dream that I am dreaming, must the dream become an object there? It certainly seems not.” *What caused him to move so unexpectedly from image-production to dream-production, and from “where” to “where” is he moving? And, most importantly, what kind of co-referential objectification is he talking about that includes both productions? Isn’t he perhaps touching upon adesse objectivity itself suddenly coming into its own and this, finally, within its own ground? As Ricoeur might express it: In the midst of its unconsciousness, the unconscious mind remains unconsciously toward the Other. Yet, correspondingly, in the midst of transcendental subjectivity, Husserl remains (dare we say it?) unconsciously Husserl because he is*

already toward the Other of his new science. But did he ever think of it like that? Can we ever *consciously* start to nest an entire realm of objectivity within another more ephemeral realm of objectivity?

At this point, Husserl abruptly breaks his musing series of penetrative questions, hurriedly and parenthetically noting that the entire current state of affairs being described “must be considered further.”³⁷ But are we not clearly herein left in the lurch and must we not finally ask ourselves that, if a dream-in-a-dream *cannot become an object*, how can it be further intended and thematized?

So what has suddenly happened here? Why this gratuitously posited notion of his—this strange incongruent addendum of the very dream-within-a-dream itself becoming an object, and this in the middle of a description, not of an actual dreaming-experience, but of a wholly diverse safari-resting-place experience of daydreaming within a daydreaming? Note that what he says in no way follows along naturally as if it were part of the preceding phenomenological analysis of the imaginational rest stop during his imaginational safari. His intentional analysis wavers and flutters at the very edge of losing focus and (impossibly!) fragmenting itself. It is, as it were, oddly superimposed upon the preceding analysis exactly because he has veered inexplicably away from *daydreaming* about centaurs to the absolutely diverse scenario of *actually dreaming-within-a-dreaming while asleep*. What then did he see that made him recoil and turn away? It is almost as if he were in a way-station of self-becoming-greater-than-self, *itself* not reductively vindicated by either the natural or the phenomenological standpoint! Note also that we are ourselves not simply attempting to hold in abeyance or dissimulate or confound his musing, veering questioning one way or another. As honest thinkers we simply wish to call attention to it in order to add a much needed, clarifying addendum to his abrupt addendum: that perhaps the subsidiary dream-within-a-dream cannot become a thing-like object offered up to some possible intentional analysis, yet itself can remain nonetheless wholly objectifiable not as a thing-like, absolutizable object but as a relation-like object that is, in a wholly relation-like way, referring itself back to the originative, base-line dream as ***adesse* objectivity pure and simple**, unsullied by further reflective (and, quite possibly, impossible) analysis? It simply is what it is. And just because it cannot be seen and thus grasped by, and assumed under, traditional, frontal, intentional analysis doesn't mean that it doesn't have its own original objectivity-and-meaning such that some further differ-

ently oriented analysis could thereby bring forth within it some, at least partial, descriptive clarity.³⁸

Let us continue immersing ourselves in what Husserl had to say, not about daydreaming, but about dreams themselves. We will find that Husserl, coming more into his constructive element, is not quite as baffled as it may at first seem. Further along in the same work, we read the following, quite penetrative description:

In dreaming, the dreaming Ego is lost in the dream; it becomes the Ego *in* the dream, the *quasi*-subject of the *quasi*-experience. In waking consciousness, however, the waking Ego in the proper circumstances is confirmed as phantasying Ego. It does not lose itself in the dream. As waking Ego, it brings about a shift into dreaming and carries out an actual positing, an actual *ego cogito*, in which it grasps what is *quasi*-experienced as *quasi-experienced*, and in a voluntary fashioning of sense and in a uniformly intuitive phantasy-fashioning fulfilling it, constructs, in the form of a unitary *quasi*-experience, an individual *quasi*-object.³⁹

Husserl is not a Tibetan Buddhist. In other words, he is not indulging in a clairvoyant and paranormal passage back into a dream-experience in order, by actually (and, of course, paranormally) “seeing” the very dream itself in all its emergent clarity, to bring a final, eternal meaningfulness (in the Buddhist sense of interdependent origination) to such Chinese-box-like experience. The above passage from Husserl is simply a remarkably fresh transcendental-phenomenological analysis of waking up and remembering a dream, the first of its kind in the history of philosophy. It proceeds in the usual fashion of such analyses, the Transcendental Ego according to “proper circumstances” “confirms” the awake Ego as now in charge of everything. This Ego formally, and in full awareness of itself, “constructs” the quasi-object of the remembered dream.

But let us look more closely at Husserl’s matter-of-fact statements themselves. Doesn’t the only way that such an analysis can “formally take place” (within the confines of the *epoche*) *itself* depend upon self-continuity? Where can this continuity come from? The dream state? The waking state? Furthermore, what exactly *is* going on? Utterly left out of the forthright analysis of waking up and remembering a dream is the haziness of waking up itself in its actual essence as a hazy half-asleep horizon of “about to become conscious” consciousness. Is not Husserl’s entirely intentional analysis (as it recoils from and ignores this haziness)

accomplished with such wakeful clarity not because such haziness is not given, *which it, indeed, is*, but simply because, as a pure towardness of pure consciousness ITSELF beyond itself, such haziness is purely and simply not able to be given *within* the intentional analysis-structure available within general phenomenology? It is not even like the off-to-the-side “edge” of a visual field that cannot be directly looked at, yet can be wakefully described as constituted horizon. The mystery to which are now directing our attention is infinitely more miraculous: a pure gratuity. As we *now* approach and firmly stand at outpost, a first ray of light is at last beginning to dawn for us. Everything depends upon both the mirrored gift and the not-able-to-be-seen-from-the-outside *intimacy* of gift. *Centrifugally “In”* is, by such gifting, here and now incandescently coalescing with *centripetally “Toward.”* Thus, as that grandmaster of Infinity, Levinas himself (eschewing as he always does, the third-party perspective) might express it: the entire, vital, hall-of-mirrors-like structure precisely of Other within Other, seems to be now co-arising from Same within Same.

And finally, above all else (and recalling exactly what we wish to achieve in this chapter), there is the concrete matter of method. Since the notion of a Transcendental Ego itself waking up while simultaneously constituting what is going on is just as baffling as the miraculous possibility of Husserl somehow in full consciousness *watching himself wake up*, we seemed to have reached the puzzling, shifting glacial crevasse of an odd methodological impasse: exactly *how* was Husserl’s above quite groundbreaking analysis itself achieved within transcendental subjectivity? Phenomenology remains promissory to the degree that its analyses remain arbitrarily limited, not by epoche, but by a partial epoche that goes no further into the Everest-reaches of Being Itself. But can we proceed further at all, finding soul within soul, and thereby a priori science within a priori science? Indeed, something akin to a faint structural outline has appeared to us, and we may take courage from it. Yet, even led thus Serpa-guided from way-station to way-station, convergent phenomenology can, following faithfully its own evidential givenness, itself theoretically both alight and take flight as a new science only when an evidential and rock-based Ground—*a Ground, other than traditional transcendental subjectivity*—appears and shows itself from itself. Here is not a foot-climb but an exceedingly dangerous rope-climb. Let us not look back and let us go bravely forward.

2.3.2 *Meditations on the “Other”: Ricoeur and Levinas*

Ricoeur

We have seen some of the baffling problems that the simple experience of waking up from a dream poses for both the natural and the phenomenological standpoint. And perhaps our prosaic and logical every day “self,” and perhaps our already-engrossed phenomenologically-working “self” would tend to wish such problematic things as dreams away into fictive nothingness by considering that a dream is, actually, nothing but its own amorphous “recounting of itself”—minus the awake consciousness. Apropos of this, Ricoeur tells us that “the dream becomes a complete thought only upon awakening. It is a complete image, that is, representation of the unreal, only on the basis of the real and in the form of a recounting.”⁴⁰ And yet, *what* it is, is exactly *not* “something minus consciousness.” To veer away from it, and, in such wholly refractive light, thus (ourselves now fictively—soul within quasi-soul—methodologically “doubled-up,” and finally completely awake) “describe” it, is always a distortion and even a dissimulation. Anyone knowing the way Ricoeur thinks knows that, when he gets interested in a topic, his unique, dialectic-oriented mind suddenly begins to move quantum jump by quantum jump. Let us try to follow what he goes on to say: “The dream was not the recounting minus the quality of consciousness. What was it? That is hard to say, since I can only speak of it in waking, in a memory directed toward my nocturnal being from my waking being. In any case, it was less than an image, but lent itself to being received into a working image.” Isn’t Ricoeur speaking here, contrary to the illuminated method of Husserl, of an odd and even baffling outpost-landscape of almost-images somehow quasi-creating their own (even more interior!) almost-images? What is he really trying to describe? In this astonishing foray of the pure “coming-in-for-a-landing” of the transcendental imagination, and at the center of Ricoeur’s own proverbial and masterful dialectic within himself,⁴¹ precisely *what* has he then discovered? What exactly is this remarkable “lending of itself”?

What we should notice here is that this very “lending of itself, *toward...*” (i.e. toward the here and now haziness of the quasi-productive imagination) is certainly an authentically analyzable content, yet it is already, in the retrogressive light of such *sui generis* analysis, a purely relational rather than a thing-like, able-to-be-directly-intended, noematic content. It can only be intended once the utterly *adesse*-like, purely relational *lending process* has ceased. For isn’t this exactly what has now come into focus?

The extraordinary fact is that, since it is a wholly relation-like objectivity, to that very degree, nothing about it can be brought into the frontal spotlight of anything-like intentional analysis to be thus absolutized and “essentialized” into a thematizable self-givenness. Although it can be directly meant, it is accordingly miraculously refracted outside of traditional intentional analysis altogether. It is indeed “given” but according to a revised notion of givenness, intractable to every kind of (already thing-like) intentional analysis able to be assimilated and used by general phenomenology itself.

Levinas

At the theoretical place we have now reached, our philosophical GPS has lost its satellite management. Mist seems to surround us everywhere. Can we go further forward here? Since no one has ever watched herself either fall asleep or wake up (an apodictic truth that, if it ever wandered into the blazing light of transcendental subjectivity, could very likely never tell us how it got there in all its own shy, apodictic glory), then what is this something outside of us, beyond us, and yet inside of us also, that then IS truly putting us to sleep and waking us up? If, as cognitive neurology tells us, falling asleep requires a special kind of quasi-self-hypnosis, then the hall-of-mirrors-like, inexhaustibly convoluted, contradictory-in-a-thing-like-manner “fact” is precisely that we must tell ourselves, by snap of finger and in the double role of sleeper and self-hypnotist, that, when we wake up, *we will be asleep*: a conflicted state of affairs; a square circle, if you will, suddenly becoming conscious of itself⁴²: an already refracted illogicality from the very start and truly a numinous event that couldn’t ever be fully constituted within traditional phenomenology. And, on the other side of the contradictory coin, when we thus actually wake hours later, self-role of finger-snapping hypnotist wholly lost beyond itself in complete oblivion, what is then truly, once and for all, waking us up *in fact*? Is what induces us to sleep the same as that which induces us to wake? Is it wholly exterior, or wholly interior? If it is exterior, what is it in its own *objective essentiality*?

Waking up seems to be a kind of coming into oneself from “something exterior,” something “not yet” oneself.⁴³ Thus, no one has ever, at such a moment, fully “intended,” even in Husserl’s sense of intention, to wake herself up. In a nuanced description of these conflicted states of affairs, Levinas pointedly writes: “what can be meant by this exteriority that is not intentional ectasis? A retro-cendence, that which identifies itself in immanence and overlaps there with itself, detaches itself from itself or

sobers up, as at the moment sleep gives way and when, in waking up, what was hitherto lived fades into a dream that was and is only remembered.”⁴⁴

This vital-sounding, and entirely on-the-wing description may perhaps partially help us in our quest. Yet exactly what kind of entirely relation-like objectivity does Levinas dredge up from the depths in this astonishing notion of retro-cendence? That he is actually seeing it—in some way—or, at least, faithfully and even starkly describing it, is clear, but out into what new type of beyond-intentionality (or, more precisely, beyond-thing-like-objectivity) *regions* has he thus gone to do so? If the ultimate and by-its-own-essential-nature *wakefulness* of intentional analysis cannot thus look back into sleep but sublimates (recoils, doubles into itself or even shies away from) that which what is beginning to “lend” itself thereby always entails: a kind of both embodied and “intoxicated” infinite regress (regress of the heady possibility of a dream within a dream within a dream, itself foreshadowed by a retro-cending waking...) then exactly *what* is Levinas confronting so fearlessly? Infinity, itself, at last? But what does that really mean? Can such meaning be fulfilled beyond all stretch of the full meaning-intention of waking life? Is there another Transcendental Ego living within the workaday Transcendental Ego? Levinas continues: “Transcendence in immanence, the strange structure (or *depth*) of the psychic as a soul within a soul, is the ever-recommencing awakening in wakefulness itself; the *Same* infinitely brought back in its most intimate relation to the Other.”⁴⁵

We must not quote these extraordinary lines for their ontological power (which they indeed possess, and for ethics especially!) but for their phenomenological and methodological significance, since our entire and over-arching goal in these meditational passages is to disclose the first material object of convergent phenomenology. Thus, let us merely note that Levinas, in drawing attention to something wholly and utterly relation-like at the very heart of this already-awake, something-about-which” “Same” with its thing-like methods and approaches (that are here coextensive with traditional Husserlian analysis), seems to have somehow caught in the act a kind of pure “waking-up-in-order-to-go-back-to-sleep” (or going-into-pure-consciousness-in-order-to-leave-the-“in-itself”-of-pure-consciousness) from within a hidden sub-region of phenomenological description already quite impenetrable to the always-available intuitive objectification of that very pure consciousness itself as the wakeful, transcendental constitution of *inesse* objectivity. In this sub-region, Levinas uncovers and sustains an infinitely deeper soul than the usual soul: a kind

of primeval, transcendental subjectivity and even dares to describe it as intimately and primordially relational, that is, as already (just as Ricoeur would have said) “lending” itself completely outside itself toward the Other. It is a primal towardness already outside itself and already becoming a grateful reception of such an incomprehensible gift of wakefulness thus being borrowed back into it. As such, it is thus only able to be objectified at all as an already passing miraculously “beyond itself,” as it were, toward something else. It enacts this “passage” tentatively, passively, precisely by its simply letting-become-supportive the very Ground itself of the dream—by searching for its actual, empirical self as having-just-dreamed—by thus heading out endlessly toward... toward what? Toward something already infinitely “awake” as well as already endlessly dreaming—something not at all classifiable within the set regions of traditional pure consciousness itself? It is hard to say. All we know is that this wholly relation-like, subalternate transcendental subjectivity must have fashioned (constituted?) precisely what Husserl himself might have called a quasi-something, a “something-purely-toward” first in order to move back there to look. But it couldn’t have directly intended to do such fashioning of something-purely-toward or it would have simply woken itself up. Reader, if that something—what our new science can now formally define as “the transcendental proto-constitution of adesse objectivity,”—is now what interests you, you have, by that very fact, entered into the first material object of convergent phenomenology: namely the Transcendental Ego as suddenly toward the towering summits of the *actus purus essendi*. You have achieved what Sankara called an *avasana*, a place where the over-worked horses of the transcendental imagination can be at last unharassed: a Waystation of Grace. You have arrived at the foothill outpost of a new eidetic science.

2.3.3 *Meditation on the Ground of Convergent Phenomenology*

Our groundbreaking meditations have at least gained us a new (coming-into-being-and-immediately-passing-beyond-itself!) Ground fit for the laying of the landing-field foundation of our new science. It is already the founding of an absolutely new as-structure, thus of a special appearing as soul-within-soul-like *Apophansis* of all possible apophanses. For seeing the empirical and thing-like world suddenly as toward the absolute being of consciousness is a negative doing-nothing (a doing-nothing in the purely passive sense comparable to the utter passivity of the interior time-

consciousness that Husserl uncovered) out of which positively emerges *intentionality itself* AS the absolute being of constituted pure consciousness. Seeing the empirical and thing-like world AND BEYOND THAT the hazy, only asymmetrically real, one-sided entering into absolute being that *adesse* object-consciousness necessarily itself **must become by lending itself to such becoming** is a negative (a doing-nothing) out of which positively emerges *the transcendental proto-constitution of adesse objectivity itself*, again, AS the absolute being of pure consciousness. Intentionality as transcendently constituting the world of *inesse* experience, and our new, coming-into-view transcendental proto-constitution of *adesse* objectivity, both viewed thus as being, equally, actualizations of object-consciousness, are thus rayed acts coming from the unitive activity of the *selfsame* Transcendental Ego as such, but they are rayed acts of different sorts, each demanding a different eidetic science for a formal elucidation of their structure and content.

There is always a kind of uneasy, albeit purely formal, “schizophrenia” in Husserl’s unnerving disclosure of the Transcendental Ego. Yet, as we move forward into our new eidetic science, we are still Husserlian phenomenologists. Nothing changes within ourselves. But we are not thereby lost. We have at least found out (by our penetrative analyses of dreaming within a dream)—and we have achieved such knowledge according to its own unshakeable certainty—we have at least found out, then, precisely that our ownmost suddenly becoming wholly related outward beyond ourselves, taken according to its formal essence as the transcendental proto-constitution of purely *adesse* objectivity, entails not the slightest empirical change within ourselves, *even as phenomenologists*. What we have called the transcendental proto-constitution of *adesse* objectivity is, as such, **pure consciousness** just as natively as is the co-relational towardness (of both act and object) of intentionality itself viewed now for the first time exactly as it is in itself, thus as *adesse actually becoming itself* beyond all possible phenomenological fields of this or that self-giveness. More formally expressed: Convergent phenomenology discloses itself as an authentic science of pure consciousness at that moment when the pure self-giveness of transcendental subjectivity, as *inesse* objectivity, is put out of operation, leaving that selfsame transcendental subjectivity to upsurge and newly disclose itself precisely as pure self-giveness of *adesse* objectivity. That is why the psychic construct of “dreaming within a dream” was a helpful (and even workable!) analogy supremely useful for the disclosure of the new eidetic science in question. In other words, we have proceeded

almost infinitely deeper into the sheer **interiority** (as well as the exterior “**Otherness**”) of pure consciousness than did traditional phenomenology precisely because the upsurge of the pure towardness of *adesse* objectivity revealed by such a reductive soul-within-soul construct as a “bracketing-within-a-bracketing,” applied to the entire *inesse*-like field revealed by traditional bracketing, can (by reason of its inmost essential towardness to pure subject-consciousness as it is in itself *as wholly Other*) go no further into the **exteriority** of Being Itself without the abrupt finality of pure self-contradiction. “Waking up” to a “self-contradiction” is actually being self-contradicted as such a state of affairs itself awakes, which is nothing else but the final apodicticity of the inescapable fact that actual towardness cannot be actually toward any further towardness. Indeed, it cannot even be toward a further towardness of that entirely theoretical self-giveness of *evidential and wholly prepredicative towardness to the truth* that becomes disclosed at the height of the science of formal logic as eventually and finally envisioned (and set in motion for all time to come) by Husserl. Such an ultimate outpost conclusively brings to an end all further motions forward of all further intentional horizons and leaves us standing within the confines of an utterly new eidetic science of consciousness.

It is becoming clearer, at least in grasped outline, precisely how the ground of convergent phenomenology can become for us mere beginners an alertly awake and endlessly fruitful ground indeed. As Edith Stein tells us with her own incontrovertible fierceness of spirit:

The philosopher must also grasp why his predecessor went about it like this. He must get down into the grounds themselves and grasp them. And this means that the grounds must grip him and best him in the sense that he decides to accept them and retraces within himself the path the other followed from grounds to conclusions, perhaps even going beyond him. Or else he must best the grounds; I mean, he must decide to get free of them and take another path. To be bested by St. Thomas’s [*and, we here might dare to add, by Husserl’s*] “grounds” means to vanquish him philosophically for ourselves. To best his grounds means to “be done” with him philosophically.⁴⁶

It is only when a phenomenologist is “bested” by Husserl’s own work that she begins to see, with radical clarity, that everywhere she looks in the immense field of transcendental phenomenology, it always appears to be of the very essence of traditional intentional analysis that it must first, in a wholly self-conscious manner, exercise a fixed (completely awake!) meth-

odological control over the thing-like objectivities that it wishes to absolutize into their eventual (and essential!) self-giveness. But what happens when we give up such frontal control and, in the above warrior-like spirit of Stein, allow ourselves to be carried by the strong arm of something utterly beyond ourselves? Suddenly, as if we are even able to awake from the very state of being awake itself, we must fiercely and finally realize for the life's sake of our own encompassing eidetic method, that, to actively use Levinas concept as method, the "retro-cending" stirring-outward of motions from semi-consciousness into consciousness are certainly real, but they are not, in any realizable sense, controllable situations. As the consummate theoretician Stein realized as she moved, as if in a fervent dream (and so skillfully) between Aquinas and Husserl, such stirrings of what she called the "Ground" originate within the uncontrollability of the self's own transformative shifts: those life-changing events that often happen to us *utterly from beyond ourselves*.

Appendix II: "Waking" from the Waking-State of Intentionality Itself

Events that morph us beyond our phenomenological selves do not have to be life-changing, however. They may be so incidental as to be verging on ridiculous. It is here well to recall that the eminent anthropologist, Claude Levi-Strauss, tells of sitting idly smoking next to a tribal fire, when suddenly he chanced, in his mind, upon a final synthesis of kinship relations that explained in a single innovative conception all the scattered notions that he had so far studied about all such primal relations everywhere, a conception that rose to the supreme theoretical heights of his burgeoning science of Structural Anthropology thus to bring it into final scientific focus forever. He was about to grab his book and write this brilliant, all-encompassing solution down, when the woman cleaning pots next to him grabbed the side of his jacket and wiped her nose. Levi-Strauss completely forgot his brilliant insight.

Let similarly bring ourselves to a heightened state of awareness and ask with a startled sense of mundane inconsequentiality: Precisely *where on earth and by means of what transcendent GPS* did the eidetic science of phenomenology come from, and from what landing-field-like (and thus regionally prescribed) "super-domain" in ourselves did it inexplicably awake?

Husserl speaks somewhere of a tiny gnat suddenly flying up his nose; he even scientifically recorded watching this event bring an inconsequential (and truly a here and now, not-able-to-look-back-at-itself, and thus per-

haps even irreversible) halt to his important phenomenological musings.⁴⁷ Such events cut across even the highest of theories.⁴⁸

The Other is Other, self to soulful self, as is the Same, the Same. Husserl got so close to the real sometimes that it seemed that the real was speaking through him. Isn't what we most like within ourselves carried along inside ourselves by our dumb awareness of liking it? Doesn't the very act of sleeping have its dreams identically as convergent phenomenology has its own material objects? Husserl is already a convergent phenomenologist when he tells us, quite surprisingly that what we call "liking" "is nothing foreign to consciousness at all that could present itself to consciousness through the mediation of phenomena different from the liking itself; to like is intrinsically to be conscious." Convergent phenomenology carries the forever silent, never-able-to-look-back-at-itself TRUTH that **to be toward is intrinsically to be conscious.**

Socrates held, silently within himself, the fact that he really didn't know, Same to Other, what lies beyond death, but he kept moving toward simply being conscious about it with immense courage. And how do we really know in our innermost heart of hearts that the entire solitary realm of transcendental subjectivity is not simply an impotent and refractive self-delusion, thus nothing more than an eccentric, incongruous quirk in the mind of Husserl? Correspondingly, convergent phenomenology presses forward even to the heights of the *actus purus essendi*, knowing all the while that even the very Truth of Being Itself is so easily lost.

Setting the dream-like, back and forth logicity of such dire scenarios aside, we must dare to ask a question dire even to the steady foundations of Advaita Vedanta: Why can't the Witness-Self witness the Witness-Self? Is there anything missing, unaccounted-for, that we should know by simply extending the adaptive horizons of our all-too-human gaze? If the edge that retrogressively grounds the odd upsurge of a dream within a dream can, as we have seen, give us an immanent but workable analogy to the off-to-the-side-ness of the human visual field, then we must put out on foot with all such imaginative waystations behind us. We must ask: What is the final horizon of all horizons? What exactly IS that famed root of the transcendental imagination (*time itself* in its own frail purity) from which Kant (and, yes, even that way-master Heidegger) recoiled?

The answer is amazingly simple. Epistemology, to find itself, must take care of itself. It must deepen from single image-pivot *in actu* into a hazy, risky (possibly-co-referenced) **entire pivoting landscape** of interrelated images *in actu*. Edith Stein gleaned much from the famed *convertuntur*

ad phantasmata of Thomas Aquinas (a formidable gnat to swallow!), just as Advaita gained from the antahkarana verti of Sankara. But, lodged in the waystation-less ground we have now achieved, we now should ask ourselves, did Aquinas and Sankara go far enough? What lies further, hidden in what Stein called the *Ich-Leben*, that deals exactly with our imagination's landscape-like production of free-floating *grouped* images, and accordingly positions this tentative, luminous *Ich-Leben* precisely at that awake ethereal fulcrum point, over and above such marshaled, grounding images, when the pure consciousness of Husserlian phenomenology, that Stein had penetrated into further than any other phenomenologist before or since, comes incandescently shining into focus *beyond all imagining*? In other words, can human object-consciousness ever become purely *adesse* in such a fashion whereby the helpful landscapes of converging images are needed no longer? Following our meditations fearlessly forward, at one step beyond, willing to be bested by (yes!) the Witness Self Itself, we find that something (dream-within-dream-wise) may perhaps finally come to rest and peremptorily take us upward with it on the fierce wings of philosophical flight that CHANGE NOTHING of our entire INTERRELATED and thus wholly *adesse*-like landscape-imagery in which it itself had (so inexplicably) come to rest.

We *can* move forward. The universe remains the same, unchanged. As Aquinas knew, if all empirically real relations suddenly vanished, no conscious mind would notice, the cosmos would continue, we would merely think an annoying gnat had interrupted us, but, at the disappearance of all empirically real relations, all ontological-phenomenological knowledge ever achieved in history would vanish utterly. As already *toward*, *adesse* objectivity, thus up from the shadows of its own wings, arises already, ordering and ordering but changing nothing of the universe that it leaves in its wake. We might have lived in a universe where real relations could not be intuitively seen because they simply never existed. That they, almost beyond imagining, *do* exist, and are as old as the world, changes nothing in the *inesse* of the universe itself. Relation Itself (divided finally by Aquinas himself [and by his silent marshaling a landscape into view of images] into real, asymmetrically real, and merely intentional) must clearly be nothing but pure gift.

How can we possibly render such an immense, multi-continent-wide *inesse* suddenly inoperable within transcendental subjectivity in order to find the frail, upsurging reality of such a supreme and surprising and final-summit-wise, achieved *gift*? Must we, within the center point of

our own isolate *Ich-Leben*, then find solace in mere landscapes? There is hope. Hermes Trismegistus defined divine reality (uncreated subject-consciousness) landscape-wise as an infinite sphere whose center point is everywhere able to be determined but whose circumference is nowhere able to be determined, Yet is he not simply describing the uncanny human perception of real relations themselves, an already-absolutized intuition of a quasi-being so frail as to have possibly not been there at all, all along the line? But, given such an inestimable gift, how can we ever NOT imagine a doggedly persistent, set-theory-like ordering of everything simply outward, toward...? For, indeed, real relations are thus a miraculous ordering in which we forever live, irrespective of the fact that they need not have been there at all. More graphically put: The floating landscape at the shifting hub-center within the resonant, originative sphere of Hermes Trismegistus can only “best” us (in Stein’s sense) when we spend the rest of our life, as convergent phenomenologists, painstakingly describing what the *ad-esse* of that sphere has apodictically given to us precisely as it proceeds forward in flight and thereby changes nothing of the newly witnessed created universe itself, a newly proto-constituted universe thus being at last co-relationally described—and certainly, apodictically, described—as the first material object of convergent phenomenology, thus, indeed, as “pure consciousness toward...” as such.

2.3.4 *The Last Meditation on the First Material Object of Convergent Phenomenology*

Aristotle is actually pre-delineating the limit-boundaries of First Philosophy as such when he tells us that the intellective soul **itself** is, in a way, all things. And yet Aquinas, surveying the same ontological ur-boundaries, tells us that, if there were no created and uncreated intellects, then Truth would utterly vanish, and only Being **Itself** would remain. More puzzling still, Sankara tells us in his emblematic construction of *tadatmya* that the Witness Self witnesses... **Itself**. And then, wonder of all wonders, as Husserl becomes wholly awake, pure consciousness defines **Itself** as an infinite field of investigative research.

Where does this extraordinary process take us? Have we not returned to the apt eulogy set forth in the Introduction where we found Merleau-Ponty declaring an epitaph not just for Husserl but for his own life also: “At the end of Husserl’s life there is an unthought-of element in his works which is wholly his and yet opens out on something else. To think is not

just to possess the objects of thought; it is to use them to mark out a realm to think about which therefore we are not yet thinking about.”⁴⁹ This should give us a clue: as phenomenology arises, so convergent phenomenology arises. For isn’t the reflective sum of the “all things” spoken of by Aristotle *itself* made new for pure consciousness when we define for ourselves a new way of thinking **about thinking**? Kevin Wall’s thoughts about asymmetrically real relations at this point shines forth like some final mantra: “The act of thinking is relative to Relation; everything but the act of existence is relative only to essence.”⁵⁰ For Merleau-Ponty, in the same remarkable passage about Husserl’s final gestures outward, goes on speaking—tentatively and almost as if he were preternaturally attempting to catch, as if for the first time and on the wing—a state of affairs synchronistically and philosophically close to the twofold material objects the proto-constitution of which the new convergent phenomenology itself endeavors to describe. He says, “Just as the perceived world endures only through the reflections, shadows, levels, and horizons between things (which are not things and are not nothing⁵¹ but on the contrary mark out by themselves the fields of possible variations in the same thing and in the same world) so the works and the thoughts of a philosopher are also made of certain articulations between things said.”⁵² “Not things and not nothing” delineates in outline the entire realm of *adesse* itself. And Leibnitz, certainly the most luminously self-aware of all Western philosophers, agrees. Trying to explain how the human intellect orders itself according to the centrifugal truths of first principles, Leibnitz says that our minds “have at least the ideas upon which these truths depend, and we can even say that they already possess these truths, if we consider them as relations between ideas.”⁵³

Thinking—not just about “all things” but about, at a greater depth, the originative interrelationality of “all things,” which, as a emergent kernel within Husserlian pure consciousness, can thereafter be viewed in flight as the first material object of convergent phenomenology—thinking, then, to find itself, must go beyond itself, using its connective ideas to “mark out a realm to think about which therefore we are not yet thinking about.” One cannot enter First Philosophy without such co-relational, and thus wholly apophantic and wholly emergent “self-consciousness.” And such thinking, as a making all things new, relates as an incipient and newborn *cogito* to this new realm as to no other, but, as Merleau-Ponty tells us elsewhere, “the act of relating is nothing if divorced from the spectacle of the world in which relations are found.”⁵⁴ Thus, it is not just the symbiotic interrelation of perception and language, but, above all, both imagina-

tion and thought itself that are often left inarticulate by the bad faith of this aberrant “divorce” of *noesis* and *noema* (and of the [both resonant and dissonant] “divorce” and ultimate “mentalization” of relations away from both their foundations and terms) concerning which Merleau-Ponty speaks. The following three areas (of perceiving, imagining and thinking) should accordingly, to bring the divisiveness of this divorce into useful focus, be spot-checked and addressed.

1. *Perception and the thing-like speaking that is language itself.* It may be the case that it is language itself that produces this “divorce” that numbs us to the upsurge, in the flesh, of empirically real relations. Language often blinds itself to the *adesse* of the world in the very attempt to express it. A good example of this is Jean Piaget’s famous experiments that attempt to show how preschoolers eventually develop correct perceptual judgments. His studies are revelatory not so much because they show how such preschoolers come progressively into correct judgments of the real world but because the children’s mistakes are often due to the minimal ability of language itself to express actual towardnesses of things to each other. Indeed, most of the immediately intuitable relation-like objects surrounding us simply have no corresponding words whereby they can be directly expressed. Through Piaget’s work, it has been fairly well established that a preschool child, when shown the sudden staggering of two stacked parallel sticks of equal length (i.e. when the lower stick is suddenly moved to the right), says “It got longer!”⁵⁵ The psychologist notes the “error” that the preschooler makes, calculates the age when the child will simply say, “You moved it,” but neglects to explain *exactly why the prior mistake was made*.⁵⁶ In other words, perhaps the child is intuiting something so wholly relation-like that the only available words to express it simply overreach the reality being here and now seen. As penetrative studies into the wondrous perceptual scenarios of hour-old infants shows us, infantile asymmetricality, in the utter newness of its own flesh, cannot ever, for all time to come, look back at itself.
2. *Imagination as entangled in language.* Such overreaching is endemic not only to language but also to imaginative thought. Some mandala-like metaphors defy *in esse* descriptions. Hermes Trismegistus defines God as “an infinite sphere whose center point is everywhere determinable, but whose circumference is nowhere determinable.”⁵⁷ If we attempt to arrive at any kind of exemplar imagery as a pivotal base for

this definition, we find ourselves falling into a Merleau-Ponty-like core of the floating *adesse*-convolutions and partialities of *empirical perception itself* from which language, entrenched in *inesse*-convolutions, can bring nothing back. Is God being defined or is the floating and benumbed retro-cession-back into the already co-related objects of perception being defined? Truly, why we lapse irretrievably back into such inarticulate and yet co-referenced “pieces” of perception is a mystery hidden in an enigma. And yet, by leaving behind the mysterious, already-frontal imagination in its subsidiary role as already tied down to the *inesse* vagaries of empirical perception, and going deeper into what the freed imagination itself can disclose, it can be said that, inwardly, centrifugally, the imagination often gives us interrelational landscapes in which, through a miraculous kind of synthesis, a central image assumes governance, even though such core-governance often fades in its very expression of itself. Perhaps this is why, in dreams, we can dream that we are dreaming, and wake up thence to find no “words inside the words” for what has just occurred. More starkly stated: dreams simply have no articulate beginning in consciousness. Dream-glances never look back at themselves to see where they came from. Or, at least, waking consciousness, oddly enough, has never “seen” a dream through “from its beginning.” Intentionality, whose singularly clear exemplar is wakefulness,⁵⁸ wakes and speaks and the resting place of dreams fades off and off and vanishes. For no one has ever, at such a blurred “moment” of wakefulness, fully “intended” to wake themselves up. Similar to the child who, when a book is introduced into its crib, plays with it, yet has no idea that the book has a “behind-ness” to it, so our self-consciousness of “looking forward,” as it moves from dream to reality precisely as *adesse*, has no “behind itself.” A dream, and even more particularly, a dream within a dream, has nothing-like day-time imagery to sustain it because it is, by its inmost nature—and, as becomes emblematic in Hermes’ interstitial example—*wholly and interdependently relational*, and, to the exact extent that it is *directly* known in the sudden gut-feeling that it brings to us, cannot upsurge into anything-like language thus to express itself further. Even if “God” is best describable as an infinite sphere, we cannot do more than move inexorably forward within such free-floating imagery toward something else.

3. *Thought as entangled in language.* It may also be the case that thought itself becomes enmeshed in the inarticulate limits of a language almost

wholly grounded in its rough and ready expression of thing-like objectivity. In a remarkable passage in one of his lectures, Husserl describes “thinking” by catching it on the wing in the following fashion: “In speaking we continuously carry out an internal act of meaning that melds with the words, as it were, animating them. The result of this animation is that the words and the entire discourse incarnate within themselves a meaning, and incarnated in them, bear it within themselves as sense.” The sphere floats, and we thus are miraculously living in language itself as a foreshadowing and as an upsurge of what we are just about to “think.” Such a “resting station” is itself perforce *totally relational in character*. Thought, all mooring thus refracted, can thereby easily become convinced that it can settle in to live in the rarified air of its own relation-like development from such a thing-like language, floating along from intelligibility to intelligibility, without truly understanding (and thereby rooting itself) according to the pre-predicative grounding in the exemplar-like *adesse* objectivity therein involved.

Given this tripartite failure of language in the areas of perception, imagination and thought, how then should we proceed in our analysis? Thinking, at the asymptotic limit of all possible intelligibilities, is at all times able to, once and for all, *proceed beyond itself, using its refracted ideas to “mark out a realm to think about which therefore we are not yet thinking about.”* Analogical to the nothing (but not yet completely nothing because we are at rest within its equivocal core) of dreamless sleep, Merleau-Ponty’s epitaph of the “not yet” haunts us at all levels: We must then ask ourselves: Exactly *where*, before the hectic “upsurge” of thought and image and perception, are we already at rest thus to originatively and fully open ourselves toward such a transcendent realm? If we have to return to a new way of looking at the empirical world, we must first of all pull down the curtains from the perplexing, translucent halls of our Transcendental Ego, pack up our heady, essentialistic baggage, proceed out the door and *suddenly return exactly to this quasi-cloudy “new way of looking at the empirical world.”* Pure consciousness must align itself to a new process of wonder-filled thought and become, without turning back, as **toward** the *actus purus essendi* as it already is in fact. *Thus only* can our “not yet thinking” find its own autochthonous expression. Aristotle, Aquinas, Sankara and Husserl didn’t simply sit placidly constructing empirical-like relations in their minds. They *saw* them in the endless expanse of nature that is

always there at hand. Rather than blandly proceeding forth into our own set-theory-like and wholly solitary pursuit of a glib handling relative terms with supposed ease, we should perhaps, once in our lifetime, simply look over their shoulders to see what they themselves saw.

Our final meditation ends by realizing that pure consciousness must witness the truth of its own process of thought *even in those forward areas in which it can no longer look back at itself*. For, a self, that proceeds from something unapproachably more glorious than itself must come most from that greater (and even more wondrous!), much more *Itself*, self, a self as old as the world, and therein a self indeed (as *adesse*) perhaps able to be newly marked out as even older....

This holds also as the refractive method. For by such a mirrored retro-cendence, of converging helplessly and endlessly inward toward our undiscoverable frailty—toward, then, that inmost core of “nothingness-toward...” that not even the *Dasein* of human temporality itself can look backward to find—convergent phenomenology stands or falls. For if it doesn’t begin by finding its ground, as did Stein, precisely and humbly in its own most characteristic way of looking outward thence, with a kind of childlike innocence, to suddenly and wondrously mark out the actual exteriority of a kind of boundless territory wholly beyond itself, then convergent phenomenology will remain forever an illusory dream rather than finally taking the supreme risk to become **Itself**, within the suddenly-awaking (now being wholly held-and-carried) *Ich-Leben*, as an authentic eidetic science. Stein’s confidence must be our confidence also.

