

Gender and Power

Towards Equality and Democratic
Governance

Edited by

Mino Vianello

and

Mary Hawkesworth



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Mino Vianello

Università di Roma La Sapienza, Italy

and

Mary Hawkesworth

Rutgers University, USA

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Selection, introduction, conclusion and editorial matter © Mino Vianello and Mary Hawkesworth 2016

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Foreword © Raewyn Connell 2016

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First published 2016 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

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Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

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ISBN 978-1-137-51415-8 ISBN 978-1-137-51416-5 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781137514165

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

To Cynthia Fuchs Epstein

Pioneer in Gender and Power Studies

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Contents

<i>List of Figures and Tables</i>	x
<i>Foreword: Gender, Power, and the Worldwide Struggle for Equality</i> Raewyn Connell	xii
<i>Preface and Acknowledgments</i>	xx
<i>Notes on Contributors</i>	xxi

Introduction <i>Fatima Sadiqi</i>	1
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Part I Democratic Deficits: Sites, Contexts, and Tactics of Redress

Section Introduction

Michal Palgi

1 Women's Political Representation in Brazil <i>José Álvaro Moisés and Beatriz Rodrigues Sanchez</i>	11
2 Women and Political Participation in Morocco and North African States <i>Moha Ennaji</i>	35
3 Gender, Policy and Leadership: A Comparative Perspective <i>Joyce Gelb</i>	53
4 Probing the Parameters of Gender, Power, and Democracy in Nigeria <i>L. Amede Obiora</i>	64
5 Building Women's and Men's Political Representation in Post-Communist European Countries <i>Renata Siemieńska</i>	82
6 Women's Participation in Global Executive Positions <i>Michal Palgi</i>	103

Part II Explaining Inequalities: Multidisciplinary Perspectives

Section Introduction

Luigi Zoja

7	Economics, Gender, and Power <i>Elisabetta Addis</i>	121
8	Feminine Creativity and Masculine Power <i>Elena Caramazza</i>	137
9	The Centrality of Women in the Human Adventure <i>Piero P. Giorgi</i>	154
10	Gender and Power <i>Mino Vianello</i>	171
11	The Submissiveness Trap <i>Luigi Zoja</i>	187
12	A Different Power <i>Valeria Perucca</i>	195

Part III Reconceptualizing the Quality of Democracy

Section Introduction

José Álvaro Moisés

13	Gender and Democratic Governance: Reprising the Politics of Exclusion <i>Mary Hawkesworth</i>	215
14	Quality of Democracy and Political Inclusion <i>José Álvaro Moisés</i>	235
15	Gender and Democracy <i>Mino Vianello</i>	253

Part IV Strategies for Social and Political Transformation

Section Introduction

Jane H. Bayes

16	The Feminization of Authority in Morocco <i>Fatima Sadiqi</i>	275
17	Gender, Power, and Networks: Women's Organizing and Changing Gender Relationships in Africa and Latin America <i>Jane H. Bayes</i>	293
18	Gender Power and Violence: Perspectives for Change <i>Elena Liotta</i>	313

19	Gender Issues in Primary Childcare and Their Implications for Democracy <i>Eva Pattis Zoja</i>	331
20	Women's Mobilizations for Political Representation in Patriarchal States: Models from Japan and South Korea <i>Ki-young Shin</i>	344
	Conclusion <i>Renata Siemieńska</i>	366
	<i>Name Index</i>	375
	<i>Subject Index</i>	381

Figures and Tables

Figures

1.1	Latin America: Percentage of female candidates/percentage of women elected to the House of Representatives	17
1.2	Latin America: Proportion of seats occupied by women in national parliaments	18
1.3	Brazil: Participation of women in the top executive offices of political parties	20
1.4	Latin America: Percentage of female candidates/percentage of women elected to municipal governments	23
1.5	Latin America: Percentage of female candidates/percentage of women elected to city councils	24
1.6	Latin America: Percentage of female candidates/percentage of women elected to legislative assemblies	24
1.7	Latin America: Percentage of female candidates/percentage of women elected to the House of Representatives	25
1.8	Latin America: Growth rate of municipal governments	25
1.9	Latin America: Growth rate of city councils	26
1.10	Latin America: Growth rate of legislative assemblies	26
1.11	Latin America: Growth rate of House of Representatives	27
1.12	Revenue Success Index: Male and female candidates for office of state and federal deputies in 2006	30
1.13	Revenue Success Index: Male and female candidates for office of state and federal deputies in 2010	30
5.1	Acceptance of negative stereotype of women's role in politics according to gender in 1992–2008 (in percent) Polish General Social Survey (PGSS)	92
5.2	Acceptance of negative stereotype of women's role in politics according to gender and age in 2008 (in percent) PGSS	92
5.3	Acceptance of negative stereotype of women's role in politics according to gender and education in 2008 (in percent) PGSS	93
5.4	Introduction of quota not less than 35 percent of one gender (men or women) on the list of candidates in the last parliamentary elections in 2011	94
5.5	Women and men in the Sejm (lower chamber of parliament), 1985–2011 (percent)	95
20.1	World and regional averages of women in parliaments, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015	346

20.2	Women elected to lower house in Japan (1946–2012, percent)	347
20.3	Women legislators in local assemblies in Japan (1977–2012, percent)	348
20.4	Women elected in South Korean parliamentary elections (1948–2012)	349
20.5	Women elected in South Korean local elections (1991–2014)	349

Tables

1.1	Latin America: Adoption of quotas in different parliamentary houses	21
1.2	Financial resources used by men and women in the parliamentary and state level government elections in 2010	29
5.1	Percentage of women in selected parliaments during and after Communism in Eastern Central Europe	86
5.2	Political quotas in post-Communist countries	87
5.3	Views on characteristics of “democracy” in nine Central and East European countries in 1990–1991	89
5.4	“When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women” (percent agreement)	90
5.5	“Men make better political leaders than women do” (percent agreement)	90
14.1	Democracy index by regime type (2013)	238
17.1	African and Latin American countries: Percentage of women in Parliament	307
20.1	The institutional landscape of candidate gender quota legislation and party compliance in local elections	359

Foreword

Gender, Power, and the Worldwide Struggle for Equality

In the early 1990s a retired accountant called Esther Chávez Cano, living in Ciudad Juárez, on the northern border of México, became concerned at the murders of women in her area. She began documenting the killings, which were on a scale that led Mexican activists to speak of *feminicidio*, “femicide,” in parallel to genocide. Many killings were extremely brutal, with women disappearing and their bodies later being recovered from the desert around the city. Over the following years Chávez’s concern grew into a public campaign to end the impunity of the killers, and the neglect and denial by government. Amid continuing violence, a refuge and support center for women, *Casa Amiga*, was created, action was launched in human rights forums, and an international campaign of publicity and support developed, with participants as far away as Australia (Chávez, 2010; Cruz, 2013).

Was this another case of the age-old domination of women by men? Certainly the killers, so far as they are known, are men. But this isn’t a scenario of tradition. Juárez is a very modern, rapidly developed city. It is situated at an international border and sees massive truck traffic passing through. It is also a very new industrial center, the product of neoliberal globalization. Juárez is a site of large-scale foreign investment: in the 1990s it had hundreds of *maquiladoras*, light-industry factories producing goods for export, especially into the huge and wealthy US market just to the north. Women are preferred for this workforce: their wages are low and they are not unionized. Given rural poverty and unemployment elsewhere in México, internal migrants, often indigenous women trying to support themselves and their families, flooded into Juárez. There they found poor housing, poor transport, and few social services; in short, vulnerability. With an upheaval in customary gender relations, little policing, corrupt government, and on top of it all, an increasingly violent and hyper-masculine drug trade – in which large numbers of men were being killed, by rival gangs and by the state – a situation was created that led to appalling brutalities against women.

This is one example of the interplay between gender relations and global processes – economic, political, cultural, and embodied – that demands we think in new ways about gender and power. In a backhanded way, this has even become a problem in international relations. A narrative has been created, partly through the efforts of feminists in United Nations agencies

and other international forums, in which a key test of modernization and social well-being is the position of women. But this narrative could also be used for markedly non-feminist purposes, as became clear when the second Bush administration in the United States launched the “war on terror.” Neoconservative governments, and their anti-feminist supporters such as the Murdoch television and newspaper empire, made the emancipation of women from misogynist regimes a means of constructing images of righteous, protective masculinity for themselves – and justifying military interventions into Muslim-majority countries, notably Afghanistan and Iraq (Messerschmidt, 2010). This is still a theme in the Obama administration’s public relations.

Women are almost completely absent from the top economic and military decision-making of the countries launching such interventions. The invasions are accompanied by rhetoric that constructs an image of strong, protective masculinity for the political leaders. The irony of men from different patriarchal regimes killing each other in the name of women’s rights is almost unbearable.

How do we understand these events? Common-sense understandings picture gender as a biological dichotomy resulting in deep natural differences of psychology and behavior between women and men. This is little help in understanding real politics; and it is also factually wrong. A very large body of empirical research in psychology and related fields shows that there are few broad differences in measurable traits between men as a group and women as a group, or between girls and boys.

This massively documented fact, of great importance for understanding gender, is one of the best established generalizations in the human sciences (Hyde, 2005; Connell and Pearse, 2014). But it runs so strongly against popular ideologies of gender that it is little recognized; perhaps it would even be true to say, widely denied.

Differences between male and female bodies there certainly are, and any adequate account of gender must deal with childbirth, child rearing, and reproductive biology. Some Australian feminists have suggested that childcare is the structural basis of the whole gender order. But this should not be mythologized. Some significant “sex differences” in social behavior can be found, such as different rates of involvement in severe violence or participation in the paid workforce. It is empirically clear that these differences vary with circumstance. Such differences in conduct have far more to do with the different situations in which groups of men and women are historically placed (such as being members of armed forces, or committed to domestic labor) than with hypothetical natural differences of character or personality.

These problems have been greatly clarified in the last few decades, as it has come to be understood that gender is a social structure as well as a feature of personal life (Barbieri, 1992; Chakravarty, 2003, etc.). Gender

can be seen, in a first approximation, as the way social conduct, interactions, and institutions become organized in relation to human reproduction. To put it another way, gender processes are those that bring reproductive bodies and reproductive distinctions into history. Gender patterns change historically, and change in major ways. Gender arrangements are actively produced, in new arenas, as new institutional patterns come into existence. The computer industry, for instance, is notoriously gender-unequal, a fact of importance given its centrality to 21st-century economies. But it hardly existed 60 years ago.

The *steering* of those changes is inherently a political process, and it is in this process that power becomes clearly visible as a dimension of gender. The power dimension of gender relations is not a stark dichotomy, with men in one bloc here and women in another bloc there. There are multiple masculinities and multiple femininities in social life; this is a major finding of empirical research on gender by sociologists (e.g. Olavarria, 2009). Gendered power relations are woven through a complex terrain of institutions and cultural processes. Gender is in no sense segregated from other aspects of social life. So economic transformations, such as the creation of industrial economies or global trade networks, involve reconstructions of gender divisions of labor. And major cultural changes reconstruct gender ideologies, sometimes dramatically.

Political institutions, from international diplomacy to electoral processes and bureaucracy, always have gender dimensions. This was not highly visible when cabinets, armies, and managements were all men. But in fact an all-masculine institution *is* highly gendered, and that becomes visible when the first woman walks in the door. The advent of Australia's first female prime minister, Julia Gillard (2010–2013), triggered a shower of misogynist abuse from politicians, media, demonstrators, cartoonists, and others, which did not stop until her own party dumped her.

It is now a cliché that the institutional world of government, business, and media is a scene of globalization. The term was popularized in business journalism in the 1980s to describe the strategies of what were then called multinational corporations – global sourcing, global financing, and global marketing. In the 1990s the term became popular in social science, to describe what was usually seen as a novel and rapid worldwide homogenization of culture. Feminist critique and research soon began to explore the gendered character of globalization (Chow, 2003).

Most accounts of globalization have played down the continuities with the earlier history of European and North American imperialism. Strangely, the main centers of globalized culture happened to be the old imperial powers, and the old inequalities of wealth persisted. With them, came gender patterns. Historical research in the last 30 years has shown abundantly that imperial expansion was a strongly gendered process, and the colonial

societies created in its wake were also markedly gendered (e.g. Morrell, 2001; Reid, 2007).

The ruling groups of North Atlantic empires were almost entirely men – but not any men. Drawn from the gentry and masculinized occupations of the empire-building countries, particular patterns of power-oriented masculinity developed to sustain imperial rule, and colonial versions of femininity developed to sustain and reproduce the colonizers. Indigenous gender orders in colonized regions were often violently disrupted – mass rape was a usual part of conquest – and radically restructured, under missionary pressure or for economic exploitation. The workforces of plantation economies with slave or indentured labor, and colonial mines, were usually gender-divided. Domestic labor for the colonizers' households was also supplied by a gendered workforce. Modern race divisions, a distinctive feature of the history of imperialism, were produced in close interaction with gender arrangements (Viveros, 2007). It was not only the colonized whose gender relations were reshaped by imperialism. The masculinities of the conquerors, too, were deeply affected (Nandy, 1983).

Resistance to colonialism also took gendered shapes. Nationalist movements often relied on mobilizing women, but were usually led by men; and post-colonial regimes often took the form of a reinvigorated patriarchy (Mies, 1986). Not surprising, then, that women were prominent in the Arab Spring of 2011, at a time of multiple risings against neocolonial dictatorships across the Arab-speaking world.

The gendered character of the contemporary world economy and political system, then, is not accidental. It grows out of a long history of gendered power relations, embedded in the institutional structures of imperial and post-colonial societies. It also grows out of a history of struggle, because none of these arrangements has been instituted without conflict.

There is now research from many parts of the developing world about the economic changes connected with the new strategies of international capitalism that have come to be summarized as “neoliberalism” (Connell and Dados, 2014). The *maquiladoras* of Mexico are part of a scene that includes the clothing factories of the “south China economic miracle,” the micro-processor assembly plants of south-east Asia, business parks in Morocco, and call centers in India. Change in economic gender relations spills into old industries too. The export agriculture of Chile, expanded by neoliberalism's comparative-advantage strategy, drew rural women into paid labor for the first time. Domestic labor too has become an export industry. Filipina and Indonesian women have become breadwinners for their families as maids, housekeepers, and childcare and elder-care workers in South-East and East Asia and the Gulf states. Their remittances are now an important part of economic strategy for the home country.

This is also a scene of resistance and social struggle, as the story of Ciudad Juárez shows. In other sites there are attempts to develop countervailing power through unionization, supported by international union confederations, addressing issues such as poor health and safety conditions as well as wages. There are local movements concerned with bullying, rape, childcare problems, and other aspects of gender politics in the new workplaces. And there is an intricate network of connections that reach across local and national boundaries, from informal web-based feminist discussion to highly organized NGOs and international agencies (Moghadam, 2005; Harcourt, 2009). Such connections provide vital resources for new forms of policy activism, which monitor and attempt to steer state policy in its impact on gender relations. A striking example is the Index of Achieved Commitments developed by a feminist network in Latin America, as a tool of “citizen control” (Valdés, 2001).

Aid programs to developing countries, which grew to significant size during the Cold War, were dominated by men and mostly supported men’s economic activity. This was subjected to feminist critique from the 1970s on, and a “Women in Development” strategy emerged in donor institutions. This mutated into a “Gender and Development” strategy that tried to incorporate men as well as women as agents in achieving gender equality (Harcourt, 2009). The strategy of involving men in gender reform was pursued in other arenas, with most success so far in Scandinavia (Holter, 2003). It has been taken up in other UN forums, and increasingly through an international network of NGOs, now formalized as MenEngage (www.menengage.org), which links anti-violence campaigns, engaged fatherhood projects, AIDS prevention, and more.

The “NGO-ization of feminism” is controversial, many seeing it as a sell-out to neoliberalism. So far no significant alternative for transnational organizing has emerged. Such organizations and networks now exist in all regions of the world. They have been important in sustaining pressure for gender reform through the worldwide turn of political elites toward neoliberalism, a policy shift that broadly advantages middle-class men, while disadvantaging both women dependent on the state for transfers of income or protection of rights, and working-class men thrown out of employment by restructuring.

To think of gendered power on a world scale, then, is not just a matter of scaling up local-level models of patriarchy. It is to recognize the importance of new types of institutions: transnational corporations, international NGOs, worldwide electronically managed markets, global media, global mass transport systems, and a transnational security state.

All of these institutions are strongly gendered, as a growing body of research has shown (e.g. Gierycz, 1999). Transnational corporations, to take just one instance, have managements that are overwhelmingly men, operating within masculinized organizational cultures. But they employ very large

numbers of women, in other gendered roles – for instance as clerical workers, factory operatives, sales personnel, and so forth. And they employ large numbers of men in strongly gendered positions too, including oil and transport workers, guards and private police, technicians and tradesmen. Gender arrangements in contemporary global society, thus, are by no means just a hangover of tradition. However fragmentary, a gender order on a planetary scale has been brought into existence, mainly in the last two generations.

There is still only a little research that looks at the gender patterns at the elite levels of transnational institutions. Top power-holders are, of course, hard to research directly. But their lives and work leave public traces – decisions, media appearances, memoirs – which can be studied. Researchers have begun to use these traces, and studies of people a little lower in hierarchies of power and wealth, to develop understandings of the gender patterns in the heavily masculinized elite levels of global power. Studies of managerial masculinities in the international economy are now appearing (Olavarría, 2009). This research also illuminates the situation of women. In a striking study in the international chemical industry, it has been shown how women rising into management levels of large corporations are obliged to take on the masculinized practices and outlook of their environment, constructing their home lives as well as their work lives to suit – in short, to “manage like a man” (Wajcman, 1999).

The concepts and analyses underlying the discussion above, and the discussions in this book, mostly come from thinkers in the global North. That is where most of the funding, skilled labor, and institutional support for gender research are located. The global North is also, as part of a longstanding global division of labor, the source of almost all internationally circulating gender *theory*. This is a problem; because intellectual frameworks grow out of the social experience of the regions the theorists come from and work in. And the majority of the world’s people live in other parts of the world, and have different social and historical experiences.

It is easy, within Northern intellectual frameworks, to think about gender and power only as it is experienced in relatively wealthy and well-armed societies – and thus to miss the largest-scale structures of power, which operate on a world scale. These are more visible from the global periphery, and the colonized world too has intellectuals, and has produced analyses of colonialism and globalization – including the gender dimensions. There is a global history, not just a Northern history, of consciousness about gender.

I want to finish, then, with a reminder of the importance of opening discussions about gender to the experience and ideas of the global South, broadly understood. Connecting different feminist experiences from around the world, and linking different conceptual approaches, is difficult – but it is being attempted (Bulbeck, 1998). To educate ourselves for this means recognizing a wider history of thought about gender, including pioneers such as Kartini (2005) in the Dutch East Indies, or He-Yin Zhen in late imperial

China. It means paying serious attention to powerful recent gender theorists such as Fatima Mernissi (1985) from Morocco, Heleieth Saffioti (1969) from Brazil, and Bina Agarwal (1994) from India.

It is only by using our worldwide intellectual resources that an understanding of gender and power on a global scale can be built; and then we will be in a position to honor adequately the work of such remarkable activists as Esther Chávez. I welcome the international collaboration that has gone into this book, and hope that it brings fresh ideas to a wide readership.

Raewyn Connell
University of Sydney

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Preface and Acknowledgments

In 2010, Professor Mino Vianello initiated an exchange of ideas on Gender and Power among a small group of researchers active in the field of Gender Studies. To expand the range of perspectives in the discussion, Professor Vianello recruited additional scholars from multiple disciplines and nations to prepare papers to present at an intensive seminar on Gender, Power, and Democracy. Prepared over the course of one year, these papers were the object of lengthy discussions during a week-long self-financed workshop held at the Conference Center at San Servolo in Venice in the summer of 2013.

The conversations during that workshop were unique, bringing together scholars, practitioners, and activists from multiple nations and diverse academic disciplines, who differed in their methodological approaches, theoretical frameworks, and intellectual styles. What the seminar participants shared was a vibrant commitment to inclusive democratic practices, gender equality, and open intellectual exchange. In the course of intensive debates at San Servolo, the participants committed to the creation of a book that would bring their competing views of gender, power, and democracy to a wider public. Through intensive discussion, participants agreed to organize their work under four thematic frames: (I) Democratic Deficits: Sites, Contexts, and Tactics of Redress; (II) Explaining Inequalities: Multidisciplinary Perspectives; (III) Reconceptualizing the Quality of Democracy; and (IV) Strategies for Social Transformation.

From August 2013 through June 2014, each chapter for the volume was revised, peer reviewed by two workshop participants, and revised again on the basis of their critical feedback. In August 2014, a second week-long self-financed workshop was organized at San Servolo to discuss the revised chapters, prepare introductions to each section of the book, and to draft an introduction and conclusion for the volume. The result is the present book.

The contributors to this volume are grateful to Mino Vianello for his stalwart leadership of this project and for his gracious hospitality in the beautiful city of Venice. We would also like to express our sincere thanks to Dr. Fulvio Landillo, Director of the San Servolo Servizi – Provincia di Venezia, and his assistant Dr. Andreina Forieri, for the financial facilitation in hosting both workshops in their institution. We are also grateful to Prof. Agar Brugiavini, Dean of the Venice International University, and her assistant, Dr. Igor Folca Nash, for allowing us to use their remarkable facilities. We are thankful to all of them for the gift of time and cooperation they afforded us.

Contributors

Elisabetta Addis is an economist working primarily on gender issues. She holds an Italian University degree from the Scuola Normale in Pisa (1978), a PhD from Clark University, Massachusetts, and has received fellowships at the Center for European Studies at Harvard and The European University Institute in Florence. She is a founding member of *Se Non Ora Quando*, the activist group that launched the demonstrations of 13 February 2011 in Italy, and of IAFFE (International Association for Feminist Economics). Most recently she coauthored the Reports of the Research “A Meta-analysis of Gender and Science” financed by the European Commission under the 7th Framework Programme. She is Professor of Economics at the University of Sassari, and teaches course on Policy and Economics of Welfare at LUISS Guido Carli in Rome. She has a blog on Huffington Post Italy and can be found on twitter as @Eliaddis.

Jane H. Bayes is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute of Gender, Globalization, and Democracy at California State University, Northridge. She also is the Director of the International Social Science Council Research Network on Gender and Globalization. Most recently, she edited and contributed to *Gender and Politics: The State of the Discipline* (2012). She is a coauthor of *Women, Democracy and Globalization in North America* (Palgrave, 2006) and co-editor and contributor to *Globalization, Gender, and Religion: The Politics of Implementing Women's Rights in Catholic and Muslim Contexts* (2001); *Gender, Globalization and Democratization* (2001); and *Comparable Worth, Pay Equity and Public Policy* (1988). Her other books include *Minority Politics and Ideologies in the United States* and *Ideologies*.

Elena Caramazza is a medical doctor and pediatrician, and a member and preceptor of the Italian Association of Analytical Psychology. She has published several articles and reviews in *Rivista di Psicologia Analitica* and in *Studi Jungiani*, as well as book chapters, such as “L'Ombra” (“The Shadow”) in *Trattato di Psicologia Analitica*, edited by Aldo Carotenuto (1992), “L'Ombra della motivazione nella relazione analitica” (“The motivation's shadow in the analytical relationship”) in *Cosa Muove il Mondo. Sulla Motivazione* (“What moves the world. On motivation”), Magi, 2009. She has coauthored with Mino Vianello *Gender Space Power* (2007), which has been translated into several languages. She has also been the keynote speaker at the fifth National Congress of Analytical Psychology (2005).

Raewyn Connell holds a University Chair in the University of Sydney. She has previously held posts in other universities in Australia and the USA, and visiting positions in Canada, the USA, and Germany. Her early research explored class dynamics (*Ruling Class, Ruling Culture*, 1977 and *Class Structure in Australian History*, 1980), and the ways class and gender hierarchies are remade in the everyday life of schools (*Making the Difference*, 1982). She developed a social theory of gender relations (*Gender and Power*, 1987), which emphasized that gender is a large-scale social structure not just a matter of personal identity. She was one of the founders of the research field on masculinities, and her book *Masculinities* (1995, 2005) is the most cited in the field. She has been an advisor to UNESCO and UNO initiatives relating men, boys, and masculinities to gender equality and peacemaking. In other applied fields she has worked on poverty and education (*Schools and Social Justice*, 1993), sexuality and AIDS prevention, gender equity, violence prevention, and labor movement strategy (*Socialism & Labor*, 1978). Her most recent work develops a sociology of intellectuals in the context of neoliberal globalization. Her book *Southern Theory* (2007) critiques the Northern bias of mainstream social science, and surveys social theories that arise in the global periphery.

Moha Ennaji is a Moroccan academic with research interests in gender issues, language, and migration. His most recent publications are: *Multilingualism, Cultural Identity and Education in Morocco* (2005); *Language and Gender in the Mediterranean Region*, IJSL Issue 190, Editor (2008); *Migration and Gender in Morocco*, coauthored with F. Sadiqi (2008); *Women Writing Africa, the Northern Region*, co-edited with F. Sadiqi et al. (2009); *Women in the Middle East*, co-edited with F. Sadiqi (2010); and *Gender and Violence in the Middle East* (2011). He is a professor at Fès University and a visiting professor at Rutgers University. He is the President of the South North Center for Intercultural Dialogue and a founding president of the International Institute for Languages and Cultures at Fès, Morocco. His writing has also appeared in international publications including *Common Ground News*, *The Project Syndicate*, *Al-Ahram*, *The Khaleej Times*, *The Boston Globe*, and in many Arabic newspapers.

Joyce Gelb is Professor Emerita of Political Science at City College of New York and Graduate Center, CUNY. Recipient of numerous international grants and awards, she has been a visiting scholar at Tokyo Metropolitan University, Mexico City CIDE Centro, and Australian National University, Shanghai University, Taiwan Cultural Center, and University of Haifa. She has been a consultant on Women and Politics for the Asia Foundation, the Aspen Institute, the Ford Foundation, the Social Science Research Council, and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. Her major works include: *Women and Politics Worldwide* (2009); *Gender Policies in Japan and the United States:*

Comparing Women's Movements, Rights and Politics (2003); *Women and Public Policies* (1996, 1987); *Women of Japan and Korea: Continuity or Change* (1994); and *Feminism and Politics: A Comparative Analysis* (1989).

Piero P. Giorgi holds a BSc in Biology from the University of Bologna (Italy) in 1965 and a PhD in Neurology from the University of Newcastle upon Tyne (UK) in 1974. He did research and taught in several universities in Europe (Italy, UK, and Switzerland) before joining in 1981 the University of Queensland (Brisbane), where he did research and taught Developmental Neurobiology, Medical History, and Peace Studies (Political Sciences) for 23 years. In 1997 he was awarded a fellowship by the Australian Institute of Biology. He has published one hundred papers in refereed journals, five books about history and peace, and eight chapters about neurobiology and nonviolence. From 1995 to 2003 he was the editor of the bilingual journal *Convivio* dedicated to Italian Studies. His hobbies include reading, writing historical novels, and being in nature.

Mary Hawkesworth is Distinguished Professor of Political Science and Women's and Gender Studies at Rutgers University. Her teaching and research interests include feminist theory, women and politics, contemporary political philosophy, philosophy of science, and social policy. Her major works include *Political Worlds of Women: Activism, Advocacy, and Governance in the 21st Century* (2012); *War and Terror: Feminist Perspectives* (2008); *Globalization and Feminist Activism* (2006); *Feminist Inquiry: From Political Conviction to Methodological Innovation* (2006); *Women, Democracy and Globalization in North America* (Palgrave, 2006); *The Encyclopaedia of Government and Politics* (1992; 2nd Revised Edition, 2004); *Beyond Oppression: Feminist Theory and Political Strategy* (1990); and *Theoretical Issues in Policy Analysis* (1988). She served as editor of *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* (2005–2015).

Elena Liotta is a clinical psychologist who has specialized as a psychoanalyst, and training analyst. In addition to her clinical practice, over the course of her career, she has served as a city councilor in the Local Government of Orvieto, and held appointments in city agencies focusing on Health, Education, Social Services, and Youth. She has also served as supervisor of women's help organizations, and Professor of Continuing Education, offering courses with a gender perspective on public social services and education, as well as on gender socialization in early childhood. Recently, she has served as a consultant for women soldiers serving on UN Missions, training them to recognize and assist women suffering from abuse. She also works as a consultant on refugees, international multicultural encounters, and issues facing immigrant women particularly with respect to food and resettlement. She has a continuing collaboration with intercultural Frauenzentrum SUSI, Berlin.

José Álvaro Moisés is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Public Policy Research (NUPPs) at the University of São Paulo in Brazil. Has published books, articles, and chapters in Portuguese, English, Japanese, and Spanish, including *A Desconfiança Política e seus Impactos na Qualidade da Democracia – o caso do Brasil* (2013); *O Congresso Nacional no Presidencialismo de Coalizão* (2011); “The Effects of Political Discontent for Democratic Legitimacy,” *International Review of Sociology* (2011); and “Political Discontent in New Democracies: The Cases of Brazil and Latin America,” *International Review of Sociology*, 21: 339–366. He is a member of the Executive Committee of the International Social Sciences Council (ISSC) of UNESCO, the Executive Committee of the International Political Science Association, Chair of the Research Committee on the Quality of Democracy of IPSA, and editor of the website qualidadedademocracia.com.br. He has been a visiting fellow at St. Antony’s College (1991–1992), Oxford University; and he served as National Secretary for Cultural Support (1995–1998) and National Secretary for Audiovisual Development (1999–2002), Ministry of Culture, in the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration in Brazil.

L. Amede Obiora holds advanced law degrees from the University of Nigeria, Yale University, and Stanford University. A former Minister of Mines and Steel for the Federal Republic of Nigeria, she served as the Coca-Cola World Fund Visiting Faculty at Yale University and is the recipient of several distinguished awards, including fellowships from the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford, Institute for Advanced Studies Fellowship at Princeton, Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Study Center, and the Djerassi Resident Artist Program. She has been the Genest Global Faculty at Osgoode Hall Law School in Toronto, the Visiting Gladstein Human Rights Professor at the University of Connecticut, and the manager for the World Bank Gender and Law Program. She is the founder of the Institute for Research on African Women, Children and Culture (IRAWCC) and the Convener of both the Leadership Enterprise for African Development (LEAD) and SPIN which is a corollary initiative to stimulate the growth of indigenous philanthropy in Nigeria. She has published extensively and lectured at different forums across the globe. She is Professor of Law at the University of Arizona.

Michal Palgi is Head of the Institute for Research of the Kibbutz and the Cooperative Idea at The University of Haifa and Founder of the Master’s Program in Organizational Development and Consulting at Emek Yezreel College. She has served as President of the International Communal Studies Association, Chair of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Emek Yezreel College, and President of research Committee on Participation, Organizational Democracy and Self-Management at International Sociological Association. Her major works include: *The Paradox in Partnership; Sexual*

Equality: The Israeli Kibbutz Tests the Theories; On Hundred Years of Kibbutz Life: A Century of Crises and Reinvention; and Industrial Democracy in Israel.

Eva Pattis Zoja is a clinical psychologist and Jungian psychoanalyst with ÖGAP (Österreichische Gesellschaft für Analytische Psychologie), AGAP (Association of Graduate Analytical Psychologists), CIPA (Centro Italiano Psicologia Analitica), and NYAAP (New York Association for Analytical Psychology). She holds a Diploma in Sandplay with ISST (International Society for Sandplay Therapy). She has taught courses at the C.G. Jung Institute, Zürich, C.G. Jung Foundation, New York, and ÖGAP, Vienna. She has been in private practice in Vienna and Bolzano/Bozen (1980–1985), Milan (1985–2002 and from 2002 to current date), New York (2000–2002). Her major works in English include: *Abortion. Loss and Renewal in the Search for Identity* (1997); *Sandplay Therapy: The Treatment of Psychopathologies* (2002); *Sandplay Therapy in Vulnerable Communities* (2011). She currently works in South Africa, China, and Colombia on a project in Expressive Sandplay, helping neglected children in areas where psychotherapy is not available. Her most recent work is available in German, *Expressive Sandarbeit* (2012).

Valeria Perucca is a medical anthropologist and member of the Scientific Committee of the Institute on Decision Making Processes in Emergency Medicine at the Catholic University of Milan. She is the author of “Psychopathology and Culture: Toward a Psychopathological Culture,” *International Review of Sociology* (2010).

Beatriz Rodrigues Sanchez is an MA candidate in Political Science at the University of São Paulo – USP. She graduated with a bachelor’s degree in International Relations at the same university. She is a research fellow of the Center for Public Policy Research (NUPPs) at USP and works on the project “Brasil, 25 years of democracy – a critical survey: Democratic institutions, civil society, political culture and public policies.” Research on women’s political participation and representation is central to this study.

Fatima Sadiqi is a former Fulbright Scholar and recipient of a Harvard Fellowship. She is Professor of Linguistics and Gender Studies, author of, among other works, *Women, Gender, and Language in Morocco* (2003); editor of *Women and Knowledge in the Mediterranean* (2012); co-editor of *Women in the Middle East and North Africa. Agents of Change* (2010); *Gender and Violence in the Middle East* (2011); and *Women Writing Africa: The Northern Region* (2009). She founded the first Moroccan Centre for Studies and Research on Women in 1998 and the first graduate program on Gender Studies in 2000 at the University of Fez. In 2006, she founded the Isis Centre for Women and Development (with the aim of bridging the gap between the university and civil society) and in 2009 she was elected President of the National

Union of Women's Associations. In the same year, she cofounded the International Institute for Languages and Cultures (INLAC). She was nominated a member of the UN Council for Development Policy (ECOSSOC), and was also nominated a member of the Administrative Board of the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture (IRCAM). From 2007 to 2009, she served as Director General of the Fes Festival of Sacred Music. She is currently writing a book on Moroccan feminist discourses with a focus on the missing dimension of Berber women's agency in these discourses.

Ki-young Shin is an associate professor at the Graduate School of Humanities and Sciences and affiliated researcher at the Institute for Gender Studies at Ochanomizu University in Japan. She holds a PhD in Political Science from University of Washington, Seattle. Her current research interests include gender quotas, comparative women's movements, and gender mainstreaming policies in East Asian countries. Her works are published in English, Japanese, and Korean academic journals. She has also contributed to edited volumes, including *Law and Social Movements*; *Global Gender Research: Transnational Perspectives*; and *Routledge Handbook of Japanese Politics*; as well as Japanese and Korean books. She was honored with the Betty Nosveld Best Paper Award for the paper on women and politics at the 2004 Western Political Science Association.

Renata Siemińska is Professor, UNESCO Chair in Women, Society, Development, Chair of Sociology of Social change at M. Grzegorzewska University in Warsaw, and Head of the Center of Interdisciplinary Gender Studies at the R.B. Zajonc Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw. She has served as President of the UN International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW) in Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic), and as an expert for the UN, UNESCO (Division of Human Rights and Peace), and the Council of Europe. She was a member of the Advisory Board of the Plenipotentiary of Equal Status of Men and Women in Poland (1992–2005). Her most recent scholarly works include: *Spółczesność w czasach zmiany. Badania Polskiego Generalnego Sondażu Społecznego 1992–2009* (Polish Society at the Time of Change) (2009); Changing Conceptions of Gender, a special issue of the *International Journal of Sociology* 38(4) (2008); *Gendered Career Trajectories in Academia in Cross-National Perspective* (2007); *Płeć – wybory – władza* (Gender – Elections – Power) (2005); *Aktorzy życia publicznego. Płeć jako czynnik różnicujący* (Actors of Public Life. Gender as Differentiating Factor) (2003); and *Women and Men in Elites: Cross-National Study* (1999).

Mino Vianello (University of Rome, "La Sapienza") has concentrated his research over the last 40 years on the issue of gender and power. In 1975, he launched the first international survey on this topic, which owing to the

scientific community's lack of interest restricted the study to Canada, Italy, Poland, and Romania. In 1991, when this research conducted with Renata Siemienka appeared (*Gender Inequality: A Comparative Study of Discrimination and Participation*, Sage), it became possible to extend the study to the 27 most advanced countries of the globe. In 2000, part of the research, co-edited with Gwen Moore, appeared as *Gendering Elites: Economic and Political Leadership in 27 Industrialised Societies* (Palgrave Macmillan), which received the Descartes Prize "Honorable Mention," the first time for the Social Sciences, from the European Commission. The complete study, co-edited with Gwen Moore, appeared in 2004 as a special issue of *Contemporary Sociology* and as a book, *Women and Men of Political and Business Elites in the Industrialised World* (Sage 2005). At the same time, together with Elena Caramazza, Vianello started a theoretical investigation of what gender means for power, publishing three books, the last of which (*Gender Space Power*, 2005) was translated into Chinese, French, German, Italian, Japanese, and Spanish.

Luigi Zoja is Past President of the IAAP (International Association of Analytical Psychology), and a Jungian analyst practicing in Milan, who now devotes half his time to writing. His writings have been translated into 14 languages. His books in English include: *Drugs, Addiction and Initiation* (1989, 2000); *Growth and Guilt: Psychology and the Limits of Development* (1995); *The Father: Historical, Psychological and Cultural Perspectives* (2001, 2002); *Cultivating the Soul* (2005); *Ethics and Analysis* (2007, 2008); and *Violence in History, Culture and the Psyche* (2009).

Introduction

Fatima Sadiqi

This collective volume addresses some of the most significant intersections between gender, power, and democracy with the aim of localizing the deficits in democracy and improving the quality of democratic practices through reconceptualization and strategizing. Intertwined in complex and poorly understood ways, gender, power, and democracy are becoming increasingly important to both democratic theory and praxis. To achieve both scope and depth, the book is interdisciplinary and transnational. It provides novel perspectives and groundbreaking views on complex challenges involving gender, power, and democracy in the 21st century.

Realities on the ground and across cultures and regions indicate that in spite of women's participation in politics, the economy, and law-making, and in spite of the progress that this participation has engendered, existing democracies remain deficient at social, economic, and political levels. This quasi-structural deficiency in democracy-building is largely due to persistent inequitable power-sharing and gender inequality. Feminine and feminist approaches continue to be marginalized, albeit with differences from one society to another. On the other hand, there is no "going back" with respect to women's hard-won gains. Women have become part and parcel of the public sphere of power, and their absence from the engineering and implementation of democracies will only make those democracies even more deficient. Indeed, the emergence of women in the powerful spheres of decision-making and authority, as well as their intention to sustain their hard-won gains in various fields, are posing serious challenges to democracy and indicate a push for more gender-inclusive policies and actions. Admittedly, the weight of the centuries-old marginalization of women from the spheres of politics, economy, and law-making is engendering resistance, hence the importance of an interdisciplinary approach (a combination of sociological, psychoanalytic, and historical treatments) to understand and counter women's marginalization.

This state of affairs calls for a clear understanding of the nature and causes of persistent inequalities between women and men with the aim

of improving democracy. Gender inequalities are deeply rooted in pervasive and multifaceted patriarchy, which starts at the level of the family and continues in institutions and society at large. The causes of gender inequality are social and psychological. Understanding gender inequalities leads to reconceptualization in the studies on democracy, which, in turn, leads to strategizing and social transformation.

These ideas constitute the core of this volume, hence its structuring into four major parts: (i) democratic deficits: sites, contexts, and tactics for redress; (ii) explaining inequalities; (iii) reconceptualizing the quality of democracy; and (iv) strategies for social transformation. The parts interact and feed into each other. The contents of each section are provided by authors who belong to different genders, cultures, geographical locations, and disciplines. However, the physical and virtual encounters between the contributors facilitated the synergy and cross-fertilization of ideas and experiences.

Section I assesses various deficits in democracy. Taking democracy in its most elementary sense as “rule by the people,” the chapters document the profound absence of women’s full participation in various parts of the world and in various social sectors. As male domains par excellence, politics and the corporate sector are arenas where gender inequality is pervasive despite two centuries of women’s mobilization for inclusion. Case studies from nations as different and distant from each other as Brazil, Japan, Morocco, Nigeria, Taiwan, Poland, and other post-socialist states propose ways in which women’s participation is both promoted (e.g. quota systems) and blocked (e.g. patriarchal political culture). The one consensus that seems to transpire (directly or indirectly) from the papers is that only an efficient and sustained participation of women in politics can improve democracy. This implies that work is needed on the nature of women’s participation and ways in which feminist agency can be included in political culture with the aim of attaining social justice. Diagnosing democratic deficits and exploring tactics that remedy them, these chapters examine political structures, election rules, campaign finance, political parties, social movements, cultural values, and corporate practices, and their complex effects on women’s persistent underrepresentation in positions of power and prestige.

The pervasiveness of gender inequities within and across nations requires explanation, especially in an era in which 189 countries have ratified the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Yet it is no easy feat to explain inequalities that characterize interpersonal relations, family dynamics, social conventions, legal status, institutional practices, political hierarchies, corporate operating procedures, and religious doctrines, as well as national and international systems. In Section II, contributors draw upon different theoretical frameworks, methodological approaches, and analytical techniques to explain gender inequalities. The authors use creativity, myth, centrality, difference, and symmetry as vantage

points from which to explain the inequality in gender dynamics. Their analyses challenge received views across an array of disciplines. For example, contemporary economic theory, which has had a profound influence on the understanding of decision-making, is based on a “General Equilibrium” model in which no explicit mention of gender or power is to be found. Resources and power continue to be allocated and reallocated in ways that privilege men more than women, yet the fundamental assumptions of the discipline of economics ignore gender as a category of analysis.

Several chapters in this section turn to psychoanalysis to explain the pervasiveness and persistence of gender inequality. In contrast to social sciences committed to the criterion of falsifiability to demarcate the realm of empirical investigation, psychoanalysis embraces a broader vision of *scienze umane* (It.), *sciences humaines* (Fr.), *scencias humanas* (Sp.), *Geisteswissenschaften* (German): literally sciences of the *spirit* as conceptualized by Dilthey.¹ Although they do not conform to critical rationalist notions of falsifiability as laid out by Karl Popper, psychoanalytic theories are evidence-based: tests can prove that therapies are effective. Psychoanalysis also breaks with the conception of “healing” central to the medical model of science. Conceiving healing as restoring a patient to the condition prior to illness, the medical model seeks to restore equilibrium. Psychoanalysis, particularly as envisioned by Jung, has a teleological rather than a restorative aim. Psychoanalysis seeks to enable a new mode of consciousness, which engenders new possibilities for existence. Rather than going back to an initial condition, the goal is transformative. By drawing insights from psychoanalysis, then, contributors probe dimensions of inequality omitted from traditional social and medical sciences. Whether examining feminine creativity and masculine power or the submissiveness trap, the authors envision possibilities for women and men to transcend gendered dynamics that have haunted interpersonal and social relations for centuries.

With the ascendancy of poststructuralism in the contemporary academy, both the kind and the temporality of theorization have been constrained. With the proscription of “totalizing theories” and “grand narratives,” the scope for analyzing gender inequalities has been dramatically curtailed. Several chapters in Section II defy such proscriptions in order to take the long view in examining gender inequality. Drawing upon research in anthropology, history, and neurobiology, contributors explore women’s centrality in the human adventure over millennia and examine the complex factors that create and perpetuate violence, subordination, and marginalization. Another chapter investigates the sexual division itself in relation to asymmetries in emotion, sentiment, solidarities, power, and labor. These synthetic theoretical accounts transcend biology to show that individuals are instrumentally oriented to “become” what they are. By illuminating the psychological and social nature of women’s and men’s roles, identities, desires, fears, and anxieties, the chapters in this section contribute to

understandings of how symmetries, asymmetries, complementarities, fungibilities, and incommensurabilities contribute to inequalities and their justifications and ramifications.

Section III addresses the importance of reconceptualizing democracy in order to remedy the devaluation and marginalization of women, as well as their absence from positions of power across all sectors of public and private life. In contrast to mainstream approaches in political science that conceive “democracy” solely in terms of competitive elections and rule of law, contributors argue that the “quality of democracy” must be more finely calibrated to include inclusive public values, participatory practices, egalitarian habits of mind, and substantive commitments to social justice if the promise of democracy is to be fulfilled. At a moment when inequalities within and across nations have increased exponentially, corrupt and abusive governments proliferate, citizen activism is violently repressed, and internecine warfare and organized conflict engulf multiple regions of the globe, the authors offer a robust catalog of the kinds of changes in individual beliefs, interpersonal relations, social sentiments, institutional practices, state policies, and international conventions that will be required to create meaningful democracy. Conceptualizing democracy as an ongoing project constantly in need of revision, the contributors seek to transform understandings of past practices, current processes, and future possibilities in order to eradicate the politics of exclusion, which remain pervasive, socially accepted, and psychologically legitimized.

In Section IV, the authors again draw lessons from creative practices in various regions of the world to demonstrate positive strategies for social transformation. From the creation of transnational women’s networks in Africa and Latin America, and the creation of women’s parties and quota policies in East Asia, to the feminization of authority in Morocco, changing child-rearing practices in Europe, and global mobilizations to address violence against women, the authors trace vibrant strategies to improve democracy by fighting gender inequalities. In documenting these diverse interventions, the contributors provide insightful analyses of precise problematics that require social change, sophisticated accounts of the social, economic, familial, and political formations that must be transformed, and lucid discussions of the scope of social transformation that can be achieved through intentional action, while also assessing the unintended consequences and social contagion effects of mobilizations for social change. These chapters also consider the costs of various strategies for social change, both in terms of the psychological costs for individual activists and the social consequences of “backlash,” when mobilized by those who prefer to perpetuate the inequitable status quo.

In the concluding chapter of the book, contributors share concrete recommendations for cultural, economic, educational, familial, interpersonal, institutional, legal, policy, philosophical, political, and social

transformations that would improve the quality of democracy. Viewing gender inequalities through the prisms of power and democracy, the volume collectively builds on realities on the ground, opens new horizons of thought, and asks critical questions about how to overcome the stalemate in democracy in the 21st century. The authors' cumulative assessment is that democracy must be seriously reconceptualized if it is to be saved.

Note

1. I am indebted to Luigi Zoja for this helpful distinction.

Part I

Democratic Deficits: Sites, Contexts, and Tactics of Redress

Section Introduction

Michal Palgi

Democratization has been celebrated as one of the singular achievements of the late 20th century. In its most rudimentary form, democratization is defined as a transition from various types of authoritarian regime and command economies to liberal democracy and capitalism. In Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Russia, democratization is characterized as a process of transition through which regimes that have been bureaucratic authoritarian, military dictatorships, and/or state socialist move toward an elective system of governance and a capitalist market.

Proponents of democratization suggest that democratic governance respects the dignity of human beings, affords rights and immunities to individuals, prevents abuse of power by government officials (or provides remedies for removal of abusive governments), fosters individual freedom, encourages collective action to achieve political benefits, provides opportunities for political innovation, and maintains mechanisms through which citizens can hold governments accountable. Such optimistic expectations for democratization coexist with marked democratic deficits when the experience of women citizens is taken into consideration. Evidence drawn from women's lives around the globe suggests that democratization produces gendered redistributions of resources and responsibilities that leave women far removed from the promise of equality. In 2015, the global average for women's representation in national parliaments was 22.2 percent – a far cry from parity.

The economic indicators of democratization are also troubling. According to the *United Nations Development Report* (2014, 21), “The 85 richest people in the world have the same wealth as the 3.5 billion poorest people. Between 1990 and 2010, income inequality in developing countries rose 11 percent” (21). More than 2.2 billion people, 15 percent of the world population, are either near or living in multidimensional poverty. Nearly

80 percent of the global population lack comprehensive social protection. About 12 percent (842 million) suffer from chronic hunger, and nearly half of all workers – more than 1.5 billion – are in informal or precarious employment (UNDP, 2014, 3). According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), only a third of countries worldwide – with about 28 percent of the global population – provide comprehensive social protection for their citizens (UNDP, 2014, 19). Economic vulnerability is also gendered. Just as women are underrepresented in positions of power, they are overrepresented among the poor.

The chapters in this section explore complex democratic deficits in particular nations in Africa, Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and Latin America, key sites of the “third wave” of democratization since 1990 (Huntington, 1993). The first five chapters provide an overview of women’s participation in the political life of Brazil, Morocco, Japan, Taiwan, Nigeria, and Central-Eastern Europe with an emphasis on Poland. Attuned to the complexity of politics within each nation, the chapters explore factors that facilitate and factors that obstruct women’s inclusion in democratic processes. They also examine women’s political mobilizations to press for political rights, equitable treatment, and greater representation in governance. Individually and collectively, these chapters investigate national traditions and cultures that both enable and constrain women’s advancement. They pay particular attention to political institutions from the role of political parties, the design of election systems and regulations governing campaign finance, to the creation of equality policies and women’s political machinery as forces influencing women’s access to political power. Several chapters explore quite different effects of the introduction of quotas – which have been called women’s “fast track” to political office. With the advent of quotas, the number of women in office has increased, although the increases have been modest. In 2014, women held 9 percent of the seats in parliament in Brazil, 17 percent in Morocco, 24 percent in Poland, and 33 percent in Taiwan. As this variability suggests, quotas may take very different forms (voluntary or mandatory, constitutional or statutory, reserved seats or inclusion on candidates’ lists). The particular form of quota, the will of those in party elites to implement quotas, the penalties established for non-compliance, and the kinds of women recruited through quotas all affect the success of women in securing elective offices, and what they can accomplish once elected.

Gender equality has become a focus of international as well as national politics. With the near unanimous ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the global mobilization to fulfill the 12 equality commitments of the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, women have mobilized locally and globally to

press for improvements in their lives. Moving from local to global, activists mobilize within nation-states for women's economic well-being, physical security, and gender justice, pressuring their governments to raise these issues in international meetings. Moving from global to local, they use international treaties to enhance public awareness of gender inequities and to pressure governments to ratify and comply with international covenants such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Once ratified, they monitor their government's compliance with international agreements and seek creative means to hold them accountable, sometimes taking recourse to international agencies and courts. Within international forums, they participate in multilateral and intergovernmental arenas to lobby directly for women's issues and for the creation of international women's machinery to meet women's needs. They have also injected new issues, such as violence against women, into international politics, and they have worked to transform the terms of political discourse in areas such as population control and human rights. The chapters in this section provide rich accounts of women's activism to secure social change within their nations, while also documenting the challenges they encounter in doing so.

Political life is only one arena in which women struggle for opportunity, recognition, and positions of power. Business and corporate sectors are also disproportionately male dominant. The final chapter in this section provides an overview of women's paths to power in the business world and the complex challenges they face as a minority – or indeed as outsiders – in the top echelon. Like women in political offices, top women in business confront organizational cultures in local and international institutions based on men's knowledge, men's experiences, and men's tendency to protect their traditional superior power over women. Exclusionary practices often structure the operations of firms. Women are often asked to assimilate into the existing organizational culture and to accept its value commitments and behaviors. As a result, the advantages of diversity are often lost, and inequalities are reproduced rather than eradicated.

In the business world as in politics, some women overcome gender barriers by using their political skills and will, as well as their social networks. For others, it is more difficult to surmount the challenges and barriers standing in the way of their advancement or to circumvent powerful gatekeepers hostile to women's presence. These barriers are so deeply embedded in the workplace and political cultures that it will take a strategic, persistent campaign of incremental changes and "small wins" to achieve meaningful progress. Yet, as the "third wave" of democratization since 1990 makes clear, steady progress cannot be taken for granted. Advancement for women in some contexts has generated "backlash," the resurgence of right-wing or fundamentalist parties committed to the restoration of male advantage.

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Women's Political Representation in Brazil

José Álvaro Moisés and Beatriz Rodrigues Sanchez

Introduction

Since the 1990s, the issue of women's political representation has become one of the most important topics in the discussion of the nature of democratic regimes in different parts of the world. What are the implications for the functioning of democracy when democratic regimes maintain fundamental inequalities among citizens? This question affects not only young democracies in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa, but also democracies in countries in which the system of government is perceived to have been consolidated long ago, such as the United Kingdom, France, the United States, and Italy.

Women comprise one of the last social constituencies to win political rights in contemporary democracies. And, just as in consolidated democracies, this achievement weighs relatively little on the distribution of positions in political offices in new democracies. In the field of political science, Lijphart (1999, 2003) has touched the heart of the matter by arguing that the rate of women's participation in national parliaments is a relevant indicator of the quality of democracies currently in existence. Other authors reinforce this argument by insisting on the fundamental centrality of the principle of political equality in the evaluation of the comparative advantages of a democratic regime over its alternatives (Iazzetta and Vargas-Cullell, 2004; Diamond and Morlino, 2005; Moisés, 2015; Chapter 14 of this book). According to Diamond and Morlino, the representation of women in parliament is an indicator of the fair representation required for the making of policy that is inclusive and mindful of all citizens. That means that the more equitable the representation of women in a country, the better the quality of its democracy. Equality, in this case, does not only involve the right to elect the members of the political elite who will govern, but also the right to be chosen to take part in and to influence the decision-making processes that affect the political community as a whole.

Based on this premise, this chapter aims to contribute to the debate over women's political participation by discussing the case of Brazil from a comparative perspective. This subject becomes even more important at a moment when the country has completed a quarter of a century of democracy following the overthrow of military dictatorship in 1985 – only the second democratic period since Brazil became a republic in 1889. Currently, the participation of women in Brazilian parliament is less than half of the world average; that is, less than 9 percent compared to 22.2 percent. Among all Latin American countries, Brazil ranks second to last – Panama ranks last – in the participation of women in parliament.

On one hand, dominant culture, social behaviors, and traditional divisions of roles among genders involve discrimination against and unequal treatment of women. On the other hand, institutional structure of Brazilian democracy does not maintain any formal restrictions on their political participation. Recent research has shown that, regardless of the existence of a policy of quotas for women in political competition – designed to correct the traditional exclusion of women from political participation – the effective differences in the treatment of men and women by political parties continue to affect the access of women to financing opportunities for running for office, thus negatively impacting their electoral performance (Grossi and Miguel, 2001; Miguel and Biroli, 2009; Meneguello et al., 2012; Speck and Sacchet, 2012). The relevant issue consists, then, of knowing if the implications of that impact are limited to the political exclusion of women from politics or if they affect the functioning of the democratic regime as a whole.

On the international scene, an increasing preoccupation with this theme has recently translated into the creation of commissions, within organizations and international regimes, designed to address issues related to the participation of women in the politically relevant decision-making mechanisms and to gender politics in general. An example of this type of initiative was the creation in 2010 of a UN women's agency: the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, headed until recently by Michelle Bachelet, president of Chile. At the same time, in the 1990s, the role of political institutions in the promotion and implementation of equal rights for women and men achieved new relevance with research into, among other approaches, historical institutionalism, which became one of the decisive explanations for political discrimination against women. Owing to their power to recruit people into political life, to legitimate political leaders, and to decide on issues of public interest, political parties became a central factor in the debate. With regard to parliaments, they are perceived in the literature as fundamental pieces in the articulation of the political interests of women. This finding served as inspiration for movements promoting political reforms as a means of bettering the democratic regime (Goetz and Sacchet, 2008).

The contemporary political debate about the political participation of women emphasizes, among many other things, two principal arguments. The first raises the question of justice or of recognition; drawing on the premise that it is illogical and unnatural for a democratic political system to sustain the notion that the talent and virtues necessary for public life are attributed exclusively to the masculine gender. Part of the literature demonstrates a conflict that exists between the defense of political rights for women and the effective functioning of institutions created by men who constitute the dominant elite: in practice, institutions constrain the performance of women and other outsiders to the system. According to this perspective, institutions are not neutral. Rather, they nurture biases or incentives that make certain outcomes more likely than others. Furthermore, they are marked by the circumstances of their historical development, reflecting the power relations at their root. Given that representative institutions were created in the context of asymmetric gender relations, important implications arise for the substantive representation of women. Moreover, the effects of that asymmetry resulted in the primacy of masculine conceptions, interests, and priorities (Franceschet, 2011). In other words, the absence of women from positions of political representation or implementation of public policies should be attributed to the discrimination they encounter, even if the discrimination is not institutionalized. The second argument refers to the threat of compromising the efficacy of institutions such as parliaments and parties as a result of the exclusion of women, who, in the majority of cases, make up 50 percent or more of the population of the countries under consideration here. In this sense, the exclusion of women would affect not only the performance of those institutions but also the very legitimacy of the representative political system. This brings into question the nature of the democratic regime.

Other authors maintain that ensuring the presence of women in parliaments or other offices as public representatives, from a symbolic point of view and in light of its cultural impact, leads contemporary societies to recognize the singular nature of the social and political contributions of women, concomitantly causing an increase in the respect owed to them by reevaluating their place in society, culture, and contemporary politics. Seeing that women have distinct life experiences from those of men, not to mention different perceptions and evaluations of the democratic political process, their participation could potentially challenge the representative democracy in question, bringing to the table the need to incorporate interests and perspectives rarely taken into consideration by the political system. In other words, because women and men occupy different positions in the structure of contemporary societies, women have the potential to assume distinct postures toward a more exigent and ethical treatment of public business, contributing to the betterment of the political system.¹

With the academic development of new institutionalism, a new current of thought emerged, feminist institutionalism. It critiques and seeks to overcome the gender blindness of existing scholarship in political science, to include women as actors in political processes and to move the research agenda toward questions about the interplay between gender and the operation and impact of political institutions (Kenny, 2011). New institutionalism strengthens the idea that not only formal but informal institutions are important to analyze the barriers to women's political participation.

The underrepresentation of women, especially in parliaments and in political parties, has come to be seen, for the most part, as an expression of a democratic deficit that brings into question the quality of democracies currently in existence. Although contemporary democratic theory recognizes that the level of inclusivity of the political system – that is, the extent to which civil and political rights are guaranteed to all citizens without exception – is a fundamental condition for democratic consolidation, the minimalist approach to democracy dismisses the consequences of the impermeability of the system to the participation of all social strata when evaluating the regime. Open, clean, and predictable electoral processes that are free of fraud can alter the social composition of political elites – as in the case of Brazil since 1988 (Rodrigues, 2013) – but the deepening of democracy depends on whether or not guaranteed access to political power is offered to all segments of society; that is, it depends on the existence of effective conditions that ensure the participation and/or the influence of all adult members of the political community in the decision-making processes that affect them.

The Brazilian case confirms one of the most important findings presented in the international literature on the impact of the political inequality that affects genders. This finding identifies the specific limitations found in both of the stages in which the process of participation of women in electoral competition unfolds. On the one side, there are limits to women's capacity to pass from the condition of eligible citizens to the condition of candidates actually apt to participate in the electoral process. Those limits involve electoral legislation – the system of open-list proportional representation, the predominance of party oligarchies in decision-making, and the Quotas Act (*Lei de Cotas*) – and the manner in which political parties choose their candidates. In Brazil, for example, political parties do not adopt democratic nominating mechanisms such as the American primaries model, to select candidates. On the other side, there are obstacles that complicate women's access to the organizational and financial resources necessary for their participation in the political competition; recent experiences have demonstrated that this is one of the main hindrances to the efficacy of female participation in Brazilian politics.

Various factors can explain this situation, especially those related to socioeconomic or cultural nature, not to mention the strictly political ones.

However, in light of the lack of existence of explicit institutional barriers that keep women out of candidacy for public offices, the issue points to a deficit in the functioning of Brazilian democracy. Therefore, research in this area needs to elucidate the roots of the contradiction between the institutional parameters that do not impede the existence of female candidates and the formal and informal procedures that, in practice, make the selection of female candidates by political parties very difficult or unviable (Matland, 2003; Sacchet, 2008).

The implications of this process for the quality of Brazilian democracy need to be evaluated. This chapter provides a preliminary contribution to the debate by focusing on three main aspects: first, innovations in the examination of the subject introduced by the quality of democracy; second, the description of the Brazilian case compared with other Latin American countries; finally, a discussion of recent research on the financing of women candidates in recent elections in Brazil. In contrast to the work of Luis Felipe Miguel, which focuses on discourse analysis of male and female speeches in National Congress (Miguel, 2012), this work analyzes, among other aspects, financial obstacles to women's candidacy. Our analysis owes an intellectual debt to Teresa Sacchet and Bruno Speck, whose work greatly influenced the thoughts presented here.

Women's political representation in Brazil

In 2013, Brazil completed 25 years of democratic experience under the new constitution adopted in 1988. The electoral cycles for choosing governments have usually taken place according to the constitutional rules that ensure an alteration in power. Today, fundamental individual liberties are guaranteed and there has been an expansion of citizenship rights, pointing to some improvement in the functioning of republican institutions. After an interval of more than two decades of authoritarian rule (1964–1988), the military returned to their professional duties and no relevant political actor vindicates the adoption of undemocratic means to compete for power. Although faced with strong resistance, a Truth Commission, tasked with documenting repression and resistance during the dictatorship, is in operation in the country.

Such advances, however, are not enough to affirm that, apart from its electoral virtues, a democracy of quality has been established in the country. Some evaluations of democratization in Brazil indicate that the country suffers from deficits and significant distortions in the functioning of its democratic system. Abuses of power, such as the increasing incidence of corruption, show that the rule of law is not yet fully established. The Brazilian federal model involves imbalances relating to the operation of the electoral system, which gives unequal weight to the vote of citizens of large and small states, such as São Paulo and Roraima. More serious are the

conditions of grave insecurity, especially among populations in the periphery of large cities: since 1985, more than a million people have been murdered in the country. With respect to access to education, although Brazil experienced the almost complete universalization of enrollment in primary education in the mid-1990s, over 70 percent of young people who complete elementary school are not able to complete high school, which profoundly affects the opportunities that relate to their participation in the labor market and political life. All this adds to the unequal treatment meted out to different social segments with respect to their political rights, as is the case in the underrepresentation of women, people of African descent, and indigenous communities in government and in the National Congress. This is an indication that the process of extension of rights to citizens – and, particularly, political inclusion – still has a long way to go. Important asymmetries and distortions also characterize the functioning of democratic institutions, limiting, on the one hand, institutional fiscalization and control of the executive and, on the other, the function of representation assumed by political parties and parliament. The presidential system prevailing in the country gives the executive complete control of the political agenda and, given the huge legislative prerogatives reserved for the president, parliament plays a more reactive than proactive role (Moisés et al., 2010).

This does not deny the economic and social advances that have occurred in the country over the last two decades under democratic governments. The macroeconomic stability and inflation control achieved in the Cardoso administration (1995–2002) and maintained by Lula da Silva (2003–2010) improved living conditions and participation in terms of consumption benefits for broader segments of the population. Greater attention to social issues has resulted in the improvement of indicators that measure inequalities. But the efficiency and effectiveness of the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of public policies are still limited. In different areas of governmental activity, planning is absent, and there remains financial waste aggravated by embezzlement and corruption. Moreover, the criteria that inform the decision-making process do not always take into account inequalities between genders, social groups, or regions.

Assessing the quality of Brazilian democracy requires specific measurements of different dimensions, such as political participation and inclusion, vertical, social, and horizontal accountability mechanisms, and government responsiveness. This chapter deals with the first of these dimensions based on the examination of comparative data on women's political participation in Brazil and other Latin American countries. The starting point for characterizing the pattern of women's participation is the proportion of parliamentary seats occupied by them in the national parliament. The premise is that the measurement of this participation is a proxy for the effective political inclusion of women in the country. The chapter then examines the barriers created by campaign financing to such inclusion.

Second only to Panama, Brazil has one of the lowest rates of women in federal legislative positions in Latin America. In the world ranking, Brazil occupies the 111th position.² In the 2010 general elections, Brazilian women accounted for 19.42 percent of the candidacies, but reached only 8.77 percent of the total number of representatives elected to the House of Representatives.³ Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of female representation in the House of Representatives between 1998 and 2010:




Figure 1.1 Latin America: Percentage of female candidates/percentage of women elected to the House of Representatives

Source: TSE, 2012.

The underrepresentation of women in political institutions occurs not only in Brazil, but is also a recurring fact in all Latin American countries. Figure 1.2 shows the evolution of female political representation in Latin America between 1990 and 2011. The data show that in most Latin American countries political representation of women increased during this period, suggesting that democratization affects political inclusion. However, the percentage of seats held by women is still much smaller than that held by men. Brazil's situation contrasts sharply with that of other countries, especially Cuba, Costa Rica, Argentina, Ecuador, Mexico, Bolivia, and Peru. With the exception of Cuba, which has not yet experienced a process of democratization, all other countries established democratic regimes following the "third wave of democratization" (Huntington, 1991) and adopted a presidential system of government. Although the relationship between the executive and legislative branches varies, the parliaments in almost all Latin American




Figure 1.2 Latin America: Proportion of seats occupied by women in national parliaments

Source: World Bank, 2012.

nations are more likely to react to political agendas proposed by the executive than to actively present alternatives. In this context, the capacity of women representatives to succeed in introducing new subjects into the political agenda has been limited, although studies of countries such as Argentina and Chile indicate that the limitations depend on both formal and institutional rules and specific political contexts that lead actors to expand their work space (Franceschet, 2011).

The obstacles that hinder the success of women in electoral processes are multidimensional. The literature points to three main barriers: the electoral system, political parties, and campaign financing. Brazil adopts the open-list proportional system in which candidacies are decided on the basis of political capital and resources available to the candidates rather than lists defined by political parties. In addition to a fierce intraparty dispute between candidates – which weakens the parties – the process is characterized by an extreme personalization of candidacies and, for that reason, depends fundamentally on the ability of individual candidates to ensure the support of social networks and draw on their own financial resources to meet the costs of political competition; this can be extremely fierce and costly. Apart from that, the distribution of political resources available to the parties (in the case of Brazil, money from a public party fund and free

television exposure during an electoral broadcast hour) is marked by large disparities. The scheme reproduces the inequalities of the social structure. Such features annul the comparative advantages that some authors attribute to the proportional electoral system (Lijphart, 1999). Instead of facilitating the recruitment of candidates from a broader social spectrum, political recruitment depends on factors outside the political process, particularly the influence of money and social prestige (Sacchet, 2012).

In the case of political parties, the Brazilian experience confirms the evidence presented in the literature to the effect that both their structure and ideology are factors that influence the electoral performance of women. The multi-party system in Brazil is relatively unstable and fragile and is not characterized by well-defined programmatic profiles. Rather, parties tend to change position according to the political circumstances that influence the formation of the majority coalition, which characterizes the coalitional presidentialism in the country. This is of little help for voters when they decide how to vote. Given the characteristics of the proportional electoral system – which monitors the recruitment for seats in the House of Representatives – political parties adopt a very pragmatic viewpoint with regard to the selection of candidates. This selection, except in very rare cases, remains in the hands of political oligarchies, most of which have been leading the political parties for decades. The result is a model that, as suggested earlier, tends to give preference in the final decisions to candidates who have their own resources to draw from or have access to resources provided by their supporters.

In spite of these circumstances, the social pressure for increased participation produced by the democratization process has resulted in some changes. Although we cannot properly speak of a democratization of the structures and procedures adopted by parties, permeability to female participation has increased especially among left-wing parties. This has signaled an improvement trend which, however, has generated very minimal results. In this sense, Figure 1.3 shows the participation of women in the top executive offices of political parties today.

The Workers Party (PT) has the highest participation of women in its top executive body, followed by the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), and the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB). Although the percentage of women in the upper levels of PT didn't exceed 35 percent, it is undeniable that the party's experience with female militancy beginning in the 1980s served as an incentive for women's greater access to senior leadership positions than was afforded to them by other political parties. As a result, since 2011, 50 percent of PT's leaders have been women. This process was clearly more limited in the parties of the center and right, such as the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) and the Democratic Party (DEM). Recent studies also show that, in addition to PT, PSB, and PDT, other parties of the left, such as the Communist Party of




Figure 1.3 Brazil: Participation of women in the top executive offices of political parties

Source: IDB, 2009.

Brazil (PC do B), gave more opportunities to female candidates. This indicates that in the Brazilian case, ideology is a factor that affects women's access to leadership positions in political parties.

The role of quotas

As a result of female militancy during the process of democratization, almost all Latin American countries adopted, from the 1990s on, the policy of quotas for female candidates aspiring to assume legislative positions. In Brazil, the adoption of quotas was an initiative of leftist parties. The country has implemented quotas for female candidates at the municipal level for proportional elections since 1995. In 1997, these measures were extended to all proportional elections, establishing a minimum of at least 30 percent and a maximum 70 percent for each gender on the party lists.

The adoption of quotas was justified by the expectation that if there were no structural, cultural, or political obstacles to the political participation of women, the number of representatives of both sexes would be more balanced. The perception that imbalance derived from both formal and informal discrimination gave rise to the premise that such an imbalance could be corrected by a policy that, in addition to changing the institutional norm, would influence the political culture. The argument in favor of quotas also claims that the inclusion of marginalized segments of society, women for example, in decision-making increases the expression and recognition of different points of view in a democratic political system, thus enhancing the adoption of policies aimed at the needs and interests of broader groups in society. Thus quotas are tools that affect the legitimacy and quality of the democratic system. An assessment of the initial outcomes of the quotas

policy provides important information for the debate about the quality of Brazil's democracy.

Affirmative action policies such as quotas were motivated in large part by the recognition of true inequalities among specific social groups. The purpose of quotas is to ensure that these groups enjoy equal opportunities. In this context, the predominance of a legislature composed mostly of men was seen as a threat both to the implementation of policies designed for specific social groups, such as women, and also to the lessening of gender gaps and unfair divisions of labor. The idea is that changing the profile of the players who define the public policies, making them more diversified and complex, can be an initial step toward gender equality in different spheres of social and political life. But the tension between the imperative of equality and the range of differences among women that actually exists has marked the debate over quotas since its inception. Some have challenged the notion that women share a specific group identity that should be considered in the field of political representation, arguing that it is essentialist, assuming innate similarities among women, and static, presupposing fixed differences that rather than an ongoing process of change. This debate continues, even as quotas have been introduced. But the initial effects of quotas in Brazil, which are presented below, are far more modest than proponents hoped.

Any discussion of quotas must be situated in the specific political and structural context of each country in which quotas have been adopted. The data presented below show the framework for the adoption of quotas in Latin America for the different parliamentary houses, in both unicameral and bicameral structures (Table 1.1):

Table 1.1 Latin America: Adoption of quotas in different parliamentary houses

Countries	House of Representatives	Senate	Unicameral countries
Argentina	1	1	
Bolivia	1	1	
Brazil	1	0	
Chile	0	0	
Colombia	0	0	
Mexico	1	1	
Paraguay	1	1	
Dominican Republic	1	0	
Uruguay	1	1	
Costa Rica			1
Ecuador			1

Table 1.1 (Continued)

Countries	House of Representatives	Senate	Unicameral countries
El Salvador			0
Guatemala			0
Honduras			1
Nicaragua			0
Panama			1
Peru			1
Venezuela			0

Legend: 0 = No, 1 = Yes.

Source: IDB, 2007.

In Latin America, only Chile and Colombia have no quotas for either congressional chamber. Brazil adopted quotas for the House of Representatives, Legislative Assemblies of States, and Municipal Chambers. In relation to countries whose parliamentary structures are unicameral, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Venezuela have not adopted a policy of quotas. As Figure 1.2 demonstrates, except for El Salvador, three unicameral nations without quotas have experienced an increase in female participation after democratization. Chile and Colombia, despite not adopting quotas, are countries where women's representation has increased slightly. Of greater interest is the evidence showing that, with the exception of Brazil and Uruguay, the countries where female representation most improved, namely Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Paraguay, and the Dominican Republic, are precisely those that have adopted quotas. In Argentina, in particular, there has been significant growth. A preliminary conclusion which follows from the observation of this framework is that, in general, the process of democratization has placed the issue of female representation on the agenda, but the most positive results, though not spectacular, have occurred in countries that have adopted the quota policy.

Brazil, however, represents, the most significant exception in this set of countries. In fact, the adoption of quotas was not enough to bring about greater participation of women in legislative positions. Research shows that there are many causes of this problem. Among them are the type of open list electoral system in the country, the non-obligatory legal fulfillment of quotas by political parties (the law that sets quotas does not require the parties to fill them), the fact that quotas do not involve a mandatory allocation of political resources in favor of women candidates, and, last but not least, the low number of women who present themselves in electoral competition. These political, institutional, and cultural factors explain the failure of quota policies in Brazil and other countries (Bohn, 2009). In the Brazilian

case, an assessment cannot be restricted to the federal level. The data on female candidates running for Legislative Assemblies of States and Municipal Chambers indicate that there may be a gradual increase in mobilization in favor of women's participation in positions of political representation precisely because of the existence of quotas. In the last municipal elections, in 2012, the percentage of quotas was respected by all parties.

Figures 1.4–1.7 show the evolution of the number of female candidates who were elected to city councils or to positions such as state and federal deputies and mayors between 1996 and 2012. Figures 1.4–1.7 show that there was a significant increase in the number of women running for the posts of city councilors and state and federal deputies. However, this increase was not reflected in an increase in the percentage of women elected, which remained practically unchanged. Although the 1997 quota law endorsed a minimum quota of 30 percent, the procedures for the selection of candidates within parties and, particularly, the distribution of resources that affect electoral competition have not changed. This shows two things: first, that the issue cannot be assessed without taking into account the integration between the formal structure of quotas and informal procedures of political parties; second, that, albeit timid, the scenario of women's participation in positions of political representation in Brazil only changed with the introduction of the quota policy (Figures 1.4–1.7).

Figure 1.4, for municipal governments, shows that both the percentage of women candidates and the percentage of women elected followed the




Figure 1.4 Latin America: Percentage of female candidates/percentage of women elected to municipal governments

Source: TSE, 2012.




Figure 1.5 Latin America: Percentage of female candidates/percentage of women elected to city councils

Source: TSE, 2012.




Figure 1.6 Latin America: Percentage of female candidates/percentage of women elected to legislative assemblies

Source: TSE, 2012.




Figure 1.7 Latin America: Percentage of female candidates/percentage of women elected to the House of Representatives

Source: TSE, 2012.

same upward trend, but the growth in the number of candidates for mayors was lower than the growth of candidates for councilors or MPs. One possible explanation for this is the fact that the quota law does not apply to majority elections. To prove this statement we calculated the growth rates for female candidates and female elected officials in each office between 1996 and 2012.⁴ Figures 1.8–1.11 show the results of this procedure.




Figure 1.8 Latin America: Growth rate of municipal governments




Figure 1.9 Latin America: Growth rate of city councils




Figure 1.10 Latin America: Growth rate of legislative assemblies

Growth rates for women running for the positions of city councilor and deputy had the largest increase, and this is directly associated with the adoption of the Quotas Act for this type of political competition. In spite of this, the growth rates for women elected in both cases remained stable. In the case of elections to municipal governments, the growth rate of women elected




Figure 1.11 Latin America: Growth rate of House of Representatives

accompanied the growth rate of women running for office; however, growth has not reached 3 percent. In this case, it is notable that there was no adoption of quotas. It is possible to conclude that the adoption of the quota law in Brazil resulted in an increase in the number of female candidates running for the positions to which the law applies; but this increase did not translate into an increase in the number of women elected. The explanation for this has to be sought in other factors relating to women's political participation. On the other hand, in cases where there was no adoption of quotas, that is, in elections to municipal governments, the number of women running for office grew at a much slower pace than in cases where the law was adopted.

Electoral financing and the performance of women

Brazilian women face a double barrier in electoral competition. In the first place, they are underrepresented among the candidates. Second, when they manage to run for office, they face difficulties that affect their electoral performance. In Brazil, the electoral system involves proportional representation, but open lists leave electoral campaigns primarily in the hands of the candidates. This condition results in discrimination against women for many reasons. Research shows, for example, that there is a high statistical correlation between financial collections for the campaigns and election results. Indeed, together with factors such as electoral law and political parties, the literature on women's political participation identified campaign financing as a major factor affecting female performance. In reality, these three elements are combined in the production of the frame which results in

underrepresentation of women in politics, but this is mainly because political parties unevenly distribute organizational resources and materials that impact on the success of campaigns and, therefore, the success of female candidates.

The data presented below were collected to offer a preliminary overview of the situation for Brazil based on the 2010 general elections and rely in large part on the work of political scientists Teresa Sacchet and Bruno Speck. Inequality in campaign financing for women in Brazil can be observed through comparative data on the total revenue of financial resources used by men and women in the parliamentary and state level government elections in 2010, as shown in Table 1.2.

The data show that the average funds of male candidates is bigger than the average total funds of female candidates in all cases. To analyze these data with greater analytical precision, Sacchet and Speck created the Revenue Success Index (ISR). To measure the success of fundraising efforts, some calculations were made. The indicator of success in revenue (ISR) relates the sum of the funds raised by each candidate to the sum of revenues from all candidates of each state (or UF). Thus, it is possible to measure the percentage of funds collected by each candidate over the total resources of the UF.

$$ISR_{candidate} = \frac{R_{candidate} \times Nuf}{Ruf}$$

$R_{candidate}$: candidate's total revenue

Ruf : total revenue of the UF/state (sum of the revenue of all the candidates of the UF/state)

Nuf : number of candidates from each UF/state

The ISR has a value 1 when the votes or revenue of the candidate correspond to the average of the votes or revenue of the UF or states concerned. The value is greater than 1 if the candidate achieves higher than average votes or revenue, so the closer to zero these indicators are, the worse the performance of the candidates in terms of resources and votes with respect to their competitors' averages. The use of the ISR allows for a more accurate comparison of the performance of individual candidates, both with respect to the funds collected and to the votes obtained, making it possible for the analysis to take into account different Brazilian states and parties. Figures 1.12 and 1.13 show the data for the campaign funds of men and women who competed for office as state and federal deputies in 2010. In this case, the data is compared with the 2006 election and measured in ISR with the goal of making a comparison of their campaign financing more precise.

By comparing the values in the Figures, it can be observed that the differences between fundraising for men and women are significant. For the office of state deputy in 2006, women's funds were 9 percent less than men's,

Table 1.2 Financial resources used by men and women in the parliamentary and state level government elections in 2010

Office	Total revenue (among the candidates with information) – 2010 Elections					
	General		Female candidates		Male candidates	
	Candidates	Elected officials	Female candidates	Female elected officials	Male candidates	Male elected officials
State Deputy	R\$ 944.186.346,80	R\$ 454.419.049,22	R\$ 118.234.210,63	R\$ 53.543.502,49	R\$ 825.952.136,17	R\$ 400.875.546,73
Federal Deputy	R\$ 916.032.830,36	R\$ 574.368.583,21	R\$ 76.554.013,11	R\$ 45.791.773,85	R\$ 839.478.817,25	R\$ 528.576.809,36
Governor	R\$ 725.351.043,61	R\$ 302.379.851,42	R\$ 61.343.719,05	R\$ 30.076.727,76	R\$ 664.007.324,56	R\$ 272.303.123,66
Senator	R\$ 348.686.746,07	R\$ 223.370.862,48	R\$ 49.336.462,05	R\$ 37.770.070,94	R\$ 299.350.284,02	R\$ 185.600.791,54

Source: Sacchet and Speck, 2012a.




Figure 1.12 Revenue Success Index: Male and female candidates for office of state and federal deputies in 2006
Source: Sacchet and Speck, 2012a.




Figure 1.13 Revenue Success Index: Male and female candidates for office of state and federal deputies in 2010
Source: Sacchet and Speck, 2012a.

but for the office of federal deputy – the most important from the point of view of political representation – women’s resources were 41 percent less than men’s. In 2010, the difference based on the ISR shows that women’s resources were 31 percent less for the office of state deputy and 54 percent

less for the office of federal deputy, showing that inequality in this case may be growing rather than decreasing over time; thus, neutralizing the positive effects of the adoption of quotas.

Sachet and Speck present four hypotheses to explain the unequal funding of female candidates' campaigns. The first suggests that private financing – that is, the ability of applicants to utilize their own financial resources in their campaigns – is critical to their success, which would leave women in a position of disadvantage, among other reasons because they have traditionally less control over their own resources and those of their families. The second hypothesis states that women have limited access to social and political networks that might otherwise provide alternative sources of campaign funding. The third hypothesis is focused on low financial support of private donors for female candidates; private companies tend to invest resources in the candidates they deem most likely to win the election, in this case, men. The final hypothesis holds that parties discriminate against women in the distribution of party fund resources, despite the fact that these resources are public; that is, they are derived from tax revenues collected from both men and women. It is important to note, however, that resources donated by parties do not just have a public origin; they are also donated by private enterprises.

As the indices presented show, there is an imbalance in the relationship between the number of candidates of each sex and the proportional volume of campaign fundraising. The data show that men raise proportionately more money than women for their campaigns. This underfunding of women candidates is a feature of most Brazilian states. It can be argued, therefore, that the low success rates of women candidates in elections are directly linked to the low funding levels of their campaigns. On the other hand, the political capital, understood as the political experience of the candidate based on their prior political participation, also influences the behavior of donors and the number of votes received. Two explanations for the influence of political capital on the performance of candidates may be mentioned: the first is that the longer the candidates have been involved in politics, the greater their chances of winning elections; the second suggests that candidates with more political capital have greater access to financial resources. There is a close relationship between political capital and electoral success. However, female candidates are disadvantaged both as candidates who have not held office for a previous term (less political capital) and in relation to candidates vying for re-election (greater political capital). Men's long standing control over elective offices has spillover effects. Re-election increases men's electoral advantage over women. And experience in office increases candidates political capital and their financial support from donors, thereby contributing to the persistent underfunding of women's campaigns (Sacchet, 2012a).

Brief conclusions

Since 1998, there has been an increase in the participation of women in legislative positions in Brazil. A major reason for this increase is the adoption of legislation providing quotas for female candidates. As Figure 1.1 shows, however, the number of elected women remained stable over time. This means that quotas are not enough to increase the political inclusion of women and, concomitantly, reduce the inequality observed between women and men. Other measures are essential to ensure more equitable conditions for electoral competition, most notably, more equitable funding of women's election campaigns. In addition, the absence of democratic practices within Brazilian political parties to choose candidates for elected office is also a factor of great importance.

The issue discussed here touches on a fundamental aspect of the quality of democracy that was proposed by theorists of democracy many years ago. Sartori (1992), for example, argued that "more than any other factor ... it is the competition between parties with balanced resources (political, human, and economic) that generates democracy." The significant differences in the financing of campaigns for men and women in Brazil show that this condition has not yet been achieved in the country. Research also indicates that there is a high correlation between the funds raised by candidates and their chances of electoral success. Electoral financing is, therefore, one of the most important factors that influence the performance of women in elections. In showing the importance of election financing to the quality of democracy, this analysis sheds light on critical deficits in the functioning of Brazil's democratic regime. Such deficits can be remedied through reforms of the democratic institutions. This, however, is not the goal of this work and should be investigated on another occasion.

Notes

1. In this sense, studies focused on analyzing the general political process demonstrated that even when the proportion of women in legislatures increases, the political practices and the results do not necessarily change. The issue becomes a matter of knowing if the increase in the participation of women is enough to produce changes that can lead to the betterment of the political system or, to the contrary, if the intrinsic characteristics of the political system are such that they would impede that possibility; for proper evaluation, the topic requires new empirical research that falls outside the scope of this paper.
2. Interparliamentary Union, 2015.
3. TSE, Supreme Electoral Court, 2012.
4. In some cases, the growth rates for elected women are higher than the growth rates for female candidates. This happens because growth rates are a relative data. For the calculation of growth rates, we used the following equation: N_{women}/N_{total} . Subsequently, we calculated the difference between the years. In the case of the growth rate for the number of female candidates for city council, for example,

Nwomen/Ntotal in 1996 was equal to 0.108672. In 2000, this same index was equal to 0.191431. The growth rate between 1996 and 2000 was, therefore, equal to 8.28 percent.

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2

Women and Political Participation in Morocco and North African States

Moha Ennaji

Moroccan women's participation in political life is an essential component of the country's democratization and modernizing processes. Their political involvement has benefited from fundamental global economic changes, from national and international support for the country's social and political reforms, from changes in political priorities and the growing importance of democracy in the world, as well as from the increased role of women's movements worldwide (Ennaji, 2007).

Following on from these changes, a number of women have risen to high positions in the public arena, particularly urban educated women who belong to politically and economically influential families. Morocco's adoption of a progressive family code in 2004 and a new constitution on 1 July 2011 was hailed by democrats as a great step forward for women's rights nationally and as an example to follow for Muslim-majority countries. Morocco's new constitution introduced an array of articles that enhance women's participation in public life and gender equity (Sadiqi, 2003, Chapter 3).

This chapter focuses on women's political participation and political power in Morocco. It provides a synopsis of the actions leading up to the reforms of the family code and the constitution, their foremost impact on the political participation of women, the issue of the implementation of the constitution, and the continued feminist struggle for power. The chapter is part of the fieldwork I undertook between September 2008 and December 2013 to elicit the attitudes and achievements of different social and political movements in Morocco. The fieldwork consisted of semi-structured interviews with a total of 96 informants (47 men and 49 women), 11 officials, and 85 non-officials during the struggle for change and democracy. The chapter is also based on my readings and on previous studies on the subject matter.

The theoretical framework adopted is that of intersectionality theory, which underscores the interconnection of fields of domination such as

social class, political power, gender, religion, language, ethnicity, education, and media (Crenshaw, 1989; Collins, 2000; Belleau, 2007). Let us first provide a historical overview of women's contribution to the struggle for independence (see Daoud, 1993; Ennaji, 2010; and Sadiqi et al., 2009).

Women's struggle in the nationalist movement

During the resistance period of the 1940s and 1950s, the independence struggle shifted from armed resistance in rural areas to political struggle in urban zones.

Marches were organized all over the country by Moroccan women to protest against the French protectorate. In August 1952, Rabat City's female textile-workers joined a strike that had lasted a full month, while the women of Casablanca took part in the general strike and the demonstrations that occurred in December of the same year. Several women and men were killed by French police, who fired on unarmed demonstrators. Following these protest movements, the French colonizers decided to imprison leaders of the *Istiqlal* (independence) and Communist parties throughout the country. When they sent King Mohamed V into exile in Corsica and then Madagascar for two years, men and women in almost equal numbers came out onto the streets and started an armed struggle against the colonial authorities and their collaborators.

During the resistance, women used to carry weapons in their handbags and under their veils. They worked as liaison and information agents and hid resistors in their homes, thus taking part in the struggle for independence (Sadiqi et al., 2009). As Malika al-Fassi, one of the leaders of the nationalist movement in Morocco, wrote in 1992, "housewives in Fès went up on to their balconies and used every kind of household object as a weapon: saucepans, bowls of hot water, big stones" (Akharbach and Rerhayé, 1992, 22). The armed struggle continued until King Mohamed V's return from exile on 16 November 1955. Women's voices expressed their nationalist feelings and their strong participation in the struggle for the independence of Morocco. As a result, on 21 November 1955 at its conference, the *Istiqlal* party proclaimed equality between women and men and supported female emancipation.

Malika al-Fassi became a public figure because she was the only woman to sign the Independence Manifesto ratified by 59 Moroccan nationalists. She fought for women's liberation and their right to education and political participation. She was also one of the few female members of the *Istiqlal* party, in which she was very active. At an extraordinary party conference, she encouraged her female comrades to get actively involved in political life and demand women's right to vote and stand as candidates.

Associations also arose in the north of Morocco, which was under the Spanish protectorate, particularly in Tangiers and Tetuan. All of them

benefited from the help and support of Sultan Mohamed V. They made it their prime objective to create a new Morocco and established the priorities of stimulating and encouraging women's education so as to enable them to fully assume their responsibilities, which resulted in literacy programs being organized in several of Morocco's regions. Whether literate or illiterate, the first Moroccan women to engage in political activities believed deeply in their country's progress.

After independence, women experienced significant advances in education and employment and, like men, obtained the right to vote and be elected to public office. Paradoxically, between 1962 and 1990, their political involvement became less intense, which was due to various factors: first, an illiteracy rate of over 75 percent; second, women remained more often than not under the yoke of patriarchy. The third important reason is related to the fact that the oppressive regime of the period had stifled women's voices and shut them out of public life. Recently, although women do not enjoy the same power as men, they have entered the political field in considerable numbers. With the expansion of civil society and the reform of the new family code, women are in the process of negotiating a newfangled kind of activism aimed at their mobilization and emancipation (El Khayat, 1992).

Post-independence feminism

Since the independence of Morocco from France in 1956, different political parties and civil society organizations have demanded reforms of the family and labor codes and electoral laws to improve the rights and status of women and their participation in public life. The monarchy has played a determining role in the enactment and implementation of a wide range of changes. For example, the personal status law *Mudawana* has experienced two major milestone reforms since it was established in 1957.¹

The first reforms took place in 1993, but they were minor as they only slightly restricted polygamy and required women's consent for the marriage to occur. The 1993 reforms were a real disappointment for women's associations mainly because of the child custody issue. Custody was given to the mother, but in case of the mother's remarriage, custody was given to the father or to the maternal grandmother instead of the mother. In spite of their disappointment, liberal feminists considered the 1993 changes to be immense symbolic gains because they made the debate on the *Mudawana* public for the first time in the history of Morocco, a sign that the Moroccan feminist movement was making significant headway. Indeed, the biggest success of this movement was its ability to bring an almost 'sacred' religious text into the heart of public debate (see Ennaji and Sadiqi, 2012).

After a decade of debate and advocacy, in 2004 the family code was substantially amended, which allowed women to freely marry at the age of 18 whomever they wished (without the guardianship of the father) and put

both marriage and divorce in the hands of the family court. Furthermore, the *Mudawana* has had a positive effect not only on personal and family spaces but also in the public field. Women's organizations, which gathered one million signatures in favor of the reform, were actively involved in the struggle and the national debate which resulted in the espousal of the milestone *Mudawana* (see section below on women's activism).

Public opinion was enthusiastically involved in debates and conversations concerning these reforms and new laws (Zoglin, 2009; Ennaji and Sadiqi, 2012). Progressive political parties described the *Mudawana* as a vital building block in the development and democratization processes. As Nouzha Guessous, one of the female members of the Royal Commission that undertook the reform, asked: "How can Morocco become a democracy if it does not have democracy in the family?"²

In Morocco, a country of 34 million, where religion and traditional thinking are predominant, women scarcely benefited from a worthy respectable status until the new reform was promulgated in 2004, underscoring gender equity and equality in family legal responsibility: both spouses are legally heads of the family and have rights and duties. Thus, Moroccan women can enjoy a more decent life at socioeconomic, political, and cultural levels. This much fought-for reform irrefutably constitutes a new accomplishment, not only for the feminist movement, but also for democratically progressive men who believe in gender equity and equal rights and responsibilities.

Although gender and power are often presented as conflicting between Islamic tradition and democracy, for instance with respect to the headscarf issue, the reality is much more intricate. Moroccan women's legal status and daily life have been transformed over the last two decades; their legal, political, social, and educational achievements have been outstanding and valuable to the entire country. Nonetheless, women are faced with some serious problems, which are closely related to the conservative nature of Moroccan society, which remains fundamentally patriarchal, and where illiteracy is extremely high among women. Women are subject to more social restrictions than men and they are the main victims of Muslim fundamentalism, remaining mostly barred from key government positions. Conversely, it is evident that women's empowerment in a post-colonial society such as Morocco will not be achieved without their genuine participation in the public sphere and in power sharing.

Women's political representation

At the global level, women's political representation in parliament constitutes only 22.2 percent (see Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2015). Underrepresentation of women in politics is a common feature of many Arab countries. Since the Conference for Women in Beijing in 1995, the debate has been on ways in which to increase women's political participation.

Many researchers and experts have focused on different quota systems, political institutions, and political parties, and why they often exclude women. Today, given the complex link between democracy, human rights, and the political participation of women, the debate about the inclusion of women has reached global proportions. According to Drude Dahlerup (2009), the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has the “lowest representation of women in parliament in the world” (10 percent). However, there exist important variations, from 27.6 percent in Tunisia to 10 percent in Morocco to 0 percent in Qatar, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. The latter is the only country in the world where women are not allowed to vote. Former King Abdullah had promised to give Saudi women the right to vote in 2015.

As discussed above, Morocco, which is situated at a global crossroads of ideas, markets, and development plans, has experienced many changes not only in the organization of its economics and policies, but also in the more profound issues of political identity and social structure. Moroccan women have enjoyed the right to vote and to run for elective office since 1962 under the first Constitution. Although the rate of women’s electoral participation is the same as that of men, if not higher, they have suffered from exclusion from the corridors of power for decades. However, since the late 1990s, Morocco has witnessed progress, especially since gender quotas have been adopted in order to increase women’s political participation and representation (Tahri, 2003).³ As a result, female candidates have increased in number with each successive election, and their access to political power has become feasible.

Women first became part of the Moroccan government in 1997, when King Hassan II nominated four women as ministers.⁴ Since that time, however, the number of female ministers has remained limited. While the initial Constitution (1962) asserted the right for equality and explicitly recognized women’s political rights (Article 8), the amended constitution (2011) recognizes that women – in addition to having equal civil and political rights – have equal economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights (Article 19). Thus, the new constitution offers huge hopes for gender equality and for women’s access to power and to public life.

The recent adoption of electoral gender quotas in North Africa, particularly in Morocco and Tunisia, with the aim of rapidly increasing the seats allotted to women, has had a positive impact on neighboring countries such as Algeria and Libya, which have also lately adopted the quota system, as more and more women are involved in electoral processes and in political power. Political parties have themselves taken measures for gender quotas, monitoring the gender dimension of their candidate lists.

Although the quota system is helpful to women, as it allows them to reach parliament without going through the high financial cost of election campaigns, intimidation, and harassment, it is harder to change mentalities and eliminate prejudice (Dahlerup, 2006; Darhour, 2008). Furthermore, since

quota systems vary, there are cases of gender quotas that are inefficient or can lead to limited change, and thus have a purely symbolic aspect. More than 100 countries have electoral gender quotas, and countries with the most women in parliament are also the most likely to use quotas (Dahlerup, 2006).

In Morocco, 305 of the 395 members of the lower house are elected in 92 constituencies through a proportional representation system. An additional 60 seats are reserved for women, while 30 are reserved for men under the age of 40. The reserved seats for women are filled by those elected through a proportional representation system based on nationwide closed party lists (Article 23–2 of the Organic Law 27–11 on the House of Representatives). This system, legislated through the 2011 electoral reforms, builds upon the previous ‘honorary agreement’ between the political parties, formed in 2002, which reserved 30 seats for women.⁵

At the local level, a new law regulating elections (Law 59–11 on the election of council members of local authorities) was passed in 2011, introducing quota provisions for women. In particular, according to Articles 76 and 77, at least one-third of the seats in regional councils, which are directly elected, must be reserved for women. Furthermore, for elections to communal councils, the law provides for additional electoral constituencies reserved for women, who should be elected through a proportional representation system (Article 143).⁶

Morocco’s political system is often depicted as a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral parliament. However, in reality, the king enjoys strong political power, as he is the chief of the army, the head of state, and commander of the faithful (religious ruler); his speeches are adopted as laws, and his person is inviolable and above accountability. During the last three decades, the government has launched numerous reforms to liberalize the economy and to democratize and modernize the country. The late King Hassan II kicked off limited reforms, while King Mohammed VI followed suit by enacting laws and policies to ensure the development and democratization of Morocco. Nonetheless, the country faces a variety of socioeconomic and political challenges which need to be resolved to achieve democracy. Separation of powers, good governance, freedom of expression, illiteracy, and unemployment are cases in point. For instance, 45 percent of the total population is illiterate, and 69 percent of the female population remains uneducated despite the progress achieved. During the 2000s, the schooling rate of rural girls aged 6–15 years increased from 70 percent to 92 percent (Department of Statistics, 2012).⁷

Furthermore, access to the labor market remains restricted, as only a little over a quarter of the workforce is female. Their unemployment rate remains higher than that of men (9.9 percent against 8.7 percent in 2012).⁸ The greater longevity of women leads, moreover, to their finishing their lives alone or taking responsibility for their family. One in five women had the status of head of household in 2011, compared to 15 percent in 1994. Up

to 22 percent of these women live alone, while 54 percent are widowed and 74 percent are inactive in the waged labour force.⁹

The socioeconomic profile of women: Obstacles to their political participation

Despite the recent efforts of government and civil society to modernize the country and promote women, the challenges facing women and democratization remain significant. At the sociopolitical level, the political reforms of the 1990s (amendment of the constitution and law relating to the election system) led to more democratization and to the emergence of numerous women's associations with a great national and regional impact (see section below on women's activism).

In Morocco, women play a crucial role in socioeconomic development despite the existence of large inequalities between men and women so far as access to resources is concerned. In the rural areas, which are marked by labor and gender division between men and women, the latter have growing responsibilities in ensuring the survival and well-being of the family, and in doing their share in farming and production, small trade, and services.

A considerable proportion of women in Morocco are active in jobs related to the public and private sectors. In the formal sector, women are active in the public domain and in social services. The rate of women working in the public sector has been increasing since the 1960s. For example, the rate of female 'economic activity' in urban areas increased from 17.3 percent in 1994 to 27 percent in 2004, according to the general statistics of the Moroccan Ministry of Population and Housing.¹⁰ The overall rate of active women in 2012 was 26.9 percent according to the World Bank.¹¹ However, they have had little access to top jobs or decision-making positions, which is thanks to negative attitudes and prejudices against women. Today many changes have occurred as a result of education and of the democratization process.

