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Yijie Tang

Anthology of Philosophical and Cultural Issues

An Exploration into New Frontiers



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Preface

Since I have often been asked about my life of study, it is better for me to give you a brief account of it here as a preface.

First of all, I have to admit that there is a big gap between me and scholars of my father's generation (such as my father Tang Yungtung, Prof. Tschen Yinkoh and Feng Youlan) in terms of academic background. From a very early age, they received their enlightenment education by reciting the *Four Books and Five Classics*, fully at home with traditional Chinese canons. In their 20s, they were all sent abroad to study further for 5 or 6 years. Having become competent in both Chinese and Western learning with a good command of foreign languages, they came back to China as leading scholars in educational and research institutions. In that sense, my father belongs to the first generation of academics of that kind, Qian Zhongshu is second generation, and I am probably part of the third or fourth generation. Our educational background and opportunities have been different.

As for the relationship between me and my father, we don't have any sort of "family learning" handed down from father to son. In fact, he let me loose on learning. He may be perceived as a man adhering to practices of the past; however, he was not as conservative as many people may think. For instance, he didn't believe in traditional Chinese medicine, nor did he like watching Peking opera, but he did indulge in reading Western detective fiction, and liked Mr. Jin Yuelin very much with whom he frequently exchanged English novels of that kind. Having a research area of Chinese learning, especially in the history of Buddhism and metaphysics of the Wei and Jin Dynasties, he was oddly very much interested in things of the West, which I think had something to do with his life of studying abroad.

Reflecting on what he taught me, there were mainly two aspects: One was to read certain books, such as Yu Xin's *Lament for the South*. My great grandfather was a teacher who cultivated three Jinshi among his student, including my grandfather. My father also instructed me to read *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra*, which I thought was to train my ability in analyzing different concepts. Another thing he taught me was how to behave as a responsible person. Absorbed in his area

of learning, my father was a scholar of non-confrontation. And yet what he wrote in his book was quite pertinent with critical rationality.

In my memory, frequent acquaintances of my father at that time were Qian Mu, Xiong Shili, Meng Wentong, and Lin Zaiping. They often went to Zhongshan Park, drinking tea at the Laijinyu pavilion, when I was about five or six, together with me and my younger sister. After the kids were catered to normally with a plate of *baozi*,¹ they would start their discussions. As recorded by Mr. Qian Mu, the two main topics they discussed were: the national crisis (since the Japanese invasion of Northern China was imminent) and the impact of the New Cultural Movement on traditional culture. Being a conservative group of people, they did not exactly agree with Hu Shih. My father usually contemplated the proceedings and kept quiet even amid heated debates since he was reluctant to argue with anyone, as Qian put it, which more or less taught me to do the same.

My father was a member of the Xue Heng School (school of impartial learning), which was opposed to the New Cultural Movement led by Hu Shih, but his relationship with Hu Shih was not in conflict. In 1931, my father was invited by Hu Shih to teach at Peking University, shifting from the Central University. Ideologically, they were not identical, but still they had a lot in common concerning research in Buddhist history: for example, they all held a critical view of Liang Qichao.

During my study at university, several lecturers deeply impressed me. Mr. Fei Ming, in the Chinese Department, a fellow-villager of mine, taught me Chinese. I remember that he was so bold to say that he had a better grasp of the *Madman's Diary* than Lu Xun (the author) himself. Also he was very earnest about his job—always very carefully corrected and commented on students' essays handed to him once a month. He inspired me to be courageous (but not necessarily confrontational) as well as meticulous.

Mr. Hu Shihua, a lecturer in logic, was a first generation expert in computing science in China. He taught us formal logic, mathematical logic and scientific methods of deduction, which greatly benefited my logical thinking following the path of mathematical reasoning. I think students of Chinese language and culture should all take these courses.

My female lecturer Yu Dazhen's kind attitude made a great impact on me. At the time, she taught the history of English literature in the Department of Western Languages. As a student majoring in philosophy I attended her classes out of extensive interests. Her use of English as the medium of instruction to teach text books all written in English posed a great challenge to my limited English. However, after class she always talked to me to find out where I had missed out and directed me to read certain pages of the book.

Now, let me talk about how I have been engaged in scholarship and what lessons I have learned. Recently, I wrote a book entitled *The Way of My Philosophy*. At the beginning of the book, I state that "I am not a philosopher," which was the question

¹Steamed stuffed buns.

asked by a graduate student at the University of Leuven in Belgium. Since she wanted to write a thesis on the topic, I explained to her the historical reason why I am not a philosopher over 2 h.

After the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, there was a prevalent understanding that no one could be granted the title of "philosopher" except great figures like Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao Zedong, who had created new concepts. People like us who are engaged in the study of philosophy could only be called "engagers of philosophy" and their job was to explain the ideas of these philosophers or to apply their concepts to historical or current issues. In his *Author's Preface to Sansong Hall*, Mr. Feng Youlan also confirmed this assertion.

As a well-known philosopher, Feng Youlan dared not to declare his status after 1949, and yet he was unwilling to keep quiet as an "engager of philosopher" either. Since he uttered some "undesirable ideas" from time to time, he was constantly under political criticism. As an "engager of philosophy" myself, I avoided a lot of trouble. After I graduated from Peking University in 1951, I spent more than 5 years at the Party School of Beijing Municipal Party Committee, teaching the history of the communist party and the history of the communist party of the Soviet Union, mainly in the area of socialist economic construction. Later on I switched to teach philosophy.

During this period, I read works of Marx and Engels pretty systematically, which equipped me well to carry out my teaching duties in the field of Marxism. In 1956, I came back to Peking University when the movement of "letting a hundred schools of thought contend" was in full swing. It was followed by the "anti-rightist movement," which left us little time for reading (in fact I had less than a year for reading during that entire period).

Between then and the "Cultural Revolution," I published more than thirty articles, all of which are ridiculous stuff from today's point of view. These articles fall into two categories: One criticized Feng Youlan and Wu Han, mainly on the issue of traditional cultural and moral heritage (I disagreed with Wu Han that morals could be inherited). My naivety had bred my boldness.

The second kind evaluated historical figures. I wrote several papers for the symposiums on Confucius, Mencius, Chuang-Tzu and Lao-Tzu, basically to criticize them. Why? Because basically I was carried away by the textbooks of the Soviet Union, specially by Zhdanov's definitions of materialism and idealism, which simply relate everything progressive to the former and everything reactionary to the latter. In fact, I couldn't really be engaged in scholarship in its true sense until the end of the "Cultural Revolution."

In retrospect, as activists we all participated in student movements led by the communist party and joined the party after "liberation." All along the way, we followed closely the instructions of the party and Chairman Mao who was deemed the greatest philosopher, and whenever discrepancies occurred, we constantly corrected ourselves. Then after the death of Chairman Mao and the end of the "cultural revolution," the first question that came to my mind was: "Whom should I follow now?"

During the “Cultural Revolution” I frequently went astray: by opposing Nie Yuanzi,² I was labeled a “reactionary”; by aligning with the writing group “Liang Xiao,”³ I made even more serious mistakes as everybody knows. As a matter of fact, my faults were constantly identified when I followed Chairman Mao’s instructions closely. Mr. Zhou Yiliang, a colleague of mine in the same writing group, wrote a book titled *After All a Scholar*. Originally it was titled *After All a Scholar who was Cheated by Chairman Mao*, but he dared not write that down. After his death, I put that in an article and sent it to the journal *Popular Tribune*: it was rejected, but later on published by *The Eastern Miscellany*. It seems clear to me now: we have to listen to our own inner voice not that of somebody else, or we will foolishly make other mistakes without reasoning.

During 1979 and 1980, the philosophical issue of how to evaluate idealism was raised again after it had been denounced at a conference discussing the history of philosophy in 1957. What concerned us most was how to correct this denunciation.

I therefore suggested that we might treat the history of philosophy as a cognitive history which has to come down to the issue of philosophical scope, within which philosophers inherited not only materialism but also idealism. The question was then: could we view the development of philosophy outside the dichotomy of materialism and idealism? Following the route of epistemology we might find the contributions made not only by materialism but also by idealism.

Considering how to break through the dogmatic bondage framed by the dichotomy of materialism and idealism, I wrote an article published in *Social Sciences in China* in 1981, mainly exploring this philosophical scope.

In 1983, I went to Harvard University to carry out my research sponsored by the Luce Foundation. In the early 1980s I had focused mainly on Daoism and Buddhism rather than Confucianism. At Harvard, however, I was revitalized by scholars like Prof. Tu Weiming who had continuously carried on the ideas of Mou Zongsan as a Neo-Confucian. And grand international philosophy conferences were held there, composed of several thousand people and many panels. Since the panel on Chinese philosophy was holding its first meeting, it attracted a huge crowd. Invited by chairpersons Cauchy and Tyminecka of international phenomenology, I delivered my speech on the possibility of a third phase in the development of Confucianism, explaining the unity of heaven and man, knowledge and conduct as well as emotion and scenery.

In my view, the study of Chinese philosophy may be approached in this way: the unity of heaven and man is concerned with truth, the unity of knowledge and conduct queries goodness, while the unity of emotion and scenery explores beauty.

My speech was commended by the audience as being lucid and logical. A listener, who used to come to Peking University to attend my lectures, asked me: “It seems to me a bit strange that you have not mentioned Marxism, why is that?”

²A leader of a rebel faction.

³A writing group composed of members of Peking and Tsinghua Universities organized by the “gang of four.”

I answered, “How I understand Marxism is to seek truth from facts. Since I have been following this guideline, my research is very much in line with Marxism.” This has implied to me that one has to cultivate one’s own views whether they are correct or not. The speech was later written up as an article entitled “On truth, goodness and beauty in traditional Chinese philosophy” and published in China.

What are the fundamental differences between Chinese and Western philosophy? Surely there are many apart from plenty in common. In reading Aristotle, Kant or Hegel, one finds a “system of knowledge” concerning truth, good, and beauty. In reading Chinese philosophy, however, one finds above all the “realm of life,” which distinguishes it from the west. I have therefore written another article titled “More discussion on truth, goodness and beauty in traditional Chinese philosophy,” which is definitely my own view.

Recently I have read Yu Yingshi’s book, in which he points out that one of the differences between Chinese and Western philosophy is that the former is characterized by “immanent transcendence” whereas the latter deals with “external transcendence.” I think his viewpoint very much coincides with my understanding of the “realm of life” and the “system of knowledge,” and therefore I have written four more papers on the issue of these two transcendences.

Bearing in mind that Chinese society, from ancient times to the present, has basically been ruled by man, the question then I raise in my articles is: Has this something to do with the concept of “immanent transcendence”? This so-called “transcendence” relies on one’s *xin-xing* (mind-nature) and self-transcendence so as to transcend the mundane world without requiring any external forces. In the West, however, from Plato to Christianity almost all rely on external forces to pursue an external standard out there.

It may be possible that “immanent transcendence” breeds the “rule of man” whereas “external transcendence” leads to the establishment of the “rule of law.” But can we simply conclude that? In studying Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism, I have gained some insights into the characteristics of their “immanent transcendence,” which are of value in cultivating morals and temperament. However, they are also linked to the tendency toward rule of man rather than rule of law. In this regard, can we combine the two transcendences at a higher philosophical level? This possibility has now drawn the attention of my colleagues who are contemplating feasible resolutions.

In China, the first article criticizing Huntington published in *Philosophical Researches* was written by me, which arose from my interest in cultural issues. Engaging research in this field had brought up the issue of an “Axial Age,” referring to the time around 500 B.C. when great thinkers occurred almost simultaneously in ancient Greece, India, China, Israel, and Persia. It prompted me to think about the possibility of a “New Axial Age” in the twenty-first century. I then raised the issue at a conference in 1998.

Since then my interest has directed me to study hermeneutics. Because textualism has been widely applied in the humanities and social sciences in China, I wrote an article titled “Can we have a Chinese hermeneutics?” in 1998, the year marking the centenary of Peking University.

China has a longer history than the West of expounding its classics, starting at least from the Warring States period (as I have analyzed in my second article), and yet still has not established systematic theories and methods to elaborate its own philosophical issues. In the Sui and Tang Dynasties, after Buddhism was introduced into China, several Sinicized Buddhist sects were established, such as Hua-yan School, Tian-tai School and Zen Buddhism. They had all been deeply influenced by Chinese thought, especially Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu on Zen Buddhism, the metaphysics of the Wei and Jin Dynasties on Hua-yan and so on. Today, based on Chinese concepts and historical records, can we formulate a Chinese hermeneutics? In my understanding, apart from myself, at least four or five other scholars are currently engaged in the subject, including the late American scholar Fu Weixun, who approached the issue from a methodological perspective and categorized the topic into five levels, which makes a lot of sense to me. Now, given that Sinicized Buddhist sects did occur in history, why can't we think about establishing Sinicized Western philosophical schools?

Recently I have started a project to compile *Complete Works of Confucian Canon* using a similar method to collecting abundant commentaries from different dynasties. For instance, the *Book of Changes*, there were more than 2000 commentaries in the history, and the *Analects* alone has been glossed by about 3000 commentaries. The reason I have taken on this job is mainly due to the consideration that it's better for a person of my age to collect data as references for others to do research than to put forward new ideas of my own.

In all these initiatives, three major points have been weighing on my mind which I share with you as follows:

First, in order to achieve better academic results, a solid foundation of Chinese and Western learning must be laid.

Second, in engaging scholarship, one has to be conscious of the problems which are currently confronting our society. For example, in the 1980s I thought about the issue of "harmony," and now we are trying to build a harmonious society; considering "transcendence" earlier, we can now relate it to the building of a society based on the rule of law. We therefore all need an alert mind for current issues from a fresh perspective.

Third, as scholars you need to continuously exploit the new frontiers of academic fields with a broad outlook. Studying philosophy cannot be carried out in isolation; you should, to a certain extent, also be involved in literature or economics or sociology, for instance, to expand your horizons. Also, with foreign language competence, you should be able to read foreign works in their original texts.

As Mr. Feng Youlan points out, we should have "three carry overs" (in fact it should be more than three): Namely, carrying over Western philosophy in the same way we carried over Indian Buddhism in the Sui and Tang Dynasties; carrying over our traditional culture in the same way Neo-Confucianism carried over Confucianism; carrying over Marxism in the same way we carried over a pragmatic approach to solve practical problems, not in a dogmatic way.

In a nutshell, for any culture to prosper it has to be firmly rooted in its foundations: the Renaissance in the West went back to ancient Greece, Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming Dynasties found its resources in Confucius and Mencius. However, these ancient concepts were merely a starting point, not a terminus. We have to build something on that groundwork by thoroughly mastering the canons if we really want to achieve excellence.

Beijing, China

Yijie Tang

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Chapter 1

On Truth, Goodness and Beauty in Traditional Chinese Philosophy

A general understanding of traditional Chinese philosophy may be achieved by a concise elaboration of its truth, goodness and beauty, which, in my view, are correlated with the integration of *tian* (heaven) and *ren* (man) and *zhi* (knowledge) and *xing* (practice), as well as *qing* (feeling) and *jing* (scenery) respectively.

Definitions of “heaven” and “man” may vary according to different philosophers. Generally speaking, in traditional Chinese philosophy, the *Dao* of heaven refers to the macroscopic view of the universe while the *Dao* of man concerns the microscopic aspect of social life and human relations. The proposition of man-heaven relations was firstly put forward in the *Book of Classic History*: “What heaven witnesses is generated from man’s observation; what heaven listens to comes from man’s hearing.”¹ Clearly, in traditional Chinese philosophy man and heaven are not separate but an integrated entity.

The issue of heaven-man relations had always been an important one approached by Chinese thinkers of different dynasties: so Sima Qian (145–87 BC) in the Han Dynasty called his *Historical Records* a book that “probes into the relations between heaven and man;” Liu Yuxi (772–842) in the Tang Dynasty criticized his contemporary Liu Zongyuan’s *On Heaven* for not quite getting the point of exploring the link between heaven and man; Shao Yong (1011–1077) in the Song Dynasty put it even more bluntly, “Any learning cannot gain any credit until it probes into the relations between heaven and man.” Despite various opinions on the relations of the two, one thing is certain: that the main schools of traditional Chinese philosophy prioritized the concept of “integrating heaven and man”.

In fact, Confucius said more about “human affairs” than the “mandate of heaven”. He believed that with the paramount position of heaven, the mandate of heaven and the utterance of any sage are virtually consistent and should all be revered. In a way, man and heaven are internally connected, as Confucius’ disciples later elaborated.

¹“Tai Shi” in the *Book of Classic History*.

Mencius had the idea of “integration of heaven with man” in a complete sense: “Exhausting yourself, know your lot and then you can understand heaven;” “A profound man should keep up with heaven above and earth below,” revealing his holistic view on heaven and man.

Xun Zi (313–238 BC), although requiring that a “distinction be made between heaven and man,” had the main idea to alter the mandate for a practical purpose by juxtaposing man with heaven: “Despite seasonal changes in earthly products, man has his position in controlling all that; if heaven, earth and man each performs its functions harmony will be achieved;” “In evaluating ancient deeds, current events have to be taken as references, and in talking about heavenly things human judgment is inferred.”²

The theme of Metaphysics of the Wei and Jin Dynasties (220–589) was the relation between nature and the ethical code, namely the heaven-man relation. Even celebrities who defied official posts like Ji Kang and Ruan Ji advocated that “the ethical code be overstepped and nature followed”: they actually opposed the pseudo-ethical code not the real one, insisting that the ethical code be reconciled with nature.

As Lu Xun (1881–1936) pointed out, “In the Wei and Jin Dynasties (220–589), these who seemingly believed in feudal ethical codes were actually disbelievers carrying out a detrimental mission; these who were seemingly saboteurs might be the true believers in the codes.”³ Nevertheless, the theme of Metaphysics of the Wei and Jin Dynasties was to harmonize nature and Confucian ethical codes.

Thus Wang Bi (226–249) embraced the idea that “the intrinsic and the extrinsic are as one,” and he urged that “the essentials (nature and the Dao of heaven) be upheld to rule the nonessentials (the ethical code and mundane affairs).”⁴

Guo Xiang (252–312) also believed that the emperor, though physically sitting on the throne, was of different mind to people in the bush, and “there is no intrinsic beyond the extrinsic”: he therefore concluded that “heaven is the general term for all things on earth.”⁵

In promoting the doctrine of mind and life in the Song Dynasty, the Confucian philosopher Zhou Dunyi (1017–1073) pointed out in more explicit terms: “A saint shares virtues with heaven and earth,” and “a saint aspires to heaven.”⁶ Later Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692) advanced the idea that man moves along with the vaporization of heaven to explain why heaven is integrated with man: “There is not a day that heaven stops thinking of destiny, and there is not a day that man does not submit his destiny to heaven.”⁷ Cheng Yi (1033–1107) theorized that “the intrinsic and

²Xun Zi, “On Heaven” in *Xun Zi*.

³Lu Xun, “Demeanor of the Wei and Jin Dynasties and the Relations between Article, Drug and Wine.”

⁴Wang Bi, *Annotations to Lao-Tzu*.

⁵Guo Xiang, *Annotations to Zhuang Zi*.

⁶Zhou Dunyi, *Annotations to Tai Chi Chart*.

⁷Wang Fuzhi, *Annotations to the Book of Change*.

extrinsic come from the same source;” “in heaven is destiny, in man is character, and the heart commands the body. They are actually one and the same.”⁸

Zhu Xi (1130–1200) had this to say, “Since heaven has a biological heart man also has a heart of benevolence;” “Heaven is man, and man is heaven. The beginning of man is derived from heaven. Since this man was born, heaven rests in him;” “The Dao of heaven is manifested in man;” “A saint ... is integrated with heaven.”⁹

Stressing the importance of the heart, Wang Yangming (1472–1529) said, “The heart is heaven which upholds heaven, earth and all things;” “Man is actually one with heaven, earth and all things;” “The heart has no intrinsic but takes the response of heaven, earth, and all things as its intrinsic.”¹⁰

In Chinese philosophy, there were no serious discussions about whether the *Dao* of man could be carried out without mentioning the *Dao* of heaven, and vice versa, so that is where the significance of the thought of “integration of man with heaven” lies. The reasons are as follows:

First, in Chinese philosophy, instead of being opposed to heaven, man is part of it and has the responsibility of protecting it from any damages, which could also be seen as damaging man’s own self. Man ought not only to know heaven but also revere it. Nowadays, “knowing heaven” has often been translated into ruggedly exploring and altering nature, resulting in ruining its deity.

Knowing heaven without revering it, in Chinese philosophy, will naturally lead to a misconception that heaven is being viewed as an inanimate object full of mysterious force, which can do no good to man at all. Therefore, knowing heaven and revering heaven have to go hand in hand to prompt man’s innate responsibility to heaven, constituting an integral part of Chinese view of “the integration of heaven with man.”

Secondly, since heaven and man are viewed as being internally connected in Chinese philosophy, man therefore has the same benevolent nature as heaven which nurtures everything on earth.

If heaven has no human heart, how can man survive and propagate? By the same token, if men lose their caring heart and damages what heaven has produced, how can they continuously live on earth? The two are therefore complementary and dependent on one another and must be studied interdependently.

Thirdly, it is precisely because of this holistic view of Chinese philosophy concerning relations between man and heaven, that Chinese philosophy can to some degree replace religion in China. Unlike Christianity and Buddhism which are purely religious, Chinese philosophy respects heaven not only in its natural sense but more so in its deity, culminating in a superb realm integrating the two. In a way, Chinese philosophy only incorporates certain religious elements. With a thought

⁸Cheng Yi, *Er Cheng Ji*.

⁹Zhu Xi, *Selections From Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi*.

¹⁰Wang Yangming, *Pandect of Duke Wang Wencheng*.

mode of this kind, it is quite meaningful for us to break through the problematic dichotomy of heaven-man relations.

The issue of “knowledge and practice” has usually been approached from an epistemological perspective. In traditional Chinese philosophy, however, it poses even more a problem of ethics and morality. Historically, if the epistemological issue had not been linked to the ethics, it would have not been passed down as part of traditional Chinese philosophy. The issue of knowledge and ethics are therefore often closely integrated, that is why ancient Chinese philosophers advocated that man should not only seek “knowledge” but must also pay special attention to “conduct” (practice). Despite different opinions on goodness, one thing is certain: that all the important traditional Chinese philosophers had always agreed that the unity of knowledge and practice must be regarded as a prerequisite for goodness, and to be pursued as an ideal. The *Book of Classic History* says “It is not difficult to know but difficult to put it into practice.”¹¹

Mencius stressed “intuitive knowledge” and “intuitive ability,” concerning four factors—benevolence, righteousness, rite and wisdom as moral codes. These four virtues like a flame, could either inflame the world when blazing, or doom someone nearby to fail when vanishing.

Xun Zi emphasized “practice” as the purpose of seeking “knowledge;” at the same time also admitting that the guidance of “knowledge” provided for “practice.” He believed that reading anything is better than reading nothing, and knowing what you read is even important. As he put it, “Learning is ultimate when it is put into practice. One who practices it knows it; one who knows it is saint.”¹² As a saint, therefore, one must integrate knowledge with practice.

The *Great Learning* also emphasizes the unity of knowledge and practice. Up to the Song Dynasty, although Cheng Yi advocated “knowledge precedes practice,” he still related the issue to its moral aspect, where any learning could not be regarded as true learning unless and until it was put into practice.

Following the line of Cheng’s notion, Zhu Xi paid special attention to practice by advocating that action is always more important than knowing something.

Prevalent in the study of traditional Chinese philosophy now is a viewpoint which asserts that since the Song and Ming Dynasties the neo-Confucians, when discussing knowledge and practice, often mixed up the issue with that of ethics and insists that this is where the limitations and mistakes of ancient Chinese philosophers lay. Here, I feel that two questions deserve to be elaborated.

First, since the Song and Ming Dynasties, the neo-Confucians did not regard knowledge and practice merely as an epistemological issue; it was regarded as an important issue precisely because it had always related to morality and self-cultivation and the ultimate goal of the relations between knowledge and practice was to improve moral cultivation. It is therefore irrelevant to assert that the neo-Confucians confused the issue of epistemology with that of morality.

¹¹“Tai Shi” in the *Book of Classic History*.

¹²Xun Zi, “On Learning” in *Xun Zi*.

Secondly, as an issue of morality and self-cultivation, the theory of integration of knowledge with practice and the viewpoint of unity between the two cannot be said to have no positive significance. Ethically, knowledge and practice cannot be separated into two ends. The remark made by Wang Yangming that “knowledge is the guidance of practice and practice is the actuality of knowledge; knowledge is the beginning of practice and practice is the accomplishment of knowledge”¹³ could be seen as the best summary the ancient Chinese philosophers ever made on the issue.

It is known that Confucius, as a man of sentimentality, regarded music as a form of cultivation. According to records, in the state of Qi, after hearing the music of *Shao*, he was unable to savor the taste of meat for 3 months. Standing by the river another day, he sighed: “Everything passes on just like this, not ceasing day or night!”¹⁴ which revealed his feelings stirred up by the sight, even it was not a theoretical analysis on the relations between sights and feelings.

In traditional Chinese poetry writing, there are three kinds of literary expressions: implication, comparison and narration. “Implication” means the idea that there is more to the poem than the words state; “comparison” is to cite things to indicate one’s intention; “narration” is a direct account of the occurrence in embodying the idea. The three approaches should be taken appropriately according to different contexts, enhancing it with charm and force and polishing it with color so that those who read it will find unlimited savor and those who listen to it will be stirred up.

Wang Guowei (1877–1927) put forward his theory of “integration of feeling with scenery” as an aesthetic issue. In his *Random Talks about Poetry*, he made a thorough discussion: “Realm is the top quality in poetry writing. Having realm, a poem is naturally of a high quality and carries popular lines.”

What does “realm” mean? Wang explained: “Realm does not refer to scenery alone; delight, anger, sorrow, and joy are also a realm in man’s heart. Therefore a poem that can depict true scenery and true feelings can also be said to have realm. Otherwise it should be said to have no realm.”¹⁵ Obviously the term “realm” refers not only to scenery but to “sentiments” as well.

“Red apricot blossoms along the branch, spring feelings stir.” With that one word “stir” (*nao*) the realm of the poem is completely expressed. “As the moon breaks through the clouds, flowers play with their shadow.” With that one word “play” (*nong*) the realm of the poem is completely expressed.

The essence of integrating sights with feelings is actually an aesthetic expression of the unity of man and heaven. From the point of view of truth, goodness and beauty, issues of integrating man and heaven, knowledge and practice as well as scenery and feeling all fall into the category of realm. Taking the three approaches into consideration and choosing the most appropriate, enhance it with charm and

¹³Wang Yangming, *Pandect of Duke Wang Wencheng*.

¹⁴Confucius, *The Analects*.

¹⁵Wang Guowei, *Random Talks about Poetry*.

force and polish it with color so that those who read it will find unlimited savor and those who listen to it will be stirred. This will be a poem of the top quality.

Generally speaking, in traditional Chinese philosophy, the integration of scenery and feeling, knowledge and practice were derived from the integration of heaven and man. More specifically, the integration of knowledge and practice requires a thorough understanding of the *Dao* of man and the *Dao* of heaven, which are combined perfectly in people's daily life; in other words, when people practice the integration of the two they reach the realm of integration of man and heaven.

Concerning the integration of scenery and feeling, as Chuang-Tzu said, "A sage's wisdom is to restore the original beauty of nature." That is to say, a man's feeling ought to be the reflection of nature. In this sense, "feeling is generated from amid scenery and scenery is generated from amid feeling. Namely, scenery is the scenery of feeling, and feeling is the feeling of scenery." "Once feeling is integrated with scenery, witty expressions are readily available."¹⁶ This last sentence perhaps constitutes the basic proposition for China's traditional theory of art and literature, manifesting its basic view on "beauty." In traditional Chinese philosophy, what art requires is thus the "integration of feeling with scenery" so that "feeling is generated amid scenery and scenery is generated amid feeling." When one enters the realm of creation, one will reach a situation in which the true, the good, and the beautiful are integrated, where the meaning of life and the man's highest ideals lie.

Therefore, truth, goodness and beauty in Chinese philosophy, mingling with the integration of man and heaven, knowledge and practice, scenery and feeling, reflect a pursuit of an ideal goal in traditional Chinese philosophy characterized by the thought mode uniting man and nature.

¹⁶Zhuang Zi, "Carefree Journey" in *Zhuang Zi*.

Chapter 2

The Anti-traditionalism of the May Fourth Movement and Academic Freedom

It is almost seven decades since the May Fourth Movement. How should we evaluate this great movement—how much “science and democracy,” the goal of the movement, have been achieved? Especially, how should we navigate our cultural development under its shadow? These are still issues requiring exploration. At the core of the problem is the relation between tradition and modernity. This paper intends to provide my view on certain points of the issue, not a comprehensive evaluation.

In some scholars’ view, both at home and abroad, there is a tendency in the May Fourth Movement to repudiate totally traditional Chinese culture, and for that reason it should be criticized. While the negative vision of traditional culture since the Movement is simplistic, however, in my view that is not the main fault of the Movement; on the contrary, it did not provide critical views of traditional Chinese culture, that were sufficiently substantial to guide the sprouting of modern culture in China.

The question is whether the total negation of traditional culture is the solution. The answer is obviously not. For one thing, the critics themselves are involved in traditional Chinese culture; for another, even they did, the best result they could achieve was to denounce feudal dross, but that would have nothing to do with rational analyses and comments affecting our societal progress and leading us to modernize our culture.

It is often said that we should take the approach of critical inheritance, selecting the essential and discarding the dross. In reality, it may be quite easy to criticize the “dross” (though sometimes it may not be very easy to identify what the “dross” is); however, it may be more difficult to inherit the “essential.” It is hoped that there is a line of demarcation clearly defining the dross and the essential of traditional Chinese culture, which could benefit us not only now but also in the future.

However, is there such a dichotomy in traditional Chinese culture? Perhaps not. Certain methodologies are involved. Certain components of traditional culture seem to be essential now, but may not actually be so under closer scrutiny. It is rarely possible to take any “raw materials” from our traditional culture straightaway into

the organic body of our modern culture; they have to be transformed to become part of modern Chinese culture.

Here is a point worth further discussion: certain elements in our traditional culture that have always been regarded as “essentials” may in fact exert negative influence on the making of our modern culture. This aspect, which has been neglected since the May Fourth Movement, perhaps requires our further attention. The following are some of the more typical and important thoughts.

2.1 The Dao of Sageness Within and Kingliness Without

Hu Shih, a representative of anti-traditionalism in the May Fourth Movement, advocated Westernization in the hope of building Chinese society into a free, democratic, progressive and prosperous one resembling the West. He believed that Chinese society can only be transformed in this way by a “good-people-government,” as he first put forward in 1921. He said, “We need a bunch of good people to form a good government to play an active role in people’s social life, otherwise it will be carried out by bad people.”¹ In 1922, he wrote another declaration, signed by another eminence Li Dazhao, proclaiming that the only way out for China’s political reform is to have a good bunch of people with bold fighting spirit.

I wonder what kind of ideology lay behind his proposal to reform China? Moreover, is there any connection between his thought and traditional Chinese thought? In my view, the traditional Chinese way is “rule by man,” based on the “*Dao* of sageness within and kingliness without.”

“The *Dao* of sageness within and kingliness without” originated from the “the World” in *Chuang-Tzu*, infusing into traditional Chinese culture, Daoism, Confucianism, and some of the modern ideas in China. Even around the May Fourth Movement, this infusion attracted more eulogy than criticism. Most notably, as Liang Qichao (1873–1929) pointed out, “The term ‘the *Dao* of sageness within and kingliness without’ embodies Chinese scholarship with the true meaning of cultivating the self internally and enabling statesmanship externally.”²

Xiong Shili (1885–1968) paraphrased the phrase based on the *Great Learning* in his *Outlining the Classics: xin-xing* (mind-nature) is the root of investigating things, extending knowledge, rectifying hearts and seeking sincerity, which constitute sageness within; regulating families, governing states, and making peace of the world are manifested as kingliness externally. Therefore the eight great items of the *Great Learning* are typified by “the *Dao* of sageness within and kingliness without.”³

¹Hu Shi, *Collected Works of Hu Shi*.

²Liang Qichao, *Making Textual Criticisms and Explanations to the Analects*.

³Xiong Shili, *Outlining the Classics*.

Feng Youlan (1895–1990) put it even more bluntly in his *New Inquiry on the Dao* (also known as *The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy*), “the *Dao* of sageness within and kingliness without is the core spirit of Chinese philosophy,” “in whatever school of Chinese philosophy, the belief in ‘the *Dao* of sageness within and kingliness without’ is emphasized.” He further explained that only sages are capable of being kings, who run the country as paramount leaders. If this logic proves right, which we all believe it is, then, following the pattern, what Chinese philosophy pursues is the way of making sages, namely the “the *Dao* of sageness within and kingliness without.”⁴ And in this regard, Confucianism has been the most prominent among different schools of Chinese philosophy over the past two thousand years.

It is recorded in “Gong Meng” of *Mo Zi*, “Master Gong Meng said to Mo Zi that among sages in the past, the top one was set to be an emperor, while the second best became senior officials. Nowadays, since Confucius is insightful concerning literature, rituals and myriad things, he should be seen as a sage, and consequently shouldn’t we extol him as an emperor?” This argument supported the belief that a sage was considered the top ruler. At the end of the Warring States Period, disciples of Xun Zi extolled him as having the virtue of Yao and Shun, which was rarely found among his contemporaries. His wisdom had reached a supreme sphere where everything is disciplined according to the *Dao*. Indeed, he was so wonderful that he should be the emperor! This kind of ideology of “the *Dao* of sageness within and kingliness without” has been dominating our society over the past two thousand years.

Is the “good-people-government” proposed by Hu Shih a refurbished traditional idea in modern society? Are the so-called “good people” the most qualified to be the top leaders of a society and to form a government? Following “the *Dao* of sageness within and kingliness without,” can China become a modern democratic society? I do not believe so.

Modern democracy means having a government ruled by the people and guaranteed by a political and legal system. However, the Confucian “*Dao* of sageness within and kingliness without” is based on the idea of “sage-to-be-emperor” in the hope of a sage man emerging to save his people. The question is: how can the people have august wisdom by themselves? How can people’s well-being rely on sages’ personal morality and cultivation? This kind of belief is actually an illusion originating from small-scale farming, in the same way as farmers call on Heaven for the sweet rain. In fact, the histories of both China and foreign countries have proven that democracy and a legal system are not the gift of sages or “good people.”

How could “the *Dao* of sageness within and kingliness without” be produced by traditional Chinese culture? In my view, this arose from the Confucian intention to moralize politics as well as politicize morality. Although there are connections

⁴Feng Youlan, *Omnibus of Feng Youlan*.

between morality and politics, the two are nevertheless in separate domains of value systems.

Mixing up the two may have two consequences: sugarcoating politics with the abstract morality the politician advocate; and subordinating morality to politics, making people believe that everything is moral so long as it fits politics.

In modern democracy there is no such thing as “sage rulers,” which can only lead to “ruling sages.” In Chinese history, only Confucianism fabricated and deified some “sage rulers” such as Yao and Shun, who in fact never existed. What actually merged were self-glorified “ruling sages” who had either usurped power by any means or attempted to do so. “Noble eulogy” was either blandishment or foolish flattery peddled mainly by junior or senior Confucians.

Moreover, emperors are not qualified to be sages, since if they did they would attempt to apply the unrealistic Confucian doctrines of “ruling the world” to society, nor they would fool themselves by presenting a false appearance of peace and prosperity.

In my view, the so-called sages are in fact the least qualified to be emperors. If they became rulers they would lose their sagacity since they were fantasists who would be committed to something they knew that was mission impossible.

Emperors had to confront reality, which cannot be dealt with by idealism without stripping them of their sagacity. If moral doctrines were used by the “sages” to reform society, which was doomed to fail, they would be regarded as trying to deify reality.

Having said that, I do not believe there are no special values in Confucian sagacity, merely that sages should always be alienated from official duties. From the moral high ground they can always play a consultative but not participatory role in politics, exerting moral and scholarly influence on society. In my view, the true value of “sagacity theory” in traditional Chinese philosophy, especially in Neo-Confucianism in the Song and Ming Dynasties, lies in its insight into universal life.

An understanding of universal life is a kind of internally transcendent philosophy, which cannot be realistically implemented. Actually ruling a country is rarely if ever compatible with the sages’ knowledge of universal life, which is impractical and hard to apply by sages or emperors.

Those prominent thinkers in Chinese society in the past, who intended to be philosophers who would both set their own hearts on Heaven and Earth and set life for people, would in all probability end up in tragedy.

Their ideology might be to embrace their compatriots and their well-being, however in reality the best they could do was to follow the flow and ease tension. I therefore believe that the thinkers’ task is to understand universal life and raise people’s spirits, but not to create a society with extreme ideologies. A healthy and rational society has to be maintained by its corresponding institutions, not by sages with personal virtues.

2.2 People-Oriented Thought

In discussing Mencius' thought, Hu Shih also pointed out that his political concept of "people-orientation" had a lot to do with today's civil rights, which put people as individuals above rulers to enjoy their maximum benefits.

Another prominent figure during the New Cultural Movement, Chen Duxiu (1879–1942) also argued that "Since ancient times, there has been the idea of coordinated cultivation of the nobles and the populace advocated both by Xu Xing and Confucius' 'equalizing wealth' ... all these lofty ideas have proved that in our social economy there are ingredients of rule by the people."

As we all know, under the banner of anti-old feudal ethics and traditional morality, the May Fourth Movement had played an active role in criticizing the old ethical code, old moral and feudal traditional culture, but very rarely people have seriously analyzed the "people-orientated thought" in traditional Chinese culture. On the contrary, leaders of anti-traditionalism have either treated it as the thought of civil right or the thought of governing the state by the people. Are they correct?

As it is said in the "Song of five masters" in the *Book of Classic History*, "Rulers should be intimate with the people without losing their status. The foundation of a country is its people; once the people are properly treated with respect, the country will be at peace." This means once people are living and working in peace and contentment, sovereignty will be consolidated, since among the people there is a mighty force or tool determining the fate of governance.

The truth is that there is no such thing as civil rights in traditional Chinese culture, only rulers' rights. As the great Chinese thinker Zhu Xi pointed out, "Everything has to be scrutinized by the emperor himself 100 % and then can be carried out; not even if 80 and 20 % left to the prime minister,"⁵ let alone to common people.

To authorize emperors' power, the "theory of the divine right of emperors" was created. Sometimes, for the sake of stabilizing society and avoiding its subversion, "confining emperors' power to the limits of Heaven" was advocated, but never were civil rights mentioned. The true meaning of so-called "people-oriented thought" was to say the common people are important because they are the main workers, without whom the rulers have nothing to rely on.

Mencius's concept of people-orientation might have some progressive and estimable meanings, but it definitely had nothing to do with today's "civil rights." We have to realize that the feudal Chinese system was a society bound by patriarchal relations, with the emperor on top of the hierarchical structure and officials at different levels ruling the people. In ancient China, the relations between the emperor, officials and the common people were not only political (ruler-ruled), but also patriarchal, in the way officials at different levels were honored as "parental officials," and the emperors were parents of the world. In that way "sage-emperors" and "clean officials" were expected, with the best results of wise rulers ruling those

⁵Zhu Xi, *Selections from Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi*.

ruled. All in all, in feudal Chinese society, it was rule of the people but not rule by the people.

In a modern democracy, it should be the people, rather than officials, who determine the fate of a society. This relationship had been reversed in ancient China, where “people-oriented thought,” in and of itself, bore no relationship whatsoever to the concept of modern democracy, and the opposite might also be true.

2.3 Social Responsibility and Historical Mission

The Chinese people in general, and Chinese intellectuals in particular, have always had a strong sense of social responsibility and historical mission. There are sayings in Chinese: “Every man alive is responsible for the fate of his country,” “Die for a just cause,” “Dying for righteousness.” Surely, this kind of consciousness among Chinese intellectuals was on the one hand estimable, but on the other was easily headed in the direction of “seeking quick success and instant benefits” by directly participating in politics and official affairs. I cannot really figure out whether it was fortunate or unfortunate for intellectuals to have such a sense of mission. For me, intellectuals should be solely making their living out of creating and dispersing knowledge; they should be critical of politics and intolerant of “pseudo-truths” or “half-truths” including the “consultative-but-not-participatory” approach to politics; the virtue of a gentleman who by nature should be a member of the independent group performing special functions in society.

However, an over-strong sense of social duty and historical mission has often led Chinese intellectuals to cross the line, making becoming an official their ultimate goal. As a result, they lost their critical functions and became dependent on political power.

Surely, history defies generalization: there were exceptional Chinese intellectuals. However, compared with intellectuals in the West, Chinese intellectuals on the whole have been more sensitive to social duty and historical mission, and more desirous of obtaining official posts. Even secluded scholars, like Ji Kang and Ruan Ji, deeply sucked into Daoism, initially all wished “iron could turn into steel,” and when their wishes failed they then became hermits.

I have no intention to deny that there were some true gentlemen in Chinese history, carrying out their social duty and historical mission honestly. For their honorable ambition and spiritual pursuit of faithfulness, kindness and beauty, my admiration is unbounded. However, more often than not, they overdid it in their excessive sense of mission, resulting in what Chinese call “trying to draw a tiger and ending up with the likeness of a dog,” namely attempting to save the world through over-ambitiousness and tragically resulting in failure either as hermits or martyrs.

Since every society requires a group of people to carry out managerial duties, politically powerful groups are formed. However, since “power corrupts,” it is therefore necessary to have a group of people to criticize and supervise these politicians and that is the duty of intellectuals. In addition, there should be entrepreneurs to promote social wealth. When these three social groups are interactively balanced, we can expect a healthy and rational society.

As a special social group, Chinese intellectuals should have a thorough and historical understanding of their social duties, which have been characterized as a “consultative and non-participatory” approach to politics. As the saying goes, “The true face of Mount Lu is lost to your sight, for it is right in this mountain that you reside.” Intellectuals should therefore keep a certain distance from politics, in order to maintain their sober, objective and critical power, so as to assist social progress as outsiders.

The May Fourth Movement, despite its shortcomings, exerted great positive influence on Chinese society and can be characterized by its anti-traditional spirit, which needs to be carried forward even today. History tells us that only in a free academic environment can various schools of thoughts truly contend. Around the May Fourth Movement, for example, all kinds of western thought flooded into China through translation, such as anarchism, pragmatism, neo-realism, bergsonism, Nietzschean philosophy, Schopenhauer’s philosophy, Babbitt’s Humanist philosophy, Marxism and so on.

Some scholars insist that we should further promote traditional Chinese culture or integrate Chinese culture with western culture while in the process of accepting western science and democracy; some, hold an even more conservative view, of anti-western culture rejecting western culture and wanting comprehensively to protect traditional Chinese culture. All these can be discussed as issues concerning the development of Chinese culture on an equal footing with western culture.

I believe that we should today carry forward the critical spirit of the May Fourth Movement in creating a free academic environment, where multiculturalism instead of monoculturalism is promoted, so as to benefit the healthy development of Chinese culture. As is said in *The Book of Poetry*, “Although Zhou is an old state, it dedicates itself to reform.” Although China is a country of a few thousand years old, we are dedicating ourselves to a new historical mission of realizing modernization, which is the rejuvenated goal of all Chinese people.

Chapter 3

On Culturally-Hinged Forces During Cultural Transitional Periods

Concerning cultural development, it is necessary to firstly define its stages. As we know, cultural development usually consists of “identification” and “deviation.” “Identification” refers to a culture evolving in conformity with the mainstream culture in the light of its own precepts: while excluding alien cultural elements, it consolidates its own conventional cultural patterns.

So-called “deviations” refer to any transitional period when cultural crisis, fracture, recombination, and renewal take place, such as the Warring States, Wei-Jin and Southern-Northern, and the May Fourth New Culture periods, which constitute three major cultural upheavals in the history of China. More specifically, during such “deviations” (cultural transitions), exotic ideas are criticized and denounced, mainstream culture suspected, cultural boundaries blurred; in the meantime, previously oppressed forces have been released, posing a threat to mainstream culture.

In dealing with traditional culture during a transitional period, there are three obvious forces, namely cultural conservatism, cultural liberalism and cultural radicalism—these terms are not used in either a commendatory or a derogatory sense. These three kinds of cultural forces coexist within the same framework and the dynamic interactions among them impel cultural and social development. In the past, it was usually believed that only radicalism had such a positive function, while liberalism and conservatism were on the other side of history, impairing cultural development. I think this kind of view is a bit biased and needs to be reviewed.

3.1 I

The Spring and Autumn and the Warring States (770–221 B.C.) were periods of social upheaval in Chinese history, when Emperor Ping of the Zhou Dynasty had to move the capital to the East. After that, dukes constantly waged wars on one

another and caused cultural crises, resulting in a situation where “a hundred schools of thought contended,” including Confucianism, Daoism, Legalism, Moism, Logic, Yin-yang and so on, with the first three schools making the greatest impact on later generations. Until the Han Dynasty, with the declining of Moism and Logic (despite a slight recovery of Logicians at the end of the Eastern Han Dynasty) and Yin-yang being devoured by Confucians, a situation of tripartite confrontation was gradually formed, with Confucianism cast as conservatism, Daoism as liberalism, and Legalism as radicalism.

During this period, since Confucians (mainly Confucius and Mencius) took it as their mission to restore the traditions of the Zhou Dynasty, in this sense we call them conservatives. Confucius believed that in an age of ritual collapse, the mission that had historically been entrusted to him was to restore the authority of the Eastern Zhou Dynasty’s rites. As he said, “should anyone hire me to manage a society, I would definitely renovate the Zhou system.” And indeed, he spent all his life advocating inheriting the cause of Emperors Wen and Zhou. “Since the system of the Shang Dynasty was inherited from the Xia and that of the Zhou from the Shang, both with discernable but slight alterations, that later dynasties would follow the Zhou Dynasty rites, even after hundreds of generations, could also be foreseen.”¹

Over historical time, although there were both inheritance and reforms, in Confucius’ view development had to carry forward the cause and forge ahead into the future without losing the thread of tradition by appropriately preserving ancient culture. Following the tenet of “admiring and believing in ancient rituals and speaking without action,” he taught his disciples traditional culture comprehensively, mainly its odes, history, rituals, and music. Owing to his conservative attitude, Confucius was ridiculed as “attempting the impossible.” Mencius was determined to follow Confucius’ paradigm by eulogizing and faithfully following the rulings of Yao and Shun.

As it is recorded in the *Records of the Grand Historian*, “when the strategy of using the power of vertical and horizontal alliances of states with the state of Qin as the pivot” was practiced, Mencius advocated the virtues of the Xia, Shang and Zhou dynasties, which did not suit the needs of those states. He then went back his hometown, together with Wan Zhang, and set out to compile *Odes* and *The Book Classic History*, to elucidate Confucius’ doctrine. He also wrote a book of seven chapters, *Mencius*. Clearly, Mencius inherited Confucius’ ideas and both of them were later deemed foolish conservatives.

We perhaps need to note here that cultural conservatism is not blindly conservative, but wishes to preserve traditions, carry forward the cause and forge ahead into the future. By the same token, cultural conservatism is not equivalent to political conservatism, even less a kind of resistance to social progress. During the pre-Qin Period, although Confucianism did not completely adapt to the drastic social changes, its contributions to the culture of later generations were believed to

¹Confucius, *The Analects* (Chap. 2).

be positive and, as the guardian of traditional culture, its conservative attitude was always extolled.

Also during the pre-Qin Period, as a representative of liberalism, Daoism increasingly gained its distinctive characteristics as it evolved from Lao-Tzu to Chuang-Tzu. As an archivist of the Zhou Dynasty, Lao-Tzu was fed up with social upheavals and constant wars, therefore lost confidence in the traditional rituals and observed critically, “Now ritual is the mere husk of loyalty and indeed the first step towards brawling.”²

In his view, since *ren yi* (human-heartedness and righteousness) were at odds with human nature, they were responsible for all the hypocrisy and confusion. As he pointed out, “When the great *Dao* collapsed, benevolence and morality were required; when intelligence and knowledge appeared, great hypocrisy began started; when the lineages were no longer at peace, there was talk of filial sons; not till the motherland was dark with strife, did we hear loyal officials.”³ Therefore, “by throwing out wisdom and knowledge, people will benefit a hundredfold; by banishing benevolence and morality, people will become dutiful and compassionate; by discarding skill and profit, and then thieves and robbers will disappear.”⁴ He thus believed that the natural path of inaction would restore the primitive state of a small utopian society where people could use the simplest tools to survive. In this sense, we may say Lao-Tzu tended towards “anti-culturalism.”

Moreover, Chuang-Tzu pursued a kind of spiritual freedom. As he advocated in the first chapter of his book entitled *Peripateticism*: A man should rid himself of both internal and external limits in order to reach the realm of freedom. By abandoning traditional culture, Chuang-Tzu was more obviously “anti-cultural.” In the book of *King Ying*, he used the words of Pu Yizi to express his idea: “Do you know what is happening now? The Yu generation is worse than its Tai predecessor. Sure, Master Yu professes benevolence and is popular among his fellow workers. However, in attracting people he is also confined to external objects. Master Tai, a care-free type of quiet gentleman, sleeps peacefully without a single worry. Whatever others call him, a horse or ox, he just lets them go on their way. To me, his wisdom and morality are genuine since he has freed himself from the bondage of external things.”

In Chuang-Tzu’s view, the reason for the decline of social morale mainly lay in the pursuit of manmade things. Only by returning to a primitive condition, where humans and other species were not clearly distinguished, can men be free of all bondage and live in the way they choose. This entirely agreed with his ideals of introspection and obliviousness of self. He believed that in order to enter the realm of spiritual freedom, men must discount their bodies, banish their wisdom and knowledge and then be connected with the flux of nature.

²Lao-Tzu, *Lao-Tzu* (Chap. 38).

³Lao-Tzu, *Lao-Tzu* (Chap. 18).

⁴*Ibid.*, (Chap. 19).

Anti-culturalism this may seem to be, but Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu saw it as personal choice. Although they prescribed an ideal blueprint for society, they did not strike forward to realize this. Their expectation was to let it grow naturally into an ideal state without any interference: as Lao-Tzu said, “So long as I am inactive the people will of themselves be transformed; so long as I love quietude, the people will by themselves have their way; so long as ‘I do nothing,’ the people will by themselves become prosperous; so long as I am not greedy, the people will by themselves return to the state of simplicity and genuineness.”⁵

As Chuang-Tzu said, “If you are desire-free, obedient to natural law, and gradually lose selfishness, the state will be ruled properly” (in “King Ying”). Unlike the radical legalists, who advocated realizing their dream by force, Chuang-Tzu and Lao-Tzu only passively held negative attitudes toward traditional culture, instead of actively doing something detrimental, so they were called liberals.

As a radical legalist in the pre-Qin period, Shang Yang (395–338 B.C.) is believed to have held a positive view of traditional culture, though we cannot deduce this from what he actually said since the records remain completely silent on that. But he pointed out that, “In ancient times, people loved their relatives and self-interest, during the middle ages, people respected sages and liked benevolence, modern people adore bigwigs and officials.” “In ruling the country, the sages do not follow the ancient way, nor stick to convention. In following the ancient way, we may lag behind the current trend; being stuck to convention, we may block the way of development” (in *The Book of Shang Yang*). It would follow that he thought rulers of a state should not abide by the old rules, nor imitate ancient governance.

Based on this theory, he would seem to have opposed following the beaten track and instead advocated reform. Not only did he not pay much attention to tradition, he also wanted to break the bondage of tradition: “As long as we can make the state prosperous and powerful, it’s not necessary to comply with the old rules; as long as it is beneficial to the people, we do not have to observe the decrepit rituals.” The later legalist Hanfei Zi also believed that social history was constantly moving on: “In ancient times people were judged by their morality, during the middle ages they were evaluated by their astuteness and resourcefulness, nowadays people resolve conflicts through violence.” “Therefore, we should constantly be on the move, laying stress on the present and venerating later kings. Now, when Confucians lobby monarchs, they don’t talk about current ways of governing the state well, instead they always cite past experiences; they do not examine current official affairs, nor understand the craft and evils of politics but admire the ancient sages and achievements of previous kings.” They therefore “openly desire to copy the ways of former kings’ teachers by arbitrarily affirming everything the ancient kings Yao and Shun did, which is either foolishness or deception” (in *Hanfei Zi*).

Meanwhile, Hanfei Zi viewed traditional culture, adored by Confucians, as outdated. He often used the example of shield and spear to criticize the contradictions between the doctrines of Confucianism and Moism, attempting to

⁵Ibid, (Chap. 57).

ideologize the cultural issue so as to terminate “the contention of a hundred schools of thought.” As a radical school, legalists not only denounced traditional culture but also demanded other schools of thought be wiped out.

In fact, “the contention of a hundred schools of thought” in the pre-Qin Period was the result of the blooming development of cultures constituted by the co-existence of and mutual conflicts among Confucianism, Daoism and Legalism (and other schools such as Moism, logic, Yin and Yang and so on). Clearly, we can see the confrontation between radicalism represented by Shang Yang and Hanfei Zi and conservatism.

It is quite reasonable for Sima Qian to categorize Lao-Tzu, Chuang-Tzu, Shen Buhai and Hanfei Zi into one “biography.” The connections between Legalism and Daoism have to date been confirmed by many researchers, and will not be reiterated here. Given the historical background to every cultural transition, Confucianism, Daoism and Legalism all made positive contributions to the development of Chinese culture, and we should not favor one and discriminate against the others. Perhaps we may put it this way: without Confucianism, traditional Chinese culture might have been disrupted; without Legalism, there would have been hardly any break-through in Chinese culture; and without Daoism Chinese culture would be less colorful and inspirational.

Clearly, during the pre-Qin period, the academic culture in this transition was diversified into multiple cultural orientations where different scholars could explore various cultural issues, even multi-dimensional ultimate cosmic concerns. In that respect, Chinese culture was by no means inferior to any other cultures in the world then, such as Greek or Indian culture. Multi-dimensionality rather than mono-dimensionality was the key to cultural diversity, which also inspires us to view any cultural transition from various perspectives so as to promote cultural development.

At the same time, we have to realize that it was precisely the deviation from traditional culture that resulted in the dominance of Confucianism during the four hundred years of the Han Dynasty, for Confucianism had actually absorbed the concepts of Legalism, Daoism, Yin-yang and so on, ushering Chinese culture into the period of “classical Confucianism.” During that time, Confucianism became an official school, which was further classified into five sub-schools which were responsible for annotating the Confucian classics as traditions handed down to the following generations.

Although the tradition had certain flaws, the contribution the Confucian classic studies of the Han Dynasty made to the development of Chinese culture should not be overlooked. Taking a historical view, we may find that “cultural deviation” inevitably leads to “cultural identification” just as it is to be expected that “deviation” will be experienced during cultural transitions when “identification” seemed to be out of the question.

3.2 II

The Southern and Northern Dynasties (220–581) could be regarded as the second important cultural transition, when social upheavals caused by the peasant uprisings at the end of the Han Dynasty had divided the country and destroyed this Dynasty. The result was a tripartite confrontation of Wei, Shu and Wu, before the Western Jin Dynasty (265–316) temporarily reunited the country, which then split again under the invasion by northern minorities. Social turmoil led to a state of diversified cultural confrontation where Confucianism had actually declined despite its potential for social influence.

Unorthodox Daoism still had considerable impact on the society (though the thoughts of Huang and Lao retained significant influence). According to historical records, there were no less than 60 major thinkers of the Daoist school, among them Yan Junping, Wang Chong and Zhong Changtong, comprising an undercurrent that offset and “purified” Confucianism and constituted the framework of the Metaphysics of the Wei and Jin Dynasties.

Meanwhile, the principles of the Logicians—“granting official titles based on talents” and “seeking substance from the nominal”—again became demanding. The related Mohist Canon annotated by Lu Sheng also attracted attention. During this period, Buddhist culture, having originated in India and the Western Regions, spread in China. The encounter between exotic and local cultures certainly have caused some new problems, generating a second “contention of a hundred schools of thought,” which was significantly different from the previous one both in form and contents since the doctrine of “revering Confucianism while rejecting all other schools” had by then already been established (in the Eastern and Western Han Dynasties).

Generally speaking, there were three kinds of cultural forces during this second transitional period, namely radicalism, liberalism and conservatism, which held different attitudes towards traditional cultures formulated since the two Han Dynasties. The cultural framework of this transition saw two views differentiated by the crucial issue of whether to take Indian Buddhism into consideration or not. Obviously, only by allowing for the influence of Indian Buddhism can we gain a holistic picture of the cultural framework throughout the Wei, Jin, Northern and Southern Dynasties.

Well-known scholars Ji Kang and Ruan Ji put forward the idea of “brushing aside eminent doctrines and freeing human nature” and severely criticized the orthodox: “rituals were not set up for our generation.” Ji Kang not only scorned the Confucian classics and attacked authorized documents, viewing all six classics as dirt and ritual codes as rancid, he also slandered some sages, such as Yao, Shun, Tang, Duke Zhou and Confucius. Their criticism was well grounded in their belief that these doctrines were codified in a way that discriminated against human nature and were often used to pursue self-interest by hypocrites and cheaters. Their radical attitude toward eminent doctrines also shifted their severe criticism to Confucianism.

Ji Kang disdained Confucians who took the rituals of Zhou as their guide and the six classics as their principles. He elaborated the reason for his anti-Confucianism in this way: “The six classics rest on manipulation while human nature inclines to pleasure; manipulation is set to discriminate against man’s desires while following human nature will naturally gain something. When you enjoy life and fully manifest your nature, it has nothing to do with the six classics and all their rituals and moral codes. Therefore, their advocacy of benevolence and obligations is not for nourishment of life, and behind their humility lies severe contention, not nature at all.” While denouncing traditional culture, typified by the six classics, Ji Kang inherited another unorthodox but traditional part of Chinese culture—the traditions of Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu since the pre-Qin period. As they admitted “Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu are my teachers.” Clearly, there was a close link between anti-traditionalists and heterodoxy.

Though having different philosophical ideas, Wang Bi and Guo Xiang both attempted to mediate ideologies between Logicians and Naturalists, Confucians and Daoists, believing that they could follow the natural way without banishing the Logicians, who virtually reflected nature. In annotating *Lao-Tzu*, Wang Bi wrote: “As a means, naturalness could be used by a sage to rule his office;” “simplicity is nothing but authenticity. When naturalness is released, all sorts of creatures can act as containers. After their dispersion, sages set up official positions, allocating personnel according to their talents and worth, and transformed social traditions for the common purpose.” While the *Dao* was constantly unnamed, when naturalness was transformed into a tool it gained its name. Since Logicians have naturally followed the *Dao*, it should surely not be cast out.

Moreover, in Guo Xiang’s view, “the so-called ‘immortal’ actually resembled today’s sage, who may live in the imperial court whilst having a heart for the populace; he may wear gold and imperial jade, travel to mountains and rivers, and inspect the conditions of the people, and yet remain the most intelligent and capable person. As a sage, he may labor all day long and still compose himself easily; attend to numerous affairs everyday and yet still have a sense of aplomb. His external mighty power is strengthened by his inward vigor. We haven’t seen anyone whose far reaching power is not based on his internal introspection, and vice versa. Therefore, what a king does should not be something desired by his heart but a will to follow nature” (in *Chuang-Tzu*).

Guo Xiang’s philosophy is mainly based on his theory of “inner sagacity being the foundation of outer kingliness,” believing that Logicians are naturalists, the populace and officials are mutually related, and any outer kingliness must be backed up by inner sageliness. In this sense, Confucianism and Daoism are utterly reciprocal. More specifically, their theory was infused into their annotations of the classics, Wang Bi annotated *Lao-Tzu*, *the Book of Changes* and *the Analects*; Guo Xiang explained *Chuang-Tzu* and *the Analects* in various ways.

However, they both believed Confucius to have been a bit smarter than Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu. According to Wang Bi’s Biography (written by He Zhao), when he was a teenager Wang visited an official in charge of personnel, Shi Peihui, and they had a thorough discussion on the issue. In short, Wang believed that Confucius

had an integrated sense of “nothingness,” whereas Lao-Tzu understood “existence” better, and that was the reason why Lao-Tzu constantly explored the meaning of “nothingness” which was deemed to be unexplainable. As Guo Xiang said in the *Preface to Chuang-Tzu*: “Chuang-Tzu gained certain insights into something fundamental which were all expressed in his soliloquy. As a natural response, his non-specific language, though it seems to be lofty, often ends up useless. Nevertheless, his status is still quite different from those who are motionless and responsive only really have no alternatives” (Preface to *Chuang-Tzu*).

In Guo Xiang’s view, although Chuang-Tzu knew the fundamentals, he could not make the connection between “roots” and “branches,” and constantly divided Logicians and Naturalism. In other words, some saints like Confucius, who were unwilling to respond to the change, had managed to merge the Logicians with Naturalism. In the Eastern Dynasty, Wang Tanzhi further elaborated Guo Xiang’s idea: “It was not that Confucius did not understand the perspective of the root; he viewed its imminent aspect as long-term. It was not that his disciple Yan Hui did not have the virtue required; Confucius actually carried out his teaching based on virtue being a reserved asset.” From this, we may conclude that though dominated by the thoughts of Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu, Wang Bi and Guo Xiang in fact made palpable attempts to reconcile Confucianism and Daoism.

Masters of Neo-Daoism in the Wei and Jin Dynasties as they were, Ji Kang, Ruan Ji and Guo Xiang held different attitudes towards traditional culture. Ji Kang and Ruan Ji, as radicals, strongly opposed traditional ethical codes, whereas Wang Bi and Guo Xiang, as liberals, attempted to reconcile the ideas of the Logicians and Naturalists.

Pei Wei, Fan Ning and Gan Bao could be seen as representatives of conservatism. In the Western Jin Dynasty, Pei Gu severely criticized its debauched customs and degenerate rituals in his book entitled *On Loftiness*: “I am deeply worried about these heterogeneous people, who are so dissipated and malicious toward Confucianism. He Yan and Ruan Ji, for example, have been renowned for their lofty yet empty talk. They defy any and all rituals and ethical codes, wandering about and doing nothing. As for someone like Wang Yan, with his overwhelming reputation and authority, he actually bore no responsibilities for any public affairs, instead degrading social conduct and exerting bad an influence on all other places. I therefore have written *On Loftiness* to reveal these flaws.”⁶

The purpose of Pei Wei’s book was to criticize and countermand the popular trend of admiring nihilism. He pointed out, “many celebrities now prefer ‘nothingness’ to something real which caused many social flaws. If you promote that kind of practice, it will affect the formality which is constituted by the system; if you overlook the system, ignorance will take over and the annihilation of rituals will prevail. Without a proper system and rituals in place, there will be no way to govern” (in *On Loftiness*). In his view, the idea of inaction advocated by celebrities would then inevitably evolve into the state of denying any action to be proper, and

⁶“Biography of Pei Ban” in the *Book of Jin*.

promoting naturalism would lead to the condemnation of the Logicians and the collapse of the ritual system. As a result, the society would fall into disorder. He believed that for any society to be ruled properly, it is absolutely necessary to define social relations, such as distinctions between gentlefolk and commoners, old and young, intimacy and estrangement and so on, and *li* (the ritual system) was set up rationally to regulate all of these as the foundation of society. Clearly, standing firmly on Confucian ground, Pei Wei actively promoted and protected the ritual system established in the Eastern and Western Dynasties.

In the Eastern Han Dynasty, as the fashion of dissipation became widespread, Fan Ning uttered the following strong words: “People like Wang Bi and He Yan are really heretics who despise all classics and ritual codes, propagating zealotry and corrupting the generations following. They use extravagant rhetoric to blur reality and disturb society, whose proper order has been abruptly altered, the simple folkways downgraded, Confucianism doomed, the ritual system damaged, the central plane upset. In ancient times, what was condemned as the evil conduct of advocating fallacy and misleading people describes exactly those “celebrities of the Jin Dynasty.”

