PERSPECTIVES IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS

POLITICIZED ETHNICITY

A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

ANKE WEBER, WESLEY HIERS, AND ANAÏD FLESKEN

Politicized Ethnicity

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

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To Florens, Katie, Andrew—for their love and support

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SERIES EDITOR FOREWORD

Politicized Ethnicity: A Comparative Perspective by Anke Weber, Wesley Hiers, and Anaïd Flesken uses the comparative method to provide important new answers to complex and timely questions: What are the circumstances that cause politicians to base their campaigns and policies on ethnic identities and what are the consequences when they do so?

To find their answers, the authors develop a theoretical framework and analyze the same factors in five case studies, Kenya, Tanzania, Bolivia, Peru, and the United States. Their sample reflects the heterogeneity found in the real world, and the book respects case-specific factors as well, yet the evidence in each case supports the general theoretical hypotheses, suggesting that the analytical framework might be generalized to other cases. Certainly it is put to a rigorous test in the four developing countries, which are studied in pairs (Kenya and Tanzania, then Bolivia and Peru). In both sets we find that two countries in the same region, with many similarities in their histories and conditions, have moved in opposite directions with respect to the treatment of ethnicity. Why is ethnicity so sharply politicized in Kenya and significantly so in Bolivia, and yet so much less so within neighboring states (Tanzania and Peru)? By examining the differences within each pair that lead to these different outcomes, this book guides us to a far more sophisticated understanding of the dynamics of ethnic politicization in developing countries in general.

Although the United States is treated *on its own*, there too the discussion probes more deeply than is sometimes the case. Here we are offered a long-term view of the politicization of the

relations between whites and African-Americans throughout the history of this country. It is a history that begins with slavery and continues at the present time, but it is not a single straightforward line, nor one that is consistent from region to region within the United States. It has not always been politically advantageous to play politics with racial prejudice, and those who find it useful are not always members of the same political party. Although occasionally ethnicity can be politicized by and for the oppressed, as when citizens are asked to support candidates determined to enact policies specifically outlawing the exercise of racial bias, overall the tale has been and is a sad and disgraceful one, with outrageous consequences.

This book is a very welcome addition to the series Perspectives in Comparative Studies, a series in which each book presents an overview of a timely topic in contemporary political discourse and develops a theoretical framework for its study, then presents three or more case studies, and concludes by summarizing the varied causal mechanisms and drawing out the new hypotheses that their research has uncovered. Here the authors are extremely careful to make no exaggerated claims, but the fact of colonial or protocolonial administrative rule, the question of access to resources, language choices and nation-building policies, as well as the skills and motives of political entrepreneurs, all emerge as important variables. Despite their caution, the authors' evidence and their reasoning are strong. *Politicized Ethnicity: A Comparative Perspective* offers a profound and nuanced understanding of what is really going on when competitors for power wilfully pit their followers against ethnic "others" for political gain.

CHAPTER ONE

Politicization of Ethnicity

Introduction

Ethnic diversity is widely seen as an impediment to economic prosperity and stable democracy: ethnically diverse countries seem to exhibit low macroeconomic stability (Alesina and Drazen 1991), diminished growth rates (Easterly and Levine 1997), increased corruption (Mauro 1995), low quality of governance (LaPorta et al. 1999), democratic instability (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Fish and Brooks 2004), as well as increased risk of violent conflict (Sambanis 2001; Wimmer et al. 2009b). Whereas early studies ascribed this effect to ethnic diversity per se, more recent studies recognize that it is indeed the role of ethnicity in the political process, that is, the *politicization of ethnicity*, which explains these outcomes. Yet the question remains which factors lead to the politicization of ethnicity. While an extensive literature links ethnicity to the emergence of civil conflicts, few authors have focused exclusively on the question under which circumstances ethnicity emerges as a politically salient identity. Evidence on the causes of the politicization of ethnicity is scarce and often focuses on only one factor to explain politicization. In particular, convincing country examples that include a discussion of a comprehensive set of explanatory factors remain scarce. The present book aims to fill this gap.

This book offers an extensive comparative analysis of five cases in three regions—namely Kenya, Tanzania, Bolivia, Peru, and the United States—to demonstrate how colonial administrative

rule, access to resources, nation-building and language policies, as well as political entrepreneurs contributed to ethnicity politicization in these countries. Using these five case studies, this book pursues the following questions: Which factors drive the political salience of ethnicity in particular countries? Why is ethnic identity an important (or irrelevant) factor in the political sphere? In answering these questions, we make two main arguments. First, politicization is a relational, dynamic process in which structure and agency intertwine. We provide the reader with a framework that analytically situates and clearly defines our dependent variable, the politicization of ethnicity, and that reveals the sequence of processes leading to this outcome. This framework identifies how ethnic identities are transformed into socially salient ethnic identities, and how some of these socially salient ethnic identities come to be used for political mobilization, that is, become politicized. Our second main argument is that the major factors contributing to politicization are generally long run in nature. Colonial administrative rule, access to resources, and nation building are the major factors that determine the degree to which ethnicity is enduringly politicized. Actions by political entrepreneurs, in contrast, play a major role in short run, intense bursts of politicized ethnicity.

In the remainder of this chapter we first develop our dependent variable, the politicization of ethnicity. We then lay out our theoretical framework, which combines existing literature into a comprehensive analytical framework. Last, we specify in greater detail our empirical approach including the selection of cases and include a roadmap of the book.

The Politicization of Ethnicity

A first step in defining "politicization of ethnicity" is defining what we mean by ethnicity. In accordance with much of the vast literature on the concept, we define ethnicity to mean the *perception of a common origin*, based on a set of common attributes, such as language, culture, history, locality, and/or physical appearance (Connor 1978, 386; Cornell 1996, 269; Geertz 1996,

43–44; Horowitz 2000, 17–18, and 50; Hutchinson and Smith 1996; Weber 1996 [1922], 35). Any of these can be markers for the formation of putative groups along ethnocultural, ethnoreligious, ethnoracial, etc., lines. Key to ethnicity is the *belief* (held by people either "inside" or "outside" an ethnic category, but usually both) that one or more of these markers creates a boundary between insiders and outsiders, and that, with respect to the insiders, the group is self-contained and could exist in perpetuity via sexual reproduction. These latter characteristics, that is, bounded perdurability via sexual reproduction, are what make these groups "ethnic" in the sense of constituting them as "ethnos" (the Greek for "people").

The shift from ethnicity per se to the politicization of ethnicity as the source of social disharmony was the recognition that ethnic identities are not, in fact, based on ancient, fundamental categories and hence fixed, but are instead socially constructed and thus changeable and contingent. While this constructivist approach to ethnicity is today virtually universally accepted (e.g., Eriksen 2010; Gil-White 1999; Hale 2004; Chandra 2012), there is little agreement on *how* ethnic identities are constructed, and few studies examine either why *this* and not some other identity is constructed (see Posner 2005, 1–2) or why it becomes an important issue in the political sphere. And while it is convenient to speak of ethnic groups, how much "groupness" is actually entailed by ethnic boundaries varies considerably over time and space (Brubaker 2006) and therefore must be empirically investigated.

If the above is what is meant by ethnicity, then what does it mean for ethnicity to be *politicized*? Stated in the starkest terms, politicization describes the process of becoming political. Our specification of the political is state centered, though with a broad construal of state. Ethnicity must enter the formal state/political arena to count as politicized. Civil society groups and individuals (e.g., social movements, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), media figures) may attempt to politicize ethnicity, but their efforts register as politicization in our terms only when they gain attention in the formal political arena. This specification places politicians, parties, policies, and power at the center of analysis, along

with institutions and practices that connect the formal political arena with society (e.g., elections/state bureaucracies). Or to put it another way, this specification prioritizes certain actors (politicians, party officials, voters), actions (claims making, state-policy creation and implementation, voting), and institutions (parties, state bureaucracies, elections). The *politicization of ethnicity occurs when specific types of "ethnic actions" are carried out in the context of institutions that are linked to the state/political arena*. Power pervades this process in the sense that actors carry out these ethnic actions either in the pursuit of power (whether to acquire or maintain it) or in the use of power (particularly control of the state) already acquired.

Forms of Politicization

Politicization by ethnic actors can take on different forms, most importantly discursive and nondiscursive forms. The most direct form of ethnicity politicization manifests in the realm of discourse, particularly claims making. Ethnicity is politicized overtly when actors frame "social, cultural, and economic interests, grievances, claims, anxieties, and aspirations" in ethnic terms and bring these claims "into the political arena" (Rothschild 1981, 8–9). More specifically, politicization occurs when politicians and party officials invoke ethnicity in the course of politicking—for example, building coalitions in the context of campaigning or arguing for/against policy proposals in party platforms or laws.

One specific form of politicization is through the formation of ethnic parties. Of the eight criteria identified by Chandra (2011) in a review of the literature on ethnic parties, four are discursive and therefore can be collapsed under the general category of discourse: ethnic parties can be identified by their name, by the social categories for which they explicitly advocate, by the issues for which they explicitly advocate, and by their implicit campaign message. These invocations can be overt—for example, in the United States the Democratic Party equated the post-Civil War enfranchisement of African Americans with "negro domination" (Hiers 2013); and in Nigeria prior to the 1966 coup "the

Northern People's Congress was open only to people of Northern origin" (Horowitz 1985, 292). In its starkest form, ethnic claims making is used to instigate ethnopolitical violence in the name of seizing and maintaining political power.

But discourse is not always overt. It is often rather subtle: in politicizing ethnicity, political entrepreneurs often opt for "code words" (see, e.g., Chandra 2011; and esp. Gadjanova 2012). The aim of such subterfuge is plausible deniability: in response to charges that they are fostering divisiveness and discursive forms of exclusion, those who politicize ethnicity with coded language are able to claim that they are promoting no such thing. This leads to a somewhat paradoxical phenomenon: the politicization of ethnicity can center on political struggles over whether ethnicity is being politicized—that is, a significant part of ethnicity politicization can be, in the face of Actor *Y*'s vehement denials, Actor *X* claiming that Actor *Y* is politicizing ethnicity.

It is not just in the electoral arena that ethnicity can become politicized. Another discursive form of ethnicity politicization is through the formation of "ethnically based governmental policy" (Cornell and Hartmann 1998, 157). This includes the passage of laws that favor one ethnic group over others (e.g., South Africa's apartheid system or pre-1960s Australia's starkly differential legal treatment of "whites" and "aborigines"), as well as the administration of prima facie neutral laws in ways that have similar effects (e.g., the US South's administration of voting laws in a way that de facto allowed only whites to vote after a change in the US Constitution prohibited voting exclusions on an explicitly racial basis). These uses of political power amount to "formally institutionalizing the ethnic boundary in the political structure of the country . . ." (Cornell and Hartmann 1998, 156). The use of political power to politicize ethnicity also includes, usually more subtly, the reservation of all or most government jobs, or high government jobs, including military positions, for a single ethnic group, to the general or absolute exclusion of others (Wimmer 2002, 91–95; see also Cederman et al. 2006, which uses this discriminatory standard to identify "politically relevant ethnic groups").

Politicization that takes legal and administrative forms—that is, politicization that emerges out of the *use* of political power rather than only its pursuit—assumes a necessarily enduring form that blurs the distinction that we make between structural factors and short-term actions by politicians in the following way. It is an instance of ethnicity politicization in the sense that the state and politics become thoroughly ethnicized (akin to, and sometimes because of, the presence of ethnic parties and ethnic voting). But it also can resemble a prepoliticized form of social salience to the extent that ethnicization becomes a factor in everyday life—that is, taken for granted to the point that the processual character implied by "politicization" becomes instead something structural, part of the background conditions of social life. Even when this happens, however, these laws and administrative practices lay the groundwork for later rounds of politicization, as subordinate ethnic groups eventually struggle to change the exclusionary status quo and dominant ethnic groups struggle to maintain it; under such circumstances, "a relatively favored ethnic group perceiving its domination to be threatened can become as militant as a deprived one struggling to end its subordination" (Rothschild 1981, 39). In other words, using political power to draw ethnic boundaries through the creation of laws and state administrative practices is itself an instance of ethnicity politicization, but it also, by virtue of institutionalizing these ethnic boundaries, ensures that these ethnic identities will remain salient long after the eventful moment of politicization (i.e., the creation of an ethnic law or administrative practice) has passed, thereby creating the conditions for subsequent rounds of politicization.

Politicization within the Population

Yet the degree of politicization is determined not only by the supply of discursive or nondiscursive actions by ethnic actors, but also by the support for such actions in the population. Here we go back to ethnic parties, identifying them on the basis of who votes for them. Like Chandra (2011), we follow the insights

of Donald Horowitz: "To be an ethnic party, a party does not have to command an exclusive hold on the allegiance of group members. It is how the *party's* support is distributed, and not how the *ethnic group's* support is distributed, that matters" (Horowitz 1985, 293). In other words, where multiple ethnic categories are politically relevant, a party that relies on the exclusive or nearly exclusive support of a single ethnic group is an ethnic party even if the voters in that ethnic group distribute their support to more than one party: "Where party boundaries stop at group boundaries, it is appropriate to speak of ethnic parties, regardless of whether any one group is represented by more than one party" (Horowitz 1985, 298). At the limit, where group boundaries and party boundaries are coterminous, both parties and voters are thoroughly ethnicized in the sense that voting occurs strictly along ethnic lines, which makes each party a reflection of its ethnic base and the election results tantamount to an ethnic census.

Having mentioned this much-invoked "ethnic census" metaphor, it is important to note that the group boundaries relevant for the identification of ethnic parties are not necessarily coincident with the group boundaries of a population census. "The line" that distinguishes a party that is ethnic from one that is not "cannot be drawn …by separating parties that speak for one ethnic category from parties that speak for many" (Chandra 2011, 157). The relevant group boundaries for identifying an ethnic party depend on "political context" (Horowitz 1985, 299). A party that depends on two or more ethnic groups is still an ethnic party so long as it relies on these groups to the near or total exclusion of at least one other. Whether a party is "ethnic" "lies not in the number of categories that [the party] …attempts to include, but in whether or not there is a category that [it] …attempts to exclude" (Chandra 2011, 157).[1] For example, in Malaysia where the three most important politically relevant categories are Malay, Chinese, and Indian, the parties that draw the vast majority of their support from Chinese and Indians are neither "multiethnic" nor "nonethnic" by virtue of this support base or their own self-description, because the relevant dividing line is Malay/non-Malay (Horowitz 1985, 299–300).

Ethnicity Politicization as a Continuum

In summary, politicization of ethnicity can be assessed by combining information on the two aforementioned areas, namely (i) whether ethnic claims are made in the political arena and whether ethnically based government policy exists, and (ii) whether voters respond to these claims and parties draw exclusive support from specific ethnic groups. Politicizing ethnicity may be a gradual process and there exist various degrees of politicization. Table 1.1 provides an overview of how the key indicators (left column) change when moving from a low degree of politicization of ethnicity (left side) to a high degree of politicization (right side). At one extreme, a low degree of politicization can be characterized by politicians voicing inclusive statements and programmatic content, voters allocating their support equally among political parties, and the implementation of policies that provide equal access to rights and resources of all citizens. At the other extreme, a high level of politicization is characterized by overt ethnic claims in the political sphere, political parties drawing unique support from specific ethnic groups, and existence of policies that exclude or favor certain ethnic groups.

Explanations for Ethnicity Politicization

The discussion of *how* ethnicity becomes politicized has already touched upon *why* it does so. One prominent factor in the above discussion is the variety of actors in the pursuit or defense of power. Here we consider how these actors are motivated by and draw upon historical and structural legacies that have already laid the foundation of ethnicity politicization.

With our focus on structural factors and actors, the approach taken in this book deviates from demographic approaches which assume that politicization arises more or less automatically from the demographic ethnic structure in a society. While today few in-depth case studies assign such a direct effect to demography, quantitative studies often include demographic measures in models calculating the (often adverse) effects of ethnic diversity. Such studies rely on measures of (i) the (relative) size and

Table 1.1 Measuring the degree of politicization

Indicator	*Low degree of politicization . . . . . to . . . . . high degree of politicization*		
Ethnic rhetoric in the political sphere	✓ Inclusive claims in the political sphere, i.e. stating that ethnicity should not matter in the political sphere or stressing the national identity ✓ Programmatic political statements ✓ Rhetoric void of references to ethnicity	✓ Ethnic claims from civil society that are not, however, picked up in the political sphere	✓ Use of explicit ethnic statements in the political sphere in form of oral or written communications by politicians and in party manifestos. Ethnic references are used by politicians to exclude or mobilize specific ethnic groups on the basis of their ethnic category. ✓ Subtle or implicit ethnic claims, i.e. not using stark ethnic terms but referring to code words, which are understood by the wider public in ethnic terms (e.g. "madoadoa" [translation: spots] as a reference to the Kikuyu ethnic group settled in the Rift Valley Province in Kenya; or, in the US context, stating opposition to "forced busing" rather than school de-segregation) ✓ Organized ethnopolitical violence in the name of seizing and maintaining political power
Electoral support of parties	✓ Catch-all parties or parties with national coverage, i.e. parties draw support from all ethnic groups		✓ Ethnic parties, i.e., parties draw exclusive support from one (or more) distinct ethnic groups and are not supported by other ethnic groups (in its extreme form this is an "ethnic census")
Overt exclusionary policies	✓ Implementing inclusive policies that aim at decreasing the salience of specific ethnic identities and at fostering a national identity ✓ Implementing a legal structure that fosters equal access to resources		✓ Rights in the polity are distributed along ethnic lines. Examples of overt exclusionary policies are racial slavery, barring certain ethnic groups from basic citizen rights, such as voting or testifying in court, and distributing basic resources, such as education or housing, along ethnic lines ✓ Allocation of public offices to co-ethnics

distribution of ethnic groups (e.g., Gurr 1993; Mozaffar et al. 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005); (ii) ethnic fractionalization, which captures the probability that two randomly sampled individuals in a society belong to different ethnic categories (e.g., Easterly and Levin 1997; Alesina et al. 2003; Fearon 2003); or (iii) cross-cuttingness, which assesses the extent to which different ethnic cleavages overlap (e.g., Selway 2011). While these approaches may be fruitful once ethnic differences are politicized, they do not explain how ethnic differences become salient or politicized to begin with, as they treat the ethnic demographic structure as given rather than constructed. Hence, they are not able to answer the question why *ethnic* differences are the basis of mobilization, nor why *these* ethnic differences rather than others are relevant.

Chandra (2004) and Posner (2004, 2005) most famously combine the demographic structure with constructivist arguments, demonstrating that attributes present in the population may be used by political entrepreneurs as bases for ethnic mobilization if they result in minimum winning coalitions. That is, political entrepreneurs consider the viable size of groups for political competition during mobilization, combining attributes to create minimum winning coalitions and thus creating and politicizing ethnic boundaries in the process.[2] However, in these accounts salience and politicization go hand in hand in a rather short-term process; ethnic boundaries are made salient *in order to* politicize. And both Posner and Chandra acknowledge that demographic structure and political entrepreneurs are not the only factors, as they work in historical and structural contexts. Thus, while the relative group size argument has received some empirical support and is plausible, it needs to be complemented with analyses of the structural enablers of ethnic mobilization to arrive at a comprehensive explanation.

Likely candidates for structural enablers are greed and grievance. While virtually all studies of ethnic politics agree that political competition over scarce resources plays a central role (see, e.g., Olzak 1983; Horowitz 1985; Wimmer 1997; Lieberman and Singh 2012a), accounts differ on how and why competition matters. In a first set of approaches, the so-called

instrumentalist or greed approach, actors—both elites and followers—act out of rational interest and choose or create ethnicity on the basis of their shared preferences, mobilizing in order to attain access to scarce resources. To be complete, these approaches would need to be able to explain both why ethnicity and no other social categorization has been chosen for the basis of mobilization, and why this ethnic categorization rather than another is selected (see also Cohen 1978; Loveman 1999; Posner 2005; Wimmer 2008). In the second resource-oriented approach, the grievance approach, ethnicity develops "naturally" from unequal access to resources, as powerful actors share resources with their perceived in-group while discriminating against their perceived out-group. The salient ethnic lines are those that overlap with these inequalities, as they are taken to easily distinguish between in- and out-group. Once ethnicity is salient, the discriminated population will politically mobilize to gain access to resources (see, e.g., Gurr 1993). Yet again, to be complete, these approaches would need to be able to explain where the former inequalities come from, which points to longer-term structural factors.

While incomplete, the greed and grievance approaches themselves are not conflicting but perhaps complementary: the main difference seems to be that greed is an active motivator in the creation of groups by actors, while grievances arise after group differences. Both work in tandem for the continued politicization of ethnicity. Competition over scarce resources can hence be seen as a main factor driving politicization among actors.

While competition over scarce resources is an important explanatory factor, it is not the only one. In particular, it is still necessary to explain why specific ethnic categories are used as rallying ground. Here, we can draw on a further line of research focusing on institutions as creating, politicizing, as well as de-emphasizing ethnic differences (e.g., Brubaker 1996; Berman 1998; Lieberman and Singh 2012a, 2012b; Wimmer 1997, 2013; see also Olzak 1983). This includes accounts of the creation of localized ethnic identities as well as broader national categories through policies. In addition, this line of research explores how policies and the logic of different

political systems incentivize and exacerbate ethnic competition and conflict. In the following, they are distinguished by the underlying mechanism.

On the one hand are accounts that demonstrate how institutions create and politicize ethnic boundaries and hence make these hegemonic in social and political relations (e.g., Lieberman and Singh 2012a). These authors view institutions as instrumental in explaining why ethnic identities emerge as salient identities and how highly salient ethnic identities lead to ethnic conflict. Yet again, this research does not answer the question why *ethnic*, and not class, differences are made salient and why these, and not other, ethnic differences are significant.

Besides having negative consequences for ethnic salience, institutions might also effectively counter the emergence of salient ethnic identity through nation-building policies. Nation-building policies designed to expand the boundary of who is included in the national identity and who is excluded critically influence the salience of ethnic boundaries perceived in the population (Wimmer 2013, Ch.3). In practical terms, nation-building policies might encompass the abolition of discriminatory policies; implementation of housing and schooling policies that foster intermingling of different ethnic groups (McGarry and O'Leary 1993, 17); but also language policies designed to create an overarching national identity or to accommodate language diversity (see Laitin 1992; Kymlicka and Grin 2003; Brubaker 2006, 139). While nation-building policies seem to be an important piece in the puzzle to explain why ethnic identities are not salient in some countries and emerge as highly salient factors in others, it is not clear under which circumstances nation-building projects are successful. Whether it is the specific strategy of nation building—that is, incorporation of minority ethnic groups into the majority identity, forming a national identity based on a mix of existing identities, or emphasis shifting from local ethnic groups to overarching national identity (Wimmer 2013, 50–52)—or, rather, the level of preexisting salience of ethnic identities in the population remains, however, unanswered. Moreover, some nation-building strategies, particularly those that emerge after an extended period of widespread and legally sanctioned ethnic exclusion, may in fact,

with the help of political entrepreneurs, facilitate the continued politicization of ethnicity. In such cases, components of the inclusive nation-building strategy that aim to reverse some of the past effects of ethnic exclusion—for example, through affirmative action policies in employment, education, and government contracts, or through the drawing of electoral district boundaries in such a way to promote the descriptive representation of previously excluded groups—can become fodder for claims of "reverse discrimination" and "reverse racism" in the political arena, claims in essence that the historically dominant group (or groups) is now being subordinated to a new legal exclusion. The United States is a good example of this, particularly in relation to affirmative action policies (see, e.g., Edsall and Edsall 1992).

Besides directly influencing the salience of ethnic identities, institutions also provide incentives for political actors to draw certain type of boundaries. While these political-institutional settings might be helpful to understand the *extent* of ethnicity politicization, they cannot explain the *emergence* of politicized ethnicity. Political-institutional settings merely reinforce the usefulness of ethnicity for political campaigning. One such indirectly working institution is the electoral system. In particular, plurality electoral systems are thought to be conducive to ethnic appeals during election campaigns, especially so if the polity encompasses few large ethnic categories, as ethnic categories seem to be ready-made support bases. Campaigning and voting along ethnic lines lead to the permanent exclusion of minority groups (e.g., Lijphart 1977; Diamond 1999). But proportional representation, too, may foster ethnic appeals during election campaigns: as even small parties may enter government under this system, it facilitates ethnic party formation. While, on the one hand, this may ascertain minority representation (e.g., Lijphart 1977, 2004), on the other hand, it may give rise to extremist parties and thus serve to reinforce segregation along ethnic lines in the long run (Horowitz 1985; Taagepera 1998; Reilly 2001). Proportional representation may not only fix already existing deep divisions, but also further their development in ethnically diverse democracies and even more so in democratizing countries (Birnir 2007). Huber (2012), in contrast, argues that proportional representation lowers

politicization because multiple parties may target the same group of voters along cleavages other than ethnicity. So far all that seems certain is that no electoral system exists that is perfect for all contexts (e.g., Diamond 1999; Reynolds 2002).

Similarly suspected to increase ethnic politicization—and similarly debated—are levels of decentralization. Some argue that high levels of decentralization foster ethnic political mobilization as local politicians have the precedent as well as the means to demand ever-larger shares of political power (e.g., Treisman 1997; Hale 2000). Others, however, reason that decentralization decreases ethnic political mobilization as local politicians are less motivated to mobilize since their demands are already being heard (e.g., Tsebelis 1990; Kaufmann 1996; Stepan 1999). More recently, Brancati (2006) presents support for both arguments while Miodownik and Cartrite (2010) show that the effect is nonlinear, with high levels of decentralization decreasing the likelihood of mobilization, and low to moderate levels increasing it. While both electoral systems and decentralization may partially explain the usefulness of ethnicity in the political process, they do not add much to the explanation of why certain ethnic groups become salient identities.

In summary, institutions constitute the context in which political actors may politicize ethnicity in competition over scarce resources. Any changes in the intensity of ethnic politicization hence arise from changing institutions, resource distribution, or (the strategies of) actors. These changes constitute critical moments, which, despite the name, may vary considerably in their temporal duration. Attention to such critical moments of change is implicit in many approaches, but few authors make them explicit. For example, long-term structural explanations focusing on colonialism or modernization assume that major societal shifts change the structural (institutional or economic) context. And short-term explanations focusing on political entrepreneurs implicitly assume a critical moment when different entrepreneurs perceive different opportunities for mobilization. In our integrated framework we aim to make these critical moments explicit. In particular colonization, nation-building efforts, and democratization, but also internal and international wars, constitute critical moments that

change both the structural context as a whole as well as the distribution of power, and thus may incentivize new actors to follow new strategies in the pursuit of power. Such critical moments, therefore, provide a link between micro- and macrosocial processes of ethnic relations (see also Hechter and Okamoto 2001; Wimmer 2008).

An Integrated Framework

Individually, the structural factors seem relevant but insufficient, which is why we combine them into an integrated analytical framework. By taking into account the interrelationship between structure and actors, our framework encompasses mechanisms that explain both the creation of salient ethnic identities and the subsequent politicization of these identities. We do not claim to have created a new theory of ethnic politicization, but instead to have integrated previous theories into an overarching framework that can explain a variety of ethnic relation dynamics—including, importantly, their absence.

In summary, then, the process of politicization occurs as follows (Figure 1.1): Individuals in a given society are socially endowed with a variety of identity traits pertaining to, for example, language, race, tribe, ethnicity, skin color, religion, gender, occupation, and marital status (t_0 in Figure 1.1). While the pool of potential identities is large, only a small number of identities eventually become salient and politicized. Salient identities are those that humans consider socially relevant. Along with gender and age, ethnic markers are typically among the most important salient identities around the world (t_1 in Figure 1.1). Individuals may have more than one socially salient ethnic identity. Structural or long-term factors, such as resource distribution or legal structures, explain why identities become salient over time.

Socially salient ethnic identities can then be used by politicians for political purposes. Ethnic groups are seen as ready-made support basis for politicians since they convey low-cost information regarding for whom this group will be voting (t_2 in Figure 1.1). The more salient the ethnic identity is before



Figure 1.1 The process of politicization of ethnicity.

politicians begin their mobilization process, the lower are the costs of mobilizing the ethnic groups. In addition, the larger the pool of potential ethnic identities, the larger is the variety of groups that can be mobilized—but also the higher are the costs of such mobilization (since various smaller ethnic groups must be united, see Mozaffar et al. 2003). Additional institutional features, such as electoral systems that match ethnic group boundaries, might increase the usefulness of ethnic identities for political campaigning. In any case, we hold that ethnicity politicization needs to be instigated by actors, whether as individuals or organizations. Given the substantial investment involved in building up a political support base from identities, politicians are most likely to use already salient ethnic identities.

Reviewing the chronology of the process of politicization of ethnicity helps to understand the different dynamics and the time elapsed for ethnic identities to become politicized. The emergence of salient ethnic identities is a long-term process and depends on

structural factors. The activation of salient ethnic identities for the political purpose, on the other hand, is a shorter-term process driven mainly by political actors.

Our approach hence combines the above considerations: in critical moments of uncertainty, some actors may perceive the opportunity to change power relations for their own advantage in the competition over scarce resources and hence act to create/redefine/utilize ethnicity. They need to have the opportunity to do so, that is, the absence of structural constraints and the presence of resources. Finally, their action needs to be received in the wider population and acted upon. All steps need to be fulfilled for ethnicity to be politicized.

In particular, we argue that colonialism provided a critical moment of change and colonial policy set the institutional framework, in which some actors changed power relations in order to secure access to scarce resources. These institutions create the ethnic boundaries we see today and, by producing grievances regarding resource allocation, enhance their salience. Later the boundaries are politicized when people mobilize on their basis. Whether people actually mobilize along these and no other lines depends heavily on the salience of the boundaries as well as the absence of other boundaries. If, for example, class boundaries are more clearly present and/or national identification is strong, ethnic mobilization is less likely to be successful.

Empirical Approach

Our argument is based on case evidence from five ethnically diverse societies. Case studies are an appropriate tool to address phenomena where explanatory paths appear complex (Lijphart 1971; Yin 2003, 1; George and Bennett 2005). George and Bennett (2005, 19) propose that case studies are particularly useful to uncover new hypotheses and discuss complex causal mechanisms. In contrast to statistical analyses, case studies have the potential to describe a phenomenon by using a holistic approach and by emphasizing the process through which outcomes were produced. In addition, deviant cases, that is, those where outcomes do not follow from

the initial theoretical framework, are particularly useful for generating new hypotheses and identifying missing variables (George and Bennett 2005, 20; Levy 2008, 3).

Our distinction between overt and subtle politicization via ethnic claims making also suggests the importance of expert case knowledge for detecting the politicization of ethnicity. Such knowledge becomes all the more important when one moves beyond words (written or verbal) to other forms of action, that is, from discursive to nondiscursive forms of ethnicity politicization. The identification of, for example, ethnic parties, according to who votes for the party, who leads the party, and the party's arena of contestation, specifically whether the party competes for the support of certain ethnic groups and not others (Chandra 2011, 162–166), depends on case-specific knowledge that must take the form of a detailed rationale in the context of the case discussions. We employ case study analyses to test our theoretical framework against real life cases. In doing so, we are able to provide evidence for the processes that lead to the politicization or the nonpoliticization of ethnicity.

Case Selection and Methods

This book aims at contributing to the development of a general framework for understanding ethnicity politicization, which might be then applicable to a variety of countries. Hence, we selected cases that allowed investigating some of the existing heterogeneity of ethnicity politicization in the world. More precisely, we selected cases to present evidence of different degrees of politicization of ethnicity, that is, different values of the outcome variable, as well as to cover different geographical regions. In particular, we begin our analysis by confronting the theoretical framework with a pair of most-similar and most-probable cases coming from Africa. In a second step, we replicate the case study design to study a most-similar pair of cases coming from a different geographical area, Latin America. Last, we challenge our analysis by putting our theoretical framework to test in a "hard case," where it seems unlikely to hold: the United States. A summary of the case selection criteria is shown in Table 1.2.

Table 1.2 Case selection: Logic and degree of ethnicity politicization

	Most probable case	*Testing theory in a different geographical region*	*Least-likely case, i.e., a "hard case"*
Cases	*Kenya* (high politicization), *Tanzania* (low politicization)	*Bolivia* (low-medium politicization), *Peru* (low politicization)	*US* (medium-high politicization)
Case selection methodology	Most-similar design	Most-similar design	"Hard case"

We begin our analysis by examining a case of high salience and politicization of ethnic identity, namely Kenya. Kenya is marked by long-standing ethnic political competition: a recent analysis of Kenya's party system in the past 20 years concludes that all significant parties during this period are based on ethnic appeals (Elischer 2013, 95). Voting patterns are accordingly based on ethnic categories, to the point that they have been described as an "ethnic census" (Bratton and Kimenyi 2008, 14). The importance of ethnic identities as building blocks in the political process became undeniable during postelection violence following the 2007 elections.

Following Przeworski and Teune's (1982) "most-similar design," we then compare the experiences in Kenya with those in neighboring Tanzania, which shares several background variables with Kenya.[3] Both countries are former British colonies and hence share a common history; they became independent in the 1960s; formed single-party independence governments; and transformed to multiparty systems in the mid-1990s. In addition, the two countries are both presidential republics with proportional vote, and have similar geographical features. That is, the countries have similar structural backgrounds which should have contributed to similar levels of ethnic politicization.

