ETHNICITY AND RACISM IN CYPRUS

NATIONAL PRIDE AND PREJUDICE?

PETER A. J. STEVENS

Ethnicity and Racism in Cyprus

Mapping Global Racisms
Series Editor: **Ian Law**, Professor of Racism and Ethnicity Studies in the School of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Leeds, UK

Titles include:

Nikolay Zakharov
RACE AND RACISM IN RUSSIA

Ian Law
MEDITERRANEAN RACISMS
Connections and Complexities in the Racialization of the Mediterranean Region

Ian Law
RED RACISMS
Racism in Communist and Post-Communist Contexts

Shirley Anne Tate and Ian Law
CARIBBEAN RACISMS
Connections and Complexities in the Racialisation of the Caribbean Region

Peter A. J. Stevens
ETHNICITY AND RACISM IN CYPRUS
National Pride and Prejudice?

Ethnicity and Racism in Cyprus

National Pride and Prejudice?

Peter A. J. Stevens
Ghent University, Belgium

palgrave
macmillan

For Mary and Yiannis,
for your love and inspiration

Contents

List of Figures and Tables

Figures

Tables

Foreword

Ethnicity and Racism in Cyprus: National Pride and Prejudice? is part of a larger project, which aimed to understand the nature and causes of students' views of and experiences with racism and ethnic out-groups in Cyprus. The book is a more focused attempt to shed light on the relationship between national pride and ethnic prejudice. Having co-supervised with the author the research project from which he drew the data to write this book, I have a privileged and intimate relationship with its subject matter. The journey from Peter's initial idea for a research study to the formal end of the project and the publication of results has been long and challenging. To start with, the research topic itself entailed a well-designed but flexible plan, which could be adjusted to a complex and dynamic local scene with its own sensitivities and constraints. Managing a study which addresses a sensitive issue requires constant vigilance and a great deal of patience and optimism. It is with great pleasure that I write the book's foreword, which offers me an opportunity to reflect on the issues which Stevens addresses and which are, in many ways, issues I have been personally struggling with in my own work with children, nationalism and identity construction in Cyprus.

Much has been written over the years about nationalism and nation-building in Cyprus. Yet, we still lack a deeper understanding of how these processes unfold and become meaningful in ordinary people's everyday lives. Of particular interest to this unfolding are the children and young people who find themselves caught between the state's institutionalized attempts to produce particular kinds of citizen-subjects who will uphold its national narrative, the social and political discourses which frame 'ways of thinking' about 'self' and 'other', and their own personal and familial histories. Granted, the task of unpacking these processes of citizen-making and identity construction is enormous and clearly a challenging one. But it is a task worth pursuing. *Ethnicity and Racism in Cyprus* does this through an informed theoretical and methodological engagement with different sets of carefully collected data that allow for a nuanced analysis and interpretation which remains faithful to the empirical reality.

The book contributes a great deal to our understanding of the intricate and entangled relationship between national pride and prejudice in the context of divided Cyprus. It highlights how a deeper understanding of the development of this relationship needs to take into account the historical and social particularities of the context; it is not enough, Stevens shows, to just take into account national identifications but it is also important to consider additional configurations of identity such as cultural, religious and racial ones.

The two schools on which the author focuses – *Green Lane* and *Red Brick* – offer him the opportunity to explore young people's inter-ethnic relations, an opportunity which is quite rare and unique in the context of Cyprus' division. In turn, we are offered a glimpse into what happens when otherwise ethnically antagonistic groups participate in the same educational institutions, an issue of immense political and social significance for a society attempting to transition to a post-conflict situation through a political settlement of the Cyprus problem.

In that sense, *Ethnicity and Racism in Cyprus* is a timely book which offers much useful insight to educational policymakers. At a time when efforts at finding a political settlement on the island are intensified, books like this provide opportunities for rethinking the practical implementation of policies in school contexts. Stevens' close look at the two schools allows him to explain why group attitudes in one school are more polarized as compared to the other. Differences between the two schools' multicultural and anti-racist policies, the perceived politicized nature of their governing bodies, and students' experiences of racism as well as the size and ethnic composition of the schools contribute to this difference. By identifying these complicating factors, the book makes a convincing argument about the differential reception of educational policies. What are otherwise well-intentioned policies do not have the desired reception by those they affect. The hard stance, for instance, of *Green Lane* towards incidents of racism against Turkish Cypriot students ended up fostering feelings of resentment among the Greek Cypriot students of the school, who felt that Turkish Cypriots were granted more privileges as compared to themselves. Thus, what might on the surface appear to be a clear and decisive position towards racist incidents ends up exacerbating negative feelings among the groups involved. And this is a productive lesson for educational policymakers who need to become aware of

how delicate and challenging is the act of maintaining balances in all efforts to fight racism.

The book also provides important insights into the workings of boundary-making, which Stevens argues is always a situated process: young Greek and Turkish Cypriots engage in boundary work in relation to specific ethnic out-groups which are meaningful to them. This is a call away from simplifying and homogenizing out-group perceptions and attitudes and towards situating and historicizing them. Above all, it is a call for paying closer attention to what the implicated social actors have to say about their own boundary work.

Those who are interested in understanding the hold of nationalism on both Greek and Turkish Cypriots will find interesting differences in the data presented by Stevens, and much to reflect on. Take, for instance, the finding that the Turkish Cypriot students were more likely as compared to their Greek Cypriot counterparts to see themselves as 'Cypriot'. Or the finding that Greek Cypriot students were more likely to see their ethnic group identity in nationalistic terms, to consider in other words their group as culturally different and superior to other groups, and to attach more significance to religion. These findings allude to differences in the ideological orientations of the two communities in Cyprus and suggest the need for further research into the factors that constitute these differences. Turkish-speaking students' more negative views of Turks compared to Greek Cypriot views of Greeks as well as Turkish-speaking students' perceptions of Greek Cypriots that are more positive compared to Greek-speaking students' perceptions of Turkish Cypriots similarly invite researchers to further explore these differences.

The multiple definitions of self-assigned identity among Greek Cypriot students versus the more dominant 'Cypriot' identity preferred by most Turkish Cypriot students pinpoints the differential dynamics of identity construction and ideological differentiation that characterizes the two groups. Yet, in the end one cannot help but note that Greek Cypriot students are more likely to claim a national, Greek identity while Turkish Cypriot students mainly prefer a more overarching Cypriot identity. This might of course be an outcome of the ideological orientations of the Turkish Cypriot students who attend schools in the south and who are more positively predisposed in their attitudes towards Greek Cypriots. As Stevens shows, the large number of what may be termed more Hellenic

Greek Cypriot students who think of themselves as primarily Greek is significant, at least in the sense that their version of collective identity excludes Turkish Cypriots. The book directs our attention to these differential outcomes of socialization processes, which need to be tested further among a larger sample of students from both communities.

Unsurprisingly, some of the findings confirm results of previous studies (e.g. the overwhelmingly negative perceptions of Turks by Greek Cypriots), but even then Stevens' study shows how the internal identity differentiation among Greek Cypriot students results in somewhat different evaluations. In this way, the book problematizes understandings of 'self' and 'other', and provides more nuanced theorizations of inter-ethnic perceptions and attitudes while avoiding reductionist tendencies. This more nuanced differentiation of group identity allows Stevens to show how group boundaries shift, how they expand and collapse to encompass or exclude 'others' in a world where ideological orientations are multiple and varied.

Interestingly, the study also debunks the Greek Cypriot homogenizing stereotypes, which have Turkish Cypriots be close to Turks by showing that the former overwhelmingly consider the latter to be their cultural inferiors. The lived realities of Turkish Cypriot students and their encounters with mainland Turks in the occupied north challenge the putative potential of nationalism to unify and further invite us to look beyond the surface for internal divisions and conflicts in the two communities.

Though this is clearly a book about Cyprus, scholars interested in questions of nationalism, national pride and prejudice will find many useful insights of comparative interest. The book's sociological insights will also likely appeal to education scholars as well as students from other disciplinary backgrounds including political science, anthropology and social psychology. Likewise, childhood studies researchers who are more accustomed to purely qualitative studies may find the mixed-methods research design which Stevens uses to be a productive and enriching one that brings forth complementary knowledge and understanding.

Using a sharp sociological lens, Stevens offers us through *Ethnicity and Racism in Cyprus* a complex picture of the interrelationship between national pride and prejudice. The book highlights the

complexity of this picture, which allows us to see more clearly the colours and shades which illustrate it. It is in this sense that the book makes an undoubted contribution to our evolving understandings of national pride and prejudice among the young.

Spyros Spyrou
Nicosia, July 2015

Acknowledgements

1
Introduction

> But vanity, not love, has been my folly. Pleased with the preference of one, and offended by the neglect of the other, on the very beginning of our aquaintance, I have courted prepossession and ignorance, and driven reason away, where either were concerned. Till this moment I never knew myself. (Elizabeth Bennet in Jane Austen's *Pride and Prejudice*)

In this passage from Jane Austen's famous novel, the protagonist Elizabeth discovers that she has misjudged Darcy, and blames her prejudice on her vanity, which is described by her sister Mary as 'what we would have others think of us' while she relates pride more 'to our opinion of ourselves'. More specifically, Elizabeth realizes that Darcy's initial proud and condescending attitudes towards her family had touched her pride. Through this incident she developed strong feelings of dislike towards Mr Darcy, which she can only rationalize or put in context towards the end of the story. One of the main themes in this novel is how two people overcome their own pride and prejudice to discover that they actually love each other. Is there then an intrinsic relationship between these two social psychological traits? Does pride lead to more prejudice, and are both fundamental barriers to the development of close and positive relationships between people?

This book addresses this question, albeit not applied in the context of two individuals, but in relation to people's feelings of national pride and

prejudice towards ethnic out-groups. The question if and how feelings of collective, national pride relate to feelings and attitudes of and behaviour to ethnic out-groups has been a topic of interest in a broad range of social science disciplines, including (political) sociology, history, social psychology, and educational and communication sciences. Chapter 2 critically evaluates key qualitative and quantitative research contributions in this field. It suggests that the relationship between national pride and prejudice is complex owing to the different ways in which national pride can be conceptualized, as illustrated in Mary's distinction between vanity and pride. Furthermore, it shows that researchers should look beyond the limits of 'national' identifications and explore what kinds of ethnic (racial, cultural, national, religious) in-group and out-group identities become meaningful in particular social contexts and how properties of in-group ethnic identities relate to prejudice towards meaningful ethnic out-groups. It also emphasizes the importance of considering the underlying social and sociological processes and characteristics that mediate the relationship between ethnic pride and prejudice. This chapter concludes with a description of the key research questions that will be addressed in this study, and a description of the context of Cyprus, in which this research has been carried out. Cyprus constitutes a theoretically important 'extreme case' to study the relationship between ethnic pride and prejudice as processes of nation building (and related national identities) go hand in hand with the positioning of ethnic groups as outsiders and even enemies. Furthermore, in its specific political and demographic processes, Cyprus allows for an analysis of the relationship between ethnic pride and prejudice in relationship to ethnic out-groups that differ in terms of their historical and political relationship with dominant ethnic in-groups.

A key argument that this book hopes to demonstrate is that research on ethnic pride and prejudice can benefit from adopting a particular methodology, in which qualitative and quantitative research techniques are used in combination to address specific, interrelated research questions. Chapter 3 briefly describes the characteristics of the mixed methods research design that underpins this study.

Chapter 4 is the first empirical chapter that looks at how Greek Cypriot (GC) and Turkish Cypriot (TC) students develop ethnic boundaries in the context of Cyprus and the underlying socio-psychological motivations for doing so. Such an analysis allows us to explore what kinds of ethnic in- and out-groups are meaningful for

GCs and TCs in the context of Cyprus, how they distinguish these groups from each other, and what kinds of socio-psychological motivations they have for doing so.

Chapter 5, as a second empirical chapter, builds on this base by investigating more inductively how the structural environment in which these young people operate stimulates them to opt for particular cultural scripts in describing their ethnic in- and out-groups in a particular way. In the context of Cyprus, and with the students included in our sample, it identifies the school and the family as two key institutions that inform students' ethnic prejudice. More specifically, it highlights the importance of school institutional features (related to their anti-racism and pro-multiculturalism policies and the politicized nature of the school board) and characteristics of social networks in school (the size and composition of the school in terms of ethnicity and the occurrence of discrimination in school) as important factors that contribute to young people's inter-ethnic attitudes and relationships. In addition, it suggests a strong overlap between young people's ethnic in- and out-group opinions and those of members of their family, as presented by these young people. Finally, it also suggests the importance of peer-groups, sports activities and youth clubs in developing (or reducing) ethnic prejudice.

Chapter 6 is a final empirical chapter, which tests particular hypotheses about the relationship between ethnic pride and prejudice; hypotheses that developed through the analysis of the qualitative data and review of existing research in this field. It suggests the importance of socio-psychological and sociological theories of prejudice in partially explaining the relationship between ethnic pride and prejudice. In addition, it also shows how different general dimensions of national pride (such as patriotism on the one hand and nationalism and centrality on the other) relate differently to prejudice and how context-specific characteristics of ethnic identities (such as the distinction between a Cypriot, Greek Cypriot and Greek identity and the attachment to a refugee identity) influence students' prejudice. Finally, it shows that research should consider the variety of meaningful ethnic out-groups in studying the relationship between ethnic pride and prejudice.

Chapter 7 summarizes these findings and discusses the limitations of this study, and suggests how the findings and limitations can stimulate further research in this area.

By focusing on the relationship between national pride and prejudice in one particular national context, this study deviates somewhat from the comparative approach employed in the *Mapping Global Racism* series, edited by Ian Law. While this book looks primarily at factors and processes specific to a national context in shaping prejudice, the other contributions in this series rely more on a national comparative approach to identify overlap and links between racisms in different national settings (Law 2012, 2014). However, these differences in approach should be perceived more as complementary to each other, rather than competing with each other, as they both use a different lens to study the same phenomena. As both approaches help to put together different parts of the same puzzle, their combined efforts allow us to draw a more detailed picture of the manifestations of racism and its underlying causes in different social contexts.

2
Studying the Relationship between National Pride and Prejudice in Context

Ethnic pride and prejudice

Within the fields of (political) sociology, history, social psychology and educational and communication sciences there has been considerable interest over the relationship between various forms of collective ethnic, national or racial pride and ethnic, national or racial prejudice (e.g. Harnetz 2002; Kyriakides, Virdee and Modood 2009; Wagner et al. 2012). There is no agreement between social scientists in how to define related concepts such as prejudice, racism, stereotypes and discrimination. Sociologists usually fall back on Allport's (1954) definition of prejudice (Quillian 2006), as something that consists of both an affective (antipathy or a negative emotion or feeling towards a particular group) and a cognitive dimension (a stereotype or a poorly founded beliefs about a particular out-group). Racism is then conceptualized as prejudice and/or discrimination, the latter representing a behavioural dimension. However, the socio-psychological ABC model of attitudes assumes that an attitude has three components: an affective (prejudice), a behavioural (discrimination) and a cognitive (stereotypes) component. Stereotypes are then perceived as a set of beliefs about the group or individual, which determine (rationalize) prejudice, or negative feeling towards a person or group based on their affiliation with a group (Dovidio et al. 1996). In this study, ethnic prejudice will be defined as individuals' negative beliefs about and/or negative feelings towards a particular ethnic group and will be considered as an indicator of racism.

Most of the **quantitative research** in this area restricts its focus on the relationship between *national* pride and prejudice to ethnic

minority groups, and concludes that different forms of national pride impact differently on prejudice. Research in this area consistently shows that respondents' belief in the national superiority and dominance of their nation over other national groups (labelled *nationalism*) increases prejudice. On the other hand, research is less clear about the influence that the respondents' attachment to the nation, its institutions and founding principles (labelled *patriotism*) has on prejudice: while most studies show that patriotism has a negative impact on prejudice (i.e. more patriotic people are less prejudiced), some studies report a positive or no relationship with prejudice (for recent reviews, see Jeong 2013; Wagner et al. 2012).

Some authors argue that the inconsistent findings regarding the relationship between patriotism and prejudice can be explained by differences in the measurement of this concept in the quantitative research literature (de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003; Schatz, Staub and Lavine 1999; Wagner et al. 2012). For example, some authors argue that the measurement of patriotism often includes items that measure respondents' support of democratic values, rather than their level of patriotism; and that it is not patriotism per se, but primarily the support of democratic values that is associated with less out-group derogation (Bar-Tal 1997; Cohrs et al. 2004; Wagner et al. 2012).

Despite the fact that there is no consensus on how these variables should be measured, most of these empirical studies have relied on Kosterman and Feshbach's (1989) definition and measurement of nationalism as a 'perception of national superiority and an orientation toward national dominance' (p. 271) and patriotism as 'the affective component (of) one's feeling toward one's country […] the degree of love for and pride in one's nation – in essence, the degree of attachment to the nation' (p. 271). According to this definition, the key difference between these two dimensions of national pride is that while patriotism constitutes a self-referential assessment of the extent to which people regard their own group in positive terms, nationalism refers to an (almost exclusively, downwardly) comparative assessment between groups (de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003; Jeong 2013). Related to this, social psychological research has shown that respondents indicate higher levels of prejudice when they were asked to compare their in-group with an out-group, but not when they were asked to compare it with their in-group in the past (Mummendey, Klink and Brown 2001).

In other words, while patriots feel positive towards their own national group, nationalists feel better compared to people who do not belong to their national in-group.

This suggests that underlying social psychological mechanisms play an important role in explaining why different forms of national pride impact differently on ethnic prejudice. In addition to the difference between self- and other-referential comparisons, some studies show that essentialist notions of national in-group belonging (Meeus et al. 2010) and the centrality of the national identity of individuals increase ethnic prejudice (Pehrson, Brown and Zagefka 2009). Furthermore, while very few studies in this area seem to do so, it appears important to consider the mediating influence of key social psychological theories of prejudice, such as the Contact Hypothesis (Esses et al. 2005; Pettigrew 1998) and the Symbolic/Realistic Group Threat Theory (Esses et al. 2005; Pettigrew 1998), in testing the relationship between national pride and prejudice. Put differently, nationalists might feel more negative towards ethnic minority groups because they have less contact with members of these groups (or in contexts with conditions that do not facilitate the development of positive out-group attitudes) and/or because they feel threatened by these ethnic out-groups in terms of their control of or access to cultural (such as language, religion) and material (such as jobs and access to welfare) resources.

In sum, quantitative studies highlight the importance of distinguishing between *different types of national pride*, such as nationalism and patriotism, and hypothesize that nationalistic interpretations of the in-group will increase prejudice and patriotic feelings can decrease prejudice; and that the latter concept requires a more valid and reliable form of measurement. In addition, they emphasize the importance of considering *general, social psychological characteristics of national identities*, and hypothesize that the centrality and essentialized understanding of such identities and the extent to which they involve out-group comparisons rather than in-group evaluations increase prejudice. Finally, research in this area should pay more attention to the mediating role of social psychological explanations for prejudice, such as the Contact Hypothesis and the Symbolic/Realistic Group Threat Theory.

Most of the **qualitative studies** on the relationship between national pride and prejudice originate from the fields of history and

education and communication sciences, and focus on the overlap between and presentation of racist and nationalist discourses, as expressed in different forms of text, including interviews with young people (e.g. Kyriakides, Virdee and Modood 2009) and/or teachers (e.g. Christou 2007), school curricula (e.g. Papadakis 2008), educational policies (Bryan 2009), state propaganda (e.g. Roos 2012) and popular culture (Harnetz 2002). A recurrent concept in this line of research is that of *racialized nationalism*, which refers to the introduction of racist discourses in nationalist projects through the discursive construction of nationhood according to visibly identifiable features.[1] The rise of racialized nationalism is a global feature of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Arendt 1951; Law 2012), as racist ideas and practices became a fundamental part of processes of nation building, and related to this, colonization and decolonization. The categorization of certain groups of people as biologically and/or culturally inferior did not only serve to legitimize colonial rule, but also the rule of (formerly) colonized elites over less powerful groups in the process of building new nation states (Law 2014). Studies focusing on more contemporary contexts have applied the concept of racialized nationalism in the cases of British (Gilroy 1987; Gilroy 1993), English and Scottish (Kyriakides, Virdee and Modood 2009), and Hindu and Australian (Patil 2010) national belonging. All these studies have identified the construction of a racialized belonging to a particular national in-group, evident in the exclusion of members on the basis of fixed, usually physical features. These studies suggest that the construction of racialized nationalism is complex and can be reinforced and/or undermined by other observable indicators of collective belonging and exclusion related to cultural expressions, such as accent, dress, mannerisms and religion (Kyriakides, Virdee and Modood 2009).

Regarding the local context, there is a substantial number of qualitative case-studies that explore the manifestation of and relationship between nationalism and racism in the context of Cyprus (the Republic of Cyprus, i.e. the Greek-speaking part). It is important to discuss these studies more in depth not only because they are good examples of the key research questions, findings, strengths and weaknesses of qualitative research in this area, but also because they report on a context in which this study takes place.

Five themes emerge from these studies conducted in Cyprus: (1) The importance of the educational system in developing racialized

nationalism as expressed in school policy documents, textbooks used in classrooms, interactions between ethnic minority students and school staff and ethnic majority students and through school memorial services. (2) The role of other socializing institutions, particularly the family and the media, in offering cultural scripts to young people that foster particular perceptions of the ethnic in- and out-groups. (3) The consequences of contact between ethnic groups in developing in- and out-group attitudes. (4) The intersections between race, class, gender and nationalism in developing ethnic in-group identities and ethnic out-group stereotypes. (5) The multitude of sometimes overlapping, meaningful ethnic identities, and related national, supra-national, racial and cultural boundaries that young people draw between their ethnic in- and out-groups in the context of Cyprus.

It is striking that most of the research on racism and nationalism in Cyprus has been carried out in schools, usually through qualitative, ethnographic case-studies in which researchers observe interactions between students and teachers in school settings, conduct interviews with both and/or analyse policy documents or curriculum textbooks.

In a now classic study in the context of Cyprus, Spyrou (2002) relied on ethnographic data to explore how GC (Greek Cypriot) elementary school children and their teachers perceive, imagine and talk about Turks as people. In interviewing GC students, Spyrou found that they perceived Turks in a very negative way, as: barbarians, bad, egoists, terrorists, torturers, warmongers, quarrelsome, rapists, wild, murderers, vandals, looters, heartless, revengeful, hateful, malicious, devious, ungrateful, unfair, jealous, illiterate, impolite, dirty, liars, foolish, crazy and thieves. These stereotypes were motivated by pointing to history lessons in which they were taught what Turkey did to Cyprus. In analysing the role of teachers in developing such views, Spyrou identified four ways in which teachers help to construct such negative views of Turks, and simultaneously construct an image of Greek Cypriots as 'peaceful victims' of Turkish aggression. First, teachers were perceived to use highly loaded and emotional language in describing what Turks did to GCs (e.g. 'They *slaughtered* the Greeks in Constantinople'). Second, in teaching about history, teachers actively constructed national heroes and assigned them super-human powers ('They (the Turks) heard his (our hero) voice, and they ran away'). In so doing, they give their students a sense of collective, national and cultural belonging, power and hope over

their situation and feelings of gratitude and debt to those who had made sacrifices for the greater, national good. Third, by describing the more general role of Turkey in international politics as immoral and not trustworthy (e.g. by describing Turkey as an ally of Germany, Japan and Italy during WW II, even if they were officially neutral), and particularly by contrasting this with the moral and honest response of the Greeks, Turks and Greeks are constructed as moral opposites. Fourth, by presenting 'the Turk' as a homogeneous group in time and space to their students, teachers essentialize this group, leave little room for variability within this group, and connect past actions of this group as a realistic present tense danger. Spyrou also found that children and teachers can identify 'good Turks', which are usually Turkish Cypriots (TCs) or Turks who were 'forced to do bad things' because they were ordered to do so. However, by considering these 'good Turks' as the exception or the opposite of the 'bad Turks', the latter stereotypes are still reproduced in such discourse.

These strong, negative stereotypes of Turks, TCs and Turkish-speaking students as fostered by teachers were later confirmed in other studies (Zembylas 2010a, 2010b), and even when comparing a school that explicitly adopts a more multicultural approach with one that does not (Theodorou and Symeou 2013):

> Despite differences in location and student composition, the two schools shared important similarities with regard to the national curriculum they followed, and their formal and informal educational practices that were characterised by an abundance of ethno-centric and religious-centric themes, based on the assumption of serving a largely homogeneous Greek-Cypriot student population. Such manifestations could be seen in the decoration of classroom boards with pictures of the occupied territories of the northern part of Cyprus under the motto 'I know, I do not forget, and I struggle', which served as a daily reminder for the students of the presence of Turkish troops on the island and the occupation of 'half of Cyprus' – a phrase often used in classroom discourse. The lesson of Religious Studies, in which children studied the principles of Christian Orthodoxy and the lives of saints, was accompanied by other informal practices that solidified the presence of Orthodox Christianity at the school, such as Morning Prayer and the display of icons of saints in prominent places in the classrooms. (p. 7)

Hence, through their teaching activities, GC teachers seemed to promote a particular collective ethnic and national identity, in which GCs are united and characterized by their status as victims of (past and present) Turkish aggression, their shared Greek culture and Roman Orthodox religion. 'The Turk' is considered as the essential ethnic out-group, the ultimate evil enemy that gives meaning to and mirrors the central (virtuous) ethnic in-group.

In addition to these teacher–student interactions, research in Cyprus also points to the importance of educational textbooks in providing racialized nationalistic frames of reference to young people. In comparing GC and TC history textbooks in primary and secondary education until 2004, Papadakis (2008) found that textbooks on both sides emphasized the cultural and national ties with their motherlands, respectively Greece and Turkey. On the Greek Cypriot side, the history of Cyprus is presented as an extension of the history of Greece, and on the Turkish Cypriot side as an extension of the history of Turkey, stressing common history, descent, language, culture and religion. Hence, these textbooks foster an ethnic nationalism on both sides, with little attention on internal differences and interaction and cooperation; and a dualistic framing of actors throughout history, with the ethnic in-group consistently defined as 'good' and the ethnic out-group as 'evil'. However the content of these textbooks can change, with Papadakis observing meaningful revisions in TC textbooks after the left-wing party CTP came to power in 2003, highlighting not just conflict, internal divisions and discontinuities, but also social and cultural interactions and cooperation between the two communities (for an extensive review of this study, see also Vryonides and Spyrou 2014).

More recently, Theodorou (2014) shows that not only educational textbooks, but also educational policy documents reinforce racialized notions of national in- and out-group belonging in the context of Cyprus, even in those documents that explicitly address the importance of intercultural education for the first time (from 2006 onwards) – an issue that has become more dominant in Cyprus as a result of their accession to the EU in 2004. In analysing archival material that has been published and/or circulated by the Cypriot Ministry of Education in relation to intercultural education, during the years 1997–2012, Theodorou found that although the state appears to implement an intercultural education rhetoric,

they produce, reproduce and mobilize 'exclusionary discourses that generate particular student subjectivities based on perceptions of "tolerability" postulated by the majority' (p. 267). Three groups are distinguished: the 'tolerable others', such as children of repatriates, which are constructed as ethnically affiliated to the Greek Cypriot norm; the 'deficit others', who lack sufficient knowledge of Greek language and who are in need of remedial teaching and whose knowledge of other languages is silenced and hence rendered useless; and the 'problematic others', which constitutes a group whose culture poses a risk and threat to the maintenance of a homogeneous Greek (Cypriot) culture and identity, and who require integration to the norm. An essential premise that emerges from these documents is the discursive construction of a pre-existing, ethnic and religious homogeneous ethnic group and a nation state, which functions as the cultural beacon to which minorities have to integrate. In addition, the conceptualizations of intercultural education are built on a view of bi- and multilingualism as deficient and a notion of intercultural education as imbalanced in terms of power, as primarily members of minority groups are expected to adapt to the norms of the dominant society, and not the other way around.

Finally, research also shows how schools can reinforce but also challenge racialized notions of national belonging and negative stereotypes of Turks through the organization of ceremonies in school to celebrate and/or remember particular historical events. Zembylas (2013b), for instance, compares two different school ceremonies in the Greek-speaking part of Cyprus; both concern ceremonies that commemorate the missing persons as a result of the 1974 invasion of the island by Turkey. One school (A), which the author perceives as the more dominant approach in Greek Cypriot state schools, adopts the 'hegemonic' model, which emphasizes the emotional themes of heroism and victimhood. This type of ceremony is very much in line with the educational objective of 'I don't forget and I struggle' (Den Xechno kai Agonizomai), which has become prominent in Greek Cypriot school life after the invasion of 1974. This objective aims at teaching Greek Cypriot children and youth to acquire knowledge so that they will never forget the 'occupied territories' and care enough so that they will struggle in various ways to liberate those territories. The most prominent themes of the 'I don't forget' campaign focus on the remembrance of the Turkish invasion and occupation, the thousands

of refugees, the missing persons, the enclaved who live in the North of Cyprus, the violation of human rights and the destruction of ancient Greek archaeological sites. The other school (B) follows an 'alternative' model, which promotes the emotional themes of peace and recognition of common pain. School A promotes feelings of collective GC trauma and suffering and focuses on the past, while the second school promotes a more stoic emotional stance and focuses on the mutual victimhood of both communities in Cyprus, with a focus on the future. The observation that school A constitutes the dominant or typical way of organizing school ceremonies about these issues with young people suggests that young GCs in Cyprus are mainly presented with a picture of the ethnic in-group as culturally homogeneous, unchanging, bound to a nation state and a victim of Turkish aggression.

In addition to the importance of the school context in developing particular views of ethnic in- and out-groups, research in Cyprus also suggests (albeit often implicitly) the importance of the family in presenting young people with particular views about the ethnic self and other. For example, a recent study (Christou and Spyrou 2012) explores how the process of crossing the physical border between the Northern and Southern part of Cyprus informs the way in which Greek Cypriot children construct notions of the ethnic self and other. The analysis shows that such experiences are inherently emotional for most of the young people involved, particularly those that come from refugee families, and that their interpretations of what they experience are informed by interactions between both material characteristics of the locations they visit (military presence, passport controls at the checkpoint, different national flags, the remains of lost property, people who look and speak differently) and pre-established beliefs about the 'other' and the 'self'. Although these young people show a sense of agency in developing unique pictures about what they have seen, the analysis also shows that on many occasions these experiences strengthened strongly held beliefs and emotions about the ethnic in- and out-group, with children particularly referring to interpretations that they learned from family members (and at school) to make sense of these experiences. Hence, while such experiences can modify how young people perceive the ethnic self and other, the narratives of these children suggest that personal experiences with 'the other side' are strongly framed by the cultural scripts provided by both the family and the school, two institutions

that seem to have a strong influence on how young people in Cyprus make sense of ethnic belonging and exclusion.

In addition, research also suggests that young people rely on media presentations to support particular views of ethnic minority people, as suggested by Spyrou's (2012) research about young GCs' stereotypes of Eastern European women:

> Interviews with children revealed that they developed a sense of who Russian and Romanian women are and what their character is like, not because they had direct contact with them but based on hearsay about the lives they lead and their encounters with local men. Television seems to play a particularly important role in this respect. Many children, for example, pointed out that they heard about Russian and Romanian women from TV and the news in particular (e.g., hearing in the news about these women's involvement with night clubs and drugs). This kind of information (e.g., news about arrests for prostitution, etc.) facilitates the sexualized construction of these women and their overall negative social perception as immoral. Some children also mentioned learning about Russian and Romanian women from locally produced TV series which often depict them as characters, in stereotypical roles (e.g., as attractive foreign women who lure Cypriot men). That these TV shows have a powerful impact on children's understandings of these women is evidenced by the fact that many of them mentioned the names of these TV characters when asked if they knew any Russian or Romanian women. (p. 233)

Related to young people's exposure to and interpretations of media messages is the use of the internet by particular political parties to attract followers in support of their political goals. Christou and Ianniou's (2014) case-study of the extreme right-wing political party ELAM's use of the internet in Cyprus is relevant in this respect. The authors explore how a nationalist, extreme right-wing organization in Cyprus, which attracts mainly youth as followers, uses the internet to present views of (and draw boundaries between) themselves and various out-groups in Cyprus. The analysis of ELAM's discourses shows that the ways in which they describe themselves ('Us, all of us', 'Greeks of the island', 'nationalists', 'ELAM', 'Greek, local workers') and meaningful out-groups ('immigrants (illegal)', 'Other

religions', 'Turkey', 'Turkish Cypriots', 'Government (general leftist)', 'KISA', 'journalists', 'Capitalists') correspond with their racialized nationalistic motto of 'Greek Cypriots are essentially Greek' (p. 129) and related stereotypes of 'immigrants', as criminal, unemployed, causing problems, reproducing and taking advantage.

The citation from Spyrou's research above also illustrates two additional themes that are discussed in this line of qualitative research in Cyprus. First, Spyrou's research on GCs' stereotypes of Eastern European women (Spyrou 2012) and Asian women (Sri Lankan and Filipina women working mainly as household servants and childcare support workers in GC families: Spyrou 2009) illustrates how gender intersects with ethnicity and social class in developing particular ethnic stereotypes. For instance, young GCs seemed to have contradictory views of Asian domestic workers, describing them on the one hand as hard-working, polite, cheerful and caring, in response to the often intimate role of the domestic worker in the GC household. However, at the same time they describe these women as uneducated and poor, because of the lower social class position of these workers and as uncivilized, untrustworthy and non-white. The latter stereotypes are attached to Eastern immigrants, including Turks, stereotypes that contrast with their perception of their ethnic in-group as civilized, trustworthy, European and white. However, these positive attributes are to some extent conditional, particularly among GC boys, on their domestic worker's acceptance of their subordinate position and hence, the authority of the GC family members, and particularly of GC men, over these women. Interestingly, while Sri Lankan and Filipino domestic workers are perceived as motherly and by definition as asexual, young GCs perceive Russian and Romanian women primarily as sexually immoral, snobbish, cold, boastful, proud, devious and bad characters, because they come to Cyprus only to marry a Greek Cypriot man for financial and legal (citizenship) reasons.

Spyros refers to this as an example of 'sexualized racism', or

> a condition whereby these women's bodies are inscribed with a kind of sexualized identity that equates their physical characteristics and appearance with their sexual identities and their moral characters (…) their sexuality becomes synonymous with their ethnic/national identity in a way that one directly presupposes the other. (p. 239)

Because of their sexually predatory behaviour towards GC men, they are considered as a threat to the stability of GC families, to the superior morality of the GC society (in which women should be passive, loyal to their husband and focused on maintaining a family) and, hence, as a threat to the GC nation as a whole. In other words, in describing Russian and Romanian women as such, the GCs in Spyrou's study define GC women and GC culture and nationhood more generally as the moral opposite, as clean, pure, peaceful and beautiful.

While Spyrou's studies focus on the intersection between gender and ethnicity in developing particular stereotypes of ethnic out-groups, Zembylas (2013a) explores how social class differences between GCs and Turkish-speaking ethnic minorities inform GCs' stereotypes of Turkish-speaking ethnic minorities. By integrating analyses conducted in a private secondary school (Zembylas 2010b) and a primary state school (Zembylas 2010a), Zembylas concludes that ethnic minorities were excluded by GCs in both schools, but that the greater social class differences between GCs and ethnic minorities in the primary school added an additional layer of discrimination, which can in part explain the more overt hostility to TCs by both staff and students in the primary school setting. While relationships between GCs and ethnic minorities in the secondary school could be described as a form of 'parallel co-existence and denial', in the primary school they appeared as 'resentment and exclusion'. A study by Theodorou (2011) also illustrates the intersection between social class and ethnicity, not by focusing on how GCs perceive ethnic minorities from various social classes, but by showing how Pontian Greeks interpret experiences of discrimination at the hands of GCs by pointing not only to their ethnic background but also to their lower social class background. Finally, apart from gender and social class, some of the qualitative case-studies conducted in Cyprus (Christou and Spyrou 2012; Zembylas 2010a) suggest that young people who identify as 'refugees', or as children from families who were forced to reallocate to the South of Cyprus, feel more hostile towards Turks. In sum, these studies show how young people's feelings of belonging to ethnic, gender, social class and refugee groups interact in developing particular views of (specific) ethnic minority groups.