NOTES

1. Such a landscape-like metaphor is fitting. Did not Edmund Husserl himself—in a poignant, striking image—liken his nascently philosophical (and thoroughly *scientific!*) journey to the journey of an ageless Moses standing on the crest of a final mountain, gazing down upon the Promised Land, a land shaped by the primordial shifts and fault lines of a supreme “ontology of the real”—a land, appearing before him like a dream within a dream, a land that he himself would never enter?
2. All quotations from Jitendranath Mohanty are taken from his foreword to *Convergent Phenomenology and Edith Stein’s Philosophical Eidetics, Essays on Emergent Self-consciousness in the Systems of Sankara, Aquinas and Husserl*, by Jim Ruddy (Lambert Academic Publishing, Germany, 2014), pp. 3–4. Mohanty’s own special fascination with a new and thoroughgoing Thomistic–Husserlian take on phenomenology itself is long-standing. As

he says in the foreword, “As a graduate student in Gottingen, I read in excitement Edith Stein’s writings connecting Aquinas and Husserl. A copy of her translation of Aquinas’ *On Truth* was my companion for years to come.”

3. At least as prepared for and fore-shadowed by a not yet fully articulated or published “sub-ontology” of empirically real relations as they are in themselves and thus as formally apart from their thing-like-grounded inherence in ontological “accidents,” and thus, in phenomenological terms, from their inherence in non-independent entities that Husserl himself referred to as *abstracta*.
4. Systems wherein the theoretical structures of the aforementioned asymmetrical relations, in their purely material, as well as spiritual, phases of co-reference (toward their fundamentals and their terms), were at last fully uncovered, described and employed.
5. Stein, Edith, *Finite and Eternal Being—an Attempt at an Ascent to the Meaning of Being*, translated by Kurt F. Reinhardt (IGS Publications, Washington DC, 2002), p.15.
6. *Adesse* objectivity can be roughly characterized purely as “towardness-objectivity” and thus as ultimately diverse from the foundational objectivity characterized purely as “inness-objectivity.” The latter term would then circumscribe the essential, frontally situated givenness of Husserlian intentionality as uncovered and exfoliated in traditional phenomenology. Within the enhanced formal ontology aspired to by Stein lies an almost entirely unspoken duality: consciousness-toward... and consciousness of... a duality thus defining as such, at least in outline, the entire domain of pure consciousness most generally considered.
7. Kevin Wall, author of a book of masterful clarity entitled *Relation in Hegel*, and certainly one of the most brilliant expositors of asymmetrical relations in the Western tradition, tells us, in a Whiteheadian vein, that the divine reality “not only makes a multiplicity of creatures, ordering them one to another, but he also adds that order to each one as an added perfection. This makes creation a beautiful and complete whole—a cosmos.” Convergent phenomenology has as its utterly gratuitous and gifted scientific object this selfsame “added ordering,” and could very well define itself as nothing other than this miraculously-coming-into-focus *adesse* ordering suddenly becoming consciously and theoretically and descriptably (and, thus, *phenomenologically!*) aware of itself as an eidetic science. (*Note: Wall’s quote is from an unpublished essay, entitled, simply, “Relation.” I wish to thank Wall’s brother-in-law, Dominic Culvert, for going down into his basement and unearthing this essay from several boxes of Wall’s nachlass.*)
8. Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate*, Quest. 1, art. 1 ad 5. The full idea is as follows: *Cum enim illa quae sunt causa aliorum essendi sint maxime entia, et*

illa quae sunt causa veritatis sint maxime vera. However, in the reply to objection six, Aquinas puts forth the ultimate ground for the miraculously non-reciprocal relation of identity between truth and being, which lies at the asymmetrical core matrix of the *respectus transcendens* itself as such: “There is a conceptual difference between the true and being since there is something in the notion of the true that is not in the concept of the existing—not in such a way, however, that there is something in the concept of being which is not in the concept of the true.” Aquinas never explains exactly how a purely conceptual relation of total identity—at the highest level of *metaphysica generalis*—can itself be considered asymmetrical. He very well might answer this eventual question (veering off as it does into an apparent total contradiction in this direction) by saying, “It simply is what it is.” Such an ineffable asymmetry enabled him, later on in *De Veritate*, to enact a kind of proto-epoche (a strange and total reversal of Husserlian epoche) of both divine and human consciousness as follows: “Even if there were no human intellects, things could be said to be true because of their relation to the divine intellect. But if, by an impossible supposition, intellect did not exist and things did continue to exist, then the essentials of truth would in no way remain” (Ques. 1, art 2, *corpus*.)

9. If, indeed, there are any such orthodox thinkers left!
10. Levinas, Emmanuel, *Discovering Existence with Husserl*, translated by Richard A. Cohen and Michael B. Smith (Northwestern University Press, 1998), p. 161. He speaks of “a transcendence in immanence,” and of “the Other calling the Same in the deepest part of itself.”
11. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Prose of the World*, edited by Claude Lefort, translated by John O’Neil (Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1973), p. 28. That Merleau-Ponty is speaking, on the wing, of the constitutive emergence of *adesse* objectivity from *inesse* objectivity is clear from what he pronounces, further on in his work: “Therefore the world perceived by man must be such that, through a certain arrangement of elements, we are able to make appear in it emblems not only of our instinctive intentions but even of our most intimate relation to being.” p. 60. These *adesse* constructs gather in his work *by their own force*. Thus, Merleau-Ponty, in a certain respect, even attempts to resurrect what we have called the soul-within-a-soul construct when he tells us, following Claudel, that “God is not above but beneath us—meaning that we find him not as a supra-sensible model which we must follow but as another self in ourselves which dwells in and authenticates our darkness.” pp. 83–84.
12. Also because her own courageous thrust forward into a Thomistic–Husserlian area [not-yet-even-imagined!] theoretically demanded it. Indeed, in a letter to Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Stein had finally begun to perceive her special, high-altitude, co-relational eidetics (which was both an utterly new “formal ontology” as well as a purely theoretical and yet purely personal

attempt to, as she said, “get from phenomenology to scholasticism and vice versa”) to be *an originative phenomenological method as equally important to modern thought* as both Hartmann’s ontology and, of course, Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit*, a work which she had read and critiqued with the orthodox eidetics of her own and of Husserl’s traditional phenomenology firmly in mind. (See *Edith Stein/Self-Portrait in Letters*, translated by Josephine Koeppel, O.C.D., *The Collected Works of Edith Stein*, Institute of Carmelite Studies Publications, vol. v, letter 135, p. 130f.) From what she says about herself, it cannot be denied that Stein’s *entirely theoretical goal* was to be able to move serenely (and wholly within the formal ease of pure logic itself—which, as Wittgenstein rightly held, “must take care of itself”)—between the archaic relational eidetics of Aquinas’ profound theory of “*intentio*,” and the set-theory-like rigor of her colleague Husserl’s masterful (and Brentano-sourced!) eidetics of intentionality, while at the same time shunning completely her other colleague Heidegger’s (unorthodox and fatal) lapse into a lonely anthropologism, where, in the final analysis, *Dasein* is nothing but a relation outward toward “*Das Nichts*.” She accomplished this goal with astounding brilliance. For notwithstanding the immense diversity between the entirely eidetic objectivities with which Aquinas, on the one hand, and Husserl, on the other hand, dealt, Stein proceeded forward like some valiant warrior, to describe, wholly within the Husserlian orthodoxy, the consummately human, yet proto-temporal “towardness” that pure consciousness achieves as it allows itself to be carried forward (*in actu!*) toward the *actus purus essendi* as it is in itself. Not to read her in this light, and to dismiss her findings as a servile lapse into a fatuous following of Thomistic ontological dogmas, is simply to become blind and deaf precisely toward that about which she continued fearlessly to speak and concerning which she faithfully described, page after page, with such tireless eidetic clarity.

13. At the time of her death, Auschwitz had switched to using houses as well as the large chambers, and it was in one of these houses that Stein was murdered.
14. Thus following Aquinas’ notion precisely that the intellect-in-act (in objective human knowing) is, at the now-point of being known, suddenly and utterly the same as the object-known-in-act.
15. These towardnesses show themselves forth as lying beyond the first object, and evanescently appearing at an even more remote exterior area of transcendence than ordinary, thing-like empirical objects of perception. They are also available as a subalternate eidetic correlate within the proto-constitutive power of the transcendental proto-constitution of *adese* objectivity as it is in itself.
16. Husserl, Edmund, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, translated by Ingo Farin and James G. Hart (Springer, The Netherlands, 2006), p. 63.
17. As Stein must have assumed through her dealings with Aquinas’ general definition and divisions of mental, real and asymmetrical Relation, Being Itself must ultimately divide itself (1)first into non-thematizable *adese*

objectivity, on the one hand, which must be left to itself as being simply toward something else, and thematizable *inesse* objectivity, on the other hand, which can be active, intentional ground for ordinary, propositional states of affairs, and then (2)second—and more formally according to intellectual reason own high-flying prescriptions—into act and potency.

18. For example, a stick may be relationally toward another stick in the relation of “longer than...” but cannot be longer than a further “longer than” without ultimate contradiction, and, indeed, without implying a kind of stark illogicality that even seems to pass beyond the usual familiar sense of inherent contradiction.
 19. At its own *inesse* level of wholly ontological towardness, already bracketed by transcendental phenomenology, intentionality is already different than the object which it constitutes within itself. It is noetically the “same” as that object solely in a higher level, entirely spiritual, *adesse* sense, a sense not yet available within phenomenology until a further, final-stage complete “bracketing-out” of *inesse* objectivity is achieved.
 20. Here, Merleau-Ponty has led the way. The stark and mystifying “events” of incarnate subjectivity which Merleau-Ponty lets emerge and unfold within his trail-blazing descriptions of perceptual experience are ultimately rooted pre-predicatively in *adesse* objectivity alone. The act/object identity *in actu*, even as foreshadowed by the noeses/noemata identity *in actu*, is no less mysterious simply because Merleau-Ponty is often attempting to see such ineffable identity analytically from two sides as an originative signification itself already completely out toward, and living within, what it signifies. As he tells us definitively in *The Prose of the World* (p. 106): “To signify, to signify something as a decisive act, is therefore accomplished only when that something’s constructions are applied to the perceived as the source of signification or expression. The perceived object, with its viscous significations, has a twofold relation to what is understood. On the one hand, it is only the sketch or fragment of meaning which calls for a repetition that fixes the perceived object and finally makes it *exist*. On the other, the perceived object is the prototype of meaning and alone accomplishes the actual truth of what is understood.” In other words, it seems wholly problematic that something which in its being and by its formal essence is already heading out toward something else can itself be nevertheless *meant* by human intentionality and that it does so almost continuously *by virtue of living perception itself* is nothing less than a nearly inarticulate, yet *entirely cosmic, miracle* that constantly re-worlds itself back into itself. For example, try to explain the very meaning itself of three-dimensional perception to the proverbial one-eyed scientist and the whole problematic, to which we are addressing ourselves here, becomes fittingly clear!
- Convergent phenomenology, reductively isolating out such *adesse-identity* in its own purity (through its deeper proto-constitution of such unity), simply restores the living, incarnate unity in question **precisely as** already

toward the *actus purus essendi*, now no longer apophantically viewed as ontological source, but in an even more inner and more vital apophansis as suddenly, albeit refractively, phenomenologically describable. More emphatically stated: Just because traditional phenomenology has never (and for reasons rooted in the pure logic of a relational eidetics, *could* never) open up the entirely spiritual and entirely intellectual, mental construction (and thereby its own *meant* objectivity) of *actus purus essendi* as phenomenologically describable and thus as already constituted within pure consciousness, doesn't mean that a new and deeper phenomenology can never discover and open up (and painstakingly describe!) the newly available, proto-constitution of that selfsame construction in question. Stein took genuine pride in "besting" Aquinas by doing just that.

21. If one doesn't immediately understand how *in esse* objectivity and *ad esse* objectivity cut across Being Itself in a final and infinitely deeper fashion that do potency and act, then the theoretical problematic of convergent phenomenology that eventually enables the outlines of the science to begin to appear to a working phenomenologist will remain impenetrably obscure.
22. No other intellectual construct can be more "spiritual" (in Stein's sense) than the miraculous and sui generis identity of a wholly intellectual act with its wholly intellectual object. In more forceful terms, Stein was the first phenomenologist to attempt to finally (and within the supreme orthodoxy of Husserlian phenomenological methodology!) describe the entirely human pure consciousness of a kind of encompassing "pure act" as a kind of natural mirror-reversal of intentionality itself, intentionality finally reflecting upon itself at an almost inconceivably higher level. When, for example, she tells us flat out that: "Subjectivity is the original form of spiritual object. In contrast, being a spiritual object in the sense of existing for a subject is derived." Then, this statement is a side-flung spark precisely from the core-fire of the selfsame orthodox descriptions, page after carefully worded page, of actual phenomenological material *which she herself was the first to discover*. Otherwise what she is saying, from the phenomenological point of view, is simply patent nonsense. See Edith Stein, *Potency and Act: Studies toward a Philosophy of Being*, (henceforth PA), translated by Walter Redmond, (ICS Publications, 2009), p. 123.
23. It must be understood that the wholly secondary "something" in this phrase, because of its connective co-referential disclosure within the first material object of convergent phenomenology, is not at all equivalent to the inesse-like "something" of Husserl's formal ontology. Real relations, in their inherent towardness, simply cannot be thematized in *anything*-like sense. They simply *are, toward*.... Here I follow the lead of J.E. Salomaa who tells us with a kind of disarming simplicity that relations "are as much actual facts as the existence of objects. They are not created with our

thought, but are antecedent to it in objects.” Salomaa, J.E., *The Category of Relation* (Helsinki, 1929), p. 175. In other words, by their own already making their inherent term to be referred outward to “something else,” they themselves certainly can never be “about which” in any usual thing-like sense. What they are truly “about” can only be disclosed within the eidetic descriptive efforts of the science of convergent phenomenology as such.

24. I am using this sudden reference to epistemology in a rather odd sense: because, if an intellective object is *inesse*, then intentional objectivity can only constitute such an object as transcendent and thereby as **utterly diverse** from its own immanent self, but if an intellective object is *adesse*, then such wholly relation-like objectivity can only proto-constitute such a “towardness” object as co-referential and as a towardness and, at least in this degree, **somewhat like** itself (such proto-constitution having reached the odd luminosity of achieving somehow its own “already being toward...”). In other words, intentionality, as *inesse*, if it could at that unitive moment speak, would tell us, “I must be diverse from my object,” whereas *adesse* would tell us, “I am somewhat like the object now passing out toward its term.” This second, rather odd quasi-likeness is “self-luminous” within what Stein called the *Ich-Leben*, and beyond either ontology or epistemology. The scholastics, however, intuitively realized this likeness as an absolutely unique “epistemological” likeness. Metaphysics must speak through Relation, and offers relations all the way up through Essence as such toward, indeed, the ineffable *actus purus essendi* itself. Thus, Poinset held that the science of metaphysics itself falls off into utter delusion and error unless we model its constructs upon *real relations* discoverable in the world around us. And do we not find the ultimate ontologist, Avicenna, insisting that we must have already given something of ourselves into any act of knowing any empirically real relation, which is not the case in regard to that which the scholastic called “simple apprehension” (pre-judicative [yet already intellective] apprehension—and thus, in Husserl’s terminology, wholly noematic) at the *inesse* level. If, as the scholastics whole-heartedly maintained, truth resides, not in simple apprehension but infinitely higher at the level of intellective judgment, where the self now is giving something of itself into this new predicative state of affairs, then, correlatively, *mutatis mutandis* (within the luminous, quasi-epistemological “halfway house,” to which we are now directing our attention) the self is mysteriously and self-luminously lending itself, somehow or other, and even according to the truth of the intuited relation in question, into receiving the gift of towardness-to-something-utterly-diverse-from-the-self that the real relation itself provides. *How* it does this, causatively, is, as yet an utter mystery. (Unfortunately there is no actually worked-out “sub-ontology” of real relation yet available to philosophy.) The point is, of course,

- that only the eidetic science of convergent phenomenology can uncover and describe in its purity the innermost proto-constitution of the radiant, co-relative lending process in question. Summing up what I would, as a proxy-epistemologist, be forced to say: “Our finally seeing divine reality itself would have to be, *in actu*, intellectually and incandescently one with such reality from our point of view, but probably ‘two’ from divine reality’s point of view (non-reciprocity aside!), but who on earth is counting?”
25. What attracts our attention, for example, when we see the similarity of a son’s face to his own father’s face, is the ethereal, not-able-to-be-nominalized *towardness* of the faces to each other. Our immediate, absolute intuition of this very towardness, in its own essential nature, itself has little to do with each face already substantialized, or, better, “noematicized.” Only at the *in esse* level are the faces able to be kinesthetically founded within intentionality as being somehow “here” and “there.” This holds generally in regard to any kind of empirically real relation.
 26. Perhaps one should apologize for this neologism, which Nicolas de Warren has labeled “unintelligible,” but there is really no better term to use.
 27. See note 14, above.
 28. Aristotle, *Physics*.5.2.225b11-13.
 29. Anyone who thinks that the self of the natural standpoint changes when she performs the Husserlian reduction and enters into the field of pure consciousness herself may be an adept at describing some morphed, heady and perhaps even psychedelic “altered state” of consciousness. She is certainly not an authentic phenomenologist.
 30. Jim Ruddy, “Source of the Classical Category of Relation in Western Thought,” *Indian Philosophical Journal*. Vol. 10, 1974–75, pp. 50–51. Most of the eidetics of relation underlying this work had its embryonic germ in this article; it should be searched for under my Dominican religious name, William Ruddy.
 31. Certainly, it is the not-even-real-enough-to-be-in-time character of the entirely passive core of internal time-consciousness that has, up until now, baffled all attempts of general phenomenology to penetrate it and describe it. As a stolid seeker after ultimate ground, Immanuel Kant himself, as Heidegger claimed, recoiled from its groundless frailty.
 32. This whole enterprise was instanced out and aided by a phenomenological-anthropological investigation into how a fear-ridden *Ich-Leben* might achieve, within the converged center of itself, a finally stable self-concept in the midst of the paranormal fear prevalent within South India’s multicultural religious life. The emblematic findings in this area, as incidental to the discovery of the science of convergent phenomenology, were enhanced by the helpful mentoring efforts of T.M.P. Mahadevan and J.N. Mohanty, as

- well as by several seminal conversations with Paul Ricoeur, all three of whom read through and commented on the doctoral thesis in question.
33. Edmund Husserl, *The Idea of Phenomenology*, translated by Lee Hardy (Kluwer Academic Publisher, Netherlands, 1999), p. 24.
 34. Impossible to describe in either the natural or the phenomenological standpoint because it IS, simply and finally and non-thematically, *adesse* objectivity as such.
 35. Husserl, Edmund, *Phantasy Image Consciousness and Memory (1898–1925)*, translated by John B. Brough (Dordrecht Springer Science & Business Media, 2005), p. 207.
 36. *Ibid.*, p. 220.
 37. Derrida somewhere suggests, chidingly, that Husserl’s phenomenology perhaps depends, with a warped illogicality, upon the noematic convolutions of its own self-reference. It is akin to the kind of self-referential musings of an art lover who wanders into an art museum and stares at a special painting depicting that selfsame row of painting in that very museum itself. Thus, the art lover’s benumbed mind suddenly stares and then loses itself in the hall-of-mirrors-like effect of looking at the paintings within the paintings within the paintings, and so on. Such examples lead us onward to an unanswerable question: How can intentionality found itself upon another founded intentional act? Where does it all end? Derrida advises going outside, relaxing and taking a cold breath of fresh air.
 38. Husserl, in a small aside as he deals with other matters in one of his lectures tells us that we must not look back into dreaming or into our “becoming slowly awake.” He says, rather abruptly, “Let us remain in the sphere of wakeful activity which is alone fruitful for us.” *Analyses concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic*, Translated by Anthony J. Steinbock (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 2001), p. 24.
 39. *Ibid.*, p. 661.
 40. Ricoeur, Paul, *Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary*, translated by Erazim V. Kohak, (Published by Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 389.
 41. In a remarkable passage in *Oneself as Another*, he uses this dialectic to uncover the terrible and pernicious degradation or “effacement” of the self that occurs by an over-emphasis on action rather than on one’s own innermost self as *already toward such action*. He says, “The occultation of the question ‘who?’ can, in my opinion, be attributed to the orientation imposed by analytic philosophy on its treatment of the question “what?” by placing it in an exclusive relation to the question “why?” Despite the enormous differences that will appear between different varieties of the analytic philosophies of action, they all can be said to share a common focus on the question of what ‘counts’ as an action among the events of

this world. It is in relation to the notion of *something that occurs* that one then strives to determine the descriptive status of actions. This orientation given to the question ‘what?’ in relation to the notion of world event contains potentially the effacement to the point of occultation of the question ‘who?’ despite the stubborn resistance that the replies to the question oppose to their alignment with the strongly impersonal notion of event. The answers to the question ‘what?’ applied to action do indeed tend to separate themselves from the answers required by the question ‘who?’ as soon as the answers to the question ‘what?’ (what action has been performed?) are submitted to an ontological category that is in principle exclusive of the category of selfhood, namely, the event in general, the ‘something that occurs.’ ” Paul Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, translated by Kathleen Blamey, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994), p. 60. Note that Ricoeur’s rather tortuous dialectic points toward a very important discovery achieved by convergent phenomenology, namely, that the only traditional ontological category that is not wholly and implacably exclusive of the “category” of selfhood is the ontological category of real relation.

42. Meaningful knowledge of impossible objects is the one case where the sheer asymmetry of relation-like objectivity within human knowledge brings us to a logical standstill somewhat like recalling strains of music from a forgotten symphony, or, better, like the details of a Rembrandt painting that seem to stand out with their own kind of odd, chiaroscuro relief. How can one have symmetrical knowledge (thus a correlationally real knowledge from both sides of the single intentional act) of something that not only doesn’t exist but, according to the way things are, never, ever can come into existence and therefore never can unfold itself within the *Lebenswelt* as a possible object of human knowledge? What is playing itself out in this hypnotically tantalizing interplay? Husserlian phenomenology attempts to describe such a moving-bravely-forward act of attempting to mean an impossible object, though we have the feeling that the description itself already warps intentionality beyond recognition, even notwithstanding intentionality’s familiar and essential capacity to mean “emptily” something that can never fulfill its intention. Husserl tells us that, in really meaning a “square circle,” we are simply apprehending “the real impossibility of meaning-fulfillment through an experience of the incompatibility of the partial meanings in the intended unity of fulfillment” (*Log. Invest.* Inv I, Chap. 15). Can a phenomenologist do more than offer such a bald statement? For, just as in a self-hypnotist waking herself up *precisely in order to lapse into sleep*, since the act is clearly passing through its own tangled incompatibility toward something else, then, patently, something

more is “really” going on, just as music is often more than itself and a painting is often more than itself. Thus, even at the height of pure logic, even when all phenomenology comes to a dazed standstill, it would be well to push further forward and dare to ask: exactly *what are we doing* when we meaningfully and actually and functionally relate ourselves to a square circle, or to our own wholly ambiguous attempt to “wake up” into sleep? The most daring answer I can think of is to be found in a passage from the eighteenth-century Polish scholastic, Maximilian Wietrowski. When a colleague objects to the possibility of meaningfully having an impossible object within human knowledge because actual knowledge cannot have an actual relation to something impossible, since there can be no actual relation to nothing at all, Wietrowski bravely counters, “It is not contradictory that some real entity have a real relation to something impossible and that it be (thus) connected with the impossibility of that thing. For, certainly, nothing is truer or more real than God. And yet God is essentially connected with the impossibility of what is destructive of himself, and therefore God has a real relation to such an impossible thing.” Thus, in what Doyle calls a “breathhtaking” solution, Wietrowski is telescoping together, and allowing a kind of orchestral interplay to occur, in dream-like fashion, between the following items: (1) object-consciousness as really out toward a subject-consciousness “impossible” to really relate back to oneself; (2) a “real” knowledge of a square circle, or an impossibility of our waking-into-sleep; (3) a subject-consciousness that is *so perfect* that it is not afraid to *veritably and actually* confront the *sheer impossibility* of something greater and more perfect than itself; (4) a sort of back-hand vindication of Aquinas’s truism that subject-consciousness cannot be *really related* to anything *actually* outside itself; and (5) a returning back into a new object-consciousness that, from one side at least, is now, somehow, and “impossibly,” greater than itself precisely for having answered the objection with such resounding and uncounterable finality! For a more detailed analysis of this remarkable statement of Wietrowski, see John P. Doyle, *On the Borders of Being and Knowing, Some Late Scholastic Thoughts on Supertranscendental Being* (Leuven University Press, Leuven, 2012), pp. 88–90. My point is that ordinary, Husserlian phenomenology, without some further reductive expansion of insight and some further field in which to describe what is seemingly “going on,” cannot “cash out” such illuminative yet one-sided returns into object-consciousness. They seem to remain, within general phenomenology, and precisely because of the utter incompatibility of the somehow already-co-related fragments of partial meaning-fulfillment, simply “indescribable.”

The situation is akin to the impasse-situation up in the heady realm of mathematical logic wherein all the semiotic counters are in place, all sets

(even the warped-by-Russellian-reflection sets!) are being sketched out in advance, or, to use a vivid metaphor, all possible future fugue themes are counterpointally and notation-wise arranging themselves in endless algorithms within the ethereal concert halls of constructive symbolism, *but there is never any emergence, as a pure and miraculous gift to our poor ear—like a Self purely waking itself up into its own purely falling asleep—of any actual music.*

43. Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, an Advaita logician as brilliantly aware of Kant and Hegel's logic as he was of the inexorable logic of Advaita itself, gives us the following proto-phenomenological analysis of waking up from complete unconsciousness:

“Admitting the existence of the self as an entity behind the mental states, one may hold that in dreamless sleep the self is unconsciousness not self-conscious. Let us dwell on the stock Vedantic argument on this point. When a man rises from dreamless sleep, he becomes aware that he had a blissful sleep during which he was conscious of nothing. This he knows directly from memory. Now memory is only of a presentation. Therefore the bliss and the consciousness of nothing must have been *presented* during the sleep. If it be objected that only the absence of disquiet and knowledge during sleep is *inferred* from the memory of the state before sleep and the perception of the state after the sleep, it is asked in reply, can we *infer* anything the like of which was never presented? If reasoning is only a manipulation of rarified images, the images could have been derived only from percepts. But it may be urged that the negative concept, at any rate, could not have had any percept corresponding to it, and therefore one may justifiably hold the *absence* of disquiet and knowledge to have been inferred. To this it is replied that absence cannot be inferred, unless it be conceivable. The absence of knowledge cannot be referred to unless the absence be the object of a direct consciousness of it *during the absence*. Like knowledge, the absence of knowledge cannot be known by any external perception or any form of inference founded upon it, but by internal perception or self-feeling.” (Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, *Studies in Vedantism*, (University Studies #3)(Calcutta University Press, Calcutta, 1909), p. 7)

Given the contextual nature of Advaita logic, Bhattacharyya feels called upon, in a following passage, to use the example of a blind man, who, once his blindness is cured, remembers the *absence* of vision as neither an inference nor a percept but as the inestimable depth of the wholly personal

- “towardness” of self-feeling only. My point here is that the *argument itself* holds irrespective of Bhattacharyya’s idealism.
44. Levinas, Emmanuel, *Discovering Existence with Husserl*, translated by Richard A. Cohen and Michael B. Smith (Northwestern University Press, 1998), p. 161.
 45. In particular, the Other of Husserl’s face was for Levinas, a bearded prophets face, but that did not dissuade the young student Levinas, in one of their peripatetic talks, from becoming intimately the Same toward that illustrious Other. Once, while out walking in Freiburg with Husserl and his wife, Levinas, born into the Jewish merchant class, got hurt by a disparaging remark that Malvina Husserl insensitively blurted out against that class. He recalled that Husserl, turning to notice his hurt face, kindly told him, “Don’t worry, Herr Levinas. I myself am from Jewish merchant stock!” As Levinas remarked later, “Husserl’s reflection calmed me.” Emmanuel Levinas, *Discovering Existence with Husserl* (Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1998), p. 193.
 46. Edith Stein, *Potency and Act* (The Collected Works of Edith Stein) (Kindle Locations 429–430). Kindle Edition.
 47. Edmund Husserl, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, translated by Ingo Farin and James Hart (Springer, The Netherlands, 2006), p. 59.
 48. I can recall once asking a phenomenological anthropologist friend of mine that, if she were able to transport herself back thousands of years to that very, seemingly inconsequential, instant when the proverbial ape-group became suddenly human, how could she both watch her new eidetic science come into focus and yet study the group itself thus emerging? And wouldn’t she have had to utterly forgo the miraculous full-blown “coming-into-Being” of her now-surfacing eidetic science of Phenomenological Anthropology and simply become part of the present-moment group, in which she had landed, in order to assure herself that the group was indeed a human group and not still an ape-group? Wouldn’t she even eventually have to *fully wake up to the inescapable fact that she herself was now part of the group?*
 49. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, *Signs*, translated by Richard C. McCleary (Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 160.
 50. Kevin Wall, “Relation.” I wish to thank Wall’s brother-in-law, Dominic Colvert, for sending me this unpublished monograph.
 51. Averroes speaks of empirically real relations as of such minimal being that many have regarded them as being mental only. *Averrois Commentaria et Introduction is in omnes libros Aristotelis cum eorum version elatina* (Venetiis: Apud Junctas, 1562), vol. 8, fol. 306ra.
 52. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, *Signs*, translated by Richard C. McCleary, (Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 160. Astonishingly, this pas-

sage recaptures and articulates in its own way the now muffled and almost wholly forgotten tradition of Jean Poincaré of achieving *scientia* as the true philosophy only by authentically modeling it not so much on substances and their accidents but precisely out from the ethereal reality of empirically real relations already existing in the world. Without such fundament-modeling precisely through actually (intuitively!) *seeing* existent relations in their own essential, bodily selfhood (thus as themselves what he calls “a third kind of being”), it follows that relational constructs such as matter toward form, genera toward specific difference, essence toward existence, and even potency toward act, would falter and vanish into illusory constructions not based on reality at all. One of the main efforts of convergent phenomenology is, of course, not to resurrect such constructs in their own authenticity as ontological, but simply to describe them at last as being the proto-constitutive meanings of pure consciousness itself, as did Edith Stein.

53. Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, *Oxford Philosophical Texts* (University of Oxford Press, New York, 1998), pp. 78–79.
54. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, *The Phenomenology of Perception*, translated by Colin Smith (Routledge and Kegan Paul, New Jersey, 1962), p. ix. The “divorce” he speaks of has produced enormous bad faith. Thus, the oblivious manner in which many modern thinkers live and breathe in the fatal error that reduces all relations to mental relations—and utterly blinds itself to empirically real relations in the world—is not just bad philosophy. It is even more pernicious to phenomenology than is psychologism itself. Once you have finally and totally convinced yourself that relation is nothing but a mental concept that can be purely formalized and thus finally set into symbolic form, obviously you are going to mentally understand any primordial dator intuition of real relations out in the world to be an naïve illusion and a failure, even though, whenever you open your eyes, you still perceive these actual relations right in front of your face. Husserl often derided the scientists that unselfconsciously used ideas everywhere in their writings in their very attempt to discredit ideas themselves. What Weinberg does is just as unknowingly fatal to thought. See, for example how Weinberg predefines relation as wholly mathematical and conceptual and then views the entire 2000 years of Western ontological truths concerning real relation to be simply a failed attempt at clarity in respect to his own specialized “concept” of relation. He begins his essay on relation as follows: “It will readily be admitted that the concept of relation (which, for the moment, means that which is normally expressed in logic by an n -place predication [$n \geq 2$]) is fundamental to modern science, logic and philosophy. There is no doubt, also, that the need for this concept has been felt throughout the history since the time of the Greeks. It is not, however, so

readily admitted or much realized that many aspects of ancient, medieval and early modern philosophy prevented a clear understanding of this concept. That various philosophical views were responsible for this delay in the understanding of relation is the subject of the present study. In particular, I shall attempt to set forth some of the ideas and causes which account for the slow realization of the concept of relation.” Julius R. Weinberg, *“Abstraction, Relation, and Induction, Three Essays in the History of Thought”* (The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison/Milwaukee, 1965), p. 61. Notice that Weinberg speaks of “a need for this concept” as being the proof of its usable truth. His pragmatism is on his own short-sighted side alone. For he preemptively brands the entire Western history of truths about real relation as being false because of ontological and theological “needs.” And then he concludes his essay on relation with the following words: “The need for unilateral [*what we have termed asymmetrical*] relations prevented the medievals from achieving a correct understanding” (p. 119). Such a final statement is as preposterous as proclaiming that the entire history of Western art failed to produce any objects of actual, lasting beauty because it neglected to study the modern science of optical neurology!

55. Piaget, Jean, *Mental Imagery in the Child*, translated by P.A. Chilton (Routledge, 1997), p. 294.
56. Let us assume an unusual slant on the scenario: All child psychologists make the same mistake also back when they were preschoolers but have they themselves thereby radically “changed” by eventually arriving at a correct judgment? And precisely what prepredicative reality was thereby lost?
57. Faivre, Antoine, *The Eternal Hermes: From Greek God to Alchemical Magus* (Phanes Press, Grand Rapids, 1995), p. 94.
58. As we have already noted, Husserl, in a small aside as he deals with other matters in one of his lectures tells us that we must not look back into dreaming or into our “becoming slowly awake.” He says, rather abruptly, “Let us remain in the sphere of wakeful activity which is alone fruitful for us.” *Analyses concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic*, Translated by Anthony J. Steinbock (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 2001), p. 24.

Convergent Phenomenology and Real Relations

3.1 THE QUESTIONS TO ASK

We have started from the first material object of convergent phenomenology: pure consciousness itself newly viewed according to the theoretical limit concept which we have expressed as gaining new depth within itself as “something, toward...” Now we turn to the second material object, real relations out in the world. We have a much more difficult task before us.

General convention usually divides relations into mental and real. Let us stay at such a general level, focus in on real relations rather than mental relations and, begin, purely hypothetically, as follows: If there were, out beyond the empirically real things (what Husserl called *concreta*) and thing-properties that we perceive (what Husserl called *abstracta*), existent and yet minimally real “relations,” “towardnesses,” “orderings”—whatever one may wish to call them—inherent in such thing-properties, but at a more evanescent and minimal level of being than such thing-properties themselves, then phenomenology, to be true to itself, must study these empirically real relations also *as constituted objects of experiences*, somehow bracketed as well by a newly nested epoche, and similarly and connectively purified from all natural-standpoint-positing of empirical reality. And furthermore—and here we again are remaining at a purely hypothetical level—if they are inaccessible to any thing-like *intentional* act being referred toward them (a real towardness to a real towardness being clearly an ontological absurdity),¹ but if they still can be intuited as real and thus *meant*, then the exact fashion in which this proto-constitutive, meaning-giving action takes place can only

be clarified by a new subsidiary and sui generis phenomenological methodology.² We have to put the entire realm of intentionality, complete with its immense variety of horizons, into total abeyance within pure consciousness itself and set it thereby completely out of operation and make no further use of it. We must do this without looking back.

Accordingly, our hypothetical situation has now led us to ask the following three questions:

- (1) Do real relations exist?
- (2) If they exist, how are they experienced and meant?
- (3) And, finally, if these real relations, (a) when they are brought within the reduced sphere of pure consciousness and (by an epoche at one remove) disclosed precisely as wholly new phenomenological material, and, furthermore, (b) if it is thereby clear that their own sui generis individuality and essentiality is given as entirely outside of the ordinary thing-like individuality and essentiality appearing within traditional intentionality, then, our final third question is precisely *how* would the new phenomenology, emerging, of necessity, in their regard, proceed forward to disclose their own suddenly sui generis “constitution” within pure consciousness?

3.2 SOME PRELIMINARY LOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Husserl begins his foray out into transcendental subjectivity by presenting us, in the chapter in *Ideas* entitled “Fact and Essence,” with one of the most dense and intractable logical essays in the history of philosophy. The one guiding principle that can lead through the ponderous, labyrinthine maze of what he discloses, at the regional limits of pure logic, is the simple principle that Husserl always rigorously followed: “Every type of being... has ways of being given which are essentially its own, and therewith its own ways as regards methods of knowledge.” Before we begin our own foray out into our exploratory search for a hypothetical *adese* outpost leading, summit to summit up into the new regions of convergent phenomenology, I would like to present the reader with the following wholly logical considerations for what they are worth:

- (1) *Judgments about the Eidos of This or That Empirically Real Relation; General Eidetic Judgments about Relationality Itself, either Mental or Real.* Following Husserl’s distinction between judgments that speak

about essences on the one hand, and purely general judgments on the other hand that are eidetic, but that indeterminately speak about an individual instance simply “as instance” without any positing of its concrete existence, we thus distinguish correspondingly between judgments that speak of the essence of an empirically real relation as being toward, wholly apart from its inherence in a foundational thing-like *abstracta* or *concreta*, and judgments that speak of a mental or real relation as an instance of pure towardness in general apart from either real or mental relations as such. Judgments of the second type would then refer with a kind of absolute generality to the empirically real relation, for example, of similarity between two red books taken not in the concrete but solely as an instance of the pure towardness that is entailed by any mental or real relation. The difference between Husserl’s classification and ours is simply that Husserl’s classification of eidetic judgments is based on the primordial dator intuition of this or that material thing or on its attendant, founded properties, whereas our classification of eidetic judgments is based formally on pure consciousness itself as toward something beyond itself.

The eidetic science of convergent phenomenology, viewed according to its logical directiveness toward what we have spoken of as its first material object, and thereby viewed as regressing back into the (static!) pre-predicative description of the constitution of relation-like *adesse* objectivity in general, uses, primarily, judgments of the first type. Convergent phenomenology, viewed according to its logical directiveness forward toward what we have spoken of as its second material object, and thus viewed as (genetically!) constructive out into the eventual systematizing of its descriptive findings, uses, primarily, judgments of the second type.

(2) *Notes Toward a Formal Logic of Relation.* As the introduction to this work has already made clear, there are, within the high regions of pure logic, two kinds of sciences, sciences of “something about which...” containing divisional, thing-like eidetic “groupings” or classifications of what Husserl referred to as material or formal (and thus “filled-up”) “regions” and the corresponding “empty,” purely formalized “categories”; and, on the other hand, sciences of “something toward...” containing divisional, relation-like classifications of what we can call “domains,”³ which cannot be divided into formal and material, and which furthermore cannot be divided into filled regions

or empty categories, and which are thus only proportionately similar to Husserl's system. (Note that both of these kinds of sciences can be further divided into sciences of fact [that posit, at least implicitly the realm of empirical reality], and sciences of essence, eidetic sciences [which do not include any such positing]). But what are domains as such? The concept of domain includes elements from both region and category in Husserl's classification, but is much closer to the notion of region than to the notion of category. Bachelard tells us that "communities of essence cut the totality of concretely determined individuals up into regions (such as the region spatial shape, sensible quality, etc.). Inside each region one finds a hierarchy of concepts that subordinates the less general to the more general, for example the concept triangle is subordinated to the concept spatial form."⁴ Stein saw this as asymmetrically heading toward the final individual. Similar to this, domain-communities of relation-like essences cut the province of relation into separate domains of real and mental relations themselves yet remain beyond any hierarchy of general to particular. They are *sui generis* domains, wholly non-thematizable, and as such cannot be nominalized even at the height of pure logic itself. Domains are nevertheless, even as sets of objects themselves relation-like to start with, either absolute or referred beyond themselves or both. Absolute domains contain what general parlance would call logical or mental relations, constructed by the mind and remaining within the mind only. Referred beyond themselves, domains contain wholly real "towardnesses" and can be divided (and here I shall use the division found in later Western scholastic thought) into *respecti* (towardnesses that are ontological sources of Being) and *ad aliquid* or *relatio* (towardnesses that are empirically real). Domains that are simultaneously both absolute and referred beyond themselves contain towardnesses that are themselves uniquely *one relation*, yet which are real from their foundation toward their term⁵ but are simply logical or mental from their term back toward their foundation. We can call these special domains that are exactly both absolute and referred beyond themselves, asymmetrical domains.