State feminism, which may be defined as the government's official policy and vision that seeks to achieve the emancipation of women and gender equity in all walks of life, started to develop in the MENA region after the moves to independence in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. It is used in this chapter to describe the state's ideological and legal commitment to promote women's empowerment. It refers to the state's programs and policies that seek to upgrade women's rights and political participation (see Hatem, 1992). State feminism is considered a historical strategy that has been adopted in different parts of MENA (specifically, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon) to improve women's conditions and to contribute to their well-being.

Thus, education opportunities, health care, and work served women's empowerment and the country's image abroad. Many feminists have criticized this top-down feminism which, according to them, makes women

dependent on the welfare and the intervention of the state (Moghadam, 1997). However, state feminism across the MENA region has contributed to women's emancipation and to the increase of resources available to them, which helped alleviate the burden and restrictions of patriarchy. Women's participation is guaranteed by the Constitution, which stipulates that all citizens (male and female) are equal before the law, and have the same rights and opportunities. State feminism is enforced by the different government departments such as education, health, commerce, industry, interior, and welfare. These departments together with the parliament supervise the policies and programs in favor of women's empowerment and liberation.

In Morocco, state feminism was initiated during King Mohammed V's reign (1956–1961), which promised equality of men and women and a better life for all. This kind of progressive feminism, which included the provision of free education and health services and opportunities for women in the job market, was also meant to embellish the image of the state. But, in the long run, its main beneficiaries were for the most part women from the upper and upper middle classes. In the 1980s, however, with the application of economic reforms (the structural readjustment plan imposed by the International Monetary Fund, IMF), the socioeconomic retreat of the state began, which weakened the prospects of a better future for women of the working and the middle classes. This retreat had negative effects on women's participation and emancipation, because it meant for most of them returning to reliance on the patriarchal system and to further social marginalization.

Thus, although state feminism succeeded in giving women access to education, health, and employment in most North African countries, it did not really bolster women's access to public life, nor did it challenge the negative social attitudes towards women, who are still regarded as dependent on men; these conservative views are reflected in the attitudes of male judges who often refuse to apply the new laws, and persist on applying the old personal status laws.

The economic reforms which were implemented in the 1990s as a result of the adoption of the structural readjustment, which fostered economic liberalization and free trade, led to a reduction of state feminism. The relative retreat of the state from the economic scene as the main agent of change undermined its commitment to gender equality. In general, it is working-class women, particularly rural and unemployed women, who suffered most from these unfair economic and social restrictions.

This dire situation created a vacuum which was soon filled by the Islamists, who embrace a fundamentalist approach to Islam. The Islamists' views on women's education and employment have been to the detriment of the accomplishments realized by women and by state feminism. Islamists have been rather hesitant about women's work and political participation (Ennaji, 2008). For them, education is good for women so long as it helps them to become obedient wives and good mothers (Amin, 2006). While progressive

forces assessed the positive economic effects of women's employment on families and society as a whole, Islamists opposed women's waged work outside the home, focusing on the negative impact it had on children and families.

A large proportion of rural and working-class women gave their support to the Islamists in the region, and often donned the veil as a reaction against their poverty and their marginalization in society. Many who wear the veil see it as liberation from objectification and standards of beauty, enabling women to be treated with respect and more like the equals of men in society. After the Arab Spring, many women supported the Islamists' rise to power, as a way of protesting against the corruption that permeated their societies under the secular regimes (see Ennaji, 2013).

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have recently taken the lead by stepping in to encourage women to fully partake in public life and to mobilize society as a whole to recognize women's role in democratization and development. Despite this important move, women have not benefited from greater participation in public affairs and in decision-making. Although the state has declared its readiness to share power, it imposes conditions that specify which group or party it is ready to work with, and which groups it is not ready to tolerate.

Consequently, women in general continue to struggle so that the state will respond to their social and political needs; through advocacy campaigns and strong lobbying, they exert their influence on the political scene to defend their rights. Indeed, multiple women's organizations are needed to represent women of all social strata and classes, given that economic liberalization and globalization have resulted in dividing women into groups with different social needs and interests (see Ennaji, 2008).

At the educational level, in present-day Morocco, the soaring percentages of illiteracy are concentrated among rural women. In spite of the considerable endeavors that have been made at government and civil society levels to remedy this state of affairs, the specter of illiteracy is still very real. In retrospect, it seems that another vector of discrimination against rural women is the Moroccan educational system, which still favors urban areas over rural ones. Indeed, generalized education has not systematically fostered equality between urban and rural women and between men and women. Even in urban areas, girls are generally encouraged to opt for the least prestigious disciplines or for those that lead to the least available professional prospects. Dropping out of school is considered less problematic for girls than it is for boys, because they can always find a husband who can provide for them.

Women's activism and struggle for power

In North Africa in general, and Morocco in particular, women's involvement in politics is complex, since it is constantly blocked by obstacles and

ideological, cultural, economic, and social factors. Despite these social and cultural restrictions, women do have an important impact on political life, which depends heavily on their participation on a national scale.

In her book *Sultanes oubliées* (1990), Fatima Mernissi shows that religious discourse and nationalism often relegate to the background the issue of women and their political participation. She emphasizes that, though the Arab-Muslim mindset supports female intelligence, it does not yet accept women's individual political aspirations. In general, Muslim women feel held back, and this is less because of incompetence or lack of experience than through the common conviction that politics is rather the prerogative of men, who rarely trust women when they hold the reins of power. This explains the relatively small number of women in government, parliament, and local councils – who are there purely because of the quota system.

The majority of women who have been active in favor of gender equality and women's emancipation belong to an elite that enjoys a comfortable life, unlike most poor women, who are still struggling to meet their family's basic needs. Since independence, Moroccan women have exercised political power in a specific way, and in many cases their activism has been distinct from men's.

Women's organizations

NGOs play an important role in the political participation of women and in their integration in development. The action of women's associations is part of the natural extension of women's activism and struggle for their civil rights. Through these associations many contacts and networks have been created both within and outside Morocco. This dimension is significant for the Moroccan feminist movement symbolically as well as practically.

As a case in point, it is worth mentioning the most well-known women's organizations: *l'Union de l'Action Feminine* (UAF) and *l'Organisation Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc* (ADFM) founded in 1983 and 1985 respectively, in conjunction with the struggle for women's rights. The UAF is a non-profit organization that started as an informal women's group under the name of March 8th Movement, in reference to International Women's Day that year. The group, which developed over the years into a movement for the promotion of women's rights in Morocco, became UAF in 1987. Since then, this NGO has been the driving force behind efforts aimed at raising awareness among women, decision-makers, and society as a whole. The UAF has consistently fought for women's mobilization and against discrimination and marginalization. It has successfully organized several national advocacy campaigns, meetings, and conferences targeting women's grassroots associations, civil society or non-governmental organizations, parliament, and government to promote women's rights and increase their participation in civic and political life.

The ADFM, which is also an autonomous feminist non-profit organization, assigns itself the mission of protection and promotion of women's human rights as universally recognized. Its principal objective is the promotion of women's political rights and strategic interests. In the framework of the constitutional reform process, launched in 2011 by Morocco, the ADFM, among a dozen other Moroccan NGOs, was invited by the Consultative Commission for the Revision of the Constitution to submit its propositions for reform.

The action of the women's associations constantly reminds political leaders that the international context, where legal standards concerning women are applied, can no longer be ignored. Nevertheless the choice between modernity and tradition remains a considerable challenge. In a country such as Morocco – which has opted for multiculturalism, a liberal economy, and political pluralism within a constitutional monarchy – that choice cannot ignore either Islam or the international community. The domestic context also has an important part to play: one of the great challenges concerns the choice of a model for economic and social development and the gradual integration of women into political life.

The feminist movement in Morocco has played a major role in the advancement of women's political participation and gender equality. All the reforms that took place would not have been possible without the feminist movement's long struggle and strong advocacy based on real expertise and linked to the grassroots reality and experiences of women. For Leila Rhiwi, one of the founders and ex-president of the ADFM:

This movement is truly a carrier of a progressive project of society where women, as an alternative force, enjoy full rights. It is important to see the multitude of writings, memorandums, analyses, and reports that the feminist movement has developed describing the modern and egalitarian society to which we aspire.¹²

All in all, Moroccan women have managed to express their autonomy and their complaints in a hostile male-dominated environment. Their action has been fruitful in areas such as education, development, the legal field, and more recently politics. As a result of their struggle, the women's associations and democratic forces in general have succeeded in bringing about the reform of the *Mudawana* in 2004. Furthermore, the regional environment and the recent Arab Spring have been very conducive to change and supportive of women's participation in politics.

Impact of the Arab Spring

The year 2011 saw dramatic changes in Morocco and the Arab world in general. Unprecedented popular demonstrations were organized by the youth

20 February Movement. These uprisings, demanding end of corruption and dictatorship, freedom of expression, social justice, democracy, gender equality, and dignity, resonated across the region and led to the fall of regimes in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Yemen.

There were many reasons for the uprisings. First, according to the World Bank, food prices rose by 15 percent between October 2010 and January 2011, which was 29 percent above its level a year earlier.¹³ Second, there were low wages, poverty, and high unemployment rates especially among the youth, reaching 25 percent in Morocco (Ennaji, 2014). Many university graduates were unable to find jobs as a consequence. Third, people were becoming frustrated with corrupt irresponsible political systems. Fourth, the huge gap between the rich and the poor was becoming intolerable, as most of the gains were amassed by a wealthy few. Fifth, the dictatorial regimes, characterized by human rights violations and corruption, were outdated.

On another level, social media and communications technologies proved to be a new and powerful political tool for women. They helped to increase the intensity of the protests and their spread across the country. The youth became “a real threat to the regimes in mid-2010, when social media facilitated their collective mobilization against entrenched regimes” (Bayat, 2011, 3). A large contribution was made by the new “Internet-savvy youth” who wanted change.

Thanks to the spreading of social media, women protesters had an unparalleled chance to converse, rally, and express their democratic demands on the public scene. Today, a revitalized new generation of women, armed with a fresh political ambition and new tools, has emerged, ready to protest for change and reforms.

Whereas the uprisings produced regime change in Tunisia, Morocco underwent peaceful reforms that left the monarchy in place: a new constitution shifts executive power from the king to the prime minister, guarantees separation of powers and gender equity, and recognizes Berber as an official language. The prime minister is appointed from the party that wins the majority of seats, and the king remains the head of the army and homeland security, and the commander of the faithful, which entails religious authority (Ennaji, 2013).

Yet, the post-Arab Spring Islamist-led government has much work to do, namely job creation and a crackdown on the corruption that has plagued the country’s economy. The ruling Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD) in Morocco has taken a pragmatic stance, and feminists and democrats have received strong government assurances that women’s rights will be respected.

In conducting interviews with women in the region, I was impressed by their overall resistance. Although they fear the loss of their acquired rights and feel a great deal of concern that Islamists in power will enact backward and gender-biased policies, they are determined to fight for their full

participation in public space. In Egypt, for example, the Freedom and Justice Party claims that a woman cannot become president. Egyptian women took an active part in the revolution that toppled former President Hosni Mubarak in 2011, yet they have been mostly excluded from political representation and from any executive decision-making responsibility since the uprisings (Tadros, 2014; Zuhur, 2014). In Tunisia, 49 women won seats in the 217-seat Constituent Assembly in the 2011 elections. But the vast majority of these women were members of the *al-nahda* party, which considers *Shari'a* (Islamic law) the source of legislation (Arfaoui, 2014; Ennaji, 2013, 2014).

Organizations such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) have repeatedly issued reports demonstrating the connection between economic decline and oppression of women. Simply put, MENA countries will not succeed unless women are fully integrated into political and economic life. The Arab Human Development Report (UNDP, 2010) stressed the urgency of including women in the processes of democratization and development. Although the report underlined the notable advance made by many countries in the region over the past decade, it affirmed that the region has not progressed as fast as comparable countries in other regions. The report states that women's empowerment and political participation are of paramount importance for democracy and development in the region. I, for one, can assert that no democracy can be realized without the full participation of women and without their political representation. International organizations and treaties have generally had a constructive impact, as they pushed the government to adopt the gender approach in its policies and measures, and to pass and implement progressive laws and reforms in favor of women's rights and political participation.

Steps toward more political participation

In recent years, a number of steps have been taken to improve the status of women in Morocco and to ensure their political participation. Women's rights groups and human rights activists took a unique approach to tackling gender parity on the political stage by first addressing inequality within the household through the reform of the family code in 2004.

The new constitutional reform increased the number of seats reserved to women from 30 out of 325 to 60 out of the 395 seats (15 percent) in 2011. Though still well below the 30 percent quota claimed by women's movements, it is an improvement on the initial quotas implemented in 2008. Electoral laws have also undergone significant changes to increase the political participation of women, starting with a reform of the ballot system and electoral code in 2002, through the introduction of a proportional list system, followed by the institution of positive discrimination in the form of a gender quota. September 2007 marked the election of 34 women to Parliament: 10.77 percent in contrast to 0.66 percent in the 2002 elections. In

local councils, the participation of women exploded, as the rate of participation multiplied by 22, increasing from 0.56 percent in 2002 to 12 percent in 2009, increasing the number of elected women to local councils from less than 100 to more than 3,465.¹⁴ Today, women constitute 17 percent of the members of parliament (2012–2016) – nearing the world average. They are present in decision-making positions although in insufficient numbers. There are 67 elected women parliamentarians, 60 from the national list and 7 from direct local lists.

In a recent interview with the iKnow Politics organization, Jamila El Mossalli, member of parliament from the ruling party of Justice and Development, asserted:

This is my third term in parliament. I entered parliament in 2002 and was the youngest parliamentarian. Now during my third term in parliament, I am a member of the bureau of parliament. I am particularly interested in community and women's affairs. From this perspective I can say there has been substantial progress in Morocco on both the legislative and political fronts. Of course, many obstacles and restraints still need to be overcome, especially on the economic and social fronts. We hope that the change in government, the new constitution, a new legislative plan and government program will address these issues and bring about change in living standards for Moroccan women.¹⁵

For her, the Arab Spring has positively impacted Moroccan women, as it has brought a new constitution and more reforms enhancing their political participation.

Morocco's new constitution came seven years after the enactment of the new family code (in 2004), which was also hailed as a great step forward for women's rights domestically and as a model for the broader Muslim world (Zoglin, 2009). The family code introduced a range of measures that enhance women's equality in marriage, divorce, and other aspects of family life: women are treated as equal to men before the law; divorce is no longer in the hands of the husband; polygamy is drastically restricted; and the woman is free to marry a man of her choice. The family code is remarkable for the additional reason that it has sparked Moroccan society to engage in a public dialogue regarding gender equality in the family. It constitutes a fundamental reform, which has transformed women's status and their image in Moroccan society, and confirms the fact that democracy, women's rights, and social justice are indivisible.

On the other hand, Article 19 of the new constitution enhanced equality of men and women before the law and underlined the crucial importance of women's sharing of political power and welfare. Like the family code, the new constitution has been cited as an example of Morocco's progress toward becoming a more democratic society. To promote women's political

participation, the state must implement Article 19 of the new constitution, as it is fervently demanded by the feminist movement in Morocco in order to foster women's political participation and access to power.

Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed the importance of women's representation and political participation, and has emphasized their struggle for emancipation and for civil rights, as well as the hard work that remains to be done to ensure their access to public responsibilities.

The fighting that preceded the acquisition of these rights must be remembered, as rights were not granted to women on a silver plate, but were earned by feminist struggle and activism. This chapter has shown the actual progress of Moroccan women's access to public duties despite many challenges posed by the male-dominated political arena, illiteracy, and the fundamentalist threat. Voting rights and eligibility for office do not necessarily produce parity, however, this remains a goal for the future. In politics, as in social responsibilities, one always hopes for the best.

If we look at the situation in the other countries of the MENA region, Morocco is one of the role models. However, parity is not yet fully achieved in practice. More toil and action are still badly needed to reach that goal.

Legislation has already had an effect in the lower districts and at national level. The quota system has had fruitful results and has increased women's political representation. Beyond these laws, the Moroccan feminist movement equally aspires to the adoption of the principle of equal inheritance between men and women and to open access to decision-making positions. To enable women to access political power, it is insufficient that laws are enacted. Daily action to change mindsets through education, sensitization, and advocacy campaigns is necessary. What is encouraging is the fact that Moroccan public opinion has a real appetite for renewal, rejuvenation, and political parity.

Despite the ratification of the new constitution, which is considered one of the most advanced and progressive in the field of women's rights, compared with the constitutions of other countries in the region, there is a gap between these legal texts and the reality of life. The constitution must be adequately implemented; otherwise it will end up like previous constitutions that remain just ink on paper.

Notes

1. See Zoglin (2009) and Ennaji and Sadiqi (2012) for a historical background of the family code reform.
2. Nouzha Guessouss, member of the Royal Commission for the Reform of the Family Code. Comment at Parliament, Rabat, Morocco (Fall 2004).

3. For more on the history of Moroccan women's political participation, see this paper: http://www.quotaproject.org/cs/cs_morocco_tahri_27_7_2004.pdf (accessed on 19 April 2014).
4. See this link about the historical progress made by Moroccan women in politics: <http://www.lavieeco.com/news/politique/femmes-ministres-deputees-maires-conseilleres...-20785.html> (accessed on 22 May 2014).
5. For more information on the Moroccan House of Representatives, see this URL: <http://www.maroc.ma/en/content/parliament> (accessed on 22 May 2014).
6. See previous note.
7. See the official website of the Haut Commissariat au Plan: http://www.hcp.ma/Communique-de-presse-a-l-occasion-de-la-journee-internationale-de-la-femme-2013_a1142.html (accessed on 19 April 2014).
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. cf. United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 2004.
11. See this website: <http://search.worldbank.org/data?qterm=women+in+the+work+force&language=&format=> (accessed on 20 April 2014).
12. Quote from the interview that Rhiwi gave in April 2014 to the electronic francophone Moroccan journal *Economia*. See this link: <http://www.economia.ma/fr/numero-20/e-revue/entretien-avec-leila-rhiwi-de-nombreux-progres-encore-faire-en-termes-d-egalite-des-sexes> (accessed on 19 April 2014).
13. See details about the rise of food prices according to the World Bank Website: http://www.worldbank.org/foodcrisis/food_price_watch_report_feb2011.html (accessed on 2 March 2014).
14. This data is retrieved from this link: http://makeeverywomancount.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2124:morocco-parliamentary-elections-2011&catid=69:political-participation-a-election-monitoring&Itemid=170 (accessed on 20 April 2014).
15. See the entire interview here: <http://iknowpolitics.org/en/knowledge-library/interview/jamila-el-mossalli> (accessed on 20 April 2014).

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3

Gender, Policy and Leadership: A Comparative Perspective

Joyce Gelb

This chapter presents a comparative framework to evaluate women's power and political impact, as well as their influence on policy change, with a primary emphasis on Japan and Taiwan. It suggests that formal political systems may structure options in four ways: constitutionally, legislatively, through common practice (political opportunity structures), or a combination of all three. These structures may also respond to leadership – female and male – and to the impact of activist women's movements and organizations, as well as to transnational norms and rules, in helping to develop new paradigms. This chapter seeks to illustrate the complexity and importance of contextually based power relationships, by using case examples from Taiwan and Japan. Taiwan (which is not recognized by the Inter-Parliamentary Union) has a female legislative representation of 34 percent, among the highest in Asia (Liu, *China Post*, 2013). By comparison, Japan's two houses have only 13.4 percent women. (Women's representation in executive offices in Taiwan is far lower; at present just one in seven.) The chapter argues that while Taiwan presents one of the most positive pictures for women in Asia, Japan lags far behind. The chapter will also include references to the United States and other nations where relevant, to demonstrate how these three structures come into play and how leadership and women's groups, as well as transnational systems and norms, influence outcomes.

The role of constitutions

Constitutions are key to the role of women in politics, as they structure basic principles of democracy, including balance of powers, the rule of law, and representative government. More recently, some constitutions, including those in Taiwan and Japan, contain statements and concepts of gender equality. Article 136 of the 1946 Constitution in Taiwan guaranteed women's representation at all levels of government and initially provided that at least 10 percent of those elected be female in the multi-member district system that prevailed until recently. In contrast, Japan provides an example of how

constitutional rights do not always come to fruition. In Japan, constitutional provisions mandating gender equality were written by Beate Sirota Gordon, who accompanied General Douglas MacArthur in the American occupation in 1946. As one of the few – 26 – Americans who spoke Japanese, Sirota Gordon inserted equal rights provisions in the Japanese constitution. At a time when the United States constitution provided no such guarantees, Sirota Gordon drafted comprehensive rights pertaining to women in politics, economics, and family life, as well as property ownership and inheritances. Perhaps because these provisions were imposed by an occupying power and contravened deep-seated political practices in Japan, they have never been fully or even partially operationalized, though they remain officially on the books.

Legislatures and legislation

Legislative structures are another potential point of access for women in politics. In the case of Taiwan, women enjoy greater representation than in neighboring Japan. Women comprise 44 percent of the current delegation in the leftist Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan's legislative *yuan* (parliament). There is no comparable number in either party in Japan. It is important to note that women were active in demanding larger representation during the period when Chiang Kai-shek, the dictatorial head of state from 1949 to 1975, imprisoned many of their husbands. A large number of women surged into the political process to take up their husbands' vacant political places. Once the system was liberalized after the death of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975, women were in an excellent position to take advantage of their prior political mobilization. As Taiwan's experience suggests, political opportunities for women may occur in newly developing democratizing systems. Similar advances for women occurred in Wales and Scotland after devolution from Britain in 1999. Gender quotas and all-female shortlists of candidates enabled women to increase their representation to 37 percent in Scotland (recently reduced to 33 percent) and 47 percent in Wales. By contrast, Northern Ireland lags far behind Scotland and Wales with only 18.5% women in the legislature, despite the changed rules (Carrel, McClure, Gourtoyannis, 2011). In the more progressive state in Taiwan, which has emerged in the last decades, the numbers of elected women have surpassed the quotas that were initially imposed.

The political opportunity structure: Limiting women's political options

In most political systems, there exists a "political opportunity structure," that is, factors that lead to the emergence, development, and influence of social movements. Whether implicit or explicit in national norms and practices, when these factors specifically relate to assumptions about the role

of and options for women, they may constrain or enhance opportunities for female access to political power. For example, in Japan, a so-called bamboo ceiling pervades the entire society, from corporate life to the political arena, limiting women's options in every sector. Japan ranks 115th of 189 nations with regard to the numbers of women in parliament. Women representatives hold 9.5 percent of the seats in the more powerful Lower House and 15.7 percent in the Upper House (IPU 2015). As of 2014, there is just one woman cabinet member in the current Abe regime. Although Prime Minister Abe has spoken of increasing women's leadership roles to 30 percent, many take this with a pinch of salt. This goal was initially proposed by an earlier prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi, in 2003. Similar promises made at that time to increase available daycare places have never been implemented either. There is skepticism as to Abe's commitment, given his highly traditional views on the family and gender roles, as well as his controversial statements on wartime "comfort women," largely dismissing the war crimes committed against Asian women as non-existent. Members of the Abe administration have also made public statements demeaning to women in 2013 and 2014.

In the case of Taiwan, the acceptance of gender quotas in parliament has already been noted; women must be 50 percent of nominees for the seats elected by proportional representation. There is a far more receptive atmosphere for women in the political arena than in Japan. These patterns are also reflected in economic life: Japan has one of the widest wage gaps for women in the world – close to 50 percent (Gelb, 2003) – while in Taiwan, women typically earn 80 percent of the average male wage, probably the highest ratio in Asia and higher than the United States (Tompkins, 2011). Japanese women continue to work part time and have limited economic options; the persistent M-shaped curve refers to the strong tendency to leave or "retire" from the labor force after marriage and/or childbirth. In Taiwan, a larger percentage of women remain in the labor force. Japanese women may work part time after they leave full-time employment and consequently lack access to benefits, pensions, and good salaries. In Taiwan, a U-shaped curve reflects far more continuous labor force participation by women (Tompkins, 2011; Yu, 2009). The case of Taiwan also demonstrates continuing commitment to gender equality in society, in part reflecting the key role female activists played in the process of democratization. Nonetheless, women's labor force participation in Taiwan demonstrates a secondary position as well, though not as marked as in Japan, suggesting that political gains for women are not always replicated in the economy (and vice versa) (Clark and Clark, 2009).

Women's movements and leaders

Feminist political theorists Carole Pateman (1989) and Iris Young (2000) have suggested that women's leadership can be "transformational." Pateman conceptualizes a transformed system of highly participatory, egalitarian

politics, in which leaders and constituents are bound to each other by citizenship and less or not at all to the state. Young advocates leadership styles that maintain a balance between serving as a role model, as well as empowering followers based on an environment of trust, confidence, and creativity. In addition to labeling these “transformational,” they are also “transactional,” reflecting new relationships which are collaborative, inclusive, interactive, and empowering for all participants. Feminist scholars have substituted the concept of “power to” (enabling, empowering) rather than “power over” (the largely male model) as another way of demonstrating the unique role that some women in politics may play.

An example of how formal political systems may reflect the input of women’s movements dates from 1998, when women’s movements in Taiwan asked for a quota system to be implemented in the nomination and election of women to national and local office. They obtained agreement from their male colleagues for one of every four nominees to be a woman. Although this policy may have emanated from a male hierarchy, which co-opted or bestowed access to power on a few women, the circumstances on the ground suggest a more complex story. Affirmative action in constitutions and legislation may in fact be actively pressed for by women’s non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or by women’s groups within party organizations. In the more progressive state in Taiwan, which has emerged in the last decades, women have surpassed the quotas that were initially imposed. They first pressed for increased representation through a major women’s leader, Annette Lu, symbolically on International Women’s Day in 1972. This example highlights another important factor in analyzing conditions that foster change for women: the role of female (and sometimes male) leaders who highlight issues, which command respect and influence because their advocates are so highly placed in political office. Female leaders may also serve as role models and mentors, and pave the way for others to follow them into politics or political activism.

In some circumstances, female policymakers, even from rival political parties, are able to develop collective agendas on some issues of concern to women. Among these are welfare and health policies, policies sustaining abortion and reproductive rights as well as domestic violence. In addition, they may include equal employment and family friendly policies (which have the potential to challenge male domination as women gain increased autonomy to attain more leadership positions and to redistribute power). In addition, they may address inheritance policy and distribution of property in marriage, whose disposition if implemented may alter women’s societal role significantly as well.

Leadership and activism

Female leaders may play a key role in galvanizing activism, encouraging other women to enter the political arena. In the Taiwanese case, for example,

in the 1970s feminist political leaders Annette Lu and Peng Wan-Ru (who unfortunately died at an early age) had a profound influence on other women who followed them into political activism. Influenced both by their experiences in Taiwan and by transnational feminism, they founded the New Awakenings foundation, which sought to develop feminist consciousness, encourage self-development, and voice feminist opinions. The group published a journal to promote these perspectives (Huang, 2002). In these cases, as will be discussed below, the activist groups that these women helped to mobilize served to galvanize further activism as well. Peng Wan-Ru, who was director of the Women's Department of the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party), led the initiative to promote a gender quota in that party.

In Taiwan, although a democratizing state since the late 1980s and the strong role of female activists enabled women to increase their political role beyond the reserved seats they initially held, initial efforts of these women to enter political life were rebuffed under the authoritarian regime of Chiang Kai-shek. The only organizations tolerated by this patriarchal regime were conservative and non-threatening to the status quo. Initially, the reserved seats for women were viewed as a way for the party leaders to gain more power by controlling the distribution of parliamentary seats to their female allies, most probably an indication of co-optation. During much of this period, women were quite marginal to the system, as the issues they sought to raise were seen as less important than nationalism (Huang, 2002). However, even when women's role in politics was circumscribed and limited, female activists were able to raise issues of interest to women, particularly relating to childcare and health, as well as child prostitution, pornography, and economic discrimination. By the late 1980s, martial law was lifted and it was possible for change-oriented activism to gain an airing.

Taipei mayor Chen Shui-bian is an example of a male leader who initiated increased representation of women in local politics in 1994. He subsequently replicated this action when he became president in 2000. As the DPP presidential candidate, Chen Shui-bian ran with feminist activist Annette Lu as his vice-presidential candidate. Chen's election ended more than 50 years of Kuomintang rule. During his historic campaign, Chen issued a White Paper on women's policy issues, promising that women would comprise 25 percent of his cabinet, pledging to consult Lu as an equal, and promising that he would elevate the future head of the cabinet-level Women's Rights Promotion Association to premier, not just vice-premier, as had previously been the case (Yu Sen-lu, 2000). He also advanced women into his cabinet, in addition to the legislature. His reforms were not entirely sustained, reminding us of the temporary nature of change, which depends on sympathetic political leadership.

Not all female (or male) leaders are progressive or transformational, however: as women get closer to power they may in fact behave more as their male colleagues do. There are numerous international examples of women in politics who lacked or lack the quality of empathy or concern for issues

related to gender fairness and equality. They include Margaret Thatcher in England, Golda Meir in Israel, Indira Gandhi in India, and presently, President Park Geun-hye in South Korea.

Women's groups

Challenging common patriarchal practices embedded not only in constitutions but also in legislatures is part of what women's groups seeking power and influence do. In a number of nations, women have created their own groups to recruit and train more women candidates such as by EMILY's LIST (Early Money Is Like Yeast) and Voters for Choice, as well as the Women's Campaign Fund in the United States. Although these organizations may aspire to gender parity in public office, their results may fall far short of that goal—as is the case in the USA where women remain only 19% of the representatives in the federal congress. In Japan, WINWIN played a similar role in recruiting women candidates, although it seems to have faded from the scene as its leaders have aged. There have been similar groups in the UK and elsewhere, though they face a more difficult path in nations where party control and discipline is greater. Even in circumstances where parties have primacy, female policymakers are able to develop policy on some issues of concern to women. These may include welfare and health, and reproductive rights, as well as laws related to violence against women and children. They may also include equal employment and family friendly policy. They may also address inheritance policy and the distribution of property in marriage, whose reform may alter women's societal role. Such collective agenda-setting may have the power to challenge male domination as women gain increased leadership roles.

Connections with constituents and other politicians

Women who are elected to government positions often owe their support in part to their female constituents, many of whom have accompanied them through their political careers up through the ranks, sometimes beginning their careers as community activists, then running for local office and later for higher office. As women politicians move from local activism to higher office many continue to advocate for the issues they initially raised (e.g., education, health, and environmental concerns). Sometimes known at the "pipeline," this trajectory may insure that once in higher leadership, women who have followed this path continue to maintain the transformational and transactional approaches suggested above. In Japan, the phenomenon known as *giin rippo* led women from different parties to join together in proposing policy for issues of concern to them. The issues that were addressed involved victims: primarily child prostitution, child pornography, as well as domestic violence policy. The issues that elected women in

Japan raised were similar to those advanced by their colleagues in the Taiwan legislative *yuan*.

These cross-party efforts have been most likely to be successful for issues which are not of concern to the male-dominated party leaders, and which may require limited budgetary commitment (see Gelb, 2004, for a more expanded discussion). The issues on which successful policy agreement have been possible may include links by female politicians to advocacy groups and sympathetic bureaucrats (“femocrats”). The existence of coalition governments may permit intervention by smaller, third parties with different agendas and constituencies, sometimes more favorable to women’s interests.

Women and community activism

Women in many nations have participated and organized at local or community level around issues that are relevant to their roles as wives and mothers or as waged workers. In several cultures, such as Japan and the United States, women have formed women-only law firms which handle labor and employment cases relevant to gender equality, and working women’s networks that are locally based and seek to challenge prevailing patterns of discrimination against women. The Working Women’s International Network has utilized appeals to transnational networks and treaties as well to strengthen its claims on the state. While this group is not organized on collective principles, its members are consulted on policy decisions and strategies. In most nations, the initiative for domestic violence shelters and hotlines has emanated at the local level, where discussion of shared experiences with male violence has led to efforts to create a gender-centered response. Taiwanese efforts at creating shelters began in the late 1980s, spurred by several highly publicized cases of violence against women. NGOs began to study the issue and the government followed suit. The disappearance, rape and murder (never solved) of feminist activist Peng Wan-ru in 1996 in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, on the eve of her proposal to reserve one quarter of DPP seats for women awakened the public to the violence and harassment of women. After a second murder and rape of a teenager from a well-known family, thousands of people took to the streets to protest against acts of violence against women. They demonstrated again two months later, in a similar protest. These actions led to consideration of legislation to address the issue by the government. Women’s groups were asked to organize a draft to present to the legislative *yuan*. The framers of the policy looked to the United States and other nations for models for their new law, which was passed in 1998. This law sought to integrate judicial, police, health, and other societal institutions, in an effort to develop a comprehensive approach to domestic violence, which included orders of protection and punishment for perpetrators. A female judge, Judge Gau Fehn-shin, played a major role in championing this issue and helping to draft the policy, again suggesting

the significance of women's leadership as well as activism. The Taiwanese actions helped to galvanize female activists in Japan and elsewhere in Asia to demand similar redress. The law that resulted was a collaborative effort between women's groups, health professionals and social workers, the public, and the government (Chao, 2005). The turn to national government from the initial local focus was due both to the need for funding to sustain services and to a wish to equalize policy and resource access in every part of the nation.

In Japan, the law against domestic violence (or DV) was passed in 2001 and amended in 2007. As in Taiwan, it has sought to develop a comprehensive approach to dealing with prevention and response related to victims and their attackers, although the approach in Japan does not criminalize domestic violence; only violation of protection orders is punishable by jail and a fine. A recent effort in Japan has mobilized on the Internet and other media to protest against an increased incidence of men stalking women; this was publicized initially by a well-known public figure.

In both nations, attention to domestic violence as a public issue was galvanized at first by transnational efforts based on emerging norms related to women. Among them were a series of interventions that began with the UN's passage of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1979. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women was launched in 1982 to make recommendations on any issue affecting women to which it believes the States parties should devote more attention. At the 1989 session, the Committee discussed the high incidence of violence against women, requesting information on this problem from all countries. In 1992, the Committee adopted general recommendation 19, which requires national reports to the Committee to include statistical data on the incidence of violence against women, information on the provision of services for victims, and legislative and other measures taken to protect women against violence in their everyday lives, such as harassment at the workplace, abuse in the family and sexual violence. In response to global mobilization of activists to politicize and stop violence against women, the UN World Conference on Human Rights issued the 1993 Vienna Declaration, which stipulates in section 18 that "The human rights of women and of the girl-child are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human rights. The full and equal participation of women in political, civil, economic, social and cultural life, at the national, regional and international levels, and the eradication of all forms of discrimination on grounds of sex are priority objectives of the international community. Gender-based violence and all forms of sexual harassment and exploitation, including those resulting from cultural prejudice and international trafficking, are incompatible with the dignity and worth of the human person, and must be eliminated" (<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Vienna.aspx>).

Not all issues unite women, either within a nation or among nations. The issue of “comfort women,” the women in nine nations who were forced to act as sex slaves for the Japanese military during World War II, remains controversial (not least because the Japanese government has alternated between apologies and, under the Abe regime, periodically denying that this ghastly system ever existed). Some feminist activists in Japan have rejected the Asian Women’s Fund, a Japan based NGO which seeks to compensate the former “comfort women,” advocating for government reparations instead. In Korea, women have been divided as to whether to accept the money – viewed as “tainted” by many – preferring to wait until/if the Japanese government will provide these funds. As many former “comfort women” are aging, as the time since World War II has elapsed, it is possible that the issue will not be resolved in a manner that will satisfy those who were victimized by Japanese militarism. In the United States, conflicts between women over access to abortion and reproductive rights have created enduring divisions in the years since the *Roe v. Wade* Supreme Court decision in 1973. Intended to provide abortion access for women throughout the nation, irreconcilable differences between so called pro-choice and pro-life groups of women (and some men) have proven mostly impossible to surmount. In Japan, disagreements over contraceptive access divided women for many years.

Positive action and advocacy on gender issues by community activists can lead to significant change on gender issues. In the United States, the primary initiative for the emphasis on sports as a vital part of the reformist Educational Amendments of 1972, which addressed all aspects of gender and education, came from community-based women, who were aided by their families, including children and fathers. This policy effort has served not only to transform the role of women in sports, but also to provide a sense of self-confidence and empowerment which has served women well in their later lives and careers. Many attribute to this legislation the increased victories of American women in international competitions such as the Olympics, demonstrating that policy can both reflect and shape community activism.

Transnational politics and impact on women’s domestic activism

Beginning in the 1970s, international women’s conferences were held in a variety of venues. The UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) helped to set the stage for a human-capital approach to be applied to women demanding that all societal resources be utilized equally (Disney and Gelb, 2000). Later treaties, including CEDAW, enunciated international norms of gender equality, and mandated states to provide services that facilitate harmony between work and family life. A significant and symbiotic relationship developed between NGOs in the women’s movement and new transnational

structures and institutions, resulting in such events at the International Women's Year (IWY) in 1975 and the Decade for Women, 1976–1985. Electronic space has reinforced communication and interaction among groups. Conferences have continued to cement relationships, beginning with the 1975 UN World Conference on Women in Mexico City. The 1985 conference, held in Nairobi, published a Plan for Action with an explicitly feminist perspective. The landmark 1995 Beijing conference and NGO forum were attended by close to 40,000 women. Their international networking led to national legislation in many countries across the globe, spearheaded by the activists who attended the conference. The twelve-point Beijing Platform for Action reflected the views of attendees and sought to hold national states to a new international standard. Other international bodies, including the International Labor Organization (ILO), have similarly helped to create a new framework to which activists may appeal in making claims for more and more responsive policy related to women's interests.

Conclusion

This chapter has presented a comparative framework to investigate some aspects of the roles played by women leaders in formal political institutions and civil society organizations in Taiwan and Japan, often transformative and transactional, and sometimes with assistance from male leadership. The analysis has emphasized the importance of community activism and political advocacy by women to press for political change and monitor implementation and enforcement once policy has been enacted. The chapter demonstrates that both in Taiwan and Japan activist women have organized locally to address issues related to work, violence against women, and other concerns related to their roles as mothers and family care-takers. The chapter also illustrates the important role of international gender equality norms and strategies, including quotas and affirmative action promoted by the UN as well as by transnational feminist activists within and across nations. National and international factors have helped to shape political strategies and actions related to gender in Japan and Taiwan.

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4

Probing the Parameters of Gender, Power, and Democracy in Nigeria

L. Amede Obiora

Two images of power

A few years after the UN Conference on Women in Nairobi, feminist activists and academics planned an international conference at a university in Nigeria. In addition to bringing together activists from across the continent, a major goal of the conference was to involve grassroots women. Despite a year of careful planning, on the day the congress was to open, the hall was markedly empty, the grassroots target audience noticeably absent. Outside the conference venue, a woman sat by the roadside selling groundnuts. To the conference organizers, she appeared to be the personification of the case for gender empowerment. Yet when the organizers arrived at a meeting with the Market Women's Association in the hope of recruiting grassroots participants for the conference, they were astonished to discover that the groundnuts seller was the head of the association. When asked for assistance in generating an audience, the woman modestly said that she would see what she could do. The next day, the conference hall was filled to capacity. The unassuming groundnuts seller, who had no cellphone, no email, and no other modern means of communication, used her organizational skills, impressive networks, and persuasive power to rally women to attend a workshop presumably on "empowerment." In less than 24 hours, this market woman accomplished what an entire committee of eminently credentialed feminist academics and activists could not do in a whole year.

In June 2006, while in Nigeria to organize a conference on indigenous philanthropy, a Nigerian citizen who had been living and teaching as a law professor in the United States for two decades received an unsolicited nomination to serve as the Minister of Mines and Steel Development for the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The nomination process was quite unconventional. There was no prior consultation with the candidate and she was given no notice in advance of the

I am highly indebted to Mary Hawkesworth for her kind editorial assistance.

nomination; she only learned of the nomination from a journalist who had seen an announcement on the news outlets. Without having been asked or having consented, the law professor was introduced to the nation as a prospective member of cabinet, pending legislative confirmation. The politics of any cabinet appointment is complex, but certain aspects of this situation seemed exceptionally peculiar. The assumption of compliance without seeking prior consultation or consent in a setting riddled with political intrigue could only complicate the future working environment for a woman minister negotiating with a notoriously warped civil service. These circumstances helped concoct a recipe for unremitting resistance and contravention.

These two vignettes offer insights into radically different conceptions and operations of power. The first depicts the power of a local market woman, who earned the respect of her peers, having risen through the ranks and possessing unimpeachable knowledge about intricate grassroots dynamics, strategies, and networks for effective resource mobilization. Nevertheless, such power is routinely overlooked or discounted because of gender, lack of formal education, socioeconomic position, and misunderstanding of how power operates at the grassroots in specific locales. Providing strategic leadership in a pivotal sector that sustains subsistence and ensures survival, but is often trivialized and marginalized as “informal” by orthodox canons and measures, the leader of the Market Women’s Association is easily rendered invisible in dominant discourses and transactions of power. Just as the informal sector is elided from official statistics, macroeconomic indices and definitions of national productivity such as the gross national product and gross domestic product, this woman’s leadership exists below the threshold of visibility, despite its enormous capaciousness, influence, and effectiveness. Yet her keen command and exercise of power poignantly exemplify the venerated ability to “lead from the back.” Her power is embedded in multiple ties and relationships, cultivated over the years through acts of cooperation and reciprocity, which sustain economic equilibrium in a volatile theater. Her legitimacy rests primarily on the confidence of the association for which she works, a confidence predicated on and animated by integrity, accountability, and mutual respect.

In the second vignette, the power typically associated with educational and professional accomplishments, and cosmopolitanism was eclipsed by the failure to consult and by the absence of apparent respect for or deference to decisional autonomy. Rather than privilege the moral agency and hard-won independence of an adept academic, the president, an astute general, and the longest-serving ruler of the Nigerian state, orchestrated an extraordinary appointment process structured by political intrigue. The president’s focus on transforming his aggressive vision of reform into reality, while involved in a dire contest with the legislature, contributed to a situation in which a conscientious woman was privileged to make important

contributions to her nation, but under extraordinarily difficult circumstances. Reminiscent of a military style of command and control, the very peculiarity of announcing a nomination prior to consultation with either the designated candidate or party elites positioned the nominee as a lightning rod for bureaucratic angst. The expediency of involving Nigerians from the diaspora in nation-building did not mitigate the harsh realities and opposition in a complicated political arena. Once confirmed as the Minister of Mines and Steel Development, the seasoned woman administrator had enormous power and enjoyed the unequivocal support of the pragmatic president. In a manner analogous to dodging minefields, however, she was forced to confront antagonists across a broad spectrum of stakeholders and vested interests, who had long benefited from pervasive corruption in the system. Tasked with an arduous mandate that dictated a radical “clean up” in a transitioning democracy rife with weak institutions, the power of the new minister and her ability to deliver productive outcomes required the constant backing of the president.

These anecdotes illuminate operations of power and the complexity of gender participation to enhance the quality of democracy. A resilient and predictable indigenous sector run by women who trade on competence and powers long established in culture and tradition contrasts with a dynamic political milieu characterized by considerable maneuvering, chaos, and corruption. As the woman in the second vignette who was appointed Minister of Mines and Steel Development, I have experienced the intricacies of power as a cabinet level officer appointed, subject to elaborate senate confirmation, to lead a strategic sector at the highest echelon of the federal government. My intense but brief term in office stands in marked contrast to the power of local women who operate *continuously* to enable and sustain the conditions for daily existence in Nigeria, despite their neglect by political and development analysts. To situate these two models of power in context, I begin with a brief overview of Nigeria and the recurrent problems that have undermined equitable inclusion.

The political economy of a centennial

The country now known as Nigeria is an amalgamation of disparate “protectorates” united by British imperial interests and colonial agendas one century ago. Nigeria’s post-independence history is a microcosm of the intractable problems underpinning Africa’s perennial quandaries.¹ Although the British colonial administration in Nigeria was able to exercise hegemony on a shoestring by co-opting vibrant indigenous institutions and apparatus of governance through a system of indirect rule, at the centennial of its amalgamation, Nigeria remains adrift, seemingly devoid of the capacity for self-renewal. Enmeshed by structural and cultural violence, the euphoria at independence was displaced by a development industry beholden to

Afro-pessimism as Nigeria became a laboratory for experimentations that perpetuate the crises of state. The authoritarian reflexes of key political leaders compounded the inherent coerciveness of development prescriptions to the detriment of resourceful indigenous agency. Both governance shortfalls and neo-liberal policies, however, have contributed to the growing assumption of responsibility by common folks, who cooperate to produce subsistence and confront the casualties of poverty. Working independently of official systems of governance, market women provide a moral economy that augurs well for the revitalization of civil society.

Scholars have documented the extensive scope of formal political power and authority that women wield in several traditional African societies. Kamene Okonjo (1976), for example, discussed the dualities that characterized Igbo political systems. Within the African “dual-sex” systems of organization, each sex has a credible path to manage its own affairs and women’s interests are represented at all levels. The dual-sex institutions of shared power and authority enable women and men to play critical roles in establishing equilibrium in their societies. This dual-sex system was mediated by a flexible gender system in language and culture that distinguished between biological gender and culturally constructed gender roles and statuses. This system stands in stark contrast to Western configurations of power which classify political offices and roles as male, thus forcing women in public life into “male” roles. With British colonization, the power of women was systematically undercut as the colonizer introduced the singular principle and practice of male power (Boserup, 1970; Waring, 1988). Despite the institutionalization of male power in the formal sector, women soldiered on, providing stability and succor, which invariably shored up individual, household, communal and national growth and survival.² Civil society organizations such as the Market Women’s Association have historically served as vehicles for valuing and evaluating political institutions (Van Allen, 1972).

Yawning democratic deficits, along with the mobilization of transnational feminist activism at the global level, have contributed momentum to Nigeria’s embrace of gender-inclusiveness as a value for institution-building. Burgeoning empirical evidence suggests the expedience of linking gender equity and anti-poverty rationales in vindicating women’s rights. The United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) signals an international consensus against gender discrimination. Nigeria was one of the first countries to ratify the CEDAW; its adoption in 1979 coincided with a review of the Nigerian Constitution which culminated in incorporation of equal rights as a fundamental value in the Constitution. Reframing the terms of discourse to empower women as both a constitutional guarantee and a human right further animated the transformative potential of feminist agency and spurred constructive dialogue, which fortified local actors to tackle problems ordinarily relegated to the seemingly inscrutable realm of culture and religion.

In more than five decades since independence, however, the vast preponderance of Nigerian state officials have been men. The same patriarchal principles that hamstrung successive regimes in Nigeria dictate the gender parameters for political participation in contemporary Nigeria. The sexist colonial legacy was reinforced after independence by misogynistic nationalist, praetorian, and civilian governments. When convenient, these governments artfully usurped gender scripts for propaganda purposes. Under military authoritarianism and repression, for example, select individuals and official umbrella women's organizations of questionable autonomy exploited international sentiments to commandeer gatekeeping roles, proclaiming themselves spokespersons for "women's interests." The failure of ad hoc gender equity practices, entrenched in unsustainable personality cults and gender machineries, foregrounded the paradox of gender imbalance in a post-colonial political arena that was forged through legendary gender activism that featured epochs such as the Igbo Women's War (Van Allen, 1972).

Nigeria attained political independence in 1960 and became a federal republic in 1963. Shortly thereafter, the government collapsed under a military coup. By 1967, the country had spiraled into political abyss and civil war. The country remained under the subjugation of successive military regimes until the advent of the Second Republic in 1979. The ensuing democratic experiment survived one full term, but was prematurely aborted by a military seizure of power shortly after a second round of elections in 1983. That military government was in turn toppled by a counter-coup in 1985. As material conditions rapidly deteriorated, the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces was forced to institute containment measures that ranged from structural adjustment to an ambitious set of programs to transition to civilian rule. Eventually, the military dictator annulled the elections for a Third Republic and installed an interim government. With the end of the Cold War and increasing pressure for democratization, strategic bilateral and multilateral partners imposed a series of sanctions on Nigeria to condemn the annulment. The interim arrangement was superseded by yet another *coup d'état* and the ensuing administration remained in power until the sudden death of the military despot in 1998. When the stopgap military administration succumbed to mounting pressure, the Fourth Republic was born in 1999. General Olusegun Obasanjo, who had turned the government over to civilian authority in 1979, was elected president in 1999.

On 19 April 2004, Nigerians went to the polls – only the second time that the country experienced serial democratic handover. The re-election of incumbent President Obasanjo sparked protests and a litany of election misconduct. On 29 May 2007, Nigeria experienced its first transition from an elected presidency to a successor civilian administration (Iliffe, 2011). Again the elections came under fire, with credible observers calling for stringent

remedial measures, including annulment of the results. Despite vitriolic opposition, the country did not implode and military intervention was not espoused as a viable option in public discourse.

As the Nigerian electorate matures in commitment to democratic ideals and practices, corresponding checks and balances are cropping up to reorient the general public and eliminate the market for “cash-and-carry” electoral returns. As the evolution of a civic culture and formative infrastructure for substantive popular sovereignty cannot merely be wished into existence, the transition from one civilian administration to another is an important step. The defeat of the proposition for a constitutional amendment to extend presidential tenure to three terms, the so-called 3rd Term Agenda, demonstrated the transformative potential of the separation of powers doctrine and the qualitative difference that comes with decisive legislative leadership. The frustration of the campaign to accommodate a third term for President Obasanjo, however, also generated heightened appreciation of the dangers of a power vacuum stemming from the neglect of succession planning. The routine failure to plan for succession enables deeply entrenched political interests to compromise the democratic process and co-opt power.

Against grave odds, Nigeria’s transition to democracy has survived 16 years. Nigerians returned to the polls in March 2015 and the incumbent President, Goodluck Jonathan, the flag-bearer for the ruling party, lost to the opposition leader, Muhammadu Buhari. Like Obasanjo, Buhari had been a military Head of State. In fact, he came into power due to a coup that toppled the civilian democratic administration that succeeded Obasanjo in 1979. To acknowledge the recently concluded peaceful elections as a historic milestone is not to trivialize valid reservations and vehement reproofs about the abysmal quality of democracy in Nigeria. However, civil wars and successive coups provide a sobering reminder that democratic consolidation is no mean feat. Just as the carnage of Biafra’s bid for secession still looms large in the memory of many, the imprint of despots still plagues the country, hence the vindication of a semblance of democratic dispensation as the lesser of fraught alternatives. The refusal of Nigerians to swallow the outcomes of manipulated polls and disputants’ savvy appeal to the judicial system attest how far the country has come. Whatever happens to mushrooming election petitions, objective evidence suggests that the days of “kangaroo courts” and overwhelming judicial passivity are gone. After years of political machinations, the judiciary seems poised to recuperate its independence and assert its relevance as a pivotal democratic institution. The emergence of the court as a bulwark for the rule of law is tied to recent political stability. The independence of the judiciary is both a hallmark of and an instrument for democratic consolidation. Thus, the implications of a vigilant judiciary for good governance and accountability cannot be over-emphasized.

Approaching its 55th anniversary of independence, contemporary Nigeria is at a critical crossroads. The country has surpassed South Africa and become

Africa's biggest economy, boasting the world's 26th largest Gross Domestic Product. With a GDP of \$522.64 billion in 2013, Nigeria has shown significant growth from \$166 billion GDP in 2007. According to the Central Bank of Nigeria, the GDP annual growth rate averaged 6.12 percent from 2005 to 2014, reaching an all-time high of 8.60 percent in the fourth quarter of 2010 and a record low of 3.46 percent in the first quarter of 2012. From an all-time high of 47.56 percent in January 1996, the inflation rate averaged 12.4 percent from 1996 until June 2014, when it decreased to 8.2 percent. Oil remains the mainstay of Nigeria's economy.³ Oil revenue has fueled unsustainable consumption, while fostering a fragile coalition of competing ethnic and religious interests. Abundant revenue has not resulted in significant social investments and infrastructural development, however.

Nigeria continues to experience growing religious fundamentalism, escalating ethno-religious violence, and political and socioeconomic difficulties. Widely condemned as ultra-corrupt, Nigeria ranked 144th of 177 countries on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index in 2013 (Ekeh, 1975; Smith, 2008). As the country gets richer, more Nigerians live in poverty and Nigeria ranks third on the world poverty index. With the seventh largest population in the world (174,507,539 per July 2013 estimate), the GDP per capita was \$1,097 in 2013, placing it 180th of 229 nations; 61 percent of Nigerians were living on less than a dollar a day in 2010. Indeed in 2013, the *Economist* named Nigeria the worst country to be born in, with one of the lowest life expectancy rates in the world (212th of 223) and one of the highest annual number (239,700) of deaths due to HIV/AIDS. In an encouraging turn of events, however, the government mustered the political will to combat the recent outbreak of the Ebola virus to the applause of international health agencies.

Nigeria has a median age of 17.9 years: children under the age of 14 constitute 43.8 percent of the population; 15–24 year olds account for 19.3 percent, and 25–54 year olds make up 30.1 percent. According to UNICEF, almost 5 million primary school-aged children are not enrolled for classes and approximately 30 percent of all pupils drop out of primary school. The literacy rate among males aged between 15 and 24 is 75.6 percent compared with 58 percent for females in the same age group. In 2011, with unemployment hovering around 23.9 percent, the World Bank estimated that only 33.7 percent of Nigerians aged 15–24 were employed. The majority of this age cohort engage in precarious or vulnerable activities that provide low income and little human security. As the National Youth Policy observed, “untrained, jobless and alienated youth are ready to take up arms in exchange for small amounts of money.” The alienation and disaffection of youth shed some light on the insurgencies that keep Nigeria on the brink of disintegration.

Biafra's bitter quest for self-determination was an early iteration of the perennial struggle for resource control. Despite the phenomenal death toll from Nigeria's war against Biafran secession, the carnage did not orient the

state sovereign to forestall subsequent fissures. The ad hoc peace that provided a modicum of relief from the carnage failed to provide an enduring framework for peaceful coexistence. Successive military regimes used strong arm tactics that did not dispel ethnic, religious, and other sociocultural discontents. With the return of civilian rule in 1999, heavily armed militancy erupted in the Niger Delta, holding the region to ransom, and threatening to derail initiatives to develop natural resources, which could generate revenue for planned economic growth. In the past decade, with the onslaught of terrorist insurgencies, the state has witnessed some of the greatest threats to its legitimacy and existence. The Niger Delta militants had barely been quelled when competition over resources again arose under the guise of religious conflict. From vicious bomb attacks to dastardly kidnappings, the putatively Islamist terrorist organization Boko Haram has earned global notoriety. The world took notice when Boko Haram abducted more than 300 girls from a secondary school with relative ease and impunity. Despite skillfully orchestrated “Bring Back Our Girls” campaigns and the international military collaborations galvanized by the campaigns, the stolen girls remain missing and Boko Haram seems all the more emboldened. The rescue campaigns bear similarities to episodic containment efforts that distract attention from substantive conflict-resolution strategies, which require strong institutions, equitable resource distribution, and democratic inclusion.

Gender and politics: Lessons from experience

Despite the lip service paid to gender equality by the community of nations, CEDAW commitments have not been translated into actual guarantees to better the lives of women in most nations. Equal participation of women in decision-making and leadership has proven particularly elusive in Nigeria. Although the 1979 Nigerian Constitution specifically prohibits sex discrimination, women remain disadvantaged across a broad range of issues, including underrepresentation in public offices (Obiora, 2005; Obiora and Toomey, 2010). Despite historic socioeconomic obstacles that have compounded political exclusions in Nigeria, a handful of women have managed to attain prominence in national politics. In the 2015 election women won 5.6 percent of the seats in the House of Assembly and 6.5 percent of the seats in the Senate. Six women served as ministers in the first Obasanjo administration. Although 12 women served in the cabinet in 2012, this number quickly dwindled to nine. The favorable performances of some of these women refute sexist stereotypes and dispel myths that women are unfit to exercise high level political power.

My experience as Minister for Mines and Steel Development provides a unique lens for analyzing the possibilities and pitfalls that confront women who seek to promote social justice and democratic reform. Prior to my political appointment, I worked as a social entrepreneur, pioneering

various strategies to address an array of needs. The overarching framework for my civil society interventions has been the Institute for Research on African Women, Children and Culture (IRAWCC), which I founded in 2000. IRAWCC harnesses indigenous resources to invigorate individual agency and develop local capacity to enhance reform, particularly concerning opportunities, constraints, vulnerabilities, and needs linked to gender disparities. IRAWCC's programs include Ophelia, a gender empowerment grassroots model that seeks to alleviate the vulnerabilities of women and children; SPIN, a philanthropic initiative to mobilize and sustain indigenous resources through capacity building, innovation, and collaborations; LEAD (Leadership Enterprise for African Development), a program to leverage African experiences, insights, and resources to foster leadership and governance in public, private, and civil society sectors; PADY (Platform for African Diaspora Youth), a transformative digital agora involving African heritage youth which is designed to hone knowledge, commitment, competencies, and productivity to contribute to equitable development in Africa; and NIMAVEC, a strategic peace infrastructure aimed at unlocking the entrepreneurial potentials of Nigeria's vibrant youth to contribute to national integration, dynamic growth, and global competitiveness.

While in Nigeria to organize a leadership forum to stimulate indigenous philanthropy in June 2006, I learned from a journalist that I had been nominated for ministerial appointment. I had no political pedigree or patronage, and my unsolicited appointment was rendered all the more remarkable by my long residence in the United States. President Obasanjo had just relieved a minister from my state of origin (Imo State) of her portfolio and wanted to fill the vacancy with a female candidate. Although I had never met the president and had no prior political affiliation or aspiration, the president nominated me on the basis of my reputation and work in the civil society sector. My unconventional appointment stunned and infuriated party chieftains who complained (out of the president's earshot) that he had usurped their political prerogative to sponsor ministerial candidates. My lack of political interest, experience, and pedigree made me reluctant to accept this unforeseen nomination, and initially I welcomed the intraparty elite resistance as a valid exit option. I was strongly encouraged, however, by pertinent constituencies to stand and deliver, so I allowed my nomination to go forward. Despite the initial dissension around my nomination, I was unanimously confirmed, as opposing factions professed to be disarmed by my candor, integrity, and merit during the confirmation hearing. My experience in the confirmation process, aptly characterized as trial by fire, prepared me for the daunting challenges that defined the portfolio I was assigned.

In choosing me to serve as Minister for Mines and Steel, the president sought an effective advocate who could help to achieve key objectives to revitalize mining in Nigeria. Prime among these objectives were the promulgation of the legislative framework to govern the mining sector and

the attraction of foreign direct investments. Delivering on these two objectives defined the thrust of my efforts. Mines and steel development is a highly technical, strategic, and contested sector in Nigeria. The discovery, development, and management of mineral assets involve complex variables that transcend the boundaries of pure science. Nigeria had a rich history of mining prior to the discovery of sweet crude. Domestic problems that precipitated the decline of mining coupled with international market factors helped to redefine the country's trajectory in ways that give credence to the so-called resource curse theorem.⁴ My mandate was to reverse the curse.

Restoring Nigeria's competitiveness for global mining capital required establishing some key structures and processes. To rehabilitate the sector, the administration implemented a package of programs to stimulate reform and foster growth to yield democratic dividends. The cornerstones of the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), the home-grown strategy to reduce poverty and safeguard human security, were public sector reform, private sector growth, social charter, and cultural reorientation. Integral to the private sector as an engine to catalyze wealth creation, employment generation, and poverty reduction was the designation of solid minerals development as a strategic priority. Incubating a competitive mining sector required focused strategies to rein in corruption. This focus in turn demanded that that so-called good governance and anti-corruption measures not be taken at face value, but closely evaluated for credibility and impact.

Pertinent milestones

A fundamental objective of the reform was to create an enabling environment to build the confidence of investors in Nigeria's prospect as a choice destination for global mining capital, thereby attracting foreign direct investment. This entailed overhauling the law and policy regulating mining operations in Nigeria to align it with global best practices. The bill to revitalize the moribund mining industry had languished in the National Assembly for six years preceding my appointment. The chances of adopting the bill were particularly dimmed by tensions between the executive and legislative arms of government following a failed bid to amend the constitution to allow the president to run for a third term. To secure the passage of this critical legislation, I had to cultivate the goodwill and good offices of the lower and upper chambers of the National Assembly, diffusing tension and working across party lines to build a supportive coalition. After six months of intensive lobbying, I succeeded in winning sufficient votes to ensure the passage of the bill. Through my arduous efforts, the Mining Act was passed by the National Assembly. The fast-tracking and signing of this legislation in the sixth month of my tenure as minister seemed to vindicate the president's confidence in steering clear of orthodox party-line politics for my

appointment. The promulgation of the legislation was widely acknowledged as a significant indication that Nigeria was open for minerals and mining business.

To attract foreign direct investments into the minerals and mines sector, we launched aggressive international promotional and marketing outreaches, including more than a dozen visits to six countries, a dozen formal presentations at conferences, and over a thousand technical and business discussions with a broad spectrum of major mining company representatives, support service providers, regulators, financiers, analysts, and catalysts of various stripes during my first six months. The strenuous effort put Nigeria on the radar screen of serious mining companies, resulted in numerous visits by mining elites, which in turn translated into permit applications and meaningful expressions of interest in various mineral assets. This laid the groundwork for concrete exploration and mining contracts once the legislation was finally in place.

To build on the momentum of these early successes, I prevailed on the president to declare 2007 Minerals and Mines Year (MAMY). The impact of this declaration was enhanced by the Mining Investment Conference, which yielded measurable dividends in terms of substantial participation and concrete follow-up by foreign prospects and investors. After 16 years of planning and nine respective feasibility studies, the Nigerian Institute for Mining and Geosciences was officially launched at the declaration ceremony for the Mining Year. MAMY signaled a chance for equitable local participation in mineral resources management, and I initiated elaborate steps to raise consciousness, engage community stakeholders, and build the capacity of small and medium entrepreneurs.

There were good reasons to privilege indigenous agency in natural resource development. Nigeria's prioritization of mining coincided with the eruption of crises in the oil-rich Niger Delta region, where various factions were contesting inequities, noting that booming profits had failed to improve the lives of the local people. Alarming pollution was also worsening basic well-being, demonstrating the importance of treating communities with minerals deposits as serious stakeholders. With recurrent backlash against the oil industry and high expectations for the minerals sector, the first order of business was to stimulate constructive dialogues and harness dissent by providing demonstrable dividends for democratic participation through astute buy-ins, and some semblance of a succession plan in the court of public opinion. Friend-raising and relationship-building were also core values that defined my tenure. These energetic pursuits recruited trusted intermediaries whose in-kind and cash contributions augmented the modest budget of the ministry, giving rise to innovative local programs supported by philanthropic initiatives, corporate citizenship, and inter-agency collaborations.

The concept of stewardship implies more than routine oversight and management; good stewardship is a matter of accountability and effectiveness. My record of accomplishment reflects my commitment to the ideals of good stewardship, but this record does not reveal the enormous toll associated with a woman in power who dares to take seriously the responsibility of good governance and political stewardship in a transitioning democracy. My good faith efforts to revitalize the mining sector bore great resemblance to Anezi Okoro's (1972) depiction of struggles to avoid manifold minefields in *One Week, One Trouble*.

Illustrative minefields

Even after the mining bill was promulgated, entrenched interests tried and almost succeeded in smuggling radical changes into the statute at the gazette stage, without the legislature's knowledge. The traces of vested interests were also palpable in the financial practices within the ministry, which compelled me to prioritize substantive capacity-building to offset corruption and indiscretions. Toward that end, I sought a strategic partnership with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to retain the services of KPMG Professional Services to design and operationalize critical norms, systems, and processes to rationalize the organizational structure and redress the corruption and culture of impunity. My goal was to introduce sustainable reforms that would not be reversed when elections brought new leadership to power.

Nigeria could not become a global mining destination if, for instance, file folders containing crucial scientific data about core mineral assets "disappeared" during negotiations about privatization. Individuals who had access to those files could reap unfair advantage from exclusive control of vital information, distort market competition and undermine revenue generation. Implementing a management information system that created a database incorporating all dimensions of the supply, demand, and technology chains could enable continuity across successor administrations. The quick turnover of Executive Ministers, which made me the ninth minister in the 11 years of the ministry's existence, compounded the odds against continuity and made institutionalizing protocols and gains of signal importance. By the same token, my tenure alone saw the quick succession of three different permanent secretaries. Ironically, the succession of permanent secretaries was both a symptom and a cause of the corruption in the civil service bureaucracy.

KPMG's comprehensive institutional review generated governance procedures – a "Tsunami" of checks and balances as some of the ministry's staff called it – aimed at overcoming strategic and operational hurdles that hamstrung the ministry.⁵ The bold reorganization initiative was very unpopular with key civil servants, whose aversion to change translated into opposition, hostility, resistance, and subversion of the proposed reforms. It was an

eloquent commentary on the ethical and patriotic bankruptcy of the implicated personnel that few acknowledged the public good and institutional returns that emanate from enhancing work conditions and orchestrating an investment-friendly business climate. When I resigned from the ministry, KPMG's project stalled, squandering the development-assistance that the UNDP devoted to the project.

Beyond the ministry, the politics associated with a \$120m World Bank loan to develop mining was a source of extreme frustration. The World Bank's Sustainable Management of Mineral Resources Project (SMMRP) illustrates the failings of the system: both the design and management were unsustainable. The perverse role of the World Bank, the self-anointed global good governance evangelist, was the key to the problem. Exempt from Due Process Certification and Federal Executive Council Review, the SMMRP became the means to finance transactions that would not ordinarily pass scrutiny. Under these circumstances, a loan extended for the common good of a sovereign nation was distorted into the equivalent of a petty cash facility to fund everything that could be cloaked in a rhetoric that resonated with the World Bank's orthodoxy. An inordinate proportion of the loan was reserved for "consultancies," which frequently burdened Nigeria with subsidizing exorbitant payments to "experts" with World Bank connections. Another sizeable percentage of the loan was designated as project budget, providing another slippery slope for the borrower to foot bills for the conspicuously ostentatious life-styles of visiting World Bank missions. Certain World Bank officials would rather squander millions of dollars on proliferating bureaucracy and conducting pedestrian studies with sterile findings than allow a sovereign borrower-nation the prerogative to use a loan to build local capacity and deliver the constitutive elements of a social contract.

Although the SMMRP was putatively controlled by my ministry, the project was actually managed by World Bank employees who had oversight of the project. Their corrupt management distorted incentives and undermined macro-level nation-building objectives. A case in point involved geo-science data generation, a prerequisite for public investment in the mining sector. Prior efforts to attract mining capital faltered because of the dearth of substantive data. Less than a year after advertising a \$10m contract for airborne geophysical survey bids, World Bank staff demanded that the contract be awarded for \$25m and took umbrage when urged to articulate a valid explanation of the monumental variance from advertised rates. Additional tension about transparency arose over the terms of reference that favored a contractor who had reneged on an initial award and derailed the progress of critical operations. Concerned that reliance on World Bank funding left the country beholden to self-interested World Bank associates, I sought a way to adapt procurement processes to advance national priorities.

My rudimentary goal was to “save the Bank from itself” by streamlining activities scheduled for implementation under the SMMRP to avoid economic waste and optimize returns on investments. To temper the World Bank’s control, I insisted on catalyzing a project management unit that reflected Nigeria’s minerals ownership, was less susceptible to manipulation, and was more motivated by public good. Apparently, standard World Bank directives impose spending goals to be met as a metric for success and upward mobility. A major problem with such a target in the context of the SMMRP was that the World Bank’s employees seemed motivated to force the approval of expenditures in a manner that was not consistent with Nigeria’s sovereign interest in securing value for money. Keen to avoid reducing ministerial approval to rubber-stamping, my initial approach to this conflict between Nigerian and World Bank interests was to attempt to persuade Bank officials that certain proposals entailed far too much waste for my imprimatur. When they refused to modify economically wasteful projects, I pulled rank and suspended the loan in its entirety, a particularly onerous decision given that this loan provided the main funds for the mining sector.

The aversion to economic waste that precipitated my collision with the World Bank also fueled a series of interventions related to privatization. The correlation between corruption and privatization is well established. The dominant privatization model championed by the World Bank under the auspices of the Bureau of Privatization Enterprises promised signature bonuses for compliance with World Bank formulas and timetables. But if stimulating production is a preeminent objective of privatization, slavish adherence to one formula can be a gross disservice to the national interest. Natural mineral resources take generations to form, which mitigates against treating them as if they are manufactured commodities. Moreover, mining requires expertise and intensive capital investment. Without these, the outright sale of natural resources leaves the government with minimal recourse if new owners fail to develop transferred assets or hoard them to speculate on option values. The Nigerian Mining Corporation and the Nigerian Coal Corporation – the properties earmarked to be disposed of – were the few assets for which reasonable geo-science data existed. If properly harnessed, the assets could be the catalysts for the planned vibrancy of the mining sector.

Drawing from best practices in natural resource management, I recommended consideration of alternatives to outright disposition of mineral properties. I was concerned that the entities vying for private control of these resources seemed better equipped to posture than to develop the properties. Past disputes and struggles to recuperate potentially productive mineral assets stranded in the possession of entities unable to develop them gave me strong reservations about the dominant formula for privatization, especially in the absence of adequate data to value these assets. As a substitute for negligible signing bonuses, I sought to recruit credible mining companies with

proven track records to do justice to the ministry's core objectives. Indeed, I endorsed subsidization of exploration projects to determine reserve levels, and quality and quantity of assets prior to privatization.

Throughout these battles with ministry staff and with external forces such as the World Bank, the president unequivocally supported my efforts to steer reform. Trusting my sagacity and convinced that my objectives were in the best interest of Nigeria, the president endorsed my position to expedite the transformation of the mining sector. As the election drew near, however, preoccupation with political strategy supplanted concerns with sound public policy. Certain members of the ruling party whose procurement contracts had been held in abeyance as a result of my suspension of the World Bank loan began pressuring the president to force me to reconsider the suspension. Ultimately, political calculations undercut his support for my reform position, and the president capitulated to pleas to reinstate the loan. I was unwilling to temper my resolve, however. I remained convinced of the manifold negative consequences of the wasteful use of the loan. I also considered it bad policy to reduce the approval of a cabinet officer appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate to a mere rubber stamp. Interpreting the president's waning support as a vote of diminished confidence in my leadership, I tendered my resignation as the Minister for Mining and Steel Development of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and returned to my professional commitment as an academic in the United States.

Advancing gender-power and justice

My tour of duty offers instructive insights about the gulf between gender balance in governance and power-sharing for the public good. Increasing the number of women in office is not the same thing as enabling women to exercise power in the interests of egalitarian justice. Gender parity can simply reproduce the status quo. Democratic aspirations buttress the case for women in power, but to achieve democratic objectives women leaders must modify how power is exercised.

When considering questions of power, it is imperative to ask how power is deployed and for what ends. Successive rulers who have used their power to "bring women into politics" have not yet succeeded in building institutions that ensure stability and promote the public good. Paternalist appointments may simultaneously open doors for women to demonstrate effective agency as power operatives, constrict the autonomy of women co-opted into government service, and perpetuate patriarchal hegemony. While individual talent and political acumen can engender impressive accomplishments, the dependence on the backing of powerful men to sustain public-spirited endeavors can only go so far. Accordingly, it is imperative to address the quality of democracy as a logical extension of agitation for gender inclusion.

To paraphrase Virginia Woolf (1938), it is imperative for women to question the terms on which they participate in politics and governance, for in “slavish imitation of men, they are wasting their chance.”

As the opening anecdote makes clear, market women create and sustain operations of power that ensure subsistence, stable functioning of economies and societies, and ways and means of political mobilization that serve the common good. These women labor assiduously with minimal or no formal education to build a solid and sustainable system that stands the test of time. Although these important expressions of women’s power and vital contributions to national security are routinely overlooked by the state and invariably obscured by the liberal feminist focus on formal equality in decision-making, they buttress the backbone of the nation, shoring it up even in the midst of grave uncertainties through decades of massive socio-economic and political turmoil. Insofar as managing uncertainty lies at the heart of political decision-making, market women have useful lessons for the governance of everyday life. As the stable indigenous apparatus of governance, they have survived decades of colonization, military rule, coups d’état, and corrupt governance.

If the inclusion of women in democratizing leadership and consolidating democracy in Nigeria is to have an impact, much more must be learned from the divergent experiences of power discussed in this essay. As Nigerians pragmatically strive to recuperate the legitimacy of the state, institutionalize robust structures and processes for meaningful statecraft, promote equitable participation, and build confidence for civic virtues, the dynamics of indigenous apparatus of governance, exemplified by civil-society stalwarts such as the market women, provide a compelling example of gender power worthy of emulation. By contrast, the hurdles that confront a woman cabinet minister who tried to negotiate reform illuminate the conundrums of ethical leadership. To advance the transformative potential of gender-inclusive power-sharing as a democratic ideal and deepen the quality of democracy, it is imperative that gender power be coupled with concerns of justice.

Notes

1. The civil war that ensued on the heels of independence demonstrated the limitations of arbitrarily forging a nation from competing ethnic and religious identities, exacerbated by the challenges of leadership and failure of institutions after the war. As illustrated by the resurgence of conflicts in Angola, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan, conflicts over vital resources are an abiding feature of the landscape.
2. Women’s facility with crisis management assumes added importance in the wake of neo-liberal downsizing and privatization of key state enterprises mandated by austere structural adjustment programs. As the individualization of public responsibility intensifies, extolling women’s efforts to revivify local traditions of

self-reliance has not been unproblematic. The logic of heroic coping mechanisms compelled by the retrenchment of social opportunities, goods, and services is often co-opted by reactionary elements eager to abdicate state responsibility. See Obiora 2004.

3. Nigeria is the sixth largest oil exporter globally and the tenth for natural gas reserves; oil production is at the heart of the economy. Per the 2014 Index of Economic Freedom, oil and gas account for roughly 90 percent of export earnings and 80 percent of government revenue.
4. A robust literature has addressed the notion of the “resource curse” or “the paradox of plenty” in debates about development in Africa. The “psychology of windfall” from a resource boom has been linked to the limited diversification of resource-rich economies. This in turn produces dependence, considerable macroeconomic vulnerability, and breeds a rentier state apt for extreme corruption, clientelism and neopatrimonialism, weak state institutions, and curious economic policies. Historically high commodity prices add momentum to the contention that abundant natural resources turn out to be a “curse” for the purposes of socioeconomic development, poverty reduction, good governance, democracy, human rights, peace, and security.
5. The terms of reference for the contract charged the consultancy to articulate unambiguous job descriptions, core skills and competencies requirements, key performance indicators, as well as to determine prevalent skills gaps and training needs, develop responsive learning curricula, train key operators, enhance the effectiveness of the frontline departments, review and optimize revenue generation and contract procurement policies and procedures, improve the efficiency and efficacy of incentives and administrative protocols, establish an adequate IT strategy and reporting system.

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5

Building Women's and Men's Political Representation in Post-Communist European Countries

Renata Siemieńska

In this chapter, we detail the position of women in politics in European post-Communist countries with special attention paid to Poland, a country that represents a mosaic of traditional and non-traditional systems of values, behaviors, and expectations towards women and men in terms of family, work, and politics. Why does inequality of women and men remain a fact in the region? What are the real determinants of women's access to power?

As a result of ongoing global social changes, the issue of identity is of significance for emancipated women, who are freed from the restrictive demands of home and homeliness, but encounter a closed social environment. In societies that strictly confined the identity of women by home and family, masculine stereotypes were the only available patterns of identity when women "came out" (Giddens, 1991). Since the second part of the 20th century, women have been creating various new identities as they enter the public sphere, according to various, "life plans." Specific roles earlier perceived as reserved for either women or men have been changing (e.g. Inglehart and Norris, 2003). In several dozen countries the position of women has been changing fast. Women have joined blue- and white-collar workers, although it soon became apparent that they were able to find jobs only in specific sectors of the economy – mostly those in which women had also been hired previously. The jobs that they found were usually among the poorly paid, and even if they performed work of the same value as men, they received lower salaries. Women are rarely present within decision-making bodies, such as parliament, government, the local administration, or the world of business. At the same time, they are still responsible for raising children and running the household; there has been little redefinition of feminine and masculine roles in this regard.

Moreover, the aspirations and values of individuals and social groups are confronted with existing social conditions and solutions in social policy,

which may either hinder or contribute to modification of the traditional roles (Kunin, 2012).

Peculiarity of women's participation in the public sphere during the democratization processes in Eastern and Central Europe

At the beginning of the 1990s the Communist system collapsed in the region. The authoritarian system based on a one party or multi-party system, where the leading role of the Communist party was guaranteed by constitutions, was transformed into multi-party democratic systems. The lack of democratic institutions and lack of tradition of civic activities for more than half a century created specific conditions for building a new system. Because of this history, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are called new democracies. Differences among countries in the region as well as specific developments different than from those experienced by new democracies, for example in Latin America or in established democracies in the Western World world, are frequently stressed (e.g. Jacquette and Wolchik, 1998). The process of building new political systems has been accompanied by a transformation of the economic system, from highly centralized and controlled by the ruling Communist parties to a free market with a growing sector of private property. Summarizing the situation of women in transition countries in Eastern and Central Europe and Latin America at the end of the 1990s, Schmitter concluded:

(1) women (along with other excluded and oppressed social groups) rarely determine the timing and mode of transition, and (2) to the extent that women got swept up in the resurrection process their impact would probably be ephemeral. Once the polity had begun to settle into the "normal" processes of liberal democracy, competition between political parties and representation according to territorial constituencies would take over and relegate movement-type activity to secondary, if not marginal, importance.

(Schmitter, 1998:223)

The reasons for women's marginalization are various. They have lower and different cultural and social capital (as defined by Putnam, 1993) than men. The institutional tradition of a patriarchal system in public and private spheres makes men the main actors in the public sphere, especially in politics, while women are responsible for activities in the private sphere, where they are mainly employees in the labor market. The lack of a tradition of civic activities and relatively more traditional conceptions of female and male roles in society are additional factors hampering women's access to decision-making positions in these countries. However, from a longer

time perspective than that observed by Schmitter (who analyzed the late 1990s), we may say that women's empowerment is progressing since the period immediately after the change of the political system. This is not to say that they have achieved the same position as women in leading Western European countries in this respect. But countries in Western Europe also vary with respect to women's level of education, inequality in the labor market, and access to power.

Women building cultural and economic capital during a time of transition

The economic transformation of the early 1990s led to increased demand for people prepared to work in an economy that was undergoing modernization and a changing structure. A large number of women and an even greater number of men lost their jobs in state-owned enterprises. Because people with university education rarely became unemployed, the new economic situation led to increased aspirations among youth to receive high school and university education. The new free-market opportunities were conducive to an increased supply of private and public educational services. The process of large-scale massification of education started in Eastern and Central Europe after 1990 – that is, later than in Western European countries: “In the EU27, 36 percent of persons aged 30 to 34 had completed tertiary education in 2012, compared with 34 percent in 2010 and 28 percent in 2005. . . . [By contrast, completion of tertiary education] ranges from 22 percent in Italy, Romania and Malta to 51 percent in Ireland” (Eurostat news release 56/2013–11 April 2013:1). In 2012, the percentage was higher in some East Central European countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and Slovenia) than the average for the 27 EU member states (EU27). The proportion in some countries almost doubled in the period 2005–2012; for example, in Latvia, the Czech Republic, and Romania. Since 1980, in many countries women constituted more than half of those studying at different types of institutions of higher education. In 2012, on average in the EU27, 40 percent of women aged 30–34 had completed tertiary education while for men the figure was only 31 percent, including all post-communist countries (Eurostat news release 56/2013–11 April 2013:1). In some post-Communist states, the differences between women and men are higher, for example in Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia. In the majority of the post-communist countries the percentage of employed women with tertiary education and upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education in ages 15–64 was higher than the average in EU-27 (Eurostat Labour market statistics, 2011 edition, table 2.7).

As before the change of political and economic systems, women constitute a large part of the labor force in the region. They usually occupy

lower positions and are lower paid, and are less competitive when it comes to becoming candidates for legislative bodies. The gender pay gap in post-Communist countries differs from country to country (e.g. the 2003 European Employment Strategy, resolution 2008/2012(INI) by the European Parliament). It is lower than the EU 27 average in Hungary, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Poland (one of the lowest in Europe), while in Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Lithuania, it is higher (Addressing the gender gap: Government and social partner actions. Eurofound, 2010, 3). Gendered pay inequities do not depend on the sensitivity of general policies toward gender equality in particular countries. The highest gender gaps are in Austria, Netherlands, and Germany, the lowest in Italy and Portugal.

Factors facilitating the building of women's political representation

The cultural capital achieved by women and their moderate economic gains in recent decades have not “translated” into a proportional increase of women's political representation in post-Communist countries. In 2012, for example, the number of women ministers was higher than the EU average (26.76 percent) only in Latvia (28.6 percent), while Romania, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia, and Slovakia had the lowest number of women ministers in EU 27 – below 10 percent. Women's representation in national parliaments in 2012 did not look much better, and was only a little bit higher among national deputies to the European Parliament (with the exception of Estonia and Slovenia, where women constituted 50 percent of deputies) (Robert Schuman Foundation 2012).

The tradition of political rights for women (when they were granted the right to vote and to stand for election) in particular countries is not correlated with the recent number of women in parliaments or the type of political regime. Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland were among the early adopters of women's suffrage in Europe (1918). Czech Republic and Slovakia followed not much later in 1920, Romania in 1929, Bulgaria in 1944 and Croatia and Slovenia in 1945 (Women's suffrage [www://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/suffrage.htm](http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/suffrage.htm)). The undemocratic communist system played an important role in hampering women's real access to politics. The governing Communist party controlled the final list of candidates. Women in the parliaments did not represent women's interests, but had been selected to show that the ruling party was sensitive to women's issues and supported their presence in politics. The women holding office were usually less educated than men and occupied marginal positions in society. This type of politics has been called “state feminism or feminism from above” (Rueschmeyer, 2008). The Communist government decided about rights to abortion, women's presence in politics, the labor market, the type of support

Table 5.1 Percentage of women in selected parliaments during and after Communism in Eastern Central Europe

Country	Last Communist election	Elections (September 2006)	Elections (May 2014)
Bulgaria	21.7		24.6
Czech Republic	29.4	15.5	19.5
Estonia	32.8	18.8	19.0
Hungary	8.3	10.4	9.5
Latvia	32.8	21.0	25.0
Lithuania	32.8	22.0	24.1
Poland	20.2	20.4	24.3
Romania	34.4	11.2	13.5
Russia	32.8	9.8	13.6
Slovakia	29.4	16.0	18.8
Slovenia	17.7	12.0	33.3
Ukraine	32.8	7.1	9.7

Source: Rueschmeyer, 2008: data for the last Communist election and Elections (September 2006). Data for 2014: *Women in National Parliaments. Situation as of 1st May 2014* [nup://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.num](http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.num)

(The World's Women 1970–1990. Trends and Statistics. United Nations. New York 1990: 33.) During the next 25 years women's representations in national parliaments are slowly growing in most of the countries (Table 1).

for family, and so on, without consulting wider society (Siemienska, 1990; Weinert, Spencer, 1996; Rueschmeyer, 2008).

After the change of political system in 1990, when democratic electoral mechanisms began to affect the number of candidates for parliaments and the relative merits of those candidates, the number of women decreased in East European parliaments (Table 5.1).

As Drude Dahlerup concluded at the beginning of the 2000s:

The electoral and party systems that emerged during the transition had a significant impact on the political participation of women in Central and Eastern Europe. All countries in the region use some kind of proportional representation (PR) or a mixed electoral system, combining an element of PR with majoritarian/plurality elections. Much scholarly research shows that PR systems tend to promote women's representation more than majoritarian systems. In those countries that use PR, the electoral prospects of women highly depend on their position on the lists. In general, the proportion of women on party lists for national elections in Eastern Europe is low, averaging between 13 and 16 percent. However, the percentage of elected women indicates a relatively high success rate among nominated women. Regional research also reveals that more women are reelected than men.

(Dahlerup, 2004:14)

Table 5.2 Political quotas in post-Communist countries

Country	Voluntary political party quotas (target percent)	Legislated quotas (target percent/ current percent of female legislators)	
		Single/Lower House	Upper House
Bosnia and Herzegovina	No	Candidate (33/19%)	
Croatia	Yes (40%)	None	
Czech Republic	Yes (25%)	None	
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	No	Candidate (33/33%)	
Hungary	Yes (22%)	None	
Lithuania	Yes (33%)	None	
Poland*	Yes (30%)	None*	
Romania	Yes (30%)	None	
Serbia	No	Candidate (30/22%)	
Slovakia	Yes	None	
Slovenia	Yes (33%)	Candidate (35/14%)	

*In Poland a legislated quota (35 percent) for the lower house was introduced in 2011.

Source: Quota project, <http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/search.cfm>.

The same conclusion was reached by Matland and Montgomery (2003).

Recently, to increase the number of women in parliaments in several countries in the region, candidate quotas have been established either by electoral law or voluntary agreement within parties to include a certain number of women on their candidates' lists (voluntary quotas) (www.quotaproject.org) (Table 5.2). According to the quota study project, by the year 2000 there were quota systems in place in 30 European and Western countries, including in 11 post-Communist countries.

Gender equality in private and public spheres became an important issue in public discourse, but did not necessarily produce satisfactory results solution.

Empirical research conducted in many countries shows that increasing emphasis on gender equality has become a central component of the democratization process. Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris (2003) have pointed out, however, that support for gender equality is not a simple consequence of democratization. It is part of a broad cultural change, which has been transforming industrial societies and demanding more of increasingly democratic institutions (Inglehart and Norris, 2003, 91). Emergence of democratic institutions as such does not mean that the number of women in public life – in the bodies functioning on the basis of elections, as well as those based on nominations – is automatically increasing. Intercultural analyses

show that the level of economic development, which is higher in many democratic countries than in non-democratic countries, is also of significance. As a rule, growing numbers of women in public office is associated with increasing education, which also indicates a change in the value system, including a perceived need for equal status for women and men. This does not mean that the new elites are always eager to accept such changes (Siemieńska, 2004). Implementation of gender equality in social life, both in the private and public sphere, requires increased perception of the need for this principle and the existence of appropriate institutions, standards, and “rules” of collective activity which will allow it to come to life. The democratic system may be used to create conditions that facilitate these changes. World Values Survey (WVS) and European Value Study (EVS) data from several dozen countries indicate that attitudes toward gender equality and roles played by women and men are among the “emancipation” values that condition the democratization of countries, the development of liberal democracy, an intensification of demands in terms for the creation of institutions that would will function in accordance with the emancipation attitudes (Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005, Welzel and Inglehart, 2009). Four components of the “emancipation” values are “gender equality dominant over patriarchalism,” “tolerance dominant over conformism,” “autonomy dominant over authority,” and “participation dominant over security.” The values associated with “gender equality dominant over patriarchalism” include disagreement with the views that men are better political leaders, education is more important for boys than for girls and that men have more right to employment than women, when jobs are scarce. The authors Welzel and Inglehart also emphasized that the a high level of internalized support for democracy could emerge prior to systemic transformation and democratization, which did indeed occur in the non-democratic countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Estonia, and Hungary) The emancipation values are not endogenous to democratic institutions. According Inglehart and Welzel (2009), causality runs from values to institutions and not in the opposite direction. In this context, attitudes concerning roles of women and men in the sphere of public life are an integral part of processes that determine the course of democratization. Later, existence of the democratic institutions facilitates process of a growing consciousness of women’s rights in public and private spheres.

In the early 1990s, when the Communist system was abolished, the meaning of democracy and a free market economy were rather unclear to inhabitants of Eastern and Central Europe, as were the consequences of democratization and marketization for women and men. Democratic notions were different in particular countries and continue to change substantially over time (Siemieńska, 1997). Equal rights for women and men were considered as part of the democratic model more often in some

Table 5.3 Views on characteristics of “democracy” in nine Central and East European countries in 1990–1991

Characteristics:	Countries with highest % responding “very much”	Countries with lowest % responding “very much”
Political freedom	Czechoslovakia 80%	Slovenia 43%
Higher social equality	Bulgaria 60%	Czechoslovakia 26%
More decisions on local level	Poland 54%	Slovenia 26%
Less corruption	Bulgaria 72%	Lithuania 26%
Moral freedom	Bulgaria 33%	Slovenia 26%
Legal equality	Bulgaria 89%	Czechoslovakia 29%
Governmental control over banks	Rumania 44%	Rumania 15%
Equal rights for men and women	Bulgaria 73%	Slovenia 45%
More jobs	Romania 67%	Slovenia 22%
Better life conditions	Bulgaria 82%	Czechoslovakia 43%
		Czechoslovakia 20%
		Czechoslovakia 37%

Note: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Ukraine took part in the project “Democratization of Eastern Europe” in 1990–1991 (Siemieńska, 1996a, 2011).

countries than others. Table 5.3 summarizes views about the centrality of various characteristics to “democracy” in various Central and Eastern European States in 1990–1991.

Different dynamic of attitudes toward equality of women and men in the labor market and in politics – cross-cultural comparison

In general, societies find it easier to accept equal rights for women and men in the labor market than in politics (Tables 5.4 and 5.5).

As Table 5.4 notes, the views expressed in new EU member states differ greatly from those in some countries in Western Europe. According to WVS research conducted in 2005, in some of the post-Communist countries (Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia), the number of people believing that men have more right to jobs than women has decreased since 1999. At the same time, in the Western countries, particularly in Scandinavia, the number of respondents opting for men to take priority has remained very low—in Sweden and Norway, for example, below 10 percent. In other European countries, these values were higher, reaching 17–18 percent in France, Germany, and Spain (WVS, unpublished data).

From 1990 to 1999, however, the level of acceptance of women in politics in some countries of Eastern and Central Europe decreased, while in others it increased, showing that changes in attitudes in this regard were not unidirectional (see also Inglehart and Norris, 2003).

Table 5.4 “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women” (percent agreement)

Country	1990			1999		
	Total	Women	Men	Total	Women	Men
Bulgaria	45	35	57	39	33	45
Czech Rep.	54	51	58	18	19	17
Estonia	44	43	46	13	10	18
Hungary	42	44	41	25	25	25
Latvia	34	32	38	20	19	20
Lithuania	66	63	70	24	20	30
Poland	56	50	63	35	34	35
Romania	42	38	46	38	38	38
Slovakia	55	54	56	24	20	29
Slovenia	29	25	34	18	18	18
Aver. E. Europe	47	43	51	25	24	28
Aver. W. Europe*	24	23	25	15	13	17

*Average for six Western European countries (Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden).

Source: Galligan et al. (2009) *Gender Politics and Democracy in Post-socialist Europe*.

Table 5.5 “Men make better political leaders than women do” (percent agreement)

Country	1990			1999		
	Total	Women	Men	Total	Women	Men
Bulgaria	52	43	61	45	36	56
Czech Rep.	47	43	56	50	44	57
Estonia	66	60	74	42	40	47
Hungary	49	45	55	45	40	53
Latvia	61	57	66	35	33	38
Lithuania	50	43	57	41	38	48
Poland	51	46	57	40	32	51
Romania	59	53	65	63	57	70
Slovakia	63	57	68	52	43	65
Slovenia	42	38	46	39	32	48
Aver. E. Europe	54	49	61	45	39	53
Aver. W. Europe*	18	15	21	18	14	21

*Average for four Western European countries (Finland, Germany, Spain, and Sweden).

Source: Galligan et al. (2009) *Gender Politics and Democracy in Post-socialist Europe*.

Although changes in women's and men's attitudes have occurred in parallel, men tend to be more traditional than women. Yet, both men and women find it easier to accept gender equality in terms of work than to accept the presence of women in politics.

The causes of differences in the level of acceptance of equality in access to work and to politics are worth considering. Women have worked outside the home for a long time, and societies have had time to get used to their presence on the labor market. Moreover, the sources of differences in the level of acceptance for participation of women are partially rooted in differing relations with the existing – and broadly understood – resources. Work is a way to obtain additional material resources, when these are not strictly limited or not perceived to be zero-sum. In politics, however, the number of influential positions (e.g. number of seats in parliament and local councils and the number of positions in national and local governments) is fixed. Women entering politics – unlike in the sphere of work – bring about an entirely new distribution of limited, fungible goods, which may become a source of conflict. For this reason, the presence of increasing numbers of women in politics may require the creation of effective mechanisms (e.g. quotas, alternating women's and men's positions on candidate lists in elections, more governmental nominations for women) that equalize their chances when they are competing for positions that cannot be freely multiplied.

Attitudinal and institutional factors determining women's presence in Polish politics

The available data for Poland allow for a more complex analysis of changing mechanisms that facilitate or hamper women's access to politics.

From 1992–2008, women's access to politics became more acceptable for Poles; education and gender were the key factors that determined this attitude (Figures 5.1–5.3). However, this general rule failed to apply when the direct interests of members of various groups were at stake. For instance, young, well-educated, wealthy men were most strongly opposed to greater participation of women in decision-making bodies, while women of the same “social parameters” (young, wealthy, well educated) wanted to see more women in politics (Siemieńska, 2011). The well-educated men considered women with the same type of skills to be unwanted competitors for attractive positions in the labor market and in politics.

To examine the persistence of negative stereotypes concerning the role of women in politics, surveys conducted by the Institute for Social Studies at the University of Warsaw asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with two questions: (1) Most men are better suited to engage in politics than most women; and (2) “Women should take care of the home




Figure 5.1 Acceptance of negative stereotype of women’s role in politics according to gender in 1992–2008 (in percent) Polish General Social Survey (PGSS)

Source: PGSS research in 1992–2008 (database: Archive of social data of the R.B. Zajonc Institute for Social Studies of University of Warsaw).




Figure 5.2 Acceptance of negative stereotype of women’s role in politics according to gender and age in 2008 (in percent) PGSS

Source: PGSS research in 1992–2008 (database: Archive of social data of the R.B. Zajonc Institute for Social Studies of University of Warsaw).

and leave ruling of the country to men.” Figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 report the percentage of people agreeing with these statements.

An increasing number of Poles believe that there are no significant differences in personal traits between men and women, which would justify women’s underrepresentation in politics (Siemińska, 1996, 2005). This belief is becoming a basis for growing demands for women to be promoted to higher positions, and their increasing dissatisfaction with the existing situation. A representative study using a national sample, conducted after the Sejm and Senate election of 2011, showed that women, especially highly




Figure 5.3 Acceptance of negative stereotype of women's role in politics according to gender and education in 2008 (in percent) PGSS

Source: PGSS research in 1992–2008 (database: Archive of social data of the R.B. Zajonc Institute for Social Studies of University of Warsaw).

educated women, were increasingly disagreeing with the view that men were better suited to politics. Male respondents at various education levels, however, were still equally eager to declare that men are better suited for engagement in political activity (Pentor, 2011, unpublished data).

Although the introduction of a quota system is a hot topic among politicians, public opinions about the likely effects of a quota-based system as a mechanism for increasing the number of women in parliament are diverse, but not as diverse as the attitudes toward the participation of women in politics. It may seem surprising that a large number of respondents believe that introducing a quota will not change much when it comes to elective positions (similar results were obtained a decade earlier). Figures 5.4 and 5.5 demonstrate various views on the likely effects of a quota system. Nevertheless, women more often than men declared that the introduction of quotas on the lists of candidates would increase the chance that women would engage in politics.

Women in Politics in Poland

Despite changing attitudes toward the presence of women in politics, increasing levels of education and long experience with women in the labor force (although at lower levels of organizational structures), there have not been significant changes in the presence of women in politics during the last 25 years. Studies conducted after each election have confirmed that voters usually vote for those who are at the top of party candidate lists in the existing multi-member districts governed by proportional representation. (The notable exception is in towns with populations below 20,000 inhabitants




Figure 5.4 Introduction of quota not less than 35 percent of one gender (men or women) on the list of candidates in the last parliamentary elections in 2011

* A good idea because there will be more wise deputies in the Sejm (lower house).
 ** A bad idea because more deputies will not have the right skills to work in the Sejm.
 *** Meaningless because voters may choose to elect those candidates whom they consider the best.
 Source: Pentor, 2011 (unpublished data).

that have single-member constituencies rather than multi-member constituencies.) Mechanisms to support women’s candidacies are important, but not easily introduced to the Polish electoral system.

Below, I present a more complex analysis of the determinants and contexts of changing women’s representation in parliament and at local levels.

Women in parliament 1989–2011

The number of female candidates in elections after the political transformation of 1989, both in the Sejm (lower chamber of parliament) and the Senate (the upper chamber), have been growing, but this has not resulted in a proportional increase in the number of those who are elected. The number of female candidates in elections to the Sejm grew from 902 (12.9 percent of the total number of candidates) in 1991 to 3,063 women (43.5 percent of the total number of candidates) in 2011. In this period, the number




Figure 5.5 Women and men in the Sejm (lower chamber of parliament), 1985–2011 (percent)

of female candidates increased more than three times, but the number of female deputies only a little more than doubled (Figure 5.5). The number of female candidates in elections to the Senate grew from 54 (8.8 percent of the total number of candidates) in 1991 to 70 (14 percent of the total number of candidates) in 2011 as the number of women in the Senate declined. The highest number of women elected to the Senate was 23 (23 percent) in 2001. By contrast, women were only 13 percent of elected senators in 2011, similar to the number elected in 1993 and 1997.

