

TOURISM AND DICTATORSHIP

Europe's Peaceful Invasion of
Franco's Spain

SASHA D. PACK



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Major tourist destinations of Spain. Reproduced by permission of Joel A. Przybylowski.

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To Yda and George

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List of Abbreviations

ATESA	<i>Autotransporte Turístico Español, S.A.</i> (state transportation services firm)
CCS	<i>Comisión Central de Saneamiento</i> (Central Sanitation Commission)
CIT	<i>Centro de Iniciativa y Turismo</i> (Center for Initiative and Tourism)
DGEAT	<i>Dirección General de Empresas y Actividades Turísticas</i> (Directorate General of Tourist Enterprises and Activities)
DGPT	<i>Dirección General de Promoción de Turismo</i> (Directorate General of Tourism Promotion)
DGT	<i>Dirección General de Turismo</i> (Directorate General of Tourism)
ENTURSA	<i>Empresa Nacional de Turismo, S.A.</i> (National Tourism Company)
ICA	International Cooperation Administration
IEAL	<i>Instituto de Estudios de Administración Local</i> (Institute for Studies of Local Administration)
IEME	<i>Instituto Español de la Moneda Extranjera</i> (Spanish Foreign Exchange Institute)
IET	<i>Instituto de Estudios Turísticos</i> (Institute of Tourism Studies)
INI	<i>Instituto Nacional de Industria</i> (National Institute of Industry)
IUOTO	International Union of Official Tourist Organization
NO-DO	<i>Noticiarios-Documentales</i> (state newsreels)
OEEC	Organization for European Economic Cooperation
PNT	<i>Patronato Nacional de Turismo</i> (National Tourism Patronate)
SGT	<i>Subsecretaría General de Turismo</i> (Undersecretariat General of Tourism)
SNT	<i>Servicio Nacional de Turismo</i> (National Tourism Service)

Introduction

Two images dominate memories of Spain in the mid-twentieth century. One is Francisco Franco, victorious generalissimo in the Spanish Civil War of 1936–1939, wartime ally of Mussolini and Hitler, and dictator of a staidly conservative authoritarian regime until his death in 1975. The other is the insouciant tourist, typically one having traveled from a northern European country in search of the pleasures of sea and sunshine. By the mid-1960s, Spain's Mediterranean coasts formed the largest playground for Europe's growing cascade of holidaymakers, who descended on Franco's country armed with unprecedented disposable income and time. Tourism and dictatorship, the two prevailing emblems of the age, scarcely could appear more discordant. Franco, owing to his associations with the fascist dictators, his austere Catholicism, and his contempt for liberal democracy, appeared anachronistic and isolated, the antithesis of reconstructed Western Europe. The tourists, by contrast, represented the hallmarks of postwar European civilization—consumer entitlement, transnational mobility, efficiency, comfort, and permissiveness.

Europeans had practiced modern tourism for at least two centuries, visiting cultural centers, admiring nature's sublimity, and seeking therapeutic waters of spa and ocean. Only in the twentieth century, however, did their numbers and tastes require long stretches of temperate coastline. By 1900, exposed bronzed bodies had come to epitomize the ideals both of youthful vigor and healthfulness, and the tan complexion that once indicated a life of outdoor manual labor now signified membership in a leisured traveling class. The sun-soaked Mediterranean rim increasingly became a more attractive travel destination than the coenesthetic beaches of the North Atlantic.¹ The opening of inexpensive and accessible resorts on the Spanish Mediterranean mid-century enabled large and diverse populations to enjoy what had long been an exclusive pursuit. They brought with them the fashions and tastes of their time, frivolity, and relaxed sexual attitudes that challenged the austerity and hierarchical authority embodied in the Franco regime.

If tourism presented new challenges to Francoist asceticism, it also significantly enhanced the regime's sovereignty and vitality following a period of isolation and stagnation in the 1940s. After the fall of fascist Europe, the Franco regime was left without a major European ally. The early postwar period witnessed Spain's exclusion from the United Nations (UN) in 1945 and its quarantine from all major institutional processes of European reconstruction and American Marshall Plan aid. France closed its border with Spain to virtually all trade and traffic between 1946 and 1948, and UN sanctions remained in place until 1950. In 1949, Spain received 283,890 foreign visitors compared with Italy's 1.9 million and France's 2.8 million.² By 1968, Spain surpassed all rivals in tourism revenue per capita, and only Italy and the United States grossed more income from tourism.³ Tourism proved valuable to Spanish foreign trade as early as 1950 as the country began to specialize in low-cost vacations, much as it had with inexpensive agricultural produce directly after the war.⁴ Revenue provided the most valuable collateral for obtaining international loans and the foreign currency necessary for purchasing industrial equipment and financing large-scale development projects. In an age of dramatic economic expansion across Western Europe, Spanish growth was unrivalled in proportionate terms, and only the economies of Austria, Switzerland, Ireland, and Yugoslavia displayed a remotely comparable dependence on tourism during the 1960s.⁵ Between 1959 and 1969, revenue from foreign tourism covered two-thirds of Spain's trade deficit.⁶ Equally important was the political spectacle of a country considered the antithesis of postwar European values becoming the epicenter of one of postwar Europe's largest mass rituals, the beach holiday. As one critic of the regime observed, "Tourism in the Francoist context functioned as a form of propaganda," as "the substantial presence of foreign tourists would demonstrate the acceptance of the regime abroad and reinforce the legitimacy of the Spanish economic model."⁷ In two decades, the underdeveloped and once-isolated peninsular nation at the fringe of Europe's traditional travel routes became, as triumphalist government discourse often phrased it, "the world's foremost tourist power."⁸

Journalists, promoters, and scholars often have invoked imperial metaphors to characterize the role of international tourism in Spain. The Spanish press termed the peaceful onslaught an "invasion," and observers referred to "colonies" of British, German, Swedish, French, and other northern European holidaymakers along Spanish coasts. Critics of the industry came to apply the model of economic dependency, arguing that Franco's government, as though blinded by the short-term dividends to

be earned from rapid tourism growth, subjected the country's coastlines to "neo-colonial" exploitation by West German and British travel firms.⁹ They held that the industry's eagerness to provide good service amounted to national servitude. Yet, even after the Socialist Party attained power in 1982, Spain experienced no reaction against tourism from the Left—a telling contrast to the more genuinely imperialist American tourism in Cuba that rallied many to support Fidel Castro against the Batista regime in the 1950s.¹⁰ Unlike Cuba, the preoccupations of Spanish identity lay not in colonization, but in marginality and difference with respect to Europe. This concept led others to the assessment that European tourism functioned as a democratizing influence on a repressed society. According to one impression, observing foreign tourists bred "an unquenchable desire to live like Europe" among Spanish youth while the authorities remained contemptuous. The distinguished economic historian Ángel Viñas remarked that tourists taught Spaniards "that there was more to life than immutable nationalistic rhetoric and immutable political institutions."¹¹

Imagery of the tourist's Spain often seemed to encourage a kind of "orientalist" gaze usually associated with non-Western lands. Spain's international image, observes José Álvarez Junco, "had been constructed around the Andalusian stereotype (considered 'oriental' and therefore 'authentic' in Spain)."¹² The 1952 film *Bienvenido Mr. Marshall* famously parodies the notion that Spaniards would sell their exoticism for foreign aid, depicting an impoverished Castilian village redone in exaggerated Andalusian style as its inhabitants prepare to enchant the American secretary of state (who never arrives) with their quixotic Iberian charm. Similar scenes were repeated across Spain throughout the 1960s. As a recent general history comments, "Towns with no tradition of flamenco or bullfighting hurried to build bullrings or gypsy caves to lure the American and European descendents of the Romantic travelers."¹³

The frequent depiction of tourists as the foot soldiers of democratic Europe's irresistible imperial march on romantic Spain reflects a widely perceived dichotomy separating "Europe" from one of its oldest nation-states. This tendency reveals a good deal about the dynamics of modern Spanish identity and the motivating power of "Europe" therein. The Spanish tourist bureau's most prominent slogan, "Spain is Different," encapsulated this mentality. The Franco regime appeared to be the slogan's literal manifestation, representing to many casual observers a hierarchical, superstitious, bloodthirsty anachronism, where travel amenities were retrograde and, as tourists and readers of European tabloids occasionally learned, even modern swimwear was subject to censure. It is worth

remembering, however, that Spanish tourism promoters' use of national clichés was by no means unique. They consoled themselves to note that the Dutch windmills and American gunslingers of tourism kitsch were arguably no less reductive than bullfights and flamenco. In 1934, over a decade before the Spanish campaign began, the Soviet travel agency Intourist ran advertisements in British newspapers declaring, "The USSR is Different."¹⁴ At the beach, many middle-class Spaniards too had begun to loosen their ties and expose more of their skin in the early twentieth century until a revival of moral austerity under Franco interrupted this process of bodily emancipation.

Slogans and perceptions notwithstanding, *difference*, both represented and real, was only a secondary aspect of Spain's tourism project during the Franco period. Much more important was a return to the theme of national regeneration, which had dominated public discourse during the first decades of the century. Advocates of tourism in this period regarded it as a means to reassert Spain's international presence and reduce, not reinforce, prevailing beliefs in Spanish exceptionalism within and without. One perceptive author has indicated an arresting continuity between Spain's first tourism promotions of the early twentieth century and those of the 1960s: both evoked Spain's timeless beauty while simultaneously highlighting the modern amenities available to foreign visitors.¹⁵ The Spain of Moors and matadors was not suppressed completely, but was merely one aspect of a national heritage perfectly compatible with the comforts and efficiencies of modern life. The Franco regime and private entrepreneurs alike were concerned foremost to dispel the "orientalist" gaze by presenting tourists with a leisure infrastructure befitting a respected country.

The central project of this book is to consider how broad patterns in international travel and tourism mingled with the changing conditions and aspirations of Franco's Spain. Although Spanish economic historians and political scientists have produced several admirable studies of mass tourism during this period, none has considered fully the industry's impact on broader historical developments.¹⁶ There was considerable debate within the Franco regime on the extent to which it should permit the consumer preferences and international distribution mechanisms of leisure travel to shape the nation's future. Franco's identity as national savior was closely tied to self-sufficiency and the defeat of "cosmopolitan" forces in 1939, but his success was equally dependent on reestablishing the Spanish claim to a seat among the civilized European nations. After 1945, mass tourism appealed to moderates in the Spanish government as a useful vehicle to stabilize the economy and to present

Spain not as merely a land of the quaint and picaresque, but as an open-minded participant in modern European civilization. Others, if they recognized some narrow benefits, cautioned that this latter-day *El Dorado* was a temptation to decadence and no substitute for the difficult task of rapid industrialization. The political debates mirrored broader social preoccupations about tourists, who came to symbolize the new Spain's prosperity, "Europeanizing" identity, and openness on the one hand, its slipping morals and colonization on the other. As this controversy developed from the end of World War II, when foreign travel became a real possibility for unprecedented numbers of Europeans, to the dictator's death in 1975, it made a significant impact on the political dynamics and long-term evolution of an authoritarian regime.

Mass Tourism as International Relations

It will first be useful to address the question of whether and how an eminently apolitical phenomenon such as mass tourism might play a role in international relations, the transmission of ideology, and, ultimately, political change. The notion of leisure travel as a component of international relations dates at least to the late eighteenth century. As early as 1785, Sir Edward Gibbon reported from his Swiss villa that "the increase of a race of animals . . . said to come from an Island in the Northern Ocean" was damaging Britain's prestige abroad.¹⁷ Victorian elitists reserved similar scorn for tourists, whom they viewed as the antithesis of the cultivated traveler, though one celebrated contemporary, the pioneering British travel agent Thomas Cook, envisioned his tours as fostering harmony and mutual understanding among nations.

In the context of post-1945 Europe, various politicians, intellectuals, and industry interests reflexively presented mass tourism as an instrument of peace and a propellant of European federalism. The broad spirit of internationalism emerging in postwar Europe lent a coherent ideological thrust to the growing number of organizations and academic centers dedicated to monitoring tourism. The emerging *Tourismuswissenschaft* crystallized around the belief that the expanding phenomenon could broaden the scope of trade and improve international income distribution, and that, "above all, [tourism] can do more than any other single agency to promote international understanding and good will, breaking down prejudices and hatreds and laying foundations for enduring peace."¹⁸ As the Cold War crystallized, the emerging concept of a "Free World" implied free movement, the "Iron Curtain" a graphic metaphor of its limits. Soviet bloc leaders similarly promoted tourist exchanges

among Socialist brethren, but by the 1960s the promise of Western currency held considerably more appeal for most satellite nations. Communist countries began to negotiate larger visa quotas with Western governments and East–West travel presaged the end of Soviet influence. It was the awkward relaxation of East German foreign travel restrictions in 1989 that emboldened crowds to assail the Berlin Wall.¹⁹ The West German sociologist Karl Deutsch classified tourism as a form of “social communication” critical to the construction of a federal Europe; writing a half-century later, the historian Akira Iriye would read the explosion in international tourist border crossings in the twentieth century as an indicator of “cultural globalization.”²⁰

Such assumptions seemed to others an intellectual *cul-de-sac*, prompting skeptics to dismiss the political value of tourism altogether. Echoing Victorian elitism, many postwar social commentators condemned the practice as socially vulgar and anti-intellectual. Daniel Boorstin argued that the purpose of tourism was to satisfy a widespread craving for “pseudo-events.”²¹ Even allowing that some forms of tourism might involve genuine cultural exchange, this tended not to apply to the beach holiday. The Mediterranean coastal resort was regarded as a site of homogenized comfort rather than local flavor. Tourists were known for their heliolatry, excessive drinking, and promiscuity; their prearranged cultural excursions were notoriously shallow and contrived. They reputedly moved with their own kind, largely in isolation from the locals, though it must not be forgotten that a significant number resisted this stereotype and dictatorships such as that of Franco possessed neither the power nor the will to seal them completely from indigenous populations.²² In his study of postwar European cooperation, Alan Milward reserved no analytical place for mass tourism, commenting,

[I]t is by no means evident that this remarkable and new phenomenon produced the emerging sense of “community”. . . . The greatest increase in numbers of visitors from other western European countries throughout this period was recorded by Spain. What is to be said about the impact on European integration, either in the sending or receiving country, of those many millions stretched out on its sandy beaches?²³

Tourists’ reputation as passive hedonists is largely earned, but their unique identity as traveling consumers nevertheless has possessed considerable political significance in the contemporary world. The increasingly widespread ability to travel—whether for acculturation, tranquil repose, or impertinent curiosity—was a basic element of mass emancipation.²⁴

British industrial workers aspired to and fought for family vacations as much as for other material comforts.²⁵ Some fourteen countries in Europe and the Americas had legislated paid vacations of some kind by 1935 precisely to satisfy such demands. France and Britain established far-reaching paid vacations laws respectively in 1936 and 1938, and the Fascist and Nazi regimes developed leisure travel programs to inculcate broad loyalty to state and nation.²⁶ Citizens of the prosperous European nations came to regard recreational travel as a basic activity, the restoration of which, observes Alon Confino, was a *sine qua non* for the reestablishment of normality following World War II.²⁷ The French sociologist Joffre Dumazedier postulated in 1962 that Europe had built a “leisure civilization” to remedy the numb routines inherent to modern labor and urban life.²⁸

The great expansion of tourism should not be viewed as a frivolous consequence of Western Europe’s newfound stability and prosperity, but as an integral component. Already during the interwar period, tourist visa allotments became commodities for bilateral trade negotiations. Following World War II, the architects of reconstruction quickly recognized that tourism would serve a constitutive function in Western Europe’s postwar international system. By the end of the 1940s, the free-movement zones for travelers and currencies became a political signifier of inclusion in the cooperative reconstructive endeavor. American tourists’ transatlantic dollar transfers and cultural contacts became important auxiliaries to the Marshall Plan.²⁹ Americans dominated the initial wave of tourism in postwar Europe, their numbers rising from 286,000 in 1950 to 861,000 in 1960.³⁰ Travel executives from American Express and Trans World Airlines preached to their European counterparts the gospel of Fordism and its application to tourism. The Americans explained that an expanding supply of moderately priced transportation and destinations would maximize travel industry profits and expand ordinary citizens’ leisure travel possibilities—an important concept, though not one that would have been unfamiliar to Thomas Cook and his contemporaries.³¹

Despite American concerns to close the “dollar gap” and foster a common sense of Western civilization, the more profound economic, social, and political impacts of tourism ultimately were felt on the European rather than transatlantic plane. Tourism became progressively less Atlantic, as the flow of American tourist dollars into Europe quickly declined in relative importance compared with southward vectors within Europe. As prosperity returned, intra-European tourism rose to unseen levels. By 1960, the number of American tourists in Europe had trebled while intra-European tourist movement increased ten-fold.³² Travelers arriving in Europe from elsewhere (predominantly North America) rose

from 3 million in 1960 to 8 million in 1970; over the same period, intra-European foreign tourism increased from 32 million to 68 million.³³ A 1969 survey of Europe's thirteen richest countries revealed that whereas disposable income had increased by 87 percent between 1958 and 1967, expenditure on tourism had increased by 237 percent.³⁴ Tourism expanded southward, quickly saturating the prewar Mediterranean resorts of France and Italy, then moving on to Spain, Greece, Yugoslavia, and elsewhere: in 1961, arrivals to Europe's Mediterranean rim accounted for 38 percent of world border crossings; in 1973, the figure was 51 percent.³⁵ Tourism was the single most important conduit for the southward redistribution of Europe's wealth in the postwar era.