The second additional theme identified in Spyrou's citation above (Spyrou 2012) also illustrates how a focus on contact between ethnic

in- and out-groups, or a lack of contact, informs the development of stereotypes. More specifically, research in Cyprus shows that young people can develop stereotypes of ethnic out-groups while having had no or very little real face-to-face experiences with members of these out-groups (Spyrou 2002, 2012). On the other hand, the research shows that contact, even if it involves intimate and caring relationships over a long period of time, such as with Asian domestic carers in GC families (Spyrou 2009), does not necessarily eradicate negative stereotypes. Finally, the studies discussed suggest that the opportunity for direct, face-to-face contact between GCs and ethnic minorities in school does not necessarily result in the development of positive perceptions and relationships. This is explained by pointing to social class differences between GCs and ethnic minorities and a lack of support for the development of positive relationships by school policies, curricula and teachers, the media and (implicitly) GC families. More generally, these studies seem to suggest that some of the conditions (such as equal status, common goals, intergroup cooperation, support of authorities and personal interaction – see Pettigrew and Tropp 2005) that are considered as important in developing positive relationships and perceptions between ethnic groups through face-to-face contact are not fulfilled.

A final theme that emerges in this qualitative line of research conducted in Cyprus concerns the meaningfulness of particular ethnic identities in this context. First, although researchers in this context usually focus on GCs as the main ethnic in-group, they suggest that there is variability between GCs in how they perceive themselves. For instance, Spyros identifies two different collective GC identities: a Hellenocentric identity, which emphasizes the Greekness of Greek Cypriots and has been mainly supported by the political right; and a Cypriocentric identity, which emphasizes the Cypriot identity that the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities share and has been mainly supported by the political left (Spyrou 2001). As we have seen above, more Hellenocentric interpretations of a GC identity also draw on biological (skin colour, white) and/or culturally essentialist notions of in-group belonging, which are strongly tied to the development of the nation state and related national identity. In addition, GCs also seem to identify with a more supra-national 'European' identity, although in complex ways. While they identify with Western European countries that are generally perceived as 'civilized', they

distance themselves from Eastern European countries (and the 'East' more generally, including Asian countries and particularly Turkey), which they perceive as less civilized (Philippou and Theodorou 2013). Finally, these studies also highlight particular ethnic out-groups as being meaningful for GCs: Turks, Turkish Cypriots, Pontians, Roma, Asian immigrants (Sri Lanka, Filipinas), Eastern European immigrants (Russians, Bulgarians) and Black people; these are groups to which they attach very different stereotypes, which are in turn informed by social class, gender and historical relationship between the ethnic in- and out-group (as, for instance, shown by the more negative stereotypes attached to Turks by young GCs who define themselves as refugees).

In sum, qualitative studies on ethnic pride and prejudice highlight the importance of not focusing exclusively on national identities, but on processes of (national) identification and categorization (Brubaker 2004), in which national, racial and religious identities (and pride) can be perceived as subcategories of ethnic identities (Wimmer 2013). As a result, qualitative studies emphasize the importance of investigating respondents' meaningful categorizations of ethnic (national, religious, racial) in- and out-groups. In addition, these studies explore how ethnic identities interact with gendered, class-based and other social (e.g. refugee) identities to develop particular ethnic stereotypes. Finally, qualitative studies suggest the influence of particular institutions, such as the media, families and schools, in reproducing racialized notions of national belonging and exclusion. The latter is hypothesized to occur through the content and delivery of the curriculum, educational policies and interactions between students and teachers more generally. In reviewing these studies, and particularly research carried out in the context of Cyprus, we can identify the following issues that could be taken up by future research.

First, research could pay more attention to the relationship between variability in ethnic in-group identifications and expressions of ethnic prejudice. For instance, in the context of Cyprus, researchers acknowledge the diversity between Greek Cypriots in how they identify in ethnic (racial, national and cultural) terms, but they rarely use this diversity in explaining differences in prejudice. Second, there is generally very little research on how ethnic minorities draw ethnic boundaries around themselves and others, and the stereotypes they attach to others. In the context of Cyprus, it is quite

remarkable that little attention has been given to how TCs perceive themselves, which ethnic out-groups they define as meaningful and what kinds of stereotypes they attach to members of out-groups (and the motivations for doing so). Third, although research has given considerable attention to the importance of school characteristics and processes, it would be theoretically very interesting to compare schools where relationships between GCs and TCs are very different (i.e. much more positive in one school compared to the other), and explore how these differences relate to particular school characteristics. In so doing, research would be better positioned to explore under which conditions face-to-face contact can (not) help to deconstruct ethnic prejudice between different ethnic groups.

Different methods, different research questions

Comparing qualitative studies with quantitative studies in this field also helps to illustrate how methodological differences relate to differences in research questions. Following explicitly or implicitly Barth's (1998) 'boundary theory', qualitative studies emphasize the importance of inductively exploring how people in various contexts develop symbolic boundaries between themselves and others by assigning particular (usually cultural) 'boundary markers' or 'contrasting diacritica' that allow for a distinction between the in- and out-group, and hence between insiders and outsiders (or, in Barth's later work, between 'us' and 'them': Barth 1998).

While Barth was initially interested in describing how ethnic boundaries obtained a more or less stable character through the process of assigning boundary markers ('ethnic dichotomization') and the 'structuring of interactions' (which refers to 'a systematic set of rules governing interethnic social encounters': Barth 1998, p. 16), more recently, the ethnic boundary-making approach 'rests on the assumption that individuals behave strategically' (Wimmer 2013, p. 44), they promote certain types of classifications, and 'they do so in an attempt to gain recognition, power, or access to resources' (Wimmer 2013, p. 44). Hence, the more recent emphasis on 'boundary making' or 'boundary work' also denotes a shift from a more deterministic to a more agency-centred approach in studying ethnic boundaries and consideration of the 'different options that actors may pursue to react to different boundaries' (Wimmer 2013, p. 44).

Wimmer (2013) describes a comprehensive typology of 'ways in which actors may attempt to change the location of the meaning of a boundary' (p. 63). He distinguishes between strategies that attempt to change the location of existing boundaries ('**boundary shifting**') by 'expanding' (more inclusive boundaries) or 'contracting' (more exclusive boundaries) the domains of the included and those ('**modifying boundaries**') that do not aim at the location of a boundary but try to modify its meaning and implications by challenging the hierarchical ordering of ethnic categories ('**transvaluation**', through '**normative inversion**' or '**equalization**'), de-emphasizing ethnicity and emphasizing other social divisions ('**blurring**'), or changing one's own position vis-à-vis the boundary ('**positional moves**').

At the same time, qualitative studies often explore how structural and institutional features influence the way in which people draw particular configurations of ethnic boundaries. While some researchers focus on particular institutions, such as the family, media or schools (see above), Wimmer (2013) offers a more general theoretical framework in which variation in the outcomes of these boundary struggles are perceived as the result of three interacting forces: institutions, the (unequal) distribution of resources and social networks. Labour laws (e.g. recognizing foreign diplomas) or educational tracking processes are examples of **institutionalized rules** that 'provide incentives to pursue certain types of boundary-making strategies rather than others' (p. 32). Different diplomas, or cultural capital (which are related to social class) can be perceived as **resources** that can explain variability in the struggle over boundaries of inclusion. **Network structures** refers to the homogeneity and heterogeneity of social networks, whether they consist of weak or strong ties. Interestingly, although Wimmer does not explicitly draw parallels between his own theoretical framework and classical socio-psychological theories of prejudice, network structures seem to relate to some extent with some features of the Contact Hypothesis (Esses et al. 2005; Pettigrew 1998) and inequalities in resources with the Symbolic/Realistic Group Threat Theory (Esses et al. 2005; Pettigrew 1998).

In sharp contrast, more quantitative studies on the relationship between ethnic pride and prejudice are often focused on testing the (strength of) relationships between particular characteristics of

ethnic (national) identities and prejudice. Such studies encourage us to conduct more rigorous tests of particular hypotheses about the relationship between ethnic pride and prejudice, to think more carefully about how to measure such characteristics and to test the mediating influence of broader-context characteristics and underlying socio-psychological characteristics.

This study starts from the observation that both lines of research offer a unique and complementary perspective on the study of ethnic pride and prejudice, and therefore should be used together. This study builds on both bodies of research by: (1) Exploring first how young Greek and Turkish Cypriots draw ethnic (cultural, religious, racial) boundaries around themselves and others, and in so doing make ethnic classifications of in- and out-groups that are meaningful to them in the context of Cyprus. (2) Exploring the importance of different socializing institutions, inequalities in resources and characteristics of network structures, and related socio-psychological theories of prejudice in developing ethnic pride and prejudice among Greek and Turkish Cypriot youngsters. (3) Testing the relationship between the way in which Greek and Turkish Cypriots identify themselves in terms of ethnic belonging and their attitudes to various, meaningful ethnic out-groups, controlling for the influence of underlying social psychological and sociological theories that explain the development of prejudice. In sum, this study advocates the use of a sequential transformative (QUAL → QUAN) mixed-methods design (Creswell et al. 2003), in which the qualitative design feeds into the development of the quantitative design and in which both address different, complementary research questions. Before describing the research design that underpins this study, the following section will briefly describe key characteristics of the national setting in which this study took place.

The context of Cyprus

Cyprus' strategic location (east of Greece, south of Turkey, west of Syria and north of Egypt) has made it a popular destination for settlers from various civilizations throughout history, including the Mycenaeans, Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, Greeks, Ptolemaic Egyptian, the Roman Empire, the Byzantines, Arabs, French Lusignan,

Venetians and the Ottomans (Law 2014). Following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Cyprus first became a protectorate of the British Empire in 1878 and was later annexed as a Crown Colony of the British Empire in 1925.

What came to be known as the 'Cyprus problem' emerged with the gradual clash between the opposing nationalisms of the two main ethnic communities on the island – the Greek Cypriot majority (about 80%) and the sizeable Turkish Cypriot minority (about 18%) – imported to the island by the respective 'motherlands', Greece and Turkey. Greek Cypriot nationalism first appeared in Cyprus in the early nineteenth century following the Greek War of Independence, but became a mass phenomenon in the early twentieth century under the guidance of the Church leadership with the open support to the demand for *enosis* (i.e. union with Greece) (Law 2014). At the root of Greek nationalism is the dream of rebuilding a new Greek state to encompass all the ethnic Greek areas of the former Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire, including parts of Anatolia, Cyprus, Crete, Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace and the Aegean islands, with the city of Constantinople as the capital. This political goal is in part legitimized by a racist discourse of cultural and biological superiority over non-Greeks, as illustrated by the 2012 election slogan of the People's Association – Golden Dawn: 'rid this land of filth'. This modern, ultra-nationalist, far-right, neo-nazi party was founded in 1993 and has close connections with its Cypriot 'sister party' ELAM (Law 2014).

While 'Greek nationalism' in Cyprus can be considered as a form of racialized nationalism and echoes the Greek nationalism movement of mainland Greece, both forms of racialized nationalism developed in opposition to Turkish racialized nationalism. The process of building Turkey as a nation state coincided with and was strengthened by the development of a biologically and culturally distinct Turkish identity, which was perceived as part of the Western (white) identity and civilization, with Atatürk being openly hostile to academic studies positioning Turks as 'yellow' or as members of an Asiatic race (Law 2014). The Turkish race was considered scientifically different from Greeks, Jews, Armenians and Kurds; the latter were perceived as being biologically and culturally inferior. As this form of nationalism was strongly backed by the Turkish state, its development resulted in forced assimilation into the Turkish race and culture backed by the full force of military persecution and state surveillance. Both Turkish

and Greek nationalism competed with and reinforced each other, as illustrated in the case of the Greek (or Pontic) genocide where, beginning in 1914, Christian Greeks in Asia Minor were systematically exterminated through forced deportations involving death marches, summary expulsions, arbitrary executions and destruction of cultural, historical and religious monuments (Law 2014). As a result of this, both nationalisms foster strong, negative perceptions and feelings of hatred and threat towards each other.

However, Turkish Cypriot nationalism cannot be reduced to Turkish nationalism, as it appeared more as a reaction to the Greek Cypriot demands for *enosis* and counter-proposed *taksim* (i.e. partition of the island between Turkey and Greece). Between 1955 and 1959 the Greek Cypriot nationalist resistance group EOKA initiated an anticolonial struggle which, although aiming at *enosis*, ultimately resulted in the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, an independent bi-communal state, in 1960. However, this bi-communal state proved impossible to contain these two opposing nationalisms, and soon after its birth, interethnic conflict broke out (1963–67), with both Greece and Turkey, as guarantors of the Republic's Constitution, playing an active role in shaping the events during this period. The rise of a dictatorship in Greece in 1967 and its political disagreements with the then president of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios, resulted in a failed coup attempt in July of 1974. Following the coup, Turkey, claiming its guarantor status, invaded Cyprus, occupied the northern part of the island and forced the relocation of Greek Cypriots to the south and of Turkish Cypriots to the north. Since 1974, Cyprus remains a de facto divided island with the two communities living generally separated from each other with relatively few interactions between them (Vryonides and Spyrou 2014): the Republic of Cyprus (Greek: *Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία*, *Kypriakí Dīmokratía*) and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Turkish: *Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti*) (Law 2014).

Keeping in mind the island's recent troubled history, issues of ethnic and national identification within the GC community become particularly complex. Specifically, beyond the hyphenated 'Greek-Cypriot' identity and the 'Cypriot' super-identity, the long history of the irredentist movement for *enosis* on the island has established 'Greek' as a valid ethnic/national group identity. Despite the post-1974 abandonment of *enosis* as a political goal, the

collective imagination understands GCs as forming an organic part of *Hellenism*, i.e. the aggregate of ethnically Greek people, including the Greeks of the diaspora. This double identification is closely connected with the a long-standing ideological tension within the GC community during the second half of the twentieth century between two opposing collective orientations, namely *Hellenocentrism* and *Cyprocentrism* (Mavratsas 1997, 1999; Papadakis 1998; Spyrou 2001). Hellenocentrism – traditionally identified with the GC political right (most notably DISY) – emphasizes the Greekness of Cyprus and the antagonisms between the two ethnic communities; while Cyprocentrism – traditionally associated with the political left (AKEL) – emphasizes the 'Cypriotness' of GCs and TCs, and advocates rapprochement and the reunification of the island. Although this ideological tension still pertains today, this binary alone may not suffice any more to explain GC collective identification processes, since in the post-Annan plan period (2004 onwards) an additional polarity seems to have emerged, namely that between the 'pro-solution/pro-federation' and 'anti-solution/anti-federation' political camps in GC politics (Papamichael 2011; Trimikliniotis 2004).

As a result of the forced relocation of Greek Cypriots to the southern part of the island in 1974 and Turkish Cypriots to the northern part, a considerable proportion of the GC and TC population developed a 'refugee identity' in which they also associate themselves to a varying degree with a group of people who belong to some extent to an occupied part of Cyprus and/or share a history of forced family displacement and/or loss of property (Zetter 1999). However, while these refugee identities are ambiguous and complex, with GC and TC refugees perceiving themselves as being both insiders and outsiders and expressing different responses to their perceived status, they persist as meaningful ethnic boundaries even among the younger generations of TCs and GCs who have personally never experienced forced resettlement (Zetter 1994).

Beyond the interethnic conflict, over the last decades, the Republic of Cyprus has become an increasingly more multicultural society. In the early 1990s, for the first time a guest worker policy encouraged a migrant labour influx into Cyprus in order to meet labour shortages in a number of sectors of the economy (Trimikliniotis 2004). Today, there is labour migration from Western European (particularly Greece), Asian (particularly Philippines, Sri Lanka, Vietnam

and China) and Eastern European countries (particularly Bulgaria, Romania and Russia) (Spyrou 2002, 2009; Vryonides and Spyrou 2014). Research suggests that these recent immigration processes have resulted in an increase in hostility towards immigrants among the local Greek-speaking community, with Cyprus showing the highest levels of racist attitudes to migrants among all EU countries (Gouliamos and Vryonides 2010; Trimikliniotis 2004). Furthermore, qualitative studies (Spyrou 2002, 2009; Vryonides and Spyrou 2014) show that these particular ethnic/racial minority groups are meaningful to young Cypriots in discussing ethnic/racial diversity in Cyprus.

In sum, in relation to our research questions we first expect some variability in terms of how TCs and GCs define themselves in ethnic and national terms. Within the group of GCs, we expect at least a difference between GCs who define themselves as 'Cypriot' and those who perceive themselves as primarily 'Greek'; the latter identity is more strongly related with a racist discourse (and as a result symbolic boundaries) of cultural and biological difference and superiority. Similarly, we expect TCs to associate either with a Cypriot identity or a Turkish identity, the latter which, like the Greek identity, overlaps with racist boundaries of cultural and biological superiority. Furthermore, in the context of Cyprus, we expect that GCs and TCs perceive themselves in varying degrees as 'refugees', which might have repercussions on how they perceive ethnic out-groups, particularly those that they hold responsible for the loss of property and forced dislocation (Christou and Spyrou 2012; Zembylas 2010a). Finally, it is possible to identify various ethnic out-groups that are meaningful to TCs and GCs in the context of Cyprus, including groups that have a long, historical relationship between them (like Turks and Greeks) and groups that have become more meaningful only recently (like Eastern European and Asian immigrants).

3
Methods

A mixed methods design

The larger research project that underpins this study[1] consisted
of a mixed methods design, with three integrated data-collection
and analysis phases involving lower secondary (Gymnasio) schools
in and around Lefkosia: (1) An explorative, qualitative interview
phase; (2) a theory-testing, quantitative survey phase; and (3) an
explorative, qualitative interview phase that focuses more on cer-
tain findings and themes that emerged as theoretically interesting
from the previous two phases. This study only relies on the survey
data collected in the second phase and the qualitative interview
data collected in the third phase.

In ideal circumstances, the survey would have been developed and
carried out after a thorough analysis of the qualitative interview data
from the first phase. In so doing, we would maximize our chances of
including ethnic in- and out-groups that are meaningful to the stu-
dents included in this study. However, in face of time constraints, the
survey had to be administered shortly after conducting a first wave
of qualitative interviews with young people, and as a result we could
only benefit from a basic analysis of the interview data in develop-
ing the survey questionnaire. The limitations of this method will be
discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.

Similarly, the analyses would have been stronger, and the collected
data richer, if the third research phase could have been carried out
after conducting a rigorous analysis of the survey data from the second
phase and the interview data from the first phase. However, as it turned

out, the third phase of data-collection had to be undertaken soon after the second phase, which again only allowed for a superficial analysis of the quantitative data before embarking upon the final phase of data-collection. As a result, the survey helped the third phase of data-collection, particularly in terms of identifying specific school settings on which further research seemed theoretically interesting (see below) but less in terms of identifying specific relationships that required further, in-depth analysis. On the other hand, by the time the third wave of data-collection started, we were in a better position to identify gaps and limitations in our first qualitative research phase, which allowed us to improve our interview questions and focus on additional issues that appeared important in the third (final) phase of data-collection.

As a result, the research design that underpins this study can perhaps be classified as a combination of a sequential qualitative design (QUAL (phase 1) → QUAL (phase 2)) and a (double) sequential, transformative mixed methods design (Creswell et al. 2003), which contains two cycles of distinct and subsequent data-collection phases: QUAL (phase 1) → QUANTS (phase 2) and QUANTS (phase two) → QUAL (phase three), in which the use of a particular method is informed by the particular research questions that it seeks to address, and in which the first phase informs the focus of the second phase of data-collection and analysis.

The first phase of qualitative research was designed by the author (also the supervisor of the larger project), the co-supervisor of this project and two research assistants. The latter two carried out the collection of interview data in phase one in three Greek-speaking, public junior secondary schools in Lefkosia (see below for details of the schools). The survey was designed by the same team and a fourth research officer, who also collected the survey data from four public and two private secondary schools in Lefkosia. The analysis of the survey data and the entire third, qualitative research phase were carried out by the author of this book. The following sections briefly describe the key characteristics of the qualitative and the quantitative parts of this mixed methods research design.

Qualitative interviews

In total, 172 students were interviewed as part of this study, selected from five different schools (see Table 3.1). However, in this book we

Table 3.1 Sampling of schools and students for participation in student survey and interviews

	Number of pupils in school	Percentage ethnic minority(*) students in school	Number of students participating in survey	Response rate	Number of students interviewed
Urban homogeneous state school I	403	6%	137	34%	24
Urban homogeneous state school II	304	7%	243	78%	none
Urban mixed state school	222	31%	175	79%	30
Rural homogeneous state school	409	2%	307	75%	28
Urban private school – *Red Brick*	206	54%	136	66%	30
Urban private school – *Green Lane*	1088	18%	536	49%(**)	53
TOTAL			1534		165

* The number of ethnic minority students is defined by the school and relates to students who speak another language than Greek at home.
** The response rate for this school is actually 88% as we only focused on students enrolled in lower secondary school.

only focus on the interviews carried out by the principal researcher in the two urban private schools, involving 83 students in total, namely 38 GC and 15 TC students in *Green Lane* and 15 GCs and 15 TCs in *Red Brick*.[2] Almost all the students were between 13 and 16 years old, and in both secondary schools and for each ethnic group we selected roughly the same number of boys and girls. These students were selected from *Green Lane* and *Red Brick* because initial analysis of the quantitative survey data from both schools suggested that TC/GC relationships were more polarized in *Green Lane* than in *Red Brick* (see Chapter 4). In addition, both schools offered the rare

opportunity in Cyprus to study GC and TC students together in the same school setting where they can interact with each other on a daily basis.

Green Lane and *Red Brick* schools are both situated in the Southern, mainly Greek-speaking, unoccupied part of the divided capital of Lefkosia and attract mainly students from middle and higher social class backgrounds. The vast majority of students attending these schools aim at obtaining qualifications that will allow them to study at universities in the UK and the USA. *Green Lane* is a large school (with 1088 students on the roll: see Table 3.1), with the majority of students coming from the Greek Cypriot majority (72%) and a minority from Turkish Cypriot (15%) or other ethnic minority backgrounds (13%). In contrast, *Red Brick* is a small school (with 206 students on the roll) and ethnically more heterogeneous (46% Greek Cypriot, 15% Turkish Cypriot and 38% of other ethnic background).

The interviews were conducted in English, recorded and transcribed verbatim. Students were allowed to take the interview with one friend and interviews typically lasted between 40 and 60 minutes. All students and parents provided their informed consent to participate in the interviews. The interview questions focused on the following key topics: students' ethnic, national and religious in/out group identities and attitudes, their experiences and definitions of racism and their strategies in response to racism. Each interview started with a 'card-game' to explore more inductively which ethnic groups students consider as meaningful in- and out-groups. More specifically, students were presented with a set of cards, which were laid out in front of them on the table (and two sets in case the interview was a double interview). Each card contained the name of one particular ethnic group, and a set typically contained the following 23 groups: African, Armenians, British, Bulgarians, Chinese, Cypriots, Europeans, Filipinos, Greeks, Greek Cypriots, Israelis, Jews, Kurds, Muslims, Nicosians, Non-Religious, Non-Whites, Orthodox, Palestinians, Pontians, Turkish Cypriots, Turks and Whites.

In addition, each set of cards contained two cards with a question mark printed on it instead of a group name so that 'if a group that is important to you is not written on the cards, you can use this question mark to include that group' (and they were subsequently asked to describe this group if they used this opportunity). The selection of the groups included in the card set was based on a review of

qualitative studies that explore young GCs' (see review of research in Cyprus above) perceptions of in/out group relations in Cyprus and discussions with the research team throughout the process of qualitative data-collection, in which suggestions from students during interviews were considered.

In participating with the card-game, students were asked to 'select those groups which you feel you belong to', and then to 'select those groups which you don't want to belong to, for whatever reason'. Afterwards, students were first asked to rank the groups that they selected as groups they belong to, with the group on top being the most important group for them personally. Afterwards they were asked to rank the groups which they don't want to belong to, with 'the group you would not like to belong to the most' on top. Students were explicitly given the option to put groups next to each other in the ranking exercise. After students fulfilled this selection and ranking exercise, the researcher started with questions about: (1) their motivations for ranking particular groups differently; (2) their motivations for selecting particular groups as groups they don't want to belong to; and (3) their perceived similarities and differences between particular groups (for instance: 'you see yourself as both Greek Cypriot and Cypriot, but if being Cypriot is more important to you, what is then the difference between a Cypriot and a Greek Cypriot?').

A grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967) approach was used to analyse the interview data. Although the nature of the research questions and related interview questions generated particular codes that were considered relevant at the start of the data-collection (such as 'experiences of racism', 'strategies in response to racism', 'ethnic in-group perceptions', etc.), a more open form of coding resulted in the validation of these pre-defined codes but also the emergence of new codes and relationships between them.

Quantitative student survey

This study uses quantitative survey data from students randomly selected from six purposefully selected secondary schools situated in or around the area of Lefkosia – in the Greek Cypriot part of the divided capital of Cyprus (see Table 3.1). Schools were selected so to maximize variability in terms of school characteristics that can be

important in shaping ethnic in- and out-group relationships, related to the social class and ethnic composition of the school population and the level of urbanization of the area in which the school is situated (Hooghe and De Vroome 2015; Stevens and Görgös 2010; Van Praag et al. 2014). More specifically, we collected survey data from two urban, public, ethnically homogeneous schools; one urban, public, ethnically heterogeneous school; one rural, public, ethnically homogeneous school; and two urban, private, ethnically heterogeneous schools. Two public, ethnically homogeneous schools were selected because we obtained a very low response rate in the first school we selected with this profile. The sample of students (S=1534) had an almost equal composition of boys and girls and students selected from a private or public school. Additional information about the composition of the samples used for data-analysis is provided in Chapter 6.

All students in the selected schools were invited to participate in the survey (average response rate: 70%), which was administered by a trained research assistant. The survey questionnaire had been previously piloted and adapted where necessary in three different languages: English, Greek and Turkish. The translation from the survey from English to Greek and Turkish was undertaken by different translators who conducted and afterwards compared and reconciled differences in interpretation. Students could choose the language of the survey, and participation was voluntary and anonymous, with parents having the opportunity to opt their child out of the study. Additional information about the employed analysis methods (logistic regression) and the variables included in the models can be found in Chapter 6.

4

Greek and Turkish Cypriot In- and Out-Group Perceptions

The main goal of this chapter is twofold: (1) to explore how young GCs and TCs draw ethnic (cultural, religious, racial) boundaries around themselves and others, and in so doing make ethnic classifications of in- and out-groups that are meaningful to them in the context of Cyprus; and (2) to explore the socio-psychological motivations that underpin their attitudes to particular ethnic out-groups. Both quantitative and qualitative data are utilized to answer these questions, with the former used primarily to paint a general picture of in- and out-group attitudes, and the latter, in line with the anthropological tradition on studying 'boundary work' (Barth 1998; Wimmer 2013), to offer a more detailed understanding of how GCs and TCs construct meaningful ethnic, religious and national boundaries around themselves and others and their motivations for doing so. A first section focuses on the quantitative data-analysis and forms a platform for the second phase, which reports on the qualitative data-analysis.

Charting Greek and Turkish Cypriots' in- and out-group perceptions

The following sections present quantitative analyses based on the survey data and the card-game that was used in the qualitative interviews (see Chapter 3) to offer a general picture of how GCs and TCs in our research perceive themselves and others in terms of collective, ethnic, national and/or religious belonging. The analysis focuses first on how GCs and TCs perceive themselves in ethnic, national

and religious terms, and afterwards on how they perceive each other and particular out-groups in Cyprus. A final sections focuses on the school context, and explores differences and similarities between GCs' and TCs' attitudes to out-groups in the different public and private schools included in this research.

How Greek and Turkish Cypriots perceive themselves

In order to map out how GC and TC students perceive themselves in terms of ethnic and national belonging, the survey asked students to self-identify with one out of five possible categories: 'Greek', 'Greek Cypriot', 'Turkish', 'Turkish Cypriot' or 'Other'; if selected, the latter category had to be specified in words. When we compare students who speak Greek with their mother or father with those who speak Turkish with at least one parent, we can see that GC and TC students' ethnic identifications are complex and different from each other (Table 4.1).

First, the regional identities appear salient for these young people in the context of Cyprus, as 75% of the Turkish-speaking students and the Greek-speaking students define themselves as TC and GC respectively. Although 'Cypriot' was not a category explicitly given to students, 7.2% of the Greek-speaking and 15.8% of the Turkish-speaking students defined themselves explicitly as 'Cypriot' (through selecting and specifying the 'Other' category in the survey). This suggests that for the Turkish-speaking students in our sample, the collective 'Cypriot' identity is more meaningful than for the Greek-speaking students in our study. Finally, 'mother country' identities appear more important for Greek-speaking students as compared to Turkish-speaking students, with 13% of the former perceiving

Table 4.1 Greek- and Turkish-speaking students' ethnic identifications

Students who speak Greek at home			Students who speak Turkish at home		
I belong to the following group:			**I belong to the following group:**		
Greek	156	12.5%	Turkish	6	4.5%
Greek Cypriot	940	75.1%	Turkish Cypriot	98	73.7%
Other (Cypriot)	89	7.2%	Other (Cypriot)	21	15.8%
Other (non-Cypriot)	67	5.2%	Other (non-Cypriot)	8	6.0%
	1252	**100%**		**133**	**100%**

themselves as primarily 'Greek' compared to 5% of the latter group perceiving themselves as primarily 'Turkish'.

In comparing Greek- and Turkish-speaking students' choices of their selected collective ethnic identity, we can conclude that the selected ethnic category to which Greek-speaking students related to was more important for them in the way they perceived themselves (centrality) as compared to Turkish-speaking students. In addition, Greek-speaking students were more likely to attach a nationalistic ideology to their ethnic in-group (nationalism), which means that they were more likely than Turkish-speaking students to consider their own ethnic group as culturally different and superior to other ethnic groups (Table 4.2).

Finally, the survey shows that our sample of Greek- and Turkish-speaking students differs in how they perceive themselves in terms of their religion and their status as refugees. While none of the Turkish-speaking students perceived themselves as a refugee, 39% of the Greek-speaking students described themselves as such. This suggests that (for our sample of GC students) the meaningfulness of the status 'refugee' can be transmitted from generation to generation, irrespective of whether or not people have actually experienced the displacement personally – all students in this study were born after the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey and the forced displacement of GCs and TCs. The Greek-speaking students in our sample also appear to attach more importance to religion: while 77% of the Greek-speaking

Table 4.2   The centrality, nationalism and public and private regard of Greek- and Turkish-speaking students' ethnic in-group

Ethnic in-group perception...	Mother speaks...	N	Mean	SD
Centrality ethnic in-group*	Greek	1022	**25,72**	5,46
	Turkish	105	**24,71**	4,69
Nationalism ethnic in-group***	Greek	1035	**28,00**	5,93
	Turkish	100	**25,06**	6,37
Private regard ethnic in-group	Greek	1031	**23,54**	4,56
	Turkish	104	**23,52**	4,40

Note: An independent sample t-test was conducted to compare the perceived centrality, nationalism and private regard of Greek- and Turkish-speaking students, with higher averages indicating higher levels. * indicates differences in averages between Turkish- and Greek-speaking students that are significant at p<.05 and *** at p<.000.

students considered religion important to themselves, 79% of the Turkish-speaking students considered this as not important to themselves ($\chi 2$ = 161.87 (df = 1),N=1226, ϕ = −.36, p < .000).

The analysis of the card-game (for description, see Chapter 3; for results, see Appendix 1 and 2) supports some of these findings. While only 53% of the TCs interviewed considered themselves as Muslim and only 30% put this identity in their top-three most important identities, 88% of the GCs interviewed considered themselves as Christian (Orthodox), with 62% of GC students putting this identity in their top-three most important identities. Furthermore, while 40% of the TCs considered themselves explicitly as belonging to the non-religious group, only 6% of the GCs interviewed expressed the same opinion. In terms of ethnic/national identification the card-game also illustrates that TCs are more likely to perceive themselves as Cypriot as compared to GCs, who in turn are more likely to prefer a more exclusive ethnic or national (Greek) identity in describing themselves. For example, while 83% of the TCs put Cypriot in their top-three most important identities, only 68% of the GCs made the same choice. Conversely, while 52% of the GCs put Greek in their top-three most important identities, only 17% of the TCs interviewed put Turkish in their top-three most important identities.

In sum, the Turkish-speaking students in our sample seem to be less religious and less nationalistic as compared to their Greek-speaking peers. In addition, they attach less importance to their national or ethnic identity, do not perceive themselves as refugees and are more likely to perceive themselves as belonging to a collective 'Cypriot' identity than their Greek-speaking peers, who are more likely to identify with a more exclusive ethnic or national (Greek) identity.

How Greek and Turkish Cypriots perceive others

In the survey, students were asked to indicate how positively or negatively they saw the following nine groups in Cyprus: 'Asians (Chinese, Vietnamese Philippines, etc.)', 'African Black', 'Eastern European (Bulgarian, Romanian, etc.)', 'Greek Cypriots', 'Greeks', 'Pontians', 'Turkish', 'Turkish Cypriots' and 'British'. In comparing the percentages of Greek- with Turkish-speaking students that felt (neutral or) positive towards particular ethnic groups in Cyprus we can draw several main conclusions.

Figure 4.1   Percentage of Greek- and Turkish-speaking Cypriot students with positive views of ethnic groups in Cyprus

First, Turkish-speaking students seem more positive of recent immigrant groups compared to Greek-speaking students Furthermore, Turkish- and Greek-speaking students do not seem to distinguish between various immigrant groups, in that their perceptions of Asians do not seem to differ very much from the way they see Africans and Eastern Europeans. This suggests that these various immigrant groups can be analysed together in a more general category of 'recent immigrants'.

Second, British people are generally perceived in very positive terms by both Greek- and Turkish-speaking students, which is perhaps somewhat surprising given the status of Britain as a former colonizer of Cyprus and Cyprus' struggle for independence from Britain.

Third, and not so surprisingly, Greek-speaking students seem very positive towards Greek Cypriots and Greeks, while the same is true for Turkish-speaking students' attitudes towards Turkish Cypriots and Turks. However, Turkish-speaking students have much more negative views of Turks as compared to Greek-speaking students' views of Greeks: while more than 30% of the Turkish-speaking students interviewed perceive Turks in a negative way, only 11% of the Greek-speaking students perceived Greeks in a negative way.

Furthermore, Turkish-speaking students' perceptions of GCs are more positive as compared to Greek-speaking students' perceptions

of TCs: while 74% of the Turkish-speaking students perceive GCs in a neutral/positive way, only 52% of the Greek-speaking students perceive TCs in a neutral/positive way. Additional data-analysis shows that the average differences between Greek-speaking and Turkish-speaking students' attitudes to these groups are significant (p<.005), except for their attitudes to British immigrants (see Appendix 3).

Finally, the survey data also allows us to test if both group of students perceive particular out-groups as more threatening. As perceived (economic, cultural, physical) threat is considered to be a primary cause of prejudice, we would expect Greek-speaking students to feel more threatened by out-groups as compared to Turkish-speaking students. The analysis suggests this is only partially the case (Table 4.3).

