

CREATING
SOCIAL
COHESION
IN AN
INTERDEPENDENT
WORLD

Experiences of Australia and Japan

Edited by Ernest Healy,
Dharma Arunachalam,
and Tetsuo Mizukami



Creating Social Cohesion in an Interdependent World

Creating Social Cohesion in an Interdependent World

Experiences of Australia and Japan

Edited by

Ernest Healy, Dharma Arunachalam, and Tetsuo Mizukami

palgrave
macmillan



CREATING SOCIAL COHESION IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD

Selection and editorial content © Ernest Healy, Dharma Arunachalam, and Tetsuo Mizukami 2016

Individual chapters © their respective contributors 2016

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2016 978-1-137-52021-0

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission. In accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.

Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

First published 2016 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of Nature America, Inc., One New York Plaza, Suite 4500, New York, NY 10004-1562.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

ISBN: 978-1-349-70500-9

E-PDF ISBN: 978-1-137-52022-7

DOI: 10.1057/9781137520227

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Creating social cohesion in an interdependent world : experiences of Australia and Japan / edited by Ernest Healy, Dharma Arunachalam, and Tetsuo Mizukami.

pages cm

Includes index.

1. Multiculturalism—

Australia. 2. Multiculturalism—Japan. 3. Australia—Emigration and immigration. 4. Japan—Emigration and immigration. 5. Australia—Social policy. 6. Japan—Social policy. I. Healy, Ernest, editor.

HN850.Z9M8437 2016

306.44'60994—dc23

2015028784

A catalogue record for the book is available from the British Library.

Contents

List of Figures	vii
List of Tables	ix

Part I

1 Social Cohesion and the Challenge of Globalization <i>Ernest Healy, Dharma Arunachalam, and Tetsuo Mizukami</i>	3
2 Japan's Social Cohesion in Relation to Immigration Issues <i>Tetsuo Mizukami</i>	33
3 Australian Multiculturalism—"Natural Transition" or Social Coercion? <i>Ernest Healy</i>	47
4 Contemporary Australian Attitudes to Immigration <i>Andrew Markus</i>	81
5 Immigration Challenges in Japan: How Has Japanese Society Coped With Immigration? <i>Hirohisa Takenoshita</i>	95

Part II

6 Why Half the Municipal Governments Disappear Under a National Mergers Policy? Changing Local Bases in "Globalizing" Japan <i>Takashi Machimura</i>	115
7 "Diasporic" Muslims, "Minoritarian" Islam, and Modern Democratic Citizenship: Negotiating Accommodation and Integration <i>Clive S. Kessler</i>	127
8 Volunteering and Civic Participation in the Vietnamese-Australian Community <i>RoseAnne Misajon, Vicki Hutton, and Ana-Maria Bliuc</i>	145
9 Inter-marriage, Language Use, and Integration of Migrants <i>Dharma Arunachalam and Maria Karidakis</i>	161
10 Inter-marriage and Japanese Identity <i>Shuko Takeshita</i>	175

Part III

11 Internationalization of Higher Education as a Response to Globalization: Japan's Policy Challenges since the 1980s <i>Yukako Yonezawa and Akiyoshi Yonezawa</i>	191
--	-----

vi CONTENTS

12	Higher Education and Social Cohesion: Universities, Citizenship, and Spaces of Orientation <i>Miriam Faine, Sue Plowright, and Terri Seddon</i>	205
13	Individual Labor-Related Dispute Mechanisms in Japan—Policy Intention and Individual Worker Aspirations <i>Nobuko Hosogaya</i>	221
14	The Youth Labor Market in Japan <i>Nobuaki Fujioka</i>	243
15	Globalization, Immigration Policy, and Youth Employment in Australia <i>Bob Birrell and Ernest Healy</i>	263
	Notes on Contributors	281
	Index	285

List of Figures

5.1	The Number of Foreign Nationals in Japan over Time	99
5.2	The Proportion of Those Who Are against an Increase in the Number of Foreigners in Respondent's Community	105
6.1	A Schematic Diagram of the Rescaling in the Second Half of the 1980s	117
6.2	Account-by-Account Details of Public Expenditure (Japan, 1980–2009)	118
6.3	Foreign Workers Locally Employed by Japanese Corporations (by Main Countries and Regions, 1995–2006)	120
6.4	Share of Municipalities That Experienced the “Great Heisei Consolidation” (Number of Municipalities, Total Area, and Total Population)	122
6.5	A Schematic Diagram to Help Understand the Rescaling in the Early 2000s in Japan	123
10.1	Number of Intermarriages in Japan	176
10.2	Nationality of Foreign Spouses	178
13.1	Changes in the Number of Collective Labor Disputes, General Labor Consultations, and the Individual Labor-Related Disputes, 2002–2013	222
13.2	Changes to the Composition of Grievances in ILRD Consultations	230
13.3	Model of the Actual ILRD Resolution Process	231
13.4	Individual Labor Dispute by Type of Employment	234
14.1	Young People under the Age of 35 in the Labor Market, 1990–2014	244
14.2	Unemployment Rates by Age Group, 1990–2014	244
14.3	Changes in the Number and Ratio of “NEETs,” 1995–2013	245
14.4	Nonregular Employment Rates by Age Group, 1992–2012	246
14.5	Changes in the Number of “Freeters,” 1992–2013	247
14.6	Age-Earnings Profiles by Employment Status (Hourly Wage as of June 2014)	248

14.7	Job Opening-to-Application Ratio for New Graduates, 1990–2014	251
14.8	Nonregular Employment Rates for Workers under the Age of 35 by Gender, 1992–2012	252
14.9	Share of Low-Paid Regular Employees Aged 25–29 by Gender, 1992–2012	252
14.10	Ratio of Workers at “Black Companies” by Age Group, 2013	255

List of Tables

2.1	The Number of Foreign Nationals in 2004–2013 from Selected Countries	39
2.2	Response to the Question as to Nexus between “Efforts” and “Rewards” in 1988	43
2.3	Response to the Question as to Nexus between “Efforts” and “Rewards” in 2013	43
3.1	Level of Australian Qualification by Response to the Statement “Ethnic Groups Should Keep Their Cultures to Themselves,” Australia 1988	55
3.2	Level of Australian Qualification by Response to the Statement “People Who Come to Australia Should Change Their Behaviour to be More Like Other Australians,” Australia 1988	56
3.3	Level of Australian Qualification by Response to the Statement “Having Lots of Different Cultural Groups in Australia Causes Lots of Problems,” Australia 1988	57
4.1	“Do You Think of the Number of Immigrants Accepted into Australia is ?,” Scanlon Foundation National Surveys, 2007–2014	84
4.2	“Accepting Immigrants from Many Different Countries Makes Australia Stronger,” Scanlon Foundation National Surveys, 2007–2014	86
4.3	“Multiculturalism Has Been Good for Australia,” Scanlon Foundation National Survey, 2014	90
4.4	Negative Responses by Selected Question, Scanlon Foundation National Surveys, 2013–2014	91
9.1	Percentage of Men Who Married a Partner from a Different Birthplace, Australia 1960–1962 and 1980–1982	164
9.2	Percentage of Partnered Men and Women with Spouse of a Different Ancestry, by Gender and Generation, 1986	165
9.3	Percentage of Partnered Men and Women with Spouse of a Different Ancestry, by Gender and Generation, 2011	166
9.4	Percentage of Language Shift in the First Generation, 1991, 2001, and 2011	168
9.5	Percentage of Second- and Third-Generation Migrants Who Spoke Only English at Home, by Ancestry, 2011	170

13.1	Institutions and Their Functions in the Processing of ILRDs	224
13.2	The Number of Consultations on Civil Individual Labor Disputes, Advice and Guidance, and Mediation	228
13.3	ILRDs by Labor Type	235
13.4	The Incidence of ILRDs by Selected Prefectures	236
14.1	Ratio of Workplace with Implementation of Training for Employee by Employment Status, 2014 (%)	249
14.2	Coverage of Social Insurance and Benefits by Employment Status, 2010 (%)	249
14.3	Share of Involuntary Nonregular Employees by Gender and Age Group, 2010 (%)	249
14.4	Human Resource Management of Black Companies	254
15.1	Annual Growth in the Labor Force and Employment, Australia, and Labor Force Participation as of May 2012 to May 2014	265
15.2	Annual Additions to the Numbers of Persons Born Overseas Who Arrived in Australia after 2010, Who Were Employed and in the Labor Force, May 2011 to May 2014	266
15.3	Overseas-Born Arrivals (15 Plus Years) 2011 to 2014, as of May 2014	267
15.4	Temporary Visa Holders in Australia as of March 2012, March 2013, and March 2014	268
15.5	Last Substantive Visa Status of Those Issued 457 Visas Onshore, Year up to August 31, 2012	276
15.6	Number of Visas Granted in 2011–2012 and 2012–2013, by Visa Subclass, to Those Whose Last Visa Held Was a Student Visa	278

Part I

Social Cohesion and the Challenge of Globalization

Ernest Healy, Dharma Arunachalam, and Tetsuo Mizukami

Introduction

Since the mid-1990s, there has been a rapid growth of interest in the issue of social cohesion by academics and policy professionals and in public commentary. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) economist Michael Woolcock (2013) presents citation data relating to social cohesion for the period 1985 to 2009, along with data for a number of closely associated concepts, including “social capital,” “human capital,” “social exclusion,” and “civil society.” The number of citations relating specifically to social cohesion increases markedly from the early 1990s, and particularly from the mid-1990s, from a low base of fewer than 1,000 to 10,000 by 2009. The data also show a dramatic increase in citations to civil society and human capital, from a low base in the early 1990s to a peak of nearly 35,000 citations for civil society and to around 27,000 citations for human capital in 2005–2006.

A pervasive sense of anxiety has characterized this focus on social cohesion, reflecting the great uncertainties and perceived ill effects of globalization. Ritzén (2000: 1) points to “one of the paradoxes of our age”: “the more things come together, the more they fall apart.” Snowballing global interdependence is accompanied by an opposing tendency to retreat into localism and minority identity, something manifest in the “proliferation of new states based on ethnic identities in the aftermath of social or ethnic conflict.” Similarly, Castells (2010: xxiii) observes that “the more the world becomes global, the more people feel local.” This paradox has been accompanied by “deep concern about how and whether society as we have known it will remain possible” (Ritzén, 2000: 1). Similarly, James (2009: 22) observes that some of the most difficult barriers to globalization are sociopsychological in nature and that “it is here that a sense of helplessness is profoundly pervasive.” By the closing decade of the twentieth century, there was, for many,

a sense of being caught between the “backward utopia” of a national past and the uncertain “forward utopia” of global citizenship (13). Increasing doubt about the capacity of national governments to act effectively in the face of global pressures, and the implications of this for the functioning of democratic institutions, has also been a source of widespread anxiety. Drezner (2001: 54) adds: “The question of national policy autonomy has triggered the most public anxiety about globalisation,” and cites Friedman (1999), who dramatically asserts that nation-states are left with a stark choice between “free market vanilla and North Korea.”

Of course, social cohesion is a long-established area of social analysis, having been a central concern of founding social theorists such as Durkheim and Marx, and more recently of many other social analysts. Nevertheless, the increase in the sheer volume of discourse and policy development dealing with social cohesion and related concepts over the past two decades in academic and public policy circles is remarkable. It is all the more remarkable for its international scope, encompassing Europe, the United Kingdom, North America, Asia, and middle-tier economies, including Australia.

The work of US sociologist Robert Putnam since the mid-1990s, dealing with social capital and civic engagement, is sometimes cited in explaining the rapid increase in interest in these concepts (Larsen, 2009; Wilkinson and Bittman, 2002). Indeed, the number of citations relating to social capital does begin to increase markedly from around 1994, when Putnam published his seminal work on civic traditions in modern Italy (1994), which focused on the importance of civic engagement and social capital for the functioning of democratic culture. His subsequent publication *Bowling Alone* (2000), which documented the erosion of civic engagement and social trust in the United States, is also seen as having added momentum to the concern about social cohesion.

However, a broader historical view is required to explain the high level of attention currently given to the issue and to understand its full importance. In this context, Putnam’s work seems to represent an intersection of sorts between nationally focused concerns about social cohesion and anxiety about the effects of globalization. Although his recent work has been largely concerned with developments within the United States, his troubling findings resonated in other national contexts. The impact of globalization, in its many manifestations—international trade and migration flows, increased ethnic and religious diversity within societies, increased foreign investment, the outsourcing of production and jobs to foreign locations, the emergence of a globally mobile labor force, and the ascendancy of a free-market ethos—have presented new and fundamental challenges to inherited identity and culture (local, regional, and national) and to the capacity of governments and societies to act coherently and effectively in the face of rapid change.

The broader, systemic impetus to the discourse on social cohesion is explored below. In particular, the roles of two peak international organizations, the United Nations (UN) and the OECD, are examined as two significant sources of high-level discourse on social cohesion.

The ways in which these organizations have articulated anxieties about the effects of globalization upon social cohesion are important. This is because the conceptual frameworks formulated by these organizations have influenced national and subnational policy responses to contemporary problems of social cohesion.

Moreover, these organizations have assumed a proselytizing role, promoting a particular viewpoint regarding how current challenges to social cohesion should be understood and responded to. Unfortunately, the way the contemporary challenges to social cohesion have been conceptualized seems prescriptive, limited, and ideological. An understanding of these limitations is necessary to better grasp the different ways in which societies may respond to the pressures of globalization in practice.

Clarity on the nature of the debate on social cohesion to date is a prerequisite to the focus of this book, which examines the challenges of maintaining social cohesion in the particular and contrasting situations of Australia and Japan.

Before examining the ways in which the UN and the OECD have dealt with issues of social cohesion, a brief outline is provided of the nature of recent discourse on the issue.

Discourse on Social Cohesion

Berger-Schmitt (2000) had observed that in the context of the growing uncertainties of the late twentieth century, there had been a shift in the way social well-being was conceived and measured. Discourse shifted from a preoccupation with “wealth” to a broader concern with “quality of life.” At the same time, there was a shift in focus from empirical measures relating to the individual to indicators of social qualities, such as the quality and structure of social relations, and feelings of security. Against this background, social cohesion emerged as an important research and policy focus.

In this context, the range of meanings attached to the term “social cohesion” increased. As ever more indicators were proposed, the need to discern which were causal antecedents, mediating factors, or the consequences of social cohesion became more pressing (Freidkin, 2004). Freidkin stresses the complexity of social cohesion, that it is not a unitary phenomenon, but multidimensional—“a domain of causally interrelated phenomena.” A coherent theory of social cohesion, he argues, requires an understanding of the attitudes and behaviors of the individuals participating in group activity, as well as of the social processes or environments within organizations or networks that affect individuals’ attitudes and behaviors. This is a view similar to that put forward by Glaeser (2001). Likewise, Berger-Schmitt (2000) reiterates the idea that social cohesion is not limited to issues relating to the nature and quality of relationships among individuals, but between social units—groups, associations, and territorial units. Furthermore, an intrinsic part of the challenge of understanding social cohesion in times of rapid social and economic change is to grasp it as a dynamic process.

A number of terms used in the contemporary debate have closely related or overlapping meanings. “Social cohesion” is closely associated with “social capital,” and the latter with “human capital.” Easterly et al. (2006: 106) argue that “social capital” is often used to refer to “the resources inhering in relationships, networks, and other forms of social connection.” Berger-Schmitt (2000) observes that theorists most frequently regard social capital “as a property of a social entity and not an individual.” “Social cohesion” is therefore a more appropriate term for

describing and analyzing society as a whole (Easterly et al., 2006: 106). By contrast, “human capital” is most often used to refer to the aptitudes, education, communication skills, and other personal resources that individuals can bring to bear upon their social circumstances. Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) suggest that transmission of knowledge is facilitated in associationally intense societies, which in turn increases the creation of human capital.

Nevertheless, there is considerable variation within the academic literature about what these terms encompass. In defining social capital, Putnam (2007) has stressed the horizontal associations between people within networks of civic engagement. Coleman (1988) includes vertical associations between corporate actors within the social structure as something facilitated by social capital. North (1990) extends this approach, including the formalized relations of macro-institutions such as political regimes and judicial systems in the discussion of social capital (see Berger-Schmitt, 2000).

As indicated, a broad range of social attributes have been identified for the measurement of social cohesion and to understand the social factors that either facilitate or inhibit it. Foremost among these attributes are social trust, shared values, sense of community belonging, and sense of shared purpose or common enterprise (Easterly et al., 2006; Ritzen, 2000). Among the indicators used to measure these attributes are membership of organizations and the frequency and type of civic participation, volunteering activity, and attitudinal measures relating to perceptions of trust and well-being. Indirect measures have been used to identify the relationship of social inequality to social cohesion, such as differences in educational attainment or income. The quality of political institutions and the prevalence of corruption, as well as levels of racial and ethnolinguistic fractionalization, have also been explored as factors relevant to understanding social cohesion (Easterly et al., 2006; Ritzen, 2000).

There is an extensive body of literature on the economic benefits that characterize cohesive communities. Strong social capital within a community can facilitate overall economic performance, such as in the creation of trust between individuals when undertaking uncontracted transactions or in overcoming the free-rider problem in the provision of public goods (Glaeser, 2001). An important consideration from an economic standpoint is to understand the circumstances in which individuals invest in a community without any expectation of a commensurate, direct, and immediate personal return, but is nevertheless an investment which enhances the capacity of a society to cooperate and coordinate action (and presumably social cohesion) for the benefit of the community as a whole. Freitag (2003: 994) argues that generalized trust “stimulates a type of generalized reciprocity where altruistic behavior and obligations will be repaid at some unspecified time, at some unspecified location, by an unspecified person . . . [incorporating] people who are not personally known.”

Other analysts have argued that economic development and resilience are greater in societies which have effective public institutions. In turn, effective public institutions are seen as more likely to be found in societies with greater social cohesion. Easterly et al. (2006) argue that social cohesion determines the quality of institutions. From an examination of a broad range of data from both developing and developed nations, the authors conclude:

these suggestive empirical results show that building social cohesion—through the construction and maintenance of high-quality institutions pursuing the common good, and through the lowering of economic (and other) divisions—has been, and remains, a vital task for countries wrestling with development. (111)

In this context, Easterly et al. (2006: 110) conclude that the most cohesive societies ranked “within the lower half of ethnolinguistic fractionalisation” and in “the upper half of share of middle class.” The share of population falling within the middle class was taken as a measure of inequality (or lack of it), or as a proxy for social division. The authors conclude that societies that are characterized by significant inequalities (e.g., in relation to class and income) and ethnic/linguistic divisions will have a much more difficult time creating social cohesion, efficient institutions, and, consequently, economic growth. They also argue, however, that the state may compensate to some degree by fostering unity. A study by Alesina and La Ferrara (2000), which analyzed survey data on group membership and locality data within the United States, drew similar conclusions. The authors found that participation in associational activities was significantly lower in localities that were more unequal and ethnically or racially divided.

The level of educational attainment has been identified as a particularly strong indicator of social cohesion (Easterly et al., 2006; Glaeser, 2001). Glaeser (2001: 16) states that “[u]nquestionably, the most robust correlate of social capital variables across individuals is years of schooling.”

Easterly et al. (2006) also identify education as an important area for government involvement in the creation of social cohesion, particularly in heterogeneous societies. Not only can public education be used to instruct individuals about appropriate interactions with others and between individuals and the state, but it also has the potential to “create harmony within a nation of divergent peoples” (Heyneman, 2000, cited in Easterly et al., 2006: 117).

The close linkages between strong civic networks, community trust, and vibrant democratic culture have been a key theme within the literature on social capital. Putnam’s research comparing regional governments in northern and southern Italy highlighted these linkages. The “inefficient, lethargic and corrupt” government in some regions stood in stark contrast to the creative and prosperous government which characterized others (Putnam, 1993: 2). The strongest predictor identified by Putnam to explain these differences was the strong tradition of civic engagement that existed in the more democratic, economically prosperous Italian regions. This civic engagement involved a wide range of overlapping organizational activities, from soccer clubs to choral societies. Such activities, in turn, were associated with greater commitment to democratic outcomes: high voter turnout, newspaper readership, mutual trust, commitment to equality, and institutional integrity. Citizens do not consciously take part in civic activities to create or increase their shared stock of social capital; rather, Putnam argues, social capital is a by-product of their preferred associational activities.

However, research findings that highlight the significance of social cohesion for institutional efficiency, democracy, and economic growth present a potential dilemma for governments and communities being subjected to relentless social and economic change. On the one hand, there is a growing body of research which

indicates an inverse relationship between social division—along racial, ethnic, and class lines—and social cohesion. At the same time, the impetus from globalization toward ever greater international and regional people flows, which are likely to increase social fractionalization, appears unavoidable. In some cases, as in Europe, migrant settler populations are characterized by both cultural and class marginalization within their respective host societies. Research suggests that the coincidence of increasing ethnic diversification with the concentration of social disadvantage presents a serious challenge to the creation or preservation of social cohesion. Further, such coincidence of social disadvantage with ethnic diversity can make analysis of social cohesion difficult. Thus, Demireva (2011: 2) notes:

The empirical evidence from the US suggests a negative relationship between diversity and cohesion. The evidence from the UK and rest of Europe is more mixed. British and other European studies have raised the yet unresolved question whether it is income inequality, in particular deprivation and impoverishment of an area, rather than diversity per se that serves to estrange people.

The ongoing destabilization of societies as a result of global interdependence may make the preservation of social cohesion increasingly difficult for societies with either high or low levels of social cohesion. Even in societies with a strong inherited stock of social capital, disruption of economic and social norms may make the preservation of this stock challenging. Similarly, for societies with low inherited stocks of social capital, uncertain conditions and disruption may diminish the capacity to establish the networks of civic engagement necessary for the creation of a civic “tradition.”

Significantly, Putnam also points to the potential threat to social capital from economic and social restructuring initiatives of government and other public agencies:

[W]hen considering the effects of economic reconversion on communities, we must weigh the risks of destroying social capital . . . some government programs themselves . . . have heedlessly ravaged existing social networks . . . Shred enough social fabric and we all pay. (1993: 6)

Such damage may be inadvertent. Research findings which indicate that ethnic diversity may inhibit social cohesion present a further dilemma. Some governments, such as in the United Kingdom, acknowledge the importance of shared values for the maintenance of social cohesion, but then embrace ethnic diversity as a core national value to serve this function (Crowley and Hickman, 2008). Embracing diversity is thereby seen as a means and prerequisite for preserving social cohesion at the national level. However, much research suggests that the adoption of core values-based ethnic and racial diversity may be self-defeating.

Therefore, a problematic attribute associated with the definition and measurement of social cohesion is social inclusiveness. It has been frequently assumed by policy makers that socially cohesive societies are inclusive, a correlate of shared purpose and sense of belonging. However, the prospect that highly cohesive

societies with a strong sense of shared values may, as a consequence, set significant barriers to entry represents a dilemma for those who recognize the contemporary global challenges to social cohesion, but who nevertheless remain committed to the ideal of cosmopolitan inclusiveness (see Berger-Schmitt, 2000). The following sections show how this dilemma was writ large during the 1990s and 2000s.

The United Nations—Social Cohesion

On the fiftieth anniversary of the UN in 1995, when Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali delivered his opening presentation at the World Summit for Social Development, in Copenhagen, he was eager to portray a great continuity of purpose since the organization's founding. During the UN's 50-year history, it had pursued an unswerving purpose in promoting recognition of human rights, social and cultural rights, and the struggle against poverty and inequality (Boutros-Ghali, 1995). The Summit also focused upon another established UN goal: "the right to development." Under the rubric of social development, issues of social integration and social cohesion figured prominently.

Today's global economy affects everyone. We also know that its effects are not all positive. It erodes traditional ties and solidarity among individuals. It has marginalised entire countries and regions. The gap between rich and poor is getting wider. (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: 128)

And,

there are negative developments that include social polarisation and fragmentation, widening disparities of income and wealth within and among nations . . . marginalisation of individuals, families, communities and institutions as a result of the rapid pace of social change, economic transformation, migration and major dislocations of population. (United Nations, 1995b) (Part C of the Copenhagen Declaration, and the associated Action Statement on social integration)

In reality, however, the UN's development agenda had altered significantly since the 1970s and 1980s. The UN's criticism of North–South disparities and its demands for a new international economic order to radically redistribute wealth between the North and South had, by 1990, been superseded (Noel and Therien, 2008: 154).

The ascendancy of neoliberal politics in the United Kingdom and the United States during the 1980s had a profound effect upon the way that the UN would subsequently frame its development agenda.

Elected in 1979, Margaret Thatcher took exception to the way the UN posited a bipolarity of interests between the North and South, and she rejected the validity of the distinction altogether (Noel and Therien, 2008). In 1984, the United States withdrew from the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the United Kingdom in 1985. Further, in 1985, the United States

withheld its financial contribution to the UN budget. The consequences of this challenge to the UN were significant.

The pressures brought to bear during the 1980s put the UN on the defensive . . . in the field of development it assumed a much lower profile. The very idea of overhauling the world economic order was dropped . . . when the UN initiated a comeback in the area of development in the 1990s, it adopted an approach that was plainly less ambitious . . . the UN increasingly fell into line with the prevalent orthodoxy . . . development policies had to rely upon the market. (156)

Throughout the 1990s, the UN continued to accommodate demands for market-orientated ways of addressing global disparities of wealth and well-being. In part, this pressure was encapsulated in what, in 1989, US economist John Williamson labeled the “Washington Consensus.” The reforms associated with the Washington Consensus included a reordering of public expenditure priorities by governments toward high-return, pro-growth initiatives; a broadening of the taxation base; trade liberalization and the liberalization of foreign direct investment; the privatization of state assets and enterprises; economic deregulation and a reduced role for the state (WHO, 2012; Williamson, 2004). With the collapse of Soviet state planning at the end of the 1980s, globalization based on the principle of multilateral free trade was increasingly promoted as irrevocable and inevitable (James, 2009).

The UN’s reconciliation with the primacy of markets helps explain its promotion of interest in “social capital” and related concepts during the 1990s and 2000s. The concept of social capital could be promoted as a way of achieving social stability and cohesion while rejecting strong government in favor of open markets. The idea that communities may progress not on the basis of a direct redistribution of resources by governments, but by reliance upon local initiatives and informal networks, emerged as the preferred basis for policy development for the UN. Interest in the idea of social capital from this vantage point was shared by many free-market advocates. From the early 1990s, neoliberals:

advanced social capital as crucial for solving collective problems, and for creating civil society, democracy and development . . . The ideal state now is decentralised and participatory. (Sinha, 2005: 166)

The UN’s social cohesion agenda resonated strongly with Third Way politics, which found particular expression in the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States during the 1990s. As the willingness and capacity of governments to direct national economies was weakened during the 1980s and 1990s, traditional left demands for the redistribution of wealth appeared increasingly unachievable. By the turn of the millennium, many former critics of globalization, including many on the left, had become persuaded not only of the inevitability of global economic integration and the limitations this imposed on intervention by national governments, but also of its potential merits.

The emergence of Third Way politics (particularly in the English-speaking countries) appears to have been an expression of this ideological turning point. This perspective was succinctly described by former Australian Labor Party leader Mark Latham:

The Third Way is more interested in the relations between people than controlling economic relationships . . . It . . . marks a change . . . away from empowering the state and towards dispersing power to the regions, communities and citizens instead, giving people the raw materials with which they might build a more mutual, caring society. (2005: 105)

The adoption of a “people-centred” framework for social development by the UN at the Copenhagen Summit in 1995 may be interpreted as an expression of this market-centered outlook. Familiar social justice concerns remain about the alleviation of poverty, the advancement of human rights, and development, but they are refracted through the lens of a devolved self-help agenda, to empower “people to maximise their capacities, resources and opportunities,” and to enhance peoples’ capacity to share in the responsibility for their own lives (United Nations, 1995a: 5).

Governments, accordingly, are called upon to allocate “resources to promote local initiatives in maintaining and increasing community cohesion”; to strengthen “the capacities and opportunities for all people . . . to establish and maintain independent organisations representing their interests”; to give “community organisations greater involvement in the design and implementation of local projects”; and to encourage “the free formation of cooperatives, community and other grass-roots organizations, mutual support groups, recreational/sports associations and similar institutions that tend to strengthen social integration” (United Nations, 1995b). The UN’s diminished support for centralized governance was accompanied by a more pluralistic and open concept of community and community development (discussed below).

From the standpoint of contemplating the options available to governments for preserving stable and cohesive societies in the face of destabilizing global pressures, the UN perspective seems limited and problematic. It appears blind to a range of potential responses by national governments that are not premised upon Washington Consensus priorities. The primacy of markets is taken for granted, as inevitable and compatible with the preservation of strong, cohesive communities as they undergo ever greater enmeshment.

However, having accepted the primacy of markets and global economic interdependence as an inescapable precondition for nurturing social stability, the UN was confronted with a Gordian knot, in part of its own making. The experience of the 1990s had led to the realization that the global economic system is inherently unstable and subject to periodic shocks, in both the periphery and the core of the global system (James, 2009). Reliance upon the primacy of markets would prove an unreliable basis for meeting humanitarian objectives, including social inclusion, stability, and cohesion.

By the end of the 2000s, it was becoming evident that the potential for global market integration to create a win-win outcome for developed and developing nations alike, as well as for improving living standards across the board, was not being fulfilled. To the contrary, the great promise of global economic integration, promoted under the rubric of the Washington Consensus, was being subjected to ever greater skepticism. It was increasingly recognized that, in the contemporary global economy, it may be inherently difficult to simultaneously maintain high economic growth rates, full employment, and economic stability, a dilemma manifest in the United States, Japan, and Europe. Indeed, conventional approaches to economic analysis were proving unable to explain economic reality (Alpert, 2013; Summers, 2014). Some commentary pointed to the prospect of slow economic growth in the US economy for the foreseeable future (Gordon, 2014). Reinert (2012) argues that the tenets of the Washington Consensus, which were initially conceived for application in the Third World, had by the 2000s come to destabilize First World economies, through deindustrialization and financial crisis. He points to a trail of destruction of wealth, wages, and productive capacity in different national settings since the 1970s. Neoclassical economics, he argues, which had informed the West's approach to globalization, had led to a situation where Western democracies had unlearned "how their own economies became rich"; average incomes had diminished, manufacturing declined, there was a failure to distinguish between the financial economy and the real economy, and an austerity-based attack on purchasing power had undermined the capacity of societies to recover from financial crisis and sustained sluggish growth. Alpert (2013) points to the disruptive effects of the greater integration of the Chinese and Indian economies into the global economic system from the 1990s. So great has been the consequent oversupply of cheap credit, labor, and productive capacity emanating from these emergent economies that normal macroeconomic policy mechanisms used to manage the developed economies now fail to achieve the necessary adjustments. Neither the favored economic stimulus perspectives of the political left nor the austerity strategies of the right could be effective in restoring the economic vitality of the developed economies. Under contemporary circumstances, economic stimulus packages by governments in the developed world are more likely to generate off-shored jobs in India or China than in their own economies (Alpert, 2013). Prestowitz (2009: 3) similarly argues that globalization had been guided by a theory of trade, the policy assumptions of which were "increasingly divorced from reality." Whereas US-led globalization had met expectations in the early post-Second World War period (1950-1975), it had begun to falter during the 1980s. The current reality, however, is one of chronic trade imbalances between the United States and East Asian nations, and growing inequality. Markets had failed to correct and orthodox economic doctrine had proven wanting. As a consequence, globalization had resulted in a growing divide between rich and poor in many countries, including the United States; environmental degradation had accelerated and democratization (an assumed natural corollary of free trade) had been very uneven. Indeed, in some cases, globalization appears to have strengthened undemocratic regimes. Global corporations, Prestowitz observed, tended to be more responsive to authoritarian governments. His central concern is that the

growth of international trade had proceeded on the basis of “two economic systems”: countries pursuing universal free trade and governments pursuing neo-mercantilist policies, a situation which had largely led to perverse outcomes (5). Elkus (2008) maintained that so great had been the loss of manufacturing functions in the United States, associated with free-market economic strategy, that the United States had undermined its ability to innovate.

Furthermore, as noted above, by the late 2000s, a substantial body of social research had emerged which suggested that ethnic diversification combined with social inequality may be counterproductive for social cohesion. This did not bode well for the UN’s commitment to open, increasingly pluralist societies and small government. Alesina and La Ferrara (2000), for instance, observed a vicious cycle whereby low social capital and low community trust leads to a decline in the capacity of public institutions to rectify the negative effects of low social capital. Updated research by Putnam generally corroborated such findings. He found that ethnic diversity and social solidarity were negatively correlated, potentially engendering a withdrawal from collective life (Putnam, 2007). To the extent that globalization facilitated ethnic diversification and inequality within many societies, such research might have resulted in a greater level of caution among one-world advocates than it did, particularly among the left.

However, from the 1990s onward, the overriding belief in small government and self-correcting economies became closely associated with an assertive cosmopolitanism. From this perspective, a more united and prosperous economic world would be naturally accompanied by cultural convergence toward economically open and culturally inclusive societies based on cosmopolitan principles. As the economic dimension of this vision came under strain in the face of the global financial crisis of the late 2000s, efforts to shore up the cosmopolitan ideal nevertheless increased. It seemed that the more threatening the consequences of global economic integration, the more fervent were efforts to promote convergent cosmopolitan solutions to social and cultural dislocations. Social cohesion initiatives were largely circumscribed by this policy hegemony. The next section explores the role played by the OECD in this context.

The OECD—Social Cohesion

By the early 2000s, widespread concern had emerged within Europe about the difficulties of reconciling ever greater global interdependence with social stability. Strong reaction to the settlement of poorly integrated migrant minorities had emerged within some Western European societies, and against the disruptive effects of unceasing economic restructuring and the pursuit of open markets. Nevertheless, the OECD’s efforts to reconcile the disruptive effects of global development with a vision of social stability based on cosmopolitanism became more pronounced.

In 2011, the OECD hosted the International Conference on Social Cohesion and Development. The Conference focused on better understanding “the complex and pertinent relationship between social cohesion and development”

(OECD, 2011). Three major dimensions to the creation of social cohesiveness were posited:

building networks of relationships, trust and identity between different groups; fighting discrimination, exclusion and excessive inequalities; and enabling upward social mobility.

Further:

Many groups in society, such as minorities, migrants and the elderly have been largely excluded from the benefits of growth, leaving them more vulnerable to the shocks that come with the opening of economies. (OECD, 2011)

The Conference presentations reflected these themes. The Deputy Head of the UN's Development Program, Rebecca Grynspan, pointed to increasing "evidence that widening social divisions, growing inequality, and increasing alienation are important obstacles to development progress." She added:

[I]n many countries of the world, many forces are causing people to lose their sense of belonging, their identification with collective objectives and their bonds of solidarity . . . this reveals the importance of efforts to actively "create societies" that embrace diversity and demonstrate an awareness of social responsibility of individuals and groups. (Grynspan, 2011)

Significantly, Grynspan alludes to an approach not so much focused on preserving inherited social cohesion within societies against destabilizing influences, but upon how to create social cohesion anew in the context of global disruption. Grynspan's perspective may therefore be understood as challenging inherited structures of social cohesion while advocating the re-creation of social cohesion on an alternative basis.

Grynspan's statements highlight an essential bind facing the OECD. Like the UN, it was committed to continued global economic integration and economic growth. It took for granted that closing the gap between rich and poor, both within and between societies, would be achieved through the expansion and further integration of the global economy. At the same time, it was forced to acknowledge the continued potential for serious social and cultural dislocation through globalization, including the prospect of social alienation and cultural and ethnic conflict. However, despite growing evidence of such conflict, human global mobility and cultural diversification within societies were deemed inevitable and a necessary social and moral good.

In this context, cosmopolitanism emerges as a template for development. One of the principal areas of difficulty associated with global integration was thereby prescribed as part of the solution, and proselytizing the high moral virtue of "social inclusion" emerged as a priority. Further, this perspective implicitly assumed that globalization would inevitably lead to cultural convergence around the cosmopolitan ideal.

Some contributors at the Copenhagen conference were more forthright in asserting the cosmopolitan implications of globalization and the imperative to absorb migrant minorities into host societies. Cassam Uteem, former president of Mauritius and member of the Club de Madrid, advocated the creation of “shared societies.” These societies are defined as stable and just, where human rights are respected, and as tolerant and diverse (Uteem, 2011).

Uteem suggested that the poor integration and economic performance of some migrant minorities in Western European societies reflected a failure of authorities to adopt a sufficiently inclusive approach. Significantly, Uteem rejected demands for migrant integration into host societies. In his view, the challenge is not one of “fitting others in,” but of finding “common ground.”

Again, the OECD sidestepped the contradiction of advocating a cosmopolitan template in a global context where mass international migration and the settlement of migrant minorities had proven politically and culturally problematic in a growing number of countries. Essentially, it did this by resorting to a simple moral assertiveness: that any form of cultural exclusion is wrong and must be supplanted with a morally superior cosmopolitan outlook.

The Minimal Cosmopolitan Society

The OECD recognized that societies varied in their respective understandings of social cohesion. It nevertheless prescribed a cultural/political template for the achievement of social cohesion. In effect, the OECD relied upon a basic liberal perspective with which it could easily reconcile its cosmopolitan commitment. In adopting this approach, the OECD’s commitment to social equality extended beyond narrow economic issues related to the distribution of wealth, wages, and individual opportunity to the advocacy of an open cultural pluralism in which all cultures and identities may belong equally. Thus conceived, social inclusiveness conformed to a cosmopolitan standard.

In elaborating this perspective, the OECD drew upon the thinking of liberal American political philosopher, John Rawls. The appeal of Rawls appears to be that he challenges the ideal of an overarching dominant culture which may function as a delimiting principle for social inclusion, integration, and stability. Rawls advocates the coexistence of different comprehensive belief systems, whether moral, religious, or nonreligious. His perspective does not require that, over time, an overarching framework of durable, shared social values and axioms should be established to supplant a potentially kaleidoscopic range of competing values and belief systems. Indeed, the common ground negotiated by those holding different value systems may be minimal and residual. Again, Rawls explicitly rules out a liberal democracy where citizens hold the same comprehensive doctrine or value system. He asks instead:

[W]hat political conception of justice can provide the common basis of principles and ideals to guide public political discussion on which citizens affirming conflicting religious and nonreligious yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines can agree? (2005: xl)

Rawls's view is that a just and fair system of social coexistence can be negotiated between persons and groups with diverse, even incompatible, religious and other values and interests. An "overlapping consensus" is thereby deemed possible "as long as members of society are open to compromise, i.e. [are] 'reasonable'" (OECD, 2012: 53).

Numerous philosophical and pragmatic criticisms may be made concerning this viewpoint. However, it is not intended to enter into a thorough discussion of them here. Nevertheless, one implication of the OECD interpretation of Rawls is that "bonding capital" of the type described by Putnam (linkages among persons perceived to be homogenous) would virtually cease to exist within societies most impacted by globalization.

Both this report's and the Club de Madrid's concepts of social cohesion are different from narrower ones that highlight the bonding nature of networks and institutions that shape collective action. (53)

Conversely, "bridging capital" (social linkages and networks between socially heterogeneous persons and communities) is implicitly elevated as a substitute for bonding capital in the face of incessant social disruption.

In addition, although promoted in defense of tolerance and inclusion, the liberal cosmopolitanism promoted by the OECD appears to suffer from an inherent inconsistency. This is that the established concept of the nation-state, based on primary allegiance to a sovereign national community, as the basis of rights and obligations, is rejected as insufficiently tolerant or inclusive, while the intolerance often inherent in many ethnic, religious, and other bases of identity is largely ignored as benign in the hope that Rawlsian processes of overlapping consensus will succeed.

Cosmopolitan Convergence and the Redefinition of Rights

As noted, the UN and the OECD both prescribed a small government, cosmopolitan response to globalization. In the case of the OECD, this was linked to a fundamentalist liberal view of society. By the 1990s, these organizations considered cosmopolitanism to be a more or less natural outcome of globalization and as largely inevitable.

This sense of inevitability seemed plausible during the 1990s because of the utopian mind-set among some analysts and commentators. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, optimism spiraled about the prospects of an international cosmopolitan order. Calhoun (2002) remarks:

In the wake of the Cold War, it seemed to many political theorists and public actors that the moment had finally arrived . . . for cosmopolitanism to extend beyond mere tolerance to the creation of a shared global democracy. It seemed easy to denigrate states as old-fashioned authorities of waning influence and to extol the virtues of international civil society. (87)

As in earlier historical periods of international economic expansion, globalization was associated with the prospect of universal peace (James, 2009; Werner Muller,

2013). Increasingly, individuals were not understood as having entitlements derived from their status as citizens of sovereign nation-states, but as citizens of the world uniting in free exchange within markets (Gowan, 2000).

Some commentators confidently asserted the emergence of a postnational basis for the exercise of rights. The European Union passport is sometimes presented as the clearest example of this development. The recognition of dual citizenship and the increasing rights claims of transnationally organized identity groups are also cited (Soysal, 1997). Such arguments often rest upon the observation that, since the 1980s, there had been a proliferation of groups and communities that were dissatisfied with an exclusive identification with the sovereign nation-state (Sassen, 2006).

A number of factors are identified as having contributed to “changing parameters of claims-making, and participation” (Soysal, 1997: 510). The vast expansion of post-Second World War labor migration and the associated settlement of migrant minorities within Europe and other regions, led to the establishment of ethnic and religious minorities which made demands upon nation-states while maintaining a primary identification with transnational communities and value systems. As a result, established understandings of citizenship and the public sphere had been largely supplanted (521). Soysal points to the capacity of transnational communities to strategize in making demands upon nation-states, while remaining essentially independent of them. Islamic migration to Europe is highlighted as an example of the new reality:

The assertive presence of Islamic groups in European public spheres delineates two specific features of the emergent modes of collective claims-making: First . . . the groups that partake in the public realm deploy identity narratives, couched within the axiomatic verities of universalistic discourses. Second, the terms of the participation extend beyond the confines of the nation, span multiple localities, connect (and simultaneously construct) transnational communities, and thus diversify the “spaces for and of politics.” (515)

Such developments, it is claimed, reflect a breakdown of the linkage between national identification and rights. This disassociation involved the recasting of citizenship rights, which are linked to formal membership to discrete national communities, into human rights, which are conceived as universal. The UN played a role in promoting this shift (Soysal, 1997). The shift legitimized claims upon nation-states based upon group identities other than citizenship status. The maintenance of ethnic, religious, and other bases of group identity was thereby viewed as “natural” and legitimate.

One consequence of the shift in emphasis from state-based citizen rights to universal human rights has been the legitimization of multiple identity claims, which were seen to cut across and supersede the citizenship ideal. Soysal cites the example of Islamic mobilization in Britain:

When urging Islamic instruction in public schools and the recognition of Muslim family law, during the 1987 national elections, the Islamic associations in Britain asserted the “natural” right of individuals to their own cultures . . . To frame their position, they directly invoked the international instruments and conventions on Human Rights. (516)

In such situations, the priority given to universal human rights and rights claims based on comprehensive belief systems like Islam are mutually reinforcing in the pressure they bring to bear upon nationally circumscribed citizenship rights.

The “open republic” concept of Delbruck (1994) is a further expression of the utopian postnational thinking that flourished during the 1990s. Like Soysal, Delbruck assumed that the traditional nation-state was already obsolete. A reconceptualization of the nation-state was thereby deemed necessary. National interest must be redefined to incorporate the notion of a “global public interest,” to replace the traditional concept of the closed, self-centered, and self-reliant nation-state (54). In Delbruck’s view, these changes would, in turn, require an extension of the forms of democratic participation “to the supranational level to give greater legitimacy to the process of global decision making” (54). The result of such changes, if applied universally, would be a world “Confederation of Republican States” or “Open Republics” (57). Delbruck posits a:

close connection between the demand for the “Open Republic” and the irreversibly growing recognition of universal human rights . . . This . . . cuts to the roots of the traditional, exclusive, and in-group oriented nation-state. (58)

By the end of the 2000s, however, heightened expectations of a shift to a supranational cosmopolitan democracy had become significantly tempered. Sassen (2006) was correct to emphasize the difference between denationalization and “postnational” developments. Rather than representing an independent, alternative basis for collective and individual rights, many of the developments highlighted by Soysal and others may simply “be interpreted as a decline or devaluation of citizenship” (306). It was not at all clear, even within the European Union, that rights, entitlements, and obligations ultimately rested upon anything other than the depleted but continuing authority of member nation-states. Although claims may be made through an appeal to universal human rights, the nation-state ultimately met such demands. Soysal nevertheless highlights a dilemma for nation-states in the current context:

One of the main premises in theorising democratic society is that networks of civic engagement and associations should foster collective “trust” and “solidarity” by cutting across social cleavages. However . . . it is precisely on the basis of these “social cleavages” that mobilisation of civil societies takes place. (1997: 515)

Ideological Limitations of the Liberal Cosmopolitan Orthodoxy

Contrary to stated intentions, the cosmopolitan orthodoxy of the 1990s and 2000s may, in practice, jeopardize social stability rather than facilitate it.

The continued weakening of national sovereignty and identity may awaken suppressed social divisions that had been previously sublimated. Greenfeld (1992) highlights the way in which the establishment of national identity involved the sublimation of received differences and grievances within populations:

Every member of the “people” thus interpreted partakes in its superior, elite quality, and it is in consequence that a stratified national population is perceived as essentially homogenous, and the lines of status and class as superficial. This principle lies at the basis of nationalisms. (7)

Gowan (2000) argues that the 1990s saw the consolidation of a more aggressive form of cosmopolitanism which found particular expression in the Anglo-American world, and which he labeled the “new liberal cosmopolitanism” (NLC). While the NLC foreshadowed a singular world order, Gowan points to the prospect of the entrenchment of global inequalities.

Although having much in common with previous globalist perspectives, he observes significant differences. Whereas previous liberal internationalist formulations had been premised on the existence of the Westphalian order, the NLC sought to “overcome absolute states’ rights through the development of a global order governing the internal as well as the external behaviour of states” (Gowan, 2000: 2). Rather than sovereign states being conceived as the basis of citizen rights, the NLC posited the subordination of states to a global order as a means of “protecting the rights of individual citizens from state authorities.” State authority would be transformed from an absolute right to a *license* to govern, which could be withdrawn from recalcitrant states: “States will continue to exist, but their sovereignty will be both conditional and partial” (2, 3). Not only are free markets advocated as a means for the generation of wealth, but also as a way of establishing individual liberal freedoms, including in the areas of civic life and politics (3).

Although the NLC envisages humanity as being “finally united in a single, just world order,” Gowan points to the more sober reality of a perspective premised upon the reinforcement of asymmetrical international relations—guaranteeing the “rights of foreign operators to gain ownership of domestic assets, to establish businesses within states which can have the same rights to operate as domestic private or public companies” (2000: 27, 20). The international “norms” that are advocated as the foundation stone of the NLC are “really reflections of American and West European principles” (Kagan and Kristol, 2000, cited in Gowan, 2000: 22). In his view, the current:

trends both in international trade and in the internal transformations of non-core political economies are very far from guaranteeing virtuous circles of cosmopolitan economic and social gains for the world’s populations. (20)

The UN is implicated as a source of legitimacy for such asymmetrical international power relations (10).

Similarly, Calhoun (2002) observes that the meaning of cosmopolitanism tended to be ill-defined, it being assumed that the movement toward an interdependent, cosmopolitan world was natural and self-sustaining. As a result, advocates often failed to sufficiently differentiate an authentically democratic cosmopolitanism from that promoted by transnational corporate business interests, motivated by a desire to bypass or weaken state-based regulatory structures. Often, little thought was given to the prospect that undermining the legitimacy of

nation-states, while posing poorly defined cosmopolitan alternatives, may erode efforts to defend past gains in the provision of social equity, let alone advance them (Calhoun, 2002: 90–93).

Part of the appeal of cosmopolitanism since the 1990s derived from its association with Third Way politics. Noel and Therien (2008) make the observation that with the explicit rapprochement between the UN and Bretton Woods institutions (e.g., the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization) that occurred by the end of the 1990s, “[a] global version of Third Way politics then seemed to be emerging” (183).¹

As noted, Third Way politics purported to chart a political path between the allegedly oppressive and overnurturing social–democratic welfare state and market-driven winner-take-all neoliberalism. Similarly, in the realm of international relations, a form of Third Way cosmopolitanism was advocated that claimed to offer a developmental pathway between “rampant corporate globalisation and reactionary traditionalism or nationalism” (Calhoun, 2002: 91). As traditional social–democratic perspectives were abandoned and the role of markets given greater legitimacy, national identity was supplanted with more diffuse cosmopolitan notions of identity and entitlement.

When contemplating what changes in identity and culture societies undergo in response to the pressures for globalization, it is important to consider the extent to which such adjustments are embraced, rather than imposed. In what circumstances can people genuinely consider cultural, social, and economic adaptation to be their own? As Calhoun (2002) points out, the ideal of global civil society is often argued in the name of democracy. But:

Democracy must . . . empower people not in the abstract but in the actual conditions of their lives. *This means to empower them within communities and traditions, not in spite of them*, and as members of groups not only as individuals.

We need to pay attention to the social contexts in which people are moved by commitments to each other. (93) (Our emphasis)

This more sympathetic understanding of cultural adaptation to globalization stands in contrast to the neoliberal cosmopolitanism and to its Third Way variant of the 1990s and 2000s. In contrast to a more endogenous adaptation to globalization, the neoliberal orthodoxy has advocated a worldview largely devoid of a cultural or national vantage point (Calhoun, 2002). A cultural leveling takes place, whereby no cultural or traditional viewpoint is deemed to have precedence over any other. The link between identity and place is compromised, as is any intimate link between identity and territorial sovereignty. The cosmopolitan ideal is thereby rendered compliant with rampant market access and global free trade. No national or traditional cultural vantage point can be legitimately advanced to fundamentally limit or shape the operation of markets. Calhoun (2002) highlights the danger of cosmopolitan advocates acquiescing to neoliberalism:

The affinity of cosmopolitanism to rationalist liberal individualism has blinded many cosmopolitans to some of the destructions neo-liberalism—the cosmopolitanism of capital—has wrought and the damage it portends to hard-won social achievements. (109)

Furthermore, perhaps counterintuitively, there is an implicit intolerance of received identities and cultures within some of the cosmopolitan formulations of the 1990s and 2000s. The neoliberal cosmopolitan formulations of this period do not so much express enthusiasm for customary differences, even when conceived in pluralist terms, as with multiculturalism, but as the rarefied cultural fabric of a largely uniform, all-inclusive, post-parochial world—of an all-encompassing break from the past. Similarly, Brennan (2001) observes that cosmopolitanism:

designates an enthusiasm for customary differences, but as ethical or aesthetic material for a unified polychromatic culture—a new singularity born of a blending and merging of multiple local constituents. (76)

The prospect of societies developing broadly consensual and culturally distinctive approaches to the maintenance of social cohesion in response to global pressures is thereby circumscribed.

How Might National Communities Respond in Practice?

If the assumption of global cosmopolitan convergence, as formulated under the rubric of the Washington Consensus, is questioned, what may then be the options available to nation-states for preserving social cohesion in a globalizing context? Once multilateral free trade and the maximization of open markets are no longer accepted as the key factors governing cultural adaptation, the options then available to societies to respond to global engagement may broaden significantly and in ways more reliant upon and sympathetic to received identity and culture.

To explore the possibilities for preserving social cohesion in both developed and developing countries in the context of global enmeshment, it may be useful to briefly reflect on how societies underwent the transition to modern nationalism. This may provide insights into how societies can adjust to pressures for change while managing the potential for social and cultural dislocation. This is because the social and cultural unification that typically characterized the establishment of nation-states involved the subordination of inherited cultural, religious, and other cleavages (see Joppke, 2004: 239).

With the exception of the first modern nation, England, the emergence of national identity entailed the adoption of foreign ways of thinking and acting. Ultimately, the compulsion to adopt novel, foreign bases of political organization and collective identification was rooted in the overwhelming success of societies that had already done so (Greenfeld, 1992). Nevertheless, as Greenfeld argues, the fundamental transformation could not be accomplished without significant modification of the introduced ways of thinking, through adaptation to indigenous norms and traditions. This adaptation often involved a simultaneous reinterpretation of both the imported national idea and traditional values:

Such reinterpretation implied incorporation of pre-national modes of thought within the nascent national consciousness, which were then carried on in it and reinforced. (15)

The compulsion to adopt an introduced model of collective action and self-identification has often been characterized by *ressentiment*, a tension between recognition of the limitations, or even the inferiority, of one's received culture and a continued subjective commitment to traditional identity (16). Modern Chinese history provides an example.

Levenson (1958) argued that when Chinese tradition was defended in the face of foreign alternatives, it was inevitably redefined in the process.

When Confucian traditionalism comes to be accepted not from a confidence in its universal validity but from a traditionalistic compulsion to profess that confidence, Confucianism is transformed from a primary, philosophical commitment to a secondary, romantic one, and traditionalism from a philosophical principle to a psychological device. (xvi)

The struggle between traditionalism and iconoclasm in times of rapid change had not been conducted in purely abstract terms. History is not understood as something that may be either modified at will or by ahistorical standards. In the Chinese context, "two reciprocal processes" developed side by side. In their different ways, both Confucian traditionalists and iconoclasts were concerned to demonstrate the "equivalence" of China and the West. In adjusting to external challenges, both were therefore concerned with the search for "ideas that *Chinese* could accept" (xvi).

The ambiguous feelings that can arise may thereby be eventually reconciled. However, this accommodation may be fraught with lasting cultural stresses and strains. In a statement that resonates in the context of early twenty-first century globalization, Levenson declared:

[N]o one is so ethereal, so cleanly delivered from native soil and the limited culture which formed him, that he can see its relative disqualification with perfect equanimity. If a foreign answer is to be intellectually accepted as right, the native culture's emotional claims must somehow be squared. (xviii)

Sometimes foreign ideas and practices may be accommodated by identifying a traditional precedent that is consistent with the imported elements. Japan's Meiji Restoration—the creation of a new order, a period of rapid economic modernization and adjustment in response to the challenge of Western incursion—provides an example of the way in which cultural stresses and strains may be played out in the adoption of introduced thinking and practices. Nineteenth-century Japanese intellectual Yukichi Fukuzawa provides an example of the deep-going critical self-reflection of this period:

[W]ith our recent ties with foreigners we have begun to contrast our civilisation with theirs. Our inferiority to them on the external technological level is obvious, but our mentality also differs from theirs. Westerners are intellectually vital, are personally well disciplined, and have patterned and orderly social relations. In our present state . . . we are no match for them. (2009: 227)

However, Western ideas and practices could not be simply adopted without any reconciliation with the inherited Japanese identity. While adopting a constitutional

government largely based on European precedents and embarking upon a modern national education system, the Emperor remained a unifying element that all sections of society could relate to. Hirai (1983) points to a number of features of traditional culture which leveraged Japanese modernization, in particular the this-worldly focus of Japanese culture and religion, Shinto. This is deemed to have assisted modernization through its emphasis upon the ideal of continued striving and refinement.

The physical and psychological stresses and strains of modernization would be tempered by a reassuring sense of continuity with the past. The modernization of Japan did not equate with “westernization” in any simple sense; indigenous cultural elements were molded into a new form (Hirai, 1983).

Alternatively, the potentially deep social anxieties created between the compulsion to adapt to external pressures and the impulse to preserve a sense of continuity with inherited identity and culture can devolve into violent, uncompromising opposition to change.

Midlarsky (2011) documents numerous instances during the twentieth century and since, where societies or social groups which are subject to apparently irreconcilable change have given rise to extremist-induced carnage. Examining the emergence of fascism, communism, radical Islam, and extreme nationalism, he identifies a number of factors associated with this type of outcome. Where there are perceived historical injustices, perhaps a period of subordination after a perceived glorious and distant past, a sense of loss and individual and collective humiliation may give rise to apocalyptic violence. Further, “ephemeral gains,” in the form of a temporary or partial victory against the perceived agency of loss, may act to trigger an escalation in violent behavior (62–68).

The crisis of contemporary Islam provides a compelling example. Gerges (2006) cites the “conventional Western wisdom,” which explains the rise of Islamic militancy as a response to the overwhelming of traditional life by rampant industrialization, urban decay, and unfulfilled promises made by elite and corrupt secular state bureaucracies. He emphasizes, however, that in the eyes of Islamic radicals, religion was not perceived simply as a means to an end, but as an end in itself.

Iraqi statesman Ali A. Allawi refers to the impersonal global forces that weighed upon the world of Islam. These forces, which increased after the fall of the Soviet Union and which eclipsed the “power of nations”—“lightly regulated markets,” “financial liberalisation,” and “unimpeded capital flows”—“increasingly defined the substance of power” (2009: 8). He states:

As the gap between what is perceived as the latent potential of the Islamic world and its reality of economic backwardness and political dependency becomes ever more obvious, the siren song of the ideologues of political Islam reaches more and more ears. (8, 9)

Allawi makes a salient point in relation to the current prospects for social stability and cohesion in the current circumstances:

The crisis of Islamic civilisation arises partly from the fact that it *has been thwarted from demarcating its own pathways into contemporary life*. (8, 9) (Our emphasis)

In contrast to the spiritual emptiness of secular progress as perceived by many Islamic radicals, the turn to Islam held out the promise of an alternative and authentic route to social and cultural legitimacy.

The above discussion not only raises the question of whether the liberal cosmopolitan prescriptions of the 1990s and 2000s are appropriate and acceptable as a cultural template for global engagement, but also whether, in some contexts, they may engender violent opposition. The apparently benign character of the cosmopolitan ideal may entail greater risk for the preservation of social cohesion than has been obvious.

Australia and Japan Compared

The discussion above provides a backdrop against which to examine the ways in which two very different societies, Australia and Japan, have dealt with challenges to their cultural and institutional fabric and to social cohesion arising from accelerating global enmeshment.

The approach of this publication is unusual in that it juxtaposes the study of two societies which, although developed, are contrasting with regard to their historical origins, cultural legacies, and levels of economic sophistication. More usually, international comparisons focus upon like societies. By contrast, using Australia and Japan as instructive counterpoints, the collection of papers presented here contributes to an understanding of the contemporary challenges to social cohesion and, it is hoped, to the ways in which global enmeshment may be accommodated by societies from their distinctive historical and cultural vantage points.

Japan provides an example of a society that has undergone a profound and rapid economic transformation since the nineteenth century without, until relatively recently, a commensurate reformation of traditional institutions and values. Indeed, until the last quarter of the twentieth century, Japan's meteoric technological modernization was largely premised upon the reinforcement of core Japanese values. Traditional values, which had previously focused on the ideals of family solidarity and loyalty, obedience to authority, and reinforcement of the paternalistic family ideal, were partially redirected toward the modern Japanese state and toward national progress. Governance of the economic transformation also relied somewhat upon the ethics of frugality, self-discipline, and the subordination of individual aspirations to group success.

By contrast, Australia, a founding settler society at the periphery of empire, was by the early twentieth century lauded as a social laboratory with the highest living standards in the world; born modern, egalitarian, and socially innovative. This success was underwritten by the abundant resources of a vast, easily exploited "virgin" environment, a protectionist compromise between labor and capital, and a privileged economic relationship with British industrial power. By the last quarter of the twentieth century, however, key aspects of the Australian high-wage, high-tariff, nation-building compact were being dismantled. Australia would become an exemplar and advocate of multilateral free trade in the Asia-Pacific region. In turn, this profound economic reorientation was reflected in the

adoption of multicultural idealism as the national creed, reinforced by ongoing high immigration from diverse countries of origin. The national story was rewritten. Free trade had become synonymous with the idea that Australia is, and always had been, “a nation of immigrants.”

The ways in which Australian and Japanese societies have become increasingly engaged with one another over recent decades as a result of global economic enmeshment and people flows, whether through tourism, education, or business-related movements, should not be underplayed. Globalization has acted as a catalyst for engagement, even between societies that are culturally distant. Indeed, this publication is a product of this process.

However, can Australia and Japan continue to accommodate global integration without serious loss of social cohesion?

The contributions in this volume suggest a complex interplay of factors that are sometimes mutually reinforcing and sometimes cross-cutting in relation to social cohesion. Some factors or processes may act to increase social cohesion in some ways, but inhibit it in other ways or actually detract from it.

Several contributions have focused on issues relating to the challenges associated with immigration. By broad comparison, Australia and Japan stand at very different stages of development in relation to immigration. Australia has had a mass immigration program in place since the early post–Second World War period until relatively recently, based principally on settler migration, rather than upon temporary flows. Although Japan has experienced significant growth in immigration from a low base, there appears to be reluctance on the part of the Japanese government and the Japanese public to embrace large-scale settler immigration (Chapters 5 and 14). This challenge could be avoided for a long period because Japan was able to supply its own labor needs during times of rapid economic expansion through internal migration from rural to urban areas (Chapters 2 and 5). Only now, at a relatively late stage in its economic development, is Japan confronting the option of mass immigration, and it remains widely controversial. For the most part, immigrants to Japan are looked upon as temporary and are expected to return to their countries of origin, which, in turn, seems compatible with their role as low-status nonregular workers or *de facto* “guest workers.” A major consideration for Japanese authorities and the Japanese public appears to be a desire to preserve valued notions of national character and cultural norms (Chapters 5 and 10).

In this regard, mass immigration is not something to be taken lightly because the consequences of mass immigration for identity and culture are profound and can be relatively swift. Healy (Chapter 3) notes how the Australian population of the early postwar period (which was over 90 percent Australian-born) was initially persuaded to accept a policy of mass immigration on the basis that migrants would assimilate to the Australian way of life—that migrants would *become* Australians. Within 25 years, a national conversion to multiculturalism was well and truly on the political agenda. By the 1980s it had become dogma, with the inherited national identity reduced to one “ethnic” identity among many—and regarded with suspicion among political and cultural elites.

Although the pathway that Japanese society will go down in relation to this dilemma is not clear, the consequences for social cohesion appear significant

either way. As Mizukami (Chapter 2) highlights, population aging and localized decline are already impacting negatively upon the social fabric of many communities in Japan. The growing presence of visible immigrant minorities in exploitative nonregular employment has almost certainly already resulted in anxieties about the meaning of community. Just how long perceptions of ethnically bounded Japanese “communities” can be preserved in the face of a growing foreign presence is not clear. From a different perspective, Machimura (Chapter 6) analyses the consequences of globalization for the multiple re-scaling of governance and meaningful social inclusion in Japan.

By contrast, having gone down the mass immigration route, Australian society currently appears unable to extricate itself from high immigration flows. So closely has immigration become associated with the ideals of tolerance and inclusion, under the rubric of multiculturalism, that for many, particularly among the left intelligentsia, any lapse of confidence in high immigration is interpreted as a sign of reemergent xenophobia. A factor here appears to be the extent to which universal human rights and a cosmopolitan worldview have eclipsed the notion of citizenship rights embedded in the ideal of a sovereign nation-state. For some sections of the Australian population, perceptions of “rights” have been largely disassociated from national identity; for others, sovereignty remains a principal point of anchorage for allegiance, identity, and entitlements. For the free-market right, any relaxation of high immigration levels tends to be seen as a regression to the protectionist “malaise” of the early nation-building period. Just how these internal fault lines pan out and what their consequences for social cohesion will be is uncertain.

Nevertheless, the analysis of intermarriage in Australia by Arunachalam and Karidakis (Chapter 9) provides a valuable alternative vantage point for understanding the relationship between immigration and multiculturalism and social cohesion in the Australian context. Notwithstanding differences in the rates of intermarriage between ethnic groups, the high overall rates of intermarriage, even among some relatively recent migrant groups to Australia, suggest that any essentialist conceptualization of multiculturalism in Australia is seriously mismatched with the current reality. What meaning can an essentialist approach to minority cultural maintenance (and “rights”) have in a population which is increasingly comprised of persons of mixed descent? Contrary to the continued ideological thrust of essentialist understandings of Australian multiculturalism among elements of the Australian intellectual elite (see Healy Chapter 3), the high incidence of intermarriage may open up possibilities for a unified national identity on a new basis. Ethnicity may once again become a residual factor in identity formation and allegiance. One caveat to this is that sustained high rates of immigration result in substantial first-generation cohorts who may identify more strongly with multicultural doctrine.

The contribution of Kessler (Chapter 7) adds a further note of caution against essentialist notions of Australian multiculturalism in his discussion of the challenges to Muslim integration into Australian society. Policy perspectives which presume ethnic essentialism, as well as migrants with essentialist and “majoritarian” expectations, appear inadequate to the task of meaningful engagement in a liberal democracy. Although the analysis of Arunachalam and Karidakis (Chapter 9)

does suggest significant levels of intermarriage between Muslims of different national or ethnic backgrounds, in-marriage between Muslims remains high. In turn, this may be a factor behind Markus's observation (Chapter 4) that around one in four Australians think negatively about Muslims. In a society where intermarriage is the norm and a major integrative force, strong in-group behavior may attract disdain.

Such high rates of intermarriage raise questions about the meaning that should be attached to the high levels of support for multiculturalism in Australia, as shown, for example, in the survey analysis by Markus (Chapter 4). As noted above, the meaning which survey respondents attach to multiculturalism is often not clear. Where there are high rates of intermarriage between ethnic groups, it is unlikely that respondents perceive or are endorsing multiculturalism in essentialist terms, which place a high priority on the preservation of primordial identities. For many, such support may merely signify endorsement of some basic notion of fairness between persons from different backgrounds. Similar to Putnam's (2010) observation that a high proportion of secular Americans consider that religion can play an important part in American life, many Australians who are not strong supporters of multiculturalism may indicate that they think it has been "good" for Australian society.

The exploration of altruistic behavior, through volunteering, among Vietnamese Australians by Misajon et al. (Chapter 8) provides further insight into the relationship between in-group behavior and social cohesion. Arunachalam and Karidakis (Chapter 9) observe relatively low rates of intermarriage among Vietnamese Australians. At the same time, Misajon et al. find robust altruistic behavior within the Vietnamese community. These findings raise questions about the geographic and social levels at which social cohesion functions. Strong social cohesion at the local or group level may not say much about social cohesion at higher social levels, including the national level. Yet, it is at the national level where responses to the uncertainties of globalization would seem crucial. While empirical studies may show that sustained high immigration and multicultural policy appear compatible with local social harmony, for example, as measured by feelings of trust within persons' neighborhoods, there is no guarantee that this translates into a national political culture capable of responding democratically and coherently to the challenges of an unstable global environment, and with a coherent collective view of the sovereign interest. Without bridging social capital to complement strong local in-group altruism, the overall outcome may remain relatively balkanized.

The discussion of intermarriage in Japan by Takeshita (Chapter 10) stands in stark contrast to the Australian experience. With the exception of Westerners marrying Japanese spouses, the expectation is that foreigners assimilate to the culture of their Japanese spouses. As described, this appears to be especially the case where Japanese men in traditional rural situations marry foreign brides with a view to having children who will be raised as Japanese. Nothing analogous to the Japanese expectation that the children of mixed marriages should be indistinguishable from Japanese exists in Australia.

Notwithstanding the very different levels of development and size of the Australian and Japanese economies and different labor relations institutions, the

impact of global economic competition, investment flows, and associated economic restructuring has had serious deleterious consequences for the domestic labor market in both countries. Hosogaya (Chapter 13) and Fujioka (Chapter 14) point to the sharp rise in nonregular employment in Japan and to the increased levels of exploitation of those in precarious employment. Fujioka describes the particular difficulties faced by Japanese graduates in gaining entry to good jobs and the rise of highly exploitative “black companies.” Birrell and Healy (Chapter 15), likewise, highlight how the employment prospects of Australian youth, particularly those seeking entry level jobs, have deteriorated in a period of sustained high immigration and slow jobs growth in recent years. The consequences of deteriorating labor markets for social cohesion are profound and a potential source of social disillusionment. In the Australian context, government inaction on labor market competition for scarce jobs from migrants, including temporary resident migrants from countries with high levels of unemployment, suggests an increasing commitment to the idea of a borderless labor market, where the interests of domestic workers are not, in practice, given priority.

There is a broad similarity between Australian and Japan in the way that their tertiary education sectors have been utilized to facilitate global engagement. Of course, the detail of how this has been pursued has differed in each country. It is notable that in each case, a key purpose has been to create people with a global outlook. Faine et al. (Chapter 12) argue that Australian universities have become essentially cross-border institutions with a focus on producing global citizens and increasingly managed according to corporate business logic. As such, universities have become largely detached from any clear concept of the national interest and no longer strive to inculcate a nationally circumscribed view of collective well-being. There have been multiple drivers of this process in Australia. University intellectuals have been a significant social force in articulating and promoting internationalist perspectives since the 1970s. It therefore should be no surprise that Australian universities have been so amenable to global enmeshment. Another factor has been the increasing reluctance of the Australian government to fully fund universities, which has led to the heavy marketing of Australian universities to the overseas student market. In turn, overseas student recruitment has been linked to the prospect of favorable immigration outcomes to Australia. As a result, student life in many Australian universities has in many ways become an international experience. Yonezawa and Yonezawa (Chapter 11) similarly show that the Japanese government’s attempts to internationalize Japanese universities has been linked to efforts to regenerate Japan’s economic relevance through human resource development in a rapidly changing global economic environment.

A sobering observation from the contributions in this volume is the ways in which social sensitivities and anxieties over the preservation of collective identity and culture, in two societies as different as Australia and Japan, have been so bluntly mediated by the pressures of economic adjustment, as societies are drawn into the maelstrom of the global economy. Any more sympathetic accommodation of economy with culture appears allusive.

Note

1. The UN had been adopting a Third Way approach to international development throughout the 1990s and set the precedent for the application of the Third Way approach in the sphere of international relations.

References

- Allawi, A. (2009) *The Crisis of Islamic Civilisation*. London: Yale University Press.
- Alesina, A., Baqir, R., and Easterly, W. (1999) "Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 114(4): 1243–1284.
- Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, E. (2000) "Participation in Heterogeneous Communities," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 115(3): 847–904.
- Alpert, D. (2013) *The Age of Oversupply—Overcoming the Greatest Challenge to the Global Economy*. London: Penguin Books.
- Berger-Schmitt, R. (2000) *Social Cohesion an Aspect of the Quality of Societies: Concept and Measurement*. EuReporting Working Paper No. 14, A TSER-Project financed by the European Commission, Centre for Survey Research and Methodology (ZUMA), Mannheim.
- Boutros-Ghali, B. (1995) Statement, Opening Statements, United Nations, Copenhagen World Summit, March 6–12.
- Brennan, T. (2001) "Cosmopolitanism and Internationalism," *New Left Review*, January–February: 75–84.
- Calhoun, C. (2002) "The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travellers: Towards a Critique of Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism." In S. Vertovec and R. Cohen (Eds), *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 86–109.
- Castells, M. (2010) *The Power of Identity*. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing.
- Coleman, J. S. (1988) "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital," *American Journal of Sociology*, 94: S95–S120.
- Crowley, H. and Hickman, M. (2008) "Migration, Postindustrialism and the Globalised Nation State: Social Capital and Social Cohesion Re-examined," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 31(7): 1222–1244.
- Delbruck, J. (1994) "Global Migration—Immigration—Multiethnicity: Challenges to the Concept of the Nation-State," *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, 2(1), Symposium: Global Migration and the Future of the Nation-State (Fall): 45–64.
- Demireva, N. (2011) "Immigration, Diversity and Social Cohesion," *Briefing Paper for the Migration Observatory*, University of Oxford.
- Drezner, D. (2001) "Globalisation and Policy Convergence," *International Studies Review*, 3(1): 53–78.
- Easterly, W., Ritzen, J., and Woolcock, M. (2006) "Social Cohesion, Institutions, and Growth," *Economics and Politics*, 18(2): 103–120.
- Elkus, R. (2008) *Winner Take All: How Competitiveness Shapes the Fate of Nations*. New York: Basic Books, ISBN 978-0-465-00315-0.
- Freidkin, N. (2004) "Social Cohesion," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 30: 409–425.
- Freitag, M. (2003) "Social Capital in (Dis)similar Democracies—the Development of Generalized Trust in Japan and Switzerland," *Comparative Political Studies*, 36: 936–966.
- Friedman, T. (1999) *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux.

- Fukuzawa, Y. (2009) *An Outline of a Theory of Civilisation*. New York: Columbia University Press (a translation).
- Gerges, F. A. (2006) *Journey of the Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy*. Orlando, USA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, ISBN 9780151012138.
- Glaeser, E. (2001) "The Formation of Social Capital," OECD, www.oecd.org/innovation/research/1824983.pdf
- Gordon, R. (2014) "The Turtle's Progress: Secular Stagnation Meets Headwinds." In C. Tuelings and R. Baldwin (Eds), *Secular Stagnation, Facts Causes and Cures*. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), pp. 47–59.
- Gowan, P. (2000) *The New Liberal Cosmopolitanism*. IWM Working Paper No. 2/2000, Vienna.
- Greenfeld, L. (1992) *Nationalism—Five Roads to Modernity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Grynspan, R. (2011) "Advancing Human Development: Towards Policies that Build Social Cohesion." Presentation to OECD *International Conference on Social Cohesion and Development*, Paris, January 20–21.
- Hirai, N. (1983) "Traditional Cultures and Modernisation—Several Problems in the Case of Japan." In *Proceedings of Kokugakuin University Centennial Symposium Institute for Japanese Culture and Classics*, Kokugakuin University.
- James, H. (2009) *The Creation and Destruction of Value—The Globalisation Cycle*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Joppke, C. (2004) "The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy," *The British Journal of Sociology*, 55(2): 237–257.
- Larsen, C. (2009) "Why Social Cohesion Declines in Liberal Regimes and Increases in Social Democratic Regimes—A Comparative Study of USA, Great Britain, Denmark and Sweden, Centre of Comparative Studies, Aslborg University." Paper prepared for the *RC19 Conference*, University of Montreal, August 20–22.
- Latham, M. (2005) *The Latham Diaries*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
- Levenson, J. R. (1958) *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate—The Problem of Intellectual Continuity*, Vol. 1. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Midlarsky, M. (2011) *Origins of Political Extremism—Mass Violence in the Twentieth Century and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Noel, A. and Therien, J. (2008) *Left and Right in Global Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- North, D. (1990) *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- OECD (2011) "Background," *International Conference on Social Cohesion and Development*, Paris, January 20–21, <http://www.oecd.org/dev/pgd/internationalconferenceonsocial-cohesionanddevelopment.htm>
- OECD (2012) *Perspectives on Global Development 2012—Social Cohesion in a Shifting World*. OECD, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/persp_glob_dev-2012-en
- Prestowitz, C. (2009) *The Smart Globalists Agenda—A Plan for Responsible U.S. Economic Engagement in the World*. Paper sponsored by Demos and the Economic Strategy Institute.
- Putnam, R. (1993) "The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life," *The American Prospect*, 13: 35–42.
- Putnam, R. (1994) *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press (with R. Leonardi and R. Y. Nanetti).
- Putnam, R. (2000) *Bowling Alone*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Putnam, R. (2007) "E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century, the Johan Skytte Prize Lecture," *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 30(2): 137–174.

- Putnam, R. (2010) *American Grace, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values*. Delivered at Princeton University, October 27–28.
- Rawls, J. (2005) *Political Liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Reinert, E. (2012) “Neo-classical Economics: A Trail of Economic Destruction since the 1970s,” *Real-World Economics Review*, Issue 60. In MPRA Archive, MPRA Paper No. 47910, posted July 2013.
- Ritzen, J. (2000) *Social Cohesion, Public Policy, and Economic Growth: Implications for OECD Countries*. OECD Presentation, Quebec.
- Sassen, S. (2006) *Territory, Authority, Rights*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Sinha, S. (2005) “Neoliberalism and Civil Society: Project and Possibilities.” In Saad Filho, A., and Johnston, D. (Eds), *Neoliberalism—A Critical Reader*. London: Pluto Press.
- Soysal, Y. N. (1997) “Changing Parameters of Citizenship and Claims-Making: Organized Islam in European Public Spheres,” *Theory and Society*, 26(4), Special Issue on Recasting Citizenship (August 1997): 509–527.
- Summers, L. (2014) “Reflections on the ‘New Secular Stagnation’ Thesis.” In C. Tuelings and R. Baldwin (Eds), *Secular Stagnation, Facts Causes and Cures*. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), pp. 27–36.
- United Nations (1995a) Department of Economic and Social Affairs—Division for Social Policy and Development, *Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development, Introduction*.
- United Nations (1995b) Department of Economic and Social Affairs—Division for Social Policy and Development, *Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development, Part C, Chapter 4: Social Integration*.
- Uteem, C. (2011) “The Shared Societies Project: Democratic Leadership for Dialogue, Diversity and Social Cohesion.” Presentation to the *OECD Conference on Social Cohesion and Development*, Paris, January 20–21.
- Werner Muller, J. (2013) *Contesting Democracy—Political Ideas in Twentieth Century Europe*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Wilkinson, J. and Bittman, M. (2002) “Volunteering: The Human Face of Democracy.” Research Paper issued through the Social Policy Research Centre, University of New South Wales, Australia.
- Williamson, J. (2004) *A Short History of the Washington Consensus*. Paper commissioned by Fundacion CIDOB for a conference “*From the Washington Consensus towards a new Global Governance*,” Barcelona, September 24–25.
- Woolcock, M. (2013) *Social Inclusion: Its Significance for Development Theory, Research and Policy*. Paris: UNESCO, March 2013.
- World Health Organization (WHO). (2012) Washington Consensus, <http://www.sho.int/trade/glossary/story094/en/index.html>

Japan's Social Cohesion in Relation to Immigration Issues

Tetsuo Mizukami

Introduction

In contemporary social research—whether dealing with the involvement of citizens in social life, national character, or the relationships between immigrant or minority groups and the host citizens—social cohesion has become a major topic. However, there is no universal definition of social cohesion (Demireva, 2015; Markus, 2010), though there have been some common understandings of the concept. In addition, this concept is also found in the elaboration of political doctrines as well as in academic analyses, and there are some key terms which can be identified when attempting to define this term. In the United Kingdom and other developed democracies, “[s]ocial cohesion is often identified as ‘solidarity’ and ‘togetherness.’” The OECD, in its report *Social Cohesion in a Shifting World*, suggests three perspectives: “social inclusion,” “social capital,” and “social mobility” (2012: 53–54). Another way of considering this is to focus upon three common elements: “shared vision,” “a property of a group or community,” and “a process” (Markus, 2010: 8). Extensive surveys of social cohesion have helped define the national character of some societies, and will often include a nation’s attitudes toward newcomers who arrive via some form of immigration. On the other hand, social cohesion is also interrelated with the way in which immigrants and minority groups become participants in social life and therefore in their relations with the citizens of the host nation. The dynamics of social cohesion are central to the ways in which they develop solidarity with the host community. According to the OECD Director for Employment, Labor, and Social Affairs, Mr. Stefano Scarpetta: “The policy objectives for migration have also shifted, as has the perception of the role of migration. Today’s policy debate places greater emphasis on social cohesion and less on urgent recruitment needs” (OECD, 2014: 10).

Japan’s situation has been complex for some time. For example, in terms of responding to the need for labor, the approach taken by *Keidanren* (the Japan

Business Federation)¹ has not always been aligned with, or developing in the same direction as, government policies. In Japan, the current debate about migration and the growth of a significant immigrant labor force have not been explicitly associated with social cohesion. Rather, while the debate has concentrated upon the demand for more labor, it has also been the consequences of an increase in the population. In Japanese research, via extensive surveys that claim to investigate the phenomenon, the term or concept of social cohesion has not hitherto been generally applied, nor has it been referred to research frameworks or policy doctrines. However, this does not mean that governments, academics, and the general public are not keen to promote social cohesion. In other words, although the term has not yet been widely used, there is voluminous research relevant to an understanding of the concept and the key elements of Japanese social cohesion, as they have investigated social trust, social networks, social capital, and so on. In this chapter, I first discuss population issues and then explain how current migration issues are integrally related to these issues, highlighting some findings from Japanese research which are relevant to social cohesion.