Conditions in the immediate postwar period were favorable for the European travel industry's expansion, especially in the Mediterranean. American hegemony guaranteed Western European countries the security necessary to permit the open cross-border flows and the liberal currency-exchange mechanisms required for efficient tourist movement. Austerity of the late 1940s encouraged receptor countries in Alpine and Mediterranean Europe to build an infrastructure fit for many low-budget tourists rather than a few large spenders. Wartime aviators, particularly in Britain, began to profit from their expertise by operating charter shuttles to Mediterranean resorts at far lower fares than regular commercial carriers. Building on prewar precedents, Europe's democratic states made the distribution and organization of leisure time a significant feature of their national welfare systems.³⁶ By the mid-1950s, almost all British workers took advantage of paid vacations, a pattern that quickly extended to continental Europe.³⁷ The beach was the crucible of the leisure civilization, where health, repose, bare skin, and displacement from routine converged most dramatically. The French resort chain *Club Méditerranée*, founded in 1950, experienced considerable commercial success with its evocations of a preindustrial way of life juxtaposed with an "overriding concern with pleasure and self fulfillment."³⁸ Though Europe's Atlantic and alpine resorts also captured larger markets during this period, the Mediterranean best satisfied demotic consumer tastes while also providing relatively more unfamiliar cultural landscapes for those who might be interested.

High consumer demand, effective distribution, and social legislation were necessary but insufficient for the rise of postwar mass tourism. An adequate supply of accessible tourist destinations in Mediterranean Europe also was required, along with the political will in those countries to absorb the impact. The mass provision of travel possibilities therefore carried political weight in both the North and South. For industrialized

countries of the North, access to mobility and leisure was fundamental to mass participation in the “incessant movement and displacement” at the center of modern life.³⁹ For receptor regions, principally Spain, tourism became a significant, if not central, component to the modernization programs that often justified governments’ legitimacy. In this sense, Franco’s Spain was integral to the construction of postwar Europe’s leisure civilization, without which the course of contemporary European history would have developed quite differently. Tourism, vulgar and hedonistic though it may have been, was an aspect of postwar politics virtually everywhere in Europe. The effect was distorted in Spain, where foreign travelers until recently had been highly conspicuous novelties, where urban infrastructures were unprepared to accommodate three-fold population jumps in the summer months, and where national and European identities frequently were at odds.

Spanish Modernization and European Tourism

The historical significance of Spain’s tourist boom cannot fully be understood without examining its connection to the broader concept of modernization in Spanish history. Modernization refers both to a process and to a myth, and both senses are of concern here. As a process, modernization typically is understood as a progression toward urban, bureaucratic, industrial, technological, or consumer society. In addition, scholars of American foreign relations have identified a myth of modernization, the belief that such processes lead inexorably to stability and democracy, as a driving force of American empire.⁴⁰ Modernization further may be considered as a political program, active in many nations long before Anglo-American social science reified it and brought the current term into usage. It is typically strongest amid a prevailing sense of backwardness or decline, constituting a potent motive force in Alexandrine Russia, Meiji Japan, the late Ottoman Empire, and the French Fourth Republic, for example, as well as in the archetypal developing countries of the Cold War era such as Brazil and South Korea.

In Spain, reform programs since the eighteenth century typically have been aimed at overcoming the apparent “short-circuit” of modernity and progress. Twentieth-century modernization discourse in Spain encompassed variegated traditions, from those advocating total “Europeanization” (an abstraction rarely elaborated) to those proposing an autarkic nationalist blueprint. Between iconoclasts and isolationists lay a cadre of reformers, personified by Alfonso XIII (1886–1931), who envisioned the selective adoption of foreign models for the sake of

strengthening the national institutions of crown and Church.⁴¹ The historical background presented in chapter 1 traces the concept of foreign tourism in modern Spanish identity and reformism beginning long before tourists entered Spain in significant numbers. Since the eighteenth century, and with increasing intensity after 1900, modernization programs have been closely associated with efforts to increase social, cultural, and economic contacts with other European countries through travel.⁴² State involvement in tourism originated precociously during the reign of Alfonso XIII: the Bourbon monarch established the world's first state tourism commission in 1905, five years before the next two appeared in France and Austria, though the latter countries probably received at least ten times the number of foreign visitors.⁴³ The first state tourism projects were undertaken not in response to rises in tourist activity on the peninsula, but in the hopes of encouraging it. These continued during the years of the Second Republic (1931–1936) and acquired an overtly propagandistic aspect during the Civil War, when Franco's insurgent Nationalists designed battlefield tours in order to sway international opinion.⁴⁴

The prediction proved correct that foreign tourism would become a direct agent of socioeconomic change, particularly in more remote areas of Spain's southeastern and southern Mediterranean littorals. The new industry offered myriad opportunities for entrepreneurship on every scale. Massive investment—public, private, national, and foreign—stimulated the dramatic transformations of hundreds of coastal municipalities. It fueled an explosion of temporary service-sector and construction employment for large populations of agricultural day laborers near tourist zones who, unlike their homologues in northwestern Europe, had never been drawn off the land by the promise of industrial jobs.⁴⁵ As the author of a major economic history of the period reflects,

The traditional modes of life were affected by the habits and collective conduct of neighboring countries with higher standards of living. In numerous parts of the Spanish territory, the slowness of local life had suddenly to awaken to the challenge of massive European tourism.⁴⁶

The study of tourism adds considerable perspective to vigorously debated questions about the evolution of Franco's Spain, the power of modernization as both myth and process under Franco, the origins of its eventual transition to democracy, and its conflictive identity as a European nation. Efforts to recast Spain as modern and rightfully European did

not begin with the Socialist governments of the 1980s, but possessed deep historical roots and indeed thrived under Franco. Chapters 2 and 3 examine how tourism became a component of both foreign relations and economic policy directly after World War II, and, as the regime's political goals shifted, contributed significantly to Spain's adjustment to the post-1945 international conjuncture. It is clear that Franco, a conservative Catholic nationalist contemptuous of "imported modernities," was at best uneasy with his regime's interest in encouraging foreign tourism. This was particularly the case after 1945, when it was no longer possible to restrict tourists' freedom of movement or shower them with political propaganda without appearing to be morally equivalent to the dictatorships of the Soviet bloc. Yet analysis of an authoritarian regime always requires distinguishing the personal views of the dictator from the broad contours of the dictatorship, which in this case proved to be adaptive to changing international circumstances and represented a plurality of political families.⁴⁷ The need to adjust to American hegemony, ameliorate economic hardship, and appeal to the overarching Francoist myth of national resurrection increasingly trumped personal skepticism over foreign tourism.

By the late 1940s, several regime figures working in foreign and commercial policy began to recover Alfonsine ideas about tourism and its complementary political and economic implications. They envisioned foreign tourists bearing witness to the progress, order, and tranquility of Franco's Spain, where they could see that freedom of movement, sophisticated culture, and a modernizing outlook thrived.⁴⁸ In addition, foreign tourism, at least initially, enabled Spain to extract wealth from those European countries benefiting from the Marshall Plan without making the necessary sacrifices of political and economic liberalization required for direct American aid. As Spain's doors opened to millions of foreign tourists, its hospitality industry became an increasingly useful auxiliary to the regime's formal diplomacy. Tourism, in this sense, was a form of engagement with democratic Europe, where political pressures prevented close high-level ties to the Franco regime.⁴⁹ Soon to follow were debates over the limits of moral tolerance, adjustments in the ways nationalist propaganda was directed toward foreign travelers, and challenges to the *dirigiste* state capitalism upon which the Spanish travel and hospitality industries were hitherto based.

The industry's breakthrough occurred between 1957 and 1962, when tourism began a new phase of precipitous acceleration in terms of raw quantity, its role in popular consciousness, and as a factor in broader policy making. The latter forms the focus of chapter 4, which reassesses

the economic impact of tourism during a period when reorienting economic and trade policy was the regime's paramount concern. This chapter introduces evidence suggesting that a strong tourism economy was a precondition and indeed a direct motivation for a series of major policy reforms in 1959. These reforms, which for most scholars mark the basic point of inflection in the regime's history, definitively ended the supremacy of industrial autarkists in influencing policy. Franco's promise to a Málaga audience to convert the city's cloudless blue into the black smoke of industry and progress indicates his lack of regard for the possibilities of tourism in the late 1950s.⁵⁰ By 1962, on another visit to the Málaga province, the dictator would comment that massive hotel construction "proved the existing faith, which I share," in the region's future.⁵¹

The final three chapters explore the dramatic years of Spain's tourist boom, the 1960s, and the years leading up to Franco's death. This period bore witness to a dramatic remobilization of Spanish society following a two-decade retreat to private life following the Civil War.⁵² The regime's modernization program became enshrined in a series of four-year development plans, which served the important political function of justifying Franco's leadership to a new post-Civil War generation that found the dictatorship's foundational myths to be anachronistic and oppressive.⁵³ Tourism was the most controversial and transcendent aspect of the program. Municipalities, investors, writers, youth, and religious leaders, among others, began to discuss and court this new phenomenon. In the process, Spain's economic geography and political landscape were significantly reconfigured, particularly after tourism industry interests obtained a powerful voice in the person of Manuel Fraga, who served as minister of information and tourism from 1962 to 1969. As Cristina Palomares's study of political reformism in the late Franco regime illustrates, modernization acted not solely as a tool to confirm the effectiveness of a supposedly technocratic *Estado de Obras* (roughly, Public Works State), but also presented an opportunity to several regime figures, with Fraga at the fore, looking to forge separate political space as the dictator advanced in age.⁵⁴

The analysis of tourism policy in chapter 5 reveals a prolonged struggle between the indefatigable reformists of Fraga's ministry, supported by a rising class of tourism interests, and a more conservative set of self-styled technocrats, frequently associated with the lay-Catholic secret society *Opus Dei*, who favored policies supporting conventional industry usually at the expense of tourism development. The uneven and improvisational characteristics that many Spanish resorts developed in these years were

due largely to this lack of consensus. Liberal historians have indicated that tourism development diverted investment away from conventional industries and contributed to the country's uneven economic development—a complaint shared, ironically, by the *Opus Dei* technocrats of the period.⁵⁵ The latter, thoroughly antidemocratic in their disposition, recognized that tourism interests favored open commercial exchange, encouraged the proliferation of numerous small enterprises, and promoted xenophile attitudes and nearly limitless tolerance of foreign tourists' permissive behavior. The technocrats' own patrons among the industrial bourgeoisie and the conservative wing of the clergy, by contrast, harbored little interest in promoting such policies and attitudes.

Chapter 6 posits an emerging “touristic consciousness” within the industry, government, and in wider public discourse as well, centered on the idea that modern leisure was central to the national project of modernization and normalization with respect to some ideal of Europe. The result was a major challenge to what Carolyn Boyd described as “the empirical reality of Spanish ‘difference,’ the myth of Spanish inaptitude for modern political and economic life, which had helped legitimize the Francoist dictatorship.”⁵⁶ Spain's intense participation in the new leisure civilization did much to erode deeply rooted perceptions of difference with respect to Europe. “The paradox,” the sociologist Amando de Miguel commented in 1971, “is that Spain with tourists has become less different. It is a little different in the sense that all countries are. [But] it is more different in relation with traditional Spain.”⁵⁷ The present study fully captures neither the subjective experience of Spaniards coping with the tourist boom nor the meaning that the undifferentiated *turista* came to acquire in Spanish literature and film in the manner possible in a local history or a cultural study.⁵⁸ Yet a national study grounded in predominantly elite sources remains relevant precisely because it illustrates that the economic, social, and cultural drama of Spain's tourist boom was closely tied to a strong neo-regenerationist political force. Fraga's style, perceptively described by the political scientist Elisa Chuliá as “predicting coming changes with the goal of channeling them,”⁵⁹ laid foundations for a new Spanish Right adaptable to the relatively more liberal dictates of a European democracy. By the end of Fraga's ministerial tenure, the tourist boom had subverted the idea that “Spain is Different”; now its staunchest opponents invoked the slogan, apparently without irony, to argue for Spain's exemption from the democratic requirement for European integration.⁶⁰

As Spaniards came increasingly to regard mass tourism as a modernizing and cosmopolitan force, they also grew more critical of the industry's

problems and social costs, developed in chapter 7. The imagery of European glamor fueled growing disillusionment with the unpleasant realities of an industry still operating on the model of low prices and maximized clientele. The centrifugal geography of the tourism economy strengthened old peripheral resentments of a central state that appeared increasingly unfit to manage the lucrative natural resource of sand and sun. By the end of the decade, local elites in littoral and insular Catalan-speaking regions complained with increasing audacity that they were left with mono-crop local economies and high social costs while the regime diverted tourism revenue to subsidize the impoverished Castilian interior. The very conservative “bunker” government installed in 1969 attempted to address grievances in the usual manner of a dictatorship, seeking *dirigiste* solutions to reassert the role of state capitalism and the bureaucrats who ran its institutions, though these measures largely would not survive the post-Franco democratic transition.

In general, the idea of Europe eclipsed that of democracy as a mobilizing agent for change in late Francoist Spain.⁶¹ International tourism, the infrastructure that supported it, and the society that tolerated its challenges were emblematic of a new “European” Spain, the consummation of which required formal democratization. Mass tourism presented the Spain of the 1960s with a countervailing force to the dry technocratic ideal much of the regime represented, mobilizing participation from the wider population in closer engagement with Europe. The democratic transition following Franco’s death did not take the form of a popular reaction against bureaucratic paternalism, distinguishing it from, for example, the numerous pseudo-revolutions of 1968 and the Portuguese revolution of 1974. Instead, it was largely an affair of compromise between Francoist elites, increasingly forced to recognize the obsolescence of the myth of Spanish difference, and their opposition counterparts, who trod lightly on the development and social reforms of the Franco years. It is futile to argue that without tourism the post-Franco democratic transition would not have occurred, yet it is undeniable that tourism profoundly conditioned the political atmosphere the transition’s architects would inherit on Franco’s death. Democratization may well have resulted in any case, but it is quite imaginable that the combination of an economy dominated by large industries, and social and cultural institutions unchanged from the regime’s foundational days, would have offered post-Francoist and opposition parties little incentive to moderate their positions or to profess the primacy of stability over confrontation.

Spain's experience lends status to the idea that mass leisure and personal mobility formed a considerable aspect of contemporary international history. Foreign visitors' penetration of Franco's Spain bolstered the regime's domestic and international standing, while also triggering changes in commercial policy, standards of social decorum, and conceptions of Spain's national and European identities. With the aim of modernizing their societies and encouraging political stability, numerous states of the Mediterranean rim, Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia since have sought to exploit tourism. Isolated dictators such as Muammar Qaddafi and Fidel Castro hoped that tourism might help to increase international acceptance of their regimes. In none of these places has the effectiveness of tourism on economic development and intercultural relations been uncontroversial. Where there is revenue, there is environmental degradation and low-wage seasonal employment; where there is cross-cultural contact, existing antagonisms and stereotypes often are confirmed. In the case of dictatorships, strong tourism industries will strengthen some and undermine others, but in most cases the political dynamics will be changed. The effectiveness and desirability will depend on local circumstances rather than abstract blueprints. Profound attention to the politics and economy in the host country is required to answer many of the outstanding questions.

CHAPTER 1

Travel and Tourism in Spanish History

Peripheral Identity

The theme of periphery has permeated Iberian history through the ages. *Finis terræ* to Ancient Rome and Carthage, the peninsula would from the eighth century constitute the northwestern limit of Islamic civilization and the southwesternmost reach of Christian Europe. The historian Claudio Sánchez Albornoz observed that Spain's unique historical geography has fostered cycles of longing xenophilia and hostile xenophobia among its peoples, and given rise to the question of Spain's very identity as a European nation. Many Spanish thinkers of modern times, he lamented, "have raised onto the sky the Pyrenees, until they become an uncrossable barrier."¹

The Pyrenean range is not, however, a uniquely formidable obstacle to international contact. A comparable sierra separates Rome from the central portion of continental Europe, but this did not prevent pilgrims and tourists from flocking to the Eternal City through the ages. Medieval Spain attracted similar peregrinations. The *Camino de Santiago*, a route stretching from points in southwestern France across northern Iberia to Santiago de Compostela, in Galicia, led pilgrims to the supposed tomb of St. James the Apostle. The first known non-Spanish pilgrim to Compostela, a French bishop, made the journey from Puy in 951, and within a century the town had received dozens of notable pilgrims from northern lands and countless anonymous devotees. By the end of the eleventh century, Compostela acquired an international religious significance that even briefly threatened Rome's privileged status in the Christian world.² Though it is impossible to gauge with accuracy the total number of pilgrims to Compostela, the

influx was sufficient to support numerous professional guide services by the twelfth century. In 1114 the Royal Council of León resolved to accept a pilgrim's letter of introduction from his home diocese as a valid passport, an act that one modern legal historian interpreted as an early attempt to standardize documentation procedures and facilitate the free movement of travelers.³ The seminal document of modern Spanish law, the thirteenth-century *Partidas* of Alfonso X, called on Spaniards, "when roamers pass through their places, to honor them and protect them."⁴ The waves of pilgrims stimulated commerce and contributed to the repopulation of northern regions of the peninsula. Medievalist scholars of the Franco era associated the Camino de Santiago with the adoption in Christian Spain of French social and cultural traits and even the origins of the crusading spirit against Muslim rule.⁵ It is appropriate and probably no coincidence that the Camino de Santiago surfaced in Spanish historiography at a time when discussions of travel and the spread of European culture had assumed a particularly current relevance.

