Charles O. Nussbaum

Understanding Pornographic Fiction

SEX, VIOLENCE, AND SELF-DECEPTION

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
Also by Charles O. Nussbaum

THE MUSICAL REPRESENTATION: Meaning, Ontology, and Emotion

Understanding Pornographic Fiction

Sex, Violence, and Self-Deception

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For Sherry, Renée, and the four young men, Isaac, Jack, Joseph, and Ryan

For the natural man cannot bear to recognize diseases in his lusts. The light of nature is stifled sooner than take the first step into this profound abyss. For, when philosophers class immoderate movements of the mind among vices, they mean those which break forth and manifest themselves in grosser forms. Depraved desires, in which the mind can quietly indulge, they regard as nothing.

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Calvin's *Institutes of the Christian Religion*,
Vol. I, Book II, ch. II, Sect. 24

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Preface and Acknowledgments

This book derives from a single thought. The thought in question is (for me) a very old one, having originated during my earliest years as a philosophy graduate student. Since then, as I researched the topic, it has undergone numerous modifications of detail and emphasis, and has suffered one methodological false start. It has also been tabled on a number of occasions to make way for other projects. But through all of this, the thought has remained essentially the same: the conviction that pornography as we know it, or think we know it in the modern West, is a mode of sophistical representation, sophistical because it enables self-deceptive gratification. This book is an attempt to elaborate this thought and defend it.

Anyone who has dipped a toe into these waters will know that the literature on pornography is large and broadly interdisciplinary. As a result, I cannot hope to take it all into account, nor is it my ambition to do so. My approach will be to narrow focus radically, first, to pornographic narrative fiction in the modern West and second, to the implementation of a philosophical pragmatics or speech–act approach to this phenomenon. The literature bearing on the subject of this doubly narrowed focus promises to be much more manageable.

A final note: for stylistic reasons only, the masculine pronoun is adopted as the default expression throughout.

1
The Protestant Ethic and Modern Western Pornographic Fiction

1.1   Introduction and chapter conspectus

There are, Susan Sontag (1967, 35) once asserted, at least three pornographies – pornography as an item in social history, pornography as a psychological phenomenon, and pornography as a "modality or convention" within the arts – and "no one should undertake a discussion of any pornography before acknowledging all three and pledging to take them on one at a time." I acknowledge the first two and, with caveats, the third, and I do take them on one at a time, though not quite in that order. I begin with the first, then take on the third, and finally engage the second. Like Sontag, I narrow my focus to literary pornography, but not in the way she does. She addresses only pornography that in her view qualifies as literary art. This category, I shall argue, is empty,[1] although I would not deny that a given literary work may contain both some art and some pornography or that pornography may be artfully done. But artfulness does not make a work literary art. The pornography I shall be addressing is the pornographic narrative fiction of the modern West (hereafter, unless otherwise indicated, often modern pornographic fiction or simply pornographic fiction).

Although not all pornographic representation need take the form of narrative, it is clear that the narrative form plays a significant role in the way in which pornographic fiction works its central effects. Much cinema also takes the narrative form, and the analysis of pornographic fiction I offer could most likely be adapted to much of it. But any such application stands outside the purview of this work, for two reasons. First, the pornography of the written word is a large topic in its own right. The literature on it alone is large, and I will be able to address only a fraction of it. And second, I am particularly interested in the

circumstances of the emergence of pornographic fiction, which obviously predated the era of motion pictures.

This work defends two main theses. First, modern pornographic fiction functions as a self-deceptive vehicle for sexual or blood-lustful arousal[2] (self-deceptive, because it indulges desires virtually whose satisfaction in actuality would tend to clash with dictates of conscience in neurotypical individuals); and second, its emergence owes as much to Puritan Protestantism and its inner- or this-worldly asceticism as does the emergence of modern rationalized capitalism according to Weber's classic essay, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. (The this-worldly asceticism of Puritanism is dedicated to accomplishing God's work here on earth, rather than merely preparing the believer for the afterlife.) Modern pornographic fiction also owes a great deal to the "formal realism" of the newly emergent eighteenth-century English novel. The novel of formal realism eschews the supernatural and pretends or purports to refer to actual persons and to narrate a series of actual events in real time. The story of the development of the modern English novel also contains an important sociological component, namely the rise of the bourgeoisie in early modern Europe. Yet this study is a work of philosophy, not sociology, economics, literary theory, or even history, though none of these subject matters bears ignoring. My principal aim is analysis, and the resources at hand include the philosophy of language, specifically the pragmatics of speech acts, the philosophy of fictional literature, and moral psychology, which is the descriptive, psychological component of a naturalistically oriented philosophical ethics.

I argue that modern Western sexual pornographic fiction emerged as a distinctive genre[3] in eighteenth-century England, having descended from literary obscenity, a form already long in existence. Violent pornographic fiction, on the other hand, emerged in nineteenth-century England from the older forms of the gothic novel and the so-called penny dreadful. Whereas the obscene is an aesthetic category that concerns offensiveness in the extreme,[4] the pornographic is a linguistic, psychological, physiological, and ultimately a moral category that concerns the pragmatics of speech acts, the psychology of self-deception, the physiology of arousal, and the morality of sexual and violent actions – the morality of the actions or action-types themselves, not the morality of the *pornographic representation* of such actions. (I shall not be addressing the normative question of whether pornographic representation is moral or immoral.)[5] One of the principal aims of this work is to establish and defend these conceptual distinctions, a task that I believe has not heretofore been accomplished.

Following Glassen (1958), Feinberg (1985, 107–112) holds that the obscene is a "charientic" category (deriving from the Greek '*charis*', meaning something like grace), a category he believes should be distinguished both from the moral and the aesthetic. On this view, charientic judgments concern neither the morally good and bad, nor the beautiful and ugly. Rather, they concern the seemly and the unseemly. Charientic judgments are properly applied to humans and their behaviors, and fundamentally concern crudity or refinement of taste. Obscenity, says Feinberg (1985, 109), is "the outer limit of vulgarity." The distinction between charientic judgments and moral judgments is fairly clear, though the unseemly or the indecent can easily take on moral significance. A person may be impeccably moral and obscene nonetheless. Such a person's moral behaviors may be obscenely ill-mannered, while another person's immoral behaviors may be refined and stylish. When the stylish individual does act morally, he may act not from moral conviction, but from concerns about showing bad form. Feinberg (1985, 108) allows that charientic judgments run parallel to moral judgments in some respects – for example, with regard to what is considered decent – but insists, rightly, I think, on the legitimacy of the distinction between the two types of judgments. What is not so clear is the distinction between charientic and aesthetic judgments, which also (in standard usage both philosophical and nonphilosophical) involve the exercise of taste. We may suspect that this distinction is, at least to some degree, a terminological issue, and that any sharp separation is artificial.

This suspicion is intensified when we have a look at the way in which Glassen introduces the distinction:

> Judgments in terms of 'vulgar' are characteristically made about persons and their acts; aesthetic judgments are characteristically made about things and experiences. To be sure, we do judge certain works of art to be vulgar, but this is only an indirect way of judging the artist to be vulgar and those to whom his work appeals. (Glassen 1958, 139)

These claims are, in my view, eminently contestable, for they presuppose an unreasonably narrow view of the aesthetic. The *beautiful,* on any account a notion central to the aesthetic, is a nonclassical concept (a concept not definable by means of necessary and sufficient conditions) that is extremely difficult to analyze and is applied in a variety of ways to a wide range of phenomena that include objects both fabricated and natural, but also to persons, their personal styles, and their

behaviors. Persons may be physically beautiful or beautifully poised; a gesture may be beautiful, as may be a work of art, a furnished living space, or a natural scene. On the other hand, a remark may be as ugly as it is obscene. Moreover, it simply is not true that a work of art, as opposed to the artist who created it, cannot properly be termed vulgar. It would be quite unfair to tag Giuseppe Verdi, incontestably a great artist, as vulgar; but his works can, on occasion, slip into vulgarity. I do not claim that there is no place for the charientic. Rather, I suggest that it is best understood as a special case of the aesthetic. There is no need to cavil if someone wishes to label the obscene a charientic category and, as such, distinguishable within, if not from, the aesthetic. But I do question Feinberg's claim that the obscene is vulgarity in the extreme. This is too narrow as well. The obscene is that which is extremely offensive to taste, and vulgarity is only one way of being offensive in this way.

Matthew Kieran also challenges Feinberg's identification of obscenity with vulgarity in the extreme. But, in my view, Kieran's own definition does not properly distinguish the obscene and the pornographic. "[X] is appropriately judged obscene," he says (2002, 54),

> if and only if either (A) x is appropriately classified as a member of a form or class of objects whose authorized purpose is to solicit and commend to us cognitive-affective responses which are (1) internalized as morally prohibited and (2) does so in ways found to be or which are held to warrant repulsion and (3) does so in order to (a) indulge first order desires held to be morally prohibited or (b) indulge the desire to be morally transgressive or the desire to feel repulsed or (c) afford cognitive rewards or (d) any combination thereof or (B) x successfully elicits cognitive-affective responses which conform to conditions (1)–(3).

Presumably, (A) (1), (A) (2), and (A) (3) are intended to be individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for obscenity, as are (B) (1), (B) (2), and (B) (3). But, as I shall be arguing, (A) (1) is necessary for pornography, but not for obscenity. There is no necessary connection between obscenity and morality,[6] though the solicitation and commendation of certain morally prohibited cognitive-affective responses may *cause* extreme offense to sensibility and, as a result, be judged obscene. That eliminates one of the conditions allegedly necessary for obscenity. Moreover, (A) (2) and (A) (3) seem to require (A) (1): the placement of the (1) after "which are" suggests that the repeated "does so" in (A) (2) and (A) (3) refers back by anaphora to "solicit and commend to us

cognitive-affective responses which are internalized as morally prohibited." The grammar is, to be sure, a bit ambiguous. But if this is right, then it would eliminate (A) (2) and (A) (3) as well: if (A) (1) is not necessary for obscenity, then neither are (A) (2) and (A) (3). The same considerations brought against (A) (1)–(3) being individually necessary for obscenity apply to (B) (1)–(3).

Defining pornographic fiction, it should be clear, presents a serious challenge. "Only that which has no history," Nietzsche famously declared, "is definable" (1887/1967, II/18, 80). Modern pornographic fiction originated as pornography of the written word, a phenomenon that most definitely has a history. Whether Nietzsche's fine epigram be accepted or rejected, anyone who attempts to define pornography of any sort while ignoring its history does so at his peril. I do make an attempt to define pornographic fiction in a way that is consistent with its historicity, or at least to formulate a set of necessary conditions it must satisfy. A concept with so tangled a history will, however, require for its analysis considerable preliminary theoretical groundwork and historical spadework. As a result, I make no attempt at definition until the end of Chapter 3. My proposed definition (or, less ambitiously, set of necessary conditions) will, however, be a revisionary one. I shall be prescribing how the expression 'pornographic fiction' should be used, not describing how it happens to be used. Because much current English usage is, in my view, conceptually inconsistent and historically unaware, the locution is often applied in ways that are anachronistic or confused. We need a term to refer to the distinctive literary genre identified in this study and, in light of its invention in the nineteenth century, the expression 'pornography' seems the most appropriate choice.

Like Weber, we will begin by tracing the history of the phenomenon. Modern pornographic fiction did not arise de novo any more than did modern rational capitalism. Our story, however, will not just be a history. It will be a genealogy that makes use, as Weber is wont to repeat, of "genetic" not merely generic, concepts [*genetische Begriffe*], that is, concepts, in Weber's technical usage, that allow the investigator not merely to categorize, but also to understand the value commitments of the intentional beings under consideration, to simulate them, to put himself inside their heads, thereby putting himself in a position to understand the evolution of these concepts. But how is a philosopher's propounding of a sociological thesis like Weber's to avoid the charge of rank dilettantism? To answer this question, we will have to look at Weber's methodology.

After briefly glossing the argument of *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* in section 1.2, I take up Weber's methodology in section 1.3. Examining his conceptions of causation and probability, we learn that Weber endorsed intentional or "folk" psychological explanations of social-historical phenomena and that he held a propensity or probabilistically dispositional view of causation compatible, as I shall explain, with such a position. Section 1.3.1 briefly scouts out current philosophical views of dispositions, and section 1.4 considers the possibility of converting practical syllogisms (action explanations using desires and beliefs) into dispositional explanations.

1.2   The argument of *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*

Capitalism, or free-enterprise economic systems of various forms, did, of course, exist in the West before the Reformation. But its relationship with Catholic Christianity was always somewhat uneasy. Given scriptural proscriptions against usury and the accumulation of wealth, the pre-Reformation capitalist bore a prima facie onus of self-justification. This, according to Weber, is what changed after the Reformation. Placing a great deal of weight on Luther's notion of the "calling," Weber argued that the accumulation of wealth was legitimized as the proper aim and product of business as a worldly vocation. To become wealthy *in the right way* was now to do God's work in the world.

Everything turns on becoming wealthy in the right way. Asceticism, it can hardly be denied, had been an integral component of Christianity since its inception. But Catholicism had levied different ascetic requirements on the clergy and the laity. Priests, nuns, and monks were the professionals – God's appointed representatives. Of them much was demanded. The laity was expected to make bona fide efforts to avoid sin, both mortal and venial, but when the flesh was weak, the confessional and superordinate layers of clergy were available to buffer the layperson's relations with God. Also available was the option of atonement and the performance of good works. With time, this degenerated into the anodyne of granting indulgences that Luther so despised – the credit for "good works" purchased but not performed.

Protestantism swept all this away. Each believer now stood in immediate contact with the all-knowing God and, as a result, found himself confronted by a newly merciless conscience. In accordance with his calling, the believer was expected to practice asceticism in this world, but not the monkish asceticism that diverted the believer's gaze from

this world to the next. "Now," says Weber, "every Christian had to be a monk all his life" (1904–1905/1996, 121). Salvation was achieved through faith, not works, which, for the Puritan Protestant, were "not the cause, but only the means of knowing one's state of grace" (141). This demonstrates Calvinist influence; and for the Calvinist, doubt concerning election, says Weber, was a temptation of the devil, "since lack of self-confidence is the result of insufficient faith, hence of imperfect grace" (111). Constant self-scrutiny was the order of the day: I *am* one of the elect; purity in deed *as well as in thought* is essential to my identity.[7]

It is important to note that Weber, who was something of an Anglophile (see Roth 1993), made a major distinction within Protestantism between Lutheranism and Puritanism, and he saw the Protestant ethic as emblematic of the latter, not the former. "[T]he idea of the calling in its Lutheran form," he states, "differed in kind from its shape in ascetic Protestantism" (Weber 2001, 32). With regard to an issue that will loom large in our subsequent discussions, he asserts that Puritan "attitudes to women in general have seen the abolition of the view of them as principally sexual vehicles – in contrast to Luther's residual peasant outlook" (113). Unfortunately, along with these more enlightened attitudes came a tendency to suppress female sexuality, indeed to pretend it did not exist, a tendency especially marked in Victorian England.

Weber's view does appear to have a basis in fact. The German Catholic monk Clemens Sender records that in the year 1532 the public brothel in the Bavarian city of Augsburg, which had been in continuous operation for at least two centuries, was closed at the prompting of "Evangelical" Lutheran clergy (Roper 1996, 333). The city declared for the Reformation in 1534 and formally committed to it in 1537. Before the closing, the existence of the brothel was justified on grounds that had been adduced by both Augustine and Aquinas and commonly used throughout pre-Reformation Christian Europe: it protected respectable women by providing an outlet for male sexual urges, thereby enabling men to marry relatively late after they had established themselves professionally. According to this traditional view, prostitution performed the function of a sewer: unpleasant perhaps, but necessary for the health of the body politic. Although visitation by clergy was nominally proscribed, this rule was enforced with little vigor in many German cities of the time. In Nuremburg, clerical visitation was officially banned, but in Nördlingen, clerics were banned only from staying overnight (Roper 1996, 335). In addition, the Church in Augsburg actually derived revenue from the local brothel (341). Although prostitutes were required to wear

distinctive identifying attire in public, as were Jews, and although they were considered social outcasts, they were traditionally invited to participate in civic events like the annual venison feast at Frankfurt (334). Towns even made use of the local brothel as a civic resource: during imperial visits, etiquette mandated that the emperor and his retinue be offered a complimentary night at the brothel (334). Most of the women housed in these institutions ended working as indentured servants as a result of debts they incurred and were never able to repay.

However, despite the closing of the Augsburg brothel, the earlier medieval view of women as the more sensual sex, indeed as potentially dangerous harlots, was maintained by Luther and his followers, even as it was later rejected by Puritan Protestantism. (We shall return to this issue in Chapter 3.) After Augsburg committed to Protestantism and closed the brothel, sympathy for the prostitute declined. She was regarded as a source of filth to be rooted out using methods of interrogation and trial that were often brutal. Punishments for clientele merely involved heavy fines; prostitutes, now lumped together with "fornicators" or sexually active single women who did not exchange sex for money, on the other hand, faced stiff prison sentences. Privatized prostitution continued largely unabated. Regular customers, it is true, were now regarded as unregenerate sinners, but the double standard concerning male and female sexual behavior remained very much in force: there is no evidence of a change in attitude toward women as "sexual vehicles" resulting from the Augsburg closing. The Augsburg case suggests that Weber's distinction between Lutheran and Puritan strains within Protestantism has some legitimacy.

As already indicated, in the changed environment of the Puritan Reformation wealth had come to be taken less as a hindrance to entry to heaven than as a sign of God's favor and thus of election to heaven. But the wealth had to be properly gained. The acquisitive life had to be a life of sobriety, self-discipline, and constancy: a man's word was to be his bond. The economic framework constructed to support these ideals incorporated practices of legally enforceable contracts and double-entry bookkeeping.[8] The institution of business as a calling, and the endeavor to rise in business, created a new social class, the bourgeoisie, who not only directed their lives according to these values, but inverted the old aristocratic value system that had formed an unspoken alliance with Catholicism. Engaging in business affairs was no longer to sully one's hands; rather, engaging in the "gallant" pursuit of extramarital sexual affairs, in "dangerous liaisons," was to do so. "The sexual asceticism of Puritanism," says Weber, "differs only in degree, not in fundamental

principle, from that of monasticism, on account of the Puritan conception of marriage" (1904–1905/1996, 158). "Protestant asceticism (in my sense of the word)," he asserts, "demanded chastity in marriage *as well*, in the sense of elimination of 'desire' and the restriction of sexual intercourse to the *rational* 'natural purpose' of procreation as its only morally acceptable outlet" (2001, 113). Weber has been accused, perhaps with some justice, of exaggerating in passages such as these the Puritan condemnation of concupiscence within marriage (Leites, 1986: 3). But he was, I am persuaded, correct when he observed (1904–1905/1996, 274) that Protestant influences have played a decisive part in the emancipation of woman and, we might add, in the acceptance of the modern version of companionate marriage, first in England and the United States and then, to a greater or lesser degree, through much of the industrialized Western world. These developments, I shall argue in subsequent chapters, strongly influenced the emergence of pornographic writing in the modern West. Having offered this gloss of the Weber thesis, I will have nothing more to say about the rise of modern capitalism until we consider the development of the pornography of violence in Chapter 4.

1.3   The methodology of *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*

In print now for over a century, Weber's classic remains a puzzling document. Although massively commented upon and hugely influential, there exists even today no firm consensus concerning the correctness of its main thesis, or even what that thesis precisely is. Was the Reformation a necessary condition for the emergence of modern capitalism, or was the relationship a weaker one that construes the Reformation as a factor contributing to a social transformation that would or could have come about without it?[9] As we will see, Weber conceived of the Reformation neither as a necessary causal condition, nor as a sufficient one, but as an "adequate cause," a technical notion we will be taking up presently. Is modern capitalism a distinctively new type of economic system at all, different in essential respects from earlier forms of capitalism? Some of Weber's critics (e.g., Robertson 1933) thought it was not. Is it the case that Puritan Protestantism was committed to an "inner-" or "this-worldly asceticism" not found in Catholicism or even in Lutheranism and most of the Protestant sects that derived from it? All these questions are controversial, and the controversies that continue to swirl around these issues suggest that even if Weber's thesis is empirically responsible,

it is not testable even by the standards of contemporary quantitative sociology, and that, as a consequence, Weber's sociology is not a science that attempts to formulate or test any law-like hypotheses. Weber in fact admitted this, stating that the formulation of such laws was not his aim (1949, 77), while insisting that his thesis identified social causes in a way that historiography, however interpretively compelling, does not. Weber, that is to say, required that his sociology meet standards of what he termed *causal adequacy*.

This notion Weber derived from Johannes von Kries, a contemporary German physiologist and legal theorist.[10] In order to achieve causal adequacy, according to von Kries[11] (1888, 1927), a hypothesis had to show that some state of affairs or event increased the "objective probability"[12] of an outcome. von Kries seems to have thought that in order to achieve precision, objective probability should conform to classical probability.[13] This ideal, however, is in most cases unattainable: when we direct our attention away from games of chance like dice and roulette where all outcomes are, within negligible margins of error, equally probable,[14] all possible outcomes are known, and conditions remain constant, the classical theory is unworkable. In most real-life situations, alternative outcomes are not equally probable, nor can we enumerate all possible outcomes, nor do conditions remain constant.[15] As a result, we must, when making real-world judgments of probability, fall back on probability based on relative frequencies. But with certain social phenomena, as both Weber (1949, 183; 1978, 10) and von Kries[16] recognize, we are more often than not denied the definite numerical comparisons with reference classes required to determine relative frequencies with any precision. Companies that sell life insurance compile voluminous sets of statistics concerning the longevity of members of specific classes of persons, and companies selling automobile insurance do the same for classes of drivers based on sex, age, marital status, driving record, and location. But such statistics are not available in much of human experience and, more importantly, they are not applicable to the cases that most interested Weber the sociologist, namely the occurrence of singular historical events like the rise of modern capitalism. Relative frequencies say nothing about the probability of such events. When available, relative frequencies may, however, serve as indicators of or evidence for *single-case propensities* or the *probabilistic dispositions* of particulars, for there is a systematic relationship between relative frequency and the propensity of a particular "experimental setup," say a fair coin combined with a tossing device, to show heads with a frequency of 50% in the long run. This relationship is expressed in Bernoulli's theorem, or the "law of

large numbers," which holds that the relative frequency of heads in an indefinitely long run of tosses of a fair coin will approach 50% in the limit.

This is not to say that such relative frequencies and comparison classes are never available in contexts of historical sociological explanation. The eminent sociologist Robert Merton (1936), for example, argued that Weber's Protestant ethic was a crucial factor in the development of experimental natural science in early modern Europe. With the advent of Puritan Protestantism, he claimed, empirical study of the natural world and the search for confirmable truth took on a legitimacy it had never before possessed. It became a genuine calling, a noble activity, not unlike the accumulation of wealth in modern "rationalized" capitalism. The inner-worldly asceticism of Puritanism and Calvinism helped to transform the natural world from a vale of tears to be endured into an object to be studied, for its organization attested to the goodness and majesty of God. (This claim resonates curiously with Nietzsche's assertion toward the end of the third essay of *On the Genealogy of Morals* that science is not, as is commonly believed, the enemy of the ascetic ideals of religion, but rather the vehicle for their most profound contemporary realization.)

Merton supports his case in the Weber manner by adducing textual material from contemporary scientific writers such as Francis Bacon and Robert Boyle, as well as from religious writers such as Richard Baxter, John Ray, and John Wilkins. But he also has at his disposal some hard quantitative data, for example, data concerning the composition of the original membership of the Royal Society of London. Of the 68 members on the original list about whom information is available, he points out, 42 were committed Puritans (Merton 1936, 16). This is remarkable in light of the fact that Puritans constituted a relatively small minority in seventeenth-century England (loc. cit.). Merton offers similarly compelling hard data concerning attendance at the *Realschulen*, the natural science-oriented secondary schools in nineteenth-century Prussia, data that indicate a connection between Pietism – for Merton the Germanic version of Puritanism – and scientific activity (25). He also has some suggestive things to say about the religious denomination of students at schools in France that followed the natural science-oriented teachings of the Protestant Peter Ramus and those that did not, though here he offers no hard data.

More often, however, such data are not available to support Weber-style qualitative sociological explanation, and there is reason to conclude that the ideas that Weber was, by his own admission, "plundering"

(1949, 186n42) from von Kries, namely the ideas of *objective Möglichkeit* and *Spielraum* ("space of play"), indicate that, like von Kries, Weber held a propensity view of probability, the view that relative frequencies are the *expression of tendencies inherent in particular states of affairs*. A fair die, for example, possesses an "original" [*ursprünglich*] *Spielraum* of six possibilities each with an equal chance of realization. (If the die is loaded so as to favor one of its six sides, this deviant *Spielraum* is not "original" because of the presence of an interfering factor.) As Popper points out (1959, 35–36), this "possibility" interpretation of probability just is the propensity view minus any indication of the tendencies inherent in the experimental setup (die and throwing device) to *realize* the possibilities in question. Although von Kries distinguished between "subjective" probability (*Wahrscheinlichkeit*) that concerns degree of expectancy and probability that is allegedly "objective" (*objektive Möglichkeit*), his interest in the latter remained epistemological, for there was no metaphysical commitment on his part to phenomena that are inherently probabilistic, as there was on Popper's, who applied propensity explanation to subatomic physical phenomena widely (though not universally) held to be nomologically indeterministic. von Kries, by contrast, distinguished between so-called nomological principles and ontological determinations, as did Weber, in light of his appropriation of von Kries' language of adequate causation and objective possibility. The former, von Kries asserted, are "universally valid principles that apply to entire categories of things," while the latter are only of "singular significance" (*von nur singulären Bedeutung*) (von Kries 1927, 86): they are the specific initial conditions that we cannot precisely and exhaustively ascertain, but that determine outcomes within the constraints of standing physical law.

"Suppose," says Weber (1975, 122), "that a storm strikes a boulder from the side of a cliff and splinters it into innumerable scattered fragments." The entire event can, in principle, be explained nomologically by way of covering laws, causal mechanisms, and initial conditions. "Any further need for causal explanation would be awakened," Weber claims, only by the discovery that "there is a single phenomenon which…appears to contradict established 'laws of nature,'" for this is impossible: "the universal validity of 'determinism' remains purely a priori." (Here speaks the committed neo-Kantian.) However, we cannot predict the resultant position of each and every boulder shard. The initial conditions are too multifarious and the requisite computations too complex. But suppose that we find some of these scattered fragments disposed in a way that is highly improbable when considered as a result of physical forces alone. Say, for example, a number of medium-sized fragments near impact form

a nearly perfect circle ten feet in diameter. (This is not Weber's illustration.) Depending on knowledge of context, we might be inclined to conclude that human activity had occurred in the vicinity and to designate these actions as the adequate cause of the unexpected formation. We interpret its provenance using principles of intentional psychology. In such cases, Weber concludes (loc. cit.), "we can provide a 'comprehensible' interpretation of the concrete, individual phenomenon, but an interpretation that does not directly contradict our nomological, empirical knowledge."

It was historical, "concrete, individual phenomena" involving human intentionality (though, as we will see, not depending exclusively on it), phenomena like the rise of modern capitalism, that most interested Weber the historical sociologist. Accordingly, Weber, as I interpret him, follows von Kries by arguing for a mode of explanation that is dispositional rather than nomological, never pretending that the influence of the Protestant ethic on modern capitalism instantiated any deterministic sociological law:

> [E]ven in the case of so-called 'economic laws'…we are concerned here not with 'laws' in the narrower exact science sense, but with adequate causal relationships expressed in rules and with the application of the category of 'objective possibility'. (Weber 1949, 80)

What, then, exactly is an "adequate cause," and what are the "rules" whereby such causal relationships are expressed?

An example from von Kries (1888, 201) supplies some clues. Suppose a coachman happens to get drunk or fall asleep while driving. The coach is struck by lightning and the passenger is killed. We may judge that the coachman's inattentiveness caused the death in this particular case, for we may assume, von Kries contends, that if the coachman had been in his normal alert state, the course of the coach "undoubtedly" would not have coincided precisely with that particular lightning strike and the passenger would have remained unhurt. That is, the driver's state is a necessary causal antecedent of the mishap, provided the mishap was not overdetermined by some other causal condition. But the driver's state is not an *adequate* cause, for suffering a lightning strike on a moving coach in open terrain is "in general" no more likely in the case of a drunken or soporific coachman than it is in the case of a sober or wakeful one. This is the sort of "rule" Weber has in mind. Suppose, on the other hand, the coach overturns and the passenger is injured or killed. In this case, the coachman's state *is* an adequate cause, for it

increased the probability of the event. The cause may or may not have been necessary, but now it is adequate, since adequacy depends on a distinctive mode of "abstract" generalization. A coach driven by an inattentive driver, says von Kries, possesses "a tendency [*Tendenz*]" to favor the occurrence of such an event, to increase its "possibility [*Möglichkeit*] or probability [*Wahrscheinlichkeit*]." In more contemporary terminology, an "experimental setup" consisting of a coach and an inattentive driver has a greater *propensity*, or *probabilistic disposition*, to turn over than one that consists of a coach and an attentive driver.

Now how do we know this? Here the issue of Weber's "rules" comes to the fore. No doubt, putting ethical issues aside, a series of tests of representative experimental setups consisting of coaches and soporific or inebriated drivers could be initiated that would yield determinate relative frequencies in the long run. But such tests are not an option. The same is true of propensity judgments regarding the occurrence of social phenomena: "[T]his type of verification is feasible with relative accuracy," Weber says (1978, I, 10),

> only in the very few cases susceptible of psychological experimentation. In very different degrees of approximation, such verification is also feasible in the limited cases of mass phenomena which can be statistically described and unambiguously interpreted. For the rest, there remains only the possibility of comparing the largest number of historical or contemporary processes which, *while otherwise similar, differ in the one decisive point of their relation to the particular motive or factor the role of which is being investigated*. This is the fundamental task of comparative sociology. [emphasis mine]

This sort of comparative procedure involves applying what is generally "the rule." Weber offers the following examples (1949, 184–185). The outcome of the Battle of Marathon is properly judged an adequate cause of subsequent Western history, for if the Persians had won the battle, the development of Hellenic and consequently of Western civilization almost certainly would have taken a very different course. On the other hand, the discharge of two gunshots in front of the Berlin Castle was not an adequate cause of the outbreak of the 1848 March Revolution in Germany, because the revolution probably would have happened anyway. In a case of adequate causation, Weber says (loc. cit.), "the opposite of 'chance' is not … 'necessity', but rather 'adequate' [i.e., adequacy] in the sense, which, following von Kries, we developed above." No universal unexcepted causal law laying down necessary

and sufficient causal conditions for mishaps with coaches could be formulated or would really be of much help in the case of determining the causal responsibility of the feckless coachman. Any such "law," even if it could be formulated, would be highly probabilistic or it would be riddled with *ceteris paribus* qualifications. We are better served by relying on our experiential knowledge of the propensities of similar entities in similar circumstances and focusing our attention on what is unusual, what is not the rule, in the circumstances that interest us. As might be expected, von Kries expresses a similar view: the carelessness of the coachman did not necessitate the accident, but it was the accident's adequate cause (1888, 202).

1.3.1 A brief excursus on dispositions

The contemporary philosophical literature concerning dispositions is a highly contested one (see, e.g., Crane 1996; Handfield 2009; Mumford 1998; Tuomela 1978). One point of general if not universal agreement, however, is that there is a fundamental distinction to be made between properties that are dispositional, that concern the available range of responses of an entity to external factors, and those that are categorical, which qualify the entity considered "in itself." But here agreement comes to an end (with one exception to be noted). Positions range from outright eliminativism regarding dispositional properties (Quine 1974) to eliminativism regarding categorical properties (Fetzer 1978), with intermediate positions including reduction of the dispositional to the categorical (Armstrong 1996), reduction of the categorical to the dispositional (Popper 1959), dualism (Place 1996), yet another view that holds that all properties range between categorical and dispositional limits and that no property is wholly one or the other (Martin 1996), and even a "neutral monism," which holds that there is no fact of the matter concerning the dispositional and the categorical, but that properties are equally amenable to dispositional and categorical description (Mumford 1998).

More detail concerning these controversies is, I believe, unnecessary here, beyond noting that I find the eliminativist positions implausible. But it is important to say something about the exception mentioned parenthetically in the previous paragraph. A number of writers, friends and foes of dispositions alike, have noted a peculiarity in dispositional causal accounts, namely that they can seem to violate Hume's principle of "separate existences" regarding causes and effects. Since the identity conditions for a disposition on most accounts require reference to its characteristic manifestations, be it a "single-track" disposition like brittleness or a "multiple-track" one like human emotional irritability,

dispositions *seem* to require a conceptual connection with their manifestations as part of their identity conditions.[17] To be brittle just is to tend to break easily when struck, and to tend to break easily when struck just is to be brittle. Since dispositions must, as it were, "make reference" to their manifestations, U. T. Place (1996, 23) asserted (against Brentano) that rather than being the mark of the mental, intentionality is the mark of the dispositional. I regard this view as untenable, since it ignores, with regard to intentionality, "the importance of being erroneous" (Beisecker 2000). To stand in an intentional relation to something is to take it as something. And, as Dennett rightly says, there is no taking without mistaking (1996, 37).[18] It may be that Place conflated intentionality with intensionality. Both sorts of contexts are referentially opaque, but only intentionality involves the characteristic "aboutness" relation.

Putting the comparison with intentionality aside, then, some writers, for example, Mackie (1978, 104), see the alleged conceptual connection between disposition and manifestation as a serious problem in dispositional analysis, yielding empty *virtus dormitiva* "explanations": opium puts a user to sleep because of its soporific powers, which are powers that tend to put the user to sleep; glass vases break easily when struck because they are brittle, which is to break easily when struck. Mumford (1998, 136ff), on the other hand, brands the conflict with Hume's principle of separate existences only apparent, as resulting from a confusion of mode of description or "mode of presentation" with ontology. Causes and effects are ontologically distinct existences all right, but they may be *described* in such a way so as to introduce a conceptual connection. Who would deny that 'the cause of G caused G' is true (Mumford 1998, 139)? Its denial, Mumford claims, would be contradictory, for it would amount to denying 'the cause of G is the cause of G', which is a Fregean "uninformative identity" and thus a logical truth, assuming the axiom of identity.[19] To be sure, it is empirically empty and therefore *explains* nothing; but explanation is an epistemological notion, and dispositions may be regarded as explanatory placeholders (cf. Mackie 1978, 105). Humans knew that dry wood is disposed to burn long before the oxidation theory of combustion explained why. Hippocrates knew that willow bark was disposed to relieve pain, but modern pharmacology was required to explain that this disposition was a result of its possession of an ingredient active in aspirin. Dispositions may not, on their own, explain causal processes, but they still manage to indicate their presence and to guide our expectations and our scientific investigations regarding them. Indeed, even Mackie (1978, 106) sees dispositions as "indispensable within our knowledge," for we "still identify natural

kinds and scientific properties as clusters of powers." Powers are nothing but dispositions by another name.

1.4 "Sociology as philosophy"?

Something similar may be said concerning folk or intentional psychological explanations of human behavior. Folk psychology is not so much, as the Churchlands would have it, stagnant empirical theory, as it is dispositional causal explanation lacking precisely determined probabilities and, as a result, standing in need of adequate theoretical supplementation. Humans have ascribed folk-psychological states to each other for as long (or perhaps for nearly as long) as they have ascribed the disposition to burn to dry wood. Humans also have strong propensities or probabilistic dispositions to act on their beliefs and desires, or, stated more cautiously, to behave in ways that are effectively interpretable using practical syllogisms and the vocabulary of beliefs and desires (preferences, pro-attitudes). Consider the following version of the general structure of the practical syllogism deriving from G. H. von Wright:

$F_1 a$ = 'a is an agent who from now on intends to bring about S at time t.'

$F_2 a$ = 'a considers (believes) from now on that he cannot bring about S at time t unless he does A no later than time t', and that from now on he is able to do A.'

Ta = 'a is not prevented, from now on, from doing A.'

Therefore,

Ga = 'a sets himself to do A no later than when he thinks time t' has arrived.'

According to Niiniluoto (1976, 360), this syllogism can be reformulated as a dispositional causal action explanation, as follows:

(x) $[P (Gx|F_1x$ & F_2x & $Tx) = r]$

F_1a & F_2a & Ta

$\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad [r]$

Ga

In English: for any agent *x*, the probability *P* that an agent with the properties F_1 and F_2 who is subjected to condition *T* will set himself to perform an action *G* equals that agent's dispositional tendency *r* to set himself to take that action. A particular agent has these properties and is subjected to this condition. Therefore, that agent sets himself to take action *G*. The first universally quantified expression would not, in Davidson's estimation (1980, 233), qualify as a "serious," even if probabilistic, law because it does not give "sharply fixed probabilities." At best, it expresses what Ringer (1997, 69) terms a "qualitative application of probabilistic reasoning," the expression of a Weberian "rule." The double lines separating explanans from explanandum indicate some (fairly high) degree of inductive support rather than the logical entailment of a deductive-nomological causal explanation, which would be indicated by a single line.

Dispositional tendency is, of course, not the same as degree of inductive support, so it is a bit confusing for Niiniluoto to use '*r*' for both. But he has precedent. According to Fetzer (1974, 180), whom Niiniluoto follows here, the following formulation is canonical for single-case probabilistic explanation:

$$P\,(Ax|Dx \cdot Tx) = 1/6 \ ^{20}$$

$$Da \cdot Ta$$

$$[1/6]$$

$$Aa$$

In English: the probability that a given fair die (*Dx*) when tossed (*Tx*) will turn up showing ace (one) (*Ax*) equals 1/6. *a* is a fair die (*Da*) and it is tossed (*Ta*). Therefore, it will turn up ace (*Aa*). The degree of inductive support of this conclusion is also 1/6 (shown in brackets), so the probability shown in the first line of the explanans and the degree of inductive support are systematically related. How so? The probability that the die will turn up showing a particular side is determined by the dispositional tendency of it together with the throwing device, and degree of dispositional tendency is simply the propensity of an experimental setup of a certain kind to produce an outcome with a specific relative frequency in the long run when subjected to specific conditions. Now, according to Fetzer (1974, 185), the *meta-linguistic analogue* of statistical probability is nomic expectability: "On this [nomic expectability]

approach probability statements reflect not the frequency with which a particular outcome occurs within a sequence of trials but rather the frequency with which *statements describing such outcomes* happen to be true relative to a sequence of statements describing those trials" [my emphasis]. Since on this view we are talking of relative frequencies with which *statements describing events* are true, and not of relative frequencies of the occurrence of the events themselves, it is a short step to the logical relation of inductive support. If r in the first line of the explanans is viewed as expressing a degree of nomic expectability, it may also, says Fetzer, express a degree of inductive support of the explanandum *in a single trial*.[21] This is crucial. In the case of the dispositional explanatory practical syllogism, however, r, though high, cannot be determined with the precision of a die and a throwing device.

Beliefs and desires themselves, moreover, lend themselves to dispositional construal, and they are dispositional not only to the extent that they are nonoccurrent as opposed to occurrent, a distinction that is orthogonal to the dispositional/categorical distinction. Even occurrent beliefs may be considered dispositional. As Wilfrid Sellars suggested nearly 40 years ago (1975), an occurrent belief is a short-term *propensity* to say out loud. And before him, Charles Peirce asserted that "[t]he essence of belief is the establishment of a habit; and different beliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which they give rise" (1934, V, 5.398). A habit, however, is itself a standing disposition to act. To assert any of this is to *explain* very little. But it is also not merely to interpret: it is to treat reasons as causes, even if we do not happen to know what these causes or their causal mechanisms are. Like disposition-descriptions themselves, reason-descriptions and desire-descriptions are conceptually connected to the descriptions of actions that they are alleged to cause, for reasons and desires play an indispensable role in the determination of the identity conditions for these actions. A behavioral episode counts as an *intentional act* of turning off a light switch only if the agent believes it is a light switch and desires that it be turned off. Supplying reasons as causes constitutes a large part of what Weberian sociology purports to accomplish.

Lacking the sort of relative frequency data concerning experimental setups that would serve as evidence for propensities, the only technique remaining to Weber was a qualitative comparative technique that employs an "imaginary experiment" (Weber 1978, 10), a version of *thought experimentation*, the philosopher's stock in trade. As we have already seen, the sociologist, according to Weber, compares as best he can historical or contemporary social "processes" that are generally

similar (say, economic activity in seventeenth-century European and North American societies), but that differ regarding a causal factor that is hypothesized to be critical (some of these societies are predominantly Catholic, some Lutheran, and some Puritan). The sociologist then asks himself whether history is likely to have been different with the removal of the hypothesized factor, in this case, the Protestant ethic and its inner- or this-worldly ascetic stance. If the answer is yes, then it qualifies as an adequate cause. To call this procedure "uncertain," as Weber does (loc. cit.), is rather an understatement, for it seems to substitute for a probability judgment supported by relative frequencies, which require definite reference classes and hard statistics, a judgment of subjective probability, something not unlike the giving of odds. A philosopher is as well positioned to give such odds as anyone else, provided he is in possession of the requisite concepts and has the requisite knowledge of relevant fact, including, it is important to add, relevant *textual* evidence. Indeed, much of Weber's own evidence was textual, deriving from Anglophone Protestant writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, including Baxter, Bunyan, Franklin, Wesley, and others.

In all fairness, Weber's procedure is no more uncertain than the sort of estimation of probabilities concerning individual cases that occurs in courts of law and in historiography, areas that stimulated the interest of von Kries. What is the probability that O. J. Simpson murdered his ex-wife? What is the probability that the assassination of John F. Kennedy contributed to the United States involvement in the Vietnam quagmire? Lawyers and historians are generally not concerned with confirming general law-like hypotheses. Rather, they are concerned with identifying particular causal sequences, what caused what on this or that occasion, with the help of causal principles, both scientific and "platidudinous," (i.e., folk-psychological) already established (Hart and Honoré 1959, 9).

Although Weber was a trained lawyer in the continental Roman tradition (see Turner and Factor, 1994), Weberian sociology is neither law nor historiography. On the one hand, it exhibits a certain similarity to rational decision theory, a similarity that draws on the classic Weberian notion of an ideal type – in this case, the prototypical ascetic Protestant capitalist. Unlike the historian, Weber was not primarily interested in interpreting the actions of specific individuals and gauging their effects. He was interested in interpreting the actions of a *type* of person with a specific set of values and attitudes in a specific set of circumstances and determining the social effects of allegiance to those values and the possession of those attitudes. The Weberian ideal type is no stereotypical

average. It really is an idealized cognitive model, a theoretical construct. It is this that separates Weber's historical sociology from standard histori- ography. On the other hand, Weber was well aware that human behavior is often the result, not of rational decision, but of various factors he considered merely causal and nondeliberative, including unreflective habit, socially enforced convention, social "contagion," and emotion (Weber 1978, 312). Like the late Donald Davidson's "Psychology as Philosophy" (1989), which employs practical syllogisms both to ration- alize and to identify the causes of actions, Weberian sociology is posi- tioned between extremes of a rational decision theory "from which the obviously empirical has been drained" and "some form of behaviorism [or other scientific psychology] better imagined than explained from which all taint of the normative has been subtracted" (Davidson 1989, 241). Again like Davidson, Weber insisted both on rational interpreta- tion and causal adequacy in action explanations. One commentator (Ringer 1997, 147) goes so far (perhaps a bit too far) as to assert that Davidson's "subject matter is really equivalent to Weber's."

While he is considered a proponent of methodological individualism in sociology, the view that social phenomena are, *ontologically speaking*, nothing over and above the decisions, actions, and behaviors of indi- vidual agents, Weber offers no explicit general ontology. His interpretive psychology, however, is, like Davidson's, folk psychology, the intentional psychology of beliefs, desires (or preferences), and practical syllogisms. Sociology is no more a nomological science for Weber than folk psychology is for Davidson. According to Davidson, every mental state is token-iden- tical with some brain state, and any mental event falls under laws only when described using the language of physical science, not the language of folk psychology. (Lawful sequences of events may occur in the world, but laws themselves are the *theoretical descriptions* of these sequences in some canonical vocabulary.) Hence, Davidson's ontological position, as is well known, is a monistic physicalism, but an "anomalous" monism to the extent that events described psychologically resist subsumption under laws, psychological or psychophysical, for there are none. While hostile to a "greedy reductionism" or any brand of eliminativism, there is no evidence that Weber had any sympathies for mind–brain dualism in any of its forms, much less for idealism. It would be anachronistic overreaching to foist on him an explicit token/token mind–brain iden- tity theory, to say nothing of an anomalous monism. Yet the following sentence could have been written by Davidson himself: "Culture is a finite segment of the meaningless infinity of world process, a segment on which human beings confer meaning and significance" (Weber 1949, 81).