In comparing Greek-speaking with Turkish-speaking students, the analysis shows that the former feel indeed more threatened by (recent) immigrant groups, which might explain their more negative views of immigrant groups in Cyprus. However, the data also shows that both Greek-speaking and Turkish-speaking students perceive Turks in particular as a threat, despite the observation made earlier that Turkish-speaking students seem more positive towards Turks as compared to Greek-speaking students. Finally, although both Greek- and Turkish-speaking students appear equally positive to British immigrants, British immigrants are perceived more as a threat to Greek-speaking students.

The quantitative analysis of the card-game (see Appendix 1 and 2) supports and expands on the analyses of the survey data. Here too,

Table 4.3   Perceived threat from British, other immigrants and Turks

Perceived threat of...	Mother speaks...	N	Mean	SD
British***	Greek	1008	**14,80**	3,88
	Turkish	87	**12,59**	5,11
Other immigrants**	Greek	999	**15,23**	4,32
	Turkish	87	**13,56**	4,71
Turks	Greek	992	**17,06**	5,12
	Turkish	89	**17,89**	5,61

Note: An independent sample t-test was conducted to compare the perceived threat of Greek- and Turkish-speaking students to British, other immigrants and Turks, with higher averages indicating higher levels of perceived threat. ** indicates differences in averages are significant at p<.005 and *** at p<.000.

GCs' attitudes of TCs are more negative than TCs' attitudes of GCs: while 38% of the GCs don't want to belong to the group of TCs, only 10% of the TCs report that they don't want to belong to the group of GCs. In addition, when given more freedom to choose which groups they like or don't like, GCs and TCs identify somewhat different groups, including groups that were not included in the survey. In order of dislike, TCs wanted to belong least to the group of Kurds (30%), Orthodox (27%), Jews/Israelis (23%), Greeks and Turks (both 20%). GCs, on the other hand, did not want to belong to Turks (52%), Muslims (42%), non-religious and Turkish Cypriots (both 38%) and Jews/Israelis and Palestinians (all 28%).

This shows that, in line with the survey data, GCs appear in general more negative to out-groups. However, it also shows that some of the out-groups selected in the survey, particularly the new immigrant groups (Asians, Eastern Europeans, Africans) are relatively less important in discussing in/out group relations for the GC and TC students interviewed. Only the group of Philippines was selected as a relevant out-group to whom TC and GC students did not want to belong (by 7% and 18% respectively). The card-game also shows that TCs feel somewhat ambivalent towards Turks, by both associating with and distancing themselves from Turks. Finally, the outcome of the card-game strongly suggests the importance of religion in discussing in/out group attitudes, with TCs distancing themselves from Orthodox and GCs distancing themselves from Muslims and non-religious people; here too the negative attitudes of GCs appear more pronounced than those of TCs.

In sum, the quantitative data-analysis suggests that TCs have in general more positive attitudes to ethnic, national and religious out-groups as compared to GCs. Furthermore, TCs have more positive attitudes of GCs as compared to GCs' attitudes of TCs. Finally, GCs appear to feel more threatened by ethnic out-groups as compared to their TC peers, except for the group of Turks, which was perceived by both GCs and TCs as the most threatening ethnic out-group.

School differences

In this study it is not possible to investigate the effects of structural and cultural school characteristics (e.g. proportion of minorities and lower social class students enrolled in school, multicultural school policies,

racist school culture, etc.) on students' in–out group attitudes through quantitative analyses, as the sample of schools involved is too small. However, given that we selected state schools that vary in terms of urban/rural location and proportion of minority students enrolled in school (with no TC students on the roll), it is interesting to compare how GCs' attitudes to ethnic in- and out-groups groups differ/overlap in these public school contexts. In addition, as the qualitative data-analysis focuses only on students selected from two private schools that both welcome GC and TC students, it is important to describe how TCs' and GCs' attitudes to in/out groups differ/overlap in these private school contexts, as this could point to variability in the data that is theoretically interesting and, as a result, can be subjected to further analysis in this book.

A second figure presents the proportions of GC students that have positive views of specific ethnic groups in Cyprus in three different, public school contexts: (1) an urban, ethnically more heterogeneous school context; (2) an urban, ethnically more homogeneous school context; and (3) a rural, ethnically more homogeneous school context. Following a crude application of the contact hypothesis (Allport 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp 2005), we expect that GCs' attitudes towards out-groups are most positive in an urban, ethnically more heterogeneous school context and the least positive in a rural, ethnically homogeneous context, as GCs are more likely to come into contact with ethnic out-groups in the former context as compared to the latter; with students from an urban, ethnically more homogeneous school context taking a somewhat in-between position. The findings seem to confirm this hypothesis, with GCs from context 1 showing in general more positive views to ethnic out-groups as compared to context 2 and especially to context 3 (Figure 4.2).

The associations between school contexts and proportion of GC students that are positive to out-groups is significant for all six out-groups (Cramer's V between .06 en .18 and p between .05 and .000). GC students' attitudes to their own GC and Greek in-groups are generally very positive and do not differ between school contexts. While these findings seem to confirm the importance of school and broader social contexts in generating out-group perceptions through structural features that impact on students' opportunities to have contact with out-groups, the small sample included in this analysis does not allow us to really test these school effects. Focusing now

Figure 4.2   Percentage of Greek-speaking Cypriot students with positive views of ethnic groups in Cyprus in different public school contexts

on our two private schools, Figure 4.3 presents the percentages of GC and TC students that have positive or neutral views of particular ethnic groups in *Red Brick* and *Green Lane*.

Interesting differences and similarities can be observed between GCs' and TCs' attitudes towards each other and immigrant groups in Cyprus between these two schools. First, in both schools, TCs seem to have slightly more positive attitudes to recent immigrant groups as compared to GCs, but the differences are very small, particularly in *Green Lane*, and not significant, except for the difference in attitudes to Asians between TCs and GCs in *Red Brick* ($\chi 2$ = 5.41 (df = 1), N=48, ϕ = .34, p < .05). This suggests that the inclusion of GC students from public schools increases the differences between TCs' and GCs' attitudes to out-groups and makes them statistically significant.

Second, the attitudes towards GCs and Greeks appear more polarized in *Green Lane*, with TCs in *Green Lane* showing less positive views of GCs and Greeks as compared to their TC peers in *Red Brick*. Finally, in both schools GCs have much more negative attitudes of TCs and Turks as compared to TCs' attitudes to themselves and Turks.

The quantitative analyses of the card-game appear to support some of the findings from the survey data. First, a larger proportion of GCs in *Green Lane* do not want to belong to the categories of Turks, TCs and Muslims as compared to their GC peers from *Red Brick*. Second, a larger proportion of TCs in *Green Lane* do not want to belong to the

Figure 4.3 Percentage of Greek- and Turkish-speaking Cypriot students with positive views of ethnic groups in Cyprus in *Red Brick and Green Lane*

categories of Greeks and Orthodox as compared to their TC peers from *Red Brick* (see Appendix 1 and 2). The observation that inter-group attitudes between TC and GC are more polarized in *Green Lane* compared to *Red Brick* will be subject of further investigation in Chapter 5.

Constructing the collective self and other in the context of Cyprus

The following sections explore how GC and TC students construct a sense of collective ethnic, in-group belonging and how they distance themselves from and give meaning to particular out-groups in the context of Cyprus. In addition, we focus on the underlying motivations that surface in students' discourses that can help us to understand why they describe themselves and others in this particular way. The analysis is mainly based on the probing questions that were introduced immediately after students finalized the card-game, but also on the inter-ethnic marriage questions and any section of the interview data that included a discussion of particular in- and out-groups (see Chapter 3). The presentation of the findings is divided in two main parts: a first section focuses on TCs' discourses and a second on GCs' discourses. In each of these two sections we investigate two related topics: (1) How we describe ourselves (in-group perceptions); and (2) How we describe others (out-group perceptions).

Turkish Cypriot students' in- and out-group perceptions

In the following sections we explore first how TCs construct a sense of collective ethnic in-group belonging, and in so doing highlight and obscure particular boundaries between the categories of Cypriots, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Afterwards we focus the analysis more on those categories that they consider as outgroups, which in their discourses appear to be primarily Kurdish and/or Turkish immigrants and Greeks.

How we describe ourselves…

The qualitative interviews suggest that TCs' more positive views of GCs (as compared to GCs' views of TCs) and their preference to perceive themselves as Cypriot (instead of Turkish) are interconnected. In general, most TC students interviewed considered TC and GC to be artificial categories and preferred instead to label TCs and GCs as both 'Cypriots'. A key motivation for preferring the overarching category of 'Cypriots' in describing themselves is their belief that the distinction of Cypriots into GCs and TCs causes division between them and hampers the development of a solution to the Cyprus problem or a reunification of the country:

Researcher: 'Both of you put Turks as a group you don't want to belong to. Now, what's the difference between being Cypriot and being Turkish Cypriot?'

Atlan: 'In the group of Cypriots there are Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, which we don't want to separate. I think I don't belong to the group of Turkish Cypriots, I don't believe that Turkish Cypriots exist, there are Cypriots only because I don't want a divided country, that's why I don't want to be introduced in the Turkish Cypriots group.'

Researcher: 'Ok, Bulut what's your opinion about that?'

Bulut: 'In my opinion there shouldn't be anything such as Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots. It is the separation of the two groups that started this war and I believe we should just be called "Cypriots" but I still have, I still belong to this (Turkish Cypriot) group, no matter how much I don't like it because I was born in the other side and this is what I am.' (Interview, *Green Lane*)

The above extract shows that while these TC students prefer to see themselves (and GCs) as 'Cypriot', the division of the island also made their belonging to a TC group meaningful (albeit undesirable). Two key collective identification processes seem to explain *how* TCs constructed a Cypriot identity. Although they recognized that TCs could be considered as culturally similar to Turks, they were at pains (1) to magnify cultural similarities and downplay cultural differences between TCs and GCs, and at the same time (2) magnify cultural differences and downplay cultural similarities between TCs and Turks, and between GCs and Greeks. In relationship to the former, TCs often stressed that TCs and GCs 'are the same'. While they recognized that there were cultural differences, most notably in terms of language and religion, they were keen to stress the similarities between TCs and GCs in terms of their culture and downplay any differences:

Peter: 'Now what is then the difference between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots?'

Can: 'Well Greek Cypriots they are similar to Greeks and Turkish Cypriots. We have culture similarities and we act in the same way – for example we swear in the same way.'

Peter: 'Like?'

Can: 'For example they say "pezevengi" we say "pezeneng", they say "pushti" we say "psht"; just one letter difference. And for some words we have Cypriot words, for example "godjagare" it comes from Turkish, it means "kodja" means old and "gare" means woman, it means like old woman, old lady but we call this Cypriot words because we changed the accent of the pronunciation, we change it and it becomes Cypriot. I think if we live together we can make another language.'

Peter: 'Do you think that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots have a different mentality or character or they are the same?'

Can: 'I searched about this in internet and it says "they are the same" and I FEEL that we are the same, I feel that we are the same but some of the people their mentality they say "I am Greek I'm not even Cypriot" and other people say "I'm Turkish and Cyprus is Turkish" or "Cyprus is Greek" but I don't agree with that.' (Interview, *Red Brick*)

This TC student is typical in that in discussing obvious language differences between TCs and GCs, he immediately decides to stress characteristics of TC and GC languages that connect them (even suggesting that they could develop into the same, distinct language), and at the same time differentiate them with Turks and (mainland) Greeks. In so doing this student constructs a cultural language boundary and legitimation for a shared Cypriot identity, something that was often broadened to include other cultural markers, like food ('we eat the same food') and values and attitudes ('we think in the same way'), which were in turn often explained and fortified through a perceived shared geographical and historical ancestry ('we come from the same island').

The last sentences of this extract also say something about *why* TCs feel the need to distance themselves socially from Turks and come closer to GCs in developing a pan-Cypriot identity, in that the TCs interviewed seemed to experience at least two sources of threat to the recognition of a collective Cypriot identity (and related culture): a threat experienced from Turkish immigrants and from more Hellenic GCs (see below). In tandem with this, TCs were keen to stress apparent cultural differences and minimize similarities between TCs and Turks. Take Can, for instance, who in the extract above immediately tries to identify similarities between the TC and GC languages in discussing differences between these two groups. When the question turns to perceived differences between TCs and Turks he does exactly the opposite:

Peter: 'And what would you see then are the differences between the Turkish Cypriots and the Turks?'

Can: 'So many differences, such as pronunciation, dialect and I can say that I play basketball and I went to Turkey so many times, I've been to Turkey a month ago and when we talked, they actually didn't understand us from our dialect and we had to talk like them (for them) to understand us. And we don't really eat the same food. You know halloumi?'

Peter: 'Yea.'

Can: 'We call it "helim" they say "what kind of cheese is that"? It's not even cheese, you know. We have so many differences but we also have similarities.'

The TC students interviewed often used these two strategies in combination to construct a cultural legitimization of a Cypriot

identity. In addition, in the same way as they tried to reinforce cultural connections between TCs and GCs by referring to a shared geography and cultural history, TCs aimed to distance themselves from a Turkish identity by pointing to differences between Turks and TCs in terms of their geographical ancestry, or, as Ferit puts it: 'I was born here (in Cyprus) and I have the culture of Cyprus not of Turkish people.' In sum, the TCs in this sample are quite similar in terms of the ethnic boundaries they draw around themselves, with most of them identifying with a 'Cypriot' identity that is inclusive of both GCs and TCs.

How we describe others

Greeks are…   TCs, however, did not perceive all GCs as 'Cypriots', and categorized some GCs as 'Greek'. While GC 'Cypriots' were perceived in positive terms (and very similar to themselves), GC 'Greeks' were defined in negative terms, primarily because they were regarded as intolerant of TCs and wanted Cyprus to belong only to Greeks. Members of this group were usually not perceived as residents or immigrants from Greece but as Cypriots who identify strongly with Greece and Greek culture, or what we could call more 'Hellenic Cypriots', and were often defined as 'nationalistic', 'very religious', 'fascist' and 'racist':

Azra:	(laughs)) 'I don't want to be Greek, because they did bad things to us and now we have hate, a little bit of hate, but not to Greek Cypriots or Cypriots.'
Researcher:	'Ok, so you don't want to belong to Greek group; is that because what happened in the past?'
Belinay:	'No, because of what happened in school, not the past.'
Azra:	'Yes, I didn't know that there are lots of racist people on this side before I came to this school. I came to this side before I came to this school but there was no racist people or I was with my family, so I wasn't affected by them.'
Belinay:	'Last year one of our friends forgot his Turkish book in a class and a Greek student saw it and ripped it and he had to buy it again.'
Researcher:	'So you started to hate Greeks because of…'
Azra:	'The things they did us.'

Researcher: 'And they are the people who see themselves as Greek?'
Azra: 'Yes.' (Interview, *Green Lane*)

This extract illustrates TCs' distinction between 'good' GCs as (Greek) Cypriots and 'bad' GCs as Greeks. Furthermore, it also shows how this distinction and a dislike of more Hellenic GCs develops through lived experiences of exclusion from certain GCs within a particular school context – with 'Greeks' considered as the most likely perpetrators of discriminatory behaviour towards TCs. Later in the book we will see how lived, everyday experiences of racism from GCs usually revolve around acts of social exclusion, in which GCs directly or indirectly tell TCs that 'they don't belong here (in Cyprus)' (see Chapter 5). The claim that Hellenic GCs are very religious needs some clarification. In general, TCs consider GC not only as believers of a different religion (Orthodox Christianity instead of Islam) but also as much more religious compared to TCs, who defined themselves mainly as unreligious or as (non-practising) Muslim, with the latter identity almost always ranked as relatively less important:

Researcher: 'Do you think language is the only barrier? Imagine you all speak the same language?'
Emin: 'Yes, language is a great barrier but I don't think religion is that much a barrier.'
Demir: 'I think religion is a barrier. The Greek Cypriots have a church with a lot of power, so I think that would be a problem. Most of the Greek Cypriots I know they go to church every Sunday.'
Emin: 'And they always wear a cross.'
Demir: 'And there is a student who goes there and cleans, I think sometimes after school as like a hobby, helps the church I think, that's quite different to us.'
Emin: 'The Turkish Cypriots are not concerned about religion but the immigrants from Turkey care about religion but they don't care that much either.' (Interview, *Green Lane*)

While the extract above illustrates a common perception of TC students in that they consider GCs (and Turkish immigrants) as more religious compared to themselves, it also shows that TC students varied in terms of their views on whether this constituted a barrier

between TCs and GCs. The data suggests that TCs did not consider GC (or TC) religiousness as a problem per se, but considered more strongly religious Orthodox GCs as more intolerant of TCs.

Peter: 'Ok now you put Orthodox as a group you don't want to belong to. Why is that?'

Cemre: 'Well, because I know some people from the school or out of school that are Greek Orthodox and because of the hatred [I feel] and I feel excluded when I am with those people.'

Peter: 'You mean those people see themselves as Greek Orthodox?'

Cemre: 'Well they are Greek Orthodox but they EXCLUDE people like ME.'

Peter: 'How do they do that?'

Cemre: 'With words, like "Cyprus is Greek" and like "you have no right to be here" and stuff like that.' (Interview, *Red Brick*)

This also points to a more general observation, in that the distinction between 'good' and 'bad' GCs should not be considered as a dichotomy, but more as a continuous variable in that GCs could vary in terms of their 'Cypriotness' or 'Greekness':

Damla: 'There are actually three groups (of GCs in school): one that accepts us as Cypriots and welcome us, which is unfortunately really small. And then there is another group which thinks we are Turkish Cypriots and they don't care if we live separate but if they see us they say "hello" it's fine they respect us, they think they are more Cypriot than us but they don't treat you bad because of that. And there is another group, which is a minority, which says that half of them are under occupation, because of their families and because of the education system.' (Interview, *Green Lane*)

Damla's claim that GC families and the GC education system are to blame for developing feelings of 'hate' towards and spreading lies about TCs also reflects a common theme in the interviews with TCs. While these TC students often excused the racist views of some of their GC peers as 'they were only children', they did not accept such views from adults and/or teachers 'who should know better'.

Turks are… A key difference between the way in which TCs described Greeks (or more Hellenic GCs) and Turks is that they presented the latter in much more negative, stereotypical terms. While TCs only described Greeks as nationalistic, very religious, fascist and racist or intolerant of TCs, they used a greater set of negative stereotypes to describe Turks. The first and most dominant stereotype that emerges from the interview is that Turks are perceived as culturally inferior to TCs, with the former described as 'uncivilized', 'not modern', 'dirty', 'eating rubbish'; they 'smoke', 'swear', are 'cold', 'loud' and 'rude'. A second, key stereotype is that Turks are more 'criminal', which relates to other stereotypes of Turks as 'thieves', 'untrustworthy', prone to 'do bad things', 'have mafia', are 'violent', 'rapists' and 'start a fight easily'. A third stereotype is that Turks feel superior (to TCs), in that 'they don't care (or listen to) what you say', 'always think they are right' or 'better than us'. A fourth stereotype of Turks relates to their socio-economic position, in that they are perceived as 'uneducated' and often 'poor' and 'unemployed' or looking for work, or employed in lower-status jobs. A final stereotype of Turks is that they are perceived as 'more religious'. Several observations can be made in relationship to these stereotypes.

First, of all the stereotypes mentioned, the claims that Turks have a lower social class background appears particularly important, as it seems to relate to other stereotypes of Turks, particularly the stereotypes of Turks as culturally inferior and more criminal. Or, in other words: it is perhaps because they are considered uneducated that they are perceived not to know how to behave and because they are perceived as poor (and/or uneducated) that they are involved in crime. The social class-based nature of these stereotypes seems to be reinforced by comparisons of Turks in Turkey with Turks that immigrated to Cyprus. Such comparisons tend to reveal that TCs don't necessarily feel negative towards all Turks. Just as their perceptions of GCs seem to vary between positive (GC as more Cypriot) and negative (GCs as more Greek), they seem to make a (more implicit) distinction between good (higher social class) Turks and bad (lower social class) Turks. More specifically, the TCs interviewed do not necessarily see the Turks in Cyprus as representative of Turks in Turkey, and argue that a specific population of Turks immigrated to Cyprus, one that is perceived as less educated, more likely to be unemployed and often of Kurdish ethnic background:

Can: 'The ones that come to Cyprus they are close to the group of Kurdish people, we say that they are Turkish but half of them maybe I can say 80% of them are Kurdish. So we can separate them. Do you know Istanbul?'

Peter: 'Yea.'

Can: 'In Istanbul you can separate them. [In Istanbul] they are a bit more higher class but those that come from the Southern Turkey they are a bit lower class and if you are in the South you are close to Arabic countries and they are similar to Arabic people and Kurdish people and they say "I'm Turkish" they come to Cyprus, but you see that they are Kurdish or Arabic and you can understand from their accent, it's like a bit like Arabic.'

Can implicitly associates himself more with Turks with a higher social class background in Istanbul, and distances himself from Turks 'from Southern Turkey', who are perceived to share a lower social class background and to be physically and culturally (in terms of their language) different. The perception that a large proportion of Turks in Cyprus are actually (lower social class) Kurdish immigrants was shared by many TCs interviewed, with some of them not making this statement but instead arguing that the Turks that immigrated to Cyprus 'sound more Arabic' and look different with their 'black hair' and 'long beards'. The observation that TCs' negative perceptions of Turks relate to their perceptions of Kurdish immigrants with a lower social class background also explains why TCs (in performing the card-game) were most likely to select Kurds as a group they did not want to belong to (see above).

Second, the reason *why* TCs seem to think of Turks in a more negative and stereotypical way compared to more Hellenic GCs can in part be explained by the observation that they also feel more threatened by Turks as compared to Hellenic GCs. The prevalence of stereotypes of Turks as culturally inferior in TCs' discourses indicates the meaningfulness of these differences and was often explicitly discussed in relationship to a perceived threat to the continued existence of a (Turkish) Cypriot culture and identity:

Ferit: 'I mean they are not very modern as us like: they spit around, they throw their things away, they swear and smoke all the time.'

Hakan: 'We don't want to lose the Cypriot culture.'
Ferit: 'Yes, and also they take the jobs.'
Peter: 'Do you think it's a good thing for Cyprus that a lot of Turkish people immigrate?'
Ferit: 'No, no, more than half of the population is from Turkey.'
Peter: 'And why is that not good?'
Ferit: 'They are killing our culture.'
Peter: 'How do you see that?'
Ferit: 'I mean if there are less people from Cyprus then the culture is changing.'
Hakan: 'He has a friend he hasn't seen him for a while. In primary school he was a good nice, boy with good culture, but now when I see him or when he sees him, because he is more like somebody from Turkey, he swears and does bad things.'
Ferit: 'Yes, because he is friend now with people from Turkey he has changed a lot.' (Interview, *Green Lane*)

The strong, emotive language used to describe their perceived threat from Turkish culture and identity ('they are killing our culture') also emerged in other interviews, with students claiming that 'they just strangle the Turkish Cypriots identity from the throat' and 'TCs are facing extinction'. While this extract also illustrates that the TCs perceived Turks as an economic threat ('they take our jobs'), this economic threat appeared less important as compared to the perceived cultural/identity threat. At the same time, many TC students interviewed acknowledged spontaneously that the Turkish immigrants were often employed in jobs that 'we don't want to do', like domestic cleaning, waste management and construction (see also extract below with Emin and Demir). Hence, it might be possible that this more middle and high social class sample of TC students perceived Turks more as a cultural and less as an economic threat because they did not see them as direct competitors in the employment market. A third perceived threat relates to political power, as some TCs argued that Turks wanted to 'control' or 'dictate what happened in Cyprus'. Such criticism was often made in relationship to a more general criticism of Turkey's political power over the North (and related to this, the North's perceived economic dependence on Turkey). This threat relates to stereotypes of Turks as 'feeling superior'

or who 'mock us', or as people who are not willing to take account of TCs' viewpoints in relationship to the future of Cyprus. A final threat relates to the perceived lack of physical safety of TCs, a feeling that corresponds strongly with their view of Turks as violent (criminals), with many TC students arguing that they did not feel safe walking in areas where a lot of Turkish immigrants live.

The perception of these various forms of threat seems to be reinforced by a structural characteristic, in that many TCs interviewed perceive Turks as 'outnumbering them', which is often backed up by the presentation of statistical data on the number of Turks and TCs in the North of Cyprus (see extract above) and sometimes regarded as a deliberate strategy of Turkey to increase their influence over the island. Simply put, with the perceived increase of Turkish immigrants to Cyprus, TCs feel increasingly more threatened in terms of their culture and (to a lesser extend) economic position (see above), their political power and their safety:

Ilker: 'When the Turks came in, crime has gone up, drug use has gone up, traffic accidents rates have gone up, petty theft rate has gone up and jails are filling up I mean you can't help but connect.' (Interview, *Green Lane*)

Finally, although the TCs interviewed considered Turks as more religious, as with their perception of GCs, this more religious nature was not considered as a problem per se. The more religious nature of Turks was illustrated by pointing to specific social actions that were defined as more religious, such as the observation that Turks are more likely to go to the mosque and (women) more likely to wear a headscarf. The perceived religiousness of Turks was often discussed in the context of their more traditional (which were also regarded as inferior) views on life. However, while such traditional views were seen as a threat to the maintenance of their TC culture and identity, unlike their perception of more religious GCs, religious Turks were not necessarily seen as excluding TCs. Or, put differently: while (according to the TCs interviewed) more religious Turks wanted TCs to become Turks and adapt to their (more traditional) lifestyles, more religious GCs did not want TCs to become part of their (Cypriot/Greek) group. Hence, the TCs interviewed, seemed to experience different types of social pressures from these two different, more religious groups.

Other important ethnic out-groups are… In discussing the group of 'immigrants' with TCs, they almost always meant Turkish or Kurdish-Turkish immigrants to Cyprus, and very rarely discussed other (i.e. Asian, Eastern European or African) groups of immigrants, despite the recent influx of such immigrants to the North and South of Cyprus. Even when the researcher explicitly named other immigrant groups, TCs often refocused the conversation to Turkey or Turkish immigrants:

Peter: 'You know that people come from Philippines, Sri Lanka, from Asia [to Cyprus] to work here, and some people would argue that "they are being taken advantage of", you know people take advantage of THEM and some people argue that "they actually take advantage of the society". So, which one do you think is true, or none or both?'

Ilker: 'No one is taking advantage of no one. It's a matter of territory actually. Who's going to stay in the island? Because as I have told you it's very economically political: they supply us with tons of money {**Koray**: "yea"} they pay our civil servants, they pay our roles the Turkish government. They exploit that, I mean it's not a matter of good will they exploit it I mean.' (Interview, *Green Lane*)

In his reply, Ilker immediately removes immigrants from Asian countries from the discussion and instead focuses on the political and economic role of the Turkish government in Cyprus. The general unimportance attached by TC students to non-Turkish immigrants supports the quantitative analysis from the survey and card-game data, which suggest that Asian, Eastern European or African immigrants are not considered very important and not perceived in a very negative way as compared to TCs' perceptions of Turks, Kurds and Greeks. As in the extract above, the researcher explicitly asked some students if they felt that these recent immigrant groups 'took advantage of Cyprus' or if 'Cyprus took advantage of these groups', in order to stimulate students to reflect on this issue. The following extract is a typical example of how TCs responded to this question, usually taking the middle ground by arguing that both take advantage of each other:

Peter: '(…) Africans? Now some people say that "immigrants take advantage of the system" other people would argue that

"immigrants are being taken advantage of by society". Where, with what do you agree? Both? One of them?'

Emin: 'I agree with both of them because usually the system takes advantage of people [by making] them do hard jobs like construction and gardening and collecting garbage, but sometimes the immigrants take the advantage because all the prisons are full of immigrants.'

Demir: 'I think it's two ways kind of agreement because the system provides jobs to the immigrants who can't find jobs in their own country but also the system takes advantage because none of the residents of that country wanted to do that jobs so...'

Peter: 'Right. And do you think there should be more or less immigration?'

Emin: 'I don't think that there should be more because we are already overpopulated.' (Interview, *Green Lane*)

TCs seemed to consider immigrants from Asian, Eastern European and African countries as vulnerable in that they were likely to be exploited by Cypriots (e.g. by getting low pay) and often involved in low-status jobs that Cypriots did not want to do. However, at the same time they felt threatened by their alleged involvement in crime and by the perceived size of this group. Nevertheless, the TCs interviewed appeared to attach relatively little importance to these non-Turkish immigrants as they considered Turks and Kurds (and to a lesser extent Greeks) as their main threat to their collective culture and identity.

A final group that appears meaningful in analysing TCs out-group perceptions are the (in their discourses) connected groups of Jews and Israeli. The quantitative analysis of the card-game suggested that TCs perceive these groups in a more negative way, with 23% of the interviewed students distancing themselves from either one or both of these groups (a percentage that was only higher in relationship to the Turks and Orthodox, see Appendix 1). Although the interviews, owing to time constraints, did not often probe deeper into their attitudes towards Jews and Israeli, TCs appeared to consider people in these groups as more violent and intolerant:

Peter: 'Let's talk about these two groups that you "don't want to belong to": Israelis and Africans; could you say why?'

Ela: 'Israel because they always fight and Africans because they
              are so poor and [I don't want to be in such a situation].'
Peter: 'And what do you mean "Israelis always fight"?'
Ela: 'On TV they are like they are so Fascist.'
Peter: 'Ok, well what do you mean with being Fascist?'
Ela: 'Like they hate other religions, other people.' (Interview,
              Green Lane)

This extract is representative in that few TCs could really elaborate
why they did not like Jews or Israelis. If more detailed explanations
were given, they usually focused on the alleged treatment given by
members of these groups to Palestinians, often referring to the TV
or news as a source of information. Some students even argued that
'they do the same to Palestinians what the Germans did do them',
suggesting that they considered such treatment to be very negative
and immoral (as they, more than anyone else, should know what it
means). Only one student referred to 'the incident', which was not
further elaborated, but perhaps very meaningful as the interviews
were taken after the Gaza flotilla raid in 2010, in which nine Turkish
activists were killed by Israeli soldiers (BBC News 2010), but before
the conclusion of an internal investigation by the Israeli government
(in 2013), a period that was characterized by a sharp deterioration
of Turkish–Israeli relationships. The extract above also illustrates an
additional motivation of students (both TC and GC) for distancing
themselves from groups, particularly the category of Africans, in
performing the card-game. While students often appeared distance
themselves from groups because they felt threatened by these groups,
they also distanced themselves from groups that, according to their
perception, lived in less enviable circumstances, because they did
not want to share such a situation. Hence, petty reasons, rather than
threats seem to drive these students' motivations for putting certain,
usually Third World country groups, in the groups 'they don't want to
belong to', which included sometimes Jews, Israelis and Palestinians
because of the violence experienced by these people in their countries
and (in relationship to Jews) their suffering during the Holocaust.

How others describe us…

As the interviews focused more on TCs' perceptions of their own
in-group and various out-groups, information on how TCs think

other groups perceive them is rather scarce and developed more spontaneously throughout interviews. However, according to the TCs interviewed, there are at least two main, related misconceptions that GCs have of TCs: they tend to see TCs as Turks and as Muslims. The relatedness is implicit but strong: TCs are Turks and Turks are Muslim, so TCs must be Muslim. In line with the distinction between 'good' and 'bad' GCs, the TC students interviewed usually associated such misconceptions more with Hellenic GCs:

Peter: 'And do you feel that most of the Cypriots who are Orthodox don't like Turks or is not the case?'

Cemre: 'I think they don't, because I know many Greek Cypriot and not all of them are like that to me because I have some friends, they are really nice to me, they are Greek Cypriots but they are not Orthodox but the people who are Christian Orthodox they are more like AGAINST the race.'

Peter: 'How you feel that they look at you? Do they see you as Cypriot?'

Cemre: 'No, they see me as a Turk, because they don't accept the term "Turkish Cypriot".'

Peter: 'And how do you know that?'

Cemre: 'Words again, (....) and there were like fights at the school before about this and like many people got on the net.'

Peter: 'Ok and what happened?'

Cemre: 'I don't really know what happened but it was about this Cyprus thing and like that, Cyprus was Greek not Turkish and there is no such thing as Turkish Cypriots but Greek Cypriots cause Cyprus is Greek and all that.' (Interview, *Red Brick*)

Cemre makes a distinction between (Christian) Orthodox and non-Orthodox GCs, and claims that the former don't like TCs and that they consider TCs as Turks. The Orthodox GCs' rejection of TC as a valid collective identity that is different from the identity of Turks and their refusal to include TCs in the Cypriot identity is explicitly associated with their view that Cyprus is or should be only for Greeks. Hence, Cemre considers the positioning of TCs as 'Turks' not merely as a misconception, but rather as an active effort by some (Hellenic) GCs to legitimize the exclusion of TCs from Cyprus.

Considering that the TCs interviewed perceived themselves more as non-religious and Cypriot and actively distanced themselves from a Turkish (and even TC) identity, it should perhaps not surprise us that they resisted such labels. The data suggests that TCs used at least two counter-attacking strategies (Mellor 2004) in response to these forms of out-group positioning by GCs. A first strategy could be described as a form of 'asserting one's identity', in that they present themselves in collective terms in such a way that counters particular misconceptions or challenges related to their collective identity:

Peter: 'Ok now you also put "non-religious" as a group you belong to and "Muslim" as a group you don't want to belong to. Why did you do that?'

Fatma: 'Because I don't like believing in God, I'm an atheist.'

Peter: 'Ok but why did you put "Muslims" to the group you don't want to belong to and "Orthodox" in the group you don't mind belonging to?'

Fatma: 'Because some people think I am from, when I know Turkish they think that I am from Turkey so they believe like I am Muslim but I'm not and I don't want [to be seen as a Muslim].' (Interview, *Red Brick*)

Fatma presents herself as non-religious but deliberately distances herself from the label 'Muslim' because she feels that people will be more likely to label her as a Muslim simply because she speaks Turkish, and she does not like that. Hence, her rejection of the category Muslim does not seem to be (primarily) fuelled by negative perceptions of Muslims, but rather by attempts of outsiders to force this label upon her. A second, more common counter-attacking strategy concerns TCs' efforts to 'educate' GCs:

Ilker: 'Anyway, we were talking history not politics and I just popped out "do you know we came on this island on 1561?" He (GC peer) was like "no, you came here in 1974 from Turkey", I was like "what?" ((laughs)). That's actually what they think. But it is not their fault, I explained every single detail and he accepted that we came in 1561 and it was like a trauma (for him), like everything he was told by the teachers was wrong!' (Interview, *Green Lane*)

This extract also suggests that the perception of TCs as Turks and Muslim relates to more general assumptions that GCs have about the history of Cyprus and the role of families and schools in developing a particular, Hellenocentric interpretation of the history of TC and GC relationships and notions of collective 'belonging' in the context of Cyprus. It also illustrates (like the extract above with Damla) that TCs often did not blame GC students for expressing such views, as they considered this as a form of ignorance, which existence should be blamed upon parents and teachers.

While GCs were criticized for perceiving TCs as 'Turks' and Muslims', Turkish immigrants were criticized for seeing TCs as 'Greek' and as 'ungrateful towards Turkey'. As with the alleged stereotypes of GCs, there seems to be a connection between these two stereotypes. In this case TCs' more positive perception of and association with GCs, and (in relationship to this sample) their desire to enroll in a school in the Greek-speaking part of the island, seems to be criticized by Turks who consider this as a betrayal of the (military and economic) help TCs received and still receive from Turkey:

Azra: 'People who came from Turkey think that all the Cypriots are like Greek, like Greek people.'

Researcher: 'And how do you see that? What do they say?'

Belinay: 'Like for example we go to school and they say "Ah! you are Greek, you are with them and our enemies", and things like that. And some Turkish people from Turkey think that Cyprus belongs to Turkey.'