The splendor of what had been a "collective phenomenon of Medieval Christian Europe"⁶ could not withstand the religious and imperial fracturing of the sixteenth century. After 1530, few non-Catholics crossed into Spain. A 1571 decree prevented Englishmen from entering Spain and required special licenses of other foreigners. Even after this was lifted in 1604, few attempted the voyage, and those who did dissuaded others with unsavory accounts of their experiences.⁷ The pilgrimage to Compostela declined, frequently into a smokescreen for vagabondage, and the liberties of movement previously granted to pilgrims were gradually rescinded.⁸ A long cycle of wars pitting Spain against the emerging Dutch and English powers fueled antipathy toward northern Europeans and Protestants. Even Catholic recusants traveling from the northern domains received little sympathy from Spanish authorities, who, on observing their fair complexion, frequently stamped them as Lutherans and treated them accordingly.⁹

Against the backdrop of imperial and religious rivalry emerged what came to be known as the "Black Legend"—a diffuse body of literature and public opinion that condemned the Spanish character as inherently lazy, arrogant, bloodthirsty, and medieval in outlook.¹⁰ The first manifestations of this attitude appeared at the height of Spanish imperial power, gaining momentum during the long phase of economic and imperial decline experienced in seventeenth-century Spain. The anti-Spanish sentiment prevalent in early modern Europe was not unique

when compared with other examples of malicious reductionism between warring nations throughout history, and the large number of adversaries and fronts against which it fought during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries made Spain a singularly vulnerable target. Apart from war, the limited Spanish presence in continental cities, the notorious reputation of the Inquisition, and visible signs of imperial decay also contributed to Spanish infamy in a revitalizing Europe increasingly attuned to humanist and rationalist ideals. If Protestants had virtually no opportunity to view Spain objectively, Catholic travelers from Italy and France often looked scornfully at a country that did not seem to have absorbed the baroque culture and Enlightenment values of their homelands.¹¹ Once an alluring frontier of Christendom, the Iberian Peninsula had become in the minds of many a model of failure.

The Iberian Peninsula remained marginal from the main touring routes of early modern Europe. A handful of northern visitors reached Spain over the course of the seventeenth century, but the main touring destinations in southern Europe were Italian, especially after restrictions against Protestant visitors there were loosened after 1630.¹² British Grand Tourists rarely entered Spain, despite the numerous cultural treasures to be found there. The southeast of Europe was similarly bypassed, though this was largely due to the difficulties of language and distance. The Spanish, notwithstanding their francophone elite, were reputedly a reclusive and inhospitable people.¹³ Despite their proximity, French travelers preferred other continental destinations, even after the installation of a French Bourbon dynasty in Madrid in 1702.¹⁴

Although anti-Spanish attitudes were diverse in origin, the published accounts of foreign travelers encouraged them and gave them palpable form. As travel literature became a favorite genre toward the end of the seventeenth century, writers reinforced the canon of anti-Spanish biases with eyewitness accounts of mendicancy and violence. Foreign travelers were frequent victims of highway robbery, indicating to travel diarists a Spanish proclivity for crime.¹⁵ Many concluded that Spaniards' "unenlightened religious practices had produced ignorance, bigotry, superstition, and moral and social decay."¹⁶ J. N. Hillgarth has unearthed numerous counterexamples to the foreign traveler's typical scathing appraisal of Spain, but concludes that the majority complained of squalid lodging and "venomously bad" cuisine, while only a small number expressed admiration for Spanish culture, luxuries, and hospitality.¹⁷

Travel and Modernization in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries

Despite some travelers' dismal portrayals, eighteenth-century Spain was in fact experiencing a revival from the depression of late Habsburg rule. Bourbon reformers focused considerable attention on the national transportation infrastructure, both to increase commerce and improve standards of individual travel on the peninsula. The royal minister Campomanes outlined the "goal of ensuring that nationals and foreigners travel and circulate from place to place without the difficulties [they have encountered] until now."¹⁸ Construction on a radial highway network began under the reign of Fernando VI (1746–1759). Having surveyed industrial development in other European countries, a royal envoy returned to Spain in 1754 convinced of the need for "great roads, from Madrid to La Coruña, to Cádiz, to Alicante, and to the French line."¹⁹ Limited resources kept the pace of construction glacially slow, and, in the haste to link the interior capital with the more dynamic coastal regions, smaller interior locations were bypassed virtually altogether.²⁰ The first comfortable and reliable travel on wheels became available to well-to-do travelers in the 1760s, whereas analogous services had been widely available throughout much of Europe considerably earlier.²¹ In 1789 the minister Floridablanca instituted twice-weekly diligence services from Bayonne to Madrid.²²

Lodging, the other main component of the travel infrastructure, also received attention. Legislation from 1749 attempted to redress its numerous inadequacies, requiring innkeepers to "make the necessary provisions for supplies, clean beds, comfortable bedrooms, and other conditions for hospitality." The minister Jovellanos subsequently argued that quality inns were essential components of a modern road network: "It is imperative to improve inns profoundly, . . . so that, if [a] road is built, [His Majesty] also will receive three very comfortable inns."²³ After 1794, road-financing schemes included modernization incentives for innkeepers.

The dramatic unevenness of infrastructural improvement was not lost on travelers. Travel diaries indicate that lodging in Spain's major cities met continental standards but describe repugnant conditions in smaller town and village inns.²⁴ The advent of roads suitable for wheels increased the speed of travel between Spain's major urban centers: travelers in the mid-eighteenth century covered 50–60 kilometers daily on major inter-city routes, a pace only somewhat slower than French averages.²⁵ France, however, with a population density two and a half times greater, possessed

a network of such roads six times the extension of the Spanish.²⁶ A period of war in Spain spanning from the Napoleonic invasion of 1808 down to the conclusion of the first Carlist War in 1839 disrupted efforts to keep pace with road improvement elsewhere: in 1826, main Spanish routes compared in quality with routes from the 1780s in France, where travel times meanwhile had been halved.²⁷

As prospects for efficient mobility in Spain continued to lag, travel commanded increasingly broad appeal elsewhere. The availability of passenger rail service helped to satisfy a growing appetite for various types of recreational travel, frequently to spa and seaside towns, alpine regions, and cultural heritage sites.²⁸ The geography of international tourism in the middle of the nineteenth century resembled the main early modern itineraries, though scale and efficiency were increased considerably. Europe's first tourist hotels appeared in Switzerland in the 1820s, and Anglophones who traversed France, Italy, and Switzerland soon could access a growing international service network operating at bank branches if not proper travel agencies.

Despite accruing interest in international travel, the foreigner who ventured beyond the Pyrenees remained more of a swashbuckler than a tourist. Exotic portrayals of Spain in French and English Romantic literature inspired only a few hundred more eccentric travelers to tour the country. Only the southern cities of Cádiz, Málaga, Granada, and Seville, easily accessed from the British enclave of Gibraltar, received a steady trickle of foreign visitors, including a colony of invalids at Málaga attended by a resident British physician.²⁹ According to the French hispanophile Théophile Gautier, civil conflict and brigandage made "a trip to Spain as rare and risky as an expedition to the interior of Africa" in the 1820s and 1830s.³⁰ Yet even during nearly three decades of relative tranquility after 1840, habit and poor travel amenities continued to keep most travelers away, whereas the war and turmoil to engulf the Italian peninsula after 1848 failed to discourage. Railroads, though not always of the best quality, replaced the more tumultuous diligence services in southern France and northern Italy in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, making passenger travel faster and more affordable. Likewise, the Spanish began constructing railroads in the 1840s and suspended diligence services by 1854, but slow steel production retarded the completion of an effective rail network.³¹ An express train linked Paris to Madrid by 1865, but once in the Spanish capital, visitors contended with an interior rail network deemed "unsatisfactory" by the venerable Baedeker guide's 1901 edition.³² Moreover, the standard rail gauge was set at a width roughly a foot wider than the established

continental standard, which for passengers meant the added inconvenience of transferring trains at the Spanish border.³³ Spanish inns were still held in generally though not universally low repute among foreigners who had used them, a few erratic modernization programs notwithstanding. Murray's guidebook warned travelers not to expect the courteous service and comforts normally found in well-traveled locales.³⁴ The best-known chronicler of travels in Spain, Richard Ford, often labored to repudiate the Black Legend, though neither was he heedlessly positive. He classified Spanish inns according to three categories—"bad, worse, and atrocious"—and advised prospective travelers to bring their own provisions.³⁵ The poor quality of lodging he attributed to Spaniards' inexperience with the demanding English tourist.³⁶

Spain's nascent tourism industry was predominantly indigenous in the nineteenth century, and Spaniards on holiday rarely mingled with foreign travelers. Outside large cities, suitable tourist hotels were found only at a series of Atlantic resorts between San Sebastián and Santander and to a lesser extent around Málaga and Cádiz.³⁷ Although they met continental standards, these hotels served a well-to-do set of predominantly domestic clients. In this way patterns of tourism in Spain differed from those of prominent Alpine destinations such as Switzerland and Austria, which depended almost entirely on foreigners, and from those of France and Italy, where established international travel routes supplemented internal migrations to coastal and thermal resorts.³⁸

Water was the critical factor that would determine the geography of tourism in Spain, and indeed throughout much of Europe in the modern period. Its purported therapeutic qualities began to lure travelers further away from home than in previous centuries. After Europe's first seaside and spa resorts appeared in England in the 1730s, the fashion spread to France, Germany, and Spain's Atlantic coast over the next century.³⁹ Medical experts later discovered an alternative to the shock therapy of cold Atlantic waters on sunny Mediterranean coasts, which served by the 1830s as convalescent centers for Britons stricken with illness. Winter colonies of non-ailing upper- and middle-class northerners appeared on the Franco-Italian Riviera after 1840 and the Adriatic after 1860, though belief in the healthful effects of warmer climes often was mitigated by concerns about poor urban sanitation and even malaria.⁴⁰ The enthusiasm among northern Europe's superior classes for winters in the South gave birth to the Côte d'Azur, a series of resorts in southern France inspired by cosmopolitan fashions and imported aesthetic styles, though only in the twentieth century would a similar process radically transform the rest of Europe's southern rim.⁴¹

Sea bathing as a formal custom of the Spanish elite dates to 1830, when members of the Madrid court imported the fashion from France. The motive generally was therapeutic, and, as elsewhere, opaque carts known as “bathing machines” and full-length swimming costumes prevented the sight of skin from distracting from this purpose. As the preferred summer retreat of Isabel II (1833–1868), the resort at San Sebastián enjoyed the greatest prestige, which was enhanced further by direct rail service from Madrid and Paris and considerable commercial investment in the 1860s. Receiving some 50,000 visitors in 1872, San Sebastián was Spain’s largest beach resort, though the growth of a radial rail network also permitted the urban upper classes access to several regional resorts at Sitges, Sanlúcar de Barrameda, Alicante, Cádiz, and Málaga.⁴² The *veraneo*, or summer holiday, emerged as an important Spanish custom, becoming the main form of tourism practiced by Spain’s upper and middle classes by 1900.

The *veraneo* became a trademark of Spanish bourgeois identity, but it was the prospect of receiving tourists from abroad that mobilized the ambitions of a wider array of patriots and municipal leaders throughout Spain. Returning from a voyage to Belgium in 1840–1841, the Spanish essayist Ramón de Mesonero Romanos identified the poor conditions the foreign traveler faced in Spain and mused on eliminating them one day:

If one day with the improvement of our roads, our lines of communication, personal safety, good inns and hotels, and the tolerance and good manners of our peasants we would make our country accessible to traveling *touristas* [*sic*], especially to the English—for whom the very idea of privation, want, and danger is intolerable—what a wellspring of wealth hundreds, thousands of these rich guests would open for our country!⁴³

Echoing the concerns of their Enlightenment forebears, some state planners recognized the relationship between tourism and modern infrastructure. Citing “not a little repugnance at the smells and great discomfort on the part of wayfarers,” the provincial government of Madrid in 1850 proposed “the installation of urinals and public washrooms” throughout the city.⁴⁴ An 1877 manual for tourism promoters urged “that it is necessary to surround the traveler with comforts, pleasures, distractions, with all sorts of facilities in order . . . to make agreeable to him the place or places he proposes to travel.”⁴⁵

Concerted promotion of Spain as an international tourist destination began in the 1870s, around the same time that tourist industry interest

groups and local promotional societies (*syndicats d'initiative*) appeared in France and Switzerland.⁴⁶ During this decade, publishers turned out several books and the first regular Spanish periodicals devoted to travel.⁴⁷ Construction began on luxury hotels in the southern towns of Algeciras and Ronda in the 1870s with hopes of capitalizing on the proximity of British Gibraltar. In 1897, little over a decade after the first municipal *syndicats d'initiative* for tourism promotion appeared in Switzerland and France, Málaga established a similar venture—named the “Propagandistic Society for the Climate and Beautification of Málaga”—in cooperation with the local British consul.⁴⁸ In 1892, the advent of train service from Barcelona to the French line prompted local developers to attempt to lure foreign tourists from the crowded resorts of the Côte d’Azur to join or even supplant local bathers down the coast across the Spanish line.⁴⁹

Despite the growing intensity of local initiative, the international tourism industry was slow to promote Spain. Baedeker published its first guide to Spain in 1898, as its Swiss and Italian guides reached nineteenth and thirteenth printings respectively.⁵⁰ Even then, Baedeker recommended hotels owned and staffed by non-Spaniards, and cautioned against locally owned *posadas* and restaurants in all but the largest cities. It deemed the Málaga initiative to be “seriously hindered by the dust and dirt of the streets and by the inefficiency of the drainage system,” and noted that “the amount [of safe drinking water] is no longer adequate to the needs of the growing city.” The guide further noted Málaga’s “comparative deficiency of really comfortable quarters and of the means of amusement and distraction.”⁵¹ Interest on the part of commercial travel services such as Cook and Baedeker grew in relation to the gradual improvement of train lines and the appearance of higher-quality hotels at major urban destinations. By 1900, residents of Madrid, Barcelona, Seville, Granada, Palma, and the Andalusian coast were not totally unaccustomed to the sight of foreign tourists, though both Thomas Cook and Baedeker continued to present Spain as a destination for adventurous clients seeking the exotic and undiscovered.⁵²

Tourism and Regenerationism

The deep political significance of tourism during the Franco period can be traced to the first decades of the twentieth century. The business of receiving foreign tourists acquired an increasingly politicized aspect, reflecting a changing national mood during the Restoration era, and particularly the reign of Alfonso XIII (1886–1931). Although Spain’s long-term economic outlook was good in 1900, any sober optimism was

overshadowed by bleak comparisons with Europe's industrial powers.⁵³ Defeat at the hands of the United States and the subsequent loss of Spain's vestigial American empire in 1898, moreover, provoked a broad crisis of national confidence. Acute pessimism would emerge, according to a prominent Spanish sociologist, as "the most influential mentality of the twentieth century."⁵⁴ Though Spain was only one of a series of European countries forced to confront a feeling of national decadence, its foremost thinkers drew sharp contrasts between Spanish failures and European successes. José Ortega y Gasset and Miguel de Unamuno, two intellectual rivals with differing visions of Spanish identity, both grappled with "Europeanization," implying a process of becoming something that their northern neighbors already were.⁵⁵ In politics, whatever consensus existed was centered on the need for national "regeneration," on which politicians of virtually all stripes staked their claim.⁵⁶ Regenerationism did not refer to any particular program, but to a general conviction that Spain's very survival as a nation hinged on successful economic and sociopolitical modernization as measured against a northwestern European standard. Successive governments pursued various means to produce a "Revolution from Above," in the words of conservative leader Antonio Maura, attempting to eradicate institutional corruption, modernize industry and urban infrastructure, and pull remote regions into national civic life.⁵⁷

The regenerationist era produced the first coordinated efforts to harness international travel both for its integrative quality and its potential to reverse the fates of stagnating regions. The initial attempt was a "National Commission to Promote Artistic and Recreational Excursions of the Foreign Public," a small program created in 1905 by a cadre of dynastic politicians including the prominent liberal Conde de Romanones. State involvement in tourism promotion abroad—and indeed the very use of the word "tourism" in a state bureau—was a novelty in Europe.⁵⁸ The Commission operated on severely limited budgets and expertise, but was emblematic of a growing recognition of tourism as a national interest. Concurrently, foreign tourism increasingly was understood as a national economic good. In 1903, a Majorcan journalist published a study on the "Industry of Foreigners" asserting that tourism revenues made a considerable impact on the national economies of Switzerland, Italy, and France, and could surely do so for Spain as well.⁵⁹ In 1905, Spain's development minister cited large tourism revenues in Switzerland and Italy as justification for state involvement in the sector, though the macroeconomic impact of tourism would not be the object of formal investigation anywhere in Europe until 1911.⁶⁰