As the number of women in the lower chamber of parliament increased from 9 percent in 1991 to 24 percent in 2011, they tended to have a higher level of education than their male counterparts. Despite these educational advantages, women have more difficulty (compared to men) in getting themselves initially placed on a candidate list (Siemieńska, 1996a).

Although some political scientists have emphasized constitutional guarantees of equality and the creation of quotas as the “fast track” to women’s success in elections, the sudden significant increase in women’s presence depends on many more factors (Matland and Montgomery, 2003, Siemieńska, 2003). For this reason, analyses of the factors contributing to women’s electoral success have to be more sophisticated. After the parliamentary elections in 2001 in Poland, the number of women in the lower chamber of parliament increased suddenly to 20 percent and in the higher chamber to 23 percent (both from 13 percent in 1997). The next section investigates these impressive gains.

Changing context – changing rules of parliamentary elections – changing electoral behavior

The increased presence of women in 2001 was caused by a series of events and initiatives that occurred between the parliamentary elections in 1997 and 2001. In 2001, constituencies were larger and with a greater number of seats, owing to the new administrative division of the country. This resulted

in an increased number of women being listed as candidates (Siemieńska, 2003).

Attitudes toward women in politics became more friendly. In 2001, 60 percent of women (compared with 50 percent in 1997) and 40 percent of men (compared with 28 percent in 1997) did not agree with the opinion that “men are better suited to politics than women” (Siemienska, 2003). The women’s lobby became stronger and better organized. A large number of women’s organizations were created, with 50 organizations joining the Pre-Electoral Coalition of Women – an open agreement between women’s organizations and groups with center and left orientation. The coalition was also supported by the Women’s Parliamentary Group, whose members belonged to different political parties. A voluntary gender quota stipulating that neither of the sexes should be represented by less than 30 percent of all candidates was introduced by the coalition of SLD (post-Communist party – Social Democracy of Poland) and UP (Labor Union), as well as UW (Democratic Union) (liberal-center). Moreover, right-wing parties such as the League of Polish Families (LPR) included more women on their candidate lists because they wanted to receive the support of voters connected with the influential Catholic Church. The electoral preferences of society also changed in the Polish election of 2001: the coalition SLD-UP obtained the highest number of votes (a shift from right to left). The parties incorporated women’s issues in their political programs. As a result of all of these factors, the number of female candidates was much greater than before. In several regions, the percentage of women elected was higher than the percentage of women listed as candidates. In the regions with more votes for the post-Communist SLD, more women were elected (Siemienska, 2003). A significant number of both women and men voted for both women and men, as opposed to voting only for men. In 2001, there were 46 percent of men in comparison with 31 percent of women who voted exclusively for men, but 39 percent of men and 55 percent of women voted for men and women (Siemieńska, 2005).

Before the next parliamentary election in 2005, however, the leftist parties lost support. They were criticized for using their election success in 2001 to strengthen the financial position of their members, creating corrupt bonds between elected representatives and the business world. Additionally, the split of the DLA into two parties weakened its election potential. As a consequence, the rightist Law and Justice party built a coalition with the populist Self-Defense and the nationalist League of Polish Families. All these parties emphasized the traditional roles of women and family. The number of women elected to the Sejm in 2005 (20.4 percent) did not change. In the Senate, women’s representation decreased from 24 percent to 13 percent. Women constituted 24.5 percent of all candidates.

Women’s issues and the problem of quotas were almost absent in the electoral campaigns of 2005 and 2007. In the parliamentary elections in 2007,

the Civic Platform (center right party) created a coalition with the rather conservative Polish Peasant Party, arguing that Polish interests were increasingly related to Poland's membership of the European Union. The Women's Party, created before the election in 2007, received about 1 percent of popular votes. The Women's Party was considered extravagant both because its campaign poster featured naked women and its campaign focused largely on the party leader. The number of women elected in 2005 and 2007 was almost the same as in 2001, despite the increasing number of women on candidate lists. The number of women in the Senate declined to eight after the election in 2007.

The parliamentary election of 2011 featured the same coalition of the Civic Platform and the Polish Peasant Party; however, this election was governed by a legislated quota system that obliged all parties to include a minimum of 35 percent of women and men on their lists of candidates. This mandatory quota went well beyond the voluntary quota introduced by some of the parties prior to the election of 2001, which had declared that women should constitute at least 30 percent of the lists of candidates. But Polish politicians remain far from keen about quotas despite the creation of this mechanism to facilitate women's access to parliament. They have resisted the proposal by the Congress of Women that would require the obligatory alternation of women and men on the candidate lists (a "zipper system" that moves women candidates from the bottom of candidate lists). Instead, the legislated quota required at least one woman among the first three candidates on the list and two women among the first five. Analysis of results of the previous election shows that in the case of less popular parties, in many districts only one person – or none – has any chance of entering parliament at all. Thus, even with the introduction of the mandatory quota in the elections of 2011, the number of women elected to the Sejm was almost the same as in earlier elections in the 21st century. In the words of Frances Millard:

The most important factors in explaining the [2011] Polish result were (1) the absence of a "zipper," a list ordering that alternates men and women candidates, thus ensuring high list-places for women; (2) the parties' favoring of men in their list placement; (3) the relative size of the political parties; and (4) voters' support for list leaders and incumbent deputies. Despite a disappointing outcome, quotas may be seen as beneficial in increasing women's presence and the potential for further evolution of the electoral system.

(Millard, 2014, 260)

The change in electoral regulations was due to pressure exerted by the lobbying of a strong national organization, the Congress of Women, established in 2009 as a grassroots organization. The Congress members are women who

represent very different political views (from leftist to liberal), mostly well or very well educated, representing various careers and with a good position in the labor market. The success of the Congress' lobbying effort was facilitated by the evolution of views on women's and men's social roles, as well as attention paid by the governing coalition to European Union policy concerning the implementation of the principle of gender equality as an important political goal.

Role of women in local politics

Participation in local politics is important because of the opportunities it gives to influence a number of decisions concerning allocation of funds, directions of local development, and so on, which are made at this level. In addition, local politics plays an important role as a first step in a career ladder to politics at a national level (Siemieńska, 2001, 2005). The number of women elected to local government bodies grew from 1 percent in 1990 to 25 percent in 2010. Recently, the number of women in local councils is higher than in the Sejm (according to the State Electoral Commission). The number of female candidates in local elections is growing faster than the number of elected women, however, as in the case of national parliamentary elections. Growth from 21 percent in 1998 to 31 percent in 2010 demonstrates the increasing interest of women in elections as well as the changing attitudes of politicians toward women's presence in politics. However, women's participation did not increase in 2010 as much as was expected. (State Electoral Commission).

Women are present mostly at the lowest level of political office – in commune councils. Warsaw (the capitol) has been an exception: the number of female candidates and elected women is definitely higher (more than 30 percent) owing to the large number of highly educated women in the city. The number of those voting for both men and women in local elections has increased over time (Siemieńska, 2005). The behavior of voters is differentiated by social "class," defined as a combination of the level of education and income. This synthetic indicator shows that women and men belonging to the highest classes (the most educated and those doing best in a financial sense) differ significantly with regard to the level of support granted to women and men during elections; yet men remain much less eager to vote for women (Siemieńska, 2005).

Women in NGOs as pressure groups in politics

Women constituted half of the members of the Solidarity movement in 1980 (formally registered as a trade union), which played a decisive role in abolishing the Communist system. But their role in Solidarity did not open their way to politics after the change of the political system; they

were marginalized (Siemienska, 1996a, 1999; Pen, 2003). Women's non-governmental organizations established after the change of the political system in 1990 became pressure groups, attempting to facilitate women's access to decision-making positions. The existence of democratic mechanisms and an increasing number of educated people, with higher aspirations and more aware of their rights, facilitated the proliferation of civil society organizations. The origins of women's NGOs are various: some were initiated by governments on different levels; others have a grassroots character; some are branches of international organizations. The most visible is the Congress of Women, which has groups all over the country and integrates women of different professions and various political affiliations. The Congress stresses its apolitical character, while in reality formulating political goals.

Conclusions

To sum up, the last quarter of a century has brought change in social, economic, and political structures in Central and Eastern Europe. The population has become more educated, particularly women. Women with tertiary education are a growing part of the labor force in the region. However, their positions in decision-making legislative and executive bodies are much more limited, and their representation in elective offices is smaller than in the majority of countries in the European Union. But at the same time electoral behaviors and attitudes toward women in politics have been changing during the last 25 years. Women want to enter the world of politics and they are more and more welcome as candidates, although support for them is not evenly distributed in society, as the Polish case shows. The greatest problem is still a lack of willingness by the parties to integrate women fully on lists of candidates. The introduction of a voluntary quota system by the SLD-UP and UW in 2001 and a legislated quota in the parliamentary election in 2011 did not bring about similar results. Where important gains were made in 2001, the 2011 election generated a small increase in the number of women, because society became more rightist oriented. Today the quota system without an alternating "zipper" list of candidates is not sufficient to make a real change in women's representation.

Nevertheless, changing values and attitudes provide a basis for the creation of formal and informal mechanisms to support gender equality. At the same time, we have to be aware of the existence of culture-based premises that strengthen the inequality of women and men on an individual and collective level. Significant discrepancies in views between the older and the younger generation, the badly and the well educated are a source of conflict between them with regard to men's and women's roles, rights, rightful demands, and the established patterns that they should follow. This conflict pertains to the division of goods and power.

As Bourdieu wrote, “androcentrism is being legitimized by practices, which are produced by it, since the disposition to act, being a result of embodiment of bias, which is embedded in the order of things, forces women to confirm such bias repeatedly. Thus, we are dealing with a curse of a self-fulfilling prophecy. It is present in the uncountable, everyday acts of exchange between the sexes, in the same dispositions, which make men entrust women with works that are worse, less worthy and unrewarded, freeing them from behaviors, which would be against their honour” (Bourdieu, 2004,45). The issues of inequality and methods by which inequality can be reduced belong to the key issues of modern democracy (e.g. Przeworski, 2009). Moreover, when analyzing issues central to public discourse and specific regulations, it is important to recognize that outcomes may be determined by specific political or ideological premises as much as by potential effects for members of specific social groups (Bacchi, 1999).

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6

Women's Participation in Global Executive Positions

Michal Palgi

Introduction

This chapter examines several aspects of women's participation in top executive positions in global firms. In the business sector, which comprises a significant proportion of the private sector, quota systems have not been incorporated into either national or international legislation. The inclusion of women in top executive positions thus depends on the decisions of a few powerful people, usually men, at the top of the firm's hierarchy. Women's advancement in the business milieu also depends on individual women's personal resources, which help them weave their way to the top. Studies show that women in top positions contribute to the economic and social success of their firms (Annis, 2008; McKinsey & Company, 2010; Coleman, 2011). Even so, it is apparent that the costs and benefits of globalization are distributed unevenly among different groups within the executive world as they are outside it. They are distributed unevenly especially across gender but also within each gender, according to local cultures, personal skills, economic status, and firms' policies. For some groups of women and men, globalization opens up new opportunities, but for others it denies the opportunity to take part in and advance to top positions in global firms. With the aid of the Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) (Branisa et al., 2014), which measures underlying discrimination against women for over 100 countries, it was found that gender equality and the opportunities given to women in social institutions vary in different world regions. This makes the analysis of women's participation in global firms more complex.

The phenomenon of relocating labor-intensive manufacturing, as well as high-tech firms, in developing countries where cheap skilled labor can be found is quite prevalent. Therefore, countries that combine low wages with high technological skills (e.g. India) have outcompeted well-developed countries. The relative ease with which companies move from one country to another, and transfer their production to the most viable location, often

makes it necessary to send top executives to other nations. These executives will manage overseas ventures, looking after the interests of their mother firm. The top executives appointed to these offices are usually men (Adler, 1997, 2002; Poster, 2000; McKinsey & Company, 2010, 2012; Werhane, 2011); women are scarcely seen in this arena.

The 2013 GMI survey of women on boards of directors (Gladman and Lamb, 2013) includes data on 5,977 companies in 45 countries around the world. It shows that women hold 11 percent of board seats at the world's largest and best-known companies, whereas in 2009 the corresponding figure was 9.3 percent. Industrial Europe and the Nordic countries lead in terms of gender-diverse boards, mainly owing to legal requirements for women's representation. All the companies surveyed in Sweden and Finland had at least one female board member, although no company had a woman chair. Of the companies surveyed in France, 91.1 percent had at least one female board member. In Spain, the figure was 83.7 percent. In the USA, the percentage of companies that had at least one female director increased from 69.3 percent in 2009 to 71.1 percent in 2012. (More recent data was not available in the above report.) On the other hand, the number of female board members in firms surveyed in Canada decreased from 72.6 percent in 2009 to 65.5 percent in 2013. Japan shows the lowest level in the world representation of female directors, with 9.9 percent in 2009 and 12.1 percent in 2013.

The percentage of companies with women chairs is much lower. In 2013 it was 2.3 percent, up from 2.0 percent in 2009. Norway leads, with 13.3 percent in 2013, up from 4.3 percent in 2009. Of the 25 industrial-market countries surveyed, nine had no female chairs in 2013 (Gladman and Lamb, 2013).

This chapter concentrates on the effect of globalization on top-level executives in global firms, analyze it from a gender perspective, in an attempt to answer the following questions: What challenges do women face by accepting top executive positions in global firms and how do they face them? In answering these questions, issues such as cultural diversity, unpredictable scheduling, relocating, employment values, use of political skills and will, as well as social dilemmas will be examined.

Gender, work, and globalization

The combination of gender, work, and globalization is usually connected to the phenomenon of trafficking women from poor countries to rich countries to do a variety of jobs – usually unsavory ones. Less attention has been paid to the interrelationship of gender, top executive offices, and globalization. During the last decade, several companies have attempted to show how intentional change that involves more women in executive jobs contributes to the economic success of their organizations (e.g. McKinsey & Company,

2010). Despite these sporadic reports, the rate of increase in the number of women in executive jobs is slow.

Women who are educated and manage to get executive jobs are considered to be lucky because they participate in the workforce in prestigious positions, where knowledge, personal skills, and experience are most important. While globalization offers new prospects to these professional women, it also often sets them back. They regularly find themselves both as occupational minorities and as tokens (Taylor, 2010).

For the present discussion the relevant aspects of the process of globalization are (Altman and Shortland, 2008):

1. Transformation of the world into a global village, where borders almost disappear, distances shrink and in many cases are not relevant, and communication times shorten;
2. Increasing links among people from different countries and cultures as natural and artificial barriers fall;
3. The increase of international flows of trade, finance, and information in a single, integrated global market;
4. The infiltration and adoption of “new” norms and cultural customs as part of the “globalization game”;
5. The spread of egalitarian values both in the home company and its overseas branches;
6. The persistence of latent local values about gender, even though on the surface they often disappear;
7. The foreign social institutions that affect gender equality.

The rapid development of information technology (IT), which has no border limitations and almost no discipline seclusion, has aided the acceleration of globalization and the proliferation of companies’ branches into other countries.

The following is an analysis of structural, organizational, and social variables that affect women in executive jobs in global firms.

Feminist theory and economic change

How can we understand the stability of women’s place in management in the face of extensive modernization processes? Some feminist theorists suggest that changes in the direction of greater gender equality follow from technological and economic development. For example, Chafetz (1990, 144) postulated “that technological change, and an associated increase in economic scale, constitute the primary mechanism that alters the gender division of labor.” Chafetz (1990) and others (e.g. Blumberg, 1989) differentiated two types of change: unintentional and intentional. Chafetz (1990, 142) defined unintentional change as “general social processes that produce

such change without the willful or conscious intervention of people committed to producing it." She then defined intentional change as "people (mostly women) organize(ing) in a conscious attempt to bring about gender systems change."

As the above description of women's executive positions in global firms indicates, increasing use of high technology and high levels of economic growth did not produce "unintentional" change in the gender system. Nor did these changes contribute to many efforts toward "intentional" change, such as women's growing initiatives or women's awareness, as might have been expected according to feminist theory (see Blumberg, 1989; Chafetz, 1990).

An alternative theoretical perspective (e.g. Smith, 1988; Acker, 1990; Meyerson and Fletcher, 2000) suggests that gender inequality is deeply embedded in the ordinary ways of organizing work and daily life that are often seen as gender neutral, having nothing to do with inequality between women and men. Technological change and economic growth may only reorganize gender inequality, rather than reduce it. As a result, technological change can increase and even create occurrences of ostracism within the organization (Wu et al., 2012). To change the gender system, concerted efforts towards this goal must be made by the company as well as via governmental policies (Eagly and Carl, 2003; Elmuti et al., 2009; McKinsey & Company, 2010, 2012; Coleman, 2011).

A third approach, which does not contradict the previous one and may in fact enhance it, was presented by Kanter (1977) and in a different way by O'Reilly et al. (1991) and by Cook and Glass (2013). Kanter's conclusions (1977, 1982) were that gender inequities are due to structural factors; that is, scarcity of women in some career paths and scarcity of women in power, not to their sex per se. According to this point of view, women in top executive jobs are occupational minorities as well as tokens (Taylor, 2010) and change will occur when more women entered high-status jobs. To avoid structural changes and non-standard practices, women and minorities are encouraged to "fit in" by adopting the same values, informal norms, and formal practices of their white male colleagues (O'Reilly, Chatman, and Caldwell, 1991; Niemann and Dovidio, 1998). These processes result in "gender blindness," the absence of managers' awareness of the influence of gender on the male-female balance of power in organizations (Eagly and Fisher, 2010).

These three theoretical approaches enhance the need to examine the social position and location of women. Some authors argue that women act like women because of their social position and not because of inherent traits (Gerstel and Sarkisian, 2006; Deutsch, 2007; Eagly and Fisher, 2010).

These theoretical approaches point to the notion that to bring about more gender diversity in global firms' executive personnel, organizational culture and work practices need to be directed specifically at gender equality. Otherwise, equality will not occur as a byproduct of other processes in

these firms. The theoretical approaches strengthen the opinion that, without understanding the contribution of women executives to the firms and the challenges that women face, global firms will preserve their present structure. Furthermore, many global firms will not change their corporate governance in order to accommodate and benefit from women's special skills and values because this might challenge male hegemony (Elmuti et al., 2009). Nevertheless, they might make some "politically correct" gestures in that direction.

Most of the studies that looked into the issue of gender and managerial positions did not analyze the specific issue of top executive jobs in the global firms' environment. Specifically, these studies did not examine the challenges women executives face and the benefits they bring with them.

Challenges women face by accepting top executive jobs in global firms

Work conditions for top executives vary according to the firm: its products, size, stability, and managerial structure. There is almost no contention that the prevalent philosophy of top executives is of total commitment. High salaries on the one hand and commitment to work as much as needed on the other symbolize this philosophy. Many global firms can be characterized by their special organizational climate, which involves unconventional working hours, stress and tension, partial participation in organizational social events, relocation, isolation in new cultural environments, frequent trips abroad, and being subject to stereotyping. These characteristics present many hurdles and challenges for office holders, which are emphasized for women. Organizational and social norms have been molded for and by male jobs. Therefore, the surrounding society more readily accepts long working hours and absence from home, which are assumed to be male traits. The following are the main challenges faced by top executives in global firms.

The challenge of working hours: Flexible, long, and unconventional working hours are specifically connected to globalization. The different time zones of firms that are connected commercially with each other often make it necessary to be available at all hours of day and night. With the advent of personal contracts, important trade union achievements, which protect the workforce by limiting its working hours and separating work and private life, have disappeared. Creating borders between work and private life is usually in the interest of the individual; erasing them is frequently in the interest of the organization. Therefore, this total commitment by top global executives, at all hours of the day and night, places an especially heavy burden on women who are mothers of young children (Elmuti et al., 2009).

The challenge of appropriate benefits: Usually top executives are well rewarded. They have high salaries and their working conditions are good. Personal growth and job enrichment are considered important in their positions. In addition, they are given many status symbols such as company cars,

cellphones, laptops, and vacations in exotic places. But a close examination of requests for promotion and benefits (Meyerson et al., 2000; Babcock and Lachever, 2003; Cook and Glass, 2013) shows that women request less than men, even if they work in the same position. The dilemma facing women is whether to accept the fewer benefits offered to them in order to get the position, and later negotiate better terms; or to negotiate the benefits beforehand and risk losing the opportunity. Their decision often depends on their political knowhow, as well as the type and strength of their networks within and outside their organization (Perrewe and Nelson, 2004; Gregory-Mina, 2012; Wu et al., 2012; Doldor et al., 2013).

The challenge of isolation: A position abroad as an executive of a global firm includes work in a foreign environment, often without the knowledge of the local language, which encumbers cooperation with local teams and the development of social networks. It also limits the possibilities of brainstorming with local teams. In addition, it might lead to misunderstandings. As a foreigner, a woman can easily be perceived as violating local norms, as being “the other,” simply by occupying an executive job (Heilman et al., 2004). Coping alone with the assimilation of organizational values in the new culture, with organizational problem-solving, and with being in an unfamiliar place are normally challenges; but women executives have to cope with additional problems, such as social isolation, exclusion, and personal hostility in cultures where it is not accepted that women should serve in the top organizational echelon or even socialize with men (Kanter, 1977; Heilman et al., 2004). Furthermore, there may be evening and night curfews in countries where it is unsafe or unaccepted for women to go out alone.

The challenge of stress and tension: Top executives have many roles that often conflict with each other and cause stress and tension. There are conflicts inherent within their positions and conflicts between their work and family. These are usually aggravated in global firms because of their special characteristics (e.g. different time zones and working in a foreign environment).

A. Stress and tension within work: Top executives must constantly respond to complex, unpredictable events from the environment, which is even more stressful in a foreign environment (Elmuti et al., 2009; Wu et al., 2012). Therefore their jobs usually entail radically varying levels of pressure. Some of this pressure can cause stress. Numerous situations and events can cause stress, but in top executive jobs it occurs mainly when:

1. There are demands to maintain a very tight timetable.
2. There are demands from many people, particularly customers, which cannot be answered simultaneously or sometimes conflict with each other.
3. There are job demands that require the presence of the top executive in different geographical areas at the same time.

4. There are solutions to work-related problems that might be beyond the organizational authority or knowledge of the particular top executive.
5. There are areas of responsibility that are not clear.
6. There are role demands, as a top executive, from the mother company that conflict with role demands at its overseas branch.
7. There is a low level of acceptance of *any* foreign top executive by local managers, leading to ostracism.

(Wu et al., 2012)

B. Stress between work and family: Unpredictable timetables, relocation, and long working hours are particularly stressful to married women with young children. As mothers, they are still, in most cultures, responsible for the well-being of the family. Having to cope with both the responsibility for their families and for their organizations, they have to maneuver between long hours at work and short hours of public education; between going abroad or to a distant location and going home; between attending to a sick child and attending to an urgent matter at work (Wellington et al., 2003; Karve and Nair, 2010). In some countries, solutions are found by having daycare on the premises of the firm, or alternatively, by having 24-hour private childcare. (An interviewee, for an ongoing related research project, described how she sometimes goes to pick up her baby from the childcare center at 2 a.m. She resists waking the child rather than talking to her. This is despite the fact she has not seen her all day.) Women perceive themselves as transnational mothers with a family remote control. The remote control sometimes malfunctions, and they feel guilty about not being “good mothers.”

As a result, some women relinquish the idea of working overseas. This is an option that on the one hand enables women to cope with family obligations, but on the other hand deprives them of many challenging opportunities at work (Baxter and Wright, 2000; Elmuti et al., 2009).

But many of the more successful married women mention having a supportive spouse who sees an obligation to share family responsibilities and to encourage his wife to develop her career as an important and binding goal, even if it means relocating with her (Altman and Shortland, 2008). For example, in India a small group of well-educated women work as managers in software companies. This has altered their relationship with men, including their ability to resist arranged marriages. Without the security and status of their income, they would ordinarily agree to such matches (Monsod, 2001). This example is not the rule. Generally, women across the world find themselves in power positions that are inferior to those of men.

In contrast to those women who relinquish opportunities to work overseas, some women delay or limits family obligations. A study in Germany (Wippermann, 2010), for example, reveals that 53 percent of female executives are married compared with 73 percent of men. In addition, 44 percent

of women executives remain childless compared with 23 percent of the men analyzed. Both sets of statistics indicate a strategy, used by some women executives, to ameliorate the family–work conflict.

The challenge of power and its division: Globalization offers female executives opportunities they did not have before. Top executives have the ability to mold and redesign the strategic plans of their organization and thus affect its organizational climate, its decision-making practices, and the well-being of its workers. But because women are usually a minority in management positions, they might decide to use the mechanism of ingratiation politically in order to fit in to their new role (Wu et al., 2012).

Poster's study (2000) compared female IT workers in Silicon Valley and in India. The findings show that social control of women in the Silicon Valley company mainly follows a pattern of normative control, involving restrictions on the *content* of women's activities; while the social control of women in the New Delhi company primarily follows a pattern of confinement control, involving restrictions on the *boundaries* of their activities (contact with co-workers, clients, etc.). When a female top executive from Silicon Valley has to relocate to India, she needs to cope with this new environment very sensitively, so as not to offend local values or her own.

The division of power within organizations often depends on the type of mentors (both formal and informal) that managers are able to find during their careers. The scarcity of women in top executive jobs often limits their ability to have female mentors who might relate better to their specific situation. Men usually have a different style of coping and a different life situation than women, and therefore their skills for mentoring women are limited (Palgi, 2000; Palgi and Moore, 2004). This is more prevalent with formal mentors, whom the organization appoints; and less prevalent with informal mentors, whose selection is partially decided by the women executives. Mentors can have psychosocial importance for their protégés as well as practical importance. Practically, they can increase the visibility of their protégés within the organization, help them advance in the organization, and thus further the protégé's interests. Psychologically, they can enhance their protégé's effectiveness, self-esteem, and self-efficacy (Palgi and Moore, 2004). Men, owing to cultural environment, stigmas, and stereotypes, are more reluctant to have female mentors. This can be a challenge for female top executives in global companies (Palgi, 2000; O'Neil and Blake-Beard, 2002; Palgi and Moore, 2004).

The challenge of overcoming the global firms' dilemmas about appointing a female top executive: Owing to the process of globalization, local markets are integrated into the world market and are strongly influenced by fluctuations in that larger market. A failure in one country can cause collapse in others. The frequency of financial crises increases with the growth of international capital flow (Monsod, 2001). Therefore, when a firm appoints its top executives, it expects them to increase the efficiency of the

firm, contribute to the achievement of the firm's goals, and comply with the firm's vision and values. The following are some of the dilemmas facing the appointment of women to top executive jobs in global firms.

The Cultural Diversity Dilemma: Women may be successful executives in the home firm; but in many foreign cultures there is a conceptual rejection of the idea that a foreigner, and especially a woman, should have so much power over local men (McKinsey, 2010, 2012). This might impede the firm's development.

The Firm's Tradition Dilemma: Many global firms have established in their overseas subsidiaries, and with their clientele, a certain organizational climate and mode of action, which was developed by their male executives. When the firm appoints a female top executive, the male executives are afraid of losing the competitive advantage they had established in their firm. Nevertheless, they hope that the synergy achieved through the diversity of the executives will improve the firm's success (Adler, 1994; Selmer and Leung, 2003).

The Fittest or the Strongest Dilemma: Women are usually a minority in executive jobs. Appointment for an executive position in a global firm is desired by all candidates. If a woman is chosen, she suffers much more from the normal lack of cooperation from her disappointed colleagues, as well as from her associates in her new location, even if she is the fittest candidate. The firm's dilemma here is whether or not to appoint the fittest or the strongest (Selmer and Leung, 2003; Wu et al., 2012).

As can be seen from the above analysis, women executives have to juggle personal, organizational, cultural, situational, and institutional challenges. In addition to their job expertise, top executives adopt several tactics and skills in order to cope with these challenges. Among them are fostering their social and business networks, using their political savvy and will, as well as the ability to adjust to different cultural and personal situations.

Discussion

The aim of this chapter was to challenge the view that globalization is a gender-neutral phenomenon by examining globalization and its effects from a gender perspective.

Women in top executive jobs in global firms contribute to the economic and social success of their companies and countries; even so, they still have to face numerous challenges that arise from being a minority in the top echelon, and being seen as outsiders. The challenges reflect issues of cultural diversity and different types of role stress. Some of these challenges are faced by women, as well as by men, in non-global firms, but not at the same intensity and volume.

It was shown that women's occupational roles are increasingly connected to globalization and technology. Globalization, coupled with technology, creates new opportunities for executive positions for women in the

international market. However, it also maintains old barriers. The cause of most of the barriers to women's advancement seems to be the fact that men hold the majority of executive positions in global firms. As a result, the organizational cultures of local and foreign institutions are based on men's knowledge, men's experiences, and men's tendency to protect their traditional superior power over women.

The description of the work environment in global firms shows that it has additional requirements and challenges that are different from those in "traditional" firms. The expatriate position of women executives puts them in the position of "the other" in three ways: a woman, an executive, and a foreigner. The analysis in this chapter indicates that while women executives face numerous challenges, they also have many new opportunities (Deutsch, 2007).

The organization of exclusion often manifests itself in the norms and practices of firms. Women are often asked to assimilate into the existing organizational culture and to accept its value commitments and behaviors. As a result, the advantages of possible diversity are lost. It was found that some firms do try to accommodate women with special benefits. Nevertheless, this chapter explains how other benefits are taken from women executives through the subtle, systemic, and more powerful sources of bias in a company's cultural norms, working practices, and informal "rules" (Gregory-Mina, 2012).

Some women overcome the gender barriers by using their political skills and will, as well as their social networks (Perrewé and Nelson, 2004; Doldor et al., 2013). For others it is more difficult to surmount the challenges and barriers that stand in the way of their advancement. They are so deeply embedded in the workplace culture that it will take a strategic, persistent campaign of incremental changes and "small wins" for real progress to occur until a strong, reform-minded female executive is appointed. "It's not the ceiling that's holding women back; it's the whole structure of the organizations in which we work: the foundation, the beams, the walls, the very air" (Meyerson et al., 2000).

The gendered implication of the apparently gender-neutral organization of work is that a new social contract between women and their global firms has to be activated. This contract must reconsider symbols and definitions of competence and commitment, mobility patterns within the organization, and the way in which talents are identified.

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Part II

Explaining Inequalities: Multidisciplinary Perspectives

Section Introduction

Luigi Zoja

For many, the nature of gender remains self-evident: the human species encompasses men and women. Biological diversity is subsequently culturally channeled, thereby creating a plethora of differences, which are manifested in social roles, divisions of labor, status hierarchies, structures of consciousness, stylizations of bodies, as well as individual desires and aspirations. Within the interdisciplinary field of gender studies, scholars have introduced a number of important distinctions to illuminate the complexity of gender as an amalgam of sex, sexuality, sexual identity, gender identity, gender role, gender role identity, social relations, cultural norms, and institutional arrangements. Yet, once the manifold dimensions of gender are enumerated, additional questions arise: What do these phenomena have to do with one another? How are they interrelated? And why is gender difference so routinely channeled into systems of advantage and disadvantage that privilege men?

The chapters in this section are rooted in the puzzle of pervasive and persistent gender inequalities. Rather than naturalizing these unequal relationships, these chapters attempt to explain why gendered differences in opportunities, roles, power, and rights that disadvantage women surface in virtually all societies. To explore this question, the chapters draw upon diverse intellectual disciplines – anthropology, economics, history, neuroscience, philosophy, psychoanalysis, and sociology. Informed by different theoretical paradigms and multiple methodological approaches, the chapters offer a wide range of insights into cultural, historical, social, psychological, and political structures of power.

Despite their widely varying analyses, the chapters have some common ground. The authors agree that any adequate understanding of gender inequality must supplement biological claims with detailed attention to cultural conventions, economic contributions, species survival, social hierarchies, and political agendas. They concur that gender identity and the

concrete behaviors by which it manifests remain at great remove from nature, having been structured to promote mainly (or exclusively) the advantage of males. Whether legitimated through appeals to men's "natural" superiority, divine will, economic efficiency, or sexual complementarity, men have claimed an entitlement to public institutions and indeed, the public sphere, attributing to these domains rationality, factuality, reliability. Men have credited themselves with greater physical strength and greater capacity to provide subsistence, despite shorter lifespans, and empirical evidence that women were the mainstay of subsistence agriculture prior to the 19th century in the West, and remain so across the global South to this day. Men have transformed a relative advantage stemming from not being responsible for breastfeeding, which accorded them a marked difference in freedom in pre-modern societies in which one pregnancy followed another, into a system of male domination. The imbalance of gendered power grew exponentially when men attributed to themselves not only the monopoly of legitimate violence (control of military and police forces) but also of political and economic life. In principle, neither the rule of law nor the management of the economy is linked to gender. In practice, however, men have used custom, law, religion, and tradition to bar women from equal participation in these spheres. Paradoxically, an imbalance of power grounded in the exercise of brute force increased exponentially through cultural transformations, which have been celebrated as civilizational achievements: these include the enlightenment, secularization, and the overthrow of feudal systems that tied privilege to particular families.

Claiming the public world for themselves, men assigned women to the private domain, allotted them responsibilities that men chose not to perform (childcare, eldercare, emotional labor, and social reproduction) and attributed to women characteristics that men devalued (sentiment, lack of depth, fidelity, and unpredictability). Even in the 21st century, in the most progressive societies, men continue to be disproportionately represented in the public realm, in professional positions, in domains of power and authority. They continue to define themselves as producers of knowledge, publishing books that conflate objectivity with the perspective of a hegemonic male subject, just as the first psychoanalytic works assumed a male doctor who treated a female patient (possibly for hysteria, a syndrome implying female inferiority in the concept itself).

Several of the chapters in this section interlace sociology with anthropology and psychoanalysis to explore how the cultural expectations associated with male domination have structured not only individual consciousness and shared social expectations, but have bound *collective unconscious images* to certain roles. Just as a male figure is associated with the idea of the hero (and it is irrelevant here whether the image corresponds to reality or to rhetorical manipulations), it is also associated with economic knowledge and prowess. For this reason, a woman who enters the world of finance

must overcome more obstacles than a man before investors entrust her with their funds. Although they operate at an unconscious level, these resistances have existed and continue to exist everywhere. Even in Scandinavian countries, women's entrepreneurship requires public interventions to level the field of material and psychological disadvantage. In less egalitarian countries, whether in the North or the global South, pro-male bias remains so entrenched that such interventions are neither considered attainable nor desirable.

Cultural forms – whether in the domain of arts, sciences, politics, sports, business, religion, or inventions of the past – are intertwined with male power in a circular process that is difficult to define: they are both its cause and consequence. Gender differences have permeated the collective imagination in more subtle and everyday ways than is typically understood. Beyond mandates of what must be done, human beings are also driven by taboos and prohibitions, which determine *boundaries that must be respected*. Jung and Freud disagreed about the specifics of these boundaries, with Jung theorizing an archetype present from birth, and Freud suggesting that the internal compass orienting human behavior stems from an introjection of parental figures, who have themselves introjected parental norms from the previous generations. Nonetheless, both agreed that the past is never completely eliminated and both agreed that these internal prohibitions are markedly gender-specific, whether manifested in the domains of ethics or aesthetics. Hence, under the same conditions, women feel guilty for reasons that are often not the same as those that induce guilt in men.

How these gendered incorporations of norms, prohibitions, and taboos have played out in the history of the West – a history that is once again, under conditions of globalization, remaking the world in its image – is a subject of intensive debate. Extrapolating from Jung's conception of *enantiodromia*, a process whereby the concentration of any force inevitably produces its opposite, I have suggested that male dominance should be understood as a compensatory mechanism that stems from men's comparative relative insignificance in the production of life (Zoja, 2000). Yet patriarchal society has almost always been characterized by structures of inequality that go well beyond gender hierarchy, manifesting in ethnic, racial, and religious stratifications as well – most notoriously embodied in systems of enslavement and indentured servitude. Mastery as a mode of existence that reduces some humans to the status of property has taken particularly gendered forms. Male masters routinely forced enslaved women to have sexual intercourse, knowing that their status as property denied them the capacity to dissent. Laws that established slave codes thus authorized rape with impunity. These laws enabled the generation of an incalculable number of children who were not acknowledged by the male parent, creating a stark differentiation between the concepts of patriarch and father (a concept whose etymology implies taking responsibility). In its sexual license, patriarchy fostered

unpunished crimes of incalculable temporal and geographical extension. The historical record offers no ground on which to conceive the opposite situation. No societies ruled by women produced markedly differentiated stratifications of race, ethnicity, and religion, which were characterized by women's cynical sexual exploitation of male slaves, where the callous pursuit of pleasure/power was recklessly careless of consequences. History and fantasy suggest that cultural boundaries would bind a woman minimally to the children born of such unions, even if their abandonment were legally permitted. This same fantasy suggests that culturally programmed behaviors in women have remained closer to a less exploitative mode of human interaction, to a more ethical frame of interrelationship. In seeking to explain gender inequality from various disciplinary perspectives, several chapters in this section suggest that ending patriarchy and creating political initiatives to accord women greater public responsibility might have collateral benefits, contributing to societies that are less brutally exploitive and perhaps more moral.

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7

Economics, Gender, and Power

Elisabetta Addis

Introduction

In the General Equilibrium Model that constitutes the heart of contemporary mainstream economics, there is no explicit mention of power and there is no explicit mention of gender. Yet economics has become the system of thought that drives an increasing number of decisions, so much so that we talk of the intellectual “imperialism” of economics, which is invading the fields of other social sciences. In a world where gender and power are pervasive, the main theory guiding decision-makers has very little to say explicitly about them. It cannot therefore forecast what will happen to power relations and gender relations as a consequence of decisions made following the prescription of the model. In this chapter I try to illustrate the model, to see where power and gender may be hidden, and then to introduce some considerations that suggest how one could try to correct this invisibility and introduce gender differences and power in economic theory. Since the article is part of an interdisciplinary project, the language used is open to understanding by non-economists, and therefore some explanations may appear redundant to economists.

The central core of economics

At the core of economics is a representation of the market,¹ where exchange between agents takes place. In this representation, each agent is sexless and rational, and enters into a relation with other sexless and rational agents. Agents differ because they have different tastes, and different endowments of resources which they come to the market to trade. In the early neoclassical models adopting this approach, exchange was timeless or happened instantaneously. An important development in the theory was introduced with the study of intertemporal Overlapping Generations Models (OGM: Diamond, 1965). In this development, agents exist in time. They come into being at time t , and cease to be at time $t+n$. Yet they are not born of women, nor reared by parents. Their tastes are not the result of a process

of acculturation: they simply are given. Their rationality is governed by a set of axioms – basic ones such as: if an agent prefers a to b and b to c, he cannot prefer c to a. Agents know their tastes; they don't learn about them by trial and error.

Agents exchange goods. Goods are goods because somebody has a taste for them. As long as somebody has a taste for them, their physical qualities are not an issue. Some agents, the producers, have an excess of some goods, and they wish to sell. Other agents, the consumers, have a need, or a wish (the difference, in this context, is of no consequence), for some other goods. It follows that each agent must be both producer and consumer. If agents are not producers, they do not have the means to acquire what they need. If they do not have wishes, they do not enter the exchange relationship. It can be shown that a necessary axiom under which the theory works is that the utility function is never satiated; that is, each agent always has some unsatisfied want. There is no room in this model for an agent with no endowments – nothing, not even his/her capability to work or sell his/her organs, nothing that others wish of him/her. Such an entity will simply starve and die. The market has no pity.

Once these basic concepts are clarified, and I would say purified, the model works very easily. The monetary price agents are willing to pay for each good is equal to the marginal utility of each good to each of them; the price at which they wish to sell reflects the marginal costs each had to pay in order to produce. This generates a set of demand and supply functions, one for each good – including labor, of which more later on. The price at which exchange happens in a competitive market is the price at which the quantity demanded equals the quantity supplied. The desires and the endowment of the buyers will dictate what the suppliers will produce, and where they will invest. The market system will produce what people wish. The price mechanism is the most powerful information system to tell producers what people want, and alternative arrangements (e.g. state planning) have been proven theoretically and empirically inferior.

As long as some important conditions are met, the market system, described as above, reaches an enviable condition called a Pareto optimum. The Pareto optimum, obtained in a General Equilibrium Model of all the markets, is defined as the state in which no agent can be made better off without some other agent being made worse off. This is the Holy Grail of economics, the intellectual construction that demonstrates the superiority of free competitive markets over other possible arrangements and policies. The model is sometimes referred to as the neoclassical model, by its supporters, the neo-neoclassical model by its opponents, “orthodoxy” by those who try to be heretics but often belong to other orthodoxies. By analogy with physics, I call it the “Standard Model” of economics.

By entering trade, agents, both as sellers and as buyers, gain a surplus of value. The equilibrium price is usually lower than what some of the buyers

would be willing to pay, and higher than that for which some of the sellers would be willing to sell. This is because they trade something that for them has a lesser value, with something that for them has a larger value. Therefore, both participants in any willing exchange gain. The act of trading creates value. The physical goods that come out of the market are the same physical goods that came into the market, but people's wants have been satisfied to a larger extent, so we can speak of a "consumer surplus" and "producer surplus."² If some of the possible trades do not happen, these surpluses of value are lost. Yet, in the state of Pareto optimum, each agent comes out of the exchange with an amount of resources/value which depends on the resources/value he had to begin with. Initial endowments determine what each agent gets, given what he wants, and given the tastes of all agents for what he has to offer. Power, here, is the buying power each agent has to begin with. In addition, each agent has the power to choose what to buy, given his tastes, and to decide what to supply, given what he has or what he can produce. In this theoretical market, in equilibrium nobody can make a gain or a loss: if prices equal the marginal values, what each receives is strictly a function of what one has to begin with, as endowment. This is all the power that exists in the Standard Model.

Endowments are expressed in monetary value. However, it is unclear whether they are money or material goods, and what material goods they are. The set of prices and quantities that constitutes the General Equilibrium is the result of tastes and endowments. It will be different, therefore, according to how tastes and endowments are distributed at the beginning. The tastes of those who have a larger endowment to begin with, and therefore can buy more, will shape prices by way of demand, and therefore will help decide what is supplied and how much it costs. But we cannot speak of a structure of power, of one agent having power over another, other than the power to buy or not to buy merchandise, and the power to buy more or to buy less. If an agent refuses to buy something she has the money and the desire to buy, as in a boycott, she may exercise some power, but at the expense of depriving herself of something she wants.

People enter the market with a given amount of buying power; that is, they are relatively rich or poor, and have given tastes. If they can buy, they have the power to decide what is produced; if they cannot buy, their tastes do not matter in shaping investment. Suppliers have an endowment as well. It is the capital they can invest to produce whatever it is that they supply and must sell. And they have one power: the power to invent new ways to make their product either cheaper or more palatable to buyers with the capital they can muster or borrow to invest. The only relation that exists between agents is the exchange relation. One buyer/seller faces another buyer/seller, and implicitly all the other buyer/sellers that in a competitive market may be willing to buy or sell at a better price. When the price one offers is equal to the price the other is willing to accept, then exchange takes place. That

is the only human relation there is. There is no bond between an individual and the other. There have been attempts to model solidarity and kinship, in fact to strip solidarity and kinship from their characteristics and reduce them to this basic model of trade. The most notable is the economics of the family, which represents the family as a special micro-market where two people exchange money and time between them to raise their own children (Becker, 1981). The bond is the children. Modeling the family along Beckerian lines was severely criticized by most feminists (Bergmann, 1995; Addis, 1997), although some feminist economists use it in Italy and elsewhere (Apps and Rees, 2004). In the Beckerian family all the power derives from the fact that one of the partners can earn more outside the home than the other. The distribution of working time, leisure time, and time dedicated to domestic unpaid work is dictated by relative earnings and relative tastes for domestic versus paid work.

Kenneth Boulding (1989) has drawn an important and useful distinction between “power over” and “power to,” still used in political theory. “Power over” is the power to make somebody do your will, “power to” is power to achieve whatever you wish to achieve. The boundary between the two becomes blurred in the presence of conflict. If two agents want to eat the same orange, or if one wants to build a house and the other leave the ground pristine, they are in conflict. “Power” can be defined as the capability to resolve a conflict according to one’s will; and it is at the same time “power over” the other person compelling her to give up the orange, and “power to” get the orange for yourself.

Let us examine the situation depicted by the Standard Model in terms of these two articulations of power: money gives agent A the “power over” agent B, who will give him his goods for a given price, but limited by B’s willingness to sell. So “power over” loses its authoritarian edge: the will of the buyer is done without the will of the seller being thwarted. Each of the agents has “power to” buy all the goods that he needs to fulfill his project of life, but only assuming they are on sale and that he has the endowments to buy. The equilibrium reflects the wish of both the buyer and the seller. They are both equally happy to have done a transaction that they both freely choose to make, and overall they are as happy as the ratio between their wishes and their constraints allows. Conflict is eliminated, solved by money, by the possibility of the monetary transaction. If freedom is to be free of any “power over” oneself, so that one is never forced to act against one’s will, then if in reality a market similar to the one represented in the model existed, it would be the realm of freedom, subject only to the initial constraints. And also of peace: it is the impossibility of trading to get what is wanted that leads from conflict to war. Therefore we can conclude that in the Standard Model there is no such thing as “power” in the classical sense, but only a bounded version of what is usually called “power”: all the power that remains is that due to initial endowments. If they were equal for all, there would be no power.

Constraints can be changed by a redistribution of initial endowments, the resources with which each agent enters the market. In reality, we encounter resource redistribution in many forms (luck, ability to forecast future events correctly, skill, technological knowledge, monopoly power). The most important agent that we can observe effecting redistribution on a daily basis in present-day Western democracies is the state. The state has political power over agents, which is summarized in two main functions. The first is regulating the market by legislating which contracts are enforceable and providing the most important infrastructure by which the market can function: money. The second is taking resources from some agents and giving them to others; that is, tax and spend, provided that too much spending does not create unwanted price inflation. Thus we have two main and interconnected articulations of economic policy: fiscal and monetary policies. By these policies the state has the power to shift the constraints, to change the initial endowments by redistributing resources. In western democracies, the government is in charge of fiscal policy, and a special agency that links together private banks and the government, the central bank, is in charge of monetary policies. By means of fiscal and monetary policy the government has the power, to an extent, to regulate the macroeconomy, that is, the process of economic growth and of income distribution, and therefore the resources that agents (men and women) can take to, and obtain from, the market. Should the state have and maintain this power? How should this power be used? One story, somewhat feeble but the only available story coherently expressing the central metaphor, is related to the concept of the Pareto optimum. In the next paragraph I will try to explain this connection.

Pareto-optimality

The market, into which agents enter with the same endowment of resources, produces wonders. Trade increases consumer and producer surpluses, and wishes can be satisfied to the maximum possible extent. Pareto-optimality guarantees exactly this: that all the possibilities of creating value by trade have been exploited, and that what each agent gets when at the Pareto optimum point is the maximum possible that he can receive without diminishing what somebody else gets, given everybody's tastes and endowments.

Pareto-optimality is a very frail construction. In order to achieve it, we must assume that some important conditions hold. The most famous condition needed to achieve optimality is the absence of monopolies. If there are monopolies, then the monopolist unduly appropriates the consumer surplus, the extra gain each participant to the trade receives. It is by way of monopoly, and by way of the other features by which reality differs from the Standard Model, which I will list later, that power enters economics.

We are not in the Marxian world, where there is exploitation by capitalists to reap the surplus value that is produced by the workers. Extraction of surplus in the Marxian model happens by selling the product at a price well

above the sum of the wages paid and the other costs. This, instead, according to the Standard Model, can only happen if there is monopoly. The Standard Model thus encompasses the Marxian model as one special case where one of the conditions of the Standard Model (absence of monopoly) does not hold.

In the world of the Standard Model, if there is perfect competition and no monopolies, no extra surplus is unduly extracted; there is no power and no exploitation. Some agents enter the market endowed only with their labor, and they sell it at the price they can obtain, given competition from other propertyless workers. But if the market for the products is competitive, the capitalist employer, like his workers, will only gain enough to make a living. His managerial wage is dictated by the supply of and demand for managers in a competitive labor market of managers, augmented by the interest rate of the capital invested, which in turn is set in the capital markets. Surplus can be extracted above this competitive level and extra profits can be made by owning or establishing a monopoly,³ or as explained later, by exploiting other features by which reality differs from theoretical equilibrium conditions.

A central question, therefore, is to assess how widespread monopolies are. Causes of monopoly quoted by economists are many: there are natural and artificial monopolies – ownership of oil wells versus patents and licenses. There may be barriers to entry owing to the amount of capital needed to start production. Even if there were no natural or artificial monopolies and loans of capital were available for all entrepreneurs that have a good business idea (a condition called “absence of liquidity constraints”), each producer/seller must sell here and now, so he has no competitor in his neighborhood and for at least a few minutes. He has a degree of monopoly and earns extra profits. The shop that sells fruit under my door in the center of town has monopoly power with respect to another shop that sells fruit at the periphery. The one in the periphery cannot find an outlet in the center, since the slot is occupied by the existing one. A small degree of monopoly is the normal condition of any successful business, insofar as there are advantages for an incumbent. In the end, monopoly is like a coefficient that is 1 if there is truly only one seller and no substitutes nearby for the good it sells, and small, but never zero, if there are many more sellers of similar items.

Monopolies and oligopolies, therefore, are pervasive. The policy prescription that derives from the Standard Model is that they should be dismantled, if possible and as much as possible; hence the creation of anti-trust authorities, and the proposals for spreading the credit system – loans to deserving investors, and to students, microcredit to avoid credit rationing and to allow the overcoming of barriers to entry. Anti-monopolistic policies are the basis for an ancient and solid alliance between liberals and socialists. Monopoly is a source of power which must be fought constantly because it has the tendency to be reborn, each time that a successful firm buys a competitor in trouble and grows.

Perfect competition, in other words the absence of monopolies, is only one of the conditions needed to achieve the Pareto optimum. There are other conditions that affect the possibility of achieving the Pareto optimum, much in the same way as monopolies do, and create extra profits, and therefore the possibility of “power” in the pristine scenario of the Standard model. They are:

1. Symmetric information; that is, all the agents must know the world in the same manner and to the same degree: those who know more make profits and have power over those who know less;
2. “Complete markets”; that is, an agent should be able today to sell the right to buy his good at any specific date in the future or under any possible circumstances, at a given price. If markets are not complete, those who need goods for which there is no market are at a disadvantage: they get less surplus and less power.
3. No externalities; that is, the price should always capture all the value of a good to the agents. The common examples are that if there is a chocolate shop from which good smells emanate for nothing, the price of the chocolate does not reflect the positive value for the passerby; or the damage that fumes from a plastic producer do to the lungs of its neighbors are not counted in the price of the cheap plastic); Those who enjoy the effects of a positive externality gain surplus and power; those who endure the effects of a negative externality are “exploited.”
4. Constant returns to scale; that is, the size of the firm does not cause a decrease in unitary costs. It is a key fact, known to economists since Adam Smith described the pin factory, that a large market allows the existence of a large factory where efficiency can increase and cost be cut: returns of scale are not constant in reality.
5. No public goods; that is, goods are all excludable and rivalrous. A good is excludable if one can prevent others from consuming it: an apple is excludable, clean air is non-excludable. A good is rivalrous when, if one agent consumes it, this prevents other agents for doing so. An apple is rivalrous, music is non-rivalrous. If all goods were private, each consumer’s marginal rate of substitution would be the same. Public goods complicate matters: technically, the Pareto optimum amount of a public good is found when the combined sum of the marginal rate of substitution between private goods and a given public good of all individuals is equal to the marginal rate of transformation. The intuition is that public goods help to spread surplus and power around.

In the real world, each of these conditions is violated, and, many of them are simultaneously violated. In addition, rationality, a fundamental characteristic of the behavior of the agents depicted by this theory, has been thoroughly dismantled (Simon, 1957; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The

conditions for optimality are almost never met. There are markets that are almost like the model, such as electronic markets for securities which have been developed since the inception of computers, but even there, gains and losses are made on imperfect asymmetric information and the markets are far from complete.

Power in economics

When the conditions for Pareto-optimality are not met – and one can see that they are practically never met – two things happen:

- (1) The absence of these conditions generates sources of power. Power may be obtained by exploiting the absence of Pareto-optimality conditions.
- (2) Political democratic power may and should be therefore created to prevent it. There is room for public policy. The state acquires a role in the economy: it can make up for the lack of conditions to Pareto-optimality, and can issue regulations to create or approximate such conditions. According to many economists (Barr, 1987, 1992, 2004; Artoni e Casarico, 2005), here is the root of a possible reconciliation between economic theory and economic policies advocating redistribution, in other words between the state and the market. Where reality differs from the Standard Model, people can organize collectively and provide for some goods in an alternative fashion, by public provision. Thus, primary education should be made available at no cost to all because it is a public good, with positive externalities; health should be regulated and public because information about sickness is very asymmetrical between physicians, patients, and pharmaceutical firms; taxing citizens to pay wages to anti-trust commission employees is efficient. To the enlightened economist, the state should be granted power, exactly because reality does not conform to Pareto-optimality conditions.

The foundation of policies, and in particular of social policies, according to this line of thought, lies exactly in the fact that when the conditions for Pareto-optimality are not found in reality, it is rational, useful, and necessary to bring them about by public intervention. The aim of these policies is to bring reality into alignment with the model of the free market that provides Pareto-optimality. They can do this in two ways: (a) by regulating the markets so as to make them competitive, and (b) by redistributing power and resources towards those who are hurt by market failures. In this respect, a pro-free market policy is indeed a pro-freedom policy, in that it strips monopolists of their power over all the other agents who are not monopolists, or who are monopolists to a much smaller extent, including consumers and workers. The reason why we need the power of the state is to reduce

the power of the monopolists, or of those who profit from the absence of Pareto-optimality conditions. Are there special conditions under which the government, or some other publicly owned agency, should become the owner of some industrial sectors? The answer is yes, both for liberals and for socialists. The remaining item to be factored in is the inefficiency connected with the lack of private ownership: without the owner in control, or the managers who should care for his interests, what economists call the “principal-agent” issue becomes a problem. The choice is therefore between the inefficiency of large private monopolies that extract surplus value and acquire power over all society and the inefficiency of the public sector. The choice between “the state” and “the market” becomes a matter of empirical measurement: there is a point at which the two inefficiencies are in a balance, and there we find the correct share of public versus private sector in the economy.

If this narrative holds, it is a serious mistake to believe, as many people on the left of the political spectrum still do, that it is only greed, self-interest, and will to power that generated the wave of pro-market, neo-liberal policies that swept the world in the decades before the 2008 crisis. It is also a mistake to assume that free market policies always produce gender relations damaging to women. We are still lacking, among feminists, serious, scientific, empirically based discussions about when and where the development of free markets helped women to achieve freedom and power, and when and where it did not. Women in free market oriented societies may well be better off than under any other arrangement. I resent the automatic siding of feminism either with liberalism or with socialism. Feminist thinking is an autonomous strand of philosophical, social, and political thinking, which may cross paths and objectives with liberalism, socialist, and religious thinking, but cannot be reduced to any of them.

Note, however, that active policies to introduce “free markets” may have ambiguous results in terms of power. Privatization is not the same as liberalization. As the Russian and Italian experiences at the end of the last century have shown, there are privatizations that are not liberalizations, but put market power, monopoly power, into private hands. Selling out firms and even entire industrial sectors, that under socialist arrangements were state owned, to single owners created huge private monopolies. The reduced role of the government did not, by itself, lead to a market and toward a Pareto optimum; it may be taking us further away from it, or it may happen that in an ill-functioning democracy, with voters who do not forecast correctly the effects of given policies, monopoly power over a piece of the industrial sector may be granted to a corrupt and overpowering public bureaucracy.

We have no guarantee that private production is better than public production, or vice versa, for leading us toward a world of freedom and equitable distribution of power and resources. There is no general principle that makes the market better than the state or the state better than the market. We must

regulate the economy using our brains and what we know. Today, this means using both economic theory and feminist theory in an intelligent way and using data, case by case, until we produce a theory that encompasses both neoclassical notions of how markets work and what we know about women and gender.

The market child of the state

Economic theory has only to offer this feeble ground to government intervention in the economy, this very tenuous theory of the state: the lack of conditions for Pareto-optimality. To worsen the matter, since the concept of a Pareto optimum is rather advanced and cannot be introduced at early stages of learning, governments appear in economics textbooks from nowhere. In the model that is presented to our first year students the state appears to be there only to interfere with the correct functioning of the market. Even in textbooks written by quite progressive economists, for example the one by Paul Krugman and associates (Krugman et al., 2014), the first introduction to the market is through the explanation of the “dead weight loss”; that is, the idea that the application of a tax diminishes the consumer and producer surpluses from trade. The explanation that the tax is needed by the state to fulfill other important economic functions appears only much later, when taking up the topic of externalities and public goods.

The state has a long history and an important role in shaping gender power relations. It is a history grounded in the most basic power relations among human beings: the physical power of the strong over the weak, of the adult over the child, of the man over the woman, of the armed over the unarmed. It is a history full of war, which is the extreme act of achieving or preventing domination, acquiring power or avoiding being under the power of somebody else.

In the market, according to the central metaphor, a buyer and a seller meet as free and neutral equals. But the fact that this can happen is the result of centuries of civilization, of creation of “the market,” of the liberation from feudal bonds, of the existence of the rule of the law, of the state itself. Civilization has produced institutional developments which are capable of overturning the basic power relations between humans. We are faced by a loop. We can think of agents in markets as free, rational, and autonomous, abstracting from their physical, bodily characteristics, because the state has made contemporary human beings more similar to this metaphor than they have ever been in history.

Yet rational gender-neutral agents we are not: we are bodies, and bodies have a sex and an age. When two human beings meet, they seldom meet as equals. Human beings come to the world as children of parents of different sex. Freudian psychoanalysis makes this relation of the child with mother and father the core of its reflections. The child comes to the world at the

same time completely powerless and full of potential. The parents can cause her to die just by abandoning her, but she has the power to become the human being that she is capable of becoming. Growing old is to express one fraction of this potential, and let all the rest go until, soon before death, all the power to do and to become is exhausted. Also, the child comes to the world with a sex.⁴ When two people meet they immediately relate to one another as people of different sex and age. The relationship among generations – parents and children, young and old – is the other great dichotomy, together with gender, that runs through societies and economies. The Overlapping Generation Model introduced generations into economic modeling; sexual difference and gender are yet to come. In which way can we integrate sexual differences and the concept of gender into economic theory? This issue has been on the table since the publication of *Beyond Economic Man* (Ferber and Nelson, 1993). Since then, a rich literature has flourished on various empirical aspects of women in the economy, thanks also to the existence of the International Association for Feminist Economics and the journal *Feminist Economics*, but little progress has been made on the theoretical front (Nelson, 2002). Perhaps some interesting development may yet come from a strand of economic and sociological literature known as “social capital theory” (Bourdieu, 1983; Coleman, 1988; Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Addis, 2014), making use of new tools of network analysis.

Sex, gender, and the welfare state

The fact that humans come in two varieties is at the root of what we call gender.⁵ Gender is a cultural construct, according to which people of different sexes are prescribed different roles, attitudes and behavior, from how to act to what to wear (Butler, 1990; Hawkesworth, 2005). Sex is an inborn characteristic, but gender changes through space and time. Many of us are old enough to have seen it change in front of our very eyes, not to mention observing the differences between being a woman in Saudi Arabia and in Europe today. Yet there is something in gender relations that is unchanged. Belonging to one or the other sex always has a meaning. The meaning changes, but to make sense of the overall social construction, gender difference seems always to be required. There is a “grammar” of gender that is still perceived even in the most advanced societies, where women have conquered important freedoms and fundamental rights.

This grammar is not simple. It prescribes the position of one agent with respect to another in a social order. This position is the result of being male or female, young or old, and of other usually less important physical and social characteristics, such as being tall, being fast, being born in a given family with a given inherited wealth. In this grammar nature and culture continuously interact, and, as young humans become old, and as people achieve their life outcomes, the relative position of each person is continuously upset

and changed. In this grammar, the adult, male, healthy, rich, and strong come with a plus sign. Young, female, poor, weak come with a minus sign. The network of relations that results is the structure of power. The difference in value between each pair of characteristics is historically determined: in our age and country, physical strength has lost social value, and the female sex with its intellectual skills has gained social value, with respect values of the 19th century. Gender is a concept very akin to the concept of power. When we say that gender relations change through time and history, we mean that, among other things, power relations between the people of the two sexes change.

Women and men are different. In the past this difference was perceived as female inferiority. It is unclear how much of this perception is cultural and how much is hard-wired in human brains. Much of this difference, moreover, is not real, but is just the result of a biased perception. When the performance of men and women is measured, expectations of women's lower performance mostly turn out to be prejudice and bias (Goldin and Rouse, 2000). Yet the perception is very hard to eradicate. Feminism is about making sure that this difference is treated as a difference, not as inferiority. Policies, in other words public intervention by the state, are the means to bring an equitable distribution of resources among genders, ages, and ethnicities. Which policies are appropriate, though, must be discovered by fully using what we know about markets, Pareto-optimality, and the need to allocate resources, with regard both to equity and efficiency of the results.

Welfare state redistribution can change the constraints that agents have when entering the market. In the last two centuries the state has taken up a new role. The modern nation state as it developed in Europe was an institution which gained the monopoly of armed power for purposes of defense and police, under the leadership of an aristocratic ruling class. In a development which has been amply studied in the literature, partly as a consequence of the need to provide a well-fed and well-educated national army, partly as a consequence of the push from below that men and women who were not in power exerted, requesting more democratic institutions and provision in favor of the population at large, the character of the state changed deeply. The modern state took upon itself a number of practices that had previously been in the private sphere of the family, the Church, or private business: public education, public health and sanitation, and ensuring resources for people in need by mandating insurance against the main risks (disability pensions for the injured, old age pensions for the elderly, unemployment subsidies). To do this, it subtracted resources via taxation of the private sector (families and business) and gave them back to the private sector either in kind (public services) or in cash. It took on many of the tasks which in the traditional, pre-welfare state, societies were women's. This deeply changed families and the gender roles within families, and interfered profoundly with

the business sector and the market, further increasing the distance between the Standard Model and reality.

If taxation is not enough, the state can borrow by issuing government bonds. At this point in the narrative another important junction between the state and the market should be mentioned. Central banks, by buying and selling government bonds, can expand or reduce the money supply. Congruent with the Standard Model, in the 1980s, a school of thought called Rational Expectations argued that the result of monetary expansion to finance state deficit spending could only be inflation, not, as Keynesians believed soon after the war, a stimulus to economic growth. The recent worldwide economic crisis has shown the limitations of this result. When Obama saved the world from a much worse economic crisis than the one that had started in 2008 by using a stimulus package, this story of deficit spending creating inflation – completely dominant in my student years – began to be discredited in practice as it already was in theory (Quiggin, 2012). However, in Europe the dogma of balanced budget and austerity is slow to crumble owing to the links with national cultures and interests. The theory that buried Keynesianism is in decline, but a theory able to support Keynesian policies and explain how the welfare state is a fundamental part of the macroeconomy in its own right is not yet in sight.

The point which feminist economics should always underline is that in Western countries the government takes and spends between 30 and 50 percent of GNP, and on average two-thirds of this amount is so-called social expenditure. This expenditure interacts on a daily basis with the work, paid and unpaid, of all citizens, especially women. The economy is not made up of markets, with a residual role for the welfare state and domestic unpaid work by men and women. The economy is made up of three equally large and interconnected parts, markets, the welfare state, and families. Only by studying these parts as a whole can we understand what public policies will do to power relations among the sexes, and how economic policies effect gender changes.

The consequences of the welfare state for gender relations and for power between the sexes are enormous (Addis, 2003). It is not far-fetched to say that the rise of the welfare state is the material basis that allows whatever women's emancipation and liberation we have achieved in the West. The welfare state hired women, providing them with the opportunity for financial independence. At the same time, public services did what was once done by women's previously "unpaid" work for the family, freeing women's time to be sold in the labor market. In both ways it empowered women with respect to the men in their families.

One may wish to ask the more general question of whether, overall, women and men have both been empowered or disempowered by the processes of capitalist and welfare state development. One may claim that both men and women have acquired rights and freedoms, or, the opposite, that

they have been disempowered with respect to the economic system as a whole: the interdependence of all humans grew with economic growth. In pre-capitalist pre-welfare state times people were subject to the whims of a local lord, of the weather, and of poorly understood sicknesses. Today people feel subject to decisions that are taken in financial markets, central banks, technological labs, and firms of which they know very little. Whatever the answer one gives to this more general question, there is little doubt that gender relations at each step of the social and economic ladder have become more egalitarian.

One may question whether power relations in society have become more or less equal between those at the top and those at the bottom. If we consider the difference in power between men at the top of the social hierarchy – those with most power – and the most powerless women at the bottom, the distance between them increased, as proved by Piketty (2014). At each step of the social ladder, though, the empowerment of women relative to men is difficult to deny.

Conclusions

In summary, the answer to the question “What does the Standard Model of mainstream economics have to say with respect to the issue of gender and power?”, the answer is: it says nothing explicitly; but in fact the theoretical battles that happen within the discipline have a lot to do with women’s empowerment. The existence of people of different sex remains unspoken by economics. Deriving policy prescriptions out of a theoretical model that does not include how gender differences produce economic effects (a) in families, (b) in the institutions of the welfare state, and (c) in the private “market” sector, economics practices a selective cut. This cut makes the discipline unable to fully articulate issues of well-being, provisions for needs, and happiness. In order to understand its own subject matter,⁶ and to overcome its own deep intellectual crisis, economics needs a deep change of focus. It needs to model gender and power explicitly. At the same time, feminists of either sex, who believe that power and resources should be distributed fairly among all human beings, need a deeper understanding of what the market, as understood by mainstream economics, does. We still need the reference points provided by market theory and Pareto-optimality to design equitable and efficient public policies.

Notes

1. This representation, as shown by Diana Strassmann (1993), has the character of a metaphor, which is, a narrative that chooses to stress some elements of reality and exclude some others, in a selective fashion aimed to obtain power. The main implication of this is that the analytical tools (equations and calculus) and the validation methods (statistics and econometrics) can falsify or validate proposition

within the metaphor, but not the metaphor as such. Economics as a science is only as good as its central metaphor.

2. There are some difficulties about the role of money, which we use to measure value. Is money a commodity like any other, oranges or apples, which enters the market as a fixed quantity, the quantity of money? If so, we should find the same amount before trade and after trade, only with a different allocation among agents, like all other commodities. But then, where did the consumer and producer surpluses go? Did they disappear? Did they exist only in the mind of the customers? What is measuring them?
3. That is, something akin to Marxian surplus value may be extracted only in the presence of monopolies but it is unclear whether the exploited are the workers or the consumers.
4. There is a fraction of people, larger than once believed, that are born with both sexes or neither, and we are beginning to educate people to the existence of transgender, which deserve full acceptance and recognition.
5. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gender>
6. The subject matter of Economics, according to the classical definition of Sir Lionel Robbins, is the production and allocation of resources.

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8

Feminine Creativity and Masculine Power

Elena Caramazza

Beyond the feminine shadow

The contrast between the negative modalities (which often assume extremely destructive forms) with which male elites manage power in the upper echelons of the various sectors of public life and the female predisposition toward pacific and constructive behavior cannot be denied.

However, since we can only achieve wholeness of the personality through the knowledge and integration of our shadow,¹ I shall start by examining the obscure aspects of the feminine psyche, which are perhaps less visible and well known than their masculine counterparts, then focus on the creative qualities peculiar to woman and explore the hypothesis that it is precisely in these qualities that the hope of a better destiny for democracy lies.

There exists a form of feminine destructiveness that differs qualitatively from its masculine equivalent, which is expressed mainly at the level of interpersonal relationships: for example, with respect to modalities, by poisoning communication with ambiguous messages rather than giving clear commands, and, with respect to situations, by obstructing the autonomy of the other, partner or child, through the exploitation of his/her dependence. To understand the characteristics of feminine destructiveness we must bear in mind that when the woman succumbs to the fascination of power within interpersonal relationships it is because she identifies with the powerful archetypal forces flowing through her,² such as the force of procreativity. The woman has difficulty in abandoning the place of origin, dominated by the mythical image of the Great Mother who assimilates everything and everyone, in order to initiate a process of personal differentiation from the other and of acquiring a consciousness of her own limits. Her fundamental anxieties revolve around the phantasms of solitude and abandonment, while her maturation demands that she cease to hold her real and symbolic children to her bosom, in a state of symbiotic fusion.

On the other hand, I believe that the temptation of power, however it is understood, has always been obstructed in women, not only by the

exclusion from various spheres of social life, imposed by men, but also by a form of unconscious memory inscribed in her own body, which tells her that pregnancy and childbirth are constellated with risks for herself and the unborn child, and hence that her feeling of being one with the life force that is renewing itself in her cannot be separated from the consciousness of her fragility as a single individual.

Moreover, in the majority of cases negative behavior in women cannot be attributed to “historical guilt,” but, rather, concerns the inner sphere and thus the order of intentions. That is why it would seem easier for women than men to work through guilt feelings, to experience remorse, and to seek a remedy, at least when destructive feminine impulses do not drastically interfere with behavior.

For all these reasons I believe that if, in the future, women succeed in occupying, in a considerable number, important positions in the organization of collective life – granted that they are able to cross the barrier erected by men to block their path – it is unlikely that they will bring to the public sphere the specific destructive modalities they have adopted in its private equivalent.

On the other hand, the power they have exercised in intimate relationships has always been linked to an affective factor and has concerned solely the circle of people who have an existential value for them. Women are rarely interested in dominating people and almost never in identifying with ideal abstract forms.

One of the risks a woman is open to is that of succumbing to the fascination of some forms of masculine megalomania, mistaken for greatness, and hence of identifying with the image the man has of her in order to please him, to obtain his support, and thus to experience, albeit indirectly, his power, although this is almost never desired in and for itself, but as the expression of a person she admires and on whom she feels dependent. All things considered, this is always a kind of love, albeit warped, for a man who exerts a powerful attraction on her. For example, when totalitarian movements such as Nazism and Fascism asserted themselves, many women were possessed by a form of worship for the dictator, completely devoid of any critical sense, to the point of justifying even the sacrifice of their children to an ideal of grandiosity of the fatherland; an ideal that should immediately have rung false to their sensibility. This phenomenon occurs when the woman has not gained sufficient awareness of herself and the man becomes the recipient of a projection of greatness that compensates for the feeling of inferiority the woman experiences when she is unable to recognize the true qualities of her own nature, and seeks to ignore the problem by unconsciously identifying with the man.

Another way in which women can react when they are seduced by power is to conform to the styles of masculine behavior in the management of public life. In this case, they imitate the male and are seized by a form of

animosity that alienates them from their own nature. With respect to the situation described previously, here the identification with the male takes place at a conscious rather than unconscious level, precisely because the woman tends to incorporate into her identity those characteristics of power that she admires in the man.

The first mode of reacting can lead the woman to assume masochistic positions, the second sadistic stances. But in both cases she elevates the man, and not herself, to the function of "ideal of the Ego."³

The issue I am dealing with here is whether the feminine predisposition to behavior that is predominantly pacific and constructive can exert an influence in the public sphere. We cannot imagine the obscure aspects of woman having any effect, other than completely marginal, on public life now or in the future (in fact, we would be unable to visualize worse atrocities than those already thrust upon us by history managed by men!), while an unfolding of feminine creativity in this area – an unprecedented event in the entire history of humanity – could truly mark the beginning of a new order.

To this end, it seems essential to focus on certain characteristics of feminine creativity and its close relationship with the spiritual dimension of life: a discourse that is only apparently of little importance with regard to public affairs.

Creativity and symbolic consciousness

In *Così parlò Sherazade* (Thus Spoke Sheherazade) Fabrice Dubosc (2003) recounts an African story that a wet-nurse tells to her little boy:

One night, a man who owned a herd of cows discovered that some young celestial women descended a rope that they had let down from the stars and milked his cows. He caught the most beautiful one and made her his bride. They were happy but the woman, who owned a basket, begged him not to look inside it for any reason, otherwise they would be struck by a tremendous misfortune. One day the man, seized by curiosity, lifted up the lid of the basket and burst out laughing, saying to his wife: "There's nothing inside!" The woman walked away into the sunset and vanished forever.

Then the wet-nurse explained: "The woman didn't leave because the man broke his promise, but because he saw nothing when he looked into the basket." Dubosc comments: "The feminine does not tolerate the violence of a superficial gaze on the spiritual nature of her receptivity" (p. 113). For Fabrice Dubosc it is precisely the veil that characterizes the mystery of the feminine, as he says in his book *Il Deposito del Desiderio* (*The Repository of Desire*) (2007). The veil that envelops the woman is, first and foremost, a protective veil, because it protects her from a masculine gaze that can reduce

her to an object, and which, by idealizing beauty and attributing to her the power to satisfy all desires, prevents desire itself from becoming “aspiration.” While, in fact, desire seeks to possess the object and, in the illusion of obtaining complete satisfaction, confines itself to the finite, aspiration is open to the inexhaustible aspect of life and reality. On the other hand, the veil “has the function of defending what is in itself invisible,” that is from the loss of the “in-visible,” namely the loss of the capacity to see “into and go beyond appearance.” The wife’s basket was empty for the husband who did not know how to see the invisible. The veil would prevent one from falling prey to the illusion of being able to make the visual image coincide with the essence and profundity of being, whereas if there is no veil we may think that we already have everything in front of us, and there is nothing to discover. I think Narcissus perishes not because he loves himself too much or himself alone, but because he mistakes his image reflected in the water – which for him has no reference to anything else whatsoever and remains confined to the concreteness of the perceived outline – for his real self, which, by contrast, has invisible and unknowable dimensions. Following the impulse to be reunited and to become one with the object of his desire, he dissolves in a mirage devoid of substance, depth, and future.

The same veil that has a protective value can also assume oppressive, segregationist characteristics when it is imposed on the woman by a husband legitimized a priori by social consensus, which reserves for him alone the right to see his wife, but without realizing that his gaze is blindly possessive (*ibid.*, p. 62). From this point of view masculine consciousness would have difficulty in accepting a feminine world that it has perceived as obscure and enigmatic since the primordial experience of pregnancy, in which is rooted the primary wound firmly embedded in the masculine collective unconscious. In this situation, the man might say the following: “I’m veiling you to deny the ungraspable aspect of truth and reality and, with this, the mystery of your identity. Reality lies completely in my vision.” To which the woman might reply:

I wear a veil so that you will not think you know me and possess me simply by giving me a name and identifying me with my appearance; I wear a veil so that you will know that you must learn to see inside, to “see me” inside, and not persist in reducing reality to facts and truth to the rational concept of things.

We are led to reflections similar to those prompted by the symbolism of the veil by the rereading of the myth of Pandora as a myth linked to the feminine nature,⁴ since Pandora has been considered the progenitor of all women. There is something enigmatic about the myth because this woman, who was given every gift by the gods, was subsequently considered by tradition as the dispenser of every evil and of unhappiness. One may wonder

(Liotta, 2007) whether the mystery might not be explained by the hypothesis that the masculine psyche projected its guilt on woman, in much the same way as it did on Eve; or whether the myth might not allude to the complexity of the psyche that hosts an open-ended dialogue between creativeness and destructiveness.

From this standpoint I believe, and here I am anticipating topics that I shall analyze more thoroughly when discussing spirituality later, that one characteristic of the feminine psyche could be that of tolerating contradictions and letting them incubate in the alchemical jar of interiority. The good that woman can bring to the world includes the Shadow. I think that an important interpretative key to the myth is to be found in the original story:

Pandora, animated by Athena and made of water and earth by Prometheus, possessing every gift from the gods, is brought to earth by Hermes to marry Epimetheus, the brother of Prometheus. During the wedding the jar is opened by Epimetheus and the contents poured out: evil and vices instead of good and virtues. The only thing that is left in the jar is hope.

Our first thought is that it is the very act of opening the jar and pouring out the contents that causes the gifts, originally good, to be transformed into evils. In fact hope, which is good, remains such precisely because it does not come out of the jar.

In *Symbols of Transformation* (1912/1952) Jung likens Prometheus, who in Greek mythology steals the fire from the gods to give it to men, to the Indian divinity Pramantha, associated with the production of fire by rubbing. The Sanskrit root of Pramantha is *menth* or *meth* which means “to shake, to rub, to produce by rubbing,” while the Indo-European root of Prometheus is *men* which means “movements of the spirit,” from which derive *μανθάνω* “to learn, to find out,” and *προμηθεόμει* “to reflect, to take care beforehand,” so that Pro-metheus is the Provident One, as opposed to Epi-metheus, who only takes account of things after they have happened, and is thus the Improvident One.

Owing to her origins, therefore, Pandora is associated with a form of intelligence peculiar to the feminine mind (Athena), and also with the ability to learn from experience, to foresee, or rather to see in the profundity of things their future possibilities and to take care of them (Prometheus). Consequently, Pandora’s feminine intelligence combines vision and therapy, since her intense experience of the present, where attention and care converge, will inevitably become the capacity to change and redirect the course of events. Hers is an intelligence which, conscious of its intentionalities of love, does not separate knowledge from life or creation. Moreover, Pandora has also been considered the inventor of the arts born from the discovery of fire – probably because of her connection with Prometheus:

Jung sees the myths and rituals connected with the production of fire as symbolically representing the transformation of human instinct from blind and compulsive impulse into movement illuminated by consciousness and endowed with intention. This leads us to think that the consciousness of which Pandora is the bearer is not born from an act of separation from the unconscious and does not generate dichotomies, but unfolds through a process that always remains linked to its unconscious matrix and does not ignore the profound sense of belonging at its origin: that “unconscious consciousness” of which Jung speaks (1947/1954), which already begins at the level of the Self, and existed long before a consciousness of the Ego was formed; a legacy that women have been able to preserve through the millennia, precisely because they have been relegated to the domestic hearth by the male, who has devoted himself, instead, to the honorific activities of war and hunting. In other words, the matter from which Pandora was formed, and indeed the whole of reality (shaped from water and earth), is essentially connected with the spiritual principle (the movements of the spirit and divination, both pertaining to Prometheus, but also nature’s very tension toward the production of meanings).⁵

Might we not then suppose that the origin of evil lies precisely in that act of opening and emptying the jar by a man deprived of empathy and superficial, and therefore in the violence of the selfsame masculine gaze of which Fabrice Dubosc speaks, which is intended to reduce the woman, and with her the whole of nature, the womb of the earth that contains us, to an object to be known, to possess and to exploit? The not seeing anything in the celestial woman’s basket (in the African story) and being sure of having seen everything there was in Pandora’s jar correspond to a similar need to deny the subjective dimension of reality and its unpredictable way of offering itself as a gift charged with intentionality. But gifts lose their significance and cease to be such when they are detached from a giver and a receiver, from their origin and their destination. A gift separated from someone who intends to give and from someone who hopes to receive becomes booty to plunder, something brutish, a “conquest,” and no longer a symbol of the relationship between two people, which transmits love and the desire to fill a void, on the one hand, and acceptance and gratitude, on the other.⁶

Thus, beauty, deprived of a spirit that illuminates it, ceases to be a transit toward an inexhaustible generative source and becomes formalism, aestheticism, an act of plastic surgery, which imprisons in the finite:⁷ abundance, separated from the matrix that produces it, becomes accumulation and exploitation; the word, extracted from its founding relationship with silence, becomes clamor and polemic; eternal life, configured as an abstract idea and severed from the experience of existing, rather than evoking the non-temporal root of time and being the enchantment of the present moment – its unique and unrepeatable value – becomes the image of time extended

ad infinitum and, therefore, repetition and boredom or the anticipation of a perfect world that would inevitably be transformed into an inhuman one as soon as we succumbed to the crazy illusion of possessing the formula to make it a reality, as the experiences of the totalitarianisms of the 20th century have shown us. In such cases, there is a danger of hope, too, becoming omnipotent certainty and fanaticism. But since hope, as Raimundo Panikkar teaches us, is not waiting for the future, but rather the vision of the invisible, and hence a gift that puts us in contact with the profundity of the present and with the mystery of reality, it offers us a form of knowledge that cannot be reduced to a rational formula or to a means for pursuing a goal of concrete and total satisfaction. By uniting knowledge and life, subject and object, hope goes beyond epistemology and leads us toward what we call "wisdom." It is not coincidental that in the Pandora myth hope alone remains inseparable from the jar that contains it: the jar is an analogy for the veil that covers and, at the same time, reveals female beauty. One naturally asks oneself if the most intimate essence of beauty, when we are able to delight in it and to see it as the expression of the ineffable, might not be hope itself. The moment we realize that the images which appear before us are themselves veils and that the invisible is part of them, we no longer need protective veils. It is hope that enables us to enter that infinite atmosphere laden with possibilities that surrounds and goes beyond given facts.

We might then also affirm that the veil, like the jar, through which beauty and hope are offered, are images connected with what Jung calls the "symbolic conception" of reality.

We might therefore ask ourselves if the symbolic attitude is, in fact, a quality of consciousness that can be described as "feminine," and consequently if the woman's psyche has maintained a privileged access to said attitude, which has, instead, become attenuated, or actually ceased to exist, in the majority of men as a result of the development of the strategic mentality that they have exercised through the millennia, in the course of which their nervous system has been forced to reprogram itself to cope with the demands of conquest, of power for power's sake. I am not saying that symbolic consciousness is a metaphysical essence that pertains only to women, since it can be, and in fact is, exercised by men and is certainly the predominant form of consciousness in poets, artists, scientists, and saints. However, what we call "civilization," that which is recounted in history books, is the celebration of activities of conquest, of power for power's sake, and hence of violence, in all fields, which are typical of the masculine psyche with its tendency to hegemonize the world. This is the effect of a masculine identity that has fallen victim to identifying with that modality of thought which Jung would call linear, rational, logical-deductive, ordered, and convergent, as opposed to the fantastical, intuitive, nonlinear, multiple, chaotic, divergent, and complex thought strongly influenced by the

unconscious, which has generally been considered an “inferior” prerogative of the feminine mind.

The last few decades in our history have seen the emergence of a new phenomenon: the woman as an actor in public life and a protagonist in her own right, alongside the man, in shaping the construction of the social order. Are we to think, therefore, that the woman must make her consciousness conform to its masculine equivalent in order to become aware of herself and her goals, or rather that she must develop her own particular modality of consciousness, which differs from its masculine equivalent, and, in a historical perspective, actually become capable of fecundating those forms of masculine consciousness that, still predominant today, have confined themselves to a unilateral extremism? I believe that the latter is her task most pregnant with hope. Perhaps today, like a second Pandora, she can once again offer her gifts to men, because she is more aware that they can be neither substantialized, nor separated from the psychic container that preserves them.

Another form of knowing

If symbolic consciousness is peculiar to the feminine, we would expect the woman to have a modality of knowing different from its masculine equivalent, and an original relationship with *truth* and with the *word*. Returning to the roots of Western civilization, Fabrice Dubosc points out that on Delos, the island sacred to Apollo, being born and dying were forbidden. “The Apollonian cult of absolute clarity – δῆλος = splendid – did not tolerate the irreducible reality of human transit” (2007, 25). For an Apollonian consciousness, which hypostatizes being, it is impossible to conceive reality in terms of relativity, limit, becoming, and relation to an origin and a goal. There is a resemblance between the Apollonian principle and the philosophical formulation of Parmenides – who, not incidentally, was a priest of Apollo, who inaugurated the equivalence between being and thinking. Thought dictates the characteristics of the object and says what being is, without realizing that in doing so it has imprisoned being and bent it to the intentions of the observer. The word defines the object, reducing it to its name; it confines it to the concept and describes its modalities of function. This has given rise to the extraordinary phenomena of science and of technology, but has also led to the brutal dichotomy between subject and object, knowledge and life, matter and spirit, male and female, good and evil which, according to the myth of the earthly Paradise, was the first consequence of the cognitive act. Moreover, it is precisely this last dichotomy that has justified practices of violence, because evil has always been projected upon the enemy, and the most atrocious actions have been committed in the name of upholding justice, protecting security or a totalitarian ideology.

The fascination of the absolute, contained in the clear, distinct idea, has prevailed over a reality that is characterized instead by the inexplicable, and even unjustifiable, coexistence of lights and shadows. This has not only produced a vision of the world pervaded by a masculine perspective, but precisely a world that has not been able to develop its potentialities because it is forced to exist within the interpretative grid that has been imposed on it. I am referring deliberately to a world in its entirety, also in the material sense, and not merely to a mental image. We must, in fact, conceive the world as something unfinished and in a state of constant transformation, and the act of consciousness which portrays reality as being intimately connected with that transformation. It was necessary to arrive at the discoveries of subatomic physics to understand that the observer modifies the object under observation.

As Raimundo Panikkar remarks, there is another word besides the “logos” of reason, through which Being expresses itself freely and unpredictably, a word that represents a coming to light from an unknown depth that goes beyond a process of definition, description, and explanation, and becomes *revelation* (in the etymological sense of the Latin *re-velare*, i.e. “to put on a new veil” and not to take off the existing one), and which we might call a “word symbol”: it is myth. For this word to be articulated it is necessary to create a listening space able to receive it, where things are not known beforehand and where the new can be recognized: in short, a listening space receptive to the subjective dimension of reality. I think that this word eludes us as soon as we try to catch it in the net of our logical deductions or to link it to the results of our experimentation. It requires a radical form of receptiveness from our being where not only our thought, but also feeling, intuition, and sensorium itself can be touched. I would say that it is not enough merely to listen to this word; we must also incubate it, so to speak, in our interiority, in order to arrive at its source and to allow ourselves to be transformed by our relationship with it. As in all relationships, in fact, we are at the same time transformed and transformers.

I am talking about a particular form of knowledge, which we might define in Jungian terms as “mythical,” because myth makes us see something other than facts as they appear and reconnects us with the universal paradigms of human experience, with which I believe the woman has developed a special affinity because, through the centuries, she has always privileged the space of relationship and the exercise of empathy and of what matters for life. This is not the kind of knowledge that is overly concerned with distinguishing the subject from the object or ensuring that our mental images are faithful reproductions of reality, but a knowledge whose aim is the union and transformation of knower and known. From this standpoint, the search for truth does not consist in controlling the laws of phenomena so that we can steer events in the direction we wish, but in a profound loyalty to the relationship that we establish with the thing or the person we are getting to know,

together with a respect for the autonomous goals inherent in their becoming. This does not mean returning to a state in which subject and object are merged indistinguishably or nostalgically pursuing the lost paradise of our total adherence to things, which was, perhaps, the feeling that reigned in an archaic stage of our psyche. Rather, it is a question of rediscovering, or better still recreating, after having truly completed the process of our personal differentiation, a new unity of the real whose harmony is constituted, this time, by actual relational nexuses, which in social life signify “community” (and which today, thanks to the Internet, tend increasingly to be the networks, the “virtual communities” of which Manuel Castells speaks). Because if, at the level of our Ego, we are unique individuals, at the level of our Self, others and the world are part of our very being. From this perspective, knowing is a little like becoming the known thing. We might also call this feminine form of knowledge empathetic because it means grasping the subjective dimension of the object through the resonance of our subjectivity. It is a knowledge that is not separate from love and can also be considered a creation, because it is born from a kind of mental pregnancy where the transformations of the one who knows and the one who is known occur simultaneously.

On a collective level, therefore, feminine creativity, which is concretized in listening to and interpreting the needs of others, leads to communitarianism, to flexible forms of intervention that may seem anarchical to proponents of order, since they are in opposition to the masculine mentality that tends to bypass dialogue and to impose its abstract schema on the world. This schema is often designed to hide megalomaniac drives, and is the effect of an overflowing ego that tends to invade all areas of the psyche and has severed its essential tie with otherness, understood both as a dimension of the inner world and as an external reality.

The woman, instead, finds it easier not to identify with her own heroic quality and to draw on the resources of the other without feeling impoverished, because her life is realized without her having to be the “single, exceptional protagonist” of whatever she undertakes. She is able to feel that she is herself without needing to separate herself from everything and everybody, without having to sail under the banner of uniqueness.

This modality of psychic functioning very rarely causes the woman to perform a rigidly programmed exploitative action toward the outside world, because her aims have to coincide with those of the people closest to her and must not be imposed unilaterally, in the awareness that the others and situations transform themselves continuously, have their own destiny; and while her interaction with them is an essential part of this destiny, it never determines it completely.

However, since she has been socialized in a totally masculine world, the woman is subject to masculine values, as if she were drugged by them.

As I mentioned earlier, this gives rise to the eagerness and pride with which mothers sacrifice their own children in the name of typically masculine ideals, to the cult of the hero and of the powerful man and of the seductive woman, and the acceptance of everything – from long, varnished nails to stiletto heels – that evinces her subordinate role and her function of exhibiting, as Thorstein Veblen (1953) underlined in 1899 in *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, the sign of the prestige and wealth of her keeper. For the woman, the idea of the Ego is still filled with masculinity connotations. Even those women who have escaped from the prison of tradition still nearly always passively adopt the masculine efficiency model as a value criterion for their own ego. The consequence is that the female Ego is considered an Ego of the second order because, by definition, women cannot realize that “ideal Ego,” which is always pursued in a man’s shadow. This explains the suspicion, and often hostility, with which a woman regards a career woman, because, in her eyes, the latter will never be able to attain the position occupied by a masculine ideal.

Ethicality and responsibility

Conscience’s symbolic orientation cannot be without consequences for community life, and therefore women might be the bearers of a new ethos that transforms social interaction and political activity. In particular democracy implies, as Sartori states, an ideal and deontological boost: “a political system is democratic inasmuch as it is fed by a consonant ‘have-to-be’ ... A democratic experience develops over the difference between ‘have-to-be’ and ‘to-be,’ following a line marked by ideal aspirations which always exceed reality” (1957, 7).

The impulse toward the implementation of values is intrinsic to ethical behavior. But implementing them is possible only by avoiding rational thinking based on the contrast between ideals and reality. It is rather a matter of practicing a kind of thought that, as Panikkar (1986) maintains, aims not at analyzing but at grasping the tendency that everything is endowed within the harmony of the universe. Only by starting with an act of trust in the richness of the universe can we see what is not yet effectual; that is, that the values inherent in the “have-to-be” are already present in the depth of reality which is the true source of them. Ethical behavior is consequently our responsible participation in transforming reality and at the same time being open to the unexpected things that will emerge from it, in contrast to solutions imposed from above. This process does not take place in a passive way, but requires the involvement of conscience that recognizes and shapes values. In this sense, women’s and men’s contributions to democracy can be of vital importance, if they free themselves from the constraint of the abstract masculine mind.

Guilt and responsibility

While women can make this fundamental contribution to civil life, the male spirit, still obsessed by the inferiority feeling inflicted upon it by the primary wound, can fall prey to the feeling of guilt, a radically different thing. Clementina Pavoni emphasizes that our ethical behavior depends on the ability to transform anger and despair into sorrow and compassion: anger and despair lead to guilt, sorrow and compassion to responsibility (2009, 61). A characteristic of guilt is that it is always projected: upon others, with the risk of acquiring a persecutory trait, or on oneself, thus originating depression; that is, the feeling of being unfit to incarnate the narcissistic ideal of perfection. In both cases the feeling of guilt embodies the experience of a failure to achieve a dreamed and yearned- for omnipotence. Because such omnipotence is necessarily impossible, guilt is accompanied by an imagined subjugation and punishment by "all-powerful" others. This is so because the errors committed at the expense of one's own or of others' individuation are not realistically recognized as such (it is not accidental that reference is always made to guilt, not error). What is experienced as intolerable is the feeling of frailty, incompleteness, impotence, the negation of which is one of the factors that causes the structuration of a persecutory destiny, which in the male psyche tends to project itself on the collective. Hence man's frequent recourse to the concept of Revolution as a "resolutive solution." What surprises is that, although this negative complex is experienced as a prison it is not possible to escape from, an alliance often takes place inside it between the prisoner and the jailers. The grip anguish is overcome by the even greater freedom anguish. The subject allies unconsciously with what one feels as destiny's power and cooperates with one's own ruin because of a semblance of strength and invincibility that this power seems to offer, thus enjoying a form of triumph in crushing one's own fragile and dependent parts. What matters and impels people is the feeling of omnipotence injected by the destiny complex, because it makes everything seem possible and the "totally negative" can overturn into the "totally positive" through a magic act that shuts out time, gradualness, and exertion. And since all creations not belonging to an absolute order but rather to a relative and partial one must necessarily take place within a limited framework, megalomaniac omnipotence coincides with destructivity and becomes impotence: the "Whole" pursued turns into a "Nothing." The past century offers classic examples of men who have fallen victims to their own guilt projections. The idea of guilt is therefore inextricably bound to the intolerance of the limit and to the pursuit of perfection. A patient told me after years of therapy: "How poor that perfection that I pursued was and, on the contrary, rich, in a certain sense 'infinite', this being limited and partial is!"

In the light of what we said about the difference concerning the male and the female psyche we might expect to find that the feeling of guilt,

being linked to a secret power aspiration, affects men more than women. In reality, this does not happen: both sexes are equally affected by it, even though for women it tends more often to result in depression. This difference can be explained by the fact that, if a woman yearns for a feeling of guilt or unworthiness, on the one hand she compares herself to a model of male perfection difficult to imitate, and on the other she expects her male partner to provide guidance in complying with the ideal model (I referred to this phenomenon earlier when speaking of the “female shadow”).

The issue of guilt therefore has implications not only on individual, but also on collective life. Totalitarian regimes tend to project guilt on anyone who disagrees and feel surrounded by enemies to destroy, thus generating a sort of collective paranoia.

The feeling of responsibility seems to me closer to the female psyche, irrespective of sex, since it implies the willingness to listen to others and consequently to respond to their needs, taking upon oneself one’s own errors and failures not in order to devalue but to correct oneself in view of the others’ lot. This is possible because the others’ problems are painful for us, like one’s own sorrow for having at least partially contributed to causing them. In the feeling of responsibility “the other” is always present as part of oneself and not as an outsider or enemy. Sartori stresses that democracies were established as “reason structures” and that those who demand realistic measures are not at ease with them, and he wonders: “Will we succeed in tempering our rationalistic heritage with an infusion of realism and inversely in opening our realism to the acceptance of ideals?” (1957, 46). As hinted above, the integration of realism and idealism can be achieved when ideals are not conceived as models of perfection that constrain reality within abstract schemes and force it to change into something else, but as the most intimate values rooted in it, the kernel of its essence. Sartori states:

In Max Weber’s terms, our problem is how to shift from a *Gesinnungsethik*, an ethics of principles to pursue irrespective of their consequences, to a *Verantwortungsethik*, a kind of moral behavior that is consonant to the requests of people, and therefore takes into consideration the responsibility inherent to our actions or omissions.

(Politik als Beruf)

Another fundamental difference between guilt and responsibility consists in the fact that the former takes place in a condition of coercion, and the latter implies freedom of choice, that is of action, of remaining true to one’s own values. In particular, freedom of action cannot overlook the conditioning deriving from the environment and from our psycho-physic constitution. Our freedom, therefore, is always limited, at times tragically limited, and requires a degree of tolerance of the situation in which it is expressed. For this reason, the feeling of responsibility prompts an attitude of

compassion for what happened and at the same time fosters reparation. The guilt feeling, on the contrary, originates from transgressing absolute rules and is the effect of subjection because it is caused by violating a way of being or a behavior felt as imposed upon, but to which we bow uncritically and that commands blame and expiation.

Freedom of being and creating in the public dimension

In the light of what I said before, freedom of being and creating as products of symbolic conscience belong, much more especially than freedom of doing on the basis of decisions originated by willpower, to the feminine principle, active in women or men. What can be the contribution of this principle to the growth of democracy?

We are aware that it is not enough to secure wage fairness, creation of new jobs, unemployment subsidies, and decent pensions: all fundamental conquests, but insufficient to create a feeling of happiness and to satisfy the sense of our being. It is necessary to give dignity to human work in such a way that the products of our hands are not just quantities fit to win in the market competition, but outcomes of our subjectivity able to arouse emotions in users. Effecting this transformation would create new spaces for craftsmanship, art, and culture, but also for institutions of education and assistance to sick and disabled persons where not just notions and medical care should be given, but intersubjective relationships should be established.

Women are equipped with a special sensitiveness in assembling concrete and symbolic activities because they have practiced daily for millennia an activity that I would like to call “proto-symbolic” linked to the care of what matters for life. It is enough to think of the difference experienced by a child if the milking mother thinks only of basic food necessities or if she also transmits to the child love and an image of the world.