Yet curiously, these two countries differ strikingly on the outcome variable of the analysis. Evidence for the difference of the level of politicization of ethnic identities in Tanzania can be drawn from surveys conducted by the Afrobarometer Network (2002, 39), which provide information on the self-identification

of people: the majority of Tanzanians identify themselves in occupational categories (76 percent) rather than in ethnic (3 percent), racial (<1 percent), or religious categories (5 percent). In comparison to the ten other African countries surveyed, Tanzanians seem to exhibit an identification pattern uniquely low on ethnicity-related identities.[4] Additionally, an examination of the foundation bases of parties reveals that parties neither use ethnic symbols nor language to mobilize specific ethnic groups (Chama Cha Mapinduzi 2000; Civic United Front 2000; NCCR MAGEUZI 2000; Tanzanian Labour Party, 2000). This finding is corroborated by Elischer's (2013, 219–220) analysis of the Tanzanian party system, which concludes that political competition in Tanzania is instead primarily based on political ideology.

This first set of cases is followed by a second pair of cases from a different geographical region, Latin America. We replicate the research design by using most-similar cases with similar structural backgrounds but different outcomes. Bolivia and Peru share a common colonial history, having been under the same colonial administration in the Viceroyalty of Peru until independence in the 1820s. They also have similar demographic structures, with today 36 recognized indigenous peoples in Bolivia and about 50 peoples in Peru, as well as European-descendant (creole) and mixed (*mestizo*) populations. Although no clear geographic division can be made, the different indigenous populations mainly inhabit the countryside of the Andean mountain range and plains as well as the lowlands of the Amazonian rainforest, while creoles and mestizos live in the cities. Each country has a presidential political system. And while in both countries ethnicity had not been politicized for most of the independence period, this slowly changed in the 1990s in Bolivia, contributing in 2005 to the election of the country's first indigenous president. In Peru, in contrast, no such politicization occurred.

Following these two sets of most-similar cases, we confront our theoretical framework with the "hard case" of the United States. According to Brady and Collier (2004, 159), a "'hard case' for a theory . . . would be one where the prior probability of a theory being a correct explanation is low, but the degree of

confidence in that prior assessment is also low." The usefulness of "least-likely cases" to confirm a theoretical explanation and to identify new causal pathways is strongly echoed in the literature (Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias 2004, 61ff; George and Bennett 2005, 111; Levy 2008, 13). "American exceptionalism" and other rather myopic assumptions aside, there are many reasons why the United States represents a "hard case" for our theoretical approach. Its official colonial era ended longer ago than even that of Latin America, more than 225 years ago, making it unlikely that the colonial era can shed light on ethnicity politicization throughout the independence period. In addition, the population that was on the losing end of the colonial period, Native Americans, was both demographically and territorially marginalized very early on—also in contrast to our Latin American cases. Moreover, although it is not uncommon for researchers to treat Latin America as a case of "post-colonialism" (e.g., Mahoney 2010; Bortoluci and Jansen, 2013), the same is not true for the United States. This reflects at least two other defining characteristics of the United States: its high level of economic development (which for most of its history has also been relatively high) and, relatedly, the fact that exploitative relations with the former colonial power, or any global power, did not continue after independence. The hypothesis that struggles for social resources are more fever pitched in poorer countries, which makes it more likely that territorial populations will be ethnically divided against themselves (e.g., Wimmer 2002), predicts the opposite outcome in the United States. To be sure, the long history of racial slavery points in a different direction. But one of the dominant narratives about the significance of slavery and its aftermath contends that the dominance of "whites" made it possible, for most of the time, for the "race question" to be removed from politics altogether (e.g., Woodward 1974; Marx 1998—but see King and Smith 2011). The vast literature on race/ethnicity and politics does not even pose the question of whether ethnic (or racial, in the usual American parlance) parties have played a central role in what a major subfield of US political science calls "American Political Development."

In summary, this book presents evidence from five cases, spread over three different geographical regions and including a "hard test" for our theoretical framework. Thus our sample reflects already some of the heterogeneity found in the real world, and the evidence collected in each case supports the general theoretical hypotheses. This provides confidence that the analytical framework might be generalized to different (so far unstudied) cases. Nevertheless, throughout the book, we are cautious not to overstate our results. In addition, we abstain from claiming to have identified causal relationships in our case studies, but only propose that certain factors "favor" the politicization of ethnicity in certain cases (George and Bennett 2005, 27).

Our method is comparative and historical (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; Lange 2012). Regarding the former, the empirical adequacy of our theoretical framework is examined through structured and focused comparison (George and McKeown 1985; George and Bennett 2005, 73–88). More precisely, we apply the same theoretical framework and analyze the same factors in all five case studies to answer the question of which factors contributed to the degree of politicization of ethnicity in each case. Analyzing the same factors in all cases permits a structured comparison that can reveal how the same factors influence the outcome in different cases. Insofar as the theoretical framework holds across our cases, we offer what Skocpol and Somers call "a parallel demonstration of theory"—that is, a demonstration of our framework's consistent "ability . . . to order the evidence" across a series of "relevant historical trajectories" (Skocpol and Summers 1980, 176; see Lange 2012, 53–54 for a discussion). In this respect, "contextual particularities" of specific cases are a backdrop "against which to highlight the generality of the processes" emphasized by our theoretical framework (Skocpol and Summers 1980, 178). Note, however, that the method of structured and focused comparison does not preclude scholars from including case-specific factors in their analysis when necessary. Indeed, as George and McKeown (1985, 43) point out, including case-specific factors alongside the structured discussion of the

common factors might add to the overall theory development process of the case analysis.

This comparative analysis of country cases is fundamentally diachronic. Because causal processes often take a long time to unfold, and because the effects of causes frequently endure long after the causes exit from the scene (what Stinchcombe dubbed "historical causation"), we take a long-term, historical approach to all of our cases (Stinchcombe 1987, 103–118; Pierson 2004). More specifically, we examine the historical trajectories of each of our cases in order to link our independent variables, that is, the explanatory factors identified in the theoretical framework, to the dependent variable, that is, the politicization of ethnicity (see Lange 2012, 95–116).

Roadmap

In the next three chapters, we will present evidence on ethnicity politicization for Kenya and Tanzania (chapter 2), Bolivia and Peru (chapter 3) and the United States (chapter 4), as well as draw together evidence from the different cases in a comparative analysis of the underlying factors of ethnicity politicization (chapter 5).

We start our analysis of the politicization of ethnicity in Africa and examine a most-probable case of high politicization of ethnic identity, Kenya. The level of politicization of ethnicity was high from the start in Kenya and remained high throughout the observation period. When moving to the most-similar case of Tanzania, we find that, on the contrary, politicization of ethnicity remained very low throughout Tanzania's history. The different levels of politicization of ethnicity will be traced back to the role of segregating institutional frameworks, biased resource distribution, and lack of sufficient nation-building policies, which laid the foundations of long-lasting ethnic politicization in Kenya. In contrast, less oppressive colonial administrative rule, access to resources independent of ethnic identities, and strong nation-building policies have resulted in a low level of politicization of ethnicity in Tanzania. Political

entrepreneurs have additionally exacerbated the politicization of ethnicity in Kenya.

The next chapter on Latin America demonstrates that structural factors do not always lead to a high level of ethnicity politicization. In both Peru and Bolivia, politicization was generally rather low throughout history. During colonialism and early independence, politicization mainly consisted of parallel legislation for indigenous and creole inhabitants and, intermittently, of political maneuverings when some intra-elite factions attempted to gain indigenous support against the respective other. Later, in attempts at nation building, any ethnic politicization consisted of efforts to include the indigenous population into the nation. In Bolivia, not in Peru, ethnic politicization then occurred from the 1990s onwards, this time driven by nontraditional actors such as indigenous movements and parties.

As the chapter on the United States shows, the relevant ethnoracial cleavage—African Americans versus the "White" ethnic group—remained politicized and the roots of the ethnicity politicization are historically deep. For nearly all of US history, the two-party system has contained one party that has relied almost exclusively on white voters for support. Also, government policies have placed ethnoracial categories at the heart of the polity by privileging whites and excluding nonwhites. This has been evident in a variety of domains, including labor, freedom of movement, and access to public services, voting, education, and housing. This ethnoracial politicization can be explained by colonial administrative legacies and, following independence, by political institutions, processes, and nation-building policies.

In the comparative chapter, we combine the evidence from the five preceding cases to display the similarities of the foundation and development of ethnicity politicization. In particular, we show that in all five cases structural factors, such as colonial rule and biased resource distribution, laid the foundation of salience of ethnic identities. While in some countries nation-building policies helped to integrate all ethnic groups into the predominant

identity and thus attenuate the salience of ethnic identities, the lack of such policies or the suppression of minority ethnic identities led to subsequent pronouncement of ethnic identities. Aided by structural factors, political entrepreneurs then heighten existing ethnic identities for their own purposes and mobilize voters along ethnic lines.

CHAPTER TWO

The African Cases: Kenya and Tanzania

Introduction

We start our analysis of the politicization of ethnicity and its causes by examining Kenya, the most-probable case of high salience of ethnic identity (see Figure 2.1). The level of politicization of ethnicity was high from the start in Kenya and remained high throughout the observation period. Slight variations can be discerned, in particular rising levels of politicization before elections.

We then move within this geographical region to a most-similar case, Tanzania (see Figure 2.2). Kenya and Tanzania share a variety of characteristics, such as being former British colonies, becoming independent in the 1960s, having single-party independence governments, and transforming to multiparty systems in mid-1990s. In addition, the two countries are both presidential republics that use a proportional voting system and that have a similar geography. However, while in Kenya ethnicity is a highly politicized factor throughout the observation period, politicization of ethnicity remained very low throughout Tanzania's history and the only traces of ethnic politicization are confined to the semi-autonomous islands of Zanzibar.

The different levels of politicization of ethnicity can be traced back to the role of segregating institutional frameworks, biased resource distribution, and lack of sufficient nation-building policies, which combined to lay the foundations of long-lasting ethnic



Figure 2.1 Map of Kenya (1988).
Source: Library of Congress (http://www.loc.gov/resource/g8410.ct001674/).

politicization in Kenya. In contrast, less oppressive colonial administrative rule, access to resources independent of ethnic identities, and strong nation-building policies have resulted in a low level of politicization of ethnicity in Tanzania. Political entrepreneurs have additionally exacerbated the politicization of ethnicity in Kenya.

The analysis of the development of ethnic politicization and the explanatory factors throughout the observation period (from

Figure 2.2 Map of Tanzania (1968).
Source: Library of Congress (http://www.loc.gov/resource/g8441f.ct002873/).

the colonial period until today) is organized in two chronological narratives. The next sections discuss which factors led to the high politicization of ethnicity in Kenya, and which factors explain the low level of politicization of ethnicity in Tanzania. A synthesis of the explanatory factors is provided in the discussion section.

The Level of Politicization in Kenya

Before British colonization in 1895, ethnic identities in Kenya were fluid, changing through intermarriages, trade, and warfare. Most communities belonged to various ethnic and language

groups: "There were no watertight ethnic groups. Numerous clans, lineages and sections of clans expanded and contracted, gaining and losing members" (Ogot 2005, 268). While ethnic identities existed, these were subject to continuous change over time. However, with the arrival of the British colonial administration and their "divide and rule" policy these fluid identities became frozen.

Colonial Period: 1895–1963

The British colonial period from 1895 to 1963 laid the basis for the high level of politicization of ethnicity in Kenya. British rulers enacted segregating administrative structures, hampered cross-ethnic cooperation, and stressed local ethnic identities. Thereby, ethnicity became highly politicized.

Britain aimed to develop a strong Kenyan export sector (driven by farming of white settlers in Kenya) and this required expropriating native land, implementing a suitable administrative system, and impeding uprisings of the native population. In a first step toward an efficient administration, the British rulers pursued a "divide and rule" policy and implemented indirect rule based on local leaders. They set out to divide the population and create ethnically homogeneous entities out of what in fact were fuzzy entities, acting as if African ethnic groups were "discrete units living in defined areas and speaking a common language" (Ogot 2005, 285) and building administrative infrastructure upon those putatively distinct entities. Through this policy, formerly fluid and contextual ethnic identities became frozen as distinct tribes were deliberately "invented" and ethnic boundaries fixed (see also Ranger 1983). The policy of grouping people into distinct entities led in some cases to the creation of bigger tribes (through uniting formerly unassociated smaller tribes) and in others to the imposition of a sharp boundary that divided previously united, or at least affiliated, people. Moreover, the British colonial administrators settled Europeans in between neighboring ethnic entities, in order to further impede interethnic cooperation. Due to the separation of the different ethnic groups, the effective cross-ethnic cooperation necessary for a united resistance against the British

colonial rulers became more difficult (Rosberg and Nottingham 1966, 56; Ogot 2005, 268).

Furthermore, the British strongly relied on local tribal chiefs for administrative purposes and emphasized the use of local vernaculars (instead of one language for all Kenyans) in the schooling system. Colonial-era education policies required the use of local vernaculars as the language of instruction, in line with the rationale of preserving the diverse tribal identities and of preventing the formation of a nationalist identity (Jerman 1997, 224; White 1996, 19; Ochieng 1972, 258, cited in Voll 1995, 263). British rulers regarded Swahili—a potentially common language for all tribes in Kenya and facilitator of transethnic organization—as a threat. Indeed, early organizations, dating back to the East African Workers Union in 1922, were comprised of different ethnic groups and used Swahili for communication (Githiora 2008, 241). The strong focus on vernaculars and weak promotion of Swahili during the colonial period would later be reinforced by Kenya's education policy after independence.[1]

The policy to divide the Kenyan population into distinct ethnic groups promoted high levels of ethnic identity awareness. The population census carried out at the end of the colonial period (1962) records 48 different ethnic groups, including the Kikuyu (20 percent), Embu (1 percent), Meru (5 percent), Luo (14 percent), Luhya (13 percent), and Kamba (11 percent), as well as many smaller ethnic groups, such as the Tugen, Nandi, Kipsigis, Elgeyo, Marakwet, Pokot, Sabaot, Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu (see Table 2.1).

Besides the administrative and education policies, expropriation of land for white settlers can be seen as a crucial factor contributing to the high politicization of ethnicity. Intending Kenya to be the economic center of East Africa, the British implemented policies to guarantee that white settlers were granted access to land and provided with sufficient infrastructure. Not long after the 1895 establishment of a British protectorate in Kenya between 1903 and 1906 British colonialists started expropriating the most fertile lands from the Kenyan population and distributing this land to white settlers (Rosberg and Nottingham 1966, 19). Land was distributed to European settlers to stimulate economic prosperity through the export of agricultural products grown in what

Table 2.1 Census data on ethnic groups in Kenya and Tanzania (in percent)

Kenya					*Tanzania*[a]	
Ethnic group	*1962*	*1969*	*1979*	*1989*	*Ethnic group*	*1967*
Kikuyu	19.63	20.12	20.90	20.78	Sukuma	13.33
Meru	5.26	5.07	5.48	5.07	Nyamwezi	3.54
Embu	1.14	1.08	1.18	1.20	Makonde	4.15
Luo	13.73	13.91	12.76	12.38	Chagga	3.83
Luhya	12.99	13.28	13.83	14.38	Haya	3.59
Kamba	11.16	10.95	11.26	11.42	Ha	3.34
Kisii	6.44	6.41	6.16	6.15	Hehe	3.14
Mijikenda	4.96	4.76	4.78	4.70	Gogo	3.14
Turkana	2.17	1.86	1.35	1.32	Nyakyusa	2.67
Maasai	1.84	1.42	1.58	1.76	Sambaa	2.37
Ogaden	1.45	0.82	0.17	0.65	Luguru	2.24
Kalenjin	0.05	Not listed	10.78	11.46	Bena	2.19
Tugen	1.31	1.19	Not listed	Not listed	Zanaki	0.31
Pokot	0.92	0.85	Not listed	Not listed	Turu	2.15
Nandi	2.03	2.39	Not listed	Not listed	Zaramo	1.98
Marakwet	0.80	0.73	Not listed	Not listed	Yao	1.78
Elgeyo	1.21	1.01	Not listed	Not listed	Iragw	1.73
Kipsigis	4.09	4.31	Not listed	Not listed	Iramba	1.69
Sabaot	0.34	0.39	Not listed	Not listed	Zigua	1.62
Hawiyah	1.01	0.04	0.01	0.13	Pare	1.59
Taita	1.00	0.99	1.00	0.95	Mwera (L)	1.58
Iteso	0.87	0.78	0.86	0.83	Fipa	1.41
Boran	0.70	0.31	0.45	0.37	Makua	1.41
Samburu	0.58	0.50	0.48	0.50	Rangi	1.31
Kuria	0.50	0.55	0.58	0.52	Jita	1.30
Tharaka	0.46	0.47	0.06	0.43	Luo	1.17
Mbere	0.46	0.45	0.40	0.47	Kuria	1.08
Gurreh	0.41	0.45	0.54	0.37	Rundi	1.00
Pokomo/ Riverine	0.36	0.32	0.26	0.27	Kaguru	0.99
Ajuran	0.24	0.14	0.14	0.13	Ngindo	0.99
Nderobo	0.17	0.19	0.05	0.00	Ngoni	0.91
Rendille	0.16	0.17	0.14	0.12	Pangwa	0.87
Orma	0.14	0.15	0.21	0.21	Matengo	0.84
Gabbra	0.14	0.15	0.20	0.17	Kinga	0.83
Bajun	0.14	0.22	0.24	0.26	Sumbwa	0.80
Swahili/ Shirazi	0.10	0.09	0.04	0.07	Pogoro	0.80
Other Somali	0.09	0.24	1.02	0.21	Arusha	0.78
Gosha	0.09	0.03	0.01	0.01	Ndali	0.74
Taveta	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.07	Nyiha	0.72
Boni/Sanye	0.06	0.04	0.03	0.05	Safwa	0.70
Njemps	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.07	Maasai	0.69
Sakuye	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.05	Rufiji	0.68
Dorobo	0	0	0	0.11	Ndengereko	0.59

Table 2.1 Continued

Kenya					*Tanzania*[a]	
Ethnic group	*1962*	*1969*	*1979*	*1989*	*Ethnic group*	*1967*
Degodia	0	0.59	0.61	0.47	Nguu	0.57
Basuba	0	0	0.39	0.50	Nyasa	0.55
El Molo	0	0	0	0.02	Matumbi	0.53
Bulji	0	0	0	0.03	Other (<0.5%)	14.53

Source: United Republic of Tanzania (1971) and Republic of Kenya (1964b, 1970, 1981, 1994).
Note: "Not listed" means that this ethnic group was not listed in the population census results.
[a]After 1967, no questions on ethnic, religious, or language identity were included in the censuses in Tanzania.

became known as the "white highlands" (Low 1965, 22)—lands that were traditionally inhabited by the Kikuyu ethnic group but also by nomadic groups, such as the Kalenjin, Maasai, and Turkana (Wamwere 2008, 20). The colonial government paid a monetary compensation to around 8,000 Kikuyu for the expropriation but another 3,000 Kikuyu received no compensation (Rosberg and Nottingham 1966, 19). Many of the expropriated Kikuyus stayed on their former land to work as laborers for the settlers. The proximity of the Kikuyu to their "stolen" lands might also explain the continuing grief.[2] A senior Kikuyu chief explained, "When someone steals your ox, it is killed and roasted and eaten. One can forget. When someone steals your land, especially if nearby, one can never forget" (Brockway 1955, 87–88, cited in Rosberg and Nottingham 1966, 74).

The loss of land was a major factor explaining the specific predominance of Kikuyu in the fight against British rule and the general politicization of ethnicity. Kenya's independence movement started off as a primarily Kikuyu nationalist movement with the Kikuyu Central Association and later the Mau Mau Movement, which was more willing to confront colonial violence with counterviolence. Grievance over land loss was the major theme common to all political movements by the Kikuyu during the colonial period (Rosberg and Nottingham 1966, 35). The Kikuyu organization initially demanded a change of the land laws that favored the white settlers, but it soon fought for liberating Kenya from colonial rule (Rosberg and Nottingham 1966, Ch.10; Krabbe and

Mayer 1991). This distinguished the Kikuyu from other ethnic groups, increasing the salience of the Kikuyu ethnic identity, and it also contributed to the development of ethnic nationalism.[3] In fact, the first political organizations in Kenya emerged in the region where the Kikuyu had lost most of their land (Rosberg and Nottingham 1966, 40).

The colonial ruler's response to resistance in the Kenyan population was to prohibit pan-Kenyan political organizations and to allow only tribal organizations (Chweya 2002, 91). Attempts of Kenyans to organize a cross-ethnic resistance, for example, in the East African Association or the Kenya African Union, were banned by the British; and during the peak period of the Mau Mau rebellion all political associations were effectively prohibited (Rosberg and Nottingham 1966, 310; Voll 1995, 279; wa Kinyatti 2008, 48). In 1955, then, the British considered the situation to be more stable (i.e., less effective resistance by the Kenyans) and allowed again the formation of political associations, but only on the tribal level. As a result, a number of ethnic-based associations did form, such as the Kikuyu Central Association, Kikuyu Provincial Association, the Kavirondo Taxpayers Association, the North Kavirondo Taxpayers Association, the Taita Hills Association, and the Ukamba Members Association (Ajulu 2010, 255). These tribal associations then became the basis of the political parties for the first multiparty elections in 1963—even though by that time the prohibition of national political associations was lifted—which meant that from the outset Kenyan political parties had a strongly ethnic component (Ajulu 2010, 257). In this way, the British colonial administration laid the foundation for today's politicized ethnic identities in Kenya.

A last factor explaining the high level of politicization in Kenya is the close correspondence between electoral constituencies and ethnic group boundaries. As envisaged by the Regional Boundaries Commission of the British colonial rulers in 1961, the electoral constituencies were to reflect ethnically homogeneous areas (Fox 1996, 597). More precisely, electoral boundaries were drawn in accordance with the tribal lines perceived by the British colonial rulers at the time of the creation of electoral boundaries. Constituencies were designed to comprise for the most part

only one ethnic group, described as a way to cater to the groups' "wish" not to be dominated by other ethnic groups (Kenya Regional Boundaries Comission 1962, as cited in Boone 2012, 101). Throughout Kenya's postcolonial history, the distribution of parliamentary seats was amended to match the incumbent party's support base and thus remained an important factor explaining the prevelance of ethnic appeals in Kenya's politics.

First Independence Government: 1963–1978

The first independence government from 1963 to 1978 failed to enact suitable nation-building policies that might have helped to decrease ethnic politicization. On the contrary, biased resource distribution of land and education as well as appeals to ethnic identities for political support further increased the politicization of ethnicity.

Although the Kikuyu were the most visible ethnopolitical group during the colonial period, ethnicity politicization became much broader after independence. Table 2.1 shows the ethnic groups in the country from 1962 onwards. The first independence government in December 1963 had a clear ethnic basis. It was formed by the Kenya African National Union (KANU) with Jomo Kenyatta (Kikuyu) as president and Jaramogi Odinga Odinga (Luo) as vice-president. KANU had a very strong base in Kikuyu territory—the home of KANU leader Jomo Kenyatta—as well as a strong following in the Luo areas—the home of the vice-president and of former KANU leaders (Elischer 2013, 46). Moreover, to attract a winning majority, Jomo Kenyatta broadened his support base by appealing to the Kikuyu-cousin ethnic groups, namely the Embu and Meru. Kenyatta tried to strengthen the loyalty of the Kikuyu, Embu, Meru co-ethnics to the party by performing mass oathing ceremonies (Maupeu 2005, 36; wa Kinyatti 2008, 407–408). During these ceremonies, these ethnic groups were asked to swear their ethnic loyalty and also to pay a small tribute to the ethnic cause (wa Kinyatti 2008, 407). The tradition of oathing goes back to the beginning of the resistance against British colonial rulers, when oaths were used as a means of mobilizing people for resistance. As described by Rosberg and Nottingham (1966, Ch.7), oaths were

Table 2.2 Main ethnic groups for political support in Kenya, 1963–2012

Timeline	*Incumbent party: ethnic support group [president, his ethnic identity]*	*Opposition party: ethnic support group*
1963-election	KANU: Kikuyu[a] and Luo [Jomo Kenyatta, Kikuyu]	KADU: Kalenjin, and smaller ethnic groups such as Luhya and groups from the Coast province
1964	Merger of KADU in KANU. KANU: Kikuyu, Luo, Kalenjin, Luhya and groups from the Coast province	
1966		Split of mainly Luo fraction from KANU and formation of Kenya People's Union (KPU); the KPU was banned shortly after
1978-election	KANU: Kalenjin and Kikuyu [arap Moi, Kalenjin]	
1982	After a coup d'état changes of ethnic composition of KANU (government positions): mainly Kalenjin	Kikuyu
1992-election	KANU: mainly Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu (=KAMATUSA), some Kamba and Luhya [arap Moi, Kalenjin]	FORD-K: Luo and Luhya (and some Kikuyu); FORD-A: Kikuyu; DP: Kikuyu
1994		Split of Luo fraction from FORD-K and merger into smaller party National Development Party (NDP); FORD-K became Luhya based
1997-election	KANU: Kalenjin with Maasai, Turkana, Samburu (=KAMATUSA) [arap Moi, Kalenjin]	FORD-K: Luhya; NDP: Luo; DP: Kikuyu; SDP: Kamba
2001	Merger of NDP (Luo party) into KANU. KANU: Kalenjin with Maasai, Turkana, Samburu (=KAMATUSA) and Luo	

2002	President arap Moi declares Uhuru Kenyatta (Kikuyu) as KANU's presidential candidate for 2002 general election. KANU: Kalenjin with Maasai, Turkana, Samburu, Luo and some Kikuyu and Luhya	After nomination of Uhuru Kenyatta, a protest group (mainly Luo) split from KANU and formed the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). LDP subsequently merged with other opposition parties into the National Alliance of Rainbow Coalition (NARC). NARC: Luo, Kikuyu, Luhya, Kamba
2002-election	NARC: Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Kamba [Mwai Kibaki, Kikuyu]	KANU: Kalenjin, Kikuyu, Luhya (but after election Luhya politicians split and merged with incumbent NARC; and further divides between Kikuyu and Kalenjin within KANU)
2004	KANU merged with NARC	
2005	Various changes in the party compositions and party alliances preceding the constitutional referendum held in 2005.	
2006	NARC without Luo-wing formed the National NARC-Kenya and later changed to Party of National Unity (PNU). PNU: Kikuyu, but also Kalenjin, Maasai, ethnic groups from the Coast and Luhya [Mwai Kibaki, Kikuyu]	Luo-wing split from NARC and merged with other parties into the united opposition party, the Orange Democratic Movement Kenya (ODM-K). ODM-K: Luo, Kamba, Kalenjin, Luhya. Then split of Luo-wing from ODM-K to form the Orange Democratic Movement. ODM: Luo, Kalenjin; ODM-K: Kamba
2007-election	PNU: Kikuyu, Kalenjin [Mwai Kibaki, Kikuyu]	ODM: Luo, Kalenjin; ODM-K: Kamba
2012-election	Jubilee Alliance: Kikuyu, Kalenjin [Uhuru Kenyatta, Kikuyu]	ODM: Luo; United Democratic Forum Party (UDM): Luhya

Note: The table presents mainly the big ethnic groups in Kenya, such as the Kikuyu (including Embu and Meru, 27%), Luo (12%), Luhya (15%), Kamba (11%), Kalenjin (12%, including Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu, 15%) (see Table 2.1, population census from 1989). The table draws on Elischer (2013, Ch.3).

[a] Throughout Kenya's history the cousin-ethnic groups Embu and Meru were part of Kikuyu's support base and hence are not listed separately in this table.

widely employed to build solidarity and increase political commitment. Traditional Kikuyu oaths involved Kikuyu symbols, such as goat meat but later also soil—symbolizing the lost land.

Moreover, the unity of the Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru ethnic groups was institutionalized through the creation of the Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association (GEMA) in 1971 (Ogot 2005, 338; wa Kinyatti 2008, 416). Supported by President Kenyatta, this association was formed for the social and economic advancement of Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru people.[4] The census data from 1989 in Table 2.1 shows that only 21 percent of the Kenyan population identify themselves as being Kikuyu. Only after the inclusion of the Embu and Meru into the wider super-tribe GEMA, did this ethnic support base add up to around 27 percent of the total population. Combined with the votes from the Luo followers of KANU's vice-president this added up to 40 percent and was thus sufficient to win elections (Kenya has an electoral system based on plurality).

For the first independence government KANU, led by Jomo Kenyatta (Kikuyu), competed against the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) led by Ronald Ngala (Coastal), Masinde Muliro (Luhya), and Daniel arap Moi (Kalenjin) (an overview of the ethnic groups for political support is presented in Table 2.2). Neither KANU nor KADU managed to field candidates in the ethnic stronghold of the other party (Elischer 2013, 47). In addition, KADU's campaign featured strong ethnic rhetoric, such as frequent invocations of Majimboism, which basically meant that ethnic groups not indigenous to particular regions of Kenya should return to their "homeland"—that is, the region of Kenya associated with a group's origins, thanks in no small part to the previously discussed administrative practices of British colonial rule.[5] KANU was able to win the first independence elections and Jomo Kenyatta became Kenya's first president. Thus, the ethnic basis of the parties, voting along ethnic lines and ethnic rhetoric all confirm that the politicization of ethnicity was high in Kenya from the start.

Once the first independence government was in place, other issues caused ethnic politicization, and prime among them was the distribution of land (Muigai 1995, 166–167, cited in Rutten

and Owuor 2009, 311). After most white settlers left the country and sold their farms to the Kenyan state, many Kikuyus, who had originally been chased off their land, took this opportunity and bought former white farms from the state. Some of these lands had been the property of the Kalenjin or the Maasai prior to white expropriation, especially farmland in the Rift Valley. The settlement of Kikuyu on formerly Kalenjin/Maasai land in the Rift Valley became a source of recurring anger and feeling of injustice by the Kalenjin ethnic group, and it has featured in the ethnic rhetoric and ethnic violence throughout Kenya's history (e.g., the ethnic violence after the general election in 2007 broke out precisely in the areas where Kikuyus were resettled after independence; Konrad Adenauer Foundation 2009, 58–65). The debate regarding whether Kikuyus rightfully bought this land continues to this day in Kenyan discourse. Some see pure ethnic favoritism by Kenyatta in ensuring dominance of Kikuyu buyers of white farmland. Others argue that only a small elite of Kikuyus was provided with farm land and that the vast majority of Kikuyus struggled hard to raise funds to buy the land (Wamwere 2008, 15).[6]

Besides the bias in the distribution of land, the majority of schools built during the Kenyatta area were located in the home province of the Kikuyu, that is, Central province. Hence, the Kikuyus do seem to have benefited from having one of their own as a president.

Another factor contributing to the high levels of ethnic politicization is the education policy adopted by Kenyan governments after independence. In particular, Kenya continued to use vernaculars, which weakened the use of Swahili. Kenya adopted Swahili as the national language in 1964, but it was not until 2010 that it became an official language, that is, a language spoken by the government for political purposes (Laitin 1992, 140; Standard 2010).[7] The reason for this might have been the emphasis of the Kenyan education policy on vernaculars. Education policy required teachers to use local vernaculars for instruction in primary schools and Swahili and English in secondary schools (Githiora 2008, 246). As this would suggest, primary schools were supposed to teach Swahili, but that language was not included in the primary school leaving exam until the late 1980s. This education policy led to

a very low understanding of Swahili throughout the country, a situation compounded by the fact that Kenya has a second official language, English, as well as a multitude of vernacular languages, such as Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Dholuo, and Kikamba. English is viewed as the language of the educated, and it is used for business and by the government; meanwhile, vernaculars are used at home and within the ethnic community, thereby leaving few instances where proficiency of Swahili proves advantageous. Thus, it is not surprising that Swahili is much less used in Kenya than in neighboring Tanzania.

Another consequence of the language policy was the need for local teachers to speak the vernacular of the particular area where they teach primary school students. Thus, teachers have been effectively restricted to work in their home provinces where they know the vernacular, which has further reinforced the relevance of ethnic boundaries in Kenya. The so-called Ominde Report (Republic of Kenya 1964a, 29) underscores the severe consequences of vernacular use for national unity: "We believe that the secret of a national feeling which overrides tribal and local loyalities lies in bringing about much more conscious mixing within our educational system than is at present practised." In particular, the Ominde Report suggests that teachers work two years in another province before starting to work in their home area. To facilitate this, the report recommends that English be promoted as a medium of instruction.

Period 1978–1992

While the ethnic support base of the president changed in 1978, the same strategies by politicians were employed throughout the period of 1978–1992, namely biased distribution of educational resources as well as the use of ethnic identities to seek political support. In addition, the president enacted a de jure single-party state to secure his power and reduced the number of government posts held by non-co-ethnics. Taken together, these measures contributed to maintaining a high level of politicization over this period.