Population Issues and Japan's Demographic Character

Considering life expectancy, Japan's figures show some outstanding characteristics. Japan ranks first among the World Health Organization (WHO) member countries in several respects. The statistics for 2012 report that "women in Japan have the highest life expectancy in the world at 87.0 years, followed by Spain, Switzerland and Singapore," while Japanese men are ranked eighth (80.0 years) (WHO, 2014: 42). In terms of "healthy life expectancy," Japan ranked first in 2010: "men were 70.42, while women were 73.62" (*Koseirodoshō*, 2014: 44). People may live longer in Japan, but serious problems have arisen from the combined effects of such population aging and a very low birthrate. These trends have given rise to one of the more heated debates in Japanese society about deeply rooted problems relating to an insufficient labor force and the decline of local communities. These issues have required much public and private sector deliberation and are closely associated with issues related to the relaxation of immigration restrictions on overseas labor. In turn, public debate has also focused upon the deterioration of local communities in relation to the lack of, or underdevelopment of, personal support networks, which is in evidence around the country. These issues have been a major concern for governments and various scholars.

Birthrates and Population Pyramid

Japan experienced a rapid increase in the birthrate after the Second World War. In 1947, the total fertility rate was 4.54, and in the three years between 1947 and 1949, some 8.057 million were born in Japan (Kato, 2004: 35). This group is the *Dankai sedai*, or the baby-boomer generation. In 1966, the rate had declined to 1.58 due to the "Fiery Horse" superstition. This is the forty-third of a sexagesimal cycle. The superstition has persisted that girls who are born in this Fiery Horse year have

fiery temperaments and may kill their husbands, and 1966 was the last Fiery Horse year (the next will be 2026). However, in 1989 the total fertility rate dropped even lower than 1.58, and was designated the “1.57 shock.” After 1989, the rate has gradually declined to the low point of 1.26 in 2005 (Naikakufu, 2015). Since then, the rate slightly recovered to 1.39 in 2011, but the decrease in absolute population numbers had begun a few years before that. Indeed, the numbers of people who marry at a later age or who are not married, including single-households, have increased partly due to the extension of women’s participation in the workforce and a delay in policymaking to improve the work conditions of married people. According to Noro (2015), the decrease in Japan’s population is now over 200,000 per year and thus Japan needs nearly 3 million additional people per decade to maintain the same population. This scenario of population decline and rapid aging has now activated a debate on immigration in Japan.

According to Jinkomondai kenkyujo (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, 2015), in 2010 the national population was 128.06 million, and the proportion of people who were 65 years of age and over was less than a quarter (23.0%), while the age cohort of 0–14 years was 13.1 percent. In 2010, there is a relatively large age group of those in their mid-60s—this was the first of the baby-boomer generations, the *Dankai sedai*, as previously mentioned.

The second baby-boomer cohort can be found in the mid-30s age groups. These are those born during 1971–1974; this group is evident from the second protrusion in the population pyramid. However, a third baby boom did not take place, and the proportion of the 0–14 year age cohort has constantly decreased, while at the same time, the size of the 65 year and over age cohort will be gradually augmented every year. The latter age cohort is expected to occupy nearly one-third (31.6%) of the entire population by 2030. The population is expected to decrease constantly, and it is estimated that in 2030 the number will be 116.62 million (Jinkomondai kenkyujo, 2015). These data have helped to generate the debate about the introduction of foreign labor into Japan, as the decline of the domestic labor force is indisputable.

To Open or Close the Country

When social planners seek to identify the size of the working-age population, they are confronted by these figures which foreshadow a serious shortage in the numbers of people of working age. This problem has been reflected in public discussion about immigration. Japan’s immigration debate commenced in the 1980s, when the number of foreign visitors rapidly expanded. Since the mid-1980s, the massive intake of Asian foreigners has become a matter of significant public concern, and by the late 1980s, it had become a dispute over whether to develop a “closed” or an “open” country. The idea of Japan as a “closed country” can be traced back to the Edo period when, during 1633–1639, the Shogunate, Iemitsu Tokugawa, introduced the policy of banning most foreign relations. Foreigners were forbidden entry and no Japanese person was permitted to leave the country. There were, however, some trade-related relationships with China

and the Netherlands. Thus, to be exact, Japan was not a completely closed country, but some heavy restrictions were introduced. This so-called closed country policy was retained until 1854, the year of the Convention of Kanagawa or when the Japan–United States Treaty of Peace and Amity was concluded. This argument as to whether Japan should be open or closed has occurred at the time when Japan has to decide upon the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement.

Newcomers' Influx and the Formation of Ethnic Communities

At the time the government commenced compilation of “immigration control” statistics in 1950, the number of foreigners who entered Japan was almost 18,000 (Homusho, 2015a). These statistics include foreign nationals who landed in Japan for both short-term and long-term stays. And, the number increased to over 200,000 in 1962, and reached approximately 775,000 in 1970. It then dropped down for a few years and started to increase again from 1975. In 1978, the number of foreign nationals reached over 1 million and grew to 2 million in 1984. In 20 years, there had been a threefold expansion, and in 2005 the number was recorded at 7,450,103 (Homusho, 2015a). More recently, in 2013 the number of foreign nationals who visited Japan was 11,255,221. This number basically consisted of two types of visitors: foreign nationals who reentered Japan with a reentry permit (1,700,806) and new entrants (9,554,415) (Homusho nyukokukanrikyoku 2014: 32). The increase in the number of foreign visitors is considered to have been caused by the decline of the yen’s value and the government’s introduction of deregulated visa requirements for persons from the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Registered foreign nationals are those who live in Japan for the medium term or long term, and do not include foreign visitors. In 2013, there were 2,066,445 such persons. This count of foreign nationals excludes those persons who stayed for a short term, such as tourist visa holders staying for less than three months, as well as “special permanent residents.” As Japan’s population in that year was about 127.298 million, this meant a foreign population of 1.62 percent (32). When compared to other industrialized countries, the proportion of foreign residents in Japan can be considered low. Nevertheless, as mentioned, the number of foreign nationals in Japan for medium- or long-term stay has been increasing, and sometimes persons of non-Japanese ethnicity are quite visible in certain inner-city areas.

Since the 1980s, Japan has experienced a persistent inflow of newcomers, mainly from neighboring Asian countries. The background to this is related to Japan’s postwar industrialization and urbanization. Postwar economic development was facilitated from the 1950s by government development policies, which saw the nation’s youth leaving agrarian villages and towns for metropolitan areas for employment in manufacturing and other industries. In the 1960s, Japan’s rapid industrialization necessitated massive infrastructure construction, which drove the rural–urban population mobilization. This postwar economic development

and rapid urbanization was in striking contrast to developments in Western Europe, North America, and Australia. In particular, postwar economic development in Australia was supported by settler immigration, which provided “50 percent of labor growth between 1947–1973, giving Australia the highest rate of increase of any OECD countries” (Castles et al., 1988: 24). In other words, when the “Western” industrialized countries needed large-scale labor forces, they resorted to massive migration from overseas, whereas in Japan the necessary work force was provided by internal labor migration. In Japan, massive economic development continued to rely upon internal population movement up until the oil crisis of 1973–1974; following this, Japan experienced inner-city decay, with a sharp decline of population in these areas. With subsequent suburban development, those who had moved into the inner cities from all over Japan then moved to the outskirts of the metropolises, particularly when they married and formed households. In turn, such suburbanization contributed to problems associated with an aging community in inner-city areas.

Between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s, however, the labor pipeline was opened to overseas workers. Labor supply was no longer from rural to urban areas, but from foreign countries to Japan. In spite of the Japanese government’s exclusionary policies, ethnic businesses—including ethnic food shops, entertainment centers, and financial institutions for transferring savings to migrants’ homelands—have developed significantly. Newspapers and journals have regularly carried articles about non-Japanese-speaking foreign residents. At the same time, multicultural perspectives on Japan have appeared and the myth of Japan’s homogeneity has been attacked, at least in the sociological arena.

Because the Japanese government has been sluggish in assisting with the problems faced by foreign residents, since the mid-1980s various civic organizations have been established across Japan to address issues associated with the settlement of newcomers in local communities (Mizukami, 1998). Some major organizations have been established in metropolitan areas to deal with these problems. In April 1986, *Kyofukai* (the Japan Christian Women’s Organization) established the House in Emergency of Love and Peace (HELP) in the Shinjuku area of central Tokyo, to provide a shelter for women and children who face difficulties with life in Japan. In Yokohama, *Kalabaw-no-kaï*² was formed in May 1987 for the protection of the human rights of migrant workers and other foreign residents (Mizukami, 2010). In December 1987, an organization designated the Bangladesh–Japan People’s Friendship Society was established by several Japanese citizens and other foreigners. Its name was later changed to Asian People’s Friendship Society (APFS), its aim being “to promote a mutual aid system and foster interchange between compatriots who have similar backgrounds, namely foreign students and workers” (Yoshinari, 1993: 61–62).

Changes in Immigration Policies

From the early 1990s, foreign workers became quite visible in metropolitan areas in a variety of industries. This was discernible not only in the manufacturing

sector or among laborers on construction sites, but also in key places at the center of major cities where groupings of diverse ethnic populations came to the fore. In response to the increasing foreign population, which included many undocumented migrants, the Immigration Act was amended in 1990, severely restricting unskilled labor migration, while at the same time opening the door to people of Japanese descent from some South and Central American countries such as Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina, who could gain lawful employment even though they may have been unskilled laborers. This in turn introduced a legal distinction into immigration policy between persons of Japanese descent (*jus sanguinis*) and the right to citizenship based on birth within a territory or nation (*jus soli*) (Mizukami, 2000: 105). In addition, this revision of the Immigration Act instituted penal regulations for Japanese employers who hired undocumented foreign workers. The major streams of newly arrived foreigners have been from neighboring Asian countries, but, as noted, since the early 1990s, another stream has occurred—those of Japanese descent from southern Central America. In Japan, these two types of arrivals during this period have generally been designated with the sociological term “newcomers.” At the initial stage of their settlement, many of these foreign residents were regarded as “migrant workers” who were expected to return to their homelands after a few years or so; in practice, some of them have developed distinctive settlement patterns within the host Japanese community. Many did indeed return to their home country. Some, however, have become transnational migrants who have retained a strong tie with their country of origin while living in Japan. Others have become rooted to Japanese society, marrying and establishing families.

In terms of the undocumented foreign population, in 1993 (as of May 1) the number reached a peak of 298,646. But, in 2014 (as of January 1), the undocumented foreign population was estimated to be about 59,061. This was said to be due to Japan’s economic recession, with contraction in some sectors leading to a decrease in undocumented foreigners. On October 17, 2003, Homusho (the Ministry of Justice), Tokyo Municipality, and *Keishicho* (the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department) made a joint declaration that “the number of illegal residents will be reduced by half in five years’ time” (*Asahi shinbun*, 2003: 14). They then embarked upon a strict implementation of this policy of 2004. In fact, after this declaration, the number of undocumented foreigners gradually decreased: in 2004 (as of January 1), the number was 219,418, but by 2008 (as of January 1) it declined to 149,785, and in 2009 it was 113,072. By 2010 it had decreased to 91,778 (Homusho, 2010: 33).

Increase in Foreign Population

The number of registered foreigners has also been augmented: since the mid-1980s, the foreign population has increased and the list of source countries has expanded. Since the early 1990s, the population of foreign residents has steadily increased: the number in 1991 was almost 1.22 million. By 2007 the number had reached over 2 million, as shown in Table 2.1. This number does not include the

Table 2.1 The Number of Foreign Nationals in 2004–2013 from Selected Countries

Nationality/ year	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Total	1,863,870	1,906,689	1,989,864	2,069,065	2,144,682	2,125,571	2,087,261	2,047,349	2,033,656	2,066,445
China	470,940	501,960	546,752	593,993	644,265	670,683	678,391	668,644	652,595	649,078
Korea	594,117	586,400	586,782	582,754	580,760	571,598	560,799	542,182	530,048	519,740
Philippines	178,098	163,890	171,091	182,910	193,426	197,971	200,208	203,294	202,985	209,183
Brazil	281,413	298,382	308,703	313,771	309,448	264,649	228,702	209,265	190,609	181,317
Vietnam	25,061	27,990	31,527	36,131	40,524	40,493	41,354	44,444	52,367	72,256
United States	47,745	48,376	50,281	50,858	51,704	51,235	49,821	49,119	48,361	49,981
Peru	49,483	52,217	53,655	55,487	56,050	54,607	52,385	51,471	49,255	48,598
Thailand	28,049	29,599	32,029	34,547	36,560	37,812	38,240	41,316	40,133	41,208
Taiwan	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	22,775	33,324
Nepal	4,105	5,314	6,596	8,417	11,556	14,745	17,149	20,103	24,071	31,537
Other	184,859	192,561	202,448	210,197	220,389	221,778	220,212	217,511	220,457	230,223

* The number is counted at the end of each year.
 Source: Homusho (2015b, 2015c); Nakamura et al. (2015).

short-term stayers (such as tourists) and special permanent residents (mainly Koreans).

After 2008, the number of registered foreigners decreased for the first time, with a decline of almost 19,000 from 2008 (2,144,682) to 2009 (2,125,571). The reason for this decrease is possibly a result of the “Lehman shock” of 2008, bringing depression to the manufacturing industry and thus inducing an exodus of Brazilians who were residents in Japan. The Tohoku earthquake of March 1, 2011 also had an impact that can be discerned in the official data. When the foreign population (2,066,445 in 2013) is disaggregated by nationality, it can be seen that Chinese people occupied nearly one-third (31.4%) of the entire group. In the last decade, there has been a remarkable increase in the numbers of Chinese people.

The newcomers from neighboring Asian countries have created ethnic communities in some metropolitan areas. For example, Shinjuku ward has embraced the largest number of newcomers and has the largest proportion of foreign population in Tokyo’s 23 wards: in 2014, the population of the ward was 324,082 of which 33,568 (10.4%) were foreign nationals (Shinjuku-ku, 2015). The Shin-Okubo district (of Shinjuku ward) is well known for its ethnic Korean neighborhood, selling Korean cuisine and groceries, and attracts a steady flow of tourists.

There has also been a tendency for newly arrived migrants to cluster around metropolitan areas. Mizukami (2000: 113) notes:

The ethnic concentration in metropolitan areas is explained in terms of a synergy between job opportunities and accessibility of settlement services not only from governments but also from the community efforts offered by compatriots of the same ethnic background.

And:

In recent years, the eastern part of the Shin-Okubo station is identifiably Korean, while in the western part of the station, Chinese shops and other ethnic shops have been increasing, and the northwest area is known for its Muslim streets on which Halal grocery stores and restaurants have been located. (Mizukami, 2015: 55)

Changes in Immigration Control Acts

Some metropolitan inner-city areas have flourished with the development of ethnic businesses. However, these ethnic businesses are not directly connected to the business prosperity of the areas in which they are located. In other words, customers of ethnic shops tend to be distinct from those at the local shopping malls. In addition, Japan’s inner-urban areas have encountered serious problems with aging populations. As mentioned previously, the lack of a sufficient labor force and the decline of local communities have been a significant source of concern. Hence, public concern is rising, and in recent years various books relating to migration issues have been published. Some support the immigration intake, namely Sakanaka (2012) and Menju (2011), who emphasize the need for large-scale

immigration. There are also opposing opinions, as with the contribution of Saeki (2010), who argues that “immigrants are unnecessary.” As noted, the debate about immigration suggests that Japan has to decide *once again* whether to be an open or a closed country.

A major recent policy change has been the implementation of a points-based system that provides preferential treatment to highly skilled professionals. In addition, the 2012 revision of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act has received wide attention in the media. The points-based system aims to:

provide preferential treatment—including expanded accompanying family permission and the permission to bring domestic staff, as well as faster access to permanent residence—was introduced in May 2012. In total, about 430 individuals were recognized as highly-skilled professionals in the eleven months after the start of the system, more than half from China, although most were already in Japan. (OECD, 2014: 268)

According to the Immigration Bureau, Ministry of Justice, the 2012 revision of immigration control requires that:

from July 2012, a foreign national who is residing in Japan for a medium to long-term period is issued with a residence card at the time of receiving permission relating to residence such as landing permission, permission to change the status of residence or permission for extension of the period of stay. This residence card gives such details as the name, date of birth, sex, nationality or region, place of residence, status of residence and period of stay of the foreign national. (Note) The alien registration system was abolished in July 2012 at the time of the implementation of the new residency management system. (Homusho, 2015d)

This means that a new system was introduced for foreign nationals who stay in Japan for medium and long terms, who are issued a residence card, while a “certificate” is offered to those who possess special permanent residency. Before this revision, these foreigners were managed by the Alien Registration Act, which was abolished, and they are now registered under the Residential Basic Book Act, as are Japanese citizens. Implicitly, there has been a positive shift in viewpoint in the 2012 revision of immigration control, and this has arisen in response to the increasing demand for highly talented foreigners. However, there have been some criticisms of the revision, because it has also strengthened the way in which foreigners are subject to strict controls. For example, a foreign national who has overstayed his/her visa is unable to renew or receive a residence card and is not allowed to access public welfare.

Community Decline and Need for Social Cohesion

Japan’s aging population and very low birthrate have not only brought about labor shortages, but also a decline in the social viability of local communities. In Japanese society, if a sense of belonging to the local community decreases, it is said that local

connections have been diluted (*Koseirodoshō*, 2014: 123). As mentioned previously, although the concept of social cohesion has not been adopted, there is, nevertheless, extensive research relating to this concept. One of the extensive surveys conducted by *Koseirodoshō* (the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare) in 2014 is titled “Conditions Awareness of Health.”³ In previous research in 2007, 65.7 percent replied that they “had no neighbors with whom they could cooperate” (*Koseirodoshō*, 2014: 123).

According to the surveys conducted by Naikakufu (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan), the recent results of nationwide public opinion polls regarding social consciousness indicated that many people felt stressed in the course of their daily lives. It was found that, some Japanese people hardly had any family members to have meals with or neighbors to cooperate with. Nearly 70 percent of respondents answered that a desirable local community is one in which the residents help one another when they encounter problems (41.9% of the respondents desired to live in a local community where all residents help one another, while 26.4% responded that people should support “agreeable residents” within a local community) (*Koseirodoshō*, 2014: 124–125). In fact, many people tended to think that a desirable local community is one in which residents come together to help one another in times of trouble, as they could not find any appropriate people to share company with. The share of respondents who answered this way increased in comparison with 2002, indicating a discernible increase in people wishing to find some help each other in local areas. This is certainly a problem in relation to social cohesion in Japan.

There have also been extensive surveys conducted by *Tokeisuri kenkyūjo* (The Institute of Statistical Mathematics),⁴ which include research into the Japanese national character. In the twelfth survey of 2008, the results indicated some pessimistic views from Japan’s youth:

The most conspicuous change of the past 20 years in the attitudes of Japanese people must be the rapid spread of what might be called “the pessimistic view of society” that took place from 1993 to 1998, and such phenomenon may be said to constitute the “loss of confidence” among the Japanese. (*Tokeisuri kenkyūjo*, 2015)

And:

We see that throughout the survey years, around one-fourth of respondents have expressed a pessimistic outlook toward the future as the view that “people will be unhappy”; more than half the respondents still say that “people’s health will get worse” though the proportion taking this stance has decreased for the past decade. (*Tokeisuri kenkyūjo*, 2015)

To one of the many questions related to the nation’s view of its social life, the respondents chose between answers, which were either: “I think that I will be definitely rewarded someday if I continue to make a serious effort” or “I think that no matter how much I try, I am not likely to be rewarded.” To the latter negative answer, in 2013, 26 percent indicated that it was how they thought. This was an increase from 17 percent in 1988 (*Tokeisuri kenkyūjo*, 2015: 4), as shown in Tables 2.2 and 2.3.

Table 2.2 Response to the Question as to Nexus between “Efforts” and “Rewards” in 1988

Age, sex	Rewarded	Not rewarded	Other	Do not know	Total (%)	Number of respondents
Total	79	17	2	2	100	1,824
Male total	76	21	2	1	100	805
20s	70	26	3	1	100	153
30s	72	24	2	2	100	151
40s	74	24	1	1	100	169
50s	84	13	3	—	100	159
60s	77	20	1	2	100	110
70 and over	79	17	2	2	100	63
Female total	82	14	2	2	100	1,019
20s	79	18	1	2	100	190
30s	83	11	3	3	100	220
40s	84	14	1	2	101	199
50s	84	14	1	1	100	178
60s	80	16	2	1	99	147
70 and over	80	9	4	7	100	85

Source: Nakamura et al. (2015).

Table 2.3 Response to the Question as to Nexus between “Efforts” and “Rewards” in 2013

Age, sex	Rewarded	Not rewarded	Other	Do not know	Total (%)	Number of respondents
Total	72	26	1	2	101	1,579
Male total	68	29	1	2	100	714
20s	62	37	1	—	100	73
30s	61	37	1	1	100	122
40s	67	31	2	—	100	115
50s	72	26	1	2	101	109
60s	71	25	1	4	101	162
70 and over	74	23	1	2	100	133
Female total	75	23	0	1	99	865
20s	77	22	1	—	100	88
30s	73	25	—	2	100	127
40s	77	23	—	—	100	143
50s	74	24	—	2	100	144
60s	79	19	—	2	100	176
70 and over	73	25	1	2	101	187

Source: Nakamura et al. (2015).

When we focus upon some particular age cohorts, such as those in their 20s and 30s, one-fourth of the female respondents chose the answer “I think that no matter how much I try, I am not likely to be rewarded”; over one-third (37%) of male respondents answered negatively in 2013. More precisely, a relatively large proportion of the younger generation, in their 20s and 30s, answered the question negatively (not rewarded), an increase of nearly 10 percentage points when compared to 1988.

In some areas, ethnic businesses have been prosperous, but this prosperity has not always been shared by local communities. In fact, some surveys have shown that Japanese communities now need a renewed understanding of social cohesion or need to develop a new sense of solidarity to aid in the revitalization of inner cities. In Japanese sociological research, multicultural perspectives and ethnic research have now become a major part of the discipline’s response to the need for positive social change, including the preservation of social cohesion.

Notes

1. *Nippon keizaidantai rengokai* (Japan Business Federation) was founded in May 2002 by the amalgamation of *Keizaidantai rengokai* (Japan Federation of Economic Organizations, established in August 1946) and *Nihon keieidantai rengokai* (Japan Federation of Employers’ Associations, established in April 1948). On June 2, 2015, this federation consisted of 1,329 companies, some 109 industrial associations, and 47 regional economic organizations (*Nippon keizaidantai rengokai*, 2015).
2. *Kalabaw* (carabao) means a water buffalo in the Tagalog language.
3. This research was designed by *Koseirodoshō* for investigating generational and regional differences in consciousness of health, and it was conducted on February 21–26, 2014 throughout the entire country. The methodology was an investigation that assumed trust and gathered 5,000 respondents (*Koseirodoshō*, 2014: 43).
4. “The project began in 1953, and since then a new installment has been introduced every five years. In principle, these survey installments have been conducted with the same methodology, using the same questionnaire items each time” (*Tokeisuri kenkyūjo*, 2015).

References

- Asahi shinbun* [Asahi Newspaper], 2003 (October 10 evening edition). “*Kōgo gonen de fuhotaizai o hangen* [The number of illegal foreign-residents will be reduced by half in five years of time].” p. 14.
- Castles, Stephen, Mary Kalantzis, Bill Cope, and Michael Morrissey. 1988. *Mistaken Identity: Multiculturalism and the Premise of Nationalism in Australia*. Leichhardt: Pluto Press.
- Demireva, Neli. 2014. “Immigration, Diversity and Social Cohesion.” *Migration Observatory Briefing*, COMPAS, University of Oxford, UK, April 2014.
- Homusho [The Ministry of Justice]. 2010. *Heisei 22 nenban Shutunuyukoku kanri [2010 Immigration Control]*. Tokyo: Homusho.
- Homusho “*Heisei 24nen no puresurerisu* [Press Release in 2012].” http://www.moj.go.jp/nyuukokukanri/kouhou/nyuukokukanri04_00015.html (retrieved May 25, 2012).
- Homusho nyuukokukanrikyoku [Immigration Bureau, The Ministry of Justice] (ed.). 2014. *Heisei 26nenban shutunuyukoku kanri [Press Release in 2012]*, Tokyo: Homusho nyuukokukanrikyoku.

- Kato, Hisakazu. 2004. "Dankaisedai no jinkogaku [Demography of Baby Boom Generation]." In Y. Higuchi (ed.), *Dankaisedai no teinen to nihonkeizai [Retirement Age of Baby Boom Generation and Japan's Economy]*, pp. 35–54. Tokyo: Nihonhyoronsha.
- Koseirodoshō [Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare]. 2014. *Heisei 26 nenban kouseirodo hakusho [White Paper on Annual Health, Labour and Welfare 2014]*. Nikkeiinsatsu.
- Markus, Andrew. 2010. *Mapping Social Cohesion, the Scanlon Foundation Surveys Summary Report 2010*. Melbourne: Monash Institute for the Study of Global Movements.
- Menju, Toshihiro. 2011. *Jinko gekigen: Nihon ni imin wa hituyoudearu [Population sharp decline; Japan needs immigrants]*. Tokyo: Shincho-sha.
- Mizukami, Tetsuo. 1998. "Urban Residents' Movements and the Settlement of Foreigners in Japan: Activities of the Asian People's Friendship Society." *Asian Studies Review*, 22(3): 357–371.
- Mizukami, Tetsuo. 2000. "The Myth of Cultural Homogeneity and Living Together: Studies of Assimilation and Australian Multiculturalism." *Hyogokyokudaigaku kenkyukiyo [Hyogo University of Teacher Education Journal]*, 20: 105–116.
- Mizukami, Tetsuo. 2010. "A New Epoch of Immigration for Japan: Directional Shift in Civic Organizational Support for Newcomer Settlement." In H. Vinken, Y. Nishimura, B. White, and M. Deguchi (eds.), *Civic Engagement in Contemporary Japan: Established and Emerging Repertoires*, pp. 101–116. New York: Springer.
- Mizukami, Tetsuo. 2015. "The Characteristics of Notable Ethnic Towns in Tokyo." *Gurobaru toshikenkyu [Global Urban Studies]*, (8): 49–59.
- Nakamura, Takashi, Takahiro Tsuchiya, and Tadahiko Maeda. 2015. *Kokuminsei no kenkyu dai13ji zenkokuchosa [A Study of the Japanese National Character: The Thirteenth Nation Wide Survey (2013) ISM Survey Research Report]*, No. 116.
- Noro, Yoshiaki. 2015. "Shoshi koreika wa gaikokujin ukeireni donoyoni eikyosuruka [How Do the Population Decline and Rapid Aging Trends Have Effects upon Acceptance of Foreigners]." In K. Yoshinari, T. Mizukami, and Y. Noro (eds.), *Shimin ga teiansuru korek-arano iminseisaku [Citizens' Proposal for Prospective Immigration Policies]*, pp. 19–30. Tokyo: Gendaijinbunsha.
- OECD. 2012. *Perspectives on Global Development 2012: Social Cohesion in a Shifting World*. OECD Publishing.
- OECD. 2014. *International Migration Outlook 2014*. Paris: OECD Publishing.
- Saeki, Hirofumi. 2010. *Imin fuyoron [Doctrine for Immigrants Are Unnecessary]*. Tokyo: Sankeishinbunshuppan.
- Sakanaka, Hidenori. 2012. *Jinkohokai to imin kakumei: Sakanaka Hidenori no iminkokka gsenen [Population Collapse and Migration Revolution: Declaration of Sakanaka Hidenori's Immigration Nation]*. Tokyo: Nihon Kajo Shuppan.
- Takeisuri kenkyujo [The Institute of Statistical Mathematics]. 2015. "Nihonjin no kokuminsei dai, 13ji zenkokuchosa." Tokyo: Takeisuri kenkyujo [The Institute of Statistical Mathematics].
- World Health Organization (WHO). 2014. *World Health Organization*. Geneva: WHO Press.
- Yoshinari, Katsuo. 1993. "Kokusaitoshi Tokyo—Banguradeshujin to tomoni [International City, Tokyo: Living together with Bangladeshis]." In Y. Hase and H. Miyake (eds.), *Banguradeshu no dekasegi rodosha [Overseas Transient Workers from Bangladesh]*, pp. 61–90. Tokyo: Akashishoten.

Websites

- Homusho [The Ministry of Justice]. 2015a. "shutunyukoku kanri tokei [The Number of Foreign Nationals Entering Japan and Japanese Nationals Leaving Japan]." http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_nyukan.html (retrieved June 10, 2015).

- Homusho [The Ministry of Justice]. 2015b. “*Kokuseki-chiikibetsu zairyugaikokujinsu no suii* [The Numbers of Foreign Population by Countries and Regions].” <http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001129794.pdf> (retrieved June 8, 2015).
- Homusho [The Ministry of Justice]. 2015c. “*Kokuseki-chiikibetsu zairyugaikokujinsu no suii* [The Numbers of Foreign Population by Countries and Regions].” <http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001129794.pdf> (retrieved June 10, 2015).
- Homusho [The Ministry of Justice, Immigration]. 2015d. “Immigration Control of Japanese and Foreign Nationals.” <http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/IB/ib-01.html> (retrieved June 8, 2015).
- Homusho “*Heisei 24nen no puresu rerisu* [Press Release in 2012].” http://www.moj.go.jp/nyuukokukanri/kouhou/nyuukokukanri04_00015.html (retrieved May 25, 2012).
- Jinkomondai kenkyujo [National Institute of Population and Social Security Research]. 2015. *Population Pyramid*. <http://www.ipss.go.jp/index-e.asp> (retrieved June 10, 2015).
- Naikakufu [Cabinet Office, Government of Japan]. 2015. “shoshika taisaku no genjyo to kadai [Contemporary Situation and Problems of Countermeasure for the Population Decline].” http://www8.cao.go.jp/shoushi/shoushika/whitepaper/measures/w-2013/25/webhonpen/html/b1_s1-1.html (retrieved June 10, 2015).
- National Institute of Population and Social Security Research. 2015. “Population Projections for Japan: 2011–2060.” http://www.ipss.go.jp/site-ad/TopPageData/Pyramid_ea.html (retrieved June 6, 2015).
- Nippon keizai dantai rengokai* [Japan Business Federation]. 2015. “Keidanren Policy & Action.” <http://www.keidanren.or.jp/> (retrieved June 10, 2015).
- Shinjuku-ku. 2015. “Shinjuku-ku no tokei [The Number of Foreign Nationals Entering Japan and Japanese Nationals Leaving Japan].” <http://www.city.shinjuku.lg.jp/kusei/38toukei.html> (retrieved June 11, 2015).
- Tokeisuri kenkyujo* [The Institute of Statistical Mathematics]. 2015. “The Surveys on the Japanese National Character.” http://www.ism.ac.jp/kokuminsei/ks_e/index_e.html (retrieved June 11, 2015).

Australian Multiculturalism— “Natural Transition” or Social Coercion?

Ernest Healy

Background

Few countries embodied the UN’s cosmopolitan ethos of the 1990s more than did Australia. However, Australian society was squarely on this trajectory prior to the 1990s. From the early 1970s onward, the Australian political elite were persuaded that Australian society should be identified as multicultural. This fundamental shift was partly due to the influence of a small and determined group of multicultural intellectuals and lobbyists. Their influence, however, was greatly enhanced by the rapidly changing international strategic and economic environment of the 1970s, and by anxiety among Australia’s political and business elites about Australia’s viability in the emerging new world order. The Australian government’s increasingly Asia-focused foreign policy aspirations provided a fertile environment for multicultural lobbyists to consolidate their influence. So, when liberal cosmopolitanism gained international momentum during the 1990s, Australian governments were primed to showcase Australia to the world as an exemplar of the new paradigm of economic and cultural openness.

It is often claimed that Australian society has successfully managed a mass immigration program since the early post–Second World War years, accepting migrants from an increasingly diverse range of countries, while embracing an explicitly multicultural policy outlook, with little overt evidence of conflict and social dislocation. Australia had been remaking itself and, it seemed, was on the side of history.

In exploring the implications of globalization for Australian identity and social cohesion, it is necessary to recognize the degree to which the pursuit of multilateral free trade and the embrace of cultural openness, which took the form of multiculturalism in Australia, have become intertwined since the 1970s. As detailed

below, by the 1990s, for sections of the Australian intelligentsia, the abandonment of the founding legacy of national economic protection had become closely associated with the perception that economic openness necessitated casting off an alleged xenophobic cultural inheritance. Left-liberal support for cultural diversity and tolerance meshed neatly with the economic right's quest to remove inherited cultural and institutional barriers to international flows of goods, capital, and labor. As time passed, the economic rationalist drift in Australian economic policy became intertwined with the advocacy of multiculturalism.

The much heralded openness of Australian society in the 1990s was closely associated with the dismantlement of the protectionist national ethos which dates from the early federation period, often referred to as the Australian Settlement. The Settlement institutions had served as the basis for nation building since the Federation of Australia in 1901. As discussed below, the rapid transformation of Australian society from a highly protected economy, with highly centralized regulation of labor relations and restricted immigration, to an open globally orientated economy, involved an attempt to strip the Settlement heritage of legitimacy. A positive national memory of strong, centralized government, restrictive immigration, and of industry and jobs protection was perceived to be a serious impediment by advocates of multilateral free trade, particularly given Australia's proximity to the emerging economic powerhouse of Asia.

Advocates of Australia's transformation to an economically and culturally open society have often portrayed this process as having been an inevitable and largely unproblematic adjustment to changing domestic and international circumstances. It is argued here, however, that social stresses and strains associated with the rapid recasting of the nation's founding institutions and identity have periodically surfaced and are still being played out.

The Australian Settlement

The latter half of the nineteenth century saw the development of two rival perspectives on how economic and social development within the colonies should proceed. Protectionists feared that if Australian colonies simply remained suppliers of raw materials without acquiring the capacity to produce finished goods, colonial societies would remain dependent and immature. The protection of nascent secondary industries and high wages against cheap imported products and labor would facilitate the emergence of a balanced economy and a higher level of social development. By contrast, landed rural interests opposed protection, fearful that it would increase the costs of equipment, labor, and capital. Such landed interests were joined by commercial and other elements that stood to benefit from the importation and distribution of cheap goods (Clark, 2006; Miller, 1959).

The unresolved struggle between these competing perspectives spilled over into the early federation period, when the protectionist approach to nation building gained majority support in the Australian Parliament. The Australian nation-building experiment was not premised upon small government (Rosecrance,

1963). Early Commonwealth legislation addressed issues relating to immigration restriction, labor arbitration, and social services—key planks of the protectionist nation-building agenda.

Since the 1970s, the 1901 Immigration Restriction Bill has been widely cited as evidence of the early incorporation of racist attitudes into the political fabric of Australian society. Indeed, there were vocal racist elements at the time. Nevertheless, federal parliamentary debate on the Bill, which lasted for five months, points to a more nuanced set of concerns. Although initially ambivalent toward the protectionist perspective, Labor Party parliamentarians swung their support behind the Bill. They opposed the prospect of employers importing cheap labor, which would pose a threat to trade union objectives—something for which there had been a precedent during the nineteenth century (Windschuttle, 2004). After significant trade union defeats in the early 1890s, this prospect was a sensitive issue.

Parliamentary debate on the Bill shows that there was considerable reluctance to restrict entry to Australia simply on the basis of race or skin color. Willard (1923: 191) distilled the mood of the parliamentary debate by emphasizing that Australian political leaders were not motivated “by any idea of the inferiority of the mentality or physique” of those who would be excluded, but by cultural concerns relating to immigrants’ capacity for successful integration into the founding society (Willard, cited in Windschuttle, 2004: 284). Many believed that restricted immigration was necessary to ensure the success of the still fledgling national experiment in democracy building (Windschuttle, 2004).

In 1903, the Parliament passed an Act creating the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration to resolve industrial disputes which extended beyond state borders. In 1906, a benchmark decision by Justice Higgins established the concept of the basic wage in Australia. Higgins determined that the role of the Court was to secure for workers that which they could not obtain through individual bargaining (Clark, 2006). The passage of this bill was linked to legislation providing increased tariff support for most goods manufactured in Australia. In return, employers were required to pay “fair wages” (Birrell, 1995).

In 1908, the Commonwealth government passed the Invalid and Old Age Pension Act. It decided upon a noncontributory, but means-tested scheme, where applicants needed to have resided continuously in Australia for 25 years (Kewley, 1980). Such pension arrangements were not considered charity, but citizenship entitlements. As such, their enactment reflected an enlarged attitude toward the legitimate role of the state.

Shifting International Alignments—1970s

A seismic shift in international power relations during the early post–Second World War period had, by the 1970s, prompted a serious reconsideration of Australia’s role within Pacific Asia. It also brought a critical focus to bear upon the Australian Settlement institutions.

Key elements of the changing international context included Britain’s military withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore by 1971, Britain’s acceptance to the

European Economic Community in 1973, the US retreat from the Cold-War foreign policy orthodoxy, and the US retreat from forward military involvement in Asia.

Moreover, Australia's trade patterns had been shifting toward Asia. By 1966–1967, Japan had overtaken Britain as the Australian economy's largest buyer. The share of other Asian nations in Australian trade had also been increasing. Further, US policy priorities in Asia had become focused upon regional economic growth and securing a stable investment environment for US transnational investment.

Increasingly, it was perceived by Australian political and business elites that a new, dynamic situation had emerged to which Australia needed to either respond proactively or enter into decline. Various policy options surfaced in the course of debate. Those which predominated were the ones most sensitive to the economic growth signals associated with the US policy shift. In this context, one function of "second-tier" countries like Australia would be to steer countries within the still politically unstable Asia-Pacific region to embrace liberal trade relations and foreign investment flows. By the late 1970s, this second-tier role was clearly recognized by its Liberal Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser (cited in White and Kemp, 1986: 26).

Reflecting the expectations associated with this second-tier role, Australia was promoted as a politically secure base for transnational capital, a base from which to engage the growing business opportunities within the Asia-Pacific region, and as a genuine regional participant (Camilleri, 1990; Hyde, 1978). However, major adjustments in national culture and outlook would be required to legitimize any such initiatives.

Labor Party leader Gough Whitlam was quick to grasp the direction of events. As federal Opposition leader in 1968, he was propounding economic internationalization in South East Asia and recognized the role that Australia might play (Hyde, 1978). In doing so, however, he had to deal with aspects of the Australian Settlement heritage.

National Culture Problematicized

While Opposition leader in the late 1960s, Gough Whitlam lamented that "Australians have yet to learn to think regionally" and that "there is abroad in Australia a spirit of isolationism which runs in head on conflict with Labor's internationalism" (1968: 38–39).

After winning government in early 1974, Whitlam visited Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, Burma, Singapore, and the Philippines. The themes pursued in the course of these visits included: a new independence and maturity in Australian foreign policy; a deepening engagement by Australia with Asia; the development of a new forum for economic cooperation; greater cultural exchange; and a refutation of the White Australia policy (Whitlam, 1974). In the Philippines, Whitlam emphasized his government's support for the UN resolutions on Southern Rhodesia and its intention to ratify the International Convention against Racial Discrimination. He stated:

The timing and nature of these actions were deliberate. They were intended to signal to the world the priority which the newly elected government would give from then on to questions of race in formulating its policies and were designed to initiate the visible process of ridding Australia of any racist image. (46)

A number of other developments contributed to the Whitlam Labor government's proactive internationalism and domestic accommodation of cultural differences. One was the middle-classing of Labor Party membership and its support base from the 1960s. This provided internal party support for his regional initiatives and a more open national cultural outlook.

At the same time, there was significant pressure for progress in race relations from the UN and the British Commonwealth. It was becoming increasingly difficult for Australian delegates and those from former colonies to relate formally as equals when Australian immigration policy was foreclosing the entry of these same peoples on racial terms (Dyster and Meredith, 1990).

Domestically, there was a growing gap between official migrant assimilation rhetoric and the high levels of discontent among migrants from non-English-speaking backgrounds (Birrell, 1982). The Whitlam government finally abandoned the migrant assimilation policy, with Immigration Minister Al Grassby's 1973 statement, "A Multicultural Society for the Future," signaling this change.

In this context, the Whitlam government opened the door to incorporation of migrant elites into the state apparatus. For the first time, migrant members were appointed to the Commonwealth government's Immigration Advisory Committee. Further, in 1973, Migrant Task Forces were established in six capital cities to investigate, consult, and report on migrant concerns (Castles et al., 1988). The Australian Assistance Plan (AAP), established in 1973, which aimed to actively involve local and regional communities in the provision of social services, explicitly set out to involve migrant representatives. In so doing, the AAP facilitated:

scattered groups of migrants and migrant oriented welfare organisations [to] move towards the centres of political power, and also acted as a catalyst for the development of more integrated and articulate migrant organisations. (Martin, cited in Castles et al., 1988: 61)

Whitlam clearly set a precedent for future governments. However, it is also important to note the discontinuities between Whitlam and subsequent Labor governments. Whitlam's initiatives were pursued under the rubric of a confident and progressive nationalism. His vision for regional Asian engagement was based on the ideal of independent sovereign states acting out of mutual respect and enlightened self-interest. By contrast, by the mid- to late 1980s, Australian government perspectives on regional engagement would be increasingly refracted through the prism of an ascendant neoliberalism. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the identification of Australia as a multicultural society would be integral to an increasingly aggressive pursuit of an open, deregulated national economy and multilateral free trade.

The Fraser Government—1975–1983

The Fraser Coalition government represented a further stage in the redefinition of Australian identity.

Following the recommendations of the *Review of Post Arrival Programs and Services for Migrants* (popularly known as the Galbally Report) in 1978, a number of initiatives were implemented to address the needs of migrants, especially those from non-English-speaking backgrounds. Notable developments in this regard were the establishment of the Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs in 1979, the extension of ethnic radio beyond the existing services in Melbourne and Sydney to all capital cities, and the establishment of ethnic television. Ethnic Affairs Commissions (EACs) were also established at the state level as permanent advisory bodies to government. A purpose of the EACs was to facilitate the participation of migrants in matters that affected them, especially in relation to government decision making. In effect, this often meant the increased participation of ethnic elites, who acted as gatekeepers, mediating between their respective minority constituencies and government agencies, and who had a vested interest in the promotion of multiculturalism and the politicization of minority identity (see Jakubowicz, 1994; Jupp et al., 1989).

The Galbally Report also facilitated and legitimized government endorsement of the maintenance of minority cultural identity. In a speech to the House of Representatives in 1978, Fraser endorsed the principle adopted by the Report, that “every person should be able to maintain his or her culture without prejudice or disadvantage” (3).

Just how radical the implications of this position was for the received national identity and how great the potential uncertainties of adopting the policy became evident in a speech by Fraser to the Institute of Multicultural Affairs in 1981, the year his government formally adopted multiculturalism as a policy.

Here, Fraser acknowledged that the adoption of a large-scale immigration program in the early postwar period was only politically palatable to the Australian public on the condition of migrant assimilation to Australian norms. Fraser (1981) observed that, by the 1970s, mass immigration had delivered a very different outcome in having created “one of the world’s most diverse populations” (1). Assimilation, he maintained, had proven unworkable in practice. Migrants had held onto their respective values and heritage and had endeavored to pass them on to their children. Indeed, migrants had established a broad range of culturally specific organizations.

Fraser claimed that this largely unexpected outcome had proven Australian society to be capable of “embracing an ever increasing degree of ethnic and cultural diversity” (Fraser, 1981: 2). Australians had been progressively persuaded as to the merits of the national multicultural perspective:

Patiently and doggedly ethnic communities sought out and changed the attitudes of the press, educators, welfare agencies, churches, politicians, public servants *and the general public*. (1, 2) (My emphasis)

In the process, Fraser argued, the Australian identity had been fundamentally altered. An ethnic dimension had not been simply grafted onto "an otherwise unchanged conception of ourselves"; "[t]here has been a fundamental reappraisal of the established way of seeing Australia" (3). Much more than a "passive toleration of diversity," multiculturalism involved a profound cultural leveling of Australian society, whereby each culture was deemed to be of equal status, no matter how recently introduced.

Despite government endorsement of the right of migrants to preserve their minority cultures and identities, Fraser did not assume that this would occur spontaneously without significant, even ongoing, government intervention. It was deemed necessary to foster "a multicultural attitude in Australian society" and "the retention of the cultural heritage of different ethnic groups" (Fraser, 1978: 6–7). Further, it cannot be assumed that proactive government involvement in the creation of a multicultural ethos was solely aimed at a recalcitrant Anglo-Celtic mainstream; many migrant minorities themselves stood to be converted to the idea of a pan-ethnic, multicultural Australian awareness. Lopez (2000) observes that members of non-English background migrant communities in the early 1970s were tightly focused on the interests of those within their respective communities. Furthermore, "most ethnic groups resented being treated as if they shared a common voice and interests with other ethnic groups" (23). There was no pan-ethnic consciousness to speak of. Major initiatives in schools, in the training of professionals, and indeed in the provision of specialist migrant media, would be required to help socially engineer this outcome (Fraser, 1978).

There was also a significant gap between rhetoric and reality with regard to the degree to which Australian society had actually undertaken the transformation to multiculturalism. This disassociation between rhetoric and reality would continue to dog Australian multicultural policy over the coming decades.

From the perspective of Australia's ethnic communities, the basis of multicultural policy from 1981 was premised on the expectation that migrant minorities would leave homeland prejudices and rivalries behind and concentrate on the interests of their respective communities in Australia through a form of interest group politics.

Multiculturalism—An Elite Vision

In hindsight, it might seem that multiculturalism was inevitable. But, as Lopez (2000) cogently argues, support for multiculturalism within the Australian population during the early 1970s was very marginal. The limited polling available from that time indicates that around 90 percent of Australians did not support multicultural ideas. Limited support did exist, however, among tertiary-educated professionals and specific ethnic communities.

From the late 1960s onward, a very small number of determined and articulate lobbyists had pushed their multicultural message among the political elite and within the apparatus of government, and were eventually able to embed themselves within the machinery of government. Malcolm Fraser was personally

introduced to, and converted to, the perspective in late 1973, after which he had it included in the Opposition policy platform in early 1974, prior to coming to government in 1975 (Lopez, 2000). Lopez states:

The events that led to the success of the multiculturalists in establishing multiculturalism as a basis for ethnic affairs policy during the 1970s presents an ideal case study of elite politics, lobbying and the power of influence. (27)

Although support for multiculturalism did grow from the 1970s, it continued to be concentrated among particular segments of Australian society. Tables 3.1–3.3 help illustrate this outcome. The survey data cited below are from the 1988 *Issues in Multicultural Australia* survey conducted by the Office of Multicultural Affairs. By this time, surveys often included questions about the public's attitudes toward multiculturalism as well as toward immigration.

The statements used in the survey were designed to gauge the level of support for multiculturalism among the general population. Each table shows the responses to one such statement. The responses in each table are cross-tabulated against the level of Australian qualification held by the respondents.

Table 3.1 shows responses to the statement "Migrants should keep their culture to themselves." The statement runs counter to the multicultural orthodoxy that migrants should be encouraged not only to maintain their cultural identity in Australia, but also to engage in an open appreciation of cultural difference. Examining the educational profiles of those who either strongly agreed or disagreed with this statement, a striking difference is observed between those with university degrees and those with trade qualifications. Support for migrants keeping their respective cultures to themselves was strong among tradespersons, but very low among the university trained. A similar observation is made for the statement "People who come to Australia should change their ways to become more like other Australians" in Table 3.2. Again, this statement contradicts the multicultural tenet that assimilation is an outmoded principle and should not be an expectation in contemporary Australia. The contrast is most striking of all with the statement in Table 3.3, where responses are to the statement "Having lots of different cultural groups in Australia causes lots of problems." Again looking at those who most strongly agreed and disagreed, 47 percent of those with trade qualifications agreed, while 43 percent of the university trained disagreed. This statement deals with one of the core principles of multiculturalism; whether cultural diversity is something to be celebrated as a source of cultural enrichment for all, or regarded as a problem to be managed.

The data show that Lopez's observation of the early 1970s, that the tertiary educated provided a sectional support base for multiculturalism, persisted to the late 1980s. The data suggest strong differences of opinion about multiculturalism based on class. The characterization of Australian society as multicultural had remained controversial for many Australians. Significant sections of Australian society had not been persuaded to surrender their inherited identity to multiculturalism. As discussed further below, public opposition to and uncertainty about multiculturalism persisted into the 1990s and beyond.

Table 3.1 Level of Australian Qualification by Response to the Statement "Ethnic Groups Should Keep Their Cultures to Themselves," Australia 1988

Statement	Ethnic groups should keep their cultures to themselves										Total	
	Higher degree	Bachelor degree	Diploma	Trade; Apprentice	Higher School Certificate (TAFE)*	Business College Certificate	TAFE etc. Certificate	Adult Ed. Course	In-house course	Other Certificate		NES Other
Agree very much	0	4	8	68	5	11	23	3	0	1	3	126
Agree a little	11	19	9	57	3	13	22	9	0	0	2	145
Disagree a little	16	51	21	43	5	24	44	8	2	3	7	224
Disagree very much	15	39	29	31	3	9	27	6	1	1	2	163
Not stated/refused	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Don't know	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	42	114	67	199	16	57	116	26	3	5	14	659

* Secondary School completion.
 Source: Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Issues in Multicultural Australia, 1988, Canberra, Australian Data Archive, the Australian National University, 1989.

Table 3.2 Level of Australian Qualification by Response to the Statement "People Who Come to Australia Should Change Their Behaviour to be More Like Other Australians," Australia 1988

Statement	People who come to Australia should change their behavior to be more like other Australians										Total	
	Higher degree	Bachelor degree	Diploma	Trade; apprentice	Higher School Certificate (TAFE)*	Business college certificate	TAFE etc. certificate	Adult ed. course	In-house course	Other certificate		NES other
Agree very much	3	12	14	80	4	13	30	4	0	1	3	164
Agree a little	16	39	30	75	6	15	37	10	0	2	7	237
Disagree a little	16	30	10	31	4	13	33	10	1	1	3	152
Disagree very much	7	31	13	13	2	16	16	2	2	1	1	104
Not stated/refused	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Don't know	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Total	42	114	67	199	16	57	116	26	3	5	14	659

* Secondary School completion.

Source: Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Issues in Multicultural Australia, 1988, Canberra, Australian Data Archive, the Australian National University, 1989.

Table 3.3 Level of Australian Qualification by Response to the Statement "Having Lots of Different Cultural Groups in Australia Causes Lots of Problems," Australia 1988

Statement	Having lots of different cultural groups in Australia causes lots of problems											Total
	Higher degree	Bachelor degree	Diploma	Trade; apprentice	Higher school certificate (TAFE)*	Business college certificate	TAFE etc. certificate	Adult ed. course	In-house course	Other certificate	NES other	
Agree very much	1	15	19	94	6	19	36	10	1	1	2	204
Agree a little	16	41	21	66	5	26	39	12	2	2	5	235
Disagree a little	7	26	15	27	3	12	27	3	0	2	3	125
Disagree very much	18	31	12	12	2	0	14	1	0	0	4	94
Not stated/refused	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Don't know	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	42	114	67	199	16	57	116	26	3	5	14	659

* Secondary School completion.
 Source: Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Issues in Multicultural Australia, 1988, Canberra, Australian Data Archive, the Australian National University, 1989.

The Hawke Keating Years—1983–1996

By the time the Labor Party, under Prime Minister Bob Hawke, was returned to office in 1983, multicultural policy enjoyed bipartisan support. Although Labor had not formally adopted multiculturalism under Whitlam, by the mid- to late 1970s many senior Labor figures had been personally won over to the perspective. The bipartisan environment of the 1980s resulted in a constrained intellectual environment surrounding both immigration and multicultural policies. This had the effect of dampening criticism of multiculturalism and a reluctance to recognize widespread, but politically diffuse dissatisfaction toward it from some sections of Australian society. Bipartisanship also created a very favorable political environment for those who were most committed to multiculturalism.

This was a period in which considerations relating to the scale and composition of immigration could not be easily separated from multicultural issues. Any questioning of immigration ran the risk of being interpreted as an assault on multicultural principles and regression to an alleged national xenophobia.

At the same time, immigration and multiculturalism continued to be a central plank in the Australian government's efforts to promote Australia as a genuine participant in the rapidly changing Asian region. Nevertheless, continued uncertainty and concern among sections of the Australian population about the impact and purpose of multiculturalism and high immigration would periodically surface as a source of social anxiety.

The Intelligentsia Flexes Its Muscle

The growing confidence and determination of the left intelligentsia in its advocacy of multiculturalism was demonstrated in 1984 in response to a speech made by the highly regarded Melbourne University historian and Dean of Arts, Professor Geoffrey Blainey, to a local Rotary Club gathering in the regional city of Warrnambool in the state of Victoria.

Blainey cautioned that the proportion of Asians in the Australian immigration intake had risen sharply and moved ahead of public opinion, particularly in relation to the values of "old Australians," and that the current approach may put social harmony at risk (Lewins, 1987). He argued that many migrants were from cultural backgrounds very different from Australian mainstream norms and values and that the establishment of a good social fit into Australian society may be a long way off. He further argued that the continuation of the current approach to immigration may engender resentment within the community (*The Australian*, 2005). Blainey pointed to the historically high levels of unemployment at the time and was concerned that the suburbs where many Asian migrants tended to settle were those with severe unemployment. Significantly, Blainey criticized what he saw as hypocrisy among political elites and the intelligentsia concerning their unqualified support for high levels of Asian immigration at a time of labor market stress.

In hindsight, the Warrnambool speech may seem unremarkable. What was remarkable was the fierce, sustained reaction against Blainey for his comments.

Within weeks of Blainey's Warrnambool speech, 24 of his History Department colleagues at the University of Melbourne published a letter in the Melbourne newspaper *The Age*, dissociating themselves from Blainey's views. Students boycotted his lectures and he was unable to speak at public functions on campus for the remainder of 1984 (Windschuttle, 2008). Blainey's family was threatened with violence. Reluctantly, he resigned in April 1985, one year after the speech.

It became clear that many of Blainey's critics held the Australian mainstream in contempt. One line of argument against Blainey's recourse to public opinion to question the insensitivity of immigration policy to a large section of public opinion was that he ignored the prejudices that informed public views (Lewins, 1987). Indeed, at times, it was argued that "public opinion" should not be taken seriously, but be understood as a rhetorical intellectual construct.

Historically, it was noted, immigration policy had been implemented despite widespread public opposition to it; why should this not continue? Blainey had confused "ethics with politics" (Lewins, 1987: 269). His claim that "in recent years a small group of people has successfully snatched immigration policy from the public arena, and has even placed a taboo on the discussion of vital aspects of immigration" was deemed to be historically inaccurate; it had never been treated democratically (269). Therefore, according to this logic, Blainey's argument was not legitimate.

The CAAIP Report

An unexpected source of criticism of the way immigration and multicultural policies had been handled by the Australian government during the 1980s was the handing down of the 1988 Commonwealth government-commissioned Report of the Committee to Advise on Australia's Immigration Policies (CAAIP). The Labor government clearly expected to have its management of immigration—and, by association, multicultural policy—endorsed by the Report. However, although the Report recommended immigration at even higher levels than had been set by the government, and defended multicultural policy in principle, it was highly critical of the way these policies had come to be identified in the public mind with minority interests. This, the Report contended, was the prevalent perception among the Australian mainstream.

Significantly, the CAAIP Report did not assume that the mainstream distrust of the way in which immigration and multiculturalism had been managed was altogether misplaced.

The views of foreign governments may be heard and our immigration policies should take into account our international interests, as well as the interests of intending migrants. But only in the context of a purposeful view of the Australian interest. *There are voices in the immigration debate which would seek to prescribe an Australia based on other cultures, as though there were no Australian dimension at all.* (CAAIP, 1988: 10) (My emphasis)

The CAAIP Report found widespread distrust and confusion surrounding the relationship of multiculturalism and immigration. Many people felt that

multicultural policy was driving immigration policy, rather than immigration being conducted in the interests of the whole Australian community (CAAIP, 1988). Critical of the government's management of immigration, the Inquiry Committee asserted that:

[M]ulticulturalism provides important support for immigrants, but as a concept it is not something with which many can identify . . . *It is the Australian identity that matters most in Australia . . . if the Government will affirm that strongly, multiculturalism might seem less divisive or threatening.* (11) (My emphasis)

In addition, the CAAIP Report considered there was too little distinction between the rights of citizens and noncitizens, and that a broad consensus on immigration may depend on greater cultural selectivity in the choosing of migrants, in the sense of choosing migrants who would be willing to cast off those aspects of their cultures of origin not acceptable in Australia. The Report stated that "we need to make it very clear that the unacceptable and repugnant are not to be transplanted" (4).

The CAAIP Report was received with hostility by Commonwealth government leaders and by ethnic leaders who had benefited from the federal government's pursuit of minority-patronage politics. Nevertheless, its impact was significant because, as noted, the years prior to its release had been ones of high confidence for the multicultural elite. Indeed, a concerted push had been under way to reconfigure Australian institutions to reflect Australia's cultural diversity. The goal was structural, rather than symbolic pluralism. An Office of Multicultural Affairs¹ document, published in 1988, just prior to the CAAIP Report, stated:

At the core of this situation [the disadvantage of non-English-speaking migrants] is the fact that most of Australia's structures and mechanisms are derived from a particular cultural tradition, that of Britain. For much of the last 200 years it has implicitly been assumed that Australia was a British society transplanted to the other side of the world. (161)

The message from such multicultural advocates was clear: Australian mainstream culture was obsolete and illegitimate, and should be supplanted with a thoroughly institutionalized form of ethnic pluralism as quickly as possible.

Australia—"A Nation of Immigrants"

The Australian government's determination to promote Australia as having cast aside its past cultural insularity had been a significant factor in the empowerment of multicultural elites during the 1980s. The multicultural message complemented the Australian government's changing perception of its role in Asia and, in turn, its trade liberalization overtures in the neighboring region.

The Prime Minister Bob Hawke frequently cited Australia's diverse immigration program and multiculturalism as evidence that Australia should no longer be perceived as a European outpost in Asia. His efforts to convey this message help

explain his hostility to the CAAIP Report, which called upon the government to reassure mainstream Australians that their identity was not threatened by immigration and multicultural policy.

The CAAIP Report was delivered just prior to the Australian Bicentenary celebrations, which Hawke had planned to utilize to the full to showcase Australian society's cultural openness to the Asian region. Ignoring the CAAIP Report recommendations, Hawke reiterated the claim that Australia was naturally and inevitably a "nation of immigrants," a message that he conveyed both domestically and internationally. Addressing the Federation of Ethnic Communities Councils of Australia in 1988, he stated:

We are, and essentially remain, a nation of immigrants . . . Above all else, our Bicentenary has been a celebration of our identity as a nation of diverse ethnic origins. (Hawke, 1988: 501)

The Australian government's virtual abandonment of any recognition that Australian society had developed a valuable and distinctive national culture, and that it was not simply a British outpost in Asia, had patchy support at best within the Australian community, as the survey data above indicate. The elevation of ethnicity as the definitive criterion by which to characterize the inherited national culture was simplistic at best. As Hirst (1994: 2) noted, "mainstream Australian society had been reduced to an ethnic group" and "its right to primacy denied."

Consistent with this perspective, the Australian government's approach to citizenship became increasingly "procedural," whereby immigrants could be included as citizens as long as they were law-abiding and tolerant. Citizenship, according to this view, did not require any strong sense of belonging to a distinct people, shared history, evolved culture, or sense of a common future (Betts and Birrell, 2007: 47).

Inner social tensions would inevitably build during the late 1980s and 1990s as a consequence of the mismatch between the escalating government rhetoric—that Australian society had undergone a decisive cultural and economic break from the past—and mainstream public opinion, which held to the ideal of a distinctive and positive national inheritance.

Breach in Bipartisan Support for Asian Immigration—1988

In August 1988, the federal Liberal–National Opposition, under the leadership of John Howard, announced a shift in its policy position on immigration which breached the tacit bipartisan agreement to depoliticize the immigration issue, and by association multiculturalism. Against significant opposition within his own party and the Coalition, but sensing the Labor government's vulnerability on the issue, Howard asserted the right of the Australian government to determine the composition of immigration intake in such a way as to ensure social cohesion.

This presented a challenge to the new orthodoxy that immigration selection on the basis of ethnicity or culture was inherently racist and a thing of the past. Howard's maneuver invoked a hostile response from the Labor government and

resulted in a frenzied defense of uncompromising national openness by Labor leaders and multicultural elites.

The Opposition's breach of bipartisanship on immigration and multiculturalism occurred at a time when net overseas migration to Australia had reached its highest level in the postwar period, at nearly 173,000 persons, or approximately 1.7 percent population growth over the previous year (1987) (ABS Catalogue 3101.0). It had been rising steadily since Labor had come to office in 1983. Yet, as noted, this was also a time of significant public unease about high immigration and its ethnic composition. The 1987 Australian Election Study Survey indicated that 23.2 percent of survey respondents thought Asian immigration should be limited to a small quota of the overall intake. A further 39.5 percent thought "[w]e should not have any more migrants at the present time" (McAllister and Mughan, 1987).

Economic Recession and Its Aftermath—1990

The early to mid-1990s was a turbulent period of reaction and counter reaction, for and against high immigration and multiculturalism. The period of high confidence for multicultural elites had waned. Howard's retreat from bipartisanship on immigration policy was soon followed by the onset of economic recession, which created a dilemma for the Labor government's commitment to sustained high immigration. A business-as-usual approach would have been political suicide.

Economic recession created an environment in which critics of the way immigration had been managed could speak more confidently. Moreover, unease about high immigration was set against a background of growing dissatisfaction with the federal government's economic rationalist policies, which were not yielding the benefits that had been foreshadowed.

Furthermore, the early 1990s saw a split within the political right in Australia. Robert Manne (1992), a conservative who was editor of the conservative political magazine *Quadrant*, pointed to the insensitivity of economic rationalists to the unforeseen and detrimental impact of rationalist policies:

[T]he rationalists are extraordinarily impervious to evidence . . . those who now adhere to this ideology could not surrender significant parts of it without real psychic cost. Their faith insulates them against clear-sighted appreciation of the failures of their reforms. (56)

Manne might justifiably have leveled similar criticism at the multicultural elite over the preceding period, who had bolstered Labor leaders' support for an aggressive multiculturalism in support of their regional free-market agenda.

By November 1992, national unemployment had reached a record postwar level of 11.3 percent. By January 1993, youth unemployment reached 32 percent. In December 1992, the Senate Standing Committee on Employment, Education, and Training warned of the emergence of an alienated underclass of unemployed youth, many of whom were second generation unemployed (*The Age*, 1992).

In September 1993, economist Bob Gregory highlighted the rapid decline in the male full-time job to population ratio, stating that this was probably the largest employment loss in Australia's history (*Sydney Morning Herald*, 1993). Nongovernment welfare agencies were being stressed to the limits of their resources, with the Salvation Army criticizing politicians for their single-minded pursuit of economic restructuring at the expense of social cohesion (*The Age*, 1993).

The less constrained intellectual climate surrounding the immigration issue ushered to the forefront of public debate criticism of the spurious demographic arguments that had been used to support it. Australian National University demographer Christabel Young (1991) entered the debate, feeling that it was imperative for demographers to correct faulty demographic arguments used by the pro-immigration lobby during the 1980s. Exaggerated claims as to the benefits of immigration for the national economy were also challenged at this time. Stephen Joske (1990), researcher for the Legislative Research Service, asserted that the Bureau of Immigration Research, which had been established by the Labor government in 1989, had propounded a one-sided optimism concerning the economic benefits of immigration to Australia.

Formerly muted voices within the Labor government itself became more obvious from this time. Federal government backbench member Graeme Campbell, who had been a consistent critic of Labor's immigration and multicultural policies, gained in prominence, although he was later expelled from the party for his views. Senator Peter Walsh, a formidable center-right presence within the government, also a critic of Labor's immigration and multicultural policies, utilized his regular column in the *Australian Financial Review* for this purpose from May 1990 onward.

Scandal surrounding the Business Migration Program in 1991—based on allegations of its manipulation by Asian criminal elements and revolving door money flows by applicants with phony business plans—did not help the government's reputation on immigration management. The Immigration Minister Gerry Hand was forced to suspend the program for six months in 1991 (*Australian Financial Review*, 1991).

Under these conditions, high immigration intakes became difficult to justify. Net overseas migration, which had already been declining since its zenith in 1998, declined further to only 34,900 in 1993.

Counter-Reaction

Although economic recession and social crisis had forced the Labor government to cut the immigration intake, this did not mean that immigration ceased to be an important part of its agenda to transform and internationalize Australian society. No sooner had Labor reduced immigration than the stage was set for a reformulation of its arguments for immigration and multiculturalism. The fact that the Labor government unexpectedly won the 1993 federal election meant that Labor leaders and the multicultural lobby gained extra time under the leadership of Paul Keating.

The ministerial shakeout that followed the 1993 election saw Labor Left Senator Nick Bolkus receive the immigration and ethnic affairs portfolio. This was a turning point in the efforts of immigration and multicultural advocates to recover lost ground. Although Bolkus was constrained in some degree by more moderate elements within the Labor Party, he nevertheless pushed multicultural ideology to new extremes in asserting a decisive cultural and economic break from the nation's past. Bolkus (1993) considered the inherited mainstream culture immature and Anglophile.

Even as federal Labor was living on borrowed political time, Bolkus and federal Labor member of parliament (MP), Andrew Theophanous, who was also closely associated with Labor's ethnic group lobbying and the Office of Multicultural Affairs, were key figures behind the release in January 1996 (only months from Labor's 1996 election defeat) of *Our Nation*, the Labor government's updated multicultural vision for Australia (Birrell, 1996). This policy document demanded an even more "aggressive propagandisation of ethnic diversity" and "ethnic proportionalism" in the allocation of government positions on the basis of ethnicity" (19).

Bolkus's period as Immigration and Ethnic Affairs Minister is notable for the way left-liberal and economic rationalist perspectives converged. Under Bolkus, multiculturalism was presented as an indispensable element of the internationalist, free-market agenda even more explicitly than had previously been the case. Labor's "Productive Diversity" policy was the principal ideological formulation of this period and was formally launched at the Productive Diversity in Business Conference in 1992.

During the low point of the economic recession, Australia's large non-English-speaking background population and workforce had come to be viewed by some as a liability. Significant concentrations of heavily welfare dependent ethnic minority populations had consolidated in Australian capital cities, particularly in Melbourne and Sydney.

However, the "productive diversity" rhetoric turned this perception on its head. An elaboration of the idea from the mid-1980s that "people-to-people" links with Asia through immigration would help link Australia with Asian economic dynamism, "productive diversity" asserted that immigration and multicultural policies provided a competitive advantage, enabling business links with Asia-Pacific markets. In launching the Productive Diversity Conference, Paul Keating stated:

Productive diversity [is a] turning point in the way we regard multicultural Australia . . . we have a market in Australia whose diversity is a virtual microcosm of the world into which we trade. (1992: 1, 2)

Nevertheless, it is also clear that, at this time, Prime Minister Keating was mindful of the skepticism within the Australian population concerning immigration and multiculturalism. In 1994, he expressed a more conciliatory approach, for example, when addressing the Australia-Asia Institute:

We do not and cannot aim to be Asian or European or anything else but Australians. But we can and should aim to be a country which is deeply integrated into the region around us. (1994: 12)

Now, Keating implied, multiculturalism and immigration policies did not entail a break with the nation's past. Moreover, it had grown organically from Australians' commitment to democracy and egalitarianism. Keating (1993) thereby characterized the radical change of the previous decade as a consensual adaptation on the part of the majority of Australians.

Some expert commentary, however, pointed to a more sober reality. Hugh Mackay, in the 1993 publication *Reinventing Australia*, observed that Australians were in a state of anxiety about what it meant to be Australian:

about changes in the racial composition of the Australian population, about appropriate levels of migration, about the long-term consequences of multiculturalism and about Australia's relationship with the rest of the world—especially Asia. (154)

Survey research conducted in the wake of the 1996 federal election lent support to this contention. The results showed that a large share of Australians still held to a strong sense of Australian identity and were concerned about the effects of immigration upon employment prospects. These views were also often held by significant proportions of migrants. The 1996 *Australian Election Survey* indicated that a large share of Australians supported national independence in world affairs, with 43 percent agreeing that Australia should "follow its own interests even if this leads to conflict with other nations" (Jones et al., 1996). Despite more than a decade of concerted derision of the Australian identity and history by the multicultural lobby, under the rubric of federal government policy, 81 percent of respondents indicated that they were either "very proud" or "fairly proud" of Australian history (Jones et al., 1996). Sixty-three percent thought that the number of immigrants being allowed into Australia had either "gone too far" or "gone much too far" (Jones et al., 1996).

Concerns about the negative impact of immigration on unemployment were shared by many migrants. Markus (1993) notes that concerns had been expressed over the previous period that high unemployment may trigger racist attitudes within the Australian community, especially toward Asians. The economic circumstances of the early 1990s provided the conditions to test such claims. A survey conducted in the middle Melbourne suburb of Springvale in December 1992 set out to examine "attitudes toward immigration and other aspects of government policy" (35). The survey included questions on government cultural policy and feelings about being Australian. Springvale was chosen because of its high migrant and very diverse ethnic population, including a significant Indo-Chinese presence. Most respondents thought immigration was too high and did not support multicultural policies which "involved state support for the maintenance of ethnic cultures" (36). Fifty-five percent of respondents thought that migrants should fit into the Australian community "as soon as possible," while another 21 percent thought that people should be left to fit in at "their own pace" (36). Only 12 percent supported government funding for cultural maintenance. Nevertheless, 65 percent of all respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that Asian migrants had "a great deal to offer the Australian way of life" (37). The

share of the Australian-born answering in this way was also 65 percent. Markus concluded that:

Most respondents appeared capable of holding views opposed to immigration and active multiculturalism while, at the same time . . . showing a tolerant disposition towards recently arrived Australians—including Asians. (36)

Howard Coalition Government—1996–2007

By 1996, the electoral tide had well and truly turned, with the Liberal–National Party Coalition, under the leadership of John Howard, coming to office with an overwhelming majority in the House of Representatives, but a finely balanced upper house.

As Opposition leader, Howard had stepped away from the tacit bipartisan agreement on immigration policy in 1998, which contributed to a freer intellectual environment for critics of the government’s management of immigration. Howard had also adopted a more skeptical posture toward multiculturalism, which he continued to articulate on coming to office.

Implying that the previous Labor government had gone too far in favor of cultural diversity at the expense of national unity, Howard urged a greater sense of balance in the debate about national identity. Immigrants came to Australia, he maintained, because they wanted to become Australians. Implicitly contesting the largely negative characterization of the inherited national identity under Labor and by multicultural advocates, Howard (2006) maintained that Australia had become a magnet for migrants around the world, “not because of what it might become, but because of what it has become” (1). In his view, Australia’s history and heritage was something that Australians should be proud of, that migrants should learn about and, in turn, would contribute to in a spirit of loyalty and patriotism. Howard tried to square the circle, describing cultural diversity as a national strength, but also as something that should be accompanied by an overriding commitment to Australia.

Like Fraser more than a decade before, Howard’s endorsement of cultural diversity was tempered by the implication that the preservation of social cohesion in the face of such diversity could not be taken for granted. Beneath his stated optimism is an undertone of doubt: “In the 21st century, maintaining our social cohesion will remain the highest test of the Australian achievement” (4). Australia’s celebration of diversity should not be at the expense of the “common values that bind us together as one people” or “at the expense of ongoing pride in what are commonly regarded as the values, traditions and accomplishments of the old Australia” (4). Presciently, he warned that without common values, Australia risked becoming a “society governed by coercion rather than consent” (4). Pointing to the multicultural excesses of the Labor years, he declared:

We’ve moved on from a time when multiculturalism . . . came to be associated with “the transformation of Australia from a bad old Australia that was xenophobic, racist

and monocultural to a good new Australia that is culturally diverse, tolerant and exciting". Such a view was always a distortion and a caricature. (4)

Howard was clearly concerned about rescuing the cultural reputation of the "old Australia" from the ashes of the cultural nihilism that had been unleashed during Labor's period in office. However, he was also careful not to alienate migrant constituencies, including the more recently arrived. Reflecting Malcolm Fraser's comments more than a decade before, he reiterated that there was "no hierarchy of descent" in terms of being truly Australian (5).

However, a much less compromising voice against the policy extremes of the Labor years was emerging on the margins of Australia's political landscape.

Pauline Hanson and the One Nation Party

The election of political outsider Pauline Hanson to the Australian Parliament in 1996 provided the catalyst for an explosive demonstration of accumulated public grievance against the concerted and at times aggressive efforts of government leaders and cultural elites to internationalize the Australian economy and redefine the Australian national identity over the previous period. Equally intense was the reaction against her. Not since the Blainey "debate" of the mid-1980s had public discourse on the issues of immigration and national identity been characterized by such naked vitriol.

Elected to the Australian House of Representatives as an independent, Hanson was already controversial as a result of her disendorsement as a Liberal Party candidate immediately prior to the election, because of her criticisms of Australian Aboriginal funding. She secured a voter swing of 19 percent to take the seat of Oxley in the state of Queensland. Hanson was immediately polarizing because of her views on national identity, immigration, Asian immigration, and loss of economic sovereignty. Like Blainey, she took aim at the cultural elites who had spearheaded the criticism of Australian mainstream culture and who had, she claimed, personally benefited in the process.

Her maiden speech in parliament created a sense of moral panic among multicultural advocates and broader sections of the left intelligentsia. She criticized not only the fundamental tenets of multiculturalism, but also the international free-market agenda over which there was still strong bipartisan agreement. Initially at least, Hanson's appeal was increased by her awkwardness in speech and her untutored media presence. Referring to herself as an "ordinary Australian" whose views were based on "common sense," Hanson's (1996) pedestrian demeanor became a credential in giving political focus to grievances that were widespread, but up to that point had remained diffuse. Her appeal in this respect may have in part reflected the low standing of politicians in the eyes of the Australian population at this time. In 1996, national survey data showed that 30 percent of respondents considered that people in government "usually looked after themselves," rather than doing the right thing (Jones et al., 1996).

She pointed to “a type of reverse racism” practiced against mainstream Australians by “those who control the various taxpayer funded ‘industries’ that flourish in our society servicing Aboriginals, multiculturalists and a host of other minority groups,” who stood “to lose the most—their power, money and position, all funded by ordinary Australian taxpayers” (Hanson, 1996: 1). Rejecting reliance upon racial criteria in public policy, she advocated a vision “of a single society in which racial emphases were rejected and social issues addressed” (2).

Hanson argued that for “far too long ordinary Australians have been kept out of any debate by the major parties” on the issues of immigration and multiculturalism (3). Therefore:

I and most Australians want our immigration policy radically reviewed and that of multiculturalism abolished. I believe we are in danger of being swamped by Asians. (3)

She added: “A truly multicultural country can never be strong or united” (4).

Hanson also opposed the reduction of tariffs on imported goods, which had contributed to large-scale job losses for Australian workers: “We must look after our own before lining the pockets of overseas countries and investors” (5). Referring to the acutely high levels of unemployment in Australia, particularly among youth, Hanson called for a temporary cessation of immigration, highlighting the contradiction of admitting many migrants who were unskilled, with poor English proficiency, in such circumstances. Nevertheless, she added:

I must stress at this stage that I do not consider those people from ethnic backgrounds currently living in Australia anything but first-class citizens, provided of course that they give this country their full, undivided loyalty. (4)

Hanson was variously labeled as extreme right, racist, parochial, and a populist for her allegedly irrational appeal to the imagined virtues of “the people” (Stokes, 2000). There was a virtual closing of ranks between left-liberal cosmopolitans and the free-market right in condemnation of Hanson. In the eyes of many converts to either the new world order of multilateral free trade, or to the spell of global cosmopolitan inclusiveness, Hanson was a throwback to the xenophobic protectionism of the Australian Settlement era. Some analysts, however, saw through the haze of Hanson’s comments about race to appreciate the profound alienation which had resulted among some sections of the population from the breakneck pursuit of economic rationalism. The National Affairs commentator of the *Courier Mail* (1998) saw Hanson as a product of, and a response to, the globalization of capital and the use of the market as a replacement for state intervention. Ipswich, where Hanson had been elected, was a downtrodden rust belt area, a “classic battlefield in the economic rationalism war” (*The Courier Mail*, 1998).

Following Hanson’s personal electoral success in 1996, she formed the Pauline Hanson One Nation Party (ONP) in 1997. The first test of the ONP was the 1998 Queensland state election, where it attracted nearly a quarter of the total votes and won 11 of the 89 seats in the Queensland Legislative Assembly.

The subsequent 1998 federal election, however, produced a lesser result. Nationally, the ONP received 936,621 first preference votes for the House of Representatives, or 8.4 percent of the total votes. This was greater than for the Nationals Party, the Australian Democrats, and the Greens, which received 5.3 percent, 5.1 percent, and 2.1 percent, respectively. However, because its voter support was widely distributed across electorates, the ONP secured no seats in the House of Representatives. For the Senate, the ONP received over 1 million first preference votes, or 9 percent of the total first preference vote, which gave it one Senate representative (Australian Electoral Commission, 1998).

Analyses of post-election survey data provided some insight into the socioeconomic composition of the ONP support base. It remained strongest in Queensland, the state where the party had been founded. This is not unusual for minority political parties in the Australian context (Bean, 2000). Those least likely to vote for Hanson's party were people with a university education, who worked in managerial or professional occupations, who had high incomes, and immigrants from non-English-speaking countries, especially Asians. Geographically, ONP voter support was found to be strongest in rural areas and weakest in inner-city areas, with outer metropolitan areas representing an intermediate position.

Although the ONP has remained part of the Australian politic, it subsequently underwent a process of decline, partly as a result of internal conflicts. Nevertheless, the brief One Nation flourish may be significant for understanding the longer-term implications of the economic and cultural renunciation of the Australian Settlement institutions for social cohesion. ONP reflected, and was able to draw upon, deep historical grievances that had remained unresolved within some sections of the Australian population, since the 1970s at least.

Social survey data still strongly suggest that, after more than 30 years as policy, multiculturalism has only become widely accepted in a "soft" sense. In this context, questions which ask respondents if multiculturalism has been good for Australia do not mean a great deal. This is because even those who are weak supporters of multiculturalism may answer "yes." State-resourcing for minority cultural maintenance is not accepted by a significant proportion of Australians (Markus, 2014). There is still a strong normative national sentiment among the Australian people. Anything significantly beyond "soft" multiculturalism remains the preserve of intellectual elites and sections of the broader intelligentsia, who have now been inculcated into a cosmopolitan world view.

Antidiscrimination Legislation and the Inculcation of Multicultural Principles

The central argument presented here is that, despite various claims to the contrary, multiculturalism did not reflect a "natural transition" in public outlook at the time of the policy's adoption, and is now only accepted in any strong sense among particular sections of the Australian population. As documented above, the rejection of the inherited national identity by multicultural elites, premised upon a repudiation of the national past, has subsequently led to episodic political dislocation and

expressions of disillusionment among significant sections of the population. Indeed, there now appear to be significant divisions within Australian society along class lines on the issues relating to national identity and sovereignty. This raises important questions about the future consequences of multicultural policy for maintaining social cohesion in an increasingly unstable global context.