The problem with making a move parallel to Davidson's and calling Weberian theory "sociology as philosophy" is that Davidson's "psychology as philosophy" is itself something of a misnomer. Folk psychology may respect rationality constraints, but that does not make it philosophy. When interpreting the actions of another agent, we must, Davidson famously claimed, employ what he termed a "principle of charity." In order to make sense of an agent's discourse and behavior, that is, we must assume that most of what he believes is true, that most of his desires fall within a range of human normality, and that he meets minimal standards of rationality. The philosophical part of this, however, is not the *employment* of the principle of charity (if we do employ it; this remains controversial).[22] What is philosophical is the second-order claim that we cannot interpret human behavior *without* employing it and that the descriptions of the beliefs, desires, and actions in a practical syllogism must "make sense," must rationalize the behavior. Weberian sociology is not, then, sociology as philosophy, but something more like sociology as "situational logic" (Popper 1950, 449), a mode of explanation that brings to bear the folk-psychological rationality assumptions and the judgments of subjective probabilities that play a role in historiography, the law, and everyday life, as well as descriptions of the "personal interests, aims, and other situational factors" (Popper 1950, 449), such as information available to the relevant human agents or to *ideal types* of human agents.

This is an issue of emphasis; for I do not pretend that my thesis concerning the rise of modern pornographic fiction does not make a causal claim. But how much daylight is there, really, between the explanatory aims and methods of *The Protestant Ethic*, the work of a philosophically-minded sociologist, and *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, the work of the sociologically-minded philosophers Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno of the Frankfurt School,[23] however great the difference in style of expression? (Weber was not given to these philosophers' oppressive tone of scornful hauteur.[24]) As a matter of fact, the present work may be seen as an essay influenced by the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory,[25] if not, as a piece of naturalistic philosophy of literature, actually a work *of* Critical Theory, albeit one sympathetic to the aims of *Ideologiekritik*. I shall be engaging in some qualitative sociological historiography and Weber-style thought experimentation. But these are intended primarily to motivate an account of situational logic, or the "logic of social situations" (Popper 1950, 291). This is to say that the social historiography and thought experimentation will be of secondary theoretical importance to my central and distinctively philosophical project: an *analysis*

*of the pragmatics of modern pornographic narrative fiction and an examina-
tion of the moral psychology of its readers*.

1.5   General conspectus

The remainder of the book falls into three chapters presenting the
following account of the pragmatics, the development, and the moral
psychology of pornographic fiction.

Chapter 2 Literary Discourse and Pragmatic Implicature

We begin with a brief survey of a number of versions of the pragmatics of
implicature. A pragmatics-theoretical analysis of pornographic fictional
literature is just a special application of a pragmatic-theoretical approach
to fictional literature. The chapter continues with an attempt to unpack
the notion of this pragmatic-theoretic approach. A sketch of H. Paul
Grice's original theory, as well as an account of its subsequent expansion
and modification by later writers, both neo-Gricean and anti-Gricean,
are provided. We then take up the characteristic literary functions of
displaying, showing, and presenting, and demonstrate their connection
with simulation theory in the philosophy of mind. Finally, we explore
the important link between these topics and the role of literature in
achieving "extended" reflective or "perceptive" equilibrium in moral
deliberation.

Chapter 3 Pornographic Fiction, Implicature, and Imaginative
Resistance

This chapter adopts a genealogical approach to the problem of
accounting for the emergence of pornographic fiction in the modern
West. Its Weberian "adequate cause," I argue, was the Reformation
and the establishment of the Protestant ethic. In taking this approach,
attention is directed to some of the vicissitudes of the relations between
pornography and the law. We take note of *Stiltrennung*, or separation of
styles, and its relation to Christianity, Protestantism, and social value
inversion, while making the distinction between pornographic writing
and pornographic reading, as well as briefly noting important differ-
ences between the formal realism of the newly emergent English novel
and the early modern novel as it developed in France. This sets the stage
for the argument for the central thesis of the chapter, that pornographic
writing exploits the conversational pragmatics of the literary speech
situation in order to work its arousing effects in persons equipped with
the Puritanical conscience and its contemporary descendants. Finally,

an assessment of Cleland's *Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure is* offered, a work that is, in my view, the first genuinely pornographic piece of Western fiction, and a parallel contemporary test case is considered.

Chapter 4 Pornographic Fiction and Personal Integrity

This chapter begins with an account of the prehistory of pornography in an attempt to tie together sex, violence, and primal kinship. We consider two approaches to explaining human primal kinship: the structuralist approach of Claude Levi-Strauss and the evolutionary approach of Bernard Chapais, declaring the second the more convincing account. Attention is then given to the pornography of violence. The problems of homoerotic pornographic fiction and of the sexually explicit romance novel, stumbling blocks for some feminist analyses of pornography, but also, at least prima facie, for my own, are raised and addressed. Finally, we take up the moral psychology of pornography, avoiding (to the extent we can) thorny issues of normative ethics and meta-ethics. The chapter section in question begins by introducing Richard Dawkins' notion of the human extended phenotype, while departing from, or at least augmenting, Dawkins' treatment by applying the notion explicitly to the social construction of the responsible human agent. The bad conscience engendered, according to my thesis, by the consumption of pornography is interpreted psychologically as a type of cognitive dissonance indicating a threat to the homeostasis of the autobiographical self as an important component of the human extended phenotype, which, I argue, functionally supports the socially constructed responsible human agent.

2
Literary Discourse and Pragmatic Implicature

2.1 Introduction and chapter conspectus

Pornographic narrative fiction is literature, if not literature in the honorific sense. A speech-act approach to pornographic literature, therefore, will be a special application of a speech-act approach to literature. Speech-act theory, part of pragmatics, or the theory of language use, is the study that concerns itself not with what is said by a speaker, but with what is *done* by a speaker *in saying* (illocutions) or *by saying* (perlocutions). In this chapter, I argue that pornographic fiction exploits the pragmatics of fictional discourse, specifically its convention of expressing implicatures by flouting conversational maxims or rules. I shall explicate the expression of implicature by flouting, an idea first developed by H. Paul Grice, presently. Although a number of writers, including Searle (1979), Wolterstorff (1980), Sperber and Wilson (1986), and, perhaps most systematically, Currie (1990), have adopted a speech-act approach to literary discourse, to my knowledge, only one writer, Mary Louise Pratt, has made a sustained attempt to apply the Gricean notion of flouting as an indicator of implicature to an analysis of literary discourse in her unfortunately seldom-cited[1] *Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse* (1977).

As a first approximation (subject to further refinement), Gricean implicature designates that aspect of meaning not included in the semantic content of an utterance. The semantic content of an utterance has traditionally been limited to truth conditions along with contextually determined indexical or deictic content (expressions using context-sensitive pronouns like "this," "that," "I," and "you"). Pratt's effort may be groundbreaking, but it suffers from a serious, though unavoidable, flaw. When her book was published in 1977, Grice's *Logic and Conversation* had only

been available in print for two years in an excerpted version. It was first printed in complete form in 1989. Before that, the theory of implicature had been disseminated by way of a widely circulated but still unpublished manuscript deriving from his *William James Lectures* of 1967. In 1977, moreover, pragmatics was in a state of flux, just having survived a failed coup by generative semantics, which attempted to reduce pragmatics to semantics by treating speech acts as implicit statements of performative intention, the so-called performative hypothesis – the idea that all speech acts could be reduced to the locutionary ones by the addition of an appropriate assertive prefix like "I promise that…" or "I order you to…" To be sure, Grice's earlier, pragmatically oriented paper "Meaning" (1957), which distinguished speaker meaning from sentence meaning, already loomed large in the philosophy of language. However, with the exception of "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions" (1969), most of his important work in pragmatics was yet to come, as was the gradual absorption, refinement, and elaboration of his theory of conversational implicature. In 1977, philosophical pragmatics had Austin's founding text, *How to Do Things with Words* (1962), Grice's three important papers, Strawson's discussion (1964) of Grice's "Meaning," David Lewis' *Convention* (1969), John Searle's *Speech Acts* (1969), and not much else. In light of all that has happened in pragmatics since the 1980s, including developments in philosophy, linguistics, and cognitive science, Pratt's application of the theory of implicature to literary discourse comes across today as naïve, even if highly original and suggestive.

A major problem facing anyone who wishes to apply the theory of implicature to literature in this day and time is determining which of many currently available versions of the theory to adopt. Most versions remain neo-Gricean, but these range from the conservative (Bach and Harnish 1979), to the moderately reformist (Horn 1989; Levinson 2000), to the radically revisionist (Lewis 1979; Sperber and Wilson 1986), to cite the most important representatives. There are also on hand dissenting, anti-Gricean approaches (Davis 1998; Wierzbicka 2003). Adjudicating in any definitive way between these versions would, at present, be difficult, if not impossible, and, as we will see, unnecessary for our purposes. I propose, therefore, to bring them all into consideration and to adopt elements and distinctions from each that I find convincing and useful, clarifying or criticizing where necessary, while taking pains to avoid any inconsistency that might result from drawing on these disparate accounts.

I begin the next section of the chapter with a sketch of Grice's original theory of implicature and an overview of the current state of play in

implicature studies. Pratt's idea was that texts engage in communicative acts that may be characterized as displaying, showing, or presenting. All three of these notions will be discussed in Section 2.3, along with the important relationship they bear to simulation, a mode of understanding the mental states of others that exploits empathetic reenactment. Simulation, in turn, plays an essential role in the understanding of literary texts; such understanding is indispensable in achieving states of "perceptive equilibrium" (Nussbaum 1990) or, alternatively, "extended reflective equilibrium" (Richardson 1997). These topics are taken up in Section 2.4 and filled out with an examination of Herman Melville's *Billy Budd*, which, I shall argue, may be approached as a literary thought experiment in moral philosophy. Section 2.5 provides a summary and conclusion.

2.2   Implicature

Grice's original aim in constructing the theory of implicature was to demonstrate that the ordinary-language English words "and" and "or" and the corresponding logical connectives were semantically univocal, and that any additional senses the ordinary-language expressions might seem to possess were not a matter of semantics, but of pragmatics. The meaning, strictly speaking, of "or," he argued, was that of the inclusive disjunction (and/or) of propositional logic. The exclusive disjunction of ordinary language (either/or but not both) was an implicature not part of the expression's semantic content, that which is strictly "said."[2] Similarly, although "and" and "but" are truth-functionally equivalent, "but" carries an implicature of contrast that "and" lacks: "That car is ugly, but inexpensive" differs in meaning from "That car is inexpensive, but ugly." The first conveys a pro attitude, the second a con attitude. Because of the truth-functional equivalence of the two expressions, however, these additional meanings are *conventionally implicated*, not entailed. Commutivity sometimes also fails to hold with conjunction in ordinary language: "Mary got married and had a baby" conveys a meaning quite different from "Mary had a baby and got married." The apparent difference in meaning results from the addition of a temporal component, which also is conventionally implicated and not entailed. This rejection of multiple meanings in favor of the generation of implicatures is traditionally termed "Grice's Razor."

But, as we know, Grice took his theory of implicature far beyond such cases of conventional implicature. He distinguished implicatures that were nonconventional; he distinguished those nonconventional

implicatures that were conversational (governed by the "conversational maxims") and those that were not; and he distinguished those conversational implicatures that were generalized, expressing utterance-type meaning, and those that were particularized, expressing speaker meaning. A generalized conversational implicature (GCI) is one that will be successfully expressed, barring contextual cues that cancel it, like the generalized implicature from "Some doctors are competent" to "Some doctors are not competent," whereas a particularized conversational implicature (PCI) requires specific contextual assumptions for successful expression, as with Julius Caesar's comment to the soothsayer, "The Ides of March are come" and the reply, "Aye, Caesar, but not gone," implicating that Caesar was not yet out of danger. Without the warning delivered to Caesar concerning the Ides of March earlier in the play, this exchange would be banal, lacking any implicative significance. Any contemporary application of the theory of implicature must remain mindful of all these distinctions.

In addition, how conventions themselves are to be construed is controversial. They have been seen as regularities intentionally implemented to achieve some social goal (Lewis 1969), or as regulative norms enforced by the threat of community sanction (Clarke 1987), or as initially unplanned patterns of behavior that have proliferated as a result of their socially coordinating functions (Millikan 1998), or as "count as" rules (Bach and Harnish 1979, 108), as raising one's hand in a meeting may *count as* an affirmative vote. What is generally agreed, however, is that the conventional is in some sense arbitrary: conventions that are in place could have been different from what they are. People may greet each other by shaking hands, as they do in the United States, or by kissing both cheeks, as they do in France. The principles governing conversational implicatures, Grice thought, were not arbitrary, and consequently were not conventional. They were principles not merely social or even linguistic – they were universal principles of rational behavior – and particularized implicatures could therefore be "worked out" by means of inferences concerning a speaker's state of mind, whatever language was being spoken. This is sometimes termed "Grice's Calculability Assumption." As a result, Grice attempted, with a characteristic combination of whimsy and obeisance to philosophical tradition, to place conversational implicature under one overarching principle governing conversational behavior, the Cooperative Principle (CP),[3] and to lay out a subsidiary set of conversational maxims grouped, in Kantian architectonic fashion, according to quantity, quality, relation, and manner. According to Grice's Theoretical Definition, a speaker

implicates something conversationally only if the speaker is presumed to be following the CP, which mandates observance of the conversational maxims.

These maxims are sufficiently familiar to require only a précis. Indeed, they are as well known to students of pragmatics as the attempts by neo-Griceans to reconfigure them and reduce their number have been tireless. Grice proposed (1989, 27) two maxims of quantity: (1) provide enough information to satisfy the current aims of the conversation, but (2) don't be redundant and provide more information than necessary; a "supermaxim" of quality: try to make your contribution one that is true, under which were included two subordinate maxims: (i) do not say what you believe to be false or (ii) what you believe lacks adequate evidence; one maxim of relation: be relevant; and one supermaxim of manner: be perspicuous, under which were included such maxims as (a) avoid obscurity of expression, (b) avoid ambiguity, (c) be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity), and (d) be orderly. He allowed that there may be others (1975, 27), notably a maxim of politeness, which would include an important maxim of conversational turn taking. These could be seen as falling under the supermaxim of manner. Grice clearly regarded the Cooperative Principle and the maxims as normative for conversation qua rational, goal-directed activity. Once in place, they leave the rational conversationalist only four options: (1) compliance, with the possibility of clashes between maxims, for example, between the maxims of quantity and quality, being enjoined to say as much as necessary but also respecting truth and justification; (2) opting out, which disqualifies the speaker as a player in the conversational language game; (3) violation, the covert, and perhaps unintended, transgression of the CP or a maxim; and, most importantly, (4) flouting, an overt transgression of a maxim *intended by the speaker to be recognized* as such by the hearer. With the exception of opting out, the remaining three options can give rise to implicatures; but flouting is especially significant since it flags a conversational transgression as intended for recognition.

As Currie (1990, 29) observes, there is a natural fit between Gricean pragmatics and the analysis of literary discourse, since a literary text can be viewed as a conversation in which one interlocutor, the writer, does all the talking, thereby flouting the rule of turn taking. Whereas Currie says little about implicature itself and relies without further discussion on the Bach and Harnish speech-act schema, which is an elaborated version of conditions for "non-natural" meaning Grice had laid down in his 1957 paper,[4] Pratt invokes Grice's original "Logic and Conversation" theory of implicature to argue, against the Russian Formalist and Prague

School styles of textual analysis still influential at the time, that literary discourse does not constitute an isolated, aesthetically privileged idiolect, but is a special case of quotidian verbal display, which is "a fundamentally human activity" (1977, 140). A literary text is a "display text," a text that does not merely report, but presents events on the basis of their intrinsic "tellability." Crucially, all literary texts are display texts, but not all display texts are literary texts. In fact, display "texts" occur regularly in everyday verbal discourse. Verbal display is something in which all human language users, not just writers of fiction, engage. But there are some constraints:

> Assertions whose relevance is tellability must represent states of affairs that are held to be unusual, contrary to expectations, or otherwise problematic; informing assertions may do so, but they do not have to, and it is not their point to do so. Both types are used to inform, but they inform for different reasons. In making an assertion whose relevance is tellability, a speaker is not only reporting but also displaying a state of affairs, inviting his addressee(s) to join him in contemplating it, evaluating it, and responding to it. His point is to produce in his hearers not only belief but also an imaginative and affective involvement in the state of affairs he is representing and an evaluative stance toward it. He intends them to share his wonder, amusement, terror, or admiration of the event. Ultimately, it would seem, what he is after is an interpretation of the problematic event, an assignment of meaning and value supported by the consensus of himself and his hearers [Pratt 1977, 136].

For Pratt, then, verbal display is a mode of conversation subject to the CP, a mode in which hearers are prepared to suspend their usual expectation of turn taking and cede a speaker the floor, provided that the CP is respected. Flouting and other transgressions may occur, but if they do, hearers will be expecting rewards of imaginative and affective involvement and shared wonder, amusement, terror, or admiration. If such rewards are not forthcoming, the hearer may well opt out of the conversation. In the literary context, Pratt argues, the CP is "hyperprotected" (215): the conventions governing the writing and reading of literary texts *guarantee* compliance with the CP. With this guarantee in place, any transgressions of the conversational maxims *count*, at least prima facie, *as floutings*: the author is granted wide latitude, the freedom to ignore truth and justification, to be outrageously prolix or frustratingly laconic, to be grotesquely offensive, or even subliminally

unintelligible. And these transgressions, as floutings, *signal the presence of implicatures*. Because of hyperprotection, the default assumption is that when an author of a literary display text disregards a conversational maxim, he has not opted out of the CP. Rather, *he is inviting a reader to extract an implicature*.

We must, and we will, say more about what constitutes a display text. However, Pratt's basic conception, her identification of literary texts as display texts and her recognition of the importance of implicature for literary effects, has much to recommend it. It is eminently argu-able from the standpoint of the philosophy of literature, as is evident from the number and the quality of later philosophical accounts that endorse in one way or another similar ideas, for example, the writings of Currie (1990), Wolterstorff (1980), and, with caveats, Walton (1990).[5] The problem with Pratt's account is that it remains joined at the hip to Grice's original, highly provisional formulation of the theory of conver-sational implicature. An unmodified Gricean position is no longer tenable, or, at least not tenable without defense against later criticisms of which Pratt was not and could not have been aware.

Although she shows no sensitivity to the important distinction between particular and general conversational implicatures, already noted by Grice in "Logic and Conversation," Pratt's emphasis on flouting makes it clear that when she refers to conversational implicatures, it is PCIs that she has in mind. Generating implicatures by flouting is some-thing particular speakers do in particular situations. Some GCIs certainly arise through flouting, but in a more standardized manner. The tautology "War is war" generally implicates that during war terrible things tend to happen by flouting the first maxim of quantity: a tautology is unin-formative because it is compatible with all possible states of affairs. Other GCIs, however, are not fully conventional because they are easily cancelable on the spot. "Some faculty attended the picnic" implicates generally "Some faculty did not attend the picnic," especially if uttered with an emphasis on "some." But the implicature can be canceled: "Some, indeed all, of the faculty attended the picnic." Or again: "Even senators, indeed especially senators who live in glass houses, should not throw stones." The "even" construction implicates a graded scale of rele-vant possibilities on which senators initially are ranked low compared to others on the scale with regard to expectations. But this implicature is immediately canceled by the "indeed especially" construction, which implicates that senators really should be expected to meet higher stand-ards. The ranking of senators is recalibrated mid-sentence. According to Levinson (2000, 6), GCIs serve to solve an informational bottleneck

problem: if information transfer were limited to what is strictly said or entailed, communication would be excruciatingly slow because of the montonic, sequential structure of statement and deductive inference. In literary discourse, PCIs should be emphasized because they do most of the important work, but the role of GCIs should not be discounted either. Unfortunately, because of challenges from the Gricean radical reformists and the Gricean skeptics, we are not free simply to follow Pratt and adopt Grice's original account of implicatures and their role in literature.

2.2.1   Some later developments in pragmatics

Although Grice was certainly cognizant of the possibility of clashes between his maxims, it has been left to neo-Gricean pragmaticists like Horn and Levinson to reconfigure and reduce the number of conversational maxims so as to eliminate redundancy and bring out important dialectical relationships between them. (Readers uninterested in these developmental details may skip to Section 2.3 without losing the argumentative thread.) Levinson in particular construes the conversational principles not as maxims but as heuristics belonging to what he styles a generative theory of "idiomaticity" (24), heuristics that guide a speaker's choice of expression so as to motivate preferred interpretations by conveying information implicitly. Consider, for example, Grice's two maxims of quantity. One enjoins the speaker to say enough to provide the hearer adequate information, the other to refrain from saying more than is needed, counting on the hearer to fill in the gaps. There is a dialectical relationship between these maxims, as there is between the first maxim of quantity (provide as much information as necessary) and the second maxim of quality (say only what you believe to be epistemologically warranted). There is also an overlap between the maxim of relevance and the maxim proscribing prolixity. Regrouping the maxims according to the respective interests of speaker and hearer in a conversation highlights these dialectical relationships and ameliorates overlap or redundancy. Horn (1989, 194) suggests a reduction to two basic principles: (1) a "hearer-oriented" Q (quantity) principle ("Make your contribution SUFFICIENT") that collects Grice's first maxim of quantity (say as much as required to inform the hearer), his second maxim of quality (say what you believe to be justified in order to convince the hearer), and his first two maxims of manner (avoid ambiguity and obscurity so as not to confuse the hearer); and (2) a "speaker-oriented" R (relation) principle ("Make your contribution NECESSARY") that collects Grice's maxim of relation (be relevant), his second maxim of quantity (be concise), and

his third and fourth maxims of manner (be brief and be orderly). The supermaxim of quality – say what you believe to be true – Horn regards as "primary and essentially unreducible."

Levinson's arrangement is similar, but recommends a distribution of some of the content of Horn's Q principle to an M (manner) principle and redesignates Horn's R principle as an I (inferential) principle that permits the speaker to count on the hearer to supply relevant missing information that may be assumed because it is common knowledge, or uncontroversial, or contextually obvious. For example, a news broadcaster need not mention that the human subject of a news story possesses a heart and kidneys, breathes air, and dines on food. But the I principle can be trumped by the M (manner) principle. Suppose an adult were to be described as drinking rather than eating his dinner. This marked mode of expression would alert the hearer that the situation may not be typical, and normal I inferences (in this case, normal inferences concerning dining) would be suspended so as to implicate something unexpected, say, that the adult is an alcoholic: according to Levinson (op. cit., 42), all (nonconventional) inferences made when extracting generalized (and, presumably, also particular) conversational implicatures employ nonmonotonic reasoning and are thus defeasible. Such use of marked expressions seems to be how Levinson is inclined to construe Grice's floutings, and when in the course of this study I make use of the Gricean expressions "flout" or "flouting," I mean to include a construal like Levinson's. If a music critic writes that on the preceding evening a certain singer produced a series of sounds that more or less comported with the score of Schubert's *Der Erlkönig* rather than just saying that he performed *Der Erlkönig*, the marked mode of expression invites extraction of the intended negative implicature by the reader of the review. In Grice's terms, the critic has generated the implicature by flouting the second maxim of quantity. In Levinson's terms, the M (manner) principle has trumped the I (inferential) principle. Levinson's Q (quantity) principle, on the other hand, has priority over the M principle: quantitative and scalar implicatures like the "some" and "even" constructions considered earlier are impervious to M and I considerations and survive unless explicitly canceled.

The priority of the M (manner) principle over the I (inferential) principle, should a model like Levinson's be adopted, would constitute a matter of considerable importance for understanding the role of implicatures in literary discourse. For it is agreed on all hands that literary, and especially poetical, language tends to be highly marked: the difference in a piece of literature between just the right word and a word

that is almost right, as Mark Twain quipped, is the difference between lightning and a lightning bug. Just the right word is often the skill-fully marked expression. Marked language subverts the usual I infer-ences and alerts readers to look for unexpected implicatures. Reverting for the moment, with Pratt, to Gricean orthodoxy, we could say that literary and poetical language and style flout the maxims of manner and relevance in the interest of generating especially extensive sets of unusual implicatures, and it is, in great part, by means of such implica-tures – both GCIs and PCIs – that a reader projects the world of a piece of fiction (Wolterstorff 1980) and constructs the make-believe game worlds authorized by a text that is used as a prop in a literary game of make-believe (Walton 1990).

With some adjustments, the points of the previous paragraph can be squared with contemporary thinking concerning these matters. As regards PCIs, consider Sperber and Wilson's (1986) radically reformist Gricean position, which demotes GCIs in importance (1986, 36–37). Grice had already taken the step of construing the conversational maxims as principles of rationality rather than as linguistic principles. Sperber and Wilson accept this move and radicalize it. Boldly reducing Grice's entire group of conversational principles to one principle of relevance (257n26), they deny that the requirement of relevance func-tions as a normative maxim at all with which a conversationalist may or may not comply. For them, relevance is not a linguistic maxim but a psychological principle of least effort, a principle with which no psychologically plausible information-processing system can choose not to comply. Defining a contextual effect either as a deductive infer-ence enabled by combining old information with new, or as a change in the cognitive salience of a piece of old information brought about by combining the old information with new, Sperber and Wilson argue that the more contextual effects a new piece of information has for an informational system and the less effort required to process these effects, the more relevant it is to that system. Implicatures access assumptions, either in encyclopedic memory or available ("manifest") in the natural and cognitive environment, that are required as premises to allow the deductive inferences to go through.

Sperber and Wilson also defend a somewhat idiosyncratic version of deductive inference, limiting it formally to binary operator elimination rules like modus ponens and simplification, but excluding binary oper-ator introduction rules such as addition. The motive, presumably, is to curb compositionality and relieve the deductive mental device of the burden of making an unmanageable number of inferences and resulting

in informational overload. Yet they enrich their deductive device by allowing informal material conceptual inference, like the inference from the premise that something is red to the conclusion that it is colored. As might be imagined, these radical moves have provoked resistance on the part of various critics who have greeted this attempted hostile takeover of pragmatics by cognitive psychology with skepticism (see the open peer reviews in Sperber and Wilson (1987) and Levinson's judicious 1989 review). Still, whatever we say about the attempt at reduction to the single rule of relevance and the reduction of implicature to deductive inference, Sperber and Wilson manage to offer some useful insights that can be detached from their more radical proposals.

In some contexts, a particular conclusion will be strongly and relatively unequivocally implicated, as when someone asks if a certain business address is safe and receives the answer that there is a police station just around the corner, implicating that it is. Adding the missing premises and deducing the conclusion here is relatively straightforward. But in literary and poetical contexts, say Sperber and Wilson (1986, 222; 1987, 751), any number of conclusions tend to be weakly implicated. For them, an apparent flout of the Gricean maxim of relevance is no flout at all, for there is no such maxim that could be flouted. Rather, a Gricean "flout" would be a locution that poses an inferential challenge to the reader. What is Charles Dickens (or his authorial persona) implicating when he says that it was the best of times and the worst of times, on its face an inconsistent statement of contrariety? What is Tolstoy (or his authorial persona) implicating when he makes the elliptical observation that all happy families are happy in the same way, while each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way? What is implicated by Conrad's marked repetition, "the horror, the horror"? Any number of things, and it is a function of interpretation to determine what they are, that is, to extract deductive consequences by generating paraphrase and by supplying assumptions and auxiliary premises. Once these consequences are drawn, the reader may deduce implicatures. There is, however, more to interpretation than paraphrase, supplying premises, and making deductions, and it is here that Sperber and Wilson become particularly suggestive.

Sperber and Wilson contrast, in my view correctly, the interpretive function of language with the descriptive, fact-stating function. Sentences may, of course, describe other sentences in a meta-language. But this is not the standard intralinguistic function. Interpretation, on the other hand, is not description: it is paraphrase or explication of content. Interpretations of sentences are sentences with related

content, and two sentences are related in content to the extent they share analytic and contextual implications. (For Sperber and Wilson, the "analytic" implications of a sentence are those that follow from it alone.) The fictional utterances of a novelist clearly are not fact stating: the reader is not supposed to believe them, but to make-believe them (Currie 1990; Walton 1990).[6] These fictional sentences may be descriptive of the world of the work, but, as fictional, they are not descriptive of the actual world.[7] At a "higher level" (Sperber and Wilson 1987, 751), however, they may function as *interpretations of truth claims* about the actual world. Readers may then go on to extract these truth claims from fictional texts, a process termed "exportation," and one that we shall take up in more detail in the next chapter. Drawing implicitly on Wittgenstein, Sperber and Wilson claim that fictional statements are cases of "showing, rather than stating that" (1987, 751). They *say nothing* about the actual world, but they may show something about it in this indirect way. On occasion, they may even function as interpretations (paraphrases) of truth claims about the world. In general, they invite us to contemplate particular situations, albeit fictive ones, thereby potentially affecting our *actual* cognitive environment by showing what is possible and, as a result, may modify our assumptions concerning the actual world. They "force the listener or reader to develop or otherwise modify mental models, scenarios, scripts, or schemas" (Sperber and Wilson 1987, 751). In this way, they, too, may have contextual effects on the reader as a member of the actual world. Pornographic fiction, I shall be arguing, is most emphatically not in the business of making such demands on the reader. Rather, it is in the business of sexual or blood-lustful arousal.

Consider now the skeptics Davis (1998) and Wierzbicka (2003). They do not deny Grice the honor of having been the first to call attention to implicature phenomena and their importance. But they reject his nonconventionalist approach, in particular, his psychosocial account of the cooperative principle and of the conversational maxims. They are particularly critical of what they see as Grice's tendency, a tendency some might accuse him of sharing with other British ordinary-language philosophers of his generation, to elevate certain conventionally entrenched modes of English usage to the status of universal rules of rationality.[8] For them, implicatures are almost entirely conventional and not, as they are for Sperber and Wilson (who may, in this regard, be placed at the opposite theoretical extreme), universal psychological phenomena. For Davis and Wierzbicka, implicatures are not only conventional, they are language

specific. Moreover, they are not generated psychosocially on the basis of allegedly universally applicable rules of rational cooperation.

The key to explaining implicature phenomena, according to Wierzbicka, lies not in pragmatics, but in a reformed semantics, albeit not the *formal* semantics of the performative hypothesis. She proposes an empirically derived set of "universal semantic primes" (2003, 8) for which, she claims, all known languages have semantic equivalents. These primes include substantives (I, YOU, SOMEONE, PEOPLE, SOMETHING/ THING, BODY); determiners (THIS, THE SAME, OTHER); quantifiers (ONE, TWO, SOME, ALL, MUCH/MANY); evaluators (GOOD, BAD); descriptors (BIG, SMALL); mental predicates (THINK, KNOW, WANT, FEEL, SEE, HEAR); speech (SAY, WORDS, TRUE); actions, events, and movement (DO, HAPPEN, MOVE); life and death (LIVE, DIE); logical concepts (NOT, MAYBE, CAN, BECAUSE, IF); intensifiers; augmentors (VERY, MORE); and a number of other categories, including those of existence and possession, time, space, taxonomy/ partonomy, and similarity. In her view, they form the core of what she terms a "Universal Semantic Metalanguage" that can be used to analyze the meaning of any speech act, including any implicature, in any language. (She denies a tenable principled distinction between semantics and pragmatics in linguistics.) Which of these universal primes figure in which speech acts and what is implicated are entirely empirical questions, and results will, as already suggested, vary from language to language and culture to culture. There is no universal set of maxims. Gricean maxims and universal principles of rationality, she claims, play (at best) a supporting role in the generation of implicature. She does not specify what this role is, but perhaps she would accept something like Levinson's heuristic role. She does, however, claim that the maxims must be relativized to specific linguistic contexts. But flouting as a signal of implicature does disappear in her picture (there is no reference to it in her index).

The following analysis of Japanese conversational practice is typical of her approach. The maxim of turn taking in Anglo-American conversation, she says (80–81), is a special case of a "more general principle of personal autonomy and of a general respect for the rights of every individual." What is considered polite is culturally relative. Using her "semantic primes," Wierzbicka paraphrases the Anglo-American maxim of turn taking as follows:

- Someone is saying something now.
- I can't say something at the same time.
- I can say something after this.

The Japanese, however, seem to operate with a very different rule. "[S]ince Japanese culture values interdependence more highly than autonomy, in Japanese conversation utterances are expected to be…a collective work of the speaker and the addressee, or, more generally, of different speakers." As a result, there are frequent interruptions in the course of conversation, with one speaker oftentimes finishing the sentences of the other. The semantic prime paraphrase of the Japanese maxim goes as follows:

- I want to say something now.
- I think you know what I want to say.
- I think you should say the same.
- I think I can say part of it; you can say another part of it.
- I think this will be good.

Wierzbicka's conclusion from this and a plethora of other examples is that there is no universal conversational maxim of turn taking, just a congeries of related, culturally specific conversational procedures, the meanings of all of which can be captured using her list of semantic primes.

Davis' attempt (1998) to generalize the anti-Gricean argument is similar in its emphasis on conventionality and second-order (meta-level) semantics, but philosophically more nuanced and sophisticated. Davis clearly regards the role of Gricean maxims as epistemological, or perhaps as heuristic: "Although the existence of conversational implicatures does not [contra Grice] depend in any way on the assumption that the speaker is observing the Cooperative Principle, conversational principles may play a role in the recognition of implicatures…Because speakers in general tend to observe the Cooperative Principle, and hearers know this in a vague and tacit sort of way, hearers tend to assume that particular speakers are cooperating, in the absence of evidence to the contrary" (1998, 127). Abiding by the maxims or, for that matter, flouting them, counts, then, as *evidence* that the CP is in force. They do not *depend* on the CP being in force. The CP, in turn, is now seen as a component of a conventional practice of implicating, rather than as an assumed necessary condition for it ("Grice's Generative Assumption"), and the assumption that it is in force helps in the recognition of implicatures, rather than making them possible. If this epistemological or heuristic reinterpretation of the conversational principles or maxims were to be adopted (something that I should not necessarily be taken to be advocating here), Pratt's point that the CP is hyperprotected in literary contexts would not,

I think, be hopelessly undermined: it could simply be said that in literary contexts whatever tendency speakers have to respect the CP convention (if that is what it is) is significantly strengthened.

Although GCIs, according to Davis, are fully conventional, their conventionality is more constrained than the conventionality of meanings assigned to words in a language. "Man" in English means a male adult human, but some other easily managed word could do this job just as effectively. GCIs, in contrast, are more like idioms, in that they are *second-order* linguistic vehicles: according to Davis' Principle of Antecedent Relation (184), what they mean is a function of the meaning of the sentence or utterance used to generate the implicature, just as the idiom "kick the bucket" (a dead metaphor) is a function of the literal meaning of the sentence. When an implicature is generated, a sentence is used to mean something else, as in the case of a metaphor. Where understanding an implicature is styled by Davis as a "cognitive" operation (presumably because some mode of inference is required), understanding a first-order word or sentence is termed a "cogitative" one (158).

There are several points to notice here. First, as Davis admits (157), his conventionality thesis applies primarily to GCIs, not PCIs. Grice denied that PCIs are conventional, and Davis allows for this (157). Yet it was PCIs that most interested Grice and that uniquely interest Sperber and Wilson. So Davis is talking past Grice and his more radical followers to some extent. PCIs, moreover, do more significant work in literary contexts than do GCIs. Because they tend to be fresh and not hackneyed, it is the PCIs that let loose the lightning bolts, as opposed to the lightning bugs. In addition, Grice probably would have agreed with his conservative followers Bach and Harnish (1979, 172) that GCIs are to *some degree* conventionalized or standardized, even if cancelable. He might well have been willing to concede to his reformatory follower Levinson (2000, 27) that "there is a diachronic path from speaker meanings [including PCIs] to utterance meanings [including GCIs] to sentence meanings," the last of which are fully conventional, as in the "inexpensive but ugly" construction (on this point, compare Horn 1989, 344). This is not so different from Davis' own developmental account of convention:

> [B]ecause the practice of steering to the right enabled drivers to drive cooperatively when it arose, the practice persisted and became a convention; because it is a convention, American drivers learned to steer to the right; because of this habit they automatically steer to the right and the convention perpetuates itself. Similarly, because

certain implicature practices enabled speakers to converse coopera-
tively in the past, the practices persisted and were transmitted to us.
[176–177]

There are, however, some GCIs that are robustly universal, or nearly
so. Here are some cases in point. The O (lower right) corner of the
Aristotelian square of opposition ("not all" = "some not") *never* lexicalizes
(forms a single word) in *any language* in the way the upper right ("No")
almost always does, as far as we know (Levinson 2000, 69). We have in
English the expression "none" (not one), just as German speakers, for
example, have "*kein*" (*nicht eins*). But we do not say "nall" for "not all,"
nor does German have any equivalent expression. The explanation for
this is that the lower-left corner (some) strongly implicates "not all,"
which is logically equivalent to "some not." Lexicalization, therefore,
may be superfluous with this implicature in place (Levinson loc. cit.).[9]
The fact that this phenomenon is robustly pan-linguistic should give us
pause. Similar considerations can be seen to apply to the modal opera-
tors alethic, epistemic, and deontic.[10]

Consider the alethic modal operators arranged on a square of oppo-
sition: at the upper left, necessary; at the upper right, impossible; at
the lower left, possible; at the lower right, possibly not. Necessary
and impossible, then, are contraries, and possible and possibly not
are sub-contraries, whereas necessary and possibly not and impos-
sible and possible are contradictories. Once again, "possible" does not
entail "possibly not," because "possible" is entailed by "necessary" and
"necessary" excludes "possibly not." But "possible" does often *implicate*
"possibly not." And, once again, the contrary of necessary lexicalizes
as "impossible" (cf. German *unmöglich*), but "possibly not" does not
lexicalize. Bypassing the epistemic modal patterns that closely parallel
the alethic ones, consider deontic modality. Here we have, clockwise
from upper left, must, must not, may not (permitted not to), and may
(A, E, O, I). In the E spot, "must not" contracts, and so lexicalizes as
"mustn't," but one does not normally say "mayn't" for "permitted
not to." (We do, however, say "needn't," which weakens Levinson's
claim.) Here there happens to be no German parallel for "mustn't," but
recall that the claim was that the expression at the E position *almost*
always lexicalizes because there is no implicature from A to E, which
are contraries.

In sum, there seems to be a range of cases from the highly convention-
alized and culture-relative implicatures emphasized by Wierzbicka to the
near-universal, apparently nonconventional sub-contrary implicatures

emphasized by Levinson. This range of cases appears to have escaped Grice's attention and led him to make stronger psychological claims for his set of maxims than warranted. Davis attempts, with questionable success, to account for these very strong pan-linguistic squares of opposition implicature and lexicalization phenomena by suggesting a linguistic version of evolutionary homoplasy or analogy (186–189): they are so many convergent solutions to communication problems faced by all human societies, just as there have occurred multiple evolutionary solutions (ocular designs) to the problem of seeing.

A number of Davis' examples of linguistic homoplasy are either too narrow to serve his purpose or are hopelessly defective. "[M]any uncontroversially conventional linguistic practices," he claims, "are common to many languages and some are nearly universal. The most obvious are certain punctuation conventions. In every language I know of," Davis continues (187):

(1) "." is used to end indicative [sic., declarative?] sentences,
(2) "?" [is used to end] interrogative sentences,
(3) "!" [is used to end] imperative sentences.

In speech, Davis says,

(4) the corresponding intonation conventions are just as widespread.
(5) Stress has a similar function in many languages, if not all.
(6) Lexically, people around the world generally use the same names for people.

If "every language I can think of" means "every human language written today," claims (1), (2), and (3) are too narrow to establish linguistic homoplasy, for punctuation was not used in Chinese, Japanese, and Korean writing until it was adopted from the West in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This would then be a case of linguistic homology, not homoplasy. If it means "every human language ever written," it is patently false. Neither ancient Chinese nor ancient Greek used the period, the question mark, or the exclamation point, and the latter two punctuation marks did not come into common use in European languages until well after the invention of printing in the fifteenth century.[11]

If "intonation conventions" in (4) means the "intonational sentence melodies" associated with declaratives, imperatives, and interrogatives, it is false: this varies widely among languages. (5) may have the strongest

claim to truth: sentence stress is similar in very many languages, but even it is not universal.[12] It is difficult to believe that (6) refers to proper names, for that would make it obviously false. It may, however, refer to generic family names that function as proper names, names like "Father," "Mother," "Sister," etc. For all I know, this is true, if "lexical" use means taking a one-word form.

Davis and Wierzbicka's most telling criticisms of Grice, I believe, are the ones directed at his explanation of tautological implicatures. For Grice, as we have seen, expressions like "war is war" or "enough is enough" or "what will be will be" generate implicatures because they flout the first maxim of quantity, the maxim of informativeness: since a tautology is compatible with all states of affairs, it is completely uninformative. Skillfully exploiting her intimate acquaintance with a number of foreign languages, including Polish (her native language), French, Italian, German, and Russian, as well as ideographic languages like Japanese and Chinese, Wierzbicka is able to make a convincing case that a variety of non-English speakers would not use these tautologies (or perhaps any tautology) to motivate the implicatures they motivate in English, and that as a result, the generation of these tautology implicatures may, to some degree, be an artifact of the English language (and indeed of Anglo-American culture), and may have little to do with the flouting of an allegedly universal maxim of informativeness. For example, no speaker of French would translate "war is war" as "*la guerre est la guerre,*" but rather as "*c'est la guerre*" ("that's war"), which is not a tautology, though another French expression, "*guerre, c'est la guerre*" might be judged to have a stronger claim to tautological status. Conversely, in English one does not say "life is life," but "that's life," whereas in Russian "life is life" is perfectly acceptable, though there it has a somewhat different meaning, suggesting "life has to go on," rather than the sober, more cynical world-wisdom of the English locution (ibid., 394). This difference seems culture specific as much as it is language specific. Sometimes expressions of this sort express an attitude of tolerance, as in "boys will be boys" (not a tautology), but sometimes not, as in "enough is enough" or "business is business" (both tautologies). The different senses of these English expressions seem not to be the result of Gricean psychological working out motivated by the flouting of a maxim of informativeness, but rather seem to function as familiar set phrases peculiar to a language and culture.[13] The English expression "what's done is done" (a tautology), Wierzbicka informs us (437), has no tautological counterparts in the languages of eastern or southern Europe.

Whatever their flaws, Wierzbicka and Davis' language- and culture-relativity points do offer a useful caution for any student of implicature, and one that I intend to take to heart. Indeed, as we will have occasion to observe, there is an important nexus between the emergence of pornographic narrative fiction as a distinct genre in the modern West and the rise of the modern English novel, a highly culture-specific phenomenon. As such, the implicatures a reader of an English novel is expected to make are likely also to be, at least to some degree, culture specific. Still, care must be exercised regarding the issue of culture relativity, for Grice was fully aware that not all conversation was cooperative in his sense, say in contexts of diplomacy, interrogation, or espionage. Bach and Harnish (1979, 300n28), for example, argue in defense of Grice that his theory is conditional: *if* the CP is in force, *then* implicatures can be explained on the basis of floutings of conversational maxims. Adducing evidence, as did Eleanor Ochs Keenan (1976), that the Malagasy regularly withhold information from one another in their conversational practice in seeming violation of the first maxim of quantity, they claim, is no refutation of Grice if their conversational practice is not judged cooperative *in the Gricean sense*. But this would seem to reinforce the Davis and Wierzbicka case against the Gricean claim of a culture-unspecific rational basis for his conversational principles. Do we want to say that the Malagasy are by nature irrational? Indeed, Wierzbicka (2003, 100) adduces the Javanese as a similar counterexample: it is Javanese conversational practice, not an opting out of the CP, to "avoid gratuitous truth," a style of social élan termed by them *étok-étok*. Its analysis in terms of her semantic primes is:

- I don't want to say what I think/know.
- I don't have to say this.
- I can say something else.

"European culture," on the other hand, says Wierzbicka (103), "has traditionally placed a great premium not only on 'knowing' but also saying what is knowable (or true)."[14] The semantic prime analysis of the European "convention" regarding truth (her version of Grice's first maxim of quality) goes as follows:

- It is bad to say what is not true.
- It is good to say what is true.

2.3   Displaying, showing, presenting, and simulation

All the theorists of pragmatics discussed so far recognize that some-
thing special occurs with fictional narrative texts, something that they
alternatively characterize as "displaying" (Pratt), "showing" (Sperber
and Wilson), or "presenting" (Wolterstorff). Display texts report[15] or,
if fictional, only purport to report: they invite the audience to make-
believe that they are reporting facts. But they do more. Display texts, as
Pratt maintains, seek to induce an audience to share a speaker's wonder,
amusement, terror, or admiration by producing in that audience affective
and imaginative involvement. What is it to "share" by way of "affective
and imaginative involvement"? One answer to this question on offer,
namely Currie's, is, I believe, the best one: since we adopt an attitude of
make-belief regarding fictional texts, we simulate the characters' mental
states, just as we do with existent persons. The display text does not just
describe them. But there is also an added twist noted by Currie. Display
texts also induce readers to simulate the mental states of a narrator or
authorial persona. When an authorial persona simulates the mental
states of subjects of his narrative or characters in his story, there will be a
"collapse of iterativity" (Currie 1995b, 158–159; 1997, 69), which results
in the simulation by the reader of the mental states of these subjects or
characters. In the cases of belief and desire, iterativity does not collapse.
When we believe that someone else believes that a third person believes
something or that a third person desires something, we do not auto-
matically simulate belief or simulate desire of that thing. But to simulate
someone simulating someone else is just to simulate the mental states of
the first-level subject of simulation.