Azra: 'Yes, because they saved us during the war. They think that the whole of Cyprus must be Turkish and Greeks must go away, to Greece.' (Interview, *Green Lane*)

This extract also shows that while TCs considered only more Hellenic GCs as a threat to a Cypriot identity that unites TCs and GCs together (see above), the Turkish immigrants in Cyprus are regarded as a threat in general to the legitimacy of a collective, unifying Cypriot identity. The threat is different in that while more Hellenic GCs want to exclude TCs from their (Greek) Cypriot culture, more traditional Turks want TCs to assimilate to the Turkish culture.

All this suggests that there are strong connections between the way TCs perceive themselves, the way they perceive particular

out-groups and the way in which they think out-groups perceive TCs. Underlying TCs efforts to highlight or obscure particular boundary markers is a common desire to develop, legitimize and fend off any threats to a collective Cypriot identity that integrates both TCs and GCs, and related to this a solution for the Cyprus problem through a reunification of the island.

Greek Cypriot students' in- and out-group perceptions

The following sections explore first how GCs construct a sense of collective ethnic in-group belonging, and in so doing highlight and obscure particular boundaries between the categories of Cypriots, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and Greeks. Afterwards the analysis focuses more on those categories that they consider as out-groups, which in their discourses appear to be primarily Turks, Turkish Cypriots and Muslims.

How we describe ourselves…

While TC students appeared to define themselves primarily as 'Cypriots', there appears to be more variety in how GC students describe themselves in terms of ethnic/national belonging. The data-analysis of the card-game suggests that there are two different groups of GC students in terms of how they identify themselves collectively. On one hand, there are GC students who rank 'Greek' and 'Orthodox' relatively high, and 'Greek Cypriot' and 'Greek' higher than 'Cypriot', in selecting and ranking groups they feel they belong to. On the other hand, there is a (smaller) group of GC students who rank being 'Greek' and 'Orthodox' relatively low, and being 'Cypriot' higher than 'Greek Cypriot' and 'Greek'; some students take a more intermediate position. The latter, smaller group, which I will refer to as the 'Cypriot GCs' has in lot in common with the TC students described above in that they describe themselves primarily as 'Cypriot' and as not (or less) religious, and play down differences between GCs and TCs:

Agamemnon: 'In Cyprus there are only Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, but these two groups should be one group.'

Peter: 'Does that mean that you also feel a little bit Turkish Cypriot or not? Because Turkish Cypriots are also Cypriots?'

Agamemnon: 'Yes, I don't feel like I am a Turkish Cypriot but I feel that the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots should be one. We are all Cypriots but we have Greek as our first language and they have the Turkish, that's the only difference.' (Interview, *Green Lane*)

Agamemnon was one of the few GCs interviewed who considered himself primarily a Cypriot and not Greek. Furthermore, he did not consider himself to be religious, and in fact put all religious groups in the pile of groups he did not wanted to belong to. While he also emphasized religion as a main difference between TCs and GCs, he plays down the importance of religious differences, arguing that: 'I think that the religion is not the reason that can keep us away from each other, so we may have 43 different religions but we still are human beings and we should be together.' Hence, while he recognizes religious differences between GCS and TCs, he immediately draws a collective boundary around TCs and GCs by arguing that they are similar or 'all human beings'. While Agamemnon tries to obscure (the relevance of) religious differences between TCs and GCs, other Cypriot GCs tried to highlight cultural, social and even biological similarities between TCs and GCs:

Peter: 'Now why is that you don't like Turks more than Turkish Cypriots?'
Cristoforo: 'Because Turkish Cypriots have Cypriot blood, they have my blood, and because they act more like Cypriots, some of them can speak Greek and I would prefer to be friend with a Turkish Cypriot more than a Turk.'
Peter: 'And when you say "they act more like Cypriots" what do you mean with that?'
Cristoforo: 'Like their language, they speak the language, they want to be more friends with Cypriots or Greek Cypriots they act better towards us than Turks'.
Peter: 'Have you got experiences with Turks?'
Cristoforo: 'No, but you know, like half of Cyprus is occupied by the Turks and that's why we have a big issue with them.' (Interview, *Red Brick*)

Cristoforo argues that TCs have the same 'blood' as GCs, and in so doing connects TCs and GCs in an essential (unchangeable) way.

He adds to this the existence of cultural ('they speak Greek', they 'act like us') and social ties ('they want to be our friends'), that not only function to pool together TCs and GCs as belonging to the same group, but also to separate TCs from Turks. Not only did Cypriot GCs try to draw clear boundaries between TCs and Turks, but also between GCs and Greeks:

Agamemnon: 'It's like Salvador, because they were colonized by Spain but they are not Spanish people, I mean they are from Salvador, ok? They are not Spanish, it's the same with us. We were colonized by Greek people, maybe we are made by Greek people like the island but we are not Greek, because we made our own culture and our own, in 1960 we made our own independence like another country.' (Interview, *Green Lane*)

Agamemnon's extract also illustrates how Cypriot GCs legitimize the togetherness of TCs and GCs in one Cypriot category and their 'difference' from Turks and Greeks, by claiming that GCs and TCs share the same historical and geographical boundaries, which are used to support the idea of a distinct Cypriot identity and culture. In sum, more Cypriot GCs seemed to use the same identity strategies as their TC peers in that they constructed a collective Cypriot identity that contains both GCs and TCs by highlighting similarities and obscuring differences between these groups and by highlighting differences and obscuring similarities between TCs and Turks and between GCs and Greeks. These efforts towards the construction of a shared, Cypriot identity seems to be fuelled by the same political motivation that underscores TCs' in-group positioning, namely the aim to form a nation, and hence a solution to the Cyprus problem, where, in Agamemnon's words, TCs and GCs 'should be one'.

In sharp contrast, the other, larger group of GCs, which I will refer to as the 'Hellenic GCs', all share the basic belief that there are very few differences between Greeks who live in Greece and Greek Cypriots who live in Cyprus, particularly in relationship to their culture. Most of these students perceive GCs as 'Greeks living in Cyprus' and TCs as 'Turks living in Cyprus'. From this point of view, 'Cypriots' are people who only share the same country, but they

don't share a collective culture or identity as these are determined by the 'mother countries' of Greece and Turkey. As a result, for these students, being 'Greek' is considered more important than '(Greek) Cypriot' in describing themselves as a collective in-group. While many of these students consider TCs also as 'Cypriots', this only refers to a weak, more obscured geographical boundary that encompasses all Turkish- and Greek-speaking people in Cyprus; groups that are otherwise kept apart by identifying clear, usually cultural and geographical boundaries that separate TCs from GCs and connect TCs with Turks and GCs with Greeks:

Peter: 'Now you put Greeks completely at the top and you put that before Greek Cypriots and before Cypriots. Why?'

Nicolas: 'I chose to put Greeks on the top because if there was not Greece I wouldn't be Greek Cypriot and I wouldn't be a Cypriot if there wasn't Greece because we see in history the whole civilization of Cyprus starts with Greeks coming from Crete in Cyprus and bringing together their culture, like their celebrations, their festivals and this is how all started in Cyprus.'

Peter: 'So you feel more Greek than Greek Cypriot?'

Nicolas: 'Yes.'

Peter: 'Ok, and are there differences between somebody who is Greek and somebody who is Greek Cypriot? Or is that the same?'

Nicolas: 'A Greek Cypriot is like a person that has roots from Greece but he is a Cypriot but Cyprus I think does not have the experience as an island by itself without the help of Greece to call myself a Cypriot rather than Greek Cypriot.'

Peter: 'Do you think there is difference in the way Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots behave and think or you think is just the same?'

Nicolas: 'But of course there is difference in mentality and in the way they live but I don't think it is just because they call them Turkish Cypriots. It's the Turkish culture; if you ever go to the occupied side you see that there are many influences from Turkey but if you forget all about the landscape you think you are in Turkish country.'

Peter: 'And how can you see that Turkish influence?'

Nicolas: 'You can see that through the way they speak, they speak Turkish, they also took the Muslim religion, they have mustaches, many Turks do that they have mustaches ((laughing)).'

Peter: 'So the way they dress?'

Nicolas: 'The way they dress, their religion, the way they speak, some of their festivals, they are very close to Turks.' (Interview, *Green Lane*)

Nicolas perceives himself primarily as Greek and refers to a strong historical, demographic and cultural relationship between Greece and the island of Cyprus to support the legitimacy of this identity over a Cypriot and GC identity – identities that would not even exist 'without the help from Greece'. At the same time he draws clear cultural boundaries (language, religion, fashion, festivals) that separate Greeks from Turkish Cypriots and connect the latter with Turks. In addition, a small sub-group of these Hellenic GCs goes further by claiming that 'Cyprus is Greek', effectively claiming the 'Cypriot' identity and related territorial legitimacy of the island exclusively for their Greek or GC in-group, usually by referring to strong historical and cultural ties between Greece and the island of Cyprus that legitimize this claim, and sometimes even by drawing fixed, biological boundaries between these groups:

Peter: 'Now you said "Turkish and Turkish Cypriots they are the same just like Greek Cypriots, Greek and Cypriots are the same". Now let's just compare. What is the difference between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots?'

Panayiotis: 'Turkish Cypriots they are from Turkey and they live in Cyprus; they still are Turkish but they live in Cyprus, they don't have blood of a Greek person, they have only blood of Turkish people. Greek Cypriots their nation is Greek but they live in Cyprus and Greek Cypriots, Greek people and Cypriot people talk the same language.'

Peter: 'Ok, now can Cypriots also be Turkish Cypriots or not?'

Panayiotis: 'No, they are not the same, because the Cypriots have the blood of Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots they have the blood of Turkish people.'

Peter: 'Ok, and are there other differences like mentality, character?'

Panayiotis: 'The Turkish people their character is not so friendly to other nations of people, they like to do wars, to destroy countries…'

Peter: 'Ok, and you say they are, Turkish Cypriots?'

Panayiotis: 'They are very brutal, Turkish people.'

Peter: 'And how can you see that?'

Panayiotis: 'You can see it if you study the history of Turkey, you can see that they are very brutal people from the wars, what did they did to us, to other countries.' (Interview, *Red Brick*)

For students like Panayiotis, being 'Cypriot' is the equivalent of being 'Greek Cypriot' and being 'Greek', groups that are bound together because they 'talk the same language'. Turkish Cypriots are explicitly excluded from the category of Cypriots because they 'have the blood of Turkish people' and not of Cypriots, and because they are culturally not only different (as in the extract with Nicolas above) but negative and/or inferior (they like to go to war and are brutal) as compared to Greek (Cypriot) people. Even the acknowledgement that TCs are born in Cyprus is not sufficient for these more extreme Hellenic GCs to include them into the Cypriot category:

Argyro: 'Before some months the Turkish Cypriots I think something happened between them and [Greek Cypriots] and [the Greek Cypriots] wanted to be only Greek and then the Turks just started drawing everywhere the Cypriot flag and I was like "you are not Cypriot, you are Turkish and that's not the flag you need to be drawing!"'.

Olympia: 'Because they believe that because they are born in Cyprus they are Cypriots but their parents are Turks and they cannot say that they are Cypriots, that's why we call them Turkish Cypriots, because I was born in Cyprus, they were born in Cyprus but we are not the same.' (Interview, *Green Lane*)

Olympia and Argyro, who belonged to the group of most Hellenic GCs, seem to refer to an incident where TCs challenged GCs' efforts

to exclude TCs (by claiming that 'Cyprus is Greek'), by actively presenting TCs as 'Cypriot' (too). Olympia and Argyro refer to this incident to (re)claim the Cypriot identity as something that belongs exclusively to their in-group and not to TCs, who are positioned as Turks, which is in turn related to the (alleged) country of birth of TCs' parents. Like the more Cypriot GCs and TCs in general, some of the more extreme Hellenic GCs consider the distinction between GCs and TCs as artificial and even problematic. However, the reasons for doing so are very different in that the former see this distinction as a cause for division and a barrier to unification (as 'we are all Cypriots'), while the latter see this as a possible and unjustified recognition of Turkish claims on Cyprus:

Panayiotis: Nowadays, we have Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, which was (a distinction) introduced by the British when they ruled Cyprus, because they wanted to have good relationships with Turkey. Nowadays we still use it and I don't know why. I think this is wrong because first of all you are a Greek and then you are a Cypriot, because this is what you are, this is where you live.' (Interview, *Green Lane*)

The above extract also illustrates another theme that surfaces in the discourses of more extreme Hellenic GCs in that their in-group belonging is not only determined by an alleged strong bond or (cultural and historical) overlap with Greece, but also by their mutual and ongoing conflict with the same out-group: 'the Turks'. Furthermore, while religion seems much more important for GC students as compared to TC students in describing themselves, Hellenic GCs, and particularly the more extreme students within this group, consider their belonging to the group of 'Orthodox' as very important; with the vast majority of Hellenic GCs ranking this group within their top-three most important in-groups. This observation seems to add legitimacy to TCs' claims (see above) that more religious GCs are more likely to have more negative views of or try to distance themselves from TCs. Finally, the last part of the extract involving Panayiotis also illustrates how the strict exclusion of certain ethnic/national out-groups goes hand in hand with the development of ethnic/national stereotypes

of these groups; these stereotypes serve as legitimizations and boundaries between the (Cypriot) in-group and the Turkish/TC out-group, the nature and underlying motivations of which will be discussed in the next section.

How we describe others

Turks, Turkish Cypriots and Muslims are… The card-game shows that GCs held particular negative views towards Turks, Muslims and Turkish Cypriots. Further analysis of the interview data suggests that these out-group perceptions overlap to some extent and are related to each other.

   In general, very few GCs perceived Turks in a positive way, with many of them describing Turks as 'violent', 'loud', 'brutal', 'aggressive', 'fanatic', 'dogmatic' and/or as 'feeling superior to others'. When asked to clarify why they thought about Turks in this way, GCs almost always referred to the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey, as 'they divided Cyprus in two', 'stole our land', 'left people homeless' and 'they killed and tortured GCs'. The association of Turks with war was so strong that it appeared impossible for some students to disassociate both terms, even if they tried, or, as Theodora put it: 'We don't want to have a bad image about them but we always remember the war when we hear the word Turkey or Turkish.' Hence, a strong feeling of actually lived and potential threat emanates from these descriptions; that is, GCs feel not only threatened by Turks because of what Turks could do (or what GCs could lose), but also because of what Turks have done (or what GCs have lost). For example, a first dimension of this perceived threat relates to loss of property, either related to land, housing and/or territory. In responding to the question how he deals with the presence of TCs in his school, Damalis argues that he would prefer that the school was 'exclusively for Greek Cypriots' because 'I think it's like having a person steal from you and then you invite him for dinner'. In contrast, Argyro highlights more the potential rather than the lived threat in explaining why she does not believe that TCs and GCs can live together in saying: 'it's like you tell them "come, you have taken this side of Cyprus, now come and take the other one"'. Other dimensions of threat associated with Turks and TCs constitute: a physical threat ('they harmed us and could harm us again'), an economic threat ('they made us poor and could do

it again'), and, related to this, a threat to the maintenance of the social welfare system developed by GCs:

Olympia: 'Turkish Cypriots coming here and they take a lot of ben-efits: they have free medicines, hospitals, many of these, like, if you go to the airport there is a parking space that is only for Turkish Cypriots taxis and they take the jobs of the Greek Cypriots and they are in their country you know they take their country.'

Olympia accuses TCs explicitly of taking jobs, benefits and land from GCs, illustrating a sense of perceived injustice and (economic) threat that was particularly common with more Hellenic GCs. These sentiments resulted in strong, negative attitudes to TCs and Turks, and a belief that both communities cannot be united in one country, or, as Argyro puts it: 'Turkish and Greek are not made to be together.' In addition, for some of these students the mere presence of Turks, TCs and other cultural groups in Cyprus seemed to increase their sense of belonging to a specific in-group and stimulate feelings of 'loss':

Olympia: 'I believe that Greeks who live in Greece, not all of them but some of them are not as Greek as Greeks who live in Cyprus because I think living in another country rather than Greece you feel more Greek; like the Greeks who live in Australia: they feel Greek more than a (Greek) man who lives in Greece.'
Peter: 'And why is that do you think?'
Olympia: 'Because you miss your place, you can see the difference between the others and then you FEEL it's like {Argyro: "yes"} you see the difference.'
Peter: 'You say "Greek people who don't live in Greece feel more Greek"? So how do you see that?'
Olympia: 'I don't know in Cyprus where there are Turks and Turkish Cypriots and all that you can see the difference where a man a person in Greece cannot see the difference.'
Argyro: 'Yes.'

In feeling more confronted with Turks and TCs 'and all that', these students argue explicitly that they become more aware of

and attached to their own (Greek) in-group, and simultaneously develop a feeling of 'loss' in relationship to their collective self ('you miss your place'). In sum, many GCs and particularly more Hellenic GCs, attached highly negative stereotypes of TCs and particularly Turks; these stereotypes represent the Turk as a violent, aggressive threat to GC interests, past and present. Overlapping with and reinforcing these stereotypes of Turks are GCs' perception of Muslims. Turks were perceived to have a 'violent religion'; this religion was described in terms that are similar to those associated with Turks, as Muslims were seen as 'fanatics', 'enraged', 'wild', 'aggressive', with Islam a religion that 'teaches that killing some-body you don't like is good' and encourages people 'to commit suicide for no reason'. While both Turks and Muslims were often discussed separately during the interviews (although described in a similar way), some students explicitly linked the violent nature of Turks to their Muslim religion:

Peter: 'We talked about religion, you said that Turkish people are very fanatic about their religion? So what is the difference between people who are Muslims and people who are not Muslims?'

Damalis: 'I think that every religion has its fanatics but I can't compare Buddhism with Muslims because in Buddhism you see like a person wearing a robe, seating there praying, enjoying everything in life and even if they argue they are speaking like by giving examples from nature, but in Muslims we see they are getting on the road with AK47s and shooting people, shouting, burning other countries' flags. I can't put myself in the position of a person that lives and does everything for its religion and I think that if we took the religion out of the Turks they would be less than half power because this is what gives them power, they read books for their culture, for their religion and this is what makes them so enraged I think.'

Peter: 'You think that's the same for Turkish Cypriots or not?'

Damalis: 'Because Turkish Cypriots are not 100% Turks they are not as enraged because of being a Muslim as Turks because Turks also live I think in an environment that supports this enragement.'

Damalis, like many other GCs, perceived Turks as Muslims and Muslims in turn as very aggressive and intolerant (which also assumes a sense of superiority), and explicitly claims that Turks would be less powerful (and hence also less threatening), if 'we took the religion out of the Turks'. Hence, the way in which GCs described Turks is strongly interwoven with their perception of Muslims and the religion of Islam. Both reinforce each other to make the Turk and Muslim a potential, and in the discourses of the GC students, a lived and powerful threat to GCs. However, Muslims and Turks were not always synonymous, as GCs also attached other stereotypes more exclusively to Muslims. In particular GC girls criticized Muslims for treating and thinking of women in a negative, sexist way. General descriptions, such as that women are 'not treated equally' or treated 'like dogs', as 'a prisoner' or 'a minority', with 'no power', and with Muslim men as 'dictators to their wives', were further specified and justified by pointing to the particular treatment of Muslim women, who were 'beaten', 'raped', 'not allowed to go out', or 'drive a car', were forced 'to cover themselves in long clothes', and had to accept that their husbands take several wives. The more Hellenic students in particular were more likely to attach the categories of Turk and Muslim to each other, in which the 'Turk' and the 'Muslim' could be used interchangeably, like the categories 'Greek' and 'Orthodox', and in which the former two-sided coin represents the moral opposite of the latter:

Peter: 'Let's say that your daughter wants to marry a Muslim, not a Turkish Muslim just say Muslim so not somebody from Turkey but from another country. Would that be a problem or not?'

Hectoras: 'Muslims can't marry someone who isn't Muslim, the girl has to change her religion I think.'

Peter: 'So imagine your daughter has to convert. Would that be a problem?'

Hectoras: 'I would never talk to her again.'

Peter: 'Why not?'

Hectoras: 'If she would change religion for a Turkish? Because she is Greek Orthodox and she would convert to the opposite most opposite religion that is Muslim.'

In the hypothesized scenario, where Hectoras would have a daughter who wants to marry a non-Turkish or TC Muslim, Hectoras uses Muslims and Turks as synonyms and at the same time as the opposite of Greek Orthodox religion. In sum, the negative stereotypes that GCs have of Turks and TCs, and the underlying threat that seems to fuel these stereotypes, overlap with and are strengthened by their perceptions of Turks and TCs as Muslim. The more Hellenic GCs seem to attach more negative stereotypes to both categories, and also appear more likely to connect both groups as inseparable.

However, the GCs interviewed did not always perceive TCs as equal(ly bad) as compared to Turks. In one of the extracts above, Damalis argues that TCs are 'not as enraged' as Turks because they are not 100% Turkish and not influenced in the same way by Islam as Turks. Particularly more Cypriot GCs were keen to stress differences between TCs and Turks (see above), and as a result presented TCs usu-ally in a more favourable manner as compared to Turks. GC students who appeared more positive towards TCs seemed to use three discursive strategies to justify a more favourable description of TCs as compared to Turks: they either presented TCs as (1) victims, (2) not guilty and/or (3) more like GCs. On the one hand, they claimed that TCs suffered from hardship too, in that they did not live in a recognized state (are invisible), were controlled by Turks (are powerless), were uncertain about how they should describe themselves or to whom they belong (are confused) and were treated less fairly or abused by more 'Greek' GCs (are discriminated against). In addition, some GCs replaced or narrowed down the responsibility of TCs in causing hardship to GCs during and after the invasion. For example, some students argued that TC peers were never directly involved in (the aftermath of) the invasion and that their parents or grandparents were to blame 'for what happened', or that the blame does not only rest on TCs but also on GCs, or not on TCs or even Turks in general, but on Turkish politicians or the army:

Peter: 'You didn't put Turks and Turkish Cypriots in the groups that you wouldn't mind belonging to, why is that?'

Achileas: 'Once again, the minority spoils it for the majority. I talk to you from the depths of my heart: I have no problem with the everyday average housewife of Turkey who goes to market every day, takes the bus, prepares food for her husband and kids. If there was a war I wouldn't go kill her,

> I wouldn't kill her children, I wouldn't kill any old man who is sitting in his wheelchair and just waiting to die, what I am against is the army, the army itself. They are pretty much the reason why the Turks, why they are still based in Cyprus, and it prevents us finding a solution.'

Finally, a very common argument used by GCs, especially more Hellenic GCs, for presenting TCs in a more favourable light as compared to Turks was the claim that TCs are to some extent 'Cypriotized' or that they have been socialized in part in a Greek environment, which makes them 'behave better than Turks':

Peter: 'And what about Turkish Cypriots and Turks? Are they different, are they the same?'

Panayiotis: 'Well, Turkish Cypriots are a bit different than Turks because Turkish Cypriots have LEARNED to live a little bit like Cypriots now since they are in Cyprus for so long, but it's like it's almost the same as Greek and Greek Cypriots and Turks and Turkish Cypriots.'

Peter: 'What do you mean "they have learned to live in Cyprus"? How can you see that?'

Panayiotis: 'Because now they communicate, before they were only Turkish and they stayed with Turkish but now they started to learn Greek and if you see some of them they act like Cypriots.'

Peter: 'How can you see that?'

Panayiotis: 'They are very confident about themselves, they are very proud of themselves, so yea, the Turkish Cypriots are starting to behave better, yea.'

_____

Peter: 'Now, do you think there is a difference between Turks and the Turkish Cypriots?'

Theodora: 'Yes, the Turkish Cypriots are more free, because they've changed, and after they've lived with us for so many years they are less Turkish, they are more Cypriots.'

Theodora: 'Like, I think they don't/very few people from the Turkish Cypriots wear the scarfs and as I see from the girls at school it's not that they wear long skirts, they dress like us, ok, maybe they are Muslims but not like the Turks, they are more free, yea.'

Panayiotis argues that TCs have 'learned to live in Cyprus', unlike Turks, and as a result TCs 'behave better'. Other GCs argued that TCs can speak some Greek or want to learn the language and that they accept GCs. In the second extract Theodora claims that TCs 'have changed after they lived with us' and that they are 'more Cypriot' as a result. Similarly, in an extract above, Damalis points to the importance of TCs' presence in a non-Turkish environment in explaining why TCs are not so 'enraged' as (Muslim) Turks. A key element in these discourses is the often implicit assumption that Greek (Cypriot) culture is superior to the Turkish (Cypriot) culture and that TCs have to be more like Greeks or GCs in order to be (perceived as) better. The more Hellenic GCs in particular added to this the expectation that TCs have to take the initiative to integrate or assimilate in (Greek) Cypriot society.

Other important ethnic out-groups are…

While most GCs held very positive attitudes of mainland Greeks, with especially more Hellenic GCs describing themselves as belonging to this group, some (particularly Cypriot) GCs took distance themselves from the group of Greeks. While this can in part be explained by these students' efforts to construct a pan- (Turkish and Greek) Cypriot identity that is different from the identities of Turks and Greeks (see above), at least some GC students seemed to distance themselves from the Greek identity because they felt excluded by Greeks, or, as Emelia puts it: 'They refuse us, they don't want us to be part of them and I don't feel like chasing Greece.' While students like Emelia recognized the similarities between GCs and Greeks, they were also keen to stress differences between GCs and Greeks, and in so doing stereotyped Greeks as 'narrow-minded', 'rude', 'uptight', 'distant', 'they think they are the best', they are more 'religious' and more 'against immigrants'. While some of these views seemed to develop through face-to-face contact with Greeks from Greece, some students referred to information they obtained from TV programmes or the web. For example, when Theodora was asked to motivate why she felt treated as an outsider by Greeks she argued that during online chat sessions with Greeks she was often asked questions like 'What's your name?', 'Where are you from?', which made her feel uncomfortable and not being treated as part of their (Greek) group.

In line with the quantitative analysis of the survey and card-game data, GCs seem to have more negative attitudes to recent immigrants from Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe as compared to their TC peers.

In addition, as a sample, there appeared to be more variability in GCs' attitudes to these groups, and GCs were much more likely to spontaneously discuss these groups as compared to TCs, who were more homogeneous in terms of their views and more likely to focus on Turkish/Kurdish immigrants. Like TCs' perceptions of Turkish/Kurdish immigrants, GCs perceived more recent immigrants from Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe as an economic, cultural, physical and numerical threat. First and most importantly, immigrants were often described by GCs as taking advantage of Cyprus by taking jobs from Cypriots and by receiving generous social benefits for which they didn't have to do anything and which were not made available to Cypriots (an economic threat). For example, in explaining why Greece is experiencing (at the time of the interviews) more economic problems as compared to Cyprus, Olympia claimed that immigrants in Greece 'have some benefits that they shouldn't have or they get too much money for what they are', and Argyro adds that 'they come and they get the jobs that Greek people would worship to get'. In addition, she extents these problems to the context of Cyprus, by adding that:

Olympia: 'And also Romanians, Bulgarians they come and they have no job, they take benefits of 1000 Euros and maybe they have another job and they don't say they are making extra money.'

This appears as an important difference between the TC and GC students interviewed, with the former acknowledging but also downplaying somewhat the importance of Turkish/Kurdish economic threat to TCs. In addition, and in line with TCs' perceptions of Turkish/Kurdish immigrants, GCs accused immigrants of being involvement in crime, particularly in relationship to theft, robberies, drugs-related crimes, murder and/or assault, with several GCs arguing that they felt 'not safe' in a context with many immigrants, as on the bus (physical threat):

Hectoras: 'in Cyprus they have huge amounts of immigrants and it's like you get in the bus and it's like 40 people and 37 are immigrants and only the bus driver and two [others are Cypriot].'
Peter: 'And how that does this make you feel?'

Hectoras: 'It's like it's not controllable; sometime you are afraid to get on the bus. Because someone might take a knife to you and say "give me your phone, your [money]".'

This extract from Hectoras illustrates another point that was frequently made by GCs, particularly by the more Hellenic GCs, namely that 'there are too many immigrants' (numerical threat). This was often backed up by presenting statistical data on the size of the immigrant population as compared to the Cypriot population, and by pointing to social contexts in which they claimed to feel outnumbered by immigrants, as in public schools, the old city centre and (as in this extract) when using public transport. The perception that immigrants constituted a large and ever-increasing group of people also fuelled a sense of loss over the control of a situation and added to the perceived economic, physical and cultural threat:

Paris: 'Because of the number of immigrants. Cyprus with the population of 700 000 people can get immigrants, only a small number, not [that many].'
Peter: 'And what will happen if more and more come? What is the problem then?'
Homer: 'Our culture, our nation. We have our problems. We have the problems with Turks, we don't want other problems. Because we will lose our culture.'

Homer sees immigrants as a threat to the maintenance of a (Greek) Cypriot culture, an opinion shared by many more Hellenic GCs and a view that overlaps with TCs' perceived threat of Turkish/Kurdish immigrants to their (pan-) Cypriot culture. However at the same time, many GCs interviewed argued that many of these immigrants experience problems, in their homeland owing to a lack of job opportunities, and in Cyprus, where they are perceived to experience racism and to take jobs often under their level of education; these are jobs that 'Cypriots don't want to do' (such as household cleaning, construction and waste management) and often at a lower pay and with less favourable working conditions as compared to Cypriots:

Natasa: 'And Philippinos, I don't want to be one of them because they've been through a lot and all over the world they've

been bad with them Philippinos they don't have a good
life and they live in bad situations or Pontians have been
through racism, that's why.'

Especially more Cypriot GCs were keen to stress the problems that
immigrants experienced in Cyprus and their homelands, the positive
experiences they had with immigrants (e.g. by describing positive
experiences they had with their nanny, housemaid or cleaning lady).
Sometimes these students explicitly questioned the validity of claims
that immigrants take advantage of Cypriots:

Agamemnon: 'Look in Cyprus the news and the journalist, when
something steals or there is a robbery or some-
thing, when it is an immigrant they say "a man
from Bulgaria stole", but if he's not from Bulgaria
and he is from Cyprus they won't say [this], they
say [instead] that "somebody stole this thing" and
that's what causes the racism here because every-
body thinks that it is only the Bulgarians and the
Romanians who steal things, but in the reality
maybe the Cypriots are worse than them.'

Agamemnon was previously defined as a (arch)typical Cypriot GC,
and in line with similar-minded GC students he did not perceive immi-
grants as a threat to Cyprus and instead emphasized the problems they
experience. Hence, we can see some overlap between GCs' attitudes to
TCs and to immigrants: both are often ambiguous, in that GCs and
immigrants are acknowledged to experience problems, but on the other
hand they are perceived as a threat to GCs. The more Hellenic GCs
seemed to draw the strongest parallels between immigrants and TCs, with
both groups perceived as an economic, cultural, physical and numeri-
cal threat, in which the perceived cultural threat appeared stronger in
relationship to immigrants, perhaps because they were considered to
actually live in the same geographical region as compared to the GCs.

Conclusions

This chapter has sought to shed light on how and why GC and
TC students perceive themselves, each other and other minority

groups in Cyprus in a particular way. To answer these questions we first analysed quantitative data from the survey and card-game to offer a general picture of GCs' and TCs' in- and out-group attitudes. Afterwards, we included a more in-depth analysis of interview data with GCs and TCs to offer a more detailed picture of how they construct boundaries between themselves and other groups, and the underlying motivations for doing so.

The quantitative data-analysis shows some important differences in how GCs and TCs perceive themselves, each other and other ethnic minority groups in Cyprus. The TCs in our sample have on average a higher socio-economic background and are less religious as compared to their GC peers. In addition, they put less emphasis on the national/ethnic identity and perceive their national/ethnic identity in a less cultural and biological nationalistic way. Finally, the TCs in our sample were more likely to perceive themselves as belonging to a collective 'pan-Cypriot' identity than GCs, who were more likely to identify with a more exclusive ethnic or national (Greek) identity. Furthermore, in relationship to attitudes to out-groups, the quantitative data-analysis shows that TCs have in general more positive attitudes to ethnic, national and religious out-groups as compared to GCs and more positive attitudes of GCs as compared to GCs' attitudes of TCs. Finally, GCs appear to feel more threatened by ethnic out-groups as compared to their TC peers, except for the group of Turks, which was perceived by both GCs and TCs as the most threatening out-group.

The quantitative data-analysis also suggests that out-group perceptions vary according to school context, with GC students showing more positive attitudes in a school and urban context that is ethnically more heterogeneous as compared to school and rural contexts that are ethnically more homogeneous. In addition, despite the presence of both GCs and TCs in our two private schools, and the similarities in terms of (their high) socio-economic background of these students, GC/TC relationships appear much more polarized in *Green Lane* as compared to *Red Brick*.

The qualitative data-analysis of the card-game suggests the prevalence of two main groups of students. On the one hand, almost all TC students interviewed and a group of more Cypriot GCs consider themselves as primarily Cypriot. This pan-Cypriot identity includes both GCs and TCs, and is constructed by obscuring (mainly cultural, biological and geo-historical) differences and highlighting similarities

between GCs and TCs, and by obscuring similarities and highlighting differences between Turks and TCs and Greeks and GCs. On the other hand, a relatively large group of more Hellenic GCs define themselves as primarily Greek, a collective identity that excludes TCs and, in its more extreme version, claims the Cypriot identity as exclusive Greek. This Hellenic GC identity is constructed in the opposite way to the more pan-Cypriot identity: by obscuring (mainly cultural, biological and geo-historical) differences and highlighting similarities between Greeks and GCs and Turks and TCs, and by obscuring similarities and highlighting differences between Turks and Greeks or TCs and GCs.

Hence, when our respondents were confronted with alternative choices over various ethnic boundaries through probing questions in the interviews, they opted for particular strategies of boundary work that fall within the typology described by Wimmer (Wimmer 2013). Hellenic GCs on the one hand and more Cypriot TCs and GCs on the other seem to opt primarily for shifting of boundaries when describing in/out group relations: more Hellenic GCs shift (expand) boundaries by fusing the categories of GC, Cypriot, Greek and Christian Orthodox and by fusing the categories of Turk, TC and Muslim, in which the category of TC is excluded from the category of Cypriot. More Cypriot GCs and TCs in turn expand boundaries by including both the TC and GC category in the category of Cypriot (again, by blurring the boundaries between TCs and GCs). At the same time they contract boundaries or dis-identify with categories one is assigned to by outsiders by excluding Greeks from GCs and Cypriots, and Turks from TCs. As the more Cypriot GCs and TCs still mark TCs and GCs as (somewhat) culturally different, they engage more in a shifting rather than a fusion of existing ethnic boundaries (or Cypriots = GCs + TCs).

Build into this process of boundary shifting is also a particular hierarchy of possible collective ethnic identities: while the more Hellenic GCs consider the Greek category as the most important one, the more Cypriot TCs and GCs consider the pan-Cypriot identity as the most meaningful identity, with the other meaningful, collective identities either perceived as sub-identities from these parent identities or identities that are different to and excluded from the parent identity. This also reflects that students are able to discuss the relationships between these categories in a context where these categories (Turks, Greeks, Cypriots, TCs and GCs) are presented as legitimate categories

to which one should or can position him/herself. In this context, they engage in a process of normative inversion, in that more Hellenic GCs challenge the view that the Cypriot identity is the most important one and consider the Greek identity as the most important identity. In contrast, the more Cypriot GCs and TCs challenge the view that the Greek identity is the more important one and consider the Cypriot identity as the most (legitimate) ethnic category. In this process, the differences between their sub-identities (e.g. Greek Cypriot, Orthodox and Cypriot for more Hellenic GCs and TCs, and GCs for more Cypriot GCs and TCs) become blurred rather than fused together.