The Commission's main concern lay with foreign tourists. In addition to advertising Spain's tourist attractions to French, British, and North American audiences, it also regulated the quality and prices of hotels and inns, which constituted the country's most direct interface with foreign travelers.⁶¹ In this sense, the Commission was an early agent of the kind of "consumer diplomacy" that would define state interest in tourism throughout the twentieth century. It promoted cultural and historical attractions, seeking to put Spain on the modern Grand Tourist's map, but paid little attention to the seaside leisure increasingly popular in Spain and elsewhere. Like the National Commission, several local tourism promotion initiatives launched across the country in the early twentieth century trained their sights almost exclusively on foreign markets. These included Málaga (1897, see earlier), San Sebastián (1902), Palma de Majorca (1906), Barcelona (1908), Zaragoza (1908), Tarragona (1910), Cádiz (1910), Burgos (1912), Valencia (1919), and the region of Aragón (1925).⁶²

Much of the credit for inscribing tourism promotion with a nationalist ethos belongs to the Marqués de la Vega Inclán, a military scion linked to the traditionalist Carlist movement. Vega Inclán made a second career of refurbishing decaying historical and cultural monuments throughout the country and opening them for public viewing. The conversion of the painter El Greco's dilapidated Toledo home into a museum counts among his most enduring achievements. By 1909, Vega Inclán was actively recruiting the patronage of well-heeled patriots and promoting greater state commitment to national tourism.⁶³ Vega Inclán's labors were paralleled by the efforts of the Marqués de Marianao, a young Catalan deputy who likewise considered tourism an important arena of state action. Proposing the establishment of a "Spanish Circuit" for foreign tourists, Marianao appealed directly to regenerationist principles:

The living interests of the country, those anxious for progress and for our country to figure among the most prosperous, and patriots in general, must second this initiative . . . so that, in solidarity with the integrative idea of regeneration it implies, we indicate to the State that a strong current of opinion in this country, WANTS it to live and claim its rightful place, among the CULTURED PEOPLES.⁶⁴

The National Commission was replaced in 1911 with another bureau, the Royal Tourism Commissariat, of which Vega Inclán became the first director. The royal declaration establishing the new body conveyed a

nationalism at once romantic and modernizing:

From external motivations, born of the admiration that the foreigner feels toward the Spanish artistic heritage, and for national decorum, the necessity has arisen for our Fatherland to grant due attention to the artistic treasures which it has inherited from antiquity and give them adequate support within the demands of modern life.

. . . Natural beauty, landscape, climate should be accessible to the foreigner who visits our Fatherland. We shall seek through all possible means to ensure that the appreciation of the beauty of our land should be comfortable for the foreigner. With this goal in mind, the legislature has presented guidelines and precepts for stimulating the traveler's curiosity . . . offering him opportunities to find out precisely the richness Spain treasures.⁶⁵

Spain's precocity in developing state tourism initiatives was due not to the strength, but rather to the weakness of its tourism industry, combined with growing recognition of the latter's potential. In countries possessing more robust tourist economies, governments hitherto remained sidelined. The Spanish state's early and sudden entry in 1905 reflected an epochal faith in the stimulative quality of state initiative, yet its scope remained quite limited. The Commissariat's *magnum opus* was an inauspiciously timed "Sunny Spain" exhibition in London and New York in early 1914. In contrast to counterparts later to emerge elsewhere in Europe, the Spanish commission was heavily weighted toward promotion rather than industrial planning. Meanwhile, France and Austria each created national tourism offices in 1910 to regulate the industry and gather statistical data, and France soon after would establish a fund to provide credit for hotel construction and improvement. It was not until 1920 that the French state intervened in promotional and preservation efforts, and even these were supplemented with private capital.⁶⁶ Switzerland and Italy, the two outstanding European tourism receptors, did not possess state regulatory bodies until 1919.⁶⁷

Spanish state involvement intensified during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship of 1923–1930. Though international tourism remained largely hypothetical, the Primo regime's strong devotion to massive public works projects and infrastructural modernization coincided with a widening interest in the tourism industry.⁶⁸ Rising automobile ownership and wider access to paid vacation time had stimulated another phase of tourism expansion in Europe during the 1920s, including for the first time a large resort culture in the western Mediterranean.⁶⁹ Vega Inclán continued to deliver broadly regenerationist rhetoric: "The need

to foment and develop tourism is becoming ever more apparent," he submitted in 1925, "not only for the wealth it can bring to Spain, but for the general aspect of its culture and international ties."⁷⁰

No wealth would be forthcoming, however, without basic infrastructural improvements, and, in view of Spain's retrograde reputation abroad, this was in essence a matter of international relations. Before the 1920s, only prosperous and cosmopolitan San Sebastián had undertaken significant improvements in water supply and hygienic conditions in direct response to the demands of tourism.⁷¹ A 1926 Interior Ministry order complained, "It is truly shameful for Spain that foreign guide books have been able to claim many of our towns cannot be visited due to lack of hygiene, and that an excess of filth and parasites in a large number of hotels and inns should discourage travel aficionados from visiting our country." Rather than dispute the many "exaggerated criticisms," the ministry preferred to focus on "eliminating any pretext for such unfavorable judgments" by "motiv[ing] our municipal and sanitation authorities to attend to hygiene and sewage."⁷² The Primo dictatorship's major highway improvement initiative, passed in 1926, also invoked "the great national interest of promoting tourism [and] enhancing the natural beauties and artistic richness of Spain." The bill aimed to increase "positive impressions by overcoming the long-standing battle against potholes and dust," and to "link the most important cities and the routes of great historic and artistic value." Financing the project, in fact, would be the responsibility not only of the state, but also the provinces and municipalities "benefiting from tourism" and the automobile industry, "which in a paved economy would have much to gain."⁷³

Among non-state interests, a national *esprit-de-corps* was crystallizing around similar issues. During the 1920s, the principal voice of the fledgling industry was the biweekly *El Peregrino y el Turista*, which combined gentle satires of the industry's primitive state with ardent proposals for improvement. Don Aniceto, the aspiring hotelier brought to life in an *El Peregrino* cartoon, frantically arranges beds in every room of his home and instructs his family to sleep in closets and cupboards. The earnest patriarch tells his exasperated wife, "Great! A wave of tourists! 4,000 will come this year! We have to prepare . . . The Fatherland and the Royal Tourism Commissariat demand it!" He then hastily prepares a letter: "Most Excellent Royal Commissar," he writes. "In this house we are ready. The great wave can arrive whenever Your Excellency wishes."⁷⁴

An ethos of national pride and romantic patriotism underlie the critiques and proposals for the tourism industry found in the pages of *El Peregrino*. An editorial argued that mastering the mechanical aspects of

tourism organization was insufficient, for

it is necessary to create an ideal for the nation, to bring to a boil the patriotism in the hearts of its sons, for them to love the glory of its history and the beauties of its land, to inculcate them with the vision of a glorious future. Without this, we will never attain the admiration and envy of the world, which is all that is required to make others want to visit.⁷⁵

Editors also warned that “the Spaniard’s unique psychology” rendered him especially sensitive to the negative judgments of foreigners: “He will be the first to be convinced that in all our hotels the Parasite reigns supreme, much the same as he is convinced that our railroads are the worst in the world, even though . . . they are comparable with most others in Europe.”⁷⁶

Antonio Bermúdez Cañete, a contemporary economist of national stature, argued in the pages of *El Peregrino* that efforts to develop tourism hitherto lacked coordination and an industrial ethos. Common platitudes regarding the role of tourism in enhancing national wealth, culture, and prestige were, he reckoned, “things known to everyone.” “What it appears are not known,” he continued, “are the means . . . to turn tourism systematically into a considerable source of revenue that could bring to our Fatherland the wealth our (tragically unfavorable) trade balance saps from us.”⁷⁷ Bermúdez Cañete, who would later become a fascist ideologue and the first Spanish translator of Hitler’s *Mein Kampf*, was unconcerned with ranking the relative value of religious, natural, cultural, hydrothermal, and seaside attractions. Spain possessed each in abundance; what distinguished modern tourists was not their preference of activity, but that “all demand ‘comfort,’ . . . which is precisely what we lack and what we must pursue by all means.”⁷⁸ He lamented the lack of quality train service between tourist centers, noting that the radial system emanating from Madrid made travel through Andalusia inconvenient. The state belonged at the vanguard of efforts to make leisure travel comfortable, efficient, and organized. The Royal Tourism Commissariat, he lamented, “is presently an essentially artistic organization . . . [It] needs to be a predominantly commercial enterprise.”⁷⁹ These opinions were shared by José Herrero Anguita, an enterprising developer who in 1926 produced Spain’s first thorough treatise on forging a state-regulated national tourism industry. The 57-page document was distributed to hundreds of Spanish politicians, entrepreneurs, chambers of commerce, and diplomats, and received with broad enthusiasm.⁸⁰ Within months, the Royal Commissariat began seeking

closer collaboration with rail companies, hoteliers, resort managers, local chambers of commerce, and various state directorates.⁸¹

Increased coordination among technocrats and business interests under the aegis of state leadership led to the creation of a new bureau, the *Patronato Nacional de Turismo* (PNT), which replaced the Royal Commissariat in 1928. Reflecting the Primo dictatorship's ethos of state-managed modernization, the PNT would attend to the "juridical functions" hitherto seen to be deficient in Spain: "highways for motor-coach excursions, tourist itineraries, customs and frontier crossings for tourists, [and redressing the] lack of good hotels in some cities of renowned artistic interest [and] absolute scarcity of publicity abroad."⁸² The agency benefited considerably from its position within the Presidency of the Government, which permitted its executors to bypass the considerable red tape and interministerial conflicts that would frustrate future tourism bureaus. The PNT administered Spain's first state subsidies to finance hotel construction in 1929, mimicking a French program to expand development on the Côte d'Azur. Though this program was limited to projects in and around Seville and Barcelona, the sites of international exhibitions that year, it anticipated the highly touted Hotel Credit program of the Franco era. Attending to the issue of comfort, the bureau established new standards governing bathrooms, floor space per occupant, heating, elimination of odors, telephones, and the availability of interpreters. It established price schemes based on three categories of lodging: inns, hotels, and grand hotels. Hotel owners who modernized their facilities were rewarded with more flexibility in their pricing. The PNT licensed the foreign travel agencies American Express and Wagon-Lits Cook to sell Spanish rail and boat tickets. It also regulated guide services, published hotel price lists, and established a national complaints registry for discomfited travelers. Within two years, tourism information offices opened in London, Paris, Rome, Munich, Gibraltar, New York, and Buenos Aires. Publicity efforts expanded within Spain as well, as provincial PNT delegates across the country collaborated with private local interests to erect information offices to guide tourists to their monuments, towns, highways, and inns.⁸³

The most enduring achievement of the PNT, however, was to institutionalize and nationalize the work of the Marqués de la Vega Inclán. A new public fund, the "Network of National Paradors and Wayside Inns," financed the restoration and conversion of historic buildings in rustic locations into luxury inns. The first of these was the National Parador at Gredos, near Ávila.⁸⁴ To this fifteen were added by 1936, inspiring over the next decades similar state enterprises in Italy, Portugal, Greece, and

elsewhere.⁸⁵ The underlying purpose of the project reflected the goals of modern Spanish state enterprise in general—to stimulate commerce in underdeveloped areas and set standards of quality for private sector emulation.⁸⁶

The Second Republic, established in 1931 following the fall of Alfonso XIII, brought a dramatic restructuring of the state bureaucracy from which the tourist board was not exempt. The Republican government established the *Dirección General de Turismo* (DGT) within the Ministry of the Interior, and reduced the PNT to a small subdivision of the new bureau responsible for the Paradors program. The restructuring followed the Republican government's charge that Primo de Rivera's PNT had been wasteful and corrupt.⁸⁷ The Republic was no less aggressive in tourism promotion than preceding regimes, though it differed considerably in its approach. The new government pursued a decentralized model, permitting local tourism initiative societies to carry out many of the functions previously performed by state appointees—an adoption, in effect, of nineteenth-century Swiss and French practices.⁸⁸ In intergovernmental tourism planning, the Republic was more active than previous regimes. Even though Spain was not yet a major tourist receptor or generator country, it fought for and won a seat on the League of Nations Tourism Committee, citing the “extraordinary interest for Spain” and the “growing moral and spiritual importance” of tourism.⁸⁹ As a result of its multilateral enthusiasm, the Republic succeeded in eliminating visa requirements for tourists from 11 European countries, Japan, and Cuba.

The number of foreign tourists entering Spain remained relatively stable during the Republic's first five years, hovering slightly below 200,000 per year. In 1934, roughly half came from France, one-fifth from Portugal, and one-tenth from Great Britain; some 3,500 U.S. visitors represented the only significant contingent from outside Europe.⁹⁰ Until the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936, the Atlantic shores of the Basque Country and Cantabria remained the most visited beach resorts among Spaniards and foreigners. The major new initiatives in tourism promotion in the interwar period occurred in Catalonia. Two luxury resorts at S'Agaró and Tossa de Mar appeared in the 1920s, the latter a frequent retreat of prosperous Germans, and enclaves of middle-class Barcelonese sprouted nearby. The Catalan coastline, stretching north from Barcelona to the French line, became known as the Costa Brava and would in principle be the jurisdiction of the Catalan regional government after 1935.⁹¹ In the south, Málaga and Cádiz had become minor resorts for domestic clientele. The largest Balearic island

of Majorca was home to a small contingent of wealthy British expatriates, joined in the early 1930s by their countrymen participating in Worker Travel Association holidays.⁹² The Canary archipelago, a Spanish possession in the Atlantic off the Western Sahara coast, was virtually unknown to tourists. Information on itinerant tourists in cities and at shrines and monuments during the 1930s remains even more elusive, though the cultural draws of Andalusia and Castile had spawned the construction of tourist hotels in several interior cities.⁹³

Although tourism never accounted for more than one-tenth of one percent of GNP during this period, tourist areas had begun to carve a larger cultural space.⁹⁴ This was most pronounced at the beach, where popular European fashions of the early twentieth century challenged elitist bathing customs. Fun gradually replaced therapy as bathers' primary motivation, and rules requiring full-body swimwear and the use of bathing machines were relaxed. As early as 1913, long before Franco's rise, conservative clergy warned that daring seaside fashion was turning women into "carnal goddesses."⁹⁵ Status and class mobility fueled preoccupations about moral degeneracy on the beach. If a pale white complexion once had signaled a station above the burdens of outside labor, by the early twentieth century a tan was a badge of leisured classes with time to soak up sun. The French designer Chanel first recognized the commercial possibilities of the bronzed style in the 1920s, developing feminine swimwear that exposed yet more skin. Although Spanish women took part in this trend, one study of tourism imagery of this era reads a tendency to associate daring costumes with foreign influence and the full-length bathing robe with Spanish virtue.⁹⁶

Tourism and the Early Franco Regime, 1936–1945

The military coup attempt of July 18, 1936 that sparked the Spanish Civil War brought international tourism to a virtually total halt in Spain. The aspiration of regenerationists to overcome *fin-de-siècle* pessimism had miscarried, and other more radical movements had now collapsed into conflict with one another. With the Republic under assault from an insurgent army supported by the governments of Mussolini and Hitler, and itself receiving Soviet aid, the Spanish war seemed to many at the time to portend a general European conflict between Fascism and Democracy, or alternatively, Bolshevism and civilization. Yet despite three years in the cockpit of international affairs, Spain remained profoundly unknown to most of its neighbors. The earnest ambitions of tourism promoters to improve Spain's economy and international stature

might have seemed totally irrelevant during the bellicose years after 1936 were it not for new ideas about the role of tourism in political propaganda.

General Francisco Franco emerged as the leader of the insurgent army largely due to his success in mobilizing diverse right-wing elements under a single party umbrella dominated by the Falange, a fascist movement inspired by revolutionary totalitarian models. By the time Franco established his first formal government nineteen months into the Civil War, Europe's revolutionary dictatorships had furnished precedents for the use of travel and tourism as instruments of direct propaganda. Organizers of the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin produced a spectacle designed to show visitors the grandeur, prosperity, and humanity of the Third Reich. The Soviet travel agency Intourist also had made deft use of tourism to promote Bolshevism abroad.⁹⁷ Both seem to have influenced Franco's wartime propaganda apparatus. On June 7, 1938, during a brief lull in the fighting before the decisive Battle of the Ebro, his interior minister Ramón Serrano Suñer announced that the main roads of the northern Nationalist zone would be opened to organized tourist traffic to enable foreign and Spanish visitors "to observe the tranquility and order which reign in the regions recently conquered by our arms." Serrano Suñer contrasted this exercise with the propaganda "which the [Republican] enemy . . . are conducting in foreign countries," for opening the nationalist zone to tourists "on the contrary [would] show the whole world the real truth about Spain, about the war, and about our political movement."⁹⁸ From the inception of Franco's first formal government, a National Tourism Service (*Servicio Nacional de Turismo*, SNT) was in operation, playing a hand in forging the foundational myths of a Nationalist uprising against godless decadence and red anarchy.⁹⁹

The wartime tourist service was managed by Luis A. Bolín, a conservative journalist who possessed the political and vocational credentials for the position: purged from his post as the Andalusian delegate to the PNT at the onset of the Republic, he became a correspondent for the monarchist *ABC* in London, whence he chartered the plane used to transport Franco in the July 1936 insurrection. During the first part of the Civil War, Bolín served as a battle-site guide for foreign reporters in nationalist zones.¹⁰⁰ His *Rutas de Guerra* tours operated in much the same way, as paying clients were transported to battle sites in chartered buses and subjected to politically charged narrations. This may be the only example of any wartime government sponsoring guided commercial tours to active war zones. It seems that the project's very novelty accounted for much of its albeit limited clientele. The propaganda purpose was served at least to some extent: right-leaning journalists from

Portugal and Britain returned home from tours to publish nationalist versions of the war, and at least one group of American sympathizers made a tour in 1938.¹⁰¹ The notion of tourism as counterpropaganda, the most effective antidote to the lies of the dictatorship's enemies, would soften over time, but continue in some form for decades following the war's end.