Currie offers a speculative but plausible evolutionary account of this
decoupling of simulation and belief. Simulation in literature, Currie
suggests, is an application of a more general ability for strategy testing
that we already possess because it has been adaptive. It can be quite
helpful to be able to "read the mind" of another conspecific, say a
competitor, by simulating his mental states without actually believing
what the competitor believes; for belief, when coupled with desires
or pro-attitudes, tends to give rise to action. Taking some such action
precipitously without trying it out first in imagination and generating
concomitant emotional responses could be dangerous or even disas-
trous. I want to understand my competitor's mental states, but I may
well not choose to act on type-identical ones of my own.

The dispute in cognitive psychology and the philosophy of mind
between simulationists and theory-theorists is sufficiently familiar to

require only the briefest reprise here. The dispute concerns the means by which we understand the mental states of others. Theory-theorists argue that we deploy, at least implicitly, a discursive theory that makes use of psychological generalizations and that we infer conclusions concerning the mental states of others using these generalizations as premises. The simulationists, on the other hand, argue that we put ourselves in the position of the person whose mental states we are trying to understand, determine what we would do in that position, and then conclude that the other person would do the same, assuming reasonable intraspecies psychological similarity. A mixed approach is also possible, and indeed plausible (recall the discussion of folk psychology as dispositional explanation in Chapter 1). One might conclude discursively that another person had certain beliefs and desires, which the simulator could then adopt off-line, that is, with connections to perceptual input and motor output suspended but with functional connections to the system of affective appraisal intact, then run the simulation, and then conclude that the person was disposed to take certain actions.

Affective and imaginative involvement in fictional literature depends heavily on implicature, even if does not exclusively so depend. Sperber and Wilson say (1987, 751) that in "good fiction," "successful first-level communication [i.e., descriptive communication about the world of the work] is complemented by successful second-level communication," that is, communication by means of "showing," which includes using a multiplicity of weak implicatures. Wolterstorff (1980, 115) says that fictional "narrations are never wholly explicit. Good ones are far from that." Leaving "nothing to the imagination" in a fiction, says Currie (1995a, 153), "would usually be considered a stylistic vice...What the author explicitly says and what can be inferred from it...will set signposts and boundaries. But if these are all we have to go by in a fiction, it will seem dull and lifeless." Meanings that are conveyed neither by what is said nor by what can be inferred from what is said are implicated.

However engaging it may be, imaginative involvement remains distinct from experience: simulation stays off-line. But there is an alleged exception. "Over the whole range of literature," claims John Skow (1994, quoted in Currie 1995a, 154n12), "only erotica functions differently. If it works, sexual arousal is real, not imaginary." "Erotica" can be, as it seems here to be, a euphemism for pornography, literature whose primary aim is sexual arousal. In pornography, little or nothing is left to the imagination in two distinct ways. First, pornography is sexually explicit. But second, for reasons I shall be providing in the next chapter, pornography discourages imaginative engagement because engagement is a *potential*

hindrance to arousal. A pornographic literary text presents itself as a display text, which, as we will see, is how it originally derives its license explicitly to display, to show, to present. Yet a pornographic text does not deliver on the commitments undertaken by the author of a display text, the sharing of wonder, amusement, terror, or admiration by way of affective and imaginative involvement, for this is likely to interfere with its purpose of on-line arousal, a purpose that remains covert (with a wink and a nod). In the passage excerpted, Skow happens to be explaining his inability to become imaginatively engaged by a certain novel containing homosexually erotic scenes because of his heterosexually determined inability to be aroused by it. I question the implicit claim that sexual arousal is required for a heterosexual to become imaginatively engaged by a piece of homosexual erotica, provided that piece of erotica really is a display text and not a piece of pornography. If the text is pornographic, imaginative involvement will fail to occur just as surely as it would if the fictional descriptions were heterosexual and not homosexual. These are topics we shall take up in detail in the next chapter.

2.4   Fiction, thought experimentation, and "perceptive equilibrium"

"Perceptive equilibrium" is an expression coined by Martha Nussbaum (1990) to indicate an extended[16] and enriched version of the reflective equilibrium that is supposed to emerge from philosophical reflection and thought experimentation. First proposed by Nelson Goodman (1983) in his discussions of the justification of inductive inference and then taken up and applied to moral deliberation by John Rawls (1971), reflective equilibrium is a mental state of balance between normative principles and judgments of particular cases. "*A rule is amended,*" says Goodman, "*if it yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it violates a rule we are unwilling to amend*" (1983, 64, emphasis original). Nussbaum takes exception to Rawls' exclusion from moral deliberation of those judgments "given when we are upset or frightened" (1990, 177), judgments, that is, made under conditions of emotional arousal. To be sure, emotional stress can distort and even on occasion subvert considered judgment. But any wholesale exclusion of emotion will deprive us of a certain sensitivity to salience, an important, perhaps even indispensible, mode of access to that which is deserving of attention in our deliberations. Since emotion is a mode of perception,[17] the perception of something as bearing on the perceiver's weal or woe, it is particulars (or particular circumstances) that emotions make salient.

Sometimes these judgments of particular cases are termed by philosophers "intuitions," not only because of the historical connection in the philosophical literature between intuition and the perception of particulars, but also because intuitions present themselves as self-validating: they do not, at least initially, claim discursive support. They are supposed to plead, if not to make, their own case. Their function is to serve as independent tests of commitment to candidate principles. If an intuition clashes with a well-entrenched principle, it is likely to be rejected. But an intuition may also pose a challenge because it somehow seems correct, or it feels right, or perhaps it just "makes sense." To say it *feels* right is to say that it appears positively valent, and that is to say, at least in part, that it (or its content) is emotionally perceived that way. When philosophers construct thought experiments to test intuitions, one thing they do is make certain features of these imagined particulars salient. But even the most ingenious of these philosophers' examples, including virtuoso performances like Dennett's "Where Am I?" or Williams' "Are Persons Bodies?" or Thomson's "A Defense of Abortion" are, relatively speaking, spare in perceptual detail, and their engagement of the emotions is, as a result, not very robust. If it is perceptive and not merely reflective equilibrium in morality we are after, we might be well served, as Nussbaum suggests, by turning to narrative fiction.[18]

If pieces of fiction are display texts, we can well see why this should be so. The aim of the author of a display text, recall, is to "produce in hearers not only belief but also an imaginative and affective involvement in the state of affairs he is representing and an evaluative stance toward it." The reader is to "share the author's wonder, amusement, terror, or admiration," a requirement, as I argued earlier, that depends on make-believe and simulation. But why the reliance on implicature? First, as we have seen, even if fictional worlds are not, like possible worlds, maximal, such that every possible state of affairs either obtains or does not obtain, not every fact that obtains within a fictional world can be stated or even acquired by way of logical implication from what is stated. But implicature, I believe, also carries a deeper significance in literary discourse, one that can be gleaned from Nussbaum's observation (1990a, 156) that situations in real life "do not present themselves with duty labels on them." In fact, they don't present themselves with any descriptive labels at all. The task facing the novelist is a delicate one. On the one hand, he must direct the reader's attention to salient particulars, thereby providing more guidance than does the brute, unlabeled actual world. His text must be "criterially prefocused" (Carroll 1997), that is, organized in such a way as to direct attention to detail that is important,

a literary technique that has something in common with the emotionally gripping cinematic close-up. On the other hand, not everything should be "said," or even implied by what is said, on pain of losing requisite emotional involvement of scanning for detail and thereby failing even to pursue, much less achieve, perceptive equilibrium.

The emotions evolved to detect real-world saliences, situations in which something is at stake for the perceiver (Lazarus 1991). If they are to be engaged, even off-line, re-creation of the real-world circumstances in which the emotions evolved is required. Implicature, I propose, helps solve this problem. The novelist provides Currie's signposts, but only implicates much of what is to be conveyed. This allows the emotions of the reader their proper function: the detection of saliences as yet *descriptively unlabeled*. The "weak" implicatures of poetic language, recall, "force the listener or reader to develop or otherwise modify mental models, scenarios, scripts, or schemas" (Sperber and Wilson 1987, 751). Mental models, scenarios, and schemas are various terms for analog, nonconceptual representations, representations whose contents are either perceptual or imagistic. (For extended discussion of nonconceptual representations and references, see my 2007, chapters 2 and 5; see also Gunther 2003.)

2.4.1   Achieving perceptive equilibrium: a literary test case[19]

"For what except fear could move a cold heart," Schopenhauer asks rhetorically (1841/1965, 66) when charging Kant's universalizability criterion for moral maxims with a covert egoism. Using Kant's own words against him, Schopenhauer asserts (90) that the real reason a universal law to lie cannot even be thought (much less willed) has nothing to do with the logic of universalizability, but everything to do with fear of consequences: under such a law, says Kant (1785/1981, 4:403) "I should be paid *in the same coin* [*mich dochmit gleicher Münze bezahlen würden;* Schopenhauer's emphasis]." Schopenhauer took Kant the theoretical philosopher as a mentor, but Kant the moral philosopher he despised. Rare,[20] I think, is the contemporary philosopher who would be inclined to take Schopenhauer's side in this particular dispute, for all the eloquence of his moral philosophy of compassion. There is, however, a literary work that powerfully challenges the intuitions of even the most committed deontologist.

It is an established fact that late in life, decades after the publication of *Moby-Dick*, Herman Melville took an interest in the philosophy of Schopenhauer, acquiring copies of major works that were then first becoming available in English.[21] This interest could well have influenced

the composition of his posthumously published small masterpiece, *Billy Budd*, begun in 1886 and left not quite completed at his death in 1891. Melville's novella is plausibly interpreted as a literary thought experiment that weighs the morality of duty against the morality of compassion. I shall sketch the outlines of the tale only briefly, but include for proper effect a few samplings of Melville's description of salient detail.

An eighteenth-century merchantman sailor of unknown origins impressed into the Royal Navy, Billy Budd is respected and beloved by all who know him. Here is Melville's description (1988, 10):

> Cast in a mold peculiar to the finest examples of those Englishmen in whom the Saxon strain would seem not at all to partake of any admixture of the Norman or other admixture, he showed in face that humane look of reposeful good nature which the Greek sculptor in some instances gave his heroic strong man, Hercules. But this again was subtly modified by another and pervasive quality. The ear, small and shapely, the arch of the foot, the curve in the mouth and nostril, even the indurated hand dyed to the orange-tawny of the toucan's bill, a hand telling alike of the halyard and the tar bucket; but, above all, something in the mobile expression, and every chance attitude and movement, something suggestive of a mother eminently favored by Love and the Graces; all this indicated a lineage in direct contradiction to his lot.

Beloved by all but one, that is. In John Claggart,[22] the master-at-arms of the warship *Bellipotent*, Billy inspires hatred. Why? Claggart suffers from envy – of that there is no doubt. But he is not motivated by envy alone, for his animus overrides his self-interest. It is sheer malice, even unto his own destruction, that drives Claggart. And malice, says Schopenhauer, is one of human nature's three fundamental motivational springs, the other two being the egoism with which he had charged Kant's moral philosophy and compassion or loving kindness, which he made the cornerstone of his own. Motivated by malice, Claggart plots Billy's destruction.

The late eighteenth century was a time of great concern for the Royal Navy. Not only was Great Britain faced with the Napoleonic threat, but a serious mutiny had recently occurred. As a result, British naval officers were on the lookout for the slightest sign of insubordination among their crews. Claggart dispatches a henchman in an attempt to involve Billy in a nonexistent mutiny plot or, failing that, to gain evidence of a tolerant attitude toward the hatching of such a plot. When Billy angrily sends

the man packing, but does not, because of his forbearing nature, report him, Claggart determines to act. He goes to the captain, the Honorable Edward Fairfax Vere, and falsely accuses Billy of plotting mutiny.

Not merely so titled, Captain Vere really is honorable. A man of not inconsiderable learning and culture, Vere inspires total respect in the officers and men under his command. "With nothing of that literary taste which heeds less the thing conveyed than the vehicle, his bias was toward those books to which every serious mind of superior order occupying any active post of authority naturally inclines" (25). In the eyes of his subordinates, Vere compares favorably as a warrior with the likes of Sir Horatio, Lord Nelson, even if some believe that "there is a queer streak of the pedantic running through him" (26). By a chance early association with a line referring to a "starry Vere" in Andrew Marvell's poem "Appleton House," Captain Vere had acquired the nickname "Starry," which had somehow stuck for life. Melville's borrowing from Marvell's poem seems entirely unmotivated: it is the sort of marked occurrence of which the student of implicature takes notice. For one thing, Marvell's "starry Vere" is a woman, not a man. She is Anne Vere Fairfax, the mother of Mary Fairfax (1638–1704), whom Marvell had tutored (Hayford and Sealts 1962, 152–153). Melville quotes only four lines from the very long poem:

> This 'tis to have been from the first
> In a domestic heaven nursed,
> Under the discipline severe
> Of Fairfax and the starry Vere.

Fairfax, it is clear, is young Mary's father. The captain's name does suggest an elided version of "discipline severe." But why Melville named his captain "Vere" and adopted the Fairfax surname and the "starry" appellation from the mother of Marvell's student remain mysterious.

Melville's acquaintance with German philosophy, which he knew largely second-hand as filtered through the writings of the Transcendentalists Coleridge and Emerson, was spotty. He did, however, have some acquaintance with the philosophy of Kant, for he mentions him in his novels *Redburn* and *Mardi*. In the latter, according to Pochmann (1978, 437), the character Bardianna, who is inclined to utter "whimsicalities and profundities" (Pochmann 1978, 437), stands in for Kant. Melville's attitude toward German philosophy seems to have been complex: skeptical and satirical, but clearly fascinated: "'Then I

had rather be a fool than a wise man. I love all men who dive. Any fish can swim near the surface, but it takes a great whale to go downstairs five miles or more' ... For Melville, Kant was one of those thought-divers, and there is not an instance among the dozens of passages that belittle his disciples of all stripes which impugns Kant's own sincerity or depreciates his philosophic abilities" (ibid., 759n258). Melville's personal log records a sea voyage during which a series of long "metaphysical" conversations took place with George J. Adler, a young professor of German at New York University, and one or two other learned passengers. "Hegel, Schlegel, Kant, &c. were discussed," Melville writes, "under the influence of the whiskey." Any opportunity for discussion "got—all of us—riding on the German horse again" (Leyda 1951, I, 322–323). It is not unreasonable, if speculative, to imagine that on one of his German equestrian adventures Melville encountered what is perhaps the most famous pronouncement of Kant, another impressive character with a queer streak of the pedantic[23] running through him: "Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe: the starry sky above and the moral law within." As we soon learn, the moral law surely resides within Starry Vere.

Skeptical of the charge against Billy, Vere thinks he has Claggart, whom he has long despised, exactly where he wants him. Bearing false witness, like many an offense in the Royal Navy of the day, was a capital offense. Summoning Billy to his cabin, he earnestly bids him answer his accuser. But Melville, characteristically implicating an Old Testament theme, has planted a fatal defect within this fortune-favored son of his imagination: the young man becomes completely tongue-tied when overexcited:

> With the measured step and calm collected air of an asylum physician approaching in the public hall some patient beginning to show indications of a coming paroxysm, Claggart deliberately advanced within short range of Billy and, mesmerically looking him in the eye, briefly recapitulated the accusation ... the accuser's eyes, removing not as yet from the blue dilated ones, underwent a phenomenal change, their wonted rich violet color blurring into a muddy purple. *Those lights of human intelligence, losing human expression, were gelidly protruding like the alien eyes of certain uncatalogued creatures of the deep. The first mesmeric glance was one of serpent fascination; the last was as the paralyzing lurch of the torpedo fish* [70, emphasis mine].[24]

Unable to defend himself verbally, Billy strikes out in mute frustration, knocking Claggart to the ground and killing him. In the excellent 1962

black-and-white film version of the story directed by Peter Ustinov (who also stars as Vere), Claggart (Robert Ryan) smiles up at Billy (Terence Stamp) in evil triumph as he dies, an added touch not indicated in Melville's text.

Now Billy's fate is played out with the inexorability of a Greek tragedy, also prefigured in Melville's description of Billy. Having so much as struck, not to say killed, a superior, Billy must pay with his life. There is the option, widely favored by the officers and men aboard the *Bellipotent*, of suspending disposition of the case pending judgment by a higher officer because of the extenuating circumstances, but Vere, despite his fondness for the young man, will have none of it. "'I doubt not'," he says, "'from the clash of military duty with moral scruple – scruple vitalized by compassion. For the compassion, how can I otherwise than share it. But, mindful of paramount obligations, I strive against scruples that may tend to enervate decision'" (84). He is the commanding officer of the *Bellipotent*. He wears the King's uniform with its insignia of rank, the King's "buttons." It is his duty to pronounce judgment and carry out sentence, particularly in those parlous times. And so he does, but only after closeting himself with Billy for some time. As to what is said, Melville gives only this clue: "The first to encounter Captain Vere in act of leaving the compartment was the senior lieutenant. The face he beheld, for the moment one expressive of the agony of the strong, was to that officer, though a man of fifty, a startling revelation. That the condemned one suffered less than he who mainly had effected the condemnation was apparently indicated by the former's exclamation": just before he hangs, Billy calls out "God bless Captain Vere!" An expression of loving kindness? So it would seem. Marked language implicating another biblical, this time a New Testament, theme? Perhaps. What Melville explicitly tells us is this: "At the pronounced words and the spontaneous echo that voluminously rebounded them, Captain Vere, either through stoic self-control or a sort of momentary paralysis induced by emotional shock, stood erectly rigid as a musket in the ship armorer's rack" (101). Mortally wounded in a subsequent engagement, the dying Vere was heard by his attendants to murmur, "Billy Budd, Billy Budd."

Is Melville's tale intended to function as a Schopenhauerian "refutation" of the Kantian moral philosophy? Of course not, though Melville was rather dismissive of the pretensions of some Transcendentalist metaphysics and ethics: "Utilitarians, – the every-day world's people themselves, far transcend those inferior Transcendentalists by their own incomprehensible worldly maxims" (quoted in Parker 1996, II, 69). The tale, I submit, is intended to test intuitions and affect perceptive

equilibrium. It may have even resulted from Melville's testing of his own intuitions against Schopenhauer's attack on Kantian moral philosophy. What we can say with some certainty is that Melville supplies us with any number of implicatures that force us "to develop or otherwise modify mental models, scenarios, scripts, or schemas." The story, that is, functions as a descriptively richly detailed intuitive test case, a literary moral thought experiment. Nowhere in Melville's tale are there any statements of philosophical moral principles, be they those of Kant or Schopenhauer. But implicated they surely are.

2.5   Summary and conclusion

A pragmatics–theoretical analysis of pornographic fictional literature is a special application of a pragmatics theoretical approach to fictional literature. This chapter began with an attempt to unpack the relevant theory. Section 2.2 provided a sketch of Grice's original theory, as well as an account of its subsequent expansion and modification by subsequent writers, both neo-Gricean and anti-Gricean. Section 2.3 took up the characteristic literary functions of displaying, showing, and presenting and demonstrated their connection with simulation theory in the philosophy of mind. Section 2.4 explored the important link between these topics and the role of literature in achieving extended reflective or perceptive equilibrium in moral thinking by taking a look at Herman Melville's *Billy Budd*. At the end of Section 2.3, I provided a hint as to the manner of application of the theoretical apparatus of pragmatics to pornographic literature. The following chapter will expand that hint into a fully explicit account.

3
Pornographic Fiction, Implicature, and Imaginative Resistance

3.1   Introduction and chapter conspectus

Having discussed issues of methodology in Chapter 1 and introduced the requisite philosophy of language in Chapter 2, we are now ready to pursue the central arguments of the book, the arguments to the conclusions that (1) the Reformation in its Puritan form was, in Weber's language, an "adequate cause" of the emergence of pornographic narrative fiction as a distinct genre in the modern West and (2) that this genre constitutes a self-deceptive vehicle for sexual or blood-lustful arousal. (Here we shall confine ourselves to sexual pornography. The phenomenon of violent pornography will be addressed in Chapter 4.) An adequate cause according to Weber, it is essential to recall, is a causal condition that is neither necessary nor sufficient, but raises the probability of some event's occurrence. We begin in Section 3.2 by considering the uneasy relationship between pornographic literature and Anglo-American law. Section 3.3 takes up Erich Auerbach's influential idea of *Stiltrennung*, or "separation of styles," in the literature of the West and its relations to Christianity, Protestant Christianity, the modern novel, and pornographic writing. Section 3.4 explicitly ties the concerns of the present chapter to the issues of conversational implicature and perceptive equilibrium broached in Chapter 2 by introducing the important notion of imaginative resistance. Section 3.5 uses results gleaned in these discussions to frame John Cleland's *Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure* as the first genuinely pornographic Western literary work. Section 3.6 considers the relationship between pornography and prostitution, and Section 3.7 summarizes the chapter and poses a question concerning pornography as cultural construction or psychological universal, a question taken up in detail in the following and final chapter.

3.2   Pornography and the law

Since *Regina v. Hicklin* in 1868, which applied Lord Cockburn's standard of depravation and corruption of "those whose minds are open to such immoral influences" (Kendrick 1987, 121), pornography has posed a challenge to British and American law. At its least helpful, the legal process has yielded Justice Potter Stewart's exasperated expostulation in *Jacobellis v. Ohio* (1964), "I shall not today attempt further to define [hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it." At its most helpful, the legal process has produced the *Roth v. United States* (1957), *Memoirs v. Massachusetts* (1966), and *Miller v. California* (1973) decisions, the last of which held that material that (1) appeals to the prurient interest of an average person using community standards; (2) depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct or excretory functions specifically defined by applicable state law; and (3) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, is not protected by the First Amendment. This, in effect, identifies hard-core pornography as obscene expression, sexual or scatological, that appeals to prurient interest and that lacks, when taken as a whole, serious value and is, as a result, subject to censorship.

The *Roth*, *Memoirs*, and *Miller* decisions have worked well enough in practice for First Amendment advocates. Indeed, *Memoirs* was instrumental in placing the written word beyond the reach of American censorship. Nevertheless, Anglo-American legal theory has yielded conceptual analyses that are less than satisfactory. First, there are issues of clarity and consistency. The *Miller v. California* criteria do little to clarify in any satisfactory way the conceptual relationship between obscenity and pornography and are capable of supporting inconsistent definitions. For British legal theorist Norman St. John-Stevas (1974, 2) the pornographic is a proper subset of the obscene, namely obscene material that is intended to function as an aphrodisiac. For American legal theorist Richard Posner (1992, 351), the obscene is a proper subset of the pornographic, namely, pornographic representation or presentation that the law may legitimately suppress: on this view, legally proscribed obscenity just is "pure" pornography (see Feinberg 1985, 174). Second, what is it that makes an appeal to *sexual* interest an appeal to *prurient* interest? Is an appeal to sexual interest improper per se? If so, any number of sexually explicit novels from Lawrence to Miller and beyond might be classed as pornographic. But that seems wrong. Or must the sexual interest be "lewd," "lascivious," "wanton," or "morbid"? But that is just

to say it is prurient. We seem to be caught in a circle of interdefinable terms. Third, what is it for a work to lack serious value? This constitutes a stumbling block as much for the literary aesthete as for the literary moralist. Who would deny that John Cleland's *Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure* (1748–1749) sports a fine literary style and inculcates the then-emerging middle-class values of conjugal love, constancy, and companionate marriage? Yet if this work cannot be caught up as pornographic, our net, I believe, needs some mending.

In my view, the pornographic is not a proper subset of the obscene, nor is the obscene a proper subset of the pornographic. Rather, the pornographic and the obscene are logically independent, albeit genealogically related, categories. Consider a comment of D. H. Lawrence, whose opinions on such matters are generally worth attention: "Boccaccio at his hottest seems to me less pornographical than [Richardson's] *Pamela* or *Clarissa Harlowe* or even [Charlotte Brontë's] *Jane Eyre*" (1953, 73). I offer at this juncture no unqualified endorsement of this rather startling claim, but there is a nugget of wisdom buried in it to which I shall return. It does, however, suggest, in my view correctly, that the obscene and the pornographic admit of degrees and that they may vary independently. If Lawrence is right, a pornographic work may be minimally obscene or not obscene at all – say, for example, selected portions of text, including picture captions intended to be witty, in an issue of *Playboy Magazine* – and an obscene work may not be in the least pornographic. Henry Miller's *Tropic of Cancer* is sexually obscene, but arguably not pornographic.

If it is correct to say that the concept of pornography carves out a distinct linguistic/psychological/physiological/moral category, this concept has not been available at all times and places. Indeed, it is arguable that no such concept was available in the West, or perhaps anywhere, until the nineteenth century. The word "pornography" is not to be found in Dr. Samuel Johnson's dictionary, and it does not appear in any English dictionary until 1867. No version of the word seems to have been printed in any modern Western language until 1806, when it appeared in French in Etienne-Gabriel Peignot's *Critical Dictionary of the Principal Suppressed and Censored Books* (Hunt 1993a, 14). The English cognate word "pornographer" first appeared in print in a translation from the German "*Pornographen*" in art historian P. O. Müller's 1850 treatise, *Handbuch der Archäologie der Kunst*. Müller coined the term to refer to the producers of the sexually explicit ancient Pompeian frescoes and statues that had recently been unearthed, and to the producers of other ancient risqué representations. Müller, in turn, seems to have

derived the term from a lone usage in the *Deipnosophistai* ("Learned Banquet"), a work by the second-century chronicler Athenaeus, who called artists who painted portraits of courtesans and also decorated their faces '*pornographoi*' (whore-painters) (Kendrick 1987, 11). (Neither this word nor any Greek word for pornography appears in Liddell and Scott's standard *Greek Lexicon*. But '*porne*' [prostitute, street walker] and '*porneia*' [fornication, idolatry] can be found.) The Pauline nexus in the word *porneia* between fornication (cf. Latin *fornix*: brothel) and idolatry is suggestive. But there is no reason at all to think that Athenaeus' "*pornographoi*" or Müller's derivation carried anything like the moral freight of the contemporary expression "pornographer." Indeed, as late as the latter half of the eighteenth century, French writer Restif de la Bretonne (1734–1806) adopted the title "The Pornographer" as an honorific intended to reflect his continuing concern with prostitution as a public nuisance and to draw attention to the methods he proposed for palliating its undesirable social effects. Even sober-minded nineteenth-century reformers Alexandre-Jean-Baptiste Parent-Duchâlatet (1790–1836) in France, William Acton (1814–1875) in England, and William W. Sanger, M.D. (no dates available) in the United States were thought of as "pornographers" because they wrote about prostitutes and their lives.

Perhaps, then, we should go easy on Justice Stewart. Pornography may be difficult to define, but, as Nietzsche's example demonstrates, that which resists definition because of its history may be approached by way of genealogy. That is what I propose now to do.

3.3 Literary *Stiltrennung* (separation of styles) and Christianity

As Müller's coinage shows, the ancient Greeks and Romans produced representations – literary, pictorial, and sculptural – that modern Westerners have considered obscene and indeed pornographic. In his *The History of Prostitution* (1859, 79–80), Sanger asserts:

> In no modern civilized society is it allowed to present immodest images to the eye, or to utter immodest words in the ear of females or youth. At Rome the contrary was the rule. The walls of respectable houses were covered with paintings, of which one hardly dares in our times to mention the subjects. Lascivious frescoes and lewd sculptures, such as would be seized in modern countries by the police, filled the halls of the most virtuous Roman citizens and nobles...All

of these were daily exposed to the eyes of children and young girls, who, as Propertius says, were not allowed to remain novices in any infamy.

How is it that "the most virtuous Roman citizens and nobles" lived comfortably in the midst of these lewd and lascivious words and images? The answer is that sex had not yet been moralized in the Christian manner. Moral virtue was certainly of paramount importance for the Romans, as it was for the ancient Greeks. But an ancient Roman would have been perplexed by the Christian notion of sexual ardor or "concupiscence" as morally problematic in itself.[1] The Augustan Romans did negatively sanction a range of behaviors as *stuprum*, or debauchery, including adultery, which meant having sexual relations with someone else's wife, and extramarital sex with a woman who was a matron, or *mater familias*, that is, a woman who held a place as wife, mother, daughter, or widow in a respectable family. They also prohibited rape, though the line between rape and seduction was not always sharply delineated, and they required that any long-term liaison be legitimated by marriage or concubinage. This legitimization requirement, by the way, did not extend to slaves, stage performers, prostitutes, procuresses, or women convicted of adultery. Men and women were allowed only one spouse at a time, but men were permitted to keep as many concubines as they wished and could afford (see Foucault 1985, 23; Moses 1993; Rousselle 1983/1988, ch. 5).

Obscenity occupied a well-established proper place in the literature of the ancient world, namely in comedy, satire, farce, and social critique, all of which fell within what Erich Auerbach in his classic work *Mimesis* termed the "low" style. Epic and tragedy, on the other hand, which treated weighty issues of fate and moral responsibility, belonged to the high style, from which unseemly topics of sex and scatology, as well as vulgar modes of expression, were excluded. Although this convention of "separation of styles" continued well beyond ancient times into the Middle Ages and beyond to Shakespeare and even to the eighteenth-century French classicists, it eventually broke down under Judeo-Christian influence:[2] the stories of the Old and New Testaments, says Auerbach, stand as examples of treatment of subjects of high moral seriousness, but in the context of characters drawn from ordinary life: carpenters, fishermen, and even prostitutes, the sort of characters that in the ancient pagan world would have constituted subject matter suitable only for the low style. Auerbach's distinction between the high and low styles does bear an undeniable similarity to Nietzsche's ancient aristocratic value hierarchy of good versus bad, and the breakdown of the convention

of the separation of styles, as I shall argue, also led to an inversion of values, but an inversion distinct from that described by Nietzsche, and one that does not carry his implications of disease and degeneration in the evolution (or devolution) of good/evil from good/bad.

3.3.1 The separation of styles and value inversion

The soaring rhetoric and learned philology of Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morals* make for scintillating reading, but as Christian historiography, its accuracy is questionable. Available evidence suggests that rather than slaves and rabble, many of the earliest converts to Christianity after the death of Jesus were middle- and upper-class members of the Jewish diaspora that had been created by Roman religious oppression in ancient Israel (Meeks 1993, 20; Stark 1996, 59). These largely Greek-speaking people found themselves in a position not unlike that of contemporary diaspora Jews whose bond with the Jewish people is more ethnic and cultural than zealously religious, people, namely, to whom Reform Judaism has appealed. The indefatigable proselytizer and earliest Gospel writer Paul offered these early diaspora Jews a doctrine that was at the time still viewed as a brand of Reform Judaism, whereby they could maintain a sense of Jewish identity without immersion in the Hebrew language and the assumption of the heavy yoke of orthodox Jewish law and practice.

In addition, women played a particularly important role in the spread of the Christian faith because early Christianity elevated them above the lowly status to which they were in the main relegated in the ancient world (Stark 1996, ch. 5). It is true that Greco-Roman Stoicism had, from the first, adopted a radically egalitarian stance, exceptional in its day, with regard to the dignity of the rational individual, whatever a person's gender or social status, a stance that is particularly evident in the writings of Musonius Rufus (30–100 C.E). But philosophy in the ancient world, as Hume (or his interlocutor "friend") observes in section XI of the *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, was the province of the relatively small minority of the highly educated and had limited appeal for the masses. If Christianity, as Nietzsche quipped in the preface to *Beyond Good and Evil*, is Platonism for the people, scarcely less is Pauline Christianity Greco-Roman Stoicism, or at least Stoic ethics, if not Stoic metaphysics, for the people.[3] The Stoic influence in Paul's version of the teaching of Jesus is discernible in its emphasis on the equal standing of the individual, Jew and Gentile alike, in the sight of God (Rom. 10:12), on the universal human capacity to seek and find truth (conditional, of course, on the acceptance of Christian faith),[4] and, above all, on the importance of the state of the heart or the "inward man" (Rom. 7:22).[5]

Female mortality rates were very high in both ancient Greece and Rome as a result of abortion and the exposure of female infants who were in any way sickly or malformed. If family resources were limited, female children were considered dispensable, while males, who were eligible for the military, for professional or political work, or to function as heirs, were not. Given these practices, male-to-female ratios among pagan Romans became quite unbalanced, creating a shortage of marriageable women. This, in turn, caused an ever-declining birth rate, a major factor in the increasing enfeeblement of the Roman Empire. In expanding Christian communities in Rome, Corinth, and Thessalonica, communities to which Paul addressed his epistles, proscriptions against abortion and infanticide worked to slow, arrest, and even reverse these developments. Given the natural appeal of Christianity to women, it was the wife in most mixed marriages who was the Christian and the husband pagan, and many of these women managed to get their husbands to convert. Much of the motivation for conversion, then, was not the *ressentiment* of the weak and impotent rabble, as Nietzsche would have it, but a variety of factors, including a desire for ethnic identity among diaspora Jews and a desire for domestic harmony between mixed couples belonging to these communities.

In the context of the ancient separation of styles, female tragic heroines are unusual, but hardly unheard of: witness Sophocles' Antigone, among others. But the idea of constructing a tragedy that turned on the *sexual* virtue of a fallen unmarried or unprotected female character, a high tragic drama like Samuel Richardson's *Clarissa* or Thomas Hardy's *Tess of the D'Urbervilles*,[6] would have been unthinkable. Even Shakespeare, still working under the influence of the separation of styles, presented the most familiar such Roman tale, the rape of Lucretia (a married woman), in the form of a long narrative poem, not a tragic drama.[7] It is arguable that only in Benjamin Britten's twentieth-century opera was the story finally invested with tragic gravitas. By the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it seems clear, a momentous literary value inversion had occurred.

Both *Clarissa* and *Tess* are exemplary of the point at issue. Homer's *Iliad* is a high-style epic, if anything is. Its heroes are the male aristocratic warriors Agamemnon, Achilles, Odysseus, Patroclus, Ajax, Diomedes, and Hector. And the women? They are of comparatively little importance. They are uxorial property, like Helen, or spoils of war, like Chryseis and Briseis, or figures of fear and lamentation, like Andromache and Hecuba, or the querulous unheeded voice of impending doom, Cassandra. Issues of male sexual comportment are passed over in silence

as irrelevant, and female (as opposed to wifely) sexual comportment is of no interest at all. Achilles' withdrawal to his tent from battle is motivated by Agamemnon's taking of Briseis, whom Achilles regards as his rightfully awarded spoil. Directing attention to Chryseis, Briseis, or even Helen as characters of moral significance in themselves would have been inappropriate. The *Odyssey* is, in its essentials, no different. Formidable female figures like Circé (who becomes the lover of the married hero Odysseus) and the Sirens are counterintuitive agents with superhuman powers and, as a result, fall into a category entirely different from that of ordinary women. (Circé transforms Odysseus' men into pigs, no doubt an authorial comment on their distinctly nonheroic status.) Compare Cantarella (1987, 26–28) on both works: "Even Andromache, one of the characters frequently cited to illustrate ancient female power, is no less under the thumb of her husband than Penelope is under the thumb of her son in the absence of Odysseus … The Homeric woman is not only subordinate but also the victim of a fundamentally misogynist ideology … Weak, fickle, opportunistic and perhaps even incapable of lasting feelings, [woman] was destined for marriage."

All this is to say that the male heroes stand high in the Homeric hierarchy of virtue, women as property, low. Again, Cantarella (1987, 31): "The Homeric wife had to accept more than physical punishment. She had to tolerate her husband's relations with a concubine and other women, such as prisoners of war … and household slaves."[8] Clarissa and Tess, on the other hand, are unmarried tragic heroines both, whose strength of will and fineness of spirit humble their adversaries. (Hardy subtitled his novel *A Pure Woman*.) In these dramas, the violated but pure woman stands high, while the aristocratic figure, now portrayed as a dissolute libertine and rake, a Robert Lovelace or an Alec D'Urberville, stands low. The aristocrat as exploitative cad is a familiar figure in the novels of Jane Austen: he is the condescending and rapacious gallant excoriated by the early feminist writer Mary Wollstonecraft in *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792/1967). Wollstonecraft pronounced the products of the system of women's education of her time beings "only fit for a seraglio" (1792/1967, 35). How did this literary value inversion occur?

3.3.2 The separation of styles and Protestantism

To be sure, pre-Reformation Christianity did work, as Auerbach claims, to undermine the separation of styles, and it did, in some respects, raise the status of women. But it also encouraged considerable misogyny, along with a patronizing division within the courtly love tradition of women into inaccessible madonnas and accessible, but dangerous,

harlots. It also condoned libertine practices among its nobility, and even, at some times and in certain places, tolerated concubinage and whoring among its nominally celibate clergy (Leonard 1965, I, 66n1). During the Middle Ages, the Church was remarkably tolerant, not only of weakness of the flesh, but also of obscene expression, provided it was not put to the service of heresy. Even the infamous List of Prohibited Books compiled by the Counter-Reformation Council of Trent consisted almost entirely of texts heretical rather than obscene. Christianity may, as Auerbach claims, have weakened the old separation of styles, but a new separation rose to stand beside it, one motivated by the distinction between the sacred and the profane. Obscenity, even sexually arousing obscenity, could be tolerated if confined to the realm of the profane and if they constituted no threat to orthodoxy. And tolerated, to a degree, they were.

The advent of Protestantism, particularly the Puritanism that appeared in England, a development that, significantly, coincided with the rise of the modern English novel and its "formal realism" (Watt 2001, 32), profoundly altered this situation. The novel of formal realism describes characters, actions, and locales at a level of detail that had been considered inappropriate in literature of the high style.[9] As a result, some attributed to Richardson a "keyhole view of life" (Watt 2001, 200).[10] One of the important changes wrought by Protestantism was an alteration in the conception of the marital relationship: there arose, first in England and America but then in other lands where the middle class and its "Protestant ethic" of "this-" or "inner-worldly asceticism" (Weber 1904–1905/1996) gained ascendancy, newly invigorated forms of the ideals of companionate marriage and "affective individualism,"[11] ideals which until then, if realized at all, had been realized only partially and sporadically (see also Tocqueville 1835–1840/2007). According to these ideals, marriage was to be based on an emotional tie between the individuals involved, and not on the consolidation of wealth achieved by advantageous family alliances.[12] We now take such a view for granted, especially in the United States, but it really is a fairly recent and novel development. In the ancient world, even in late Republican and Augustan ancient Rome, where husband and wife were expected to establish and maintain ties of affection, marriages among members of the ruling and literate classes tended to be arranged and negotiated, and the role of a wife was to bear a man's legitimate children and heirs.[13]

This is actually a point of some controversy among scholars. Treggiari (1991, 120) sees in ancient Rome evidence of the existence of genuine companionate marriage: "It may be postulated, though not proved,

that a growth of individualism and an increased tendency to seek for personal happiness in private life had led to heightened expectations of emotional rewards of marriage around the time of Cicero" (106–43 B.C.E.). Harper (2013, 64–65) informs us that under Augustan law,

> The wife brought a dowry into the marriage, but it was not a gift to the husband; the property of husband and wife were, legally, distinct funds, and the married pair could not even make significant gifts to one another. All of these rules had the effect of making the wife a partner of her husband, not a ward…companionate marriage flourished in part because the Roman wife was perched, legally, between her old family and her new.[14]

Others (Bradley 1991; Cantarella 1987, 2002) are skeptical:

> Roman marriage was not a matter of personal choice, but a family matter, involving the economic interests and the social expectations and ambitions of the two families arranging the marriage…The Romans did not marry for love. Marriage was a practice often dictated by necessity, whose main function was the creation of children. [Cantarella 2002, 274][15]

Cantarella refers here specifically to marital practices in force during the Principate, or early empire period, which extends from Augustus until the end of the second century C.E., the time at which the status of Roman women is generally agreed to have reached its zenith. Garnsey and Saller (1987) attempt to be evenhanded and, like Bradley, recognize that "arranged marriages do not preclude marital affection." However, they allow that

> [it] might still be claimed that emphasis on the sentimental attachment of husband and wife increased during the Principate, but decisive evidence is hard to find. Pliny's letters [presumably Pliny the Younger (61–112 C.E.)] demonstrate that marriages were still arranged with a view to family honour and advancement much more than to the compatibility of the couple or the wife's happiness. [133]

And Treggiari is compelled to admit that although Romans subscribed to an ideal of monogamy for both men and women, "Roman practice was mostly against it" (235). It is easy to see why. *Univirae* (once-married

women) were prized, but rare, and most Roman women were monogamous only serially. Most Roman men of means were not monogamous at all beyond their legal limitation to marriage to one wife at a time. Harper (op. cit.) reminds us that "the double standard reigned almost universally" (64), that "a woman's range of motion remained always defined by her position among men" (65), that "one who corrupts a wedded wife steals what belongs to another man" (44), that "when sex with a decent woman was not an open provocation of another man, attitudes might be less exacting" (43), and that "adultery was, from its origins, a crime against man, not God, and it never lost this sense in Roman society" (43).

Because I make no examination of the relevant primary Roman texts, I shall leave resolution of this controversy to the social historians, though it should be clear which view I find the more compelling. But the following facts are worthy of note. By late Republican times, the Romans had developed a very peculiar version of surrogate motherhood (see Cantarella 2002, 269–274). No less a personage than Cato the Younger (95–46 B.C.E.), the "Honest Abe" of ancient Rome (if we may believe Hume in the famous section X on miracles in the *Enquiry*), divorced his beloved wife Martia so that she could marry and bear the child of one of his childless friends, Hortensius, who, presumably, also divorced his barren wife for this very purpose. When Hortensius died not too long thereafter, Martia promptly remarried Cato. Remarkably, when Martia was delivered over to Hortensius, she was already pregnant by Cato! But that was no problem. Ancient Romans designated a pregnant woman a "*venter*" (literally an abdomen), a technical, if somewhat disparaging, term that referred both to the woman and to the fetus growing within her. A tendentious translation might be "incubator." A husband who divorced a pregnant woman had the power to name a person as *curator* (or *custor*) *ventris* (custodian of the fetus), who was charged with ensuring that the woman did not have an abortion (Cantarella 2002, 278).

More astoundingly, Hortensius had first asked for the hand of Portia, Cato's married daughter. Cato did have the "paternal power" (*patria potestas*) to break her marriage to Bibulus so as to accede to Hortensius' request, but he was understandably reluctant to visit this unhappiness on his daughter. So he turned to his ever-supportive wife. Notably, though Cato was willing to farm Martia out (so to speak) to Hortenius, he felt obliged first to consult Philippus, his father-in-law, who had paternal power over her.[16] Philippus acceded to Cato's proposal with decisive alacrity. No one knows what Martia thought of all this (though after she had remarried him, she did implore Cato not to do it again), but

none of it seemed to disturb any of the men. Martia was Cato's marital "companion" in some sense, but not very recognizably in our sense. Most remarkably of all, no one seems to have viewed the whole affair as eccentric or even unusual.

Despite the apparent differences between Roman and modern conceptions, it would nevertheless be a mistake to see in the early modern emergence of the ideals of companionate marriage and affective individualism any tendency to equalize the status of husband and wife. The husband remained the lord of the family. But modern companionate marriage did attempt to accomplish something to that point in time widely believed, both by ancient and earlier Christian society, to be impossible, or nearly so. It attempted to combine in one person the roles of lover and friend, to direct the emotions of *eros* and *philia*, sexual passion and loving friendship, toward one and the same individual.[17] In so doing, it accorded to women, or contributed to a movement to accord to them, the moral status of persons as opposed to property.[18] This development may have been influenced, as Ian Watt (2001) has suggested it was, by Protestant moral and political Enlightenment thinkers such as Locke and Kant. Locke was considered the philosophical spokesperson of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 that led to the ascendancy of the middle class and its values in England.

Note that eighteenth-century England saw the inception of the first sustained abolitionist movements directed against prostitution, which at the time was legal or, if illegal, at least tolerated with a wink and a nod in most of Europe. The Reverend Martin Madan, a learned and munificently philanthropic English eighteenth-century divine, put forward in a massive three-volume work entitled *Thelyphthora or a Treatise on Female Ruin* (1781/2009) the modest proposal that polygamy (really, polygyny) be legalized in England. This, he thought, would force men to take responsibility for the women they sexually exploited, thereby putting put an end to prostitution, which, in his lexicon, included the aristocratic custom of keeping mistresses, a practice savagely attacked earlier in the century by Defoe in his novel *Roxanna* (1724). Drawing on immense biblical and theological learning, along with an enviable command of Greek, Latin, and Hebrew, Madan argued that laws against polygamy were a Catholic hoax and that neither the Old Testament nor the teaching of Jesus explicitly prohibited the practice. As might be expected, Madan gained few adherents in England or anywhere else in Christendom, in part because many saw Protestantism, especially Puritanism and Calvinism, as the consummate realization of the Pauline vision of Christianity. And it was Paul, the earliest New Testament writer,

who stated in I Cor. 7:2, "let each man have his own wife and each woman her own husband."