In terms of out-group perceptions, GCs and TCs seemed to differ in terms of which groups they disliked most. TCs distanced themselves most from and attached more negative stereotypes to two groups: Greeks and Turkish or Kurdish immigrants. While the former were defined as nationalistic, very religious, fascist and racist, the latter were perceived in even more negative terms and described as culturally inferior (uncivilized), criminal, violent, poor, uneducated, more religious and arrogant. GCs, on the other hand, distanced themselves from and attached very negative stereotypes primarily to three groups: Turks, Muslims and Turkish Cypriot. These stereotypes overlapped and reinforced each other in that Turks were seen as Muslims and both groups were described as violent, fanatic, dogmatic and arrogant. The more Hellenic GCs were more likely to perceive TCs as synonymous with Turks and Muslims and attached strong, negative and overlapping stereotypes to these three groups. While both GC and TC students interviewed attached less importance to more recent immigrant groups in Cyprus, like African, Asian and Eastern European immigrants, more Hellenic GCs appeared more negative towards these groups, and were more likely to describe them as criminal and taking advantage of Cyprus.

A key finding of the analysis is the continued relevance of classic social-psychological theories in explaining in/out group relationships, in particular the Symbolic/Realistic Group Threat Theory (Esses et al. 2005; Pettigrew 1998), or, in Wimmer's (2013) terminology: the perceived unequal distribution of resources. The interviews with TCs and GCs suggest strongly that students' negative perceptions of out-groups are influenced by their perceived threat of these groups. Interesting in this respect is that both TCs and more Hellenic GCs consider Turks as a threat to their in-group interests, related to the maintenance

of their culture, identity, economic interests (jobs, maintenance of their social welfare system) and physical safety. Hence, the extent to which members of an in-group feel threatened by or feel in competition with an out-group over material or symbolic resources fuels their prejudice towards these groups. In addition, students' attachment to a (in this context Greek) nationalistic ideology, in which the own group is defined as culturally different and superior compared to the out-group, seems to go hand in hand with more negative perceptions of and a desire to exclude out-groups.

Although these sections shed light on the way in which GCs and TCs in the context of Cyprus perceive themselves, each other and particular out-groups, and the underlying social-psychological motivations for doing so, they do not tell us how people come to believe that particular groups are less/more threatening and/or culturally inferior to their own in-group. In other words, the contexts and agents of socialization that influence these young people in developing particular views of the collective self and others are missing from this analysis. The following chapters explore more in depth how different socializing institutions, inequalities in resources and characteristics of network structures, and related socio-psychological theories of prejudice, develop ethnic pride and prejudice among Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

5
Cultural Repertoires within Context: Institutions, Resources and Social Networks

Through the process of ethnic dichotomization, or the use of different (cultural, biological) boundary markers to highlight differences between ethnic groups (as illustrated in students' stereotypes of ethnic out-groups) and by considering rules that govern inter-ethnic interactions (or the structuring of interactions), students offer us a particular view of social reality – an image of social reality that they want to present to the researcher. However, their ideas about social reality, which can be conceptualized as cultural expressions, do not come falling out of the blue sky, but are chosen from a set of available cultural repertoires or frames of reference, which vary, in terms of their constitutive characteristics, according to the social context. These characteristics refer to the legitimate status of these views as 'true representations of reality', in terms of their mere availability, their taken for granted nature, their importance, the extent to which they can be modified, etc. Hence, cultural repertoires are informed by structure in that their key properties depend in part on the structure in which they develop. In fact, many students interviewed argued that young people cannot be held fully responsible for expressing racist views, as they are 'too young to fully understand' the complex realities of social life (are ignorant) and are vulnerable to indoctrination (are easily led), particularly through their family, which they recognized as legitimate agents of socialization. In other words, young people expected and accepted to be influenced by others in developing attitudes to their own ethnic in-group and ethnic out-groups, as their age implied a cognitive, emotional and structural dependence on others; others who are usually older and were perceived to have

more wisdom and authority (but also responsibility) to tell young people right from wrong.

By reproducing (parts of) these repertoires, the properties of these repertoires, such as their status as legitimate or 'true' views of social reality, are reaffirmed and strengthened. However, as these repertoires relate to structure, they relate by definition to structural inequalities and opposite interests, which results in the development of competing repertoires or views about reality. Conflict also harbours the possibility of social change, and hence of changes in key properties of cultural repertoires (for instance, in relationship to how social reality is perceived, the taken for granted nature of such views, etc.). Finally, while the students interviewed seemed to portray themselves as influenced by their social environment in presenting ethnic in- and out-groups in a particular way, they cannot be regarded as 'empty vessels' that are simply filled up with ideas by their external environment, as they too make choices among the variety of cultural and competing repertoires available to them, can challenge particular views about reality that they encounter and can purposefully hide behind the authority of their social environment in order to remove their own responsibility (and potential negative consequences) in making particular claims about reality.

The question then arises as to how structural characteristics of students' social environment stimulate them to make use of particular cultural repertoires in making such presentations. And how do they respond when confronted with representations of social reality that compete with their own? To answer these questions, we explore more inductively which structural features of our students' social environment seem to stimulate students' choice for particular cultural repertoires in presenting specific images of their ethnic in- and out-groups. Although the identification of these structural characteristics of the social context were developed more inductively, through a grounded theory approach of qualitative data-analysis (Glaser and Strauss 1967), we employed Wimmer's (2013) broad distinction between institutional processes and rules, inequalities in resources and characteristics of social networks as a loose set of 'coding families' (Glaser 1992) that inform (but do not determine) the process of interpreting the qualitative data. The interviews with young people suggest the importance of at least two main institutions that stimulate the young people in this

study to rely on particular cultural repertoires in making statements about their ethnic in- and out-groups: the school context and the family. In addition, the data-analysis also suggests the importance of peer groups, sport organizations and youth clubs in shaping young people's perceptions of their ethnic in-group and relevant out-groups.

School context

The quantitative analysis of the data from the survey and the card-game shows that GC/TC attitudes were more polarized in *Green Lane* as compared to *Red Brick*. While 58% of the GCs in *Green Lane* did not want to belong to the group of 'Turks', this was only the case for 33% of the GCs interviewed in *Red Brick*. Similarly, while 27% of the TCs interviewed in *Green Lane* did not want to belong to the category of 'Greek', only 13% of the TCs interviewed in *Red Brick* shared the same opinion (similar differences can be observed in relationship to GCs' attitudes to Muslims and TCs' attitudes to Orthodox). Other sections of the student interviews further support this apparent polarization of GC/TC attitudes in *Green Lane*. Students in *Red Brick* were asked to compare their school with *Green Lane* in terms of how well GCs and TCs get on with each other, as many students enrolled in *Red Brick* seemed to know *Green Lane* school through friends, family or personal experiences. In comparing *Red Brick* with *Green Lane*, they always claimed that relationships in *Red Brick* were much more positive, not only because GC and TC students liked each other more, but also because they were socially closer or less separated from each other:

Can: 'I think in my school they get along well, quite well, for example in my class I'm very good friends with Greek Cypriots. But I have my cousin in *Green Lane* and like all my friends are there and they say "they are so racist" and they are in groups, for example in break time Turkish Cypriots are in one group, Greek Cypriots in one group, separate, but in our school Turkish Cypriots, Philippinos, Palestines we are all together, we don't care, we don't say "you are British, you go away, you are Greek you go away, you are Turkish, you go away" we don't have that mentality.'

TC and GC students in *Red Brick* often argued that GCs and TCs in *Green Lane* are more 'racist', or 'fight together', 'swear at each other' or label each other as belonging to particular ethnic out-groups and are socially separated into their own groups of friends. The analysis of the interview data suggests that at least four, interacting phenomena explain this polarization of attitudes in *Green Lane*: (1) Differences between *Red Brick* and *Green Lane*'s multicultural and anti-racist school policies; (2) The more politicized nature of *Green Lane*'s major school-governing bodies; (3) The more negative and hostile treatment of TCs by GCs in *Green Lane*, as measured by comparing TCs' experiences of racism from GCs in *Red Brick* and *Green Lane*; and (4) The size and ethnic composition of the student population in both schools. In terms of Wimmer's (2013) classification scheme, the first two factors refer to characteristics of the institutional (school) context in which students operate, while the latter two refer more to characteristics of the social networks in which these students interact.

Schools' pro-multicultural and anti-racism policies

The data suggests that all students interviewed were fairly happy with their school's multicultural and anti-racism policies, except for the GCs from *Green Lane*. Most GCs from *Green Lane* criticized their school for 'creating conflict' between GCs and TCs, or for making GCs 'dislike' or 'hate' TCs, or making GCs 'more fanatical'. In general, many GCs, both the more Hellenic and the more Cypriot GCs, argued that their school gave particular privileges to TCs and not to GCs. A first privilege concerns the assumption that it was easier for TCs to enrol in *Green Lane*, in that some GC students argued that entry exams were more strict for GCs compared to TCs, or that the latter benefited from entry quotas that allowed TCs with lower scores than GCs to enrol in the school and/or that TCs had to pay lower tuition fees. A second privilege relates to the perception that the school puts more effort into recognizing Turkish or TC culture and identity as compared to Greek or GC culture and identity:

Panayiotis 3:   'The only thing we were told about Christmas was: "this is what the English provide on Christmas" and not the Cypriot tradition of Christmas. And we were given the Turkish Bayram, now, I wanted to know

[about Bayram], but I wanted them to know about us instead of us only about them. They think that this might make us want to talk to them (TCs) but I think (it creates) exactly the opposite, because it makes us mad that they only favour them.'

Panayiotis 3 criticizes *Green Lane* for recognizing a Turkish religious festivity but not doing the same for the GCs by only celebrating the 'English' version of Christmas. However, while this student seems to recognize TCs' right to celebrate and/or recognize their culture at school, more Hellenic GCs often went further by criticizing the school for taking away what they considered an exclusive Greek or GC prerogative, namely the right to celebrate their culture, religion and history. For instance, some GCs argued that 'they never celebrate our heroes', 'they want us to forget our past' or 'forget who we are'. Such accusations were often legitimized by criticizing the school for not allowing students to march in the school in recognition of national holidays or the celebration of war heroes, the removal of religious (Orthodox) icons from classrooms and the removal of the Greek national flag at the entrance of the school (and school premises in general). The difference between these accusations and those from students like Panayiotis 3 is that the former claim, explicitly or implicitly, that only Greek (Cypriots) have the right to celebrate their culture in *Green Lane*. While these students criticized their school for not showing its 'true' cultural face by removing any Greek national and/or religious (Orthodox) symbols on the school premises, they also firmly rejected the school's attempts to force GCs not to express any personal religious or national beliefs or symbols that could be interpreted by TCs as offensive:

Argyro: 'Let's say someone feels Greek, like us, we feel Greek, but they draw on their planners let's say a Greek flag and a Turkish Cypriot sees that and let's say he sits next to you he will tell you "why do you think you are Greek?"'

Olympia: 'And he will go to the teacher, and then the teacher will say that you are fascist because you have very strong beliefs and all that. [But] I have the right to believe whatever I want and I have the right to say what I want [because] we have democracy. You know a teacher

cannot come and tell me there was something with a flag or someone said "Cyprus is Greek" … I have the right to tell whatever I want.'

(…)

Argyro: 'And last year there was a rule that we were not allowed to wear (religious) necklaces because of that thing that happened.'

Peter: 'With the cross?'

Argyro: 'Yes, but why not to wear? It was just a cross why I can't wear a cross? I believe in God I have the right to wear a cross.'

This extract, involving two more Hellenic GCs, is illustrative for the opinion of many Hellenic GCs who argued that they should be allowed to express their political views in relationship to Cyprus (i.e. 'Cyprus is Greek') and their religious beliefs, regardless of whether TCs interpreted this as offensive or not. Argyro's reference to an incident, which the researcher then specified as the incident 'with the cross', is discussed in more detail elsewhere (Stevens, 2014), as narrative analysis of students' presentations of particular incidents of conflict can be used to explore these students' presentations of the ethnic in- and out-groups involved. GCs who argued that *Green Lane* should allow them to express their political views and national and religious symbols usually legitimized this on the basis of three arguments: the idea that their attitudes reflect the truth (in that they believe that Cyprus and their school is or should be only or mainly Greek); the idea that in a democracy they have the right to express such views (see above); and/or the idea that TCs, because of 'what happened', should expect to receive some criticism:

Orpheas: 'I think it is wrong how the school protects Turkish Cypriots so much.'

Aris: 'They came in the school, they came in this country and they knew the dangers of what they are going to face but they still came. I'm not saying that this is their fault but they have to learn to live with the dangers; they have to take the responsibility for the risk that they take. So, if you dislike someone else [because he shows he is] a Greek Cypriot and you make this an issue, yea, they are doing the opposite, they expose themselves to more dangers.'

Aris claims that TCs 'have to learn to live with the dangers and take responsibility for the risk they took' in going to a school in the Republic of Cyprus. This view reflects a more general opinion shared by other Hellenic GCs, in that they almost unanimously considered racism towards TCs as morally wrong, but at the same time justified expressions of dislike or even racism to TCs because of the hardship experienced by GCs at the hand of Turks and/or TCs. However, *Green Lane* seemed to be characterized by a greater inconsistency in how the school applied its anti-racism policy in that school staff seemed to allow more room for expressions of racism, particularly in relationship to the expression of nationalistic and/or religious symbols:

Researcher: 'Now if somebody would write let's say a Greek flag on his or her planner?'
Levent: 'Yeah, they do that quite a lot: five planners in the class are like that, I counted them.'
(…)
Researcher: 'And how do teachers respond to that?'
Levent: 'Well, technically they can't really do anything to the planners but you are not allowed to say that loud or show it to somebody else, although they do that but if the teacher doesn't see it she or he cannot really do something.' (Interview, *Green Lane*)

Thus, while staff at *Green Lane* did not seem to (always) punish the display of national or religious symbols on personal property, they seemed to punish the deliberate use of these symbols against their TC students. In sharp contrast, the expression of such symbols appeared to be more strictly prohibited in *Red Brick*:

Researcher: 'And you think if you would go to them [the principal and bible teacher] they would help you?'
Mazhar: 'Yes definitely they would help me, yes, because they don't accept racism in the school.'
Researcher: 'Do you think that if there is racism they would take it seriously?'
Mazhar: 'Yes they take it very seriously.'
Researcher: 'How can you see that?'

Mazhar:	'Because one day as I said they drew flags on their bags, Mr Green saw this and he told the guy "you have to rub this out or put Tipp-Ex on it".'
Researcher:	'So, they are not allowed to do that?'
Mazhar:	'No, they are not allowed.' (Interview, *Red Brick*)

A final criticism levelled at *Green Lane* concerns GCs' perception that the school 'overprotects' TCs, primarily by taking the side of the TC students in a conflict between TCs and GCs and by assuming that GCs bully, discriminate against or express racism towards TCs:

Christiana:	'I believe that the management of the school creates this conflicts {**Daphne**: "I agree"}. Because we are friends with the Turkish Cypriots in our classroom we know them for three years now we are friends with them {**Daphne**: "yes"} we talk to them from Facebook and we make fun, jokes.'
Peter:	'What is it exactly that they do to cause conflict?'
Daphne:	'They continually tell us to "don't discriminate" but maybe there are like 5 to 10 students in the school which are very fanatical about the Turks, but the rest of us don't mind, we get along and they take all of us and tell us … and they say "it's a minority [so] we have to treat them well".'
Christiana:	'If I go and say something to a Turkish Cypriot I would get in trouble but if a Turkish Cypriot comes to me and tells me something, it will be like nothing happened (…). [It] makes us fanatics. And they had us in the lecture theatre for a presentation about bullying and the only thing they talked about was about the Turks being bullied, the Turkish Cypriots being bullied, it's like telling us "stop doing that to them".' (Interview, *Green Lane*)

Both Christiana and Daphne could be described as more Cypriot GCs and were in general very positive towards TCs. However, they, like most of the GCs interviewed in *Green Lane*, criticized their school for treating all GCs as potential racist bullies and TCs as potential victims of (GC) racist bullying. More generally, the interviews suggest that *Green Lane* put much more emphasis on tackling racism in

school by implementing a more formal and strict anti-racist school policy. It was remarkable that in almost all the interviews in *Green Lane*, TCs referred to a particular teacher (Mrs Orange) who was part of the senior management team and was considered a natural point of contact in reporting racist incidents. In addition, most GC and TC students in *Green Lane* referred to assemblies and presentations (e.g. see Christiana above) organized by Mrs Orange in which they discussed racism, its relation to bullying and the school's policy against bullying and racism:

Theodora: They think that we are fighting with each other and that we hate each other (…) they make this [hating each other] happen because when they make assemblies they talk to us about the Turkish-Cypriots and they say "we will interview them every week" [**Lefki**: "yes"], yes, "we will interview them every week and ask them if you harm them" and in this way, if someone likes them [the TC students] the teachers make us don't like them. (Interview, *Green Lane*)

   The school's more formal anti-bullying and anti-racist policy as well as the visible point of contact for students that Mrs Orange provided seem to have made it more likely for TC students to report incidents of perceived racism occurring in *Green Lane*. However, for most GCs interviewed, these policies were perceived as targeted against GCs (see Christiana and Theodora above) and resulted in a situation where TCs are encouraged to report GCs as racist:

Aris: 'They give them (TCs) the idea that whatever happens it's because they are Turkish Cypriots and they give them the idea that if somebody kicked him, even if it was a misunderstanding, that it was because he was Turkish Cypriot.' (Interview, *Green Lane*)

―――――

Alexia: 'I think that the Turkish Cypriots, if something happens between a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot, they would take it more personally.'

Theodora: 'Yes, it's like we attack all of them.'

Alexia: 'They don't take it individually, they are like if we say something like we are sitting together next to each other and they ask us if we have any pencils because he or she forgot his pencil we don't have any other, we only have one pencil and it's true and they will think that we are racist.'

Theodora: 'Yes, they exaggerate things and they go to the head and blame us for something that, for example if a Turkish Cypriot walks in the yard and one of us, I mean a Greek Cypriot gives him a look or something, he will go straight to the head and blame us and say that we kicked him, and yes, they always exaggerate.' (Interview, *Green Lane*)

While Aris seems to put the responsibility for TCs' claims of GC racism in the hands of the school, Alexia and Theodora accuse TCs of exaggerating, and seeing and reporting incidents wrongly as expressions of racism. Similarly, other students argued that TCs were 'too sensitive', or that they 'always make a big deal out of nothing' and 'complain too easily'. Hence, while many GCs blamed the school for creating an environment in which GCs were wrongly labelled as racists and bullies, they were also critical of TCs for taking advantage of this environment by interpreting and reporting events wrongfully as incidents of GC racism against TCs. This also relates to a more general assumption shared by more Hellenic GCs, in that TCs should 'take responsibility for the risk they took' (see Aris), and expect and (to some extent) accept GCs' expressions of dislike (and racism) towards them. While we were not in a position to evaluate these policies in detail (e.g. we did not have access to what was said during these assemblies, or the content of school policy documents and staff views and implementations of these policies) the interviews with students in *Green Lane* suggest that while such policies managed to make TCs feel protected by the senior management in school (see Stevens et al. 2016), they were interpreted by GCs as an attack to their group's interests, particularly among more Hellenic GCs, who considered these school policies as a threat to the legitimate nature of their personal and school (Greek and Orthodox) identities and related political views. This in turn seemed to foster feelings of resentment among GCs and further polarized relationships between

GCs and TCs as, for instance, illustrated by Loiza's claim that this makes them 'more fanatic' or Theodora's claim that 'in this way, teachers make us not like them'.

While students in *Red Brick* did not mention any formal school policies in relationship to racism in school, or any seminars on this topic organized by school staff, TC students in *Red Brick* mentioned the principal and the teacher of Religious Education as two points of contact in *Red Brick* that could deal with incidents of racism effectively. Hence, despite the lack of a strict and formal anti-racist policy in *Red Brick*, TC students seemed to know where to go for support in school in case they experienced racism. At the same time, none of the GC students interviewed in *Red Brick* reported being treated less fairly or targeted by the school in relationship with racism.

In sum, while both schools were successful in making TC students feel protected against racism, it seems that *Green Lane*'s more formal anti-racism policy stimulated TC students to respond to racism in an increasingly uniform way, by reporting such incidents immediately to Mrs Orange (Stevens et al. 2016). However, at the same time it seems that in condemning more strongly any expressions of GC racism to TCs, the school fostered feelings of resentment among their GC students, not only towards the school management but also towards TCs for having privileges (including that TCs have to do less to get into the school, are allowed to celebrate their culture (more) or can prevent GCs from celebrating their culture and are more protected in conflicts between GCs and TCs) and for 'taking advantage' of this situation. The latter, in combination with a situation in which strict policies against the expression of racism are not consequently followed by a particular school response, possibly created a positive feedback loop, in which GCs express more hostility to TCs as a response to multicultural and anti-racist school policies that they consider to be unfair to GCs, which in turn results in a greater number of reported incidents of GC racism by TCs, which in turn legitimizes the school to see GC racism as an issue that needs to be treated seriously, which then creates more resentment among GCs and in turn to expressions of hostility to TCs. While the greater number and more serious nature of reported incidents of GC racism to TCs in *Green Lane* supports this analysis (see below), the following institutional factor also contributed to the more polarized nature of GC/TC relationships in *Green Lane* compared to *Red Brick*.

The politicized nature of governing bodies in school

Although *Green Land* and *Red Brick* were both private schools that, compared with public schools in Cyprus, charged tuition fees and offered a (recognized) curriculum that was different from what was offered by state schools in the Republic of Cyprus, *Green Lane* was partially funded by government money and hence in part controlled by the government. Both students and teachers in *Green Lane* felt that both right- and left-wing political parties were represented in the school's management board and that they had very different views on how to manage ethnic diversity and, related to this: the inclusion of Turkish Cypriots in *Green Lane*. At the time when this research took place at *Green Lane*, the president of the Republic of Cyprus was a member of the communist (AKEL) party, and the school's (British) head teacher and board were considered by most of the more Hellenic GCs interviewed as 'left wing' and in favour of more pro-multicultural policies:

Panayiotis: 'Most of our students in our school say that they belong to DC, AKEL, DICO, and so on, some say "we are in the middle" or "we are nationalist", or left wing, or right wing and so on. In our school left wing [people] and those multiculturalists and non-religious and so on are treated better, are treated like the majority. Also Turkish, Turkish Cypriots for them are treated like the majority but right wing and so on, people that are patriots or nationalist or anything else they are treated like the minority.'

(…)

Paris: 'The government is left side, so *Green Lane* is part of the government and they changed the staff to left side.' (Interview, *Green Lane*)

Panayiotis and Paris defined themselves in the interviews as 'patriots', and both fit the profile of more extreme Hellenic GCs in terms of their in/out group feelings. For these students, the schools' multicultural and anti-racism policies were not just political in that they were considered as opposite to their own political ideals, but also because they were strongly related to existing political parties

that, through the school, aimed to 'brainwash' GCs into accepting an ideology that they did not agree with:

Daphne: 'Like with the Turkish Cypriots we talk with them and we have no problem with them. They are in my class for three years, and we know them we talk with them, we are friends with them, but sometimes, because this school management, it's like that sometimes now the Turkish Cypriots with the littlest of things maybe that was not even on purpose maybe they go and tell [the teacher]. And I know from a friend of mine heard her teacher tell them [in class] "Cyprus is not Greek".'

Christiana: 'Yes which, she is clearly left and when you are a teacher it's not your position to show to tell us "Cyprus is not Greek" my family teaches me "it's like that" and you can't tell me what to believe.'

Daphne: 'And because they know that at this age it is critical for the way we think, they try to affect us.'

Christiana: 'Brainwash.' (Interview, *Green Lane*)

Hence, given that these students considered the school board to be politicized and polarized on issues related to multiculturalism and anti-racism, it should perhaps not surprise us that they framed the schools' intentions to tackle racism and develop more respectful relationships to different cultures as politically driven. This could also be observed in the way in which some of the more Hellenic GCs in *Green Lane* described themselves as 'right-wing', 'nationalist' and/or 'patriotic' and positioned these in-groups against what they described as 'left-wing', 'communists', 'anarchists' and 'multiculturalists'. These political categories overlap with in-group identifications as 'Greek' and 'Orthodox' on the one hand, and 'Cypriot' and 'less religious' on the other. In contrast, while more Hellenic GCs in *Red Brick* also perceived themselves as primarily Greek, they did not use such political labels in describing themselves or out-groups. Furthermore, none of the students interviewed in *Red Brick* thought that the school had a particular left- or right-wing political agenda and did not mention any political power struggles at the level of the school board or attempts of teachers to indoctrinate students. In sum, the more polarized GC/TC attitudes in *Green Lane* might be in part the result

of the more political and polarized nature of the school board, which rendered debates and policies about issues related to multiculturalism and anti-racism not as a conflict between individual viewpoints, but rather as a conflict between political parties and related ideologies.

Christiana's claim that it is up to the parents and not the teachers in school to tell students what to believe also suggests that some of these students considered *Green Lane*'s policies not merely as a tool to inform students but as an explicit attempt to brainwash them into believing a particular (different) ideology. The importance that this student attaches to the family as a legitimate socializing agent overlaps with data discussed earlier that shows that the students interviewed seem to consider some agencies as more legitimate sources in proving cultural frames as compared to others. For instance, parents and to a lesser extent other family members were generally considered as more legitimized sources as compared to teachers, and peers were, like themselves, often perceived as 'too ignorant' to provide legitimate or reliable cultural scripts about politically and/or morally sensitive issues.

The extracts above also suggest that teachers have to walk on a tightrope, as they are considered legitimate sources of cultural scripts because of their age and profession, but they do not have the legitimate power or authority to impose particular political and/or morally sensitive views. While the politicized nature of the school's management board and the school's anti-racism policies can be considered as institutional factors that explain in part the differences between *Green Lane* and *Red Brick* in students' choices for particular cultural scripts in describing their ethnic in-group and meaningful ethnic out-groups, and the relationships between these two, the following sections suggest the importance of particular characteristics of the social networks between GC and TC students in both schools.

The more negative treatment of TCs by GCs in *Green Lane*

When students were asked if they experienced racism from students inside the school, students from *Green Lane* reported more incidents of racism by GC students and experienced more hostile expressions of racism as compared to their peers from *Red Brick*. The reported incidents typically involved:

1. Deliberately showing nationalistic or religious symbols to TC students (e.g. showing a Greek Orthodox cross after scoring in

a football match; showing the Greek flag drawn on their personal planners, pencil cases, calculators or desks in the classroom etc.).
2. Verbal abuse, in the form of: (i) insults (e.g. 'the best Turk is a dead Turk', 'stupid Turk', 'Cyprus is Greek', 'Turks out of Cyprus' …) said in English or in Greek (which the TC students usually cannot understand but, based on intonation and non-verbal communication, interpret as abusive and racist); and/or (ii) ridicule (e.g. by making fun of a Turkish name and applauding in an exaggerated manner when a TC student answers a question correctly in class).
3. Physical abuse: one incident in *Green Lane* where a TC student boy claimed to have been tackled very hard and injured on purpose by a GC student in football.
4. Destroying or damaging property: one incident in *Green Lane* where a GC student threw water in a TC student's schoolbag and destroyed his I-Pod, while he also ripped pages off from his Turkish-language folder.

Furthermore, in the case of *Red Brick*, the reported experiences of racism from GC students mostly relate to a small group of five or six students in a particular class and year-group, while in *Green Lane* these experiences appear as more widespread, involving a larger group of students from different years and class-groups. Most of the reported incidents involved GC expressions of a strong dislike towards TC students (especially for having them in 'their' school and/or country). Such incidents were reported much more frequently in *Green Lane*, and the following excerpt provides an example:

Onur: 'Yes. When they open the Greek flags, not the Cyprus flag, I get offended.'
Researcher: 'Why do you find that offensive?'
Onur: 'Because they hold it towards me.'
Researcher: 'And what is it that they want to say?'
Ruslan: 'Like "Cyprus is Greek and you should go away."' (Interview, *Green Lane*)

Hence, the more polarized attitudes between GCs and TCs in *Green Lane* can in part be explained be the observation that TCs experienced more incidents of racism, particularly incidents that made them feel unwanted or excluded from GCs in *Green Lane*

(and Cyprus more generally). Given that the school policies in *Green Lane* stimulated TCs to report such incidents more than in Red Brick, which in turn seems to foster resentment and discrimination from GCs towards TCs in *Green Lane* (see above), these characteristics of the social relationships between GCs and TCs interact with institutional features to develop more polarized attitudes between GC and TCs in *Green Lane*.

The ethnic composition of the student population and opportunities for contact

At a superficial level, both *Red Brick* and *Green Lane* seem to provide an ideal setting in which GC and TC students could develop more positive perceptions of and relationships between each other through contact (i.e. the contact hypothesis). First, both schools welcome both GCs and TCs, and as such provide a rare context in Cyprus where young GCs and TCs have the opportunity to interact with each other (*opportunity for personal interaction*). Second, GC and TC students in both schools all share a relatively high social class background (*equal status*), with the shared aim of doing well in school (*common goals*), and where authorities can be expected to support positive relationships between them (*support of authorities*) and ask GC and TC students to collaborate in relationship in certain educational interactions without competition (*intergroup cooperation*, e.g. by mixing TC and GCs in making up sports teams during PE lessons). The interviews seem to confirm the validity of the contact hypothesis in that prolonged face-to-face contact between TCs and GCs can break down barriers between these groups and stimulate the development of less stereotypical and more positive views of each other:

Peter: 'You've been here for a couple of years. Have your attitudes towards Greek Cypriots changed or did they remain the same?'

Hiranur: 'Well, in a way it changed, I am more friendly to them and more closer to them in a way than before, when I was going to school in the Turkish side but now I am more open.'

Peter: 'How were you before then, before you came to *Red Brick*?'

Hiranur: 'Like when I would see someone talking with (a Greek) I would just like you know run away, like "O my God,

they are Greeks!" But now when I see someone Greek, I say "they are people too", cause I used to see them as bad people but now I really see them as good.'

Peter: 'You saw them as bad people because?'

Hiranur: 'Because I was living in the Turkish side and people on the Turkish side are racist against the Greek people, because I was going there I used to think that they were bad people but of course they are not.' (Interview, *Red Brick*)

———

Peter: 'Have your views towards Turkish Cypriots changed over time since you came in or is it the same?'

Pavlos: 'When I FIRST came to this school I didn't like them that much, honestly because of the things my dad was telling me but because I've known, we have two or three Turkish Cypriots that have been in my class for the seven years and I got to know them so well that they just became really good friends of mine so I have no problem with any of them even with people out of my class.' (Interview, *Red Brick*)

These extracts involve a TC (Hiranur) and a GC (Pavlos) student from *Red Brick*, and illustrate an opinion shared by most GCs and TCs interviewed in *Red Brick*, in that they felt that they developed more positive views of each other over time. In addition, TC and GC students who reflected on how their attitudes towards each other developed over time often pointed to socializing contexts or agents that stimulated them to think in more negative, stereotypical ways about 'the other', prior to having the opportunity to interact with them, like Pavlos's reference to his father and Hiranur's reference to her former school and 'people on the Turkish side'.

While these interview extracts seem to suggest that the conditions in which TCs and GCs interacted with each other in *Red Brick* were such that they stimulated the development of more positive views of each other, this seems far less the case for *Green Lane*. In sharp contrast to *Red Brick*, GC and TC students in *Green Lane* were much less likely to express the feeling that they grew closer to each other over time, often suggesting that their (usually more distant or negative) attitudes remained the same or that they became even more negative of the other group over time, or developed a view

of the other as more polarized (that is: consisting of very good and very bad people).

A first reason for this seems to relate to the differences in the ethnic composition of *Green Lane* and *Red Brick*, which made it less likely or necessary for GCs and TCs in *Green Lane* to interact with each other. More specifically, *Red Brick* is a much smaller school when compared to *Green Lane*, with a greater mix in terms of the national/ethnic descent in terms of its student population. In contrast, *Green Lane* is a relatively big school with a large, dominant group of GC students, a smaller group of TC students and a very small group of students with different ethnic/national backgrounds (see Chapter 3). Students in *Red Brick* often spontaneously pointed to these structural differences in explaining why they felt that GC/TC relationships were better in their school:

Cemre: 'The groups are smaller [here in *Red Brick*] and you are likely to make friends with other people from different races but there [in *Green Lane*] it's like you got in a group and if one person says "they hate us, this and this and that" and the other people get affected by that and like [they can] just make a huge group and no one feels excluded, and no one needs more friends from the other race so.'

In comparing *Red Brick* with *Green Lane*, Cemre, like other TCs in *Red Brick*, argued that the small size and ethnically heterogeneous composition of their school stimulated TC and GC students to interact and become friends, or, as Cesin puts it: 'our school is also small and like people have to cooperate'. Hence, it is likely that GC/TC relationships in *Green Lane* are more polarized because the students of these two groups were visibly more dominant in *Green Lane* and sufficiently large to allow TC and GC students to fall back on their own group.

A second reason for this seems to be that TCs and GCs enrolled in *Green Lane* felt less equal to each other as compared to their peers in *Red Brick*, which, according to the contact hypothesis, constitutes a key requirement for developing positive in/out group perceptions and relations. For TCs in *Green Lane*, the perceived inequality to GCs seemed to relate to two issues: the numerical dominance of GCs in *Green Lane* and the more negative attitudes of GCs to TCs (see above).

The following extract illustrates this and involves a unique case of a TC student (Demir) who first went to *Red Brick* and afterwards enrolled in *Green Lane*, and as a result could compare the two schools through his own, lived experiences:

Peter: 'How did your attitudes change since you've come here? Have they been exactly the same towards the Greek Cypriots or have they changed?'

Emin: 'I think before I came to school I was more friendly with them but when I started to grow up I started not to like them.'

Peter: 'Why?'

Emin: 'Because they are really racist sometimes, so it makes you more racist against them.'

Peter: 'Ok. What's your take on that?'

Demir: 'My case is quite different because before I came to school I went to *Red Brick* and there were some Greek Cypriots but most of the people were from other countries so I thought that they would be friendly, the Greek Cypriots. When I came to *Green Lane* there were no problems at first because in the first year we were all together with the Turkish Cypriots in one class, but then we got separated in different classes with Greek Cypriots and [then] I think you learn that they can be quite racist so you don't like them so much.'

Peter: 'And how was *Red Brick* different then?'

Demir: 'Because you know, when I was going to *Red Brick*, there were more Turkish Cypriots in my class than Greek Cypriots and there were like two South Africans and many people from other countries, so it was a more friendly environment and everyone got on well with each other.' (Interview, *Green Lane*)

Emin claims that he became more racist to GCs when he started going to *Green Lane*, something that he explains as a reaction to experiences of racism from GCs to TCs. Although Demir is somewhat unclear about how he thinks his attitudes developed over time, he clearly feels that GCs are more racist to TCs in *Green Lane* as compared to *Red Brick*, and explicitly links this to the ethnic composition of the student population, as 'there were more TCs in my class than GCs' in *Red Brick*. It seems that the large number of GCs compared

to TCs in *Green Lane* created a unequal power relation in that TCs felt more threatened by GCs and GCs were perhaps less inclined to seek contact with TCs, something that was even felt at the level of the classroom:

Peter: 'How do you see the school change in respect to that? It's always been the same or you think there has been changes?'

Damla: 'We (TCs) were first in separate classes so there was nothing at all, no communication at all. In second form we mixed and it was nothing again, we mainly said "hello" "hello" (to each other). And then in third form it wasn't like we start to / it took them one year to accept us in their class, in third year it was better I remember at least we were talking in breaks and we were like joking with each other and stuff and third form was the most stressful year, (because) the boys were getting like they were trying to be hooligans and stuff, they were like they start act like they were being very brave like I act two different things, one came to say me that / I was supporting a football team here Omonia because one of my friends was supporting the group here and stuff and he came to say "no, you can't support one of our teams" and stuff (…). Yes, third form was like that, with some we were getting really friends and with some we were like having fights.'