After Franco's victory in April 1939, tourism, insofar as it existed at all, would remain for the moment an unabashed component of the state propaganda apparatus. Throughout the summer of 1939, the Spanish government anticipated an expansion in foreign tourism and considered ways to exert more control over visitors' movement and experience in Spain. On June 5, 1939, the undersecretary of foreign affairs notified diplomats that, "the war having ended, we can expect in the near future a considerable increase in foreign tourism to Spain," and instructed them to "promote as much as possible this tourist traffic which is so useful for the nation's propaganda and economy."¹⁰² The new regime nevertheless was sensitive to the dangers of unmonitored tourism, especially in a still unconsolidated and highly repressive dictatorship. Spanish diplomats were alarmed by growing numbers of foreign travel agents requesting "broad authorization to arrange transportation, lodging and visits to Spanish monuments without the mediation of the [SNT] and its criteria." Considering the intensity of postwar political repression and the dramatic unevenness of the national tourist infrastructure, the notion that foreign tourists' movement might be left unrestricted was unacceptable. The Foreign Ministry informed its corps of diplomats abroad of the extent to which the SNT would accommodate the desire for free itineraries: it was "prepared to organize group or even individual visits, in certain cases, to cities and sites not normally included in the tour routes . . . [B]ut the lack of means of transportation . . . and the scarcity of lodging in many areas requires that the Service act as an intermediary . . . in order to avoid the counterproductive effects these deficiencies would cause."¹⁰³

Bureaucratic reorganization after the war restored the DGT, now under Bolín's leadership, to the Ministry of the Interior. Its broad goal was to build upon the efforts of Primo de Rivera's PNT and foster a corporate consciousness in the tourism industry. This was to be accomplished largely through systematic regulation and punitive sanction, all bathed in a national-corporatist rhetoric. The first major act of the DGT was to impose thorough regulatory codes on the hotel industry. In April 1939, it established a hotel classification system correlating official price controls to standards of service and quality.¹⁰⁴ This classification

system would in theory guarantee foreign tour organizers minimum standards for their clients' comfort. A rigorous regulatory circular issued in August noted that the regulations had been devised to respond "to complaints heard inside and outside of Spain about chronic deficiencies of our hotels," and were

prepared for the benefit of the Spanish hotel industry, called upon to keep conscientious vigil over its reputation among the Spaniards and foreigners who use their services.¹⁰⁵

Beneath the pretext of national duty, the new regulations governed the minutiae of hotel operation. Establishments were to be kept meticulously clean and bathrooms painted white. Male personnel were to shave daily and mirrors hung, in sensitivity to unusually tall foreign visitors, at "heights convenient . . . for persons of diverse statures." Cleanliness was paramount, and the DGT warned that "hotels will be the object of necessary inspection, and the smallest deficiency observed . . . will be punished with the maximum severity."

Food constituted another potential hazard to the tourist's welfare. In the same circular, the bureaucratic elites of the DGT revealed their misgivings about popular Spanish gastronomy, observing, "Our country has not always known how to distinguish between eating a lot and eating well," adding that the country's "cuisine, so delicious and varied, suffers from general neglect." The circular dictated that the hotelier serve Spanish cuisine of the highest grade, avoiding "regional concoctions" with "excessively strange characteristics or strong dressings unknown outside of Spain." Uncertain chefs were encouraged to contact the DGT, which would recommend "*paella, cocido madrileño, tortilla a la española* . . . and many other renowned Spanish dishes [that] are served abroad with great success." As one of Spain's most important agricultural products, olive oil was always to be given special consideration. "It is imperative to ensure its prestige among foreigners," the DGT warned, and "the use of low-grade olive oil is absolutely prohibited." Finally, the authors noted the rewards to be gained from improving the national cuisine: "It is often forgotten that its proper preparation and presentation constitutes a gold mine for the intelligent hotelier and a great attraction for national and foreign tourism."¹⁰⁶

The 1939 tourist season was no gold mine for Spain, though in the wake of the Civil War reliable statistics were never gathered. Bolín claimed that his national tour routes made a profit, but its extent is unknown.¹⁰⁷ The major European tourism markets meanwhile experienced a continuing

recovery from Depression-era troughs of the mid-1930s.¹⁰⁸ It was only the outbreak of World War II that shut down European tourism completely. Despite economic hardship, the Spanish government continued to operate the *Rutas de Guerra* (renamed the *Rutas Nacionales de España* in 1939). Despite Bolín's claim that "there were hardly any foreign tourists, but Spaniards, living in peace, wanted to know their country,"¹⁰⁹ travel was a highly minoritarian activity in a war-ravaged country living on limited food rations. From 1938 to 1945, the Rutas attracted 23,257 clients, generating 3.6 million pesetas in revenue.¹¹⁰

Foreign tourism during World War II was again largely academic. Travel was heavily restricted throughout Europe, and the regime's principal concerns lay in consolidating power and surviving the world war. But even so, tourism never disappeared completely from the government agenda. The seven state tourism functionaries of 1938 had multiplied to 31 by 1941.¹¹¹ A "Ten-year Plan for National Resurgence," issued in 1940 by the Ministry of the Interior, called for measures "to correct the grave deficiencies today evident in the Spanish hotel industry and make it capable of receiving the great legions of foreign tourists who might visit our country, bringing lodgings to a level comparable to that found in other countries."¹¹² Carlos Ibáñez de Ibero, Marqués de Mulhacén, a radical nationalist and intellectual dilettante, included tourism alongside colonial defense, religious missions, and cultural propaganda in his prescription for a new Spanish imperialism.¹¹³ Conforming to the grandiloquent style typical of the early Franco dictatorship, a DGT memo from 1942 explained the role of tourism in the regime's all-encompassing National Crusade:

In the course of relations among States, the latter have taken control of the natural and biological fact of TOURISM . . . Spain holds the honor of being the first Nation to forcefully link the State to the defense and regulation of national touristic interests . . . It foresaw this necessity in all its forms, as no other Nation had done before that time . . . After some years of world conflict, with Spain having reemerged as a titanic power, the hour has arrived to prepare for the near future by perfecting the State organism which can successfully confront all the possibilities tourism offers.¹¹⁴

Such lofty plans were pure fantasy in the wake of a devastating civil war and amid a major European war. Funds for development projects were unavailable, despite DGT insistences that "they would be directly profitable, . . . imminently generate national wealth as well as foreign

currency,” and provide “propaganda . . . of great practical value, since it demonstrates to our people and to foreigners the best Spain has to offer.”¹¹⁵

State efforts to develop a coordinated national tourism industry accelerated somewhat in 1942. The official hotel trade union established a Professional Hotel School in Madrid, offering training in hotel management and cuisine without neglecting requisite formation in the subjects of “National Syndicalism” and Religion.¹¹⁶ Also introduced was the first rigorous regulation of travel agencies, which henceforth retained a legal monopoly on coordinating tourist services. Obtaining an agent’s license required joining the official trade union and maintaining a minimum capital of between 10,000 and 50,000 pesetas, depending on the services authorized. Twelve agencies were registered or re-registered under the new system over the next three years, dominated by the large Spanish enterprises Marsans and Meliá and the international Wagon-Lits Cook, which, though foreign, received special authorization to continue operating 26 branch offices.¹¹⁷ The Spanish Industrial Credit Bank approved a program to subsidize hotel construction with low interest loans through a program known as Hotel Credit. Along with the hotel classification system of 1939, these state initiatives in tourism were hopeful gestures conceived amid a difficult period for the Franco regime and for Spain generally.

The dictatorship’s first attempts to regulate and promote tourism were largely abstract exercises. World War II precluded tourism throughout most of Europe, and Spain’s poverty and war-torn transportation infrastructure curtailed internal travel. Early DGT regulatory practices conformed to grand ideological visions rather than lessons of experience. A description of how the tourism industry was to function in a national-corporatist state might look as follows: foreign clients would contract state-approved Spanish travel agents to arrange the services of professional hotels, licensed guides, and transportation companies at state-controlled prices. As a result, foreign guests would be delighted, price gouging eliminated, collective profit for the national industry ensured, and the prejudicial effects of corruption and individual greed overcome. The client base was too small, for the moment, to put this formula to the test.

Overtly propagandistic tours run by the *Rutas Nacionales* continued on a limited scale, but the broader lines of tourism policy developed during World War II were more concerned with professionalism than political indoctrination. The DGT gradually would abandon the national-corporatist model in favor of regenerationist-era principles—namely, the notion that presenting Spain to foreigners as modern, open, and civilized

would work as a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy, stimulating over time a national modernizing consciousness. Generalized war, however, delayed the complete return of this mentality. Though Spain was virtually non-belligerent throughout, security and repression was the Franco regime's overriding concerns. Permitting unrestricted travel was out of the question. But, like comfort and charm, a broad spirit of openness—in commercial, cultural, and territorial terms—would resurface in peacetime as the *sine qua non* of European tourist culture. The conflict between the regime's concern for security and the liberal requirements of postwar travel would unfold over the course of the next three decades as the Franco regime struggled to balance the various political and economic interests surrounding tourism.

CHAPTER 2

Tourism and International Engagement, 1945–1957

The dictatorship reframed its interest in international tourism considerably after the conclusion of World War II. Whereas previously the regime had understood foreign tourism as an instrument of nationalist cultural policy and propaganda, its more genuinely conservative, nonrevolutionary face to emerge after 1945 would come increasingly to consider the practice as a form of regular commercial and social engagement among nations. Understanding, however, did not always mean acceptance. Whereas some inside the government sensed great advantages to be gained from encouraging this kind of intercultural contact, many other influential officials regarded foreign tourism as a potential threat to the dictatorship's moral and economic autarky.

Tourism would not constitute a major public issue for another decade, but its growing presence already had come to influence policy decisions and internal debates. By the late 1940s, signs indicated that, a century after such hopes first emerged, foreign tourism at last might make a significant positive impact on Spain's international relations and economic development. Already among the largest industries in Western Europe by 1950, tourism grew proportionately the fastest in Spain, albeit from a lower base. The 83,568 foreigners to visit Spain in 1946 more than doubled to 172,892 by 1948.¹ As in the 1930s, Spanish figures remained roughly one-tenth of the Italian totals and one-sixth of the French.² By 1953, however, Spain had gained ground on its Latin rivals, receiving 909,344 tourists—one-fifth and two-sevenths of Italian and French totals respectively. The increase, to be sure, followed a broad increase in international travel after postwar travel restrictions began to loosen in 1947. But Spain was not historically an important part of the European travel network, and the idea that the government might

encourage this trend penetrated the core of the regime's identity as national savior and sentinel of Western civilization.

Tourism statistics and policy acquired far greater significance in view of the Franco regime's unenviable political and economic circumstances. Poor economic management during World War II forestalled recovery from the Depression and Civil War of the previous decade, and food rationing was tighter and lasted longer in Spain, remarkably, than in most of Europe's belligerent nations. Following the defeat of the Axis, Spain soon became Europe's only one-party state not aligned with the Soviet Union. Although in fact the regime's fascist colorations began to fade after 1943 and a limited but nevertheless genuine pluralism slowly reemerged on the Spanish Right, the regime's original sin of fascist collaborationism and stories of continuing repression left the country deeply stigmatized.

The major international developments after World War II, as well as much of Franco's own policy and rhetoric, appeared to confirm the impression that Spain was fully isolated from the emerging global order. Spain failed to gain admission to the UN in 1945, to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1948, and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, and was excluded from the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan) in 1948. France was openly hostile to the regime, even closing its southern border without warning in March 1946.³ Moreover, France tolerated anti-Franco guerrilla camps stationed in its southern departments, whence originated frequent cross-border operations until 1949.⁴

The Franco regime also perpetuated assumptions about its own isolation. Self-sufficiency, along with a kind of defensive nationalism, constituted important political themes during the 1940s. The myth of an enduring anti-Spanish conspiracy dating from the Thirty-Years War and the Black Legend, surfacing again in the guise of the French Revolution, nineteenth-century liberalism, atheist socialism, and the American war of 1898, now usefully explained the regime's ostracism in the emerging post-1945 international order.⁵ It was probably this concept more than any other that lent ideological unity to Franco's fragmented constituency of Falangists, Catholics, traditional conservatives, monarchists, and military officers during the 1940s.⁶ To satisfy his military and industrial constituencies, Franco emphasized industrial autarky throughout that decade, arguing that Spain could not rely on a hostile outside world for aid in industrialization and national defense.⁷ At the center of the autarkist project was Juan Antonio Suanzes, who headed the umbrella state holding company, the *Instituto Nacional de*

Industria (INI), established in 1941, and became minister of industry and commerce in 1945. Suanzes constructed a highly protectionist economy founded on import substitutions and an overvalued currency, which by 1947 had fallen to 39 to the dollar on the open market despite an official rate of 10.95.⁸

Yet it is an error to assume that the Franco regime's highly touted autarkic principles were ever fully realized, or even defined the regime's ideal program. The goals and composition of Franco's government were too complex to permit a total retreat to isolationism. Enhancing Spanish prestige and strengthening the industrial economy were both important components of the Francoist "national resurrection," and both required some degree of international engagement. Unappetizing though rapprochement with the Western democracies might have been for some ideologues, important segments of the government pursued a controlled opening to the exterior. The pressures of international ostracism and a malnourished treasury left some latitude for comparatively liberal action as early as the late 1940s, especially among diplomats and industrial managers.⁹ Capturing foreign currency was a basic imperative. As hope dwindled by summer 1948 that Spain could obtain American aid without committing to political change, Suanzes searched for ways to siphon Marshall Plan funds from elsewhere in Europe.¹⁰ Soon after the conclusion of World War II, Spain negotiated bilateral trade arrangements with ten West European countries, who, fearing runaway postwar inflation, eyed inexpensive raw Spanish imports as a means to help stabilize prices.¹¹ In addition, Suanzes provided more incentive for foreign capital, suggesting, as Antonio Gómez Mendoza has observed, that the minister's "attitude toward foreign investment was less hostile by 1948 than often portrayed."¹² Restoring a positive international image for Spain was largely the task of the Catholic elite, embodied by the new foreign minister Alberto Martín Artajo.¹³ Although the dictator reserved mistrust for the professional diplomatic corps, which he felt was susceptible to contamination by foreign ideas and behaviors, he recognized its usefulness in recasting his dictatorship as a defender of Western and Christian values.¹⁴

The extent to which foreign tourism could benefit the current imperatives of diplomatic and industrial policy was becoming increasingly clear. Continued expansion in tourism was expected throughout Europe. By 1947, Europe's multilateral economic organizations regarded tourism, in the words of a British delegate, "as being one of the most important fields of activity, and one which may have far-reaching results on the European Balance of Payments."¹⁵ The Marshall Plan provided

for a sixteen-member European Travel Commission to coordinate tourism promotion efforts, and a newly established International Union of Official Tourism Organizations predicted that “the tourist trade is one of the invisible exports upon which the participating countries will increasingly rely as a means of balancing their accounts with the rest of the world.”¹⁶

Although Spain remained outside all such multilateral arrangements for the time being, it was for the Iberian nation that their statements would prove most prophetic. If deficiencies in transportation and lodging could be overcome, Spain harbored competitive advantages in climate, price, and the variety of its attractions. It was plausible to expect that soon one million Europeans and Americans might take a Spanish holiday in a single year. The economic implications of such an eventuality were self-evident, and in addition a mass of delighted tourists might prove to be a powerful instrument of diplomacy. It would be unjust, however, to suggest that men like Suanzes regarded tourism as a means to integrate Spain into the international economy; on the contrary, they viewed tourism revenue as temporary nourishment for the national industrial plant that did not require exposing Spanish industry to international competition. In this sense, foreign tourism revenue initially did not contradict the policy of industrial protectionism, but rather seemed to be a felicitous complement to it.