Conscience’s moral and ethical form

Jung (1958) distinguishes moral (from “mores,” customs) from ethical behavior. The former is the behavior that conforms to collectively recognized principles in a certain epoch, and can be either conscious or relatively unconscious when it conforms to a code introjected as part of the Super-Ego. This kind of behavior is not necessarily functional to justice. As Jung argued, a judgment that directly interrogates the individual becomes inevitable only when we are in the presence of a conflict between duties, and in this case the decision cannot depend on morals. This is the ethical judgment, a creative act which may also run the risk of violating the law in the name of a superior value to be saved. Ethicality presupposes the participation of conscience, but questions all faculties inasmuch as reason by itself cannot opt for one of the

two terms in conflict: "it is a particular case of what I called transcendent function, that is a confrontation and cooperation between conscious and unconscious factors" (Jung, 1958).

If this is true, the ethical dimension coincides with responsibility because the individual is called upon to answer the challenge on the basis of the "law of the situation" and not of abstract, general laws that cannot anticipate all circumstances that reality presents. Ethical behavior, therefore, implies acceptance of the symbolic orientation, in which consciousness does not proudly sever itself from the unconscious depth of life, but lets it express itself. It is not hazardous to conclude that democracy cannot prosper without ethicality, which is essentially the expression of the female principle.

Notes

1. In Jung's approach "Shadow" is a complex reality. When Jung considers the psyche from an ethical point of view, he defines it in the following way: "By 'Shadow' I mean the 'negative' aspects of personality, and precisely all the hidden, unfavourable characteristics, the only partially developed functions and contents of the personal unconscious" (1917/1943, 1983, 67n.). By personal unconscious Jung means that part of the unconscious pertaining to individual life which carries lost memories, removed unpleasant representations, subliminal sensory perceptions, and also elements not yet mature for conscious life (Ibid., 67). When Shadow is negatively evaluated it should be understood as "the non-accepted side of the personality...all the tendencies, characteristics, behaviours and desires that are unacceptable to the Ego" (Trevi and Romano, 1975, 13). However Shadow is for Jung not only a negative element, since it has in itself all that is unknown within ourselves and is therefore also the source of creative ideas. From this point of view what is unknown today may correspond to future awareness in the same way that today's underdeveloped abilities may become part of future growth. Shadow is thus paradoxically also the source of light: "We are eternally incomplete, grow and change. Our future personality is already within ourselves, but hidden in the Shadow" and "the future Ego's potentialities depend on one's present shadow" (Basilea Seminars, 1934, published in French by Roland Cahen, Albin Michel, 1943, 1987, 118).
2. Archetypes for Jung are models of the functioning of the psyche, with which we are born and that are able to produce images that represent, in a symbolic form, the most significant experiences of humanity. They cannot be represented in themselves, but are the source of representations and originate in the collective unconscious, which is not the result of personal experience, but of the global experience of humanity. Therefore archetypal images are not exactly like platonic ideas (although they are similar in some ways), because they are the results of the interaction between inborn predispositions of the psyche and life experience. Archetypal images may spontaneously emerge in dreams through the collective unconscious and are different from images emerging from personal unconscious, because they do not refer to daily life materials, but correspond to the powerful representations of myth: that is, as Freud had already intuited, to the dreams produced since time immemorial by humanity.

3. This could explain phenomena such as that of the woman soldier at Abu Ghraib, where we witness the disappearance of compassion and the undisputed assertion of vindictiveness.
4. Myths are humankind's dreams, portray universal experiences, and constitute the sources of symbolic and therefore transhistorical consciousness that grasps the meaning of events.
5. For Jung, moreover, the spirit is precisely the archetype of meaning, namely a principle that confers meaning on what initially seems chaotic and senseless.
6. With regard to this point, Spitz's observations of babies in orphanages are highly significant. He discovered that, even if adequate material care is ensured, children under six months tend to die and above that age easily become sick if they do not receive personal attention from loving caregivers who grasp their emotions and acquaint them with life.
7. In this case, I do not use the expression "finite" in the sense of the "limit" to which the images of the vase and the veil poetically allude, and which is the very condition of existence. From this perspective, that is as limit, the finite is also confine in the literal sense of the Latin *con-finium*, of possessing a finitude that is not isolation because it is shared with others: to be "with" or "together" with something or someone. A confine, in fact, both separates and differentiates a being from all other beings, and places him in contact with an elsewhere, just as the skin delimits our body and, at the same time, through sensoriality, enables us to communicate and interact with the world. "Finite," in the sense that I use it here, is instead the consequence of that arbitrary act of power that absolutizes limit, converting it into a concrete "whole" that can be grasped and that excludes all further meaning.

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9

The Centrality of Women in the Human Adventure

Piero P. Giorgi

Introduction

There is much evidence from several academic disciplines supporting the idea of a central position of women in the natural, cultural, and spiritual history of humanity. The aim of this chapter is to briefly present such evidence, while outlining the general time (the Late Neolithic period) when gender equality and female centrality were substituted in almost all cultures by several models of patriarchal regimes, *with striking negative consequences for humanity*. Interestingly, during the same Late Neolithic period the production of food was also invented,¹ large hierarchically stratified human settlements made their appearance, various forms of violence emerged, and religion became formalized.²

It will be argued that the marginalization of women and the growth of power systems have been the most damaging consequences of the dramatic cultural changes resulting from one otherwise clever innovation: the production of food.

The general aim of the discussion promoted by this book is to analyze the interdependence between gender and power in public life; that is, the power to make decisions affecting relevant features of collective life. Our contribution to this analysis is broader and more radical than this general aim. We argue that “power systems” are themselves part of the negative consequences of food production and of large communities in the Late Neolithic period, not a natural feature of the human society that women should seek to join. In a near future, decision-making will rather be a “service” collectively provided by politically mature citizens, with women at the center of participatory democracy, the natural situation for human beings. The above ideas, critical of so-called civilization, *are in no way related to J. J. Rousseau*, who knew nothing about anthropology and had, in reality, a negative opinion of “man in nature”; moreover, he did not use the term “noble savage” so often reported in the literature. For details, see Giorgi (2001, 14, note 7).

The present analysis will also revise several accepted ideas still rooted in a number of academic disciplines: biology, anthropology, neuroscience, and sociology. We hope to stimulate new ways of thinking.

We begin this exposé from basic biological facts, not because they are more important, just because a story should start from the beginning. In this way the important idea of a central place of women in society will unfold as the logical finale of a sonata of data and reason, rather than the product of beliefs and wishful thinking. This chapter is not a moral proposal, but the prediction of emerging nonviolent social systems, the distant origins, and the only future of humanity. The implication is that *gender equality in politics (power) may be a short-term strategy, but not an appropriate long-term aim for women*, as we will discuss.

The centrality of eggs

In the Middle Ages (13th century) learned scholars, as well as common people, believed that inherited characteristics derived only from the father's seed, while the mother had a simple nourishing and protective role, like good earth around the seed in plant growth (Nardi, 1938, 40–46; Varghese, 1996, 158–165; Porter, 1997, 128–131).³ While this idea was certainly maintained and perpetrated by male prejudice, in the first place it was due to total ignorance about the microscopic size of mammalian eggs. The subsequent invention of microscopes revealed the real contribution of women to reproduction and provided the details of how one sperm cell fuses with the egg.⁴

Most textbooks on evolution describe the emergence of multicellular organisms as just another step toward the complexity of life forms, without emphasizing that the true revolutionary novelty has been the emergence of the egg, a highly specialized cell – but acting as the universal stem cell – that was able not just to divide itself (as previous unicellular organisms did) but also to differentiate into all the cell types necessary for the construction of a multicellular living organism. This feast of biological information (embryogenesis) cannot be simply referred to DNA and its genes, as inferred by pop science, for several reasons. Here we mention only three (for more information see Giorgi, 2001, section 2.2.5; Schoenwolf et al., 2008, and Wolpert and Tickle, 2011): (a) The initial three-dimensional organization of the egg directs,⁵ alone, the initial three-dimensional organization (body plan) of the early embryo destined to form a new individual; (b) The subsequent expression of genetic information (needed only to define specific proteins) is itself guided by the interactions among the initial embryonic cells (induction),⁶ therefore DNA cannot be considered a primary information for development;⁷ (c) All the energy-producing organelles (mitochondria) of our cells are of maternal origin (from those contained in the egg, see note 4), another unique female contribution to inheritance and body functions that is not commonly known by the public.

In conclusion, the erroneous medieval concept of inheritance has not yet been fully corrected. The two genders do not contribute equally to inheritance, as commonly described by biology textbooks, simply because the mother contributes an egg and her DNA, while the father contributes only his nuclear DNA to add genetic variability.

A male-controlled scientific world and media system are still misinforming the public, probably to conceal the tremendous importance that women have concerning the very beginning of our life. Dismissing the major biological information contained in the egg denies, therefore, one important aspect of the centrality of women by reducing their contribution to a mere genetic equality.

The centrality of the female developmental design

Almost all vertebrate species (from fish to man) are basically designed to become females (Schoenwolf et al., 2008; Wolpert and Tickle, 2011). A certain number of individuals inherit, however, a special genetic make-up that prevents them from undergoing the normal female developmental program. In humans this is represented by the Y chromosome, contained in about half of the father's sperm cells. Interestingly, the Y chromosome transmits mostly negative genetic orders, such as "do not develop a uterus," "do not complete the development of mammary glands," and so on. As a result, about half of embryos develop into "aborted females," that is, males,⁸ who fulfill specific roles in the survival of the species (e.g. providing genetic variability in general and sometimes procuring food or offering defense from predators).

A male-dominated education and media system is obviously reluctant to disseminate such simple biological information, which would encourage a view of female centrality concerning the design of our body, let alone the other historical, social, and political arguments we will develop below.

The centrality of mothers in nurturing

In mammals the sheltering and feeding of embryos, fetuses, and newborns represent fundamental contributions of mothers to reproduction and the maintenance of the species. Male partners often leave the scene after mating or only partially collaborate, in social species, in procuring food or chasing off possible predators.

The human fetus lives many months protected within its mother's uterus and is nourished by her blood circulating inside the placenta. After birth the baby is fed by the milk produced by her breast. Men simply cannot provide such nurturing services. The mother also protects the infant from cold and dangers with her arms and body. She also provides consolation after all sorts of distress. Men could, if necessary and after training, do the same, but not as

effectively because of the special mother–child relation already established before and soon after birth.⁹

After birth the child instinctively searches for the mother's breast and nipples and actively sucks her milk. The mother's voice directs the child's attention toward her face, which becomes the favored fixation point of the child, whose visual cerebral cortex is already able to distinguish her from other faces.

Interestingly, the baby's active behaviors described above represent the only instincts of human beings.¹⁰ Unfortunately the term "instinct" is used inappropriately in daily parlance as well as in the literature influenced by biological determinism and Freudian psychology. This unfortunate trend causes a lack of awareness of a characteristic of higher social mammals: *the post-natal definition of social behavior*, which is exquisitely developed in humans, as proved by the existence of thousands of different cultures on the earth.

The very important investment in nurturing by women is the extreme expression of a clear evolutionary trend that can be observed from fish to man: from a very numerous offspring combined with a very limited postnatal care, to the generation of one child followed by a great effort in protection and feeding, followed by a long period of nurturing and socialization. The same trend is still evident within mammals, from rodents to primates. Within primates, human beings excel in nurturing: a mother literally defines her child after birth by offering sophisticated behavioral blueprints: from her the child acquires (not learns)¹¹ the capacity of walking, talking, and dealing with the environment.

The centrality of women in cultural transfer

Almost all mammals are able to transfer knowledge from one generation to the next. Differences are only quantitative, from the minimum of rodents to the maximum of carnivores and primates. In these last two orders, the offspring spend a few years with their mother, the very important time when they acquire all behaviors necessary to survive. For example, simply chasing a moving object or little animals is an instinct in carnivores, but hunting, with all its special strategies and tricks, is acquired through cultural transfer from the mother and further perfected after much personal trial and error. This is why a lion cub rescued after its mother's killing and raised in a zoo *never becomes a true lion* and would not be able to survive in nature.

Women are therefore responsible for raising their babies into true human beings by priming them to relate to other human beings with empathy, cooperation, and solidarity, which are not just moral rules, but essential characteristics of human beings (*Homo sapiens*). That primary example will have to be confirmed outside the family with appropriate social models.

Inappropriate motherhood, fatherhood, and social models will transform potentially normal babies into potential antisocial people, liars, criminals, and psychopaths. Within structurally violent societies,¹² these human abnormalities, luckily fully expressed only by a minority, can be transmitted culturally through many generations.

The neurophysiologist James W. Prescott has researched for many years the relationship between violent behavior in adult life and the lack of appropriate mother–child relation in the first two to three years, when the basic structures of the developing brain are affected (rather, defined) by life experiences. Prescott (1990) provides strong evidence of the necessity of receiving breast-feeding and physical contact from one’s mother in order to be able to demonstrate human empathy and solidarity later in life.

One may ask, therefore, why seek sociopolitical equality and power, when women already have the “power” of generating human bodies and defining human minds, thus enjoying an obvious centrality and importance in society? We will take up this fundamental question later in this chapter, together with a criticism of power systems.

The centrality of women in prehistory

Readers may have already understood our strategy of considering human questions from a very broad perspective, the opposite of analyzing the “here and now,” which is also useful but too short-sighted for understanding causality and possibilities of changes.

A new welcome trend in history is the acceptance of Paleolithic rock art as “documents,” a novelty that has added about 40,000 years to the history of humanity (Anati, 2003), so far limited to its last 5,000 years, when written documents become available.

The most interesting features of Paleolithic rock art are engravings, paintings, and mobile figurines. Importantly, in the Middle-Upper Paleolithic of Europe (23–25,000 years ago) mobile figurines represent almost exclusively women or female symbols.¹³ Their interpretation has referred to religion, the prehistoric Venuses. Of course, female scientists offer interpretations that differ from those of their male colleagues: see, for example, Reed (1975), Wiber (1997), Hrdy (2009), Morgan (2011), and Fausto-Sterling (2012).

As already indicated in the Introduction, we prefer to adopt the scientific approach; that is, referring, in this case, to physical evidence and seeking an agreed, logical interpretation of it, rather than describing personal feelings and, worse, no real evidence (e.g. stories from Greek mythology, invented archetypal characters, Old Testament stories). Giorgi (2007a) has proposed a new interpretation of female prehistoric representations, which moves away from religion, to attempt an exploration of the prehistoric minds of hunter-gatherers, as they possibly operated within a social environment similar (not

equal) to contemporary hunter-gatherers.¹⁴ This proposal developed within the general theme of the author's research on the origins of violence after the domestication of nature (Giorgi, 2001, 2008).

Prehistoric artists probably represented with engravings, paintings, and sculptures life forms and concepts that were important for them, a way of expressing emotions and sharing them with others, just as contemporary artists, singers, and writers do. This is not art for art's sake or aesthetics; it is communication. Women probably enjoyed a central position (not political power) in the Paleolithic hunter-gathering society, therefore the frequency in art production of two themes – animals for hunting and the female members of the community for social stability and continuity – recognized two important aspects of that particular worldview.

Beyond the artistic motivation that generated female statuettes, the problem remains of imagining their practical use. Female statuettes may have been kept in appropriate locations where an extended nomadic family lived at that moment, in order to identify the woman who founded it and, by extension, the family itself. The religious interpretation (fertility goddesses) is incompatible with the emergence of the concept of divinity and religion only much later in the Middle Neolithic period, and with the need for female fertility emerging only in the later agricultural economy.

We must stress the length of period during which gender equality and female centrality may have dominated human life: it could be 80–100,000 years (since the migration of *Homo sapiens* from Eastern Africa), or at least 50,000 years (since recorded rock art), that is during our ancient hunter-gathering lifestyle. By the time of the Late Neolithic period (quite recently) male dominance removed women from their central position in the ever-growing communities of food producers; this heralded the “recent” period (about 6–7,000 years in Europe) of violence that we are still experiencing now.

We conclude this section by reminding that one should not romanticize the past. Well, the distant past has been romanticized in the 17th–18th centuries by Hobbes and Rousseau, who formulated wild and contradicting guesses about prehistory and human nature, without the support of any scientific evidence. Nevertheless they continue to be cited by contemporary authors (typically sociologists and political scientists) without fear of romanticism. Now that we have fairly good multidisciplinary evidence supporting a very different model of Paleolithic culture, we seem to hesitate discarding those past “authorities” and we are warned to be prudent in formulating hypotheses. As already indicated, we believe in attempting hypotheses in order to stimulate further research and test their validity. This normal, healthy, scientific approach is weakening among contemporary, conservative academics, however, who are forced to take no risks in the current precarious public support of science.

The sad consequence of food production and the emergence of power systems

In this biocultural overview of women's central role in society, it is important to establish how male dominance and violence (there was no direct causal relationship, as we will see) emerged in the Late Neolithic period, instead of thinking that such an abnormal situation has always been so, as presented by most academic and lay reports. We have suggested a hypothesis which, with a few exceptions (e.g. Facchini, 2006, 228; Evans Pim, 2013, 515; L'Abate, 2014, 34–35), has so far not been considered or refuted by anthropologists or peace researchers. Here I am only outlining the possible causal chain of events of this dramatic turning point in human cultural evolution. For details and evidence, see Giorgi (2001, 2007a, 2008, 2010) and Fry (2013).

- The human species (*Homo sapiens*) emerged in East Africa about 150–200,000 years ago through a process of biocultural evolution (not just biological evolution)¹⁵ inside the genus *Homo* and began migrating into five continents about 70–80,000 years ago.
- Human beings lived as nomadic food collectors (hunter-gatherers) mostly in subtropical or temperate regions undergoing minor genetic changes and substantial cultural changes to adapt to different environmental conditions.
- For about 100,000 years they lived in small bands of 100 individuals or less, characterized by sophisticated nonviolent social strategies to maintain solidarity, cooperation, gender equality, and female centrality. This was an adaptive survival strategy.

(Up to this point modern anthropology textbooks agree with the present hypothesis, although the media protect the public from the embarrassingly nonviolent human nature, while the textbooks of social, political, and, partially, psychological sciences maintain outdated ideas about our alleged innate violence.)

- As a consequence of food production, the typical and long-held nonviolent survival strategy of human beings was gradually transformed (by purely cultural changes therefore modifiable, still now), first into structurally violent social systems, followed by direct violence and then war, as described below.
- During the Late Neolithic period, human settlements became gradually larger. Unfortunately, a relatively small community is a necessary condition for knowing each other personally and maintaining the traditional practices necessary for the nonviolent solution of conflicts of interest, a requirement for preventing violence. This is not recognized in the literature on violence or interestingly, on peace studies (Ferraris, 2012a; Byrne and Seneci, 2012, chapter 2).

- In parallel with their increase in size, human settlements in the Late Neolithic period also became stratified, because job specialization emerged and some occupations were more valued than others; that is, provided advantages for bartering.
- The important phenomenon of female oppression also emerged in the Late Neolithic period, together with structural violence, but the causal mechanisms remain to be clarified.¹⁶
- The change from gender equality and female centrality to women becoming second-class human beings *has represented a tragedy for humanity* (not recognized by anthropologists and historians) with the gradual emergence of power systems, different types of violence (structural, direct, cultural, and military), and a general loss of the basic traits of being human (acquired culturally after birth).
- This dramatic cultural alteration of human societies was not apparent in the Early Neolithic period, when agriculture was practiced in small communities and women still held a central social position, as described in the “Ancient Europe” of Marija Gimbutas (2005). War then massively erupted in Southern Europe and Southern Asia after the southward invasion from the Asian central steppes of belligerent pastoral cultures (the “kurgan,” also described by Marija Gimbutas).

The return of women after the long age of violence and war

During the Middle Ages and the Modern Age some women managed to raise their heads and demonstrate the value of the best half of humanity,¹⁷ but their vigorous return bloomed only in the 19th century.

The so-called women’s movement first concentrated, rightly so, on securing civil rights equal to men. But this worthy enterprise has recently shifted toward imitating men in their pursuit for power, competitiveness, and greed, the very non-human traits that have maintained us in a world of violence and poverty for thousands of years. This takes us directly into our central issue: gender, power, and democracy.

The lack of awareness of the tragic consequences of food production, of the increase in size of human settlements, and of the loss of the nonviolent central role of women in the human adventure coexists with the lack of interest in *contemporary nonviolent hunter-gatherer cultures*,¹⁸ which continued to exist in the 19th and 20th centuries, before colonialists physically eliminated them and post-colonial administrations destroyed them through cultural genocide (Wolf, 1982; Evans Pim, 2010; Fry, 2013). This lack of awareness serves well those who gain from a culture of violence: men in general and in the last 50 years the commercial-media oppression of consumers. Women are now the main victims of the widespread culture of violence, while they enjoyed centrality (that is, great respect, not power) when the normal social culture was nonviolent.

The restoration of nonviolent social systems should be (it is already slowly becoming) the main historical task of women, but also the task of men of goodwill; that is, those fortunate enough to gain the freedom to express their human potentialities.

A pause here to ponder the main question

We have seen how the emergence of power systems and various types of violence corresponded to (perhaps it was caused by) the development of a strong social stratification (the social pyramid), with men at the helm seizing power. This is a relatively recent cultural evolution, not the normal human situation as most of us are led to believe. Again, male-controlled academia and media do not emphasize this dramatic cultural change that transformed the very long and essentially nonviolent Paleolithic period into the “recent” violent world of the last 7,000 years or so. We are taught to call it “civilization.”

This takes us to the main question. If we became aware of our origins, of our long history of solidarity and female centrality, and compare it with the current antagonism (competitiveness and belligerence) in male-controlled power systems, one could ask the key question: which one is the social environment that best suits human beings? In this case “human” would mean happy and healthy people who practice empathy, solidarity, and cooperation. History demonstrates that social systems have changed all the time and that violent rapid changes (revolutions) did not last, while slow nonviolent changes remained. Therefore, the question posed is not in the realm of utopian thinking; it is in the realm of scientific knowledge (not just morality), modern democracy, and trust in slow human changes coming from below.

As innovative scientists (Evans Pim, 2009, 2010) and psychologists (Christie and Evans Pim, 2012) are already beginning to realize the human advantages of gradually reducing and then eliminating all forms of violence, *why should women delay such an obvious human improvement by seeking an equal share of power systems, thus prolonging all types of violence?* For women it would be much better to bypass this delaying stage by promoting (as they are already doing) a nonviolent transformation of society (Giorgi, 2007b),¹⁹ and claiming in this way their natural central (not commanding) role in the human adventure. We will take up this proposition again in this chapter.

Power politics and service politics

Power systems are typical of post-agricultural social systems. One has many types of power systems, which operate differently in almost all aspects of social life: for example, education, nutrition, reproduction, economy, politics, profession, health, and entertainment.

We had the opportunity to co-organize a conference entitled “Ethics and politics – Experience of women engaged in active citizenship” (Giorgi, 2006). From the final document drafted by participants it clearly appeared that impediments perceived by women were: (a) The preoccupation of political parties mostly oriented toward obtaining and maintaining power, much more than elaborating and promoting projects that may serve the needs of people, the very approach favored, instead, by women entering politics; (b) The obscure tactics and secret agreements that make women feel uneasy in party life; and (c) The limited importance given to experience and the limited role of formative programs able to transform personal predispositions into political competence. A number of proposals were put forward to promote female participation in politics, mainly in the domain of introducing ethical values in politics, as a “female” approach to public service.

This conclusion raises important questions. Why are we educating our male offspring to become little bastards and to grow into competing citizens with a poor level of civil participation? See, for example, Giorgi (2010), pp. 90–91 (“How to ruin a good little boy”). Why are we educating our female offspring to become, instead, empathic, cooperating, and preoccupied with the welfare of others? As a matter of fact, we are applying structural violence (see note 12) toward male children and adolescents, by preventing them from expressing their human potentialities (nonviolence and solidarity). *Importantly, is seeking power really a natural human characteristic?* For a discussion see Ferraris (2012b).

As indicated above, women already involved in participatory democracy understand the limitations of party politics (*power politics*) and are in tune with the alternative, *service politics* or, better, *Politics* with a capital letter. If understood in this way, Politics would not be a dirty word any more and all projects of social promotion, from differential rubbish collection to non-violent economy and nonviolent foreign policy, would be part of Politics, the daily concern of politically savvy citizens.

Suggestions for the future

The criticism of power systems presented here – which is not just a semantic question – contrasts with the current views of mainstream political scientists: “From the very beginning, the qualifying topic, if not the only one, of political analysis has been identified in *power*” (Pasquino, 2009, 12). Our different view comes from the premises of advanced anthropology research (Fry, 2013) and of nonviolence studies (L’Abate, 2014), which is still a budding discipline and a topic ignored by political scientists, sociologists, and diplomats. The criticism of the anthropological and historical concept of “civilization” is simple and pragmatic: since the Late Neolithic period the human condition has deteriorated, while only technology has improved. Civilization was

not an improvement from the human point of view (as pointed out early in this chapter, this is not Rousseau's position).

These ideas are not "politically correct" and find it difficult to overcome barriers in academia and the media, but they are a solid ground for building *a positive future around the topic of gender, power, and democracy*.

Oppressing and marginalizing the gender that most invests in reproduction, nurturing, and formative parenthood has been the real "original sin" (not biting an apple) that caused the current social malaise. Sigmund Freud (1939) had the excellent intuition that we are not living in the way we were originally designed (by natural biocultural selection) to live in order to be happy and healthy. But he made an error of 180 degrees in causality by adopting the explanation of a violent human nature, as critically discussed in Giorgi (2001, 2008, 2010). Of course, he lacked the modern knowledge of neuroscience and anthropology. Surprisingly, in 2015 most people (including academics) are still making the same 100-year-old mistake.²⁰

Women have been at the forefront in all initiatives of direct democracy, of both the old and new types, just as they are currently at the forefront of most social innovations and social remedial projects. Since childhood, they mostly acquire a deep culture of dynamic service (cooperative activism), as opposed to the culture imposed by men; that is, mostly talking tough and scheming for personal power. That is why in the proposal of a slow transition from party politics to service politics (Giorgi, 2012) women must be the leaders of the new participatory democracy put into practice through active citizenship.

Details of such transitions cannot be discussed here in detail, except to say that (a) this social adventure is not a *utopia* (a naïve impossible idea) but a *neotopia*,²¹ that is, possible and unavoidable changes that are already slowly happening; (b) the modality of application will be different in different countries, regions, and towns, according to local resources and cultural peculiarity; (c) the shift in paradigm will be slow, nonviolent, and legal; (d) this transition will represent an historical opportunity for women to claim their rightful centrality in society and prove it in practice, rather than just imitating men and joining them in power systems; (e) after an intermediate hybrid situation with (power) politics and (service) Politics coexisting, men will learn from women (or acquire in childhood) how to practice nonviolent Politics, that is without power systems, a natural situation that emerged from human biocultural evolution and was successfully tested for about 100,000 years (as already discussed earlier in this chapter); (f) the new service Politics will first emerge in the local administration of small townships (Giorgi, 2012), as already demonstrated, tentatively and inadequately, by the civic lists that are gradually excluding political parties: (g) competent city alderwomen may then decide to run as independent candidates for positions in a regional administration, then at the national level; and (h) ideally, the

contribution to politics should be based on professional competences and should last for a limited period of time, after which representatives should return to their profession.

This model of democracy without power systems based on a new political competence of citizens (through education) will naturally facilitate women's equal presence in politics, in the first place, and will eventually return to them the social centrality they enjoyed at least 30,000 years ago. This is not "going back" to prehistory, but going forward by restoring lost humanity through a modern realization of human nature: solidarity and cooperation among citizens, while benefiting from modern technology and advanced knowledge.

Conclusion

This chapter has proposed unusual approaches and new hypotheses. Gender studies is a multidisciplinary field of research; hence we have adopted data from biology, anthropology, archaeology, neuroscience, and history. This information has justified our suggestion of a centrality for women in the human adventure. In Europe this special position of women is documented from 30,000 years ago to now; by progressing our research through time and space, we might find out more.

The invention of food production has led to profound changes (we described them as a tragedy) in human societies, with the emergence of power systems, structural violence, and the oppression of women. This has perpetrated a severe social malaise during the last 6–7,000 years, a relatively short and recent period. Importantly, this unfortunate change has purely cultural bases; therefore it can be reversed. Unfortunately the widespread, but outmoded, "historical" view of humanity (the last 4–5,000 years of violence) contributes to the belief that our present lifestyle is "normal"; this idea of "normality" is encouraged by political leaders and conservative lobbies who fear radical social changes, even those supported by academic evidence.

What have these new ideas to do with the topic of our collective discussion? My proposal is at the same time simple and complicated, because it involves a different worldview, undergoing personal changes, and taking responsibility. In the short term women will have to continue to join the current system of power games, by claiming equal share with men, while also demonstrating the effectiveness of nonviolent strategies; that is, serving in cooperation and solidarity. In the future, however, their natural position of centrality (not power) implies *a very important responsibility: they will have to promote a nonviolent social transformation inside their own local context*, as they already lead several forms of social promotion. This suggestion indeed unfolds as the logical finale of a female sonata of reason.

Notes

1. In this context, it is important to distinguish cultures based on *food collection* (hunter-gatherers) from those based on *food production* (farmers and animal breeders). As we will see, this very significant difference is rarely used even in the anthropological literature. Other terminologies (savages, “man in nature,” nomads, tribal, primitives, indigenous, illiterates, and pre-State) mean almost nothing; they were used during colonization when non-industrialized cultures were stereotyped and considered to have no history (Wolf, 1982).
2. In this context it is important to distinguish spirituality from religion, used much too often as synonyms. See Giorgi (2008), Chapter 5, and Giorgi (2015).
3. This male prejudice was not limited to the Middle Ages, as we have evidence of its existence at earlier (Nardi, 1938) and even later times in several places. It is, however, in the 13th century when we have the first academic discussions (see Varghese, 1996) aiming at rationalizing the male origin of inherited characters.
4. The surface of the egg actively phagocytes (sucks in) only the head of the sperm cell, containing nuclear genetic material, leaving out the packet of energy-producing mitochondria that powered its movements. Mitochondria also contain DNA for the generation of more organelles; the genetics of oxygen-based energy is, therefore, entirely of female origin.
5. The egg is a cell, with a very complex and heterogeneous three-dimensional distribution of organelles and molecules, not just a saline solution in which the nucleus (with DNA) floats. Such egg architecture contributes very significantly to the definition of the body plan and its parts (see note 6).
6. The first events after fertilization represent subsequent divisions of the egg into daughter cells (segmentation of the egg), which do not behave as yet as a community of cells (a tissue). Then the intercellular space between them decreases and they begin to communicate by establishing contacts and causing changes inside neighboring cells. These changes are responsible for the cell differentiation of different body tissues. This involves activating specific genetic sequences (via transcription factors) for the synthesis of new proteins. This is the phenomenon of embryonic induction, in which DNA only responds to external guidance from cell-cell interactions (see note 7).
7. At certain stages of development the embryo needs specific proteins that are synthesized from genetic information. But DNA can only inform amino acid sequences of proteins, not developmental events occurring precisely in space and time the very parameters of which DNA cannot define. Another source of information of maternal origin (“stereo information” in egg structure) is therefore necessary (for details, see Giorgi, 2001, section 2.2.5).
8. I use the description of a man as an “aborted” female to shock my students and stimulate a discussion. This strong expression refers only to the body, but it helps to remember the terms of other underlying aspects.
9. The mother–child relationship begins to be established already in the uterus from where the late fetus can easily hear her voice and probably smell her body.
10. An instinct is “a specific congenital behavior that occurs without any particular post-natal experience to define it.” In reality we have another important instinct, strangely ignored in biomedical sciences: a baby is able to swim unaided at about 12 months of age, if gently immersed in water of mild temperature (Morgan, 2011). This is a “critical age”; older children lose this ability and must learn to swim.

11. In this context, it is important to distinguish between the “acquisition” of a function in the first years of life, while the brain is still laying down basic neural connections, from the “learning” of a function at later stages. A good example: children very easily acquire speech and one or more languages at the age of two to four years if somebody talks to them, while school students need a long time and great efforts to learn a foreign language after that critical period. The same applies to walking and hand dexterity, if somebody helps the child and encourages her/him.
12. In order to avoid semantic misunderstandings, authors should provide the definition of the special terms they use. *Definition of violence*: oppressing or wounding or killing members of one’s own species consciously, systematically, and in large numbers. This makes violence a sophisticated social behavior (not an “impulse” or “instinct”) that cannot be defined by genes and transmitted biologically throughout generations. Practically only humans are violent, but only in the last 6,000 years, that is, recently if considering their existence over the last 200,000 years. *Aggression*, on the contrary, is common to all animals (human included), because, unlike plants, they need to kill other species (plant and animals) to live, and need to compete (human excluded) with members of one’s own species (without killing) for food and sex. *Definition of structural violence*: all those ideas, institutions, and social practices in daily life that prevent children and adolescents from expressing their human potentialities. In this definition the adjective “human” means empathic, nonviolent, and cooperative. Structural violence was the first form of violence to appear in the Neolithic period and is the mother of all other forms of violence (direct violence, cultural violence, and war). Therefore, we cannot hope to reduce and eliminate wars without first reducing and eliminating structural violence; that is, establishing nonviolent local cultures. Unfortunately, this is not generally understood and integrated by the peace movement and by the programs of peace education (Giorgi, 2001, 2008, 2010).
13. The representation of these so-called Venuses can be realistic, such as those of Willendorf (Austria) and Laussel (Dordogne, France); sketchy, such as those of Vestonice (Moravia, eastern Czech Republic), Menton (France), Savignano (Italy), and Parabita (Italy); stylized, such as those of Lespugne (Haute-Garonne, France) and Avdieievo (Ukraine); and just symbolized, such as those of Pekarna (Moravia) and Trou Magrite (Belgium). For details, see Jelinek (1975).
14. In this context one should try and think as much as possible in the way that Paleolithic people thought. The nearest (but not equal) mentality we know is that of contemporary hunter-gatherers. For a literature about hunter-gatherers see Lee (1979), Giorgi (2001, 2008, 2010), Fry (2013).
15. There are several types of evolutionary mechanisms (Ayala, 2004). Biocultural evolution is a type of parallel evolution where biology and culture interplay in natural selection, as normally adopted by social carnivores and primates.
16. Women’s loss of centrality was probably caused by social stratification and by their tradition of gathering during the hunter-gathering past; unfortunately in the Late Neolithic period gathering was limited to the cultivated fields, a fact that reduced women to the status of farm laborers, the lowest social level in those new large agricultural communities. At the same time large pyramidal societies were becoming structurally violent and beginning to be controlled by a minority of males, the gender equipped with weapons (originally used only to hunt) and physically able to apply direct violence. More research is needed on this

- topic, which is currently neglected because in most cultures female inferiority is erroneously held as a normal, natural human situation.
17. For example, the emergence in the 13th century of the spiritual movement of the beguines, women in search of sanctity within freedom; that is, without being answerable to male authority (husbands, priests, or bishops). They probably reached the number of about one million in Medieval Europe. The price was the accusation of heresy, persecution, and death for some of them (Pancieria, 2011). The experience of the beguines has, of course, been neglected by male historians, but a recent revival of spiritual (not religious) life is granting to them the recognition they deserve. Whether they represent the first feminist movement or not is still being discussed.
 18. Contemporary hunter-gatherers typically practice gender equality and female centrality in different ways according to their cultural traditions.
 19. During my long experience (since 1991) in social promotion and academic teaching of nonviolence, I have organized or joined many public gatherings on the topic of peace and nonviolent social transformation. Interestingly, the vast majority of participants have consistently been women and this trend is becoming stronger. Without any theoretical pronouncement, women are spontaneously occupying again their natural central role with their desire for a nonviolent culture.
 20. Some examples are the following. The 1986 Seville Statement that denies violence as a human natural characteristic was adopted by UNESCO, but it received a bad press or was ignored by the conservative media. Many developmental psychologists think that children are instinctively violent and need remedial action (Oliverio Ferraris, 2012), while the opposite is true: violence is systematically acquired from the first years of life. In reality, human beings are neither congenitally violent nor nonviolent, because social behavior is not defined by genes. Nonviolence is the product of human biocultural evolution (not biological evolution) and is acquired after birth in normal (nonviolent) societies, just as violence is acquired in structurally violent societies (most post-agricultural ones).
 21. This neologism, literally “new place,” refers to a new society. See the website www.neotopia.it. Details about the possible nonviolent transformation of our society can be found in two articles in Italian (Giorgi, 2009) that can be downloaded at http://www.neotopia.it/area_download.html. For an English version see Giorgi (2007b).

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10

Gender and Power

Mino Vianello

A gender division based on genitals is obsolete. Yet power in public life is still a monopoly of human beings with testicles. Is there a link between gender and anatomy as far as power is concerned?

Although a characteristic of human beings is the ability to go beyond nature, our mammalian origins cannot be ignored. Natural evolution gave us sexually connoted bodies which enter our mental and social life, contributing to determination of (but not determining) our gender identification (Fausto-Sterling, 2012). Evolution, in spite of millions of years of sexed reproduction, is in a state of unstable equilibrium and tends, in a way that may sound chaotic, to overcome the dichotomy that grounded gender on genitals.

Sex, no longer just a reproductive instrument, is encapsulated into gender, a proteiform reality forged by factors of various nature. A man can identify with the female gender at a certain point in his life, be a loving father in another, become a passive homosexual in yet another, and so on, successively or simultaneously, as was “normal” in classical antiquity (the prototype was Julius Caesar). But in any case biological sex plays a role: as well as being implicated in generating life, it is an activity people are emotionally attached to.

Consequently, even if gender today is not determined by sex, a link persists between the two, marked by erotic desire and by the orientation toward reality. We learn gendered patterns of different “femininities” or “masculinities” thanks to a haphazard “series of encounters with the constraints and possibilities of the existing gender order” (Connell, 2009, 101).

The problem we have to face is by whom, how, and with what aim power is used (McClelland, 1975). Traditional approaches state only that societies need a political centre that, in order to use power, is bound to produce power like the economic process, which in order to generate money needs money. It is certainly important to understand in the analysis of a certain case whether we are in presence of a monolithic or poliarchic structure of

power, how the consensus it is built on has been formed, the channels and the costs to gain access to it; but an analysis of this kind tells us nothing about power's roots.

I reject, consequently, the stand held by Robert Dahl, who maintained that the analysis of power does not imply psychological premises. I wonder why for millennia it was taken for granted that power should be male. Until the developments of postwar psychoanalysis, the patriarchal view was shared by the followers of Freud's theory. Experimental psychology could not throw much light on the problem. But in the last decades, mainly under Jung's influence (Samuels, 1985; Shamdasani, 2003), gender difference has become central in dynamic theory as well as clinical practice. Yet its impact has been little felt in the social sciences, still dominated by a male outlook suspicious of the gender difference theory.¹

Discrimination against women in public life

Why are women discriminated against in public life? Freud adopted penis envy as the key to explain women's feeling of inferiority and the cause of their lack of interest in playing a role in the public domain. Another heuristic key rooted in envy seems to me more realistic and fertile, but on men's side: the envy of generativity (O'Brien, 1981; Fast, 1984).

Men's power greed is far greater than male animals' drive to control the territory around the primary relations group, made up almost always exclusively by females and their offspring. It is obsessively characterized by the urge of conquest for conquest's sake in whatever field, overlooking costs or benefits in human terms for other people and even for themselves (McClelland, 1975). Given the irrationality of this drive, it is logical to surmise that it may be a reactive unconscious mechanism originated by an ancestral frustration which in the course of several hundred thousand years shaped in a different manner men's and women's psychic endowment.

Discarding biological or metaphysical explanations,² all we can do is to have recourse to universal history, inasmuch as male monopoly of public power and women's ostracism from it is a "constant," continuously reproduced and bred by daily practices characterizing all cells of society in any time and place. History, anthropology, and psychoanalysis consent to put forth a hypothesis that does not claim to explain the difference between women and men in general, but only as far as power in public matters is concerned.³ The kernel, which presupposes the existence of a "collective unconscious" (Jung), consists in holding the view that men are traumatized – as a consequence of the ignorance of the link between copulation and pregnancy⁴ (which still survives in certain parts of the world, and might be the reason why in simple societies men still today consider their sisters' children as their own) – by the shock of seeing a new human being emerging from the

female body, which is thus regarded as capable of an autonomous generating potency.⁵

In this light, hunting, the longest phase of human history, appears to be, against superficial explanation, the compensatory reaction rooted in men's inferiority complex (Ariotti, 1980; Giani Gallino, 1986; French, 1992).⁶ While animals hunt out of instinct, for men hunting with weapons is largely a cultural fact. And even more so war, which appeared in human history probably only in the last 10,000 years and is unknown between animals except in terms of disputes about females and food.

It should not appear "eccentric" to identify the origins of male trauma in the shock deriving from the cessation of menstrual blood for mysterious causes, and the subsequent growing of a new life in a woman's body. Today we still speak of "blood ties," a clear memory of beliefs that held the offspring as fruit of the blood retained in the maternal body (Laqueur, 1990).⁷ It should not therefore sound so eccentric to put forth the hypothesis that men look spasmodically for a "bloody compensation" as a reaction to women's mysterious superiority, and that out of this originated the longest phase in the species' history, hunting, which was necessarily centered on strategy. Strategy ended up by blurring in men's nervous systems the empathic component with which they too had been endowed by nature (Wilson, 1989; Panksepp, 2011, "Part III"), while leaving it practically unimpaired in women. Women's subordination as portrayed in the "Man the Hunter" theory has been correctly criticized as androcentric and empirically groundless. But that was the naïve version of the theory, which ascribed the origin of hunting to the introduction of meat into the hominid diet, without differentiating between gathering small animals by hand and killing medium to large animals with weapons. On the contrary, it seems reasonable to think that, had it been just a question of getting animal proteins, other ways would have been found. This is the case for other animals that feed on non-vegetarian proteins. Besides, as Asiatic people's experience shows, meat is not a necessary food for humans. The literature that considers hunting as the factor that played the decisive role in human success among primates is basically vitiated in linking the two phenomena, hunting and a carnivorous diet, because in so doing it ignores the symbolic meaning – that is, what is specifically human – of hunting with weapons. In the beginning it was not hunting that shaped human psychology, but the opposite. Only later did the hunting of medium to large animals, having become the activity which offered the supreme criterion of prestige, slowly mold the male nervous system to such an extent that it ended up generating a representation of reality quite different from the female one. It became a male task to develop skills connected with strategy, while for women domestic chores continued to be the main activity. Gendered work division was imposed by the first form of organized oppression, that of religion (from *re-ligare*: the power of binding attributed to priests; in Greek *ieréus*, whence the term "hierarchy": men

who claimed to have access to transcendent powers). In the course of millennia each sex improved the cognitive abilities corresponding to the two activities and slowly acquired a psycho-physical predisposition (ascertained by experimental psychology [Maccoby and Jacklin, 1974]) inherited by the unconscious collective mind of the respective sexes and confirmed by the process of socialization.

It is the symbolic meaning of hunting as a rite that should be emphasized. The animals which become prey, such as those represented in caves, portray the channel through which men "create" their world in revenge for women's mysterious power. The former is the world which counts, and it presupposes aloofness in relation to daily chores as well as the ability to appropriate the energies of others in order to have time and energy to increase one's own prestige.

In fact, in all societies only men can go hunting. Furthermore, women's dietetic taboos concern animal parts connected with genitals: proof of the unconscious compensatory nature that hunting has for men. Contact with weapons as well as their manufacture have also traditionally been taboo for women: since, for men, they are the equivalent of sex, they must be barred to women. Proof of this thesis is the fact that, in those simple societies where the awareness of the link between coitus and pregnancy has been reached, men can marry only after proving their virility by killing their first prey,⁸ women after entering fertile age with the evidence of menstruation.

Thus, blood is the link that connects the two sexes. Menstruating women are isolated not because they are impure, even if this is the official explanation, but because they represent the most radical challenge for men: menstruation is the "natural" sign that makes of a person a body able of giving life to a new human being. In this sense, circumcision is to be considered as a rite aimed at re-establishing the equilibrium with menstrual blood. During the 24 hours preceding circumcision, the ancient Hebrews placed the lancet under the mother's pillow: a clear reference to the maternal ability to generate, which the rite aims to imitate.⁹ This primordial phenomenon gave rise to the split between nature and culture. Captured animals belong to the sacred, and hunting is the sacred rite thanks to which men can enter the world of culture as a reward for their value. Consequently, it seems reasonable to consider it a mechanism both of psychological compensation as well as of women's exclusion from the domain that counts, making of their world an area that must be kept under control and as distant as possible from the public sphere, centered on the offspring which it is their duty to bring up, following the male paradigms and providing what is useful for life (but of no prestige).¹⁰

The psyche evolves functionally to the material conditions it has to face. From the very beginning the two sexes had to deal with deeply different situations which, even aside from the primary wound of the male psyche, forced males to get involved with the outside world, females with the primary

relations network. This difference is not the only factor of gender diversity. The latter depends, in addition to unfathomable basic elements of our being mammals and that consequently escape to conscience, on in-depth mechanisms of the psyche that rest on the primordial all-enclosing experience, the separation from the mother, the “matrix” that embraces the whole reality (not by chance, the etymon of “mother” is the same as that of “matter”), whose consequences cannot be the same for boys and girls.¹¹ On the other hand, mothers do not know role interruption: for them, culture and biology merge, while for males paternity is an external social event. Only rather recently and only in some parts of the world, unions, almost always partial and contradictory, have developed among humans where fathers take upon themselves responsibilities toward children. The role of father and the role of male remain distinct, being the result of an abstract moral imperative, as Zoja (2010) stresses, and therefore are seldom fused as happens with women.

Male psyche and female psyche

The strategic mind resulting from history as the prevailing male attitude ends up in the most extreme cases as paranoia.¹² It is the expression of a sick form of narcissism, leading to a hypertrophic unconscious ego, which is therefore not subject to self-criticism. Examples are Hitler and Stalin (Zoja, 2012).¹³

“Strategy” means to arrange spatially the elements to be used to achieve a goal on the basis of a plan. Not by accident, strategic thinking includes the hierarchical factor, whose expression is the organization chart. In modern time it culminates in Max Weber’s “formal rationality.” It is therefore obvious that resistance toward this kind of abstract and impersonal rationality manifests itself less strongly among men than women, bound up as the latter are with life’s immediate needs. It is commonly believed that men’s need to behave strategically submits to time. In reality, time is created by that need. The “feeling” that we as well as other people evolve is instinctive, a property we share with animals. On the contrary, the “idea” of time, that is of a measurement of movement, is linked to the need to give order to what happens around us. There is, thus, a difference between the time of in-depth processes, in relation to which we can only try to predispose favorable conditions rather than hastening them, commonly women’s time and willpower’s quantifiable time, typically men’s time.¹⁴

Women preserved the ability to consider events in terms of contact and the practical solution of contingent problems, usually rejecting behavior based on an abstract plan. Being concerned with contingent problems does not imply, of course, a lack of recourse to rational procedures. But reason is not used as an end in itself; a woman’s behavior is dictated more often by the requirements of the situation. Her conscience and ego structure are

symbolically oriented; that is, to catch in things something which goes beyond what is definite, something that involves the subject. As Catharine MacKinnon (1997, 73–74) writes, obviously referring to affluent democratic societies, “women’s distinctive experience as women occurs within that sphere that has been socially lived as the personal – private, emotional, interiorized, particular, individuated, intimate – so that what it is to know the politics of women’s situation is to know women’s personal lives.” As a consequence, the drive to conquest for the sake of conquest in collective life is weaker for her: as daily experience shows, the quest for it is the least desired among things that women look for. The male rational approach, on the contrary, aims not only at effecting a plan, but sets a dichotomy between subject and object, disconnecting the latter from subjectivity; whence the extolled male “objectivity,” usually unfamiliar as a virtue to a woman, for whom subjectivity is essential in structuring reality. It is easier for a woman than for a man to avoid a total identification with her ego and keep in touch with her deep self, and consequently to remain open to other people’s needs and social instances without feeling deprived, or afraid that the curtain may drop on her and thus stop turning her own ego into a show. It is a fact of common experience that at the social level irresponsible behaviors are much rarer among women than among men. Not being contaminated by the instrumental logic to which she may have recourse for personal matters, women tend not to perceive other human beings, apart from in romantic affairs, as antagonists, but rather as part of her world. In other words, her incidental paranoia concerns personal and direct relationships, not the collective world.

A few words are necessary here to comment on what belongs to the core of humankind’s nature: empathy.¹⁵ To avoid misunderstanding, empathy has nothing to do with the sentimental readiness to help others. It is grounded in a form of knowledge that does not turn the “other” into a mere “object,” but takes her/him into consideration as a subject on the wavelength of her/his subjectivity, an “affective knowledge” as Husserl’s concept of *Empfindung* can be translated.

Empathy is a feeling, but feelings are erroneously conceived as opposed to reason. A sound conception of reason does not claim the annihilation of feelings or their reduction to its own parameters, but integrates them in a meaningful world vision. In this perspective, reason is conceived as a process leading to conscience, a process in which the more complex society becomes, the more it becomes capable of promoting what we call “social behavior.” Empathy at the social level consists in working with others for the satisfaction of reciprocal needs, therefore feeling to be conscious members of a community. Of course, this is a schematization. Community life is bound always to be characterized by a certain degree of friction. Empathy is a process, and like all processes it is subject to ups and downs. This shift toward empathy is taking place under our eyes. Thanks also to web

networks,¹⁶ new generations in advanced countries think more and more in terms of relativity and accept the complexity of the world, where there is no room for unilateral solutions, but only for a constant search for reciprocal comprehension. Their anti-bureaucratic way of getting in touch with each other, their tendency to include rather than exclude, their openness to diversity make them the most empathic generation in the whole course of human history, ready to discover their feminine side by sharing domestic chores, a basic prerequisite of gender equality. As Sylvia Walby writes (2011, 62), “there is a need to capture the multiple and overlapping nature of social differences, the way in which individuals are simultaneously located within several different social groupings, which have varying significance and priority according to time and place.” This does not mean that the existence of millions of people, men and women, who support the patriarchal status quo is being ignored, but merely detects a trend.

This drive to “cosmic empathy,” to use an expression dear to Jeremy Rifkin, is not wishful thinking: it is enough to compare times past with those we live in, which witnessed the end of colonialism, successful struggles for civil rights in many parts of the world, peace movements, struggles to have the rights of the “diverse” acknowledged, to understand that we live, in spite of horrible collective crimes, in a totally new era. The problem lies with institutions’ cultural gap, understandable because of the determination of the male power elite to resist to the bitter end. And yet today we are in the presence of a world that might satisfy the needs of its inhabitants but whose destiny is put at stake by destructive practices (Gorz, 1997), decided by the male mind.

This empathic attitude may also be found in many men, and at the dawn of history must have been common to both sexes; otherwise humankind could not have survived. But women, not having identified themselves in a unilateral form of conscience, made of the empathic attitude their privileged instrument to get to know reality. They, therefore, tend to favor in daily life a flow of energy toward the outside world of which they feel they are fully part. One of the consequences of this difference that is rooted in history concerns women’s attitude toward religion. Their greater propensity toward it depends on the fact that the “paradise” that in each of them is the supreme goal offers an “empathic” conception of reality which they find congenial.¹⁷

Women, unlike men, concentrate on the present (see Chapter 8) in their attempt to deepen and enlarge their experience of it, because they feel that present events implicate them in their daily life, while men looking to the future in their search for power usually get in touch with reality in terms of decisions (Harding, 1971, 11). This to a large extent depends on the fact that the interior world is experienced either as an object, in which it is possible to intervene as one pleases, or else as a subject, which may have contradictory characteristics yet is the bearer of an energy that can result in innovative life projects.

Women, therefore, common prejudices notwithstanding, are vitally deeper than men, because their approach is holistic; it connects the rational with the irrational dimension. The same happens to artists and poets who have an insight beyond what can be rationally grasped. And this is so because artists and poets express themselves with their female part, which is able to offer symbols and inspiration. But, given the dominant male culture, this wealth has never been at the center of social life, never raised to the dignity of being worthy of intellectual elaboration. The first women “philosophers” as contributors to the discipline began to emerge less than a century ago (often under Husserl’s direct or indirect influence [Ales Bello and Brezzi, 2001]).¹⁸

Male culture and female counterculture

Gender difference makes up the oldest and most pervasive cognitive map for the human species. Exterminating life is, in the context of what we are accustomed to call “civilization,” an activity more prestigious than giving life, since it is able to suppress it. Capturing or killing wild and large animals and later in history victories in war, conquests of markets, imposing by force one’s own religious or political ideologies are all outstanding marks of prestige. Whence the male cult of the conqueror – a cult not aspired to by the overwhelming majority of women, at least not to the same extent.

It is the eruption of uncontrollable drives inherent to the inferiority complex of the male unconscious collective psyche which often becomes violence against women, and even an instrument to demoralize and humiliate peoples and deprive them of their future (as in the case of ethnic cleansing). Examples of this are the practice of mass rapes in the former Yugoslavia and in Germany under the Red Army.¹⁹ Many thinkers have dealt with the problem of violence in history. The situation has not changed since the time of Clinia, the Spartan, who states in the “First Book” of *The Laws*:

What the majority of men calls peace is only an empty concept A restless war persists between all cities. If you examine the issue in this light, you will for sure discover that the legislator of Crete [who enjoyed the highest prestige among the Greeks] organized all our [that is, Sparta’s] public and private institutions functionally to war . . . , because no wealth or undertaking is of any profit if one does not triumph in war so that the goods of the enemies become the winners’ property.

Nobody wondered what the legislator’s mind was. This is understandable: “the ideology [that is, the way people see the world] is the ideology of the elite.” In other words, the way the world is seen is the male eye.

Experimental psychology has shown several gender differences (Maccoby and Jacklin, 1974; Hyde, 2005), but without giving an explanation of it.

In the light of dynamic psychology, these differences are not considered the result of nature. Human beings are certainly mammals, and it is interesting that in the first steps of embryogenesis the embryo, although potentially being able to evolve as male or female, shows characteristics that resemble more closely female genitals and only later may evolve under the impact of male genes and gonadic hormones in a male fetus. In a sense, to become male is to swim against the stream. Indeed, it is a fact that men are more vulnerable than women, who are privileged well beyond reproductive age: a clear indication that nature does not just care about the physical survival of the species, but also about its moral well-being, because it is thanks to women that values and practical wisdom are transmitted. But in any case, even if humans are mammals, gender difference is much greater than sex natural distinction, because it is the result of cultural factors and of the human ability to elaborate symbols.

It is necessary, at this point, to specify that I speak of distinction, that is of “separateness,” not “separation.” Woman and Man are different, not opposed, beings. There is a constructive male principle inscribed in the very nature of mammals, without which their survival would have been impossible, different from, but not hostile to, the female one, a principle which in history has gone off into strategic thinking because of men’s primary trauma due to ignorance. We can define this “sound” original male predisposition the ability to keep distinct the subjects belonging to emotional domains and to hand over to the outside world what originates in the inwardness of the mind, while women are better equipped to listen to and to live intimately. If it belongs to women to give life, it belongs to men to help it to emerge from indistinctness; if it belongs to women to understand others by sharing their feelings, it belongs to men to favor in the child after the first four or five years of life the growth of individual identity. This does not imply superiority or inferiority; it is the result of natural evolution. A female principle deprived of the male would be suffocating and would imprison life within its source as much as a male principle deprived of the female would become, and as a matter of fact has become, destructive.

Even before Jung and Freud, the presence in Woman of a male principle and in Man of a female principle was part of popular wisdom and of speculation (e.g., Plato, in the *Symposium*) to the point that it can be considered a universal archetype. Jung developed this insight identifying in every human being’s psyche a principle that at the unconscious level has the characters of the opposite sex, which makes up the link between the ego and the self (Hillman, 1985; Zinkin, Whitmont and especially Young-Eisendrath in Schwartz-Salant, 1992; Kast, 1993; Riedel, 1998). Becoming aware of this binary structure makes desire possible and with it relationships: all kinds of relationships, sentimental ones included, because this awareness rejects the refusal of the Other with the consequence that all relationships are *com-bina-tions*, that is, putting together two different things. The desire to

merge into each other brings forth a falsification of reality and consequently a destructive involution in the attempt to effect a relationship not grounded in the acceptance of the diverse.

Gender dualism is thus a reality, on one side grounded in and the result of natural evolution, but on the other the outcome of a distortion. The consequence is a divergence between one sex inclined to introversion, care, and concreteness following the practical needs of the situation, and the other sex bent on the search for prestige to which reason and will are functional. Reason and will became thus the supreme values of male-dominated culture, and consequently are imposed on all from childhood.

Weapons embody culture's superiority because what they "produce" is more conspicuous than what nature "produces." Conquest thus becomes men's paramount aspiration, inextricably tied to violence.²⁰ But violence at the collective level needs an apparatus, which means followers. To secure them, one has to become a "leader," that is, someone skilled in dispensing favors and above all capable of a superior vision to propose in the public arena, where he has to be able to play at the same time the role of actor and stage director. The vision, which must contain an emotional appeal to abstract truths, is essential. Even in cases where leadership has a long legal tradition, an appeal to a transcendental factor is necessary to reduce the masses to obedience.

Women's emancipation

Women are today for the first time allowed in the majority of countries to live publicly what until yesterday was a private matter, ending thus that hybrid condition, masterfully analyzed by Carole Pateman (1988), that for centuries characterized their lot: to belong to civil society insofar as they were by definition "individuals" and at the same time to be outside it insofar as they were eminently natural and thus irrelevant beings (Kantola, 2006).

In one century women's presence imposed itself at a global level on national and international institutions, leading to the creation of laws, organizations, and treaties aimed at eliminating discrimination. An important impetus came from groups of various natures (Inglehart and Norris, 2003). Today, however, even a slight tendency to vertical mobility is still slow to appear (Vianello and Moore, 2000). Although progress continues (Waylen, 2007), it is characterized by retreats and reversals when compared with the feminist struggles that marked the last 150 years of history. Nowadays feminism has restricted itself to marginal matters, such as corroding the work privileges of the male elite; affirming sexual freedom, which is inevitably exploited by consumerism, pillars of which are the fashion and cosmetic industries, both of them grounded in women's bodies: a domain where feminist opposition is not so virulent as it should be; and analyzing progress at the margins of institutions without facing the crucial issue:

power in the public domain. Indeed, there is no structural analysis of power in the public domain in the literature of Third Wave Feminism or Feminist Institutionalism,²¹ not to speak of the literature of the Women's Liberation Movement of the 1970s, which was centered on topics that at that time as today were of capital importance, although they have nothing to do with the direct control of society at the macro level, where vital decisions for the future of peoples are still basically a male monopoly.

Gender and power

This chapter regards a person instrumentally oriented as "belonging to the male world," apart from the fact that in the overwhelming majority of cases this person is anatomically a man. The few women found in this category belong to or are connected with the power elite, which is consistently male, and in any event are chosen by it. The person characterized by an empathic orientation, taste for aesthetic enjoyment, and devotion to research is to be considered "belonging to the female world." In the majority of cases the empathic are women, although almost all male artists, scientists, religious people, and social workers belong to this category (which does not exclude the fact that in personal relations they may be envious and competitive).

Someone might object that this reference to women is too generic, while the conditions that characterize their existence vary from place to place and from time to time. But there is a fact that is common to all: women were almost never allowed to participate in the decision-making processes affecting collective life, and when this happened it was thanks to men's support. The picture is certainly changing, but the problem does not consist merely of "institutional" data (the number of women at various levels of legislatures, their percentage in political parties, their relevance in professions), but of their ability to place on the agendas of these various institutions matters that are important for them, as well as their own interpretations and solutions. From this point of view, the road ahead appears very long and hard, because interpretations and solutions of issues concerning women are still dealt with in a male context (think of laws about reproduction), to which women chosen by men to hold public offices usually bow. Political and judicial measures, albeit important, are not enough: practices embedded in customs, shaped by the overarching male culture, survive deliberate decisions.

Women's emergence in public life entails, as happened in the previous steps toward an open society, a total subversion of values; not only political and legal, but those of economic institutions; of knowledge paradigms; of social reality's multifarious features.²² As a result, the future will witness the flourishing of new categories that will not resemble those we are accustomed to, and, as has always happened, what looks unconceivable today

will be considered normal in a future that is perhaps closer than a healthy pessimism leads us to think.

We may be witnessing the end of the logic that has inspired the mechanisms of power at the top of the leviathans that decide people's destiny in the territories they rule. This requires reflection about how political organizations, culminating in the modern state, are inextricably tied to the male psyche (Scott, 1988; Squires, 1999). It is clear that the question is not so much about having more women in power structures, positive as this may be, but about transforming the very structures and mechanisms (Okin, 1979; Eisenstein, 1988; Connell, 1990; Chappell, 2006).

My stance elicits suspicion of an unacceptable reductionism in historical analysis. Yet the question concerning the psychic structure of humans who are so often inhuman and in whose hands lie collective vital decisions cannot be ignored (McClelland, 1975). The contributions of mainstream political science are useful: from the point of view, for instance, of the legitimacy of decisions taken and those who took them; of sanctions' nature and their relevance; of the means that were used; of the resources available; yet it is necessary to grasp the underlying dynamics which are always, albeit not only, tied to gender difference. What we need is a new approach in political science as well as in gender studies, away from the tortuous theories criticized by Nussbaum (2000) that do not make room for political action.

It is clear that in order to be co-opted at the top of public life, women have to adopt the male style and accept a stooge role. The question is whether a women's grassroots movement supported by the networks that currently flourish can transform the logic of power, diverting it from craving for domination to a tool that satisfies collective needs. Information technology allows people with common interests to unite their forces not only to share data and news, but also to exert a pressure on decision-makers, as Manuel Castells emphasizes.

History with a capital H, of which men are still the almost exclusive protagonists, teaches that the destructive practices of which the male elite is so proud have prevailed up to now. The future will witness either the success of empathy, the most precious treasure preserved by women, and its rediscovery by men, or global decay and maybe self-annihilation on behalf of the impersonal rationality that is exalted and at the same time deprecated by Weber.

Notes

1. That theory was criticized in 1988 by Cynthia Epstein, who correctly blamed it at the time as being an argument in favor of women's inferiority.
2. Another trivial explanation is the rational choice theory, which claims that women's exclusion is the unforeseen result of a set of perfectly rational decisions by women at the individual level, because concentrating on domestic life maximizes their psycho-physical wellbeing (Driscoll and Krook, 2009).

3. Meyerhoff (1962), as far as I know, was one of the first and also rare scientists (preceded by Erikson's 1958 seminal work on Luther) to point out from a general, systematic point of view the importance of this multidisciplinary approach in the study of politics, explicated by the outstanding scholar Charles Merriam half a century earlier (1950, 6-8).

As to psychoanalysis, some social scientists still had recourse to it in the 1930s (Lasswell, f.i.), but, even if they touched on the issue of gender, being caught in Freud's theory of the libido (the reason for the break with Jung), could not reach any satisfactory explanation of the difference between men and women. The main and lasting contribution of psychoanalysis to the social sciences of those days has been Adorno's *The Authoritarian Personality* (of marginal interest for gender studies [Duverger, 1964]).

4. The awareness of male role seems to have started about 10,000 years ago in Anatolia (French, 1994).
5. Later, when the awareness that copulation at times originated pregnancy, one may presume to suspect that another envy devastated men's souls: the confiscation of their semen in the female body and their loss of control over it.
6. This hypothesis came to my mind in 1981, when I spent ten days in a village along the coast about 300 miles west of Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea. It was the only time I met teenagers who ignored the nexus between coitus and pregnancy. A woman told me that the boys and girls used to go out in the bush, and that when a girl stopped menstruating and started swelling, a fact attributed to a spirit coming from the sea, then gave life to a new human being the boys became furious and began destroying things. Finally they would go out hunting cassowaries, big and dangerous ostrich-like birds, until they succeeded to catch one, which they would bring jubilant to the village. I thought it might be an unconscious remembrance of the hominids' beliefs about birth, inextricably tied up with those concerning sexual identification, fecundation, and kinship systems (the most complicated fields of ethnography and cultural anthropology; see Héritier, 1996), which often present solutions incredible to Western eyes.
7. Which in a subsequent phase passes from womb to breasts and becomes milk, as Hippocrates believed, followed by Galen, and a thousand years later Isidorus from Seville (Laqueur, 1990). When coitus is recognized as the source of pregnancy, the popular belief found in all countries is that, if a woman does not have children, it depends on her blood: male impotence is unknown.
8. "Virility" derives from Sanskrit *virā*, Latin *vir*, which means "hero," the brave in war. The idea of violence enters in the idealization of men.
9. The red okra decorating female bodies in Sub-Saharan Africa during the rites, the feasts, and the banquets that are organized on the occasion of circumcision remind us of menstrual blood.
10. The two worlds find their expression from the time of the first documents. In the Lascaux caves we find the representation of the male world: an open space where a hunt strategy unfolds. The figures are all male. The Willendorf Venus, on the contrary, embodies the closed space typical of women.
11. For the girl it will not be that easy to see herself as a being different from the mother inasmuch as both share a common nature. Consequently, the individualization process is more complicate and tortuous for her because, if she recognizes herself as a person only in her diversity from her mother, she alienates her female nature, while if she does not free herself from her unconscious identification with her mother, she loses her specificity as a person. Whence her ambivalence in

relation to the mother and her insecurity in life, because she perceives in the depth of her soul that maternity, in which her biological resemblance with the mother culminates, risks making her regress to the fusional condition with her first love object, and also with the world itself as it happens to the new-born baby (Chodorow, 1978).

12. The difference reflects itself in all spheres of life, jobs and studies included (Charles and Bradley, 2009).
13. Also, the so-called normal men often tend to be contaminated by the sensation that an enemy responsible for all evils exists, on whom they have to discharge all the violence they are capable of, in order to compensate for their frustration and feelings of inferiority.
14. Men's will to control territory is evident in the search for speed; that is, the time which is necessary to cover a certain distance: the higher it is, the greater the feeling of power they derive from it.
15. The first approach to empathy is to be found in Plato and Aristotle, before the Scottish School in the 18th century, whose importance cannot be overestimated for its implications on Kant and post-Kantian philosophy, in particular Husserl and his followers. For Francis Hutcheson, the main exponent of this school, the ability to "feel" others' sentiments is the factor that makes social life possible. Contrary to popular belief, even the father of economic science held that thanks to sentiments we can become moral beings not only when, albeit aware of our uniqueness, we succeed to understand the other, but when we become aware that we too can become objects of comprehension and emotional attachment of the other. In the following centuries empathy became a central topic not only of philosophers, but of psychologists as well as of biologists. Recent paths in neurosciences confirm the centrality of this phenomenon (Zaboura, 2008).
16. The Internet, like any technological tool, can be used in a positive or a negative way. There is no doubt that it unleashes huge amounts of pornography, cyber-stalking, and hate speech. Online contacts are almost always superficial, besides being potentially dangerous as instruments of manipulation. But they are a powerful vehicle of relativism, and relativism is the antechamber of empathy.
17. The word "paradise" originated in Persia (*pareidaeza*) and indicated a closed space. *Daeza* means "clay mixture" and corresponds to Sanskrit *deha*, a word used only in philosophy to indicate the body as cover of the soul. The feminine form of it, *dehl*, in the Veda means "dirt earth." All these meanings that cluster around the idea of paradise notions such as "clay" and "body" (Adam's body is made of clay), "closed space" (Eden), and stickiness typical of the womb are not casual. The similitude "paradise-fortifications" survives in the Judaic-Christian tradition, from the cherub with the flaming sword at Eden's entrance to Celestial Jerusalem's iconography.
18. The existence of women "thinkers" is documented in the West from the time of Hellenism, but systematic contributions to the traditional branches of philosophy was minimal until the 20th century.
19. About two million German women were raped and many of them were killed. Similar occurrences, although not of the same magnitude, happened in other parts of the world with soldiers of different nationalities. It is true that this behavior may also have been part of a plan of revenge or of ethnic cleansing, but the fact is that the reverse, women killing men on a mass scale, never happened.
20. Proof of the fascination that this mechanism exerts on the male psyche (and also, although more seldom and to a lesser extent, on the female psyche) is the fact

that workers employed in industry potentially decisive for war purposes manifest a strong attachment to their work and show a low rate of absenteeism and strikes in comparison with other sectors that are equally paid.

21. A comprehensive presentation of this approach is in an issue of *Politics and Gender*, 2009, 237–280, edited by Fiona Mackay and Georgine Waylen.
22. What would chemistry be, had not Lavoisier swept away in one blow alchemy, or physics, had not Copernicus and Galilei swept away the Ptolemaic conception of the universe? Radical ruptures mark the advancement of progress.

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11

The Submissiveness Trap

Luigi Zoja

The disintegration of the father

When considering gender differences, we should take little account of symmetry. Biological evolution, cultural history, and hence the psychology of men and women, follow complementary but different paths. Jungian psychoanalysts are accustomed to thinking of the principal psychological dynamics as being situated between two poles: young–old, woman–man. But dualism is not symmetry. Identity of a gender can itself be represented by two poles: for instance, for the woman, mother and partner. These two forms of femininity are the two sides of scales: they exist and alternate, in the individual and in the group; and not only in every human society, but at practically every stage of evolution, from the simplest animals to human beings.

If we consider male identity, on the other hand, we see that father and partner are less symmetrical and interchangeable. The father – the person who not only fertilizes the mother, but (as the etymology indicates) provides food for the child and takes on responsibility for its growth – exists in human societies, but is almost absent in most animal societies. Even the males of the animals closest to man (the anthropomorphic apes) mostly mate and generate their young not on the basis of a permanent relationship with the female or their offspring, but when they prevail in fights with other males. Taking the argument to an extreme, Margaret Mead said that motherhood has its basis in genetics and manifests itself until a culture teaches the opposite; fatherhood, by contrast, is almost absent unless a culture teaches it.¹ Simplifying a complex argument, we might say that the father is basically a civilized construct, a recent taming of the male. It is therefore not firmly anchored in the instincts: it does not balance those of the competitive and animal male, but superimposes itself on them and drives them down, into the darkness of the unconscious. The two male polarities *do not have a horizontal relationship, but a vertical one.*²

This has a consequence. In collective psychology, when the heavy lid of patriarchy is removed, what comes out is not necessarily – as a principle of

justice would require – a more maternal, welcoming psychology (which we suppose, historically and biologically, to be more attentive to relationships and dialogue). What comes out – in accordance with the law that psychoanalysis calls “the return of the repressed” – is principally a more archaic, aggressive, precivilized maleness. The law of the father, which is less warm than the maternal one but generally brings stability, is replaced by what has been called “the horde of the brothers;” the principle of vertical authority is replaced by horizontal competition. Potentially everyone is fighting against everyone. In concrete terms, the pack establishes an order of its own, consisting of degrees of strength, from the alpha male down to the lowest, until a new, violent competition shuffles all the roles again. Civilization – according to Freud,³ Jung,⁴ and anthropology – is a fairly thin crust, under which, in the individual and collective unconscious, the ferocity of the instincts is not very different from that of prehistory. Patriarchy has dominated the historical West; and hence, through colonization and later globalization, most of the world. Criticism of thousands of years of abuses of paternal authority is, however, still recent, and certainly not complete (though it seemed to have peaked in the 1960s and 1970s).

The return of masculine prepaternal instincts is reinforced by the dominant economic dynamics in postmodern society; it has become more competitive in every respect, so it rewards the archaic psychology of males fighting against each other and even tends to impose it on women. A greater awareness of the problems of gender and the successes of feminism are balanced by the masculinization of many emerging women; in this sense, for society as a whole in the 21st century the internal reference or “Ego-ideal” tends almost to become more male (indeed, it might be added, even in external reference it is women who have gradually chosen to wear trousers, not men who have taken to petticoats).

By creating the father, then, civilization attempted to bend nature in a constructive direction. But its apparent stability, already marred by so many fatherly abuses, could come to an end and turn out to be a mere truce in the cataclysms of history. Sociocultural circumstances can turn male impulses, which already contain aggression, in even more destructive directions.

Like all animals, human beings are capable of using other species as prey; we kill several kinds of animals and eat their flesh without many feelings of guilt. However, instinct usually prevents animals from preying on members of their own species. Starting from specialized literature such as the writings of the paleontologist Raymond Dart, after the horrors of World War II a somehow pessimistic view of human nature has taken hold. According to a prevailing theory, only the human being has become an ape that kills its own kind. Civilization has superimposed so many cultural differences that often humans can no longer perceive the other as part of the human species. If he/she belongs to a population different from us, through the color of his/her skin – but especially through his clothes, his incomprehensible

language, or his/her unfamiliar customs – we no longer perceive him/her as a human; significantly, the representation of others as animals (that is, as belonging to another species) is typical of the worst forms of racism, and has been a prelude to genocides. So civilization, by superimposing too many customs on our animal component, can deform the instinct of relationship into an instinct of predation. Perceiving the other, for cultural reasons, as belonging to another species has been called *pseudo-speciation* by Erik Erikson (1968)⁵ and Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1984).⁶

Gender violence

In practice, all civilizations are also “unnatural” in another sense: they have emphasized the differences between man and woman, making them more distant from what they are in nature, and assigning quite distinct tasks to each. Only in the 20th century did male and female roles draw close to each other again, becoming interchangeable in many cases. Among predatory animals, it is usual for both males and females to hunt. Among humans, however, hunting has been exclusive to males. This has fostered another, extreme, deformation of the human species. Among animals, although male sexuality may contain elements of brutality, rape hardly exists. Among human beings, not only is this crime widespread; but where a group psychology prevails, and in situations of collective regression (wars, widespread criminality, extreme cultural poverty), gang rape can become common. In this situation (unlike the individual rapist, who is well aware that he is committing a crime, and hides), the perception of guilt is eliminated by the “us” feeling, with its reciprocal approval.

Being very difficult to punish, collective rape seems to have spread alarmingly in recent times in the most lawless areas of the world (although, as in the case of individual rape, it is hard to tell how far the phenomenon has objectively increased and how far the perception of it has increased, owing to the fact that it is no longer a taboo subject).

This state of collective possession (which I have called *centaurism*, because of the mythical precedent: rape was the only form of coupling the centaurs knew) is in its turn an example of pseudo-speciation.⁷ In wartime this occurs because the victim may belong to a very different population, as well as being female: a radically “other” being for the soldier-rapist, who may have been on active service for years without ever meeting a woman, living completely immersed in the most masculinist of psychologies, that of the army.

After all, a – relatively speaking – *soft* alienation/animalization of the female figure manifests itself in peacetime, too; for what are hypersexualized advertising images, parades of prostitutes, and inflatable dolls? They are transformations of women from subjects into “available objects” which, in the collective unconscious, may be a prelude to the dehumanization of

a woman and therefore to the possibility of brutalizing and perhaps even killing her.

These are, of course, extreme examples. The point is that *culture* (that is, Western and global culture) *has traditionally exaggerated the separation of what man and woman are in nature*. This “distancing” almost always favors a dominance of the former and a subjugation of the latter: we see this, for example, in the extreme forms of the three monotheisms. In a hypothetical natural state, such as the archetypes (innate psychological tendencies), the instincts (innate physiological tendencies) are bipolar. In order really to understand them, we must think of pairs of opposites. Submissiveness is complementary to aggression. Their pathological expressions are also a pair; in fact, they often form a compound word: sado-masochism. With a theory that has been partly accepted, and partly criticized, by European culture and by psychoanalysis itself, Freud describes masochism as being inherent in the female “nature.”

It is almost impossible to verify to what extent this and other hypotheses of Freud and Jung are literally true; but what we can do is judge whether or not they make sense. Certainly both men and women potentially contain two bisexual poles of psychology and of instinct. But it is likely (since we observe it in animals, particularly in the fights preceding mating) that the impulse to aggression is, relatively speaking, stronger in males, and the impulse to submissiveness stronger in females. What particularly concerns us here is the fact that patriarchal culture has sharply increased this imbalance.

It is, I am aware, not only very difficult but also dangerous to distinguish between what is natural and what is cultural in human impulses. In debates about rape one often comes up against the objection that a certain number of women have fantasies about being raped, and that in some cases they may even experience some sort of pleasure during rape. The analytical profession may provide some confirmation of these assertions, but it would be inappropriate, particularly for a male analyst, to deduce from this what degree of violence and submissiveness is “natural,” and therefore admissible or even healthy. We may suppose that infinite potential differentiations of the instincts are present in each of us; but that culture, by accentuating the contraposition between male-aggressive and female-submissive, and by rewarding these roles, activates and enhances the corresponding impulses in individuals. In this way it fosters them, not only in individuals but also in the selection of the species.

Evolutionary “advantage”

It may be objected that it takes a very long time for evolutionary selection to leave any concrete trace; present-day human beings are, in their bone structure, almost identical to the Cro-Magnon (from whom we are separated by tens of thousands of years). So we presume that the instincts (an expression

of the nervous system, unfortunately not preserved in the pre-historical remains) have not changed much either. Yet, in reality, the presence in a group of that indistinguishable complex of impulse and education which we call submissiveness can change very quickly for other reasons.

In very general terms it may be presumed that even during the long period of transition from *Pithecanthropus* to *Homo sapiens*, females who behaved more submissively had more children. But this greater prolificness as compared to more independent temperaments has been markedly accentuated in historical times, particularly in the last decades. (It should not be forgotten that when we speak of temperament, we refer mainly to the – unmeasurable but certainly present – instinctive and innate component, as distinct from the influence of family and education).

This could be seen as a *regressive selection, which favors the submissive female character and tends to eliminate the independent one*. The latter would lead to feminist choices, or at least to an awareness of having an independent role, to an improvement in cultural and professional levels, and to taking on public tasks. But this form of modern femininity mostly corresponds to a much lower fertility rate than the traditional one.

Perhaps I may be permitted a reference to my profession, which may be significant. I have worked as a psychoanalyst in three countries and for 44 years, during which about half of my patients have been women. Apart from their sociocultural background and their interests, they were almost all rather independent people. They sought individual choices as a result of their education but also their temperament: in other words, even in the many cases where they had made a traditional marriage and felt at ease with it, they were certainly not women of a submissive character. Of these several hundred women, a pretty significant proportion, perhaps a third, had no children (though some may have had them later). A clear majority had one child, a clear minority two, very, very few three, and, as far as I remember, only two of them had four (both not because they had traditional lives, but because they had had many marriages).

Now, we know that demography makes its predictions on the basis of women's fertility: for a population to be stable it is necessary on average for each woman to have slightly more than two children (slightly more to compensate for the fact that some children may die before they, in their turn, reach a fertile age).

Let us imagine – simplifying for convenience's sake – a population of 100 of these women with an "independent temperament." Assuming that about half of their children are female, since they have on average slightly under one child each, after one generation there will be between 40 and 50 of them; after two generations they will have dwindled to about 20.

Now let us imagine another decidedly traditional group of 100 women, where, for cultural and religious reasons, female choice – particularly control over their own sexuality – is practically absent, even though all the

irresistible products of modern life (modern medicine, cars, and computers) enter into it. These women will have many children, as women used to do in the past; unlike in former times, however, because of improved sanitary conditions they are unlikely to die in childbirth or see their children die in infancy. If they have eight children on average, in one generation there will be 800 children, of which 400 will be women; and in the next generation there will be 3,200, of which about 1,600 will be women; moreover, they will certainly have achieved this numerical success in a short time, because they will marry and start having children at an early age, around 20, while the independent women may often have their first child at 40. *In a mere two generations, starting from a condition of parity, the submissive temperament will have become 80 times more numerous* than that of women who by nature, or for cultural reasons, seek autonomy (in this abstract and extreme case, the “temperament,” supposed inborn, will have been culturally selected, multiplying in an explosive way the gender gap of power).

Very few of this large number, of course, will reach positions of responsibility from which they can disseminate their worldview. But that will be done by their husbands, who will in turn be even less favorable to female autonomy. Certainly, the women from the more educated classes will have a greater role in society and will be inclined to disseminate secular ideas and culture; but will they really be able to prevail against the strength of numbers? The extinction of a population in effect puts an end even to the rights that they have won.

Unfortunately, beyond our abstract (and intentionally extreme) calculation there is a lot of concrete, historical reality. In the societies where slavery was present, the most brutal and aggressive slave-owners fathered many children without recognizing them. In colonial societies, particularly in Latin America, the first centuries of colonization were characterized by a similar violent mating. Initially, the conquistadors emigrated to the Americas without women, eliminated great numbers of native males, and took innumerable concubines: the powerful ones, even 100 or more. Being deeply interwoven with power, history has continuously selected powerful males and submissive females.⁸

The power of numbers and of the economy

If we also reflect on the real power of women in the world in this 21st century, we must not confine our attention to the relative oases of North America or Western Europe. What I have proposed is once again not just an abstract theory. One need only consider the demographic development of Israel (one of the most advanced non-Western countries) since its creation. The educated and secular classes of Euro-American origin have been depleted, while the numerical growth of the Haredim (who double their population, and therefore, through the laws of democracy, also their

parliamentary representation, every 15 years or so) has transformed the culture and politics of the country.

Israel is a small state, though with no minor influence in geopolitics. The most powerful, as we all know, will soon be China. What effect will this country's transformation into the leading world power, which is expected to come about by 2030, have on the worldwide development of the female condition? Even in the upper classes (leadership of the Chinese Communist party, and finance), women remain almost absent. In the weaker classes, two-thirds of a century with a Communist government, egalitarian in matters of gender, seems to have left little trace. One only has to consider how women are undervalued even in the new and relatively well-educated middle class. For reasons of cost, ultrasound scanning of the fetus in pregnancy is practiced chiefly by this neo-bourgeoisie, which is rapidly growing but is still in a clear minority. And yet, among newborn babies, males are about 18 percent more numerous than females. What will happen when the rural classes gradually grow richer and gain access to these modern medical technologies which make it possible to abort the female fetus? In theory, according to free market principles, scarcity raises the value of a product. Will the value of the female identity rise? Submissiveness, unfortunately, is a cultural trap (and, we may hypothesize, in part a genetic one too) in which the Chinese woman has been caught not for centuries but for millennia. The market allows the value of an "object" to vary even in a short time, but this does not necessarily change its condition of being an "object."

To sum up what has been briefly stated: for several reasons, which may reinforce one another (culture and biology, evolutionary selection, demography and psychology), the female gender may be caught in a "submissiveness trap," which is supported by a tremendous inertia of the collective unconscious, and which the progress of ideas is not sufficient to break. Thematizing and discussing it seems to me at least as urgent as compiling optimistic programs.

Notes

1. Mead, Margaret (1949). *Male and Female*. New York: William Morrow.
2. I have expanded upon this in: Zoja, Luigi (2000). *The Father. Historical, Psychological and Cultural Perspectives*. London and New York: Routledge. 2001 (Original: *Il gesto di Ettore. Preistoria, storia, attualità e scomparsa del padre*).
3. Freud, Sigmund (1929). *Civilization and Its Discontents*, in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, 24 volumes, Ed. James Strachey. London: The Hogarth Press 1953–1974, Vol. XXI. (Original: *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur*).
4. Jung, Carl Gustav (1964). *Civilization in Transition*, in *The Collected Works of C.G. Jung*, 20 volumes. Read, Herbert, Fordham, Michael, Adler, Gerhard (Eds.). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1953–1979, Vol. X (Original: *Zivilization im Übergang*).
5. Erikson, Erik H. (1968). *Identity, Youth and Crisis*. New York – London: Norton, Chapters I and VIII.

6. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Irenäus (1984). *Die Biologie des menschlichen Verhaltens*. München: Piper, parts I and IV.
7. Zoja, Luigi (2010). *Centauri. Mito e violenza maschile*. Roma – Bari: Laterza.
8. Something very similar happened when the Arabs conquered the Berbers in North Africa: they killed the males and married the Berber women. Their Arabization and Islamization of North Africa implied the subjugation of the women. See Ennaji, Moha (2005). *Multilingualism, Cultural Identity and Education in Morocco*, New York: Springer, chapter I.

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12

A Different Power

Valeria Perucca

“We were born to exist, not to know, to be, not to affirm ourselves. Genesis has caught our condition better than our dreams and our systems have,” Romanian philosopher Emil Cioran reflected in his *History and Utopia* in 1960. He added, “He who aspires to complete freedom only comes to it as a return to his starting point, to his initial enslavement.”

The prophecy remains relevant as Cioran incisively defines the disturbing social and political scenario we are immersed in, where uncertainty not only determines daily and personal parameters but also makes the freedom at our disposal increasingly intangible. The question arises as to whether there has ever existed a society of the origins, as it were, where being has prevailed over assertion, where the political sense is expressed without a referent, or where the latter is deprived of any power.

The power of difference

By observing the conditions of power in simple societies where central concepts and mechanisms lie outside the categorical relationship “right and state, sanction and strength,” we move into more complex environments (at first sight elusive but no less rigorous) that determine values and social organization, and invest it with a pervading, referential, structurally motivated reality which constitutes its identity.

Initiation is the crucial moment when we pass from natural life to cultural awareness: it corresponds to a rite and at the same time to a process allowing access to the mythical, religious, social, and technical knowledge of the society of pertinence, thus becoming a full member after overcoming trials and demonstrating reliability, the ability to guard secrets, and endurance to physical pain. The presence of blood, a cruel element of life and death in both representations, in its symbolic importance sanctifies the difference of state, class, and pertinence granted the initiate.

What occurs during the rite is permanent, establishing membership of the world of “men,” of tribal knowledge, of what in modern parlance might

be defined as the appropriation of one's own history, identified with the dominant group of power. The ritual representation evokes death and resurrection, where the latter means the rejection of the state of non-being, of shameful and effeminate insipience, in favor of the condition of being, achieved through the knowledge of myth, an essential truth to understand individual and collective life and confer meaning, and from which all other capabilities and possibilities will derive. These capabilities are ritual: war investiture, membership of secret societies, and of "age groups" that regulate juridical, administrative and political functions; the possibilities are those of knowing the foundation and origin myths and the means of access to the afterworld and the ancestors, the right to life, and an explanation of the world.

In these contexts, women's difference is expressed by the non-access to power, understood both as the operation of command and as knowledge.¹ Multidisciplinary research in linguistics, psychology, philology, history, and anthropology suggest that mythopoeia is a male peculiarity; nonetheless women, without the initiate's knowledge of the meanings of myth, have been adept at using it in its magical and operational function. Detailed ethnographic research suggests that we should not confuse the practice of magical, divinatory, or therapeutic arts, sometimes allowed to women, with the attribution of an exercise of power. In shamanism, for example, the priestly investiture and the social authority he subsumes are denied to a woman, who can only develop therapeutic, prophetic, and occult powers. Although women possess the power of continuity through their offspring and through quotidian routines in caring and healing, harvesting and seeding, weaving, home-making, basket-making, and pottery, songs and music (a power apparently free and informal but extremely cohesive in reality), the power of women remains essentially private. As ethnographic enquiry has evidenced, exceptions concern only partial and marginal aspects of command or military tasks, subject to the influences and interests of lineage and kinship. First-person administration of autonomous power remains a myth forbidden to a woman as the most effective taboo.

The conception of matriarchy is one of Bachofen's intellectual constructions, a formal and cultured exercise predicated on a classical and mythological humanism through which he articulates a hypothesis proffered on the basis of his own conjectures. Historical, archaeological, and anthropological data negate any empirical support for the existence of matriarchy. Although the phenomenon may have been desired, it was unrealizable owing to women's prior exclusion from power.

Guaranteeing that everyday life remains the same in its immutable principles, the feminine function is still a power, however, on a cultural, social, and consequently political level. The anthropologist extends her gaze to the ties, obligations, and charges assigned by kinship to social order, the economy, and the hereditary transmission of simple societies. Morgan (1969) had

already acknowledged that familiarity and the definition of consanguinity were behind the expansion and consolidation of implicit and observed rules structuring membership through lineages, tribes, and clans. The matrilinearity of offspring consists in the acknowledgment of belonging to the woman's extended family (wives, mothers), who through their brother, brother-in-law, or sister's son maintain and practice the authority of lineage, the respect for tradition, the obligation of residence, training in hunting, agriculture, the rearing of livestock, and the arts of war, as well as the redistribution of goods and property transfer. The administration of goods, knowledge, and human resources in matrilineal societies, however, is always the exclusive province of the males from the mother's line: in such a context, the sum represents only a watershed of relations and forces, structured by parental affection, compensating the contractual affection of society.

Returning to the principles of difference exercised through power in simple societies, we see how this denies women any autonomy or public personal acknowledgment, even inside their own family, albeit aristocratic or affluent, and how such a situation is retained even in complex societies, lasting through documented historical times that are in relative proximity to our own.

The power paradox: Authority without power

Anthropologists have observed scattered phenomena of a "different power," though rare, which represent a concrete possibility for different models of social organization. The culture produced by encephalic activity, without which the human species would have been unable to survive, has achieved such significance and dimensions that humans fail to realize they are using it and assumes it to be their own nature, to the point where they no longer recognize it anymore and are unable to think of it otherwise. Indeed, we could conclude that they paradoxically absorb it, making it into a biological product. Today, power is highlighted in acts that detach themselves from everyday life, in contrast to simple society where power is integrated within the quotidian. The weight it has assumed in our culture is so different at a conscious and formal level that it seems impossible for us to perceive it within an unconscious and non-formalized environment, where our usual interactions between rule and authority have no validity.

The primordial horde concept has been rejected by ethnographic research. Indeed, from its first appearance, the humans have organized, establishing coherence and sense – both of supernatural nature through myth, and of social and affective nature. The term simple societies is deceptive – the concept of simplicity referring to the lack of writing and social organization devoid of written and contractual rule, since we often see human groups disposing of easy and elementary techniques and coexisting with a refined cosmology represented by oral narratives, and with

complex canons and practice in socially shared behaviors, as Malinowski amply demonstrated in his research on the Trobriand Islands.

The power of diversity: Pierre Clastres

Power is denoted by a state of diversity that defines it, establishing its nature and function. What we mean is not the result of a theoretical or speculative assessment, but the observation and assessment of ethnographic research that has in itself a documentary and methodological exactness. By using Pierre Clastres's studies, supplemented by knowledge of an extended literature of Amerindian societies, we access the results of an in-depth analysis of an unusual phenomenon in the expression of leadership. We consider the premise essential in guaranteeing the scientific value on which an original perspective is founded, both in its dynamics and in its hermeneutics, and in offering a number of stimulating evaluations and hypotheses.

According to Clastres, ethnographic research in the Americas points to a different way of intending and exercising power. Although the features of a layered mass society are present in Incaic organization, respecting the models of centrality and extension of an empire similar to examples close to us (the Egyptians), the sense of democracy and the taste for equality prevail in most Amerindian societies. In his study of 1949, Lowie had already pointed out how an Amerindian leader had to be essentially a "peacemaker," to such a point that the military leadership was entrusted to a second person, thus dividing the task of command in an evident and unequivocal way.

The coercive model is effective only in exceptional situations of external threat, but not for matters regarding group dynamics. The prestige comes from equity and eloquence, and the acknowledged suitability is arbitral and ethical. "Greed and power are incompatible with the exercise of leadership, while the ability of the word must not only solve conflicts but also uplift, gratify and everyday evoke tradition, peace, harmony and honesty, all founding values of a group. Polygamy is acknowledged as the chief's exclusive privilege" (Clastres 1989, 22–23).

Among some 200 South American ethnic groups, only ten are monogamous, Clastres observes, "where polygamy is culturally limited to very few individuals appointed as chiefs." The reciprocity of relations and benefits represents the collectivity's founding dimension, structuring it in a circular fashion and designating its inner cohesion. In order to preserve and perpetuate itself, culture, through which it expresses and defends itself, generates the paradox of a power unable to be exercised, devoid of substantiality, and configured through functions and values at variance with Eurocentric or Asian parameters. The group enjoys equity and order, since the goods and resources are shared equally and efficiently distributed without any surplus or accumulation. Such conception of power becomes the guarantee and the status of social life, since the reasons that constitute it are also those

that allow the human community to exist and are defined by the means through which authority exerts its function. The common feature of equanimity and oratory characterizes the performances of the chief, the only individual with the privilege of a number of wives, thus leaving unaltered the mutual relation of exchange through which the structure of the group as such is constituted.

Clastres defines the importance of the chief's function as modest, and, moreover, controlled by public opinion; this in turn connotes it with a permanently fragile nuance, since power is determined by group consensus, where crises must be avoided to prevent the generation of disputes that the leader would be unable to solve, thus evidencing the "powerlessness of the institution." In a society based on the exchange of goods, the anthropologist observes, a scarcity of technology does not allow for a great accumulation of wealth: the chief must work hard to express his own prestigious generosity and to cope with the community's demands (no tributes are paid). Polygamy is his only privilege, and is inherited wherever the position of chief itself is hereditary. This privilege interrupts and ends the mutual movement of goods, as we have seen, and defines the very structure of the group: power is excluded by reciprocity, and this exclusion defines and imprisons it.

Antagonism and limitation thus enter the equation: the group's freedom and life "confine" power, submitting it to consent, excluding it from exchange, subjecting it to their own will, and investing it with requests and demands that include harmony, peace, and generous utilization of the chief's personal goods. In other words, he is at their service and excluded from the arbitrariness and prevarication granted by the lack of authority.

The rule, founded on tradition, is behavioral, and is acknowledged and effective. Paradoxically, power becomes marginal if compared to the system and to the social whole; differently from what we are used to observing, the act of accepting dependency can be expressed and preserved. The political institution's refusal drives it to powerlessness. In this case, it is meant as a threat of nature's savage dominion, to which human culture opposes a regulating force. The most accomplished expression of this effort consists of language, since dialogue is the opposite of violence, a guarantee against threat and constraint. The leader detects the essential and vital values for everyone's existence, such as continuity, represented by women: solidarity, the fruit of generosity, and origins, tradition, and peace, all actualized by the word. This is why the chief's lonely speech recalls that of the poet, for whom "words are more sense than signs" (Clastres 1989, 47). The leader is separated by speech that, distinct from power, is thus intended as order or command. The locus of this refusal is society, because it is the real dominating power, and not the chief. Isolation is the warrior's destiny, because conflict is tragic and uncertain, but he who intends to prevaricate is doomed to death from the very beginning.

Clastres's study concerns an all-observant and self-contained society which nothing escapes, since all exit routes are blocked; a society capable of perpetually reproducing itself substantially unchanged through time. Population increase threatens its balance, however, both inner and associative. An imbalance of relations and founding forces is created in the new numeric dimension, in favor of a clan chief endowed with an increasing power and command, and with a considerable political power over extended settlements, as the French and the Portuguese Europeans discovered during their colonization – a phenomenon which threatened traditional organization. In the 15th and 16th centuries, the karai's prophetic word became virulent and eminently subversive, enjoining the Indians to recognize the danger of the destruction of their society. The power of such prophesy was redeeming. The omens recognized the unhappiness and disgrace attending the slow death to which the emergence of power condemned them: they invited them to enter the mythical land without evil, and to survive according to their own ways, coherent and cohesive with their origins. We can here observe how the prophetic word translates and implements the sociocultural function of utopian speech, able to oppose the disruptive temptations of European diversity through its own conscious and trusting strength of self-preservation. The culturally preservative phenomenon is implicit in the prophetism defined by Lanternari in his studies as a movement as well as a release offering "freedom and salvation."

Useful here is Pritchard's observation of the phenomenon's first and innovative appearance as soon as the presence of the white man seriously threatened African ethnicities and groups. "This expresses the care a culture has of itself – Clastres (1989) observes – and at the same time its dream of going beyond itself: a metaphor of the tribe, an image of its myth." The outcome of prophetism has resisted both time and colonization, allowing Clastres to meet and observe the 304,000 Gurang who still lived in the forest during the 1960s.

Power and word, two extremes, each inert in itself, can only subsist one within the other, and if they seem to transcend history, they nevertheless contribute to feed its movement: a historical event takes place when they both establish themselves in the very act of their meeting. "The meta-historical relation between power and the word is no less indissoluble in primitive societies than in state formations, where the most evident difference consists of its conjugation: in state societies the word is power's right, while on the contrary in stateless societies it is power's duty" (Clastres 1989, 151). What the anthropologist is referring to is the whole of state societies, from archaic and modern totalitarianisms to present democratic societies, whose relation of state, although liberal, is nevertheless the remote owner of a legitimate violence.

Clastres (1989, 169) detects "the extreme of negativity, given by the One opposed to the many, in the almost blinding light – reflected by natives'

meditation on the misery of the human condition,” together with the idea that when we detect it, we can possibly avoid it. But below the metaphysical equation that attributes disaster to the One, Clastres perceives another, more subterranean, that assimilates the One to the state and provocatively compares and ponders the two opposite polarities. His “Society against the State” (the title of his ethnographic researches) reproduces society’s radical centrality as the only means of real expression and of efficient democratic participation, far from representativeness and institution (deprived of vitality and maybe, we would say today, of usefulness). He shows us the prevalence of the social in comparison with the affirmation and manipulation of arbitrariness and privilege – and teaches us that responsibility is not a strictly individual term, but can be extended and cultivated in a general, accessible way: a guarantee of balance if not of equity. In this lies the most interesting and evocative suggestion we were initially referring to, if caught in the optics of a power regeneration and of a different way to live it. He also indicates the instruments: the relations and reciprocity of the law, the effectiveness and validity of a tradition that coincides with the group’s sense of identity, the potentialities and development of language and of dialectics, the sense of service (as a supportive availability), as well as of the equally vital participation. According to political and social anthropology, the model retains validity in the limited numeric controllability of the social whole in the co-presence of human limits and contradictions.