Asymmetrical domains are either wholly empirical, such as an entire thing viewed mentally as toward an entity itself not really related back to it, or are simultaneously mental and real yet not empirical but entirely

within pure consciousness, such as the entire general realm of intentionality, as purely spiritual act/object, thus non-reciprocally yet still unifiedly referred beyond themselves all the way down to each individual, intentional act.

Only one thing can be said about any kind of theoretical “unity,” if such were to be understood, between “domains” in this new sense we have now given to the term on the one hand and the “regions” of Husserl’s classification on the other hand: Domains, as a kind of pure consciousness conceived at the most general possible level, have absolutely nothing to do with either subject-consciousness or object-consciousness or even the special eidetic objectivity within consciousness that “Fact and Essence” breaks down into regions and categories.⁶ In other words, the gap between the two “realms” is uncrossable. Domains are beyond both Husserlian formal logic and the traditional transcendental phenomenology that grounds such logic. That being said, there are nevertheless modal differences within this most generalized pure consciousness (viewed concretely solely as the first material object of an utterly new phenomenology). The modal differences in question are derived, purely and simply, from the above kinds of domains. The following paragraphs treat of these modal differences.

- (3) *Notes Toward a Transcendental Logic of Relation.* Let us recall that we are constructing these layered and nested logical notions within an entirely hypothetical framework arising by assuming the possible existence of real relations actually in the real world, whether such is the case or not. We are speaking from an unexplored area somewhere between formal ontology and phenomenology. Given this quite heady project, we may go on to declare, that, within pure consciousness, there are three modes of “being,” **first**, the (“relative,” i.e. already-referred-toward-consciousness) mode of being of *contingent things* exteriorly existing (the world, then, of nature) a world of things which can only appear to us through perspectival *Abschattungen*; **second**, the absolute and non-contingent mode of being of *consciousness* which, primevally embedded in the ground of inner time-consciousness, gives base for the evidential emergence of the cogito—note that consciousness is self-manifestating and thus necessarily cannot be given through the serial unfolding of *Abschattungen*; and, **third**, the utterly sui generis mode of being of *empirically real relations*.

Thus, against all those who says that the general mode of being of *omnitude realitatis* (all existent things of nature) and the general mode of being of consciousness that lives in and experiences and essentializes this *omnitude realitatis*, itself exhaustively expresses all that can be subsumed under “modes of being,” we should on the contrary contend that there is a third mode of being that is circumscribed by neither of the first two modes of being, and is utterly diverse from both. This third mode nonetheless participates in some of the characteristic of the first two modes. Thus, similar to the first mode of being, this third mode is the mode of being of an *in-esse*. By convenience, we could express this through the terms of classical ontology by saying that empirically real relations are accidents residing in base accidents (quantity, quality, etc.) of an empirical substance—with the important proviso that they do not unfold themselves through *Abschattungen*, as do the base accidents, but are self-manifestating since they give themselves up wholly to the consciousness thus intuiting them, or else they remain utterly unknown. And yet similar as well to the second mode of being of consciousness itself, this third mode of being is also, and exclusively, an *ad-esse*. Empirically real relations, should they ever exist, would then be in an odd sense “absolute” as having their own being—precisely as *ad-esse*—absolutely determined by their towardness to a term utterly beyond themselves.

These three modes of being thus listed each demand, correspondingly, their own kind of sciences. The first mode of being demands what Husserl refers to as the sciences of the natural standpoint (including the physical and humanistic empirical sciences, the mathematical sciences and sciences of “natural consciousness” all the way up to the realm of both formal and “real” ontologies—all sciences therefore that presuppose, and include at least the ground-positing of, empirical existence). The second mode of being, achieved as a realm of experience through the epoche that brackets out and sets aside the entire empirical existence of the natural standpoint, is an infinite realm of being of a new kind: thus experienced by an utterly new kind of experience, wherein, should real relations exist, they would be utterly hidden from view up to that point. This mode demands the eidetic science of phenomenology in Husserl’s own traditional sense. The third mode of being, achieved through a special *convergent reduction*⁷—a neutrality modification applied to the entire field of pure consciousness—is also an infinite realm of being of a new kind: thus experienced by an utterly new kind of experience. This mode demands the eidetic science of convergent phenomenology. We follow Husserl in this regard; he tells us, quite simply, “Where there is a new experience, a new science must arise.”⁸

(Note: Since empirically the supposed real relations would be contingent realities, each supposed empirically real relation has an objective essence, an *Eidos* of itself which can be grasped in all its purity, leading to a formal eidetics of real relation. We are not saying anything extraordinary here. Avicenna tells us quite lucidly, [To everything there is a reality by virtue of which it is. Thus a triangle has a reality in that it is a triangle, and whiteness has a reality in that it is whiteness.]”⁹ Correspondingly, all that we are saying is that an empirically real relation, should it ever exist, would by necessity have within itself an essential *adesse*: a pure whatness that would be entirely exhausted in already being [toward] rather than “in”: because its being is to be such—and that is exactly its essence, its inmost nature as being, as such, pure towardness: its [quiddity,] as Avicenna goes on to say. It is not of consequence that what is being spoken of is an empirical thing, an accident of an empirical thing (whiteness), a wholly ideal object (triangle) or a relation residing in an empirical thing).

To the degree that these essences as pure relationalities are transcendent of consciousness, they have either been already bracketed by the phenomenological epoche, or they are further bracketed by the convergent reduction itself.

Convergent phenomenology differs from general phenomenology by thus requiring a single “outpost” reduction only, albeit at one further remove, termed “convergent reduction.” General phenomenology, here identical with traditional, Husserlian phenomenology and wholly neutral toward such a far-flung maneuver, and itself at a more basic level, is fully achieved and attains its own native country by requiring not only the eidetic reduction away from the transcendence of all essences, but also requiring the reduction that brackets out all empirical existence.

If we follow Husserl’s division of ontology into formal ontology and material ontologies, the latter heading up even toward Aristotle’s “First Philosophy,” then the *sui generis* third mode of being which we have sketched out above would require us to arrive at a formal ontology of relation-like objectivity as well as a kind of material sub-ontology of empirically real relations as such, which must, indeed, already lie undiscovered within the heart of First Philosophy. The only philosopher, other than Sankara, who came close to discovering and exfoliating this sub-ontology was Aquinas. He tentatively defines a “domain” apart and even gives us a quite scientific and exhaustive division of Relation, but never goes forward to locate the special domain in question midway between *metaphysica generalis* and *metaphysica specialis* where it is guided by both sciences and where it itself natively belongs.

3.3 OUT OF WHAT TRADITIONAL REGION DOES OUR INVESTIGATION PROCEED?

In this chapter, we are asking three interrelated questions, whether empirically real relations exist, what they are according to their essential nature, and how are they constituted within pure consciousness.

Any project that includes these three questions within itself cannot be a phenomenological project since it deals with the ontological existence of real relations. Nor can it be strictly an ontological project since it must include wholly eidetic and what could even be called “domain-judgments” concerning the formal possibility of a new phenomenological science. In regard to the first issue especially, Husserl tells us that, in the purely ontological attitude, one “will never, in principle, encounter a phenomenological judgment.”¹⁰ Our project thus of the revitalized laying of the foundation of convergent phenomenology as a true, eidetic science is a setting forth or a “starting out” not from the proper arena of ontology but from an almost wholly uncharted, domain-inscribed or quasi-regional level, a level somewhere between phenomenology and formal logic. Within such a framework, then, one could perhaps speak of some sort of a laying of the ground-level foundation for a science not yet fully achieved. The radicalism of our approach thereby places us in the position of assuming ourselves to be beginners in the field of convergent phenomenology as if such a science were about to grow up before us—almost through the entirely projective process itself of learning to feel at home within its boundaries—although the entire motivation for such a projective beginning is lacking.

It is lacking, that is, until, with perfect freedom to do so, we produce the guidance, the normative ideal of such a science newly for ourselves as true beginners in the field.¹¹

For we must assure ourselves from the start that our laying of the foundation cannot be a surreptitious retrieval of an edifice already built.¹² It is simply a process, albeit a projective process. We must also understand, on the other hand, that it is not at all a complacent end process of “a giving of final touches” and “a standing back to look.” This special and self-revitalized laying of the foundation of the science of convergent phenomenology could be best expressed as an anticipatory and preliminary determination of the architectonic limits of the science itself in its own essence as a completely possible phenomenological science. It is nothing

less than an ultimate disclosure of the final ground of convergent phenomenology as a true science.¹³

We should understand from the first, however, that convergent phenomenology, once projectively gained, is not an unfolding system of pure philosophical axioms arranged into systematic form. Its own preliminary character is closer to a descriptive biology than to any deductive science. Those involved in the Human Genome Project knew the hard work involved in their search but kept themselves going by imagining the holistic importance of the results themselves. We also in our search here are not quite certain yet of the scientific field in which we may eventually find ourselves. The field of convergent phenomenology might perhaps thereby contain within itself a pure, clarion invitation toward ultimate risk, toward simply and finally, going to work in a new, projected scientific field here and now opening up precisely as we thus move forward to find it. Its scientific excitement is accordingly not the complacent excitement of finally solving an intractable, age-long philosophical puzzle about the nature of Being, but much closer to the already-out-in-the-field excitement of discovering a whole new serial genera of life forms and realizing that it is going to take generations to classify them into their own species with anything approaching genomic clarity.

There are ways to go. It is Husserl, quoting Kant, who tells us that “we do not augment but rather subvert the sciences if we allow their boundaries to run together.”¹⁴ Thus, this new science of convergent phenomenology is no less a science because it borrows its sources from transcendental phenomenology. And its limits are clear: while standing utterly on its own, it, at the same time, depends upon, while yet lying at one remove from, traditional, Husserlian phenomenology. It is thus a subalternate (i.e. wholly dependent) science in relation to general transcendental phenomenology in the strict sense. Notwithstanding its dependency, we shall be showing forth *from the Ground upward* exactly the reasons why convergent phenomenology has every right to claim to be (equally with formal logic, as well as with transcendental phenomenology itself) a full-blown eidetic science, standing completely on its own, and supremely at its own level. This claim is therefore modest in regard to its ground and its principles, but far-reaching as regard its eventual outpost architecture, focused boundaries, style of method and the final material and formal objects that it, alone, has the methodological power to actually and painstakingly go forward to describe and classify.

3.4 A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY AS A DEFENSE AGAINST ERROR

Levinas tells us that within phenomenology we find, at last, a true philosophical method. “There is a reflection upon oneself which wants to be radical. It does not only take into consideration that which is intended by consciousness, but also searches for that which has been dissimulated in the intending of the object.”¹⁵

We shall soon discover that there is a masking that takes place in respect to the second material object that we wish to elucidate in this chapter. There is a linguistic masking that renders the actual “towardness of things to each other” nearly impossible to express directly; and there is a concomitant reductive masking within modern philosophy of the West that blithely and complacently attempts to mentalize all such empirically real relations from the start. The clarifying and ultimately defensive methodological position that we have taken in this projective founding of convergent phenomenology is thus threefold.

- (1) Firstly, once we have achieved entrance into convergent phenomenology, we will not dissimulate by introducing any ontological premises back into this new region of eidetic research. The entire empirically real complex of the actual world outside us, God himself included, and all the age-long sciences of this world, East and West, including both *metaphysica generalis* and *metaphysica specialis* themselves (as well as the entire spectrum of the mathematical and empirical sciences, including the burgeoning science of artificial intelligence) have thereby been given the tag end of “completely neutral” and are accordingly set aside and are not to be considered. They are touched upon in this work solely as guiding insights quite similar, indeed, to the indirect guidance such as a geometer uses when she draws empirically real figures on a blackboard as crude instances of geometrical figures as such.
- (2) Secondly, we intend to probe directly into the entire arena of transcendental subjectivity itself disclosed by Husserl and see if, at the core of all of the intentional analyses of Husserl, there can be found any genuinely unique content that cannot be dealt with at the traditional level of pure consciousness as it stretches before us.¹⁶ This is done in the spirit of Husserl himself as the final, infinite task-master. Husserl’s own student Levinas goes on to say in the passage just

quoted: “the object in phenomenology is reconstituted in its world and in all the forgotten intentions of the thinking that absorbed itself into it. It is a manner of thinking concretely. There is in this manner a rigor, but also an appeal to listen acutely for what is implicit.”¹⁷ If we discover new areas of such implicit, yet hithertofore hidden, objective experience, it is our duty to proceed forward to capture them for our new science and to render them clear in the ultimate purity of their own absolute givenness within pure consciousness.

- (3) Thirdly, apart from all ontology and all phenomenology, we shall hold, within ourselves, a truth, which is either achieved at a wholly personal level or it is not achieved at all, that philosophy itself is a love of wisdom. Wisdom is that absolute knowledge towards which we must, by entire motivation of our deepest self and heart, set forth if we ever wish to become philosophers. Once we enter into convergent phenomenology and claim it as our own region of research, we must, by virtue of that claim, find there several things *beyond all ontology, and beyond all phenomenology*. Firstly, we must find, in convergent phenomenology, the ineffable, possibly shared by us, yet almost entirely unknown, participatory knowledge of the divine reality of uncreated subject-consciousness, for that IS wisdom. Not just Aquinas, not just Sankara, but the honest thinker Husserl saw such knowledge as his own quite personal life’s goal. Mohanty tells us, “Husserl on various occasions indicates that his whole philosophical search is aiming at knowledge of God.”¹⁸ Secondly, we must find, in convergent phenomenology, the Transcendental Ego as our very self-living, in actual, *adese* fashion, toward such knowledge of divine subject-consciousness. If we haven’t found such pure and objective “towardness,” we have not even started to gain entrance to the inmost truth of the self-givenness of *adese* objectivity that the science itself in question unfolds. Are we not even already infinitely frailer than even the wavering temporality itself that Heidegger’s analytic of *Dasein* finally discloses? Are we not even less than the anxious, baseline Heideggerian *Nichts* thus to be ourselves real *only as already too frail to be even Nichts, or, better, already heading out of the Nichts of ourselves toward the divine reality of wisdom itself?* Such a new, proto-*Dasein* should be analyzed further. Thirdly, we must at last together set forth the common project of a new analytic of proto-*Dasein*-toward-*proto-Dasein*. We must find, in convergent phenomenology, the *intersubjective consciousness* of all Transcendental Egos *toward* each other, a

relational and entirely communal towardness that is nothing more or less than the miraculously intersubjective “body-subject” and reification of *all philosophizing itself*. Fourthly and finally we must find, in convergent phenomenology, the humility to admit our own short-sightedness. If we dare to ground the *mathesis universalis* of all formal-yet-still-transcendent ontological knowledge in the dim and shadowy “art” (as Kant called it) of the transcendental imagination as time—grounding such knowledge, that is, no longer in the production of single images as Aquinas and Kant supposed, but grounding it rather in this new over-arching “science” of the wholly purified transcendental constitution of *adesse* objectivity (itself newly embodied in the laid-out-before-us “landscapes” of several unified “kernels” of converging images)—then we must also admit, along with Kant, that we, even according to the very progress we have thus made, still *know nothing* of such a hidden art *as a real faculty*. Ontologically, we must posit it; phenomenologically it is still impenetrably dark for us. This solemn truth cannot be emphasized enough: the overwhelming truth, namely, that, except as *ad-esse*, we know nothing of the occult ontology of such a miraculous art within us. It is a kind of emblematic icon of our permanent ignorance, exactly as is the famous “mystery hidden within an enigma.” We know absolutely nothing of this art precisely as it, here, and now—and in the never-able-to-be-completed, endlessly encompassing “sphere” that such quasi-time-bound, up-surg-ing, floating, ordering images offer us—spins out, like some held-beyond-itself, gyroscopic, dream-within-a-dream, perfectly balanced hub-core-pivot-point, its grounding function to all universal, spiritual and yet, contrariwise, ultimately concretely *human*, yet ultimately co-relational, knowledge of subject-/object-consciousness even at its most generally conceived level. Whether there actually are in sustained hierarchy, a divine reality, and infinitely downward an angelic reality, and infinitely downward a human reality, as Stein as a still orthodox Husserlian described it, no longer theoretically matters. The entire controversy generated by the Cartesian/Nietzschean demise, or the Stein-like phenomenological resurrection, of such a tripartite hierarchy is, from our new vantage point, over and done with. For, as we move from the pivot of a single image to the converging pivot of a centralized and ordered group of images, thus from *convertuntur ad phantasmata* to *convertuntur ad topiata*, we have hit bedrock. Here alone is where convergent phenomenology, resting in

the genuine self-givenness of itself, now newly viewed as proto-constitution of the first material object of its own ultimate investigative interest, finally opens up for us precisely as a fully eidetic science. To use a mundane panorama of travel metaphors: if we wish to climb Everest, we first take a train to the foothills: that is the natural standpoint and the essence of the transcendental imagination is simply assumed as an unseen art within us. We then climb on a horse and proceed to what Sankara called the *avasana* (final outpost where the horses are unharnessed and left behind): all the way up to the *avasana* is the phenomenological standpoint and the essence of the transcendental imagination is now revealed as describable, *inesse*-wise, in its essential structure as producing single images as pivot-ground for purely spiritual concepts. Finally, we move forward on foot: that is the new, suddenly converging standpoint where the selfsame transcendental imagination is now revealed as describable, *adesse*-wise, as producing shifting “landscapes” of images being ordered, perhaps by a central image, as pivot-ground for the proto-constitution of *adesse* objectivity as such.

3.5 THE FIRST QUESTION: ARE THERE EMPIRICALLY REAL RELATIONS OUT IN THE WORLD?

We are, in this third chapter, finally traveling “by foot” within the no man’s land between phenomenology and formal logic. Thus located, let us do some preliminary investigations of ordinary perception.

If I see two yellow pencils on my desk and in a single intuitive glance find that the one on the left is longer than the one on the right, I can, in the broadest sense, affirm that I have seen the left pencil as “toward” the right pencil by a kind of seen relational comparison that “moves” from the left to the right. I express this by saying to myself about the left pencil, “It’s longer.”

Let us look at this “intuitive glance.” It is not, strictly speaking, a glance directed toward the left pencil or toward the right pencil or toward both of them in any kind of a grouped looking. It is a raw, immediate glance that directly sees, instead, the stark, intuitable towardness of the left to the right pencil. I cannot say that this “glance” is directed to the left pencil as toward a kind of thing-like content of its own directed act since the “content” of the act is exactly the pencil as here and now wholly beyond itself

toward the right pencil. We cannot hold onto an object *as a thing-like object* if it is already referring itself outward (like tentacles as Husserl tells us) utterly beyond itself, *in a very unthing-like way*, toward something else.

The curious thing about this whole state of affairs is that the experience that we live through is an experience of seeing (actually intuiting) a concrete, individual, empirically present towardness of one thing toward another, but the verbalization of this experience is almost always out of tune with this relational experience and already living in a thing-like expression masking the original experience. No one says, as an expression of what the glance sees, “Look. There is a towardness of the left pencil to the right pencil that shows me right from itself as “toward” that the left pencil is longer.” But why is this the case? The whole matter requires further investigation.

3.6 THE FIRST QUESTION CONTINUED: WESTERN SOURCES OF RELATION

In Husserl, there are two general types of transcendence: (a) the formally objective transcendences of thing-like eidetic objects such as gestalt-like or collective formal groupings, mathematical objects such as ideal triangles and pure numbers, and logical objects (e.g. propositions-in-themselves) all given in what he calls categorical intuition; and (b) the empirically real transcendence of thing-like objects of perception given in ordinary perceptual intuition.

Corresponding to this duality of transcendence, relation developed out of Greek thought in a twofold way.

- (1) Buried in the mists of ancient Greek philosophy, there were primitive notions of Being’s sources, later emerging into relational constructions such as matter-toward-form, potency-toward-act, and substance-toward-accidents.¹⁹ These were stratified and pinned down with extraordinary lucidity by Aristotle’s own “first philosophy” and eventually crystallized into the medieval scholastic notion, a special notion not at all concerning what we wish to treat here in this chapter (since, herein we are treating of empirically perceivable real relations [referred to as *relatio* or “*ad aliquid*”]) but rather concerning “*ontologically*” *real relations*—what were called *respectus transcendens* and

which, in a most general manner, could be said to parallel the purely formal, non-empirical objects of Husserlian categorical intuition.²⁰ These transcendently real relations were real because they were the towardnesses of real sources of Being, not because they were real affections of our empirical or sensible knowledge. Mirroring these *respecti*—and residing in the imminence of human logical thought—were the basic logical relations such as the relation of first principles or “premises” to conclusions, and, even more pertinently, the various idealized and purely formal logical relations of genus as matter toward specific difference as form and so on.

- (2) Corresponding to Husserlian transcendence of empirically real objects of ordinary perception was the benchmark decision of Aristotle to delve into the very nature of Being and to wrest from thence a strange category called empirically real relations (*ta pros ti*) from the mystery of Being Itself. Because his discovery was so true to itself and to Being, and because the limit-reality of the category was thereby so faint as to be the most minimal possible of all accidental realities, many odd and seemingly paradoxical notions began to swarm around this special category, as we shall see.

3.7 THE FIRST QUESTION CONTINUED: EASTERN SOURCES OF RELATION

Sankara, like Aristotle, saw relation as being more toward something than in something and thus irreducible to the terms that it joins together.²¹ Of course, we cannot really lay Sankara’s and Aristotle’s notions side by side as such since they are embedded in systems of ontological knowledge utterly diverse. It is evidently and immediately clear to any serious comparative ontologist that Advaita is a system wholly diverse from Western ontology in general, and its own *utterly idealistic premises* (which it insists upon for both religious and philosophical reasons) are also wholly diverse. Once these idealistic premises are accepted, however, the logic of the Advaita system falls unshakably into place with a certitude perfectly equaling the West in regard to both demonstrations and conclusions.

One will always find, in studying with a devout Advaita scholar (e.g. of the stature of T.M.P. Mahadevan, or R. Balasubramanian,), that one gradually begins to understand and thereby “live” in two salient truths. The first truth is that the teachings of Sankara are nothing if they are not

ahistorical in the sense that they are not surrounded by a concrete Life-World able to give meaning to them. The truths that Sankara utters are like the far away light of a pole star whose intensity and exact location remain utterly indeterminable. Seeing this, one then begins to understand something deeper about the classroom sessions with such masters. Such masters are, in much the same sense as Sankara, exemplary teachers not so much because they answer the logical difficulties of their students, which they often do with unsurpassed clarity, but because they see, with uncanny accuracy, the psychological binds into which these students had wandered. Such masters direct themselves much more to loosing these binding feelings rather than solving the ostensible logical problems at hand.²²

This brings us to a second salient truth. There is a reason why this work does not effusively quote Sankara equally to Aquinas and Husserl. There is not only the matter of what Mohanty speaks of concerning the Indian saint's writings being culturally embedded in a style of poetic diction nearly intractable to the modern mind.²³ There is also the following matter: Often through encounters with Advaita masters one gradually begins to look at Sankara as a friend of the heart rather than of the mind. A friend speaks to you more because she loves you and not so much because she wants you to academically analyze what she just told you with such force of feeling. And if you further realize that such a friend has put the entire probative wealth of pure human logic at the service of a divine subject-consciousness that she considers herself already identical with, then, certainly, to answer her logical statements with any kind of counter-logic may improve your skills but will do nothing for your friendship. Aquinas said many, many truths about divine subject-consciousness, just as did Sankara. Yet when one listens to the truths that Sankara dispenses in regard to divine subject-consciousness, and begins to see them in all their blinding intensity, to "logically analyze them further" would very often lead one away from their source and perhaps thereby away from one's own personal search for the truth.

Along these same lines, when one looks to the vast literature of India's classical system of ontological truth to find statements about real relations, one sees immediately that one would do well to turn not only to the poems of Sankara but also to some of the derivative schools, particularly the school of the Nyaya-Vaisesika.

A note of caution: We have been contrasting relation-like with thing-like objectivity and indicating that notions of universal and particular belong in the latter arena. In Indian philosophy, there is no clear-cut demarcation

between universal and particular, as if universals are wholly seeable only by the clear, spiritual thought of mental reasoning, and particulars solely by empirical perception. Indeed, there is even a sense in which one may affirm that universals, according to the Indian scholastic thought, are seen through the same means of perceptual knowing as their own instances are.²⁴

Accordingly, keeping such caveats in mind, there are actually two different kinds of real relations in the Indian ontologies: *samyoga*,²⁵ bearing an analogous similarity to what the classical Western thinkers would refer to as lower-level real relations, such as similarity, which are discoverable in empirical experience; and *samavaya*,²⁶ which contains elements not only of simple real relations of classical Western Ontology, but also the higher, asymmetrical relations found in the writings of Thomas and his school, and about which we shall have much to say in the following chapter.

Just as the wholly subsidiary system of convergent phenomenology allows for general phenomenology to finally come into focus over and above such radically diverse objectivities as relation-like and thing-like, the discovery of *samavaya* by the Nyaya-Vaisesika tradition allows the generality of universal entities to be viewed as identical with the concrete, actually existing instances of such universals.²⁷

Both *samyoga* and *samavaya* are referred to as ontological categories. But, as is clear in the realist doctrine of in the classical *Nyaya-Vaisesika* dialectic of Indian thought, *samavaya*, which is always formally presented as a relation that has aspects of a kind of eternal existing-in-itself apart from the human mind,²⁸ possesses its own sui generis character. When I found this out, such a discovery itself indeed confirmed the statements of Aristotle and Avicenna regarding the special character of relation over against the other ontological categories. It would not be very useful here to go into a deep discussion of the actual nature of *samavaya*, but the fact that it at least bears similarity to the category of real relation set up by Aristotle and to the asymmetrical power of a relation simultaneously both mental and real according to Thomas Aquinas should be enough to indicate that we are on the right track.

At the beginning of his *The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl*, a final and definitive work on Husserl, Mohanty quotes a beloved passage from the Advaita commentary called *Vivaranaprimeyasangraha* which substantiates Husserl's notion of the certitude of transcendental subjectivity.²⁹ It should be noted that he quotes this passage without his own commentary, but that is exactly the point.

One final note: R.K. Tripathi actually contends that the controversy whether relations are realities or simply wholly mental impositions of the mind upon the underlying terms is the central watershed issue that divides up the various system of Indian metaphysical thought: “Their attitude toward relation,” he says “gives them their fundamental logic, and so it can be regarded as the pivot of the system.”³⁰ On the Western side, controversy starting from Aristotle’s odd and perplexing denomination of empirically real relations as being one of the predicaments of accidental being has caused quite a controversy of its own.

3.8 THE TRUE ESSENCE OF REAL RELATIONS

Since we are now, according to our final mode of travel, walking upward on foot and leaving behind our half-way house between phenomenology and formal logic, let us use some more down-to-earth examples, similar to the yellow pencil example above, to establish the possible existence of empirically real relations.

If, while out walking in the morning on the beach, we happen to come across two round white stones lying half-hidden in the sand in front of me, their suddenly discovered relation of similarity to each other can neither be reduced to the stones themselves nor to their own concrete quality of roundness or whiteness, inherent in each, but to the real, irreducible towardness of the one to the other. This freshness-of-view of the stones each being toward each other in such an immediately seen similarity should be left, at its own level, to show itself exactly as it is. No one has done this better than Aristotle in his treatment of relation as a real category of Being, and it would be helpful to look more closely at what he achieved.

Aristotle tells us that the whole essential nature of real relation itself is that it simply be *toward* that to which it relates itself, whether it itself inheres in a subject or not. This more or less fits in with what I see in front of me on the sand of the beach. When we verbalize the found state of affairs in front of us, as a thing-like expression such as “The stones are similar,” it is nevertheless the *similarity* of the stones, according to the full mutual towardness of the one to the other, which has caught our attention, not the stones themselves.

Thus, although we have never seen a real relation of similarity in this empirical world that didn’t inhere in its foundation, it nonetheless “seems” that such inherence has nothing to do with its own essential “quiddity,” in other words with exactly “what” the empirical relation is in itself.

The ontological category of real relation built up from this by Aristotle (and similar in some respects to the ontological categories of relation discovered by the *Nyaya* ontologists, as we saw above) is thus of a very strange kind indeed, not classifiable as one among the other accidental categories, such as inherent quality or inherent quantity, which formed the most immediate basis for the endless mental intelligibilities of universal and particular, and the correlative “genus, species and difference” that permeated Greek logic and the Eastern and Western medieval dialectic as well.³¹ Real relation thereby stands wholly apart from this thing-like, form-inhering-in-matter kind of dialectic. Indeed, real relation, in its essential purity, passing wholly beyond all attempts to contain it and analyze it as a sort of formal, mentally superimposed, logical joining of terms, cannot be further clarified by adding a formal difference to its material genus. It can only be ultimately understood as already absolutely diverse from all the other accidental categories, categories whose own ontological essence consists in being-IN-something-else. Real relation’s own inmost nature seems, exactly through what we have just witnessed in our simply “letting become effective” of the essence of what we intuited in respect to the stones, does not lie in “inness” but in “towardness.”

To be true to what we have “seen” how should we then proceed? If we would wish, as attempting now to become an enlightened modernist, to turn away from the situation of our two beached stones, as already toward each other according to their very real similarity unfolding in front of my face, and, if we, as is often done, would then wish to abruptly formalize all these blunt, authentic and descriptively honest statements of the nature of real relation (that Aristotle similarly sets forth in the *Categories*) into a few narrow, masking, logical propositions “about the subjective mind relating the stones” and “about the two objective stones themselves,” then, we would find, unavoidably, that what Aristotle is *actually looking at* and, perhaps even in Husserl’s sense, phenomenologically describing (and perforce placing into such a wholly unique category of Being), *disappears altogether*. And what is mentally left over is the completely misguided assumption that Aristotle’s real relation makes things relative by inhering in them. Critics assume that Aristotle is thereby intending either to reduce real relation to its terms, or somehow to empty real relation of all actual, seeable, and thus intuitable, towardness and alter it into some new kind of mental construct only. Such critical accusations hide within themselves a much more pernicious and far-reaching reduction of real relation to something else, either as itself correlative to a wholly unknowable thing-in-itself

kind of situation, or as a purely conceptual joining of terms. In Aristotle's treatment, it is most certainly neither. Aristotle is not reducing real relation into its term by calling it an accident; nor is he saying that such a relation is a towardness formed only by the mind itself. This is exactly NOT what Aristotle is saying.³²

We should perhaps prefer to call all those who reduce the Aristotelian category of real relation either to something inhering in something and nothing more, or to something in the mind alone, the true Reductionists. These Reductionists leave Aristotle's crucial, salient point of real relation's unique and quite clearly experienced towardness utterly behind, blinding themselves to what he is actually seeing and faithfully describing. Thereupon, for all time to come, the wholly experienced, and lived-through, and patently real nature of such relational towardness becomes utterly reduced to some purely unreal, mental relation which (as the Reductionists contend) we ourselves, as onlookers, have simply superimposed upon the terms, which, as thus also reduced, have accordingly reverted to some sort of exterior things-in-themselves. Thereby is such pernicious blindness complete. The reality that Aristotle saw, and primitively but authentically described, is utterly left behind. The Reductionists believe they are advancing forward to a more sophisticated notion of relation, and their own refracted, empty, wholly mental "relation" is then analyzed formally within mathematics, or within an analysis-philosophy that is reducible to mathematical sources, or within some materialistic, or Kantian, or psychologistic or idealistic interpretation of human experience. But the undeniable fact is simply, once and for all, that we LIVE in these relational realities. They are there, and certainly as immediately there, as are all the other such day-by-day, lived-through experiences.³³

To use another example, when, while visiting a friend, we unexpectedly see that his son's face looks like his own face, we know that we are SEEING this, and not simply imposing a mental "something" on the two faces.³⁴ To pronounce that such relational realities are not "really there" is akin to the reductive pronouncements of the famed one-eyed scientist who attempted to exhaustively describe what ordinary, three-dimensional human vision is by a life-long project of measuring tiny variations in the double photos that are inserted into a stereopticon viewer. And just because he amassed a full library of data over the years doesn't mean that his project was not fatally doomed from the start by its own physically reductive limits. Those who simply open both eyes and LIVE in such three-dimensional vision know what three-dimensional vision is AS SUCH.

That is really all that we are, as on-foot travelers, saying about real relations as well. Our point here in regard to this second example is simple: To allow the actually there, empirically real relation of similarity between our friend's face and his son's face (and all other such relational realities) to vanish out of all knowledge by instead turning to this face here and that face there, contending that that alone is the only real part of the experience, is equally as narrow-sighted and Reductionist as the ill-fated, monocular stereopticon project.

3.9 THE SECOND QUESTION: WHAT EXACTLY ARE EMPIRICALLY REAL RELATIONS AND HOW ARE THEY KNOWN?

As we let these *prima facie* facts speak for themselves, and move through such lived-through examples of real relation, what do we gain? In other words, by avoiding such a main stream tradition of Reductionism and instead assuming that Aristotle and Avicenna and Aquinas and the *Nyaya* logicians knew at least something of what they were talking about when they spoke of actually experiencing the very reality of such empirically real relations, what have we achieved?

Let us start out to find what we have achieved by first giving ourselves some general ontological "hints." Everyone would, at first glance allow us to, by means of a most commonsense perspective, distinguish between mental relations and real relations out in the empirical world before us. Mental relations are wholly fictitious, they simply do not, in any way, exist. Real relations exist. Because, as both Aquinas and Husserl agree, being is not a genus, ontologically, there can be no highest genera of relation that includes relations of reason and relations in reality. The line is non-crossable, once and for all. This is in keeping with our ordinary way of speaking about such matters. We cannot move from the one to the other directly at all. Thus, starting out wholly within the realm of mental relations, everyone should agree (at least logically) that they are either non-empirical, wholly ideal relations based, indirectly on substantial being like an ideal relation between a thing and itself (a relation of identity), and between a thing and its non-existence (what Husserl would call *concreta*); or, on the other hand, they are wholly ideal relations based on accidental being such as a mental relation that relates two lower mental relations (what Husserl would call *abstracta*). In all of this, there is no way of

referring such fictitious relationality outward toward a correspondence of relationality out in the real world. Turning the page and beginning a new page, we might then say, real relations are simply what are left over, and we have yet to characterize them.

How would we thus characterize them?

We have said that our setting forth to ground the second material object of convergent phenomenology is a setting forth on foot from a remote outpost where the horses have finally been unharnessed, and thus into a fairly uncharted region between the realm of pure logic and formal ontology and the realm of general phenomenology. No longer are we grounding our purely spiritual thought in this or that image, but rather we have taken the risk of grounding our purely spiritual thoughts in a misty upsurge of dimly seen landscapes of grouped images, all of which seemingly have a central image ordering the rest. And now, when we take the above ontological hints into consideration, it seems that we have come, according to our new, methodological frame of mind, to the ultimate watershed-like dividing line between, on the one hand, the absolute, purely conscious character of all mental relations and, on the other hand, the fleeting, shifting, transient empirically real character of all real relations. Let us simply let the lived-through experience of empirically real relations guide us here at this “continental divide” of all relationality in general. Let us list as many characteristics of real relations as we can from our stance from which we now speak—our “stance,” of course, being simply the neither phenomenological nor ontological stance we have taken. Baldly stated, we are not saying that real relations *do* exist, but rather we are asking, hypothetically and according to a risky frame of mind, if they *did* exist, then what would they be like? And since there has, as yet, been no formal eidetics of empirically real relation either conceived or developed, we are perforce entering completely new territory here. Let the following shifting thoughts suffice.

Should a real relation actually exist, then its reality, or, to follow Husserl’s entirely non-Platonic notion of essence,³⁵ its “whatness” simply lies in its being **toward**, not in its being **in**. In other words (although it would always exist “in” its own term), yet, when it truly “appears,” that is when it truly shows itself from itself, the “whatness” or essence that it shows itself as, would then be, remarkably, “already toward” its referent. Thus, a real stone has an entity in itself whereby it is distinguished for all other entities. Contrariwise, an empirically real relation, being uncountable—and even being “unidentifiably”—already beyond itself toward

something else, would not be a thing-like entity like a stone or a flower that can be seen to be distinct from all other thing-like entities by our viewing it as it is in itself. Viewed as it is in itself, and if it did exist, a real relation's *towardness* would then be absolutely all there was to it.

Because it would have to be an *abstracta* of another *abstracta*, or, to use classical terms, because it would have to be the sui generis case of a special accident that inheres, not in a thing here and now present before us, but in the already present, *grounding accident* of a thing here and now present before us, a real relation would not, at least in any traditional sense of abstraction, be able to be abstractively defined and viewed (as we might say of ground accidents) "in itself" (such as the universal essence of red being universalized as redness-in-itself). This is the second shifting fact.