As we observed (following Auerbach) in Section 3.3, with the breakdown of the separation of styles, literary obscenity was deprived of its traditional venues in the low style. In eighteenth-century France, it maintained, until the revolution and its immediate aftermath, its old alliance with satire, farce, bawdy, and social critique, and its more recent alliance with atheistic, materialist, and anarchist philosophy and propaganda, as in the works of the Marquis de Sade. This material, liberally laced with gleeful sacrilege, scenes of demented cruelty, and rants against any and all humanly imposed moral sanctions that interfered with the dictates of "Nature," is antinomian in inspiration and designed to shock more than it is to arouse. Similar observations apply to the erotic works of Pietro de Aretino, the early sixteenth-century Florentine and Venetian writer, works that are considered by at least one scholar, namely Moulton (2000, 121), with whom I stand in agreement, to be the progenitors of modern pornography, albeit not themselves pornographic, or at least not pornographic without qualification (see note 24).

But in England, literary obscenity could no longer be relegated to the low style, nor could it be tolerated as safely quarantined in the mundane. The this- or inner-worldly asceticism of Protestantism in its Puritan form required that every Christian male, as Max Weber explained in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, be (so to speak) something of a monk all his life. Every Christian, moreover, deprived of confession, indulgences, and the mediation of the clergy, was forced to confront directly his or her maker, a being who enjoyed unrestricted access to the hidden recesses of each human soul.[19] After centuries of doctrinal battles constituting a history far more fractious than the historiography written by the victors would indicate, the Pauline vision of the "inward man" had now come into its own: the believer is preserved from sin, not by conformity to law externally imposed, but by the law inscribed in his heart. The sinner in deed, or even in thought, stands condemned by his own conscience. All concupiscence, not only expressed in action, but even willfully imagined,[20] stood condemned. This forced arousal by the sexually obscene into the psychological underground, but in doing so rendered it an object of close attention and, indeed, of obsession:[21] the poor soul who was tempted to use such materials as an aphrodisiac would be required to engage in an elaborate self-deception so as to convince himself, and so (in his mind) his God, that his thoughts were not impure and not sinful. This self-deception was aided and abetted by the conventions of the very form

that was perhaps the most important literary legacy of the collapse of the separation of styles, namely the modern Western novel of formal realism, which provided for its reader a private, "keyhole" perspective on the quotidian doings of characters, a perspective that was unprecedented in its detail and in the intimacy of its gaze, and therefore easily exploited.[22] This keyhole perspective licensed the inclusion of sexual and scatological elements heretofore thought too unseemly to be explicitly mentioned in serious literature. The realistic novel is serious business, not low-style farce, and so is pornography. This is not to deny any and all confluence of humor and pornography.[23] It is, however, to maintain that pornographic humor tends to provoke the complicit snigger rather than the derisive guffaw. Thus did the sexually explicit find a new home in the new form of the novel and thus, I submit, was modern sexual pornographic narrative fiction born from the obscene.[24] This account, it should be clear, is a folk-psychological explanation of the sort discussed in the first chapter, an explanation involving beliefs, desires, and actions of ideal types and one presenting the "logic of the social situation" of the production and consumption of pornographic fictional narrative. Inspired by acts of pornographic reading of obscene texts (see the discussion of Pepys later), seventeenth-century readers and writers whose values were strongly derivative of Puritanism came to desire virtual sexual gratification that evaded the proscriptions of conscience and came to recognize a demand for such virtual gratification. By combining a "high-style" literary form newly on hand – the novel of formal realism – with literary forms already in existence – namely "low-style" forms of obscene satire – these readers and writers forged an effective means whereby this desire could be satisfied and this demand met. The result was modern pornographic fiction. Still, I would not claim that the pornographic is all-or-nothing. Whether a work is pornographic is a question both of the historical applicability of the term and the extent of presence in the work of genuinely pornographic material.

In my view, our descriptor "pornographic" is not properly applied *without qualification* to works like the *Sonetti Lussuriosi* and *Ragionamenti* of Aretino, or even Michel Millot and Jean L'Ange's sexually explicit *L'Ecole des Filles* (*The School of Venus*, 1655), which is not in any sense a narrative but a brief and fundamentally comic, and therefore low-style, sexual how-to dramatic dialogue between two female characters, one experienced and one naive. The *Sonetti* were written as a protest against a politically authoritarian act: the papal imprisonment of Aretino's friend and colleague, Raimondi (Moulton 2000, 123), and the *Ragionamenti*

mounted an unsparing attack on clerical corruption. *L'Ecole des Filles* invites interpretation as an obscene expression of rebellion against the newly imposed strictures of the Counter-Reformation and the edicts of the Council of Trent rather than as an attempt to titillate readers. Apparently closest of all to modern pornographic fiction is *La Puttana Errante* (*The Wandering Whore*), often mistakenly attributed to Aretino (Moulton 2000, 150). This item shares its title with an entirely different work in verse written by Lorenzo Veniero, a disciple and imitator of Aretino. Foxon (1965, 27) considers the former work "the first imaginative prose work to deal directly and exclusively with physical sexual satisfaction." The author and date of composition of the work are unknown, and it is also a dialogue, not a novel. Finally, like much pre-pornographic sexually transgressive literature, Nicolas Chorier's notorious *Satyra Sotadica* (*Satyric Dialogues*, 1660) also satirizes societal mores and displays some of the nihilism, cynicism, and strongly anticlerical attitudes that were later to be associated with the name of Sade. Since Foxon terms this work the "classic" of French pornography, it invites further scrutiny.

There is no doubt that Chorier's *Satyra* is sexually explicit as can be. But it is just too pompously physiologically learned (if occasionally grossly misinformed), too irreverent, too full of recherché allusions to ancient classical erotica, and too downright funny[25] to qualify as pornographic, for these qualities all militate against arousal, sexual or bloodlustful, which is pornography's characteristic vocation.[26] Picture, if you will, the following scene.

Ottavia, one of Chorier's two female conversationalists, has just that day married Caviceo. His concupiscence being too great to brook any delay, even unto the wedding night, Caviceo has prevailed upon a somewhat reluctant Ottavia to grant him husbandly access immediately. But at that moment Ottavia's mother enters the room. A dialogue ensues from which the following is excerpted.

"'Well, Caviceo, what dost thou think of thy wife?'"

"'I think a lot of her and am desperately in love with her; nor could Love itself add anything to my over burning love. But by all the Gods and goddesses that preside over, and assist at, weddings! Allow me, mother, to act the husband, and, since it is your good will that I should possess so comely and charming a wife, do permit me to fulfill the duty of a husband.'"

Ottavia's mother smiles. "'Now, really, these unruly fits of thy passion are altogether out of place, they lack dignity. Wait until night; that which is diferred [sic] becomes only the sweeter.'"

"'Ah! mother, have pity on your son-in-law: indeed Ottavia herself does not refuse to heal the wound she has made in my heart.'"

This touches the maternal heart. "'Doest thou hear,'" she says, turning to Ottavia, "'wilt thou cure this sickness? wilt thou serve him as medicine?'" Directing the couple to a more private location, she admonishes Caviceo to limit himself to a single act of intercourse in consideration of the imminent arrival of the wedding guests. She instructs that her daughter, "'satisfy his desire but once only; dart out as soon as he has finished.' ... 'if thou actest otherwise,'" she warns, "'thou shalt incur my anger.'"

Having locked in the happy couple, mom "retired in a fit of laughter." But almost immediately, she was back, having forgotten to warn Caviceo to take care, in view of the impending social event, not to dishevel Ottavia's clothes too badly. By then, however, both actors are dishabille. "'I was naked up to the navel,'" says Ottavia, "'and he had unsheathed the virile weapons ... Caviceo darted backwards with his threatening mentule; my mother beheld it.'" "'Oh, the monster!' said she, 'but be courageous, daughter'" (Chorier 87–91). "'The name of mentule was given to that tendon,'" Tullia, the elder and more experienced of the two conversationalists, sententiously explains, "'because the power of creating sound reason in us [by driving out virginity] has been imparted to it by Nature'" (102). Amusing, even if not exactly politically correct by our standards.

In this scene, not at all atypical, farcical humor derails ardor: the aim is not arousal, but the risible. But all is not farce, for Chorier's *Dialogues*, like the satirically obscene works of Sade to follow, has a disturbing morality to teach – in this case the knavish morality of Plato's Thrasymachus. This moral teaching is aided and abetted by the work's obscene content. "'Honor and dishonor,'" says Tullia, "'does not consist in the things themselves, but in the use we make of them ... Ottavia, dost thou wish to live well and happy? Imagine that everything is permitted, and prohibited, to thee at the same time. Let that be the great maxim in that state of life, which the law of marriage has assigned of thee ... Whatever thou canst conveniently do, without any scandal to thy husband or family, be fully persuaded that it is permitted to thee; but what thou canst not safely do, doubt not of its being entirely prohibited.

"'Above me is religion, which, while occupying the first rank in politics, has no place in the order of nature ... First, it is meet that married women should be pious or appear to be so. Now, the one that is truly pious and makes no show of her devotion does not carry the day over her who at least offers the appearance of piety without having any. A

wife's supreme happiness depends on the judgment her husband has formed of her. She who is made much of by her husband, although destitute of value, is happy and fortunate; whereas, she who is hated and despised by her husband, be she ever so handsome and virtuous, has a very sad life indeed.

"'Draw a veil of holiness over thy life. He that gives his evil actions an appearance of probity is far more useful to civil life, than he whose good actions are blackened by disgrace. Assume a certain modesty which thou canst easily cast aside, whenever that becomes necessary.'" And cast it aside they do in a variety of adulterous debaucheries described in detail by Chorier. Such teaching Tullia learned at the knee of Ottavia's mother, Sempronia: "'Every woman with a judicious mind should hold for certain that she was born for her husband's pleasures, and that other men were born for hers. The former thou owest to thy husband, the latter, to thyself'" (133–137). Says Tullia, "'Honorable is what honorable seems. Men inquire into absolutely nothing except what falls under their senses. Assume an honorable appearance. Whoever carefully keeps it up, is considered every where an honorable man'" (262–263). Is all this mere window dressing intended to drape the sexually arousing scenes? I think not. Chorier's moral world is closer to Sade's than it is to Cleland's world of English middle-class morality.

The same may be said of another notorious French book published nearly a century later (1748), the Marquis d'Argens' *Thérèse the Philosopher*, designated by Darnton (1995, 87) as "the flowering of a vast literature peculiar to the Old Regime." *Thérèse the Philosopher* fell into the category of books termed at the time "philosophical," a warning label indicating content that was obscene, sacrilegious, libelous, or metaphysically materialist and atheistic. Obscene, sacrilegious, and materialist *Thérèse the Philosopher* certainly is, but it abjures atheism in favor of deism, combined with the genial hedonistic materialism of La Mettrie, rather than the ferocious nihilistic materialism of Sade.[27] Like the *Satyra*, the book is sexually graphic, but once again, arousal seems not to be the principal aim of the book. Satirical humor and the ridicule of clergy are the order of the day. The following scene narrated by Thérèse's confidant Mme. Bois-Laurier is typical:

> I barely got into the room when three Capuchins stormed in. Not used to morsels as tasty as I seemed to be, the three threw themselves at me like a pack of starving dogs. I was at the moment standing, with one foot lifted onto a chair, tying up one of my garters. One of them, with a reddish beard and the filthiest breath I've ever smelled, rubbed

up to kiss me on the mouth, slobbering his tongue all over me while he was doing it. A second was grabbing a handful of my tits. And I felt the face of the third, as he lifted up my skirt from my behind, rough and coarse, like horsehair, rubbing up against the cheeks of my ass and heading for the center, and then this same thing, like a horse's tail, pressed between my thighs, rummaging among the interesting obstacles in the area. [d'Argens 1970, 108–109]

And what reader could contain his mirth long enough to find this montage sexually arousing:

We all got to tumbling around in on a big old bed. Naturally, our usually hidden parts were shown off. Mine were found admirable for their perspective. Minette's lover, indeed, set up shop, placing Minette on the edge of the bed, bared her, entered her, and then begged her to sing. Sweet Minette, after a moment's consideration, struck up an air in three-quarter time. The lover drew back, then pushed in, and pushed out again, keeping in time with the music. His lips syncopated with the beat that his thrusting thighs marked. I watched, I listened, with tears of laughter, lying on the same bed. It was all going beautifully when voluptuous Minette, approaching her climax, slipped out of key, hit a false note, and lost her beat, all at once. "B flat, B flat!" cried her lover. "Not B natural, B flat! Ah, you bitch," he cried again, our lover of fine music, "now look what you have done. You damn near broke my eardrum. And you threw the old driveshaft right out of the cradle. Here, look here," he shouted at her now, drawing away from her, "just look at the result of your goddam [sic] B natural!" Sure enough, the poor devil had lost his fire, the metronome that beat the measure had become all unwound…Throughout the whole strange scene, I had barely been able to get my breath through all my laughter. Really now, has anyone ever sung to such a purpose, has anyone ever kept time with such an unlikely instrument? And has anyone ever been able to imagine a B natural instead of a B flat to have such an unnerving effect upon a man? What sensitivity! [op. cit., 100–102]

Yet whatever its display of mordant humor and its traffic with musical mordents, as "philosophical," the book accords metaphysics pride of place. "Graphic as it was," says Darnton (op. cit., 93),

– and the full text includes plenty of anatomical detail – it conveyed a metaphysical message…Father Dirrag seduced Eradice[28] by persuading

> her to take one side of the [Cartesian ontologically dualist] dichotomy
> for the other – that is, to experience her orgasm as a spiritual epiphany.
> He got away with the ultimate stroke of priestcraft, all the more deli-
> cious to the trained, anti-clerical eye of the eighteenth-century reader
> in that it was accompanied by materialist philosophizing dressed up
> as Christianity.

The materialism of *Thérèse the Philosopher*, Darnton continues (103),
"could be seen as a mortal threat to the body as well as the soul. Its rhet-
oric, therefore, proceeds from the assumption that the reader … must
be reassured. His defenses must be broken down in the same way as
Thérèse's. He must be made complicit." Material of this sort, I submit,
functions as propaganda more than as pornography, a distinction we
shall take up in detail in Section 3.4. Darnton is no doubt correct when
he remarks that "the combination of sex and philosophy in *Thérèse the
Philosopher* is bound to astonish the modern reader" (90–91). It did not,
however, astonish the author of *Philosophy in the Bedroom*, who admired
the work as "the only book before his own to have 'achieved happy
results from the combining of lust and impiety'" (d'Argens, 1970, xii,
translator's introduction). Reasonably enough, Cleland's *Memoirs* is not
his model.

   According to Foxon's determination, the earliest English reference
to a "pornographic" book is Samuel Pepys' now-famous diary entry of
January 13, 1668. Pepys records that having furtively perused *L'Ecole des
Filles*, a "mighty lewd book," in a London bookstall on an earlier occa-
sion, he returned to buy it. After an evening of merrymaking with his
friends, Pepys read the book, masturbated, and then, in a paroxysm of
shame, burned it, having deliberately purchased a cheap, plainly bound
edition he never intended to place in his library. It is difficult to imagine
a male French reader of the time, even a French bourgeois, engaging
in such an elaborate charade. The inception of English pornographic
writing may well have resulted, at least in part, from acts of *reading*:
obscene texts were imported into England from Italy and France, read,
domesticated, imitated, and then exported. Just about any text can be
read pornographically if its content is conducive to it and the requi-
site attitudes are in place.[29] Pornographic texts, on the other hand, are
designed to be read this way.[30] A reader, as well as a writer, may violate
or even opt out of the maxims of literary conversation, maxims like the
maxim of quantity (Do not provide more detailed information than is
necessary) or those of manner, including politeness. By the eighteenth
century, England had shifted from a major importer to a major exporter

of written pornographic material, most of it modeled on Cleland's *Memoirs*. Indeed, according to Hunt (1993a, 21), *Memoirs* is the "single most read pornographic novel of all time." If my analysis of the nature and provenance of pornographic fiction is convincing, this should not be surprising.

Foxon finds it "revealing to see Pepys in his role as the first great middle class civil servant" and asks us "to remember that it has probably been the apparently respectable (and often scholarly) professional man who has provided the bulk of the demand for pornography over the years" (1965, 50). By the mid-eighteenth century, Protestant ideas of affective individualism (autonomy and choice of marriage partner based on compatibility, not considerations of consolidation of property and wealth) had been imported into France by the *philosophes*. In addition, the middle class and its values had by then gained a firm economic foothold there.[31] After the French Revolution, Napoleon's armies forced these ideas on much of continental Europe under the aegis of the Napoleonic Code, "which protected the personal rights of a woman until she was twenty-one and made procuration a criminal offense" (Bullough and Bullough 1987, 266).[32] As a result, the ideals of companionate marriage and affective individualism gained considerable hold across large parts of Western Europe. Once established, the Protestant ethic gradually sloughed off its dependence on religion for its continued grip on the middle-class mentality: the Weberian "iron cage" of modern capitalist society had been forged.[33] Still, in Germany, in the French First Estate, and in Catholic Austro-Hungary where the influence of the Enlightenment remained particularly weak (see Kann 1960, 69–70, 81, 91, 116, 119, 147, 293), the older aristocratic value system with its misogyny and double standard continued to exert considerable influence. For reasons already given and more about to be given, I hypothesize a direct relationship between the appetite for pornography of a segment of society and its commitment to the Protestant ethic.

The extreme susceptibility of the early modern obscene works just discussed to pornographic reading makes them transitional or proto-pornographic forms[34] standing between the low-style obscene and modern pornography, at least when viewed with hindsight. Once born, however, pornographic fiction has sought to distance itself from its origins by softening or even eliminating the shock of the obscene, for arousal had usurped the place of shock as the primary goal. With the collapse of the separation of styles and the rise of the modern novel, the function of pornographic writing in the West characteristically has been to enable imaginative indulgence in the morally forbidden while avoiding what

was at one time a crushing awareness of sin, today perhaps merely a mildly disquieting sense of making an objectifying misuse, scarcely recognized as such, of a person in imagination. To accomplish this end, pornography had to perform two offices. First, it had to subvert reflection and not jolt it into activity, for too much reflection on sexual beings as persons with inner lives, as affective individualism now presented women, would interfere with, or at least complicate, arousal;[35] but also, it needed to supply just enough of a plain brown wrapping of material that was *not* obscene to allow for a simulacrum of "value," literary, artistic, or scientific, so as to get past the newly strengthened internal censor.

This "bad conscience," this fear of mental seduction by printed material, is, I believe, evident in the lines quoted by Dr. Sanger (1859/1972, 21) from eighteenth-century English poet Alexander Pope as a warning to his reader (and, perhaps unconsciously, to himself) in the introduction to his treatise on prostitution:

> Vice is a monster of so frightful mien,
>
> As, to be hated, needs but be seen;
>
> Yet seen too oft, familiar with her face,
>
> We first endure, then pity, then embrace.

The chronicler courts the danger of becoming a customer, even if only in imagination. But even virtual consumption exacts its costs. The costs to the ferociously repressive Puritan conscience of *actual* consumption, detailed with merciless honesty by W. Somerset Maugham in the masterful story "Rain," are, of course, considerably greater.

3.3.3   *Stiltrennung* and the origins of the modern novel in France

Following Watts, we had observed that the *Stiltrennung* continued to make its presence felt well into the eighteenth century in the works of the French classicists Corneille and Racine. But the work generally considered the first great modern Western novel, *The Princess of Clèves* (1678), was produced not by a man in England, but by a woman, Marie-Madeleine de Lafayette, in the salons of Paris (DeJean 1991, 66). The salons were courtly organizations consisting mainly, though not entirely, of aristocrats who wrote, read out loud, and critiqued the literary works produced by its members. Notable is the fact that salon members were exclusively women. Equally notable is the fact that in the France of the era, the writing of novels was considered an activity particularly

suited to women. The proper venue for serious male imaginative literary expression remained verse. Having gained some notoriety for acumen and bravery during the pre-revolutionary civil war in France between the nobles and the crown known as the *Fronde* (1648–1653), women attempted to revivify these virtues in their literary activity. The court of King Louis XIV dubbed these women *précieuses*, that is, female intellectuals or, more pejoratively, bluestockings, and saw them as subversive of male authority.

Subversive they were, not of aristocratic virtues as such, like bravery, honesty, and loyalty, but of the French aristocratic society that fell short of realizing them. But, interestingly enough, their work continued to adhere to the conventions of the *Stiltrennung*, displaying little or none of the characteristics Watt identifies with formal realism. A look at *The Princess of Clèves* confirms this. "Ambition and gallantry," says the critical authorial voice, "were the sole occupation of the court, busying men and women alike" (10). The princess is fond of her doting husband, but does not reciprocate his passionate attachment to her. Her love is directed toward another aristocrat, one Monsieur de Nemours. Although the princess's behavior remains entirely proper, her husband, who is understandably jealous, comes to believe her guilty of infidelity. This precipitates in him a mortal illness. Believing herself responsible for her husband's subsequent death, the princess declines Nemours' offer of marriage and retires to a convent.

Whatever its undeniable merits, this work clearly does not comply with Watt's definition of formal realism. It lacks, for the most part, the "writing to the minute," the detailed, up-close description of ongoing action so prized by Richardson.[36] Peeking through the princess's noble sentiments, moreover, is the cynical view of love and marriage widely held in the pre-Protestant Christian world:[37] "[B]ut do men keep their love in these permanent unions," the princess asks herself. "Ought I to expect a miracle in my case? Monsieur de Clèves was perhaps the only man in the world capable of keeping his love after marriage. My fate forbade my enjoying this blessing. Perhaps, too, his love only survived because he found none in me" (103). The princess fears the inevitable cooling of Nemours' affections should she marry him. "One may make reproaches to a lover," she observes, "but can a woman reproach her husband for ceasing to love her?" "The fading of his love after marriage, and all the pangs of jealousy which she regarded as certain," the authorial voice informs us, "showed her the misery to which she would expose herself; but she saw too that she had assumed an impossible task in undertaking to resist the most lovable of men, whom she loved and who loved her,

in a manner which offended neither virtue nor propriety" (107). Lastly, and most importantly, *The Princess of Clèves* also lacks, for the most part, the rich descriptive detail required to effect "perceptive equilibrium": we finish the novel with little sense of any distinctive physical qualities imparting a unique stamp to the characters or locales.

3.4   Imaginative resistance, implicature, and perceptive equilibrium

> Whatever speculative errors may be found in the polite writings of any age or country, they detract but little from the value of those compositions…But a very violent effort is requisite to change our judgment of manners…And where a man is confident of the rectitude of that moral standard, by which he judges, he is justly jealous of it, and will not pervert the sentiments of his heart for a moment, in complaisance to any writer whatsoever. [Hume 1985, 246–247]

The distinction between belief and make-belief broached in the previous chapter is a familiar and highly intuitive one: children make use of it in their games and in their appropriation of game props. As both Currie and Walton have emphasized, the distinction is also central to the reading of fictive texts. But here there is the asymmetry noted by Hume in "Of the Standard of Taste." I can't believe that six fictional characters can go off in search of an author, but I can easily make-believe that this occurs when reading or viewing a performance of Pirandello's play. Similarly, I can't believe that overthrowing the U.S. government and murdering and/or enslaving the non-Aryan population is morally acceptable. But I also have difficulty *make-believing* it when reading Andrew Macdonald's *The Turner Diaries*. Why?

One response is the assertion that the difficulty is cognitive. Consider the first lines of two imaginary fictional works:

(1) In a brilliant paper, McGillicuddy had shown the series of prime numbers to be vast but finite, ending with the Prime of All Primes.
(2) After much rumination, I have come firmly to believe that there is no important difference between making use of a woman's body to assuage the sexual urge and making use of a glass of water to slake one's thirst.

Both pose a difficulty for the imagination. But whereas the first difficulty is conceptual, the second is not. Rather, it involves what Gendler

(2000) has termed "imaginative resistance," an unwillingness, not a cognitive incapacity, to engage in the proposed make-believe. The following excerpt from *The Turner Diaries* tends to engender a similar sort of resistance:

> If the organization fails in its task now, *everything* will be lost – our history, our heritage, all the blood and sacrifices and upward striving of countless thousands of years. The Enemy we are fighting fully intends to destroy the racial basis of our existence…No excuse for our failure will have any meaning, for there will be only a swarming horde of indifferent, mulatto zombies to hear it. There will be no White men to remember us – either to blame us for our weakness or to forgive us for our folly.

In both cases we do, of course, want to know who it is that is speaking, for that is how we secure proper uptake of the literary speech act. Is it the author, an omniscient authorial persona, an epistemically limited fictional narrator, or a character? In cases that engender imaginative resistance, this desire to know is particularly acute, for it affects our decision to engage or to refuse to engage in the proposed make-believe. To the extent we take the voice of *The Turner Diaries* passage to be the author's voice, we are strongly disinclined to engage. The Humean explanation of this phenomenon is helpful as far as it goes: a reader is "justly jealous" (protective) of the "rectitude of that moral standard by which he judges" and "will not pervert the sentiments of his heart for a moment." But how would *making*-believe pervert the *actual* sentiments of the heart? The answer is that it can pervert proper *habits* of the heart by means of simulation and concomitant off-line emotional response. Simulation of fictive scenarios engages actual emotional responses, even while the actions to which those responses normally give rise are inhibited. As actual, these emotional responses play an important role in a person's ethical training regime.

As we observed in the previous chapter, Martha Nussbaum takes exception to Rawls' exclusion of emotional response from the process of evaluation of principles by way of reflective equilibrium. Literature's distinctive contribution to reflective equilibrium, she claimed, is "perceptive equilibrium," which depends upon a detailed particularity inaccessible from the standpoint of philosophical reflection alone. In their choice of names, their descriptions of physiognomies, carriages, gaits, gestures, locales, and objects, writers enrich what might be considered the reader's reflective potential. One may be familiar with an array of

philosophical positions and moral principles and do everything Rawls recommends to reflect under circumstances free of distorting influences. But when evaluating commitments to deontological principles in a given situation, it may be very helpful to call up in one's imagination Henry James' impassive Mrs. Newsome (Nussbaum's example) or Herman Melville's stoical Captain Vere (my example) to achieve perceptive equilibrium.

Recall that according to the Gricean conversational analysis of literary discourse proposed by Mary Louise Pratt, transgressions against the conversational maxims may occur; but if they do, hearers will be expecting rewards of imaginative and affective involvement and shared wonder, amusement, terror, or admiration. In the literary context, we were told, the Conversational Principle is "hyperprotected" (Pratt 1977, 215): a literary text presents itself as *guaranteeing* compliance. With this guarantee in place, any transgressions against the Gricean maxims count, at least prima facie, as floutings, which grants the author wide latitude. These floutings signal the presence of implicatures. Certain texts, we now may say, ask that we suspend or temporarily overcome imaginative resistance, that we put in jeopardy our jealously guarded moral standards and habits of judging. But in importuning us in this way, the writer of fiction incurs a debt of reflective payoff, a debt that pornography is not intended to discharge. It borrows on literary credit, but skips out on the loan. The MacDonald text just quoted is a piece of propaganda, not pornography. But it is vulnerable to a similar charge.

In the previous chapter, I argued that pornographic fiction exploits the hyperprotection of literary discourse that assumes flouting as the default position in cases of noncompliance with the Gricean conversational maxims. By presenting itself as a display text, it derives its license to exhibit the sexually or violently explicit in social contexts influenced by the Protestant ethic. Yet a pornographic text does not deliver on the commitments undertaken by the author of a display text, commitments to deliver a rich set of implicatures. Such implicatures, we may now say, are likely to engender imaginative resistance in persons of conscience (an inheritance to which the Puritans have contributed mightily), and imaginative resistance will militate against the arousal that is pornography's real business. The real business of propaganda, on the other hand, is not arousal, but attitude modification and motivation to action.[38] Yet, the two are close cousins, for both tend to suppress reflection. Moreover, a text may well function both as a piece of pornography *and* as a piece of propaganda: a pornographic text may lend itself to propagandistic uses. Still, its ends are not the ends of propaganda, and conceptual clarity

demands that they be distinguished. Where propaganda is deceptive (because it is directed toward others), pornography is *self-deceptive*: it is designed to enable the user to pretend that he is not, for the sake of actual arousal, endorsing (in make-believe mode) exploitative and irresponsible behaviors that, were he to reflect on their significance, he would find repugnant to his conscience and that, as a result, would tend to engender imaginative resistance.[39] This is not to deny that propaganda may also be put to self-deceptive uses. For example, propaganda may, as it so often does, help a white supremacist blame his own failures on reverse discrimination or on the evil machinations of world Jewry. But it is to claim that propaganda does not systematically use self-deception as pornography uses it to *enable arousal* by muting the sting of conscience.

Recall that Grice's original proposals have spawned a number of variants that range from the conservative (Bach and Harnish 1979), to the mildly reformist (Horn 1989; Levinson 2000), and to the radically revisionist (Lewis 1979/1983; Sperber and Wilson 1986). In recent times, Rae Langton and Carolyn West (1999; reprinted in Langton 2009) have proposed a cognate analysis of pornographic texts[40] that seems, at least superficially, to run counter to my own. According to these writers, pornographic writing is neither free speech *sans phrase* (and so clearly protected by the First Amendment), nor is it mere nonrational stimulus (and so clearly *not* protected by the First Amendment), but a mode of saying by implicature. In their discussion, Langton and West rely on the David Lewis version of conversational implicature, which we must now briefly explicate.

Lewis interprets the language game as analogous to a rule-constituted game like baseball. "At any stage in a well-run baseball game," says Lewis,

> there is a septuple of numbers $\langle r_v, r_h, h, i, s, b, o \rangle$ which I shall call the score of that game at that stage. We recite the score as follows: the visiting team has r_v runs, the home team has r_h runs, it is the hth half (h being 1 or 2) of the ith inning; there are s strikes, b balls, and o outs. [1979/1983, 236]

How the game progresses is a function of these changing numbers. For example, if a batter has a count of three balls, then if that number changes to four, the batter may take first base without a hit; otherwise, he may not (unless he is hit by a pitch, the pitcher balks, or the catcher drops the third strike). If it is the end of the top half of the ninth inning,

then, if the home team has more runs than the visiting team, the game ends. If it is the end of the bottom half of the ninth inning and either team has more runs than the other, the game ends. If the teams have the same number of runs, the game continues until one of these conditions obtains. Certain regulative rules apply as well, for example, "play in such a way as to render the number of your team's runs larger than the opposing team's number of runs."

The kinematics of the language game is similarly a function of rules and stages. The components of the conversational score are not numbers, but other set-theoretic "constructs," such as "sets of presupposed propositions, boundaries between permissible and impermissible courses of action, or the like" (loc. cit.). It is clear that many of these rules are nothing other than Gricean conversational maxims or neo-Gricean principles. Take Lewis' rule of presupposition. The statement, "Even George Lakoff could win" presupposes that Lakoff is not a leading candidate (234). This expression "even," it will be recalled from the previous chapter, invokes a graded scale and falls under the most fundamental of Levinson's pragmatic principles, the Q-principle. But, says Lewis, there is one big difference between the kinematics of baseball scoring and the kinematics of scoring in the language game to be noted (240). If a batter walks to first base after three balls, that move is not thereby rendered acceptable, even if it is not explicitly challenged (as, of course, it would be). But in the language game, this regularly occurs. For if the statement about George Lakoff's candidacy goes unchallenged, it will stand by "accommodation": whatever occurs tends to *count as* correct play if not explicitly challenged. On the other hand, if someone counters, "Whadda ya mean, '*even* George'?", the implicature that Lakoff is not a leading candidate may be canceled.

According to Langton and West, a pornographic text does one or both of two things. Either (1) it "says" things about women by presupposition that are false, for example, "Sexual violence is legitimate," or "Women enjoy rape" (Langton and West 1999, 312). Other examples might be "'No' means yes'," or "Sex involves no assumptions of personal responsibility," or "Women are objects, not persons." Such presuppositions are accommodated because they remain unchallenged within the pornographic language game. Or (2) it blurs the line between what in a fictional text is intended for "exportation," that is, application by the reader to the actual world, and what is not so intended. For example, one may learn any number of facts about the French Revolution by exportation from the fictional *A Tale of Two Cities*. Pornographers, then, are either "background liars," or "background blurrers," or both (316–317).

But they are such, I submit, *only to the extent that they are propagandists in addition to being pornographers*, or to the extent that pornography *just is* a kind of propaganda.[41] In fact, Langton comes close to saying this herself: "[C]ertain kinds of pornography help to form and propagate certain views about women and sexuality. Such pornography is said to work as a kind of propaganda" (2009, 140). Notice, however, that she is careful to say that certain kinds of pornography *work as* a kind of propaganda. She does not say that it just is propaganda, and for good reason. The aim of propaganda is attitude modification and action motivation. The aim of pornography is sexual or blood-lustful arousal. One, as I argued, is inherently deceptive, the other inherently self-deceptive.

I acknowledged earlier that Langton and West's speech-act analysis seems to run counter to my own, since they hold that pornographic fiction makes claims by implicature, whereas I have been arguing that it *discourages* the extraction of implicatures by the reader. The road to reconciliation lies in the recognition that a pornographic text *that also works as propaganda* may invite the extraction of *some* implicatures, namely the objectifying ones identified by Langton and West, but, like propaganda, will subvert extraction of implicatures that are not conducive to its aims, whether these be aims of arousal or attitude modification. It is, therefore, entirely proper to maintain the charge that pornographic fiction violates rather than flouts the conversational rules governing the literary speech-act situation, just as propaganda does. Floutings, recall, signal the presence of implicatures; violations (which can amount to opting out of the Cooperative Principle) do not. Both pornography and propaganda are therefore forms of literary sophistry. What pornographic texts most emphatically do not do is produce anything like perceptive equilibrium or encourage the simulation, emotional engagement, and reflection that go with it. For emotional engagement would tend strongly to produce imaginative resistance in persons with Protestant–Puritan habits of the heart, which, in turn, militate against arousal, the principal aim of the pornographic text. But these habits of the heart remain, in some important ways, the habits of the heart of modern liberalism, which is to a significant degree, if not entirely, a product of Protestant–Puritan culture, even if it has secularized and, in certain ways, transcended it. Yet the pornographic text exploits the conventions of the display text where the Conversational Principle is hyperprotected and sexual explicitness tends to signal implicature by flouting maxims concerning prolixity and politeness.

The aim of the author of a display text, recall, is to "produce in hearers not only belief but also an imaginative and affective involvement in

the state of affairs he is representing and an evaluative stance toward it." The reader is to "share the author's wonder, amusement, terror, or admiration," a requirement, as I argued earlier, that depends on make-believe and simulation. In the pornographic text, such make-belief and simulation are blocked. Pornographic texts pretend to flout conversational maxims, but in reality, they violate them while encouraging self-deception. This is why the writings of Sade, perhaps most notably in the case of a work such as *Justine*, are not properly regarded as pornographic: his obscene descriptions are floutings that implicate his materialist, morally nihilistic philosophical doctrines and force the reader to reflect on them. This is not to claim, however, that he is always above employment of the techniques of propaganda.

3.4.1   Witch hunting in modern Europe and America

Because of the association in the popular mind between Puritanism and the witch hunts that occurred in colonial New England, most notoriously in Salem, Massachusetts, some readers may resist the suggested connection between Protestant–Puritan habits of the heart and liberalism. Such skepticism would be ill founded. For one thing, two more centuries would be required for liberal ideals to break down in any significant way barriers of class (see Chapter 4), and even longer to begin to overcome those of race and gender. For another, the events at Salem, though certainly horrific, were a late and relatively mild reverberation of a central European phenomenon much more extended in time and far more brutal and deadly. During a period lasting roughly three centuries (1450–1750), European tribunals prosecuted about 90,000 persons, 75 to 80% of whom were women (Levack 2006, 21). About half of these prosecutions occurred in the German lands, where 20,000 to 25,000 executions were carried out (ibid., 21), many during a period of particularly intense activity stretching between 1560 and 1630.[42] According to Levack (2006, 212), the number of witch trials held within the ever-shifting borders of the Catholic Holy Roman Empire, which included the German lands, was greater than the number of trials held in all other parts of Europe combined. The Salem events, by contrast, which dwarfed in intensity other occasional outbreaks of witch hunting in colonial America, even those that occurred elsewhere in New England, lasted only for a few months in the year 1692. That infamous episode saw 162 persons, mostly older, unmarried women, accused, 76 tried, and 30 convicted (Levack 2006, 193).[43] In contrast to European continental practice, where burning at the stake, sometimes with the accused mercifully already dead from strangulation, sometimes not, was the favored

method of execution and where torture was used to extract confessions and the implication of alleged accomplices, witches at Salem were hanged and torture was illegal, as it was in England at the time.

Why the early modern witch hunts and executions occurred when and where and with the differential ferocity and brutality they did is a complicated issue not likely to yield to any one-factor explanation (see Barstow 1995, 69). For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that the inception of the European witch hunts predated the Reformation and to note the following point as well: the Reformation may, as a result of Luther's translation of the Bible into German, have intensified witch hunting in the German lands and elsewhere by newly focusing the attention of tutored and untutored alike on Christian lore identifying witches not only as traditional perpetrators of *maleficia* (deeds of black magic), a view in fact common to many cultures, but also as especially vile and dangerous heretics (consorts of the Devil) whose aim was the destruction of the Christian world. Particularly important in the minds of early modern persecutors, it seems, was the biblical injunction, "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live." But the Reformation also played a role in the extinction of witch hunting by bringing about the very "disenchantment" of the world, the purging from it of magical and demonological elements, that Weber attributed to the Protestant ethic and its rationalization of the world (cf. Levack 2006, 264).

3.4.2   Langton's "silencing" argument and the case for censoring pornography

In the article written with Carolyn West cited earlier (1999) and other writings, Langton develops a sophisticated philosophical argument designed to defend the conceptual integrity of the law censoring pornography[44] crafted by Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin that was passed in Indianapolis, but later overturned on appeal on First Amendment grounds. The law has been criticized (by Ronald Dworkin) as misconceived for suggesting that pornography, which is a mode of representation, just *is* the subordination of women. Langton's aim is to show that this charge does not stick. Looking to J. L. Austin's original version of speech-act theory, Langton proposes that pornography infringes on the rights of women by making it difficult or impossible for them to perform illocutionary acts, to do certain things with words. Briefly, to perform a locutionary act is to say something. An illocutionary act, on the other hand, is something one does *in* saying something, and a perlocutionary act is something one does *by* saying something. Declaring a meeting adjourned is an illocutionary act, whereas motivating persons

at the meeting to get up and leave by saying those words is a perlocutionary one. Finally, in order to perform an illocutionary act successfully or "felicitously," there must be proper "uptake" on the part of the hearer(s). It must be taken as the speech act it is. A actor on stage in a theater yelling "Fire!" truly will fail to utter a warning, an illocutionary act, if the spectators think it is just part of the show (2009, 49).

In many cases, explicit conventions must be in place for the felicitous illocutionary performance. A cleric or a civil magistrate, but not I, may pronounce two persons husband and wife. Similarly, an antebellum American slave owner could order a slave to pick a row of cotton, but the slave could not so order the owner. This is not a question of getting someone to do something, which is a perlocutionary act; it is a question of successfully performing the illocutionary act of ordering in uttering the command. But the conventions sanctioning illocutionary performance need not be so explicit. If, as Pratt argues (and I have agreed), writing a novel is a speech act, then implicit nineteenth-century conventions prevented women from securing uptake through publication without assuming male names, as did the Brontës and Mary Ann Evans (George Eliot). Here we arrive at the *nervus probandi* of Langton's argument. Similar conventions, implicit in the hierarchically sexist society in which we in the United States presently live, prevent women from performing felicitous speech acts by preventing successful uptake: their illocutionary acts are not taken seriously, not taken to be the acts they are or are intended to be. This both silences and subordinates. Pornography contributes to or helps sustain these implicit sexist conventions to a significant extent by inculcating sexist attitudes.[45] Therefore, it constitutes an infringement on the right to free speech of women and, as a result, arguably should not itself be protected as free speech any more than intentionally and falsely shouting "Fire!" in a crowded auditorium or advocating the overthrow of the government of the United States are so protected.[46]

Assuming the truth of the attitudinal causal hypothesis, something that has not been shown, I would consider this rather ingenious and even profound argument to be successful as a defense of the MacKinnon–Dworkin thesis that pornography subordinates women against Ronald Dworkin's charge that it suffers from a dangerous confusion in its claim that pornography (which is merely representational) could, in and of itself, subordinate anyone (see Langton 2009, 65–73). But Langton's silencing argument does not justify the thesis, even if this were her aim, which it is not. However, before I try to explain why, an important distinction needs to be made.

The main (though by no means the only) target of the MacKinnon–Dworkin law seems to have been heteroerotic pornographic films. In addition to any other harms these films may visit on women, the pornographic film industry exploits women in order to make the films. This last consideration, important as it is, is irrelevant to the topic of this book. Putting this issue to one side, Langton's silencing argument applies only to pornographic fiction that works as a kind of propaganda, not to pornography as such. To argue successfully that pornography subordinates women by infringing on free speech, it would have to be shown that pornography just is a kind of propaganda, or that it must work, or at least that it in general tends to work as a kind of propaganda in order to bring about its arousal effects, or at the very least that its arousal effects are reliably accompanied by attitude modification. But Langton makes no such claims, nor is there any reason to accept them. As I have argued, pornography characteristically seeks to circumvent attitudes not conducive to arousal. It does not, as a general rule, go to the trouble of attempting to modify them. Langton argues only for the weaker (and more defensible) conclusion that to the extent that *some* pornography, by means of background lying and blurring, helps form and propagate certain views about women and sexuality, does it work as a kind of propaganda. This is unobjectionable, but would be too weak to justify the sweeping MacKinnon–Dworkin subordination thesis. However, in all fairness, we should remind ourselves that Langton did not set out to justify the thesis, but rather to defend its conceptual integrity against Ronald Dworkin's charge of confusion. For pornography can have these effects and (arguably) sometimes does, namely, when it works as a kind of propaganda, affects attitudes towards women, and infringes on their right to free speech by preventing proper uptake of their illocutionary speech acts.

Langton also remains cautious about claiming that the silencing and subordination arguments make Mackinnon's case for censorship without further argument (2009, 31–32), again for good reason. The case of *The Turner Diaries* seems an illuminating parallel. For one thing, it uses deceptive techniques of attitude modification to advocate (fictionally, to be sure) a factually ill-founded racist ideology. That brings it within the ambit of propaganda. For another, the ideology of racism is at least as deeply rooted in this country as is that of sexism. Indeed, there are forces currently active in the United States that have in the last 30 years acquired a dangerous patina of legitimacy, forces that would return us to the America that preceded the civil rights legislation of the 1960s, the Supreme Court decisions of the 1950s, and perhaps even the Civil War

itself. Notice the ubiquity these days of "states' rights" language, that fig leaf for locally institutionalized discrimination, now chiefly taking the form of vote suppression under the guise of voter identification that is intended to be immune to interference by the federal government. The Civil War was not really a civil war at all, but a war between the states, some have always insisted. But, I ask, ought racist propaganda like *The Turner Diaries* be censored? No – we want it out there where it can be read, discussed, and critiqued.

3.5   Cleland's *Memoirs* and the emergence of modern pornographic fiction as a distinct genre

As Dr. Sanger was most likely aware, the object of Pope's admonition and of his fears had already been realized in eighteenth-century England. Pornography as a chronicle of prostitution had evolved into pornography as a vehicle of virtual prostitution. Published in 1748–1749, Cleland's *Memoirs* is arguably the paradigmatically modern pornographic literary work, perhaps the first work of its genre.[47] Adopting a modified version of the recently invented epistolary form favored by Richardson and other early novelists, Cleland manages to describe in explicit detail highly arousing scenes, running the now-standard gamut of lesbianism, voyeurism, heterosexual sex, group sex, and male gay sex, while scrupulously avoiding any and all obscene terminology. The book also gestures at moral outrage at male gay sex, at the endorsement of values of affective individualism and companionate marriage, and at the newly emerging middle-class view of aristocrats as untrustworthy libertines and rakes. Cleland's considerable literary skill is undeniable. But the book is pornographic because its aim and its effect are to arouse while working to subvert the reader's reflection on Fanny and on her world. Implicatures concerning the world of an eighteenth-century prostitute in London that can be taken seriously are hard to come by. Fanny's bawd Mrs. Cole is kind and considerate, as are Fanny's fellow sex workers. Mrs. Cole had in her high-class brothel "insensibly formed a little family of love," says Fanny (Cleland 1748–1749/1985, 93). In Fanny's world, no one is stricken with any serious disease, venereal or otherwise; no one must deal with physical or even verbal abuse; and the only occasions on which Fanny must contend with revulsion are those in which she has to fend off the attentions of a loathsome old lecher, and when she becomes a morally outraged, but willing, peephole witness to male gay sex, a sop to eighteenth-century prejudice.[48] No one is tricked or forced or sold into the life of prostitution; no one is, in effect, a sex

slave, a serious problem in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe (Bullough and Bullough 1989, 265). All this, I submit, amounts not to a literary experience, but to a self-delusional simulacrum of literary experience. It offers arousal more than it does a way of seeing, even a Sadean way of seeing. Much less does it work to adjust the reader's perceptive equilibrium or provide the reader a "sentimental education" (Robinson 2005). It *is* possible, just possible, that *Memoirs* was at least in part intended as a satire of the mildly titillating picaresque novels popular at the time such as Defoe's *Moll Flanders*, which features a sexually adventurous but charming female scoundrel. Or perhaps it could be placed alongside Fielding's *Shamela* as a satire of Richardson's *Pamela*, the story of a young woman under sexual pressure who uses her allure as a bargaining chip in her efforts to "marry up": Fanny falls in love with and marries one of her upper-class clients. Such interpretations, like Robinson's (2006), are perhaps not unsustainable, but they seem to me to be something of a reach. To the extent they can be sustained, however, *Memoirs* may have a claim to be regarded as something more than pornography.