Politics without power: Acephalous societies

The anthropological inquiry into political power in simple societies does not accept the phenomenon as immediately recognizable, evident, and classifiable, thus confirming the discipline in its vocation of science of the different. According to Radcliffe-Brown, the research of social anthropology should emphasize a society intended as a moral community that as a whole operates and defends itself from those who try to break its rules. Such a perspective (influenced by Durkheim) rests on a pervasive and shared idea of a rule that can be broken but not subverted or revoked, nor replaced by another. The “introversion of an implicit political conception” that is not evident in a figure or an institutional organism is the focus of some significant research into the Bushmen, the Nuer, and the Masai, societies defined as acephalous.

Other authors have shown that the consensus necessary in such contexts to guarantee social cohesion can be obtained in multiple forms that differ from the law’s legitimate violence, and that a political organization can exist without being necessarily connected to the employment of violence or an authoritative figure. A glance at history shows that general laws of social behavior will never be discovered (although comparative research is possible), but a typology may be created. Evans-Pritchard thought it

was essential to explain the differences, since any pretention of universality contrasts to sociology's real aim; he therefore approached the study of societies as moral rather than natural systems, identifying models instead of scientific laws, and preferring interpretation to explanation. Far from relying on unproductive generalizations, then, we refocus our attention on the original assumption and observe how different forms of power are concretely (even if variously) realizable.

The Bushmen of Central Africa have been studied by several anthropologists in the last 30 years. Hunter-gatherers (17th-century Dutch colonists defined them as Men of the Undergrowth), they live in the inhospitable regions of Botswana and Namibia, gradually retreating in the face of stronger and more aggressive neighbors. Accurate inquiries have shown that, if the dominant ideology privileges hunting as the distinctive and characterizing trait of the Bushmen's life and culture (a reflex of the male predominance if compared with the female), the empiric reality of the composition of their everyday diet shows the primary role of harvest, to which women are principally devoted. Long periods of time are spent by both sexes in rest, ritual, and recreation.

The communities can be designated as gangs, each of them composed of some ten individuals who occupy a territory that is defined exclusively, according to a principle of sovereignty, evincing a concept of political continuity differing from that of parentage or society. This political sense is developed in behavioral rules: if a hunter or a group trespasses when running after wounded prey, when killed, a part of it is offered to its legitimate owners (according to a principle of territoriality) as compensation; the offender thus demonstrates that his action was unintentional and non-aggressive. The Bushmen, where kinship is the cement of social relations, live in a society that is based on territorially autonomous and self-determined social and political unities, evincing respect for the limits of means that are internally and externally, socially, and politically regulated. Each territorial group represents an extended patrilocal family.

The political sense is socially explained internally as a parental unity, and externally when it decides and acts on public affairs, with a precise division of private and public. The men's council or assembly is not an institutionally acknowledged and defined system: disposing of neither power nor coercive means, it can neither take binding decisions, nor impose its own position. Decision are taken around the fire after a briefing by the men, implemented by all the members. The oldest member can have a greater social influence and sometimes performs the functions of an "executive officer" and, if still physically able, those of a leader in the case of raids. But his authority is not legitimated, nor does he possess means of turning his wishes into orders. Any member can contest him, disregard his decisions, or act autonomously. Given the non-legitimacy of his authority, his responsibility is not a privilege but is conceived as a *primus inter pares*. Within the gang, which also

subsumes the social and political function, the family is nuclear and acts as an autonomous entity in periods of water and food scarcity. We see, then, that the Bushmen's "political sense" is neither identified with a person nor with a specific function.

The Nuer of southern Sudan, studied by Pritchard and Fortes, Sahalins and Kuper, are transhumant shepherds, but according to the season and rain supplies become farmers, hunters, or fishermen. Kinship impregnates and marks social relations; despite its movements, the community constitutes a territorial, parental, and political entity, retaining its own identity and even entering into contact with other sections of its own ethnic group. Such contacts, despite the transversal agnatic relations within tribes, clans, and lineage, are far from always peaceful and cooperative. Conflict exists among the different units (where alliances can shift according to circumstances) and within the single units. In spite of this, the political unity, defined by exchanges, shared water sources, territories, camps, herds, game, and also raids or wars against other ethnic groups, is never broken, despite oscillating tensions and confrontation: Nuer identity and culture are thus allowed to survive, even without the structural institution of a chief or a centralized government that represents and guarantees its totality. Their model, however, though devoid of people or political organisms resembling a state, is not without "government."

A hierarchic model exists, defining parental relations: each lineage moves around a segment of lineage that constitutes its center and takes its name from its founder. Several villages unite in a district that constitutes a tertiary tribe, with a dominating segment of lineage that in its turn is subject to the highest tribal level, where a single clan holds a position of supremacy: an example, then, of a complex organization coexisting with and presiding over a simple society. The terms of conflict go from internecine fights to other serious internal imbalances that range from cattle theft to murder.

The figure authorized to reconcile the parties is the man with a leopard fur, an initiatrix cum religious figure whose task is to mediate and decide on redress and compensation: either vengeance or reward, which is always decided by the offended party. Despite the crucial nature of his function, overseeing the continuity and order of social unity, the assignee possesses neither power nor coercive means to impose his will or settle a quarrel, the terms of which are defined by the people concerned. Despite Kuper's criticism of Pritchard's interpretative theoretical construction, there is no shortage of evidence of the ease with which a chief, endowed with a legitimate and effective authority though devoid of any binding function, can impose and maintain permanent cohesion and identity within social dynamics.

It is of considerable interest that both Nuers and Bushmen succeed in overcoming "critical" situations, despite lacking any authoritative leadership, and maintain their identity and traditions in totally realistic contexts and not in utopian theorizations. Another such example is offered by the Masai,

transhumant shepherds of Kenya (studied by Hallis, Gulliver, Spencer, and Rigby), who conduct their social and political organization without a chief through age-assorted groups that “rule” for 15 years and have their tasks:

- Military tasks: the singira, young single men;
- Business and family: the moruak;
- Political and decisional tasks: the elderly piron;
- The protection of ritual prerogatives: the dasali, respected and honored since they are the depository of Masai shared values, though endowed with only moral authority.

Finally, it should be pointed out that age groups confirm a “different presence and assigning of power” in absence of kinship, without any acknowledged chiefs or authorities.

A different thought-process

The feminine tendency toward union was chosen by Pulcini as the possible foundation of an ethics paradigm that must take into account the texture of relations and the importance of the concrete Other in order to choose. Philosophy detects an opposition between the two forms of affectivity of male and female and of the emotional manifestations of the two sexes. Promethean male subjectivity is fed by an incessant dynamism and perennial dissatisfaction, as opposed to women’s fullness, satisfied by their bodily potential and by their intrinsic and natural capability of loving, which keeps them within themselves and within the separate Other, in a calm balance undisturbed by the tension of desire. Feminine power can unite, bring peace, and heal.

Through a critical and self reflexive process, philosophy proposes a shift in favor of the concept of power that lies outside the dominion and the destruction of the Other, but becomes an “expression and an endowment of a ‘happy and virtuous’ I, satisfied with its love for itself but conscious of its own moral limits, ‘useful’ for itself and others” (Weil 1956). Simone Weil’s concept of “passive power” is revived and again proposed as a social and cultural model since it conjugates mutual love for oneself and self-empowerment with an ethical attention for the other. Desire deserves a critical approach because it is not in itself a sacred and incontrovertible factor of truth and, philosophy warns, if it has been forbidden to women for a long time, its denial can make it emerge in all its blind and enslaving strength. Today technology feeds the sacredness of desire: by eroding the critical capacity, it affects autonomy and the authentic desiring capacity, manipulating individual interiority through external forces, thereby making a person the unconscious creator and victim of his/her own destiny. The inauthenticity of desire is devoured by a devious process that makes its nature mimetic

rather than free, the consequences of which are conflict and social violence on the one hand and the absence of individual authenticity on the other (a sign of frustration and alienation that today is increasingly pathological).

If in Pulcini's analysis man's freedom and identity are now seriously in danger, as Cioran warned in his opening observation, the prospect is neither apocalyptic nor millenaristic. Women can determine the chance in the post-modern era: in a chaotic dispersion and disintegration, they can create a cohesive identity (through care and love) despite its ambivalences and its inevitable plurality, thus rediscovering both the limit and the authenticity of desire. In this sense, "desire can assume a subversive power compared with the objectifying power of speeches and a function of irreducible dissonance compared with the homologation and self-identification of a subjectivity, which will in any case forever remain, always with regard to apparently obvious truths or to definitively closed orders" (Pulcini 2003).

The analysis of the transformation of the very concept of power proposed by Pulcini has been substantially modified by other authors. Freud allows us to understand its roots within the individual, where it would occur not through external construction but through the self-determined internalization of authority; Foucault has shown how power is exercised not through coercion but through control, prevention, and discipline. He has integrated the repressive concept with the productive one of knowledge and forms of discourse (philosophical, medical, and scientific) that tend to penetrate bodies and souls, thus both dominating them and at the same time making them accomplices. Both interpretations of the phenomenon show that the public-private dichotomy is outmoded, transformed in an all-pervading dimension of human life, and can indeed subject freedom, identity, and conscience to new definitions.

By observing the social and cultural dynamics of our Western world, we notice how the modern individual's priority and fundamental desires are reduced to those of acquisition and fame, in which the individual finds the very sources of his/her identity and affirmation. According to Pulcini (2003), desires have access to the symbolic sphere through power that becomes the instrument to self-affirmation in a world where nothing is any longer attributed "a priori," but where each person is called to manage his or her own program of life autonomously.

Observing the individual in postmodern Western society, philosophy, in accord with Lipovetski (2005), grasps the paradox of the loss of instrumental and contracted rationality produced by the subjectivist tendency, where the excessive emphasis on the ego is parallel to the incapacity of pursuing one's own authentic interest. Imprisoned in a sterile and dangerous spiral of indifference and immediacy, the individual is concerned only with self-realization, and hostile to any "communitas" whatsoever, and subject to events he/she is unable to manage and control. Pulcini renegotiates the real premises of modernity, asking if an emotional drive exists in the modern

human, involving consideration of the other not as a means but as an end. In the private sphere, women privilege values such as friendship, sisterhood, and care, which are removed or expelled by the public sphere, over competition and rivalry. In their maternal capacity and potentiality, they are able to transform their own specificity and dignity into caring, which can operate in public and private environments through their ways of being, acting, and choosing. The deficit of social solidarity is in this way compensated and filled by the anthropological-psychic concept of responsibility that keeps the two inalienable aspects of individuality ambivalently united and of an opening to alterity, the object of a relational tension.

Pulcini, however, insists on the necessity of a reciprocal characteristic of responsibility whose matrix is neither based on need nor sacrificial but a free subjectivity of gift that intends to re-establish a bond, because “we perceive ourselves as subjects in debt and acknowledge a constitutive part of our identity and of our being in the world in the other. . . . We give because we acknowledge our very vulnerability, and failure” (Pulcini 2003). The motive is belonging, the widening of the boundaries of one’s ego, and the consequent projecting into a common dimension. The gift represents the symbolic event in which the passion for the other is made concrete and the giver is configured as an open and hospitable subject, who realizes himself/herself at the moment when s/he acknowledges the sense of his/her existence in the other. All this must be performed and expressed according to a deep adhesion to the self (consonant, ordered, and fit for one’s desires, passions, and inclinations), the real and only chance of authenticity. Being for the other thus becomes being with the other without any negation of one’s own identity, but with a reunification to the missing part we desire and choose to belong to. It is on this free and active capacity for ethical recognition that we can build social coexistence, where even the “remote” foreigner represents the ineludible interlocutor of an individual.

Without the power of utopias

If contemporary studies of “applied anthropology” are focused on producing programs and projects tending to improve conflict and disquiet through a sensibility toward the identity and freedom of expression of individuals and of groups, Cioran’s opening consideration invites us to consider how power is prevailing in our lives. The seduction of ideologies, whose application has documented only contradictions and failures, has certainly ceased to nurture the reassurance about the future that has operated from the Enlightenment to the present day.

In the long term it becomes stifling, at least for the multitude. If it wishes to avoid paralysis, the world needs a new delirium. . . . Imagine a society overtaken by doubts, where apart from a few moral drifters, nobody

adheres completely to anything: where resistant to superstitions and certainties everybody refers to freedom and nobody respects the form of government that defends and embodies it.

(Cioran 1998b)

Or consider these contradictory consequences: “No, this society that cares nothing for you is not sinister, but it grants you the right to attack it, it invites, and indeed forces you to do so in those moments of inertia where it lacks the energy to execrate itself” (Cioran 1998b).

The place of power located at the center of the Greek *agorà*, so that it can belong to no-one who would misuse it, as Vernant observes, has returned to prominence in modern society over the citizens it should represent: subjugated, yet endowed with inalienable rights. The loci and the ways in which these rights are respected represent the dangerous game through which freedom passes from a real juridical state to its mystification, depriving it of any possibility of existence.

According to Rigoni, the two genders, the utopist and the apocalyptic, seemingly so dissimilar, in Cioran merge and embrace and give rise to a third, surprisingly capable of mirroring the new reality which menaces us, described by Attali in his 2006 *A Brief History of the Future* from which the new imminent forms of power emerge realistic and troubling. Attali quantifies the time that separates a socially necessary innovation from its effective diffusion as about half a century. Observing a series of phenomena that are presently marginal or as yet undefined, he prefigures landscapes in which the most diverse situations are coexistent, rather than in chronological succession, as the author presents them. Curiously, the role of sciences and technologies that constitute the dominant forces of our time represent (as Cioran prophesized) the closest form of enslavement. Following Attali, the Internet, in its “spatial revolution,” represents the first substantial warning of future phenomena: it performs the same functions as a geographical continent, although it cannot be physically measured or placed, to discover, populate, and organize, and to favor in its users a sense of ubiquity that contemplates a new nomadism (this time technological), united to an altered sense of reference and belonging. The main consequence of this process, according to Attali, would be the extinction of the social contract, thus reducing the state to the function of intermediary between enterprise and public opinion. The most immediate consequence would be a change in the sense of sociality, where the individual of tomorrow would perceive the world as a totality at his/her own service, within the rules imposed by assurances as to individual behavior, and would only consider the Other as an instrument of his/her own happiness.

Significant changes would accompany the dissolution of institutional tasks: arbitration would take the place of the judiciary; the exercise of power would manifest itself through hyper-control transferred and performed

by technology, and fundamental functions, such as education, health, and sovereignty, would be entrusted to market forces. In this globalized extraterritoriality, online economic and financial transitions would end up favoring tax evasion, and also the illegal income of organized crime. In such a context the media themselves would have to adapt to a free, participatory, and ultra-personalized broadcasting. In the psychological disorientation produced by such scenarios, the needs for security, to overcome fear and distraction, to conquer alienation, suffering, and boredom – all seen by Attali as personified in the great enterprises of insurance and of entertainment – would necessarily predominate: the latter, for example, is strictly involved in the promotion and production of old and new drugs, technological drugs included, that are intended for mass consumption.

To contrast disruptive and destructive tendencies, emerging forces would be activated, replicating what has happened during the historical successions of changes and movements of business, and would thus affirm themselves as a putative success, able to impose a decisive trend inversion. Technologies, strategies, competences, and sophisticated systems of analysis and prediction would be employed and oriented by organizations of discrete institutions, able effectively to prevent conflict by dissuasion, and acquire growing credibility and influence in order to guarantee respect and influence (Attali points to a number of such elements already operative in the international community). To avoid chaos, the structure should be accompanied by an effective civil society which, however, Attali adds, could come only from society itself.

We can grasp here the return of a social dynamic prefigured in Clastres, whereby we ask power to define and guarantee a way of being “equal, quiet, united, and fraternal” with no coercions. This democratic and planetary ethos should limit the powers of the market, trying to win other wars “against man’s insanity, climate aberrations, mortal diseases, alienation, exploitation, and misery” (Clastres 1989).

Since, rather than considering itself the master of the world, it is conscious of enjoying the temporary use of it, this new avant-garde could also implement property rights, not tied to any concrete place, from purchase to access (thus granting a stay of execution for the habits of the Nuer and Masai). Attali (2011) recognizes the fundamental change in lifestyle in the rejection of nomadism in favor of permanent settlement, perceived and experienced “through a new and different sense of vigilance, of hospitality, of the long term perspective,” and concludes his essay by honoring and indicating maternity’s deepest meaning, to bring joy and happiness as distinctive human elements.

The aim of the present reflection is to point out how care, culture, and mediation are new transformative lines in women’s hands and destinies to be democratically integrated into present society. Women find themselves at a turning point between tradition (to preserve and evaluate), modifications, notes, ruptures, and censorship, as regards domestic, social, cultural, and

judicial aspects. Mawkishness and rhetoric apart, maternity presents itself as a propulsive capacity to contain something which is “other than one’s self,” to bring him/her into existence, and accompany him/her through to independence and maturity (common goals both of sociality and of culture).

Note

1. In some ethnic groups there are initiation rites for women that present different contents connected to fertility, to technical abilities, sometimes to divination. These rites are nevertheless unrelated to the myth of origins, to cosmogony, to afterlife, to war, to deep sea fishing, and to hunting.

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Part III

Reconceptualizing the Quality of Democracy

Section Introduction

José Álvaro Moisés

All the chapters in this book are based on the conviction that democracy is the best form of governance. Some differences among authors refer, however, to explanations of how and why, in spite of the tremendous technological and intellectual advances of the last centuries, democracy, although varying to a great extent between countries, is only partially implemented. From the point of view of the link between gender and democracy, some chapters uphold the view that women's marginalization can be remedied by including and promoting women in political, economic, social, and academic life in the context of critical existing democratic experiences, while others sustain the view that the overarching male culture, characterized by the obsessive search of "power for the sake of power," is a stumbling block not just for women, but for democracy itself.

In the current era of globalization, democratic values face serious challenges. Exclusive focus on liberal conceptions of individual rights has sometimes eclipsed concerns about communal flourishing which is essential for democracy. As inequalities have grown exponentially within and across nations, self-interest is celebrated and naturalized. The pursuit of individual advantage independently of the social context and hard profit-making with no concern to its impact on the structure of inequalities has displaced notions of equitable distribution, collective well-being, and social justice.

Under these circumstances, particular interventions are essential to enable democratic values to take root. We maintain that special efforts must be made to transform public debate: the pursuit of self-interest must be denaturalized; and campaigns must be launched to emphasize the centrality of interdependence, collaboration, solidarity, and mutuality in everyday life, referring also to the importance of partners sharing domestic chores.

I am indebted to Mary Hawkesworth and Mino Vianello for the rich conversations that informed this Introduction.

Innovative leadership programs should also be created to train a new generation of leaders who could champion democratic values and be prepared for the long struggle for social transformation. The content of education should be redesigned to teach children to value equality, appreciate diversity, practice shared decision-making, to explore their interior feelings, and understand the myriad harms created by inequalities in intimate, family, community, national, and global relations.

Drawing on the skills of artists and activists, media campaigns should be launched to change the terms of public discourse that extol the use of female bodies for the cosmetic and fashion industry, to prioritize anti-racism, anti-sexism, anti-homophobia, anti-xenophobia, and to illuminate the virtues of plural, diverse, and inclusive societies. In the context of persistent discrimination and violence, protest, litigation, and negotiation remain critical mechanisms to press for the rights of the marginalized and the oppressed.

Popular mobilization is therefore essential to contest the power of money in electoral politics and to press governments to limit the power of the affluent to shape election results. And in the context of violent political conflicts, it is imperative to develop international mechanisms to stop the organized deployment of force to achieve political objectives. Diplomatic initiatives, economic sanctions, and prohibition of the sale of armed weapons are important means by which to stop governments from killing their own citizens or oppressing those they deem enemies of the state.

These considerations may seem “utopian” to some. Movements beyond the pursuit of self-interest and the quest for power for power’s sake may seem unimaginable. Yet the historical experience demonstrates that the transformation of values is always possible. In the past four decades, fascist rule has been replaced by vibrant democracy in Portugal and Spain; military dictatorships have been overthrown and replaced by far more participatory and egalitarian politics in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and many other nations in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. The authoritarian model of the Soviet bloc was also transformed after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In the late 18th century, proponents of aristocratic orders such as Edmund Burke deemed a regime governed by individual rights inconceivable. Just as individualism has taken root over the past two centuries in many parts of the world, cultures that prize empathy, solidarity, and mutual respect, and economies that work to meet human needs are conceivable – not only in the centuries ahead but in the present. Indeed, those values lie at the heart of many contemporary social and political movements, as recent events have shown in North Africa and in the Middle East. To fulfill the promise of inclusive democracy, it is not necessary to invent something altogether new, but to struggle against elites that structure systems of governance in their own interests rather than in the interests of the vast preponderance of the human population.

Specific recommendations

1. Democracy should be understood as a work in progress. As a political regime based on principles of freedom and equality, democracy must be permanently open to transformation designed to achieve new dimensions of individual realization and communal well-being. Social, economic, political, and technological changes pose new challenges that require innovation in democratic governance to foster and preserve equitable outcomes;
2. To develop egalitarian rights for all and promote the full inclusion of women, political and social actors should organize collective action committed to the transformation of existing democracies;
3. Democracy must also be seen as a complex political phenomenon that integrates principles, processes, practices, and outcomes, and not only institutional procedures. Thus, institutions must be carefully constructed to foster participation, equitable representation, rule of law, full implementation of the equal rights of all citizens, inclusive mechanisms to involve all strata of the citizenry in decision-making processes, and systems of accountability that enable the people to control what governments do in their name;
4. To fulfill the democratic promises, political reforms must be introduced in existing democracies to guarantee equal representation of women and other marginalized social segments, but also to democratize parliaments, judiciaries, and political parties. Democratization of political parties requires change in electoral laws to establish the right of partisans and interested electors to take part in decisions about candidates, constituency boundaries, and party programs;
5. Democratization requires changes in laws, constitutions, and operating procedures of the institutions of governance. In addition to changes in the formal procedures and practices of governance, democratization requires transformation of political culture, informal practices, and individual attitudes. Innovative education to foster respect for the democratic rights of citizenship and the political inclusion of women and marginalized groups is particularly important. Systemic interventions are needed to ensure that democratic values of diversity, empathy, inclusion, solidarity, and mutual respect shape all dimensions of social and political life.

13

Gender and Democratic Governance: Reprising the Politics of Exclusion

Mary Hawkesworth

As an ideal, democratic governance respects the dignity of human beings, affords rights and immunities to individuals, prevents abuse of power by government officials (or provides remedies for removal of abusive governments), fosters individual freedom, encourages collective action to achieve political benefits, provides opportunities for political innovation, and maintains mechanisms through which citizens can hold governments accountable. In establishing fundamental freedoms for citizens through the constitutional protection of certain civil liberties (freedom of thought, speech, press, association, freedom from particular forms of governmental abuse, and freedom to participate in politics by voting and standing for election) and the provision of fundamental fairness through the rule of law and a range of entitlements to certain standards of living secured by the state, democracy is characterized variously as a gender-neutral, gender-blind, or gender-inclusive system of governance. Yet, there remains a great gulf between the promise of democratic governance and its practice in the 21st century. This chapter explores that gulf in relation to the unfulfilled promise of gender equality.

Explaining women's continuing absence

In 2015, women's roles within the state are as diverse as the offices of state, spanning executives, judiciaries, legislatures, and bureaucracies. Yet their numbers remain sparse: 22 women hold chief executive offices in their nations, roughly 11.5 percent of the world total; they are joined in the executive branch of government by female cabinet ministers, who hold on average 16 percent of cabinet posts, concentrated in the areas of education, health, and welfare; and across the globe, women constitute approximately 23 percent of the high court justices (Hoekstra, 2010) and 22.2 percent of the members of parliament or national legislatures (IPU, 2015). Although women work within the bureaucracies of most states, they are far more

numerous in support staff positions than in the ranks of senior civil servants. Women constitute 30 percent of the police force in only two countries, Australia and South Africa; the global average falls below 10 percent (Amani, 2010). Women serve in the military in many countries in the 21st century, but only two nations, Eritrea and Israel, require mandatory military service for women; and only a few nations allow women to serve in combat roles (Seger, 2009).¹ The persisting gulf between formal equality – a constitutional guarantee of the equal status of all citizens – and equal representation of men and women in the institutions of governance stands sorely in need of explanation.

Prior to the emergence of feminist approaches to the study of politics, most of the research in political science ignored gender. Although the literature suggested that “gender blindness” was a form of objective analysis appropriate to the study of “citizens,” most accounts confused male bias with gender blindness. The early studies of women’s political behavior make this bias particularly clear. In the first large study of voting behavior in the United States, for example, which was entitled *The People’s Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign*, Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet (1944) characterized “sex” as “the only personal characteristic that affects non-voting.” Finding women to be less interested in the presidential campaign than men, the authors concluded simply that “men are better citizens.” In the first comparative study of women in European nations, *The Political Role of Women*, Maurice Duverger (1955) explained the paucity of women in elective offices in terms of individual choice, although Duverger noted that women’s choices were linked to deeply entrenched cultural values. “The small part played by women in politics merely reflects and results from the secondary place to which they are still assigned by the customs and attitudes of our society and which their education and training tend to make them accept as the natural order of things” (Duverger, 1955: 130).

When political scientists attempted to explain women’s decisions *not* to engage in the rough and tumble of electoral politics, they emphasized factors independent of political institutions. Some attributed women’s absence from politics to cultural values that deemed it inappropriate for women to engage in public life. Some suggested the pervasive influence of social roles, suggesting that marriage, motherhood, and homemaking divert women’s interest and energy from politics, concentrating it instead on the private sphere. Some suggested that girls were socialized to deference, which makes them prefer “behind the scenes” roles in politics rather than positions that place them in the public eye. Some noted that gendered divisions of labor at home and at work left women without the resources essential to a career in politics – high income, advanced education, free time, institutionally acquired skills, extensive professional networks (for a review of this literature see Flammang, 1997; Burns, 2007). Whether the

explanation emphasizes cultural values, social roles, or economic resources, these accounts of women's absence from political leadership all direct attention to nonpolitical forces. Women's political disadvantage stems from individual choices that have nothing to do with politics.

Over the past 40 years, feminist scholars have proven that "individual choice" explanations for women's underrepresentation in elective and appointive offices are woefully inadequate. Individual choice accounts are oblivious to forces that shape individual "preferences" and ambitions, to institutional contexts that enable and constrain individual action, and to structural forces that circumscribe the possibility of free choice. Indeed feminist scholars have argued that individual choice explanations only serve to mask political relations *between* women and men, rendering systems that advantage men invisible (Kathlene, 1989, 1994; Rule and Zimmerman, 1994; McClintock, 1995; Flammang, 1997; Peterson and Runyon, 1999; Chappell, 2002; Mazur, 2002; McDonagh, 2002).

Gendered institutions and the politics of exclusion

Since the 1970s feminist scholars have devoted considerable energy to theorizing concepts such as *gender power* and *gendered institutions* in order to develop more illuminating explanations of women's underrepresentation in positions of political power; and in the process, they have greatly expanded our understanding of the contours of political life.

Developing a "theory of gendered institutions," feminist scholars have begun to map the manifold ways that gender privilege and disadvantage are created and maintained, not only through law but also through institutional processes and political practices, which distribute political opportunities on the basis of race and gender (Acker, 1989, 1992; Steinberg, 1992; Kenney, 1996). The theory of gendered institutions calls attention to the politics of exclusion embedded in historical and contemporary practices. According to this account, political institutions are gendered in that male lawmakers have used the state to create laws that privilege men. At very different historical moments, across many geographic sites, men have passed laws to ban women from political life. Consider a partial list:

- In the 5th century, the Salic law was implemented in much of the Holy Roman Empire to exclude women from inheritance of land, property, and title, the preconditions for political power. Although nothing specific was said about monarchy in this early formulation, in the 14th century in the midst of succession struggles in France, and later in Spain, the Salic law was resurrected to prohibit women from serving as regents.
- In the "New World," which supposedly held no truck with feudal hierarchies and titles of nobility, between 1776 and 1783 when designing their constitutions in the midst of the American Revolution, 12 of the original

13 states forming the United States excluded women from the rights of citizenship. Reflecting Quaker influence, New Jersey's first constitution awarded voting rights to single women who owned property. This right was rescinded in 1807 (Apter Klinghoffer and Elkis, 1992).

- In 1778, the English House of Commons prohibited women from attending and listening to its debates from the floor or gallery (Towns, 2009).
- Despite women's active and critical participation in the French Revolution, in 1793, the French National Assembly voted not only to exclude women from rights of citizenship, but to ban women's participation in political clubs and to prohibit the existence of popular women's associations, effectively closing all avenues for women's political activism (Landes, 1998; Offen, 2000).
- In 1804, following the failure of the first French Republic, the *Code Napoleon*, which was later imposed on much of Europe, classified women as "incapacitated" and excluded them, along with children, convicted criminals, and the insane, from political life. Indeed, the Napoleonic Code deprived women of rights to perform as civil witnesses, to plead in court in their own names, or to own property without their husband's consent (Landes, 1988, 1998).
- In 1843, Colombia defined citizenship exclusively in terms of "men of means" (Coker Gonzalez, 2000).
- In 1851, Prussian law stripped women of all political rights and banned them from attending political meetings (Towns, 2009).
- In 1868, the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution introduced the language of "male citizen" as a precondition for voting rights, qualifying the earlier gender-neutral language that referred to "persons."
- In 1887, The Netherlands banned women from participation in politics (Bock, 2002).
- In 1890, Japan's Imperial Diet issued the Law on Assembly and Political Association (*shukai oyobi seishaho*), banning women from participating in political meetings or joining political parties. Although the ban on attending political meetings was lifted in 1921, the ban on political party membership continued until 1945, when suffrage was granted with some restrictions (Molony, 2010).
- Women were banned from all political activity in Germany in 1900, in Austria in 1907, in Italy in 1912, in China in 1913, and in Portugal in 1913 (Bock, 2002; Edwards, 2010).
- In 1948, the Republic of Korea outlawed the leading progressive women's organization (*NamChoson Minju yosong Tongmaeng*). Although Korean women were granted the franchise, this restriction made it impossible for them to support socialist or Communist parties (Kim and Kim, 2010).
- In Indonesia in 1965 Gerwani (*Gerakan Wanita Indonesia*), the largest segment of the Indonesian Women's Movement, was banned and many of

its members were among the half million murdered and the 580,000 imprisoned by the Suharto “New Order” regime (Blackburn, 2010).

- In 1972 in the Philippines, MAKIBAKA, a political organization organized by women for women, was suppressed and its leader, Lorena Barros, was killed by the military (Roces, 2010).
- In 1990 the military government in Myanmar refused to recognize the election results that would have made Daw Aung San Suu Kyi the prime minister, after her party carried 82 percent of the vote.
- In Pakistan between 2000 and 2002, despite new legislation creating 60 (22.5 percent) reserved seats for women in the National Assembly, social and religious leaders in 20 percent of the electoral districts prevented women from being candidates and in 30 percent of the electoral districts prevented women from exercising their right to vote (Krook, 2009).
- Until 2008, Maldives banned women from serving as president or vice-president (UNDP, 2010).
- In states governed by Muslim law, women are excluded from the “*wilaya kubra*” (the great ‘guardianship’), which means that they cannot lead Friday prayers or lead a country, and in some cases they cannot lead a government.²

Women have been banned from political life at very different times and places, but that fact does not explain why this has happened. These exclusions have been introduced by secular regimes and religious regimes, by revolutionaries and by conservatives, by proponents of democratic republics, socialist states, and nationalist administrations, which suggests that the cause is not tied to any particular political ideology. Exclusionary practices have been introduced repeatedly over the course of history at times when women have been actively engaged in politics. Rather than being a remnant of prevailing traditions, mechanisms that exclude women are innovations associated with particular political reforms traceable to precise historical moments.

Feminist scholars have investigated the complex factors that contribute to the exclusion of women from political life at particular times and places. They have called attention to the role of misogyny in designing electoral systems, nominating procedures, and political institutions that advantage men. As Joan Landes (1988, 1998) and Linda Kerber (1980) have documented, rather than fostering women’s liberty on equal terms with men, the ideology of “republican motherhood,” cultivated by republican revolutionaries in the United States and in France, insisted that women’s contribution to democratic politics lies in childbearing and childrearing. Only when restricted to the home could women develop the “natural morality” requisite to the nurturance of future male citizens. Indeed, in the *Social Contract*, Rousseau (1762/1947) grounded the right of democratic participation on a principle

of *resemblance*, an embodied likeness that he imagined his ideal male citizens would share by virtue of being farmers who owned land and were masters of their households – households in which men ruled over women and children.

By excluding women from full citizenship, male lawmakers used the law as a means to produce not only sex-segregated political spaces, but to reshape gender identities within the confines of emerging conceptions of “separate spheres.” Asserting that men and women have different “natures,” proponents of the emerging gender ideology insisted that men and women be assigned to sex-segregated social and economic roles for their own happiness, as well as for the good of society. Indeed, French aristocrat, revolutionary, and diplomat Talleyrand (1754–1838), who assisted in writing the *Declaration of the Rights of Man*, went on to persuade the French National Assembly that women’s “share should be uniquely domestic happiness and the duties of the household.” In his “Report on Public Instruction” (1791) presented to the Assembly on behalf of the Committee on the Constitution, Talleyrand argued that “in accordance with the will of nature,” women should renounce political rights in order to ensure their happiness and their long-term protection (Offen, 2000: 59).

From the outset, then, bourgeois domesticity, whether in the form of the nuclear family or the colonial plantation, was inherently political – even as the private sphere was proclaimed pre-political and “protected” from the intrusions of state power. By situating women, the indentured, and the enslaved in a domain beyond the reach of the state and barring them from public speech and political participation, proponents of “liberty, equality, and fraternity” naturalized subordination, allowing the rhetoric of republican motherhood, “opposite sexes,” “inferior races,” and separate spheres to mask the explicit acts of men that produced the subordination.³

In Europe, over the course of the 19th century, women were effectively excluded not only from political clubs and associations, and legislative assemblies, but also from coffee houses, educational institutions, the professions, the practice of science, and the worlds of art and cultural production (Davidoff, 1998). By 1850, women were excluded from the leadership of unions. And although poor women always worked outside the home, repeated efforts were launched in the 19th century to bar women from factories, mines, and other skilled crafts. As feminist labor historians have demonstrated, the invention of the “male breadwinner” and the quest for a “family wage” were well-orchestrated attempts to mask the pronounced presence of women in the industrial labor force and to remove women from desperately needed waged labor (Anderson, 2000; Offen, 2000). Defining women by their familial relationships, placing women under the legal guardianship of men, and denying them the right to enter into contracts effectively precluded women from selling their labor freely in the marketplace. In this way, bourgeois law produced *homo oeconomicus* (the

conception of man as a rational, economic maximizer who acts intentionally to improve his condition) as an exclusively male identity. Women were not completely excluded from the productive sector, but they were denied the right to represent themselves in economic negotiations, to control the conditions of exchange for their labor and their products, and to benefit equitably from the sale of the products they produced. These restrictions have had long-lasting consequences: only 1 percent of the world's assets are owned by women. In the many nations in which personal wealth plays a large role in influencing elections, women suffer cumulative disadvantage.

Political theorist Carole Pateman has traced the means by which nascent welfare states constructed (white) "male independence" as the criterion for public citizenship, while simultaneously making it impossible for women to meet that criterion. States created "three elements of 'independence' ... related to the masculine capacity for self-protection: the capacity to bear arms, the capacity to own property and the capacity for self-government" (Pateman, 1998: 248). States used mandatory male military service, conscription, and militia duty as means to construct men as "bearers of arms." Women, on the other hand, were "unilaterally disarmed," barred from military service and from combat duty, as men were assigned responsibility for the "protection of women and children." Through laws governing freedom of contract, states created the most fundamental property owned by "free men," the property in their own person and in their labor power. By constructing women as the property of their fathers or husbands, states denied women the right to freely contract their labor. By structuring marriage laws to guarantee men perpetual sexual access to their wives, states denied married women autonomous ownership of their bodies. Moreover, by creating the category "head of household" and restricting it to men, states created men's capacity for governance, not only of themselves but of their "dependents." Pateman points out that census classifications in Britain and Australia officially recognized the male worker as "breadwinner" and his wife as his "dependent," regardless of her contributions to household subsistence and income. Between 1851 and 1911 in Britain, and in 1891 in Australia, women's domestic labor was reclassified from a form of productive activity to a mode of dependency. This reclassification was coupled with efforts to remove married women from the paid labor market on the belief that female workers depressed men's wages. The campaign for a "family wage" paid to the male "breadwinner" – actively promoted by the trade union movement – enshrined the principle of unequal pay for women in law, as it simultaneously masked women's presence in the industrial and agricultural labor force, and rendered their role as family providers invisible. In 1912, there were 45 percent of the male workers in Australia who were single, yet they were paid the family wage; while female workers, one-third of whom were supporting dependents, were paid 46–50 percent less than male wages on the basis of the legal fiction that

they were not breadwinners. Thus the state created and reinforced women's identity as "dependent" directly and indirectly, even as it used dependency to legitimate women's exclusion from political life. Defined by the state as dependent, regardless of their actual earnings or wealth, women were declared "trespassers into the public edifice of civil society and the state" (Pateman, 1998: 248).

Political parties and the politics of exclusion

Beyond enacting laws and policies that legitimate unequal treatment of women, male politicians forged alliances and crafted organizations that play crucial roles in political life. Most notable among these are political parties, organizations that exist to vie for political power – recruiting candidates, organizing election campaigns, structuring issue agendas, and once elected organizing legislative and executive processes of governance. Like public offices, political parties continue to be male-dominant institutions: women constitute less than 10 percent of the leaders of political parties in nations around the globe (Sacchet, 2005). Through complex nominating processes and construction of party lists of candidates, male party leaders tend to recruit men to run for "winnable seats," thus playing a "gatekeeper" role that effectively excludes women. For years, party leaders claimed their preference for male candidates simply responded to voter preferences, citing opinion polls from the 1930s that indicated that voters would not cast a ballot for a qualified woman. Public opinion polls since the 1970s, however, reveal that sex bias among voters is no longer a problem. Indeed election returns from Europe, Africa, and the Americas indicate that women candidates often outpoll their male counterparts. Sex bias among male party elites, however, remains a sizable obstacle to women seeking elective offices. In all regions of the globe, studies have documented continuing gender discrimination in political parties' recruitment practices, provision of campaign financing, and the pervasive operation of old boy networks within parties in parliament and in the executive branch of government.

Some might argue that such entrenched pro-male bias within political parties is a thing of the past, citing the proliferation of party quotas for women candidates since 2000. Indeed, party and constitutional quotas have proliferated since the 1995 United Nations World Conference on Women in Beijing: 111 nations now have formal or informal policies in force to increase the numbers of female candidates nominated for elective offices (Krook, 2009). And these quotas go a long way toward explaining increasing numbers of women in parliament since the mid-1990s. But quotas are far from transparent instruments. There is considerable evidence that quotas are more effective in signifying interest in advancing women than in actually advancing women in politics. Quotas are perhaps best understood as a promissory note whose payment depends on additional conditions.

Consider, for example, the constitutional mandate for *parité* (sex equality in elective offices) in France. The constitution and the electoral law were amended in 1999 and 2000, respectively, to mandate that parties nominate 50 percent male and 50 percent female candidates in all electoral contests. Yet, in the first decade of implementation the percentage of women serving in the National Assembly increased only from 11 percent in 1997 to 18.9 percent in 2008 and 27 percent in 2012. Despite the strong constitutional promise of equality, the legislation implementing *parité* failed to specify that female candidates had to be nominated in districts where they had a chance of winning. Moreover, the penalties for non-compliance were limited to small fines – so small that the major parties lost little by ignoring the law and incurring the fines.

India provides another instructive example, having gained international acclaim in the early 1990s by establishing a reservation policy that sets aside 33 percent of the seats on village councils for women. Since then, women who were first elected to reserved seats have successfully run for non-reserved seats with the result that more than 40 percent of local elected officials in India are women, twice the national average around the globe. Yet despite massive lobbying efforts by feminist activists in India, the National Assembly has refused to pass a similar quota bill at the national level.

Brazil provides additional insight into the politics of gender quotas. Brazil established a 20 percent quota for female candidates in 1996, which was scheduled to increase to 25 percent in 1998 and to 30 percent in 2000. At the same time, however, the legislature passed a regulation to allow parties to nominate 50 percent more candidates than there are seats available in the legislature. This “escape clause” resulted in a decline in women’s representation from 6 percent in 1994 to 5 percent in 1996. In 2002, women increased their representation to 8 percent, then to 9 percent in 2006; although they suffered a slight decline to 8.8 percent in 2010, women won 9.9 percent of the seats in the lower house and 13.6 percent in the upper house in the October 2014 election. Women have gained ground in Brazil, yet they remain a very long way from the 30 percent mark suggested by the quota (Jalalzai and Krook, 2010: 16).

Gendered institutions and women’s experiences in governance

Beyond exclusion by law and gatekeeping by male politicians, gendered institutions operate in ways that ensure that women face unique challenges when they enter the political life. In assuming state power, women confront many of the same challenges as their male counterparts – political intrigues, partisan wrangling, struggles for power, constitutional constraints, complex policy problems, economic crises, international alliances, national security, natural disasters, and partial knowledge. But women also confront an additional set of challenges when working within gendered institutions –

male-dominant organizations calibrated over long expanses of time to the rhythms of male lives and to practices of power premised on the exclusion of women. These challenges ensure that even when women hold equal offices, they do not work on precisely the same terms as their male counterparts. Gendered institutions affect the conditions under which they can succeed in their work, the nature of interpersonal exchanges while in office, when and under what conditions they can pursue initiatives “for women,” and the level of satisfaction they find in their work.

Empirical studies routinely indicate distinct policy priorities among male and female legislators. A recent global survey by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), for example, found that “women parliamentarians as a whole tend to emphasize issues such as childcare, equal pay, parental leave, and pensions. They highlight reproductive rights, physical safety, gender-based violence, human development, the alleviation of poverty, and the delivery of services” (UNDP, 2010: 102). But there are many factors that may undermine efforts of women legislators to translate their policy priorities into policy gains for women as a group (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008). Women constitute only a small minority among elected officials. Without support from their male counterparts, they don’t have the votes to pass legislation.

Extrapolating from Rosabeth Moss Kanter’s (1977) work on gender power within organizations, some scholars suggested that women MPs would have better prospects in acting for women once they achieve “critical mass.” By relying on numbers alone, however, the concept of critical mass presumes that women legislators share the same views, ignoring the effects of ideology and party on legislative priorities. When male-dominant parties control the nomination of women candidates, they can recruit women who will do their bidding. Exacting party discipline within legislative chambers can make it difficult, if not impossible, for women to push pro-female legislation (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008). Cross-party organizing among women may be easier where parties are fractured and party discipline is weak (Waylen, 2010: 227). But even in those circumstances, cross-party organizing may be possible only around certain issues. Georgina Waylen (2010) suggests that cross-party alliances among women in support of quotas have been relatively unproblematic; collaboration on issues pertaining to violence against women, child maintenance, and divorce has been feasible in many nations; but cross-party alliances on reproductive rights have been particularly difficult. In the United States, for example, women in Congress agreed to create the Congressional Women’s Caucus in 1977 only on the condition that the issue of abortion be excluded from its purview – a policy that has remained in place (Gertzog, 2004).

Discussions of substantive representation – the representation of “women’s interests” – often suggest that women possess a clearly defined set of interests that can be represented if female legislators possess the will to do so. But this simplistic formulation masks a formidable obstacle to

substantive representation. Female parliamentarians do not and cannot represent all women because all women do not share the same experiences or understand their needs and interests in the same way. In contrast to the notion that women have a determinate set of interests, “most empirical studies stress divisions among women – like race, class, age, and party affiliation – that prevent formation of a collective female legislative agenda” (Krook, 2010: 236).

The difficulty of representing diverse constituencies who possess competing and sometimes antagonistic interests poses a fundamental challenge to the possibility of substantive representation of women. Intensive political labor to forge consensus about women’s needs and interests is involved in every effort to legislate for women. Even before elected officials begin the arduous work of drafting legislation, shepherding bills through committee review and floor debates, and building political coalitions to pass laws, they face a prior challenge of defining women’s policy needs and building consensus around that definition. When female legislators commit themselves to representing women as a national constituency, they pledge themselves to the political work of forging a common agenda. Within the legislative process, they try to move beyond articulating the diverse and conflicting needs of women to framing issues in ways that can win the assent of men and women legislators within and across party lines. Undertaking this work cannot guarantee that all women’s interests are adequately represented in any particular bill, nor can it ensure the success of any particular piece of legislation. But it is demanding work, nonetheless – work that only some women legislators agree to undertake (Hawkesworth et al., 2001).

Since the 1970s, increasing numbers of elected women have articulated a commitment to represent women. In some nations, the mobilization around quotas themselves created a “‘mandate effect,’ whereby women legislators perceive an obligation to act on the behalf of women” (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008: 394). Yet in assuming this obligation, women legislators can define the responsibility in various ways. Procedurally, they can represent women simply by being present in the policymaking process, by visibly standing in for the underrepresented majority. Substantively, women legislators can strive to ensure that all legislation guarantees women equal opportunity and equal access. They can advocate for issues of traditional concern to women as caregivers (health care, policies for children and the elderly, education, housing, and the environment). They can seek to eliminate gender-based injustices, and they can attempt to redefine women’s issues to encompass a more expansive legislative agenda (national security and defense, international relations). They can actively investigate the gender-specific impacts of proposed legislation and they can work to insure a gender-equitable distribution of public resources and government funds.

As a small minority within most national assemblies, women face sizable obstacles in their efforts to promote women’s interests, however they are

conceived. Their efforts can be derailed by failure to secure other legislators' assent to their conception of women's most pressing needs or to their policy prescriptions to remedy those needs. Widespread consensus achieved among female legislators can be thwarted by a changing political climate, party leadership unsympathetic to women's issues, or strategically placed committee and subcommittee chairs with other priorities and concerns. Hard-won victories may prove remarkably short-lived when subsequent parliaments act to rescind legislation or fail to authorize and appropriate funds necessary to keep programs alive (Hawkesworth et al., 2001).

Susan Franceschet and Jennifer Piscopo (2008) investigated women's efforts to legislate for women in Argentina and found complex and contradictory effects. They trace women's cross-party collaboration to the quota campaign of 1991 and the creation of the Network of Political Women, comprising women from 15 political parties. Mobilizing to press for quotas in both provincial and national legislatures, "quota pioneers emphasized the historical marginalization of women, equality, social justice, and the feminization of poverty . . . Some argued for distinct perspectives that women bring to politics, [suggesting] that women are more sensitive to the real needs, daily and concrete, of the people" (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008: 409). The quota campaign built ties between women's movement activists and elected women, and also brought many activist women into electoral politics. Newly elected women devoted more attention to children and adolescents, sexual assault laws, maternity leave and pregnancy, sex education, surgical contraception, and emergency contraception. The numbers of bills on issues addressing women's health, reproductive freedom, representation, and physical safety ("women's issues" as defined by Franceschet and Piscopo) increased exponentially as increasing numbers of women were elected. Franceschet and Piscopo tally a 268 percent increase in the number of bills after women achieved 30 percent of the seats in both houses and a 500 percent increase in the number of bills relating to violence against women (412). The lessons from Argentina corroborate earlier studies that suggest women legislators are more likely to put women's issues on the legislative agenda.

Women authored 79% of the bills on gender quotas . . . In the area of reproductive rights, women introduced 80% of the bills to legalize abortion and to expand access to contraception, and to improve reproductive health through education and access to health care. In the area of violence against women, a category that includes all bills to enhance women's protection from violence, female legislators sponsored 69% of all bills. Women also authored 73% of bills aimed at combating sexual harassment.

(Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008: 410)

Despite intensive efforts to provide substantive representation to women, Franceschet and Piscopo note that agenda expansion did not automatically translate into policy change.

Despite a huge increase in numbers of bills introduced, very few pass. Only three important pieces of women's rights legislation passed in Argentina between 1991 and 2008: Labor Union Quota 2002, which applies 30% quota to leadership posts in labor unions; Sexual Health Law in 2001, which created national health program for sexual health education and contraception availability; and the Surgical Contraception Law in 2006, which legalized surgical contraceptive methods (vasectomies and tubal ligations) and made these procedures available in public hospitals. . . . The majority of women's rights bills actually do not succeed. . . . The success rate for approving women's rights bills is lower than average.

(Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008: 415–416)

Between 1991 and 2006, the success rate for women's issue bills was 1.3 percent compared to a success rate of 3.73 percent for all bills introduced in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies. Legislation drafted by women for women failed more than twice as frequently as general legislation (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008: 416).

In addition to the extreme difficulty in getting women's issues bills passed, Franceschet and Piscopo documented several sobering correlates of increasing numbers of women in the Argentine legislature. "Only half of female legislators in Argentina introduced at least one bill with gender content. Shared features (biological sex) guarantee neither shared beliefs nor automatic allegiances among women" (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008: 414). Moreover, as some women attempted to provide substantive representation for women's concerns, male legislators began withdrawing from this field, imposing the duty to represent women on their female colleagues. "Male leaders may respond to women's presence by establishing a gendered division of labor, wherein female legislators are encouraged (or even pressured) to introduce the less prestigious women's issues bills" (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008: 413). But when female legislators do take the initiative and act for women, male legislators do not support their endeavors.

Multiple formal and informal institutional norms and practices have limited female legislators' ability to move from bill introduction to bill passage in Argentina. Party discipline has been a critical factor in reducing the success of women's rights initiatives. As relatively recent entrants to the Chamber of Deputies, "women often lack the influence necessary to force a committee or plenary discussion on their women's rights initiatives" (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008: 416). It is up to the committee chair to

determine which bills move forward, and very few women have attained these powerful positions. As the leader of the majority party in the legislature, the president often signals to committee chairs about whether or not a bill should move. As critical institutional gatekeepers, party leaders can block their colleagues' legislative initiatives from floor discussions and determine which legislators will be allowed to participate in parliamentary debates (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008: 417). Informal norms can also pose problems for female legislators. Important strategy sessions are often held in late night meetings in bars, which women are not invited to attend.

Within the halls of the legislature, women are held to different standards than men; they are seldom treated as authorities and they need constantly to prove the validity of their ideas. In their efforts to persuade their male colleagues about the importance of proposed legislation, female legislators also encounter entrenched gender bias. Indeed, "women who advocate for gender equality are derided as *las locas del 50-50* (the 50-50 crazies)" (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008: 420). Not surprisingly, some ambitious women legislators are unwilling to associate themselves with women's issues for fear of being marginalized. Thus Franceschet and Piscopo suggest that although women have attained 35 percent of the seats in the Argentine legislature, they have not succeeded in transforming legislative outcomes. But this failure is not the fault of the female legislators: "The main factors inhibiting legislative success are institutional, namely party leaders and executive control of the legislative process and informal norms that entrench gender bias" (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008: 421). Such long-standing gendered practices are not easy to reverse, even in the case of Argentina, where a woman has been elected to serve as president.

The gendered dynamics of the Argentine legislature are not unique. Research on parliamentary procedures in many nations have found similar gendered dynamics – institutional rules and norms that compel women to conform to existing male legislative practices. Backlash by some male legislators, who employ a range of tactics to obstruct women's policy initiatives and keep them outside positions of power, are also common. In elective office, as in many other professions, women face obstacles that their male counterparts do not confront – obstacles that make it more difficult to do their jobs. Women do equal work within legislative bodies but not on equal terms; they confront forms of sex bias that are seldom acknowledged or discussed.

In one of the earliest studies of women in the US Congress, Irwin Gertzog (1984) argued that Congress should be understood as a "male institution" not only because of the sheer number of men in office, but also because male bonding was central to congressional operations and institutional culture, and because congressmen perceived women as intruders. Indeed, one congressman Gertzog interviewed lamented the "unfortunate tendency of women to identify as women." Gertzog catalogued a number of challenges that confront women who work in male institutions: men refuse to

take women seriously; men treat women as invisible or hypervisible; men respond to women either with exaggerated courtesy and paternalism or sexualization and flirtation. Male legislators treat their women counterparts as having limited and specialized interests, restricted solely to a narrow conception of women's concerns. Moreover, congressmen do their best to exclude women from key networks and party leadership.

Although the percentage of congressional seats held by women increased from 3 percent to 19.4 percent between 1980 and 2015 and Nancy Pelosi served as the first female Speaker of the House of Representatives from January 2007 to January 2011, the challenges catalogued by Gertzog continue to face female legislators in the United States. In a quantitative analysis of 138,246 bills introduced to the House of Representatives over four decades, Craig Volden, Alan Wiseman, and Dana Wittmer concluded that women in Congress continue to face a set of hurdles that men do not.

Put simply, women in Congress are disadvantaged in a variety of ways. . . . Seniority-based institutions then limit women's institutional powers, with the average man being five times more likely to hold a committee chair than the average woman, for example. These institutional differences . . . result in bills sponsored by women (especially women in the majority party) being more likely to die in committee and less likely to ultimately become law. . . . Moreover on traditionally women's issues (where women in Congress exert a disproportionate share of their efforts), the gridlock rates for proposals are higher than on other issues . . . with an average success rate of 2.10% for all bills in these categories . . . [compared to a] 5.00% success rate for all bills.

(Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer, 2010: 31–32)

These findings corroborate other studies of women legislators at state and federal levels in the United States that document concerns about discrimination and isolation (Thomas, 2005: 252) and perceptions of marginalization (Hawkesworth, 2003). Gendered norms in committee hearings silence women's voices, an effect that increases as the proportion of women on a committee grows (Kathlene, 1989, 1994). Bills introduced by women are sent to more committees for review than are bills introduced by men, and they are subjected to longer discussion and more hostile testimony during hearings (Flammang, 1997).

Several studies document that female legislators undertake coalition building on behalf of women at considerable political cost. Working across party lines can place congresswomen at odds with their party and their party leadership – a position that can have dire political consequences for the careers of women in elective office. Being too outspoken on behalf of women can also have deleterious effects. Female legislators report that their credibility within the party and within Congress, and their efficacy across a range

of legislative issues, can be seriously impaired when male colleagues perceive them to be too closely identified with women's issues (Hawkesworth et al., 2001). Perhaps it should come as no surprise then that studies of astute women politicians in South America and Africa have noted that many elected women avoid associating themselves with women's issues because they believe it limits their political opportunities (Htun and Jones, 2002; Goetz and Hassim, 2003; Rodriquez, 2011).

Sexist bias can be manifested in many ways within institutions of governance. Men's refusal to defer to women's expertise is one manifestation; their refusal to acknowledge women's talent as politicians is another. Catherine Tasca, who has served as a deputy in France's National Assembly, as a senator and vice-president of the Senate, and as the Minister of Culture from 2000 to 2002, captures another manifestation of gender bias – the double standard: "Women are expected to be better than men to obtain the same level of responsibilities . . . there is a demand for a proof of competence from women which is never required from men" (Quoted in Murray, 2010: 96). Despite palpable evidence of women's abilities as elected officials, many men demean women in parliament as "quota women" and as "under-qualified and incompetent, undeserving of office" (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008: 402).

Evidence from every country in which women have gained political office indicates that women fulfill the diverse demands of their offices with skill and dedication. They have proven adept at the complex demands of leadership, building consensus about national needs and priorities, dealing with economic crisis, international challenges, natural disasters, and negotiating the complex and often competing demands of citizens, lobbyists, government agencies, and political parties. In undertaking the challenges of political rule, women confront unique obstacles, however, difficulties created by pro-male bias built into the standard operating procedures of political institutions. In addition to gendered institutional practices and processes, women in governance encounter persistent sexism and overt hostility on the part of some men with whom they work. Obstacles created by men have not succeeded in thwarting women in governance; they just make a difficult job that much harder to do. If the promise of democracy is to be fulfilled, then democratic nations must intervene to disrupt gendered practices, processes, and institutions that advantage men.

Informal and institutional practices that are hostile to women, hamper or preclude women's participation, and structure women's access to decision-making construct political space as male space. Governments cannot continue to claim to be democratic if they allow half their populations to be grossly underrepresented. Emerging liberal democracies, like their mature counterparts, have embraced the rhetoric of equal opportunity only to mask systemic inequality. By construing women's absence as a deprivation of

public roles, proponents of democratic governance have a powerful means to challenge the legitimacy of institutions that privilege men. Holding political parties and elected officials accountable to inclusive norms of democracy may be one way to reopen the very old question of whose lives are to count politically and whose interests are to be served through democratic decision-making. Perhaps it might also reopen the question of what kind of democracy is possible in the 21st century.

Notes

1. The percentage of women serving in the military varies widely from less than 2 percent of the active forces in countries such as Poland and Turkey to a high of 23 percent in Latvia. In Australia, France, Spain, Russia, and the United States, women make up 10–15 percent of the military. For a global overview, see Seger, 2009.
2. I am indebted to Fatima Sadiqi for this insight.
3. There is no question that women privileged by race and class have also participated in subordinating men and women of other races, classes, ethnicities, and nationalities, but in an era when even elite women were barred from law and politics, they devised other mechanisms to subordinate those they deemed their “inferiors.” For compelling accounts, see Jayawardena, 1995; McClintock, 1995; Newman, 1999; and Stoller, 1995, 2002.

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14

Quality of Democracy and Political Inclusion

José Álvaro Moisés

Introduction

As many observers have noted, more than at any time in human history, we live today in a democratic age. Extraordinary political changes initiated in Europe and America in the second half of the 18th century consolidated the foundations of this peculiar process during the 19th and early 20th centuries. In the last four decades, changes adopted in all regions of the world have brought the institutions of many existing political systems closer to the ideals of democracy. In marked contrast to the dominant power structures of the 20th century, the majority of independent countries around the world have gone through political transformations that have brought many political systems closer to democratic ideals, but contemporary political institutions and procedures embody these ideals only partially. In many nations, the rule of law, civil and political rights, and mechanisms for citizens' control of governments remain ineffective or underdeveloped.

Analyses of the democratic regime are part of the core agenda in comparative politics research. Since the mid-1970s, these investigations have grown larger and more comprehensive with the advent of the "third wave of democratization" (Huntington, 1991). Transitions from authoritarianism to democracy and processes of regime consolidation have vastly enriched comparative research, enabling examination of favorable or unfavorable conditions for the emergence of democratic practices and critical assessment of factors that help democratic governance endure. Despite the wealth of empirical cases to examine the theoretical issues they raise, we are still beginning to analyze the dimensions of democratic practice and procedure that deepen and enrich democratic life. As Bobbio (2003) and others following Plato and Aristotle have suggested, the question at stake is one of the oldest and most fundamental questions in political thought: what is the best form of government? What qualities of the polity foster conditions that allow citizens to maximize their human development? At the heart of these qualities

of the political regime is the question of how to enlarge the capability of common people to choose what is best for their lives and their communities.

The intellectual debate about the qualities of democracy rests upon normative foundations. Yet these normative concerns cannot be adequately addressed without detailed empirical analysis of the nature of democratic structure in existing nations, and the processes conducive to its emergence, expansion, and consolidation. To undertake sustained empirical investigation requires researchers to develop concepts, measures, and empirical indicators suited to the challenge of comparative methodology. As Morlino has recently noted, comparative analysis requires careful attention to the cultivation of key concepts that can inform specific hypotheses, which can be tested in real world conditions through the adoption of replicable methods, transparent research practices, and consistent data (both quantitative and qualitative). Only under such circumstances can researchers generate findings that will sustain empirically supported conclusions about democracy that hold across various regions of the world (Morlino, 2012).

This chapter discusses the theoretical and empirical challenges of deepening democracy in several different areas of the world. I focus on the different qualities of a democratic political regime. By illuminating the qualities essential to human flourishing within democratic states, it becomes possible to establish objective criteria to assess the practices of varying nations that call themselves democratic. That more countries around the world proclaim themselves to be democratic does not necessarily mean that their democratization process is complete. For example, many economically advanced nations declare themselves to be democratic while fully half of their citizenry remains absent from positions of power in decision-making. Women constitute one of the last social constituencies to win political rights in contemporary democracies. In new democracies just as in old and consolidated democracies, this achievement weighs very little on the distribution of power in positions of governance, or in dimensions concerning political representation. What are the implications for the quality of democracy when nations maintain fundamental political inequalities among citizens?

Since the 1990s, however, the issue of women's political representation has become one of the most important topics in academic discussions about the nature of democratic expansion in different parts of the world. The underrepresentation of women in governance affects not only young democracies in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa, but also long-established democracies such as England, France, the United States, Belgium, and Canada. Lijphart (1999) has suggested that the rate of women's participation in national parliaments is a relevant indicator of the quality of democracies. Feminist activists and scholars have called attention to this since the 19th century, and in past decades many political scientists have stressed the fundamental centrality of the principle of political equality in evaluating comparative advantages of a democratic regime over alternatives.

Equality, in this sense, does not only involve the right to elect members of the governing elite, but also the right to be chosen to take part in and to influence the democratic decision-making processes (O'Donnell et al., 2004; Diamond and Morlino, 2005; Dahl, 2006).

In the following sections I discuss both concepts of democracy and of quality of democracy in relation to women's political inclusion and participation. Finally, I consider some of the important challenges that derive from the concept of the quality of democracy, and discuss initiatives that can allow changes and institutional reforms capable of ensuring the effective inclusion of women in contemporary democracies.

The concept of democracy

Democracy is an old and contested concept. Aristotle wrote of democratic Greek city states where citizens participated in self-government, but these polities excluded women and slaves from citizenship and political participation. Rousseau, Montesquieu, and more recently Bobbio, O'Donnell, Morlino and Munck (2012) wrote of the democratic regime as the one that allows members of the political community to live under a regime of laws, governed by an institutional structure that guarantees basic individual and collective liberties and rights, and hence provides freedom from domination.

Yet the recent global expansion of regimes claiming to be democratic has stirred scholars to revise the long-accepted definitions that emphasized competitive elections, civil and political rights, and a market economy. The magnitude of this definitional challenge is apparent when considering the various initiatives that seek to classify the new democratic regimes existing in the world. For example, according to The Economist Intelligence Unit, which defines democracy in terms of five criteria – electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political culture, political participation, and civic liberties – only half of the 167 countries around the world are considered to be democracies today (Table 14.1). “Full democracies” are 15 percent of the countries studied, while 32 percent are rated as “flawed democracies.” Of the remaining 88 countries in the index, 31 percent are said to be “authoritarian” and 22 percent are considered to be “hybrid regimes” (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012). This example suggests relevant questions involved in the debate. The criteria used by different international institutions to construct the proposed indexes of democracy and authoritarianism are controversial, but results such as the ones generated by The Economist Intelligence Unit are not substantially different from those provided by others in recent years.¹ Thus, these indexes provide a helpful empirical point of departure for the analysis of factors that may deepen or worsen the quality of democracy, but do not mean much more than that. Table 14.1 shows the number and percentage of countries as well as the percentage of world population for each regime type in 2013.

Table 14.1 Democracy index by regime type (2013)

Type of regime	Scores	# of countries	% of countries	% of world population
Full democracies	8.0–10	25	15.0	11.3
Flawed democracies	6.0–7.9	54	32.3	37.2
Hybrid regimes	4.0–5.9	37	22.2	14.4
Authoritarian regimes	0–3.9	51	30.5	37.1

World population refers to the total population of the 167 countries that are covered. Since this survey excludes only a few countries, this is nearly equal to the entire actual estimated world population in 2010.

Elections are sometimes seen as the cornerstone of democracy. But the democratization process in different parts of the world has shown that elections do not guarantee the establishment of political systems capable of ensuring fundamental principles such as the rule of law, respect for citizens' civil, political, and social rights, and the oversight and control of governments. Once the new regime has been established, despite signaling that undemocratic alternatives have been overcome and that in the future the choice of who governs must be subjected to the principle of popular sovereignty, elections do not necessarily guarantee that electoral democracies will meet the minimum criteria of democracy. Authoritarian regimes may persist and indeed shore up their legitimacy through elections. In Southern and Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa, polities that have adopted competitive elections sometimes coexist with governments that are not completely committed to the principles of equality before the law, political inclusion, and control over and punishment of corruption. In many cases, parties and politicians that misappropriate public funds to accomplish private objectives, and function and operate without any mechanisms of vertical, social, and horizontal accountability, came to power through popular election (O'Donnell, 2004, 2005).

What is at issue, then, is not whether democracy exists, but its quality. These cases and processes make clear that democracy and its qualities are interrelated dimensions, but refer to two conceptually distinct empirical domains that cannot be subsumed in a single term. To measure and to evaluate the qualities of a democratic experience is something that depends on the actual existence of a democratic regime. Yet this does not exhaust the qualities of a flourishing democracy. Although there is a strong theoretical connection between democracy and its qualities, both phenomena have their own existence and each has its own dynamics and specific characteristics (Morlino, 2002; O'Donnell et al., 2004; Diamond and Morlino, 2005; Moisés, 2010, 2013).

For this reason, controversies over the definition of democracy are again at the center of the contemporary political science debate. The defining criteria of democracy adopted by mainstream political science emphasize mainly political procedures, such as the competitive mechanisms for choosing who should govern; more rarely, however, mechanisms concerning how to govern, and even less frequently what the results of the democratic process should be. Within mainstream political science, democracy is considered to be a political concept, which pertains to the domain of the state. Within this frame, democratization is characterized as a political process quite distinct from social revolution (Przeworski, 2010, 67 cited in Munck, 2012). Procedural definitions are still considered to be the most empirically solid reference to define the democratic regime, understood as an empirical phenomenon infused by the ideals of freedom and equality.

On the one hand, democracy is supposed to be about the value of freedom; that is, a political system that allows its members to live under a regime based in institutions that guarantee liberties. Citizens are supposed to obey laws that they have prescribed for themselves. Thus “self-prescribed laws and norms” heighten the legitimacy and the stability of democratic governments. On the other hand, democracy is said to be about political equality; that is, a democratic political system which is based on the participation of all members who are defined as citizens. The status of citizenship itself confers a fundamental political equality.

To chart the emergence of procedural conceptions of democracy, it is worth recalling that Schumpeter (1942) first defined a democratic political regime as an institutional arrangement designed to produce political decisions by actors chosen in competitive elections. Under his influence, several other authors adopted a definition that posited political competition and the peaceful contestation for power as the main characteristics which distinguish liberal democracy from its alternatives. As a conception of democratic elitism, however, it falls prey to an “electoralist fallacy,” which privileges electoral process and procedures over other important dimensions of democracy, failing to acknowledge how exclusionary practices can undermine democratic relationships in the interaction among citizens and between citizens and their elected leaders (Karl, 2000).

By defining democracy essentially as a method of choosing elites who compete for positions in government, Schumpeter’s minimalist approach gives little importance to other specific democratic institutions. It largely ignores discrimination against women, which excludes them from integrating into governing elites or influencing issues on the public agenda submitted to the decision-making process. A narrow focus on electoral competition fails to consider how and why institutions such as parliament, political parties, and the judiciary may operate in conflict with their constitutional mission or even in a manner incompatible with the doctrine of separation of powers and the notion of checks and balances. Concern only

with electoral rules may mask how systemic inequalities undermine the principles of democracy. Venezuelan and Russian cases, for example, have recently shown that under circumstances of political conflict, the opposition may be barred from competing on an equal footing, yet may find no remedial support from institutions such as the general prosecutor's office, the judiciary, or the parliament, when restrictions on freedom of expression and censorship of the media constrain citizens' rights to participation and access to alternative information about the political process. Likewise, differences in treatment of women and other political outsiders are not recognized as a problem that calls into question the functioning and the quality of representative democracy.

Dahl differs in some aspects from the mainstream even if his work is usually considered to be central to the literature on the procedural definition of democracy. He broadened the definition of democracy to call attention to characteristics of polyarchies, both in terms of historical tradition and political culture. In the 1950s, he enlarged the procedural approach by suggesting that competitive elections required more than citizens' participation; democratic contestation depends on the actual existence of an opposition, which affords citizens meaningful choice in elections. Dahl also argued that the principle of contestation over power is assured only when the participation of *all adult members* of the political community is unconditional, and their right to choose and be chosen to form governments is secured. For Dahl, "full democracies" are only those in which suffrage has been extended to all segments of society, and necessarily to women and the descendants of slaves, among others. In his book *Democracy and its Critics* (1989), he reflects about the fact that only in the 20th century in most democratic nations, and only after World War II in countries such as France, Belgium, and Switzerland, women received the right to vote and to hold public office. He designates this history of exclusion as a structural obstacle to the realization of political equality and the theoretically derived demand for political inclusion in democracies. Even theorists such as John Locke, who had powerful influence on Dahl's theoretical perspective, excluded women from the right to vote and to compete for power (Dahl, 1989, 124, 135, 2003).

Dahl (2008) noted that as citizens, people are intrinsically equal, and as equals each citizen is deemed the judge of his/her best interests. Effective political participation is a precondition for legitimate electoral competition, and turns on the existence of an opposition able to contest who is in power (Dahl, 1971). Effective participation requires the involvement of all sectors of the citizenry. Thus when any social sector, such as women, is excluded from political participation, the democratic system is either deficient or flawed. The theoretical implication of this intrinsic equality is that there is no justification for impeding or precluding any citizen, female or male, from taking part in the procedures of the democratic system. All political

decisions that affect members of the political community should be taken on the basis of their participation.

Dahl has also stressed that governments' and political leaders' responsiveness is fundamental to democracy. He considers the organization and representation of civil society based on political parties, voluntary associations, and social movements as essential for this. He does not always acknowledge, however, that these political organizations or institutions may not be democratic. As is evident in the case of political parties, their internal democracy is a necessary condition for the creation of opportunities that facilitate the effective participation of women and other outsiders of the democratic system. Although questions related to political inclusion are central in his work, the consequences of inclusion for the democratic functioning of political parties are not always clearly acknowledged.

Although critiques of exclusionary practices are long-standing, some suggest that these critiques refer to democracy as an ideal, not to democracy as a reality (Vianello, 2015), raising once again the old controversy about democracy as *form* and as *substance*. The original argument goes back to Marx's analysis of complex market societies that are structurally divided among owners of means of production and sellers of labor, which do not afford real equal treatment to social actors who are in fact unequal. Defenders of socialist revolutions insisted that 19th-century liberal doctrines were flawed because they privileged formal equality which did not allow for social and economic changes capable of responding to the needs of the masses in socially divided societies. Formal representation alone was ineffective in eliminating the consequences of the social distance between dominant and subordinated social classes.

To overcome the limitations of formal equality, a number of scholars have held that democracy must include substantive and not merely procedural rights. Some authors have gone so far as to argue that the procedural definition does not adequately acknowledge the rights of unprivileged minorities (Munck, 2012). Indeed, the majority—the cornerstone of political arrangements adopted under procedural definitions—may take decisions that ignore the interests of minorities. Thus, states that conform to the minimalist procedural definition, may not afford any meaningful democracy to minority citizens. In contrast to traditional democratic theory's emphasis on procedure alone, the solution to this controversy requires that democracy not be defined only in terms of institutional procedures. In addition to considering *who* is entitled to govern and *how* governors can take decisions, democracy must also involve the content of decisions or *what* is decided by elected leaders (Ferrajoli, 2011; cited in Munck, 2012; Morlino, 2012).

Other authors have argued, however, that it is impossible to distinguish political form and content in relation to democracy, suggesting that formal political guarantees are content-laden (Coutinho, 1972; Weffort, 1984, 1992). For example, during the period of authoritarian rule in Brazil,

formal mechanisms such as habeas corpus meant the difference between life and death for political activists who resisted or fought against dictatorial governments.² Formal protections have practical consequences for the consolidation of rights and political participation in complex and divided societies. To claim that democratic form and content are separate is inaccurate; they should be seen as integral parts of the same political phenomenon. The accomplishment of democratic principles always depends on the effectiveness of both legal form and content, and both dimensions are important for the assessment of the quality of the political regime.

The dominant view in political science debates about democracy, however, still tends to favor a definition that privileges procedure over substance. But as Bobbio (1983) noted this established consensus is based on the presumption of non-reversible relationships between (a) civil and political rights and the liberties associated with them, and (b) political equality. Contrasting the experience of the Western democracies with what was happening in countries within the Soviet system, Sartori (1957, 1987) reaffirmed the prerequisite for the achievement of any kind of equality – political, social, and economic – as the rule of law and the effectiveness of civil and political rights. In the context of Great Britain, Marshall (1950) demonstrated that social rights were recognized in the 20th century as a consequence of developments that had consolidated first civil and then political rights in the previous centuries. The emergence and consolidation of mass-based political parties in the second half of the 19th century, which allowed the working class to become a central political actor in many Western countries, was also an important outcome of the process of democratization, which had started in the 18th century but was then gradually expanded over the next two centuries. These historical advancements involved both democratic form and content.

Recent advances in political science, which reflect political developments in old and new democracies, have gradually created a space for a growing consideration of substantive aspects of democracy. Whether involving research into policy studies and welfare rights or attention to political equality per se, scholars from Dahl to Rawls and Sen, among others, have taken up questions concerning political justice. Political rights and participation are central to these developments, and to related features such as political information (Morlino, 2012). According to an expanded definition, a democratic regime involves:

- (1) The right of citizens to choose governments through competitive elections open to the participation of all adult members of the political community, a condition that was met only with the gradual extension of women's suffrage in the 20th century;
- (2) Regular, free, open, and competitive elections, controlled by an independent electoral institution or organization;

- (3) Guaranteed rights to expression, assembly, and organization, especially for political parties that compete for power (although little consideration has been given to whether internal decisions of the parties are subject to democratic rules);
- (4) Access to alternative sources of information about the actions of governments and the political process;
- (5) Influence over the process of agenda-setting; that is, possibilities to introduce issues to be dealt with by governments and democratic institutions.

This definition clearly implies that any political system that is not based on competitive processes for choosing public authorities and does not depend on the vote of the mass of citizens cannot be considered a democracy. Yet the mainstream in political science has typically neglected the unequal treatment given to political outsiders such as women and minorities in making judgments about what counts as a democratic polity. From the time of the emergence of the first democratic regimes in the 18th century, throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, scholars ignored the exclusion of women from political participation. Despite substantial advances in previous centuries, as civil and political rights were granted to citizens and restrictive qualifications grounded in class, race, and gender were eliminated from voting requirements, substantial inequalities related to political participation were not acknowledged by an influential part of the political science literature as counting against the democratic nature of a regime.

Conceptualizing the quality of democracy

Although mainstream political science continues to stress the procedures and the competitive mechanisms for choosing who governs, new approaches analyze democracy multi-dimensionally, involving not only elections and associated institutional procedures, but also effective civil and political rights, institutions of representation, mechanisms of monitoring and controlling governments, and the civic culture of citizens. These approaches broaden the procedural definition of democracy to consider the requirements of effective popular empowerment through vertical, horizontal, and social accountability, the content of policy, and the outcomes of the democratic regime. They emphasize full political inclusion and effective citizens' participation in addition to the performance of institutions in order to assess whether a democracy realizes its full promise; and they analyze the role of social and communitarian movements and new forms of social media- and Internet-based political mobilization (Santos, 2012; Vianello, 2015). The theoretical perspective that informs these approaches conceives democracy in terms of form, content, and qualities that can deepen democratic practices. As noted above, qualities do not follow necessarily from the

minimal definition of democracy, but involve specific characteristics that must be consciously implemented by political actors. In this sense, qualities must be constructed, enhanced, and reproduced; they do not materialize simply because certain procedures are in place.

According to this perspective, the principles of liberty and equality, central to any democratic regime, require practical articulation with other components of the democratic structure. Articulation in this case means that procedures and/or institutional arrangements cannot work separately or autonomously from policy content and substantive outcomes. Thus, the quality of democracy depends on different dimensions of the regime: the procedures that govern its daily operation, the content of its laws and policies, the substantive results of its initiatives, as well as its demographic composition. The quality of democratic processes involves citizen participation and government responsiveness to citizens' needs, but also precise timing of certain programs which themselves contribute to the cultivation of particular democratic characteristics among the citizens.

Within this frame, a democratic regime should meet the expectations of citizens with respect to:

- (a) the mission that is ascribed to governments (quality of results);
- (b) the guarantee of rights to freedom and political equality that allow citizens to participate and influence the decision-making process, and to achieve their interests and preferences (quality of content);
- (c) the institutional methods, norms and laws, which guarantee that citizens can freely choose governors or be chosen to act as such (quality of procedures);
- (d) the specific mechanisms of accountability designed to empower citizens to assess and judge the performance of governments and/or representatives authorized to act on their behalf (quality of procedures).

Institutional procedures and government performance are redefined as means of achieving principles, contents, and results expected by citizens regarding the functioning of democratic processes, and particularly the rights conferred by citizenship status. Citizens' participation is linked to the existence of a political culture that affords them a central role in the political process. The system is legitimized not only because citizens participate in elections, but also because governments promote citizens' interests. Citizens abide by the law under the condition that they are custodians of basic rights, and the state respects those rights in all aspects of law enforcement. Political education plays a crucial role in this process, transmitting knowledge about the functioning of the democratic system, and inculcating a set of democratic values from generation to generation. Democratic regimes are supposed to produce citizens who value diversity and political tolerance, and respect equal rights of their fellow citizens.

Promoting the qualities of democracy entails the articulation and mutual constitution of political principles, institutional procedures, and the participation of citizens. This is precisely what makes political inclusion a fundamental condition necessary for the attainment of political equality. Any kind of restriction on the participation of members of the political community implies a low-intensity democratic quality, which influences the meaning of “belonging” to the political community. In the contemporary era, the question of political belonging within a democratic system is associated with the inclusion of women, and the recognition of the rights of immigrants from all over the world.

Diamond and Morlino (2005) have identified eight main dimensions according to which the quality of a democracy can vary. The first five involve procedural rules that are integrally enmeshed with the content of democracy: the rule of the law, political participation, political competition, and vertical, horizontal, and social accountability. Two substantive dimensions follow: respect for civil liberties and political rights; and the guarantee of political equality and its correlates, social and economic equality, which necessarily depend on the existence of appropriate distributional and redistributive institutions. The final dimension explicitly integrates procedures into contents: the responsiveness of governments, which allows citizens to evaluate and judge whether public policies, laws, institutions, procedures, and the decision-making processes match their interests and preferences.

This approach defines democracy in terms of its fundamental principles and contents, which clearly implies that citizens are aware of and act upon their responsibilities. Thus political equality is a precondition for the integration of institutional procedures into content in ways that enable citizen assessment of the practical results of the system. Only if and when political equality is effective can social and economic equality be achieved. This is then an alternative to both the minimalist definition of democracy and theoretical proposals that imply an opposition between democratic form and content.

An important implication of this approach is also the connection between political representation and participation for the realization of the preferences of members of the political community. This perspective implies that those elected as representatives maintain close connection to those who elected them, and when this is effective, it overcomes the gap between formal institutions and social life (Munck, 2012). Free and fair elections – and the subsequent monitoring of government performance through representative institutions – are a means to give effect to the rights of citizens. These mechanisms are a driving force in establishing an institutional balance of power, the effective existence of a political opposition, and the obligation of governments to be held accountable for their actions. For this reason, the role of political parties and parliaments is strategic, but whether or not they guarantee a democracy of quality depends on their actual performance

and functioning. In many contemporary democracies in Latin America and Southern and Eastern Europe, the functioning of parties and parliaments is called into question. Critics refer to the enormous distance between the feelings and expectations of voters and the performance of elected officials. Party decisions are often monopolized by political oligarchies, which contribute to the political marginalization of social sectors, and the delegitimation of the democratic regime. Political parties hold the monopoly of political representation, but they are more and more seen as factions only committed to the interests of their leaders and protégés. In such a situation the quality of the democratic regime is severely diminished (Sacchet, 2005; Moisés, 2010; Vianello, 2015).

By emphasizing the connection between representation and participation, this approach shifts the emphasis from the formal dimension of democratic institutions, stressed by minimalist and procedural theories, to specific modes and means, including informal ones, which ensure effective rights and the principle of political equality. This opens new theoretical perspectives on the relationship between civil society and the state, which encompass normative concerns associated with participatory and deliberative democracy (Morlino, 2012).³ In this regard, it is worth recalling again the relevance of political culture and education. For the achievement of normative conceptions of democracy – particularly those concerned with the centrality of women's inclusion – depends on the adoption of political values that prize critical participation (see Moisés, 2011). Precisely because these values must be cultivated, the role of political actors is strategic. Institutional transformation to increase women's representation requires democratic leaders who act consciously and efficaciously to produce popular support for that expected result. Such catalysts for change may be women or men, but they have to mobilize support for inclusive democratic practices among party elites, rank and file party membership, and the citizenry at large.

Fundamental democratic rights always depend on the effectiveness of the rule of law, and the challenge is magnified when a state seeks to transform political representation to ensure that the values of freedom and equality are realized. Freedom and equality for all materialize only with the political inclusion of all social segments. Political institutions and political culture may require systemic transformation to achieve this full political inclusion. Indeed, the distribution of basic resources of power – as exemplified by political organization – and money must be adjusted to foster meaningful equality of opportunities in electoral competition, openness of the political party system, control of corruption in electoral campaigns, and inclusive substantive results. To measure the quality of democracy all these factors must be brought into the equation. Continuing discrimination, whether formal or informal, which excludes women and other outsiders from political participation in a representative democracy lowers its representativeness. Thus exclusion and discrimination must be politicized and made a matter of

public debate, awareness, and concern for all political actors committed to the purposes of deepening democracy wherever it already exists.

Toward this end, the contemporary political underrepresentation of women in governments, parliaments, and political parties has to be brought to the center of debate about the quality of democracy. This underrepresentation, especially in parliaments and in political parties, is a clear form of political discrimination that demands specific courses of action if a society wants to move toward deeper democratization. Contemporary democratic theory recognizes that the level of inclusivity of the political system is a fundamental precondition for democratic consolidation and insists that civil and political rights are guaranteed to all citizens without exception. Yet in practice, when evaluating a regime, procedural definitions of democracy often ignore the unjust consequences of the impermeability of the system to the participation of all social strata. It is certainly important to consider that open, clean, and predictable electoral processes, which are free of fraud, can alter the social composition of the political elites, as happened in Brazil in the last 25 years (Rodrigues, 2013). But the actual deepening of democracy depends on how the access to political power is open to all segments of society; in other words, it depends on the existence of effective conditions that assure the participation of all adult members of the political community in the decision-making processes. The presence or absence of women in parliaments and political parties is therefore a clear indicator of how effective the political representation of a country has become. Indeed, gender inclusiveness signifies not only effective political representation, but also the possibility of opening space for the adoption of substantive public policies that benefit all citizens (Diamond and Morlino, 2005).

Consider the multidimensional obstacles that hinder the political inclusion of women in democracies. The literature points to at least three main barriers to the success of women when they present themselves as candidates: the electoral system, political parties, and campaign financing (Goetz and Sacchet, 2008). Hawkesworth (2015) shows that one of the most notable factors is the case of political parties: parties recruit candidates, mobilize electors, influence the definition of issue agendas, and once chosen by electors have a relevant role in organizing legislative and executive processes of governance. Yet the practices of major political parties in most nations suggest that recruitment efforts afford little opportunity to diverse citizens who might want to participate in public life and achieve their preferences:

[...] studies have documented continuing gender discrimination in political parties' recruitment practices, provision of campaign financing, and the pervasive operation of old boy networks within parties in parliament and in the executive branch of government.

(Hawkesworth 2015, Chapter 13 in this volume)

Significant differences also exist in the financing of campaigns for men and women in many democracies. Some research has clearly indicated that there is a high correlation between the funds raised by candidates and their chances of electoral success. Electoral financing is, therefore, one of the most important factors that influence the performance of women in elections, but almost all recent research on campaign finance has shown their difficulty in financing electoral participation and efforts in seeking voter support and publicizing their political agenda (Sacchet and Speck, 2012a, 2012b; Moisés and Rodrigues, 2015).

The persistence of these barriers sheds light on important deficits in the functioning of the democratic regime in many countries. It is important to measure these deficits in order to determine what is to be done to overcome them. Democratic deficits and distortions associated with unequal opportunities for the political inclusion of women should be remedied through political changes and reforms of democratic institutions. In this sense, a major challenge faced by progressive forces responsible for the spread of democracy throughout all regions of the world over the past 40 years is converting awareness of these deficits and distortions into action to reform institutions. Detailed studies of persisting obstacles can provide the scholarly knowledge to convert the perception of deficits and distortions into tools for the deepening of the democratization process.

The fulfillment of these tasks involves a demanding agenda including (a) clarity of purpose, (b) leadership, (c) political mobilization, and (d) transformation of the political culture that legitimizes inequalities. In this respect, democratic education of new generations is one of the most powerful instruments. Democracy is a complex political system and specialized knowledge is required to make it work. Toward that end, public education designed to provide formal processes of knowledge transmission to new generations is essential to equip citizens with adequate understanding of the main characteristics of the democratic regime. This content of education is particularly important when the mission entails deepening the democratic character of the political regime through the inclusion of political outsiders such as women.

Discussion

Attention to both the concept of democracy and the qualities of democracy demonstrates that the contemporary process of democratization in many countries and in many different areas of the world is still unfinished. This is particularly the case in relation to one of the main premises of the democratic regime; that is, the demand for effective political inclusion. Women are not the only victims of this political distortion in contemporary democracies, but the gulf between their numbers in the population and their

numbers in political office remains stark, and as such warrants attention. Although an exhaustive discussion lies beyond the scope of this chapter, some aspects of an agenda for change are worth mentioning:

1. Clarity of purposes: Even in the present democratic age, political structures and political process will not change without pressure from below; that is, from interested social sectors and committed political forces. But political action to remedy the lack of political inclusion of women, particularly their underrepresentation in parliaments and governments, must be specific. To move forward, it is critical to identify specific goals such as the internal democratization of political parties, setting a minimum percentage for candidates of each gender, and creating equitable distribution of financial and organizational resources for political candidatures.

2. Leadership: Identifying and choosing proper democratic leaders committed to the action necessary to transform the structures of democracy to ensure women's participation in setting the public agenda and in the political decision-making process deserves special attention and action. Leaders have to be recruited, and this does not necessarily follow from the simple existence of grassroots and social movement organizations, the new opportunities for participation and mobilization opened by the Internet and facilitated by IT, or the activism associated with the so-called third sector. Recruitment of leaders is a task that has to be fulfilled by democratic political movements explicitly committed to the purposes of transforming political institutions. This is so because leaders must be consciously motivated to act "to disrupt gendered practices, processes, and institutions that advantage men" (Hawkesworth, 2015), and this must be part of an explicit political agreement among the interested parties.

3. Political mobilization: Important democratic advances have always been associated with massive political mobilization.⁴ Leaders do not act alone. To stimulate the participation of broad segments of ordinary people, political leaders need to focus on specific goals, but they also must address the hearts and minds of women and men to propose effective and transformative political actions. In this respect, empathy – as suggested by Vianello (2015) – is an important asset.

4. Transformation of the political culture: Political discrimination against women and obstacles to their political inclusion are not only due to political institutions or structures and their functioning, but also depend on values, political beliefs, behaviors, and the ways that ordinary citizens organize their relations among themselves, interact with the state, and enact their democratic rights. Traditional values that legitimize discrimination and block the political inclusion of women must be radically transformed to allow new

generations to be formed on the basis of the fundamental premise of democratic political inclusion. As Dahl (1998, 185) insisted, “one basic criterion for a democratic process is enlightened understanding: within reasonable limits as to time, each member must have equal and effective opportunity for learning about relevant alternative policies and their likely consequences.” Because political culture is an empirical domain that has great durability and does not change easily, its transformation depends in the first place of the changing behavior of the political leaders, who introduce new perspectives into public education. Political leaders committed to social transformation must act to transform the political culture, which so strongly influences both formal and informal modes of political discrimination against women. No substantial changes in the scenery of the contemporary democracies will occur without conscious intervention and determined action by political leaders.

Notes

1. See among others: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/>, Ratings on the guarantee of political and civil rights in all countries worldwide. Data available from 1972 onward and yearly updated, developed by the American NGO “Freedom House”; <http://www.democracyranking.org/en/index.htm>, Democracy index based on political and socioeconomic factors. Available for 100 countries between 2008 and 2010; <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>, Classification of political systems on a scale between the two extremes autocracy and democracy. Yearly updated, data is available for all countries worldwide from 1800 onwards.
2. In 1966, the author of this chapter, then an undergraduate student at the University of São Paulo, was arrested on charges of organizing activities deemed illegal by the authoritarian regime established in Brazil in 1964. Because the right of habeas corpus was still in force, he was released. Some years later, when the authoritarian regime had grown more repressive and habeas corpus was no longer in force, a colleague of the author, Luiz Merlino, was arrested and killed under torture.
3. In the case of Brazil, the 1988 Constitution has broadened the concept of political participation by the inclusion of plebiscite, referendum, citizens’ initiatives of law and deliberative councils for public services such as education, health, and public security (Moisés, 1989).
4. On 28 August 1963, Martin Luther King led the March for Labor and Freedom, convening more than 250,000 people in Washington, DC, and drawing public attention to entrenched social and political injustices, especially toward blacks. Catalyzing people across the country, the march helped change the political dynamics in the USA in subsequent years. The conquest of the right to vote by blacks forever changed the political face of the southern US, causing, in 1966, the number of blacks elected to public office in Mississippi – the most racist of the Southern states – to be greater than in any other state of the country. In 1965, just over 100 blacks were elected to public office in the USA. Today, there are more than 8,000 African-American elected officials, mostly in the Southern states.

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15

Gender and Democracy

Mino Vianello

Whatever definition may be given,¹ democracy should not only be a regime that pursues equality in the widest meaning of the word, but in the first place a political regime antithetic to absolute power, a legal system that resists autocracy and oligarchy, an outcome of liberalism. Democracy rests, therefore, on the institution of constitutional government (Spiro, 1959), liberalism's conquest. Democratic resolutions, laws, and mandates are presented as expressions of the whole people in whose interest they are by definition taken, since the decision-makers are elected by universal suffrage.

Where does this leave women's exclusion from public life? The answer offered by mainstream human sciences is that their exclusion depends simply on an unfortunate gap due to historical circumstances that can be put right by giving women equality with men in public life. No mention is made of changing the political structure. This chapter is a comment on both the traditional conception of democracy and its narrow remedy for the exclusion of women.

Let us begin by stating that in all complex societies, across the world and throughout history, power has been not only men's monopoly in a physical sense, but has also been sanctioned by an overarching² culture infused with male values.³ What is the central value of this culture? Is it compatible with democracy? An answer to these queries implies highlighting what generated it. In other parts of the globe, accounts of this culture have been traced back to religious beliefs, but in the West recourse to Reason has, since Plato, generally been the canon to reinforce belief. For more than 2,000 years a series of philosophical explanations followed one another to justify the sundry political organizations that progressively came into existence. All of them claimed the defense of that archvalue and the order resting on it because it appeared the only alternative to chaos. Consequently, to avoid such nefarious consequence the (male) elite has always had recourse to violence to compel people to submit to the political organization inspired by that culture. How can this absolute hegemony of male culture in the governance of public matters be explained when the negative results of it are all too often manifest to everybody? This is the conundrum.

Feminist thought usually steps back at this point lest it be accused of biological determinism. Its reluctance shows how feminism too, a truly revolutionary strand of thought, has fallen victim to the paralysis that has characterized post-17th-century Western culture under the impact of the so-called Scientific Revolution – a revolution that increasingly imposed bulk-heads between disciplines, reducing intellectual activity to testing empirical hypotheses to the detriment of intentionalities and symbolism.⁴ As this chapter aspires to show, philosophy, psychoanalysis, and neurosciences offer a solution to this question.⁵ Concepts such as “collective unconscious” (Jung), “empathy” (Husserl and the Phenomenological School), and “affective cognition” (neurosciences⁶) supply the tools for it.

As argued in Chapter 10, power for power’s sake became for men the supreme source of prestige,⁷ a goal with priority over all others.⁸ As a consequence, wars of conquest, first to attain military and political territorial expansion, then economic and ideological or religious supremacy, fill up the annals of history. The dualism “Woman the Angel of the Hearth” in opposition to “Man the Conqueror” became entrenched in the kernel of this culture,⁹ resulting in practices of discrimination and oppression of women. This dichotomy was unknown in Paleolithic societies (see Chapters 8, 9, and 10). Over time, demographic growth, territorial conquests, technological progress, and trade expansion made hierarchical institutions necessary to secure within the same community the supremacy of one small group of inhabitants over the others.¹⁰ Therefore, public power is marked, from its inception to the modern state, by that overarching culture, embedded in the male collective unconscious, exalting “Man the Conqueror.”

In the course of the last three centuries economic and technological progress injected into the West a previously unknown individualistic spur. As a consequence, human beings began to conceive of themselves as no longer bound to the social status into which they were born. This revolutionary tendency, from which the feminist movement was also generated, has undoubtedly affected the protection of individual freedom in its sundry manifestations,¹¹ but also became an increasingly formidable tool in the hands of the elite and the precondition for the implementation, as Marx stated in his *Manifesto*, of the main economic, social, and political transformation of human history: capitalism, the supreme embodiment of male logic based on the principle of pursuing profit for the sake of profit.

It does not make sense to debase or to exalt our liberal–democratic political systems by comparing them with the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century in intellectually and socially developed nations or with the contemporary authoritarian regimes in societies where the philosophy of human rights conflicts with the local culture.¹² What is clear is that democracy, in spite of the proclamation that it is “government of the people for the people,” responds to the logic that glorifies power for power’s sake. Theories

that matched this great transformation necessarily had to abandon the paradigm of society defined by Tönnies as "*Gemeinschaft*," whose mechanisms of integration were based on communitarian ties, and move on to explain and justify the "*Gesellschaft*" society as characterized by contractual relations functional to the new market economy. Within this context, political organization had to be conceived as the expression of the free choice of individuals,¹³ whom it was the government's duty to protect as such. Later on, in the 20th century, a further step of liberal societies was identified in pluralism (Dahl, 1971), which integrated the constitutional system of checks and balances.¹⁴

All these theories "sanctioned" this new sociopolitical formation,¹⁵ presenting it as the result of a metaphoric contract and, consequently, as being consensual. Freedom, the source of the contract, was defined as the pursuit of one's own interest. Society began to be considered the "sum of the individuals." The "individual interest" came to be conceived as the mainspring of social life. The state of nature¹⁶ was depicted by its classical theorist, Hobbes,¹⁷ as everyone's drive "to destroy, or subdue one another." Hostility became depicted as the natural trait typical of human beings. Political organization was seen as the remedy, for without a power controlling them, men's lives would be "solitary, nasty, brutish and short." The classical philosophy of the "social animal" was over.

The idea that consent provides the ground for power spread across the whole world after World War II.¹⁸ Democracy became the global yearned-for ideology (Archibugi, 2008). However, its ideology remained from the very start anchored in male culture. Breaking with the *ancien régime*, democracy produced the "citizen," though only men could be citizens. Marianne, the French symbol of empathy, of social cohesion, and responsibility, quickly waned. Women, it was stated in the Age of Enlightenment (although some voices of dissent were by then beginning to be heard), are by nature unfit to exert any role in the public arena,¹⁹ as they are destined to family life, and even there under male supervision.²⁰ Nevertheless there was a seed at the root of this theory which after World War II began to emerge in the West and slowly everywhere: the idea that all citizens, irrespective of their sex, have the opportunity to discuss matters of common concern and to gather freely in associations of various kinds to promote their own interests. It is at this point that a new wave of the feminist movement, after the first naïve, abstract, and rigid approaches of the liberal as well as the Marxist school in the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, broke off to attack the core issue: male power and its overarching culture.

How do things look today? Democracy continues to perpetuate male supremacy, but the emergence for the first time in history of women as subjects in public life gradually spreads the awareness that democracy was born crippled and defective. Women's appearance even in top political offices (although psychologically important for the collective imagination

because it helps to break down traditional stereotypes) means little,²¹ since in 99.99 percent of cases these women are chosen by men. And even those women who attain power without male patronage must in the end respond to the male overarching culture. The logic of power for the sake of power, profit for the sake of profit, and success for the sake of success still reigns supreme. The notion that the government lives up to people's expectations and responds to its representatives appears to a large extent to be a fantasy, which electoral rites no longer succeed in masking. The same holds true for the myth of the self-regulating market: its dramatic deficiencies are obvious to all. Party leaders, stripped of rhetoric, appear to be the political arms of lobbies and pressure groups of all kinds.²² World capital, which dominates oil reserves, the agricultural and petrochemical industry, mineral resources, and above all the financial sector that controls countries' often gigantic public debts and consequently directly or indirectly the destiny of their peoples, in the end influences them all. Party leaders, like the barons of feudal times, select the peons, male or female, who defend and promote these vested interests and, as facts make evident (Gottfried, 2013), care to pursue the satisfaction of collective needs only to the extent required by the electoral game, which is easily vulnerable today to highly sophisticated techniques of manipulation.