To evaluate its merit rating, Gan Bao wrote *On the Jin Dynasty* in which he also criticized the heretical atmosphere: “While the customs have been polluted somewhat, noble ideas were lost somewhere. Scholars nowadays take the thoughts of Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu as their tenet and ignore the six classics; they prefer empty talk to actual deeds. The social atmosphere is in a mess: as individuals, they fail to follow the moral codes; as academics they pursue noble status by all means even at the cost of integrity; as officials, they lay stress on currying favor with their superiors instead of diligent work.” Obviously, Fan Ning and Gan Bao took the task of defending traditional rituals and the Confucian classics as their mission, backed up by the substantial force of conservatism.⁷

According to the statistics, abundant works were produced during this period, including: concerning the *Book of Changes*, 94 books with 829 chapters; *History*, 41 books with 296 volumes; *Poems*, 76 books with 683 volumes; *Rituals*, 211 books with 2186 volumes; *Music*, 46 books with 263 volumes; *History of Spring and Autumn*, 13 books. Of these, 119 books, mostly *Rituals*, have been lost. As Zhu Xi commented, “exquisite rituals were produced during the Wei, Jin, Northern and Southern Dynasties” and Shen Yao, a Confucian in the Qing Dynasty had a similar judgment. Clearly, the contribution made by these scholars in this period should not be ignored.

The conservatives in this period couched their criticism indiscriminately not only against radicalism and liberalism but also masters of metaphysics (such as Ji Kang and Ruan Ji) and idle talkers (such as Huwu Fuzhi and Wang Yan): perhaps this had something to do with their restrictions of time. Historically, radicalism and liberalism, which in essence should be seen as one new trend of thought, made significant contributions to smashing the trammels of traditional thought on creating

⁷Qian Mu, *A History of Chinese Thoughts* (3), Taiwan: Dongda Publishing Press, 1977 (138–9).

new ideas, exerting a greater impact than conservatives on their contemporaries and following generations.

If we take Indian Buddhism into account, we may get a better picture of the cultural framework in the Wei, Jin, Northern and Southern Dynasties. From a traditional cultural point of view, Buddhism could be seen as radicalism, metaphysics (including by Ji Kang, Ruan Ji, Wang Bi and Guo Xiang), liberalism, scholarship which stuck to rituals and Confucian traditions (including by Pei Wei, Fan Ning, Gan Bao) or as (another form of) conservatism.

Any exotic culture coming to China would naturally have some conflicts with traditional Chinese culture, but initially Buddhism attached itself to Daoism and later to metaphysics, with no obvious confrontation.

From the Eastern Jin Dynasty onwards, as more Buddhist scriptures were translated into Chinese, especially after Kumarajiva's visit to China, many differentiated forms of dharma including Mahayana and Hinayana were more accurately translated and understood by the local people, contradictions and conflicts inevitably appeared. As is recorded in *Spreading the Way and Elucidating the Teaching: A Collection of Expositions of Truth*, there were debates on various issues, such as immortality, karma, cause-effect, emptiness, "whether Buddhist monk should respect the king," filial piety, secularism, relations between Chineseness and barbarity (or foreignness), and so on, all reflecting clashes between traditional Chinese culture and an alien culture. Conflict was particularly notable when it came to the question of rituals and filial piety.

In his *On the Dao*, Sun Chuo severely attacked Buddhism concerning the issue of filial piety by citing Confucianism: "According to Duke Zhou's and Confucius' teachings, filial piety and its virtue are the foundation for all trades to prosper. Only when the base is consolidated can one find the *Dao* and reach out to the deity. As children serving their parents, offspring should support parents while they are alive and sacrifice when they pass away. Among various responsibilities, having offspring is considered to be paramount. The body, given by our parents, dare not be harmed by any means, such as over-exuberance, alteration or injury, otherwise we will experience life-long regret. However, in Buddhism's doctrine believers have to leave this mortal life and their loved ones to strangers, shaving their heads, impairing their appearances. Monks allow their parents to live a life without proper nourishment till they are so frail as to die. In a way, they treat kin like passers-by. What they are doing actually deviates from rituals and betrays human nature—nothing could be worse than that."

Nonetheless, Sun Chuo also defended Buddhism and believed that Buddhists could also glorify and illuminate their ancestors by preaching Dharma. Since they practised celibate monkhood, their view on offspring inevitably contradicted traditional Chinese culture. During the Cheng Kang period of the Eastern Jin Dynasty (326–344), Yu Bing acted on behalf of Emperor Cheng Di, called Buddhist monk in and demanded a ritual bow, which led to a controversy about the monarch-subject relationship. As Yu asked rhetorically in the *Zhao*: "Based on the reverence of children for their fathers, the monarch-subject order was established, our system set up, and these rituals codified, so is that all unnecessary?" "As the

foundation, only when rituals are respected and dignity prevails, can the framework of ruling the state be established” (*Spreading the Way and Elucidating the Teaching: A Collection of Expositions of Truth*). “The practice of Buddhism, however, has tended to deform the human body, violate conventions, alter ethical codes, banish all classics, resulting in the collapse of unified rules and a lack of due regard for precedence.”⁸ Therefore, he demanded Buddhist monk practice the ritual of bowing to the emperor.

However, this demand was opposed by He Chong, the chief imperial secretary, and thus not practiced. By the Eastern Jin Dynasty, Huan Xuan reintroduced the issue by quoting the ideas of Lao-Tzu: “*Lao-Tzu* is as important as three other kings, since what his thought emphasizes is fundamental to lives and survival. How could a single sage have done all that without the assistance of his peers? The paramount virtue in the universe is life which is very much determined by the King, who therefore reveres gods and constitutes rituals not for their formality but for actual governance. How could he do otherwise? For Buddhist monk (Buddhism) to survive and prosper, it should also practice these rituals while exercising virtues. There is no such thing as receiving favors while discarding respect, which is not only breaking the rules but also out of touch with common sense.”⁹

Since Buddhist monk has benefited from the emperor just as anyone else, they therefore shouldn’t be favored by virtue but abandon its ritual codes, or “receive without reverence”. Clearly, Huan Xuan used Lao-Tzu to protect traditional rituals. Hui Yuan, on the other hand, tried his very best to differentiate the practice of Buddhism at home from that of monks. When a Buddhist is living at home, he is just a common person who should follow the basic rule of filial piety; as a Buddhist monk, however, since he has become a monk, living in seclusion, in such a way that secular rules have been altered and personal adornment changed, surely their ritual codes should be even loftier.”

On the one hand, Hui Yuan tried to reconcile Buddhist practice with traditional Chinese culture; on the other, he insisted that Buddhist monk should not follow the ritual of bowing to the emperor. During the Southern and Northern Dynasties, there were two attempts to extinguish Buddhism for different reasons, not excluding the cultural conflicts. But even under various constraints, Buddhism still continuously evolved: “As people competed to read its scriptures, the Buddhist Dharma was printed over a thousand times more frequently than the six classics.”¹⁰ By the Tang Dynasty, quite a few prime ministers and advisers had criticised Buddhism from the point of view of traditional Confucianism (such as *On Buddhism* written by Han Yu). Notably, however, some Chinese Buddhists attempted to meld Buddhism with Confucianism but ended up without any fundamental resolutions.

Taking the Neo-Daoism of Wei-Jin as a whole, its representative figures like Wang Bi, Guo Xiang, Ji Kang and Ruan Ji were all liberals. However, Ji Kang and

⁸Fang Xuanling, *Book of Jin*.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Wei Zheng, *Book of Sui*.

Ruan Ji held particularly strong anti-traditional views of ritual codes, for two reasons:

First, Ji Kang and Ruan Ji did not belong to the mainstream of metaphysics, which intended to reconcile the Logicians, Daoists and Confucians, and therefore its naturalism remained unchanged.

Secondly, although Ji Kang and Ruan Ji vigorously criticized the feudal code of ethics, basically they were serious about life and had a firm belief in it. As Lu Xun pointed out, “Those people (such as Ji Kang and Ruan Ji) have long been viewed as destroyers of the feudal ethical code. However, in my opinion, this judgment is wrong. The fact was, beneath their seemingly rebellious behavior, they were true believers.”¹¹ Lu Xun’s comment was certainly not wrong. In view of the hypocritical practice of some royals and aristocrats towards the end of the Han Dynasty, Ji Kang and Ruan Ji were deeply disappointed about the social atmosphere and showed their discontent as rebels. From the verses they wrote we could infer their true feelings, such as in a letter home, Ji Kang said: “We should not do some trivial modest things, but be generous in vital matters; show not just a little, but grand humility. If we want to retire and give room to better men, it is better for us to do it in the court for a noble cause. Kong Wenju, who died on behalf of his brother, should be a role model for us to follow.”

In one of Ruan Ji’s poems, he also had such a line: “How short a life is/we should make an effort to catch thee.” As Chen Wende commented, “Ruan Ji’s articles reveal his noble ambition, loyalty and lofty goals” (Chen Wende). Undoubtedly, Ji Kang and Ruan Ji was heavily influenced by traditional Chinese culture.

Taking whatever outlook, we can see the Wei, Jin, Northern and Southern Dynasties are cultural transition periods, where Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism intermingled well, laying the ground for their further integration. This trend carried on through the Tang to the Song Dynasty, when Neo-Confucianism emerged after integrating Buddhism and Daoism, re-entering a stage of “identification” following the earlier “deviation.”

3.3 III

From the start of the 20th Century, Chinese society was in turmoil for quite a lengthy period. The New Cultural Movement grew around the May fourth Movement in 1919. After the 1949 founding of the People’s Republic of China, China entered a new stage of cultural transition, which is more complicated than the previous two, and is still an ongoing process.

Confronted with drastic changes in Chinese society and global cultural trends, we may identify different schools during the May Fourth period in following

¹¹Lu Xun, *Complete Works of Lu Xun*, volume 3, 1957 (pp. 388–391).

categories: radicalism, represented by Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu; liberalism, represented by Hu Shih and Ding Wenjiang; conservatism, represented by Hu Shih, Du Yaquan, Liang Shuming, Zhang Junmai (including the academic journal *Classics*). The main issues involved were: How to handle traditional Chinese culture? How to receive Western culture? How to construct our new culture? and so on.

Once upon a time during the May Fourth Period, radicalism and liberalism joined hands in launching a severe attack on traditional culture by holding aloft the banner of “democracy” and “science”. As Li Dazhao said, “In short, ‘democracy’ is the only authoritative word of our time.” For Chen Duxiu, “The reason why Europe in modern times has become superior to other nations, is mainly due to its science, together with human rights—functioning as two wheels of a vehicle.”

Chen Duxiu directed furious criticism at old ethical codes, morals and traditions and set his goal as pursuing “science” and “democracy.” In responding to the attack on the journal *New Youth* edited by Chen Duxiu, he said “What they throw at us are actually nothing but damaging old ethical codes, rituals, cultural chastity, ethics, old literature and art, religion, politics.”¹²

This reveals that Chen’s intention in mobilizing the new cultural movement was to eliminate the traditions that had been imprisoning people’s minds for the last several thousand years. In consideration of China’s social backwardness, political corruption and oppression by Western powers, as well as Western prosperity and social civilization, they believed that China must learn from the West, denounce old cultural traditions, and import Western culture. To put it more bluntly, “the so-called new culture is nothing but Western culture; the old culture is also nothing but indigenous Chinese culture. Fundamentally, the two cannot be compromised.”

In fact, liberals like Hu Shih also advocated the overall absorption of Western culture: “Certainly, very bluntly I blame our Oriental civilization and zealously praise modern Western civilization ... Now some fools incite you to exaggerate your belief that old Chinese culture is superior to other cultures, old Chinese morals are better than those of other nations ... But I have to say this to you: don’t be cheated! We have to admit that we are lagging behind Westerners in many ways, such as in our machinery, political system, morality, knowledge, literature, music, art and physiology.”¹³

Understandably, the mentality of “wholesale westernization” promoted by radicalism and liberalism was based on the fact that China was backward in comparison with the West. Undoubtedly, this kind of “anti-traditionalism” had its merits in breaking the tether of traditional thought and opening up a new path for the development of Chinese culture, as well as laying the ground for its enlightenment. Despite its negative effects, such as its unadulterated ideological tendencies, belief in the “omnipotence of science”, scientism, “cultural determinism” and so on,

¹²Chen Song, *The Cultural Issues around the May 4 Movement*, China Social Science Press, 1985 (p. 101).

¹³Hu Shi, *My Thoughts*. Jilin University Press, 1980 (p. 64).

nevertheless the positive implications of “anti-traditionalism” should not be neglected.

However, before long (in 1920) Liang Qichao returned with his *Travel Notes on Europe*, and realized that after World War I the West had been trapped in desperation and Oriental culture might save the world. In his book, he savagely attacked Western culture symbolized by science: “People have been longing for the success of science, which will hopefully bring a golden age to mankind. Now, the material progress they have made over the last hundred years is several times that of the previous three thousand years. The reality, however, is that people have not experienced happiness but disasters. It is very much like a traveler lost in the desert: when a mirage appears in the distance he will desperately run over to it in the hope of getting a guide. However, after a certain distance the image disappears, leaving nothing but desperation. The mirage is ‘Mr. Science.’ Europeans had a dream of ‘omnipotent science,’ which is now shattered. This has been the main feature of the recent drastic social change.”¹⁴

Previously, Liang Qichao had written *On New Citizens*, introducing Western culture to China and having some negative words for traditional Chinese culture. However, in his *Travel Notes on Europe*, while disapproving of Western culture he also praised traditional Chinese culture highly: “Our dear young fellow citizens, please forge ahead to the opposite continent to save several hundred million people whose civilization has collapsed because they are in need of your help. Our ancestors and predecessors are all watching us in the heavens, and blessing us to accomplish their noble cause.”

Liang’s book certainly had a counter-effect on the notions of anti-traditionalism and wholesale westernization. As Hu Shih noted, “Since the publication of *Travel Notes on Europe*, the ‘scientific fever’ cooled down a bit, and some old pedants were delighted to say: ‘European science is bankrupt—Mr. Liang has declared!’”

In the summer of 1921, Liang Shuming gave a speech entitled “Eastern and Western cultures and their philosophies,” providing a comprehensive review of “anti-traditionalism” from the point of view of conservatism, with a rational critical spirit. He believed that China should introduce Western culture and use science and democracy to promote its development even though Western culture is characterized by its aggressive nature. In his understanding, Western culture originated from ancient Greece and Rome, passed through the oppression of the Dark and Middle Ages and was revived in modern times, with an emphasis on science and technology.

Based on this understanding, as well as his three-stage theory of historical development, Liang Shuming naturally concluded that, during a certain stage of history, a Western style of living could apply to China: “Science and democracy are absolutely right in their own terms, and therefore we should indiscriminately and

¹⁴Chen Song, *The Cultural Issues around the May 4 Movement*, Beijing: China Social Science Press, 1985 (p. 374).

Hu Shi, *My Thoughts*. Changchun: Jilin University Press, 1980 (p. 89).

unconditionally accept ‘wholesale-westernization’ which is an urgent task for all of us. Otherwise, as academics, we have no right to talk about human dignity.”

He therefore reiterated: “The way we promote Oriental culture is different from the old diehards who totally reject Western culture.”¹⁵ At the same time, he also criticized modern Western culture and insisted on reviving the spirit of Chinese culture. He believed that Western culture had already reached its climax, encountered many dilemmas and difficulties, and resulted in pain and disasters, such as irrational economic phenomena, barren spirituality, strained human relations, battling against one another, exhausting natural resources and so on. All these indicated that Western culture had come to a stage where reform was required to transform its society, attitudes and opinions.

Liang Shuming also believed that there were already symptoms of change in Western cultures, such as social reform, altered attitudes, human-orientated rather than material-orientated approaches, and most noticeably in life-philosophy, all of which conformed to the essential spirit of traditional Chinese culture. On these grounds, Liang predicted that Chinese culture would recover in the near future, just like the revival of Western culture after the prolonged Dark and Middle Ages. Therefore, Liang’s emphasis was not on “anti-traditionalism” but on how to revive and carry forward Chinese culture.

There was also a school of *Academics*, who were mainly Chinese graduates from Harvard University in the 1920s, such as Mei Guangdi, Wu Mi, Tang Yungtung, Hu Xiansu (who majored in physics and was also highly accomplished in biology). Under the influence of the “new humanism” at Harvard, they put forward a slogan: “promoting the quintessence of Chinese culture while absorbing new knowledge.” From 1922 to 1933, the journal *Academics* published 79 issues in total, with a focus on establishing relations between tradition and the modern world, so as to continue traditional Chinese culture.

Generally, they believed that— (1) The so-called “new” and “old” were relative; there was no absolute boundary between the two; (2) Since they are different from the natural sciences, Darwinism may not be an appropriate solution for the humanities; (3) As there are “constants” and “variables” in the development of history, certain elements of “truth” have been accumulated in the humanities, which are eternal and universal values.

These views may not mean much today, but in their historical context—among all kinds of “anti-traditionalism,” they had a unique resonance. Most interestingly, these Chinese students (all graduates of American universities) had a good understanding of Western culture (some of them had even introduced Western concepts into China), and yet still supported their profound knowledge of traditional Chinese culture.

While Liang Qichao, Liang Shuming or the school of *Academics* were not opposed to introducing Western culture to China, they did object to “anti-traditionalism”. In my view, they certainly did not belong to the mainstream

¹⁵Liang Shuming, *Occidental and Oriental Cultures and Philosophies*, 1921.

of Chinese culture, nor did they counteract new Chinese culture; they somehow both contained the ideological trend of “anti-traditionalism” and also hindered the process of “wholesale westernization” that had been passionately promoted by radicalism in general and liberalism in particular.

In 1923, there was a debate on issues of “science and metaphysics,” which could be seen as a confrontation between the mainstream and the non-mainstream schools in the new cultural movement, reflecting the war of words between radicals (supported by liberals) and conservatives. Seemingly, the school of metaphysics, represented by Zhang Junli, lost the battle, but it nevertheless generated plenty of food for thought. For example, issues like “Are there any limits to science (Ding Wenjiang believed not).” As an “ism,” “Does scientism contradict the scientific spirit?” “Are all issues related to one’s outlook on life?” and so on. Ironically, after this debate, radicals and liberals announced their split.

In the “Preface to *Science and Philosophy*,” Hu Shih publicly described his “scientific outlook on life” as a “naturalistic outlook on life”: the natural universe is infinite in both space and time, where average human beings with average life expectancy are as dwarfed as microorganisms ... However, they still use their heads and hands to create various tools and cultures. Moreover, they not only domesticated many animals, but also discovered natural rules that have been used to manipulate travel, can even propel electrically and use the air to deliver messages “... In short, within this naturalistic view of life, there are plenty of opportunities to exercise ‘creative intelligence.’”¹⁶

By then Chen Duxiu had accepted a “materialistic view of history” and he put his question to Hu Shih and other members of the “school of science”: “Do you also believe in a ‘materialistic view of history?’” Hu replied: “Although we warmly welcome the idea of employing an ‘economic view’ as a means of studying history, we cannot deny the fact that thought and knowledge are also a kind of ‘objective cause,’ which can reform society, explain history and guide views of life.”¹⁷

It was Chen Duxiu who classified Hu Shih in the camp of Zhang Junmai: “While Hu respects science, how can he treat the mind and matter equally! He propounds materialism but also values subjectivities (such as knowledge, thoughts, opinions and education) as a cause to reform society, explain history and guide views of life. Such blunt mind-body dualism would be warmly welcomed by Zhang Junmai!”

Hu Shih’s break from Chen Duxiu implied a divorce between liberalism and radicalism, the two major schools of the new cultural movement, once joined hand in hand fighting against old feudal culture and morality to promote science and democracy. However, they parted on issues of how to struggle against feudal autocracy and achieve science and democracy. Namely, liberals advocated social reform whereas radicals proposed drastic revolution. As a result, a situation of tripartite confrontation (including conservatism) emerged.

¹⁶Hu Shi, *Science and Philosophy*, Taiwan: Yadong Publishing Press, 1930 (p. 101).

¹⁷Ibid (p. 106).

From the 1920s to 1930s, there were constantly debates in China's intellectual and cultural circles on various issues of philosophy, the nature of Chinese society, social history, Oriental culture versus Occidental culture (i.e. westernization versus localization) and so on. The philosophical debate between Zhang Dongsun and Ye Qing in 1927 actually represented the clash between liberalism and radicalism. Based on various concepts of Western philosophy, Zhang established his system of "multiple epistemologies." As Ye Qing, a supporter of Marxist dialectical materialism, pointed out, "In Zhang Dongsun's philosophy, there is nothing creative, just a collection of different works or even passages of ancient and modern philosophers from Europe or America."¹⁸

The debate began with the issue "Is dialectical analysis a scientific method?" and ended with the question "Is dialectical analysis correct?" While Ye Qing criticized Zhang Dongsun's theory from the point of view of the dialectic, he himself was also rejected for having distorted Marxism by orthodox Marxist Ai Siqi. Their philosophical debate was recorded in a book entitled *Collection of the Debate on Dialectical Materialism* edited by Zhang Dongsun.

Regarding the nature of Chinese society, the debate took place from 1929 to 1935, involving radicals, liberals and conservatives, and the following views were formed. China was a society of: commercial capitalism (Tao Xisheng), capitalism (Ren Shu, Yan Lingfeng), semi-feudalism and semi-colonialism (Lv Zhenyu, Guo Moruo) and so on.

To clarify the nature of China's society then, it was deemed necessary to investigate and discuss thoroughly the development of Chinese society from ancient times to the present. Among the diversified articles and works published then, the most influential were Guo Moruo's *Study of Ancient Chinese Society*—based on the Marxist theory of five modes of production (slave, feudal and so on); Tao Xisheng's *An Analysis of China's Social History, A History of Chinese Political Thought* and others—he believed that the theory of five modes of production, derived from analyzing European society by European scholars, had been arbitrarily applied to Chinese society; Li Ji's theory against five modes of production—using Marx's possibility of an Asian mode of production, he pointed out the differences between Chinese and Western societies (typified by ancient Greece and Rome) and therefore objected to the theory of five modes of production. Judged from today's point of view, this debate had little meaning since it was mainly confined to arguing over names, or mechanically applied various Marxist dogmas to Chinese society, had nothing to do with in-depth historical analyses, and therefore ended inconclusively.

The debate on Oriental and Occidental cultures was initiated by the *Manifesto to Construct Local Chinese Culture* written by ten professors represented by Sa Mengwu, He Bingsong and etc. in 1935, reflecting a clash between liberalism and conservatism. After its publication, a series of symposia on the issue were held, constructing a grand debate. During the May Fourth movement, "wholesale

¹⁸Guo Zhanbo, *A History of Chinese Thought over the past Fifty Years*. Beijing: Humanity Publishing Press, 1936 (p. 8).

westernization” was the preferred option of both radicals and liberals; however, it did not become a systematic view until Chen Xujing’s summary. Chen believed that culture, as an integrated entity, could not be divided; therefore when we take in Western science it is necessary to bring in other related elements, including its shortcomings.

Chen Xujing said, “Judged as cultural development, modern Western culture is indeed more advanced than ours, such as in conceptualization, art, science, politics, education, religion, philosophy, literature, even in daily life, like food, shelter, transportation, so the only way forward for Chinese culture would be to become utterly westernized.”¹⁹

During this period, Hu Shih also suggested the term “full westernization” or “full globalization” instead of “wholesale westernization.” However, in his criticism of “local culture” we can still perceive his stance of “wholesale westernization,” such as in his article entitled “I fully support Mr. Chen Xujing’s wholesale westernization.” Besides, the *1935 Manifesto* states: “China has disappeared in the cultural field, Chinese politics, social organization, ideological forms and contents have also lost their characteristics ... In order to rejuvenate all that we must engage in reconstructing the fundamentals of local Chinese culture.”²⁰

The *Manifesto* also criticizes the prevailing opinions on constructing Chinese culture and puts forward its own tenet: “Be not conservatives, nor blind followers, but creators thinking critically; be firmly localized in the Chinese soil, taking a scientific approach to examining the past, seizing the present and creating the future.”

These seemingly plain words were in fact justifying their comments on the school of westernization. As Hu Shih said in his article entitled “On the so-called construction of ‘local Chinese culture’ ...”, “We have to point out that these ten professors keep on saying they want to maintain local culture while not being conservative, but deep down they still follow the doctrine of ‘Chinese learning as the fundamental structure, Western learning for practical use’ merely in another form.”²¹

Although Hu Shih had penetrated the intention of the school of “localized culture,” he failed to lay his finger on the path that Chinese culture should head for. I think that neither the ten professors nor Hu Shih nor Chen Xujing actually freed themselves from the constraints of “cultural determinism” and its rigid ideological mindset, therefore this discussion actually contributed very little to the development of Chinese culture.

From these debates noted above, we can conclude that neither radicals, liberals nor conservatives were able to indicate a direction for the development of new

¹⁹Luo Rongqu, *From Westernization to Modernization*, Beijing: Beijing University Press, 1982 (p. 371).

²⁰Ibid (p. 399).

²¹Ibid (p. 420).

Chinese culture, meanwhile none of the three schools gained dominance in the public arena, therefore the tripartite confrontation remained. The cause for that I think was deeply rooted in Chinese social conditions then. Nevertheless, we may conclude that, though certain important questions were put forward in these debates, most of them argued for the sake of argument, were often manipulated by political forces and therefore failed to provide any meaningful resources for the development of Chinese culture.

The period between the mid-1930s and the mid-1940s was important for the development of Chinese culture and academics, when a group of influential figures appeared who had a lasting impact on Chinese culture, academics and ideology for some time to come, typically radicals like Lu Xun, Guo Moruo, Hou Wailu. Lu's essays provided a penetrating view of Chinese society, history, culture and other aspects, leaving us valuable spiritual treasures; Guo's study of the inscriptions on ancient bronze objects and Chinese social history, as well as Hou's research on the history of Chinese society and thought both made positive contributions.

During this period, the liberals were represented by Hu Shih, Chen Xujing, Zhang Dongsun, Jin Yuelin and others. Since Hu Shih was in the United States at the time, his contribution to academic culture was limited, but his *On Confucianism* corrected his earlier prejudice towards Confucianism, and his other studies also carried out some research into Zen religion. Jin Yuelin wrote *On the Dao* and *On Knowledge*, two systematic explorations of metaphysics and knowledge systems respectively (the latter published by the Commercial Press in 1983). Conservatives, represented by Xiong Shili, Feng Youlan and He Lin, also achieved something substantial. Xiong laid out his philosophical system in *New Realism*, laying the ground for modern Chinese Neo-Confucianism; Feng not only wrote his influential *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, but also produced *Six Chapters on Zhenyuan*, using Platonic philosophy and neorealist methodology; He Lin applied his profound knowledge of German classical philosophy to explain Chinese philosophy, and expounded further on Lu and Wang's School of Mind in his *On Modern Spiritualism* and *Review of the Unity of Knowledge and Action*.

In addition, a number of other scholars could be called "masters of Chinese culture." They were well versed in both Chinese and Western learning both ancient and modern. Being epochal achievements, their writings have been widely recognized as authoritative works, laying the foundation for any further research in their respective fields. For example, Tschen Yinkoh's research on Northern, Southern, Sui and Tang Dynasties, Chen Yuan on religious history, Tang Yungtung on the history of Chinese Buddhism and Metaphysics of the Wei and Jin Dynasties, Dong Zuobin on the oracles and the history of the Shang Dynasty, and so on. Therefore, we may praise these ten years as the best decade so far for the development of Chinese academic culture, characterized by a considerable number of scholarly works. After 1949, the development of Chinese academic culture entered a new historical period, which will be discussed in another section.

In reviewing this history, we may draw the following conclusions:

- (1) During cultural transitions, diversification is usually the norm where healthy academic development is based on forces resulting from dynamic interactions between radicalism, liberalism and conservatism, which promote cultural development.
- (2) When they coexist, the merits of radicalism, liberalism and conservatism cannot be judged by a single value system, specially non-academic values, if they are to develop healthily.
- (3) Cultural transitions are by no means short. From the Spring and Autumn period to the Western Han Dynasty, it took three to four hundred years for Confucianism to become orthodoxy. The second transitional period—from the Wei and Jin to the Sui and Tang Dynasties—also took three to four hundred years. The most recent one—starting at the end of the 19th century—was just over a hundred years, also quite long in terms of forming a new cultural tradition. During such periods, the notion of “letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend” is absolutely necessary.

Chapter 4

Concerning Spirit and Beliefs at the Turning of the Century

Having listened the last three speeches, I think we may consider some practical issues in Chinese society. After the “cultural revolution,” a problem has been frequently referred to as “spiritual crisis” or belief crisis. Tracing the causes, some said this is mainly due to the catastrophe of the “cultural revolution.” However, in my view it should be traced back even further to 1949 (the year the People’s Republic of China was founded) when the seeds were planted for future unrest. As we know, after 1949 incessant political campaigns were mobilized to always breaking but never making. As a result, an ultra-leftism was formed, which broken up our cultural tradition, making us a nation without national culture.

After the “cultural revolution” there was a strong demand for bringing order out of chaos. Entering the 1980s, people culturally urged to be free from the “two traditions”—the old tradition of autocracy that had been lasting for more than 2000 years, and the new tradition of ultra-leftism (another kind of autocracy) of 30 years. Many scholars believed that it is impossible to modernize China under the confinement of the two “traditions,” thus a heat debate on the orientation of Chinese culture occurred on Mainland China in the mid-1980s. Within the intelligentsia then, out of deep concern of absence of political and cultural modernization among the “four modernization” that had been advocated so furiously by the Chinese government, a considerable number of Western works of social science and humanities had been translated into Chinese during this period, providing an impetus for the reform of Chinese society. However, the momentum was sharply interrupted by the “June Four Event” in 1989, terminating the tendency of continued pushing for political and cultural modernization.

Up to the 1990s, drastic change had taken place in the Chinese intellectual circle. In early May 1989, we held an international academic conference to mark the seventy anniversary of the May Fourth Movement in Wofu Temple of Fragrant Hill, where intellectuals still had some confidence that they could play a role in promoting China’s political and cultural reform. By early May 1998, however, on an international academic conference to mark the eighty anniversary of the May Fourth Movement at Beijing University, an American scholar, who attended the conference

in 1989, asked me the differences between these two conferences, my answer was: the Chinese intellectuals were marginalized after the “June Four Event,” being seriously deprived of their competence in terms of political intention as before.

After the Beijing University conference, we organized another symposium in Dajue temple of Fragrant Hill, participated by scholars who had attended the 1989 conference. The meeting went on just little over an hour before it was interrupted by an unexpected event, we then had to watch a show of “Zen tea ceremony.” I couldn’t help but think that quite a lot of people actually wish us, the undesirable intellectuals, to drink tea, or play chess or instruments, or even sing some “paeans,” that couldn’t make them happier. Under such circumstances, we may say that Chinese intellectuals in the 1980s perhaps still had a sense of “spiritual crisis” or “belief crisis;” in the 1990s, however, they became content with the status quo. What particularly worries me is the tendency among many young intellectuals that is to pursue nothing but money and power. This is also the case among young students in Beijing University, who admire students in Tsinghua University, thinking that they may have a better prospect for official careers. That is truly a “spiritual crisis” as well.

What can we do about all these? I think it’s pretty hard. Moreover, the situation hasn’t attracted much attention. Although some scholars put forth the proposal of reconstructing “humanistic spirit,” it is nevertheless confined to a limited field and by no means to be spread out. Some scholars from the north also asked me: “When can we have a true humanistic spirit? How can we ‘reconstruct the 1990s?’” In the academic circle, it is quite active ostensibly, introducing a considerable number of “new thoughts,” such as Post-modernism, Post-colonialism, *Guoxue re* “craze for national learning” (as it has recently appeared on Peking University campus) so on and so forth. However, all these have made little impact on the society.

On the other hand, all kinds of Qigong have become popular. Especially, the “Falun Gong Event” has shocked the government and public. People may wonder why so many people have believed in such a weird Qigong, and why during such short period of time we have to mobilize all of our media—newspapers, journals, TV station, radio and so on—to furiously attack it. Perhaps, there is only one answer: we, as a nation, have a profound “spiritual crisis.”

Had a nation lost its spiritual pillar, is very much like the human body without a soul. Nowadays, there are prevalent “fetishism of money” and “power worship” in our society—cases of corruptions are full of our newspapers and magazines, not to mention on the website, where the cases are many times more than that revealed in the press.

The widespread practice of “abusing of power” and “trading power for money” has seriously corrupted the general mood of society. Although the party and government have adopted various measures to curb the corruption and punished corrupt officials as many as possible, but the effect seems to be very limited. Apart from the flaws in our system, such as lack of supervisory organ and systematic protection for the freedom of speech, the main cause lies in national “spiritual crisis,” which I think may be to some extent “cured” from the following several aspects:

First of all, we should restore and carry forward our traditional virtue, which is deeply rooted in our national tradition which is the foundation for our survival. What we have to do is not to abandon but to inherit it and make it more suitable to the development of our society. Recently, philosophers, ethicists, religious scholars and sociologists put forward the idea of “global ethic,” which I think is quite meaningful.

It will not only in one aspect overcome our national “spiritual crisis” but also point out a way for nations and countries of the world to walk out the moral dilemma. Searching a “global ethic” is a project of moral construction which should not be seen as simply to pursue an ethically “minimum consensus,” but to explore the core values of different national traditions (or the ultimate idea of ethics theory) so as to provide a resource that can benefit today’s social morale.

As we know, cultural traditions, especially these of long history and having an important role to play in guiding the society, have consolidated certain basic ethical concepts, which constitute the foundation of a nation’s ethos and ensue its survival and prosper. Wherever seeking for “minimal ethical consensus” we have to make some connections with a nation’s basic ethical concepts, namely it cannot be separated from the basic ethical system; in other words, healthy social norms cannot be established by abandoning traditional virtues.

For example, we now advocate “respect for others,” promote the movement of “five stresses and four points of beauty” for revolutionary culture (the five stresses are: stress on decorum, manners, hygiene, discipline and morals; the four points of beauty are: beauty of the mind, language, behavior and the environment), “spiritual civilization” and so on, if, however, we do not relate them to the ethic ideological system that has been influencing our society over many generations, where can we find the root of that? “Respect others,” for example, should be traced back to Confucian “benevolence.” Otherwise, if we criticize “benevolence” agitate the idea of “imposing on others what you are unwilling to do,” and encourage “fighting with one another with endless joys,” how can you then really respect and protect others? Therefore, any specified social norms have to be backed up by a set of ethical theory that has been accumulated within a tradition.

While Confucian ethic theory may not entirely suit to the modern world (the issue cannot be fully discussed here), its core value—“love people” is undoubtedly still worth inheriting and carrying on. In my view, Confucius’ benevolence is based on having affection with one another, as he pointed out in the *Doctrine of the Mean*: “Benevolence is nothing but prioritized by love.”

In the *Analects*, “Filial piety is the trunk of Goodness.” “Love” is not something created out of thin air, but derived from loving your beloved ones. However, benevolence does not stop here; it has to put oneself in the place of another—extend the respect of the aged in your family to that of other families; expend the love of the young ones in your family to that of other families; help others to establish what he himself wishes to establish and to achieve what he himself wishes to achieve. That is to act according to the principle of benevolence and loyalty, which is easier said than done.

Should extend *ren* (benevolence) to the entire society, as Confucius said, “It has to be *ke ji fu li* or restraining the self so as to restore propriety, and then benevolence can prevail. Therefore, benevolence initiates from the self not from the others.” Previously I was incorrect in interpreting the phrase *ke ji fu li* by simply juxtaposing “restrain the self” and “return propriety;” it is actually not in line with Confucius’ thought.

I now realize that the so-called *ke ji fu li* is has to be based on self-restraining then return to propriety. As benevolence is man’s internal virtue, “restraining self” becomes a kind of self-consciousness, and ritual is external norm of decorum, regulating human relations. Once rituals are all in place social harmony will be achieved. That is the essence of benevolence zealously advocated by Confucius.

We can thus conclude that Confucius’ “self-restraining” (benevolence) is mainly motivated by consciousness, “once I determine to pursue benevolence, it will finally arrive.” In our daily ethical practice, it becomes ultimate ideal of conducting the golden mean of the Confucian school. This may illustrate the point I made previously that even the minimal ethical consensus requires the close link with certain ethic system. If Confucius’ benevolence had only explored the relations between benevolence and man (the *Dao* of man), Mencius developed it further into the relations between benevolence and heaven: “For a man to give full realization to his heart is for him to understand his own nature, and a man who knows his own nature will know Heaven.”

Which means human heart and heavenly heart are interconnected. As Zhu Xi elucidated more clearly, “There is a living heart between heaven and earth, and being born out of this heart humans naturally become beings of heart. The virtues of this heart may be pervasive and ruling over everything, but they all can be summed up in one word: benevolence.” In other words, since the “heavenly heart” is benevolence thus human heart cannot be otherwise; the two are actually correlated under the grand coverage of Confucian ethical theory. As Confucius said in the *Doctrine of the Mean*: “While truthfulness is the *Dao* of heaven, the one who makes truthfulness is the *Dao* of man.”

However, if we treat “benevolence”—“do not impose others to do what you are unwilling to do” as reactionism, and completely abandon it, we actually lose the tenet of being a virtue man, which has been with us as a moral support over the past two thousand years, and then how can our society not be in turmoil? How has “spiritual crisis” not occurred? Viewing from this prospect, in dealing with traditional ethical thought, we can only inherit and develop it, making it fit to today’s modern social life, but not to throw it away by formulating a “struggle philosophy.” Surely, whilst carrying on the tradition, we have to not only renew it constantly, but also absorb some ethical virtues from other nations that suit to our social development.

In absorbing other nations’ ethical virtues we have also learned harsh lessons. Since over a quite long period of time, our country was in a state of treating other countries or nations’ ethic virtues (including their national religions) as something vicious and to be excluded, and our nation has consequently characterized its mentality of rejecting and rebelling against everything. No wonder we have “spiritual crisis.” Under a relative normal political circumstance, I think, if we join hands with many intellectuals and officials in recognizing the danger of the crisis

and making our due efforts, we may, after two or three generations, restore our healthy and upward national virtue.

Secondly, concerning whether people should have a belief, I think this has to be related to the issue of “spiritual crisis.” Czech’s president, the thinker, Javier said, “It is unthinkable for people to have no belief. People of faithless will do whatever enjoyable and become callous to other things unrelated to themselves.” In a society, people may have different beliefs due to different circumstances, social positions, educations or opportunities. They may have religious faith, doctrines, theories, or mostly, gain a belief from folklore where they have long been living. Under normal conditions, we cannot require all the people to have the same belief, this has been proved as a common sense at all times and in all lands.

Therefore, I think any belief that is beneficial to social life, inspiring people to be inclined to goodness or charity, should be respected, and the “freedom of belief” should not be interfered by political power. These beliefs are normally related to their ideals as well. As Javier said, only these who have faith in their hearts can they better seek truth from fact (or their hearts have opened to reality); they will normally not twist the fact since there is no reason for them to do so either personally or emotionally. I think this kind of belief is certainly a benign one to people’s social life.

However, we must admit that due to people’s diversified spiritual life, benign beliefs should by no means be a sole and coercive one, otherwise it will become an autocratic means of controlling people’s mind and feelings, as it happened in our social life in the past. Requiring all thoughts and beliefs be united under certain ideology is not only unreasonable but also detrimental to a nation’s vitality, because once a political (or other kinds of) crisis occurs a society may become a vacuum of beliefs and result in a “belief crisis,” just as what happened after the cultural revolution in our country.

Now, we cannot say that our society has walked out the period of “belief crisis.” In my view, some officials have lost their beliefs all together; they in fact do not believe in anything – ideology, doctrine, or religion except money and power. If that can be called a “belief” I think what they really believe in is “fetishism of money and power,” and they themselves have become corrupt officials who are blind to any social problems and insensitive to populace’s sufferings. With such conditions, how could we not be trapped into a “belief crisis”? When taking a taxi, we may probably hear some drivers utter out their complaints over our “social diseases.”

For a reasonable and healthy society to be appropriately run, two set of social mechanisms are usually required: one is a sound political and legal system (such as democracy), another is social code of ethics (which is often intertwined with religious or ethical beliefs). The former has to be carried out with certain degree of coercion in order to protect people’s rights and demand their social obligations; the latter has to do with people’s personal beliefs, which should not be interfered by any political forces due to its independent nature. Historically, using political force to attack religions will achieve a result just the opposite to what it intended. For example, in the Northern Wei Dynasty, Emperor Taiwu wished to extinct Buddhism, but up to his next generation Emperor Xiao Wen, Buddhism was restored.

In the Northern Zhou Dynasty, Emperor Wu tried to extinct Buddhism but by the Sui Dynasty Buddhism was unprecedentedly flourishing. According to the *Book of Sui*, “As people admire Buddhism the dharma were printed hundreds or even thousands of times more than the six classics.” Religions, such as Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity, Islam are deeply rooted in mass with their profound cultural influence, which cannot be eliminated by any political force. The same is true to other doctrines, such as liberalism, Marxism, neo-conservatism, neo-romanticism, neo-humanities and so on, which can only be dealt with by the party’s guidelines of “let a hundred schools of thought contend.” Diversity, instead of conformity, is thus the way to avoid the human society to become “a pool of stagnant water,” which by no means is an ideal state. These descriptions mentioned above have been my analysis on some of the current social issues of our country.

In fact, the gloomy phenomenon is also prevalent among other countries or nations. Fortunately, at the turning point of the new century, many thinkers and politicians had serious reflection on these social issues and the way out for “spiritual crisis” and “belief crisis.” Hopefully, the 21st century will be a nicer, healthier and brighter century, where we can have more room “to sing what we like to sing.”

Chapter 5

May Fourth Movement and the Debates on Transitional Culture

This year marks the 80th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement. Over the past near-century, China has been in a process of cultural transition that will continue quite long into the future. The core issues of debate during the period have been the relations between tradition and modernity, China and the West, focusing mainly on three interrelated topics: the attitude towards traditional Chinese culture, the approach to receiving Western culture, and the repositioning of Chinese culture in the light of current contemporary cultural developments in the world.

Generally speaking, cultural development consists of identification and deviation. “Identification” refers to a culture further evolving in conformity with the mainstream culture in the light of its own precepts, while excluding alien cultural elements, consolidating its own conventional cultural patterns. In terms of “deviation,” exotic ideas are not downgraded but incorporated and empowered through critical elimination, posing a threat, sometimes a serious challenge, to mainstream traditional culture. When deviation becomes a dominant force a society is dragged into a cultural transitional period.

In dealing with traditional culture during a transitional period, there are three obvious forces, namely cultural conservatism, cultural liberalism and cultural radicalism—the terms used here indicate no personal preferences but only cultural connotations.

Over a long period in the past, much attention was paid to cultural radicalism, which was deemed to be a force driving cultural development. In my view, however, the other two forces are equally valid, and need to be reevaluated. The dynamic interactions between the three forces (which may be defined variably at different periods of time), accentuating “traditional culture,” navigate a society forward during a transitional period.

Ever since the early 20th century, symbolized by the May Fourth Movement in 1919 (its actual formation was earlier than that), Chinese culture has always remained consistently in transition, manifesting bewilderment, and the serial social unrests of Chinese society have only complicated the situation.

Around the May Fourth period, debates on issues of “China versus the West and Tradition versus Modernity” occupied journals of different orientations, such as *New Youth*, *New Tide*, *Journal of Oriental Studies*, *National Treasure*. Another heated debate on “Science versus Philosophy” in 1923 caused a clash between the mainstream and non-mainstream cultural schools.

The debate, initially between conservatism and radicalism allied with liberalism, ended in the split of the latter two associated partners, resulting in a situation of tripartite confrontation in Chinese cultural views since the 1920s. During the 1920s and 1930s, cultural wars between different schools broke out periodically, such as the debate over philosophical issues between liberalists and radicals after 1927; “the nature of Chinese society and its social history” among radicals, liberalists and conservatives between 1927 and 1935; and “wholesale-westernization versus culture-localization” triggered by professor Sa Mengwu’s article entitled “Declaration to Promote China’s Local Culture” in post 1935.

Up to the period of the Resistance War against Japan, although a certain consensus was reached among different cultural sectors on strategies of fighting against the common invader, discrepancies still existed on cultural issues, centering around topics previously debated concerning the relations between tradition and modernity from the perspectives of China and the West. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, as dramatic societal change took place, cultural transformation headed in a new direction—while being completely “Sovietized” as advocated by radicals, traditional Chinese culture as well as all cultures other than Marxism in the West, was basically condemned and rejected.

During the catastrophic “Cultural Revolution,” traditional Chinese culture was fatally sabotaged while certain vicious elements of it, such as deifying political leaders, were ludicrously revived, leading radicalism into ultra-leftism. After the end of the “Cultural Revolution,” especially after the third Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC held in December 1978, the dominant ultra-leftism was terminated and the situation of tripartite confrontation between radicalism, liberalism and conservatism reappeared.

Since 1984, as “cultural fever” swept the mainland of China, heated discussions on the topic of “How to transform our traditional culture into a modern one” were going on uninterrupted until the summer of 1989. After one or two years’ break, however, a new wave of *Guoxue re* (craze for national learning) arose in the early 1990s. Meanwhile, a post-modern trend of thought came into being in search of cultural pluralism.

Entering the 1990s, a pluralized cultural discourse took place in China, where various discussions and debates were carried out on issues of public concern, such as humanism and the relations between Chinese classics and Marxism, Confucianism and Christian culture. Most recently (in the 1990s), explorations into modernity have become a hot topic, drawing attention from liberalism and neo-leftism at different levels. Reviewing the 20th century one may realize that Chinese culture has been evolving along with debates on issues concerning tradition, modernity, Chineseness and the West, and the current pluralistic cultural

pattern, formulated in the 1990s, will certainly persist for a quite considerable period into the 21st century.

Over the past century, the debates mentioned above have steered the direction of Chinese cultural development by focusing on issues deeply concerning the Chinese literati—How to lead China into a modern society? In which way(s) can Chinese culture be rejuvenated or utterly reformed? In hindsight, therefore, the lessons we have learned from the past may be summarized into the following three major points:

(1) In a cultural transitional period, diversification is usually the norm where healthy academic development is based on a force resulting from dynamic interactions between radicalism, liberalism and conservatism, which can be defined differently in different historical periods. Their historical values should not be judged by a dogmatic standard, especially not one imposed by external ideologies. Only when these three cultural forces are evaluated objectively and impartially can Chinese cultural development be analyzed and revealed in a rational manner.

In assessing these three cultural forces, their dichotomous nature in the cultural transitional period may be revealed: while radicalism has a unique role to play in breaking through traditional cultural patterns and opening up a whole new frontier, it may also go to extremes and become “leftism” by completely repudiating everything traditional; conservatism stands out for protecting traditional culture and ensuring the continuation of the cultural trend, and yet it may also develop into parochial nationalism if it conceals itself within the traditional containment.

Liberalism can put forward new questions and new ideas to navigate cultural development into a more open space, nevertheless it may become relativism if these ideas are self-inflated and out of touch with reality. Therefore, their merits and flaws have to be judged in their historical perspectives. We should realize that there is no short-cut for any cultural transition to be completed. Considering the fact that it took three to four hundred years for Confucian thought to become a legitimate doctrine from the Spring and Autumn period to the Han Dynasty, and it took another similar length of time from the Wei and Jin to the Sui and Tang Dynasties for it to be consolidated as an orthodoxy, the recent cultural transition in China, initiated from the 19th century, little more than a hundred years ago, will certainly proceed for quite some time before transforming traditional Chinese culture into one that goes along with the trend of the world’s cultural development.

Some may think that dividing the Chinese cultural field into radicalism, liberalism and conservatism has given too much weight to political divisions and is oversimplified. Indeed, the reality manifested in the circle was rather more complicated than one may have expected in the 20th century. If we go through influential figures we may find every one of them is different, highly distinguishable from one another.

During the 1930s, for example, Ye Qing (1896–1990) and Ai Siqi (1910–1966) were both radicals, but they behaved differently; Zhang Dongsun (1886–1973), deeply influenced by Neo-Kantianism and Jin Yuelin (1896–1984), a scholar of analytical philosophy, were nonetheless both believers in liberalism; among conservatives, Liang Shuming (1893–1988) and Xiong Shili (1885–1968) had quite different attitudes towards Buddhism, just to mention a few examples.

Approaches purely based on individuality (surely it is necessary) may hardly be applicable to defining scholars of different academic schools in the cultural field. As mentioned above, our classification of different schools of thought has been focused on their attitudes (or their main mind-set during the prime time of their academic career) towards tradition per se, meanwhile remaining fully aware of the changing orientation of their thoughts during their life-long search process.

Hu Shih (1854–1921), for example, was a liberal who was the first scholar to introduce Western thought but then turned into a conservative as far as his cultural views were concerned. However, we still regard him as a representative figure of early liberalism since he was a shining star exerting a huge influence on China's academic and cultural development in his prime and gradually faded out as he became increasingly conservative. As far as the connection between cultural preference and political orientations was concerned, in my view, the two had very little in common.

Most scholars of radicalism, liberalism and conservatism in the first half of the 20th century opposed the autocratic rule and corrupt politics of the Kuomintang government and gradually approved the idea of socialism in the early 1950s. After the mid-1950s, however, their political view took another turn while their cultural beliefs remained consistent. All these historical facts have reinforced our conviction that the recognition of radicalism, liberalism and conservatism has to take into account their views in dealing with traditional culture.

While case by case analysis of individuals is important in cultural studies, common characteristics among different groups of people should not be neglected. In fact, by seeing through the appearance to perceive the essence, sometimes the classification of typologies may play an even more effective role provided that due attention is paid to various personalities. In this way, we have set up our criterion to differentiate different cultural schools by focusing on their attitudes towards traditional Chinese culture as a common ground. In a sense, it is absolutely necessary to have this kind of classification in carrying out Chinese cultural studies of the 20th century.

(2) Over the past hundred years or so, in my view, the debate on issues concerning tradition, modernity, Chineseness and the West has been lingering in our cultural circle, where two major views have divided the field into those who believe in wholesale-Westernization and regard everything concerning Chineseness and the West as still in the domain of tradition versus modernity; and those who disagree, instead upholding the quintessence of Chinese culture.

Indeed, issues concerning Chineseness and the West have involved some of the questions of tradition and modernity, such as the approach to the concepts of science and democracy, feudal ethical codes, rites and ritual system in their traditional and modern contexts and so on. In discussing how to move society forward out of the pre-modern age, surely these are the issues of modernity.

However, not all issues concerning Chineseness and the West are stuck in the rut of tradition versus modernity. For example, issues raised by Confucius, such as the “destiny of man and way of heaven,” “unity of heaven and man,” “unity of knowing and doing,” “despising officials on moral grounds,” “harmony is paramount,” “harmony in diversity,” internally-transcended egoism, will not lose their

thread but will constantly be renewed and revived over time with our national cultural evolvement, regardless of having little bearing on the West.

It is precisely because of these far-reaching ideas and their manifestations over different historical periods that our national culture can stand on its own amid the global trend of the current cultural development. In today's highly interrelated world, no country or nation in the world can deviate from the common theme of peace and development. Similarly, any culture in the world today has to make progress within the vision of globalization and multiculturalism.

Having global awareness is to view cultural development in a universal perspective, while multiculturalism embraces opposing cultural features. In today's world, the development of any national culture has to embody generality and individuality, modernity and national character. Following this line of thinking, certain root causes of unsettled issues concerning the Chinese cultural transition may be addressed.

In reviewing the debates over cultural transitional issues since the May Fourth Movement, another phenomenon has drawn our attention: of the various scholars of radicalism, literalism and conservatism with diverse orientations in their cultural studies and different attitudes towards traditional culture, only those who were not merely knowledgeable in traditional and modern Chinese culture but also well versed in both Chinese and Western learning made significant contributions to academic culture in the 20th century.

In this sense, Mr. Ji Xianlin's view is quite right when he points out that the minds of academic masters of pre-modern times were confined to the Chinese cultural framework due to historical conditions, whereas masters of modern times could excel in both Chinese and Western cultures. Therefore, those scholars of the Chinese classics who fiercely opposed western culture and advocated only traditional Chinese culture, have actually made no significant impact on Chinese academic culture since the May Fourth Movement.

In contrast, scholars such as Lu Xun and Guo Moruo from the radical camp, Hu Shih and Zhang Dongsun from the liberals and Liang Shuming and Tschen Yinkoh from the conservatives all masters well versed in both Chinese and Western learning with different expertise, who created a new panorama of Chinese culture in the 20th century. It was not their erudition, however, that differentiated them, but their attitudes towards traditional culture.

Only in a relative sense, can we say that the debate between the three camps was meaningful. If we are stuck in the rut of a mindset in evaluating the individuals' academic achievement (although it might be necessary in some sense) we may lose sight of the trend of Chinese cultural development.

In analyzing their different attitudes towards traditional culture (or transitional culture), a clear clue of how Chinese culture was evolving during the 20th century may be revealed, providing a reference for Chinese cultural orientation in the future. As we are approaching the new millennium we ought to get rid of the old mindset of arguments between China and the West, tradition and modernity; instead, we should forge ahead and open a new horizon for Chinese academic culture by absorbing the essence of Western culture (and all other cultures).

(3) Reviewing Chinese cultural development over the past hundred years or so, it is also easy to find the contradictions between enlightenment, rescuing the nation, and academic objectives in these transitional arguments. Believing that one may have surpassed or hindered the other, and seeking purely academic advantage can only have a negative impact on the society.

These are only one side of the coin. In fact, the mission of Chinese academic cultural development is much more than enlightenment; it has to concern itself with current social issues and national destiny, while tolerating the notion of “learning for learning” or “art for art’s sake.” Since ancient times, the Chinese literati have had a strong sense of mission with social and historical responsibilities; whether mainstreaming or being marginalized, their hearts would always be with the national culture.

In a relatively stable society, particularly scholars of “learning for learning’s sake” may deviate from utilitarianism and probe into certain ultimate questions of human society at a metaphysical level. Attention should also be paid to the interpretation and compilation of traditional Chinese culture and philosophy (including newly discovered and unearthed relics) based on new ideas and new approaches.

Therefore, I believe that academic cultural research, whether intended as enlightenment, or as a tool to enrich or empower the country, or as pure theory, is always beneficial to the development of Chinese culture and how it positions itself on the world stage.

In our current academic and cultural research, perhaps we have been concerned too much with utility and too little with “pure theoretical studies” due to the overdone tendency to “value physical science and belittle social science,” which I believe will do more harm than good to the revival of Chinese national culture. I therefore sincerely call for a new ethos of study in Chinese academic and cultural circles by adopting a more open-minded approach: that is, to stick to one’s own academic orientation while appreciating others’ choices. Only in this way can our traditional spirit of “the golden mean” and “seeking harmony in diversity” be fully manifested.

Chapter 6

A Bird's-Eye View of the Impact of Western Philosophy on the East

Today's Chinese culture is in fact the result of assimilation of cultures from other nations, countries and regions over the five or six thousand years. There had been two great tides of foreign cultural importation that made great impact on the development course of Chinese culture: One was Buddhism from India (there were also Nestorianism in the Tang Dynasty and *arkagun* in the Yuan Dynasty but both vanished due to certain historical reasons); Another one started from the end of the 16th century to the mid of 19th century, when the Western culture flooded in.

As Bertrand Russell said in his *Chinese and Western Civilization Contrasted*, "Contacts between different civilizations have often in the past proved to be landmarks in human progress."¹ The twice cultural inflows into China have greatly influenced every aspect of Chinese culture and society, and each caused a profound cultural transition.

As we know, cultural development usually consists of "identification" and "deviation." The so-called "deviation" refers to a cultural transitional period when cultural crisis, fracture, recombination, and renewing take place, such as the Warring States period, Wei-Jin and Southern-Northern period and the May fourth New Cultural period, which constitute three major cultural upheavals in the history of China.

"Identification" refers to a culture further evolving in conformity with the mainstream culture in the light of its own precepts; while excluding alien cultural elements, consolidating its own conventional cultural patterns. More specifically, during the "deviation," namely a cultural transitional period, exotic ideas are criticized and denounced, mainstream culture suspected, cultural boundaries blurred; in the meantime, previously oppressed forces have been relieved, posing a threat to mainstream culture.

Indian Buddhist culture, both as religion and philosophy, spread into China and made a profound impact on various aspects of Chinese culture, such as religion

¹Russell, B. *Chinese and Western Civilization Contrasted*. Changchun: Art Time Press, 1998 Edition (p. 8).

(including the Daoism), philosophy, literature, art, architecture and people's social life. By reflecting this period of time, we may gain some insightful references in understanding how Western culture has been introduced into China.

1. When Indian Buddhism (including its philosophical thought) was introduced into china, it was generally went through three stages

(1) From the Western Han Dynasty to the Eastern Jin Dynasty, Buddhism was mainly attached to astrology (also known as Daoist magic arts), and the Metaphysics of the Wei and Jin Dynasties. During a quite lengthy period of time, what Buddhism preached were mainly "immortality," "karma" and the like.

As Yuan Hong said in the *Book of the Later Han*, "In the Han Dynasty, Buddhism held that when a person dies his spirit does not perish, but merely instantly takes on a different form. One's deeds when one is alive, whether they be good or evil, will always be met with retribution. Thus the important thing is to cultivate the spirit unrelentingly until one attains the state of inaction (*wuwei*), and at that point one will achieve Buddhahood. The idea of indestructibility of the soul was in fact originally Chinese, so this aspect of Buddhism could easily gain a ground and become popular."

(1) From the Western Han Dynasty to the Eastern Jin Dynasty, Buddhism initially attached itself to *fang shu* (the techniques of Daoism), and then *xuan xue* (metaphysical learning) in the Wei and Jin Dynasties. During a quite long period time after Buddhism came to China, the main contents of its preaching were generally such thing as "indestructibility of the soul" and "cause and effect and retribution."

By the end of the Han and the early Wei Dynasties, as the translation of Buddhist sutras increased, Buddhism became popular in China in two major branches: one was the system installed by An Shigao, which was a school of Hinayana Buddhism, emphasizing the method of dhyana (or Chan) or meditation. An Shigao translated many sutras, among which the most influential were the *Ānāpānasmṛti* (Breathing) Sūtra, Sūtra of Yinchiru and so on.

The other was the system of Lokakṣema, which was a Mahayana school and emphasized the teachings of prajua (thinking and wisdom). Former taught breathing methods and the steadying or maintaining of one's mind. This was very similar to the teaching of the techniques of breathing (inhaling and exhaling) of China's own Daoists and School of Purusha (or atman, immortals). The latter explained the terminology of Buddhism and its concepts and was very similar in style to the textual scholarship with which the Han erudites annotated the Chinese classics. The Sūtra of Yinchiru, in discussing the universe and human life, took *yuanqi* (original breath) to be the root, and said that *yuanqi* was equal to the *wuxing* (Five Elements). It went on to use this to discuss the *wuyin* (Five Negatives, this was later translated as the *pañca-skandha* "five aggregates"). It also explained Buddhism's categories of *rūpa* (Form), *vedanā* (Feeling), *saṃjñā* (Perception), *saṃskāra* (Impulse), and *vijñāna* (Consciousness) as the effects of *yuanqi*. Thus we can see that the Hinayana dyaria method propagated by An Shigao was clearly attached to the *daoshu* (the methods of practicing Buddhism) thought already popular in China, and that he used *daoshu* to explain Buddhism to the Chinese.

The school of Lokakṣema, on the other hand, belonged to the prajña-oriented teachings of Mahayana Buddhism. It considered “reverting the spirit to its original truth” as the most important, fundamental truth of human life. It also considered this to be a reversion and reconnection with the *Dao* (the natural Way). Here we can see the extent to which it was influenced by the thoughts of Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu. Lokakṣema’s third-generation disciple, Zhi Qian, translated the Indian (Sanskrit) *prājñāpāramitā-sūtra* as *Daming duwuji jing* (Sūtra on the ferrying across to the endless ultimate by the great illumination). Here he translated *prājña* (wisdom) as *da ming* (great illumination), which is clearly derived from the idea of *zhi chang yue ming* (knowledge of the constant is the illumination or enlightenment) in the classic *Lao-Tzu*. He also translated *paramita* (conveyance to the farther shores) as *duwuji* (conveyance to the ultimate), which also conveys the sense of achieving the state of oneness with the *duo* (in *Lao-Tzu* we read reversion to *wuji*, or the ultimate).

In the Wei and Jin dynasties, the *xuanxue* (metaphysics), which was formed on the framework of the ideas in *Lao-Tzu* and *Chuang-Tzu* became greatly popular. The focus of *xuanxue* discussions was on the question of *ben-mo* (origin and end) and *you-wu* (being and nonbeing). The central question in Buddhist *prajna* scholarship was also the question of *kong* (*śūnya* or void) and *you* (reality or substantiality), which was rather close to *xuanxue*. Therefore, the Buddhists of the time generally used *xuanxue* to explain the principles of Buddhism and adopted the methods known as *geyi* (defining meanings) and *lian lei* (connecting categories). For example, the monk Dao An, in *Bi-naiye xu* (Preface to the *Vinaya Pitaka*), said: “Of the Twelve segments of scriptures, the most voluminous is the *vaipulya* (i.e., the sutras). This was because in this country (China) the people used the teachings of Lao and Zhuang to propagate the (Buddhist) teaching. Their teachings (i.e., Lao-Zhuang) are quite similar to the (teachings of) *fang deng* (Mahayana *vaipulya*) scriptures. In this way, a tendency of merging metaphysics and Buddhism occurred.

Chinese indigenous academic change had affected the orientation of Indian Buddhism’s spread in China, meanwhile taking in Indian culture for nourishment. In the early Eastern Jin Dynasty, despite there were “six schools and seven sections” in the Doctrine of Prājña but primarily it was dominated by metaphysics. Later on *Zhao Lun* (*A Collection of Seng Zhao’s Treaties*) concluded the debate over metaphysics of Wei and Jin Dynasties and marked the beginning of sinocized Buddhism. Using the Doctrine of Prājña for reference, the writing style of *The Corpus* resembled Wang Bi’s *Annotations to Lao-Tzu* and Guo Xiang’s *Preface of Annotations to Chuang-Tzu*, which fully reflected the two-way choice mechanism during the two cultural interactions.

(2) After the Eastern Jin Dynasty, as the translation of Buddhist Sūtras increased and systemized, contradictions and conflicts between Indian Buddhist culture and indigenous Chinese culture appeared, resulting in mutual influences as well as mutual absorption. As it is recorded in *Spreading the Way and Elucidating the Teaching: A Collection of Expositions of Truth*, there were various debates over issues such as whether Buddhist monk should pay homage to the king, the probability of spiritual immortality, karma and retribution, the relationship between

humanity and other forms of life, the differentiation between *Hua* (Chinese) and *Yi* (barbarians), localization and foreignization and so on.

Over these issues, we can sense the mutual conflicts as well as mutual influences. There was also a confluent trend of merging between celebrities and well-known monks. In fact, many of them were both court officials and good friends of Buddhists, living in seclusion on the mountains sometimes while participating in politics under the imperial edicts.

As the translation of Buddhist sutras increased, the teaching of Buddhism also became widespread. Seemingly, it was quite possible to for Indian Buddhism to replace indigenous Chinese culture. However, it was not until Liu Song Dynasty *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* became popular, especially the forty volumes of “mahā-nirvāṇa Sūtra” published that the tendency had been altered. Although Buddhist Prāṇa required “disfigurement in exploring human nature”, the emphasis was always on the former. By the Song and Qi Dynasty, the Nirvāṇa school merged and became popular in the Liang Dynasty. Now, we have found the successive relations between Prāṇa and the Nirvāṇa school.