This brings us to an eidetic fact that counterbalances the above essentially "concrete-already," yet non-abstractable eidetic fact in the preceding paragraph. However, this third, shifting landscape of eidetic "fact" is extremely difficult to clarify. In attempting to express this third necessary trait of empirically real relations, we could simply say that, since we are already toward something greater than ourselves (as finding ourselves heading toward the first material object of convergent phenomenology: namely the Transcendental Ego), the special trait that we are trying to clarify has to do with the inescapable fact that **we are more "at home" with ourselves when we intellectually "see" a real relation** (should they ever exist) (as finding ourselves heading toward the second material object of convergent phenomenology: the un-deniability of the now intuitively seen *existence* of real relations), **than when we intellectually "see" a more full-bodied intentional object** (either abstracta-wise or concreta-wise). Aquinas, theoretically living and working within *adesse* objectivity constantly and proto-constituting such objectivity without realizing it (as did Poinset), and especially when he was dealing with the connective paradoxes of unity and diversity within the *actus purus essendi* itself, is able to simply say that "something mental and thus entirely spiritual" is involved every time we see a real relation. We must lay down such a fact with an immediate proviso, however, since our modern mind can very readily misconstrue such a fact as tantamount to denying the *essential reality* of towardness at the core of real relations themselves, and thereby holding that such towardness is mental only (as do the modern and current Reductionists that we spoke of earlier). The following investigation in this paragraph into the third trait in question must proceed step by step, and carefully, by emphasizing that this third trait lies in the odd,

paradoxical state of affairs that even an empirically real relation would have to have a remarkable aspect whereby it always includes indirectly within itself something Husserl might, if he were trying to clarify it, call a “moment,” indeed, something that, though not base-wise reflectively conceptualizable is nevertheless “logical” or “mental” *to a certain degree*, simply because (and we must as convergent phenomenologists dare to face this mysterious fact) consciousness, whether viewed as in the natural standpoint OR as in the phenomenological standpoint, is already *adese to a certain degree*. Fortunately, it is at the pivot-center of this selfsame convoluted paradox (of mental-and-real-towardnesses, whose watershed diversity we spoke of earlier) that relation-like objectivity stands in stark contrast to thing-like objectivity. Husserl says that intentional consciousness of thing-like objectivity is a “consciousness about something that is what it is not.”³⁶ This cannot be said of what we have begun to speak of in this third paragraph as a kind of “spiritually **already convergent**” and thus already non-“intentionalizable” consciousness of the fully *adese* character of purely relation-like objectivity at its most generally conceivable level. Let us try to understand this shift in quality of all real relations better by stepping backward into some deep ontological paradoxes that occupied the schoolmen from Aquinas to Suarez. Formally expressed, an empirically real relation is the only accidental predicament (i.e. ontological category) that can (and this not by abstraction, but by simply being seen) have, besides its empirical existence, an absolutized existence in the human mind, which non-independently (again reverting here to Husserlian terminology) becomes a sui generis kind of “moment” in the mind, a quasi-existence in the mind as a “logical inexistence.” As we have explained, this unique mental quality has nothing to do with what one ordinarily understands by direct, active consciousness or conceptualization of any kind.³⁷ Let me attempt to clarify this complicated and leveled species of real/mental analogy by dwelling on the almost oblique and refractive way in which relational-like objectivity, viewed as out beyond the mind and thus empirically there in the real world, must, should it ever exist, manifest itself to human consciousness. When an empirically real relation shows itself as *toward* its referent, our mind, thus knowing it, also would then become simultaneously “*toward*,” but not “actively,” not conceptually, but rather only to that very degree. (Thus, one might even dare to say, being toward..., but neither in the real self nor in the real world, toward....) This is not the case with the other accidents such as quantity and quality. Helpfully glancing backward again, we find that the

ancients and the medievals declared (with a naïve freshness of insight) that the mind is “immaterial” because, when we abstract the empirically real accidental predicament “red” (the quality of red) from a red thing, that does not mean that our mind becomes red by knowing such an abstracted and universal form of redness. Yet should we ever intuit the towardness of an empirically real relation, we would then become, in a certain sense, also toward the thing to which the real relation refers, although this is not a moment either concrete or abstract. It could perhaps be expressed as a uniquely “absolutizable existence toward... that would thereby pass beyond itself and into the very exteriority of Being Itself.”³⁸ Another way to say this is that our minds would accordingly be absolutized by seeing the towardness of a real relation (which in its own essence is neither concrete nor abstract but purely toward), whereas our minds are not absolutized into the concrete when they know the immaterial essence of a concrete thing (or, as Husserl would say, the ideally objective essence of a concrete thing [which he called a *concretum*]), since the mind thus knowing is already *individually* immaterial in its own nature. Qualities such as redness and quantities such as the weight of a thing always are concrete. As we saw above with the example of redness, such a wholly individual thing as a stone, with its own weight and color and shape, does not enter into the mind and change the mind into a stone when it is known. But, in a certain sense, the towardness of an empirically real relation *does* enter into the mind and thus causes the mind itself to become not just actually but logically or mentally toward (but not, and this is vastly important, in any “reflective sense,” as if we are now suddenly toward by *our starting to “reflect” on the seen towardness in question*). This special way in which the mind would then absorb itself, almost osmotically, into a real relation out in the world beyond the mind (and, here, recall we have been and will be speaking hypothetically in all these current, shifting paragraphs, and thus remain in the mode of speaking that goes: if real relations actually existed, then this is what they would be like) is not the case with any of the other accidental realities that exist in the classical categories of accidental being, since these other categories are categories that unfold a concrete particular being in its own substantial completeness, as utterly standing alone by itself, and, of course, as utterly *other than ourselves*. Perhaps all I want to say in this now much too long third note about empirically real relations could have been more generally expressed as follows, using the medieval notion of *respectus*: The absolutely seeable “towardness” (*respectus transcendens*) of a created material entity out in the world (ontologically, the

towardness either of its substance or of its accidents toward that which brought it into being) is closer to human object-consciousness (intentionality, as already toward its object) than is the selfsame entity considered as standing alone by itself in all its individualized concreteness.³⁹

The almost-impossible-to-express-in-thing-like-language “fact” that we nevertheless attempted to express in the preceding paragraph above does not mean that the reality of an empirically real relation can thus be etherealized by being ideally objectified by the higher towardness of human consciousness. On the contrary, an empirically real relation, should it ever actually exist, could not be essentially seen unless it be here and now fully seen as already outward toward its referent. Its own actually being-what-it-is lies wholly in its towardness (*ad-esse*), and its “inness” (*in-esse*) is only accidental to such seen actuality. Thus, a real relation could not become itself toward *another towardness* without losing what it really means to be toward in the first place. Indeed, trying to see a real relation as toward another relational towardness is exactly as contradictory as trying to see something as both existing and not existing in the same respect. Such an absurd state of affairs is not only ontologically contradictory but also phenomenologically meaningless. It is quite simply not able to be intuitively clarified at a higher level. Its case is similar (but, we should hasten to add, only *analogically* similar) to the grayish, off-to-the-side “almost-able-to-be-seen-ness” of the constantly present “edge” of our visual field. We live, unreflectively, day in and day out, entirely within such an experience, yet we certainly also know full well that any extraneous scientific attempt to look “directly” at this grayish, colorless “edge” is not only wholly misdirected theorizing but also, itself, phenomenologically, is simply nonsensical. In much the same way, real relations could not be seen as in their terms but solely as toward their referents already. This is what we would be living in, purely and simply should real relations be shown to exist. *Indeed, this is what we would be living in, once and for all, irrespective of all possible, “after-the-fact” theories of wholly formalized relational “properties” retrospectively able to be conjured up and conceptualized and expressed.*

From this, it clearly follows that the active process of understanding this hypothetical reality could not be enhanced by “relating” a seen real relation to a higher level of intelligibility since, indeed, the oddly overlaying etherealizing process of somehow attempting to further relate a real relation toward another (itself tending-toward) relation, either real or mental, leads, exactly, nowhere. Following the rule that one should ask of an entity

only as much as that entity can unfold from itself, we must then hold that, though mathematicians can formalize *mental* relations all the way to the bounds of their mathematical research areas, for one to attempt to formalize, in a similar mathematical fashion, an actually existent, real relation in the empirical world is asking of it something that, by absolute necessity, it simply cannot unfold for us. Astounding as it may seem, and yet following uncounterably from the non-formalizable character of empirically real relations, our own moving consciously from one real relation to another would, accordingly, be precisely *not* a state of affairs wherein one thing can be counted as “this” and then another thing can be added to the first and counted as “that.” Whatever is taking place in such a state of affairs, “two” real relations are simply *not there*. Aquinas expresses this mystifying trait of real relations even more succinctly when he says “Two real relations are not more than one real relation.”⁴⁰

Therefore, it is further evident that the accidental category of relation, viewed as a directedness out beyond itself, is an utterly *sui generis* kind of accidental category, both in regard to its being and in regard to the knowing of its being, and it is such to such a degree that it cannot, as the other categories can, be totalized or systematized or formalized or abstracted as containing a formal and material aspect. Should it ever exist, it would then not be real enough to be in time at all. To temporalize a real relation is simply to have missed its reality entirely. In Aristotelian terms: the other accidental categories unfold a deeper thing through their own secondary, accidental showing of themselves (or, in Husserlian terms, already-founded intentional acts can only be founded on other more primary intentional acts), and thus because a real relation could not do this in either the Aristotelian or Husserlian sense, it simply *could not exist in time*. All this successive layering of temporality itself vanishes when we would then pen our eyes and mind and “see” a real relation existing out beyond us in the real world. In classical terms: the category of relation appears without requiring, for its *essential* appearance, a deeper thing in which to appear, and is thus self-illuminating, similar (again, only analogically similar) to the absolutely self-illuminating and primitive and flowing intentionality of our own-most, wholly passive, internal time-consciousness as Husserl eventually began to uncover it and describe it.⁴¹

We have been traveling on foot upward toward the treacherous slopes of the *actus purus essendi*, noting in passing the swirling mists of what a real relation would have to be in order to truly be itself. Aquinas was perhaps the greatest risk-taker of all when he actually dared to nest real relations

into the very core of the *actus purus essendi* itself. At this point, we have nevertheless come to a simple salient fact: in order to be both seen and understood, a real relation would have to have been left to itself to be here and now toward its referent, or it would simply vanish from all knowledge: More formally put: the action of understanding it could be neither a *generalization* (such as one would normally perform by understanding the inherent quality of this white thing by abstracting from its inherence to a level of some universal essence such as “whiteness itself”) nor, conversely, a *particularization* (such as one would normally perform by attempting to find an instance of universal whiteness by realizing that the formal quality of universalized white inheres in this white thing here and now before us). Nor, as we saw above within the mathematical crevasse of the uncountability of grouped real relations, could the act of understanding the *adesse* of a real relation ever be a mathematically abstractive *formalization* either. Seeing an actually present, empirically real relation would clearly involve none of these kinds of actions.

Positively speaking, then, a real relation being, as it seems, the most fleeting and most ethereal of real things already could only be seen here and now, TOWARD, against a kind of receding backdrop, itself wholly inaccessible to the counterbalancing degree that the relation would then begin to show itself.

As the mists begin to clear, another simple fact begins to come into focus: Empirically real relations would have to be change-neutral. They could have nothing whatsoever to do with the perfection or imperfection of that in which they inhere. They would thus come to be in a subject so absolutely and finally and leave the same subject so absolutely and finally that their “coming to be” and their “passing away” (if we even dare to use such thing-like terms) would be *wholly irrelevant* to any changes going on, here and now, within such a subject. From this, it follows that should an empirically real relation ever come to rest in a thing, it wouldn’t posit any interior change at all in the thing to which it had come, but it would simply make it to be toward something else.

From such summit clarity, it is thereby likewise clear that real relations, taken in their essential nature as such, could not move or change. Bluntly put, if something is already toward something else (*ad aliud*, as the scholastic ontologists expressed it), then it could not come to rest in something further or be moved toward something further. Real relations must according to their inmost nature be towardnesses to things that, as things, themselves rest or move and change. Indeed, real relations could

even be towardnesses to the states of rest themselves or to the changes and motions themselves, but they, in their own inmost nature, could not be inherent enough in things to *themselves* thus undergo motion or change. As a result, real relations could even be toward that which is already eternal and infinitely diverse from thing-like objectivity altogether. Our here and there appearing, newly focused summit can be either infinite or finite, yet changing nothing in the real relation that exists, should it then be seen to exist. In Husserlian terms, the interior formality of such supposed real relations is of such a *sui generis* essence as to be, as such, utterly indifferent to being brought within or being kept outside the primitive retentive unfolding of interior time-consciousness. If that to which they are related is eternal and infinite, this is irrelevant to their own essential nature. And if that to which they are related itself ultimately and cor-relatively changes, then the real relation (making such a state of affairs to be toward something else) would simply *not be there* in such an absolute sense that it could not even be strictly or formally said to have “changed” from being there to not being there. Its absolute disappearance as ultimate EMPTINESS would be exactly the total opposite to what Aquinas once described as the sudden FULL towardness of the act of creation itself—viewed, not as slow, temporal coming-into-being, but ontologically as this concrete-sudden-universe-NOW-wholly-out-toward-the-creative-force-of-Being-Itself-that-brought-it-into-Being. We have traveled far on foot. The reality of empirically real relations, should such a reality ever come creatively into existence for us (and if it did, nothing would change in the *inesse*-like cosmos itself!) would be minimal, in a counterbalancing sense, precisely in reference to such maximum fullness of created *inesse* reality as such.⁴² If this sounds paradoxical (and it is indeed close to the paradoxical unity in *Ideen* that Husserl uncovered between the Absolute being of pure consciousness and the Relative being of all possible intentional objects able to, for-all-time-to-come, be thought that, *in essence*, could possibly be otherwise than what they are *in fact*), let it simply *be* paradoxical, for there is no other way to describe it. As true phenomenologists we are simply returning, full force and immanently revitalized, right back to the things (and the relations) themselves.

Let us again move forward: Perceptual thing-like objects are, essentially, open to further perspectival views of themselves, *ad infinitum*. Real relations as wholly relation-like objects would be either absolutely or finally seen, or they would simply not be seen at all. Note that a corollary here arises because the entire work area of Husserlian pure

consciousness, as such, is also non-perspectival, that is, absolutely given. What is being focused on here, then, is in decisive contrast to the interior, noetic givenness of pure consciousness. Real relations, should they ever exist, would have to be given to us non-perspectivally not because they would then be absolutizable towardnesses to the real world (as are all acts of intentionality, i.e. all acts of conscious intending a thing-like object) but because they would be towardnesses already passing out beyond themselves toward something else, and this to such a degree that any further unfolding perspectival view of them would be not only contradictory but also, in an ultimate sense, simply unimaginable at every conceivable level of pure consciousness. At such a formal level of pure logic, this would have to be true because, formally, the first material object of convergent phenomenology is, by our new on-foot perspective, nothing other than the second material object of convergent phenomenology, hypothetically considered.

What then can be said of real relations and the traditional, Husserlian vision of phenomenology? Real relations, though in a sense grounded upon entities themselves intendible, are not themselves strictly intendible as a kind of bodily present content of a meaning fulfilling act. Husserl says that the object of an intentional act is “in” consciousness, and indeed the only way that a thing-like objectivity can be known is by its being “in” consciousness as the noematic correlate of an intentional act thus directed to it.⁴³ By contrast and even in the strictest sense possible, an empirically real relation could not be known by either being in consciousness or by being in something outside of consciousness, but by a supra-intentional act (absolute intuition) that would then see it already as toward something else. We can mean a real relation, but we cannot, in the strict sense, become it (i.e. intentionally tend toward it) to the exact degree that it would then be, here and now, *becoming itself* toward something else. Thing-like objectivities are in consciousness as meant objectivities. Relation-like objectivities are simply “toward” as meant objectivities. We can only mean them as towardnesses, and thus we can only idealize them and thereby point to their eidós, their essence, *as towardnesses*. Let us attempt to penetrate into this new notion of the pure essence of all relationality in the following manner: In Husserl’s final vision, there are two kinds of essences, *generalizable* material essences from which the moments of genus and species are derived (such as the essence “red”), and formalizable formal essences that are pure forms within formal logic and within formal ontology itself (examples of which

are “propositions-in-themselves”). If we ever were to reach the summit of ourselves and begin to live and move among empirically real relations, however, and if we ever were to turn to begin to schematize this experience, we would come to realize, with apodictic clarity, that the whatness of such actual relations would thereby lie in their towardness. Whatever further notions we may derive from such a state of affairs, it is at least clear by now that, even though its eidetics can be established through an extension of pure logic itself, nevertheless this radically new kind of essence of relation-like objectivity in general fits into neither arena of essence that Husserl himself envisioned.

Empirically, real relations are nonetheless “beings.” Therefore, we can add an ontological postulate, and speak as an ontologist, and thereby, in keeping with our traveling to Everest metaphor, allow a deus-ex-machina “helicopter” to come in with new supplies. In other words, we may thus temporarily take leave of the neither-ontological-nor-logical-nor-phenomenological rope-climbing wherein we have postulated the hypothetical *adesse* objectivity that we have been attempting to describe in these paragraphs. Let us set down, then, once and for all, the following ontological truth, a truth that follows absolutely from all that our sketched outlines of an eventual, wholly formal, eidetics of real relation has taught us: *Ontologically, real relations are, as such, “towardnesses”; all other ontological entities (to use the classical example which can, mutatis mutandis, be extended to Husserl’s own outpost) are either things standing absolute in themselves or properties inhering in such things. Such a difference is uncrossable and simply there and should be left to show itself exactly as it appears.* Returning to a phenomenological formulation of this selfsame truth: The essences of empirically real relations are towardness; all other essences are either *concreta* (standing by themselves) or *abstracta* (requiring items from another category for their being and their being known).

Finally, the “difference” spoken of in the preceding paragraph is even more radical than the universally accepted difference, for example, between the empirical sciences such as anthropology on the one hand and wholly eidetic sciences such as geometry on the other hand. Therefore, any discipline which seeks to “theoreticize” itself correlative to such diverse areas of objectivity that have been delineated by such a difference must not gloss over the given demarcation lines already present. Husserl, as the great modern master of clarity in regard to systematic and yet unitary realms of knowledge tells us: “The field of a science is an objectively closed unity: we cannot arbitrarily delimit fields where and as we like. The

realm of truth is objectively articulated into fields: researches must orient themselves to these objective unities and must assemble themselves into sciences.”⁴⁴ It is the formal eidetics of empirically real relations itself that grounds the possibility of convergent phenomenology as an eidetic science of consciousness.

A final summary of the above discussion as the ultimate answer to the Second Question: What are real relations and how are they known? Empirically, real relations, in which human consciousness finds itself more “at home” than when living solely within intentional, thing-like experience, are not real enough to be in time, not real enough to be formalized and counted, and not real enough to be thematized by a direct look into their nature. They are change-neutral. They posit absolutely neither change nor non-change in that in which they reside, but simply make that in which they reside to be toward something else. And, most importantly for our purpose in this work (of founding convergent phenomenology), real relations—although, at least within human purview, always “in” something—are, in their essential nature, as toward..., wholly indifferent to the eternity or temporality of that in which they reside and equally wholly indifferent to the eternity or temporality of that toward which they direct themselves.

Real relations, in themselves and according to the ultimate eidetics of their own nature, are neutral to both subject-consciousness and object-consciousness, and thereby would have to be neutral as well to the entire ontological, phenomenological and natural states of affairs both in which they ARE and in which they ARE KNOWN.

3.10 THE THIRD QUESTION: HOW IS THE PROTO-CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRICALLY REAL RELATIONS ACHIEVED WITHIN PURE CONSCIOUSNESS?

If there is a realm of relation-like objectivity absolutely and once and for all able to be distinguished from a realm of thing-like objectivity, then the phenomenological description of the proto-constitution of relation-like objectivity, even though basing itself upon the more general constitution of traditional phenomenology, cannot be achieved within the present realm of thing-like objectivity, but requires some further exploratory investigations into the eidetic groundwork of *adese* itself viewed, motivationally at least, as a further science to be thus architectonically achieved. Husserl’s own short, trenchant motto that caved in the naïve

constructions of naturalism was: “From facts, nothing but factual consequences follow.”⁴⁵ Correspondingly, one cannot remain within the thing-like standpoint of general phenomenology and ever hope to clarify what relation-like objectivity actually is in its own essential purity. Mental, or purely unreal and logical towardnesses are the very nucleate bone structure of the noetic–noematic correlates of the intentional act. But, look as penetratingly as we might wish into such able-to-be-mentally-X-rayed correlates, the only *real towardness* we can ever thus hope to find will be the *asymmetrically real* (i.e. real outward, merely intentional or mental back again) *towardness* of the general nature of intentionality itself, and not the currently sought-after experiencing of the relation-like objectivity of empirically real relations themselves. One cannot “intend” these empirical relations, and that is that. As we shall eventually discover, it is because intentionality is asymmetrically real as able to be already out into (and *in actu* identifiable with) a Real, and yet non-reciprocatingly-and-only-mentally-back-toward-it, Object, that general phenomenology must remain permanently in the dark as to the intricate weave of mental and real relational towardnesses that upsurge out into the exteriority of Being to become the miraculous towardness *in actu* in question. To be exhaustively understood, Husserlian intentionality must be re-worlded beyond the epoche that brought it into phenomenological focus. The final mission of convergent phenomenology is to open our eyes to these mental and real and asymmetrical towardnesses that we have been living in but of whose actual essence, seen suddenly according to its own pure self-giveness, we have remained until now unaware.

On the other hand, convergent phenomenology is not a break from general phenomenology but a faithful continuation, at one further remove. Convergent phenomenology does not cause Husserl’s famous and purely noetic act of genetic constitution to be metamorphasized into some sort of “real” yet non-conscious constitution from our childhood upward, thus an id-based ur-constitution that comes somehow bubbling up into consciousness from the primeval and entirely originative encroachments of the exterior world. If one feels (unfortunately sometimes, with justification) that Husserl, with his *Crisis*, has gone so far as to require all time-bound, exteriority of human history to stop at his own door, and that Husserl himself will now take over and begin the new history of philosophy from scratch, then perhaps all that convergent phenomenology wishes to do, as a counter-alternative, is to bring some fresh air in from the converging and often labyrinthine, and certainly *adesse*-incarnated

center of all pure consciousness itself, *and not from the exterior world of empirical reality*. The *actual* miracle of origins, as Husserl well knew, is inaccessible to any conceivable phenomenology and open only to the First Philosophy, toward which Husserl headed but into which he never entered. Our bracketing within bracketing leaves us at an even further remove, but with greater hope. This will become clear in Chap. 4 when we radically expand the notion of real relation to include some special, asymmetrical relations that, even in their identity as one single relation, are nevertheless real from only one side of the relation, and wholly mental, wholly intentional, from the other side of the selfsame relation back again. Such non-reciprocities, fanning out like an endless hall of mirrors from intelligibilities, themselves built up, here and there, from perspectival fragments of objectivities, are not origins and, indeed, themselves can only faintly mirror such origins. The important point to be taken is that all such, in the last analysis, *originative, yet already-converged* relationalities, both empirically real and asymmetrically real, are not unconsciously constitutive ur-archetypes of this here and now actual human mind, but, after the reduction-within-a-reduction effected by convergent phenomenology, purely and simply proto-constituted eidetic objects of an eidetic science. While distantly promissory, they are just as intuitively able to be clarified, as are, for example (and within the eidetic science of geometry whose origins Husserl so assiduously attempted to investigate), the wholly objective, yet wholly unworldly, mathematical objects of eidetic triangles and eidetic circles .

We have seen that the second laying of the foundation of convergent phenomenology through the eidetic clarification of the second material object of convergent phenomenology occurs within a special on-foot journey upward from the makeshift, *avasana*-outpost lying between phenomenology and formal logic. Most of the speaking, therefore, that set down the several listed facts in Sect. 3.9 above with its shifting paragraphs and refracted paradoxes is not a fully ontological speaking (in the traditional sense of the massive project of clarifying *ens generalis* over against *ens specialis*). Rather, the speaking of these several facts appears to require a branching off into what might be called a kind of not yet fully aware of itself “sub-ontology” wherein relation may eventually be finally and intuitively clarified by bringing to light what relation, as such, in its essence, actually must be to be such a “towardness” beyond all regular totalizing notions of participation, and, indeed, beyond all possible generic and specific (i.e. universal and particular) “inness.”

We shall see that preserving and attempting to at least clarify to a certain degree (as we have done above) the rarely brought-to-light truth of a non-Reductionist tradition, in both the East and the West, over against all critical attempts (both classical and modern) to discredit it, a tradition, indeed, that refuses to either mentalize real relations or reduce them to some exterior, thing-like objectivity in the world, is crucial to the final verification of convergent phenomenology and of the claims of this utterly new phenomenology to be a self-subsistent science with its own special eidetic objects to investigate. Convergent phenomenology is equally a help to the establishment of transcendental logic as is Husserlian phenomenology. We have spoken often in this work of the contradiction involved in the attempt to really become toward that which, *in actu*, is already actually beyond itself toward something else. This is not because the *psychological* act of relating oneself toward a real relation cannot refer itself to the empirically real, psychological objectification of a real relation, even though this might be the case. What “I,” as convergent phenomenologist, am speaking of has absolutely nothing to do with some eventually discoverable “laws” of psychic perception taken as this or that real action in the empirical world. We are talking here instead of a depth-within-a-depth *contradiction* seen with apodictic clarity as already constituted within traditional transcendental subjectivity itself. Thus, the contradiction that “I” mean when “I” speak of it is simply *what “I” mean as such* and no further, and can never be downwardly identified as, or verifiably confused with, this or that actual psychic act. This is similar to the meant state of affairs that appears when we think about the traditional “principle of contradiction.” When we say that a thing cannot exist and not exist at the same time and in the same respect, we immediately co-understand that we are not saying this because psychological acts prevent us from knowing a thing and its non-existence simultaneously, even if that may be the case. Why? Because that is not what we objectively mean when we express such a principle and think it as an object of thought. To be a philosopher means that we are not going to derive our final unity of intended meaning from some source beyond ourselves but from out of our own self utterly and nowhere else. In this case, a depth within an encompassing depth is nothing, *in actu*, but an apodictically clear self-deepening heading toward something utterly diverse and not yet known. General phenomenology, as well as convergent phenomenology itself, stands or falls upon this precise point. What we mean by a depth-rising-up-within-a-further-encompassing-depth is what we mean by what we have just expressed, and no subsequent theory of meaning can

reach beyond such an ultimate limit. Thus, in respect of what the principle of contradiction means, general phenomenology describes this principle within formal logic not as psychological but as already set within the center of the eidetic field of transcendental subjectivity itself as, *in principio*, a meant object of scientific interest somewhat the same way that Stein set her morphed and endlessly deepened analogy of being irremovably, as well, within the *Ich-Leben* of that selfsame transcendental subjectivity. Similarly, as we shall soon establish, convergent phenomenology, from its own unique standpoint, is fully able, as a self-standing eidetic science, to describe and clarify the former freshly meant contradiction involved (in relating an empirically existent, actual towardness to another towardness). The contradiction thus being given to us in such a manner is simply stated. It is the equally irremovable *eidetic state of affairs* that prevents us from “really becoming toward another real towardness.” If this is truly what a convergent phenomenologist means when she intuits and expresses such a contradictory state of affairs, then that very state of affairs itself is now at last and finally being seen as a meant object to be studied within the field of pure relationality itself, as it is in itself. And such a pure relationality is the determinate objectivity made available and accessible solely within the domain of the new science whose outlines now are beginning to shape themselves, like hierarchical signposts around the *Ich-Leben*, an *Ich-Leben* which Edith Stein knew by heart to be already “carried by a strong arm,” and certainly an *Ich-Leben* fully capable of becoming a bedrock ground for such emergent and directive outlines. Not as a hazy-minded mystic, but as a theorizing logician fully aware of the domains and limits of pure logic itself, Stein tells us that, in our search for theoretical truth, “if we succeed in penetrating to a certain depth in one particular direction, a larger horizon will be opened up, and with this enlarged vista, a new depth will reveal itself at the point of departure.”⁴⁶ In the present case of attempting to lay a lasting ground and base for convergent phenomenology, the “new depth” Stein speaks of is, quite simply, the formal object of the science that we wish to found.

We thus have a good Husserlian reason for showing the co-relational parallel between the principle of non-contradiction and what we might call its extensional, refracted mirroring out into convergent phenomenology as taking this new form: that an *actually existent* towardness can’t be toward another towardness. The former non-contradiction demands, phenomenologically indeed, that the judged co-relational states of affairs be first projected as either utterly toward Being or utterly toward non-Being.

Only within this higher view does the principle of contradiction involve simply the pure “sense” of “anything whatsoever,” moving inexorably inward into the very core of the pure “grounded meaning” of “anything whatsoever, already toward something else.” Husserl does indeed place the theory of consistency and non-contradiction within the threefold stratification of formal logic by means of pure sense alone,⁴⁷ and convergent phenomenology merely deepens and vindicates this placement through such a further notion of meant “relation-like or *adesse* objectivities in general” and their ultimate non-self-relationality as *in actu* identical, in the most general conceivable sense, with the very exteriority of Being Itself.

Let us try now to get closer to what we indeed *do* mean by the act of the transcendental proto-constitution of the grounding act of reference of *adesse* objectivity as it passes utterly through, and thereby ultimately “converges,” the traditional intentional act so endlessly exfoliated by Husserl.

3.11 THE THIRD QUESTION CONTINUED: EMPIRICALLY REAL RELATIONS AS MEANT, PROTO-CONSTITUTED OBJECTIVITIES

Empirically, real relations can be meant. They can be meant not by intentionality directly but by the proto-transcendental constitution of *adesse* objectivity.

Let me repeat this great truth. Empirically, real relations can become meant objects of a purely scientific interest within a new phenomenological and wholly eidetic science dedicated to the full clarification of their essential nature. If one were teaching convergent phenomenology, they should tell their students to daily live and breathe this one self-manifesting and yet hard-won truth.

The scientific ramifications of this truth are immense. For the Husserlian notion of empty meaning intentions and their subsequent convergent fulfillment by the bodily present selfhood of the objects previously and emptily meant has a very instructive parallel within convergent phenomenology. How one may arrive at this parallelism takes on the ethereal aspects of a kind of miraculous super-dream unfolding within the base dream of our already-converged consciousness.

We have already seen that deeper, ontological considerations may lead us to assert a further wholly direct objectivity to some kinds of relations, namely ontologically real relations existing in a quite transient manner

out in the real, empirical world around us, rather than existing as already combined states of affairs within consciousness.⁴⁸

The tentative examples of yellow pencils and white stones used above should at least partially convince us that some immediately perceived relations, such as the relational towardness involved when I notice that one pencil on my desk is actually longer than another lying next to it, are not mental constructs, but are truly “out there,” that is, truly existent in the empirical world—although such special relations cannot really become strict, frontal “objects” of a higher, intentional towardness to them (thus, a seeing that sees them as thing-like parts of an already combined state of affairs). For it is common sense to realize that you cannot hold on to something in a thing-like way if that something is, in a very unthing-like way, suddenly referring itself outward beyond itself toward something else. Rightly did Husserl thus refer to non-intendible “tentacles.” Nor can you hold on to that “something” as already combined within a group of things in some sort of higher mental grasp of it.

We might thus accordingly, feel strongly, but found it hard to really put it into words, that “empirically real relational objectivity” (whatever that phrase might mean), as here and now being “intended,” contained a special “towardness-content” that couldn’t be wholly encompassed in the traditional “intentional act.” This existent reality (in our above concrete example: the experientially discovered “longer-than” towardness of the longer pencil to the shorter pencil) is a kind of unique, “in-between” reality and yet as a reality it should be able to be constituted within pure consciousness and given meaning as real, even though its own outwardly referring character seems to pass out beyond the bodily present character of the two pencils as the grounded/grounding (and thus, in a very loose manner of speaking, “material”) content of the actually appearing relation itself.

Often it is a very subtle, but very final distinction that enables philosophical progress of one’s thoughts. In the natural standpoint of everyday life, before one begins to think as a phenomenologist, everyone would know what you mean when you say “Here, this pencil is longer.” We can *mean* the comparative, greater length of the longer over the shorter, turn back to such a state of affairs, point to the pencils and express what we mean and share this meaning with others. But let us be perfectly clear here. Husserl shows, in his intentional analyses, with incomparable clarity, that there can be empty meaning intentions that can be fulfilled when we turn to the here-and-now, bodily available presence of the object being

intended. But if we turn back to our desk to see the real relation again, the full, intentional act is toward the pencils themselves as the sole objective content intuitively fulfilling the meaning-giving act. *Where is the actually and here-and-now being meant relation in this intentional directedness toward such thing-like objects?* The real relation is fulfilling the meaning intention not as a here-and-now appearing bodily present thing-like content co-present with the content of the pencils, but as a “towardness-content” of a higher and fleeting and different sort altogether.

Surely we find, again and again, in situations such as these, that lower-level intentional analyses (even of the most complexly nested fulfilling content) failed to bring clarity to the actually lived-through situation.

Accordingly, when we remain true to what is in the real world in front of me, and then when we move from the natural standpoint and enact the slight shift of attention that brings the whole realm of transcendental subjectivity into full view—thus when we suddenly started to think as a phenomenologist, we nonetheless have to maintain the subtle distinction between relation-like and thing-like even up at this new level of scientific work. We will thereafter discover that we are required, by the force of the truth itself, to begin to seek to bring such relation-like objectivity to equal clarity alongside the traditional and basic “thing-like” objectivity (otherwise referred to as intentionality) already available within Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity.

Having done this, we will find that the traditional, noesis–noemata framework seems to evaporate again and again when it comes to describing the constitution of truly “relation-like” objects of thought within pure consciousness. We see with growing clarity that real relations are not objectifiable as “in,” but that their empirical reality as well as their intuitive essentiality lay in their being “toward” in a way that could not be wholly constituted within the founding intentional act in which they often seemed to appear “as if” they were a wholly thing-like, material content when, in reality, they were nothing of the kind. How can we revitalize our immanent turn to these puzzling events? Can intentionality itself be thus re-worlded?

Here, Husserl himself came to the rescue. Even as early as the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl distinguishes, once and for all, between the enacted reality of this real, psychologically embodied **act** of judgment, and what is truly **meant** in such a here and now enacted judgment.⁴⁹ Driven by this selfsame honesty, we should come to see it as a culminating necessity that we must finally, and once and for all, distinguish between the

enacted reality of a judgment that both takes the position that real relations exist out in the world and affirms the here and now existence of an instance of such a real relation, and, on the other hand, what we really mean when we thereby direct ourselves toward such an entity and describe it and point it out and express its own special kind of reality to others. For the first time, it becomes clear that both items thus being so primordially distinguished were indeed towardnesses, but towardnesses of a radically different sort from each other. In the first case, there is a consciously directive relational towardness to the real relation that is being meant, being “intended” albeit intended in a sense not ordinarily prefigured in the traditional analyses of intentionality. In the second case, there is the purely meant relational towardness of the entity-now outwardly relating-itself-to-its-referent. *This second towardness was then now viewable as a pure meaning irrespective of who is enacting this here and now present conscious act of meaning it.* When we (when “I” as convergent phenomenologist) cross over the line and began to live in the overpowering ruling that such a distinction brings with it for all of human scientific consciousness, we find ourselves overcome with a certain, almost religious variety of awe. The feeling truly recalls to mind the famous passage in the Cartesian Meditations where Husserl suddenly achieved the ego with its stream of cogitations, and faithfully described it as a present-moment core that is apodictically experienced, while yet “beyond that, only an indeterminately general presumptive horizon extends, comprising what is strictly non-experienced but necessarily also-meant.”⁵⁰ Husserl guides us further, and helps us to move on foot upward. We begin to see, as the mists clears, as if for the first time, that a relation cannot be strictly a bodily experienced part of an intentional act, but that it still can be meant. This intensification of an intentional act into a core act that *could actually mean something*, and indeed mean something that itself was already utterly beyond itself toward something else we can now refer to as *the transcendental proto-constitution of adesse objectivity*.⁵¹

It will become clear in the following paragraphs exactly what the object of the act of the transcendental proto-constitution of *adesse* objectivity is. We can say, using the above example of pencils, that the object of the transcendental constitution of *adesse* objectivity itself when it is directed out into the empirical world to look for such presumed towardnesses is the already-appearing towardness of the real relation itself, in our exemplar case, the towardness of the longer to the shorter pencil. It is a long way from this blunt statement to the elucidation of what a higher

level judgment such as “this pencil is longer than that pencil,” presupposes. Husserl says that “wherever an activity of judgment, an activity of thought of any kind, explicit or not, comes into play, objects must already be present in the mind, either in an empty way or as intuitively self-given: every activity of thought presupposes pregiven objects.”⁵² Convergent phenomenology would agree to this state of affairs, but only in a modified sense, exactly because, as we have seen, we cannot re-constitute a real relation within the directive towardness of intentional consciousness without losing exactly that which makes such an actuality into a truly *meant* object in the first place: namely its *own* absolute, directive towardness to its referent.

When we do isolate out the notion of the transcendental proto-constitution of *adesse* objectivity and see its remarkable parallelism of form to intentionality itself, we finally begin to feel, from our whole self outward that the watershed division of *adesse/inesse*, with its shifting faults and plates, is base for an immense continental divide, resting and reaching into the absolute stratification of First Philosophy Itself. Perhaps for Stein, such excitement was akin to the excitement she must have felt, in her early work on Thomas Aquinas, at finally understanding that the achievement of Aquinas—of the entire (and wholly analogical and yet meaningful!) coming-into-focus of *metaphysica specialis* at the center of *metaphysica generalis*⁵³—is perhaps no longer based utterly on the quite ordinary *convertuntur ad phantasmata*⁵⁴ of the simple act of the intellect knowing the universal essence of a sensible object, but in what Przywara calls Stein’s “free-floating” grouping and describing of essences now based, subterraneously at least, on entire, shifting landscapes of organized images. In more general terms, such excitement is also akin to Kant’s excitement (and, later, Heidegger’s excitement) at discovering that there was a *pure* synthesis hidden at the center of ontological or transcendental knowledge that relied indirectly on the pure manifold offered by the transcendental imagination and was thereby able to bring forth both pure intuition and pure understanding into focus as already interrelated to each other and thereby outward toward the authentic, thing-like ontological object thus achieved as now being meant.⁵⁵ In the same way, the convergent phenomenologist suddenly begins to realize, with a great deal of wonderment, that relation-like objectivity *itself*, paralleling Husserl’s notion of eidetic intuition of essences, is indeed fully able to be intuitively separated out and clarified AS SUCH, as a unique kind of “already here and now converging incipiently *toward...*” object of thought. In other

words, because the convergent phenomenologist is now able to see the general *Eidos* of Relation as a meant objectivity no longer contained in the all-absorbing and built-up reciprocity of the ordinary intentional act, she is forthwith able to live and breathe and do her work within this new field of research opening up around her in much the same way as she had eventually learned to live and breathe and do her work within general phenomenology as a whole—at that very moment when transcendental subjectivity itself was itself seen in all its eidetic glory.

However, this re-kindled excitement is as yet enough to lead us into any exalted conception of some sort of further arena of investigative research. Rather, this must come later. Indeed, it is only by slowly and painstakingly carrying out authentic pieces of work, year by year, within the new science (almost without even suspecting that it *is* a new science) that she will gradually begin to understand not only the availability of such a science but also its determinate boundaries and its own special methods of approach. Borrowing a metaphor from Husserl himself⁵⁶: a pioneer out in the vast stretches of a wilderness area must make do with rough cultivation of whatever acreage appears the nearest and most available. It is only later, when connections are made between this and that cleared area of cultivation with a perhaps more expansive end in view, that then the whole homestead landscape itself begins to come into final focus.

Thus, convergent phenomenology is, for reasons that will be made clear, truly a science in every sense of the word. It is an eidetic science, and can thereby present credentials to be enlisted even into the ranks of such fully noetic disciplines as, indeed, purely formal logic, and all other such loftier sciences as directly dealing with the logical and ontological essences of realities instead of the concrete worldly realities themselves.