In 1978, President Kenyatta (Kikuyu) was succeeded by Daniel arap Moi, a Kalenjin. When Moi started his political career, he mobilized a support base surrounding his marginal ethnic group, the Tugen (1.2 percent of Kenya's population in 1969, see Table 2.1), with cousin ethnic groups to form the Kalenjin ethnic group (Ogot 2005, 290). The name Kalenjin translates merely as "I say to you," and was used to instill a sense of unity in the different Nandi-speaking ethnic groups: Tugen, Nandi, Kipsigis, Elgeyo, Marakwet, Pokot, and Sabaot (Kiondo 2001, 260–261; Lynch 2006, 57–58; Kipkorir and Welbourn 2008). The apparent similarity of the languages was fostered through deliberate attempts to bring the different languages of the tribes closer together, for example, through the establishment of language committees. Starting in 1954, a committee—with the participation of arap Moi—worked on a unified grammar and vocabulary for the different Nandi speakers, as well as a translation of the Bible into Kalenjin language (Lynch 2011). The merger of the ethnic groups is supported by population census data (see Table 2.1). Note in particular that in the earliest censuses (1962 and 1969), the seven Kalenjin subgroups appeared separately, with none exceeding 5 percent of the total population. The 1962 census counted Kalenjins as just 0.05 percent of the national population, and this ethnic category did not even appear in the 1969 census. However, the census of 1979, which followed the nomination of Moi as president, records a jump from 0 to 10.78 percent of Kalenjin membership, while the Nandi, Kipsigis, Elgeyo, Marakwet, Pokot, and Sabaot disappeared from the list of Kenyan ethnic groups.[8] In the most recent available census of 1989, the Kalenjin ethnic groups together appear as the fourth largest ethnic group in Kenya.[9]

It is interesting to see that the political tactics underlying the construction of super-tribes, such as the Kalenjin, were known to the members of the founding tribes. As cited by Klopp (2002), a Kenyan newspaper reported that the Nandi people were frustrated by the way their votes were being used to build the Kalenjin ethnic group, that is, the ethnic support base for President Moi during his first years in politics (without receiving sufficient resources in return from president Moi). Similar frustrations about not

benefiting enough from clientelistic resource distribution were expressed by the Sengwer ethnic group. The Sengwer, despite being linguistically close to the Kalenjin group and thus having the potential to join the super-tribe, refused to become part of it. They too believed they were not benefiting enough from the clientelistic network of the Kalenjin and, well aware of the political nature of the Kalenjin group, deliberately distanced themselves by stressing cultural differences between the two groups (Lynch 2006, 56).

After an unsuccessful coup d'état in 1982, allegedly by followers of former president Jomo Kenyatta, President Moi drastically reduced the number of Kikuyus in his cabinet and replaced them with members of his own ethnic group. In addition, he secured his power by implementing a de jure single-party state (Elischer 2013, 48) and by detaining those who advocated multiparty politics (Adar and Munyae 2001, 6–7). By banning political opposition, President Moi secured monopolistic control of the state. In the years that followed, he used his monopoly on state resources to the great benefit of his own ethnic group, in particular in the education sector.

When President arap Moi gained power in 1978, he wanted to increase his own people's access to secondary schools in their own province. His predecessor had allocated most of the education resources to the Central province (home to the Kikuyu). Hence, President Moi reallocated education resources away from Central province to other provinces and especially to his ethnic group. The new schools built in the homeland of the Kalenjin, however, were then also populated by other ethnic groups, who formerly went to schools in Central province. To restrict attendance of secondary schools in the Kalenjin home province mainly to fellow Kalenjins, President Moi enacted the quota system, which regulated the admission of students to all Kenyan secondary schools (Amutabi 2003, 135). The quota system required that 85 percent of a school's students would come from the school's local area, that is, only 15 percent of the students admitted could come from outside the local area. This policy was purportedly enacted to "strengthen local interest and commitment towards development and maintanance of their schools" (Republic of Kenya 1988, 29).

An immediate consequence of the quota system was its reinforcement of ethnic identity and regionalism: "Good or bad performance of a school is no longer viewed as that of the individual school but rather as [the performance of] a school from a particular ethnicity" (Amutabi 2003, 135).

In addition, the quota system had consequences for the use of English as the language of instruction in secondary schools (Amutabi 2003, 135). The quota system produced secondary school classes that were fairly homogeneous in terms of ethnic composition. Instead of English, lectures could therefore make use of local vernaculars. Thus, even secondary education became a site for promotion of vernaculars, further increasing their importance.

Additional evidence of biased resource distribution along ethnic lines comes from demographic and health surveys in Kenya (1989–2009) showing that fellow tribesmen of Kenyan presidents have a higher probability of finishing primary education (Kramon and Posner 2013). Clientelistic resource distribution nurtured the feeling of having been left out among those outside a president's own ethnic circle and the conviction that their own ethnic group would prosper only if a fellow tribesman was in power. Thus, resource distribution seems to have been an important factor explaining the development of ethnicity politicization in Kenya.

Period 1992–2002

The period 1992–2002 was marked by the return of Kenya to multiparty politics. The ensuing general elections in 1992 and 1997 were particularly violent and politicians strongly relied on ethnic identities as political support blocks. Thus, instead of reducing the level of politicization of ethnicity, the shift to multiparty politics seemed to increase the usefulness of ethnicity in the political process.

After substantial pressure from international donors and the withholding of US$1 billion of development aid, Kenya returned to multiparty elections in 1991 (Ajulu 1998b, 275). The following two multiparty elections were characterized by low programmatic content in party manifestos, substantial ethnic rhetoric, and the employment of hired thugs to rig elections (Elischer 2013,

53). Parties advocated for the interests of specific ethnic groups, namely Luo and Luhya (FORD-K), Kikuyu (FORD-A), the cousin ethnic groups Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru (DP), and the KAMATUSA (KANU). President Moi with his KANU party received most of his votes in Rift Valley, North-Eastern, Eastern, and Coast provinces—the home of the KAMATUSA groups. The DP and FORD-A were particularly strong in Central province—populated mainly by the Kikuyu; and Ford-K was able to win most electoral seats in the province inhabited by the Luo, that is, Nyanza province (African Elections Database 2012).

Before the return to multiparty politics, the incumbent president's party—KANU—was based primarily on the Kalenjin ethnic group. In the run-up to the first multiparty elections, Moi tried to enlarge his ethnic support base by creating the ethnic coalition KAMATUSA in order to counter the political opposition made up by Luo and Kikuyu (Simatei 2010, 428). KAMATUSA was based on ethnic groups indigenous to the Rift Valley province, that is, Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu (Lynch 2006, 57–58; Simatei 2010, 427–428). The creation of the KAMATUSA was supported by leading KANU politicians, who stressed the cultural similarities of the different ethnic groups, namely Nilo-Hamitic language and a common pastoralist tradition (Lynch 2006, 58).

That the KAMATUSA was based on ethnic groups indigenous to the Rift Valley province is no coincidence. Both the Rift Valley and Coast provinces have ethnically heterogeneous populations, making them potential swing states (Ajulu 1998b, 277). Given Kenya's constitutional requirement that winning parties/candidates must have a minimum of 25 percent support in at least five of the country's provinces, these two provinces in particular were targets of President Moi's electoral campaigns. Because Kenya has a first-past-the-post electoral system (FPTP), parties must gain the support of a majority of the voting population in order to win. To ensure that the majority of the population of the Rift Valley and Coastal provinces voted for Moi, KANU politicians persuaded the inhabitants of the two provinces to evict citizens of ethnic groups not linked to Moi (i.e., non-Kalenjin/non-KAMATUSA) (Daily Nation 1999a, 17; Kimenyi and Ndung'u 2005, 125). While the Kalenjjin (plus Maasai, Samburu, and Turkana)

constituted the main support base for the incumbent President Moi, the Kikuyu, Luo, and Luhya were seen by Moi supporters as voting for the opposition party. Hence, the eviction of the latter ethnic groups from their homes would automatically result in a lower vote share for the opposition party.

Politicians used ethnic mobilization strategies, including ethnic rhetoric and hired thugs, to change the voting demographics in the two swing voting provinces. In particular, KANU politicians used hate speeches and the distribution of incendiary leaflets during electoral rallies to mobilize voters and instigate ethnic violence before the 1992 and 1997 election. The Judicial Commission that investigated the ethnic clashes argued that all violent incidents were preceded by electoral rallies in the Rift Valley wherein high-ranked Kalenjin politicians urged their ethnic clientele, in pursuit of Kalenjin KANU victory, to evict the non-Kalenjin population from the province (Daily Nation 1999a, 54).

More specifically, ethnic clashes in October 1992 started in the Rift Valley at the Miteitei farm and quickly spread to other parts in Rift Valley and even beyond into the Nyanza province. Non-Kalenjin or non-Maasai, that is, mainly Kikuyu and Luo, were attacked: some were killed and houses were burned (Daily Nation 1999a, 2). Although the latter ethnic groups had been settled in the Rift Valley province for decades, they were labeled by the Kalenjin as "foreigners" or "madoadoa" (translation: spots) who needed to be sent back to their ancestral homes (Daily Nation 1999a, 17; Ajulu 2010, 259). While the aggressors could not always be identified, most witnesses maintained that they were foreign Kalenjin not belonging to the local population but wearing similar uniforms and arms (Daily Nation 1999a, 51, 54). They also claimed that Kikuyus were attacked because they would not vote for Moi's KANU but for the opposition parties (FORD-A, FORD-K, or DP) (Daily Nation 1999a, 46). This suggests that the tribal clashes were not spontaneous but well-planned actions with common patterns, and hence might be best described as the working of hired thugs.

The majority of ethnic clashes took place in constituencies where the non-KAMATUSA population had the majority (Kimenyi and Ndung'u 2005, 149). For example, the most

intensive clashes took place in the Nakuru district in Rift Valley (Daily Nation 1999a, 42), one of the districts with the lowest proportion of KAMATUSA (15.7 percent whereas 60 percent were Kikuyus) and before 1992 the majority of parliamentarians in Nakuru came from the Kikuyu (=non-KAMATUSA) ethnic group. KAMATUSA ethnic groups, fearing that this district would vote in favor of the opposition party (Daily Nation 1999a, 44), thus were probably the driving force behind the intensive ethnic clashes in this district.

In addition to the eviction strategy and the emphasis on KAMATUSA ethnic identity, President Moi employed gerrymandering to ensure electoral victory in 1992 (Fox 1996, 597; Southall 1999, 94; Omolo 2002, 219). In 1987, President Moi added 30 new constituencies (formerly 158, then 188), which were allocated disproportionately to the areas of Moi's ethnic support base. In addition, Kenya's two major cities, that is, Nairobi and Mombasa, did not receive any additional parliamentary seats despite the substantial increase in inhabitants over the past years (Fox 1996, 602). This was probably because both cities comprise a large proportion of opposition ethnic groups, that is, Kikuyu and Luo (Fox 1996, 602). As a consequence, constituencies where the main ethnic support base of President Moi is located (Rift Valley, Eastern, and North-Eastern provinces) gained a number of parliamentary seats quite disproportionate to their share of the overall population. As Fox (1996, 604) shows, the home of the traditional opposition party (i.e. the West, Central, and Coast provinces as well as the city of Nairobi) has a substantially lower number of parliamentary seats despite their high population size. In particular, Nairobi had only eight parliamentary seats, with a population of 680,000, while the North-Eastern province had ten seats with a population of 142,000. Similarly, Eastern province had 32 parliamentary seats and Central province had 25, despite the fact that each province had the same number of registered voters (Ajulu 1998, 280). As the author points out, in the 1992 general election President Moi needed only 33,352 registered voters to attain electoral victory, while the opposition party needed 51,850 (Fox 1996, 604).[10] The alignment of constituencies to the ethnic support

base of President Moi increased the usefulness of ethnicity as a basis for political mobilization and thus contributed to the high level of ethnic politicization in Kenya.

President Moi's strategy yielded victory in the 1992 elections. He received the majority of his votes in the traditional areas of the KAMATUSA groups (i.e., Rift Valley, North-Eastern, Eastern, and Coast provinces), while gaining very little support from traditionally Kikuyu and Luo areas (Central and Nyanza provinces) (African Elections Database 2012). Ethnic rhetoric and orchestrated ethnic violence resulted in election results mirroring ethnic lines. Thus, the level of politicization of ethnicity was high during the time of the general election in 1992.

The 1997 general election looked very much like the 1992 election: very low programmatic content of manifestos, ethnic rhetoric, instigated ethnic clashes, and voting along ethnic lines (Elischer 2013, 72–74). The political opposition became still more fragmented and opposition parties were based on very narrow ethnic groups (i.e., FORD-K (Luhya), NDP (Luo), DP (Kikuyu), and SDP (Kamba)). Politicians made ample use of ethnic rhetoric in the run-up of the 1997 election (Elischer 2013, 54–55).

In addition, an "eviction strategy" similar to that used for the 1992 election was employed prior to the 1997 election, only this time in the Coast province, and in particular in two districts, the Likoni division of Mombasa and Kwale district. The population in these districts is ethnically heterogeneous and the main divide is between the Muslim coastal ethnic groups (Digo and Duruma) and the Christian population (Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, and Kamba). As in 1992, the strategy was to evict ethnic groups not supportive of President Moi in order to increase Moi's vote share and thereby contribute to electoral victory. Leaflets warned the "upcountry" population in the Coast province—that is, Kamba, Luo, Kikuyu, and Luhya—to leave the province and return to their "home" (Daily Nation 1999b, 15). The long-standing belief of the coastal population (in particular the Digo) that they were economically disadvantaged and had lost their ancestral lands to the upcountry population (particularly to the Kikuyu) has added

to the readiness of the Digo to attack the "non-indigenous" population (Rutten and Owuor 2009, 314, with reference to Human Rights Watch 2002).

Ethnic clashes started in August 1997 when a group of Digo youth raided the Likoni police station, took weapons, killed policemen, and burned down the station. The raiders then proceeded to burn private property, including two churches, and to kill putatively "upcountry" people (Daily Nation 1999b, 22, 31). Over 3,500 people fled from the violence to a church in Likoni. When the ethnic clashes stopped after two weeks, the death toll was 65 and over 10,000 people had been displaced from their homes in the Coast province (Kimenyi and Ndung'u 2005, 125–126).

During the displacements before the elections in 1992 and 1997, the police and other administrative units were found to either be passive or to actively support the attackers. For example, during the pre-1997 election clashes, the police and the provincial administration in the Coastal province were seen as having supported the attackers by promoting oathing ceremonies, supplying military training, and refusing to prevent ethnic clashes despite prior intelligence regarding such actions (Daily Nation 1999a, 56, 60; 1999b, 7, 18; Southall 1999, 99).

The ethnic clashes proved successful and KANU was able to increase its parliamentary seats from one seat (1992) to two (1997) and to increase the overall vote shares in Kenya from 34 percent (1992) to 42 percent (1997) (Mutahi 2005, 70–71). The ethnic rhetoric and displacement of certain ethnic groups in the run-up to the general election resulted in voting along ethnic lines. The KANU mainly won seats in traditional regions of the KAMATUSA ethnic groups (i.e., Rift Valley, Coast, North-Eastern, Eastern) but it failed to secure support in other provinces, such as Nairobi (one seat out of eight) and Central (no seat out of 23) (Ajulu 1998a, 77–78). Support for the opposition parties also had a clear ethnic dimension. The SDP (Kamba) gained most of its votes in the Eastern province—the traditional location of the Kamba ethnic group. The NDP (Luo) with Raila Odinga won the majority of its seats in the Nyanza province—home to the Luo. Last, the FORD-K

party (Luhya) won almost 50 percent of its seats in the Western province—home of its ethnic group, the Luhya (Electoral Geography 2014).

Period 2002–2007

The period 2002–2007 was characterized by continued use of ethnic identities for political mobilization—albeit to a lesser extent than in previous periods. This might be explained by the fact that the two presidential candidates in the 2002 election came from the same ethnic group.

After two contested multiparty elections (1992 and 1997), President Moi was barred constitutionally from standing for a third election. He nominated Uhuru Kenyatta (Kikuyu), the son of the first president of Kenya (Jomo Kenyatta), as presidential candidate for the 2002 general elections. Prior to his nomination, Uhuru had not been actively involved in politics. The nomination of Uhuru might be explained with ethnic arithmetic: Moi's party was confronted with an opposition comprised of the Kikuyu—the most numerous ethnic group in Kenya—and a large number of smaller ethnic groups. The opposition party nominated Kibaki, a Kikuyu, as presidential candidate, with Raila Odinga (Luo) and Wamalwa Kijani (Luhya) candidates for premiership and vice presidency (Njogu 2005, 24). Moi wanted to split the Kikuyu vote between Kibaki (opposition) and Uhuru (incumbent party) (Mubuu 2005, 134; Njogu 2005, 25).

Two parties—the KANU with Uhuru Kenyatta and NARC with Kibaki—contested in the 2002 election. The party manifestos of the two parties contained very low programmatic content (28 percent and 32 percent of the party manifestos respectively contained programmatic statements) (Elischer 2013, 82, 89).[11] The negative ethnic rhetoric that was so prevalent during the 1992 and 1997 elections was largely absent from the 2002 electoral campaign. In terms of instigated ethnic clashes, the 2002 election likewise marked a departure from the previous two campaigns. This might be explained by the fact that both presidential candidates (i.e., Uhuru and Kibaki) came from and appealed to the Kikuyu ethnic group (Elischer 2013, 81). However, there was

some use of ethnic language to mobilize voters from specific ethnic groups. Kibaki appealed to one of the bigger ethnic groups, the Luhya (14 percent, see Table 2.1), employing symbols and language specific to the Luhya community (Katumanga 2005, 212). At one meeting, for example, Kibaki appeared alongside Wamalwa (a prominent Luhya politician), both dressed in the colobus monkey skins that represent royalty in Luhya tradition and signal a higher destiny for those who wear them. In addition, when addressing the Luhya people, Wamalwa referred to himself as the "first born" of the Luhya, which was the same as declaring himself to be the leader of the Luhya people.

The 2002 general election resulted in a victory of Kibaki and the NARC. Election results as well as evidence on ethnic rhetoric show that NARC and KANU received votes from and catered to various ethnic groups, that is, they were catch-all parties (Elischer 2013, 88–89). However, not long after the election long-standing ethnic animosities reemerged, in particular between Luo and Kikuyu. A period of rapid mergers and split-offs of ethnic support bases from parties characterized the years 2003–2006 (see Table 2.2, also Elischer 2013, 91). For example, the Luo fraction of the elected NARC party split from the party and eventually formed the basis of the opposition party in 2006, that is, the Orange Democratic Movement Kenya (ODM-K). Thus while the politicization of ethnicity seems to have decreased slightly during the electoral campaign in 2002, it returned to its previous high level shortly after the election.

Period 2007–2012

The years 2007–2012 were a particularly violent period in the history of Kenya. The general election results in 2007 closely mirrored ethnic lines and the following postelection violence led to thousands of deaths and displaced people. Grievances, such as those over land lost after the independence or biased resource distribution by previous governments, were a major driving force behind the postelection violence.

The run-up to the 2007 general election was characterized by constant mergers and splits of parties, with the main cleavage

being the Kikuyu/Luo divide (Elischer 2013, 88). The importance of ethnic identities as building blocks in the political process was highly visible in the ethnic voting pattern during the 2007 election and the ensuing outbreak of ethnic violence. An analysis of the general election showed that the voting pattern in Kenya can be described as a mere "ethnic census" (Bratton and Kimenyi 2008). Contesting parties were found to draw their support from distinct and separated ethnic groups. Kibaki's Party of National Unity (PNU) was mainly supported by the Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru ethnic groups. The Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), which combined several opposition groups and was headed by Raila Odinga, was supported by Luo, Luhya, and Kalenjin ethnic groups. The third presidential candidate, Musyoka, was supported by the Kamba (Gibson and Long 2009, 500). Again ethnic rhetoric dominated the electoral campaign. In Rift Valley, leaflets signed by the "Rift Valley Land Owners and Protectors army" warned "non-indigenous" ethnic groups that their lives depended on leaving the province and returning to their ancestral home (Integrated Regional Information Networks 2007). Kibaki was anounced winner of the election, but given the small margin and Raila Odinga's initial lead on the election day, voters cried foul. The anger over the lost election was intensified by the long-standing grievance over land lost during the independence period. The aftermath of the election was characterized by widespread ethnic violence, in particular between combatants aligned with the Luo, Kikuyu, and Kalenjin communities. This postelection violence resulted in more than 1,100 deaths and the displacement of around half a million Kenyans (Gibson and Long 2009, 497).

One factor contributing to the outbreak of ethnic violence might be the use of vernaculars in the electoral campaigning and discussions in particular after the release of the election results in local radio stations. In particular, the liberalization of the media in 2002 and the subsequent spread of vernacular radio stations, such as Inooro FM and Kameme FM (both Kikuyu), Lake Victoria (Luo), and Kass FM (Kalenjin), have contributed to the use of vernaculars and to increased ethnic consciousness (Wamwere 2008, 41). In the postelection period, these radio stations provided a platform for hate speeches and thereby crucially contributed

to the ethnic violence experienced in 2008 (Konrad Adenauer Foundation 2009; and Somerville 2011). Freer speech meant more ethnic speech. During radio transmissions strong ethnic language was used: for example, participants described all members of the Kikuyu ethnic groups as thieves (Wamere 2008, 42) and complained that "the 'mongoose' had come and 'stolen the chicken'" (which translated means that Kikuyus (mongoose) have "stolen" former Kalenjin land in the Rift Valley) (Somerville 2011, 91). This provides evidence that the Kikuyu predominance among land buyers after independence and their resulting resettlement in what had been Kalenjin areas still contribute to ethnic animosities to this day. Postelection ethnic violence in 2007 occurred precisely where Kikuyus resettled after the independence, strongly suggesting that the biased land distribution after independence had a lasting negative impact on ethnicity politicization.

Period 2012–Today

While politics in Kenya continues to be based on ethnic identities, there has not been another outbreak of ethnic violence as of this writing. Revisions of the electoral law might have contributed to a more attenuated use of ethnicity in the political process.

In contrast to the 2007 general elections, the most recent general elections, in March 2013, were generally peaceful (Afrobarometer 2013). Former president Kibaki was not allowed to contest for a third term. The main challengers for the presidency were Uhuru Kenyatta (Kikuyu) with the Jubilee Alliance and Raila Odinga (Luo) with the ODM. Kenyatta won the election by a small margin. But having learned from the 2007 postelection violence, both leaders urged their followers not to use violence to contest the election results (Afrobarometer 2013). Instead, Raila filed a petition to render the electoral results invalid, but accepted the Supreme Court of Kenya's ruling that electoral results were valid.

On the election day ethnic ties still proved a strong predictor of voting outcomes. On the basis of exit poll data, Feree et al. (2014, 158–159) find that 83 percent of the Kikuyus voted for Kenyatta (Kikuyu) and 94 percent of the Luos voted for Raila Odinga (Luo) (similar to results obtained for the 2007 election).

However, looking at the most recent data from the Afrobarometer one can discern a small—yet growing—notion of Kenyan national identity. While in earlier years, only 40–46 percent of the population agreed that the Kenyan identity is more important than ethnic identity, in 2011 this share rose to 56 percent.[12] Some caution is warranted as people might have learned that affirming the national identity is socially desirable (especially considering the international attention given to the 2007 postelection violence). Nevertheless, the results from the Afrobarometer provide some hope that the level of politicization is slowly decreasing in Kenya.

As noted, one factor explaining the apparent, if small, drop in ethnicity's relevance in the 2012 elections might be the revision of the electoral law following the postelection violence in 2007. Before 2007, electoral constituencies of the president's ethnic group held disproportionate numbers of parliamentary seats (compared to the number of eligible voters) and thus helped to ensure reelection. The revision of the electoral law addressed in particular the discrepancies between population figures and parliamentary seats. According to the new electoral law in Kenya constituencies must be aligned to a population quota, that is, dividing the number of population by the number of constituencies (Ongoya and Otieno 2012, 24–25). This means that now populous ethnically heterogeneous constituencies, such as the capital Nairobi, received parliamentary seats equivalent to their size and hence became important regions for electoral campaigning. Thus, the alignment of voter numbers to constituency size may have decreased the usefulness of ethnicity for political mobilization.

The Level of Politicization in Tanzania

As in Kenya, individuals in precolonial Tanzania did not belong to fixed and clearly identifiable ethnic groups. Rather, each person identified with various groups, such as the "nuclear family and extended family, lineage and chiefdom, and perhaps clan and tribe" (Iliffe 1979, 318). Which group individuals belonged to seemed more dependent on geographic location than on the ethnic group

of their ancestors (Iliffe 1979, 10). Boundaries of ethnic groups were loose and the transition from one ethnic group to another could be triggered by simple economic incentives. An example of the flow of ethnic identities is the following description of the Maasai (note that the Maasai are characterized by being nomadic and pastoralist, i.e., cattle and goat herders): "After the rinderpest had decimated their herds some nomadic Masai turned hunters like their congeners, the Ndorobo, before them. Masai married to Bantu women . . . settle[d] with their peasant in-laws" (Raum 1965, 165).[13] These examples show that a pastoralist Maasai losing their livestock could become a hunter and thus move closer to the Ndorobo identity. Similarly, a nomadic Maasai could change to a settled lifestyle and thereby become more like the members of the Bantu ethnic groups.

Colonial Period: 1885–1961

The colonial period from 1885 to 1961 did not lead to strong ethnic politicization in Tanzania. Oppression by the colonial rulers was felt evenly across ethnic groups, and resistance against the colonial administration was organized across ethnic lines.

Germany decided to create an East African colony comprising the territory of modern Tanzania in 1985, but the actual conquest of the territory and its inhabitants was not pursued with vigor (due to limited financial and political support from the German government) and hence was accomplished relatively slowly. The German colonial administration attempted to classify the Tanzanian population into different ethnic groups, but their approach was less vigorous than that of the British in Kenya. The German administration grouped the native population according to certain criteria (such as name of the tribe, population size, attitude toward Germans, etc.) and strove to maintain relatively homogeneous ethnic entities (Jerman 1997, 188–190). However, these ethnic entities were not governed by local ethnic leaders but instead by so-called maakida, mostly well-educated Muslims from the coastal area who spoke Swahili (Tripp 1999, 38). The imposition of these foreign Tanzanian leaders who spoke Swahili, together with the adoption of Swahili as the administrative

language in Tanzania (Jerman 1997, 209), helped to make Swahili a uniting factor for the country's diverse ethnic groups. Education policy further strengthened the role of Swahili during the German colonial period. To support the colonial administration and facilitate the dialogue of the native population with the colonial rulers, the education policy foresaw the learning of Swahili instead of vernaculars. In line with this objective, German administrative officers also had to learn Swahili (Jerman 1997, 209).

After World War I, the mandate to administer Tanzania was conferred on the United Kingdom. The British colonial rulers tried to change the administrative structure by creating distinct ethnic entities and replacing the maakida by local ethnic leaders. The reasons for this appear to be the following: First, the maakida were seen to have "accelerated the disintegration of 'tribal customs'" (the British believed that the diverse tribal identities of the native population should be preserved) (Jerman 1997, 262). Second, the British colonial rulers hoped that tax collections would increase if they were carried out by the local chief due to his/her closer ties to the inhabitants. However, even within the British administration, several opposing opinions existed about how administrative structures should be implemented. Opposition came, for example, from the Secretary for Native Affairs (Charles Dundas), whose previous experiences in East Africa had taught him that ethnic identities are fluid and contextual—instead of geographically fixed and time invariant (i.e., the prevailing notion within the British administration) (Graham 1976, 5; cited in Jerman 1997, 227). Similarly, the first administrator of the British colony (Sir Horace Byatt) believed that the administration should not "disturb the African population," which had suffered in the past from famine, diseases, and the consequences of the war (Ingham 1965, 547).

An underlying factor contributing to the leaner administrative approach in Tanzania was that the British colonial rulers focused on developing Kenya as the strategic center of East Africa with strong agricultural production. Tanzania seemed to have been a mere byproduct of the government of Kenya. This resulted in a low influx of European settlers in Tanzania and, as a consequence, little need for the colonial administration to expropriate and

systematically oppress the Tanzanian population (Brett 1973).[14] In sharp contrast to the expropriation of Kenyan population and the redistribution of land to white settlers, the British administration in Tanzania felt that "the first duty of the Government was to the native" (Brett 1973, 224). While Kenyans were not allowed to grow cash crops such as coffee[15] and instead were compelled by the imposition of heavy taxes to work on Europeans farms, Tanzanian farmers were explicitly encouraged to cultivate cash crops. In addition, the British were reluctant to promote settlement of Europeans in Tanzania; they refused to clear land for white settlers or to subsidize white settlement through the taxation of the African population—as done in Kenya (Brett 1973; Ch.7).[16] The few white settlers living in Tanzania at that time strongly opposed the African cash crop production (due to its competition with their own production) and asked for more advantageous laws to force Tanzanians to work longer on settlers' farms, but this was opposed by the British colonial rulers (Brett 1973, 224–225). Compared to Kenya, very few Europeans settled in Tanzania, which in turn prevented the Tanzanian postindependence government from having to redistribute land to the native population. Hence, the different strategic importance of Tanzania compared to Kenya (i.e., few settlers and not an economic center) meant that there was much less need to use ethnic divide-and-conquer tactics against the local population. In fact, the oppression by the colonial rulers was felt evenly by the Tanzanian population and hence the independence movement was supported by all ethnic groups: The Tanganyika African Association (TAA) was founded as a nationalist movement with cross-ethnic members (Tripp 1999, 40).

Thus, the colonial administrative approach in Tanzania led to much lower salience of ethnic identities during the colonial period. Although ethnic categories existed in Tanzania (see list of ethnic groups in Tanzania from the 1967 population census, displayed in Table 2.1), these were not politicized during the colonial period. Moreover, the laxer administrative and agricultural approach in Tanzania provided a favorable environment for cross-ethnic resistance, and resulted in a cross-ethnic national independence movement (cf. Iliffe 1979, Ch.13).

Period 1961–Today

During the postindependence period in Tanzania, strong nation-building policies, unbiased resource distribution, political representation independent of ethnic identities, and development of Swahili as a national language were implemented, which ensured that ethnic politicization remained at a very low level throughout Tanzania's history.

Tanzania (at that time called Tanganyika) became independent in 1961 and merged with Zanzibar to form the state of Tanzania in 1964. The first postcolonial government of Tanzania was led by Julius Nyerere with the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). An advocate of African self-rule and socialism, President Nyerere had a strong vision of a national Tanzanian identity and was respected by the population, who called him Mwalimu (Swahili for teacher). His vision for a socialist Tanzania included the belief that tribal identities are counterproductive: "Modern African socialism can draw from its traditional heritage the recognition of 'society' as an extension of the basic family unit. But it can no longer confine the idea of the social family within the limits of the tribe" (Nyerere 1966, 170). Over the course of his government period Nyerere introduced various policies to strengthen the use of Swahili as the national language, foster intermingling of different ethnic groups at an early stage, and make access to land, education, and government posts independent of one's ethnic identity. Thereby he and his party contributed to the very low level of politicization of ethnicity (Aminzade 2013).

One of the most important factors explaining the low level of ethnic politicization in Tanzania is the language Swahili, which became the cornerstone of the Tanzanian national identity (Laitin 1992; Barkan 1994; Miguel 2004). Nyerere stressed that "we need to break up tribal consciousness among the people and…build up a national consciousness" (Nyerere 1966, 39). He promoted the universal use of Swahili by, for example, translating Shakespeare into Swahili (Topan 2008, 257). The use of a Bantu-rooted language instead of the language inherited from the former colonial rulers (English) enhanced the acceptance of a national language (Laitin 1992, 8). While colonial languages are associated with the

oppressions by the former colonial ruler, Swahili is a truly "African" language and thus free from negative connotations of the former. In addition, Swahili was not strongly associated with any particular ethnic group and thus could be regarded as a "neutral" language.

After Tanzania became independent and embarked on the socialist way envisioned by Nyerere, the government pushed for a quick promotion of Swahili throughout the country. Education policies clearly targeted the use of Swahili as a national language. While vernaculars and English were used as the language of instruction under British colonial rule, Tanzania adopted Swahili as the common language of instruction in all primary schools (Laitin 1992, 139; Jerman 1997, 251). In secondary schools, teaching was carried out in English, but Swahili continued to be an examinable subject (Kessler 2006, 49). The use of ethnic vernaculars was also minimized in the political and professional spheres and restricted to the social and personal spheres. Local ethnic languages were strongly discouraged in government offices and national businesses (Whiteley 1969, 111, as cited in Tripp 1999, 54). People were expected to communicate and work together using Swahili as their common language. Another factor increasing interethnic cooperation and the use of Swahili was a policy that encouraged the posting of civil servants outside of their home region (Tripp 1999, 45).

Besides the promotion of Swahili several policies in the education system were introduced to support the nation-building project in Tanzania. Access to schooling has been regulated by the government to prevent favoritism toward any ethnic group. In particular, the quota system in Tanzania was designed to ensure that the limited places in secondary schools were equally allocated by gender and region (Cooksey et al. 1994, 216; Therkildsen 2000, 413). In addition, the school curriculum emphasized the common Tanzanian identity and history (Court 1984, as cited in Miguel 2004, 335).