That is to say, Buddhism, being prevalent in the Northern and Southern Dynasties, after eliminating all the illusions, had truly merged its Buddhahood which was manifested in ten aspects as Baoliang of Liang Dynasty illustrated in his *Annotations on Nirvāṇa*. In the same way Seng Zhao applied Buddhist Prāṇa to the study of metaphysics (derived from the thoughts of Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu), Baoliang's *Annotations* applied Nirvāṇa to exploring into Buddhahood, which is in close connection with traditional Chinese disposition theory.

During this period, although there were contradictions and conflicts between indigenous Chinese culture and Indian Buddhist culture, in general, however, the Chinese both in the court and the commonalty took a positive attitude toward Indian Buddhist culture, which was being not only tolerated but taken in. That was a drastic transitional period where the orthodox metaphysics of Wei and Jin formulated during the two Han Dynasties, started to be transformed to a “deviated culture” of Buddhism and Daoism. Among the populace, since Buddhism became so prevalent that many folk beliefs had been swapped. As the *Book of the Sui Dynasty* states, “Buddhist sutras among the populace then had several hundred times more than the six classics.”

(3) Up to the Sui and Tang Dynasties, the uniquely rich Chinese culture had been evolving for two to three thousand years, could it be transformed into Indian culture given its profound influence on almost every part of Chinese culture and society since it was introduced into China over the previous five or six hundred years? The answer is no. On the contrary, after the Sui and Tang Dynasties, Buddhist culture had been deeply influenced by the Chinese culture, specially by the philosophical thoughts of Confucianism and Daoism, resulting in several sinocised Buddhist sectors.

For example, sectors of Tian-tai, Hua-yan and Zen Buddhism had all integrated with Confucian dispositional theory—the “wholehearted mind” of Tian-tai, “the Dao-heart law” of Hua-yan, and the “seeing into one's heart and attaining

Buddhahood” could proceed “mind theory” in the pre-Qin period and precede the “mind-natural study” of the Neo-Confucianism in the Song and Ming Dynasty.

We may also notice that conflicts caused by issues such as whether Buddhist monk should pay homage to the king had disappeared. By Buddhist sutras, monks could only worship Buddha but not kings or parents, which contradicted the core value of traditional Chinese filial piety. However, in the “Song” the Zen sutras, “The grace means dutiful to the parents, the obligations loyal to the superior and inferior, the modesty to harmony, tolerance to indiscriminate evils.” Moreover, Zen Master Da-hui of the Song Dynasty declared that “secular doctrines and Buddhist doctrines are virtually one”; “though I am a Buddhist, my loyalty to my emperor and country is no different from those loyal officials.”

These Buddhist sectors have clearly tinted with Chinese culture—Tian-tai absorbed some thoughts of Daoism, and Hua-yan and Zen Buddhism were closely linked with the thoughts of Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu (such as naturalist thought). Meanwhile, the Great Pilgrim Master Xuan-zang advocated Yogacara School, which was essentially very Indian and consequently declined in the Tang Dynasty after about thirty years of transmission. Interestingly, while Indian Buddhism started to decline in the 8th and 9th century and was almost extinct in the 14th century, sinocized Buddhism boomed during the same period, which spread to Korean peninsula, Japan, Vietnam and other places, and formed different kinds of Buddhism after mingling with the local cultures.

In the Song Dynasty, Neo-Confucians while criticized Indian Buddhism for its illusions and emptiness on the one hand, fully took in some of its thoughts on the other, such as “multiple conversion,” “seeing into one’s heart and attaining Buddhahood,” epiphany and so on. Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming Dynasties, since its emergence, had gradually replaced Buddhist philosophy which generally became a folk belief without significant theoretical achievement. Therefore, we may say that Chinese culture (philosophy) has greatly benefited from Indian Buddhism which was in turn being carried forward in Chinese culture. In this way, it was not the Chinese culture but Indian Buddhism that had been assimilated.

This shows that cultural exchanges between an alien culture and the local culture often mark a milestone; meanwhile, two-way choices and cultural transplant often take place between two cultures with historical and cultural significance. In general, Indian culture had been well received during that period by the Chinese culture, mainly by way of directly taking in. Typically, the Tian-tai School (Tian-tai School’s *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra*), the Hua-yan School (Hua-yan School’s *Avataṃsaka Sūtra*), and the Epiphany Zen school (Zen’s *Vajracchedikā-prāññāpāramitā-Sūtra*). Meanwhile, Yogacara perished with its purely Indian fashion, Tantra School though was all the rage at the time and eventually could not last long in China.

As mentioned above, Indian Buddhism began to decline in the 8th and 9th century and nearly to its end in the 14th century, but revived in Chinese soil. In the same way, Greek philosophy was propagated to Arabia and returned to Europe, and ended up as a strong culture. Once again this has proved that two-way choices and

cultural transplantation is the milepost in cross-cultural exchanges, as Russell correctly pointed out.²

Why we have to briefly review the history of Indian Buddhism's dissemination in China? This is because it can provide us with some implications and a frame of reference for us to analyze and elaborate how Western culture has been introduced and received in China.

2. Nestorianism was introduced into China from the West in the Tang Dynasty, later when Emperor Wuzong obliterated Buddhism, it was also being implicated and then disappeared all together from China. Nestorian Christianity was wiped out with the fall of the Yuan Dynasty as well. It was not until the 16th century in the mid-Ming Dynasty that the Western culture made a real impact on the Chinese culture, mainly with the mission of Jesuits of Christianity. The introduction of the Western culture, together with Western technology, had always been attached to traditional Chinese.

Especially, Matteo Ricci (1552–1610) and Xu Guangqi (1562–1633) jointly translated *The Elements of Geometry* written by Euclid (384–275 B.C.), Li Zhizao (1569–1630) and Francois Furtado (1587–1653) translated *Aristotle's Dialectics* into Chinese, could all be counted as meaningful events. Up to the early Qing Dynasty, the “Chinese Rites Controversy” interrupted the trend of cultural pouring from the West until the mid-19th century when Western powers opened China's door using their weapons. Now, the omnibearing input of Western culture has become something unavoidable to Chinese culture, especially to Chinese philosophy.

(a) In defining what is “culture,” there are various definitions, however, philosophy should be the core of culture. In probing into the deep understanding of a culture, one has to grasp the content of its philosophy. By the same token, in order to have a good insight into the Chinese culture one has to understand Chinese philosophy. However, what is Chinese philosophy? Is there such a thing as Chinese philosophy? These are the questions we have to firstly clarify. Surely, most of Chinese or foreign scholars would not deny Chinese philosophy—Confucianism, Daoism, Chinese Buddhism are certainly richly saturated with philosophical thoughts, but this was not the case two or three hundred years ago.

From a Western point of view, such as Hegel put forward that there is no such a thing as philosophy in China or even in the East; at its best, what China (or even the East) has is opinions, which are contrary to the truth. Surely, Hegel had it wrong in that front; no one can deny the rich and profound philosophical thoughts and resources for philosophical issues embodied in traditional Chinese culture.

Before Western philosophy was introduced into China, there was no such a word as “philosophy” or *Zhe-xue* in the Chinese language. The term *zhe xue* was coined by a Japanese scholar Nishi Amane (1829–97), who borrowed the two Chinese characters *zhe* (“wisdom”) and *xue* (“study”) to refer to “philosophy” originated in Ancient Greece and Rome. This new term was introduced into China by a Chinese

²Russell, Bertrand. *A History of Western Philosophy*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972.

scholar, Huang Zunxian (1848–1905), and was well accepted by Chinese scholars. Accepted as it was, the question remained, regarding whether China had “philosophy” or the sort that was comparable to Western philosophy. We have to, however, acknowledge that, before the importation of Western philosophy, there was no scholarly study of Chinese philosophy in its own right, as a field distinct from “canon studies” (*jing xue*) and “traditions of the masters” (*zi xue*). In other words, the Chinese had not consciously treated “philosophy” as an independent discipline as it was seen in West as a “wise subject” of probing into the truth of human life and the universe.

From the current point of view, some of the scholars’ works in Chinese history should be seen as philosophical works, so to speak, such as Wang Chong’s *Discourses Weighed in the Balance*, Wang Bi’s *Annotations to Lao-Tzu*, Ji Kang’s *The Theory of Music*, Zhou Dunyi’s *On Tai Chi Charter*, Zhang Zai’s *The Harmony of East and West*, Chuang-Tzu’s *The World*, Sima Tan’s *On Classification of Classics*, and so on. Surely, these were written not specifically for the sake of “philosophy,” nor was a subject of independent discipline, despite they are abundantly embodied with philosophical thoughts. More strictly speaking, perhaps Gongsun Long and Hui Shi’s certain articles could be seen as serious exploration into philosophical issues.

To my understanding, “philosophy” is a systematic approach comprised of a set of concepts and terminology with a clear target and efficient methodologies of analyzing and synthesizing issues of human life and the universe.

Historically, the invasion to China by Western powers was propitious to all kinds of cultures in the West to be brought to China. Meanwhile, some Chinese had realize the connection between Western powerfulness and its culture, with philosophy as at its core, therefore started paying attention to Western philosophy. From then on, concerning the spread of Western philosophy, three interrelated questions have always been confronting us: How do we deal with philosophy? How do we view the indigenous philosophy of our nation? How do we develop a new Chinese philosophy? Confronted with the furious clash between Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy during the extremely complicated historical period, Chinese scholars naturally had different attitudes toward the three interrelated questions.

During the process of taking in Western philosophy, Chinese scholars split into three different schools with diverse or even contrasting attitudes: radicalism (or the wholesale Westernization school), localism (or the cultural conservative school) and reformism (or mediative school for Chinese and Western cultures). Over the past hundred years, there have been academic conflicts, political confrontations between three schools, which quite often politicized and ideologized the philosophical, academic issues.

It is hoped that *The Gradual Impact of Western Philosophy on the East in 20th Century* will provide an impartial description, review and outlook (including some personal views of the contributors) on how Chinese philosophy has been established and developed under the influence of Western philosophy over the past hundred years. The multi-volume collection of five million words could be

compiled in several ways, such as transversely presenting and reviewing different schools of Western philosophy during a certain period of time when they were imported into China; or chronologically, inserting different schools of Western philosophy into different historical periods of China's recent hundred years.

We have finally adopted the latter way which is easier and better handled but is by no means superior to the former one. The monograph is composed of 14 volumes: Volume 1. *Pandect*; Volume 2. *Evolutionary Thought in China*; Volume 3. *Voluntarism in China*; Volume 4. *Pragmatism in China*; Volume 5. *Marxism in China*; Volume 6. *Neorealism in China*; Volume 7. *Analytic Philosophy in China*; Volume 8. *German Classic Philosophy in China*; Volume 9. *Structuralism and Deconstructivism in China*; Volume 10. *Phenomenology in China*; Volume 11. *Postmodernism in China*; Volume 12. *Christian philosophy in China*; Volume 13. *Western Philosophy in the Sight of Chinese Philosophy*; Volume 14. *Western Philosophy in Hong Kong and Macao*. Each volume is attached with an appendix of relevant reference and a catalogue for research and checking.

By the latter approach, the invited authors, who are the experts in different schools of Western philosophy or in the history of Western philosophy were introduced into China, can fully present their academic achievements. Also, since studies on different schools of Western philosophy are normally carried out across a time-span, if a volume is written by several authors, it will be inevitable to incur contradictions or discordances. Surely, chronologically, different views or certain inconsistency may also occur, but the individual viewpoints of the authors are apparent to the reader, illustrated by the clue of time frame that how certain school of Western philosophy has developed in China.

Therefore, under the guiding principle of allowing "a hundred schools of thought contend," in compiling the monograph, apart from certain fundamental norms or styles (i.e. introduction of the translated works of the individual schools, the development history, their contributions and the reviews concerned), there is no requirement for uniformity of academic viewpoints as long as they are said with a solid ground and judgment. Taking the set as a whole, it will provide us with a complete view on how Western philosophy had been merging into various aspects of China and exerting its due influence. As a chief editor I only serve as an organizer.

Of course, I have my own views on some of the issues concerning how Western philosophy had been propagated and promoted in the 20th century of China, which may be quite different from these authors, either as a group or individuals. For me, this all seem to be natural, since on academic issues opinions should always be diverse; academic development, can only be propelled by academic freedom, else it may move backward, or stall, which is the lesson we should learn from the past.

Concerning the history of gradual influence of Western philosophy on the East, I may provide the following viewpoints.

(b) As mentioned above, it was not until Western philosophy was introduced into China that "Chinese philosophy" became a branch of learning. This is by no means to say there was no such thing as Chinese philosophy; they are different in terms of philosophical thoughts. Surely, prior to the introduction of Western

philosophy Chinese philosophy was a part of classical, historical or canon studies, and philosophical issues were often merged into the history of thought or academics. As we know, discussing certain philosophical issues will not necessarily lead to the establishment of a certain subject as an academic discipline.

(c) In the previous section we have a bird's-eye view of how Indian Buddhism was introduced into China, concerning Western philosophy, are there certain phenomena same or similar to that process? While history may never repeat itself exactly either in China or in the world, but certain remarkable similarities can also be found. In the Tang Dynasty, Nestorianism was introduced, in the Yuan Dynasty Nestorian Christianity once became popular, and in the end of Ming Dynasty Western logistics was also brought in, however, these had not made any impact before they disappeared. Historical records indicate that in the end of 16th and early 17th century the Western missionaries did bring in Western philosophy, and similar cases of the introduction of Indian Buddhism into China can also be found in Mateo Ricci's Chinese book.

For the purpose preaching the gospel, Mateo Ricci adopted various approaches to combine the dominant Confucianism and Western Catholicism, such as "integrating Confucianism" (describing the commonness between Confucianism and Catholicism), "surpassing Confucianism" (pointing out certain advantages of Catholicism over Confucianism), "complementing Confucianism" (illustrating the points that Catholicism can in aspects make Confucianism better), "attaching to Confucianism" (amending Catholicism in order to suit traditional Confucian thought), and so on.

Methodologically, Xu Guangqi's approach had been influenced by Indian Buddhism, such as "classification", "analogism" and so on. However, apart from the very few Chinese scholars who had a thorough understanding of Catholicism (such as Xu Guangqi and Li Zhizao), most of them excluded Catholicism, such as Zhong Shiseng's criticism: "Catholicism is an evil religion which seemingly repudiates Buddhism but actually has stolen its dress; it hypocritically reverences Confucianism but in fact it distorts Confucian essence." Some Chinese scholars still had the mindset of "Chinese learning as the fundamental structure, Western learning for practical use" (Chinese structure and Western use), having interest only in Western material things, such as binoculars and clocks.

From the point of view of a Confucian Xu Dashou, these Western technologies were nothing more than gadgets, unprofitable to the sacred virtue. Up to the end of 19th century when Western philosophy started to make certain serious impact on China. This may also reveal that the debate between "China versus West and ancient versus modernity" can be traced back along the development process of Chinese culture in the 20th century.

Initially, the idea of "Chinese structure and Western use" was accepted by the most of Chinese scholars. As they gained more insight into Western culture, however, their views on the approach started to alter, and the representative figure being Hu Shih who had such criticism: "I may quote the honorable gentlemen Qiu Kefu's comment: 'structure' and 'use' are actually combined for one purpose, such as a cattle's body is built for carrying weight and a horse is born to endure distant

trip; I have never heard that you can employ a cattle's 'structure' while exploiting a horse's 'usage.'”

Based on his penetrating understanding of Western culture, Hu Shih pointed out that “Western countries are constituted in freedom and manifested in democracy.” Regardless whether the conclusion drawn by Hu Shih was correct or not, this remark certainly carried some weight to the debate over the issues of transitional period and provided a clue for the Chinese to have preliminary understanding of Western culture. Following it up, the debates of this kinds rose one after another, signified by the establishment of Confucius Temple by Yuan Shikai around the time he proclaimed himself emperor, the criticism and repelling of Western culture by Confucianism, and consequently resulted in the first debate between Chinese and Western culture.

Having no concept of what “philosophy” exactly was, the discussion often centered around cultural issues instead of philosophical ones. The criteria for identifying Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy frequently and simply lay in the differentiation between the antique and modern, the old and new, the tranquil and agitated and so on. The typical of debate occurred between the *Journal of Oriental Studies* edited by Du Yaquan and the *New Youth* edited by Chen Duxiu.

Although Du Yaquan should not be viewed as a typical conservative of blindly protecting traditional culture and repudiating Western culture, his theory of “agglomeration” surely provided a typical discourse for the conservatism: “Historically, just as the Duke of Zhou consolidated the merits of the three kings, Confucius epitomized his predecessors and Mencius further completed them by eliminating all the heresies.” In the meantime, the debates over “issues and doctrines” between Hu Shih and Li Dazhao, philosophically could also be seen as a fight between reformism and radicalism. Around the May Fourth Movement, the Sino-Western debated reached their peak, where the two major camps—represented by Marxist Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao’s radicalism and pragmatist Hu Shih’s liberalism—had jointed hands in attacking traditional culture under the banner of “Down with Confucianism” and promoting “science and democracy.”

Attributing backward Chinese society and corrupted politics to traditional Chinese culture, Chen Duxiu and Hu Shih were strongly motivated to fight against traditional culture and advocating Western culture. They believed that the so-call “Chinese learning” belonged to the past and had become obsolete, therefore China must learn everything from the West, including Western philosophy; in other words, China had to be totally westernized. Comparing to the tenet of “Chinese learning as the fundamental structure, Western learning for practical use” in the end of 19th century, the proposal of Chen and Hu could be elaborated as “Western learning as the fundamental structure, Western learning for practical use.”

However, we have to admit that the approach of “wholesale Westernization” advocated by Chen Duxiu and others had strong impact effect on breaking with tradition (Confucianism, Daoism and Chinese Buddhism) and laying a ground in China for the enlightenment and propagation for Western philosophy. Around the May Four Movement, whatever philosophical thoughts appeared in the West would soon be introduced into China correspondingly. Under the huge pressure from the

West, Chinese learning was bound to strike back, represented by Liang Qichao and Liang Shuming.

While Liang Qichao couched quite serious criticism on Western science in his *Travel Notes to Europe*, Liang Shuming's *Chinese and Western Cultures and Philosophies* could be seen as a valuable response of Chinese philosophy to Western philosophy as well as a sober reflection on Chinese philosophy itself. Following the May Fourth Movement, debates over Sino-Western cultural and philosophical issues continued. For example, a debate over "science and outlook of life" took place in 1923, and ended up with a seeming victory of "Western learning" (including Marxism, Pragmatism and Western Scientism) over "Chinese learning" (typified by Zhang Junli's proposal of restoring the Neo-Confucianism of the Song Dynasty).

The debate also resulted in the split between Marxist school and Pragmatic school represented by Chen Duxiu and Hu Shih respectively. Since then, a situation of tripartite confrontation formed between Marxism, Pragmatics and Conservatism in the field of Chinese philosophy. In 1935, another debate occurred over the issue of "the antique versus the modern and China versus the West" caused by the *Declaration of Nursing Local Chinese Culture* written by ten professors (such as Sa Mengwu and He Bingsong), which could be view as a grand debate between local culturalism and "wholesale Westernization."

The school of local culturalism lay much stress on natural culture while neglecting its epochal characters; the school of wholesale Westernization, on the contrary, only had their eyes on contemporaneity while totally ignoring its national characters and cultural inheritance. The debate was doomed to exert little impact on the development of Chinese culture. Since the War of Resistance Against Japan broke out in 1937, the philosophical debates had generally eased somewhat, nevertheless occasional disputes still occurred, such as Marxists couched criticism on Feng Youlan's Neo-Confucianism, professor Hong Qian of Vienna school also had an argument with Feng Youlan about the metaphysical issues, all this still reflected the philosophical debate over "the antique versus the modern and China versus the West."

Since 1949, a drastic change took place in Chinese society on the Mainland, and its philosophy had also had a sweeping swift accordingly. The guiding principle of "lean to one side"—unreservedly learn everything from the Soviet Union's Marxism, Leninism and Stalinism—that China had adopted, was in fact a variation of "wholesale Westernization." At that time, the criterion for judging philosophy was solely based on Stalin's *Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism*, and Zhdanov's *Speech at the Symposium on History of Western Philosophy* became our standard textbook for the study of philosophy. By such a standard, traditional Chinese philosophy, including thoughts of Confucius, Mencius, Lao-Tzu, Chuang-Tzu, Cheng Yi, Zhu Xi, Lu Jiuyuan or Wang Yangming had all become the target for criticism. The condemnation of ultra-leftist Marxism and Leninism for traditional Chinese culture, especially for Chinese philosophy, continued to the "Cultural Revolution."

During the "Cultural Revolution" (1966–1976), the destroying of the "four dregs of society" resulted in the isolation of Chinese philosophy from the culture of the

world, and caused a fault in Chinese philosophy itself. After the “Cultural Revolution,” although the political guiding principle of “taking class struggle as the core” had been rejected and “reform and opening up” policy for the “four modernizations” was put forward by Deng Xiaoping, philosophically, the debate over “the antique versus the modern and China versus the West” had never ceased. During the 1980s, the compelling task confronted China’s cultural and ideological circles was to transform traditional Chinese society to a modern one, therefore it must repudiate the influence of confined feudal despotism. The typical event during this period was the television broadcast of *River Elegy*.

Despite errors and distortions of history that appeared in *River Elegy*, its theme was nevertheless to alert the Chinese that we should never return to the old path of self-confinement and move forward. However, it received a severe criticism. This event reflected a choice confronting China: Moving forward to go along with the world guided by the “reform and opening up” policy or, carrying out the reform that is only confined to the economic field and remaining its self-enclosed attitude in the cultural and ideological front. In essence, this was undoubtedly the repeated debate over “the antique versus the modern and China versus the West.” The political turmoil in 1989 had interrupted the trend of moving forward to modernization in culture, ideology and even in political system. After a period of silence, two trends of thought appeared in cultural and ideological circles, one was Post-modernism and another Neo-conservatism.

The idea of Post-modernism had entered China in the 1980s but did not become popular until the 1990s before it caught the attention of Chinese philosophical circle (including other fields, such as in literature and art and so on), resulting in abundant translated publications as well as academic works and essays written by Chinese scholars.

One of the important reasons behind this, I think, lay in the resolving the centralization of culture. However, after the “June Four Event” an article appeared in a Beijing’s newspaper entitled “Pluralism is Nothing but Liberalism”, which furiously criticized the pluralized cultural phenomenon previously appeared. It reflected the demand of someone wishing to return to the state where ultra-leftism dominated the cultural circle since 1949; some scholars, however, believed that it was a retrogressive move that would drag back the situation of our cultural and ideological development.

In order to alter the trend of cultural uniformity, heaps of translated works as well as explanations of Post-modernism have been produced. While Modernism is characterized by clarity, certainty, ultimate value, integrity and systematic nature, Postmodernism emphasizes vagueness, uncertainty, unlevelled, decentrality, pluralism and so on. I believe that apart from the introduction and popularization of Postmodernism, Chinese culture and philosophy have also played a role in curbing cultural conformity.

In autumn 1992, *Guoxue re* (“craze for national learning”) occurred on Mainland China aiming at promoting traditional Chinese culture. In view of the negative impact that Western culture had exerted on human society, some scholars thought that traditional Chinese philosophy may be applied to correct some of the deviations

of Western philosophy. Judging from the circumstance then, although some scholars may have exaggerated the significance and conservatism of Chinese philosophy, most scholars still believe that serious exploration into one's native culture (including philosophy) will surely facilitate the process of transforming the traditional culture (philosophy) into a modern one.

In June 1994, a signed article published in the *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, it says, "Some people propagate that China is in need of Confucius, Dong Zhongshu and reconstruction of a philosophical system parallel to Marxism; some even use 'Chinese learning,' the ambiguous concept, to exclude the new socialist culture from Chinese culture." At a symposium organized by the Journal in 1995, many scholars repudiated that article, pointing out that positioning Chinese learning and Marxist research in opposition is bound to set Chinese culture in opposition to Marxism, so as to repeat the dogmatist ideology of distrusting and criticizing Chinese learning.

This debate of the 1990s, although exerted little impact on the development of Chinese culture, still in one way or another reflected the controversial issues during the transitional period. In the meantime, certain Chinese scholars who were at home with Western philosophy (such as Liu Xiaofeng) held a strong critical attitude towards Chinese culture and philosophy, which had caused counterattack from traditional conservatives (such as Jiang Qin). Some scholars, who were appreciative of both Chinese and Western cultures and philosophies, attempted coordinate the divergences between the two.

Undoubtedly, all this have been the continuous and periodical reflections of the debate on "the ancient versus the modern and China versus the West" during the development of Chinese culture over the past one hundred years. The controversy between "liberalism" and "neo-leftism" in the end of 1990s (which in some sense has been ongoing) still centered around the theme of "moving from tradition towards modernity," being part of incessant process.

I have so far outlined the path Chinese culture and philosophy have gone through, aiming at depicting the fact that when an indigenous culture and foreign culture (such as Chinese culture and Western culture) are met, contradictions and conflicts during a certain stage are inevitable. The introduction of Western culture (philosophy) and Indian Buddhism into China, though quite different, still had something in common. When Indian Buddhism spread in China, the Chinese culture was at its sliver age, whereas when Western culture was introduced as a strong culture into China, the Chinese culture was in decline.

Initially, Western culture was attached to Chinese culture (the so-called "attached-Confucianism") for a widespread but transient period. The cross-cultural exchanges were interrupted by the controversy of rite until the mid-19th century when Western culture flooded into China as a strong culture. During the 20th century, the theme was dominated by adopting and digesting Western culture into Chinese culture. The two cultures are coordinated and absorbed each other in the process of confrontation and contradiction, very much assemble to the process when Indian Buddhism was brought into China in the Northern and Southern Dynasties. We may assume this is a general phenomenon of contact between two different traditional cultures with long history when they met at certain stage.

(d) Moreover, philosophically there were similar cases could be found in the Sui and Tang Dynasties and afterwards. In the 20th century, there were several schools of Sinocized Western philosophy or modern Chinese philosophy based on Western philosophy. In introducing Western philosophy into China, the most influential figure was Hu Shih, who translated the *Evolution and Ethics* propagated the evolutionary thought on the Chinese for several generations.

Subsequently, the philosophy of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche's philosophy and ancient Greek philosophy, anarchism, Marxism, pragmatism and realism, the 19th Century philosophy of Germany, analytic philosophy, philosophy of the Vienna school, phenomenology, existentialism, structuralism, deconstructionism, post-modernism and so on have been introduced into China, making a great impact on the academic circle of Chinese philosophy.

The establishment of Chinese philosophy in the 20th century initiated from studying the history of Chinese philosophy, as a result several works on the history of Chinese philosophy appeared, such as *An Outline of Philosophic History of China* (English version known as *A History of Logic in the pre-Qin Period*) written by Hu Shih, and previously Xie Wuliang wrote *The History of Chinese Philosophy* published in 1916. During the same period, Feng Youlan produced his representative work entitled *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy* in an effort to prove there was such a thing as "Chinese philosophy" since the pre-Qin period.

In one way or another, it has revealed that Chinese scholars had consciously taken Chinese philosophy as a subject of study under the influence of Western philosophy being imported from the West. Subsequently, several works on the comparison of Chinese and Western philosophies came out, such as Liang Shuming's *Eastern and Western cultures and philosophies*, using cultural prototypes to illustrate the differences between philosophies of China, India and the West. In this way, Liang's book could be seen as a serious review of the development of "anti-traditionalism" and "westernization" since the May Fourth Movement.

In this book, he believes that we ought to endorse "science" and "democracy" in China by introducing Western culture and philosophy, and he reiterates that the way we promote eastern culture is quite different from bigots who totally refuse Western culture. While clearly influenced by the philosophy of Bergson, Liang also engages in criticism on Western culture, claiming that indigenous Chinese culture can play an active role in making significant contributions to human society, and will rejuvenate itself in a foreseeable future, in the same way Western culture did after a prolong Dark Age in the West.

Since Western philosophy culminated in the 1920s, many of its flaws and dilemmas have been explored, resulting in sufferings and disasters and causing spiritual barrenness, strained relations among people, and deteriorated natural resources. Chinese philosophy, on the other hand, with its Confucian "benevolence," a non-utilitarianism, promoting a life attitude that follows nature, being optimism in approaching one's destiny and well-settlement in the same way

Confucius advocated, can certain provide some remedies to Western philosophy. Liang's views, though is still confined to the comparison between Chinese and Western philosophies, his unique insights proved to be more penetrating than the views in the early 1920s.

In the early 1930s, several "modernized Chinese philosophy" was formed on the basis of absorbing Western philosophy, such as Xiong Shili, Zhang Dongsun, Feng Youlan, Jin Yuelin and Mao Zedong (who wrote *On Practice* and *On Contradiction*) and so on. Xiong's *New Realism* was completed section "Ontology" (theory of quality), which was somehow under the impact of Bergson's philosophy and left section "Epistemology" (theory of quantity) unfinished. He believed that since there is lack of epistemological components in Chinese philosophy it is therefore quite necessary to establish an epistemology with Chinese style. As he put it, "Since Chinese academic style is characterized by ontological thought and weak in analytical thinking; in order to complement each other between the East and the West, Chinese learning should take in Western thought so as to enrich itself."

To this end, Xiong contemplated that "As philosophy should be seen as a field of study that mixes thinking and virtue. For thinkers being wise as they are, but due to their moral weakness, it is hard for them to reach out to a high ground. Moral cultivators, on the other hand, being virtuous as they are, may nevertheless be frail in intellectual analysis, resulting in imperfectness. A combination of intelligence and virtue can therefore make a perfect learning."

Xiong in fact made a great effort to developing modern Chinese philosophy by absorbing Western philosophy. His theory of "differentiating ontology and pragmatics" and "transformation by alteration" had further expanded the philosophical thought of *The Book of Changes* and heralded a new area of modern Confucianism. His approaches was followed by Mou Zongsan and Tang Junyi and other prominent figures who have inherited and carried out the essence of Confucianism even today.

Zhang Dongsun also put forward his "Multi-epistemology" and "Structurism" to form a kind of modern Chinese philosophy based on Neo-Kantian and critical Realism thought. Different from Jin Yuelin's philosophy which is the transition from epistemology to ontology, Zhang Dongsun's philosophy engages in the pursuit of Epistemology transcended from cosmology.

The two philosophers represented two major schools of traditional Chinese philosophy, namely the ontology of the *Book of Changes* and the formation of cosmology and both of them had built their philosophical systems, which made reference to Western philosophy. Jin Yuelin's *On Dao* and *On Knowledge* were written by analytical and logical positivist approaches with an emphasis on analytical philosophy. In formality, it may not look like Chinese philosophy but in contents he was deeply influenced by Daoist and Confucian philosophies.

Feng Youlan said his Neo-Confucianism was not abided by but carried on the New-Confucianism of the Song and Ming Dynasties, in a way he had incorporated Platonic "commonality," "specialty" and Neo-realism with Chinese philosophy, dividing the world into "truthfulness" (or called "theory" or Tai Chi) and "reality," meaning everything is caused by a reason. Particularly, in Feng's *New Rationality* (also known as *The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy*) he believed that the spirit of

traditional Chinese philosophy is the *Dao* of “Sageliness within and Kingliness without.”

He said, “In traditional Chinese philosophy, regardless factions and schools, the *Dao* of ‘Sageliness within and Kingliness without’ had been a dominated theme,” so was his one. However, he had gone further than that by putting forward a theory of “Four States,” believing that Western philosophy excels at analysis (positive metaphysics) and Chinese philosophy intuition (negative metaphysics), but his philosophy combines both. All this indicates that Feng’s philosophy has carried on Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming Dynasties and modernized Chinese philosophy by applying Western philosophy.

Basically, Feng’s philosophy still lies in differentiation between “truthfulness” and “reality,” which carries on the “Differentiation Theory” of the Song and Ming Dynasties while combining the idea of “commonalty” and “specialty” of West throughout the history of Chinese philosophy. This has also exemplified the reason why he chose Platonic philosophy and Neo-reality as a reference, and revealed the fact that Chinese scholars have made great efforts in creating Chinese philosophy with a new style patterned after Western philosophy.

Over the same period, Tang Yungtung studied the Metaphysics of the Wei and Jin Dynasties for the purpose of proving that there is such a thing as ontology in Chinese philosophy with a special philosophical methodology (“obtaining the significance and forgetting the words”), which has drawn attention of scholars from both China and abroad. The approach he employed writing *A History of Buddhism in the Han, Wei, Two Jins and Northern and Southern Dynasties*, which has become a definitive work on the subject in the history of Chinese philosophy, was clearly influenced by German philosopher Wendell Ben.

During his study in the United States, Tang Yungtung was somehow under the influence of the prevalent Neo-conservatism, therefore his philosophy was “burnt-in” Western learning. Among the prominent figures of “modern Chinese philosophy,” some are more influential than others, such as Feng Youlan and Xiong Shili being more well-known than Jin Yuelin and Zhang Dongsun, since the former have been “carrying on” traditional Chinese philosophy while the latter more Westernized. One thing in common, however, has been the recognition of lacking epistemology (theory of knowledge) in Chinese philosophy, they therefore tried to fulfill the gap in view of Western philosophy.

In view of Western philosophy, the Chinese scholars carried out a historical study of Chinese philosophy as an initial step of constructing its system, subsequently Xiong Shili, Zhang Dongsun, Feng Youlan and Jin Yuelin have further established their “modern Chinese philosophy.” But to put it in perspective, Zhang Dongsun and Jin Yuelin’s philosophy, though quite penetrating, exerted less influence than Xiong Shili and Feng Youlan on modern Chinese philosophy, the reason I think mainly lay in the degree of inhering traditional Chinese philosophy, as it was mentioned above.

Clearly, although much elements of Western critical thinking have been accommodated into his philosophical system (becoming more analytical than traditional Chinese philosophy mainly by absorbing Yogacara Buddhist thoughts),

Xiong Shili still mainly followed the path of the holistic and intuitive nature (or mixed nature) of Chinese philosophy. His cohorts basically have followed his approach as well although taking in more Western philosophical theories and methodologies. Feng Youlan's logical analysis, heavily influenced by Western philosophy, has gone much further than Xiong Shili, nevertheless his philosophy can be seen as "modern Chinese philosophy" rooted in the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming Dynasties, as mentioned above.

Philosophies, dominated with logical components, such as analytical philosophy, scientific philosophy, are bound to be dim in China. When two philosophies are encountered, inevitably two-way selection becomes an issue. Some scholars of Western philosophy (or scholars of both Western and Chinese philosophies) have tried to interpret Western philosophy with Chinese philosophy (or an explanation of Western philosophy with Chinese characteristics), the practice could be seen as a benign experiment of sinicizing Western philosophy.

In my view, the attempt made by Chinese scholars in terms of Sinicizing Western philosophy or modernize Chinese philosophy in no way could be compared to Chinese Buddhist philosophy formulized in the Sui and Tang Dynasties, nor to Neo-Confucianism in the Song and Ming Dynasties following critically taking in Indian Buddhism, let alone to have developed Modern Chinese philosophy that matches the trend of modern Chinese society and the development of philosophy in the world.

After the founding of the people's republic of China in 1949, for a quite lengthy period of time studies of the history of Chinese philosophy and traditional Chinese philosophy was not in good shape though certain merits had been achieved. Since 1980s, great achievements have been made in areas of the history of Chinese philosophy, traditional Chinese philosophy as well as Western philosophy, significantly exceeding the previous eighty years both in terms of quantity and profundity. However, in general, the second half of the 20th century witnessed none of philosophers with great influence comparable to Xiong Shili, Zhang Dongsun, Feng Youlan and Jin Yuelin. While it is regrettable, the causes were nevertheless not attributed to the philosophers of this period but the social and political circumstances.

6.1 The Development Characteristics of Philosophy in the New Axial Age

The idea of Axial Age was proposed by German philosopher Karl Jaspers (1883–1969). According to his theory, around 500 B.C., great thinkers appeared almost simultaneously in Ancient Greece, Israel, India and China, and they contributed their original ideas to the solution of the problems which are of great concern to humankind. Distinctive cultural traditions were then formed respectively by Socrates and Plato in Ancient Greece, Lao-Tzu and Confucius in China, Sakyamuni in India, and Jewish

prophets in Israel, which, after more than two thousand years of progress, have become the principle part of human intellectual wealth. These regional cultural traditions however were independent in their births and developments, without mutual influence.

“Until today mankind has lived by what happened during the Axial Age, by what was thought and created during that period. In each new upward flight it returns in recollection to this period and is fired anew by it. Even since then it has been the case that recollections and re-awakenings of the potentialities of the Axial Age—renaissances—afford a spiritual impetus.”³ For example, the Europeans in Renaissance had traced the origin of their culture back to Ancient Greece, which had rekindled the European civilization and left its mark in world history. Similarly, the Song and Ming Neo-Confucian thinkers in China, stimulated by the impacts of Indian Buddhism, rediscovered Confucius and Mencius of the pre-Qin Period, and elevated the indigenous Chinese philosophy to a new height. In a certain sense, the current development of world multiculturalism might become a new leap forward on the basis of the Axial Age 2000 years ago.

As we all know, since World War II, with the gradual collapse of colonialism, the once colonized and oppressed nations have taken upon themselves an urgent task to re-affirm their independent identities by all means. Their unique cultures were the most important means for this justification.

Perhaps the 21st century would be dominated by four principle cultural systems: the Euro-American, the East Asian, the South Asian, and the Islamic (Middle Eastern and North African). Each of the four cultures has a long tradition and a population of over a billion. Of course there are other cultures influencing the future of human society in the 21st century as well, for example, the Latin American and the African; nevertheless, at least in the present, the influences of these cultures are far less than that of the four principle cultures mentioned above. If human society hopes to terminate the present chaos, it should especially criticize the cultural Hegemonism and cultural Tribalism, it should not only face this new cultural Axial Age but also make unremitting efforts to promote the dialogues among states or nations belonging to different cultural traditions, in order to coordinate all the cultures into a project of solving the common problems challenging human society.

(1) In this globalized world, everything has been integrated—from economy to science and technology, and the development of information network has amalgamated the world as a whole. Therefore, in this new “Axial Period,” any culture in the world can no longer develop in isolation; a co-existing of interactive multi-cultural scenario will emerge and, the contribution to human culture they each will make depends on their capacity of absorbing certain elements of other cultures and constantly renewing themselves.

The Axial Age around 500 B.C. was a time when axial civilizations entered the Iron Age, and a time of great leaps forward in productivity, which in consequence produced great thinkers.

³Karl Jaspers, *Origin and Goal of History*, London: Routledge Revivals, 2011.

Now we have entered the Information Age, when another great leap forward in human society is just happening. Because of the economic globalization, the integration of science and technology, and the progress of information network, different regions all over the world are tightly connected, and local cultural progress could no longer be independent as they once were in the “Axial Age” two thousand years ago. Instead, they will be developed in the midst of discords, conflicts, and through mutual influences or mutual absorptions.

Different cultural traditions would subsist in this New Axial Age, each with a population too large to be eliminate—even with wars, there would be only little or temporary effects. Thus, in the long run, the coexistence of civilizations is predictable.

As Bertrand Russell said in his *Chinese and Western Civilization Contrasted*, “Contacts between different civilizations have often in the past proved to be landmarks in human progress. Greece learnt from Egypt, Rome from Greece, the Arabs from the Roman Empire, mediaeval Europe from the Arabs, and the Renaissance Europe from the Byzantines. In many of these cases, the pupils proved better than their masters. In the case of China, if we regard the Chinese as the pupils, this may be the case again.”⁴

It is no exaggeration to say that the vitality of European culture lies in its mechanism of constantly assimilating other cultural elements, enriching and renewing itself. In the same way, Chinese culture has been developing. Historically, when Indian Buddhism spread to China it benefited as well as being manifested by Chinese culture greatly, and in turn, it further spread to Korean Peninsula and Japan, formulating certain distinguished Buddhist culture by combining the local cultures.

In China, under the influence of Indian Buddhist culture, the basic idiosyncrasy of the Song and Ming Dynasties had once gain returned to Confucius and Mencius and lifted Chinese culture up to Neo-Confucianism. Many indications nowadays suggest that a new Axial Period will occur, in a way that the four great cultures mentioned about will, while consolidating their immanent spirit, fully absorb the nutrition of other cultures and result in a new cultural leap.

(2) The cultural development in the 21st century has to be driven by cross-cultural and cross-disciplinary studies. Since the world has been linked together, no culture in the world can develop in isolation, therefore studies of cross-borders will boom. As the saying goes, “You don’t know true shape of the mountain since you are in the mountains;” a culture may thus be best approached externally in order to pull down the fences isolating the views and to get an overall picture.

It has been widely accepted in China’s academic circle that reviewing the culture from the perspective of others is the core value of “inter-subjective” and “cross reference” and is beneficial to laying a ground for multicultural development.

⁴Russell, Bertrand, *Chinese and Western Civilization Contrasted*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2012 edition.

Totally different from the situation in the 18th century, academic disciplines are no longer confined to their borders; instead, many new disciplines and inter-disciplines have occurred.

The original confinement of academic disciplines has been blurred—physical chemistry or chemical physics, instead of pure physics or chemistry have become the popular subjects. Furthermore, the boundaries between natural science and social science have also been broken, such as in studying comparative literature “dissipative structure theory” invented by the physicist, a Nobel Prize winner, Prigogine, has also been used by many scholars.

Currently, mutual-assimilation between different cultural traditions and different disciplines has widely taken place. It is predicated that the most influential culture will be the one that can promote dialogue between different cultural traditions and disciplines and take a holistic approach. The new Axial Period of the 21st century will be an interlocutory and mutual assimilatory one, which is quite different from the previous one.

(3) The new Axial Period will not be dominated by a few great thinkers; instead, a myriad of thinkers will play a role in navigating cultural development. Given the rapid development of modern society, which far exceeds the ancient one in speed, a trend of thoughts has been changing with each passing day in an interactive manner. In a new landscape, since almost everything has been interwoven and interdependent, there are hardly any conditions for great “lonely thinkers” to appear.

Nowadays, what thinkers are confronted is no more a single country or nation but the whole world; inevitably, they have to absorb certain elements from other cultures with a global view. True accomplished thinkers, therefore, have to belong to both the nation and the world. In the West, over the past century or so, trends of thoughts replaced one another with a dominant one lasting no more than several decades, and so far none of the thoughts can synchronize various schools as a whole.

Over the past century or so, China has still been in the process of learning western culture and building its new culture. It is foreseeable that a new “contention of a hundred schools of thought” will emerge in China, forming a multicultural landscape. As we have seen that since the “reform and opening-up,” all kinds of theories and schools of thought have flooded into China, where a huge amount of western materials are still being digested, and yet no modern “new Chinese culture” has emerged out of the digestion, in the same way that the Neo-Confucianism was produced inspired by Indian Buddhism in the Song and Ming Dynasties.

Entering the 1990s, China's thought and cultural circles have been further diversified, formulating different academic groups, each with single dominant thought. There has been no authoritative thought taking a leading role. Looking ahead into the future, more diversified schools of thoughts will probably emerge in parallel to the development of China's modern society, with the less likelihood of materializing a unified thought system.

Given such conditions in China and abroad, chances for great thinkers like Plato, Confucius and Sakyamuni, who exerted great influences on human culture over the past two thousand years, to remerge are extremely rare. History will show that the

time of attempting to become the Savior of the world has gone forever. We should therefore realize that from now on the resultant force of different groups of thinkers, embodied as multiculturalism, will determine the direction of human cultural development.

The transformation may have something to do with the shift from the elite culture to popular culture. Since the pace of modern life has increasingly become faster in line with the development of popular culture that meets people's emotional and spiritual requirements at a quick tempo. As a result, thoughts and doctrines tend to be simplified and popularized, which will further hinder the great thinkers to appear, such as Confucius, Lao-Tzu, Plato and Sakyamuni who are normally regarded as the Saviors. In this way, I should say the 21st century will witness the integration of the elite and popular cultures.

(4) In the New Axial Age, how can Chinese philosophy be developed? Looking back the 20th century, we may get very good idea that scholars who made significant contributions to Chinese philosophy or Chinese culture, have to be masters of possessing a wide knowledge of things ancient and modern as well as fusing western culture and Chinese culture (mastering Chinese culture alien learning). As Sima Qian (145–87 B.C.) said, his *Chronological Record of History* aimed at “Exploring into the law of Change between heaven and man and establishing a unique type of discourse.” Ji Xianlin also pointed out, “Over the Chinese academic history of several thousand years, there were few erudite and well informed masters in terms of mastering the cultures of China and the West in every era, who heralded the direction of academic research as shining stars.”

Certainly, there is no exception in modern China with slight variations. For example, Mr. Yu Yue and his disciple Zhang Taiyan, both of them are great masters of their time, symbolizing a turning point of academic development during the end of 19th century and early 20th century. The only difference was that the student had acquired insights of Chinese and Western learning, apart from possessing knowledge of China and the West learnt from his teacher. The same was true to their successors, such as Liang Qichao, Wang Guowei, Tschén Yinkoh, Chen Yuan, Hu Shih and so on.

I think that Ji Xianlin's view was very reasonable. However, the causes to these differences lay not in the scholars' intention but the time they belong to. I thus may paraphrase Sima Qian's comment to “Exploring into the law of change between heaven and man, and merging Chinese and Western learning.” Philosophers not only rely on their power of understanding, but a wide range of knowledge, new methodologies and new materials with new insights of the trend of the academic development, so as to penetrate into universal life.

As mentioned above, since the world has become one, national issues quite often turn out to be global ones. Although different countries and nations may have different ideas, ways and methods in dealing with problems confronted, their philosophical judgment should not be absolutely different. Therefore, Chinese philosophers who had achieved something in the 20th century had to be not only erudite in Chinese learning, but also thoroughly at home with Western philosophy.

This has been proved by our research on Chinese philosophy in the 20th century. As mentioned above, prominent figures were these masters of traditional Chinese learning as well as modern Western science, such as Hu Shih, Zhang Taiyan, Jin Yuelin, Feng Youlan, Zhang Dongsun, Hu Shih, Tang Yungtung, He Lin, Shen Youding, Fang Dongmei, Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi and so on. As a defender traditional Chinese philosopher, for example, Xiong Shili, though was not efficient in English (his limited knowledge of Western philosophy was mainly obtained through Zhang Dongsun's introduction), he still believed that Chinese philosophy could go nowhere without learning something from Western philosophy.

In view of the historical development, as Jaspers pointed out, each cultural leap has been rekindled by reviewing the Axial Age around 500 B.C. For Chinese philosophy to play a significant role in the New Axial Age of the 21st century has to make full use of the essence of traditional Chinese philosophy while consciously absorbing Western philosophy. This is not only the case for Chinese philosophy but also for philosophies of other countries and nations in the New Axial Age.

6.2 Navigating Chinese Philosophy to Go Abroad

Concerning Take-ism, as Lu Xun said, "All in all, we need to take in something, which can either be used, or stored or dumped. Since the owner of the house has been transformed, so has the house. However, this requires the owner to be placid, courageous, discerning and selfless for the awareness that without take-ism, a man could not be refreshed, nor has a revival of art."⁵

What Lu Xun really proposed was to take a broader view and use our own judgment in taking in things. The same principle should be applied to us now—taking in everything that could be used as fertilizers from the West and other nations, to modernize our culture. Concerning give-ism, as Lu Xun pointed out, during the Qing Dynasty and early National Republic of China, it was given out as a gift in forms of antiques and natural resources to promote national pride and prestige, which had nothing to do real cultural exchange.

Today, the kind of "take-ism" advocated by Lu Xun is still valid. Only when we are brave and smart enough to take in the core value of western and other national cultures systematically, other than fragmentally or narrow-mindedly, can we renew our culture. As the saying goes, "the true face of Mount Lu is lost to my sight, for it is right in this mountain that I reside;" there can be no identification without contrast. Therefore, by setting up "other cultures" as a reference the merits and shortcomings of our own can be clearly identified. Since many scholars have recently offered plenty of advice on how to take in foreign cultures, I would just like to elaborate more on "give-ism."

⁵Lu Xun, *The Completed Works of Lu Xun*, Vol. 6 (p. 31), Beijing: People Literary Press, 1962.

During my visits to Europe and the United States, I was very surprised by the lack of knowledge about Chinese culture and philosophy of local college students (apart from those who are majored in Chinese culture). By contrast, Chinese students of science and technology are more or less familiar with Western culture (such as philosophy, religion, history, literature, art and so on), some are even well informed.

Why is this so? This is nothing more than the gesture that China is backward and Western countries look down upon us, thinking that they can learn nothing from China, including Chinese culture and philosophy. However, the problem may not be that straightforward. Reviewing a bit of history may help better comprehend the phenomenon.

As an alien culture, Indian Buddhism spread into China two thousand years ago. According to *Biographies of Eminent Monks* written by Hui Jiao, it was Indian monks who first brought Buddhism to China from the western regions or India, and then Chinese monks or believers went to the “western heaven” to obtain sutras. However, during the same period, Chinese culture (such as Confucianism and Daoism) had not spread into India. According to historical records (e.g. *The Old Historical Book of the Tang Dynasty*, *The New Historical Book of the Tang Dynasty*, *Biography of Xuan-zang* etc.), the *Dao Te Ching* was translated into Sanskrit by monk Xuan-zang, whether it was being brought to India the records remain silent (Ji Xianlin). However, one thing is for sure that its Sanskrit version did not make any impact on Indian culture (in fact, it has disappeared). This may give rise to a question: during the Han and Tang Dynasties (even later dynasties), why Indian Buddhist Sūtras had been substantially translated into Chinese but Chinese classics and works were not translated into Sanskrit (or other Indian languages)? Let alone to be spread over in India and made any impact on Indian social life?

From a historical point of view, since the 2nd century, monks of India and Western regions had flooded into China year in and year out, many of them spent even spent all their lives in China. It was not until the Three Kingdoms period that Chinese monks and believers began to travel to the western region or India to learn Buddhism, such as Zhu Shixing, Fa Xian, Xuan-zang, Yi Jing and so on, but the number was much less than that of their counterparts. The single goal in the Chinese minds when traveling to India was to obtain Buddhist Sūtras with not the least intention to spread Chinese culture to India. What was the reason of this?

Up to the Sui and Tang Dynasties, our eastern neighbors on the Korean Peninsula, such as Silla, Paekche, Coreia and Japan all sent “monk scholars” to China to study Buddhism, Confucianism or Daoism, even extended to areas of music, dance, architecture, food and so on. Some Chinese books brought back to Korea and Japan by their monks, which may have lost in China, still show traces of Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, literature, history, notes, novels and so on. However, during the same period we did not bring in the Korean and Japanese cultures with equal enthusiasm. What was the reason of this?

However, strange enough, some technologies invented in China, such as the “four inventions” (gunpowder, printing, compass and papermaking) were soon

spread abroad and applied by the West. It turns out, over the past two to three hundred years, Chinese technologies have been left behind the West, which is a phenomenon requiring serious studies.

Historically, when Western culture (Christianity) was introduced into China in the Tang Dynasty, it did not cause any sensation. It was not until the second half of the 16th century that missionaries such as Ruggieri and Matteo Ricci came to China to preach, as part of Western exploration into Chinese market, together brought in Western culture and technologies. In the second half of the 19th century, along with the expiation of Western powers and invasion, Western culture came to China at a more large-scale.

Until the late 16th, the western missionaries came to China, bringing in western religion, philosophy, art, science and technology, as well as introducing Chinese culture to Europe, causing huge sensation in the intellectual circle—Voltaire was then called “Confucius of Europe,” Leibnitz even put it more bluntly, “China has gain our reverence by its admirable ancient morality, philosophy and deism.”

In the first half of the 20th century, Western powers set up many church schools to infuse their science, technology and values into Chinese students' minds. During this period, we learned from the West and received Western civilization whether actively or passively, however we rarely promoted Chinese culture to the West, what was the reason then? Not to mention, in recent years, the influx of publicly and privately founded students has gone to the West to study.

From a historical point of view, basically we have always been taking an approach of “taking in” other than “sending out” in cultural exchanges whether in periods of prosperity (e.g. the Han and Tang Dynasties) or decline (e.g. since the end of the Qing Dynasty). Up to now, apart from a very few sinologists (some of them take an interest in Chinese culture only for the purpose of Western invasion or plunder) who are interested in Chinese culture and have achieved something, most of westerners are ignorant about the essence of Chinese culture and the precious resources that could provide for current social development of all mankind. Their knowledge about China is nothing more than dragon-playing dance, walking on stilts, *yangko* dance or movies like *Raise the Red Lantern*.

Entering the 21st century, I have tried several reasons to explain the phenomena mentioned above, but they all failed to satisfy me. To save other scholars' efforts, I have to do my best to provide another attempt in elaborating the Chinese cultural phenomena. In my view, when China was in its prime time, we did not intend to “export” our culture to India was mainly due to the belief that there were something different in human nature: the Chinese being docile, obedient and lenient ritual-orientated, while foreigners staunch, greedy and strict rule-orientated as He Chengtian (370–447) outlined.

Ironically, at the same time there was a story of Lao-Tzu went abroad to nurturing foreigners. Isn't that contradictory? Specially, during the Northern and Southern Dynasties and later on during the Sui and Tang Dynasties, many Chinese scholars and monks believed that Indian Buddhism was somehow superior to Chinese culture, as Zhang Jing put it, “Imitating something Chinese may still be dim as emperor Wen and emperor Xuan were not so enlightened.” In the Liu Song

Dynasty, when emperor Wen ruled the state he kept the six classics and consulted the Buddhist Sūtras as guidelines in searching the true spirit of nature. During that period, the noble sons of literati whether went out to be monks or became believers at home, prompting a Buddhist frenzy among the populace.

After the Song Dynasty, as Neo-Confucianism rose, it openly criticized but secretly took in Buddhism, integrating Buddhist thought with Confucianism. During this period, though different views persisted on Buddhism, the Chinese generally were quite open about foreign cultures. Even when Chinese went down its low point, they were still positive about something alien, specially in the 20th century certain degree of Westernization had taken place, indicating the Chinese had lost confidence in their own culture.

It may be difficult to reach a common consensus on this extremely complicated issue among scholars. I am here only attempting to give a tentative proposal to inspire you on the issue. Basically, the Chinese are quite positive and consciously about absorbing foreign culture, but passive and unconsciously about spreading out their culture to foreign countries. Surely this has something to do with our national characters. In history, the Chinese were always very tolerant and conclusive to other cultures, but short of entrepreneurial spirit, or we may say the Chinese culture is innate less aggressive.

In other words, perhaps we have the psychology of “Heavenly Kingdom” where it is perfectly justified to draw others to learn from us and not necessary to spread Chinese culture over other places. When our national strength declined, our mentality had gone through a process from blindly arrogance to self-abasement, and I think both of them signify a culture lacking entrepreneurial spirit.

Moreover, the mentality perhaps has been deeply rooted in our social and political system. Since China is essentially a family-orientated agricultural patriarchal autocratic society, pioneering spirit is naturally absent in its idea and system. For example, exiling someone to a remote area as punishment, believing in the ethical code that “one should not travel far when parents are alive” and so on, are all blocks hampering us to actively promote our culture to the outside world. By this I do not mean to advocate cultural expansion, but to support cultural exchange which will benefit both sides.

Entering the 21st century, while accelerating our society to industrialization and informatization, we may also have to transform our attitude towards culture. The Chinese should be more selective when taking in cultures from the outside world, as Lu Xun (1881–1936) said, in choosing products “sent” by foreigners, it has to go through a selective process using our brains, judgment and evaluation. By “selection,” I do not mean to be exclusive, but rather to choose the things we really need from a wider range of Western culture and other cultures. Meanwhile, we should spread over Chinese culture to other countries and nations more consciously with an innovative spirit.

By “entrepreneurial spirit,” it by no means to impose Chinese culture to other countries and nations (which is not desirable nor possible eventually) but to let other peoples understand Chinese culture and Chinese philosophy. Therefore, cultural exchanges should always be two ways; while actively absorbing the

quintessence from all other cultures, we should also introduce the excellence of Chinese culture abroad, so as to jointly promote cultural development of mankind through cultural dialogue and discussion.

The current economic globalization is bound to exert more significant impact on the development of human society. One thing has to be clear that economic globalization can not abolish conflicts between countries and nations; on the contrary, under certain circumstances they may be intensified. Therefore, discussions about cultural conflicts and cultural coexistence are undergone worldwide. Clearly, human fate in the 21st century is hinged on the crossroad of “peaceful coexistence” led by enhancing mutual understanding and tolerance between different cultures or wars caused by cultural isolation and hegemony. Currently, there are two trends detrimental to cultural development in the world, namely cultural hegemonism and cultural tribalism.

Some Western countries are still advocating “West-centered Theory” with the intention of maintaining their hegemonic position, whereas other countries that have just achieved independence or revival have been trapped in cultural tribalism by refusing other cultures in the hope of consolidating their local cultures. In fact, the Chinese cultural circle today is more or less affected by these two ideological trends. Some scholars support that we should indiscriminately “take in” Western culture while denouncing traditional Chinese culture. Other scholars believe that Western culture has come to an impasse and the 21st century will be dominated by Oriental culture (or Chinese culture). In my opinion, these two views are in no way objective and rational in recognizing the trend of cultural development in China and in the world, attempting undesirable approaches in “taking in” or “sending out” cultures.

At present, we should take a new prospective in comprehending the relations between different cultures so as to formulate a innovative, diversified and open cultural outlook. In the 21st century, as the world has been interconnected as a whole by technology and information network, mutual influence and exchanges between different cultures have thus become inevitable. No nation or country's culture can be developed in isolation; rather, it has to be moving forward by way of cultural dialogue and consultation and making the best of the both worlds. In the meantime, after World War II, as the collapse of colonial system and retreat of west-centered theory, more and more nations and countries have called on to promote their cultural quintessence. It is therefore very difficult for super powers to impose their values to other nations and countries. In the general, the cultural development of mankind has to be navigated in line of multiculturalism. Under such circumstance, Chinese culture, for its own sake, has to adopt “taking in” as well as “sending out” approaches, so as to develop more rationally and healthily during the process of interactions with other cultures in the world.

Concerning “sending out” our culture, some may ask: Is there something worthwhile in Chinese culture for us to spread over to other countries? If there is not, will the “sending out” be an empty talk? I may answer this question tentatively, which is by no means a comprehensive one in terms of the contributions the Chinese culture could and has made to human society. Within my capacity, I can

only elaborate the “taking in” and “sending out” approach in dealing with the cultural exchanges by taking some of the beneficial aspects of Confucianism and Daoism as a paradigm.

In a diversified cultural environment of the 21st century, as a member of multicultural international community, Chinese philosophy has to positioning Chinese culture in the world. In the long stream of human history, no doctrine has been perfect, promising to solve all problems as an absolute universal truth. Like other traditional national culture, traditional Chinese culture processes both valuable resources that could be used for the development of human society (perhaps after being given a certain kind of modern annotation) and outdated elements hampering the social development. In no way we can believe that the Chinese culture is a panacea which offers a one-size-fits-all solution to all social problems.

Therefore, during cultural exchanges the Chinese culture should constantly replenish and renew itself through learning from others’ strong points to offset its weakness, so as to keep up to the changing situation of economic globalization and multiculturalism. It is often said that the theme of current human society is “peace and development”. In order to achieve “peaceful coexistence” in the 21st century, it is necessary to properly deal with human relations; broadly speaking, to better handle relations between nations, countries or regions. As mainstream philosophies, Buddhism and Daoism, mutually complement each other, both have played a significant role in China’s history.

Confronted with the theme of “peace and development”, what positive resource the philosophies of Confucianism and Daoism can offer to mankind? I think *ren* (benevolence) of Confucianism and *wu-wei* (inaction) of Daoism have something invaluable in respect. With the sustainable development of human society, it is necessary not only to properly deal with human relations but also relations between human and nature, and Confucian “unity of heaven and man” and Lao-Tzu’s “nature worship” all can contribute to this dimension. Not to mention that Buddhism, especially the Chinese Buddhist sects (such as Tian-tai, Hua-yan and Zen and), also played a significant role in the history of Chinese philosophy.

Confucius initiated the thought of *ren* by answering his student Fan Chi: *Ren* is meant benevolence. On what ground benevolence was based? A sentence in Guodian bamboo slips provides us with a clue for understanding this: “*Dao* begins with emotion instead of being born with emotion,”⁶ it means human *Dao* could be obtained by rationality or by learning. Quoted by the *Doctrine of Golden Mean*, Confucius further elaborated: “Benevolence is the full manifestation of humanity characterized by loving one’s parents.” Mencius also said, “Love your family is *ren*.” As an innate virtue, the feeling of “loving others” did not come from nowhere, but germinated loving the family. However, it should not be confined to the family, but you have to put yourself in the place of another, “extend your respect for the elderly and care for the young to that of other families,” which is easier said than done.

⁶*Guo Dian Bamboo Slips*, Beijing: Cultural Relics Publishing House, 1998.

Furthermore, Confucius advocated the doctrines that “Not doing to others what you would not have them do to you,” “loyalty and tolerance,” “wishing to establish myself will also establish others,” one should be “self-disciplined,” which is the foundation for accomplishing anything, in order to restore rites. To this end, *ren* can be realized only when it is practiced on the basis of self-constraint (*ke ji*). I think it is not a good explanation to divide the doctrine into “self constraint” and “ritual restore” two parallel aspects; in fact, the latter can be realized only when it is based on the former. According to Confucianism, *ren* is an internal virtue of any person (*ren* is an endowed nature), while ritual (*li*) is an external system regulating people's behavior, adjusting human relations, and “the most valuable use of the rites is to achieve harmony.”

Once everyone attains the quality of propriety-orientated self-disciplines, as Confucius put it, then the society will be harmonized, therefore everyone should conscientiously apply *ren* to their daily life. As the desire of being *ren* (benevolent) will always attract *ren* (benevolence), the ethnics based on pursuing *ren* is to be the “supreme applied moderation,” where “supreme” means culminating in philosophical realm of *ren*; “applied moderation” signifies its pertinence to our daily life. Furthermore, apart from the relations between *ren* and man, Mencius explored the relations between *ren* (man) and *tian* (heaven) by saying “He who devotes himself in thorough contemplation will get into the true nature of the man; he who knows the true nature of the man knows heaven”; the sense of compassion embodies *ren* (Gao Zi).

Zhu Xi (1130–1200) put it even more bluntly, “*Ren* in heaven and earth is manifested in booming all creatures; *ren* in humanity is embodied in all virtues for caring for others and benefiting all things.”⁷ “Since Heaven and the man are interrelated, the benevolent nature in Heaven will inevitably be infused in human nature.” It is precisely on this moral metaphysic ground that Confucian *ren* established. It is said in *Doctrine of the Golden Mean*, “Sincerity is the *Dao* of Heaven. To think how to be sincere is the *Dao* of man.” Confucian theory of *ren* based on the ontological unity of human beings and the myriad things, may not solve all today's societal problems, but as a moral metaphysic discipline, it certainly provides some meaningful guidelines for harmonizing human relations.

Lao-Tzu, the founder of Daoism had a profound idea of “inaction,” which could contribute to the handling of human relations. Since all kinds of conflicts in today's world are caused by greedy pursuit of power and money. The world disorder is rooted in the expansion and exploitation of natural resources of undeveloped countries by powerful developed countries. The “inaction” is supported by less voracity and desire, which is surely not meaningless.

According to Lao-Tzu, one should not plunder something of others or satisfy one's desire at cost of others. The key to rule a state is to let people live and work in peace and contentment, rehabilitate, “Governing a great state is like cooking delicate small fish (should not to disturb it all the time).” In the early Han Dynasty, the

⁷*Anthology of Zhu Xi* (vol. 67).

Rule of Wen and Jing was quiet and gentle, resulting in a prosperous society. Therefore as a sage has said, “I will do nothing purposely, and the people will transform themselves; I will be fond of keeping constant, and the people will get right themselves; I will not be bothered about engaging in anything, and the people will become worthy naturally; I will manifest no desire, and the people will reap simplicity.”⁸ I think these words may still be fit to modern society after some modification.