Also something of a reach is Lubey's (2012, 23) take on *Memoirs*.[49] She places early English novels as diverse as *Pamela*, *Memoirs*, and *The History of the Human Heart, Or the Adventures of a Young Gentleman* (1749) by an anonymous contemporary of Cleland's in the category of the morally instructional. On her view, all three use sex, whether it be the ever-present *implicit suggestion* of sex (*Pamela*), the occasionally *explicit but restrained representation* of sex (*History*), or the *repeated and explicit* (but deliberately verbally inoffensive) representation of sex (*Memoirs*), to "urge readers toward moral instruction in the midst of sexual excitement…Sex in novels, I'm arguing, is an exceptional empirical case, for it asks readers to witness the most violent of passions – and to feel some measure of the desires and fears it involves – all the while remaining sentient of virtuous aims" (113). Again, this claim should not be dismissed out of hand, but it also should not be accepted before taking note of significant differences between the three novels. Where *Pamela* is a proto-romance novel featuring a dangerous but attractive male hero who threatens violence and ravishment (see Section 3.6 for an extended discussion), *History* is a comedic farce, replete with standard marks such as impostures subsequently unmasked (twin sisters impersonating each other, women impersonating men), repeated unexpected interruptions of attempted amorous consummations, and heavy accents of melodrama (a dishonored woman expires in a pitch of emotional frenzy). The aim is satire, the ridicule of Camillo, a fumbling gallant of

genial but weak character, and men like him: "How ridiculous does a man look, when detected in a manifest falsity?" (1749/1974, 312). The book is interlarded with extensive learned footnotes expressing opinions that are by no means unintelligent, but are often seriously misinformed. For example, the author explains Camillo's inherent timidity by means of the by-now-long-discredited preformation theory of ontogenesis, according to which the zygote contains a tiny, but fully formed, human being. Upon witnessing a beheading, Camillo's mother takes a fright so terrific that her emotional state permanently affects for the worse the constitution of the preformed child she is carrying (19). The novel's two fully explicit sex scenes seem intended not to arouse, but to bring home to the reader the appeal of concupiscence to an amorously inclined but weak-willed young man such as Camillo. Still, *Pamela* and *History* could be seen as morally instructive, as Lubey would suggest. *Memoirs*, on the other hand, is something else again. It is implausible (but still, not impossible) that the novel's sheer density of explicit sexual detail is there to provide "moral instruction" or to serve any purpose other than the arousal of the reader.

Because Cleland himself was an Anglican (he is buried at St. Margaret's Churchyard in London) and because *Memoirs* dates from the Hanoverian period that succeeded the Puritan rule of the Commonwealth (1649–1653) and the Protectorate under Cromwell (1653–1660), and postdates the Restoration (1660) with its liberalization of public mores, the claim of a causal link between Puritanism and the emergence of modern pornographic fiction may be found unconvincing.[50] But such a reaction, in my estimation, seriously underestimates the extent to which the Puritan ethos had by the turn of the eighteenth century worked its way into the very marrow of English society. "Puritanism, not the Tudor secession from Rome," writes historian R. H. Tawney, "was the true English Reformation, and it is from its struggle against the old order that an England which is unmistakably modern emerges" (1929, 198). The reverberations of this struggle resounded across subsequent centuries, and the result was a particularly English version of Puritanism that was individualistic, secular, and utilitarian, a phenomenon distinctly different from Calvin's original theocratic conception. Where the spirit of the latter may be discerned in seventeenth-century Massachusetts, the scene of the notorious witch hunts, that of the former underwent its New-World efflorescence in eighteenth-century Pennsylvania, home of Benjamin Franklin, always one of Weber's prime examples of the Protestant capitalist happy warrior.[51] Calvinism, says Tawney, "had begun by being the very soul of authoritarian regimentation. It ended

by being the vehicle of an almost Utilitarian individualism" (op. cit., 227). The "lusty plutocracy of the Restoration, roaring after its meat," he observes (267), was not at all indisposed to adopt the Puritan view that accumulated wealth was an unmistakable sign of divine election.

The effects of English Puritanism on the emerging English novel must also not be underestimated. Cleland was an Anglican, but so was Richardson (interred at St. Bride's Church in London), even if an Anglican who identified with the devout dissenters and Anglicans of an earlier period, particularly John Bunyan. Yet both *Pamela* and *Clarissa* are steeped in the self-searching Puritan devotional literature and its tradition of constant self-examination coupled with solitary writing, here taking the form of the letters mandated by the form of the epistolary novel. "When we speak of Puritanism in the eighteenth century," says Cynthia Griffin Wolff (1972, 5),

> we are referring not to the religious movement of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries – nor solely to the dissenters who were the descendants of that tradition. We are identifying the social system, the family patterns, the attitudes toward oneself that were fostered by the religious ethic and which persisted after its death. By 1700 these patterns were typical not only of dissenters but of many Anglicans as well, especially lower-class Anglicans; as Weber has suggested, they were patterns that shaped the lives of the upwardly mobile businessmen.

It is not too much to say that the English epistolary novel of formal realism stands deeply indebted to this Puritan tradition of self-examination and to the practice of writing about it "in the moment" so as to capture it for the purpose of subsequent meditation.[52] Nor is it too much to claim, as does Wolff (106), that the male protagonists of both *Pamela* (Mr. B.) and *Clarissa* (Lovelace) are intended as stand-ins for the bawdy licentiousness that is a mainstay of Restoration drama. The Restoration may have liberalized sexual mores after official Puritan repression, but the early English novelists Richardson and Defoe, whom Richardson admired, were not dancing to this tune, much less calling it.

3.5.1   A contemporary test case

Modern pornographic fiction, I have argued, poses as a display text from which it derives its license to exhibit the sexually explicit in social contexts influenced by the Protestant ethic, but one that does not deliver on the conversational commitments undertaken by the author

of a display text. Let us test this proposal by considering *Isabelle and Véronique: Four Months, Four Cities* by Laurence St. Clair, a relatively contemporary (1989) novel that few today, I think, would hesitate to brand as hard-core pornography, whatever their theoretical commitments. Like *Memoirs*, *Isabelle and Véronique* is skillfully written. It is also relatively restrained in its use of scatological language, if not, as with Cleland, entirely innocent of it. And like Cleland's text, it is intended both to arouse and to facilitate self-deception.

Martha Nussbaum (1995) discusses this work in some detail, and we will both build on and depart from her analysis.[53] Nussbaum's principal focus is the notion of the objectification of persons and the questions of whether and how pornography perpetrates it and whether the objectification of persons is always bad. To answer these questions, she must get clear concerning what objectification is. Nussbaum finds a cluster of seven logically independent, but complexly interconnected, components, including denials of autonomy, agency, and subjectivity. I have nothing to add to her careful analysis.[54] Having told us what objectification is, she goes on to argue that the objectification of persons as it is perpetrated by pornography is bad, but that objectification is not, given the proper context, always bad. For example, using a person instrumentally usually amounts to a denial of autonomy, but if a lover uses her partner's belly with consent or without objection as a pillow in bed, this is not necessarily bad.

The objectification portrayed in St. Clair's pornographic novel, however, is bad, and, speaking for the moment in Nussbaum's terms, I agree. But why is it bad? She answers: because the main male character and the text as a whole "represent women as creatures whose autonomy and subjectivity don't matter at all, insofar as they are not involved in the gratification of male desire. The women, including whatever signs of humanity they display, are just there to be used as sex objects for men in whatever way suits them" (280). Although the two extended passages from the novel quoted by Nussbaum (252–253, 291) would suggest that objectification of women as sex objects for men is the text's main offense, I believe the charge to be too simple and arguably inapplicable to a significant number of other scenes, which are replete with female-initiated sex (no "inertness" or denial of agency there, though I can imagine someone seeing it as a mode of male servicing), bisexuality, and lesbian sex. Indeed, by the end of the novel, it seems clear that the two female protagonists Isabelle and Véronique are more interested in each other than they are in the male protagonist Macrae. Moreover, Véronique is no man's plaything: during a stop during a motor trip

through Italy in her spiffy red Alfa Romeo, she flirts with a handsome young rustic and informs Macrae that she has found his replacement as a traveling companion. It takes him more than just a moment to realize that she is joking, for "she is quite capable of leaving him in this dusty village to find his way south if she prefers the company of someone else" (141). Véronique is actually a rather masterful character, a gifted and successful erotic artist and a woman who knows what she wants and does not hesitate to act in accordance with her desires. Isabelle is not much different in this last respect: if the sexual mood is not upon her, she has no difficulty declining Macrae's advances (154).

St. Clair's text is eminently "egalitarian": it does not seem to be committed to Anne Eaton's "gender inequity."[55] The text is certainly, as Nussbaum charges, "formulaic" (281n51), but not, or not just, I believe, because it "invites us to see the characters as mere pretexts for the implied author's expression of a view about women's sexuality." Any such expression of views is incidental and, should it become obtrusive, potentially counterproductive to achieving the novel's actual aim, which is the reader's sexual arousal. But if we see through the formulaic facade, then we are able to see the characters as mere pretexts for arousal, which depends upon the absence of the "complex characterization" that would interfere with arousal by engendering reflection and possible imaginative resistance. There is a scene, for example, in which Macrae, as the houseguest of a libertine Italian countess, is sent a sixteen-year-old girl who administers a full-body massage that quickly turns sexual. (In ancient Rome, the girl might well have been a slave: no problem there, for that was not, in the Roman world, a person.) We do not know Macrae's age, but are told that his face, with "his deep blue eyes, eyes set hard into his face," is "dark and lined like his old leather jacket, soft, supple, mobile" (122, St. Clair's wannabe?). It is difficult to imagine that he is younger than 40. A subsequent scene that involves the same girl depicts what in many a contemporary locale would amount to an act of statutory rape of a person Macrae had only encountered moments earlier. He knows nothing whatever of the girl or her circumstances, nor does St. Clair wish to raise any discomfiting questions in our minds. It must be acknowledged that Nussbaum takes note of this, for she accuses pornography (albeit now in the form of a *Playboy* photo caption) of constructing "for the reader a fantasy objectification of a class of real women. Using this as a masturbatory aid, it encourages the idea that an easy satisfaction can be had in this uncomplicated way, without the difficulties attendant on recognizing women's subjectivity and autonomy in a more full-blooded way" (284), indeed, I would add,

without the difficulties attendant on taking on the heavy responsibilities of physical intimacy with another human being. Think, if you will, of Goethe's Faust declaring he wished he'd never been born near the end the Margarete episode, which concludes the first part of the drama. Nonrecognition of a woman's subjectivity and autonomy is not the only problem here. There is also the issue of the moral responsibility of sexual intimacy.

In order to perpetrate its deception, St. Clair's novel skillfully assumes the trappings of a display text. The authorial voice purports to have an engaging tale to tell, a tale set in a glitzy version of the art world. Its drama concerns the execution of a plan to check the evil machinations of a sleazy gay art dealer (a bit of homophobic pandering?), Adam Mandelstam (a touch of anti-Semitism?), a man whose hand is "soft and clammy like a corpse's" and whose eyes, in obvious contrast with the deep blue eyes of the Aryan heterosexual athlete Macrae, are "crooked," "narrow," "venal," and "black" (128–129, 131). Mandelstam, it appears, is blackmailing Véronique by threatening to reveal that she is the male artist René S., a rising star whose agent is none other than Macrae. In the art world, evidently, the "impenetrability of the pseudonym is an essential prerequisite to the very nature of the erotic."

The text is bedecked with other pompous deliverances of pseudo-aesthetics that help the reader pretend that the real business at hand is something other than sexual arousal. Standing in the countess' garden before a replica of Bernini's *Apollo and Daphne*, a sculpture that he fancies represents the "last moment of the human erotic thought caught in the instant of its transformation, timelessly," the deeply moved Macrae recalls "Keats in the garden. *Forever panting, and forever young*" (156). There is no implicature of Sadean nihilism in this vicinity, despite the fact that the sixteen-year-old masseuse is soon to be led out, willingly shackled to a large wooden X-shaped cross, licked by a dog, penetrated by a mechanical metal gear-driven dildo cranked by the countess, and then brutally whipped into erotic ecstasy while Macrae and a flock of other guests look on and engage in sexual activities of their own. At the conclusion of this spectacle, "the spell broken," Macrae

> walks up to the girl, still held fast in her manacles, arms outstretched above her, ankles clipped to the wood. He touches her skin: it is hot and molten. Then he looks at her, raising her face with one hand, tenderly. Her cheeks are damp with tears or sweat, her eyes are dark. Her mouth hangs slightly open, lips parted, teeth visible, in a smile of distilled, transfigured joy. [183]

This is airbrushed sadism served up to those dishonest enough to wish to indulge in it without the courage of Sade's nihilistic materialist convictions.

In his efforts to simulate a display text, St. Clair brings to bear considerable familiarity with various European locales and cultures, as well as a knowledge of French, Italian, German, and Latin. Occasionally, a pleasantly fresh piece of writing stands out:

> As they coast down towards the valley, Véronique eases off the power, letting the Alpha float down to earth like a glider landing. Macrae can feel the air thickening up around him, and the engine's carburettor starts to bite properly on oxygen again after the constant, gasping struggle for breath at nearly ten thousand feet. Running back on a falling tack towards the massif, the car is suddenly plunged into shadow, into the valley where the early light has yet to penetrate, and it is as if they have nose-dived into a mass of cool water. [139]

But more often than not, we choke on overwritten clichés:

> Then he watches as the two women rise slowly, smoothly, flowing towards the dance floor, until their bodies hit the edges of the stroboscopic light, where for a moment it is as if each of their bodies are taken over by some staccato mechanism, and they begin to move with the same robotic movements of the other dancers, the same patches of fluid colour playing iridescently on their kaleidoscopic clothes, and they become just a succession of split images exploding on the retina. [115]

The atavistic, self-immolating sexuality that many of St. Clair's descriptions strive to display, Nussbaum thinks, "is Lawrence, and Schopenhauer, in Blue Moon Press clothing" (280). In light of my display text simulation thesis, I would be more inclined to say that it is Blue Moon Press in Lawrentian, and Schopenhauerian, clothing.

3.6 Pornography and prostitution

> The writer or scholar who undertakes to discuss pornography has in effect made a contract to construct an ideal type of a brothel—and he has in addition contracted to maintain the distinctions that Weber established. [Marcus, 1966, 266]

Having at this point reestablished contact with D. H. Lawrence, let us return to his claim, earlier tabled, that *Pamela*, *Clarissa*, and even *Jane Eyre* are more pornographic than Boccaccio. Lawrence is prepared to brand as "pornographical" any writing that "insults" or "does dirt on" human sexuality, anything that turns it into a "dirty little secret." By kidnapping and raping Clarissa, Loveless has defiled her beyond redemption, causing her to prefer death to the marital union with him that he desires and that would rehabilitate her in the eyes of her family and society. Watt suggests (236n2) that the lexical similarity between Clarissa's surname Harlowe and the word 'harlot' is not accidental, any more than is the homonymy of 'Lovelace' and 'loveless'. The price the unfortunate Mr. Rochester must pay to gain sexual access to Jane Eyre is disfigurement and blindness. Both of these scenarios fill Lawrence with loathing. Notice that *Wuthering Heights* escapes his wrath. Emily Brontë, like Sade before her and Nietzsche after her, was an antinomian (cf. Seymour-Smith 1994, 230). The shock of the obscene, either in content or in mode of expression, can be an effective tool in the hands of the antinomian, but the arousal of pornography is not. Witness Heathcliff's frequent displays of a brutality that borders on the obscene.[56] Boccaccio, Lawrence believes, is frank about sex, but makes nothing shameful of it. Given Lawrence's rage directed at the effects of Weber's "iron cage" on the human capacity to experience erotic passion, his dismissals of Richardson and Charlotte Brontë are understandable, even if a trifle unfair, despite the fact that there were some in Richardson's own day who, like Fielding, thought his descriptions of his heroine Clarissa, hyperventilating in her thin night shift when tricked into revealing herself by Lovelace, obscene and even arousing in the dishonest way I am terming pornographic. (Recall that there was as yet no word for pornography in English or any other modern European language.) Many women of Richardson's day, on the other hand, were as taken with him as he was with them, his adoring female fans. The contemporary, sexually explicit woman's romance novel, or "bodice ripper," is his fairly easily recognizable progeny.[57] I had claimed, however, that there remained a nugget of wisdom to be mined from the comments of Lawrence. If we interpret his "insult" and "doing dirt on" sex as part of the Puritan condemnation of concupiscence, which, he says, is "grey, grey in every fibre" (74), combined with a *self-deceptive indulgence of those very concupiscent longings in imagination*, something that might, in a Pauline vein, be thought of as fornication in the heart or virtual fornication (*porneia*), we can see how material might at once be obscene minimally or not at all, and yet be pornographic.

"Pornography is the theory, and rape is the practice," feminist writer Robin Morgan famously asserted (1980, 139). But this does not seem right. Pornography, except perhaps to the extent it also functions as a kind of propaganda, is not a theory of anything, and prostitution, not rape, is its real-world correlate: pornography involves the buying and selling of bodies as objects. Etymologically speaking, *theoria*, to be sure, is a way of seeing; but pornography, as I argued, is not in the business of cultivating ways of seeing. Rather, it is in the business of arousal. Better, I think, to say this: pornography markets the virtual commodity, prostitution the actual one.

There is, however, an issue to be faced: what counts as prostitution, especially if we include societies that are not officially monogamous, varies significantly with time and place. For example, Bullough and Bullough (1987, 10) inform us that in Ugra (Outer Mongolia), prostitutes, defined for the moment as women who provide sexual services to men for payment, have been regarded as legitimate, if temporary, wives, though they do not give us the time period in which this occurred. "Merchants and lamas," they continue (loc. cit.),

> took prostitutes as companions on short journeys, and when these were paid and discharged, they sought others to take their place. Though this is prostitution by some definitions, it was not defined as such by the society. Among some of the American Indian tribes, it was customary for a man to be accompanied by a woman when he went on an extended hunting expedition in order to satisfy both his material and sexual needs. The woman received a liberal share of the profits for her services and the arrangement terminated at the end of the hunt. In other Indian tribes women were purchased to serve as sexual partners for the night, week, month, or season. Most of these temporary liaisons were not regarded as marriages unless children resulted. Often the same elaborate negotiations were carried out for the short-term marriages as for the long-term ones ... To most of these peoples, however, such practices were not prostitution since even temporary cohabitation could be classed as a marriage relationship, unless the woman involved was the wife of another man.

"Mut'a," an old Arabic custom of temporary marriage, was "a kind of legalized prostitution. Contracts would be made for a fraction of a day, or for a year, or for longer periods" (ibid., 75). The children of such unions, we should note, were regarded as legitimate. This makes it difficult to separate such practices from the polygyny that was common in ancient

and medieval China, the Middle East, and elsewhere (ibid., 101) or from the concubinage common in officially monogamous ancient Greece and Rome.

But this much I think we can say: we may *hypothesize* an inverse relationship between the presence of *officially sanctioned or tolerated* polygyny, concubinage, or prostitution – in a word, practices that express an attitude that regards women as property or as a fungible commodity – and the production of sexually pornographic fiction: where the former are negatively sanctioned, especially if they are subject to the negative sanctions of a corrosive bad conscience, the latter will flourish, as is the case in countries where the Protestant ethic and companionate marriage became strongly established, as, most notably in Victorian England, but also the United States, and, to some extent, post-revolutionary France. And where the former are accepted, the appeal of pornographic fiction will be weaker, for men who make actual sexual use of women as property will have less need of the virtual and will suffer no bad conscience to assuage.[58] This hypothesis is no more than a conjecture, but it is a testable one

In the catalog of the Private Case of the British Library, Hunt informs us (1993a, 21), the "overwhelming majority of the 1,920 titles are either English or French." Titles in German number 127, of which 28 are translations from French or English, 38 in Italian, 32 in Latin, 9 in Spanish, "and so on to Hungarian ([2] titles) and Finnish ([1] title)." Now this is just a selection, not a compendium of works of this nature published during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Notice, however, that there are no titles in Dutch, which is not to say that none were published, for a few were. There are a number of plausible reasons for this relative underrepresentation. First, the Dutch have traditionally taken a relatively tolerant attitude toward prostitution.[59] Today it is legal, at least in Amsterdam. Recall my postulation of an inverse relation between such tolerant attitudes and the prevalence of pornography. Second, to the extent pornographic writings were read in Holland during this period, they were (for the most part) imported and read in their original languages. Third, and perhaps more importantly, Holland's tradition of religious tolerance seems to have minimized any need for the obscene subversive literature from which, as I have argued, sexual pornography was born (cf. Mijnhardt 1993, 293, 295).[60] Lacking a genuinely indigenous literature of the obscene, a corresponding absence of pornographic literature, its dissolute progeny, might well be expected. Fourth, there was no Dutch philosophical champion of individualism and individual rights in the mold of John Locke, no corresponding strong tradition of

affective individualism, and no indigenous literary tradition of formal realism. Hunt (1993a, 23) adds that "hardly any of the non-English or French titles, even the translations from those languages, were published before 1800…Until at least the middle of the nineteenth century, French and English publications overwhelmingly dominated European pornography." This is significant because 1800 marks the beginning of the Napoleonic era, the surge of the middle classes in central Europe, and the descent of Weber's bourgeois "iron cage." But once again, it is important to keep sight of the fact that Hunt is counting works such as those of Chorier and even Sade as "pornographic," a classification I have questioned.

3.6.1 Pornographic fiction, prostitution, and religion in pre-unification Germany: testing for adequate causation

Pre-unification Germany was a collection of principalities that ranged from the predominantly Lutheran to the predominantly Catholic, with the notable exception of the Brandenburg court at Berlin, which had converted from Lutheranism to Calvinism in 1613, and, later in the seventeenth century, to Pietism. We have already taken note of Weber's opinion of Luther and Lutheranism with regard to the status of women. Elector Frederick III of Prussia saw Pietism, a dissident seventeenth-century movement within Lutheranism that bore some resemblances to Puritanism, and hence to Calvinism, as a means to unify the Prussian Calvinist aristocratic minority with its predominantly Lutheran nonaristocratic majority. It was particularly influential at the universities of Berlin and Halle, but its influence gradually waned (see Clark 2000). In many, indeed most, areas of Lutheran and Catholic Germany, prostitution was not morally condemned as it had been by abolitionists in England, the United States, and even post-revolutionary France. In the Germany of today, prostitution is legal, as it is in predominantly Catholic Austria.

We do not know just who the principal consumers of the German "pornographic" material post-dating 1800 cited by Hunt were, nor does she supply any titles. But we do know this: the most notorious and widely read "immoral" books published in German during the early years of the nineteenth century were not translations of Cleland's *Memoirs* and its numerous knock-offs, but *The Memoirs of Casanova* (1822), Christian August Fischer's *The Beloved of Eleven Thousand Ladies* (1804), Johann Scheible's *The Memoirs of Lola Montez, Accompanied by the Intimate Letters of King Ludwig of Bavaria* (1851), and *Prima Donna or the Memoirs of an Opera Singer* (1861), the last allegedly written by

Wilhelmine Schroeder-Devrient, one of the leading divas of her day and a colleague of Richard Wagner. Of the four, only the Fischer book is entirely fictional. The others are or purport to be the memoirs of actual persons or to be based on the lives of actual persons. They lie, therefore strictly speaking, beyond the scope of the present discussion. More importantly, all but *Prima Donna* lack the explicit sexual detail of the modern pornographic novel (see Leonard 2005). Nineteenth-century Germans, whether Lutheran or Catholic, seem to have been more intrigued by the representation of violations of the established social order than by the newly nascent pornographic novel. The Puritan sexual conscience, which, I have argued, functioned as an adequate cause of the emergence of modern pornographic fiction, was foreign to most regions of the Germany of the time.

Prima Donna was published in the Danish-controlled city of Altona, near Hamburg. It is a little difficult to believe that this work, supposedly derived from a sheaf of papers discovered among the author's effects by a nephew after her death in 1860, was written by Schroeder-Devrient herself. For what would have been the motivation of a person of her standing to leave behind a set of memoirs so frustratingly uninformative? We learn next to nothing of her artistic career, the contemporary music scene, or her impressions of illustrious figures she encountered, including Beethoven, Goethe, Wagner, and Weber. The work is clearly pornographic in the sanitized manner of Cleland's *Memoirs*, yet inclusive as well of odious elements he abjured like gratuitous descriptions of brutal executions and acts of necrophilia. Like Cleland's novel, *Prima Donna* displays the touch of the professional writer who knows his audience. Since the letter is addressed to the physician who treated her during the final bout of the syphilitic infection that killed her, it is possible that Schroeder-Devrient's life approximated the sexually profligate one chronicled. It is also possible that the document was a private confession never intended for publication. But if so, conveying the details of her sexual adventures to her personal physician in a book-length document seems a bit odd. Perhaps there was a long letter that some person or persons unknown later elaborated on in order to cash in on the singer's notoriety.

It must be said that the work is leavened here and there with some striking observations concerning love, morality, male and female psychology, and music that transcend the platitudes of the St. Clair novel we considered earlier, such as this one:

> [W]hat exactly is meant by "filth"? Every day we nourish ourselves with matter which, when analyzed, is found to be in a state of decay.

> Try as we may to convince ourselves that we purify our food with water and with fire, it remains a fact that we eat dirt. Certain foods have to be completely rotten to please us…In a word, dirt is something very relative, and who thinks of the raw materials when he is enjoying something? It is exactly the same as if someone, having fallen in love with a girl, were to lose all his poetic feelings by thinking of the natural needs of his beloved. Personally, I believe exactly the contrary. When a man loves some person or object he no longer sees anything obscene, dirty, or disgusting in the object of his love [169–170].

Or this musically insightful remark:

> Italian operas give the singers a chance to deliver everything of which they are capable, for it is written for them. German music is first and foremost instrumental and we always have to sacrifice ourselves in favor of the orchestra. [136]

Here speaks the prima donna who really might have slapped Wagner's face for indignities inflicted on the *bel canto* voice, as Schroeder-Devrient is reputed to have done. But such material plays second fiddle, as it were, to the interminable descriptions of diverse acts of sexual congress. We may never be able to establish who really was the author or authors of this unnecessarily sexually inflammatory "memoir," whether its author actually was a woman, or even whether its original language was German, for Schroeder-Devrient's original manuscript no longer exists, if it ever did. The book's wide readership in Germany seems to have been as much (or even more) a function of the superstar status of its purported author and her reputedly scandalous private life as it was of its undeniably pornographic content.

3.7   Summary and conclusion: pornography: cultural construction or psychological universal?

The argument of this chapter is a long and, I fear, complicated one. My genealogical approach construed pornographic narrative fiction as a phenomenon that came into being here in the West at a certain time and a certain place. Its Weberian "adequate cause," I argued, was the Reformation and the institution of the Protestant ethic. Section 3.2 considered the relationship between pornographic literature and Anglo-American law. Section 3.3 took up Erich Auerbach's idea of

Stiltrennung, or "separation of styles," in the literature of the West and its relations to Christianity, Protestant Christianity, the modern novel, and pornographic writing. This set the stage for the argument, presented in Section 3.4, for the central thesis of the chapter, that pornographic writing exploits the conversational pragmatics of the literary speech situation in order to work its arousing effects in persons burdened with the Puritanical conscience and its descendants. Section 3.4 also explicitly tied the concerns of the present chapter to the issues of conversational implicature and perceptive equilibrium broached in Chapter 2 by introducing the important notion of imaginative resistance. Section 3.5 used results gleaned in these discussions to frame John Cleland's *Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure* as the first genuinely pornographic Western literary work and considered a contemporary test case. Finally, Section 3.6 took up the relationship between pornography and prostitution.

I conclude now with a question: Is it possible to isolate a set of conditions individually necessary and perhaps also jointly sufficient for the emergence of pornography among members of the biological species *Homo sapiens* anywhere and at any time? That is, is it possible, despite Nietzsche's assertion to the contrary, to define pornography, history notwithstanding? Such conditions, we may now surmise, may reasonably be said to include the following. In order for pornographic representation to appear, there must be morally proscribed behaviors, there must be the motivation to engage self-deceptively in these behaviors in imagination, there must be representational vehicles capable of serving the imagination in this way, and there must be the capacity to feel guilt about these imaginings. (I urge the reader to keep in mind that as a Weberian "adequate cause," which is neither necessary nor sufficient, the Protestant ethic was *not* a necessary condition for the emergence of modern pornographic fiction. It merely significantly raised the probability of its emergence.) Societies differ with regard to their moral proscriptions, and not every society has developed the introspective style and the bad conscience associated with the Protestant ethic. Nor has every society developed the requisite representational vehicles, including literary ones. It is not obvious that "every epoch and society has the pornography which it deserves," as Kronhausen and Kronhausen claim (1959, 285), because it is not clear that every epoch and society has a pornography at all. Better said: *If* a society has a pornography, it has the pornography it deserves, for that pornography will reflect its moral commitments and the moral psychology

of its members. A given society may lack a pornography because some condition necessary for its emergence is lacking. Pornographies may, then, vary even as the pornographic imagination remains a universal human potential. What seems to be a constant, however, is that the morally proscribed behaviors indulged by the pornographic imagination will include behaviors involving sex and violence as central cases. Why should this be so? The next chapter will attempt to answer this question.

4
Pornographic Fiction and Personal Integrity

4.1   Introduction and chapter conspectus

Near the end of the previous chapter, I claimed that in order for pornographic representation to appear, there must be morally proscribed behaviors, there must be the motivation to simulate these behaviors covertly in imagination, there must be representational vehicles capable of serving the imagination in this way, and there must be the capacity to feel guilt about these imaginings. I also claimed that there might be good reason to expect the behaviors in question to include those involving sex and violence. The aim of the present chapter is to elaborate and justify these claims.

Section 4.2 offers an evolutionary account that attempts to explain why it is that sex and violence constitute the central topoi of pornography. An evolutionary approach to explaining the promiscuous and violent tendencies of the human male, tendencies that fuel the male appetite for pornography, has, it hardly needs saying, been taken before,[1] but not in conjunction with the important idea of the extended phenotype deriving from Richard Dawkins and not with much emphasis (if any) on the importance of the development of human affine (in-law) kinship relations for the evolution of *Homo sapiens*. Section 4.3 constructs a genealogy for the pornographic violent fiction, and Section 4.4 discusses the problem of male homoerotic pornography, which poses a challenge to the feminist analysis of pornography as material that, by definition, degrades women, but also, as I shall explain, poses a challenge to my own analysis. Section 4.5 discusses the problem of the sexually explicit romance novel, another challenge to the feminist analysis of pornography as well as to my own. Section 4.6 takes up the moral psychology or moral emotional dynamics of pornographic fiction, invoking the notion

of cognitive dissonance driving from Leon Festinger (1957), as well as the distinction between persons and wantons developed by Harry Frankfurt (1988), but now fortified with findings from neuroscience relevant to the maintenance of personhood, an important, perhaps the central, component of the human extended phenotype. Section 4.7 concludes both the chapter and the book.

4.2 The prehistory of pornography: sex, violence, and primal kinship

> To see others suffer does one good, to make others suffer even more: this is a hard saying but an ancient, mighty, human, all-too-human principle to which even the apes might subscribe; for it has been said that in devising bizarre cruelties they anticipate man and are, as it were, his "prelude". [Nietzsche 1887/1967, II/6, 67]

The expression "extended phenotype," first coined by biologist Richard Dawkins in his book of that name (1982), includes within phenotypic expression external structures that a species is designed by natural selection to produce as part of its adaptive strategy. Standard examples include spider webs, beaver dams, bird nests, and beehives. Dawkins' notion of the extended phenotype is a component of a theoretical package that includes the controversial position of gene selectionism. This is the view, contrary to Darwinian orthodoxy, that the unit of natural selection, the entity that may be said to "benefit" from adaptive mutations, is the gene and not the organism, despite the fact that natural selection operates directly on phenotypic traits and not genotypic ones. It may then seem that acceptance of the notion of the extended phenotype mandates commitment to gene selectionism. But this is not so, for Dawkins contends that application of the concept of the extended phenotype is not a factual issue, but an interpretive one: it concerns not facts but two ways of "seeing facts" (1982, vi, 1). An organism selectionist who accepts principles of inclusive fitness, the view that the principal "interest" of the individual organism is to maximize the proliferation of its genotype and those of its genetic relatives, and a gene selectionist will agree that the genes are the replicators, but disagree on how best to interpret the question of evolutionary *cui bono*, what entity is properly said to benefit from adaptive mutations. For the gene selectionist, the organism, along with its phenotypic traits, are mere vehicles housing "selfish" genes; for the organism selectionist, the organism is an inter-actor whose fitness is measured by its contribution to the composition

of a reproductively isolated gene pool. However, both could adopt the doctrine of the extended phenotype as an interpretive strategy without inconsistency.

Although I endorse the idea of the extended phenotype, I shall, in what follows, prescind from the controversy concerning the proper unit of natural selection. But I do want to draw attention to the following issue. In adopting gene selectionism, Dawkins tends to underplay the importance of a certain function of the individual organism and not the gene, namely the propensity to maintain homeostasis. Dawkins seems to feel a certain amount of pressure from this direction, for he entitles his final chapter "Rediscovering the Organism," where he is moved to observe:

> There really is something pretty impressive about the individual organism…The organism is a physically discrete machine, usually walled off from other such machines…So what is so special about the individual organism? Given that life can be viewed as consisting of replicators with their extended phenotypic tools of survival, why in practice have replicators chosen to group themselves together by the hundreds of thousands in cells, and why have they influenced those cells to clone themselves by the millions of billions in organisms? [1982, 250–251]

Dawkins answers his question concerning cellular organization by pointing out that clumping together in the nuclei of eukaryotic cells enables genes to maintain their structural integrity and ward off invading "outlaw genes," that is, genes that subvert the proper replicative functions of those segments of DNA we term genes (1982, 264). He answers his question concerning multicellular organization by arguing at length that reproductive cycles of multicellular organisms, or new multicell organism growth from a single cell, allow mutation and natural selection much greater latitude in the process of redesign, making the emergence of organisms with complex, specialized organ systems more likely. Such phenotypic complexity, according to Dawkins, is likely to be a vehicular improvement from the standpoint of the selfish gene: "Complex organs and behavior patterns are favored in arms races" (1982, 264).

It is curious that the word "homeostasis" appears neither in the glossary nor in the index of *The Extended Phenotype*. Dawkins admits that "Lovelock rightly regards homeostatic self-regulation as one of the characteristic activities of living organisms" (1982, 235), but this rather tepid endorsement occurs in the context of an attack on the Gaia hypothesis,

the notion that the earth itself is an organism. Dawkins also allows that "homeostatic adaptations in individual bodies evolve because individuals with improved homeostatic apparatus pass on their genes more effectively than individuals with inferior homeostatic apparatuses" (236). I have belabored this point here because in my view, the importance of homeostatic adaptation should not be minimized: I shall be arguing for its attribution not only to the individual organism, but also to the socially constructed person.

The human extended phenotype includes elaborate social phenomena, including social institutions, practices, norms, and, perhaps most importantly, the social identity of the individual. If a particular social phenomenon is widely shared among humans, this could be the result of convergence or homoplasy: human beings in different times and places may be led to solve similar problems of social coordination in similar ways using strategies that are independent in origin. To the extent a social phenomenon approaches universal distribution, however, the likelihood that it is the result of convergence diminishes. Language use is perhaps the most salient example. All known extant human societies communicate using language, and whatever controversies may remain concerning the details of generative theory in linguistics, there is at this point little doubt that all human languages employ universal "descriptive" grammatical principles and that normal humans possess selected-for brain structures that carry out the functions of a language acquisition device that is, to some extent, innate.

When we turn our attention to human marriage customs and kinship categories, we do see a considerable amount of cultural variation. Humans have historically practiced polygyny (pair bonding between one man and more than one woman), monogamy (pair bonding between one man and one woman), and, much less often, polyandry (pair bonding between one woman and more than one man). Clans or tribes (primitive kinship networks) sometimes consist of or constitute "moieties" (linked pairs of sub- or super-groups of unilineal descent whose members may not marry one another). Almost without exception, human clans have been patrilineal (descent traced from the father) as opposed to matrilineal and patrilocal (married women depart the clan of their origin to join that of their husbands) as opposed to matrilocal. Combinations of these types are possible: societies[2] that are patrilineal and patrilocal or matrilineal and matrilocal are termed "harmonic," those that are not, "disharmonic" (Levi-Strauss 1969, 215). All human societies, however, proscribe some sexual behaviors, most notably incestuous ones (though incest is variably defined [Chapais 2008, 71]), just as all societies proscribe

certain marriage partners; and all societies proscribe some acts of lethal violence against kin, that is, members of one's own tribe, or group of clans. The fact that these extended phenotypical traits are strongly pan-cultural suggests that factors other than mere convergence are at work. But what might these factors be?

There are to my knowledge only two answers to this question available, one much better supported empirically than the other. The first derives from the structuralist theory associated with the name of Claude Levi-Strauss, and the second is a more recent evolutionary account ably presented in its contemporary form by Bernard Chapais (2008). Despite their profound differences, these theories share one important feature: they both hold that the establishment of bilateral affine, or "in-law," kinship relations between local groups by way of pair bonding was crucial in the separation of the hominid lifestyle from those of nonhominid primate relatives. Bilateral affine relations derive from both members of a bonded pair. While the social structures of a number of primate species share with humans certain bits and pieces, including bloodline organization, patrilocality, incest avoidance, negative sanctioning of violence against kin, and recognition of *unilateral* affine relations, they display no recognition of the *bilateral* affine relation. Compare Chapais (2008, 124):

> In a [human] patrilocal society, for example, a wife lives with her husband's relatives (her in-laws); similarly, a husband, even if he does not live with his wife's relatives, meets with them and hears about them on a more or less regular basis, depending on the society. In human societies, therefore, exogamy translates into the bilateral recognition of affines. The situation is very different in primate societies.

In particular, the primate species most closely related to humans by evolutionary descent, namely the Pan clade consisting of chimpanzees and bonobos, show no recognition of the affine relation *on the side of the female* who has left her patrilocal community. The difference between the two theories lies in the way in which they explain the establishment of the crucial maternal kinship relations.

The structuralist approach of Levi-Strauss shares Chomsky's anti-evolutionary bias (cf. Chapais 2008, 95). For Levi-Strauss, the establishment of kinship relations rests on the invariable structure of reciprocal exogamy, or the exchange of females, the "most precious category of goods" (Levi-Strauss 1969, 61), between communities. If one community gives up a woman to another, the first must also gain a woman.

If the transference occurs between two communities only, it is direct; if community A gives up a woman to community B while B gives up one to C, which in turn gives up a woman to A, it is indirect. Human indirect exogamy may take on forms that are quite complex, involving exchange among multiple communities across more than one generation. While there is this sort of flexibility regarding how a community implements reciprocal exogamy, every human society, according to Levi-Strauss, will implement some version of it as a result of an innate capacity in the human mind-brain to represent the basic structure of reciprocal exchange. The following claim on the part of Levi-Strauss, written a decade before Chomsky made his seismic impact on linguistics and cognitive psychology, suggests such a nativist view: "Every new born child provides in embryonic form the sum total of possibilities, but each culture and period will retain and develop only a chosen few of them" (Levi-Strauss 1969, 93; cf. also Chapais 2008, 95). Just as Chomsky's language module (or language acquisition device) is held to be unique to the human mind-brain and an item about which speculation concerning evolutionary provenance is of little or no use, the same is true of the device that we might, with a bit of license, call the Levi-Strauss reciprocity module. Chomsky's fundamentally Cartesian bias in favor of marking off human linguistic capacities *toto caelo* from anything of which animals, even our closest primate relatives, are capable is discernible in Levi-Strauss' attitudes toward human reciprocal exogamy and the bilateral affine kinship relationships it engenders. The development of *specific forms* of reciprocal exogamy, however, is for him entirely a matter of culture, a matter of nurture and not of nature. It is these cultural products that decisively separate human from nonhuman animal life.

At this point, one might make the principled objection that sophisticated functional components of the mind-brain like those postulated by Chomsky or Levi-Strauss tend not to be freak accidents sprung fully armed from the head of a cephalagiacal nature, but tend rather to be products of the tinkering of evolution, the blind watchmaker. Fortunately, we need not engage in any such dialectical maneuver, for Levi-Strauss' version of the doctrine suffers from a fatal flaw. For him, exogamy is a cultural construction whose *raison d'être* is the avoidance of incest: men gave up their sisters and daughters so as to avoid incestuous sexual relations with them. That is, he endorses the now widely discredited Freudian view that human beings have a natural proclivity toward incest that civilization must work mightily to suppress (1969, 17). The Freudian account is incompatible with robust data indicating an innate tendency to *avoid* incest

among primates (Chapais 2008, 76). This being the case, it is unlikely that humans would have developed the opposite proclivity. Both Freud and Levi-Strauss were aware of the pioneering work of Edward Westermarck, but they dismissed his results a priori, results strongly indicating that young children reared together in intimate familial circumstances tend (and *only tend*) to develop an aversion to sexual intimacy with each other, whether or not they happen to be biologically related.[3] Why, reasoned the Freudian theorists, would human societies impose so stringent a prohibition (with some notable exceptions under special circumstances) against a mode of activity toward which its members already felt a strong aversion? These theorists seem not to have realized that some of the most firmly entrenched human behavioral imperatives are explicit codifications of norms, which to that point in time had already been implicitly implemented in practice (cf. Chapais 2008, 84). Their question is like asking, why would we have adopted Aristotle's rules of syllogistic inference if human beings already were disinclined to reason fallaciously? But human beings did not need Aristotle to dissuade them from reasoning in ways that did not accord with at least a number of intuitively obvious forms of valid categorical syllogistic inference. It was the explicit codification of the rules and the systematic organization of *all* the valid and invalid forms and moods of categorical logic, that is, the invention of the science of logic, that was his great achievement.

According to the second evolutionary account, proposed by Chapais, Richard Wrangham, Dale Peterson, and others, the exogamy configuration is a *result* of innate incest avoidance rather than its cause. That is, the human exogamy configuration is an instance of evolutionary exaptation, the adaptive co-option of a structure already in existence. It is a fallacy to try to use extant species of primates as direct stand-ins for the evolutionary ancestors of modern humans. But our closest living relatives, chimpanzees, can provide some useful clues concerning the most recent common ancestor predating the human–Pan split. Like us (in most cases), chimpanzees are patrilineal and patrilocal. That is, they trace lineage along the male bloodline with male control of territory, while the females related by blood and therefore sexually unavailable depart to join other groups to mate. When this occurs, the females gain as "in-laws" the relatives of the males of the new group, but lose all contact with members of their home group, a major, indeed, as Levi-Strauss would have it, *the* major fundamental structural difference between nonhuman and human social organization.

Another major difference between humans and chimpanzees in particular is that the sexual habitus of the latter is promiscuous: during

estrus, males and females mate indiscriminately with multiple partners. The chimpanzee rainforest habitat and the easy availability of fruit as the major food source support this lifestyle. The allied males will defend their common territory, but because of the density of food sources, defense of specific food-bearing locales within that territory is unnecessary. There is also no requirement of a division of labor, with hunting delegated to males and food gathering and preparation to females, since chimpanzees are only opportunistically carnivorous. Still, sexual jealousy is a strong motivator, and there are clearly defined orders of male dominance. Males will fight over sexual access to females and will groom, cajole, coerce, and, if necessary, even viciously batter females in order to ensure their sexual availability. The lifestyle of the common ancestor of humans and chimpanzees was in all probability similar, since it was hominids post-dating the human–Pan split that made the transition from the tropical rainforest habitat to the drier, more open savanna. It should be noted that we humans are genetically more similar to chimpanzees than we or chimpanzees are to gorillas. This change in habitat required a change in sexual practices. Now more dispersed food sources had to be defended and, with an increased premium placed on food sharing and division of labor between male hunting and female food gathering, females had to be protected against interlopers as well. As a result, ancient hominids forsook the chimpanzee practice of sexual promiscuity and took up a version of the pair-bonding strategy.