While biased access to land was one of the major factors that increased ethnic politicization in Kenya, various policies in Tanzania contributed to relatively equal land distribution. In particular, President Nyerere's quest for *ujamaa* (Swahili for familyhood) through villagization, the much disputed policy

of establishing ujamaa villages, ensured that no ethnic group received favored access to land (Nyerere 1966). Prior to this policy, the Tanzanian population lived in relatively scattered clusters, which made it difficult for the government to provide basic infrastructure. Nyerere's administration set out to build villages with appropriate infrastructure and communal farmland and then to regroup the population into these larger villages. Nyerere wanted to create self-supporting entities. Through forced resettlements almost 80 percent of the Tanzanian population was living in ujamaa villages by 1976 (Barkan 1994, 20). Although scholars agree that the policy of ujamaa set the wrong incentives for economic growth, it had positive effects on equal land distribution. No ethnic group was favored in the redistribution of land. In addition, areas that produced cash crops, such as coffee and tea, were heavily taxed and these revenues were used to support areas with lower production outputs (Barkan 1994, 23). The ujamaa villagization policy also increased the necessity of communicating in Swahili. People from various ethnic groups were drawn together in the ujamaa villages and hence the need for a common language significantly increased (Kessler 2006, 49).

Besides the language, education, and land distribution policies, Tanzania took various active steps to reduce the usefulness of ethnic groups as political building blocks. For example, Tanzania abolished the system of indirect rule through traditional leaders that it inherited from the British colonial rulers. Under British rule these traditional leaders catered to the needs of an ethnically defined community. By prohibiting these traditional leaders from participating in the independence government, political elites made it clear that ethnically oriented leadership had no place in Tanzania (Listowell 1968, 320–322, as cited in Lofchie 2013, 131).[17]

In addition, during the eras of both single-party rule and the multiparty system, Tanzania's leading party tried to maintain a regional balance—and thus an ethnic balance—in the distribution of government posts (Tripp 1999, 44; Nyang'oro 2006). Nyang'oro's (2006) analysis of the allocation of key government posts from 1990 to 2000 demonstrates that the posts were distributed across more than 11 different ethnic groups and that

no single ethnic group dominated the government during this period. In addition, governments since independence have taken pains to ensure that the president comes from the mainland while the vice-president comes from Zanzibar (Kessler 2006, 59). This tradition ensures at least some religious balance, as a mainlander is likely to be Christian and a candidate coming from Zanzibar is likely to be a Muslim (Tripp 1999, 45).

Furthermore, electoral constituencies were created as large entities so that politicians had to appeal to different ethnic groups to win the constituency (Tripp 1999, 45). For example, the territory of the two unrelated ethnic groups Wameru and Waarush was combined in the newly created Arusha Rural constituency (Bavu 1989, 6–7, as cited in Tripp 1999, 45).

Last, there are several electoral rules that prohibit the use of ethnicity in the political context. Political parties in Tanzania must have national support (at least 200 voters in ten different regions in Tanzania), and they are not allowed to be based on religious, ethnic, tribal, or racial groups (United Republic of Tanzania 1992, The Political Parties Act, Article 8). Moreover, a Code of Ethics for Elections was introduced in 2005 according to which Swahili must be used in political campaigning (EISA 2010). If vernaculars are used for political campaigning, Swahili translators have to be employed. Candidates not complying with this code are banned from political campaigning.

Nyerere led TANU, or Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) as it was later called, until 1985. To this day, the CCM has won every election, first under single-party rule and from 1995 onwards under multiparty rule.[18] An analysis of the voter base and ethnic rhetoric of the CCM between 1995 and 2010 reveals that CCM is a catch-all party with strong national support and an absence of ethnic rhetoric (Elischer 2013, 193–196). The low political salience of ethnicity is also supported by evidence coming from the Afro-Barometer Network (Afrobarometer 2002), which provides information on the self-identification of people. Most prominently, the majority of Tanzanians identify themselves in occupational categories (76 percent) rather than in ethnic/language/tribe (3 percent), racial (< 1 percent), or religious categories (5 percent) (ibid., 38). In comparison to the other ten surveyed African countries,

Tanzanians seem to exhibit a unique identification pattern, which is strongly built on nonethnic related identities.[19]

The only evidence of ethnicity's political relevance in Tanzanian politics can be found in the tension between Muslims and Christians in the semi-autonomous territory of Zanzibar (Campbell 1991). On the islands of Zanzibar and the coast of the mainland, the Civic United Front (CUF), the strongest opposition party until 2010, has its base. CUF uses partially programmatic statements but is also seen by the incumbent party and the population in Zanzibar as the main party of the Pemba people (Muslims) (news24archives 2000). The 2000 election (won by the CCM candidate) was followed by riots by CUF members in Zanzibar, who claimed that elections were not fair. Twenty-three people died during the clashes. The government reacted by setting up a Commission to examine the violence and by further changing the electoral system to ensure that ethnic violence will not break out again. A by-election in 2003 in Zanzibar was considered to be peaceful (Integrated Regional Information Networks 2014). The traces of ethnic tensions seem further decreased as shown by the last general elections in 2005. In particular, voters were less inclined to vote for CUF, and the party was only the third strongest force in Tanzania after the CHADEMA. Founded in 1993, the CHADEMA does not use ethnic rhetoric but has only very low support in the population (mainly among the Chagga ethnic group) (Elischer 2013, 196).

Discussion

While the level of politicization certainly varied throughout Kenya's history, with peaks in particular before elections, the average level of politicization in Kenya remained high throughout the observation period. In contrast, politicization of ethnicity in Tanzania remained very low throughout its history. Three sets of factors explain the differing levels of politicization in Kenya and Tanzania, namely institutional settings (including colonial administrative rule and electoral boundaries), resource distribution (agricultural land, governmental posts, and access to

education), and nation-building policies (in particular, the use of vernaculars versus Swahili).

Britain's aim to transform Kenya into the core of East Africa and its strategy to develop a strong Kenyan export sector led to the widespread settlement of Europeans in the most fertile areas in Kenya. The settlement policies of the British government could only be implemented by expropriating the land of several ethnic groups living in these areas. The ethnic groups which bore the major burden of this policy were Kalenjin, Maasai, and in particular the Kikuyu. The strong grievance over the expropriation of their land led to the Kikuyu's pioneering role in the independence movement and to colonial rule impeding a cross-ethnic national resistance. The large-scale expropriations by the British obligated the postindependence government to redistribute the former settlers' land. At this point the government led by Kenyatta had the opportunity to redistribute this land equally. However, the major beneficiaries from the land distribution were the Kikuyus, who settled primarily in areas formerly occupied by other ethnic groups, such as the Kalenjin. The grievances these ethnic groups felt over the land lost to the Kikuyu still persist today and contribute to an increased politicization of ethnicity. Further policies implemented by the postindependence governments, such as the quota system in the education sector and the promotion of local vernaculars, additionally spurred ethnic consciousness and thereby increased the political salience of ethnicity. Kenyan politicians failed to implement suitable nation-building policies that could have overcome the diversity of ethnic consciousness and created an overarching national identity. In addition, electoral boundaries matching ethnic location, first established during the colonial period, have substantially increased the usefulness of ethnicity for political purposes and thus contributed to the high level of politicization. Last, politicians in Kenya have not only reacted to the prevailing high level of politicization but also aggravated the situation by utilizing ethnic identities during electoral campaigns (through the use of ethnic rhetoric and attacks by hired ethnic thugs).

In contrast, the development in Tanzania led to a low level of politicization of ethnicity. The British colonial ruler showed little interest in the occupation of Tanzania due to its focus on Kenya as the strategic center of East Africa. This resulted in a low influx of European settlers and, as a consequence, in little need to expropriate and systematically oppress the Tanzanian population by the colonial administration. In addition, lessons learned in Kenya in combination with administrative personnel in Tanzania sympathetic to the African population led to a more lenient administrative approach in Tanzania which did not rely on a systematic separation of ethnic groups. This was a favorable environment for cross-ethnic resistance which resulted in a cross-ethnic national independence movement and provided the first postindependence president, Julius Nyerere, with an opportunity to pursue his vision of a united Tanzania. Through the low influx of white settlers in Tanzania, President Nyerere was freed from the need to redistribute land after independence. Moreover, he pursued the ujamaa policy, which granted equal access to land to the Tanzanian population regardless of their ethnic identity. In addition to equal resource distribution, Nyerere implemented strong nation-building policies focusing on the promotion of Swahili and fostering interethnic cooperation. Specific electoral policies additionally barred ethnicity from the political sphere.

Could it be that differences in ethnic structure alone or in part explain the stark difference between Tanzania and Kenya? In a word, no. The claim that President Nyerere pursued programmatic politics because his own ethnic group—the Zanaki—was too small to build a minimum winning coalition might seem persuasive in isolation. But the Zanaki ethnic group is of similar size as the Tugen, the ethnic group of Kenya's President arap Moi (see Table 2.1). Both ethnic groups are negligible with population shares below 1.5 percent.[20] However, as illustrated frequently, ethnic categories, rather than corresponding to stable and fixed identities, can be made and remade and Kenyan politicians have formed larger ethnic support groups by combining various cousin ethnic groups into larger super-groups (i.e., Tugen together with other ethnic groups formed the Kalenjin).

In sum, a primary factor explaining the differing level of politicization of ethnicity in these two nations lies in their different institutional settings. Through the colonial approach of "divide and rule," the British built well-defined ethnic groups in Kenya, while a looser colonial administration in Tanzania equipped the country with a basis for pan-ethnic political organization. Following colonization, electoral systems further increased the usefulness of ethnic identities for political mobilization in Kenya. In contrast, nation-building policies, such as promotion of a national language and fostering interethnic cooperation through the education system, reduced the relevance of ethnicity in everyday life and thereby lessened the politicization of ethnic identities in Tanzania.

Second, biased resource distribution in Kenya and allocation of land independent of ethnic identity in Tanzania also helped to produce the diverging levels of politicization. While Tanzania followed a socialist approach resulting in equal access to land, Kenya experienced a period of expropriation and biased redistribution of land. Comparing the distribution of both land and clientelistic resources in Kenya and Tanzania provides evidence that unequal access to land, political posts, and infrastructure in Kenya increased ethnic animosity, whereas access to resources unrelated to ethnic membership in Tanzania led to far lower consciousness of ethnic identities.

While the structural factors laid the foundation for strong ethnic identities, throughout Kenya's history politicians have further contributed to sporadic rises in the level of ethnic politicization. Politicians are likely to respond to prevailing levels of politicization, for example, by mobilizing already salient ethnic identities as suitable voter bases. However, in other times, politicians might themselves provide the impetus and actively promote ethnic identities, thereby changing the prevailing levels of politicization. Politicians not only react to a prevailing environment but actively shape ethnic identities and thereby increase the level of politicization of ethnicity (De Leon et al. 2009). Evidence from Kenya demonstrates that political entrepreneurs have exacerbated the level of politicization by using ethnic identities for political mobilization rather than merely reacting to the prevailing

environment. (However, we do acknowledge that a clear distinction between these two forms of politicization of ethnicity can be difficult to achieve in particular cases.)

On the other hand, Tanzania's politicians have emphasized national ideas and used programmatic content rather than ethnicity to mobilize voters. In particular, Julius Nyerere, the first president of independent Tanzania, had a long-lasting positive influence on ethnic relations in Tanzania. His vision of a national Tanzanian identity and policies implemented to foster nation building provided the foundation for the low level of politicized ethnicity in Tanzania today.

CHAPTER THREE

The Latin American Cases: Bolivia and Peru

Introduction

Bolivia and Peru are highly heterogeneous societies. In Bolivia, the latest census counted 41 percent of the population belonging to any of the 36 recognized indigenous peoples, each with their own language. In Peru, the 2007 Census of Indigenous Communities in the Peruvian Amazon recorded 51 different peoples. Yet despite this heterogeneity, these different groups are often summarized in policy and practice as "the indigenous population." If any distinction is made, it is according to geographic origin, with the largest groups (the Quechua and Aymara in both countries) traditionally in the countryside of the Andean highlands and a much larger number of smaller peoples in the lowlands of the Amazonian rainforest. And despite this heterogeneity, ethnic politicization has been generally rather low in both countries, yet growing stronger during certain times, in different ways.

During Spanish colonialism and the first decades of independence, politicization consisted mainly of the institutionalization of ethnic difference through parallel legislation for indigenous and for creole inhabitants, that is, those descended from Europeans. In some instances, factionalism among the creole elite motivated creole–indigenous alliances against the governing faction, during

which promises for indigenous rights and resources were made; yet, these alliances neither lasted nor resulted in sustained politicization. During later efforts toward nation building, governments—still mainly of creole descent—attempted to include the indigenous population in the nation, but inequality and the social salience of ethnic difference persisted. Ethnicity increasingly reentered the formal sphere from the 1990s onwards in Bolivia, but not in Peru, this time not driven by political elites but by nontraditional, indigenous actors emerging from the countryside. The following sections explore and explain the politicization of ethnicity in Bolivia and Peru chronologically, detailing both the presence and absence of politicization. The discussion section draws together the different actors and structural factors that affected the type and level of politicization.

Spanish Colonialism

The so-called indigenous population is not one homogeneous group but a collective noun for everyone living in Latin America before the arrival of the Spanish colonizers in the beginning of the sixteenth century, as well as their direct descendants. Before colonization, the area of modern-day Peru and Bolivia was inhabited by a large number of diverse peoples. Along the coast and the Andean mountain range the Incan Empire Tawantinsuyu had forcibly conquered or assimilated many of the smaller, scattered native populations. In exchange for tribute payments to the empire, they received territorial rights, protection, and relative autonomy. Thus, while the official language of the empire was Quechua, many local languages and dialects prevailed. The vast Amazonian lowlands exhibited even higher heterogeneity, home to many small communities that lived in relative isolation. The sweeping Spanish conquest in the 1530s marked the end of the Incan Empire and integrated the coastal, Andean, and lowland regions into the Viceroyalty of Peru—although, just as the Incan Empire, the Spanish did not manage to penetrate the dense, rainforest-covered Amazonian lowlands for several decades (Klein 1992, 287; Klarén 2000,

1–31). Instead, the colonization and administration of the Amazonian lowlands was "delegated" to the Catholic Church and private actors (Remy 1994, 117; Albó 2002, 176). The interactions with the state hence differed between highland and lowland indigenous communities. In this chapter we refer to the former if not indicated otherwise (the topography is depicted in the maps in Figures 3.1 and 3.2).



Figure 3.1 Map of contemporary Bolivia.
Source: Library of Congress (http://www.loc.gov/resource/g5320.ct002052/).

Figure 3.2 Map of contemporary Peru.
Source: Library of Congress (http://www.loc.gov/resource/g5310.ct001558/).

To govern the vast area of the viceroyalty, which included most of Spanish South America, the Spanish Crown resorted to creating two "republics": the "Republic of Spaniards" and the "Republic of Indians," each governed by a different set of laws. This segregation was based on the conviction—at the time widespread and legally institutionalized in Spain with regard

to other minorities—that the indigenous population did not possess "clean blood" and that the Spanish needed to be protected from contamination. The natural superiority believed to result from clean blood soon justified the privileging of the colonizers over the colonized (Loveman 2014, 62). Although the latter covered a highly diverse population, the laws and their political, economic, and social consequences created and reified an indigenous category, with a common boundary to the Spanish colonizers and their descendants, the creoles (Thurner 1997, 5–8). One key facet of this distinction was the system of *encomiendas*, which continued the Incan tribute: Spaniards and creoles were entrusted with lands and indigenous laborers and, in exchange for their labor and tribute payments, were tasked with protecting them and instructing them in Spanish culture and Catholicism. Abuses of the system and additional labor obligations in the silver mines, together with the consequences of violent colonization and the spread of European diseases, soon took a toll on the native population. Severely diminished and scattered, communities were uprooted and, regardless of origin, merged into larger and geographically bounded entities with increased state presence (Klein 1992, 37–38; Klarén 2000, 41–51). These so-called *reducciones* and the encomienda system both helped to reify the imagined indigenous population and to maintain the salience of the indigenous versus Spanish distinction.

While relatively strong in the rural areas of the viceroyalties, the distinction began to blur in the cities as the new ethnic category of mestizos—those of both indigenous and Spanish descent—emerged (Larson 2004, 145). By 1795, mestizos were the second-largest and fastest-growing demographic group in the viceroyalty, with approximately 22 percent of the population (Fisher 2003, 55).[1] Although these demographic realities further belied any clear-cut ethnic distinction, as attempted by Spanish crown officials, it did not do much to undermine the hierarchical ordering of ethnic categories: as mestizos were perceived as illegitimate offspring, they were said to lack the "purity of blood" legally required for public office (Klarén 2000, 94).

Despite, or because of, the highly unequal power relations, enhanced by language difficulties and illiteracy, the indigenous population adapted to the situation and resorted to the legal system to defend or advance their interests and, in doing so, implicitly recognized the colonial legal order (Klarén 2000, 65). Yet in some instances, resentments over labor exploitation or religious pressures from the Catholic Church would or could not be settled in court and instead led to armed revolts, with at times Incan undertones.

The revolts usually remained local, community bound, and short lived, but when economic reforms in the second half of the eighteenth century further increased the burden on the indigenous population, they sparked large-scale and well-coordinated uprisings that threatened the colonial regime. The Great Rebellion of 1780–1782 began with an insurrection spearheaded by José Gabriel Condorcanqui, who took to arms when his proposals for reform of the tax system were repeatedly declined by crown officials. Supported by a multiethnic alliance of indigenous, mestizos, and creoles, Condorcanqui's main aim was to change a malfunctioning government, rather than to overthrow the regime per se. Yet the Incan rhetoric he used to mobilize the local indigenous population—for example, he called himself Túpac Amaru II after last Incan emperor from whom he claimed to be descended—was quickly turned around by crown officials, who styled the insurrection as an ethnic war of indigenous against creoles.[2] Condorcanqui's rebellion was followed by that of Julián Apasa Nina, naming himself Túpac Katari, in the south, as well as a multitude of smaller revolts throughout the viceroyalty, which became increasingly radical and which were increasingly painted as following a race war agenda. The revolts thus turned into a civil war of indigenous rebels against creole government forces, with the loss of nearly 100,000 lives (Klarén 2000, 108–121; Thomson 2003, 119–121; Robins 2005, 37–50).

Following repression of the revolts, the creole authorities sought to strictly control indigenous identity and customs to erode any future attempts at insurrection: they confiscated property, removed indigenous community leaders from office,

and banned Incan symbols and native languages. And although they also aimed at addressing the causes of the rebellions by reducing labor and tax obligations, local elites continued to exploit the indigenous population (Flores Gallindo 2005, 159–166; Robins 2005, 50–51). What had begun as a multiethnic alliance for reform ended in an even stricter differentiation between ethnic categories in both politics and society (Mallon 2010, 284–285).

From the 1790s, the repression, together with a mining crisis, harvest failures, and epidemics, led to tensions, also among the creole elite. Upheavals in Europe and the collapse of the Spanish Crown provided those dissatisfied with the royal rule with the opportunity to obtain the power to govern independently from Spain. The wars of independence ensuing in the early nineteenth century were fought mainly between American-born creoles and Spaniards, although support existed among indigenous and mestizos for both sides. Following creole victory, the Republic of Peru was proclaimed in 1821 while the area south of Lake Titicaca became the Republic of Bolivia in 1825.

Independent Bolivia

Bolivia's first president, independence fighter Simón Bolívar, after whom the republic was named, decreed the equality of all citizens and the abolition of the indigenous tribute system. However, the war of independence had brought the young state to the brink of economic collapse, and a decline in silver production as well as the bureaucracy's inability to collect taxes from the creoles further worsened the economic situation. Bolívar's successor thus reintroduced the tribute payments only one year later, notwithstanding the constitutional recognition of the equality of citizens. Indigenous tribute payments now constituted nearly 60 percent of government revenues. In return, the creole authorities also continued the protectionist policies of the colonial state throughout the highlands and legally confirmed indigenous communities, the *ayllus*, as well as their right to territory. Until the 1860s, the ayllu-based

population, although subject to the tribute payments, grew by 24 percent and supported the policy as it provided their inhabitants with relative autonomy (Klein 1992, 105–106; Larson 2004, 205–211).[3]

The upshot of such autonomy was that ayllu-inhabitants were also prevented from active political participation in the Bolivian Republic. Electoral law required employment and later the ability to read and write in Spanish for the right to vote. These requirements practically excluded the ayllu population, as they mainly practiced subsistence farming, had little formal education, and were unlikely to know Spanish. Of the approximately 1.4 million Bolivians registered in the first national census of 1846, of which around 1 million were indigenous, hardly 20 percent were fluent in Spanish and only 7 percent literate (Klein 1992, 121–122; Larson 2004, 204–205). While policymakers were aware of this de facto exclusion of the indigenous population, they argued that the requirements were aimed at excluding the "ignorant" population, and insisted that should indigenous inhabitants meet the necessary standards, they would of course be allowed to vote (Barragán 2005, 288, 393). Thus, while the legal framework per se did not make references to ethnicity, and while it also excluded some mestizos and creoles, the suffrage restrictions contributed to the continued salience of the distinction between indigenous and nonindigenous citizens. Moreover, they prevented proindigenous issues from being put on the political agenda—and hence ethnicity from being politicized beyond the tribute system—as no votes could be won with them. State policies thus bolstered the continued relevance of the categorical difference between indigenous and nonindigenous citizens while ensuring that indigenous issues did not enter the formal political sphere beyond such policies.

This also meant that few formal political avenues existed to represent the interests of indigenous inhabitants. And in the 1860s, economic recovery meant that the indigenous tribute declined in importance for public finances, and with it the government's incentive to protect ayllu lands. At the same time, economic growth stimulated the expansion of large-scale landholdings, the

haciendas, and liberal reforms further fueled this development as they privatized ayllu-held lands to the benefit of haciendas. While some communities attempted to fight the reforms in court and before the government, others turned to arms against the local landholders, but both to no avail.

Thus, when in the 1890s the Liberal Party planned to overthrow the governing Conservative Party and its leader José Manuel Pando Solares sought to mobilize the indigenous population with the promise to return indigenous lands, he was well received. Led by Aymara Pablo Zárate Willka, indigenous forces fought on the side of liberals during the ensuing civil war, until it became clear that Pando would not keep his promises. At that point many indigenous troops soon followed their own agenda: to get back and defend indigenous lands and to institute an autonomous indigenous government. Both the liberal and conservative factions soon began to see the indigenous rebellions as directed against the white race (Larson 2004, 230–236; Rivera Cusicanqui 2010, 85–86).

Although the indigenous rebellions were ultimately repressed by government forces, they sparked fears among the creole elite, which were further strengthened by a series of localized revolts in the 1910s and 1920s. Influenced by social-Darwinist thought that had developed at the time in Europe, elites sought policies to "civilize" the indigenous population and, in the long term, exterminate the indigenous race. The 1900 census, they thought, already showed an increase in the number of mestizos, and hence the vanishing of the indigenous: the privatization of ayllu lands had forced many indigenous inhabitants to migrate to urban centers, where they no longer fell in the "communal indigenous" census and tax bracket. Thus convinced that current policies were working, the government pressed the land reform. By 1930, the number of communal lands was even more severely reduced and the influence of local landholders increased, to the extent that the latter wielded enough power to keep forced labor in place until far into the twentieth century, long after the abolition of the indigenous labor contribution to their landlords (Klein 1992, 125, 151–152; Rivera Cusicanqui 2010, 87–107). Again, while formal policies rarely referred to

ethnicity, and overt politicization was hence low, they upheld the ethnic hierarchy in practice and salience.

Both the "civilization" of indigenous, on the one hand, and the stabilization of ethnic hierarchy, on the other, were strengthened through education reforms. In the face of rural unrests, and with the hope for "racial improvement," policymakers aimed at the hispanization of the indigenous population through education. But fearing widespread literacy, which would turn the indigenous into voters, their education was to take place in a "separate, segregated system of rural education, geared to their 'racial aptitudes' and 'natural habitat'" and to produce a manual workforce in support of the Bolivian economy (Larson 2003, 188).[4] When indigenous communities took schooling into their own hands, to gain suffrage and the tools to fight land expropriation, the government tightened its control over rural schools (Rivera Cusicanqui 2010, 114; Larson 2011, 151). Some opposition politicians, in contrast, supported the spread of literacy in the hopes of capturing indigenous votes (Larson 2011, 142–45): in 1927, the newly formed Nationalist Party even waived literacy requirements to be able to attain indigenous votes, and nominated for the first time an Aymara candidate, both with little electoral success (Ticona Alejo 2005, 71–74).

Opinions on how to solve the "indigenous problem" further diverged following the Chaco War against Paraguay in 1932–1935, which ended with a disastrous defeat for Bolivia. Indigenous peasants, miners, and workers—now fully armed—demanded citizenship and welfare rights for their services and sacrifices to the nation during the war. While these could not be completely denied, any advances came with increased state intervention in social affairs (Larson 2003, 191). Yet the upheavals of the war also opened up space for new political actors and ideas, and strengthened voices among the creole elite that called for a reappraisal of the societal makeup: having served together with indigenous foot soldiers in the trenches, and having had to count most losses among these, mestizo and white officers began to question the ethnic hierarchy. Indigeneity and indigenous claims became accepted as legitimate, and postwar

indigenous uprisings became "less classic caste war and more and more social protest movements in which pan-Indian rights were the prime issue" (Klein 1992, 198).

While support for the traditional elite plummeted, it soared for the political left. In the politically unstable postwar period, a rapid succession of governments promised to widen education (which was somewhat effective), end forced labor (which was not), and integrate the indigenous population (which remained symbolic) (Klein 1992, 218–219; Yashar 2005, 159). By the time of the 1950 census, literacy and urbanization rates were still low, with 72 percent of the population engaged in an agricultural sector that accounted for only 33 percent of the gross national product. Preferential land distribution during the colonial period and the resulting uneven power relations in the countryside meant that land distribution had become one of the most unjust and uneconomic in Latin America. Amid growing labor unrest and government repression, the leftist National Revolutionist Movement (MNR) emerged as the dominant opposition force. When denied its electoral victory by an alliance of conservative politicians and the army in 1951, the MNR entered government by force in an armed revolt, supported to a large extent by the middle class and by virtually all organized labor. Once in power, the MNR announced its aim to "refound the nation" with revolutionary nationalist reforms (Klein 1992, 224–225).

One strand of reforms focused on increased integration of the countryside, by extending the reach of the state as well as assimilating the population into the Bolivian nation. Toward these aims, the MNR introduced universal suffrage and downplayed ethnic differences. Following the revolution, most official discourse and documentation emphasized the class, rather than ethnic, identity of the rural population and the indigenous were now referred to as peasants. This "peasantization" was institutionalized with a sweeping land reform, which redistributed land from the hacienda landholders to those who had cultivated it, and with the transformation of rural communities into peasant unions (Albó 1994, 57–58; Yashar 2005, 156–159). Rural education was expanded to "civilize" the indigenous population and

to homogenize the nation culturally and linguistically (Contreras 2003, 261–263). Indigeneity thus vanished from the political sphere, although not for long.

Toward Inclusion of Indigenous Claims in the Formal Political Sphere

Throughout history, indigenous Bolivians, as a subordinate group, had very little success addressing issues of creole domination within the political arena. Ethnic rhetoric was used only by the political elite itself, and then not with the intention to exclude the indigenous population from the polity. On the contrary, many of the policies were offered in the name of better integrating indigenous people into Bolivian society, though without much success. The political opposition sometimes emphasized the sociopolitical marginalization of the indigenous population if this seemed instrumental in gaining support, but when this perceived advantage receded so, too, did politicization. From the 1970s onwards, however, indigeneity became increasingly politicized outside of the established political sphere.

Following the overthrow of the MNR in 1964, a succession of military governments had continued the party's propeasant rhetoric, yet steadily undermined peasant interests. From the end of the 1980s, the Bolivian government was faced with increasing public pressure, and indigenous organizations and rhetoric began to play a role in national politics, in both the informal and later the formal political sphere. In the highlands, indigenous actors had organized from the 1970s, first clandestinely and then more openly. Some organizations attempted to participate in formal politics by forming parties, such as the United Front for Katarista Liberation, the Túpac Katari Indian Movement, the Túpac Katari Revolutionary Movement, and the National Katarista Movement. Their efforts were frustrated, however, by burdensome electoral regulations, electoral manipulation by dominant parties, insufficient financial resources for campaigning, and/or disunity within the parties. A major factor leading to disunity was disagreement about the weight that should be given to ethnic versus class issues in party organization. Thus, the parties gained less than 2 percent

of votes for over 25 years, while left-wing parties kept winning the plurality of votes in the countryside (Madrid 2005, 41–46; van Cott 2005, 79–85; Yashar 2005, 168–72).

Parallel mobilization efforts occurred in the lowlands. The state, presuming that the lowlands were unsettled and its land unused, had distributed the land in the 1960s and 1970s to highland peasants and hacienda owners who displaced the lowland indigenous population. The 1980s saw the emergence of indigenous organizations to defend communities against logging and ranching interests, and soon the organizations built alliances across indigenous peoples. Regional organizations like the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Eastern Bolivia had an explicit ethnocultural agenda. In contrast to the highland organizations, they decided to enter formal politics only in the 1990s, and then formed alliances with other, nonethnic parties. In the meantime, they relied on informal means to make their demands heard. In 1990, the Indigenous Peoples Central of the Beni led the March for Territory and Dignity over 700 kilometers, from the city of Trinidad to the seat of government in La Paz, demanding state recognition of indigenous territories. The march raised public attention to indigenous issues and led to concessions from the state, such as the recognition of indigenous territories and the incorporation of indigenous customary law into national law.[5] Other marches by both lowland and highland indigenous organizations followed throughout the 1990s, supported by international attention and aid as the environment became an international concern (Albó 1994, 62–63; van Cott 2005, 60–61, 71–77; Yashar 2005, 190–218).

Some politicians began to recognize the value of indigenous rhetoric. In the 1989 elections, two emerging populist parties incorporated ethnic rhetoric into their election campaigns. Larger parties followed the trend, if only rhetorically. In the subsequent 1993 elections, the MNR (of the 1952 national revolution) surprisingly invited Víctor Hugo Cárdenas, an Aymara activist and leader of the Túpac Katari Revolutionary Liberation Movement, to be vice-presidential running mate of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada—with success: the MNR attained

34 percent of the votes and entered government (Albó 1994, 64–68; Madrid 2012, 42). The new government introduced an array of multiculturalist reforms. It constitutionally recognized Bolivia's "pluricultural and multiethnic" nature as well as indigenous land rights, introduced policies concerning bilingual education in any of 36 recognized indigenous languages, and strengthened municipal governments to the extent that it recognized a variety of local traditional organizations, effectively providing them with enough autonomy to reinstate customary indigenous law (Klein 2003, 261–262; Albro 2006, 414; Albó 2008, 25–26).

The reforms opened up opportunities for indigenous political participation at the local level, and subsequently at the national level. One major emerging actor was the movement of coca farmers (*cocaleros*) and its leader Evo Morales.[6] The cocalero movement had emerged in the wake of the neoliberal reforms in the mid-1980s which, among others, had privatized the Bolivian mines. Laid-off miners migrated to the countryside and began to cultivate coca. Both population and coca production soared and the new farmers, skilled in social movement organization from their time in miners' labor organizations, formed a successful movement that eventually acted as de facto local government, and rose in the ranks of the national Unitary Syndical Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia. When the government began its US-sponsored "War on Drugs" in the countryside in 1989, the cocaleros framed coca as an indigenous tradition, which gained them support from both the indigenous and nonindigenous population. In 1994, Morales led the March for Territory and Sovereignty, which put him firmly on the political map. In the 1997 national elections, his party, the Movement toward Socialism (MAS) attained four seats in Congress and has since experienced a sharp rise in support (van Cott 2005, 57–59, 85–93; Yashar 2005, 181–187; see also Albó 2002). The MAS is neither narrowly class nor ethnicity oriented but relies on "tactical flexibility . . . cross-sector alliance . . . and the use of Andean cultural frames" (Albro 2006, 420).

The state's neoliberal course led to further protests and to what would be called the protest cycle of 2000–2005, with at least 90 lives lost and a rapid turnover of five presidents. While the protests

were primarily anti-neoliberal, they referred to indigenous issues and used indigenous symbols for legitimation and mobilization. Indigeneity was increasingly integrated into the newly emerging conception of Bolivianhood as a nation of the "poor and humble," pitted against the neoliberal elite (Albro 2005, 251–264; Postero 2005, 74–85). In some instances, indigeneity was radicalized, especially in the rural highlands. Aymara activist Felipe Quispe spoke of "two Bolivias, one Indian, one *q'ara*" (white) that existed in the Andes ever since Spanish colonization (cited in Gray Molina 2007, 8; see also Assies and Salman 2005, 279–283). However, such radicalism did not attract wider support, as the following elections would show.