The growing presence of foreign tourism, along with creeping temptations to encourage it further, invited concern and derision from other elements of the regime. As Juan Pablo Fusi observed, the demise of fascism had prompted the regime to largely abandon creative revolutionary cultural programs in favor of a purely negative policy of heavy censorship.¹⁷ Bolín’s *Rutas Nacionales* continued to operate on a small scale, but state-run cultural tours to Nationalist and Catholic shrines lacked the wide commercial appeal of warm-weather resort tourism, which, far from positive propaganda, resembled to many a threat to the moral and political order established by the Nationalist victory. As the revolutionary nationalism of the war years diminished in favor of a conservative authoritarian state, foreign tourists from comparatively liberal European countries were more readily judged a threat than the subjects of mass spectacle. Concerns of the effect of tourists on public decorum resurfaced. A 1950 editorial in the monarchist *ABC* instructed travelers to “dress in the style of the city. Do not be seduced by the climate. Overcome your preference for the colorful, and avoid the daring. Do not come in shorts or sandals. Leave your tie on, for the beauty of Spain is well worth the knot of a tie.”¹⁸ An unnamed minister in Franco’s cabinet

was said to have remarked in 1950 that Italy “lived off Communism (taking money from the Marshall Plan to keep up appearances) and tourism”; when asked about the prospects of tourism in Spain, the minister replied, “Why would we want a few foreigners coming in and showing us their hairy legs?”¹⁹ Franco was ill at ease with the idea of encouraging tourism at this point—it was only toward the end of the 1950s that the Caudillo tacitly began to accept that the economic benefits outweighed the social costs.²⁰ To the extent that other currents of Franquista opinion pondered tourism at all, attitudes were skeptical. Borrowing Unamuno’s comment on the Spanish character, the Catalan tourism promoter Jorge Vila Fradera recalled that, with regard to tourism, most Spanish politicians “disparaged that with which they were not acquainted.”²¹

Tourism as Commerce and Diplomacy

Severe monetary protectionism was among the most basic obstacles to foreign tourism. The nominal exchange rendered the cost of travel in Spain, like most Spanish products, unappealing to the European consumer. To avoid economic asphyxiation, commercial negotiators pursued a complex series of bilateral accords loosening exchange rates for trade in selected goods and encourage limited trade in certain sectors. Suanzes and Martín Artajo endorsed a similar policy with regard to personal border crossings. In 1946, the Spanish Foreign Exchange Institute (IEME), under Suanzes’s mandate, proposed the establishment of a “preferential exchange rate to stimulate the transfer of foreign currency in the forms of ‘tourism’ and ‘family aid’ ” for carriers of sterling, American dollars, Swiss francs, and Portuguese escudos.²² French excursionists, who had been the most numerous before 1936, were kept out virtually altogether after France unilaterally sealed its Spanish border in 1946 in protest of the Franco regime. The preferential tourist exchange was formally adopted in a ministerial order on December 6, 1947, which enabled foreign-organized group tours to purchase transport, guide, and lodging services at 16.40 pesetas per dollar; exchange rates for other goods hovered between 8 and 15.²³

This marked only a baby step toward the end of opening Spain to tourism on the scale experienced by France and Italy. Even with the preferential rates, customs regulations dating from 1941 required all passengers entering Spain to carry at least 200 pesetas (roughly US\$12) per day of their stay, a quantity well in excess of a realistic nonluxury traveler’s budget, in order to ensure substantial inflow of foreign currency per

tourist head. The entering tourist was required to tender the amount at the border in exchange for pesetas at the official rate.²⁴ Apart from being burdensome for the traveler's budget, the requirement was the source of negative publicity. Tourists routinely stretched their budgets into stays substantially longer than their official allocation, and, if harassed, claimed never to have been informed of the rules. Much ire and ill will resulted when Spanish customs officers required tourists to surrender the balance of their foreign currency quotas before allowing them to depart.²⁵ A Harvard hispanist who had seen enrollment for his summer courses in Madrid plummet alerted Spanish authorities that the requirement "has produced an extraordinarily unpopular reaction in [American] academic circles," adding, "I cannot imagine anything more counterproductive than this short-sighted requirement . . . Tourists of good faith should not be subjected to coercive measures and treated as though they were undesirable elements."²⁶

Changing relations with France and Great Britain early in 1948 prompted Spain to pursue policies more amenable to the tourist trade. Commercial policy makers came to recognize that a high volume of tourist traffic was more desirable than maximizing revenue per tourist head. The main issue concerning France was the reestablishment of regular cross-border traffic, disrupted for nearly two years because of French hostility to Franco. By early 1948, Spanish diplomats perceived a reopening to be imminent. In anticipation, Spanish consulates in southern France began distributing free visas, often unsolicited.²⁷ Even a return to the *status quo ante* of frequent day excursions, familial visits, and beach holidays along the Spanish Basque coast, which had been commonplace before the war, would benefit the Spanish treasury significantly: If the 90,000 French visitors to arrive in 1934 were to return in 1948, each carrying a reasonable 24-hour budget of 100 pesetas, the inflow of revenue from French tourists alone would have equaled nearly double the amount that the Spanish government had been able to provide for hotel construction credits in 1947.²⁸

Reopening the frontier was of little benefit to the tourist trade, however, as long as current currency requirements remained in effect. In January 1948, one month before the frontier's reopening to tourist traffic, a Spanish diplomat in Paris warned that, free visas or not, high currency quotas would discourage French excursionists from traveling southward. Multiple Spanish consuls pointed out that, "in view of the generally familial and excursionist character of French tourist traffic," the 200-peseta requirement was a prohibitive vestige of wartime.²⁹ As the consul at Bayonne argued, "The dilemma has never been clearer: Are currency import quotas more important than the broad exchange of

economic, cultural and social relations?"³⁰ On May 7, 1948, the IEME reduced minimum currency by half.³¹ The move complemented the free visa provisions for French tourists, for both reflected an incipient strategy to maximize total foreign entries, not the economic benefit of each individual entry. A precipitous rise in border crossings followed, rising at the main eastern entry point of Port-Bou from 7,357 in 1946 to 37,339 in 1948 and 89,703 in 1949.³²

The main barriers to British tourism were also dismantled between 1946 and 1948. Both countries were keen to expand the scope of British travel to Spain, though numerous political factors complicated bilateral negotiations. Tourism had formed a considerable part of British trade with much of Europe before World War II, and with trade unions and the Labor government pushing to implement the 1938 Holidays with Pay Act, a new emphasis on low-cost tourism for the many appeared to be on the horizon.³³ The possibility of more British tourists spending their sterling abroad made tourism an important aspect of general trade negotiations amid the economically turbulent period following the war. British trade officials hoped to exploit their country's status as a major tourist market in order to gain favorable trading terms from several continental countries, including Spain. The possibility of many more British tourists spending their sterling abroad made tourism an important aspect of general trade negotiations amid the economically turbulent period of 1947–1948. On October 1, 1947, the British government imposed a ban on foreign travel for all its subjects in order to plug an accelerating sterling drain.³⁴ The threat to continue the travel ban through the 1948 summer season provided British trade negotiators a "valuable counter in the hands of our negotiators who are and will be discussing our balance of payments with various foreign countries."³⁵

Though fewer in number than the French, British tourists were particularly important to Spain because of the relative strength of their currency and their tendency to take extended holidays rather than brief excursions. Late in 1947, Britain chose to delay negotiations with Spain, hoping to limit the benefits of tourism to its principal trading partners and avoid an uncontrolled flight of sterling to far-flung destinations. American insistence on multilateral approaches to European recovery prevented Britain from favoring one continental democracy over another, but it was acceptable to "omit Spain, which can presumably be justified on political grounds."³⁶ Mindful of rumors in early 1948 of the travel ban lifting, Spanish diplomats in London were not content passively to wait for an invitation for inclusion. Although Spain did not figure into Britain's immediate plans to employ tourism policy to the wider ends of postwar reconstruction, hope was crystallizing that the travel question

would raise, in the words of Jaime Alba, the Spanish commercial attaché in London, “unsuspected possibilities” for Anglo-Spanish trade negotiations to be held later in the spring. Britain’s Labor government gradually reinstated overseas travel, but drastically limited the amount a tourist would be allowed to spend on holiday to a stingy allotment fluctuating between £25 and £50, a budget a British diplomat in Paris thought would leave tourists in France “severely strained.”³⁷ As a low-cost alternative for the British traveler, Spain potentially could help satisfy the long-term goals of British overseas travel interests. Moreover, Britain’s largest travel firm, the now nationalized Thomas Cook, possessed deep investments in Spain, and numerous other investors had begun to eye Majorca and the Costa Brava for coastal development. Alba optimistically explained that although monetary crisis prevented the British government from raising foreign travel allowances, “political demands” would require a low-cost alternative like Spain to accommodate “the immense numbers of people that the fixed quotas for the large tourism countries cannot allow.” With “this entire human mass is at our disposal,” Alba envisioned

great benefits: The moral value is evident, considering that [Spain and Great Britain] scarcely know one another . . . Materially, we have spoken of figures in the millions . . . Such is the contrast between the current reality and the wide field of possibilities opening before us.³⁸

From the British perspective, the question of opening Spain to tourism was not confined to the pragmatic judgment of the civil service, but carried a certain political weight as well. But while a Labor government was interested in encouraging the creation of a travel alternative for modest budgets, ideological aversion to the Franco regime remained a consideration. Indeed, many of Labor’s supporters had volunteered in anti-Franco militias a decade earlier in the name of the same working class. In 1946, the British organizers of an International Conference of Travel and Tourist Agencies felt compelled to exclude Spain in order to avoid a row with other participants, such as Poland and Mexico, which were particularly averse to the Franco regime.³⁹ As late as 1952, with the reestablishment of normal diplomatic relations with Spain nearly complete, the Foreign Office registered concern that “it would be unfortunate if the left wing of the Labor Party made this occasion for an attack on the slightly more accommodating attitude towards Spain which we are now following.”⁴⁰

Of the fourteen countries with which Britain initiated bilateral tourism negotiations in February 1948, Spain was given the lowest

priority. As one British negotiator remarked, "We had no objections to seeing tourism reopened with Spain, though we were not very keen on pressing it early." Spain lacked the advantages of economic clout and political sympathy, but harbored the potential to offer attractive options for middle-range tourists and British entrepreneurs alike. The main obstacle continued to be the Franco regime's autarkist policies. If the tourist exchange issue and the bias against foreign capital had been corrected somewhat, the British were positioned to demand a good deal more. In the meantime, the Foreign Office reported, "It was agreed that we should not make a special attempt to get Spain in the first list, but would take it up later after examining the currency regulation question."⁴¹

A slower time-scale for incorporating Spain was therefore predetermined, but this did not prevent British negotiators from hearing out Spanish aspirations. Spain was asked to grant reasonable facilities for its own citizens to travel to Britain, though, as Alba noted, "naturally with no expectation of equilibrium of the number of travelers in each direction."⁴² The more significant British demand was that "*bona fide* visitors from the UK . . . not be obliged to spend more than their reasonable requirements in pesetas." For their part, Spanish trade negotiators were willing to reorient their policies significantly in order to open the door to British tourism. Their delegation stated that it "wished to see the resumption of tourist traffic from the UK, and that the currency regulations would be administered with the object of encouraging it."⁴³

The Spaniards' professions of good faith on currency exchange did not wholly mollify their British counterparts, who remained uneasy about continuing restrictions on British travel companies' operations in Spain. Spanish regulations stipulated that foreigners travel "under the care of Travel Agencies officially established in Spain."⁴⁴ The Spanish government did not wish to relinquish control over tourists' movement for several reasons: it wished to preserve the authority to channel foreign clients toward good hotels, comfortable transportation, and approved itineraries, all of which were seen to reduce the risks of customer dissatisfaction, negative national propaganda, and the infiltration of anti-Franco agitators. In addition, the rules demonstrated the regime's commitment to protecting Spanish travel agents from the competition of larger agencies abroad. Finally, by having Spanish travel agents organize all tours, the government was able to monitor currency exchange, preventing, in theory, the purchase of cheaper pesetas on the underground market. A law dating from 1938 obligated travel agents to honor official rates and report any violations.⁴⁵ For their part, British negotiators remained unwilling to concede any restriction on British tourist

agencies' access to the Spanish tourism market. They insisted that "the regulations be adapted to enable a tourist with Cook's, or any other travel agent, to book in the same way as he does when he goes to France or Switzerland."⁴⁶ Maintaining the Spanish travel agent's privileged legal status was proving to be incompatible with the interests of the coveted British market. The DGT refused to yield to British pressure and undo the law requiring foreign firms to contract Spanish agencies. As a result, Spanish aspirations for inclusion in the British travel zone for the 1948 tourist season were frustrated.

Further calls to liberalize travel procedures emanated from Spanish representatives in the United States. The director of the Spanish tourist office in New York warned that American travel agents had little patience for the current currency exchange requirements, "and if there is any incident involving a client they send to Spain on a package tour, not only will they stop sending more, they will go so far as to give us openly bad publicity."⁴⁷ A commercial attaché in Washington pressed further, arguing to the Foreign Ministry that institutional obstacles to free travel, both among organized tour groups and individuals, should be removed as rapidly as possible:

Tourism is a singularly important component in the trade balance of many countries (France and Italy, for example). In Spain there have been periods in which tourism accounted for many millions. The DGT is trying to promote the attraction of visitors, but this cannot be done without . . . eliminating the inconveniences. Many of these trips are . . . organized by travel agencies . . . through all-inclusive payments . . . In terms of economic and commercial interests such trips must be considered in the national interest, but no less should we value the travel of an expert, industrialist, or businessman who comes . . .⁴⁸

On December 3, 1948, the decisive step was taken toward encouraging travel free from control of Spanish agencies. All visitors, business and pleasure, including those traveling independent of a travel agent, now enjoyed a special tourist's exchange rate of 25 pesetas per dollar (100 per pound sterling), compared with rates ranging from 10 to 18 for other goods.⁴⁹ Moreover, on May 1, 1949, Spain eliminated altogether the minimum currency allotments that hitherto had infuriated tourists.⁵⁰ Foreign entries exceeded pre-1936 levels for the first time, jumping by 61 percent in 1949 to 283,890. With basic border and currency controls loosened at the Pyrenees, the French became Spain's most numerous visitors, a position they would continue to occupy throughout the

dictatorship and beyond. British tours, too, began arriving once British trade delegates were satisfied with eased currency restrictions. American tourists could not have accounted for more than one-twentieth,⁵¹ and foreign travel remained highly restricted for the other potentially large European market, West Germany.

Courting international tourism while maintaining official monetary supports inevitably produced a black market for the Spanish currency. Indeed, this phenomenon appeared throughout Western Europe after 1945, leaving central banks little alternative but gradual liberalization. In 1950, France abandoned its fixed exchange rates, shifting toward greater openness to competitive currency markets. Allowing the sale of francs beyond French borders at market rates opened the possibility of undesired fluctuations, but this was judged a lesser threat than the smuggling of francs out of France to sell to Swiss and British tourists.⁵² By contrast, the Spanish system for combating black markets continued to rely on travel agents, who, by prescribed procedure, collected payment directly from foreign tourists, then contracted all transport, lodging, and other services on their behalf. It grew increasingly common, however, for foreigners to bypass the system, as making arrangements directly with hotels and transportation services allowed them to circumvent both the Spanish agents' fee and the obligation to obtain their pesetas at the official exchange rate. The tourism industry's national-corporatist structure was proving to be poorly suited to the requirements of international exchange.

Unlike the French, Spanish authorities were not prepared to subject their currency to the open market, but hoped to confront the problem with the creation of a large public firm with the strength and backing to stand up to currency smugglers. This occasioned the first involvement in tourism on the part of the INI, the umbrella organization for state enterprise headed by Suanzes. In 1949 the massive state holding firm infused Luis Bolín's *Rutas Nacionales* enterprise with 50 million pesetas in capital to create *Autotransporte Turístico Español* (ATESA). The ATESA investment was relatively small in comparison with INI investment in other sectors, accounting for two-tenths of one percent of total INI investment in 1950, but nevertheless a significant amount for Spain's modest tourism industry.⁵³ As a large state company consolidated transportation and hotel booking services, ATESA was conceived as a useful service for foreign travel firms and individual tourists, and, significantly, one whose revenues provided direct nourishment to the national industrial plant. Alongside the creation of ATESA came a further relaxation of monetary supports. This brought the tourism exchange rate in line with a

significant sterling devaluation in 1949 and favored tourism from the dollar area (Belgium, France, the United States, and Switzerland) even more.⁵⁴ In August 1950, Martín Artajo and Suanzes jointly promulgated an increase in the tourist rate to 39.40 pesetas per dollar, while trade in most other goods now ranged from 16 to 33.⁵⁵

With the combination of a strong national travel agency and a more attractive exchange rate, planners hoped to eliminate the black-market currency, but fell well short of their goal. For the plan to have been effective, the regime either would have had to nationalize the entire industry or dramatically improve its surveillance mechanisms, for struggling Spanish travel services were unlikely turn away foreign clients offering to pay them in smuggled pesetas. Sensing that its mandates were routinely ignored, the IEME gently reminded travel agents to always collect fees from foreign clients in foreign currency, “thereby avoiding incidents experienced already by some travel agencies, who have been surprised to find that their reimbursements have come from illegal sources.”⁵⁶ But the problem would only worsen. In 1953, the *Boston Sunday Globe* informed readers that 10,000 pesetas, costing \$718 at Spanish ports, could be purchased in Boston for \$238.⁵⁷ The liberal government economist J. J. Forns reasoned that eliminating artificial supports was the only way to “avoid the clandestine current of Spanish money leaving [Spain] in search of gains on the exchange.”⁵⁸ The first public acknowledgment of the problem did not come until 1955, when Manuel de Arburúa, head of the newly formed Ministry of Commerce, announced that his bureau “was doing everything possible to encourage foreign currency revenue from invisible sources; that is, tourism, immigrants’ remittances, etc., . . . which has meant a hard fight against the black market.”⁵⁹ But Suanzes and Arburúa remained unwilling to expose the peseta to free exchange, hoping to simulate the effect with a mixture of statist solutions like the creation of ATESA and a very gradual softening of tourism exchange rates.