Irem: 'For me, because I am separated, I go to classes where I am the only Turkish Cypriot and like I sit there and I do the lesson, and (then) I go away. I don't talk with any Greek Cypriots, (because) like they don't want to ask something from them they just answer like and then talk in Greek. I ask something in English like to get to know them and continue like I am not there. Yea. I have three classes like that.'

Damla: 'I am always with some Turkish Cypriots and like in some classes during the lesson time, we make jokes together, we are happy, but when the lesson finishes we are separate again.' (Interview, *Green Lane*)

This extract is interesting for three reasons. First, it illustrates how Irem feels more isolated and excluded in classrooms where she is the

only TC student and where the majority of other students are GC students, who, perhaps because of their numerical dominance, communicate in Greek between each other. In contrast, Damla has more positive experiences with GCs but refers to classroom contexts where both groups are smaller and more equal in terms of size. Second, they discuss experiences of being excluded by GCs, which illustrates a second important reason why TCs feel less equal in this school as compared to their TC peers in *Red Brick*, who were much less likely to express such experiences. Finally, both Damla and Demir describe how TCs were 'put together' during the first year at *Green Lane*. They refer to a policy that was adopted in *Green Lane*, but not in *Red Brick*, in which TC students were taught exclusively together during the first year, which is likely to have restricted the opportunities for contact between TCs and GCs in the first year – a year in which new students form their first friendship ties with peers in school.

While the larger number of GCs in *Green Lane* and their more hostile treatment of TCs stimulated TCs in *Green Lane* to feel (treated) unequal as compared to GCs, the GCs in *Green Lane* in turn felt not treated as equal to TCs in that they accused the school management of treating TCs better (see also above):

Peter: 'And what do you think of what the school does to bring the two groups together? You think they do a good job?'

Panos: 'I think that they are not doing a good job, because they aren't trying a lot to bring us closer they are just strict to discipline [us], instead of trying to get us all together. And every little fact that happens in our school, they make it a big deal and try to punish the Greek Cypriots for being rude to Turkish Cypriots and trying to make them more polite and more friendly to Turkish Cypriots, but they punish a Greek Cypriot because he's done something to a Turkish Cypriot even if it is a mistake and the Turkish Cypriot just wanted to get in trouble.' (Interview, *Green Lane*)

Hence, the criticism of GC students in *Green Lane* towards their school's multicultural and anti-racist policies cannot only be considered as a polarizing force in that it fostered feelings of resentment towards TCs (see above), but also in that it created a barrier for face-to-face contact between GCs and TCs to develop more positive views

of each other, as the former considered themselves as not equal to
TCs. In addition, GCs' perception of the school management as
being biased in favour of TCs also violates another key condition
related to the contact hypothesis: the (perceived) presence of an
authority that supports positive attitudes and collaboration between
these two groups. In sum, while the presence of both GCs and TCs
in both schools seems to provide a fertile climate for these students
to develop more positive views of each other through face-to-face
contact, the analysis of the data suggests this is far less the case for
GCs and TCs in *Green Lane*.

Two institutional and two network characteristics seem to interact
to explain why GC and TC relationships in *Green Lane* are more
polarized, or why the students from *Green Lane* relied more on nega-
tive cultural scripts in describing each other. *Green Lane*'s particular
ethnic composition, its decision to separate TCs and GCs in the first
year and the higher occurrence of discrimination to TCs from GCs in
this school and school's policies in relationship to multiculturalism
and anti-racism and the perceived politicized nature of the school-
governing body and *Green Lane*'s, all contributed to the development
of an environment in which face-to-face contact between TCs and
GCs was either restricted or hampered in developing more positive
views between these two groups of students.

The family

Although the analysis above shows the importance of the school
context, the interview data suggests that the family constitutes the
most important source of information for young people in choosing
particular cultural scripts to describe their ethnic in- and out-groups.
In all interviews, students were asked to reflect on how their parents
would react if their child (i.e. the student interviewed) would want
to marry a partner from a different ethnic out-group. The researcher
usually selected ethnic out-groups on the basis of the card-game,
and particularly groups to which the student did not want to belong
were selected as groups from which the student would select (hypo-
thetically) a partner for marriage. The analysis of the data revealed a
very strong overlap between students' own perceptions of particular
out-groups and the way in which they portrayed the views of (some
of) their family members towards these groups. The following two
extracts were taken from two interviews with GC students from *Green*

Lane; first is an interview with two, more Cypriot GCs and second with two, more Hellenic GCs:

Peter: 'Ok, let's now imagine a situation that you are a bit older and you come home with a Turkish boy and tell your dad, mom that you want to marry this person. How would they respond?'

Theodora: 'My dad hasn't got a problem with that, like when I tell him they are not invited to the parties he says "why?" and "you have to be friends with them" and "they are part of Cyprus". He's very open with them. I don't think he would care if he's Turkish he would care if he's a good person and he would care about other things not his nationality and I think it would be ok for him. My dad has friends because he has studied in Russia, and there were also Turkish Cypriots and they meet often like last week they were together and my dad went to their house and they feed them and he say they are very good people, they open their house to him. And my mom I think she doesn't care about the nationality she cares of what family he is, how he is.'

Peter: 'And if it was a Muslim?'

Theodora: 'No, I don't think if he would want me to become a Muslim but if we would just marry.'

Katarina: 'My father wouldn't have a problem with me being with a Turkish boy because none of my parents are racist and they would support me with whatever I do. And like if he comes from a good family and all this kind of things they wouldn't care about his nationality, because they have both been exposed to different cultures, because they have both studied abroad for a lot of years so …'

Peter: 'What if the person is a Muslim?'

Katarina: 'They actually wouldn't have a problem with it but it's uncomfortable for them because he has a different culture, he can't continue our traditions and the way we live, so it's different and hard …' (Interview, *Green Lane*)

———

Peter: 'Ok, now, let's imagine a situation where you are let's say 25 years old and you come home with a Turkish or

Turkish Cypriot girl and you would tell your parents you want to marry this girl. How would your parents react?'

Hectoras: 'My father would never accept this, because he and my mother were affected by the war, he lost his house, money, a lot of land and he has a totally negative image about Turkey and Turkish people.'

Peter: 'So he would not …'

Hectoras: 'And neither would I accept it, never.'

Peter: 'Why?'

Hectoras: 'I grew up with a negative picture of these people. Maybe not all of them but, generally, what has "Turkey" is not very good for me.'

Xenos: 'Me too, the same not my parents and myself but it's about the way we grew up because our parents were victims of the invasion {**Hectoras**: "yes"} they gave us negative picture about Turkish people and Turkish system.'

Peter: 'And what is this negative picture?'

Hectoras: 'That they kill the people.' (Interview, *Green Lane*)

While both Theodora and Katarina expressed positive attitudes to Turks and TCs (and Muslims) in playing and discussing the card-game, Hectoras and Xenos appeared much more negative towards these groups – attitudes that seem to overlap strongly with the way in which they later describe their parents' views during the interview. Students do not only seem to rely strongly on their parents' views of particular ethnic out-groups in developing their own views, but also consider similar motivations or justifications for such views. While Theodora claims that her father 'has travelled' and as a result knows TCs and has TC friends who are very kind to him, Hectoras describes his father as somebody who experienced the economic and physical threat of Turks through the war. The former suggests the importance of the contact hypothesis and the latter the importance of perceived threat or competition for scarce resources as underlying motivations for developing particular in/out group feelings, motivations that these young people use to justify their parents' views and their own. The strong connection between these attitudes was not only cognitive, in that students did not just 'copy' their parents' views, but also and sometimes mainly emotional, in that students often said that they could not consider marrying particular out-groups 'because

I wouldn't want to do this to my parents', or 'it would hurt them too much', even if the students themselves appeared more positive to these particular out-groups.

At the same time the 'family' influences students in a complex way, with most students spontaneously highlighting the opinions of particular members more than others, suggesting that the opinions of some members are more influential or relevant to these students than others. Although students usually referred to their father (as with Theodora and Hectoras), mother, or both (as with Katarina and Xenos), other students (also) referred to the opinions and experiences of one or several grandparents and/or cousins and uncles or aunts; these opinions and experiences did not necessarily always overlap with those of other family members, but at least seemed to be considered in the process of expressing particular views of ethnic in- and out-groups. The importance of the family as a socializing agent also resurfaces throughout the interviews on different occasions, for example when students discuss whose responsibility it is to 'teach' young people about other groups (see above). Finally, the influence of the family in developing students' views of their collective self and various out-groups seems equally strong for both the GC and TC students interviewed. As a result, we find very little variability in the sample of TCs, in which the vast majority of the parents are portrayed as having very positive views of out-groups, and particularly of GCs. In sharp contrast, in line with the distinction between more Hellenic and more Cypriot GCs, there appears to be a greater variety in terms of how parents' views towards out-groups are described by the GC students (see extracts above).

Other socializing agents and contexts

The two interview extracts above also suggest the importance of other socializing agents, as the participating students in both 'double' interviews share remarkably similar attitudes. Most of the interviews in *Green Lane* concerned double interviews, as the researcher was allowed to take two students at the same time out of their classroom to participate with an interview (in contrast, in *Red Brick* the researcher was only allowed to take out one student at the same time during lesson time). Students were given the freedom to choose each other, with the only requirements that they trusted each other and

that they should both want to participate with the interview (and have authorization of their parents and their teacher to participate, see Chapter 3). The analysis of the interview data shows a strong overlap in attitudes between participants of the same interview. While this can in part be explained by students' desire to agree (or at least not disagree strongly) with a friend in such a context, it is also likely that this reflects to some extent a convergence of attitudes between friends in relationship to politically and/or morally sensitive issues. This can in turn be explained in different ways, first as an indication that young people influence each other in considering particular cultural scripts in describing ethnic in- and out-groups (peer-group effects) and/or secondly, that young people select friends that prefer cultural scripts that are closer to their own (selection effect). While the data does not allow us to make any claims about the validity of these effects, they do suggest that peer groups can have a (reinforcing) effect on young people's attitudes to in- and out-groups.

Another context that seemed to stimulate young people in developing particular views of others concerns sport-related activities. Two types of sport-related activities could be distinguished: those in which the student usually participated as a participant and those in which the student functioned merely as a supporter of a sports team. In general, it seems that involving TC and GC students into the same sport team stimulated the development of more positive inter-ethnic attitudes. TC and GC students who claimed to play sports on a regular basis with TC and GC team-mates all argued that this brought them closer together:

Can: 'I have a (GC) friend Kyriakos we go to basketball tournaments and there is (this thing called) "peace players", so Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots get together and if they are not from *Red Brick* or from *Green Lane* they come from local schools, I know so many people, maybe 95% of them they come from local Greek and Turkish schools and they become friends. And there is summer camp and this helps a lot [for] the kids to get together and know each other and say "I'm Turkish I'm Greek, I don't care, we are brothers we are friends". So basketball I believe that if we can play basketball together with Greeks we can live together. Maybe it looks simple, playing basketball you say basketball, what does it do with living together but it's very important I think.' (Interview, *Red Brick*)

Can plays basketball with TCs and GCs, and feels that this has brought them together. This should perhaps not surprise us, as such contexts reflect all the conditions as prescribed by the contact hypothesis as necessary for developing positive attitudes through contact (see above). However, two elements appeared to be key in this: the student had to want and like his/her participation in this event (in other words, participation was voluntary and evaluated in a positive way) and the participation in these events had to have some continuation over time (i.e. be regular and not restricted to a few occasional events) or supplemented by other, similar activities, like Can's mentioning of a Summer camp, activities where 'kids can get together and know each other'.

Students' participation in sports activities as supporters also seems to inform their attitudes to out-groups, in that students could support sport teams that were associated with strong political views. Of particular relevance to the students interviewed seems the support to two (GC) rival football teams based in the capital of Lefkosia: Apoel and Omonia. While the former is strongly associated with a right-wing political ideology, and hence a more Hellenic in-group perception and negative attitudes to ethnic out-groups, particularly to Turks, Omonia is associated with a left-wing political ideology, a preference for a pan-Cypriot identity and positive attitudes to out-groups, particularly to TCs. The association between an individual's identification with one of these sport teams and his/her political attitudes was widespread and deeply ingrained in the minds of almost all students interviewed, or as Panayiotis put it: 'Once you pick a team you also support its [national] president.' In particular TCs were keen to spontaneously stress the importance of football in making GC peers more 'fanatic', 'racist' and 'nationalistic' and generally for turning GCs more against TCs:

Damla: 'Here (in the Greek part of Cyprus) it's very different situation with football because football is like a symbol of political views: if you are with Omonia you are left supporter and if you are with Apoel you are right supporter and if you are left supporter you are not going to support Apoel, no way. And when you get into Apoel matches, like the Apoel fans they open Greek flags and stuff and Omonia fans they open a Cheguevara flag, it's obvious and

everyone knows it. And when you become a fan of Apoel because your friends are Apoel or whatever, and when you go to Apoel [matches] you become a group and that group is nationalist and they tell you nationalist things and you wave a Greek flag and everything then you, you don't even realize but you become nationalist.' (Interview, *Green Lane*)

Damla thinks that GC students become (sometimes subconsciously) more nationalist when they support a sport team (Apoel) that is considered as nationalist because 'they tell you nationalist things'. Finally, for at least one student, his participation in a youth club appeared important in understanding how he thought about himself in collective, ethnic terms and how he looked at various ethnic out-groups:

Panayiotis: 'IF, IF Turkish girl [was in the God made] and so on, I came here with a Turkish girl. I don't think that my parents will have problems / I will have problem ((laughing)) but / I think a good advice that chief scouts told me is that if a Turkish come to our scout troop and wants to be part of it / I will write him a register as a scout but every time that / we are starting he have us, all of us to / at the Greek flag, ok? And saying our national anthem. Is that, if they come here they will act like us. Here it's, here it's a Greek island and here we live like this. If they have problem go out.' (Interview, *Green Lane*)

Panayiotis fits the profile of an extreme Hellenic GC and was also perceived by his peers as very nationalistic and strongly negative towards TCs and Turks. In this extract he spontaneously mentions the advice given to him by his 'chief scout' in relationship to the hypothetical enrolment of TCs in their group, suggesting that such issues are discussed in this context. As Cyprus is 'a Greek island' the hypothetical TC recruit would have to demonstrate his allegiance by singing the Greek national anthem and saluting the Greek national flag – which illustrates the strong assimilationist and mono-cultural (Greek) policies that were typically embraced by more Hellenic GCs. Although this anecdote does not allow us to make any strong

inferences about the influence of youth clubs on GCs' and TCs' preference for particular cultural scripts in describing themselves and each other, they at least suggest that such contexts make particular cultural scripts about ethnic in- and out-groups more available and legitimate than others.

Conclusions

This chapter has explored why the GC and TC students' interviewed opted for particular cultural frames in describing their ethnic in-group and meaningful ethnic out-groups in particular ways. A more inductive form of qualitative data-analysis suggests the importance of two main socializing contexts: the school and the family. In addition, the interviews suggest that students' peer groups, their participation with sports activities and youth clubs can inform their preference for particular cultural scripts in describing themselves and others.

In relationship to the school context, the data suggests the importance of and interactions between two institutional school features and two characteristics of their social networks in developing in/out group attitudes. Although both *Green Lane* and *Red Brick* school seemed to offer, on a superficial level, a context that supports the contact hypothesis and develop close relationships between TCs and GCs, TC and GC attitudes and relationships towards each other seemed more negative in *Green Lane* as compared to *Red Brick*. The perceived politicized nature of *Green Lane*'s school management and related policies and their more explicit anti-racism school policies (which were perceived by GCs as focusing exclusively on GC racism towards TC) and multicultural policies (which were perceived by GC as privileging TCs' and threatening GCs' cultural and material interests) seemed to foster GC resentment towards TCs and the school management, which can in part explain why GCs in *Green Lane* were more negative to TCs compared to their GC peers in *Red Brick*. These institutional features interacted with network characteristics, related to the higher occurrence of GC racism towards TCs and their structural separation of TCs and GCs owing to the ethnic composition of the student population and first-year enrolment procedures characteristic of *Green Lane*. In sharp contrast, TC and GC students in Red Brick reported that their perceptions of each other improved over time, which can be related to the smaller and ethnically more

heterogeneous class-groups, the absence of a politicized school board and related interpretation of school policies and the prevalence of anti-racism and pro-multicultural policies that appear less as explicitly devised to tackle GC racism and protect the interested of the (Turkish) minority group.

In addition, the data suggests the importance of the family context in Cyprus in providing cultural scripts to young people; scripts that they employ to make sense of themselves and others in terms of ethnic belonging and exclusion. The boundaries that TCs and GCs draw around their in- and out-groups, and their motivations for doing so, overlap strongly with how they present their parents' and family's attitudes towards their ethnic in- and out-groups and the explanations they use to support these views. As a result, the TC students and their more Cypriot GC peers presented their family and particularly their parents as supportive of close and positive relationships between TCs and GCs, while the opposite is true for the more Hellenic GCs.

Finally, young people's involvement with peer groups, sport activities, and their support of particular sport organizations or youth clubs that are associated with strong, political ideologies, seem to stimulate young people to develop their perceptions of their collective 'self' and meaningful 'others'. The way in which these contexts inform young people's in/out group perceptions seems to depend on the dominant ideological discourses that are made available by and reproduced through participation in these peer groups and organizations, and the extent (in case of participation in sports activities and peer groups) to which participation involves interactions with the out-group that is in line with the requirements of the contact hypothesis.

Although the analysis suggest the usefulness of Wimmer's distinction between institutional rules and regulations and network characteristics, differences in resources seem less important in explaining variability in GCs' and TCs' in- and out-group attitudes. This can perhaps be explained by the homogeneous nature of our sample in terms of social class, as both the TC and GC students from *Green Lane* and *Red Brick* all come from a more middle-class background. However, this does not mean that both groups always seemed to have access to the same resources. For instance, TC students in Green Lane were more likely to feel threatened in classrooms where they

were the only TC student. This suggests that TCs' access to resources in response to or anticipation of racism vary according to school context, something that is discussed more in detail elsewhere (Stevens et al. 2016). The final empirical chapter will test some of the key hypotheses on the relationship between ethnic pride and prejudice that emerged through the qualitative analysis in this and the previous chapters and the research literature.

6
Testing the Relationship between Ethnic Pride and Prejudice in the Context of Cyprus

In this chapter[1] we use the survey data gathered from GCs and TCs to test some of the hypotheses that emerged from our analysis of the qualitative interview data and the review of the international literature on the relationship between ethnic pride and prejudice. We defined GC students as those students who perceive themselves as either Cypriot, Greek Cypriot or Greek and who have at least one parent that speaks Greek to them. Similarly, we defined TC students as those students who define themselves as either TC or Cypriot (excluding the few students who perceived themselves as Turks) and who have at least one parent that speaks Turkish to them. As there are no respondents who speak both Greek and Turkish with their parents, the variables that measure the languages that our respondents spoke at home with each parent seems a valid boundary to distinguish GCs from TCs. The analysis is divided in two parts. First, we focus on GCs' and afterwards on TCs' attitudes to meaningful ethnic out-groups. For both GCs and TCs we try to explain variability within these two groups in terms of their perceptions to meaningful ethnic out-groups. Or, in other words, we try to explain why some GCs are more positive to ethnic out-groups as compared to other GCs and why some TCs are more positive to ethnic out-groups as compared to other TCs.

Greek Cypriots' attitudes to recent immigrant groups, Turkish Cypriots and Turks

As described in Chapter 3, our questionnaire design could not fully benefit from a rigorous analysis of the qualitative interview data,

as the quantitative part of this mixed methods study was carried out shortly after the first qualitative research phase. However, the survey data allows us to test various hypotheses that emerged from our analysis of the qualitative interview data and the international literature on ethnic pride and prejudice. In addition, we are able to test these hypotheses in relationship to ethnic out-groups that are meaningful to the GCs included in this study: Africans, Asians and Eastern Europeans (as recent immigrant groups) and Turks and Turkish Cypriots (as meaningful ethnic out-groups with whom GCs have a longer, historical relationship of conflict). First, in line with our qualitative data-analysis we expect GCs who define themselves as 'Greek' (or more Hellenic GCs) to be more prejudiced to ethnic out-groups as compared to GCs who define themselves as belonging to a more inclusive 'Cypriot' identity and (to a lesser extent) as compared to GCs who define themselves as 'Greek Cypriot'.

Hypothesis GC1a: GCs who perceive themselves as 'Greek Cypriot' and especially 'Greek' will be more negative to all ethnic out-groups as compared to GCs who define themselves as 'Cypriot' (*Hellenism hypothesis 1*).

At the same time, the interview data and literature suggest that more Hellenic GCs are particularly negative to Turks and TCs, groups they often perceived as similar, as more Hellenic GCs develop an ethnic in-group identity in opposition to a racialized, nationalistic Turkish identity (Law 2014):

Hypothesis GC1b: The negative relationship between a more Hellenic (i.e. Greek) identity and perceptions of ethnic and racial minorities will be stronger in relation to Turkish and Turkish Cypriot out-groups as compared to attitudes to more recent immigrant groups (Africans, Asians and Eastern Europeans) (*Historical conflict hypothesis*).

In addition, the qualitative data also suggests that more Hellenic GCs find their ethnic identity more important in describing themselves, are more nationalistic (or perceive their culture as different

and superior to cultures of other ethnic groups) and also feel more threatened by various ethnic out-groups. This is further supported by research that suggests that a more Hellenic identity as it develop in Greece (and seems to have influenced GCs' ethnic identities) is inherently built around notions of cultural and biological superiority (Law 2014):

Hypothesis GC1c: The negative relationship between GCs' attachment to a more Hellenic ('Greek') identity and their perceptions of ethnic/racial minorities can be (partially) explained by the mediating effect of nationalistic ideology, centrality and the perceived threat of relevant ethnic and racial out-groups (*Hellenics as nationalistic and threatened hypothesis*).

Furthermore, in line with the existing socio-psychological literature on ethnic pride and prejudice, we expect that key features of GCs' ethnic identities, related to their nationalism and patriotism (Jeong 2013; Wagner et al. 2012) and centrality (Pehrson, Brown and Zagefka 2009) relate to their perceptions of all meaningful ethnic out-groups:

Hypothesis GC2: More nationalistic GCs will have more negative attitudes to all ethnic out-groups (*Racialized nationalism hypothesis*).

Hypothesis GC3: The centrality of GCs' ethnic identity is negatively related to their perceptions of all ethnic or racial minority groups (*Centrality hypothesis*).

Hypothesis GC4: GCs who perceive their own ethnic group in a more positive way will be more positive to all ethnic or racial out-groups (*Patriotism or positive in-group regard hypothesis*).

Furthermore, the qualitative interviews suggested that the loss of property and related forced displacement after the Turkish invasion of the Northern part of Cyprus is often mentioned by GCs as a reason why they and/or their parents do not like Turks and TCs. These findings confirm the meaningfulness of a 'refugee' identity among

Cypriots (Zetter 1994, 1999), and we can therefore expect that the salience of a this 'refugee' identity with GCs relates negatively with their perceptions of Turks and TCs, but not to other (more recent) ethnic out-groups.

Hypothesis GC5: GCs' perception of themselves as refugees will relate negatively with their perceptions of Turks and Turkish Cypriots but not with their perceptions of other ethnic out-groups (*Refugee hypothesis*).

In addition, based on the contact hypothesis (Pettigrew 1998) and the mere exposure hypothesis (Bornstein 1989), we expect GCs to be more positive to all ethnic out-groups when they claim that their friendship groups include relatively more members of ethnic out-groups:

Hypothesis GC6: More ethnically mixed friendship groups relate to more positive attitudes to ethnic out-groups (*Contact hypothesis / mere exposure hypothesis*).

Finally, as students who were interviewed together seemed to have very strong overlapping views about ethnic out-groups, we expect a strong relationship between GCs' attitudes to ethnic out-groups and their friends' attitudes to these groups:

Hypothesis GC7: GCs who report that their friends are more positive to ethnic out-groups will have more positive attitudes to these particular ethnic out-groups (*Peer group reinforcement hypothesis*).

Variables

Dependent variables

Students were asked (see Appendix 4) to answer the question: 'In GENERAL how positive or negative do you see the following groups that live in Cyprus?' for each of the following groups separately: 'Asians (Chinese, Vietnamese, Philippines etc.)', 'Black Africans', 'Eastern Europeans (Bulgarian, Romanian etc.)', 'Turkish Cypriots' and

'Turks'. A five-point answer scale, ranging from 'positive' to 'negative' was recoded into a dummy variable with 0 = negative and 1 = neutral or positive in relation to students' perceptions of Turkish Cypriots and Turks and with 0 = negative or neutral and 1 = positive in relation to students' perceptions of the other racial/minority ethnic groups (in order to obtain more equal proportions of cases in both categories).

Independent variables

The main characteristics of students' national/ethnic identity construction included in the analyses are: (1) Hellenic ideology of national/ethnic identity, (2) centrality of identity, (3) in-group regard (*patriotism*), (4) cultural essentialist ideology (*nationalism*) and (5) perceived status as refugee. Students' national/ethnic identity content was measured by asking students: 'In which of the following groups do you feel you belong the most?', with students being able to choose between 'Greek Cypriots', 'Greeks', 'Turkish Cypriots', 'Turkish' and 'Other (please specify)'. As a considerable number of students self-identified with 'Cypriot' (through selecting and specifying the 'Other' category) we were able to recode this variable for analysis purposes to 0 = Cypriot, 1 = Greek Cypriot and 2 = Greek (with higher values indicating a more Hellenic-orientated national/ethnic group identification).

Afterwards, students were given the following instructions and questions: 'From now on the group you feel you belong to will be called «MY GROUP». For every sentence circle the answer to which you agree with'; answers were given on a five-point scale ranging from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree'. The questions that followed were taken from Sellers' and Shelton's (2003) 'Multidimensional Inventory of Black Identity' scale (MIBI scale), with items related to the identity's centrality (i.e. 'Overall, being a member of my group has very little to do with how I feel about myself', $\alpha=.72$), private (in-group) regard (i.e. 'I feel good about people from my group', $\alpha=.83$) and nationalism (i.e. 'It is important for people of my group to surround their children with art, music and literature of my group', $\alpha=.75$). Total scale scores were computed for these four continuous variables. The final in-group identification variable included in the analyses is refugee status, which was measured with the question: 'Are you a refugee?' (0=NO and 1=YES).

We consider the MIBI scale to be a very good alternative for the scales used in the quantitative literature cited above as it contains

dimensions that measure key concepts in this research field, has been thoroughly tested and validated, and allows us to focus not just on national groups but also on groups that are considered as both nationalized and ethnicized. Finally, we believe that two sub-scales in particular offer additional theoretical advantages over the scales currently used in quantitative studies. First, the nationalism dimension in Sellers' and Shelton's MIBI scale measures 'the extent to which respondents emphasize the uniqueness of being African American' (Sellers and Shelton 2003: 1083). While this sub-scale and the nationalism sub-scale used by Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) both measure belief that (1) the national/ethnic in-group is essentially (culturally) different from other racial/ethnic groups, (2) that these differences are legitimate boundaries for out-group exclusion and (3) that these differences should be maintained and/or protected, the key difference between these two measures is that the notion of cultural superiority is less explicit in the MIBI scale. However, considering the changing nature of racism, and particularly the observation that racism is expressed today in more subtle ways with strong, public condemnation of overt forms of racism, including overt expressions of in-group superiority (Quillian 2006), it is theoretically relevant to include a measure of cultural, essentialist nationalism that makes the idea of cultural superiority less pronounced.

Second, Sellers' and Shelton's private regard sub-scale is designed to measure 'their affective and evaluative judgments of their racial group (or) the extent to which respondents have positive feelings toward African Americans in general' (Sellers and Shelton 2003: 1080, 1083) and as a result overlaps well with how patriotism or in-group regard (as an affective component of national pride) is conceptualized by researchers in this field (e.g. see Kosterman and Feshbach above). However, the private regard scale appears much more focused in terms of what it measures (that is: love for and attachment to the national/ethnic in-group), with for instance no items related to respondents' attachment to democratic values, which should allow for a more valid test of the relationship between these two concepts (see also Bar-Tal 1997; Cohrs et al. 2004; Wagner et al. 2012).

A self-developed measure of perceived group threat was composed ($\alpha \geq .93$) as this measures an important social-psychological determinant of prejudice (Brown 1995). Respondents were asked: 'I think

that X …' (1) Impose their culture on my group, (2) Take jobs away from my group, (3) Take unfair advantage of unemployment benefits given by my group, (4) Harm my group physically or psychologically, (5) Want to take property or land from my group; where X referred to (1) Turkish Cypriots, (2) Turks, and (3) Other immigrants in Cyprus (hence, three questions with five items each). The question related to 'Other immigrants in Cyprus' was employed in the analyses that investigate students' attitudes to Asian, African and Eastern European immigrants. Total scale scores were computed for these three variables to create a measure of perceived threat from Turkish Cypriots, Turks and other immigrants in Cyprus.

A dummy or three-value ordinal variable was included to measure the perceived attitudes of respondents' friends to the various ethnic out-groups included in this analysis: African, Asians, Eastern Europeans, Turks and Turkish Cypriots. The decision to use either a dummy or three-value ordinal variable was informed by the distribution of responses over the various values of the original variable, which contained five values, ranging from 'positive' to 'negative'. Finally, students' ethnic composition of their friendship networks was measured with the question 'Think of all the friends that you have in Cyprus, how many of your friends have the same ethnicity/race as you?', which contained five answer categories ranging from (1) 'None' to (5) 'All of them'. This variable was subsequently recoded into a three-value ordinal variable based on the distribution of responses over the various values of the original variable. Unfortunately, this is a single variable used in all models as we did not measure students' composition of friendship groups in relationship to different ethnic out-groups.

The control variables included in the first step of the data-analysis include gender (0=male and 1=female), age of students (0=12–13 years old, 1=14–15 and 2=16–18) and father's highest diploma (0=lower than university and 1=university).

Methods of analysis

Binary, sequential logistic regression analysis is employed as this study assesses linear relationships between sets of continuous and categorical independent variables with one single binary dependent variable (0=does not like minority group and 1=likes or is neutral to minority group, see Appendix 4). Logistic regression estimates

the probabilities (or more correctly the odds ratios) associated with each binary option and how these probabilities vary owing to differences in the predictor variables (see Klienbaun and Klein 2002).The statistical model consists of three steps. A **first step** only includes the descriptive ethnic identity variable (I feel: 'Cypriot', 'Greek Cypriot' or 'Greek'), and three control variables (age, gender and parental education). In a **second step**, four other characteristics of GCs' ethnic identities are included in the equation: (1) the centrality of their ethnic identity, (2) their in-group regard or patriotism, (3) their level of nationalism or the extent to which their ethnic identity is based on a culturally essentialist ideology, and (4) GCs' perceptions of themselves as refugees. In a **third step**, we included (1) a measure of GCs' perceived threat from the particular ethnic out-group on which the model focuses, (2) the ethnic composition of their friendship groups, and (3) the extent to which their friends perceive particular ethnic out-groups in a positive or negative way. Distinguishing between these three steps allows us to test how various characteristics of ethnic identities and key social-psychological processes interact in influencing GCs' perceptions of meaningful ethnic out-groups in the context of Cyprus. These three steps were analysed separately for GCs' perceptions of (1) Asians (2) Africans, (3) Eastern Europeans, (4) Turks and (5) Turkish Cypriots.

Results for GCs

In a **first step** we included only our descriptive ethnic identity variable to test if GCs' perceptions of themselves as 'Cypriot', 'Greek Cypriot' or 'Greek' impacts on their perceptions of meaningful ethnic out-groups (Africans, Asians, Eastern Europeans, Turks and Turkish Cypriots), controlling for age, gender and parental education (see Appendix 5).

The analysis shows that more Hellenic GCs, or those defining themselves as 'Greek', have more negative attitudes to all ethnic out-groups, a relationship that only fails to be significant in relation to their attitudes to Africans. Furthermore, this relationship is stronger for GCs' attitudes to Turks and Turkish Cypriots. Although there does not seem to be a difference between GCs who define themselves as 'Cypriot' or 'Greek Cypriot' in terms of their attitudes to recent immigrant groups in Cyprus, those GCs who see themselves as 'Cypriot' have more positive views of Turks and TCs than GCs who define

themselves as 'Greek Cypriot'. Finally, the models explain better the variability in attitudes of GCs towards Turkish Cypriots, as compared to their attitudes to the other meaningful ethnic out-groups. In a **second step** of the analysis we added four additional characteristics of GCs' ethnic identity: the extent to which their ethnic identity is important to them (centrality), their levels of in-group regard (patriotism) and nationalism, and whether they perceive themselves as refugees or not (see Appendix 6).

The analysis shows that GCs who attach more importance to their ethnic identity (centrality) and perceive their in-group as cultural different and superior to ethnic out-groups (nationalism) perceive all ethnic out-groups in a more negative way, a relationship that appears to be slightly stronger for their attitudes to Turks and Turkish Cypriots. Furthermore, GCs who are proud of their ethnic in-group (in-group regard or patriotism) show more positive attitudes to all the more recent ethnic out-groups in Cyprus (Africans, Asians and Eastern Europeans) but not to Turks and Turkish Cypriots. Finally, GCs that perceive themselves as refugees have more negative attitudes to Turks and Turkish Cypriots, but not to the other ethnic out-groups. Apart from these direct effects of these additional ethnic identity characteristics on prejudice, they also seem to mediate some of the influence of the descriptive identity variable on prejudice.

More specifically, after controlling for these four additional identity characteristics, the effect of perceiving oneself as 'Greek' opposed to 'Cypriot' disappears for all the ethnic out-groups, except for GCs' attitudes to Turks and Turkish Cypriots. In addition, after controlling for these four additional identity characteristics, the differences between 'Cypriot' and 'Greek Cypriot' GCs' attitudes to Turks and Turkish Cypriots disappears. In general, adding these additional identity characteristics improves the predictive strength of our model substantially, particularly for explaining GCs' attitudes to Turks and Turkish Cypriots.

In a final, **third step**, we added three additional characteristics to our model: GCs' perceived threat of a particular ethnic out-group (i.e. their perceived threat of 'Turks', 'Turkish Cypriots' and 'recent immigrants', the latter being specified in the survey to include Asians, Africans and Eastern Europeans together), the ethnic composition of their friendship group and the (perceived) attitudes of their friends to the particular ethnic out-groups (measured separately for each ethnic out-group) included in these models (see Appendix 7).

In terms of direct effects, the analyses show that perceived threat of ethnic out-groups has a strong negative impact and the attitudes of GCs' friends a strong positive impact on GCs' attitudes to all ethnic out-groups. In contrast, the ethnic composition of GCs' friendship networks do not seem to relate to their attitudes to ethnic out-groups. In terms of the mediating effects of these additional socio-psychological characteristics, the data shows that the relationship between GCs' refugee status and prejudice, and the relationship between the centrality of their identity and prejudice hardly changes after including these additional variables. However, it seems that the relationship between GCs' nationalism and prejudice can in part be explained by the threat variables and the attitudes of GCs friends, as the effects of nationalism on prejudice become smaller and only borderline insignificant for their attitudes to Turks and Turkish Cypriots. The relationship between in-group regard (patriotism) and prejudice becomes slightly weaker for the more recent ethnic out-groups and Turks but slightly stronger (suppressor effect) for GCs' attitudes to TCs. Similarly, while the distinction between 'Greek' GCs and 'Cypriot GCs' reduces even further for more recent ethnic out-groups and Turks, 'Greeks' and (to a lesser extent) 'Greek Cypriots' are even more negative of Turkish Cypriots, controlling for all other characteristics.