In my view, this passage of Lao-Tzu could be understood in this way: within a country, the common people are less interfered the peaceful society will become; their speech and behavior are less controlled the community is more likely to be on the right track; the lives of the populace are less disturbed they will live more comfortably. Internationally, the more interference to other countries’ affairs, the world will be more likely in turmoil; the more threat of force is resorted, the less chance for the world peace to prevail; the more exploitation of the powerful countries engaged in the name of assistance, the poorer the weak countries become.

In a country, as the rulers’ insatiable avaricious desire expands, it will naturally result in rampant corruption and deteriorated social morality. In the world, as the developed countries’ ambition inflates, the world will increasingly become an immoral place. In this sense, I think “inaction” could be a wake-up call for state rulers and world leaders, providing them with the alternative governing principles of “self-transformation,” “self-correction,” “self-enrichment,” and “self-simplification.” In fact, the idea of “govern by noninterference” can be found everywhere in *Lao-Tzu*. The question will then be asked is: how could sage rulers achieve this (i.e. by keeping governmental organization and regulation to a minimum)? The answer offered by Lao-Tzu is “The sage has no invariable mind of his own; he makes the mind of the people his mind.”⁹ That is to say good leaders are those who do nothing but follow the people’s desire instead of his own.

This probably illustrates the essence of Lao-Tzu: Rulers must follow the common sense of their people, which is in line of nature. Should the leaders reign in this way, the common people would not feel pressured and hampered, but instead they would support them as leaders. As Lao-Tzu put it, “In a way, though the ruler rises above the people, they do not feel oppressed; when he stands before the people, they do not feel hindered. So his popularity soars all over the place.” It has normally been the case that the famine people suffered was usually caused by their heavy tax burden, and the difficulties rulers confronted were by and large the consequence of too much interference. The rulers’ severe plunder would more often than not result in people’s rebelling even at the risk of their own lives.

As Lao-Tzu said, “When rulers take grain so that they may feast, and their people starve; when rulers behave in a way that only serves their own interests, the ruled become rebellious; when rulers live extravagantly, their people fight back and

⁸*Lao-Tzu* (Chap. 57).

⁹*Ibid* (Chap. 49).

no longer fear death.”¹⁰ And to achieve this, rulers must diminish their ambition and reduce their own desire.¹¹ Therefore, Lao-Tzu believed that “There is no guilt greater than following desire; no calamity greater than to be discontented with one’s quota. Therefore one who is content with what has obtained is to constantly satisfy all his needs.”¹²

As Russell notes in his *A History of Western Philosophy*, “... the philosophy of Descartes ... brought to completion, or very nearly to completion, the dualism of mind and matter which began with Plato and was developed, largely for religious reasons, by Christian philosophy ... the Cartesian system presents two parallel but independent worlds, that of mind and that of matter, each of which can be studied without reference to the other.”¹³ Cheng Yi (1033–1107) theorized that “the intrinsic and extrinsic come from the same source;” “in heaven it is destiny, in man it is character, and it is the heart that commands the body. They are actually one and the same.”¹⁴ According to Confucian philosophy, heaven and man are not divided, let alone contrary to one another externally; it cannot study one and leave out to another.

Confucius said, “It is man who carries forward the *Dao* and not the opposite.” Namely, “the heavenly *Dao* is manifested human.” Zhu Xi (1130–1200) had this to say, “Since heaven has a biological heart man also has a heart of benevolence;” “Heaven is man, and man is heaven. The beginning of man is derived from heaven. Since this man was born, heaven rests in him;” “The *Dao* of heaven is manifested in man;” “A saint ... is integrated with heaven.”¹⁵ If there was no man there would be no container to hold “heaven” which would lose its rationality and purpose, and consequently how could the dynamism of nature be reflected on earth? Therefore, setting man’s mind for heaven and earth has to be incorporated with human nature. The way we approach the relations between heaven and man is different from that of the West, which is by no mean to downgrade the value of Western culture.

Surely, the value of Western culture has been widely recognized and exerted great influence on human society and advanced its development. However, towards the end of 20th century, the flaws Western philosophy, largely related to its “dichotomy of heaven and man,” has become more apparent. Fortunately this point has been realized by many scholars both in the East and West. In 1992, for instance, 1575 scientists around the world issued a report titled *The Warning of Scientists to Humanity*, it says “Human beings and nature are on courses conflicting with one another.” As a remedy to the western cultural flaws, the Chinese idea of “unity of heaven and man” will, in my view, provide food for thought very positively concerning future development of human society.

¹⁰Ibid (Chap. 75).

¹¹Ibid (Chap. 19).

¹²Ibid (Chap. 46).

¹³Russell, Bertrand. *A History of Western Philosophy*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972.

¹⁴Cheng Yi, *Posthumous Papers* (Vol.18).

¹⁵Zhu Xi, *Selections from Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi*.

What the Confucian view on “the unity of heaven and man?” There is a passage of Confucius’ disciple Zi Gong in the *Analects*: “I have heard a lot about my master’s talking on writing, but none about the relations between emotion and the *Dao* of heaven.” Rarely it is in *The Analects* concerning issue, but it cannot be said that there is no mention of the relations.¹⁶ Emotion is concerned about human nature, the *Dao* of heaven is to explore the law of nature, namely the law of universe. The relation of “emotion and the *Dao* of heaven” is thus the issue of “the unity of heaven and man.”

Confucius said, “By nature, men are quite alike; by practice, they become wide apart,” and the later Guodian bamboo slips (for writing in ancient China) had footnoted the passage: “A sage or man of medium talent or even below is born in identical nature; their later living environments make difference.” In other words, there is no much difference in human nature originally, only the circumstances they late lived differentiate one another. Here, Confucius did not mention neither “good” or “evil” of human nature, just like a blank sheet, only later Confucians provided various elucidations of human nature. The question then will be: “Where does human nature come from?”

As it is said in the *Doctrine of the Mean*, “Human nature is endowed with heaven,” this is also annotated by the Guodian bamboo slips, “Nature is determined by destiny which is the mandate descended from heaven,” which means there is a compelling power transcended human ability. Among various views of ancient Chinese on heaven, Confucius and Mencius were of prominence: “As a supreme power surpassed that of man, heaven is the mandate dominated human life; the proper way for a man to face up the heavenly mandate is to preserve his humanity, cultivate his benevolent nature. In that way, disregard his lifespan he endowed with heaven.” When Confucius said, “At the age of fifty, I fully realized my destiny revealed from heaven,” which means he had fully possessed his nature from heaven according to heavenly rules.

It is said in Guodian bamboo slips, “Knowing heaven and man then we can follow the *Dao*; knowing the *Dao* then we can know the fate.” It means that by mastering the law of the universe and society (which is called the *Dao*) then they can have the power for their own destiny. “*The Book of Changes* thus focuses on the *Dao* of heaven and man,” namely is to explore the unity of heaven and man. Stressing the importance of the heart, Wang Yangming (1472–1529) said, “Since the Han Dynasty, in tracing down the *Dao*, men of noble character have been concerning the historical ruins, and not knowing the sage learning is actually the essence of the *Dao* of man. Only Zhou Dunyi formulated the theory of Tai Chi, probing into the source of the unity of heaven and man, he therefore obtained the truth the *Dao* of heaven—the deity becomes its nature which is manifested in human’s daily practice following the natural and inevitable change of Yin and Yang.

¹⁶Confucius, *The Analects*, (Chap. 8).

This passage of Wang Fuzhi serves as a good illustration in understanding the Confucian concept of “the unity of heaven and man;” “The heart is heaven which upholds heaven, earth and all things;” “Man is actually one with heaven, earth and all things;” “The heart has no intrinsic but takes the response of heaven, earth, and all things as the intrinsic.” In this way, the Confucian thought of “the unity of heaven and earth” had been endowed with philosophical meaning. The combination of the *Dao* of man and the *Dao* of heaven, characterized by the Confucian philosophy, a philosophical pattern different from the Western one, can certainly make contribution in dealing with the relations between man and nature.

As early as two thousand years ago, viewing from a harmonious prospective universal law, the great Chinese philosopher Lao-Tzu put forward the theory of “Man follows earth, earth follows heaven, heaven follows the *Dao* and the *Dao* follows nature,” which reveals a universal law innate in nature for us to abide by. Therefore, “the sage can only assist the law of nature and by no means to replace it.”¹⁷ We can only follow nature then can be nature, however, in Lao-Tzu’s eyes, man often disobeys nature.

Wherever disobeying nature, retaliation will catch up. As Lao-Tzu put it, since the universal law is natural and without action, never issuing orders to myriad things on earth, we should be more conscientious in not disturbing nature. As a later generation philosopher, Chuang-Tzu raised the issue of “universal harmony,” meaning that since there are innate perfect harmonious relations among everything on earth, we should follow its way to behavior abide by the *Dao* of heaven and “five virtues” of natural law.

Therefore, *Chuang-Tzu* elaborated the issue with a special emphasis on following nature: only by obeying nature can receive its favor. He believed that the ancient time was an age where nature and man were harmoniously integrated; people pursued nothing except letting nature take its course. There is a story in the “King of Ying” of *Chuang-Tzu*:

There was a King called Shu in South Sea and King called Hu in North Sea and King called Hundun in the center. When Hundun met Shu and Hu in the center with great delight, moved by his hospitality, the other two kings proposed: ‘since everyone has seven apertures in the head and you don’t, let’s try to make them.’ They then started digging holes on his face day in and day out. However, on the seventh day, Hundun died.

While this story may seem a bit extreme, but the implications revealed is very profound. As part of nature, man should not relentlessly exploit nature and treat it as something inanimate. Confronted with the current situation where natural resources have been wasted, ozone layer thinned, oceans poisoned, environment polluted, threatening the survival of mankind. Under such circumstances, a theory of “natural worship” is surely worth attention.

The reason why people should not destroy nature, is mainly based on the idea of “the *Dao* is inherited in nature.” As a fundamental concept, the *Dao* to Lao-Tzu is nameless and shapeless but nourishes everything. Chuang-Tzu has further

¹⁷Lao-Tzu (Chap. 64).

developed the concept, believing that the *Dao* not only invisible but accomplishes everything. To him, the *Dao* is not something concrete but the basis and noumenon transcending myriad things between heaven and earth. As Lao-Tzu said, “the *Dao* that can be told of is not the constant *Dao*,” and “the *Dao* is the mother figure of all things under the sun” and “the common source of all nature.” Chuang-Tzu also pointed out, “the great *Dao* is never be named but operated in everything;” “since it is the source of nature, everything gains dynamism and prospers when living in it but dies and fails when losing it.” (“Fishman” of *Chuang-Tzu*)

It is precisely because the *Dao* is nameless and shapeless, it can be ubiquitous in the universe and become the “doorway whence issuing all secret essences.” And in Chuang-Tzu’s words, “the *Dao* is so prevalent that no one can avoid it.” The view of integrating the *Dao* and entity, noumenon and utility forms the foundation. In this prospective, there are overlaps between Daoism and Confucianism in terms of thinking patterns, navigating people to follow the *Dao*, which is based on the principle of “Doing nothing and everything is done.” Therefore people in governments should adore “nature-worship” and practice “governing by noninterference.”

Following the theory of “complying with nature,” Lao-Tzu’s doctrine is philosophical ontology founded on the transcendent *Dao*, which also lay ground for his cosmology: “The *Dao* generated one; one generated two; two generated three. The three then generated myriad things. All things leave behind them *yin* (the obscurity) and go forward to embrace *yang* (the brightness).”¹⁸ Although there always different interpretations on the passage, it is widely accepted that Lao-Tzu had realized the transforming process from simplicity to complication where the universe was formulated.

In Lao-Tzu’s view, the primitive state of the universe was a harmonious entity, which has been polarized and complicated only because it is increasingly deviated from the *Dao*, human beings therefore need to return to their root, which is the *Dao* of the original state, so as to eliminate the “man-made” social flaws. The Daoist cosmology is the philosophical foundation for man to follow nature, therefore the ontology and cosmology of Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu have made a great impact on Chinese philosophy. In study Daoist thought, attention should be paid to the rational construction of our current philosophy.

Judging from the above analyses, perhaps we may say that Confucianism is a humanism based on moral cultivation and career dedication, which could be used to promote people’s morale in making contribution to society; Daoism is a naturalism founded in a purified heart and reduced desire, which inspires people to return to their original nature and contribute to society as well. Therefore, either Confucian “benevolence” or Daoist “inaction,” together with their thinking mode of “the unity of heaven and man,” are all beneficial to today’s human society. In other words, the Chinese culture can not only play a significant role in adjusting “people to people” and “people to nature” relations, but also be very meaningful in the development of

¹⁸Lao-Tzu (Chap. 42).

philosophy in the 21st century in terms of thinking pattern and metaphysical studies.

However, if Confucian thought is exaggerated its humanism may go to the extreme of “pan-moralism;” if Daoist thought is overemphasized, its naturalism may result in doing nothing indiscriminately. By the same token, if Chinese philosophers do not seriously soak up the knowledge-based and logic analytical Western spirit, introspecting the weakness of our philosophy by taking a reference of Western philosophy as “another prospective,” it would be impossible to overcome the intuition of Chinese philosophy and to lift it up to a higher level. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary to entrust Confucian thought and Daoist ideas new meanings and reposition them as a modern philosophy.

In order for the Chinese culture to be in the forefront of mankind culture in the 21st century, we must, while giving full play to its inner dynamism, eliminate the elements that have been obsolete and misleading, and fully take advantage of the merits of other cultures, so as to renew our culture on a constant and daily basis to meet the requirements of modern social development. Should all this be done, the Chinese culture will surely make great contribution to the theme of “peace and development” and the philosophical issues concerning mankind, which is also the true blessing to the Chinese nation.

At the same time, under the current international situation, the Chinese culture with a history of five thousand years, should also actively fulfill its duty by sending out its outstanding culture, which will compose a harmonious symphony with fabulous cultures of other countries and nations in the 21st century.

Why should we discuss the issues of “take-in-ism” and “sending-out-ism” in the “General Preface” of *The Impact of Western Philosophy on Chinese Philosophy in the 20th Century*? I think this reminds us that from now on we should not only continuously introduce Western philosophy to China, but also be able to approach it from Chinese philosophical perspective. Only in this way can we better value and carry forward the essence of Chinese philosophy based on constant absorbing of Western philosophy.

6.3 Several Issues Requiring Clarifications

(1) Ever since Western philosophy was introduced into China in the 20th century, a huge impact was formed on the Chinese academic culture, leading it enter a cultural transitional period much more profound than the previous one when Indian Buddhism spread to China. During a cultural transitional period, multicultural academic cultures would normally be developed; in fact it was precisely due to the combined impetus of radicalism, reformism and conservatism that drove the cultural development. For a complicated situation as such there is no way to impose an evaluation by a dogmatic judgment or external ideological standard if a healthy academic development is expected.

That is to say, in order to carry out reasonable and realistic analyses we should provide objective and impartial comments on the various functions of these three different cultural forces. We can also realize that during a cultural transitional period, radicalism may play an iconoclastic role to reform tradition and create a new situation in the development of culture; however, it may become ultra-leftism of totally denying tradition should it shift at the extreme end.

Conservatism prevents interruption of a tradition, making the continuation of national culture possible. However, if conservatism is concealed in an outdated tradition, it may become narrow nationalism and populism. Reformism, on the other hand, can provide much food for thought and new dimensions for exploring cultural development, it may also become realism if it inflates itself and being out of touch with reality. Therefore, specific, historical and realistic analyses are required.

In the meantime, we have to realize that cultural transition is by no means a short period. From the Spring and Autumn period to the Western Han Dynasty, it took three to four hundred years for Confucianism to become an orthodox. The second transitional period—from the Wei and Jin Dynasties to the Sui and Tang Dynasties—also underwent three to four hundred years. The most recent one—starting from the end of 19th century to now, just little more than a hundred years, may also have a quite long period of time to go in terms of forming a new national cultural tradition that is in line with the trend of cultural development in the world.

Here is another questions requiring answer as some scholars have put it: Isn't it too simplified and politicized to divide Chinese academic circle into radicalism, reformism and conservatism? Indeed, it was a very diversified situation in China's academic field during the 20th century. Influential academic figures, if analyzed case by case, differences will be found from one to another.

For example, in the 1930s Ye Qing and Ai Siqu all belonged to radicalism but they were quite different. In the reformism camp, Zhang Dongsun was deeply influenced by Neo-Kantianism, while Jin Yuelin was basically an analytical philosopher. Both as conservatives, Liang Shuming and Xiong Shili held different views on Buddhism and so on. If we strictly stick to this kind of mentality in carrying out research, there would be no way for us to category scholars in the academic circle. Their basic inclinations to the issue of tradition versus modernity have therefore to be taken as reference for judgment.

Also, the thought orientation of a well-known scholar may shift from time to time. Scholars such as Hu Shih, the first person who introduced Western reformism into China, became a conservative in his later life, we nevertheless still treat him as a typical early reformist since his profound influence on the cultural development of China and had faded out when he was really conservative.

Concerning the connection between people's political references and radicalism, liberalism and conservatism, I think they are separate issues and not necessarily interrelated. In the first half of the 20th century, for instance, radicals, reformists and conservatives were all opposed National Party's dictatorship and bureaucratic corruption, and in the early 1950s scholars of different academic orientations approved socialist system. However, their political attitudes shifted somewhat in the

late 1950s, which had little to do with their academic cultural inclination. All this are historical facts.

This is the reason why I have repeatedly emphasized scholars' attitudes toward tradition and modernity, which should be used as the benchmark to classify the subjects. And classification of research enables us to penetrate into the essence of phenomena.

While analyzing individuality (specialty) is important, revealing commonality may sometimes be equally important if not more so. Surely, every individual is different among the subjects of our research, however, in terms of paradigm set for differentiation (such as the attitudes toward "tradition" and "modernity"), certainly something could be found in common. In this sense, classification of Chinese academic circle in the 20th century is definitely necessary.

(2) Concerning the debate on "the ancient versus modernity and China versus the West" over the past hundred years, there have been two different views, namely any debate on "China versus the West" is essentially related to the issue of "ancient versus modernity," proposed mostly by the school of wholesale-Westernization, while others, mostly the school of nationalism, believed not. At the time of the debate, the two issues were in fact interrelated.

To be more specific, the issue of whether to adopt "science and democracy," whether the doctrine of "three obediences and four virtues" are fit to modern society and whether it is feasible to maintain the ritual system affiliated with autocratic system, all these issues are still related to the debate over "the ancient versus modernity" or whether we should move out of the "pre-modern society." However, not all issues of "China versus the West" are connected with the topic of "the ancient versus modernity," such as Confucius' "fate and the heavenly *Dao*," "unity of heaven and man," "coordinating knowledge and action," "virtue surpasses position," "cherishing harmony," "diversity in harmony" and so on, are essentially immanent transcendences of individual consciousness, which belong to our national culture that can be renewed on a daily basis, regardless of the passage of time or the differences compared with Western culture.

We believe that our national culture can play a special role in the general trend of cultural development in the world is largely attributed to these profound thoughts and their elucidations during different historical periods. Given the close interrelations of today's world, the multicultural process of the world culture can only be moving forward under the "global consciousness" which concerns commonalities of cultural development in relation to diversified individual cultures. Currently, any national cultural development has to embody the combination of commonality and specialty, modernity and national characteristics, and the controversies centered around "the ancient versus modernity and China versus the West" over the past hundred years were mainly caused by the improper handling of these issues.

Entering the 21st century, although the debate over "the ancient versus modernity and China versus the West" may still remain, we should nevertheless come out of this dilemma, turning the situation around for a new orientation of Chinese cultural development by absorbing the essence of Western cultures and all other national cultures.

(3) Over the past hundred years of China's cultural development, the debate over "the ancient versus modernity and China versus the West" had often taken place as part of "enlightenment," "national salvation" or "academics" respectively, with one overwhelming or hampering the other; learning for learning's sake, for example, has been deemed as having negative effect on social progression. All this to my mind, have looked at only one side of the coin; in fact, a diversified components are needed to develop Chinese academic culture, should it be "enlightenment," "national salvation," "learning for learning's sake," or "art for art's sake."

Since ancient times, Chinese intellectuals have always been obliged to take the social and historical responsibilities for their nation and culture, whether they are marginalized or centralized, so long it was good to the national culture or philosophy they would take a positive approach. Especially during a period of relative social stability, "learning for learning's sake" may enable scholars to get away from current utilitarian calculus and penetrate into the philosophical issue of ultimate concerns of human fate. These seemingly unrealistic but metaphysically realistic questions are therefore also worthy to pay our attention.

There are something regrettable to this fourteen volume of *A History of Western Philosophy Spreading to the East in the 20th Century* edited by Chinese Culture Academy and Philosophy and Culture Institute, such as Greek Philosophy in China and *The 18th Century French Philosophy in China* and so on have not been included, mainly due to lack of competent author not the due attention. The good thing is these areas have been generally covered in the first volume.

This fourteen volume collected works together with their related references are made possible during such short period of time thanks to the efforts of more than twenty scholars and the staff of the Capital University Press. As an organizer, I express my deep gratitude to them.

Chapter 7

Repositioning Confucianism in a New “Axial Age”

The global culture will be greatly affected by the globalized economy, which will not eliminate but may intensify the conflict between countries and nations, concerning which worldwide discussion on both cultural conflict and co-existence has been opening up. The fate of mankind in the 21st century will rest on the probability of peace as a result of mutual understanding and tolerance between different cultures, or of wars caused by separation and hegemony.

Since the end of World War II, with the collapse of the colonial system and the fading away of Occidentalism, cultural exchange between nations, countries and regions has become more frequent, integrating the world as a whole. However, two trends seem to be harmful in this regard: sticking to West-centrism to safeguard their own interest or tradition, continuously imposing their values on other nations and countries and holding onto Occidentalism. Concurrently, there is also a xenophobic trend promoted by nations that have achieved independence or rejuvenation, attempting to trace their roots back in history and consolidating their local culture as tribalism. Currently, how to deal properly with cultural hegemonism and tribalism has caught our attention to avoid widespread confrontation. Under such circumstances, we must oppose both trends.

The best way to oppose cultural hegemonism is to accept multiculturalism by fully acknowledging and respecting various civilizations, nations, communities, as well as individual diversity and heterogeneity. In dealing with cultural tribalism, one has to face up to the reality that cultural development worldwide has been based on cultural exchanges and mutual influence among nations over the past centuries, in such a way that narrow-minded views could be eliminated and a new pattern of multiculturalism be established from a refreshed prospect of intercultural relationships.

Under the new circumstances, we should approach different cultural relations from a new prospective as well in order to form a new multicultural landscape.

As the German philosopher Karl Jaspers (1883–1969) put forward the concept of *Achsenzeit*, literally “Axis Time” but usually translated as “Axial Age,” we may say that in some sense we are experiencing a new Axial Age, which is intrinsically

different from the previous one. It is predicted that within a foreseeable period, along with the economic development of different countries and nations, distinctive world cultures will also form; that economic globalization in fact paves the way for multicultural development.

In line with this trend of cultural development, a multicultural environment will emerge as a result of globalization. In the 21st century, it is quite possible that several important cultural zones will be formed, namely European and North American culture, East Asian culture, South Asian culture, Middle-Eastern and North African culture (Islamic culture), as well as Diaspora cultures, constituting the dynamism of cultural development in the world.

As part of this multicultural world, Chinese culture (itself a multicultural entity but typically Confucian) has to reposition itself globally. Taking a global view, just as no doctrine is universally applicable no single solution can solve all the problems of the world. A philosophy without self-justification cannot be truly valid; however, a truly self-justified philosophy may be entirely invalid. The most fruitful schools of philosophy contain obvious contradictions, which ensure them only partial truth.

Like all other great ideas in the world, Confucianism has both positive and negative sides—providing valuable resources for solving current social problems while holding back some aspects of social development. We should accept that Confucianism is not a panacea for all social problems; instead, it ought to learn from others’ strong points to offset its own weaknesses, so as to adapt to the new situation of economic globalization and multiculturalism.

The current theme of human society is believed to be “peace and development,” which means to properly handle human relations to achieve “peaceful coexistence,” and the Confucian concepts of *ren* (benevolence) and “the unity of man and heaven” can provide ample valuable resources for smoothing human touch as well as harmonizing relations between man and nature.

Confucius initiated the idea of *ren* by answering his student Fan Chi: by *ren* is meant benevolence. Quoted in the *Doctrine of the Mean*, Confucius further elaborated: “Benevolence is the full manifestation of humanity characterized by loving one’s parents.” Mencius also said, “Loving your family is *ren*.”¹ As an innate virtue, the feeling of “loving others” did not come from nowhere, but germinated in loving the family. However, it should not be confined to the family, so you have to put yourself in the shoes of others, “extend your respect for the elderly and care for the young to that of other families,” which is easier said than done.

Following Confucian doctrines (such as “Not doing to others what you would not have them do to you,” “loyalty and tolerance,” “wishing to establish oneself will also establish others”), one should be “self-disciplined,” which is the foundation for accomplishing anything, in order to restore the proper rites. To this end, *ren* can be realized only when it is practiced on the basis of self-constraint (*ke ji*).

According to Confucianism, *ren* is an internal virtue of any person (*ren* is an endowed nature), while ritual (*li*) is an external system regulating people’s

¹Mencius (Gao Zi II).

behavior, adjusting human relations. As Confucius argued, “the most valuable use of the rites is to achieve harmony;” “the practice of *ren* has to be motivated by self, how can that be done by others?” “How can a man observe the *li* (rites/rituals) if he is not *ren* (benevolent)?” which clearly defined the relations between *ren* and *li*. Once everyone attains the quality of propriety-orientated self-disciplines, as Confucius put it, then society will be harmonized, therefore everyone should conscientiously apply *ren* in their daily lives.

As the desire to be *ren* (benevolent) will always attract *ren* (benevolence), the ethics based on pursuing *ren* must be “applied supreme moderation”, where “supreme moderation” means culminating in the philosophical realm of *ren* and “applied” signifies its pertinence to our daily lives.

Furthermore, Mencius explored the relations between *ren* (man) and *tian* (heaven) by saying, “He who devotes himself to thorough contemplation will penetrate the true nature of man; he who knows the true nature of man knows heaven;” the sense of compassion embodies *ren*.²

Zhu Xi (1130–1200) put it even more bluntly, “*Ren* in heaven is manifested in all creatures; *ren* in humanity is embodied in all virtues of caring for others and benefiting all things. Since Heaven and man are interrelated, the benevolent nature of Heaven will inevitably be infused into human nature. It is precisely on this moral metaphysical base that Confucian *ren* was established. *The Doctrine of the Mean* states that “Sincerity is the *Dao* of Heaven. To think how to be sincere is the *Dao* of man.”³ The Confucian theory of *ren* based on the ontological unity of human beings and the myriad things, may not solve all of today’s societal problems, but as a moral metaphysical discipline, it certainly provides some meaningful guidelines for harmonizing human relations.

An unearthed Guodian bamboo slips may assist us to get a better idea of Confucian moral metaphysics, such as *Human Nature is Determined by Heavenly Fate*: “The *Dao* begins with emotion and emotion entails human nature,” “Human nature is determined by fate, which is descended from Heaven.”⁴ Clearly, it is believed that heavenly mandate rules human passions; so-called fate is nothing more than heavenly domination and determination.

This provides us with a clue that human nature, emotions, fate and heaven are essential concepts. “The *Dao* begins with emotion instead of being born with emotion” means human *dao* could be obtained either by rationality or by learning. Those who are masters of human nature can manipulate their emotions, and these who know *li* (rites) can regulate their emotions according to the moral codes. Therefore *li* and human emotions are closely bound up and a moral person should start with emotion but end up with *li*. Also, the assertion that “The *Dao* begins with emotion” was based on the reality that ancient China was a family-orientated patriarchal society where kinship was the foundation for maintaining family bonds.

²Ibid.

³Zhu Xi, *Selections from Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi*.

⁴*Guodian Bamboo Slips*, Beijing: Cultural Relics Publishing House, 1988.

Therefore, we can deduce that Confucianism in the pre-Qin period was really founded on this basis. The *Analects* record nothing in writing about “emotion,” but the way one behaved oneself depicted well one’s affections, such as when Yan Hui, one of whose best students died, Confucius mourned despairingly.

Another example was when Confucius heard the music of Shao, in the state of Qi, he was so enchanted that he lost his appetite for meat for 3 months—never thinking a piece of music could be so beautiful. However, “the *Dao* begins with emotion” was based on Confucius’ idea of *ren*, namely “benevolence.” In his own words, “*Ren* means loving people and priority should be given to your relatives;” “extending the idea of filial piety, all people under the sun will be favored;” “love your father first, then you can love others and *ren* will naturally follow.” All these could be seen as following on from Confucius’ own utterances.

In *Mencius*, it also seems no such word as “emotion” can be found, but his “four beginnings,” especially “the milk of human kindness,” are full of emotions: “When a man witnesses a child falling down a well, he will naturally feel something in his heart to give a hand, which is not caused by the acquaintance he may have with the child’s parents, nor his desire to gain praise from his neighbors, nor his fear of getting a bad name if he doesn’t.” In *Mencius*’ view, it is the natural response of a man.

The correlation between human nature and emotions was also discussed in classical works of the pre-Qin period. For instance, *Xun Zi* writes that “Emotions of liking, disliking, anger, sadness and cheerfulness are all part of human nature.” But during this period, nature and emotions were mixed up as one—“The *qi* of disliking, anger, sadness and grievance are thought to be human nature” (in this context, *qi* refers to the “*qi* of blood”, or vigor of blood).⁵

However, it might also be said that *Xun Zi* started to realize the differences between human nature and emotions. In *On Heaven*, for example, he pointed out, “Liking, disliking, cheerfulness, anger, sadness, happiness are different emotions hidden by ‘human nature.’” Similarly, *The Book of Rites* states “A person is born static of heavenly nature, only to become dynamic when moved by feelings; desires produce emotions.” *Dong Zhongshu* responded to Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty, “Emotions are the product of aspiration.”

“Static nature and drastic emotion” were a prevalent view (or at least one view) in the pre-Qin period. As is said in *Emotions Come out of Fate*: “The *qi* of joyfulness and melancholy are emotions, which are sensed and manifested externally. Emotions are stirred up by myriad things.” This is to say that human nature is stimulated by external things, and then expressed as emotion or desire; “nature” is preserved inwardly while “emotion” flows out visibly—another way of stating the belief in “static nature and drastic emotion.” Therefore, it is pointed out in *The Doctrine of the Mean*: When the emotions of liking, anger, sadness or cheerfulness are properly contained, this is called ‘the mean’; When they are relieved in a balanced way, they are called ‘harmony.’ The mean is the root of everything on earth and harmony is the greatest way under the sun. When “the mean” and

⁵Zhu Xi, *Selections from Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi*.

“harmony” are achieved, everything is appropriately located, and will propagate and boom. As the renowned Confucian Zhu Xi pointed out, “By ‘the root of all’ is meant the fundamental law of the universe and the origin of the *Dao*, which determines the nature of things underpinning evolution on earth from ancient times up to now. This demonstrates that human nature and emotions are constantly manipulated by the *Dao*.”

Confucian ontology attributes human nature and emotions to heavenly fate, which is dominant, justified and inclusive. The relations between heaven and man clarify metaphysically that “human nature is determined by fate.” The essence of Confucian views on heaven has been consistent over the past thousands of years despite certain slight variations.

In Confucianism, everything is endowed by heaven. As Mencius pointed out, “Everything will prosper if it follows the law of heaven, or else it will perish.” In the Song Dynasty, Neo-Confucianism explicated Heaven as *li*: the nature of heaven is embodied in *li*. Consequently, the term *tian li* or “heavenly-*li*” was produced, signifying the integrated nature of the combination of heaven and *li*. As Zhu Xi put it, “Heaven has its present state precisely because of *li*; without *li* it wouldn’t be heaven as such since the two are uniquely incorporated.” Therefore, “standing in awe of *li* could be seen as reverence for Heaven.”

In this sense, from the point of view of Confucianism, Heaven is forever sacred and superb. As Zhu Xi pointed out, “A divinity is called ‘fate’ in heaven and ‘human nature’ when it is embodied in man and manifested as emotions. The way it defines things couldn’t be more obvious.” Therefore, “multifaceted heaven could be viewed in this way: *li* functions as its substance in the application of fate, the perceived spirit of human nature, and the human manifestation of emotions.” Heaven and man in this have been organically united to form Confucian ontology.

As Russell notes in his *A History of Western Philosophy*, “... the philosophy of Descartes ... brought to completion, or very nearly to completion, the dualism of mind and matter which began with Plato and was developed, largely for religious reasons, by Christian philosophy ... the Cartesian system presents two parallel but independent worlds, that of mind and that of matter, each of which can be studied without reference to the other.”⁶

Differently from Western philosophy, the Confucian view is that one cannot thoroughly understand heaven (nor the way of heaven) without studying man (the way of man) and vice versa, which is based on the Confucian ideology of the unity of heaven and man. Cheng Yi (1033–1107), a well-known Confucian of the Song Dynasty, asked “Is there anyone who knows the way of man but doesn’t know the way of heaven? The *Dao* (the way) is actually an integrated one—who says that the way of man and the way of heaven are different entities?” Confucian said, “The *Dao* is manifested through man and not vice versa,” and the same can be said about the way of heaven. Zhu Xi elaborated further: man and heaven cannot be separated from one another, since man originated from heaven, and heaven in turn is

⁶Russell, Bertrand. *A History of Western Philosophy*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972.

manifested through man. Accordingly, without man heaven would lose its essence and there would be no way to manifest rationality and to beg heaven for the fate of people, since man and heaven cannot be divided. In saying this, we not mean to devalue the views of western culture on man and heaven which are full of dichotomies. Western culture has certainly contributed much to the development of human society over the past two or three centuries, nevertheless its shortcomings have also become apparent, and this perhaps has something to do with its views on heaven-man relations.

This point has been realized by many scholars in both the East and West. In 1992, for instance, 1575 scientists from around the world issued a report entitled *The Warning of Scientists to Humanity*, which states that "Human beings and nature are on courses conflicting with one another." As a remedy for western cultural flaws, the Chinese idea of "the unity of heaven and man" will, in my view, provide very positive food for thought concerning the future development of human society.

An understanding of the Confucian theory of "the unity of heaven and man" can be found in Confucius' fragmentary utterances, such as "A gentleman's writings can be obtained and read; but human nature and heavenly *Dao* cannot be physically sensed." While human nature concerns self-examination, heavenly *Dao* is about the laws of the universe, and the relations of the two thus constitute "the unity of man and heaven."

Confucius also said, "By nature, men are quite alike; but in practice, they become wide apart," and later slips of bamboo (for writing in ancient China) footnoted this passage with "A sage or man of medium talent or even below are born with identical nature; their later living environments differentiate them." In this regard, Confucius himself did not distinguish between benevolence and viciousness in human beings, merely likening nature to a piece of blank paper. It was only later on that descendant Confucians differentiated humans by their 'nurture.'

Where does human nature come from? According to the *Doctrine of the Mean*, "heaven endows human nature," and this is also annotated by the later bamboo slips: "Nature is determined by destiny which is the mandate descended from heaven," which means there is a compelling power that transcends human ability.

Among various views of ancient Chinese on heaven, those of Confucius and Mencius were most prominent: "As a supreme power surpassing that of man, heaven is the mandate dominating human life; the proper way for a man to face up to the heavenly mandate is to preserve his humanity, cultivate his benevolent nature and so to disregard the lifespan he was endowed by heaven." When Confucius said, "At the age of fifty, I fully realized my destiny revealed from heaven," he meant he had fully owned his nature from heaven according to heavenly rules.

The concept of "the unity of heaven and man" has always been part of fundamental Confucian principles, which hold that "He who knows heaven knows man; he who knows man knows the *Dao*; only then it is possible for him to know the mandate of heaven." This means that once we know the law of heaven (the universe), we can probe into the law of man (society), and once we know both we can fully realize the mighty force operating behind the scenes.

The so-called concept of change is the combination of the *Dao* of man and the *Dao* of Heaven. The *Book of Changes* is mainly about the “unity of man and heaven.” Wang Fuzhi’s (1619–1692) comment on this issue could be seen as an annotation: “In pursuing the way of becoming a profound man, since the Han Dynasty people have been fond of tracing historical remains and ignorant of the base of the sacred scholarship.”⁷ Only when Zhou Dunyi established the *Theory of Tai Chi’s Picture*, exploring the common original sources of nature and man, was the conclusion drawn that “human life is nothing but the natural consequence of heaven’s mandate; its divine essence is transfused into human nature and its laws operate in people’s daily lives. Everything follows the natural law of variation in the form of *yin* and *yang*.” Here Wang provided a perfect annotation for the Confucian concept of “integrating man and heaven.”

So the *Dao* of man originated from the *Dao* of Heaven; one cannot talk about one *Dao* without mentioning the other. Clearly, the principle of “the unity of nature and man” determines the vicissitudes of the natural world. In this way, the Confucian theory of “the unity of man and heaven” has become a metaphysical philosophy, which is quite different from a dichotomy between heaven and man, and made a unique contribution to human society.

Since actively and enthusiastically participating in social activities is the main ideological requirement of Confucianism, Confucians are required to rule the country based on the morality of the combination of human nature and the heavenly mandate, which has been discussed above. We may also consider Confucianism as a form of diligent and self-cultivating humanism, which can contribute to people’s development of virtue and harmonization of both human relations and relations with the natural world. Meanwhile, as a holistic thought mode, it can also contribute to developing patterns of philosophical thinking and metaphysics in the 21st century.

To be sure, the implications of Confucian thought should not be overemphasized for it may go to the extreme of “pan-moralism.” If, for example, Chinese philosophy is unwilling or unable to learn the merits of Western philosophy, such as knowledge-based systems and logical analysis, or to review its own philosophical problems from “another” perspective, then its concept of “the unity of man and heaven” will be vulnerable to accusations of being intuitive, rather than opening up a new horizon.

Perhaps every nation or country in today’s world could resort to its own cultural traditions as a resource for social development. However, each could then only make contributions from their own perspectives, which would not offer solutions for all the world’s social problems. Confucianism, originating from China, as one of these, needs a renewed position in the world, provided that its concepts are appropriately reinterpreted and transformed into a modern philosophy.

⁷Wang Fuzhi, *Pandect of Duke Wang Wencheng*.

In order to march forward and stay in the forefront of development in the 21st century, Chinese philosophy, while giving full play to its vitality, has to eliminate its obsolete or misleading factors and take in beneficial elements from other cultures. By constantly renewing itself, Chinese philosophy can contribute to the current theme of peaceful social development and the ultimate concerns confronting human beings. Only in this way, can Chinese philosophy be a blessing to the well-being of the Chinese people.

Chapter 8

Several Crucial Points on Cultural Issues

Culture is a very complicated topic with more than a hundred probable definitions. Of the issues concerning cultural exchange, relations between national characters and modernity, dominant and dominated cultures, interpretation of different cultural thoughts and so on, all add further to the complexity of the topic. Having fully realized that any serious conclusion can be drawn only based on ample data through social investments, I am here merely to elaborate several crucial points that concern me most.

8.1 Culture as a Two-Way Choice

There are two aspects to the issue: the mutual choice of cultures and the integration of local culture and imported culture. Take the spread of Buddhism as an example, when it was introduced to China from India from the end of the Western Han Dynasty (206 BC–24 AD) to the mid-Eastern Han Dynasty (25–220), the Theravada meditation represented by master An Shigao was paired with China's local Daoist magic arts, “the Four Greats” with “the Five Elements,” “the Five Disciplines” with “the Five Constant Virtues.”

It is also said that “vital *qi*” can be interpreted as “five elements” or “five Skandhas.” In *Commentary on Yinchiru jing*, it says “Five *yin* origins are lives ... like vital *qi*... while inter-reacting, they bloom, fall, terminate and revive, moving around in the three worlds infinitely and generating lives.” It might seem to be far-fetched to interpret five *yin* of Buddhism with the vital *qi*, it was nevertheless quite consistent with the principle of Daoism prevalent at that time.

Since the Eastern Jin Dynasty (317–420), as more sutras, laws and doctrines of Theravada meditation and Mahayana of Buddhism were translated into Chinese, the differences between local Chinese culture and the imported Buddhist culture became increasingly apparent, causing certain cultural clashes, such as on issues

concerning whether it was right for Buddhists to worship the monarchs, spiritual imperishability and so on.

On the other hand, following “Metaphysics of the Wei and Jin Dynasties,” Prāṇa, a discipline of Buddhism continued its pursuit of metaphysics. Since the Song (420–479) and Qi Dynasties (479–502), however, as Nirvāṇa reached its peak, the interlink between the two could be perceived.

Upon the disillusionment divulged by Prāṇa, the reach of Nirvāṇa through cultivation became possible. Following it up, in the Liang Dynasty (502–557), in revealing the Buddha-nature, Master Baoliang listed more than a dozen doctrines. In the same way, Seng Zhao, in *A Collection of Seng Zhao's Treatises*, applied Prāṇa to metaphysics.

The issue of Nirvāṇa and Buddha-nature had gradually been integrated with the traditional Chinese doctrine of character-cultivation. Also, the Sui (581–618) and Tang (618–907) Dynasties witnessed the speed-up of the localization of Indian Buddhism in China. During this period, various notions were formulated, such as the “heart-based dharmas” of the Tian-tai sect, the “all inclusive approach” of Hua-yan, “defining nature through soul searching” and “acquiring the character of Buddha by cultivation” of the Zen sect and so on, were all well-positioned to inherit the doctrines of self-cultivation of the pre-Qin Dynasty (before 221 BC) and heralding the traditional Mind Theory (the theory of mingling the character or mind with reason) of the Song (960–1279) and Ming (1368–1644) Dynasties.

Take the Zen sect as an example, it not only assimilated the thought of indulging in nature inspired by Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu, but also incorporated the Confucian thought of loyalty and filial piety into its theoretical system. Specifically,¹ as Master Dahui of Zen sect said, “All laws in the world are virtually Dharmas and vice versa,” “Buddhist as I am, my loyalty and devotion to the Monarch and country are no less than the literati and officialdom.”

The Vijñaptimātratā School, a sect of typical Indian Buddhism, however, faded out during a period as short as only 30 years in China despite the promotion of Master Xuan-zang (the later revival of it in modern times was another story, which is not to be discussed here). This seems to suggest that when two cultures were confronted with one another, an issue of two-way choice would emerge during the historical process. Apart from the transplanting of Buddhism from India to China, examples of such kind are many—typically, Esoteric Buddhism prospered in Central China for only a short period and then declined. However, its combination with the local religion Bon produced Tibetan Buddhism in Tibet and Northern Sichuan regions.

When two different traditional cultures (specially these with a long history) encounter, they will both alter somewhat—the indigent one becomes more selective to take in what it can take, while the alien one has to modify itself in order to be

¹Cf. *Verse of Alaṅkāra (Devoid of marks)* of Qi Song's version of *Platform Sutra*.

taken in both socially and culturally. This kind of two-way-choice, namely the mutual adaption and assimilation, happened in history and is taking place now in their cultural exchange.

8.2 Cultural Transplant and One-Way Flowing

As Bertrand Russell said in his *Chinese and Western Civilization Contrasted*, “Contacts between different civilizations have often in the past proved to be landmarks in human progress. Greece learnt from Egypt, Rome from Greece, the Arabs from the Roman Empire, mediaeval Europe from the Arabs, and the Renaissance Europe from the Byzantines. In many of these cases, the pupils proved better than their masters. In the case of China, if we regard the Chinese as the pupils, this may be the case again.”²

Surely, judging from the current situation, we spare no efforts in learning from the West since we are still lagging behind them in many aspects, wishing eventually to surpass them—whether this will be done in the future, will depend on how much effort we will put in and how far human society will orientate. In history, there have been no shortage of cases where a transplanted culture flourished in a foreign land, such as the cultural development in Europe, as Russell mentioned above. So has Indian culture in China.

As we all know, Indian Buddhism, originated about 2500 years ago, having gone through a lengthy process, but declined in the 8th and 9th centuries and almost died out in the 14th century. However, since it was transplanted to China in the 1st century, mingling with the local culture, Buddhism reached its peak in China in the 8th and 9th centuries. As a result, three localized Buddhist sects were formulated, namely the Tian-tai, Hua-yao and Zen sects.

We can thus confidently say that Chinese culture benefited from Indian culture and Indian culture in turn manifested in Chinese culture. Throughout history, Chinese culture spread to the Korean Peninsula, Japan and Vietnam. The reason for this phenomenon was cultural exchange. When one culture has being transplanted into another culture, it has also been enriched in its own terms by certain new elements, which could neither exist nor were full-fledged previously; it thrived by infusing elements from other cultures. Surely, there were cases where an alien culture could not survive transplantation due to certain reasons, such as foreign invasion, war turmoil, but most of all, it seems to me, it failed to be nourished by the heterogeneous culture. How therefore a culture can survive and bloom in a foreign land is still an issue requiring further research.

Previously, we have discussed the issue of two-way choice of cultural transplantation. Now, let’s look through the other side of the issue—one way choice of

²Russell, B. *Chinese and Western Civilization Contrasted*. Beijing: Art Time Press, 1998 Edition (p.8).

cultural transplantation. As we all know, when Indian Buddhism spread into China, most of the sutras were translated into Chinese. As it was recorded by Bai Juyi in the Tang Dynasty, one temple stored more than 5058 volumes of sutras.³ However, during the same period, although as it was recorded that *Dao De Jing* was translated into Sanskrit, there has been no proof of whether it spread to India, so far.

One thing, however, is for sure, that the Sanskrit version of *Dao De Jing* did not make any impact on Indian culture before it disappeared a long time ago. This shows that it is quite possible to have a one-way cultural flowing. In a narrow sense, imbalanced cultural exchanges are more commonly existent in the world, such as in the cultural exchange between China and the West, we have obviously taken in much more from other cultures than the other way around. As for why India did not take in Chinese culture in history as one may have expected, I think this had something to do with religion, which is exclusive in nature. Given the atheistic but conclusive nature of Chinese culture, Chinese literati and officials could stand on their Confucian ground while believing Buddhism or Daoism at the same time, a phenomenon that is rarely seen in other parts of the world. Surely, one-way cultural flowing can be a very complicated issue that requires further research.

8.3 Cultural “Take-Ism” and “Give-Ism”

Concerning Take-ism, as Lu Xun said, “All in all, we need to take in something, which can either be used, or stored or dumped. Since the owner of the house has been transformed, so has the house. However, this requires the owner to be placid, courageous, discerning and selfless for the awareness that without take-ism, a man could not be refreshed, nor has a revival of art.”⁴

What Lu Xun really proposed was to take a broader view and use our own judgment in taking in things. The same principle should be applied to us now—taking in everything that could be used as fertilizers from the West and other nations, to modernize our culture. Concerning give-ism, as Lu Xun pointed out, during the Qing Dynasty and early National Republic of China, it was given out as a gift in forms of antiquities and natural resources to promote national pride and prestige, which had nothing to do with the true meaning of cultural exchange except mere flattery gestures.

Today, the kind of “take-ism” advocated by Lu Xun is still valid. Only when we are brave and smart enough to take in the core values of western and other national cultures systematically other than fragmentally or narrow-mindedly, can we truly renew our culture. As the saying goes, “the true face of Mount Lu is lost to my sight, for it is right in this mountain that I reside;” there can be no identification

³Bai Juyi, *Postscript of Qian Fo Tang Zhuan Lun Jing Cang of Southern Zen Yard in Su Zhou*.

⁴Lu Xun, “Take-ism”, *Completed Works of Lu Xun*, Beijing: People Literature Publishing Press, 1957 (pp. 412–422).

without contrast. Therefore, by setting up “other cultures” as a reference the merits and shortcomings of our own can be clearly identified. Since many scholars have recently offered plenty of advice on how to take in foreign cultures, I would just like to elaborate more on the point of “give-ism.”

As a splendid culture with several thousand years of history, we have never seemed to export our cultural values consciously or actively to foreign countries. As mentioned above, when absorbing Indian Buddhist culture, we failed to spread our culture to India. Since the Sui and Tang Dynasties, surely the Korean Peninsula and Japan have been greatly influenced by Chinese culture, but that was done mainly by foreign students and monks who came to China to study and then took what they learned with them back home. In that way, their cultures have been nourished by ours mostly out of our carelessness.

Until the late 16th, western missionaries came to China, bringing in western religion, philosophy, art, science and technology, as well as introducing Chinese culture to Europe, causing a huge sensation in the intellectual circle—Voltaire was then called “The Confucius of Europe,” Leibnitz even put it more bluntly, “China has gained our reverence by its admirable ancient morality, philosophy and deism.”

Apart from these, are there any useful resources that our Chinese culture can provide for solving some of the major problems confronting our modern society? Yes, there are. Taking the major theme of our time—peace and development as an example, the so called “peaceful co-existence” requires proper dealing with relations between countries, nations, locations and regions, that implies not only harmonizing human-to-human but also human-to-nature relationships.

In dealing with such important issues, Confucian notions of “Benevolence” (*ren xue*) and “Integration of man and nature,” and the Daoist theory of “Inaction” and “Adorning nature” can provide invaluable resources in harmonizing human-to-human and human-to-nature relations, provided that they are annotated in modern terms in order to meet the requirements of modern social life. However, we have to realize that there is no such thing as “a single solution solving all problems,” if there is one, which I doubt very much, it is quite possible that it would be a pseudoscience. Therefore, the best we can do is to partially solve certain problems with some thoughts and do one step at a time.

8.4 Concerning the Issue of “Cultural Awareness”

The issue of “Cultural awareness and Social Development” was first put forward by Mr. Fei Xiaotong, which was also the theme of the “Second Forum on Chinese Culture in the 21st Century” held in December in Hong Kong. Early in 1998, I raised the question of establishing Chinese hermeneutics, which had been drawing my attention over the past few years and resulted in five articles of mine collected in the book of *Harmony in Diversity*, published by Liaoning People’s Publishing Press.

The reason why I have made the suggestion is that in studying Chinese philosophy, literature, religion, art and so on, most methodologies employed have been derived from western hermeneutics.

In the West, hermeneutics originated from interpreting the *Bible* and, having gone through a brewing process of several centuries it finally became a theoretical discipline in the 19th century, mainly because of work by Friedrich Schleiermacher (1769–1834), the German philosopher and theologian, and W. Dilthey (1835–1911), the German historian and sociologist. As a matter of fact, China has a much longer history of interpreting classical works than that in the West, such as *Zuo Zhuan* interpreting the *Spring and Autumn Annals* around 400 B.C., and later on around 200 B.C., *Yi Zhuan* interpreting the *Book of Change*, Mozi interpreting the Mohist works and Hanfei zi interpreting *Dao De Jing* and so on. Despite all this, we have nevertheless not yet studied it as an independent discipline. Hopefully, by reviewing our history of interpretation on classics, differences between these kinds of studies can be identified, which will lead to the establishment of an academic subject—Chinese hermeneutics.

Historically, there must be a process of accumulating questions, data, thoughts and so on before an academic discipline can be established based on a set of systematic theories and methods, which formed a so-called “prehistory,” such as “comparative literature” as a branch of study founded in the mid-19th century.

As we know, the per se of comparison of literature appeared long ago not only in the West but also in China. In the chapter of “On Poems” in *Carving a Dragon at the Core of Literature*, for example, the writer Liu Xie made a comparison of works of different poets and styles of poems during different periods: “At the beginning of the Song period of Four Southern Dynasties, the trend of poetry had altered—as the metaphysical poems of Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu style was gradually fading away, poems on mountains and rivers thrived.”

It was a comparison between the poetry styles of the Southern and Wei and Jin Dynasties. In the Wei and Jin periods, “metaphysical poems” prevailed but were gradually replaced by poems about mountains and rivers in the first one of the Four Southern Dynasties, integrating more with the natural scene. The same thing could be said about the relations between comparisons on literature work and “Comparison of Literature”—the former are the necessary materials prepared for the latter, and the two are not virtually equivalent. As Professor Li Dasan points out, comparative literature was not matured enough as a discipline until the 1830s or 1940s when Ann Bayle (1800–1864) and Wellman (1790–1867) had accomplished the overall design.

In China, it was not until the 1920s that the issue of literature comparison became a topic to be studied under the influence of Western comparative literature studies. Similarly, archaeological discoveries and antique appraisals took place ages ago both in China and abroad, however, according to the *Volume Archaeology of Encyclopedia of China*, archaeology as a discipline was germinated during 1760 and 1840 in the West and established by Pei Wenzhong, Li Ji and others in the late 1920s.

Concerning Chinese philosophy, I don't think Hegel was right when he said China has no philosophy; the fact was before Western philosophy was introduced to China there was no such thing as “philosophy” to be studied as an academic discipline since Chinese philosophical thoughts had always been part of historical and Confucian classical studies. The term *zhe xue* was coined by the Japanese philosopher Nishi Amane (1829–97) who borrowed two Chinese characters *zhe* and *xue* to render “philosophy,” a doctrine originated from ancient Greece. The term *zhe xue*, was then introduced by the Chinese scholar Huang Zunxian (1818–1905) to China, which was well received by the academic circle. In that way, Chinese philosophy was detached from other studies as a separate discipline under influence of Western philosophy. After almost a century's evolvement, “Chinese philosophy” has roughly been established as a branch of “learning,” which is found to be in no way inferior to Western philosophy in richness. Generally speaking, the former is aimed at pursuing spiritual enlightenment whereas the latter emphasizes building a knowledge system.

From this point of view, we can see that the establishment of any “learning” (discipline, scientific principle, theoretical system) is based on theoretical and methodological awareness of targeting certain subjects in a way that has been generally accepted by society. In studying Chinese culture, for example, we should consciously set it up as a subject with a systematic, creative and realistic approach, so as to reveal the true spirit and values of Chinese culture, explore its merits and shortcomings as well as purposely and actively absorb and digest the essence of other cultures.

8.5 Extinction and Co-existence of Cultures

As human culture is the product of human beings, different nations will always generate diverse national cultures. However, just as not all ethnic groups could survive, in history some of them may have survived, but their cultures have disappeared. The reasons for these extinctions are varied, including internal, external, natural and man-made disasters, which do not have to be elaborated on in detail here.

Presently, several major cultures in my view will not die out in the foreseeable future, they are the European and North American culture, East Asian culture, South Asian culture and Islamic culture, each with a long history and over a billion population. As we all know, since World War II, as the Western colonial system gradually collapsed, an urgent task facing these colonized and oppressed nations was to confirm their independent identities in all perspectives punctuated with their distinctive cultures.

Therefore, we believe that a new cultural “Axial Age” will be formed in the 21st century, the term was put forward by Karl Jaspers (1883–1969) in his *Historical*

Origin and Object.⁵ As he points out, around 500 B.C., great thinkers occurred almost at the same time in ancient Greece, Israel, India and China, presenting their own views concerning mankind, such as Socrates and Plato in ancient Greece, Confucius and Lao-Tzu in China, Sakyamuni in India, Jewish Moses in Israel, formulating different cultural traditions.

After over 2000 years of development, these cultural traditions, although thriving separately without any interaction, have become a cultural treasure for mankind. As Jaspers wrote, “Until today mankind has lived by what happened during the Axial Age, by what was thought and created during that period. In each new upward flight it returns in recollection to this period and is fired anew by it.”⁶ History has proved him right. The Renaissance in Europe, for instance, turned attention to its cultural root—ancient Greece, consequently rekindling European civilization and exerting great influence on the world.

In China, under the influence of Indian Buddhist culture, the basic idiosyncrasy of the Song and Ming Dynasties had once gain returned to Confucius and Mencius and lifted Chinese culture up to Neo-Confucianism. Many indications nowadays suggest that a new Axial Age will occur, in a way that the four great cultures mentioned will, while consolidating their immanent spirit, fully absorb the nutrition of other cultures and result in a new cultural leap.

The new Axial Age will be significantly different from the old one in 500 B.C. mainly the following three fronts:

(1) In this globalized world, everything has been integrated—from economy to science and technology, and the development of the information network has amalgamated the world as a whole. Therefore, in this new “Axial Age,” any world culture can no longer develop in isolation; a co-existing of interactive multicultural scenarios will emerge and, the contribution to human culture they each will make depends on their capacity for absorbing certain elements of other cultures and constantly renewing themselves.

In the previous Axial Age, several cultures were mutually unrelated to one another, but in the following 2000 years, they turned to each other positively. As Russell pointed out in his *Chinese and Western Civilization Contrasted*: European culture had taken various elements from other cultures before the 17th century, and consequently sucked in something from Indian and Chinese cultures in the following centuries.

It is no exaggeration to say that the vitality of European culture lies in its mechanism of constantly assimilating other cultural elements, enriching and renewing itself. In the same way, Chinese culture has been developing. Historically, when Indian Buddhism spread to China it benefited as well as being manifested by

⁵Jaspers, Karl. *Historical Origin and Object*, the Chinese version was translated by Wei Chuxiong etc., and published by Hua Xia Publishing Press, 1989.

⁶In Jaspers, K. *German Culture in Enlightenment* (In Chinese), Translated by Wang Zhao Ren etc. and published by Commercial Press, 1990.

Chinese culture greatly, and in turn, it further spread to the Korean Peninsula and Japan, formulating certain distinguished Buddhist culture by combining the local cultures.

In modern times, impacted by Western culture, Chinese culture has been continuously learning from the West and renewing itself. Looking back, over the past century, various schools of western culture have exerted great influence on Chinese culture and have been changing the landscape of Chinese culture and society. Clearly, it is precisely because this exchange and mutual influence between different cultures that produced the splendid human culture today. This trend will surely continue in the new Axial Period where every culture develops against the background of globalization. This is certainly a feature distinguishing itself from the old one.

(2) Cultural development in the 21st century has to be driven by cross-cultural and cross-disciplinary studies. Since the world has been linked together, no culture in the world can develop in isolation, therefore studies of cross-borders will boom. As the saying goes, “You don’t know true shape of the mountain since you are in the mountains;” a culture may thus be best approached externally in order to pull down the fences isolating the views and to get an overall picture.

It has been widely accepted in China’s academic circle that reviewing the culture from the perspective of others is the core value of “inter-subjective” and “cross reference” and is beneficial to laying a ground for multicultural development. Totally different from the situation in the 18th century, academic disciplines are no longer confined to their borders; instead, many new disciplines and inter-disciplines have occurred.

The original confinement of academic disciplines has been blurred—physical chemistry or chemical physics, instead of pure physics or chemistry have become the popular subjects. Furthermore, the boundaries between natural science and social science have also been broken, such as in studying comparative literature “dissipative structure theory” invented by the physicist, a Nobel Prize winner, Prigogine, has also been used by many scholars.

Currently, mutual-assimilation between different cultural traditions and different disciplines is widely taking place. It is predicated that the most influential culture will be the one that can promote dialogue between different cultural traditions and disciplines and take a holistic approach. The new Axial Period of the 21st century will be an interlocutory and mutual assimilatory one, which is quite different from the previous one.

(3) The new Axial Age will not be dominated by a few great thinkers; instead, a myriad of thinkers will play a role in navigating cultural development. Given the rapid development of modern society, which far exceeds the ancient one in speed, the trend of thoughts has been changing with each passing day in an interactive manner. In a new landscape, since almost everything has been interwoven and interdependent, there are hardly any conditions for great “lonely thinkers” to appear.

Nowadays, what thinkers are confronted with is no more a single country or nation but the whole world; inevitably, they have to absorb certain elements from

other cultures with a global view. True accomplished thinkers, therefore, have to belong to both the nation and the world. In the West, over the past century or so, trends of thoughts replaced one another with a dominant one lasting no more than several decades, and so far none of the thoughts can synchronize various schools as a whole.

Over the past century or so, China has still been in the process of learning western culture and building its new culture. It is foreseeable that a new “contention of a hundred schools of thought” will emerge in China, forming a multicultural landscape. As we have seen that since the “reform and opening-up,” all kinds of theories and schools of thought have flooded into China, where a huge amount of western materials are still being digested, and yet no modern “new Chinese culture” has emerged out of the digestion, in the same way that the Neo-Confucianism was produced inspired by Indian Buddhism in the Song and Ming Dynasties.

Entering the 1990s, China’s thought and cultural circles have been further diversified, formulating different academic groups, each with single dominant thought. There has been no authoritative thought taking a leading role. Looking ahead into the future, more diversified schools of thoughts will probably emerge in parallel to the development of China’s modern society, with less likelihood of materializing a unified thought system.

Given such conditions in China and abroad, chances for great thinkers like Plato, Confucius and Sakyamuni, who exerted great influences on human culture over the past two thousand years, to reemerge are extremely rare. History will show that the time of attempting to become the Savior of the world has gone forever. We should therefore realize that from now on the resultant force of different groups of thinkers, embodied as multiculturalism, will determine the direction of human cultural development.

The transformation may have something to do with the shift from the elite culture to popular culture. Since the pace of modern life has increasingly become faster in line with the development of popular culture that meets people’s emotional and spiritual requirements at a quick tempo. As a result, thoughts and doctrines tend to be simplified and popularized, which will further hinder the appearance of great thinkers, such as Confucius, Lao-Tzu, Plato and Sakyamuni who are normally regarded as the Savors. In this way, I should say the 21st century will witness the integration of the elite and popular cultures.

These are the three main points of mine concerning cultural development in the 21st century; surely there may have more features which need to be pointed out. In the context of economic globalization and technical integration, the four types of cultures mentioned above, will surely co-exist for a quite long period. Again, they will contribute differently to society depending on the ability of renewing themselves. As for Chinese culture in the new Axial Age, it should fully manifest itself and discard the dross, making it suitable to modern life by constantly renewing itself. Only in this way, can Chinese culture be rejuvenated and make great contribution to the society.

Chapter 9

Synthesizing Chinese Learning with Western Learning Chronologically in Breaking a New Path

The definitive shape of current Chinese culture is the result of constant assimilation of other cultures of different nations, countries and regions in the world over the past five or six thousand years. During this prolonged process two crucial waves of foreign cultures heavily influenced the development of Chinese culture: the spread of Indian Buddhism in the first century and the introduction of Western culture since the end of the 16th century, especially during the mid-18th century. These two events had a great impact on Chinese culture. As Bertrand Russell said in his *Chinese and Western Civilization Contrasted*, “Contacts between different civilizations have often in the past proved to be landmarks in human progress.”¹

The spread of the cultures mentioned above had a far-reaching influence on Chinese culture and almost every aspect of Chinese society, resulting in profound transitions. Since philosophy is at the core of culture, briefly reviewing the history of how Indian Buddhism was introduced into China may yield insights to better understand the later development of Chinese philosophy under the impact of Western philosophy, which has always been seen as an in-depth reflection of the outlook of that time.

The spread of Indian Buddhism (including its intrusion as a philosophical concept) in China has gone through roughly three stages:

In the first stage, from the Western Han Dynasty to the Eastern Jin Dynasty, Buddhism attached itself to China’s indigenous Daoist magic art (*Fang shu* or *Dao shu*), while in the Wei and Jin Dynasties, it attached itself to Metaphysics. During the quite long period of time of Buddhism’s introduction to China, the main content it preached was the immortality of the soul, karma and so on.

There were in fact similar concepts in China to which Buddhism attached itself. From the end of the Han Dynasty to the early Wei Dynasty, with more and more of its classics being translated into Chinese, Buddhism gradually evolved into two major schools in China. The first was the school of An Shigao or the Theravada

¹Russell, B. *Chinese and Western Civilization Contrasted*. Changchun: Art Time Press, 1998 Edition (p. 8).

with an emphasis on Zen, at the time when several sutras such as *Ānāpānasmṛti* (Breathing) Sūtra and Sūtra of Yin-chiru had already been translated into Chinese. Its teaching was mainly about breathing-meditation, similar to the practice of Daoism or the School of Immortality. It also matched the “five yin” with the “five elements”, the “five disciplines” with the “five constant virtues”, the “original *qi*” with the “five *xing*” and so on, which were in fact very far-fetched for Buddhism.