Such concern is further justified because the Australian legislative framework, developed during the 1980s and 1990s, aimed at the promotion of multicultural principles, has been based on a fundamentalist perspective, quite remote from commonplace, “song and dance” perceptions of multiculturalism which predominate among the general public.

An examination of how this legislative framework has been deployed suggests that the maintenance of multicultural policy in Australia may ultimately rely upon the threat or exercise of coercive state powers. This is reflected in the legal and institutional framework pertaining to antidiscrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, and national origin that has been established over the past few decades.

The Racial Discrimination Act

In October 1975, the Whitlam government enacted the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, the primary focus of which was to make it unlawful to unfairly discriminate against a person on the basis of ethnicity or national origin with regard to access to employment, remuneration and working conditions, treatment before the law, access to housing, access to goods and services, and trade union membership. The benchmark international instrument for the Act was the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Significantly, however, the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 did not make racial defamation and propaganda unlawful (Human Rights Commission, 1983: 1, 2). The Act appears to have been a preliminary step toward the adoption of a Human Rights Bill, and ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Whitlam Institute). However, the Whitlam government lost office before this latter initiative could be enacted.

The Human Rights Commission

The Fraser government (1975–1983) built on this initiative by establishing the Human Rights Commission (HRC) in 1981 as a statutory authority under the Human Rights Commission Act. The Commission was established with a “sunset” clause and was thereby due to cease in 1986. Its principal role was to scrutinize existing and proposed legislation for consistency with human rights and to “inquire into any act or practice that may be inconsistent with or contrary to any human right” (HRC, 1983: vii). Its role also included recommending legislative change relevant to human rights to the minister, to make recommendations to the minister to ensure compliance with international covenants and other international treaties to which Australia is a signatory, and to promote understanding and acceptance of human rights.

From the outset, the HRC faced a dilemma concerning the obvious trade-off between freedom of speech and the sanctioning of racial defamation, which it had

defined broadly to include defamation on the basis of descent and of national and ethnic origin. Although the Commission recognized the right to free speech as the "hallmark of a true democracy," it nevertheless recommended that free speech should be curtailed if it came into conflict with another human right (1).

In 1983, the HRC released a report which recommended a number of amendments to the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, dealing with incitement to racial hatred and racial defamation. The recommended changes were designed to correct perceived shortcomings of the Act, as inherited from the Whitlam years. The Commission recommended that two new provisions should be added and a new definition incorporated. The first provision addressed the issue of "racial hatred" and would "make it unlawful for a person publicly to utter or publish words or engage in conduct which . . . is likely to result in hatred, contempt or violence against a person or persons, or a group of persons, distinguished by race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin" (14). The second recommendation dealt with "racial defamation" and would make it "unlawful publicly to threaten, insult or abuse an individual or group, or hold that individual or group up to contempt or slander, by reason of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin" (14). A broad definition of "publication" was advocated, to "cover the print and electronic media, sign boards, abusive telephone calls etc." (14). Under this definition, both the individual making a statement and the publisher could be held accountable.

It is notable that, at this stage, the Commission advocated that infringements of the proposed amendments, should they be legislated, would fall under civil rather than criminal law. On British experience, it was considered that conviction would be more difficult under criminal law, as *intent* would need to be proven according to a higher standard. Under the proposals put by the Commission, unlawfulness would not rely on intent on the part of a perpetrator, but on level of harm incurred (HRC, 1983).

The HRC argued that the first recommendation was aimed at protecting racial and ethnic groups from statements or propaganda of a serious kind, for example from extremist organizations. The second focused on the defamation of individuals by virtue of their membership of a particular group, which may in turn constitute defamation of the group as well. Such defamation may involve statements which would "detract from the humanity of people" and which may involve "unfavourable stereotypes" (15). The Commission noted that its recommendations did not explicitly cover religious groups or individuals, as this was not covered by the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination upon which the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 was founded. However, religious defamation may be indirectly covered via association with ethnic identity.

A number of observations can be made about the content of the proposed changes, which are relevant to understanding how such legislation has been used to enforce multiculturalism. A primary motivation from the Commission's perspective was to ensure a decisive break from the nation's cultural past, which it deemed to have been racist and exclusionary. The HRC concluded:

Many would argue that the time has now come to make a break with the past and for Australia to take a clear stand and declare through legislation that incitement to racial hatred and racial defamation are not acceptable behaviour. (1)

The HRC's sense of urgency about the prospect of racial and ethnic discrimination or hostility is notable, as there appears to have been little hard evidence that such discrimination was a significant problem at the time. The Commission virtually admitted this when it stated: "In Australia racial violence is now an exceptional occurrence" (1). Nevertheless, the Commission considered that "inaction" may encourage "members of the Majority" to attack "members of minority groups" (1). Conversely, it was argued that, if racial and ethnic minority groups became frustrated in feeling that their rights were not being protected, they may resort to racial violence themselves.

The HRC proved unsuccessful in persuading the then federal government to legislate its recommended amendments. However, its successor organization, the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC), created in 1986, did achieve this goal in 1995, during the Keating Labor government's dying months in office (detailed below). As a result, since the early 1980s, there was in existence a generously resourced, government-created organization with powers mandated in legislation, whose brief was to ensure that Australian government actions and legislation remained consistent with an essentially cosmopolitan ideology enshrined in an international convention. This convention was premised on the supremacy of international human rights over national sovereignty and citizenship rights. The AHRC leadership considered that it had a mandate to promote its agenda regardless of, and even in opposition to, the policies of the Australian government of the day (Berg, 2013).

The 1995 Racial Hatred Reforms

The Racial Hatred Act was introduced late in 1995 as an amendment to the Racial Discrimination Act. As indicated, the 1995 amendments closely reflected recommendations for alteration of the Act in 1983. The thrust of the Racial Hatred Act 1995, in Section 18C, was to make it unlawful public behavior to "offend," "insult," "humiliate," or "intimidate" another person or a group of people on the basis of race, color, or of national or ethnic origin. To establish a breach of the Act, it would be necessary to establish that the abuse or defamation was made *because* of the race, color, or national or ethnic origin of the plaintiff (Australian Government, 1995).

A number of exemptions were provided for under Section 18D of the Act. These related to artistic performances and exhibitions, or in the course of any "statement, publication, discussion or debate made or held for any genuine academic, artistic or scientific purpose or any other genuine purpose in the public interest" (3). Exclusions were also included in relation to fair and accurate reporting of any event or matter of public interest, as well as "fair comment on any event or matter of public interest if the comment is an expression of a genuine belief held by the person making the comment" (3).

In addition to the above amendments to the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, the Labor government proposed the addition of three criminal offenses to the Crimes Act 1914. The first two dealt with offenses in public against people or property on the basis of race, color, or national or ethnic origin. The third prohibits acts done in public with the intention of inciting racial hatred (Hansard, 1994:

3337). In contrast to the civil regime which would apply under the proposed amendments to the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, a breach of the proposed additions to the Crimes Act 1914 would potentially attract a prison term.

Within the Australian Parliament, there was extensive debate about the Racial Hatred Bill. The federal Liberal–National Coalition opposed the Bill. One complaint was that, there was no need for it, as there were already sufficient laws, including criminal penalties, to cover the more extreme cases of threatening behavior and intimidation. Further, existing defamation law could be resorted to under the Civil Code. Along these lines, the Liberal MP Philip Ruddock argued: "At no stage has the government demonstrated a need for a racial vilification bill as wide as the one put before the House today" (3345), and that the Racial Hatred Bill was "divisive and unnecessarily restrictive" (3342).

Concerning the low threshold proposed, Ruddock added:

The Commonwealth standard of "insult and offend" is both broad and vague in our view in that an extraordinary range of statements are likely to be included under this definition. (3347)

Nor had the government, in Ruddock's view, demonstrated that legislation per se has a proven capacity to address the fundamental causes of racism (Hansard, 3344). Yet another shortcoming of the Bill, it was argued, was that it did not provide a clear test of intention of incitement to racial hatred:

What the government has introduced is not a test of intention but a test of some other person's view of what is reasonably likely, in all the circumstances, to incite [racial hatred]. (3343)

Given these concerns, what may the Labor government's motives have been for the proposed legislative changes? The parliamentary address of the Labor Attorney General, Michael Lavarch, provides some insight.

Beyond talking about a desire to address *actual* transgressions, Lavarch alludes to the defense of principles. This suggests that a motive for Labor in advocating amendments to the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 was to establish multiculturalism as an unassailable expression of universal human rights within Australian law, rather than as simply a government policy which may potentially be superseded or replaced at some future date. The significance of doctrinal considerations pertaining to universal rights in putting forward the Bill is further suggested in a report of the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislative Committee (SLCLC) in March 1995, which stated that the Bill:

was introduced as a response to *a number of reports* which had addressed the issue of racial vilification, *and in furtherance of international treaty obligations* concerning incitement to racial hostility or violence. (1) (My emphasis)

The sense of urgency with which the Labor government pressed ahead with amendments to the Racial Discrimination Act in 1995, does not appear to have reflected a pressing need to counter *actual* racial abuse, defamation, or violence,

but a compulsion to establish multicultural ideology as an immutable legislative reality. This goal was pursued through the incorporation of the doctrine of universal human rights, as it related to race and ethnicity, into Australian law, as defined in the international treaties to which Australia was a signatory. If this ideological task was the principal purpose of the Racial Hatred Bill, then restricting infringements to the most extreme cases of racial vilification would have fallen short of sending the broadest possible message to the Australian population that the threat to multicultural tolerance is ever present and pervasive.

The sense of urgency which characterized the federal Labor government's racial vilification initiatives in 1995 almost certainly reflected the sense of crisis that existed in the wake of economic recession in the early 1990s and the associated questioning of the management of immigration and multiculturalism at that time. As noted above, the period when the Racial Hatred amendments were being promoted by Labor was one characterized by a counter-reaction by multicultural elites in an attempt to recover the credibility and momentum that had been lost in the preceding period. Many of the figures recruited for the drafting of the 1991 National Inquiry into Racist Violence in Australia were prominent members of the multicultural elite. By 1995, the federal Labor government knew that its days in office were numbered, as did the multicultural elite who had grown dependent upon Labor's patronage.

As a result of widespread resistance to the criminalization of racial "insult" and "offense," the inclusion of criminal provisions in the Crimes Act 1914 was dropped from the Bill. However, the civil amendments to the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 were passed into law.

The first high-profile test of the new racial discrimination provisions came in 2009, when journalist Andrew Bolt, writing for the Melbourne daily newspaper the *Herald Sun*, criticized fair-skinned individuals of part aboriginal descent who, he argued, had chosen to identify as indigenous for purposes of personal advancement, including access to funding specifically available for aboriginal people. The case was brought against Bolt by the principal litigant, Ms. Eatock, and on behalf of others like herself who had "a fairer, rather than darker skin, and who by a combination of descent, self-identification and communal recognition are, and are recognised as, Aboriginal persons" (Federal Court of Australia, 2011: 2).

In part pointing to the inflammatory tone of Bolt's opinion piece, Justice Bromberg found that Bolt had breached Section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975:

I am satisfied that fair-skinned Aboriginal people (or some of them) were reasonably likely, in all the circumstances, to have been offended, insulted, humiliated or intimidated by the imputations conveyed by the newspaper articles.(2)

Several aspects of Justice Bromberg's determination are relevant here. First, the Justice concluded that such fair-skinned aboriginal people of mixed racial descent have *no choice* about identifying as aboriginal, as they had been raised to believe this and were recognized by others as indigenous.

None of them "chose" to be Aboriginal. Nor have they used their Aboriginal identity inappropriately to advance their careers. Each is entitled to regard themselves and be regarded by others as an Aboriginal person. (3)

This is an extraordinary position, suggesting that people are locked into racial and ethnic identities by virtue of upbringing and enculturation, whereby identity becomes something from which individuals cannot escape by rational thought and free choice.

Second, the test of whether an act is "reasonably likely to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate a group of people" was determined by Justice Bromberg to be an "assessment . . . by reference to an ordinary and reasonable member of the group of people concerned and the values and circumstances of those people" (4). This judgment amounts to an endorsement of cultural relativism as a basic tenet within the framework of Australian law.

Third, in making the determination, Justice Bromberg interpreted the purpose of the Act, which is to defend ethnic and racial pluralism as the basis of identity in Australian society and that challenging multicultural doctrine carries legal risks.

In reaching those conclusions, I have observed that in seeking to promote tolerance and protect against intolerance in a multicultural society, the Racial Discrimination Act must be taken to include in its objectives tolerance for and acceptance of racial and ethnic diversity. At the core of multiculturalism is the idea that people may identify with and express their racial or ethnic heritage free from pressure not to do so. (6)

Although Justice Bromberg indicated that his judgment in the Bolt case did not suggest that it is: "unlawful for a publication to deal with racial identification, including by challenging the genuineness of the identification of a group of people," there is little doubt that the judgment has created a high level of uncertainty about the reach of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 relating to issues that may be sensitive to minority groups, but which are nevertheless critical to a broad-based discussion about what it means to be Australian in a globalizing context (7). A fully developed discourse about the merits of multiculturalism as a policy and as an ideology has become more difficult. It is likely that an attempt at any such debate would now be scrutinized in terms of the Act, and possible prejudged as racist and discriminatory.

Soon after the Bolt judgment, in November 2012, the federal Labor government attempted to push antidiscrimination legislation to greater extremes with the release of an exposure draft of the Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Bill, which aimed to consolidate various antidiscrimination Acts, introduce additional areas of discrimination relating to the expression of political views in the workplace, and to reverse the onus of proof (Section 124 (1)) for anyone accused of discrimination on the basis of a "protected attribute," including race (broadly defined) and religion (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2012). It is notable that this Bill was much more explicitly couched in terms of

human rights and in relation to the international conventions and instruments to which Australia had become a signatory. Seven human rights conventions and four International Labor Organization instruments were cited in the draft bill, with a stated objective of the proposed legislation being to meet these obligations.

In the face of strong opposition to the draft bill, by early 2013, the Labor Attorney General announced that the federal government had directed the draft back to the department for major changes, as it had not, in his view, struck an acceptable balance between free speech and providing a disincentive to discrimination (*Sydney Morning Herald*, 2013a). The Bill had proven highly divisive, receiving strong support from some quarters, including the Greens Party and from elements within the legal fraternity, and derision from others.

The Liberal–National Opposition opposed the Bill. Some were concerned about the way antidiscrimination laws may be used for vexatious litigation and that complaints would be heard by the AHRC, an institution “desperate to increase its relevance” (*Sydney Morning Herald*, 2013b).

Almost from its inception through to the Labor Party’s electoral defeat in 2013, the development of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 had reflected a multicultural perspective that a significant proportion of the Australian population did not share. As shown above, most Australians understood multiculturalism as implying that overseas-born Australians could maintain elements of their cultures of origin, but that this should largely be a private matter and should not attract strong government support and resources. By contrast, the model of multiculturalism favored by many among the political elites and sections of the left intelligentsia has been much more focused on the idealization and preservation of cultural difference and pitting such difference against the mainstream national identity, which is deemed to be historically moribund.

The extremes to which the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 had gone had not become obvious to many until the Andrew Bolt litigation. These were further highlighted with the terrorist attack upon Charlie Hebdo staff in Paris in January 2015. After the attack, the libertarian Human Rights Commissioner, Tim Wilson, argued that many of the Charlie Hebdo cartoons would be banned under existing Australian racial discrimination legislation. He proposed that the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 be changed, particularly in relation to Section 18C of the Act, which made it an offense to “offend,” “insult,” or “humiliate” on the basis of race (broadly defined). The Liberal–Nationals Coalition government, which had previously committed to removing Section 18C, had capitulated, citing concerns from the Australian Muslim community. Wilson argued that the Act as it stood amounted to censorship. Under Australian law, Charlie Hebdo would likely have faced ongoing litigation. Such circumstances, Wilson argued, had led to self-censorship within Australia (Australian Broadcasting Commission, 2015). He stated:

People are either being hypocrites when they say Je Suis Charlie and saying they defend these people’s right to free speech, or they . . . recognise that laws that make it unlawful to insult or offend people are censorious.

Conclusion

It is often considered that shared core values and a sense of common purpose are prerequisites for a society to function cohesively. However, it is not clear whether multicultural policy can provide these prerequisites at the national level. The doctrine became orthodoxy in Australia during a period of ascendant neoliberal economics and the pursuit of multilateral free trade—a time of economic and cultural dislocation. In this context, under the rubric of multiculturalism, the meaning of Australian citizenship became increasingly “procedural” insofar as “belonging” to the Australian nation did not require any strong sense of belonging to a distinct people, a shared history, or even a strong sense of a common future. As “a nation of migrants,” being Australian no longer involved any collective sentiment which linked the past to the future through collective memory. The idea of an Australian mainstream culture was rendered ever more tenuous.

The essentially cosmopolitan values that have informed the world view of multicultural elites in Australia have meant that multiculturalism has not so much provided an alternative basis for national identity, but an anti-identity whereby individuals may slip seamlessly from the global to the local or the individual. Multiculturalism has been largely defined by what it was against—the received mainstream culture from the protectionist nation-building period. In many ways, this has been a socially damaging exercise. For Australian society, there was no syncretic moment where the old was alloyed with the new through a gesture of collective reconciliation; the new supplanted the past on the basis of rejection. Can a perspective as diffuse and as negatively defined as Australian multiculturalism provide an adequate basis for a cohesive and robustly democratic national response to the challenges of globalization?

It might be expected that, with the passing of time, social anxiety around issues of national identity will attenuate as immigration supplants the remnant “old Australian” population that can remember an earlier time and an earlier cultural milieu. For example, in September 2014, *The Australian* newspaper referred to recent immigration having resulted in a “kind of benign cultural genocide” whereby “The old race of Austral-Britons’ is gone forever” (). In reality, the resolution of the social divisions discussed above may not be so easy. Although sentimental attachments to the idea of the “old Australia” will certainly fade, emergent aspirations for a coherent national response to global challenges may highlight the inadequacies of multiculturalism as a unifying national ethic.

Note

1. As an indication of its influence, at this time the Office of Multicultural Affairs was located within the Office of the Prime Minister.

References

- Australian Broadcasting Commission (2015) Tim Wilson Joins Call for Changes to Discrimination Laws, says Charlie Hebdo Cartoons Would Be Banned in Australia, News Report, January 13, 2015.

- Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Catalogue 3101.0, Australian Demographic Statistics, Table 1. Population Change, Summary—Australia.
- Australian Electoral Commission, (1988) Results 1998 Federal Election, http://www.aec.gov.au/Elections/Federal_elections/1998/Index.htm
- Australian Financial Review (AFR)* (1991) Government Ends Business Migration Program, Sacks Agents, July 26, 1991.
- Australian Government (1995) “Comlaw,” www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2004A04951
- Bean, C. (2000) “Nationwide Electoral Support for One Nation in the 1998 Federal Election,” in Leach, M., Stokes, G., and Ward, I. (Eds), *The Rise and Fall of One Nation*, Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, pp. 136–152.
- Berg, C. (2013) *The Biggest Vested Interest of All: How Government Lobbies to Restrict Individual Rights and Freedom*, Melbourne, Institute of Public Affairs.
- Betts, K. and Birrell, B. (2007) “Making Australian Citizenship Mean More,” *People and Place*, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 45–61.
- Birrell, B. (1982) “Socio-Cultural Aspects of Population Growth,” United Nations Country Monograph Series 29, New York.
- Birrell, B. (1995) “The 1995–96 Migration Program,” *People and Place*, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 30–38.
- Birrell, B. (1996) “Our Nation: The Vision and Practice of Multiculturalism Under Labor,” *People and Place*, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 19–27.
- Bolkus, N. (1993) “Immigration and Multiculturalism—Directions for Australia,” *Current Issues*, May, Canberra: Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs.
- CAIIP (Committee to Advise on Australia’s Immigration Policies) (1988) *Immigration, A Commitment to Australia*, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.
- Camilleri, J. (1990) “The Emerging Pacific Economy: Australia’s Role,” in Mouer, E. and Sugimoto, Y. (Eds), *The Multifunction Polis Debate*, Melbourne: La Trobe University Press, pp. 15–23.
- Castles, S., Kalantzis, M., Cope, B., and Morrissey, M. (1988) *Mistaken Identity*, Sydney: Pluto Press.
- Clark, M. (2006) *A Short History of Australia*, London: Penguin Books, first published 1963 (reprint 2006).
- Dyster, B. and Meredith, D. (1990) *Australia in the International Economy in the Twentieth Century*, Sydney: Cambridge University Press.
- Federal Court of Australia (2011) *Eatock v Bolt* FCA 1103, Bromberg, J., September 28, 2011, Melbourne.
- Fraser, M. (1978) Statement by the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Malcolm Fraser April, from: Commonwealth of Australia Background to the Review of Post Arrival Programs and Services for Migrants Canberra, Commonwealth Government Printer; <http://www.unimelb.edu.au/malcolmfraser/speeches/nonparliamentary/multiculturalism.html>
- Fraser, M. (1981) The Inaugural Address on Multiculturalism Given by the Prime Minister, the Rt Hon. Malcolm Fraser, to the Institute of Multicultural Affairs, Melbourne, November 30.
- Hansard (1994) House of Representatives, No. 198, Tuesday, November 15, 1994.
- Hanson, P. (1996) Maiden Speech in the House of Representatives, September 10, <http://australianpolitics.com/1996/09/10/pauline-hanson-maiden-speech.html#more-7395>
- Hawke, R. (1988) “A Nation of Immigrants,” *The Australian Foreign Affairs Record*, Vol. 59, No. 11, p. 501. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.
- Hirst, J. (1994) “National Pride and Multiculturalism,” *People and Place*, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 1–6.

- Howard, J. (2006) *Address to the National Press Club by the Prime Minister, John Howard, in the Great Hall, Parliament House, Canberra, January 25*.
- Human Rights Commission (HRC) (1983) *Report No. 7, Proposals for Amendments to the Racial Discrimination Act to Cover Incitement to Racial Hatred and Racial Defamation, November*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1984.
- Hyde, J. (1978) *Australia: The Asia Connection*, Melbourne: Kibble Books.
- Jakubowicz, A. (1994) "Ethnic Leadership, Ethno-Nationalist Politics and the Making of Multicultural Australia," *People and Place*, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 20–28.
- Jones, R., McAllister, I., and Gow, D. (1996) *Australian Election Study, 1996* [computer file], Canberra: Australian Data Archives, The Australian National University.
- Joske, S. (1990) *The Economics of Immigration: A Postscript*, Background Paper from the Legislative Research Service, January 18, Canberra: Parliament of Australia.
- Jupp, J., York, B., and McRobbie, A. (1989) *The Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in Australia*, Canberra: Australian Government Publications Service (AGPS).
- Keating, P. (1992) Speech by the Prime Minister, the Hon. P. J. Keating MP, Productive Diversity in Business Conference, Melbourne, October 28.
- Keating, P. (1993) Speech at launch of "The Burma-Thai Railway," Canberra, April 23.
- Keating, P. (1994) Inaugural Asia Lecture, Australia-Asia Institute, Brisbane, November 9.
- Kewley, T. H. (1980) *Australian Social Security Today—Major Developments from 1900 to 1978*, Sydney: Sydney University Press.
- Lewins, F. (1987) "'The Blainey Debate' in Hindsight," *Australia and New Zealand Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 261–273.
- Lopez, M. (2000) "The Politics of the Origins of Multiculturalism: Lobbying and the Power of Influence," *People and Place*, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 22–27.
- Mackay, H. (1993) *Reinventing Australia: The Mind and Mood of Australia in the 90s*, Sydney: Angus and Robertson.
- Manne, R. (1992) "The Rift in Conservative Politics," in Carroll, J. and Manne, R. (Eds), *Shutdown; The Failure of Economic Rationalism and How to Rescue Australia*, Melbourne: Text Publishing Company, 49–57.
- Markus, A. (1993) "Racism and Recession," *People and Place*, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 35–39.
- Markus, M. (2014) *Mapping Social Cohesion*, the Scanlon Foundation Survey 2014, ACJC, Monash University, ISBN: 978-0-987 4195-3
- McAllister, I. and Mughan, A. (1987) *Australian Election Survey, 1987* [computer file]. Canberra: Australian Data Archive, The Australian National University.
- Miller, J. (1959) *Australian Government and Politics*, London: Gerald Duckworth and Co.
- Office of Multicultural Affairs (OMA) (1988) *Towards a National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia*, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.
- Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (2012) Exposure Draft Legislation – Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Bill 2012.
- Rosecrance, R. (1963) "The Radical Culture of Australia," in Hartz, L. (Ed.), *The Founding of New Societies*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World.
- Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee (SLCLC) (1995) Report on the Racial Hatred Bill, March.
- Stokes, G. (2000) "One Nation and Australian Populism," in Leach, M., Stokes, G. and Ward, I. (Eds), *The Rise and Fall of One Nation*, Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, pp. 42–56.
- Sydney Morning Herald* (1993) We're in a Vicious Circle of Poverty, September 15, 1993, p. 39.
- Sydney Morning Herald* (2013a) Discrimination Laws Go Back to the Drawing Board, March 20, 2013.

- Sydney Morning Herald* (2013b) Racial Hatred Bill Offers Open Slather to Obnoxious, January 14, 2013.
- The Age* (1992) Senate Reports on a Jobless Generation, December 17, 1992, p. 3.
- The Age* (1993) Australians Need the Salvos, May 17, 1993, p. 1.
- The Australian* (2005) Apologise to Blainey, December 15, 2005—Opinion Piece by Peter Ryan.
- The Australian* (2014) Preamble will Divide, Not Unite, the Nation, September 20, 2014, p. 20.
- The Courier Mail* (1998) Full Circle, Saturday, June 13 (McGregor).
- White, D. and Kemp, D. (1986) *Malcolm Fraser on Australia*, Melbourne: Hill of Content Publishing Company.
- Whitlam, G. (1968) “Beyond Vietnam—Australia’s Regional Responsibility,” in The Victorian Fabian Society (Ed.), *Australia’s foreign Policy in the Seventies*, Townsville: Australian Institute of International Affairs; North Queensland Branch, pp. 17–40.
- Whitlam, G. (1974) *Australia and South-East Asia*, Principal speeches made during a visit of the Prime Minister of Australia to South-East Asia, January 28 to February 13, 1973, Canberra: Australian Government Printing Service.
- Whitlam Institute, www.org/gough_whitlam/achievements/democracy-law-and-human-rights, October 1, 2015.
- Willard, M. (1923) *History of the White Australia Policy*, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
- Windschuttle, K. (2004) *The White Australia Policy*, Sydney: Macleay Press.
- Windschuttle, K. (2008) “Stuart McIntyre and the Blainey Affair,” *Quadrant*, October 8, <http://quadrant.org.au/2008/10/stuart-mcintyre-and-the-blainey-affair>
- Young, C. (1991) “Let’s have Some Demography in Australia’s Population Policy,” in Smith, J. W. (Ed.), *Immigration, Population and Sustainable Environments: The Limits to Australia’s Growth*, Adelaide: Flinders Press, pp. 99–113.

Contemporary Australian Attitudes to Immigration

Andrew Markus

Surveying in Australia

Given the significance of immigration for the development of Australia, there has been surprisingly little systematic public opinion research into attitudes to immigration and cultural diversity until recent years.

Within the European Union, public opinion is tracked by the annual Eurobarometer, established in 1973, which surveys a minimum of 1,000 respondents in each member state, and the biennial European Social Survey, which has been conducted since 2001 to “measure attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of diverse populations” in more than 30 nations.

In England, the British Social Attitudes survey has been administered annually since 1983 to monitor and interpret the British public’s changing attitudes toward social, economic, political, and moral issues. It is completed by a sample of 3,000 respondents. In addition, wide-ranging citizenship surveys were conducted between 2001 and 2011. The first three citizenship surveys were each administered to 15,000 respondents (including a minority ethnic boost of 5,000) in face-to-face interviews, taking approximately 60 minutes to complete.

In Canada, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration commissioned tracking surveys on quarterly basis between 1996 and 2005 and has conducted annual surveys in most years since. (Butler, 2014; Ekos, 2010; Pollara, 2003). Immigration Minister Jason Kenny observed in 2012, “I keep a very close eye on public opinion . . . We want to avoid the disconnect between popular opinion and policy on immigration that we’ve seen in Western Europe” (Canadian Press, 2012). An Ethnic Diversity Survey, conducted in 2002 by Statistics Canada in conjunction with other departments, set a standard of excellence involving personal interviewing of 42,500 respondents, utilizing a rigorous sample based on the 2001 census.

Australia lacks government-sponsored surveying on the scale of the EU, England, and Canada. The main source of long-run time series data is the

relatively underfunded work of researchers at the Australian National University (ANU). ANU researchers conducted the Australian Survey of Social Attitudes between 2003 and 2012, with the survey now managed by the Australian Consortium for Social and Political Research Incorporated. It is presented as “Australia’s main source of data for the scientific study of social attitudes, beliefs and opinions” and has been conducted biennially. It contributes to the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) conducted in some 40 countries. It is a mailed out, self-administered survey which achieves some 3,000 to 4,000 completions.

Two other major social surveys are conducted by ANU researchers. The Australian Election Study (AES) is administered following a federal election, at an average frequency of three years. The AES utilizes a mailed, self-administered questionnaire. It achieves a sample of 1,800–2,000 respondents and provides insight into the relative importance of political issues, including immigration. The ANU poll commenced in 2008 and was planned to run on a quarterly basis, but has not been maintained at that level of frequency, with the sixteenth survey published in September 2014. It is administered by telephone and reaches 1,000–1,200 respondents. In addition to common questions across surveys, each survey focuses on a specific topic. The seventh poll, published in October 2010, covered population, immigration, and aging.

Australian tracking of short-term shifts of opinion on immigration has, until recent years, been reliant on commercial polling conducted for the print media. There are problems, however, with reliance on such polling. Commercial polls typically include just one to three questions on immigration, in the context of an omnibus survey exploring a range of issues. There is no consistency in wording, and frequency is determined solely by level of public interest. In some years there has been no polling on immigration.

For the first time in Australian social research, systematic surveying of attitudes to immigration, cultural diversity, and social cohesion has been conducted since 2007 by the Scanlon Foundation, which has undertaken seven national surveys between 2007 and 2014, with sample size ranging from 1,200 to 2,000 respondents. These surveys were conducted by telephone (landline and mobile) and were administered by an interviewer. The 2014 survey comprised some 65 questions, including 13 items on immigration and cultural diversity. In addition to the national survey, four parallel local area surveys have been conducted (in 2007, 2009, 2012, and 2013), with a major focus on areas of high immigrant concentration. Two experimental online surveys have also been conducted as part of the Scanlon Foundation program, one of recent immigrant arrivals and the second of third-generation Australians. In total, some 24,000 respondents have completed the Scanlon Foundation surveys, making possible reliable analysis of subgroups (Markus and Dharmalingam, 2008; Markus, 2009–2014; Markus and Arnup, 2010)

Australian Attitudes to Immigration

There is substantial evidence to indicate that, among western nations, Australia and Canada rank as the most receptive to immigration (Markus, 2012a; Reitz, 2011).

For example, a 2003 ISSP survey found that 68 percent of Canadian and 61 percent of Australian respondents supported the current level of immigration or favored an increase, compared with 34 percent in France, 30 percent in Germany, and 22 percent in England (ISSP, 2003). A 2014 European survey found that disapproval of government handling of immigration averaged 60 percent, with 77 percent disapproval in Spain, 75 percent in Greece, 73 percent in the United Kingdom, and 64 percent in France and Italy. Disapproval in the United States was at 71 percent (Transatlantic Trends, 2014: 6). In contrast, the 2014 Canadian tracking survey found that just 25 percent of respondents considered that that immigration intake was too high, while 62 percent felt that it was about right or too low (Butler, 2014).

The results of Australian surveys in 2014 were close to the Canadian level. A Newspoll survey for *The Australian*, conducted in July 2014, asked: “Do you think the number of immigrants coming to Australia through official channels and allowed into Australia should be increased, decreased, or stay the same as now?” A very low 27 percent indicated that the intake should be decreased, 70 percent thought that it should stay the same or be increased (*The Australian*, July 16, 2014). The Lowy Institute Poll, conducted in February 2014, found that 37 percent of respondents considered the intake to be “too high,” while 61 percent considered it to be “about right” or “too low.” The 2014 Scanlon Foundation survey obtained a similar result.

Questions on immigration employing a three-point response scale have been a staple of Australian surveying since 1951 (Goot, 1999: 39). The long record of polling indicates that a question which asks respondents if the intake is too high, about right, or too low finds considerable variance over time. In a period of increasing or relatively high unemployment, there is majority support for the view that the intake is too high; in times of economic growth and relatively low unemployment, there is majority support for the intake or for its increase. Four of the five Scanlon Foundation surveys conducted between 2007 and 2012, a time of relatively low unemployment, found that a majority of respondents (53–56%) considered that the intake was “about right” or “too low.” In 2010 there was a statistically significant fall in support, to 46 percent, in the context of economic concerns and politically divisive debate over population growth (see Table 4.1).

Long-run findings raised the expectation in 2014 that there would be increased concern at the level of immigration, in the context of rising unemployment (reaching 6.2 percent in June) and highly publicized announcements of the planned closure of major manufacturing plants, including the car manufacturers Ford, General Motors (Holden), and Toyota. Yet the reverse occurred: in the 2014 Scanlon Foundation survey, just 35 percent agreed that the intake was “too high,” while 59 percent consider that it was “about right” or “too low.” Thus, despite increase in unemployment, concern at the level of immigration fell.

A possible explanation for this relatively low level of concern is the effectiveness of the government’s measures to stop asylum seeker arrivals by boat. This success conveyed the message that the government had reestablished border control and could be trusted to manage immigration. It may also have reflected the incorrect understanding that a significant number of immigrants were arriving by boat—and these arrivals had been halted.

Table 4.1 “Do You Think of the Number of Immigrants Accepted into Australia is . . . ?,” Scanlon Foundation National Surveys, 2007–2014

	Too high (%)	About right (%)	Too low (%)	Refused/Don't know (%)
2007	36	41	12	11
2009	37	46*	10	7*
2010	47*	36	10	7
2011	39*	40	14*	6
2012	38	42	14	6
2013	42	38	13	7
2014	35*	42	17*	8

* Change statistically significant from previous year at $p < 0.05$.

Source: Scanlon Foundation (Markus, 2007–2014).

The Scanlon Foundation survey findings on attitudes to immigration are in large measure consistent with the long-run finding of other published surveys. Goot and Watson identified 25 surveys on immigration conducted in the period 1999–2010, with considerable variance in question wording and methodology. The average of the 25 surveys finds 52 percent in support of the current immigration level or support for increase, 43 percent in support of reduction, and 5 percent uncertain (Goot and Watson, 2011: 23): this compares with 54 percent, 39 percent, and 7 percent, respectively, on average, for the seven Scanlon Foundation national surveys.

Reliability of Survey Findings

These surveys, with few exceptions, were conducted by telephone and were interviewer administered. Interviewer administered surveying runs the risk of producing misleading results through the potential for “social desirability bias” (SDB). SDB refers to the tendency of respondents to give answers they believe are more socially desirable than responses that reflect their true feelings. This form of bias is of particular importance in questions that deal with socially sensitive or controversial issues, which includes attitudes to immigration and minority groups.

An online questionnaire completed in privacy can provide conditions under which a respondent feels greater freedom to disclose opinions on sensitive topics. A 2010 report prepared for the American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) noted that “respondents may be more honest and accurate when reporting confidentially on a computer” (30). A prominent American researcher, Humphrey Taylor, observes that “where there is a ‘socially desirable’ answer, substantially more people in our online surveys give the ‘socially undesirable’ response. We believe that this is because online respondents give more truthful responses” (2007). Similarly, Roger Tourangeau and his co-authors of *The Science of Web Surveys* report that a review of research “demonstrates that survey respondents consistently underreport a broad range of socially undesirable behaviours and overreport an equally broad range of socially desirable behaviours” (2013: 133).

Given these potential gains from online surveying, together with substantially lower cost and completion in less time, why are the Scanlon Foundation and other surveys not conducted utilizing what may be a superior methodology?

The answer is that it is not possible at present to establish that an online survey is completed by a representative sample of the population. If all members of a population had computer access and their computer addresses were centrally listed, as in a telephone directory, then it would be possible to conduct surveys with Internet-based random samples, but that is not presently the case. Currently, Internet surveying in Australia is limited to using samples drawn from nonprobability opt-in panels of survey volunteers maintained by commercial providers.

Despite the maintenance of very large panels, it is not possible to establish that the panel members are representative of a population; thus a specific personality type (such as those with more negative social views) may be attracted to join a panel, either by opting in or accepting an invitation to participate; further, the younger and more educated are likely to be overrepresented, while those with lower levels of education and lack of computer skills will be underrepresented.

In 2008 AAPOR established a task force to “review the current empirical findings related to opt-in panels utilized for data collection.” Its report, released in March 2010, stated:

Computer administration yields more reports of socially undesirable attitudes and behaviours than oral interviewing, but no evidence that directly demonstrates that the computer reports are more accurate. (34)

The AAPOR task force also concluded that “researchers should avoid nonprobability online panels when one of the research objectives is to accurately estimate population values” (4). The more recent study of Tourangeau and his colleagues (2013) published by Oxford University Press reached a similar conclusion.

In 2014, the Scanlon Foundation explored differences of telephone and online panel responses to questions on immigrant and cultural diversity. In addition to the telephone administered national survey, an online survey of third-generation Australians was conducted. The survey covered respondents born in Australia with both parents born in Australia and sampled the Your Source online panel of more than 100,000 respondents maintained by the Colmar Brunton market research agency. Third-generation Australians, as defined, comprise 47.4 percent (7.83 million) of the Australian population aged 18 or over; of these, 94 percent indicate that they are of Australian or Anglo-Celtic ancestry.¹

A total of 1,070 third-generation Australians completed the online survey, and their answers were compared with the 801 third-generation Australian respondents (of the total sample of 1,500) in the telephone administered national survey. This large sample provided the basis for exploring the impact of mode of survey administration. Comparing over 50 questions common to both the telephone administered and online survey provided evidence of variation consistent with the Social Desirability hypothesis, but not at a level that negates the broad understanding of Australian attitudes provided by telephone-based surveying. This is an issue further discussed in this analysis; the first finding is that on attitudes to

current immigration there is only minor variation: among third-generation Australians responding to the telephone survey, 39 percent considered that the intake was “too high”; the online the proportion was marginally higher, but still a minority at 46 percent.

Cultural Diversity

The broad range of questions in the Scanlon Foundation surveys provides a number of perspectives for determining Australian attitudes toward cultural diversity.

A general question presents respondents with the proposition that “accepting immigrants from many different countries makes Australia stronger.” Across the seven surveys, the level of agreement has been within a narrow band, ranging from 62 to 68 percent, the level of disagreement in the range of 26–29 percent, with 8–11 percent indicating “strong disagreement” (Table 4.2). In the 2014 telephone survey among third-generation Australians, disagreement was at 29 percent, in the online survey an almost identical 30 percent.

The Scanlon Foundation surveys provide much evidence of acceptance of cultural diversity in Australia. When questions are asked in specific terms with regard to immigrants who have settled in Australia, for most questions there is a low level of negative sentiment. Thus among third-generation Australians in the online survey, who can be expected to be more conservative with regard to cultural diversity than the general population, just 6 percent “disagreed” or “strongly disagreed” with the statement “I like meeting and getting to know people from other cultures”; 5 percent with “we should recognise that cultural and ethnic diversity is an important feature of Australian society”; and 11 percent with “my local area is a place where people from different national or ethnic backgrounds get on well.” In the national survey, the local area question found disagreement at almost the same level, 10 percent.

Table 4.2 “Accepting Immigrants from Many Different Countries Makes Australia Stronger,” Scanlon Foundation National Surveys, 2007–2014

Response	2007	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Strongly agree	21.9	24.7	19.1	24.2	25.7*	22.0	26.4*
Agree	45.1	43.2	43.3	40.1	39.4	40.1	41.3
<i>Subtotal agree</i>	<i>67.0</i>	<i>67.9</i>	<i>62.4</i>	<i>64.3</i>	<i>65.1</i>	<i>62.1</i>	<i>67.7</i>
Neither agree or disagree	3.3	3.1	5.9	6.4	5.5	6.1	4.5
Disagree	18.1	17.9	18.6	16.2	15.3	18.1	15.9
Strongly disagree	7.8	8.9	10.9	10.6	10.7	10.6	9.7
<i>Subtotal disagree</i>	<i>25.9</i>	<i>26.8</i>	<i>29.4</i>	<i>26.8</i>	<i>26.0</i>	<i>28.7</i>	<i>25.6</i>
Refused/None/Don't know	3.8	2.2	2.2	2.6	3.5	3.1	2.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<i>N</i> (unweighted)	2012	2019	2021	2001	2001	1200	1500

* Change statistically significant from previous year at $p < 0.05$.

Source: Scanlon Foundation (Markus, 2007–2014).

National Groups

In all countries of immigration there is a hierarchy of ethnic preference, which informs attitudes to newcomers. In Australia, for much of the twentieth century there was a large measure of consistency in the hierarchy, with immigrants from the United Kingdom and other English-speaking countries ranked at the top, northern Europeans next, followed by other Europeans. That is where the ranking ended; non-Europeans were denied permanent residence until a process of reform between 1966 and the late 1970s brought to an end the White Australia policy.

The four Scanlon Foundation surveys conducted between 2010 and 2013 asked respondents for their attitude to immigrants from 15 specified countries, selected from a grouping of English-speaking, European, Asian, and Middle East countries, with an African country and the Pacific Islands added in 2013. Consistency in attitudes was found across the four surveys.

The level of negative sentiment toward immigrants from English-speaking countries (England, New Zealand) and European countries (Italy, Germany) averaged less than 3 percent. Negative sentiment toward immigrants from China was 13 percent (“very negative” 3%, “negative” 10%), India 15 percent (“very negative” 6%, “negative” 8%), and Ethiopia 16 percent (“very negative” 6%, “negative” 10%).

The highest level of negative sentiment was toward immigrants from Iraq and Lebanon. In 2013, 10 percent of respondents indicated that they were “very negative” and 13 percent “negative” toward immigrants from Iraq; 12 percent were “very negative” and 15 percent “negative” toward immigrants from Lebanon.

On one interpretation, the findings indicate a substantial change in Australian attitudes over time. Continental Europeans, who were the target of hostility in the 1960s, and immigrants from Asia whose entry in large numbers was much questioned in the 1980s, are now seen in a positive or neutral light by a large majority of Australians. For example, in 1984, when immigration issues, including the Asian intake, were much discussed, a McNair Anderson poll found that 54 percent of respondents were of the view that the intake of Asian immigrants was too high, although it is possible that this result points to a high level of concern over immigration, not just the immigration from the Asian region (Goot, 1999).

A second interpretation, however, supports the view that opinion has changed, although there is a high level of ambivalence and negativity toward immigrants from the Middle East countries specified in the survey. Thus in 2013, while 13 percent of respondents were negative toward immigrants from China, 31 percent were neutral, and the largest proportion, 53 percent, were positive. With regard to immigrants from Lebanon, 27 percent were negative, the largest proportion, 38 percent, were neutral, and 31 percent were positive.

Religion

The 2010–2012 and 2014 Scanlon Foundation surveys further explored attitudes by considering views toward three faith groups, Christian, Buddhist, and Muslim.

The questions engaged respondents, indicated by the very low proportion (1–3%) of “refused” and “don’t know” responses.

Across the four surveys, 5 percent or fewer respondents indicated that they were “very negative” or “somewhat negative” toward Christians or Buddhists. However, a significantly higher 12–13 percent were “very negative” toward Muslims and a further 11–12 percent “somewhat negative,” a combined 23–25 percent, with the pattern of response toward Muslims similar to the pattern obtained for Middle East countries. Thus, the largest proportion, 44 percent, were neutral toward Muslims and 28 percent were positive.

A similar preference hierarchy or ranking was obtained by a VicHealth survey conducted in Victoria in 2013, which asked respondents if their feelings were “cold,” “warm,” or “neither cold nor warm” toward people of specified “racial or ethnic groups background” in Australia. The survey found that 2 percent of respondents were “cold” or “very cold” toward people of “Mediterranean European background,” 6 percent toward those who were “Asian,” 11 percent toward those who were “African,” and 22 percent toward those who were Muslim (VicHealth, 2014).

These results may, however, may understate the level of ambivalence and negative sentiment toward the groups least favorably viewed. While on most questions the extent of difference between responses to the telephone and online survey was below 4 percentage points, when the 2014 survey asked for the attitude to those of Muslim faith in the telephone administered survey, 25 percent were negative in the national sample and 28 percent negative among third-generation Australians, while 44 percent were negative in the online survey of third-generation Australians.

Multiculturalism

While multicultural policies have been the subject of increasing critical discussion in Europe, a number of surveys have found continuing support in Australia.

In 1997, when a Newspoll survey asked whether “multiculturalism has been good or bad for Australia,” 78 percent of respondents agreed that it had been good. A survey in 2005 asked respondents if they supported or opposed “a policy of multiculturalism in Australia” and found 80 percent in support (Markus, 2011: 93).

The Essential Report, which conducts weekly online surveys, has on three occasions asked whether “multiculturalism (i.e., acceptance of people from different countries, cultures, and religions) made a positive or negative contribution to Australian society.” Those responding with “negative” or “very negative” totaled 29 percent in 2011, 30 percent in 2014, and 29 percent in 2015 (ER, March 3, 2015; <http://www.essentialvision.com.au/contribution-of-multiculturalism-3>).

The Scanlon Foundation survey asked questions on multiculturalism in 2013 and 2014. First, the survey asked for responses to the proposition that “multiculturalism has been good for Australia.” Later in the survey, respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with five statements concerning multiculturalism, presented in both positive and negative terms:

- Benefits/does not benefit the economic development of Australia;
- Encourages/discourages immigrants to become part of Australian society;
- Strengthens/weakens the Australian way of life;
- Gives immigrants the same/more opportunities than the Australian born;
- Reduces/increases the problems immigrants face in Australia.

The findings indicated strong support for multiculturalism, consistent with earlier Australian surveying. Thus in 2013, 84 percent of respondents agreed that “multiculturalism has been good for Australia” (37% “strongly agree,” 48% “agree”); in 2014, an almost identical 85 percent agreed. Thus, a relatively high proportion of respondents “agree” and view multiculturalism positively, but not at the strongest level. Analysis of the 2014 survey indicates that of these respondents, while a clear majority agree that a diverse immigration intake makes Australia stronger and that people from different national and ethnic backgrounds get on well together, only one-third (33%) agree with the proposition that “ethnic minorities in Australia should be given government assistance to maintain their customs and traditions.” The strongest positive association of multiculturalism was its contribution to economic development (75% agreement) and its encouragement of immigrants to become part of Australian society (71% agreement).

For the 2014 survey, the 37 percent of respondents indicating “strong agreement” were analyzed by eight demographic variables: gender, state of residence, region of residence, age, educational attainment, financial situation, intended vote, and birthplace. The highest proportion indicating “strong agreement” were:

- Those intending to vote Greens (62%);
- Those with Bachelor or higher level of education (55%);
- Born overseas in a non-English-speaking country (50%);
- Aged 25–34 (50%);
- Those who describe their financial situation as “prosperous” or “very comfortable” (47%).

The lowest proportion indicating “strong agreement” were:

- Those whose highest level of completed education was Year 11 or lower (22%) and Trade or Apprenticeship (28%);
- Over the age of 65 (26%);
- Born overseas in an English-speaking country (27%);
- Resident outside a capital city (29%).

Analysis was also undertaken by background: third-generation Australians, Australian born with one or both parents born overseas, overseas born of English-speaking background and overseas born of non-English-speaking background. While “strong agreement” with the proposition that “multiculturalism has been good for Australia” was highest among those from a non-English-speaking background, the combined “strongly agree” and “agree” responses showed only minor variation, ranging from 82 percent among third-generation Australians to 90

percent among those from a non-English-speaking background. Third-generation Australians indicating disagreement with the proposition ranged from 12 percent in the telephone survey to 22 percent in the online survey (Table 4.3).

Extent of Intolerance

All populations are made up of diverse personality types, ranging, for example, from those who are tolerant to or intolerant of cultural diversity. The intolerant are characterized by unease when in the presence of members of minority groups, by their negative view of multiculturalism, by their demand that immigrants should assimilate to what they see as the national “way of life” (or go back to their countries of origin), and by their opposition to government policies designed to promote harmony, including understanding of other cultures.

Research undertaken in 2000 by the European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia indicated that the proportion of the intolerant within the EU countries ranges from a low of 4 percent of the population to a high of 27 percent. Intolerant attitudes were most widely held by people living in Greece and Belgium and were at the lowest levels in Sweden, Finland, Portugal, and Spain (Thalhammer et al., 2001).

While there can be no definitive measure of the level of intolerance in Australia, on the basis of Scanlon Foundation surveys and a number of additional surveys conducted over the last 30 years there is an indication that the core level is close to 10 percent of the population. Using a broader definition (incorporating both the strongest negative and next level negative response), rejection of cultural diversity reaches close to 25 percent of the population.

This conclusion is supported by selected questions from the 2013 and 2014 surveys that provide five substantive response options, including two levels of

Table 4.3 “Multiculturalism Has Been Good for Australia,” Scanlon Foundation National Survey, 2014

Response	Third-generation Australians (%)	Second-generation Australians (%)	ESB (%)	NESB (%)	Total (%)
Strongly agree	30.8	43.3	26.7	50.3	37.2
Agree	51.4	43.9	57.3	40.1	47.6
<i>Subtotal agree</i>	<i>82.2</i>	<i>87.2</i>	<i>84</i>	<i>90.4</i>	<i>84.8</i>
Neither agree or disagree	4.8	2.1	3.3	2.7	3.8
Disagree	6.2	6.9	7.3	5.1	6.2
Strongly disagree	5.5	2.5	4	1.1	4
<i>Subtotal disagree</i>	<i>11.7</i>	<i>11.4</i>	<i>11.3</i>	<i>6.2</i>	<i>10.2</i>
Refused/Don't know	1.3	1.3	1.3	0.8	1.3
Total	100	100	100	100	100

ESB = English-speaking background; NESB = non-English-speaking background.

Source: Scanlon Foundation (Markus, 2014).

negative response. Consideration of survey items which asks for attitudes toward immigrants from Lebanon and Iraq, those of the Muslim faith, and the value of a diverse immigration intake, finds a consistent pattern: the strongest negative responses are in the range 10–12 percent, the next level of negative response in the range 13–16 percent, a combined 22–27 percent (Table 4.4).

These proportions are obtained from telephone surveying, and, as noted, the operation of SDB may result in underestimation of the extent of intolerance. Comparison of the responses of third-generation Australians in the 2014 telephone and online surveys finds that the proportion indicating the strongest negative response is little different in the two surveys when the value of a diverse immigration intake is considered: 11 percent by telephone, 14 percent online. With regard to attitudes toward those of Muslim faith, there is greater differentiation, at 12 percent and 23 percent, respectively. There is thus support for the view that with regard to a minority of issues the extent of negative sentiment is understated by telephone polling, but it is an issue that cannot be resolved on the basis of existing data, given the problems associated with nonprobability panel surveys.

The above estimates of minimum levels of intolerance (core 10%, broad 25%) represent the average across the population. There are heightened levels of intolerance within specific demographics, with the variables of age, level of education, income, and locality of residence producing statistically significant variation.

This is evidenced by consideration of attitudes toward those of the Muslim faith, utilizing the combined data set for the 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2014 Scanlon Foundation national surveys which yield a combined sample of 7,548. This analysis indicates that the highest proportion of those indicating that they are “very negative” or “somewhat negative” are within the subgroups aged 65+ (40%), with highest completed education to Year 11 (32%), with Trade or Apprenticeship qualifications (31%), and intending to vote Liberal/National (30%) or Independent/other (30%). The lowest proportion indicating a negative response was among those aged 18–24 (10%), 25–34 (19%), 35–44 (19%), intending to vote Greens (15%), with highest completed education at university degree level (17%), and resident in Victoria (17%).

Table 4.4 Negative Responses by Selected Question, Scanlon Foundation National Surveys, 2013–2014

Question and response	Strongest negative (%)	Strong negative (%)	Total (%)
Feelings toward immigrants from Lebanon—very negative/somewhat negative (2013)	12.0	15.4	27.4
Attitude toward Muslims—very negative/negative (2014)	11.7	13.5	25.2
Immigration from many different countries makes Australia stronger—strongly disagree/disagree (2014)	9.7	15.9	25.6
Feelings toward immigrants from Iraq—very negative/somewhat negative (2013)	9.7	12.7	22.4

Source: Scanlon Foundation (Markus, 2013, 2014).

Conclusion

A feature of Australian attitudes is the continuing majority support for the immigration program and a diverse immigration intake. In this regard Australia, together with Canada, is differentiated from attitudes in the EU and the United States. There is also consistent majority endorsement of immigration from the major source countries and for multiculturalism, evident across the broad spectrum of Australian opinion. Multiculturalism, an ambiguous term interpreted by individuals in different ways, is a strong and supported “brand,” most favorably associated with its contribution to economic development and its encouragement of immigrants to become part of Australian society. It does not, however, translate into majority support for governments to assist ethnic minorities to maintain their cultures and traditions.

The Scanlon Foundation survey findings also provide evidence of relatively high negative sentiment toward immigrants from specific Middle East countries and those of the Muslim faith. These qualifications to the generally positive survey results highlight the reality that maintaining a large and ethnically diverse immigration program presents substantial and ongoing challenges for Australian government and society.

Note

1. Calculated on the basis of “first ancestry,” excludes those who did not state an ancestry (2% of the third generation aged 18 or above). 2011 census analysis using the Australian Bureau of Statistics Table Builder Pro.

References

- AAPOR (American Association for Public Opinion Research) 2010, AAPOR Report on Online Panels, March 2010. http://www.pollingreport.com/ht_online.htm
- ANU Poll, available at <http://www.anu.edu.au/anupoll/>; Report at http://www.aapor.org/AAPORKentico/AAPOR_Main/media/MainSiteFiles/AAPOROnlinePanelsTFReportFinalRevised1.pdf
- Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (AuSSA), available at <http://aussa.anu.edu.au/>
- Blinder, Scott 2011, “UK public opinion toward immigration: Determinant of attitudes,” The Migration Observatory, <http://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/uk-public-opinion-toward-migration-determinants-attitudes>
- Butler, Don 2014, “Canadians in the dark about immigration numbers: Survey,” *Ottawa Citizen*, August 27.
- Canadian Press 2012, “Canadians less enthusiastic about immigrants, survey finds,” October 30, <http://www.thespec.com/news-story/2170973-survey-suggests-canadian-hearts-hardening-toward-immigrants/>
- Citizenship Survey 2009–2010, United Kingdom. Accessed at Migration Observatory, Public opinion, attitudes to immigration levels, <http://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/data-and-resources/charts/create/public-opinion/attitudes-british-totals>, accessed December 16, 2011.

- Ekos 2010, Ekos Research Associates, *Annual Tracking Survey – Winter 2010*. Submitted to Citizenship and Immigration Canada, April 2010.
- European Commission Public Opinion, Eurobarometer Surveys, available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index.cfm?lang=en
- European Social Survey, available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>
- Goot, Murray 1999, “Migrant numbers, Asian immigration and multiculturalism: Trends in the polls, 1943–1998,” National Multicultural Advisory Council, *Australian Multiculturalism for a New Century*, Statistical Appendix part 2.
- Goot, Murray and Ian Watson 2011, *Population, Immigration and Asylum Seekers: Patters in Australian Public Opinion*, Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Library, May.
- ISSP Research Group 2003, International Social Survey Programme, National Identity II, SPSS data file, Distributor: GESIS Cologne Germany, Identification number ZA3910.
- Lowy Institute 2014, *The Lowy Institute Poll*, <http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/lowy-institute-poll-2014>
- Markus, Andrew 2007–2014, *Mapping Social Cohesion, The Scanlon Foundation Surveys*, available at Mapping Australia’s Population Internet site, <http://monash.edu/mapping-population/>
- Markus, Andrew 2011, “Attitudes to Multiculturalism and Cultural Diversity,” James Jupp and Michael Clyne (eds), *Multiculturalism and Integration. A Harmonious Relationship*, ANU E Press, Canberra, 89–100.
- Markus, Andrew 2012, “Immigration and public opinion,” Jonathan Pincus and Graeme Hugo (eds), *A Greater Australia: Population, Policies and Governance*, CEDA, Melbourne, 114–132.
- Markus, Andrew and Arunachalam Dharmalingam 2008, *Mapping Social Cohesion: The 2007 Scanlon Foundation Surveys* (Monash Institute for the Study of Global Movements), available at <http://www.arts.monash.edu.au/mapping-population/>
- Markus, Andrew and Jessica Arnup 2010, *Mapping Social Cohesion: The 2009 Scanlon Foundation Surveys* (Monash Institute for the Study of Global Movements), available at <http://www.arts.monash.edu.au/mapping-population/>
- Pollara 2003, *A Pollara Report on Canadian’s Attitudes Regarding Immigration*. Prepared for Citizenship and Immigration Canada, December.
- Reitz, Jeffrey 2011, *Pro-immigration Canada. Social and Economic Roots of Popular Views*, IRPP Study, No. 20, October.
- Statistics Canada, *Ethnic Diversity Survey* (EDS), available at <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/>
- Taylor, Humphrey 2007, “The case for publishing (some) online polls,” *The Polling Report*, 15 January.
- Thalhammer, E. et al. 2001, *Attitudes toward Minority Groups in the European Union*, European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Vienna.
- Tourangeau, Roger, Frederick Conrad and Mick Couper 2013, *The Science of Web Surveys*, Oxford University Press.
- Transatlantic Trends 2014, *Mobility, Migration and Integration*, The German Marshall Fund of the United States.
- VicHealth 2014, *Findings from the 2013 Survey of Victorians’ Attitudes to Race and Cultural Diversity*, Victorian Health Promotion Foundation, Melbourne.

Immigration Challenges in Japan: How Has Japanese Society Coped With Immigration?

Hirohisa Takenoshita

Introduction

Many people view Japan as a racially and ethnically homogeneous nation. When compared with other modern nations like Australia, the proportion of overseas-born persons is not large (less than 2%). Nevertheless, the number and diversity of immigrants to Japan have increased significantly in a relatively short time and there are now significant immigrant concentrations in some locations. Some scholars challenge the view that Japan is a mono-ethnic country (Lie, 2001), as the makeup of Japanese society is changing. Tsuda (2006), for example, has argued that Japan has accepted a large number of immigrants from other nations and has thus become a de facto country of immigration. This chapter considers the way in which immigrants have been incorporated into Japanese society and the institutional settings that provide the context for the acceptance of immigrants in Japan.

To illustrate the specific circumstances surrounding the acceptance of immigrants into Japanese society, this chapter employs the notion of “modes of incorporation” and “segmented assimilation,” as developed by Alejandro Portes and his collaborators (Portes et al., 2005: 1001–1013). The context of the reception for immigrants, it is suggested, consists of three dimensions: immigration and integration policies, labor market structure and discrimination, and ethnic community. This perspective can be applied to immigration in Japan. In addition, it is necessary to account for the way in which institutional arrangements relating to welfare and employment policies targeting Japanese people have influenced the context of immigration in Japan. In fact, several comparative studies on immigrants in European countries have reported that the treatment of immigrants and their offspring in the receiving society depends largely on the institutional arrangements for the provision of welfare and employment in that receiving society (Crul and Schneider, 2010; Kogan, 2010).

This chapter focuses primarily on the context of immigration in Japan. First, I describe the historical trajectories of immigration policies in Japan. Immigration policies can be classified into two types: (1) policies aimed at immigration and border control, and (2) policies aimed at the integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities. Next, I describe how immigrants have been accepted in Japan. For this purpose, the treatment of immigrants in the labor market and the attitudes of the mainstream Japanese population toward immigrants and ethnic minorities are examined. Finally, I provide a brief discussion regarding how we should integrate immigrants into Japanese society in the future.

This chapter analyzes several types of immigrant living in Japan because there is great diversity in the mechanisms by which immigrants have been incorporated into Japanese society. In doing so, it also focuses on the situation of unskilled immigrant workers because numerous immigrants engage in unskilled work.

Immigration and Border Control in Japan until the 1980s

Although Japan has been regarded as an ethnically homogeneous nation, this image is inconsistent with the reality of Japan's racial and ethnic composition (Lie, 2001). Because of Japan's colonization of Taiwan and Korea, more than 2 million Koreans and Taiwanese migrated to Japan as recruited workers and forced laborers during the period preceding the Second World War (Chitose, 2008). After the war ended in 1945, over half a million former colonial subjects remained in Japan. Although Koreans and Taiwanese were considered Japanese nationals under the Japanese empire, they were redefined as foreigners after the war. Because of this loss of Japanese nationality, Koreans and Taiwanese were deprived of several important benefits, such as easy entry into and exit from Japan, access to public sector jobs, and welfare benefits. Moreover, the Japanese Constitution guarantees citizenship rights only to nationals and thus did not guarantee rights to these ethnic minorities (Surak, 2008).

The loss of Korea and Taiwan as colonies after the Second World War strengthened the myth of ethnic homogeneity in Japan, and discrimination against these former colonial subjects and their descendants became deeply embedded in various institutions in Japan and persisted until very recently.¹ In the 1960s, the economic boom in many advanced societies led several national governments to accept immigrant workers from other countries; however, Japan did not accept immigrants during this period because domestic migration from rural to urban areas fulfilled the strong demand for skilled and unskilled workers in the manufacturing industry. Japan was thus able to realize rapid economic growth without relying on immigrant workforces from other countries (Kajita, 1994; Tsuda and Cornelius, 2004).

Until the 1970s, most foreign residents in Japan were Korean or Chinese. They were referred to as "old comers" in Japan. In the late 1970s, Japan made significant changes to its immigration policies and accordingly experienced an influx of immigrants. In 1979, the Japanese government ratified the two International Covenants on Human Rights and, in 1981, it ratified the United Nations Refugee

Convention under pressure from other advanced countries. The Japanese government ultimately had to revise existing law in Japan because these international conventions required the state to treat citizens and foreigners equally (Kashiwazaki, 2000). In addition, in 1978 Japan began to accept refugees because of international pressure, although the number of refugees remained strikingly small (Surak, 2008). During the period between the 1980s and the 2000s, the Japanese government accepted a modest number of refugees from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The total number of refugees accepted in Japan until 2005 reached 11,319—which is much lower than the number of refugees accepted in other advanced countries such as Australia, Sweden, and the United States. The circumstances of their exit from their home country and reception in Japan have affected the refugees' adaptation to and integration into Japanese society. This is because they are more likely to settle in Japan than are temporary immigrants, who hope to eventually return to their country of origin (Portes and Rumbaut, 2006).

Since the 1980s, Japan has accepted a significant number of immigrants from other countries because of a combination of several demographic, economic, and social trends (Tsuda and Cornelius, 2004). Eventually, the demand for labor in Japan exceeded the supply of domestic workers, as previous labor sources, such as rural workers, were depleted and as declining fertility rates had reduced the size of the Japanese workforce. Furthermore, an increasing number of Japanese youths became well educated and were thus unwilling to perform “3D” (dirty, dangerous, and difficult) jobs (Tsuda, 2006). The segmentation of the labor market between large and small firms also generated a need to introduce immigrants into small firms, which constituted a considerable portion of the secondary sector in Japan (Takenoshita, 2013a). Because workers in small firms receive lower compensation and fewer promotions but are exposed to a higher risk of unemployment, employment in these firms became less attractive to Japanese workers (Takenoshita, 2008). Consequently, small firms suffered from a severe labor shortage in the 1980s, and several employers sought unauthorized immigrant workers to fill the vacant positions.

Changes in Policy on Immigration Control in the 1990s and Its Consequences

To cope with these challenges, the Japanese government revised the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act in 1990. Although the Act officially prohibits foreign unskilled workers from entering Japan, the Japanese government has created various mechanisms that allow the introduction of a large number of unskilled workers from other countries to the Japanese economy. The revised immigration policy specifically allows the admission of second- and third-generation *Nikkeijin* (i.e., descendants of Japanese emigrants). Through this policy, several Japanese firms attempted to use *Nikkeijin* immigrants to meet the demand for unskilled labor in the Japanese economy, yet officially the policy aimed to provide *Nikkeijin* immigrants with opportunities to meet their relatives in Japan, learn the Japanese culture, and visit their ancestral homeland. The revised immigration law established a new visa category of “long-term resident,” which

includes several diverse groups, such as Indochinese refugees, families of settlers, and descendants of Japanese emigrants up to the third generation (Surak, 2008). As no restrictions are placed on the activities of individuals with a long-term resident visa, many *Nikkeijin* immigrants—who migrated from Latin American countries such as Brazil and Peru—were employed as precarious workers that were temporarily dispatched to client organizations to meet the strong demand for unskilled labor in Japan (Takenoshita, 2013b). This revision thus enabled the Japanese government to introduce unskilled workers from abroad to the Japanese economy without contradicting the basic principles of its immigration policies.

Another mechanism by which unskilled workers were introduced into Japan from other countries was a revision to trainee programs that allowed employers to accept trainees from abroad. Employer associations for small and medium-sized organizations strongly advocated for the introduction of unskilled migrant workers from abroad.

Given the serious labor shortage that resulted from the bubble economy, the Japanese government recognized the need to expand the trainee programs for small and medium-sized organizations (Iguchi, 2012). Although trainee programs were formally established so that trainees from developing countries could acquire technical skills in Japanese companies, many employers have used trainee programs as a source of unskilled foreign labor, employed at extremely low wages (Tsuda and Cornelius, 2004).² In other words, trainee programs have epitomized the Japanese short-term labor rotation system (Belanger et al., 2011). China has been a major country involved in sending trainees to Japan. In 2007, approximately three-quarters of trainees were Chinese; other trainees were Filipino, Thai, and Vietnamese.

The Feminization of Immigrants and the Growth of Marriage Immigrants

Immigration in Japan has increasingly become feminized. This trend has occurred partly because the structural shift in industry from manufacturing to services has created a strong demand for female workers and partly because demographic changes resulting in depopulation have led to demand not only for care workers from abroad, but also for foreign spouses for Japanese nationals. Such spouse flows help Japanese nationals perpetuate their families and contribute to the maintenance of communities. Several local governments and international marriage brokers have played a role in arranging marriages between Japanese men and immigrant women. In rural areas, many male workers in the agricultural sector have faced difficulties in marrying, as they are less attractive to women because of their lower socioeconomic status (Sellek, 2001). In addition, Japanese women have avoided marrying farmers, largely because of the prevalent patriarchal structure in which wives are expected to take a subordinate role in the traditional family. In several places in Japan, foreign spouses have migrated to rural areas and had children. However, due to the patriarchal system, some female immigrants have reportedly found life stressful when having to adapt to local environments and cultural practices that differ from those of their country of

origin (Kuwayama, 1995). Further, many female immigrants have to provide care not only for their children and husband, but also for their husband's parents.

The number of international marriages involving Asian women has also been increasing in urban areas. Private international marriage brokers have played a critical role in introducing foreign wives to Japanese men in these areas. One of the reasons that international marriage has increased in urban areas is because more Japanese women are attending college or university and can attain more prestigious jobs with higher salaries. To avoid downward mobility, these educated women tend not to marry men with low-paying jobs. Thus, some Japanese men residing in urban areas have faced difficulties in finding a spouse and have relied on international marriage brokers to find spouses from other countries (Sellek, 2001).

Changes in the Composition of Immigrants over Time

Figure 5.1 shows the number of foreign nationals in Japan during the period between 1975 and 2011. Although Koreans had been the largest group of foreigners until recently, the proportion of Koreans in the total number of foreigners in Japan has gradually declined. In 1975, 86 percent of foreigners were Korean nationals, whereas only 26 percent of foreigners were Korean nationals in 2011. Conversely, the number of Chinese people living in Japan has increased dramatically over time, and in 2007 the number of Chinese exceeded the number of Koreans. Brazilians comprise the third largest group of foreigners in Japan. Until the 1980s, the number of Brazilians in Japan was quite negligible. After the revision of the immigration policy in 1990, which allowed the admission of *Nikkeijin* immigrants into Japan, the Brazilian population rose rapidly from 1,955 in 1985 to 119,333 in 1991.




Figure 5.1 The Number of Foreign Nationals in Japan over Time

Source: Statistics of foreign registration records in Japan.

A large number of Filipino immigrants has also migrated to Japan, as shown in Figure 5.1. The number of Filipinos grew dramatically after the 1980s, exceeding 200,000 in 2007. Among Filipino immigrants, more women than men have migrated to Japan. For instance, in 2009, 80 percent of Filipino immigrants in Japan were women. Many of these Filipino women migrated to Japan during the 1980s and 1990s, seeking employment as entertainers in the sex industry. However, in the 2000s, the number of entertainment visa applications declined substantially because of greater governmental restriction on employment for such entertainers. Furthermore, a large number of female Filipino immigrants migrated to Japan through international marriages to Japanese men. Several local governments and international marriage brokers have played a role in arranging these marriages, as noted above.

The Growing Flexibility of the Labor Market and Immigrant Incorporation in Japan

The current flow of immigration from many countries highlights the great diversity of ways in which immigrants may be incorporated into the labor market of a host country. Highly skilled immigrant workers may attain higher socioeconomic status shortly after beginning work in the receiving country, whereas unskilled immigrants may not be able to attain upward social mobility even if they live in the host society for many years. Additionally, if immigrant entrepreneurs hire co-ethnic workers, newly arrived immigrants who are unfamiliar with the language and culture of the host society can use their mother tongue in the workplace. As such, ethnic enclave economies can provide newly arrived immigrants with work experience and training (Portes et al., 2005; Zhou, 1997). This is highly inconsistent with the conventional assimilation theory, which assumes that immigrants who engage in unskilled labor upon arrival in a host country can eventually upgrade their socioeconomic status, as they gradually adapt to the host society over time and across generations (Gordon, 1964; Zhou, 1997).

Moreover, wide variation exists in the labor market outcomes among immigrants in Japan, depending upon the level of immigrants' skills, whether an ethnic community exists, and the scale of immigrant entrepreneurship. To understand these differences among immigrant groups, we must take into account the effect of the institutional arrangements on immigrants' incorporation into the labor market. Further, the substantial segmentation of the labor market in Japan, between "core" and "periphery" sectors, should be accounted for to fully understand the labor market incorporation of immigrants.

As noted previously, labor market segmentation between large and small firms in Japan shaped the demand for immigrant workers in the small firm sector during the 1980s, as employment in the small firms was less attractive to Japanese workers because of the relatively poorer working conditions in small firms (Takenoshita, 2013a). In other words, the demand for immigrant workers has been structurally embedded in the Japanese labor market. Consequently, several small firms in the manufacturing and construction industry have relied on undocumented immigrant workers to meet labor demand.

In addition, institutional arrangements within the labor market in Japan have substantially shaped the way in which immigrants are employed in organizations (Takenoshita, 2013b). The Japanese labor market is characterized by long-term employment practices, seniority earnings, and firm-based labor unions (Takenoshita, 2008). One of the reasons for providing a high level of employment protection for workers in Japan is that employers have had a large incentive to invest in workers in order to enhance their firm-specific skills. An accumulation of firm-specific skills and technology enables organizations to produce high-quality products and thus to gain a comparative advantage over other firms (Estevez-Abe et al., 2001). However, this personnel employment strategy implicitly fosters gender discrimination in the workplace. Because of the gender-based allocation of family responsibilities in Japan, women are more likely to quit their job when they have young children. Many employers are thus more likely to invest in the work-related skills of men rather than those of women. Accordingly, many married women with young children have been precluded from gaining access to internal labor markets within business organizations and from climbing up the corporate ladder (Brinton, 2001).

Organizations need flexibility to respond to changes in their external environment and in product demand (Bochholz et al., 2009). However, if employers face obstacles in dismissing workers, organizations cannot adapt to declining labor demand. To ensure organizational flexibility, employers thus need to hire workers who can be easily dismissed. Part-time workers, workers with fixed-term contracts, temporary workers dispatched by other agencies, subcontractors, and so forth have thus been used to provide labor within nonstandard work arrangements (Hevenstone, 2010). Married women with young children have been a primary source for such work. Furthermore, globalization has accelerated economic competition across organizations and has increased economic uncertainty. Consequently, globalization has required organizations to become more flexible in the changing economic environment, thereby leading to an increase in the number of precarious workers in nonstandard work arrangements (Bochholz et al., 2009). Accordingly, the nonstandard employment sector constitutes a new segment of the labor market in Japan (Sato, 2010).

With the growing competitive pressures from globalization, immigrants in Japan have been increasingly employed as flexible workers who can be easily dismissed by employers for economic reasons. In the manufacturing industry, *Nikkeijin* immigrants are typically used as such flexible workers. Although official immigration policy in Japan bans unskilled immigrants from entering Japan and working, *Nikkeijin* immigrants have a privileged visa status in Japan because their work activities are not restricted at all. Thus, *Nikkeijin* immigrants can officially engage in any sort of occupation, ranging from professional to unskilled jobs. Nevertheless, most *Nikkeijin* immigrant workers from Latin America have been involved in unskilled jobs in the manufacturing industry (Takenoshita, 2013b).

Notably, *Nikkeijin* immigrants, mainly from Brazil and Peru, have been incorporated into the dispatched employment sector controlled by labor brokerage agencies and contract companies. In the 1990s and 2000s, the Japanese

government relaxed its restrictions on the occupations in which temporary employment agencies could be involved, but social protection of temporary workers has yet to be improved. This deregulation, which expanded the “periphery” sector of the labor market, has helped organizations employ flexible workforces (Imai, 2011). In addition, Japanese firms have come to rely on contract companies and temporary help agencies for another reason: labor brokerage agencies have more experience managing Brazilian workers with different linguistic and cultural backgrounds (Tanno, 2007).

As a result, Brazilian immigrants in Japan have been socioeconomically marginalized, rendered vulnerable to economic fluctuations, and substantially disadvantaged in the labor market. In the literature, immigration scholars have examined the ways in which immigrants can overcome their socioeconomic disadvantage and upgrade their socioeconomic status. In particular, US immigration scholars have demonstrated the importance of becoming entrepreneurs in the self-employment sector (Portes and Rumbaut, 2006; Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993). When immigrants become their own bosses, they can control the labor process and may not have to face discrimination inside their own organizations. If these entrepreneurs hire co-ethnic workers, their workers can speak the language of their country of origin in their workplace. Such workplaces comprise so-called ethnic niches or ethnic economies (Portes and Bach, 1985), which can provide newly arrived co-ethnic workers who lack language fluency in the host society with opportunities to work in the labor market. In addition, ethnic economies also provide co-ethnic workers with training so that they can acquire work-related skills that are specific to the host country’s labor market (Bailey and Waldinger, 1991).

Nevertheless, according to the 2000 and 2005 Japanese censuses, only approximately 1 percent of Brazilian workers in Japan are self-employed (Takenoshita, 2013b), partly because they can easily find jobs in the dispatched employment sector. Thus, an ethnic economy would be unlikely to help Brazilian immigrants overcome socioeconomic marginalization in Japan. Furthermore, regardless of whether such an ethnic economy would improve their socioeconomic status, Brazilian immigrants as a whole have failed to develop an ethnic economy in Japan (Takenoshita, 2013a). Brazilian entrepreneurs have been primarily engaged in managing Brazilian restaurants or providing goods and services associated with Brazilian culture, such as food, clothes, music, and imported DVDs, to their co-ethnics. Hence, Brazilian entrepreneurs have generally failed to target Japanese customers and other Japanese companies (Kataoka, 2004). As an exception, however, contract companies and temporary employment agencies that dispatch Brazilian temporary workers to Japanese client firms have successfully extended their business networks to other Japanese firms. As an example, I have been to several shops, grocery stores, and restaurants that Brazilian entrepreneurs run, and I rarely saw Japanese customers at these businesses. Consequently, Brazilian entrepreneurs compete with each other to attract a limited number of co-ethnic customers and thus fail to substantially grow their businesses. These entrepreneurs hence cannot afford to employ a large number of co-ethnic workers.

Trainee Programs—The Japanese Version of “Guest Worker Programs”

Immigrants are also utilized as temporary workers in programs for trainees and technical interns. Formally, trainee programs aimed to contribute in transferring skills from Japan to other developing countries by providing trainees with an opportunity to learn work-related skills in Japanese work settings (Iguchi, 2012). Traditionally, during the first year of such programs, immigrants were admitted into Japan as trainees. During the second and third years, the residence status for these workers was changed from trainee to technical intern. However, trainees and interns were not allowed to reside in Japan for more than three years. Immigrant workers who were admitted into Japan through these trainee programs were also not allowed to return to Japan under the same visa category. In this sense, the trainee system hinders immigrants from settling in Japan and functions as a type of “temporary guest worker program.” Employers thus deploy trainee programs to provide an ongoing source of low-paid temporary workers (Belanger et al., 2011; Tsuda and Cornelius, 2004).

The difference between trainees and technical interns lies in whether the immigrants were regarded as workers. Technical interns were treated as workers who were actually involved in the production process, whereas trainees were not treated as workers because they were assumed to be taking training courses to acquire skills relevant to Japanese work settings. Consequently, labor legislation, such as the Labor Standards Act and the Industrial Safety and Health Act, did not apply to foreign trainees. Nevertheless, these trainees were often used for unskilled, low-paying labor in factories where they had no opportunity to take training courses. Accordingly, they were less likely to acquire work-related skills in Japan. The lack of protection under labor laws has thus led to harsh working conditions for foreign trainees (Sellek, 2001).

Japanese immigration policy stipulates many restrictions on the work activities of trainees and technical interns (Kamibayashi, 2013). Notably, trainees are strongly tied to their first employer, and they cannot change employers once they migrate to Japan. Consequently, Japanese employers can exploit trainees and interns by subjecting them to harsh working conditions and paying them less than the minimum wage. When employers can no longer employ trainees and interns, a placement agency is supposed to find other employment for these workers. However, if an agency cannot find a new job for a trainee, then, under the trainee system, that trainee will have to leave Japan (Belanger et al., 2011; Tsuda and Cornelius, 2004).

The trainee system was revised in 2011 to abolish the status of trainee. Theoretically, every technical intern who enters Japan with a visa under the trainee system is treated as a worker upon arrival (Belanger et al., 2011; Kamibayashi, 2013). Accordingly, the current system officially protects all immigrant workers who enter Japan under this visa category because labor legislation, such as the Labor Standards Act, applies to technical interns. However, an important restriction on technical internship programs was maintained: interns from other countries cannot choose and change employers once they enter Japan. Thus, employers

can still subject technical interns to harsh working conditions because these interns cannot voluntarily change employers under their visa conditions and continue working in Japan; otherwise, they must return to their country of origin. Despite the recent revision to technical internship programs for immigrants in Japan, the current system nevertheless maintains an imbalanced power relationship between employers and foreign interns.

The Japanese Perception of Immigrant Workers

As noted previously, the labor market in Japan is characterized by segmentation between the “core” and “periphery” sectors. This labor market segmentation primarily originated from the male breadwinner model and gender discrimination in the workplace (Brinton, 1993). It is suggested that employers do not provide training to female workers and that they therefore allocate unskilled jobs or jobs that do not require training to female workers because employers perceive that women are more likely to quit their jobs than are men. Hence, employers’ perceptions of disadvantaged social groups shape how individuals within such social groups are employed and whether they are promoted up the corporate ladder, regardless of whether these perceptions reflect reality (Takenoshita, 2012). Many immigrant workers in Japan have often been precluded from gaining access to the core sector of the labor market, that is, the firm-based internal labor market. The workplace discrimination against immigrants in Japan primarily stems from employers’ recognition that immigrants are temporary rather than permanent residents (Takenoshita, 2013a). Therefore, employers do not invest in immigrant workers because they perceive that immigrants are likely to leave their jobs eventually. Stereotypical views of immigrants in Japan have thus led to discriminatory treatment of immigrant workers in the workplace.