Improvements in democracy can, under these conditions, only be marginal (which does not mean meaningless).²³ It is absurd to expect that a situation in keeping with the male ethos may be deeply changed by politicians, men or women, who are amenable to that same ethos. Seeking basic reforms through the state is futile (Connell, 1994). And, in fact, there is no male social movement to stifle a change in that direction: men do not need to mobilize to secure their power in public life! Getting out of this inhuman logic depends on the commitment of both women and men to promoting grassroot initiatives,²⁴ facilitated today by high technology,²⁵ which activate forms of effective participation in decision-making processes aimed at improving the quality of life (Sen, 1999; Nussbaum, 2000; Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003; Castells, 2009; Smith, 2009; Dryzek, 2010; della Porta, 2013).²⁶ This mobilization is spreading worldwide (see Chapter 17), and in the long run might lead to a situation in which the principle of empathy might prevail over the principle of instrumental rationality that has poisoned History up to the present (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1947; Heidegger, 1952).²⁷ Once this radical evolution is achieved, conflicts at the political level, which are inevitable in a pluralist society, will be solved in a new democratic context permeated by a cooperative ethos. At the economic level the market, rid of the demon of power, will function in terms of satisfying the managers' need of achievement with positive results for the collectivity, as we can already witness to some extent in the Nordic countries.²⁸

The contribution of women is of vital importance for democracy because democracy, in order to fulfill its promise, requires social structures that

are held together by emotional ties, like the communities that have characterized human history for thousands of years,²⁹ and are today no longer determined by destiny, as in the past, but by choice (Etzioni, 1993). In the same way that machines marked the beginning of a new era in the capitalist industrial revolution, the Internet, which is less than 20 years old, but is used by more than one billion people, can become the tool, as Manuel Castells was among the first to understand, for the creation of a world system inspired by the culture of freedom, of social responsibility, and of constructive mediation. Its practice matches the female spirit,³⁰ as demonstrated by the fact that many web networks, especially in the area of welfare, were founded by women or are run by them.³¹

With capitalism, a system came into existence to produce profit for profit's sake. Freedom and equality of atomistically conceived individuals really means that some people have the right to buy the labor power of other people, who thus become their subordinates, thanks to the mechanism of a contract, which is only apparently free and equal. It was consequently logical to split the connection between the factory, which was initially small with workers living around it, and the community, which upheld values based on conventions, contacts and beliefs that differed deeply from those necessary for the industrial capitalist organization (Hodgson, 2013). Communities were slowly forced to dwindle in importance. If community life had prevailed, we would not have had the present type of industrialization that has grown out of a world conceived as a huge machine in which people move like Newtonian atoms. But modern political philosophy developed ignoring the community (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, 1993; Etzioni, 1993).³² This is not surprising, because an approach focused on the community would have implied placing gender difference at the center of analysis. As a matter of fact, the community was linked to the family, which was felt and experienced as an autonomous reality. With the capitalist revolution the family became on the contrary a creature of the system, dominated by capitalist logic, and no longer reflecting its members' needs. Even in the collective mind community today belongs to the sphere of private life – in Greek *idion*: that which does not matter (whence “idiot”). This transformation split the modern from the pre-capitalist world, where primary ties played the preeminent role.

Today the crisis of the welfare state, which affects particularly women and the social networks in which they are involved, anticipates a re-evaluation of the public role of the community. This is because the future of democracy, at least in the advanced countries of the world, depends mainly on people's expectations, which nowadays have, except in times of crisis, not so much to do with material needs but rather with the quality of life, which can no longer be satisfied by a central political organization. To understand how this has come to pass, a glimpse at the history of welfare, the heir of class struggle, is necessary.

In the first half of the 20th century, class struggle was still a reality. In the second half, class struggle started to wane and be replaced by local (at times very long and violent) industrial conflicts. The central theme of political and social life became welfare. One of the main causes of this was that the role of women had begun to change. The traditional family with its gender roles division, husband as breadwinner and wife as housewife, began to be superseded by a different kind of family, which makes room for a new role for women outside the domestic walls. In this new context people basically claim policies that secure health provision, full employment, higher wages, and better conditions of work, education, and life (Inglehart, 1997) – all areas of primary concern especially for women, since they concern assistance for elderly and disabled people, youth problems, the rights of immigrants and their families, and women's unemployment.

The last four decades, deep demographic transformations, globalization, economic straits, immigrations, and unemployment have jeopardized public welfare systems, thus opening the way to the impetuous growth of the Third Sector, in which women's voices are preponderant (Themudo, 2009; Teasdale et al., 2011).³³ The Third Sector, implemented by web networks, is the future of and for democracy (Ferrera, 2005) in many important respects: it provides part-time jobs, especially for women; initiatives for elderly and disabled people; vocational courses in cooperation with industrial districts (where they exist, and promoting them where they do not exist), especially for youngsters; requalification courses for adults who have lost their jobs; and childcare day centers for working mothers, possibly in cooperation with firms (Evers, 1999; Evers and Laville, 2004; Heinen, 2004). Women get more and more involved in extra-domestic work not just to supplement their husbands' wages, but in order to have a career. This transformation is matched by the growing awareness that families do not belong just to the private, but also concern the public sphere. The commitment to welfare campaigns thus combines two areas which are equally important for women's emancipation: mass collective action as an indispensable platform to achieve certain results at national levels and, at the same time, involvement in micro-politics concerning daily personal life.

The Third Sector, with its communitarian approach, makes it possible to overcome liberalism's anti-social individualism.³⁴ In fact, we are witnessing the growth of a vast dynamic network of informally interconnected non-profit centers which function thanks to daily participation from the grassroots upward (Salamon and Sokolowsky, 2005). It is a pattern similar to the growth of the free market, which conservatives a couple of centuries ago had difficulty in accepting, wondering how an economic system might work without a center. Yet markets have worked and, in spite of many problems, still work, while centralized economic systems have collapsed.

A great deal of research has been conducted in the last decades on the nexus between women and welfare (a comprehensive approach is offered by

Daly and Lewis, 2000) in sharp contrast to earlier interpretations, although this evolution – as Daly remarks – has not itself produced a counter-theory of welfare and continues to show a preference for macro- over micro-processes. The patriarchal paradigm, which dominated in previous state welfare research, has lost ground since the 1980s thanks to historians who proved that gender played a major role in the shaping of different, non-state, welfare systems, especially in promoting maternal and child interests. Studies of welfarism flourished first and above all in the Scandinavian countries:³⁵ the name of Gøsta Esping Andersen, who in his last book (2009) places gender at the center of his analysis, immediately comes to mind. Years before, it was two Nordic scientists, Helga Hernes and Birte Siim, who marked a turning point in the history of welfare by criticizing the absence of reproductive and non-wage work from welfare state literature. They were also among the first to reject the belief that the modern welfare state had achieved greater equality between men and women, remarking that power in public affairs had remained a male monopoly. Women's powerlessness, claimed Hernes, depends on their marginal position within the corporate system, particularly as developed in the Nordic countries. Siim's conclusion was that the modern welfare state can be said to be patriarchal to the extent that public policies are governed by male assumptions about women as mothers.

In order to observe some results of women's social political activity, some American researchers, following a seminal work by Skocpol (1993, 1995), have begun to use the term "maternalism." Manifesting thus a visible sign of a growing interest in integrating gender perspective into welfare state research, Larsen (1996) underlines that the authors who developed this approach emphasized that the reforms on which the development of welfare states were usually studied related to a limited range of social problems: sickness, disablement, old age, unemployment, labor protection and the introduction of progressive income taxes. Few addressed politics dealing with motherhood, fatherhood, childbearing, and child raising and they did so only marginally. Instead Skocpol had noted that, although a social security system based on insurance arrangements was not passed by the American Congress until 1935, the federal government or the government of individual states did play a role in promoting welfare before then, with reforms aimed at women and children.³⁶

The contribution of this line of enquiry is of paramount importance for our topic, but doubtless raises some questions. In particular, the attempt to present women as a unified political force by defining all women as potential mothers has caused debate among feminist scholars. Like Skocpol, Larsen underlines that Gordon too, one of the leading historians, stressed the importance of organized women as promoters of maternal and child welfare (1993, 1994). However, whereas Skocpol argued that the maternalist celebration of the civic value of mothering was shared "by mothers of all classes and races," Gordon claimed that maternalists are elite people,

mainly in agreement about the exigency of preserving the male breadwinner as the head of the family. Skocpol had failed to see this because she left out factors such as race, class, and religion. Moreover, she ignored informal influences from social movements or shifts in popular consciousness and used maternalism in opposition to paternalism, without expressing the difference between the two concepts. Skocpol did not see that the forms of political power with which she was so concerned are shaped by male culture. Some points, however, Larsen emphasizes, are common to all these scholars. By applying the idea that women possess special moral qualities by virtue of being mothers, they made mothering the fundamental defining experience of womanhood, yet they helped to move welfare speculation from the narrow macro-economic field to the micro-social gender-biased Third Sector approach. This is a vital step for democracy, helping it to overcome the deadly clasp of the male viewpoint.

In fact, the civic society organizations that make up the Third Sector exert their activity in many different ways and aim at affecting policies concerning not only welfare and women's issues, but also sectors of general interest. While some organizations' activities are contrived for groups on need, others are more concerned about lobbying at state level for reforms in a very wide sense of the word, including, for instance, education (Heinen, 2004). Through integrating voluntary and private welfare activity in the study of social policy, we can thus discover new ways in which the private-public mix marks welfare policies (Ascoli and Ranci, 2002). To date no theory of welfarism based on its gendered agents has emerged. In welfare research, women are still considered either as mothers in the analysis of family policies, in which the family is conceived in conventional terms, or as paid workers in the labor market. Gender per se, as the basic structure of society, has been given no space. Consequently the outcomes of specific programs on the distribution of resources between women and men as well as the link between policies and outcomes are hardly known (Ferrera, 2005).

The Third Sector, an area largely inspired by the female spirit, appears to be a field of decentralized meeting points where citizens who are increasingly well equipped to deal professionally with issues concerning the quality of life are committed to giving an answer to public expectations. Workers, even manual workers, who in Marx's and Engels' time were illiterate and prey to superstitions, today participate in the Enlightenment heritage and are acquainted with science and technology. Their presence in the Third Sector is no longer an exception.

Life in the past was controlled by a social system characterized by the authority principle. Today that system has been replaced by one in which on a daily basis all kinds of authority tend to melt away or at least be contested, and individualism, which is responsible, on one hand, for pathological forms of narcissism, mass consumption, and media manipulation, has, on the other hand, brought to people's central attention the expression of their needs, their feelings, their expectations in a strongly egalitarian

context where everyone develops an identity which is no longer exclusively determined by one's status and occupation. Society does not appear rigidly organized today, but rather a labyrinth where giving a sense to one's life is difficult and aleatory, but at the same time highly enticing. However, in this society lie deadly contradictions, which may be solved not by going back to a traditional society but must move forward in accordance with an ethical stand based on the absolute principle that human needs have priority over profit-making. As Marx anticipated, the bourgeoisie digs its grave with its own hands. Indeed, it is the subjects emancipated by capitalist development, and in the first place women, who will make this transformation possible, thanks to a stress on self-reliance, overcoming powerful institutions and movements that strive to maintain the status quo. If this is so, the male instrumental logic is bound to wane at the local level and persist fully only in the global top governance, where internecine struggles rage between its protagonists, creating an increasingly fragmented and opaque situation that is characterized by overlapping and conflicting forms of sovereignty.

A new path begins to improve the quality of democracy: to promote and coordinate Third Sector networks. It means rediscovering the original role of parties: to inform and discuss issues of common interest, starting with down to earth local realities. But this is impossible in the presence of the traditional power mechanisms of modern states which, born out of the elites' reaction to feudal society in the most advanced countries, Great Britain and France, perceived communities as obstacles to their own growth. Bodin's advice,³⁷ notwithstanding the hostility of the vested interests (the Catholic Church, the feudatories, the guilds), was followed by the kings of Great Britain and France, who thus promoted the evolution of the bourgeoisie from a commercial to an entrepreneurial class and with its support founded the "modern state," alien only to the Catholic Church, since both feudatories and guilds had no other choice but to accept this new reality or to fight for the triumph of a foreign monarchy. There was no more room for the communities that were condemned to disappear in the sacred name of the "nation," defined by Jung as "a monster, a horrible thing," able to generate mass raptures.

The traditional party system is wrecked. A new civil life's legitimating reality is necessary. This means the assertion of empathy in opposition to formal rationality. Whether this is just wishful and utopian thinking can be proved only by the future. What is true is what Heidegger (1952) wrote: "The bewildering thing is that we are not able to reach an adequate solution for the reality of our time thanks to a 'non calculating' way of thinking." How this can be achieved, we do not know. At the beginning of the 1930s nobody could have foreseen one of the most significant event of the 20th century, the New Deal, just few years later.

A stand like this will no doubt be looked down upon by mainstream science as "sentimental." I have no difficulty in agreeing, and indeed in emphasizing it, because sentiments are the foundation of ethics. As Jung

reminds us, contrary to common belief, sentiment, analogous to thought, which expresses a judgment on the specificity of a thing, is a “rational” function because it expresses a value judgment. It communicates the value a thing has for us, thus linking the objective and the subjective spheres. The world is full of complaints about the lack of ethics, but it should be obvious that, by eliminating sentiments, the ethical sentiment also vanishes because the value link between reality and our life is jeopardized. Invidious comparison becomes the basic rule,³⁸ which does not need a introspective analysis of personal motivations in order to justify one’s behavior: things have in themselves their justification, whence the mix of cynicism and narcissism in which people live.

Participation is the soul of citizenship. But “real” participation, and not just electoral participation, presupposes that people know each other, discuss their respective problems, their practical and emotional implications. *Fraternité*, represented by the portrait of Marianne, meant exactly this: the willingness to give and receive human warmth so as to create a new bond thanks to an empathic approach. This symbol, which in the first post-revolutionary days triumphed in all French squares, soon disappeared and became a cartoon character. Men’s resistance had been, after all, explicit in this effigy: Marianne was supposed to represent female warmth, but not women’s rights in public life. “Citoyens” were only human beings entitled to wear weapons, symbols of power and tools of violence, and consequently those who were franchised were only men.

The rebirth of the community, based on the central role of knowledge as the basis for the Third Sector’s initiatives, is the path of democracy. While in the past many young people used to be party militants, today they are increasingly active everywhere in the Third Sector, being conscious that developing social capital, which is to say collective empathy, is the premise for building new forms of political capital. Communities provide citizens with a multiplicity of access points to decision-making (Sartori, 1958, 261, 271),³⁹ and consequently are an asset for people who want change.

Unfortunately, we have to address the resilience of the previous age’s ideology that started with the presuppositions of scarcity of resources and reciprocal indifference among “individuals,” and consequently conceived of justice as the ability to resolve the inevitable frictions between atoms through the allotment of resources. But, as Hume used to say, there would be no need for justice, granted that goods are not enough, if generosity were human nature’s prevalent trait. At this point in global development, this virtue Hume spoke of, generosity, a synonym of empathy, appears to be a realistic possibility. It is a process which has just begun. Centuries were necessary to overcome that feudal society where peoples and territories could pass from one king to another. Nevertheless the problems plaguing the planet now are of such magnitude that, if not faced, humankind can hardly survive (Gilligan and Richards, 2009).

Conclusion

For the first time in human history half of humankind, which has throughout history been excluded from participating in public life, is entering the decision-making processes that rule it. It is not chimerical to expect that this “half of heaven” be the bearer of values different from the traditional ones.

Great transformations take place silently. In the *Wealth of Nations*, Adam Smith (1776, 391) recalls the case of the large landowners who could not be subjected to the king by the vassalage pact: “but what the discipline of feudal institutions could never achieve, was gained by the silent and imperceptible hustle and bustle of foreign traders and handicraftsmen. They gradually offered the large landowners something to be exchanged with the whole surplus of their lands.” In competing for the possession of useless goods (Smith makes the well-known example of the diamond buckle), they gave up their economic function and the authority that went with it:

A revolution of the utmost importance for collective happiness thus took place thanks to two different categories, none of which had the slightest purpose of serving the common good. To gratify its childish vanity was the only goal of the great landowners. Merchants and craftsmen, much less ridicule, were motivated by their own self-interest, trying to get a penny wherever it was possible to get a penny.

(Smith, 1776, 323)

In this manner the feudal regime was replaced in Great Britain by the modern state. Is it utopian to think that in a world haunted by the atomic bomb we may be on the brink of a similar transformation? Or should we accept what Smith wrote two and a half centuries ago: “The violence and injustice of peoples’ chiefs is an old evil to which the nature of human things can bring no remedy”?

Notes

1. Democratic theory includes today, in Thomas Humphrey Marshall’s wake, the concern for human rights (Diamond, 1999; Zakaria, 2003), which for some should include also the right to solidarity: practically, a typical social-democratic solution (Landman, 2013). For a definition in the context of globalization that takes into account gender discrimination, see Walby (2009). A comprehensive overview of contemporary democracies is Lijphart, 1984.
2. “Overarching” because it permeates and conditions all other values, habits of mind and institutions.
3. Consequently, all forms of political organization (see van Creveld, 1999) that followed in the course of history and the corresponding philosophical theories that sanctioned them are but precarious attempts to negotiate intellectually the tension between the conditions generated by the economic, technological, and civil evolution on one side, and the male elite’s policies on the other.

Forms of power evolve macroscopically, but the logic remains the same. A king may become the champion of the common people against the feudal lords, who later on, in the face of the emerging bourgeoisie, may find it convenient to line up with him. National sentiment, a product of the bourgeoisie which initially necessitated safe and, later, larger and larger markets, had in the beginning the king as its symbol, but that same sentiment quickly became the basis for requests that led first to constitutional monarchies and later to republican governments. In the economic domain, first Colbert's vision triumphed and then the very industrial progress which it promoted swept away the patrimonial conception of the state. History twists in whirling and upsetting ways, and yet the archdominant culture remains the same.

4. An example of reaction to this trend was given by Jung and Pauli who, albeit active in different fields, collaborated for more than a quarter of a century with reciprocal advantage (Pauli and Jung, 1952).
5. Recent important contributions in this field are Jean-Pierre Changeux and Paul Ricoeur (1998); Changeux (2008).
6. See the "Series in Affective Science", Oxford University Press, which includes more than 20 titles, among them *The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions* by Jan Panksepp, a specially important contribution to the human sciences. See also Changeux (2008).
7. In the economic world profit for profit's sake.
8. To the point that the prestige as well as the pleasure of the powerful people increases the more they succeed in violating the laws scot free, even the laws they made themselves. Usurpation gives them the feeling of being above not only the common man, but the also the collectivity. The feeling of power, which can be only experienced in the present, is, as both Freud and Nietzsche stated, "life's dizziness," ecstasy and abyss. Usurpation provides the climax. See the profound reflections by Canetti (1960).
9. The Indo-European stem of the word "virile" which characterizes the behavior of a real man means "hero."
10. Supremacy of the few over the majority started being practiced with the appearance of settlements (Oppenheimer, 1911). The hypothesis that the first complex forms of political organization developed in Mesopotamia c.5000 BC as a consequence of irrigation works seems validated by archaeologists (see van Creveld, 1999, Chapter 1 "Before the state: prehistory to AD, 1300").
11. The defense of personal rights as the foundation of freedom was unknown to the Greeks, who by freedom meant only the freedom of the polis (Benjamin Constant's speech on 'De la liberté des Anciens comparée à celle des Modernes, 1819, is the classic text).
12. As in East and South-East Asia, the Middle East, and some Latin American countries. The gap between the countries in the Magna Carta tradition and those out of it is felt also in the West. The impact of eight centuries of history cannot be ignored. Yet, when the elite's privileges are threatened, recourse to violence is not rare even in well-established democracies such as Great Britain and the United States, without any consideration for the rule of law.
13. Defined as "rational beings," without any distinction of sex, psychic structure, or role in society.
14. The problem since Rousseau and de Tocqueville has been how to avoid the majority's dictatorship, because the result of elections is that a part of the population ends up deprived of representation. In reality, this is largely an academic

discussion, since power is overwhelmingly outside both majority and opposition voters' control. Nevertheless, a representative regime where public opinion is accustomed to think that the government works for the people and a pluralism of political organizations exists certainly avoids falling into the hands of autocrats, not to say dictators. Yet, also in these countries the overarching culture is always the instrumental one, with its dire consequences.

15. Kant is an exception; in fact, it is no coincidence that his approach did not influence political philosophy.
16. Grotius already (*De Jure Belli*, 1609) defined the state of nature as a "situation in which men live in kinship and not state associations," with the consequence that violence against these "savage peoples" was legitimate. The East India Company was launched in those years, followed almost immediately by the Dutch Company of Oriental India (Pateman and Mills, 2007).
17. Hegel's antithetical position (contract and covenant versus ethical idea) leads to the same practical conclusion.
18. Rejected by Rousseau because it ignored income, power, and social status. It re-emerges, though, in the general will theory, whose aim is to re-create a democracy of free and equal citizens not corrupted by social institutions.
19. Notice that in one of the most ancient democracies of the world, Switzerland, franchise was granted to women only in 1971.
20. As far as marriage is concerned, paradoxically defined a "contract," the classical work is Carole Pateman (1988).
21. As Part I of this volume also shows. The 2014 Report of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, on the other hand, shows that in terms of women elected in top legislative assemblies the United States is surpassed by Burkina Faso, Saudi Arabia, Cambodia, and Pakistan; Israel by Kyrgyzstan, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Burundi; the Nordic countries (which are first with 42 percent of women in parliament in terms of macro-regions) by Rwanda.
22. Some semi-public, like the "independent agencies" in the United States and in other countries, outside any control and operating with a total lack of transparency (Lowi, 1979). As far as the EU is concerned, in 2009 there were in Brussels 2,600 pressure groups and 15,000 lobbyists, of whom 1,700 were in the financial sector, with 120 million euros at their disposal ("Report" *Corriere della Sera*, see also the reports of the Corporate Europe Observatory). In the United States two recent (2014) decisions of the Supreme Court upheld the total elimination of any restriction of financial contributions from corporations to politicians (Lepore, 2014).
23. There is no doubt that somehow democracies can be improved. But, as one of its champions (Moisès, 2013) admits, success can be only limited even as far as defective essential aspects are concerned. A formal victory, like the overturning in 1929 by the British Privy Council of the Canadian Supreme Court's decision that women are not persons, important as it has been symbolically (and also practically, because on that basis women gained access to the Senate), has not led to significant structural changes.
24. A logic that disconcerted Marx, who wondered why capitalists were obsessed beyond reason by the spur of accumulation for the sake of accumulation. Ignoring gender difference made recourse to medieval categories inevitable.
25. IT allows not only different actors to coordinate themselves, but to mobilize in real time vast masses of people and to exchange news between themselves, as the street demonstrations of the past decade have shown.

26. Not only initiatives at the welfare level, but also struggles to secure reproductive rights and all forms leading to sexual freedom; campaigns to educate the male partners to rediscover their feminine qualities, and getting them emotionally involved in domestic chores and childcare; aggressive demonstrations against all forms of exploitation of women's bodies (in fashion shows and the advertising of cosmetics, regularly plugged also in progressively oriented media); all are of vital importance.
27. See Sandel (2nd edition, 1998) on the relationship between justice and liberalism in Rawl's work. See Heidegger's (1952) remark about the word 'reason,' from *ratio* which refers to both calculating and reckoning in a transaction (*ratio* stems from *reor*, to measure something comparing it with something else).
28. It will immediately be objected that the results achieved in terms of gender equality (especially in the political field) are due to a party, the Social Democratic Party. The difference with the rest of the world consists in the fact that life in Nordic societies (which represent less than 0.04 percent of the world population) has been characterized since time immemorial both by an overarching culture based on the principle of "live and let live," which implies sexual freedom (one of the pillars of gender equality as witnessed by the Icelandic Sagas), as well as by a sentiment of solidarity called for by exacting environmental conditions.
29. In Europe until the 18th century and still today in large parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
30. In communities every member tends to adopt with flexibility different styles of behaviors on the basis of her/his needs, in line with the principle of respecting the other members' needs. In this sense a community embodies a female spirit, is a "personalized" space defined by the users' activities and choices, strongly tied both to the temporal and physical immediate situation, where things fall directly under everyone's eyes, and their dimensions, distance, and links can easily be perceived, while what lies afar is experienced as ambiguous and inconsistent. It is a space within which life cannot be standardized, and there is no room for the strategic mind. It is the space of empathy (ruled out in Rawls's conception. See Sandel, 1998, 50–65, 150; Dryzek, 2010).
31. It is unfortunate that statistical data on this issue are missing.
32. Charles Fourier, Robert Owen, and more recently Adriano Olivetti are often not even mentioned in handbooks of political philosophy. In the same way, experiments that originated from their work are not recorded in manuals of history. Even the case of the century-old *kibbutzim* is overlooked in spite of a rich literature (Rosner and Getz, 2006).
33. It is clear that conquests in the field of reproductive rights and welfare in general benefit not only women, but also men.
34. Often not distinguished from liberalism (the reader may be interested in the exchange of opinion between Croce and Einaudi, 1947).
35. This part is largely indebted to the brilliant PhD Dissertation of Erik Larsen, 1996.
36. The United States was not alone in developing social welfare reforms aimed at mothers and children, but stood out in comparison to Europe because these policies were championed by elite middle-class women "for the good" of less privileged women, and not by socialist parties or trade unions as in Europe.
37. Centralized public administration responsible exclusively to the king; the king's monopoly of armies made up of permanent soldiers regimented by professional career officers; monopoly of coin mint and of tax imposition; professional judiciary system free from local interferences.

38. The first analysis of this phenomenon was Thorstein Veblen's (1898), one of the most important 20th-century social scientists whose importance tends to be overlooked for various reasons (incidentally, feminist institutionalists, in spite of Veblen's contributions to women's studies and of his being the very founder of institutionalism, don't even know his name – at least I never found it cited).
39. Rousseau's words ring in these lines.

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Part IV

Strategies for Social and Political Transformation

Section Introduction

Jane H. Bayes

Any strategy for social or political transformation invariably relies on: (1) an understanding of what needs to be changed; (2) a theory/narrative (or theories/narratives) about what factors influence and shape social, psychological, economic, and political formation; and (3) beliefs concerning what action is possible through intentional human agency in the society in question. Strategies for social and political transformation also depend on (4) visions of what kinds of transformation are desirable, how change occurs, and the level of transformation sought, whether individual, institutional, national, or transnational; and (5) fears on the part of opponents of change and the backlash they may mobilize. Beyond the hopes and ambitions that fuel social change efforts, activists must also grapple with competing agendas, unintended consequences, contagion effects, and symbolic outcomes.

Written by authors from different countries, backgrounds, and disciplines, the chapters in this section articulate different ideas about what needs to be changed to produce a more just world, and consider the relative impact of various factors in shaping current and future possibilities. These chapters address diverse social and political problems, including violence against women, the centrality of empathetic childcare in the first year of a child's life to the development of democratic citizens, alternative tactics devised by women in Japan and Korea to obtain legislative representation, the effective political mobilization of regional women's networks in Africa and Latin America, as well as women's successful organizing and advocacy to produce major changes in the nature of power and authority in Morocco. Women's strategic organizing plays a critical role in each of these chapters, although the focus of their organizing efforts varies widely to include the education of parents to provide adequate care for their children during the first year of life; combating violence against women through provision of counseling, shelters, and helplines; creating a women's party in Japan and lobbying for quotas for women in Korea; creating new laws and institutions that change

patriarchal structures and practices in Morocco; and forging transnational networks to press for change in Africa and Latin America.

The authors in this section draw upon varying theoretical frameworks to envision social and political transformation, ranging from psychoanalysis and poststructuralist conceptions of power, to feminist theorizations of social mobilization, advocacy, and gendered institutions. Challenging mainstream accounts grounded in evidence drawn from men's lives, these chapters illuminate new possibilities for social relationships and contribute to new forms of knowledge. Grounding theory in the everyday lives of women, several authors analyze the diversity of women's experiences, their competing worldviews and their understandings of the social relations of production and exchange to illuminate new avenues for democratic politics. Other chapters show that by combining theory with practice, women have created rape prevention programs, battered women's shelters, and educational programs for parents of newborns. They have organized a women's party, quota systems, reformed family and personal law, and built networks and community organizations. Analyzing change over time, each chapter shows how women experiment, learn from their experiences, revise their ideas, and try again when earlier efforts fail. Often these creative actions produce unintended consequences, sometimes positive, sometimes negative. Sometimes a gain may be purely symbolic without substantive effects. On other occasions, symbolic actions produce long-term positive changes that may not be fully recognized until the next generation reaches maturity. Tactics for social transformation developed in one nation can be contagious – appropriated and reproduced in other regions as the proliferation of party and legislative quotas, battered women's shelters, and transnational networking among women make clear. The visions for social transformation that inform certain chapters draw attention to intimate relations in families within and across generations, while acknowledging that these intimate ties reflect particular social relations, norms, ideologies, and structures of power. Other chapters shift the focus from the familial and interpersonal to civic and political organizations, national policies, and transnational organizations or networks. The chapters share a commitment to the creation of a world free from intimate violence, family violence, structural violence, and organized conflict. The authors envision a world in which women and men are treated with dignity and respect by all institutions and individuals in the society. Some chapters advocate equitable treatment of gender differences, insisting that women ought not to have to conform to models of existence drawn exclusively from men's experiences. Women's unique contributions to life and to social relations deserve to be fully valued and esteemed. Another chapter emphasizes that the seeds of democratic citizenship must be sown in the earliest stages of life through the cultivation of empathy in the most basic relations between parents and their children.

Social and political transformation requires strategic thinking that is context-specific. Women and men who seek to promote change must evaluate the possibilities and opportunities within their own societies while forging transnational ties and drawing upon resources afforded by international organizations. In addition to reach out to those at national and international levels who seek to foster progressive change, activists must also be keenly aware of local and global forces that oppose such transformations. The tactics required to improve the well-being of women in traditional, patriarchal, and theocratic states are quite different from those that have succeeded in non-inclusive liberal democratic and republican states. Yet working within patriarchal religious traditions for social change can produce impressive results, as the chapter on Morocco demonstrates. Feminist activists have also mobilized as outsiders, appealing to democratic conceptions of racial, ethnic, class, and gender equality to mobilize at grassroots level and to organize major social protest against inequitable practices. Pushing from the outside to secure rights and opportunities for all who have been excluded can sometimes produce important gains. For effective social change, historical and cultural context matter, as does the timing of strategic interventions. A strategy that may work in one country or context at one time may be totally inappropriate in another country or time. Yet female activists in different contexts have much to learn from each other and from their predecessors.

16

The Feminization of Authority in Morocco

Fatima Sadiqi

Introduction

With the advent of the 21st century, women in Morocco scored significant social, legal, and political gains. Armed with education, they did not only improve their socioeconomic and political status, but also their self-confidence in public spaces that have hitherto been constructed as “male.” As a result, new feminine roles emerged that deeply affected traditional gender-role assignment, family, and society at large. In other words, the spectacular entry of Moroccan women into the powerful spheres of decision- and policymaking is shattering the foundations of a centuries-old and pervasive space-based patriarchy and is feminizing authority, the instrument par excellence of this patriarchy.

As power sanctioned by society and psychologically legitimized by individuals, authority is no longer exclusively masculine in Morocco. Women are increasingly accepted as enterprise leaders, high-profile managers, religious figures, judges, in brief as authority-holders. Their strategizing skills helped them create a “peaceful” transformation that seems to be there to stay in spite of the ups and downs created by an agonizing resistance.

In order to understand the significance of these and related issues, I have written this chapter in two major sections: the first presents an overview of the major gains that Moroccan women have scored and the second explains the significance of these gains for the conception of authority, women, and society.

I acknowledge the help of Mary Hawkesworth and José Alvaro Moisés in restructuring and reformulating some of the central ideas of this paper. I also register my gratitude to Mino Vianello for giving me opportunity to contribute to this volume. Finally my thanks go to all the participants in the 2013 and 2014 eye-opening San Servolo (Venezia) encounters.

Overview of Moroccan women's gains

From the early 1960s onward, the overall status of women in Morocco has unquestionably improved: they now have more control of their reproductive health, increased access to school, more legal rights, and more visibility in the political arena, including civil society. These improvements have been enforced by the requirements of economic development that the various versions of the Moroccan government needed to carry out in order to present a decent face to the world outside, as well as by the efforts and strategizing skills of the Moroccan feminist movement.

Progress in women's reproductive rights

One of the most important conditions of human life is health. According to the World Health Organization (WHO, 2008), "the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being." Health is also a source of economic productivity, and the absence of health is associated with poverty, especially for people near the margins of subsistence. Health outcomes depend on a series of factors such as income distribution, government expenditure, and individual behaviors and lifestyles. When we consider the social and economic contexts of Morocco and the ideological foundations that influenced policymaking and implementation, we note that some progress has been made in improving the health status of Moroccan women, even in the rural regions where major challenges remain.

The medical infrastructure improved after the independence of Morocco and free public health care allowed the majority of urban women to give birth in hospitals. For example, a national program of family planning was set up as early as 1966. The implementation of this program, however, only began in the early 1980s, mainly as a measure to counter the then-perceived too rapid population growth. The success of this implementation was greatly enhanced by women's positive attitudes to contraceptives as a means of preserving their health. Further, through its efficient household service delivery, the Moroccan government was able to provide modern contraceptives to low-income and rural women who did not have access to private-sector services. In 2004, more than 50 percent of married women in rural areas had access to modern family planning methods: this is important as half of women aged between 15 and 49 are illiterate, and 65 percent of them are in rural areas (Chattou, 1998; Hamdouch and Khachani, 2004).

According to Juhie Bhatia (2012):¹

By 2010 Morocco had decreased its maternal mortality ratio by over 60 percent since 1990, according to the Ministry of Health, with much of that drop in recent years. And between 1990 and 2008 it achieved an annualized decline of 6.3 percent, the fastest in the region with the exception for Iran's 8.9 percent, according to a 2011 report by the Ministry of

Health and the United Nations Population Fund. This progress means Morocco might meet U.N. Millennium Development Goal No. 5, which calls on nations to reduce maternal mortality by three-fourths between 1990 and 2015. With three years left to go, Morocco is one of a small group on track, a September 2011 study found.

Progress in family planning was accompanied by improvement in other reproductive health indicators. For example, the provision of care at birth and professional antenatal care have improved considerably. Between 1992 and 2004, the percentage of pregnant women receiving antenatal care increased from 32 percent to 68 percent of all births.² Assistance at delivery is another important variable that has influenced delivery outcomes and reduced the health risks for mothers and children. In 1992 only 31 percent of Morocco's births were delivered by trained medical providers, but that proportion increased to 63 percent by 2004. The disparity in access to deliveries by trained medical personnel between the poorest and richest women has also declined. A direct result of this is that in the last decades, Morocco has witnessed a considerable decline in its fertility rate. According to the 2003–2004 Demographic and Health Survey, Moroccan women have 2.5 children on average, three fewer births than the average registered in 1980. It is in rural areas that the change has been dramatic: 6.6 births on average in 1980 and 3.0 births in 2004. In 2014, 2.15 children were born per woman according to the World Factbook.³ The two main causes of the fertility decline in Morocco are the increase in women's average age at marriage and the increase in married women's use of contraceptive methods, as explained below:⁴

These transformations in reproductive behaviour suggest underlying changes in marital practices. The marriage age has increased considerably in the past fifty years. In 2010, women married at an average age of 26.6 and men at 31.4, which is 9.3 and 7.5 years later, respectively, than in 1960.

This state of affairs has, in turn, greatly impacted women's life expectancy:⁵

Moroccan society is witnessing massive demographic and social shifts, a recently released National Demographic Survey concluded. While the average Moroccan born in the 1960s had a life expectancy of 47 years, it has now risen to 74.8 years, the findings conducted in 2009–2010 revealed. Indeed mortality rates dropped mainly because of improvements made in sanitary and living conditions.

Similarly, the proportion of women married by ages 20–24 dropped from 64 percent in 1980 to 32 percent in 2011. According to the same sources, the use of contraceptive methods among married women of reproductive age

increased from 19 percent to 63 percent. Further, the number of girls who enter school and stay in it has increased considerably. According to the 2013 World Bank Report:⁶

National enrollment rates for girls increased from 52.4 percent to 98.2 percent in primary education, from 17.5 percent to 56.7 percent in lower secondary education and from 6.1 percent to 32.4 percent in upper secondary education. There has also been clear progress toward equity, with the gap between urban boys and rural girls at the primary education level narrowing to just 3.5 percentage points by the 2012 school year.

These facts indicate that in spite of unemployment among young women being much higher than among young men, an increasing number of girls aged between 15 and 24 take up jobs, especially in the textile and export processing industries, and agriculture, as well as the manufacture of clothing, microfinance, and tourism.

The specific factors that led to this reduction are a combination of mass education, consciousness-raising, and the role of the media. Women in Morocco are increasingly aware of the importance of their physical health for their general well-being, a perspective enhanced by the introduction of family planning. The use of the pill as a means of controlling family size was very successful among women in urban and later in rural areas. The absence of “fatwas” (religious decrees) dictating family size made this possible.⁷ Across Morocco, the family planning method most used is still the pill. More efforts are being deployed to secure a broad, balanced mix of methods, including the so-called male methods. Further, the gap between the rich and poor with respect to access to professional antenatal care is being bridged by home deliveries. It is true that single mothers receive very poor services and face higher-risk deliveries, but efforts are being deployed here as well: Non-governmental associations (NGOs) such as Bayti (My House) endeavor to take care of “illegitimate” children (whose father is not known) and single mothers. To face the taboo that surrounds these two social categories, the government has created shelters for “women in difficult situations,” and these are increasingly operational. Furthermore, the legal implementation of the reforms brought about by the 2004 Family Law will certainly help alleviate some of these hurdles.⁸

Women’s legal gains

Of all Moroccan women’s gains, it is the legal ones that are most tied with their struggle for rights and strategizing skills; they are also those that are most involved in Morocco’s attempts at democratization.⁹ Barely two years after its independence in 1956, the first law that the Moroccan state crafted was the Personal Status Code (Mudawana), setting, thus, the ground for the type of citizens it wanted. While Moroccan codified and state-promulgated

laws were based on the French civil law, only the Personal Status Code (Family Law) was based on the Maliki School of *fiqh*,¹⁰ a religious law. It was thus clear that the state wanted to maximize its centralized power over the citizens as the monarch held both executive and religious authority.¹¹ In other words, the state needed to assert its own authority and not leave it in the hands of the *ulama* (male religious scholars). Ever since, citizenship has been defined by belonging to the state, and not by belonging to a religion. Furthermore, at the eve of Morocco's independence, unification, and not particularism, was the ultimate goal of the Moroccan state, and women and their rights did not constitute a priority in the overall post-independence political agenda.

The 1958 Personal Status Code was very detrimental to women who, among other things, could be unilaterally repudiated and were required to obey their husbands and their in-laws in return for board and lodging. Understandably, the widespread illiteracy, especially among women, that characterized pre- and post-independence decades consolidated the Personal Status Code as a "sacred" text that could not be touched. Various attempts to reform the *Mudawana* throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s failed (Buskens, 2003). These failures made reforming the *Mudawana* the backbone of the Moroccan feminist movement, and also the source of significant gains that eventually transcended the legal realm. Women understood that by securing legal rights they could strategize better for other types of rights.

Indeed, significant breakthroughs in Moroccan women's legal rights have been scored. First, the sacrality of the *Mudawana* was lifted in September 1993 pursuant to women's pressure on the government. Examples of such reforms were the abolition of *jabr* (the father's forcing marriage on his daughter), making the bride's verbal consent compulsory, the necessity of a judge's permission in matters of polygamy and unilateral divorce, and the required permission of the first wife in cases of polygamy). These reforms were considered "superficial" by women's rights associations, but they were important symbolically as they rendered the Personal Status Code an ordinary (not sacred) law. This was in itself a momentous victory for the women's movement.

More substantial reforms were introduced in 2004. The mounting tide of Islamization in the last decade of the 20th century and the first years of the 21st weakened women's secular feminist movement. However, by seizing the May 2003 Casablanca terrorist attacks and being the first to take to the street and denounce the glorification of the Islamists' propaganda, women succeeded in speeding up reforms. Three such reforms stand out as genuine gains. First, the concept of equality was enshrined in the law: both husbands and wives were made legal "heads of the family," both boys and girls could marry when they were 18 years of age, both men and women could file for divorce. Second, the reforms targeted family equilibrium: the public ministry could automatically intervene in the application of the Family Law,

family courts were established, creating a friendlier space for women to take their issues to justice, means of reconciliation were provided, a fund for family assistance was created, and Moroccan marriages contracted abroad were recognized. Third, children were legally protected: the divorced mother's custody was not lifted if she remarried or resided far from the father, the social status of the child was preserved after divorce (especially with regard to dwelling and standard of living), and most importantly the paternity of the child was recognized if s/he was conceived before the marriage contract was formalized. This last point is very important as it allows women to gain more rights through the "window" of "protecting children." Hence, for example, a judge can order a man to undergo DNA paternity tests if a pregnant woman claiming paternity can prove she was engaged to him. DNA paternity tests are a genuine legal aid for single mothers in Moroccan society, because the identification of the father forces the latter to recognize the child and provide financial support. The father's legal recognition of the child after DNA paternity tests also protects single mothers socially by facilitating their acceptance by their family and community even if they don't eventually get married. Recognition of paternity is indeed crucial in the heavily patriarchal Moroccan society. Admittedly, judges have applied the law only rarely because of the various problems encountered in securing the father's recognition, such as poverty. However, this window in the *Mudawana* is a genuine gain for women, and Morocco is the only country in the Arab-Islamic world to address, albeit implicitly, the issue of single mothers, and allow DNA paternity tests to protect them.

Other gains of the 2004 pro-women legal reforms were registered. For example, the *Mudawana* is considered a project of society, making women's issues part and parcel of the state's issues. Further, the language of the *Mudawana* has become more egalitarian as terms deemed degrading or debasing for women, such as "obedience," have been weeded out, and the overall packaging of the *Mudawana* is more responsive to Moroccan society's frame of mind: do justice to women, protect children's rights, and preserve men's dignity. This packaging opened the door to more legal reforms. Hence, a Nationality Law was promulgated in 2006, putting an end to the situation where children of Moroccan women married to foreign nationals (or living overseas) needed to renew their residency permit every year although they "felt" Moroccan, and these children and their fathers could not vote as Moroccans. The new amendment to Article 6 of the Moroccan Nationality Law was the cornerstone of a change which essentially sought to expand the definition that was initially based on origin to include the paternity line – in other words, it sought to achieve complete equality regardless of whether it was the mother or the father who was the Moroccan parent. The wording of the new Article is clear: "Nationality is granted on the basis of origin or paternity line." This allows any Moroccan woman to automatically pass on her nationality to her children at birth, whether they are born in Morocco

or elsewhere, as the wording of the new article is specific: “The child of a Moroccan father or mother is considered a Moroccan national.” Similarly,

A child born to a mixed marriage is Moroccan at birth due to his maternal line and needs to choose, on reaching the age of 18 to 20, which nationality to maintain. Should the mother have intervened to make that choice prior to the age of consent, then the offspring has the right on reaching the age of maturity to amend the change and demand the resumption of his Moroccan nationality.

Morocco has also been a signatory to international treaties such as the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the Organization of Children’s Rights. The new 2004 Family Law endorses the other changes made in Moroccan family law by underscoring the equality in rights and duties between men and women in accordance with these conventions.

Other laws, such as the Labor Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Law on Civil Registration, have been reformed, and subsequent amendments were extended to several other laws to remove discriminatory language. Likewise, some Moroccan ministries have started to incorporate gender in their administrative policies. For example, in 2004 the Ministry of Communication, in partnership with the Canadian Agency of International Development (Agence Canadienne de Développement International – (ACDI) and the Fonds d’Appui à l’Egalité Entre les Sexes – FAESII) began gender mainstreaming its activities. This mainstreaming project drafted a “middle-term” program to be implemented between 2006 and 2010. It concerns many departments of the ministry, such as the Syndicat National de la Presse Marocaine (SNPM) and the second national channel 2M.

Finally the 2011 post-“Moroccan Spring” constitution built on the previous reforms to institutionalize gender equality and parity.¹² Although the implementation of all this pro-women legislation is slow because of economic factors, strong stereotypical attitudes, traditional discriminatory practices, and misinterpretations of religion that often preclude change in prescribed gender roles and behavior, the legal gains that women scored are genuine breakthroughs. The legal situation of women has improved significantly, and Morocco is now amongst the few North African countries with the most improved laws for women’s rights.

Women’s gains in civil society and politics

From the mid-1980s onward, civil society has been increasingly feminized.¹³ Feminine and feminist NGOs proliferated and addressed all women-related issues from grassroot concerns (fight illiteracy and poverty) to professional concerns (employment creation), academic aspects (university centers), and artistic concerns (promotion of female artists). A number of research

projects, as well as the national discourse, linked the proliferation and performativity of these NGOs to Morocco's democratization openings. This, in turn, led to further reforms in the 1990s and the 2000s and, in a way, saved Morocco from chaos during the so-called Arab Spring turmoil. Women's NGOs have had to negotiate power and strategize with both society and the decision-makers. They succeeded to a large extent on both fronts. The result is that in spite of high percentages of women's illiteracy and poverty, Morocco was propelled to the forefront of the Arab world with respect to democratization and women's rights. However, with the recent Islamization of the region, women's NGOs fear the loss of their hard-won rights and are struggling to maintain them.¹⁴ Notwithstanding these fears, women's NGOs such as the Association Démocratique des Femmes Marocaines – ADFM (Democratic Association of Moroccan Women) and L'Union de Action Féminine – UAF (Feminine Action Union) have gained national and international recognition for their credibility and efficiency, and are determined to safeguard and improve their hard-won gains.

Along with a strong presence in civil society, women in Morocco excelled in politics (local and national), and some of them managed to reach top positions. Historically, women joined political parties before independence and this has continued. In 1993, two women were elected members of the parliament for the first time in the history of Morocco. Both women belonged to parties which were then in the opposition: the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires – USFP (Socialist Union of Popular Forces) and the Parti de l'Istiqlal (Independence Party). Both women were long-term practicing politicians whom the political elite knew very well. The feminist movement regarded their election as an achievement. In 1997, four women were designated by late King Hassan II as Secretaries of State in a government of 30 members. The four women were the first to enter a Moroccan government. One of the women was responsible for the Administration of Mines, considered up to then a typically "male" department; the remaining three were responsible for the Departments of Sports, Social Affairs, and the Handicapped. In 1998, and for the first time in the history of the country, a socialist government took power. Two women were appointed by the Socialist Party as Secretary of State in this government: one was responsible for the Department of International Cooperation, affiliated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the other for the Department of the Handicapped.

Moroccan women's gains in civil society and politics sharpened their strategizing skills, which they needed to institutionalize a quota system. They attained this goal in 2002, resulting in the number of women jumping from two to over 30 in the 2002 legislative elections. The increasing physical presence of women in the spheres of authority was instrumental in fighting the then growing religious extremism. The spectacular rise of political Islam in Morocco from the mid-1980s created debates in which the

overall status of women occupied center stage. Islamists attributed the social crisis to the “negative” influence of Western values, judged to be too liberal. They demanded a return to “the source” (i.e. *Shari’a*) in whatever concerned men’s and women’s behavior. They highlighted modest physical appearance and encouraged the veil (for women) and the beard (for men) as outward political tokens. Islamists also accused feminists of weakening the Islamist struggle, defined as an existential priority. Within this context, women’s secular and Islamic NGOs targeted extremism; the former from a human rights perspective and the latter from inside Islam.

Overall, Moroccan women are better represented in political life and in positions of leadership. Their social and political achievements led to their presence in the private sector as enterprise owners and managers. In the poorer sectors, although women are concentrated in low-skilled jobs with low pay and poor working conditions, they are more and more accepted as breadwinners.

Women’s gains in the realm of knowledge

Another domain where Moroccan women scored considerable gains is the domain of knowledge production. The entrance of women into universities from the late 1950s created real change in the country, which culminated in the creation and maintenance of gender and women’s studies postgraduate units. In their endeavor to address the needs of women students and teachers (who ended up constituting the core of the female educated and militant elite), fundamental assumptions behind Moroccan scholarship and teaching, and even the way Moroccan universities were structured, were rethought. Conscious of the importance of the role of female university teachers in matters of education and training, persuaded that all women’s skills and abilities must be mobilized, and convinced of the absolute necessity of scholarly research, many female professors decided to create women’s centers, such as the Center of Women’s Studies which was created in the Faculty of Letters, Rabat in 1997 and the Center for Studies and Research on Women which was created in Fez in 1998 in the Faculty of Letters, Dhar El Mehraz, Fez. Both centers were coordinated by women from the departments of English,¹⁵ and both served as a springboard to create the first postgraduate units of gender and women’s studies in the country. These centers are considered the first of their kind in the region; they are open to all researchers, male and female, interested in gender and women’s studies. They aimed to fill the gap in the domain of gender/women’s studies, to contribute to the development of scholarly research, and to change social perceptions, attitudes, and structures that obstruct gender equality. The women teachers who initiated and pioneered these centers were fully aware that some of these perceptions, attitudes, and structures were deeply rooted in the past of the region, but some were new ideas and movements that threatened women’s rights. A typical illustration of such new ideas was the escalation

of Islamic extremism that aimed at protecting “human rights” at the cost of gender equity and women’s emancipation. The preaching of slogans such as “women need education to raise good families but don’t need jobs because of soaring unemployment” is an example in this regard. In the same vein, extremism scapegoated women for any infringement or “decline of traditional society,” even if these transformations were often inherent in the very process of change. For example, women’s will to pursue education abroad was sometimes perceived as “too much emancipation” that would lead to “spinsterhood.”

The major objective of women and gender centers in Morocco was to invigorate the liberal arts curricula by redesigning courses that would reflect the new scholarship on women. The impulse toward wholeness reflected not only the interdisciplinary nature of gender and women studies, but also the fact that knowledge is never objective. New attention was turned to the theoretical and institutional structures of the university, such as emphasis on interdisciplinary work. The conferences, round tables, and study days organized by these centers and the graduate units that they helped to set up show that gender and women’s studies cannot fall within the established disciplinary boundaries.

The significance of Moroccan women’s gains for the notion of “authority”

Moroccan women’s gains are, thus, wide-ranging but linked. For example, it was women’s education that led to their empowerment in the social, legal, and political fields. Admittedly there is still much to be done, especially in rural areas, and the implementation of the new progressive Family Law still meets with resistance from some judges, lawyers as well as common people, but it is a fact that these gains are real and that there is no going back. Moroccan women are indeed assuming new roles that have hitherto been the prerogative of men. The significance of these changes is most attested and appreciated in the sociocultural realm where a centuries-old space-based patriarchy reigns. Women’s gains in the public spheres of authority meant a radical change in the very foundation of this patriarchy: the gendered space. For example, the change from an extended type of family to a nuclear one, a direct result of women’s salaried jobs, the increasing acceptance of women as breadwinners, and women’s voices as genuine voices in the interpretation of sacred religious texts destabilize the patriarchal regime and interfere with the concept of “authority” which this regime has been ascribing to men. Authority is increasingly being feminized in Morocco in spite of surface resistance at the sociocultural level. Before addressing these deep changes, it is appropriate to define and contextualize the concepts of power and authority in the Moroccan sociocultural context.

Contextualizing power and authority in Moroccan society and culture

An understanding of power and authority is important for appreciating women's new roles in Moroccan society and culture. The concept of authority has both sociological and psychological components and is related to two other concepts: power and legitimacy. Often defined as personal or social ability to achieve certain ends (Foucault, 1980), power is crucial to authority, obtained first by social sanctioning and then by individual legitimization (psychologic internalization of power by the members of a society). A combination of power and legitimacy sanctions authority at individual and social levels. The concept of authority gained more attention with the advent of social sciences, where it is increasingly used to explain the power dynamics in a given society. The central figure in this regard is the sociologist Max Weber (1958), who singled out three types of authority: traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational. Traditional authority is attested in the traditional norms of feudalism, which maintain a strong grip on individuals and communities by blocking any law that does not support feudal interests. Long-established customs, habits, and social structures are used to legitimize traditional authority with the aim of perpetuating the status quo and blocking any significant social progress. Indeed, change is difficult under this type of authority. The second type of authority, charismatic authority, may be exemplified by a strong leader, such as a prophet who inspires others through extraordinary characteristics and divine supernatural powers. It is in the domain of religion that charismatic authority is central to traditional authority (Riesebrodt, 1999), in the sense that charismatic authority is "routinized" or "ritualized" by becoming "traditionalized." As for the third type of authority, legal-rational authority, it is best exemplified in a formalistic belief in the content of the legal law to the extent that such law is conceived as natural rational law. Weber cites the example of political and economic bureaucracy as a carrier of legal-rational authority. Other examples are the modern state, city government, private and public corporations, as well as various voluntary associations. The rational-legal authority within the Moroccan context is embodied in the Maliki School, which legalized interpretations of the Qur'an, especially in matters of family law.

The strength and relevance of Weber's types of authority reside in the fact that they create a belief system that resists change. These types were further developed by a number of researchers such as Coser (1971), who highlights the inter-connectedness of authority types, and Blau (1963), who qualifies traditional authority as "impersonal," charismatic authority as "personal," and associates the legal-rational authority with "irrational" traditional authority. Another significant development of Weber's characterization of authority is the work of Collins (1986), where Weber's categories of authority are linked to a larger network of concepts that include class, status groups, and parties. Collins argues that whereas traditional authority

underlies status groups, charismatic authority underlies market schemes such as the potential for life chances. A crucial aspect of authority is its relationship with hierarchy (itself based on the superior-subordinate relationship). Indeed, an efficient organization of power structure is based on a combination of authority and hierarchy. Such a power structure is, in turn, necessary for a well-ordered society.

In the context of Morocco, the major source of authority is patriarchy, which tightens its grip on individuals (men and women) and society through politics and religion. This type of politico-religious authority is assigned to men and is heavily instrumentalized at individual, family, and state levels.¹⁶ The tightening starts in the family and is relayed by state institutions.¹⁷ For example, of all the laws, only family law is based on *Shari'a* (Islamic law) and Islam is a state religion. Hence, religious law and state rule guarantee control and are accepted by individuals and society as legitimate authority.¹⁸ In spite of the mighty, multifaceted, and overwhelming system of authority, women have managed to feminize it.

The feminization of authority in Morocco

The feminization of authority in Morocco started when women's social, economic, and political gains became significant to the country's development and "modernity." It is at this level that the psychological dimension of the concept of authority is crucial because it changes political culture by drawing attention to the importance of women and allows a subjective dimension which is crucial in explaining the political discrimination against women. It is at this level that the conceptual part of this chapter meets with the empirical one. More concretely, this section underlines the role of the Moroccan feminist movement in feminizing authority.

The history of the women's movement in Morocco goes back to the colonization period during which male leaders of the *Islah* (Reform) movement, such as Allal Al-Fassi and Hassan Ouazzani, argued for women's emancipation within the cultural/religious value systems of Moroccan society. These leaders linked social development and modernization with women's education. These views inspired many women of the 1930s and 1940s to start claiming their rights through pioneer women's organizations such as *Akhawat Al-Safa* (Sisters of Purity), which demanded rights at home and in politics as well as the abolition of polygamy. This association was created and encouraged by educated and urban elite women who had connections with the larger national liberation movement through male family members. Names such as Malika al-Fassi, Zahra Chraibi, and Touria Sakkat are examples in this respect. The *Akhawat Al-Safa* (Sisters of Purity) association did not problematize women's status because women believed that independence would bring about their emancipation; their aim was rather to make women aware of their social importance and train them in the public

organization of their demands. These pioneer women used strategies such as press articles, public speeches, and private/public gatherings to explain the importance of women's education and of their participation in the struggle for independence to other women and men. As a result of these actions, women participated in revolutionary movements by combating the French colonizers, hiding male members of their families, and smuggling weapons. These actions bestowed considerable authority on women during the struggle for independence, a mobilization transitional phase, which like any such phase was characterized by the blurring of gender frontiers to achieve more urgent priorities.

Following the independence of Morocco in 1956, the new ruling elite sought to re-establish Islam in their sociolegal institutions through a family law based on the *Shari'a*. Educated women started to realize that the shift from the ideology of liberation to that of state-building marginalized them. In addition to academics, many women activists started to organize themselves politically by creating women's sections within leftist parties.¹⁹ Representative names of prominent women in this respect were Khnata Bennouna, Nouzha Skalli, and Latifa Jbabdi. These women used the political space to challenge the "reactionary" establishment and called for more social equity and human rights. They greatly succeeded in acquiring authority within and outside their political parties. They also served as role models for the increasing numbers of educated girls and young women.

In the mid-1980s, women's central role in development surfaced with more acuity because of four major factors: literacy, employment, democratic political values, and international pressure. These factors were heavily exploited by the leftist socialist movements which were very popular then. Women's voices within these movements became louder and two trends emerged: women who pushed for social equity through party lines and those who, although partisans of social movements, stressed gender issues and the singularity of women's demands. It is women of the latter category who largely contributed to the emergence of a strong and powerful civil society in Morocco from the late 1980s to the present.

Pioneer activist associations such as the Association Démocratique des Femmes Marocaines – ADFM (Democratic Association of Moroccan Women) and L'Union de l'Action Féminine – UAF (Feminine Action Union) gradually became a prominent part of an overall social movement which, backed by calls for more human rights, launched the era of civil society which is still thriving. In the 1990s and 2000s, the proliferation of women's associations reached an unprecedented level of mobilization. The feminist movement operated through civil society, academe, and politics. Women from lower social classes joined and the movement became more versatile, professional, and vocal, attracting the support of human and cultural rights associations, the state, and democratic men. In capitalizing on civil society, women were a prominent part of the overall progressive and human rights promotion

movements of the mid-1980s onwards. Reform of family law remained at the core of women's demands either in political parties or within civil society, in contexts where Islamists resisted any amendments. Conscious of the mounting Islamization of Moroccan society, secular feminists started to use more Arabic in their propaganda and to invest the religious field. This clever strategizing switch at a crucial moment gained them popularity, and more and more female voices, such as Farida Bennani and Zainab Maadi, advocated a reinterpretation of the sacred texts (the Qur'an and the Prophet's Sayings) from a secular feminist perspective. It is such endeavors that partly led to the spectacular 2004 reforms of family law. Indeed, rampant Islamism pushed for more strategizing between the feminist movement and the state, both apprehending Islamic extremism.

Women's associations became more and more active, becoming, therefore, more accessible to women than the institutional political parties as they do not require extensive material resources or influential connections. Two main types of women's associations may be discerned at the beginning of the 21st century: those that focus on service provision by filling gaps left by deficient state structures in terms of social and economic development, such as addressing concrete problems on the ground using available means, and those that focus on advocacy and lobbying with the aim of defending a vision of society where women's legal and civil rights are respected. Both types of women's associations maintained a dialectical relationship with the broader civil society (human rights associations, youth organizations that involve women's issues, etc.). This advocacy and lobbying tightened the link between women's associations and other emerging actors of civil society.

Overall, women's associative work started to assume political, social, and economic functions, hence strengthening institutional politics. Politically, local activism bridges the gap between women and the institutional political sphere mainly through local activists' networks with more urban/political women's NGOs. Socially, the increasing proliferation of women's associations allowed women to assume more powerful social roles as leaders and managers of public affairs. Economically, NGOs have allowed many women to acquire economic independence through self-generating incomes such as micro-credits.

On a more general level, women's associations have started to become carriers of alternative projects of transformative gender roles in Moroccan society, and this protects and guarantees an effective exercise of public freedoms favoring the emergence of pluralist collective identity based on the universal values of the culture of citizenship, for bottom-up development and for empowerment (Kandiyoti, 1991; Joseph, 2000). Indeed, women's associations endeavored to promote participation, social mobilization, and

associative lobbying to encourage good governance and a culture of responsible citizens, not passive subjects, thus working toward a dynamic participatory and equitable democracy (Moghadam, 1995; Chadli, 2001; Roque, 2004). They have become real schools of democracy which encourage women to get involved in decision-making in local public affairs and to empower women at all levels of governance. NGOs have enabled women to critically assess their own situation, and to create and shape a transformation of society. In the light of these breakthroughs, activists demanded a re-examination of the social, political, and economic structures and an analysis of the judicial norms with respect to male–female relations in order to fight the ambivalence in male–female social relations. On other fronts, secular feminists reduplicated efforts to introduce gender as a powerful tool of analysis in various public institutions, including the country’s ministries.

It is within this overall context that women’s movements in Morocco may be said to have had a significant impact on democratization processes in the country, the lifting of the sacredness that surrounded religious texts, and the impact on people’s attitudes. The relationship between the feminist movement and the state has not always been smooth and even, but from the mid-1980s onward, women have started to play a “modernizing” role in the overall politics of Morocco. Theirs has become a larger society project that the state was forced to support, as the rise of political Islam was perceived to be a real threat to both women and the state.²⁰ Political Islam, a result of a combination of events that took place at the international level at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, namely the success of the Iranian Revolution, the downfall of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of the US as the sole superpower, greatly impacted Moroccan feminists. Among many things, political Islam brought back the veil and traditional roles of women.

In the face of political Islam, women, whether secular or Islamist, continued to use religion to empower themselves. Younger women engaged in the sacred texts’ interpretation using *Ijtihad* (progressive interpretation) of these texts. This type of interpretation has always been undertaken by ulama. The presence of women in the religious space gave them considerable authority. By investing in political and religious spheres women indeed started to feminize religious authority. By so doing, they succeeded in asserting that inequality and social relations are socially constructed, and that the religion-based law itself is a social construction that can be deconstructed and reconstructed on the basis of equality.

The significant headway obtained by women in Morocco highlights the fact that their experiences, interpretations, and understandings of issues and events were unique and often differed from men’s. These endeavors brought about changes in women’s access to health care and employment. Women’s voices began to be taken seriously by the decision-makers.

Conclusion

Authority is being feminized in Moroccan society in spite of various ups and downs. Indeed, the advent of the 21st century was accompanied by the emergence of women in the Moroccan public sphere as transformative agents of change in the face of serious social, economic, and political challenges. Their successes and failures accompanied the successes and failures of their country, but their impact is real. Today, conscious of their indispensable role in the development of Morocco, women want more rights and more room in the public spheres of power; theirs is a continuous story of struggle on various fronts. The spectacular and unprecedented emergence of women in powerful spaces does not mean that they have reached the ultimate goal of equality and dignity; the road ahead is still long, but the feminization of authority in Morocco carries genuine hope for the future.

Notes

1. <http://womensenews.org/story/reproductive-health/120722/moroccan-moms-benefit-maternal-health-revolution>
2. Ibid.
3. See <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2127.html>
4. See http://magharebia.com/en_GB/articles/awi/features/2011/03/18/feature-0.3
5. See http://magharebia.com/en_GB/articles/awi/features/2011/03/18/feature-03
6. <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/09/11/maintaining-momentum-on-education-reform-in-morocco>
7. Morocco is different from the Middle East in that the fatwas (religious decrees) do not have political authority, that is, they are not enforced, and hence they do not carry the same social meaning.
8. More on the 2004 Family Law is given in the following section.
9. See Sadiqi (2013). This point is detailed more in the second section.
10. *Fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) derives from the Arabic verb *faqaha* (understand). The aim of *fiqh* is to understand the message of Islam at the legal level. There are many schools (*madahibs*: paths) of *fiqh* which cut across both Sunni and Shi'i Islam. These schools hold the names of their founders.
11. See Charrad (2001), Buskens (2003), and Ennaji (2011).
12. Article 19 of the 2011 Constitution stipulates:

The man and the woman enjoy, in equality, the rights and freedoms of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and environmental character, enounced in this Title and in the other provisions of the Constitution, as well as in the international conventions and pacts duly ratified by Morocco and this, with respect for the provisions of the Constitution, of the constants [*constantes*] and of the laws of the Kingdom. The State works for the realization of parity between men and women. An Authority for parity and the struggle against all forms of discrimination is created, to this effect.

See http://www.ancl-radc.org.za/sites/default/files/morocco_eng.pdf

13. See Sadiqi and Ennaji (2006).
14. See Sadiqi (2013).

15. The Rabat Center and postgraduate unit was set up and coordinated by Fouzia Ghisasi and the one in Fez by Fatima Sadiqi.
16. See Sadiqi (2014).
17. Ibid.
18. In theory, an individual may possess legitimacy without having actual power or possess power without having actual legitimacy. A classic example of the former is the legitimate heir of monarchical power who is forced to live in exile, and of the latter the usurper who exiled the heir to the throne and appropriated his monarchical functions. Power and legitimacy relate to authority in the sense that an individual or a group possesses authority only when they have both power (social sanctioning) and legitimacy (unconditional acknowledgment and acceptance). In other words, the social and psychological aspects of authority are essential for its viability and its inclusiveness of power and legitimacy, hence its cultural strength.
19. Leftist parties were in opposition in the decades that immediately followed independence.
20. See Sadiqi (2006).

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17

Gender, Power, and Networks: Women's Organizing and Changing Gender Relationships in Africa and Latin America

Jane H. Bayes

Introduction

An enormous gulf exists between the ideal of democratic governance and its implementation in the 21st century. Even in nations that have passed a variety of laws expanding women's suffrage, increasing women's educational opportunities, admitting women into the waged labor force, instituting gender mainstreaming and affirmative action policies, and calling for equal opportunity, equal pay, and quotas for women in elected office, the differential between ideal and reality remains. In most cases, these new laws or initiatives intended to make women's democratic participation and citizenship more equal to that of men have been imposed upon or risen within societies with well-established institutions whose concepts, ideologies, institutional practices, religious beliefs, language, and personal relationships are not fully in agreement. While power in its many forms may be exercised in passing these laws, the implementation of this legislation may well depend not only on major changes in the ideas, relationships, and behaviors of men and women, but also require changes in institutions (family, religious, economic, and political) whose ideologies, histories, rules, and disciplinary actions are not supportive of or are in conflict with these new laws.

Influenced by theories that posit changes in society to be like changes in language – gradual, with many tracings of the old mixed with the new – this chapter draws explicitly on Michel Foucault's concept of power as embedded in systems of social relations or networks (1982, 792–793) to argue that strategies for social transformation should look to new formations of social relations as new sites of power – optimally, positive and creative power. Just as new words and new speech acts must coexist and/or compete with old expressions for acceptance, so, too, new relations of power in a society

can/will compete with and possibly change or modify older institutionalized formulations and relationships. The chapter begins with a review of Foucault's concept of power. While this interpretation of Foucault is deliberately partial and perhaps overly optimistic, the purpose of using a theory here is to establish a frame of reference that focuses on the importance of social networks as a form of positive power creation.¹ The second part discusses power in women's domestic and transnational networks and organizations. Finally, the third part explores the impact that the formation of new informational and advocacy networks working to advance women's well-being has had in the last 30 years in Africa and Latin America to assess their influence in transforming gender relations.

Part I: Foucault's view of power

If we follow Foucault's concept of power, human beings are born into systems of social relations or networks in which power relations are rooted (1982, 792–793). In Foucault's view, all relationships involve power. Like a language that one learns to speak, these power relations already exist. One is born into the system of social networks in which power relations are rooted (Foucault, 1982, 793). As Nicholas Dungey puts it:

Human beings always–already find themselves in a webbing of power relations that constitutes the conditions of possibility of their identity, meaning, and moral and political values. The exercise of power is a form of conducting, directing and managing these human, moral, and political possibilities.

(Dungey, 2014, 13)

Institutions are also important for Foucault in thinking about power. To the question: How is one to analyze the power relationship? Foucault responds:

One can analyze such relationships... by focusing on carefully defined institutions. The latter constitute a privileged point of observation, diversified, concentrated, put in order, and carried through to the highest point of their efficacy (1982, 791).

He continues:

...I wish to suggest that one must analyze institutions from the standpoint of power relations, rather than vice versa, and that the fundamental point of anchorage of the relationships, even if they are embodied and crystallized in an institution, is to be found outside the institution (1982, 791).

Institutions, for Foucault, may take on a variety of forms that mix traditions, customs, and legal structures. They can have their own regulations and hierarchies and can function with relative autonomy or be intertwined in very complex systems, as is the state (1982, 792); however, Foucault does not find that the study of institutions is sufficient for an analysis of power relations. He states:

One sees why the analysis of power relations within a society cannot be reduced to the study of a series of institutions, not even to the study of all those institutions which would merit the name "political." Power relations are rooted in the system of social networks (1982, 792–793).

For Foucault, power can be repressive and disciplinary, but it can also be positive.

What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't wholly weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression (1980, 119).

If we follow Foucault's concept of power, we are led to think of society as a network of social relations encapsulated in institutions that exercise discipline over citizens; yet this networked power is not static and, as new relations form, can also be creative and innovative. Institutions are a way to observe power relations, but as old institutions are disrupted and as new ones form, new forms of social relations and gendered relationships are possible.

Part II: Thinking about power in women's domestic organizations and networks and in women's transnational networks

A place where new power relationships can form is in women's groups in civil society, in women's movements, and in transnational networks or coalitions. In all these formations, new creative productive power is derived from coming together, from the consequent joint recognition of a common goal or purpose, and from changes in the identity and behaviors of those involved. Women's and feminist organizations generate power through consciousness raising, advocacy, and knowledge creation, processes that can occur domestically and transnationally.²

Women's and feminist organizations and their activities

Consciousness-raising

Women's organizations perform different functions that deserve differentiation. The work of consciousness-raising is one important component (Hawkesworth, 2006, 31–32). Consciousness-raising requires recognizing, articulating, and confronting the injustices of existing gender and racial hierarchies. This can happen in many types of groups organized for other purposes such as micro-credit, agricultural self-help, environment, health, employment, education. It often involves trying to envision what a better alternative would be in any given country or society and communicating this as broadly as possible. For some groups, consciousness-raising may be an unarticulated byproduct, whereas other groups may consider it a group goal. This differentiation is one that often separates those who define themselves as “feminist” in that they consciously and directly seek to change women's gender subordination and those who are organized to improve women's lives with regard to basic necessities such as food, shelter, water, education, health, and other survival matters. Some recent large-scale studies by the World Bank and Oxfam in rural areas of Africa and India have shown that women's self-help groups and agricultural cooperatives that encourage women to meet together for economic development do not always dramatically improve women's economic situation, but they do improve indicators related to women's health, civic participation, and decision-making within the family (Deininger and Liu, 2008; Desai and Joshi, 2013). One of these studies (Deininger and Liu) found that improvements in nutrition, consumption, and civic participation occurred not only among those participating in the self-help groups, but also for other women in the region who were not participants in the self-help groups.

In countries such as India and Mexico, those explicitly concerned with consciousness-raising and gender injustices will refer to themselves as “feminist” and are often located in large urban areas, whereas other women's groups mobilized around obtaining necessities (often in more rural areas) reject the feminist label and consider themselves to be a part of the “women's movement.” Many others associate the term “feminist” with Western imperialism. This is true in industrialized nations as well, in that the “feminist” label is rejected by many who believe in equal rights and equal opportunity but are not willing to associate themselves with other aspects of what they view as “feminism” (Bayes, 1991).

Advocacy

In addition to the consciousness-raising function, many women are organized to engage in advocacy work often around a specific issue such as reforming family law, equal rights for women, human rights, peace, the environment, suffrage, development, and violence against women. Lang

(2013, 22–23) makes a further distinction between *institutional advocacy* and *public advocacy* according to the position, resources, goals, and tactics of an organization. Those engaged in *institutional advocacy* are often insiders or close to insiders. They seek to lobby decision-makers to shape public decisions. *Public advocacy* groups seek to identify, mobilize, synthesize, and amplify citizen voices. They identify allies, develop a constituency, engage in consciousness-raising, generate consensus on immediate political goals, and create strategies for achieving these goals. Lang argues that since public advocacy is difficult to sustain over long periods of time, groups that begin by engaging in public advocacy generally move to institutional advocacy over time if they remain viable.

A characteristic that differentiates women's local or national advocacy organizations and movements from transnational networks and transnational advocacy groups is that women's advocacy groups tend to be confined within the borders of one country and may be associated and identified with nationalist agendas and identities or with other social movements or political parties within the country.

Transnational Networks – Informational and Advocacy

Transnational networks can be primarily advocacy oriented or primarily informational. Both are involved in consciousness-raising. Keck and Sikkink (1998, 9) define transnational advocacy networks as being composed of groups or coalitions of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and governmental organizations in different countries, foundations, and parts of regional and/or international organizations. The different groups are brought together to promote a particular cause such as women's development (Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN)), women's rights and women's leadership (Association for Women's Rights in Development (AWID)), or Center for Women's Global Leadership, for eliminating violence against women.

Transnational networks that are primarily informational are composed of groups or coalitions of NGOs or individuals in different countries. A good example of this kind of transnational networking activity is found in the *encuentros* held by Latin American and Caribbean feminists beginning in Columbia in 1981; then Peru, 1983; Brazil, 1985; Mexico, 1987; Argentina, 1990; El Salvador, 1993; Chile, 1996; Dominican Republic, 1999; Costa Rica, 2002; Brazil, 2005; Mexico, 2009; Colombia, 2011; and Argentina, 2013. The purpose of the *encuentros* is to gather women together to share ideas and strategies and to build coalitions among women's movements in the Latin American and Caribbean region. Over the three decades, these *encuentros* have spawned a variety of transnational advocacy organizations as they allowed minorities such as the indigenous, racial, or lesbian groups to unite on a regional basis, raise consciousness, and form identity networks

and transnational advocacy networks dealing with issues such as women's health, women's sexual and reproductive rights, violence against women, and women's political participation. Peruvian feminist Virginia Vargas (1999) has described the *encuentros* as "recreating collective practices, deploying new analytical categories, new visibilities, and even new languages being invented by feminisms at the national level, naming that which heretofore had no name: Sexuality, domestic violence, sexual harassment, marital rape, the feminization of poverty, and so on" (30).

Transnational advocacy networks and coalitions differ from transnational informational networks in that they are policy oriented and often supported by governmental agencies, NGOs, international organizations, and by private foundations. While foundations, US agencies, Northern European governments, and religious organizations had been funding national NGOs that engaged in economic development, service provision, and income generation for women to some extent prior to the 1990s, the scope and pace of this activity expanded rapidly after 1985. The impetus for this accelerated activity was the United Nations and its Commission on the Status of Women. Beginning in 1975, the United Nations began holding world conferences on women designed to bring governmental delegates and non-governmental representatives of women's social movements together to develop strategies for improving the legal status and economic well-being of women. The four world UN conferences on women in Mexico City (1975), Copenhagen (1980), Nairobi (1985), and Beijing (1995) provided a variety of opportunities for the creation of women's transnational advocacy networks and for coalitions to meet together, to share ideas and experiences, to develop strategies, and to lobby their governmental delegates. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1991, the UN and various funding agencies increased their activities by having more meetings on topics related to women's interests in the early 1990s in New York on the child (1990); in Rio de Janeiro on the environment (1992); in Vienna on human rights (1993); in Cairo in 1994 on population; and in Istanbul in 1996 on habitat. This increased activity included extensive outreach efforts in preparing for the Fourth World Conference on Women (FWCW) in Beijing with local, regional; and international preparatory meetings aimed at preparing the 12 point Platform for Action that was the critical negotiating document of the Beijing meeting in 1995.

Among other items, the Beijing Platform for Action called on governments to increase access and ensure the equal participation of women in decision-making and leadership. It called for institutional mechanisms to advance women, such as gender mainstreaming and gender budgeting. It called for national machineries to integrate gender perspectives into legislation, public policies, programs, and projects. Furthermore, it encouraged non-governmental agencies and groups to continue to exert pressure to implement these policies in their home states. In many instances, it encouraged

women to form special issue groups concerning health, economic development, micro-lending, childbearing, structural adjustment policies, and nutrition. It also called for women's human rights to be respected and for adherence to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Many countries responded positively to these prescriptions by establishing women's ministries, women's commissions, and women's agencies to fulfill the Platform for Action mandates.

As Fleschenberg has noted (2010, 178), women's transnational advocacy networks can be a double-edged sword. Resources in the world are not evenly distributed among nation-states. Transnational connections are almost by definition going to reflect those global power hierarchies, their ideas, their preferences, their worldviews, and their policies. Funding agencies in northern rich countries (the North) that establish transnational connections such as the World Bank, the UN, various foundations such as Oxfam, Ford, Rockefeller, or the governments of Northern Europe, may encourage the formation of women's groups in the world's poorer countries (the South). They provide social services, development programs, and awareness campaigns that can link women and women's groups in different sectors of the society. They can use their funds to recruit and help organize rural and grassroots women. However, this assistance usually brings with it the ideas and priorities of the funders who are from the West, and these initiatives can co-opt local women activists' agendas. Local elite leaders seeking funding often adhere to the viewpoints of these funders in order to attract grants and thereby become even further removed from the non-elite women they seek to serve. Funders tend to favor "safe" issues such as women's health, education, self help development, and micro-enterprise, often projects supported by a neoliberal free market philosophy. In addition, funders want projects that can generate verifiable short-term results – still another factor that may be irrelevant to those receiving the assistance.

To free themselves from this sort of influence and to exercise their own voice, many women activists in the South have allied themselves with nationalist or anti-colonial projects and allies. Women activists sensitive to this issue have developed South to South transnational networks such as DAWN, a transnational network that is closely associated with the United Nations because its members are advisors to UN bodies. DAWN, however, has been critical of UN and World Bank structural adjustment policies. *Jamaat-e-Islami* is another organization which links Islamic women in Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Kashmir, and Afghanistan and is highly suspicious of projects funded by the United Nations or other western funders (Jamal, 2005). Another example is *El Grupo Latinoamericano de Estudio, Formación y Acción Feminista* (GLEFAS), a Latin American transnational network associated with anti-colonialism that is primarily informational. With members from various parts of Latin America, this feminist group seeks to rediscover and develop political ideas and policies that are indigenous to Latin America.

They write and publish papers and use the Internet to hold online classes throughout Latin America (GLEFAS website at www.glefas.org; Mendoza, 2014).

The significance of this resentment on the part of many women activists from the South should not be minimized. Global hierarchies of race (white/non-white), class, religion, and development (North/South) pervade the relations of those transnational networks among those that have contact with the North and even those that do not. Bridging these divides to encourage the flow of women's knowledge from the South to the North constitutes a major challenge for women's transnational networks.

PART III: Women's power-generating networks at work: A comparison of the roles of women's social movements and transnational networks in Africa and Latin America – 1980 to the present

Both African and Latin American countries had women's transnational informational groups or NGOs operating prior to the 1990s. In Africa, for example, a group of African scholars formed the Association of African Women for Research and Development (AAWORD) in 1972 as an organization of African researchers. Latin American women in 1981 began to meet every three years in *encuentros* or gatherings held in different parts of the continent to discuss women's and feminist issues. Beginning in the mid-1980s and accelerating in the 1990s, countries on both continents experienced an explosion of transnational advocacy NGOs operating in their countries. This was a global phenomenon that occurred in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Clarke, 1998). (NGOs in the developing world include philanthropic foundations, church development agencies, academic think tanks, and other groups focusing on topics such as health, human rights, gender, agricultural development, and indigenous peoples.) This proliferation of NGOs has been attributed to a number of factors. A major reason is the increased flow of funding from Northern NGOs. The UN Human Development Report for 1990 reported that Northern NGOs sent US \$7.2 billion to Southern NGOs and People's Organizations (POs). (POs are local non-profit community organizations or cooperatives, trade unions and peasants' associations.) This was added to the funds already going to Southern NGOs from multi-lateral and bilateral governmental development agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which in 1986 was mandated by Congress to channel a minimum of 13.5 percent of its budget through NGOs (Clarke, 1998, 37). Increased funding also came from governments in the South, who because of the economic recession of the 1980s, were forced to recognize and involve more NGOs in their social programs. Another major change that encouraged NGO and transnational network formation was the breakup of the Soviet Union and the demise of the bi-polar

world order in 1989–1991 leaving some countries “open to persuasion.” The early 1990s was also a time when the United Nations dramatically increased its organization of NGOs to attend UN global conferences on the child in 1990, environment in 1992, human rights in 1993, population in 1994, and women in 1995, and engaged in outreach activities to recruit local NGOs to attend local and regional preliminary and preparatory meetings throughout the world.

Gerhard Clarke argues that the liberal and neoliberal views of NGOs at the time was one that saw them as promoting economic and social development or as efficient non-governmental providers of services to the poor, respectively. Those on the left were more likely to see NGO action as intrinsically political, as committed to creating a “new politics” that could transform society, a view that is more in line with Foucault than with the liberal view (Clarke, 1998, 40).

Another similarity between the countries of Africa and those of Latin America is that in the 1980s, significant numbers of countries in each region had been undergoing dramatic disruption. In Africa, 14 of the 46 countries on the continent had experienced civil wars and were in post-conflict situations. In Latin America, many countries overthrew military dictatorships in the 1980s and were in a “transition to democracy” stage. Both of these situations created openings for new forms of power relationships as many of the old structures and institutions of society were in disarray. It was a time of new constitutions and new beginnings in many of the countries of both regions. Both regions also had a legacy of strong patriarchal traditions and institutions. How did the mobilization of women’s NGOs, women’s social movements, women’s transnational networks, and women’s transnational advocacy groups impact gender relations on the two continents?

Africa

Aili Tripp et al. in their 2009 book assessing African women’s movements note that the African countries that have been the most successful in advancing women’s rights since 1985 experienced the confluence of four factors: (1) the presence of active and autonomous women’s movements; (2) an acceptance of international norms regarding women’s rights and political participation; (3) the availability of funds to advance women; and (4) the recent conclusion of some major upheaval in the society, such as conflict or war which had disrupted old patterns of behavior and opened new opportunities (Tripp et al., 2009, 1–2). This claim is generally supported in the literature (Ballington, 2004; Lowe-Morna, 2004; Bauer and Britton, 2006; Waylen, 2007; Bauer, 2012).

African women also participated in national independence struggles of the 1960s and formed national women’s organizations to promote the nationalist cause. In some cases, women’s rights were a part of the struggle, while in others they were not. After independence, women continued to be active,

but women's organizations were often co-opted by single party or ruling party regimes (Tripp et al., 2009, 51).

Africa's women's organizations in the 1990s

In response to neoliberal global forces and the economic crisis they were creating in Africa with structural adjustment policies and other stringent measures, new autonomous African women's organizations began to form in the 1990s. This was aided and abetted by increased funding from donor groups. The Third UN Conference on Women in 1985 held in Nairobi had an enormous impact on African women. Africa already had a number of national and regional women's organizations such as AAWORD, founded in 1977 as an association of African researchers, or the *Association des Femmes du Niger*, founded in 1973. However, the outside funding beginning in the 1990s opened African groups to international norms propagated by funders such as the Ford Foundation, women's foundations, Oxfam (Oxford Committee for Famine Relief), the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the Netherlands government, United Nations agencies, and feminist groups such as DAWN. The pre-conference organizing for the Beijing Fourth UN Conference on Women in 1995 accelerated and reinvigorated the formation of women's organizations. A 2005 AWID study of gender-based organizations identified 94 from Africa; of those, 39 percent had been formed between 1990 and 1999 and another 32 percent had been formed between 2000 and 2005 (Tripp et al., 2009, 74–75). In addition, regional groups such as the African Union and the Southern African Development Community also pressured national governments to adopt women-friendly policies, and served as facilitating intermediaries in preparations for the Fourth World Congress on Women.

Outcomes

In sub-Saharan Africa, a variety of studies have shown that “democratic” transitions that moved from unelected authoritarian dictators to elected presidents changed the form of government but did little to change the rulers (Geisler, 1995; Fallon, 2008; Tripp et al., 2009). Even progressive movements calling for liberty and equality did not initially prioritize gender once the transition had occurred (Seidman, 1993; Meer, 2005; Hassim, 2006). However, the increased NGO activity of the 1990s in combination with funding from outside donors and the specific conditions of a continent emerging from significant disruption due to wars and conflicts created a host of women-friendly policies adopted by African governments and a growing presence of women leaders in legislative and executive positions. Since 1990, 38 countries have rewritten their constitutions and six more have made major revisions. Countries emerging from civil conflict have been the most impacted by transnational organizing and women's NGO activities.

Except for Tanzania, all the countries that have 30 percent or more of their legislative seats held by women have come out of conflicts after 1986. These are Burundi, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa, and Uganda. In all, 71 percent of the 14 post conflict countries have adopted constitutions that mandate that statutory law shall override customary law (generally unfriendly to women), whereas only 34 percent of the non-post conflict countries have this provision. Thirteen of the 14 post conflict countries have outlawed discrimination based on sex. Only 25 out of 32 (78 percent) of the non-post conflict countries have such a law (Tripp et al., 2009, 6). Other post-1990 legislation includes provisions addressing female genital cutting, domestic violence, abortion, and protection for women's economic rights to land, property, credit, and other resources. While it is unclear how or to what extent these policies are actually being followed, their presence represents a change (Tripp et al., 2009, 8).

Latin America

In Latin America, feminist and women's movements began to emerge in the 1970s in response to neoliberal structural adjustment policies that cut social programs for women and children, the economic and political policies of authoritarian military regimes, and the disappearance of family members. Poor women's neighborhood associations organized to provide basic needs for their families and women's human rights groups organized to protest the disappearances (such as the *Madres de la Plaza de Mayo* in Argentina).

Latin American women and feminists were active in campaigning against the rule of authoritarian military dictators in the mid-1980s in the Southern Cone countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay) and in Central America (Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras). In the war-torn countries of El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, women were involved in guerrilla warfare (Luciak, 2001; Viterna, 2006). In Chile, Argentina, and elsewhere, women organized in neighborhood groups to survive the economic hardships of neoliberal reforms (Di Marco, 2010, 162). In Argentina and Chile, women marched in public to protest the disappearance of their loved ones and to campaign for human rights. In Venezuela (whose last military dictatorship was overthrown in 1958), a coalition of women worked to reform the civil code for women's human rights and family law between 1979 and 1982, successfully passing reform legislation in 1982 (Rakowski and Espina, 2010, 255–272).

International activities

In 1975, the first United Nations Conference on Women was held in Mexico City, bringing women together from around the world to address women's concerns. In addition, Latin American women began to gather in transnational regional gatherings called *encuentros*, the first of which

was held in Bogotá in 1981 (described above). Women participated in the democratization movements of the early 1980s that sought to overthrow authoritarian dictators, and although they were generally excluded from leadership positions thereafter, they were able to work to advance gender policies, involving such matters as electoral quotas for party candidates or special police stations for domestic violence victims in Brazil (Lebon, 2010, 9). Alvarez argues that the NGOs of the 1970s and 1980s exhibited “hybrid political strategies and identities. They were concerned both with being committed to fostering women’s empowerment and with transforming gender power relations, but they were also developing expertise in gender policy advocacy” (Alvarez, 1999, 182).

Alvarez describes these *encuentros* as articulating and sustaining social movement webs – “the capillary connections among feminists and their sympathizers” occupying a diverse and widespread variety of political locations (Alvarez, 1999, 185). By communicating through newsletters and publications, meetings, conferences, and the Internet, “NGOs have functioned as the key nodal points through which the spatially dispersed and organizationally fragmented feminist field remains discursively articulated” (Alvarez, 1999, 185).

Peruvian Virginia Vargas also describes the creative work of *encuentros*.

By politicizing private lives, feminists took on ‘women’s discontent’ (Tamayo, 1997) generating new categories of analysis, new visibilities, and even a new language to name that which previously had no name: domestic violence, sexual harassment, marital rape, and the feminization of poverty are some of the new meanings that feminism placed at the center of democratic debates (2010, 319).

Latin American women’s organizations in the 1990s

In the 1990s, Latin American NGOs experienced the same proliferation as was witnessed in Africa as the UN began promoting more NGO participation in UN conferences. Encouraged by UN agencies such as the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the women’s unit of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Latin American feminists developed an expertise in transnational policy advocacy by attending, networking, and lobbying for feminist issues at UN conferences in Rio de Janeiro, Vienna, Cairo, and Copenhagen. This was made possible by over a million dollars of funding from foundations during 1993–1995 for regional NGO participation in the process (Alvarez, 2000, 37–39). While this effort broadened and internationalized parts of the women’s movement in Latin America, it was another cause for tension and disagreement between the “international” and the “autonomous” feminists.

This professionalization and bureaucratization of Latin American NGOs was a major source of contention within the women's movements of Latin America – exemplified by a major split that erupted at the sixth *encuentro* in Cartagena, Chile in 1996.³ As states downsized in response to neoliberal policies, intergovernmental organizations, and state and local governments turned to women's NGOs for technical help in servicing poor women or evaluating gender policies. The critical feminist advocacy part of the hybrid identity lost ground to the professional technical activities and identities. These professional technical activities separated NGO activist-professionals from their “militantly ‘autonomous’ feminist critics (Alvarez, 1999, 182).” In Venezuela in 1992, for example, the government created a Women's Foundation to process private and international funds, and femocrats recruited civil society women and women's NGOs as paid consultants, service providers, and gender experts, bureaucratizing them and separating them somewhat from their grassroots women's organizations (Rakowski and Espina, 2010, 259).

Transitions to democracy

In Africa from 1980 to 2007, democratization (defined as regular competitive elections) increased as the number of authoritarian states decreased from about one half to one third, yet during the same period, many non-democratic countries such as Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe also adopted women friendly policies (Tripp et al., 2009, 8), suggesting that factors other than concern for the democratic rights of women were involved. The position of these developing countries in the global world order cannot be ignored. Both Latin American and African countries, whether democratic or authoritarian, were courting foreign assistance. Status in the global international community or even within the regional community has been offered as another reason (Htun, 2003).

In the 1980s, many Latin American dictatorships fell: Bolivia (1982); Brazil (1985); Chile (1990); Guatemala (1986); Honduras (1982); Peru (1989); Paraguay (1989); Uruguay (1985); Nicaragua (1979); El Salvador (1979); Ecuador (1979); and Surinam (1988). However, as many studies have shown, the democratic transition governments and male-dominated political parties did not include women after the dictators left in the 1980s (Waylen, 1994; Geisler, 1995; Paxton, 1997; Jaquette and Wolchik, 1998; Bystydzienski and Sekhon, 1999; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Reynolds 1999; Paxton and Kunovich, 2003; Tripp and Kang, 2008). Paradoxically, the transition to democracy did not immediately make women more politically visible. Those women who had used their status as mothers, such as the *Madres de Plaza de Mayo*, to protest the disappearance of their loved ones and advocate for human rights were told to return home (Fisher, 1989; Chinchilla, 1994; Luciak, 2001). In Brazil and other countries where women's grassroots

organizations were very strong under the dictatorship, feminists were not able to make advances in terms of legislative representation (Brazil has less than 9 percent women in its lower house); however, the women's movement has continued to operate, influencing the writing of the constitution in 1988 and advancing women-friendly policies in the legislature and bureaucracy (McCaulay, 2010, 273–288).

In a 2012 quantitative study of women's legislative representation and democratization in developing countries from 1975 to 2009, Fallon, Swiss and Viterna find that while women's legislative representation drops after a democratic transition, it does so only for a period of time and then begins to rise. The period of time varies according to the pre-democratic legacy of the country, the historical electoral system, and the implementation of quotas (Fallon et al., 2012, 380–408). To draw major conclusions from this requires acceptance of the assumption that the rate of women's participation/presence in national parliaments is a relevant indicator of gender equality and/or of democratic quality in the society. To the extent that one can agree with these assumptions, the finding supports the importance of the creation and maintenance of women's transnational informational networks such as the *encuentros* as well as national and transnational advocacy networks such as those sponsored and encouraged by the United Nations in the 1990s. Table 17.1 compares the countries of Africa and Latin America with regard to the number of women representatives in the lower legislative body. In Africa in 2013, seven (out of 47 or 15 percent) countries (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Benin, Botswana, Gambia, Congo, Nigeria, and Egypt) have less than 10 percent women in their legislatures, while nine countries (out of 37 or 19 percent) (Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Mozambique, Argentina, Tanzania, Uganda, Angola, Algeria, and Burundi) have over 30 percent women in their legislatures. In Latin America, two (out of 33 or 6 percent) countries (Belize and Haiti) have legislatures with less than 10 percent women, while seven countries (out of 33 or 21 percent) (Cuba, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Argentina, Mexico, Grenada, and Guyana) have over 30 percent women. (In Europe, by comparison, 25 percent of the countries have over 30 percent women in their legislature.) Countries in both Africa and Latin America have made remarkable advances on this measure of democratization since the 1990s.

Conclusion: Comparing women's networks and social movements in Africa and Latin America

The evidence from qualitative and quantitative studies suggests that women's networks, social movements, transnational networks, and transnational advocacy networks have been at least partially responsible for substantial changes in gender relations in both African and Latin American countries since the 1990s. At least in part as a result of the massive escalation

Table 17.1 African and Latin American countries: Percentage of women in Parliament

African Countries	% Women	Latin America and Caribbean	% Women
Rwanda	56.3	Cuba	48.9
South Africa	42.3	Nicaragua	40.2
Senegal	42.7	Costa Rica	38.7
South Africa	42.3	Argentina	37.4
Mozambique	39.2	Mexico	36.8
United Republic of Tanzania	36.8	Grenada	33.3
Uganda	35	Guyana	31.3
Angola	34.1	Trinidad and Tobago	28.6
Algeria	31.6	El Salvador	26.2
Burundi	30.5	Bolivia	25.4
Ethiopia	27.8	Peru	21.5
Lesotho	26.7	Honduras	19.5
Tunisia	27.6	Sao Tome and Principe	18.2
South Sudan	26.5	Saint Vincent and Grenadine	17.4
Sudan	24.6	Venezuela	17
Nambia	24.4	Barbados	16.7
Malawi	22.3	Saint Lucia	16.7
Mauritania	22.1	Chile	14.2
Eritrea	22	Guatemala	13.3
Cape Verde	20.8	Bahamas	13.2
Kenya	18.8	Jamaica	12.7
Madagascar	17.5	Dominica	12.4
Morocco	17	Paraguay	12.5
Libya	16.5	Colombia	12.1
Gabon	15.8	Uruguay	12.1
Burkino Faso	15.7	Suriname	11.8
Zimbabwe	15	Togo	11.1
Chad	14.9	Antigua and Barbuda	10.5
Guinea-Bissau	14	Brazil	8.6
Cameroon	13.9	Panama	8.5
Somalia	13.8	Saint Kitts and Nevis	6.7
Swaziland	13.6	Haiti	4.2
Niger	13.3	Belize	3.1
Djibouti	12.7		
Sierra Leone	12.4		
Zambia	11.5		
Liberia	11		
Ghana	10.9		
Cote d'Ivoire	10.4		
Mali	10.2		
Equatorial Guinea	10		
Dem. Republic of Congo	8.9		
Benin	8.4		
Botswana	7.9		
Gambia	7.5		
Congo	7.4		
Nigeria	6.7		

Source: Interparliamentary Union June, 2013.

of women's NGO advocacy and networking activity from 1990 and before to the present, not only are more women in decision-making positions in Africa and Latin America, but many more women-friendly policies and practices are inscribed in new constitutions and in public policies concerning family law, especially in Latin America (Htun and Weldon, 2011), election laws, domestic violence and rape laws, inheritance laws, and even in international treaties such as the 2003 Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women. This document includes a limited right to abortion, the right of a woman to be protected against sexually transmitted diseases and genital cutting, and declares rights for widows, the disabled, and elderly women (Tripp et al., 2009, 7).

In both African and Latin American countries, women's social movements and transnational networks are not the sole contributors to changes in gender relations, but are important catalysts to enable change if other social, economic, and political conditions are in place. Changes in the economy that bring women into the paid labor force or changes that weaken traditional family or religious ties, or demographic changes that create generational change can all influence gender power relationships in a society. Literacy, education, and access to electronic communications are also important factors in addition to issues of war, conflict, and regime change.

A major difference between the women's networks and social movements in Africa and Latin America lies in the presence and vitality of the routinized regional autonomous *encuentro* meetings supported by the Latin American feminist and women's networks that have been meeting continuously since 1981 in different parts of the region. These meetings are places where women from all parts of Latin America gather to discuss, plan, trade information, and strategize. From Foucault's point of view, these are places where positive and creative power originates and flows, power that can generate changes in the gendered power relations of the various institutions of the regions' societies. Here, new discourses are generated. Here, major disagreements are discovered and voiced. Here, identities that need to be voiced are recognized: indigenous, racial, gay/lesbian, class-defined, and post colonial. The presence of this routinized practice of networking suggests that the Latin American women's movements are somewhat ahead of the African women's movements (and women's movements in other parts of the world) in that they have established a regional international infrastructure of networking, one that can be mutually sustaining throughout the continent to provide information to alter gender relations in various institutions within their own societies.