The second was the school of Lokakṣema or Mahayana Buddhism, whose main teaching was Prāṇa, which believed that the basic truth of life is to “return to the spiritual origin” which was unified with the *Dao* of Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu, and later gradually became attached to the Metaphysics of the Wei and Jin Dynasties. The core issue of metaphysics—the relations between “root and end” and “being and non-being”—were very much related to the issue of “being” and “non-being” of Buddhist Prāṇa, and also had lasting influence on the early Eastern Jin Dynasty where, although “six branches and seven divisions” were established, the basic issues remained the same. As a concluding work of the Metaphysics of the Wei and Jin Dynasties, the *Comments of Monk Seng Zhao* also heralded Chinese Buddhism.

In the second stage, from the Eastern Jin Dynasty onward, more and more Buddhist sutras were systematically translated into Chinese. As more differences between Indian Buddhism and indigenous Chinese culture were exposed, an increasing number of contradictions and conflicts between the two cultures emerged simultaneously as they also mutually influenced and absorbed one another during this process. According to the *Spreading the Way and Elucidating the Teaching: A Collection of Expositions of Truth*, the hotly debated issues then included “whether the Buddhists should worship the monarchs,” “perishability and imperishability of the spirit,” “the existence of retribution,” “the relations between emptiness and being,” “the identification criteria for Chinese and barbarians” and so on.

Moreover, this period also witnessed rather fierce debates between Buddhism and Daoism on issues such as “Lao-Tzu’s incarnation into Buddha,” “transmigration in Buddhist and Daoist Karma,” “the spiritual format of life and death” and so on. At the same time, Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism were able to assimilate one another—Daoism took in many Buddhist ideas and concepts and Buddhism in turn also absorbed some elements of Confucianism. While some Confucian scholars, such as Liu Xie, began to profess Buddhism, certain Daoists, such as Tao Hongjing, started to set up two halls to worship both Buddhism and Daoism simultaneously. In general, during this period, the Chinese attitude toward Buddhist culture was eager, inclusive, embracive and positive.

In the third stage, starting in the Sui and Tang Dynasties, Indian Buddhist culture started to exert profound influence on Chinese culture. According to “Record of Classic Works” in the *Book of Sui Dynasty*, at that time “the Buddhist sutras were several tens of times more than the Six Pre-Qin classics.” In the meantime, under the impact of Confucianism and Daoism, Buddhist culture had also been deeply altered, forming several branches of localized Buddhism.

For example, the Tian-tai, the Hua-yan and the Zen sects all integrated the Confucian notion of mind-nature. The Tian-tai sect absorbed some Daoist ideas, whereas both the Hua-yan and the Zen sects had all kinds of links with the thoughts

of Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu on both content and method. When it came to the Song Dynasty, Indian Buddhism had been totally melded into Chinese culture (as Indian Buddhism had disappeared at the time) to form Neo-Confucianism.

Reviewing the history of the spread of Indian Buddhism in China may provide us with some lessons and implications as a reference frame for expounding how Western culture could have been better introduced to China.

Certain elements of Western culture had in fact been spread to China early in the Tang Dynasty, such as a religion known as Nestorianism. Later, as Tang Emperor Wuzong (814–846) eliminated Buddhism, Nestorianism was also involved and gradually disappeared in China. Similarly, another foreign religions also vanished much later with the fall of the Yuan Dynasty. The real influence of Western culture on China began at the end of the 16th century with the coming of some of the teachings of Christian Jesuits. The Christian missionaries (such as Matteo Ricci) followed a strategy of attaching Christianity to indigenous Confucian thought.

Except for a few Chinese intellectuals (such as Xu Guangqi and Li Zhizao) who had themselves converted to Christianity, most held a negative attitude towards Christianity or tried to relate it to Confucian thought in terms of comprehending and appreciating its doctrines or techniques. In some ways, the situation resembled the time when Buddhism was first introduced to China. During the early Qing Dynasty, due to the “rites controversy,” the spread of Western culture was suspended until the mid-19th century when Western countries waged aggressive wars against the Qing government, causing Western culture to flood into China. Ever since then, a century-long debate over issues concerning “China versus the West and ancient versus contemporary” has been continuing, right up to now.

By the end of the Qing Dynasty, the notion of “Chinese ideology and Western applied science” had been widely accepted by Chinese intellectuals. As more and more Western culture was introduced by Chinese scholars (such as the prominent figure Hu Shih), its outlook as perceived by the Chinese had somewhat altered. Entering the period of the Republic of China, the debate over “China versus the West and ancient versus contemporary” became even fiercer. The Confucius Temple was set up even before Yuan Shikai declared himself the new emperor, attempting to quench the fever for Western culture by using Confucian thought.

Later, from 1915 up to the May 4th Movement in the 1920s, waves of debates over the relations between Chinese and Western cultures reached their peak. Typically, the debates in the *Journal of Oriental Studies* edited by Du Yaquan and *New Youth* edited by Chen Duxiu, were over issues of “question versus ism” represented by Hu Shih and Li Dazhao and so on. As different trends evolved, the radical school represented by Marxists Chen Duxiu and Li Daozhao and the liberal school represented by pragmatist Hu Shih jointly raised the flag of “Overthrowing the Confucian School” while promoting Western “science and democracy.”

Confronted with the strong impact of Western ideas brought in by the May 4th Movement, the National School naturally launched a counter-attack, represented by two scholars of traditional Chinese culture—Liang Qichao and Liang Shuming. While Liang Qichao’s *Traveling Notes in Europe* exerted extensive influence by

criticizing Western science, Liang Shuming provided certain thoughtful insights as a response in his *Chinese and Western Cultures and Philosophies*.

In 1923 the debate over “science versus view of life” broke out. Seemingly, schools of Western learning (including Marxism, pragmatism, scientism, etc.) had won over school of Chinese learning (Neo-Confucianism with Zhang Junli as a representative), but it ended in the split between Marxism and Pragmatism respectively represented by Chen Duxiu and Hu Shih. After that, a situation of tripartite confrontation arose in China’s cultural circles, namely, the co-existence of Marxist radicals, pragmatic reformists and tradition-guarding conservatives.

The debate over “China versus the West and ancient versus contemporary” had a lasting effect on Chinese intellectual development following it which had been forming a central issue for quite a lengthy period—typically, during the debate over “philosophical questions” and “the nature and history of Chinese society” in the late 1920s; during the controversy caused by the “Declaration to Cultivate Chinese Indigenous Culture” written by Sa Mengwu and other nine professors in 1935; and so on. After the anti-Japanese war broke out in 1937, even though the tension between Chinese and Western cultures eased somewhat due to the war, there were still confrontations among different schools of thought, such as Marxists’ criticism of Feng Youlan’s “Neo-Confucianism”, the debate between Hong Qian (a scholar of the Vienna Circle) and Feng Youlan on metaphysical questions, and other disputes, all centering around the same core issue.

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, extraordinary changes have taken place in mainland China. Adopting a so-called “one-sided” policy of unilaterally copying the Soviet Union (a form of westernization), Stalin’s *Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism* and Zhdanov’s three speeches were chosen as guidelines to criticize traditional Chinese culture, until the “cultural revolution” when the policy of “destroying the four dregs of society” (old thoughts, culture, customs and habits) was put in place to isolate Chinese culture from the rest of the world.

Clearly, new and old isolated and dogmatic approaches of dealing with cultural issues should be abandoned. In that regard, that most notable television program *River Elegy* reflected the urgent desire to realize the dream of modernization. In the early 1990s, two ideological trends (“post-modernism” and “neo-conservatism”) grew phenomenally. “Post-modernism” was introduced into China in the 1980s but did not gain much popularity until the 1990s. The reason for its sudden surge, I think, mainly lay in its function of resolving the cultural monopoly.

After the June 4th 1989 incident, an article titled “Diversification will lead to bourgeois liberalization” was published in a Beijing newspaper, criticizing the trend of cultural diversification. Fully aware of the danger of being drawn back to cultural isolation and cultural monopoly, Chinese scholars rallied their efforts to introduce and expound still more post-modernist theory. As a result, a *Guoxue re* (craze for national learning) occurred in China around 1992, manifesting the zeal for studying and carrying forward traditional Chinese culture.

In view of the possible negative impact that Western culture may impose on human society, some scholars believe that traditional Chinese philosophy may be

used to rectify its defects. However, an article published in *The Study of Philosophy* (June 1994) rang alarm bells: “Someone has attempted to reconstruct a Chinese philosophical system that shares equal status with Marxism by promoting Confucius and Dong Zhongshu”; “We are doubtful about their intention to exclude socialist new culture from traditional Chinese culture by employing the ambiguous term of *Guoxue* (national learning).”

In a symposium held by the *Journal of Confucius Studies* in early 1995, a considerable number of scholars disagreed with the opinion published in *The Study of Philosophy*; some even wrote another article in the *Journal of the Orient* in the same year to refute the argument that placing the study of *Guoxue* in opposition to the study of Marxism would result in an inevitable restoration of dogmatism by suspecting and denouncing *Guoxue*. Though the debate in the mid-1990s had no substantial effect, it nevertheless echoed the same theme of “China versus the West and ancient versus contemporary.”

In the meantime, some experts on Western culture (especially Christianity) held quite critical views of Chinese culture, which had caused counterattack from the conservative camp and drew overseas sympathy to modern neo-Confucianism. Some scholars, who were at home both with Chinese and Western cultures, attempted to reconcile the discrepancies between the two, seeking common ground while reserving differences, so as to propel the development of Chinese culture.

From the late 1990s onward, the debate between Chinese liberalism and neo-leftism seems to be centered on the issue of how to transform Chinese culture from its traditional to a modern version, but in essence it is still related to the argument of “China versus the West and ancient versus contemporary.”

Over the past century, the debate over “China versus the West and ancient versus contemporary” has in fact been the dispute between westernization and localization. To place China and the West, ancient and contemporary, in opposition is in my opinion to oversimplify the approach in dealing with cultural issues, an unhealthy route to cultural development. Therefore, we should now move beyond the dichotomy and get out of the endless argumentative trap.

From the analyses aforementioned, we may conclude that at present Chinese culture is in a transition from its second stage to an early third stage, identical to the process when Indian Buddhism was introduced to and impacted Chinese culture from the Southern and Northern Dynasties to the Sui and Tang Dynasties. During the third stage, cultural differences usually have merged into local culture; if this is again the case, we should move out of the dilemma of “China versus the West and ancient versus contemporary” and start the process of comprehensively and penetratingly absorbing Western culture.

To exit the debate on “China versus West and ancient versus contemporary” we have to grasp two points. First, we should have a good idea of commonality rather than differences between Chinese and Western cultures to achieve a state of “harmony in diversity” through dialogue and compromise. Second, every culture has both merits and defects for geographical, historical and national reasons, thus it is not realistic to expect that any culture can solve all the problems of all nations much less all mankind.

Ancient thoughts were surely derived from their environments. However, since they were the outcome of contemplating human issues they were inevitably endowed with something transcending time.

Kaleidoscopic as it is, the core issues of Western philosophy are in fact still extensions of those raised by the ancient Greek philosophers. By the same token, hotly debated questions confronting with modern Chinese philosophy are equally extensions of those explored by philosophers of various schools in the Pre-Qin period.

Thus, I quite agree with what Theodor Jaspers said: up to now, humans have been surviving on the thoughts of and virtually everything created by the Axial Age, and every leap we made later on was nothing but its re-ignition.

Following the development of Chinese philosophy, I would like to elaborate how Chinese philosophy is now in its third stage, identical to the process when Buddhism was introduced to China, in absorbing and integrating Western philosophy to form in due time a renewed, modernized Chinese philosophy different from the West.

In China, there was originally no such a word as “philosophy” or *Zhe-xue* in the Chinese language and many Western philosophers did not even think there was any such thing as “philosophy” in China. Hegel, for example, thought that what China had were nothing but opinions. In his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, concerning oriental thoughts he said “I haven’t found anything there that could be called philosophical knowledge.” Confucius, Hegel said, “was obviously a wise folk man, and he had some benign, skilful and moral teachings, but nothing special in terms of dialectical philosophical thinking.”

The term *zhe xue* was coined initially by Japanese scholar Nishi Amame (1829–97), who borrowed the two Chinese characters *zhe* (“wisdom”) and *xue* (“study”) to refer to the “philosophy” originating in Ancient Greece and Rome. The renewed term was introduced to China by a Chinese scholar, Huang Zunxian (1848–1905), and was well accepted by Chinese scholars.

To further explore the issue, we may generally assert that before the importation of Western philosophy, there was no such thing as “Chinese philosophy” in its own right, as a field distinct from “canonical studies” (*jing xue*) and “traditions of the masters” (*zi xue*). Namely, it had not been studied as an independent discipline in academic circles.

However, this is not to say that China did not have philosophy per se. Historically, China had philosophy distinct from the Western varieties, which has been widely acknowledged by Chinese and foreign scholars alike. Having said that, we have also to admit that the introduction of Western philosophy into China has provided us with a reference frame by which Chinese philosophy could be gradually separated from “canonical studies” (*jing xue*) and “traditions of the masters” (*zi xue*), evolving into an independent discipline.

One of the influential figures in introducing Western philosophy into China was Hu Shih, who translated *Evolution and Ethics* into Chinese, which with its notion of evolution influenced the Chinese philosophical concepts over many generations. Following his book, many other Western concepts, such as Kantianism, the philosophies of ancient Greece, the Vienna Circle, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche,

Anarchism, Marxism, pragmatism, realism, Hegelianism, analytical philosophy (e.g. Bertrand Russell) and so on were introduced to China one after another, influencing Chinese philosophical circles. This situation was similar to the spread of various Indian Buddhist thoughts to China between the Southern and Northern Dynasties and the Sui and Tang Dynasties when many of the Hinayana and Mahayana Buddhist sutras, laws and theories were translated into Chinese.

The construction of “Chinese philosophy” began with the study of its history in the early 20th century. Among its published works, the best-known ones are *An Outline of the History of Chinese Philosophy* by Hu Shih, *A History of Chinese Philosophy* by Xie Wuliang (1916), *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy* by Feng Youlan and so on, proving that there had been such a thing as “Chinese philosophy” since the pre-Qin period.

These studies also indicated that Chinese scholars had begun to intentionally separate Chinese philosophy from “canon studies” (*jing xue*) and “traditions of the masters” (*zi xue*), which could have resulted from bringing Western philosophy into China. During this time, several comparative works on Chinese and Western philosophies were also published, the most notable and representative being Liang Shuming’s *Oriental and Occidental Cultures and Philosophies*, which analyzes the differences between the two based on their cultural typologies, thoroughly examining the notions of “anti-tradition” and “promoting Western learning” since the May 4th Movement.

In this book, the author believed that China should introduce Western culture and philosophy, to develop “science and democracy” in China. He reiterated, “We are also promoting Eastern culture, but unlike the old minds we do not reject Western culture.” It is also clear that Liang was deeply influenced by Henri Bergson’s life philosophy. However, Liang also made some critical comments on Western philosophy, advocating a resort to the spirit of indigenous Chinese culture to address the confronting problems in human society.

Since the beginning of the 1930s, several different types of “Chinese philosophy” had been taken shape based on different Western philosophies as referents. Most notably, philosophical theories such as those of Xiong Shili and Zhang Dongsun, Fung Youlan and Jin Yuelin, as well as Mao Zedong’s *On Practice* and *On Contradiction* were works deemed Marxist philosophy with Chinese characteristics. All these demonstrate that Chinese scholars, including politicians, had made serious efforts to absorb Western philosophies for the purpose of constructing Chinese philosophies of their own.

With his book *A New Treatise on Consciousness*, Xiong Shili merely completed considering the role of “Ontology” (which was deeply influenced by Bergson’s own life philosophy). The general direction of what he left unfinished (epistemology) can also be gleaned from his other books. In Xiong’s opinion, given the lack of epistemology in Chinese philosophy, a sinicized epistemology should therefore be created. As he said, “China’s academics are of sensations and observance rather than differentiation, which is its merit as well as its defect. The appropriate approach is thus to combine Chinese and Western cultures; by melding with more Western elements the Chinese mind could be broadened.”

Xiong also pointed out, “I often think that philosophy is a kind of learning requiring both wisdom and cultivation. Those who are concentrating on differentiation and analysis may be wise but will lose their roots for lack of cultivation and eventually fail to reach a superior state of mind. On the other hand, those who are obsessed with self-cultivation may form a fine temperament but have left behind their ability to differentiate, which will inevitably impair their integrity. Therefore, only those who can fuse both to a high degree of efficiency can achieve perfect learning.”²

Clearly, Xiong has made an effort to build modern Chinese philosophy on the basis of taking in Western philosophy. Especially his theories that “noumenon and manifestation are one” and “transformation is derived from contradictions” followed the line of the *Book of Changes* but carried it forward into a new stage of modern neo-Confucianism. His successors, Mou Zongsan and Tang Junyi, have respectively incorporated Kant’s and Hegel’s philosophies into neo-Confucianism, as the backbone of this philosophical thought.

On the basis of absorbing neo-Kantianism, Zhang Dongsun proposed his “framework theory” as part of his poly-epistemological system, which he called an “epistemology-orientated Chinese philosophy.” Unlike Jin Yuelin, who matched the “theory of knowledge” with “ontology,” Zhang Dongsun tended to relate his “cosmology” to the “theory of knowledge” by denying Chinese ontology. In terms of style, Jin’s philosophy seems not in conformity with traditional Chinese philosophy, however, on probing into its contents the profound influence of Confucianism and Daoism can be identified, such as his “non-being derived from being,” is clearly based on Chinese wisdom.

In his *Neo-Confucianism*, Feng Youlan clearly stated that his philosophy is not a copy of neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming Dynasties, but a “carry-over”—incorporating Platonic “universality,” “particularity” and neo-realism into Chinese philosophy. In dividing the world into “rationality” and “reality,” he infused his theory with a dual nature—it both connects with the neo-Confucian theory of “diversifications based on commonality” of the Song and Ming Dynasties, and incorporates Western ideas of “universality” and “particularity” into Chinese philosophy.

His *New Version of Understanding* is an attempt to integrate Chinese and Western philosophies in terms of their methodologies. In his view, Western philosophy excels at analysis (a positive metaphysical method), whereas Chinese philosophy is naturally intuitive (a negative metaphysical method), and the approach employed in his neo-Confucianism is to combine both. This is another case demonstrating the efforts made by Chinese scholars in the 1930s and 1940s to establishing Chinese philosophy by using Western philosophy for reference.

²Xiong Shili, *A New Treatise on Consciousness*.

Meanwhile, in upholding China's ontology, Tang Yungtung adopted the approach of "streamlining the verbiage in searching for the essence" in studying the Metaphysics of the Wei and Jin Dynasties, opening a new frontier in the academic field. Following German philosopher Zeller's methodology in studying the history of Greek philosophy, and also (since Tang studied in the USA in his early years) under the influence of American scholar Irving Babbitt's new humanism, Tang wrote *A History of Buddhism in the Two Jins and Southern-Northern Dynasties*, which is regarded as an authoritative book even today.³

Among the new schools, some were more influential than others. For instance, Feng Youlan and Xiong Shili, who "carried on" traditional Chinese philosophy, had more impact on Chinese philosophy than Jin Yuelin and Zhang Dongsun, who were obviously more westernized in their studies of philosophy, but retained less Chinese flavor.

However, in constructing modern Chinese philosophy, Chinese scholars have realized that traditional Chinese philosophy lacks epistemology; and this realization itself signifies the influence of Western philosophy, which has been increasingly sucked in as a reference to formalize modern Chinese philosophy. To this end, Xiong Shili, Zhang Dongsun, Feng Youlan and Jin Yuelin, among many others, started this trend.

While Xiong Shili's philosophy has embraced the critical thinking of Western philosophy, as well as incorporated more speculative elements (mostly of them coming from the *Vijñaptimātratā* teaching of Indian Buddhism) than Chinese philosophy in its traditional form, it nevertheless is still evolving along the line of holistic and intuitive Chinese philosophical thought. His successors have employed even more Western philosophical theories and approaches but are still following his lead. The logical analysis applied by Feng Youlan has obviously exceeded that of Xiong Shili, way too much westernized as well and yet, as aforementioned, in essence he still "carried on" the neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming Dynasties and moved it into modern Chinese philosophy. In contrast, it is harder for philosophies dominated by logical analysis, such as analytical philosophy and the philosophy of science, to become popular and influential.

Judging from this point, when two philosophies encounter one another, a two-way choice has to be made. Some Chinese scholars of Western philosophies have made serious attempts to unscramble these based on their understanding of Chinese philosophy (or to interpret Western philosophy in a Chinese style). It is nevertheless a worthy endeavor to localize Western concepts on Chinese soil.

In my view, these attempts are valuable and commendable but their outcomes have still not yet attained the level comparable to sinicized Buddhist philosophy during the Sui and Tang Dynasties in terms of impacts and implications, nor reached the status of neo-Confucianism after it critically took in Indian Buddhist philosophy during the Song and Ming Dynasties. Therefore, there is still a long way

³Tang Yijie, *Tang Yijie Academic Essays*, Beijing: China Youth Press, 1996.

to go in terms of creatively establishing a Chinese philosophy that is in line with the development of modern Chinese society and philosophy in the world.

Since the founding of the people's republic of China, earth-shaking changes have taken place in Chinese society. As the "one-sided" policy of blindly following the Soviet Union was adopted, traditional Chinese culture was severely criticized, even generally denounced by ultra-leftists in the study and teaching of philosophy, especially during the "cultural revolution." In a sense, it may also be argued that the confrontations between "China versus West and ancient versus contemporary" were tinted with a strong political color, resulting in a fracture in the study of Chinese philosophy.

After the end of the "cultural revolution," especially as the reform and opening up policy was adopted in the 1980s, various schools of Western philosophy flooded into China one after another, such as existentialism, Nietzschean philosophy, Marxism, phenomenology, constructivism, deconstructionism, post-modernism, hermeneutics, semiotics and so on. This great impact has broadened the frontier of the study of Chinese philosophy and provided it with a multi-dimensional view as well as a substantial reference system. The situation is identical to the time when Indian Buddhism was introduced into China during the Sui and Tang Dynasties.

This is both a challenge and an opportunity for Chinese philosophy. Regarding the development of Chinese philosophy in the 21st century, which concerns most Chinese philosophers and also draws different opinions from different people, I think the prevailing phrase will be "integrating with the world."

Currently, as various Sinicized Buddhist sects have appeared (as happened in the Tang Dynasty), it is quite possible to have various sinicized schools of Western philosophy set up on the basis of thoroughly understanding and digesting these philosophies, such as sinicized existentialism, phenomenology, deconstructionism, post-modernism, hermeneutics, semiotics, or even Marxism and so on.

In so doing, we will benefit Chinese philosophy on at least two fronts. First, instead of unilaterally taking them, Chinese philosophy should also participate in various schools of Western philosophy, enriching Western philosophy with Chinese philosophical concepts and ideas, integrating these into the mainstream of contemporary Western philosophy. Second, formulating sinicized disciplines (such as sinicized phenomenology or hermeneutics) will augment the contents of Chinese philosophy, which will also be brought into the development of the mainstream Western philosophy.

Perhaps, some may worry that this will cause Chinese philosophy to lose its identity and become an appendage of Western philosophy. I disagree. For instance, according to the "Record of Classic Works" in the *Book of Sui Dynasty*, at the time "the quantity of Buddhist sutras collected by the populace was several thousand times more than the six classics," but this did not make China a Buddhist country; on the contrary, nourished by originally-Indian Buddhism, already Sinicized, Chinese philosophy was empowered and eventually gave birth to the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming Dynasties.

We have to realize that constructing Sinicized Western disciplines will not hinder the development of other schools of modernized Neo-Confucianism or Daoism, despite their route being a philosophy that “incarnated” (or imbued) Chinese thoughts with Western ones. Given its cultural roots of 5000 years, Chinese philosophy will not diminish its identity in the face of powerful Western philosophy; rather, it should boost its vitality by absorbing nutriment from other cultures. The major cultural transition period that China is currently in is bound to involve multiculturalism, so we should consciously move away from the debate of “China versus West and ancient versus contemporary.”

Perhaps I may enumerate one or two examples to prove my point. In the last century, one of the most noteworthy philosophers was Feng Qi, a Marxist intending to localize his belief by incorporating traditional Chinese and Western analytical philosophies. His *Three Talks on Wisdom* could be seen as a paradigm which successfully combined the materialist dialectics of Marxism, analytical philosophy, and traditional Chinese philosophy. His “Introduction” states, “This piece is mainly about dialectics based on practical cognitive processes. More specifically, it is about linking human nature and the *Dao* of heaven by adopting the way of Buddhist thinking.”⁴

Feng Qi did not attempt to apply materialist dialectics to solving the puzzle of whether matter or thought is primary; instead, he used Marxist dialectics to probe into a Chinese philosophical issue—the relation between human nature and the heavenly *Dao*, which does not fall into the field of the epistemological study but rather the realm of life. Moreover, he drew on the Buddhist ideal of “transforming knowledge into wisdom” to tackle the issue. He argued that “Through the interaction of knowing the world and oneself on the basis of practice, man and nature, humanity and the *Dao* are complementary to one another through the dialectical unification of theory and practice; in a way, virtue and the *Dao* are manifested by melding the elements. Eventually, knowledge is transformed into a realm of wisdom and free virtue, where the border between finite and infinite is blurred.”

Following up on this idea, Feng applied analytical philosophy to examining a series of concepts, such as “experience,” “subject,” “knowledge,” “wisdom,” “virtue” and so on. As a result, an important proposition was consequently drawn from his analyses: theories could be turned into methodologies as well as virtues.

In expounding his proposition, he pointed out, “While philosophical theory has to be infused into one’s way of thinking and research field as well as one’s own activities, one should also materialize both theory and method with one’s virtue and personality.” In fact, whether turning theory into method or virtue, practical material dialectics has a vital role to play. Therefore, “turning theory into method” is a way of acquiring not only knowledge but also wisdom.

Unlike knowledge, which is narrative, wisdom goes beyond any language, resulting in the transformation of knowledge. However, the process of “turning

⁴Feng Qi, *Omnibus of Feng Qi*.

knowledge into wisdom” can only be managed by “reasonable intuition.” In this connection, Feng explained, “The basic feature of the reasonable intuition of philosophy lies in a lively grasp of the infinite and absolute, which is a leap of rational thinking and virtuous cultivation.” “Rational intuition” is a leap through “synthesizing differentiation” based on logical analysis. Without logical analysis as a basis, it will be unconvincing, whereas without “synthesized differentiation” on the basis of logical analysis, it will be impossible to break new ground for philosophical research.

Feng’s logical analysis and synthesising ability are manifested in this theory, which is conceptualized as material dialectics. Once again, it reveals his ultimate purpose—applying material dialectics to resolve the issue of human nature and the *Dao* of heaven (namely the relationship between man and nature), an ancient philosophical puzzle that has been perplexing the Chinese up to now. I believe that Feng’s approach of applying Marxist material dialectics to Chinese philosophical studies is inevitable to build a localized Marxist philosophy in China.

Take another issue as an example—establishing Chinese hermeneutics, which I put forward in 1998. As we know, China has a longer history than the West in expounding its classics, and yet China has still not established systematic theories and methods in elaborating its philosophical issues. In the West, hermeneutics originated from interpreting the *Bible* and, having gone through a brewing process of several centuries it finally became a theoretical discipline in the 19th century, mainly thanks to Germans Friedrich Schleiermacher (1769–1834), a philosopher and theologian, and W. Dilthey (1835–1911), an historian and sociologist.

In fact, it took only a little more than a century for hermeneutics to become a “discipline” in the West. The reason for the absence of hermeneutics in the Chinese context, I think, very much lies in “cultural awareness.” Despite China’s long history of classics-interpretation, before Western hermeneutics was introduced into China, no one even thought to summarize the various theories and methods that had been applied to annotating Chinese classics by establishing these as a “discipline.” Targeting a certain subject, a discipline ought to be a conscious study which can produce a systematic theory and methods that are widely accepted by the society.

With Western hermeneutics spreading to China, we can now consider constructing Chinese hermeneutics, which is not only possible but absolutely necessary. Given China’s long history of classics-annotation, abundant resources and uniquely styled theories and methods accumulated over the course of two and half thousand years, if systematic sorting and summary are employed, surely certain theories and methodologies, distinct from that of Western hermeneutics, will be identified, which will make significant contributions to human culture and the study of philosophy the world over.

However, it is not easy to construct a Chinese-style hermeneutics. Currently, as western hermeneutics have been widely applied to many fields in China, some Chinese scholars are now working on foundations needed to build a Chinese hermeneutics, which so far have hardly been accepted in academic circles. By my understanding, efforts are needed in the following three aspects:

- (1) We should make greater efforts to study the history of how classics (especially the *Bible*) have been interpreted in the West, the theories and methods of Western hermeneutics created by Schleiermacher and Dilthey, the various ways of applying hermeneutics by different philosophical schools, and the differences among them.
- (2) By systematically sorting out the two-thousand-year history of China's interpretations of its classics, we can probe into the essence of their theories and methods, making this a branch of philosophy.
- (3) Since some positive results have been achieved in applying Western hermeneutics to many disciplines in China, careful scrutiny of the current experiments is required. To this end, I have written six papers in the hope of drawing the attention of my colleagues in the academic field. In a way, while sinicized hermeneutics can enrich the study of hermeneutics as whole, Chinese philosophy per se may also be brought into the mainstream of world philosophy.

Now is the time therefore to end the debates over “China versus the West and ancient versus contemporary.” We must realize that Chinese and Western philosophies, each with its strengths, can mutually benefit each another through dialogue. In fact, while Chinese philosophy is in its transition from the traditional to the modern, prominent scholars of Western philosophy (e.g. Martin Heidegger, Jürgen Habermas, François Jullien, Embathour Echo [Umberto Eco] and so on) also turned their eyes to China in the hope of getting some inspiration from Chinese philosophy. People should begin to realize that we are actually approaching to a “New Axial Age” characterized by reflecting on its cultural origins, passing on our cultural lifeblood and integrating the essence of all ages.

Clearly, Chinese philosophy is currently in such a transition where the East and West, ancient and contemporary, are meeting and mingling. As aforementioned, on the one hand, various sinicized philosophical schools (previously supposed to be dominated by Western culture) are now taking shape, such as sinicized phenomenology, hermeneutics and so on; on the other, by absorbing Western philosophy (including philosophies of other nations and countries), Chinese philosophy has been renewing itself, resulting in certain kinds of modern Chinese philosophy, such as modern Neo-Confucianism, modern Neo-Daoism and so on.

Looking into the 21st century, guided by the notion “tracing back to the original point with innovation,” Chinese philosophy will form a renewed philosophical system with its own unique features. “Tracing back to the original point” means being able to soundly grasp our philosophical sources, as Jaspers correctly pointed out—to trace back to *our* Axial Age over 2500 years ago, when all philosophies were generated. The vitality of our philosophy will increase in the new century along with our understanding of philosophical sources.

“Innovation” means we have to provide the interpretation of our traditional philosophy in conformity with our time, meanwhile forming new philosophical theories based on our traditional philosophical sources, applicable to some of the major problems confronting human society.

In fact, there is no division between “tracing back” and “innovation.” Only by digging deeply into the true spirit of traditional philosophy can we create a new rationale for the development of philosophy in due time. Likewise, only when we face up to the new questions with renewed philosophical explanations, can the true spirit of traditional Chinese philosophy be revived in the 21st century. Today, our nation is at the eve of its great rejuvenation, we therefore must waste no time in moving away from the confinement of “China versus West and ancient versus contemporary” and resuming the process of “tracing back to the original point with innovation” aiming to build a new and modern Chinese philosophy in the new era.

Chapter 10

Three “Carry on” Orientations in Modern Chinese Philosophy

Recently, I have written several articles concerning the current situation where Chinese culture is under the heavy impact of Western philosophy. Resembling the case in the Sui and Tang Dynasties (581–907) after Indian Buddhist culture was introduced to China during the Northern and Southern Dynasties (386–581), and Chinese culture started its transition from the previous stage of conflicting with foreign cultures to that of digesting and absorbing foreign cultures.

As we all know, in the Sui and Tang Dynasties Indian Buddhism had evolved into several localized Buddhist sects in China, such as Tian-tai, Hua-yan and Zen sects, forming the Buddhism infused with Chinese elements, most noticeably that of Neo-Confucianism and Daoism. We therefore often narrate that history in this way: Chinese culture had benefited from Indian culture and Indian Buddhism was in turn being promoted in China.

In other words, at that time China was experiencing a process where foreign cultures were accepted and localized in order to suit the Chinese way of life. In analyzing the phenomenon, two academic terms “carry-on” and “abide-by” were created by Feng Youlan. Typically, during the Sui and Tang Dynasties Indian Buddhism had been dealt with more by way of “carry-on” than of “abide-by.”

In order to promote Chinese culture to the world, making it an influential one, we should now go beyond the stage of “abide-by” and enter the stage of “carry-on,” where, in my view, explorations into at least three issues can be carried on in light of this approach, namely concerning traditional Chinese philosophy, certain Western philosophy and Marxist philosophy.

10.1 The “Carry-on” of Traditional Chinese Philosophy

Over the past century, under the immense impact of Western philosophy, Chinese philosophy has undergone a transformation from the traditional to the modern by absorbing and digesting the theories and methodologies of Western philosophy.

Several Chinese philosophers had made significant contributions to constructing modern Chinese philosophy, such as Xiong Shili, Zhang Dongsun, Feng Youlan, Jin Yuelin, He Lin and so on.

Their philosophical approach was no longer “abide-by” but “carry-on” which had taken in Western philosophy for reference. Feng Youlan’s New Confucian philosophy, for example, carries on rather than abides by the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming Dynasties. By the same token, the philosophy of the philosophers in the Song and Ming Dynasties, the so-called “Neo-Confucianism,” came into being after absorbing and infusing Indian Buddhism.

Feng’s “carry-on” approach introduced into Chinese philosophy Platonic “universals” and “particulars” as well as the thought of the latent of the New Realism Philosophy. He divides the world into “truth” (or “idea” or *Tai Chi*) and reality. A matter in reality becomes a matter relying on “idea.” In this way, his New Confucian philosophy carries on the thought that “the principle is one and its manifestation are many” of the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming Dynasties on the one hand and, applies the thoughts of “universals” and “particulars” of Western philosophy into Chinese philosophy on the other, giving impetus to the modern transformation of Chinese philosophy.

The approach of “carry-on” applied in Feng’s *New Confucian Philosophy* was actually to use a new bottle to contain old wine as he described, since he carried on analysis of Chinese philosophy using certain thoughts of Western philosophy. In response to the criticism of Hong Qian, a scholar of Viennese School, he clarified the differences between his metaphysics and the old one in his book entitled *A New Understanding of Terms*, attempting to integrate the approach of Chinese philosophy with that of Western philosophy.

In his opinion, Western philosophy is better at analysis (metaphysically positive method), while traditional Chinese philosophy does best in intuitive impression (metaphysically negative method), and his metaphysics applied in New Confucian Philosophy is the combination of both, which not only carries on Chinese philosophy but Western philosophy as well. The issue here is not a nominal one but the idea and approach of taking in Western philosophy in view of transforming Chinese philosophy from the traditional into the modern.

In the meantime, the “new ideology of mind” is represented by He Lin, whose well-known paper entitled “Further comment on the unity of knowledge and action” explores Wang Yangming’s theory of “knowledge as action” using a Western philosophical approach in analyzing the concepts of “knowledge” and “action,” identical to Feng Youlan’s approach of “new bottle and old wine.” As He points out, “knowledge” (*zhi*) is mental activity, “action” (*xing*) is physical activity, and the so-called “knowledge as action” is nothing else but taking two actions simultaneously.

He Lin called his theory “natural knowledge as action,” although the idea was mainly based on the synchronization of knowledge and action proposed by Western philosopher Spinoza, he made further explanation, “‘Knowledge as action’ refers to two aspects of a behavior—the mental aspect and physical aspect; since they belong to one action, they are naturally united.” This conclusion could be seen as being drawn from modern psychological and biological knowledge.

He Lin believes that Wang Yangming’s theory of “unity of knowledge and action” surely embodied virtue and self-cultivation, presenting a certain moral code, it nevertheless requires an epistemological basis. He says, “Studying the issue of ‘knowledge and action’ uncritically and discussing morality indiscriminately will certainly lead to dogmatic ethics.” As a result, his theory of “natural knowledge as action” has complemented Wang Yangming’s “unity of knowledge and action” by providing a rational knowledge foundation. He Lin’s “further commentary” is, though not perfect, new in the sense of incorporating Western philosophy and modern knowledge, raising several new issues for exploration. Therefore, his theory is not “abide-by” but “carry-on” Wang Yangming’s “unity of knowledge and action.”

Unlike Feng Youlan and He Lin, who had received formal education in Western philosophy in Europe and the United States, Xiong Shili’s knowledge of Western philosophy was mostly from reading the translated works or lectures of Zhang Dongsun. However, Xiong is certainly an influential figure in modern Chinese philosophy, as well as one of the founders of modern neo-Confucianism. He discusses ontology in his works *A New Treatise on Epistemology* and *Ontology*: Since substance has virtue function, without function there will be no substance and vice versa. Clearly, this has led to the study of relations between “noumenon” and “phenomenon.”

Disagreeing with Western philosophy in dividing the world into “noumenon” and “phenomenon,” Xiong points out, “Western philosophy takes phenomenon as transformation whereas substance as reality, which has been trapped on the point as in Buddhism.” In his view, Buddhism regards the state of immortality and inaction as one world, whereas mortality and action are another. Generally speaking, issues concerning “noumenon” and “phenomenon” have long been a topic discussed in Western philosophy since Greek philosophy. Without judging his understanding of Western philosophy, on relations between spirit and the material, his proposition of the “macrocosm of human life” is certainly influenced by theories of Schopenhauer and Bergson.

Xiong published only part of his *New Epistemology*—“On Noumenon.” Although he did not finish the rest of his manuscript, in which he was supposed to write more on epistemology, his theoretical framework can roughly be discerned. In general, Xiong believed that traditional Chinese philosophy accentuates intuitive feelings more rather than dialectical analysis, so “the right way is to combine Chinese and Western cultures” and “China should absorb more of the Western way of thinking to open it up.”

He suggested that we should combine Chinese intuition with Western analysis to make a more comprehensive way of learning. It seemed to be a consensus in China’s academic circle at that time that it was necessary to introduce modern Western epistemology to make up its shortcomings. Surely, none of these three philosophers had “abided by” traditional Chinese philosophy in searching of constructing modern Chinese philosophy; rather, they all made effort to absorbing Western philosophical thoughts by way of “carrying on” when confronting enormous impact from the West.

As for Jin Yuelin's philosophy, whether his approach is "carry-on" or "abide-by" is still questionable in the field of Chinese philosophy studies. As Feng Youlan claimed that comparing his philosophy of "new bottle and old wine," Jin's is "new bottle and new wine." Having said that, is there significant difference between Jin and Feng's philosophies?

Recently, I have read professor Yu Xuanmeng's comment on Jin's theory. He believes that the ideal and approach employed in Jin's *On the Dao* are all Western, aiming at creating a world that is purely theoretical. However, the theoretical world has to take care of reality, that is the dilemma Western philosophy has been confronted with since Plato. Attempting to avoid the dilemma, Jin's *On the Dao* nevertheless ends up being trapped in the same dilemma as well.

Here is a question: Whether Jin's philosophy carries on traditional Chinese philosophy or Western philosophy? Professor Hu Jun believes that many of the philosophical issues that Jin raised initially made criticism of Hume's philosophy (such as his metaphysics were mainly for solving Hume's problem of cause and result or that of induction), in general, Jin further promoted apriorism based on the relevant theories of Russell and Lewis and constructed his metaphysic system in relation to the propositions of innateness and apriority.

However, can we thus say that Jin's philosophy was constructed for the purpose of solving problems of Western philosophy? In his article, Hu points out, "the reason why Jin Yuelin wrote *On the Dao* was mainly because he attempted to internalize the *Dao*, the symbol of Chinese culture, into his own thought and life." According to Jin himself, "since I was born and grew up in China, naturally I am Chinese, in my way of thinking and feeling." "The *Dao*, cannot be named, nor be exhausted by explanations of various schools, admired by the Chinese people utterly from their hearts, tangling in everything, every way and every cause, is in fact the most lofty concept of Chinese people, motivating the nation moving forward. Philosophically, I can only approach the *Dao* from my way that has been engaged in many years, either clearly or vaguely. Personally, however, it is hard for me to desert 'self,' being inevitably confined to such a way of the *Dao*, which makes me restless as well. Often, nevertheless, I am quite content with the *Dao* achieved in this way."¹

Clearly, although many Western philosophical issues have been brought into his system, Jin's purpose was to solve the problems of Chinese philosophy, enriching its content and making it connectable to the world. In fact, the philosophical topics most frequently discussed then by Jin Yuelin, such as "universals" and "particulars," concerned both Chinese and Western philosophical circles. In his *A History of Modern Chinese Philosophy*, he said, "In the 1930s and 1940s, issues concerning 'universals,' especially the 'existence of universals' drew attention from the circle of Chinese philosophical studies ... 'Universals,' unequal to 'particulars,' does not occupy any space-time owing to its transcendent nature. However, 'universals' cannot be split from 'particulars;' it is possible only in theory but not in reality. In nature, however,

¹Liu Peiyu, *Studies on Jin Yuelin's Thought*, Beijing: People's Publishing Press, 2002 (p. 59).

‘universals’ are immanent and therefore contained in ‘particulars.’ Having analyzed in this way, the hotly debated issues were consequently resolved and, so were the questions like ‘ration above matter’ or ‘matter within matter.’”²

Feng continued, “Jin Yuelin is a representative figure of Neo-Confucian philosophy.” In conclusion, Jin’s philosophy, though full of issues of Western philosophy and identical to Western philosophy in methodology, shows that his intention was to solve problems of Chinese philosophy, making a necessary transition for traditional Chinese philosophy be transformed into a modern philosophy. Today, when we talk about “Chinese philosophy” we therefore have to pay particular attention to the “carry-on” of Jin Yuelin.

10.2 The Carry-on of Modern Western Philosophy

During the Sui and Tang Dynasties (581–907) as mentioned above, several Sinicized Buddhist sectors such as Tian-tai, Hua-yan and Zen had come into being. By absorbing and fusing thoughts of Confucianism and Daoism, they further “carried on” Indian Buddhism, becoming Chinese Buddhism. Confronting Western philosophy now, can we introduce some Chinese philosophical thoughts and issues into Western philosophy so as to form certain sinicized schools of Western philosophy? If it is feasible, then can’t we say that Chinese philosophy is “carrying on” Western philosophy moving forward?

In my previous article, I raised the issue of constructing “Chinese hermeneutics,” discussing how to introduce the Chinese thoughts of classic interpretation into Western hermeneutics to form a hermeneutics with Chinese characteristics. Recently, I have read the book entitled *Modern Annotation on Chinese Philosophy* by professor Jing Haifeng. In its section two of chapter one, he divided the history of hermeneutics into six stages, which can be roughly summarized as three periods: pre-hermeneutics period (Bible interpretation and philology), classical hermeneutics (Schleiermacher and Dilthey) and contemporary hermeneutics.

In his view, the concepts and system of traditional Chinese annotations, probably can only be defined as “pre-hermeneutics” since it was not until the 1970s to 1980s after Western hermeneutics was introduced into China by some Chinese scholars attempting to establish a Chinese hermeneutic system and methodology. He points out Fu Weixun, Cheng Zhongying, Huang Junjie and Tang Yijie as representative figures in this regard. These four scholars, however, surely do not wish to set up a discipline that will be regarded as “pre-hermeneutics” or “classic hermeneutics” by the West, but truly “modern Chinese hermeneutics” comparable to “modern hermeneutics” in the West. To this end, they have certainly made meaningful efforts.

Fu Weixun put forward the concept of “creative hermeneutics,” dividing philosophical thinking (philosophical questions) into five levels: a. Literal level,

²Ibid, (p. 75).

exploring the original connotations; b. Intentional level, searching the motivation; c. Implication level, revealing the true meaning; d. Annotational level, analyzing the way of being interpreted; e. Creative level, reasoning their unspoken words.

The fifth level may best display the creativity of modern hermeneutics. That is to say, through constant mindset searching, hermeneutic experts could be transformed into creative thinkers. Using his "creative hermeneutics," Fu has in fact annotated several classical works and achieved fruitful results, such *Tao Te Ching*, *Platform Sūtra*, *Faith in Mahayana Theory*, etc.

Different from Fu Weixun, whose hermeneutics is more methodology-oriented, Cheng Zhongying paid particular attention to the ontological aspect of hermeneutics. In Cheng's view, noumenon has rich connotations in Chinese philosophy, being both as its historical origin and thinking system. So the noumenon of Chinese philosophy is bound to hermeneutic, involving intuition, understanding, cognition as well as evaluation. Any interpretation of meaning system in turn will inevitably go back to ontology, as Xiong Shili's theory of "substance and function are one" rightly states.

Cheng Zhongying classified hermeneutics into two types: namely "hermeneutics based on noumenon" (the Western ontology) and "hermeneutics seeking noumenon" (the Chinese ontology). Since the latter has no pre-supposition or pre-condition, it is a world view formulated by reflection, therefore it is a dynamic ontology rather than static ontology. Cheng further divided his hermeneutics into two phrases and ten aspects. Heavily influenced by Western philosophy as he is, Cheng's hermeneutics has nonetheless always been orientated toward Chinese philosophy, since he believes that the highest philosophical noumenon has to be the dualistic animate ontology where knowledge and axiology are integrated. Clearly, orientating ontological issues to dispositional ones has characterized Chinese philosophy.

Jing Haifeng regards Huang Junjie's hermeneutics as "classical hermeneutics centering on Mencius." He attempts to classify researchers on Mencius into two camps: the philosophical/ideational one versus historical/ideological one, and he believes that the two approaches can be united in hermeneutics and complementary to one another. If we make full play of the advantages of traditional Chinese classical interpretation (such as the historicalness of interpreters, the subjectivity of the awareness of questioning, the cycling of interpretation) and discover the rich resources of ancient classics interpretation (from a history of over two thousand years and voluminous classical literature), then it is quite possible to construct Chinese hermeneutics.

Huang Junjie concluded that there were three basic types of interpreting *Mencius* in history: First, interpreting it as an expression of the interpreters' mind, reminding us of Confucian learning of self-nourishment since the interpretation of classics had been interwoven with the interpreters' life; Second, interpreting the Confucian thinking as study of politics, manifesting the moral tone of the political ideal of Confucianism; Third, interpreting the doctrine as a protective tool for its rich historical resources in order to maintain its originality and legitimacy.

Although the analysis on *Mencius* was an individual case, Huang's study has universal meanings in revealing how Confucian classics could be interpreted. It is

precisely based on the long tradition of Chinese classics interpretation that I proposed constructing Chinese hermeneutics, which should be different from that in the West and is feasible in no time. To this end, however, we have to fully comprehend the history and current development and apply Western hermeneutic theories and methods to traditional Chinese classic interpretation before we can conclude some of the features of Chinese classic interpretation and set up “Chinese hermeneutics” as a discipline.

I have also attempted to make some preliminary analysis on different methods of interpreting Pre-Qin classics. Nevertheless, I don’t think enough effort has yet been made by Chinese scholars to construct certain modes of “contemporary Chinese hermeneutics,” which has to be based on ample Chinese classic thoughts and philosophical analyses of Western hermeneutics understood in a Chinese context. Besides, we may also contemplate setting up Chinese semiotics, Chinese phenomenology and so on. Chinese symbols, in fact, originated from the *Book of Changes*, evolved into *wu xing* (five elements) in *Hong Fan*, mysterious patterns in *Hetu Luoshu*, abracadabra in Daoism and mathematics from the Song Dynasty onward. Can these specific symbols become the subject of our philosophical studies? Similarly, Guo Xiang’s comment on Chuang-Tzu and analyses of Buddhism on the “world of phenomenon” may also be taken into consideration in forming a discipline different from Western phenomenology.

In the 21st century, if we, a nation who created Chinese Buddhism in the Sui and Tang period, can still be creative in building several sinicized philosophical schools influential in the West, then we will be considered to have made a significant contribution to philosophy in the world today as a whole.

10.3 The Carry-on of Marxist Philosophy

The late Mr. Feng Qi was a creative Marxist, who made an attempt to localize Marxism by fully absorbing traditional Chinese philosophy and combing it with Western analytical philosophy. His *Three Talks on Wisdom* was a benign experiment in integrating practical material dialectics of Marxism, Western analytical philosophy and traditional Chinese philosophy.

In the “Introduction” of the paper, he put it straightforwardly: “The piece is mainly about dialectics based on practical cognitive process. More specifically, it is about human nature and the *Dao* of heaven by leaping up the way of Buddhist thinking.” By creatively applying practical material dialectics, Feng’s target was not analyzing Western philosophical issues, but rather solving the problem of “human nature and the *Dao* of heaven,” a typical Chinese philosophical topic. Concerning how to acquire insightfulness of the topic, he employed the Buddhist concept of “transforming knowledge into wisdom.”³

³Feng Youlan, *Omnibus of Feng Youlan*.

He said, “Through the interaction of knowing the world and oneself on the basis of practice, man and nature, humanity and the *Dao* are complementary to one another by dialectical unification of theory and practice; in a way, virtue and the *Dao* are manifested by melting the elements. Eventually, knowledge is transformed into a realm of wisdom and free virtue, where the border of finite and infinite is blurred.”

Following it up, Feng applied analytical philosophy to examining a series of concepts, such as “experience,” “subject,” “knowledge,” “wisdom,” “virtue” and so on, concluding the way of how to transform knowledge into wisdom in the process of knowing the world and the self, which I believe is a typical pattern of Chinese thought. An important proposition was consequently drawn from his analyses: theory could be turned into methodologies as well as virtues.

In the author’s view, while theory and method are united in Marxism, theory and virtue are one in Chinese philosophy. What he actually attempted to achieve was to combine theory, method and virtue as one. As he explained, “While philosophical theory has to be infused into one’s way of thinking, research field as well as his own activities, one should also materialize the theory and method with one’s virtue and personality.”

According to Feng, whether turning theory into method or virtue, practical material dialectics always serves as a foundation. “Turning theory into method” is not only a way of acquiring knowledge but also wisdom. Unlike knowledge, which is narrative, wisdom goes beyond any language, resulting in the transformation of knowledge.

However, the process of “turning knowledge into wisdom” can only be managed by reasonable intuition. In this connection, Feng explained, “The basic feature of the reasonable intuition of philosophy lies in lively grasp of the infinite and absolute, which is a leap of rational thinking and virtuous cultivation.” In a sense, it is similar to the epistemology of integrating personal thought and moral cultivation proposed by Xiong Shili.

“Rational intuition” is a leap through “synthesizing differentiation” based on logical analysis. Without logical analysis as a basis, it will be unconvincing, whereas without “synthesized differentiation” on the basis of logical analysis, it will be impossible to break new ground for philosophical research. Feng’s logical analysis and synthetical ability are manifested in this theory, which is theorized by material dialectics. Once again, it reveals his ultimate purpose—applying material dialectics to resolve the issue of human nature and the *Dao* of heaven (namely the relation between man and nature), an ancient philosophical puzzle that has been perplexing the Chinese up to now.

I believe that Feng’s approach of applying Marxist material dialectics to Chinese philosophical studies is an inevitable course to build localized Marxist philosophy in China. More than just passively “following” Marxist philosophy, Feng instead was actually “carrying on” the essence of Marxist philosophy by introducing Chinese philosophical thoughts and Chinese philosophical issues into Marxist philosophy. Now, it may be necessary to briefly introduce Zhang Shenfu’s philosophical thought. In the preface of *Interviews with Zhang Shenfu*, well-known

philosopher Zhang Dainian wrote, “Zhang Shenfu highly recommended Marxist material dialectics and logical analysis of Western analytical philosophy and has made an attempt to combine the two. While realizing ‘dissecting’ and ‘materializing’ as being two major trends of the 20th century’s philosophy, he also praised the Confucian theory of *Ren* (humanity) and proposed a view of the trinity of Lenin, Russell and Confucius.”

In his *Small Talks*, Zhang said, “I always believe that Confucius, Lenin and Russell are essentially one, which is the view that can not only renew Chinese philosophy but also benefit philosophical studies in the world.” Consequently, he put forward his theory of “grand objective world-view.” In his article “My Philosophy,” Zhang said, “My theory is to embrace both objectivity and subjectivity; the so-called grand objective world-view means extending the objective boundary to subjectivity, with an emphasis on objectivity... But one of the flaws in Western philosophy is the sharp dichotomy of the subjective world and objective world.” He then made further explanation on his theory from the perspectives of truth, beauty and benevolence, setting up “fairness” as a criterion of his philosophical theory, which has to be the combination of subjectivity and objectivity. Later, he summarized his theory into three sequential words: *shi* (materialism), *huo* (dialectics and logical analysis) and *zhong* (golden mean). In this sense, Zhang’s philosophy is based on materialism, supported by logical analytical approach, and targeted at the “golden mean.” In his *Small Talks*, published in the 1940s, although he attempted to combine the thoughts of Confucius, Leninism and Russell, he nevertheless returned to Chinese philosophy eventually.

On June 4, 1980 Zhang Shenfu said in his Conversation with Vera Schwarcz, “I might be one of the greatest thinkers of China in the 20th century (with some pride in his eyes) since I have attempted to do something impossible, that is to combine the best of traditional Chinese philosophy with the newly developed philosophical ideas in the West ... I still believe that my theory of grand objective world-view can link up with the two different worlds.” Regrettably, he didn’t conclude his theory with a substantial book.

Throughout his life, Zhang had always highly recommended the material dialectics of Marxism and Russell’s philosophy until his remaining years when he finally returned to Confucianism, which could probably characterize modern Chinese philosophers.

Concerning the three “carry-on” aforementioned, I may make the following points as food for thought:

(1) Since Chinese philosophy did not establish as an independent discipline, separating from the study of Confucian classics until the 20th century when Western philosophy was introduced into China, exerting great impact, it is naturally confronted with a dual task of dealing with traditional Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy, namely modern Chinese philosophy could either carry on traditional Chinese philosophical thoughts or Western philosophy to further construct Chinese philosophy.

(2) With the efforts of many Chinese scholars in absorbing useful elements of Western philosophy, Chinese philosophy has been gradually taking shape from its

traditional form. However, once its richness is revealed, its theoretical value will undoubtedly become part of the spiritual treasure of philosophical studies in the world.

A nation or country is supposed to take its philosophy as the root for its survival and development. Therefore, carrying on traditional Chinese philosophy to constructing modern Chinese philosophy has become a vital route. In the hope of building certain localized Western philosophical schools, we probably have to not only systematically translated and introduced Western classical philosophical thoughts of different periods resembling some senior monks’ practice in the Northern and Southern Dynasties (420–589) but also studied Western classics as some senior monks did in the Sui and Tang Dynasties (581–907) in order to integrate Chinese thoughts into Western philosophy, making them an organic whole and going global.

It has been widely acknowledged that Marxist philosophy, though originated from the West, has had a special and profound influence on China over the past century or so. The task of modern Chinese philosophers, therefore, is to further localize Marxist philosophy, infusing Chinese philosophical elements into it by engaging mutual dialogues so as to solve Chinese philosophical and social issues, as well as to contribute to the development of Chinese society, and even human society as a whole.

(3) In the meantime, the so-called “carry on” also means we should pay close attention to the achievements Chinese philosophers had made in the 1930s and 1940s in building modern Chinese philosophy, including making proper evaluations on the philosophical issues they raised, as some of the new generation philosophers are currently engaged in.

Furthermore, by reading *Exploring Modern Chinese Philosophy*, I have found professor Chen Lai’s theory has certainly further deepened Feng Youlan’s thoughts on Neo-Confucianism, providing some meaningful comments as food for thought. Such is the way of being a philosopher—never stop questioning and innovating but avoid impulsivity.

(4) Some scholars suggested that in exploring philosophical thoughts, various approaches should be employed, including “contradiction” or “alternativity.” Historically, this was proved right in developing different schools of philosophical thoughts. Hanfei Zi’s *Five Malignance*, for example, was written in opposition to the Confucian school and Mohist school; Chuang-Tzu of the Daoist school may be counted as an “alternative thought” in relation to Confucianism. In fact, this kind of “contraction” or “alternativity” can also be seen as another kind of “carry on” in terms of forming the history of human culture.

In terms of “carry on,” we can say *Five Malignance* carried on the earlier legalists on the one hand, and carried on Confucian and Mohist thought from an opposition position on the other. Similarly, in writing his book, while Chuang-Tzu took a different approach from Confucian thought, he also deviated slightly from the orthodox versions of *Lao-Tzu* unearthed in Guodian. By criticizing Confucian thought he actually carried on traditional Chinese philosophical thoughts from an

alternative perspective. Therefore, the value of philosophical research lies in constant proposition of new ideas and new approaches in searching new directions and new fields.

In conclusion, modern Chinese philosophy should adequately “carry on” the achievements of Chinese and foreign philosophers before it can thrive and make contributions to the revival of the Chinese nation and the orderly and rational development of all mankind.

Chapter 11

Confucian Ethical Codes and Modern Chinese Entrepreneurial Spirit

In the 1980s and 1990s, China started its transition from planned economy to market economy. During the process, certain important issues emerged: What kind of ethos the Chinese entrepreneurs should have? What role traditional Chinese culture, especially Confucianism has to play given the profound influence it has had on our nation as a mainstream national culture?

The book titled *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* written by Max Weber (1864–1920) is an important work in exploring the relations between the rise of western capitalism and the Protestant ethic (especially Calvinism). It has caught widespread attention among academic circles around the world, especially among Chinese scholars in East Asia.

After World War II, the rapid economic development of Japan and the rise of the Asian “four tigers” meant the relationship between Confucian ethics and the East Asian economic miracle became a hot topic. As Max Webber points out in the “Introduction” of his book, “Capitalism” is synonymous with profit making and remaking by a sustainable and rational way of capitalist entrepreneurial activities. It is doomed to fail for any individual entrepreneurs who are incapable of using any opportunities to make profit in a normal capitalist social order.¹

In Weber’s view, an entrepreneur has to devote his whole life to making money out of money through a kind of “transcended and irrational spirit” based on Calvinism and, usually by way of a rational manner. As the Asian economic crisis occurred at the end of last century, Webster’s question seems to have been ignored.

In today’s world, however, confronted with a situation where China’s Confucianism is being revived, and economic crises have perplexed some of major countries in Europe and North America, the issue may be re-approached from a slightly different perspective. According to Webster, as mentioned above, the goal

¹Weber, Max. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* in Chinese, Xi’an: Shaanxi Normal University General Publishing, 2006, p. 4.

of modern capitalism, motivated mainly by the spirit of Calvinism, is to make money through rational means. In other words, in Calvinism, making money is taken as a religious “holy duty” to glorify God.²

By “most rational ways,” it mainly means the scientific operation and management popularly employed in western enterprises. In analyzing the question of purpose and means, we may slightly switch to another angle: taking the “purpose” as a goal to promote social welfare and to lift up entrepreneurial spirit by using all the necessary “means.” If we can consider the relationship between economic purpose and means in this way, it will be very much in line with the Confucian ethical code. Unlike the Protestant ethic, which is infused with “transcendental and irrational” religious significance, the Confucian ethic very much emphasizes the significance of secular social life. As the *Book of Changes* (in “The Survey Part II”) says, “What is the purpose of people gathering together? Surely for wealth.” This implies the mass could be held together by wealth as a means. It is where the spirit of Confucian ethics lies.

Mencius also said, “People are living in such a way: when they have real estate, they would make long term decisions; otherwise, they wouldn’t.” And long term decisions and people’s gathering have to be based on certain moral codes and behavioral principles. He added, “Any benevolent governance must begin with allocating farmlands,” which refers to the “nine squares” system of land ownership in China’s feudal society where a block of standard land equals 900 mu (1 mu = 6 acres). Of which 100 mu was public and the rest 800 mu was allocated as private lands to eight households, who had to plow the public land first before they could do their own.

By allowing people to own their property, Confucianism is not against every form of profit-making; instead, it advocates that profit making has to be done in a proper way and cannot forsake righteousness at the sight of money. As Confucius said, his life-long goal was to pursue the *Dao* of heaven, by which social justice and people’s well-being will be improved. I believe that this goal has to be achieved through “most rational means” of profit-making before human society (especially Chinese society) enters the modern or post-modern period. Chinese entrepreneurs, if they can do business in this way—taking people’s well-being as their ultimate goal and running their enterprises through most rational means, will certainly find their spiritual realm be on a constant rise.

As it is said in the *Book of Changes* (in “The QianHexagram”) “Material benefits are used to settle people for the purpose of adoring virtue;” “Welfare is the sum of righteousness.” Surely, the term “welfare” here refers to public interest. Cheng Yi (1033–1107) also pointed out, “Righteousness and welfare are synonymous with ‘public’ and ‘private’ respectively,” which means righteousness and welfare have to be judged by the dichotomy of the public and the private. In Confucianism, making profit for public benefits through a most rational way is a

²Weber, Max. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* in Chinese Xi’an: Shaanxi Normal University General Publishing, 2006, pp. 54–55.

noble spirit that in my view the Chinese entrepreneurs should possess. Here I may borrow Feng Youlan's theory of "four states of life": the innocent state, the utilitarian state, the moral state and the transcendent state, beginning with the lowest, the innocent sphere.

In the innocent state mankind is a kind of species surviving like other animals without much consciousness about the goal of life. In the utilitarian state, people become conscious beings who furiously pursue interests. Entering the moral state, based on the profits they made, people start dedicating to public interest, making a contribution to society. Furthermore, once people have a universe in their mind, they will be living in the transcendent state, where they not only contribute to society but the universe. This is the state where man is not only in harmony with others but with himself. In other words, he has completely "settled" himself, an utmost state pursued by the Confucian school of the Song Dynasty.

If Chinese entrepreneurs can truly make their goal to improve people's welfare by employing the most reasonable means, then they will be counted as modern Chinese entrepreneurs with the spirit of Confucian ethics, engaging in a great cause that is "to ordain conscience for heaven and earth, to secure life and fortune for the people, to inherit sacred teachings for preceding sages and to initiate peace and security for all ages," an ideal state revealed by Zhang Zai (1020–1077). By achieving this state, they will become men of morality and universality.

As Zhu Xi said, "One should have a tranquilized mind to deal with all sorts of situations, even if the world is in chaos, he can still resist vicious influences and have peace of mind. Otherwise, even if the world is in good order, his mind and body may be still restless. It should be realized that in this regard, it makes no difference whether it's in a country or a household." In a word, according to Confucianism there is nothing wrong in pursuing profit as long as he sets his mind to improving public welfare and personal spirit through justified means.

We have also noticed that in Weber's view modern capitalism, as an exception, can only happen once in human history. In this sense, Weber does not quite agree with the theory of historical homogeneity of social development. Namely, the combination of modern western capitalism with the Protestant ethics is merely an exceptional case which can only happen in modern western society. This is to say, there is more than one mode for modern enterprises; they vary according to different cultural traditions. By the same token, the combination of Chinese enterprises and Confucianism will surely produce modern entrepreneurs of Chinese style, therefore Confucian ethics should not be neglected in terms of nourishing the Chinese entrepreneurial ethos, just as in the same way the Christian ethic has never been neglected for its irreplaceable influence in western capitalism development. We should also realize that the Protestant ethic is only one of the many causes contributing to the rise of modern capitalism in the West, there were also other factors such as political, geographical and historical reasons. The establishment and development of Chinese enterprises surely cannot be attributed to Confucianism alone, which nevertheless should be paid thorough attention by Chinese enterprises.

Enterprises surely have to make money in order to increase social wealth. However, it seems to be paradoxical to making money while using the “most rational means.” In Western experience, it is precisely because the “most reasonable means” are used that brings out today’s social wealth. Chinese entrepreneurs, therefore, have a lot to learn from their Western counterparts in making maximum profit through most rational means in their operational and managerial systems accumulated over the past two or three hundred years. If they have set their goal for public welfare, the spirit of modern Chinese entrepreneurs will surely be elevated, since their purpose of making money is not only for society but for the universe (nature). In that sense, they will reach not only the moral state but also the universal state.