Employer discrimination against immigrant workers reflects the general attitudes of ordinary Japanese people toward immigrants. Numerous scholars have demonstrated that Japanese people are often reluctant to accept immigrants from other countries because of the myth of ethnic homogeneity (Tanabe, 2013). Many Japanese people believe that Japanese society is primarily an ethnically homogeneous nation (Lie, 2001). The number of ethnic minorities and immigrants from other countries is considered to be negligible. Japanese people also perceive a clear national boundary between Japanese nationals and foreigners (Yoshino, 1992). Thus, Japanese people believe that Japan’s sovereign territory should be controlled by Japanese people because Japanese people and their ancestors have governed this territory over a long historical period.

In reality, however, the size of the foreign population in Japan has substantially expanded over the last several decades. According to Figure 5.1, the number of foreign nationals has tripled since the 1970s, and foreign nationals have become increasingly diverse in nationality or country of origin. Given this trend, it may be expected that the increasing number of immigrants may begin to change Japanese people’s attitudes toward immigrants. Figure 5.2 presents the results of a survey question concerning Japanese people’s attitudes toward the increasing number of immigrants




Figure 5.2 The Proportion of Those Who Are against an Increase in the Number of Foreigners in Respondent's Community

Source: This result comes from the Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS).

in their neighborhoods. The same question has been repeatedly measured in the Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS) for a decade. Regardless of the year in which the JGSS was implemented, approximately 60 percent of Japanese respondents opposed the increase in the number of foreign immigrants in their neighborhoods. Despite the actual growth of the immigrant population in Japan, the exclusionary attitudes of Japanese people toward immigrants have not changed significantly.

Support and Integration Programs for Immigrants

Two types of government policies shape the context of immigration in a given country: (1) immigration control policies, and (2) citizenship and welfare policies, which facilitate the integration of immigrants into the host society (Kogan, 2010). Immigration control policies enable a government to decide and select who is admitted into the destination country. In other words, the government can control the door for individuals outside the national border. Conversely, integration and welfare programs focus primarily on immigrants who have already been accepted into the host society. Policies that help immigrants integrate into the host society include welfare and integration policies specifically targeting immigrants, policies providing assistance for general populations, and citizenship policies determining access to formal citizenship (Kesler, 2006; Reitz, 2003).

Japanese citizenship and welfare policies have exacerbated the socioeconomic marginalization of unskilled immigrant workers in Japan. In some European countries, citizenship and welfare policies have played a significant role in helping immigrants, but similar policies do not exist in Japan. As argued above, the Japanese government has focused on immigration control and border enforcement measures, while neglecting the rights and citizenship of immigrants and their children (Takenoshita 2013b, 2015; Takenoshita et al., 2014).

Access to formal Japanese citizenship is highly restricted because of *jus sanguinis* (Kashiwazaki, 2000). The Japanese government considers foreign immigrants to be temporary rather than permanent residents; therefore, it has not addressed the right to citizenship for immigrants. The Japanese government continues to formally reject the characterization of Japan as a country of immigration (Tsuda, 2006; Tsuda and Cornelius, 2004), believing that foreign immigrants will return to their country of origin in the future. The myth of temporary migration legitimizes the lack of integration programs for immigrants in Japan. The Japanese government's stance toward immigrants appears quite similar to the German *Gastarbeiter* (guest worker) model, which also has implicitly assumed that the government does not need to integrate immigrants into the host country even if they permanently settle in the society (Takenoshita, 2015).

In contrast to the national government, local governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have provided social integration programs for immigrants in Japan (Tsuda, 2006) and have thus played a substantial role in mitigating the growing gap between policy intentions and policy outcomes. These programs focus on translating information about local governments into different languages and providing educational programs for school-age children. However, no integration programs address the socioeconomic marginalization confronted by unskilled immigrant workers (Pak, 2006). This shortcoming stems largely from the introduction of policies aimed at multicultural coexistence into the programs and services provided by local governments and NGOs. The aim of such *multiculturalism* is to draw attention to the cultural and linguistic barriers that hinder immigrants from participating in the larger society, but often neglects the structural discrimination and socioeconomic disparities that play a larger role in shaping the incorporation of immigrants (Takenoshita et al., 2014).

In addition, welfare policies for the overall population can greatly influence immigrant integration into the host society, sometimes adversely. For instance, where firm-specific skills are deeply rooted in companies' organizational structures, as in Japan, the state government is likely to facilitate employment protection to ensure that organizations do not lose workers with firm-specific skills (Estevez-Abe et al., 2001), as when helping firms keep redundant workers during economic slowdowns. In turn, this has led to a weaker role of the government in providing the economic and social support for the unemployed because this measure may encourage workers to move across organizations. A strong emphasis on employment protection has thus rendered disadvantaged workers, including immigrants, vulnerable to economic cycles.

Furthermore, it is important to consider what kind of changes have occurred in the Japanese labor market due to the relaxation of the employment protection policies that restricted the activities of labor-dispatching agencies (Imai, 2011). Such deregulation was motivated by economic globalization, which has required organizations to be more flexible in response to the changing external environment. During the 1990s and 2000s, there was an increase in the number of workers in nonstandard work arrangements, who were more vulnerable than other workers to economic fluctuations (Kalleberg, 2003). Nevertheless, Japan has not substantially enhanced the social protection of temporary workers. In Scandinavian countries,

the longer duration of unemployment benefits allows the unemployed to take vocational training courses. These programs have helped the unemployed to enhance their work-related skills and to return to the labor market. Despite the growing number of workers in nonstandard work arrangements in Japan, including migrant workers, Japan has not strengthened welfare policies to protect disadvantaged workers to the same extent as several European countries (Takenoshita, 2015).

The Growth of Unemployment and Integration Programs for Immigrants

As argued above, employment and welfare policies have shaped the context for immigration outcomes in Japan. Many unskilled immigrant workers have been incorporated into the peripheral sector of the labor market in Japan. Moreover, the lack of social inclusion policies for contingent workers has hindered immigrants from improving their socioeconomic status and has rendered immigrants highly vulnerable to economic fluctuations. Nevertheless, although immigrant workers who are employed by temporary employment agencies and contract companies are likely to often lose their jobs, they are not protected under the current mainstream welfare and employment regimes. Furthermore, the Great Recession, which originated largely from the American mortgage crisis in 2007, damaged the Japanese economy (Higuchi, 2010), and unemployment rates subsequently rose from 3 percent in 2007 to 5 percent in 2009. Employees in Japan, however, were not equally affected by the economic slowdown. Many temporary workers dispatched by temporary employment agencies and workers with fixed-term contracts lost their jobs during the latest recession; the risk of unemployment was therefore concentrated among these contingent workers.

Because of the concentration of Brazilian workers in the precarious employment sector, a large number of Brazilian workers became jobless in 2008 and 2009. Surveys of immigrants in Shizuoka Prefecture conducted in 2007 and 2009 showed that unemployment rates increased remarkably, from 4 percent to 27 percent, among these immigrants, whereas they increased only modestly, from 3 percent to 5 percent, among Japanese workers (Takenoshita, 2015). To cope with these challenges, the Japanese government implemented two programs. First, the government implemented a program providing a travel allowance to Latin American immigrants of Japanese ancestry to facilitate their return to their country of origin. This program lasted for one year. Moreover, the program stipulated that the applicants who were offered a travel allowance would not be granted a long-term resident visa for at least three years. Obviously, this program reflects the Japanese government's view of immigrants of Japanese descent as temporary immigrants rather than as legitimate members of society. The program thus represents a form of social exclusion, targeting immigrant temporary workers who are no longer needed in the Japanese economy (Takenoshita, 2015).

Second, the Japanese government implemented integration programs that provide Japanese language and vocational training to unemployed Latin American immigrants. This policy measure is designed to foster social inclusion among immigrants, in contrast to the policies encouraging jobless immigrants to return home.

There are generally two types of policy measures that protect the unemployed: active measures, which help the unemployed to return to the labor market by providing job matching and vocational training, and passive measures, which provide the unemployed with living expenses through unemployment benefits. The Japanese government has historically offered little protection for the unemployed because long-term employment practices have prevailed across Japanese organizations (Estevez-Abe et al., 2001). Specifically, long-term employment and seniority pay for regular workers have deterred employees from changing employers (Takenoshita, 2008), and the consequent lower turnover rates have allowed organizations to accumulate firm-specific skills. To complement this skill formation and human personnel development in organizations, the Japanese government has accordingly implemented greater employment protection for regular workers, but less protection for the unemployed (Estevez-Abe et al., 2001).

To cope with the massive growth of unemployment among immigrants, the Japanese government began to implement integration programs specifically targeting *Nikkeijin* immigrants. As part of these efforts, the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) implemented language courses and vocational training programs, which constitute one of the active measures of employment policies for the migrant unemployed. The total number of study hours in these programs ranges from 420 to 480 hours. By comparison, the duration of these programs in Japan seems to be shorter than that of similar programs in several European countries. Notably, the Japanese government provides free language and vocational training courses that facilitate disadvantaged immigrants' access to integration measures.³ In Europe, countries such as Denmark and Sweden provide free language courses, whereas countries such as Germany and the Netherlands require payment for language courses (Jacobs and Rea, 2007).

Several aspects of the integration measures in Japan may nevertheless be insufficient to ensure social inclusion for immigrants. Notably, immigrants do not receive any social allowance while participating in language and vocational training courses, and many courses are provided in the evening because many participants work during the day. The lack of social allowance thus prevents unemployed immigrants from participating in integration programs. Furthermore, the duration of unemployment benefits is very short, ranging from six months to one year. Conversely, in European countries, unemployment benefits are provided for more than two years. The short duration of unemployment benefits in Japan has made it difficult for the MHLW to implement language courses and vocational training on a long-term basis. In other words, the institutional arrangements which reflect employment and welfare policies have substantially constrained the integration programs in Japan and their effectiveness (Takenoshita, 2015).

Conclusion

This chapter provides an overview of the context for the reception of immigrants in Japan relative to that in other countries. Given the demographic shifts that have occurred, including the aging of the Japanese population, Japanese society cannot avoid accepting a large number of immigrants from other countries to maintain

the Japanese economy and society. Japan has historically emphasized immigration control and border enhancement, and thus, integration measures to help integrate immigrants into Japanese society are generally lacking. As the context for the incorporation of immigrants in Japan depends largely on the labor market structure and welfare regimes that target the general population, we must carefully consider how established institutional arrangements may prevent immigrants from being integrated into Japanese society.

Although a policy discussion on immigration control and border enforcement is ongoing in the Japanese government, discussion on how to integrate immigrants into Japanese society is lacking. Nevertheless, given the shrinkage of the Japanese population, policymakers need to understand the importance of accepting a large number of immigrants from other countries to help maintain the Japanese economy and society. Recently, the Japanese economy has experienced an economic boom in the construction industry, associated with recovery from the great earthquake in March 2011 and the production of facilities for the Olympic Games in Tokyo in 2020. The Japanese government has considered using skilled and unskilled immigrant workers to meet the labor demand by modifying the technical intern programs. However, the Japanese government has continued its stance against becoming a country of immigration. Although the Japanese government has relaxed restrictions on immigration and expanded technical intern programs to increase the number of immigrant workers in Japan, it still regards immigrant workers as temporary residents rather than legitimate members of society. The Japanese government's current stance toward immigrants is reflected in its use of the term "foreigners," not immigrants, to refer to immigrant workers, highlighting an attitude which essentially excludes immigrant workers from Japanese society (Kashiwazaki, 2011).

Divergence between official immigration policy and actual practice has been growing in Japan. Can the Japanese government maintain its current immigration policy despite the growing presence of immigrants in Japan? Without measures to integrate immigrants or efforts to decrease the gap between official immigration policy and practice, immigrants who already reside and have settled in Japan will remain marginalized and excluded. These immigration challenges may provide Japanese society with an opportunity to revisit the unequal treatment of minority people who lack citizenship in Japan and the myth of ethnic homogeneity and may finally enrich Japanese society's ethnic and cultural diversity.

Notes

1. For instance, many Koreans living in Japan were discriminated against in the labor market. Specifically, Koreans were prevented from gaining access to jobs in the private sector, which was also hindered by their lack of Japanese nationality. As a result, Koreans were concentrated in the self-employment sector (Kim, 2003).
2. In the past, the trainee programs distinguished between trainees and technical interns. In the first year, although they were assigned repetitive work tasks, trainees were not legally recognized as workers and were thus not covered or protected by labor law. After one year, upon passing skill tests, trainees became interns and were legally protected by

labor law. The programs allow employers to pay trainees less than minimum wage. Consequently, the “trainee” category was abolished from this system in 2010. Under the new system, immigrants become interns at the beginning of their stay in Japan, which provides them with protection under Japanese labor laws (Belanger et al., 2011).

3. See Takenoshita (2015) for details on the integration programs for immigrants in Japan.

References

- Bailey, T., and R. Waldinger. 1991. “Primary, Secondary, and Enclave Labor Markets: A Training Systems Approach.” *American Sociological Review* 56(4): 432–45.
- Belanger, D., K. Ueno, K. T. Hong, and E. Ochiai. 2011. “From Foreign Trainees to Unauthorized Workers: Vietnamese Migrant Workers in Japan.” *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 20(1): 31–53.
- Bochholz, S., D. Hofacker, M. Mills, H.-P. Blossfeld, K. Kurz, and H. A. Hofmeister. 2009. “Life Courses in the Globalization Process: The Development of Social Inequalities in Modern Societies.” *European Sociological Review* 25(1): 53–71.
- Brinton, M. C. 1993. *Women and the Economic Miracle: Gender and Work in Postwar Japan*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- . 2001. “Married Women’s Labor in East Asian Economies.” Pp. 1–37 in *Women’s Working Lives in East Asia*, edited by M. C. Brinton. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Chitose, Y. 2008. “Compulsory Schooling of Immigrant Children in Japan: A Comparison across Children’s Nationalities.” *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 17(2): 157–87.
- Crul, M., and J. Schneider. 2010. “Comparative Integration Context Theory: Participation and Belonging in New Diverse European Cities.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 33(7): 1249–68.
- Estevez-Abe, M., T. Iversen, and D. W. Soskice. 2001. “Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State.” Pp. 145–83 in *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*, edited by P. A. Hall and D. W. Soskice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gordon, M. M. 1964. *Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hevenstone, D. 2010. “National Context and Atypical Employment.” *International Sociology* 25(3): 315–47.
- Higuchi, N. 2010. “Keizai Kiki to Zainichi Brajiru Jin.” *Ohara Shakai Mondai Kenkyujo Journal* 622: 50–66.
- Iguchi, Y. 2012. “What Role Do Low-Skilled Migrants Play in the Japanese Labor Markets?” *American Behavioral Scientist* 56(8): 1029–57.
- Imai, J. 2011. *The Transformation of Japanese Employment Relations: Reform without Labor*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Jacobs, D., and A. Rea. 2007. “The End of National Models? Integration Courses and Citizenship Trajectories in Europe.” *International Journal on Multicultural Societies* 9(2): 264–83.
- Kajita, T. 1994. *Gaikokujin Roudousha to Nihon*. Tokyo: NHK Publishing.
- Kalleberg, A. L. 2003. “Flexible Firms and Labor Market Segmentation: Effects of Workplace Restructuring on Jobs and Workers.” *Work and Occupations* 30(2): 154–75.
- Kamibayashi, C. 2013. “Rethinking Temporary Foreign Workers’ Rights: Living Conditions of Technical Interns in the Japanese Technical Internship Program (Tip).” Tokyo: Institute of Comparative Economic Studies, Hosei University.

- Kashiwazaki, C. 2000. "The Politics of Legal Status: The Equation of Nationality with Ethnonational Identity." Pp. 13–31 in *Koreans in Japan: Critical Voices from the Margin*, edited by S. Ryang. London: Routledge.
- . 2011. "Internationalism and Transnationalism: Responses to Immigration in Japan." Pp. 41–57 in *Migration and Integration: Japan in Comparative Perspective*, edited by G. Vogt and G. S. Roberts. Munchen: Iudicium.
- Kataoka, H. 2004. "Hamamatsu Shi Ni Okeru Ethnic Business No Seiritsu, Tenkai to Chiiki Shakai." *Keizai Chirigaku Nenpo* 50: 1–25.
- Kesler, C. 2006. "Social Policy and Immigrant Joblessness in Britain, Germany and Sweden." *Social Forces* 85(2): 743–70.
- Kim, M. 2003. "Ethnic Stratification and Inter-Generational Differences in Japan: A Comparative Study of Korean and Japanese Status Attainment." *International Journal of Japanese Sociology* 12: 6–16.
- Kogan, I. 2010. *Working through Barriers: Host Country Institutions and Immigrant Labour Market Performance in Europe*. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Brill.
- Kuwayama, N. 1995. *Kokusai Kekkon to Stress*. Tokyo: Akashi Shoten.
- Lie, J. 2001. *Multiethnic Japan*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Pak, K. T. 2006. "Cities and Local Citizenship in Japan." Pp. 65–96 in *Local Citizenship in Recent Countries of Immigration: Japan in Comparative Perspective*, edited by T. Tsuda. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Portes, A., and R. L. Bach. 1985. *Latin Journey: Cuban and Mexican Immigrants in the United States*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Portes, A., P. Fernandez-Kelly, and W. Haller. 2005. "Segmented Assimilation on the Ground: The New Second Generation in Early Adulthood." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28(6): 1000–40.
- Portes, A., and R. G. Rumbaut. 2006. *Immigrant America: A Portrait*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Portes, A., and J. Sensenbrenner. 1993. "Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social Determinants of Economic-Action." *American Journal of Sociology* 98(6): 1320–50.
- Reitz, J. G. 2003. *Host Societies and the Reception of Immigrants*. La Jolla, CA: Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, University of California, San Diego.
- Sato, Y. 2010. "Stability and Increasing Fluidity in the Contemporary Japanese Social Stratification System." *Contemporary Japan* 22: 7–22.
- Sellek, Y. 2001. *Migrant Labour in Japan*. New York: Palgrave.
- Surak, K. 2008. "Convergence in Foreigners' Rights and Citizenship Policies? A Look at Japan." *International Migration Review* 42(3): 550–75.
- Takenoshita, H. 2008. "Voluntary and Involuntary Job Mobility in Japan: Resource, Reward and Labor Market Structure." *Sociological Theory and Methods* 23(2): 85–104.
- . 2012. "Family, Labour Market Structures and the Dynamics of Self-Employment in Three Asian Countries: Gender Differences in Self-Employment Entry in Japan, Korea and Taiwan." *Comparative Social Research* 29: 85–112.
- . 2013a. "Labour Market Flexibilisation and the Disadvantages of Immigrant Employment in Japan: The Case of Japanese-Brazilian Immigrants." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 39(7): 1177–95.
- . 2013b. "The Labour Market Incorporation of Brazilian Immigrants in Japan: Institutional Arrangements and Their Labour Market Outcomes." Pp. 155–78 in *Migration: Practices, Challenges and Impact*, edited by H. T. Huy. New York: Nova Science Publishers.
- . 2015. "Labor Market Structure, Welfare Policy and the Integration of Immigrants in Japan: Brazilian Immigrants During the Economic Downturn." Pp. 234–55 in

- International Migrants in Japan: Contributions in an Era of Population Decline*, edited by Y. Ishikawa. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press.
- Takenoshita, H., Y. Chitose, S. Ikegami, and E. Ishikawa. 2014. "Segmented Assimilation, Transnationalism, and Educational Attainment of Brazilian Immigrant Children in Japan." *International Migration* 52(2): 84–99.
- Tanabe, S. (Ed.). 2013. *Japanese Perceptions of Foreigners*. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press.
- Tanno, K. 2007. *Ekkyousuru Koyou System to Gaikokujin Roudousha*. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.
- Tsuda, T. 2006. "Localities and the Struggle for Immigrant Rights: The Significance of Local Citizenship in Recent Countries of Immigration." Pp. 3–36 in *Local Citizenship in Recent Countries of Immigration: Japan in Comparative Perspective*, edited by T. Tsuda. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Tsuda, T., and W. A. Cornelius. 2004. "Japan: Government Policy and Immigrant Reality." Pp. 438–76 in *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, edited by W. A. Cornelius, T. Tsuda, P. L. Martin, and J. F. Hollifield. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Yoshino, K. 1992. *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan: A Sociological Enquiry*. London: Routledge.
- Zhou, M. 1997. "Segmented Assimilation: Issues, Controversies, and Recent Research on the New Second Generation." *International Migration Review* 31(4): 975–1008.

Part II

Why Half the Municipal Governments Disappear Under a National Mergers Policy? Changing Local Bases in “Globalizing” Japan*

Takashi Machimura

An Unexpected Result of a Local “Reform” Policy

In the 1980s, when Japan was enjoying its bubble economy with a wild sense of enthusiasm, the somewhat flamboyant phrase, the “world city” Tokyo, frequently appeared in documents of government policies and plans. The “world city” policy had a goal of reorganizing Tokyo’s urban structure in order to turn the city into an international financial center. This policy, which was supported by the political coalition of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, the Central Government, and political parties, had a major political influence in the second half of the decade (Machimura, 1994). Fanned by this movement, central Tokyo recorded an abnormally high surge in land prices and the stock market. It did not last long, however. In the short period between the late 1980s and the early 1990s, land and stock prices fell to approximately one-third of their initial level. The economic bubble had burst.

For the next ten years, Japan struggled to clean up the mess of the burst bubble, and was faced with a long period of economic stagnation. However, on the world level, this was the period of full-scale globalization in which the Cold War came to an end and the Internet emerged and gained momentum; at the same time, it was an era of neoliberalism during which free market principles began to gain wide support and exert influence. For this reason, it is incorrect to regard the changes that Japan experienced during the period of the “Lost Decades” as just a short-term phenomenon of the bubble economy and its backlash. Rather, we need to understand that period as a time when Japan’s “postwar regime,” which had been shaped in the second half of the twentieth century, was forced to transform itself or break up in order to adapt to the changing global environment.

Furthermore, Japan's changes had already been influenced by other factors, such as its low birthrate and aging population, over a longer period of transformation in Japanese society.

Because those changes were continuous and cumulative, they prolonged the period of stagnation and exploration in Japan. It is therefore necessary to turn our eyes to the process of multilayered changes in order to understand the present local communities in Japan. Japanese society per se is never a "singular" society. As I discuss in this chapter, each of the changes was a factor that could have occurred in any country. Yet, there were Japanese characteristics ("singularities"), in that within a short period of time, those changes, half by chance, half by structural inevitability, washed over society and overlapped with one another.

In the following discussion, I introduce these characteristics of Japanese society while examining the large-scale consolidation of municipalities as an example of the major changes Japan's local communities have experienced over the last 20 years.

As of 2000, there were 3,231 municipalities in Japan, which were divided into cities, towns, and villages. However, as of 2010, the number dropped sharply to 1,730. In Japan, abolishing or integrating administrative institutions and organizations that have been strongly associated with vested interests has been considered extremely difficult to achieve. Thus, although, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Central Government declared that it would halve the number of municipalities, people did not necessarily believe that it could be done. In reality, however, that number fell by nearly half in approximately five years. How was such large-scale "reform" possible?

From the Collapse of the "World City" Policy to the End of Postwar Developmentalism

The policy aimed at making Tokyo "a world city" was premised on the idea that the city of Tokyo plays the role of linking a global economy and a domestic economy in a concentrated and exclusive manner. From the standpoint of the rescaling theory (Brenner, 2004, 2009, 2011), it had characteristics of a multi-scale coordination process. However, regarding it at the scale of a state or nation, it seemed to be a policy to further amplify the spatial organization with overconcentration in Tokyo.

Since the period of high economic growth, Japan's national land policy had been characterized primarily by a policy of developmentalism focusing on redressing regional disparities between the three major metropolitan areas and local regions, as well as promoting interregional balance. For this reason, the Tokyo "world city" policy was regarded as something greatly deviating from that existing policy line; it drew opposition from the public, particularly from local regions. The policy was considered to further exacerbate the overconcentration of Tokyo and this issue was symbolically called the "Tokyo problem" in Japan (Nihon KeizaiShimbun Press, 1988). One case in which this issue surfaced was the dispute

over the characterization of the “world city” Tokyo in the Fourth National Comprehensive Development Plan, which was in the process of being formulated in the mid-1980s (Machimura, 1994; Saito, 2012).

Figure 6.1 shows a schematic diagram of the situation of state rescaling in the second half of the 1980s. The Tokyo “world city” policy—with an emphasis on directly linking a global scale and an urban scale by partially jumping over a state scale—was a precursor to the spatial policy aspiring for interurban competition on a global scale, which would get fully underway in the 1990s.

However, looking back now, there remained several historical and geographic restrictions in terms of the thoroughness of globalization.

First, in the second half of the 1980s, the Cold War was still going on and the integration of world markets had not been implemented sufficiently. After the 1990s, economic globalization would spread all over the world, involving many of the hitherto socialist countries and the third world. Ironically, Tokyo and the rest of Japan, still stagnant, would miss out on this globalization and be forced to remain one lap behind.

Second, although the idea of linking a global scale and an urban scale surfaced as a policy issue, its specific image remained in the stage of industrialization. For instance, the Tokyo Waterfront Subcenter plan, a main part of the “world city” policy of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government in the 1980s, evolved from the idea of physically constructing an “international port of information” named Tokyo Teleport (Machimura, 1994). However, the very concept of concentrating, managing, and processing flows of information by constructing a huge information processing facility with a parabolic antenna in one place would soon grow archaic. This was in the mid-1980s, when the Internet had not yet spread into the civilian realm. After the widespread use of the Internet, the linked formation of a global




Figure 6.1 A Schematic Diagram of the Rescaling in the Second Half of the 1980s

scale and a local scale would eventually spread like an “interface,” not a limited node “point.” The Tokyo Waterfront Subcenter, initially envisioned to be a financial and information center, was later diverted to an urban resort space.

Third, the functions that characterized Tokyo as an international financial center in the 1980s were exclusively supported by activities of Japanese corporations; they had invested abroad immense amounts of capital accumulated by domestic business activities and by trade. In other words, Tokyo differed greatly in its foundation from preceding “world cities” such as New York and London that had developed their roles as international financial centers based on capital flowing in from overseas.

In this manner, Tokyo’s “world city” policy was not only eventually shelved without gaining enough support domestically, it also hit the wall as an “early” policy that would not necessarily correspond to the policy in the later era of full-fledged globalization. Then, due to the collapse of the bubble economy, which would occur shortly after, the foundation of this policy was shaken to its roots.

From the 1990s onward, Japan continued to endure a long period of economic stagnation. Japan next selected a policy institutionally adhering to the policy of developmentalism, which had been dominant in the past. In the first half of the 1990s, public investment by central and local governments showed a sharp increase as part of the economic-stimulus package. Figure 6.2 shows the transition of the total amount of public spending in the national economy (including both national and local governments) along with the gross domestic product (GDP) of the same period. Public expenditure can be broadly divided into the public gross capital formation comprising of public works projects, and the government final consumption expenditure that includes social welfare. As we can see here, from




Figure 6.2 Account-by-Account Details of Public Expenditure (Japan, 1980–2009)

Source: *The 2009 National Accounting (2000 Standard, 93SNA)*, The Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office, 2011. http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/jp/sna/data/data_list/kakuhou/files/h21/h21_kaku_top

around the beginning of the 1990s, the rate of government spending began to rise sharply due to the economy-boosting measures and the advance of the aging society, while the GDP stagnated. In particular, the general government fixed capital formation, which is comprised of public works projects, increased rapidly; its rate against the GDP exceeded 7 percent from 1992 to 1999, and reached 8.6 percent in 1995. The expenditure that rose especially sharply was that by local governments that had been faced with more severe economic conditions.

However, the increase in government spending, which had been provided mainly by issuing bonds and without the backing of tax revenues, reached its limit in the mid-1990s. In terms of the breakdown of spending, the focus gradually moved from the developmentalist investment in public works projects to social security as the aging of the population rapidly advanced. As a result, the percentage of the general government fixed capital formation against the GDP continued to fall to 6.9 percent in 2000, 4.6 percent in 2005, and 3.9 percent in 2008.

It was clear by then that the Keynesian economic-stimulus measures of investment by the national government had not functioned sufficiently. Under increasingly fierce global competition stemming from the end of the Cold War, the first thing Japanese corporations chose in order to maintain their capital accumulation was a sweeping reduction of labor cost and the subsequent instability of working conditions (such as low wages, employment under limited terms, a shortened employment period, and a decline in the rate of union organization). Their second choice, mainly by manufacturers, was moving their base of operations overseas.

From 2000 to 2005, within the number of domestic workers, the total labor force decreased by 1.53 million, 1.35 million in the manufacturing industry (*Labor Force Survey*, Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications). On the other hand, during the same period, a great many Japanese corporations turned to foreign countries, seeking relatively cheap labor.

Let us look at Figure 6.3. According to *The Foreign Direct Investment Database 2010*, compiled by the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI), an incorporated administrative agency, the number of local workers employed by Japanese corporations in foreign countries saw an increase of 1.35 million from 2000 to 2005. China had by far the largest increase among those countries. During the same five-year period, the number of Chinese workers employed by Japanese corporations rose by 750,000, reaching a total of 1.4 million. However, those statistics, by their nature, reflect only part of the actual data (calculated by the author based on data provided by the RIETI, 2011).

As global competition grew fierce, "light-footed" capital and corporations went on to explore a new spatial scale of their own, which would fit their business activity. In the case of Japanese companies, one of their measures was to further expand the scale of activity from Japan, a single-nation scale, to East and Southeast Asia, a regional scale. However, corporations moving their base of operations overseas from Japan will not only contribute to a relative decrease of domestic employment, but also deal a major blow to the economy of the region where the corporation was formerly located. Consequently, the foundation of taxation by the national government will be gradually affected, rendering it difficult for the




Figure 6.3 Foreign Workers Locally Employed by Japanese Corporations (by Main Countries and Regions, 1995–2006)

Note: The *Foreign Direct Investment Database 2010* was created by re-tabulating individual questionnaire data such as *The Survey of Overseas Business Activities*, by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). Thus, those statistics can apply only to the corporations that had responded to the survey, not all the Japanese corporations overseas.

Source: The *Foreign Direct Investment Database 2010*, the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). <http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/database/FDI2010/index.html> (accessed on May 2, 2012)

government to aggressively implement economy-boosting measures, or leading to a severe financial crisis.

Overall, it was clear that the coordination policy by the government sector on a national scale had been limited. The crisis was especially serious in some domestic regions, where employment had been lost and people had struggled with adverse financial conditions. Entering the new century, the new measure to spatially reorganize the local unit itself, literally the “spatial fix” policy (Jessop, 2002), would go on to make major progress.

The End Result Called “The Great Heisei Consolidation”: A Japanese Form of State Rescaling

The measure to coordinate between two scales involving local governments made major progress, first on the financial front. In the early 2000s, and under the Koizumi administration in particular, the “Three-in-One Reform” policy was carried out in earnest to handle local government finances. The reform, consisted of the three measures to be simultaneously implemented: a reduction of various types of subsidies paid by the Central Government to local governments, a reduction of the distribution of the local allocation tax from the Central Government, and the transfer of tax sources from the Central Government to local governments. This reform had the characteristics of an interscale coordination in

finances and authorities. Since the 1990s, the government had implemented the "decentralization" measure, part of which, it was pointed out, was the "Three-in-One Reform" policy. In reality, though, due to the fact that the subsidies from the government, which used to back up various public services, were largely cut, it was becoming increasingly and decidedly difficult for small-scale municipalities, financially weak in the first place, to survive.

Thus, there was the above financial coordination measure in the background of the movement toward the "Great Heisei Consolidation" in the early 2000s, which went on to gain further momentum. With a goal of reducing the number of municipalities, the Central Government promoted and implemented the consolidation policy on a national scale by employing carrot-and-stick dual incentives under which the government would give the merging municipality administrative and financial support by issuing special bonds for post-merger projects, yet also reduce local allocation tax grants. Thus, the "Great Heisei Consolidation" policy had the characteristics of state-initiated spatial reorganization on a local scale. However, it is noteworthy that behind the major impact of the policy over a short period of time—contrary to most predictions and thanks to state-level guidance—there was also the reality that each municipality had been faced with severe circumstances such as a shrinking population and declining industry due to low birthrate and an aging society.

As a result of this consolidation, the 3,231 municipalities existing as of 2000 sharply dropped to 1,730 in 2010. To be more accurate, 2,090 municipalities, approximately two-thirds of the municipalities existing in 2000, were engaged in the consolidation; subsequently, either by being merged or newly founded, they were eventually grouped into a total of 589 municipalities. At one time, 42.5 percent of the total population of Japan lived in those 2,090 municipalities (based on the 2005 data). Translated in terms of area, 56.3 percent of Japan's total area experienced a spatial reorganization in the form of consolidation (computed by the author, based on the Population Census). In any case, half or more of Japan underwent a spatial rescaling and a boundary restructuring in practically less than five years.

Here, let us examine in detail the characteristics of local spatial rescaling. As stated previously, the Great Heisei Consolidation had strong aspects of rescaling and integration of small-scale municipalities that had been forced into difficult circumstances because of such measures as the "Three-in-One Reform" policy. To confirm this, I tabulated population and area data by dividing the 2,090 former municipalities, the actually consolidated ones in total, into the two groups of municipalities: those with the largest population in each of their consolidated areas ("central municipalities" hereafter) and the rest ("peripheral municipalities" hereafter). Figure 6.4 shows the results.

According to the results of the tabulated data, before the consolidation there were 589 central municipalities and 1,501 peripheral municipalities. Let us add population numbers for each group. As of 2005, the total population of the 589 central municipalities was 40.65 million, while that of the 1,501 peripheral municipalities (approximately three times in number) was merely 13.7 million. By simple calculation, the average population of the central municipalities was 69,000, while that of the peripheral municipalities was approximately 9,000. What emerges from here is a policy under which plural small-scale municipalities were




Figure 6.4 Share of Municipalities That Experienced the “Great Heisei Consolidation” (Number of Municipalities, Total Area, and Total Population)

transferred at once to relatively large-scale neighboring municipalities. To put it in perspective, this meant that one central municipality was consolidated with approximately three peripheral municipalities.

The Great Heisei Consolidation was, by design, a policy to rescale the administrative units that govern national land space at the local level. In that sense, it was an approach that undertook local and “horizontal” rescaling. It is often stated formally that the Great Heisei Consolidation was implemented to streamline the administration and further advance administrative services by a scale expansion of municipalities. Yet, in reality, this policy had strong characteristics of an endeavor to automatically incorporate certain areas among local regions, especially “peripheral” areas in a serious financial crisis, into relatively larger neighboring regional cities.

The idea was to prepare governing units at the local level through consolidation, to which the government could potentially provide versatile and high-level administrative services, including welfare, and then transfer part of state authorities and financial resources. Through all this, the Central Government would selectively withdraw from the local scale. The “peripheral area” that had lost its




Figure 6.5 A Schematic Diagram to Help Understand the Rescaling in the Early 2000s in Japan

autonomy as a “governing unit” would have no choice but to preserve and develop its own residential services or explore ways to maintain its regional identity in the newly integrated unit (e.g., Aoki and Tamura, 2010; Maruyama, 2008).

Such a local- and large-scale spatial rescaling actually took place on the national scale within a limited period of time by employing state-level incentives such as “special bonds for post-merger projects” and a reduction of the local allocation tax. In this reality, one can see the characteristics of a “vertical” rescaling in the Great Heisei Consolidation (Maruyama, 2012).

During the same period, the state attempted to continuously wield influence over the local scale in diverse ways; the government did this by founding the “Special Zone” as a descending reorganization or by flexibly establishing the diverse gray zone where the government, public, and private sectors intersect with one another—in other words, by controlling even the concept of a descaling or interscale area.

Figure 6.5 is a schematic diagram to help understand Japan’s rescaling in the early 2000s. As is customary with such a diagram, it is somewhat simplistic. Yet the figure describes the way different scales covary or compete against each other while incorporating rescaling approaches within each scale.

Conclusions

In conclusion, the following five points emerge. First, in Japan, the approach to dealing with limitations on capital accumulation and social integration was developed by diversely connecting regional rescaling and state rescaling, with the main focus on capital. However, in the last two decades, while regional rescaling by

corporations and capital faced with a crisis showed supranational or global progress, the rescaling of governmental functions has been limited to domestic purposes. The gap between economic and political spaces has thus become increasingly larger. In this respect, the difficulties of the coordination policy have grown.

Second, various measures—including interscale coordination—were expected to play a role in coordinating ever-expanding interregional disparities in Japan. In reality, however, those measures also caused or amplified new types of interregional inequalities.

Third, although it is true that the authorities of the Central Government, founded on the unit of the state, have weakened, they have retained strong regulative power in terms of institutional design in response to a crisis and postproject evaluations. How did a series of competition-oriented spatial policies, which the state of Japan under developmentalism experienced without a sufficient foundation of liberalism, end up reorganizing the skewed relationship between neoliberalism and developmentalism? On this point, there have been essential studies from international perspectives (e.g., Sorensen, 2011).

Fourth, spatial rescaling in Japan was launched as a response to crises, particularly those involving capital accumulation and social integration. Consequently, however, an attempt to manage one crisis caused another; this chain-reaction characteristic went on to occupy a major place in spatial rescaling. This “crisis of crisis management” theory provides important clues to understanding Japanese cases. As pointed out in the works of Habermas and Offe a system crisis materializes in a chain reaction through a social integration crisis, legitimation crisis, or identity crisis (Habermas, 1975; Offe, 1984). But which actor assumed the national spatial policy? And which actor opposed or resisted it? Rescaling theory, conceived exclusively at the system level, is not necessarily equipped with an adequate analysis framework to answer these questions.

Fifth, behind the practical implementation of rescaling theory in Europe and North America, there were specific cases of experiencing “scale” reorganization, such as the founding of the European Union. In contrast, the trend of regional scale formation in East Asia remains unclear. In terms of capital and labor, while potential and functional areas for scale formation have already been observed in East Asia as well, the rescaling by the respective states coordinating those moves seems undeveloped. Also, for historical and geopolitical reasons in East Asia, the already strained relations have worsened. Is there a possibility for any governance and corresponding spatial formation? The answer to this is of increasing importance in the current conflicting situations.

Here, at the end of this chapter, I like to point out that the Great East Japan Earthquake that occurred in 2011 helped expose the reality that further diverse relations coexisted in terms of the spatial arrangement of authorities and functions. More specifically, those relations were: (1) the emerging United States–Japan relationship as a temporary spatial scale in response to a crisis, (2) the space between logistics and coordination at a national level when a military organization (Self-Defense Forces) forms in an emergency as an intermediary between the government, the market, and civil society, and (3) a multiscale coordination

mechanism increasingly emerging during the process of exploring postearthquake recovery measures.

Will these series of events sever the existing institutional trajectory or reproduce it? To comprehend the diversity of those spatial measures, we need to interlink not only scale concepts, but also frameworks of other spaces such as region, place, and network.

With the progress of globalization, there have been more cases of coexistence of the actors who advocate a spatial strategy based on diverse scales. There have also been more approaches to coordinating the existing scales in order to deal with recent movements, such as the Great Heisei Consolidation and the Special Zone policies. What this means is that they have generated additional new problems in terms of social governance. In particular, there is one urgent question: How possible is it to substantiate democratic governance under multiscaled circumstances? Since space is limited, let me enumerate only the issues in the following:

- First, how do we determine who is and who is not a member under newly emerging multiscaled circumstances? And how do we redefine civil rights? To answer these questions, a certain concept other than a yes-no dichotomy will be required.
- Second, how does one plan a system that enables democratic governance based on representation and participation? And upon what will its legitimacy and rationale be based?
- Third, is there a certain "optimal" scale in multilayered scales of governance? For instance, how do we coordinate the two standards in "scale and democracy," questioned by R. Dahl and E. R. Tufts (1973)—in other words, "effective participation" and the "system's functional efficacy"?
- Fourth, what role will the "state," still the strongest scale and system, play under multiscaled and increasingly mobile circumstances?

None of these issues are new. However, the fact that they have surfaced again is a characteristic of the new circumstances our society is in. In an ever-globalizing society, the versatile ability or potential to flexibly employ multiple scales according to the purpose and situation, rather than relying on specific scales, has increasingly become one of the important prerequisites for economic success. However, there aren't a great many people who are rich with such ability or potential to handle multiple scales. From there, disparities are generated. Thus, how will we address the inequality issue? There are many problems ahead of us.

Note

- * The major part of this chapter is based on an English translation of my previously published article in Japanese, which appeared as "Examining 'attempted' state rescaling as a political strategy in Japan: From global city formation to 'Heisei municipal mergers,'" in *Annals of Regional and Community Studies*, Vol. 25, 2013. I thank the Japan Association of Regional and Community Studies for its permission to translate and reuse the article.

References

- Aoki, Y. and Tamura, M., eds., 2010, *Fighting Local Communities: The Great Consolidation in the Heisei Period and Small-Scale Municipalities*, Kyoto: NakanishiyaShuppan.
- Brenner, N., 2004, *New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Brenner, N., 2009, "Open Questions in State Rescaling," *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, 2: 123–139.
- Brenner, N., 2011, "The Urban Question and the Scale Question: Some Conceptual Clarifications," in Schiller, N. G. and Caglar, A., eds., *Locating Migration: Rescaling Cities and Migrations*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press: 23–41.
- Dahl, R. and Tufts, E. R., 1973, *Size and Democracy*, Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Habermas, J., 1975, *Legitimation Crisis*, Boston: Beacon Press.
- Jessop, B., 2002, *The Future of the Capitalist State*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Machimura, T., 1994, "World City" Tokyo's Structural Change: *Sociology of Urban Restructuring*, Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Press.
- Maruyama, M., 2008, "The Conditions for Local Governance After the Great Heisei Consolidation: From the Perspective of Local Democracy," *Annals of the Japan Association of Regional and Community Studies*, 20: 103–118.
- Maruyama, M., 2012, "State Rescaling and Urban Governance: An Example of Local Politics of the 'Great Heisei Consolidation,'" *Sociology Review*, 62(4): 476–488.
- Nihon KeizaiShimbun ed., 1988, *The Tokyo Problem: A Huge Maze of the Japanese Economy*, Tokyo: Nihon KeizaiShimbun Press.
- Offe, C., 1984, *Contradictions of the Welfare State*, London: Hutchinson.
- The Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI), 2011, *The Foreign Direct Investment Database 2010*, <http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/database/FDI2010/index.html>
- Saito, A., 2012, "State-Space Relations in Transition: Urban and Regional Policy in Japan," in Park, B. G., Hill, R. C., and Saito, A., eds., *Locating Neoliberalism in East Asia: Neoliberalizing Spaces in Developmental States*, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell: 59–85.
- Sorensen, A., 2011, "Uneven Processes of Institutional Change: Path Dependence, Scale and the Contested Regulation of Urban Development in Japan," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 35(4): 712–734.

“Diasporic” Muslims, “Minoritarian” Islam, and Modern Democratic Citizenship: Negotiating Accommodation and Integration

Clive S. Kessler

A central challenge to Australian multiculturalism is presented by the failure of many Australian Muslims, individually and within certain social groups and enclaves, to achieve integration within broader Australian society. Yet, understanding this failure and national predicament is not achievable by recourse to what we may call conventional postcolonialist “multicultural theory.” Fathoming this failure and the obstacles to Muslim integration does not require recourse—these days, habitual and often reflexive recourse—to the generalities of contemporary postmodernist orthodoxy, but attention to the historical specificity of Islamic society and sociability. It requires us, no more and no less, to take Islamic history seriously.

Here we are treading upon what these days is contested, and often dubiously contested, ground. To explore the specificities of Muslim social experience and its historically evolved presuppositions and patterns is not, as postmodernist orthodoxy insists, a capitulation to “essentialism.” It is to recognize that the history of Islam—a unique history that is specific and specifiable, for those who are prepared to consider it with clear and unflinching vision—has yielded certain ideas and patterns of consciousness that have taken identifiable shape as a distinctive “Islamic social template.” To suggest this is anathema to antiessentialist postcolonialist orthodoxy. Yet, to do so is not to say anything that most Muslims are in any position to contest. After all, it is precisely that social template, that distinctive Islamically derived form of sociability, that they seek to maintain—and to whose defense their community leaders and spokesmen rally (as the basis of their own entitlement to social acceptance and to dignity and moral autonomy within our

national society) under the banner and protection of general multiculturalist principles.

Muslims Today: Globalization, “Diaspora,” Citizenship

Like the reaction to Salman Rushdie’s *Satanic Verses* before it and a number of widely discussed similar episodes in following years, the worldwide controversy in early 2006 over the publication in Denmark of a series of cartoons that were widely perceived, and vehemently denounced, as anti-Muslim involved questions arising from what we may term “the new globalization of Islam.”

Islam as a civilization has always seen itself as, and has always aspired to be, global. For a while it did create and define its own world in its own terms. But “the world of Islam” has now become part of a wider world, one that is subsumed within and has been made subject to a wider history than its own. It was not only Islam’s heartlands that were subjected to protracted foreign rule. In recent generations, millions of Muslims have migrated from the core heartlands of the Islamic world to live elsewhere, especially in the lands of the so-called West, as members of growing but in many ways still marginalized minorities.

As a result of the development of this far-flung “Muslim diaspora” where Muslims live among others, rather than in Muslim majority societies, Islam has again “gone global,” but in a way different from that in which it first launched itself into world history. In the past, Islam was long accustomed to live within and engage with the world on its own terms; for a millennium and more, it created its own world according to its own script and also fashioned the wider world, if not in its own image then in relation to its own requirements, consistent with ideas of its own centrality and supremacy.

Its present situation is different. This new situation now poses questions of unprecedented kinds, both to those non-Muslim host societies where many Muslims live and to their Muslim minority inhabitants now grappling with situations that do not sit easily with what I call the “majoritarian assumptions” of Islam’s historical and civilizational self-understanding.

How are Muslims and non-Muslims to live together in societies where Muslims are but a minority? What claims may the host society and its non-Muslim majority legitimately make upon the Muslim minority? What kinds of claims for understanding and sensitivity can members of the Muslim minority reasonably make upon the non-Muslim majority (and what not), and on what basis may they legitimately and effectively do so?

Fatwa, Papal Lectures, “Raw Meat,” and Offensive Cartoons

These are questions that have been posed by a number of controversies: from the publication of Salman Rushdie’s *Satanic Verses* to the Danish cartoons controversy, Pope Benedict’s University of Regensburg lecture, a contested Berlin production of Mozart’s *Ideomeneo*, disputes in France and elsewhere over women’s veiling, and the recent *Charlie Hebdo* events in Paris. There are also our local

controversies concerning “immodestly” clad women who (so Imam Taj El-Din Hilaly of Lakemba in Sydney suggested) represented an invitation to testosterone-loaded young men, like the understandable temptation to cats of raw meat. To analyze the underlying issue posed by these cognate controversies, let us consider first the Danish cartoons as an exemplary instance or test case.

Put aside here the question of whether the offending cartoons were offensive, that is to say, contemptuous, humiliating, insulting. Instead, let us focus on something more basic upon which angry Muslims insist. Whether in cartoon form or otherwise, whether in mocking caricature or in a favorable image, all depictions of the Prophet Muhammad are said by most Muslims to be categorically impermissible. Hence any purported pictorial representation whatsoever of the Prophet, they hold, is an offense to them, their religion, and the divine word of their God. So they have a right not to encounter, be confronted with, or “made to see” any such depiction; what’s more, a modern, liberal, secular, democratic society has an obligation to suppress and prohibit the publication of such images offensive to Muslim sensibilities.

On what grounds, one may ask, and to what extent might the members of a minority community argue that their own sacred values and religious taboos should be enjoined upon all their fellow citizens and enshrined as a general rule of society as a whole; on what basis might they plausibly argue, in a secular democratic society, that they ought not to be exposed to the possibility of encountering the sight of things that, for religious reasons that are distinctively theirs, they find disturbing? Have they the right to such protection? The questions may seem simple, but they do not permit of simple—which is to say easily accepted and hence readily workable—answers. How are such differences to be resolved, or, if irresolvable, at least clarified and negotiated?

These are serious and urgent questions. They are not questions that can be settled simply—and certainly not by any decisive, authoritative invocation of the diffuse, diversely connotative, and fundamentally contested notion of “multiculturalism.” Nor can necessary debate be ended by laying down the familiar postmodernist trump card: the preemptive enlistment of its *dogma ex machina* of the ineluctable plurality of voices and narratives. Yes, life and history are diverse and plural, not monolithic. But what follows from this commonplace is far less than many enthusiastic postmodernists seem to think. That we cannot find objective grounds upon which to say, in general, that one kind of view is better than another does not itself entail that all views are equally good (or bad); nor that there is not and can never be any prospect of reasonable people finding some basis, in particular instances, upon which they might agree in order to jointly choose one specific option over another. In other words, we must all, as thought-dependent beings, articulate our own choices and preferences to ourselves and then, on that basis and as citizens sharing a society and the world with others, engage with our fellows who think differently—who advance their claims in other discursive voices, even theoretically “strange tongues.”

Let us begin by acknowledging that we must find ways of living together in this world, of sharing it. Let us also agree that a decent society is one in which people are not willfully and gratuitously humiliated, targeted for offense and insult.

Democracy—the kind of political and moral order under which we live or at least, most of us, aspire to—ultimately requires a public culture that promotes universal habits of participation and inclusion, of consideration and civility. Democratic definitions of and arrangements for rights and civil liberties must be grounded in such notions of mutuality and the sharing in common of social space and opportunities, and ultimately of the world as a whole.

Certainly, most of us do not wish to live in a world or society where people may be willfully and wantonly humiliated, gratuitously insulted, and made to feel under assault because of their social origins, their cultural background, and their adherence to a historic religious faith community. That is one of our most basic principles and aspirations, a core tenet of our public culture and citizenship ethos. It is an important one, but not the only core doctrine of our pluralist democratic credo. Yet how are we to reconcile our adherence to pluralistic multicultural democracy with this matter of depictions of the Prophet Muhammad? On what grounds might any group claim that the wider society has an obligation to prohibit and suppress forms of expression simply because the ideas involved arguably transgress that community's special religious taboos and irritate their own sectionally sacralized sensitivities?

Basis of the Prohibition: Identifiable and Assumed

There is no doubt that this prohibition against depictions of the Prophet Muhammad is taken very seriously in Islam these days. Simply to encounter such depictions or purported depictions may, and often does, cause shock, profound dismay, and genuine pain to most Muslims. To encounter such an image is, for many Muslims, to experience and be rudely confronted with the violation of a basic taboo or prohibition. It occasions both a kind of cognitive dissonance—one is confronted with something that is not supposed ever to happen—and also an ensuing moral anguish. So, the issue is not just calculated insult and humiliation, but the far more wide-reaching objection: the categorical impermissibility, so far as most Muslims are concerned, of their producing or viewing any pictures or purported representations whatsoever of the Prophet Muhammad.¹

Summarizing arguments that I have made at length elsewhere, I make two points here. First, that if there is any such prohibition upon the production and viewing of pictures of the Prophet Muhammad, it can only be one, in the nature of the case, that applies to Muslims. Even if the Prophet Muhammad ever issued any such edict, which many Muslims assert but are hard put to substantiate, the prohibition is theirs and upon them alone. In a society run by Muslims on their preferred lines they may impose such a prohibition on others, or seek to, but where they are a minority in a modern secular democratic society, the problem is theirs to work through; it is their business, not everybody's. It is, and can only be, a prohibition imposed by and within Islam upon Muslims. If you are Muslim, that kind of Muslim, and you accept it, then it applies to you. And if not, not.

Second, one must also ask whether there is in fact any such categorical prohibition upon the production and viewing, even by Muslims, of portraits of the

Prophet Muhammad² and, if so, what its scriptural, doctrinal, and legal bases might be. The fact that there is no such clear and binding prohibition has been definitively conceded: notably, for example, by Tariq Ramadan, grandson of the Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna and son of the legal scholar Syed Ramadan. Tariq Ramadan is a scholar with Islamic and modern Western scholarly credentials no less impressive than his lineage. Professor at leading Swiss and French universities, fellow at Oxford, and an adviser to Tony Blair, he, more than any other scholar of our time, has sought to bring Muslims and his “strict constructionist” views of Islamic law into productive engagement with Western modernity. Yet he concedes that there is no scriptural basis, no *locus classicus* in the faith’s sacred texts, for this prohibition. It is simply a subsequently constructed consensus among many, but not all, conventional Muslims.³

Even as he upholds this prohibition, Tariq Ramadan concedes that he is simply voicing “a traditional consensus” that was reached in the years after the Prophet’s death. To say that it represents an early traditional consensus is not to say that such ideas are bogus or valueless; but it does weaken the force of the prohibition, if it really is one. The practice is simply a human convention entirely lacking in divine, sacred, or prophetic authority. It is a practice that may have been appropriate in its originating time (when the only depictions were likely to have been iconic and potentially idolatrous, calculated to appeal to unsophisticated imaginations), but not necessarily a practice that will also be appropriate and should be made obligatory now.

The Cognitive Prism of “Majoritarian Islam”

We all, as individuals, carry our childhoods with us. The same is true of civilizations— and especially notable among them are those whose formative experience and early history have, for one reason or another, been of “living in the world on their own terms,” in accordance with the terms of their own core collective imagination. But such success is not an unmixed blessing. It has its advantages, but also—and increasingly, as the wear and tear of the world-historical process sets in—its price and cost.

A case in point, though not unique, is Islam: by which I mean here the religiously based civilization of Islam which is now seeking to reaffirm and restore its sense (an old but in modern times “violated” sense) of civilizational coherence, integrity, and centrality; and which, on that basis, aspires to recover its ability once again to write the script of its own history—to live the history that it imagines and has long imagined for itself, and so live again in the world on its own terms—but which is experiencing enormous “cognitive dissonance” as it attempts to do so.

Why? Because there is (and this difficulty stems from) a basic, historically generated tension or dissonance: the “lack of fit” between the experienced realities of modern Muslim life and the historically, civilizationally, and ultimately religiously provided terms for its apprehension—which is to say, for the individual management and collective ordering of those characteristic shared and often painful experiences. The basic Islamic template or paradigm of international geography, or as we would

now say global geopolitics, is dual or bifurcate. It consists of the *Dar ul-Islam* (the “house” or “abode” or “domain” of Islam) where the majority of the population are Muslims and where Muslims, and others too with special provisions and concessions, live according to Islamic law as enforced by an Islamic government, and which is therefore the “abode” or “space” of what we might call “majoritarian governmentalist” Islam; and the *Dar ul-Harb* (the house, abode, domain or place, and space of war, struggle, contention) where Muslims, basically because they do not constitute the majority, do not live under Islamic governance and in accordance with state-enforced Islamic law.⁴

Diaspora, the “New Globalization,” and the Crisis of “Majoritarian Governmentalist” Islam

The gap, the tensions, and the dissonance between what is (including what Muslims experience) and the traditionally given or conventional terms for understanding that experience—for its cognitive and moral apprehension—have increased dramatically, especially in recent times. Over the last centuries and more, two major historical transformations have placed Islam’s sense of its own civilizational centrality and historical self-sufficiency fundamentally in question. Never in perfect accord, ideal model and political-demographic reality have in modern times been driven further apart than they ever previously were. First, was the retreat, loss, even collapse of Muslim political sovereignty in the Islamic heartlands, and with it the everyday supremacy (where it had arguably prevailed) of the *shari’a* law, in the age of imperialism and colonialism, beginning with Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the end of the caliphate.

This period of subjugation to foreign domination produced a crisis of “governmentalist majoritarian Islam” in the Islamic heartlands themselves. Many Islamic societies have subsequently remained—so far as their “religious demography” is concerned—majoritarian but, as the colonial grip tightened, they were no longer subject to Islamic governance. Majoritarian governmentalist Islam largely ceased to be a reality; instead, what the term denotes came increasingly to embody a dream, a yearning, or a utopia to be recovered. No longer a term that might describe a substantial existing reality, it became instead the vehicle of an elusive, even remote, if fervently besought abstraction—and, especially for today’s historically unreconciled Islamists, a poignantly felt absence, an inconceivable loss, an unfathomable deprivation.

The second great historical development has been the other side of this same coin of the loss of Islamic sovereignty, political centrality, and self-sufficiency. Modern times have seen a massive emigration from what had been “Muslim lands,” the now economically lagging and marginalized Islamic heartlands of the *Dar ul-Islam*, to the new, newly powerful, and now economically ever more dynamic societies beyond them: to Europe and the further lands of Euro-American civilization, of “the West,” that is to say the lands of “post-Christian Christendom.” Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Scandinavia, the United States, Australia,

and others have become the destination of this Muslim emigration, and hence the scene and terrain of this “new globalization of Islam.”

This is a second Islamic globalization: the first, for a thousand years and more from the faith’s beginnings, was the spread of the *Dar ul-Islam* and its reach, of Islamic rule and of governmentalist Islam; the second, more recent and still occurring, even accelerating, is the spread, as a result of mass emigration, of major centers of Muslim population from the *Dar ul-Islam* to the lands of what used to be conceptualized as the *Dar ul-Harb*. Its result has been the creation of a vast and growing Muslim diaspora, and with it the encounter and engagement of many Muslims—often hailing from societies of arrested development and now, in their new societies of domicile, from positions of social weakness and marginalization—with highly diverse societies and defiantly cosmopolitan, even forthrightly secular, cultures.

This has been a fateful encounter for Islam, and hardly an easy one for many Muslims. Majoritarian governmentalist Islam suffered its first historical blow when it was placed on the back foot by, and politically “under the boot” of, the West. It lost its basis and was deprived of the conditions of its own political possibility and existence, its governing political prerequisites. It is now undergoing a second onslaught or transformation: not simply has its political sovereignty and self-sufficiency been put in question by the “new globalization of Islam” and the growth of the Muslim diaspora in the West, so too has its cultural primacy and that of the *Dar ul-Islam* among Muslims. And it is there, beyond the reach of an increasingly beleaguered and repressive governmentalist Islam, that most of today’s intellectual innovation, cultural creativity, and religious as well as political rethinking of the Islamic heritage is now occurring in the societies of this new Muslim diaspora.

Those of postmodernist predilections may hold that to suggest that any such Islamic template—that of governmentalist majoritarian Islam—may exist and exert a grip upon, and even constrain, contemporary social and political imaginations is to succumb to “essentialism.” Yet my argument here is, and my views in general are, in no way “essentialist.”

My approach simply (and sensibly) holds that history is real—contingent, non-determined, open-ended, but real. Its consequences, too, are real, among them cultures. Cultures are made and also remade in history, sometimes even consciously and deliberately; cultures are sedimented from human understanding and effort and action in and by and through history. They are the “crystallized” or half-stabilized forms that those evolving forms of social understanding and practice take. Islamic civilization is no exception. It is the product, the “transcript” of the career, of the divine word that, as the *Qur’an*, was injected—via the Archangel Gabriel and through the Prophet Muhammad—into human history and so “made real” in mundane, phenomenal terms. Everything that ensued and subsequently took shape as the religion and civilization of Islam is a human product and historical construct. It can be understood and has to be analyzed as such—as an evolving repertoire of social practices. It is not immutable. But it is real, not a figment of deluded pre-postmodernist imaginations. Its underlying form has endured, providing the living—not ossified—basis and framework for the evolution of Islamic

civilization for a thousand years, so long as the societies of Islam were masters of their own fate. And it did not disappear, but has continued to inhabit, and even haunt, the imaginations of most of the world's Muslims in the modern era, even after Islamic civilization lost its sovereignty and, with it, the ability to live its history according to its own preferred script.

Religious Sensitivities and Suffering: Minoritarian Situations, Majoritarian Responses?

Religious suffering, as has been famously remarked, is real suffering, genuine and not imaginary affliction. It occurs and besets us not in heaven, but here on earth, in human society. Where deep religious suffering occurs, including in our modern secular and skeptical world, it is not to be questioned or doubted, denied, and disallowed. Others, when they see it, need to recognize, not dismiss, it; and those who are subject to and experience it need to manage and master it. How? In the case of the undeniable religious suffering of contemporary Muslims in modern secular democratic societies, the source of their religious suffering and of its painful amplification need to be understood, not least by them.

The religious suffering—genuine, real, and undeniable—that so many “diasporic” Muslims now experience in modern national societies like ours is in large measure the product of a “mismatch” or lack of congruence: between the facts of their minoritarian situation—from which their painful experiences arise and in which much of their religious affliction is grounded—and the assumptions of the deeply entrenched “majoritarian” *Weltanschauung* (or cognitive framework and outlook) to which many Muslims, “modernists” and “progressives” as well as conventional and traditional ones, remain attached. It is an outlook or cognitive map which has been bequeathed to them from the long worldly journey of the religion of Islam within the historical vehicle of Islamic civilization, from its triumphant formative years and thereafter over a millennium of worldly history, but which may now be less than appropriate to them in their new-found nonmajoritarian circumstances.

I can humanly understand, and also intellectually probe and analyze, the genuine basis for the sincere, and sincerely held, abhorrence that some, even many, Muslims feel at the very idea of making or being presented with a picture of the Prophet Muhammad. I am not unsympathetic to their feelings and dilemma. But let me try to indicate both the basis of my sympathy and also its limits, with an example that many Muslims may, perhaps to their surprise, not find altogether alien.

Growing up Jewish, born as a Jew who became conscious of self and the world at the knee of refugee grandparents from Germany during the depths of the Second World War, I grew up with and have retained from earliest childhood many complex ideas, strange attitudes, and reactions. One of them is an absolute abhorrence of ham, pork, and bacon. I simply cannot bear to smell them being cooked, to touch or handle, let alone eat them (despite many disciplined and at times “principled” efforts to force myself to, to get myself to like it). Incidentally, when I visit Malay Muslim friends in the vast public housing towers of Singapore, I have

this reaction and I see my hosts often struggling with the same problem—as their far more numerous Chinese neighbors on all sides, in their day-long simmering and frying and braising, cook their bacon, pork noodles, pigs’ feet, spare ribs, pig offal delicacies, and who knows what else. At the Easter Show (the great “state agricultural fair” held annually in Sydney, when the entire countryside and its rural economy “comes to town” to put itself on display to effete city-siders) I would always, as a child, fall ill whenever we neared, let alone entered, the piggens and pavilions. Even today, when the local council uses pig manure as extra fertilizer in the parks and gardens I nearly die. I go around gagging, at times retching and even vomiting, while I try to “trick” my nose by enclosing it in a scented handkerchief.

I find all this unbearable. But I also see it as my problem, not somebody else’s. I have never taken the view that because I have a profound, genuine, religiously based abhorrence of pig meat and pig smells that the world should reorganize itself in such a way as to protect me from ever having to deal with what I find abhorrent. As a child, the first time I ever saw, in our friendly little shopping center, gloriously displayed in the window of the local butcher, a huge severed pig’s head with a large orange stuffed in its mouth (as was the custom in those days) I nearly died, from shock and horror, from revulsion and terror; and for years after I was revisited by that primal porcine experience, that gut-wrenching revulsion, every time I passed that or any similarly adorned butcher shop. But it never entered my mind to ask the butcher to change how he decorated and advertised his store, or to ask the local council to prohibit such displays which might prove disturbing not only to me but to a significant proportion of the population of that largely, at that time, European Jewish refugee neighborhood. The problem was mine and ours, not theirs. On what basis might I possibly ask that others—my Christian and unbelieving, unconcerned neighbors—make, if not the problem then the means of providing a solution to my problems, theirs?

Why did I not ask, why did I not have any such expectations? Because, I expect, of the basically “minoritarian” assumptions and hence modest expectations that were built into the very terms, derivatively Jewish, in which I saw and experienced and understood the world. I say it not as a criticism, but purely analytically, when I suggest that one must have, at least deep down, a basically “majoritarian outlook” to expect that others will change their ways to help you avoid facing what you personally find unpleasant and that you are entitled, as a matter of legal or “multicultural” right, to have them do so. In sum, many of the problems that Muslims in Australia and other derivatively Western countries have in coping with the demands of their no longer exclusively or “officially” Muslim environment, and many of the problems that arise between the Muslim and non-Muslim components of such societies, are not simply matters of the “acceptance and recognition” of “cultural difference”; they are, rather, the consequences of such majoritarian thinking—its persistence within and continuing dominance of the mindset of many members of modern diasporic Muslim minority communities—and of the often unrecognized effects of such underlying and irreconcilable (and, in this new context, arguably inappropriate) “majoritarian” assumptions.

The same point was made concisely, in an interview in Melbourne by the then Chief Rabbi of Great Britain, Sir Jonathan Sacks, an eloquent champion of

interfaith dialogue and reconciliation, a prominent opponent and critic of “Islamophobia,” and an admired interlocutor of a number of leading Muslim thinkers and Islamic representatives worldwide.

In response to the question whether, as the current wave of radical Islam unleashed a backlash in the West toward the general Muslim population, Muslims, as some suggest, have become “the new Jews,” Chief Rabbi Sacks replied:

I don't believe that these are comparable. Jews have had, since the destruction of the First Temple, twenty-six centuries' experience of being a minority. Most Muslims have not had the historical experience of being a minority and therefore they are faced with a situation for which Islam has not yet written the script, whereas we were the beneficiaries of one of the greatest pieces of advice ever given to a religious minority, Jeremiah's letter to the exiles, which said, “seek the peace of the place to which you are exiled, and pray to God on its behalf, for in its peace you will find peace.”

That, together with Shmuel's [Talmudic] rule, “*dina demalchutah dinah*”—that the law of the land is the law—those two principles define Jewish existence in the Diaspora. But Islam doesn't have that, which is why you get the call for Shari'a law.

Jews have been able to handle the experience of being minorities in Europe, though it was not always a pleasant experience and sometimes a tragic one. But we've been there. Muslims have not been there and that means that the younger generation of Muslims in Europe don't really have a compass to guide them and sometimes that expresses itself as confusion and anger.⁵

“Made to See” What Offends You—or Choosing Not To?

I am not unsympathetic to the genuine pain and real distress that many Muslims may feel when confronted with, or as they might put it “made to see,” what purports to be a portrait or picture of the Prophet Muhammad. But no amount of sympathy or analytical insight can transmute that prohibition that the Prophet Muhammad (arguably, but only arguably) placed upon his followers into a restriction, or support for a restriction, upon the rest of us not to consider, to make, to view, to publish such purported pictures and depictions of the Prophet Muhammad. If Muslims do not wish to see them, they need not and should not be made to; but the suggestion that—in order to help Muslims avoid seeing or being “made to see” such pictures, to help them avoid the possibility of ever seeing such “dubious” portraits and portrayals—everybody should be restrained and prohibited from having anything to do with such pictures (and that these pictures should have no “public reality” and accordingly remain only some sort of “private vice” or furtive taste) is an unwarranted, unjustifiable, and incommensurate measure. If Muslims do not wish to look, then, in the end, in our kind of society, rather than requiring that all things offensive to them be put out of general sight, they should, and (to borrow a Quranic phrase) will in the end have to, simply lower their gaze, “avert their eyes,” look away, choose not to see what may displease and even offend them.⁶

If that is not enough, not good enough, then, in this kind of society, it is up to them—those Muslims who do feel deeply offended—to persuade their fellow citizens of the appropriateness of making these changes by democratic means and

procedures, to convince others of the grounds of their claimed entitlement to have these sectional prohibitions made general rules of society. Proposals for such far-reaching changes would, of course, be unlikely to win much support among non-Muslim Australians—apart from causing great disquiet among some, perhaps many, Muslim Australians—and would be incompatible with the basic assumptions of modern democratic pluralism and constructive multiculturalism. In sum, the conclusion that—if in good faith you find it distressing to see or be confronted by pictures of the Prophet Muhammad—you should just try to “avert your eyes,” rather than ask that all such depictions be prohibited, may ultimately prove painful and sorely inadequate to many Muslims. But it is perhaps the most that, as of right, you can ask for and demand (though not the best that, through constructive and persuasive argument, you can get) in this kind of society on the basis of its underlying assumptions and animating ethos, its understandings of inclusive multiculturalist democracy.

For many Muslims, or rather Islamist ideologues and activists, this may be less than completely satisfactory; it may not, in the short run, be anywhere near enough. But this may be the best you can get here, and it is the best that this kind of society can guarantee you. Those who opt to reside in such a society will need, consistent with that choice, to accept its consequences. One is that ill-considered agitation—on grounds of the general society’s supposed obligation to enforce on everybody what are sectional or minority religious taboos and prohibitions—will surely generate a pervasive general mistrust of the hopes that the term “multiculturalism” was coined to denote, and a growing marginalization of Muslims. It will also encourage an intensified, and in many ways perhaps understandable, religious and cultural distrust, even hostility, toward Islam. That is something that none of this society’s citizens, Muslim or non-Muslim, has any proper interest in or can afford.

“Liberal Decency,” Multiculturalism, and Obscurantism

Many Australian Muslims, of course, do not want to do any such thing. But in this, as in so many matters, the moderates within Australian Muslim society, as in Muslim society worldwide, are often reluctant, even fearful, to speak out. They do not wish to expose themselves to criticism, make themselves vulnerable targets. More than that, beyond a prudent concern for self-protection, many feel a genuine and quite understandable reluctance to “break ranks” and express basic dissent at a time when Muslims worldwide, and even Islam itself, are seen as being under attack, in need of some good defense. This is not the time to break ranks, to defect, give seeming comfort to Islam’s adversaries by a self-indulgent show of disloyalty, even principled dissent.

But the consequences of this understandable reluctance are disquieting. One of them, again in this case, is that their silence or prudence has enabled the spokesmen, representatives, and activists of the “less gentle” forms of Islam to proffer themselves and push themselves forward as the uncontested defenders of Islam itself. In this way they rally people, in the name of defending Islam, behind and in support of some of the “less gentle,” more thoroughgoing Islamist agendas, with

all their exclusivist objectives and majoritarian attitudes and assumptions.⁷ Moreover, in Australia and elsewhere, as in the cartoon controversy, they have managed to “spook” many well-meaning, long-term, and principled multiculturalists. While mobilizing a vast body of Muslim opinion behind their own partisan “defense of Islam,” the Islamist militants have also contrived, in the name of multicultural inclusion, to align a significant proportion of the principled non-Muslim supporters of multiculturalism (some of them unhappily, with much disquiet and serious reservations) behind an agenda that is the very antithesis of inclusive, pluralist, democratic multiculturalism.

Meanwhile, the rest of us have little prospect of calling the militants’ bluff or of countering their enlisting of powerful Muslim feelings of exclusion to advance their own agenda, their own narrow but preferred version of Islam’s future. But we might be a little more attentive to the way in which the ideals, idioms, and familiar rhetoric of multiculturalism, together with the repertoire of attitudes of “liberal decency,” have been corralled, in the name of repudiating the humiliation of Muslims, behind a position and for purposes that no sensible multiculturalist—had they taken the trouble to consider what is at stake—could plausibly support. Decent people have been “conned” and “spooked” by their very decency to endorse and support retributive obscurantism; principled, humanistic, and inclusive anti-clericalists have volunteered service as the dulcet-voiced choirboys of an aspiring clericalist tyranny.

Veiling, Recognition, and Citizenship

In a decent society, it is impermissible to humiliate and marginalize an entire category of citizens by vilifying their religious identity for the unadulterated purpose of causing hurt. Yet there are and must be clear limits in the extent to which such a community may be entitled to require the wider society to enshrine some of its own particular sensitivities and distinctive religious prohibitions as general rules of society as a whole.

In the cartoon controversy, each side felt a surpassing moral entitlement to its position and to the expectation that the other side should accede to it. A powerful body of Muslim opinion held that people, everybody, should understand and accept that depictions, any depiction whatsoever, of the Prophet Muhammad were inherently offensive and painful to Muslims, and that a decent multicultural society should therefore not expose its Muslim citizens to the sight of such pictures and confront them with the possibility of being shocked by their publication. Meanwhile, democratic theorists passionately maintained that the right to produce and publish such pictures, to see and offer them to the sight of others, so long as they were of a general illustrative nature or for legitimate public purposes (including at times acerbic political persuasion), was a fundamental right and tenet, a generic and not merely incidental feature, of the kind of society we are and that our Muslim fellow citizens have chosen to join. It was accordingly not a right that—no matter how insistently many Muslims might wish to uphold one of the core prohibitions of their own faith and culture in their own midst yet among us all—was to be

abrogated by society at large and, for the great majority of its members, simply because of certain specifically Islamic prohibitions and Muslim sensitivities.

The same rhetorical minuet has been danced on some related, and no less contentious, issues such as the question of the veiling of women and the wearing of the body-enveloping *niqab* and *burqa*. Here again, the issues and argument go beyond simple invocations, however high-minded in themselves, of “multiculturalism” and affirmations of cultural rights. They also primarily involve other matters, notably the ethics of modern citizenship and the associated or implied etiquette of civil sociability.

Some brief mention of the recent reemergence of the dispute over veiling may further clarify this point. On grounds of democratic civility, I see no problem in all (or many or some or any) of us going about wearing Sikh turbans, Jewish skull-caps, Muslim headscarves (*hijab*), or white pilgrim caps (*taqiyah*), or Akubra hats—or none of these. But I do see a problem in a society where all or most or many (or even some) of us might routinely go about our business wearing ski-masks, balaclavas, dark-shielded motorcycle helmets, or Islamic full-face covers.

Why? Because citizenship in a modern democratic society requires face-to-face interaction and, across our contingent differences, human recognition not just as members of our communities but also as individuals. We need as individuals to be “legible,” to be open to one another in our humanity, in the humanity of our countenance and its expressions. There needs to be a symmetry of such recognition between fellow citizens, rather than the imbalance that obscured or inaccessible facial expression and selective human legibility entail.

That kind of openness to others, to one’s fellow citizens in the public world, is fundamental to trust, to signaling our readiness for trust—to social participation grounded in a shared democratic trust among citizens. Not to recognize this necessity, and to insist upon exemption from it on any grounds, including those of religion and custom, is to express a mistrust in trust and in democratic citizenship itself. To refuse that openness and personal legibility is, in effect, the assertion of an unbridgeable social distance, a human unreachability, a denial of commonality. It is to affirm symbolically that “I may be in your world but I am not of it, nor are you of mine; we are not part of the one same social universe, we are not part of nor are we conjoined by a shared and common sociability.” Such a symbolic *défi* is a refusal of democratic recognition, participation, and mutual accountability.

What people do at home or among themselves behind the walls of their own communities, so long as it does not encroach upon or diminish the citizenship rights of others, is their individual and communal business; but what they ask to be entitled to do and not do as citizens in the public world is, in principle, everybody’s business. Being open to others, intellectually and culturally and also facially, is intrinsic to that good-faith negotiation of human recognition and common shared citizenship. This, in my own rather than his words, was pretty much what the former UK Home Secretary Jack Straw once said: before the press “processed” the dispute with its own characteristic simplifications, before the predictable outbursts of ensuing, if at times misdirected, outrage and before the media further applied its simplification processes to the second-order shaping and projection of that outrage.

Yet soon I heard, on BBC Radio, a leading British Muslim spokesman protesting, in some puzzlement and genuine distress, why it was that people might freely wander around the country's streets with all sorts of brutal metal hardware in their noses, tongues, and lips but not, without protest and denunciation, a modesty scarf or veil. Where was the fairness in this, he wanted to know, the slightest trace of even-handed policy?

I can and do sympathize personally with that British Muslim who asked why people can put metal pins and studs through their lips and tongues and eyes but not wear face-bibs. But that's exactly the point. I too am personally revolted by all that facial hardware and by many facial tattoos too. I am really disgusted at times. But that's disgust: my disgust at how these people choose to make their faces and expressions visible and available, like it or not, to public inspection, what they do to modify and enhance their facial expressions, even in grotesque ways.

However affronting it may be to me, it is their chosen social face, the social persona that they fashion for themselves and display, and through which they elect to be and make themselves known. It is a bizarre individuality, but an individuality, not, as with a concealing mask, an effacement of individuality, of individual face—a refusal of personal “knowability.” Grotesque though it is, it does not stop me seeing and knowing them: knowing them as they choose to be by individual presentation and even, to me, bizarre “self-modification.” On the contrary. What they do is aesthetically horrifying to me, and what kinds of people they so choose to construct and, in florid public display, advertise themselves as is for me something between an abomination and a nullity. So I may wish that they would make less of an exhibition of themselves and who they want, or imagine themselves, to be. But, eager to shock, they do not hide themselves, make inaccessible the identity that they adopt or choose to affect.

Serious veiling and facial occlusion do. They too express, and very publicly, the choice of an identity. They signal an identity—they symbolize and communicate a choice of identity—that conveys one overriding and unmistakable public message: that their bearers' is an identity that is not publicly to be made available, a personality that must remain opaque. It proclaims the presence of an absence. It signals, by that withholding of socially legible presence, a refusal of reciprocal recognition. It speaks of an identity that is occluded, that denies that it shares the world, as all modern citizens do and recognize, with others—however, they may differ from oneself, however differently their individuality may be culturally shaped and historically conditioned.

That is why veiling and facial occlusion are different from displays of “punk features” and why, unlike the sadomasochistic self-decorative techniques of these young people, they offend and run foul of what many of us consider the interactive ethics of democratic civility, recognition, and citizenship. Such a claim may seem unduly, even selectively, prescriptive and arbitrary, but it is not. What are involved and centrally at issue here are the normative—perhaps ideal but characteristically normative—presuppositions of civility: not merely abstractly or formally but also as they are realized and given life in the distinctive interactive etiquette of democratic sociability.⁸

“Ah!” but some have said, “what about sunglasses?” This rejoinder makes my point, precisely and perfectly. Because of their familiarity as an item of fashion and their status for some, too, as a medical necessity, sunglasses have won and now enjoy a degree of toleration and protection. But even when they cover the eyes—those little “windows to our souls”—they do not fully mask and obscure our entire faces and so totally “efface” our individual facial expressions and responses. Even so, despite the protections of familiar everyday practice and fashion, we may, and some often do, ask people to remove their sunglasses when we discuss serious matters with them: at airports, in banks and government offices, at business and professional meetings. It is considered rude and inappropriate to enter legal negotiations, and quite improper to enter a court, with one’s eyes and their expressiveness blocked, unless there is an overpowering medical reason. (Some years ago, long before a judge in a West Australian court found herself faced with this dilemma, I put the question to a senior judge: would he allow a witness or juror to wear sunglasses in his court? He would not, he said, unless, by some medical or similar imperative to which he had reluctantly to defer, he had to do so. One needed, he said, as a matter of general principle, to see a person’s face, and for their social personality to be publicly visible, in order to be satisfied of their seriousness and that they were conducting themselves in a trustworthy, publicly acceptable way.) Conversely, we have the case of those reflector-lens sunglasses of some law-enforcement officers in certain jurisdictions that are outspokenly devoted to strong notions of “law and order.” Their use we generally find confronting, even affronting—so much so that their use is considered impolite and inappropriate to, and an intrusion and limitation upon, the everyday sociability shared by fellow citizens. Significantly, this style and strategy is one that is characteristic of those with some military status or quasi-military vocations (which render their intimidating wearers, as “licensees of state violence,” in some ways something other than “ordinary citizens”).