Notes

1. Reviewers of this chapter have questioned the use of Foucault's concept of power in this essay for three reasons. The first is that Foucault was not a feminist. Can we not find a feminist to provide a theory for this chapter? The second is that Foucault

abolished the subject and the idea of individual agency, so how can those who believe in social and political activism for women find merit in Foucault's ideas? Related to these two is the third, that Foucault's ideas carry with them negative baggage that will bias readers against the argument of the chapter. Yet for those of us who have struggled not to become too discouraged by the slow and often dismal progress toward equality for women, by the many psychological, economic, political, legal, and cultural obstacles that continue to perpetuate inequality, violence against women, lack of economic or political justice for women, including lack of inclusive democracies, Foucault's concept of social change – slow, gradual, interactive, situational, like a language – ironically promises hope that our efforts to organize, to create new networks of social relations may not be in vain. As a student of how power structures create and discipline social hierarchies, Foucault studied these structures to understand what they do to those at the bottom and how the bottom affects those at the top. His positive concept of power as creative and positive, as existing in networks of social relations, suggests that while individuals themselves may not be agents of change, their networked interactions are loci of a positive creative power. This way of conceiving the world leads us to pay attention to the formation of new networks of social interaction and provides an argument for why the formation of these networks as loci of positive knowledge-creating power may have the potential to be transformative. Since one of the roles of theory is to help explain social and political phenomena and to suggest hypotheses that can then be tested regardless of the original assumptions of the theory, this chapter seeks to use Foucault's ideas in this manner and not as a grand theory that explains all of reality.

2. Brooke Ackerly (2014), drawing on her research involving women's human rights organizations in Bangladesh reports on the power of "connected activism." "'Connected activism' is the practice of bringing about change by working in relation to others, aware of the ways in which one's work contributes not only to the objective at hand, but also to the establishment and development of networks of allies that support rights enjoyment more generally (also through activism around particular issues and claims)." (458).
3. For an individual account of the *encuentros* (1981–1999) see Alvarez et al. (2003).

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18

Gender Power and Violence: Perspectives for Change

Elena Liotta

According to the World Health Organization (WHO, 2013),

35% of women worldwide have experienced either intimate partner violence or non-partner sexual violence in their lifetime. On average, 30% of women who have been in a relationship report that they have experienced some form of physical or sexual violence by their partner. Globally, 38% of the murders of women are committed by an intimate partner.

WHO characterizes violence against women, particularly intimate partner violence and sexual violence, as major public health problems and violations of women's human rights. Declaring violence against women "a pandemic in diverse forms," UN Women emphasizes that the spectrum of violence against women extends from rape as a mode of ethnic cleansing and genocide in war to widespread sexual harassment on the streets and in the schools.

- Rape has been a rampant tactic in modern wars. Conservative estimates suggest that 20,000–50,000 women were raped during the 1992–1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina,¹ while approximately 250,000–500,000 women and girls were targeted in the 1994 Rwandan genocide.²
- Between 40 and 50 percent of women in European Union countries experience unwanted sexual advances, physical contact, or other forms of sexual harassment at work.³
- In the United States, 83 percent of girls aged 12–16 have experienced some form of sexual harassment in public schools.⁴

As an indicator of brutal discrimination, exclusion, and subordination inflicted on more than half the population of the world, the physical violence and abuse perpetrated by some men on women and children is incompatible with democracy. In 1993, the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women offered the first official definition of "Gender-based Violence" (GBV) as any act "that results in, or is likely to result in,

physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivations of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.” In principle, gender-based violence includes any harm that is perpetrated against a person’s will, and that results from power inequalities that are based on gender roles. But because statistics indicate that gender-based violence is predominantly directed against women and girls, gender-based violence is often used interchangeably with the violence against women (VAW).⁵ GBV affects women across all cultures. GBV can occur throughout a woman’s lifecycle, and can include everything from early childhood sexual abuse, early marriage and genital mutilation, to sexual abuse, domestic violence, legal discrimination, and exploitation.

According to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 23 independent experts on women’s rights who monitor the implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), violence against women proliferates despite the existence of specific national laws and international conventions against it.⁶ In some nations where organized conflict continues to ravage populations (e.g. Afghanistan, Somalia, India, Pakistan, and Congo), the danger for women is higher: health threats, sexual violence, murder, human trafficking, maternal mortality, female feticide through voluntary or forced abortions, infanticide, forced marriages, pedophilia, and prostitution of children under the age of 15 (the demarcation between childhood and adulthood in international covenants). In many nations, moral, traditional, and patriarchal practices coexist with existing formal equality. Police and other officers of public institutions may fail to implement anti-violence legislation, thereby denying remedies to abused women or girls who seek official assistance.

Violence against women surfaces in many forms, from discrimination in public institutions and exploitation of women’s labor and bodies to various forms of physical, psychological and moral abuse, ranging from humiliation, cruelty, subjugation, and enslavement to annihilation or “femicide.” As a relatively recent conceptualization, femicide or feminicide is defined as the intentional murder of a woman, because she is a woman. Occasioned by dramatically increasing numbers of women murdered during “peacetime” in countries such as Mexico and Guatemala, femicide has gained the attention of international organizations as a disquieting gender problem. As these examples make clear, femicide encompasses intimate and stranger violence, honor killings, and dowry-related murders. The United Nations documents and monitors violence against women, issues guidelines concerning “best practices” concerning regulations and laws to contain it, and conducts campaigns to encourage all nations and groups to adhere to CEDAW prescriptions.

In 2011, the Council of Europe adopted the “Istanbul Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence,”

which has been ratified by 14 member states and signed by another 22 states that are not Council of Europe members. Drawing connections between gender inequality and gender-based violence, this convention creates a blueprint for a coordinated approach to combating all forms of gender-based violence. With the Istanbul Convention, Europe has created legally binding standards to prevent violence, protect victims, and prosecute perpetrators through an integrated set of policies. To ensure effective implementation, the convention includes a monitoring mechanism, launched in 2015.⁷

Laws and their limits

Laws to address gender violence have superseded earlier eras when nothing existed to protect abused women, who had no recognized rights. Men, who continue to hold disproportionate numbers of seats in parliament, have used democratic authority, based on equality and respect for differences, to counter authoritarian patriarchal culture. They have envisioned a culture of equality between men and women, yet that vision remains more theoretical than actual. Despite an impressive number of laws and regulations regarding equitable social relations, some players do not know how to or do not want to adopt and play by the new rules. Some continue to be infatuated with pseudo-natural principles such as “the law of the strongest,” which purportedly authorizes “the strong” to rule over “the weak,” “the superior” over “the inferior,” the man over the woman. But such notions of strength or superiority are not given in nature. Social relations are not fixed by DNA. Violence is not innate. Violent behavior is acquired through learning. As a learned behavior, violence can be contained and guided toward nonviolent expression; yet to do so presents formidable challenges in terms of new educational initiatives and effective prevention measures.

Contemporary psychological knowledge, gained through research, long-term developmental studies, and psychoanalytical insights drawn from psychopathology and extreme psychiatric cases, documents the major influence of the family on cognitive and emotional conditioning. Children often observe violence committed by men against women in the home. Seeing physical abuse and hearing violent words and sounds foster consciousness of dangers that may paralyze children with fear. When femicides are widely reported by newspapers and television, children of all ages are witnesses of the crime. From the obscurity of domestic violence to the horror of war, when systematic abuse, rape, or murder takes place in front of children, the surviving children bear the psychological wounds of witnessing the violent attack and loss.

Recent highly debated discoveries in neuroscience concerning the Mirror-Neuron System call attention to the importance of learning by watching, witnessing, and understanding, not simply imitating, the behaviors of others. The visual-motor connection, active very early in life, could

cause the further development of violent (or victim) behaviors in adults (Cheng et al., 2008). As studies of “witnessed-violence” have indicated, children’s physical, cognitive, psychological, and social development are inhibited, especially when they witness fathers beating or killing their mothers. Whether manifested in immediate clinical evidence or resurfacing as memory in adult life, the damage caused by witnessing violence may take the form of subconscious identification with the father (aggressor) or the mother (victim), which later contributes to replicating or suffering violence in the future. Thus, abusers have often been abused themselves. Children do not need to have direct bodily experience of violence; watching the suffering of a beloved person is already a deep, active learning process. Alice Miller has written extensively (1984, 2002) about the long-term traumatic effects of events in childhood. Whether experienced or witnessed, inevitable outcomes of violence include: chronic anxiety and fear, trauma-related traits becoming part of personality, depression, increases in aggressive and antisocial behaviors, poor achievement in school, lower levels of academic attainment, and temperament problems. Although witnessed violence is a more recent area of research than domestic and gender violence, and debates continue about how to categorize it as a form of maltreatment, it is deemed critical in the fields of psychology, law, education, and health for developing effective interventions to benefit children and families.⁸

Many factors can hamper effective implementation of laws that prohibit violence against women. Lack of training and competence about the correct application of new laws routinely affect the decisions of judges and lawyers, who are not prepared to address the complications raised in divorces by abuse, gender conflicts, and their psychological impact on children. This can result in inappropriate custody decisions. Psychologists, other mental health professionals, and social workers can make errors and violate ethical guidelines. Both the gravity and the context of the crime can affect such decisions. For example, many couples experience moments of tension, heavy conflict, and abusive behavior during separation and divorce, which may not be mentioned in the courtroom. Women are often reluctant to accuse their partner and father of their children of serious abuses such as battering or perverse, sadistic, psychological violence. In these cases, violence can be ignored and underestimated. In clinical psychotherapeutic settings with female patients, this kind of intense violence often surfaces as a memory or as an actual event in her present life. Whether episodic or chronic, the violent event may receive due attention and support within a clinical setting, which enables the woman to elaborate it emotionally. But this inner work will not necessarily be accompanied by or followed later by external consequences, such as penalties for the man who perpetrated the violence (Lucatti, Liotta, and Baldocchi 2014).

Many women no longer accept old forms of total submission, and the level of their acquiescence is wearing thin. At the same time, individual women do not trust the law, the police, or the courts to protect them from male violence, retaliation, envy, blackmail, or guilt for the failure of the relationship. Too often, the woman is blamed for having been abused. Laws against violence are insufficient when the entire social system, the professionals, and the services involved blame abused women rather than male abusers. The Parental Alienation Syndrome (known as PAS) provides a good example of this problem. Invented by Dr. Richard A. Gardner around 1985 this syndrome suggested that mothers involved in divorce proceedings made false accusations of child abuse and sexual abuse in order to prevent further contact between fathers and their children. Although now discredited, PAS was used for 20 years to challenge the validity of women's claims about violence, insisting that "respectable" men could not be violent abusers of their wives or children. The covering up of the truth about violence is a general characteristic of the traditional male society. PAS enabled the father to maintain power, role, and presence despite having committed violence and the expressed desire of children who did not want to see the father. Indeed, PAS provided a means to punish a mother who initiated a divorce by threatening her with loss of her children.⁹

For similar reasons, most women do not file complaints when ex-husbands stop contributing financially to support their children. Afraid of losing their children, mothers prefer to work double jobs rather than enter into legal conflict against violent men. Structural and institutional violence persist when patriarchal legacies continue to privilege paternal authority. PAS reveals the power of male lobbies, where specific male groups impose their interests with profound contempt and manipulation of mothers and their children. The initial scientific validation of this harmful myth by medical and psychological specialists who made themselves available to diagnose the "syndrome" in court cases demonstrates the androcentric bias that continues to pervade scientific professions.

Lawyers, counselors, attorneys, social workers, and psychologists working in the area of violence against women know and suffer the frustration of seeing a woman give up her rights, her freedom, the protection of her children, because of her fears and doubts. We should look at this phenomenon as the effect of power understood as a coercive mechanism used to obtain submission and obedience on the part of another person, in the case of gender-based violence, the woman. As a social institution, the family is seen as a sacred, untouchable, totemic object with an intimate and secret core. Fantasies and contrasting interpretations can be triggered in contexts of separation and betrayal, especially when violence and sex are involved. No one outside the couple can know all that is going on, especially when the picture is in pieces. The law cannot regulate all this. Each and every participant

can subjectively manipulate the situation in his/her favor, aiming to gain benefits at the expense of the other. Given such complexities, imperfect enforcement of the law and the impossibility of preventing these crimes loom large.

Challenges to social change

What solutions might be possible in a global technological society so compromised by violence? Ideally change on a mass scale would be based on research generating reliable statistics concerning multiple factors related to violence. Hypothesis testing and validation should inform the synthesis of data used to create new prevention strategies and new projects in education from nursery schools to universities. Unfortunately, however, new ideas and practices pertaining to gender are often ignored or dismissed in mainstream institutions. Hierarchical institutions are still characterized by conservative and rigid resistance to transformation, and thus perpetuate structural and subtle forms of gender discrimination. Education guided by social values of empathy, solidarity, and sharing capacity faces powerful opposition from models centered upon force, arrogance, achievement of individual success, and narcissistic gratification.

Consider, for example, how gender stereotypes are perpetuated for commercial gain. Research has shown that shop owners and parents orient themselves better – and are encouraged to buy more easily – when toys and games are defined by sex and gender. Toys for boys appeal to male stereotypes: cars, airplanes, machines of all kinds, weapons, figures such as warriors and monsters, computer games where violent gangs fight or simulate war, and so on. Girls' toys accelerate adoption of conventional femininity, whether in the form of miniature fashion models, television or movie stars. From the age of three, hair, makeup, nail decorations, jewelry, clothing, tattoos become the main attraction. These commercial products have changed little in decades. The beauty stereotype of Barbie has gained ascendancy over the stereotype of the caring mother evoked through baby dolls, as most mothers in advanced economies work outside the home and girls no longer have the permanent example of their mothers performing domestic chores before their eyes.

Gender stereotypes in games reduce versatility and reinforce standard male and female approaches and defensive strategies, including, respectively, arrogance, abuse, violence on one side, and submission, inhibition, conditional surrender, and impotence on the other side. The human “fight or flight” response in confronting a dangerous situation is historically gender-oriented: men are supposed to fight, women to flee. Gender identity clusters together physical, emotional, cognitive, and social behaviors, and fantasies, revolving around what is defined by others as feminine and masculine. Even colors and shapes are associated with specific genders. The media reinforces

this fantastic world through toys and films and other screen games that run on tablets and phones. The same logic and attitudes are inculcated in teenagers and grown-ups. Eventually, becoming an adult woman or man according to the media/market system requires a progression from the toy (houses, figures, weapons, means of transportation, and the rest) to the real object, all planned. It is sufficient to follow the indications of the model. The appearance, the mask, and the role align in the realization of one's "true self." In this atmosphere, where children become consumers too soon, subject to manipulation, exploitation, and to the dangers of technology as well, new measures for the control and prevention of violence become necessary, a responsibility that must be shared by parents and educators.

Both males and females develop awareness of their own genders and of the other's through interpersonal contact. The quality of a same-gender relationship can change in the presence of someone of the other gender – from the means and the style of communication to the experience of deep emotions and ideas. In mixed groups, the combination of gender power and desire can create alliances and antagonisms with the potential for violence. Violence is always latent and may or may not explode, depending on multiple – not always conscious – factors. Gender issues are an interesting topic of discussion among groups of boys and girls, who tend to act out their unconscious desires and aggressive impulses in defiant modes. Bullying and stalking episodes, physical attacks, including date rape, suicide following public denigration campaigns, and group molestation are among the negative outcomes registered in different countries.

Nonviolent strategies for social change

Feminist scholarship has produced a spectrum of theories and accounts of women's conditions in different countries and cultures that refute early essentialist views of gender identity. From investigation of historical discrimination against women, research has extended to the complex roles of women in contemporary societies, and to interventions to promote equality. Some studies document the existence of a "women's culture," characterized by various way of thinking, practices, styles, languages, and symbols created by women. Although often ignored or limited by hegemonic culture, practices grounded in the "ways of women" operate in multiple contexts, thanks to the new freedom of rights gained through women's liberation struggles. Living according to declared values of equality and respect, women have mobilized across multiple domains, particularly to address conflict and abuse (Liotta, 2007).

Although classical male diplomacy advocates dialogue, the use of words rather than weapons, seeking alternatives to physical destruction of the enemy with its collateral violence against civilians, wars are still proliferating. Although diplomacy endeavors to make peace, many cultural methods,

strategies, thought processes, and practices continue to be animated by a cultural archetype of the violent male warrior, manifested in the obsession with weapons, from knives to guns, that pervades advanced societies, generating ever newer instruments and technologies of destruction.

In contrast to traditional diplomacy, several methods of nonviolent communication and conflict resolution have been elaborated and diffused since the 1970s. Women have been intricately involved in producing them. In areas such as infant care, health, job opportunities, adult education, social aggregation, social care and services, cooperation, housing, immigration, and so on, women's empowerment has produced clear and effective results mainly at local levels. Low-paid, anonymous, and ignored, women have been operating on the front lines of major transformations. Consider immigration, for example. Many men take up immigration issues at an international policy level or in the highest echelons of national politics, or as pundits who generate newspaper assessments or appear on talk shows and debates, without really being touched by the impressive phenomenon of migration. Women, on the other hand, are the absolute majority of the frontline workers providing services for refugees, offering immediate aid and resettlement assistance to growing numbers of immigrants from all areas of the globe, including many women and children. Local women providing immigrant assistance know first-hand about multiculturalism and its development in the cities of advanced economies, both in relation to problems and opportunities. These women exchange culture and tradition, food and clothing, music and prayers, words and images. They create informal and formal networks, transmit information, and initiate transformations, silently, barely visible. Their contributions are difficult to detect, routinely ignored by conventional media and by powerful men in policymaking institutions where migration is officially dealt with. Women have similar expertise in educational fields, where they provide almost all teaching of preschool children, confronting cultural differences as local children learn together with migrant children.

Policymakers decide central issues pertaining to migrant integration without direct experience of traditions of migrant women and families that are relevant to questions concerning multicultural, intercultural, or pluralistic societies. Rather than considering the push factors that contribute to economic dislocation and mass migration, many adopt a xenophobic view of immigrants as "invaders." Many paradoxes are surfacing in advanced economies owing to ongoing waves of immigration, often culminating in conflict. Specific forms of gender violence are often associated with immigrant populations, although the "culturalization" of gender-based violence often masks the prevalence of domestic violence in the native population. Xenophobes assert that immigrant women are not compatible with Western patterns of womanly behavior. To preserve their culture and tradition in often hostile environments, immigrant men may try to

impose conformity on the women in their families. Cultural clashes may be inevitable when cross-cultural relationships, engagements, or marriages are established. Migration also offers some women opportunities to experience new forms of freedom in comparison with women in their countries of origin. International and transnational organizations of women are involved with all these dimensions of migration and resettlement, trying to ameliorate the condition of women in the receiving and sending countries.

The transversal empathic women's movement is also actively involved in creating and staffing centers and shelters and providing other services for abused women. In the history of victimization, solidarity among women has always been the first resource to provide aid, primary care, and protection. Current help centers and hotlines follow this basic strategy, meeting the survival needs of the weak and the poor. In European countries, centers and shelters provide services to immigrant women who have been battered, abused, or threatened. Many are alone with children, some are in Europe without documents, others come as humanitarian or political refugees, some are widows because of war or guerrilla activity, or terrorism. Some of their male relatives have disappeared or dwell elsewhere, some are in jail or psychiatric facilities, and others have returned to their country of origin. Many immigrants experience linguistic difficulties and require translators to help them communicate their secrets.

The so-called cycle of violence in which abused women are entrapped remains the same here, there, and everywhere. Services are necessarily incomplete. With limited funding, there is always something missing or at risk of being withdrawn. But for immigrant women struggling with language difficulties, there are additional obstacles. In episodes of sudden, unexpected violence, such as rape or threats on their lives, women need immediate physical and psychological support, loving care, reassurance, and temporary assistance with their other responsibilities. Help has to be available whenever needed, not only in emergencies. After abuse, a woman may or may not be able to return to her normal life; some must be protected for long periods. The scenario of permanent chronic abuse is harder to detect, stop, and solve. Here the cultural element of violence against women is enmeshed in all passages, procedures, and codes. Collective institutions including the media are sometimes ambiguous and allusive, and tend to shed primary or secondary guilt on the victim. A crime seems to be differently evaluated when a man rather than a woman is the perpetrator. In cases of violence, women are often asked what they have done to "provoke" the criminal male behavior. In cases where a woman takes recourse to violence, they may face contempt and heightened punishment because they offer "living proof" that "women are also violent." Sometimes evidence of male cruelty is mitigated when the woman assaulted is a prostitute, as if sex work legitimated violence and gave men a right not only to sexually exploit but to take her life away.

Women's nonviolent approach has produced help organizations widespread in the world. In these organizations, through daily contact with abused women, the defense mechanisms that allow violence to go on for years become manifest. The dominant feeling when confronted with violence is fear, for anybody. Fear dominates many situations, quite apart from gender violence – fear of the economic crisis, poverty, of getting married or not getting married, of having or not having children, of leaving home or not having home, fear of dying or being alive. In this atmosphere women's archaic sense of fear regarding men becomes just one more fear. Helping women escape from a fear that takes over their lives, rendering them incapable of asking for help, or even of trusting those who lend them support, is the first step in fighting violence against women. Repressed fear that is often the source of incomprehension and criticism of other women is harbored in even the most courageous women. Although it may not be primary and may be confused with other aspects, the sexual element of this fear remains insufficiently recognized among women, especially when confronted with male power in whatever context (Gordon, and Riger, 1989). Anger is another emotion that is often repressed by women, who are suffocated by feelings of guilt as well as fear.

In women, repressed anger continues to be intimately connected to fear, creating indirect hostility and a variety of psychosomatic symptoms. In men, it turns more easily into violence, and only strong control mechanisms inhibit acting out. The more intense fear becomes, the more anger tends to explode in the annihilation of self or of others. Subjugation and annihilation to the point of suicide seem to be the historical strategy for women, while eliminating others has been, and still is, the option taken by men. When men lose control of their anger and give in to violence, it sometimes manifests in sadistic pleasure. Laws, social conventions, and institutions do not take the "fear factor" into consideration even when it is capable of annihilating them, as when collective "anger-violence" erupts in revolutions.

Current femicide in advanced societies goes hand in hand with the increase in women's freedom of choice. Inducing fear is a spontaneous strategy used by human beings to weaken and control other human beings. Control technologies, in all fields and in all ways, are dictated by fear. One might suggest that men have always been more subjected to existential fear than women, although they routinely attribute every possible weakness and fragility to women. And it is precisely because of this fear that men have created so many protective and offensive devices "for defense." But in spite of all these defenses, the general fear has increased instead of diminishing. This does not seem to be the right road.

Women's help services deal with fear and have fears of their own. The fears of the users or beneficiaries unconsciously infect every institution or association active in the social sphere, including voluntary work. While this

is normal, natural, and healthy – in the sense of empathy and human mirroring – it is imperative that activists contain this tendency, analyze, and reflect upon it to avoid weakening their actions. Those who wish to act in compliance with the law and in a paradigm of nonviolence must be aware of and have a thorough knowledge of the mechanisms of violence. They must also grapple with the fear of exposing oneself, of being recognized, and of being subjected to external attacks.

Governing a group or a whole society with a truly democratic political ideology can work only in the direction of nonviolence. Strategies and techniques for a new type of social containment and control, via educative processes, must be elaborated. But this is still a long way off. Our society is suffering from an identity crisis, caused by the contradiction of having selected democratic governance and at the same time complying with the remnant of the old authoritarian and violent system.

Decades of feminist activism have brought some changes both in the life of elite women engaged in political and other executive positions, and in service delivery for women who experience violence. Unfortunately, however, all over the world little has happened to transform the lives of the majority of women who bear the weight of service, maintenance, reproduction, care, help, and assistance to the elderly, children's education, and other vital functions always at a level below men. As women labor to produce and sustain their families, men prefer to run, organize, head, supervise, evaluate, and, above all, control the budgets, far too often to embroil themselves in corruption.

The patriarchal paradigm and the new male

Public institutions (schools, hospitals, political offices, churches, armies, etc.) still operate according to a male patriarchal code, even when women work within them. In many institutional jobs that deviate from the stereotypical secretary role, women do not feel at ease and may be marginalized for complaining about discrimination. Job segregation by sex continues to place men in positions of authority and women in positions of subordination (director versus secretary, doctor versus nurse, professor versus teacher, cardinal versus nun, also painter versus model). Men are often dissatisfied when a woman is their superior or supervisor at work, just as they are unhappy at home when their partners start asserting their needs for personal autonomy and freedom. These situations are at risk of becoming violent, either directly through mobbing, bullying, stalking, and molesting behaviors, or indirectly, through behind-the-scenes unfair competition and male lobbying against the women. Men may work together to deny women opportunities, refuse to share information and knowledge, program women's failure, or perpetuate sex-based disparities in pay, despite similar professional competence and performance.

The absolute predominance of male figures in the history of our planet has shaped the structure of power from the top of political levels down to the family or vice versa. In a sort of mirror dynamic, public and private communication and organization reflect each other and consolidate male power and discriminatory control. This is structural violence. Everything must remain forcefully in its place. This is the power of tradition. The present stereotyped division of human population by biological sex and social gender reflects the patriarchal organization of past communities. Powerful patriarchal moral codes continue to undermine the equality initiatives as well as new legislation to promote the advancement of women. Confronting different experiences, cultures, nations, and theoretical positions has helped women understand the underlying common ground that makes it so difficult to maintain linear progress in the achievement of opportunities and freedom equal to those of men. The only clear hope toward real equality at this moment seems to rely on a forced numerical balance in political representation, which is far too little. And even this goal appears still distant and not strong enough to change the spirit of the system. Women raised in a male-dominant culture, created and perpetuated by men, are not fully free to express themselves, let alone to be fully acknowledged as authoritative politicians.

The characteristics of the violent patriarchal paradigm, whether conscious or unconscious, are still strongly alive in our present world. If the adjective 'patriarchal' sounds obsolete or too charged with feminist flavor, male domination will do. What matters is to think of and analyze this phenomenon from a new more complex perspective in order to find more effective and successful ways to eliminate it. Nothing but a decisive cultural and educational change will truly and radically transform the situation. But who is going to face this enormous task? Obviously, it cannot just be women by themselves.

Men must be called into the venture: men who believe in the project, who are critical of their gender, who do not want a violent and discriminatory world any more, those who have respect for their mothers, sisters, daughters, female friends, and colleagues, women of the entire world, and for themselves as well. In more recent years men have been getting more involved in social, civil, and political movements against violence in general. Specific groups of men, who are interested in the area of violence against women, have followed a path similar to women's groups, going from acquisition of self-consciousness and self-criticism of their gender and its history, toward new identities, opportunities, and values, depending on their original background.¹⁰ In Europe, there appear to be signs of solidarity and companionship by men on the path of nonviolence. Some women have had an ambivalent response to this development. The fear of the millenary patriarchal control and potential destructiveness may condition some feminist groups to be distrustful toward direct involvement with men, abusers

and non-abusers. On the other hand it is clear that men need to rethink their past history and the culture of their gender and find new relational patterns to approach women who have drastically changed in the past few decades, both as individuals and as a gender. Working against violence is one of the keys to determine the degree of civil coexistence and sincere partnership.

Eliminating the patriarchal paradigm would remove multiple forms of gender violence. Within the paradigm, men are advantaged when women become passive in violent situations, rarely responding by fighting back. By contrast, when two men violently confront each other, the interaction often ends differently – in individual fighting or worse, augmented by peer forces. In mobbing and bullying as well, a scapegoat is selected among “weak” targets to receive the aggression passively, without exhibiting a dangerous response. It is no surprise, therefore, that children hold the record along with women as victims of abuse. Male dominion, collective or individual, was and still is exerted over women and children, who are considered personal possessions and weak enough not to be a problem. Laws have established and reinforced fathers’ higher decisional right, compared to the mother’s inferior one. Although formal equality has now been ratified in many nations, these often coexist with subtle forms of male power. As noted above, equality can give way to abuse in separation and divorce cases where mothers, especially those who have initiated the legal action, are reduced to impotence in their efforts to avoid endless conflict, an impotence that profoundly affects the children as well.

Gender violence is a cultural problem that originates in the deep belief that many men have about themselves as entitled to punish women with whom they are involved for having “provoked or offended their dignity and honor” – whether or not she has violated any cultural, social, or institutional rules. A delusional concept of omnipotence is transformed over time and history into a collective code of male privilege in deciding about life, death, and private property. On the other side, women can bear and tolerate incredible abuses, while trying to protect their children, spending years and even decades before moving away or searching for help. Many years ago, one old woman answered my question about why she had stayed for so long under such difficult conditions, saying, “We had been taught this way – to bear, endure, be patient and silent, put up with moods and modes, swallow insults, and so on. That was being ‘a good wife’.”

As far as contemporary men are concerned, it is too early to predict if a gender transformation will take place from their side – if there is potential for a new form of partnership without violence, physical or psychological. Previous worldwide nonviolent movements only partially addressed the specific situation of women. The gradual and persistent effort of women who are trying to change the patriarchal code and its sexist violent culture has encouraged a minority of men to interrogate themselves and start seeing violence as a male gender problem. Undoubtedly, some men come from

family experiences with episodes of domestic violence and remember witnessing violence; other men have a personal sensitivity to take care of weak and wounded people, which drives them toward medical or psychological professions, just as the desire for justice can attract some toward advocacy for social justice. The activities of male groups and centers often follow a method similar to AA (Alcoholics Anonymous) and other self-help organizations. Men who feel they are having a problem with violence meet regularly in groups or individually with counselors or psychotherapists and follow specific programs. Obviously men can have their own symptoms, fears, insecurities, conditioned behaviors, sexual problems, and mental scripts that psychotherapy can help to soften and overcome, but the violence we are considering is much deeper and lies in a collective texture that individual liberation is not enough to uproot. Both in the role of the abuser or in that of a victim, men show a strong male gender conditioning represented by the soldier stereotype – not to show emotions, not to speak about feelings or other personal dilemmas, not to ask for help, not to cry or exhibit suffering (Holtzworth-Munroe and Anglin, 1994).

Very few men have been able to go beyond the gender stereotypes of their time. National independence leaders such as Gandhi, for example, as well as many saints, philosophers, and thinkers who have been officially non-violent, have remained quite far removed from women's conditions, never moving away from the patriarchal view. The same attitude is shown by most male psychotherapists and psychoanalysts, by doctors, priests, professors, and so on. Training in a “helping profession” is not a guarantee against patriarchal inclinations. Sexual abuse, harassment, and pedophilia in general are far more likely to be committed by adults who are close to and trusted by children (relatives, neighbors, pediatricians, and teachers) than by strangers.

It is an important step, then, that networks of male gender centers now exist and work with individual abusers and batterers, and at the same time are active in cultural, educational, therapeutic areas, collaborating when possible with centers dedicated to address violence against women.

Conclusion

Violence is a serious male problem, which cannot be relegated to the category of just one more problem that women have to avoid. Popular culture is filled with sexually exhibited female bodies, whether or not generated of the woman's own free will. From the aesthetics of the escort to child prostitutes to the woman as victim, raped or abused, we are surrounded by images that depict cruel and degrading treatment of women. Framed as detached visual entertainment, whether in film or advertising, violence against women generates the psychological response defined as habituation, a form of desensitization, adaptation, or even dependence, rather than a common refusal of violence. In addition, extreme, uncanny, gruesome material circulates on the web, available to everyone.

Witnessed violence discussed in relation to children who are exposed to abuse, battering, or femicide must also be considered in relation to the reproduction of similar scenarios broadcast by cinema, television, and computer screens. Because of their curiosity, children and adolescents are a vulnerable target, more so when the family is undergoing critical tensions or abuse between mother and father. Male and females around puberty are looking for models to imitate. Wanting to live as adults and unaware of their limited experience, children may take sexual risks, creating emotional predispositions to extreme adventures, sometimes including illicit substance consumption. Internal psychological restlessness and confusion can produce chaotic behaviors with unpredictable future effects on gender identity as well as other aspects of personality. Again the issue of prevention and the role of education and rehabilitation come to the foreground.¹¹

Laws and official stances cannot produce serious results if the media are not full partners in the endeavor. Anti-violence policies must be supplemented with media and networks free from bias of any kind. Yet, explicit and subliminal forms of violence pervade mass media, expressed in sexist language, selected comments about crime news, reports, documentaries, and various film productions and talk shows. We cannot speak of a proper re-victimization of women, but we also cannot say that women in the media are violence-free. Portraying violence against women reinforces the association and makes it realistic, while legitimating doubt about whether what is viewed on TV really captures "real life."

Reports from the UN Commission on the Status of Women and from the World Health Organization document pervasive violence against women and track disastrous consequences for physical and psychological health, affecting sexual and reproductive functions with a major risk of acquiring HIV. Depression, suicide, chemical and substance dependency, and traumatic stress are twice as frequent among abused women. Interestingly enough, similar outcomes and risk factors link perpetrators and victims: exposure to child maltreatment or witnessing violence in the family, low education, attitudes that accept violence and gender inequality. The only difference appears to be the harmful use of alcohol on the part of the perpetrator. On the level of collective and transnational events, situations of conflict, post-conflict, and displacement may exacerbate existing violence and present new forms of violence against women: rape and sexual violence are still used as war weapons. But, apart from extreme political and international events, ubiquitous domestic violence unmasks the persistent patriarchal attitude all over the world, even among recent generations of European, high income, educated males. Thanks to women's solidarity, the trends of localism and globalization begin to intertwine with each other. This women's way and style of interaction and problem-solving creates a different social quality compared to the more traditional aggressive and competitive men's associations.

Women's help services operate to assist women victims of violence, providing them with growing specialized support, both legal and psychological, in territorial networks with other services (health/ER, social, security, job, housing, finance, etc.), provided according to need. Networks have matured through the years, learning from the specific experiences and confrontations with abused women, local and immigrant, including encounters with humanitarian and/or political refugees, immigrant families, foreign residents in mixed partnerships, single and married women, who are often pregnant, generating new lives to take care of. Centers and shelters exist now even in the more difficult and dangerous areas of the world. Women's solidarity networks travel far and reach their goals in spite of all the adversities they encounter.

The power of non-violence is still not fully recognized by men in power or by society in general. It is not a matter of women occupying the places of traditional male power and replacing its peculiarities with their own. What is needed is giving each other due importance in a new space, public and private, and with new codes and forms responding to the vital needs of our contemporary world, while envisioning the future for our children. Women proponents of nonviolence must pursue their commitments, wherever they live, intensifying their encounters, exchanges, and mutual solidarity, together with those men who feel at ease in the nonviolent paradigm. We do not necessarily have to expect the change to come from the top of the power pyramid, where male and females could be equally distributed but only nominally. In any case we do not need to pursue female acknowledgment along well-worn paths that have been tried in the past. Perhaps we could trust the energy of aggregations of women and men, inspired by gender responsibility and personal awareness to work toward peaceful collective transformation, oriented by basic human needs and rights, in which everyone is acting freely, while all together aim at the same direction and goal. Perhaps this could be considered a sociopsychological interpretation of democracy.

Notes

1. Based on reports by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Commission. J. Ward on behalf of the Reproductive Health Response in Conflict Consortium, 2002, *"Bosnia and Herzegovina", If Not Now, When?: Addressing Gender-based Violence in Refugee, Internally Displaced, and Post-Conflict Settings*, p. 81. Cited in UNIFEM, *Facts and Figures on Peace and Security*.
2. United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Rwanda, 1996, *Report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda*, E/CN.4/1996/68, United Nations, New York.
3. Directorate-General for Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs, 1998, "Sexual harassment at the workplace in the European Union," p. iii, Brussels, European Commission. Cited in UN General Assembly, 2006, "In-depth

Study on All Forms of Violence against Women: Report of the Secretary-General," A/61/122/Add.1, p. 42, New York.

4. Based on a nationally representative study among female and male students in Grade Eight to Grade 11. American Association of University Women, 2001, "Hostile Hallways: Bullying, Teasing, and Sexual Harassment in School," p. 4, Washington, DC. Cited in UN General Assembly, 2006, "In-depth Study on All Forms of Violence against Women: Report of the Secretary-General," A/61/122/Add.1, p. 42, New York. For additional information, see – See more at: <http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/ending-violence-against-women/facts-and-figures#sthash.IEF3d5be.dpuf>
5. A central question often raised in discussions about gender violence is whether women are as potentially violent as men. Has women's violence been "controlled" by cultural education or discrimination, or limited by physical "inferiority" relative to men? Is there a "natural," hormonal difference related to potential motherhood that makes women less dangerous and less destructive? Those who insist that women are "as violent" as men suggest that women can be as cruel and destructive as men. Yet there remains an enormous statistical disparity in gender crimes, more than 90 percent of which are committed by men. Some women can be cruel, violent, criminal, or pathological to the point of killing their partners and children. But past and current statistics show that men engage in far more violence, both in wars and in interpersonal relations, than women.
6. Since its passage by the UN General Assembly in 1979, 187 nations have ratified the CEDAW.
7. <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/convention-violence>
8. The Child Witness to Violence Project at the Boston Medical Center provides one example of interdisciplinary approach. See "Tips for parents and other caregivers: Raising our children in a violent world" at http://www.childwitnessstoviolence.org/uploads/2/5/7/9/257929/tips_brochure_2007.pdf. For legal aspects, see: US State Codes, area Education, domestic violence at https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/state/can/protecting.cfm; the UE Lanzarote Convention, CETS N. 210, meant to defend children from sexual abuse, exploitations and other forms of violence is a reference point for an advanced general strategy of protective prevention. www.coe.int/lanzarote
9. The issue of PAS resurfaced in August 2014 in the *Monitor on Psychology* published by the American Psychological Association under the general title "New ways to protect kids," and a more specific essay, "Contested Custody: Inappropriate assumptions are common in family courts." Family court practices could be transformed by overcoming the major emphasis on the false idea of parent alienation, which is a rare problem according to experts in the field. Yet, beliefs about PAS have had serious consequences for children, who have been removed from caring mothers and handed over to abusive fathers.
10. Centers for batterers have been active in the US for a long time and according to court pronouncements offer certified programs where interventions focus on stopping the violence and helping the batterer to identify, confront, challenge, and change controlling and abusive behavior towards their partner and children. A variety of groups meet on a weekly basis. In Europe, Italian centers for batterers were recently created (2009) and their present number is 15. They are located mainly in the northern and central area of the country where the traditional gender view is less powerful compared to the South. Italian chauvinist culture opened to change after World War II, allowing women to vote in 1946. The elimination

of the Honor Code, which allowed penalty mitigation for men in cases of femicide, named at the time uxoricide, occurred only in 1984.

Maschile plurale: www.maschileplurale.it Roma; Nuovo Maschile. Uomini liberi dalla violenza: www.nuovomaschile.com Pisa; Centro di Ascolto Uomini Maltrattanti www.centrouminimaltrattanti.org; Firenze.

11. Analogous to the Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, in 2005 the EU conceived "The Lanzarote Convention on protecting children against sexual exploitation and sexual abuse," CETS N. 201, which opened to signature and ratification in 2007 and entered into force in 2010. The Convention is a comprehensive legal instrument to protect children against sexual exploitation and abuse. As EU regulation increased, these type of perpetrators select children or adolescents at a distance to avoid external controls, making the Internet an increasingly dangerous site of recruitment. The Convention takes the UN and Council of Europe standards as a starting point and extends them to cover all possible kinds of sexual offences against minors, including child prostitution, pedopornography, grooming, and corruption of children through exposure to sexual content and activities, criminalizing them. It also promotes international cooperation to achieve the same objectives.

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19

Gender Issues in Primary Childcare and Their Implications for Democracy

Eva Pattis Zoja

Introduction: The centrality of the primary care relationship

Feminist discussion about gender inequality has from time to time asked to what extent women themselves are responsible for this inequality because they have been trained to underestimate themselves and give more importance to men in general. From the point of view of developmental psychology, the next question is whether or not this inequality begins in infancy. While feminist psychoanalytic studies on gender have mainly concentrated on a revision of Freudian concepts, the process of identity formation in small children has received little attention. The fact that the primary care-taker for the first years of an infant's life is in most cases female has psychological implications and consequences.

Chodorow (1979) describes how the course of personality development for males and females is different. She deems it significant that most, if not all, children are mothered by a woman. Chodorow underlines that bonding between mothers and children in early childhood has a deep imprinting effect on children and that this effect is different for the male and female child. Yet, there has been no further exploration and discussion with regards to the consequences of those differences. This is the theme we will therefore attempt to develop from a psychoanalytic and conceptual point of view.

An infant's world is centered on one primary care-taker, in most cases the mother. Erich Neumann (1949) describes how the small boy needs to establish an alternative gender identity much earlier than the girl and cannot do so by identifying with his mother. Instead, he is forced to distance himself from her and from the female world as a whole. This process begins in early childhood and finds expression in the puberty rituals of all peoples. In a boy's development, a rupture must occur which distances him irreversibly from the world of children and mothers, whereas a girl, psychologically speaking, can remain in the same "world" of mothers and children

beyond puberty without this necessarily leading to a neurotic disorder. The girl's development seems to occur in a more linear way, a hypothesis which is supported by the puberty rituals for girls, which are based on continuity of their everyday life, their tasks and duties. Woman can remain identified with the female care-taking figure; men have to develop away from it.

Freud, and particularly his pupil Karen Horney, mentioned the problem in their work, although further conceptual and empirical studies did not emerge. What, on the contrary, has been extensively studied since the 1960s is the impact of the primary care-taker (mostly female) in a child's life. René Spitz (1965) was the first to discover that newborn babies in post-war Germany orphanages, who received only physical care in their first months of life but whose relational needs were not tended to, simply died of *anaclitic depression*. Furthermore, John Bowlby had become interested in understanding why children coped so differently with the same experiences of extreme trauma and loss during World War II: he discovered that the importance of bonding in the first two years of human life made a significant difference (Bowlby, 1988). In fact, children with secure attachments were able to overcome traumatic experiences in more effective ways than children with insecure attachment patterns.

In recent decades, studies on the consequences of attachment patterns have been numerous (Stern, 1977, 1985, 1998; Schore, 2003; Brisch, 2010, 2014), and in spite of the different concepts such as Bowlby's "working models" or Daniel Stern's "RIGS," which have been used to describe the development of human relationships from the first months of babies' lives, they all converge on a few main findings: the modality for how an individual relates to the world and to people is influenced by the experience of the primary relationship. For the infant, his or her first experience of the primary caregiver (man or woman) is crucial: "mother" is synonymous with "world." If this "mother/world" is attuned to the baby's psychophysical perceptions and emotional states, if the child is understood and mirrored, then the baby will have a good chance of developing a positive experience of himself which goes hand in hand with developing his innate capacities for prosocial behavior and empathy. Today, we know that the modality of this first relationship determines the perceptive, emotional, and cognitive structures into which a child grows (Schore, 2003). According to Schore, experiences of early relationships occur on nonconscious, affective levels. In the first two years of life, the child downloads information from interactions with the main care-taker. The contact through the mutual gaze, empathetic and attuned responses, and moment-to-moment matching of each others' behavior patterns create bonding, which enables the child to gain a positive sense of self. This matching process is emotional and cognitive. Schore calls it "relational knowledge," which is retained in implicit memory systems. John Hill provides a clear description of this. If the interactive processes of attunement,

misattunement, and re-attunement are not successful, the child's affective development will be disturbed. It will become increasingly hard for him or her to adapt, appraise, or create meaningful relationships with the environment. Mis-attunements and failed processes of adaptation and appraisal, with a corresponding loss of sense of self, will be stored in implicit memory and determine later relationship patterns. The ability to bond with others will be impaired (Hill, 2010).

In an *adequate* mother-child relationship, the caring adult is capable of relating to the infant, so that he or she feels unique, understood, and emotionally accepted. If the primary caretaker is a woman, from the first months of his life, a boy will introject enough positive "caretaking" attributes and be able to separate himself from the mother figure and to replace initial identification with a growing relationship to her. A girl will continue to identify partly with her mother beyond puberty and then search for an identity which at the same time is similar and also different from the mother. More or less the same will be true if the primary caretaker is the father.

If all is well, or as Donald Winnicott puts it, if the situation is "good enough," no major issues in identity forming should occur nor will there be gender-biased differences in self-esteem or in the capacity of relating to others. Boys and girls will develop according to what a specific culture offers them as role models.

But what happens if the primary relationship is ill-fated? What if the child has experienced the primary care-taker as dismissive, disparaging, and manipulative, and if it has not experienced itself as an autonomous being with its own feelings and thoughts, but instead largely as a narcissistic extension of the parent? The child (boy or girl) will more easily develop feelings of guilt, as well as auto-aggressive tendencies, and gaps will necessarily occur in the identity-forming process. First, the perception and sensual experience of its own body will be impaired since the desires for closeness, tenderness, attachment needed to be repressed, muscular tensions and rigidity will serve as defense against void and fear. Self-esteem will be impaired, which means that skills and talents might remain undeveloped. However, these talents and skills will not just lie fallow, but – like everything repressed by consciousness – they will be projected onto the world outside, onto other people. The growing child sees others as better, as more intelligent, and as more capable than him/herself; thus creating the basis for envy and jealousy. Power instead of love will likely be the child's goal, because power gives the child a feeling of "being in control," to compensate for his lack of trust in love and affection. How is this child to gain power? Here the author proposes the hypothesis that gender differences will appear, and depending on how strongly the culture supports fixed gender role models, the more this difference will influence the individual's life.

The primary care relationship for boys and its consequences

For the boy exhibiting a predominantly negative experience of the primary relationship (if the primary care-taker is a woman), the archetypal and instinctual tendency to “develop away” from all that can be associated with this experience will be strongly pronounced. His equally pre-existing need for a soft, permissive, feeling, dialogue-oriented attitude will remain unsatiated. That is, it cannot be introjected and differentiated, but instead will be screened out at an early age, only to bring forth compensatory, one-sided, rigid, and, in extreme cases, violent attitudes. Whatever is feeling oriented, receptive, trusting and permissive is devalued. Exercising willpower, taking action, imposing one’s own decisions on others are favored behaviors. Instead of feeling inferior, now the child feels powerful. This means that his own neediness is devalued and projected onto weaker human groups. Since for the boy, the primary care-taker was a mother, female values and woman themselves need to be devalued, creating a deeply rooted misogyny that has its root in fear. Sexuality cannot be a way to open up, a way to get close and intimate, and to exchange tenderness. A man whose need for an attuned care-taker has been repressed since early childhood will encounter difficulties attuning himself to the relationship with a partner. In order to overcome his fears, he needs to possess the woman sexually and control her. Sexuality is divorced from feeling: the sexual drive is acted out, but the world of exploring one’s vulnerabilities through the erotic encounter is not allowed to be part of sexuality. This means that whereas the woman is sexually desired and possessed, she must also soon be abandoned because the risk of being emotionally involved must be avoided. The existential feeling of emptiness and abandonment experienced in one’s own childhood must be avoided at any cost. The return of the repressed, the heartbreak of one’s childhood, reveals itself only indirectly, namely in addictive behavior involving substances, games, work, power, violence, and sex. Despite those impediments which limit not only his relationships to women, but also his capacity for empathy in general – a man is not necessarily compromised in his determination to gain power and influence in society. If we consider studies on corporate psychopathy (Babiak and Hare, 2006), we might imagine that many successful careers have been possible not in spite, but *because* of the poorly developed capacity for empathy. Robert Hare’s “psychopathy checklist” is not gender specific and we are not focusing on psychopathic personality traits. Nonetheless, we are putting forward the hypothesis that women (with insufficient primary care-taking experience) do not pursue successful careers in society with the same motivation and determination as men do. Since there have not been statistically supported studies on this subject, we will merely conceptually describe why such a phenomenon *could* be relevant to gender studies. The only empirical data from which this hypothesis stems are clinical vignettes from psychotherapy sessions.

The primary care relationship for girls and its consequences

We are opening up for discussion whether an inadequate primary relationship (if the care-taker is a woman) affects women differently and influences their motivation to strive for influence and power in society.

As mentioned above, for both men and woman negative primary care-taking leads to not being able to experience one's own body with pleasure. One's own body will not be a source of vitality, but will be loved only if – analogous to a failed primary relationship – it can be used for a specific purpose. If the male adolescent rejects his own body, this does not prevent him from wishing to impose his sexual desires on a woman. He does not need to be fond of himself to be sexually aroused. On the contrary, often he seeks a sexual encounter with a woman to get rid of himself, to “dissolve” for the time of the sexual encounter, to stop thinking while getting sexual pleasure. For the woman, sexual relationships are often more complicated and differentiated. To have access to complete sexual satisfaction, for many women it is necessary that she herself likes her body and finds it attractive. She tends to look at herself through the eyes of the partner and evaluate herself according to this view. Sexual relationships alone – even if they are satisfying and gratifying – are often not enough to protect her against the inner void experienced in the primary relationship, when “mother” was equivalent to “world” and the mother was rejecting.

One hypothesis we are forwarding here is that women, whose need for feeling in attunement with the care-taker has been unsatisfied in early infancy, begin to develop an unconscious expectation of a possible alternative to this first insufficient experience. This could be formulated in this way: maybe there is another “world” out there, maybe there is another existence possible, if one is seen by the gaze, admiration, and love of a man.

In many cases of destructive relationships, where women are not able to separate themselves from an abusive partner, the woman seems to have an implicit expectation that the relationship with the man will compensate for the lack of self-value and will save her from her feelings of senselessness. Why do women project this onto men? Could there be a link between the fact that the primary care-taker was a woman, whom she could not trust, who produced experiences of fear and void through abandonment, self-devaluation, and manipulation, and that the “other” gender can save her from that abandoning or persecuting world/mother? For such women, a man's interest in her body is misunderstood as interest in her as a person.

The problem with this is evident: the male world is overvalued by both men and women. The devaluation of the entire female world by women themselves has been an important subject in feminist literature. From a psychological point of view, if conflictual dynamics with other women repeatedly manifest themselves as they did with the mother, female solidarity and complicity are scarcely capable of developing. One possibility for

evading the feminine, which carries negative connotations, is the tendency to increasingly develop “male” attributes, just as a boy does spontaneously. But there is also another solution, which society has presented on a silver platter from time immemorial: namely, the possibility of projecting one’s own abilities and talents onto the male world in general, and onto a male partner in particular. This implicit law can be phrased as, “Men are simply more important.” Its secondary benefit for a woman has been for centuries evidently the effortless enhancement of her self-esteem (she has become “someone” through the right marriage) and the preservation of a submissive identity, which seems to be better than none at all.

Psychoanalysts encounter such women today in analysis. Women from all educational backgrounds make almost the same verbatim statement: “I can achieve (or I have achieved) a lot in my life – but this isn’t worth anything without a man in my life.” Something quite awful resonates through this statement, namely, that what has been accomplished so far is hardly worth anything “without a man” – as if life had been erected around a center which time and again risks remaining void. Having a relationship with a man seems to take priority over all other tasks, activities, and relationships. Their own person would appear not to be cathected with narcissistic love, but instead with an “object” outside themselves, on which semiconscious wishes and fantasies center and into which personal expectations and social prejudices blend in a fatal way. A large part of these women’s energy, intelligence, sensitivity, and fantasy is aimed at seeking a partner, resolving conflicts with him, or weathering a separation.

Even if the external conventions scarcely exist any more, the dynamics sit deeper. If one’s own inner center is either negatively cathected (I am worthless) or characterized by a sense of void (I don’t know what I desire), then the other gender, endowed with positive projections, is implanted into this center. As seen from the outside, the pattern of the unsuccessful primary relationship repeats itself: the woman, as a helpless child, implores this idealized adult to look after her. Her entire right to exist depends on “him,” just as it did on her mother. He is the secret altar on which she sacrifices herself every day.

Understanding this connection often represents a turning point in the analysis of women suffering from a pathological dependency on their partner or who fail to recover from a terminated love affair: the mother/world, the giver of life par excellence that extinguishes itself when the male partner leaves a woman. If she already lacked the opportunity as a young girl to develop an alternative to her mother’s critical voice and if she doesn’t live in a stimulating social environment, she remains unconditionally at the mercy of the man, who is the only screen far and wide onto which she can project her positive attributes. If the partner joins in this unconscious game and smothered his female partner with solicitousness and testimonies of her value, this will not be enough for her maturing process: if she does not make

an effort to develop her own female *and* male abilities, she remains a dissatisfied little girl and her self-esteem will depend on the evaluations of others. Such a woman will diligently and gratefully help build her partner's career and bask in his success, but her own goals will hardly reach beyond the private sphere – even if she is capable of proving her worth and adeptness in professional life.

What a woman with an inadequate primary relationship may lack is the motivation to want to gain any influence at the workplace or in public life. The center around which her life revolves is in actual fact not the family, as she might be telling herself, but her inner dependency on an external figure (husband/children) whom she expects to care for her or, in a reversal of these dynamics, to whom she constantly offers care. The negative primary care-taker experience makes it difficult for her to realize motherhood in a differentiated way and particularly on the meta-level; for instance, to apply it to herself and to bring forth something creative. Her motherhood lacks a symbolic and spiritual form of expression. Thus, she lives her motherhood predominantly in a literally material fashion (for her children and for those who make out that they are children) and is barely able to transfer it onto social problems. Doing so is quite naturally left to men. The energy, intelligence, and creativity of women trapped in this constellation are lost to society.

In summary, a predominantly negative primary relationship prevents women a good deal more than men from reaching influential positions in society, because both men and women overevaluate the male world and expect recognition, love, affection, and identity from men. This would explain why a large number of women who lack neither talent nor ability do not aspire to power and influence either at the workplace or in society, no matter with or without a male partner. Power in society would put them too much in competition with men. Such women “choose” unconsciously to identify themselves with men and a male world. They develop as their own “female” identity what men are expecting from them: an aggressionless, adaptative beautiful being, Virginia Woolf's looking-glass. In *A Room of One's Own* Virginia Woolf asserts that throughout history women have served as models of inferiority, thereby boosting men's superiority: “looking-glasses possessing the magic and delicious power of reflecting the figure of man at twice its natural size” (Woolf, 1989).

We may further add that the woman herself sees him as twice his size, and as a consequence of this, sees herself as half the size. The psychodynamics of such situations are not only frequent in analytical practice, but are also heavily exploited to ensure high viewing and sales figures for inferior media products and to influence the cosmetics, fashion, and luxury goods industries.

The more a woman's identity is dependent both upon a man as individual and upon the masculine world and its values in general, the less she

will be motivated to change this world and its political systems, because – psychologically speaking – she lacks a real archimedic standpoint outside it, from where she may reflect upon it. She is a vital part of the system, without being aware of it. To put it in radical terms: even today she offers her “child” to the “Führer” (Harrer, 1938): She sacrifices her personal and social potential to dominant values, which today might not be a “patriarchal” system but a pervasive attitude of exploitation of different life forms.

Poor and insecure individual bonding experiences influence the development of mature social bonding, leading to *identifications and symbiotic fusion* instead of relationships to people, ideas, values, groups: a fact/phenomenon which has been observed well in historic tragedies (Fromm, 1941; Adorno, 1950; Gruen, 2002, 2013; Keilson, 1959). This is true for women and men, but in the case of women, there is a double layer of dependency, which explains the role of some women in totalitarian systems or in criminal associations today. There is no evidence whatsoever (see also the Milgram experiments) that they might be less unconscious and less cruel than men.

To summarize: two premises have been theorized by psychoanalysts since Freud:

Primary affect deficit creates lack of self-esteem, poor autonomy, and limited development of empathy in individuals. (Empathy is innate in humans and apes.)

The individual with primary affect deficit tends to “project” the wish of a positive caring mother principle onto different “objects.”

“Projection” is a psychoanalytical term and means that this wish is unconscious and that the “object” is not seen realistically, but rather perceived in an idealized form, *as if* it possessed the desired qualities, and *as if* it behaved in the desired way, in spite of evidence pointing to the opposite. “Objects” for projections can be nearly anything: it may be nature, it may be individuals, groups, religion, landscapes, ideologies.

In the case of the primary (deficient) care-taker having been a woman, the consequences for the daughters and sons will be different:

Women tend to project their wish for a caring mother principle (which they have never experienced) onto men and onto the masculine world in general.

The consequence is that they remain dependent upon men. They perceive their own weakness/vulnerability in themselves, they tend to idealize men, and foster the expectation of being cared for.

Men tend to project their wish for a caring mother principle (which they have never experienced) *also* onto men and onto the masculine world in general.

The consequence is that they are *also* dependent and submissive to men: but instead of perceiving their own weakness/vulnerability in themselves, this is projected onto women (and/or other groups), idealizing themselves and the masculine world.

It is obvious that the consequence of all this is the fact that both men and women overvalue the masculine world.

What alternatives do we have?

“It takes a whole village to raise a child” (African proverb). To be able to be an adequate first care-taker figure for her infant, a parent (of whatever sex) would need “a whole village” around him/her, that is, a functioning social context.

If the primary care-taker is a man, which until today is the exception, we could expect new patterns of identification processes. But if the couple could decide together which parent will be the primary care-taker – beyond cultural schemes – the child would have more chances of getting the more adequate of the two: we can assume that the one who decides freely (not because of cultural or economic reasons) might be also emotionally better equipped for this task: the parent with the better maternal instinct (man or woman) will want to stay with the child while the other one might prefer alternative activities, which do not trigger his/her own vulnerabilities associated with primary care. But what he/she really requires for this task is, besides remuneration, recognition from society.

If the importance of the parenting role is clearly recognized by society, then even the parent with poor empathic capabilities might make an additional effort to learn how to take care for his child. Recognition would mean that society mirrors the parenting couple in their essential role for contributing to society. Parents need collective recognition of the importance of their role in the first years of a child’s life, the years which determine the child’s way of perceiving the “other” and therefore his potential for empathy. Without individuals who are capable of entering into the feeling mode of the other, democracy is not thinkable. Winnicott would suggest in a paper written in 1950 (Philips, 1988) that there was a “precarious but innate democratic tendency in the developing individual,” but that on the other hand democracy is based on emotionally mature individuals.

Many parents today need culturally specific education about child rearing. Since traditions are no longer transmitted directly, young couples do not know how to relate to a child. They sit at home reading childrearing books and remain isolated, insecure, and often depressed. One way to intervene would be psychological education for parents. The programs SAFE and BASE developed by Prof. Brisch (2013) at the department of psychosomatics of the Hauner’scher Kinderklinik in Germany could be an example.

The other question would be how to help children who have had inadequate primary care-taking and consequently have not developed their capacity for prosocial behavior. Do all such children need psychotherapy?

Neuroscience research has brought useful perspectives to this question. Jaak Panksepp has studied play behavior in mammals and humans for decades (Panksepp, 1998, 2005).

All humans inherit at least three genetically-provided, social-emotional, brain-mind tools, shared by all young mammals, that help promote construction of fully-social minds: Our childhood urge to PLAY should be integrated with our capacity to CARE for others, and to feel PANIC (separation-distress) when social bonds are severed. These, and other, inherited emotional action systems allow young children to become fully social – they facilitate social bonding, social understanding and ultimately empathy and concern for others. Collectively, in the context of PLAY, they could be better used for joyful, positive enculturation. PLAY may help build and strengthen the reflective, inhibitory resources that enable empathetic-thinking brains (...). At present, such inherited emotional resources are being used haphazardly. If we learn to use them well, we may have less need for addiction-promoting, personality-changing psychostimulants that temporarily enable neocortical functions that have not adequately matured under the guidance of brain PLAY systems.

Panksepp proposes:

Our work suggests we are not recruiting the social PLAY urges – genetically provided brain-tools that prompt positive social engagements and learning – to enhance healthy pro-social brain maturation. To evaluate this hypothesis, we must create joyful learning environments for pre-school children where natural playful activities have an optimal chance to do their appointed mind-creating work.

Panksepp (2010) describes “play sanctuaries” as places where children can explore new ways of socializing and connecting with themselves and others to gain through spontaneous play what was lacking in their infancy.

Play sanctuaries could provide more children with the free play they often don’t get in the modern world. They are also places where children can be instructed “naturally” in good behaviors, and those who have difficulty playing might be given special attention. We might also need to train new kinds of child clinicians – those who really know how to play, not just talk and talk, not just test-test-test, but play. A real play-master.

Children’ spontaneous play is auto-educative and auto-regulative, consisting mainly in role play, where social behavior is trained again and again.

By playing, a child learns to get into another's shoes, a precondition for empathic behavior. Another area regarding play that remains to be studied is symbolic play: not only in its limited use described by child psychotherapists, but also, and foremost, in its universal importance for the child's emotional maturation.

Play is an innate behaviour, common to all cultures, which children react spontaneously to difficulty, insecurity or fear, but also to new impressions and exciting experiences. Play belongs to a child's healthy behavioural repertoire and is the child's very own innermost way of approaching the world and internalizing it. Play is also always a process of mental assimilation. With its help, emotions can be converted into cognitive processes, into understanding.

(Pattis Zoja, 2011, 49)

Social work with children in non-psychotherapy settings has proven that symbolic play in a free and protected space activates the psyche's self-regulating capacity, especially in the case of deprived and traumatized children.

While experiences of insufficient primary care-taking may be recuperated in infancy, it is more difficult to imagine large-scale interventions for adults with the same problem.

What needs to be transformed on a personal level would first of all be implicit knowledge about relationships, which has been "imprinted" in the relationship with the primary care-taker. In order to develop an alternative to an implicit knowledge – which could sound like "I will always be abandoned" – it is not enough to have a number of exterior social experiences that prove the implicit knowledge to be wrong. Even if those experiences were consistent in time (a loving partner, a true friend), they are not strong enough to reach the "hard-wired" emotional structures around which the personality has grown. As soon as the smallest potential of betrayal (by the loving partner or the true friend) appears on the horizon, the archaic traumatic reaction is triggered and pervades the personality with panic and/or with automatic over-adaptation to whatever the environmental "system" – be it the dynamic of an abusive personal relationship or a political authoritarian one – requires.

Lasting changes may be acquired if the *interiorized* primary relationship is transformed: this is possible with a consistent attitude of attention on the part of the adult's consciousness towards other needy parts of himself. Neuroscientists describe the human brain as a "symbolic organ"; this is precisely why it is not sufficient to rely on changes from the environment, from society: it is necessary to intervene from within on an imaginative and symbolic level. This is not to contradict the fact that the human being is a social being: on the contrary, the human is a social being also and especially "from within." There is a continuous, semiconscious, inner dialog

taking place between different inner representations of personality parts, emotional “complexes” which express themselves in preconceptions, opinions, or moods. These dialogues may be drawn to consciousness by means of different humanistic, culturally relevant approaches. If there is a precarious perception of one’s own suffering (Gruen, 2013), it follows that the perception of other people’s suffering will be extremely restricted: on an unconscious level it will be polarized and acted out as either the victim or aggressor identity. Relational deficiencies lead to limited perceptions. One needs to work on this patiently and in the long term – not only in psychotherapy – towards a constant inner attitude of attentiveness to one’s feelings; very similar to how one takes care of a real child.

In summary, to regulate the gender-specific consequences of deficient primary childcare, we have discussed several forms of preventive interventions:

Parents should be able to decide freely whether the mother or the father will assume the role of the primary caretaker in the first year of the child’s life. This would give more children the possibility of having a primary caretaker who at least has chosen this role consciously.

Parenting programs based on the findings of recent neuropsychological studies should be taught in schools and offered free of charge to young parents.

Programs aimed at helping adults work on traumatic experiences in their childhood should be offered for free in group settings.

Children with poor prosocial behavior and problems such as aggressivity and hyperactivity should not be pathologized, but instead be offered additional hours of free play which are minimumly adult-directed, in order to let these children develop social skills at their own pace.

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20

Women's Mobilizations for Political Representation in Patriarchal States: Models from Japan and South Korea

Ki-young Shin

In the 21st century, women's underrepresentation in politics continues to be a global phenomenon. Men comprise an overwhelming majority of elected officials, whereas women hold only 22.2 percent of lower and single house seats (as of 1 April 2015, IPU 2015). Gender equality in political representation did not follow either the dramatic democratization of authoritarian regimes or efforts to enhance women's social and economic status. Japan and South Korea provide telling examples of such gaps.

The number of women elected to the Japanese lower house in the most recent national election in 2012 decreased to 7.9 percent, from 11.3 percent and 9.0 percent in the two previous elections. The percentage of women elected to the South Korean national legislature in 2012 (15.7 percent) is still below the Asian average of 19 percent, although it is the highest achievement in South Korean history. Gender and politics scholars have cited strong cultural norms on gender roles, women's lack of resources, party behavior, and the election system, among other factors, to account for this phenomenon (Steel and Kabashima, 2008; Dalton, 2015; Gaunder, 2012; Lee and Shin, 2015).

Local politics demonstrates slightly different trends in these two nations. In Japan and South Korea, a shamefully low level of women's political representation persisted until the 1990s. Women were sensitized to male dominance, which was entrenched in electoral politics, and they struggled against men's power in politics. In Japan, women's representation in municipal councils had begun to increase rapidly since the 1990s. Women were proactive in creating their own local women's party to practice an alternative model of political representation. Although focusing exclusively on their representation at local legislatures, this strategy has been widely successful in several cities, sending steady numbers of women deputies to municipal councils for nearly 30 consecutive years.

South Korean women pushed for institutional reforms for the inclusion of women in politics. Women's movement organizations from left and right outside parties formed a non-partisan solidarity network to augment their voices and mobilized wide public support for electoral law reform to adopt legislative quotas for women party candidates. The effect of quotas is most prominent in local elections for town assemblies, while quotas brought about only modest increases in higher levels of election.

Japanese and South Korean women's strategies in local elections are two noteworthy attempts among many creative ways that women have adopted to break male dominance in politics. Women's parties are not so rare (Sweden's Feminist Initiative won its first seat in the European Parliament in 2014, for example), although their success has varied across nations. Over the past 25 years, gender quotas have become one of the most popular forms of electoral reform for the enhancement of women and minorities' representation in elected bodies (Dahlerup, 2006; Krook, 2009).

This chapter examines *the alternative women's party strategy* (Japan) and *the gender quota strategy* (South Korea) as distinctive and prominent strategies to improve women's political representation. A close look into these two cases sheds light on how different strategies for women's political representation develop, their immediate achievements, and the long-term implications they might have for gender and political power. The following sections provide a brief overview of women's political representation in Japan and South Korea, then analyze the alternative women's party strategy in Japan, and the gender quota strategy in South Korea. The final section discusses general implications of two prototypical strategies to enhance women's political representation on gender and political power in democratic governance.


Brief overview of women's political representation in Japan and South Korea

Women's descriptive representation (women's share of seats) in elected office from 1995 to 2015 reveals the following global trends.

- Women's parliamentary representation has increased steadily and clearly. The world average as of 1 February 2015 reached 22.1 percent (both houses combined). This is almost double the 11.3 percent of seats held by women in 1995.
- As Figure 20.1 demonstrates, women's political representation varies by region. The Nordic region is the most advanced, although some nations surpass regional averages. With women holding 63.8 percent of the seats, Rwanda has the world's highest percentage of women parliamentarians.
- While women's representation has increased in all regions, the speed in increase varies by region. Asia and the Pacific have been slow, while

Regional averages of women in parliaments, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015

Situation in July 1995, January 2000, January 2005, January 2010 and January 2015, both houses combined. Regional ranking in the order of the percentage point change.



Percentages do not take into account the situation of parliaments for which data was unavailable.

Figure 20.1 World and regional averages of women in parliaments, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015

Source: Women in Parliament: 20 Years in Review (IPU, 2015).




Figure 20.2 Women elected to lower house in Japan (1946–2012, percent)

Source: White Paper on Gender Equality 2013 (The Cabinet Office of Japan, Gender Equality Bureau, 2013).

the Americas, Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa are among fast-growing regions. These regions have surpassed Asia over the past 20 years.

- The Asian average of women's parliamentary representation is 18.5 percent, yet it is still below the world average.

In Japan and South Korea, women's representation remains far below the Asian and global averages, despite their status as leading democracies and economies in the region. In Japan, there was even a dramatic drop in the number of women legislators in the most recent election. As Figure 20.2 indicates, in the first postwar election in 1946, the first election in which women were enfranchised and allowed to run for political office, women won 8.4 percent of the seats in the Japanese Diet, the highest percentage for the next 50 years.¹ During almost the entire postwar period in Japan, women were an extreme minority in the Japanese legislature. Women legislators finally began to increase in the mid-1990s only when the ruling party lost its popularity. The peak was 11.3 percent in 2009, and fell back to 7.9 percent at most recent election in 2012, with the return of the old conservative party.

Subnational legislatures in Japan illustrate more diverse trends. An average level of women's descriptive representation in local legislatures has steadily increased over time. Moreover, women fare much better in municipal and town assemblies in large cities. For example, the top two lines in Figure 20.3 represent sharp increases in the number of women legislators in 23 special ward assemblies in Tokyo metropolis, and municipal assemblies in 12 government-decreed cities.² The percentage of women in special ward assemblies in Tokyo metropolis has reached more than 25 percent in




Figure 20.3 Women legislators in local assemblies in Japan (1977–2012, percent)

Source: White Paper on Gender Equality 2013. The Cabinet Office of Japan, Gender Equality Bureau.

recent elections without any particular institutional changes or electoral law revisions.

In sharp contrast, women are poorly represented in lower level local councils and prefectural assemblies outside the cities. The average percentage of women in 746 town and 183 village assemblies is below 9 percent. About 40 percent of those legislatures did not have a single woman legislator in 2012 (The Cabinet Office, 2013, 54). These all-male local legislatures are symbolic of a significant democratic deficit in governance in Japan.

South Korea shows a similar historical trend regarding women's low representation in politics. From the first parliamentary election in 1948 through to the year 2000, women were virtually absent in the national parliament. During this period, regardless of frequent changes in the total number of legislators, women's representation remained at about 2 percent. What differs from the general trend in Japan, however, is a sudden increase in women in legislative bodies when gender quotas were introduced (in the national election in 2000 and new quotas in 2004 (Figure 20.4) and local elections in 2002 (Figure 20.5) respectively).³

In 2000, 16 women legislators entered the national parliament, comprising 5.9 percent. Although the number is still a small minority, it was a




Figure 20.4 Women elected in South Korean parliamentary elections (1948–2012)
 Source: National Election Commission (www.nec.go.kr, accessed 8 November 2013).




Figure 20.5 Women elected in South Korean local elections (1991–2014)
 Source: National Election Commission (www.nec.go.kr, accessed 10 June 2014).

record achievement. Women’s ratio increased again to 13 percent in the subsequent election in 2004 and this trend has continued. While the speed has significantly slowed down and parties do not comply with quota laws fully, it is clear that the introduction of gender quotas brought about these achievements (Shin, 2014).

The impact of gender quotas on women’s representation is more straightforward in local elections. It is noteworthy that half of the women elected in local elections earned their seats through gender quotas in proportional representation (PR), the part of the election system where quotas are mandatory.⁴ Of 113 women elected to prefectural and large city assemblies

in the 2014 local election, 55 women came through PR quotas. This election pattern of women is also true of women's election to lower-level local county assemblies (369 women elected in districts versus 361 via PR quotas). In contrast, men were elected disproportionately in single-member districts. Only 29 of the 671 men were elected through party lists under proportional representation for prefectural and large city assemblies. In summary, gender quota laws proved to be a most effective institutional tool for women who are mostly newcomers to politics, enabling them to break through party gatekeepers and enter all levels of the legislature in South Korea.

A brief review of the state of women's political representation in Japan and South Korea illustrates that in both countries there has been a more dramatic increase in women taking part in lower level local elections (cities in Japan and towns and counties in South Korea) than in national and prefectural elections. Different electoral systems in local elections, political parties' local organizations, and parties' different interests in local assemblies compared to higher level legislatures explain the progress to some extent, but it is also because women themselves view local politics as a political space for grassroots democracy and citizens' direct participation (Eto, 2005). In the next section, I shift attention to the Japanese women who organized their own local party to transform existing power dynamics in city politics.

Alternative women's party strategy in Japan

As Figure 20.3 above demonstrates, since the 1990s in Japan women have made impressive gains in their presence in special ward and municipal assemblies. Various factors contribute to these gains. Women constitute a significant part of independent candidates and candidates of the Japanese Communist party and the *Komei* party at local elections (Oyama and Kunihiro, 2010, 44). Women prefer to run as independents partly because women had difficulties in getting a nomination from major parties, but also because they aim to represent the issues closely related to their family and women's own lives that major political parties have ignored. The Japanese Communist party and the *Komei* party are also exceptional in their recruitment pattern of female candidates in local elections. They have developed extensive local organizational networks in which women are also important participants. The parties recruit women members of their own organization as candidates for local elections.

Also conspicuous, however, is the success of a local women's party, called the *Seikatsusha Nettowa-ku* (literally "Life-makers' network," the *Netto* hereafter).⁵ Members of the *Netto* do not perceive their party specifically as a "women's party" and its initial top leadership was assumed by men.⁶ The *Netto* is run by women members, however, and *Netto* "Dairinins" (deputies) elected to local assemblies are exclusively women. The *Netto* recruits women

candidates to run on its platform,⁷ and carries out the entire election campaign with the labor of women volunteers. In these regards, I argue that the *Netto* should be seen as a women's party, albeit not a feminist party.

Women's parties have drawn very little scholarly attention, yet women in many places have attempted to create political parties in the service of "women's interests." Many women's parties have proved short-lived, with only a few exceptions such as the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition and Women of Russia, which have won national seats (John, 2003; Cowell-Meyers, 2014). Many women's parties are "movement parties" that emerged from a social movement organization to push for particular goals in politics (Cowell-Meyers, 2014). Electoral success per se is not so much the ultimate goal of a movement party. Instead, the goal is to increase pressure on mainstream parties to increase women representation and access to politics.

From this perspective, Japan's *Netto* is exceptional in its duration and purposes. Although it is also a movement party, for nearly 35 years, since its inception, *Netto* has been very successful in having its candidates elected to local assemblies. The party solely targets elections to local assemblies, and does not aspire to be a national party. It is grounded on a distinct political constituency and organizational principles in pursuit of an alternative representation system. Winning seats and obtaining presence in local councils are its essential strategy for making women's voices heard in local governance. I delve into these aspects by revisiting the *Netto* within the framework of a comparative study of women's political parties.

Origin

Women's parties tend to arise in response to political opportunities opened by major political change or conflict. They emerge most readily when there is already an established tradition of separate political organizations for women (John, 2003; Stevens, 2007; Cowell-Meyers, 2014). The Japanese women's local party, the *Netto*, is also based on an existing women's network. In this case, it is a regional co-op organization, the *Seikatsu Kurabu Seikyo* (the Life Club Coop hereafter), whose constituency is overwhelmingly local housewives. The *Netto* was organized as a legally separate political organization from the Life Club Coop in the late 1970s to send deputies of the local coop members directly to municipal councils. This *Dairinin* (deputy) movement was first proposed in 1977 by the organizer of the Life Club Coop, a former Socialist party activist, Kunio Iwane,⁸ and mobilized successfully to elect its first deputy in the 1979 local elections in Tokyo Nerima ward (Amano, 2011). The Life Club Coop provided the social and ideological base for the *Netto's* deputy movement.

The Life Club Coop has a much longer history than the *Netto*.⁹ It began in 1965 as a collective milk purchaser by a group of housewives under Iwane's leadership in Tokyo Setagaya ward. Members belonged to a local unit (*han*)

in their neighborhood. Each *han* placed a collective milk order directly with the producers to secure good quality produce at lower prices by bypassing middlemen. The activities of Life Club Coop attracted many housewives, and it quickly grew to become a very successful coop movement with hundreds of thousands of members. Most activities were carried out by women's voluntary participation in local units, including the coordination of orders and arrangement of deliveries.

At first, this organization constituted a response to the intense industrialization of Japan and housewives' concerns about the harmful effects of industrialization on food safety and the correlate environmental destruction. As participants increased, local units of the Life Club Coop expanded their activities to various fields. Moving beyond the initial practical interests, they aimed at the broader goal of establishing an alternative society based on cooperative local communities. Through participation in various activities, women came to realize the relationship between their activities as consumers and larger social problems, such as environmental destruction. Women became informed about the harmful outcomes of capitalism and industrial development, which were associated with men's work. These views persuaded women of the importance of their wifely roles as careful consumers, and their unique ability to propose and develop an alternative way of life and engagement with nature (Amano, 2011).

As women became sensitized to the importance of these problems, they came to understand how municipal policies influenced the lives of their communities. They submitted formal petitions and appeals to the local administration to change policies about garbage, chemical detergents, and school food programs as extension of the Life Club Coop activities. As they observed their petitions shelved repeatedly by council committees, the Life Club Coop activists were motivated to send their own representatives to the municipal councils (Igarashi and Schreurs, 2012). As noted above, the first representative was elected in Nerima ward in Tokyo in 1979. By 1987, *Netto* had made a widespread impression through "the dazzling debut of 'hordes' of 'ordinary housewife' assembly members" in local elections across the nation (Amano, 2011, 147). The number of representatives of the network sitting in local councils and prefectural legislatures reached 137 nationwide by 2010.¹⁰

Identity

Although the *Netto* is an all-female organization, they adopted a gender-neutral concept of *Seitatsusha* (life-maker) for the party's idealized constituency. It was an extended identity of the Life Club Coop. The Life Club Coop appropriated *Seikatsusha* to define its proactive activities for a new way of living, which should be different from both employed workers and passive consumers in a capitalist society (Amano, 2011). An English translation of life-maker does not capture the full meaning and nuance of *Seikatsusha*, which emphasizes autonomy and self-governance, similar to the

Western concept of citizen, yet does not convey the notion of citizen that is strongly associated with the public sphere and norms of universal citizenship. While the meaning of *Seikatsusha* has changed over time in Japan as well, its consistent emphasis is on locality, integration of domestic and public spheres, and human agency for living by participating in both production and consumption that cannot be separate and isolated from each other (Amano, 2011). “Local” has a specifically important meaning for *Seikatsusha*, for life issues come into existence and the change of life takes place in a locale.¹¹

Owing to a strict gender division of labor within the capitalist economy in Japan, life-makers are virtually all full-time housewives. To be more precise, it is only certain full-time housewives who can afford to be a *Seikatsusha*. Only those housewives whose specific social position is located outside capitalist production can avail themselves of the spare time and free spirit for the cooperative activities that promote alternative living in cities (Iwane, 1993). A survey of the Tokyo *Netto* members in the early 1990s attests that an absolute majority of them were unemployed housewives. Among them, more than 60 percent were from high-income households, with their husband’s annual salary surpassing 8 million yen (comparable to 80,000 US dollars) (Watanabe, 1995). The average education level of *Netto* members was much higher than that of other Japanese women in the same age cohort at the time of the survey.¹²

This identity of gendered *Seikatsusha* is also expressed in their policy priorities. *Netto* members identified garbage problems, environment, and children’s safety issues as the primary concerns of the deputy movement, far ahead of human rights and gender equality issues (Watanabe, 1995, 203). Yet, this gendered identity is precisely why the *Netto* has been so successful as a women’s local party. As LeBlanc dexterously describes, housewives’ care-taking role at home and in the neighborhood forms a pivotal ground for their claims to be able to represent ordinary people’s concerns as “community care-takers.” The *Netto* deputies brought particular women’s concerns to politics, and gradually these issues gained legitimacy and became worthy of policy attention. Through these activities, women with interests primarily in food safety and family transform themselves from family-oriented housewives to fellow-oriented life-makers, and finally to community-oriented citizens (or women citizens) (Ogai, 2005, 146–150).

This incorporation of community activism into the extended housewife role, and the growth of organizations as a result of this form of women’s participation, however, reflect the potential limit of women’s activism within the framework of culturally ascribed gender roles (LeBlanc, 1999).

Alternative representation system

Because the *Netto* deputy movement started as a critique of the conventional representation system and the non-responsiveness of interest-driven politics to women’s concerns, one important goal of the *Netto* was to propose

an alternative representation system and develop a party organization to realize that goal. The *Netto* members perceived current Japanese politics as interest-driven politics in service of professional politicians who marginalized citizens' voices. The distance between citizens and their representatives diverged so greatly in the conventional representation system that politics was no longer capable of taking ordinary citizens' life issues into account or providing meaningful accountability to ordinary citizens.

In contrast, the *Netto* is based on the idea that politics is a life-tool with which citizens protect their lives and flourish. To reclaim politics as a citizens' space, which fosters their political expression, the *Netto* proposed a strictly straightforward relationship between citizens and their representatives through which representatives provide a direct channel for citizens' voices to be delivered in the legislature. This idea of direct representation, which enables the will of the constituency to direct and circumscribe representatives' behavior, inspired the *Netto* to name its representatives *Dairinin* (deputy or delegate) instead of the more conventional term *Giin* (legislator, member of assembly). *Dairinins* are not only direct speakers for their constituencies, but the activities of *Dairinins* at local councils are meant to be part of a larger *Seikatsusha* movement for a change of living in local communities.

To fulfill this alternative representation norm in praxis, the *Netto* introduced three unique organizational structures: (1) rotation and term limitation of deputies, (2) "donation" of deputies' salary to the organization, and (3) election campaigns staffed fully through volunteerism.¹³ Rotation in office enforced by mandatory term limits is a unique characteristic of the *Netto*, adopted to "avoid over-privilege" of deputies (Tokyo *Seikatsusha* Network HP). According to this rule, all deputies are expected to quit elected office after serving two to three terms (eight or 12 years) in local councils. Former deputies return to their communities where they utilize their experiences to assist other citizens. The *Netto* then fields other candidates in the elections as their replacements.

Donation of deputies' remuneration is another defining character of the interdependent relationship between the *Netto* and deputies. Deputies are obliged to donate a significant portion of their remuneration, if not all, to the *Netto*. These donations are an important part of the *Netto's* revenue to fund everyday activities. *Netto* in turn takes full responsibility for the deputies' campaign financing and staff. The logic behind this is that the *Netto* and its deputies remain accountable to its constituency by disclosing the flow of money.

Finally, the *Netto* values volunteerism and participation as a process of becoming a *Seikatsusha*. Voluntary participation in activities beyond self-interests is seen necessary because it can transform citizens from passive recipients of services to proactive agents for change. Amano summarizes these characteristics of the *Netto* deputy movement as "a practical

application of participatory politics by women who hitherto had been said to ‘go no further than voting’” (2011, 147).

This very emphasis on ordinary people’s voluntary “amateur politics” also creates dilemmas, however. The *Netto* faces challenges as to how the movement can “avoid creating ‘professional’ politicians without sacrificing its most experienced activists, and balance the advantages of its ‘regular housewife,’ volunteer image with the need for devoted activists with the freedom and desire to make movement objectives a priority” (LeBlanc, 1999, 161). Moreover, the *Netto*’s policy appeal to its main constituency has gradually eroded, partly because women’s economic independence is valued more than women’s role as life-maker and other new parties added life issues to their platforms, making it difficult for the *Netto* to differentiate itself from other major and local parties.

Many regional *Nettos* have been pressed to reconsider the *Dairinin* representation system. They are also conscious of critiques which suggest that its agenda and praxis limit the potential to move beyond the boundary of an overwhelmingly “housewife party.” While most regional *Nettos* still retain the original representation rules, including rotation and term-limitation, the *Dairinin* movement has been debating how to reach out to citizens beyond the confines of its traditional constituency. Such efforts risk diluting the party’s identity and losing support from its traditional constituency. The *Netto* also faces increased competition from other local political organizations that run on similar life issues platform. Whether or not the *Netto* can successfully expand to a larger female citizens’ party still seems to be an open question.

Quota law strategy in South Korea

As in Japan, the number of women has increased significantly in local legislatures in South Korea. Yet the reason for the improvement is quite different. Since local parties are not allowed in South Korea, a women’s local party was not an option. Nor did large-scale separate women’s organizations exist in South Korea that could constitute the social base for a local party. Instead, the South Korean women’s movement advocated for electoral reforms and pushed for quota legislation, a “fast-track” strategy, to improve women’s political representation. Women’s movement organizations, both conservative and progressive grassroots groups, outside political parties formed a wide ranging non-partisan solidarity network to maximize their voices and overcome parties’ resistance against gender quotas. They argued that more women in the legislature would help democratize old corrupt politics, and that gender quota legislation was the best and the only way to accomplish that goal. This section examines the role of women’s groups in introducing gender quotas, and the achievements and limitations of the quota strategy.

Context leading up to quota legislation

Gender and politics scholars have demonstrated a pivotal role for women's movements in improving women's political representation and electoral reform (Bauer and Britton, 2006; Krook, 2009; Celis, Krook, and Meier, 2011; Dahlerup and Leyenaar, 2013). South Korea is no exception. The revival of local elections in 1991 after a long military authoritarian rule, and the Beijing Conference in 1995, inspired women's groups to attend to the issues of grassroots democracy and women's political empowerment (Yi, 1998; Yoon, 2002). Like Japanese women, South Korean women's groups viewed local politics as a political space for grassroots democracy and self-governance.

In the early 1990s, they attempted various strategies to improve women's political participation in local politics. Women's groups offered classes for citizenship education for women voters, recruited and trained potential women aspirants in the run up to the local elections, educated campaign volunteers in support of new women candidates, and also monitored parties' recruitment process (Korean Women's Organizations United 1998). Women's grassroots organizations had great hope for local self-government and thus actively participated in local elections. They supported "citizen candidates" to be elected to local government in collaboration with other grassroots organizations in many regions. Citizens' organizations expected the local legislature to be autonomous from old corrupt politics in national government. They fielded their own candidates in the name of "citizen candidates," who were distinct from the candidates of political parties. Women's grassroots organizations also participated in that movement, and those candidates stood for election as independents.

Despite these efforts, however, lack of resources and local organization resulted in the sweeping marginalization of women candidates, who ran for elections as independents. Most independents failed to enter the local legislature in the first election in 1991. Voters preferred to cast ballots for candidates of established political parties since most independents were new to voters. As a consequence, local legislatures were filled with heads of regional party offices and local power bosses, most of whom were male. As a consequence, the percentage of women in local councils remained extremely low, even below 2 percent. In those circumstances, women's groups could hardly expect the workings of grassroots democracy to increase women's political representation.

This disappointing experience motivated women's organizations outside established political parties to reconsider their exclusive reliance on direct participation in local elections. Instead, they turned to political parties to recruit and train more women candidates to run on party platforms. In 1994, a year before the second nationwide local election, a wide range of women's organizations came together to form an ad hoc solidarity network – the first of its kind formed between the two leading women's organizations from

both the conservative and progressive wings (Yi, 1998). The solidarity network demanded that parties implement voluntary party quotas to recruit women newcomers as candidates.

Although parties paid lip-service to women's demands in each election, they continued to be passive in recruiting and fielding women candidates. Parties promised internal gender quotas during election campaigns, but failed to enforce their own quota rules in the final stage of candidate selection. Even though parties of the left were relatively more favorable to the recruitment and fielding of women candidates to run on their platforms, women candidates were ranked low on the party lists or were fielded in less winnable districts. Women's groups were convinced that parties proved to be gatekeepers against women's aspiration to enter the legislature. These repetitive failures emboldened women's groups to beef up their mobilization for mandatory measures, which would directly constrain parties' recruitment behavior. Gender quota legislation was deemed to present that possibility.

Gender quotas as the greatest common denominator among women's groups

For the past 20 years, women's movement organizations have been united to form several solidarity networks in pushing for adoption and strengthening of gender quotas to improve women's legislative representation. As I illustrated above, women's groups have focused on quota legislation partly because they believed that the expansion of quotas was the most effective way to break male dominance, or "homosocial" bonds, in party politics and increase the number of women in elected office.

But quotas were also attractive because a commitment to improving descriptive representation of women was the greatest common denominator of various women's organizations from across the wide ideological spectrum that came together to create a concerted "women's voice." In other words, participants in the solidarity network set aside potentially controversial issues, such as which women could represent "women's interests," that is, questions about substantive representation of women, and what kind of relationship was desirable between the women's movement and the women elected to office with their support. In South Korea, women's groups suppressed the diversity among them to mobilize for the immediate goal of quota legislation. In this regard, gender quotas provided a new movement repertoire to bring various women's groups together to mobilize for women's political empowerment, at least in the early stages of the movement.

Since the level of women's representation was hopelessly low, parties were not in a good position to make persuasive rebuttals against women's demands for gender quota legislation. Nonetheless, they opposed quota adoption by arguing that quotas would violate the freedom of party's candidate selection, that parties would not be able to find enough qualified

women willing to run for election, and that women were not capable enough to win seats in single-member districts.¹⁴

A series of electoral reforms in the early 2000s, pushed by the Constitutional Court's decision on election law,¹⁵ opened up a new opportunity in favor of quota laws. In the course of debates for electoral reform, the women's movement brought wide public attention to the blatantly low level of women's representation in elected offices. Civil society groups were also favorable to the introduction of quota laws. Against a backdrop of this favorable public support, women's groups were able to persuade parties that bringing more women into politics was an indispensable part of political reform, and that women would contribute to improving the quality of democracy by replacing old and corrupt male politicians. Reluctant as the parties were, they included gender quota clauses in the 2002 election laws' revision.

According to the new provisions, parties were required to recruit women as 50 percent of the candidates on party lists for proportional representation seats and 30 percent of the candidates in single-member districts in local elections. The law also stipulated strict placement mandates, adopting a "zipper list" style which alternated women's and men's names on the candidate lists. Strong sanctions were added for non-compliance with quota regulation in the case of party lists. It was unfortunate, however, that the law stopped short of creating any enforcement measures for quotas that applied to candidates in single-member districts, where the absolute majority of the seats are elected.

Table 20.1 summarizes an overview of legal mandates for and institutional compliance with gender quotas in local elections. Quotas adopted for local elections later expanded to national elections in the reforms in 2004.¹⁶ As Figures 20.4 and 20.5 (above) demonstrate, quotas brought about an immediate increase in the number of women at all levels of legislature in South Korea. The lowest local councils witnessed the most dramatic increase, while the increase is more moderate in national and prefectural legislatures.

Women's groups have formed several more solidarity networks whenever there has been a new opportunity for further electoral reform. Since legal reform requires wide support of the majority of members of parliament drawn from parties of the right and the left, women's solidarity networks have adopted a non-partisan strategy. This non-partisan stance facilitates the collaboration of various women's groups that have been influential in both the ruling and the opposition parties. The power of the solidarity network culminated in 2003 when the network grew to include as many as 321 organizations. They actively participated in civil society's mobilization of political reform and argued for increased women's representation in the name of "all women." The solidarity networks contributed to the strengthening of gender quotas throughout the 2000s. The most recent solidarity network was formed to push for "parity" candidacy (50-50 for each gender)

Table 20.1 The institutional landscape of candidate gender quota legislation and party compliance in local elections

Election related law revisions	Electoral candidate quotas for women	Quota compliance
Law on Political Parties (2000, 2002)	50 percent and more of PR lists	50 percent and more of PR lists
Law on the Election of Public Officials (2002, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2009, 2010)	Placement mandate (“zipper” list with woman on odd numbers)	High
Law on Political Funds (2002, 2004, 2005, 2006)	Strong sanctions for non-compliance	Very low
	30 percent of SMD candidates	30 percent of SMD candidates
	Financial incentives for quota fulfillment	High
	At least one woman candidate must be fielded for any subnational electoral districts per each district of the national parliamentary election	Very low

Source: National Election Commission.

in the 2010 local elections. Throughout this period, the goal was to achieve more visible increase of women in the legislative bodies through repetitive institutional reforms.

The limits of descriptive representation

There is no doubt that without women's groups' concerted efforts, gender quota laws would never have been adopted. The very nature of non-partisan strategies to enhance the descriptive representation of women through institutional reform constrained other aspects of women's political representation, however. As in most countries, women's groups see quotas as a temporary measure that is necessary in the early stage of mobilization to enhance women's political representation, assuming that more focus should be placed on substantive representation of women's interests later.

The notable success of the solidarity network for the 2004 national election, ironically, exposed the tensions between descriptive and substantive representation. Women legislators elected through gender quotas with support of the solidarity network blindly followed their party line on the controversial policy issues over which parties were sharply divided (Cho, 2005). Feminist organizations criticized these women for being anti-reform and anti-women. At the same time that women legislators representing specific parties wished to get continuous support from women's organizations after they were elected, particularly when they were running in subsequent elections, women's groups have sought to preserve their stance as politically neutral and non-partisan. Women's groups believe that they should remain "outside politics" in order to retain their critical and autonomous standpoints. The legacy of feminist organizations' antagonistic relations with the state during the military regime kept them cautious about collaborating with the state authority even after democratization.

As South Korean parties are fiercely antagonistic and competitive, the non-partisan strategies place an increasing burden on both conservative and feminist organizations. From the perspective of a long-term goal of women's political empowerment and inclusive democracy, quotas are definitely insufficient. In the ten years since the adoption of gender quotas, women came to comprise 15–25 percent of the legislatures in South Korea. They have not reached the level of critical mass, let alone parity in politics.

There remains a considerable gulf between the current level of women's demographic representation and the long-term goal of women's equal political representation, which eradicates male dominance and improves substantive representation of women and minorities in politics. In confronting this gulf, women's groups face difficult decisions about whether they should continue to push for increases in the number of women in politics without questioning the political credo of particular women candidates, or whether they should shift toward women's substantive representation beyond numbers.

Conclusion

Women's underrepresentation in elective offices embodies the democratic deficit, concentrating political power in men's hands and perpetuating the marginalization of women's voices. Mainstream political scientists have long been silent about this profound problem of democratic deficit (see Moisés, Chapter 14 in this volume). Women's underrepresentation in politics and the decision-making process has often been attributed to women's own choice to stay outside formal politics or their lack of qualifications for public roles. However, laws and religions have often banned women's political participation outright. Various informal and cultural pressures have also kept women within the confines of particular gender roles (see Hawkesworth, Chapter 13 in this volume).

Despite those ample examples of straightforward as well as informal forms of marginalization of women from political power, liberal democracy has assumed that women and minorities will catch up with the powerful group as they gain better education and more resources. Yet, as Iris Young criticizes, the actual outcome of liberal democracy based on the principle of such universal citizenship created "the paradox of democracy" by which social power makes some citizens more equal than others, and equality of citizenship makes some people more powerful citizens" (Young, 1998, 410, See also Young, 1990, 2000). She argues that in actual social life, an individual of less powerful social groups is perceived as a member of that social group, and that marked group membership justifies the marginalization of the individual of particular social groups. It is only certain individuals (usually mainstream men) who can claim individual freedom, free of their own group.

History demonstrates that the catch-up of less powerful social groups has hardly occurred without women and minority groups' own mobilization for justice and equality. This chapter examined two examples of such mobilization by women for the improvement of their political representation that have been advanced in Japan and South Korea. Two cases examined here confirm that it is always the marginalized groups themselves that rise to demand redress for their marginalization from political power. Japan and South Korea are two leading economies in East Asia where despite women gaining tremendously in their social and educational status, their presence in politics has been meager. Women have cast doubt on this gulf and politicized their underrepresentation in politics.

In order to gain equal representation, women drew on the idea of group representation and demanded the institutional mechanisms to make their voice heard in politics. Even though these two cases demonstrate the difficulty of representation of all women as a single group, women's socially ascribed gender roles provide an important resource with which to form a political movement based on distinct women's interests at a particular

historical moment. The lack of formal institutional mechanisms to include women in mainstream political parties in Japan led some women to form their own local movement party, but the women's local party provided in turn an important institutional channel for politicization of women's interests and the political participation of "ordinary" housewives. Again, Young suggests that the solution to the paradox of democracy

lies at least in part in providing institutionalized means for the explicit recognition and representation of oppressed groups . . . a democratic public, however that is constituted, should provide mechanisms for the effective representation and recognition of the distinct voices and perspectives of those of its constituent groups that are oppressed or disadvantaged within it.

(Young, 1998, 413)

South Korean women employ this idea in praxis by pushing for institutional reforms and the adoption of gender quotas.

The institutional mechanisms and public resources for oppressed group representation would support at least three activities, Young proposes:

(1) self-organization of group members so that they gain a sense of collective empowerment and a reflective understanding of their collective experience and interests in the context of society; (2) voicing a group's analysis of how social policy proposals affect them, and generating policy proposals themselves, in institutionalized contexts where decision-makers are obliged to show that they have taken these perspectives into consideration; (3) having veto power regarding specific policies that affect a group directly, for example, reproductive rights for women, or use of reservation lands for Native Americans.

(Young, 1998, 413)

To this extent, what is crucial is specific representation of such groups in decision-making procedures from which their voices have been excluded or are likely to remain unheard. Women's political mobilizations, at least up to this time in democratic history, seem to support Young's claim that "group representation is the best means to promote just outcomes to democratic decision-making processes" by having all groups participate and express their needs and interests.

Notes

1. The Japanese Diet passed legislation barring women from participation in political activities, including attending public campaigning speeches and political party membership, in 1890. The prevention was lifted in 1922 by women's mobilization for suffrage. It was only in 1945, however, when women obtained

equal rights for full suffrage. Men of 25 years and older were granted suffrage in 1925.