If all of our entrepreneurs can run their business with the Confucian ethos, they will take care of the following three major problems that profoundly influence the orderly development of human society: conflicts between man and nature, conflicts between peoples of different countries and nations, as well as conflicts between the mind and body within man.

(1) What causes “ecological problems” on our planet? The main reason is human destruction of the natural environment. In 1992, for instance, 1575 scientists around the world issued a report titled *The Warning of Scientists to Humanity*, it says “Human beings and nature are on courses conflicting with one another.” This is very much the reflection of the current situation.

Over the past two or three hundred years or so, whilst industrialization or modernization has greatly improved people’s livelihood, in the meantime it has also ruthlessly damaged the natural environment which humans rely on to survive due to excessive disorder and exploitation. This has very much to do with the traditional Western idea of “man-nature dichotomy.”

As Russell put it in his *A History of Western Philosophy*, “Contacts between different civilizations have often in the past proved to be landmarks in human progress. Greece learnt from Egypt, Rome from Greece, the Arab from the Rome Empire, medieval Europe from the Arabs, and Renaissance Europe from the Byzantines. In many of these cases, the pupils proved better than their masters. In the case of China, if we regard the Chinese as pupils, this may be the case again.”³

That is to say, in Western cultural tradition, the spiritual and material worlds have long been regarded as two separated and unrelated worlds where mind and body are contradictory to one another and, nature has not been seen as part of living conditions but often been conquered to meet man’s requirements. On the contrary, according to Confucian mind-set, man and nature are integrated; one cannot develop alone while disregarding the other, which was a view put forward as early as the 3rd century BC. Such as in *The Book of Changes*, it says “Changes are the convergence of the *Dao* of man and nature.”⁴ Most of the renowned Confucian

³Russell, Bertrand. *A History of Western Philosophy*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972.

⁴*Guodian Bamboo Slips*, Cultural Relics Publishing House, 1998 (Chap. 1).

thinkers have carried forward the idea of “unity of man and heaven.” Most noticeably, as Zhu Xi said, “Heaven is man and man is heaven; man originated from heaven and its nature is in turn manifested in man.”

Therefore, man should not only “know heaven” (know the way of heaven) but also hold heaven in awe, since in the Confucian view, heaven is not only something natural but has a sacred nature as well. Nowadays, people tend to treat heaven with little respect, which is at odds with the Confucian holistic approach of knowing as well as revering heaven (nature). “Knowing heaven” without “holding heaven in awe” will treat it as something lifeless and fail to recognize its animate nature (as it is said in *The Book of Changes*, “As heaven maintains its vigor through movement, a gentleman should constantly strive for self-perfection”) or fail to gain an insight that earth is the carrier bearing and nourishing all things in the universe (as it is said in *The Book of Changes*, “As earth’s condition is receptive devotion, a gentleman should hold the outer world with broad mind”). “Holding heaven in awe” without “knowing heaven,” however, will result in regarding heaven as a kind of mysterious external power rather than animate energy and will fail to recognize earth’s potential of nourishing a myriad of things in the universe. The unification of “knowing heaven” and “holding heaven in awe” manifests an innate responsibility man bears to heaven. In this way, “to ordain conscience for heaven and earth” equals to “to secure life and fortune for the people”—the two aspects cannot be separated.

Now, since we have witnessed the serious consequence that human society brought about by the thinking mode of the “man-nature” dichotomy, can we then solve the problem with another kind of thinking mode? Surely, the notion of “integration of man and heaven” is the choice, which can not only solve the current ecological crisis but also provide an alternative way of thinking for harmonizing the coexistence of man and nature. Chinese entrepreneurs in particular, endowed with Confucian cosmology, can certainly establish an image of a new type of entrepreneurs making a unique contribution to human society.

(2) At present, tensions have been built between peoples, nations and countries due to the expansion of power, pursuit of material interests and vicious plunder of natural resources, resulting in indifferent or hostile social and international relations, causing conflicts or even wars. In today’s world, neo-imperialism is posing a threat globally and various schools of fundamentalism have launched terrorist attacks on people around the world. If we let things drift without check, human society will suffer immensely. Can we then find something helpful in Confucian culture to drag human society out of this dilemma? The answer is definitely “yes.” In *The Guodian Bamboo Slips*, a comment on this point is worth noting: “The *Dao* originated from the affection.” That is to say, relations between people are based on emotions. In China family ties have always been highly valued. In answering what *ren* (benevolence) means, Confucius said, “it is nothing but love.”

“Benevolence is initiated from loving people; of which loving your parents is paramount and then you can extend your love to others.” The spirit of *ren* (benevolence), according to Confucianism, is innately based on loving one’s family members. However, *ren* ought not to halt here; it has to extend to others. As it is said

in *The Guodian Bamboo Slips*, “To love your parents can only be called ‘love,’ whereas to love all people is deemed *Ren*,” “By the same token, one’s filial piety to parents should be extended to all people under the sun.” The question now is how to translate *ren* into a benevolent government in society. Confucius said, “*Ren* means to restrain oneself and observe propriety. Once one does this the whole world will be embraced in his humane mind.” This means only by restoring propriety through self-cultivation can *ren* be achieved.

Fei Xiaotong provided a reasonable annotation: “Restoring propriety is a prerequisite for a person to enter society.” Since *ren* is an innate virtue and propriety is a set of rules regulating people’s behavior harmoniously, therefore they ought to be followed out of virtue spontaneously, that is the so-called *ren*. When *ren* is fully constituted in people’s daily life, a society will be peaceful and harmonious just as Confucius’ saying previously quoted. This is particularly meaningful to the leaders of developed countries, who are committed to rule their countries and participate in world’s affairs. They have to realize that this has to be done “benevolently,” and “hegemony” can only cause conflicts or even wars between nations and countries. Chinese enterprises may also consider applying certain ideas of “benevolent governance” into their practice, such as “expanding the love of family members to that of other people,” “letting all people have real estate so as to have long-term plans.” In that way, we may succeed in formulating our own social enterprise ethos and providing reference and aspiration for their counterparts in other countries.

(3) In Confucian culture, self-cultivation plays a significant role in building a harmonious society. According to the *Great Learning*, a classic of Confucianism, self-cultivation is paramount to anyone ranging from the emperor to common people; once self-cultivation reaches a certain level, managing the family, ruling the country and harmonizing society will naturally follow suit. Since the Confucian ideal of social harmony is based on self-cultivation, the coordination between one’s mind and body is highly valued. According to Confucianism, the ultimate goal of life is not life itself, nor wealth or social rank but the moral status that could benefit society. As Confucius said, “What perplexes me most when I see people don’t practice virtue, nor learn the doctrines, nor follow righteousness and nor correct themselves when they realize they are wrong.” Here is the life lesson: “practicing virtue” is not an easy task, which has to be led by a lofty ideal and concerns for the long-term interest of human life; “learn the doctrines” requires people to constantly improve themselves in knowledge and skills and take responsibility for social welfare; “follow righteousness” means people have to pursue morality on a daily basis and apply justice to social life; “correct oneself” should be the constant practice which makes a better and courageous person in society—all these teach us the way of how to achieve internal and external harmony as a person.

China should be a society of “rule by law” as well as a community of “cultivating people with morality.” If Chinese enterprises, in my view, can take the same approach, then the Confucian ideal of self-cultivation will become a very meaningful resource in lifting up Chinese entrepreneurs’ morale. Chinese entrepreneurs should have a Chinese style endowed with Confucian ideals as their inexhaustible thought resource.

Finally, let me make it clear that I don't think there is only one model for modern Chinese entrepreneurs to follow; there certainly are more of them since Chinese enterprises are still in the process of reshaping themselves. However, taking the Confucian ethic of 2000 years of history as their guiding principle, will certainly be one of the feasible choices.

Chapter 12

Chinese Philosophy Under the Influence of Western Philosophy

Originally, there was no such a word as “philosophy” or *zhe xue* in the Chinese language. The term *zhe xue* was coined by a Japanese scholar Nishi Amane (1829–97), who borrowed the two Chinese characters *zhe* (“wisdom”) and *xue* (“study”) to refer to “philosophy” originated in Ancient Greece and Rome.

This new term was introduced into China by a Chinese scholar, Huang Zunxian (1848–1905), and was well accepted by Chinese scholars. Accepted as it was, the question remained, regarding whether China had “philosophy” of the sort that was comparable to Western philosophy. Even last year, “the authentic nature of Chinese philosophy” as an academic issue was hotly debated in Mainland China.

Since Western philosophy was imported into China at the end of the nineteenth century, the foremost and most influential introducer, Hu Shih (1853–1921), had translated numerous Western philosophical texts into Chinese, especially those pertaining to evolutionary theory. Before long, the texts of Kant, Descartes, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche were also introduced to the Chinese people.

These movements provided a perspective on the issue of whether there is philosophy in China. Some Chinese scholars found that although “philosophy” was not an independent discipline in Chinese history, there were ample philosophical thoughts and questions in the classical Chinese canons, such as *Shang Shu (The Book of Classic History)*, *Yi Jing (The Book of Changes)*, *Lun Yu (the Analects of Confucius)*, *Lao-Tzu*, and *Chuang-Tzu*, that were comparable to those in Western philosophy. Surely, there were also significant differences between the inquiries in these canons and those in Western philosophy, and study of these differences is of value to scholarship.

We have to, however, acknowledge that, before the importation of Western philosophy, there was no scholarly study of Chinese philosophy in its own right, as a field distinct from “canon studies” (*jing xue*) and “traditions of the masters” (*zi xue*). From the first half of the twentieth century, there was a surge into China of the fields

of Western philosophy including Marxism, Pragmatism, Realism, Analytic Philosophy, Ancient Greek Philosophy, and nineteenth-century German Philosophy. This had a powerful impact on scholarship in China.

As a result of their engagement with Western philosophy and its frameworks, Chinese scholars attempted to compile voluminous collections of classical canons and commentaries associated with Confucius, Lao-Tzu, Chuang-Tzu among many others, in light of philosophical thinking in order to establish a discipline of “Chinese philosophy.”

In its early stage, such study focused only on the thoughts of particular individuals or isolated topics. By the twentieth century, however, the field of Chinese philosophy had been founded primarily along the line of studies in Chinese intellectual history. During this period, several volumes of “History of Chinese Philosophy” had been published, including Xie Wuliang’s *History of Chinese Philosophy* (1916), Hu Shih’s *Outline of the History of Chinese Philosophy* (1922), Feng Youlan’s *A History of Chinese Philosophy* (1931), demonstrating that Chinese philosophy had pre-Qin (before 221 B.C.) origins. In other words, these Chinese thinkers were consciously separating philosophical study from studies in classics and studies under masters, and establishing Chinese philosophy as an independent disciplinary field. Nevertheless, all these accounts of Chinese intellectual history were greatly influenced and defined by the frameworks supplied by Western philosophy.

From the 1930s, Chinese philosophers had absorbed and adapted Western philosophy in their accounts of Chinese philosophy. This led to the articulation of several modern versions of Chinese philosophy. The prominent thinkers of this period include Xiong Shili, Zhang Dongsun, Feng Youlan, and Jin Yuelin. Unfortunately, after 1949, such attempts to construct strains of modern Chinese philosophy were abruptly halted, as were studies that sought to further engage dialogue between Chinese and Western philosophies.

It was not until the 1980s, when China embraced reforms moving toward a more open society, that the study of Chinese philosophy was again permitted. The doctrines of existentialism, Western Marxism, phenomenology, structuralism, hermeneutics, postmodernism, semiotics, to name but a few, flooded into China. This not only broadened the horizons of Chinese philosophers, but also provided many different perspectives and parameters for richer, in-depth scholarship in Chinese philosophy.

From this brief retrospective on the history of the importation of Western philosophy into China, I would like to make the following proposals in order to generate further discussion.

12.1 Thanks to the Introduction of Western Philosophy, Chinese Philosophy Has Become an Independent Discipline

As mentioned above, there was neither an original Chinese term *zhe xue* nor did Chinese philosophy as an independent discipline originate in China. It was only in engagement with and response to Western philosophy that elements of philosophical ideas and philosophical questions were identified in the Chinese classics. Hence, the “Chinese philosophy” that had been developed through this period was primarily constructed according to paradigms and frameworks provided by Western philosophy.

Therefore, the so-called “Chinese philosophy” was in fact for a rather long period no more than “philosophical thinking” or “questions” from those ancient literatures, and its structure, terminology, and perspectives were mainly borrowed from their equivalents in Western philosophy. These include concepts such as idealism and materialism, ontology and cosmology, monism and dualism (or pluralism), empirical and transcendental, phenomenon and essence, universals and particulars, thought and existence, and the like. These conceptual frameworks were employed to explain certain notions in Chinese thought including *dao*, *tian*, and *xin*.

Existing ideas, issues, terminologies, concepts, and logic of Chinese philosophical thoughts were shaped by Western philosophy. Fortuitously, the result was greater clarity in the specification of issues and outline of concepts, as well as greater precision in logic. I suggest that this was a necessary step in the creation of a viable “Chinese philosophy” alienated from its traditional status.

“Modern Chinese philosophy” in the 1930s and 1940s was comprised by scholarly work that characteristically *continued* rather than *followed* the traditional discourse of Chinese philosophy. That is to say, in the process of studying and adapting Western philosophy, Chinese philosophers transformed Chinese philosophy from the traditional to the modern. This continued development in Chinese philosophy had to meet the criteria of Western philosophy; attempt to “converge the Chinese and the West” was primarily involved supplementing the shortcomings of Chinese scholarship with those of Western scholarship. Let me demonstrate this with two representative examples. The first is Xiong Shili’s doctrine of Neo-Buddhism and the second, Feng Youlan’s Neo-Confucianism. Xiong Shili’s Neo-Buddhism is only partially complete. The completed section, the “Doctrine of the Jing,” is a treatise that covers topics in the field of ontology in Western philosophy, albeit with some Chinese characteristics. The other section which he had originally planned to write was the “Doctrine of the Liang.” Had it been written, this section would have covered a topic area roughly equivalent to epistemology in Western philosophy. His other works allow us a glimpse as well into his view of Chinese philosophy as it stands in relation to Western philosophy.

He believes that traditional Chinese philosophy tended to place more emphasis on experiential wisdom than rational judgment or analysis. For Xiong, this is where discussions on epistemology in Western philosophy can benefit Chinese philosophy: He envisaged an epistemological approach that synthesized experiential

wisdom with rational analysis. In his approach to Neo-Confucianism, Feng Youlan asserts that his vision was not to follow, but to continue the Neo-Confucianism of the Song (960–1280) and the Ming Dynasties (1368–1644). Feng’s approach resulted in an introduction into Chinese philosophy the “universals” and “particulars” of Platonic philosophy, as well as ideas in Neo-Realism. Using this schema, the world is divided into “truth”—or principle or great ultimate—and “reality.” Accordingly, things in reality become what they are guided by their essence or principle to be. In adapting the bipolar concepts of truth and reality, Feng was able to continue the Neo-Confucian doctrine of the “many sharing the one.”

Another Neo-Confucian work of Feng Youlan, entitled *A New Understanding of Words*, discusses philosophical methodology and its relation to epistemological questions. According to Feng, Western philosophy excels in analysis while traditional Chinese philosophy excels in intuition. His treatment of Neo-Confucianism combines, and reaps the benefits of, both these approaches. Both Xiong Shili and Feng Youlan drew from traditional Chinese thought to articulate Chinese philosophy. However, they continued the tradition by taking on Western philosophy as the fundamental framework. Unfortunately, such benign developments based on the trend of the 1930s and 1940s in Chinese philosophy were forestalled by external conditions.

From the discussion above, it is clear that whether we understand Chinese philosophy in terms of its early forays into Chinese intellectual history or its continuing development in the early modern period in Chinese history, we must recognize that it was very much shaped by Western philosophy.

12.2 Taking Western Philosophy as a Paradigm May Cause Some Potential Problems in Constructing Chinese Philosophy

As human beings, we inevitably share some common features that cut across different civilizations and cultures. Nevertheless, each civilization or culture is unique in geographical, historical, and even accidental aspects. Naturally, we expect that Western philosophy will have distinctive characteristics due to its evolution within a particular socio-cultural environment. Likewise, Chinese philosophy will necessarily be influenced by its social and cultural factors and hence will possess certain particularities. Thus, injudicious and unrestrained construction of Chinese philosophy according to the terms of reference in Western philosophy will unavoidably be problematic. I believe that there are at least two fundamental problems.

The first problem concerns the obliteration of characteristics of Chinese philosophy that may be of unique significance to philosophical inquiry. I will discuss two key features of Chinese philosophy that will help to elaborate this point. Western philosophy from the time of the ancient Greeks and especially from Descartes on, has regarded more highly the systematic construction of philosophic knowledge. By contrast, thinkers in the Chinese tradition have put more emphasis

on the pursuit of certain paths or goals in order to realize one's virtue or efficacy. A passage in the Confucian *Analects* portrays Confucius' emphasis on the "inner," personal pleasure associated with learning: "They who know the truth are not equal to those who love it, and they who love it are not equal to those who delight in it" (the *Analects* 6:18).

The ultimate pursuit of life is not merely to attain knowledge or acquire skills; rather, it is to harmonize one's love of learning and personal conduct, that was the "ideal state of Confucius and disciples" chased after by Confucians in the Song Dynasty. The Daoist philosopher Chuang-Tzu pursued transcendence of spontaneous wandering which was not cramped by conventional aspirations and values. Similarly, a well known Zen Buddhist poem articulates the *transcendence* of being comfortable in different environments:

The spring flowers, the autumn moon;
 Summer breezes, winter snow.
 If useless things do not clutter your mind,
 You have the best days of your life.

The spirit of such a philosophy characterized by reflecting personal engagement with its insights of Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism is distinct from those predominant in Western philosophy, but its value for humanity cannot be underestimated.

Another distinctive and fundamental characteristic of traditional Chinese thought is its balance of holistic and individual perspectives. The key notions in traditional Chinese philosophy include "the integration of heaven and humanity," "the myriad of things are one" and "the unity of body and mind, the exterior and the interior." These fundamental paradigms stand in contrast to the subject-orientated approaches and the subject-object dichotomy that are dominant in Anglo analytic philosophy.

If this subject-orientation and its attendant dualistic frameworks are used as reference points from which to understand Chinese philosophy, the distinctive characteristics of the latter will not be sufficiently articulated. On the other hand, it is important to note that the themes in Chinese philosophy outlined above are more closely aligned in spirit and approach with those in continental European philosophy, such as in Phenomenology, which emphasizes the inter-subjective nature of an individual's engagement with the world. To bring to the foreground these features in traditional Chinese thinking will benefit both Chinese and Western philosophies.

The second source of potential problems is related to the translation of meaningful Chinese terms and phrases into English. There are many notions in traditional Chinese thought such as *tian*, *dao*, *xin*, *xing*, *you*, *wu*, and *qi*, with distinctive meanings within specific philosophical frameworks that are difficult to express in correspondence with Western philosophy. For example, *tian* (often "thinly" translated as "Heaven") has at least three connotations:

- (a) supreme and ultimate heaven endowed with the sacred nature of personal god;
and
- (b) naturalistic heaven incorporating a sense of the natural environment;

- (c) heaven associated with a transcendent order laying the ground of normative principles that may also have implications for ethical conduct.

Another example is *qi*, which may be interpreted in at least three ways:

- (a) material existence;
- (b) vitality and consciousness, as for instance in Mencius' and energetic and dynamic *qi* or the *Guan Zi*'s essential *qi*; or
- (c) the ultimate, as for instance in the "one *qi* evolved into three" theme in Daoist thought.

It is not easy to find parallels to all these meanings of *qi* in Western philosophy. Strictly speaking, some of them cannot be translated, and I suggest in these cases to use transliterations. If Chinese philosophy can transcend the confinement of Western philosophical mind-set and terminologies, it in my view will certainly make unique contributions to philosophical studies throughout the world.

12.3 Future Development of Chinese Philosophy

In my view, scholars of Chinese philosophy should continue serious and systematic study of Western philosophy, paying special attention to its new trends, which are part of globalization. However, in order for Chinese philosophy to make significant contribution to the world, the following two aspects are worth noting:

I draw upon the history of the adaptation and synthesis of Buddhism into Chinese culture to illustrate how we might approach the engagement of Chinese and Western philosophies. During the Sui and Tang Dynasties (from the sixth to the eighth centuries), several Sinicized Buddhist schools emerged in China. These schools developed the doctrines of Indian Buddhism by integrating within it Confucian and Daoist ideas.

In engaging Chinese and Western philosophies, one important methodological approach is to employ relevant themes and concepts in Chinese thought to explicate and embellish ideas in Western philosophy. This kind of study not only broadens the scope of Western philosophy, but also makes new contributions to the discipline of philosophy.

We are now aware that this is an emergent approach as, for instance, in the theses of scholars who explore Chinese hermeneutics, Chinese phenomenology, Chinese semiotics, and the like. In this light, the phrase "Chinese philosophy" should apply not only to "the philosophy of the Chinese," but also to a philosophy that influences contemporary debates in a distinctive way.

This method is compatible with the kind of constructive strategy used by a number of Chinese scholars in the 1930s and 1940s, to which I referred earlier. Scholars including Xiong Shili and Feng Youlan constructed the early Chinese philosophical traditions in resonance with Western philosophical themes and concepts to create a modern Chinese philosophy. Indeed, scholars now may even

extend and continue the work of Xiong Shili and Feng Youlan, just as they continue the traditions of Confucius, Mencius, Zhu Xi, and Wang Yangming in their engagement with Western philosophy.

In brief, scholars in the field of Chinese philosophy should both take up the standpoint of its proper tradition and effectively absorb and adapt new ideas in contemporary Western philosophy. In contemporary Chinese-Western cultural exchange we should, in our dialogues, place these philosophies on equal footing. This will allow philosophical discussions to achieve significant developments in the twenty-first century. Active engagement in these discussions will enhance the development of philosophy, Chinese and Western, in an increasingly globalized world.

The other experience which may be drawn on is the transliteration used in translating Indian Buddhist concepts, such as “*prajñā*,” “*nirvāṇa*” which were all transliterations from Sanskrit into Chinese. These have now been “naturalized” in the Chinese language as terms sanctioned by usage.

Master Xuan-zang established “five principles of transliteration” incorporated with paraphrasing for certain concepts. That approach may also apply to our practice today; we do not have to translate these terms by borrowing Western concepts mechanically any more. In a way, the richness and characteristics of Chinese philosophy can be maintained and its insightfulness highlighted to the world.

Chapter 13

Neo-Confucianism and Chinese National Rejuvenation

13.1 Confucianism and the Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation

13.1.1 *Breaking Through a New Path by Returning to Its Root*

As the Chinese nation is in the process of its rejuvenation, we are inspired to compile a volume of *A History of Confucianism*. Any nation's rejuvenation is bound to pump up its national cultural fever. Since Confucianism has always been the mainstream culture in China's history, influencing every aspect of Chinese social life, its rejuvenation is inevitably correlated with the Chinese national rejuvenation. In the very beginning, Confucius inherited the culture of the Xia, Shang and Zhou Dynasties, which was deemed as the root of the Chinese nation's development. If for some reasons this root is cut off then there will be no hope for its rejuvenation.

The mission entrusted with us is to renew this tradition on the basis of its cultural lifeblood. Judging from the current situation, Confucianism as a method of spiritual enlightenment will have a new development in China, Asia and even the world, due to political and economic reasons, as well as the impact of Western learning symbolized by its philosophy as part of spiritual culture, on traditional Chinese culture dominated by Confucianism in every aspect.

Reflecting the past hundred years, during quite a lengthy period of time, Chinese culture (Chinese learning) had undergone setbacks one after another in the battle with Western culture (Western learning). While Westernization (or Soviet Unionization) prevailed, "Down with Confucianism" had once even become a fashionable slogan labeling certain "progressive intellectuals."

Under such a difficult situation, generations of Chinese scholars persistently inherited the merits of traditional Chinese culture while being left open to Western learning. Believing that Chinese learning, especially Confucianism should not be

severed from its tradition, they consciously carried out the mission of rejuvenating traditional Chinese culture. It was precisely due to the impact of the West that Chinese scholars were compelled to do some self-reflection—gradually realizing what was to be manifested and eliminated and laying a groundwork for Confucianism to move towards modernization from its traditional state.

Modern Confucianism has to be a doctrine that is able to lead the rejuvenation process of the Chinese nation and provide spiritual strength for today's society to move forward peacefully, in a manner of unity, friendship, trust, mutual assistance and harmony as an enlarged family. Modern Confucianism ought also to be the one that will be able to break a new path by searching its root. Only by searching the root of Confucianism's evolution can we consolidate our cultural foundation and empower its vitality in the new century.

By breaking a new path, it requires us to comprehensively grasp the crucial issues confronting human society and the general trend of ideological and cultural development, and correspondingly provide a timely new elucidation. We cannot distinguish between “searching root” and “breaking a path” which are mutually complementary to one another in terms of finding a new frontier for Confucianism and providing valuable food for thought concerning the issues of human society. Only by so doing, can we “rekindle” Confucianism in the 21st century and make contributions to human society.

13.1.2 Confucianism and the “New Axial Age”

With globalization, today's human society is undergoing a drastic change, where the contradictions and complex relations of politics, economy culture and so on are entangled, perplexing every country and nation in the world. As we have entered the third millennium, we have called for new thoughts for the “New Axial Age” in order to find the way out for human society in dealing with its complicated issues. Emphasis should thus be laid on reviewing and exploring our cultural sources in the hope of leading the world onto a road of peace and development that is both healthy and rational.

The term “Axial Age” was first put forward by the German philosopher Karl Jaspers (1883–1969). It refers to the time around 500 B.C. when great thinkers occurred almost at the same time in ancient Greece, Israel, India and China. Presenting their own views concerning mankind were thinkers, such as Socrates and Plato in ancient Greece, Confucius and Lao-Tzu in China, Sakyamuni in India, Jewish Moses in Israel, all formulating different cultural traditions. During that time, since there were no interactions between them, they therefore each developed in isolation. Two thousand years later, with mutual influences among them they have become a common treasure trove of human civilization.

As Jaspers wrote, “Until today mankind has lived by what happened during the Axial Age, by what was thought and created during that period. In each new upward flight it returns in recollection to this age and has been rekindled by it.

The revival and recollection (or rejuvenation) of the Axial Age have always provided psychic force for the current generation, such as happened in China, India and the West.”¹

As we all know, the Renaissance in Europe, for instance, turned attention to its cultural root—ancient Greece, consequently rekindling European civilization and exerting great influence on the world. In China, under the influence of Indian Buddhist culture, the basic idiosyncrasy of the Song and Ming Dynasties had once again returned to Confucius and Mencius and lifted Chinese culture up to Neo-Confucianism, exerting great influence on cultures in the Korean Peninsula, Japan and Vietnam.

Entering the new millennium, will the human culture make a new leap? As Jaspers particularly mentioned what had happened in China, India and the West, does this mean that another rejuvenation will occur in Chinese culture? I believe so. Currently, the Chinese nation is in the process of rejuvenation which is based on the revival of its national culture. The *guo xue re* (craze for national learning) is said to be an indicator of Chinese culture in searching for spiritual support from its tradition so as to contribute to human society with a concept of harmony.

We may also sense the trend that recently occurred of attaching great importance to the study of traditional culture, forming a social current in reading canons, classics and restoring its moral cultivation in the 21st century, many primary and high schools have reframed their curricula to embrace the *Analects*, *Lao-Tzu*, *Three Character Primer*, *Classical Disciplines for Students* and so on. All kinds of classes and symposiums on classics learning have been set up by organizations, units and communities at all levels. This trend has made an impact even on the top leaders of our country.

Hu Jintao, the general secretary of CPC, said in his report to the Seventeenth Congress, “disseminating Chinese culture and constructing Chinese national spiritual home” will greatly promote the development of Chinese culture. It is worth noticing that a batch of Chinese intellectuals have carried out in-depth studies into traditional Chinese culture, while paying more attention to the trend of the world’s cultural development. They have realized that for Chinese culture to be fully rejuvenated and rekindled it has to constantly renew itself on the basis of inheriting its tradition. Currently, more than 200 hundred Confucius Institutes have been established worldwide and Confucian classics have been translated into eight languages, which have all been well received by people around the world. These are all indications of the revival of Confucianism in the “New Axial Age.”

I also believe that the rejuvenation we endeavor to pursue has to be the one which is deeply rooted in our mainstream culture with universal values while incorporating cultures of other nations, especially the cultural essence of the West, so as to contribute to the rejuvenation of human society. We are therefore making an effort to welcome the early arrival of the “New Axial Age” with scholars of other

¹Karl Jaspers, *Historical Origin and Object*, the Chinese version was translated by Wei Chuxiong etc., and published by Hua Xia Publishing Press, 1989.

countries in the situation of globalization. In Europe, having criticized the “modernity” of deconstructive post-modernism, process-based constructive post-modernism occurred.

They believed that “Constructive post-modernism is critical of deconstructive post-modernism ... so as to construct a post-modern world that weighs equally on the well-being of all lives.” According to constructive post-modernism, in the brand new age everyone’s rights should be respected. If the slogan of the first enlightenment was “self-emancipation” then the second one should be “respect others and differences.” They put forward a universally holistic concept of integrating man and nature as opposing to scientism and the instrumental rationality of modern dualism.

In his *The European Dream*, Rifkin emphasized that in the brand new age, everyone’s rights are to be respected and cultural differences welcomed, and every individual should be able to enjoy the high quality (not luxury) of life and live a stable and harmonious life. Therefore, they believed that much attention should be paid to certain concepts of pre-modernism and the wisdom presented by philosophers more than two thousand years ago. For example, during the process of achieving Indian independence in 1947, many national leaders adopted traditional Indian thought as a spiritual weapon to mobilize people.² The leader of Congress Party, Gandhi, had implemented a policy that combined Hinduism and national movement to formulate the Congress Party’s guiding ideology and its personnel distinctly characterized by Hinduism.

In the middle of the last century, Indian thinker Golwalkar (1906–1973) pointed out, India must build a country with strong Hinduism since Indian civilization is in essence a civilization of Hinduism. In his view, only when Indian politics is infused with religious passion by Indian people can prerequisite conditions be formed for the true rejuvenation of India. In other words, the rejuvenation of the Indian people has to rely on the ideological and cultural tradition of Hinduism. The Bharatiya Janata Party adores Hinduism, which is characterized by Indian nationalism with the core value of Indian culture.³

They believe that it is a must to connect current India with its glorious past, and rebuild India with Indian ideology and recognition. And the thinker of the Bharatiya Janata Party, P.D. Upadhyaya (1916–68) proposed the “*Rashtra Dharma*” (State of Dharma) to integrate the traditional concept of Dharma with modern humanism for the purpose of defending traditional Indian civilization and spirit and withstanding the invasion and influence from the West. The two parties, who take turns in power in Indian politics, herald the rejuvenation of Hinduism in India as a key position in the “New Axial Age.”

Under the situation of globalization, can we say that China, India and Europe are faced with another opportunity of rejuvenation during their transitional periods? I think Jaspers was visionary in predicting what would happen in these places. I must

²Rifkin, Jeremy, *The European Dream*, Penguin; First Printing edition, 2004.

³Sharma, Jai Narain, *Encyclopaedia Eminent Thinkers: The Political Thought of M.S. Golwalkar*, 2001.

add that I have by no means denied there would be other rejuvenations in other national cultures, such as in the cultures of Latin America, the Middle East, Northern Africa, the Islamic nations and so on. However, it is very possible that the rejuvenations of China, India and Europe have truly indicated the arrival of the “New Axial Age.”

13.1.3 The Three Dimensions of Confucianism

The approaching “New Axial Age” is entirely different from the “Axial Age” two thousand years ago. Globalization has linked the world into an interrelated entity where the issues that countries and nations are to deal with have no longer become theirs but that of the world. Therefore, great thinkers or a group of great thinkers transcending the borders of countries will appear, guiding human society’s move out of its dilemma and helping it to embrace a new age, as some of the thinkers in many countries and nations are currently involved with. In that regard, national historical traditions and wisdom are of value. As for Chinese society, it is necessary to have a general evaluation of Confucianism, the dominant ideology over the past two thousand years.

It is only natural to have different views on historical sediment as profound as Confucianism. In today’s world of globalization and modernization, however, I think we should approach Confucianism from three dimensions, namely Confucianism of politics, tradition and learning.

(1) Politicized Confucianism. Politicized Confucianism has long been entangled with despotism, the “three cardinal guides and six detailed rules” had played a significant role in governing the state. By moralization, Confucianism did to certain an extent stabilize Chinese society. However, the exaggeration of morality has resulted in the tradition of “rule of man-orientated society” rather than that of “rule of law,” so as to embellish political rule. On other hand, the politicized morality has made it a tool of politics. Surely, the Confucian ideal of benevolent government was manifested in its doctrine of “moral superiority over position,” “morally administering the state and pacifying the world.” In general, however, Confucianism in this perspective has left more problems than legacy to be inherited.

(2) Orthodox Confucianism. Like any historically formed doctrine or belief in the world, Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism all have their traditions in Chinese history. Confucianism, in particular, claimed to be the legitimate culture of the Xia, Shang and Zhou Dynasties, in the meantime it included certain elements of doctrines by advocating the principle of “A myriad things thrive in harmony without violating the Dao.” Nevertheless, it had to some degree excluded other doctrines, oppressing other “heterodoxies,” which might, as was often the case, compose certain challenges on the mainstream thought, in breaking a new path.

(3) Academic Confucianism. This refers to the scholarly tradition of the belief, embracing the world view and thinking method as well as the pursuit of truth, kindness and beauty. Although Confucianism could not solve all social problems,

the meaningful ideological resources it provided in such aspects have been widely recognized.

Having categorized Confucianism in this way, it by no means overlooks their interconnections; in fact, they might be closely linked to one another. The study of Confucianism from now on should adopt an all-inclusive approach which defies the boundaries of politics or academics to constantly renew itself while engaging in dialogues with other cultures.

As an important aspect of Confucianism, we should pay special attention to its academic dimension in the following four perspectives:

A. Culturally, we should have firm subjective consciousness, which enables us to fully grasp, preserve and carry on the essence of our culture, while digesting and absorbing other cultures. Without this capacity, a nation will lose its vitality to enrich itself and eventually perish or be assimilated by others.

B. In the long river of history, any culture intending to forge ahead, has to take in other cultures by engaging in mutual dialogues. As Russell rightly point out, "Contacts between different civilizations have often in the past proved to be landmarks in human progress." Historically, the Chinese had experience in taking in and assimilating Indian culture which should be highly valued. In today's age of globalization, confronted with the powerful culture of the West, we should become more competent in absorbing the excellence of Western culture and other cultures, making Chinese culture more accessible to the world.

C. Certain insightful thoughts of antiquity have faded away with the passing of time; instead, they may have eternal values in terms of ideals, concepts and the way of thinking. As Jaspers points in his *Great Philosophers*, we may have exceeded Aristotle in scientific method but not in philosophy itself; in general, we can hardly reach the level of Socrates and Plato. Surely, progressions have been made in philosophical history, but we should be very cautious about concluding that later generational philosophers will certainly surpass the earlier ones.

D. No ideological system, whether in history or at present, is absolutely right and universally applicable; limitations and contradictions are inevitable. Even the essence of an ideology has to be reasonably annotated by modern terms.

In *Anti-Duhring*, Engels pointed out, "After Hegel no comprehensive theory can ever be established. Obviously, the world has been linked into one entity, and the theoretical foundation of a holistic system has to be based on recognition of the whole natural world and historical process, which is out of reach of human thought. Therefore, any such theory has to be set up either by virtualization or unreasonable illusion and become a product of ideologists."⁴

By systematic theory, it means an approach that is self-claimed all-inclusiveness, righteousness and universal truth, which may turn out to be fallacious. As Russell pointed out in his *History of Western Philosophy*, a philosophy that cannot be self-justified may not be completely right, while a philosophy of self-justification

⁴Engels, Frederick, *Anti-Duhring: Herr Eugen Duhring's Revolution in Science*, Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1969.

could be completely wrong. The most fruitful philosophy of various schools may embrace contractions, which entails partial truth.

These two passages are very meaningful to today's study of ideology and culture. Like any ideology or culture, evolving under certain historical conditions, Confucianism cannot answer and solve all questions, but has been interpreted and commented differently during different historical periods, and new criticism revealing new directions or contradictions are also expected.

As human society has entered the age of globalization, to rejuvenate Confucianism, we therefore have to constantly review its problems (contradictions), explore its new annotations, and follow the ancient axiom of renewing on a daily basis so as to be in tune with the timely development.

13.1.4 Confucianism and Awareness of Unexpected Development

Different from Buddhism, Confucianism as part of traditional Chinese culture, is characterized by its thought alteration on entering political stratum, which is full of awareness of unexpected development. As it is said in the *Book of Changes*: is the author aware of the danger? The answer seems to be obvious.

Since Confucius, Confucian scholars have historically regarded the national affairs as their own duties, which is a uniquely critical spirit of traditional Chinese scholars distinctive from modern intellectuals. It is the social and historical mission that Confucianism has always held.

Confucius lived in the Spring and Autumn Period where the *Dao* was vanished. As it is recorded in *Garden of Anecdotes*: “Master Gong Hu said, the Spring and Autumn Period is an age that rulers can draw reference from, namely 36 emperors were murdered and 52 states perished. Confronted with the situation where ritual had collapsed, Confucius was deeply anxious. In the *Analects* the word “anxiety” is mentioned many times, typically “A true gentleman is not anxious about poverty but the *Dao*,” which represents the spirit of Confucius.

What is the *Dao*? To Confucius, above everything else it was the ideal society of his benevolent *Dao*. In the *Analects*, it is recorded: “Gongshan Furao was plotting rebellion in the castle of Bi, and summoned Confucius to join him, and he would have liked to go. Zilu was upset and said, ‘After having refused in so many cases, why on earth must we go to this man Gongshan?’ The Master replied, ‘How could this person who has summoned me to do so for no reason?’ If anyone were to use me, I would certainly make a Zhou Dynasty in the east.”⁵ Clearly, what was in Confucius’ mind was how to rule a society according to the *Dao* when it was lost.

In *The Book of Rites*, there is a story about Confucius’ comment on “A harsh government is fiercer than the tiger,” which penetratingly reveals his strong

⁵Confucius, *The Analects* (Chap. 17).

awareness of preparing for the worst for the country and people, typified by Confucius' humanity of benevolently treating the people and his critical attitude towards harsh governments.

Mencius' well-known saying signifies Confucians' awareness of hardship as responsible scholars who take the destiny of their country as their own duties: "Life springs from sorrow and calamity, death comes from ease and pleasure."⁶ Mencius also criticized these states where "Domestically they lack wise and loyal men, while there is no threat confronting them from their rivalries" since they are more likely to perish.

Perhaps we all can be moved and purified by reading Mencius' lines "A true scholar should not to be corrupted by riches or honors, nor be departed from principle despite poverty or humble origin, nor be submitted to force or threat." In my view, this is the true spirit of Confucians, which could resist and repel all evil spirits or even sacrifice ties of blood to righteousness.

Can't these cases be found in history? When Duke Zhou executed his brother for the sake of his state, the loyal minister Guan Zhong initially assisted Gongzi Jiu and shifted to Duke Huan, the deed was highly appreciated by Confucius. When Xuan King of Qi asked Mencius: Wasn't it true that Emperor Tang sent Xia Jie into exile and Emperor Wu sent armed forces to suppress Emperor Zhou? Mencius answered: Isn't it justifiable to slaughter the kings who have destroyed *ren yi* (benevolence and righteousness) as autocrats?

In ancient Chinese society, emperors played a significant role in social politics and the admonishment of liegemen was noteworthy as well. As it is recorded in *Guodian Bamboo Slips*:

Emperor Mu of Lu asked Zisi: "Who are the loyal ministers? Zisi answered, they have to be the kind of persons who are constantly pointing out the emperor's evil deeds." Who are the loyal ministers? Zisi answered, they have to be the kind of persons who are constantly pointing out the emperor's evil deeds. The emperor was sulking and Zisi retreated. And then Chengsun Yi presented himself before the court, Emperor Mu of Lu said he was upset upon hearing what Zisi told him. Chengsun Yi said, "It's terrific to hear what he said! You know, there are people who lost their lives for the emperor but no such people always pointing out the evil deeds of an emperor. For the former people, what they sought after were nothing but ranks of nobility and high pay; for the latter, however, what they cared about had nothing to do with these things. Apart from Zisi, I haven't heard about anyone who would pursue righteousness and justice at the expense of losing personal gains."⁷

This passage reveals that some Confucians have always been concerned about their nation and people, and the true loyal ministers, as they were viewed and interpreted by Zisi and Chengsun Yi, were those who would unceasingly fire criticism at the emperor regardless of ranks and interests (such as money and

⁶Mencius (Gao Zi I).

⁷*Guodian Bamboo Slips*, Beijing: Cultural Relics Publishing House, 1988.

power). In China's history, some Confucians with the mission of social duties and the awareness of unexpected development would preserve this spirit.

In the early Han Dynasty, when the country had just slightly become peaceful, Jia Yi wrote *On Public Security* to the emperor: "All advice presented to the emperor has been about peace that has been achieved under the current rule, which is so wrong to me. The people who advocate that peace and great order have been achieved are either ignorant or flattering."⁸ In this regard, Jia Yi held the same view as Zisi. He believed that in administering a country, the ruler needs both "rule of ritual" and "rule of law;" the former is to prevent the undesirable from happening, and the latter is to smooth out the bumps. In a way, it is relatively easy for "rule of law" to be more effective than "rule of ritual" in practice. In his view, both are indispensable.

This ideal of combining the rule of ritual and law in governing a country had profound influence on the successive dynasties in Chinese history. There were various positions of imperial censors in different dynasties, such as annotations in the Chinese Etymology Dictionary and Ban Gu's *Comprehensive Discussions in the White Tiger Hall*: An imperial censor is positioned to assist the paramount emperor. And their duties varied from making good omissions and deficiencies in the Tang Dynasty to providing critical opinions and justified suggestions in the Song Dynasty. Although they were nominal positions in historical Chinese society of imperial power, a few literati with awareness of social mission provided frank advice and to certain extent played a critical role in affecting the social politics. This is another topic worthy of carrying on with separate research.

Oh, I have tried to probe into minds of the ancient nobles, whose feelings might be different from the people I mentioned above. Why is this? The reason is that they were not thrown into ecstasies over things adventitious, nor for the sake of themselves. Positioned high at court, they worried about the people; banished to remote regions, they were concerned about their sovereigns. They thus were carefree in neither case. Then, at what time were they delighted? They would say, "Worry before all others who have worried, and rejoice after all others who have rejoiced." Alas, who else should I seek for company if not people of this type?⁹

This passage reflects the heartfelt wishes of great Confucians. In general, under the rule of imperial power in tyrannical societies, scholars of Confucianism could not deprive themselves of anxiety. Their concerns for people in essence were for benevolent government and were a kingly way of ruling the country, and their ideals were therefore hard to be realized. On the other hand, their worries for their sovereigns, were based on "rule of man" which could hardly be reliable as well. In an autocratic system, people with lofty ideals, though they could think broadly, were after all confined to their historic limitations.

Confucian scholars could die to achieve virtue or for a just cause, but they could do nothing to tumble the system of imperial power; on the contrary, they had to a

⁸Jia Yi, *Omnibus of Jia Yi*.

⁹Ban Gu, *Comprehensive Discussions in the White Tiger Hall*.

large degree assisted the imperial destiny. Their heroic and moving deeds with great ideals should not be blamed. It is historically inevitable that their lofty wishes could only be realized (even at the least degree) when the autocratic system has been reformed.

The Confucian awareness for crises, though playing a certain role in criticizing the system of imperial power, was after all different from the critical consciousness of modern intellectuals, which is based on the tenet of “All men are equal.”

Modern intellectuals’ critical consciousness targets no individuals but the system deemed to be outdated. Confronted with the deteriorating social atmosphere and devoid of beliefs, it is necessary to lift up Confucian awareness to critical consciousness, compromising with no pseudo-truth, therefore its criticism should be filled up with independent spirit backed up by freedom and democracy.

By carrying out the legacy of Confucian awareness for unexpected development and improving it to the standard of modern intellectual consciousness and providing new interpretations and reflections, our nation could surely constantly renew itself and never perish on earth.

13.1.5 Confucianism and the Construction of Harmonious Society

Early in this century, we set up our goal to build a harmonious society, which will brighten the future of human development and have a great impact on the well-being of all mankind. As we know, “harmony” is the core concept of Confucianism, and there was a profound ideological resource in traditional Confucianism which could be used to build a harmonious society. The cosmopolitanism narrated in the *Book of Rites*, outlines a blueprint for China’s ideal harmonious society.

The ideal promoted in the *Analects* that “the most valuable use of the rites is to achieve harmony” is certainly very meaningful in regulating people’s social relations, and the tenet of “harmony in diversity” is to provide a theoretical base for peaceful coexistence among different nations. The thought of “Neutralization” in the *Doctrine of the Mean* requires an appropriate degree of adjustment to achieve a harmony among myriad things. In *The Book of Changes* the ideology of “Supreme Harmony,” in particular, has been constantly elucidated into a “universal harmony.”

The so called “universal harmony” denotes a diversified concord embracing man-nature, man-man (man and society, state-state, nation-nation) as well as self-harmony, culminating in “supreme harmony” described by Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692) as the “perfect harmony.” All these harmonious thoughts have offered a valuable world-view and a way of thinking to human society.

To revive Confucianism entails “problem-awareness” confronting the world. Confucians have always been conscious about worldly issues, and deriving its theories of true values accordingly. Currently, what are the most severe issues

confronting the world? In my view, over the past hundred years or so, they perhaps have been those of excessive exploration of natural resources and savaging the ecological environment.

The material-driven impulse and expanded desire for power have caused all sorts of contractions and conflicts among people and countries, even resulting in wars. Overly indulging in money and sensory enjoyment, has led to various sociopathic behaviors, such as schizobulia, personality distortion, taking drugs, committing suicide or murder and so on. Therefore, the key issue is how to deal with “self” in relation to others, nature, and society.

Concerning the three issues mentioned above, I believe that Confucianism can offer tremendous ideological resources to human society.

(1) Confucian thought of “integrating man and heaven” can smooth out the relations between man and nature. In 1992, 1575 scientists around the world issued a report titled *The Warning of Scientists to Humanity*, it says “Human beings and nature are on courses conflicting with one another,” which in my view has something to do with the Western dichotomous view of man and heaven. Russell also pointed out in his *A History of Western Philosophy*, “... the philosophy of Descartes ... brought to completion, or very nearly to completion, the dualism of mind and matter which began with Plato and was developed, largely for religious reasons, by Christian philosophy ... the Cartesian system presents two parallel but independent worlds, that of mind and that of matter, each of which can be studied without reference to the other.”¹⁰

In Western philosophy, man and heaven have been viewed separately; they can be studied in isolation based on its dichotomous thought pattern, although there are some alternations entering the 20th century, such as the views of Whitehead. In Chinese philosophy, however, man and nature are internally related and have to be examined in relation to one another.

The Book of Changes is the most ancient magnum opus of China and the source of Chinese philosophy, fully illustrating the thought of “integrating man with heaven.” According to *Guojian Bamboo Slips*, it says “Changes are the convergence of the *Dao* of man and nature.” What Zhu Xi (1130–1200) said was very important, “Since heaven has a biological heart man also has a heart of benevolence;” “Heaven is man, and man is heaven. The beginning of man is derived from heaven. Since this man was born, heaven rests in him;” “The *Dao* of heaven is manifested in man;” “A saint ... is integrated with heaven.”¹¹ As a world view and thought pattern, “integrating man with heaven” necessitates the harmonization of man and heaven rather than confrontation of the two. Any damage to nature in fact harms human beings themselves and we cannot get away with impunity. Therefore, knowing heaven and revering heaven are two sides of one coin, which enable man to reasonably utilize nature while taking due responsibility to protect it.

¹⁰Russell, Bertrand. *A History of Western Philosophy*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972.

¹¹*Ibid.*

Knowing heaven without revering it will treat heaven as the inanimate rather than the dynamic, therefore it is said in *The Book of Changes*: “As Heaven keeps vigor through movement, man should unremittingly practice self-improvement,” denoting the dynamic wholeness of sustainable life of heaven and man. Revering heaven without knowing it, on the other hand, will view heaven as a mysterious external force imposing on man, being unable to receive its blessing. The thought of “integrating man with heaven” involves the missions of exploring nature as well as protecting nature. In this way, the ideology of ancient Chinese wisdom presents a meaningful thinking resource for the current ecological crisis.

(2) The concept of “people are one” (human unity), promoting internal connections between the “self” and “others,” is beneficial to the solution of people’s conflicts (societal relations).

In *Human Nature is Determined by Heavenly Fate* recorded in *Guodian Bamboo Slips*: “The *Dao* begins with emotion and emotion entails human nature,” namely human nature is determined by fate, which is descended from heaven, which was the foundation of Confucian benevolence. In *The Doctrine of the Mean*, Confucians said, “*Ren* (benevolence) means loving people and, priority should be given to your relatives, others and anything related” as Mencius put it.

Mencius said, one should love his family members and extend this love to other creatures.

As recorded in *Guodian Bamboo Slips*: “Extending the idea of filial piety, all people under the sun would be favored;” “love your father first, then you can love others and *ren* will naturally follow.” If every country or nation on earth could extend their love to others then wouldn’t world peace be achieved? Correspondingly, when “loving your relatives is broadened to other people,”¹² then benevolent government would be in place. The term “benevolent government,” though does not appear in *The Analects*, it is manifested pervasively in other expressions, such as “broadly love your people and help the vulnerable,” “exalt those who closely combine ethics and talents,” “extensive benevolence,” “guided by virtues and led by rites” and so on, are all part of it.

Confucius’ successor Mencius further spread the meaning of “benevolent government” by saying that “people who have real estate can then have the foundation to set up their moral standard and behavioral codes.” Otherwise it would be baseless to advocate the belief. Therefore, “‘Benevolent government’ has to be initiated from the field where farmers plough.”¹³

I believe that in today’s “harmonious society,” for our people to have a better-off life the first thing the government has to do is to let them possess properties. For the people of the world the same is also true; the powerful nations should not plunder resources and wealth from the weak ones. In this sense, the ancient Chinese thought of “human unity” is quite meaningful in building a harmonious society and harmonious world.

¹²*Guodian Bamboo Slips*, Beijing: Cultural Relics Publishing Press, 1988.

¹³Mencius (Gao Zi II).

(3) “Honesty of the body and soul” (the internal and external oneness), the notion of harmonizing physical and spiritual worlds, could be used to solve the contradictions between “the self” and external factors. Confucianism believes that the oneness of body and soul requires cultivation. It is said in *Guodian Bamboo Slips*, “once you have acquired the *Dao* of being a decent person, you should introspect yourself, which is self-cultivation.” Therefore *The Great Learning* believes that one should “cultivate themselves, put family in order, administer a country and make world peace;” “self-cultivation is the foundation for being either an emperor or an ordinary person; there is no such thing as a peaceful country when the foundation is shaky.”

In *The Doctrine of the Mean*, it is also said that “a government is administrated by man whose cultivation of the *Dao* determines the degree of benevolence.” Clearly, “self-cultivation” and “benevolence” are closely related in Confucian belief, as it is annotated by *Guodian Bamboo Slips*: “Cultivating the self leads to the practice of benevolence,” the two thus have a causal relationship. The aim of self-cultivation in Confucianism is to “put family in order, administer a country and make world peace,” as well as to build a harmonious society.

An ancient utopian society described in *The Book of Rites* was an ideal Confucian harmonious community, where a good system governed by moral people, and self-cultivation and harmonization became a norm.

Feng Youlan divided human life into four spheres of living in ascendant order: the innocent sphere, the utilitarian sphere, the moral sphere and the transcendent sphere, beginning with the lowest. In the innocent sphere, people live like animals, they just simply survive there without any purpose; in the utilitarian sphere, they pursue everything for personal tangible benefit; in the moral sphere, they behave in accordance with righteousness and contribute to public interest. Entering the transcendent sphere, people dedicate themselves to society, even the universe, where harmonization is achieved between man and others or society or universe, as well as within themselves.

A passage in the *Analecets* could be viewed as a motto: “What I am anxious about is being unable to cultivate my virtue, teach what I have learnt, follow righteousness, reform evil deeds.” This reveals the truth to pursue for being a decent man: it is not easy to practice self-cultivation without a lofty ideal for the long term interest of mankind, nor to preach without constantly improving your knowledge and ability for taking social responsibility.

Only by really following righteousness, moving toward benevolence and social justice on a daily basis, rectifying misbehaviors in one way or another openly, can one be truly qualified as a gentleman—all these are so-called “self-cultivation” or “being settled.”

“Following righteousness,” means to go after what is right in the orientation of justice which can benefit society meanwhile correcting mistakes with tremendous courage. Only based on this fundamental righteousness can one qualify oneself both internally and externally as the right person to serve society.

According to Confucianism, the key to deal with the contradictions mentioned above lies in the “cultivated man,” who can set his heart for heaven and earth, his

life for people and inherit the sage's knowledge, as well as maintain peace and security of all ages. In this sense, we may say that Confucianism can provide a valuable ideological resource for solving the various problems confronting human society, as well as seizing the opportunity to revive itself.

We are surely fully aware that Confucian thought is not perfect, nor can it solve all complex social problems; it can only provide us with a way of thinking as a world view, view of life, values and so on to inspire people to make contribution for development of a harmonious society.

As historian Sima Qian (145–87 B.C.) said, “the ways of governing a state in history viewed from today’s perspective, may mirror some truth, there were nevertheless differences,” which I think requires refreshing our approach based on the wisdom of the past. Therefore, our task today is to annotate the valuable thoughts including Confucianism in order to create certain new thoughts and theories that are in line with the trend of modern societal development.

13.2 Confucianism and Universal Values

Should Confucianism provide a valuable ideological resource to smoothing out relations between man and nature, man and man and physical and mental conditions within the “self,” we may also consider its universal values on certain specific issues. Axiology is a current prevalent theory, involving religion, philosophy, literature, art, politics, economics, even science and technology, of which axiological philosophy is the most significant branch.

Generally speaking, axiological philosophy is concerned with philosophical issues or concepts, such as Confucian “benevolence,” “unity of man and heaven,” “the *Dao* follows nature,” the doctrine of loyalty and consideration for others (“loyalty” means to exhaust oneself to the justified cause, while consideration refers to tolerate others as Zhu Xi put it). I believe that there are “universal values” among different national cultures, worthy of being explored in today’s multicultural context of globalization.

At present, a series of discussions on cultural or philosophical values have taken place in our literati circle, concentrating the core issue of “universal values” that may or may not be embraced within a particular culture or philosophy. Some scholars and politicians hold a negative view on this, which I cannot agree with. In my view, to disregard universal values among different natural cultures may lead to Relativism which denies any kind of truth, even the truth in a relative sense. Once the truth becomes a matter of personal preference, it is hard for different cultures to engage in dialogues on an equal footing, reaching consensus over certain issues commonly concerned.

This view is detrimental to current globalization and the healthy development of human society. Also, if we are silent about the issue of “universal values” and leave the matter to Westerners, who will spare no effort to promote their values, in that way we will give up our right to discourse and further enhance their discourse

hegemony. We should therefore not underestimate the significance of exploring “universal values” among different nations.

13.2.1 Seeking a Common Ground Through Cross-Cultural Communication and Dialogues

Since the 1990s, a new wave of *guoxue re* (craze for national learning) has swept China with a special attention paid to the national identity of Chinese culture and its special values. The phenomenon in my view is caused by the cultural advancement of the world, where the colonial system of the West has collapsed and the previous colonies have become independent nations and established their own countries. The daunting task facing them is to ensure their identity as characterized by their unique cultures including religion, philosophy, values and so on.

Under this circumstance, it is reasonable for the Chinese nation that is in the process of rejuvenation to be more concerned about its subjectivity and unique values. Meanwhile, as some western countries have modernized and more developing countries are moving in that direction, an ideological trend of universalism has occurred in the West, believing that the universal values are embraced only in Western ideologies but not in other national cultures (or less so); any non-western cultures can only be exhibited in museums.

On the other hand, some nations that have achieved independence or are in the process of rejuvenation, have also been influenced by “universalism,” replacing Western cultural values with their own. Some Chinese scholars, for example, assert that in the 21st century, “the east wind will prevail over the west wind” in terms of human cultural development, and Chinese culture will save the world. Clearly, opinions like this are as detrimental as western universalism.

It is only natural for China and other developing countries to pay more attention to their own special values and subjectivities, so as to maintain a polarized cultural development in the world and oppose “universalism” and Europe-centralism. In the meantime, we should also guard against national cultural conciliarism or fundamentalism.

While opposing “universalism,” we should not deny the universal values of different national cultures. “Universalism,” apart from various definitions, in my understanding is to absolutize and generalize certain concepts or propositions by excluding others from different cultures, even denying their values. “Universal values” on the other hand, refers to certain same or similar values generally accepted by different cultures. In fact, “universal values” are usually embraced in the values of specific different national cultures.

This is precisely the reason for us to seek the “universal values” from “specific values,” which is a philosophical relation between “commonality” and “specialty.” We have to differentiate between “universalism” and “universal values” which is to be sought after from special values of different national cultures.

Currently, although human society has entered economic globalization and science and technological integration, cultural diversification has formed due to the collapse of the post-war colonial system and the degradation of Euro-centralism. We therefore have to seek universal values through communication and dialogue between different cultures so as to reach certain kinds of “common views.” And I consider this is the only way feasible to understand the true meaning of “universal values.”

13.2.2 The Way to Pursue “Universal Values” Among Different Cultures

Why should we have to seek “universal values”? This is because, as humans we all confront certain problems that are common to us, requiring certain common valuable ideological resources to deal with them.

There are many ways in seeking “universal values” among different human cultures. The following are three of them for your reference:

(1) Originally, there are ideologies common or similar evolved in different national cultures, which form a common ground. In 1993, during the world religion conference held in Chicago, United States, a “minimum common view” or “the bottom-line ethics” was proposed. And in the final sitting the *Manifesto of Global Ethics* was signed by delegates, declaring its “moral golden rule” as Confucius’ words: “Do not do to others what you would not have them do to you.” It also quoted a phrase from Buddhism, expressing similar meanings.

The *Manifesto* also enumerates certain thoughts of religion and thinkers to elaborate the motto, which was generally deemed as a “universal value.” In *Anti-Duehring*, for example, Engels raised the issue of “no stealing,” which certainly bears the commonality of “universal values.” Similar thoughts, such as “not stealing, not committing adultery, not committing abuse” can also be found in “five prohibitions” of Buddhism and “Moses’ Ten Commandments” of Christianity, which can all be seen as having “universal values.”

(2) “Universal values” are manifested differently in different national values, such as Confucian “benevolence,” Christian “caritas,” and Indian “mercy,” though different in forms and modes of thinking, the essence of universal values is more or less same.

Confucius initiated the idea of *ren* by answering his student Fan Chi: What I mean by *ren* is benevolence. Quoted in the *Doctrine of the Mean*, Confucius further elaborated: “Benevolence is the full manifestation of humanity characterized by loving one’s parents.”

As an innate virtue, the feeling of “loving others” did not come from nowhere, but germinated in loving the family. However, it should not be confined to the family, so you have to extend your love to other people and other beings to fulfill the perfect “benevolence” (love). Therefore in *Guodian Bamboo Slips*, it says,

“extending the idea of filial piety, all people under the sun would be favored;” “love your father first, then you can love others and *ren* will naturally follow.” Although the starting point lies in loving relatives, it would eventually end up in caring for people as a whole, achieving the ideal of “managing the state and pacify the world.” To this end, we can say, Confucian “benevolence” certainly has some “universal values.”¹⁴

The fundamental value of Christian *caritas* is the tenet of “Everyone is equal before God,” treating everyone as the son of God, which lead to “Everyone is equal before the law,” resulting in the belief of social justice.

According to *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra* (vol. 27), “Buddhist mercy is to delight the populace and save them from a sea of woes.” As it is interpreted in the *Dictionary of Buddhism*, “The crowd are struggling in the world just as a myriad of beings surviving in the abyss of bitterness, and the aim of mercy is to conjure a magic power to carry people to ‘the other shore.’” In my view, this is certainly a kind of “universal value.”

Whether Confucian benevolence, or Christian *caritas* or Buddhist mercy, although mutually distinguishable, the spirits are similar—their core value being “loving others,” which is very meaningful in terms of “universal values.”

(3) Certain unique ideals created by different national cultures often also contain certain “universal values.”

Searching for “universal values” from special national cultures, may entail different opinions, which in my view could be resolved by adopting the approach of seeking common points while reserving differences. Here I may enumerate two examples from Confucianism to elaborate my point.

Different ideas, concepts, philosophies, customs and values of different national cultures, may cause contradictions and conflicts, as they did in history and are still happening in some of the places now in the world. To this end, Confucian concept of “harmony in diversity” as a universal value can surely play a role in eliminating certain kind of “civilization conflicts.”

The approach will provide a platform for us to carry out dialogues in reaching a common ground. From diversity to harmony, is not a process of eliminating or assimilating one another, but finding an intersection, where both parties can be promoted. In this way, “harmony in diversity” as a “universal value” can contribute to peaceful coexistence of civilizations significantly.

Previously I have quoted a statement from the “World Scientists’ Warning to Humanity” signed by 1,575 scientists around in 1992: “Human beings and the natural world are on a collision course” and this situation in my view is caused by people’s excessive exploration and savage plunder.

Concerning the unity of man and heaven, Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692) said in *Commentary on Zhangzai’s Correcting Ignorance*: Having examined doctrines since the Han Dynasty, I have found all of them had only concentrated on presentations of the *Book of Changes*, instead of its *ren dao* (human nature). It was not

¹⁴*Guodian Bamboo Slips*, Beijing: Cultural Relics Publishing Press, 1988.

until the Song Dynasty that Zhou Dunyi (1017–1073) proposed the *Tai Chi Diagram* to explore the root cause of the unity of man and heaven, elaborating the *Dao* of heaven that determines human fate.

The transformation of the heavenly *Dao* has infused its nature to man, resulting in a consistent law between the two. Wang Fuzhi's remark could be seen as annotations to the thought of "unity of man and heaven" and the assertion of "changes are the convergence of the *Dao* of man and nature." Clearly, the *Dao* of man originated from the *Dao* of heaven, and the two cannot be discussed and viewed in isolation, since the "unity of man and heaven" is the cause both reasoning the *Dao* of man and determining the alteration of *yin* and *yang* of the heavenly order.

Since the *Dao* of man is derived from the *Dao* of heaven, man is therefore responsible for heaven. Viewed from this aspect, it is surely meaningful for the current savage damage to nature. That is also the so-called "universal values." In western academic circles, in fact, there are also similar views, such as Whitehead, philosopher of philosophy, points out, "man and nature are a living community," revealing the interlinks between man and nature, and the mission that people should protect nature as their lives. This concept is of significance in terms of "universal values."

In the *Analects*, Confucius said, "*Ren* means to restrain oneself and observe propriety. Once one does this the whole world will be embraced in his humane mind."¹⁵ This means only by restoring propriety through self-cultivation can *ren* be achieved. Fei Xiaotong provided a reasonable annotation: "Restoring propriety is a prerequisite for a person to enter society, and it may be the crux distinguishing the oriental and occidental cultures when we come to 'self-cultivation' and 'self-emancipation.'" This is truly an insightful explanation.