Discussion of GCs' attitudes

The analysis confirms the *Hellenism hypothesis* as GCs who define themselves as 'Greeks' are more negative to all out-groups compared to GCs who define themselves as 'Cypriots'. At the same time, and in line with our *Hellenics as nationalistic and threatened hypothesis*, this relationship can be mainly explained by the mediating effects of other social-psychological mechanisms, as 'Greek' GCs also seem more nationalistic, put more emphasis on their ethnic identity, claim to have more friends with negative attitudes and feel more threatened by ethnic out-groups as compared to 'Cypriot' GCs; all are additional characteristics that increase prejudice. Finally, as expected (*Historical conflict hypothesis*), our models with these ethnic identity characteristics are better in explaining GCs' attitudes to ethnic groups with whom they have a longer and more intense historical relationship of conflict (Turks and Turkish Cypriots) as compared to their attitudes to more recent, meaningful immigrant groups (Africans, Asians and

Eastern Europeans). This can be explained by the observation that a 'Greek' national identity is inherently racist (or built around the idea of cultural and biological superiority) and developed strongly in opposition to a racialized, nationalistic Turkish identity (Law 2014).

The data also supports our hypotheses in relationship the other characteristics of GCs' ethnic identity, as nationalism and centrality of ethnic identity lead to negative ethnic out-group perceptions (*Racialized nationalism* and *Centrality hypothesis*), while in-group regard or patriotism leads to more positive ethnic out-group perceptions (*Patriotism or positive in-group regard hypothesis*). However, at the same time these relationships become generally weaker and less significant when we control for perceived threat of particular ethnic out-groups and the out-group perception of friends, which underlines the importance of considering both deeper socio-psychological characteristics (i.e. threat) and more sociological context measures (i.e. attitudes of friends) in understanding the relationship between ethnic pride and prejudice. In addition, as predicted, GCs who perceive themselves as refugees are more negative to Turks and Turkish Cypriots only, and not to other, more recent ethnic out-groups in Cyprus.

More generally, these analyses underline the importance of conducting analyses on different ethnic out-groups that are meaningful but have a different sociological and historical relationship with the ethnic in-groups. In addition, they illustrate the importance of considering different, general and context-specific characteristics of ethnic in-group identities in studying the relationship between ethnic pride and prejudice. Finally, they underline the importance of the realistic/symbolic conflict theory and agents of socialization (here peers) in explaining young people's attitudes to ethnic out-groups.

Turkish Cypriots' attitudes to Turks, Greeks and Greek Cypriots

Our survey data is, however, less appropriate to test hypotheses in relationship to the observed variability in TCs' attitudes to various out-groups. First, our sample of TCs (N=138) is small as compared to our sample of GCs (N=1275), which makes it less likely to find statistically significant relationships. Second, as shown in our descriptive analysis in Chapter 4, our sample of TCs is much more homogeneous in terms of how they perceive themselves in ethnic terms as compared to GCs. While GCs defined themselves primarily as 'Greek', 'GC' or 'Cypriot', most of the TCs preferred the categories 'Cypriots'

and 'Turkish Cypriot' but not 'Turkish'. In addition, none of the TCs identifies with the category of refugees. Furthermore, TCs are also more homogeneous in terms of their feelings of in-group regard and the centrality of their ethnic identity. Finally, the out-groups that are meaningful to the TCs in our sample do not always overlap with the ethnic groups that we included in our survey. While we included the groups of 'Turks' and 'Greek Cypriots', the more recent (Eastern European, Asian and African) immigrant groups do not seem to be very meaningful to our TCs, and meaningful groups like 'Kurds', 'Jews' and 'Greeks' are not or only partially included in our survey.

Despite these limitations, we should be able to test the following four hypotheses that emerged out of the literature and/or our more inductive analysis of qualitative interview data with TCs: first, as TCs seem to experience both threat from Turks and (more Hellenic) GCs, we can expect, following the realistic and symbolic conflict theory (Esses et al. 2005), that such experiences of threat will relate to more negative views of both groups. As we only have data on TCs' experiences of threat in relationship with Turks and GCs we can test the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis TC1: TCs' experiences of threat from Turks and GCs relates negatively with their perceptions of these groups (*Threat hypothesis*).

Second, as the TCs in our sample are more connected to a more inclusive ('Cypriot') identity as compared to GCs, and because our sample of TCs is smaller and shows less variability in terms of their ethnic identity characteristics, we do not expect that their levels of nationalism, in-group regard and centrality of their ethnic identity relate (strongly) with their perceptions of meaningful ethnic out-groups (in this case Turks, Greeks and Greek Cypriots).

Hypothesis TC2: Nationalism, in-group regard and centrality of TCs' ethnic identity do not relate to TCs' attitudes to Turks, Greeks and Greek Cypriots (*Low relevance ethnic identity context hypothesis*).

Third, following the contact hypothesis (Pettigrew 1998), or the mere exposure hypothesis (Bornstein 1989), we expect TCs to be

more positive to Turks, GCs and Greeks if TCs' friendship groups include relatively more members of ethnic out-groups:

Hypothesis TC3:   More ethnically mixed friendship groups relate to more positive attitudes to ethnic out-groups (Greeks, Turks and GCs) (*Contact hypothesis / mere exposure hypothesis*).

Finally, given the overlap between the perceptions of ethnic out-groups between students interviewed together (which almost always involved students who gave the impression of trusting each other and/or defining each other as friends), we expect a strong relationship between TCs' attitudes to Greek, Turkish and Greek Cypriot out-groups and their friends' attitudes to these groups.

Hypothesis TC4:   TCs who report that their friends are more positive to ethnic out-groups (Greeks, Turks and GCs) will have more positive attitudes to these particular ethnic-out-groups (*Peer group reinforcement hypothesis*).

Variables

Dependent variables

Students were asked to answer the question: 'In GENERAL how positive or negative do you see the following groups that live in Cyprus?' for each of the following three groups separately: 'Turks', 'Greek Cypriots' and 'Greeks'. A five-point answer scale, ranging from 'positive' to 'negative' was recoded into a dummy variable with 0 = negative or neutral and 1 = positive in relation to students' perceptions of these three ethnic out-groups (see Appendix 8).

Independent variables

The main characteristics of students' national/ethnic identity construction included in the analyses are: (1) centrality of identity, (2) in-group regard (*patriotism*) and (3) cultural essentialist ideology (*nationalism*); these variables were measured in the same way as with GC students (see above). The same measure of ethnic group threat was

used as in the analysis above with GCs, but now only in relationship to 'Turks' and 'Greek Cypriots' (see Appendix 8).

A dummy variable was included to measure the perceived attitudes of respondents' friends to the various ethnic out-groups included in this analysis: Turks, Greek Cypriots and Greeks. The value of the particular dummy variables was informed by the distribution of responses over the various values of the original variable, which contained five values, ranging from 'positive' to 'negative'. Students' ethnic composition of their friendship networks was measured in the same way as with GC students, with the question 'Think of all the friends that you have in Cyprus, how many of your friends have the same ethnicity/race as you?', which contained five answer categories ranging from (1) 'None' to (5) 'All of them'. This variable was subsequently recoded into a dummy variable based on the distribution of responses over the various values of the original variable. Unfortunately, as with the analysis with GC students, this is a single variable used in all models as we did not measure students' composition of friendship groups in relationship to different ethnic out-groups. The control variables included in the first step of the data-analysis include gender (0=male and 1=female) and age of students (0=12–13 years old, 1=14–15 and 2=16–18, see Appendix 8).

Methods of analysis for TCs

As with the analysis above involving GC students, binary logistic regression analysis is used because we are interested in testing linear relationships between a set of continuous and categorical independent variables with one single binary dependent variable (0=does not like Turks, Greeks or Greek Cypriots and 1=likes or is neutral to these ethnic groups, see Appendix 8). Logistic regression estimates the odds ratios associated with each binary option and how these probabilities vary owing to differences in the predictor variables (see Klienbaun and Klein 2002). In contrast to the analysis with GC students above, the statistical models in relationship to TCs only consist of two steps. In a first step, all variables related to the key characteristics of TCs' ethnic identity (centrality, nationalism and in-group regard) are included in the analysis, together with the control variables gender and age of TC students (parental education is left out because of the very low variance in this variable in the sample of TCs). In a second step, we added variables related to perceived threat of a specific ethnic out-group,

the ethnic composition of their friendship groups and the attitudes of their friends to particular ethnic out-groups. The analysis is then conducted separately for their perceptions of the following three out-groups: (1) Turks, (2) Greek Cypriots and (3) Greeks.

Results for TCs

In a **first step** of the analysis we test the relationship between TCs' ethnic pride (nationalism and in-group regard) and the centrality of their ethnic identity and their perceptions of Turks (see Appendix 9), Greek Cypriots (see Appendix 10) and Greeks (see Appendix 11), controlling for TCs' gender and age.

The results show no relationship between TCs' in-group regard and the centrality of their ethnic identity and their perceptions of Turks, Greeks or Greek Cypriots, controlling for gender and age. Furthermore, while TCs' nationalism does not relate to their attitudes of Turks, it relates negatively with their attitudes to GCs and Greeks, the former being borderline insignificant. In general, the models tested in the first step explain better the variability in attitudes towards Greeks and particularly towards GCs but appear less appropriate for explaining TCs' attitudes to Turks. In a **second step** (see Appendices 9, 10 and 11), we include TCs' perceived threat of Turks or GCs (but not of Greeks), the extent to which their friendship group is ethnically mixed and the perceived attitudes of their friends towards Turks, Greek Cypriots and Greeks.

The analyses show that perceived threat of Turks and Greek Cypriots relates negatively with TCs' attitudes of these groups. In addition, while the proportion of ethnic out-group members does not relate to their attitudes to Turks, Greek Cypriots and Greeks, TCs will be more negative towards these groups when they report that their friends perceive these groups in a negative way. Finally, the effect of nationalism on TCs' attitudes to GCs and Greeks is reduced and becomes insignificant when we include TCs' perceived threat and the attitudes of their friends to the analysis. As with the analyses in step 1, the models seem much more appropriate in explaining variability in TCs attitudes to GCs and Greeks as compared to their attitudes of Turks.

Discussion of TCs' attitudes

Owing to limitations in our sample, we could only test a few hypotheses in relationship to TCs' attitudes to various out-groups. First,

the analysis confirms the *Threat hypothesis* in that TCs will look less favourably to Turks and GCs when they feel more threatened by these groups, controlling for all other characteristics in our models. The strength and persistence of these relationships again underline the validity of the realistic/symbolic group conflict theory in explaining prejudice. Second, the findings also support the *Low relevance ethnic pride context hypothesis*: while TCs' in-group regard and the centrality of their ethnic identity do not relate to their perceptions of Turks, GCs and Greeks, their level of nationalism does, albeit only in relationship to GCs and Greeks. However, the latter relationships become smaller and insignificant once we control for their perceived threat and the perceptions of their friends, which suggests that more nationalistic TCs' negative perceptions of GCs and Greeks can be explained by their perceived threat of these groups (in relationship to GCs) and the influence of their social (peer) environment.

More generally, these findings suggest that the importance of characteristics of ethnic identities, related to their pride and centrality, can vary from context to context and the particular groups that are included. As the sample of TCs is smaller and much more homogeneous as compared to the GCs in terms of how they perceive themselves in ethnic and national terms, it is not surprising that these characteristics explain less variance in TCs' attitudes to ethnic out-groups as compared to GCs' attitudes.

Third, again we cannot find any evidence in support of the *Contact hypothesis / mere exposure hypothesis*, as ethnically more diverse friendship networks do not seem to impact on TCs' attitudes to Turks, GCs and Greeks. As with the analyses with GC students, this might be explained by the way in which we measured this characteristic, as it does not differentiate between friends of particular groups.

Finally, and also in line with the analyses with GC students, we find strong support for the *Peer group reinforcement hypothesis*, with TCs reporting much more negative attitudes to Turks, GCs and Greeks when they claim that their friends have negative perceptions of these groups. Although this finding does not allow us to make any claims about the validity of either peer-group socialization processes and/or peer-group selection effects, they suggest at least the importance of peer groups in legitimizing or strengthening young people's attitudes to ethnic out-groups.

7
Conclusions and Discussion: National Pride and Prejudice?

The main aim of this book has been to explore how national pride relates to ethnic prejudice. Building on existing qualitative and quantitative research in this area, and particularly on a rich body of qualitative research conducted on this topic in Cyprus, this study began from the following four premises:

- First, research that focuses on national pride and prejudice should broaden the focus to consider the variety in national but also other, overlapping (religious, cultural …) identifications made by actors; these identifications vary between contexts and need to be meaningful to the actors involved.
- Second, research in this area should consider the variety in ethnic out-groups that are meaningful to particular actors within a particular national context, as the relationship between national pride and prejudice can vary according to the perceived characteristics of these ethnic out-groups; this in turn depends on the specific historical relationships between these groups within a particular context.
- Third, research on ethnic pride and prejudice needs to take account of the underlying social-psychological mechanisms, and related theories of prejudice, that might mediate this relationship.
- Finally, research needs to investigate how institutional rules and regulations, characteristics of social networks and inequalities in resources, or, in other words, specific features of the broader social structure, stimulate actors to choose particular cultural scripts in describing national in- and out-groups in a particular way.

In so doing, this study complements more recent approaches to the study of racism that seek to establish links, commonalities and overlap between the manifestations of racism(s) in different national contexts (Goldberg 2009; Law 2012, 2014). For instance, while a recent study convincingly shows how Greek Cypriot racism overlaps with and heavily borrows from Greek racialized nationalism (Law 2014), it obscures the variability in terms of national identifications within the category of 'Greek Cypriots' and does not consider the variability in perceptions towards different ethnic out-groups that are meaningful in the context of Cyprus. Furthermore, it does not explain how differences in prejudice between and within the groups of GCs and TCs in the context of Cyprus can be explained by underlying structural characteristics and socio-psychological mechanisms. Knowledge of the context-specific development of the relationship between national pride and prejudice and racism more generally is crucial as it offers more specific information in terms of the underlying causes and hence potential areas for policy intervention. In this way, this book complements recent efforts to explore and highlight commonalities between racisms as they develop across the globe and in different periods of time.

Following these premises, this book focuses on the following three related research questions:

- How do young GCs and TCs draw ethnic (cultural, religious, racial) boundaries around themselves and others, and in so doing make ethnic classifications of in- and out-groups that are meaningful to them in the context of Cyprus?
- How do different socializing institutions, inequalities in resources and characteristics of network structures, and related socio-psychological theories of prejudice, develop ethnic pride and prejudice among Greek and Turkish Cypriot youngsters?
- How do particular choices in relationship to available, meaningful ethnic and national identities influence GCs' and TCs' attitudes to various, meaningful ethnic out-groups, controlling for the influence of underlying social-psychological and sociological theories of prejudice?

These research questions require a particular methodology, one that first identifies more inductively, through qualitative research,

how GCs and TCs draw ethnic (national, religious, racial, cultural) boundaries around themselves and meaningful out-groups, and how these boundaries relate to particular underlying social-psychological processes and structural features. Afterwards, the relationship between ethnic pride and prejudice can be tested more deductively through quantitative data-analysis, which relies on larger samples and particular concepts and measurement instruments that emerged out of the qualitative data-analysis as more valid within the national context under study. The particular national context on which this study focuses is that of Cyprus. As processes of nation-building (and the related construction of national identities) and ethnic out-group positioning seem to go hand in hand in this particular context, owing to historical and more contemporary political and demographic processes (Charalambous 2010; Law 2014; Vryonides 2012), Cyprus constitutes an 'extreme case' (Flick 2002) in which we can reasonably expect to observe and gain a better understanding of the social phenomena in which we are interested.

A **first empirical chapter** explored how GCs and TCs develop ethnic stereotypes or boundary markers to distinguish their own ethnic in-group from ethnic out-groups, and the socio-psychological motivations for doing so. The analysis suggests at least two meaningful, opposite ethnic in-groups in the context of this study: 'Cypriots' and 'Greeks' (see also Spyrou 2001). The former includes the sub-categories of 'Greek Cypriots' and 'Turkish Cypriots' and as a result allows for more variability in terms of sub-forms of ethnic identification and shared boundary markers. In contrast, the Greek identity draws its content from a Hellenic Greek (racialized national) identity and emphasizes cultural homogeneousness and superiority. While the population of TCs in our sample perceive themselves almost collectively as 'Cypriot', the GCs in our sample were divided in terms of their ethnic, national identity between the two extremes of 'Cypriot' and 'Greek'. In terms of meaningful out-groups, TCs identified Turks, Kurds, Greeks, Orthodox and Jews as the main ethnic out-groups to which they did not want to belong. The first two were perceived in particularly negative terms, as: uncivilized, criminal, feeling superior, aggressive, uneducated and more religious. 'Greeks' were seen in a negative way because they did not like TCs, and were labelled as nationalistic, racist, fascist and very religious. While more Cypriot GCs did not have strong stereotypes towards ethnic out-groups, they

tended to identify Turks, Greeks and very religious people as groups to which they did not want to belong. More Hellenic GCs were much more negative of Turks, which they perceived as synonymous with TCs and Muslims and to which they attached similar, reinforcing stereotypes: violent, aggressive, dominant and intolerant. In addition, more Hellenic GCs were also negative to more recent immigrant groups in Cyprus, such as Eastern Europeans, Asians and Africans, which they accused of taking advantage of their economic system and as a threat to their culture. The latter also illustrates the most important socio-psychological motivation for ethnic stereotypes, as almost all respondents with strong, negative stereotypical views also appeared to feel threatened by these groups in terms of culture, economic resources and/or physical wellbeing.

A **second empirical chapter** investigated how characteristics of the social structure can explain why our students interviewed opted for particular cultural scripts in drawing ethnic in- and out-group boundaries. The analysis suggests the importance of two institutions in shaping GC and TC students' attitudes: the school and the family. Institutional school features and characteristics of social networks appeared important in explaining why attitudes between GCs and TCs appeared more polarized in *Green Lane* school as compared to *Red Brick*, despite the observation that both schools offer a relatively unique social context in which both groups can interact with each other on a daily basis. Although it seems that the opportunity to interact with each other lead to more positive attitudes between GCs and TCs over time in *Red Brick*, *Green Lane*'s school policies in relationship to anti-racism and multiculturalism, the ethnic composition of the student population, the school's decision to separate TCs from GCs in the first year and the higher frequency of discrimination of TCs in *Green Lane*, all interacted with each other to develop a climate in which TCs and GCs felt threatened by each other, and hence developed more negative, polarized views of each other. More generally, these findings suggest that classroom contexts that are small in terms of size and heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity, and school policies that are decoupled of party political processes and that do not give particular ethnic groups the feeling that they are targeted unfairly, all contribute to the development of more positive ethnic out-group attitudes. Apart from the school context, the data also suggests that young people rely heavily on their family, and particularly (but

not only) their parents in drawing ethnic boundaries between their ethnic in-group and meaningful ethnic out-groups. Overlapping with the perceptions of the young people interviewed, we found very little variability between the population of TCs, who all presented their parents as being positive towards GCs and ethnic minority groups (except for the groups they themselves do not want to belong to, like Turks and Kurds). Similarly, more Cypriot GCs presented their parents as more positive to ethnic out-groups and more Hellenic GCs as more negative to ethnic out-groups. Finally, the analysis also suggests a strong overlap between young people's attitudes and those of their friends, and indicates that participation with sports activities and youth clubs can stimulate young people to draw from particular discourses in discussing relevant ethnic in- and out-groups.

A **final empirical chapter** tests specific hypotheses regarding the relationship between GCs' and TCs' ethnic identities and ethnic prejudice, controlling for underlying social-psychological and sociological theories for prejudice; these hypotheses emerged out of the qualitative data-analysis and a review of the literature. Given the limitations in our mixed methods research design (see Chapters 3 and 6), we were only able to test a few hypotheses in relationship to our sample of GCs and particularly our TCs. However, the analyses suggest the importance of the realistic group threat theory and students' peer groups in explaining prejudice more generally, and the relationship between national pride and prejudice in particular. Furthermore, the analysis seems to confirm the more homogeneous nature of our group of TC students in how they define themselves and others in terms of ethnicity, and hence the lack of meaningfulness of ethnic identity characteristics in explaining prejudice for this particular group. In relationship to GCs, our analysis confirms that more Hellenic GCs are more negative to almost all ethnic minority out-groups, but that this relationship is stronger for prejudice to Turks and TCs, and can in part be explained by the observation that more Hellenic GCs are also more nationalistic, attach more importance to their ethnic identity and also feel more threatened by ethnic out-groups. While nationalism and centrality relate to more prejudice, patriotism reduces prejudice, but this relationship can in part be explained by the perceived threat of ethnic out-groups and the attitudes of students' peer groups. Furthermore, GCs who perceive themselves as refugees are more negative to Turks and TCs, but

not to more recent immigrant groups in Cyprus, controlling for all other factors included in the models. The ability of these models to explain variability in prejudice between GC students is stronger in relationship to their attitudes to TCs and Turks, which suggests the importance of considering different, meaningful ethnic out-groups in studying the relationship between ethnic pride and prejudice.

Taken together, this study confirms the importance of considering not just national identifications in studying the relationships between ethnic pride and prejudice, but more generally, ethnic classifications, as feelings of national, cultural, religious and racial belonging often overlap and develop particular, meaningful configurations in specific national contexts and relate to prejudice in various ways. This explains the question mark in the subtitle of the book, as this work hopes to show that future research should consider the variability in what constitute meaningful 'national' identifications in studying the relationship between national pride and prejudice. In addition, the question mark in the subtitle also refers to the alleged relationship between these two concepts, as this relationship seems complex, and not just because of the different forms of national pride that can be distinguished, but also because of the social-psychological and sociological processes and factors that mediate this relationship and the variety of meaningful, ethnic out-groups that can be distinguished in a given national context.

In addition, this study reiterates the important role of the state in developing particular cultural scripts that young people can use to make sense of their ethnic in-group and ethnic out-groups. Previous research in Cyprus has shown how state-sponsored schools, through interactions between teachers and students (Spyrou 2002), the use of particular textbooks (Papadakis 2008), the circulation of policy documents (Theodorou 2014) and the organization of school ceremonies (Zembylas 2013b), often stimulate young GCs to adopt a more Hellenic, collective ethnic, national identity, which is built on notions of cultural and biological similarity and closeness to the mother country of Greece, and differentiated from other ethnic out-groups, particularly Eastern ethnic groups, that are defined as less civilized and a threat to the existence and purity of the Hellenic culture.

This study builds on these findings by further highlighting the role of schools, and identifying other factors that can explain variability between schools in how they inform ethnic prejudice between their

students, such as the ethnic composition of schools, the nature of school anti-racism and pro-multiculturalism policies and the extent to which they are perceived as politicized by the students in school. Hence, although families seem to play a crucial role in developing young people's views about their ethnic self and the ethnic others, schools can make a difference, and the difference they seem to make in the context of Cyprus is, based on the existing evidence, not supportive of more positive relationships between GCs and TCs.

There are obvious limitations to this study, which need to be considered in interpreting its findings and which can stimulate further research in this area. First, although the mixed methods research design employed here helped us to develop a more detailed and valid analysis of the relationship between ethnic pride and prejudice in the context of Cyprus, it could have benefited from a more lengthy period of data-analysis between the qualitative and quantitative research phases. This would, for example, have allowed us to further refine the survey instruments to include particular ethnic out-groups that are meaningful for our sample of TCs, and would allow us to incorporate additional measures in relationship to family and peer-group effects and the importance of participating with sport-related activities. Finally, a more extensive period of analysis would also have allowed us to focus more on the importance of religion, as this emerged as a meaningful criterion for our young people in drawing ethnic boundaries.

Second, and related to the former, although research in Cyprus has shown the importance of gender and social class, in interaction with ethnicity, in developing particular ethnic stereotypes (Spyrou 2009, 2012; Theodorou 2011; Zembylas 2013a), this study does not focus on these intersections. Hence, future research could build on this study by comparing how TC and GC boys and girls, and TCs and GCs from different social class backgrounds, construct ethnic boundaries between each other, and other ethnic out-groups; and potential differences and similarities in terms of the influence that these groups experience from various institutional forces in using particular cultural scripts to describe the ethnic self and other.

Third, our sample of TCs was small and homogeneous, which strongly coloured our research findings in relationship to this group. It is very likely that a group of young TCs who decided, with their parents, to follow secondary education in the (mainly Greek-speaking) republic

of Cyprus, are perhaps more positive towards GCs and support the reunification of the island, and hence, a cohabitation of both GCs and TCs under the common umbrella of Cypriots. Future research could add to this study by also including TCs who follow education in schools in the (internationally largely unrecognized) Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. It can be expected that a larger, more representative sample of TCs will also show a greater variability in terms of how TCs identify themselves in terms of ethnicity (e.g. as 'Turks' or 'Kurds'), the ethnic out-groups that they identify as meaningful to them in the context of Cyprus and their attitudes towards these groups.

Fourth, this study only considers the importance of the school and the family as important institutions in making particular cultural scripts about the collective self and other available and meaningful to young people in the context of Cyprus. Although this focus seems appropriate given the attention they receive from the children interviewed, and the importance of these institutions for young people more generally at this stage of their lives, it does not provide a comprehensive picture of the various institutions that impact on young people, such as, in the context of Cyprus: the church, the military and the media. Future research could build on our understanding of the development of racialized nationalism in the context of Cyprus by focusing attention on these understudied institutions, in addition to the importance of youth clubs, peer groups and participation with sport activities, which were discussed only briefly in the context of this study.

Fifth, the localized focus of this study obscures the connections between the development of racialized nationalism in the context of Cyprus with other social contexts. Although a recent study (Law 2014) focuses on such connections, it might also be theoretically interesting to compare how the relationship between ethnic pride and prejudice, and racism more generally, develops in other divided communities (such as, in a European context, countries like Belgium, Northern Ireland and Spain), where we can expect processes of nation-building to go hand in hand with processes of ethnic out-group identification and exclusion. Such a comparison can reveal important similarities and differences between these national contexts in how national pride and prejudice develop, related to intersecting global and regional processes. In addition, such a comparison can perhaps identify features of collective ethnic in-group identities

(such as their centrality, the extent to which they are based on cultural or biological essentialized notions of group differences and the extent to which they refer to in-group evaluations or out-group comparisons) that have a similar influence across contexts, but also the socio-psychological (such as perceived threat) and sociological factors (such as the influence of families, schools and peer groups) that might mediate these relationships across contexts. In addition, such a comparative analysis can help to identity features of collective ethnic in-group identities that are significant in understanding the relationship between ethnic pride and prejudice for particular national contexts, such as the 'refugee identity' or the distinction between a 'Cypriot', 'Greek Cypriot' and a 'Greek' identity in the context of Cyprus. Finally, such a comparative analysis might reveal that similar ethnic out-groups are constructed in different national contexts (such as the 'Muslim'), but also the variability in meaningful ethnic out-groups within different national contexts and the local and global structural conditions that make these boundaries meaningful within these contexts.

In terms of social and organizational policy, this study suggests that in the context of Cyprus, educators, policy-makers (e.g. through textbooks and curricula) and parents should engage young people to critically examine notions of cultural essentialism, centrality and the importance and meaning of being a refugee in relation to the development of national/ethnic in-group identities. In addition, the importance of a Hellenic ideology of nationhood in developing a Cypriot in-group identity should be critically examined in developing more harmonious relationships between the two divided communities in Cyprus. Particularly worrying is the observation that ethnic and social boundaries can be so firm in a school context where you would expect students to develop more positive attitudes of and relationships between them. On the other hand, this study has shed light on the underlying factors and processes that are responsible for the development of such polarized relationships and views, and compares this with a context where interactions between ethnic in- and out group members seem to lead to more positive inter-ethnic perceptions and relationships. Such a comparison, and past research in school on racism and nationalism in Cyprus, suggests that schools in Cyprus should reconsider their whole functioning, related to the development of policy documents, curriculum textbooks, interactions

between staff and students, school ceremonies, school anti-racism and pro-multiculturalism policies, structural composition of classroom and the (perceived) politicized functioning of the school board.

This seems an extraordinary challenge considering the scope and depth of the changes required, and the self-critical attitude that has to carry such changes, in a context where actors act with considerable autonomy (which is a key characteristic of the teacher's role: Lortie 1975) and at the same time experience fear, hostility and threat from and a sense of ingrained superiority towards the ethnic out-groups. However, perhaps more feasible in policy terms concerns the possibility of supporting (long-term) a few small case-study schools, to implement across-the-board changes aimed at developing more positive ethnic in/out group relationships, particularly but not only between GCs and TCs. If these schools can demonstrate 'good practice' they can function as role models for other schools and a motivation and legitimation for policymakers to make more education-wide changes with the real potential of improving relationships between ethnic groups in Cyprus. The latter can be considered essential in realizing a sustainable, long-term solution to the Cyprus problem and developing positive, cohesive ties between different ethnic communities in an increasingly more multicultural Cyprus.

Appendices

Appendix 1 Quantitative analysis card-game with Turkish Cypriot students

	TC-RB		TC-GL		TC-TOTAL	
	(15 students)	%	(15 students)	%	(30 students)	%
Out-group related choices						
No groups they don't like	4	27	2	13	6	20
Don't like Greek Cypriots	3	20	0	0	3	10
Don't like Greeks	2	13	4	27	6	20
Don't like Orthodox	3	20	5	33	8	27
Don't like non-religious	2	13	2	13	4	13
Don't like Israelis and/ or Jews	6	40	1	7	7	23
Don't like Palestinians	1	7	0	0	1	3
Don't like Philippines	1	7	1	7	2	7
Don't like Pontians	0	0	0	0	0	0
Don't like Kurds	7	47	2	13	9	30
Don't like Turks	4	27	2	13	6	20
In-group related choices						
Muslim in in-group	9	60	7	47	16	53
Muslim in top 3 in-group	6	40	3	20	9	30
Non-religious in in-group	5	33	7	47	12	40
Cypriot in top 3 in-group	14	93	11	73	25	83
Turkish Cypriot in top 3 in-group	13	87	13	87	26	87
Cypriot more important than Turkish Cypriot	8	53	7	47	15	50
Cypriot equally important to Turkish Cypriot	3	20	4	27	7	23
Cypriot less important than Turkish Cypriot	4	27	3	20	7	23
Turkish in top 3 in-group	1	7	4	27	5	17
Turkish in in-group	5	33	6	40	11	37

Note: TC = Turkish Cypriot. GC = Greek Cypriot. RB = Red Brick and GL = Green Lane.

Appendix 2 Quantitative analysis card-game with Greek Cypriot students

	GC-RB		GC-GL		GC-TOTAL	
	(12 students)	%	(38 students)	%	(50 students)	%
Out-group related choices						
No groups they don't like	4	33	9	24	13	26
Don't like Turkish Cypriots	3	25	16	42	19	38
Don't like Turks	4	33	22	58	26	52
Don't like Muslims	3	25	18	47	21	42
Don't like non-religious	5	42	14	37	19	38
Don't like Israelis and/ or Jews	2	17	12	32	14	28
Don't like Palestinians	2	17	12	32	14	28
Don't like Philippines	2	17	7	18	9	18
Don't like Pontians	2	17	4	11	6	12
Don't like Kurds	3	25	4	11	7	14
In-group related choices						
(Orthodox) Christianity in in-group	11	92	33	87	44	88
(Orthodox) Christianity in top 3 in-group	8	67	23	61	31	62
Non-religious in in-group	0	0	3	8	3	6
Cypriot in top 3 in-group	8	67	26	68	34	68
Greek Cypriot in top 3 in-group	9	75	26	68	35	70
Cypriot more important than Greek Cypriot	5	42	17	45	22	44
Cypriot equally important to Greek Cypriot	1	8	3	8	4	8
Cypriot less important than Greek Cypriot	5	42	15	39	20	40
Greek in top 3 in-group	4	33	22	58	26	52
Greek in in-group	7	58	29	76	36	72

Note: TC = Turkish Cypriot. GC = Greek Cypriot. RB = Red Brick and GL = Green Lane.

Appendix 3 GCs' and TCs' attitudes to various out-groups

Attitudes to...	Mother speaks...	N	Mean	SD
Asians*	Greek	1127	3.45	1.154
	Turkish	117	3.77	1.020
Africans*	Greek	1121	3.55	1.203
	Turkish	117	3.84	1.025
Eastern Europeans*	Greek	1126	3.54	1.173
	Turkish	117	3.90	1.054
Greek Cypriots**	Greek	1132	4.69	.778
	Turkish	117	4.04	1.213
Greeks**	Greek	1130	4.57	.863
	Turkish	115	3.44	1.332
Pontians*	Greek	1126	3.20	1.255
	Turkish	116	3.47	1.042
Turks**	Greek	1127	2.15	1.373
	Turkish	117	3.43	1.476
Turkish Cypriots**	Greek	1128	2.76	1.399
	Turkish	116	4.73	.609
British	Greek	1129	4.27	.998
	Turkish	117	4.24	.858

Note: An independent sample t-test was conducted to compare the attitudes of Greek and Turkish speaking students to various ethnic groups, with higher averages indicating more positive attitudes. * indicates differences in averages are significant at $p < .005$ and ** at $p < .000$.

Appendix 4 Descriptive statistics variables in statistical models with GCs

Independent discrete variables	N	Values	Fi	Valid %
National/ethnic identity – content	1179	0 = Cypriot	86	07.3
		1 = Greek Cypriot	938	79.6
		2 = Greek	155	13.1
Gender	1173	0 = male	573	48.8
		1 = female	600	51.2
Age	1157	0 = 12–13 years	436	37.7
		1 = 14–15 years	467	40.4
		2 = 16–18 years	254	22.0

Continued

Independent discrete variables	N	Values	Fi	Valid %
SES (Highest diploma father)	1018	0 = lower than university	405	39.8
		1 = university	613	60.2
National/ethnic identity – refugee status	1160	0 = no refugee	721	62.2
		1 = refugee	439	37.8
Mixed friendship groups	1163	0 = none to half of friends are in-group (IG) members	159	13.7
		1 = most of my friends are in-group (IG) members	705	60.6
		2 = all my friends are in-group (IG) members	299	25.7
Attitudes friends to Turks	1089	0 = my friends are positive to somewhat negative to Turks	482	44.3
		1 = my friends are negative towards Turks	607	55.7
Attitudes friends to Turkish Cypriots	1097	0 = my friends are positive to neutral to Turkish Cypriots	541	49.3
		1 = my friends are (somewhat) negative to Turkish Cypriots	556	50.7
Attitudes friends to Asians	1116	0 = my friends are (somewhat) positive to Asians	397	35.6
		1 = my friends are neutral to Asians	452	40.5
		2 = my friends are (somewhat) negative to Asians	267	23.9
Attitudes friends to Africans	1108	0 = my friends are (somewhat) positive to Africans	433	39.1
		1 = my friends are neutral to Africans	339	30.6
		2 = my friends are (somewhat) negative to Africans	336	30.3
Attitudes friends to Eastern Europeans	1098	0 = my friends are (somewhat) positive to Eastern Europeans	463	42.2
		1 = my friends are neutral to Eastern Europeans	381	34.7
		2 = my friends are (somewhat) negative to Eastern Europeans	254	23.1

Independent continuous variables	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	SD
National/ethnic identity – centrality	1041	8	40	25.61	5.275
National/ethnic identity – in-group regard	1047	9	30	23.52	4.415
National/ethnic identity – cultural essentialism	1049	9	45	27.86	5.725
Group threat – Turkish Cypriots	1014	5	25	15.89	4.818
Group threat – Turks	1009	5	25	17.04	4.979
Group threat – Other immigrants	1016	5	25	15.11	4.257

Dependent dummy variables	N	Values		Fi	Valid %
Perception of Asians	1148	0 = negative or neutral		606	52.8
		1 = positive		542	47.2
Perception of Africans	1142	0 = negative or neutral		532	46.6
		1 = positive		610	53.4
Perception of Eastern Europeans	1148	0 = negative or neutral		530	46.2
		1 = positive		618	53.8
Perception of Turks	1148	0 = negative		733	63.9
		1 = neutral or positive		425	36.1
Perception of Turkish Cypriots	1150	0 = negative		535	46.5
		1 = neutral or positive		615	53.5

Appendix 5 Stepwise logistic regression analysis GCs – step 1

Table 1   Perceptions of Asians (step 1)

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
Cypriot			8.495	2	.014	
Greek Cypriot (1)	−.525	.371	2.008	1	.156	.591
Greek (2)	−1.127	.429	6.909	1	.009	.324
Gender (1)	.436	.157	7.717	1	.005	1.546

Table 1　Continued

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
Age student			2.438	2	.295	
Age student (1)	−.246	.178	1.915	1	.166	.782
Age student (2)	−.271	.213	1.623	1	.203	.763
Education father (1)	.256	.165	2.404	1	.121	1.292
Constant	.318	.393	.654	1	.419	1.374

N = 496. Cox & Snell R^2 = 0.03 and Nagelkerke R^2 = 0.04.