Ethnic elements were also increasingly emphasized in the run-up to the 2005 elections, especially by presidential candidates Evo Morales and Felipe Quispe, who ran with his party Pachakuti Indigenous Movement (MIP). The less radical candidate prevailed: while Quispe attained only 2.2 percent of the votes, Morales won with an unprecedented margin and became the country's first indigenous president (Madrid 2012, 57). His administration marked an increased focus on ethnic politics, both symbolically as well as in policy, which became strongly contested during the writing of a new constitution. Representatives of major indigenous organizations, allied in the Unity Pact, demanded, among other things, the recognition of Bolivia as a multinational state; the introduction of municipal, indigenous, and departmental autonomies; the inclusion of indigenous symbols as state symbols; and the addition of 36 indigenous languages as official languages. The opposition, mainly made up of traditional elites, argued against such pluralism as it would foster subnational identities at the expense of national unity. Differences regarding the content, but also the constitution writing process itself, led to polarization not only within the constitutional assembly and in congress, but also in the streets, which were the site of violent clashes between government supporters and opponents, with increasingly racist motivations (Flesken 2013, 342–346). In the first half of 2007 alone, 156 major social conflicts were reported, 16 percent of which turned violent (Harten 2011, 181–182).

In response to the violence and political deadlock, the Morales administration became more moderate and decided to revise the constitution together with the opposition. The revision process, under protest from a number of social and indigenous organizations, led to changes in over a hundred articles. While grievances persisted on both sides, the new constitution was passed in congress and ultimately approved in a referendum in January 2009 with over 60 percent of the vote (Schilling-Vacaflor 2009, 312; Assies 2011, 115). The new constitution strengthens the rights of indigenous peoples considerably, but as Morales enters his third term at the time of writing, criticism about its implementation and compliance grow louder (see, e.g., Crabtree and Chaplin 2013).

Independent Peru

Ethnic relations in the independent Republic of Peru developed very similarly to those in neighboring Bolivia. Following independence, the new governing elite, influenced by European enlightenment ideas, abolished the two republics and pronounced an egalitarian state which recognized creole, black, and indigenous inhabitants as Peruvian citizens with equal rights, although it did not recognize their cultures. This "one-size-fits-all citizenship" (Mallon 2010, 282) starkly reduced the politicization of ethnic difference. On the contrary, Peru's ten constitutions during the nineteenth century mention indigeneity in only two matters, of which one concerned an inclusive policy: the 1828 and 1839 constitutions tied the rights to run for office and to vote to literacy, but for a transitional period exempted indigenous (and later mestizo) citizens from this requirement if they did not have access to a school (Congreso de la República del Perú 2014).

In practical terms, however, this assimilationist approach did little to end indigenous marginalization or, indeed, to advance assimilation. Economic resources and political power largely remained in the hands of the mainly creole elite. Moreover, like its Bolivian counterpart, the Peruvian government soon

reinstalled the colonial indigenous tribute tax as well as labor contribution to support the faltering economy—the second mention of indigeneity in the constitution. In return, it continued granting collective rights to territory, often as a result of legal cases in which indigenous claimants demanded that the state uphold their traditional indigenous rights established during the colonial regime (Thurner 1997, 28–30; Larson 2003, 143–144). In some instances, indigenous citizens took to arms to press their demands. Yet the revolts remained localized and, importantly, often occurred in alliance with mestizo and creole citizens, suggesting that allegiances were based on local conditions and relations rather than ethnicity (Klarén 2000, 146–147). Thus, while indigeneity remained salient, it did not serve as a basis for political mobilization.

With the abolition of the indigenous tax in 1854, the protectionist measures and indigenous collective rights and institutions, deemed a "hindrance on the road to progress," were dismantled (de la Peña 2005, 721).[7] Indigeneity as an ethnic category disappeared from public record as indigenous inhabitants were to be assimilated into the Peruvian Republic, though some among the creole elite worried "what good will they do the Republic?" (cited in Larson 2004, 149). Consequently, nation-building efforts intensified from the 1860s. Influenced by European racial theories, the aim was to homogenize and "whiten" the Peruvian nation with policies encouraging European immigration. Miscegenation—or *mestizaje*—was to bring out the best of both whites and Andean indigenous, who, after all, were descendants of the heroic Incans.[8] This racial approach was later accompanied by educational efforts to help in "civilizing" the indigenous population, for example, with the establishment of "Indian trade schools" to teach carpentry or stone masonry (de la Cadena 2000, 14–21; Larson 2004, 160).

Such civilizing efforts seemed ever more necessary after Peru's heavy losses in the War of the Pacific against Chile in 1878–1883, which some elites blamed on indigenous backwardness and lack of civic virtue. The following period from the 1890s to 1920 was thus marked by paternalist policies to turn indigenous into fully

functioning citizens, attempting to "improve" the Peruvian population from within by enhancing education and health standards. While power politics precluded any real change, this approach altered the official definition of the ethnic boundary from being based on race to culture, and became the basis for cultural mestizaje which allowed Peruvians to "climb up the social ladder" through education and employment (de la Cadena 2000, 14–21; Larson 2004, 196–198; Loveman 2014, 217–222).

The postwar administration ended in crisis, aggravated by the economic effects of World War I. Presidential candidate Augusto Leguía took advantage of the ensuing labor protests and promised to cater to their demands. Part of his populist approach was to reach out, often using indigenous rhetoric, to peasants who were increasingly protesting rising pressures on both their labor force and produce prices exerted by landlords and traders. Forging alliances with the peasantry allowed Leguía to turn a deaf ear to hacienda landowners, long-time supporters of his political adversaries. His administration constitutionally recognized indigenous communities, created an Office for Indigenous Affairs, proclaimed the national Day of the Indian, and was generally receptive to peasant demands. Yet when peasant mobilizations nonetheless expanded in scope as well as militancy, Leguía feared for the political order, withdrew his support, and returned to traditional power alliances (Remy 1994, 112; de la Cadena 2000, 89–97; Klarén 2000, 245–255).

But indigeneity had found its way into the formal political sphere, and although it remained there only for a short while in the beginning of the 1920s, appeals to indigeneity became more frequent in political rhetoric. Drawing on the peasant rebellions, the growing radical left saw in the rural population a promising constituency for its revolutionary politics. Indigenous-peasant organizations, in turn, were now in need of a new ally and decided to stress their peasant over indigenous roots. For example, when the Peasant Confederation of Peru was founded in 1947, its discourse was strongly focused on peasantry rather than ethnicity, despite many of its members being of Quechua and Aymara origin (Madrid 2012, 115). The newly formed communist parties thus allied with these organizations and incorporated indigenous

issues in their electoral campaigns, always emphasizing economy over ethnicity (de la Cadena 2000, 128; van Cott 2005, 146–147). Besides reflecting left political ideology, this decision was also based on the consideration that indigenous issues per se were controversial, and the indigenous population not important enough in electoral terms: while it counted 46 percent in the 1940 census, large numbers were not allowed to vote as they did not fulfill the literacy requirement (Klarén 2000, 285; Paredes 2008, 6).

General political instability since the end of the Leguía administration in 1930 and a highly unequal distribution of wealth strengthened left and peasant movements and resulted in large-scale peasant unrest and land invasions. Following failed attempts at agrarian reform in the beginning of the 1960s, Juan Velasco Alvarado led a military coup and established the Revolutionary Government of Armed Forces in 1968. With the aim of making Peru a more equal and democratic society, the government introduced legislation that benefited the indigenous population. It recognized Quechua—the most frequently used indigenous language in Peru, spoken by around 16 percent of the population—as an official language, promoted bilingual education, and issued legislation protecting the rights of indigenous communities. But the "indigenous problem" was considered to be mainly a socioeconomic, rather than cultural, one. Velasco's nation-building strategy consisted of eliminating ethnic divisions by turning indigenous citizens into peasants to put an end to "unacceptable racist habits and prejudices" (cited in García and Lucero 2004, 163): a sweeping agrarian reform was to redistribute land from the landowning elite to land-working peasants, while official documents were revised to exchange the term "indigenous" with "peasant." For example, the Day of the Indian was redesignated as the Day of the Peasant (Remy 1994, 115; Klarén 2000, 312–347; Yashar 2005, 230–232).

This "peasantization" applied only to the highland indigenous population. The state's relationship with the lowland indigenous population remained less structured, despite increasing state involvement and settlement in the Amazon lowlands from the end of the nineteenth century. From the 1880s, a rubber boom in neighboring Brazil had led rubber industrialists to enter the

Amazon and force the indigenous population to work in rubber extraction (Klarén 2000, 211). When in the 1920s and 1930s petroleum was discovered in the area, the state encouraged settlement and created infrastructure. In the 1970s Velasco further encouraged settlement by redistributing what was seen as unused lands to highland peasants. The lowland "native communities," as they were now legally denominated were, in contrast, confined to certain areas for settlement (Yashar 2005, 252–253). Until then relatively isolated, the lowland indigenous population now faced impositions similar to those experienced by the highland indigenous population hundreds of years earlier.

Velasco's reforms and in particular his accommodation of indigenous citizens sparked another coup in 1975. The following military government largely reversed Velasco's policies, particularly concerning the recognition of highland indigenous identity through symbols and language as well as recognition of lowland indigenous land rights (Yashar 1998, 256; García and Lucero 2004, 163). Economic liberalization and austerity measures, to counter an impending economic crisis, in conjunction with popular frustration with the mixed results of the land reform, fanned public opposition against the government and increased pressures for popular political participation. The military government scheduled elections for 1978, the first of a series of transitional elections until 1982 (Klarén 2000, 359–363).

In the meantime, the radical left had grown more militant. From the 1960s, it not only subordinated indigeneity to class in its rhetoric but rejected it completely as a basis for mobilization. Peasant organizations concurred, regarding indigeneity as a "pathetic social condition" (de la Cadena 2000, 193; see also van Cott 2005, 148–419). The Peasant Confederation of Peru, for example, explicitly renounced efforts for competing mobilization along ethnic lines in 1974. In this environment, two armed radical left movements emerged from 1980, the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) and the Shining Path, which made exterminating indigenous identity part of its "total war" (Mallon 1998, 116, as cited in van Cott 2005, 149–152).[9] The rural indigenous population now found itself in the crossfire of rebel groups and government forces, since the government firmly

believed they were staunch supporters of the rebels. Of the estimated 69,000 lives lost throughout the internal war in the 1980s to the early 1990s, three-quarters spoke the indigenous language Quechua (Raymond and Arce 2013, 557).

During the internal war, politics and election campaigns centered on ending the political violence as well as on containing a severe economic crisis—both unsuccessfully. In this environment, the 1990 elections brought to power the relatively unknown candidate Alberto Fujimori. Himself born to Japanese immigrants, he took advantage of being seen as an outsider to the mainly creole elite and their politics. With the slogan "a president like you" and the inclusion of *cholos* (urbanized indigenous or dark-skinned Peruvians) on his party ballot, he appealed to indigeneity only indirectly, but his noncreole status got him the votes of large parts of the indigenous population (Madrid 2012, 122–125). However, Fujimori's term did not benefit the indigenous and/or poor population, on the contrary. Once in power, Fujimori installed harsher austerity measures than advertised by any of his competitors, eroded civil and political rights in the fight against Shining Path, and removed traditional protections for indigenous lands and opened them up for mining (Klarén 2000, 407; van Cott 2005, 164; Yashar 2005, 238). Fujimori was nonetheless reelected in 1995, largely owing to the capture of Shining Path leader Abimael Guzmán in 1992 (Madrid 2011, 282).

The following presidential election campaigns also pitted candidates from the traditional creole elite against outsiders who appealed to indigeneity. The successful candidate in the 2001 elections, Alejandro Toledo, who had already competed in 1995 and 2000, frequently invoked indigenous symbols, wore indigenous clothes, and embraced indigenous issues during his election campaigns as well as in office. For example, his Belgium-born but Quechua-speaking wife Eliane Karp became the president of the National Commission for Andean, Amazonian, and Afro-Peruvian Peoples, designed to support indigenous initiatives. In addition, the Toledo administration installed reserved seats for indigenous peoples in local and regional assemblies, although these, according to van Cott (2005, 166), hurt indigenous representation more than benefitted it. But while not always successful,

Toledo's rhetoric and policies remained largely proindigenous (García and Lucero 2008, 258; Raymond and Arce 2013, 558).

In the 2006 election campaign, Ollanta Humala followed into Toledo's footsteps and appealed to indigenous voters in a similar fashion. He also positioned indigenous candidates high on his party list. While Humala received the majority of votes in indigenous constituencies, and his party managed to place seven indigenous candidates in congress, he lost narrowly to his competitor Alan García (Madrid 2012, 127–130; Raymond and Arce 2013, 559). In the following election campaign of 2011, Humala capitalized on the grievances raised by García's anti-indigenous rhetoric during his term, and was voted into office on the promise of social inclusion (Madrid 2012, 130–131; Arce 2014, 75).

While appealing to indigenous voters, both Humala and Toledo were careful to avoid exclusionary rhetoric. For example, Toledo noted during his presidential campaign in 1995 that "we are not going to lose this opportunity for the cholos. Our turn has arrived, that is *not anti-anybody*, but rather pro-us" (cited in Madrid 2012, 108, emphasis added). Humala, in turn, distanced himself from the ethnonationalism (or "ethnocacerism") espoused by his father and his brothers, one of whom also competed for the presidency in 2006 in the name of restoring the powerful position that the "copper race" held before colonization (García and Lucero 2008, 261).[10] Rather than making ethnically exclusivist appeals, both Toledo and Humala aimed at differentiating themselves from the established creole elite, and their populist appeals played a larger role in their campaigns than their ethnic rhetoric (Madrid 2012, 131–144). During the 2011 election campaign other parties, too, have taken up indigenous issues or sought to ally with indigenous candidates or their organizations (Raymond and Arce 2013, 568), demonstrating that indigeneity is becoming increasingly important in Peruvian politics.

Discussion

In both Peru and Bolivia, politicization of ethnicity has been generally rather low but changing over time. During colonialism and early independence, politicization consisted mainly of

parallel legislation for indigenous and creole inhabitants and, intermittently, of political maneuverings when intra-elite factions attempted to gain indigenous support to defeat each other. Later on ethnic politicization consisted of efforts to include the indigenous population into the nation. In Bolivia, not in Peru, ethnic politicization then occurred from the 1990s onwards, this time driven by non-traditional actors such as indigenous movements and parties. To better understand the dynamics of ethnic politicization in both countries, as well as the differences between them, the following distinguishes between sets of actors as well as structural factors and outlines their interplay in turn.

First, the type and level of politicization in the Latin American countries differed with the type of *actor*, whether governing elite, opposition elite, or nontraditional grassroots actors. Following colonization the governing elite, traditionally composed of creoles, first constructed two parallel administrative systems, with different laws for different ethnic categories. In doing so, it created a ranked society (Horowitz 1985, 22), with creoles at the top and the indigenous population at the bottom of the hierarchy. While the ranks of the hierarchy blurred over time, particularly with the rise of the mestizo population, and while individual indigenous and mestizos may climb up the ladder by "whitening" themselves, this hierarchy is still in place. Following independence, an ideology of liberalism guided the inclusion of indigenous into the nation, though interrupted by a return to the "colonial pact" of indigenous tribute payments versus community autonomy. After that, assimilation meant the deconstruction of indigenous rights, but still with the aim of inclusion. In the mid-twentieth century it became state policy to ignore ethnicity—politicization by the state was low.

Opposition politicians, also mainly creoles, in contrast, often attempted to build alliances with indigenous communities against the governing elite. While such alliances occurred often at the local level, they also happened at the national level, perhaps most famously with the 1890s civil war in Bolivia or Leguía's political appeals in the 1920s in Peru. The alliances were often strategic, symbolic, and abandoned once they did not seem to be advantageous anymore.

Leaving aside normative questions on the desirability of assimilation or strategic alliances as well as the low success rates of such efforts in practice, we can therefore say that ethnic politicization in Bolivia and Peru was, for the most part, not exclusive but inclusive or, at least, mainly reactionary. Policies became exclusive when elites felt threatened by a rising presence of indigenous actors, even if their actions were not primarily ethnically motivated. The Great Rebellion in the 1790s, but also other uprisings throughout history, were all interpreted—and intentionally spun—by economic and political elites as threats from indigenous peoples, and were followed by the repression of indigenous symbols or even more serious acts of oppression. The recent rise of indigenous movements in Bolivia has been similarly met with resistance of conservative elites as they began to recognize their threat to hegemony, although this time the resistance has been less successful.

Where Bolivia and Peru differ most is in the actions of the third type of actor, the grassroots movements. Since both are hierarchically ordered societies, "internal" indigenous mobilization had to occur outside the formal political system. In Bolivia, this began to happen from the 1970s onwards, if at first without success, and increasingly from the 1990s onwards. Strategic ethnic appeals boosted Evo Morales's standing and helped his election as the first indigenous president in 2005. However, it is important to note that these appeals aimed at indigenous inclusion and any exclusionary rhetoric was aimed at a class category, the neoliberal elite, rather than at an ethnic category. In fact, exclusionary ethnic rhetoric, such as that espoused by the MIP in Bolivia or the ethnocacerists in Peru, failed in both electoral arenas.

In Peru, indigenous movements were not as successful and followed a different logic than their Bolivian counterparts. Indigenous mobilization has been more cultural and is only lately becoming political (García and Lucero 2004, 159). The difference can be explained by insufficient means and opportunity for mobilization (Yashar 2005, 225), but also by the limited repertoires available for mobilization. In Peru, the indigenous repertoire was not as accessible as in Bolivia because, on the one hand, it had been appropriated by the political elite who had chosen to embellish their campaigns and nation-building projects with

references to indigenous—and in particular Incan—heroes (van Cott 2005, 143–144; Glidden 2011, 62). Instructive here is a comparison of how the main figures of the eighteenth century Great Rebellion are remembered: while Túpac Amaru has been rehabilitated in Peru as a noble indigenous leader of a multiethnic alliance, stripped bare of any race war connotations, Túpac Katari is still remembered in Bolivia, if at all, as a fearsome, violent indigenous-peasant leader (Thomson 2003, 120–121). In Peru, this appropriation meant that indigenous symbols were not available any more for a rhetoric of resistance. On the other hand, the indigenous repertoire was not as accessible in Peru as in Bolivia because the increasingly militant left in Peru decided that indigenous identification was undesirable for mobilization, insisting instead that class was the basis of repression, to the point of violently repressing every form of non-class-based organization during the 1980s internal war against the state (van Cott 2005, 144). In the Peruvian lowlands, where the war did not have as strong an impact, local ethnic mobilization is stronger.

Thus, even where parties did overcome fiscal and administrative hurdles to compete in elections, such as the Peruvian Indian Movement or the Túpac Amaru Indian Movement in the 1970s, they gained few votes. The abolition of the literacy requirement for suffrage in 1979, newly enfranchising mainly indigenous Peruvians, led to the expansion of leftist rather than indigenous-based parties. Indeed, voting behavior barely differed between majority indigenous or non-indigenous constituencies (Madrid 2011, 271). Political appeals aiming at indigenous inclusion only gained traction from the 1990s, and came then from opposition politicians such as Fujimori, Toledo, and Humala, not from grassroots movements.

Our discussion of the different actors has already pointed to three important *structural elements* that shaped—and were shaped by—them: colonialism, nation building, and resources. The installation of two distinct administration systems during the colonial regime—one for indigenous and one for Spanish inhabitants—laid the basis for creole domination by categorizing all inhabitants as either indigenous or non-indigenous. Through different laws for both ethnic categories ranging from resource distribution

to educational access, the colonial regime institutionalized the salience of ethnic difference. In particular the indigenous tribute system systematically marginalized the indigenous population. Even following the end of the formal colonial regime, the tribute system or equivalent structures remained in place, if not due to official policies then due to on-the-ground dynamics between elites and masses in the countryside. In addition, binding suffrage to literacy requirements excluded nontraditional actors from the political sphere.

A second structural factor concerns the nation-building efforts in both countries since independence. Inspired by the egalitarianism of European enlightenment movements, nation-building efforts aimed at abolishing ethnic differences by "whitening" the indigenous population. First, this was to be achieved with the biological mestizaje of indigenous and white inhabitants, which would bring together the best of both the heroic Incan and the civilized European traits. In Peru, more so than in Bolivia, Incan symbols and rhetoric were incorporated into official discourse. Second, mestizaje then changed from biological to cultural: the indigenous population could now be whitened through education and health care. Third, from the 1950s in Bolivia and the 1960s in Peru, the state attempted "economic mestizaje" by redistributing land resources and rebranding indigenous inhabitants as peasants. The ethnic elements hence disappeared from official discourse and legislation and the imposition of collective management systems on the newly established peasant syndicates strengthened the organization of peasant, rather than indigenous, communities (Rice 2012).

The effect of these nation-building policies of mestizaje was that once "civilized," one was not indigenous anymore. For example, the Peruvian novelist Mario Vargas Llosa judged Bolivian president Evo Morales as "not an Indian, even if he was born into a poor indigenous family . . . One only needs to hear his good Spanish . . . to know that Don Evo is the emblematic Latin American [creole]" (cited in García and Lucero 2008, 262).

A third structural factor is that of resource distribution. The colonial regime left highly unequal societies, with inequality both expressed and deepened with uneven land distribution. Both

Bolivia and Peru have long relied on agriculture, either for self-subsistence or as the basis for national economy, such that land distribution remains a main factor affecting people's livelihoods. The serious inequality has sparked protests and rebellions in both countries throughout the colonial and postcolonial histories. Although these were not often explicitly ethnically motivated, they were perceived or even actively framed as such by local, landholding elites. Policies enacted in response to the indigenous threat further strengthened the hierarchical system.

Thus, the ethnic hierarchy established by the colonial regime was a relatively stable system. Changes occurred only in reaction to shocks to the system, either in the form of popular uprisings or, more importantly, following wars or other international influences, with a corresponding change in ideas. In Bolivia in particular the Chaco War of the 1930s turned the tide by challenging established ideas and introducing new actors. In Peru, the historical parallel occurred with the War of the Pacific in the 1870s which similarly rocked the system and introduced impetus for change. In contrast, internal wars, such as the Andean Great Rebellion in the 1790s, the Bolivian civil war in the 1890s, or the Peruvian internal war in the 1980s—in all of which land distribution played a central role—served to strengthen the system.

Other external shocks, if not as sudden, were produced by other international events. The liberal ideas of establishing independence via constitutional change were inspired by the European enlightenment movement following the French Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century; the ideas of racial mixing was based on the advent of social-Darwinist thought; and the increasing attempts at indigenous inclusion from the 1990s, however symbolic, was linked to a rising international concern for human rights and environmental issues.

In conclusion, actors and their ideas as well as changing structures worked together to determine the type and extent of the politicization of ethnicity in Latin America. Structural developments were important in shaping future ideas and actions, but could also be shaped by them, particularly if shocks offered openings for new ideas or actors. The interplay may be demonstrated with the recent ethnic politicization in Bolivia. As already

mentioned, indigenous movements used an emancipatory rather than exclusive ethnic rhetoric. In Bolivia it is likely that the latter would have resulted in state repression of the movement as a danger to society. Indeed, terrorism charges have been formulated against indigenous actors in several Latin American countries. However, once in power, Morales could have abandoned the emancipatory rhetoric and instead begun to politicize ethnic distinctions for political and economic gains, as has been frequently observed in Africa and elsewhere. While observers feared that to be the case particularly around the time of the writing of the new constitution in 2006 to 2009, which prompted conflicts both in the political and the public sphere, Morales soon abandoned the indigenous rhetoric and instead focused on programmatic politics. Any other decision would likely not have been supported as strongly by the popular opinion which—also due to nation-building efforts—overwhelmingly sees Bolivia as a mestizo nation. In sum, the Bolivian and Peruvian experiences are clear examples of the effect of—as well as of the interplay between—structures and agencies in determining the level and types of politicization of ethnicity.

CHAPTER FOUR

The United States

Introduction

The United States in general is a case of medium/high-level politicization of ethnicity. African Americans, Native Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Asian Americans have all been subject to ethnic politicization denying them full participation in the polity by legal manipulation, including separate territories for Native Americans and limited access to citizenship for immigrant Hispanics and people of Asian descent. The ethnoracial boundary between whites and African Americans, the focus of this chapter, has both a long history of political salience and a wide geographic extent, which has meant a major role for this boundary in the development of national politics (Goldfield 1997; Hutchings and Valentino 2004; King and Smith 2011). This distinctiveness was also due to African Americans' historically greater share of the overall population, as compared to other "non-white" groups. From colonial times onward African Americans have constituted at least 10 percent of the population and a much larger share in the slavery-centered southeastern region—at least 25 percent of each state's population in this region until the great migrations to the North in the twentieth century.

African Americans' exclusion has been sociopolitical, but not territorial. The centerpiece of this exclusion for the first 80 years

of independence, slavery, was subject to periodically heated political contestations, culminating in a massively destructive civil war. Moreover, while this war ended slavery, the ethnoracial boundary between whites and African Americans has continued thereafter, shaping law as well as coalition building and claims making in the formal political sphere until this day.

Forms of Politicization: An Overview

Black versus white ethnoracial politicization in the United States has taken a variety of forms over time in the domains of the party system, political claims making, and policy. More specifically:

1. The two-party system has featured one major party that draws its electoral base almost exclusively from those socially recognized as white. Moreover, until the post-1960s period (i.e., after passage of major civil rights legislation), this ethnoracial party generally identified itself explicitly as the party of whites on a regional basis (the South) and, until the 1930s, on a national basis as well.
2. During many periods of US history, this party self-identification has translated into high levels of politicization in terms of claims making in the political arena, as the ethnoracial party endeavored to defend and mobilize its white base.
3. Lastly, throughout most of US history, government policies have placed ethnoracial categories at the heart of the polity by privileging whites and excluding nonwhites. Moreover, such policies frequently have been implemented by the ethnoracial party as part of its explicit agenda.

The Development of Ethnicity Politicization in the United States

The subsequent historical overview fleshes out the three aspects (mentioned above) of ethnoracial politicization in the United States and explains them in terms of colonial legacies and independence-era political institutions and processes of nation building, including government-influenced distribution of resources.

Colonial Administrative Rule: A Legacy of "White" Local Control and Ethnoracial Domination

The 13 colonies that allied to fight the British in the 1770s and to form the United States of America a decade later had been forged in a political context wherein European settlers largely governed themselves on the basis of high degrees of local control. These colonies "enjoyed a far more extensive autonomy than did those of any other Euroamerican empire" (Savelle 1974, 41; see also Burroughs 1999, 170). Besides granting considerable local autonomy, the British also required colonies to govern themselves on the basis of the representative principle (Morgan 1988, 39–54). Of the 12 colonies that were founded in the seventeenth century (Georgia was not established until 1732), all had representative assemblies by the end of that century, more than 70 years before the War for Independence (Kammen 1969, 10–12). Moreover, these "representative assemblies took the initiative in government almost from the beginning" (Morgan 1988, 46) and became, by the middle of the eighteenth century, the "centers of power" in each of the colonies that became the United States (Steele 1998, 120).

Political power during the colonial period, then, was decentralized with respect to two larger contexts. The first was the British Empire. The second was the other 12 colonies. At the same time, local autonomy did not mean unchecked elite control, at least not in principle and political form, since local governance was self-governance based on representative political institutions. Indeed, "probably a majority of adult males in all the colonies and a large majority in most" voted during the colonial period (Morgan 1988, 137). The highly autonomous, colony-specific governments were not just representative but also, in terms of the adult male population, fairly broad based.

To be sure, this characterization of autonomous, broad-based self-governance based on the representative principle during the colonial era conceals the crucial ethnoracial boundary that relegated one group to a social existence far removed from representation and autonomy. Nearly all African Americans made the transition from colony to independence as the personal property of

another human being; the first national census, in 1790, counted less than 8 percent of African Americans as formally free.[1] The vast majority of African Americans were not just excluded from the people represented by the elected colonial assemblies, and from the ownership of land and other forms of property; by force of law and by force itself, they were themselves property.

But the exclusion of African Americans from the colonial polity, and even their subjugation by law, did not depend on their enslaved status. The highly autonomous colonial assemblies used their powers to institutionalize the marginality of formally free African Americans as well. "The Virginia Assembly's declaration in 1668 that free Negroes 'ought not in all respects to be admitted to a full fruition of the exemptions and impunities of the English' proved to be the guideline which in varying degrees was accepted in every colony" (Jordan 1968, 123). In no southern colony, for example, could nonenslaved African Americans testify against whites in court (Ibid., 125). Restrictions on territorial movement in the South were also severe: several of these colonies barred free African Americans from entering the territory and also dictated that all manumitted slaves must leave the colony unless granted special government permission (Guild 1936, 95–102; Jordan 1968, 123–124; Higginbotham 1980, 203–204, 224–225). Most of these colonies also banned free Blacks from voting (Berlin 1974, 8). Northern colonies appear not to have barred African Americans from voting, but a formal right to vote stood in odd juxtaposition with a range of exclusions. Pennsylvania's colonial government barred free African Americans from testifying against whites in court, while also stipulating that any such person found to have had sexual relations with a white person could be sold into slavery or indentured servitude (Higginbotham 1980, 269, 282). In colonial Connecticut, African Americans could live in towns only if the white population did not object to their presence (Winch 2014, 15). In colonial New England more generally, free blacks could not serve on juries or even leave their town of residence without a pass (Greene 1966, 299–300). And in at least New Jersey, New York, and the New England colonies, free African Americans were barred from owning land (Winch 2014, 12–15).

High degrees of local autonomy and subjugation developed together in the colonial context, albeit on different sides of an ethnoracial boundary. These bifurcated developments laid the groundwork for legally institutionalized white dominance in the period of independence, rendering African Americans as virtual foreigners on their territory of birth. In other words, a key "first mover" that pushed the United States down the pathway toward medium/high ethnoracial politicization was the nature of administrative rule during the colonial period, and the different consequences this rule had for whites and African Americans.

Colonial administrative rule in the United States left two important legacies for ethnoracial politicization in the independence period. First, the dominant conception of peoplehood that developed was distinctively "white." The establishment and workings of broad-based representative governments allowed European settlers to entrench, virtually unchecked, their domination over African Americans, thereby helping to establish a clear, salient cleavage between Euro-descendants and non-Europeans, with the former as "the people" to whom the polity belonged (cf. Mann 2005, 83–98). This meant that the expansion of rights and the wider distribution of resources—particularly land in the nineteenth century, then access to home ownership in the twentieth century—tended to benefit only white males (cf. Fredrickson 1971). In this respect, nation-building policies and racially exclusionary policies became generally two sides of the same coin; nation building happened along ethnoracial lines. This included the mechanisms and outcomes of resource distribution.

The second important legacy of colonial administrative rule was linked directly to the nature of that rule. Those who organized the revolt against British imperial rule did so in defense of local control (hereafter, I use "local" in a relative sense to mean both "state" and "local" levels in the US context). But this local control, rather than being an aspiration never before attained, was in fact something that settlers had enjoyed for most of the colonial period, until, for a variety of reasons, the British tried to assert more centralized control in the 1760s and 1770s. Thus, a key development during the colonial period was the construction of political institutions on the basis of relatively local control

through representative government. Not surprisingly, then, after fighting a war for independence stimulated substantially by the efforts of the British to curtail that local control, the 13 colonies that came together to forge an independent country established a fairly decentralized form of government, a form that provided extensive constitutional and normative protections from federal incursions into locally institutionalized racial subordination. Following upon the colonial legacy of white peoplehood, the balance of central/local control became a key axis around which ethnoracial politicization and conflict revolved in the era of independence.

Politicization in the Nineteenth Century

Conflicts over localized racial control were frequently linked to partisan divisions, though the precise nature of this linkage varied over time. Consistent with the colonial legacy of peoplehood, the populist, "everyman" party—the Democratic Party—was also overtly the "white party" on a national level well into the twentieth century. Since the 1820s, the Democratic Party has been one of the two major parties in the US party system, competing first against the Whig Party (1820s–1850s) and then the Republican Party (1854–present). For the first century of its existence, the Democratic Party drew its support from whites and promoted policies that explicitly excluded African Americans (Kousser 1974, 1992, 2002; Frymer 1999; Valelly 2004; Hiers 2013). Prior to the Civil War (1861–1865), "Democrats . . . advocated a highly populistic political system . . . that empowered adult *white* males and championed their rights against many of the social and political elites in the nation" (Ashworth 1995, 295—emphasis added). Based on her exhaustive study of the antebellum Democrat Party, Baker (1983, 24) concludes that "the vital core of Democratic thinking was a firm commitment to a 'white man's republic'" (see also Richards 2000, 116).

This defense of a "white man's republic" was evident most clearly in Democrats' continual efforts at the state level to exclude nonenslaved African Americans from voting during the antebellum period. "Black suffrage was a partisan issue that the Democrats

strenuously opposed and the Whigs, somewhat less strenuously, supported" (Howe 1979, 17; see also Field 1982, 48). By the eve of the Civil War, formally free African Americans had the same voting rights as whites in just 5 of the 34 states (Keyssar 2001). This exclusion extended to a range of other domains as well, including access to education, the right to settle in individual states, and the right to testify in courts of law (see Hiers 2013 for state-by-state evidence). To be sure, nearly nine out of every ten African Americans in the United States were enslaved, not free.[2] In this regard, it is relevant that the Democratic Party was also united across the North and South in defense of slavery (Silbey 1985, 97; Gerring 1994; Ashworth 1995, 329–330; Richards 2000, 111–115, 127–143), an alliance that continued until the South's attempt to secede led to the Civil War and the subsequent abolition of slavery (Holt 1992, 57–87; Gerring 1994; Jaenicke 1995).[3] This Democratic Party defense of slavery initiated a significant period of overt ethnoracial politicization in terms of claims making and discursive coalition building.