It is also a science akin to biology or paleontology in the sense that it can widen its landscape by ever-new, descriptive studies of those special objects with which it itself is alone concerned. And thus, although remaining wholly subalternate to the basic Husserlian investigations upon which it is grounded, convergent phenomenology is clearly a formal discipline that provides access to a radically new arena of work, and thereby remains, secured by a kind of secondary apophansis wholly diverse from the traditional apophansis enacted by the Husserlian *epoché*, a completely new, scientific field of investigative research.

If such is the case, why did it remain undiscovered and unavailable to Husserl and his followers? One of the main reasons is that Husserl, given his Kantian proclivities, never saw relations except as either (a) wholly unable to be analyzed further or else (b) simply mental rather than real.

If, in their painstaking phenomenological descriptions, Husserlian phenomenologists say they are dealing with a “real relation” and then begin to deal, as did the Reductionists, solely with that relation’s thing-like foundation, or thing-like term toward which the relation refers, then there is left no empirically perceived towardness to describe from the start, and the essence of what we purport to scientifically describe is utterly masked. It is simply not there. It has become mentalized already. The phenomenological reduction alone cannot show us this relation-like material. Without a further, convergent reduction itself in place, no pure towardnesses (empirically real relations as Eidos) can be described in their pure givenness, nor can they be meaningfully proto-constituted. It is as simple as that. A convergent phenomenologist should become just as frustrated by what we have termed Reductionism as was Husserl by those so-called phenomenologists who said they were looking at the Transcendental Ego when they were actually describing their own contingent, psychic, non-absolutized ego instead.

Thus, all we can say is that, for us instead, our risky, upward, on-foot wandering within a land neither phenomenological nor ontological has enabled us to see, as the mist clears cloud by cloud, the summit entrance at last into this hitherto undiscovered science. And this because we take the radical statements about relations (especially statements about *real* relations, found in the West in Aristotle, Avicenna, Aquinas and Jean Poinsot, and in the East in the ontological writings of the realist *Nyaya-Vaisesika* school) with a great deal of philosophical seriousness. What is today, in most philosophical circles, a naïve, archaic oddity can then become, for us all, a guiding insight, and, indeed, a leading motivation for proceeding forward into the new science itself.

NOTES

1. How can an entity whose *entire being*, as Aristotle tells us, is simply to be toward something ever come into the realm of empirically existing things if that “something else” is itself already another entity whose *entire being* is to be toward something else? This absurdity becomes crystal clear when we attempt to say that this stone in front of us is bigger than a “bigger than.” Suarez proves this point negatively as follows: He tells us that to say that “toward something” is itself a thing-like something is a game of words. In other words, Suarez follows Aristotle in affirming that a real relation, coming to a thing, does not change the thing. And if “toward something” is

something, “then he who gains “toward something” gains something. Therefore he is in another way and is changed” (*Nam, si est, ergo qui habet ad aliquid de novo, aliquid etiam de novo habet, ergo aliter se habet, et mutatum est*). See Francisco Suarez, *On Real Relation*, translated by John P Doyle, (Marquette University Press, 2006), p. 4. In this way, we can see how clearly the possibility of convergent phenomenology is vindicated *ontologically* because “something about which” (in a thing-like, *inesse* view) is already seen as wholly diverse from “something about which, yet already toward” (in a relation-like *adesse* view), or Suarez argument falls. Each region of objectivity thereby already demands, by the inmost nature of the objectivities thus in question, a special eidetic science.

2. One is again and again at a loss to theoretically clarify such stratospheric notions of an *adesse*-rooted meaning-theory beyond all possible, traditional meaning theories, precisely since there exists no sub-ontology of real relations from which to achieve conceptual ballast to ground such a working distinction between relation-like and thing-like. Medieval scholastic ontology comes close, but Aquinas never directly fashions any formally ontological distinction (as we have done in this chapter) between thing-like changes that affect us (pertinent to substance and all the categories of accidents [except relation]—the experience of which can be absolutized, or better, essentialized in general phenomenology) and relation-like changes that simply make us toward, without changing us (pertinent solely within the sui generis category of real relation—the experience of which can be essentialized in convergent phenomenology). He does come close. He imagines some other person suddenly becoming like him because of some new quality the other now possesses, for example, suppose Reginald, his secretary had grown to be as fat as Aquinas already is. Aquinas sees himself not in least changed, but does see himself nevertheless referred toward that person in an utterly new empirically real relation of similarity. He says: “When, therefore, someone newly receives that quantity, that common root of equality is determined in regard to that person and then nothing comes to me anew from this that I begin to be equal to another through his changing.” *Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics*, Book 5, Lesson 3 (667). Aquinas could have gone on to see this state of affairs as analogical to himself suddenly becoming “toward” the science of ontology that he loved so dearly. My own point in all these upper-atmosphere-like ontological wanderings is as follows: Whenever we enter into any eidetic science, we become asymmetrically “toward” that science without any empirical change in ourselves. Now, as living and breathing in the new science of convergent phenomenology, we are at least “on the way” toward knowing *why this is the case*.

3. I am using a term taken from informational system terminology because using the terms “super-region” or “super-category” would, in this instance, be misleading.
4. Suzanne Bachelard, *A Study of Husserl’s Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1968, p. 36.
5. In convergent phenomenology, both the “foundations” and the “terms” of empirically real relations are analogical to what Husserl calls the hyletic material of an intentional act, material that is neither noetic nor noematic. In exactly what sense the foundations and terms of empirically real relations are simply given and in what sense they are constituted within pure consciousness demand far reaching and laborious analyses which cannot be elaborated upon here.
6. Aquinas sensed this quality of real relation and pressed forward to consider a new eidetics of Relation that would enable him newly to describe real relations as being able to be viewed as in themselves indeterminately applicable to both subject-consciousness (both uncreated and created) and human object-consciousness. Otherwise, he would not have thereupon proceeded outward beyond all possible regions of the *analogia entis* to thus courageously (and urged solely by theological considerations) to dare to apply real relations to uncreated subject-consciousness itself.
7. Husserl speaks of several superimposed reductive disciplines, but the main two are the eidetic reduction that reduces facts to their corresponding essences, and the phenomenological reduction that brackets out of phenomenology the positing of empirical existence. Since the *in esse* (inherence of the empirically real relation in its foundation) is already neutral to the essence of the selfsame relation as *ad esse*, convergent phenomenology requires only the one reductive discipline itself superimposed on the first two, the so-called *convergent reduction*, that puts all thing-like essence embedded in transcendental subjectivity out of operation and deals solely with the resultant upsurge of relation-like essence. Both the first and the second kind of reductive maneuvers lead us directly into the selfsame Transcendental Ego. There is an alternate (and certainly more formal!) way of reductively achieving the field of convergent phenomenology that follows Stein’s powerfully thorough treatment of eidetic psychology. See Jim Ruddy, “Edith Stein’s Innovative Yet Orthodox Analyses of the Co-relational A Priori of Divine, Angelic, and Human Pure Consciousness,” in *Convergent Phenomenology and Edith Stein’s Philosophical Eidetics*, Foreword by J.N. Mohanty, Lambert Academic Publishing, Germany, 2014), p. 39.
8. Husserl, Edmund, *Cartesian Meditations*, translated by Dorian Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960), p. 27.

9. Avicenna, *The Metaphysics of The Healing* translated by Michael E. Marmura (Brigham Young University Press, Provo, Utah, 2005), p. 24.
10. Husserl, Edmund, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* translated by Ingo Farin and James G. Hart, (Springer, The Netherlands, 2006), p. 44.
11. Husserl, Edmund, *Cartesian Meditations*, translated by Dorian Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960), p. 8.
12. Heidegger, Martin, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, translated by James Churchill, (Indiana University Press, 1962), p. 4
13. We are moving in uncharted territory here. But we have analogical precedent. For just as traditional, Husserlian phenomenology lays the further groundwork for a *metaphysica generalis*, so convergent phenomenology could be projectively seen as laying the further groundwork for a special “sub-ontology” of relational objectivity were such an ontology ever worked out *in actu*.
14. Husserl, Edmund, *The Shorter Logical Investigations*, translated by J.N. Findlay from the Second German edition of *Logische Untersuchungen* with a new Preface by Michael Dummett and edited and abridged with a new Introduction by Dermot Moran (Routledge, London and New York, 2001), p. 13.
15. Levinas, Emmanuel, *Is it Righteous to Be?* (Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 93–94.
16. As will become clear in the following sections, this search parallels Aristotle procedures in regard to his sometimes naïve ontological findings. For example, he saw that real relation cannot be fully fitted into the neat scheme of the inherence-based series of the accidental categories of Being, and he then proceeded accordingly.
17. Levinas, Emmanuel, *op. cit.*, p. 94
18. Mohanty, Jitendranath *The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl, A Historical Development*, (Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 2008), p. 361.
19. I am wholly indebted to an unpublished paper of Kevin Wall, entitled “Relation,” for my almost Hegelian succinctness of relation’s history in the West. I wish to thank Fr. Wall’s family for their kind permission to use this paper.
20. It is clear that Husserl did not, in most cases, as did Aristotle and Aquinas, admit the existence of empirically real relations in the outside world. As to admitting the existence of transcendental relations as sources of Being (the *respecti*), the question is complicated by the phenomenological attitude, which says nothing whatsoever about the ontological sources of Being Itself. There is a passage in *Ideas* where it seems that he is aware of intentionality’s ability, in its most general and thus modifiable form, to relate toward *respecti*: “The possibility of a modification remains an essential

- property of these grounded acts (acts referred to the plain consciousness of this here and now present subject matter) a modification whereby their full intentional objects become noticed, and in this sense ‘*represented*’ objects, which now, from their side, become capable of serving as bases for explanations, relations [sic], conceptual renderings and predications.” See *Ideas*, translated by W.R. Boyce Gibson, (Jarrold and Sons Ltd, Norwich, 1931), p. 123.
21. Sharma, Chandradhar, *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, (Rider, 1960), p. 260. According to Sharma, Sankara held that “relation, whatever may be its nature and howsoever intimate it may be regarded, can never be identical to the terms which it relates.”
 22. If ever there was a face according to which wisdom itself seem to come down from its own height to speak, that face was the face of the famous Advaita master, T.M.P. Mahadevan. Once, in class, I asked him, “If a man, walking down the street toward me, is then and there experiencing *Samadhi*, how will I know?” Noticing the urgency of my voice, Mahadevan turned to me with a look of great interest and answered, simply, “You yourself would have to be experiencing *Samadhi* in order to know for sure.” His statement was so much more a blessing than an answer that I then remained peacefully quiet, and saw no need to speak further.
 23. See Mohanty’s Foreword to my book entitled, *Convergent Phenomenology and Edith Stein’s Philosophical Eidetics*, Foreword by J.N. Mohanty, Lambert Academic Publishing, Germany, 2014), pp. 3–4.
 24. Mohanty, J.N. “A Fragment of the Indian Philosophical Tradition—Theory of Pramana,” in *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 38, 1988, p. 257.
 25. Gupta, Sarita, and R.C. Pandeya, *Problem of Relations in Indian Philosophy*, (Eastern Book Linker, 1984), p. 2 and *passim*.
 26. Mohanty, Jitandranath, *Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought: An Essay on the Nature of Indian Philosophical Thinking*, (Clarendon Press, 1999), Mohanty also points out that, in the Nyaya Vaisesika system, relations cannot be related to other relations without an infinite regress: “The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position is based on a clear distinction between *sattā* and *astitā*. *Sattā* is a real universal (*jāti*, in the technical vocabulary), *astitā* is not. The reason lies deep in the categorial structure of the system. A real universal (*jāti*), according to this system, has to be in any of its instances in the relation of inherence, *samavaya*, and so cannot belong to that relation itself. Nor can it inhere in another real universal (*jāti*), for otherwise there would be an infinite series of them nested in succession.” P. 154. This sui generis character of *samavaya*, over against the other ontological categories, enables it to unify a real thing, re-instating it as a towardness beyond itself, after such a thing has been segmented by the categorial unpacking of parts. See Wilhelm Halbfass, *On Being and What There Is: Classical*

Vaiaseosika and the History of Indian Ontology (State University of New York Press, 1992), p. 75. This special character of the category of the *samavaya* relation in Indian thought, as Bina Gupta tells us, “enables it to be itself apart from the clear ontological dualism of the other [ontological] categories which are inherent, in a different way, in a substance.” (Bina Gupta, *Sexual Archetypes, East and West* (paragon Press, 1987), p. 75. Finally, even the asymmetricality of *samavaya* is evident in some texts. See Virgilius Ferm’s description of *samavaya* as “a relation of one-sided dependence” in his book, *A History of Philosophical Systems*, (Philosophical Library, 1950), p. 9. Clooney, on the other hand, holds that this asymmetricality of real/mental relation is better expressed by *tadatmya* rather than *samavaya*. “Brahman remains always free, and this freedom is best preserved by the *tadatmya* relationship which relates the world to brahman without binding brahman to the world in the same way.” See Francis X. Clooney, “Evil, Divine Omnipotence, and Human Freedom: Vedānta’s Theology of Karma.” *The Journal of Religion*, Vol. 69, No. 4 (Oct., 1989), p. 540. In the many forms in which we find *samavaya* in the vast literature of Indian epistemology and metaphysics, it may thus be an idiosyncratic notion, even an enigmatic notion, but it is definitely neither a logical construct nor an ontic or materialistic construct, but a full-fledged ontological construct.

27. Mohanty, Jitendranath, *Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought: An Essay on the Nature of Indian Philosophical Thinking*, (Clarendon Press, 1999), p. 166. Thus, Mohanty states that “the Nyāya needs a relation which is both adequate to tie such diverse types of entity together and compatible with their type-differences. Of the three basic types, substance, quality, and action, again, qualities and actions must belong to substances by the same sort of relation which would ‘tolerate’ their type-differences, and yet bind them inalienably. Such a relation is *samavāya*, by which the Nyāya succeeds in reconciling a pluralistic ontology required by its concept of being with a systematically structured conception of the world in which the category of substance and the relation of *samavāya* occupy an especially basic status.” In such a dual view, substance could very well correlate with what I have called thing-like objectivity and *samavaya* with relation-like objectivity.
28. Burke, B. David, “On the Measure *Parimandala*,” in *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 33, p. 281. Burke tells us that *samavaya* is not a mental relation but a relation which “only existing objects can have.”
29. Mohanty, Jitendranath *The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl, A Historical Development*, (Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 2008), p. viii.
30. Tripathi, R.K., “The Central Problem of Indian Metaphysics,” *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Jan., 1969), p. 43.

31. Once we understand, from Chap. 3, empirically real relations as the second material object of convergent phenomenology, we would do well to go back to Chap. 2 and review reduced pure consciousness as the first object of convergent phenomenology. They are interrelated, as I explained previously by being taken up eventually and finally into the formal object of convergent phenomenology which is *adese* objectivity taken apart from whether such objectivity is real, mental or asymmetrically both. One of Aquinas' seminal insights into *metaphysica specialis* (which resides in *metaphysica generalis* similarly to the way that the second material object of convergent phenomenology resides in the first material object) is that truth unfolds itself from the first principles of knowledge (which is our human sharing in subject-consciousness) in exactly the same way as truth unfolds itself from our purely intellectual knowledge of the universal essence of a real thing in the empirical world. Indeed, if we do not SEE this and SEE that the way our reasoning human mind proceeds in both cases is one and the same kind of intellectual act (Aquinas calls it analysis [demonstrabilibus]; Husserl would call it intuition), then we haven't yet reached the level of ontological truth, and are merely plodding along through an endless series of intelligibilities that are going nowhere. Aquinas considers this so important that he begins *De Veritate* with the following words: "When investigating the nature (*quid est*) of anything, one should make the same kind of analysis as he makes when he reduces a proposition to certain self-evident principles. Otherwise both types of knowledge will become involved in an infinite regress, and science and our knowledge of things will perish." *Truth*, translated by Robert W. Mulligan (Chicago, Henry Regnery Co., 1952), vol. 1, Q 1, art 1, *corpus*. As will become clear in this work, the convergent reduction into *adese* objectivity that achieves the scientific realm of convergent phenomenology also follows this selfsame insight into ontological knowledge itself. The shift of attention (the overlaid *epoche* that reaches into the transcendental proto-constitution of *adese* objectivity from the already achieved field of transcendental subjectivity) must realize from the start that the supra-intentional act (i.e. "the transcendental proto-constitution of *adese* objectivity") that constitutes an empirically real relation as ontological knowledge is the same kind of supra-intentional act that intuits the pure relationality of the Transcendental Ego (theoretically viewed as already toward something beyond itself) as miraculously and simultaneously real from one side, mental or intentional from the other side back again. The absolute intuition of pure relationality, as such, unfolds for us the "bodily-present givenness" of real relation exactly as it unfolds for us the "bodily-present givenness" of the very towardness of ourselves as the finally seen and kernel-like asymmetry of pure consciousness at the innermost hub-center of transcendental sub-

jectivity viewed, if you wish, as “absolute concreteness.” In simple terms, if we don’t see the objective towardness of a real relation out in the world as already “being toward...” apart from our mind, how can we ever hope to see the truth of pure consciousness as nothing but the towardness of our inmost “being toward...” precisely as the utter limit-concept, used by Aquinas and by Stein of subject-/object-consciousness in general. (NOTE: What I have just said in this endnote seems to be a dissimulating theological reintroduction of a divine reality itself back into a pure consciousness that has already bracketed it out. Such is not the case. We only draw a real triangle on a blackboard to help us return to the original, pure triangle itself as viewed within geometry. And, furthermore, the move from Husserlian pure consciousness into a scientific realm [i.e. convergent phenomenology] that views this selfsame pure consciousness as out beyond itself toward something else need not, in such a further reduced realm, clarify what that something else *actually* is but only present it as a limit-concept, since the new reductive view can of necessity move within its own refined view solely by subalternately basing itself [as a relation bases itself on its own foundation] on Husserl’s own, original reductive view.)

32. It may appear that this minute analysis of Aristotle’s category of relation is bordering on both the trite and the obscure. But the absolute importance of theoretical clarity in regard to these notions requires proceeding, as a mountain climber might, between two perilous drop-offs: relations as reducible to terms, and relations as merely mental constructs. Thus, what I am attempting to say in this passage is that Aristotle wasn’t sitting back and dialectically setting mental rules for dealing with ontological facts. Rather, he was going into unexplored territory, picking things up purely and simply, and describing things that were both existent and appearing, then and there, before his own directive gaze—albeit, it was the first time in history that any thinker had ever turned philosophical attention in that exact direction. Thus, when Aristotle talked about relation, he was not, as some thinkers have claimed, almost on the verge of espousing something akin to a modern logical theory of the ethereal properties of formal objects of thought. He was actually, in truth, finding something that was already existing out in the real world in front of him, catching it on the wing, as it were, and attempting to place it into an evolving system of categories based on accidental inherence in something else. In doing this, he suddenly saw by means of an immediate and quite astounding insight that relation didn’t quite fit into this previous system. It was almost as if relational towardness was of such a unique character that it required an utterly new framework in order to be fully understood and intuitively clarified.
33. It should be noted that this “living-through” is a different living-through than that which happens when we view the usual frontal objects of our

perceptual world. When I suddenly saw the similarity of “stones really toward each other,” it was a seeing of a different kind than the horizon-encompassed and perspectively unfolding seeing of the underlying stones in my field of perception. I couldn’t walk around this similarity and view it from different perspectives as I could view each of the stones themselves. The existent relation in question simply gave itself up to my gaze and passed non-thematizably away. But it was a real towardness nonetheless.

34. Husserl speaks of an intuitive seeing of relationships of similarity, but notice that he never speaks of perceiving such relationships as being out in the world and thus given as empirically real, except, perhaps, in *Experience and Judgment*. For example, after securing the fact that the essence of red, seen not in perceptual intuition but in categorical intuition, is indeed “seen” in such intuition, he continues: “We truly ‘see’ it; there it is, the very object of our intent, this species of redness. Could a deity, an infinite intellect, do more to lay hold of the essence of redness than to ‘see’ it as a universal? And if now perhaps two species of redness are given to us, two shades of red, can we not judge that this and that are similar to each other, not this particular, individual phenomenon of redness, but the type, the shade as such? Is not the relation of similarity here a general absolute datum?” Of course, no concretely seen similarity of towardness out in the world can ever be a “general” absolute datum. See *The Idea of Phenomenology*, translated by William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian, (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1964) p. 45. No passage in Husserl brings out with greater clarity the fact that Husserl primarily and systematically seldom considered relations themselves to be real, and already given as present out in the empirical realm of Nature. His above description of the relation of similarity unfolds as being clearly *not out in the world* but entirely within consciousness as a purely mental object of a constructed judgment itself founded on two already etherealized “seeings,” two acts not at all of perception but of categorical intuition. In many such passages, for Husserl, relating does not seem to be something that can ever be already done in Nature. Although there are exceptions, in most instances of Husserl’s dealings with relation, very often his phenomenological descriptions are what they are because such mental ordering is what consciousness itself does. Thus, he goes on to say: “Phenomenology proceeds by ‘seeing,’ clarifying, and determining meaning, and by distinguishing meanings. It compares, it distinguishes, it forms connections, it puts into relation, divides into parts, or distinguishes abstract aspects” (p. 46).
35. Mohanty, Jitendranath, *The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl, A Historical Development*, (Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 2008), p. 321. The first notion of essence in *Ideen I* is not of some pure form but very much more down to earth. It is, as Mohanty insists, “that which is

found in its-own-being of an individual as its *what*.” In exactly the same way, I am saying that towardness is found in the empirically real relation precisely as its “what.” When one asks of a real relation, “what is it?” the immediate answer should then be, “It is purely and simply a ‘towardness’ to that to which it refers. The scholastics called it an *ad aliquid*, a “to-another,” which is much the same thing. What must be clearly kept in mind, however, is that Husserl’s completely down-to-earth and thing-like essence can always be transferred immediately into a pure *eidos*, while, in our new viewpoint, the notion of transferring over the down-to-earth yet relation-like essence of a real relation into a pure thing-like *eidos* is wholly self-contradictory. A real relation is not a thing-like entity that can in its very whatness offer the further possibly of being ideated into some pure thing-like form. Rather, it is absolutized by absolute intuition in the very seeing of itself, or it simply is not being seen. This doesn’t mean that it cannot have an essence, since all real entities have essences, but that its essence is a relation-like essence rather than a thing-like essence.

36. Husserl, Edmund, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* translated by Ingo Farin and James G. Hart (Springer, The Netherlands, 2006), p. 64
37. I remember the reader for my master’s thesis, the brilliant Aquinas scholar, Kevin Wall, telling me, simply and directly on this point, that Thomas considered that a real relation out in the world nevertheless, viewed as more toward than in anything, *by that very fact*, contained something that was, quite unreflectively “in the mind also” simply because there is a great deal about human consciousness—as *object-consciousness* (as opposed to the created and uncreated *subject-consciousness* of angelic and divine reality)—that is itself more toward than in anything.
38. Jim Ruddy, “Source of the Classical Category of Relation in Western Thought, *Indian Philosophical Journal*. Vol. 10, 1974–75, p. 50–51.
39. Standing, finally, within convergent phenomenology proper, we could say the following about the strange paradoxes hidden within paragraph #3: The absolute intuition, with its convergent act-character, which “sees” the empirically real relation as a towardness beyond itself is a seeing in which we are more at home than the more basic, already-founded seeing of the thing-like objectivity of intentionality. As Merleau-Ponty says, I am able to appeal from the world and the others to myself (and reflect as universal mind and then speak) “only because *first I was outside of myself*, in the world, among the others, and constantly this experience feeds my reflection.” Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, translated by Alphonso Lingis (italics my own), (Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1968), p. 49. I would only add the caveat that the paradoxical problem, that even prepredicative experience requires predicative language thus to find itself and express itself, is solved not by going beyond Husserl

toward some existentialized “body-subject,” but should be solved within Husserl’s own grounded transcendental subjectivity itself, suddenly looked at in a new light.

40. Aquinas, surprisingly, does say exactly this: *Unde neque omnes relationes sunt maius aliquid quam una tantum. Summa Theologica*, Pars Prima, Question 42, art. 4, ad 3. Thus, he had either taken leave of his reason, or he was, on the contrary, speaking from the cathedral throne of a new and powerful core-eidetics of relation-like objectivity.
41. Mohanty, Jitendranath *The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl, A Historical Development*, (Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 2008), p. 264. The retentive intentionality nested at the inmost flow of time-consciousness, as Mohanty tells us, “appears to itself, without requiring a second flow in which to appear. It is as the Vedantins put it, ‘self-illuminating’ (svayamprakasa).”
42. I am aware that I am, for the moment at least, traipsing out into theology but there is a sound philosophical reason for my doing so. The odd notion of maximum and minimum relationalities with which I have attempted to bring added clarity to the essential property of empirically real relations that I am trying somehow to pin down in this paragraph is a world view, not just a Christian view. Aristotle tells us that we poor humans with a vision akin to the owl’s eyes turning into the light have to see things in part while the truth itself is something else, which is a kind of a shining whole. And, although he doesn’t explicitly say it, I am sure that Aristotle nevertheless would agree that thought-thinking itself has taken what only it itself can see: the whole ordering (in Latin, *respectus*) of created substances to each other and generously made this ordering an even higher perfection inhering in the mere accidents of these substances. In his unpublished paper, “Relation,” in the section entitled “The Reality of Predicamental Relation,” Kevin Wall tells us that empirically real relations (which he calls predicamental relations) “are therefore real because God actually confers them upon nature for which they are a possible complement. He thus not only makes a multiplicity of creatures, ordering them one to another, but he also adds that order to each one as an added perfection. This makes creation a beautiful and complete whole—a cosmos.” Posited as a philosophical idea, this notion is indeed a notion that even Whitehead could live with. It also sheds light on the somewhat cryptic remark of Wall in the same paper, “The act of thinking is relative to Relation, everything but the act of existence is relative only to essence.” And more to the point, it is not just because of his faith but *as a philosopher* that Aquinas dares to posit pure relationality, whose essence includes both maximum *respectus* and minimum *relatio*, within *actus purus essendi*.

43. Husserl, Edmund, *Cartesian Meditations*, translated by Dorian Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960), p. 42.
44. Husserl, Edmund, *op. cit.*, p. 12
45. Mohanty, Jitendranath, *The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl, A Historical Development*, (Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 2008), p. 336.
46. Stein, Edith, *Finite and Eternal Being—an Attempt at an Ascent to the Meaning of Being*, translated by Kurt F. Reinhardt (IGS Publications, Washington DC, 2002), p. 1.
47. *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, (translated by Dorian Cairns, [Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969], pp. 139–40.
48. The intuition that sees the towardness of empirically real relations I call “absolute intuition.” Absolute intuition lies somewhere between sensuous intuition and Husserl’s higher, categorial or purely eidetic intuition. I discovered absolute intuition by quite faithfully following the lead of Husserl himself. He tells us (in *Ideas I*, #138) that to every type of being (i.e. of would-be objects), there corresponds “not only a *basic kind of meaning or position*, but also a *basic kind of primordial dator-consciousness* of such meaning, and pertaining to it, a *basic type of primordial self-evidence*.”
49. In *The Formal and Transcendental Logic* (translated by Dorian Cairns, [Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969], p. 112), this idea had reached complete sophistication. He says: “We now note that this ‘*having made the judgment in the making of it*’ is not at all the same as having that judgment objectively: as a ‘*theme*’ and, in particular as a *judgment-substrate*. In judging, we are directed, not to the judgment, but to the ‘*objects-about-which*’ (the substrate-objects) currently intended to, to the *predicates* (that is, the objectively determining moments) currently intended to, to the *relational complexes*...and so forth.” Certainly, it is a natural and wholly reasonable extension if we proceed from ideal and thus categorically intuited “relational-complexes” as meant and go on to include empirically real relations as meant.
50. Husserl, Edmund, *Cartesian Meditations*, translated by Dorian Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960), p. 23.
51. There is a remarkable parallelism, therefore, between what Husserl called the act-character of intentionality, and what could be referred to as the “act-character” of the transcendental constitution of adesse objectivity. Viewed in such a light, the transcendental constitution of adesse objectivity can be seen, formally, as nothing else but the act-character of the act of absolute intuition, and the other side of such a moment of that act (the very *content* of that act) *is* the real relation itself as here and now showing itself to consciousness. The difference between Husserl’s act character and the act character of the transcendental constitution of adesse objectivity lies in the fact that the content of the transcendental constitution of adesse

- objectivity and the transcendent object of the transcendental constitution of adesse objectivity are so absolutely identified as to be unable to be analyzed further into a material content here and a formal object there. A real relation is neither a non-independent part of its foundational subject, nor the formalization of its foundational subject but the very towardness of such an inherent subject utterly beyond itself, purely and simply “toward...”
52. Husserl, Edmund, *Experience and Judgment, Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic*, revised and edited by Ludwig Langrebe, translated by James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks, (Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1973), p. 19.
 53. *Metaphysica specialis* has as its objects God, human reality and nature, each with its special realm of investigations; *metaphysica generalis* has as its objects Being Unity, Truth and so on, and the accidental categories of Being. The two domains are asymmetrically related. The latter is really dependent on the former, which, from its own height, is not at all related back to the latter.
 54. This Latin phrase means, “turning to phantasms or images.” Aquinas upheld the view that human knowledge in this life, even at the supreme heights of human reason, requires empirically produced images from the imagination as a necessary ground.
 55. Heidegger, Martin, op.cit., pp. 66–69. Note that Husserlian phenomenology would be interested in the intuitive clarification of the achievement of the *convertuntur* (or the achievement of the founding pure synthesis) as a nearly miraculous achievement of intentionality. Convergent phenomenology would be interested in the selfsame achievement as a kind of converging intensification of the intentional act, overreaching even its own towardness in order thus to unfold the pure towardness now simply *being* the transcendent object of ontological knowledge. The poor, plodding human finitude of having to ground even the loftiest ontological object through a darkening turning to the transcendental imagination is not then etherealized in convergent phenomenology. If we have to move from single phantasms or images to a relational gathering “landscape” of several phantasms or images converging toward a central, even more founded, image, then we are not vacating the ground of ontological knowledge through the premature abandonment that some abstraction would bring in its wake. Rather, we are getting closer to a more concrete ground, a ground of ontological knowledge altogether more fundamental, and thus all the more revelatory, but, unfortunately, all the more obscurely hidden in the depths of the art of the imagination itself.
 56. Husserl, Edmund, *Ideas*, translated by W. Boyce Gibson (George Allen & Unwin Ltd, New York, 1931), pp. 22–23. In an uncharacteristically poetic flight of fancy, Husserl likens his new phenomenology to the trackless expanse of a new, unexplored continent.

Convergent Phenomenology and *Asymmetrically Real* Relations

4.1 RELATIONS THAT REFER TO A TERM ITSELF NOT REALLY RELATED BACK AGAIN

It seems obvious, at least to us moderns, that the final distinction between real (as transcendent) and mental (as immanent) is the ultimate, continental-divide-like “outpost” within the immense all-encompassing region of ontological-phenomenological knowledge. To say, then, that there may be an entity, specifically at the third-level domain of existence of *adesse* objectivity, that is, even as one single entity, real outward, “toward...”, but only mental back again, ... “in,” would seem to be already “off the charts.”

But such was the conception of a single, co-relational asymmetry (thus: *real*-toward-targeted-term, but *only-intentional*-back-in-foundational-term) that reigned supreme in material logic from Aristotle all the way to Suarez within Western thought. It would be well to transport ourselves back to the paleontological “digs” of classical and medieval thought in order to uncover the hidden sediment-layers of this almost numinous conception (of an actual towardness that was real outward, mental back again) as it first began to appear in the West, and to trace its hegemony within ontology up until the petty, bickering “backwash” of Nominalistic logic hid it finally from view.

It is interesting to note that the Islamic Aristotelians in medieval times posed the problematic of this (radically problematic!) asymmetry of real/mental by simply wondering (in an almost childlike way) how something can be both one and two at the same time. As scholar Herbert Davidson

points out, when Al-Kindi is trying to make sense of how the already-embodied intellect can become wholly unified with an incorporeal (and thus purely spiritual) object of thought without having something become both itself and something else simultaneously, he says that the human soul “is both intellectual thinker [*cdqil; intelligens*] and intelligible thought [*macqul*]; consequently, intellect [*caql*] and intelligible thought are one from the viewpoint of the soul. The [*first*] intellect¹ that is eternally actual and that leads the soul [*from potentiality to actuality*] is not, however, one with what thinks it intellectually [*cdqilubn*].” Davidson’s goes on to tell us: “A marginal gloss or manuscript variant tries to help by explaining: ‘Thus from the viewpoint of first intellect [*thus back “into” the soul*], the intelligible thought in the soul is not identical with first intellect.’”² Davidson continues: “Kindi is apparently saying that whenever the human rational soul thinks, and not merely at the culmination of the soul’s development, it has ‘intelligible form’ as the object of its thought and the two become one; and since intelligible form is identical with, or part of [*even entitatively!*], first intellect, the human soul can legitimately be described as having become one with first intellect. Yet the union of soul and first intellect obtains only from the viewpoint of the soul, whereas from the viewpoint of first intellect, the soul and first intellect remain distinct. The conception is not an easy one to digest, but it asserts in effect that soul and intellect are one yet remain two.”³

Looking closely at this first paleontological find within Al-Kindi’s theology, one can sense that this whole, almost primitive, state of affairs can, *mutatis mutandis*, be transported forward to help us understand the flickering, architectonic structures glowing, fossil-wise, within Husserl’s formulation of the act/object issues embedded within intentionality itself. In other words, the gratuitous, and, indeed, miraculous, asymmetry of intentionality is centered in the fact that intentionality becomes wholly and numinously and even perhaps entitatively one with an object that can only be mentally (and thus, “intentionally”) related back to “itself-as-intentionality” even according to the most unified view possible.

My point here is simply that, if one were a Husserlian phenomenologist, she would be looking (second-level-wise) at the already-wholly-fulfilled intentional Object; but if one were a convergent phenomenologist, she would be looking (third-level-wise) at both the Transcendental Ego (as nothing in itself and entitatively everything toward the already-fulfilled intentional Object) AND the already-fulfilled intentional Object as it is in itself...: thus—in such a final, limit-view—**subject-consciousness-wise**

twofold, and yet, on the other hand, “proto-phenomenologically,” back within **object-consciousness**, one.⁴

We are, thus, to a certain degree standing in quite ambiguous digs, thus standing as beginners directly within the weighty problematic, circumscribed by pure logic (and plaguing our first two chapters), of how the **one** formal object of convergent phenomenology can be also seen as **two** material objects. For the two material objects of the science of convergent phenomenology—pure consciousness viewed as *adesse* (in Chap. 2), and the special *adesse* of real relations themselves (in Chap. 3)—have been uncovered as groundwork for the purely formal establishment, once and for all, of the a priori science of convergent phenomenology, at least in outline.

From where we are now, arriving on foot at final outpost, we still may be “bested” (in Stein’s sense) by further archeological digs that may possibly reach the final *bedrock itself* of the Absolute Ground of convergent phenomenology as a purely eidetic science. There are hints that this is the case. Aristotle talks about our walking from one side of a pillar to another as suddenly placing us in the odd position of being the resting place for a real relation which, in its essence, is outward toward the pillar which selfsame, identical relation, viewed suddenly as already inherent, is not really, but only mentally, related back again, since, entitatively, the pillar, seemingly, cares nothing about our wandering. Aquinas generalizes Aristotle’s passing insight into a powerful, epistemological insight, at an almost inconceivably higher level, by telling us in *Contra Gentes*: “In understanding one thing to be really referred to another, our human intellect simultaneously grasps the relation of the second object back to the first, although sometimes this second object itself is not really related.” I say “higher level” because Aquinas, by the single qualifying term, “sometimes,” was the first philosopher to “place” relations themselves in their own ethereal area as uncountable, non-thematizable and, as themselves—by virtue of their interior essence as such—implying neither mental nor real (and neither finite nor infinite!) domains of originative grounding both, first, as regards both existent and intellectual foundations and, second, as regards possible targeted terms. Thus, he leaves the ineffably unplaceable mystery of them on the fly, and, when, in his mature years he ventures a “division” of relation into real, mental and asymmetrically both, this division is perhaps more methodological than originative. Whichever is the case, the pervasive *Lebenswelt* of Aquinas is, beyond all modern imagining, enlivened by its daily living and breathing in a high

altitude region itself precisely real *solely as nonreciprocally referred* to the *actus purus essendi* as such. Aquinas entire ontology is simply impenetrable until this is understood. Even when he passes beyond *metaphysica specialis* (which includes both divine and created reality)—and thus epistemologically includes both subject-consciousness (uncreated and created) and object-consciousness—I repeat, when he passes beyond *metaphysica specialis*—and even when his razor-sharp intellect upsurges into *metaphysica generalis* (which includes, correspondingly, both Being and Truth)—he simply divides Being Itself into Being Itself as pure act, to which even *adesse* could be ascribed, and everything already toward Being Itself as potency/act, to which merely *inesse* could, to a certain degree, be nonreciprocally ascribed. This dug, asymmetrical bedrock is the *fundamentum in re* for the entire heights of Aquinas’s ontological knowledge as he himself (according to the nonreciprocal proportionality of the *analogia entis* that he self-discovered) sees it—and thus precisely as it upsurges, clear stream from bedrock, according to the actual way in which it then and there shows itself as Truth. Accordingly, in a way almost impenetrable to us modern-minded thinkers, Aquinas, day by day, lived in the realization that Truth is merely “asymmetrically identical,” even at the heights of uncreated subject-consciousness as such, with Being Itself. Thus, he actually dares to enact a kind of proto-Husserlian epoche that brackets out even Divine Truth Itself when he tells us in *De Veritate* that “Even if there were no human intellects, things could be said to be true because of their relation to the divine intellect. But if, by an impossible supposition, intellect did not exist and things did continue to exist, then the essentials of truth would in no way remain.”⁵

All this is mirrored in Edith Stein’s new methodology. For Stein, at the equivalent height of her phenomenological descriptions of created reality and the utter self-given *adesse* of human knowledge of this created reality within the *Ich Leben*, sensed the above *adesse/inesse* division of Being Itself⁶ to be primary and the division of act/potency to be, at least at the ultimate bedrock level with which we are now concerned, derivative. Indeed she tells us that “Subjectivity is the original form of spiritual object. In contrast, being a spiritual object in the sense of existing for a subject is derived.”⁷ From an even more unitive point of view, the Thomist–Hegelian, Kevin Wall, insists that “the act of thinking is relative to Relation, everything but the act of existence [*thus everything but the sheer actuality of Being Itself*] is relative only to essence.” In such *adesse-layered*, wholly grounded—and epistemologically-final!—bedrock we find

the inexhaustibility of the dug seepage of a clear spring. We have moved from the soul-within-a-soul upsurge delineated by Levinas, and from the upsurge of live language uncovered by Merleau-Ponty to the ontological upsurge within object-consciousness of the *actus purus essendi* as such.