Concerning the assertion that "*ke ji fu li wei ren*, or practice self-constraint and restore rites," Zhu Xi commented, "*Ke* means to constrain, and *ji* to satisfy private desire, *fu* to restore and *li* is rituals." In other words, one has to get their selfish desire under control and to follow the heavenly *li* or universal laws (rituals) when he or she is engaged in social relations. "Benevolence" is an internal virtue germinated in nature and fate endowed with heaven." *Li* is the system regulating people's behavior externally, to harmonize human relations; or to apply *li* in achieving harmony.

Following the rituals endowed with heavenly laws requires conscious benevolence whole-heartedly. As Confucius said, "Benevolence has to come out of one's heart naturally, can that be coerced by someone?" Confucius therefore believed that once everyone has a "heart of benevolence," a society will become harmonized; "once people can constrain themselves, benevolence will follow suit." Therefore, "administering state affairs well and ensuring national security" has to be run by the policy of benevolence and in a kingly way, rather than by tyranny or hegemony.

¹⁵Confucius, *The Analects* (Chap. 12).

Only in this way, can different nations and countries coexist harmoniously. If, in any way, “benevolent government” can contribute to modernization, then it surely has something to do with “universal values.” If scholars of different nations and countries join hands in exploring their own “universal values” rather than upholding the egoistic mindset of “universalism,” then there is hope for world peace.

In fact, various theories of “universal values” in different nations and countries require us to explore and reveal their resources with adequate explanations. Responsible scholars should thus carry out the mission of both preserving their own “universal values” while reverencing others. “Wide heart embraces all” is the way to vitalize a culture.

13.2.3 The Core Value of Multi-modernity

Concerning the issue of “multi-modernity,” there are different interpretations. Some think modernity varies with different nations, others consider it having basic common connotations with different national forms and ways of achieving it. Personally I prefer the latter one.

As we know, “modernity” originated from the West, where some of the countries have been modernized while many developing countries are striving toward modernization, therefore there must be certain core values behind the move. Here I want to refer to the view of Hu Shih (1854–1921) who criticized “Chinese study as ideology while Western study as a means.” He believed that the ideology and means have to be in unity; one cannot take the one and dismiss the other when it comes to learning modernity from the West. Based on this assertion, modern western society is the community underpinned by freedom as its ideology and democracy as its means. I think the modern western society Hu Shih referred to was by no means confined to the West, but to the world as a whole.

Therefore, fundamentally speaking, freedom and democracy are the core values with the former being a spirit (including the free will of individuals in a market economy) and the latter (mainly consists of rights and obligations) a means to safeguard the practice.

In this sense, freedom and democracy, though originating from the West, share the universal values of all societies. Surely, the ways of entering a modern society may vary from one to another but the core values cannot be excluded.

Viewed from the Chinese thought-mode of “the same source of substance and function,” perhaps world history may be divided into pre-modern, modern and post-modern societies. In other words, centering around modern society, pre-modern society is a community of autocracy and indoctrination and post-modern society is a harmonious society.

Pre-modern human society, whether Chinese imperial tyranny or Western kingly autocracy in medieval times (or theocracy), though in different forms, are all

autocratic societies and sustained by indoctrination. China, since the Han Dynasty, has always been an imperial tyranny in one way or another, supported by politicized Confucianism. Currently, Chinese society is in the process of shifting from a pre-modern society to modern society, as are many developing countries.

The ruling of a kingly autocratic society of the medieval West was sustained by Christian ethics. It was a multi-pre-modern world. As I mentioned above, in a modern society, “freedom” is the spirit while “democracy” is a means to support freedom, and yet both of them could have flaws since there are contradictions in any ideological system.

Any system has positive and negative sides during a certain historical period, so are “freedom” and “democracy.” However, “freedom” and “democracy” are after all essentially significant to a modern society. It was precisely the “free economy” in a free market, for example, that has resulted in a tremendous increase in social wealth and benefited people’s material well-being life since industrialization.

Also, it is precisely because freethinking, that science and culture are renewed with each passing day. However, there is no need for any reticence, free economy has polarized the world between the rich and poor (concluding disparities between nations, countries and within them). The situation, if is not properly controlled, can cause economic crisis and social turbulence, and recent financial crisis is just one of these results.

The inundated scientism and instrumental rationality have strangled humanist spirit and deteriorated value rationality. Subjectivity and subject-object dichotomous philosophy, adored by modernity, have aggravated contradictions between man and nature, bringing a structural thought toward modernity as “post-modernism.” Concerning post-modernism, I have not had substantial study on the subject except to give a general impression—the thought emerged as a criticism on the shortcomings of modernity, overshadowing all authorities and autocracies, making them fractured, discretized and apparent.

Initially, post-modernism concentrated on structuralism as a meaningful approach to destroy all authorities. And yet it did not propose any constructive suggestion in terms of embracing a new age. At the end of the 20th century, based on process philosophy, constructive post-modernism put forward an initiative of combining the outcomes of first Enlightenment with post-modernism, and calling for a second Enlightenment. For example, philosopher of process philosophy Whitehead believes that man should not be viewed as the center; instead, man and nature are a mutually connected “life community.” He criticizes the dichotomous thought mode of western society and promotes a holistic concept, laying a theoretical ground for reproaching scientism.

Director of creative center of process philosophy John Cobbe said, “Constructive post-modernism holds a critical view on structural modernism ... we have unhesitatingly introduced ecological dimension into post-modernism, which is seen as a harmonious society of man-man and man-nature. In post-modern society, positive elements of modernism will be preserved while transcending dualism, human-centralism and male chauvinism in building a commonwealth community;”

“As part of the natural world, we are living in an integrated ecological body ...”¹⁶ This point of view is perhaps in line with the Confucian concept of “unity of man and heaven.” They also believed that as the slogan of the first Enlightenment being “self-emancipation,” the second one should be respecting others and differences. As Rifkin points out in his *The European Dream*, “In the new age, everybody’s rights should be honored and cultural differences welcomed; everyone should be able to enjoy a high quality life (not a luxurious one though) within a permitted sphere on earth and the whole human beings live a secure and harmonious environment. In a word, a holistic concept has to be concerned about the harmony, integrity and interaction among a myriad of creatures.”¹⁷

The ideas mentioned above, have to a certain degree something in common with the Confucian concept of harmony. According to process philosophy, when personal freedom starts undermining the “life community,” it will eventually damage personal freedom itself. Thus there is no such thing as “abstract freedom;” freedom has to be incorporated with obligations, so as to achieve “substantial freedom.” All this in my mind are in some way in line with the notion of traditional Chinese culture that one has to survive in relation to other people.

In view of the prevalence of constructive post-modernism in the West, can post-modern society become an ideal harmonious and equal community? As an ideal, “harmony” involves relations between man and nature, man and man and the balance within the self. This kind of harmony has to be achieved by “moderation.” If we can make a smooth journey out of modern society, which is surely an arduous and prolonged process, then with an abundant ideological resource of Confucian “harmony” and “moderation,” perhaps we may be able to enter the post-modern society with relative ease.

As Cobbe rightly points out, “Traditional Chinese thoughts are of an appeal to constructive post-modernism, we cannot, however, simply return to them. We have to renew ourselves through careful dealing with science and the evolved social reality, making pre-modern society beneficial to post-modern society by taking in positive elements of the previous Enlightenment (such as honoring individual rights).”¹⁸ Therefore, searching “universal values” among different cultures will surely become one of the focuses in the academic field.

Let us now return to the question of “multi-modernity.” As mentioned above, although there are basic core values in “modernity,” the ways to approach that process vary from country to country due to their historical and cultural differences. Accepting “freedom,” “democracy” and other core values of modernity, can then Confucian thoughts play an active role in probing into a new way of its own while infusing certain fresh elements and eliminating some negative aspects of modernity?

¹⁶In Shanghai Social Science, June 13, 2002.

¹⁷Rifkin, Jeremy, *The European Dream*, Penguin; First Printing edition, 2004.

¹⁸In Shanghai Social Science, June 13, 2002.

I believe that Confucian thoughts of people-orientation, tolerance and social mission can well serve as a bridge in Chinese society connecting concepts of western freedom, democracy and human rights. The Confucian ideal of “the people are the foundation of the state,” though essentially not democratic, it nevertheless is not antidemocratic either. Theoretically speaking, it would not be hard for a society to receive “democracy” per se, where there is a notion of “people are the foundation,” even as it was viewed from the rulers’ point of view.

Also, Confucianism is well equipped with the spirit of tolerance, advocating that “ways run parallel without interfering with one another,” which is naturally connected with the spirit of freedom. Meanwhile, given the thoughts of “being prepared for danger in times of safety,” “being the first to worry and the last to enjoy” have so deeply entangled with so many Confucian scholars’ minds, those virtues and sense of mission can certainly enrich the modern concepts of democracy, human rights and so on. Historically, China received Indian Buddhist culture, which was a perfect example of how well it could be when it comes to recognizing foreign ideals. When Confucian thoughts of “people are the foundation of the state,” the spirit of tolerance and the sense of social mission are integrated with the concepts of freedom, democracy, human rights, then a new path for China to enter a modern society, that is based on freedom and facilitated with democracy, will be smoothly carved out.

Up to now, a few drawbacks have been manifested in western modern society, indicating that it may be going down the road of deterioration if not changing to another tune, which is the cause for post-modernism to appear. If, a “mission ethics” can be derived from the Confucian social and historical sense of mission, then the flaws caused by modernity may somehow be rectified. In other words, if the concepts of “freedom” and “democracy” are endowed with a sense of responsibility then a healthier and rational society will probably be produced. As Carame, chairman of the French Human Progress Foundation, insightfully points out, “mission ethics” is another “mission convention” apart from the “human rights convention.”

In fact, I notice that some Western sinologists have started to probe into the Confucian thought that is deemed to be benign to the development of human society. For instance, French Confucian scholar Vandermeersch said in his “The meaning of compiling *Confucian Collection*,” “Confronted with the challenge of modernity, western humanism, an idea that had once brought the world a perfect thought of human rights, has been unable to provide a right solution for current issues. Why, then, not to turn our attention to Confucianism in searching for guidelines for the development of the world, such as those based on ‘unity of man and heaven,’ the thought of reverencing nature may be set forth, ‘deity infused in man’ may avoid being hampered by religious wholism, and the tenet of ‘all men on earth are human brothers’ may promote philanthropy.”¹⁹

¹⁹In *Wenhui Daily*, April 8, 2009.

In the book entitled *Thinking through Confucianism*, American scholars Roger Ames and David Hall said, what we are engaged in now is not only studying Chinese traditions, but more in an effort to transform them into a cultural asset that will enrich and alter our worldviews. Can the Confucian approach of man from a social perspective offer something to rectify or enhance the western mode of liberalism? In a society based on *li* (rituals), can we find some useful resources for deepening our understanding of the idea of “human rights” that seems devoid of philosophy but full of practical values.

French Professor C. Walt at Sorbonne University said, “Full of belief, hope and mercy, Confucius’ thought has universal values, providing a paradigm for today’s practice as well as radiating its spirit in the 21st century.” It should be clear that while “freedom,” “democracy” or “human rights” are asset of modern society. “Mission ethics,” “people orientation” and “tolerant mindset” are also part of them as well. Surely, a modern society is composed of core values of freedom, democracy, human rights and so on, however, some modernized countries or nations also have some negative ideological resources counteracting freedom, democracy and human rights. Perhaps, with human society moving into a post-modern era special values, more special values contained in different national cultures are expected to be explored as resources of replenishing “universal values.”

One of the intensions in compiling *A History of Confucianism* is to reveal some universal values beneficial to human culture enclosed in Confucian values, so as to make certain contributions to the world.

13.3 Confucianism and Classic Annotations

A History of Confucianism is part of the major project of philosophy and social science *Compiling and Research of Confucianism Collection* granted by the ministry of education in 2003. The series comprises nine volumes: the Pre-Qin Confucianism, Confucianism in the Two Han Dynasties, Confucianism in the Wei, Jin, Northern and Southern Dynasties, Confucianism in the Sui and Tang Dynasties, Confucianism in the Song and Yuan Dynasties, Confucianism in the Ming 明 Dynasty, Confucianism in the Qing Dynasty, Modern Confucianism and Contemporary Confucianism.

While the focus is still on the philosophical aspect of Confucianism, the contents of the book are also enlarged to embrace other areas of canon studies. And the result is to be judged by the reader. In 1938, invited by the president of Zhejiang University, Zhu Kezhen, Ma Yifu (1883–1967) gave lectures on studies of Chinese ancient civilization, which was then compiled into a book entitled *Tai He Collection*. And in defining “Six Classics,” it says, “The so called *liu yi* or the six classics, refers to *Odes (Book of Poetry)*, *History*, *Rituals*, *Music*, *Changes*, *Spring and Autumn*, which are teachings of Confucius, the source of our scholarship over the past two thousand years. The rest are the tributaries of them. Therefore the six classics can cover all the essence of other learning, but not vice versa. Thus it has

now been denominated as an item of national learning to comprehensively signify all the current scholarly works, and leaving out nothing significant.”

Ma’s remark is very insightful. Since the “source” has been nourished and incorporated with other cultures by giant Confucians in every dynasty of history, some “universal values” have surely evolved. In fact, any national academic culture that has evolved, has evolved in a particular environment, which in turn produces a culture with special characteristics. However, all universal values are contained in particular values. For example, Confucius’ benevolence, Christian *caritas*, Sakyamuni’s mercy, though originated differently, all have common values of “love.” By the same token, we may also deduce Ma Yifu’s comment further: the six classics have not only captured the essence of traditional Chinese scholarship, but in some sense touched the core values of the West, since mind acts upon mind and people reason the same way.

Confronted with common questions, the ways of approaching issues are also largely identical but with minor differences. We should therefore seek “universal values” from both our own national culture and cultures of other nations. As the ancient saying goes, “the ways are run parallel without interfering with one another.” As Ma Yifu (1883–1967) pointed out, we carry forward the six classics aiming at not only preserving the quintessence of Chinese culture, promoting our national spirit, but also popularizing the culture to other parts of the world as a whole.

In 2001, the famous Chinese scholar Rao Zongyi pointed out: Chinese classics, as national treasures, having stood the test of history, are the foundation of our national thinking mode and knowledge structure, whose values need to be further reviewed in studying canons. However, reconstructing canons, an arduous and creative cultural undertaking, should not be confined to literal proof-reading and annotation, but more importantly should have a general evaluation on the results of previous classical collection, compiling and examination.

Confucius, as the founder of Confucianism, had inherited the culture of the Xia, Shang and Zhou Dynasties, crystallizing in the “six canons,” which although failed to be handed down from past generations in terms of literature research, the contents nevertheless remained. In 1993, the Chu bamboo slips unearthed in Hubei province discovered an important passage concerning the six canons:

Rituals: to regulate behaviors in communication;

Music: to cultivate or educate;

History: to (record) what has happened;

Odes: to compile ancient and contemporary
poetry anthology;

Changes: to search for the *Dao* of man and heaven;

Spring and Autumn: to trace events chronologically.²⁰

²⁰Liu Junming, *Studies on Chinese Bamboo Slip and Silk*. Beijing: Chinese Social Science Publishing Press, 2011.

The passage illustrates the understanding of the six canons in the mid-Warring States Period: *Ritual*, regulating rules of behaviors in communication; *Music*, cultivation and education; *History*, to record what has happened (with a few words missing the meaning can be detected from the literature context); *Odes*, to compile ancient and contemporary poetry anthology; *Changes*, to search for the *Dao* of heaven and man, that is to “probe into the laws of the universe” (Sima Qian); *Spring and Autumn*, to record events chronologically, that is to trace the evolution from the ancient to the present (Sima Qian).

According to ancient literature, the six canons include utensil, institutional and ideological cultures. As it is recorded in the *Analects*, “The Master said, I prefer to transmit what I have known instead of forging something of my own when it comes to cherishing the ancients. In this aspect, I compare myself to Lao-Tzu and Peng Zu..” In “Heavenly fate” of Chuang-Tzu, it records that “Allow me to live a few more years so that at the age of fifty I shall study again the *Book of Changes* and I will be free of any serious oversights.”

In *Mencius*, it says, “Confucius’ compiling of the *Spring and Autumn* has threatened rebellious ministers and villains”²¹ and similar remarks can be found in many other literatures in the Pre-Qin Period. Confucius himself had used the six classics as basic materials for his teaching, behaving and dealing with things. From the current point of view, apart from the six canons, there is no way we can trace back to the origin of Chinese culture, let alone to gain the spirit of Confucianism.

In the Han Dynasty, with the absence of *yue* or Music, there were only five of them left. With the notion of “banning from hundred philosophers and venerating Confucianism,” Emperor Wu Di set up the positions of the “five canon masters,” establishing *Changes*, *History*, *Odes*, *Rituals*, *Spring and Autumn* as canons, and their official position in Confucianism has not ever since been shaken despite the later emergence of seven, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen classics.

In recent years, the Research Center for Compiling Confucian Collection at Beijing University has been undertaking the research project by cooperating with scholars of South Korea, Japan and Vietnam. Having compiled the condensed version of the series, the Center is ready to compile the whole set of the series, which is composed of five hundred subjects in four categories (two hundred subjects in “Canon”) in addition to “Literature Excavated.” About a hundred and fifty volumes written in Chinese by Japanese, Korean and Vietnamese scholars, forming another feature of the series, will also be compiled by 2015. Meanwhile, we have mobilized on every front of our university to compile a comprehensive table of contents of the series (with a completed section of Canon) in 14,000 subjects.

We are fully aware of the efforts the Confucian scholars made on annotations, commentaries, examinations and correction of the five classics. Having paid due attention to the section of the canons, we are now still hardly satisfied with current results, owing to lack of sufficient research in the field. This requires our continued endeavor to constantly renew the edition for the time to come.

²¹*Mencius* (Teng Wengong II).

Confucian canons should include not only the five classics or thirteen classics, but also the unearthed Confucian literatures. As Rao Zongyi points out in his lecture mentioned above in 2001: “Literatures recorded on unearthed bamboo slips and silk vividly reveal original classics in the Pre-Qin Period, that scholars during the Song and Qing Dynasties could only dream of. Now, as Su Shi’s poetic line goes, ‘the key to reveal the authentic is in our hand.’ We should therefore spare no effort to re-compile a new ‘Bible’ of our time.” In other words, the newly excavated literatures can better present their authenticities.

The excavated texts we obtained in 2001 were mainly silk manuscripts unearthed from Mawangdui Tomb in Changsha, Hunan Province and Guodian bamboo slips unearthed from the Jingmen area in Hubei province in 1993. In the following year, Shanghai Museum bought 1,200 bamboo slips of the Warring States Period from overseas. In 2008, Tsinghua university bought another 2,000 bamboo slips from foreign countries. These silk manuscripts, though not entirely but largely are Confucian classics. So valuable as they are to Confucian classics, these ancient texts are equally significant to the five classics, such as silk manuscript the *Book of Changes*, *Five Elements*, *Confucius on the Book of Poetry*, the *Book of Classic History* and so on, which fill the textual gap between Confucius and Mencius, worthy of our special attention.

Confucian scholars of every historical period have always attached great importance to annotations of the five classics, accumulating rich resources in the field. Since ancient times, China has been a country where traditions are highly valued. As the saying goes, “the six canons are of history.” In dealing with classics, Confucius’ attitude was “to merely transmit but not to forge in anything with my admiration for the ancients.” And so indulged in interpreting the classics, Confucius even forgot his age. Mencius, also set his mind to narrate the heritage of Yao and Shun, institutions of emperor Wen and emperor Wu, as well as the will of Confucius. Xun Zi believed that a man of benevolence should succeed to the rituals of Yao and Shun, and the virtue of Confucius and Zi Gong (“Contra Twelve Philosophers” in *Xun Zi*).

In a narrow sense, works of Confucius, Mencius, Xun Zi and others are all annotations to the six canons. More particularly, the silk manuscript of the *Zhouyi* could be seen as the explanatory notes to the *Book of Changes*; some parts of the *Great Learning* to the *Book of Classic History* and *Odes*; the *Confucius’s commentaries on poems* (the Warring States bamboo slips stored in Shanghai Museum) to *Odes* (similar annotations to *Odes* can also be found in *Doctrine of the Mean* and *Five Elements*); *Li Ji* to the *Book of Rites*; the three annals of *Chun Qiu* to the *Spring and Autumn Annals* and so on. To elaborate how Confucianists had annotated the classics, we may take *The Commentary of Zuo* to the *Spring and Autumn Annals* and the silk manuscript of the *Zhouyi* to the *Book of Changes* as examples.

According to saga, *The Commentary of Zuo* was written by Zuo Qiuming. In examining its authenticity, the well-known Chinese scholar Yang Bojun says, “I believe that the author is not Zuo Qiuming but an anonym who was influenced by Confucians.” And the *Commentary* was believed to be written in between 403 and 386 B.C. Based on Yang’s judgment, the *Commentary of Zuo* was the earliest

comprehensive annotation to the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, and also probably one of the earliest explanatory books in the world almost two and half thousand years ago.

Previously, Duke Wu of Zheng married Wu Jiang of Shen, who bore Duke Zhuang and his brother Gong Shuduan. Since Duke Zhuang was born feet first, which frightened his mother, who nicknamed him Wusheng (meaning a frightening birth) and consequently bred hatred for him thereafter. Loving Shuduan so much, she intended to get him declared as the heir of the throne of Zheng. She pleaded with Duke Wu to name his heir urgently but was in vain. Later, when Duke Zhuang (Wusheng) came to the throne, she asked him to grant his younger brother Shuduan the city of Zhi, however it was rejected. “Zhi is a place of strategic significance and also Lord of Guo is buried there. As for any other place, you just have to ask,” Duke Zhuang said. Wu Jiang of Shen then asked for the city of Jing for Shuduan, and that he would be permitted to reside there with the title Lord of Jing.

When his advice was sought, the councilor Zhai Zhong suggested that any city which has walls exceeding 300 *zhang* (about 1,200 m) in circumference poses a threat to the capital, our predecessors had stipulated the rule that the major cities should not exceed one third the size of the capital; middle-sized cities one fifth and small towns one ninth. Jing has obviously breached the law. If you grant it to your brother, you will inevitably be put at risk.

The Duke replied: It is my mother’s wish, so I have to put up with risk, do I have other ways to avoid it? “Will your mother’s ambition end there?” Warned Zhai Zhong, “if you don’t act early to stop weeds spreading, you will find it difficult to get rid of them when they have spread over all the place, let alone your brother is favored by your mother.” But the sovereign only answered: Those who repeatedly conduct evil deeds will encompass their own ruin. It’s only a matter of time.

Before long, Shuduan, now ensconced with the title of Lord of Jing, demanded that the western and northern border regions acknowledge his dominion. Upon hearing this, Gongzi Lü, another high official of Zheng, sought after his sovereign: “What do you intend to do, sire? If you wish to yield your throne to your brother, please let me go and serve him instead of you. If not, please remove him as quick as possible before the people are motivated against you.” “There is no need for that,” said sovereign, “he will bring about his own demolition.”

Then Shuduan reinforced his city walls, stockpiled supplies of food, replenished his armor and weapons and refilled his foot soldiers and charioteers in preparation for an assault on the capital. Meanwhile, the queen mother had promised to secretly open the city gates from inside for his attack. When Duke Zhuang learned about the date of attack planned, he finally said, “Now it’s the time!” He ordered Gongzi Lü to lead a force of 200 chariots attacking the city of Jing. Having heard the news, the inhabitants rose up against Shuduan, who then fled to the district of Yan. Duke Zhuang then personally led a force attacking Yan, and on the 23rd day of the fifth month Shuduan fled again, this time to Gong (a small piece of land given to him as a fief by Duke Wu, his deceased father).

As recorded in *Spring and Autumn Annals*, Zheng Bo (Duke Zhuang) conquered Shuduan in Yan. Since Shuduan did not behave in a way of brotherhood, he was thus not called “brother,” but “sovereign” and “conquered.” In reproaching his family education, Duke Zhuang was named Zheng Bo. Having Shuduan flee was the intention of Duke Zhuang but he did not use the word “exile,” which more or less reflects the author’s censure.²²

²²Zuo Qiuming, *Commentary of Zuo*.

This rather lengthy passage annotated seven words in the original “Zheng Bo conquered Duan in Yan,” a narration to a historical event, including the beginning, course and end, together with related commentaries. It is a quite complete narrative story in its own right. Nevertheless, it is indeed an explanatory book to the *Spring and Autumn Annals*. In this way, “Zheng Bo conquered Duan in Yan” is the historical fact, while the passage quoted in the *Commentary of Zuo* becomes a narrative history.

Historical events and narrative history are closely related to one another. However, strictly speaking, almost all written histories are narrative in nature. Authors narrating the history are determined by their time, living environment personal morality, knowledge and even occasions, that is to say every author has his own perspective of history, such as in the passage mentioned above, the author had final comment: “He who involves in many wrong things will be doomed to perish.”

Annotations such as the *Commentaries of Zuo* to the *Spring and Autumn Annals* had widespread influence on various historical books. Many of China’s Twenty-Four Histories, as we know, have been annotated. Those such as *The Three Kingdoms* would not be so articulated without Pei Songzhi’s annotations. Instead of concentrating on the glosses, Pei’s efforts were mainly on explanation and amplification, providing abundant historical data.

In “Zhang Lu’s Biography” of the *Three Kingdoms*, for example, based on *An Outline of Classics*, Pei added in the notes: “During the year of Xiping, there were rebels everywhere, such as Luo Yao in Sanfu; up to the year of Guanghe, there were Zhang Jiao in the east and Zhang Xiu in Han Zhong. Luo Yao taught people the magic of Mianni, Zhang Jiao formed the Taiping sect and Zhang Xiu established the Five Bushels of Rice League.” It is through Pei’s annotation that we can gain much more insight into different religious sets at the end of the Han Dynasty. These explanatory books, though technically slightly different, generally fall into the same category of narrative history illustrating the original records.

The *Book of Changes*, originally used as a classic for divination, consisting of hexagram name, chart and order, as well as hexagram-records and remarks appended to the lines, contains high values but fragmentation of philosophy. With a general interpretation provided by “Copulative” of the *Appended Judgment*, however, a rather complete philosophical system can be deduced from the *Book of Changes*.

“Copulative,” with its detailed explanations to the *Book of Changes* that had ever since been viewed as a holistic system, exerted great influence on later generations of explanative works, such as Wang Bi’s *Guides to Lao-Tzu*, and He Yan’s *On Dao De Jing* and *On Nameless*, which give Lao-Tzu systematic and comprehensive annotations; *Illustration of the Book of Changes*, provides penetrating elaborations in Chinese history. While there may be many issues that could be discussed in the explanations of “Copulative” towards the *Book of Changes*, this paper mainly concentrates on two overlapped and interrelated topics—ontology and cosmology.

“Yi Ching Hexagrams Symbols” is an open organic system, structuring a framework of the universe where life is forever thriving. Therefore it is said, “Producing and reproducing is not only a philosophical exposition of the cosmic

state, but also the inherent nature of the ‘change’ itself.” Since everything in the world is adequately located in this framework, “Copulative” hence says, “the way of changes follows the law of universe without a single one going astray.” In other words, the vicissitudes of the universe are all designated in the framework presented in the *Book of Changes*, “these changes are manifested as celestial phenomena in heaven and as a myriad of visible things on earth.” Meanwhile, the reasons for their existence are also recorded in the mode the *Book of Changes*: “It is the concord between universal law and the changes that permeates the *Dao* between heaven and earth.” (the *Book of Changes*).

The cosmological framework presented in the *Book of Changes* is supposed to be the norm of a myriad of things in the universe, including both the principles of current existence and that of reality for the time to come. Changes therefore are spaceless as well as timeless. As it has been described by the author of “Copulative,” everything can be found in this all-inclusive mode. And “metaphysical things fall in the category of the *Dao* while physical things are used as tools,” which was the first time that things metaphysical and physical had been differentiated. In Feng Youlan’s view, metaphysics is the law whereas physics belongs to reality; the law is operated behind the phenomena. In other words, “Copulative” had divided the two things and started establishing a metaphysical system of change featured with shapelessness. The illustration of the *Book of Changes* as a cosmological framework, could be viewed as a metaphysical explanation to its ontology.

The annotative pattern on the ontology of the *Book of Changes* exerted profound influence on Chinese philosophy of later generations. For example, Wang Bi’s annotations to the “maximum number—it is fifty in total and forty-nine of them are used in divination” in “Copulative”: “During a divination, figures ‘forty-nine’ out of ‘fifty’ are operated to make evaluation and leave one for a general purpose. ‘One’ is not a number in its own right (nothingness) but functions as the ‘Supreme Ultimate’ corresponding to ‘forty-nine’ which complements ‘one’ as a whole. The nothingness has to manifest itself in something; once it has been transformed into somethingness, a perfect ‘Supreme Ultimate’ is formed to ultimate its *zong* or noumenon” (Han Kangbo’s Annotations to “Copulative” of the *Book of Changes*).

Since the so-called *zong* refers to noumenon, Wang Bi in fact drew relations between noumenon and utility to illustrate the functions between metaphysics and physics, devising an ontology with Chinese characteristics. In the *Guide to Lao-Tzu*, Wang Bi said, “For things to appear and function there must be causes in form of shapelessness and namelessness, which are the noumenon of a myriad of beings.”

There is an important passage in the *Appended Judgments* of the *Book of Changes*: “In the *Yi* there is the Supreme Ultimate. The Supreme Ultimate produces the Two Forms. The Two Forms produce the Four Emblems, and the Four Emblems produce the eight trigrams ... ” and so on. It is meant the *Yi* (changes) is an organic system and the *Book of Change* illustrates the ways of its production and transformation in the universe. Initiated from the chaotic Supreme Ultimate, the universe derives its yin (--) and yang (—) two dichotomous extremes, followed by

Taiyin (☷), *Taiyang* (☰), *Shaoyin* (☱), *Shaoyang* (☴) four emblems, which further polarize into eight hexagrams: ☰, ☷, ☱, ☴, ☵, ☶, ☳, ☲.

According to *Shuo gua* (illustrated divination), these eight symbols signify the nature of various things: *qian* for strength, *kun* for smooth, *zhen* for mobility, *xun* for entrance, *kan* for trap, *li* for glamour, *gen* for pause, *dui* for utterance. These eight natures also characterize eight natural phenomena respectively—heaven, earth, wind, mountain, water, fire, thunder and river.

The eight hexagrams can also be diversified to sixty-four ones with *Ji Ji* (the completed) and *Wei Ji* (the uncompleted) as their finals, denoting that everything will end up in somewhere where a new process begins. As elaborated in *Shuo gua*: “With the uncompleted hexagram, it will never be exhausted,” and “with heaven and earth as the opposite forces, everything is integrated; with male and female intercourse, every creature is born.” *Yi* therefore presents an endless evolving open system of the universe.

In the *Hexagrams Order*, it says “There were heaven and earth, proceeded by a myriad of things, and among them are males and females, who are able to mate. Once they are married, there will be relations of father and son, consequently the monarch and his subjects, the superior and inferior, requiring standards to make social etiquette. In this way, “Copulative” has made a cosmological interpretation of the *Book of Changes*. In my view, however, “the Supreme Ultimate produces the Two Forms ...” is merely an explanation to a semiotic system, but “with heaven and earth as the opposite forces, everything is integrated; with male and female intercourse, every creature is born” and “there were heaven and earth, proceeded by a myriad of things” are something more than semiotic description but an actual cosmological process illustrated by enumerations.

While we may conclude that *The Appended Judgments* has established a cosmological transforming symbol system, another philosophical issue—cosmological semiotic system—may also be raised. It may be traced back to the Study of Emblems and Numbers on the *Book of Changes* in as early as the Han Dynasty when the *River Chart* and the *Luo Writing* were composed. There were similar doctrines in the Fu Lu School of Daoism and Shao Yong’s *Diagram of the Sequence of the Eight Trigrams Anteceding Heaven* and Zhou Dunyi’s *Diagram of the Nonbeing Ultimate* (it is unsettled that Zhou’s *Diagram* was derived from Chen Tuan’s *Diagram of the Nonbeing Ultimate*). This is another issue requiring a separate discussion.

And yet it is still very important to distinguish between a cosmological transforming symbol system and a cosmological semiotic system. The former is a description of the developmental process based on actual living experience with specific images (i.e. heaven and earth, males and females), the latter however is mainly a set of semiotic symbols of cosmological formation beyond physical shapes. Similar to algebra, semiotics or names are not confined to specific affairs or nature, but are symbols that could be filled with any substance. The two Supreme Ultimates, for example, can signify either heaven and earth, male and female, or vigorousness and submissiveness. Therefore, in my view, it is not adequate to treat the *Appended Judgment* merely as a description of cosmological formation, but

rather it should be understood as a systematic pattern of cosmology, or a cosmological algebra, or cosmology pertinent to the *Book of Changes*.

Surely, cosmology presented by the semiotic system of the *Appended Judgment* is not the only one of this kind, others are also cosmological algebra with figures presenting any substances, such as in Lao-Tzu, “The *Dao* begets one, and one engenders two, two produce three, and three bring into being a myriad of things. And everything is endowed with *Yin* and *Yang*, contradictions in harmony.”

“One” could be vital *qi*, or vacuity (as it is said that “the *Dao* originated from vacuity” in the “astronomical notes” of *The Book of Master Huainan*); “Two” represents either *Yin* and *Yang*, or the cosmos (according to the “astronomical notes” the universe was born out of vacuity); “Three” is not always a synonym for heaven, earth and man, but it can also be any third synthetic produced by the combination of two correlated counterparts. However, the cosmology in the Han Dynasty was nothing more than descriptions of the cosmological transforming process, which also requires a separate discussion.

When we say the interpretation of the *Appended Judgment* to the *Book of Changes* in fact consisted of two systems—the ontological system and the cosmological transforming system, it does not mean that they are contradictory to one another; rather, they actually complement each other, forming two major schools of Chinese philosophy. The Cosmos could be viewed either as a horizontal open system with boundless spheres (such as Guo Xiang annotated “Geng Sangchu” of Chuang-Tzu, “Cosmos is unlimited in all”), or a vertical system with ceaseless extensions (as Guo Xiang said in the same book, “cosmos cannot be terminated in any directions”).

Meanwhile, chronologically it is also endless since ancient times, as Guo Xiang put it. Since the cosmos could be approached from both sides, so could the “sage philosophy” of cosmology in interpreting its system. “In fact, changes have always been in line with heaven and earth,” Guo Xiang said. The *Dao* of *Yi* is a holistic cosmological pattern open to all, which cannot be segregated among its components—whether things in the past, present or in the future can all be located in their corresponding position in this system. However, the *Dao* of *Yi* is not unanimated but a dynamic system, manifesting in *Yin* and *Yang* (which are determining changes and innate in divine forces), the two interrelated symbols signifying forces of different qualities.

Since these two forces are embraced in the *Dao* of *Yi*, their regular alteration operates the way of changes. As Wang Bi said, “The *Dao* is composed of an alteration of *Yin* and *Yang*, and any single one of them cannot function, for a *Yin* factor cannot work for *Yang*, and softness cannot replace hardness. Only when *Yin* and *Yang* make a neutral entity can an ontology be formed; only when softness and hardness combine can strength be achieved. Therefore shapeless and directionless, non-*Yin* and non-*Yang* are called the *Dao* endowed with a divine force” (Yang Shixun, “annotation to Gu Liang Autography” of the *Spring and Autumn Annals*).

Yin and *Yang* are opposite things, each one cannot substitute the other. Only the *Dao* is neither *Yin* nor *Yang*, but the noumenon of both. As it is said, “Deity is shapeless and changes follows no noumenon.” It is very philosophically wise that

The *Appended Judgment* explains *The Book of Changes* as a philosophical system that is horizontally open and vertically extensive. It is also quite different between the holistic approach that *The Appended Judgment* explains *The Book of Changes* and the narrative approach that *Zuo Zhuan* explains *The Spring and Autumn Annals*.

Concerning annotations to classics in the Han Dynasty, professor Li Ling explains them in this way: *Jing*, original text; *Zhuan*, the style and the commentaries to the original; *Shuo*, annotations (a complement to *Zhuan*); *Zhang Ju* is the explanations to every text of the original; ... *Jie Gu* (or *Gu*) is the elucidations to words.

Professor Li Ling also elaborates the relationship between these terms, revealing that we cannot thoroughly comprehend the five canons without consulting the predecessors' annotations. In addition, knowledge of scholiums, philology, phonology, textology, bibliology, bibliography and so on, are all essentials in grasping the true meanings of the Chinese classics.

In 1998, I put forward the question of whether we should set up Chinese hermeneutics, followed by four articles. In China, from the pre-Qin period to the following dynasties, there had formed various annotated methods and theories, such as interpretations to every text, sentence or word in the Tang Dynasty.

It is said in "Scholars Biology" of the *Book of Han Dynasty*, "Annotations to a classic could be as long as a million words," such as Master Qin Yanjun interpreted "Yao" and "Dian" two words in over hundred thousand words; for "yue ruo ji gu" four words, in 30,000 words. Also there was a way of using "latitude" to proof "longitude," such as Su Yu said, "'Latitude' is used to interpret books, incorporating with 'longitude' and making it as a whole. Books compiled in this way such as *Yi Wei*, *Shi Wei*, are all reiterated as *Jing* (longitude annotations)." This kind of farfetched interpretation of classics is different from the exegesis of sentences.

In the Wei and Jin Dynasties, with metaphysics emerging as a discipline, annotations to classics had sharply altered. Many metaphysicians tended to eliminate the tedious way of annotations and adopted a more straight forward and tacit understanding without being confined to their linguistic meanings. "While language cannot exhaust meaning, writing cannot fully explore the language either." Since the metaphysical method of tacit understanding was adopted there had been a fresh look in interpreting Confucian classics ("Chapter of Elucidation of Xiang" in the *Book of Changes*). Later Guo Xiang proposed the idea of "infusing additional meanings to the language" exemplified by an explanation to "Free and Easy Wandering" of *Chuang-Tzu*:

Whether there were such a kind of huge fish or bird called Kun and Peng I do not know, but Chuang-Tzu's idea was to portray a wandering in absolute leisure and freedom by extreme ways with the appropriate words to its nature. A wise man can get the essence of its narration and forget about the metaphor, obtain the inspiration and omit the details.²³

²³Guo Xiang, *Annotations to Zhuang Zi*.

This way of annotating the meaning and leaving the language aside is quite different from that used in the Han Dynasty. As it says in the *Quotation of Zen Master Dahui Pujue* (volume 22) “In reading Guo Xiang’s annotation, the wise man said that it was in fact Chuang-Tzu who annotated Guo Xiang rather than the other way around.” It might be true to say that the six canons were annotated by scholars in the Han Dynasty, during the time of Wang Bi and Guo Xiang, however, the six canons actually dominated the minds of scholars.

Before reading the book *Chuang-Tzu*, I often heard it was quoted in political argument and I thought him a debater. Not until I read this section of the book annotated by many, however, did I realize how wrong the idea and the language being rumored about were, and how unreliable the hearsay was. In my view, any words that have nothing to do with ruling the state could be regarded as useless. Macaronis, however, treat classics casually; without being bothered in carefully reading into them, they either expound the meaning at their own wills, or freely infuse their own ideas, influencing the generations to come. Faithfully following the authentic nature of the words without any distortion, therefore, would be better than being a debater. The wise way in my view is thus to preserve what it is rather than having any comments on it, for the sake of later inquirers.²⁴

It had a special implication in Guo’s reiteration of “differentiating names and analyzing the principle” (also called *ming li zhi xue* or study of principles), which was the method used by metaphysicians in the Wei and Jin Dynasties. As Wang Bi said, “If names cannot be differentiated then the principle remains vague; failing in establishing names will result in missing the essence.” According to Ji Kang in his *Ode on Qin*, “Only the most sophisticated approach can really get into the principle.” Clearly, metaphysicians in the Wei and Jin Dynasties were so conscientious about their methodologies. In the Song Dynasty, Lu Jiuyuan raised the issue of “Six Canons note me or I note Six Canons;” in fact, the idea originated from the Wei and Jin Dynasties and then evolved into a question.

Until the Qing Dynasty, textual criticism became prevalent. As Hang Shijun pointed out, “It is more difficult for current scholars to study annotations than ancient scholars, since they have to be competent in possessing the following components: thorough understanding of original meaning and the related literary quotations, and be knowledgeable about heaven, earth and society, as well as *qi lue* or ‘Seven Ancient Strategies.’” Although Hang’s opinion is in no way tantamount to Hermeneutics in the West, it reveals that the comprehension of classics since the pre-Qin period and the Western and Eastern Han Dynasties required exegeses to make it available to Chinese scholars.

Therefore, in studying Confucianism we must pay attention to annotations of canons recorded in successive dynasties, and make full use of the rich historical resources in terms of both theories and methodologies. And in compiling *A History of Confucianism*, the history of annotating Confucianism may also be reviewed, several meaningful theories and approaches may also be developed to eventually establish Chinese Hermeneutics.

²⁴*Quotation of Dahui Pujue Zen Master*, (Vol. 22).

13.4 Confucianism and the Introduction of Foreign Cultures

As Bertrand Russell said in his *Chinese and Western Civilizations Contrasted*, “Contacts between different civilizations have often in the past proved to be landmarks in human progress.”²⁵ Reviewing the history of Confucian development over the past two thousand years, we can clearly discover that every step it moves forward has been, apart from itself renewal, the result of communication with other schools of thought, absorbing Daoism, Legalism and Yin-Yangism, formulating the Cannon of Western and Eastern Hans.

During the Wei, Jin and Southern and Northern Dynasties many metaphysicians annotated Confucianism canons based on Confucian principles. It is surely worth our attention to the interaction between different schools in terms of studying the history of Confucianism. However, more attention should be paid to the impact of alien cultures on Confucianism.

In the history of the development Confucianism, two major events brought a great influence from foreign cultures on the Chinese culture. First, it was the introduction of Indian Buddhism to China since the 1st century, which laid a ground for Neo-Confucianism(Daoism) of the Song and Ming Dynasties (Nestorianism in the Tang Dynasty and Christianity in the Yuan Dynasty were somehow interrupted by some historical causes). Second, Western culture flooded into China since the end of the 16th century, especially since the mid-19th century, which had fundamentally altered the position of Confucianism in Chinese society. The question brought up then was the relations between Confucianism and Western learning, of which the “source” and “course” need to be differentiated.

It is known that any historical national culture of vitality is rooted in its head-stream, such as today’s European culture, which can be traced back to ancient Greece the Indian culture from the Ganges River. Chinese culture, with a history of five thousand years and rooted in the Yellow River and Yangtze river basin, has constantly taken in elements of other cultures as nourishment. A culture of history and vitality may be likened to a huge running river, with a headstream and many tributaries which may have abundant flows. However, in discussing cultural development, we have to deal properly with the relations between the “source” and “courses.”

²⁵Russell, B. *Chinese and Western Civilization Contrasted*. Changchun: Art Time Press, 1998 Edition (p. 8).

13.4.1 *Confucianism and the Introduction of Indian Buddhism*

Since Confucius, Confucianism has conscientiously carried forward the indigenous culture of the Xia, Shang and Zhou Dynasties and become the mainstream of Chinese culture, namely the headstream of Chinese culture over the past two thousand years. It has also been universally recognized that Indian Buddhism had exerted great impact on Chinese region, philosophy, literature, art, architecture, medicine and so on since the 1st century when it was introduced to China.

Nevertheless these disciplines mentioned above are still intrinsically Chinese. In other words, the indigenous Chinese culture was still the source with Indian Buddhism being a course. Surely Buddhism had a long history since it was introduced to China and had extensive influence on Chinese culture in the Wei and Jin Dynasties, however, when it comes to the causal relationship, we have to come to the fact that it was not the introduction of Buddhism that had produced metaphysics; on the contrary, it was existing metaphysics that made it easier for Buddhism to be popularized in China.

Indian Buddhism, despite the great role it played on Chinese thought and culture in the Wei, Jin and Southern and Northern Dynasties, was still only a “fertilizer” and in no way changed the nature or orientation of Chinese thought and culture. Metaphysics in the Wei, Jin and Southern and Northern Dynasties originated from the Chinese academic soil and the renewal of its traditional thought, evolving into a systematic school. There were in fact no necessary casual relations between Indian Buddhism and metaphysics. In other words, Buddhism was not the cause of metaphysics but rather it was transformed by metaphysics, making it acceptable to the Chinese mind. In this way, we may also say that Buddhism is only part of metaphysics. Nevertheless, the assistant role of Buddhism on metaphysics should not be neglected. Many issues, for example, discussed in the theories of Seng-chao and Dao Sheng, the popular schools of Buddhism, were debated in metaphysics already.

In fact, the four theories of Seng-chao—activity and inertia, having and nothingness, knowledge and ignorance, sagemess, are all the topics of metaphysics proposed by Wang Bi and Guo Xiang; in a way, Seng-chao carried forward metaphysics. The epiphany of Dao Sheng was the harmonization of Chinese and Indian scholarships, eliminating the conflicts between the two traditions and resulting in a sage doctrine as Cheng Yi put it.

According to “Record of Classic Works” in the *Book of Sui Dynasty*, in the Sui Dynasty Buddhist scriptures were printed several thousand times more than the six canons, even though the orthodox position of Confucianism had not been shifted. In the Sui and Tang Dynasties, several Buddhist sects influenced by Confucianism and Daoism appeared, of which the most influential ones, such as Tiantai, Hua-yan and Zen are all Sinicized Buddhist schools, focusing on issues of disposition. Vijnaptimātratā School advocated by Master Monk Xuanzang gradually vanished after thirty years of prevalence.

Disposition has always been the issue discussed by Confucianism (recent excavated documents have proved the issue), such as the “wholehearted mind” of Tiantai, “the Dao-heart law” of Hua-yan, and the “seeing into one’s heart and attaining Buddhahood.” Due to the Sinicization, Buddhist sectors (specially Zen) have greatly altered the original appearance of Indian Buddhism, and transformed supramundane to secularization, believing that one can become Buddha by living a secular life. As a result, Confucian royalism, filial piety and the Daoist thought of obeying nature have all been incorporated into Zen.

In the history of the world, an indigenous culture sometimes developed in an alien land, Indian Buddhism in China is one of those examples. Buddhism had drastically declined during the 8th and 9th century and was almost extinct in the 14th century, Sinicized Buddhism boomed during the same period, which spread to the Korean peninsula, Japan, Vietnam and other places. Therefore, we may say that while Chinese culture has greatly benefited from Indian Buddhism that was in turn being carried forward by Chinese culture.

In the Song Dynasty, Neo-Confucians while criticizing Indian Buddhism absorbed Buddhism. In nature, Confucianism is secular but not monarchical, participating in worldly affairs, quite different from the Buddhist seeking of Sukhavāti (Western Pure Land of Ultimate Bliss). Neo-Confucianism thus not only took in the thought of ruling everything by *li* (rituals), everyone and everything is operated by Tai Chi, “unity in diversity” of the Hua-yan School, but also carried forward the disposition of Confucius and Mencius, establishing a metaphysics based on *li*.

Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Yangming, on the other hand, took in more thought of Zen, carried forward the Confucian belief of thoroughly comprehending the heart, heaven and human nature, together with their own idea of “my heart is universe” and “nothing is out of heart,” formulating a metaphysics of heart. Later on, Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi though holding views slightly different from Lu and Wang, still stuck to the metaphysical principle of “administering the state and ruling the world,” and further accomplishing a comprehensive theory of Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming Dynasties.

It was precisely through assimilation, digestion, and integration of different Sinicized Buddhist sectors since the Sui and Tang Dynasties that Neo-Confucianism was established. Fundamentally speaking, Neo-Confucianism was the continuation of disposition of Confucianism since the pre-Qin period stimulated by Buddhism as a fertilizer. In a way, the relations between the source and courses are clearly exemplified.

13.4.2 Confucianism and the Introduction of Western Learning

At the end of the 19th century, with Western powers invading China, Western learning followed suit. Consequently, the debate over “the ancient versus the

modern and China versus the West” has been ongoing up to now with core issues as follows: How to deal with Western culture, how to treat our indigenous national culture as well as how to create our new culture. Over the past century, among the Western academic thoughts that have flooded into China, the most influential one was the *Evolution and Ethics* translated by Hu Shih, the evolutionary thought it propagated had a lasting effect on the Chinese for several generations.

Subsequently, the philosophy of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche’s philosophy and ancient Greek philosophy, anarchism, Marxism, pragmatism and realism, the 19th Century philosophy of Germany, analytic philosophy, philosophy of the Vienna school, phenomenology, existentialism, structuralism, deconstructionism, post-modernism and so on have been introduced to China, imposing on the Chinese academic circle a great challenge of choice among various schools.

Confronted with the introduction of Western learning to China over the past century, I think the following questions concerning the impact on Chinese academic thoughts have to be dealt with:

(1) Chinese society was in urgent need of thoughts. Since the Opium War China was in an oppressed position of being beaten due to its backwardness. In order to survive this cruel world, ideas such as “obeying heavenly fate,” “three cardinal guides, six detailed rules,” “Chinese learning as the fundamental structure, Western learning for practical use” that the Chinese had been holding dearly were no longer valid; evolutionism translated and introduced by Hu Shih thus became the most influential social thought. Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the Republic of China was in fact an evolutionist.

In the Chinese academic circle, almost everyone, whether radicals (i.e. Chen Duxiu, Lu Xun, Guo Moruo) or liberalists (i.e. Zhang Dongsun, Hu Shih, Ding Wenjiang) all accepted the thought of evolution, and even conservatives (i.e. Liang Shuming, Du Yaquan) were not opposed to evolution. Later, Nietzsche’s thought of “reevaluating everything,” was found to fit well into the rapidly changed situation of China, and thus profoundly influenced the Chinese academic circle. In 1904, while introducing Nietzsche, Wang Guowei pointed out that the purpose of Nietzsche’s theory was to destroy an old culture and create a new one, relieve the burden of old values with rebellious boldness, strong will and extreme intelligence.

Later, Lu Xun, Chen Duxiu, Mao Dun, Guo Moruo and so on all fought against “old tradition” with a strong will. Cai Yuanpei (1860–1940), in particular, said in a lecture, “It was not until Nietzsche, a German great litterateur, that we began to discover the jungle law ... the weak have to fight with the strong for their survival, which led to the evolution of the world.” In *Journal of New Tide*, Fu Sinian (1894–1950) called upon us that “We should search for supermen as well as hit out evils along the street” and praised Nietzsche as an idol-destroyer. In radical fighting against dictatorship, the thought of Nietzsche, together with other thoughts of anarchism, exerted great influence on the people around the May Fourth Movement.

(2) Thoughts renewing traditional Chinese philosophy. Having dominated China for over a thousand years, Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming Periods had gradually become rigid dogmas confining people’s thoughts. Modern Neo-Confucianism, initiated by Xiong Shili, and further developed by Mou

Zongsan, Tu Weiming, Liu Shuxian as representative personages of its third generation, consequently occurred. In fact, there are also other Confucian schools, such as the Neo-Confucianism represented by Feng Youlan and the New Learning of Mind represented by He Lin.

The New Realism of Xiong Shili, although having certain breakthroughs, has in general inherited Confucian philosophy. Concerning Western philosophy, he was certainly very insightful: “Based on ontology, Western thoughts quest changes through phenomenal alterations.” Meanwhile, he also believed that since there is a lack of epistemological components in Chinese philosophy it is therefore quite necessary to establish an epistemology with Chinese style. As he put it, “Since Chinese academic style is characterized by ontological thought and weak in analytical thinking; in order to complement each other between the East and the West, Chinese learning should take in Western thought so as to enrich itself.” Preceded by Mou Zongsan’s theory incorporated with Kantian philosophy, as well as the thoughts of Du and Liu, who embrace Western philosophy more openly while sticking to the tradition of Confucianism.

Feng Youlan said his Neo-Confucianism was not abided by but carried on the New-Confucianism of the Song and Ming Dynasties, in a way he had incorporated Platonic “commonality,” “specialty” and Neo-realism with Chinese philosophy, dividing the world into “truthfulness” (also called “theory” or Tai Chi) and “reality,” meaning everything is caused by a reason. Particularly, in Feng’s *New Rationality* he believed that the spirit of traditional Chinese philosophy is the *Dao* of “Sageliness within and Kingliness without.”

Basically, Feng’s philosophy still lies in differentiation between “truthfulness” and “reality,” which carries on the “Differentiation Theory” of the Song and Ming Dynasties while combining the idea of “commonality” and “specialty” of the West throughout the history of Chinese philosophy. This has also exemplified the reason why he chose Platonic philosophy and Neo-reality as a reference, and revealed the fact that Chinese scholars have made great efforts in creating Chinese philosophy with a new style patterned after Western philosophy.

The main ideas of New Learning of Mind advocated by He Lin are written in his “A new development of Confucianism”: A. Since Chinese philosophy is constructed on a moral basis rather than a knowledge-based system, it is therefore desirable to digest theories of Western philosophy to lay its scientific foundation; B. Confucian rituals have to be enriched by Christian essence; C. Neo-Confucianism and Neo-poetry, Neo-music and Neo-art have to be rejuvenated hand in hand by appreciating Western art. The reason for He Lin to promote a new development of Confucianism from these three prospects, in my view, is because Western philosophy has always explored the values of the truth, kindness and beauty, which could lay a new foundation for Neo-Confucianism. As he points out in *Chinese Philosophy and Western Philosophy*, “A new development of Chinese philosophy is dependent on absorbing and integrating Western philosophy; meanwhile, Chinese philosophers should also take the responsibility of reviving Chinese culture and Chinese philosophy to make a contribution to mankind.”

Having written *A History of Buddhism in the Han, Wei, Eastern Jin, Western Jin, Northern and Southern Dynasties*, Tang Yungtung started studying the Metaphysics of the Wei and Jin Dynasties for the purpose of tracing the changes of Chinese philosophy during these periods. In his view, Chinese philosophy evolved in the way of its internal logic and the introduction of Indian Buddhism only facilitated the development of metaphysics, which again fell into the debate over the relations between “source” and “course” in cultural development. The study reveals that there is learning of noumenon in Chinese philosophy, which is different from Western ontology; despite the transcendence of Chinese philosophical concepts, such as the *Dao*, nothingness, *li*, *Tai Chi* and so on, they are nevertheless rooted in a myriad of things. In fact, within Chinese philosophy substance and function are integrated, the secular and the sacred ways have merged as well.

The above cases reveal the fact that Chinese philosophers in the mid-19th century paid special attention to theories or thoughts lacking in Chinese philosophy, such as epistemology, ontology, religious thought, pure artistic spirit so as to supplement itself.

13.4.3 Thoughts That Have Greatly Influenced Chinese Society

Contributors of Chinese philosophy, including Confucians, Daoists or other scholars, were all literati with the mission of social responsibility, the tradition can be traced back to “Accounting fate” in *The Book of Classic History*: “It is not knowledge that makes things difficult but practice.” The pragmatics of Confucianism is manifested in its belief of enlightening the world with virtue, which is not an issue of idea but action, resulting in tangible achievement. As Confucius said, “Would I want to be like a gourd only hung but never eaten?” Confucianism is thus the philosophy with administration and pacification of the states and world as its chief aim.

In *About Fierbahe Syllabus*, Marx said, “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways, the point, however, is to change it,” “Social life as a whole is essentially practical.” Therefore, practice is an issue with rich implications. Since the last century, Marxism has exerted constant influence on Chinese society, the reason for the phenomenon, I think, apart from the need to have a social transformation for the society, it had something to do with the pragmatics of Confucianism (the practice of moral cultivation and social political life). Mao Zedong’s *On Practice* exemplified one of the results. Meanwhile, both Confucianism and Marxism are schools of idealism—the former with cosmopolitanism and the latter with communism. Despite their idealism or fantasy, they nevertheless inspired people with optimism for a bright future worth looking forward to.

The issue of localizing Marxism was a concern to the Chinese academic circle. Philosophically speaking, I think the deceased Feng Qi was a rather successful one. As a creative Marxist, Feng tried to Sinocize Marxism by incorporating traditional Chinese and Western analytical philosophies. His *Three Talks on Wisdom* could be seen as a paradigm which successfully combined the materialist dialectics of Marxism, analytical philosophy, and traditional Chinese philosophy.

His "Introduction" states, "This piece is mainly about dialectics based on practical cognitive processes. More specifically, it is about linking human nature and the *Dao* of heaven by adopting the way of Buddhist thinking." Feng Qi did not attempt to apply materialist dialectics to solving the puzzle of whether matter or thought is primary; instead, he used Marxist dialectics to probe into a Chinese philosophical issue—the relation between human nature and the heavenly *Dao*, which does not fall into the field of the epistemological study but rather the realm of life. Moreover, he drew on the Buddhist ideal of "transforming knowledge into wisdom" to tackle the issue.

Concerning the relations between nature and man, he argued that "Through the interaction of knowing the world and oneself on the basis of practice, man and nature, humanity and the *Dao* are complementary to one another through the dialectical unification of theory and practice; in a way, virtue and the *Dao* are manifested by melding the elements. Eventually, knowledge is transformed into a realm of wisdom and free virtue, where the border between finite and infinite is blurred." Following up on this idea, Feng applied analytical philosophy to examining a series of concepts, such as "experience," "subject," "knowledge," "wisdom," "virtue" and so on. As a result, an important proposition was consequently drawn from his analyses: theories could be turned into methodologies as well as virtues.

Firstly, Feng Qi has transformed the formula of "returning experience to experience" proposed by Jin Yuelin to "returning the *Dao* of reality to reality," which is dominated by a subject—the self, for the reality has no longer to be the natural one, but the "subject-reality." Only with this subject can one transform knowledge into wisdom by knowing the world and the self. Given "the self" as the subject of knowledge and morality, two questions have consequently been raised: One is turning knowledge into wisdom, that is to observe the world from the objective realm to subjective realm by way of knowing the *Dao*. One therefore has to transcend the self to reach the realm where the self and the *Dao* are mingled as one, enabling one to get the insight into reality. Another one is to make a unity of the self which embodies the subject of knowledge (the subject of knowing the world) as well as morality (the subject of knowing the self) in transforming knowledge into wisdom. Without the unity, there will be no way for the process of knowing the *Dao* (the laws of nature, man and recognition) to take place. In my view, Feng Qi has successfully solved the two oldest and most explored philosophical issues (human nature and objective law) by applying materialism and dialectics.

Here Feng Qi touched upon an important proposition: transforming theory into both method and virtue. In expounding his proposition, he maintains that "While philosophical theory has to be infused into one's way of thinking and research field

as well as one's own activities, one should also materialize both theory and method with one's virtue and personality." In fact, whether turning theory into method or virtue, practical material dialectics has a vital role to play. Therefore, "turning theory into method" is a way of acquiring not only knowledge but also wisdom. He said, "I have always been pondering over the relations between knowledge and wisdom, celebrated dictum and the transcendent of that."²⁶ Since knowledge cannot be deviated from practice, what about wisdom?

In his view, based on practice one can gain insights into human nature and objective law through the process of knowing the world and the self by way of transforming knowledge to wisdom. This is a cognition process where absoluteness is sought out through relativity, finite through infinite, the unconditional through conditional. The implications beyond language can only be revealed through the knowledge-wisdom transforming process and rational intuition. The key point here is that both knowing the world and the self have to be based on practice.

The world and the self are of the real development process based on practical activities, and can be internalized and connected to the issue of human nature and objective law, which are to be cognized through the finite-infinite and limited-unlimited process, or the knowledge-wisdom transformation. This transformation is also a relative process.

For a philosopher, it is possible for him to complete the process of transforming knowledge into wisdom; for the entire human race, however, the process is endless for human activities continuously carry on. Based on this process, human cognition is also making progress, following the concrete—abstract—concrete procedure. As a methodology, therefore, materialist dialectics is not only an approach of obtaining knowledge but wisdom as well.

As Feng Qi put it, unlike knowledge, which is narrative, wisdom goes beyond any language, resulting in the transformation of knowledge. However, the process of "turning knowledge into wisdom" can only be managed by reasonable intuition." In this connection, Feng explained, "The basic feature of the reasonable intuition of philosophy lies in a lively grasp of the infinite and absolute, which is a leap of rational thinking and virtuous cultivation."²⁷ "Rational intuition" is a leap through "synthesizing differentiation" based on logical analysis. Without logical analysis as a basis, it will be unconvincing, whereas without "synthesized differentiation" on the basis of logical analysis, it will be impossible to break new ground for philosophical research. In a sense, it is similar to the epistemology of integrating personal thought and moral cultivation proposed by Xiong Shili.

"Rational intuition," as an important concept, in my view, is a leap of dialectic synthesis based on logical analysis. Without logical analysis, an argument will be theoretically baseless, and without logical-analysis based dialectic synthesis, there will be no way to form a new philosophical system. Therefore, "rational intuition" is not a kind of vague epiphany, but the conscious gaining of the *Dao*. Feng's

²⁶Feng Qi, *Omnibus of Feng Qi*.

²⁷*Ibid.*

logical analysis and dialectic synthesis are fully manifested in his series of papers and the *Introduction* in particular. Practical materialistic dialectics is employed so adequately in his works to crack the puzzle of “human nature and the *Dao*,” a renewed antique Chinese philosophical issue.

Feng’s logical analysis and synthesizing ability are manifested in this theory, which is conceptualized as material dialectics. Once again, it reveals his ultimate purpose—applying material dialectics to resolve the issue of human nature and the *Dao* of heaven (namely the relationship between man and nature), an ancient philosophical puzzle that has been perplexing the Chinese up to now. I believe that Feng’s approach of applying Marxist material dialectics to Chinese philosophical studies is inevitable to build a localized Marxist philosophy in China.

As mentioned above, Feng’s theory of wisdom is to solve the problem of human nature and objective law. In his understanding, the probe into the internal relations between the true recognition of the *Dao* and man’s free development is nothing but wisdom. This characterizes Feng’s theory as a Chinese philosophy. As the old saying goes, “Self-restraint has to be cultivated solemnly and learning must aim at obtaining truth.” The former refers to moral cultivation, while the latter knowledge acquisition. In the history of Chinese philosophy, especially in Confucian philosophy, morality and learning are unified with the former nourishing the latter.

As Zhu Xi said, one could become divine by learning and contemplation (*Selections from Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi*). Feng Qi believed that the process of transforming knowledge into wisdom is a leap achieved by the interaction between knowing the world and the self based on practice. To this end, two key points are worth reiterating: Both knowing the world and the self has to be based on practice; the two cognition processes are internally related to achieve the transformation from knowledge to wisdom. By introducing a “moralized learning” approach into his philosophical system, he dismissed apriorism and perfected the moral-related-knowledge theory promoted by previous philosophers.

In the history of Chinese philosophy, it was Zhang Zai (1020–1077) who first raised the issue of “moralized learning.” Morality is not obtained through perception, which is the result of interaction of different things, but something beyond perception. It was due to the misconception of Zhang Zai who isolated knowledge of perception from comprehension of morality with an inclination of apriorism. Based on practice, Feng verified Zhang’s position by unifying the two processes: “The subjective moral autonomy cannot be separated from its objective practical activities.” In this way, Feng has appropriately dealt with the relationship between knowledge acquisition and moral cultivation in line with traditional Chinese philosophical ethos.

From the prospect of traditional Chinese philosophy, engaging in scholarship and conducting oneself are in fact interrelated; in other words, one’s learning is determined by his moral standard. In Feng’s view, the first criterion is sincerity. As it is said in *The Doctrine of the Mean*: Only by sincerity can one fully develop one’s character and move others to do the same; only when someone is doing justice to their talents, can they participate in the growth of a myriad of things in the universe together with the heaven and earth. That is to say, in order to transform knowledge

into wisdom and join the state of nourishing all creatures with heaven and earth, a sincere heart is a must.

Engaging in scholarship requires sincerity, so does conducting oneself; only sincerity can transform theory into method and virtue, which is the life attitude of both Confucianism and Marxism. Feng has set an example for us in these two aspects with his “wisdom theory” as a theoretical strength. Consider the difficulty of being a real creative philosopher over the past half century, we may value Feng’s *Three Talks on Wisdom* very much for its insight into the issue of Sinocized Marxism.