2. Tokyo metropolis consists of 23 special wards, 26 cities, four towns, and two wards. Each has an elected council.
3. A women's quota was introduced for the first time in the 2000 revision of the Political Party Law. However, this law had no legal enforcement measures and left the implementation of 30 percent candidate quota to parties. It did not have much impact, but still brought about an increase in women elected to the legislature.
4. Both Japan and South Korea implement a mixed electoral system. Legislators for national assembly (South Korea) and lower house (Japan) are elected either through party lists or single-member constituencies. As for local elections, Japan has SNTV multimember district system for town and village councils, while South Korea implements a mixed electoral system similar to national elections. In South Korea, a large majority of the members in each legislature are elected from single-member districts (90 percent of total members) and only two to five representatives are elected from party lists for each local legislature. Since the quota law stipulates that the odd numbers of party lists are given to women candidates, women are much more likely to be elected because of their placement at the top of each party list. Women's representation has increased more rapidly in county and town assemblies where PR magnitude is even smaller and thus only one or two candidates from each party list can be elected (Shin and Yoon, 2013).
5. For the origin and its historical change of the concept of *Seikatsusha*, see Amano (1995:2011).
6. *Netto's* male leadership has been one of the major critiques against it. It has been criticized as "gender division of politics" (Ogai, 2005, 145; Gelb and Estevez-Abe, 1998).
7. *Netto* does not exclude male candidates. Male candidates have been recruited to run on the *Netto* platform in one of the special wards in Tokyo metropolis and in Chiba prefecture. As of 2014, there is one male *dairinin*. However, in most cases, women are recruited and elected because there is a larger pool of capable women candidates in the region (Interview with Ogai 06/20/2014).
8. Kunio Iwane organized the Life Club Coop in Setagaya ward in Tokyo in 1965. Later in the 1970s, he ran for the election of ward council himself, but failed to be elected. He then changed his strategy and organized a local political organization that fielded women candidates in the election. It developed into the *Netto* in its current form.
9. For excellent studies on the *Seikatsu Kurabu Seikyo* (Life Club Coop), see Sato et al (1995), Amano (2011), and LeBlanc (1999) among many others.
10. <http://www.local-party.net/>.
11. This emphasis on 'local' political space later became a point of disagreement within the movement as the *Netto* grew ambitious. Some of the incumbents gained an endorsement from other political parties to challenge the National Diet.
12. 63.3 percent of the respondents had higher than high school education. This is about twice than the number of women with the same education level in the same age cohort.
13. <http://www.seikatsusha.me/publishing/publishing-past/> (accessed 2014/05/11).
14. Author interview with a former female legislator elected to the 18th national legislature (May 2012, Seoul).

15. The Constitutional Court ruled unconstitutional the election law by which PR seats are distributed in proportion to the seats that parties won in single-member districts.
16. For the impacts of quota laws in national elections, see Shin (2014).

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Conclusion

Renata Siemieńska

Discussions about women's rights and political participation have been a recurrent theme since the late 18th century. Since the mid-1970s, these discussions have become international in scope. Beginning with the UN World Conference on Women in 1975 and reinforced with the adoption of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1979, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action in 1995, and the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals in 2000, gender equality has been central to the global political agenda. Efforts to discern the barriers to women's political participation, identify strategies to promote gender equality, and assess the outcomes of women's presence in positions of power have been undertaken by anthropologists, development specialists, economists, sociologists, political scientists, and women's studies scholars. *Gender and Power: Towards Equality and Democratic Governance* examines these complex issues in a multidisciplinary, global, and comparative context.

Feminist scholars have been exploring the "democratic deficit" within and across nations for several decades. Most of these works focus on one nation (e.g. Alvarez, 1991; Duerst Lahti and Kelly, 1995; Camissa and Reingold, 2004), comparison of a few "women-friendly" nations (Chappell, 2002), examination of particular regions (Lovenduski, 1986, 2005; Jaquette and Wolchik, 1998; Craske and Molyneux, 2001; Goetz and Hassim, 2003), or particular kinds of states (Gal and Kligman, 2000; Hausman et al., 2010; Dahlerup and Leyenaar, 2013). Some works theorize issues related to gender and democracy (Pateman, 1988; Young, 1990, 2000; Phillips, 1995;

The concluding thoughts for this volume grew out of daily discussions among all contributors during a ten-day conference at San Servolo in August 2014. I am grateful to the participants for their thoughtfulness in assessing this volume. I hope that I have faithfully preserved the complexity of the discussions and the range of differences articulated.

Benhabib, 1996; Dahlerup, 2009); others generate empirical data concerning levels of women's participation in democratic and democratizing nations (Davis, 1997; Lovenduski and Kazzam, 2002; Inglehart and Norris, 2003). Some works link political economy to gender and democratization (Sassen, 1998; Wichterich, 2000; Kelly et al., 2001); and some explore the effects of particular kinds of political transition to gendered outcomes (Waylen, 2007). All these works have been published either as single-authored texts or as collections of essays by scholars within one discipline, political science.

In contrast to the works of feminist political scientists, *Gender and Power: Towards Equality and Democratic Governance* brings together perspectives from multiple disciplines (anthropology, biology, economics, history, linguistics, neuroscience, psychoanalysis, sociology, and political science) and from diverse regions of the world (Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the USA). The thoughtful essays in this collection explore the causes of persistent gender inequalities, the complex demands of social change at the individual, familial, social movement, and institutional levels, the implications for the meaning of democracy in the 21st century, and strategies for social transformation to attain gender justice.

Benefits of an interdisciplinary approach

Both gender and power are topics of contestation across multiple disciplines. This book creates a conversation about gender and power among practitioners of different disciplines in order to explore multiple dimensions of these contested concepts. Each of the chapters was created specifically for this volume and was refined on the basis of in-depth critiques offered by other participants in the conversation. Each chapter provides insights into aspects of gender power, and into resistances against and mobilizations to counteract that power drawn from particular geographical, historical, and methodological locations. The authors do not agree on many points with respect to the causes of gender inequalities or the appropriate remedies to male domination; but they all agree that justice requires that male domination in public and private domains comes to an end. Precisely because contributors disagree on key points, the volume offers fascinating insights into the influence of theoretical frameworks and disciplinary methods of analysis upon understandings of one of the most pressing issues of the contemporary period. Reading the chapters against each other not only enables a confrontation of ideas, but also reveals the profound effects of different levels of analysis (individual, familial, institutional, and systemic), different methodological approaches, and different intellectual disciplines on substantive arguments. Given the pervasiveness of the problem of gender inequality, the authors suggest that its elimination requires changes within the individual psyche, family relations, interpersonal dynamics,

institutional operating procedures, cultural beliefs, public sentiments, as well as in laws, conventions, economic relations, and academic disciplines.

Problems of gender equality in modern democracies

In the current era of neoliberal globalization, democratic values face particular challenges. An exclusive focus on liberal conceptions of individual rights has eclipsed concerns about communal flourishing. As inequalities have grown exponentially within and across nations, self-interest is celebrated and naturalized. Privatization, profit-making, and the pursuit of individual advantage have displaced notions of equitable distribution, collective well-being, and social justice. Under these circumstances, particular interventions are essential to enable democratic values to take root.

Democracy must be understood both as a work in progress and as a complex political phenomenon that includes principles, practices, procedures, and outcomes. Institutions must be carefully constructed to foster participation, equitable representation, rule of law, full implementation of the equal rights of all citizens, inclusive mechanisms to involve all strata of the citizenry in decision-making processes, and systems of accountability that enable the people to control what governments do in their name. Moreover, no existing political system fully realizes the promise of democracy. Democratization is an ongoing process that has attitudinal, behavioral, conventional, and institutional dimensions. As a political regime based on principles of freedom and equality, democracy must be permanently open to transformation designed to achieve new dimensions of individual realization and communal well-being. Social, economic, political, and technological changes pose new challenges that require innovation in democratic governance to foster and preserve equitable outcomes. To fulfill the promise of democracy, political reforms must be introduced in existing democracies to guarantee equal representation of women and other marginalized social segments, and to democratize parliaments, judiciaries, and political parties. Democratization of political parties requires changes in electoral laws to establish the right of partisans and interested electors to take part in decisions about candidates, constituency boundaries, and party programs. In addition to changes in the formal procedures and practices of governance, democratization requires the transformation of political culture, informal practices, and individual attitudes. Innovative education is particularly important to foster respect for the democratic rights of citizenship and the political inclusion of women and marginalized groups. Systemic interventions are needed to ensure that democratic values of diversity, empathy, inclusion, solidarity, and mutual respect shape all dimensions of social and political life.

Many nations acknowledge the centrality of gender equality to democracy. Equal treatment of men and women has been adopted as a fundamental principle of the European Union and has been enshrined in the

constitutions of many nations around the globe. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, signed in Nice in December 2000, recognizes equality between men and women as a fundamental principle (Article 23). The European Union pursues a dual approach to the achievement of this objective, based on gender mainstreaming and specific measures. The key objective is to eliminate inequalities and promote gender equality throughout the European Community in accordance with Articles 2 and 3 of the EC Treaty (gender mainstreaming) as well as Article 141 (equality between women and men in matters of employment and occupation) and Article 13 (sex discrimination within and outside the work place). According to EU documents,

Gender mainstreaming is the integration of a gender perspective into every stage of policy processes—design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation—with a view to promoting equality between women and men. It means assessing how policies impact the life and position of both women and men – and taking responsibility to re-address them if necessary. This is the way to make gender equality a concrete reality in the lives of women and men creating space for everyone within the organizations as well as in communities – to contribute to the process of articulating a shared vision of sustainable human development and translating it into reality.

(http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/gender_equality/gender_mainstreaming)

The European Commission identified 14 key policy areas where the policy of gender mainstreaming should take place. These are: employment and labor market, gender pay gap, gender balance in decision-making, reconciliation between work and private life, social inclusion and social protection, structural funds, migrant women, men's role in promoting gender equality, education and training, women and science, gender budgeting, development cooperation, gender equality at international level, gender-based violence, and trafficking in women. Although gender mainstreaming has been adopted as public policy in many nations, it has yet to produce the egalitarian outcomes it promises (Hawkesworth, 2012, Chapter 7).

Within and across chapters of this book, authors formulate various recommendations for public and private life that can help nations to achieve the goals of gender mainstreaming and move toward a just democratic future. One shared aspect of these recommendations is to eliminate the persistent unequal treatment of women and men of particular races, classes, ethnicities, religions, and nationalities. Toward that end, several key themes include transformation of the terms of public debate, changes in family dynamics and child-rearing practices to foster democratic citizenship, eliminating violence against women, and increasing women's participation in decision-making and governance at all levels.

Transforming the terms of public debate

Over the past four decades, neoliberalism has gained ascendancy around the globe. Incorporated in structural adjustment mechanisms imposed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and adopted by national governments as essential austerity measures, neoliberalism hails individual responsibility and rational economic maximizing as fundamental public and private values. Yet the image of *homo oeconomicus* that underlies this approach depends on a fictive account of human relations drawn from elite men's experiences that privilege "autonomy," while masking human vulnerability and the intensive labor of women in "care work" and social reproduction that is required to sustain life. To disrupt the hegemony of male norms and call attention to the heretofore invisible emotional and subsistence labor of women, the pursuit of self-interest must be denaturalized and campaigns must be launched to emphasize the centrality of interdependence, collaboration, solidarity, and mutuality in everyday life.

Liberal and neoliberal values also entrench a rigid distinction between public and private spheres that masks the role of the state in producing and sustaining "private life." As Carole Pateman stresses, however,

The popularity of the slogan [*'The personal is political'*] and its strength for feminists arises from the complexity of women's positioning in contemporary liberal patriarchal societies. The private or personal and the public or political are held to be separate from and irrelevant to each other; women's everyday experience confirms this separation yet, simultaneously, it denies and it affirms the integral connection between the two spheres... The sphere of domestic life is at the heart of civil society rather than apart or separate from it. A widespread conviction that this is so is revealed by contemporary concern about the crisis, the decline, the disintegration of the nuclear family that is seen as the bulwark of civilized moral life. That the family is a major 'Social problem' is significant for the 'social' is a category that belongs in civil society.

(Pateman, 1983 cited in Phillips, 1987, 117, 119)

Transforming public understandings of the mutual constitution of the public and the private would open new possibilities for creative strategies to foster gender equality and inclusive democratic practices.

Strategies to foster democratic citizenship

In celebrating autonomy, neoliberalism – like its liberal forbears – ignores vital processes of birthing and caring for newborns, as well as the constant demands of social reproduction. In championing selfishness and the pursuit of self-interest, the liberal tradition omits a critical universal truth: no

human can survive alone. Absent nurturance *in utero* and provision of sustenance from the moment of birth, individual life would cease. Yet provision of food is not enough to foster democratic values. Children imbibe far more than nutrients from their parents. As the reproduction of patriarchy over millennia makes clear, special efforts are needed in dealing with childcare and the education of young generations in order to develop empathetic citizens who are committed to equitable gender relations. To produce adults who are capable of mutual respect and reciprocity essential to egalitarian interactions, early relations with the caregiver must foster strong bonds between infant and parents. Educational programs for parents based on the findings of recent neuropsychological studies should be offered free of charge in schools and community centers for all expecting parents. Public programs aimed at helping adults work on traumatic experiences in their childhood should be offered free of charge in group settings. Children with insufficient social skills should not be pathologized, but instead, offered additional hours of counseling and free imaginative play to enable them to develop social skills at their own pace.

Strategies to eliminate violence against women

Violence against women is a major social issue within dating relationships, family dynamics, work spaces, and in organized conflict. Interventions are needed to eradicate violence against women at each of these levels (Breines et al., 2000; Strickland, R. and N. Duvvury, 2003). Schools should develop programs to teach children that violence is not acceptable. Local governments and civil society organizations should provide support for public services that deal with violence against women, such as helplines, shelters, and counseling services for survivors of violence. In addition to providing services for those who have experienced violence, preventive measures are also critical. Women's self-help and self-defense groups designed to foster skills to repel an attacker and men's awareness groups that emphasize that men have the power to stop physical and sexual violence are equally important. Programs designed to foster community responsibility, encouraging bystanders to intervene to prevent violence on the street and in the home, are also important. On all levels (local, national, European, and transnational), strategies are needed to end the media's glorification of violence. National and transnational efforts, such as those fostered in UN and transnational feminist networks, to build women's solidarity against domestic violence can be particularly effective in publicizing and politicizing violence against women. Also crucial is full implementation of the Istanbul Convention of the Council of Europe of 2011, which provides legally binding standards to improve the prevention of violence, protection of victims, and prosecution of perpetrators through an integrated set of policies. Long-term efforts to foster values of equal respect and recognition and

the cultivation of anti-racist, anti-sexist educational programs will help foster egalitarian attitudes and nonviolent behavior as a foundation for future relations among women and men.

Strategies to improve women's political representation

As half the population, women differ from one another in every conceivable way – just as men do. Although some women are committed to feminist objectives, many are not. Where some women embrace egalitarian values, others endorse “complementarity” or “difference” as central to their visions of a just order. Yet quite independent of particular beliefs and approaches, the principle of equal citizenship requires equitable representation of women and men in decision-making in public and private sectors. The concept of group representation is an important tool for marginalized groups to obtain a political voice in public life and in institutions of governance (Young, 1990; Phillips, 1995). Institutional mechanisms to support women's inclusion have taken various forms in specific cultural and national contexts, ranging from affirmative action and positive discrimination to special leadership training programs, from reserved seats in legislative bodies to voluntary, statutory, and constitutional quotas for candidate lists for public office (Matland, 2005; Norris and Krook, 2011). Because political parties are a prime example of gendered institutions acting in manifold ways to exclude women from positions of power, special interventions into political parties' behavior with regard to the recruitment and training of women candidates is also needed. Moreover, innovative leadership programs should be created to train a new generation of leaders who will champion democratic values and who will be prepared for the long struggle of social transformation.

Women's organizations working locally, nationally, and internationally should play a critical role in enabling social change and an important role in creating new forms of knowledge and power. By coming together to create new social networks and new social relationships, women grounded in their own contexts with intimate knowledge of their own problems can build bridges between one another and create the conditions for new transformative forms of knowledge, consciousness, identity, and power. Their activities can not only generate but also bring support for new ideas and new relationships, often enabling these ideas to gain traction and create positive transformative change. Women's organizing should be encouraged with monetary and political support to build strong civil society networks that can facilitate progressive psychological, symbolic, and substantive changes for women.

Popular mobilization is essential to contest the power of money in electoral politics and to press governments to limit the power of the affluent to shape election results. In the context of violent political conflicts, it is imperative to develop international mechanisms to stop organized deployment of

force to achieve political objectives. Diplomatic initiatives, economic sanctions, and prohibition of the sale of weapons are important means to stop governments from killing their own citizens or oppressing those they deem enemies of the state.

In sum, the chapters in this volume offer multiple perspectives on the pervasiveness of inequality in the contemporary world, its complex causes, and strategies to move toward a just democratic future. Many of the recommendations for social transformation may seem at great remove from the entrenched systems of power that characterize life in the 21st century. Yet the historical record demonstrates that a revolutionary transformation of values is possible. In the past four decades, the Cold War has ended, and authoritarian rule and military dictatorships have been overthrown and replaced by far more participatory and egalitarian politics in many other nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Individualism has taken root over the past two centuries in many parts of the world, yet it coexists with caregiving, interdependence, and solidarity. Cultures that prize empathy, solidarity, and mutual respect, and economies that work to meet human needs are completely conceivable – not only in the centuries ahead but in the present. Indeed, those values lie at the heart of many existing social movements. To fulfill the promise of inclusive democracy, it is not necessary to invent something altogether new, but to struggle against elites that structure systems of governance in their own interests rather than in the interests of the vast majority of the human population.

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Name Index

Note: Locators with an 'n' denote note numbers.

- Acker, Joan, 106, 217
Ackerly, Brooke, 309n2
Addis, Elisabetta, 121, 124, 131, 133
Adler, Nancy J., 104, 111
Adorno, Theodor, 183n3, 256, 338
Akharbach, Latifa, 36
Ales Bello, Angela, 178
Altman, Yochanan, 105, 109
Alvarez, Sonia, 304–5, 309n3, 366
Amani, Elahe, 216
Amano, Masako, 351–4, 363n5, 363n9
Amin, Galal, 42
Anati, Emmanuel, 158
Anderson, Bonnie, 220
Anglin, Mary K., 326
Annis, Barbara, 103
Apps, Patricia S., 124
Apter Klinghoffer, Judith, 218
Archibugi, Daniele, 255
Arfaoui, Khedija, 47
Ariotti, Maria, 173
Aristotle, 184n15, 235, 237
Artoni, Roberto, 128
Ascoli, Ugo, 260
Attali, Jacques, 207–8
Ayala, Francisco, 167n15
- Babcock, Linda, 108
Bacchi, Carol Lee, 100
Bachofen, Johann Jacob, 196
Ballington, Julie, 301
Barr, Nicholas A., 128
Bauer, Gretchen, 301, 356
Baxter, Janeen, 109
Bayat, Asef, 46
Bayes, Jane H., 271, 293, 296
Belleau, Marie Claire, 36
Benhabib, Seyla, 367
Bergmann, Barbara, 124
Berelson, Bernard, 216
Biroli, Flávia, 12
Blackburn, Susan, 219
- Blackwell, Maylei, 309n3
Blake-Beard, Stacy D., 110
Blau, Peter Michael, 285
Blumberg, RaeLesser, 105, 106
Bobbio, Norberto, 235, 237, 242
Bock, Gisela, 218
Bohn, Simone, 22
Boserup, Ester, 67
Boulding, Kenneth, 124
Bourdieu, Pierre, 100, 131
Bowlby, John, 332
Bowles, Samuel, 131
Bradley, Karen, 184n12
Branisa, Boris, 103
Breines, Ingeborg, 371
Brezzi, Francesca, 178
Brisch, Karl Heinz 332, 339
Britton, Hannah Evelyn, 301, 356
Burns, Nancy, 216
Buskens, Léon, 279, 290n11
Butler, Judith, 131
Byrne, Seen, 160
Bystydzienski, Jill M., 305
- Cabinet Office of Japan, 347–8
Caldwell, David F., 106
Camissa, Anna Maria, 366
Canetti, Elias, 264n8
Caramazza, Elena, 137
Carl, Linda L., 106
Carrel, Severin, 54
Casarico, Alessandra, 128
Castells, Manuel, 146, 182, 256–7
Celis, Karen, 356
Chadli, El-Mostafa, 289
Chafetz, Janet, 105–6
Changeux, Jean-Pierre, 264nn5–6
Chao, Elaine, 60
Chappell, Louise, 182, 217, 366
Charles, Maria, 184n12, 266n2
Chatman, Jennifer, 106
Chattou, Zoubir, 276

- Chen Shui-bian, former mayor of Taipei, Taiwan, 57
- Chiang kai-shek, former president of Taiwan, 54, 57
- Cheng, Yawei, 316
- Chinchilla, Norma Stoltz, 305, 309n3
- Cho, Hyon Ok, 360
- Chodorow, Nancy, 184n11, 331
- Christie, Daniel, 162
- Cioran, Emil, 195, 205–7
- Clarke, Gerard, 300–1
- Clastres, Peter, 198–201, 208
- Coker Gonzalez, Charity, 218
- Coleman, James, 131
- Coleman, Isobel, 103, 106
- Collins, Patricia Hill, 36
- Collins, Robert, 285
- Connell, Raewyn, 171, 182
- Cook, Alison, 106, 108
- Corruption Perceptions Index, 70
- Coser, Lewis, 285
- Coutinho, Carlos Nelson, 241
- Cowell-Meyers, Kimberly B., 351
- Craske, Nikki, 366
- Crenshaw, Kimberlé, 36
- Croce, Benedetto, 266n34
- Cullell, Jorge Vargas, 11
- Dahl, Robert Alan, 172, 237, 240–2, 250, 255
- Dahlerup, Drude, 39–40, 86, 345, 356–6, 367
- Dalton, Emma, 344
- Daly, Mary, 259
- Dana, Wittmer, 229
- Daoud, Zakia, 36
- Darhour, Hanane, 39
- Dart, Raymond, 188
- Davidoff, Lenore, 220
- Davis, Henry H., 367
- Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, 219
- Deininger, Klaus, 296
- Desai, Raj M., 296
- Deutsch, Francine M., 106, 112
- Di Marco, Graciela, 303
- Diamond, Larry, 11, 237–8, 245, 247
- Diamond, Peter Arthur, 121
- Disney, Jernnifer Leigh, 61
- Doldor, Elena, 108, 112
- Dovidio, John F., 106
- Dryzek, John, 256, 266n30
- Dubosc, Fabrice Olivier, 139, 142, 144
- Dungey, Nicholas, 294
- Duverger, Maurice, 183n3, 216
- Duvvury, Nata, 371
- Eagly, Alice H., 106
- Economist, 55
- Edwards, Louise, 218
- Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Irenäus, 189, 194n6
- Einaudi, Luigi, 266n34
- Eisenstein, Zillah, 182
- Ekeh, Peter P., 70
- El Khayat, Ghita, 37
- Elkis, Lois, 218
- Elmuti, Dean, 106–9
- Ennaji, Moha, 35–8, 42–3, 46, 47, 49n1
- Epstein, Cynthia Fuchs, 182n1
- Erikson, Erik, 189
- Erikson, Robert S., 183n3, 189, 193n5
- Espina, Gioconda, 303, 305
- Esping Andersen, Gosta, 259
- Estevez-Abe, Margarita, 363n6
- Eto, Mikiko, 350
- Evans Pim, Joam, 160–2
- Evans-Pritchard, Edward Evan, 201
- Evers, Adalbert, 258
- Facchini, Fiorenzo, 160
- Fallon, Kathleen M., 302, 306
- Fast, Irene, 172
- Fausto-Sterling, Anne, 158, 171
- Ferber, Marianne, 131
- Ferrajoli, Luigi, 241
- Ferraris, Maurizio, 160, 163, 168n20
- Fisher, Jo, 305
- Flammang, Janet, 217, 229
- Fleschenberg, Andrea, 299
- Fletcher, Joyce K., 106
- Foucault, Michel, 205, 285, 293–5, 301, 308, 308n1
- Franceschet, Susan, 13, 18, 224–8, 230
- French, Marilyn, 173, 183n4
- Freud, Sigmund, 119, 130, 151n2, 164, 172, 179, 183n3, 188–90, 193n3, 205, 264n8, 332, 338
- Friedman, Elizabeth Jay, 309n3
- Fry, Douglas, 160–1, 163, 167n14

- Gal, Susan, 366
 Galligan, Yvonne, 90
 Gaudet, Hazel, 216
 Gaunder, Alisa, 344
 Geisler, Gisela, 302, 305
 Gelb, Joyce, 53, 55, 59, 61, 363n6
 Gerstel, Naomi, 106
 Gertzog, Irwin, 224, 228–9
 Getz, Shlomo, 266n32
 Giani Gallino, Tilde, 173
 Giddens, Anthony, 82
 Gilligan, Carol, 262
 Gimbutas, Marija, 161
 Gintis, Herbert, 131
 Gladman, Kimberly, 104
 Glass, Christy, 106, 108
 Goetz, Anne Marie, 230, 247, 366
 Goldin, Claudia, 132
 Gordon, Beate Sirota, 54
 Gordon, Linda, 259
 Gordon, Margaret T., 322
 Gorz, André, 177
 Gregory-Mina, Heidi Joy, 108, 112
 Grossi, Míriam Pillar, 12
 Gruen, Arno, 338
 Gulliver, Philip H., 204
- Hajer, Marteen, 256
 Harrer, Johanna, 338
 Hassim, Shireen, 230, 302, 366
 Hatem, Mervat, 41
 Haussman, Melissa, 366
 Hawkesworth, Mary, 64, 131, 215,
 225–6, 229–30, 247, 249, 275, 296,
 361, 369
 Heilman, Madeline E., 108
 Héritier, Françoise, 183n6
 Hernes, Helga Maria, 259
 Hill, John, 332–3
 Hillman, James, 179
 Hodgson, Geoffrey, 257
 Hoekstra, Valerie, 215
 Holtzworth-Munroe, A., 326
 Horkheimer, Max, 256
 Horney, Karen, 332
 Hrdy, Sarah, 158
 Htun, Mala, 230, 305, 308
 Huang, Ching-ling, 57
 Huntington, Samuel Phillips, 8, 17, 235
 Hyde, Janet Shibley, 178
- Iazzetta, Osvaldo M., 11
 Igarashi, Akio, 352
 Iliffe, John, 68
 Inglehart, Ronald, 82, 87–8, 89, 180,
 258, 367
 Interparliamentary Union (IPU), 38,
 32n2, 53, 216, 224, 265n21, 344
 Iwane, Kunio, 351, 353, 363n8
- Jalalzai, Farida, 223
 Jamal, Amina, 299
 Jaquette, Jane S., 305, 366
 Jelinek, Jan, 167n13
 John, Ishiyama, 351
 Jonathan, Goodluck, 69
 Jones, Mark, 230
 Joseph, Suad, 288
 Jung, Carl Gustav, 3, 119, 141–3, 145,
 150, 151nn1–2, 152n5, 172, 179,
 183n3, 188, 190, 193n4, 254, 261,
 264n4
- Kabashima, Ikuo, 344
 Kahneman, Daniel, 127
 Kandiyoti, Deniz, 288
 Kang, Alice, 305
 Kanter, Rosabeth Moss, 106, 108,
 224
 Kantola, Johanna, 180
 Karl, Terry Lynn, 239
 Karve, Shailaja, 109
 Kast, Verena, 179
 Kathlene, Lyn, 217, 229
 Keck, Margaret, 297
 Kelly, Rita Mae, 366–7
 Kenney, Sally, 217
 Kenny, Meryl, 14
 Kenworthy, Lane, 305
 Kerber, Linda, 219
 Kim, Kyounghee, 218
 Kim, Sueng-Kyung, 218
 Kligman, Gail, 366
 Krook, Mona Lena, 182n2, 219, 222–3,
 225, 345, 356, 372
 Krugman, Paul, 130
 Kunin, Madeleine M., 83
 Kunovich, Sheri, 305
 Kuper, Adam, 203
 Kwesiga, Joy, 308

- L'Abate, Alberto, 160, 163
 Lamb, Michelle, 104
 Landes, Joan, 218–19
 Landman, Todd, 263n1
 Lang, Sabine, 296
 Laqueur, Thomas, 173, 183n7
 Larsen, Erik, 259–60, 266n35
 Lavoille, Jean-Louis, 258
 Lazarsfeld, Paul, 216
 LeBlanc, Robin M., 353, 355, 363n9
 Lebon, Nathalie, 304, 309n3
 Lee, Robert, 167n14
 Leonardi, Robert, 257
 Lepore, Jill, 265n22
 Leung, Alicia S. M., 111
 Leyenaar, Monique, 366
 Lijphart, Arendt, 11, 19, 236, 263n1
 Liotta, Elena, 141, 313, 316, 319
 Lipovetski, Gilles, 205
 Liu, John, 53, 296
 Lovenduski, Joni, 366–7
 Lowe-Morna, Colleen, 301
 Lowi, Theodore, 365n22
 Lowie, Robert, 198
 Lu, Annette, 56–7
 Lucatti, Lucatti Daniela, 316
 Luciak, Ilja, 303, 305
- Mackay, Fiona, 185n21
 MacKinnon, Catharine, 176
 Malami, Melissa, 305
 Malinowski, Bronislav, 198
 Marshall, Theodor H., 242
 Matland, Richard E., 15, 87, 95, 372
 Mazur, Amy, 217
 McCaulay, Fiona, 306
 McClelland, David, 171–2, 182
 McClintock, Anne, 217, 231n3
 McClure, John, 54
 McDonagh, Eileen, 217
 McKinsey & Company, 103–4, 106
 Mead, Margaret, 187, 193n1
 Meer, Shamim, 302
 Meier, Petra, 356
 Mendoza, Breny, 300
 Mernissi, Fatima, 44
 Merriam, Charles, 183n3
 Meyerhoff, Hans, 183n3
 Meyerson, Debra, 106, 108, 112
 Miguel, Luis Felipe, 15
- Miguel, SôniaMalheiros, 12
 Millard, Frances, 97
 Miller, Alice, 316
 Mills, Charles, 265n16
 Moghadam, Valentine, 42, 289
 Moisés, José Álvaro, 11, 16, 211, 235,
 238, 246, 248, 250n3, 265n23, 275,
 361
 Molony, Barbara, 218
 Monsod, Solita, 109–10
 Montgomery, Kathleen A., 87, 95
 Moore, Gwen, 110, 180
 Morgan, Elaine, 158, 166n10
 Morgan, Lewis Henry, 196
 Morlino, Leonardo, 11, 236–8, 241–2,
 245–7
 Munck, Gerald, 237, 239, 241, 245
 Mungwa, Alice, 308
 Murray, Rainbow, 230
- Nair, Shreekumar K., 109
 Nardi, Michele, 155, 166n3
 Navarro, Marysa, 309n3
 Nelson, Debra L., 108, 112
 Nelson, Julie A., 131
 Neumann, Erich, 331
 Niemann, Yolanda Flores F., 106
 Norris, Pippa, 82, 87–8, 89, 180,
 367, 372
 Nussbaum, Martha, 182, 256
- Obasanjo, Olusegun, 71–2
 O'Brien, Mary, 172
 O'Donnell, Guillermo, 237–8
 O'Neil, Regina M., 110
 O'Reilly, Charles A., 106
 Obiora, L. Amede, 64, 71, 79n2
 Offen, Karen, 218, 220
 Ogai, Tokuko, 353, 363nn6–7
 Okin, Susan, 182
 Okonjo, Kamene, 67
 Okoro, Anezi, 75
 Oliverio Ferraris, Anna, 168n20
 Oppenheimer, Franz, 264n10
 Oyama, Naho, 350
- Palgi, Michal, 7, 103, 110
 Panciera, Silvana, 168n17
 Panikkar, Raimundo, 143, 145, 147
 Panksepp, Jaak, 340

- Pasquino, Gianfranco, 163
 Pateman, Carole, 55–6, 180, 221–2,
 265n16, 265n20, 366, 370
 Pauli, Wolfgang, 264n4
 Pavoni, Clementina, 148
 Paxton, Pamela, 305
 Peng wan-Ru, 57, 59
 PENTOR (Center for Market and
 Opinion Research), 93
 Perrewe, Pamela L., 108, 112
 Peterson, Spike, 217
 Phillips, Adam, 339
 Phillips, Anne, 366, 370, 372
 Piketty, Thomas, 134
 Piscopo, Jennifer, 224–8, 230
 Plato, 151n2, 179, 184n15, 235, 253
 Porter, Roy, 155
 Poster, Winifred R., 104, 110
 Prescott, James, 158
 Pritchard, Evans, 200–3
 Przeworski, Adam, 100
 Pulcini, Elena, 204–6
 Putnam, Robert D., 83, 257
- Quiggin, John, 133
- Radcliffe-Brown, Alfred Reginald, 201
 Rakowski, Cathy A., 303, 305
 Ranci, Costanzo, 260
 Reed, Evelyn, 158
 Rees, Ray, 124
 Reingold, Beth, 366
 Rerhaye, Narjis, 36
 Reynolds, Andrew, 305
 Richards, David, 262
 Ricoeur, Paul, 264n5
 Riedel, Ingrid, 179
 Riesebrodt, Martin, 285
 Rigby, Peter, 204
 Riger, Stephanie, 322
 RIGS (Representations of Interactions
 that have been generalized), 332
 Roces, Mina, 219
 Rodrigues, Leôncio Martins, 14, 247
 Rodriguez, Victoria, 230
 Romano, Augusto, 151n1
 Roque, Maria-Angels, 289
 Rosner, Menachem, 266n32
 Rouse, Cecilia, 132
- Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 154, 159, 164,
 219, 237, 264n14, 265n18, 267n39
 Rule, Wilma, 217
- Sacchet, Teresa, 12–13, 15, 19, 28, 31,
 222, 246–8
 Sadiqi, Fatima, 1, 35–8, 49n1, 275,
 290n9, 290nn13–14, 291nn15–16,
 291n20
 Salamon, Lester, 258
 Samuels, Andrew, 172
 Sanchez, Beatriz Rodrigues, 11
 Sandel, Michael, 266n27, 266n30
 Santos, Fabiano, 243
 Sarkisian, Natalia, 106
 Sartori, Giovanni, 32, 147, 149, 242, 262
 Sassen, Saskia, 367
 Sato, Yoshiyuki, 363n9
 Schmitter, Philippe C., 83–4
 Schoenwolf, Gary, 155–6
 Schreurs, Miranda A., 352
 Schumpeter, Joseph, 239
 Schwartz-Salant, Nathan, 179
 Scott, Joan, 182
 Seger, Joni, 216, 231n1
 Seidman, Gay W., 302
 Sekhon, Joti, 305
 Selmer, Jan, 111
 Sen, Amartya, 256
 Shamdasani, Sonu, 172
 Shin, Ki-young, 344, 349, 363n4, 364n16
 Shore, Allan, 332
 Shortland, Susan, 105, 109
 Sieminska, Renata, 86, 95–6, 98–9
 Siim, Birte, 259
 Sikkink, Kathryn, 297
 Simon, Herbert, 127
 Skocpol, Theda, 259–60
 Smith, Adam, 127, 263
 Smith, Daniel Jordan, 70
 Smith, Dorothy, 106
 Smith, Graham, 256
 Speck, Bruno, 12, 15, 28, 31, 248
 Spencer, Metta, 86
 Spiro, Herbert, 253
 Spitz, A. René, 152n6, 332
 Squires, Judith, 182
 Steel, Gill, 344
 Stern, Daniel, 332
 Stevens, Anne, 351

- Strassman, Diana, 134n1
 Strickland, Richard, 371
 Swiss, Liam, 306
- Tadros, Marlyn, 47
 Tahri, Rachida, 39
 Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles-Maurice, 220
 Tamayo, Giuila, 304
 Taylor, Catherine, 105–6
 Teasdale, Simon, 258
 The Economist Intelligence Unit, 237
 Themudo, Nuno, 258
 Thomas, Sue, 229
 Tickle, Cheryl, 155, 156
 Tobar, Marcela Rios, 309n3
 Tompkins, Rebecca C., 55
 Toomey, Sarah, 71
 Towns, Ann, 218
 Trevi, Mario, 151n1
 Tripp, Aili, 301–3, 305, 308
 Tversky, Amos, 127
- Van Allen, Judith, 67–8
 van Creveld, Martin, 263n3, 264n10
 Vargas, Virginia, 298, 304
 Varghese, Daniel, 155, 166n3
 Veblen, Thorstein, 147, 266n38
 Vernant, Jean Pierre, 207
 Vianello, Mino, 171–85, 253–73
 Virginia Vargas, 298, 304
 Viterna, Jocelyn, 303, 306
 Volden, Craig, 229
- Wagenaar, Hendrik, 256
 Walby, Sylvia, 177, 263n1
 Waring, Marilyn, 67
- Watanabe, Noboru, 353
 Waylen, Georgina, 180, 224, 301, 305, 367
 Weber, Max, 149, 175, 182, 285
 Weffort, Francisco, 241
 Weldon, Laurel, 308
 Wellington, Sheila, 109
 Welzel, Christian, 88
 Werhane, Patricia H., 104
 WHO, 276, 313
 Wiber, Melanie, 158
 Wichterich, Christa, 367
 Winnicott, W. Donald, 333, 339
 Wippermann, Carsten, 109
 Wiseman, Alan, 229
 Wolchik, Sharon, 83, 305, 366
 Wolf, Eric, 161, 166n1
 Wolpert, Lewis, 155–6
 Woolf, Virginia, 79, 337
 World Health Organization, 276, 313, 327
 Wu, Long-Zeng, 106, 108–11
- Yi, MiKyong, 356–7
 Yoon, Jiso, 363n4
 Yoon, Jong Sook, 356
 Young, Iris Marian, 55–6, 361–2, 366, 372
 Yu, Sen-lun, 57
- Zaboura, Nadia, 184n15
 Zakaria, Fared, 263n1
 Zimmerman, Joseph, 217
 Zoglin, Katie, 38, 48, 49n1
 Zoja, Luigi, 5n1, 117, 119, 175, 187, 193n2, 194n7
 Zuhur, Sherifa, 47

Subject Index

Note: Locators with an 'n' denote note numbers.

- AAWORD (Association of African Women for Research and Development), 300, 302
- acephalous societies, 201–4
- acquisition, 49, 167n11, 205, 324
- activism, xvi, 4, 9, 37–8, 41, 43–5, 49, 56–62, 67–8, 164, 218, 249, 288, 308–9nn1–2, 323, 353
- advocacy, 37, 43–5, 49, 59, 61–2, 271–2, 288, 294–301, 304–6, 326
- affective, 138, 176, 197, 254, 332–3
- affective reason, 176, 254
- Afghanistan, xiii, 265n21, 299, 314
- Africa
- constitution, 302–3, 306–7
 - democracy, 301, 305–8
 - equality, 306, 309n1
 - feminism, 296–300, 303–5, 308
 - government, 297–8, 302, 305
 - parliament, 307
 - political representation, 293–309
- African Union, 302
- aggression, 65, 74, 164n12, 188, 190, 192, 202, 266n26, 316, 319, 325, 327, 333, 342
- aggressivity, 342
- alternative representation system, 351, 353–5
- Amerindian societies, 198
- anima v. animus, 179
- Arab Spring, xv, 43, 45–8, 282
- Argentina, 17–18, 21–2, 212, 226–8, 297, 303, 306–7
- las locas del 50-50*, 228
- art, 119, 141–3, 150, 158–9, 178, 181, 196–7, 212, 220, 281, 284
- associations, 36–7, 41, 44–5, 57, 64–5, 67, 131, 215, 218, 220, 241, 255, 265n16, 278–9, 282, 285–9, 297, 300, 302–3, 322, 327, 329n9, 338
- attachment style (John Bowlby), 332
- attitudes toward equality of women and men, 89–91
- attunement, attuned caretaker, 332–3, 334, 335
- authoritarianism, 7, 15, 57, 67–8, 83, 124, 212, 235, 237–8, 241–2, 250n2, 254, 302–5, 315, 323, 341, 344, 356, 373
- Australia
- census classifications, 221
 - feminism, xii–xiv
 - labor market, 221
 - military service, 231n1
 - police, 216
- authority
- charismatic, 285–6
 - decision-making and, 1
 - feminization of, 4, 275–90, 323, 360
 - legal-rational, 285
 - male, 168n17, 188, 202, 204, 216, 317
 - politico-religious, 286, 290n7, 290 n12
 - power and, 67, 118, 197–9, 205, 271, 284–6, 291n18
 - religious, 46, 279, 289
 - social, 196–7
 - traditional, 285–6
 - types of, 285–6
- autonomous feminists, 45, 304–5
- AWID (Association for Women's Rights in Development), 297, 302
- Beijing Conference, 62, 356
- Beijing Platform for Action, 8, 62, 298
- Biafra, 69–71
- blood, 156, 173–4, 183n7, 183n9, 195
- Boko Haram, 71
- Bosnia and Herzegovina
- genocide, 313
 - politicalquotas, 87
- Brazil
- constitution, 250n3
 - democracy, 11–33

Brazil – *continued*

- equality, 11–12, 21
- feminism, 297, 303–7
- government, 15–16, 18, 23, 25–9
- new constitution, 15
- parliament, 8, 11–14, 16–18, 21, 28–9
- participation, 11–33
- political quotas, 14, 20–7, 31–2, 223, 304
- political representation, 11–33

British colonization, 66–7

Bushmen, 201–3

campaign financing, 2, 8, 17–18, 27–8, 222, 247–8, 354

care

- antenatal/postnatal, 157, 277, 328
- caregivers/care-takers, 62, 225, 278, 331–42, 353, 371, 373
- childcare, iii, xv–xvi, 55, 109, 118, 224, 258, 266n26, 271, 320, 331–42, 371
- culture and, 200, 208
- gender dualism and, 180
- health, 41, 57, 150, 225–6, 276, 289, 326
- and love, 205–6, 321
- material, 152n6, 179
- primary, 321
- social, 320
- stereotypes of role and, 91–2, 118, 323, 353
- “work,” 370

Catholic, 96, 261

CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women), 8–9, 60–1, 67, 71, 299, 314, 329n6, 366

Central and Eastern Europe,

- post-Communist countries
- democracy, 82–100
- elections, 238
- equality, 85, 87–9, 91, 95, 98–99
- government, 82, 85, 89, 91, 98–9
- massification of education, 84
- parliament, 82, 85–7, 91, 93–9, 246
- participation, 82–100
- political representation, 236
- women in parliament, 82–100

centrality of women, 154–68

- biological facts, 155–6
- consequences of food production, 160–2
- in cultural transfer, 157–8
- and emergence of power systems, 160–3
- female developmental design, 156
- future prospects, 163–5
- in nurturing, 156–7
- in prehistory, 158–61

challenges women face by accepting top

- executive jobs in global firms
- aids in coping with challenges
- supportive spouses, 109
- appropriate benefits, 107–8
- decision-making practices, 110
- delay or limitation in family obligations, 109
- efficiency of the firm, 110–11
- firm’s dilemma the fittest or the strongest, 111
- isolation, 108
- overcoming the global firms’ dilemmas of appointing a female top executive, 110–11
- power and its division, 110
- social control (normative and confining), 110
- stress and tension (at work and between work and family), 108–10
- working hours, 107

child care, xiii, xv–xvi, 55, 109, 118, 224, 258, 266n26, 271, 320, 331–42, 371

China, xv, xviii, 193, 218

circumcision, 174, 183n9

citizen’s control of governments, 235, 238

citizenship, 15, 56, 74, 163–4, 213, 218, 220–1, 237, 239, 244, 262, 272, 279, 288, 293, 353, 356

civic culture, 69, 243

civilization, 68–9, 71, 118, 130, 143–4, 154, 162–4, 178, 187–9, 370

Civil Society Organizations, Third Sector

- and women, 37, 41, 43–4, 62, 67, 72, 79, 99, 180, 208, 222, 241, 246, 249, 258, 260–2, 276, 281–3, 287–8, 295, 305, 358, 370–2

- class
 - educated, 192–3
 - entrepreneurial, 261
 - middle, xvi, 42, 193, 266n36
 - race and, 225, 231n3, 243, 259–60, 273, 300, 308, 369
 - ruling, 132
 - rural, 193
 - social, 36, 98, 241, 287
 - status groups, 286
 - struggle, 257–8
 - upper, 42, 193
 - working, xvi, 42–3, 242
- Cold War, xvi, 68, 373
- collective psychology, 178, 187
- collective unconscious, 118, 140, 151n2, 172, 188–90, 193, 254
- collective violence, 189
- colonialism, colonization, xiv–xv, xvii, 36, 38, 66–8, 79, 161, 166n1, 177, 188, 192, 200, 220, 286–7, 299, 308
- comfort women, 55, 61
- communication, 46, 62, 64, 105, 137, 152n7, 159, 166, 262, 281, 296, 304, 308, 319–21, 324
- community(-arian)
 - activism, 58–62, 243, 353
 - care-takers, 353
 - and empathy, 176
 - ethicality and responsibility, 147
 - family and, 257, 280
 - v. individualism, individualistic, 212, 254, 258, 260, 373
 - inequalities in, 212
 - international, 45, 60, 208, 305
 - during Late Neolithic period, 160
 - organizations, 255, 272, 300
 - political, 12, 14, 237, 240–2, 245, 247
 - programs, 371
 - public role of, 146, 257
 - regional, 305
- comparative perspective, 12, 53–62
- female constituents and politicians, support for, 58–9
- leadership and activism, 56–8
- legislative structures, 54
- policy impact on women's domestic activism, 61–2
- political opportunity structure, 54–5
- role of constitutions, 53–54
- women's movements, 55–6, 58
- compassion, 148–50, 151n3
- competition
 - electoral, 4, 14, 22–3, 27, 32, 237–40, 242, 246, 306
 - male, 323, 337
 - perfect, 126–7
 - political, 12, 14–15, 18–19, 26, 83, 163, 165, 239, 245, 355
- conflict
 - within ethnic groups, 203
 - gender, 316–17, 319–20, 325, 327
 - human rights, 254
 - immigration, 320
 - industrial, 258
 - organized, 4, 272, 314, 371
 - over vital resources, 79n1
 - political, 212, 239–40, 256, 351, 372–3
 - pro-choice and pro-life women's groups, 61
 - religious, 71
 - resolution strategies, 71, 160, 198, 206, 208, 320, 336
 - sources of, 91, 99
 - and wars/social violence, 204–5, 301–3, 308
 - within work and family, 108–10
- conscience, 147–51, 175–7, 205
- conscience, symbolic v. rational, 147
- consciousness raising, 278, 295–7
- constitution
 - Africa, 302–3, 306–7
 - Brazil, 250n3
 - democratization and, 213
 - European Union's role, 369
 - France, 223
 - Japan, 53–4
 - Latin America, 301, 305–7
 - Morocco, 35, 39–42, 45–9, 281, 290n12
 - New Jersey, 218
 - Nigeria, 67, 69, 71, 73
 - South Korea, 358, 364n15
 - Taiwan, 53–4, 56
 - US, 218

constitutionalism, 8, 15, 40, 45,
47, 53–4, 67, 69, 95, 215–16,
222–3, 239, 253, 255, 264n3, 372

contemporary hunter-gatherers, 159,
167n14, 168n18

contract, 74, 76, 78, 80n5, 107, 112, 125,
197, 205, 207, 219–21, 255, 257,
265n17, 265n20, 280
v. community, 197, 255

control of reproductivity (birth control,
abortion), 56, 58, 61, 85, 224, 226,
276–8, 298, 303, 308, 314, 362

copulation and pregnancy, 172, 183n5

corruption, xii, 4, 16, 43, 46, 66, 70, 73,
75–7, 79, 80n4, 89, 96, 129, 238,
246, 265n18, 323, 330n11, 355–6,
358

creativity, 2–3, 56, 137–52, 337

critical mass, 224, 360

CSW (UN Commission on the Status of
Women), 61, 298, 327

cultural violence, 66–7, 167n12

culture
and biology, 175, 193
care and, 200, 208, 373
civic, 69, 243
evolutionary, 159, 161, 167n15, 254
foreign, 105, 111
gender and, 67, 99, 103, 109, 178–80,
187, 202, 211, 253, 255–6, 260,
264n3, 265n14, 266n28, 315,
319–20, 324–5
global/Western, xiv, 190, 254
local, 103, 167n12, 254
national, 8, 133
nature and, 174, 197, 199
organizational, xvi–xvii, 9, 106, 108,
112, 228
political, 2, 9, 13, 20, 190, 193, 213,
237, 240, 244, 246, 248–50, 286,
368
religion and, 67
traditions and, 8, 59, 66, 118, 157
violent, 314, 325

custody issue, 37, 244, 280, 316

Dairinin (deputy), 350–1, 354–5, 363n7

DAWN (Development Alternatives with
Women for a New Era), 297, 299,
302

decision-making, xiii, 1, 3, 12, 14, 16,
20, 41, 43, 47–9, 71, 79, 82, 84, 91,
99, 110, 121, 154, 181–2, 212, 213,
230–1, 236–7, 239, 244, 245, 247,
249, 253, 256, 262–3, 282, 289,
297–8, 308, 361–2, 368–9, 372

democracy
agenda for change, 249–50
in Amerindian societies, 198
authoritarian regime, 7, 15, 57, 67–8,
83, 124, 212, 235, 237–8, 241–2,
250n2, 254, 302–5, 315, 323, 341,
344, 356, 373
in Brazil, 11–33
clarity of purposes, 248–9
concept and definition, 243–8
deficits in, 1–2, 8, 11–120, 248,
348
definitions/concept of, 2, 4, 147,
237–43, 367–8
direct, 164
in Eastern and Central European
countries, 82–100
flawed, 237–8
full, 237–8, 240
gender and, 215–31, 253–73, 331–42,
366, 368
governance, 7, 213, 215–31, 293, 323,
345, 368
grassroots, 350, 356
hybrid regime, 237–8
inclusive, 212–13, 231, 360, 373
incomplete, 321
in Latin American and African
countries, 301, 305–8
minimalist approach to, 14, 239, 241,
245–6
in Morocco, 35–50
in Nigeria, 64–80
paradox of, 361–2
participatory, 163–5, 289
political exclusion/inclusion,
215–50
quality of, 4–5, 12, 215–73, 358;
specific recommendations,
212–13
in Taiwan and Japan, 53, 348

deputies, deputy movement, 350–1,
353–5, 363n7

- destructivity, 137–8, 141, 148, 177,
 179–80, 182, 188, 208, 324–5,
 329n5, 335
- developmental psychology, 168n20, 331
- difference
 - cultural, 188, 320
 - embodied, xii
 - gender, xiii, 12, 21, 28, 83–4, 92, 117,
 119, 121, 131–2, 134, 148–9, 172,
 178–9, 182, 183n3, 187, 189, 229,
 240, 257, 260, 265n24, 272, 333
 - institutional, 229, 308
 - power of, 195–213
 - respect for, 315
 - sex, xiii, 131
- direct representation, 354
- direct violence, 160, 167n12, 167n16
- diversity
 - in boards of directors, 104
 - cultural, 104, 111
 - gender, 106, 175
- divorce, 38, 48, 224, 279–80
 - by abuse, 316–17, 325
- DNA, 155–6, 166nn4–7, 315
- domestic chores, 173–4, 177, 211,
 266n26, 318
- domestic or intimate partner violence,
 56, 58–60, 298, 303–4, 308, 313–15,
 320, 326–7, 329n8, 330n11, 371
- dominant culture, 12, 264n3, 324
- DPP (Democratic Progressive Party,
 Taiwan), 54, 57, 59
- Eastern-Central Europe(ean countries,
 post-Communist), *see* Central and
 Eastern Europe
- economics, 3, 39, 54, 117, 121–35
 - core of, 121–5
 - Pareto-optimality, 125–8
 - power in, 128–30
 - role of the state, 130–1
 - sex, gender, and the welfare state,
 131–4
 - Standard Model, 122–8, 132–4
- education
 - access to, 16, 42
 - achievements in, 38, 65
 - adult, 320, 372
 - formal, 65, 79, 84
 - innovative, 212, 213, 368
 - Islamists' views on, 42–3
 - issues/policies, 258, 260, 296, 299,
 308, 315–16, 318, 369, 371
 - lack of, 65, 79
 - levels of, 84, 93, 95, 98, 217, 353, 361,
 363n12
 - male-dominated, 156, 163
 - massification of, 84
 - opportunities, 41–2, 293
 - political, 244, 246, 248
 - primary, 16, 93–4, 128, 278, 323
 - programs for parents, 271–2, 319, 339,
 371
 - public, 84, 109, 132, 248, 250
 - right to, 36
 - secondary, 93–4, 278
 - sexual health, 226–7
 - stimulating and encouraging, 37
 - tertiary, 84, 93–4, 99
 - well educated, 91, 93, 98–9, 105, 109,
 132, 192–3
- egg, 155–6, 166nn5–7
- electoral competition, 4, 14, 22–3, 27,
 32, 237–40, 242, 246, 305
- electoral reforms, 40, 345, 355–6, 358
- electoral system, 16, 18–19, 22, 27, 86,
 94, 97, 219, 247, 306, 350, 363n4
- emancipation, xiii, 36–7, 41–2, 44, 49,
 82, 88, 133, 180–1, 258, 261, 284,
 286–7
- embryogenesis, 155, 179
- emergence of power systems, 160–2,
 165, 200
- emotion(-s, -al), 3, 118, 150, 152n6, 159,
 171, 176, 179–80, 184n15, 204–5,
 257, 262, 266n26, 315–16, 318–19,
 322, 326–7, 332–4, 339–42, 370
- empathy(-ic), 57–8, 142, 145–6, 157–8,
 162–3, 167n12, 173, 176–7, 181–2,
 184nn15–16, 212, 213, 249, 254–6,
 261–2, 266n30, 271–2, 318, 321,
 323, 332, 334, 338–41, 368, 371, 373
 - v. individual(-ism, -istic), instrumental
 rationality, strategy(-ic), 256,
 261–2, 266n30, 338–41, 371
- encuentros, 297–8, 300, 303–4, 306,
 308–9
- endowments, 121–5, 172, 204
- envy, male, men's 172, 317

equality

- in Africa and Latin America, 306, 309n1
 - in Amerindian societies, 198
 - in Brazil, 11–12, 21
 - democratic conceptions of, 253, 257, 259, 266n28, 273
 - EU objectives, 369
 - gender, xvi, 7–8, 21, 36, 38–9, 42
 - gulf in, 215–16
 - in Japan, 53–4, 59, 347–8, 353
 - Late Neolithic period, 154–6, 158–61, 168n18
 - in Morocco, 36, 38–9, 42–6, 48–9, 279–81, 283, 289–90
 - in Nigeria, 71, 79
 - political, 11–12, 158, 236, 239–40, 242, 244–6
 - and political exclusion/inclusion, 215–16, 220, 223, 226, 228, 236–42, 244–6
 - in post-Communist countries, 85, 87–9, 91, 95, 98–99
 - prerequisite of, 177
 - problems of, 368–9
 - right for, 39
 - strategies for social change, 314–15, 319, 324–5
 - in Taiwan, 53, 55, 58
 - in top executive positions in global firms, 103, 105–6
 - UN initiatives, 61–2, 366
 - in US, 59
- ethnic cleansing, 178, 184n19, 313
- EU (European Union)
- Council of Europe Members, 314–15, 330n11, 371
 - Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, 314–15, 330n11, 371
 - Lanzarote Convention on protecting children against sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, 329n8, 330n11
- evolution
- biocultural, 160, 164, 167n15, 168n20
 - biological, 155, 160, 187
 - cultural, 160, 162
 - natural, 171, 179–80

- parallel, 167n15
 - regressive selection, 191
- explanations of women's
- underrepresentation, 215–17
 - male culture, 216–17
 - lack of resources, 216–17
 - socialization, 216–17
- exploitation, xv, 60, 68, 120, 125–6, 127–8, 135n3, 137, 142, 146, 180, 208, 266n26, 287, 314, 319, 321, 329n8, 330n11, 337–8
- externalities, 127–8, 130
- fair representation, 11–12
- Family Law, 278–81, 284–8, 290n8, 303, 308, 396
- family wage, 220–2
- father, the
- abuse by, 316–17
 - child custody issue, 37–8, 280
 - contribution to reproduction, 155–6, 187
 - and divorce, 280, 317
 - forcing of marriage on children, 279
 - historical, psychological and cultural perspectives, 187–9
 - inherited characteristics from, 155
 - primary role, 187, 333, 342
- female
- contribution to inheritance, 155–6
 - feticide, 314
 - judges, 59–60
- female centrality, 154–68
- in cultural transfer, 157–8
 - of developmental design, 156
 - of eggs, 155–6
 - future prospects, 163–5
 - of nurturing, 156–7
 - and power systems, 160–3
 - in prehistory, 158–61
 - restoration of equal rights, 161–2
- femicide/feminicide/*feminicidio*, xii, 314–15, 322, 327, 330n10
- femininity, xiv–xv, 171, 187, 191, 318
- feminism/feminist
- in Africa and Latin America, 296–300, 303–5, 308
 - in Australia, xiii
 - critique and research, xiv, xvi, 124, 129

- democratic conceptions, 254–5, 259, 267n38, 273, 366–7
 and economic change, 105–7, 130–1, 133
 and gender inequality, 331, 335
 globalization and, xiv, xvi
 in India, 223, 296
 institutionalism, 14, 181, 267n38
 in Japan, 61
 in Latin America, xvi
 lobbying efforts, 223
 in Morocco, 4, 37–8, 41–6, 49
 movement, 37–8, 44–5, 49, 55–7, 168n17, 254–5, 276, 279, 282, 286–9
 “NGO-ization of,” xvi
 in Nigeria, 64, 67, 79
 party, 345, 351
 and politics, 216–17, 222, 236
 psychoanalytic studies, 331, 336, 338, 367
 and social change, 319–325
 struggles, 35, 180–1
 in Sweden, 345
 in Taiwan, 57, 59
 theoretical approaches, 105–7, 131
 theorizations of social mobilization, 272–3
 transnational, 57, 62, 67, 295, 371
 in United Nations agencies, xii–xiii, 62, 64, 302
 feminization, 4, 226, 275–91, 298, 304
 flawed democracy, 237–8
 food collection, 160, 166n1
 food safety, 352–3
 Foucault’s view of power, 205, 285, 293–5, 308–9n1
 France/French
 acceptance of women in politics, 89
 civil law, 279
 colonization, 36, 200, 287
 constitution, 223
 democracy, 240, 261
 equality, 223, 306, 309n1
 female board members, 104
 National Assembly, 218, 220, 230
 police, 36
 political representation, 236
 “republican motherhood” ideology, 219
 Revolution, 218, 262
 succession struggles, 217, 261
 surveys, 104, 231n1
 freedom
 of action, 149
 of being and creating, 150
 of choice, 149, 322
 and civil liberties, 215, 237
 of contract, 221
 defined, 255, 264n11
 and equality, 212–13, 239, 244, 246, 257, 324, 368
 of expression, 40, 46, 162, 206, 240
 and identity, 205
 individual, 7, 215, 254, 264n11, 323, 326, 361
 moral, 89
 political, 89
 and power, 124, 128–9, 148, 199
 in pre-modern societies, 118
 and rights, 131, 133, 215, 290n12, 317, 319
 and salvation, 200
 sexual, 180, 226, 266n26, 266n28
 frustration(-ed), 46, 69, 76, 172, 184n13, 205, 317
 full democracy, 237–8, 240
 full-time housewives, 258, 353, 355
 gang rape, xv, 178, 184n19, 189
 gender
 barriers, 9, 14–15, 17–18, 27, 105, 112, 126, 138, 164, 247–8, 366
 budgeting, 59, 74, 76, 133, 298, 300, 323, 369
 and development, xvi
 difference, xiii, 12, 21, 28, 83–4, 92, 117, 119, 121, 131–2, 134, 148–9, 172, 178–9, 182, 183n3, 187, 189, 229, 240, 257, 260, 265n24, 272, 333
 discrimination, 12–13, 27, 31, 43–4, 47, 57, 59–60, 67, 71, 103, 172–5, 180, 212, 222, 229, 239, 246–7, 249–50, 254, 263n1, 281, 286, 290n12, 299, 303, 313–14, 318–19, 323–4, 329n5, 366, 369, 372
 division of labor, xvii, 105, 227, 353
 dualism, 67, 180, 187, 254, 369

gender – *continued*

- equality, xvi, xx, 8, 12, 21, 39, 42,
 - 44–6, 48, 53–5, 59, 61–2, 71, 85,
 - 87–8, 91, 98–9, 103, 105–6, 154–5,
 - 159–61, 168n18, 177, 215, 228,
 - 266n28, 273, 281, 283, 306, 344,
 - 347–8, 353, 366, 368–70
- identity, 117–18, 171, 221, 318–19,
 - 327, 331
- inequality, 1–5, 9, 106, 117, 120, 315,
 - 327, 331, 367
- institutions, 217–31, 272, 372
- mainstreaming, 281, 293, 298, 369
- pay gap, 85, 369
- and power, xiv–xvi, 121–35, 171–85,
 - 195–213, 293–309, 313–30
- quotas, 39–40, 47, 54–5, 57, 96, 223,
 - 226, 345, 348–50, 355, 357–60,
 - 362
- relations, xii, xiv–xvi, 13, 121, 129,
 - 131–4, 293–309, 319, 371
- roles, 55, 67, 98, 117, 132, 258, 275,
 - 281, 288, 314, 333, 344, 353,
 - 361–2
- socialization in children, 315–16
- stereotypes, 71, 82, 91–3, 107, 110,
 - 166n1, 256, 281, 318–19, 323–4,
 - 326
- studies, 117, 165, 182–3, 334
- symmetry, 2–3, 187
- violence/GBV, 189–90, 313–16, 320,
 - 322, 325, 329n5
- General Equilibrium Model, 3, 121–2
- genes, 155–6, 160, 166n4, 166nn6–7,
 - 167n12, 168n20, 179, 193, 340
- genocide, xii, 161, 189, 313
- Germany, 3, 85, 109–10, 178, 184n19,
 - 218, 332, 339
- Gerwani (*GerakanWanita Indonesia*), 218
- gift, 140–4, 206
- giinrippo*, 58
- GLEFAS (ElGrupoLatinoamericano de
 - Estudio, Formación y
 - AccionFeminista), 299–300
- globalization, xii, xiv, xvii, 43, 103–5,
 - 107, 110–12, 119, 188, 207, 211,
 - 258, 263n1, 327, 368
- government
 - abusive and corrupt, xii, 4, 7, 215
 - Africa and Latin American, 297–8,
 - 302, 305
 - bonds, 133
 - Brazil, 15–16, 18, 23, 25–9
 - Centralized, 203
 - citizens' control of, 215, 235, 238,
 - 243–5, 368
 - Communist, 193
 - democratic, 230, 239–41
 - dictatorial, 242
 - executive branch, 215, 222, 247
 - federal, 259
 - Japan, 59–61
 - Morocco, 38–48, 276, 278–9, 282, 286
 - Myanmar, 219
 - neglect and denial by, xii
 - Neoconservative, xiii
 - Netherlands, 302
 - Nigeria, 66, 68, 70, 73, 77–8, 80n3
 - policies, 106, 125, 129–30
 - post-Communist countries, 82, 85, 89,
 - 91, 98–9
 - republican, 264n1
 - self-, 221, 237, 356
 - social expenditure, 133, 225
 - Taiwan, 53, 56, 59–60
 - underrepresentation in, 247, 249
- grassroots democracy, 350, 356
- Great Mother/goddess, 137, 159
- gross domestic product (GDP), 65, 70
- gross national product (GNP), 65, 133
- guilt, 109, 119, 138, 141, 148–50, 188–9,
 - 317, 321–2, 333
- v. error, 148–9
- harmony, 61, 146–7, 198–9
- help centers, 321, 328
- helplines, 271, 371
- heterosexual(-ity), 37–8, 109, 138, 156,
 - 191–2, 220–1, 272, 277, 279–81,
 - 313–14, 321, 334–9, 371
- hidden shelters, 59, 156, 271–2, 278,
 - 296, 321, 371
- hiding, downsizing and ignoring
 - domestic violence, 316–18
- hierarchy(-chical), xvii, 2, 56, 103,
 - 117–19, 134, 154, 173–5, 203, 218,
 - 254, 286, 295–6, 299–300, 309, 318

- high-profile managers, 75, 103–20
 challenges, 107–11
 feminist theory, 105–7
 and globalization, 104–5, 111–12
 and socio-economic change, 105–7
 work environment, 107–8, 110, 112
- homo oeconomicus*, 220, 370
- homo sapiens*, 157, 159–60, 191
- homophobia, 212
- homosexual(-ity), 171, 297, 308, 338
- hotlines services, 59, 321
- human beings, 7, 119, 130–1, 134, 154,
 157–8, 160–2, 168n20, 171–2, 174,
 176, 179, 183n6, 187–90, 215,
 254–5, 262, 276, 294, 322, 341
- human biocultural evolution, 160, 164,
 167n15, 168n20
- human development, 47, 156, 224,
 235–6, 300, 369
- human nature, 159–60, 164–5, 188, 262
- hunting with weapons v. hunting with
 hands, 167n16, 173–4
- hybrid regime, 237–8
- identifications, 139, 171, 176, 183n6,
 183n11, 205, 280, 316, 333, 338–9
- identity, 3, 21, 39, 79n1, 82, 117,
 139–40, 143, 179, 187, 193, 195,
 201, 203–6, 220–2, 261, 288, 294–5,
 297, 304–5, 308, 318–19, 323–4,
 327, 331, 333, 336–7, 342, 352–3,
 355, 372
 formation, 331
- Igbo political system (dual sex
 organization), 67–8
- Ijtihad* (progressive interpretation of
 religious texts), 289
- illiteracy, 37–8, 40, 43, 49, 166n1, 260,
 276, 279, 281–2
- imperialism
 American, xiv, 296
 European, xiv–xv, 36, 66–7, 192, 200,
 202, 220, 287
- incomplete democracy, 321
- independent political parties, 350, 356
- India
 call centers in, xv
 feminist activism, 223, 296, 299
 high technological skills, 103
 low wages, 103
- mythology, 141
- organized conflict, 314
- political quotas, 223
- self-help groups, 296
- software companies, 109–10
- indigenous gender order, xv
- individual(-ism, -ization, -istic)
 activists, 4, 28
 agency, 68, 72, 308n1
 anti-social, 258
 aspirations, 44, 82–3, 117, 318
 behaviors, 207, 276, 368
 beliefs, 4
 change within, 367
 choices, 191, 217, 255
 and collective unconscious, 188
 v. community, 212, 254, 258, 260, 373
 consciousness, 118
 freedom, 7, 215, 254, 264n11, 323,
 326, 361
 identity, 179–80
 issue of guilt, 148–9
 legitimization, 285–6, 291n18
 liberties and rights, 15, 211–12, 237,
 368
 in postmodern Western society, 205–6
- rape, 189
- inequality, xiv, 1–5, 7, 9, 11, 14, 16, 19,
 21, 28, 31–2, 41, 47, 82, 84, 99–100,
 106, 117–209, 211–12, 230, 236,
 240, 243, 248, 289, 309, 314–15,
 327, 331, 367–9, 373
- inherited characteristics, 155–6, 166n3,
 167n12
- instinct, 142, 190–1
 animal, 157, 167n12, 173, 175, 188
 defined, 166n10, 190
 infant, 157, 168n20
 maternal, 334, 339
 paternal, 187–9
- institutional advocacy, 296–300
- institutional structure, xv, 12, 237, 284
- interest, 76, 129, 211–12, 255, 263, 368,
 370–1, 373
 self-common, 182, 261
 ethnic and religious, 70, 132, 191, 203,
 241
 lack of, 161, 172
 masculine, 13, 317, 324, 335, 351,
 353–4, 357, 360, 362

- interest – *continued*
 public/political, 12–13, 20–1, 43, 45, 69, 72
 vested, 66, 74–5, 256, 261
 women's, 57, 59, 62, 67–8, 85, 98, 216, 224–6, 229, 259–60, 283, 298
 international feminists, *see* feminism
 international networks, 59, 62, xvi
 IPU (Inter-Parliamentary Union), 38, 53, 215, 224, 265n21, 344
 Israel, 58, 192–3, 216, 265n21
 issue advocacy, 225, 228
- Japan
 alternative representation system, 353–5
 Communist Party, 350
 constitution, 53–4
 democracy, 53, 348
 domestic violence, 60
 elections, 363n4
 equality, 53–4, 59, 347–8, 353
 feminist activists, 60–2, 271
 government, 59–61
 Imperial Diet, 218, 347, 362n1, 363n11
 mobilizations, 271, 344–64
 parliament, 55
 participation, 60
 parties, 350–5
 political representation, 53–62, 344–64
 women on boards of directors, 104
- Juárez, Ciudad, xii, xvi
- Jungian, 3, 119, 141–3, 145, 150–1, 152n5, 172, 179, 187–8, 190, 261–2, 264n4
- Keynesianism, 133
 kinship, 124, 183n6, 196, 202–4, 265n16
 Komei party, 350
 Kuomintang Party (*KMT Junichiro*), 55, 57
- Late Neolithic period, 154, 159–61, 163, 167n16
- Latin America
 constitution, 301, 305–7
 democracy, 301, 305–8
 equality, 306, 309n1
 feminism, 296–300, 303–5, 308
 government, 297–8, 302, 305
 new constitution, 301, 306–7
 parliament, 21–2, 307
 political representation, 293–309
 laws and limits, 315–18
 leadership
 and activism, 56–8, 60
 and decision-making, 71, 298
 democratic objectives, 78–9, 164, 246
 high-profile, 275–91
 innovative programs, 211–12, 372
 male-dominated, 59, 62, 222, 227, 286, 350, 363n6
 political, xiii, 12–13, 19–20, 36, 45, 57, 67, 69, 88, 90, 97, 165, 222, 226–30, 239–41, 248–50, 256
 roles, 55–6, 58, 62, 288
 transformational, 55–8
 vision, goals, transcendental factor, 180, 199, 249
 learning, 80n5, 130, 167n11, 250, 315–16, 328, 340
 legal gains, 278–84
 legal Islam, 279, 282–3, 286, 288–9
 legislative *yuan*, 54, 59
 LGTB gender (lesbian, gay, transgender, bisexual), 135n4, 297, 308
 liberalism, 129, 253, 258, 266n27, 266n34
 liberalism v. liberism, 129, 253, 258, 266n27, 266n34
 liberalization, 40, 42–3, 54, 129
 Life Club Coop, 351–2, 363n8
 local legislatures, 344, 347–8, 355–6, 363n4
 local politics, 57, 98, 344, 350, 355–6, 363n8, 363n11
- macroeconomy, 16, 65, 80n4, 125, 133
Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, 303, 305
MAKIBAKA, 219
 Maldives, 219
 male
 breadwinner, 220–2, 258, 260
 cultural hegemony, 78, 107, 118, 143, 178–80, 253, 319, 370
 dominance, 9, 119, 159–60, 222, 224, 324, 344–45, 357, 360
 frustration, 172, 184n13, 205
 gender supremacy, 255, 264n10

- inferiority complex, feelings of
inferiority, 148, 173, 178–9,
184n13
- polarities, 187, 201, 342
- power, 67, 119, 177, 255, 322, 324–5,
328
- psyche v. female psyche, 137, 141,
143, 146, 148–9, 174–8, 182,
184n20
- mammal, 155–7, 171, 175, 179, 340
- maquiladoras*, xii, xv
- marginalization of women, 1, 3–4, 20,
42–4, 65, 83, 99, 154, 164, 211–13,
226, 228–9, 246, 287, 323, 354, 356,
361, 368, 372
- Marianne*, 255, 262
- market structure, 121–30, 132–4, 135n2
- Market Women's Association, 64–5, 67
- marriage
arranged, 109
average age of, 277–8
as a contract, 265n20, 280
and distribution of property in, 56, 58
and divorce, 38, 48
early, 314
equality in, 48
family code, 37–8, 48
and family planning, 276–8
forced, 279, 314
and labor force participation, 55, 109,
221
laws, 37–8, 48, 221
mixed, 280–1, 321, 328
remarriage, 37, 280
and self-esteem, 336
and supportive spouses, 109
traditional, 191
women's consent for, 37
and women's interest in politics, 216
- Marxian model, 125–6
- Masai, 201, 203–4, 208
- masculinities
hegemonic, 78, 107, 118, 143, 178–80,
253, 319, 370
managerial, xvii, 106, 126, 129
- matrilinearity, 197
- mediation, 67, 208, 257
- megalomania, omnipotence, greatness
(feelings of), 138, 146, 148
- men's inferiority complex, 148, 173,
178–9, 184n13
- men's feminine empathic side, anima
173, 176–7, 179, 181–2
- mentors (formal and informal), 56, 110
- Mexico
femicide/feminicide/*feminicidio*, xii,
314–15, 322, 327, 330n10
feminism, 296–7
political quotas, 21
political representation, 17–18, 21–2,
306
UN World Conference on Women
(1975), 62, 298, 303
women in parliament, 307
- Middle Ages, 155, 161, 166n3
- military authoritarianism, 68, 356
- mirror-neuron system, 315–16
- misogyny, xiii, xiv, 68, 219, 334
- mobbing, 323, 325
- mobilization, xv, 2, 4, 8–9, 23, 37, 43–4,
46, 54, 57, 60, 65, 67, 72, 77, 79,
112, 158, 180, 212, 225–6, 243,
246–9, 256, 265n25, 271–3, 283,
287–9, 296–7, 301, 319, 323, 325,
344–64, 367, 372
- monarchy, 37, 40, 45–6, 217, 261,
264n3, 279, 291n18
- monopoly, 118, 125–9, 132, 135n3,
171–2, 181, 246, 253, 259, 266n37
- morality v. ethicality, 149–50
- Morocco
constitution, 35, 39–42, 45–9, 281,
290n12
democracy, 35–50
equality, 36, 38–9, 42–6, 48–9, 279–81,
283, 289–90
family law (*Mudawana*), 37–8, 45,
278–80
feminism, 4, 37–8, 41–6, 49
feminization, 275–91
government, 38–48, 276, 278–9, 282,
286
new constitution, 35, 39, 46–9
parliament, 38–40, 42, 44, 47–8, 282
participation, 35–50
political quotas, 39–40, 44, 47–9, 282
political representation, 35–50, 275–91
society and culture, 285–6, 288–9
women, 35–50, 275–91

- mother-child bond, 156–8, 166n9, 333
 motherhood/maternity, 158, 184n11,
 187, 208–9, 216, 219–20, 226, 259,
 329n5, 337
 movement party, 351, 362
 municipal councils, 344, 351–2
 Muslim law (*wilayakubra*–great
 guardianship), 219
 Myanmar, 219
 myth(-ical), 2–3, 71, 137, 140–5, 151n2,
 152n4, 158, 189, 195–7, 200, 256,
 317

 narcissism/narcissistic love, 148, 175,
 260, 262, 318, 333, 336
 nation(-al), sovereignty, 69, 71, 76–7,
 202, 208, 238, 261
 nationalist movement, xv, 36–7
 Nationality Law, 280
 natural evolution, 171, 179–80
 nature, 142, 154, 157, 159, 166n1, 171,
 173–4, 176, 179–80, 182, 188, 199,
 255, 265n16, 352
 neoliberalism, xii, xv–xvi, 299, 301–5,
 368, 370
 neotopia, 164, 168n21
 Netherlands, the
 colonialism, 202, 265n16
 equality, 90
 gender gaps, 85
 government, 302
 participation, 218
Netto, 350–5, 363nn6–8, 363n11
 neuroscience, 117, 155, 164–5, 184n15,
 254, 315, 340–1, 367
 New Awakenings, 57
 new constitution
 Africa and Latin America, 301, 306–7
 Brazil, 15
 Morocco, 35, 39, 46–9
 Nigeria, Federal Republic of
 civil war, 68–9, 79n1
 colonial administration, 66–8, 79
 constitution, 67, 69, 71, 73
 democracy, 64–80
 equality, 71, 79
 feminism, 64, 67, 79
 government, 66, 68, 70, 73, 77–8,
 80n3
 independence, 65–70, 79n1

 Minerals and Mines Year (MAMY), 74
 Minister for Mines and Steel, 64, 66,
 71–3, 78
 National Economic Empowerment
 and Development Strategy, 73
 National Youth Policy, 70
 participation, 64–80
 political representation, 64–80
 post-independence, 66
 NGOs (NGO-ization), xvi, 43–5, 56, 59,
 61–2, 98–9, 250n1, 278, 281–3,
 288–9, 297–8, 300–6
 non-partisanship network, 345,
 355, 358, 360
 nonviolence/nonviolent, 160–5, 167n12,
 168nn19–20, 315, 319–26, 328, 372
 social systems, 155, 162
 social transformation, 165, 168n19
 strategies, 319–23
 studies, 163
 Nordic countries, 104, 256, 259, 265n21,
 266n28, 345–6
 Northern Ireland Women's Coalition,
 351
 nurturing, 156–7, 164, 206, 219, 371

 objectivity v. subjectivity, 118, 176
 Oxfam (Oxford Committee for Famine
 Relief), 296, 299, 302

 Pakistan, 219, 265n21, 299, 314
 Paleolithic rock art, 158–9
 paranoia, 149, 175–6
 Pareto optimum, 122–3, 125, 127,
 129–30
 parity, 7, 47, 49, 58, 78, 192, 281,
 290n12, 360
 parity candidacy, 358–9
 parliament
 Africa, 307
 Brazil, 8, 11–14, 16–18, 21, 28–9
 Central-Eastern Europe, 82, 85–7, 91,
 93–9, 246
 democratization, 213, 236, 247, 368
 European, 85–6, 345
 Japan, 55
 Latin America, 21–2, 307
 members of, 216, 225, 228, 230, 358
 Morocco, 38–40, 42, 44, 47–8, 282
 networks within parties, 222

- procedures, 228
 South Korea, 349
 Taiwan, 53–5, 57
 UN policies, 222
 women in, 7–8, 48, 224–5, 236, 247,
 249, 265n21, 306–7, 315, 345–8
- participation
 Brazil, 11–33
 Central-Eastern Europe, 82–100
 citizen, 244–6, 262, 293, 296, 350, 356
 civil, civic, 163, 296
 equal, 201, 239, 298, 368
 ethnicity, 147, 150–1
 in France, 219
 in global executive positions, 103–20
 Japan, 60
 Morocco, 35–50
 in Netherlands, 218
 NGO, 304
 Nigeria, 64–80
 rights, 220, 240–2, 301, 366
 Taiwan, 55, 60
 Voluntary, 352, 354
- party fund resources, 19, 31
 party quotas, 87, 222, 272, 357
 party systems, 19, 83, 86, 246–7, 261
 PAS (Parental Alienation Syndrome),
 317, 329n9
- paternal authority, 188, 317
- patriarchy, xiii, xv–xvi, 2, 37–8, 42, 57–8,
 68, 78, 83, 88, 119–20, 154, 172,
 174, 187–8, 190, 259, 272–3, 275,
 280, 284–6, 301, 314–15, 317, 338,
 344–64, 370–1
 discriminatory culture, 324
 power paradigm, 323–7
- patrilocal family, 202
- peace/peaceful, 80n4, 124, 198
 contestation for power, 239
 and diplomacy, 319–20
 and harmony, 198–9, 203–4
 movements, 167n12, 177, 296
 studies/research, 160
 transformation, 46, 168n19, 275, 328
- Phenomenological School, 254
- Philippines, 219
- physical violence, 272, 313–30, 371
- Pithecanthropus, 191
- plan
 abstract, 175, 255
 instrumental, 176, 256
 rational, 175–6, 256, 261
- play
 free, 340, 342
 spontaneous, 340–1
 symbolic, 341
- Poland, 93–8
 Congress of Women, 97, 99
 women in parliament, 1989–2011,
 94–5
- political and economic transition, 84–5,
 367
- political capital, 18, 31, 262
- political competence, 12, 14–15, 18, 26,
 163, 165, 239, 245
- political consolidation, 235–6, 242, 247
- political cross party organizing, 224
- political culture, 2, 9, 11, 20, 213, 237,
 240, 244, 246, 248–50, 286, 368
- political discrimination, 12, 247,
 249–50, 286
- political economy, 66–71, 211, 290n12,
 367
- political equality, 11–12, 158, 236,
 239–40, 242, 244–6
 see also under equality
- political exclusion, 4, 12, 71, 215–31
- political gains, 55, 275–91
- political inclusion, 16–17, 32, 213,
 235–50, 368
- political inequalities, 14, 236
 see also under gender
- political institutions, xiv, 8, 12, 14, 17,
 22, 39, 62, 67, 199, 216–17, 219,
 223–31, 235, 246, 249
- political mobilization, 8, 54, 79, 243,
 248–9, 271, 362
 see also mobilization
- political participation, *see* participation
- political parties, 2, 8, 12–16, 18–20,
 22–3, 27–8, 32, 37–40, 56, 83, 87,
 96–7, 163–4, 181, 213, 218, 222–3,
 226, 230–1, 239, 241–3, 245–7, 249,
 282, 287–8, 297, 305, 350–1, 355–6,
 359, 362, 362n1, 363n3, 363n11,
 368, 372

- political power, 8, 14, 35–6, 39–40, 44, 48–9, 55, 67, 71, 125, 159, 200–4, 217, 222, 247, 260, 295, 345, 361
- political quotas
 in Brazil, 14, 20–7, 31–2, 223, 304
 campaign, 224–7
 in East Asia, 4
 in India, 223
 in Morocco, 39–40, 44, 47–9, 282
 party and constitutional, 222
 in post-communist countries, 87, 91, 93–7, 99
 in South Korea, 271–2, 345, 348–50, 355–60, 362, 363nn3–4, 364n16
 in Taiwan, 54–7
 in top executive positions, 103
- political representation
 in Africa and Latin America, 293–309
 in Brazil, 11–33
 gender and, 1–5, 11–33, 82–100, 344–64, 366–73
 in Japan and South Korea, 344–64
 in Morocco, 35–50, 275–91
 in Nigeria, 64–80
 in post-communist countries, 82–100
 proportional representation (PR), 14, 27, 40, 55, 86, 93–4, 349–50, 358
 in Taiwan and Japan, 53–62
- political rights, 8, 11, 13–14, 16, 39, 45, 85, 218, 220, 235–7, 242–3, 245, 247, 281
- political skills and will, 9, 104, 112
- political transition, *see* political and economic transition
- politics of exclusion, *see* political exclusion
- polygamy, 37, 48, 198–9, 279, 286
- post-communist countries, 15, 82, 85, 89, 91, 98–9
- power
 conceptions of, 56, 124
 and democracy, 64–80
 difference, 195–213
 and economics, 121–35
 gender and, xii–xviii, 64–80, 121–35, 171–85, 293–309, 313–30
 as male projection, 138, 148, 206, 336, 338
 masculine, 137–52
 and networks, 293–309
 operations, 65, 79
 politics, 162–3
 power to/power over, 56, 111–12, 123–5, 127–9, 279
 systems, emergence of, 154, 158, 160–5
 and violence, 313–30
 power for power's sake, 143, 212, 254
 prehistory, 158–65
 prestige, 2, 19, 43, 105, 147, 173–4, 178, 180, 198–9, 227, 254, 264n8
 primary affect deficit, 338
 primary care, 321, 331–42
 consequences for boys, 334
 consequences for girls, 335–9
 primary relationship, 332–7, 341
 privatization, 75, 77, 79n2, 129, 368
 production of food, 154, 160–1, 165, 166n1
 profit for profit's sake, 257, 264n7
 projection(-ive), 138, 148, 336, 338
 pro-male bias, 119, 222, 230
 prosocial behavior, 332, 340, 342
 psyche, male v. female, 137, 139–44, 146, 148–9, 174–8, 184n20
 psychoanalysis, 1, 3, 117–18, 130, 172, 183n3, 187–8, 190–1, 254, 272, 315, 326, 331, 336, 338, 367
 psychological archetypes, 119, 137, 151n2, 152n5, 158, 179, 190, 320, 335
 psychological premises, 172, 325
 puberty rituals, 331–2
 public goods, 76, 77–8, 127–8, 130
 public opinion, 38, 49, 74, 93, 199, 207, 222, 265n14
 public sphere, 1, 38, 82–4, 87–8, 118, 138–9, 174, 206, 258, 284, 290, 353
 quality of democracy, 1–2, 4–5, 11, 14–15, 32, 66, 69, 78–9, 211–67, 358
 quotas, *see* political quotas
- racism, 189, 250n4
 rape, xv–xvi, 59, 119, 178
 addressing, xvi, 59
 authorized, 119
 debates about, 190
 laws, 308
 marital, 298, 304

- mass/gang, 178, 184n19, 189
 murder and, 59
 physical and psychological support to
 victims, 321, 326
 prevention programs, 272, 313
 of slaves, 119
 wartime, 178, 184n19, 189, 313, 315,
 327
 receptivity, 55, 139, 145, 334
 reform
 civil society, 37–8, 40
 constitutional, 45, 47–8
 democratic, 32, 71–2, 248
 economic, 42, 73
 electoral, 40, 345, 355–6, 358
 family code, 35, 49n1, 272, 278, 288,
 296
 inheritance policy, 58
 institutional, 237, 248, 345, 360, 362
 Islamist, 278–82, 286
 neoliberal, 303
 political, 13, 35, 41, 46–7, 213, 219,
 368
 welfare, 73, 75, 78–9, 112, 256,
 259–60, 266n36
 religion, 2, 36–8, 40, 44, 46–7, 70–1,
 79n1, 118–20, 129, 154, 158–9,
 166n2, 168n17, 173, 177–8, 181,
 191, 195, 203, 219, 253–4, 260, 273,
 275, 278–9, 281–2, 284–6, 288–9,
 290n7, 293, 298, 300, 308, 338, 361,
 369
 relocation, 103–4, 107, 109–10
 reparation, 61, 150, 302
 reproductive health, 226, 276–7
 resistance, xv–xvi, 1, 15, 36, 46, 65, 72,
 75, 119, 175, 262, 275, 284, 318,
 355, 367
 responsibility, 7, 37–8, 40–1, 47, 49, 67,
 75, 79n2, 109, 118–20, 165, 175,
 187, 192, 201–2, 206, 221, 225, 230,
 245, 255, 257, 319, 321, 328, 354,
 369, 370–1
 ethicality and, 147, 151
 guilt and, 148–50
 responsiveness, 16, 241, 244–5
 return of the repressed, 188, 334
 revolutions, 47, 148, 155, 162, 207,
 218–20, 239, 241, 254, 257, 262–3,
 287, 289, 322, 373
 ritual, 142, 196, 202, 204, 285, 331–2
 rule of law, 4, 16, 53, 69, 118, 213,
 215, 235, 238, 242, 246, 264n12,
 368
 Russia
 democratization, 7
 inequalities, 240
 privatization, 129
 women in parliament, 86
 Women of Russia, 351
 Rwanda, 265n21, 303, 305–7, 345
 genocide, 313

SeikatsuKurabuSeikyo, 351–2, 363n8
Seikatsusha (life-maker), 350, 352–5,
 363n5
 self-governance, 353–3, 356
 sentiment(-s, -al)
 feeling(-s), emotion(s) v. reason,
 rational, instrumental, 3–4, 68,
 118, 176, 179, 184n15, 261–2,
 264n3, 266n28, 368
 service politics, 162–4
 sexual abuse, 314, 317, 326, 329n8,
 330n11
 sexual harassment, 60, 226, 298, 304,
 313
 sexual violence, 60, 313–14, 327, 371
 shadow, 137–9, 141, 145, 147, 149,
 151n1
 short and long-term negative effects of
 violence, 313–30
 single-member districts, 350, 358,
 363n4, 364n15
 social and psychological legitimization,
 4, 275
 social behavior, xiii, 12, 157, 167n12,
 168n20, 176, 201, 316, 318, 332,
 340, 342
 social contract, 76, 112, 207, 219–20
 social movements, 2, 54, 241, 249, 256,
 260, 287, 298, 300–1, 304, 306–8,
 351, 367, 373
 social networks, 9, 18, 108, 111–12, 257,
 294–5, 372
 and political networks, 31
 South Korea
 constitution, 358, 364n15
 parliament, 349

South Korea – *continued*

political quotas, 271–2, 345, 348–50, 355–60, 362, 363nn3–4, 364n16
 political representation, 344–64
 space-based patriarchy, 275, 284
 speech, 15, 40, 167n11, 184n16,
 199–200, 205, 215, 220, 264n11,
 287, 293, 362n1
 spirit/spirituality, 3, 78, 139, 141–2, 144,
 148, 152n5, 154, 166n2, 168n17,
 183n6, 257, 260, 266n30, 324, 337,
 353
 stalking, 60, 184n16, 319, 323
 Standard Model, 122–8, 132–4
 state
 feminism, 41–3, 85
 formations, 200, 218
 funds/spending, 28, 133
 and market, 128, 130–1
 modern, 132, 182, 254, 261, 263,
 285
 nation(-al), 9, 132, 299
 -owned enterprises, 79n2, 84, 129
 planning, 122
 policies, xvi, 4, 278–9, 304–5
 power, 125, 128, 220, 223, 360
 progressive, 54, 56
 religion, 286
 role of, 128, 130–1, 370
 societies, 200, 221–2, 246, 265n16
 UN policies, 61–2
 welfare, 131–4, 221, 257, 259
 women's roles within, 215–17
 stewardship, 74–5
 strategy(-ic), 275–364
 v. empathy(-ic), 256, 261–2, 266n30,
 338–41, 371
 structural adjustment policies, 68, 79n2,
 298–9, 302–3, 370
 structural violence, 161, 163, 165,
 167n12, 272, 324
 struggle, xii–xviii, 9, 35–8, 43–5, 49, 70,
 75, 77, 177, 180, 211–12, 217, 223,
 257–8, 261, 266n26, 278, 282–3,
 287, 290, 290n12, 301, 309n1, 321,
 344, 372–3
 subjectivity, 146, 150, 176, 204–6
 submissiveness trap, 187–94
 culture and gender violence, 189–90
 demography and psychology, 192–3

evolutionary selection, 190–2
 father's role, 187–9
 substantive representation, 13, 224–5,
 227, 357, 360
 Sweden
 equality, 89
 female board members, 104
 feminism, 345
 symbiotic fusion, 137, 338
 symbol(-ic), 13, 37, 40, 44, 56, 107, 112,
 137, 139–45, 147, 150–1, 151n2,
 152n4, 158, 167n13, 173–4, 176,
 178–9, 195, 205–6, 254–5, 262,
 264n3, 265n23, 271–2, 279, 319,
 337, 341, 348, 372
 symbolic consciousness v. rational
 consciousness, 139–4
 symmetric information, 127–8
 Taiwan, 2, 8
 constitution, 53–4, 56
 democracy, 53, 348
 DPP (Democratic Progressive Party),
 54, 57, 59
 equality, 53, 55, 58
 feminism, 57, 59
 government, 53, 56, 59–60
 parliament, 53–5, 57
 participation, 55, 60
 political quotas, 54–7
 political representation, 53–62
 territory(-ies), 83, 172, 182, 184n14,
 202–3, 208, 254, 262, 328
 Third Sector, 249, 258, 260–2
 Third wave of democratization, 8–9, 17,
 181, 235
 three-dimensional organization of the
 egg, 155, 166n5
 time
 and energy, 174
 and history, 325
 idea of, 175
 leisure, 124
 and place, 165, 172, 177
 working, 55, 124
 tradition, xii, xvii, 3, 8–9, 12, 31, 38, 45,
 55, 66–7, 79n2, 82–3, 85, 91, 96,
 111–12, 118, 132, 140, 147, 160,
 167n16, 168n18, 171, 174, 180,
 184nn17–18, 190–2, 197–201, 203,

- 208, 219, 225, 229, 240–1, 249, 253, 256, 258, 261, 263, 264n12, 273, 275, 281, 284–6, 289, 295, 301, 308, 314, 317, 320–1, 324, 327–8, 329n10, 339, 351, 355, 370–1
- transformation, xiv, 2, 4–5, 55–8, 78, 83–4, 88, 94, 105, 118, 127, 141–2, 145–6, 150, 162, 165, 168n19, 168n21, 189–90, 193, 205, 211–13, 235, 246, 248–50, 254–5, 257–8, 261, 263, 275–364, 368–9, 372–3
- transnational, 59, 272, 295–306, 308
- transnational advocacy networks, 297–9, 306
- transnational informational networks, 298, 300, 306
- traumatic experience, 332, 342, 371
- tribal knowledge, 195–6
- unconscious
- collective, 118–19, 139–40, 151n1, 172, 174, 178–9, 188–90, 193, 197, 254, 342
 - consciousness, 142, 151
 - desires/expectation, 319, 335, 337
 - memory, 138, 183n6, 183n11
 - personal, 151n1, 204
 - Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), 61, 327
 - conferences on women, 60, 62, 64, 222, 298, 302–3, 366
 - Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 8–9, 60–1, 67, 71, 299, 314, 329n6, 366
 - Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, 313–14
 - Development Program (UNDP), 47, 75–6, 299
 - global conferences on the child, 300–1
 - Human Development Report*, 300
- United States
- abortion access, 61, 224
 - Bush administration, xiii
 - centers for batterers, 329n10
 - Congress, 224, 228–9
 - Constitution, 54, 218
 - equality, 59
 - female board members, 104
 - military service, 231n1
 - “republican motherhood” ideology, 219
 - sexual harassment, 313
 - social welfare reforms, 266n36
 - superpower, 289
 - Supreme Court, 265n22
 - underrepresentation of women, 236
 - voting behavior, 216, 218, 250n4
 - wage gaps, 55
 - “war on terror”, xiii
 - women’s agencies, 298
 - women’s groups, 58–9, 61
 - women-only law firms,
 - universal citizenship, 353, 361
 - utopia, 162, 164, 195, 200, 203, 206–9, 212, 261, 263
 - vertical, social and horizontal
 - accountability, 16, 238
 - violence
 - against children, 58, 72, 163, 221, 313, 317, 325
 - cultural, 66, 167n12
 - defined, 167n12
 - direct, 160, 167n12, 167n16
 - military, 61, 161
 - origins of, 154, 159–62, 168n20
 - structural, 161, 163, 165, 167n12, 168n20, 272, 324
 - against women (VAW), 9, 56, 58–60, 62, 66, 139, 142, 178, 180, 189–90, 224, 226, 271–2, 296–8, 303–4, 308, 309n1, 313–30, 369, 371–2
 - voters’ behavior, 98, 356
 - waged labor, 220, 293
 - war
 - civil, 68, 70, 79n1
 - victories in, 178
 - violence/crimes, 55, 61, 142, 160–2, 167n12, 313, 315, 318
 - weapons, 327
 - witnessed, 316, 327
 - welfare state, welfarism, 131–4, 221, 257, 259–60
 - witnessed violence, 316, 327

women

cultural and economic capital, 83–5
 as dependents, xvi, 42, 138, 221–2,
 337–9

descriptive representation, 345, 347,
 357, 360

in East European parliaments, 82–100
 empowerment, 12, 38, 41–2, 47, 56,
 61, 64, 67, 72–3, 84, 133–4, 204,
 243–4, 284, 288–9, 304, 320,
 356–7, 360, 362

experiences in governance, 223–31

in global executive positions, 103–20

human rights, xii, 9, 39, 45–7, 60, 67,
 80n4, 254, 263n1, 283–4, 287–8,
 296, 298–301, 303, 305, 309n2,
 313, 328n2, 353

interests, 59, 62, 67–8, 85, 216, 224–5,
 298, 351, 357, 360, 362

women's male side, animus, 176

and migration, 258, 320–1

movements, 35, 47, 53, 55–6, 61–2,
 161, 219, 226, 279, 286, 289,
 295–7, 301, 303–6, 308, 321, 345,
 355–8

nongovernmental organizations, *see*
 NGOs

in Polish parliament, 1989–2011, 94–5

political representation, *see* political
 representation

political rights, 8, 11, 13–14, 16, 39,
 45, 85, 218, 220, 235–7, 242–3,
 245, 247, 281

solidarity associations and
 organizations, 318–24, 328, 345,
 355–8, 360

underrepresentation, 2, 14, 16–17, 28,
 38, 71, 92, 217, 236, 247, 249,
 344, 361

women in public office

bureaucracy, 215–16

executive, 215, 222

legislative, 215–16, 222, 228

military, 216, 231n1

bill sponsorship, 226, 229

discrimination, 222, 229

marginalization, 228–9

success rates in bill passage, 225, 227

Women of Russia, 351

World Bank, 41, 46, 70, 76–8, 278, 296,
 299

Bureau of Privatization Enterprises, 77

structural adjustment policies, 299,
 370

Sustainable Management of Mineral
 Resources Project (SMMRP), 76–7

youth, 45–6, 70, 72, 84, 258, 288

zipper list, 99, 358–9