Let us try to unpack all these layers once and for all.

To be more precise: It is possibly the case that we will perhaps never be able to get a glimpse of the full scope of the new science in question, and how it interrelated its own two diverse objects, without first thoroughly investigating Thomas Aquinas's own remarkable, and even more "back-to-the-non-reducible-realities-themselves" doctrine of *asymmetrical* relation, a doctrine which passes beyond the describable towardness discoverable, for example, in any real relation of similarity, and speaks, not only of wholly real relations (such as similarity) and of wholly mental relations (such as the mind forming a purely logical relation by simply relating a thing back to itself) but also of a strange, single relation which is real from one side, and only mental from the other side back again.

Aquinas, in the thirteenth chapter of the first book of *Contra Gentes*, one of his earlier works, sets forward this idea with incomparable simplicity. He asks us to see all the created things in the universe as real towardness to an ineffable *actus purus essendi* that is itself in no way really related back to them. Thus, flying in the face of our usual idea of the mutual correlation between the foundations and terms of any relation, Aquinas is saying that when we turn from these towardness, these created beings, toward the act of Being Itself that made them, we expect some real correlation back again from this divine reality to creatures, but through a kind of awe-struck instant of recognition that our human object-consciousness feels in the presence of such divine reality as the pure act of existence wholly diverse from all created reality, we see that what we thought were correspondingly real sides of the selfsame relations—now viewed as referring back to each of these creatures from the divine reality—are merely some mental intelligibilities that our own mind has suddenly fashioned and begun to impose on such ineffable reality, mental constructions of the other side of the real relation in question which are, in themselves not real at all any more, even though *they are nothing but the other side of the original real relations*. As coming back from divine reality to creatures, somewhat the way that Al-Kindi above viewed our towardness to the angelic first intellect, these entirely partial and yet somehow correlative "back-again towardnesses" are not at all real, but merely mental or intentional back-again towardnesses only.

Thus, we see that there indeed must be instances of relation which are asymmetrically and yet essentially unified, real from one side, mental from the other side back again. Aquinas states what has happened with unparalleled clarity. He says that these coming-back intelligibilities are attributed to God “solely in accordance with our manner of understanding, from the fact that other things are referred to Him.” After saying this, he in a single stroke *generalizes* the preceding fact by saying the following primal and simple universal truth, a truth shining out like some sort of high-water mark of scholastic thought concerning the mysterious unfolding of time and human consciousness: His astonishing “generalization,” if we can dare to call it such, at this high level reveals that it is a clear feature of object-consciousness, in other words, of the intellectual to and fro and wholly temporally-encompassed meanderings of the plodding human mind, that we understand, in a simultaneously whole insight (if object-consciousness could for an instant become subject-consciousness it would see this with blinding clarity), that “in understanding one thing to be referred to another, our intellect also can grasp the relation of the latter back into it, although sometimes that latter referent is not *really* related back at all.”⁸

We have used the ground-breaking force of meditations on referred asymmetry to lead us up and through the gate opening out onto the plain of convergent phenomenology as an eidetic science. Now we stand in the field of this science. And here a meditational truth should occur to us, as if all human thought were, a la the poetic image of Dante, converging inward to God forever: the philosophical motion of human object-consciousness is nothing but a convergent reaching inward toward divine subject-consciousness itself as an asymptotic goal, as the illimitable source of all actual knowledge occurring within us.

All this time, during our the span of our conscious life, all this time that we were fumbling and bumping up against this or that material object in the encompassing material world, *we were living examples of an asymmetrical relationality*, without even knowing it! Our being IS such, but, further, it is because creatures are related to divine subject-consciousness asymmetrically that *human object-consciousness* is also wholly asymmetrical, in other words, really related out toward a physical, sensible object here and now that is, itself, not at all really related back to the mind. The two asymmetricalities, one toward *actus purus essendi*, the other toward an empirically real and substantial material thing in the world, in Thomas terminology, are, as Stein declares, analogically proportionate asymmetricalities. Human knowledge, in Thomas’s startling new back-

again viewpoint, can now be intuitively clarified in a radically diverse, two-fold manner: *absolutely* as a conceptual, wholly mental act that remains within the knower and perfects the knower, or *relatively* as a real relation toward the known object. As an asymmetrically real relation, according to this second angle of view, *human knowledge is not in the knower at all* but simply in the thing (and thus, as we have seen in the case of empirically real relations, absolutized by the thing) being here and now known. More than this: It has now utterly become the known object. As a real relation “toward...”, knowledge is simply the thing itself being thus here and now known in that very towardness of the mind to it. The direct track this second concept of human knowing will follow, of course, leads straight from Aquinas to Brentano to Husserl.

And yet, although there are nearly an infinite amount of hints toward it through its own intensive intentional analysis, and although it miraculously posits pure consciousness as Absolute Being and posits the *omnitudo realitatis* as contingently referred to and gaining the sense of its own ontological meaning solely from such Absolute Being, Husserlian phenomenology is not clearly aware of this new, asymmetrical and yet radical subtlety of absolute and relative *within pure consciousness itself*. Convergent phenomenology needs to be there as a kind of servant science in order to take it into account. That is what makes all the difference.

Kevin Wall, a Dominican priest, and a fervent student both of Aquinas and of Hegel, can help us decode and finally comprehend Thomas’s matured thoughts in this area, an area of the utterly outward reference of relational towardness, both in its real and in its mental aspects.⁹ Indeed, upon a careful reading of Aquinas’s famous classification of relation in the *Summa* (I, Q. 13, art. 7), one is led onward and upward and starts to ask several questions about relation itself. First, if Thomas is including the purely mental or logical relation between genus and species *within* the higher vantage point of treating the pure essence of relation (which he quite clearly and intuitively classifies as threefold (*tripliciter*): mental, real and asymmetrical)¹⁰ how did he reach such a high vantage point thus to be able to systematize and classify relations in the first place? Everywhere else in the *Summa* he spins out generic and specific distinctions to solve objections, but *here alone* the very spinning-out itself is suddenly contained along with other things in a *higher* vantage point. So a further question arises: How did he achieve such an utterly new and innovative, panoramic view and from what hitherto unknown ontological viewpoint was he thus pronouncing his definitions and distinctions and divisions of *relation itself*

as such? How could he carry this out, while all the while expressly forgoing any reliance on the quite un-relation-like (indeed quite thing-like) intelligibilities of species *logically* inhering in genus, and form *actually* inhering in matter? He is speaking as if there already exists a higher, quite special science of the pure form of all relations *as such*, and he was thereby proceeding forth from the sources of this science to bring forth the classical scenario of “defining” and “dividing” the objects of such a science. But where did this new science come from? In all the vast amount of Thomistic literature we simply find no answer to these simple, unfolding questions.

Our on foot excursion has reached its goal. And it shall become clear in the following pages how ground-breaking and far-reaching this wholly systematic and even ontological doctrine of Aquinas (concerning the pure essence of mental, real and asymmetrical relations) is and to what extensive lengths such a completely original and yet unified viewpoint can bring one across the divide of summit-ranges, down into the vortex-center of the new science itself.

4.2 ON THE ERROR OF REDUCTIONISM IN SOME MODERN THOMISTIC EXPOSITIONS OF AQUINAS

Many Thomists have considered Thomas’s theory of relation to be wholly esoteric and even inconsequential to the rest of his thought. In his book, *The Thought of Thomas Aquinas*,¹¹ the Dominican scholar, Brian Davies, says the following words, which, because they reflect a well-meaning but erroneous trend to popularize Aquinas’s notion of asymmetrical relation to which I cannot ascribe, I quote in their entirety:

What, in fact, Aquinas is saying in his (curious sounding) teaching on God’s relation to the world is that God is not something alongside his creatures. For Aquinas, God is the source of his creatures and, for this reason, is distinct from and different from them. Given the difference between God and creatures, Aquinas reasons, it can be said that being a creature is something in the creature but not something in God. Or, to put it another way, the fact that there are creatures is a fact about creatures, not God. This may sound terribly esoteric and deeply confused, which is how it has seemed to numerous readers of Aquinas and of those who in his day and earlier said the same thing. But what he is driving at is really quite intelligible and not particularly incredible. To see this, consider the following example. Suppose I go to Australia and spend a long time there as a tourist. In these

circumstances, I could be said to acquire a knowledge of Australia or, simply, to know Australia. I could also be said to stand in a certain relation to Australia—i.e. one of knowledge. It is the case that I know Australia. It is the case that Australia is known by me. On the other hand, however, my knowing Australia is nothing in Australia.

It is notable that Davies writes that he is now going to tell us what Aquinas was “driving at” by his notion of asymmetricality, as if Aquinas was attempting to say something which he unfortunately wasn’t able to quite put into clear terms. Davies is, thus, going to tell us what Aquinas really meant. Indeed, what he “would have said,” if he could have formulated it more clearly, Davies insists, was not really very remarkable at all.

Let us notice three things about the position that Davies is espousing in his own attempt at clarifying the asymmetricality of the relation between God and creatures. First off, if creatures are real towardnesses to God, anyone would think that this means that they point utterly out toward God and are nothing at all in themselves. But notice that Davies says, “The fact that there are creatures is a fact about creatures, not God.” Here Davies forgets that Aquinas, on the contrary, tells us straight up, again and again, that the fact that there are creatures is a fact that leads us to prove uncou-terably that God Himself exists. Second, notice that Davies’s example of visiting Australia is not even an example of a real relation out in the world, but of a formal, conscious relation within the mind only. Or, are we seriously to think that a creature is toward God like some tourist traveling into and out of Australia without leaving any mark? Finally, notice, even more to the case, that, for Davies thus to give a facile and homely travel-ogue example of knowledge and its object (which is wholly off the mark as regards the pertinent and entirely existential state of affairs between God and creatures) as if this brings Aquinas’s thought down to some ordinary talk, akin to an aside during a dinner table conversation, totally misses the point being made by Aquinas about the utterly transcendent state of affairs in question. Aquinas is not taking a run-of-the-mill situation and merely telling us something even more run-of-the-mill that, as Davies puts it, “can be said” about it. In other words, Aquinas is not mentally mull-ing over what could possibly be said, among other things, about this or that mental object. He is rather, once and for all, authentically and starkly describing for us *a very real state of affairs out in the real world*. He is dar-ing thus to delve into the mystery of Being Itself, as was Aristotle in the *Categories*. Nor are Aquinas’s insights into the asymmetricality of the real

relation under consideration akin to ordinary asides that one might hear at the dinner table about one's memories of a visit to Australia meaning nothing to Australia. They are formal, ontological statements of the highest possible order. For Davies, thus, to reduce Thomas's extraordinary insights into the asymmetrical nature of the relation between God and creatures to some mere prosaic, "not particularly incredible" way of talking about concepts in the mind is an apologetic slight-of-hand that I cannot follow. For, in Aquinas, the stark asymmetricality of the real relation between God and creatures is not a concept but a transcendent reality apart from our knowing of it, though it indeed parallels the further, even starker asymmetricality of the real relation as already going outward into an exterior sensible, material object which is undeniably the selfsame relation precisely viewed as suddenly returning back into the immaterial mind knowing that object. *By his balanced use of a pure and wholly prepredicative eidetics of asymmetrical relation, Aquinas delved deeper into the sheer exteriority of Being Itself than any other thinker before or since.* We scholars of Aquinas are apt to image him out in our minds as serenely dictating books in his study at the priory of Saint-Jacque, rather than as suddenly and courageously swinging open the front door and walking to the University of Paris, passing by hooligan gangs of students and dodging streams of swill being poured from above by the lay followers of his clerical enemies.

Brian Davies is a formidable scholar. But the truth is the truth. And I'm afraid that Aquinas's profound and subtle interplay between the aforementioned two asymmetricalities in both his doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* and his doctrine of the immateriality of the intellect (as it pivots off the constructed image of a sensible object thus to *actually touch* directly into the abstracted form of a sensible object) is as far from being mundane or prosaic as it is from being esoteric or confusing.

NOTES

1. It should be understood that medieval Arabic thinkers often considered the "active intellect" here mentioned to be an existent, angelic, transcendental, incorporeal "intelligence": a "separate substance" as Aquinas called it.
2. Note how close this idea is to Aquinas's notion of the asymmetrical, real/mental relation between God and creatures. The sheer act of creation itself, as pure *adesse*, is "*already* really" out toward God, yet, when we try to look at this identical, selfsame relation from God's "point of view" we can only see it as "*already* mental" back again.

3. See Herbert Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect*, (Oxford University press, New York, 1992), p. 42.
4. Descartes got this reversed, and with disastrous consequences.
5. Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate*, (Q I, art. 2, *corpus*).
6. Where did this high watershed, ontological difference between relation-like and thing-like reality actually come from? What Aquinas says about perfection can bring us closer to this ontological difference and can enable us to see its usefulness for convergent phenomenology: "Note, therefore, that a thing is perfect in two ways. First, it is perfect with respect to the perfection of its act of existence, which belongs to it according to its own species. But, since the specific act of existence of one thing is distinct from the specific act of existence of another, in every created thing of this kind, the perfection falls short of absolute perfection to the extent that that perfection is found in other species. Consequently, the perfection of each individual thing considered in itself is imperfect, being a part of the perfection of the entire universe, which arises from the sum total of the perfections of all individual things. In order that there might be some remedy for this imperfection, [...and here comes Aquinas's wondrous broadening of the notion of the illimitable (yet somehow, limit-concept-like) source of this watershed difference!] another kind of perfection is to be found in created things. It consists in this: that the perfection belonging to one thing is found in another. This is the perfection of a knower in so far as he knows; for something is known by a knower by reason of the fact that the thing known is, in some fashion, in the possession of the knower. Hence, it is said in *The Soul* that the soul is, 'in some manner, all things,' since its nature is such that it can know all things. In this way it is possible for the perfection of the entire universe to exist in one thing" (See Thomas Aquinas, *Questiones Disputatae de Veritate*, TRUTH Questions 1–9, translated by Robert W. Mulligan, S.J. [Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952] Question 2, article 2, *corpus*). Following along with this universe-in-a-grain-of-sand idea, Kevin Wall, in his unpublished paper, "Relation," in the section entitled "The Reality of Predicamental Relation," tells us that empirically real relations "are therefore real because God actually confers them upon nature for which they are a possible complement. He thus not only makes a multiplicity of creatures, ordering them one to another, but he also adds that order to each one as an added perfection. This makes creation a beautiful and complete whole—a cosmos." What Wall and Aquinas touch on in these remarkable passages is of utterly no consequence to phenomenology of course. Not the slightest trace of ontological truth can ever be found within phenomenology, nor should it be. And yet posited as a wholly transcendent, wholly philosophical idea, this notion is indeed a notion that a Leibnitz or even a Whitehead could have lived with. However, even recent

phenomenologists seemingly have achieved deeper wisdom from such purely ontological limit concepts. Jean-Luc Marion tells us “It is here no doubt that there arises the question that Husserl could not answer, because he perhaps never heard it as an authentic question: What gives [*Marion here is seemingly referring to the unlimited “ways” of givenness of categorial intuition of Being Itself*]? Not only: ‘What is that which gives itself?’ but, more essentially: ‘What does giving mean, what is in play in the fact that all [*as adesse, certainly!*] is given, how are we to think that all that is is only inasmuch as it is given.’” Jean-Luc Marion, *Reduction and Givenness* (Northwestern University Press, 1998), p.38–39. Since it leads us to the utter gratuity of *adesse*, and the fact that, if *adesse* vanished from the world, the world would be identically the same as it ever was, we must, accordingly, not allow to fall into oblivion the earth-shaking originality and profundity of Aquinas’s global insight into the *adesse/inesse* problematic: For, indeed, in his sudden broadening of the very scope of *ratio* itself into a pure self-understanding of its own legitimate (and equally pure!) asymmetrical towardness outward into subject-consciousness, Aquinas sees, as a kind of cosmic traveler (and this with blinding clarity), that the “remedy” that God provides lies solely in *adesse* givenness rather than in the *inesse*, categorial givenness of Being Itself within *metaphysica generalis*. The category of real relation shakes all the other categories and leaves them “up for grabs,” and *Metaphysica specialis* could not possibly survive as “intuitive” and scientific fulfillment of *metaphysica generalis* without the superabundant pure gift that such a remedy itself provides! Put in metaphorical terms of the striding along “progress” of First Philosophy: when we finally walk out Real into subject-consciousness, we can *only mentally* (and with almost Sartian nothingness) stumble back to see our poor, journeying self as we actually are. This is as it should be. “Toward” vanishes into all things so that all things flow back, layer by layer, into their numinous selves. And thus, to extend this metaphor forward: If we are true to this journey’s final outpost, we shall first see our self as a pure, divine gift already toward the undiscovered “*adesse-country*” of such pure subject-consciousness, or we are already misdirected into our own inert hubris. Our mantra for this journey: “Everything *toward*, nothing *in*.” Thereby does Husserl’s self-view as absolute beginner itself make perfect sense.

7. *Potency and Act. Studies toward a Philosophy of Being*, (henceforth PA), translated by Walter Redmond, (ICS Publications, 2009), p. 123s.
8. *Contra Gentes*, Book II, Chapter 13. *Intellectus enim noster, intelligendo aliquid referri ad alterum, cointelligit relationem illius ad ipsum: quamvis secundum rem quandoque non referatur.*
9. Around 1962, Wall had collected Aquinas’s references to relation and added his own notes, and did me the honor of letting me read those notes.

10. *Veruntamen sciendum est quod, cum relatio requirat duo extrema, tripliciter se habere potest ad hoc quod sit res naturae et rationis.* (I, Q13, art 7, *corpus*). Compare this sophisticated view with, for example, one of his earliest views of relation as stated in *De Ente et Essentia*. There, at the end of his ontological/logical treatment of the notions of essence and being, he sets the category of relation utterly apart from all the other accidental categories, since it is an accident in another accident rather than an accident in a subject. Yet he doesn't attempt anything like a direct and intuitive clarification of its own special character.
11. Davies, Brian, *The Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Clarendon press, 1993), pg 76.

Pure Consciousness as Transcendental Proto-Constitution of *Adesse* Objectivity

5.1 ARRIVING AT HUSSERLIAN INTENTIONALITY AS A UNITY OF REFERENCE

We are now able to travel by foot directly down into the vortex-center of the new science itself. Here the reader has to be cautious. The following descriptive study is working wholly within a new area where the relation-like proto-constituted objects that are discovered and terminologically fixed have not, as yet, been scientifically clarified by long-term usage. The words we use to achieve such a description thus contain, each at their own layered level, a surplus of meanings which is to be expected in the use of any new methodological technique, and this surplus can render exact description ambiguous. Let us then begin with these caveats in mind.

When we are moving through phenomenological data and are well within the phenomenological standpoint, we can at any moment achieve the convergent standpoint. To take our already familiar example of the two pencils, one of which is longer than the other, before we apply the convergent reduction, there is before us the comparatively grouped noetic/noematic structure of two pencils, wholly within the consciousness of thing-like objectivity, and always within such grouped state of affairs there is the possibility of turning each pencil around and looking at the other side of it, and we can shift our ray of attention from one to the other and back. We may even convince ourselves that any comparisons between the two pencils as regard shape and size and color are simply constructions of the mind, building noematic phase upon noematic phase. We can also turn

to the noetic side and describe the rays of grouped attentional modifications that themselves may be made thus to ray-out, thereby to combine the two pencils in a “comparative reference of the one to the other.” Here we must be careful. For it may be possible that the exteriority and elusive masking that may occur by such superimposed attentiveness—due to the fact that the ground and the term of the relation, as *inesse*, are intendible and thematizable, while the relation itself cannot be thus spot-checked and thematized—is not yet evident to us.

However, after the assuming of the attitude of convergent reduction, the self-same content as thing-like remains, though neutralized, but now the towardness of the longer to the shorter pencil has become the utterly new phenomenological datum to view. Everything has altered *absolutely*. We see that the attempt to “mentally” combine the pencils into a comparative reference has masked the actual objectivity of the real relation itself appearing to us. The towardness now being viewed is still “in” the thing-like content of the longer pencil and is toward the thing-like content of the smaller pencil, but the foundation-content and the term-content, respectively, have been neutralized and are re-introduced into the new descriptions now being carried out within convergent phenomenology only with the attendant signature, “thing-like objectivity only.” What is thus to be described is simply no longer describable in terms of the ground theory of noetic/noematic content.¹ We are dealing with the new, completely non-stratified state of affairs of the absolutely given (thus given by absolute intuition of the real relation itself) “towardness” (of the relation of the longer to the shorter pencil) in its pure essence. There is no noematic nucleus to describe! What we are seeing, in a raw view, is “real,” but so minimally “real” that it cannot be said to be encompassed by the primal, utterly passive stream of inner time-consciousness that encompasses the mentally grouped pencils themselves. If the term or the ground of the relation in question changes, the relation simply is no longer there in such a final sense that it cannot even be said to have “vanished” since that, at least would have been a change. Furthermore, the normal Husserlian description of perception, which would include the “real” aspects (of both the noetic phases and the hyle) and the “non-real” aspects of the noema itself, has become oddly “truncated.” The “real” aspect of the perception of an empirically real relation as now reduced is simply an absolute seeing with no phases involved at all. The foundation of the relation and term of the relation are not in any meaningful sense the “hyle” of the relation, since they are exactly the thing-like objectivities now being left out of the description from the start.

Let us now reserve the Latin phrase *ad aliquid* (a “toward-something”) for this pure essence that we have above attempted to describe through our new analysis. And since Husserl’s theory of meaning covers all situations within the entire field of phenomenology, convergent phenomenology included, we can also add that what is now being described, the *ad aliquid*, as caught in the act of being proto-constituted, is exactly the actual relation itself of the longer to the shorter pencil, not as real any more, as being rotted in *inesse*, but real in an utterly new sense as being now simply meant.

The *ad aliquid* cannot be strictly “intended” as a content of an intentional act, but it certainly can be remembered, fancied, wished for, valued and so on, and we can say, as dyed-in-the-wool Husserlian phenomenologists, that each of these modalities of the *ad aliquid* indicates whole areas of actual work within the newly achieved field of convergent phenomenology itself as an eidetic science.

We have reached the single, subsidiary area of pure consciousness where the neutrality modification has no applicability and, indeed, is thereby rendered meaningless. We cannot “hold back from” or “put out of action” the appearing objectivity of any real relation, even an asymmetrically real relation. Through our above description, we have seen this to be the case with apodictic certainty. The essential objectivity of the *ad aliquid* is either seen, and then it is immediately posited, or it is not seen and then there is no question of positing either its existence or its non-existence. Avicenna realized this when he set down the proof for the existence of empirically real relations for all time to come and against all Reductionist views that would have thereby attempted to mentalize such reality. Contrary to those who affirmed the position that relations do not exist in reality, but are mere mental forms, Avicenna used the following powerful argument: “What resolves for us the perplexity... is to turn to the absolute definition of the relative. The relative is that whose nature is only predicated with respect to another. Thus anything in the concrete that happens to be such that its nature is only predicated with respect to another belongs to the relative. But among the concrete existents there are many things of this description. Hence the relative in concrete things exists.”² The “nature” that Avicenna speaks of in this final, incontrovertible proof is exactly the *ad aliquid* that we have been describing. Its constitutive source is not the transcendental constitution of meant intentional objectivity but the transcendental proto-constitution of now newly meant *adesse* objectivity.

We are tempted, of course, to define the transcendental proto-constitution of *adesse* objectivity as the special intensification of an intentional act into a kind of core intentional act that *could actually mean something*, and exactly mean something that itself is already utterly beyond itself toward something else. But is this the case? With the introduction of the notion of *ad aliquid*, we are now privileged to be able to come closer to that within consciousness which actually makes the transcendental proto-constitution of *adesse* objectivity to be what it is *in actu*. The transcendental proto-constitution of *adesse* objectivity is **itself** able to enact the above intensification because it has the extraordinary creative ability to refer (in what the scholastics called a proportionality and what we should now perhaps call a proto-proportionality) an *ad aliquid* to another *ad aliquid* within a higher viewpoint that retains the essential towardness of each of the viewed *ad aliqua*. Here the notion of a landscape of founded imagery, rather than the pivot-point of a single image, now begins to make more sense.

Let me give a couple of examples to show what I mean.

1. *An Example from Western Thought.* Aquinas simply appropriated this creative ability of consciousness in all his ontological “talk” about the *actus purus essendi*. It was not just a talk based on proportional analogy, classically exemplified as two is to four as three is to six, but radiated out from a much deeper level of consciousness. Aquinas uses the example of the idea of health to explain how one can move inward from *what human object-consciousness is toward what divine and created subject-consciousness is*.

The sheer creativity of Aquinas in all this layered talk is stunning to say the least. Thomas would first arrive at the essence of health as pure idea, and then, opening the door and simply looking out into the world, would see that an animal (itself a creature “toward...”, and thus itself an *ad aliquid*) was healthy *in toto*, as the real, complete *subjectum* of health **and this primary insight was like subject-consciousness as purely meant**, but that the *ad aliquid* of the towardness of medicine to this animal was analogically healthy as a cause of health, the *ad aliquid* of the towardness of urine to this animal was analogically healthy as a sign of health **and these secondary insights were like object-consciousness as purely meant**. The essence of divine and angelic subject-consciousness and the essence

of human object-consciousness could be seen as converging toward a pure idea of consciousness in general, but never directly toward each other. Only thus did Aquinas dare to speak of divine subject-consciousness, and never did he directly compare subject-consciousness with object-consciousness as “this thing” compared to “that thing” (bringing thereby fresh air into the eidetics of analogy itself, and thereupon re-phrasing the *analogia entis* in this more primitive way clarifies it, once and for all, as a incomparably pure ontological method of dealing solely with *adesse*, solely with utterly relation-like rather than thing-like objectivities from the start. And it shows that the endless controversies swarming around Thomas’ notion of analogy are rooted in thing-like, Reductionist distortions of his original thought.)

The school logic at the time of Aquinas was rooted in the analogical in a much more profound sense than is usually supposed. A truth to be proved was “situated” in the corpus of the proving “article,” and the objections and counter objections were arrayed, relation-like around that central corpus. This was an alive method. When one thinks of Aquinas, one should most often think of him as a debater rather than as a solitary scholar. He became, eventually, the most famous *Magister* in the whole of Europe. One should thus imagine him presiding at one of the famous *circuli* at the University of Paris,³ (cheered on by bleachers of students, hooligan fights breaking out here and there in the wings⁴), himself, indeed, completely at home in the rigorous back and forth dialectic of objection and response, with the sounds of his own stubbornly formal tone succinct and implacable, opening the floor for all possible theological questions, then and there, on the fly, like some star soccer goalie at the World Cup.

2. *An Example from Eastern Thought.* We have brought in the ontology of Aquinas to help us unfold the notion of *ad aliquid* as it is found in convergent phenomenology. But what of the ontology of Sankara? Little is known of his actual life, but there is a wonderful story that tells of him sitting under a tree and preaching the doctrine of *mithya* to his students when suddenly the class was interrupted by a tiger loping out of the woods. The entire class, teacher included, jumped up and began to run away from the tiger. But a student running next to the teacher cried out, “Master, if your doctrine of *mithya* means that the world doesn’t exist, then that tiger doesn’t exist. Why are we running?” To which the teacher instantly replied, “Even our running doesn’t exist.”⁵

Such a reply was anything but some form of fancy footwork. Sankara employed a species of logic later to become formalized by the famous *Nyaya* school.⁶ The *Nyaya* logic of classical Indian thought was not reducible to the straightforward three-member syllogisms of classical Western thought, but was, in fact, equally contextual as well as deductive. Even the most down-to-earth contextual examples became inseparable parts of its formal, syllogistic proof. In the West, a syllogism would say, “Where there is smoke there is fire. But there is smoke on the mountain. Therefore there is fire on the mountain.” In the East, a syllogism would say, “Where there is smoke there is fire, *such as in my mother’s kitchen*. But there is smoke on the mountain. Therefore there is fire on the mountain.” The latter syllogism was not viewed as probative if the homely example about the kitchen were omitted.⁷ (Recall the just-as-homely and switching-here-and-there example of Aquinas’ healthy animal). The only way that such an off-to-the-side exemplar as a lowly kitchen fire, as such, can be actually probative is if it is viewed not as a kind of thing-like premise in itself, but instead as already wholly referred in a relation-like way, thus as *ad aliquid*, to the proof carried out by the major and minor premises. And it must be understood that, in respect to its own indigenous origins, *Nyaya* is considerably different than Western logic. It developed, not as an urbane and Grecian dialectic of the scholarly academy, but from crafty, practical attempts of one religious group to wrest parapsychological secrets from another, rival religious group.⁸ Such pundits discovered, in an atmosphere of dialectic similar to the clashes of the Western scholastic *circuli*, that, if a young novice were countered at every step by a logic that was akin to a kind of dazzling swordplay of proof, the novice would eventually drop his own arguments and blurt out, “I tell you, the truth that I seek to defend is not based on logical arguments, rather the goddess Kali, who often visits the tree next to our monastery, revealed this truth to our master.”

This kind of swordplay logic, moving in *adesse* splendor between *ad aliquid* and *ad aliquid*, is also in the Buddhist tradition. The final “entrance exam” for the present Dalai Lama of Tibet required him, at the age of 16, to perform a ritual dance in a circle of elders. The elders would ask rapid fire questions while presenting hand signs called *durgas*. The Dalai Lama had to simultaneously answer the questions and mirror the self-same *durgas* with his own hands, as part of the dance.⁹

It would seem that such swaying back and forth, *ad-aliquid*-adorned, purely ceremonious notions of logic are as remote as possible from Husserl’s own scholarly and ethereal forays into formal logic. Such is not at all the case.

Husserl himself would agree that bodily gestures and expressions, as they become sedimented in the life-world of various cultures and in the flow of human history, can give us clues even to the deepest realms of a pure theory of meaning and of the origins of the primordial evidence of logical thought. Even an honest, lucid thinker of the stature of J.N. Mohanty tells us that “there is a group of bodily movements that acquire symbolic significance and in a certain sense become spiritual objectivities. I have in mind such things as determinate gestures and bodily movements that are institutionalized symbols, for example, those involved in religious rituals or traditional dance forms (for example Indian).”¹⁰ Indeed, Bharadanatyam, the ageless dance form of South India, is nothing less than a combinatory “speech” even up to the level of what Husserl calls “expression,” since it combines mime, a subliminal “language” of eye gestures, and a deep philosophical tradition of stylized story-telling along with the purely corporeally expressed pedestal-base of its dance. These layered forms of expression of pure *ad aliquid* allow for what Maurice Merleau-Ponty called “primordial silence” out of which fleeting gestures have the uncanny ability to re-world the very world itself of exterior reality, as if intentionality itself were being finally seen as it actually exists. It is perhaps at the very point where, as Mohanty describes it, the “distinction between bodily gestures and inner mental states breaks down,” and thus where such transcending gestures are seen as utterly passing beyond themselves toward something beyond themselves, that general phenomenology can be complemented by a subsidiary, convergent system of supra-intentional description of various levels of *ad aliquid* that can “fill in the corners” of the truth of such a state of affairs with anything approaching a final, intuitive clarity.

In a certain sense, the transcendental proto-constitution of *adesse* objectivity, as the total possibility of being able to synthesize *ad aliqua* across the entire spectrum of real and asymmetrically real relations, is nothing other than pure consciousness itself as disclosed at last within the converged standpoint of the science in which we now stand. In this new, extended concept of the transcendental proto-constitution of *adesse* objectivity, what we have called domains of mental, real and asymmetrical classes of relation-like objectivity are thereby transcended utterly. In other words, the special, proto-constitution of relation-like objectivity that the transcendental constitution of *adesse* objectivity achieves passes through all domains at a single stroke. The pure Ego doesn’t live passively in the transcendental proto-constitution of *adesse* objectivity. Rather the veritable stance and creative ray themselves ability of the transcendental

proto-constitution of *adesse* objectivity rays itself out from the pure Ego in such a manner as to illuminate even the entire field of intentionality as it is in itself, and thus even according to its own continuous “being-rooted” and thus its own re-worlding of itself precisely within the timeless *adesse*, an *adesse* that itself nests like some stationed dancer within the primordial unfolding of time-consciousness exactly as it is in itself. *The transcendental proto-constitution of adesse objectivity transcends thereby the entire constitution of internal time-consciousness even down to its most primitive level and, in so doing, grounds ontological knowledge as such.* Paraphrasing Wall’s enigmatic remark, “The transcendental proto-constitution of *adesse* objectivity is relative to Relation, everything except for ultimate transcendence of the very *actus purus essendi* itself is relative only to essence.”

5.2 THE PROTO-CONSTITUTION OF *ADESSE* OBJECTIVITY AS CORRELATIVE TO THE MEANING-FULFILLMENT OF *AD* *ALIQUID*

In order to bring the above truth arrived at in Sect. 5.1 to a greater clarity of expression, let us use a single state of affairs, taken as, successively, starting from the natural standpoint, then passing through the phenomenological standpoint, and then, finally, arriving at the convergent phenomenological standpoint. Note that the pronoun “I” used in all three examples is a purely methodological “I.”

5.2.1 *The Natural Standpoint*

I am driving along in a beige-colored 2003 Nissan Altima, and I arrive at a stoplight. Just as I come to a stop, another beige-colored 2003 Nissan Altima over on the left pulls up alongside me. I begin wondering who the driver is and where the car was purchased. My mind starts to wander, and I remember that my father taught me how to drive my first car when I was a teenager. I suddenly remember a vacation that my father and I took down in Mexico when I was 15. We stayed at a ranch near the *San Pedro Martir* Mountains. The second day, we had planned to go on a horseback trip up into the mountains. I recall riding that morning to the ranch gate on my roan-colored stallion and stopping to wait for my father. He came up on my left, riding a horse of the same color as mine. The stoplight changes green, I stop my imaginative daydreaming, but as I start off, I begin to wonder if the two cars had brought the two horses to mind.

5.2.2 *The Phenomenological Standpoint*

The episode itself as phenomenological data is enormously complex. Let us single out simply the statement “I begin to wonder if the two cars had brought the two horses to mind.” This statement is a “wondering” that is founded on two base-level conscious experiences that we would have to single out in all their purity, one being an act of perception and the other being an act of fantasizing that is grounded on a past perception, suddenly recollected. We would also have to describe that manner in which the conscious act of wondering itself comes down like a ray from the constitutive power of the pure Ego and thereby encompasses both base-level acts and posits a many-rayed act as a completely new and non-real and yet still objective noematic “wonderment.” It could be said that the noematic contents—the noemata that are accordingly correlative to the many-rayed noetic act—consist of the two cars and the two horses united, vaguely enough, by some apparently mentally grouped collective comparison.

5.2.3 *The Convergent Phenomenological Standpoint*

In such a wholly general phenomenological treatment, much of the concrete, many layered, phenomenological detail is left out of the picture. And yet, as convergent phenomenologists, we would nevertheless feel required to go on to ask, “What of true importance has been left out even at this most general level?” We would immediately notice that the actual objectivity as meant of the so-called “wonderment” is *not at all available as noematic content* as would have been supposed in the above phenomenological analysis. The wonderment is precisely posited, not at the thing-like level of cars and horses, but at an utterly diverse relation-like level of a seen and thus rawly intuited similarity between the perceived cars and an imagined and thus rawly intuited similarity between the fantasized horses. The *ad aliqua* herein brought to light are being creatively referred to each other at an almost infinite depth, yet to further describe exactly how these two actually-being-synthetically-referred-to-each-other “towardnesses” are proto-constituted within the already-converged act of wondering can surely become a matter for painstakingly hard descriptive work. Whole fields of new material are thereby opened up for further investigative research. Nevertheless, the main point is clear.

NOTES

1. Husserl tells us that “it belongs to the essential nature of every intentional experience that it can ‘glance toward’ its noeses as well as its noemata.” *Ideas*, translated by W.R. Boyce Gibson, (Jarrold and Sons Ltd., Norwich, 1931), p.318. This modificational changing of a glance’s direction is not possible within the transcendental constitution of adesse objectivity, since the entire glance is already taken up in the pure directiveness of the relation’s towardness to its term.
2. Quoted by M. Mamura in his article, “Avicenna Chapter on Relation in the Metaphysics of the Shifa,” <http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/sina/art/mamura6.pdf>.
3. http://www.edocere.org/st_thomas_aquinas_bio.htm.
4. I am indebted to Thérèse Bonin for this rather rowdy slant on the *circuli*. See especially <http://www.home.duq.edu/~bonin/thomasbibliography.html>.
5. I would like to thank my great friend and forward-thinking scholar, Dayananda Saraswati, for this story.
6. See the *Vedanta—Paribhasa* of Dharma Rajadhnarindra which is based on the *Nyaya*.
7. Randle, H. N., “A Note on the Indian Syllogism,” in *Indian Logic, A Reader*, edited by Jonardon Ganeri, (Curzon, Richmond, England, 2001), p. 77, 78.
8. Dayananda Saraswati was himself adept in the quick-on-its-feet, argumentative style of the *Nyaya* school.
9. I learned about this through talking with Tenzin Choeghal, the youngest brother of the Dalai Lama, and a good friend.
10. Mohanty, Jitendranath *The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl, A Historical Development*, (Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 2008), p. 108.

The Re-worlding of Intentionality

6.1 THE INTENDING OF IMPOSSIBLE OBJECTS

By now we have come to realize the aberrant futility of attempting to relate an actual towardness to another actual towardness. In terms of standing within our own consciousness thus to become aware of the wholly essentialized “field” of Husserlian pure consciousness, we can logically spotlight such a truism. For, at its broadest conceivable level, sheer towardness or sheer *actual* relationality, paradoxically, if it were ever to become conscious of itself *as reductively finding itself as possible field of both pre-ontological and pre-phenomenological acts of so-called intentionalities* (i.e. as reductively finding itself as a “consciousness of...”—thus precisely as not yet fully aware of itself), cannot further relate itself to a higher actual relation beyond itself without losing sight of both itself and the actual relation. Simply and formally stated—at the uttermost edge of consciousness—there can be no actual towardness to another actual towardness without the resultant, flat-out contradiction of infinite regress. Thus, if there are degrees in the impossibility of a state of affairs and its transcendental constitution or proto-constitution, the above state of affairs more or less ranks at the very top of the list. There is a reason to stop and consider the aforementioned, top-ranked contradiction. For meaningful knowledge of impossible objects is the one case where the sheer asymmetricality of relation-like objectivity within human knowledge stands out with a kind of odd, chiaroscuro relief. How can one have symmetrical knowledge (thus a co-relationally real knowledge from both sides

of the single intentional act) of something that not only doesn't exist but also, according to the way things are, never, ever can come into existence and therefore never can unfold itself within the *Lebenswelt* as a possible object of human knowledge? What is playing itself out in this interplay? Husserlian phenomenology attempts to describe such a moving-bravely-forward act of attempting to mean an impossible object, though we have the feeling that the description itself already warps intentionality beyond recognition, even notwithstanding intentionality's familiar and essential capacity to mean "emptily" something that can never fulfill its intention. Husserl tells us that, in really meaning a "square circle," we are simply apprehending its very own impossibility of a true meaning-fulfillment. Yet, since the act is clearly passing through such incompatibility toward something else, then, patently, something more is "really" going on. Thus, even at the height of pure logic, even when all phenomenology comes to a standstill, it would be well to push further forward and dare to ask: exactly *what are we doing* when we meaningfully and actually relate ourselves to a square circle?