Pair bonding in a species most emphatically does not, however, mandate monogamy, which is merely "maximally constrained polygyny" (Chapais 2008, 177). This is of the first importance. The male *Australopithecine* tended to gather about him as many females and to stake claim to as much food-bearing territory as he could defend against other males *within the social group or community* (which was no longer promiscuous in the manner of chimpanzees) and predators. Polygyny, not monogamy, was the preferred arrangement. Degree of male to female dimorphism in a primate species constitutes evidence of male competition, and male competition is greatest under conditions of polygyny and general promiscuity (Chapais 2008, 178).[4] Primate sexual dimorphism is greatest among gorillas, which divide into isolated harems dominated by a single silverback male twice the size of females, and is intermediate among chimpanzees and bonobos, which are promiscuous. The premium placed on the physical size of males reliably indicates significant male competition in both cases.[5] Based on available skeletal evidence, *Australopithecine* dimorphism was considerably greater than that of chimpanzees but somewhat below that of

gorillas (Chapais 2008, 178). This, according to Chapais, indicates the presence of a polygynous mating system.

   The first hominid species to show a modern pattern of human dimorphism is *Homo erectus*, which suggests a monogamous mating system. But monogamy, recall, is maximally constrained polygyny, and the historically polygynous nature of most human societies "strongly suggests that the ancestral hominid pattern was generalized polygyny, not generalized monogamy" (Chapais 2008, 172). How, then, did monogamy develop among hominid species? Chapais maintains that the crucial factor was cultural, not biological or environmental, namely, the invention of weaponry. "God created men," it used to be said in the American Old West, "but Colonel Colt made them equal." The hominid males who made the transition from polygyny to monogamy were obviously not drawing and firing six guns, but they had developed primitive weaponry, since many a tool could double as a weapon. (Think of the memorable presentation of a moment of epiphany in Stanley Kubrick's *2001: A Space Odyssey*.) "Armed with a deadly weapon, especially one that could be thrown some distance," says Chapais (2008, 177),

> any individual, even a physically weaker one, was in a position to seriously hurt stronger individuals. In such a context it should have become extremely costly for a male to monopolize several females. Only males able to monopolize tools or males forming coalitions could do so. But because all males can make tools and form coalitions, generalized polygyny was bound to give way eventually to generalized monogamy.

Monogamy, Chapais continues (178), "did not evolve as a result of specific selective pressures. The drive for polygyny was merely checked, not eliminated. Polygyny could reemerge whenever some males secured more competitive power or were able to attract several females based on attributes other than physical prowess. Human societies amply testify to this reemergence." But this is of the first importance, for, despite the relatively low degree of modern human sexual dimorphism, it would suggest that *Homo sapiens* remains a polygynously inclined species whose sexual behaviors are constrained by cultural convention based on tool making, as well as its technological descendants, and on coalitions. As Wrangham and Peterson state (298n2) clearly, if not particularly subtly,

> Prostitution, of course, represents another expression of the polygynous inclination within (and sometimes without) officially monogamous

societies since prostitution invariably supplies a male (both hetero-sexual and homosexual) demand…*Pornography reflects the same pattern* [my emphasis].[6]

It is, then, at least arguable that pornography, wherever and whenever it might happen to appear in human society, will concern itself with sex. But this is not to say that it is bound to appear.

We share with chimpanzees (though not with bonobos) an additional, more disturbing trait. Say Wrangham and Peterson,

> Very few animals live in patrilineal, male-bonded communities wherein females routinely reduce the risks of inbreeding by moving to neighboring groups…only two animal species are known to do so with a system of intense, male initiated territorial aggression…out of four million mammals and ten million or more other animal species, this suite of behaviors is known only among chimpanzees and humans. [1996, 24]

This is a rather sobering fact, assuming it is one.[7] Chimpanzees consti-tute the only extant species other than humans whose male members engage in intergroup raiding for the sole purpose of hunting and killing vulnerable conspecifics for sport, not consumption (Wrangham and Peterson 1996, 47). Once again, this is not true of bonobos because of their distinctive female pacification techniques (see note 5). But recall as well the conviction held by both Levi-Strauss and Chapais that it is the establishment of bilateral affine (in-law) relationships that distin-guishes human society from all nonhuman animal social groups. For a chimpanzee, a male belonging to an alien group who bonds with a departed female is just another outsider. For a human, he is not: he is a likely coalition partner, a *social relative*. But human affine relationships are conventional. And this means that at some point in the develop-ment of the hominid line, the murderous raiding tendency against out-group individuals had to be suppressed so as to avoid the visitation of violence on affines, namely, males pair-bonded with departed consan-guineous females and, as a result, potential allies, as well as to avoid the visitation of violence on other members of the groups to which these affines belonged, thereby giving rise to the earliest extended commu-nities bound by ties of convention. The tendency of ancestral males (presumed on the basis of the contemporary behavior of chimpanzees) to attack female kin who had migrated to another group also had to be inhibited (Chapais 2008, 221). But suppression by convention does not

bring about motivational extirpation. The ancestral bloodlust remains in our evolutionary heritage, and, like sexual lust, will seek expression if blocked. (Once again, this resonates with Nietzsche's discussion in the second essay of *On the Genealogy of Morals*.) Pornography, as Wrangham suggests, provides the vehicle for the virtual indulgence of these lusts.

With this, we have answered the question posed at the end of the previous chapter and at the beginning of this one: Why are sex and violence central pornographic topoi? Primordial tendencies to engage in socially proscribed modes of sexual (as well as violent) behavior remain a part of our primate evolutionary inheritance. Should we really expect that the conventional restrictions that made human civilization possible would not breed their discontents?

4.3   The other "other Victorians"[8]: public execution in England and the emergence of the pornography of violence

> And it is consistent with this [our contemporary Western] culture that it is not only sex but also pain and death that bear the most outlawed excitements, and so are today's tabooed and pornographized subjects. [Gatrell, 1994, 13]

> In "punishing" the debtor, the creditor participates in the *right of the masters*: at last he, too, may experience for once the exalting sensation of being allowed to despise and mistreat someone as 'beneath him' – or at least, if the actual power and administration of punishment has already passed to the "authorities," to *see* him despised and mistreated. The compensation, then, consists in a warrant for and title to cruelty .[Nietzsche, 1887/1967, II/5, 65]

The seventeenth-century English diarist Samuel Pepys, the very same Samuel Pepys who bought, read, and then burned his cheap copy of *L'Ecole des Filles*, was an avid witness of public executions by hanging, a practice not proscribed by law in Great Britain until 1868 (Gatrell 1994, 244). (In France and the United States, public execution continued until well into the first half of the twentieth century.) A century later, James Boswell, celebrated biographer of Samuel Johnson and friend of David Hume, was similarly fascinated by these spectacles (ibid., 262). Pepys, Gatrell tells us, is known to have been shaken by an execution only once, "and then because the victim was a semi-gentleman with whom he identified (identification always being the enemy of equable dissociation)" (ibid., 244). The same is true of Boswell, who was unwontedly disturbed by the hanging of the highway robber Paul Lewis, who, said

Boswell, appeared "a genteel, spirited young fellow…He walked firmly and with a good air, with his chains rattling upon him, to the chapel" (quoted in Gatrell 1994, 288). According to Gatrell, Lewis "reminded Boswell of Macheath in the *Beggar's Opera*, a personage and play Boswell greatly fancied. Clearly," Gatrell opines, "Lewis also reminded Boswell of himself" (288). Emotional discomfort in both men was linked to the tendency to identify with the criminal and not alienate him as an other, a tendency nurtured by feelings of class kinship.

But by the mid-nineteenth century, we sense the beginnings of a sea change in attitude. In 1840, novelist William Makepeace Thackeray came away from the hanging of Courvoisier, a lowly French valet who had robbed and murdered his aristocratic master Lord William Russell, with feelings of a different order:

> The sight left on my mind an extraordinary feeling of terror and shame. It seems to me that I have been abetting an act of frightful wickedness and violence performed by a set of men against one of their fellows…I came away down Snow Hill that morning with a disgust for murder, but it was for the murder I saw done. [quoted in Gatrell, 1994, 296 and Flanders, 2011, 207]

Although Charles Dickens' reaction to the hangings in 1849 of the convicted murderers Frederick and Maria Manning was directed more toward the spectators than the condemned, its emotional tone is similar:

> When the sun rose brightly…it gilded thousands upon thousands of upturned faces, so inexpressibly odious in their brutal mirth or callousness, that a man had cause to feel ashamed of the shape he wore, and to shrink from himself, as fashioned in the image of the Devil. When the two miserable creatures who attracted all this ghastly sight about them were turned quivering into the air, there was no more emotion, no more pity, no more thought that two immortal souls had gone to judgment, no more restraint in any of the previous obscenities, than if the name of Christ had never been heard in this world, and there was no belief among men but that they perished like the beasts. [quoted in Flanders, 2011, 172]

Thackeray and Dickens were men of refined sensibility, but so were Pepys and Boswell. Yet while the two men of the nineteenth century reacted empathetically, those of the two preceding centuries, with very rare exception, did not. Why?

We must be very clear about the question being asked here. The question is, of course, a historical one, but not one concerned principally with the historical significance of the individuals Pepys, Boswell, Thackeray, or Dickens. We are concerned with social history and, to adopt Weber's terminology, with ideal types exemplifying the ideals of the societies and the classes within the societies to which these individuals belonged. The question is also clearly a causal one, but, again, one that seeks a Weberian adequate cause, not a set of nomological conditions. The causal question is: What were the conditions that increased the probability of this change in attitude toward public execution among the more perceptive within the middle class?

In attempting to answer such a question, the naturalistic philosopher must, as usual, begin by consulting the findings of experts in the appropriate fields of empirical study – in this case, social history and historical sociology. Important facts to note include the following. First, although enslavement and public execution had been practiced in Europe for millennia, in Great Britain the abolition of public execution in 1868 post-dated the abolition of slavery by a mere 35 years. Second, the same groups active in the antislavery movement, namely Evangelicals (third-generation followers of John Wesley) and Quakers, all of whom shared Puritan ideals, were active in the movement for penal reform (Gatrell 1994, 371, 399). Relying in part on a most insightful article by historian Thomas L. Haskell (1985, I and II), Gatrell hypothesizes (1994, 17, 232n) that both abolition movements shared the same adequate cause, namely the rise of modern capitalism. Now this claim seems highly counterintuitive, since capitalism is associated in the popular mind with ruthless competition and crude social Darwinism. Yet Haskell, who deals only with the abolition of slavery movement, presents a surprisingly subtle and compelling case, a case, moreover, that Weber would have appreciated: "The Quaker reformers who were so prominent in antislavery and every other humanitarian endeavor of the age were also fabulously successful businessmen who epitomized the Protestant ethic and the capitalist mentality" (Haskell 1985, I, 346; see also 340, 342n7).

Modern capitalism is indeed a realm in which *caveat emptor* rules, the scene of a highly competitive struggle for existence. But it is all too easy to miss the fact that this struggle proceeds within strictly enforced limits.[9] It is no more comparable to a Hobbesian state of nature than is a regulated boxing match comparable to a gutter brawl. For modern capitalism is also a realm of contractual obligation, of promises made to deliver goods or services by some future date, promises that are enforced by law. Before the advent of modern contract law, trading was generally

limited to simultaneous exchange, as with barter or cash payment on the barrelhead for goods tendered or services rendered at the time, and to the extent it was not, exchanges occurred only between trusted members of family and closely knit sects, for the requisite trust depended on links of "blood, faith, or community" (Haskell 1985, II, 556). Paradoxical as it may seem, the establishment of contract law had the unintended effect of elevating the standing of contractually obligated parties from alien others to partners extending a level of mutual respect. It is perhaps not too much to claim that this mutual respect reflected in the actual world of commerce a glimmer, however faint, of Kant's resplendent ideal of a Kingdom of Ends, a society of rational beings at once legislators and subjects of law. Recall the importance of the perfect duty to others of promise keeping in the Kantian ethos (Kant 1785/1981, 4:402–403), as well as his discussion (op. cit, 4:397) of the moral requirement that a merchant keep a fixed price for all customers, whether experienced or inexperienced. By extending trust to complete strangers, Haskell argues (1985, II, 556), modern capitalism and contract law expanded the boundaries of empathy beyond kin and even class to all those eligible to enter into contractual obligation and in so doing, had the effect of extending humanitarian sensibility beyond the boundaries of kin and class, boundaries that cramped the sensibilities of Pepys and Boswell.[10] For those who took contractual principles seriously, slavery was wrong because the slave had never contracted to deliver himself into a life-time of servitude without recompense. Paid servitude, and the rigid class differences that went along with it, on the other hand, remained acceptable to these early reformers because paid servitude was mutually contracted and differences in social rank were still conceived as part of the divine order. Haskell quotes Quaker abolitionist John Woolman: "The master's property in the slave is 'wrong from the beginning…if I purchase a man who hath never forfeited his liberty, the natural right of freedom is in him'" (1985, II, 564).[11]

4.3.1   The genealogy of violent pornographic fiction

In the previous chapter, we noted that sexually pornographic fiction developed from the older tradition of obscene satire, but was built on the chassis of the novel of formal realism.[12] The development of violent pornographic fiction displays a developmental trajectory of its own, for the tradition and the chassis in question are quite different. In this case, the tradition was that of the gothic tale, which characteristically included bloody violence and occult forces. This tradition, which is sometimes viewed as the product of a Romantic reaction against Enlightenment

rationality, is generally thought to have begun with Horace Walpole's *The Castle of Otranto* (1764), but it includes such classics as Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* (1818) and Bram Stoker's *Dracula* (1897), both of which reworked the ancient theme of the monster as mass murderer, a theme that goes back in Western literature as far as *Beowulf* and beyond to the *Odyssey*. In contemporary times, the traditional element of supernatural evil has tended to give way to psychological deviance, engendering the now-familiar tale of the murderous psychopath or sociopath, a conceit that will loom large in ensuing discussion. The chassis on which violent pornography was constructed, on the other hand, was the so-called pulp-fiction genre, a development of the "broadside" or "penny-blood," later "penny-dreadful," which itself also derived from the gothic tradition. These items were pamphlets of about eight pages that were sold at or near public executions and that both depicted and described in lurid detail gruesome crimes of condemned murderers. The penny-dreadfuls were immensely popular with the attending crowds, serving to intensify the expression of untrammeled bloodlust so deplored by Thackeray and Dickens. When fictional penny-dreadfuls, initially derived from actual events,[13] began to appear, they employed the same format and were termed "pulp fiction" because of the low-quality paper used for these evanescent publications hardly written for the ages. With middle-class sentiment turning against public executions and leading to its abolition in 1868, the familiar venue for this sort of satisfaction of "primal" bloodlust was no longer available (cf. Gatrell 1994, 242). But graphically violent pulp fiction like *The Curse Upon Mitre Square* and David Pae's *Mary Paterson, or, The Fatal Error* (ca. 1861)[14] remained. Most importantly, such works enabled a virtual satisfaction of bloodlust not only in those members of British society who would have continued to attend public executions with glee had they been able to do so, but also those, influenced by Thackeray, Dickens, and the Evangelical abolitionists, who had come to believe them too unseemly to attend, but still derived secret, if unacknowledged, thrills from reading thematically related fictional accounts in private. At this point, violent pornographic fiction emerged from pulp fiction. Says Gatrell (1994, 599), "The biggest audience was still a polite one, tucked away in distant clubs and drawing rooms, consuming images in safety, as pornography is always consumed."

4.3.2   Two contemporary test cases

Consider two passages, quoted (for now) out of context, from two contemporary novels. Both passages are graphically violent and both have sexual content explicit enough to qualify as pornographic. In both

cases, the agents are men. In the first, the sexual content is homoerotic, in the second, heteroerotic:

> There was a terror in his eyes, & the tension in his body tight as a board. A homely kid with blood-caked nostrils, I was getting pissed at him. His cock shriveled so tiny, like a ten-year-old's, & that look in his eyes. & thrashing his head, & trying again to fight – to fight *me*! – weak as a broken worm. MY ZOMBIE. FIGHTING *ME*. & losing control then I turned him over onto his belly & straddling him & gripping the little pigtail banging his face against the floor & fucking him in the ass my cock enormous so the skin tore & bled, ONE TWO THREE thrusts piercing to his guts like a sword *Who's your Master? Who's your master? WHO'S YOUR MASTER?*

> She tries to cry out again but she's losing consciousness and she's capable of only a weak moan. I take advantage of her helpless state and, removing my gloves, force her mouth open and with the scissors cut out her tongue, which I pull easily from her mouth and hold in the palm of my hand, warm and still bleeding, seeming so much smaller than in her mouth, and I throw it against the wall, where it sticks for a moment, leaving a stain, before falling to the floor with a tiny wet slap. Blood gushes out of her mouth and I have to hold her head up so she won't choke. Then I fuck her in the mouth, and after I've ejaculated and pulled out, I Mace her some more.

Is either or are both pornographic? Without context, it is difficult or impossible to judge. In the novel from which the first excerpt derives, the following passage appears twice verbatim:

> A true ZOMBIE would be mine forever. He would obey every command & whim. Saying "Yes, Master" & No, Master." He would kneel before me lifting his eyes to me saying, "I love you, Master. There is no one but you, Master." & so it would come to pass, and so it would be. For a true ZOMBIE could not say a thing that was *not*, only a thing that *was*. His eyes would be open & clear but there would be nothing inside them *seeing*, and nothing behind them *thinking*. Nothing *passing judgment*.

In the second, we find the following:

> [W]here there was nature and earth, life and water, I saw a desert landscape that was unending, resembling some sort of crater, so devoid of

reason and light and spirit that the mind could not grasp it on any sort of conscious level and if you came close the mind would reel backward, unable to take it in. It was a vision so clear and vital to me that in its purity it was almost abstract. This was what I could understand, this was how I lived my life, what I constructed my movement around, how I dealt with the tangible…it did not occur to me, ever, that people were good or that a man was capable of change or that the world would be a better place through one's taking pleasure in a look or a gesture, of receiving another person's love or kindness. Nothing was affirmative, the term "generosity of spirit" applied to nothing, was a cliché, was some kind of bad joke. Sex is mathematics. Individuality is no longer an issue. What does intelligence signify? Define reason. Desire – meaningless. Intellect is not a cure. Justice is dead…the world is senseless. Evil is its only permanence, God is not alive. Love cannot be trusted. Surface, surface, surface was all that anyone found meaning in…this was civilization as I saw it, colossal and jagged.

Both novels purport to display a personality not merely sociopathic, but psychotic (recall here from Chapter 2 Pratt's conception of a display text). The second, Bret Easton Ellis' *American Psycho* (1991) is, by way of its title,[15] explicit in this aim, the first, Joyce Carol Oates' *Zombie* (1995), only implicit. How successful are these attempts?

Note first syntax, usage, and graphics, for they already supply cues concerning implicature. The simple and artless sentence structures, the clumsy, childish prose, the repeated and inappropriate use of the ampersand by Oates' 31-year-old protagonist Quentin already suggest, by flouting rules of usage and style, a disturbed mind, cunning but hardly thoughtful. Psychosis is implicated early on when we learn that this serial killer actually believes, on the basis of cursory readings of some outdated books on brain surgery, that he can create a "zombie" (a nonconscious and consequently nonjudgmental sex slave) by performing a "frontal lobotomy" using a common ice pick. Inserting the pick above the eyeball through one of the ocular orbits is supposed to disconnect the orbital frontal lobes from the limbic system, thereby radically flattening affect. As might be expected, each subject (all are males) on which this procedure is attempted (without anesthesia, mind you) dies in short order, but not, of course, without experiencing terror and then excruciating pain. Yet the infliction of terror and pain is not Quentin's primary aim: in the scene with the boy, he simply loses his temper. The plan had been to try frontal lobotomy on him as well. And

nowhere does Oates have Quentin formulate anything like a considered view of the human condition, something most likely beyond his ken. His murderous psychosis is shown, in part, by the style of expression of his very modes of thought; it is not said.

Ellis' protagonist Patrick is something else again. Unlike Oates' 31-year-old loser, Patrick is a 26-year-old Master of the Universe, a successful and impeccably pedigreed Wall Street trader enamored of expensive things, a man who knows the brand of every article of fine clothing he owns or happens to be sported by anyone in view who is anybody, and who pays meticulous attention to his physical conditioning and grooming. His stated philosophy may be nihilistic, but it is not in the least psychotic. His thoughts do on one occasion taper off into unintelligibility and then silence, and on another he slips into thinking of himself, as Oates' character is sometimes wont to do, in the third person. However, these isolated episodes, even taken in conjunction with Patrick's murderous acts, offer thin support for an implicature of psychotic detachment from reality, though plenty for one of sociopathology.[16] Patrick must baldly state his nihilistic worldview, which sits like an undigested lump in the body of the novel. He holds a set of nihilistic beliefs all right, but why? Ellis implicates nothing like the ruthless consistency of Sadean materialism.

This makes it difficult to come away with a coherent take on the book. On the one hand, Patrick's speech, both internal and publicly expressed, is quite articulate. He is clearly capable of crafting well-formed, if often clichéd, sentences: the world presents a landscape "so devoid of reason and light and spirit that the mind could not grasp it on any sort of conscious level and if you came close the mind would reel backward, unable to take it in. It was a vision so clear and vital to me that in its purity it was almost abstract." The purity of the abstract is a well-worn conceit of the Western philosophical tradition, so why not invoke it: "sex is mathematics" (solid geometry of organs, numbers of partners or orgasms?) and, as a consequence, "individuality," from which mathematics abstracts, "is no longer an issue." Yes, we understand that Patrick values fine *things*, even things like works of popular musical art, more than he does human beings. For this meager yield we are served up page after page of graphic descriptions of acts of horrific brutality. Any claim that this material contributes to perceptive equilibrium is most unconvincing. If anything, imaginative perception is deadened by its unrelenting horror, rather than quickened by its judicious application.

The novel's title spikes the claim that it, like many a work, should be taken as a piece of obscene satire of a stratum of society, in this case

the American society of the 1980s,[17] rather than as a piece of violent pornography. If Patrick's nihilistic vision of human life is to be taken seriously, even relative to a certain time and place, as Sade certainly intended his own to be, the character who gives it voice should not be tagged a psychotic (but see note 15). Another possibility is to suggest that we interpret the novel as derivative of R. L. Stevenson's *The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* (1886), another product of the gothic imagination: there are two Patricks. The problem with this proposal is that the misogyny, the racism, the imperious assumptions of entitlement, and the egoism that enable the atrocities perpetrated by one Patrick are clearly discernible in the more socially acceptable Patrick. The reader, or this reader at least, comes away from this novel with the sense that the announced theme of psychosis is employed as a cover to license the commitment to paper of the vilest imaginings of which the writer is capable. Ellis has borrowed heavily against the literary guarantee of hyperprotection under the Cooperative Principle (explained in Chapter 2), but the payoff in the currency of insight is not forthcoming. Patrick briefly enunciates his nihilism, but we don't understand its basis and are not forced to take it seriously, as we understand and must take seriously the materialistic nihilism of a Wolf Larsen. Rather, the novel seems to have been written with an eye fixed on the prizes of sales and slasher movie rights. Three coherent and sensitive analyses of the work of contemporary popular musicians serve only to enhance the reader's sense of authorial manipulation.

No doubt there are some who fantasize visiting terrible acts of vengeance on women as payback for rejection and humiliation, and no doubt there are despisers of the underclass who have moments when they secretly relish the idea of using a knife to mutilate and blind a filthy, smelly, African American homeless beggar, and then of whispering, "There's a quarter. Go buy some *gum*, you crazy fucking *nigger*" (Ellis 1991, 132). And there may well be persons who have hankered to take a heavy axe to the face of a bitterly hated successful Jewish business rival, an act chronicled by Ellis in all its gory detail. To whatever extent that this novel does use psychosis as a cover, to whatever extent it is designed to enable self-deceptive gratification of violent imaginings on the part of readers, to that extent does it qualify as pornographic.

That said, the sexual content of the Oates novel naturally invites us to confront the problem left unresolved in the previous chapter, the problem that embarrassed the MacKinnon–Dworkin analysis of pornography, and, I grant, potentially poses difficulties for my own.

4.4   The problem of homoerotic pornographic fiction

[M]any homosexual men achieve in reality the kind of sexual contacts that most heterosexual men can only fantasize about. [Symons 1979, 303]

We noted briefly in the preceding chapter that homoerotic pornography constitutes a serious obstacle for the MacKinnon–Dworkin analysis. If pornography is defined as "the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women in pictures or words that also includes women dehumanized as sexual objects, things, or commodities" (MacKinnon 1987, 176), it follows that pornography that does not subordinate women does not exist. But this is demonstrably false. There is at the present time a comparatively small but thriving market for pornographic materials, including not only books, but also magazines (including *Playgirl Magazine*!), movies, and Internet sites (see Ogi and Gaddam 2011, ch. 7), that cater to gay men and that, as a consequence, do not represent women at all. A similar difficulty besets Langton's "silencing" argument, since it is limited in application to heteroerotic pornography. Does some heteroerotic pornography infringe on women's right to proper uptake of speech acts while homoerotic pornography infringes on no one's?

Unfortunately, the existence of homoerotic fiction presents, at least prima facie, an equally serious embarrassment for my own thesis, namely that such materials provide a self-deceptive, virtually engendered experience of arousal that evades imaginative resistance by minimizing reflection. For we have, or seem to have, in the case of gay males, though by all accounts not gay females,[18] a group of individuals among whom the adaptive male tendency to promiscuity[19] discussed in Section 4.2 can, and often does, express itself virtually unchecked. A number of qualified authorities attest to this. "Homosexual men were usually involved with many sexual partners. One-night stands and casual pickups were the most common homosexual relationship" (Saghir and Robbins 1973, 59). "Sexual exclusivity is not an ongoing expectation among most male couples…some couples report that outside sexual contacts have contributed to the stability and longevity of their relationships" (McWhirter and Mattison 1984, 4). "It would appear that within the cultural world of gay men, emotional intimacy and impersonal sex have not been structured as the nearly polar opposites found in the heterosexual world" (Harry and De Vall 1978, 51). "Almost one-half of the white homosexual males and one-third of the black homosexual males canvassed said they had at least five hundred

different sexual partners during the course of their homosexual careers" (Bell and Weinberg 1978, 85). "The search for new sexual partners is a striking feature of the male homosexual world: the most frequent form of sexual activity is the one-night stand in which sex occurs, without obligation or commitment, between strangers" (Symons 1979, 293).[20] Finally, Laud Humphreys' graphic eyewitness account of the mute, but complexly orchestrated anonymous gay encounters that occur in public park restrooms is not to be ignored (Humphreys 1970). It would seem that we should expect gay men to fail to experience much imaginative resistance when confronted with pornographic writing, for their behaviors indicate apparent comfort with actual, and not merely virtual, promiscuous and uncommitted sexual encounters. As a result, my account seems vulnerable to a *reductio* similar to the one that spikes the MacKinnon–Dworkin definition and bars application of the Langton silencing argument: on my principles, there seems to be no *raison d'être* for homoerotic pornography.

It would be foolish to underestimate this difficulty, but let us take stock. The MacKinnon–Dworkin definition is indeed hopeless in the face of homoerotic pornography, and the Langton silencing argument has no application at all to homoerotic pornography. For me, however, things may not be quite so grim. Here is one possible response. I could maintain that, unlike MacKinnon and Dworkin, I offer no historically decontextualized definition, and, unlike Langton, present no condemnation of any variety of pornography as subversive of anyone's First Amendment rights. Rather, I analyze sexual pornographic fiction as a self-deceptive vehicle for arousal and offer a genealogical account of its emergence in the modern West, an event, according to my argument, that occurred in England in the early eighteenth century. And as a matter of fact, there *was* at the time no free-standing genre of homoerotic pornography, which, it is fairly widely agreed, came into existence, also in England, with *The Sins of the Cities of the Plains* (1881) by the pseudonymous "Jack Saul" and, perhaps most influentially, with *Teleny* (1893), commonly attributed to Oscar Wilde, or to Wilde along with a group of his associates. Nor was the designation "homosexual" available when modern sexual pornographic fiction came into being. At the time, common terms for homosexual acts were "buggery," "sodomy," or "pederasty"; and any writing that we would consider homoerotic was incorporated into works principally heteroerotic, as in Cleland's *Memoirs*. I might, as a result, claim to be justified in ignoring homoerotic pornographic fiction. But such a response would be facile, evasive, and really not to my purpose, which is to treat today's homoerotic pornographic fiction

as a branch of the pornographic literary lineage. Moreover, I did tentatively put forward at the end of Chapter 3 a set of necessary and perhaps sufficient conditions any pornography must satisfy, conditions that include self-deceptive arousal.

Although the sources just cited offering statistics of male gay promiscuity are certainly reputable, a closer look shows their methods to have been flawed in just the same way Alfred Kinsey's pioneering studies of sexuality in the United States in the 1940s and 1950s were flawed: they do not employ probabilistic, or so-called random, sampling. Putting to one side Humphreys' book, which reports firsthand the results of an unsystematic observational field study employing no general surveys and making no statistical inferences, as well as the books of Tripp and Symons, which are discursive, synoptic monographs that sum up rather than directly present results of statistical studies, the remaining works limit their venues of investigation to large American urban centers like Chicago and the San Francisco Bay area (Saghir and Robbins;[21] Bell and Weinberg), San Diego (McWhirter and Mattison), and Detroit (Harry and De Vall). This limitation already has the potential to yield skewed results if the aim is to arrive at accurate conclusions concerning the behaviors of gay men in general or even of gay men in the United States. Equally significant are the methods employed for the recruitment of subjects of study. Because they believed that random sampling was impossible or impracticable, all these investigators used some combination of the following approaches (cf. Bell and Weinberg 1978, 31):

(1) Soliciting patrons of gay bars
(2) Engaging personal contacts of already cooperative gays
(3) Soliciting patrons of gay bath houses
(4) Soliciting the help of local homophilic organizations
(5) Using mailing lists provided by such organizations and cooperative individuals
(6) Soliciting patrons of private gay clubs
(7) Soliciting individuals in public places, including so-called tearooms (known public venues of rendezvous for anonymous gay male sex like the park restrooms described by Humphreys)

Such methods run the risk of over-representation of self-avowed, practicing gay men, which was as recently as 1994 a minority group among gays.

The one statistical sociological study of gay practices known to me that employs legitimate probabilistic sampling, namely Laumann et al. (1994), offers a much more nuanced picture, albeit one that is now more than 20 years old. These investigators interviewed 3,432 respondents, both heterosexual and homosexual, randomly drawn from the noninstitutionalized (nonincarcerated) civilian (nonmilitary) population of the United States by using an "area probability" design, with supplementary samples of black and Hispanic residents, who, the investigators believed, might be under-represented in telephone and address records. In this design, households within culturally various geographical areas throughout the United States were randomly chosen, and then randomly chosen members of these households between the ages of 18 and 59 were solicited (Laumann et al., 1994 45n6). Limitations in government funding of the project mandated the upper age cut-off point.

Laumann et al. show a noticeable sensitivity to ambiguities inherent in the designation "homosexual," a term, it is widely recognized, invented in the nineteenth century when same-gender sexual preference was medicalized as a dysfunction susceptible to psychiatric treatment (ibid., 283n1). These authors recognize three distinct intersecting groups of individuals within the category picked out by the term "homosexual": (1) individuals who engage in same-gender[22] sexual behavior; (2) individuals who experience same-gender sexual desire; (3) individuals who self-identify as homosexual (ibid., 290). Not only is it the case that "some people have fantasies about sex with someone of their own gender without ever acting on these thoughts and wishes" (291), but, somewhat surprisingly, "*desire with no corresponding adult behavior or identification* is the largest single category for both [gay] men and women, with about 59 percent of the women and 44 percent of the men in this cell" (298, my emphasis). Self-identification, on the other hand, had the "lowest prevalence of any of these measures" (297). Studies, like the ones discussed earlier, that confine themselves to or even focus on self-identifiers will be blind to these significant statistical differences. Some of the individuals who neither act on their fantasies nor self-identify as homosexuals may be pleased and excited by homosexual ideation, say Laumann et al. (291), but others may be "upset or made to feel guilty." I am unaware of any statistics showing what subgroup of gay men (if any) makes the heaviest use of homoerotic pornographic fiction, but it seems reasonable to offer the speculation (and, unfortunately, that's all it can be here) that it is the guilt-ridden ideationals who would be most likely to make the sort of self-deceptive use of pornographic fiction I have postulated.

McWhirter and Mattison, themselves a same-sex couple, do observe (1984 281) that "many [gay] couples have a wide assortment of homoerotic pornography. Some collect magazines and pictures, others collect novels, and still others have movies and videotapes they enjoy together or with friends." Just as a nonpornographic text with explicit sexual content may be read pornographically by adopting requisite attitudes, it is also possible, as I have already suggested, for a pornographic text to be read nonpornographically, that is, to be read and used for purposes other than self-deceptive arousal. One might imagine a couple sensitive to the responsibilities of sexual intimacy, heterosexual or homosexual, making non-self-deceptive use of such materials as an aphrodisiac. Pornographic texts may, however, also be read nonpornographically in a very different way: individuals who have thrown off the Christian ethos to the point of being able to engage in gay promiscuous behavior without any psychological discomfort may be expected to be able to indulge their sexual fantasies, when convenient, virtually as well, untroubled by feelings of guilt. While readily acknowledging these possibilities, by no means do they provide a basis for concluding that there is no reason for homoerotic pornography to exist. We must, that is to say, also accord some weight to findings like those of Saghir and Robbins (1973 61), dated though they may be, that the "reactions of the majority of homosexual men [in their study] to their own homosexual feelings and practices were predominantly those of guilt and fear." Attitudes have no doubt changed in the intervening 40 years, but I can see no reason to believe that these attitudes have undergone some sort of radical reversal, at least until contemporary times. Such individuals might be expected, in accordance with thesis of this book, to use pornography as a less psychologically taxing substitute for actual promiscuous sex. Note that the subjects of the Saghir and Robbins study were the *practicing self-avowed gays* in the major urban centers Chicago and San Francisco. One would think that reactions of guilt (and fear) would be *less* marked there than they would be elsewhere in the United States, where society has tended and still tends to be less accepting.

Interestingly, after pointing out that another "generalizable scientific sample that reflects the behavior of the whole population in these several developed nations [the United States, Great Britain, and France] in very recent years shows that 80 percent or so of adults [regardless of sexual orientation] have had no sex partners or only one within the last year," Laumann et al. ask, "Why are all these Western industrialized societies so similar in this important respect?" Their answer: "We suspect that these several societies have common structural features and similar

incentives to marry and form two-adult, at least moderately stable partnerships and that, within that environment, the incentives to have only one sex partner are very strong and are reinforced by personal investments in the partnership, by pressure from peers or stakeholders, and by overt social policies" (193–194). Weber, I think, would have nodded sagely. Laumann et al. do not tell us what proportion of the celibate and monogamous 80% or of the more promiscuous 20% was gay, but the celibate and monogamous gays, whatever their number, might be expected to use homoerotic pornography in the self-deceptive manner I have set out to describe.

4.5   The problem of the sexually explicit romance novel

Our troubles, unfortunately, are not over. Just as homoerotic pornography spiked the MacKinnon–Dworkin definition of pornography, embarrassed the Langton silencing argument, and challenged my own analysis, the sexually explicit romance novel, if it is to be categorized as pornography, does the same. This is material written entirely, or almost entirely, by women for women. Admittedly, to claim that some sexually explicit romance literature, like pornography produced for men, indulges in "the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women in pictures or words that also includes women dehumanized as sexual objects, things, or commodities" (MacKinnon 1987, 176) would not be entirely unreasonable. This claim may have some plausibility with regard to the S&M variety of romance fiction like the currently popular *Fifty Shades of Grey* (2012), a text that could be seen as pornographic. (For now I suspend judgment.)[23] But when applied to the ubiquitous "vanilla" variety of romance to which Lori Foster's novella *Luring Lucy* (2011)[24] belongs, the claim seems quite implausible. Prima facie, there exist, in this work, relations of mutual respect between the romantically linked characters Bram and Lucy. Bram, it is obvious, is absurdly idealized. Not only is he physically appealing and sexually magnetic, he is a man of exceptional rectitude: in love for years with his best friend David's (neglected) wife, his behavior has remained above reproach. After the divorce that results from David's infidelity and David's subsequent death in an automobile accident, Bram takes on responsibility for Lucy's children, to the point of treating them as his own. Moreover, although he desires Lucy beyond measure, he makes no immediate overtures, for fear of providing fodder for the town gossips. After their affair finally begins, Bram rejects her proposal of a casual sexual liaison, holding out for marriage and commitment. "He wasn't in search of a quick and easy

sexual adventure," Lucy concludes. "He wanted her, as an individual woman." Nubile 20-some-year-olds tend to go weak-kneed in Bram's presence and his reputation for virility suggests he has not suffered them to go neglected. Why would he be interested in the comparatively over-the-hill Lucy? Bram's answer: "'I want a woman who matches me in maturity, who's intelligent and settled and honorable.'" Clearly, the seasoned Bram is the man of any mature woman's dreams.

Even here, albeit in insipid vanilla flavor, there is detectable a central gothic theme, the theme of the dangerous, powerful, and wealthy hero with a dark past. In *Fifty Shades of Grey* this element is more pronounced: we are given to understand that Christian Grey was physically abused as a young child, as was Jake Biancolli, the hero of Christine Feehan's *Burning Wild* (2009), an example of yet another variety of sexually explicit romance. This third variety, featuring counterintuitive agents at once human and feline, and able to change form at will, demonstrates the genre's debt to the gothic tradition of occult violence. Romance heroines find these characters profoundly attractive, much as Richardson's Pamela is attracted to Mr. B., Clarissa to Lovelace, and even Charlotte Brontë's Jane Eyre to Rochester.[25]

If the sexually explicit romance novel were classed as pornographic, Langton's silencing argument would seem to face particular difficulty: Are we really to believe that the women who write and read romance fiction of any type are contributing to their own silencing by preventing successful uptake of their own illocutionary speech acts? To make such a charge stick, it would have to be shown that these women are committed to an unrecognized self-defeating ideology they would reject if it were brought to consciousness, a daunting argumentative challenge.

Unfortunately, my own analysis faces difficulties scarcely less daunting. For where do we find the covert virtual gratification that would in actuality be proscribed by conscience that I have suggested constitutes one of pornographic fiction's necessary conditions? Turning to the S&M variety of romance fiction, it could perhaps be argued that whatever Anastasia Steele's erotic transports in *Fifty Shades of Grey*, and whatever a female reader's parallel virtual erotic transports, such a reader could well find herself indignant in real life at a demand for abuse of this sort by a lover, however fascinating, wealthy, otherwise considerate, generous, and disarmingly charming he may be, and regardless of the availability of a mutually agreed-upon "contract" with hard and soft limits of permissibility placed on various activities. In actuality, the reader might well feel, upon reflection, that she was being importuned to forfeit her autonomy, to participate in her own objectification, an act against which her sense

of rectitude and personal pride might be expected to rebel.[26] To the extent the book provides dishonest gratification by suppressing such reflection, it could be considered pornographic. But as a literary study of an eccentric erotic relationship, the book also possesses characteristics of a bona fide, if not exceptionally well-crafted, display text. As a result, the line between *Fifty Shades of Grey* as display text and pornographic text is itself a shade of grey, an interesting consequence perhaps intended by its author.

The real problem for my view is the vanilla romance, the *Luring Lucy* type of story. To be sure, the book is every bit as formulaic as the porno- graphic St. Clair novel considered in the previous chapter, if not more so. It falls into three sexually themed chapters, the first featuring solo female orgasm, the second solo male orgasm, and the third mutual orgasm by way of sexual intercourse. This technique of thematic organization by type of sexual act, a technique employed by Cleland, is one hallmark of the pornographic novel. Driven by deprivation subsequent to her divorce to a febrile pitch of sexual frustration, Lucy has determined to relieve herself by instigating a one-time sexual encounter with the physically appealing 20-some-year-old stud who gardens the summer house she had shared with David. Having gotten wind of this plan, Bram imme- diately leaps into his Mustang and speeds to the scene, runs the fellow off, and steps into the breach as Lucy's sexual savior. All this is contrived and rather implausible. Desperate (and not-so-desperate) people do impulsive things, but how likely is it that an exceptionally attractive, financially stable 39-year-old divorced mother of two would carefully plot such a plan? The book may not be pornography *sans phrase*, but the theme of middle-age postmarital sexual frustration seems to function as a ruse to enable focus on details of sexual relief, thereby facilitating the introduction of a load of explicit sex that is very heavy for so slight a work, a mark of the pornographic. As a piece of literature, the book is silly and vapid, and there is no doubt that at least one of its principal aims is the sexual arousal of the (in this case female) reader.

But the pornographic touches remain relatively light. Largely bereft of implicature and consequently intensely boring, the novella never- theless does have a love story to tell and, as a result, does possess some of the descriptive texture of a display text. To say that this texture, threadbare though it may be, is in place *only* to serve as a cover to facili- tate self-deceptive sexual arousal would be inaccurate and unfair, for the intended *emotional* arousal by the story is at least as important as the sexual arousal. But this is the emotional arousal of the sentimental daydream. It is not Carroll's emotional prefocusing (see Chapter 2,

Section 2.4) at the service of the literary imagination. The emotional arousal is generated only for the purpose of gratification, not to help meet an author's challenge to a reader's understanding: the book seems merely to indulge a common fantasy of secret, unspoken attraction from afar. In the immortal words of Oscar Wilde, "a sentimentalist is simply one who desires to have the luxury of an emotion without paying for it" (1949, 130). Nevertheless, there is not much of a bone here on which bad conscience could pick, for the simple reason that the actions of the main characters are ones pretty widely regarded within the culture of contemporary readers as morally acceptable: although the sexual content is explicit, although it is intended to arouse, the context is such that no (or almost no) action is taken that would be vulnerable to moral condemnation by the vast majority of the novella's intended audience.

I conclude that *Luring Lucy* is not pornographic fiction, but rather sexually explicit erotic fantasy, even if marked here and there with touches of the pornographic. The reasons for this are twofold. First, the book is a genuine, if a rather banal, display text. There is far less objectification and far more mutual recognition between the characters than there is in pornographic fiction directed toward men. Some sentimental and unimaginative readers may well be moved by its tale of consummation of a love that, though long frustrated by circumstance, ultimately will not be denied, albeit it is difficult to believe that any intelligent grown-up would bother to read such a book were it not for the explicit sexual content.[27] This, once again, nudges it toward the pornographic. But second, the display text material does not function merely to disguise virtual indulgence in morally questionable behaviors, for there are none of any consequence. Rather, it indulges sentimental emotions. There is nothing pornographic about that.

4.6   The moral psychology of pornographic fiction

> We are embarrassed when we break wind, but ashamed when we fantasize about disfavored sexual acts. [Prinz, 2007, 78]

Surely, the skeptical reader will object, even if a convincing case for the centrality of sex and violence in pornography has been made, this (deliberately non-Freudian) story of a struggle between civilization and biological inheritance is inadequate to explain the degree of self-deception pornographic writing has been claimed to engender so as to secure its simulational aims. Merely conventional proscriptions of

sexual and violent acts, if that is all they were, could simply be ignored without such elaborate self-deception. More specifically, do the values of the Protestant ethic, which has allegedly served as an adequate cause of modern pornographic fiction, wield merely conventional force? It would seem to have to be more deeply rooted than that.

My response is to agree: mere conventional mores typically lack the imperious force of moral strictures and would be, on their own, too weak to engender anything like the Puritanical bad conscience. Young children intuitively recognize remarkably early in life a fundamental difference between morality and mere convention.[28] There is good reason for this, and to understand why, we must redirect our attention back to Dawkins' notion of the extended phenotype, but now specifically as it relates to human moral psychology. This will enable us to explain the powerful emotional reaction engendered by bad conscience: guilt packs the emotional wallop of a mortal threat to the individual.

Moral theorists, whatever their meta-ethical and normative commitments, have tended to acknowledge the importance of the negative self-directed moral emotions of guilt and shame and their other-directed complements, anger and contempt (a mixture of anger and disgust), in their accounts of human moral psychology. This is sometimes referred to in the moral psychology literature as the CAD (contempt–anger–disgust) model (see Prinz 2008; Rozin et al., 1999). (It is essential to bear in mind that the topic now under consideration is moral psychology, a descriptive account of the moral capacities and responses of the human animal, and not sentimentalist or "emotionist" moral philosophy, which is an audacious and controversial meta-ethical theory.) Whereas guilt is a self-reproach that concerns transgression, shame is a self-reproach that concerns failure to measure up to an ideal. Both of these emotions, it is important to note, require a self-concept, which is a distinctively human cognitive achievement. On the other hand, anger is elicited by infractions on individual right, contempt is directed against infractions against the communal order, and disgust against violations of purity or the "natural" order. As we have already observed, the individual human animal constructs as part of its extended phenotype a social identity, and groups of such animals construct the social world in which that identity lives, moves, and has its being. Since they are emotions, moral emotions engage "core relational themes" (Lazarus 1991, 121ff): How does this exigent situation bear on *this* particular organism, how does it bear on *me*? Core relational themes are the central varieties of harm or benefit that pertain to specific classes of emotions. The core relational theme of anger and its relatives, for example, is offense against

me or mine. That of fear is a sense of emergent danger. That of sadness concerns irrevocable loss.