The Whig Party exited the political scene in the 1850s, its northern and southern wings torn asunder over the issue of slavery (Holt 1992). Filling the void, the Republican Party formed in 1854, unified first and foremost on the principle that slavery should not be extended to the Western territories. This was not a popular view in the planter-dominated South. Unlike the Whigs, therefore, at its inception the Republican Party was entirely a nonsouthern party, existing only in states without slavery: in the 1860 presidential election, for example, Republican candidate Abraham Lincoln was not on the ballot in most southern states, and he garnered just 1 in 10,000 votes in that region (Baker 1983). However, until the war, and even to some extent after it broke out, the political conflict over slavery did not divide neatly along regional lines, because the Democratic Party was united across these lines in slavery's defense.

It was in this struggle over slavery that "race" first entered overtly and consistently into the national political arena (Mendelberg 2001). Based on Republicans' opposition to the westward expansion of slavery, Democrats overtly politicized the white/black boundary. Democrats accused Republicans of belonging to the

"African party" (Bilotta 1992, 267). During the 1860 election, the Democratic National Executive Committee circulated a campaign pamphlet claiming that Lincoln and the Republicans sought to abolish "all laws which erect a barrier between you and the black man" (quoted in Mendelberg 2001, 34–35). The Republican response was to hurl these racialized claims back at Democrats. Rejecting the "African party" label for themselves, Republicans argued that it in fact applied to Democrats, because their support for slavery's expansion amounted to a plan for the "Africanization" of the country (Bilotta 1992, 267). Republicans argued that Western territories should be settled and worked by the mass of whites, not by a few whites and their legions of enslaved African Americans—a claim that led one Republican congressman from Indiana to claim that his state had "elected in favor of the white race by prohibiting slavery" (quoted in Voegeli 1970, 20) and a Republican campaign organizer to proclaim that his party stood for "free territories for the free white men" (quoted in Bilotta 1992, 307; see generally Berwanger 1967; Wood 1968). While campaigning, Lincoln himself rejected Democratic claims, insisting that he was not and had never been "in favor of bringing about in any way the social and political equality of the white and black races…" (quoted in Mendelberg 2001, 38). After the 1858 elections, these racialized proclamations carried over into Congress, where "Republican professions of allegiance to white supremacy became daily utterances" (Aarim-Heriot 2003, 63).

This overt racialization of the political process did not cease with commencement of violent conflict, in large part because the Democratic Party outside the South was neither destroyed nor transformed by the war. With the outbreak of the conflict, the vast majority of Democrats in the North became a loyal opposition, supporting the war but criticizing its conduct and goals (Silbey 1977). As Mendelberg (2001) observes, many northern Democratic critiques of the war were framed in terms of how certain actions threatened the racial status quo. When Lincoln issued the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation in the summer of 1862, Democrats accused him of trying to turn the war into a "negro crusade" (quoted in Field 1982, 150). Democrats insisted that federal emancipation was "unconstitutional,

impractical, and unwise" (quoted in Voegeli 1970, 35) and that they wanted "The Union As It Was, The Constitution As It Is, And The Negroes Where They Are" (quoted in Curry 1969, xiv). Lincoln's Democratic opponent in the 1864 election, George McClellan, promised to reverse emancipation if elected (Mendelberg 2001, 39).

The Republican Party's attack on the institution of slavery was enough to produce overt, discursive ethnoracial politicization, because it challenged the hitherto existing prerogatives of whites to control resources on the basis of race—indeed, to dominate African Americans to the point of reducing them to the status *of a resource*, of property. But this overt politicization also endured for some time after the shooting stopped. This is because the Republican Party sought at the end of the war not just to abolish slavery but also to raise the formerly enslaved and their free born co-ethnics to the status of political equals and, most importantly, voters. While the Democratic Party continued to advocate a racially exclusive form of nation building, the Republican Party moved toward a more inclusive form (Wang 1997; Mendelberg 2001; Valelly 2004; Hiers 2013). This started with the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution and continued with the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Reconstruction Act of 1867, and then the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Adopted over the course of just five years, these measures collectively did far more than abolish slavery: they dictated that a wide range of rights in the polity (e.g., voting, office holding, property rights, rights in court) could no longer be reserved for those categorized as white; the racial "rule of difference" lost most of its constitutional and legal basis.[4] The rationale for this Republican agenda, it is worth noting, was linked to the war's political consequences. The war that ended slavery also changed the geographical base of the Democratic Party. After dominating national and northern politics for most of the antebellum period, Democrats became a political minority in the North in the context of the conflict over slavery, but they also gained a monopoly in southern politics (Hiers 2013).[5] Thus, although the Republican-led North won the war, the Republican Party emerged from that war with a political base only in the North. Enfranchising African Americans, the

vast majority of whom lived in the South, became the answer to Republicans' southern problem.

This inclusive nation building produced an exclusionary response. With the renewal of elections in the South in 1865, Democrats across the region sounded a note similar to that of the state party platform in Louisiana, which declared the Democratic Party's support for "[g]overnment of white people, made and to be perpetuated for the exclusive benefit of the white race" (quoted in Fischer 1974, 26). Up North in Pennsylvania's 1866 electoral campaigns, the Democratic Party circulated flyers that described the Freedman's Bureau, which had been established by the Republican-controlled Congress to assist those recently emancipated, as "AN AGENCY TO KEEP THE **NEGRO** IN IDLENESS AT THE **EXPENSE** OF THE WHITE MAN" (quoted in Mendelberg 2001, 42—emphasis in original). Opposing the Bureau as well as African-American enfranchisement, the Democratic gubernatorial candidate in Ohio's 1867 election promised to "save the state from the thralldom of niggerism" (quoted in Mendelberg 2001, 43). And the national party's platform in 1868 criticized the Republican Party for its program of reconstruction in the South in similarly racialist terms: "Instead of restoring the Union, it [the Republican Party] has, so far as in its power, dissolved it, and subjected ten States, in time of profound peace, to military despotism and *negro supremacy*" (quoted in Johnson 1978, 38—emphasis added).

Thus, in the face of proposals to abolish slavery, to assist the emancipated in their transition to freedom, and to extend voting rights to African Americans, the Democratic Party maintained through the 1850s and 1860s its rhetorical and policy commitments to being a "white man's party" loyal to the notion that the United States is a "white man's country." Despite this opposition, however, Republican Party leadership over the course of just five years moved the country from abolishing slavery all the way to extending the vote to nearly all African-American men.

Indeed, the Republicans' policy agenda produced a dramatic *if short-lived* democratization. The proportion of African Americans eligible for the suffrage exploded during this time—from 0.5 percent of all black males in the country as of December 1866 to

80.5 percent just 12 months later (Valelly 2004, 41). For a short time, the enfranchisement of African Americans seemed to promise that Republicans' vision of racially inclusive nation building might take hold. After the Reconstruction Act of 1867, a coalition of white and black Republicans held the reins of power across the South for a few years. Moreover, in response to their loss of power and African Americans' newfound political influence, a nontrivial faction of Democrats in the South abandoned the racially exclusive strategy for a "new departure" wherein Republicans and black suffrage were officially accepted. A major newspaper in Montgomery, Alabama, even went so far as to proclaim in 1870 that "[t]here is no 'white man's party' as such South of the Potomac" (quoted in Perman 1984, 60).[6] Those advocating a "new departure" believed that they could secure a significant portion of the black vote in the South and thereby undercut Republican control of state legislatures. The opposing Democratic faction argued conversely that adherence to the whites-only party tradition would be more effective. Often overtly signaling their racial boundary-marking project with the self-proclaimed name "white-liners," these Democrats "repudiated not only Republican control of their local and state governments but also the cooperationists' [i.e., advocates of the 'new departure'] call for moderation and restraint" (Emberton 2013, 170).

Due in no small part to *how* the new departure faction pursued the black vote—through a strategy that relied less on campaign rhetoric and tangible political commitments and more on economic coercion by employers, most of whom had been enslavers—the white liners prevailed (Perman 1984; Foner 2002). The new departure produced little tangible success in its quest to bring African Americans into the Democratic coalition and faded from the political scene after just a few years (Perman 1991). The white liner option became the Democrats' only option.

This exclusionary strategy was not limited to ordinary electioneering in the pursuit of power. White liners formed organizations with varying names—for example, the White League, the Knights of the White Camelia, the White Brotherhood, the White Man's Parties, the Peoples' Clubs, the Red Shirts, and most famously, the Ku Klux Klan (Valelly 1993, 50; Foner 2002,

425; Hahn 2003, 296)—all of which "were often little more than local Democratic clubs converted into paramilitary companies" (Hahn 2003, 296; see also Rable 1984; Valelly 1993; Foner 2002; Emberton 2013). As this characterization would suggest, the resurgence of the Democratic Party as a unified, overtly ethnoracial "white man's party" depended to a significant degree on the threat and exercise of political violence.

Political violence on behalf of white supremacy and the Democratic Party was at first undisciplined and therefore easier for agents of the federal government to suppress using the recently passed constitutional amendments and supporting legislation (Swinney 1987; Valelly 1993). But then the Democratic Party became shrewder in how it employed violence starting in the early 1870s (Perman 1984). In a strategy supported by "the Democratic party leadership at the highest level" (Perman 1991, 131), Democrats publicly professed peaceful intentions but "selectively used armed intimidation to destroy the Republican party," mainly "by keeping black voters away from the polls or forcing them to vote Democratic" (George 1984, 162). In this way, "paramilitary battles for position" became crucial in determining election outcomes (Hahn 2003, 288). As Valelly (1993, 50) argues, although elections were organized and carried out, "there was a basic, *military* structure to the region's party and electoral politics." Historians have not produced any comprehensive estimates of the African-American death toll that resulted, but any such figure would easily be in the thousands, if not the tens of thousands (see Keller 1977, 224; Foner 2002, 120, 437; Grimsley 2012, 16). Over the course of a few years, Republican governments in nearly every southern state were overthrown by a combination of fraud, intimidation, violence, and political mobilization based on "white" membership as "terrorism and murder became a frequent adjunct of the political process" (Keller 1977, 224).

With the failure of the "new departure" in the southern states and resurgence of the Democratic Party's white supremacist faction, southern democratization suffered a dramatic reversal within a generation (Tuck 2007). Black voter turnout in the ex-confederate states, which was 61 percent in 1880—although highly manipulated, coerced, etc., in many districts by this time

(see Kousser 1974)—declined to 36 percent in 1892, 17 percent in 1900, and to less than 2 percent in 1912 (Redding and James 2001). In a global context, the reversal that occurred provided "democracy's greatest experience in disenfranchisement" (Gibson 2013, 59).

It should be noted that this regional dynamic depended as well on actions and inactions at the national level. Democrats in Congress regardless of region did their part to make sure that African Americans were excluded as agents from southern politics. When the Democratic Party gained control of the House, Senate, and the Presidency in 1893 for first time since before the Civil War, they used that power to repeal voting rights enforcement laws dating back to 1870, thereby guaranteeing that African-American disfranchisement in the South could proceed unimpeded by federal intervention (Wang 1997). This action was part of a larger trend which showed that the *national* ethnoracial party that had formed at the heart of the political system in the 1820s remained there through the nineteenth century (and beyond). Between the 1860s and 1890s, about one-third of Democrats in Congress represented nonsouthern states and districts (Hiers 2013), and yet, "[f]rom 1866 to the turn of the century, not a *single* Democrat in the House or Senate *ever* voted in favor of a piece of civil rights legislation" (Kousser 1992, 149).[7] The political logic behind this interregional unity was straightforward: "Effective enforcement of Negro rights meant indefinite Republican rule in the South, and [thus] Democrats in Congress unanimously opposed the [civil rights] legislation" (Grossman 1976, 27; see also Kousser 1992, 152).

The Supreme Court did its part as well, most prominently in its 1896 *Plessy v. Ferguson* decision. With this decision, the "separate but equal" doctrine became the law of the land for nearly 60 years and provided the constitutional basis for the thoroughgoing racial segregation of southern public life (parks, hotels, restaurants, buses, trains, hospitals, schools, universities, etc.).

The legal exclusion of African Americans in the South did not depend on whether they lived in the cities or countryside, but this exclusion's economic base was fundamentally rural and agrarian. Not surprisingly, then, the urbanization and industrialization of

the United States eventually had important implications for the course of ethnoracial politicization. On the one hand, it helped to create the conditions for the end of legal racial exclusion on a nationwide basis in the 1960s. On the other hand, in combination with nation-building policies linked to housing and education, it helped to ensure the continuation of ethnoracial politicization after the federal government, compelled by the civil rights movement in a context of Cold War imperatives, dismantled the legal edifice of exclusion. We now discuss these two developments in turn.

Politicization, 1900s–1960s: Black Migration and the Regionalization of the "White" Party

From 1900 onwards, the pace of industrialization and urbanization increased rapidly, which created the conditions for the end of racially exclusionary laws as African Americans moved out of the South and into northern cities in search of economic opportunity. This migration was consequential, because after the Civil War African-American political exclusion was largely limited to the South; upon moving out of the South and into northern cities, therefore, African Americans also became voters. This in turn helped to split the Democratic Party along regional lines with respect to the question of legal forms of racial exclusion. By the 1930s and 1940s, a substantial portion of African Americans had moved into the Democratic Party coalition outside the South, and the northern wing of the party began to promote equal rights across the country; by this time, in other words, the national ethnoracial party had exited the scene leaving only a regional one. This amounted to a dramatic shift in the long-run politicization of ethnoracial boundaries in the United States.

This process took some time to unfold. With the resurgence of white supremacist Democrats in the South and the virtual elimination of African Americans from politics in that region, those African Americans who remained electorally relevant were generally in the North and gave their loyalty to the Republican Party (Frymer 1999; Topping 2008). By promoting

such an exclusionary policy agenda, the Democratic Party at the national level remained a "white man's party" in the sense that it garnered practically no African-American support. The fact that the Democratic Party had removed African Americans from politics in the South and institutionalized a systematic form of legal racial segregation by the turn of the twentieth century meant that nearly all African Americans experienced this fate; as of 1900, almost 90 percent of all African Americans lived in the southern region. Moreover, this decisive elimination of the African-American vote in the South, in tandem with the entrance of new western states into the Union that voted Republican, meant that Republicans had neither the means (i.e., African-American voters in the South) nor much of an incentive (because the new western states bolstered the Republican coalition) to keep the issue of civil rights on the national agenda for the purposes of gaining a foothold in the South (Valelly 1995, 2009; Gibson 2013, 65). Consequently, when looking through the lens of national and even regional politics in the first decades of the twentieth century, the ethnoracial boundary became largely invisible, despite being of great consequence in everyday life as well as a central axis of state and local policy in the South.

The first decades of the twentieth century, however, laid the groundwork for major political shifts regarding the role of African Americans in major party coalitions. Though the Democratic Party remained an ethnoracial party at the national level through the 1800s, the last decades of that century produced the creation of an expansive political space wherein African Americans in principle could exercise influence through ordinary political means. This space comprised all those states outside the South where, in stark contrast to the pre-Civil War era, African Americans possessed generally equal rights with their white counterparts and in particular the freedom to vote. A party organized for the specific promotion of white interests remained at the heart of the national political system, but the legal structure of racial exclusion had become regionalized, mainly—not entirely!—confined to the southern states. The Democratic Party had established a one-party region in the South by excluding African Americans

from politics. But elsewhere political competition remained, and indeed, the Republican Party was generally dominant in other parts of the country. This meant that the Democratic Party had an incentive to appeal to African Americans outside the South, particularly as they moved there in ever-greater numbers. The proportion of African Americans living in regions other than South more than doubled between 1900 and 1930, and by 1960 about 40 percent of African Americans lived outside the South.[8]

At the same time, with nearly all African Americans removed from politics in the South, the Republican Party's only chance of making any political ground in that region depended on appealing exclusively to white voters on white supremacist grounds. Republicans eventually attempted this most overtly in the 1928 presidential election, when party candidate Herbert Hoover chose Colonel Horace Mann to head his campaign in the South, a man who had alleged ties with the Klan (see Burner 1968; Sherman 1973; Lichtman 1979). Under his direction, Republicans "circulated racist propaganda" in the South that depicted his Democratic opponent, Al Smith, as a proponent of complete racial equality (Lichtman 1979, 152). This campaign claimed that Smith, who had been governor of New York, was one of the main reasons that "Negroes allegedly had been extending their influence throughout New York," and it "disseminated pictures of blacks and whites dancing together in New York clubs and of white people taking orders from black employers" (Ibid.). Hoover tried to do his part, too, though in a more subtle way. Hoover had been Secretary of Commerce under President Coolidge, and unlike most others in the Coolidge administration, Hoover desegregated the Commerce department. However, while campaigning in the South on several occasions he denied ever having done so.

In a related development, the Republican Party developed a close alliance with the white supremacist Ku Klux Klan in many states outside the South in the 1910s and 1920s, a period when the Klan was a resurgent social movement that held significant political sway (McVeigh 2009; see also Thornbrough 1961; Sherman 1964; Gosnell 1966 [1935]; Giffin 1983; Flamming 2001, 2005; Topping 2008). Indicative of this was the 1924 presidential election, when, among three major candidates, only the Republican

contender refused to denounce the Klan (Topping 2008, 10). Likewise, Republican administrations in the 1920s continued the workplace racial segregation of federal employees, which was first systematized by the Democratic President Woodrow Wilson (1913–1921) (Weiss 1968).

Founded in 1909, the influential National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) took note of these Republican actions. The NAACP leadership described Republicans in many states as having been "touched with the tar brush of the Ku Klux Klan" (quoted in Thornbrough 1961, 13), criticized Republican administrations for continuing the segregation of federal workplaces, and described the 1928 Republican campaign in the South as a "campaign of racial hatred."[9] In the 1920s, therefore, the NAACP called for "a new political emancipation," this time of African Americans from their loyalty to the increasingly unresponsive Republican Party (quoted in Giffin 1983, 139).

Since its formation, the Democratic Party had never offered an alternative for African Americans displeased with the Whigs and then the Republicans. However, in the first few decades of the twentieth century this began to change as some nonsouthern Democrats awoke to the realities of trying to win elections as the "white man's party" in areas of the country where previous historical developments and changing migration patterns brought an increasing number of African Americans into the political field—and where, starting in the 1860s, the Democratic Party generally was the weaker party and therefore needed to expand its coalition (see also Ware 2006, 219; Karol 2009, 105). To be sure, these decades were marked by ambiguity. In the 1910s and 1920s, for example, the Democratic Party displayed sharply divergent reactions to this change in the racial composition of the nonsouthern electorate, from cries of "Negro domination" by Democratic politicians in states such as Ohio and Illinois, to a concerted effort to bring African Americans into the party in the major cities of New York, Indiana, and Missouri.[10] But by the end of the 1930s, the inclusive approach had largely won the day. With African Americans' growing frustrations with the Republican Party and therefore increasing willingness to defect from the Party of

Lincoln, most Democratic politicians put down their white man's trumpet. And this trend was reinforced in a quite substantial way by the 1936 presidential election, wherein Democrats, after the fact, were shocked to learn that for the very first time a nontrivial number of African Americans (outside the South, of course) had voted for their candidate (Sitkoff 1978; Andersen 1979; Weiss 1983).

In the congressional session that immediately followed the 1936 election, the House of Representatives passed a bill to provide for federal intervention to prevent lynching—that is, extra-judicial festivals of torture and murder by hanging that had claimed the lives of thousands of African Americans since the 1880s (Tolnay 1995, 270). This was the "first Democrat-sponsored anti-lynching bill to pass the House" (Jenkins, Peck, and Weaver 2010, 83). Indeed, it was the first Democrat-sponsored civil rights legislation of any kind to pass in either the House or the Senate in more than a century of the party's existence; and it passed with overwhelming support from Democrats outside the South, with 92 percent of 199 nonsouthern Democrats voting in favor of it (Jenkins et al. 2010, 83). In the Senate, nonsouthern Democrats also pushed this legislation; in roll calls on the bill, three-quarters of them voted against the southern wing of their party. One southern senator described the legislative struggle as a "fight for white supremacy" (quoted in Sitkoff 1978, 292), while another declared the meaning of the nonsouthern Democrats' votes: "The South may just as well know . . . that it has been deserted by the Democrats of the North . . . " (quoted in Zelizer 2012, 36).

Thus by the 1930s, the hitherto national ethnoracial party had become regionalized. Except for claims making in the name of civil rights—which in effect were inclusive claims that race should *not* matter in a wide variety of social domains including politics and therefore was the opposite of ethnoracial politicization—the overt politicization of race between the 1940s and 1960s became largely a regional matter, confined to the South. The southern senator's claim that in their defense of white supremacy southern Democrats had been "deserted by the Democrats of the North," though not immediately leading to much during World War II, gained confirmation at the Democratic Party's national convention

in 1948. It was there that the Democratic Party *qua* national party overtly relinquished its historic commitment to the exclusionary racial order and adopted a platform strongly committed to eliminating this exclusion. The response from the South was immediate. Delegates from several southern states stormed out of the convention and went on to form the Dixiecrat Party. This party was committed to maintaining a "white" party in the South, but it did not last, consistent with the fate of all third parties over the course of US history. But its formation evidenced a major rupture in the Democratic Party that would play itself out over the next few decades, culminating in a post-1960s era wherein the Republican Party became the southern and "white"-centered party. Moreover, the formation of the Dixiecrat Party was part of a more general and quite overt politicization of race in terms of claims making—in the defense of whites, segregation, etc.— that had not been seen in the South since the turn of the twentieth century.

There is general agreement that the overt claims making type of ethnoracial politicization in the South received a major stimulant from the US Supreme Court's *Brown v. Board of Education* decision, which in 1954 struck down the *Plessy* separate-but-equal doctrine (see above) and thereby mandated the dismantling of the South's system of educational segregation by race. "Throughout the South the pattern of response to *Brown* was consistent: Race became the decisive focus of southern politics, and massive resistance its dominant theme" (Klarman 1994, 97). Nearly all of the South's representatives in the House of Representatives and the Senate signed "The Southern Manifesto" in 1956, which pledged this "massive resistance"—concerted obstruction by all but violent means to the racial desegregation of the southern school systems (Lewis 2006). According to Numan Bartley's count, "Southern state legislators enacted more than 450 laws and resolutions designed to prevent, delay, or limit public-school desegregation and to suppress or handicap the NAACP and other civil-rights groups" (Bartley and Graham 1975, 53). In fact, these efforts had begun earlier, in anticipation of the *Brown* decision. Several states had considered laws or referenda to convert public schools into private ones in order to avoid desegregation. And many states

had established policy planning groups aimed at defending segregation, the membership of which "encompassed most of the political power structure of the state, including the governor and top administrative officers, legislative leaders, and even the chief justice of the state supreme court." (Bartley 1999, 55).

Race also became an increasingly important issue in campaigns. Devotion to segregation was a key claim by both candidates in the 1950 campaign for the South Carolina Senate seat (Bartley and Graham 1975, 28–29). In the North Carolina Senate campaign that same year, the challenger ran a "White-People-Wake-Up" campaign and won (Bartley and Graham 1975, 52). Similar developments were evident in a range of other southern states as well, including Virginia, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Florida (see Bartley and Graham 1975, 38, 55, 63, 67, 74–79, 121; Bartley 1999, 68, 322, 341). The most systematic evidence comes from Earl Black's (1976) study of southern campaigns for governor between 1950 and 1973. Summarizing his study of 250 major candidacies for 80 governorships in the 11 southern states, Black observes: "At one point or another after the *Brown* decision, all the southern states experienced gubernatorial campaigns in which racial segregation was a central (and frequently decisive) issue . . . " (Black 1976, 141).

In his 1963 inauguration speech, Governor George Wallace of Alabama made his now infamous proclamation: "In the name of the greatest people that have ever trod this earth, I draw a line in the dust and toss the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny, and I say: segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever" (quoted in Townsend 1999, 47). The last words became a rallying cry for segregationists. In the end, however, southern white supremacists in the Democratic Party lost the battle to defend the legally exclusionary racial order. Major civil rights legislation adopted in 1964, 1965, and 1968 swept this away. But this legislation did not signal the end of the nation's long career of ethnoracial politicization. Upon signing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, President Lyndon Johnson reportedly said that he was in effect signing the South over to the Republican Party for the next 35 years. Indeed, the battle over the political loyalty of southern whites, who for so long—more than 100 years—were solidly

aligned with the Democratic Party, would play a substantial role in reviving the new incarnation of the "white" ethnic party and in stimulating significant politicization of ethnoracial boundaries.

To summarize, as millions of African Americans migrated in search of economic opportunity to the industrializing cities of the North between the 1910s and 1940s, the landscape of political competition shifted. In particular, the Democratic Party outside the South increasingly relinquished its commitment to being a "white man's party" as it sought to bring the growing African-American populations into its coalition. Reinforcing this locally variable trend, Democrats' national New Deal economic policies in the 1930s, although not designed for the specific benefit of African Americans, had the effect of solidifying African Americans' growing but hitherto hesitant affinity for the Democratic Party outside the South (Sitkoff 1978; Weiss 1983). At the same time, the renewal of Republican efforts to gain a foothold in the South—where African Americans did not vote—led the historically inclusive party to engage in campaign tactics and alliances (particularly with the KKK) that further motivated African Americans to seek a new home in the Democratic Party. Thus, by the late 1930s, the national ethnoracial party had become mostly a regional one, confined to the South. The resulting competition between Republicans and Democrats for African-American votes outside the South became an important structural condition for the emergence and success of the civil rights movement in eliminating the overtly exclusionary regimes of the South. Major Supreme Court decisions, especially *Brown v. Board of Education*, further expanded this political opportunity structure (see McAdam 1982) but also created a white political backlash in the South (Klarman 1994; Lewis 2006) that—like the earlier period of federal intervention between the 1860s and 1880s—yielded high levels of overt ethnoracial politicization.

Politicization, 1960s–Present

Since passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 racial subordination is no longer inscribed in law; this long enduring manifestation, cause, and consequence of

ethnoracial politicization has passed from the scene. Nevertheless, an ethnoracial party remains at the heart of the political system, though with two major differences from earlier periods. First, it is now the Republican Party. Second, this party no longer advertises itself as "the white man's party," and, indeed, proclaims itself to be committed to "colorblind" policies, wherein all are treated equally under the law and in accordance with policy. Explicit claims making regarding ethnoracial representation, in other words, is no longer a feature of politicization in the United States, though more subtle types of claims making have kept ethnoracial politicization on the agenda in the post-Civil Rights era. Moreover, and more fundamental to the characterization of the Republican Party as being an ethnoracial one, the voting coalition and elected representatives of the Republican Party have become increasingly white, even as the proportion of whites in the overall population has declined. In the 2012 presidential election, for example, eight out of every nine Republican votes came from whites (Haney-López 2014: 1), while just 6 percent of African Americans voted Republican.[11] This is nothing new: "Republicans have received almost no black votes since symbolically turning their backs on civil rights in 1964…" (Mendelberg 2001, 15). Likewise, in a country that is now 65 percent non-Hispanic white, all but 2 percent of state-level elected Republican officials in 2012 identified with this category (Haney-López 2014, 1).

Despite the major legislative victories of the civil rights movement in the 1960s, therefore, ethnoracial politicization continued, albeit in a more subtle form, well beyond that decade and indeed to the present. The broad structural reasons for this are twofold. One concerns the fact that at the regional and state level in the South, the polity remained very much a white polity until the 1960s, with African Americans marginalized as a pariah people. White southerners did not readily accept the dismantling of this structure of racial domination. This created an opportunity for one of the major parties to exploit the anxieties and animus attendant to the 1960s legal transformation, which, in a historical reversal, the Republican Party did. With the civil rights revolution, in other words, the political loyalties of white southerners became an object of meaningful partisan competition for the first

time since the nineteenth century, and this became a foundation of the new, more subtle ethnoracial party.

The second source of continued ethnoracial political salience after the 1960s was relevant to the South but also nationally: decades of discriminatory housing (and therefore education) policies that created a racialized geographic structure of privilege and deprivation within metropolitan areas. Due in large part to federal government subsidies, home ownership expanded from 44 to 63 percent between 1940 and 1970.[12] Importantly, the policies and practices of government and private sector entities ensured that the economic value of homes and neighborhoods would depend on the ethnoracial category of their occupants. Specifically, federal and local governments as well as the banking and real estate industries refused to finance housing in neighborhoods that were ethnoracially heterogeneous, thereby making race a key determinant of residential patterns and housing-based wealth accumulation. At the same time, and usually with encouragement from government and industry, white homeowners' associations used "racial covenants" that bound white deed holders to sell their homes only to other whites. These racial covenants were legally enforceable until the Supreme Court's 1948 *Shelley v. Kraemer* decision, and to varying degrees they remained in use (enforced by "moral" and other nonlegal forms of suasion and coercion) for two decades thereafter (Massey and Denton 1993; Gotham 2000; Sugrue 2005; Kucheva and Sander 2014). In essence, then, major institutional actors sanctioned and subsidized racial segregation and, at the same time, made the racial integration of neighborhoods a determinant of *falling* property values and wealth destruction (Shapiro 2004). The pariah status of African Americans in white neighborhoods across the country was, therefore, directly tied to the negative economic consequences of racial integration, consequences underwritten by the federal government.

Moreover, these policies affected more than home values. Because "neighborhood" schools are the sociogeographic basis of public education in the United States, residential racial segregation has meant racial segregation in education (Frankenberg 2013). And because of the way public education has been funded

in the United States, the racialized economic devaluation of neighborhoods with African-American residents has meant less funding for schools in these neighborhoods. From 1940 to 1970, between five and six out of every nine public education dollars derived from the local level of government, and most local education dollars in turn came from property taxes (Odden and Picus 2004, 6).[13] Economically devalued property, therefore, tends to produce insufficiently funded schools. And so the racialized devaluation of property in turn produced the racialized devaluation of educational institutions—widening and deepening the policy-induced socioeconomic basis of white antagonism toward African Americans.

Working together, these racialized economic nation-building policies in housing and education ensured that the ethnoracial boundary would continue to be socially salient outside the South even as major political actors in that region moved toward support for the elimination of systematic legal exclusion in the South. As a result, in the post-1960s era the South as well as the non-South became fertile soil for the politicization of race. The Republican Party took full advantage of this opportunity. At the national level its most important political entrepreneurs in this regard were Barry Goldwater, who in his 1964 presidential campaign made the most concerted bid for the "white South" since Hoover's 1928 campaign; Richard Nixon, who in the late 1960s and 1970s exploited conflicts over school busing and housing (conflicts that themselves were structurally shaped by the policies just discussed); and Ronald Reagan, who in the 1980s did the same in relation to race-conscious employment and government contracting policies. Efforts to take "race" into account in order to address the continuing effects of long-standing policies and practices of discrimination—efforts that included busing for school de-segregation and affirmative action policies in employment and government contracting—did not have the exclusionary intent of previous legal and administrative forms of ethnic politicization. But as will be seen, Republicans politicized these policies, casting them as violations of newly sacrosanct "colorblind" principles and, therefore, as unfairly injurious to the interests of white people.[14]

While researching a book on the GOP, *Wall Street Journal* columnist Robert Novak attended the Young Republicans convention in 1963, where he "observed that a majority of the delegates shared an enthusiasm for [Barry] Goldwater and 'an unabashed hostility toward the Negro rights movement'" (De Jong 2010, 43, quoting Novak 1965, 179). Novak concluded as well that "[m]any party leaders 'envisioned substantial political gold to be mined in the racial crisis by becoming in fact, though not in name, the White Man's Party'" (De Jong 2010, 43, quoting Novak 1965, 201). Barry Goldwater embodied the "fact but not in name" motif. Chapter three of his bestselling 1960 book, *Conscience of a Conservative*, delivered a paean to its titular topic, "States' Rights," which in turn was the constitutional basis of the white South's defense of local racial control. And Goldwater cited states' rights as providing a "racially neutral" rationale for his Senate vote against the Civil Rights Act of 1964: he said that he opposed racial segregation but also the use of federal intervention to dismantle it (De Jong 2010, 43). As Republican political strategist Kevin Phillips explained a few years later, the GOP's nomination of Goldwater in 1964 revealed a party that had "decided to break with its formative antecedents and make an ideological bid for the anti-civil rights South" (quoted in De Jong 2010, 43). Speaking to reporters during the 1964 presidential campaign, Goldwater pithily summarized his party's strategy to capture the white South for the first time in a century: "We're not going to get the Negro vote as a bloc in 1964 and 1968, so we ought to go hunting where the ducks are" (quoted in Thurber 2013, 173). Goldwater did poorly in the election, but carried the Deep South states, the subregional core of racial apartheid.

Elected president in 1968, Republican Richard Nixon also focused on the South. In that election, Nixon had won five southern states and his Democratic opponent only one. But running as a third party candidate, former Alabama governor George Wallace, who just a few years before had declared "segregation forever" (see above), won the other five southern states.[15] In postelection meetings with political advisers, Nixon described the South as "terribly important" for his reelection in 1972, and, evoking

Goldwater, Nixon said "*That's* where the ducks are" (quoted in Kotlowski 2001, 19). Nixon already had bagged many ducks in the 1968 election; the remaining ones were in the states won by Wallace, the segregationist.