In writing the *Book of Historical Records*, Sima Qian set his goal to search the law between heaven and man, trace the historical change up to now, as well as to form a unique discourse. Isn’t this the tenet of Feng’s book as well? This also demonstrates the need for scholars of sincerity to have a tolerant academic atmosphere to give full play to their potential and to produce more quality philosophical works to meet the requirement of our time.

Concerning the introduction of Indian Buddhism (philosophy) and Western culture (philosophy), there are relations between the source and courses. To this end, two phrases may be adopted to describe the future of Chinese culture (philosophy): one is Chinese culture (philosophy) following the development of Sinocized Marxism; another is Chinese culture (Chinese philosophy) that has taken in the essence of other national cultures (philosophy).

The discourses reflect different kinds of contents: the former emphasizes a Marxism that has taken in certain features of Chinese culture and then been transformed into a new type of Chinese culture; the latter is a new Chinese culture nourished by absorbing Marxism. I think these two orientations are not in contradiction but complement each other. However, Chinese culture is after the root of China, and others are courses. Nevertheless, it is a long term and arduous task for us to continuously develop new Chinese philosophy and Neo-Confucian philosophy.

As *A History of Confucianism* is the result of the jointed efforts of many scholars, discrepancies or conflicts in scholarly thoughts are inevitable, which may not necessarily be a bad thing but more likely a good thing since it leaves more room for continuous and in-depth research. The criterion for compilation is data-based recording and rational argument, fully manifesting the spirit of letting a hundred schools of thought contend. In terms of style and formality, however, endeavor has been made to keep all sections consistent.

This general preface by no means represents the view of all contributors of the book since I didn’t discuss with any of them; in other words, this is only my own view presented here for the sake of attracting different comments.

Chapter 14

On Ma Yifu's Theory of Six Classics

14.1 I

The editor-in-chief of *Corpora of Ma Yifu*, Professor Wu Guang invited me to write a preface for the book, although I really don't deserve this job. In the 1990s, when the first volume of Ma's anthology was published, I had the opportunity to appreciate his extensive and profound thought. What I can write is in fact to jot down my study notes of Ma Yifu's works. Without a thorough reading of his completed collection, however, I can only talk about my admiration based on this volume in the hope of drawing the attention of more readers.

As one of the three leading authorities in Confucianism, Ma Yifu specialized in canon studies (with Xiong Shili, a philosopher, and Liang Shuming, a thinker). Unlike historians of canon studies, scholars of canons have to be both masters of learning and thought, just as Ma established an ideological theory in the learning of Six Classics.

In the *Speech to Graduates in Taihe Yishan*, he said, "The fate of a state lies in culture which is rooted in ideology. In general, knowledge is obtained in form of information while an ideological system is established through a comprehensive study of the subject, resulting in systematic thought." This expounds the importance of an ideological system to a country's fortune. The publication of the *Corpora of Ma Yifu* provides the reader with the most genuine source for study of his thought.

14.2 II

The Chinese nation is currently in the process of rejuvenation. In my view, this has to correspond with related cultural rejuvenation. *Guoxue re* (craze for national learning) occurred at the end of last century. However, concerning *guoxue* or national learning, controversies have arisen. Some thought it could be too general to

deem as culture; some thought defining *guo xue* as Confucianism is too narrow since Chinese culture has long been composed of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism, and the three combined are the source of Chinese culture. However this still leaves the question of “origin” unanswered. There are diverse views on how to understand “national culture,” although Ma Yifu’s definition as the Six Classics is, in my view, very inspirational.

The German philosopher Karl Jaspers (1883–1969) said in his *Historical Origin and Object* that until today mankind has lived by what happened during the Axial Age, by what was thought and created during that period. In each new upward flight it returns in recollection to this period and is fired anew by it. Since then, history has proved itself time and again in this kind of revival or rejuvenation during the axial age, initiated from China, India and the West, and providing spiritual support.

This means that nations with long historical culture in almost every significant historical juncture return to their cultural origins to draw spiritual support. For example, the European Renaissance in the 14th and 15th centuries turned attention to its cultural roots in ancient Greece, consequently rekindling European civilization. When India struggled for independence, Brahmanism-based Hinduism was set as the foundation underlying all its efforts to build a new country. In China, under the influence of Indian Buddhism for several centuries, the principle of integrating Buddhism and Daoism while tracing back to the Six Classics was raised by the academia in the Song Dynasty. Now, under the impact of Western culture for almost two hundred years, should we integrate western learning and trace back to the Six Classics? The answer is obviously yes.

Therefore, Ma Yifu’s view of the Six Classics constituting national learning should be paid special attention. The *Odes*, *Classic History*, *Rituals*, *Music*, *the Book of Changes*, and *Spring and Autumn Annals* contain the teaching of Confucianism, which has been regarded as the source of all knowledge for the past two thousand years. Clearly, the Six Classics subsume various disciplines, therefore our national learning should be defined as the learning of the Six Classics which are inclusive in nature.

It is rather meaningful that the term Ma employed here is “modally define” rather than “officially define” national learning. As he put it, scholarship is a public arena; if it is officially nominated, exclusion may set in. Now by modally defining, each can still air their views according to different understandings without any coercion. In scholarship, it is preferred that “all schools of thoughts contend for attention,” rather than having an “official nomination.” With an all-inclusive mind, Ma has admirably merged Chinese learning with Western learning and achieved an outstanding result.

Ma’s theory of the Six Classics was essentially based on the conviction that Confucianism had consciously inherited the scholarship of the Xia, Shang and Zhou Dynasties, which were all embraced in the Six Classics. In the section of “The Six Classics dominate the four categories,” he divided the study of canons into “introductory canons” and “illustratory canons”: two parts elaborating Confucian classics and the Six Classics. In other words, the Six Classics is the origin of

Confucianism and later generations of Confucianism, which constantly carried on the heritage and also adopted ideas from other cultures.

Ma disagreed with the view that all scholarship originated from official learning, and pointed out that the important schools such as Confucianism, Moism, Legalism and Daoism all arose from the Six Classics. Thus, if uninformed of the Six Classics one can hardly understand Confucianism. Meanwhile, in the *Agreement on Chinese-Renaissance Society*, he said, “In my view, the myriad books all originated from the Six Classics ... and Confucians are guided by them as well. In the same way, other schools of thought in fact were all partially originated from the Six Classics as well.”

In the *General Regulations of Revival Academy*, he said “The tenet of the Academy is to be well versed in canons following the teaching of righteousness and rituals guided by the Six Classics. By the same token, disciplines of philosophy, history and literature should all be navigated by them.”¹ All his argument was founded on the belief that the Six Classics are the fountainhead of Chinese scholarship. Moreover, any alien cultures introduced to China have to communicate well with Chinese scholarship in order to find a firm footing. This is the reason why numerous treatises address the integration of Confucianism and Buddhism in this corpora.

It is said, “Confucianism and Buddhism, though nominally different, are based on the commonality of human nature. In fact, since ancient times, all prominent personages started their careers with knowing human nature and ended up with fully understanding of it” (*Answer to Wu Xizhi*). Too, “the ‘Extreme One’ in the *Book of Rites* and the ‘Great Ultimate’ in the *Book of Changes* are just alike the dharma realm of the one reality or the bhūtatathatā (Illustration on *Tai Chi Chart*).” Similar comments also appeared in the Appendixes of the sections of “Explanations on Grand Careers and Righteousness” and “Explanations on Grand Means and the *Dao*,” although there are differences between the two, such as sections of “Admonish for Children” and “Expectation” that revealed a consistent view of his theory on the Six Classics, which in essence very much dominate the theory of Buddhism introduced to China.

As Ma pointed out, for an ideology to be systematically presented it has to be guided by a tenet and refined by a belief if it is to be carried out in national learning. In no way is fragmented study capable of embarking on a mission that is as grand and profound as national learning (*Introduction to Taihe Conversation*). This is the key point of a thoughtful and holistic approach, actively advocated by Ma Yifu, concerning mutual benefiting and peace-making for human beings as a whole, which is the core value of Chinese national learning.

In Ma’s view, as every national scholarship has its fountainhead, the Six Classics are the source of the most antique Chinese scholarship, in the same way as the Yangtze River originated in the plateau, then enters into Sichuan, consequently merging with Jialing River, enters into Hubei, merges with the Han River, enters

¹Ma Yifu, *Anthology of Ma Yifu*.

into Jiangsu, merges with the Huangpu River, and finally is meets the ocean. Given the vastness of the cosmos, endlessness of life and inexhaustibility of sacred power, there has to be *Dao* reigning over heaven and earth signified in eternal sincerity. As the *Dao* never dies, neither does the human mind.²

Since ancient times, human society has been confronted with the problem of existence and development, challenging human beings' ability in making most rational and useful choices among various options, and testing their wisdom gestated in their national cultures. In a way, people are nourished by righteousness which has to be obtained through exhaustive contemplation. All knowledge, truth and virtue are actually embraced in the mind and are available for exploration by successive generations. Rooted in the Six Classics, Chinese national culture has to be constantly renewed through reflection on everlasting law from the ancient to the update.

What Ma proposed with the theory of the Six Classics, which has dominated all other scholarship, should therefore not be viewed as backward or stale; rather, it can be renovated day by day with persistent exploration.

14.3 III

Due to different ambiances and experiences, national cultures manifest in various forms and shapes. However, as human beings, there must be connections among them at the deep levels of rationality which form universal values. The Six Classics, as the fountainhead of Chinese scholarship, embodies certain universal values in the same way Greek culture is to Western scholarship.

As any national academic culture has been formed under certain historical circumstance with particular cultural implications, the universal values of any academic culture are actually implied in the special values of an academic culture. As Ma said, the Six Classics have not only overruled all local scholarships but can also overrule all scholarships introduced to China from the West. Concerning this issue, people may feel and reason roughly in the same way.

The Chinese nation has no choice but to seek from its own academic culture universal values that benefit human social life as a whole through academic culture, while other nations search for universal values from their own academic cultures as well. As an ancient Chinese saying goes, "The *Dao* (principles) can be carried out in parallel." As Ma put it, "In following the *Dao*, different approaches result differently, differentiated by the gains and loses of the *Dao*."

The *Book of Changes* says, "All rivers flow to the sea. However, if all thoughts have a same ending, what use to contemplate anymore?" When things are apart, categories occur; when differences merge, relations are formed. Where are the handicaps among different things? In fact, all human minds are nothing but

²Ma Yifu, *On Integrating Western Learning with the Six Classics*.

manifestations of the Six Classics, so are all human lives. Therefore it is true to say that “Nothing can go beyond the *Dao* since it has excluded everything.”

According to his theory, Ma has illustrated the following three points: First, human societies, though composed of various kinds of national cultural traditions, are fundamentally consistent. The original truth is that human nature has to be fostered by benevolence and virtue by sincerity, and only when benevolence and sincerity are explored can the dreams of “human unity” and “great harmony” come true.

Second, since the *Dao*—the fundamental truth—of human society is based on benevolence and sincerity, all national cultures are united by the *Dao* in one way or another, which determines the fate of each individual.

Ma also maintained that, “The gain and loss in each individual’s practice are all determined by the degree of their realization of the truth.” Viewed from this perspective, we should always find commonalities in deep structure through penetrating superficial differences when we examine various national academic cultures. As Ma commented, the so-called truth, goodness and beauty so keenly advocated by Westerners are in fact all embraced in the Six Classics—*Odes (Book of Poetry)* and the *Book of Classic History*, for example, are in search of goodness since they involve either teaching benevolence or inspiring wisdom; *Rites* and *Music* for beauty since they either sets rules for order or benefits people’s well-being or combines the two; the *Book of Changes* and the *Spring and Autumn Annals* for truth since they either explore the routine of the heavenly *Dao* or rectifies names, demonstrate the genuine *Dao* or normalize irregularity.

All in all, what human beings pursue is nothing but truth, goodness and beauty, either in China or in the West. If we made an effort to scrutinize what the philosophers or sages in ancient Greece, India or China were really dedicated to, it would be easy for us to find this fundamental truth, which in fact also provides common ground among all academic cultures in the world.

Third, by saying “the Six Classics overrule current Western scholarship,” Ma actually meant that the Classics had embodied the human mind: the contents expounded in the Six Classics are intrinsically about human nature, not as designed by sages. Given the profoundness of human nature, what is manifested in the Six Classics is nothing but the natural flow of virtues ingrained in human nature.

As a matter of fact, all truth originated in the human mind is available for exploitation. As Zhu Xi said, the same benevolence that is in heaven nourishes all creatures on earth; that is in human beings it warms up their hearts and nurtures others—animate or inanimate—consequently transforming all characters in all dimensions.³ Since the *Dao* of heaven breeds in an endless succession so does benevolence in the human mind. As the *Dao* of heaven promotes a myriad of things to grow, the *Dao* of man should also take care of all things under the sun since heaven and man are an integral entity (*Posthumous of Cheng*). Also, as man is constituted by the quintessence of heaven, what man has to carry out is to realize

³Zhu Xi, *Records of Zhu*, (Vol. 7).

heaven's "animate heart." In this way, with the warm heart of benevolence and in the oneness of heaven, man's mission is therefore to fully testify the *Dao* of heaven in human life and to make heavenly fate as human fate.

As the Six Classics are the innate pouring out of human nature and virtue, they can be wholly expressed in the following six aspects: wisdom, benevolence, sacredness, righteousness, mediocrity and harmony. With truthfulness, human nature culminates in "complete sincerity;" in terms of rationality, human nature consummates in "supreme goodness."

This passage can be seen as a well summarized illustration of Ma's theory of the Six Classics—the pursuit of all scholarships end up in the truth, goodness and beauty. By the same token, Chinese academic culture, originated from the Xia, Shang and Zhou Dynasties, had been crystallized in the Six Classics, and consequently enriched by the accumulation of Chinese livelihood as well as systematized by sages or noble men in successive generations—the evolutionary clue has been so clearly revealed by Ma Yifu. In this regard, we should be very grateful for his contribution.

The purpose of promoting the Six Classics is not merely to preserve the so-called quintessence of Chinese culture but to consult scholarships of other natural cultures as well, such as that of Western culture, Indian culture, ancient Persian culture and so on. In today's world of globalization, where diversification has become inevitable, joining hands can help create an ideal "world of universal harmony," as Ma put it.

14.4 IV

Having defined the Six Classics as our national learning, Ma has unprecedentedly elevated the Six Classics to a position where not only philosophy, politics and economics but Chinese natural science can all trace back their roots to the fountainhead. In terms of disciplines, the *Book of Changes* can be defined as philosophy, politics, economics, even Chinese natural science; *Odes*, apart from its literal contents, also contains thought about philosophy, politics, and sociology, among many others. In this way, it is hard to fit the *Classic History*, *Rites*, *Music*, *Spring and Autumn Annals* into a modern disciplinary classification. The trend of modern scholarship in fact is again moving toward a cross-disciplinary direction.

As mentioned above, viewed cross-culturally all scholarships of China and the West are engaged in the study of the truth, goodness and beauty. In a way, we have to take a reference to Western learning when we carry out Chinese learning. From a prospect of cross-disciplines, every classic in the Six Classics is cross-disciplinary in nature, mingling with humanity, social science and natural science as they were in ancient Greece.

This reveals that categorization of study subjects into current academic disciplines (which are very much the product of industrialized society) has blurred its originality in ancient China (so too in ancient Greece) where sages or wise rulers

were normally scholars of literature, philosophy, ethics, mathematics and so on (such as Confucius or Aristotle). Today, as social development has entered a stage where disciplinary boundaries have once again been broken and inter-disciplinary study occurred, such as chemical physics, engineering physics, biological physics, even the theory of dissipative structure of physics has been introduced into literary theory.

Since cross-disciplinary study has become the trend worldwide, our study on the Six Classics has also to be interdisciplinary with a holistic approach in order to truly get into its kernel. Therefore, Ma Yifu's theory of "the Six Classics overruling scholarships" has undoubtedly provided us with a synthetic view for conducting substantial research.

As a student of our great masters, I am humbled in writing this preface for Ma Yifu's corpora, though in fear of lacking thorough comprehension of his profound thought. Comments of all scholars are thus sincerely welcomed.

Chapter 15

The Integration of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism

About ten years ago, a fellow of the Netherlands Royal Society Professor Kristofer Schipper raised a question with me: In Chinese history, why weren't there any wars caused by religious tenets as happened in other countries or regions? Since I hadn't done any research on the issue, I could only answer the question by relying entirely on the knowledge I then had: It was perhaps due to the relatively less exclusionary practices of Confucianism and Daoism; we know that since the Qin and Han Dynasties, the imperial authority had a rather firm grip on society and this resulted in quite successful co-existence of the three religions. I fully realized that my answer was very ambiguous or lacking precision.

After the establishment of the Confucianism Research Institute at Peking University, when research topics were requested by the supervising authority, the issue mentioned by Professor Schipper flashed through my mind. It actually reminded me of religious wars in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, such as the Crusades, conflicts and battles between Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Even within a country, different religious sects also often resort to force, such as conflicts and wars among Hinduism, Sikhism and Islam in India, as well as among different denominations in the Middle East and North Africa.

Although there was the instance of "the four Chinese emperors who persecuted Buddhism" in the Northern Wei and Tang Dynasties, in general there was no such thing as wars caused by different religious tenets in China. Despite contradictions and conflicts among Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism, they still managed to evolve in terms of co-existence and co-prosperity under the banner of "the unity of religions" and "all benevolences are commonly rooted." If we could, using historical data, conclude certain theoretical points, it might contribute to easing the tension between different religious thoughts in the world.

In this regard, "A History of Relations between Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism" was set as one of the key subjects in our research project, which may be viewed from the following prospects: a. the theoretical basis of "the unity of the three religions;" b. imperial court policy toward the "unity of the three religions;" c. popular beliefs in the "unity of the three religions."

15.1 The Theoretical Basis of the “Unity of the Three Religions”

Confucianism and Daoism in China, though quite different in their ideologies, are nevertheless mutually tolerant and capable of absorbing other ideas and cultures. The *Doctrine of Golden Means* says “All things under the sun are nurtured simultaneously without harming one another; the *Dao* can reign over everything in parallel,” which embodies the tolerance of Confucianism. Confucius’ teaching was mainly based on the *Odes*, *the Book of Classic History*, *Rites* and *Music* which followed the principle of “passing on the ancient culture without adding anything new to it,” signifying his awareness of having consciously inherited the classic quintessence of the Xia, Shang and Zhou Dynasties, such that the Six Canons had been Confucianized. And by consulting with Lao-Tzu and embellishing Guan Zhong’s strategy of running a state, Confucius had further consolidated the core value of *ren* or benevolence, formulating the world-view of cultivating the self, regulating the family, governing the state and bringing peace to the world.

Thereafter, during the “contention of a hundred schools of thought” of the Spring and Warring Periods and successive dynasties, Confucianism was strengthened through constant arguments or confrontations with other schools. Typically, one Master figure Xun Zi further developed Confucian theory on the basis of absorbing the concepts of Daoism, Legalism and the School of Logicians; in the same way, by taking in the theories of Daoism, the Yin-Yang School and others, *Appendices to the Book of Changes* pioneered the philosophical ontology and cosmology of Confucianism. During the reign of Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty, Dong Zhongshu further consolidated the theoretical base of Confucianism by accommodating theories of the Five Elements, the School of the Yellow Emperor and Master Lao, while the Legalist School actually practiced “the combination of the Kingly Way and the Dictator’s Way.”

Adhering to the idea that “greatness lies in capability,” the School of Lao and Zhuang in the Pre-Qin Period integrated different schools and established an influential ideological system of the “inaction way.” Lao-Tzu’s theory of the *Dao* also became one of the sources of Chinese wisdom. In “the World” of *Chuang-Tzu*, he first proposed the concept of “sagely within and kingly without” (or inner sagehood and outer kingliness)—the ideal of Chinese social thought. Although judging every different school of thought by its own standards, employing both praised and criticized approaches, Daoism did not exclude others: instead, it embodied tremendous inclusiveness. The other example, *Master Lv’s Spring and Autumn Annals* and *The Book of Master Huainan*, works which, though mainly based on the Eclectic School, also combined thoughts of other schools in the Pre-Qin Dynasty, signifying that the spirit of “greatness lies in capability” (in a way this was very closely related to the theories of the Yellow Emperor and Master Lao in the Pre-Qin Dynasty). Similarly, Neo-Daoism in the Wei and Jin Dynasties merged the ideas of the “fundamental and incidental” and “the ethical code equaling what is spontaneous,” which led Chinese philosophy to a new stage.

After it had been introduced to China, Buddhism was initially attached to Daoism and Neo-Daoism. In the Northern and Southern Dynasties, though queries and interrogations between Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism became common practice, still many Chinese literati believed in Buddhism. During the Liang Dynasty, even emperor Wu devoted himself to Buddhism, but still appointed an official for the five Confucian classics. He said, “While my ruling of the state is guided by Zen Buddhism, I often consult the Confucian way of governance.”¹ Clearly, Confucianism and Buddhism are not incompatible.

During the Eastern Jin, Western Jin, Northern and Southern Dynasties, conflicts between Buddhism and Daoism gradually became a phenomenon. In the reign of Liu Song Dynasty, Gu Huan wrote *On Chinese and Barbarians*, clarifying Confucianism and Buddhism by their geographies and downgrading nasty Indian customs as well as promoting Chinese quintessence as fundamental. Nevertheless his book still equally honored Confucius, Lao-Tzu and Sakyamuni as sages, respecting the three religions as similarly benevolent.

In *On the Two Religions*, Seng Shao said, “In penetrating social affairs, Confucianism and Daoism have attained a superb state; in terms of divine power, however, we have to rely on the magnificence of Buddhism.” Zhang Rong wrote in his *On Entrance*: “Although Daoism and Buddhism both can go to extremes, when in their tranquil state, however, they manifest the same nature.” Linkages of this kind are more clearly reflected in Mou Zi’s *Resolution of Doubts*. Emperors Yao, Shun and Zhou, like Confucius, mainly concentrated on matters of governance, while Buddhism and Daoism devoted themselves to “government by inaction.” These two were presented as parallels, like “gold to jade, and spirit to soul, without interfering with one another.”²

He even went further: “The *Dao* of Confucianism and Buddhism are actually one: it can be materialized at home to serve relatives; it can also be a ruling force to rule a state, or even to cultivate oneself in solitude. Put into practice, it fills heaven and earth; falling into oblivion, it will not disappear. In *Controversy Over Śramaṇa’s Salutation to the Monarch*, Hui Yuan (336–592) proved that although there were slight differences between Buddhism and Confucianism on issues of “leaving the secular world” and “taking part in human communities (with a religious attitude),” the purposes of serving society are after all the same: “‘The way to attain nirvāṇa’ and ‘Confucian ethical codes’ are similar in the preaching of Buddha and Confucius—despite different origins and dissimilar manifestations, their final ends are identical.”

In *On Buddhism*, Zong Bing, the disciple of Hui Yuan, also said, “Confucius, Lao-Tzu and Buddha, although teaching different things, were all on the same road of advocating benevolence.” After it was introduced to China, Buddhism modified itself to find a foothold in Chinese culture. Meanwhile, with the increasing penetration of Buddhism into Chinese society, more and more Confucian scholars

¹“Biography of Emperor Wu” in *The Book of the Liang Dynasty*.

²Mou Zi, “*Resolution of Doubts*” in *Mo Zi*.

advocated the reconciliation of the three religions. As the master figure of Confucianism Yan Zhitui said in “On the Mind” of *The Family Instructions of Master Yan*:

“The primary requirements in the domestic ethical codes are five kinds of prohibitions, which are in line with *wu chang*, or the Five Virtues: namely as a moral person one should not commit any kind of murder; as a righteous person, one should not engage in burglary; as a polite person, one should not do anything which breaches the rites; as a wise person, one should not touch alcohol; as a honest person, one should not make any indiscreet remark.”³ All this is very compatible with the propagation of Buddhism.

In the Sui Dynasty, mediation of the three religions was further promoted in the idea that “all good works arrive at the same destination.” Emperor Wen, in particular, a devout believer in Buddhism, said in an imperial edict (March of the year of Kaihuang): “All laws, domestic or social, have the same ending of benevolence; all teachings, primary or advanced, aim at the same thing from different approaches.” In this regard, we can see all three religions orientated people to benevolence, as emperor Gao Zu (Li Yuan) of the Tang Dynasty pointed out, “different as they are, the three religions have identical concordance”. This reveals that monarchs in Chinese history all realized the benefits of these religions to governance.

Confucianism proposed that the *Dao* can reign in different ways without conflict, Daoism adhered to the principle of greatness lying in capacity, and Sinocized Buddhism also advocated tolerance towards various religious ideas. In the *Preface to Inquiry on Man from the Viewpoint of Hua-yan School*, Monk Zong Mi in the Tang Dynasty said, “Confucius, Lao-Tzu and Sakyamuni are all sages, whose teachings, though different in form, are complementary to each other, centering around praising virtue and punishing vice. From the perspective of ruling a state, the masses should be encouraged to follow the three religions of their own will.”⁴

What made the integration of the three religions possible was also due to the then prevalent classification of the Buddha’s teachings. From the Sui and Tang Dynasties, Chinese Buddhism, such as the Tian-tai, Hua-yan and Zen sects, all held the theory of division of the Buddha’s teachings, namely that all Buddhist sects were classified according to their grades. The classification, originally an internal issue among different Buddhist sects, was extended by Zong Mi to cover Confucianism and Daoism. This also showed the inclusiveness of Buddhist teaching—despite discrepancies, arguments or even slander-mongering among Confucianists, Daoists and Buddhists, they could still manage to settle their conflicts in a rather civilized way instead of resorting to force.

In short, with a certain degree of tolerance and harmony, Confucianism, Daoism or Buddhism were all embraced by the grand system of Chinese tradition, which had laid the ideological foundation that avoided any wars caused by religion.

³Yan Zhitui, *The Family Instructions of Master Yan*.

⁴Zongmi, *Preface to Inquiry on Man from the Viewpoint of Hua-yan School*.

15.2 The Imperial Court Policy of the “Integration of the Three Religions”

Starting from the Qin and Han Dynasties, China became a society of imperially authoritarian grand unification, where the issue of how to deal with various religious ideas and sects was significant to social stability. Reflecting on the rapid extinction of the Qin Dynasty, Jia Yi (200–168 BC) concluded that the Legalists’ brutal regime was to blame for they had no idea of applying benevolent policies to make governance acceptable. In the early Han Dynasty, emperor Wen thus implemented the strategy of “government by inaction,” which had previously adopted certain Confucian ideas.

Despite insisting on “restraining all other schools of thought and venerating Confucianism,” Emperor Wu took in many ideas from the schools of the Yellow Emperor and Lao-Tzu, Yin-yang, and Legalism. Emperor Xuan even applied the rule of combining the kingly way with the dictator’s way. Records reveal that there were more than sixty sects of Daoism then, indicating the slack policy of the Han rulers towards various schools. By the end of the Han Dynasty, as Buddhism had earlier been introduced to China, how to treat alien ideas and cultures had become an issue for the rulers. From the imperial court’s point of view, Buddhism was only one of the foreign religions, which also made an effort to explain itself in a way to conform with Chinese culture and thought.

In its early days of propagation, the imperial court and feudal officials did not impose any restrictions on Buddhism but were instead very lenient with it, as evidenced by events such as “King Ying of Chu taking part in the Buddha sacrifice” and “Emperor Huan feting both Buddhism and Daoism at court.” Initially, Buddhism attached itself to Daoism, and then to Neo-Daoism before it became very prevalent in its own right. In the Jin Dynasty, Neo-Daoism had proved hugely popular centering around the issues of fundamentals versus incidentals and beings versus nonbeings, and in a way the Hinayana sect of Buddhism was very similar to Neo-Daoism. Therefore many Buddhists then interpreted Buddhism by applying the mystic truths of Daoism together with *ge-yi* (the earliest method by which Indian Buddhism and Chinese thought were synthesized) and *lian lei* (the method that drew an analogy between Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu and certain Buddhist doctrines for the purpose of propagating Buddhism).

During the Han and Jin Dynasties, emperors and literati often labeled themselves free and transcendent persons. In the Jin Dynasty, literati Zhi Xiaolong, Yuan Zhan and Yu Ai and others became bosom friends, known as “ba da” or “eight noble figures.” In the Eastern Jin Dynasty, in his *On Celebrates* Sun Zhuo nominated seven Buddhists as comparable with “the seven worthies of bamboo groves.” Many Buddhists in fact excelled at Daoism. As Dao An said in the *Preface to Binaiye*: “Within the twelve sections of the institute, most of the manpower is in Piyueluo where the same people teach Daoism as well, in a way similar to teaching

Mahayana—which is as easy as following the flow.”⁵ During the two Jin Dynasties, there were quite a few emperors who believed in Buddhism, such as Ming, Ai, Jianwen, Xiaowu, Gong and so on.

During the Liu Song Dynasty, many emperors and literati added lustre to Buddhism. However, as more Buddhist Sūtras were translated discrepancies and disputes between Confucianism and Daoism occurred, which were all recorded in *Spreading the Way and Elucidating the Teaching: A Collection of Expositions of Truth*. Nevertheless, cultural and ideological divergences never resulted in force. According to historical records, since Buddhism was introduced to China, over more than a thousand years there have only been four cases of attempting to extinguish Buddhism—by “the three emperors Wu and Emperor Shizhong” (the four Chinese emperors who persecuted Buddhism). These incidents were actually caused by political and economic circumstances. For instance, during the reign of Emperor Wu in the Northern Wei Dynasty, the main reason for “extinguishing Buddhism,” though it had something to do with Confucian master Cui Hao or Daoist master Kou Qianzhi, was primarily due to the overwhelming development of Buddhism, which had resulted in a conscription crisis, reduction of revenue (since temples had occupied excessive land), depletion of the national treasury, and also a threat to the imperial court. However, after the enthronement of Emperor Wen Cheng, his predecessor’s tough policy was altered and Buddhism then revived. This clearly demonstrated the court policies’ determining effect on the rise and decline of Buddhism.

Based on the “Record of Classic Works” in the *Book of the Sui Dynasty*, “Buddhist sutras were then possessed by the populace several hundred times more often than the six classics” since Emperor Yang Jian and Emperor Yang Guang both endorsed Buddhism. In their initial enthronements, they issued imperial edicts to allow people to adopt a monastic life, set up stūpa in more than fifty states, and hold balanced symposiums to inquire into the three religions (which became very popular in the Sui and Tang Dynasties), with a population of 230,000 Buddhist monks and nuns. However, in the interim to consolidate imperial rule, Emperor Wen promoted Confucian thought equally by issuing another edict: “All laws, domestic or social, have the same ending of benevolence; all teachings either primary or advanced, aim at the same thing from different approaches.”

According to Dao Xuan’s *A Collection of Arguments between Buddhism and Daoism in the Past and Present*, the “arguments” in the Sui and Tang Dynasties were nominally held between Confucianists and Daoists, since their conclusion could be drawn by either a Buddhist or a Confucian master; however, given that the institution was guided by politicized Confucian thought, the inquiries in fact took place between all three religions. In this way, Buddhism was, on the one hand, courteously recognized and received by the regime, while on the other it was made more dependent on the regime’s due authority. The balanced inquiries presided over by the imperial court undoubtedly eased the tension between the three

⁵Mei Dingzuo (the Ming Dynasty), *On Hermeneutics* (Vol. 44).

religions and prevented violent conflicts. However, all balanced inquiries and judgments of Buddhist and Confucian masters had to be carried out within the political institution. For example, Emperor Tai Zong treated Xuan-zang (Master of Tripitaka) courteously, but when the Master requested to be accredited to punish monks who violated common commandments for laymen according to Buddhist rules, the emperor flatly refused.

This was because of Emperor Tai Zong’s thorough understanding that long-term peace and order had to be based on Confucian rituals. As he said to his ministers in the second year of his reign: “What I am interested in now is nothing but the way the sage figures of Emperors Yao and Shun ruled the state and the teaching of Emperor Zhou and Confucius, which could be analogous to birds needing wings and fish requiring water; one can’t survive without them even for a moment.”⁶ In the fifth year of Zhen Guan, when he decreed an edict to monks about honoring their parents, Confucian rituals were still prioritized. As it says in the *Old Book of the Tang Dynasty*, “In implementing Confucian rituals, ministers and officials are disciplined, social status is differentiated, conduct is moralized, mores are purified, therefore all previous wise emperors or noble figures employed Confucian literati.”

The Tang Dynasty adopted a system of *du die*, an official permit to allow a monk or nun to join a monastery, or to allow a layman to become a Daoist. These institutions and policies of the imperial courts certainly laid the foundation for eliminating religious wars. The guiding structure was generally inherited by the successive Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties.

15.3 Popular Beliefs in the “Unity of the Three Religions”

Concerning ancient Chinese religious beliefs, many Western thinkers (such as Leibnitz) have labeled them “deism.” However, in my view, in ancient China there existed not only deism but also Nara Rishis worship and ancestor worship. During the Xia, Shang and Zhou Dynasties, there were ceremonies to worship heaven, earth, state, ancestors and so on. Consequently the temples of heaven, of earth, the altar of land and grain, as well as memorial halls for sacrifice to Chinese ancestors or different lineages were built. The Yin Ruins oracle bone inscriptions also reveal sacrifices for weather.

Two issues are therefore clear: One, in ancient China monotheism did not exist; Two, multiple divinities existed simultaneously without excluding one another. The Chinese nation, as Fei Xiaotong (1910–2005) put it, is a big family consisting of multi-ethnics. Due to geographical, historical and cultural differences, their customs, habits and beliefs vary from one another. However, historically, emperors of those times all set as their goal achieving a grand harmony from diversity. During the Spring and Autumn and Warring State Periods, among the hundred schools of

⁶*State Affairs of Zhen Guan*, (Vol. 6).

thought, Confucianism advocated “great harmony” (an ideal or perfect society), the Moist School promoted “universal love and identification with superiors,” Daoism believed in “governing by inaction,” the Logicians proposed “separation of hardness and whiteness,” while only the Legalists imposed laws, force and techniques to “unify different ideas.” Despite their varying opinions, they all hated chaos caused by war and longed for “great unity.”

Politically, the Qin and Han Dynasties achieved this grand unification. However, from the imperial court to the common people, worshipping gods and ancestors was still prevalent. As “geography” in the *Book of the Han Dynasty* says: “From the emperor to the folk, everyone had to worship their ancestors, and during the spring and autumn to perform their sacrifices using dead jackals and otters.” It is also recorded that the First Emperor of Qin sacrificed to the well-known mountains and eight gods. It also notes that, “Worshippers in these temples are frequenters who sacrifice according to the seasons ... those who live far away have to set up their own altars in their locations ...”⁷ From these records, we get the idea that among the people, a multitude of names were then used in worshipping gods and ancestors. Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty, in particular, loved to offer sacrifices to supernatural beings. At the time, there were various forms of deity worship, such as devotions using pyres of “sacrifice,” “oriental integration of double tails,” “Big Dipper” and so on.

The “Biography of Necromancers” in the *Book of the Han Dynasty* says, “Since Emperor Wu loved necromancy, necromancers gathered punctually to worship from all over the place carrying their tools with them. Later, Wang Mang altered the feted symbols to favor the Emperor’s preference for augury. Therefore at the time people from all walks of life rushed from one place to another to participate in sacrifices, discussing issues of the deities and exploring arcane issues by way of *feng jiao*, *dun jia*, *qi zheng*, *yuan qi*, *liu ri*, *qi fen*, *feng zhan*, *ri zhe*, *ting zhuan*, *xu yu*, *gu xu*, as well as using the approach of identifying clouds to preserve *qi* and predict weal and woe.” All such necromancy and other magical practices were a part of deity worship in one way or another. Since they were in general confined to certain places, the population of true believers was also small.

By the end of the Western Han Dynasty, after Buddhism had been introduced to China and Daoism established, Chinese folk religions were undergoing tremendous transformation. Among folk religions, Buddhism and Daoism, with their well organized institutions, sophisticated canons, uniform dharma or regulations, hierarchies of respect, as well as sets of theories concerning good and evil, life and death, weal and woe, customs and habits, became increasingly influential and finally merged with Confucian thought, formulating the mainstream culture for the daily life of ordinary Chinese.

According to historical records from the Tang and Song Dynasties, among Chinese families Confucian rituals (such as ancestor worship, benevolent behavior and filial piety) were strictly adhered to, Buddhist concepts of *hetu-phala* (cause

⁷“Geography” in the *Book of the Han Dynasty*.

and effect), *samsāra* (transmigration) and *karuṇā* (compassion) were all well received, while Daoist magic arts (such as health preserving rites, regulated breathing) were widely practiced as well. Some literati and officials (such as Wang Wei, Bai Juyi, Liu Zongyuan in the Tang Dynasty and Su Xun, Su Shi and Su Zhe in the Song Dynasty) strictly abided by the Confucian code of ethics in their daily social lives, although they were believers in Buddhism.

With the rise of Neo-Confucianism, some Confucian masters, while observing the guidelines of “integrating Buddhism and Daoism based on the Six Canons of Confucianism,” privately made acquaintance with Daoists and Buddhists, even practising their rites, such as mind training and health preservation. Similarly, well-known Confucian master Zhou Dunyi received the Buddhist sutra of “Revering Heaven and Earth” from his Zen master Youshou and said his most inspiring ideas had been derived from another Zen master, Hui Nan, the founder of the Yellow Dragon sect. Also, Zhu Xi, the founder of Neo-Confucianism, made many friends among Buddhists and Daoists, as it is recorded that “when he was young, he attended the teaching of Zen master Dahui Zonggao, and he went to take an examination with nothing in his luggage but Dahui’s Quotations.” Engaging in frequent communication with his master, they reached quite substantial consensus on issues of righteousness and rituals.⁸

Throughout Zhu Xi’s life, like the pseudonymous character of Kongtong Daoist Zou Xin, he had been longing for Daoist inner alchemy, most notably revealed in his *A Textual Criticism on Cantong Qi of Book of Changes*, a book of alchemy. Among all Neo-Confucians, Zhu was the most frequent one as for having contact and playing in poems with many monk and Daoist friends. Wang Yangming, another Confucian master, was also closely associated with Daoism. In his *Instructions on Practical Living*, Wang talked a lot about essence, *qi* and spirit in health preservation. Although heavily influenced by Zen Buddhism, Wang launched a severe attack on it, since he stuck rigidly to the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius.

Making a general survey of this book, we can read many Zen quotes, stories and terms, fully reflecting the inclusiveness of Confucianism in absorbing the resources of Buddhism and Daoism. From the Song and Yuan Dynasties onward, multiple sacrifices and folk deity worship became increasingly popular, with idols of the Gods of the kitchen, wealth, earth, even Guan Yu (a heroic figure in Chinese history) being worshiped everywhere. In terms of harmonization, the theory of “coexistence of three religions with different functions” seemed to be more persuasive than the “integration of the three religions” to the public, and thus became another mode for synthesizing different religious cultures.

Emperor Xiao Zong of the Southern Song Dynasty said, “In dealing with the doctrines, Buddhism is to cultivate the mind, Daoism to nourish the body and Confucianism to govern the state,” which has been an influential remark since the Song and Yuan Dynasties onwards. In the late Tang Dynasty, Zhang Yanyuan said

⁸Chen Rongjie: *A New Exploration into Zhu Xi*.

in his *Record on Stele of the Third Patriarch*: “In practicing Confucianism, one’s sentiment will be refined; in exercising Buddhism, one’s character will be nurtured, which are the best standards to be set up”. Monk Zhi Yuan in the Northern Song Dynasty also said, “For a person, Confucianism is the doctrine to be applied externally, and Buddhism is a dogma to be absorbed internally. Therefore one should take in Confucianism to train the body while soaking up Buddhism to tend the heart.”

In the Qing Dynasty Zuyuan Chaoming said in his *On all in the Mind*, “Buddhism reveals human nature, Daoism nourishes human nature, and Confucianism explores human nature. They have different sources but are united in their purpose.” In the Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties, Daoism advocated the theory of the “co-existence of three religions with different functions,” which made it more prominent than Confucianism and Buddhism. In general, however, Daoism trailed the others. In the Northern Song Dynasty, Daoist Zhang Boduan of the golden alchemy sect commented on the issue from the perspective of human nature: “Shakyamuni is based on emptiness and abandonment, ... Lao-Tzu focuses on preservation and nourishment ... Confucius searches the mystery of human nature.” In the Yuan Dynasty, Daoist Chen Zhixu of the Quanzhen sect said, “the *Dao* of the three religions is after all one. A sage’s mind is by no means divided, which is to be discovered by Buddhism, rectified by Confucianism and tranquilized by Daoism. The same mind is expressed in different languages. Therefore the three religions are actually derived from a common source.”⁹

In the Yuan Dynasty, Daoist Mu Changchao of the Quanzhen sect said, “Someone may ask me: It is said that a person is to be discovered by Buddhism, rectified by Confucianism and tranquilized by Daoism, can you clarify it a bit more? I will reply as follows: Introspecting the self is discovery, eliminating wicked ideas is rectification, concealing nothing is tranquilization. In a way, the ‘three’ are actually ‘one.’”¹⁰ Since the concept of “integrating the religions” had become so prevalent in the Ming Dynasty, Lin Zhaoen set up a “trinity religion” and built its temple with the statue of Shakyamuni located in the middle, Lao-Tzu’s on its left, and Confucius and his disciples’ on its right. Government officials and well known literati all faithfully worshiped there. Even today, the layout structure has been retained as in the Changchun Taoist Temple in Wuhan. Moreover, when conducting a funeral, this temple normally observes Confucian rituals led by a Buddhist monk who recites or chants scriptures and then leads the procession. In this way the three religions co-exist harmoniously, and the temple’s practice is unlikely to be altered by any administrative orders.

The tradition of Chinese philosophy concerning relations between world view and human life can be traced back to the Pre-Qin Period, when Confucius and Mencius discussed the issue of *xin-xing* or disposition. During the succeeding Qin and Han Dynasties, the topic shifted to *yuan qi* or vital energy, and furthermore to

⁹Chen Zhixu, *A Outline of Golden Alchemy* (Vol. 14).

¹⁰Xuan Zong, *On All in the Mind*.

the ontological relations between fundamentals and incidentals. After Buddhism had been introduced to China, “Nirvāṇa and the Buddha-mind” became a hot issue of debate in the Northern and Southern Dynasties, and in the Sui and Tang Dynasties and onward it was translated into questions of the “three dogmas in one mind” (simultaneous vision of the void, the phenomenal, and the mean), “the eternal reality of Buddha-truth” (proposed by Hua-yan), “comprehending the disposition by penetrating the mind” (initiated by Zen), “whether the *bhūtataṭhātā* resides in its phenomenal aspect” (inquired by Daoist Cheng Xuanying), “cultivating the heart by *li* is the way to revive it.”¹¹

In the Song and Ming Dynasties, the central issue of Confucianism—“nature is the principle”—coincided with the concerns of Buddhism and Daoism, which were all based on human nature. In this way, the “integration of the three religions” was revealed as actually founded on ontological disposition, which constituted the fundamental theory of the three religions. It was also said, “In terms of the major concern, Confucianism is about cultivating the mind, Daoism nourishing physical nature and Buddhism enlightening human nature.”¹² Therefore the “integration of the three religions” was the result of their logical co-evolution.

The “integration of the three religions” resulted in social stability and the coexistence of different religions, which made their mutual assimilation possible. Despite written polemics (countered by challenging questions or extolling self-proclaimed truths while downgrading others’ theories) between Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism, force was never resorted to (there was no such thing as “religious wars caused by different religious cultures or thoughts”). Considering the various wars between different religions in today’s world, I think the case of China is quite meaningful in terms of practical and theoretical values.

Emperor Yongzheng of the Qing Dynasty said in his imperial edict, “Currently there are three religions, namely Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism. Confucianism, as a fundamental doctrine preached by sages, aims to improve people’s livelihood; Buddhism is set to enlighten the mind, and Daoism is to purify the spirit. The other two religions are not in contradiction with Confucian self-cultivation; rather, they all advocate praising virtue and punishing vice, both of which can assist the reign of my regime.”¹³ Clearly, starting from the Han Dynasty, the emperors and imperial courts of successive dynasties all paid due attention to the relations between the three religions, which ensured that their reigns were firmly based on Confucian doctrines.

I am not quite sure whether my explanations of the question will satisfy the query of professor Kristofer Schipper, and other scholars may provide their views as well. Nevertheless, unlike the obvious exclusiveness of some religions in the world, which are prone to cause “religious wars,” in my view, the inclusiveness of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism did contribute to peaceful unity. And the

¹¹More discussion in Li Ao’s *On Revival of the Mind*.

¹²Anomy, *The Gist of Human Nature*.

¹³Liu Jinzao, *Verification on the Extended Qing Documents* (Vol. 89).

institutions and policies of the successive dynasties, such as rituals, rules, regulations and the “balanced inquiry into the three religions” at the same time functioned as a constraining force, which could also be a benign experience for other nations. This may also explain that why Chinese society has always had the tradition of worshipping multiple divinities and a corresponding mode of thinking since ancient times.

In conclusion, it’s only natural for people to pursue their happy lives, of which beliefs are part for most of them. Due to different social environments, life experiences, personal characters as well as historical and cultural factors, people may believe in various religions, theories, doctrines or technical and scientific forces. Whatever the case, the traditional idea of “integrating the three religions,” which has long been part of Chinese culture, could surely provide something beneficial to the “peaceful coexistence” of the world and the “universal harmony” of mankind as a whole.

Chapter 16

Confucianism and Marxism

16.1 I

The 17th CPC National Congress called upon the Chinese people “to boost socialist cultural development and prosperity,” and the general secretary of the CPC Hu Jintao also said at the centenary celebration of Tsinghua University: “We should spare no effort to promote cultural inheritance and innovation,” which should be an important guideline for us to live Chinese culture with an innovative spirit. As scholars, we are fully encouraged by the call as well as aware of the daunting task. And in this regard, several issues have to be clarified.

The first questions we are confronted with are: What should we inherit and how should we innovate? Since China is endeavoring to build a socialist system with Chinese characteristics, we must inherit excellence from our traditions. In my view, we have two major traditions, namely the new and the old. The former is Confucianism which has dominated Chinese ideology for the past several thousand years, the latter is Marxism which has altered China’s social appearance over the past hundred years. We have no choice but to inherit and innovate from both of these traditions by integrating them so as to promote a socialist culture with Chinese characteristics, merging it into the globalized economy and the multicultural world.

As we all know, during pre-modern times Chinese society was profoundly influenced by Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism, with Confucianism as its backbone having inherited the civilization of the Xia, Shang and Zhou Dynasties. As the development of every societal culture in the world cannot be separated from its historical and cultural roots, the current rejuvenation of the Chinese nation must also be supported by a revival of its national culture. Confucianism, as the fountainhead of our national culture, has had profound and long-lasting influence on the growth and development of Chinese society: It emphatically should not be discarded by the

successor generations of China. Otherwise it is tantamount to declaring that our national spirit does not exist any longer, or that a nation embodying a unique vitality and ethos has disappeared or become a spiritual dependency or colony of other nations. It is specially worth noting that some elements of socialist thought embedded in Confucianism are of value to the socialist society with Chinese characteristics that we are going to build (detailed discussion is provided in the following sections). Therefore, we should pay more, not less, attention to this valuable ideological source and regenerate neo-Confucianism in the new age.

Marxism, as a revolutionary theory incubated in capitalist Europe, reveals various conflicts ingrained in capitalism. Since the 17th century, England pioneered a constitutional monarchy after the “Glorious Revolution,” and the “French Revolution” took place in the 18th century. From then onward, a series of revolutionary movements occurred in European countries, resulting in the establishment of capitalist republicanism or constitutional monarchies entering the era of modern society. China, however, in the 17th and 18th century, still remained in a pre-modern stage, ruled by the declining autocracy of imperial power and, bullied and oppressed by modern imperialist countries, became even more impoverished and decadent. At that time, some far-sighted Chinese tried to learn from the West to change the situation but did not succeed. In the early 20th century, Marxism was introduced into China and consequently the Communist Party of China (CPC) came into being. Under its leadership, the Chinese people strove forward, gradually transforming China from struggling against imperialism and autocracy to constructing socialism as a self-reliant country. Despite various mistakes having been made by the CPC (including some serious ones) and still being confronted with some urgent issues, we should not forget that the Chinese revolution led by the CPC made the Chinese people “stand up.” In this sense, we may say that Marxism has transformed China by causing earth-shaking changes to Chinese society.

Realistically, in building socialism with Chinese characteristics, we cannot depart from Marxism, especially from the evolved Marxist theory developed by the CPC and the Chinese people for the purpose of transforming Chinese society. In realizing our goal, however, we are confronted with the challenges both of comprehensively achieving modernization and of avoiding the contradictions and flaws that happened in the process of Western modernization. This is a tremendous test as well as an opportunity for the Chinese people to create a new world.

Now, how to significantly develop Marxism? I think that, on the one hand, we have to face up to the reality of Chinese society and, on the other, to localize Marxism, making it part of Chinese culture, especially integrating it with Confucianism. Clearly, in dealing with Confucianism and Marxism, inheritance and innovation are two huge tasks confronting us in their historical and modern senses. In other words, only when we have appropriately dealt with the relationship between Confucianism and Marxism—inheriting and modernizing Confucianism while localizing Marxism in Chinese reality—can we carry out the unprecedented mission of building socialism with Chinese characteristics.

16.2 II

Concerning setting up the Center of Chinese National Study, I think it will surely make a contribution to the building of socialism with Chinese characteristics and one of its tasks is to deal properly with the relationship between Confucianism and Marxism, rendering them not only coexistent but also complementary to each other. This is a topic requiring substantial study and I am not a person who is knowledgeable and competent in engaging in this kind of research, although it has also long concerned me.

In the summer of 1983, at the 17th World Conference on Philosophy Studies held in Montreal, Canada, I delivered a speech entitled “An exploration into the possibility of the third stage of Confucian thought.” In the Minutes of the conference, Professor Liu Shuxian has written the follow passage:

Following Tang Yijie’s speech, Feng Huxiang posed a direct question to him concerning the relationship between Marxism and Confucianism. Tang replied that there are at least three points that the two have in common: A. They both emphasize practice; B. They both have noble ideals; C. As for the Marxist “unity in contradiction,” Mao Zedong overemphasized contradiction and neglected unity, resulting in deviations. With harmony now being emphasized, the theory of Marxism should agree well with Confucianism under current conditions.¹

In the early 2000s, I took charge of compiling *The Complete Works of Confucian Canon*. Since the historical texts collected involve rituals and human relations in the pre-Qin period, I am reminded of another point, and will now briefly elaborate four points as follows.

(1) Concerning the issue of ideals, the “Evolution of Rites” of *The Book of Rites* says “When Grand Harmony was practiced, the world was shared by the public, and the decent and the able were chosen and promoted. People acted in good faith and lived in affection. They thus not only supported their own parents and fostered their own children, but others as well. Adequate provisions were in place to secure the aged in a comfortable life until their death, the competent had proper employment, the young were provided with an upbringing, and the widows and the sick were all properly looked after. Males had their own occupations, and females their hearths. People hated to see goods discarded on the ground, yet they did not store them for their own gratification; they were anxious to exert their strength, and yet they never used it to their own advantage. In this way, all evil schemes were prevented, and thieves, robbers, rebels did not arise, so that people could leave their external doors unbolted even at night. That was the world we call the ‘Grand Harmony.’”

It also says, “Nowadays the notion of Grand Harmony has fallen into oblivion and the world is divided into individual families, where each one loves only his own parents, cherishes only his own children. Goods and labor are preserved for selfish ends. Hereditary offices and titles are granted by ritual laws, while walls and

¹Liu Shuxian, Taiwan: *An Exploration into Cultural and Philosophical Issues* (In Chinese), 1986 (p. 90).

moats are built to provide security. Rules of propriety are stipulated to regulate the hierarchy between monarch and subjects, to insure the affection between father and son, to harmonize the relationships between brothers and couples, to define the boundaries of farmland and homesteads, to set up social institutions to exalt the brave and the wise, as well as to honor the merits of individuals ... This is the so-called ‘the modestly well-off society.’”

Grand Harmony was characterized by the Great Way and the All-inclusive Community rooted in an agricultural society where all of its members consciously abided by idealistic moral codes and the spirit of humanity. Idealistic it may have been, but it was only a fantasy based on presumed justice, righteousness and harmony. Since the concept of Grand Harmony contains certain reasonable elements of socialist ideas, it may, after certain modification, become a valuable resource for building scientific socialism. The Confucian idea of Grand Harmony may be well suited to a socialist society with Chinese characteristics since it after all embraces traditional Chinese culture and idealism.

In Marx and Engels’ works, there are many descriptions about communist society. *The Communist Manifesto* states “The synthesis to replace the old capitalist society of classes and class confrontations, will be a community where everyone’s free development is the condition of all the people’s progress.”² Engels also said in his *Speech in Eberfeld*: “In a communist society, the interests of different people are no longer in conflict but in conformity with one another, causing competition to disappear. ... Managed by the community and its regulatory agency, production is easily adjusted according to people’s needs.”³ The most typical description of the ideal of communism may be found in this passage by Marx: “In an advanced communist society, the social division of labor requiring people to work like slaves will disappear, labor will no longer be a means to make a living but the first necessity of life. As productivity increases correspondingly with the individuals’ all-round development, all social wealth will be fully realised, ... only then can bourgeois rights be completely abolished, and the tenet of ‘From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs’ be hoisted as the banner of its society.”⁴

There are some things in common between the Marxist communist ideal quoted in this passage and Grand Harmony cited in the “evolution of rites” of *The Book of Rites*, specially that “People hated to see goods be discarded upon the ground, yet they did not store them for their own gratification; they were anxious to exert their strength, and yet they never used it to their own advantage.”⁵ However, since Marxism was born in a capitalist society of intensified confrontation among different class interests, it is more applicable to the social problems of capitalist

²Marx, K. and Engels, F. *The Communist Manifesto* (In Chinese), Beijing: People’s Publishing Press, 1967.

³Marx, K. and Engels, F. *Selected Works of Marx and Engels* (In Chinese), Beijing: People’s Publishing Press, 1960.

⁴Ibid.

⁵“Evolution of rites” in *The Book of Rites*.

society; it is also more practical than the ideal of Grand Harmony to build a modern society.

Over the long river of human history, some people with vision, including Chinese and Western thinkers, have always contemplated the future of human society. Typical examples include Plato's *Republic*, Thomas More's *Utopia*, Campanella's *City of the Sun* and so on. Utopian as they are, certain meaningful ideas are embraced in them, which should not simply be discarded but are worthy of our due attention. Confucian Grand Harmony, for example, can undoubtedly provide some valuable ideas for us to build socialism with Chinese characteristics. Although Marx and Engels did not witness the collapse of capitalist society during their life-time, Marx participated in the affairs of the Paris Commune set up by the French working class in 1870, which was the first regime in the world to be established by the working class. Despite its failure, two valuable lessons could be learned as Engels summarized in the "Introduction" to *The Civil War in France* in 1891:

In order to prevent public servants at all levels of a country from becoming the owners of their society – a phenomenon which seems to be inevitable in all countries – the Commune adopted two workable methods. One was to assign all administrative, judicial and civil educational positions to universally selected personnel, all of whom could be replaced by their constituents at any time.⁶

Second, all civil servants, seniors or juniors, were paid equally to other workers. These two principles, although combining certain utopian elements, are generally justified and valid, having reference value for us in building a new world—a socialist society that is free of oppression and exploitation. Therefore they should be valued equally to the ideal of Grand Harmony.

(2) Practically, as reasonably complete philosophical systems, Confucianism and Marxism both attach great importance to social practice. From "On Fate" in *The Book of History*, Confucianism started to explore the relationship between knowledge and action: "It is less difficult to obtain knowledge than to put it into action." Similarly, *The Commentary of Zuo* says "The difficulty does not lie with knowledge but with action." (Tenth year of Duke Zhao) Wang Yangming (1472–1528) put it even more bluntly: "Knowledge must be integrated with action." *The Great Learning* states that the tenet of Confucianism is to "cultivate the self, manage the family, govern the state and bring peace to the world" because "cultivating the self is the foundation for all people including emperors and the populace." But since so much emphasis was placed on the social ethics codes, such practices may also have given rise to the rule of man instead of the rule of law.

In his *Outline of Feuerbach*, Marx said, "philosophers of the past have employed various approaches to explain the world, but the focus now should be on how to reform it." By penetrating into the inner contradictions of capitalist society, Marx set up his proletarian theory to reform the world. However, for the theory to be put into practice—to destroy the old world order of exploitation and realize the

⁶Marx, K, and Engels, F. *Selected Works of Marx and Engels* (In Chinese), Beijing: People's Publishing Press, 1960.

communist ideal of a “free men’s synthesis,” it has to incorporate certain human elements of moral cultivation by way of “integrating knowledge with action.”⁷

(3) The issue of man in social relations has long been approached from the point of view of “integrating rituals with the law,” a social ideal put forth in the pre-Qin period. In this regard, I wrote an article entitled “On Confucian Integration of Rituals and Laws.” Confucianism believes that social relations, though originating in the love of relatives, must extend that love to others. As Mencius said, “the love of your relatives can result in being kind to others, and that love and kindness can be translated into cherishing all things.” Clearly, man is born into social relationships and has to deal with human relations properly.

The Book of Rites says, “The righteousness of human relations embraces the affection of fathers, the dutifulness of sons, the care of brothers, the kindness of husbands, the obedience of wives, the tenderness of seniors, the compliance of juniors, the benevolence of rulers and the loyalty of subjects. Only by practicing these items can people cement peaceful relations by upholding good faith and adore rituals by discarding fighting. If not, how can a state be governed?”⁸

In his *Outline of Feuerbach*, Marx said that human essence is not an innate individual abstract, but the sum of social relations in their real sense. According to Marxism, man is always intertwined in various social relationships and the essence of humanity is thus to be concrete and contextual. Theoretically, though Marx’s view is more insightful than that of Confucianism in this regard, both mentalities nevertheless have a great deal in common. In discussing the sociality of human nature, Xun Zi said, “Man is inferior to oxen in strength and slower than horses in running, so how can they be employed by man? The answer could be man is a social being but animals are not,”⁹ which fully illustrates the sociality of man. This idea may also inspire us to explore certain mental factors embedded in ancient Chinese *li* or etiquette for the benefit of modern society.

(4) Regarding views on confrontation and harmonization, as the oldest book chronicling change and evolution, *The Book of Changes* holds that “Alternating between *Yin* and *Yang* is called the *Dao*” and “*Tai Chi* stretches to two extremes” (Copulative), which imply the meaningful idea that “one divides into two.” Fundamentally, Confucianism does not actually disavow confrontation while seeking only harmonization. Here I may quote a passage from Zhang Zai (1020–1077): “Everything comes into being in pairs, each of which evolves in opposite directions and causes a reaction. Reaction incurs counter-reaction, and will eventually result in harmonization.”¹⁰

⁷Ibid.

⁸*Li Ji* (the Book of Rites), China Commercial Press, 1988.

⁹Xun Zi, “On Rites” in *Xun Zi*.

¹⁰Zhang Zai, *Omnibus of Zhang Zai*.

As a revolutionary theory, Marxism sets out to reform the world based on the realization that modern capitalist society breeds class struggles caused by its polarization. And the confrontation ... will eventually result in the bourgeoisies being wiped out by proletarian revolution. Following this idea up, I think that afterwards we will enter a society of harmonization. As Jia Yi (200–168 B.C.) advised Emperor Wen of the Han Dynasty: “After gaining power, if a policy of benevolence is not instituted, the regime will collapse.” In his *Civil War in France*, Marx maintained that class struggle may not be abolished after the working class has seized power, but will enter several phases of smooth transition in a very reasonable and human way, given the benign environment provided by the community. In Marx’s view, class struggle will be different after the working class has taken power; it has to be carried out in a “most reasonable and human way,” not in a constantly uncontrolled way, for the final purpose is to achieve harmony.

The above four points concerning the commonality of Confucianism and Marxism may not have been elaborated comprehensively and penetratingly, but by all accounts the two have something in common, which proves that there were some socialist kernels in Confucian idealistic society.

Furthermore, we may consider the complementarity of the two from the following aspects:

A. Perhaps Marxism can rectify Confucianism on two fronts. One is to reevaluate its stand on the “policy of agrarianism and restriction of trade.” Since Confucianism was a product of a pre-modern agricultural society (not even pre-capitalist early industrialism), “economic foundation” had no place in its theory of managing state affairs. Given the importance of a capitalist economy to social life, Confucianism should hold a more open view on the economy.

B. Another criticism is that Confucianism has always laid more stress on the “rule of man” rather than the “rule of law.” The moral aspect is surely part of governing a healthy state (along with other aspects, such as politics, economy, law, science, literature, art and so on). However, if it is overemphasized to a degree as high as Confucianism’s “sageness within and kingliness without,” even believing it can solve all social problems, moral appeasement will displace institutional approaches to politics and law-making.

On the other hand, can Confucianism supplement or rectify Marxism? In my view, it certainly can in at least two aspects. One is attaching more value to tradition. *The Communist Manifesto* says “Communist revolution, in its process of development, has to completely rupture with all traditional ideas.”¹¹ To put this in context, since Marx and Engels had always been concerned with class societies as the beginning of human history, especially class struggles in capitalist societies, such an extreme view

¹¹Marx, K. and Engels, F. *The Communist Manifesto* (In Chinese), Beijing: People’s Publishing Press, 1967.

is understandable. As a communist revolutionary theory, however, it is more or less *ex parte*, which perhaps can be complemented and rectified by Confucianism.

Another issue is moral cultivation, which is rarely discussed in the works of Marx and Engels; particularly, they lack a systematic approach in differentiating between human beings and other creatures as well as in exploring the commonalities of human nature among people of different cultures. Confucianism is equipped with profound moral contemplation, which perhaps can provide certain meaningful ideas for Marxism.

16.3 III

Why should the relationship between Confucianism and Marxism be an important topic for us to study? I think this has to do with building socialism with Chinese characteristics. In order to achieve this great goal, we have to modernize Confucianism while localizing Marxism. Confucianism, though it is filled with certain “universal values,” took shape to deal with the issues of a pre-modern era. For it to be functional in solving today’s problems, developing this inheritance is absolutely necessary.

Marxism, born in 19th century’s Europe but embracing “universal values” for human society, mainly deals with various conflicts in Western capitalist societies and has little or no concern with China’s current social issues, therefore it needs to be sinicized. Considering our goal of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, Confucianism as a symbol of Chineseness together with its unique “socialist elements”—such as the ideal of “Great Unity” in “the whole world as one community,” which has been known as “moralized humane socialism”—can undoubtedly contribute something meaningful to the current cause of Marxism.

Over the past hundred years, Marxism has transformed the outlook of Chinese society, at the same time itself having been altered to suit Chinese realities. As a revolutionary theory full of the spirit of criticism, Marxism can surely provide a valuable resource to the construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Viewed from the prospects of history and current developments, the combination of Confucianism and Marxism could set up a paradigm for human society with a new model of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

Concerning socialism, various theories and practices have been proposed and carried out in different countries but no consensus has so far been achieved. From theory to practice, I think socialism may have a long way to go. Currently, what we have to do realistically and beneficially is to put aside differences or contradictions caused by various geographies, histories, national cultures and customs and search for certain modes of socialism acceptable to all countries or nations.

In searching for ideal modes of socialism, I consider justice, ethics, equality, harmony, respect to diversity are of top priority. As Fei Xiaotong (1910–2005) held, “we should bring out our strengths while appreciating others’ merits, so as to achieve the coexistence of beauty and the ‘Great Union.’” In other words, we should seek common ground while preserving differences by taking in all positive elements of understanding and practice from other countries, so as to enter a “common socialism” hand in hand with other societies as a whole.

The combination of Confucianism and Marxism is a massive topic for further study, and here I have just jotted down some notes on the issue in the hope of drawing more attention from others.

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