But the emotions of the CAD model, guilt, shame, anger,[29] and contempt, track the dynamics of the social environment, not the dynamics of the physical environment. Like basic negative emotions, they register threats to individual phenotypic integrity and homeostasis; but in this case it is the integrity of the *socially constructed individual human extended phenotype*, not the human biological phenotype, that is in question. Yet such threats are felt as *mortal* threats. Why? Just as a spider spins webs, recall, we humans spin selves by constructing narratives. We may say, with Dennett (1991, 418), that these narratives spin us as much as we spin them. But each of us has an especially intimate and self-protective relationship to this socially constructed self-conscious "autobiographical self," as it is sometimes styled, which includes our memories, our ideals, our very sense of who we are; and we have this relationship because of the functional dependence of the autobiographical self on more primitive brain structures and functions that generate deeply rooted emotional responses.[30]

Certain nuclei in the brainstem, including the cuneiform (or cuneate) nucleus in the medulla, the pontis oralis in the pons, and other aminergic and acetylcholine-sensitive brainstem nuclei, along with the hypothalamus and certain old mammalian cortical structures (the insular cortex and the medial parietal cortices) support what Antonio Damasio, a neo-Jamesian in emotions theory,[31] has termed the "proto-self." These structures nonconsciously monitor and modulate the states of the body and are centrally implicated in the generation of emotions that prime the human organism to respond appropriately to threats to homeostasis. The preservation of homeostasis and bodily integrity, the maintenance of a fundamental self/not-self, inside/outside distinction, in turn, is fundamental to all life (cf. Dennett 1991, 414). This is a point on which the gene selectionist and his opponent will agree. The phylogenetically more sophisticated, but only episodically conscious, "core self" enlists, in addition to proto-self structures, the cingulate and somatosensory cortices; and the temporally extended conscious and self-conscious "autobiographical self" recruits neocortical structures, including the association cortices. Both the core self and the autobiographical self, however, are functionally dependent on the proto-self. The person can (or should) be said to comprise all three "selves."[32]

The role of the proto-self is to monitor and regulate the state of the body. Though the proto-self is not conscious, the body is its intentional object, or the object of the neural representations on which it

is "based." Not so the conscious core self whose functions we share with nonhuman animals. Its intentional objects are out in the world, and there is good reason to believe that they include and must include objects of emotion. The core self, recall, does not require the specialized sensory cortices, not even the early sensory areas, only the somatosensory cortex, the cortical area that registers states of the body. Emotions, in the neo-Jamesian view, are mental states that represent the environment by way of valent or evaluative responses of the body. (James' original theory seems to regard emotions as states that are not intentional.) Although the "nominal content" of these emotions concerns the body, their "real content" concerns what is out in the world (Prinz 2004, 68–69). "Emotions and core consciousness," says Damasio (1999, 100), "tend to go together, in the literal sense, by being present together or absent together … both emotions and core consciousness require, in part, the same neural substrates."

Now it could be said that emotion and core consciousness are independent functions and that their co-presence and absence are artifacts of this partial sharing of neural substrates.[33] I think Damasio is right to urge a stronger line. For this would be an accidental functional correlation, not the "close functional relationship" (1999, 100) between emotional processing and core consciousness that he highlights. Since the conscious core self is built on the unconscious proto-self and augments its bodily homeostasis-preserving functions with emotional appraisals of worldly circumstances, the core self's representational mode is *inherently* emotional. The core self, that is to say, represents the world principally in terms of Lazarus' "core relational themes." "[S]ome degree of continuous emoting is virtually inseparable from the conscious state," we are told (Damasio 1999, 100). Yet "there is no such close functional relationship between emotional processing and extended consciousness," the mode of consciousness that belongs to the autobiographical self (100–101). From this it follows that "the continuous emoting" that is "virtually inseparable from the conscious state" requires, indeed perhaps even derives from, core consciousness. Because of its functional dependence on the proto- and core selves, the thoughts that constitute the autobiographical self are tinged with a certain "'warmth' of bodily existence," as James says (1971, 103), a distinctive emotional glow that marks them as mine. "This central part of the self is *felt*," he asserts. "It may be all the Transcendentalists say it is, and all the Empiricists say it is in the bargain, but it is at any rate no *mere ens rationis*, cognized only in an intellectual way, and no *mere* summation of memories … But when it is found, it is felt; just as the body is felt" (1971, 89, emphases

original). A threat to my autobiographical self has the emotional impact of a *mortal threat to me*.

4.6.1   Cognitive dissonance and the construction of the human extended phenotype

To this point in our discussion, the notion that Dawkin's conception of the extended phenotype can be applied to the socially constructed autobiographical self and, more significantly, that it enlists homeostasis-preserving emotional functions remains only a suggestion, a speculative hypothesis at best. But there is empirical evidence available from a rather venerable and empirically well-supported theory of social psychology, namely the theory of cognitive dissonance, a theory that has maintained a robust presence as a viable research program ever since its initial formulation by Leon Festinger in 1957. Awareness of one's own inconsistency causes, or has a tendency to cause, that state of discomfort Festinger dubbed "cognitive dissonance." A special case is inconsistency between thought and action: humans are inclined to react with discomfort to an awareness of their own practical inconsistency. Although Festinger likened the motivation to reduce dissonance to a "drive," such as hunger or sex (Festinger 1957, 3, 18), nowhere did he say that it just *is* a drive. Drives are standing physiological maintenance functions, at times quiescent, but ever-active in the healthy organism, whatever its circumstances. This is as true of hunger as it is of sex, even taking account of estrus and the intermittence of mating seasons in nonhuman animals. Festinger was quite keen to recognize that cognitive dissonance, by contrast, is primarily, if not exclusively, a circumstance-driven, intermittent psychological phenomenon that pertains to pairs of "elements" or "cognitions" that, on the one hand, "represent knowledge about oneself: what one does, what one feels, what one wants or desires, what one is," and, on the other, "concern the world in which one lives: what is where, what leads to what, what things are satisfying or painful, " and, last but not least, what is "inconsequential or important" (1957, 9). Cognitive dissonance, that is to say, concerns the evaluation by the human organism of its own mental economy and of its interactions with its environment. This tends to nudge the discomfort of cognitive dissonance over into the category of emotions, rather than drives, for emotions, as we just saw, are appraisals of exigent circumstances that concern core relational themes.

So described, cognitive dissonance could well result from inconsistency between "cognitions" of any sort and is not bound in any essential way to social context. But this is not the way Festinger conceived it. From

the first, cognitive dissonance theory was a theory of social psychology: the "environment" in question is primarily the social environment. The intensity of cognitive dissonance is very much a function of the importance of the cognitions in play, and dissonance between cognitions principally concerns inconsistency between attitudes (endorsements, value commitments) and actions. In the case of humans, value commitments that are "normative," that is, in Princeton social psychologist Joel Cooper's terminology (2007, 105), generally shared within a culture, are highly sensitive to social sanctions. It is the normative standards that historically have been held to be decisive for cognitive dissonance, because evaluative thoughts about the self, here the autobiographical self, become particularly accessible and salient in contexts where humans feel themselves subject to social sanctions (Cooper 2007, 115).

The human person is constructed by means of this process of self-evaluation in social contexts, a process in which cognitive dissonance plays an important role. According to Cooper (1999, 170–171), dissonance develops ontogenetically in humans as a "learned drive." (If dissonance reduction were a standard "drive" like hunger or sex, this would be an absurdity.) Says Cooper:

> Think about how children may learn to anticipate events in their lives. They soon learn that certain behaviors are followed by punishments and threats. Soon, children learn to anticipate the connection between behaviors and negative outcomes, and they avoid behaving in ways that bring such outcomes.

So far this is just standard negative reinforcement theory. But Cooper continues:

> Sullivan [reference omitted], in his psychiatric theory of personality development, discussed the creation of the self-system as a way of bringing about security while avoiding anxiety. The key to the system is that the self develops as a complex system of cognitions and behaviors, all designed to cope with anxiety-producing reactions from people in the environment…Children thus learn to anticipate that such events lead to profound negative responses and are to be avoided. So an *uncomfortable emotional reaction* may develop at any hint or anticipation of responsibly bringing about an aversive event…What may develop as a response to the anxiety reactions and sanctions of significant people in the environment may eventually develop its own autonomy and become the tension state known as dissonance [emphasis mine].

On this view, cognitive dissonance is a self-generated state of emotional discomfort whose purpose is the avoidance of the imposition of negative social sanctions. Other theorists have also construed the discomfort of cognitive dissonance as emotional, that is, as a state of physiological arousal coupled with cognitive appraisal: "It is doubtful, however, that discomfort would be the affective consequence of any and all forms of counter-attitudinal behavior [behavior inconsistent with value commitments]. Appraisal theorists of emotion…have empirically demonstrated that the distinct affect experienced by an individual in a given situation is closely related to that individual's cognitive appraisal of the situation along a variety of dimensions" (Elliot and Devine 1994, 292).[34] But in elaborating and enriching Festinger's original conception of cognitive dissonance, his intellectual successors have also rendered it less coherent, bringing about a split along three fault lines, a development we must now trace if we are to extract a coherent account of cognitive dissonance suitable for our purposes.

One relatively small contingent of theorists hew to Festinger's original line and hold that dissonance is nothing other than the psychological discomfort resulting from the awareness of inconsistency as such (Beauvois and Joule 1999, 44). It is undeniable that to the extent cognitive inconsistency subverts effective action, it will be negatively valenced for the organism. But in order to be negatively valenced, it must frustrate the achievement of goals. As a result, even these traditionalist theorists require "commitment" to values on the part of the agent in order for dissonance to arise. Creatures cognitively sophisticated enough to have such commitments also possess a suite of emotions that help them focus on, or "frame," what is important for achieving these goals in the face of obstacles and exigencies and to ignore what is unimportant. If the discomfort of cognitive dissonance, to the extent it is motivating, is recognized as being emotional, it will indicate some threat; and threat to me or mine, recall, is the core relational theme of fear. And indeed, another, larger contingent of "self-consistency" theorists has diverged from the traditional position in a second way, holding that dissonance does not arise from inconsistency per se, but from a *threat to the integrity of the autobiographical self* that cognitive dissonance poses. The threat in question concerns self-consistency as an ideal that regulates agency: cognitive dissonance arises from actions inconsistent with an agent's self-concept, which expresses an ideal of achievement, or an ethical ideal, or both. The emotion typically elicited by ideal inconsistency is shame; the emotion typically elicited by ethical inconsistency is guilt (cf. Aronson 1999; Higgins 1987). Shame and guilt require both self-consciousness and social context. Finally, a third contingent, the so-called New Look

theorists, hold that cognitive dissonance can only arise when an agent feels blameworthy, though not necessarily morally blameworthy, for aversive consequences that flow from one of his actions (Cooper 1999; 2007). There is, however, some telling empirical evidence against this view.[35] As a result, some (e.g., Harmon-Jones 1999, 92) prefer to construe aversive consequences as an intensifier, but not a necessary condition, of cognitive dissonance.

These considerations seem to give the self-consistency theorists something of an upper hand in this contemporary debate. The cognitive dissonance theorist may, however, also advocate a "self-affirmation" view, which acknowledges the origin of cognitive dissonance in a threat to the integrity of the socially constructed personal self, but hold that dissonance may be reduced by then using the self as a resource by bringing positive personal traits to mind that distract from the offending cognition (Steele 1988). This position, however, may be construed as a special case of dissonance reduction by the addition of positive cognitions. And as we will see, it can also be interpreted as reduction of dissonance by comparative trivialization of the threatening cognition. The self-affirmation and self-consistency views, moreover, are by no means incompatible (Aronson 1999, 134).

Self-affirmation theorist Claude Steele (1988 277–278), for example, grants that "dissonance motivation is stirred by the implication of the inconsistency that one is not adaptively or morally adequate." Steele's phrase "adaptively adequate" may be glossed to avoid Darwinian implications out of place here as "competent as an instrumental reasoner." The effective emotion is shame resulting from failure to live up to an ideal. This would suggest the self-consistency view. However, Steele and his colleagues showed experimentally that subjects could tolerate higher levels of cognitive dissonance under conditions of enhanced self-image, even, indeed especially, when the self-enhancement concerned issues *unrelated* to whatever gave rise to the original cognitive dissonance. This counts in favor of the self-affirmation view.

In an experiment designed to test this hypothesis (Steele 1988), subjects were asked to rank in order of preference ten popular record albums as part of a purported marketing survey. The subjects then were given the choice of keeping either their fifth- or sixth-ranked album. This is an inherently cognitive-dissonance–provoking situation, for it requires justification of choice between two closely ranked median options, a justification that tends to enlist some mode of rationalization. Why choose the fifth and not the closely ranked sixth? Merely noting that the fifth was, in fact, ranked just above the sixth normally

is not sufficient if the differences are negligible and if the rejected item has some noticeable merits, while the accepted one has some noticeable defects. (There seems to be some relation here to the well-known phenomenon of "buyer's remorse.") Humans tend to deal with this sort of situation by creating an artificial "spread" between the two choices. They emphasize the positive characteristics of the chosen item and de-emphasize its negative ones, while doing exactly the reverse with regard to the rejected item.

In Steele's experiment, half of the subjects had been chosen because they had demonstrated during previous questioning a strong commitment to science-oriented personal values, the other half to business-oriented ones. After the choices were made but before reasons were solicited, half the subjects were asked to don a white lab coat, ostensibly in preparation for an additional messy laboratory task. Those subjects with science-oriented values who also had donned the lab coat engaged significantly less in the standard spread rationalization of their choices than did those subjects who either did not don the lab coat at all or who did so, but held the business-oriented values (Steele 1988, 275–277). Since science values and business values are both presumably irrelevant to musical preferences, Steele and his colleagues interpreted this outcome as supporting the conclusion that those subjects whose self-image as such had been enhanced in the experimental situation by donning the lab coats were less disturbed by the cognitive dissonance engendered by the record album choice.

On one issue, however, there seems to be general agreement, or something close to it: cognitive dissonance can be reduced in only three ways: either by a change in attitude that renders it more consistent with an action taken, or by bringing to consciousness a collection of positive cognitions that diminish in a comparative way the importance of the felt dissonance, or by trivialization of the significance of the dissonant action itself. As an example of this last strategy, which is about to take on special importance in our discussion, consider someone who acknowledges that cigarette smoking is stupid (and thus inconsistent with one's personal ideal of competent agency), but then asks rhetorically, just how significant is my smoking compared to problems of truly global importance? Such a move trivializes the significance of the action of smoking.

In all the experiments discussed thus far, attitude change was the preferred method of dissonance reduction. But the exploitation of trivialization under experimental conditions should not be underestimated. Simon, Greenberg, and Brehm (1995) conducted four experimental

studies showing that (1) when a subject's preexisting attitude is made particularly salient, the participant will trivialize the cognition of dissonant behavior rather than modify the attitude; that (2) following a counter-attitudinal behavior, subjects will adopt the first mode of dissonance reduction presented to them, whether it be attitude modification or trivialization; that (3), as suggested earlier, self-affirmation easily leads to trivialization of counter-attitudinal behavior; and that (4) making an issue either personally or generally important encourages trivialization of dissonant cognitions rather than attitude change even in the absence of any opportunity for self-affirmation. The details of studies 1, 3, and 4 need not detain us here. But consider study 2. In that study, high-choice participants (once again, university psychology students) were invited to write counter-attitudinal essays in favor of mandatory final exams. Upon completion of the essays, participants were divided into two groups. Members of the first group were queried about their attitudes toward mandatory final exams first and their estimation of the importance of the issue second, whereas members of the second group were queried about importance first and attitudes second. ANOVA (analysis of variance)[36] methods yielded results indicating that, on average, members of the second group changed their attitude, while members of the first group, the group of students who were queried about their attitudes first, thereby reinforcing the attitude commitments, minimized importance, or trivialized.

Applying these results to our topic, readers of pornographic fiction do not actually engage in the actions portrayed. But they simulate them in imagination. In light of previous discussion, the speech-act structure of pornographic fiction may be conceived to provide an *effective trivialization frame* that enables the reader to minimize the cognitive dissonance between virtual imaginings and firmly entrenched Protestant-ethical attitudes by trivializing the significance of those imaginings. These considerations, I submit, lend some welcome empirical support to my adaptation of Dawkins' extended phenotype idea to the construction by the human organism of its social identity and its relevance to the analysis of pornographic fiction.

4.6.2   The homeostasis of the personal extended phenotype and the problem of altruism

The motivation to maintain the homeostasis of the socially constructed self, broadly speaking, is clearly an egoistical motivation, even if not a narrowly hedonistic one. This is particularly obvious in the case of the self-affirmation version of cognitive dissonance theory. As a result,

any moral motivation that was *purely* altruistic or self-sacrificing would serve to undermine the model of moral psychology I have developed to this point, or so it might seem. In this section, I shall attempt to show that even if human beings are sometimes motivated by purely altruistic ends, a contentious point in itself, this poses no threat to my account. Human beings may be *motivated* by pure altruism; but the *psychological moralization* of altruistic motivation, that is to say, establishing the requisite connection between altruistic motivation and the distinctively moral emotions of guilt, shame, anger, and contempt, I shall argue, will require the idea of extended phenotypic homeostasis.

There are, in fact, two problems of altruism, and only one of them constitutes a potential problem for us. In their explanations, evolutionary biologists are careful to distinguish between proximate causes, mechanisms, and explanations on the one hand, and ultimate ones on the other. The former tell us how biological mechanisms work, but the latter explain why they are present in the organism at all. Where a proximate explanation of primate color vision would advert, among other things, to photon absorption by retinal cones, opponent processing, transmission of information via the optic nerve, and distinctive activation patterns in layers of specific areas of the visual cortex, an ultimate explanation would provide an adaptive story explaining the contribution of color vision to the differential reproductive success ("fitness") of individuals in ancestral primate populations competing for limited resources, say red fruits and berries that contrast with a green leafy background. In general, psychological explanations are one and all proximate from an evolutionary standpoint: they tell us how certain cognitive functions operate, not why they are present in organisms.

The issue of altruism can be approached both ways. From an evolutionary standpoint, the problem is to explain how altruistic behavior is adaptive, since a population of altruists will eventually be overwhelmed by selfish free riders, individuals who benefit from the helping behaviors of others while incurring no cost. Biologists have attempted to solve this problem in one of four ways: (1) mutualism, that is, teamwork or collective cooperation; (2) inclusive fitness, or self-sacrifice for close relatives with very similar genotypes; (3) reciprocity that is direct (with future assistance returned to the initially helpful individual) or indirect (with assistance returned mediately through a series of social links); or, more uncommonly, (4) group selection, where free riders will indeed reduce the *proportion* of altruists within a group, but altruists will still manage to increase their *absolute* numbers by enhancing the overall size of the group, so as to render it competitive relative to other groups.[37] This will

enable groups containing altruists to grow more quickly (Sober and Wilson 1998, 79). If these are sibling or family groups (initially isolated mating pairs of adults), juvenile members of the group will grow up and leave to found new groups. In this process, altruists will tend to associate with other altruists, thereby intensifying the altruist contribution to increased group size. When the same dispersal process is repeated, absolute altruist numbers continue to increase (Sober and Wilson 1998, 67).[38] Group selection, once thought to be thoroughly discredited (although originally countenanced by Darwin), has once again become respectable in some evolution-theoretic circles (see Gould 2002; Joyce 2006; Sober and Wilson 1998).

The *psychological* problem of altruism, on the other hand, is entirely motivational. It concerns the question of whether behavior is ever genuinely altruistically motivated, that is, undertaken for the sake of others, or is just pseudo-altruistic, undertaken merely as a means to some egoistical end, be it self-gratification, self-protection, or the assuagement of guilt or some other distress state. The most thorough and scientifically systematic empirical investigation into the psychology of altruism known to me is that of Batson (1991). By controlling and combining selected variables like induction of high vs. low empathy, ease of escape vs. difficulty of escape from an (ostensibly) distressing situation, and reward in the form of money or praise vs. no reward, Batson was able to run careful experiments testing for three plausible egoistical motivational candidates in apparent cases of altruism: (1) aversive arousal (i.e., empathetic distress) reduction; (2) empathy-specific punishment (blame); and (3) empathy-specific reward (praise). If apparent cases of altruistic motivation turned out to be cases of reduction of empathy-related stress, avoidance of blame, or pursuit of praise, then the "altruistic motivation" could be reduced to egoistical motivation, which is to say it would be self- and not other oriented. Batson took his results to show that cases of altruistic motivation could *not* be reduced in this way. On the basis of these investigations, Batson was able to argue convincingly that an irreducible altruism had to be included among the motivational states of his subjects. Nowhere does he claim, by the way, that egoism played no role at all in the decisions by his subjects to help or not to help the "distressed" experimental confederate. Rather, Batson argued only that it was not the case that *all* apparently altruistic motivations could be *reduced* to pseudo-altruistic ones, that is, to means to egoistical ends.

Despite Batson's impressive results, Sober and Wilson remain unconvinced. Because high-empathy subjects helped an apparently needy

individual even when escape was easy, Batson concluded that they were motivated neither by distress nor by punishment avoidance, but by altruism. But this is too quick, say Sober and Wilson (264): these subjects may have been worried about the possibility of disturbing *memories* of help not given, and therefore avoiding distress after all. Were this the case, however, such (pseudo-) altruistically motivated individuals would be expected to try to avoid bad news in the future about the needy individual already encountered. Batson (1991, 161–163) was able to design an experiment that disconfirmed this prediction. Low- and high-empathy subjects were given the option of learning future news about the needy subject in question, news that was given a 20% probability of being good, a 50% probability of being good, or an 80% probability of being good. His results showed that it was low-empathy rather than high-empathy subjects who were more inclined to avoid future news with a low (20%) probability of being good, where the high-empathy subjects did not display this pattern.

But to this Sober and Wilson, once again, have a response. The motivation of the high-empathy subjects could still be covertly egoistic: the *very act of refusing information* about individuals who may be doing poorly can itself engender feelings of guilt. Interestingly, the high-empathy subjects were most desirous (in terms of frequency of participants choosing to engage in a second interview of the needy subject) of information in the intermediate 50% case, presumably because there, suspense was greatest, since good and bad outcomes were evenly balanced in terms of their probabilities. Yet Sober and Wilson have a response to this as well. Informational limbo can be a torment and the high-empathy subjects could have acted to reduce disagreeable feelings of uncertainty (268). Egoism yet again. Sober and Wilson's final judgment of the results of the social psychology of altruism: provocative, but case not proven.

Despite their criticisms of Batson's results, Sober and Wilson nevertheless agree with his basic thesis of motivational pluralism. In their view, human motivation is not "monistically" egoistic, whether egoism is construed narrowly as hedonism or construed more broadly. It is difficult, for example, to explain a desire for posthumous fame on a purely hedonistic basis.[39] For Sober and Wilson, altruism is part of the human motivational repertoire. But psychology, they believe themselves to have shown, is incapable of demonstrating this. That indicates the limits of proximate explanation, and moral psychology is a mode of proximate explanation. An ultimate evolutionary account is required, an account that Sober and Wilson attempt to supply, here taking hedonism as a simpler, more easily handled stand-in for a more complex egoism. Pain,

they say, whether physical or emotional, is a fairly reliable indicator of bodily and psychic insult; but it is far from infallible. Some serious injuries and diseases cause little pain; and some painful states, say certain neuralgias like the very painful tic douloureux (trigeminal neuralgia), indicate no injury. Focusing to begin with on the issue of child rearing, a functional pluralism that includes hedonism (helping one's children in order to alleviate the pain of seeing them do poorly) and altruism (helping one's children simply for the sake of helping them) is a more effective and ultimately more parsimonious evolutionary design, more effective because it involves two independent motivators and so a functional redundancy or overdetermination, and more parsimonious because of the Rube Goldberg complexity of keying a range of child-rearing behaviors to the one motivational type of hedonism (note once again the perhaps questionable simplifying strategy of the substitution of hedonism for egoism).[40] Shifting from child rearing to human relations generally, Sober and Wilson assert:

> the social setting of ancestral human life suggests that concern for others probably embraced a wider circle. Just as selection can promote the evolution of parental care, so it can lead to the evolution of cooperative behaviors in which the beneficiaries are individuals other than one's sons and daughters…Just as motivational pluralism is a plausible design solution for the problem of getting parents to take care of their children, so pluralism is a plausible design solution for the problem of getting members of a group to take care of each other. [326]

But with this move to human relations generally, we have entered the realm of moral psychology, for moral psychology constitutes an important proximate component of any adaptive solution of the problem of coordinating relations, including mutual care, between members of a human society.[41] Altruism may, as Batson as well as Sober and Wilson insist, be irreducible in the causal explanation of human behavior. But there is nothing moral in it, from the standpoint of moral psychology, until we are prepared to condemn an agent responsible for actions judged unacceptable and to bring to bear *the most serious interpersonal sanctions available*, namely, those invoking the moral emotions. These sanctions include the emotional sanctions that threaten the integrity of the agent's personal extended phenotype.[42] These alone carry the requisite moral gravitas, the practical "clout" or "oomph," as Joyce (2006, 62, 171, 176) would have it. When we impose these sanctions, we contemn, we loathe, we despise. And if moral psychology, the

empirical study of moral motivation, be our topic, as it is here, we are driven willy-nilly back to egoism (broadly construed), for that is what the CAD model and the homeostasis of the extended human personal phenotype require.

I do not wish to attempt to make an exclusive case for sentimentalism or emotionism as a moral philosophy, much less as a meta-ethics, which would anyway be beyond the scope of the present discussion. It is also not impossible that human beings are on occasion motivated, as Kant claimed we are (or can be), by moral principle as such, difficult as it is to determine on any specific occasion whether the actual motivator is in fact moral principle and not just the "dear self" (egoism) cleverly disguised.[43] Deliberately skirting here the fraught internalism/externalism debate in meta-ethics, it still remains difficult *as a point of moral psychology* to see how a moral rule could gain motivational purchase without enlisting emotional valence. It certainly is difficult to see how any meta-ethical position committed to naturalism, which I have assumed all along, could avoid tracing moral motivation to the moral emotions. This is not to insist that every moral action is *directly motivated* by some moral emotion. Such actions are often the result of long-standing, deeply engrained habit, something a naturalist would claim can easily be mistaken for a priori moral principle. But these habits are themselves formed by way of a long process of training and enculturation in which emotional sanctions play an indispensable role; and any set of behaviors, however habituated they may be, remains ever eligible for renewed emotional sanctioning. Even Kant, no naturalist, felt compelled, when turning his attention to the empirical psychology of moral motivation (Kant 1785/1981, 4:400–401; 1793/2000, 5:257), to introduce the notion of respect (*Achtung*), which is an emotion, if a complex one, while insisting all the while that it merely *results* from the humbling of "self-love" by the austere authority of the moral law, which is the only genuinely moral motivator. Respect, however, is the emotional contrary of contempt, a component of the CAD model. Schopenhauer, also no naturalist, and the classic apostle of the ethics of compassion and inveterate enemy of egoistic moralities one and all, admits that "actions of moral worth have a characteristic that is quite internal and therefore not so evident, that is to say, they leave behind a certain self-satisfaction, called the approbation of conscience" (1841/1965, 140). True, he does not say that these actions are *directly motivated* so as to avoid the sting of conscience. But notice the emotionally fraught language he chooses when discussing the sort of *sanctions levied against* "double injustice," the singularly egregious moral transgression of inflicting a

harm that at the same time betrays a trust: "This is loathed and detested as something revolting and outrageous, as a monstrous crime and *agos* [abomination] at which the gods, so to speak, cover their faces" (ibid., 156). Detestation (contempt), outrage (anger), and revulsion (disgust): the contours of the CAD model of moral psychology are unmistakable. The psychological theory of moral sanction as threat to the integrity of the human extended phenotype, admittedly a form of egoism, I conclude, remains tenable even in the face of the arguments for genuinely altruistic *motivation* given by Batson, Sober, and Wilson.

4.6.3   Persons, wantons, and pornographic fiction

The functional complex of proto-, core-, and autobiographical selves, I have argued (following Damasio), constitutes a person. Persons, Frankfurt has argued (1971), are capable of what he terms second- and higher-order desires, which are desires concerning first-order desires. Persons, moreover, are capable of *volition*, or freedom of the will, that is, they are capable of endorsing or "identifying" themselves with higher-order desires, thereby "making" certain first-order desires "their will." Nonhuman animals and very young children are not capable of forming higher-order desires, nor can they make first-order desires their will. Therefore, they are not, or not yet, persons. They are nonrational "wantons." A being capable of forming higher-order desires, but whose actions are unreflectively determined by first-order desires, is also not a person, but a *rational* wanton (1971, 16–17). Higher-order desire can, however, lead to a regress:

> [A] person may have, especially if his second-order desires are in conflict, desires and volitions of a higher order than the second. There is no theoretical limit to the length of the series of desires of higher and higher orders; nothing except common sense and, perhaps, a saving fatigue prevents an individual from obsessively refusing to identify himself with any of his desires until he forms a desire of the next higher order. The tendency to generate such a series of acts of forming desires, which would be an act of humanization run wild, also leads toward the destruction of a person. [1971, 21]

Nevertheless, Frankfurt continues, it is possible to terminate such a series of acts without cutting it off arbitrarily. When a person identifies himself *decisively* with one of his first-order desires, this commitment "resounds" throughout the potentially endless array of higher orders (21).[44]

   I submit that the series of orders of desires is not potentially endless, at least for beings constituted as we are. For there comes a point at which

the higher-order endorsement of a desire will bear on the person's sense of the integrity of his autobiographical self, his socially constructed personal extended phenotype. That, psychologically speaking, is where the regress of higher-order desires normally will terminate, just as the integrity of the organic phenotype normally is the proximate biological arbiter of the acceptability of behavioral choices. In both cases, comfort and discomfort, pleasure and pain, will be decisive, whether the comfort or discomfort is preponderantly emotional, as in the case of the personal extended phenotype, or preponderantly physical, as in the case of the organic phenotype.[45] The moral emotions of shame and guilt will be experienced as threats to the integrity of the personal extended phenotype. Of course, just as there are sociopaths abnormally tolerant of or insensitive to emotional pain, there are organisms abnormally tolerant of or insensitive to physical pain.[46]

Rather remarkably, we find similar considerations in play in contemporary attempts to reconcile Kantian deontological ethics with commitments that are even minimally naturalistic. As we need hardly be reminded, the distinction between conditional hypothetical imperatives and the unconditional categorical imperative takes center stage in Kant's moral theory. I do not here set myself the daunting (indeed, most likely bootless) task of making sense of the distinction between conditioned and unconditioned agent causality within a naturalistic framework. Rather, I pursue a more modest aim, that of making sense of Kant's distinction as a point of moral psychology, or, as he would have said, practical anthropology. And here, the solution bears a surprising similarity to the solution to Frankfurt's problem of the meta-level regress of desires. A naturalist may be skeptical about Kant's claim to have provided a pure transcendental foundation for a metaphysics of morals. That is, he may doubt either that Kant's moral law is pure and free of all admixture of practical anthropology or that any substantive moral rules can be derived from principles that lack all empirical content. And if there were any such pure substantive moral rules, an ethical externalist might doubt that they would be motivating. Whatever might be said about these meta-ethical issues, we may, I think, be confident that psychologically speaking, the rational beings referred to in the first formulation of the categorical imperative function as members of an audience (an audience including our own "fully rational selves") before whom a moral agent may feel either approval and respect, or guilt and shame (see Piers and Singer 1953, 51). Like guilt, Nietzsche shrewdly observes, the categorical imperative "smells of cruelty" (1887/1967, II/6, 65).

Christine Korsgaard, an influential contemporary interpreter of Kant's moral philosophy, has made a suggestion along these lines, though her project, that of constructing a naturalistically acceptable Kantian meta-ethics, is not mine.[47] "Pain," she says, "is the perception of a reason…If a living thing is an animal, if it is conscious, then part of the way it preserves its identity is through its sensations" (1996, 149). A human being, she continues

> is an animal whose nature is to construct a practical identity which is normative for her. She is a law to herself. When some way of acting is a threat to her practical identity and reflection reveals that fact, the person finds that she must reject that way of acting, and act in another way. In that case she is obligated. A living thing is an entity whose nature it is to preserve and maintain its physical identity [read here, its functional integrity]. It is a law to itself. When something it is doing is a threat to that identity and perception reveals that fact, the animal finds that it must reject what it is doing and do something else instead. In that case it is in pain. Obligation is the reflective rejection of a threat to your identity [read here, the integrity of the personal extended phenotype]. Pain is the *unreflective* rejection of a threat to your identity. So pain is the *perception* of a reason, and that is why it seems normative. (1996, 150)

The suite of the negative moral emotions, she rightly claims, is where "these two ideas come together," and we can now easily see why: emotions are bodily responses as well as cognitive appraisals. They involve feelings and tendencies to take action, but they also track states of affairs in the natural and social worlds. "Since a living thing is a thing for which the preservation of identity is imperative," Korsgaard claims, "life is a form of morality." Apparently realizing that this is needlessly paradoxical, she quickly rephrases: "morality is just the form human life takes" (152). Preservation of functional integrity may be normative (i.e., may constitute a "reason") for a living thing; but morality is a sophisticated form of normative demand placed on one form of life: human animals naturally designed, but not, like insects, hardwired, for complex social interaction. Still, Korsgaard concludes on a note concordant with the position I have taken here, and one pretty far removed from the position of the historical Kant: "[Y]our animal nature is a fundamental form of identity on which the normativity of your human identity depends…If you don't value your animal nature, you can value nothing" (1996, 152). It would be an error to take her to be saying that no value can ever trump the value of your

animal nature. Of course this can and does happen. But it is to say that the moral emotions, like all emotions, are states of embodied creatures and, as such, require the body to perform their proper functions.[48] The modality of Korsgaard's "can" is to be understood (here, at least) neither as deontic nor metaphysical, but as biological and psychological.

When we put philosophical meta-ethical and normative issues to one side and look at moral psychology, both consequentialist and deontological ethics seem to rely on the same motivational structure: avoidance of insult to the integrity of the autobiographical self that is central to the human personal extended phenotype. Indeed, empirical investigation using the well-known trolley and footbridge scenarios shows subjects shifting back and forth between consequentialist and deontological thinking to justify, some would say to rationalize in a post hoc manner, their shifting, and to a significant extent emotionally driven, intuitions (cf. Greene 2008).[49] These scenarios concern the morality of violence, but we should expect similar results with scenarios concerning the morality of sex since that morality has also established in the modern West deontological barriers to the merely instrumental use, or the "objectification,"[50] of a person.

Let us move now from the moral psychology of deontological meta-ethical approaches to that of consequentialist ones. When discussing in *Utilitarianism* the "ultimate sanction of the principle of utility," J. S. Mill (1861/1979, 27) is raising a motivational question, not the justificational issue he addresses in the immediately following chapter. His answer to the motivational question is that "the principle of utility either has, or there is no reason why it might not have, all the sanctions which belong to any other system of morals." He goes on to divide these sanctions into those that are external and those that are internal. The external sanctions are "the hope of favor and the fear of displeasure from our fellow creatures or from the Ruler of the universe." Both hope and fear are emotions, and fear of someone's *moral* displeasure is guilt. The internal sanction is the "sanction of duty…a feeling in our own mind; a *pain*, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty" (my emphasis). Pain indicates a threat to phenotypic integrity and is feared as such. The properly trained and motivated individual, Mill concludes, "comes, as though instinctively, to be conscious of himself as the being who of course pays regard to others. The good of others becomes to him a thing naturally and necessarily to be attended to, *like any of the physical conditions of our existence*" (31, emphasis mine).

The sense of threat to the integrity of the autobiographical self as part of the socially constructed personal extended phenotype is, then, a very

powerful motivator for compliance with moral norms, a part of human evolutionary design. The sort of behaviors considered such a threat will, to be sure, vary with cultural moral norms, but every human culture may be expected to sanction negatively behaviors not in accordance with some set of moral norms, especially ones concerning sex and violence, whatever the content of these norms and whatever their alleged meta-ethical foundations.[51] What is unusual is the *stringent* negative moral sanctioning by the bad conscience of behaviors merely *virtual or imagined* characteristic of the Puritan culture and its secular descendant, the Protestant ethic. The threat pornographic simulation poses for the auto-biographical self that this culture constructs is capable of causing severe cognitive dissonance and is the source of the imaginative resistance that pornographic representation must overcome to achieve its effects. With such an explanatory model in place, the thesis that moral psychology involves a perceived threat to the integrity of the personal extended phenotype receives some empirical support, as does the speculation that the pornographic imagination remains a universal human potential.

4.7   Summary and general conclusion

This chapter began with an account of the prehistory of pornography, tying together sex and primal kinship. We considered in Section 4.2 two approaches to explaining human primal kinship: the structuralist approach of Claude Levi-Strauss and the evolutionary approach of Bernard Chapais, declaring the second a more convincing account. Section 4.3 constructed a genealogy for the pornographic violent fiction, and Section 4.4 discussed the problem of male homoerotic pornography, which poses a challenge to the feminist analysis of pornography as material that, by definition, degrades women, but also poses a challenge to my own analysis. Section 4.5 discussed the problem of the sexually explicit romance novel, another challenge to the feminist analysis of pornography as well as to my own. Section 4.6 took up the topic of the moral psychology of pornography, while attempting to skirt, as far as possible, difficult issues of normative ethics and meta-ethics that lurk in the vicinity. The section began by introducing Richard Dawkins' notion of the extended phenotype, while departing from, or at least augmenting, Dawkins' treatment by applying the notion explicitly to the social construction of the responsible human agent. The bad conscience engendered, according to my thesis, by the consumption of pornographic fiction is interpreted psychologically as a type of cognitive dissonance that indicates a threat to the homeostasis of the personal

human extended phenotype, of which, I finally argued, the socially constructed responsible human agent is a, indeed perhaps the, central component. Pornographic fiction is designed to overcome this threat by discouraging the extraction of implicatures that might interfere with arousal by engendering reflection on the moral standing of women as sexual partners and on the responsibilities that accompany sexual intimacy. With this last conclusion, the promised elaboration and defense of the "single thought" informing this book stands completed.

That thought, it will be recalled from the preface, is the conviction that pornography as we have it in the modern West is a mode of sophistical representation, sophistical because it enables self-deceptive self-gratification. Having narrowed "pornography" to pornographic fiction, the sophistry in question involves exploiting the flouting convention that is a component of the hyperprotected speech situation of the novel as display text (Chapter 2).[52] This flouting convention allows an author to make moves in the literary language game that are ordinarily proscribed by the conversational maxims (however one counts and groups them), with the understanding that there is to be a payoff in insight and enlightenment gained by the reader by way of implicatures signaled by the floutings. But in pornographic fiction there is little or no payoff, for the detail concerning sex and violence, which might otherwise flout rules of quantity and manner (relevance, politeness), is present for the sake of affording enjoyment veiled by the display text posturing, veiled because imaginative resistance must in many cases be neutralized (Chapter 3), and any threat to the moral integrity of the reader as person, the central construct of the human extended phenotype, must be held at bay (Chapter 4). As a result, these transgressions of the rules are not floutings that signal implicatures that are not conducive to arousal, but disguised *violations* that amount to an opting out of the Conversational Principle and the literary display-text speech situation.

The second issue of importance that has concerned us is that of definition. Because pornographic narrative fiction is very much a changing historical phenomenon, it resists definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. I do gesture in an essentialist direction by suggesting a very general set of necessary and perhaps sufficient conditions it must satisfy (Chapter 3), but even to have gotten this far in any intelligible way we were required to subject the concept to a genealogical analysis that contrasts pornographic narrative fiction in the modern West with the older literary forms of the obscene and the gothic from which it descended. Genealogy is a form of historical explanation, and historical explanation is causal. The most appropriate causal model for

such explanation, I argued, is the notion of adequate causation (designating causes that raise the probability that an event will occur but are neither necessary nor sufficient) that Max Weber derived from Johannes von Kries (Chapter 1); and the adequate cause of the emergence of pornographic fiction in the modern West, I proposed, was Weber's Protestant ethic, along with the rise of the novel of formal realism, a detailed style of narrative in which an author or authorial voice purports to refer to actual individuals and describe their doings in real time (Chapter 3).

I conclude with the following cautions. In accordance with the requirements of adequate causation, I do not at all suggest that the Protestant ethic was a necessary causal condition of the emergence of pornographic narrative fiction in the modern West, nor do I endorse the absurd idea that guilt and bad conscience were foreign to the Christianity that predated the Reformation. What I do argue is that the Puritan Reformation made pornographic writing as we now have it here in the West very much more likely to have arisen, in part because I judge that when it came to sexual matters regarding the laity, the bark of the Catholic Church was far worse than its bite. I also judge that the removal of the insulating institution of the confessional did much to tighten the screw of bad conscience by invoking unremitting, unmediated divine scrutiny of private human mental states, thereby fostering extreme insecurity concerning salvation, which was, at least for the Calvinist, preordained. All of this can be seen to be capable of producing considerable cognitive dissonance in anyone lacking an impossibly high level of control of his thoughts (Chapter 4). Defense of the faith against heresy seems to have been the chief preoccupation of the Catholic Church. It was left to Puritanism fully to realize in an institutionalized way Christianity's distinctively Pauline heritage, salvation through faith and not works (not to mention indulgences), as well as the interdiction of *porneia* in the most insidious of its forms, that concerning the state of the inward man.

Notes

1 The Protestant Ethic and Modern Western Pornographic Fiction

1. Here I stand in agreement with Uidhir (2009), though not for the same reasons, and in disagreement with Vasilaki (2010).
2. Unless otherwise indicated, arousal by pornography should be assumed to include both these types throughout.
3. In what follows, this qualifier should be kept in mind, even if it is not tiresomely reprised. There is little doubt that earlier works of obscenity in the West can be read pornographically (see the discussion of pornographic reading in Chapter 3, Section 3.3.2), or are even proto-pornographic.
4. The OED supplies two definitions of "obscene": (1) Offensive to the senses, or to taste or refinement; disgusting, repulsive, filthy, foul, abominable, loathsome. (2) Offensive to modesty or decency; expressing or suggesting unchaste or lustful ideas; impure; indecent; lewd. The idea of offensiveness is central to both. The second definition encroaches on the moral, but only, I submit, insofar as immorality causes repulsion. "Decency" carries both a moral and an aesthetic sense. See the discussion immediately following.
5. This clarification was prompted by comments of an anonymous reviewer for Palgrave Macmillan.
6. Feinberg (1985, 112) tellingly observes that the word "obscene" "is still applied in English to natural objects that may in no way be the product of human design." The feeding behaviors of a snake (unhinged jaw, prey swallowed whole head first and tail last) might, for example, be found obscene.
7. We shall take up relevant issues of personal integrity in Chapter 4.
8. It should be pointed out that double-entry bookkeeping was invented in Italy centuries before the Protestant Reformation.
9. "Weber attempts to identify the ethic of ascetic Protestantism as 'only one' factor among others that have contributed to the emergence of modern capitalist culture" (Reisebrodt 2005, 34).
10. "We shall designate…cases of 'adequate causation' in accordance with the usage of the theorists of legal causality established since the work of von Kries" (Weber 1949, 184).
11. "Von Kries" has become the entrenched mode of reference in this case, despite the fact that it is not consistent with standard German practice.
12. "*Objective Möglichkeit*," translated, depending on context, either as "objective probability" or "objective possibility."
13. "In order to obtain entirely numerical determinations, we have to schematize in a certain respect; we must, for example, assume general conditions to be constant even if we know that they vary more or less; we must regard the individual cases as independent, even if we know that they in fact fall short of the ideal [*sächlich nicht vollkommen sind*]." (1927, 178–179). "[D]eterminate

probability values are therefore available where the totality of all possibilities can be exhausted using a number of such assumptions" (36).

14. This requirement of the classical theory is not explicitly mentioned by von Kries. But he does make reference to the conditions that obtain in these games of chance (see note 16).

15. "[T]his sort of independence for a number of cases and especially for a number of similar cases never obtains. It would therefore be correct to say that the calculation of probability proceeds as if the cases were sequentially independent of one another" (1927, 83).

16. "[T]he relationships that pertain to games of chance apply only partially and imprecisely to the mass phenomena of human society ... for this reason, an application of probability calculation can lead to serious errors and mishaps, if not disciplined by means of careful critique" (1927, xiii; see also 144; 1888, 219).

17. As an eliminativist regarding categorical properties in favor of dispositional ones, Fetzer (1974, 176) handles the apparent violation of Hume's principle by rejecting the analytic-synthetic distinction in scientific explanatory contexts.