The most daring answer I can think of is to be found in a passage from the eighteenth-century Polish scholastic Maximilian Wietrowski. When a colleague objects to the possibility of meaningfully having an impossible object within human knowledge because actual knowledge cannot have an actual relation to something impossible, since there can be no actual relation to nothing at all, Wietrowski bravely counters, "It is not contradictory that some real entity have a real relation to something impossible and that it be (thus) connected with the impossibility of that thing. For, certainly, nothing is truer or more real than God. And yet God is essentially connected with the impossibility of what is destructive of himself, and therefore God has a real relation to such an impossible thing."¹ Thus, in what Doyle calls a "breathtaking" solution, Wietrowski is telescoping together and allowing interplay to occur between the following items: (1) object-consciousness as really out toward a subject-consciousness "impossible" to *really* relate back to oneself; (2) a "real" knowledge of an at least ambiguously intendible square circle; (3) a subject-consciousness that is *so perfect* that it is not afraid to *veritably and actually* confront the *sheer impossibility* of something greater and more perfect than itself; (4) a sort of backhand vindication of Aquinas's truism that subject-consciousness cannot be *really related* to anything *actually* outside itself; and (5) a returning back into a new object-consciousness that, from one side at least, is now, somehow, and "impossibly," greater than itself precisely for having

answered the objection with such uncounterable finality! One might ask, since it now is beginning to appear that no *actual* limits can be set to intentionality's "as-structure" except from our new, *adesse* point of view, what will intentionality become when it is, through such a viewpoint, re-worlded back into the *Lebenswelt* from which it originated? Will it finally be able to be viewed as an utterly spiritual act/object?

The point to that we wish to establish in this chapter, however, is a great deal simpler: ordinary, Husserlian phenomenology, without some further reductive expansion of insight and some further field in which to describe what is seemingly "going on," cannot "cash out" such illuminative yet one-sided "returns" (what we might presently call, in a purely proportional sense, the "wholly *ad-aliquid*-like going forth and returning back") into object-consciousness such as the one ethereally described by Wietrowski. They seem to remain phenomenologically "indescribable." The situation is akin to the impasse-situation up in the heady realm of mathematical logic wherein all the semiotic counters are in place, all sets (even the able-to-be-mentally-warped ones!) are being sketched out in advance, or, to use a vivid metaphor, all possible future fugue themes are counterpointally arranging themselves for us within the shimmering auras of constructive symbolism, *but there is never any emergence, as a pure and miraculous gift to our ears, of any actual music.*

It is one of the aims of this present work to show that the aforementioned pivotal and prepredicative principle of "no real towardness to another actual towardness," as *fully lived-through* and accordingly as precipitously centering itself objectively and finally within pure logic, granted freshness and immediacy to Husserl's early notions of intentionality, but, as often shunted aside and ignored, became a hidden source of ambiguity in Husserl's later work.

Why was this the case? Not just Heidegger but Husserl as well was, in a lifelong fashion, influenced, through Brentano, by Aristotle's analogical "ways" in which human consciousness can "mean" Being Itself, not the least of which was as both possible and actual. And certainly, this entirely apophantic way of thinking about reality can now be extended to *adesse* objectivity itself. The layered idea of both mental and real relations being scientifically treated within modern formal ontology, apart from their discoverable instances in worldly experience—and thus rather according to their own inmost definition and exhaustive divisions—must not lose itself in some further, elaborately constructive symbolism, but should, indeed, hark back to the unexpectedly sophisticated—and purely formal—treatment that

they received first in Aristotle. Aristotle (and Aquinas, following him) held that relation *as such* accordingly can be viewed, finally and without contradiction, as either wholly real or wholly mental or, indeed, asymmetrically real only outward and merely mental back into its foundational base. The key to understanding this present work is thus clear: If “towardnesses” in such a classic view actually exist, then the notion of them ever becoming direct objects of an intentional act thereby “containing” them is both logically and experientially unthinkable, at least to the degree that intentionality is itself *already* an actual/potential towardness to its object. For act/potency is, even at the level of a final *respectus transcendens*, forever an *inesse* rather than an *adesse Sachverhalt*. Certainly, Husserl would agree that a square circle may be at least partially constituted from an intendible square and an intendible circle,² but the notion of even partially constituting a real relation from its thing-like, intendible foundation and its thing-like intendible term simply passes beyond the realm of the thinkable even at the most generally conceivable level. This chapter has now reached a logical outpost where it can thereby look more deeply into intentionality to see why this is the case.

6.2 WHY A REAL RELATION IS ITSELF NON-INTENDIBLE AS ACT/OBJECT

Recall that we have been putting into suspension all modern notions of relation and working with the now-forgotten, sedimented notions of relation as they freshly arose and became layered in early Western classical and medieval thought, and eventually passed out of all knowledge through the pseudo-logical bickering of Nominalism. The originary and prepredicative source of relation that can then be resurrected by us moderns from this lost eidetics, with its strange series of “consequences,” leads inevitably into the wholly formal/ontological ground of Relation Itself that can be uncovered in classical thought. Concentrating on what was believed to be a “real” relation existing out in the world of empirical reality, and which no doubt remains an oddity which the modern mind is all too apt to view as reducible to a hypostatizing trick of the Greek language, it was nevertheless the case that the ancients held to a kind of holistic viewpoint of the real relation itself. They believed that the entity of a real relation could only be explained by the actuality-side of what an ontologist would call the “united process” of Being Itself, originally viewed as taking on the force and retentive character of what the present author has elsewhere called a “grounding act of reference.”³ It could take on such a character precisely

as foundation for all relations: both those formed by the human mind alone (called mind-dependent by Poincaré) and those discovered as already “real,” thus discovered intuitively as already existing out in the world of empirical reality (called mind-independent by Poincaré). The general notion or ontologically saturated conception of “change,” including both local motion and sedentary change, was metaphorically or even analogically extended to such a grounding act of reference. This grounding act, latter canonized by Aquinas into the *actus purus essendi*, was thus rather primitively visualized as “passing through” both mental or real states of affairs, grounding the mental relations such that they showed themselves forth from themselves as mental, and real relations such that they showed themselves forth from themselves as actually present in the world and thus already “in” their foundations, and already “toward” their terms. A real relation was thereby already “within” its own extremes and could be intuited solely in the unique way in which it thus showed itself.

It was because of this entirely ontological and transcendent grounding act of reference that such existent relations were a lot more toward terms than in their foundations, even though no real relation, at least according to the space-bound and time-bound human viewpoint, could be intuited apart from such foundations. Such real relations, because of the grounding act of reference itself, were categorically unique in the sense that they inhered in accidents that were themselves already inhering in substance. It must be clearly understood that in the ancient, Aristotelian ontology, the entire reality of an accident was already proportioned inexorably to its own fixed inherence in a substance. Anything thus sub-inhering in an accident itself would thereby be seen to exist somehow in a manner that must be almost infinitely less real even than the clearly insubstantial reality of the accident itself.

Out from this frail conception of sub-inherence emerged an entire array of sub-properties themselves wholly enigmatic, obscure and even paradoxical. If a real relation could even be put in a category at all, such a category would already be the least real possible category. Since ordinary accidents could be known through abstracting them from inherence, it would have to be the case that real relations were known absolutely and in their utmost frailty, or they were simply not known at all, since they possessed no genuine inherence from which one could thereby extract them. A real relation was thus somewhat like an impenetrable riddle, ensconced in its own absolute particularity—an ontological riddle that could not be further elaborated and gradually thematized and thereby finally shown forth from itself as “this” or “that,” since it was already, as itself, *toward something beyond itself*. Aristotle

and Aquinas had to come to the odd conclusion that a real relation could not be grouped into a “set” of real relations. It thus could not be counted. It even could not, in its own actual, formal self change, and if its term or its ground changed, it simply was not there anymore, and this so finally that it could not even be said to have “vanished from sight.”

All of these paradoxical characteristics fade before the final aspect of a real relation, a shifting aspect itself perhaps stemming directly from what we have so far been attending to as a grounding act of reference: the case of an empirically real relation was the one case where the mind could penetrate no further into the complete exteriority of the *actus purus essendi*, the entire area of Being as it actually exists in itself. Put in terms more amenable to human object-consciousness, when such a totally object-conscious, time-bound, space-bound mind sees a real relation out in the world, it can thereby sustain no more of its own independent, entirely mental relations outward into such a state of affairs, thus to attempt to sustain its own unraveling intelligibilities around such a *sui generis* event to understand it further. There simply remained no further focus according to which the real relation being thus attended to could be made more intelligible. If ever there was an infinite regress that boggled the mind utterly, this was it. For there was clearly no further real relation somehow hiding “behind” the absolute towardness itself (and thereby actually unfolding beyond the real relation in question) that could then better explain the latter’s own formal nature. Such a state of affairs enabled human object-consciousness to finally draw an eternally meaningful line between the mental relations thereby coming to their own astonished rest and the non-transgressible and miraculously exteriority of this real relation itself blocking the way, since the mind, in the ancient view, was always endlessly able to multiply mental relations around things even off into infinity.

We now can return better equipped to answer our central question: What is it within intentionality itself that enables it to intend the term and the ground of a real relation, but to not be able to intend, in any meaningful sense, the real relation thus already grounded and already heading off so mysteriously toward its term? Because the central notion of the sheer, ontic paradox of relation in general, either mental or real, remained itself unfruitful and even undeconstructed, it has become the case, for most of us moderns at least, that accurately positioned clarity on such a crucial state of affairs (namely the exterior “event” of the grounding act of reference that, as we have seen above, miraculously sustains *adesse* objectivity precisely at the uttermost *inesse*-core of Husserlian intentionality) is frequently lacking. Perhaps Dorion Cairns was on the right track when

he insisted that “the correlation between transcendental awareness and its object (and likewise between noetic awareness and its full noema) is not a ‘real’ relation, i.e. not a relation in the world, but a transcendental relation, completely *sui generis*, to which world categories are inapplicable.”⁴ However, merely pointing out that early Husserlian intentionality’s towardness to its object is “unique” doesn’t tell us much about its own vital, core structures *as themselves specifically relational*.⁵ All the same, it is at least certain that, if any scholar wishes to proceed forward to at last describe, in all its formal-essentialistic glory, such “*sui generis*” relationality at the core of Husserlian intentionality, then she faces a daunting task indeed. Kevin Wall faced a similar task in his seminal book on the nature of relation in Hegel, and he sets forth, with exemplary clarity, the final key problems to be confronted:

The defining notion is this: that relation is the *unity of reference* of a thing to itself and to another. “It is ‘*Beziehung auf sich*’ but at the same time ‘*Beziehung auf Anderes*.’ (*Encyclopädie*, Gl. 8). ‘*Beziehung*’ is, as it were, the subject. ‘*Einheit*’ is the form. **Relation is the latter.** It is the unity of reference which is bilateral. The conception of it is a theoretical challenge. For it demands, in order that it be understood, that one first understand ‘*Beziehung*’; and then that one understand [as we tried to do with the event of *ad aliquid*, above] how more than one ‘*Beziehung*’ can be compounded into a true unity. If one can understand this, then one can grasp the Hegelian concept of relation. If one cannot do so, then this concept must remain obscure. The challenge is clear and its terms are precisely exposed.”⁶

The parallel challenge that this chapter now faces is obvious: the radical uncovering of the “I-pole/object-pole” nature of Husserlian intentionality *as it is in itself* and thus precisely as a sheer *unity of reference*.

6.3 RELATIONALITY ITSELF AS A SHEER TRANSCENDENCE-WITHIN-IMMANENCE

Facing such a challenge, the trivial,⁷ obvious question is simply this: Can an entirely formal eidetics of relationality itself seek its originative ground in the sheer unity of pure consciousness? Or, better: “When we *do* step back from the natural attitude into the phenomenological attitude, now carrying with us—once and for all—the varied, yet entirely essential structures of Relation Itself, precisely WHAT remains in our hands that can be then called a sheer unity of reference that is now wholly **transcendent-within-immanence**?”⁸ At its base such questions, trivial though they seem, unfold

nevertheless an infinite horizon of new and astonishing mysteries directly leading phenomenology as rigorous science⁹ into an undiscovered arena where each step can mean philosophical life or death. In this new eidetic area, whereby intentionality may perhaps at last exfoliate itself, in such a converged light, *as it truly is*, as a sheer unity of reference, the usual meanings of words such as “real,” “mental,” or even perhaps, in this present chapter’s case, the more pertinent phrase: “asymmetrically-real-outward-but-only-mental-back-again,” seem to have vanished without a trace.¹⁰

Trivial questions often morph into decidedly profound questions. And the deeper question entailed by our initial questions now rises full force before us: Along what untraveled path must we *now move* to find at last the intuitable (and *unified!*) evidence of truth (now possibly unfolding itself as not only ontologically achievable but also phenomenologically describable, and eventually scientifically explicable¹¹) within which **relation itself**, as transcendent-within-immanence, comes into its own precisely as a pre-predicative and purely originary self-givenness¹² To orient ourselves historically (and, even more importantly, *theoretically*) in this new, mysterious work area, let us begin back at Plato and move forward to Husserl himself.

6.4 SOME HISTORICAL CLUES CONCERNING RELATION ITSELF AS A TRANSCENDENT-WITHIN-IMMANENCE KIND OF UNITY-OF-REFERENCE

If Eugen Fink was correct, and if the Transcendental Ego is indeed “as old as the world,”¹³ then it should come as no surprise that a single, hardly noticed hint that Plato (428 BC–328 BC) let fly within his dialogue, *Parmenides*, if it had been isolated out and followed up with theoretical acuity, could have led directly into the a priori arena of phenomenology itself that Husserl discovered 2500 years later. This is precisely the view set forth by Sternfeld and Zyskind in their book entitled, *Meaning, Relation and Existence in Plato’s Parmenides: The Logic of Relational Realism*. They refer especially to the rarely-averted-to, cryptic words that Plato puts into Parmenides’ mouth. For Parmenides, portrayed by Plato in the dialogue as a surprisingly wise and venerable dialectician, reveals his purely eidetic doctrine of relation to the young Socrates by suddenly unveiling, in an oracular vein, an innovative—and, indeed, utterly new—theoretical science now to be directed, not to Being and non-Being any longer, taken as such, but to mental and real interrelations as they unify themselves constitutively in regard to both Being and non-Being. And thus, in an

all-encompassing reference to all the world's existent entities, Parmenides speaks of his new philosophical method by urging Socrates forward with this single imperative command: "You must look at the world's things in relation to themselves and to anything else which you suppose either to be or not to be, if you would train yourself perfectly and see the real truth."¹⁴ Sternfeld and Zyskind thereupon proceed to disclose a wonderful working analogy between Parmenides's aforesaid disclosure of a pure (already describable as a transcendent-within-imminence) *eidetics* of relation as a super-ontology and Husserl's momentous, far-reaching discovery of the science of transcendental phenomenology. This is what they tell us:

The positive emotional impact conveyed by the prestige of Parmenides, his authority and power as a philosopher, and his display of this power... suggests that the argument successfully constructs a network of relations in which existence is one relational concept among many, albeit an important relational concept.... This construction of abstract relational theory thus avoids the ideational duplication of a previously existing world. This achievement is like the phenomenological bracketing of the natural standpoint and the opening up of the phenomenological realm of consciousness in which existence re-enters as a part of a general description of essences.¹⁵

The only thinker to have approached Plato's arcane and hidden "relational theory" with any degree of methodological thoroughness is Kevin Wall himself. In an unpublished paper called "Relation," Wall traces its birth and development from classical into medieval thought, moving from argument to argument like some master detective unearthing the trenchant clues of a mystery novel.

Wall begins by uncovering precisely when the doctrine of what he calls "real constitutive relation" entered into Greek thought as a state of affairs that then began to cause true philosophical concern. This was when the Ionians began to delve into the problem of exactly what remained the same in changeable states of affairs. This source of identity must be at last discoverable within some kind of primal matter. Over against this source was the co-relative source of diversity or "form." Already, the heady paradox of the one and the many was being brought into focus within such co-referencing, forcing such thinkers to ponder the matter of the exact manner in which the mind can begin to interrelate these two sources or principles. But, as Wall maintains, "puzzlement about the identity principle diverted them from pursuing this consideration." They thus began to instead concentrate on the nature of the source of sameness as a kind of primal material.

Parmenides brought a new, wholly eidetic light to these puzzling matters. At this point, Wall declares that the odd, all-or-nothing Parmenidean dialectics actually ushered in what could now be called a new “philosophy of relation.” Wall goes on to insist that

when Parmenides argued that the identity of the primal matter excluded multiplicity, he set in motion a series of considerations which would lead to the philosophy of relation. This came about through the dialecticians of the Eleatic school who tried to support Parmenides’ thesis by arguing that the counter-thesis led to contradiction and therefore could not be true. This concentrated attention upon mental relations of premises to conclusions and, therefore, upon one type of relation. But this then led to the consideration of all types.

A remarkable shift suddenly occurred with Socrates, opening up like an immense earthquake divide from the faults and plates of Eleatic sophistry. Socrates began to believe that true and certain scientific knowledge could be achieved, despite the fallacious and partisan ruses of the Sophists. Eventually, Plato maintained, with the genius-use of both myths and numerology, that knowledge of unchangeable realities was actually possible, beyond even the matter and form of the earlier thinkers, and that the intellect can actually intuit such unchangeable forms which themselves sustain such matter/form states of affairs. Now the real divide began to upsurge within philosophy itself, for Plato’s notions “brought to the fore the distinction of relations which are purely mental (the relations of premises to conclusions of the dialectical Eleatics and of the Sophists) and the real constitutive relations of matter to form and of form to matter and of both to form in itself.” Wall mentions that Plato agonized over these matters in the *Timaeus* but that the matters seemed to Plato much too difficult to deal with, and as a result, Plato himself spoke only hesitatingly of such shifting co-relative states of affairs. Aristotle brought instead a great deal more formal precision to such matters: “He therefore dealt directly with the doctrine of relation, making one form of it a category of material being, but also treating of relation outside of this category. And, in the *Categories*, he says of it that ‘it is difficult to say anything definite on this point... [*that is not*] superfluous to doubt and to dispute.’ ”

When Aquinas himself treated such arcane matters, he, as we have indicated in our earlier chapters, divided relation, with a great deal of eidetic finality, into both mental and real. The domain of real relations was itself divided further into what we have been calling empirically real,

mind-independent relations on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a kind of transcendent ordering (of matter toward form, potency toward act, essence toward existence, genera toward species and, finally, the ineffable ordering of the entire essence/existence compound directly out toward the *actus purus essendi*). This proto-ordering, in all its purely relation-like “showings” came to be known as *respectus transcendens*.

At this point, Wall summarizes his detective-story-like history of the philosophy of relation in terms of a division which has become by now familiar to us all: He says that Aquinas noted, “with respect to the category of relation, that it is peculiar in that it alone of all the accidents takes its nature from its order to a term. He thus distinguishes *inesse* (the fact of being in a subject) from *adesse* (the fact of being to a term). *Inesse* it shares with all other accidental being. But *adesse* is peculiar to it alone.”

Wall ends his story of relation by locating the supreme eidetics of relation, precisely as it is in its true nature, within Aristotle’s famous categorical schema wherein the actual manner in which one may ultimately distinguish real from mental relations is thereby spot-checked and finally clarified. It would be difficult to find a better way to finally present Relation Itself as we have defined it, namely as a transcendent-within-immanence that itself alone achieves the pure unity of reference that intentionality itself actually is when it is re-worlded into the *Lebenswelt*. Certainly, no one reading the following lines of Wall’s below and translating them into the formal ontology of Husserl’s vast science of the final act/object schema of intentionality itself, can doubt that a new subalternate science of the proto-constitution of *adesse* objectivity has, within such a framework, been given complete and formal groundwork within the domain of pure logic. Here is how Wall concludes, with a kind of lightning-fast stroke of insight, his dialectical treatment the sedimented emergence of Relation Itself within Western philosophy:

Thus, the specific nature and the reality of quantity and quality both come from their order to the subject in which they are found. But while the reality of relation comes from the subject in which it is found, its specific nature does not. In its specific nature it is simply order to something else. If this is in thought and only in thought, then the order is mental. If it is in reality, then it is real. But quantity and quality, whether in thought or not, are real.¹⁶

After Aquinas, the next important historical figure to make substantial advancements within Wall’s philosophy of relation was John Poinset (1589–1644). Poinset was quite familiar with lightning-fast strokes of

insight. In his introduction to his work on material logic, he speaks first of the unfolding way that “accidental” changes wander, maze-wise, inward slowly and laboriously, through labyrinths of qualities, toward the final instantaneous flash of a complete “substantial” change at the center of a thing’s being. Then, in an astounding move upward, he compares this with the equally mysterious, unfolding way that our intellect slowly travels here and there (and Husserl, indeed, would have recognized in this his own famed zigzagging motion!) through this and that argument toward a central stroke of pure insight expressed by what Poinsoot calls “a very short sentence.” Let us treat of three of Poinsoot’s crucial surges of insight.

First, there is the little-noticed passage in Poinsoot where *intentio* itself achieves itself at the uttermost limits of its own eidetic generality. Poinsoot, himself a veritable Einstein of the philosophy of relation, succinctly tells us that “‘intention’ does not signify, in the present connection, the act of the will which is distinguished from election and concerns the end, but an act or concept of the intellect.” Then follows a brief statement whose import is very easily missed. Poinsoot says, “The intellectual operation and the concept are described as intentions in the broad sense, inasmuch as they tend toward something other than themselves, i.e. toward an object.”¹⁷ The latter “short sentence” of Poinsoot, with its sudden qualification “in the broad sense,” moves the entire previous philosophy of relation forward by an incalculable quantum jump.

Second, Poinsoot, led on by Aquinas’ notion of any mundane and actually experienced relation’s miraculous and completely sui generis unity of reference in regard to both its foundation and its term, was convinced that an actually existing relation out in the empirical world is (indeed, over and above both substance and accident) an odd, *third kind of being*, a simple towardness to something beyond itself, so much so that, when we view its “whatness” or essence, such pure towardness (in Latin: *ad aliquid*) is, quite actually, all there is to it. He proclaims: “Relation, on account of its minimal entitative character, does not depend on a subject in precisely the same way as the other absolute forms, but stands rather as a third kind of being consisting in and resulting from the coordination [in time] of two extremes.”¹⁸

Third, and finally, Poinsoot held that, if there were only absolute things and no real relations, then the intellect would have no grounded pattern whereby it could form “purely relative entities.” He tells us, “If there are not, in the real, genuine and pure relations to be used as patterns, the relations formed by the intellect [*to establish ontological knowledge*, e.g.

participative-essence-toward-actus purus essendi] would be mere figments.” Poinot indicates by his remarks that if either ontology or logic itself were constructed out from wholly relational “beings of reason” and were yet themselves without any fundamentum in re, they would ipso facto be illusory sciences.¹⁹

All three of these revelatory surges of insight find centered evidence in Poinot eventual theory of meaning. Poinot came to the inevitable conclusion, through his profound stance on real relation, precisely that it is apodictically impossible that an empirically real relation can mean anything at all unless it already actually exists.²⁰ If there were only one red rose in the world, no amount of our multiplying meaningful intelligibilities around such a rose off into infinity would give the slightest inkling of a real relation of similarity as even beginning to be possibly (and especially actually!) *meant*. We cannot, even through all eternity and even with the sheer weight of all possible apodictic evidence in our favor, meaningfully construct any such relation from ourselves. Only another red rose could do this.

We have now reached the point where we can move forward to Husserl, and finally ask again our initial question: Along what untraveled path must we *now move* to find at last the *evidence of truth* (within which **relation itself**, as intentionality or as a sui generis relation or, better, as a transcendent-within-immanence state of affairs) comes into its own precisely as a prepredicative and purely originary self-giveness? Or, rephrasing the question: Where does the synthetically achieved unity of reference of Husserlian intentionality as a co-relationality-within-diversity (of ego-pole and object-pole) come from? As geometry came from Euclid, the answer comes from Husserl himself. And, as to be expected since it is Husserl himself that speaks, the answer is not in a short sentence nor even in such forcefully imperative sentences as “Let us return to the things themselves,” or (given our current detective work!) “Let us return to the actually-existent relations themselves.” Instead, it lies embedded in Husserl’s own mind-numbing, zigzagging methodology.

In the midst of his monumental treatment of categorical acts in the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl moves from what Poinot called mind-dependent relations out toward what Poinot called mind-independent and what Husserl now calls “external” relations. With the clues we have unearthed in mind, we are now in a position to draw some remarkable conclusion from what Husserl says. Here are the crucial paragraphs:

Our exposition obviously applies to all specific forms of the relation between a *whole* and its parts. All such relationships are of categorical, ideal nature. [*Compare Aquinas' and Poinso's use of the transcendental relations, such as, for example, dependent essence toward the pure act of existence*]. It would be a mistake to try to locate them in the straightforwardly given whole, to discover them in the whole by analysis. The part certainly lies hidden in the whole before all division into members, and is subsidiarily apprehended in our perceptual grasp of this whole. But this fact, that it thus lies hidden in the whole, is at first merely the ideal possibility of bringing the part, and the fact that it is a part, to perception in correspondingly articulated and founded acts.

At this point, Husserl moves outward with the full force of his new phenomenological method in tow:

The matter is plainly similar in the case of *external relations*, from which predications such as "A is to the right of B" and "A is larger, brighter, louder than B" take their rise. Wherever sensible objects—directly and independently perceptible—are brought together, despite their mutual exclusion, into more or less intimate unities, into what fundamentally are more comprehensive objects, then a possibility of such external relations arises. They all fall under the general type of the relation of *part to parts within a whole*.

This of course brings Husserl to the notion of founding:

Founded acts are once more the media *in which the primary appearance of the states of affairs in question*, of such external relationships is achieved. It is clear, in fact that neither the straightforward percept of the complex whole, nor the specific percepts pertaining to its members, are themselves the relational percepts which alone are possible in such a complex.

Husserl then notes down the following possibility:

Only when one member is picked out as a principle member, and is dwelt on while the other members are kept in mind, does a determination of members by members make its appearance, a determination which varies with the kind of unity that is present and plainly also with the particular members set in relief. In such cases also, the choice of a particular member, or of a direction of relational apprehension, leads to phenomenologically distinct forms of relationship, correlatively characterized, which forms are not genuinely present in the unarticulated percept of the connection as a straightforward phenomenon but are in it as *ideal possibilities*, the possibilities, that is, of fulfilling relevant founded acts."²¹

I have quoted Husserl's text at length for a very good reason. An *inseparable* phenomenological methodology of the constitution of merely **thing-like objectivity** cannot reveal the sheer unity of intentionality's own referential character as it stands at its own hub-center, but we have, in Husserl's extraordinary and fresh analysis of relation, found that he is reaching out toward a more *adese*-oriented phenomenological methodology of the deeper constitution of **relation-like objectivity** out in the world around us, an *adese* constitution that can finally **converge into itself as *unum* precisely because it can now proceed much further into the exterior reality of Being Itself.**

Two radical conclusions can be drawn from Husserl's forward-moving descriptive breakthrough. The first conclusion is that Husserl completely vindicates Plato's Parmenidian eidetics of relation, and even corroborates Aquinas' unifying truth that enlightened his own famous Prolog to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. He does this by showing how intentionality can realize the utmost of its self-clarifying power simply by its "picking out" and "dwelling upon" the *unum* within any possible multiplicity either mental or real. The second, much more general, conclusion is that phenomenology itself has bequeathed to intentionality the power toward finally discovering itself as being a lot more outward toward something utterly beyond itself. Within the givenness of intentionality as it opens up to itself, we discover the special "showing" such that the description of the constitution of all founding acts are mere secondary descriptions in relation to the primary descriptions able to now be carried out within the new *adese* field of *intentionality itself* as "already toward..." in other words, as a sheer unity of reference.

At least Husserl has opened the way up to us, though he didn't proceed much further into this new field. Yet perhaps it is truly the case that, sometimes, splendid, lightning-fast insights arrive and shine forth from themselves—especially according to such a miraculous new "work area" as that which a phenomenologically reduced eidetics of relation unlocks for us—but these insights are nonetheless very easily missed. In the present case, the lightning-fast stroke of insight radiating out from Husserl's rather tortuous musings on aggregates lies forever in the apodictically evident fact that the choice of a particular member of a set is nothing other than what Husserl calls a purely theoretical "direction of relational apprehension" leading precisely to "phenomenologically distinct forms of relationship" themselves shining forth as ideal possibilities now able to be **fully meant** by intentionality, both as ego-pole and as object-pole,

and, astoundingly, within even the most universally conceived of its own founded acts. Otherwise, monism rules and intentionality is not one; monism rules and intentionality is neither itself nor its object, even though it *must be, as heading beyond itself, essentially both*. Poinot's earlier theory of meaning being thus superseded by Husserl's more extensive and much more far-reaching theory of meaning, it can only be the case that the sheer unity of reference of intentionality per se—now newly viewed as such a uniquely unifying **direction of relational apprehension**—must allow itself to model its own relational structure anew. It must re-world itself in the lived-through world of time and space, where relation is always a transcendent-within-immanence showing of itself, in order to come full circle within such an exalted new work area, precisely in order to, once and for all, finally, find itself as it truly is.

NOTES

1. For a more detailed analysis of this remarkable statement of Wietrowski, see John P. Doyle, *On the Borders of Being and Knowing, Some Late Scholastic Thoughts on Supertranscendental Being*, Leuven University Press (Leuven, 2012), pp. 88–90.
2. Husserl tells us that, in really meaning a “square circle,” we are simply apprehending “the real impossibility of meaning-fulfillment through an experience of the incompatibility of the partial meanings in the intended unity of fulfillment.” (*Log. Invest.* Inv I, Ch. 15).
3. See William [a.k.a. Jim] Ruddy, “Source of the Classical Category of Relation in Western Thought,” *Indian Philosophical Journal*. Vol. 10, 1974–75, p. 50–51.
4. Dorian Cairns, *The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl*, translated by Lester Embree, (Springer Press, New York, 2013), p. 29. Mohanty, since he is exhaustively familiar with both the classical Western notions of *pros ti* and *ad aliquid*, and the parallel classical Eastern notions of *sambhanda* and *samavaya*, is even more emphatic and comprehensive than Cairns on this point. He says: “We should keep apart intentional relation and real relation. When the thing does not exist, there is no real relation; only the intentional relation remains. However, when the object exists, then there is a real relation parallel to the intentional relation. If we consider the relations of the subject to the world posited by intentional acts (and this posited world may contain, besides real things, things that are not real), there obtain, not real relations, but a sort of ‘subjective objective causality,’ [*compare my notion of the grounding act of reference*] not real causality, but rather a ‘motivation-causality’ about which we have already learned.”

Further on, Mohanty tells us: “The intuitively experienced motivation cannot be likewise traced back, as appearances, to a real, unperceivable relation among things, determinable only by thought. What is not intentionally contained in my experience cannot motivate me.” *Edmund Husserl’s Freiburg Years 1916–1938*, Yale University Press (New Haven, 2011), p. 51 & 52. All of these important and meticulous clarifications are brought to a brilliant and intriguing focus in Mohanty’s summarizing statement on page 208: “A theory of consciousness has to be a universal theory of the relation of a consciousness pointing beyond itself.”

5. As does Cairns, Mohanty stresses, in Husserl’s polemic against Locke, that such a “unity of reference toward...” is utterly unique. This is what Mohanty tells us: “Husserl reminds us that this relation is a relatedness not to an extant entity but to an object irrespective of whether this object exists or not, and proceeds to distinguish between the immanent object of the act under consideration and the object in the standard sense of a really existing one. Moreover, this ‘bearing the object in its own immanence’ is not to be misconstrued as a real immanence, as a real ‘being-contained in.’ Once one realizes this, then one can see how the identity of an object arises out of ‘synthesis’ of various acts, and how consciousness is unified into a unity and becomes polarized in a twofold manner into an I and an object. Underlying Locke’s impoverished naturalized psychology lies the ‘blindness for intentionality.’” See *Edmund Husserl’s Freiburg Years 1916–1938*, Yale University Press (New Haven, 2011), p. 309. This blindness can be overcome only by, once and for all, uncovering early Husserlian intentionality as being already a convergent synthetic unity of reference to both the foundation of its I-pole and the term of its object-pole. The purely formal eidetics allowing for such a higher, asymmetrical aspect of neither wholly real nor wholly mental relations is clearly found in Aristotle and Aquinas (as noted by Mohanty) and is in fact similar to the asymmetrical relation (*svarupasambhanda*) that Sankara employs to describe the utterly unique relation of the individual self to the actionless Witness that is Brahman. See Sara Grant, *Śankaracarya’s Concept of Relation*, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers (Delhi, 1998), especially the Chapter entitled: “The Concept of Non-Reciprocal Relation,” pp. 157–175.
6. Kevin Wall, *Relation in Hegel*, University Press of America (Washington D.C., 1983), p.11. Bold type is my own.
7. As Husserl said, “It is the destiny of philosophy that it must find the greatest problems in the greatest trivialities.” Husserliana, Vol 24, *Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie: Vorlesungen 1906–07*. p. 150.
8. The phrase, “transcendent-within-immanence” is taken from Moran’s book on Husserl. Moran arrives at this phrase by asking simply what accounts for the evident validity of knowledge as it finally hits its actual

mark. According to Moran, Husserl's answer is "to suspend existential questions concerning the factual world transcendent to us in order to examine the *givenness* inherent in the phenomena themselves as they are found present or 'immanent' in our experience, thereby giving new sense to the notion of immanence, moving away from the Kantian conception. This, of course, involves the *epoché* and reduction (see Hua 2:44-5)." Moran then emphasizes precisely the general notion of relation, as such, in this regard: "Phenomenology solves (or dissolves) the riddle of knowledge by **redefining** the relation between 'inner' or 'immanent' subjectivity and 'outer' or 'transcendent' objectivity, such that one attends only to what is transcendent-within-immanence." See Dermot Moran, *Edmund Husserl, Founder of Phenomenology*, Polity Press (Malden MA, 2005), p. 49 (bold print is my own). In order to finally uncover the unique relatedness that early Husserlian intentionality actually is, it is indeed paramount to recognize that Husserl was the first thinker ever to rise up into philosophical awe exactly over the parallel "correlation" between the manifold ways of Being and the manifold ways of its miraculous givenness to consciousness. In fact, in a rare personal note, Husserl tells us that "the first breakthrough of this universal a priori of correlation between an object of experience and its manners of givenness (about 1898, while I was working through my *Logical Investigations*) shook me so deeply that, since then, my entire life's work has been dominated by the task of systematically working out this a priori of correlation." Husserl never allowed the unified givenness of this amazing co-relationality, precisely as transcendent-within-immanence, to become, even at the lowest levels of consciousness, a mere worldly relation. See *Krisis*, 169; *Crisis*, 166. Quoted by Klaus Held, "Husserl's Phenomenological Method," in *The New Husserl*, edited by Donn Welton, Indiana University Press (Bloomington, 2003), p. 9.

9. And thus philosophy newly viewed as a pure theory of either real or mental relations that must thenceforth ground all secondary, positivistic, empirical and/or mathematical theories about either real or mental relations.
10. Such is the forgotten abyss of "perhaps **even less real** than our already so frail, fallible, thrown and purely temporal finitude" from which Kant (and eventually Heidegger himself in his famous *Keyre*) instinctively recoiled.
11. Explicated, that is, as a wholly self-presentational directedness that yet orients itself purely "toward..." and indeed toward a transcendent term utterly beyond itself.
12. Dermot Moran, *Edmund Husserl, Founder of Phenomenology*, Polity Press (Malden MA, 2005), p. 43.
13. Fink, Eugen, *Sixth Cartesian Meditation. The Idea of a Transcendental Theory of Method*, translated by Ronald Bruzina, (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1988), p. 14.

14. <http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/parmenides.html> No one followed Parmenides' path. Let us hasten to add that, (as Husserl would be the first to tell us—see *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, translated by Dorian Cairns [Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969], p. 15–16.) even if this relation-like eidetics had been sustained and fully developed historically, as objective theory, we would still have the task of rising above the self-forgetfulness of the theorizer who lived in this theory and inquiring into the subjective inwardness of such a production exactly *as proto-constituted meaning*. Only a sedimentary search along the lines that we are here proposing could get indeed to *those* subjective depths.
15. See Robert Sternfeld and Harold Zyskind, *Meaning, Relation and Existence in Plato's Parmenides: The Logic of Relational Realism*, (Peter Lang, 1987) p. 119–120.
16. All quotations in this passage are taken from an unpublished essay entitled, simply, "Relation." I am indebted to Kevin Wall's brother-in-law, Dominic Colvert, for kindly descending into his own basement and unearthing this important manuscript from several boxes of Wall's *Nachlass*.
17. See John Poinsoot (John of St. Thomas), *The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas*, translated by Simon, Glanville and Hollenhorst, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1955), p. 70–71.
18. *Tractatus de Signis: The Semiotic of John Poinsoot*, Interpretative Arrangement by John N. Deeley, (University of California Press, 1985), p. 89. This wholly intuitable, wholly prepredicative, and wholly originary givenness of existent relations out in the world is of course proportionally extendible to intentionality itself at least *as a relation of ego-pole to object-pole* and these ground-sources are primarily what Husserl centered in on in *Experience and Judgment*. The inescapable necessity of finally modeling the sheer unity of bilateral reference of *intentio* on the towardness-character of experienced, mundane relations as a sine qua non of logical theory, and, indeed, of all ontological knowledge, was first discovered by Poinsoot himself, and through Brentano, perhaps found its way, subliminally, into Husserl own formal ontology of Relation (even though the reduction forbade the direct use of any such mundane modeling). Indeed, Brentano's complete mastery of the formalism of scholastic logic, taken from both Aquinas *and Poinsoot*, was what drew Husserl to him in the first place. See John N. Deeley, *Intentionality and Semiotics*, University of Scranton Press, (Scranton, 2007), p. 4.
19. John Poinsoot (John of St. Thomas), *The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas—Basic Treatises*, translated by Yves R. Simon, John J. Glanville, and G. Donald Hollenhorst (The University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 309, 608.
20. This vital insight (that real relations can only mean *in actu*) is imperatively critical to his entire semiotics. Unless such a principle is understood,

Poinsot's entire semiotics remains impenetrably obscure. Poinsot elaborates further on this *in actu* "difference" between mental and real relations in the following decisive passage:

The reason *for this difference* is that in the case of mind-dependent relations, their actual existence consists in actually being cognized objectively [*thus, in a phenomenological sense, being constituted as intentional*], which is something that does not take its origin from the fundament [*that is, from the abstractum in Husserl's terminology, or ontologically from the inesse subject or "foundation" of the physical relation*] and terminus [*that is, the term toward which the physical relation tends*], but from the understanding. Whence many things could be said by reason of a fundament without the resultance of a [*physical*] relation because this does not follow upon the fundament itself and the terminus, but upon cognition.