Although the problem of black-market currency hindered the direct benefit to the national treasury, it nevertheless must be recognized that several diplomats and industrial policy makers took action that enabled Spain to participate in the postwar European travel boom nearly from the beginning. Attention to tourism as an instrument of commercial policy and international exchange initiated an opening that would continue throughout the 1950s. In 1950 tourist entries increased by 61 percent to 456,968. Tourism continued to be categorized as an “invisible” revenue, valued at \$6.3 million in 1946 and \$20.6 million in 1950 according to Bank of Spain estimates.⁶⁰ Though insignificant compared with figures

of the 1960s, it was a promising sign to Spanish economic managers at the time. Traffic at Spanish ports continued to accelerate steadily after 1951. Despite exclusion from direct Marshall Plan aid, Spain shared virtually from the beginning in American tourism, which proved to be a significant component of the massive transatlantic dollar transfer.⁶¹ Americans were Spain's most lucrative tourists, spending an average of roughly \$181 per head in 1950 and \$299 in 1954, excluding passage.⁶² Although this was well below the figure for American vacationers in all of Europe (\$870 in 1955), it far exceeded British tourist expenditure, limited by law to £50 (\$140) in 1951 and 1953.⁶³ The most numerous visitors, the French, spent an average of \$10–\$20 per voyage.⁶⁴

Table 2.1 Total tourists entering Spain with a passport from selected countries (% change from previous year), 1951–1956

	<i>France</i>	<i>Great Britain</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Portugal</i>
1951	278,488	61,706	20,741	130,245
1952	317,526 (+14)	62,765 (+2)	22,400 (+8)	138,356 (+6)
1953	388,036 (+22)	88,010 (+40)	25,929 (+16)	118,674 (–14)
1954	381,312 (–2)	109,274 (+24)	36,144 (+39)	119,804 (+1)
1955	614,146 (+61)	175,773 (+61)	41,736 (+15)	133,541 (+11)
1956	690,838 (+12)	193,636 (+10)	43,409 (+4)	139,288 (+4)
	<i>Switzerland</i>	<i>West Germany</i>	<i>Scandinavia^a</i>	<i>Belgium</i>
1951	25,800	11,578	16,950	25,025
1952	23,521 (–9)	24,831 (+114)	22,587 (+33)	23,320 (–7)
1953	25,085 (+7)	45,296 (+82)	23,725 (+5)	23,655 (+1)
1954	26,947 (+7)	61,637 (+36)	23,647 (0)	30,561 (+29)
1955	40,352 (+50)	88,736 (+44)	27,927 (+18)	37,160 (+22)
1956	43,574 (+8)	120,598 (+36)	30,868 (+11)	41,114 (+11)
	<i>Netherlands</i>	<i>United States</i>	<i>Europe Total^b</i>	<i>Total</i>
1951	8,068	31,579	590,841	676,255
1952	10,406 (+29)	50,537 (+60)	659,490 (+12)	776,820 (+15)
1953	10,343 (–1)	69,048 (+37)	765,077 (+16)	909,344 (+17)
1954	11,663 (+13)	96,681 (+40)	819,403 (+7)	993,100 (+9)
1955	18,313 (+57)	98,001 (+1)	1,197,945 (+46)	1,383,359 (+39)
1956	18,796 (+3)	115,778 (+18)	1,345,561 (+12)	1,560,856 (+13)

^a Includes Sweden, Denmark, and Norway.

^b Includes countries not listed individually.

Source: Dirección General de Turismo, *Movimiento turístico en España* (Madrid: Ministerio de Información y Turismo, 1956), 8. The DGT did not tally foreign entries by nationality before 1951.

West German tourists became a significant presence once the Allied occupiers lifted travel restrictions in 1950. Yet, though their numbers increased precipitously, West German tourists in Spain lay outside the purview of official bilateral relations. West German law permitted organized group tours only to other OEEC member countries, the ranks of which Spain would not join until 1958. Spanish–German relations were limited to meticulously specified trade agreements guaranteeing Spanish products (predominantly agricultural) in exchange for German machinery.⁶⁵ Package tourism to Spain by charter flight or motor coach therefore was largely unavailable to West Germans, making the long overland journey or expensive scheduled air service the only transportation options. Tourist visas to Spain were formally unavailable to West Germans, though individuals arriving at the Spanish border by car or train were not turned away.⁶⁶

Despite inconveniences, West German tourists' appetite for travel to Spain steadily grew. In 1952, a Munich tour operator informed the Spanish Foreign Ministry that "many of our tourists have already asked me why we do not do trips to Spain," and expressed the hope that the Spanish "make some agreement with our government to make possible group tours."⁶⁷ The Spanish undersecretary of foreign affairs took interest in the idea, urging his ambassador in Bonn to "communicate to the [West] German authorities that there is interest in Spain in receiving German tourists."⁶⁸ With the current accord set to expire in September 1952, the German Federation of Travel Agents appealed to the Federal Republic's economic minister to include provisions for tourism in a renewed treaty. Travel service firms from both countries made similar appeals to Spanish authorities, arguing in a collective letter that "promoting travel would be undoubtedly beneficial for the mutual economic, cultural, and social relations between the two countries."⁶⁹ Curiously, these efforts failed to influence either government, even though the West German travel market displayed gargantuan potential. Trade protocol renewals of 1952, 1953, and 1955 all neglected tourism, continuing their exclusive focus on primary- and secondary-sector goods. It is not altogether clear why tourism was ignored so roundly, considering it already formed an explicit component of both Spanish and West German trade relations elsewhere. Tourism would only become an explicit issue in Spanish–West German commerce after 1957, by which time it had become clear that Spain was unable to balance its trade with West Germany without more tourism revenue (see chapter 4).

Tourism and Border Security

The prospect of routine, cross-border tourist traffic posed a direct challenge to the security apparatus in place since the end of the Civil War. The regime continued to perceive threats from opposition forces seeking to establish underground cells inside Spain. Yet domestic security concerns were balanced by the need to overcome the considerable deficit of goodwill for Franco's Spain in Western Europe—which was fueling sympathy for the opposition—as well as a rapidly depleting treasury. From the perspective of Alberto Martín Artajo's relatively liberal foreign ministry, successful tourism promotion translated to diplomatic gains: the chief diplomat described to *ABC* how “thousands of travelers . . . who visited us this past year have made it their business to tell the world ‘the truth about Spain.’”⁷⁰ During and directly following the world war, border crossings were infrequent enough that border police could practice a certain amount of discretion. In July 1945, the French consul at Barcelona could contrast the “liberalism of the Spanish customs with the rigor of the French,” which formed considerable nuisance for frequent frontier crossers.⁷¹ With the growing waves of travelers to enter after 1948, however, Spanish customs authorities institutionalized tighter controls, contradicting the trend toward liberalization overtaking most of Western Europe. Visa requirements were abolished by 1953 for all travel among member states of the Council of Europe and, excepting Greece and Turkey, between member states and Switzerland.⁷² Even some more authoritarian states, such as Turkey and Argentina, had by 1950 begun to make their countries “less of a police state and more attractive to tourists who dislike being troubled with formalities and restrictions.”⁷³ In Spain, by contrast, documentation requirements from 1941 remained in force, including a tourist visa and an exit permit to be requested from Spanish police several days in advance of departure.⁷⁴ Also required was the “triptych,” a complicated document to be presented at entry and exit points to demonstrate a clean police record, legitimate purpose for traveling, and prearrangement of all accommodations in the country.

Tourism advocates took issue with security officials' claim that the Spanish border crossing system was “identical to that established in other countries.”⁷⁵ When the DGT suggested eliminating the triptych, the interior minister opined, after much delay and pestering, that other forms of border documentation would be “no less bothersome to the foreigner . . . [and] moreover . . . would be ineffective from a police perspective.”⁷⁶ He appears to have been largely correct: a Council of

Europe commission concluded that regular passport scrutiny at Europe's national frontiers not only was an ineffective policing tool, but also created delays so long that "despite the remarkable technical achievements of the twentieth century, the journey from Paris to London by rail and sea could be done in less time at the beginning of the century than in 1953."⁷⁷

From the perspective of the DGT, the main concern with respect to border policy was to combat a prevailing sense among travelers that Spain lie outside the fabled "Free World" of Western civilization. The mission of presenting Spain as fully European formed the principal strand of continuity between Franco's DGT and its predecessors. As the historian Walter Laqueur later commented, "Visitors to Spain at the end of the war were struck by the strangely non-European character of the country."⁷⁸ Customs posts formed the first front in the struggle to reverse such impressions. In 1951, the DGT again dismissed the belief that special security issues justified rigorous border procedure: "For [tourists], the 'triptych' is a harassing police document, totally incomprehensible given that . . . it is required in no other Western European country except Spain."⁷⁹ In point of fact, France began requiring a similar document of all entering vehicles the following year, but it was surely true that, as a right-wing dictatorship seeking respect in post-fascist Europe, Spain's policies were more likely to confirm negative impressions.⁸⁰

The influence of tourism diplomacy was nevertheless slow to affect border policies. Spain remained at arm's length from the multilateral customs agreements operating with growing intensity elsewhere. It did not ratify a 1954 UN covenant establishing less rigorous customs procedures for tourists until 1958.⁸¹ Only in 1960 did Spain sign a 1952 International Motoring Treaty providing for mutual recognition of drivers' license and auto registration.⁸² Commercial and tourism interests continually criticized Spain's failure to join collective border conventions, and the government partially mollified them with independent actions or bilateral agreements.⁸³ Customs duty collectors began to allow exemptions for tourist purchases in 1950.⁸⁴ The personal triptych was discontinued on May 1, 1952 (though one was still required for automobiles), less the result of tourism industry pressure than of the regime's confidence that anti-Franco guerrilla activity in southern France had subsided.⁸⁵ An agreement with France the same year to eliminate normal tariffs on cross-border tourism advertising marked an incipient French-Spanish rapprochement; the French embassy in Madrid declared that "the French government eagerly wishes to ameliorate the [tariffs on tourism advertising] . . . which appears necessarily to go along with the

expansion of tourism traffic between Spain and France.”⁸⁶ By 1952, the quasi-official Royal Automobile Club of Spain held reciprocal agreements with its counterparts in several other West European countries to streamline tourist automobile entry procedures.⁸⁷

This was as far as Spanish authorities would allow customs procedures to loosen. Visas remained a requirement for all but American and Swiss citizens, and tourists were routinely detained in interminable lines in rooms one British visitor described as “the antechamber to Hell.”⁸⁸ A British parliamentarian crossing at Port-Bou recalled, “There were no queues, only mobs” awaiting clearance from customs agents.⁸⁹ British overtures to eliminate visas for travel to Spain met with rebuff. Spanish negotiators claimed that visas were necessary to prevent exiled Spanish Republicans from slipping back into the country, though this problem would have applied to the United States as well.⁹⁰ More likely, the visas were viewed as a reliable source of sterling and a means to prevent tides of working-class British tourists from flooding Spain’s weak travel infrastructure, whereas spendthrift American tourists were spared the hassle. For a brief period, Spain conceded day passes to British visitors entering from Gibraltar, but discontinued this practice in 1954 to protest a visit to the controversial rock by Queen Elizabeth II. Visas for French citizens were raised to 1,200 French francs (\$3.45), though the much more common 24-hour pass was available for only a nominal cost.⁹¹

It was unlikely in the early 1950s that the DGT would exert any further influence over formal border security procedures. Loosening border controls during this period mostly were due to the logistical problems resulting from rising tourist volume; laws did not change as quickly as *de facto* practice. Although the regime’s security requirements remained in place, practice and repetition eroded their draconian rigor. The chaos often encountered at entry points in 1951 and 1952 subsided as tourism became routine. The Ministry of the Interior, responsible for both customs and security, pledged in 1952 to consolidate security and customs inspections into a single process, define contraband with greater precision, eliminate the need for exit permits, and modernize and expand border control facilities.⁹² Completion of these goals remained years away, but the efficiency with which tourists were processed did improve. This was chiefly the result of an informal relaxation of customs security, particularly at French border crossings. Jorge Vila Fradera, then a DGT delegate in Barcelona, recalled,

There was a series of rules, especially those related to frontier controls and to foreigners in general, that fit poorly with the policy of open borders

necessary for tourism . . . It is certain that, with time, the strictest measures began to soften and even fall into disuse.⁹³

In the mean time, if delays jeopardized the positive impressions of foreigners, long border queues served as inspiration for domestic propaganda. A 1951 official newsreel displayed images of a long stream of automobile traffic heading away from a sign reading "*Hendaye Plage*," and toward "*Frontière Espagne*."⁹⁴ Though the theme would resurface only toward the end of the 1950s, vacationing hordes would become a staple of official news coverage in the 1960s (see chapter 6).

The interests of international engagement on the one hand, and political and moral security on the other, had only begun to clash. Spanish diplomats and trade negotiators succeeded in opening Spain to a steady flow of foreign tourists that was increasingly difficult to stem, forcing the regime's more traditional authoritarian elements to adjust. British and American demands that group travel be unrestricted, along with the influx of French motorists, undermined the regime's attempts to control and monitor the itineraries of foreign visitors. If this comparatively free type of foreign tourism was there to stay, attention to the notoriously decrepit tourism infrastructure was necessary in order to eliminate negative European conceptions about Nationalist Spain. This challenge would prove monumental in comparison with the preliminary act of pushing the door open.

CHAPTER 3

From Nationalist Propaganda to Consumer Diplomacy

Preparing for Mass Tourism in the 1940s

Several decades of abstract optimism and desultory planning had done little to prepare Spain for the volume of tourist traffic the postwar international travel industry was poised to create. The task of rectifying this problem fell to Luis Bolín's DGT, which over the course of the 1940s transformed from an instrument of direct political propaganda to a more conventional tourism bureau. Propaganda, which in Spanish refers to both political proselytism and product advertising, shed its overtly ideological charge and increasingly meant providing visitors a pleasant impression of Spain. Combating "anti-Spanish" opinion lent a useful patriotic thrust to a business considered by many a corruptor of national values, though in practice this meant eliminating signs of Spanish backwardness and incivility from the tourist's experience rather than exhorting the righteousness of the Francoist cause.

In its technical mandate, the DGT came to resemble the short-lived PNT of the Primo de Rivera government, charged with regulating all aspects of private tourism development and coordinating related functions of the government. The bureau suffered, however, from a severe deficit of organization and resources to carry out its mandate effectively. Operating out of a small office in old Madrid, the agency's 31 functionaries were poorly equipped to regulate a far-flung and rapidly growing industry, and, moreover, to coordinate the regime's transportation, customs, commercial, and information policies effectively. Whereas the old PNT, as an organ of the chief executive, was positioned to direct a holistic kind of operation, the DGT was buried deep within the hierarchy of the Interior Ministry, and housed roughly a mile from

ministry headquarters, where domestic security and censorship services dominated the office space and agenda.¹ In principle, the DGT's closest collaborator was a state trade union, the National Hotel Syndicate, with which it worked to establish consensus for regulation among the government and all levels of the industry. Bolín's liberal business sensibilities and his eagerness to promote direct foreign investment, however, soon revealed the sector's national-corporatist appearance to be a façade.

From the perspective of industrial policy, it was under Bolín's leadership that Spanish tourism developed its first major international contacts. After the conclusion of World War II, he made a priority of establishing contacts with the travel industries of the United States and Great Britain, where industrialized mass tourism was most developed. Adding to its London office, the DGT reopened its New York City office in 1947 and established one each in Chicago and San Francisco in 1950.² These missions not only served to provide tourist information to the general public, but also functioned as specialized consulates, pursuing business relationships and gathering information about the American travel industry.