Table 2　Perceptions of Africans (step1)

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Cypriot			4.364	2	.113	
Greek Cypriot (1)	.112	.369	.092	1	.761	1.119
Greek (2)	−.388	.421	.849	1	.357	.678
Gender (1)	.476	.158	9.073	1	.003	1.610
Age student			1.592	2	.451	
Age student (1)	−.221	.180	1.511	1	.219	.802
Age student (2)	−.176	.215	.672	1	.412	.839
Education father (1)	.190	.166	1.309	1	.253	1.210
Constant	−.017	.393	.002	1	.965	.983

N = 689. Cox & Snell R^2 = 0.03 and Nagelkerke R^2 = 0.04.

Table 3　Perceptions of Eastern Europeans (step 1)

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Cypriot			7.136	2	.028	
Greek Cypriot (1)	−.622	.396	2.466	1	.116	.537
Greek (2)	−1.121	.449	6.229	1	.013	.326
Gender (1)	.285	.158	3.266	1	.071	1.330
Age student			3.656	2	.161	
Age student (1)	−.196	.178	1.216	1	.270	.822
Age student (2)	−.404	.214	3.583	1	.058	.668
Education father (1)	.106	.165	.411	1	.522	1.112
Constant	.765	.421	3.304	1	.069	2.148

N = 687. Cox & Snell R^2 = 0.02 and Nagelkerke R^2 = 0.03.

Table 4   Perceptions of Turks (step 1)

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Cypriot			15.557	2	.000	
Greek Cypriot (1)	−.869	.361	5.796	1	.016	.419
Greek (2)	−1.754	.452	15.047	1	.000	.173
Gender (1)	.342	.167	4.211	1	.040	1.408
Age student			1.709	2	.426	
Age student (1)	−.243	.187	1.687	1	.194	.785
Age student (2)	−.100	.225	.198	1	.657	.905
Education father (1)	.051	.174	.084	1	.771	1.052
Constant	.235	.388	.366	1	.545	1.265

N = 678. Cox & Snell R^2 = 0.03 and Nagelkerke R^2 = 0.05.

Table 5   Perceptions of Turkish Cypriots (step 1)

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Cypriot			31.742	2	.000	
Greek Cypriot (1)	−1.228	.445	7.623	1	.006	.293
Greek (2)	−2.562	.511	25.099	1	.000	.077
Gender (1)	.492	.163	9.087	1	.003	1.636
Age student			6.963	2	.031	
Age student (1)	−.313	.184	2.892	1	.089	.731
Age student (2)	.232	.225	1.066	1	.302	1.261
Education father (1)	.282	.171	2.726	1	.099	1.326
Constant	1.109	.466	5.663	1	.017	3.030

N = 680. Cox & Snell R^2 = 0.08 and Nagelkerke R^2 = 0.11.

Appendix 6 Stepwise logistic regression analysis GCs – step 2

Table 6   Perceptions of Asians (step 2)

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Cypriot			2.753	2	.252	
Greek Cypriot (1)	−.360	.389	.853	1	.356	.698
Greek (2)	−.707	.457	2.390	1	.122	.493
Gender (1)	.284	.163	3.049	1	.081	1.329
Age student			5.995	2	.050	
Age student (1)	−.364	.184	3.909	1	.048	.695

Table 6 Continued

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Age student (2)	−.492	.224	4.820	1	.028	.612
Education father (1)	.223	.171	1.703	1	.192	1.250
Centrality	−.063	.022	8.454	1	.004	.939
Private regard	.058	.024	5.808	1	.016	1.060
Nationalism	−.057	.017	10.976	1	.001	.945
Refugee status (1)	−.164	.164	1.003	1	.317	.849
Constant	2.199	.634	12.021	1	.001	9.019

Cox & Snell $R^2 = 0.08$ and Nagelkerke $R^2 = 0.11$.

Table 7 Perceptions of Africans (step 2)

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Cypriot			1.031	2	.597	
Greek Cypriot (1)	.321	.394	.663	1	.415	1.378
Greek (2)	.155	.460	.113	1	.736	1.168
Gender (1)	.311	.165	3.530	1	.060	1.365
Age student			4.599	2	.100	
Age student (1)	−.360	.187	3.685	1	.055	.698
Age student (2)	−.396	.227	3.035	1	.081	.673
Education father (1)	.162	.174	.869	1	.351	1.176
Centrality	−.085	.022	14.516	1	.000	.918
Private regard	.086	.025	11.697	1	.001	1.090
Nationalism	−.062	.017	12.651	1	.000	.940
Refugee status (1)	.031	.167	.035	1	.852	1.032
Constant	1.814	.638	8.082	1	.004	6.133

Cox & Snell $R^2 = 0.09$ and Nagelkerke $R^2 = 0.12$.

Table 8 Perceptions of Eastern Europeans (step 2)

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Cypriot			2.032	2	.362	
Greek Cypriot (1)	−.462	.417	1.232	1	.267	.630
Greek (2)	−.682	.481	2.010	1	.156	.505
Gender (1)	.119	.165	.519	1	.471	1.126
Age student			7.961	2	.019	
Age student (1)	−.324	.185	3.053	1	.081	.723
Age student (2)	−.625	.225	7.692	1	.006	.535
Education father (1)	.040	.172	.053	1	.818	1.040
Centrality	−.061	.022	7.685	1	.006	.941

Table 8 Continued

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Private regard	.073	.025	8.854	1	.003	1.076
Nationalism	−.069	.017	15.906	1	.000	.933
Refugee status (1)	−.063	.165	.146	1	.702	.939
Constant	2.566	.652	15.484	1	.000	13.008

Cox & Snell R² = 0.08 and Nagelkerke R² = 0.10.

Table 9 Perceptions of Turks (step 2)

	B	**S.E.**	**Wald**	**df**	**Sig.**	**Exp(B)**
Cypriot			5.013	2	.082	
Greek Cypriot (1)	−.421	.387	1.181	1	.277	.657
Greek (2)	−1.033	.489	4.472	1	.034	.356
Gender (1)	.148	.180	.682	1	.409	1.160
Age student			6.663	2	.036	
Age student (1)	−.450	.202	4.957	1	.026	.637
Age student (2)	−.540	.248	4.739	1	.029	.583
Education father (1)	.001	.187	.000	1	.995	1.001
Centrality	−.086	.025	12.160	1	.000	.918
Private regard	.006	.026	.058	1	.810	1.006
Nationalism	−.087	.020	19.258	1	.000	.917
Refugee status (1)	−.626	.183	11.679	1	.001	.535
Constant	4.710	.732	41.441	1	.000	11.067

Cox & Snell R² = 0.15 and Nagelkerke R² = 0.20.

Table 10 Perceptions of Turkish Cypriots (step 2)

	B	**S.E.**	**Wald**	**df**	**Sig.**	**Exp(B)**
Cypriot			17.199	2	.000	
Greek Cypriot (1)	−.813	.468	3.025	1	.082	.443
Greek (2)	−1.935	.545	12.620	1	.000	.144
Gender (1)	.254	.176	2.079	1	.149	1.289
Age student			7.866	2	.020	
Age student (1)	−.544	.199	7.463	1	.006	.580
Age student (2)	−.172	.244	.494	1	.482	.842
Education father (1)	.282	.183	2.379	1	.123	1.326
Centrality	−.099	.024	16.307	1	.000	.906
Private regard	.038	.026	2.116	1	.146	1.039
Nationalism	−.081	.019	18.315	1	.000	.922
Refugee status (1)	−.540	.175	9.479	1	.002	.583
Constant	5.092	.762	44.594	1	.000	12.652

Cox & Snell R² = 0.19 and Nagelkerke R² = 0.25.

Appendix 7 Stepwise logistic regression analysis GCs – step 3

Table 11   Perceptions of Asians (step 3)

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
Cypriot			4.260	2	.119	
Greek Cypriot (1)	−.638	.406	2.461	1	.117	.529
Greek (2)	−.988	.481	4.227	1	.040	.372
Gender (1)	.226	.173	1.706	1	.191	1.253
Age student			4.073	2	.130	
Age student (1)	−.234	.194	1.451	1	.228	.792
Age student (2)	−.478	.240	3.964	1	.046	.620
Education father (1)	.180	.182	.974	1	.324	1.197
Centrality	−.053	.023	5.371	1	.020	.948
Private regard	.041	.026	2.593	1	.107	1.042
Nationalism	−.012	.019	.394	1	.530	.988
Refugee status (1)	−.098	.173	.323	1	.570	.906
Immigrant threat	−.083	.023	13.500	1	.000	.921
IG friends none or half			.546	2	.761	
IG friends most of them (1)	−.021	.269	.006	1	.936	.979
IG friends all of them (2)	−.164	.304	.293	1	.588	.848
IG friends positive to Asian			51.084	2	.000	
IG friends neutral to Asian (1)	−1.115	.193	33.305	1	.000	.328
IG friends negative Asian (2)	−1.554	.241	41.423	1	.000	.211
Constant	3.460	.709	23.792	1	.000	31.807

Cox & Snell R² = 0.17 and Nagelkerke R² = 0.23.

Table 12   Perceptions of Africans (step3)

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
Cypriot			.295	2	.863	
Greek Cypriot (1)	−.064	.426	.023	1	.880	.938
Greek (2)	−.211	.499	.179	1	.672	.809
Gender (1)	.342	.180	3.605	1	.058	1.408
Age student			2.976	2	.226	
Age student (1)	−.343	.203	2.853	1	.091	.709
Age student (2)	−.275	.251	1.202	1	.273	.759
Education father (1)	.083	.191	.188	1	.664	1.086
Centrality	−.070	.024	8.251	1	.004	.933
Private regard	.070	.027	6.522	1	.011	1.073
Nationalism	−.030	.020	2.276	1	.131	.970
Refugee status (1)	.128	.181	.496	1	.481	1.136
Immigrant threat	−.057	.023	5.991	1	.014	.945

(continued)

Table 12   Continued

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
IG friends none or half			3.977	2	.137	
IG friends most of them (1)	.098	.290	.114	1	.735	1.103
IG friends all of them (2)	−.316	.322	.964	1	.326	.729
IG friends positive to Asian			77.859	2	.000	
IG friends neutral to Asian (1)	−1.403	.215	42.686	1	.000	.246
IG friends negative Asian (2)	−1.872	.222	70.878	1	.000	.154
Constant	3.159	.736	18.417	1	.000	23.550

Cox & Snell R² = 0.22 and Nagelkerke R² = 0.29.

Table 13   Perceptions of Eastern Europeans (step3)

	B	S.E.	Wald	Df	Sig.	Exp (B)
Cypriot			2.041	2	.360	
Greek Cypriot (1)	−.647	.473	1.871	1	.171	.524
Greek (2)	−.747	.544	1.890	1	.169	.474
Gender (1)	.171	.184	.863	1	.353	1.186
Age student			3.255	2	.196	
Age student (1)	.019	.207	.009	1	.926	1.020
Age student (2)	−.391	.252	2.408	1	.121	.676
Education father (1)	.021	.192	.012	1	.911	1.022
Centrality	−.034	.024	1.940	1	.164	.967
Private regard	.058	.027	4.534	1	.033	1.059
Nationalism	−.038	.020	3.448	1	.063	.963
Refugee status (1)	.019	.182	.011	1	.918	1.019
Immigrant threat	−.113	.024	21.833	1	.000	.894
IG friends none or half			.408	2	.815	
IG friends most of them (1)	.180	.292	.380	1	.537	1.197
IG friends all of them (2)	.191	.327	.340	1	.560	1.210
IG friends positive to Asian			87.131	2	.000	
IG friends neutral to Asian (1)	−1.688	.213	63.084	1	.000	.185
IG friends negative Asian (2)	−1.975	.239	68.062	1	.000	.139
Constant	3.973	.772	26.475	1	.000	53.144

Cox & Snell R² = 0.24 and Nagelkerke R² = 0.31.

Table 14   Perceptions of Turks (step3)

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
Cypriot			2.316	2	.314	
Greek Cypriot (1)	−.474	.425	1.245	1	.264	.622

(*continued*)

Table 14 Continued

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
Greek (2)	−.802	.527	2.315	1	.128	.448
Gender (1)	.042	.197	.045	1	.832	1.043
Age student			3.962	2	.138	
Age student (1)	−.318	.223	2.034	1	.154	.728
Age student (2)	−.515	.273	3.567	1	.059	.597
Education father (1)	−.133	.207	.416	1	.519	.875
Centrality	−.074	.028	7.298	1	.007	.928
Private regard	.008	.028	.076	1	.782	1.008
Nationalism	−.040	.022	3.218	1	.073	.961
Refugee status (1)	−.612	.201	9.242	1	.002	.543
Turkish threat	−.114	.022	26.929	1	.000	.893
IG friends none or half			.248	2	.883	
IG friends most of them (1)	−.047	.309	.023	1	.880	.954
IG friends all of them (2)	−.149	.350	.181	1	.670	.861
IG friends not very negative Turks (1)	−1.536	.202	57.544	1	.000	.215
Constant	5.807	.852	46.458	1	.000	332.777

Cox & Snell $R^2 = \underline{0.27}$ and Nagelkerke $R^2 = \underline{0.38}$.

Table 15 Perceptions of Turkish Cypriots (step3)

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
Cypriot			13.407	2	.001	
Greek Cypriot (1)	−1.107	.520	4.533	1	.033	.331
Greek (2)	−2.089	.606	11.887	1	.001	.124
Gender (1)	.346	.199	3.011	1	.083	1.413
Age student			3.272	2	.195	
Age student (1)	−.242	.225	1.155	1	.282	.785
Age student (2)	.219	.278	.620	1	.431	1.245
Education father (1)	.236	.206	1.305	1	.253	1.266
Centrality	−.093	.028	10.832	1	.001	.911
Private regard	.058	.029	3.915	1	.048	1.060
Nationalism	−.019	.022	.730	1	.393	.981
Refugee status (1)	−.480	.199	5.810	1	.016	.619
Turkish Cypriot threat	−.157	.023	45.135	1	.000	.855
IG friends none or half			2.773	2	.250	
IG friends most of them (1)	.296	.323	.840	1	.360	1.344
IG friends all of them (2)	−.056	.355	.025	1	.874	.945
IG friends not negative Turks (1)	−1.733	.199	76.003	1	.000	.177
Constant	5.931	.882	45.200	1	.000	376.518

Cox & Snell $R^2 = \underline{0.34}$ and Nagelkerke $R^2 = \underline{0.46.}$

Appendix 8 Descriptive statistics variables in statistical models with TCs

Independent discrete variables	N	Values	Fi	Valid %
Gender	122	0 = male	65	53.3
		1 = female	57	46.7
Age	122	0 = 12–13 years	40	32.8
		1 = 14–15 years	46	37.7
		2 = 16–18 years	36	29.5
Mixed friendship groups	123	0 = none to half of friends are in-group (IG) members	31	25.2
		1 = most or all of my friends are in-group (IG) members	92	74.8
Attitudes friends to Turks	120	0 = my friends are (somewhat) positive to Turks	51	42.5
		1 = my friends are neutral or (somewhat) negative to Turks	69	57.5
Attitudes friends to Greek Cypriots	121	0 = my friends are positive to Turkish Cypriots	86	71.1
		1 = my friends are neutral to (somewhat) negative to Turkish Cypriots	35	28.9
Attitudes friends to Greeks	119	0 = my friends are (somewhat) positive to Greeks	59	49.6
		1 = my friends are neutral to (somewhat) negative to Greeks	60	54.4

Independent continuous variables	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	SD
National/ethnic identity – centrality	110	10	37	24.63	4.637
National/ethnic identity – in-group regard	108	14	30	23.56	3.916
National/ethnic identity – cultural essentialism	105	11	41	25.07	6.224
Group threat – Turks	99	5	25	17.78	5.593
Group threat – Greek Cypriots	91	5	25	13.76	4.617

Dependent dummy variables	N	Values	Fi	Valid %
Perception of Turks	122	0 = negative or neutral	60	49.2
		1 = positive	62	50.8
Perception of Greek Cypriots	122	0 = negative or neutral	31	25.4
		1 = positive	91	74.6
Perception of Greeks	120	0 = negative or neutral	62	51.7
		1 = positive	58	48.3

Appendix 9 Logistic regression TCs' perceptions of Turks – steps 1 and 2

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
Centrality	.024	.059	.164	1	.685	1.024
In-group regard	.003	.061	.003	1	.955	1.003
Nationalism	.000	.043	.000	1	.995	1.000
Gender (1)	−.341	.455	.562	1	.454	.711
Age student			1.850	2	.396	
Age student (1)	−.704	.522	1.815	1	.178	.495
Age student (2)	−.471	.571	.680	1	.410	.624
Constant	−.051	1.739	.001	1	.977	.950

N = 90. Cox & Snell R² = 0.03 and Nagelkerke R² = 0.04.

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
Centrality	.008	.073	.013	1	.909	1.008
In-group regard	−.013	.076	.030	1	.862	.987
Nationalism	.011	.053	.039	1	.843	1.011
Gender (1)	−.785	.535	2.148	1	.143	.456
Age student			.771	2	.680	
Age student (1)	−.315	.657	.230	1	.632	.730
Age student (2)	.251	.670	.140	1	.708	1.285
Turkish threat	−.153	.057	7.297	1	.007	.858
Most or all friends are IG	.668	.619	1.164	1	.281	1.951
Friends are neutral to negative to Turks	−1.659	.545	9.254	1	.002	.190
Constant	3.600	2.269	2.517	1	.113	36.598

Cox & Snell R² = 0.28 and Nagelkerke R² = 0.37.

Appendix 10 Logistic regression TCs' perceptions of Greek Cypriots – steps 1 and 2

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
Centrality	−.048	.100	.228	1	.633	.953
In-group regard	.180	.090	4.003	1	.045	1.197
Nationalism	−.129	.073	3.102	1	.078	.879
Gender (1)	1.495	.789	3.587	1	.058	4.459
Age student			2.261	2	.323	
Age student (1)	.516	.720	.514	1	.473	1.676
Age student (2)	1.574	1.049	2.253	1	.133	4.826
Constant	.820	2.566	.102	1	.749	2.271

Cox & Snell R² = 0.19 and Nagelkerke R² = 0.30.

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
Centrality	.111	.124	.795	1	.373	1.117
In-group regard	.161	.129	1.563	1	.211	1.175
Nationalism	−.077	.086	.811	1	.368	.926
Gender (1)	1.193	1.008	1.401	1	.237	3.296
Age student			.516	2	.772	
Age student (1)	.745	1.049	.504	1	.478	2.106
Age student (2)	.558	1.180	.224	1	.636	1.747
Greek Cypriot threat	−.325	.175	3.450	1	.063	.723
Most or all friends are IG	−.348	1.001	.121	1	.728	.706
Friends are neutral to negative to GCs	−3.412	.955	12.760	1	.000	.033
Constant	2.695	3.804	.502	1	.479	14.808

Cox & Snell R²= 0.38 and Nagelkerke R² = 0.61.

Appendix 11 Logistic regression TCs' perceptions of Greeks – steps 1 and 2

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
Centrality	.025	.063	.156	1	.693	1.025
In-group regard	−.069	.063	1.214	1	.271	.933
Nationalism	−.101	.048	4.530	1	.033	.904
Gender (1)	1.132	.471	5.770	1	.016	3.103
Age student			2.601	2	.272	

Continued

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
Age student (1)	.721	.566	1.623	1	.203	2.056
Age student (2)	.907	.603	2.263	1	.133	2.477
Constant	2.563	1.789	2.054	1	.152	12.978

Cox & Snell $R^2 = \underline{0.17}$ and Nagelkerke $R^2 = \underline{0.23}$.

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)
Centrality	.040	.068	.344	1	.558	1.041
In-group regard	−.052	.071	.536	1	.464	.949
Nationalism	−.087	.051	2.946	1	.086	.917
Gender (1)	1.036	.523	3.922	1	.048	2.819
Age student			2.645	2	.266	
Age student (1)	.886	.630	1.980	1	.159	2.425
Age student (2)	.955	.664	2.072	1	.150	2.600
Most or all friends are IG	−.732	.586	1.561	1	.212	.481
Friends are neutral to negative to GCs	−1.774	.507	12.250	1	.000	.170
Constant	2.802	1.961	2.041	1	.153	16.473

Cox & Snell $R^2 = \underline{0.29}$ and Nagelkerke $R^2 = \underline{0.38}$.

Notes

2   Studying the Relationship between National Pride and Prejudice in Context

1. This concept also appears as 'racial nationalism' and 'racist nationalism'.

3   Methods

1. This study is based on a larger research project entitled 'Exploring the nature and causes of students' views of and experiences with racism and ethnic-out groups in Cyprus: A case-study approach', which was supported by the Cyprus Research Promotion Foundation under grant number [ΑΝΘΡΩΠΙΣΤΙΚΕΣ/ΚΟΙΝΩ/0308(ΒΙΕ)/08] and the Foundation for Scientific Research Flanders (FWO) under grant number [1.2.533.09.N.00].
2. No real names are used in describing schools or participants, only pseudonyms.

6   Testing the Relationship between Ethnic Pride and Prejudice in the Context of Cyprus

1. A more basic analysis of the data on which this chapter is based was published previously as: Stevens, Peter A.J., Panayiota Charalambous, Athina Tempriou, Evgenia Mesaritou and Spyros Spyrou. 2014. 'Testing the Relationship between Nationalism and Racism: Greek-Cypriot Students' National/Ethnic Identities and Attitudes to Ethnic Out-groups.' *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 40(11): 1736–57. The analysis reported in this book expands on this publication by investigating the relationship between ethnic pride and prejudice for both GCs and TCs, and by expanding the models with variables that measure the influence of peer groups and the ethnic composition of friendship groups.

Bibliography

Allport, G. W. 1954. *The Nature of Prejudice*. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Arendt, H. 1951. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World.

Bar-Tal, D. 1997. 'The Monopolization of Patriotism.' pp. 246–70 in *Patriotism in the Lives of Individuals and Nations*, edited by D. In Bar-Tal and E. Staub. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.

Barth, F. 1998. *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*. Boston: Little, Brown.

BBCnews. 2010. 'Deaths as Israeli Forces Storm Gaza Aid Ship.' http://www.bbc.com/news/10195838.

Bornstein, R. F. 1989. 'Exposure and Affect: Overview and Meta-analysis of Research, 1968–1987.' *Psychological Bulletin* 106: 265–89.

Brown, R. 1995. *Prejudice. Its Social Psychology*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Brubaker, R. 2004. *Ethnicity without Groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bryan, Audrey. 2009. 'The Intersectionality of Nationalism and Multiculturalism in the Irish Curriculum: Teaching against Racism?' *Race, Ethnicity and Education* 12(3): 297–317.

Charalambous, Panayiota. 2010. 'Literature Education as Social Practice: Cultural Ideologies and Local Enactments of a Greek-Cypriot Secondary School Subject.' Unpublished PhD thesis, King's College London, University of London.

Christou, Maria. 2007. 'The Language of Patriotism: Sacred History and Dangerous Memories.' *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 28(6): 709–22.

Christou, Miranda and Elena Ioannidou. 2014. 'Opening Networks, Sealing Borders: Youth and Racist Discourse on the Internet.' pp. 121–38 in *Wired Citizenship. Youth Learning and Activism in the Middle East*, edited by Linda Herrera and Rehab Sakr. New York: Routledge.

Christou, Miranda and Spyros Spyrou. 2012. 'Border Encounters: How Children Navigate Space and Otherness in an Ethnically Divided Society.' *Childhood* 19(3): 302–16.

Cohrs, C. J., D. Dimitrova, T. Kalchevska, and S. Kleinke. 2004. 'Ist patriotischer Nationalstolzwunschenswert? Eine differenzierte Analyse seiner psychologis-chen Bedeutung [Is Patriotic National Pride Desirable? A Differentiated Analysis of Its Psychological Meaning].' *Zeitschrift fur Sozialpsychologie* 35: 201–15.

Creswell, John W., Vicki L. Plano Clark, Michelle L. Gutmann, and William E. Hanson. 2003. 'Advanced Mixed-methods Research Designs.' pp. 209–40 in *Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioral Research*, edited by Abbas Tashakkori and Charles Teddlie. New York: Sage.

de Figueiredo, Rui J. P. Jr. and Zachary Elkins. 2003. 'Are Patriots Bigots? An Inquiry into the Vices of In-Group Pride.' *American Journal of Political Science* 47(1): 171–88.

Dovidio, J. F., J. C. Brigham, B. T. Johnson, and S. L. Gaertner. 1996. 'Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination: Another Look.' pp. 276–319 in *Stereotypes and Stereotyping*, edited by C. N. Macrae, C. Stangor, and M. Hewstone. New York: Guilford.

Esses, Victoria M., Lynne M. Jackson, J. F. Dovidio, and Hodson Gordon. 2005. 'Instrumental Relations Amongst Groups: Group Competition, Conflict and Prejudice.' pp. 227–243 in *On the Nature of Prejudice. Fifty Years after Allport*, edited by J. F. Dovidio, P. Glick, and L. Rudman. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Flick, Uwe. 2002. *An Introduction to Qualitative Research*. London: Sage Publications.

Gilroy, Paul. 1987. *There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack*. London: Hutchinson.

———. 1993. *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Glaser, B. G. 1992. *Emergence vs. Forcing: Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis*. Mill Valley, CA: Sociology Press.

Glaser, B. G. and A. L. Strauss. 1967. *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research*. New York: Aldine.

Goldberg, David Theo. 2009. *The Threat of Race. Reflections on Racial Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Gouliamos, K. and Marios Vryonides. 2010. *Perspectives of the Cypriot Society: Findings from the European Social Survey*. Nicosia: En Toipis (in Greek).

Harnetz, M. E. 2002. 'The Ambivalence of Italian Antisemitism: Fascism, Nationalism, and Racism in Trieste.' *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 16(3): 376–401.

Hooghe, M. and Thomas De Vroome. 2015. 'The Perception of Ethnic Diversity and Anti-immigrant Sentiments: A Multilevel Analysis of Local Communities in Belgium.' *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 38(1): 38–56.

Jeong, Hoi Ok. 2013. 'Do National Feelings Influence Public Attitudes towards Immigration?' *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 39(9): 1461–77.

Klienbaun, David and M. Klein. 2002. *Logistic Regression: A Self-learning Text*. New York: Springer-Verlag.

Kosterman, R. and S. Feshbach. 1989. 'Toward a Measure of Patriotic and Nationalistic Attitudes.' *Political Psychology* 10: 257–73.

Kyriakides, C. S., S. Virdee, and T. Modood. 2009. 'Racism, Muslims and the National Imagination.' *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 35(2): 289–308.

Law, Ian. 2012. *Red Racisms. Racism in Communist and Post-Communist Contexts*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

———. 2014. *Mediterranean Racisms. Connections and Complexities in the Racialization of the Mediterranean Region*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Lortie, Dan C. 1975. *Schoolteacher. A Sociological Analysis*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mavratsas, C. 1997. 'The Ideological Contest between Greek-Cypriot Nationalism and Cypriotism 1974–1995: Politics, Social Memory and Identity.' *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 20(2): 717–37.

———. 1999. 'National Identity and Consciousness in Everyday Life: Towards a Sociology of Knowledge of Greek-Cypriot Nationalism.' *Nations and Nationalism* 5(1): 91–104.

Meeus, Joke, Bart Duriez, Norbert Vanbeselaere, and Filip Boen. 2010. 'The Role of National Identity Representation in the Relation between In-group Identification and Out-group Derogation: Ethnic Versus Civic Representation.' *British Journal of Social Psychology* 49: 305–20.

Mellor, David. 2004. 'Responses to Racism: A Taxonomy of Coping Styles Used by Aboriginal Australians.' *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry* 74(1): 56–71.

Mummendey, A., A. Klink, and R. Brown. 2001. 'Nationalism and Patriotism: National Identification and Out-group Rejection.' *British Journal of Social Psychology* 40: 159–72.

Papadakis, Yiannis. 2008. 'Narrative, Memory and History Education in Divided Cyprus.' *History & Memory* 20(2): 128–48.

———. 1998. 'Greek Cypriot Narratives of History and Collective Identity: Nationalism as a Contested Process.' *American Ethnologist* 25(2): 1–17.

Papamichael, Elena. 2011. 'Exploring Intercultural Education Discourses and Practices in a Greek-Cypriot Primary School.' Unpublished PhD Thesis. Institute of Education, University of London.

Patil, T. 2010. 'Racialised Nationalism(S): Understanding Hindu and Australian Nationalism in Relation to the Cronulla Riot 2005 and the Gujarat Riots of 2002.' In *18th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia*. Adelaide, Australia.

Pehrson, S., R. Brown, and H. Zagefka. 2009. 'When Does National Identification Lead to the Rejection of Immigrants? Cross-sectional and Longitudinal Evidence for the Role of Essentialist In-group Definitions.' *British Journal of Social Psychology* 48: 61–76.

Pehrson, S., V. L. Vignoles, and R. Brown. 2009. 'National Identification and Anti-immigrant Prejudice. Individual and Contextual Effects of National Definitions.' *Social Psychology Quarterly* 72: 24–38.

Pettigrew, T. F. 1998. 'Intergroup Contact Theory.' *Annual Review of Psychology* 49(1): 65–85.

Pettigrew, T. F. and L. R. Tropp. 2005. 'Allport's Intergroup Contact Hypothesis: It's History and Influence.' pp. 262–277 in *On the Nature of Prejudice. Fifty Years after Allport*, edited by J. F. Dovidio, P. Glick, and L. Rudman. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Philippou, Stavroula and Eleni Theodorou. 2013. 'The 'Europeanisation' of Othering: Children Using 'Europe' to Construct 'Others' in Cyprus.' *Race, Ethnicity and Education* 17(2): 264–90.

Quillian, Lincoln. 2006. 'New Approaches to Understanding Racial Prejudice and Discrimination.' *Annual Review of Sociology* 32: 299–328.

Roos, Julia. 2012. 'Nationalism, Racism and Propaganda in Early Weimar Germany: Contradictions in the Campaign against the 'Black Horror on the Rhine.'' *German Histroy* 30(1): 45–74.

Schatz, Robert T., E. Staub, and H. Lavine. 1999. 'On the Varieties of National Attachment: Blind Versus Constructive Patriotism.' *Political Psychology* 20(1): 151–74.

Sellers, Robert M. and N. J. Shelton. 2003. 'The Role of Racial Identity in Perceived Discrimination.' *Personality and Social Psychology* 84(5): 1079–92.

Spyrou, Spyros. 2001. 'One and More than One: Greek Cypriot Children and Ethnic Identity in the Flow of Everyday Life.' *disClosure* 10: 73–94.

———. 2002. 'Images of 'the Other': 'The Turk' in Greek Cypriot Children's Imaginations.' *Race, Ethnicity and Education* 5(3): 255–72.

———. 2009. 'Between Intimacy and Intollerance. Greek Cypriot Children's Encounters with Asian Domestic Workers.' *Childhood* 16(2): 155–73.

———. 2012. 'Children and the Sexualized Construction of Otherness: The Imaginary Perceptions of Russian and Romanian Immigrant Women in Cyprus.' *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 14(2): 327–43.

Stevens, Peter A. J. 2014. *18th World Congress of Sociology (ISA)*, Yokohama (Japan), paper presentation: 'Spitting images of reality. Analyzing stories of conflict between ethnic groups in a divided community'.

Stevens, Peter A. J. and Reyhan Görgös. 2010. 'Exploring the Importance of Institutional Contexts for the Development of Ethnic Stereotypes: A Comparison of Schools in Belgium and England.' *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 33(8): 1350–71.

Stevens Peter A. J., Charalambous Panayiota, Mesaritou Evgenia, Spyrou Spyros, Van Praag Lore, Vervaet Roselien, D'hondt Fanny and Van Houtte Mieke. 2016. 'Minority students' responses to racism: the case of Cyprus, *British Journal of Educational Studies*, forthcoming.

Theodorou, Eleni. 2011. 'Living (in) Class: Contexts of Immigrant Lives and the Movements of Children with(in) Them.' *Anthropology & Education Quarterly* 42(1): 1–19.

———. 2014. 'Constructing the 'Other'. Politics and Policies of Intercultural Education in Cyprus.' pp. 251–72 in *Empires, Post-Coloniality and Interculurality. New Challenges for Comparative Education*, edited by Leoncio Vega. Rotterdam: Sense Publisher.

Theodorou, Eleni and Loizos Symeou. 2013. 'Experiencing the Same but Differently: Indigenous Minority and Immigrant Children's Experiences in Cyprus.' *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 34(3): 354–72.

Trimikliniotis, Nicos. 2004. 'Mapping Discriminatory Landscapes in Cyprus: Ethnic Discrimination in a Divided Education System.' *The Cyprus Review* 16(1): 53–85.

Van Praag, Lore, Simon Boone, Peter A. J. Stevens, and Mieke Van Houtte. 2014. 'How Tracking Structures Interethnic Class Group Interactions: An Ethnographic Study of the Educational System in Belgium.' *Social Psychology of Education* 18(1): 165–84.

Vryonides, Marios. 2012. *Preliminary Analysis of Racism and Xenophobia in Europe based on the European Social Survey 2010*. Nicosia: European University of Cyprus.

Vryonides, Marios and Spyros Spyrou. 2014. 'Cyprus.' pp. 238–58 in *The Palgrave Handbook for Race and Ethnic Inequalities in Education*, edited by Peter A. J. Stevens and Gary Dworkin. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Wagner, Ulrich, Julia C. Becker, Oliver Christ, Thomas F. Pettigrew, and Peter Schmidt. 2012. 'A Longitudinal Test of the Relation between German Nationalism, Patriotism, and Outgroup Derogation.' *European Journal of Sociology* 28(3): 319–32.

Wimmer, A. 2013. *Ethnic Boundary Making: Institutions, Power, Networks*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Zembylas, M. 2010a. 'Children's Construction and Experience of Racism and Nationalism in Greek-Cypriot Primary Schools.' *Childhood* 17(3): 312–28.

———. 2010b. 'Negotiating Co-existence in Divided Societies: Teachers, Students and Parents' Perspectives at a Shared School in Cyprus.' *Research Papers in Education* 25(4): 433–55.

———. 2013a. 'Integrated Schooling in Divided Cyprus: Impossible or Indispensible?' *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 13(3): 442–54.

———. 2013b. 'Memorial Ceremonies in Schools: Analyzing the Entanglement of Emotions and Power.' *Journal of Political Power* 6(3): 477–93.

Zetter, Roger. 1994. 'The Greek Cypriot Refugees: Perceptions of Return Under Conditions of Protracted Excile.' *International Migration Review* 28(2): 307–22.

———. 1999. 'Reconceptualizing the Myth of Return: Contuity and Transition Amongst the Greek-Cypriot Refugees of 1974.' *Journal of Refugee Studies* 12(1): 1–22.

Index