Thus, for example, when we see a white stone on the beach, we can multiply off endless intelligibilities about it, (or, translated into Husserl's terms, the white stone as given "in the flesh" can become thus a founded act for all sorts of more complex intentional acts), but none of this will turn the white stone into the subject of a real relation of similarity. Only another real white stone can do this. Thus:

But in the case of physical relations, since the relation naturally results from the fundament and the terminus, nothing belongs in an order to the terminus by virtue of a fundament, except by the medium of a [*physical*] relation.

Thus the human mind can elaborate the most sophisticated possible theory of the causes of real relations, spinning out a final formal eidetics of relations that stuns the world of thought, and listing and setting down all possible ontological properties of a "fundament" and all possible ontological properties of a "terminus" but, in the whole lifelong enterprise of its constructive work, it can never, even at the pinnacle heights of this constructive connectivity, ever once actually connect a fundament and a terminus in reality. This only the fleeting transient, not-real-enough-to-be-in-time-and-space "medium" of a real relation can do. If one understands this, one is on the way to finally (and co-relatively!) understanding Husserl's sometimes maddening insistence that transcendental constitution is, at its hub-core, a meaning-giving act.

21. Husserl, Edmund, *Logical Investigations*, translated by J. N. Findlay, (Humanities Press, New York, 1970), Vol. II, p. (bold text my own).

The Transcendental Ego as *Adesse*

7.1 RANDOM THOUGHTS ABOUT HEIDEGGER AND THE USES OF CONVERGENT PHENOMENOLOGY

Advocates of structuralism delight in telling us that, to understand times gone by, we have to forget our modern concepts that unavoidably distort our perception of the past. For example, our thinking often grows so accustomed to contemporary views of insanity that it is difficult for us to assimilate the simple fact that such a clinic notion is a concept completely absent in the lived-through world of just 200 years ago.¹ To understand the world of Aquinas, then, we have to *forget utterly* about some inner “subject” of self-consciousness that knows itself apart from any lower objectification of sensible things. Aquinas simply did not live in a world where such a thing was able to be either imagined or concentrated upon. If self-consciousness appeared on the scene, even in Augustine, it was seen as “wholly toward the objects of the sensible world and nothing in itself,” or it simply wasn’t seen at all. One could almost say that, if he had become a phenomenologist in such an age, Thomas would have had to have become nothing but a convergent phenomenologist. His realm of investigation would perhaps have become a pure consciousness where there was no interior thing-like Transcendental Ego at the core, but where exterior thoughts rose of their own accord and converged toward God of their own accord, or else passed away into the absolute unknown.

This is something easily missed even by the most astute readers of Aquinas. His *Lebenswelt* was more directly and inexorably and outwardly referred

toward subject-consciousness than any philosopher before or since. But he was not on that account a phenomenologist of subject-consciousness. He didn't speak as if he had reductively (and thus fallaciously—as in a great deal of existentialist literature) *become* subject-consciousness. But that is my exact point: No one before or since ever spoke so radiantly *and so unselfconsciously* of what *divine* subject-consciousness itself must be like in order to *be* what it is.

That the ineffable subject-consciousness of divine knowledge on the one hand and the *completely reified and enfleshed* object-consciousness of human knowledge on the other are so utterly and uncrossably non-correlative through any symmetrical view is not a truth that fits well into modern and contemporary views of the self.² Do we not often believe that a kind of super-Sartrean interplay of subject and object exists within the absolutized, idealized human “subject?”

This blindness to such uncrossability is the case not just for analytic philosophy, but even for some of the continental, existential side of Western thought.

The new emergent science of convergent phenomenology that we have grounded for all time to come within the hall of pure logic, has the power to become, in this worldview, a final bastion against existentialist misinterpretation of Husserl's actual method and his undeniably authentic and objective, scientific discoveries. These discoveries can all the more be retained and preserved exactly to the degree that their domain wherein they have been attained is seen thus in the wholly new light of the new science in question.

Thus, hidden unseen within traditional transcendental subjectivity lies an even deeper, even more radical subjectivity than Husserlian subjectivity. It is a subjectivity precisely of an object-consciousness no longer simply intentional in character (i.e. understood by a correlation with an utterly exterior object) but of an asymmetrical object-consciousness that converges inward toward an utter nothingness at the point where it converges outward beyond itself, toward..., thus simply becomes itself, becomes an ever-unfolding, ever new, and yet wholly uncrossable correlation with the divine subject-consciousness as it is in itself. This is most likely the reason that, once we finally pass through the gate of the new science of convergent phenomenology and looked again at the infinite vistas of scientific material that Husserl had already unfolded, their very own ineffable Truth, each speaking for itself, becomes in a much more final sense an assured possession, a scientific knowledge, apodictic, sharable for all humankind, for all time to come.

Why does this happen for us not so much within traditional phenomenology but much more according to the shifts of light and darkness and the final lightning-fast insights hidden within the new science itself? Perhaps we will never know.

Let us try to explain such an “ex-cendent” of transcendent-within-immanence state of affairs by the following analogy: Let us say that we have an artist friend who has finally been able to have an exhibition of her work at a prestigious gallery. Thus, once we arrive at the gallery, it is one thing to stop and talk to our friend as she sits in the place of honor, and discuss the notes she has taken on her work. It is much more gratifying to our friend if we immediately proceed into the aisles of hanging paintings and thus finally see them as they are in themselves.

Similarly to a visitor at a friend’s show, we have arrived at the conclusion that, for Aquinas, the human self that this final uncrossability of the *ad aliqua* of divine and human has revealed was not a lone, self-discovered, Heideggerian-like *Dasein*, preliminarily surrounded by the to-handedness of the world’s things. The human self thus revealed was rather, even at the now-expressible vortex-center of this to-handedness, an already wholly embodied, speaking *Dasein* a *Dasein* revitalized at its core-self by becoming already a sheer towardness beyond itself.

This securely held *Dasein* is scientifically (i.e. at the new polar level of pure consciousness that convergent phenomenology achieves) nothing in itself, but everything toward the *actus purus essendi*. To see this, we have to go back to basics and take the words, consciousness and intellect, in their most general level possible. In Aquinas, the intellect *in actu* is indeed so toward as to be nothing other than the object-now-being-known *in actu*. Any lower-leveled, self-discovered inness, even mirrored endlessly by some wrongly assumed and thereby refracted subject-consciousness, tells us nothing about the foremost act of “becoming toward...” that is the transcendent, keystone center of human object-consciousness. And, although Aquinas SAW this identity of self and object in the very act of ordinary human “knowing-as-object-consciousness,” he mostly remained unassuming and mute about such a ground-breaking and powerful insight. As a result we find him, in such investigations, simply mirroring the hylomorphic truth of Aristotle: “What is in potency [our object-consciousness] cannot come into act except through the causality of something higher [the object here and now being known], which is already in act.” Not even Husserl could have expressed the phenomenologically accurate description of our own plodding temporal consciousness of the world around us in any more succinct terms. This ontological insight, embedded as it were

in such a truth, could be one of the reasons why the scholastic notion of intention became so potent a theme for Brentano and for the early phenomenologists. Indeed Husserl went much further than Brentano in not just, as did Aristotle and Aquinas, expressing the ontological truth of the identity of mind and object in the intentional act itself, but in finally, and once and for all, opening up that selfsame identity to a remarkable, thoroughgoing, insightful and clarifying description. It was as if the medieval, bestiary catalog of naïve forms were now available as a wholly sophisticated, living biology of forms, each now finally and genetically describable in all its glory. Even as early as the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl came to the point where this identity of self with the intended object had become not only thinkable but now was to be taken as obvious. He says, “It need only be said to be acknowledged that the intentional object of a presentation is the same as the actual object, and on occasion as its external object, and it is absurd to distinguish between them.”³

Heidegger shied away from the lucid, austere and painstakingly honest rationalism of any such theoretical views, and tried instead to completely ontologize intentionality. In placing *Sein* (Being as such) as the “unconscious consciousness” supporting the primal flow of time (much as Sankara placed *cit* (primal consciousness) under all transitory beings themselves always passing away),⁴ Heidegger could only end up with a *Dasein* that, at its temporalized core, was a strange, altogether nervous, subjectless subject. In the view offered by convergent phenomenology, when the tool-to-hand breaks, and the Worldhood of the world now shines forth, it shines forth not as Heidegger saw it, but precisely to the degree that actual human reality is suddenly and wholly related out toward a special and ultimate and ineffable transcendence that is not actually flowing back toward it in any real sense at all. The blind spot of Heidegger was not to actually see intuitively and then realize within his fundamental ontology that the finite, asymmetrical yet still real relation that we ourselves already ARE is already a sheer mystery of proto-constituted towardness in any *human* illumination of the world. Indeed, and because of this, if there *are* any inferences in human object-consciousness (as Being-IN-the-World), they can never become a substantial ground for some unfolding and wholly *mental* self-consciousness but themselves only faintly and asymmetrically reflect the inferences of material things.

The philosophical analytic of *Dasein* that Heidegger became obsessed with can eventually become accessible philosophically, but only as the

more-and-more interior and more-and-more fruitless and woeful task of uncovering human reality apart from the higher and purely relational activity of the *actus purus essendi*, whose divine reality is indeed the ultimate *relatum* of our own poor human towardness. *Freiheit zum Tod* is an asymmetrical relation, surely, but an asymmetrical relation viewed as a complete reversal of the intentional relation of consciousness. It has no real “sides” at all. It is the ghost of noesis and noemata, thus the dire apocalypse of ancient form and matter, coming back to haunt us. The fatalistic futility of such a wholly ontological analytic of the non-ontological intentional consciousness resides in the simple fact that the inmost relationality of the self-world-complex-toward subject-consciousness can never be concretely used or thematized as a secret source of new knowledge about the human self. The utter transcendence outward of the self-world complex can only be spoken of as *being* already-toward-something-about-which-something-more-here-and-now-can-be-spoken, or it cannot be spoken of in any meaningful manner. Heidegger’s profundity often discloses our modern psyche with astounding insight simply because such intractable and troublesome disclosure lies in the fruitless turning-toward of the *Kehre* that is Heidegger’s own personal wellspring-sadness at the center of himself. If it is futile to attempt to express something, the very expression thus arriving for human thought becomes thereby a disclosure of abject loneliness.

Following these thoughts along such final lines, we can, as beginning convergent phenomenologists, come to the conclusion that human thrown-ness is not into the world. As human Dasein we are instead thrown into *object-consciousness*, not into this passing world of time and space wherein we are already, and blessedly, embodied as an existent subject, purely and simply toward. Merleau-Ponty’s miraculous body-subject was miraculous to him in its expressiveness in much the same way as the bodies of Adam and Eve before the fall, were miraculous to Aquinas.

We might find that a slight alteration of Heidegger’s analytic of Being-in-the-World into a more dynamic analytic of Being-in-the-World-toward-subject-consciousness can re-establish and even expand the wholly eidetic science that Heidegger had appropriated from Husserl and altered into his own brilliant, rhapsodic ontology. Even more remarkable, this reinstatement of method, placed back within the authentic reductive boundaries of transcendental subjectivity itself, thereupon can very possibly open up special, further vistas of new, descriptively available material.⁵

This final “coming-to-rest-toward...” of the subject–object relation once and for all should be an astonishment to us. We have to begin an uphill task indeed. We must proceed from a study of real, empirically simply “there,” relations to the fact of human consciousness itself being asymmetrically toward its object, thence onward to a new and higher insight that no one had ever noticed about the subject–object relation. We must suddenly see *for ourselves* that the subject–object relation (beyond being what linguistic analysis saw of it—a relation reducible to nothing but the entirely mental self and the entirely unreachable “thing-in-itself,” and even beyond what Husserl himself saw of it—a pure act in which the mind utterly becomes its own meant object), that then the subject–object relation is precisely an asymmetrical towardness really relating itself outward to its object in such a way as not only to become that object but also to pass utterly beyond it simply and wholly toward, yet in a way that the mind cannot see any *real* way back into the self. The subject–object relation is nothing if not concrete and *wholly creaturely*. This is the only valid way of finally deconstructing the subject–object relation as it is in itself.

For if these indications are courageously followed through and if, at the projective summit of this thought, one re-discovers pure relationality, which may qualitatively be meant as real, mental and asymmetrical, and if then one realizes, furthermore, that such purely relational material can be exfoliated according to a supreme ontological truth of its own, then there certainly should be a new phenomenological approach to this unfolding material that would take it into account. If “back to the things themselves” could be a rallying cry, so could the motto, “back to the sheer essence of relational objectivity itself.”

Aquinas had taken a clue from the *sui generis* position of relation in Aristotle’s categories and had developed this fruitful notion into a system of relation that was every bit as sophisticated as Hegel’s doctrine of relation and even closer to the truth, a truth that lets things be as they are, and relations be as *they* are, because it first, quite wisely and with child-like simplicity, lets the divine reality itself simply be what it is. For such a child, absolute systems of thought, each claiming to be, from their own pinnacle outward, the sole ground of ontological truth, are simply to be left to be what they are. This is not relativism. *Relation, even defined absolutely, is, in the very paradox of its own definiteness, still “timelessly changing,” still moving out beyond itself, toward its referent.*

7.2 THE CONVERGENT TRANSCENDENTAL EGO AND THE ASYMMETRICAL RELATION BETWEEN APOPHANTICS AND FORMAL ONTOLOGY

Husserl tells us that a slight nuance or shift of attentional directedness away from the vast, eidetic (and yet still positive) science of phenomenological psychology toward the absolutely “real” Transcendental Ego and its own transcendent “doings” is all that is necessary to bring transcendental phenomenology itself into pure focus as a new field of work. He couldn’t be clearer on this point. This nuance is slight, but utterly unique and, indeed, a personally transforming event in the philosopher’s actual life. From the philosopher’s own self-realization of “being” the Transcendental Ego,

carried out in a really radical and consistent way, there springs up of necessity a motivation which compels the philosophizing [and hence transcendental] Ego to reflect back on that very subjectivity of his, which in all his experience and knowledge of the natural world, both real and possible, is in the last resort the Ego that experiences and knows, and is thus already presupposed in all the natural self-knowledge of the ‘human Ego who experiences, thinks, and acts naturally in the world.’⁶

Consistent with this, and thus in step with Husserl himself, we must ask those of us working phenomenologists, who wish to enter into convergent phenomenology, to perform a further shift of attention and view exactly that pivotal polarity of our own Transcendental Ego in a new light, as no longer simply constitutive of thing-like objectivity, but as moving out utterly beyond ourselves toward something else, and thus, in the finally viewed, selfsame insight of pure realization, constitutive of all empirically real relations that appear to us in the world, as well as constitutive of all founded towardness in general. This new (and “absolutely” relative) Transcendental Ego must be seen, by a new insight no less as compelling as the original insight, to be already presupposed in the traditional Transcendental Ego, and seen exactly *as such* at every step of that traditional Transcendental Ego’s intentionally constitutive “raying out of itself” toward the here and now constituted thing-like objectivity of the moment.

Intentionality has never been viewed as itself constituted by the pure formality of relation itself in general, but it certainly gains in clarity to the degree that it is finally viewed in that manner. We must therefore come to believe, after living awhile in convergent phenomenology, that the single

towardness of intentionality, real from the object toward the self, but unreal from the self toward the object, is a non-temporal towardness founded in temporality, but (as such asymmetry) not real enough to be encompassed by time, and thus “timeless” in a negative sense, and “aware of itself” in a positive sense.

As toward, then, we are not in time. As a pure self-aware already toward something else, we are not in time.

Much has been written about what Husserl’s own self-awareness actually meant to him, since it seems to radiate through everything that he wrote. We must therefore begin to see that Husserl’s self-awareness, as a hidden landscape within his “newly converged” Transcendental Ego, is in time as thing-like, but beyond time as “toward” as a kind of *super-intentional towardness passing beyond itself*. Since that is what we eventually have to “listen for” when we come upon each description of intentionality performed by Husserl, his own astonishing discoveries became that much more clearly present to us.

We here come to a crucial parting of the ways, as working phenomenologists. Just telling ourselves, then, in an uninvolved manner, that intentionality is not just purely mental, purely “intentional” as toward the thing-like constituted object being known, but also, within the identical relation, real as *actually* toward the ontological knowledge of the self-same object as real—this won’t do it. We have to live it and see it in an *absolute* intuition, or we simply have not even started to see it.

Methodologically: I AM the here and now being converged toward something else, proto-constituting Transcendental Ego.

To bring the entire field of pure intentionality to light as passing beyond both itself and its object toward something else is wholly essential to this new shift of attention, even at the height of theoretical reason itself. Husserl speaks of logic as one science, yet nevertheless able to be viewed as both apophantic analytics (as a systematic array of all possibly-true judgments) and also as the formal ontology of all categorialia as ideal objectivities, the “something about which.” All I am saying is that this makes ultimate sense once we understand that apophantic analytics is asymmetrically related to a purely formal ontology, that is, itself, not all related back in the same way, even though logic is one unified science. More forcefully put, Truth, as adding to Being the formal constituent of the towardness of intentional experience, is thereby actually related to Being, but Being is not at all related back in the same way to Truth, even though Being and Truth are one, just as, in a remarkable parallel, the intended noematic

object and the noetic act of intentionality are one *in actu*. The miraculous unity of the act of intentionality is not lost in convergent phenomenology, but at last comes into a greater and more perfect understanding of itself.

Have we inadvertently strayed into ontology itself in these reflections? Not really. Husserl tells us that all acts constituting categorical objectivities are founded acts leading back to the primal founding act that, before all logical, theoretical thought, constituted the physical material thing.⁷ Thus, the proto-transcendental constitution of *adesse* objectivity is likewise, as Poinset saw so clearly, grounded in the proto-constitution of empirically real relations. Once one sees all these analogies of “founding” coming into focus, one see exactly why intentionality is nothing other than object-consciousness, *finally becoming aware of itself as such*. Likewise the insight into the mental unity-in-diversity between Truth and Being is a founded insight leading back to the primal founding act that constituted this or that empirically real relation as *ad aliquid*, along with its derivative forms, both mental and real, each finding their place in what we have called the realm of symmetrical and asymmetrical “domains.” We must cut our way through the forest of *inesse* and begin to live in the cleared interrelated Truth of *adesse*, thus we must live in the truth that what Kant called the “dark art” of the transcendental imagination, now finally understood as wholly *adesse*. Such an art is a lot more out already toward what it synthesizes that it is any coordinate physical faculty buried within sensible intuition as such.

This founding insight of the mental unity-in-diversity of Truth and Being is actually one of a piece with the general phenomenological insight that grounds all concretely productive phenomenological work, namely, that fantasizing can best be understood as a kind of rarified perceptual intuition, now only fully understood as perception of what we have referred to above as the purified *ad aliqua* of *adesse* objectivity.

7.3 *ADESSE* MOTIVATION

The kind of analysis that we have been attempting of the convergent Transcendental Ego is beginning to uncover a kind of focused interplay of pure relationalities at the core of such an ego that we constantly live in, in order to do phenomenological work in the traditional sphere of general phenomenology, but that we rarely, if ever, reflectively avert to. To attain a deeper and more theoretical awareness of this interplay, we have to realize that, although the traditional Transcendental Ego cannot be

“real” in general phenomenology, if by real is meant something existing in the empirical world of space and time, yet, in a special sense (only finally grasped within convergent phenomenology itself), the Transcendental Ego is indeed at least asymmetrically “real” as moving out beyond itself toward a “something else” that is not, according to the self-same relation, really related back toward the Transcendental Ego. It is now necessary to disclose why this is the case.

There is an immensely profound reason for this: We cannot “intend” such a deeper actuality of pure relationality *directly, by looking at it*. We simply have to *be* it.

We cannot hope to “intend” it at a lower level without completely contradicting the very meaning of “being toward.”

This core motivation of our *adesse* self, as it begins to “make everything new,” cannot be emphasized enough: The Transcendental Ego starts to ray itself forth in convergent phenomenology *as the transcendental proto-constitution of adesse objectivity* and thus without the slightest shadow of any attempted intentional analysis that might wish to show forth its newly acquired “nature” as “toward a thing-like object.” *Noesis* and *noemata* are now absolutely one, toward...such that there is no longer any motivation to fall back into a wish thus to analyze them separately.

Indeed, actually becoming *even intentionally* toward another real towardness is just as much an absurd contradiction as the more famous, proverbial contradiction of saying that a being both exists and does not exist at the same time and in the same respect. In other words, actually becoming toward something that is already becoming toward something else is a state of affairs that itself is absolutely unimaginable. The positive side of this truth is that object-consciousness can indeed become itself toward subject-consciousness, but it cannot become (in the traditional phenomenological sense) reflectively toward subject-consciousness because it cannot become toward subject-consciousness by bringing about, or by raying forth, some already founded intentionality-modification within itself.

Another way of seeing this is to see that a tool, in itself, is nothing-at-all, is indeed “toward” nothing at all, unless already taken up by an artisan in order to be used in a context of work. Further, and even more profoundly, if human pre-thetic consciousness is worldly, it is so exactly because it is, *itself*, Heidegger’s *Zuhandenheit* “toward something beyond itself.” To the degree that *Dasein* IS *Zuhandenheit*, to that self-same degree, *Dasein* finally and ontologically becomes itself. Aquinas would agree with this, though Heidegger himself might not.

Or, again, more classically put, a real, even an asymmetrically real, relation cannot be further referred to another real relation, or we would then be immediately lost in an infinite regression of towardnesses going nowhere, towardnesses impossibly without either terms or referents. The interplay between pure relationalities that IS the convergent Transcendental Ego is either meaningful or “going nowhere” and thus wholly unknowable, and if it is so radically unknowable (as not yet, if we might express it thus, “being taken up and used by subject-consciousness”), there is simply no way at all in the direction of possibly creating a meaning for it.

All this is the case just as surely as, for example, the Big Bang theory is a trenchant theory of how the universe came into being not because it has any primary or actually *here and now* recordable scientific evidence (no scientist was there beforehand to watch it suddenly unfold) but because it postulates nothing-at-all “before” the Big Bang. We cannot be a towardness to something utterly beyond us except RIGHT NOW in this time and this space just as surely as a Bang cannot exist before itself in order to bring itself into being.

When we try to analyze all this as motivation, we certainly have an intuitive feeling that the mind can multiply out its own *mental* relations endlessly, but when we consider the actual unfolding transcendence-beyond-itself of real relations (or at a more grounded and creaturely level, the actual unfolding transcendence-beyond-itself of the *real-self/real-world* complex), this is not the case. If something is, indeed, actually TOWARD, then whether it is, in the lower, intentional sphere, objective or subjective, is of no consequence. For the very project has now become motivationally an attempt to understand it as it is in itself, not as in something else not yet known or related to something else not yet known. In more formal terms: A real relation (in this case the special, asymmetrically real “towardness” of intentionality toward its object) cannot be referred to another real relation (the asymmetrical relation at the heart of the Transcendental Ego) without the resulting error of an infinite regress. Following the “unmoved mover” ontology of Aristotle, Aquinas says that, if secondary, instrumental causality IS, then God, the unmoved mover, IS, or, quite simply, there couldn’t possibly have been instrumental motion in the first place. Phenomenologically, we are saying that if the total enfleshment of human object-consciousness IS, then pure consciousness, in all its eidetic glory, IS TOWARD SUBJECT-CONSCIOUSNESS, or else there couldn’t have been this self-same human object-consciousness in the first place.

Differently put, if we were somehow knowing-becoming the real outward towardness of the Transcendental Ego, we could not speak of such a knowing-becoming as an intending of anything as real object of thought. Thus, if a real or asymmetrically real relation, in its own essence, is simply a “being-toward,” irrespective of what it resides in, it cannot, without complete *self-contradiction*, actually possess the essence of being toward another being toward. Note that we are speaking of real relation only. Certainly non-real, wholly mental relations, as Husserlian perspectival “rays,” and even as, in Aquinas, unfolding intelligibilities, can be referred beyond themselves toward other real or mental relations *ad infinitum*. But a real or asymmetrically real relation must *actually be* a being-toward some final referent utterly beyond itself, or else it simply would not be what it is. This truth, as motivation *is* the science of convergent phenomenology as it begins its departure into its native field of study. And the referent must be either subject-consciousness or a created reality, as regard the purely scientific formality of human thought that general and convergent phenomenology have uncovered; or at least a created reality, as regards the empirical origin and empirical creative motion of human thought. Who would be aware of this more than the great classical Eastern and Western metaphysicians, especially when they spoke of all created causality as having the final nature of never being able to be extended into infinity but as eventually coming to rest TOWARD, pure and simple? Created causality could only cause something beyond-itself-lower-than-itself at that very here and now moment of its own suddenly being beyond-itself-higher-than-itself. It does not matter whether such “causing” is viewed within transcendental subjectivity (as in Husserl’s famous notion of constitution) or, more traditionally, within the natural standpoint.

The little-noticed but immensely important way Aristotle speaks, in a wholly formal way, of local motion from place to place or, indeed, any kind of change at all (even in the intellect) is a pure case in point. Not even Husserl’s descriptive clarity reaches to the genius height of Aristotle’s “phenomenological description” (I would now say “*convergent* phenomenological description”) of motion. Even the slightest motion, in Aristotle’s eye, is thereupon able to be philosophically caught on the wing *solely as being an act of potency insofar as the moving or changing thing is still in potency, toward...*its own coming to rest. It is thus philosophically “right” to say that the entire creative activity of the Transcendental Ego itself, as wholly constitutive of the subject-object relation, is also potential, toward.... It

is in seeing this “rightness” that a traditional phenomenologist suddenly becomes also a convergent phenomenologist.

If we, as object-consciousness, have to wait for either inside or outside “motion” to happen, and if then we SEE it happen, then, IN ITS OWN ABSOLUTE BEING WITHIN ITSELF, it must have been already out beyond itself toward subject-consciousness all along the line. This waiting as motivation is what I finally identified, within convergent phenomenology, as nothing but the actual (empirically real) towardness of the dark art of the transcendental imagination as it passes beyond itself in TIME, doing so more or less in the bent-back-upon-itself, curious, retentive manner that a single image gathers other interrelated images around itself as a set rule for them.

Aquinas had no difficulty seeing *in a single unifying yet analogical concept of “motion”* both some physical change from here to there on the one side and the high immaterial act of the mind suddenly becoming itself toward its known object on the other. Seeing this as motivation is what leads us into the work area of convergent phenomenology itself as an a priori science.

We have already spoken of the transcendental proto-constitution of *adesse* objectivity as the special intensification of an intentional act into a core act that *could actually mean something*, and indeed mean something that itself is already utterly beyond itself toward something else. What we are motivationally uncovering about the transcendental proto-constitution of *adesse* objectivity now augments such a view. The transcendental proto-constitution of *adesse* objectivity, as we have come to define it eventually, is nothing other than our own most, self-same unity of thought as it knows material things by suddenly “moving,” suddenly becoming itself toward something so beyond itself as to be absolutely unknown.

Motion IS, only as readying itself to finally come to rest in a place. Human consciousness (viewed analogically as a sort of “change”) IS only “convergently,” that is, only as coming to rest in the *actus purus essendi*, while, at its own utterly relational level of newly converged being, precisely becoming identified with its known object as that object is in itself, and thus coming-to-rest as nothing else but itself viewed suddenly as now wholly identifiable with that self-same object as it is in itself. Husserl, as the first philosopher ever to see this miraculous and exfoliating identity of the intentional act with its object not only at the remote height of theoretic reason but also in the most mundane of concrete praxis, never ceased to be lost in wonder at it.

From the above rightness of these truths, some other astounding truths follow: Human thought has never, in truth, thought ITSELF. In modern views of self what is often believed to be an isolatable self standing utterly alone inside itself apart from the empirical world has actually only been a seeing of the purely formal, universal and essential conformity that we ARE over against the object of knowledge that we have become. At the innermost interior of the human spirit, *there simply is no human subject-consciousness*. There is only human object-consciousness finally defined as already out beyond itself toward subject-consciousness. If it takes an always further describable array of (real and mental) essential relationalities to find this out in any deeply meaningful way, then we should perhaps suggest motivationally to ourselves that we should simply become a convergent phenomenologist and begin to “do the math.”

7.4 THE CONVERGENT TRANSCENDENTAL EGO AS “ROLE”

At the referred core of its inmost nature, the Transcendental Ego is quite simply an *ad aliquid* taken in its formal purity as we have defined it already. Convergent phenomenology shows us this notion as an asymptotic limit because we, as working phenomenologists, have taken a great risk and proceeded as far as possible into the pure form of what Husserl calls the neutrality modification, and applied it finally to the entire realm of pure consciousness as such, viewed as a constitution of thing-like objectivity. We have begun to look at our own Transcendental Ego as, indeed, nothing in itself and everything toward something else. There is an ontological ground for thus taking the neutrality modification to *its* pure limit. Let me explain. In such a final view, all conscious relationality toward Being no longer need be based on ordinary object-consciousness, even the reduced object-consciousness that is Husserlian intentionality taken in its absolutizable purity. For relation, in its *sui generis* “*Eidos*,” is correctly defined as a towardness to its term irrespective of whether it resides in a foundation that is either the same or different from itself. A relation’s pure definition is achieved authentically by simply viewing it as a towardness as such, apart from the foundation in which it resides.

This leaves us free to take the neutrality modification to its extreme ontological limit as follows: Both subject-consciousness and object-consciousness are themselves one as pure relationality added to Being and as the same as Being. Consciousness in such a completely generalized

“relation-ified” sense becomes true not by finally abiding in the “presence of Being,” but simply by becoming *itself*, toward the pure form of “something about which” that Husserl eventually inscribes into pure formal ontology. Thus, if we take away, by some impossible supposition,⁸ the entire domain of consciousness in general, both subject-consciousness and object-consciousness, then there could be no vestige left of the Truth. But Being Itself as still meant, and not the specious “ontological presence” of Being, would nevertheless remain.

Once we have taken the leap and have finally entered the a priori science of convergent phenomenology, truths of great philosophical importance become available. The towardness to subject-consciousness that this newly achieved “convergent transcendental ego” itself IS, at each lower act of intentionality, precisely when it “comes” to such an act—when it “moves” in such an act—leaves not the slightest shadow of either eidetic or temporal change within that self-same ego as constitutive of thing-like objectivity. Let us try to make this clear since it seems so etherealized as to be nearly inaccessible to thought even for one who has worked years within transcendental phenomenology itself. Remember that Aristotle held that when a relation comes to be in its foundation, it causes not the slightest change or interior addition to that subject but simply makes that subject to be toward its corresponding term. Thus, even the entire far-flung motion of the natural world, considered exactly as a thing-like constitution of the Transcendental Ego in the traditional sense, remains untouched within itself by the further addition of the higher constitution of any empirically real relation added to it or by the higher asymmetrically real towardness of the action that thus achieves such constitution.

The paradox that rises from such a view is even more strikingly seen when we further note that the cessation of the constitution of any empirically real relation also leaves the entire ensemble of the thing-like objectivity of the world equally untouched.

Such a paradoxical point might be better expressed by using the extreme example of a dramatic action that catches our attention: Thus, if motion (in our present case the motion of the entire, thing-like universe) is going on, center stage, and we are caught up there alone, then it follows that any offstage (and thus completely beyond the horizon of ordinary thing-like pure consciousness) “towardnesses” to such attended-to motion are clearly so completely out of the picture in respect of the thing-like drama in front of us that thereby their own “change” as a departure (which is nothing but a kind of invisible vanishing, as such) is simply

and once and for all, and, indeed, *absolutely*, not seen and therefore can never be brought to further intuitive clarity. If any such towardnesses, even in their own eidos “as such,” are intuited, they are already fully intuited in the most ultimate possible sense or they weren’t really intuited in the first place. This all-or-nothing aspect of empirically real relations bears analogy to the all-or-nothing character of what Emmanuel Levinas described as a “game.” He uses the half-lit existence and “as if” character of dramatic action on stage as an example of what he means by using this term, game. He says, “Theater has always been interpreted as a game...It is a reality that leaves no traces; the nothingness that preceded it is equal to that which follows it. Its events do not have real time.” In other words, a thing has colors, and if it changes from red to white, we see the change, but a towardness has nothing but itself as towardness, and cannot ever be authentically intuited as *itself either appearing or vanishing*. Again Levinas: “It has nothing, and does not leave anything behind after it vanishes; it sinks into nothingness with all its baggage.”⁹

We thus may speak of the Transcendental Ego, as the transcendental proto-constitution of *adesse* objectivity, existing toward subject-consciousness or ceasing to exist toward subject-consciousness much the same way as Levinas himself speaks of a game or a drama.

On the empty stage of an abandoned theater, the missing actors are there like ghosts, but Hamlet, or Juliet, are *in no way* present.

Convergent phenomenology vindicates the intersubjectively scientific character of the remarkable discoveries that phenomenology intuits, describes and claims within transcendental subjectivity. The seemingly devastating notion that Husserl’s phenomenology failed because it surreptitiously held on to the Ontology of Presence is seen to be unfounded when the fresh realm of convergent phenomenology takes over at the heart of transcendental subjectivity itself, newly viewing such subjectivity as already toward that which is not at all a thing-like presence at any level of consciousness.

Philosophy can only begin as endlessly outward, or philosophy has not begun, meaningfully, to philosophize. I am not “here as presence.” I am toward. Existence is not a resting in the presence of Being. It never was. Existence is already asymmetrically doubled back upon itself, already there as a self-presence that is wholly relational. Levinas tells us that existence can only appear as already there. “Existence appears as a relationship to existence.”¹⁰ This is what it is because it is already wholly relational and relation cannot be defined as in something else but as toward something else. When we are purely toward, we ARE.

The play is the thing, or rather the interplay is the thing. The intersubjectivity of all monadic subjects, and indeed the *mathesis universalis* itself, is thus finally vindicated, but not for the idealistic reasons espoused by Leibnitz. For it is the *role* of subject-consciousness (a subject-consciousness either of God or of angels—and a role, indeed, that the convergent transcendental ego must begin knowingly and honestly to play on the stage of philosophy) that is thereby brought to final intuitive clarity by the science of convergent phenomenology, and not brought to light as a mere play but as the pure formality of Truth toward Being Itself.

On the one hand, philosophers remain sane and remain truthful in philosophy when they not only, as Husserl did, remain True to the “beginning,” but also finally and vigilantly decide to stand firm and never confuse the role with the actor as did Descartes with disastrous results. For object-consciousness, as a relationality toward... is not ever real enough to be “in” time (to be a presence simply because it is already in the temporal presence of things) And thus it remains, forever and always, exactly what it is. This must be the case at all—even the highest—levels of human experience.

On the other hand, if not for the forthright vigilant event and “drama” of Husserl’s famous “as if,” viewed at last as the pure form of all possible neutrality modifications as such, all phenomenology, and convergent phenomenology included, would simply fall back into nothingness.

The absolutely undoubtable first principles of philosophy are not only, as Aquinas said, innate and wholly immanent “sharings” in subject-consciousness, they are, as Leibnitz said, at lot more the formal relations of ideas toward each other than thing-like truths in themselves. And who was more self-aware than Leibnitz?

There is no better motivation than self-awareness. Self-awareness, as purified *adesse*, is of course the final, ontological and logical ground for the new science of convergent phenomenology. Its proto-constitution is the clearest analogy possible to the manner in which subject-consciousness think-creates everything that is.

But the way is difficult. The new science becomes true to itself and to its awareness of its role by completely bracketing out what up until then had remained “unbracketable,” namely, the entire realm of transcendental subjectivity discovered and mapped out by Edmund Husserl. A new, further neutrality modification must firmly and finally be set in place that would thereupon put out of play all thing-like objectivity from the entire realm of transcendental subjectivity, and deal only with the relation-like objectivity left.

But there is another easier way to go. The *inesse* stage is darkening, and the actors have left. Not even their voices remain. In such a ghostly emptiness, a final motivational note must sound for a new drama to begin. We must mark out a realm to think about which, by the very fact of our becoming self-aware, we have not yet thought of.

All that Husserl and Stein needed was a purified a priori psychology as a foothill start and the journey into the realm of phenomenology commenced. For us also, as convergent phenomenologists, all we need is an a priori psychology suddenly purified of all *inesse* material and our journey can begin also, a journey transcending such a doubly purified psychology and rising, infinitely further into the transcendental material that is our endlessly opening task ahead for all time to come.

NOTES

1. See, for example, David Cooper in his introduction to Michel Foucault's *Madness and Civilization*, (Routledge, 2001), p. ix.
2. Heidegger's clear presentation of divine knowledge would have to see perceptual things in their unfolding adumbrations of appearance as we do. The deeper limit notion of the subject-consciousness of divine knowledge, wherein God sees the perceptual things that He has made not by allowing them to unfold ad infinitum for His knowledge but by simply knowing Himself, is not, to my knowledge, ever discussed in the writings of Husserl.
3. Husserl, Edmund, *Logical Investigations*, translated by J.N. Findlay, (New York, Humanities Press, 1970) p. 592.
4. Mohanty, Jitendranath *The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl, A Historical Development*, (Yale University press, New Haven & London, 2008), p. 265.
5. This was a personal hope for me as early as the mid-1960s. I remember the summer of 1963 and a blissful day I spent in the glacier-mountain region between the peaks of the Middle Sister and the North Sister near Bend, Oregon, writing frenzied notes on Being and Time, wishing that there were a super-hyphenization, or breach of language into meta-language, that could reveal the entire, temporarily unfolding self-world complex as now newly transcending everything, simply, and asymmetrically, toward...as such.
6. Husserl, Edmund, *Ideas*, translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson, (Jarrold and Sons Ltd., Norwich, 1931), p. 16.
7. Husserl, Edmund, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution*, translated by Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 1989), p. 19.
8. Aquinas himself, by no means a timid thinker, was the first philosopher to carry out this extreme and Husserlian-like "as if" reduction at the purely

ontological level. On Truth, translated by Richard Mulligan, (Henry Regnery 1952), Question 1, art.2 (Unde, etiam si intellectus humanus non esset, adhuc res verae dicerentur in ordine ad intellectum divinum. Sed si uterque intellectus, rebus remanentibus per impossibile, intelligeretur auferri, nullo modo ratio veritatis remaneret.)

9. Levinas, Emmanuel, *Existence and Existents*, translated by Alphonso Lingis (Duchesne University Press, Pittsburgh, 1978), p. 14.
10. *Ibid.*, p.17.

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