In addition to pursuing victory in the 1972 election, Nixon and other Republicans were playing a longer game with a strategy detailed in Kevin Phillips's 1969 book, *The Emerging Republican Majority*. As a top aide for Nixon's Attorney General, George N. Mitchell, Phillips was influential with administration officials, including Nixon (Kotlowski 2001, 22; Lamb 2005, 154). Harry Dent, the Nixon aide most directly responsible for the southern strategy, endorsed Phillips's plan and distributed several memos in pursuit of it (Carter 1996, 25–46). Moreover, Nixon's chief of staff reported that after reading Phillips's book Nixon said: "Use Phillips as an analyst—study his strategy" and "don't go for Jews and Blacks" (quoted in Kotlowski 2001, 22).

As Nixon's directive implies, the strategy was explicitly a racial one. Major portions of the GOP had at best wavering support for equal voting rights in the 1960s (Congressional Quarterly 1961, 204–207), but GOP strategist Kevin Phillips made it clear why support was in fact necessary, adducing a rationale that was the opposite of a "colorblind" one: "[M]aintenance of Negro voting rights is essential to the GOP. Unless Negroes continue to displace white Democratic organizations [in the South], the latter may remain viable as spokesmen for Deep Southern conservatism" (quoted in Edsall and Edsall 1992, 81). In other words, Republicans needed African Americans to vote not because they would vote for Republicans (as in the post-Civil War era) but rather because they would vote Democratic and thereby push southern whites into the Republican Party. Phillips further indicated that this strategy's power was not confined to the South: "The GOP can build a winning coalition without Negro votes. Indeed, *Negro-Democratic mutual identification* was a major source of Democratic loss—and Republican or [George Wallace's] American Independent Party profit—in many sections [i.e., regions] of the nation" (quoted in Frymer 1999, 101—emphasis added). The strategy was to foster an image of Democrats

as "a black party," said Phillips, so that "white Democrats will desert their party in droves" (quoted in Ibid.).

From the presidential seat of power, Nixon did what he could to show the white South that the Republican Party was, despite historical legacies, anything but the "black party." During his first year in office, Nixon nominated two southerners to the Supreme Court who had poor records on civil rights; after the Senate predictably rejected the nominations, Nixon made a statement to the press in which he described these rejections as an "act of regional discrimination" that understandably fostered "the bitter feelings of millions of Americans who live in the South" (quoted in Edsall and Edsall 1992, 83). In the same year (1969), Nixon proposed legislation to weaken Section Five of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, which singled out the southern region for federal intervention based on that region's singular denial of voting rights to African Americans (Edsall and Edsall 1992, 83). The House initially passed Nixon's proposal by a vote of 208 to 204, with nearly 75 percent support from Republicans. Though the measure failed in the Senate (and, per Phillips's strategy, this was perhaps optimal for the GOP), "Nixon . . . realized his central goal, clearly aligning himself with the white South in a battle with the Democratic Congress, and distancing his own administration from a program of stringent federal enforcement" (Edsall and Edsall 1992, 84).

Nixon took other steps to undermine federal enforcement of civil rights that were bound to fail but also curried favor with the white South. In July 1969, his administration "announced that strict compliance with timetables for [school] integration would be dropped" (Edsall and Edsall 1992, 81), and it submitted the necessary motion to the Supreme Court. When Nixon read an advisor-provided clipping from the *Savannah News* (from the southern state of Georgia) that read "Desegregation Deadlines Won't Be Enforced," Nixon scrawled "Excellent job" across the top (O'Reilly 1995, 301). The Court predictably rejected the motion. Nixon followed the same script with regard to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which again ended in the courts' rejection of Nixon's bid to weaken enforcement (Ibid., 300). In this way, the courts received the blame for desegregation (Mason 2004, 52). Nixon in fact made

this strategy explicit in a series of meetings in 1969 and 1970, telling his aides that "the use of U.S. Federal District Court actions rather than administrative compliance procedures" was the preferred pathway to civil rights enforcement (quoted in Kotlowski 2001, 29).

Much of the southern appeal strategy was a behind-the-scenes one, though one that could easily be marketed for conservative white southern consumption. The exceptions to this superficial subtlety concerned policies that supposedly overreached in the name of civil rights. One example, discussed above, is the preclearance provision of the Voting Rights Act, which singled out the South for scrutiny with respect to African-American voting rights. Nixon directly attacked the preclearance provision in the name of combating what he called "regional discrimination" (see above). The other overt issue was the use of busing—or "forced busing" as the critics called it—to integrate schools in a context of extensive neighborhood segregation. In press conferences and televised statements, Nixon criticized the use of busing to desegregate schools, employing "code words like 'forced integration' so often that his own Labor Department complained" (O'Reilly 1995, 304). In addition to public statements, Nixon floated a constitutional amendment to ban busing for desegregation (Kotlowski 2001, 39; O'Reilly 1995, 305). Nixon asked aides to prepare this amendment in anticipation of the Supreme Court's *Swann* decision regarding the use of busing for desegregation, in case the Court approved this method (Mason 2004, 147).

The Court did in fact rule in favor of busing for desegregation in *Swann* (1971). After the decision, Nixon held a press conference to announce that any prior statement of his that was inconsistent with that decision was "now moot and irrelevant because . . . nobody, including the president . . . is above the law as it is finally determined by the Supreme Court" (quoted in Buncher 1975, 104). This has the ring of statesmanship, but in the context of Nixon's overall desegregation strategy described above (i.e., blame the court), it seems more like gamesmanship: Nixon had repeatedly gone on the record against the very decision that the Court handed down; those paying attention knew on whose side

Nixon stood in the battle over federal interference in local ethnoracial relations.

Moreover, Nixon continued to fight busing in ways that conformed in letter but not spirit with the Supreme Court's decision. In May 1971, just a month after the *Swann* decision, the Department of Housing, Education, and Welfare (HEW) drew up a plan to use busing to desegregate schools in Austin, Texas that the attorney general then approved (Buncher 1975, 104). But two months later "Nixon disassociated himself…from his Administration's proposal…" (Buncher 1975, 104), making a statement that included this declaration: "I am against busing as that term is commonly used in school desegregation cases" (quoted in Buncher 1975, 104). Soon thereafter, the White House issued a public statement revealing that "President Nixon had warned government officials, orally and in writing, that they risked losing their jobs if they sought to impose extensive busing as a means of desegregating schools throughout the South" (Buncher 1975, 105). A year later and just months before his 1972 reelection bid, "Nixon went on television to criticize busing and ask Congress for a moratorium against it"; the moratorium failed, but Nixon "had carried the day politically by identifying himself with anti-busing sentiment" (Kotlowski 2001, 39).

In this effort, Nixon was joined by top administration officials and their confidants. In April 1970, Vice President Spiro T. Agnew promised audiences in South Carolina that the president would nominate "strict constructionists" to the Court and that "[u]nder this Administration, there will be no forced busing to achieve racial balance, and the neighborhood school concept will prevail, unless, of course, the Supreme Court should nullify the President's policies" (quoted in Buncher 1975, 102). In that same month, Attorney General John N. Mitchell spoke at the party's leadership conference and proclaimed that every citizen has "the right to reject unreasonable requirements of busing and to send their children to neighborhood schools," which he claimed were rights "just as important as the right of all our citizens to be assigned [to the schools] without regard to their race" (quoted in Buncher 1975, 102—bracketed material in original). A year later, Mitchell's wife, Martha Mitchell, reacted to the *Swann* decision

by telling the press "that the Supreme Court 'should be abolished' for its decision upholding the constitutionality of busing schoolchildren to achieve racially-balanced schools" (Buncher 1975, 209).

Quoting internal administration memos, O'Reilly (1995, 305) confirms the racially divisive strategy behind the antibusing posture: "Recognizing that 'busing is only a code word for the real issue, which is black/white relations', White House demographers hoped to exploit it politically in anticipation of the 1972 reelection campaign 'wherever large numbers of lower middle class whites live in close proximity to blacks'." This is the context for Vice President Agnew's September 1970 speech in Grand Rapids, Michigan—hundreds of miles from the nearest southern state—where he appealed to the "forgotten American" who "does not enjoy being called a bigot for wanting his children to go to a public school in their own neighborhood" (quoted in Buncher 1975, 103). Likewise, after the publication of a 1969 *New York Magazine* article, "The Revolt of the White Lower Middle Class," which argued that the article's titular group was "accumulating large grievances against the black community," President Nixon "circulated the article widely within the administration" (Mason 2004, 46).

None of this is to argue that Nixon did nothing to advance civil rights during his presidency. Indeed, Kotlowski (2001, 3) argues, "Divisive rhetoric notwithstanding, Nixon compiled a creditable record on civil rights." Likewise, Nixon aide Leonard Garment retrospectively claimed that Nixon's civil rights policy "was for the most part operationally progressive but obscured by clouds of retrogressive rhetoric" (quoted in Kotlowski 2001, 1). And based on a large number of files released in the late 1990s, historian Melvin Small concluded that "despite his rhetoric and *unsavory role in exacerbating racial polarization over busing*, Nixon could have boasted, had he wanted to, about his progressive civil rights policy" (quoted in Kotlowski 2001, 2–3—emphasis added).

But all of this is moot from the perspective of an analysis of politicization in the form of claims making and coalition building: Whatever Nixon's precise record on civil rights enforcement, he undoubtedly worked assiduously to stoke long-standing

ethnoracial divisions in his effort to bring white southerners into the Republican coalition. As Kotlowski (2001, 14) also concedes in stating one of Nixon's main legacies: "Nixon helped set the Republican Party's race-based political agenda through his 'southern strategy'." Indeed, Nixon repeatedly and on multiple occasions made it clear to his staff that the progress they were making on school desegregation should *not* be publicized (see Kotlowski 2001, 34–36).[16]

The Republican Party's status as the new if more subtle "white" party solidified with the nomination and election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and the policies of his administration over the next eight years. Reagan first rose to national prominence in 1964 with a nationally televised speech in support of Republican presidential nominee Barry Goldwater (Edsall and Edsall 1992, 137). When Reagan successfully ran for governor in California in 1966, he strongly supported a referendum to repeal the state's fair housing (antidiscrimination) law (Edsall and Edsall 1992, 60). Reagan's 1976 campaign for the GOP presidential nomination included advocacy of: (1) a constitutional amendment to abolish the use of busing to desegregate schools and (2) an end to government affirmative action in employment and contracting. Indeed, Nixon's own campaign advisors were well aware of the racialist veneer of Reagan's appeal. In a strategy memo assessing potential Republican contenders for the 1968 presidential nomination, Nixon campaign advisor Ray Price observed that "Reagan's strength derives from . . . primarily the ideological fervor of the Right and the emotional distress of those who fear or resent the Negro . . . " (quoted in McGinniss 1969, 190).

When the Republican Party gathered in 1980 to nominate Ronald Reagan as its presidential candidate, writers of the platform section on education included a sentence declaring: "We will halt the unconstitutional regulatory vendetta launched by Mr. Carter's IRS [Internal Revenue Service] Commissioner against independent schools" (quoted in Edsall and Edsall 1992, 133–134). The "independent schools" supported in this plan were actually religious academies that formed in the South in response to school desegregation (Andrews 2002; DiTomaso 2013, 16–17). Critics dubbed these "segregation academies" because of their

all-white complexion. Under Democratic President Carter, the IRS removed these schools' tax-exempt status due to their practices of racial exclusion (Yarbrough 1990, 73). Notwithstanding its rebuke of the IRS for penalizing these schools, the Republican platform did reject what it called "unfair discrimination" but also added the qualifier that "equal opportunity should not be jeopardized by bureaucratic regulations and decisions which rely on quotas, ratios and numerical requirements to exclude some individuals in favor of others, thereby rendering such regulations and decisions inherently discriminatory" (quoted in Edsall and Edsall 1992, 144). In particular, "quotas" became the principal coded means by which the Republican Party politicized race in the Reagan-Bush years (1980–1992).

Two weeks after the national convention, Reagan traveled to Neshoba County, Mississippi—the place where three civil rights activists were viciously murdered in 1964. Reagan decided to invoke there his support for "states' rights." This evoked the ire of racial liberals at the time and continues to do so (e.g., Haney-López 2014). Bates (2011, 18–43), however, observes that this criticism was easy for Reagan to deflect, because he had been lauding the merits of states' rights at least since the 1960s; it was not simply a ploy tailored in 1980 to appeal to the Deep South. But from another angle, that is exactly the point: in 1980, the Republicans nominated someone who was an ardent promoter of the white South's bedrock "non-racial" principle in support of racial exclusion. And as in the case of the southern segregationist, for Reagan it was not mere principle: Reagan opposed all the major civil rights legislation of the 1960s on grounds that these amounted to unconstitutional federal interventions in states' rights and/or property rights (depending on the provision).[17] Reminiscent of Nixon's "regional discrimination" claim, Reagan even went so far as to describe "the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as 'humiliating' to southerners—apparently not counting the region's millions of disenfranchised blacks as noteworthy" (Schaller 2007, 133).

Once in office, Reagan made good on the platform promises concerning race. Reagan spoke against "quotas" in his first press conference, claiming that "some affirmative action programs [are] becoming quota systems. And I'm old enough to remember when

quotas existed in the United States for the purpose of discrimination…" (quoted in Laham 1998, 19).[18] As Pemberton (1997, 139) summarizes, "The heart of the Reagan Administration civil rights policy was its rejection of affirmative action." The Reagan administration's politicization of affirmative action "gave added power to Reagan's campaign theme in white, working-class neighborhoods [anywhere] and in the South [more generally], a theme captured by the slogan aired repeatedly throughout the 1984 campaign: 'You haven't left the Democratic Party, the Democratic Party left you'" (Edsall and Edsall 1992, 177). This was a particularly evocative phrase in the South, where the Democratic Party quite overtly had been the "white man's party" unceasingly since its formation in the 1820s.[19]

This approach was more than rhetorical. In 1981 President Reagan appointed William Bradford Reynolds, a "corporate lawyer with no background in civil rights," to head the Civil Rights Division (Edsall and Edsall 1992, 187). Reagan also chose those who opposed affirmative action to head the Civil Rights Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). His EEOC appointee and now Supreme Court Justice, Clarence Thomas, had gone on the record in July 1982 as being "unalterably opposed to programs that force or even cajole people to hire a certain percentage of minorities" (quoted in Edsall and Edsall 1992, 191). Other "key members" of Reagan's administration "repeatedly affirmed for the record their opposition to race- and gender-conscious hiring and university admissions…" (Yarbrough 1990, 69).

The Republican Party's new platform plank on affirmative action in 1984 described quotas as "the most insidious form of discrimination: reverse discrimination against the innocent" (quoted in King and Smith 2011, 125). As Haney-López (2014, 70) observes, "The document said nothing about race directly, but obviously 'the innocent' meant innocent whites. Attacking affirmative action provided a way for the GOP to constantly force race—and the party's defense of white interests—into the national conversation." Sometimes this defense was quite explicit. Over the course of 1983–1984, the Reagan administration filed a series of suits that asked the courts to declare unconstitutional affirmative

action plans in a number of major cities on the grounds that such plans amounted to "reverse discrimination" (quoted in Edsall and Edsall 1992, 190). And drawing on an economist's work, "[t]he administration's 1986 budget proposal called affirmative action goals, timetables, and quotas 'a tax on the employment of white males'" (O'Reilly 1995, 365).[20]

As with Nixon, Reagan pursued the white-centric strategy through judicial nominees as well. One nominee from Alabama, Jefferson B. Sessions III, admitted to having described the NAACP as "un-American" and "Communist-inspired"—precisely the descriptive rationale that governments in Alabama and other southern states had used when they made the NAACP illegal in the 1950s and early 1960s.[21] Reminiscent of Nixon's response to the defeat of his two southern appointees, Reagan's attorney general described the defeat of Sessions' nomination as "an appalling surrender."[22] In the same year that Sessions' nomination failed, Reagan promoted Justice Rehnquist, a controversial Nixon appointee, to Chief Justice (O'Reilly 1995, 367–368). Rehnquist was controversial because as a Supreme Court clerk in the 1950s he wrote a memo defending *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896) during the Court's deliberation on the *Brown* case (Haney-López 2014, 83). The next year, the Senate voted down Reagan's nominee for the Supreme Court, Robert Bork. But what O'Reilly (1995, 369) says about the racial politics of that fight could be said about any number of similar incidents going at least back to Nixon's nomination of two racist southerners and Nixon's sympathy for (white) southerners in the "regional discrimination" they had purportedly suffered (see above): "The nomination [of Bork] had forced the Democratic Party to 'play up' its civil rights advocacy and thus drove home the gut Republican message about one party being a haven for blacks and the other a haven for whites." As previously discussed, this was precisely Kevin Phillips's strategy, which Nixon earlier implored his administration to study and follow.

To be sure, as King and Smith (2011, 123) observe, "The Reagan administration was careful to present its racial policies as the fulfillment, not the rejection . . . of the modern civil rights movement. When Reagan signed a bill in 1983 making Martin Luther King Jr.'s birthday a national holiday, the president explicitly praised

King for awakening the 'sense that true justice must be color-blind'" (King and Smith 2011, 123). And yet, President Reagan openly opposed making King's birthday a holiday as late as 1982, and this opposition in general was overwhelmingly Republican (e.g., of the 90 House members who voted against the holiday, 77 were Republicans) (Chappell 2014, 91–123). More generally, Reagan's party continued well after his departure from office in 1989 to be an ethnoracial party in terms of not only its voting coalition but also its coded appeals (see Shull 1993, 83–91 for George H. W. Bush on affirmative action). Based on other studies and her own research, Mendelberg (2001, 101) concludes that "implicitly racial appeals are now a stable feature of the American political landscape," and that such appeals "are the bread and butter of Republican campaigns in the South." In addition to academics, major players in the Republican Party have conceded the veracity of this observation. In the late 1990s, Ralph Reed (head of the Christian Coalition, a powerful member of the Republican coalition) admitted that the southern strategy had been based on a racialist appeal to whites, but he promised that the GOP was about to turn the corner away from this past (Feagin 2012, 116). More recently, two chairmen of the Republican National Committee (RNC) have acknowledged that the Republican Party's white complexion—and the virtual absence of African Americans from the party's coalition—is not accidental. In a 2005 speech to the NAACP, RNC Chair Kenneth Mehlman admitted, "[B]y the seventies and into the eighties and nineties, Republicans gave up on winning the African American vote, looking the other way or trying to benefit politically from racial polarization" (quoted in Haney-López 2014, 1). And in 2010, RNC Chair Michael Steele similarly confessed, "For the last 40-plus years we had a 'Southern Strategy' that alienated many minority voters by focusing on the white male vote in the South" (quoted in Ibid.).[23]

Discussion

According to Mendelberg (2001, 12), "[M]ore than any other cleavage, race now serves as the line dividing the two major parties." As this chapter has argued, the roots of this pattern are historically

deep. For nearly all of US history, the two-party system has contained one party that has relied almost exclusively on white voters for support. In terms of voting coalitions, the "ethnic party" so prominently featured in the contemporary literature on ethnic politics in developing countries has been an enduring feature of the US polity. Moreover, ethnoracial politicization in terms of explicit claims making became nationally relevant between the 1850s and 1870s, and, more subtly, after the 1960s. And this form of politicization was an unambiguous feature of *southern* politics between the 1850s and 1890s and then again between the 1930s and 1960s. Furthermore, party-organized, ethnoracial violence in the pursuit of political power was a prominent feature of southern politics between the 1860s and 1890s, in response to Republican-led efforts by the federal government to democratize the region. This political violence was extensive enough that historical social scientists have variously described the decades after the Civil War in terms of "a wave of counterrevolutionary terror" (Foner 2002, 425), "a full-out armed rebellion" (Emberton 2013, 170), and a "a protracted war for the American South, pitting the forces of white supremacy against those of black liberation" (Grimsley 2012, 12) with "the military arm of the Democratic Party" (Rable 1984, 95) playing a lead role.

In addition to the presence of an ethnoracial party, in terms of both its voting coalition and more episodically its explicit forms of claims making, and in addition to a prolonged period of party-organized, ethnoracial violence in pursuit of political power, there is a further reason for characterizing the United States as a case of medium-high politicization: For most of its history, government policies have placed ethnoracial categories at the heart of the polity by privileging whites and excluding nonwhites. This has been evident in a variety of domains, including labor, freedom of movement, access to public services, voting, education, and housing. Quite frequently, though not always, such policies have been implemented by the ethnoracial party as part of its explicit agenda.

Ethnoracial politicization in the United States was fundamentally shaped by colonial administrative legacies and, following independence, by political institutions and processes as well as

nation-building policies. On the eve of independence, African Americans comprised nearly one-fifth of the future US population, but over 90 percent of them were enslaved. Although the 13 colonies fought a war for independence in the name of liberty, the constitution that formally brought them into union did nothing to change the status of those who remained enslaved. This inaction reflected the political-institutional and political-cultural legacies of colonial administrative rule. Local self-governance based on broad-based representative institutions was government of, by, and for an ethnoracially circumscribed population, those of European descent, who had come to be known as "white." The exclusion of enslaved African Americans was most obvious, but it applied as well to most of those who were formally free. Out of the colonial crucible emerged a legacy of locally based political autonomy for whites, including the liberty to pursue policies of ethnoracial domination.

In combination, the colonial legacies of "white" peoplehood and extensive local control generally supported the entrenchment and perpetuation of legal racial exclusion in the independence period. But because these exclusionary policies did not remain uncontested in the formal political sphere, ethnoracial politicization went well beyond this legal form. The development of the Democratic Party as a "white man's party" in the early decades of the nineteenth century itself was conditioned by political threats to the institution of slavery. Building a coalition explicitly based on white conceptions of peoplehood and the sanctity of local racial control, the Democrats formed a national, ethnoracial party that defended slavery and other forms of racial subordination for more than a century. The conflict over slavery and the exclusion of formally free African Americans evidenced a recurrent pattern: political challenges to the status quo of locally based racial domination stimulated the most overt and discursively explicit rounds of ethnoracial politicization. It was during such times that the "whites-only" party most overtly displayed its identity as such and made claims on the basis of this identification in defense of local white racial control. This was true of the Democratic Party on a national basis between the 1850s and 1890s, and on a regional (southern) basis between the 1930s and 1960s.

The reason for the regional specificity of the second period, the 1930s–1960s, had to do with how the legal form of ethnoracial politicization was restructured after the Civil War. Following abolition, the Democratic Party's subsequent defense of a thoroughgoing legal exclusion of African Americans succeeded only in the South (albeit where the vast majority of African Americans lived at the time). This defense was in response to the emergence of a Republican-led, racially inclusive nation-building project, which itself was stimulated by the political logic of coalition building in the aftermath of the Civil War. Even though Republicans failed to institutionalize African-American voting rights and thereby Republican Party power in the South, this project transformed *the North* into a region where African Americans had the right to vote. As a consequence, when millions of African Americans moved out of the South in response to the economic opportunities entailed by northern industrialization during the first decades of the twentieth century, the nonsouthern wing of the Democratic Party eventually relinquished its racially exclusive identity and African Americans moved increasingly into its coalition.

By the 1940s, Democrats and Republicans outside the South were in heated competition for African-American voters. For this reason, and because of changes in Supreme Court jurisprudence on civil rights, and, somewhat later, because of Cold War pressures that made the legal subordination of African Americans in the South a major weakness in the battle for hearts and minds abroad, and above all because of the arduous efforts of the civil rights movement, the South's exclusionary legal order was undermined by the 1960s (McAdam 1982). But although this spelled the end of the overt legal form of politicization, ethnoracial claims making and coalition building in the formal political sphere has continued. The sociopolitical bases for this were, on the one hand, the first real competition for southern white voters in more than a century, which the civil rights transformation unleashed, and, on the other, a wide range of housing and education policies that in combination had produced considerable degrees of antiblack racial antagonism in metropolitan areas not only in the South but in fact across the country. In a historic reversal, armies of Republican politicians and operatives at the local and state

levels built on these social bases to keep the United States' master ethnoracial boundary politically relevant, but their efforts also received crucial generalizing support from a series of Republican political entrepreneurs in the arena of presidential politics, from Barry Goldwater and Richard Nixon in the 1960s and 1970s to Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush in the 1980s and 1990s. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, a key question, as formulated by political scientist Larry Bartels, is "Can the Republican Party thrive on white identity?" in the future as it has in the recent past.[24] If not, then the ethnoracial cleavage that has long remained at the core of the US political system may eventually move to the margins, and perhaps from there, to regions of political irrelevance.

CHAPTER FIVE

Comparative Analysis

Ethnicity Politicization: A Comparative Perspective

As we have shown in the different case study chapters, ethnicity was politicized in Kenya and the United States, but entered the formal political sphere only temporarily in Bolivia, and was markedly absent from politics in Tanzania and Peru. Hence, the five cases represent some of the continuum of politicization of ethnicity existing in reality. Kenya represents the highest level of ethnicity politicization, with political campaigns employing strong ethnic rhetoric, elections mirroring closely ethnic identities (culminating in an "ethnic census"), and politicians implementing exclusionary policies, in particular education policies as well as allocation of government posts to benefit the favored ethnic clientele. Similarly, throughout its history, the United States has been marked by existence of an ethnoracial party based on the "white" ethnic category (first the Democratic party, then the Republican party) and widespread ethnic rhetoric (in former times more explicit and, after the 1960s, more subtly). US government policies have placed ethnoracial categories at the heart of the polity by privileging whites and excluding nonwhites. This has been evident in a variety of domains, including labor, freedom of movement, access to public services, voting, education, and housing.

On the continuum of politicization the next case is Bolivia, with a low-medium level of politicization. The predominant cleavage of indigenous versus creole (and later mestizo) emerged as a salient factor during colonial rule and was then picked up by indigenous movements and the greater civil societies. Only in recent years, with the appearance of Morales on the political stage, his subsequent election as the first indigenous president in Bolivia, and the corresponding use of ethnic rhetoric in politics, has ethnicity become politicized. While it at first appeared as though politicization would lead to conflict both in the political sphere and on the streets, the Morales government then moderated its appeals and emphasized indigenous inclusion into a common Bolivian nationhood; this appears to have assuaged fears of nonindigenous exclusion.

The next two cases, Peru and Tanzania, are cases of low levels of ethnicity politicization. Ethnicity politicization remained at a low level throughout Peru's history. As in Bolivia, ethnic identities (i.e., indigenous vs. creole/mestizo) emerged as a salient factor during the colonial period. However, in contrast to Bolivia, Peruvian civil society remained organized predominantly in terms of class cleavages—that is, peasant identity rather than indigenous identity per se, and thus ethnicity did not become a factor in political competition.

The last case on the continuum of ethnicity politicization is Tanzania. Throughout Tanzania's history, ethnicity politicization has been very low. Political competition in Tanzania is based on political ideology, ethnic rhetoric is markedly absent from political discourse, and inclusive policies to foster national identity have been implemented. Thus, Tanzania represents the other end of the continuum of ethnicity politicization, diametrically opposed to the high-politicization case of Kenya.

With evidence on these five different cases, the question remains whether we can explain why ethnicity politicization became enduring in Kenya and the United States but flared up only during a brief period in Bolivia, and was absent in Peru and Tanzania. Table 5.1 summarizes the case evidence, focusing on four important dimensions, namely:

Table 5.1 Explanatory factors related to ethnic politicization: summary of case evidence

Case	*Dependent variable: ethnicity politicization*	*Explanatory factors*			
		(A) Resource distribution (land, education, housing) was biased along ethnic lines	*(B)* Nation-building policies inadequate for targeting all ethnic groups in population	*(C)* Electoral system and geographic location of ethnic groups supported the use of ethnic identities for political mobilization	*(D)* Political entrepreneurs used ethnicity for political purposes
Kenya	*High*	*Yes* Biased distribution of land to Kikuyu; also clientelistic resource distribution in particular in the education sector to president's coethnics.	*Yes* There were no effective nation-building policies which aimed at including all ethnic groups.	*Yes* Segregation of different ethnic groups during colonial rule. Electoral constituencies match ethnic boundaries.	*Yes* Very strong use of ethnic rhetoric as well as hired ethnic thugs led to voting along ethnic lines.
US	*Medium-high*	*Yes* First racial slavery, then biased laws concerning home ownership and access to education; and in the South until the 1960s, the legally inscribed subordinate status of African Americans in every dimension of social life meant unequal access to income and wealth generating opportunities.	*Yes* Nation-building project was built on "white" ethnic identity; African Americans were excluded. This exclusion can also be seen in the restriction of political rights, that is, African Americans did not have the right to vote until 1965.	*Yes* Until the first decades of the twentieth century African Americans were located predominantly in southern States. This changed when many African Americans migrated to nonsouthern regions, but extensive neighborhood segregation based on race created a new form of politically relevant spatial concentration.	*Yes* Strong, though episodic, ethnic rhetoric used throughout the nation's history, first mainly explicit, later more implicit.

continued

Table 5.1 Continued

Bolivia	*Low-medium*	*Yes* Indigenous tribute system, forced labor, indigenous land rights not granted; also education for indigenous population focused on "indigenous" issues, i.e., not normal formal education.	*Yes, to some extent* Nation building was based on the "white" ethnic group and tried to incorporate the indigenous population without acknowledging their cultural heritage. In addition, the indigenous population was excluded for a long time from becoming full citizens due to the literacy and employment requirement for voting, which de facto excluded large parts of the indigenous population.	*Yes, to some extent* Creole/Mestizo and indigenous lived and still mainly live in different parts of the country. However, the definition of indigenous is bound to the fact that people live in the countryside. Hence, members who move to urban settings "lose" their indigenous identity.	*No* Very little use of ethnic rhetoric.
Peru	*Low*	*Yes* Indigenous tribute system, forced labor, indigenous land rights not granted; also education for indigenous population focused on "indigenous" issues, i.e. not normal formal education.	*Yes, to some extent* Nation building was based on the "white" ethnic group and tried to incorporate the indigenous population without seriously acknowledging their cultural heritage, despite use of rhetorical and symbolic devices suggesting otherwise. In addition, the indigenous population was de facto long excluded from full citizenship by literacy and employment requirements for voting.	*Yes, to some extent* Creole (/Mestizo) and indigenous lived and still mainly live in different parts of the country. However, the definition of indigenous is bound to the fact that people live in the countryside. Hence, members who move to urban settings "lose" their indigenous identity.	*No* Focus on peasant and class identities for political mobilization; ethnic rhetoric was used only to incorporate indigenous identity into the nation-building project.
Tanzania	*Low*	*No* The ujamaa policy for land and other policies ensured that resources were allocated independently of ethnic identities.	*No* Very strong nation-building policies including all ethnic groups implemented after colonial rule, including the development of Swahili as a cornerstone of the Tanzanian national identity. In addition, all ethnic groups enjoyed full citizenship rights, that is, the right to vote.	*No* Electoral boundaries purposefully set to encompass several ethnic groups.	*No* Ethnicity effectively barred from the political sphere.

Note: Extent of ethnic politicization varies over time in the different cases. For this table, we present the "average" state of politicization as well as the main explanatory factors. The general assessment is yes/no/to some extent, followed by explanations of the assessments.

(A) Extent to which resource distribution, for example, land, education, or housing, has been biased along ethnic lines.
(B) Extent to which nation-building policies failed to include all ethnic groups in population.
(C) Extent to which the electoral system and the geographic location of ethnic groups increased the usefulness of ethnic identities for political mobilization.
(D) Extent to which political entrepreneurs used ethnicity for political purposes.

Kenya and the United States

Politicization of ethnicity is a long-term process whereby existing salient ethnic identities are utilized by political entrepreneurs for political purposes. Evidence from the case studies supports the idea that in the two (medium) high politicization cases, Kenya and the United States, ethnic identities were highly salient and these salient identities were used by political entrepreneurs to win elections.

In both cases, oppressive colonial rule, biased resource distribution, and the lack of effective and inclusive nation-building policies implemented by independence governments explain how ethnic identities emerged as highly salient cleavages. Colonial administrative rule in Kenya impeded interethnic cooperation and fostered tribal identities through promotion of ethnic languages and the geographical separation of ethnic tribes. Similarly, by fostering the simultaneous development of enslavement for people of African descent and broad legal and political rights for those of European descent, British colonial rule in the future United States fostered a strong racial divide that the politically dominant white population then reinforced in the era of independence (cf. Morgan 1975).

In addition, in both cases resource distribution was strongly biased along ethnic lines. Distribution of land to the Kikuyus as well as education policies that favored coethnics during successive government periods increased the salience of ethnic identities in Kenya. Likewise, in the United States African Americans were excluded for most of US history from access to resources—first through the system of racial slavery (with laws also against

nonenslaved African Americans that prohibited land ownership and restricted the right to settle) and later through biased laws concerning home ownership and access to education. In particular, in the South until the 1960s the legally inscribed subordinate status of African Americans in every dimension of social life meant unequal access to income and wealth-generating opportunities. A last factor contributing to the high levels of ethnicity politicization was the lack of appropriate inclusive nation-building policies. As will be detailed in the next section, the United States implemented nation-building policies that did not include African Americans for a long time period, but focused on building a nation of "whites," and Kenya failed to implement any policies that could be classified as having the purpose of nation building.