And that’s just sunglasses. How accepting would people be toward dark perspex full-face sunshields? Again, as with “punk-style” metalware and tattoos, the apparent exception “proves the rule,” vindicates the general point that is to be made. The issue here is not religion or sacred custom in general or Islam in particular, but the democratically problematic and legitimately questionable refusal of human countenance and individual presence to one’s fellow citizens.

The Bottom Line: Diaspora and Democratic Sensibilities

One may debate and affirm in general the discourse ethics and citizenship etiquette of modern secular democratic societies. But, as these issues arise—as they often do these days, in this specific form and with this cultural-religious focus—one may ask why it is that Islam so often provides the matter in question in so many contemporary controversies. The answer suggested here is not that there is anything intrinsic to Islam, an “essentialist” germ of democratic indigestibility within Islamic civilization; but there is nonetheless a legacy of Islamic civilizational history, too, to which modern Muslims are the heirs—which still informs

their thinking and pervades their imaginations in many cases—and which is in tension with the character of modern secular democratic societies. And which, for that reason, may in some ways—to the extent that it retains its grip upon modern people—hamper and disable many sincere Muslims in their efforts to engage with the very societies in which they now live.

All these cognate disputes, from the *Satanic Verses* to *Charlie Hebdo*, are parts of the one historical convulsion: one arising from a crisis under new diasporic conditions of “majoritarian governmental Islam,” and specifically of the familiar templates of Islamic self-understanding, historical and civilizational, that stem from that worldview. It is a crisis that has been brought about by the growing inapplicability of that historically sedimented cognitive template to—and its practical, experiential dissonance from or lack of congruence or “fit” with—the actual situations of an increasing, and increasingly energetic, part of the worldwide *umma*. They are manifestations of an incongruity or tension that is now driven by the modern growth of a worldwide Muslim network of ever more substantial and important minority or “diasporic” Muslim communities. This is not a crisis of Islam as a whole, but one of, for, within, and generated by “majoritarian governmental Islam” and its preferred historical imagination. It is a crisis not of “Islam per se” (whatever that might be) but of Islam in a historically specific, and now if not anachronistic then deeply challenged, form.

It is in these diasporic or minoritarian Muslim communities, and between them and their host societies, that these disputes erupt these days with such frequency and bitterness. It is these diasporic communities that are made to bear the brunt of the ensuing antagonism. Their growth, recent and still continuing, is a product of the modern, or what may be termed the “second” globalization of Islam, a globalization that, unlike the first, has not grown from and does not express Islam’s own founding, and triumphalist, civilizational script. This fact has implications for us all, and which all of us, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, must understand and, ideally, seek together to negotiate.

Argument about the “negotiation of difference” must go beyond wounded protestations of violated sacred sensibilities and simple invocations of “multiculturalism” and postmodernist affirmations of cultural rights, however worthy these concerns may often be. What we are dealing with here, these various controversies together suggest, turns rather upon something else: notably the ethics, both discursive and interactional, of modern citizenship and the associated or implied etiquette of civil sociability.

Notes

1. A reluctance to distinguish between hostile and ostensibly nonhostile representations of the Prophet Muhammad—and the apparent assumption that the entire world is bound, out of an obligation of deference to Muslim sensibilities, to repudiate the nonhostile and even any benign intention to produce such an image—seems to characterize much of internationally expressed Muslim opinion. The issue of positive depictions and representations of the Prophet Muhammad is an important one. In the midst of the confrontation in early 2006, we were reminded that a statue (arguably worse even than a picture!)

- of the Prophet Muhammad as one of humankind's great universal lawmakers is part of the architectural decoration of the building of the US Supreme Court. It would have been consistent if the opponents of the cartoons had also demanded, or sought unilaterally, to rearrange the sculpture work of that great building; yet, however inconsistent, it is also somehow reassuring that they did not try to do so.
2. This prohibition has not been absolute. It has not been characteristic of Islamic society and thought at all times and in all places. Notable exemplars in this genre are those many loving depictions, especially in the Persian/*Shi'a* and Mughal artistic traditions, of the Prophet Muhammad's marvelous night journey (*israk* and *miraj*), mounted on the splendid beast Buraq, to the "farthest mosque" (conventionally identified with Jerusalem/*Al Quds*). This event has been the subject of considerable attention, and not trivially. This episode—including the Prophet Muhammad's encounter en route with the Abrahamic patriarchs and then the earlier prophets, prior to his encounter with the divine presence—symbolically both places and authentically grounds Islam in the Semitic monotheistic tradition, yet at the same time affirms and justifies Islam's ascendant standing, or claim to such standing, within it—not just as a follower in that spiritual tradition pioneered by venerable predecessors, as Judaism's and Christianity's successor or complement, but as their completion, supersessor and, in some sense then, their negation.
 3. "Muhammad Cartoon Fallout" (debate between Amir Taheri and Tariq Ramadan, Radio Netherlands, 12.iii.2006 [at <http://www.radionetherlands.nl/features/amsterdamforum/090306af>]). Amir Taheri had earlier expressed his views in a brief "opinion column": "Bonfire of the Pieties," *Wall Street Journal*, 8.ii.2006: "There is no Quranic injunction against images, whether of Muhammad or anyone else. When it spread into the Levant, Islam came into contact with a version of Christianity that was militantly iconoclastic. As a result some Muslim theologians . . . issued '*fatwa*' against any depiction of the Godhead. That position was further buttressed by the fact that Islam acknowledges the Jewish Ten Commandments—which include a ban on depicting God—as part of its heritage. The issue has never been decided one way or the other, and the claim that a ban on images is 'an absolute principle of Islam' is purely political. Islam has only one absolute principle: the Oneness of God. Trying to invent other absolutes is, from the point of view of Islamic theology, nothing but *shirk*, the bestowal on the many of the attributes of the One."
 4. The distinction between the *Dar ul-Islam* and the *Dar ul-Harb* is routine, and calling attention to it has become a commonplace, even stereotypical. What these familiar accounts do not recognize, and recognition of which differentiates the discussion here, is the way in which this distinction and the assumptions that it embodies about the *Dar ul-Islam* gave rise to what is termed here the powerful tradition and long dominant cultural and civilizational assumptions (or conceptual "template") of "majoritarian governmental Islam."
 5. *Australian Jewish News*, 24.x.2006. Jonathan Sacks is the author of a number of major works in the area of interreligious reconciliation and intercivilizational dialogue, including *The Politics of Hope* (the Reith Lectures 1997, Jonathan Cape, London, 1997), *The Dignity of Difference: How to Avoid the Clash of Civilizations* (Continuum, London, 2003), and *To Share a Fractured World* (Continuum, London, 2005).
 6. The reference or allusion here is to the Quranic injunction (*An-Nisa*, 24: 30–31) that women should dress modestly but, equally, that the first obligation of men, should they encounter what they might consider female immodesty, is neither to remonstrate with the woman over her attitude nor to correct her behavior in matters of dress, but simply "to avert their eyes," lower their gaze, look away.

7. I coined the “shorthand” terms “gentle” and “ungentle” Islam in a discussion of Islam in Southeast Asia where I pointed out that while Islam in this part of the world has a largely well-deserved reputation for being of the “gentle” variety, this does not mean that, contrary to an all too simplistic and unduly reassuring stereotype that has taken grip in many quarters, there are not, and have not long been, places in the region where decidedly “ungentle” variants of the faith have flourished, and from where they have exerted significant influence and even expanded their reach. See my “Islam in Southeast Asia: Some Personal Reflections,” *AUS-CSCAP: Australia and Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Newsletter* 17, 2004: 11–14. See also my “Southeast Asian Islam, gentle and ungentle,” *New Mandala*, 9.ii.2015 (<http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2015/02/09/southeast-asian-islam-gentle-and-ungentle/>).
8. On the value of civility and its distinctive “tone” and “register,” the “timbre” of the kind of sociability that it informs, see Martin Krygier, *Between Fear and Hope: Hybrid Thoughts on Public Values* (The Boyer Lectures 1997, ABC Books, Sydney, 1997), especially chapter 3, “The Uses of Civility,” pp. 44–63. The sentiments of civility are low-key. They do not involve or turn upon great passions. As Krygier puts it, “civility is not one of those ideals that quicken the pulse” (p. 58). But, as people often fail to recognize, the ethic of civility entails not only obligations and burdensome duties (“a sense of civic responsibility”), but also pleasure. The pleasures of civility are distinct and generic. They are intrinsic to those largely impersonal and disinterested exchanges of human recognition and acknowledgment that pass between people on the street: the small courtesies that one citizen takes pleasure in extending to a fellow citizen, a stranger, simply because he is a fellow citizen, someone with whom, although personally unknown, one shares the world at large and, in parvo, one small part of it where one’s different trajectories now happen to cross. One example of these pleasures that may typify and stand for them all is the recognition that passes between two people when, say, out of a regard for some peculiar law of decent public etiquette, you give way to another person on the street, on a crowded footpath, or going through a door. The pleasure comes not simply from one’s own delight in “pulling off the maneuver” properly, but also from the acknowledgment, the citizenly reciprocation, that the other party returns, perhaps in the form of a smile or a slight movement of the eye, that indicates not only appreciation, that they are happy you made way for them, but also that they recognize, and recognize that you recognize and have acted upon, one of those elusive rules of dispassionate, impersonal civility. As Christopher Bryant, as quoted by Krygier (p. 63), notes, civility “remains a fundamentally democratic idea. Courtesy was for the court; gentility was for the gentry; civility is for all citizens”; to which Krygier adds, that “it is very far from servility, which is, if at all, only for servants.” Civility, says Krygier, “is a central issue of public morality in a world of many strangers: how to deal with differences?”

Volunteering and Civic Participation in the Vietnamese-Australian Community

RoseAnne Misajon, Vicki Hutton, and Ana-Maria Bliuc

Introduction

Civic participation can be defined not only as civic-minded behaviors, including volunteering, but also acts of generosity and altruism (Mason et al., 2007). It is considered a prerequisite for social cohesion and a fundamental building block of healthy social, civic, and political life in a democracy (Putnam, 2007). It is argued that active civic participation both benefits the wider society and contributes substantially to the well-being of individuals themselves (e.g., Parkinson et al., 2010; Piliavin and Siegl, 2007).

It is commonly assumed that a culturally diverse society is compatible with the maintenance of a cohesive society with high levels of civic participation (e.g., see Collins, 2007; Jupp, 2007). Indeed, all levels of government in Australia assume that the policy objectives of encouraging altruistic civic involvement and the maintenance of cultural plurality are mutually reinforcing. However, the influential work of US sociologist Robert Putnam suggests a complex and possibly problematic relationship between social cohesion and ethnically diverse societies. Putnam (2007) suggests that ethnic diversity challenges social solidarity and may actually inhibit social capital, at least in the short to medium term. Other scholars resist this conclusion (e.g., Soroka et al., 2007).

The Australian government and many researchers have consistently argued that Australia is a leading example of contemporary tolerance and diversity (e.g., Kalantzis, 2000). Indeed, cultural diversity is designated as a part of the Australian national identity (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2008). This chapter contributes to the debate by taking a nuanced look at civic participation among Vietnamese migrants living in Australia. Given that volunteer activity

is widely recognized as a key indicator of social cohesion (Department of Family and Community Services, 2001) and is arguably the most conspicuous and researched act of civic participation, we examine the understanding and practice of volunteering within the Vietnamese community in Australia.

Volunteering in Australia

Volunteering might be formal or informal and may involve acts such as coaching, teaching, personal care, clerical work, manual labor, and fundraising. Generally, formal volunteering includes activities occurring within an organization, while informal volunteering activities are those that occur outside (Cordingley, 2000). Volunteering Australia (2003), a peak advocacy group in Australia, views volunteering activity as a fundamental building block of civil society. Reflecting Australian government policy, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2007: 3) recognizes the significance of volunteer work in relation to social inclusion, as it can help “meet needs, expand opportunities for democratic participation, personal development and recreation within a community and help to develop and reinforce social networks and cohesion.” In line with trends in other western liberal democracies, there has been increasing Australian interest in promoting volunteering activity as a means of fostering social inclusion and well-being.

Since 2006, the ABS has included a question on volunteering and unpaid work in the national survey, asking respondents to indicate whether they had, in the previous 12 months, spent any time doing voluntary work *through an organization or group* (excluding any *paid* work, work done for a family business, or work done in order to qualify for a government benefit) (see ABS Census website, available at <http://www.abs.gov.au/census>). This definition, which reflects the one adopted by the United Nations, excludes acts of personal charity or kindness that are not mediated by an organization.

Current levels of volunteering in Australia are reasonably high, and increasing. According to the General Social Survey (GSS) administered by the ABS in 2010, 36 percent of the population participated in voluntary work, up 2 percent from 2006. Significantly, this survey, like previous iterations of the GSS, found that Australia-born persons were more likely than overseas-born persons to volunteer (40% of Australian-born volunteered, compared to 28% of those born overseas). Among the latter group, persons born in the main English-speaking countries were more likely to volunteer than those born in non-English-speaking countries. These findings are consistent with analyses on volunteering behavior in Melbourne using the 2006 Census (Healy, 2007). It was further found that this held true, even after controlling for income, time of arrival in Australia, and English proficiency. It is such findings that raise concerns as to the compatibility between increased cultural diversity and greater civic participation through volunteering.

However, Australian and international research has shown that socioeconomic status affects the nature and extent of altruistic behavior. This is an important consideration, given that the most culturally diverse areas in Australian cities tend to be socioeconomically disadvantaged (e.g., ABS, 2007; Healy, 2007; Musick et al., 2000;

Sundeen et al., 2007). In addition, previous research has identified some of the sociocultural factors related to differing levels of volunteering and civic participation (see Esmond and Dunlop, 2004; Mason et al., 2007, 2010; Zappala and Burrell, 2002). For example, Mason et al. (2010) note that the pathways to volunteering and civic participation can be influenced by many different factors such as families, friends, religious and educational institutions, clubs, and other associations. Additionally, research identifying the barriers faced by people from diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds when seeking to engage in volunteering found that such barriers include aspects related to language difficulties, feelings of acceptance and/or exclusion, and the cultural and organizational practices of the wider community (see Australian Multicultural Foundation and Volunteering Australia, 2007; Kerr et al., 2001). Because of these potential barriers to the involvement of certain ethnic groups, institutions themselves may require cultural change (Martin, 1999).

The UN's advocacy of volunteering as a means of nurturing social well-being and cohesion is based on the understanding that volunteering is readily recognizable in most cultures (United Nations, 2001). However, some have argued that the concept of volunteering in the Australian context, which draws from the United Nations definition, is ideologically constructed and culturally biased, and hence the standard research techniques and measures used are limited or culturally inappropriate (Australian Multicultural Foundation and Volunteering Australia, 2007). Previous survey research takes an individualistic, formalized view of unpaid service and presupposes particular notions of community, family, and mutual reciprocity that are based on a liberal perspective (Kerr et al., 2001). For instance, it is claimed that definitions of volunteering often distinguish between the "private" and the "public" spheres and emphasize the latter in terms of recognized "volunteer work." However, for some cultures, these two spheres are indistinct. One possibility, therefore, is that volunteering is occurring within ethnic minority migrant groups, but remains unrecognized as such because it is in an informal or unstructured activity.

In contrast with the definition used in the Australian GSS for volunteering, Eckstein (2001) describes group-based volunteerism, focusing on interconnected social ties and group obligations, which is distinguishable from individualistic-grounded volunteerism. A person who is a member of a religious community might have a complex reciprocal network of obligations that sees them visiting the sick or serving their community in other ways, and view this as an expression of group ties rather than acts of volunteering.

The relationship between ethnic group identification and in-group versus out-group altruism is important to consider. In-group altruism may be motivated by a desire for religious/cultural maintenance and by a sense of obligation to assist others from one's country/culture of origin. Hence there is a greater need to understand volunteering behavior in a diverse cultural context which distinguishes altruistic behavior motivated by ethnic in-group identification (bonding capital) from altruistic behavior which reaches across distinct ethnic groups (bridging capital) (see Coffé and Geys, 2007; Paxton, 2002). Furthermore, there is increasing interest in understanding drivers of altruistic behavior across group boundaries (e.g., Iyer and Ryan, 2009; Mallett et al., 2008).

Background of Current Study

This study explores experiences of volunteering in the Vietnamese community in Australia. The Vietnamese community was chosen for this study as a visible migrant population (i.e., physically distinct from the majority Anglo-Australian community) that is comparatively well established in Australia, having settled here since the mid-1970s onward. They have a unique migration history, which involves many of them arriving as refugees after the Vietnam War, providing an additional interesting context in which to examine in-group and out-group volunteering. The migration of Vietnamese people to Australia has been described as occurring in three phases: assisting orphans from the Vietnam War pre-1975; refugee resettlement between 1975 and 1985, following the fall of Saigon and the end of the war; and family reunions under the Vietnamese Family Migration Program since the late 1980s (Department of Immigration, 2001). Vietnamese refugees, a small number of whom arrived by boat in an attempt to find a safe home, were the first large group of Asian immigrants following the end of Australia's White Australia Policy in 1973.

Methods

A purposive sample was recruited for this study, using a convenience sampling technique. Given the important role that religious institutions play in facilitating community activities, Christian and Buddhist organizations located in Melbourne suburbs with a large number of Vietnamese-Australian residents were approached to assist with recruitment. In addition, Vietnamese-Australian nonreligious associations that had a broader membership base were approached. A notice was also placed on the Monash University online newsletter, inviting staff and students to participate in the study. Thirteen responders agreed to be interviewed, and interview times were arranged.

There were four males and nine females, aged between 27 and 75 years, with eight aged 60 years and over. All were born in Vietnam and arrived in Australia between 1975 and 2007. Eight had arrived between 1980 and 1989. Nine participants reported Vietnamese as the primary language spoken at home, three reported both English and Vietnamese, and only one reported English as the primary language. Most lived with a spouse and/or family members (9) and had completed tertiary education (9). Eight participants were in full-time or part-time employment. Irrespective of recruitment venue (i.e., religious or nonreligious organization), all participants stressed the important role that religion played in their lives. Eight described their religion as "Buddhist" and five as "Catholic."

Two interviewees required the presence of an interpreter. Participants did not receive any financial reimbursement or incentive for participation. The interview guide included questions seeking information on participants' involvement in "community activities" and their definition of "voluntary work," in their own words. Participants were then asked to discuss their perceived barriers to and motivations for volunteering. Sociodemographic information was collected at the conclusion of the interview.

Interviews were transcribed, including all verbal and nonverbal (long pauses, crying, laughter) communication. Pseudonyms are used in this chapter, and any specific data that may potentially identify participants have been removed or altered. The data were analyzed using thematic analysis techniques. In this study, a theme is defined as a framework that captures an important aspect of the data that represent a patterned response or meaning in relation to the research question (Braun and Clarke, 2013). Two researchers independently read through the transcripts and identified a series of relevant themes that emerged from the data. These themes will be discussed in relation to two key areas: (1) defining volunteering, and (2) barriers to and motivations for volunteering.

Results and Discussion

Defining Volunteering

In the current study, most of the participants were involved in some form of “helping behavior,” much of which revolved around a church or temple and/or within the Vietnamese community. While some classified their activities as “volunteering,” the majority were hesitant to define it as such, or particularly as “volunteer work.” As noted by Petriwskyi and Warburton (2007), much of the past research on volunteering has focused on the narrow parameters of formal volunteering. For this study, participants were asked provide their own definition of “volunteering” at the start of the interviews. Almost all defined it in broad terms, with a common way of explaining the concept akin to “helping from the heart.” For example, Huy (male, 55) defines it as: “To me voluntary is, you do the job, you are willing, no one force you to do it, it comes from your heart . . . expect nothing back.” Others echo this sentiment, such as: “Volunteer work is the work that you do from your heart without waiting for anything to coming back” (Mai, female, 29).

After the opportunity to define volunteering and discuss their civic participation, participants were presented with the Australian census item which measured volunteering by amount of time spent doing volunteer work through an organization or group. Several participants acknowledged that they were unsure or confused with this particular item. For example, participant Thien (female, 62) admits to answering “no,” despite her extensive community roles both within and beyond the Vietnamese migrant community. She had interpreted the item as relating to the Australian government’s Work for the Dole scheme for those on income support for more than six months. This scheme requires income support recipients to participate in work-like activities to gain skills and work experience while also contributing to the community (see Department of Employment, 2015). Thien states: “Actually when I read that part, . . . it confused me because some think social security, you unpaid worker for the community work, so I’m a little bit confusion . . . because I didn’t get on the dole, and I don’t have to do the volunteer work for the dole . . . A little bit confusing and I talk to my husband and I said what do I do and he said just say no.”

This confusion is despite the question incorporating the clarifying statement to exclude work done in order to qualify for a government benefit. While this is, in part, a result of issues with English language proficiency, the uncertainty of how to respond to this item was acknowledged by several participants as less to do with language and more about the boundaries between formal and informal volunteering. For example: "It's hard for people to pick yes or no" (Kim, female, 58) and "Sometimes they're not sure whether they do that for an organization or a group or just for a club, or for a small group" (Mai, female, 29). Lan (female, 38) states, in relation to her partner independently running free tai chi classes for the local community: "I never thought of that as volunteer, you know, maybe the question cover organization and, you know, when you read that you think, well, maybe not what I'm doing is volunteer."

Although the above confusion would not be unique to the Vietnamese community, a common response among several participants was that the concept of "voluntary work" was not understood in the same way in the Vietnamese community as in the broader Australian community, and that many in the Vietnamese community would be engaged in volunteering while not recognizing their activity as such. For example: "With the Vietnamese community . . . we just do it without actually knowing that's volunteer work" (Mai, female, 29) or "Helping, helping, we just think about helping people, we don't think of doing volunteer work is a high priority . . . , the concept [of volunteering] is not really set in with a lot of Vietnamese people" (Kim, female, 58). Huy (male, 55) also states: "Yes, one thing is every year there's a lot of Vietnamese doing volunteer work, . . . but for us we don't seem to, we don't publish it, we don't sort of cry, 'Ah look, we volunteer!' we don't ask a thing, we are quietly, quietly doing it." Huy's comment, as well as other references he makes in his interview, hints at a belief that volunteering should be without reward, including recognition, and that formalizing volunteering contradicts the altruistic nature of the act itself. This may reflect differences between individualistic-grounded volunteering and volunteering that is driven by complex reciprocal networks of obligation (Eckstein, 2001).

Consistent with this was the perception among many of the participations that volunteer work in the mainstream Australian community was a very formalized activity involving organization with policies, rules, and regulations, in comparison to the more ad hoc informality of "helping behavior" within the Vietnamese community. For some, this was largely because organizations within the Vietnamese community were less familiar with the administrative side of volunteer-based organizations. For example, Mai (female, 29) explains: "With the Vietnamese community, as I said earlier, we just do it without actually knowing that's volunteer work. And sometimes, I'm really sorry, but sometimes we don't even think about insurance and things, you know. But with the Australian society I think they have a better picture of the volunteer work, that they know what they're doing and what is covered and what is not." However, for others, this formality was seen as unnecessary for the Vietnamese community: "I think the Australian people is more organized . . . but for us, . . . if there's a need, we get together, make it happen, and all, 100% money received, is go there. We don't have any organization costs, no salary, no office" (Huy, male, 55).

In this study, a few participants did indicate that the formal volunteering as part of mainstream Australian organizations was actually a deterrent for some. Han (female, 24) discusses her volunteering experiences at the temple compared to her interactions with mainstream organizations: “When I come to any (non-Vietnamese) organization . . . I always giving a pack of the policy and stuff, you know what I mean? So it’s making me feeling that this is the job, . . . they control the volunteer really well. They put the volunteer in a strict policy. Like ‘do not go do this, do not, you can’t do this, you can’t do that’ and that sort of thing, so you can’t, you don’t have the motivation to do a lot of things like here [at the temple].”

Another participant, Mai (female, 29), who has a leadership role in the Vietnamese community in facilitating community participation, elaborates how the different conceptualization of “volunteer work” can impact people’s willingness to participate: “To get them to do the voluntary work, . . . I didn’t use the word volunteer work but I just tell them that come and help out whenever you can Sometime they not sure that they can keep up with the volunteer work, if you call this a job. But if you just an idea, yeah come and help us, can you do this, can you do this, why, why not help us? Then they will do it But when they get into the job, then you tell them this is the volunteer work. Then it’s ok.”

Mai’s comments demonstrate how for some people in the Vietnamese community, it is the perceptions of “volunteer work” that can be a barrier to participation, rather than the activity itself. Whether this barrier results from cultural conceptions of what type of “helping behavior” should be prioritized, or whether or not such formalization of voluntary work is intimidating, confusing, or contrary to cultural priorities in terms of civic participation, it is clear from Mai’s comments that as a community facilitator she finds the term itself problematic. The following section elaborates further on barriers to and motivations for participation.

Volunteering: Barriers and Motivations

Consistent with previous research, issues regarding language and cultural barriers were common, as well as issues regarding time, access, and socioeconomic reasons, while religion was a major catalyst (e.g., see Zappala and Burrell, 2002). However, a common theme linking the various barriers and motivations is that of identity, whether it be ethnic identity, Australian identity, civic identity, religious identity, or—interestingly for this particular group—refugee identity. These identities are important in that they determine the nature of the boundaries between perceived in-group and out-group and how the intersection of these identities can facilitate or obstruct a bridging of civic activity/cooperation across traditional ethnic and cultural groups.

“I think the main reason for them not to do much voluntary work [in the] Australian community [is] due to language barriers” (Duong, male, 72). In the current study, language presented as the main barrier to participating in more formal “voluntary work” for people in the Vietnamese community. This is not

unexpected and is consistent with previous literature (Kerr et al., 2001). Another participant (Han, female, 24) explains: “Language is really a big barrier for them because even they want to do a lot of volunteering they couldn’t do it ’cause it’s very hard to join in a different language community.” As Han and others suggest, it is the language barrier that impacts greatly on civic participation and, stemming from that, the ability to engage and understand the mainstream culture. Danh (male, 70) echoes this sentiment, stating: “The first difficulty for them is the language The second thing is they don’t know how to speak, how to understand something. They can’t, they don’t want to participate in the community work. It’s very hard to understand the culture of another country.” One of the participants (Lan, female, 38) provides a specific example of a cultural disparity that can impact intergroup communication: “Because a lot of people, when they came here, it’s really hard, the language and the culture, I mean it’s a lot of freedom of speaking. And usually we have eye contact in the Australian culture, but in (Vietnam), eye contact we’re not allowed, so when you speak to other people you don’t keep eye contact a lot, especially to the senior, like to the person older than you. So there’s a lot of things to learn.”

Previous studies found there to be lower levels of volunteering among non-English-speaking migrant groups even when controlling for English proficiency (see Healy, 2007). However, from the interviews, participants allude that it is more than just language proficiency itself; rather, it is the perception of one’s language skills being inadequate, which can then impact negatively on confidence to engage with the broader community. This can have an ongoing impact on participation, even after many years of living in Australia, as Bao (male, 57) explains: “My wife, you know, she’s been living here for say almost now 30 years and her English, her language is very limited. And so wants, so many time she told me that she wants to do this, she wants to do that, you know, like Red Cross and Salvation Army, giving hand to them, World Vision and something. But because, you know, she can’t, you see, overcome that language barrier, let alone the culture.”

One of the consequences of lack of English proficiency is access to relevant information, and as a few participants indicated, if local Vietnamese language-based media platforms do not actively promote formal voluntary work in the wider community, many within the Vietnamese community do not become aware of these opportunities. For example: “I don’t think they got a clear picture, or concept, about the volunteer work. Like Australia Day or Clean Up Day. They’re not really participating because no one actually, actually tell them and, you know, got any forum or seminars saying what is it for” (Mai, female, 29). Mai goes on to explain: “But if, if you can tell them more about what they’re doing and what is that for and how it’s affecting all the other systems because in Australia there’s a lot of systems, . . . but if you can tell them more then they will feel more comfortable.”

Although language proficiency and cultural differences were the key barriers raised by participants, issues relating to socioeconomic status were also mentioned. Volunteering levels have been found to be below average in areas of low socioeconomic status (e.g., ABS, 2007; Healy, 2007). As migrants and refugees, many within the Vietnamese community would have arrived in Australia with

little financial resources. Bao (male, 57) describes how, as a new migrant, there are many other challenges to consider that take priority over volunteer work: “There’s so many things now they have to overcome now before they are integrating to the mainstream of you know volunteering things, thinking of others When we first came here and have children, worrying about it and how fit them, you know, buying food and everything, you know, we had no, we had nothing when we come here . . . so we had to get money to buy clothes, to buy food and pay rent and, you know, that’s it.” For some, this economic disadvantage would be challenging to overcome, with issues regarding English proficiency and recognition of prior qualifications potentially limiting employment opportunities. Socioeconomic status impacts on availability of important resources such as finances, employment opportunities, and time, which can further exacerbate levels of acculturative stress, adding to the difficulty of committing to civic participation.

In terms of roles within the family context, a couple of participants did raise gender-related issues serving as further barriers to civic participation. For example, Lan (female, 38) relates how her mother would like to be more involved in activities such as volunteering but is fearful: “She like to, but then she’s afraid because in my mum’s generation a lot of women were housewife, they didn’t go out, you know, and work, and I think she’s, she’s still accustomed to that. She not going out enough.” Lan’s mother also lacks her own transportation, and hence is dependent on Lan to drive her around or relies on public transport, also limited by her lack of English proficiency. For aged migrants in particular, language barriers and mobility dependency can limit the ability to participate in community activities such as volunteering and can lead to social isolation and obligatory inactivity (see Vo-Thanh-Xuan and Liamputtong, 2003).

Underlying many of the discussions around barriers and motivations was the notion of identity. According to social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987), strong identification with a group is likely to predict greater helping behavior in in-group members. For migrants, identification with their ethnic community can be an important driver for within-group helping behavior. In this study, it was evident that for many participants the Vietnamese community was their primary in-group in relation to civic participation. For example: “To me, if I come to help my community, to take part in the community, I’m very proud, because first I help my people” (Danh, male, 70). Lan (female, 38) also talks about the importance of ethnic in-group maintenance, stating: “I think it’s quite important because you still connected to your community, like your people that speak the same language, yeah, and to keep the language survive for the next generation.”

Language plays an important role in facilitating intergroup interaction, as evidenced by this statement made by Kim (female, 58): “I think so [helping mainly within their own community] because they feel happy and secure in their own group, speaking the same language, they know what they are doing, only for those who have another language and feel comfortable using that language, that’s when we move out towards the wider community.” Kim’s statement also suggests that over time, when language barriers are reduced, intergroup relations can form and possibly a shared identity with the broader community can develop. Kim is a

respected community leader within the Vietnamese community and is proactive in facilitating participation in the broader community. She describes the transition of this process for some of the Vietnamese migrants: "At the first few years they were very shy, they try to stick together and talk in Vietnamese, but now they are coming out more and just seeing anyone, just talking, asking questions." She explains that the members' trust in her is paramount for facilitating intergroup civic participation: "I just do it and they trust me for my judgement about doing something."

However, for one of the participants, participating in the broader community was more challenging. Bao (male, 57) speaks of not only a language barrier, but also not feeling welcomed by "mainstream people," and says he feels isolated when he is with "Australians." He goes on to say: "so then, my activities, you know, . . . comprise within the Vietnamese community." Mai (female, 29) also speaks of members of the Vietnamese community wanting to volunteer for Australian organizations, but not sure whether they would be welcomed, that is, "whether they know that it's got room for them."

Nonetheless, the overwhelming sentiment among the participants was that regardless of the strength of their ethnic identity, it was not a reflection of negativity about the broader Australian community. For most, there was a recognition and/or desire to connect. And for a few, there was clearly a sense of a shared (multicultural) Australian identity. For example:

I think when we step in Australia and like Australian people, they open their hearts to take us in. Even the language barrier is make it . . . a little bit problem, but I think we think we are home. Australia is our country, we now Australian, that I think so. (Thien, female, 62)

Early research by Dovidio and Gaertner (1991) has shown that out-group helping behavior is more likely to occur when people who belong to different groups are able to find a common sense of connectedness or shared identity. If, for example, people belonging to different ethnic groups see themselves as sharing a common identity (i.e., belonging to a multicultural Australia), they are more likely to have feelings of closeness and to show an increased responsibility for the welfare of others (Levine et al., 2005).

However, regardless of whether or not participants acknowledge a shared Australian identity, there was a common sense of obligation to contribute and reciprocate to the broader community. A motivating factor for several participants, whether for informal or formal volunteering, was driven by a strong sense of gratitude stemming from their experiences as migrants and refugees. The following extract captures this sentiment well:

I think just like me when I first arrive in Australia . . . I was the first group arrive in Australia in Sydney, 200 people, we walk into a hall, and I was stunned to see that there was clothes, everything that we could need. I didn't, could not imagine that the Australian were ready to give so much and then the first week I've got some sort of like allowance. And I said, what, I get the money as well? I thought this very unusual country. . . . we stay in the hostel, you know, we get the food, we got fed and we get allowance, I say, and I thought, you know, how could I do, you know, how could I do to return all this, you know, suddenly I got all these good things from the big rich

country like Australia. I thought, from the beginning, I thought one day I will keep doing what the Australian have been doing. (Kim, female, 58)

Huy (male, 55) also indicates that, as a community leader, he utilizes this gratitude to mobilize others to participate: “We say, look, we are . . . Vietnamese background, but we are Australia[n], for most we are Australia[n]. We are here, to help other people who are in need and also because we, we owe the country, this country, for accepting us, as refugees to come here 20 years, 30 years ago, it is time for us to contribute back.”

All participants, both Buddhist and Catholic, described the importance of their religious beliefs as a key motivator for their “helping behavior.” For example: “Yes, yes, very important. I think the Vietnamese very much religious people, either Catholic or Buddhist or ancestor, you know, you worship the ancestor, or you Christian, or whatever, you live a good life, live for other people” (Huy, male, 55); or “When you go to church, you know, the priest says, you know, you should give something back . . . so a lot of them are doing it because of their faith” (Thuy, female, 35).

The role that religious organizations have in facilitating volunteering is well established (e.g., Evans and Kelley, 2000; Smith, 1994). However, religious organizations can play a particularly important role for some ethnic communities, as it is within the structures and activities of the church or temple that opportunities for intergroup interaction and bridging capital are provided. In this study, many participants were affiliated with religious organizations in Melbourne suburbs with a large population of Vietnamese migrants, and hence many of the constituents of the organizations were also Vietnamese. This resulted in many participants volunteering “within” the Vietnamese community, despite the church or temple being open to other ethnic groups. Nonetheless, these activities still open doors for some of the participants. An example of this is provided by Thanh (female, 65) with limited English language skills. She explains that through her temple, she visits other Vietnamese migrants in hospital, but that in the process, she has the opportunity to have positive interactions with the other non-Vietnamese patients in the room: “I just visit the Vietnamese [in hospital], but in the room, there four, four bed and other people look at me and I say hello . . . and they come and pat my hand, and lovely, and ask about what I am doing and I say sometimes I am joking, I play tai chi with the old lady, they very happy.”

Interestingly, another emerging notion was that of a good *civic identity*. For those heavily involved in volunteering, there was some indication of a volunteer or altruistic identity (see Finkelstein et al., 2005; Matsuba et al., 2007; Thoits, 2012). In the study, there was a sentiment of role modeling within the family in developing a mindset of good citizenship. For example, Thien (female, 62) explains: “I think mostly it (volunteering) is background because my father and my mother usually taught me when I was young, even now I teach my son, help people if you can, anything we can. Just try to remember other people, my father teach me when I was young.” Thuy (female, 35) also states: “That’s the thing; because I was raised up in a family that always was involved in the community work, or in the community, yeah, so we’re continuously encouraged to get involved.”

Older participants had a firm belief that the next generation would become more involved, once the language barrier was removed: “The next generation will be good, they speak English good, no problems, but the next generation I believe they will be involved more because no problem with the language.” (Thien, female 62). Others believed that it is dependent on the family context: “It’s the influence, you know, within the family and within the community. If you live in a family, you have someone who keep doing all the good things that they believe in, and the other people in the family, they see it . . . they will follow” (Kim, female, 58). Previous findings do suggest an intergenerational transmission of volunteering behavior (Bekkers, 2007). Furthermore, work by Zaff and colleagues (2008) suggest that ethnic socialization in young people (i.e., ethnicity-related activities with their families) predicted civic behaviors. Given that more emphasis is often placed on bridging as opposed to bonding capital, this is particularly important, as it suggests that informal volunteering behavior within ethnic groups can have a positive impact on subsequent generations in terms of their civic behavior.

In her discussion about second-generation Vietnamese-Australians, Thuy (female, 35) highlights the diversity within ethnic communities. She had been involved in a group initially targeted at second-generation Vietnamese-Australians, but it began to attract a greater number of international students. It resulted in her eventually leaving the group, indicating that she felt it was a “culture clash” and that “in terms of working ethics, it’s different. They like to work the Vietnamese way and I like to work the Western way.” She also describes ethnic-based groups having less relevance to second-generation migrants, as they are able to be part of many other social groups. This is an important reminder as to the heterogeneity of ethnic identities within groups.

Conclusion

Further work is required to understand the extent and the ways in which helping behavior or civic participation is exercised in a culturally diverse society, and to understand the role of both formal and informal volunteering in that process. Findings from this study support previous work that suggests that migrants may have a preference to give their time informally within their communities, rather than volunteer for formal organizations (Kerr et al., 2001). However, in defining “volunteering,” there was a blurring of boundaries between what is classified as informal versus formal activities. This raises concerns as to using narrow parameters of formal volunteering as an indicator of civic participation. Furthermore, the intersection between various identities—such as ethnic identity, multicultural Australian identity, or a general good civic identity—and how they can facilitate or obstruct civic participation also needs to be further explored.

Australia is among the most culturally diverse populations in the developed world. According to current demographic projections, Australia will become more ethnically and culturally diverse over the next few decades. Maintaining a cohesive society in the face of increasing change is a pressing political and social challenge. A comprehensive and clear understanding about the processes of civic participation is essential to meet these challenges successfully.

References

- ABS (Australian Bureau of Statistics) 2007. *Voluntary Work, Australia*. Canberra: Commonwealth Government of Australia.
- ABS (Australian Bureau of Statistics) 2010. *Voluntary Work, Australia*. Canberra: Commonwealth Government of Australia.
- Australian Multicultural Foundation and Volunteering Australia 2007. *National Survey of Australian Volunteers from Diverse Cultural and Linguistic Backgrounds*. Melbourne: Volunteering Australia.
- Bekkers, René 2007. "Intergenerational transmission of volunteering." *Acta Sociologica* 50: 99–114.
- Braun, Virginia, and Victoria Clarke 2013. *Successful Qualitative Research: A Practical Guide for Beginners*. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.
- Coffé, Hilde, and Benny Geys 2007. "Toward an empirical characterization of bridging and bonding social capital." *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 36: 121–139.
- Collins, Jock 2007. "The landmark of Cronulla." In *Social Cohesion in Australia*, edited by James Jupp, John Nieuwenhuysen, and Emma Dawson, 61–69. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
- Cordingley, Sha 2000. "The definition and principles of volunteering." In *Volunteers and Volunteering*, edited by Jeni Warburton and Melanie Oppenheimer, 73–82. Leichardt: Federation Press.
- Department of Employment 2015. *Work for the dole*. Commonwealth Government of Australia. Available at: <https://employment.gov.au/work-dole> [Accessed September 25, 2015].
- Department of Family and Community Services 2001. *International Year of Volunteers 2001—Evaluation Report*. Canberra: Commonwealth Government of Australia.
- Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2008. *About Australia: A Culturally Diverse Society*. Canberra: Commonwealth Government of Australia.
- Department of Immigration 2001. *Immigration: Federation to Century's End 1901–2000*, available at <http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/statistics/federation/federation.pdf>
- Dovidio, John F., and Samuel L. Gaertner 1991. "Changes in the expression and assessment of racial prejudice." In *Opening Doors: Perspectives on Race Relations in Contemporary America* edited by Harry J. Knopke, Robert J. Norrell, and Ronald W. Rogers, 119–225. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.
- Eckstein, Susan 2001. "Community as gift-giving: Collectivistic roots of volunteerism." *American Sociological Review* 66: 829–851.
- Esmond, Judy, and Patrick Dunlop 2004. *Developing the Volunteer Motivation Inventory to Assess the Underlying Motivational Drives of Volunteers in Western Australia*. Perth: CLAN WA.
- Evans, Mariah, D. R. and Jonathon Kelley 2000. "Charity work: International differences and Australian trends." *Australian Monitor* 3: 15–23.
- Finkelstein, Marcia A., Louis A. Penner, and Michael T. Brannick 2005. "Motive, role identity, and prosocial personality as predictors of volunteer activity." *Social Behavior and Personality: An International Journal* 33: 403–418.
- Healy, Ernest 2007. "Ethnic diversity and social cohesion in Melbourne." *People and Place* 15: 49.
- Iyer, Aarti, and Michelle K. Ryan 2009. "Why do men and women challenge gender discrimination in the workplace? The role of group status and in-group identification in predicting pathways to collective action." *Journal of Social Issues* 65: 791–814.
- Jupp, James 2007. "The quest for harmony." In *Social Cohesion in Australia*, edited by James Jupp, John Nieuwenhuysen, and Emma Dawson, 9–20. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.

- Kalantzis, Mary 2000. "Multicultural citizenship." In *Rethinking Australian Citizenship*, edited by Wayne Hudson and John Kane, 99–110. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
- Kerr, Lorraine, Harry Savelsberg, Syd Sparrow, and Deirdre Tedmanson 2001. "Celebrating diversity. Experiences and perceptions of volunteering in indigenous and non-English speaking background communities." *Australian Journal on Volunteering* 6: 117–127.
- Levine, Mark, Amy Prosser, David Evans, and Stephen Reicher 2005. "Identity and emergency intervention: How social group membership and inclusiveness of group boundaries shape helping behavior." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 31: 443–453.
- Mallett, Robyn K., Jeffrey R. Huntsinger, Stacey Sinclair, and Janet K. Swim 2008. "Seeing through their eyes: When majority group members take collective action on behalf of an outgroup." *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 11: 451–470.
- Martin, Jay 1999. "Volunteering in a culturally diverse context: Implications for project designers and managers." *Australian Journal of Volunteering* 4: 23–30.
- Mason, Michael Christopher, Andrew Tintin Singleton, and Ruth Webber 2007. *The Spirit of Generation Y: Young People's Spirituality in a Changing Australia*. Melbourne: John Garratt Publishing.
- Mason, Michael Christopher, Andrew Tintin Singleton, and Ruth Webber 2010. "Developments in spirituality among youth in Australia and other western societies." In *Annual Review of the Sociology of Religion, Vol. 1: Youth and Religion*, edited by Giuseppe Giordan, 89–114. Leiden: Brill.
- Matsuba, M. Kyle, Daniel Hart, and Robert Atkins 2007. "Psychological and social-structural influences on commitment to volunteering." *Journal of Research in Personality* 41: 889–907.
- Musick, Marc A., John Wilson, and William B. Bynum 2000. "Race and formal volunteering: The differential effects of class and religion." *Social Forces* 78: 1539–1570.
- Parkinson, Lynne, Jeni Warburton, David Sibbritt, and Julie Byles 2010. "Volunteering and older women: Psychosocial and health predictors of participation." *Aging and Mental Health* 14: 917–927.
- Paxton, Pamela 2002. "Social capital and democracy: An interdependent relationship." *American Sociological Review* 67: 254–277.
- Petriwskyj, Andrea M., and Jeni Warburton 2007. "Redefining volunteering for the global context: A measurement matrix for researchers." *Australian Journal on Volunteering* 12: 7.
- Piliavin, Jane Allyn, and Erica Siegl 2007. "Health benefits of volunteering in the Wisconsin longitudinal study." *Journal of Health and Social Behavior* 48: 450–464.
- Putnam, Robert D. 2007. "E pluribus unum: Diversity and community in the twenty-first century the 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30: 137–174.
- Smith, David H. 1994. "Determinants of voluntary association participation and volunteering – a literature review." *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 23: 243–263.
- Soroka, Stuart N., Richard Johnston, and Keith G. Banting 2007. "The ties that bind: Social cohesion and diversity in Canada." In *Belonging? Diversity, recognition and shared citizenship in Canada* edited by Keith Banting, Thomas Courchene and Leslie Seidle. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy.
- Sundeen, Richard A., Cristina Garcia, and Lili Wang 2007. "Volunteer behavior among Asian American groups in the United States." *Journal of Asian American Studies* 10: 243–281.
- Tajfel, Henri, and John C. Turner 1979. "An integrative theory of intergroup conflict." *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations* 33: 74.

- Thoits, Peggy A. 2012. "Role-identity salience, purpose and meaning in life, and well-being among volunteers." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 75: 360–384.
- Turner, John C., Michael A. Hogg, Penelope J. Oakes, Stephen D. Reicher, and Margaret S. Wetherell 1987. *Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory*. Basil: Blackwell.
- United Nations 2001. *Support for Volunteering: Report of the Secretary-General, Item 120, A/56/288*.
- Volunteering Australia 2003. *Universal Declaration on Volunteering*. Melbourne: Volunteering Australia.
- Vo-Thanh-Xuan, James, and Pranee Liamputtong 2003. "What it takes to be a grandparent in a new country: The lived experience and emotional well-being of Australian-Vietnamese grandparents." *Australian Journal of Social Issues* 38: 209.
- Zaff, Jonathon, Oksana Malanchuk, and Jacquelynn Eccles 2008. "Predicting positive citizenship from adolescence to young adulthood: The effects of a civic context." *Applied Development Science* 12: 38–53.
- Zappala, Gianni, and Tracy Burrell 2002. "What makes a frequent volunteer? Predicting volunteer commitment to a community services organization." *Australian Journal on Volunteering* 7: 45–58.

Intermarriage, Language Use, and Integration of Migrants

Dharma Arunachalam and Maria Karidakis

Introduction

Integration of migrants and their descendants is a common concern among countries with a long history of immigration. In Australia, this found expression in restrictive immigration policies that limited the entry of non-Europeans until the 1940s. This was based on the strong belief that national unity and social cohesion were contingent on maintaining ethnic and racial homogeneity (Jupp, 2007; Markus et al., 2009). However, spurred by an expanding manufacturing sector in postwar years and concerns about national security, Australia opened its doors to migrants from Southern and Eastern Europe. This was followed in the 1970s by a large inflow of migrants from the Middle East, in particular from Lebanon and Turkey. Migration from Asia, in particular from East Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia, has been a major contributor to Australia's migration program since the 1980s.

As Australia gradually expanded the source countries for its migration program, the focus shifted from controlling who is allowed into the country to post-arrival settlement policies and programs to manage ethnic diversity. Successive governments set up formal institutions and mechanisms, and allocated financial resources to help migrants integrate into Australian society. At the same time, it was also expected that social interactions (e.g., at work, education, sports) between new and old Australians would help narrow the social distance in an increasingly ethnically and culturally diverse society (Borrie, 1954). Government policies and programs and community organizations could facilitate and foster people to people interactions involving members of different ethnic backgrounds. This chapter looks at two aspects of such social interactions: intermarriage and the shift to use of English at home. In this chapter, we analyze and synthesize the available evidence on the patterns of intermarriage and use of English at home by birthplace

and ancestry. A brief discussion of the role of intermarriage and language use in the process of assimilation or integration is then provided. The empirical evidence on intermarriage and language use at home is presented in the following two sections. The chapter concludes with a discussion.

How is Assimilation/Integration Defined?

A common but simple definition of assimilation entails merging of migrants and their descendants with the host society in such a way that they become indistinguishable from one another (Borrie, 1959; Price and Zubrzycki, 1962a). This involves not only achieving economic and social parity, but also cultural uniformity. In other words, the migrants and their descendants not only speak the same (or only) language as their host, they also think and act the same. Assimilation thus demands a complete absorption into the host society: migrants and their descendants subscribe to and adopt the values and norms of the dominant population. More broadly, assimilation is a process whereby the social, economic, and cultural differences between migrants and natives are narrowed or completely eliminated over a long period of time.

However, whether, how, and to what extent assimilation occurs is dependent on a host of factors. They relate to both the migrants and the natives. Some degree of assimilation is possible only if migrants speak the local language. Similarly, the natives must be open and willing to interact and accommodate migrants. Migrants and locals are likely to intermingle if their language, religion, and the social and political institutions in the migrants' countries of origin are similar to those of the host society. This principle underlined the restrictive migration policies that were in effect until the 1940s (Rivett, 1962).

Assimilation and social cohesion began to dominate public debate and policy discourse from the middle of the twentieth century. This period also saw, for the first time in Australian post-settlement history, a significant inflow of migrants from Southern and Eastern Europe. Migrants from these areas spoke different languages, had different religions and sociopolitical institutions from their counterparts in Australia. The period since the 1960s saw a large inflow of migrants from the Middle East (e.g., Turkey, Lebanon) and Asia (e.g., China, India). As a result, assimilation and social cohesion is contingent on narrowing the gap in all these dimensions.

Many scholars view ethnic or cultural intermix as a sure way to narrow the social distance between groups and thereby strengthen social cohesion (Alba, 1995; Alba and Nee, 2003; Borrie, 1954; Price and Zubrzycki, 1962a). Intermix is measured by ethnic intermarriage as "it breaks down ethnic exclusiveness and mixes the various ethnic populations more effectively than any other social process" (Price, 1982: 100). The extent of intermarriage is in turn dependent on several factors. Past research has shown that the size and gender balance of a migrant group ("opportunity" or "necessity") are significant factors in determining the extent of intermarriage. If group size and gender composition are no barriers to finding a partner within that group (in-marriage), then the likelihood of finding

and marrying outside their own ethnic group is related to the social, economic, and cultural or religious distances between ethnic groups—“preference,” “propensity,” or “ability” (Giorgas and Jones, 2002; Gray, 1987; Jones, 1991; McCaa, 1989; Penny and Khoo, 1996; Price and Zubrzycki, 1962b).

The shift to the use of the language of the host society is also critical for intermarriage and integration of members of ethnic groups. Proficiency in and use of English in Australia is not only important for accessing education and employment, but also for social interactions. Thus, as social cohesion is “inherently connected with linguistic diversity,” linguistic assimilation facilitates integration and contributes to social cohesion (Piller, 2012: 282; see also Clyne, 2011; Piller and Takahashi, 2011).

Intermarriage

Until the mid-1980s, research on ethnic intermarriage in Australia relied on marriage registration data that included the country of birth of brides and grooms. The 1986 Australian census collected, for the first time, the ethnic origins of all Australians. This data, combined with information on country of birth, allowed researchers to examine intermarriage by ancestry/ethnic origin separately for immigrants and their children who were born and grew up in Australia. The census data also permitted an understanding of ethnic intermix in the total population. This was not possible with the marriage registration data.

Detailed analysis of intermarriage in Australia did not begin until the 1990s. This was partly due to the limited availability of relevant information on intermarriage and also due to the extent and nature of immigrant flows into Australia. Only at the end of the twentieth century could significant numbers of second- and third-generation descendants of migrants from a wide range of ancestry be observed. Thus, intermarriage statistics until the 1986 census could be obtained only by country of birth of grooms and brides (Jones, 1991; Price and Zubrzycki, 1962a, 1962b). The available evidence for this period is given in Table 9.1. Between 1960 and 1980, the extent of intermarriage among first-generation migrants became more widespread across almost all groups. The lowest level was observed among the newly married of Greek, Italian, and Lebanese background. Only about one in four of the newly wed in the early 1960s married someone from a different country of birth. The corresponding figure was about one in two among migrants of Polish, Yugoslav, and Chinese background. This was followed by two in three among German and Dutch migrants, and the highest level (about three in four) was observed among those from Britain. By the 1980s, the level of intermarriage ranged from two-thirds to nine-tenths among all but three groups. Only about 40 percent of the newly married grooms who migrated from Lebanon, Yugoslavia, and Poland had married someone who was born outside their respective countries of birth. While the figure for 1980–1982 was lower than the level in 1960–1962 for those born in Poland and Yugoslavia, it was the reverse for those born in Lebanon. In other words, between 1960 and 1980 intermarriage increased for all but those born in Poland and Yugoslavia.

Table 9.1 Percentage of Men Who Married a Partner from a Different Birthplace, Australia 1960–1962 and 1980–1982

Birthplace	1960–1962	1980–1982
English-speaking countries		
Australia	7	13.4
United Kingdom	78.1	82.4
New Zealand	*	82.8
Northern, Western, and Eastern Europe		
Germany	62.1	90.7
Netherlands	64.9	92.4
Poland	53	45.2
Mediterranean		
Greece	9.1	62.4
Italy	28.7	75.8
Lebanon	27.7	42.8
Yugoslavia	53.9	44.4
Asia		
China	58.9	66.7
India	*	78.9
Indonesia	*	64.8

Note: Figures were based on marriage registration data; *: less than 200 persons.

Source: Intermarriage percentages were calculated as 100 minus in-marriage percentages provided in Tables 3 and 5 in Jones (1991).

The evidence from the 1986 census for selected migrant groups who were numerically large is presented in Table 9.2. The figures in Tables 9.1 and 9.2 are not comparable, as they are based on very different data; one on marriage registration data and the other on the entire population. However, the data in Table 9.2 confirm that the intermarriage rates varied by country of birth of migrants. Thus, while one in five migrants from Greece and two in five from Italy were married to someone from outside their country of birth, it was about two-third and three-quarters among Western, Northern, and Eastern European migrants.

Table 9.2 also permits an examination of intermarriage among the second- and third- or higher generation descendants of migrants. A higher level of integration and thus intermarriage is expected among those who were born and brought up in Australia, that is, the children and grandchildren of migrants. This is borne out by the data in Table 9.2. The rates of ethnic intermarriage increased substantially between migrants' generation and their children's generation. Ethnic intermarriage was over 90 percent among second- and higher generation descendants of ethnic groups from Northern, Western, and Eastern Europe that have had a relatively long presence in Australia (Dutch, German, Anglo-Celts, Polish). Even among Australians with Italian and Greek ancestries, who in general have shown greater tendency for in-marriage, the level of intermarriage increased from about 65 percent for second-generation migrants to over 90 percent for third- or higher generation migrants. Although gender differences in the rate of intermarriage is noticeable

Table 9.2 Percentage of Partnered Men and Women with Spouse of a Different Ancestry, by Gender and Generation, 1986

Ancestry	Males by generation			Females by generation		
	1st	2nd	3rd or later	1st	2nd	3rd or later
Anglo-Celt	73	87	23	71	87	25
Dutch	74	93	98	67	94	98
German	78	97	77	70	97	76
Hungarian	66	95	*	50	95	*
Polish	65	91	96	63	92	96
Italian	39	71	95	18	75	96
Greek	21	64	95	11	71	95
Other	36	79	38	33	81	39

Note: Only persons under the age of 60, married in Australia, and still in their first marriage were included (1,859,562 marriages in total). Third- and higher generation persons of Hungarian ancestry were excluded, as there were fewer than 100 persons who were aged under 60 and still in their first marriage.

Source: Giorgas and Jones (2002: 52).

for Italian and Greek migrants—intermarriage being more prevalent among males than among females—they disappear completely for their children's generation.

Intermarriage rates by ancestry and generation for the most recent period, derived from the 2011 census, are provided in Table 9.3. A unique feature of this table is that it allows an examination of intermarriage among those of Asian and Middle Eastern origin who came in large numbers since the 1980s. The pattern of intermarriage among European ancestries changed little between 1986 and 2011. The people of North and Western European ancestries lead in the rate of intermarriage for all three generations. However, the differences between them and ancestries from the rest of Europe narrow substantially by the second generation and almost disappear by the third generation. By the second generation, only Greeks, Macedonians, and Bosnians have less than 50 percent intermarriage. By the third generation, at least 75 percent of any ancestry group of European origin have intermarried. It is interesting that by the third generation any gender difference that existed for the second generation was no longer evident.

Levels of intermarriage among migrants from the rest of the world were similar to what was observed for migrants from Greece. Among most migrant groups from Asia and the Middle East, less than 25 percent were intermarried. Only the Japanese and Indonesian ancestry groups had about a quarter intermarried. However, the rates of intermarriage for all Asian ancestry groups increased several folds between the first and second generation. Eight of the eleven groups presented in Table 9.3 had at least 50 percent intermarriage in the second generation. In fact, six of them had at least two-thirds intermarried. The exceptions were second-generation Australians of Pakistani, Korean, and Afghan ancestry. The lowest rates of intermarriage among the second generation were observed for those with Afghan (29%), Pakistani (35%), Turkish (35%), Macedonian (39%), and Lebanese (40%) ancestries. By the third generation, every ancestry for which we have information in Table 9.3 (only five ancestries) had at least 50 percent

Table 9.3 Percentage of Partnered Men and Women with Spouse of a Different Ancestry, by Gender and Generation, 2011

Ancestry	Males by generation			Females by generation		
	1st	2nd	3rd or later	1st	2nd	3rd or later
British and Irish origin						
English	39	49	29.4	35.4	49.5	30.4
Irish	69.1	85.6	77.4	66.8	84.7	76.5
Scottish	73.8	91.8	85.9	69.6	90.1	82.9
Welsh	77.9	97.7	96.7	72.1	96.5	95.6
New Zealander	74.2	97.6	96.9	71.6	96.4	96.6
Northern and Western European						
Dutch	71.9	92	93.7	65.9	91.1	92.6
French	70.3	96.1	98.6	69	95.5	98.4
German	71.9	93	84.6	69.3	92.9	83.6
Southern and Eastern European						
Portuguese	42.7	78.1	93	39.6	73.7	96.8
Spanish [^]	36	87	96	37	85	98
Italian	32.5	63.4	87.8	22.5	56.4	85.9
Greek	17.9	48.9	78.3	12	41.6	72.5
Maltese [^]	33	67	79	28	64	77
Macedonian [^]	10	39	*	8	35	*
Serbian	24.6	67.7	80.8	18.8	60.5	73.7
Croatian	34.7	71.6	90.6	28.2	69	87.3
Bosnian [^]	15	44	*	14	42	*
Hungarian	55.3	93.1	95.2	47	92.5	94.2
Polish	45	87.8	95.2	48.2	86.1	94.9
Russian	36.2	83.2	96.2	53	83.6	98.1
Middle Eastern origin						
Lebanese	15.8	39.8	74.6	11.9	29.2	68.1
Turkish	17.4	35.4	56.8	11.1	24.8	34.3
Egyptian [^]	24	66	*	14	58	*
Asian origin						
Filipino	11.7	67.7	**	52.9	81.8	85.1
Indonesian	26.4	71.8	**	57	75.4	**
Vietnamese	9.8	50.5	**	19.9	63.5	**
Chinese	9	53.4	88.9	20.2	69	92
Indian	11.2	66	79.2	10.3	70.6	70.7
Sinhalese [^]	14	95	*	13	86	*
Afghan	8.9	29	**	6.2	20	**
Bangladeshi	8.7	62.5	**	5.4	71	**
Japanese	27.4	83.6	**	75.6	96.4	**
Korean	7	44.8	62.5	22.1	58.4	**
Pakistani	17.3	35.1	**	10.8	39.5	**

Note: [^] refers to information from 2006 census; *: less than 100 persons; **: less than 200 persons.

Source: Derived from customized 2011 census tables, and Khoo et al. (2009: 20–21).

intermarriage. The rates of intermarriage for third-generation Chinese and Indian ancestries are comparable to that for third-generation European ancestries.

It is interesting that even among the third-generation Lebanese women, at least two-thirds were intermarried. But it was only about one-third among third-generation Turkish women. The two Asian groups that may follow the Turkish pattern seem to be those of Afghan and Pakistani ancestries. The rest of the Asian groups are likely to follow the Indian and Chinese pattern of further substantial increase in intermarriage between the second and third generation.

Another aspect of intermarriage that is significant for integration is the extent to which partnering involves persons of similar or different ethnic backgrounds (Khoo, 2004; Khoo et al., 2009; Price and Zubrzycki, 1962a, 1962b). Of particular interest is the level of intermarriage with persons of Australian or Anglo-Celtic ancestries who are predominantly of English-speaking origin. Evidence from the 2001 and 2006 censuses shows that by the third generation most intermarriages do occur with people of Anglo-Celtic background. However, in the second generation this does not happen to such an extent among some groups. Among the second-generation Greeks, for instance, only about 40 percent of those who intermarried did so with persons of Australian or Anglo-Celtic background. This, however, increased to over 60 percent for third-generation Greeks (Khoo et al., 2009: 22–23). The other groups that have similar lower levels of intermarriage with persons of Anglo-Celtic background are Lebanese, Turkish, and Vietnamese. But by the third generation, about 70 percent of intermarriages were with persons of Anglo-Celtic background. Similar information for third-generation Turkish and Vietnamese could not be obtained, as the size of their cohorts was relatively small. It is also interesting that the level of intermarriage with persons of Australian or Anglo-Celtic background was 60 percent among second-generation Indians and Chinese. It was over 75 percent among third-generation Chinese (data not available for third-generation Indians) (Khoo et al., 2009).

Language Shift

One of the most influential factors contributing to social integration and cohesion is language shift. Table 9.4 provides information on the use of English at home by country of birth in 1991, 2001, and 2011, for selected countries. Two major features are evident. First, the proportion speaking only English at home has increased between successive censuses for immigrants from most countries presented in Table 9.4. Second, there are significant differences between regions and countries that parallel the differentials observed for intermarriage. Among a number of groups, less than 5 percent spoke only English at home in 2011. This group included migrants from China and Nepal who were likely to have arrived under the business and skilled migration programs. In contrast, the vast majority from Iraq and Afghanistan was likely to have arrived as refugees, including a significant number of migrants from Vietnam. First-generation migrants from countries with a relatively long history of migration to Australia, but a very low shift to use of English at home, included migrants from Lebanon, Turkey, and Greece.

Table 9.4 Percentage of Language Shift in the First Generation, 1991, 2001, and 2011

Country of birth	2011	2001	1991
Afghanistan	2.0	na	na
Iraq	3.0	3.6	na
Vietnam	3.2	2.4	na
China	3.3	4.3	5.3
Nepal	3.9	na	na
Taiwan	5.5	3.8	2.9
Bangladesh	5.4	na	na
Bosnia	6.0	na	na
FYROM	6.9	4.7	na
Lebanon	7.4	6.2	na
Greece	7.4	7.1	4.4
Turkey	8.1	7.1	4.0
Korea	9.3	11.1	na
Pakistan	10.2	na	na
Serbia	11.0	na	na
Hong Kong	12.5	10.3	6.6
Ukraine	13.6	13.5	na
Russia	13.7	na	na
Indonesia	16.3	16.4	na
Japan	17.4	16.9	na
Croatia	17.5	na	na
Italy	17.8	15.9	11.7
India	21.3	na	na
Philippines	22.6	27.4	na
Poland	23.9	22.3	18.7
Sri Lanka	26.7	na	na
Spain	26.6	25.1	14.7
Malaysia	32.6	na	na
Hungary	35.9	35.0	27.7
France	31.1	36.8	30.1
Malta	40.7	38.2	30.7
Switzerland	44.2	na	na
Singapore	48.3	na	na
Germany	52.7	54.0	43.5
Netherlands	63.7	62.6	57.8

na: not available from our data.

Source: Figures for 1991 and 2001 from Kipp and Clyne (2003: 34).

High-shift groups tended to be those migrants born in Western Europe—the Netherlands (63.7%), Germany (52.7%), and Switzerland (44.2%). However, only one in three among those born in France spoke English at home. Other relatively high-shift groups included those from Singapore (48.3%), Malta (40.7%), Hungary (35.9%), and Malaysia (32.6%). There were a number of countries of birth where about 20 percent of first-generation migrants spoke English at home. These included migrants born in Fiji (23.2%), the Philippines (22.6%), India (21.3%), Egypt (20.3%),

and Romania (20.2%). Speakers of Italian (17.8%), Croatian (17.5%), Japanese (17.4%), and Indonesian (16.3%) displayed intermediate shifts on this scale.

It is thus evident that there was a general tendency for migrants from Northern, Central, and Western Europe to shift more rapidly to English, while those from Asian countries, Southern Europe, and the Middle East tended to have lower shifts to English. This indicates that cultural distance was instrumental in determining language maintenance and shift.

Information on the shift to the use of only English at home among children (second generation) and grandchildren (third generation or later) is given in Table 9.5. While only one in five first-generation migrants in Australia spoke English at home in 2011, it was more than double among their children who were born in Australia (51%). It was even higher if one parent was born in Australia. Among those who were born and grew up in Australia with one parent who was born in Australia, three-quarters spoke only English at home. In contrast, if both parents were born overseas, only about 43 percent spoke English at home. In the third generation (grandchildren of migrants), almost all (90%) spoke only English at home.

Despite one in two children of migrants speaking only English at home, there were huge disparities by language spoken. The groups with very low levels of use of English at home (about 10%) in 2011 were Vietnamese, Afghans, Taiwanese, and Koreans. In a number of groups less than a quarter spoke only English. These included Serbians, Iraqis, Turks, Japanese, Bangladeshis, and Pakistanis. Interestingly, about one in three second-generation Greeks and Chinese and one in four second-generation Lebanese spoke only English at home. At the other end of the spectrum were those of European origin, with Western European origin second-generation Australians leading the way. Other high-shift groups included those of Maltese and Italian ancestry from Southern Europe and migrants of Hungarian ancestry from Eastern Europe. There were a number of migrant groups where about two in five second-generation speakers were likely to speak English at home. These included migrants of Egyptian (44%) and Indian (40%) ancestry.

Among third- or subsequent generation Australians, the variation by ancestry in the use of only English at home was substantially less than what was found among the second generation. Across all ancestries there continued to be a high intergenerational shift: overall, 90 percent spoke only English at home among the third generation. Compared to the second generation, there was little variation among high-shift groups from Western Europe. Third-generation Australians who exhibited a very rapid shift to English included those of Middle Eastern, Southeast Asian, Northeast Asian, and South Asian ancestries. This is particularly evident when we compare rates of shift in the third generation with those of the second-generation Chinese (58.9% diff.), Japanese (63.8% diff.), Afghan (64.7% diff.), and Pakistani (61.1% diff.) ancestry groups.

There are still some third-generation ancestry groups with fewer than a quarter using English at home. They included Vietnamese and Iraqis. Third-generation Bangladeshis (31%), Koreans (40%), Greeks (51%), Macedonians (52%), Indonesians (48%), and Malays (52%) also show a relatively low level of English use at home compared to the rest.

Table 9.5 Percentage of Second- and Third-Generation Migrants Who Spoke Only English at Home, by Ancestry, 2011

Percent shift to English in the 2nd and 3rd or later generations					
Ancestry	Both parents born overseas	Father only born overseas	Mother only born overseas	Total 2nd generation	Total 3rd gen or later
Southern Europe					
Italian	58.8	85.1	84.0	68.3	92.5
Maltese	80.0	92.9	89.9	83.0	95.7
Spanish	47.2	79.1	75.1	53.6	90.4
Eastern Europe					
Hungarian	71.8	91.3	80.0	75.3	93.4
Polish	68.9	90.8	81.0	72.7	95.7
Russian	55.7	84.7	72.1	60.9	87.0
Ukrainian	68.7	83.3	72.6	70.9	82.9
South-eastern Europe					
Bosnian	24.1	44.0	37.6	26.3	66.4*
Croatian	50.7	70.8	66.0	54.3	71.6
Macedonian	27.4	42.5	39.5	30.4	51.7
Greek	27.8	48.0	50.7	32.7	50.6
Serbian	13.7	43.6	36.5	15.4	57.3
Western Europe					
Dutch	91.8	97.5	94.8	93.4	98.5
French	59.6	83.7	79.3	67.1	96.4
German	84.5	95.6	89.6	89.2	98.8
Swiss	70.3	91.4	77.1	74.9	97.6
The Middle East					
Egyptian	40.7	64.4	60.9	44.0	73.6^
Iraqi	13.4	59.1	31.2	14.8	16.4
Lebanese	22.1	33.8	38.0	25.6	62.2
Turkish	14.2	25.6	19.7	16.0	37.4
South-east Asia					
Thai	30.7	84.4	63.6	38.0	76.7*
Vietnamese	9.5	41.3	26.3	10.3	22.6
Filipino	68.5	87.4	85.9	70.4	89.7^
Indonesian	32.3	63.9	60.1	36.3	47.5^
Malay	53.3	66.3	51.2	54.4	52.2
Burmese	59.5	94.2	91.9	64.1	86.7*
Singaporean	76.9	87.3	93.6	79.3^	100.0*
North-east Asia					
Chinese	26.5	85.5	67.6	33.9	92.8
Taiwanese	11.3	0.0	31.3	11.6*	100.0*
Japanese	17.2	68.9	39.5	22.6	86.4^
Korean	11.7	61.7	35.0	12.6	40.5*
South Asia					
Bangladeshi	14.8	81.4	17.1	15.6	31.3*
Indian	38.1	73.8	63.2	40.2	85.2
Nepalese	17.2	76.9	27.3	18.8^	57.1*
Pakistani	18.9	56.7	36.7	21.2	82.3*
Sri Lankan	64.5	95.7	91.1	67.3	95.9^
Afghan	11.0	55.8	16.4	11.9	76.6*
Total	43.8	77.8	74.3	51.9	90.2

*- 200 or less; ^- 500 or less

Discussion

At the very least, migrants need to become proficient in the language of the host society to feel part of the wider society. Participation in education and in the labor market is heavily dependent on being able to converse and work in the language of the host society. Proficiency in the host language is also essential for interaction with government and social institutions and with members of society in various contexts (e.g., education, work, sport). Thus, the economic, social, and cultural integration of migrants and their children is highly likely when they adopt and use the host country's language. Inter-marriage with dominant group members and other ethnic group members in turn requires not only being able to speak the host language but also parity in socioeconomic position.

The evidence on intermarriage and the shift to the use of English among migrants, their children, and their grandchildren shows that the degree of integration increases over time and between generations. By the third generation, over three-quarters of people of all ancestries intermarry and speak only English at home. While there are substantial differences between ancestry groups among the second generation, they narrow considerably by the third generation. In general, the Northern and Western European ancestry groups show the highest rates of intermarriage and use of only English at home. This is followed by people of Eastern and Southern European ancestry, then those of Asian and Middle Eastern ancestries. Among the European groups, the Greeks, Macedonians, and Bosnians are the laggards. The other groups with relatively low levels of intermarriage and use of English are Turkish, Lebanese, Vietnamese, Afghans, and Pakistanis.

The ancestry patterns of intermarriage and use of English are strongly related to social distance from the dominant group of Anglo-Celtic background in Australia. Past research has shown the levels of intermarriage closely follow similarities in terms of religion, language, education, occupation, and income (Giorgas and Jones, 2002; Heard et al., 2009; Jones and Luijckx, 1996; Penny and Khoo, 1996; Walker and Heard, 2015). The historical migration flows of various ancestry groups have also been shown to condition the likelihood of intermarriage (Giorgas and Jones, 2002; Jones, 1991; Jones and Luijckx, 1996). Postwar marriage patterns among migrants were shaped by the size and gender balance of their respective ancestry groups (Gray, 1987; McCaa, 1989; Price and Zubrzycki, 1962a, 1962b). However, over time this "demographic" factor seems to have had less influence on the likelihood of intermarriage (Giorgas and Jones, 2002; Jones and Luijckx, 1996).

The period since the 1980s saw a significant inflow of migrants from the Indian subcontinent and from East Asia (mainly people of Chinese origin). In 1993, Price (1993: 8) observed: "It is too early to assess the marriage patterns of second generation Indo-Chinese." It is, however, clear now that the level of intermarriage among the second-generation Chinese exceeds that of second-generation Greeks. Levels of intermarriage among second-generation Indians has been even higher, being comparable to that of second-generation Maltese, Italians, and Serbians. Thus, most Asian groups that migrated in large numbers since the 1980s are likely to follow the European patterns of intermarriage over

generations, although there are some exceptions. These include Turkish migrants from West Asia, Pakistanis and Afghans from South Asia, Koreans from East Asia, and Macedonians from Eastern Europe. Interestingly, only about 40 percent of second-generation Lebanese males intermarry, with an increase of 75 percent by the third generation. Most ancestry groups that experience relatively low levels of intermarriage also have a relatively low shift to use of only English at home. Many studies have shown that intermarriage itself leads to a faster shift to the use of only English at home in subsequent generations (Clyne and Kipp, 1995; Khoo, 1995; Penny and Khoo, 1996). Some argue that migrants who display a high degree of language shift to English are more likely to assimilate readily into the host culture, while a low shift to English may promote segregation or point to multiculturalism (Clyne, 2011).

Australia did not have to deal with the issue of integration of migrants and their descendants until the postwar years. It has been argued that the maintenance of national identity and unity in an ethnically diverse Australia requires a continuous mixing between ethnic groups through intermarriage so that a sizable proportion is ethnically mixed (Price, 1993). Intermarriage and language shift patterns until the early 1990s showed a general tendency among most ethnic groups to integrate. From their analyses of the 1986 census data on intermarriage, Jones and Luijkx (1996: 84) concluded that “ethnic preference for in-marriage will, with the further passage of time, weaken to the point where they provide a relatively weak basis for group identity and for marital choice.”

The evidence from the most recent censuses further confirms that, by the third generation, a vast majority of ethnic groups intermarry and speak only English at home. The level of intermarriage and language shift was relatively low among second-generation Turkish, Vietnamese, Macedonian, and Greek ancestry groups—groups that came in relatively large numbers in the pre-1980 period. Among the post-1970s migrant groups, Afghans, Pakistanis, Koreans, and Chinese are laggards in their levels of intermarriage and shift to use of English. By the third generation, the Greeks and Chinese reach levels that are comparable to other European ancestry levels. Only third-generation Australians of Turkish ancestry have a relatively low level of intermarriage. It is too early to know how the third-generation Pakistanis, Afghans, and Koreans will experience intermarriage and language shift.

Six decades ago, after a detailed study of the integration of two early migrant groups, Germans and Italians, Borrie (1954: 179) concluded that “assimilation is a long process, that first-generation settlers seldom become completely assimilated, but that by the second generation the majority want to accept as their own the ways of life of the country in which they settled.” Evidence on intermarriage and language use from the recent censuses proves that Borrie’s observation is equally valid for the more recent migrants. With the passage of time, most migrants and their children and the later generations have tended to integrate into Australian society. It is clear from historical and more recent evidence on intermarriage and language use that there appears to be few barriers to integration into Australian society for migrants from any part of the world and their descendants.

References

- Alba, R. (1995). "Assimilation's quiet tide," *The Public Interest* 119(1): 3–18.
- Alba, R. and Nee, V. (2003). *Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Borrie, W. D. (1954). "New and Old Australians," in Aughterson, W. V. (ed.) *Taking Stock: Aspects of Mid-Century Life in Australia*, Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire, pp. 167–186.
- Borrie, W. D. (1959). *The Cultural Integration of Immigrants*, Paris: UNESCO.
- Clyne, M. (2011). "Multilingualism, multiculturalism and integration," in Clyne, M. and Jupp, J. (eds) *Multiculturalism and Integration: A Harmonious Relationship*, Canberra: ANU e Press, 73–88.
- Clyne, M. and Kipp, S. (1995). "The extent of community language maintenance in Australia," *People and Place* 3(4): 4–8.
- Giorgas, D. and Jones, F. L. (2002). "Intermarriage patterns and social cohesion among first, second and later generation Australians," *Journal of Population Research* 19(1): 47–64.
- Gray, A. (1987). "Intermarriage: Opportunity and preference," *Population Studies* 41: 365–379.
- Heard, G., Khoo, S.-E., and Birrell, B. (2009). "Intermarriage by religion in Australia," *People and Place* 17(2): 43–55.
- Jones, F. L. (1991). "Ethnic intermarriage in Australia, 1950–52 to 1980–82: Models or indices?," *Population Studies* 45: 27–42.
- Jones, F. L. and Luijckx, R. (1996). "Post-war patterns of intermarriage in Australia: The Mediterranean experience," *European Sociological Review* 12(1): 67–86.
- Jupp, J. (2007). "The quest for harmony," in Jupp, J. and Nieuwenhuysen, J. (eds) *Social Cohesion in Australia*, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 9–20.
- Karidakis, M. and Arunachalam, D. (2015). "Shift in the use of migrant community languages in Australia," *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development*. DOI: 10.1080/01434632.2015.1023808.
- Kipp, S., and Clyne, M. (2003). "Trends in the shift from community languages: Insights from the 2001 Census," *People and Place* 11(1): 33–41.
- Khoo, S.-E. (1995). "Language maintenance amongst the second generation," *People and Place* 3(4): 9–12.
- Khoo, S.-E. (2004). "Intermarriage in Australia: Patterns by ancestry, gender and generation," *People and Place* 12(2): 34–43.
- Khoo, S.-E., Birrell, B. and Heard, G. (2009). "Intermarriage by birthplace and ancestry in Australia," *People and Place* 17(1): 15–27.
- Markus, A., Jupp, J. and McDonald, P. (2009). *Australia's Immigration Revolution*, Crown Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin.
- McCaa, R. (1989). "Isolation or assimilation? A log linear interpretation of Australian marriages, 1947–60, 1975, and 1986," *Population Studies* 43: 155–162.
- Penny, J. and Khoo, S.-E. (1996). *Intermarriage: A Study of Migration and Integration*, Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.
- Piller, I. (2012). "Multilingualism and social exclusion," in Martin-Jones, M., Blackledge, A. and Creese, A. (eds) *The Routledge Handbook of Multilingualism*, Hoboken, NJ: Taylor and Francis, 281–296.
- Piller, I. and Takahashi, K. (2011). "Linguistic diversity and social inclusion," *International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism* 14(4): 371–381.
- Price, C. (1982). *The Fertility and Marriage Patterns of Australia's Ethnic Groups*, Canberra: Department of Demography, Australian National University.

- Price, C. (1993). "Ethnic intermixture in Australia," *People and Place* 1(1): 6–8.
- Price, C. and Zubrzycki, J. (1962a). "The use of inter-marriage statistics as an index of assimilation," *Population Studies* 16(1): 58–69.
- Price, C. and Zubrzycki, J. (1962b). "Immigrant marriage patterns in Australia," *Population Studies* 16(2): 123–133.
- Rivett, K. (1962). *Immigration: Control or Colour Bar?*, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
- Walker, L. and Heard, G. (2015). "Interethnic partnering: Patterns by birthplace, ancestry and Indigenous status," in Heard, G. and Arunachalam, D. (eds) *Family Formation in 21st Century Australia*, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, pp. 53–76.

Intermarriage and Japanese Identity¹

Shuko Takeshita

Introduction

The Japanese term *kokusaikekkon* (intermarriage) refers to a marriage between persons of different nationalities. Even in statistics compiled by government agencies, intermarriage includes marriages between a Japanese person and a non-Japanese person who was born and educated in Japan. In the American context, Merton (1941) defines intermarriage as marriage between persons deriving from those different in-groups and out-groups other than the family which are culturally conceived as relevant to the choice of a spouse. In other words, for Merton, intermarriage comprises a number of subcategories, including interracial marriage, interethnic marriage, interfaith marriage, and intercultural marriage.

In Japan, the myth of racial homogeneity was deeply rooted. Since there was a strong awareness of Japan as a highly homogenous country, people with a different nationality are generally seen as being of a different ethnicity and culture as well. “Nationality,” “lineage (ethnicity),” and “culture” are all component elements of Japanese identity. “Nationality” means that a person has Japanese nationality, and is a Japanese citizen as defined in the Japanese Nationality Act. “Lineage” means that the person has the blood of the Japanese race. In fact, there is no such thing as “the blood of the Japanese race,” but the persons comprising Japanese society in general have a clear image of “the physical characteristics of the Japanese.” “Culture” expresses the idea that the person has internalized Japanese culture, for example, in the form of language, values, customs, and lifestyle (Fukuoka, 1993). Mannerisms such as facial expressions and body language are also considered a part of Japanese culture (Wagatsuma and Yoneyama, 1967).