18. Dennett's requirement would extend even to God conceived as an intentional being. God makes no mistakes but remains intentional because his perfect nature immunizes him against the error to which he would, qua intentional being, otherwise be prone. An entity lacking intentionality is not prone to error at all and, as a consequence, needs no such immunization. The counterexample of divine intentionality comes from Jeremy Byrd.

19. This means that Mumford does not construe "the cause of G caused G" as a Russellian definite description, for then it would be a mere existential statement whose denial would not be contradictory. Thanks to Ken Williford for discussion of this issue and for bringing this book's epigrammatic quotation to my attention.

20. For clarity, I have altered Fetzer's notation to comport with Niiniluoto's. Since Fetzer is referring here to a "single-case" propensity, there is no universal quantifier.

21. Fetzer (1974, 187): "For the numerical value of r, viewed as a degree of nomic expectability, not only functions as an estimation of the limiting frequency with which sentences describing outcomes of that kind will be true over a long sequence of trials (with the force of overwhelming probability) but also as a designation of the degree of entailment [i.e., inductive support] with which such an explanandum follows from such an explanans on any singular trial (with the force of logical necessity)!"

22. Other candidates for this role in interpretation are Richard Grandy's Principle of Humanity (the interpreter assumes that the beliefs and desires of the interpretee are more or less like his own) and simulation theory (the interpreter imagines himself in the same circumstances as the interpretee and then ascribes mental states type-identical with his own to the interpretee). The latter approach requires no explicit theorizing *about* psychological states.

23. The philosophical sociologist, I grant, may be expected to maintain closer contact with primary nondisciplinary historical sources.

24. Horkheimer and Adorno, it is clear, take a considerably more jaundiced view of enlightenment rationality as ideology than does Weber, despite his language

of worldly "disenchantment" and confinement in the "iron cage" of rationalized modern Western industrial society (Weber 1904–1905/1996, 181; see Chapter 3 for more extended discussion and documentation). And it must be said that unlike Horkheimer, Adorno, and, in their very different ways, Marx and Foucault, *Ideologiekritik* (the critique of ideology or false consciousness on a social scale) was never, so far as I can see, an explicit Weberian concern. Despite fundamental disagreements, Weber respected Marx and regarded him as a collegial economic and social theorist (see Ringer 2004, 113).

25. I have in mind here principally Habermas and his appropriation of Anglo-American speech-act theory, on which I shall also be relying, in his rather heroic attempt to lay down transcendental-style conditions necessary for engagement in communicative or cooperative, as opposed to strategic or manipulative, action and for the realization of what he dubs the ideal speech situation, a social arrangement from which all repressive elements, whether consciously or not consciously imposed, whether *de jure* or *de facto*, have been eliminated. The ideal speech situation bears some comparison with Popper's ideal of the open society. Note Habermas' extensive discussion in *The Theory of Communicative Action* of the writings of the sociologist Talcott Parsons, who first translated *The Protestant Ethic* into English.

2 Literary Discourse and Pragmatic Implicature

1. Walton (1990) is an exception.
2. Levinson (2000) and other revisionist pragmatics theorists have argued that Grice's category of the strictly said is empty, since meaning at all levels has a pragmatic dimension.
3. As stated by Grice (1989, 26): "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged."
4. To say that *A* meant *x* non-naturally is to say that "*A* uttered *x* with the intention of inducing a belief by means of the recognition of this intention" (Grice 1957, 76).
5. Walton regards all representational works of art, including literary texts, as "props" to be used in authorized games of make-believe. Because not everything in the world of a work of fiction is explicitly said or entailed by what is said, the construction of an authorized game world will certainly have to make some use of implicature. For Walton, however, literary texts are not display texts, for he rejects the speech-act approach to literary texts: accidentally produced cracks in a rock, if they spell a legible text, may count as a prop (1990, 86–87). We certainly may *treat* such a phenomenon as if it were a display text and respond to it accordingly. But I am inclined to agree with Currie (1990, 36) that our being able to treat it as one does not make it one.
6. For Currie, make-believe functions as propositional attitude. For Walton, it is a propositional operator. This amounts to the difference between make-believing that a fictional propositional content is true (Currie) and believing that a fictional propositional content is make-believe (Walton). Currie argues convincingly (1990, 208–211) that the propositional operator version makes it difficult to explain emotional engagement with works of fiction, which

requires that we regard these fictional events as *actually occurring* in the world of the work. Currie's analysis is borne out by the fact that when disturbed by events in fictions, we seem to be able to quiet our emotions by shifting from the attitude model to the operator model, reminding ourselves that the events of which we are learning are only make-believe. This tends to weaken emotional engagement. Currie's version also neatly explains how it is that we both want Anna Karenina to suffer her terrible fate and do not want her to suffer her fate. We want it to be true in the story, and not make-believe (propositional operator), that she does suffer, but we make-desire (propositional attitude) that she not have to suffer.

7. This is not to deny that most works of fiction contain many sentences that happen to be grounded in fact. But these serve to give the world of the fiction verisimilitude.

8. "Nobody would deny the stimulating effect that a first reading of Grice's 'Logic and Conversation' [1975] may produce. But to base an entire boomlet, indeed a fad, on this rather limited construction of the pragmatic agenda in terms of Grice's 'maxims,' from which all else is presumably derived as deus ex machina, is the climax of in-group folly" (T. Givón, quoted in Wierzbicka 2003, 397).

9. Cf. Levinson's "Redundancy Constraint" (2000, 70): "For any lexical item W that carries a generalized Quantity implicature P, there will be no fully lexicalized counterpart W' that lexicalizes the content of P. Because I items on a square will always implicate O items, there will be no lexicalized O items."

10. An observation about a specific modal locution is in order here. Davis claims (142) that there "seems to be nothing in the meaning difference between 'could have solved' and 'was able to solve,' for example, that makes it more natural for the former to implicate 'did not solve' and the latter to implicate 'did solve' than vice versa." The difference in implicature, he concludes, is entirely conventional. But this seems wrong. The present perfect "could have solved" is naturally interpreted as subjunctive mood, which suggests counterfactuality (would have solved, if certain conditions had or had not obtained), whereas the past indicative "was able to solve" does not suggest counterfactuality (was able to solve, and did).

11. "Punctuation" on Wikipedia.

12. Alan J. Nussbaum, personal communication.

13. Cf. Wierzbicka (op. cit., 448): "I have presented in this chapter many examples of tautologies whose meanings couldn't possibly be 'worked out' by speakers of other languages, which are, therefore, indubitably language-specific, as well as culture specific."

14. Is Wierzbicka committing the verificationist error of identifying the true with the knowable? It is not clear, since it is not clear whether her "or" is the "or" of equivalence, though that is how it comes across. Interpreting her charitably, she could mean that truth is a necessary condition of knowability: a false proposition cannot be known, only (falsely) believed. She does, however, go on to make some startling claims, viz., "that while all languages appear to have a word corresponding to *know*, many languages do not have a word corresponding to *true*" (103). This seems inconsistent: recall that "true" is one of her semantic primes under the category of speech. "In fact," she continues, "even in English the word truth didn't always have

the impersonal and objective ring which it has now." Quoting now from linguist Geoffrey Hughes, Wierzbicka holds that the semantic notion of truth "evolves from being a private commitment to a publicly assessed quality. The form of word even changes, so that *troth*, the private form, can, by the proof of arms, be asserted above even the claims of testimony, if need arises. (This medievalised form of truth [!] is, of course, virtually the opposite of the modern notion, which is factual, demonstrable and essentially impersonal.)" One may imagine Aristotle's medieval disciples grinding their teeth while clasping *aletheia* and the correspondence theory of truth to their bosoms.

15. There is some controversy concerning whether the report model is the right one for fictional texts. See Matravers (1997) for discussion.

16. Compare Richardson's discussion of "extended reflective equilibrium" (1997, 184–190).

17. For my defense of this claim, see my (2007, chapter 5) and bibliographic citations. See also Prinz (2004).

18. Cf. Dworkin (1988, 60): "Another set of constraints is connected with what it feels like to live by certain moral codes or to attempt to live by them. One of the values of great literature is being confronted by vivid pictures of what it is like to live by certain codes, or to seek to manifest certain virtues, or to be faced with the moral dilemmas that are raised by accepting certain ideals. Moral codes are connected with ideals of human flourishing. The attempt to live by certain moralities or to rehearse what that would be like is the analogue to observational testing of scientific theories. 'Try it, [see if] you'll like it' is a reasonable criterion for a moral theory."

19. With the exception of Section 3.6.1, all the "test cases" in this book are not to be understood as empirical tests, but as tests of intuitions intended, as Gerald Dworkin suggests, to motivate the process of achieving reflective equilibrium with philosophical principles I have put forward, including Nussbaum's principle of perceptive equilibrium.

20. But not nonexistent: see Taylor (1970).

21. Leyda 1951, II, 831–832: "(February 5, 1891) *M[elville] borrows from the New York Society Library*: Counsels and Maxims [by Arthur Schopenhauer (London, 1890)]." "NEW YORK February 12 *M returns the Schopenhauer volume to the New York Society Library; now or later he purchases a copy of his own as well as other Schopenhauer volumes* [including The World as Will and Idea] ... *M acquires and reads* Studies in Pessimism, by Arthur Schopenhauer (London, 1891) ... *M Acquires and reads* The Wisdom of Life ... by Arthur Schopenhauer (London 1891)." Melville's personal copies of all these works were marked and in some cases annotated (Sealts 1966, 91). "During the last years of his life [Melville] acquired seven volumes of Schopenhauer's works (then being made available in English) and marked numerous passages apparently consonant with his own views, but they came too late," according to Pochmann (1978/1957, 757), "to exert any influence on his more characteristic writings." It is not clear whether Pochmann means to exclude *Billy Budd* from these "more characteristic writings."

22. Could Melville's choice of name have been influenced (even unconsciously) by the German verb "*klagen*," meaning "to complain"? See note 23.

23. Pochmann (1978, 757–758) informs us that in his copy of Matthew Arnold's *Literature and Dogma*, Melville inscribed an approving "true" opposite Arnold's

claim that there is "something splay, something blunt-edged, unhandy, and infelicitous" in the German mind as well as in the language." Arnold seems insufficiently acquainted with the work of such figures as Goethe and Gauss.

24. Compare Schopenhauer's (1844/1969, Vol. II, 355) quoted description of the behaviors of a snake ("serpent fascination") and its rodent victim, a description that has been thought to have inspired Melville's narrative at this point (see, e.g., Mizruchi 1998, 168–171). Lifting Claggart's dead body, says Melville's narrator, was "like handling a dead snake" (72).

3   Pornographic Fiction, Implicature, and Imaginative Resistance

1. Cf. Foucault (1986, 166): "Let us say schematically at least that in the [Greek and Roman] classical texts the synthesis of the marriage tie and sexual relations was granted mainly for reasons pertaining to procreation. For men at least, it was neither the very nature of sexual acts nor the essence of marriage itself that implied that there should be pleasure only in conjugality."

2. Why, it may be asked, did this breakdown take so long to occur? This is more a problem for Auerbach than it is for me, but I suspect that the emergence of the humanist tradition in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and the translation of the Bible into vernacular tongues, which did not occur until the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, were important factors. This objection is due to Stephen Hiltz.

3. Cf. Foucault (1986, 235): "One would thus find, formulated by a few austere philosophers isolated in the midst of a world that did not appear to be austere, the outline of a new ethics, destined, in the following centuries, to take more stringent forms and to gain a more general validity."

4. Cf. Engberg-Pedersen (2000, 220): "[T]hat particular kind of faith and trust will not be specifically tied to the Jewish law; it will be equally open to all."

5. "[T]hese [Gentiles], having not the [Mosaic] law, are a *law unto themselves*; Who show the work of the law written in their hearts, their *conscience also bearing witness*" (Rom. 2:14–15, my emphasis). Cf. Engberg-Pedersen (2000, 39): Paul was "more concerned about the inner states than the outward acts. He was certainly also concerned about the latter. But the states were considered by him a necessary precondition of the acts. Here too he agreed with the Stoics." On the relationship between Paul, Christianity, and Stoicism see also Engberg-Pedersen (2004) and Sorabji (2004).

6. Tess does eventually marry, but this event occurs very near the close of the novel and triggers her tragic end.

7. Stories like Lucretia's were standard fare in the Romance novels of late antiquity. See Harper (2013, ch. 4).

8. Cf. Foucault (1985, 22): "[I]n antiquity … women were generally subjected (excepting the liberty they could be granted by a status like that of courtesan) to extremely strict constraints, and yet this ethics was not addressed to women; it was not their duties, or obligations, that were recalled, justified, or spelled out. It was an ethics for men: an ethics thought, written, and taught by men, and addressed to men – to free men, obviously. A male ethics,

consequently, in which women figured only as objects or, at best, as partners that one had best train, educate, and watch over when one had them under one's power, but stay away from when they were under the power of someone else (father, husband, tutor)."

9. "[T]he novel [of formal realism] is a full and authentic report of human experience, and is therefore under an obligation to satisfy its reader with such details of the story as the individuality of the actors concerned, the particulars of the times and places of their actions, details presented through a more largely referential use of language than is common in other literary forms" (Watt 2001, 32).

10. A high school English teacher of mine in the 1960s thought D. H. Lawrence's *Lady Chatterley's Lover*, surely a novel of formal realism, guilty of an unpardonable invasion of privacy.

11. Compare Stone (1977, 655): "By 1700 there was clearly emerging among the [English] bourgeois and landed gentry a new family type inspired by the principle of Affective Individualism," the principle that marriage should be founded on a bond of affection between autonomous individuals, rather than being a practical arrangement designed primarily to consolidate wealth.

12. Cf. Symons (1979, 121): "For the great majority of humanity – and possibly all of it before modern times – marriage is not so much an alliance of two people but rather an alliance of families and larger networks of people."

13. See Bullough and Bullough (1987, 59): "Marriage was usually arranged and it was duty, not love, that brought two young people together...The fact that people had so little choice in mates probably contributed to the idea that love or sexual pleasure could be found outside marriage. The Roman male, however, expected his wife to be faithful since she was a kind of property, and he did not wish to leave his property to another man's child. This in no way prevented the male from seeking outside sexual contacts for himself. He did have to be careful not to commit adultery, since this was harmful to another man's property, but other than that there were few limitations."

14. Notice that a woman's status remained determined by family membership.

15. Bradley (1991, 186) reasonably allows that "although most marriages at the upper levels of society were unions of convenience, it did not always follow that they were discordant or even loveless." Roman tombstone inscriptions attest to this.

16. This shows that the marriage between Cato and Martia was not a "*manus*" marriage, that is, one in which paternal power over a daughter is transferred to her new husband, a common practice at earlier times in Rome.

17. Cf. Hunt (1959/1987, 342): "It is almost incredible that so many different peoples should be attracted by a pattern of love that is essentially Western, strongly Anglo-Saxon, and relatively new on earth. Western love, in a manner scarcely to be found in earlier history, attempts to combine sexual outlet, affectionate friendship, and the procreative familial functions, all in a single relationship. Romantic love is considered to be the adequate, and indeed the only, basis for choosing one's lifelong partner...All in all, anthropologists consider it one of the most difficult human relationships ever attempted; just as certainly, it is also one of the most appealing." This is perhaps overstated, but not seriously inaccurate. The phenomenon designated by our common expressions "romantic love" and "being" or "falling in love," as opposed to loving

someone, seems to me to be a remarkably complex one, since it includes, in my estimation, no fewer than four necessary emotional components: *philia*, the attitude of friendship that includes mutual respect and concern; *agape*, the willingness to care for and sacrifice for the beloved; *eros*, sexual passion for the beloved; and *aesthesis*, something that might be characterized as sheer delight in the presence of the beloved, a certain buoyant appreciation of style and way of being that extends beyond physical beauty and is also to be distinguished from sexual attraction (recall the discussion of the aesthetic and the charientic from Chapter 1). This is not to say that in every genuine romantic attachment all four are in play at all times, or to deny that they may coexist in different proportions or strengths in different cases. But if any of the four components is entirely lacking, one person may love another, but will not be romantically in love with that person. Or so I would propose.

18. Cf. Sripada (2008, 341): "[M]oral norms pertaining to male entitlements over women appear to have changed in fundamental ways in the last 200 to 300 years. In Western societies in particular, there has been spectacular change in the moral norms that relate to male sexual proprietoriness, and gender relations more broadly."

19. Cf. Foxon (1965, 51): "Jung has pointed out the strain that the Reformation put on the individual Protestant; he could no longer rely on the authority of the Church, but had the duty to form his own beliefs on his reading of the Bible and to deal directly with God without the mediation of the priest – in many ways a terrifying burden...Add to this the growth of the professional and middle class virtues of economic individualism, clear thinking, orderly action, prudence, and responsibility, and primary emotions are under a heavy strain."

20. "For to be carnally minded is death, but to be spiritually minded is life" (Rom. 8:6).

21. Foucault proposes a similar thesis: "What is peculiar to modern societies, in fact, is not that they consigned sex to a shadow existence, but that they dedicated themselves to speaking of it *ad infinitum*, while exploiting it as *the* secret" (1978, 35).

22. Cf. Watt (2001, 202): "Greek tragedy, however, like many other literary forms that preceded the novel, contained many elements which limited the extent to which identification could take place...The novel, on the other hand, was inherently devoid of the elements which restricted identification, and this more absolute power over the reader's consciousness does much to account for the peculiar triumphs and degradations of the novel form in general."

23. This concession is motivated by a comment made by an anonymous reviewer for Palgrave Macmillan.

24. Cf. Hunt (1993a, 10): "If we take pornography to be the explicit depiction of sexual organs and sexual practices with the aim of arousing sexual feelings, then pornography was almost always *an adjunct to something else* until the middle or end of the eighteenth century. In early modern Europe, that is, between 1500 and 1800, pornography was most often a vehicle for using the shock of sex to criticize religious and political authorities" (emphasis mine).

25. Rather remarkably, Wagner (1988, 228) believes that in this work, "[c]omic elements have disappeared."

26. Compare DeJean (1993, 121–122): "The classic French pornographic tradition places pornographic literature at the intersection of sexual explicitness

or obscenity and political dissidence ... Classic French pornography was never simply solitary or homosocial male pleasure inspired by writing on or across the female body. In early modern France, writing obscenity on the female body was always writing the body politic. It is the politics of pornography that, from the beginning, guaranteed the genre's importance – indeed its centrality – for the French tradition." In my lexicon, this "classic French" pornography is better described as transgressive obscenity that incorporates elements reasonably, if anachronistically, termed pornographic.

27. "The informed reader would recognize that Dirrag's philosophy could not be distinguished from that of La Mettrie. The Jesuit was a closet materialist" (Darnton 1995, 95). Dirrag is the novel's priestly reprobate (see also the following note).

28. "Dirrag" and "Eradice" are anagrams for Father *Girard* and Charlotte la *Cadière* of Toulon in Provence, who engaged in a scandalous love affair that had all of France abuzz in the years 1730–1733 (d'Argens 1970, ix, translator's introduction).

29. Compare Mumford (2013, 62–63) on the parallel case of pornographic seeing: "To see something pornographically is to see it sexually for the purposes of sexual excitement. And it is to do so at the expense of all else ... It is possible that we see sex but do not see it in the way described. To an extent, one chooses when to see something in this sexual way, setting aside other matters such as morality." See also Lubey (2012, 133): "*Pamela* ... risks being read for precisely the opposite story it purports to tell ... *Pamela* is here a battleground within which the possibility of pornographic reading is recognized so that it can be expelled, all the better to favor a morally sanitized engagement with books."

30. It is also possible to read a pornographic text *nonpornographically*, that is, non-self-deceptively, as a researcher would or as a committed couple who exploited it as an aphrodisiac might.

31. Cf. Mijnhardt (1993, 292): "Only after the French Revolution did pornography [in France] slowly begin to be defined on the basis of its function as a sexual stimulant alone."

32. Weber endorsed (see Riesebrodt 2005, 28) the thesis of his close friend, the Heidelberg legal scholar Georg Jellinek, that the conception of "rights of man" that drove the French Revolution derived from American Puritanism more than it did from Rousseau and other French thinkers: "The principles of 1789 are in reality the principles of 1776" (Jellinek 1901, 89).

33. "The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so. For when asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into everyday life, and began to dominate worldly morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order. This order is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production which to-day determine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistible force. Perhaps it will so determine them until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt. In Baxter's view the care for external goods should lie on the shoulders of the 'saint like a light cloak, which can be thrown aside at any moment.' But fate decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage" (Weber 1904–1905/1996, 181).

34. Cf. DeJean (1993, 120): "*L'Ecole des Filles* is one of those rare works in which one can sense the transition between world views."

35. Cf. Marcus (1966, 204): "[A] person engaged in autoerotic fantasy is not aided in his understanding if he permits himself consciously to reflect upon his state while he is involved in it."
36. In many of Richardson's scenes, "the pace of narrative was slowed down by minute description to something very near actual experience" (Watt 2001, 25).
37. This is not to deny that there were at the time some voices in France, like those of the Abbé Lange, Chaussé, and Somaize, that elevated the value of married love. But these tended to be voices raised against the *précieuses* and their feminist agenda. See Longee (1976, 63–69).
38. *The Turner Diaries* is known to have inspired Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma City bomber.
39. Although he mentions in passing the idea of imaginative resistance, Todd (2012, 114) mistakenly (I believe) asserts that "the ability of fictional pornography – *no less than standard non-pornographic fiction* – to encourage such engagement, therefore, clearly has the potential to enlighten us about our own sexual desires, but also to induce reflection on the norms governing them" (emphasis mine).
40. Langton and West do not limit their analysis to texts, but texts play a central role in their discussion.
41. Cooke (2012, 239) challenges Langton and West's background liar/blurrer criticism on similar grounds, though he misses the fact that some propaganda – like *The Turner Diaries* – is fictional and intended to be understood as such: "[P]ropaganda differs from fiction in that certain of its explicit or implied propositions are intended to be taken up as fact; that is not the usual case with fiction."
42. Thurston (2007, 124–125) sets these dates at 1580–1630.
43. Karlsen (1987, 101) emphasizes the fact that many of these women were unmarried, sonless, land owners no longer capable of procreation, one of the main duties of a Puritan wife, and hypothesizes that the New England witch trials constituted an attempt by Puritan communities to ensure male inheritance of property, another integral component of the Puritan world order. However, she notes a "deep and fundamental split in the Puritan psyche" resulting from a commitment to the "worth and dignity" of women but also to the older, malevolent image of woman Eve as the seducer of man Adam (ibid., 165, 178). Boyer and Nissenbaum (1974) supply evidence of an on-going culture war in Salem between the religiously conservative rural inhabitants of agrarian Salem Village and the more progressive, urban population of mercantile Salem Town. It was principally members of the first group who tended to direct accusations of witchcraft against members of the second group. Certain parallels with phenomena in the United States of the 1950s and of today may be discernible, the former parallel having been famously traced by Arthur Miller in *The Crucible*.
44. Defined, in part, as "the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women in pictures or words that also includes women dehumanized as sexual objects, things, or commodities" (MacKinnon 1987, 176). The full definition adds considerable detail, but retains its exclusive focus on women and their treatment. As a result, either the definition is too narrow, or there is no male homoerotic pornography. But this second disjunct is patently false. This is an issue to which we shall return in the following chapter.

45. Eaton (2007, 685–687) terms such attitudinal causal outcomes "stage 1 effects." Any resulting actions would be stage II effects.

46. Notice that falsely shouting "Fire" is proscribed because of its potentially highly dangerous *perlocutionary*, that is, causal, effects.

47. Foxon (1965, 45) considers it the first original *English* prose pornography, but per my hypothesis, that makes it the first unambiguously pornographic work of Western fiction. Hunt (1993a, 21) allows that "English writers contributed some important elements to the pornographic tradition in the seventeenth and the eighteenth century." I believe this to be a significant understatement resulting from Hunt's inclusion in "the pornographic tradition" works that I would regard as in the main obscene. The English, I maintain, *invented* modern pornographic narrative fiction, building it upon the chassis of the novel of formal realism, which they also invented.

48. Robinson (2006, 37–45) interprets this scene as an instance of "closeted" homoerotic writing and speculates that Cleland himself was gay.

49. It should be noted that Lubey's (2012, 30) definition of "pornography" is quite different from the one I have been at pains to develop here: "[B]y 'pornography' I mean texts that describe sex to a high degree of genital detail (but, crucially, are not confined only to this purpose); by 'pornographic' I mean locally and unambiguously descriptive of a sex act." Such a definition would categorize Lawrence's *Lady Chatterley's Lover* as pornographic, a result that in my view is unacceptable.

50. This objection comes from Martha Nussbaum.

51. It must be admitted that Franklin seems to have been remarkably immune to the pangs of sexual conscience. Perhaps the nine years he spent in prerevolutionary France made him an exception that proves the rule.

52. Cf. Wolff (1972, 19): "The cardinal duty of each Christian therefore was to discover through extensive self-examination his own secret sins and then to keep watch over them." (21): "The Puritan saw this sensual sin as the most tempting and most dangerous…No one was free from the need to notice and control his every sexual inclination." (37): "The letters serve their writers in much the same way that the spiritual diary had served their Puritan ancestors."

53. "Laurence St. Clair," Nussbaum informs us (254), is the pen name of a reputable academic.

54. Langton (2009, 246) believes that the component of projection, seeing the world in a way one wants to see it, is missing in Nussbaum's analysis.

55. "A work that includes a few scenes that eroticize inegalitarian relations but in which these are balanced or outweighed by other kinds of scenes…would not count as 'inegalitarian pornography'" and as such should not be the target of "a sensible antiporn feminism" (Eaton 2007, 676).

56. One memorable example: humiliated by Cathy Linton in front of Heathcliff, Isabella Linton frantically attempts to loosen Cathy's grip on her arm by using her fingernails. The spiteful Cathy issues a mock warning:

    'There's a tigress! . ..Look, Heathcliff! They are instruments that will do execution – you must beware of your eyes.' 'I'd wrench them off her fingers if they ever menaced me,' he answered brutally (Brontë 1847/1972, 92–93).

57. No doubt there is also a strong inheritance from the gothic tradition in this genre. More on that tradition in the next chapter.

58. Under such conditions, sexually explicit representation could also function as a "poor man's" polygyny, concubinage, or prostitution. By my criteria, such material would not be pornographic, unless one were to argue, as a Critical Theorist might, that in this case the entire society was in the grip of an ideology of which it was unaware and *which it would reject* were the ideology made explicit and brought to consciousness. Such an argument would face a serious burden of proof.

59. According to Mijnhardt (1993, 293), in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Holland, "reformed Protestantism was the religion of only a small majority; until the end of the eighteenth century, Catholics still made up almost 40% of the population." There was also an Arminian strain in the Protestantism of Holland, albeit one that was terminated with their expulsion, as well as other strains.

60. Mijnhardt opines (1993, 295) that "the decisive factor in explaining the absence of political and religious pornography was, however, the bourgeois character of Dutch society." He should say, I believe, the character of the Dutch bourgeoisie: the Calvinism of the Dutch Reformed Church does not seem to have been assimilated by Dutch secular society in the way Puritanism was assimilated by English secular society. In my lexicon, such "political and religious pornography" is better categorized as obscene satire, at most as proto-pornography.

4   Pornographic Fiction and Personal Integrity

1. Three representative examples are Symons (1979), Ridley (1993), and Ogas and Gaddam (2011). Surprisingly, Treggiari (1991, 318), whose book is an essay on social history that does not engage evolutionary theory or moral psychology, suggests the plausibility of such an account.

2. I am using the terms "group," "community," and "society" rather loosely to designate a social entity, with each subsequent term designating a more sophisticated or complex form.

3. Westermarck does have his critics. Lack of sexual interest between biologically unrelated men and women raised together in an Israeli kibbutz or cooperative community is sometimes taken to support Westermarck's theory. Not one marriage occurred between members of this kibbutz who were reared *in the same class from birth to age six*. From a total of 2,516 marriages of kibbutz members studied, there were 200 between men and women raised in the kibbutz – -but not necessarily reared in the same class. "One must now ask," says Marvin Harris (1989, 201), "of the 200 marriages from within the same kibbutz, what is the chance that not a single one would be between a boy and a girl who had attended the same class? Since girls were generally three years younger than the boys they married, only a very few marriages between people who were reared for six years in the same class could be expected. Actually, it turns out that five marriages did occur between boys and girls who had been reared together for *part of* the first six years of their life. Since Westermarck's theory does not predict how long it takes for boys and girls reared together to lose interest in each other, these five marriages actually disconfirm the theory" (my emphasis). But this conclusion does not follow

at all. At worst, the kibbutz example fails to *confirm* Westermarck's theory if the theory is not specific on this point. It does not disconfirm it.

4. Symons (1979, 26) points out that "the magnitude of body size in a given species is not necessarily an accurate index of the intensity of male-male competition. Sexual competition may, for example, favor non-fighting competitive strategies among males, such as sequestering females." Still, body size remains one reliable indicator.

5. Among bonobos, females play a distinctive role in male pacification that female chimpanzees do not play. Female bonobos make friends, indeed establish homosexual relations with the females of alien groups. They then band together to discourage male aggression by withholding sexual access.

6. We took note in the previous chapter of the difficulties that attend determining what is to count as prostitution.

7. About this, there is some controversy (see Sussman 2004). But see Chapais (2008, 217) for convincing rebuttal. His conclusion: "Critiques to the effect that chimpanzee violence is an artifact of human provisioning or habitat disturbance … are thus insupportable."

8. Cf. Marcus (1966).

9. Cf. Haskell (1985, II, 550): "Many holds are barred. Success ordinarily requires not only pugnacity and shrewdness but also restraint."

10. Cf. Gatrell (1994, 17): "We might prefer to argue that the shaping of the self-regulating and empathetic personality structures of bourgeois man have less to do with state-imposed constraints than with the ethical outworkings of market capitalism."

11. Cf. Dworkin (1988, 41): "How the notions of autonomy, individualism, Protestantism, and contract emerge (and merge) in moral, social, religious, and economic thought is a subject (still) worth historical investigation." By 1985 Haskell clearly had already made an important contribution to such an investigation.

12. Gatrell (1994, 2) contends that the emergence in the eighteenth century of literary formal realism served to cultivate in readers feelings of empathy like those expressed by Thackeray and Dickens.

13. J. F. Brewer's *The Curse Upon Mitre Square* (1888), like a spate of pulp fiction of its time, both in Great Britain and then in the United States, appears to be based on the rampage of Jack the Ripper: "The monk had seized the woman by the throat; a dozen times he gashed the face; the knife descended with lightning rapidity – pools of blood deluged the altar steps. With a demon's fury the monk threw down the corpse and trod it out of very recognition. He spat upon the mutilated face, and, with his remaining strength, he ripped the body open and cast the entrails about" (1888/2002, 21). Moments later, the monk plunges the dagger into his own heart. These events, having taken place in a London church that had existed at Mitre Square three centuries before the Victorian present in which the story is set, initiate the curse, which continues over the centuries to claim victims by supernatural interventions.

14. See Flanders (2011, 72–73). Pae's novel was based on the crimes of the serial murderers William Burke and William Hare, who sold the bodies of their victims to medical schools in need of cadavers for dissection.

15. Alfred Hitchcock's Norman Bates, to whom Ellis presumably alludes, is psychotic, not merely psychopathic. It is, however, possible that Ellis'

"psycho" is intended as an abbreviation of "psychopath," thereby trading on the term's association with Hitchcock's classic motion picture without genuine allusion.

16. Compare Edgar Allan Poe's masterly handling of the implicature of psychosis already present in the first paragraph of "The Tell-Tale Heart":

    True! – nervous, very dreadfully nervous I had been and am: but why will you say that I am mad? The disease had sharpened my senses – not destroyed – not dulled them. Above all was the sense of hearing acute. I heard all things in the heaven and in the earth. I heard many things in hell. How, then, am I mad? Hearken! And observe how healthily – how calmly I can tell you the whole story.

17. Tom Wolfe did this without obscenity and with great panache in *The Bonfire of the Vanities* (1987). Carroll (1997, 205) seems to interpret the book in the more benign way. Ellis, Carroll says, intended his work as a "post-modern parody," expecting it to produce "hilarity" in its readers. Instead, he informs us, it engendered disgust.

18. "But in homosexuality, the difference between the sexes is sharply drawn, not only by the ease of male-male contacts but by the near-total lack of promiscuity among lesbians" (Tripp 1975, 154). This may be somewhat overstated, as well as dated, but points to a genuine behavioral difference between male and female gays.

19. Compare Saghir and Robbins (1973, 71), who attribute promiscuous tendencies to "all males, homosexual and heterosexual."

20. Symons does qualify this claim, observing that "it is misleading to characterize homosexual men as generally promiscuous" if this is taken to mean nondiscriminating (294–295). On the contrary, homosexual men are "extremely choosy." "Some of the most promiscuous individuals," says Tripp (1975, 151), "sustain considerable frustration not from any lack of opportunity but from being exceedingly selective."

21. Saghir and Robbins (1973, 63) admit that their statistics do not "represent the sexual behavior of homosexual men in general," but "the homosexual behavior of American homosexual males who are living in a large urban setting, are of relatively higher socioeconomic status, have had some contact with homosexual organizations, and are twenty-one years or older."

22. This is the expression favored by Laumann et al.

23. I also do not claim that the sexually explicit romance novel is the only form of pornographic fiction, assuming that is what it is, enjoyed by women. But the genre incontestably constitutes a central variety of such fiction. See Penley *et al.* (2013, 14): "The overwhelming popularity of women's erotic literature, illustrated by the recent world-wide best-seller, *Fifty Shades of Grey* by E. L. James, and the flourishing fan fiction community from which it emerged, proves that there is great demand among women for explicit sexual representations. Millions of female readers embraced the *Fifty Shades of Grey* trilogy." See the discussion later.

24. I have it on good authority that *Luring Lucy* is a typical example of this genre.

25. Tempting speculations concerning the evolutionary prehistory of the appeal of these figures to female readers of romance novels beckon, but I shall resist indulging in them here.

26. After experiencing (at her request) the most extreme form of punishment Christian is inclined to mete out, Anastasia does leave him. But it is not clear that this is an act of conscience, rather than the result of an inability to satisfy his unusual needs.

27. One is reminded of Virginia Woolf's hyperbolic remark that George Eliot's *Middlemarch* is the only English novel written for adults.

28. This had led some moral psychologists (Dwyer 2008; Joyce 2006) to conclude that the human moral capacity is innate, that is, a product of evolutionary design. Since the tendency of any species to construct an extended phenotype that is environmentally responsive is innate, the account I am about to offer may, *to this extent*, be said to be innatist, but one with more specificity concerning the psychological and even the neural mechanisms involved than is standard.

29. As a basic emotion, anger is not directed specifically at the social environment. Anger engendered by frustration with something nonhuman or even inanimate is not at all uncommon. Still, the reciprocal link between anger and guilt remains a strong one.

30. The following three paragraphs derive from my (2013).

31. It is not entirely clear what James' theory of the emotions is. At times, James seems to identify emotions with the feelings caused by bodily changes, while at other times he identifies them with the bodily changes themselves. For an example of the first tendency, see *Principles of Psychology* (1890, Vol. II, 449, emphasis original): "My theory is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, *and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion.*" For an example of the second, see (ibid., 452, emphasis mine): "The more closely I scrutinize my states, the more persuaded I become that whatever moods, affections, and passions I have are in very truth *constituted by*, and *made up of*, those bodily changes which we ordinarily call their expression or consequence." What is clear is that bodily changes are, for James, not mere effects of emotional feelings.

32. Damasio (1999, 22) comes close to saying this himself: "The deep roots for the self, including the elaborate self which encompasses identity and personhood, are to be found in the ensemble of brain devices which continuously and nonconsciously maintain the body state within the narrow range and relative stability for survival." Zahavi's cognate view (2003, 59) approximates mine: "Thus the experiential self could be characterized as the *core self*." (2003, 62): "[T]he notion of the self introduced by the narrative model is not only far more complex than, but also logically and ontologically dependent upon, the experiential self…When we are dealing with the experiential self, we should stick to the term 'self', since we are exactly dealing with a primitive form of self-givenness or self-referentiality. But when we are dealing with the narrative model, it would be better to speak not of the self, but of the *person* as the narrative construction. After all, what is being addressed by this model is exactly the nature of my personality or personal character: a personality that evolves through time, and which is shaped by the values I endorse, and by my moral and intellectual convictions and decisions."

33. This objection is due to John Deigh.

34. See also Harmon-Jones (1999, 95), Cooper (1999, 150), Cooper (2007, 182), Devine et al. (1999, 309, 319), McGregor et al. (1999, 330n2), and Higgins (1987, 322).

35. In one experiment (see Harmon-Jones 1999, 80), writers of counter-attitudinal essays who were told that their essays would immediately be put in the trash and not read at all, and thus would not adversely affect anyone, still experienced cognitive dissonance, as measured by self-report. The writing of such counter-attitudinal essays is standard procedure in many of these induced compliance experiments. Simplifying a bit, subjects, usually university psychology students, are either invited (high choice) or required (low choice) to write a counter-attitudinal essay, for example, to argue for a steep increase in tuition or student fees, positions contrary to their value commitments. Subjects are normally supplied with some argumentative points, pro and con, and are given a specified time interval to organize their thoughts before they write the essay. In some cases, they are promised rewards of differing value for their participation. Depending on experimental design, some subjects are asked to express their attitude immediately before writing their essays, while others are asked immediately after. Dissonance reduction by way of attitude change tends to occur most among high-choice subjects who are asked about their attitude after writing and who are promised only a very modest reward. If choice were low, the reasoning goes, writers could evade personal responsibility; if the reward were higher, dissonance would be reduced by the introduction of gain as a reasonable motive; and it is the actual writing of the essay, not its mere mental formulation, that constitutes the dissonance-eliciting act.

36. ANOVA is designed to rule out the null hypothesis or accidental correlation in experimental situations by comparing the size of some noticeable difference between groups with variance (the measure of the range and the distribution of data points) within these groups. Ideally, this noticeable difference should be large as compared with variance. This will yield a *p*-value of 0.05 or lower, a conventionally set limit, which indicates that the difference is significant and not the result of chance correlation resulting from variance.

37. "A group is defined as a set of individuals that influence each other's fitness with respect to a certain trait but not the fitness of those outside the group. Mathematically, the groups are represented by a frequency of a certain trait, and fitnesses are a function of this frequency" (Sober and Wilson 1998, 92).

38. Sober and Wilson (1998, 67): "The frequency of altruists does indeed decline within groups, but this overall decline is halted by the periodic reassortment of the 'tribes' (the sib-groups) and the reconcentration of altruists in new sib groups." Joyce (2006, 37): "Again, everyone – both non-helpers and other helpers – wants to be with helpers, and so non-helpers get consigned to a group by themselves" (a group with lower growth potential). It is a mistake, however, (the "averaging fallacy") to conclude that *individual* altruists are thereby rendered more fit by averaging fitness indiscriminately *across* groups containing different proportions of helpers and nonhelpers, since this conflates the different mechanisms responsible for the evolution of altruism and selfishness. Cf. Sober and Wilson (1998, 33): "Between-group selection favors the evolution of altruism; within-group selection favors the evolution of selfishness. These two processes oppose each other."

39. But not on an egoistic one: the personal extended phenotype survives the death of the organism in the form of reputation. It also fits well with egoistic *ultimate* explanation: a good posthumous reputation is likely to enhance the fitness of one's descendants.

40. Cf. Joyce (2006, 114): "Protective actions toward our offspring, for example, appear to be regulated by robust raw emotions, not primarily by any moral sense of duty."

41. See Prinz (2008, 406): "[M]orality may be a solution to a social coordination problem and without it, we would be much worse off." Wong (2006, 35): "[C]onsistent with a naturalistic account are analyses of moral terms that are defended here – those employing standards or norms established to further social cooperation." (Joyce 2006, 44): "[A]mong the means favored by natural selection in order to get humans helping each other is a 'moral sense,' by which I mean a faculty for making moral judgments." (ibid., 115): "And perhaps natural selection has made us want to cooperate. And granting us a tendency *to think of cooperation in moral terms (where this includes the capacity for guilt*) is a means of securing this desire" (emphasis mine).

42. See Prinz (2007, 90): "[T]o qualify as wrong, something must be disposed to cause both self-blame and other-blame emotions. It is not the case that anything that merely disgusts or irritates us is wrong…Moralizing requires the disposition to have both self-directed and other-directed emotions in the disapprobation spectrum." Such emotions have "implications for the individual's sense of self and integrity" (Nichols 2004, 127). Both Prinz and Nichols are committed to a sentimentalist or emotionist meta-ethics, an issue on which I take no stand in this study.

43. See Sober and Wilson (1998, 239): "Just as an individual can be an altruist without being moved by moral principles, the converse is also possible. People sometimes believe that moral principles are binding for reasons that have nothing to do with how obeying those principles will affect the well being of others." Similarly, just as an individual can be an egoist without being moved by moral principles, the converse is also, I suppose, possible. But see the following discussion.

44. In a later essay (1987), Frankfurt acknowledges the obscurity of his earlier language of decisive, resounding identification and attempts to remedy it, with questionable success. At one point he considers and rejects, though not unequivocally, a proposal not unlike the one I am about to make:

   > [T]he making of a decision appears to differ from the self-reparative activities of the body, which it in some other ways resembles. When a body heals itself, it *eliminates* conflicts in which one physical process (say, infection) interferes with others and undermines the homeostasis, or equilibrium, in which health consists. A person who makes up his mind also seeks to overcome or to supersede a condition of inner division and to make himself into an integrated whole. But he may accomplish this without actually eliminating the desires that conflict with those on which he has decided, as long as he dissociates himself from them. (173–174)

   Frankfurt's claims about the maintenance of homeostasis or equilibrium are not quite accurate. The tuberculosis of the brain that killed the American novelist Thomas Wolfe at age 38 resulted from a tubercular lung infection contracted many years earlier, which had been contained by antibodies and lain dormant, but from which he had never completely recovered. Something similar could be said about the herpes simplex viruses, which, once contracted, are incurable and remain in the body for

life. Of course, Frankfurt could reply that in these cases complete healing has not taken place. Still, homeostasis has been maintained, in Wolfe's case by the action of the immune system.

45. Physical pain has an emotional component, without which it is mere nociception. And emotional pain has a physical component, the bodily sensations that are characteristically part of the emotion process.

46. Walter (2001, 298), who accepts the Damasio triune model, takes a similar psychological approach to the Frankfurt regress problem: "An emotional break-off mechanism," he argues, "solves the regress problem of traditional identification theories." "Repeated reentry into the body-loop and the as-if-loop" (the mechanism that supports the emotional processing of virtual scenarios) "makes decisions authentic…they are made consistent with ourselves, as the persons we have historically come to be" (300). Such decisions, that is to say, are ones that reduce cognitive dissonance and preserve the integrity of the human extended phenotype.

47. Joyce (2006, 197–199) may be correct in asserting that such a project is hopeless. Though any defense, partial or otherwise, of a meta-ethical position like Korsgaard's is beyond the scope of present discussion, I believe Joyce does not take seriously enough importance of positive self-valuation as a condition of all human endeavor: "Perhaps my identity as a man [i.e., a person] is deeper than my identity as a father…, but it doesn't seem to follow that any values that derive from being a man are more important, more robust, or more authoritative than those that derive from being a father."

48. Cf. Walter (2001, 289): "It seems to be necessary for learning moral concepts that the basic circuits for emotions are intact." Joyce (2006, 125): "All this evidence gives us a very coarse-grained answer to what natural selection did to the human brain to enable moral judgment: it manipulated emotional centers."

49. Some may interpret Greene to be suggesting that deontological intuitions are entirely emotion-driven, whereas consequentialist ones are entirely calculative and emotion free. This, however, would be a mistake. The difference is one of mode of emotional engagement: primitive and reflex-like, or sophisticated and reflective. See Greene (2008, 41): "I hasten to add that I don't believe that either approach is strictly emotional or 'cognitive' (or even that there is a sharp distinction between 'cognition' and emotion). More specifically, I am sympathetic to Hume's claim that all moral judgment (including consequentialist judgment) must have some emotional component [Hume reference deleted]. But I suspect that the kind of emotion that is essential to consequentialism is fundamentally different from the kind that is essential to deontology, the former functioning like a currency and the latter functioning more like that of an alarm."

50. See Nussbaum (1995) and Langton (2009).

51. Cf. Joyce (2006, 65): "[A] number of cross-cultural studies have unanimously found certain broad universals in moral systems: (1) negative appraisals of certain acts of harming others [anger], (2) values pertaining to reciprocity and fairness [anger], (3) requirements concerning behavior befitting one's status relative to a social hierarchy [contempt], and (4) regulations clustering around bodily matter [disgust]."

52. As I indicated in Chapter 1, I do not for a moment deny the existence of cinematic forms of pornography, including short clips. Nor do I deny the existence of pornographic still pictures. I have prescinded from these forms because they would require a very different treatment in line with a developed philosophy of the visual arts, a body of doctrine not currently in my possession.

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