Being highly salient, ethnic identities were then used by political entrepreneurs for political purposes. Both in Kenya and the United States, ethnic rhetoric—explicit or implicit—was strongly featured in political campaigning. Besides being highly salient, other intervening structural factors help explain why ethnicity became politicized in Kenya and the United States. The match between electoral constituencies and ethnic group location was one such factor, making ethnic identity far easier to use for purposes of political mobilization than stressing class cleavages would have been. This is very clear in Kenya, where ethnic group boundaries are almost the same as electoral boundaries. Similarly—albeit to a lesser extent—the geographic concentration of African Americans in the southern states helps to explain why the Democratic Party developed an enduringly exclusionary political agenda, why Republicans appealed to African-American voters in the decades after the Civil War, and why later on, after the migration of many African Americans to nonsouthern regions in the first half of the twentieth century, Democrats began to deemphasize racial exclusivity in those regions.

Bolivia, Peru, and Tanzania

While structural factors and political entrepreneurs worked together to produce ethnicity politicization in Kenya and

United States, the same factors (or lack thereof) help explain why ethnicity remained only slightly politicized in Bolivia and not politicized in Peru and Tanzania. In Peru and Bolivia, the colonial rulers implemented a parallel repressive administrative system, which separated the indigenous population from the creole (and mestizo). The divide was further deepened through the indigenous tribute system, which translated into forced labor and limited allocation of land, as well as restrictive access to education for the indigenous population. But although these two structural factors laid the foundation for highly salient ethnic identities, both countries also implemented somewhat inclusive nation-building policies. For most of postindependence history such nation building consisted of little more than a push toward "whitening" the indigenous population—proclaiming creole or mestizo as the "true" national category—yet these policies may nevertheless have helped to attenuate the salience of ethnic identities.

The colonial administrative system oppressed the Tanzanian population but did not systematically separate the different ethnic groups, and cross-ethnic resistance against the colonial rulers laid the ground for a strong national Tanzanian identity. In addition, the socialist economic system (the ujamaa policies) of the independence government, as well as policies ensuring access to education and government posts, were independent of the ethnic identity. A last factor contributing to the low salience of ethnic identity was the strong nation-building policies that aimed, with success, at the creation of a meaningful overarching national Tanzanian identity.

With ethnic identities being only marginally salient in Bolivia, Peru, and Tanzania, political entrepreneurs did not use ethnic rhetoric to mobilize voters. In Tanzania, the barring of ethnic claims making was even institutionalized in the national law by prohibiting ethnic rhetoric in politics, and by redesigning electoral constituencies to purposefully encompass various ethnic groups. In Bolivia and Peru, literacy requirements kept the indigenous population out of the eligible voting population for a long time and thus rendered political appeals to the indigenous ineffective to win elections.

While not all structural factors played out the same in Bolivia, Peru, and Tanzania to produce a low level of ethnic politicization, a common denominator seems to have been the dedication of the political elite to nation-building polices. This line of thought will be detailed in the following section focusing on nation building.

A Focus on Nation Building

The case evidence demonstrates that greed and grievance aspects—that is biased resource distribution—as well as institutional factors, such as oppressive colonial rule, played a major role in explaining surging levels of ethnicity politicization. However, nation building also emerges as a recurring theme and it seems clear that a lack of nation-building policies contributed to high levels of politicization, while inclusive nation-building polices were a potential "cure" for the politicization curse. Nation-building policies seem effective in environments where previous institutional arrangements and resource allocation had created initially high levels of salience (Bolivia and Peru) as well as in cases where the initial level of ethnic salience was low (Tanzania). Thus, nation building deserves to be investigated in greater detail—as a potentially effective countermeasure to a high level of ethnicity politicization.

Over time, nation building both reflected and affected the degree to which ethnicity was politicized. In order to systematize the individual chapter discussions of nation building for the purposes of direct comparison, we follow Wimmer (2013, 50–52) in distinguishing three types of nation building. In the first, nation building is directed toward opening the boundaries of the dominant ethnos to all others. This type of nation building entails a process of *incorporation*. In a two-group model, the formula implied is $a + b \rightarrow a$, where a is the dominant ethnos (type I). The second type of nation building does not privilege any preexisting ethnos with respect to nation building's "inputs." It aims to blend all ethnic groups into a new category that is considered to be an *amalgamation* of the preexisting ones. The formula implied, then, is $a + b \rightarrow c$, where c is the blended category (type II). The third type of nation building, rather than advancing a transformation

of some or all preexisting "groups," is instead a matter of *emphasis shifting*: compared to the preexisting forms of identification and membership, this type of nation building emphasizes the political relevance of a more encompassing category, a "national" one in contrast to "ethnic" ones. In this type of nation building, the mathematically expressed relationship is that of a set, with *a* and *b* as members of set *c*, that is, $c = \{a, b\}$ (type III).[1]

Thus, the process of nation building is inherently inclusive of people as abstract individuals, though not necessarily as concrete members of groups; inclusion may depend on shedding or deemphasizing existing forms of identification and membership. It is important to add that elites pursue this inclusion: (1) on the basis of varying degrees of ethnocentrism (declining as one moves from type I, which privileges one preexisting ethnos, to type III which in principle privileges none), (2) with varying degrees of coercion (see McGarry and O'Leary 1993; Miley 2007), and (3) through varying degrees of resource commitment (which is important for type I and perhaps type II, but not really for type III, at least insofar as all subgroups have meaningful access—in terms of language, education, or whatever—to the more encompassing level that is emphasized).

Regarding the first source of variation, type I nation building entails a *ranking* of ethnic groups; however, because the boundary between them is permeable, individuals who are positioned outside the dominant ethnos are not, at least in principle, relegated to a permanent form of exclusion. The second source of variation concerns the degree to which inclusion in "the nation" is both a voluntary process and welcomed outcome for those so included. And the third source of variation affects the degree to which form and substance diverge: nation building might in principle include a group discursively and even in terms of legally recognized rights; however, in the absence of sufficient resource commitments for education, dominant language acquisition, rights enforcement, etc., this inclusion will not be substantively or materially meaningful. Finally, beyond these three types of nation building and three sources of variation just discussed, nation building does not always, or even usually, embrace the entire territorial population even in principle: some

ethnic groups might be excluded altogether from nation-building processes, creating, as in the first type, an ethnic ranking; but in contrast to the first type, the boundary is impermeable both in principle and practice, creating durably institutionalized insiders and outsiders (see, e.g., Brubaker 1996, 2011; Yiftachel and Ghanem 2004).

Tanzania and Kenya

In principle, both Tanzania and Kenya conformed to the type III form of nation building after independence. The national categories, Tanzanian and Kenyan, represented a broader level of identification for ethnically heterogeneous populations. Moreover, in contrast to type I nation building, no single ethnos has been considered the "true" Tanzanian or Kenyan to which other groups should conform. Beyond this basic similarity, however, there has been a crucial difference regarding the distance between form and substance. Public policies and other elite actions in the Tanzanian political arena have been consistent with and supportive of this type of nation building. Language policies, the organization of the education system, political institutions, and electoral coalition building and state policies regarding resource distribution all promoted the shift in emphasis from ethnic heterogeneity to Tanzanian unity, if not homogeneity.

The exact opposite has been true in Kenya. It is not just that type III nation building in Kenya has lacked the commensurate policies to make it a reality; the policies pursued have directly contravened the pursuit of nation building by privileging specific ethnic groups. Education policies have privileged local languages. Ethnically based electoral districts, first instituted at the end of the colonial period, have endured throughout the independence period, creating consequential incentives for ethnically based coalition building in the political arena. In turn, these ethnicized coalitions, upon gaining power through both force and violence-laden elections, have used the state to distribute resources along ethnically specific lines. In this sense, meaningful nation-building policies have been absent from the scene for most of Kenya's

postindependence history: the idea of the Kenyan nation is an idea whose time has *not* yet come.

Bolivia and Peru

In Bolivia and Peru, type I nation building was the prevalent form for most of the independence era, though more recently, and particularly in Bolivia, this has changed to the third type. The ethnocentrism of type I nation building has been strong in Peru and Bolivia, and for some time it was racialist. In what was commonly referred to as the "Indian problem," elites across Latin America, including Peru and Bolivia, "viewed the persistence of a separate indigenous identity as an obstacle to national unity" (Earle 2007, 179) and indigenous people as "obstacles to modernity" (Lucero 2012, 286). Throughout the nineteenth century and for much of the twentieth century, the elite-favored pathway to nation building ended ideally with "white" Euro-descendants and, at minimum, with the culturally Europeanized mestizo. Biological "mixing" would help to whiten the population and to stimulate the cultural change necessary for nation building and modernization. Census officials in Peru and Bolivia "trained their focus on the binary divide between those who were Indian and those who were not, and measured 'progress' in evidence of movement across this divide—whether through [biological] mestizaje or because Indians stopped being 'Indians' in the eyes of census officials when they moved to a city, stopped chewing coca leaves, and began to wear shoes" (Loveman 2014, 131–132). Unlike in France, however, where the state created and mobilized a vast social infrastructure dedicated to turning *Peasants into Frenchmen* (Weber 1976) in the late nineteenth century, policies and resource commitments were woefully insufficient for transforming indigenous peasants into Europeanized Peruvians or Bolivians. Moreover, the nineteenth-century revival of Indian tribute in both countries, which reinforced "non-European" or "indigenous" forms of landholding and local governance, ran directly counter to the goal of cultural assimilation into the dominant European ethnos (not to mention the spatial assimilation that was a necessary condition for biological mestizaje), as

did education policies in many rural areas of Bolivia in the first decades of the twentieth century.

By the mid-twentieth century, state elites dropped the racialist frame of biological mestizaje, but the quest for cultural mestizaje remained. Despite a language of mixture unburdened by racialist, biological thinking, however, this did not mark a transition to type II nation building; it was a new form of the first type, one in which the biological boundary between mestizos and whites was elided, thereby creating a more inclusive dominant ethnos into which indigenous people were still expected to assimilate. Moreover, the resources that would have been necessary to effectuate such assimilation—above all, funds for education and Spanish-language instruction, as well as a concerted central state effort to break the power of the quasi-feudal lords that controlled the lands and people of the countryside—continued to be insufficient.

Thus, for most of Peruvian and Bolivian postindependence history, a dominant ethnos was privileged in type I nation building. And while assimilation into this "true" national category was officially encouraged, the lack of policies and resources to make it happen left its advancement to gradual, long-term processes such as rural-to-urban migration. In the last decades, however, the mobilization of indigenous identity in Bolivia (and far less successfully in Peru) has helped to shift nation building from the first to the third type, a shift whose consequences for ethnicity politicization in the medium to long term are yet to be determined.

The United States

With regard to people of European descent, nation building in the United States has moved back and forth across the three types over time, sometimes identifying white Anglo-Saxon protestants (WASPs) as the ideal American category into which others should assimilate; at other times, celebrating the "melting pot" metaphor, in line with type II; and in still other times, with nonlinguistic cultural heterogeneity largely ignored, emphasizing the more encompassing category of (English-speaking) American (see Kaufmann 2004). Universal and publically financed education,

substantively meaningful legal and political equality, and economic nation-building policies aimed at promoting broad access to agricultural land and then metropolitan home ownership helped to advance this broadly inclusive and only intermittently ethnocentric form of nation building between the 1780s and 1960s. These are the processes that generally support Aktürk's (2011, 139) characterization of the United States "ethnic regime" as being "anti-ethnic" through the 1960s.

But this was true only to a point: nation building was hardly "anti-ethnic" with respect to those populations, African Americans above all, who fell outside the boundaries of whiteness. Thus, regardless of whatever degree of ethnocentrism one would assign to the United States before the 1960s, the nation-building process was generally exclusionary with respect to African Americans. If nation building had remained *uncontestedly* exclusionary, then ethnoracial politicization would have been limited to the legal domain, leaving the formal political arena free of racialized forms of claims making and party coalition building (as in the case of Native Americans). But the conflict over slavery, the political logic of the Civil War's aftermath, and mobilization by African Americans pushed inclusive nation building onto the agenda and sharpened the party cleavage on the question of inclusion. It is true that there were some tentative efforts to strengthen inclusiveness and that the sharpness of the party cleavage varied over time, but a "whites-only" ethnoracial party that defended exclusionary nation building endured at the national level well into the twentieth century. Moreover, the ethnoracial party remained in the regional core of exclusion, the South, even after it receded from the national scene in the 1930s and 1940s. The civil rights movement and its legislative achievements were indeed transformative, moving the United States from an ethnoracially exclusionary form of nation building, whatever the type, to type III in the period since the 1960s. But the regional core of the overt ethnoracial party through the 1960s became the regional basis of a more subtle ethnoracial party in the decades that followed. Since the 1960s, government policies and institutions no longer distribute resources, rights, and nation membership along ethnoracial lines, but the significance of the ethnoracial boundary for

party coalitions and (generally subtle) forms of claims making in the political arena has endured.

A Necessarily Tentative, Comparative Causal Analysis

The comparative causal analysis of this final section is necessarily tentative because it is based on only five country cases. Nevertheless, it is worth highlighting the causal implications of our research, even if, as in the case of all small-*N* comparative analyses, these implications are more hypotheses for further research than firm conclusions (see Skocpol and Somers 1980; Lange 2014).

The above discussion of nation building has mentioned the ranking of ethnic groups in society. The concept of "ranked" ethnic groups derives from Horowitz (1985, 21–36), who defined them with reference to the degree to which ethnic and class categories coincide. We add to his conceptualization a consideration of political status and rights: ethnic relationships that are marked by coinciding class and political differences rank, or hierarchically order, ethnic groups. In contrast, where there is no systematic relationship between ethnicity on the one hand, and class and political rights on the other, ethnic groups are unranked (Horowitz 1985, 21–36). Weber (1978 [1922], 933–935), upon whom Horowitz draws, distinguishes between caste structure and ethnic coexistence, respectively. Despite Horowitz's emphasis that this distinction is fundamental, it has rarely been analyzed in the literature on ethnic conflict; here, we relate it to processes of ethnic politicization. As became clear in our case analyses, Peru, Bolivia, and the United States represent societies with ranked ethnic groups, whereas Kenya and Tanzania exhibit unranked ethnic groups.

The first point to note is that there is no necessary relation between the existence of a "ranked" ethnic system and the degree of ethnopoliticization: emerging out of colonial histories of European domination with their Euro-descent populations intact, Peru, Bolivia, and the United States all developed

ethnically ranked social systems in the era of independence; but they also exhibited wide variation in the degree to which ethnicity was politicized. And this variation emerged despite basic similarities in the extent to which resources and political rights were distributed along ethnic lines. Parsing our framework for a clue to the puzzle, we turn our gaze to the potentially decisive difference that nation-building policies have made. Even though, as just discussed, ethnically inclusive nation building in Peru and Bolivia was more principle than practice, the principle of inclusion in these countries stood in stark contrast to the United States' "white" nation building. And this difference in turn modified the similarities just invoked: the Peruvian and Bolivian ethnic systems were ranked as in the United States, but the dominant/subordinate boundary was permeable and held up as such by the countries' elites; this in turn made the use of ethnicity in electoral coalition building and claims making unlikely and in fact rare; and it meant that the ethnic inequalities concerning resource distribution and political rights were, from the perspective of those disadvantaged, subject to change through individual action. Indeed, van den Berghe and Primov (1977) argue that the close correlation of class and ethnicity in Peru has derived to a considerable degree from the fact that indigenous people become mestizo as they climb the socioeconomic ladder. In the United States, in contrast, the exclusion of African Americans was both the dominant national principle and a matter of boundary-solidifying law; this meant that efforts to alter the status quo were necessarily collective and had to work through the state and political parties, a configuration that stimulated both enduring and episodic forms of ethnic politicization.

Pivoting toward the other two cases, one can see again that there is no necessary relation between whether a country has a ranked ethnic system and whether it experiences substantial degrees of ethnic politicization: unranked systems prevail in both Kenya and Tanzania, but in Kenya ethnopoliticization has been substantial, indeed the most substantial among our cases. A ranked ethnic system, then, is far from a necessary condition for ethnopoliticization. Regarding Horowitz's (1985, 21–36) hypothesis that ethnic conflict is most likely in unranked ethnic systems, Kenya and

Tanzania stand, evidentially speaking, as diametrically opposed cases, the first strongly confirmatory and the second anything but. Why this stark contrast? Our analysis suggests that Horowitz in fact was on the right track in formulating the theoretical logic of his hypothesis. Recall his rationale for predicting a higher likelihood of ethnic conflict in unranked systems: in such cases, which he likened to the anarchy of the international system, comparably powerful ethnic groups have strong incentives to struggle over the state and its resources. However, the Tanzanian/Kenyan contrast suggests the following addition to his proposition: *in the absence of nation-building policies to bring ethnic groups together in unranked systems*—policies that were prevalent in Tanzania, but not in Kenya where instead "counter" nation-building policies were the rule—politics will tend to be highly ethnicized and marked by violence linked to ethnic membership (cf. Wimmer et al. 2009a).

If variation in nation-building policies can shed light on the contrast between the otherwise substantially similar cases of Tanzania and Kenya, what tentative conclusions emerge from a comparison of Kenya and the United States, two otherwise quite different cases that both have exhibited substantial degrees of ethnopoliticization, including the chronic presence of strong ethnic parties and periodic ethno-political violence? The absence of meaningful nation-building policies and the struggle over the state and its resources, identified as crucial for the Kenyan case, are in fact relevant for understanding the course of ethnic politicization in the United States as well. To be sure, the United States did not lack meaningful nation-building policies, but the ethnoracial exclusion entailed by these policies meant that efforts to change them, that is, to substitute inclusive nation-building policies, inevitably entailed a struggle over the state and its resources that could produce considerable degrees of violence—as it did for a full generation and more *after* the Civil War of the nineteenth century. In the case of the United States, there was not an unranked ethnic system that, absent meaningful nation-building policies, created chronic and sometimes violent ethnopolitical conflict. Instead, efforts to move the United States toward ethnoracial inclusion amounted to shifting the ethnic system from a ranked to an unranked system. And where this attempted shift

was rapid, as it was in the South after the Civil War, the effect was a temporarily unranked (with regard to political status) system, much more similar to Kenya than to Tanzania.

To conclude, nation-building policies have the potential to reduce ethnicity politicization and to work toward an inclusive society. They can be pivotal for national policymakers and international organizations looking for policies that will reduce the negative effects of ethnic diversity. However, nation-building policies do not operate in a vacuum. As we have shown in our cases, resource distribution and other intervening institutional factors affect the ease with which effective nation-building policies can be implemented and become materially meaningful. Further research investigating how nation-building policies relate to the institutional environment, which nation-building policies are most effective and under which circumstances, and which actors need to be involved to render nation-building projects successful is strongly recommended. Finding answers to these and related questions will greatly aid policymakers who seek to abate ethnicity politicization and build more inclusive and more peaceful nations.

NOTES

One Politicization of Ethnicity

1. With this specification, the first and third criteria mentioned above—the party support base criterion and the "arena of contestation" criterion—overlap.
2. While the minimum winning coalition theory is limited to democratic contexts, and both studies focus on electoral processes, similar explanations exist for nondemocratic contexts based on patronage relations between local strong men and the population (see, e.g., Berman 1998).
3. Note that Przeworski and Teune's (1982) "most-similar design" corresponds to Mill's "method of difference" (see Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias 2004, 31 as well as George and Bennett 2005, 165).
4. The average identification over the ten surveyed countries is as follows: occupation: 27 percent; ethnic/language/tribe: 25 percent; religion: 17 percent; race: 6 percent (Afrobarometer Network 2002, 38).

Two The African Cases: Kenya and Tanzania

1. In addition, the move of the capital around 1906 from Mombasa, with its mainly Swahili-speaking population, to Nairobi, which is located in proximity to Kikuyu speakers, contributed to the decline of Swahili's importance (Rosberg and Nottingham 1966, 23). Once the capital was moved to Nairobi, it saw a growing number of Kikuyu replacing the Muslim population and thus a decrease in the use of Swahili as a means of communication.
2. Other sources state that the land taken amounted to only 10 percent of the total land owned by the Kikuyu (cf. Middleton 1965, 340). However, these 10 percent were the most fertile and suitable for coffee production. Furthermore, Middleton (1965) points to another explanation of Kikuyu's land grievance. He argues that "the drawing of a boundary round the land occupied by the Kikuyu at the turn of the century, and calling it a reserve meant that there was

no room to expand into the many almost unused areas to the west and south" (Middleton 1965, 340).

3. Other factors which might have contributed to the prominence of Kikuyus in the fight for liberation from colonial rule were their proximity to the settlers, early missionary education, and strong disagreement with the missionaries' opposition to female circumcision (see Rosberg and Nottingham 1966, Ch.4). While Kikuyus were most prominent in fighting the white settlers, other tribes also voiced their grievance over land lost and participated in political organizations (Rosberg and Nottingham 1966, 136). Although the Mau Mau leaders tried to involve other ethnic groups in their fight, the movement remained confined to the Kikuyu (wa Kinyatti 2008, 143). The reluctance of other ethnic groups to join the fight for independence might be partially explained by the strong grievance of the Kikuyus due to land expropriation. However, the British colonial rulers also provided money and other resources to tribes in order to deter them from joining the Mau Mau (wa Kinyatti 2008, 259). For example, the British colonial rulers built health clinics and schools in the territory of other ethnic groups and thereby convinced them to refrain from joining the Mau Mau in the fight for independence (ibid.).
4. However, the association soon gained political strength within the KANU party and strongly opposed the presidency of Moi (a non-Kikuyu) after Kenyatta's death. The GEMA was forbidden in 1980. (For further information on the working of the GEMA within the KANU party, see Karimi and Ochieng 1980, Ch.5).
5. Majimboism was meant to ensure protection of the smaller ethnic groups, that is, Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu, from domination by the Kikuyu and Luo (Anderson 2005; Rutten and Owuor 2009, 310).
6. The following factors might contribute to explaining the dominance of Kikuyu buyers of the land: First, Kikuyus have traditionally been farmers and hence strove to own farmland (cf. Middleton 1965, 339). As Rosberg and Nottingham (1966, 170) argue, land has a strong traditional meaning for the Kikuyu. Second, the proximity of Kikuyus to missionaries and their work on white farms exposed them earlier than other African tribes to capitalist values. According to the Kenyan Section of the International Commission of Jurists (2008, 90), this early exposure to capitalism led to the founding of unions which supported the land purchases of the Kikuyu.
7. Shortly after independence, Kenya's first president Jomo Kenyatta advocated the use of Swahili as the national language. However, besides the affirmation by Kenyatta that Swahili should be used as a means of communication, no further plans were proposed to institutionalize the use of Swahili (instead of English or vernaculars) (Githiora 2008, 250).
8. The changes in the list of ethnic groups included in the population census results seem to reflect the political discourse at the time and the attempts to unify these ethnic groups under the header of the Kalenjin. For a more general discussion of the role of censuses to construct social identities, see Kertzer and Arel 2002.

9. The most recent population census data from 1999 (Republic of Kenya 2001) could not be used since the shares of the ethnic groups were not published due to the argument that information on ethnic groups has been repeatedly misused (Makoloo 2005, 11).
10. As Ajulu (1993, 99) argues, the effectiveness of gerrymandering was increased by the implementation of the first-past-the-post electoral system (FPTP) just before the 1992 election. Through the FPTP parliamentary seats were won by the candidate with the highest number of votes, even if he/she only won by a small margin.
11. The analysis of the party manifestos is based on the Manifesto Research Group's (MRG) coding scheme, which contains 52 categories of policies of which 26 are regarded as programmatic, 13 are attributed to left-wing rhetoric, and 13 are attributed to right-wing (Elischer 2013, 32; see also Manifesto Project Database 2014).
12. The percentages refer to the combined share of Kenyans agreeing to the statements "I feel more Kenyan than my ethnic group" and "I feel only Kenyan." Results: 40 percent in 2005 and 46 percent in October 2008 (i.e., after the postelection violence). The full question reads as "Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Kenyan and being a _____ [R's Ethnic Group]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings?" Possible answers include "I feel only (R's ethnic group)," "I feel more (R's ethnic group) than Kenyan," "I feel equally Kenyan and (R's ethnic group)," "I feel more Kenyan than (R's ethnic group)," and "I feel only Kenya" (see Afrobarometer 2012, Question: Q85B; data for rounds 3–5 are retrieved from African Election Database 2014).
13. Note that the tribe's original name is Maasai (which means those that speak Maa), while the British colonial rulers used Masai. Throughout the chapter we use Maasai.
14. The period of German colonial rule in Tanzania was relatively brief (1885–1918) and did not focus on the economic/agricultural development of the country. European settlement was low and reached only comparable levels with Kenya in 1913. In addition, German colonial rulers did not favor European settlements and used various means, such as increasing land prices and regulating African labor, to discourage it (Iliffe 1979, 142).
15. As described in Rosberg and Nottingham (1966, 22), African cash crop production in Kenya was purposefully restricted to ensure a steady supply of African labor on the settlers' farms.
16. The reluctance to support white settlers in Tanzania might stem from the fact that high-ranked British officials believed in their duty to protect the native population. Additional reasons might be that a large part of the settlers' community in Tanzania was made up of Germans, and the British colonial rulers feared that through these German settlers Germany might try to reclaim the colony (Brett 1973, 226).
17. The lenient British colonial approach in Tanzania (as compared to Kenya) might have led to a less institutionalized and routinized system of indirect rule

and local tribal chiefs, which, in turn, might have aided the first-independence government in successfully abolishing the traditional leaders. Indeed, the group of tribal chiefs in Tanzania seemed to have been rather diverse, encompassing local tribal leaders and maakida (i.e., nonindigenous leaders) and their reaction to the TANU party was mixed (Illife 1979, 533–535).

18. TANU/CCM-presidents: Nyerere 1964–1985, Ali Hassan Mwinyi 1985–1995, Benjamin Mkapa 1995–2005, and since 2005 Jakaya Kikwete.
19. The average identification over the ten surveyed countries is as follows: occupation: 27 percent; ethnic/language/tribe: 25 percent; religion: 17 percent; race: 6 percent (Afrobarometer 2002, 38).
20. The Tugen constitute around 1.3 percent of the Kenyan population and the Zanaki constitute around 0.3 percent of the Tanzanian population (Republic of Kenya 1964b; United Republic of Tanzania 1971).

Three The Latin American Cases: Bolivia and Peru

1. Fifty-eight percent of inhabitants were counted as indigenous, 13 percent were Spaniards, and 7 percent enslaved or free blacks. The total population was estimated at 1.12 million.
2. This would happen repeatedly throughout the Viceroyalty's colonial history as well as in postcolonial Peru (e.g., Remy 1994, 123–124; de la Cadena 2000, 126–128; Klarén 2000, 194–195; Larson 2003, 191–195).
3. These early republican dynamics relate to the highland region only. In the lowlands, the indigenous population, estimated at around 700,000 people, remained outside of any state–society relations as the state did not begin to penetrate the area until the 1840s (Klein 1992, 121–122).
4. These efforts were inspired by the US American experience of school segregation, and supported by US aid (Larson 2003, 153; 2011, 197–199).
5. Customary indigenous law relates to the legal and systems and practices traditionally in use in indigenous communities that differ from official state law.
6. Coca is a crop cultivated in much of Western South America and plays a prominent role in traditional Andean cultures. It contains small amounts of alkaloids, which, through complex chemical processing, can be turned into cocaine.
7. But note that the tax appeared again in different guises in the future; while not aimed explicitly at the indigenous population, they disproportionately hit the poor and rural peasant population (e.g., Contreras and Cueto 2007, 221).
8. The Amazonian lowland indigenous, in contrast, were regarded as "'savage' tribes . . . who, unlike the Incan descendants, had never produced any contribution to Peruvian history" (de la Cadena 2000, 21). They remained relatively autonomous at the time due to the weak reach of the state into the region.
9. While the name paid homage to colonial-time indigenous leader Túpac Amaru, the MRTA's stated goal was nonethnic, namely, to establish a socialist state.
10. Ulíses Humala only achieved 0.2 percent of the votes.

Four The United States

1. http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0056/tabA-26.pdf (accessed January 16, 2015).
2. For figures from the 1860 US Census, see http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0056/tabA-19.pdf (accessed January 16, 2015).
3. Unless otherwise noted, all references to "the South," "southern states," etc., in this chapter are to the 11 states that attempted to secede in the Civil War: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. For a map showing these states in relations to the rest of the country at the time of the Civil War, see http://lh4.ggpht.com/_hXM70CoCRWg/S8Sc_XxugdI/AAAAAAAACHE/I-DSTj_V87U/Union%20and%20Confederate%20States_thumb%5B1%5D.jpg?imgmax=800 (accessed January 31, 2015).
4. For the "rule of difference" concept, see Chatterjee (1993), Steinmetz (2005), and Jung (2015).
5. Before its demise in the early 1850s, the *southern* wing of the Whig Party was supportive of slavery, which made it competitive with Democrats in the South (Holt 1999).
6. As this implies, northern Democrats did not lead the way to a "new departure"; but they did follow.
7. For the figure reported from Hiers (2013), the South consists of all those states that practiced slavery on the eve of the Civil War—that is, the 11 states that generally define the South in this chapter, as well as Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri.
8. http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf (accessed March 15, 2015; see page 83).
9. "Negroes Protest Bias in Campaign." *New York Times* October 26, 1928, p. 11 (discussed in Lichtman 1979).
10. For contradictory trends, see Flamming (2001, 2005); Giffin (1973, 1983); Gosnell (1966 [1936]); Grothaus (1970); Guglielmo (2003); Hirsch (1990); Lubell (1964); Mitchell (1968); Sherman (1964); and Thornbrough (1961).
11. The African-American voting figure is from Roper: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/elections/how_groups_voted/voted_12.html (accessed June 2014). This figure was just 5 percent in 2008: http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/results/president/exit-polls.html (accessed June 2014). According to a Gallup daily tracking poll for 2012, non-Hispanic whites account for 89 percent of all those who identify as Republican, and African Americans account for just 2 percent. See http://www.gallup.com/poll/160373/democrats-racially-diverse-republicans-mostly-white.aspx (accessed March 15, 2015).
12. https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/owner.html (accessed October 15, 2014).
13. The local share was much higher before 1940 and it remains the source of about four out of every nine education dollars today.

14. The drawing of electoral district boundaries to increase African-American and Latino representation in the House of Representatives is another important race-conscious policy in the post-1960s era. But unlike the other policies discussed in the main text, race-conscious redistricting has not been subject to much politicization. This is because the Republican Party has found such redistricting advantageous, because it concentrates within select districts those most likely to vote against the Republican Party (see Edsall and Edsall 1992; Canon 1999, 5; Cunningham 2001, 5; Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Jost 2004).
15. For state-by-state election results, see http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection.php?year=1968 (accessed November 28, 2014).
16. Of course, it was difficult to obscure things on the ground in the South. In comments relayed to the administration, Republican George H. W. Bush of Texas complained that administration enforcement of school desegregation "is literally killing me in my Senate campaign" (quoted in Kotlowski 2001, 35).
17. During his 1966 gubernatorial campaign in California, Reagan defended, in contradiction with the state's recently passed fair housing legislation, what he described as homeowners' "basic and cherished right to do as they please with their property," explaining that "[i]f an individual wants to discriminate against Negroes or others in selling or renting his house he has a right to do so" (quoted in Lamb 2005, 181).
18. To be sure, the debate that emerged was less about whether quotas should be used than whether quotas were in fact being used under existing affirmative action programs; supporters of such programs adamantly denied that the programs used quotas (Laham 1998: 37–42). The "quota" claim, it is worth mentioning, goes all the way back to the first efforts to ensure antidiscrimination in employment during the 1940s (see Chen 2009).
19. For details on Stanley Greenberg polling of white Democratic defectors in the North, and in particular the overt racial component of this, see Edsall and Edsall (1992, 182).
20. For the exact quote in Special Analysis J of the 1986 budget, see J-11 and J-12 of http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/usspa/Specanalyses_1986.pdf (accessed July 3, 2014).
21. See http://www.nytimes.com/1986/06/06/us/senate-panel-hands-reagan-first-defeat-on-nominee-for-judgeship.html (accessed July 3, 2014).
22. See http://www.nytimes.com/1986/06/06/us/senate-panel-hands-reagan-first-defeat-on-nominee-for-judgeship.html (accessed July 3, 2014).
23. Exit polls from the 2004 to 2008 presidential elections show the success of this strategy. In 7 of 11 southern states no more than 30 percent of white voters supported Democratic candidates John Kerry (2004) and Barack Obama (2008). Considering the two elections together, the Democratic candidate's share of the southern white vote did not exceed 36 percent except in Virginia in 2008 (39 percent) and Florida in both years (42 percent). In the five southern states

won by segregationist candidate George Wallace in 1968, neither Obama nor Kerry managed more than 26 percent of the white vote (Hero and Levy 2013, 61–63).

24. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/04/16/can-the-republican-party-thrive-on-white-identity/ (accessed March 15, 2015).

Five Comparative Analysis

1. The terms in italics (incorporation, amalgamation, emphasis shifting) are Wimmer's, as are the mathematical expressions for incorporation and amalgamation.

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