In this chapter, I examine intermarriage in Japan based on statistical materials, and after providing an understanding of intermarriage trends, I investigate the ways in which the above three elements are related to identity formation for the persons involved in those intermarriages and their children. I also reexamine

“Japanese identity,” taking into account the variable of gender, with a focus on inclusion in and exclusion from Japanese society as a result of intermarriage.

Dynamics of Intermarriage in Japan

As indicated in Figure 10.1, the number of intermarriages registered in Japan was 4,156 in 1965, when figures were first made available through the Vital Statistics of Japan. This represented only 0.4 percent of all marriages in Japan. This number increased rapidly from the latter half of the 1980s through to the early 1990s—the period of Japan’s “bubble economy”—surpassing 30,000 in 1999. The highest number of intermarriages recorded in a single year was 44,701 in 2006, bringing the ratio of intermarriages up to 6.1 percent for that year.

However, 2006 marked the peak in the number of intermarriages, with the number dropping to 30,207 in 2010. Three factors could be seen as contributing to this decline.

The first factor is that in 2006, the Ministry of Justice dramatically tightened its requirements for issuing “entertainment visas.” In 2004, a record number of 137,820 foreigners entered Japan on entertainment visas. Of these, 60 percent (82,741) were Filipinos, most of whom entered Japan as singers and dancers. In 2007, however, the number of Filipinos had decreased dramatically to 5,595, and the total number of persons entering the country on entertainment visas decreased to 42,098 (Ministry of Justice, 2004, 2007). Because most of these were women, the dramatic decrease in the number of Filipino women coming to Japan also resulted in a decrease in the number of intermarriages between Filipino women and Japanese men.




Figure 10.1 Number of Intermarriages in Japan

Source: Vital Statistics of Japan

The second factor is the strengthening of efforts to expose sham marriage brokers and other intermediaries (Kuga, 2012). In 2007, the National Police Agency began publishing reports on arrests related to sham marriages. Among the foreigners arrested during that year, those of Chinese nationality accounted for the largest number, followed by Koreans and Filipinos (National Police Agency, Criminal Investigation Bureau, Organized Crime Control Department, 2007). As I discuss below, persons from all three of these countries are among the most common in terms of intermarriages with Japanese.


The third factor is the extended recession in Japan, combined with economic growth in Asian countries. As a result of the stagnation in Japan, the income of young Japanese men has grown unstable, while economic growth throughout Asia has increased the economic strength of young Asian men. As a result, Asian women are now able to find marriage partners with whom they can sustain a comfortable lifestyle within their own countries, without having to marry Japanese men (Yamada and Hirakiuchi, 2012).

Looking at the ratio of combinations of husband and wife, in 1965 about 75 percent of intermarriages were between a foreign husband and a Japanese wife, but this ratio leveled off to about 50–50 in 1974, and the balance shifted to the other side thereafter. This trend was most notable in the latter half of the 1980s, during the period of the bubble economy, when the number of intermarriages increased dramatically. From 1988 onward, between 75 and 80 percent of intermarriages were between Japanese men and foreign women.


According to the Vital Statistics of Japan in 2010, the largest number of the foreign wives were from China (10,162; 44.5%), followed by the Philippines (5,212; 22.8%), Korea² (3,664; 16.0%), Thailand (1,096; 4.8%), Brazil (247; 1.1%), and the United States (223; 1.0%). The largest number of foreign husbands were from Korea (1,982; 26.9%), followed by the United States (1,329; 18.0%), China (910; 12.4%), the United Kingdom (316; 4.3%), and Brazil (270; 3.7%) (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2010). The countries at the top of these lists have not changed dramatically, even over the past 20 years. One notable figure is the substantial ratio of “Other nationalities” for foreign spouses of Japanese women, at 31.0 percent (2,281). Starting from the latter half of the 1980s, there was a noticeable trend toward Japanese women choosing foreign spouses of diverse nationalities.

Because the Vital Statistics of Japan do not include a list of the countries contained in the “Others” category, I look to the “microdata of the 2005 Population Census” for further details. As of October 2010, there were a total of 320,844 intermarriage couples living in Japan; 230,370 comprising a Japanese husband and a foreign wife, and 90,474 comprising a foreign husband and a Japanese wife. Figure 10.2 shows the nationalities of these foreign spouses.

Here, we can see that the “Others” category in the Vital Statistics of Japan includes Indonesia, Vietnam, Russia, and Peru in the case of wives, and Canada, Australia, Pakistan, France, and the Philippines in the case of husbands. A higher ratio of Japanese women than men choose to marry Westerners (e.g., from the United States, the United Kingdom, or Canada). Japanese men, on the other hand, rarely marry Western women.



Nationality of Foreign Wives (%)



Nationality of Foreign Husbands (%)

Figure 10.2 Nationality of Foreign Spouses
Source: Microdata of the 2010 Population Census

Component Elements of Japanese Identity

Nationality

From 1873, when regulations regarding intermarriage were first established in Japan, to 1950, when the Nationality Act was amended, Japan adopted a basic principle that the wife acquired the husband's nationality and the couple should have the same nationality. Japanese men never lost their Japanese nationality as a result of intermarriage, while Japanese women who married foreigners would lose their Japanese nationality, except in cases where their foreign husbands were naturalized as Japanese.³ When a foreign woman became the wife of a Japanese, she acquired Japanese nationality regardless of whether or not she lived in Japan, or whether or not she lost her foreign nationality (Egawa et al., 1989).

However, up until the establishment of the Nationality Act in 1899, the concept of "Japanese nationality" did not exist, so the term *Nihonjintaruno Bungen* was used instead. *Nihonjintaruno Bungen* refers to social standing in Japan attained by being a member of a Japanese "household" (Kamoto, 2001: 90–91).

In 1950, the Nationality Act was amended, this time adopting the principle of independent nationalities between husband and wife, so that both parties could maintain their original nationalities. As a result, Japanese nationals entering intermarriages only lose their Japanese nationality if they acquire the nationality of a foreign country at their own choice. On the other hand, any foreign spouse of a Japanese who acquired Japanese nationality did so through the process of naturalization (Ninomiya, 1983).

In other words, before the amendment to the Nationality Act of 1950, a Japanese woman who married a foreign man was excluded from Japanese society as a "foreigner," based on the assumption that she would return with her husband to his native country, unless he was naturalized as a Japanese. Conversely, a foreign woman marrying a Japanese man was included in Japanese society as a "Japanese."

Turning now to the nationalities of children born of intermarried couples, up until 1985 Japan had adopted the principle called "paternalism in nationality"; that is, a child born between the Japanese man and a foreign woman was given Japanese nationality, while a child born between a foreign man and a Japanese woman did not have Japanese nationality. This left a problem, however: a child born to a foreign man and a Japanese woman would have his or her foreign father's nationality, but if this was impossible, the child would have no nationality at all. This problem was resolved through an amendment to the Nationality Act in 1985, when Japan adopted the principle that if either the child's mother or father has Japanese nationality, then the child may also be considered a Japanese national (Yamada and Tsuchiya, 1986).

Article 14, Paragraph 1, of the Nationality Law stipulates:

A Japanese national having a foreign nationality shall select one of the nationalities, where he or she obtains foreign and Japanese nationalities prior to his or her becoming twenty years old, before his or her reaching twenty-two years old, and where that time when he or she obtained foreign and Japanese nationalities comes after his or her reaching twenty years old, within two years from that time.

Lineage

There is an unspoken expectation in Japanese society that a person who says “I am a Japanese” should have the unique physical characteristics of the Japanese (Wagatsuma and Yoneyama, 1967). This type of categorization by visible external characteristics is closely related to the issue of lineage. This does not necessarily mean, however, that there is such a thing as “the blood of the Japanese race.” The residents of the Japanese archipelago are descended from a multitude of races: people who came from the Korean Peninsula and the Chinese mainland and people who crossed the ocean from the north and the south. The “blood of the Japanese race” is nothing more than the image that the typical Japanese person has of Japanese society (Fukuoka, 1993: 6).

Nevertheless, a person who marries a Japanese and becomes naturalized to Japan, or even a mixed child with Japanese nationality who is born and raised in Japan, is considered by society to be a non-Japanese if he or she does not look Japanese. Conversely, even a person with a foreign nationality could pass as a Japanese to avoid social exclusion resulting from discrimination, as long as his or her physical characteristics are indistinguishable from those of a Japanese.

Komai (2006) describes two predominant situations in present-day Japan: “Passing,” in which foreigners conceal their presence in Japanese society, and “segregation,” in which Japanese and foreigners avoid contact and remain apart from one another. Typical cases of “passing” can be found among Koreans, and typical cases of “segregation” can be found between Japanese and Brazilians in Japan.

However, it seems that even if one form is more characteristic for one group than the other, both forms in fact work in conjunction with each other for any given group. It is precisely because of the fear of segregation or stigma that Koreans in Japan try to pass as Japanese. It is also because of such fear that Japanese-Brazilians are starting to pass (Takeshita, 2010).

In this section, I look back through history to examine, through the lens of intermarriage, the dual positioning of Japanese as an oriental race of color, while at the same time being in a position of control similar to that of white Westerners (Oguma, 1998a). Japan has been discriminated against by Western countries, for example, in one-sided treaties that Japan entered with the United States, the Netherlands, Russia, Britain, and France in 1858 (the Ansei Five-Power Treaties), four years after Japan lifted its policy of seclusion from the outside world, which had lasted for more than 200 years. At the same time, however, from 1895 until the end of the Second World War, Japan colonized surrounding countries and regions one after another, including Taiwan, Sakhalin (the Russian island), Korea, Manchuria (the northeast region of China), and numerous South Sea Islands, and discriminated against their people.

Improving the Japanese Race

During the Meiji Era (1868–1912), Japan made determined efforts to catch up to and overtake Western countries. The Japanese felt a strong sense of inferiority to Westerners, as evidenced by a proposal put forward in Takahashi Yoshio’s treatise, *Improvement of the Japanese Race* (1884: 100): “We as Japanese should improve the Japanese race by marrying Westerners,⁴ who are racially superior to Japanese.”

The *Improvement of the Japanese Race* was intended to refer to Japanese men and not women, despite the fact that out of the 230 intermarriages between 1873 and 1897, only 50 (21.7%) were between Japanese men and foreign women.⁵ The most likely reason for this was the perceived superiority of males in the context of lineage. Japanese women who entered intermarriages lost their Japanese nationality even if they intended to live in Japan permanently, and were thus excluded from Japanese society. Many of these women were hired by their prospective husbands as mistresses before their marriage (Takeshita, 2000), thus becoming the target of discrimination because they had contact with foreign men.⁶

Assimilation Policy in the Era of Colonialism

As a result of the Japan–Korea Annexation Treaty signed in 1910, Korea became a Japanese colony, and was controlled by Japan for 35 years until Korea gained its independence after the end of the Second World War. The basic government policy was “assimilation,” one aspect of which was to encourage marriages between Japanese and Koreans.⁷ This was due to the belief that “the character of a superior race overpowers the character of an inferior race, so if intermarriages with the more superior Japanese race are promoted, then Korean will be absorbed into Japanese, while maintaining the character of the Japanese” (Oguma, 1998b: 132).

At the same time, there were those who opposed the assimilation policy from ethical, eugenic, or racial perspectives. Those who opposed the policy from an ethical perspective were in the minority, but those from a eugenic or racial perspective “could not accept the thought that the blood of the superior, controlling race should be tainted by mixing with the blood of an inferior, controlled race” (Oguma, 1995: 235–236).

A paper published in 1943 by the Ministry of Welfare, Population and Race Division, emphasized repeatedly that the mixing of blood should be prevented. That paper stated that the mixing of blood with the races of occupied regions lacked attention to eugenics: “Under the pretext of assimilation policy, we will in fact destroy the homogeneity of the *Yamato* (Japanese) race, thereby reducing our own cultural level to theirs, and in doing so, we will abandon our own awareness and strength as leaders” (Oguma, 1995: 253). The paper went on to report on an increase in intermarriages between Japanese and Koreans living in Japan: “The accepted principle of controlling relationships is that the men of the leading or controlling race should marry women of the led or controlled race, but in Japan, that relationship has been reversed” (254). In reality, there were 5,458 intermarriages between Japanese and Koreans in Japan from 1938 to 1942, and 96.0 percent of these marriages were between Korean men and Japanese women (Morita, 1996).

Culture

Japanese appear Japanese not only because of their physical characteristics, but because their mannerisms—their facial expressions and body language—are also Japanese. These types of gestures and mannerisms are a part of Japanese culture as well (Wagatsuma and Yoneyama, 1967).

Japanese society is not a monoracial or a monocultural society. We cannot deny that Japanese society is a “highly homogeneous society,” but that simply means that Japanese society has a low acceptance of the existence of heterogeneity. Persons who are different, to a greater or lesser degree, are either made invisible by being forced to assimilate as Japanese, or else they are placed in a separate category as “non-Japanese” (Fukuoka, 1993).

The dual positioning of Japan discussed in the previous section on “Lineage” has also been internalized in the issue of culture. Japanese expect that Westerners will live according to Western cultural standards even in Japan; Japanese attempt to adapt themselves to Western culture, but when non-Western foreigners come to Japan, they are expected to adapt themselves to Japanese culture (Kimura, 1994). This is an indication that Japanese attitudes toward foreigners change depending on whether or not the individual is from a Western country.

There is a hierarchy of values inherent in the sociocultural image of “advanced nations vs. developing nations,” “international elite vs. foreign laborer,” “English language vs. other languages,” and “Western culture vs. non-Western culture” (Sekiguchi, 2003: 93). This hierarchy appears in the form of discriminatory treatment of foreign spouses and intermarriage couples.

Takeshita (2000) conducted a survey targeting intermarriage couples living in Japan where the husband is a foreigner and the wife is a Japanese. The findings made it clear that in cases where the Japanese wife assimilates into the husband’s culture, there is a strong likelihood that the husband is a Westerner; in cases where the non-Japanese husband assimilates into the wife’s Japanese culture, there is a strong likelihood that the husband is Asian. One exception to this rule can be seen in intermarriages between Japanese women and non-Japanese Muslim men. In these cases, there is a strong trend toward the Japanese wife converting to Islam when she gets married, thereby assimilating into the husband’s culture (Takeshita, 2004). This is most likely due to the superior influence of a religion with strong precepts and also due to the superior position of males.

Intermarriage between Japanese Men and Asian Women

As shown in the section entitled “Dynamics of Intermarriage in Japan,” marriages between Japanese men and Asian women account for an overwhelming number of the intermarriages in Japan. In many of the cases, female marriage migrants are included in Japanese society as the wife of the oldest son or the daughter-in-law of a farming household, where the primary expectation is in a reproductive role; that is, of giving birth to an heir.

According to the research using microdata from the 2005 Population Census, the largest number of female marriage migrants welcomed into two-generation households as daughters-in-law are from Thailand, followed by the Philippines, China, and Korea. Many of these families tend to live in the Tohoku region of Japan (Ochiai et al., 2007). This is due to the serious social problems in the search for a marriage partner among male farm successors in particular areas, for which the local government has introduced a policy or program to arrange meeting with foreign females.

No matter how much one advocates internationalization, and even if this trend brings those who are trying to protect “Japanese blood” to the grudging realization that “If it comes this far, there is nothing we can do about it,” these people still have the desire to see their daughters-in-law assimilated as Japanese (Yamazaki, 1988: 204–205). For parents who welcomed daughters-in-law from Asia, their grandchildren had to be Japanese.

Kuwayama (1997: 219–220), who conducted survey-based research on female marriage migrants in Yamagata Prefecture in the Tohoku Region, made the following comments:

In regional communities and household environments with a strong atmosphere that forbids Filipino mothers from teaching their children Tagalog, no matter how much they might wish to, and in which the only absolute was that the children be raised as pure Japanese, there was an almost complete denial of the fact that the child is a Filipino.

A foreign spouse’s main language does not necessarily correspond to her identity, but there is a substantial overlap here. For a foreign spouse, not using the mother tongue in the household or abandoning the idea of passing on the mother tongue to the child can lead to a weakening of the mother’s own identity (Okita, 2002). Language is more than simply a means of communication for female marriage migrants; it holds important meaning as a cornerstone of identity. However, a hierarchy of language esteem exists in Japanese society. Among families with parents who have different native language, the non-Japanese parent’s language is less used by children as well as by Japanese parents in the Japanese-non-English families than in Japanese-English families (Yamamoto, 2002).

The children of intermarriage couples carry on and embody the cultures of both parents, but in Japanese society and Japanese schools, where there is a strong awareness of Japan as a monocultural society, the different culture brought in by the female marriage migrants tends to be seen as unnecessary and is given little recognition (Saruhashi, 2009). As the child grows up and establishes his or her identity as a Japanese, the female marriage migrant feels that she is being alienated.

As in the above example, prior research indicates that until around the end of the 1990s, Asian wives were seen as “vulnerable brides from Asia,” referred to as *Noson Hanayome* (“farming village brides”), and often pictured as “victims of socioeconomic processes.” In the early 2000s, however, the term “female marriage migrant” came into use, and there was an increase in research that viewed these women as independent agents with richer potential and abounding in diversity (Fujita, 2005; Lee, 2012; Saihanjuna, 2011; Satake and Da-anoy, 2006; Shikita, 2013; Suzuki, 2003; Takeda, 2011; Yu, 2006).

I cannot deny the possibility that past research studies themselves contributed to strengthening the stereotypes and stigma borne by female marriage migrants. In a study that Takeda conducted, she stated that excessive demands on the female marriage migrant to act as a Japanese, or the presence of an overbearing mother-in-law, did not arise as particularly serious problems (Takeda, 2011). Takeda also pointed out that much of the prior research does not go beyond investigations of the initial stages of adaptation by female marriage migrants. Consequently, it does

not take into account the process through which the female marriage migrant acquires the Japanese language and expands her social network, thereby dynamically re-creating family relationships and social relationships (Takeda, 2012). We must not forget that not all female marriage migrants undergo a one-directional assimilation into Japanese society; some maintain the identity of their country of origin, while at the same time striking a balance, as required, to adapt to Japanese society. Nevertheless, in order to counter the stereotypes and stigma borne by female marriage migrants, we must avoid having this aggressive image of independent agents become yet another stereotype.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications and rural local governments have started to consider female marriage migrants to be component members of local society. Multiculturalism policies are now appearing that view female marriage migrants as an important element for local community-building (Kamiya, 2015; Yamawaki, 2014).

Conclusion

It has been said that “race mixing” is a historical phenomenon related to colonialism, conquest, war, domination, and migration (Williams, 1991: 136), but in today’s global society, where people and things are constantly crossing back and forth over national borders, intermarriage can no longer be considered an unusual event. Even so, gender disparity remains deeply rooted in Japanese society, along with Japan’s dual positioning in terms of lineage and culture, and there remains a desire to protect Japanese identity while repeating the process of inclusion and exclusion of foreign spouses, which has a long history in Japanese society. This is not, however, a simple dichotomy between the inclusion of foreign spouses as Japanese or their exclusion as non-Japanese. There are diverse stages between these two extremes (Fukuoka, 1993), and we must not forget that there are people who have been marginalized as not falling into either of these categories, and people who endeavor to “pass” for Japanese as a result of social exclusion or in order to avoid that social exclusion.

A Japanese person is one who has Japanese lineage—that is, certain physical characteristics as a Japanese—speaks Japanese, has acquired a number of characteristics stemming from Japanese culture, and has Japanese nationality. Ultimately, however, there is the overriding concept of lineage (Fukuoka, 1993).

The Japanese term *kokusaikekkon* refers to a marriage between persons of different nationalities, with an emphasis placed on differences in nationality, but in practice in Japanese society, foreign spouses are included or excluded as a result of this overriding emphasis on lineage. In particular, if the foreign spouse comes from an Asian country, is a woman, and lives in a rural area that still maintains a patriarchal culture, there is a tendency for the husband’s family to want to ensure that children born of intermarriage couples are raised as Japanese. This tendency is the result of a perceived hierarchy of cultures, economic disparity between countries, and power relationships between the two genders.

Even though Japan does not recognize dual nationalities, I believe that the children of intermarriage couples should not be denied their multiple identity or the multicultural elements that they hold, even if those elements have yet to be

realized. It has been sometime since we have heard the term “multicultural society,” but as we move toward building a multicultural society in the true sense of the words, creating a society that respects mutual differences is a challenge that faces all of Japan today, and will be the theme of future research that I will undertake.

Notes

1. The author would like to express her thanks to the Population Census Division, the Statistics Bureau of Japan, for allowing her access to the microdata of the 2010 Population Census.

This chapter is part of the results of research conducted as Platform Research (C), recipient of a Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research received from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science: “Comprehensive study of family formation of intermarriage couples involving Japanese, with quantitative and qualitative analysis” (Theme number: 24530676) (representative researcher: Shuko Takeshita).

2. People of Korean descent in Japan who have been naturalized as Japanese are included in the Japanese category.
3. Because there was a possibility that the wife would have no nationality depending on the nationality laws of the husband’s country of origin, this point was amended in Article 27 of the 1916 law. Based on this amendment, if a Japanese woman married a foreign man, she would only lose her Japanese nationality on the condition that she acquired nationality in her husband’s country (Egawa et al., 1989).
4. There was also an interpretation that the Japanese race could be improved if Japanese men fathered offspring by having children with Western women, regardless of whether or not they were married, while desperately protecting their own Japanese identity (Kamoto, 2001).
5. It has been said that there were 265 intermarriages in Japan between 1873 and 1897, but it was only possible to obtain data on the persons involved for 230 of these cases (Koyama, 1995).
6. In the period during which Japan closed its borders to other countries (1639–1853), the only foreigners allowed by the *Bakufu* government to enter the country or to stay in Japan (Nagasaki Prefecture) were the Hollander and the Chinese. The only Japanese women allowed to have contact with these foreigners were prostitutes. Even after Japan opened its borders to the rest of the world, the *Bakufu* government only allowed prostitutes living in the red-light districts to have contact with foreigners; women in general were prohibited from having any such contact (Takeshita, 2000). As a result of this history, even after intermarriages were officially recognized in Japan in 1873, prejudice and discrimination against Japanese women who had contact with foreigners remained.
7. From the perspective of nationalities at the time, these were marriages between two Japanese; in the context of this chapter, however, these cases will be handled as interethnic marriages, which is a subcategory of intermarriage.

References

- Egawa, Hidefumi, Yamada, Ryoichi, and Hayata, Yoshiro, 1989, *Nationality Act*, Tokyo: Yuhikaku. (in Japanese)
- Fujita, Mika, 2005, “Foreign Brides Cast Ripples to a Rural Area: Discovery by Immersion,” in Sato, Gunei and Yoshitani, Takeshi (eds.), *Dividing People, Banding People: A Challenge through Intercultural Education*, Tokyo: Nakanishiya Shuppan, pp. 221–252. (in Japanese)

- Fukuoka, Yasunori, 1993, *Koreans in Japan: Identity among Younger Generation*, Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho. (in Japanese)
- Kamiya, Hiroo, 2015, "Local Municipal Measures to Support Marriage Migrants in Japan," in Ishikawa, Yoshitaka (ed.), *International Migrants in Japan: Contributions in an Era of Population Decline*, Melbourne and Kyoto: Trans Pacific Press and Kyoto University Press, pp. 256–274.
- Kamoto, Itsuko, 2001, *The Emergence of "Kokusai Kekkon": On Becoming a "Civilized Nation"*, Tokyo: Sinyosha. (in Japanese)
- Kimura, Hidenori, 1994, "Foreigners in Japan in the Context of International Society," in Ninomiya, Tetsuo and Totani, Osamu (eds.), *Changing Society and Sociology*, Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo, pp. 120–146. (in Japanese)
- Komai, Hiroshi, 2006, *Japanese Type of Multiculturalism in the Age of Globalization*, Tokyo: Akashi Shoten. (in Japanese)
- Koyama, Noboru, 1995, *The First Intermarriage*, Tokyo: Kodansha. (in Japanese)
- Kuga, Naoko, 2012, "Are Intermarriages Increasing Despite the Trend toward Not Marrying or Marrying Late in Life?," in NLI Research Institute (ed.), *Eyes of the Researcher*, March: 1–3. (in Japanese) (http://www.nli-research.co.jp/report/researchers_eye/2011/eye120308.html)
- Kuwayama, Norihiko, 1997, *Gender and Multiculturalism: Persons Living as Minorities*, Tokyo: Akashi Shoten. (in Japanese)
- Lee, Songhi, 2012, "Female Marriage Migrants in the Era of Globalization," in Lee, Songhi, Nakamura, Ayako, and Hishiyama, Kosuke (eds.), *Living in the Era of Migration*, Tokyo: Toshindo, pp. 3–41. (in Japanese)
- Merton, Robert K., 1941, "Intermarriage and Social Structure: Fact and Theory," *Psychiatry: Journal for the Study of Interpersonal Processes*, 4: 361–374.
- Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2010, *Vital Statistics of Japan*. (in Japanese)
- Ministry of Justice, 2004, 2007, *Statistical Survey on Legal Migrants*. (in Japanese)
- Morita, Yoshio, 1996, *The History of Koreans in Japan, as Told by the Numbers*, Tokyo: Akashi Shoten. (in Japanese)
- National Police Agency, Criminal Investigation Bureau, Organized Crime Control Department; Director for International Investigative Operations, 2007, *State of Arrests for Crimes Committed by Foreigners in Japan*. (in Japanese) (http://www.npa.go.jp/sosikihanzai/kokusaisosa/kokusai/H19_rainichi.pdf#search)
- Ninomiya, Masato, 1983, *Equality of Gender in the Nationality Law*, Tokyo: Yuhikaku. (in Japanese)
- Ochiai, Emiko, Liaw, Kao Lee, and Ishikawa, Yoshitaka, 2007, "Feminization of Migration from the Perspective of the Influx of Foreigners into Japan," in Yoshitaka Ishikawa (ed.), *Population Decline and Regional Imbalance: Geographical Perspectives*, Kyoto: Kyoto Daigaku Gakujutu Shuppankai, pp. 291–319. (in Japanese)
- Oguma, Eiji, 1995, *The Myth of Homogeneous Nation*, Tokyo: Shinyosha. (in Japanese)
- Oguma, Eiji, 1998a, *The Boundaries of the Japanese*, Tokyo: Shinyosha. (in Japanese)
- Oguma, Eiji, 1998b, "Purism Trips Up," in Jyokyo Shuppan Henshubu (ed.), *Reading Nationalism*, Tokyo: Jyokyo Shuppan, pp. 131–143. (in Japanese)
- Okita, Toshie, 2002, *Invisible Work: Bilingualism, Language Choice and Childrearing in Intermarried Families*, Amsterdam: John Benjamin's Publishing Company.
- Saihanjuna, 2011, *Intermarriage in the Global Immigration Era: Chinese Wives Settling in Rural Japan*, Tokyo: Keiso Shobo. (in Japanese)
- Saruhashi, Junko, 2009, "Considering the Supports for Female Marriage Migrants: From the Viewpoint of Linguistic Management and Empowerment," in Kawahara, Toshiaki and Okado, Hiroko (eds.), *Intermarriage: Multilingual Families and Their Identity*, Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, pp. 37–74. (in Japanese)

- Satake, Masaaki and Da-anoy, Mary Angeline, 2006, *Filipina-Japanese Intermarriages: Migration, Settlement, and Multicultural Coexistence*, Tokyo: Mekong. (in Japanese)
- Sekiguchi, Tomoko, 2003, *Children of Japanese-Brazilian in Japan: Identity Formation of TCK*, Tokyo: Akashi Shoten. (in Japanese)
- Shikita, Keiko, 2013, "Education of Multicultural Families in Japan: Focusing on Female Marriage Migrants," *Migration Policy Review*, 5: 113–129.
- Suzuki, Nobue, 2003, "Transgressing Victims Reading: Narratives of Filipina Brides in Japan," *Critical Asian Studies*, 35(3): 399–420.
- Takahashi, Yoshio, 1884, *Improving the Japanese Race*, microfiche. (in Japanese)
- Takeda, Satoko, 2011, *Reconsideration of Intermarriage in Rural Japan: Female Marriage Migrants and the Social Change*, Tokyo: Mekong. (in Japanese)
- Takeda, Satoko, 2012, "Problems and Possibilities of Multicultural Families," in Kawamura, Chizuko (ed.), *Multicultural Families after 3.11: People Opening the Way for the Future*, Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, pp. 162–178. (in Japanese)
- Takeshita, Shuko, 2000, *Sociology of Intermarriage*, Tokyo: Gakubunsha. (in Japanese)
- Takeshita, Shuko, 2004, *Aspects of Intermarriage*, Tokyo: Gakubunsha. (in Japanese)
- Takeshita, Shuko, 2010, "The Passing CCKs in Japan: Analysis on Families of Cross-Border Marriages between Japanese and Brazilian," *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*, 41(3): 369–388.
- Wagatsuma, Hiroshi and Yoneyama, Toshinao, 1967, *Structure of Prejudice: Japanese Sense of Race*, Tokyo: Nihon Hoso Shuppan Kyokai. (in Japanese)
- Williams, Teresa K., 1991, "Marriage between Japanese Women and U.S. Servicemen since World War II," *America Journal*, 17(1): 135–154.
- Yamada, Masahiro and Hirakiuchi, Fumino, 2012, *Fasting Boys and Dianthus Girls*, Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha. (in Japanese)
- Yamada, Ryoichi and Tsuchiya, Fumiaki, 1986, *Easy to Understand New Nationality Act*, Tokyo: Yuhikaku. (in Japanese)
- Yamamoto, Masayo, 2002, "Language Use in Families with Parents of Different Native Languages: An Investigation of Japanese-non-English and Japanese-English Families," *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development*, 23(6): 531–554. (in Japanese)
- Yamawaki, Keizo, 2014, "Historical Development of Foreign Resident Policies in Japan," in Kondo, Atsushi (ed.), *Approach to Multicultural Policies*, Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, pp. 21–39. (in Japanese)
- Yamazaki, Hiromi, 1988, "Intermarriage does not Fill the Shortage of Daughters-in-Law," in Utsumi, Aiko and Matsui, Yayori (eds.), *Migrant Workers from Asia*, Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, pp. 193–206. (in Japanese)
- Yu, Yon-Suk, 2006, "Reorganization and Negotiation of Gender Relation at Households with Foreign Wives: Focused on Korean Wives Living in Rural Areas," *Journal of the Graduate School of Humanities and Sciences*, 8: 231–240. (in Japanese)

Part III

Internationalization of Higher Education as a Response to Globalization: Japan's Policy Challenges since the 1980s

Yukako Yonezawa and Akiyoshi Yonezawa

Introduction

The internationalization of higher education is an important policy issue in many countries, and Japan is no exception. A widely regarded definition of the internationalization of higher education is “the process of integrating an international, intercultural, or global dimension into the purpose, functions, or delivery” of higher education (Knight, 2002: 2). De Wit (2002) identified 19 rationales for the internationalization of higher education and grouped them into 4 categories: social/cultural, political, economic, and academic (Knight, 2006). In the case of Japan, the economic rationales for the internationalization of higher education have come to predominate over the last 30 years. With the increasing influence of globalization on the economic and social dimensions of Japanese society, the internationalization of higher education has been a central concern for survival in the global economy at both the national and international levels. Specifically, the internationalization of higher education in Japan has been perceived as a response from the educational sector to market-led globalization (Hashimoto, 2005; Kudo et al., 2014).

The focus of this chapter is on outlining the historical changes over the past three decades in national policies for the internationalization of higher education in Japan. Particular emphasis is given to the growing social recognition of higher education as a primary driver of socioeconomic development for Japan's survival in the global economy. However, it is important to also point to the broader context of the transformation of Japanese society, and to critique the overemphasis of the role of internationalization in development, as this may obscure other

important considerations in the internationalization process, such as regional harmonization and global citizenship.

Overview

The internationalization of higher education in Japan started in earnest with government initiatives to enhance the mobility of international students. In terms of incoming international students, Japan has seen a dramatic growth in numbers over the past three decades: from 10,428 in 1983 to 184,155 (139,185 to higher education institutions, excluding Japanese language schools) in 2014 (JASSO, 2015). This significant growth has resulted from both “pull” and “push” factors.

Regarding the pull factors, there have been strong policy drives based on the Japanese national plans. The “Plan for 100,000 Overseas Students” (hereafter “Plan 100,000”), launched by Prime Minister Nakasone in 1983, set out to accept 100,000 international students by 2000. Next, the “Plan for 300,000 Exchange Students” (hereafter “Plan 300,000”), proposed by Prime Minister Fukuda in 2008, put forward another government plan to accept 300,000 international students by 2020. The regulations and administrative procedures of immigration for international students have also changed through the implementation of these plans, so that international students can earn an income during their studies to maintain a reasonable standard of living. The eligibility of international students has also been diversified. Adding to the traditional admission of degree-seeking students in regular programs taught in the Japanese language, short-term student exchange programs and degree programs taught in English have also increased considerably.

Global growth in international student numbers over the past several decades has constituted a significant push factor for the Japanese higher education sector. The total number of students enrolled outside of their country globally rose from 1.1 million in 1980 to 4.5 million in 2012. Specifically, Asia has been the largest source of international students, supplying 53 percent of all international students in the world in 2012 (OECD, 2014). Japan has been the fortunate recipient of this rapidly increasing number of students from Asian countries, most of which have experienced momentous economic growth. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) identifies factors that influence the study destinations of international students to be language and cultural considerations, geographic proximity, and a destination education system that is similar to their own. From the beginning of the twenty-first century, the number of outgoing students from East Asian neighbors such as China and South Korea has grown sharply, and Japan has been one of their major destinations. According to official Japanese government data (JASSO, 2015), 92.7 percent of international students were from Asian countries in 2014; out of that, 51.3 percent were from China, 14.4 percent were from Vietnam, 8.6 percent were from South Korea, 5.7 percent were from Nepal, and 3.4 percent were from Taiwan. The OECD (2014) also pointed out that, among OECD member countries, Japan has the highest share of international students from countries that share land or maritime borders (81% in 2012).

The distribution of international students within Japan varies by sector. The share by level of study is different between students in national and private universities. In Japanese universities, there are more international students at the undergraduate level (65,865) than at the graduate level (39,979) (JASSO, 2015). Specifically, 61.6 percent of graduate students study at national universities, while 34 percent study at private universities. By contrast, private universities absorb 80.9 percent of international undergraduate students, compared with national universities which enroll only 16.5 percent. With regards to distribution by academic specialty, social sciences and humanities are the major fields of study for these international students (41.8% and 28%, respectively), followed by engineering (12.8%).

Goodman (2007) has pointed out the hierarchical structure of the international student market in Japan. According to him, research-oriented national universities and a small number of leading large private universities have attracted high-caliber international students at the graduate level by providing sufficient opportunities for scholarships, research funding, and academic networking. However, substantial numbers of self-financed international students at the undergraduate level enter less selective private universities, usually in low-cost programs in the social sciences and humanities.

Compared with international students, the number of domestic students studying abroad has been modest. In 1983, the number was 18,066, with a gradual increase over the subsequent two decades, reaching 82,945 in 2004. Notwithstanding the governmental initiatives since the early 2000s to promote domestic students studying abroad, the number began to decrease in 2004, dropped to 57,501 in 2011, and then slightly recovered to 60,138 in 2012 (MEXT, 2015). Concerning the destination of study, English-speaking countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand remain popular destinations for domestic students. However, the overall numbers who go to those countries have been decreasing over the last decade. On the other hand, a steady increase of Japanese students can be seen in China and Taiwan. Over 60 percent of students go to study abroad at the undergraduate level, while 20 percent enroll at the graduate level.

Historical Policy Changes in the Internationalization of Higher Education in Japan since the 1980s

In Japan, the national government has played a central role in driving the internationalization of higher education institutions (Horie, 2002; Kitamura, 2001; Kudo and Hashimoto, 2011; Umakoshi, 1997; Yonezawa, 2011). Japan's modern higher education system has more than 150 years of history, and the policy direction for internationalization has changed over time in accordance with the changing internal and external circumstances of the country (de Wit, 2011). The following sections review national policies on internationalization since the 1980s, the period when the country experienced the unprecedented economic challenge of the "bubble economy."

The 1980s to 1990s: National Plan to Accept 100,000 International Students

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, Japan established its modern higher education system by introducing Western models on the basis of advice from foreign experts hired by the Japanese government and a group from the Japanese elite who had studied in Western countries. This means that the Japanese higher education system itself has an international origin; that is, the Japanese government, higher education institutions, and individual academics have tried to absorb advanced knowledge and technologies from Western countries so that Japan could establish a modern industrial system and achieve economic prosperity. This “catch-up with the West” rationale heavily influenced the direction of education and research in Japan for a long time, until it established a leading global economy in the 1980s (Kudo and Hashimoto, 2011).

Despite the international origins of its modern higher education system, Japan had not really implemented any active initiatives for educational internationalization until the end of the 1970s. Nevertheless, Japan’s economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s had encouraged a gradual increase of international students in Japanese universities: 3,003 in 1964, 4,444 in 1970, and 5,671 in 1976 (MEXT, 2001). However, international concern prompted the Japanese higher education system to provide greater support for international students at their campuses. In 1971, the OECD report entitled “Reviews of National Policies for Education: Japan,” which investigated the situation of international students in Japan, suggested that, with Japan as a developed country, the Japanese government and universities should take greater responsibility for international contributions in education. The report also suggested that Japanese infrastructure in higher education institutions had not kept up with the rapid increase of international students on their campuses.

With this report as a turning point, the then cabinet designated the internationalization of the higher education system to be a high priority (Horie, 2002; Kudo and Hashimoto, 2011; Umakoshi, 1997; Yonezawa, 2011). The then Prime Minister, Nakasone, organized the Provisional Council on Educational Reform to formulate a strategy for accepting more overseas students. The Council compiled two proposals, in 1983 and 1984, to set the number of students accepted from foreign countries at 100,000 by 2000. These two proposals set a national goal for the first time, which was eventually announced as Plan 100,000.

In the first report in 1983, the government listed 12 goals to be attained through national and individual institutions’ efforts. Horie (2002) classifies these into two categories: first, the government and individual institutions should contribute to the comprehensive reform of university education and to the improvement of educational quality to meet global standards; second, support systems should be reformed to provide the necessary services to international students. The report also encouraged the government to offer more scholarship opportunities for international students, so that national scholarships could cover 10 percent of all international students in Japan.

After Plan 100,000 had been adopted, the number of international students grew about 20 percent each year throughout the 1980s. The number reached

52,450 in 1993, which was a fivefold increase over 10 years. The government issued the interim report on Plan 100,000 in 1992 (Monbusho, 1992). This report claimed the international student increase in the first ten years of the Plan to be a success and advocated that individual universities keep up their efforts in accommodating them. Although the promotion of international exchange for Japanese students was a minor concern in the 1992 report, in this period the lion's share of the efforts toward internationalization by the government and higher education institutions was devoted mainly to attracting international students.

However, the tide of incoming students soon stopped, having stagnated by the mid-1990s. The main reason for the stagnation was said to be the global economic recession from the beginning of the 1990s. The government tackled the problem with countermeasures for this stagnation, which resulted in the introduction of a new initiative for the promotion of incoming exchange students in the mid-1990s.

To increase the number of international students, the government prepared a new budget for student exchange programs at Japanese national universities through two national initiatives. The United States–Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange (CULCON), a joint scheme between the two countries' representatives, further facilitated student exchange between both countries. Following the recommendations from CULCON, the government provided budgetary support for national universities to establish on-campus organizations to provide a broad range of services for international students. At that time, many national universities were said to have inadequate provision of educational and campus-life services for international students (Kudo et al., 2014). Through this governmental support, some national universities, especially the larger ones, established new organizations on their campuses. Generally, these organizations were called “centers for international students” or “centers of student exchange” and were implemented to provide academic staff for intercultural education and language teaching to support international exchange students.

Soon after financial support was given to selected national universities, the government announced a proposal to establish a short-term exchange program, which resulted in the launch of the Short-Term Student Exchange Promotion Program in 1995 at representative national universities. This program was intended to provide international students with both study opportunities in Japanese universities as exchange students and scholarships for the period of exchange. The core objective of the program was to augment the number of international students, especially from English-speaking countries or OECD countries, to national universities in Japan. Compared to some large private universities in this period, national universities were viewed as having failed to build richer educational services for international students (Kudo et al., 2014). In order to bridge this gap, the programs in national universities under this scheme were planned to offer curricula taught entirely in English. By 1997, 7 prestigious national universities had implemented the Short-Term Student Exchange Promotion Program and, by 2007, 23 programs in other national universities followed (MEXT, 2010).

However, the number of international students remained relatively low. The next policy papers on the internationalization of higher education were issued in

1997 and 1999. Compared with the three former reports in 1983, 1984, and 1992, these two reports emphasized systemic institutional factors influencing international student numbers rather than simply focusing on a quantitative goal. The particular goals in these policy papers were threefold: (1) to provide a wider range of programs at individual universities that satisfy the educational and research needs of international students; (2) to improve the information accessibility for prospective students all over the world; and (3) to build collaborative networking among local governments and private sectors so that international students could benefit from various sources of services (Monbusho, 1999).

Other than the specific educational reform measures, a relaxation of immigration regulations had also been implemented to facilitate Plan 100,000. In 1996, the Japanese government made immigration regulations for the entry of international students more flexible. Further immigration measures were taken in 2000 to simplify and speed up the visa issue and the entry procedure for international students (Horie, 2002; Terakura, 2011). These initiatives, combined with the favorable climate of economic development in Asia at that time, resulted in an increase of international students. Among some Asian countries—especially China, from which Japan has accepted the largest number of international students—there was a growing national enthusiasm for studying abroad under the strong impetus of economic growth. These countries had begun sending more and more students to other countries to seek better higher education opportunities. Further, at this time, some other major host countries, such as the United States and Australia, started to restrict the flow of students from Asian countries. Japanese policy initiatives, aimed at expanding the presence of international students, directed those students, mostly from China, to Japan as a study destination (Terakura, 2011).

As a result of these national and institutional efforts, Plan 100,000 was finally fulfilled in 2003. This was three years after the targeted year, with the exact number being 109,508. This success was due in large part to the growth in the number of Chinese students; the share of Chinese students in Japan increased from 41.6 percent in 1993 to 64.7 percent in 2003 (Terakura, 2011). Japanese government initiatives in support of Plan 100,000 played a key role in guiding Japan's higher education internationalization efforts with regard to incoming international student numbers. Furthermore, as Horie (2002) has discussed, government policy papers put pressure on individual universities to strengthen their organizational systems in terms of the recruitment and education of international students. The Japanese government and universities have continued to focus on international education reforms into the twenty-first century.

*The 2000s: The Mainstreaming of Internationalization Policies as
Part of National Economic and Social Reform*

After the accomplishment of Plan 100,000, the government modified its policies for the internationalization of higher education in several ways. The 2003 report by the Central Council for Education (CCE), a consultative body for the Minister of Education, was entitled “The Development of New International Student

Policy.” It announced a policy shift away from a focus on the quantity of international students to an improvement in the quality of university management in education and research (CCE, 2003). The report pointed to the changing conditions influencing international student movements. The remarkable economic growth in China and other Asian countries was encouraging students in these countries to study abroad. At the same time, because of a decrease in the youth population in Japan, universities had become more proactive in recruiting international students to meet their enrollment capacity. Simultaneously, the simplification of immigration and residence requirements by the Japanese government enabled more international students to come to and stay in Japan without any difficulty. In light of these circumstances, the report warned that some universities lacked the appropriate organizational resources for the selection, instruction, and supervision of international students. Further, some universities had experienced low motivation in some international students, and illegal visa overstays among international students had become a serious problem. The report emphasized the need for every university to ensure that only “quality international students” were accepted.

In the 2003 report, the government also urged higher education institutions to be more active in the systematic reform in education, research, and management. The government had begun to recognize the value of internationalization as a policy tool for enhancing university reform in general. A trial of this idea was the Strategic Fund for Establishing the International Headquarters in Universities, a project to be nationally funded for five years (JSPS, 2010). This project aimed to establish international headquarters within the central administrations of universities. The project expected these international headquarters to develop effective institutional strategies as model cases for campus-wide internationalization reforms. For this project, 68 universities applied, and 20 were selected (Ota, 2014).

Increased emphasis was also put on increasing the number of Japanese students going to study abroad. Reflecting on past policies, the 2003 report pointed to an overemphasis on the recruitment of international students, and advocated that a higher value be put on the bilateral flow of students for “mutual understanding and friendship with other countries.” For this purpose, the report recommended promoting more Japanese students studying abroad by providing scholarships, especially to strengthen the linkage with Asian countries. In line with this, the government provided scholarship support for the Long-Term Study Abroad Support program in 2005 (MEXT, 2010).

Further, the internationalization of higher education assumed cabinet-wide policy significance in relation to broader national economic and social challenges in this period (Yonezawa, 2011). The global economic recession in the 1990s and the unprecedented economic growth of other Asian countries led to a greater focus on the effective use of public funding and on improving the international competitiveness of Japanese society and economy. Elite universities in Asian countries such as China, South Korea, and Singapore had become competitive rivals for Japan in the fields of research and education. The Australian government also officially claimed education services to be a significant export industry and increasingly attracted international students, mainly from Asian countries, on a

commercial basis. The circumstances surrounding policymaking in relation to the internationalization of higher education had become complex.

Under these circumstances, joint ministerial announcements on higher education and related projects became more frequent. For example, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT) and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) jointly launched the Career Development Program for Foreign Students in Japan in 2007, with the objective of making effective use of international students as a resource to advance Japanese development. In this program, universities and industries jointly offered a variety of professional training, Japanese language training, and job-hunting support to international students so that they could serve as “bridges” between Japan and other Asian countries for Japanese industries and academic communities. Projects of this kind had never emerged under the auspices of a single ministry.

National Plan to Accept 300,000 International Students

As the higher education internationalization policy extended its scale, in 2008 Prime Minister Fukuda and his cabinet announced Plan 300,000, which was a scheme to accept 300,000 international students by 2020—a follow-up scheme to Plan 100,000. Six ministries were involved in formulating the basic framework of Plan 300,000—in addition to MEXT and METI, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA); the Ministry of Justice (MOJ); the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW); and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) were behind this plan. The new plan signified that the international student policy would become a key issue for the whole body of the national government. Although Plan 300,000 again held up a target number, the philosophy in the new plan was different from the former Plan 100,000, which aimed at providing educational aid to international students and elevating Japan’s international profile. Alternatively, the purpose of Plan 300,000 was to revitalize “Japanese political economy, society, and universities” (Kudo and Hashimoto, 2011: 346–347). According to this rationale, the quality of international students was regarded as a core concern, rather than simply the quantity. The figure of 300,000 was intended to maintain the current world share of Japanese higher education (5%) based on the estimated future growth of the international student market (Yonezawa, 2011). In light of this goal, the proportion of international students in the total number of students in Japan’s higher education system was estimated to increase from 3.3 percent to 10 percent (Kudo et al., 2014).

The strategy the government adopted for realizing this ambitious goal was to select and support core universities as models of internationalization. For this purpose, a national funding project entitled the “Global 30 Project” was launched in 2009. It had two primary goals: (1) to internationalize the academic environment in Japanese universities; and (2) to accept excellent international students into Japanese universities. The government selected 13 universities from the 22 universities that applied and requested that the selected universities implement a variety of approaches to internationalize their academic systems and campuses.

For instance, the project suggested developing more undergraduate and graduate degree programs conducted in English, establishing branch offices overseas for student recruitment, and renewing admission and student support systems in keeping with the digital age. According to the MEXT's postevaluation, 179 programs that were conducted entirely in English had emerged in the selected universities, and the number of international students in the 13 universities had increased from 23,000 to 33,000 in the 5 years of the project's operation (JSPS, 2012).

*The 2010s: "Global Human Resources" Initiatives and the
"Top Global University" Project*

In addition to the Global 30 Project, the government launched two other big projects for the internationalization of higher education in the late 2000s and early 2010s. For improving research excellence, the government set up Global Centers of Excellence (Global COEs) in 2007 and established the Program for Leading Graduate Schools in 2011. The Global COEs program was introduced to elevate the international competitiveness of Japanese universities, while the Program for Leading Graduate Schools was intended to help high-caliber students become globally active leaders (Yonezawa and Shimmi, 2015).

Continuing to respond to globalization, the Japanese government became more active in developing national funding projects to internationalize the university system. The government put forth the internationalization of higher education as the core scheme for revitalizing national economic and social power. In June 2010, the government, led by the Democratic Party of Japan, set up the New Growth Strategy, composed of 21 national projects for the recovery and development of Japan's economy within a 10-year timeframe. Here, the government identified the role of the higher education sector as producing human resources that would support the world as well as Japan. These projects laid out three primary targets: (1) to internationalize university education and improve foreign language education, including English and Chinese; (2) to promote overseas exchange of Japanese students and strategically acquire international students; and (3) to develop human resources capable of responding to business internationalization (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2010; Sato, 2013).

In line with these national targets, two additional funding projects were introduced for improving university education and enhancing the number of Japanese students studying overseas.

First, the government launched the Re-Inventing Japan Project in 2011. In this project, the selected universities developed joint education programs with partner universities overseas. The universities were to set up quality assurance mechanisms for credit transfers and grading through mutual recognition with partner universities. The project set particular regional targets: China, South Korea, and the United States in 2011; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2012 and 2013; and Russia and India in 2014.

Second, the Project for Promotion of Global Human Resource Development was started in 2012, with the objective of providing students with more

international experiences through study and internship opportunities abroad and various learning activities at their home campus. The strong demand from the industrial sector was the main impetus for the establishment of the project. After the financial crisis in 2008, Japanese business leaders began to stress the necessity of personnel who could work globally to ensure the survival of Japanese industry (Yonezawa, 2014). In order to facilitate better understanding of the types of human resources that are suitable for industry needs, the Global Human Resource Development Committee, led by METI, issued a report entitled “Develop Global Human Resources through Industry-Academia-Government Collaborations” in April 2010. The report identified the main three competencies for global human resources: (1) the ability to communicate in foreign languages (especially in English); (2) the ability to understand different cultures and exhibit leadership; and (3) fundamental competencies for working persons (GHRDC, 2010). In this context, global human resources needed to consist not only of skills for international communication, but also of competencies required in the business environment.

Soon after the announcement of this report by METI, the cabinet introduced the New Growth Strategy in June 2010, and the Council on Promotion of Human Resource for Globalization Development was organized by the Cabinet Office in September of the same year. The Council consists of members from different ministries and considers the various actions to be taken for cultivating global human resources. The Cabinet Council produced the final report in June 2011, with the following recommendations for higher education institutions: (1) reform and ensure international standards in the university entrance examination system; (2) reorganize management systems so that individual universities can be globalized; and (3) promote strategic recruitment and student exchange programs so that more international and domestic students can participate (CPHRGD, 2011). The Project for Promotion of Global Human Resource Development was the result of the above-mentioned discussions with various sectors and ministries.

In line with the Cabinet’s New Growth Strategy, from 2009 onward the government also increased the opportunities for scholarships and loans for Japanese students studying abroad—not only for long-term study abroad, but also for short-term overseas study. The national budget for sending domestic students to study abroad reached 788 million Japanese yen in 2011. The present cabinet is promoting a plan to increase the number of Japanese students studying abroad from 60,000 in 2010 to 120,000 by 2020 (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2013). Accordingly, the government has gradually shifted the focus of its financial support from the acceptance of international students to the bilateral mobility of university students.

The direct link between government policy for the internationalization of higher education and the national economic revitalization strategy became even stronger after the replacement of the Liberal Democratic Party-led government in December 2012. In June 2013, the Abe cabinet issued the policy paper “Japan Revitalization Strategy.” In this paper, the building of a world-class university system was stressed as a pivotal driver for national competitiveness. The paper set as its goal the placement of more than 10 Japanese universities in the ranking of the

top 100 world universities in the next 10 years (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2013). Here, the government stressed the need for a strong response by the higher education sector to ensure the development of globally competitive human resources for Japan.

Based on this paper, in 2014 the government established a new comprehensive ten-year national project entitled the “Top Global University” project. Two types of initiatives were put forward: universities aiming to achieve positions within the top 100 in world rankings (Type A) and universities aiming to be the frontrunners of internationalization (Type B). For Type A, 13 universities were selected from among 16 applicants, and 24 universities were chosen from among 93 applicant universities for Type B. The selected universities are required to clarify their institutional strategies for internationalization and detailed measures for the targeted achievements. The indicators set forth by the project were not limited to practical individual internationalization initiatives, but were to include comprehensive university reforms. Overall, the project accurately reflects the policy trends in new public management in Japan over the last two decades—namely, more detailed and transparent monitoring to ensure the effective use of public funds for the internationalization of higher education (Yonezawa and Shimmi, 2015).

Conclusion

In this chapter, historical changes in Japanese government policy for the internationalization of higher education have been examined in detail. The following points became evident through the analysis.

First, the internationalization of universities in Japan should be considered in context of the broader transformation of Japanese society. The policy initiatives for the internationalization of higher education were established in the 1980s as part of a broad policy rationale during a period of high confidence in Japan's success in the world economy. However, Japanese society's experience over the last three decades has been a long-term decline in terms of national positioning in the global economy. In this changed context, the slow responses of the education system and labor market to globalization have been considered a critical barrier to national development. In the end, government policy became focused on narrow economic considerations.

Second, the Japanese government increased its efforts to utilize policy tools to renew public management, and has done so more frequently and more broadly over the last three decades. Public spending on higher education is now delivered more on the basis of project funding with prescribed goal setting and performance monitoring. Here, open competition between the national universities and also among the public and private institutions has been stressed. In principle, the government has respected university autonomy. However, the prescribed formula and monitoring processes have become increasingly detailed and quantitatively measurable.

Third, institutional level practices within the internationalization process have varied widely. These varied experiences have involved an enriching discussion

around the values and implications of the internationalization of higher education and have taken place among teachers, students, administrators, and managers. The government and universities have also endeavored to facilitate networks of communication among themselves as well as with industry. These efforts have enriched the context of the internationalization of higher education significantly in Japan in terms of, for example, multicultural understanding, global citizenship, regional harmonization, and sustainable development.

Nevertheless, a dilemma can be found regarding the rationale behind internationalization in Japanese higher education. The national policies require higher education to contribute more to national socioeconomic development through the development of globally competitive human resources. On the other hand, during the actual learning taking place within the international environment, students, teachers, and other stakeholders may encounter the multifaceted value of internationalization that is not limited to considerations of success within the global economy. However, the detailed and transparent monitoring requirements under the new public management may not provide sufficient scope for a full appreciation of the multifaceted benefits of internationalization for Japanese society.

The oppressive atmosphere in the debates surrounding the policy and practice of internationalization of education in Japan could be due to the heavy reliance on internal communication among domestic stakeholders. A more multilevel, multifaceted approach to the discussion of common values and harmony at the regional and global levels may be necessary for the realization of an effective internationalization process in higher education. To this end, the entire range of stakeholders should be involved in open discussion through international partnerships with diverse regional neighbors, such as Australia.

References

- CCE—Central Council for Education. (2003). *Aratanaryuugakuseisaku no tenkainitsuite (Toushin) Ryuugakuseikouryuu no kakudai to shitsu no koujou wo mezashite [The development of new international student policy: Toward an expansion of international student exchange and improvement of its quality]*. Tokyo: MEXT.
- CPHRGD—The Council on Promotion of Human Resource for Globalization Development. (2011). *An Interim report of the council on promotion of human resource for globalization development*. Tokyo: Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet.
- de Wit, H. (2002). *Internationalization of higher education in the United States of America and Europe: A historical, comparative and conceptual analysis*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- de Wit, H. (2011). *Trend, issues, and challenges in internationalisation of higher education*. Amsterdam: Center for Applied Research on Economics and Management, School of Management HvA.
- GHRDC—Global Human Resource Development Committee of the Industry-Academia Partnership for Human Resource Development. (2010). *Develop global human resources through industry-academia-government collaborations: Summary*. Tokyo: METI.
- Goodman, R. (2007). The concept of *Kokusaika* and Japanese educational reform. *Globalisation, Societies and Education*, 5(1), 71–87.

- Hashimoto, H. (2005). Internationalization of universities: The impact of the global expansion of English on Japanese universities. *Transcultural Studies*, 1, 1–21.
- Horie, M. (2002). The internationalization of higher education in Japan in the 1990s: A reconsideration. *Higher Education*, 43, 65–84.
- JASSO—Japan Student Services Organization. (2015). *Heisei 26 nendo gaikokujinryuugaku-seizaisekijouyouchousakekka [Results of the survey on intake of foreign students, 2014]*. Tokyo: JASSO.
- JSPS—Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. (2010). *Strategic fund for establishing international headquarters in universities (Development of methods for internationalizing the research environment in Japan): University internationalization within global society, recommendations for internationalizing Japanese universities (Final report)*. Tokyo: JSPS.
- JSPS. (2012). *Daigakukokusaika no tamenonettowaakukeiseisuishinjigyou: Jigohyoukakekka no soukatsu [Project for establishing university network for internationalization: Summary of post evaluation]*. Tokyo: JSPS.
- Kitamura, K. (2001). *Gendaidaigaku no henkaku to seisaku: Rekishiteki Hikakutekikousatsu [Reforms and policies of modern universities: A historical and comparative study]*. Tokyo: Tamagawa University Press.
- Knight, J. (2002). Updated internationalisation definition. *International Higher Education*, 33, 2–3.
- Knight, J. (2006). Internationalization: Concepts, complexities and challenges. In J. J. F. Forest & P. G. Altbach (Eds.), *International handbook of higher education* (pp. 207–227). Dordrecht: Springer.
- Kudo, K., & Hashimoto, H. (2011). Internationalization of Japanese universities: Current status and future directions. In S. Marginson et al. (Eds.), *Higher education in the Asia-Pacific, higher education dynamics 36* (pp. 343–359). Dordrecht: Springer.
- Kudo, K., Kamibepu, T., & Ota, H. (2014). Nihon no daigakukokusaika to ryuugakuseisaku no tenkai [Internationalization of Japanese universities and the development of international student policies]. In A. Yonezawa (Ed.), *Nikkandaigakukokusaika to ryuugakuseisaku no tenkai [Internationalization of universities and student exchange policies in Japan and Korea]* (pp. 13–52). Tokyo: Research Institute for Independent Higher Education (RIIHE).
- MEXT—Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. (2001). *Wagakuni no Ryuugakusei Ukeire Seido Hyakunenno Omona Ayumi [A hundred years' summary of the acceptance system of students from abroad in Japan]*. Tokyo: MEXT.
- MEXT. (2010). *Wagakuni no ryuugakuseiseido no gaiyou: Ukeireyobihakenheisei 22nendo [Outline of the student exchange system: Study in Japan and abroad 2010]*. Tokyo: MEXT.
- MEXT. (2015). *Nihonjinnokaigairyuugakujoukyou [The trend of Japanese university students going to study abroad]*. Tokyo: MEXT.
- Monbusho—Ministry of Education, Science and Culture. (1992). *Nijuuiseikiwotenboushitaryuugakuseikouryuu no sougoutekisuisinnitsuite [Total promotion of international student exchanges: Prospecting the twenty-first century]*. Tokyo: Monbusho.
- Monbusho. (1999). *Chitekikokusaikouken no hattentoaratanaryuugakuseisaku no tenkai-womezashite: Posuto 2000nen no ryuugakuseisaku [Toward development of international knowledge contribution and implementation of international student policy: Post 2000 international student policy]*. Tokyo: Monbusho.
- OECD—Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (1971). *Reviews of national policies for education: Japan*. Paris: OECD Publishing.
- OECD. (2014). *Education at a Glance 2014: OECD Indicators*. Paris: OECD Publishing.

- Ota, H. (2014). Japanese universities' strategic approach to internationalization: Accomplishments and challenges. In A. Yonezawa et al. (Eds.), *Emerging international dimensions in East Asian higher education* (pp. 227–252). Dordrecht: Springer.
- Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. (2010). *Shin seichousenryaku: "Genkina Nippon" fukkatsunoshinario [New growth strategy; A scenario for a revival of active Japan]*. Tokyo: Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet.
- Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. (2013). *Japan revitalization strategy: JAPAN is back*. Tokyo: Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet.
- Sato, K. (2013). *Global structural change and Japan's higher education policy*. The Third International Higher Education Forum, Tokyo, Unpublished documents.
- Terakura, K. (2011). Wagakuniokeruchugokujinryuugakuseiukeire to chuugoku no ryuugakuseiseisaku [Chinese students in Japan and International Student Exchange Policy of China]. In National Diet Library (Ed.), *Sekai no naka no Chuugoku: Sougouchousahoukokusho [China in the global system: Comprehensive survey report]*. Tokyo: National Diet Library.
- Umakoshi, T. (1997). Internationalization of Japanese higher education in the 1980s and early 1990s. *Higher Education*, 34, 259–273.
- Yonezawa, A. (2011). The internationalization of Japanese higher education: Policy debates and realities. In S. Marginson et al. (Eds.), *Higher education in the Asia-Pacific, higher education dynamics* 36 (pp. 329–342). Dordrecht: Springer.
- Yonezawa, A. (2014). Japan's challenge of fostering "global human resources": Policy debates and practices. *Japan Labor Review*, 11(2), 37–52.
- Yonezawa, A., & Shimmi, Y. (2015). Transformation of university governance through internationalization: Challenges for top universities and government policies in Japan. *Higher Education*, 70, 173–186.

Higher Education and Social Cohesion: Universities, Citizenship, and Spaces of Orientation

Miriam Faine, Sue Plowright, and Terri Seddon

Introduction

The role of universities in nation building and cohesive citizen formation is challenged by globalization. In Australia, these effects are visible in the growth of international student enrollments that have made education a major “export” industry, and in deep uncertainties that now surround what it means to be a “university,” do “academic work,” and form cohesive citizenry. There is evidence that marketization, the restructuring of public enterprises so that they operate on the basis of market choice, has shifted the values and ethics of higher education in Australia. But it is less clear how these developments affect the relation between higher education, citizenship, and social cohesion—“the willingness of members of a society to cooperate with each other in order to survive and prosper” (Scanlon Foundation, 2015).

In this chapter we use the concept of “space of orientation” to understand the university as a distinctive locale for learning and identity formation. We report on a case study of Monash University, a self-proclaimed “global university,” to grasp the space, orientations, and effects of changes in higher education policy and practice on social cohesion. On this basis, we argue that universities are changing in ways that compromise familiar forms of national citizenship, but they generate spaces and orientations that support distinctive forms of cross-border social cohesion that points toward the possibility of transnational citizenship.

Social Cohesion and Higher Education

Social cohesion is an ambiguous notion. In the 1970s, Michael Mann argued that both consensus and conflict sociology overstated the idea of “cohesion.” In liberal

democracies, he suggests, cohesion arises from a lack of consistent commitment to general values relying on the “pragmatic acceptance” by subordinate classes of their limited roles in society (Mann, 1970: 435). Alongside this kind of social analysis, there are studies of social cohesion as symbolic politics. Such research shows how fears about cohesion are associated with moral panics that run through particular communities. Even sociologists can become *prophètesmanquès* when they suggest that “there has been some fall from grace and that the morality of their times is confused and impoverished” (Pahl, 1991: 345).

Over the last ten years, incidents that reveal ethnic divisions encourage the sense that social cohesion in multicultural Australia is in decline. Yet episodes of social division, such as the 2005 Cronulla riots and the more recent involvement of Australian citizens in Islamist military activities, are countered by evidence of community-wide cooperation. For example, the execution of Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran in Indonesia on April 29, 2015, prompted a widespread peaceful public outpouring of advocacy and grief, even though the drug smuggling activities of these two Australian sons, one of Cantonese-speaking Chinese parents and the other of Tamil parents, were recognized as illegal within the penal codes of both Indonesia and Australia.

The rhetoric surrounding these incidents indicates the subjective sense of social cohesion is talked up or down to foster “acceptance” of politically useful rhetoric. It draws on and perpetuates a long history of scholarly and political commentaries that steer populations toward cohesion or inflame ways of reading differences. For example, in the lead-up to and in the aftermath of the executions, Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott and Foreign Minister Julie Bishop (2015) encouraged the Australian community toward national cohesion through a redemptive narrative: “The Government had hoped that Indonesia would show mercy to these young men, who have worked hard since their arrests to rehabilitate themselves and improve the lives of other prisoners.” Yet the same government’s public rhetoric suggests no scope for redemption of disaffected and alienated young Muslim men, whose Australian citizen rights are stripped because they were lured, not by drug smuggling, but the excitement of war overseas. As Christine Milne, leader of the Australian Greens noted, this rhetoric presses “the fear, anxiety [and] insecurity button” and “misses the opportunity to talk up social cohesion” (Cox, 2015).

These examples show how social cohesion is a social effect of national narratives that encourage and authorize specific social organization, and spatial bordering and ordering. The emergence of the Westphalian social order since the 1600s established a cultural and institutional framework that secured “social cohesion” on a territorial basis, organized through the bordering and ordering of nation-states. The legal principle of sovereignty meant that national border regimes regulated cross-border flows, while state-citizen relations defined the character of the national territory, forms of authority, and patterns of rights (Sassen, 2006). The social organization of education systems—their context, content, controls, and patterns of access—were fashioned to produce imagined national communities (Anderson, 1991). This cohesion was both socially and spatially patterned, an outcome that also created national knowledge cultures, legitimized national authority, and formed the nation’s “citizen.” These civil “citizen” identities transacted

activities “democratically,” “through words and persuasion and not through force and violence” (Arendt, 1958: 26).

Since the Second World War, phenomena such as the Cold War and economic and cultural globalization have challenged this nation-building project. As ideas, people, and goods traveled across national borders, they disturbed territorial border regimes that secured national social organization and ordered its cultural and institutional fabric. In Australia, these global forces and geopolitical shifts, including evidence of a nascent “Eastphalian” social order, drove economic and social reforms, which included restructuring of public enterprises so that they operated on the basis of market choice. These developments marketized the higher education sector in Australia. The effects became visible in the exponential growth of international student enrollments and on universities’ increasing financial dependence on these enrollments. In March 2015, for example, there were 413,000 full-fee paying international students on a student visa in Australia. These figures represent an 11.4 percent increase since March 2014 and a 4.7 percent growth rate over ten years. Austrade (2015) now identifies education as a major “export” industry.

These globalizing transitions that reposition education as a form of economic activity trouble established understanding of higher education institutions and academic work. The effects prompt questions about the relation between higher education, citizenship, and social cohesion. To understand these shifting relationships, we approach the university as a “space of orientation.”

Space of Orientation

The “university” is a social institution that is organized and ordered to support learning and identity formation. The history of universities reveals how they locate, distribute, and endorse empirical and normative knowledge through networks. Within the nation-states order, their intellectual–practical activities had the effect of securing knowledge–authority orders that also cohered with national knowledge cultures and imagined national communities. Understanding the effects of globalization on higher education requires an analytical framework that questions these path-dependent narratives that are anchored by familiar territorial frames of reference. For this reason, we draw on a sociospatial perspective that recognizes the permeability of national border regimes and approach the university as a “space of orientation.” We illustrate our approach using a case study of Monash University to show how a university has effects on cohesion through the way it forms civil identities with citizen capabilities.

A Spatial Move

Robertson (2010) draws attention to the curious neglect of space and spatialities in research on education and its social effects. Drawing on Henri Lefebvre (1991), she critiques both idealist and materialist understandings of space because they both split ideas from practices. Abstract representations of space are treated as texts that set them apart from the social and physical spaces that they envelop and

often obscure. Conversely, materialist analyses of social relations tend to reduce “lived space” to labor and products, without acknowledging the diversity of these spaces, their cultural resources and practices, and unfolding effects in everyday life. Yet it is this relationship between “representations (mental space)” and “real space” that is “the space of people who deal with material things” (4).

Space becomes comprehensible, Robertson suggests, by grasping how spatialities are actively made and have effects through knowledge and networks. Lefebvre approaches this agenda by analytically disaggregating space into three forms of spatiality: spatial practice (the material or *perceived* space); representations of space (conceptualized or *conceived* space); and spaces of representation where physical space is lived through associated images or symbols as *lived space*. David Harvey identifies three different ways of knowing space and suggests that understandings of “absolute,” “relative,” and “relational” space each have specific effects in everyday life. Combining Lefebvre’s spatializations and Harvey’s ways of knowing space reveals specific relations between space-making and knowledge work (Robertson, 2010).

An Orienting Move

We use these insights into the making of social spaces to identify specific “spaces of orientation.” These locales where spatialization and orientation unfold are not just physical places, but specific spots marked by geographic location, material form, and invested meanings, which “are also interpreted, narrated, perceived, felt, understood, and imagined” (Gieryn, 2000: 465). These spots of space-making occur at some “Moment” in time and space, marked by “revelation, emotional clarity and self-presence” (Shields, 2004: 194). These moments may be seized as a basis for action, but also enable a step toward more self-fulfilled ways of being (Shields, 2004: 194). This moment of action and self-development is influenced by the cultural resources available and how the ordering of knowledge and authority frames and filters knowledge work at particular moments.

In this way, the space of orientation locates “spots” where moments and movements of learning and action unfold. Harvey’s (2006) classification of knowledge frames extends these insights by highlighting three different ways of encountering the spot and realizing learning and action. First, the spot and its effects are embedded in “absolute space,” which Harvey identifies as the materialized logics of capitalism that encourage abstract ways of seeing and knowing the world. For example, “the university” is an abstraction, a representation of space that is disconnected from the spaces where people deal with material things. Second, the spot and effects are influenced by what is seen because “the spatial frame depends crucially upon what it is that is being relativized and by whom” (272). An international student will see (relativize) the university differently to a university manager. Finally, the spot and its effects will also be affected by the lived, felt “relational space” from which the university is seen. How the international student and university manager experience and feel about their university will affect how they see, know, learn, and act.

A Methodological Translation

We build on this analysis of space, knowledge, and positioning to understand how the university is evolving into a more globalized form by focusing on narratives. This approach recognizes that the university is an absolute space that is being made and remade as managers, academics, and students learn and act on the university from particular relative and relational positions. In this respect, we see the university as a “simultaneity of stories-so-far” (Massey, 2005: 130), where stories, as forms of narrative, are a condition of social life. They become spatialized and have spatializing effects because of the way they are tensioned between absolute, relative, and relational spaces.

How narratives are produced, circulated, and distributed, by whom, and who appropriates them, under what conditions, affects the way we come to know, understand, and make sense of the social world:

[I]t is through narratives and narrativity that we constitute our social identities . . . whether [or not] we are social scientists or subjects of historical research, . . . all of us come to *be* who we *are* (however ephemeral, multiple, and changing) by being located or locating ourselves (usually unconsciously) in social narratives *rarely of our own making*. (Somers, 1994: 606)

We identify the university with the production of conceptual narratives that circulate through everyday life as vocabularies, concepts, and explanatory schema that are disciplined (Somers, 1995). We see the making and remaking of universities as processes that are mediated by representations of “the university” and also as questions about those representations. The cultural politics materialize meanings, organize and govern everyday life, influence conduct, and form identities. For this reason, we also identify the university as a “good” on the basis of how it produces knowledge and sustains critique, which have flow on effects in everyday life and democratic politics.

It is this polyglot character, as well as the protection of conceptual narrativity, that makes the university a distinctive and also powerful space of orientation. To understand how the university space orients identities toward social cohesion, we investigated Monash University as a “space of orientation.” The case study was based on public documentation, which we compiled while working at Monash, and also on interview-based data collected in the course of a small-scale investigation of network building among international students in the Faculty of Education. We report findings that show Monash as: (1) a perceived space of work and learning; (2) a conceived space governing specific representations of citizenship; and (3) a lived space where students and academics navigate cultural difference and experiences of “transnationalism.”

The University as a Space of Orientation

Universities were central to the Westphalian nation-building project and the formation of citizens, but marketization has shifted the values and ethics of higher

education. The remaking of universities with a corporate-commercial orientation privileges consumer choice, creating a novel form of “Enterprise University” in Australia (Marginson and Considine, 2000). This unbundling of the nation-building university reconstructs the space of higher education. Reforms are not just oriented toward home-grown national developments, but also reoriented by traveling policies that reference imperatives arising from the global knowledge economy and trends toward global governance (Ozga et al., 2006; Rizvi and Lingard, 2010). These globalizing trajectories remake the university as a space and orientation.

Shifting Spatial Practices: Contradictory Narratives

The restructuring and reculturing of higher education is respatializing tertiary education along four main dimensions (Axford and Seddon, 2006):

- Seeing students as learning for earning—reskilling the Australian workforce, coordinated by qualifications, learning outcomes and standards, and curriculum packaged as “flexible delivery” based on information and communication technologies (ICT).
- Shifting costs of education and training from the public to the private domain—the educational market, the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS), student loans, growth of international students, and education export.
- Reforming education and training management—from bureaucratic structures toward corporate governance.
- Recentering teaching methodologies around ICT learning platforms, software, and digital infrastructures, deemphasizing knowledge traditions and disciplines embodied by academics.

Monash University used to be described as the last of the old rather than the first of the new Australian universities. Established in 1958, this second university in Melbourne now projects its self-understanding as a “university of transformation” (Davison and Murphy, 2012). Graduates still collect their testamurs in medieval gowns and the university appointed its first “provost” in 2012, recalling the ecclesiastical rule of St Benedict (480–547). Yet these enlightenment resonances are under pressure. The university’s normative orientation is claimed, fixed in the pavement outside the graduation hall, in a statement by Sir John Monash, engineer and military leader: “Adopt as your fundamental creed that you will equip yourself for life, not solely for your own benefit but for the benefit of the whole community.” But this seemingly ageless commitment to selfless service replaced in the 1990s an earlier shield and Latin motto: “We are still learning.” This old–new public identity captures the contradictory character of a global–national enterprise university.

Corporatization also changes the university space and culture. The shift in ratio between public and private funding means Monash now depends on “industry and partnerships” and “alumni community.” These stakeholders now appear on

the university website, at the same scale, as teaching and research. Shifts in student enrollments mark changes in the bordering and ordering of the university, which is now feminized (56% female students), internationalized (34% international students), and technologically mediated (16% studying online or in mixed mode) (Monash University, 2015a). The rebordering of Monash also shifted the university footprint, which now occupies a global not just national space, and celebrates its “local footprints” in Australia (5 campuses), Malaysia (one campus), South Africa (one campus); Italy (one center); India (joint technical research academy); and China (joint graduate school). The university also experimented with a networked “global university”: the Monash Warwick Alliance that aimed to “help meet the increasing student, industry and government demand for universities to produce graduates with a global education” (Monash University, 2015b).

These trends are not restricted to Monash University, but indicate the trajectory of Australian higher education. For example, the number of formal international agreements with Australian universities in 2005 made China the lead international academic partner, rather than the United States (Universities Australia, 2009). This cross-border mobility builds on Australia’s migration history, but also challenges national narratives. Australia is no longer a white European outpost in the Pacific, but a multicultural space that is actively transforming.

Space of Representation: Ambiguous Governance Orientations

National borders define a territory with effects on sociality, citizenship, and citizen capabilities that sustain life and livelihood. How these understandings are narrated becomes significant in times of change because narratives have empirical and normative effects. For example, writing after the second European war, Hannah Arendt (1958) looked back to the origins of democratic politics that were anchored in the Greek Athenian city state in order to reaffirm the idea of an “active life” after totalitarianism. She identified this *vita activa* as a hierarchical integration of citizen speech “action,” biological “labor,” and “work,” which produces use-objects as human worldliness. In this narrative, “speech,” in a public space of appearance, is the higher order activity (7).

In the shifting spaces of enterprise universities, this “speech” becomes particularly significant in university governance that steers university spaces of orientation and learning for citizenship. For example, Monash Vice-Provost (Graduate Education) Zlatko Skrbis (2014: 3) advocates “global citizenship” premised on an ethic of cosmopolitanism. This capacity for judging builds on Kant’s “original compact” as an obligation to all other humans by virtue of our own humanity. Global citizenship, Skrbis suggests, includes democratic citizenship in its widest sense as a practice as much as a perspective. It is about making these ways of acting and connecting globally integral to university education through “teaching philosophies, policies, and curricula” (Skrbis, 2014: 1).

These statements suggest the horizons of university governance are shifting, and morally ought to shift, beyond national borders. Under the Commonwealth law, all Australian universities must develop Graduate Attributes. The Commonwealth’s

Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency (TEQSA) then evaluates universities' development and assessment of student achievement against these attributes, for registration purposes. The Monash Graduate Attributes policy reads:

Monash University prepares its graduates to be:

1. Responsible and effective *global citizens* who:
 - a) engage in an internationalised world;
 - b) exhibit cross-cultural competence;
 - c) demonstrate ethical values.
2. Critical and creative scholars who:
 - a) produce innovative solutions to problems.
 - b) apply research skills to a range of challenges.
 - c) communicate perceptively and effectively.

(Monash University, 2011, "Monash Graduate Attributes Policy") (Our emphasis)

The significance of this representation is that it establishes a point of reference for the act of judging. Judging is the point "actor and spectator become united; the maxim of the actor and the maxim, the 'standard,' according to which the spectator judges the spectacle of the world become one" (Arendt, 1978, Vol. 2: 271). As such, the Graduate Attributes policy represents a point in time, a space of orientation, which reveals judgments about the purposes of university education by the responsible university governance body. This representation, in turn, influences actions and judgments by university managers, academics, and students in relation to forming and graduating global citizens.

Australian higher education quality assurance processes and standards are largely defined and federally legislated by the Commonwealth government. But universities define their own "key graduate attributes": potentially a small oasis of autonomous judgment in the legislative landscape. Yet this glimmer may be a mirage, given the normative steering effects of quality assurance and continuous improvement. As Morley (2003) predicts, "in time, no university in any national location will be able to escape the gravitational pull of the quality assurance discourse" (21) because they form "powerful policy condensates, demanding consensus and orthodoxy" (14). The latest Monash Graduate Attributes policy was made by the Monash Academic Board in 2011. As a "conceived space of orientation," academic boards in Australia sit organizationally under the university's principal governing body and are "the principal policy-making and advisory body on all academic matters" (Dooley et al., 2013: 1). In 2006 the Monash Academic Board had 150 members; by 2014 there were 88 members forming a tripartite structure of ex-officio members, Heads of Academic Units, and 31 elected positions (including 4 student positions). This shift in composition unfolded alongside developments in quality assurance.

The 2006 report of the Australian University Quality Agency (AUQA) audit of Monash University suggested strengthening the Academic Board's role in university governance. This critique was one of several such reports critical of how university academic boards led "collegial processes of debate, discussion and review" (Baird, 2007: 108). By 2014, the Monash Academic Board Terms of Reference

reflected the reduced member numbers and identified the elected cohort as “visibly reflecting *elements* of collegiality and democratic participation in university academic affairs” (Monash University, 2014: 6) (Our emphasis). However, the Terms of Reference also indicate that compliance with quality assurance requirements is a core rationale for its existence:

Establishment of the Academic Board is also necessary to ensure compliance with the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency (TEQSA) Higher Education Standards Framework. (5)(Our emphasis)

The endorsement of global citizenship as a graduate attribute appears to navigate conflicting orientations within the university space. The process of Monash “going global” is tensioned perhaps between the gravitational pulls of an aspirational cosmopolitan ethic and, in Mann’s (1970) terms, a “‘pragmatic acceptance’ by subordinate classes” of orthodoxies generated by the external gaze of quality assurance.

Spaces of Multiplicity: Living Space Transnationally

So it’s interesting to see . . . how lots of things are happening on a global scale and at the same time be able to see the similarities of each country, which . . . wouldn’t be possible if I weren’t here [studying through Monash]. It wouldn’t be possible at all if I didn’t have the opportunity to meet and to talk to these people from different contexts. (Student P.)

This quote is from a postgraduate student enrolled in the Faculty of Education at Monash University. She was interviewed in a small-scale research project that investigated “Connecting Up” among international students. The student’s comment captures this connecting in ways that suggest interactive and overlapping national and global domains. Monash University is operating as an “analytic global–national borderlands”: it is where “global,” “national,” and “in-between” space-times become apparent analytically because they are ordered in ways that show “considerable internal differentiation and growing mutual imbrication with the other” (Sassen, 2002: 215).

As the student suggests, these polyglot borderlands locate moments where space and orientations reference different and multiple worlds. Understanding these borderlands means recognizing the absolute space of the university, and also how it is relativized by different actors: managers in university governance, academics who make spaces for learning, and students who learn. These spatialities frame, form, and filter particular relational spaces where people’s learning and working remake the university as a space of orientation. These spatial practices open up in-between spaces where transnational orientations become both imaginable and lived. For:

despite great distances and notwithstanding the presence of international borders (and all the laws, regulations and national narratives they represent) certain kinds of relationships have been globally intensified and now take place paradoxically in a planet-spanning yet common—however virtual—arena of activity. (Vertovec, 1999: 447)

These novel borderlands produce relational spaces and orientations where national territories denationalize and practices of global citizenship unfold (Sassen, 2013). These emergent denationalized and reterritorialized spaces and orientations are where “new forms of the social and the political can be *made*,” rather than as spaces for “enacting ritualized routines” (36). These moments make space and orientations that prompt novel ways of working and learning, with effects on knowledge building and identity formation.

Student Spaces

International research and postgraduate students make space for important work between the governed spaces and physical spaces of Monash Faculty of Education. As one student put it:

[T]he thing is that everybody meets at the kitchen at one point in the day. So at least say “hello” or “hi” or whatever it takes place there in the kitchen. On the same floor. [Connecting up occurs] basically because of the kitchen.

The possibility of practical encounters in the faculty builds friendships and also new “biographies of citizenship.” These are characterized by “dynamic identities, open, weak-tie relationships and more fluid, short-lived commitments in informal permeable institutions and associations” (Harris, 2014: 7). In the words of another student:

The first time I came here I felt that the most important thing that I had achieved was basically knowing people from other countries. Not necessarily network in the professional sense—at that time my friends were basically a Japanese guy who was doing archaeology, a Masters, and this guy from the Netherlands who was also doing a Masters of Arts, but he was a journalist, and this girl from Sudan, she was doing a Masters in applied linguistics. And this other person—this boy from—he was older than me anyway, but he was from Australia and he worked for the government, he was a specialist in Indonesian languages and yeah we were good friends at the moment. Facebook didn’t exist though. And I have this Iranian man who would play the santoor. It was beautiful music. He was a music teacher as well. So he was doing his Masters in music. And most of us, except for the Australian person, met at the academic writing class because none of them—none of us had English as a first language. We were all international students. Now that was my treasure for all this time. (Student O)

Making friends offers lots of benefits as well as broadening horizons, by also developing student’s sense of the way spaces are relativized through particular representations. Two students elaborated these issues by reflecting on the value of learning about other cultures:

[Y]ou get to learn about life in that country. You also learn how the educational system works there and it makes you take a bigger perspective—you know, it opens up your eyes. It’s like seeing how life really works, which is sometimes far beyond or far less than what is expressed in journal articles most of the time or chapters. (Student Q)

Australian schools are featured in the seminars and the group discussions, so I try to not discuss only with Chinese students. For example, I try to discuss with other students from other countries. I think that their insightful ideas, gave me a lot of ideas when discussing And their insightfulness, and their creativity give me a lot of idea . . . a lot of fresh ideas about how these ideas is actually [. . .] different from Chinese stereotypes, and Chinese mindsets. (Student Y)

These reality checks are directed at Australia as well as the students' home country. Their comments also reveal how they relativize the university space from positions that reference their home lives and social status. One Chinese student told us:

Maybe because a lot of us are just English majors and it seems that my friends here are quite better than my Chinese ones, because we often have the same process to be here. We have a house and we struggle for life here, and the most difficult thing is to buy the stuff like bread or something, it's really heavy for us to carry it. Every time I go to the supermarket with my friends and we handle the heavy stuff back home and we say, "Shit go back to China." When we are in China we have cars, parents' cars, and we can just drive them everywhere and then we do not have to go the supermarket, it's my parents' thing to do. I just write what I want to eat and they will buy it for me, now they just give me money.

Several students mentioned the role of online spaces as means of overcoming the "short-lived" nature of the international student experience. Several students shared Facebook group sites. They had been established to make a space that allowed the students to connect up while in Australia and also beyond their time as students. They recognized the possibility of collaborations as they moved beyond postgraduate study into academic positions, but also knew the formal rules that governed the university space of study:

Other PhD students and I think that that is a good way to think about keeping this network alive even with we no longer physically in Australia anymore. I think that having the Facebook account will still allow us to communicate easier than we are email. Because once we have done here the emails account from Monash are closed down.

Teaching Spaces

Transnationalism is also a feature of some teaching programs. For example, until 2014, the Master in Adult Education (Global) was designed and operated as a transnational space for learning at Monash University. It was based on a partnership between four universities: British Columbia (Canada), Western Cape (South Africa), Linköping (Sweden), and Monash. This intercontinental Masters program in Adult Learning and Global Change (ALGC) deliberately constructed a transnational space of orientation by selecting, organizing, and authorizing practices that acknowledged the distinctive potential of adult learning global transitions.

The curriculum, pedagogy, and assessment targeted the practice of adult learning and global change, and also oriented students toward critical questions.

The emphasis on knowledge building and identity formation encouraged students to become researcher-professionals. A formal Memorandum of Understanding governed these institutional arrangements, but the development of the legal framework was a product of the partners' learning and the experience of developing and running the program. It was based on cooperation between universities, and academic commitments to include multiple voices and ways of knowing from different parts of the world within an online pedagogy (Larsson et al., 2005).

This fully online learning offered ways of building global citizenship in higher education that could not be duplicated in nationally focused universities and programs. The teaching principles oriented course materials toward interdependence in the transnational space. Each "course" (unit) included tasks where students collaborated across countries and used resources from the settings where they lived and worked. The online teaching technology meant that people were brought together in a space that was no one's territory but, rather, a transnational space where ways of working and rules of conduct had to be negotiated between participants.

The ALGC reveals the paradox of online pedagogies in creating an *intimate* yet *global* (online) space of orientation. This pedagogy is realized through experiential learning strategies that foster reflexive acts of participation that are framed and designed to encourage cross-border global collaborations, and turn learning toward knowledge and processes of knowledge building that promote a cosmopolitan ethos. As Rizvi (2009: 265) suggests:

[I]t is now possible to do this kind of pedagogic work through networks, both informal and formal, bringing together students from different backgrounds with the aim of encouraging them to think outside their own parochial boundaries and cultural assumptions, helping them reflect on how global processes affect communities differentially and to examine the sources of these documentations and inequalities and what could be done about them.

Here is one student's account of exactly this process:

This course has been an interesting battle for me, both from a personal and a professional standpoint. Initially, in choosing this Masters I wanted a more corporate learning feel, multinational focus. . . the plan was to just get a Masters so I could move to New York and work in the UN. That was five years ago . . . Little did I know where this journey would end for me . . .

So this may not have been the course I wanted to do, however something captured my interest, I stayed on and it became the course I needed to do . . . I was shocked as to how much I learnt about things I didn't know about in the world, things I had no interest in prior to commencing this course, and how very beneficial it has been in my understanding of the world and my place within it. I've been reading my old assignments . . . and am proud of the work I first did in the program.

I am surprised about the influence of the course readings and discussions have on my current practice and the critical lens that I now view a lot of my practice

through. I wanted to make a difference and help before I joined this program. I had a vague global focus but really knew very little about it. Through this course and through my interactions, my interests have shifted to helping locally rather than globally . . .

I'm very much open to new avenues of work and learning. I don't know where I will go from here but I know that they are different from when I started. I'm a little scared about the future but also a little excited.

The idea of global citizenship offers a way of “thinking beyond the nation” (Skrbis, 2014: 6). It suggests the possibility of “global fellowship” (Appiah, 1996), where practices and spaces embrace multiple voices and perspectives. When these processes sediment through universities, they produce spaces of orientation that prompt processes of learning and working that bring people together and build novel ways of knowing, building knowledge, and making decisions that frame action.

Toward Social Cohesion?

Hannah Arendt suggests that ethical power is “actualized only where word and deed have not parted company, where words are not empty and deeds not brutal” (1958: 200). Yet work and learning in universities is increasingly defined by spaces where word and deed have parted company. There is considerable evidence that words become empty with the pursuit of technocratic futures, while deeds sometimes veer toward brutalities that disregard ways of making and sustaining life itself and also toward normative positions, including forms of cosmopolitanism.

Yet recognizing how the university is becoming a global-national borderland reveals spaces and orientations that suggest social cohesion is being remade, not just disturbed. As students suggest, social cohesion is not just bordered and ordered on a national territorial basis, because there are spaces for connections that foster friendships and encourage processes of working and learning together, which build knowledge and ways of knowing. While such learning may not seem necessary to students or to academics and university managers, it is a normative imperative “if we are to develop ways of ethically steering the direction of local–global relations, instead of allowing them to be shaped simply by the dictates of global corporate capitalism” (Rizvi, 2009: 254).

In conclusion, we underline the importance of looking at the university as a global-national borderland, rather than relying on habitual territorialized eyes. This way of seeing the university rests on an analytical move; it is not necessarily visible until the spatialization and orientation of a university is questioned. Monash University is often seen as just another Australian university—and it is, but only in part. It is in those parts that are not strictly territorialized where novel practices are emerging. It is in these spaces, where people “deal with material things” (Lefebvre, 1991: 4) in-between global and national imperatives and habits of mind, that possibilities of social cohesion informed by some logic of global citizenship might emerge.

References

- Abbott, Hon Tony, Prime Minister of Australia and Bishop, Hon Julie, Minister for Foreign Affairs (2015). Joint statement: Executions of Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran, <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/2015-04-29/executions-andrew-chan-and-myuran-sukumaran-0> (Viewed May 1, 2015).
- Anderson, B. (1991). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Appiah, K. A. (1996). Cosmopolitan patriots. In J. Cohen (Ed.), *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 21–29.
- Arendt, H. (1958). *The Human Condition*. Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press.
- Austrade (2015). Monthly Summary of International Student Enrolment Data1—Australia—YTD, March 2015, <http://www.austrade.gov.au/Education/Student-Data/2015> (Viewed June 10, 2015).
- Australian Universities Quality Agency (2006, December). *Report of an Audit of Monash University*. AUQA Audit Report Number 48. Melbourne: Australian Universities Quality Agency.
- Axford, B. and Seddon, T. (2006). Education, training and the citizen-consumer: Lifelong learning in a market economy. *Australian Journal of Education* 50(2): 167–184.
- Baird, J. (2007). Taking it on board: Quality audit findings for higher education governance. *Higher Education Research & Development* 26(1): 101–115.
- Cox, L. (2015). National security statement: Tony Abbott flags crackdown on Australians involved in terrorism. *Sydney Morning Herald*, February 23, 2015, <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/national-security-statement-tony-abbott-flags-crackdown-on-australians-involved-in-terrorism-20150223-13m4ze.html> (Viewed May 9, 2015).
- Davison, G. and Murphy, K. (2012). *University Unlimited: The Monash Story*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
- Dooley, A., Wormell, P., and McCallum, P. (2013). The purpose and function of academic boards and senates in Australian universities. *National Conference of Chairs of Academic Boards/Senates*, November 2013.
- Gieryn, T. F. (2000). A space for place in sociology. *Annual review of sociology* 26: 463–496.
- Harris, A. (2014). *Generation G, Global Connectedness & Global Responsibility*. Fostering Global Citizenship and Global Competence: A National Symposium, International Education Association of Australia, August 2014, <http://www.ieaa.org.au/documents/item/292> (Viewed April 1, 2015).
- Harvey, D. (2006). Space as a keyword. In N. Castree and D. Gregory (Eds.), *David Harvey: A Critical Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell, 270–294.
- Larsson, S., Boud, D., Abrandt Dahlgren, M., Walters, S., and Sork, T. (2005). Confronting globalisation: Learning from intercontinental collaboration. *Innovations in Education and Teaching International* 42(1): 61–71.
- Lefebvre, H. (1991). *The Production of Space*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Mann, M. (1970). The social cohesion of liberal democracy. *American Sociological Review* 35(3): 423–439.
- Marginson, S. and Considine, M. (2000). *The Enterprise University: Power, Governance and Reinvention in Australia*. Oakleigh, Victoria: Cambridge University Press.
- Massey, D. (2005). *For Space*. London: Sage.
- Monash University (2011). *Monash Graduate Attributes Policy, Approved by: Academic Board 4 3/2011 (Item 16.1)*, <http://www.policy.monash.edu/policy-bank/academic/education/management/monash-graduate-attributes-policy.html> (Viewed May 1, 2015).

- Monash University (2014). *Monash University Academic Board*. Melbourne: Monash University, <http://www.adm.monash.edu.au/excerv/academic-board/docs/ab-tors-2014.pdf> (Viewed December 5, 2014).
- Monash University (2015a). *Monash at a Glance*, <http://www.monash.edu/about/who/glance>
- Monash University (2015b). *Monash Warwick Alliance*, <http://www.monash.edu/about/world/warwick> (Viewed May 2, 2015).
- Morley, L. (2003). *Quality and Power in Higher Education*. Maidenhead, UK: Society for Research into Higher Education & Open University Press.
- Ozga, J., Seddon, T. and Popkewitz, T. S. (Eds.) (2006). *Education Research and Policy: Steering the Knowledge-Based Economy, World Yearbook of Education 2006*. London: Routledge.
- Pahl, R. E. (1991). The search for social cohesion: From Durkheim to the European Commission. *European Journal of Sociology* 32: 345–360.
- Rizvi, F. (2009). Towards cosmopolitan learning. *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education* 30(3): 253–268.
- Rizvi, F. and Lingard, B. (2010). *Globalizing Education Policy*. London: Routledge.
- Robertson, S. (2010). ‘Spatialising’ the Sociology of Education: Stand-points, entry-points and vantage-points. In M. W. Apple, S. J. Ball, and L. Gandin (Eds.), *Routledge International Handbook for the Sociology of Education*. London: Routledge, 15–26.
- Sassen, S. (2002). Spatialities and temporalities of the global: Elements for a theorization. *Public Culture* 2(1): 215–232.
- Sassen, S. (2006). *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Sassen, S. (2013). When the global arises from inside the national. In T. Seddon and J. Levin (Eds.), *Educators, Professionalism and Politics: Global Transitions, National Spaces, and Professional Projects, 2013 World Yearbook of Education*. London: Routledge, 27–41.
- Scanlon Foundation (2015). Scanlon Foundation: Social Cohesion, <http://scanlonfoundation.org.au/social-cohesion/> (Viewed April 28, 2015).
- Shields, R. (2004). Henri Lefebvre. In P. Hubbard, R. Kitchen, and G. Valentine (Eds.), *Key Thinkers on Space and Place*. London: Sage, 208–213.
- Skrbis, Z. (2014). *Coming to Terms with Cosmopolitanism, Global Citizenship & Global Competence*. Fostering Global Citizenship and Global Competence: A National Symposium, International Education Association of Australia, August 2014, <http://www.ieaa.org.au/documents/item/294> (Viewed April 1, 2015).
- Somers, M. R. (1994). The narrative constitution of identity: A relational and network approach. *Theory and Society* 23: 605–649.
- Somers, M. R. (1995). What’s political or cultural about political culture and the public sphere? Towards an historical sociology of concept formation. *Sociological Theory* 13(2): 113–144.
- Universities Australia (2009). *The Nature of International Education in Australian Universities and Its Benefits*, <http://www.universitiesaustralia.edu.au/page/submissions---reports/commissioned-studies/benefits-of-international-education/> (Viewed April 17, 2013).
- Vertovec, S. (1999). Conceiving and researching transnationalism. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22(2): 447–462.

Individual Labor-Related Dispute Mechanisms in Japan—Policy Intention and Individual Worker Aspirations

Nobuko Hosogaya

This chapter examines new types and patterns of labor disputation between employers and employees in contemporary Japan. From a macroperspective, these new patterns reflect changes in industrial structure and the bargaining processes between labor and employer, which in turn is strongly associated with changes brought about due to globalization. These changes have greatly affected the type of labor employed, including temporary contract or contingent workers. These issues can also be analyzed from a micro perspective, with a focus on the individual worker, including how labor disputation relates to the persons' living conditions and their employment careers. The author attempts to identify the major factors behind labor disputes in the current circumstances and the kinds of resolutions that have been struck between employers and employees. The particular focus is on issues that arise from what are called "individual labor-related disputes" (ILRDs). These grew in number in the context of Japan's extended recession and the bursting of the "economic bubble" in the early 1990s.

An Outline of the Issue

ILRDs are conflicts experienced in the workplace between workers and business operators. They include issues related to working conditions, sexual harassment, and bullying. Conflicts which are dealt with in disputes between business operators and unions through collective labor relations are not defined as ILRDs. In these circumstances, the two types of dispute are different with regard to their target and legislative background, while complementing each other to protect the right of all type of workers.

One reason why ILRDs are gaining attention is the decline in the traditional labor union and of the wider collective labor movement. In Japan, the numbers of workers who are organized by unions are continually decreasing. This is widely considered to be caused by the decrease in manufacturing employment, which hitherto has been the major source of union membership. There is an increasing number of firms without a labor union (Sato, 1994). It is well known that there has been a long-term cooperative relationship between management and labor in Japan. At their peak in 1974, labor disputes, which were an important part of the negotiation processes of the collective labor movement, numbered in the vicinity of 10,000 cases, but have been in decline thereafter. It was even less than 1,000 in 2007, and remains at that level today.

On the other hand, as we see from Figure 13.1, ILRDs have steadily increased. This type of dispute has its roots in labor consultation activities conducted at the prefectural level, in which the prefectural government and its labor bureau are required to assist individual workers and employers in solving labor problems at the workplace. These provisions were legislated in 2001, and cover a wide range of labor issues which cannot be dealt with in the context of traditional collective labor relationships. It is often pointed out that the rapid growth of ILRDs is a function of changes to the employment structure, and specifically to the increase in the number of contingent employees and the high level of involuntary unemployment that has come about due to the depression. More recently, it seems that changes to the performance-based evaluation that determines individual wages has also contributed to the high numbers of ILRDs (Takahashi, 2012).




Figure 13.1 Changes in the Number of Collective Labor Disputes, General Labor Consultations, and the Individual Labor-Related Disputes, 2002–2013

Source: The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare

The deterioration of employment conditions has affected both regular and nonregular employees. Therefore, these days both types of employees are involved in the ILRD processes. Local governments have taken the initiative to get involved in the consultation process for individual labor disputes and did so prior to the legislation brought about by the national government. Thus, the development of ILRD institutions and practices in Japan has brought a variety of participants into the process. This too has contributed to the rapid increase in the number of cases of this type and, at the same time, may have created a diversified policy focus, in which there is considerable variation in how disputes are resolved. This chapter examines the recent rapid development of this type of labor dispute in order to elucidate its characteristics and the reasons hampering a better utilization of this conflict resolution process.

Definition of the Term

Individual labor relations are defined as “various relationships between individual workers and employers regarding employment” (Hisamoto, 2011: 16). ILRDs refer to cases where “employers and, especially, workers conduct disputes not dealt with by collective bodies” (Kashimura, 2008: 14). This means that in the ILRD process, individual workers confront employers or management bodies by themselves, without union representation. In terms of the matters contested, the disputes arise at the initiative of the individual worker, when the worker believes his or her interests require such action. Therefore, the contents and the extent of the problem are shaped by the individual worker’s knowledge and concerns. It may also be a difference in perception between both parties that leads to the confrontation.

Cases tabled for consultation by the disputing parties and regarded as ILRDs are usually confined to those which are not in strict violation of labor-related laws, such as the Labor Standards Act. These include dismissals thought to be not against the law, the deterioration of working conditions, and bullying or harassment in the workplace. By contrast, general labor consultation involves cases in which one of the disputing parties raises issues for consultation at the prefectural government offices and Prefectural Labour Bureau. Among the general labor consultation cases, the ones which are alleged to violate the law will be investigated by proper labor supervising officers—the Labor Standards Inspection Officers. Again, ILRD cases are not regarded as violations of the law, but are nevertheless regarded as involving employer delinquency and necessitate improvement of the workplace environment and, in some cases, lead to payment of compensation for damage to workers. Therefore they are sometimes labeled “individual labor-related civil disputes.”

The Development of the Institution

The ILRD resolution framework was legislated in 2001 under the Act on Promoting the Resolution of Individual Labor-Related Disputes. This law defines the actual

procedure by which the Prefectural Labour Bureau performs its central role. The Prefectural Labour Bureau is the local division of the National Labour Bureau. As explained below, the labor section of prefectural government offices and other nongovernment organizations, such as the local federation of lawyers, also play a limited part in this process.

As discussed below, the whole ILRD resolution procedure consists of actions which are taken across a number of different administrative and judicial arrangements. Table 13.1 shows the kinds of bodies involved and their functions in the processing of ILRDs. There are various routes by which ILRDs are to be handled. The procedures are basically designed to deal with various needs of workers and to enable them to initiate the dispute resolution process at a location near to their residence or workplace, at a relatively small cost. In order to understand why these different organizations are involved in ILRD activities, the ways in which the various agencies have developed needs to be considered.

As noted, *consultation* over a labor-related issue at the local government and the labor bureau is first commenced to provide information and knowledge about the problem to the parties involved. Serious cases might be brought to the civil court for further negotiation and compensation. The legislation underpinning ILRDs utilizes and reinforces these existing services. Nakakubo (2013) explains how ILRDs have become a part of national legislation. Initially, in 1998, the Labor Standards Act was revised to reinforce the authority of related governmental offices to coordinate bodies and persons involved in an illegal workplace situation. This revision also authorized the Prefectural Labor Bureau to assist the parties to a dispute. Secondly, this authorization was defined in terms of the procedure outlined in the Act on Promoting the Resolution of Individual Labor-Related Disputes. At that time, the national government was obliged to resolve the dispute. Thirdly, the Labor Tribunal Act was introduced in 2004, for the purpose of achieving prompt, proper, and effective dispute resolution as a juridical process conducted at the court by a judge and persons with expert knowledge and experience in labor relations.

Table 13.1 Institutions and Their Functions in the Processing of ILRDs

Type of organization	Name of activities			
	Consultation	Advice and guidance	Mediation	Labor tribunal decision/suit
Prefectural Labor Bureau	**	**	**	
Labor-related sections of prefectural governments	**		*	
Labor Relations Commissions	*			
Courts			**	**
Nongovernmental Organization	**			

* Specific ILRD resolution activities conducted.

** ILRD resolution activities conducted.

Source: The Twenty First Century Public Policy Institute (2006).

The actual ILRD resolution procedure reflects the second and the third points noted above. Administrative bodies, such as the Prefectural Labor Bureau and the local government, have institutionalized power to assist in dispute resolution between employers and workers. In the Act on Promoting the Resolution of Individual Labor-Related Disputes, the national government and its subordinate body, the Prefectural Labor Bureau, were empowered to: (1) *conduct consultation* and offer information; (2) *give advice and guidance* with the authority of the director of the Prefectural Labor Bureau; and (3) organize a Dispute Coordinating Committee and, at the same time, *to conduct mediation* through it. Each Prefectural Labor Bureau is allocated 47 prefectures,¹ and each runs several labor consulting counters. This amounts to 300 throughout Japan. The labor-related sections of prefectural governments are legally entitled to conduct mediation through a local labor commission which has long been active in the collective labor process and to provide such mediating services. Local governments are given authority to offer such labor consultation services to their residents for the resolution of their labor problems. For example, the Tokyo metropolitan government has six counters in its territorial jurisdiction and in 2013 undertook 52,684 consultation cases (Bureau of Industrial and Labor Affairs, Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 2014). These services are offered free of charge.

As for the third point, the Labor Tribunal Act, which was introduced in 2006, institutionalized a process that would lead to swifter dispute settlement. Before this legislation, legal labor dispute resolution was confined to filing a case with the civil court. This process involved a relatively longer period and heavier cost for individual employees. Instead, the Labor Tribunal allows aggrieved workers to legally solve their problem in a shorter period and at less cost. The law confines the number of meetings to three for each Tribunal case. This limitation is thought to assist in enabling targeted and speedy discussion among the parties involved, and thus expedites the Tribunal's assistance. If the result handed down by the Tribunal is not acceptable to either the employee or the employer and a lawful challenge is filed against the Tribunal, it will be deemed to have been filed with the civil court.

As described, the present ILRD resolution process involves various institutions and agencies mandated by law to assist in the resolution. The reason why there is such a variety of agencies derives from two factors. The first is the involvement of two different types of law. As the fundamental purpose is to offer better resolution to the public, these two laws have a common purpose; however, the deliberations that determined the content and purpose of these laws are somewhat different. The Labor Tribunal Act resulted from jurisdictional reform, which aimed to make the Japanese judicial system more efficient and effective. The Act on Promoting the Resolution of Individual Labor-Related Disputes resulted from discussions about the regulation of the new type of labor dispute resolution process.

The second factor was a desire to reflect traditional tripartite principles in the new labor regulation process. Traditionally, decisions on important labor issues are based on a tripartite view of the national interest that is composed of equal representatives of employers, labor, and the general public. Therefore, the introduction of labor-related laws often tends to be a result of bargaining processes, especially between employer and labor representatives (Kume, 1998). As for the

policy development of ILRDs, the discussions at the related labor policy council and the practical plan put forward by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare were very influential. It was first requested in 1999, and this request came from labor representatives who suggested a new law to regulate the resolution of individual labor problems. At first, the employer representative resisted implementation of a new law, on the basis that individual labor problems should be solved inside the company as an internal problem. The Ministry was also cautious. As for the agencies to be utilized in the actual process, labor representatives relied on the Labor Relations Commissions,² which has hitherto been in charge of collective labor disputes, and the Ministry advocated the Prefectural Labor Bureau and the local governmental offices (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 1999). In the end, the Act on Promoting the Resolution of Individual Labor-Related Disputes was introduced in 2001. The outcome may be seen to be favorable to the interests of labor.

By 2003, the government adopted the ILRD resolution policy; however, at the same time, there was deregulation in fixed-term labor contracts for the purpose of enhancing structural reform in Japan (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 2003), a development favorable to employer interests.

The ILRD Resolution Process

Types of ILRDs and Procedures

When workers encounter issues at their workplace, they can utilize the ILRD procedures. As we have already seen, such appeals can be raised through multiple organizations. Murata (2006) categorizes the procedures as “juridical,” “administrative,” and “private.” As summarized in Figure 13.3, “juridical procedures” means the courts; “administrative procedures” means the Prefectural Labor Bureaus, local governments, and the prefectural Labor Relations Commissions; and “private procedures” means nongovernmental organizations, such as nonprofit organizations and agencies run by labor unions. The juridical and the administrative procedures are regulated by different laws. The private procedure does not have any specific regulating law. However, if the worker visits a consultation venue run by unions and then joins the union to negotiate against the employer with the support of the union, the process will be regulated by the law governing the collective labor process. Thus, the incident will not be categorized as an ILRD.

At the center of the ILRD process are the Prefectural Labor Bureaus, which cover the widest range of functions for bringing about a resolution, as depicted in Table 13.1. These attract most of the *consultations*, as we will discuss later. The actual procedures are consultation, advice and guidance, and mediation. The Act on Promoting the Resolution of Individual Labor-Related Disputes assigns the Prefectural Labour Bureau to cover the entire process up until the Labor Tribunal and suit (Murata, 2006). These basic processes which are followed are summarized below.

Labor consultation usually begins at the start of a formal ILRD resolution process. The consultant will seek to resolve the dispute by the offer of proper information and knowledge to correct any misunderstanding and ignorance on the part of

the contending parties. In many cases, this is useful for settling the problem. At the same time, the fact that consultation is provided by a governmental authority has the additional effect of letting the employer understand the seriousness of the worker's claim (Twenty First Century Committee of Management, 2006).

Advice and guidance is confined to the Prefectural Labor Bureau and is issued under the authority of the Director of the Bureau. Advice and guidance will be given upon request from one or both of the parties to the dispute (Act on Promoting the Resolution of Individual Labor-Related Disputes, article 4).³ Advice is given orally, and guidance is issued through documentation (Murata, 2006). Based on the subject matter of the consultation stage, the advice is intended to promote discussion between the parties, and the guidance is to show the direction toward which a settlement may be found. In this manner, an attempt is made to promote and accelerate a voluntary resolution within the company or workplace. However, the parties to the dispute are not compelled to accept the guidance and advice given. If one of the parties refuses to accept it, the case will be concluded at that point, and the party who wants to continue with the case needs to go forward to mediation, to a tribunal, or to civil court.

Mediation is undertaken by the Dispute Coordinating Committee, upon the request of one or both disputing parties, and if the Director of the Prefectural Labor Bureau finds it necessary. The Dispute Coordinating Committee members are appointed by the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare. Mediation is considered as a process which aims to achieve consent between two parties. The Committee prepares a mediation plan, taking into account the views of both sides, and proposes it to the disputing parties in order to bring about mutual consent. However, the plan does not compel parties to accept a resolution. If the Committee finds that there is no prospect of resolving the dispute by mediation, it may discontinue mediation (Act on Promoting the Resolution of Individual Labor-Related Disputes, article 4).

These processes show that the ILRD is a process *initiated on the basis of consultation*; it is *developed* by the disputing parties *through the procedures of advice and guidance*, with *mediation as a next stage*, and finally moved to the tribunal and the court.

We can infer the following differences vis-a-vis the collective labor process: (1) since an ILRD starts from the individual worker in the dispute, the individual's will is the most important factor for the continuation of the dispute; and (2) in contrast to the collective labor process, the employers are not obliged to sit in on the process. In this regard, scholars have expressed some reservation about the efficacy of the process in arriving at a resolution.

Actually, as discussed below, the number of cases involving advice and guidance or mediation amounts to about 10 percent of the number of consultations. The actual number of dispute resolutions, in the form of advice and guidance and mediation, is relatively small in comparison with the initial consultation stage. If the ILRD reflects individual worker initiatives on workplace grievances, then why have some of these workers chosen the *consultation* settlement route while others have not? In what follows, we will analyze this question, after first examining the number of ILRD cases over time.

Growth in the Use of ILRD Resolution Procedures and the Issues Contested

In this section, we are going to examine the actual numbers of ILRDs taken from the official statistics of the Prefectural Labor Bureaus, the center of the ILRD process. Since the establishment of the institution in 2001, the number of ILRDs has been increasing at a rapid pace. Table 13.2 summarizes the number of consultations on civil individual labor disputes, as well as advice and guidance and mediation provided by the Prefectural Labour Bureaus.

Since the institution of the Prefectural Labor Bureau was established, the number of consultations has grown 2.5 times. By contrast, the number of applications accepted for advice and guidance increased 5 times, while the number of applications accepted for mediation has almost doubled. Applications for mediation hit a peak in 2008, at over 2.5 times the number in the year of commencement. However, it slightly decreased thereafter to 5,712 applications (less than double the 2002 number) by 2013. From Table 13.2 it can be seen that as the number of the consultations increases, the number of people who decide to apply for advice and guidance or mediation also grows. In 2013, the number of cases for consultation represented only 5 percent of the number for advice and guidance, and 2 percent for mediation.

When we compare the numbers of applications for advice and guidance as against those for mediation, guidance is greatly preferred to mediation. Applications for guidance and advice are almost double those for mediation. Before commenting on the reasons for this outcome, it is important to first consider the changes that have occurred in the types of grievances presented for consultation in a civil ILRD. The reasons for the increase in ILRDs, especially labor consultations, may be summarized as deterioration of employment conditions and the erosion of conflict prevention procedures, which fall within the remit of the company union and are managed through supervisor-subordinate

Table 13.2 The Number of Consultations on Civil Individual Labor Disputes, Advice and Guidance, and Mediation

	Consultations on civil individual labor disputes	Accepted applications for advice and guidance	Accepted applications for mediation
2002	103,194	2,332	3,036
2003	140,822	4,377	5,352
2004	160,166	5,287	6,014
2005	176,429	6,369	6,888
2006	187,387	5,761	6,924
2007	197,904	6,652	7,146
2008	236,993	7,592	8,457
2009	247,302	7,778	7,821
2010	246,907	7,692	6,390
2011	256,343	9,590	6,510
2012	254,719	10,363	6,047
2013	245,783	10,024	5,712

Source: The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2014).

relationships in the workplace. Insufficient effort by companies to assist workers to recognize potential workplace problems has been identified as a problem area (Hisamoto, 2011; Nakakubo, 2013).

The deterioration of employment conditions includes dismissals, enforcing voluntary resignation, and long working hours. Work conditions have also been affected by a rapid increase in nonregular employees as a proportion of the labor force. In Japan, since most unions are categorized as company unions, union memberships are virtually confined to regular employees. Thus, the increase in nonregular employment means an increase in the proportion of workers who do not have the opportunity to make claims through collective processes.

The erosion of workplace conflict prevention means that the mechanisms which were effective at workplace dispute resolution in the past are now becoming increasingly inappropriate: the kinds of recreational and networking activities among workers, which provided opportunities for informal communication and mutual help and which were encouraged by the unions and the workplaces, are less relevant to nonregular employees. Further, these have become much more difficult than before because of the longer working hours.

Finally, the advent of ILRDs allows workers with workplace problems to make claims, but does not provide the opportunity to pursue a consultation process at their workplace. Latent disputes will remain unaddressed by employers who are ill-prepared to deal the requirements of a diversified work force, which includes female, aged, or nonregular employees. It is for such workers that the protective regulations have been introduced. However, lack of awareness on the part of managers and employers of the difficulties faced by these employees has been subject to increasing attention (The Twenty First Century Public Policy Institute, 2006). Further, in the case of worker harassment, internal and private consultation is not always effective; indeed, it would be difficult to find colleagues and supervisors willing to cooperate with the pursuit of such grievances (JILPT, 2009, 2010).

Figure 13.2 shows the changes in the nature of grievances within the ILRD consultation process. The grievances may be broadly divided into three categories: (1) *dismissal-related issues*, such as termination of employment, pressure to retire, informal job offer cancellation, and voluntary resignation; (2) *issues related to working conditions*, such as a deterioration in working conditions, temporary transfers and reshuffling, poor employment and recruitment management, and similar issues; and (3) *bullying and harassment*. The proportion of dismissal-related issues has been largest since the introduction of the ILRD process, although the ratio began to decrease after the economic downturn of 2008–2009. More precisely, as dismissal-related grievances decreased in relative share, other types of issues such as coerced retirement and voluntary resignation increased. At the same time, claims regarding employment conditions decreased slightly, but still accounted for about 30 percent. The most rapid increase was in bullying and harassment cases. This has been particularly noticeable for over the past three to four years. As observed above, in examining the number of applications for advice and guidance and mediation, over the recent three years, applications for the advice and guidance exceeded those for mediation. In this context, it may be inferred that discussion between disputing parties through advice and




Figure 13.2 Changes to the Composition of Grievances in ILRD Consultations

Source: The Ministry of the Health, Labour and Welfare (2014)

guidance is preferred for the settlement of bullying and harassment cases, because workers may be able to resolve their workplace grievance and still find a way to keep their job.

The ILRD Resolution Process

This section focuses on the advice and guidance and mediation functions of the ILRD resolution process. These features of the process are examined, as well as the reasons why workers move beyond consultation to seek advice to redress their grievances. As we have seen, there are several possible avenues for workers with workplace problems, as provided for by ILRD resolution arrangements. It is important to understand why specific options within the ILRD resolution framework are chosen by individual workers. By examining utilization of the mediation option in more detail, it is possible to better understand just how the institution and the individual resolution options operate.

JILPT (2007) has modeled actual ILRD resolution processes by which individual workers have pursued conflict resolution to mediation, through an analysis of 51 actual cases brought before the Prefectural Labor Bureaus (Figure 13.3). The initiation of action by an individual through private discussion with the company represents Stage 1. If this is not satisfactory, the worker resolves to address the issue by reaching beyond the company and further assistance is sought to resolve the dispute (Stage 2). Next, the institutionalized ILRD resolution process commences (Stage 3). Stages 4 and 5 are where the individual worker seeks the consent of




Figure 13.3 Model of the Actual ILRD Resolution Process

*The JLSC is the organization to provide legal assistance to citizens, based on the goal to “realize a society where legal information and services are accessible anywhere in the country”, in accordance with Japan’s “judicial reform” by government.

Source: Formed by the author based on the information from JILPT (2009)

another body to provide a resolution. The modeling shows that, in practice, the ILRD resolution process is likely to be terminated somewhere between Stages 3 and 5, with or without the consent of the other disputing parties. Not every stage (from 1 to 5) is always taken by the individual, with some stages being skipped.

At present, cases reaching Stage 3 are rapidly increasing in number, but the number reaching Stages 4 or 5 are very limited. Beyond Stage 4, the result depends upon whether agreement is reached between the parties or whether the case is dismissed when the opposite party refuses to reach an agreement.

The issues dealt with in labor disputes at higher stages of the process are distinctive. According to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, in 2013, dismissal-related issues accounted for about 40 percent of the total guidance and advice-related cases, whereas in relation to mediation cases, 50 percent of the total involved dismissal-related issues. Bullying and harassment claims, which are currently increasing, occupy only 20 percent of cases for advice and guidance, and 25 percent for mediation. For 95 percent of applications seeking advice and guidance, the Director of the Prefectural Labor Bureau forwards the application to the opposing party in the action. However, the results of the guidance and advice process are not recorded. Concerning the results of the mediation cases, among the 5,688 applications for mediation, 2,225 cases were successful in achieving agreement between the two parties. However, 3,141 cases were not successful, with mediation being cancelled in 2,102 cases because the opposite party did not participate in the mediation (The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2015b).

A basic concept in labor relations research is “voice or exit” (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). Research shows that labor union activity lowers the voluntary resignation of workers (exit) because it facilitates discussion on working conditions with employers (voice) to achieve workplace improvements. So workers’ “voice” is one of the most important factors in collective labor relations. In Japan, of course, this has proved to be the case for collective labor relations even in middle- and small-sized companies. The presence of any kind of labor representative in an organization lowers the volunteer resignation ratio in a company (JILPT, 2007).

However, the “voice and exit” model does not necessarily apply in the ILRD resolution process, since, in most cases, consultation within the company is difficult to arrange. It is because of this difficulty that the resolution process is located outside the workplace. In those cases which reach mediation, it is important with whom the individual consults with by Stage 3 (see the earlier part of this discussion). In cases that do get to mediation, unions outside the company and other entities with specialized knowledge are usually asked for input into the ILRD resolution process because persons and unions inside companies do not offer sufficient help.

In the early stages of the ILRD resolution process, friends and the company union are consulted. Friends are very important at this early stage. Research has revealed that among those who experienced problems in the workplace, only about 20 percent consulted with experts or public agencies, but almost 60 percent of them consulted with their friends and/or inquired into the issue themselves (Kashimura, 2008).

Consultations with company unions in resolving personal disputes depend upon several conditions. Hisamoto (2011) has hypothesized that actions through an ILRD process are contingent upon the nature of the union-worker relationship. Initially, workers may articulate their complaints to their company, whether or not they are union members. In companies with company unions that work properly, members are represented through routine union activity. Nevertheless, company unions are not always effective (JILPT, 2010). This is especially so when the union is too close to the management, in which case union consultation with the company may have a negative effect on the workers involved. This will be the same in the case of consultations with colleagues in the same company. Therefore internal consultation within companies has variable outcomes for the individual workers concerned, and it is for this reason that some scholars recommend the setting up of an independent advisory board, to act as a neutral third party for settling individual workplace disputes (Nakakubo, 2013; Nose, 2011).

Moreover, worker complaints are often raised externally after employers have already made a decision in relation to a complaint, which is especially so in the case of a dismissal. So, in many cases, with internal company processes having been exhausted, financial compensation is made for the worker’s resignation (JILPT, 2010).

Finally, there is a tremendous gap between the number of the cases at Stage 3 and those in the subsequent stages. In the real world, if an individual worker asks for a consultation, but cannot see any possibility of bringing about a change to the situation through persuasion, then a decision will have to be made whether or not to stay and take a stand. However, the cases in which a worker participates in consultations but then does not proceed to the next stage have not been

thoroughly investigated; hence we cannot comment upon what may be happening in such proceedings.

Individual and Local Factors

This section considers factors that affect individual conduct and the context in which action is taken. One such factor is the employment status of the worker in the workplace. As discussed above, the resolution to an ILRD is initiated and shaped by the consultation and advice already sought by the individual. The effectiveness of the ILRD resolution for any individual might also be influenced by the worker's standing in the workplace.

Employment Status and ILRD

The low rate of union membership among nonregular employees has long been a concern for Japanese labor unions. The proportion of nonregular employees within the labor force has continuously increased, and currently about 40 percent of the labor force is in nonregular employment. The traditional corporate union has confined its membership to regular employees—those whose labor contract does not run for a specified and limited period of time. Therefore, many workers within company unions do not believe that nonregular employees are entitled to membership. One union representative organization, Rengo, has recently been encouraging membership for nonregular employees and supports their grievances against employers. Nevertheless, the recruitment of such workers shows little sign of progress.⁴ As the number and the proportion of part-time employment grows in a company, the management realizes that employment on such terms is important for maintaining the corporation's competitiveness. As a result, some companies develop policies that establish an intermediate status between part-time and permanent workers. Dispatched workers, compared with those who are part-timers, work longer hours and have similar working patterns to those permanently employed. But, based on their employment status, they remain vulnerable. The overall number of dispatched workers is a much smaller part of the working population than part-timers and, because they are not directly hired by the company, membership in the company union is never considered. If the ILRD resolution mechanism aims to be of assistance to workers who do not have the privilege of traditional union membership, then it is expected that the frequency of consultations or resolutions will be much higher for such workers than it is for permanent.

Figure 13.4 shows the growth of individual labor consultations by employment type. In recent decades, the proportion of full-time employees has diminished, and the proportions of part-time workers, dispatched workers, and "perma-temps" have stabilized, while the "other/unknown" category amounts to about 30 percent. Perma-temps are workers whose contracts have a limited period of employment, although they have similar working hours and arrangements as permanent employees. It is possible to draw a tentative conclusion that the proportion of consultations for dispatched workers and perma-temps is not growing, although the figures we have do not allow us to be decisive.




Figure 13.4 Individual Labor Dispute by Type of Employment

Source: The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2015)

Table 13.3 shows the occurrence of ILRDs in relation to employed persons. The percentage is calculated by dividing the number of cases by the number of the employed persons for each employment status category. The table shows that over last three years, the incidence of ILRDs among dispatched workers is higher than that of other employment categories. Among the dispatched workers, one out of every hundred applied for a consultation, one of every two thousand sought advice and guidance, and one among six thousand asked for mediation. With regard to mediation, it seems that company size and related working conditions have been a major factor (Hisamoto, 1999; JILPT, 2010). Nevertheless, the inequality experienced by dispatched workers is, to some extent, inherent in the inferior conditions that pertain to low employment status.

The Proportion of Disputes at the Prefecture Level

Though the entire institutional arrangement of ILRDs and related laws are configured at the national level to reflect the policies and interests of the government, the national labor union movement, and the representatives of corporate management, the implementation of ILRD resolution shows significant variation at the prefectural level. Based on personal experience, Murata (2006: 201) concludes:

As for the ILRD, basically, it is intended to cope with issues in a “multilateral system,” and there are several institutional arrangements which persons in trouble can apply for; however, in our prefecture of Ehime, the possible choices themselves will not always be the same as those in a larger prefecture such as Tokyo or Osaka.

Table 13.3 ILRDs by Labor Type

	Individual labor-related disputes consultation						Application for advice and guidance						Application for mediation						
	2011		2012		2013		2011		2012		2013		2011		2012		2013		
	(number)	(rate)	(number)	(rate)	(number)	(rate)	(number)	(rate)	(number)	(rate)	(number)	(rate)	(number)	(rate)	(number)	(rate)	(number)	(rate)	
Full-time employee	106,357	101,472	101,472	97,573	4,654	5,027	4,895	3,281	3,007	2,823	0.32%	0.30%	0.30%	0.01%	0.02%	0.02%	0.01%	0.01%	0.01%
Part-time temp	43,998	42,309	42,309	40,604	2,353	2,404	2,392	1,239	1,182	1,211	0.36%	0.34%	0.31%	0.02%	0.02%	0.02%	0.01%	0.01%	0.01%
Dispatched employee	11,134	10,827	10,827	10,031	497	658	557	379	327	339	1.16%	1.20%	0.87%	0.05%	0.07%	0.05%	0.04%	0.04%	0.03%
Perma-temp	27,030	27,094	27,094	26,696	1,517	1,682	1,685	1,165	1,063	1,059	0.75%	0.77%	0.69%	0.04%	0.05%	0.04%	0.03%	0.03%	0.03%
Other/unknown	67,824	73,017	73,017	70,879	569	592	495	446	468	280	5.34%	5.70%	8.64%	0.05%	0.05%	0.06%	0.04%	0.04%	0.03%
Total	256,343	254,719	254,719	245,783	9,590	10,363	10,024	6,510	6,047	5,712	0.50%	0.49%	0.47%	0.02%	0.02%	0.02%	0.01%	0.01%	0.01%

Source: Calculated from the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2015a) and the Ministry of the Internal Affairs and Communications, respective years.

Here, we examine trends in worker preferences at the prefectural level for resolving disputes within the ILRD framework. These results are obtained from Prefectural Labor Bureau websites and the data are collated to summarize national trends. From 2013, application figures for ILRD consultations were highest in Tokyo (26,869 applications), followed by Osaka (21,364), Hyogo (18,056), Kanagawa (14,292), Aichi (13,760), and Saitama (11,558) (The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2015b). These are prefectures with large populations, and thus also with significant worker populations. Hyogo recorded the largest number of applications for guidance and advice. Tokyo recorded the largest numbers for mediation.

The incidence of consultations is calculated by dividing the number of consultations by the number of persons employed.⁵ When prefecture occurrence ratios are compared for the period 2011 to 2013, we find that there are prefectures which are consistently high or low. Table 13.4 shows the prefectural occurrence ratios for mediation or for advice and guidance consultations, and the rate at which dismissal issues are raised in consultations.

High ILRD occurrence ratios may mean that business operators in the prefecture do not have sufficient knowledge about labor-related conditions. At the same time, it may indicate that no effective consultation system exists in companies within that prefecture.

Table 13.4 The Incidence of ILRDs by Selected Prefectures

	2011				
	Cases of consultation	Cases of consultation/ number of persons in employment (%)	Mediation/ consultation (%)	Advice and guidance/ consultation (%)	Ratio of dismissal-related issues in consultation (%)
Japan	256,343	0.41	2.54	3.74	42.00
<i>Prefectures in top 10 from 2011 to 2013</i>					
Hyogo	23,365	0.92	1.13	4.12	38.04
Kyoto	7,394	0.59	2.07	2.66	38.00
Osaka	23,275	0.56	2.11	2.85	45.92
Kagoshima	4,206	0.53	1.52	2.69	36.07
Fukui	2,140	0.52	2.76	4.77	42.30
Akita	2,540	0.51	3.54	3.98	42.74
Yamagata	2,951	0.51	3.56	3.35	36.00
<i>Prefectures in least 10 from 2011 to 2013</i>					
Chiba	6,376	0.20	3.62	11.01	40.10
Niigata	2,958	0.25	3.14	3.89	31.60
Shizuoka	5,071	0.26	2.37	6.51	NA
Tochigi	2,715	0.27	5.05	5.49	38.10
Hokkaido	7,108	0.28	3.47	3.42	36.60
Wakayama	1,310	0.29	4.05	10.69	35.70

(continued)

Table 13.4 (continued)

2012					
	Cases of consultation	Cases of consultation/ number of persons in employment (%)	Mediation/ consultation (%)	Advice and guidance/ consultation (%)	Ratio of dismissal- related issues in consultation (%)
Japan	254,719	0.41	2.37	4.07	38.50
<i>Prefectures in top 10 from 2011 to 2013</i>					
Hyogo	23,991	0.93	1.28	4.60	37.58
Kyoto	6,955	0.55	1.85	1.93	34.88
Osaka	22,687	0.55	2.01	3.20	46.00
Kagoshima	4,296	0.54	1.54	2.40	39.71
Fukui	2,286	0.56	2.14	6.52	40.80
Akita	3,114	0.63	1.83	2.31	40.80
Yamagata	3,226	0.55	2.98	5.11	36.00
<i>Prefectures in least 10 from 2011 to 2013</i>					
Chiba	5,037	0.16	3.04	8.79	34.70
Niigata	3,252	0.28	2.03	4.70	32.40
Shizuoka	5,484	0.28	2.43	7.75	40.10
Tochigi	3,062	0.30	4.34	4.80	36.70
Hokkaido	7,441	0.29	2.62	3.20	38.20
Wakayama	1,392	0.31	3.30	10.42	34.80

Table 13.4 (continued)

2013					
	Cases of consultation	Cases of consultation/ number of persons in employment (%)	Mediation/ consultation (%)	Advice and guidance/ consultation (%)	Ratio of dismissal- related issues in consultation (%)
Japan	245,783	0.39	2.33	4.08	38.80
<i>Prefectures in top 10 from 2011 to 2013</i>					
Hyogo	18,056	0.69	1.61	6.23	42.71
Kyoto	6,554	0.52	1.43	2.72	35.34
Osaka	21,364	0.51	1.99	3.45	44.44
Kagoshima	4,114	0.54	1.68	1.65	42.75
Fukui	2,295	0.56	2.40	6.97	42.30
Akita	2,853	0.57	1.96	2.63	40.89
Yamagata	3,034	0.52	2.64	5.44	35.00
<i>Prefectures in least 10 from 2011 to 2013</i>					
Chiba	6,975	0.22	1.72	5.88	33.00
Niigata	3,466	0.30	1.33	5.08	34.60
Shizuoka	5,223	0.27	1.55	8.25	45.20
Tochigi	2,758	0.27	4.97	3.92	32.40
Hokkaido	7,018	0.28	3.51	3.51	37.50
Wakayama	1,240	0.27	1.69	6.29	40.50

Source: The Prefectural Labor Bureaus (see Appendix).

When we look at the occurrence ratios for mediation or for advice and guidance, there is no clear-cut relationship. Even in the prefectures with consistently low ratios, there are some that have ratios that are relatively high for mediation, or for advice and guidance, compared to mere consultations. This may indicate that the number of consultations bears no relationship with the number of serious cases which necessitate actions beyond mere consultation.

Further investigation is required to ensure that the circumstances of applicants can be improved, and whether the provision of counseling experts can be related to these incidents. Workers are supposed to not only benefit from the availability of proper internal consultation systems, but also have suitable external options for achieving dispute resolution. For example, an independent union system that is external to companies may benefit workers. Better use of advisors from nonprofit organizations and adequate staffing of experts at ILRD consultation counters may also improve matters. There may also be regional features in the workplace culture for a tendency to refuse to give up a claim when the consultations do not bring about a desirable outcome.

Summary and Concluding Remarks

The above analysis of ILRD arrangements in Japan may be summarized as follows.

Firstly, in contemporary Japan, ILRD resolution arrangements have facilitated a rapid increase in the numbers of consultations, guidance and advice, and mediation relating to workplace grievances. Although established under national legislation, ILRDs have had a great impact on processes at the micro level. In this context, the institution has been of great help to workers with workplace grievances who have difficulty resolving those grievances.

Secondly, the resulting dispute resolution outcomes still need further discussion and research. A question that arises in the current circumstances is: Why is there such a discrepancy between consultations and efforts to resolve disputes by taking matters further? One possible answer is that, in Japan, the elementary rules governing basic labor conditions might still be subject to widespread infringements in many workplaces. Some scholars suggest that traditional labor relations practices suffice for the prevention of such problems, although the present conditions may indicate that the current approach is inadequate for the empowerment of workers. It has become clear that the process which guides workers with conflicts needs to provide them with independent, outside experts. We need to understand why so many applicants stop at the consultation phase, and need find a positive and constructive way of encouraging workers with unresolved grievances to proceed to further resolution options both within and outside of the workplace.

In terms of the personal circumstances of workers, we have examined the effects of employment status and the local working conditions within which workers are embedded. It is clear that some prefectures have either a consistently higher or lower incidence of consultations. This was examined closely in relation to several possible contributing factors. However, at this time, we cannot identify any one element to explain why some prefectures have a consistently higher or lower

proportion of consultations, rather than other remedial options provided for by the ILRD resolution framework. We can therefore infer that there may be local traditional factors that affect worker attitudes and the behavior of workers when they have to deal with labor problems in the workplace.

Finally, when compared to regular employees, dispatched workers seem to be neglected within the ILRD resolution process and continue to go further up the resolution process. Since they are not directly hired by the business operators at a specific workplace, it may be that dispatched workers are more willing to present their difficulties to outside advisors. On the one hand, it seems that the ILRD resolution institutions are offering them the opportunity to make claims about their issues and to demand compensation, but on the other, the conditions in which dispatched workers find themselves at work seem to be getting worse. Attempts have been made to remove the limitations of dispatched workers' contracts, and so it will be more difficult for a dispatched worker to change status to become a regular employee.

An examination of the strengths and weaknesses of the ILRD resolution arrangements prompts the conclusion that the traditional tripartite system for forming legislation to regulate the labor system may need to be reconsidered so that an improved and impartial process for the protection of workers' rights is enshrined in law.

However, in actuality, the tripartite system has become more complex than ever before. As some scholars (e.g., Inagami et al., 2004) have pointed out, one of the major reasons why the system has functioned properly is a nation-wide pursuit of common interests and goals. Common concerns are hardly evident in contemporary circumstances, as entrepreneurs pursue different interests and opinions. Although there may be greater commonality of interest for labor, the tripartite process is now characterized by divergent perspectives on the development of the nation and the globalization process. In other words, in the face of globalization pressures, their differences have become even greater. This problem of divergent orientations has not yet been resolved, as different interests fail to find common goals—partly due to the globalization of the economy.

Notes

1. For the name and URL of each prefecture, see the appendix.
2. The Labor Relations Commissions are tripartite bodies with members representing labor, employer, and public interests. The Prefectural Labor Relations Commissions are established in each prefecture in order to make the first examination of unfair labor practices and deal with labor disputes within their geographical area (<http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/org/policy/central-labour.html>).
3. For detailed information regarding this law, refer to <http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail?id=118&vm=04&re=01&new=1>
4. In 2008, the estimated unionization rate of part-timers was 5 percent, which increased to 6.5 percent in 2013 (The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2015a).
5. The prefectural number of persons in employment for each year can be obtained from the Ministry of Information and Internal Affairs (<http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/OtherListE.do?bid=000000110002&cycode=7>).

References

- Bureau of Industrial and Labor Affairs, Tokyo Metropolitan Government. *Rodosodan oyobi assen no gaiyo (The Outline of Labor Consultation and Mediation)*. Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 2014.
- Central Labour Relations Commission. *Kaku kikan ni okeru kobetsu roushifunsou syoriseido no unyou jokyo (The Operations of Individual Labour Related Disputes in Related Organizations)*, Tokyo, 2014.
- Freeman, Richard B. & James L. Medoff. *What Do Unions Do?* New York: Basic Books, 1984.
- Hisamoto, Norio. "Kobetsu roushifunsou ni okeru rodokumiai no yakuwari (Trade Unions' Role in Complaints and Individual Labor Disputes)." *Nohon rodo kenkyu zasshi (The Japanese Journal of Labour Studies)*, 53, no. 8 (2011): 16–28.
- Inagami, Takeshi et al. *Neo koporathizumuno kokusai hikaku (The International Comparison of the Neo Corporatism)*. The Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training, Tokyo, 2004.
- The Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training (JILPT). *Chusho kigyo ni okeru roshi komyunikeshon to rodojoken kettei (Labor-Management Communications and Decision of the Working Conditions)*. The Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training, Tokyo, 2007.
- . *Kigyogai ni okeru kobetsu roshi funso no yobo/kaiketu sisutemu no unyo no jittai no tokucho (A Research on the Features and Conditions of the Applicants for Prevention and Resolution System on the Individual Labor Related Disputes Outside the Corporations)*. The Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training, Tokyo, 2008.
- . *Kigyogai ni okeru kobetsu roshi funso no yobo/kaiketu sisutemu riyosha no jittai chosa (A Research on the Activities of the Applicants for Prevention and Resolution System on the Individual Labor Related Disputes Outside the Corporations)*. The Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training, Tokyo, 2009.
- . *Kobetu rodokankei funso shori jian no naiyo bunseki: Koyo shuryo, ijime harasument, rodojoken no hikiageyobi sansha kan romu teikyo kankei (Content Analysis on the Cases of Individual Labor Related Disputes; the Terminations of Employment, Bullying and Harassment, Deterioration of Working Condition and Labor Provision to the Third Parties)*. The Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training, Tokyo, 2010.
- Kashimura, Shiro. "Rodo funso to houteki taishokodo: Nihon ni okeru kobetu rodo funso wo shoten to shite (Labor Disputes and Legal Advice Seeking: The Case of 'Individual' Labor Disputes in Contemporary Japan)." *Nohon rodo kenkyu zasshi (The Japanese Journal of Labour Studies)*, 50, no. 12 (2008): 13–25.
- Kume, Ikuo. *Nihongata roushikankei no seiko (Labor Politics in Postwar Japan)*. Yuhi-kaku, Tokyo, 1998.
- The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. *Basic Survey on Labour Unions 2013*. 2015.
- . *Heisei 25nendo kobeturodofunsokaiketuseido (A Report on the Institutional Condition of Individual Labour Related Disputes 2013)*, Tokyo, 2014.
- The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. *Labour Force Survey*. (2011, 2013, 2015)
- Murata, Takayuki. "Ehimme ken ni okeru kobetsu roshi funso shori no genjo (Individual Labor Disputes Resolution System in Ehime Prefecture)." *Matsuyama daigaku ronshu (Matsuyama University Review)*, 18, no. 4 (2006): 201–232.
- Nakakubo, Yuya. "Roushifunsou no genjyo to seisakukadai: Houritsugaku no tachiba kara (Current Conditions and Policy Issues of Labor and Employment Disputes in Japan: From a Legal Perspective)." *Nohon rodo kenkyu zasshi (The Japanese Journal of Labour Studies)*, 55, no. 631 (2013): 19–26.

- Nihon Keizai Shinbun*. “Kobetu roushi funso de shinpo yokyu (A Request for the New Law on the Individual Labor Related Disputes).” *Nihon Keizai Shinbun*, November 29, 1999.
- . “Kotorii no taiseikyoka- kiseikaikaku suishin sankanen keikaku no yoshi (Strengthening the Fair Trade Commission: Summary of 3 Years Plan for Deregulation).” *Nihon Keizai Shinbun*, March 28, 2003.
- Nose, Masaharu. “Wagakuni no kobetsu rodo funso chousei sisutemu no kadai—Igirisu tonon hikaku wo chuusinanni (The Issue of Individual Labour Dispute Resolution Systems in Japan: Comparisons with the UK).” *Nohon rodo kenkyu zasshi (The Japanese Journal of Labour Studies)*, 53, no. 8 (2011): 49–63.
- Sato, Hiroki. “Misoshiki kigyo ni okeru rosikankei (Industrial Relations in Non-Union Enterprises).” *Nohon rodo kenkyu zasshi (The Japanese Journal of Labour Studies)*, 36, no. 10 (1994): 24–35.
- Takahashi, Koji. “*Kobetsu roushifunsou e no taiou* (Response to the Individual Labor Related Disputes).” *Yoku wakaruru sangyousyakaigaku (Introduction to the Industrial Sociology)*. Mineruva shobo, Kyoto, 2012.
- The Twenty First Century Public Policy Institute. *Kobetu roudofunsou kaiketsu seido no tayoka to kongo no kadai (Diversification of Individual Labor Related Dispute and Future Challenge)*, Tokyo, 2006, <http://www.21ppi.org/pdf/thesis/060417.pdf>

The Youth Labor Market in Japan

Nobuaki Fujioka

Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the changes in Japan's youth labor market since the early 1990s and examines some major problems faced by young people. The first section looks at basic labor market indicators, such as unemployment rates and nonregular employment rates, to illustrate the essential features of recent changes. The second section analyzes the problems caused by the changes, with a focus on the inequality among young people, and the third section examines the deterioration of the working environment of young people. The chapter concludes with a consideration of some relevant changes that have occurred among young people.

Recent Changes in Japan's Youth Labor Market

Japan is an aging society with a very low birthrate, and therefore the young component of the labor force has been decreasing in recent years. Figure 14.1 shows changes in the number and share of young people under the age of 35 in the labor market from 1990 to 2014. It indicates that after a slight increase during the 1990s, both the number and share declined markedly since the early 2000s. The number dropped to about 17 million in 2014, while it was nearly 23 million in 2001. Although more than one-third (33.7%) of the labor force consisted of young people under 35 years of age in 2001, its share was only 26.3 percent in 2014. Because the number of births has been constantly decreasing, young persons' share of the labor force will continue to decline.

Some people may think that the decline of young persons in the labor force may have increased their status in the labor market, due to their greater scarcity and high demand, but this is not the case. A prolonged economic downturn after the collapse of the asset-inflated economy (the so-called bubble economy) and a severe economic slump after the global financial crisis seem to have worked

heavily against young people. Changes in youth unemployment rates since the 1990s demonstrate this (Figure 14.2). Unemployment rates started to rise in the mid-1990s, just after the bubble economy burst, and continued to rise until the early 2000s. The unemployment rate of youth aged 15–24 exceeded 10 percent in 2003, which is more than twice as high as that of the early 1990s (4.3% in 1990). While the rates clearly decreased in the latter half of the 2000s, they surged after




Figure 14.1 Young People under the Age of 35 in the Labor Market, 1990–2014
 Source: “Labor Force Survey,” Ministry of Internal affairs and Communications




Figure 14.2 Unemployment Rates by Age Group, 1990–2014
 Source: “Labor Force Survey,” Ministry of Internal affairs and Communications

the outbreak of the financial crisis. The unemployment rate of young people aged 25–34 reached 6.4 percent in 2009, which is the peak for this age group in the past 20 years and also more than twice as high as that of the early 1990s (2.3% in 1991). Unemployment rates have been improving as Japan’s economy has recovered from the recession, but the rates in 2014 (6.3% for youth aged 15–24 and 4.6% for youth aged 25–34) are still much higher than those of the early 1990s. Another thing to remember is that youth unemployment rates have been consistently higher than the rate for all workers throughout this period.

As youth unemployment rates went up and remained at a high level since the mid-1990s, a new term “NEET(s)” has been introduced and used widely in Japan since the early 2000s. This term was coined in the United Kingdom to describe young people not in education, employment, or training (Miyamoto, 2005). In Japan, this term usually means unmarried young people aged 15–34, not in education, not in the labor force, and not engaged in housework.¹ NEETs are economically inactive and seem to form the most discouraged group among young people. Therefore, youth experts and policy makers see this group as one of the most important targets for public support. NEETs as a share of all 15- to 34-year-olds has been rising since the late 1990s, though the increase has been moderate (Figure 14.3). The number of NEETs surged and exceeded 0.6 million in 2002, and has remained at a high level since then. In response, the Japanese government and nonprofit organizations (NPOs) have started to provide support programs for them since the mid-2000s (JILPT, 2007).




Figure 14.3 Changes in the Number and Ratio of “NEETs,” 1995–2013

Notes:

1. Number of NEETs is the number of unemployed young people aged 15 to 34, who are economically inactive and do not perform housework or attend classes.
2. Ratio of NEETs is the share of NEETs among total population of young people aged 15 to 34.

Source: “White Paper on Youth 2008 (Japanese Version),” Figure 1–2–12 for 1995 to 2007. After 2008, “White Paper on Children and Young People 2014 (Japanese Version),” Figure 1–4–13.

Original Data: “Labor Force Survey,” Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.

In addition to the increase in unemployed youth and NEETs, the growth of nonregular workers among young people has been one of the most important features of the changes in Japan's youth labor market since the 1990s. As Figure 14.4 shows, the nonregular employment rate of young people aged 15–34 has been rising throughout this period (although the level is lower than that of people aged 55 and over).² While the rate in 1992 (16.5%) was lower than that of adults aged 35–54 (21.9%), this relationship reversed in 2002, with the rate for youth aged 15–34 remaining higher.

In order to grasp the volume of young nonregular workers, a relatively new term “freeter(s)” has been widely used in Japan since the late 1990s. This term is an abbreviation of “free arubaita” (free arbeit³ employees) and generally means young nonregular employees. Cabinet Office (2014) defines it as individuals aged 15–34 who are neither students nor housewives and correspond to one of the following: (1) those employed as part-time employees or arbeit; (2) those unemployed and searching for a part-time or arbeit job; and (3) those who are neither in the labor market nor housekeepers and are willing to accept part-time or arbeit work. As Figure 14.5 shows, the number of freeters has jumped during the 1990s and doubled from 1.01 million to 2.08 million in only ten years. The number decreased in the mid-2000s, but has risen moderately again after the global financial crisis. It has remained at a high level in recent years.

Another noticeable thing about freeters is the number of those aged 25–34. As shown in Figure 14.5, the number was much smaller than for those aged 15–24 in the 1990s. However, since the early 2000s, the number of freeters aged 25–34 moved toward the number of freeters aged 15–24 and finally exceeded it in 2007. In addition, the number of freeters aged 25–34 began to increase again in 2009 and reached 1 million in 2012, while the number of freeters aged 15–24 has been basically decreasing since the early 2000s. These data indicate that




Figure 14.4 Nonregular Employment Rates by Age Group, 1992–2012

Source: “Employment Status Survey,” Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications




Figure 14.5 Changes in the Number of “Freeters,” 1992–2013

Notes:

1. Data was compiled according to the following definition: between 1992 and 1997, freeters were defined as aged 15 to 34 [1] and were those called “part-timers” at their offices. In case of males, the employment period was for more than one year and less than five years, and in case of females, they were single and they spent more time working than doing anything else. [2] Then unemployed people were defined as those who did not perform housework or attend classes, looking for part-time jobs.
2. From 2002: “males who graduated from school” or “females who graduated from school and never married” in 15 to 34 age group, excluding housewives and students, and meet the following: (1) “Part-time worker and Arbeit (temporary workers)” among employees (2) unemployed persons who are searching for “part-time jobs” (3) economically inactive persons who wish to obtain “part-time jobs” and at the same time not involved in housework nor attending school.
3. As mentioned above, attention needs to be paid to the time series comparison.

Source: “White Paper on Youth 2008 (Japanese Version),” Figure 1–2–11 for 1992 to 1997. After 2002, “White Paper on Children and Young People 2014 (Japanese Version),” Figure 1–4–15.

Original Data: “Employment Status Survey” for 1992 to 1997. After 2002, “Labor Force Survey (Detailed Tabulation).” Both Surveys are conducted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.

freeters have been “aging” since the early 2000s, which may imply that older freeters do not or cannot leave nonregular employment. This issue is addressed in the next section.

Inequality among Young People

This section examines some of the major problems faced by young people in terms of inequalities among them. The analysis focuses on differences in regular and nonregular employment, unfairness related to graduation year, and gender gaps.⁴

The issue of inequalities related to regular and nonregular employment has gained considerable attention in recent years. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2011) points out that the labor market dualism—which is a rigid separation in the labor market between regular and nonregular employment—is one of the major problems facing Japan, which has constrained economic growth and equity. The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) set up a council on nonregular employment (*Hiseikikoyo no*

Vijonni kansuru Kondankai) in 2011, and held review meetings focusing on the development of the vocational capability of nonregular employees (*Hiseikikoyo Rodosha no Noryokukaihatsu Bapponkyoka ni kansuru Kentokai*) in 2012. In these discussions, some important inequalities were highlighted. First, the wage differences are remarkable. Figure 14.6 shows age-earnings profiles by employment status as of June 2014. Although the wage gap between regular and nonregular employment is quite small among young people aged 15–19, it becomes greater with age. The average hourly wage of nonregular employees aged 30–34 (1,240 yen) is around three-quarters (74%) of the regular employees’ hourly wage for the same age group (1,666 yen). The gap becomes even larger if a nonregular employee continues to remain in a nonregular status. Opportunity for vocational training is another area in which a large gap has been found. As Table 14.1 indicates, non-regular employees enjoy much fewer opportunities for training than do regular employees. While more than 60 percent of all workplaces implement systematic on-the-job training (OJT) and 70 percent implement off-the-job training (Off-JT) for regular employees, only around 30 percent of all workplaces implement such training for nonregular employees. This seems to cause significant differences in vocational capability between regular and nonregular employees and helps widen wage gaps between them.

In addition to wage and training opportunities, huge differences are found in the coverage of social insurance and in fringe benefits (Table 14.2). The coverage of employment, health, and employees’ insurance is nearly 100 percent among regular employees, but is only 65 percent, 53 percent, and 51 percent, respectively,




Figure 14.6 Age-Earnings Profiles by Employment Status (Hourly Wage as of June 2014)
 Note: Data on this graph were compiled from the monthly wages and working hours of regular and nonregular employees as of June 2014.

Source: “Hiseikikoyo no Genjo to Kadai [Current Situation and Problems of Non-regular Employment],” Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (<http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/seisakunitsuite/bunya/0000046231.html>)
 Original Data: “Basic Survey on Wage Structure,” Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare

Table 14.1 Ratio of Workplace with Implementation of Training for Employee by Employment Status, 2014 (%)

	Systematic OJT	Off-JT
Regular employees	62.2	72.4
Nonregular employees	31.1	34.0

Source: “Basic Survey of Human Resources Development (2014),” Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.

Table 14.2 Coverage of Social Insurance and Benefits by Employment Status, 2010 (%)

	Employment insurance	Health insurance	Employees’ pension	Bonus	Retirement allowance
Regular employees	99.5	99.5	99.5	83.2	78.2
Nonregular employees	65.2	52.8	51.0	32.4	10.6

Source: “Hiseikikoyo no Genjo to Kadai [Current Situation and Problems of Nonregular Employment],” Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (<http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/seisakunitsuite/bunya/0000046231.html>).

Original Data: “General Survey on Diversified Types of Employment (2010),” Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.

Table 14.3 Share of Involuntary Nonregular Employees by Gender and Age Group, 2010 (%)

	Age group (years)		
	20–24	25–29	30–34
Men	22.3	41.5	38.8
Women	19.2	30.2	28.6

Source: “General Survey on Diversified Types of Employment (2010),” Appendix, Table 8, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.

among nonregular employees. The likelihood of nonregular employees receiving bonuses and retirement allowance is markedly lower than for regular employees.

If all (or most) nonregular employees understand the different outcomes involved between regular and nonregular employment and wish to work on a nonregular basis, it may be considered that there is no problem, because they are exercising their own choice. However, this is not the case in Japan’s youth labor market. In reality, there are huge numbers of involuntary nonregular employees among Japanese youth. Table 14.3 shows the share of nonregular employees who reluctantly work on a nonregular basis because of insufficient regular employment opportunities while job seeking. While the shares are relatively low among men and women aged 20–24, they are remarkably high among men and women who are 25–29 years and 30–34 years. In particular, the share among men aged 25–29 is as high as 42 percent, which means that the number of involuntary nonregular

employees is very close to the number of those who want to work on a nonregular basis. But why are there so many involuntary nonregular employees among young people in Japan? One of the reasons for this is the traditional practice of Japanese companies in the recruitment of young employees.

It is widely known that Japanese companies have a strong preference for hiring new graduates with no career experience (excluding *arbeit* experience when they are students). While Japanese companies also hire mid-career workers, less priority is given to them. One of the major reasons for this, according to Hamaguchi (2013), is that they have established a distinct human resource management approach, called “membership” type, in which companies prioritize the securing and training of flexible, high-quality human resources.⁵ In this system, it is very important to hire new graduates because they are quite flexible and able to be deployed in any department, such as sales, administration, human resources, and public relations. Thus, companies have to compete for new graduates if they want to secure flexible and high-quality workers.

As a consequence of this system, young people face the prospect of missing out on recruitment to regular employment in their graduation year. Thereafter, such graduates are at a disadvantage. Since no one can become a new graduate again after he/she enters into the labor market, young people’s opportunities for employment become highly dependent on the labor market situation in their graduation year. If a student graduates from high school or university in a year when there are plenty of job openings, he/she can enjoy adequate job opportunities. By contrast, a student who graduates during a severe economic downturn will have poor job opportunities, not only at the point of graduation, but also after entry into the labor market. Even if job openings improve later, he/she cannot apply for them as he/she is no longer a new graduate. In this system, the difference of a year can change young people’s lives dramatically, for better or for worse.

Due to the negative effects of this system, young people who graduate during a severe economic downturn tend to face the problem of long-term exclusion from good job opportunities. This seems to be a major reason for the high ratio of involuntary nonregular employees (as shown in Table 14.3) and the “aging” of freeters (as shown in Figure 14.5). The following example corroborates this interpretation.

As Figure 14.7 shows, there have been sharp fluctuations in the job opening-to-application ratio for new graduates since the 1990s. Employment opportunities for young people who graduated in the early 2000s (the so-called employment ice age generation), for example, were far less than the opportunities for those who graduated in the early 1990s (the so-called bubble generation) and 2006–2009 graduates. Although the job opening-to-application ratio recovered from 2006 to 2009, it is difficult to believe that the employment ice age generation acquired, during this recovery phase, the same opportunities as did the 2006–2009 graduates or the bubble generation. This is partly because they entered the labor market at an unfortunate time, and partly because there is no reason for companies to consider them within the “membership” type system. As a result, a certain number of the employment ice age generation seems to have become involuntary nonregular employees or freeters and has been excluded from any chance to shed this status.




Figure 14.7 Job Opening-to-Application Ratio for New Graduates, 1990–2014

Source: “College Graduates Job Opening Survey,” Recruit Works Institute for university graduates. “Survey on Employment Referrals for New Graduates,” Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare for high school graduates.

Finally, gender differences are examined in terms of nonregular employment rates and wage levels. Figure 14.8 shows nonregular employment rates for those less than 35 years by gender, from 1992 to 2012. The figure shows that nonregular employment rates for both men and women have increased considerably over the past two decades. It also demonstrates that there has been a huge gap between men and women, which increased during this period. In 1992, the nonregular employment rate for women (25%) was about 14 percentage points higher than that for men (11%). In 2012, on the other hand, the nonregular employment rate for women (47%) was about 22 percentage points higher than that for men (25%). The gender gap increased by 8 percentage points during this period. Of course, the higher rate of nonregular employment for women can be explained to some extent by women’s employment preferences, given that the share of involuntary nonregular employees for women is lower than that for men (Table 14.3). Nevertheless, it is important to lower women’s nonregular employment rate because there are many involuntary female nonregular employees (even though the share is lower than for men). In addition, we may need to encourage female nonregular workers who voluntarily choose that status to obtain regular employment to the extent that is possible. This is because a significant number of women, especially those with high educational attainment, might waste their capability and potential by choosing nonregular employment. It is also because it is desirable, in terms of gender equality, that more women achieve financial independence by getting regular employment.

In addition to nonregular employment rates, there has been gender inequality in the level of regular employees' income. Figure 14.9 clearly demonstrates this. This figure shows the share of low-paid regular employees aged 25–29 (out of all regular employees aged 25–29) by gender from 1992 to 2012. A low-paid regular employee here means a regular employee whose annual income is less than 2 million yen. As shown in the figure, the share for women has been




Figure 14.8 Nonregular Employment Rates for Workers under the Age of 35 by Gender, 1992–2012
 Source: “Employment Status Survey,” Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications




Figure 14.9 Share of Low-Paid Regular Employees Aged 25–29 by Gender, 1992–2012
 Note: 1. A low-paid regular employee here means a regular employee whose annual income is less than 2 million yen. 2. Each graph shows the percentages of low-paid regular employees aged 25–29 out of all regular employees aged 25–29 by gender.
 Source: “Employment Status Survey,” Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications

consistently higher than that for men. In 2012, for example, 15 percent of female regular employees aged 25–29 earned less than 2 million yen annually, while only 7 percent of their male counterparts did so. This means that the low-paid share for women was twice as high as that for men in 2012. Even though the gender gap became much narrower compared to the difference in 1992, the gap is still too large.

Incidentally, most regular employees whose annual income is less than 2 million yen can be seen as the “working poor,” as argued by Komamura (2008). Although the definition of the working poor is not necessarily clear, the core elements are working full-time or standard working hours with annual/monthly income below the poverty line or the public assistance standard. Regular employees usually work full-time or standard working hours, and an annual income of 2 million yen is almost equal to the public assistance standard on an individual basis (around 1.9 million yen).⁶ Therefore, Figure 14.9 shows the changes in the share of the working poor among young regular employees. If we see the information in Figure 14.9 in this way, it shows that in 2012 the share of the working poor among male and female regular employees aged 25–29 was 7 percent and 16 percent, respectively. Moreover, it shows that the share of the working poor among all regular employees aged 25–29 has been increasing since the late 1990s, from 7.6 percent in 1997 to 9.8 percent in 2012.⁷ Needless to say, it is important to focus on the gender gap in this figure. However, it is also important to understand from Figure 14.9 that the working conditions of young regular employees as a whole have been deteriorating since the late 1990s. Therefore, it is important to examine the changes in the working environment of young people, particularly regular employees. This is the focus of the next section.

Deterioration of the Working Environment of Young People

Figures 14.8 and 14.9 demonstrate that there still remain large gaps in working conditions between young men and women. At the same time, they also indicate that the employment situations of young people as a whole have become more precarious and their working conditions have worsened over the past two decades. Taking this trend into account, this section examines the deterioration of the working environment of young people. In particular, the “black company” (*burakku kigyō*) issue is analyzed in detail.

As a consequence of the deterioration of the working environment for young people, or as a major reason for this, “black companies” have gained considerable attention in recent years. In fact, the term *burakku kigyō* was awarded recognition as one of ten major buzzwords in the annual buzzwords-of-the-year contest in 2013 (Konno, 2015). The Japanese government also responded to the debate about black companies and started to take action against them in 2013 (as discussed later). Researchers and think tanks have also conducted surveys on black companies, some of which are quoted later in this section.

What, then, is a black company? Some may think that a black company is a company owned by the mafia or a criminal organization, but that’s not correct.

According to Haruki Konno, an expert on this issue, a black company is “a company which forces young people into work under illegal labor conditions” (2012: 11) and/or “a company which abuses and discard[s] young workers in an evil way” (2015: 3). In order to tackle the problems that black companies have caused, Konno set up an NPO named POSSE in 2006. POSSE specializes in labor issues, and its activities include providing practical and legal advice on labor issues to young workers, conducting research on young people’s work, proposing relevant policies, publication of a journal on labor issues, and providing lectures on labor law and workers’ rights.⁸ POSSE has already provided advice to more than 5,000 young people as of March 2015 and has been giving detailed information on black companies to the public, based on the experiences of these people (Konno, 2015). Table 14.4 is a summary of the “human resource management” practices of typical black companies that POSSE has encountered so far.

As shown in the table, there are three stages and several methods in the “human resource management” of typical black companies. First, they recruit a large number of employees by presenting false information on working conditions and/or pretending to sign regular employment contracts, while in reality signing non-regular employment contracts. Second, they screen employees during an endless trial period. Throughout the screening process, they harass their employees and force those who receive a low grade to leave the company in a selective way. Third, they abuse and discard the remaining employees systematically. They routinely force their employees to perform prolonged and unpaid overtime. Then, they promote some employees to managerial positions to force unpaid and prolonged overtime work even further. Even if their workplace becomes disordered due to the frequent harassment and extreme overtime work, they just leave it as it is.

Table 14.4 Human Resource Management of Black Companies

Stage	Method
1. Recruiting a large number of employees	a. Presenting false information on working conditions such as salary
	b. Pretending to sign regular employment contract while signing nonregular employment contract
2. Screening employees	c. Continuing an endless trial period
	d. Harassing employees and forcing many of them to leave the company in a strategic way
3. Abusing and discarding remaining employees	e. Forcing unpaid overtime
	f. Forcing extremely prolonged overtime work
	g. Promoting employees to managerial positions to force even more unpaid and prolonged overtime work
	h. Leaving a disordered workplace as it is
	i. Refusing to receive resignation letters of employees
	j. Forcing depressed employees to leave the company immediately

Source: Konno (2015: 20).

When a valuable employee tries to leave the company because he/she cannot endure such work conditions, they refuse to accept the resignation letter, so that they can continue to abuse him/her. However, once such an employee becomes ill and/or depressed and ceases to be of use, they force the employee to leave the company immediately.

Some may find it difficult to believe that such awful work arrangements are so prevalent in contemporary Japan. Unfortunately, however, this is the reality of the working environment of young people at this point. A survey conducted by a famous think tank RENGO-RIALS has corroborated the prevalence of black companies. In their survey on the work and life of working people conducted in June 2013, 24 percent of young workers aged 20–25 and 21 percent of young workers aged 25–29 answered that they were working for black companies (Figure 14.10). This implies that more than one-fifth of young workers in their 20s are employed by black companies in contemporary Japan. Needless to say, this result does not necessarily mean that more than one-fifth of all young workers are actually experiencing all the circumstances summarized in Table 14.4. Perhaps many of them have seen or experienced some of these conditions at their workplaces. At the same time, however, the result clearly demonstrates that it is not unusual for young people to work for a black company. Young people may think of black companies as a potential employer, even if they have not worked for a black company before.

In addition to RENGO-RIALS, the Japanese government has already acknowledged the prevalence of black companies. In September 2013, the MHLW conducted an intensive inspection of “businesses suspected of the exploitation of young workers” (*Wakamono no Tsukaisute ga Utagawareru Kigyo*). Before the inspection, the MHLW selected the businesses to be inspected based on information provided by labor standards inspection offices, workers themselves, and so




Figure 14.10 Ratio of Workers at “Black Companies” by Age Group, 2013

Note: This chart shows the percentages of respondents who answered “Yes” and “Moderately yes” to the following question. “Do you think that your workplace is categorized as a black company? ‘Black company’ is the term used to describe a company that exploits young employees with such characteristics as illegal overtime work, unpaid overtime, or extremely high staff turnover rates.”

Source: RENGO-RIALS (2013: 20), Figure II-10

Original Data: “The 26th Survey on the Work and Life of Working People: Oct 2013,” RENGO-RIALS

on. In December, the MHLW (2013) released a report on its inspections, which shows that 82 percent of all the 5,111 workplaces inspected were found to have some sort of labor violations. Illegal overtime and unpaid overtime were particularly prevalent, as 44 percent and 24 percent of all inspected workplaces, respectively, had engaged in these violations. Actual violation rates seem to be higher than these results, given that these inspections were conducted over a very short period of time. If the MHLW continues to inspect suspicious companies, more extensive evidence may be found.

As a response to this report, the MHLW increased its efforts to tackle the issue of black company behavior. For example, in 2014 it launched telephone consultation services for young workers, opened consultation desks for young workers at employment security offices, held seminars at universities, and set up a website to inform the public of labor laws, government services, and to provide anecdotal reports. Moreover, they proposed to amend the Working Youth Welfare Act (*Kinro Seishonen Fukushi Ho*) so that employment security offices can direct employers to disclose information on recruitment, training, and human resource management, and refuse to receive job referral forms (*kyujinhyo*) from businesses having violated labor laws repeatedly (Suezaki et al., 2015). Furthermore, the MHLW decided to disclose the name of companies having violated labor laws repeatedly, though very few (or almost no) companies will be disclosed, as the disclosure standards are very restrictive (Hirai and Suezaki, 2015). On the whole, the effectiveness of these measures seems to be very low, given that there is no strict penalty against black companies.

As stated above, the issue of black company behavior has been one of the most important areas of investigation related to youth labor and policy in recent years. This means that not only nonregular employment but also regular employment has become a labor market sector where young people are struggling against a deteriorating working environment. But why has this happened? In particular, why have so many young workers fallen victim to black companies? Can't they discern black companies from normal ones? According to Konno (2015), there are three reasons why so many young people have become the victims of black companies.

First, some young people can't help but work for black companies, even though they know the nature of the companies they work for. This phenomenon reflects the combined effect of the "membership" type system, gaps between regular and nonregular employment, and the existence of large numbers of involuntary nonregular workers. When the "membership" type system prevails widely, a new graduate who receives job offers only from black companies has only one of two options: (1) to work for a black company in order to become a regular employee, even if he/she doesn't really want to do this; or (2) to refuse to work for a black company and become a nonregular worker or unemployed person, even if there is only a small chance of becoming a regular employee later. As stated above, it is particularly difficult for young people to obtain regular employment once they enter into the labor market as nonregular employees or once they are unemployed. This is partly because the "membership" type system mainly hires new graduates on a regular basis, and partly because there is a significant number of involuntary nonregular employees who want to obtain regular employment. In other words, there is a long waiting list for a small number of regular staff positions in the youth

labor market. Moreover, there are huge gaps between regular and nonregular employment in terms of income level, opportunities for wage increases, and the coverage of social insurance and fringe benefits. Under such circumstances, a considerable number of people choose to work for black companies in order to avoid falling into the trap of nonregular employment.

Second, some young people simply can't discern black companies from normal ones. In fact, it is not easy for many new graduates to distinguish between black companies and normal companies. This is partly because they are less experienced and don't know much about the world of work, and partly because black companies disguise themselves as normal companies by presenting false information on working conditions. Furthermore, some traditional practices of Japanese companies make it difficult to distinguish between black companies and normal companies. For example, overtime work and unpaid overtime (*sabisuzangyo*) are found in most Japanese companies and young people can't use them as indicators of a black company. One of the most salient indicators of a normal (or good) company is the guarantee of long-term employment for regular employees, but this indicator has become less useful, because even large companies have dismissed their employees since the burst of the bubble economy. In this way, black companies and normal companies have converged in some respects recently. Typical black companies cunningly exploit such circumstances. They require their employees to work hard and show loyalty to the company, just as traditional Japanese companies do. However, they usually avoid providing benefits that traditional Japanese companies are supposed to offer, such as long-term employment, seniority-based wages, and labor-management negotiations. This sort of moral collapse makes it increasingly difficult to discern black companies.

Third, it is true that some young people are willing to join black companies, even though they know the problems with them. This happens mainly because some black companies are growing quickly and advertise their growth success widely. Thanks to effective advertising and promotion, a large number of young people seem to feel a strong attraction to such companies. Another reason for young people's choice to join such a company is confidence (or overconfidence) in themselves and underestimation of the risks of working for a black company. Some young people, especially those who have been successful in sports and/or school life, believe that they can be successful even at a black company.

Under the circumstances described above, a large number of young people have joined black companies and black companies have rapidly prospered. This is one of the reasons for the growth of these companies and the deterioration of the working environment of young people. However, this is only a part of the whole picture. With the above factors in mind, the discussion concludes with a consideration of some relevant responses of young people to their changing circumstances.

Conclusion: Labor Movements and Global Migration

Thus far, this chapter has provided an overview of the changes in Japan's youth labor market since the early 1990s and examined some major problems currently faced by young people. It has shown that the employment conditions of young

people have become increasingly precarious and that their working environments have deteriorated in relation to the increase in nonregular employment, the rigid inequalities existing between young people who are employed on a regular and nonregular basis, and the growth of black companies under unstable economic circumstances. In response to such difficulties, some young people seem to have developed ways to attempt to deal with their situation. The development of labor movements and global migration are examples of such efforts.

Since the 2000s, there has been growing involvement in labor movements among young nonelite workers in Japan (Endo, 2012; Kinoshita, 2012). One of the well-known examples is the Metropolitan Youth Union (MYU). The MYU is a general union for (mainly) young nonregular/nonelite workers in the Tokyo metropolitan area. It was established in 2000 by a small number of young nonregular workers. Any worker can join it, regardless of company, industry, occupation, and employment status. The MYU has advocated for the worker rights and decent working conditions for young workers, and has solved more than 100 labor disputes so far. One of the most remarkable cases was the requirement of overtime payment agreed against a hair salon chain in 2007. The MYU engaged in collective bargaining with the management of the chain and won 48 million yen for overtime to be paid to 338 employees (Kawazoe, 2015). Although the MYU is a small union with only around 350 members as of October 2013 (Kawazoe, 2013), their accomplishments should receive more attention and recognition. Another well-known example is POSSE, an NPO specializing in labor issues. As discussed earlier, they have helped young people to fight against and/or escape from black companies. Without their dedicated efforts, the issue of black companies wouldn't have gained as much attention as it now does. Needless to say, young people joining the MYU, POSSE, and other organizations are much fewer than those who have nothing to do with such labor organizations and movements. However, more attention and recognition should be given to such organizations, for they seem to be among the few agencies that really devote themselves to the improvement of young people's working environments.

Finally, the global migration of young Japanese people has been another response of some Japanese young people to changes in Japan's youth labor market. Since the early 1990s, it has been observed that a large number of nonelite young people go abroad partly or mainly due to the decline in the quality and quantity of jobs in Japan.⁹ For example, researchers point to young workers hired at the foreign branches of Japanese companies (Machimura, 2003; Sakai, 2003; Thang et al., 2002) and young temporary residents working at various types of Japanese-oriented businesses (restaurants, supermarkets, travel agencies, real-estate agencies, etc.) on tourist, student, business, and working holiday visas (Ben-Ari, 2003; Fujioka, 2014; Fujita, 2008; Glebe, 2003; Kato, 2009; Kawashima, 2010; Machimura, 2003; White, 2003). Previous research stresses that the most important factor behind such migratory movements is the foreign direct investment of Japanese companies (Glebe et al., 1999). In the course of massive investments, Japanese companies have established their branches and offices in many countries and sent their employees there. In addition, these branches and offices employ locally hired Japanese staff to support their expatriates. In response to this migratory

movement of corporate expatriates and locally hired employees, various businesses have flourished to provide goods and services for these migrants and their family members. As a result, a huge number of jobs for nonelite (young) Japanese have been created in the Japanese-oriented businesses around the world. In this way, the Japanese foreign investment has become a “pull” factor and has been the most important reason for the global migration of young people since the 1990s. At the same time, however, many of the studies cited above point out that a high ratio of nonelite young migrants have decided to leave Japan for a better life because of the poor youth labor market conditions in Japan. In other words, the youth labor market has become a “push” factor and a significant reason for their emigration. This implies that the global migration of nonelite Japanese youth should be seen as one of the means deployed to avoid the deterioration of their working environment in Japan.

Notes

1. The definition of NEET in Japan is different from that in the United Kingdom. The major difference is that the Japanese version does not include unemployed people (jobless people who are looking for jobs) while the UK version does (Miyamoto, 2005). As a result, Japanese NEETs are often regarded as young people who have no will to work or, in extreme cases, those who are too lazy to work. This sort of negative image has caused harsh criticism against NEETs instead of providing the momentum for their public support (Honda et al., 2006).
2. The nonregular employment rate of older people aged 55 and above is very high, as there are many people who “retire” (quit their regular jobs) only to restart work on a part-time basis to complement their retirement income.
3. The word “arbeit” is a German term for “work” or “job,” but it is used to mean “temporary/casual job” in Japan.
4. Gaps based on education is another important issue, though it is beyond the scope of this chapter. Difficulties faced by high school graduates are analyzed by Hara (2005) and Hori (2009).
5. Hamaguchi (2013) contrasts the “membership” type system with the “job” type system. In the latter system, companies prioritize the clarification and arrangement of jobs and try to secure workers who fit these jobs.
6. Komamura (2008) gives a detailed explanation on the poverty line and the public assistance standard of Japan.
7. According to the Survey on the Salary of Private-sector Businesses conducted by the National Tax Agency, the income level of young people had risen significantly during the period of the bubble economy (from the late 1980s to the early 1990s) and continued to rise even after the bubble burst, until the mid-1990s. After that time, since the late 1990s, it started to decline. In other words, there was a gap of some years between the end of the bubble economy and the beginning of the drop in the income level of young people. That’s why the share of low-paid regular employees decreased from 1992 to 1997, as shown in Figure 14.9.
8. Information on POSSE was gathered at the organization’s website (<http://www.npoposse.jp>).
9. According to “Population Estimates” released by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 237,000 young people aged 20–34 departed (from Japan as

temporary residents between October 2013 and October 2014). A temporary resident is a person who stays in a foreign country for three months and longer. It is impossible to calculate the ratio of nonelite migrants, but it seems quite high, given that in recent years many Japanese companies have set up their offices in Southeast Asia and created plenty of jobs there (Noji, 2014).

References

- Ben-Ari, E., 2003, "The Japanese in Singapore: The Dynamics of an Expatriate Community," in Goodman, R., Peach, C., Takenaka, A., and White, P. (eds.), *Global Japan: The Experience of Japan's New Immigrants and Overseas Communities*, London: Routledge Curzon, pp. 116–130.
- Cabinet Office, 2008, *Heisei20nenban Seishonen Hakusho* [White Paper on Youth 2008], Oita: Saiki Printing.
- , 2014, *Heisei26nenban Kodomo Wakamono Hakusho* [White Paper on Children and Young People 2014]., Tokyo: Nikkei Printing.
- Endo, K., 2012, *Kojin Kamei Yunion to Rodo NPO* [Trade Unions Giving Admission to Individuals and Labor NPOs], Tokyo: Minerva Shobo.
- Fujioka, N., 2014, *Nihon no Wakamono to Koyo Shisutemmu no Kokusaika: Osutoraria Wakinguhoride Seido Riyosha no Jirekenkyu* [Young Japanese People and the Internationalization of the Japanese Employment System: A Case Study of Japanese Working Holiday Makers in Australia], Doctoral Dissertation, Hitotsubashi University.
- Fujita, Y., 2008, *Bunka Imin* [Cultural Migrants], Tokyo: Shinyosha.
- Glebe, G., 2003, "Segregation and the Ethnoscape: The Japanese Business Community in Dusseldorf," in Goodman, R., Peach, C., Takenaka, A., and White, P. (eds.), *Global Japan: The Experience of Japan's New Immigrants and Overseas Communities*, London: Routledge Curzon, pp. 98–115.
- Glebe, G. et al., 1999, "Investment-Led Migration and the Distribution of Japanese in Germany and Great Britain," *Escape, Populations, Sociétés*, 17(3): 425–437.
- Goodman, R., Peach, C., Takenaka, A., and White, P. (eds.), 2003, *Global Japan: The Experience of Japan's New Immigrants and Overseas Communities*, London: Routledge Curzon.
- Hamaguchi, K., 2013, *Wakamono to Rodo* [Young People and Work], Tokyo: Chuokoron Shinsha.
- Hara, H., 2005, "Labor Demand for New High School Graduates in Japan," *Japan Labor Review*, 2(3): 49–72.
- Hirai, E. and Suezaki, T., 2015, "Taishokigyowa Genteteki?" [Very Few Companies Will be Disclosed?], *Asahi Shimbun*, May 16.
- Honda, Y., Naito, A., and Goto, K., 2006, *Nitotte Iuna!* [Don't Say NEET!], Tokyo: Kobunsha.
- Hori, Y., 2009, "Changes in the Transition from High School to Work," *Japan Labor Review*, 6(1): 91–104.
- JILPT (Japan Institute for Labor Policy and Training), 2007, *Jyakunensha Shushokushien no Torikumi to Houkou* [Efforts and Direction of Employment Support for Young People], Tokyo, JILPT.
- Kato, E., 2009, *Japanese Migrants Searching Themselves* [Jibunsagashi no Imintachi], Tokyo: Sairyusha.
- Kawashima, K., 2010, "Japanese Working Holiday Makers in Australia and Their Relationship to the Japanese Labor Market: Before and After," *Asian Studies Review*, 34(3): 267–286.

- Kawazoe, M., 2013, "Hiseiki Rodosha no Soshikika to Rodokumiai Undo no Kadai [Organization of Non-regular Workers and the Challenges of Trade Union Movements]," *Rodo Horitsu Junpo*, 1801: 94–97.
- , 2015, "Shutoken Seinen Yunion no Chiiki wo Jushishita Katsudo [Area-Based Activities of the Metropolitan Youth Union]," *Ohara Shakaimondai Kenkyujo Zasshi*, 677: 2–5.
- Kinoshita, T., 2012, *Wakamono no Gyakushu* [Counterattacks of Young People], Tokyo: Jumposha.
- Komamura, K., 2008, "The Working Poor, Borderline Poor, and Developments in Public Assistance Reform," *Japan Labor Review*, 5(4): 67–94.
- Konno, Haruki, 2012, *Burakku Kigyo* [Black Companies], Tokyo: Bungei Shunjusha.
- , 2015, *Burakku Kigyo 2* [Black Companies, Vol. 2], Tokyo: Bungei Shunjusha.
- Machimura, T., 2003, "Living in a Transnational Community within a Multi-ethnic City: Making a Localised 'Japan' in Los Angeles," in Goodman, R., Peach, C., Takenaka, A., and White, P. (eds.), *Global Japan: The Experience of Japan's New Immigrants and Overseas Communities*, London: Routledge Curzon, pp. 147–156.
- MHLW (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare), 2013, *Wakamono no Tsukaisute ga Utagawareru Kigyotoeno Jutenkantoku no Jisshijokyo* [Report on the Intensive Inspection of Businesses Suspected of the Exploitation of Young Workers], MHLW (Retrieved May 17, 2015, <http://www.mhlw.go.jp/file/04-Houdouhappyou-11202000-Roudoukijunkyoku-Kantokuka/0000032426.pdf>).
- Miyamoto, M., 2005, "Prolonged Transitional Period and Policy," *Japan Labor Review*, 2(3): 73–91.
- Noji, T., 2014, *Ajia de Hataraku Ima wa Sono to ki da* [It's the Right Time to Work in Asia], Tokyo: Nikkei Business Publication.
- OECD, 2011, *OECD Economic Surveys: Japan 2011*, Paris: OECD Publishing, Chapter 5.
- RENGO-RIALS, 2013, *Report of the 26th Survey on the Work and Life of Working People* [Dai26kai Kinrosha no Shigoto to Kurashi ni tsuiteno Anketo Chosahokokusho], RENG-RIALS (Retrieved May 16, 2015, http://rengo-soken.or.jp/report_db/file/1389168971_a.pdf).
- Sakai, C., 2003, "The Japanese Community in Hong Kong in the 1990s: The Diversity of Strategies and Intentions," in Goodman, R., Peach, C., Takenaka, A., and White, P. (eds.), *Global Japan: The Experience of Japan's New Immigrants and Overseas Communities*, London: Routledge Curzon, pp. 131–146.
- Suezaki, T., Toyooka, R., and Hirai, E., 2015, "Burakku Kigyo no Kyujinwa Kyohi [Refusing to Receive Job Referral Forms from Black Companies]," *Asahi Shimbun*, January 10.
- Thang, L. L., MacLachlan, E., and Goda, M., 2002, "Expatriates on the Margins: A Study of Japanese Women Working in Singapore," *Geoforum*, 33(4): 539–551.
- White, P., 2003, "The Japanese in London: From Transience to Settlement?," in Goodman, R., Peach, C., Takenaka, A., and White, P. (eds.), *Global Japan: The Experience of Japan's New Immigrants and Overseas Communities*, London: Routledge Curzon, pp. 79–97.

Globalization, Immigration Policy, and Youth Employment in Australia*

Bob Birrell and Ernest Healy

Background

Elsewhere in this volume, it has been argued that, from the late 1970s, immigration had become central to a concerted effort by Australian political and business elites, and sections of the intelligentsia, to internationalize Australia's economy, culture, and society. The maintenance of a robust immigration program was promoted as evidence that Australia was transforming itself from an inward, protectionist society to one which was economically and culturally open. Any retreat from high immigration, it was feared, would be interpreted as a loss of commitment to internationalization.

Nevertheless, in times of economic recession, as experienced in the early 1980s and again in the early 1990s, political pragmatism dictated that immigration levels be cut. With the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, however, this historical pattern was broken when the Rudd Labor government pushed net overseas migration (NOM) to record high levels. Various justifications for this action were put forward, including the long run effect of population aging upon labor force growth and the necessity to fill skills shortages associated with the Australian mining and resources boom. This boom, it was claimed, was drawing skills away from the largely metropolitan-based nonresource economy.

Yet, a close examination of immigration management and outcomes from this time indicates that immigration has been poorly targeted to national skill requirements and damaging to the labor market opportunities of Australian residents. As the minerals boom has subsided, immigration has been maintained at historically high levels in a period of slow jobs growth. This chapter examines the ways in which the Australian government's management of the Australian immigration

program has damaged the employment prospects of Australian workers in the recent period, including those of many young people reliant upon low-skilled entry-level jobs.

Labor Force Growth Outstripping Employment Growth

Since mid-2011, Australia's labor force (those employed and unemployed) has been growing faster than the total number in jobs. This is despite a significant drop in the labor force participation rate. As a result, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2014) estimates that between May 2011 and May 2014, the number of unemployed persons in Australia has increased from 589,800 to 718,900. This is an increase of 129,000, or an average of around 43,000, a year.

There are two causes for this outcome. The first is that the level of job creation in Australia since mid-2011 has slowed to about 100,000 a year. This is less than half that of the eight years of the mineral resources boom up to 2011. The second is that Australia's labor force continues to grow at a faster pace than employment growth. The main source of this labor force growth is migrant workers. These include those visaed under the permanent entry and temporary entry visa subclasses. This growth continues because the Labor government (2007–2013) made no adjustment to its migration policy and consequent visa rule settings after the minerals mining boom ended in 2011, nor has the Coalition government since taking office in September 2013.

Remarkably, there has been no acknowledgment of the migrant contribution to this outcome from the experts who dominate commentary on the labor market. For example, in an otherwise useful recent analysis of Australia's labor market, the Assistant Governor of the Reserve Bank manages not to mention immigration at all (Kent, 2014).

On the right, the main response has been that governments should redouble their efforts to improve business conditions so that businesses will create more jobs. Some (as we will see) want more immigration on the grounds that this will boost the economy by filling skill vacancies. There are others who argue that population growth will help drive the housing industry, thus helping to fill the gap in economic activity created by the waning of resources industry investment.

On the left, some, like Professor Bill Mitchell (2014), ignore the migration issue and instead focus on job creation by governments. Who could disagree, but the likelihood of the Coalition government taking up this option is remote. In the meantime, the casualties of Australia's present migration policy settings continue to mount among Australian residents.

Immigration and Unemployment—An Overview

The impact of the current oversupply of labor is manifest at two ends of the labor market for younger Australians. The first is among young people seeking to enter relatively low-skilled jobs. Australia's total unemployment rate has edged up to 6 percent over the last couple of years. However, this aggregate figure hides a nasty worsening of the situation for young people. In the case of those aged

15–24, their unemployment rate increased from around 10 percent in 2009 to 14 percent in 2015.

The second manifestation is among new graduates. Hot spots are emerging in accounting, nursing, information communication technology (ICT), and dentistry (among others), with many recent graduates struggling to get started in their profession, in part because of the competition they are encountering from recently arrived migrant professionals. Despite this evidence, the Coalition government continues to allow employers to sponsor migrant professionals in these areas under the temporary entry 457 program and under the permanent entry employer sponsorship program.

The Labor government and the current Coalition government have sought to allay public concerns. They point to a series of reforms in the skilled migration program since 2010, which allegedly result in better targeting of the skills needed in Australia. The Labor government initiated these reforms because of the scandal flowing from the out-of-control overseas student industry. Hundreds of thousands of vocational and higher education students were attracted to Australia during the 2000s with the expectation that, on their completion of an Australian qualification, they would be able to gain a permanent residence visa.

Since 2010, successive Labor governments and the Coalition government (since late 2013) have claimed that these reforms have been effective in targeting skills which are in short supply in Australia and genuinely needed by employers. However, these claims are false. There has been a serious deterioration in the skill level and relevance of the skilled migrants being visaed to skill vacancies in Australia.

The Setting

As Table 15.1 shows, there has been a sea change in Australia’s employment situation since 2011–2012. Up until 2011–2012, the annual growth in the numbers employed grew strongly. Since then, employment growth has slumped to around 100,000 a year.

Meanwhile, as Table 15.1 shows, the labor force has continued to grow in greater numbers than those employed. The consequence is that the total number of unemployed persons has increased from 589,800 in May 2011 to 718,900 in May 2014. The labor force would have grown even faster if it had not been for the

Table 15.1 Annual Growth in the Labor Force and Employment, Australia, and Labor Force Participation as of May 2012 to May 2014

Year	Labor force (000s)	Employment (000s)	Participation rate (at year end) (%)
2011–2012	223.2	192.8	65.5
2012–2013	161.8	106.6	65.2
2013–2014	142.4	99.4	64.8
Total	527.4	398.8	

Source: ABS Labor Force Survey, various issues.

drop in the overall labor force participation rate: from 65.5 percent in May 2011 to 64.8 percent in May 2014. Most of this fall is due to a decline in the participation rate of young people. They are both dropping out of the labor market and increasing their engagement in education. Some of the decline is also due to the aging effect of Australia's relatively large cohort of baby boomers who are approaching retirement age.

Almost All of the Growth in Jobs is Going to Recently Arrived Migrants

The level of NOM to Australia is very high because of permissive immigration policy settings. NOM is defined as the difference between the sum of all movements into and out of Australia, including both residents and migrants. NOM has grown from 180,400 in 2010–2011 to 242,000 in 2013–2014 (DIBP, 2013).

From the estimates published in the ABS Labor Force Survey, it is clear that recently arrived migrants are currently the main source of the growth in Australia's labor force and of those gaining employment. This is shown in Table 15.2. The table provides a snapshot of the increase in the number of migrants who arrived in Australia since the beginning of 2011 as of May 2012, May 2013, and May 2014. These numbers are an underestimation of the total impact of recent arrivals on the Australian labor market.

Table 15.3 shows that by May 2014, 380,000 overseas-born persons who arrived in Australia since the beginning of 2011 were estimated to be in employment. Yet Table 15.1 showed that, over this three-year period, the total growth in employment of all residents—whether recently arrived overseas-born persons, overseas-born persons who arrived before 2011, and the Australian-born—only grew by around 400,000. This means that almost all of the net growth in jobs over the three years up to May 2014 was in jobs taken by these recently arrived overseas-born migrants. We detail later who the major resident casualties of this competition are.

This is a conclusion that has never been admitted by left or right commentators or by the official agencies, such as the Reserve Bank of Australia.

This finding should not come as a surprise, given the very high level of NOM, of some 240,000 a year. Table 15.3 provides the ABS estimate of the total number of the 15-year plus population comprised of overseas-born arrivals in Australia as of May 2014 who arrived since the beginning of 2011. This figure was 709,000. Overseas-born arrivals made up the greater part of the total growth of the

Table 15.2 Annual Additions to the Numbers of Persons Born Overseas Who Arrived in Australia after 2010, Who Were Employed and in the Labor Force, May 2011 to May 2014

Period	Employed (000s)	Labor force (000s)
May 2011 to May 2012	129.9	146.2
May 2012 to May 2013	109.3	122.6
May 2013 to May 2014	117.9	130.5

Source: ABS Labor Force Survey, various issues.

Table 15.3 Overseas-Born Arrivals (15 Plus Years) 2011 to 2014, as of May 2014

Employed	380,100
Unemployed	48,200
Not in labor force	280,700
Civilian population	709,000

Source: ABS, Labor Force Survey (data cube ST LM7).

Australian civilian population in this age group over the three years up to May 2011. This figure was 989,100. One implication of these data is that the resident population (other than these recent arrivals) was still growing strongly (by 280,000) during the three year period to May 2014. This latter source of growth in Australia’s population could have provided for the people needed to fill the net growth in new jobs over the three years in question, especially if accompanied by an increase in the labor force participation rate.

Most of the recently arrived overseas-born persons were attracted to Australia by what they could earn in the Australian labor market relative to their home country. In addition, few could access labor market welfare benefits. They had to (and did) find work.

The Need to Fill Skill Shortages

This has been the main justification for continuing high levels of migration. The migration reforms since 2010 mentioned earlier have been repeatedly cited to justify claims that migrants really are filling skill gaps in the economy. One key reform was the establishment of a new Skilled Occupation List (SOL) in 2010. The SOL has long been proclaimed by successive governments as a mechanism to better target skilled migrants, and is widely regarded as an indicator of occupations which are in shortage in Australia, currently as well as in the medium term. However, as detailed further below, this turns out not to be true.

Some Key Indicators of Poor Skill Targeting

In 2012–2013, only 36 percent of those sponsored by employers under the permanent entry program had occupations listed on the SOL. The situation is similar for the sponsored temporary resident 457 stream. In 2012–2013, only 39.7 percent of the principal applicants visaed under the 457 program were sponsored for occupations listed on the SOL. For the first nine months of 2013–2014, this proportion fell to 34.9 percent (CFMEU, forthcoming).

Another indicator of poor targeting is the occupations for which migrants are being recruited. By far the largest single occupation, visaed in 2012–2013 under the permanent entry skill program, was cooks. Yet cooks were not listed on the SOL in 2010 and have not been listed since then. In 2012–2013, there were 8,449 cooks as well as another 1,022 bakers and pastry cooks and 696 chefs visaed under

the permanent entry skill program. These 10,167 migrants made up 16 percent of the 63,048 principal applicants visaed in the skill stream for 2012–2013. The next largest occupation was accountants (5,766), followed by software engineers (2,167), ICT business analysts (1,555), and hairdressers (1,502).

Cooks were also the largest single occupational group of principal applicants visaed under the temporary resident 457 visa subclass in 2012–2013.

Other Temporary Entry Migrant Workers

The skilled visa subclasses so far examined are only one component of the influx of migrants who are entering the Australian labor market. There is another huge category of labor market participants where there is no consideration at all as to their labor market impact on the resident workforce. There were 1.1 million persons holding temporary entry visas in Australia as of March 2014, as well as approximately another 640,000 New Zealand citizens.

About half of the 242,000 NOM in 2012–2013 was made up of temporary migrants. Others (all temporary visa holders) include students, Working Holiday Makers (WHMs), visitors, and New Zealanders. With the exception of the visitors, all have work rights in Australia (and in the case of visitors, many work illegally).

There is no way to accurately determine how many of these temporaries are in the workforce. One cannot rely on the ABS for such an estimate because the Labor Force Survey does not survey persons unless they meet the criteria for being a resident (i.e., they have to have been in Australia for 12 months out of the 16 months that ensued since their first arrival in Australia) (Birrell and Healy, 2013). This definition excludes most of the WHMs because their visa is only valid for a period of 12 months, as well as most of the visitors and some of the students, some 457 visa holders, and New Zealanders. Yet, most of these temporary entry visa holders would have worked while in Australia.

The stock of temporary visa holders is listed in Table 15.4 as of March 2012, March 2013, and March 2014. These are accurate counts because the Department

Table 15.4 Temporary Visa Holders in Australia as of March 2012, March 2013, and March 2014

	March 2012	March 2013	March 2014
Students	344,480	332,470	366,910
Visitors	220,380	248,250	234,180
457s	160,420	190,920	201,560
Working holiday makers	142,600	170,700	174,210
Bridging visas	132,320	118,820	107,190
Temporary graduate visa holders	27,980	41,090	25,110
Others	28,670	30,310	33,410
Total	1,056,850	1,132,560	1,142,560
New Zealanders	616,110	632,890	644,890

Source: DIBP, Temporary entrants in Australia as on March 31, 2014.

of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP) keeps a record of the arrival and departure of the visa status of each person moving in and out of Australia.

The numbers coming and going who hold temporary visas are “demand driven,” in the sense that they reflect the desire of those eligible for entry to take up the opportunities offered by the rules governing entry and work rights for each of these visa subclasses. Australia is a highly attractive destination and, as a result, the numbers attracted have grown, even as the labor market has weakened in recent years.

Implications for Australian Resident Job Seekers

This issue will be dealt with in two parts. Migrants currently entering the Australian labor market do so as part of two quite different streams. The first consists of those with trade, technical, professional, and managerial occupations, who are predominantly recruited either under the permanent entry skilled visa subclasses or the 457 program.

The second stream includes most of those arriving on temporary visas (except 457s). Many of these migrants have little choice but to seek work in entry-level jobs, where skill requirements are low, regardless of their formal qualifications. This is because many employers prefer to appoint permanent residents or locals to professional jobs.

Skilled Occupations

Among the occupations that best illustrate the deficiencies of the current immigration policy are accountants among the professions and cooks among the trades. Many thousands of migrants are being visaed in these and similar fields, despite evidence that they are not needed and, in many cases, are competing with Australian residents for available jobs.

Accountants

There were 5,766 accountants visaed under the permanent resident skilled program in 2012–2013 as well as another 1,000 visaed under the 457 visa program. This is a similar number to the 7,200 completions of domestic students from Australian universities in accounting at the bachelor and higher degree level in 2012 (AWPA, 2014a).

By 2012, there was evidence of an oversupply of accountants in Australia. On the basis of labor market research conducted in 2011 and 2012, the Commonwealth Department of Employment concluded: “There is a more than adequate supply of accountants. Employers generally experience little difficulty filling their vacancies, attracting multiple suitable applicants” (DEEWR, 2011: 1).

The Department of Employment repeated this conclusion in 2013–2014. It stated that the oversupply of accountants was leading to a declining rate of success on the part of accounting graduates in obtaining accounting work and to relatively

poor starting salaries (Department of Employment, 2013). The Department of Employment recommended that accountants be taken off the SOL as of mid-2014.

The responsible authority, the Australian Workforce Productivity Agency (AWPA) reviewed the *Demand and Supply of Accountants* in 2014. AWPA acknowledged that, in the light of the 7,200 domestic completions in accounting in 2012 and the similar number of visas issued to migrants (cited above), “at current levels there is an increased risk of skilled migrants crowding out domestic workers in the future” (2014a: 26).

Yet, AWPA rejected the Department of Employment’s advice to remove accountants from the SOL. How could this be? AWPA also prepares a Specialised Occupation List (separate from the SOL). The occupations included are defined as those “that are of high value and where skills take a long time to develop and acquire” (AWPA, 2014b). For AWPA, a current oversupply in an occupation may not justify removing the occupation from the SOL. The reason according to AWPA is that if shortages subsequently emerge in these occupations, the Australian economy would risk recurring skill shortages and resource wastage as a result of mismatches between educational supply and workforce demands (AWPA, 2014b).

For such occupations, AWPA looks beyond the immediate labor market situation to the medium- to long-term outlook for the occupations in question. Since almost all professional occupations are on the Specialised Occupation List, this gives AWPA the opportunity to argue that whatever the immediate labor-market situation in an occupation, it may be justified in leaving that occupation on the SOL. This is what has happened for accounting (among other occupations where skill shortages no longer exist, but which remain on the SOL). AWPA based its decision upon bullish assumptions about Australia’s medium-term economic future.

Nevertheless, in a gesture to the current oversupply, AWPA recommended, and the Coalition government accepted, that there should be a ceiling on the number of accountants visaed. AWPA recommended that in the case of accountants, the ceiling be around 5,000 per year. However, this was a very high number, given the surplus of accountants.

In reality, there will be many more than 5,000 accountants visaed because this ceiling only refers to the Skilled Independent visa subclasses. There is nothing to stop accountants being visaed in other visa subclasses, including the State/Territory Nominated visa subclasses and the permanent entry employer sponsorship visa subclasses, both of which have large quotas of visas to fill.

Why is the government disregarding the current surplus of accountants? AWPA provides the excuse. But, there is more to it than this. One factor is the health of the overseas student industry.

The government faces strong pressure from the overseas student industry (the university sector and private educational institutions) to keep accountants (and other lucrative occupations) on the SOL. Universities have already had to cope with a decline in overseas student accounting commencements, from 17,100 in 2009 to 11,500 in 2012. The removal of accounting from the SOL would be a further blow to their business prospects. Access to the Australian labor market and the hope of acquiring a permanent visa is important in the marketing of such courses.

The Mismatch between Skill Shortages and Skilled Migrant Recruitment

If the skilled migration program is really attracting the “best and the brightest,” as government and departmental officials claim, while attracting skills in short supply, one would not expect the program to be delivering so many accountants (and cooks). The series of reforms implemented in 2010 and after were supposed to avoid such an outcome. The new selection system introduced in mid-2011 put greater priority on English language skills and work experience. In addition, since 2011, the accounting accrediting agencies have required an English standard of level 7 on the International English Language Test Score (IELTS). This is referred to as “proficient English.” It is close to the level needed to perform a professional occupation. It is a demanding test which overseas student graduates from non-English-speaking countries (NESC) have had difficulty meeting.

Yet, in 2010–2011, there was an enormous number of 14,000 accountants visaed in the permanent entry skilled stream, most of whom were visaed in the points-tested visa subclasses. Accountants were also by far the largest individual occupation visaed in 2011–2012. As indicated, in 2012–2013 a further 5,766 accountants were issued permanent entry skill visas (4,144 in the points-tested visa subclasses). By this time, accountants had been overtaken by cooks. The number of cooks visaed in the permanent entry skill program in 2012–2013 surged to 8,449. Of these, 5,818 were visaed under the points-tested visa subclasses. Yet, cooks have not been on the SOL since before 2010.

Those interested in the explanation will search in vain for an official justification of this anomaly. To have admitted what was happening would have exploded the carefully cultivated story that the migration program was selecting skills currently in short supply in Australia.

The reason why so many accountants and cooks are being granted skilled permanent visas is that they represent the flow-on from the enormous stock of former overseas students who were in Australia at the time the 2010 reforms were announced. As of mid-2009, there were 386,523 people on overseas student visas in Australia, about 80 percent of whom were enrolled in higher education and Vocational Education and Training (VET) courses (Birrell and Healy, 2010). Many of these had entered these courses with the expectation that it would lead to subsequent participation in the Australian labor market, and ultimately to permanent residence.

When the reforms were introduced in 2010, some of these overseas students were already enrolled in such courses, had already applied for a points-tested visa, or had obtained or applied for a Graduate Skills visa (485) which allowed them to stay for 18 months with full work rights. Further, they were given concessional rights to apply for a permanent residence points-tested visa and to be assessed under the rules in place before the 2010 reforms. This situation meant that tens of thousands of accountants and cooks (among others—including hairdressers) remained in Australia.

As of July 1, 2011, the Labor government introduced a priority processing list which determined the order in which visa applications were processed for those being “grandfathered” in this way. Those who were placed at the bottom of the

priority list were granted bridging visas with full work rights while they waited until there were places available for them. They have been “warehoused.”

The Labor government told the overseas students affected by these new rules that their options included finding an employer willing to sponsor them for a permanent or temporary entry employer sponsored visa. This resulted in many thousands of former overseas students searching for willing employers. This situation helped undermine the integrity of these visa subclasses.

As regards the points-tested visa subclasses, places were subsequently found because DIBP ran out of applicants in the higher priority categories. The DIBP has, in effect, scraped the bottom of the barrel (in terms of its visa priorities) in order to achieve the migration program targets set by the Labor government and more recently by the Coalition government. By mid-2013, this process had not yet ended. As of mid-2013, there were still 11,200 principal applicants in the warehoused group yet to be processed (mostly cooks and hairdressers).

This situation has had serious consequences for the quality of the skilled migrants visaed. Almost all of the overseas students in question were from NESC and had completed degree level courses or, in the case of the cooks, certificate level courses at vocational colleges during the 2000s. Those with university qualifications have struggled to obtain professional jobs. Employers have been very reluctant to take them on for these roles. There is a great deal of anecdotal evidence which confirms that this is a continuing problem (AFR, 2014). Our analysis of the job outcomes of former overseas students, drawn from the 2011 Census, shows that only a small minority of recently arrived graduates in accounting and in other professional courses who were from NESC has been able to find professional positions in their field of qualification (Birrell and Healy, 2008). In the case of accountants, not surprisingly, the hardest hit of those struggling to find employment, given the serious oversupply of applicants, are the former overseas students.

The situation is different for other university graduates, particularly nurses and ICT professionals. For these resident graduates, the influx of migrants is having a serious impact on the employment prospects of domestic students.

Other Skilled Occupations

As stated at the outset, there is a growing number of professional occupations where recent graduates are finding it hard to get relevant jobs. This is evident in the health fields of nursing and dentistry, as well as in ICT, engineering, and, of course, in accounting. Problems are even emerging in the general practice labor market for medical graduates.

A distinctive pattern has emerged. During the resources boom, when shortages in most professional labor markets were evident, successive governments encouraged growth in domestic student enrollments. Young people responded strongly to the opportunities in the health fields. For a significant price in Higher Education Contribution Scheme debt and study time, there appeared to be a guarantee of a good and well-paid job.

This outcome is no longer assured. Increasing numbers of graduates are entering the labor market just as job opportunities in professional fields are

contracting and migrant competition is continuing. This is particularly the case in engineering as the resources boom has slowed, but it also holds in the health fields because of government budgetary tightening. In all of these professions, local graduates are facing competition from continued high levels of permanent and temporary migrants.

We have documented the case for general practitioners (GPs) elsewhere. The number of domestic medical graduates doubled between 2006 and 2011. Yet, GP migration through the permanent and 457 programs has continued unabated. Australia is now “awash with doctors” (Birrell, 2013).

Dentists too are hurting. According to Australian Dental Association’s submission to the 2014 SOL review, there is a “substantial oversupply in metropolitan areas.” The Association reports that the number of vacancies is “substantially less than the number of graduates expected to enter the workforce” (ADA, 2014: 2).

Nurses

In the case of nursing, concerns about shortages during the boom years led to an increasing supply of nursing places in universities. The number of undergraduate completions in nursing increased from 5,650 in 2005 to 8,425 in 2012 (ANMF, 2014).

Graduate nurses face a job market in which they must compete with large numbers of migrants. In 2012–2013, there were 2,855 visas issued to registered nurses under the permanent entry skilled program and 2,853 under the 457 program. According to the Australian Nursing and Midwifery Federation (the nurses’ union), hundreds of recent nursing graduates in each of the states of Queensland, Victoria, Western Australia, and South Australia have been unable to find nursing positions (ANMF, 2014).

The Department of Employment backed up these concerns in its submission to AWPA on the 2014 SOL. It stated: “The labour market for nurses has eased considerably over recent years. National shortages are no longer evident and recruiting difficulties are confined to particular specialisations and specific locations” (Department of Employment, 2013: 24).

The AWPA was not persuaded by these concerns. Nursing, dentistry, and general medical practice were all left on the 2014 SOL. AWPA applied the same rationale to the health occupations as for accountants.

Apart from the AWPA’s poor record of predicting future labor market demand, the response to this logic ought to be, “So what?” Given Australia’s immense attraction to immigrant professionals, should domestic output fall short, it can easily be filled on a temporary basis through migration. That was the original purpose for setting up the 457 visa program.

ICT Professionals

By contrast, in the case of ICT professionals, the output of Australian resident graduates has fallen well short of the growth in demand for such professionals. This is in large part because resident higher education completions have fallen from a peak of over 9,000 in 2002 to around 4,500 in 2011 (AWPA, 2013: 52).

Immigrants have filled the void. There were 9,723 visas issued to migrants with ICT occupations under the permanent entry program in 2012–2013 and 11,691 under the 457 visa program in the year up to August 31, 2012 (ACS, 2014).

That immigrant recruitment into this field is dwarfing the resident contribution, which is a disturbing situation given current concerns about the need to create opportunities for young residents in skilled jobs. There is no doubt that the demand for ICT skills will increase. Yet, if the present pattern continues, it will be immigrants who meet this demand.

Why have Australian residents turned away in droves from ICT courses? In 2013, AWPA pointed out that “many students who pursue an ICT education experience difficulty in finding employment in the sector on graduation” (14). This is because “there are a limited number of entry-level positions” (14). This situation reflects the structure of the ICT industry, where there is a high level of contracting or outsourcing of ICT functions. Employers have a “just in time” view of their needs. Both the end-use business and the outsourcing firms want staff who have the knowledge base and experience to produce immediately at the lowest cost in wages.

This makes it hard for resident graduates to get a start. The ready availability of migrants means that there is no need to provide for the systematic training of new graduates. ICT consulting companies can bring in as many immigrants with specialist skills as they need on temporary resident 457 visas. Sometimes, they recruit such migrants on terms and conditions that undercut resident ICT workers.

AWPA’s study of the ICT workforce recommends a number of measures to improve training opportunities for residents. It is remarkable, however, that the report has nothing to say about the contribution which the escalation of migration recruitment has played in this decline, or any recommendation that immigration be reduced to give employers a greater incentive to employ and train recent ICT graduates.

We conclude that, for the points-tested visa subclasses, there is no mechanism to exclude professional occupations from eligibility on account of a current labor market oversupply.

The Threat of Employer Sponsorship to Job Opportunities for Australian Residents

The SOL, imperfect though it is in shaping the selection of points-tested applicants, at least takes some account of whether the occupations are in short supply in Australia. But in the case of those sponsored by employers under the permanent entry employer sponsorship visa subclasses, there is no reference to the local labor market at all. The planning level for these visa subclasses in 2014–2015 was set at the high level of 48,250 places (principal applicants and dependents). The same is true for employers who wish to sponsor a migrant on a temporary entry 457 visa. Employers can sponsor who they like as long as the jobs are at trade level or above, and even at the sub-trade level under the 457 “Labor Agreement” arrangements.

Only a small minority of employers have to make any effort to demonstrate through labor market testing (LMT) that they were unable to find appropriate residents for the work in question. Nevertheless, while the LMT requirements themselves have been considerably watered down by the Coalition government, they do appear to have reduced both the rate of 457 visa nominations and the approval rate for 457 visa nominations in all occupations subject to LMT (CFMEU, 2013).

Nevertheless, only around a third of those sponsored under the temporary entry 457 and the permanent entry employer sponsored visa subclasses have occupations listed on the SOL. This listing is irrelevant for the 457 program, but it is a good indication of the lack of targeting of the 457 visa program to skills in short supply in Australia. This situation should be ringing alarm bells because, as the following analysis shows, employers continue to sponsor migrants in fields that are demonstrably oversupplied.

The Dynamics of Employer Sponsorship

The employer sponsorship visa subclasses were originally intended to allow employers to bring in skilled migrants where vacancies existed. In the case of the 457 program, it allowed employers in multinational firms to transfer staff temporarily to Australia in order to train resident employees and to transfer skills. It still does play this role to some degree, particularly at the professional and managerial levels. But, increasingly, the temporary resident 457 program is regarded, by the sponsored migrants and by employers alike, as a pathway to permanent residence.

About half of all those sponsored on a temporary resident 457 visa subsequently achieve permanent residence. Most do so through sponsorship by their employer for a permanent entry employer sponsorship visa. The great majority of all those sponsored in the latter visa subclasses (21,651 principal applicants in 2012–2013) were already working for their employer on a 457 visa. Very few are sponsored from offshore. Successive governments have facilitated this process by granting concessions to employers who sponsor those already working for them on a 457 visa. For example, from mid-2012, the rules governing permanent entry employer sponsorship were modified so that, if the 457 visa holder had worked for the sponsoring employer for two years, there would be no test of the applicant's English language skills or any assessment of their qualifications.

There are advantages here to both employers and sponsored employees. Employers can benefit from employing someone on a temporary resident 457 visa because, if the sponsored person regards the sponsorship as a pathway to permanent immigration, he or she may be unwilling to leave the job with the sponsoring employer for two years (the qualifying period for an employer-sponsored permanent entry visa under the Temporary Residence Transition stream). The sponsor person may also be willing to work on terms and conditions lower than the employer would have had to provide an Australian resident.

The employer holds the whip hand in this relationship. Temporary resident 457 visa holders are unlikely to protest, given their desire to obtain permanent residence through sponsorship by their employer or their desire to prolong their work stay in Australia on a temporary visa. Employers are just as likely to be advantaged when there is a surplus of locals available for the work as when there is a shortage. In the former situation, an employer taking on a 457 visa holder when the economy is slack and competition in the industry in question is fierce, as in the food service and construction industries, may obtain a competitive advantage relative to other employers.

Given that both the employer and sponsored employee have an interest in keeping the employment arrangements secret, the evidence that such practices occur is largely anecdotal.

There is no lack of people willing to take on such arrangements. Employers are being inundated by migrants already in Australia on temporary visas who are desperate to find work, especially if it leads to a long-term temporary visa followed by permanent residence. As shown in Table 15.4, there are currently over one million migrants on temporary visas in Australia. Most have work rights. They are being allowed to churn from one temporary visa to another over extended periods, during which time they can make connections with employers who might be willing to sponsor them on a 457 visa.

This process is illustrated in Table 15.5. For the year to August 31, 2012, there were 30,032 temporary resident 457 visas issued to onshore applicants (just over half the total principal applicants visaed in this period). The table lists the top five occupations with the greatest numbers of those who succeeded in obtaining a 457 visa.

Table 15.5 Last Substantive Visa Status of Those Issued 457 Visas Onshore, Year up to August 31, 2012

Occupation	WHMs	457	VET student ^a	Higher Education student	Visitor	Temporary Graduate (485) ^a	Other	Total
Visa class at the time of 457 visa issuance								
Cook	55	35	960	291	43	285	25	1,694
Program & project administrator	597	166	334	172	151	33	100	1,553
Marketing specialist	353	123	112	130	106	42	91	957
Carpenter	465	43	43	0	103	0	12	666
Chef	152	63	195	45	69	66	22	612
Other	7,336	6,987	2,014	1,926	3,532	430	2,325	24,550
Total	8,958	7,417	3,658	2,564	4,004	856	2,575	30,032

^aVET stands for Vocational Education and Training Student. The Temporary Graduate Visa (485) is for former overseas students who completed a higher education or VET qualification and who meet certain qualifying conditions. It permits them to stay on and work in Australia for up to two years.

Source: DIBP, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 2013 (BE6153.02).

Lower-Skilled Occupations

Each year around 350,000 young people aged 15–24 leave school, some 250,000 of whom enter the labor force. Since this latter group does not possess any post school educational qualifications, they therefore have to find work in low-skilled entry-level jobs. These include positions in the retail and hospitality industries.

The employment market is particularly tight for these jobs. Young residents have to compete for such work against recently arrived migrants, particularly those on temporary entry visas. The numbers of these migrants, as documented in Table 15.4, are large and growing. As we and others have shown, this competition is a major contributor to high youth unemployment (Birrell and Healy, 2013; Brotherhood of Saint Lawrence, 2014).

In the case of the WHMs (subclasses 417 and 462), the numbers visaed grew from 192,922 in 2010–2011 to 239,592 in 2013–2014. Part of this growth stems from the increasing number of WHM visa holders who are taking up the option (introduced by the Coalition government in November 2005 and later extended by Labor) of an additional one year visa. They can obtain an additional one year visa if they work in a regional area in agriculture, mining, or construction for 88 days. In 2013–2014, 45,950 qualified for this second WHM visa.

The country of origin of these WHMs has also changed, with big increases from Ireland, Taiwan, and Italy as well as continuing high numbers from Korea. Most of them are not coming for the traditional working holiday; rather, they are migrants seeking access to the Australian labor market. As is well known, WHMs now play a crucial role from the point of view of employers in the horticultural industries. It is often argued that by doing so they have become essential to the viability of these industries. However, it is a mistake to generalize from this contribution to the total impact of the WHM presence in Australia. By far the majority of the WHMs in Australia spend their time in the major cities. They, along with students and other temporary visa holders, are proving to be ferocious competitors for the same entry-level jobs that Australian resident youth are seeking.

The impact of these temporary entry migrants is no accident. It is a product of a hands-off policy on the part of successive governments. The Labor government could have, but did not cap any of the temporary entry visa subclasses, despite the deterioration of the Australian labor market since 2011. Nor has the Coalition government moved to do so since taking office in 2013.

The temporary entry challenge has also been magnified by the accommodating stance of successive governments toward visa churning on the part of those holding temporary entry visas. As noted above, they can move from one temporary visa to another, thus prolonging their presence in the labor force and their opportunities to find employers willing to sponsor them for employment on 457 visas, and subsequently for a permanent residence visa.

Table 15.6 indicates the number of those with an overseas student visa who successfully obtained another visa, by visa type, for 2011–2012 and 2012–2013. The numbers are huge—subsequently reaching 142,405 in 2013–2014. Some 19,768 obtained a tourist visa. It is extraordinary that this is allowed, given that DIBP must know that most of these former students will have obtained the visa in

Table 15.6 Number of Visas Granted in 2011–2012 and 2012–2013, by Visa Subclass, to Those Whose Last Visa Held Was a Student Visa

New Visa	2011–2012	2012–2013
Temporary graduate (485)	35,273	31,833
Student	32,425	29,490
Tourist	26,442	28,484
Temporary skilled migration (457)	10,567	18,050
Partner	7,257	8,671
Skilled independent	7,083	6,146
Regional sponsored migration scheme	3,902	5,508
Other skilled	4,717	5,248
Working holiday maker	2,810	2,978
Business	2,102	1,563
Onshore protection	946	1,226
Employer nomination scheme	1,133	827
Other temporary resident	489	690
Other family	476	687
Other visitor	316	397
Other visa categories	713	607
Total	136,651	142,405

Source: DIBP, Student visa program quarterly report, BR0097, June 30, 2013.

order to continue working in Australia, even though it is illegal to do so under a tourist visa. Another 18,833 obtained a 457 visa, 8,671 found a permanent resident to sponsor them for a spouse visa, and 2,978 extended their stay by obtaining a WHM visa.

This visa churning is legal, but nonetheless reflects the generous setting of the rules which act against the interests of local residents. We do not hold the data needed to detail the numbers of those holding a WHM or other temporary visa who engage in a similar merry-go-round of visa churning. It is likely to be on a large scale. The fact that Table 15.5 shows that 8,958 WHMs found an employer to sponsor them for a 457 visa in the year up to August 2012, is an indication.

Concluding Comments

The main purpose of this study has been to expose the mismatch between current immigration settings and the deteriorating labor market opportunities for local residents, particularly young Australians. They are facing fierce competition from permanent migrants and temporary migrants with work rights, especially in lower-skilled entry-level jobs, such as in the hospitality industries.

A key finding is that, as of May 2014, almost all of the net growth in jobs in Australia over the three years from May 2011 to May 2014 has been filled by overseas-born migrants who arrived in Australia since the beginning of 2011. To our knowledge, this has never been mentioned in the labor market literature. It is certainly not acknowledged by the Coalition government.

Readers will also search in vain for any acknowledgment that a high proportion of the skilled migrants being selected under the points-tested visa subclasses and the employer sponsorship visa subclasses are former overseas students benefiting from concessions dating to 2010. These accountants, cooks, and hairdressers (among others) are doing poorly in the Australian labor market and for the most part are not filling positions that are in short supply.

Those interested will find a recent literature questioning whether the SOL is functioning to ensure that occupations where there is a surplus of suitably trained residents in Australia are ineligible to apply for a points-tested visa. But for the most part this literature is buried in the official files of AWPA and other government agencies.

The result is that many Australian resident job seekers are losing out to competition from migrants in the labor market. Although there is plenty of government and employer rhetoric designed to reassure residents that their interests are foremost, the evidence reviewed above does not support such claims.

Residents' rights are likely to be further diluted as a result of negotiations surrounding the Free Trade Agreements the Australian government has been negotiating with Japan and South Korea and is currently negotiating with China. These agreements appear to prevent future Australian governments from strengthening the existing weak LMT rules for migrants recruited from the agreement countries who wish to sponsor temporary workers to Australia on 457 visas.

Note

* The authors wish to thank Katherine Betts for her advice and editorial assistance.

References

- Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2014) *The Labour Force*, May.
- Australian Computer Society (ACS) (2014) *ACS Submission to Independent Review of Integrity in the Subclass 457 Programme*, May, Appendix.
- Australian Dental Association (ADA) (2014) SOL Submission to Australian Workforce Productivity Authority.
- Australian Financial Review (AFR)* (2014), Graduates Hit Hard by Decision to Retain Skilled Migrant Status of Accountants, Opinion Piece, Edmund Tadros, July 7.
- Australian Nursing and Midwifery Federation (ANMF) (2014) *Submission to the 457 Integrity Review*, April, p. 3.
- Australian Workforce Productivity Authority (AWPA) (2013) *ICT Workforce Study*, July.
- Australian Workforce Productivity Authority (AWPA) (2014a) *Demand-Supply of Accountants*, March, p. 26.
- Australian Workforce Productivity Authority (AWPA) (2014b) *Specialised Occupations List*, accessed July 9, 2014.
- Birrell, B. (2013) *Too Many GPs*, Centre for Population and Urban Research, Research Report, March.
- Birrell, B. and Healy, E. (2008) "How Are Skilled Migrants Doing?" *People and Place*, Vol. 16, No. 1, Supplement, p. 5.

- Birrell, B. and Healy, E. (2010) "The February 2010 Reforms and the International Student Industry," *People and Place*, Vol. 18, No. 1, p. 76.
- Birrell, B. and Healy, E. (2013) *Scarce Jobs: Migrants or Locals at the End of the Queue?* Research Report, Centre for Population and Urban Research, Monash University, pp. 8–9.
- Brotherhood of Saint Lawrence (2014) *Australian Youth Unemployment 2014: Snapshot*, <http://www.bsl.org.au/advocacy/youth-employment/>
- Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU), Report Analysing the 457 Visa 2013 Reforms.
- Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR) (2011–2012) *Labour Market Research—Accountants*, p. 1.
- Department of Employment (2013) *Submission to the Update of the Skilled Occupation List for 2014*, December, pp. 12–13.
- Department of Immigration and Citizenship (Formerly Department of Immigration and Border Protection [DIBP]) (2013) *The Outlook for Net Migration*, December, p. 8.
- Kent, C. (2014) *Cyclical and Structural Changes in the Labour Market*, Reserve Bank 16, June.
- Mitchell, B. Australian labour market – unemployment rate higher than in crisis, <http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=28371>; Posted on July 10, 2014.

Notes on Contributors

Dharma Arunachalam is an associate professor and the director of the Centre for Population and Urban Research, School of Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Monash University. His research focuses on immigration and social cohesion in Australia. He is currently working on a monograph on Indian Australians.

Bob Birrell holds a PhD in Sociology from Princeton University. He is the founding director of the Centre for Population and Urban Research, Monash University, and the president of the Australian Population Research Institute.

Ana-Maria Bliuc is a lecturer at the School of Social Sciences, Monash University. Her main research areas are identity and social change, intergroup relations, and collective action.

Miriam Faine is Lecturer in Adult Education and English as a Second Language at the Faculty of Education, Monash University. Her research engages with issues and dilemmas in adult education across diverse contexts, with a current interest in transnational student experiences and in transnational online learning.

Nobuaki Fujioka holds a PhD graduate from the School of Social Sciences, Hitotsubashi University. He has conducted extensive survey research into Japanese working holiday makers to Australia and has been a visiting scholar at Monash University. He has been active in presenting his research findings at conferences in Japan and overseas.

Ernest Healy is a research affiliate with the Centre for Population and Urban Research, Monash University. He was a founding member of the centre in 1990 and a research fellow with the centre until 2014. He is also a researcher with the Australian Population Research Institute. His current research focus is on the linkages between cultural and economic ideologies and the long-term impact of market liberalism upon the structure and viability of the Australian economy.

Nobuko Hosogaya is an associate professor in the Faculty of Economics, Sophia University, Tokyo. Her special areas of interest and research are in international industrial relations and human resource management. In recent times her major research has been concerned with the impact of globalization upon human resource management in Japanese multinational corporations. For some years she was an active member of Japan's Business-University Forum and has assisted the Japanese Sociological Society through her work for the Local Organizing Committee for the XVIII ISA World Congress of Sociology, Yokohama, 2014.

Vicki Hutton holds a PhD graduate from the School of Social Sciences, Monash University. She was awarded the 2013 Mollie Holman Medal for excellence in doctoral research, marking her as a researcher "of the highest order." Her key areas of research and publications include subjective well-being, stigma (especially in relation to health conditions such as HIV), racism, and social inclusion.

Maria Karidakis is an associate with the School of Social Sciences, Monash University. Her current research explores how multicultural and multilingual perspectives inform the discourses around end-of-life care among Indigenous Australians.

Clive S. Kessler is a sociologist and social anthropologist and emeritus professor at the University of New South Wales. His main interest has been in the culture, society, religion, and politics of the Malay world. He also pursues research into the social, historical, and civilizational relations between the faith communities of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

Takashi Machimura is a professor at the Graduate School of Social Sciences, Hitotsubashi University. He is a former president of the Japan Association for Urban Sociology. He studies the impact of globalization on cities and regions in Japan. His recent work also explores social movements after the Fukushima accident.

Andrew Markus is a professor at the School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies, Faculty of Arts, Monash University. His research involves tracking changes in Australian public opinion, including attitudes toward immigrants and asylum seekers, through a series of national surveys. His research is part of the Scanlon Foundation's Mapping Social Cohesion project.

RoseAnne Misajon is a senior lecturer at the School of Social Sciences, Monash University. Her key areas of research include subjective well-being, health-related quality of life, psychometrics and scale development, experiences of prejudice, social inclusion, and culturally diverse populations.

Tetsuo Mizukami is a professor at the College of Sociology, Rikkyo University, Tokyo. He is also the director of the Rikkyo Institute for Global Urban Studies (April 2014–March 2016) and was an honorary senior research fellow at Monash University, Melbourne (September 2009–August 2010). He holds a PhD in Sociology from Monash University and an MPhil in Cultural Anthropology from Griffith University. His publications on migration and urban ethnicity include *Shiminga kangaeru korekarano iminseisaku* [*Civic Proposition onto Prospective Migration Policies*] (co-editor, 2015) and *The Sojourner Community: Japanese Migration and Residency in Australia* (2006).

Sue Plowright worked for several years as a senior manager in the faculty of a large Australian university. She holds a PhD from the Faculty of Education at Monash University; her research explored the politics of “quality” policies in higher education. She now researches higher education politics and policy and teaches postgraduate educational leadership and other courses in two Australian universities.

Terri Seddon is a professor at the Faculty of Education and Arts, Australian Catholic University. Her research interests include the sociology of education and work, historical and comparative sociology, and educational governance.

Hirohisa Takenoshita is a professor at Sophia University, Tokyo. His areas of interest include social stratification and inequality, economic sociology, and

international migration. He has conducted a cross-national comparison regarding the structure of inequality and institutional arrangements in East Asian societies. He has also explored economic inequality among *Nikkeijin* immigrants in Japan.

Shuko Takeshita is a professor at Aichi Gakuin University. Her research interests are cultural adaptability of husbands and wives and the cultural inheritance of children in intercultural families. Her publications include “Transnational Families among Muslims: The Effect of Social Capital on Educational Strategies,” W. Yang and M. Lu, eds., *Asian Cross-Border Marriage Migration*, 2010, and “The Passing CCKs in Japan: Analysis on Families of Cross-Border Marriages between Japanese and Brazilian,” *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*, 41 (3), 2010.

Akiyoshi Yonezawa is an associate professor at the Graduate School of International Development, Nagoya University. His research focuses on comparative higher education policy, the internationalization of higher education and public-private relationships in higher education.

Yukako Yonezawa is a PhD candidate at the Melbourne Graduate School of Education, University of Melbourne. Her research topics are related to the internationalization of Japanese university education.

Index

Note: Numerals in square brackets represent the number of times an entry occurs in the text, excluding references.

- A Multicultural Society for the Future[1], 51
- aging[12], 26, 37, 40–41, 108, 116, 119, 121, 243, 250, 263
- Alien Registration Act (Japan)[1], 41
- Allawi A.[2], 23
- altruism[3], 27, 147
- Anglo-Australian community[1], 148
- antiessentialist postcolonialist orthodoxy[1], 127
- Asia-Pacific region[3], 24, 50
- aspirational cosmopolitan ethic[1], 213
- assimilation[21], 51–52, 54, 95, 162–163, 181, 184
- Australian Assistance Plan (API)[1], 51
- Australian Election Study[1], 62
- Australian identity[10], 47, 52–53, 60, 65, 151, 154, 156
- Australian Labor Party[1], 11
- Australian mining and resources boom[1], 263
- Australian Muslims[2], 127, 137
- Australian Settlement[4], 48–50
- black company (burakkukigyō)[15], 253–257
- Blainey G.[12], 58–59
- bonding capital[4], 16, 147, 156
- Borrie, W. D.[3], 161–162
- Boutros Boutros-Ghali[1], 9
- Brazilian migrants (Japan)[4], 40, 107, 180
- bridging capital[3], 16, 147, 155
- bubble economy[10], 115, 118, 177, 193, 243–244, 257, 259
- bubble generation[2], 250
- burqa[1], 139
- business elites[3], 47, 50, 263
- CAAIP (Committee to Advise on Australia's Immigration Policies)[12], 59–61
- cheap credit[1], 12
- China[30], 12, 39, 41, 87, 119–120, 123, 162, 164, 167–168, 177–178, 180, 182, 192–193, 196–197, 199, 211, 215
- Chinese[27], 12, 40, 96, 119, 135, 163, 166–167, 169–170, 177, 180, 196, 199, 206, 215
- citizenship[104], 4, 17–18, 26, 38, 49, 61, 72, 77, 96, 105–106, 109, 127–128, 130, 138–142, 155, 192, 207, 209, 211, 213–214, 216–217
- civic engagement[8], 4, 6–8, 18
- civic networks[1], 7
- civic participation[19], 6, 147, 149, 151–156
- cognitive dissonance[2], 130–131
- cohesive communities[2], 6, 11
- collective humiliation[1], 23
- Committee to Advise on Australia's Immigration Policies (CAAIP)[1], 59
- Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration[1], 49
- Copenhagen Conference[1], 15
- Copenhagen Summit[1], 11
- cosmopolitanism[9], 13–14, 16, 47, 211, 217
- cross-border flows[1], 206
- cultural diversity[15], 48, 52, 54, 60, 66, 85–86, 90, 109
- cultural openness[3], 47, 61
- cultural politics[1], 209
- cultural uniformity[1], 162
- Danish cartoons[2], 128–129
- defense of Islam[1], 138
- democracy[16], 7, 10, 12, 15–16, 18, 26, 33, 49, 65, 71, 125, 130, 137, 206

- democratic citizenship[3], 127, 139, 211
 democratic sensibilities[1], 141
 denationalization[1], 18
 descendants of migrants[2], 163–164
 diaspora[8], 128, 132–133, 136, 141
 diversity[46], 4, 8, 13–14, 48, 52–54,
 60, 64, 66, 75, 85–86, 90, 95–96,
 109, 125, 156, 161, 163, 183, 208
 dual citizenship[1], 17
 dynamic identities[1], 214
- educational attainment[4], 6–7, 89, 251
 efficient institutions[1], 7
 English language proficiency[1], 150
 enmeshment[5], 11, 24–25, 28
 enterprise university[2], 210
 ephemeral gains[1], 23
 essentialism[3], 26, 127, 133
 ethnic affairs commissions[1], 52
 ethnic minorities[5], 89, 96, 104
 ethnic or cultural intermix[1], 162
 ethnicity[8], 26, 61, 64, 70, 74, 156
 ethnolinguistic fractionalisation[1], 7
 European Union[3], 17–18, 124
- face-to-face interaction[1], 139
 faith groups[1], 87
 feelings of closeness[1], 154
 Filipino[4], 166, 170, 183
 Fraser M.[16], 50, 52–53, 66, 70
 free trade[9], 10, 12–13, 24–25,
 47–48, 51, 77
 freeter[2], 250
- Galbally Report[2], 52
 global financial crisis[3], 13, 243, 263
 global governance[1], 210
 global integration[2], 14, 25
 global interdependence[3], 3, 8, 13
 global public interest[1], 18
 global university[3], 199, 201, 211
 globalization[65], 3–5, 7–17, 23, 25,
 27, 47, 77, 106, 115, 117–118, 125,
 128, 132–133, 142, 191, 199–201,
 207, 221, 239, 263
 Great Heisei Consolidation[9],
 120–123, 125
 group boundaries[1], 147
 Grynspan R.[5], 14
 guest worker[3], 103, 106
- halal[1], 40
 HECS (Higher Education Assistance
 Scheme)[1], 210
 high immigration[13], 25–28, 58,
 62–63, 263
 higher education[67], 191–201, 207,
 209–213, 215–217
 Higher Education Contribution Scheme
 (HECS)[1], 210
 historical self-sufficiency[1], 132
 Homusho (Ministry of Justice)[4],
 38–39, 41
 human capital[6], 3, 5–6
 human resource[9], 199–200, 250,
 254, 256
 human rights[28], 9, 11, 15, 17–18, 26,
 37, 70, 72–76, 96
- identity[104], 3–4, 14–18, 23, 25–28,
 47–48, 52–54, 60–61, 65–66, 70–71,
 75–77, 123–124, 138, 140, 151, 153–156,
 177, 179, 181, 183–184, 206–207,
 209–210, 214, 216
 ILRD (Individual Labor
 Related Dispute)[67], 221–224,
 228–236, 238–239
 imagined national communities[2],
 206–207
 immigrant[155], 25–26, 33, 41, 49, 60–61,
 65–66, 83–87, 89–91, 95–97, 103–109,
 148, 163, 167
 immigrant minorities[1], 26
 immigration[199], 25–28, 33, 37–41, 43,
 47–49, 51–52, 54, 58–66, 74, 77, 83–87,
 89, 91, 95–97, 103, 105–107, 109, 148,
 161, 192, 196–197, 263
 Immigration Act[2], 38
 Immigration Bureau[1], 41
 immigration control[11], 40–41, 97,
 105, 109
 Immigration Control and Refugee
 Recognition Act (Japan)[2], 41, 97
 immigration restriction[2], 49
 Immigration Restriction Bill[1], 49
 in-group altruism[2], 27, 147
 in-marriage[4], 27, 162, 164
 inclusive multiculturalist democracy[1], 137
 India[8], 12, 87, 162, 164, 168, 199, 211
 Individual labor-related dispute (ILRDs)[7],
 221, 223, 229, 231, 233, 235, 239

- informal volunteering[3], 150, 156
 Institute of Multicultural Affairs[2], 52
 integration[134], 9–15, 25–26, 49,
 95–97, 105–109, 117, 121, 123–124,
 127, 129, 131, 133, 135, 137, 139, 141,
 143, 161–165, 167, 169, 211
 intelligentsia[7], 26, 48, 58, 76, 263
 interest group politics[1], 53
 interfaith dialogue[1], 136
 intergroup communication[1], 152
 intermarriage[88], 26–27, 161–165, 167,
 169, 177, 179–184
 intermarriage rates[2], 164–165
 international students[71], 156, 192–200,
 207, 209–211, 213–214
 internationalization of higher
 education[21], 191–193, 195–201
 International Convention Against
 Racial Discrimination[1], 50
 intolerance[7], 16, 75, 90–91
 Islamic civilisation[1], 23
 Islamic migration[1], 17
 Islamophobia[1], 136
- Japanese identity[6], 177, 179, 181, 183–184
 Justice Higgins[1], 49
- Keidanren (The Japan Business
 Federation)[1], 33
 Korean[27], 40, 96, 109, 165–166,
 169–170, 177–178, 180–181
 Koseirodosho (Ministry of Health,
 Labour and Welfare)[4], 42
- labor arbitration[1], 49
 labor force[15], 4, 40, 119, 229, 233,
 243–244, 263
 Labor government[19], 51, 59, 61–64,
 66, 72–75, 263; *see also* Labor Party
 Labor Party[7], 11, 49–51, 58, 64, 76
 labor tribunal[2], 224
 language shift[3], 167–168
 Latham M.[1], 11
 liberal cosmopolitanism[2], 16, 47
 liberal democracy[2], 15, 26
 linguistic assimilation[1], 163
- mainstream[21], 53, 58–61, 64, 76–77,
 96, 107, 150–154
 majoritarian assumptions[1], 128
 majoritarian governmentalist Islam[5],
 132–133, 142–143
 majoritarian Islam[3], 131–133
 marriage registration data[4], 163–164
 mass immigration[8], 25–26, 47, 52
 METI (Keizaisangyosho – Ministry
 for Economy, Trade and Industry)[5],
 120, 198, 200
 Metropolitan Youth Union
 (MYU – Japan)[1], 258
 MHLW (Koseirodosho – Ministry for
 Health Labour and Welfare)[12], 108,
 198, 239, 248–249, 255–256; *see also*
 Koseirodosho (Ministry of Health,
 Labour and Welfare)
- migrant assimilation[3], 51–52
 migrant minorities[7], 13, 15, 17, 53
 migrant task forces[1], 51
 migrant workers[3], 37–38, 107
 Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
 (Koseirodosho)[15], 42, 177, 198, 222,
 228, 231, 234–236, 239, 249
 Ministry of Justice (Homusho)[3],
 38, 41, 198; *see also* Homusho
 (Ministry of Justice)
- Monash Academic Board[3], 212
 Monash University[15], 148, 207, 209–213,
 215, 217
 multicultural intellectuals[1], 47
 multicultural lobbyists[1], 47
 multicultural society[4], 51, 75, 138
 multiculturalism[104], 25–27, 47–49,
 51–55, 57–66, 70–71, 73–77, 88–90,
 106, 127, 129, 137–139, 142, 184
 multilateral free trade[6], 10, 24, 47–48,
 51, 77
 Muslim diaspora[4], 128, 133
 Muslim integration[2], 26, 127
 Muslims[62], 26–27, 88, 91, 127–138,
 141–142
 MYU (Metropolitan Youth Union)[6],
 258; *see also* Metropolitan Youth Union
 (MYU – Japan)
- nation building[2], 48
 nation of immigrants (Australia)[4],
 25, 60–61
 national borders[4], 184, 207, 211
 national identity[11], 18, 25–26, 52, 66,
 70, 76–77

- national knowledge[2], 206–207
 national skill requirements[1], 263
 nationality[50], 39–41, 96, 104, 109, 177–181, 184
 Nationality Act (Japan)[5], 179
 NEET(s)[3], 259
 negativity toward immigrants[1], 87
 neoclassical economics[1], 12
 neoliberal politics[1], 9
 neoliberalism[3], 51, 115, 124
 net overseas migration[3], 62–63, 263
 new globalization of Islam[3], 128, 133
 Newspoll Survey[2], 83, 88
 Nikkeijin[4], 97, 108
 niqab[1], 139
 NOM (net overseas migration)[1], 263; *see also* net overseas migration
 non-Muslim host societies[1], 128
 nonregular employment[26], 26, 28, 229, 233, 243, 248–249, 251–252, 254, 256–259
 North-South disparities[1], 9
- OJT (On the job training)[2], 248–249
 obscurantism[2], 137–138
 OECD[31], 3–5, 13–16, 33, 37, 41, 192, 194–195; *see also* Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
 Off-JT (Off the job training)[2], 248–249
 off-the-job training[1], 248
 Office of Multicultural Affairs[3], 54, 64, 77
 on-the-job training[1], 248
 open markets[2], 10, 13
 open republic[2], 18
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)[2], 3, 192
 overlapping consensus[2], 16
- Plan 100,000[10], 192, 194–196, 198
 Plan 300,000[5], 192, 198
 POSSE (non-profit organisation specializing in labour market advice – Japan)[7], 254, 258–259
 Prefectural Labor Bureau[5], 224, 228, 231, 236
 Prophet Muhammad[18], 129–130, 133–134, 136–138, 142–143
 protectionist society[1], 263
- racial homogeneity[1], 161
 racism[2], 73, 90
 radical Islam[2], 23, 136
 Rawls J.[6], 15–16
 reciprocal networks[1], 150
 refugees[12], 97, 148, 152, 154–155, 167
 regular employee[7], 239, 252, 256
 RENGO[5], 233, 255
 restrictive immigration[2], 48, 161
 reterritorialized spaces and orientations[1], 214
- Satanic Verses[3], 128, 142
 Scanlon Foundation[22], 83–88, 90–91
 sectionally sacralized sensitivities[1], 130
 segregation[3], 180
 self-development[1], 208
 small government[4], 13, 16, 48
 social anxiety[2], 58, 77
 social capital[27], 3–8, 10, 13, 27, 33
 social cohesion[133], 3–11, 13–17, 23–28, 33, 37, 39, 41–43, 47, 61, 63, 66, 70, 161–163, 206–207, 209, 211, 213, 215, 217
 social desirability hypothesis[1], 85
 social distance[3], 139, 161–162
 social division[3], 7–8, 206
 social fabric[2], 8, 26
 social inclusion[7], 11, 14–15, 33, 107–108
 social isolation[1], 153
 social polarisation[1], 9
 social well-being[2], 5, 147
 socioeconomic status[4], 107, 152–153
 sovereignty[9], 18, 26, 70, 72, 132–134, 206
 space of orientation[12], 207–209, 212–213, 215–216
 stigma[3], 180, 183–184
- tertiary education[5], 28, 148, 210, 212–213
 tertiary education quality and standards agency[2], 212–213
 Thatcher M.[1], 9
 Third Way Politics[3], 10–11
 Third World[2], 12, 117
 third-generation Australians[13], 85–86, 88–91, 169
 Tokyo Metropolitan Government[2], 115, 117

- tolerance[7], 16, 26, 48, 74–75
 trainee[29], 103, 109
 transnational communities[3], 17
- UN (United Nations)[33], 4–5,
 9–11, 13–14, 16–17, 47, 50–51,
 147, 216
 undocumented foreign population[2], 38
 unemployment[29], 28, 58, 62, 65,
 83, 97, 107–108, 222, 243–244
 UNESCO[1], 9
 United Kingdom[13], 4, 8–10, 33,
 83, 87, 164, 177, 193, 259
 United Nations[8], 4, 9, 11, 96, 147
 United States[26], 4, 7, 9–10, 12–13,
 39, 83, 97, 124, 132, 177, 180,
 193, 195–196, 199, 211
 universal peace[1], 16
 universities[88], 28, 131, 193–201,
 207, 209–212, 215–217, 256
 university managers[2], 212, 217
 unskilled immigrant[5], 96,
 105–107, 109
 unskilled jobs[1], 104
 unskilled workers[3], 96–97
 Uteem, C.[4], 15
- Vietnamese community[22], 27, 148–155
 Vietnamese family migration
 program[1], 148
 Vietnamese migrants[3], 154–155
 vocational training[8], 107–108, 248
 volunteer work[18], 147, 149–153
 volunteer-based organizations[1], 150
 volunteering[58], 6, 27, 147–156
 Volunteering Australia[2], 147
- Warrnambool speech[2], 58–59
 Washington Consensus[5], 10–12
 westernization[1], 23
 Westphalian social order[1], 206
 White Australia Policy[3], 50, 87, 148
 Whitlam G.[16], 50–51, 58, 70–71
 Williamson J.[2], 10
 within-group helping behavior[1], 153
 world city[10], 115–118
- xenophobia[6], 26, 58, 90
- young people[54], 140, 156, 243–244,
 248, 250, 253–259
 youth[29], 28, 42, 62, 97, 197, 243–244,
 249, 251, 253, 255–259, 263