A native Anglophone quick to temper his wartime activism, Bolín was well placed to court international relationships in spite of the ostracism that the regime as a whole continued to endure. The erstwhile organizer of battlefield tours who had snubbed American Express executives in 1940, Bolín quickly adopted an apolitical congeniality after World War II that would define the style of Spanish tourism authorities for the remainder of the dictatorship.³ In the early going, politics and travel were separated only with difficulty, as when talks to eliminate visa requirements between the United States and Spain were hindered by a 1949 American ban on the entry of "persons with extreme political views" that included members of the Franco regime's official single party. Commenting on the issue during a San Francisco press conference, Bolín was characteristically unconcerned: "When I arrived in San Francisco it was pouring rain and now the weather is magnificent, and I am confident the same will happen with respect to other matters."⁴ The popular American guidebook author Temple Fielding, whose guides to Spain emphasized the country's anti-Communism rather than its authoritarianism, was a particular favorite of the DGT, which furnished Fielding with a chauffeur and other courtesies during his visits. In his 1952 guide to Europe, Fielding contrasted Soviet-bloc countries with Spain, where "there are no shadows to frighten you" and "you'll never be followed, stopped, or questioned while you are a guest."⁵

It was largely from American and British business contacts that Spanish managers were first introduced to the emerging commercial techniques of postwar mass tourism. Pan American and Trans World, the major American air carriers to Spain, expressed their interest in Spain's low cost and undiscovered appeal, which Bolín obliged with a promise to provide American groups with all-inclusive tours for \$10 per day.⁶ Jaime Alba, the Spanish commercial attaché in London, advocated pursuing the British tourism market with similar emphasis on low prices, acknowledging the chief obstacle to be "the scarcity in Spain of medium-range hotels of the kind demanded by the new socialist tourism of travelers with budgets limited to modest amounts."⁷ The "new socialist tourism" to which he referred was largely the product of the Laborite currency rationing program, which, by limiting the amount British tourists were entitled to spend overseas, increased the demand for destinations moderately priced, yet suitable for a proper British holiday. Here can be found the seeds of what since has been labeled "Fordist" rather than "socialist" tourism.⁸ Nomenclature aside, Alba and his colleagues recognized the emerging trend and Spain's potential role therein. This was reinforced by the admonitions of a Boston travel agent who in 1949 withdrew Spain from his firm's European itinerary, citing the scarcity of "modest hotels still with the comforts to which Americans are accustomed," and the frequent delays and annoyances at border customs. "In [this travel agent's] opinion," the consul reported, "these inconveniences will hinder mass tourism for people of modest means, who constitute the foundation of the business, and will provoke irritations that will reflect poorly on the agency."⁹

From the perspective of the international travel industry, Spain's chief shortcoming as a major tourist destination lay in its receptive infrastructure—hotels, dining, transportation, and related services. Spanish planners therefore were forced to focus on developing transportation and hospitality, leaving the organizing and sales of tour packages to agents in the country of origin. That this directly contradicted the nominally vertical or national-corporatist structure of Spain's tourism sector intervened little in their thinking, and they continued to court foreign travel concerns on the latter's terms. Several British firms operated freely without subcontracting a Spanish agent, especially once the issue of exchange rates largely was appeased by the end of 1949. Spanish travel agents complained that British tour organizers would hire their services once, then, "having acquired sufficient experience, contract directly with the hotels that the Spanish agent had found for them."¹⁰ They further

charged that many who did contract Spanish agents never paid them, and that the DGT was reluctant to enforce the rules for fearing of alienating its foreign partners. The syndicate appealed to hotel owners' "moral duty" to refuse direct contracts with foreign companies, but this meant little when those who insisted on following formal legal procedures risked losing their largest customers.¹¹

This tendency was especially pronounced in beach tourism, which involved simpler planning than the itineraries of the typical American traveler, and was emerging as Spain's principal attraction for European tourists. A measure of this was the intensity of hotel construction in Majorca and the Costa Brava in the first half of the 1950s: at least one-third of all new hotels built between 1950 and 1955 were in those regions, and the figure may have been higher.¹² British travel firms established direct contacts with the hotel industries of Catalonia and Majorca as early as 1950.¹³ Firms launched after the war, such as Horizon Holidays and Sky Tours, along with the older Thomas Cook and Henry Lunn's, began drawing up contracts directly with middle-range and modest hotels rather than submitting to the rickety machinery of Madrid's national-corporatist bureaucracy.¹⁴ They also provided construction loans to Spanish entrepreneurs in exchange for guarantees of season-long room bookings at fixed prices.¹⁵ This quickly would become the standard model. Large players such as British European Airways began sending British travel agents to establish contacts at emerging resorts. Several were "wined, dined, and feted on every corner" of Majorca in 1955 with the enthusiastic participation of the local tourism office but no intervention from Madrid.¹⁶

The division of labor in the international tourism industry required Spain to concentrate on hotels and receptive infrastructure, and leave aside the guide and booking services central to the vision of a national-corporatist tourism system. Though the number of registered agencies in Spain rose from 29 in 1951 to 49 in 1956, this was no indication of their health. The DGT regarded their "lack of capital and lack of technical competence" as threats to "the interests of prestige for Spanish tourism."¹⁷ Spanish travel agents were relegated to the role of organizing day excursions for interested hotel guests. Even in these endeavors, it was normal for hotels to exact a 30–40 percent commission from travel agents' sales.¹⁸ Pressure on struggling travel agents to sell local day excursions led to numerous ventures to restore historical monuments of greater or lesser import and to install cultural attractions near beach resorts, giving birth to such "pseudo-events" as flamenco performances in Catalonia. The emerging system also short-circuited the nominal

state monopoly on guided monument tours. Rules requiring tourist groups to employ guides endorsed by the local Falange section were enforced only infrequently, and foreign tour leaders often regarded badge-wielding Spanish guides as little more than a nuisance. One seasoned Swedish tour guide even complained to the DGT after he was forced to retain a guide in order to gain his group access to Toledo's El Greco museum, a protocol he found exceptional and irritating.¹⁹ Contrary to their Civil War-era predecessors, however, state-employed guides were not political propagandists. Their training emphasized medieval art and history, including considerable attention to Arab influences, and generally eschewed more controversial topics of modern history. Though foreign guides remained illegal throughout the dictatorship, they became the accepted norm for most package tours while professional Spanish guides remained at only the most important national cultural sites.²⁰

Hotels and Consumer Diplomacy

Spain's hotel plant entered the postwar period deficient both in terms of quality and volume. This was especially the case in Mediterranean coastal and insular areas, which were now absorbing the greatest part of the new tourist currents. Private investment in hotel construction surged in the late 1940s. Although direct foreign investment was limited (and in most cases illegal), a combination of British loans and Spanish capital financed the large majority of the 170 hotels built nationwide between 1945 and 1951. The regime's highly touted hotel credit program, established in 1943, contributed to the construction of one-quarter of these, though state credit by law could not exceed half the total budget of any individual project.²¹ Increases in the overall state budget for hotel credit nevertheless did indicate the government's growing commitment to expanding receptive tourism capacity. From 1943 to 1947, hotel projects received 6 percent of total state industrial credit; from 1948 to 1950, the figure reached 11 percent.²² Many potential hotel investors continued to be dissuaded by the government's rigid price controls, devised to protect foreign tourists from price gouging but burdensome for smaller establishments. Pressure from the industry prompted the DGT to relax these restrictions somewhat in 1948.²³

Quality standards were a separate question, connected both to the desire to reverse tourists' "anti-Spanish" preconceptions and the related commercial need to expand the client base. Apart from the urban luxury hotels and a few exceptional resorts, lodgings, and restaurants in Spain

remained substandard vis-à-vis the expectations of tourists from abroad. In 1957, a traveling British banker, echoing his nineteenth-century forebear Richard Ford, commented, "While first class Spanish hotels are second to none, the second or third-class Spanish hotel, especially in out-of-the-way places, requires much enthusiasm and an iron constitution to enjoy."²⁴ Also like Ford, Luis Bolín believed the problem was a reflection of the basic cultural discrepancies between comparatively wealthy foreign holidaymakers on the one hand and petit bourgeois innkeepers in relatively impoverished Spanish villages on the other.

The DGT and National Hotel Syndicate aimed to remedy this problem through professionalization, inculcating a mutually reinforcing sense of national mission and individual professionalism among the syndicate membership. Resources for this effort were limited in this difficult period. In 1948, professional hotel schools in Madrid and Seville were the only two institutions in Spain supplying formal training in the technical aspects of hotel operation, basic courses in foreign languages, and the correct religious and national-corporatist values.²⁵ Expanding the formal training network would be a generation's labor. A more immediate requirement was to teach basic professional standards to the existing 11,699 owners and 59,614 workers—many of them neophytes—the syndicate claimed to represent. To this end was conceived the monthly *Hostal*, a didactic trade journal aiming to cultivate professionalism and an informed national pride within the Spanish travel industry. The revue's first number appeared in July 1950, opening with words of the thirteenth-century Castilian king Alfonso X: "Of all the lands of the Earth, Spain possesses bounty and goodness greater than any other."²⁶ The medieval cornucopia depicted in this passage may have seemed alien to a country still living on food rations, but its evocation captured the lingering regenerationist spirit at the center of the project.

Interlocking themes of good business and national pride were at the center of *Hostal*'s attempts to enhance professionalism in the hotel industry. Bolín's journal relentlessly offered advice on themes from cleanliness—"the business card of every good innkeeper"—to proper lighting, "today considered one of the essential elements in the life of a hotel." In one instance it reproduced the opinion of a 1951 Belgian travel journal that in Spain "the cleaning of the glassware is still done as it was in the Middle Ages."²⁷ A monthly feature entitled "*Así nos ven*" (The way they see us) examined foreign impressions of Spain and discussed ways to "take advantage of occasions to learn useful professional lessons and . . . how not to ignore the lessons of some ill-intentioned ignoramus."²⁸ Bolín urged hoteliers to "prepare themselves to receive

the American tourist, . . . a man who in his country is accustomed to being attended to with lightning promptness . . . The hotel staff should also have every available service for him, and they will do well to provide an immaculately clean room.”²⁹ Its overall effect, however, was limited by the size of its readership; Bolín later would lament that only five percent of the syndicate’s membership read *Hostal* regularly.³⁰

The other state project aimed at enhancing Spain’s prestige as a tourist destination was the Parador program, originally established in 1928.³¹ Paradors were not intended to compete directly with private establishments, but the DGT did recognize their usefulness in setting a standard of quality for private hoteliers to emulate. As an official statement explained, Paradors and Wayside Inns were “situated in places where there is no danger of damaging private hotels by competition. The aim is to open new fields to the tourist, and at the same time to raise the standard of the Spanish hotel industry.”³² By 1953, there were 21 Paradors in 16 different provinces, generally distant from important privately developed tourist centers.³³ In the spirit of the Marqués de la Vega-Inclán’s early labors in tourism, they were typically historic buildings refurbished as hotels, a formula later borrowed by the Portuguese and Italian tourism boards.³⁴ Foreign guidebooks roundly endorsed the Paradors. Eugene Fodor’s 1953 guide to Spain called them “clean, luxurious and inexpensive,” noting also that “the prices are uniform,” a quality tourists often could not expect at private hotels despite state regulation to that end.³⁵ A French travel guide noted, “In the big towns, hotels are usually comfortable, clean, and moderately priced,” though in rural areas the guide advised travelers to favor state-run Paradors.³⁶ To avoid jeopardizing the good name of the enterprise, legislation prohibited privately owned inns from including the word “parador” in their names.³⁷ Until 1956, Paradors were the only lodgings subject to routine state inspection, whereas the quality of private establishments typically went unchecked after initial classification was administered.³⁸

Since that time, Paradors have remained largely immune to the criticism applied to most other forms of state enterprise. They offered a novel product, contributed immeasurably to the overall reputation of Spanish tourism, and posed little threat to the private sector. In 1951, they accommodated roughly 10 percent of foreign tourists to visit Spain that year.³⁹ The proportion would dwindle to 4 percent by 1958, by which time the total Parador clientele had risen by 52 percent to 180,645 (98,866 foreign) and overall foreign tourist entries had increased by 263 percent to 2,452,543. The enterprise was on the whole marginally profitable, netting 800,000 pesetas in 1950 and 7.8 million

pesetas by 1961, suffering slight losses only in 1955 and 1956. Paradors that catered to predominantly national clientele generally finished in the red, but these losses were offset by the highly profitable and more cosmopolitan establishments at Granada, Puerto Lumbreras, and Ciudad Rodrigo.⁴⁰

The Ministry of Information and Tourism

Despite rapid gains of the late 1940s, there was little to foretell that in 1951 Franco would elevate tourism to a cabinet-level post. Throughout his life Franco almost never mentioned tourism publicly, even after the explosion of the 1960s.⁴¹ Press coverage of Anglo-Spanish trade negotiations did not mention the 1948 agreements on tourism, even though diplomats had considered this an important triumph.⁴² Even Alberto Martín Artajo, the cabinet minister most attentive to the interests of tourism behind the scenes at the time, was largely reticent on the matter in public. Speaking before the national assembly in 1950, the foreign minister extolled the value of print and radio as a weapon in “the dialectical battle against this new phase of the Black Legend,” helping Franco’s Spain “to come out from behind the smoke curtain hung by our adversaries.”⁴³ Tourism, which the regime promoted to similar ends, received no mention in the minister’s intervention, yet just six months later, in June 1951, Franco would create the Ministry of Information and Tourism.

The new ministry might have appeared to indicate, as one textbook author maintained, a “growing interest on the part of the Nation’s Government in tourism and its consequences, in both the economic and socio-political orders.”⁴⁴ But the motives behind Franco’s 1951 decision to tack tourism on to the new information ministry were less forthright than official chronicles suggest. After experimentations during the Civil War, the Caudillo was uneasy with the idea of encouraging foreign tourism in any form, and certainly not prepared to make tourism priority on par with other cabinet-level posts. His selection for the first minister of information and tourism, the ultra-Catholic integrist Gabriel Arias Salgado, had no expertise in tourism and is said to have been ashamed of the second half of his official title.⁴⁵ During his first four years as minister, Arias Salgado rarely gave tourism public mention. When he did, references were brief and unelaborated, as in a 1952 allusion to tourism as nothing more than “a contribution of revenue to the nation assessable at 2.5 billion pesetas.” In July 1953, speaking at the grand opening of the American-owned Castellana Hilton luxury hotel in Madrid, the minister glossed over the significance of tourism. He

referred only to “some two million visitors from all countries,” proceeding from there to a discourse on Spanish–American unity in the struggle against Communism.⁴⁶ Even the new ministry’s founding decree diminished the place of tourism. In four paragraphs it described the rising importance of press, theater, cinema, and radio, which “today have sufficient volume to constitute a ministerial department,” adding briefly at the bottom, “it appears advisable to also include the services which the Directorate General of Tourism [DGT], a branch of the Interior Ministry, presently provide.”⁴⁷

It indeed may have been advisable, if only for the sake of congeniality. As the main institutional history of Spanish tourism has posited, the regime added “Tourism” to what was largely a censorship and propaganda agency “as a mere appendix to soften the ministerial nomenclature”; in other words, as a benign embellishment to counterbalance the indecorous weight of a portfolio redolent of Goebbels.⁴⁸ An alternative view holds that the inclusion of tourism was a functional component of the regime’s information apparatus, constituting at bottom a prize form of international propaganda—not a counterweight to censorship, but a complement.⁴⁹ The idea of exploiting tourism as propaganda indeed had underlain the *Rutas de Guerra* and fit Martín Artajo’s project of softening the regime’s international image, although it must be emphasized that in 1951 the promotion of tourism was at most a minor propaganda exercise in comparison with the official mass communications media.

Though it is impossible to determine exactly what prompted Franco to include tourism in the new ministry’s name, it is clear that the regime had considerable incentive to give the tourism industry a more prominent public face. By 1951, international tourism was an increasingly visible social and economic fact with unclear consequences for Spain’s future. Placing tourism under the mandate of a conservative information minister like Arias Salgado may have served to rein in an activity that, spurred by opened borders, was an uncomfortably liberal force. Between 1951 and 1958 the DGT remained small and subordinate within the new ministry.⁵⁰ Bolín left the DGT to become the government’s “Press and Information Counselor” in Washington, leaving the tourism bureau to a man who shared his goals and temperament, Mariano de Urzáiz. A British diplomat in Madrid described Urzáiz as “friendly and pro-British” who favored more liberal travel and border policies.⁵¹ But Urzáiz also ingratiated his office to the mainstream of regime politics, making a *cause célèbre* of the 1954 Holy Year at Santiago de Compostela.⁵² Soon, economists associated with the ministry began to make public pronouncements about the industry’s potential. One, J. J. Forns, predicted in 1952

that "Spain, with its immense variety of countryside, climate, etc., could become the leader in world tourism." Forns envisioned a vast market for attracting European tourists who were "avid for travel, but for whom the limitations on currency assigned for such purposes does not allow travel to Switzerland, France, Germany or Italy."⁵³ Another, Juan Plaza Prieto, published a forward-looking treatise in 1954 on the potential for the tourism economy to mitigate Spain's chronic trade deficit.⁵⁴

The Franco regime's first major enquiry into tourism was not a labor of the new Ministry of Information and Tourism, but rather of the inter-ministerial General Secretariat for Economic and Social Planning (*Secretaría General para la Ordenación Económico-Social*).⁵⁵ The report set out to identify emerging patterns and to propose a comprehensive plan to address them. As with many government planning documents, this "National Tourism Plan" is more relevant as a portrait of the politics surrounding tourism in 1952 than as a real blueprint for state action. The report candidly cited Spain's low cost for foreigners as the primary tourist draw, though, more dubiously, it also gave credit to the DGT for its "extraordinarily effective publicity efforts despite limited economic means." More significantly, the Plan's genesis revealed the extent to which discussions of tourism, even at the height of the Cold War, were relinquishing their overtly propagandistic edge. In its early drafts, the report resembled Serrano Suñer's charged justifications for operating battlefield tours during the Civil War in order to expose anti-Spanish slander:

Red propaganda, . . . contrary to its intentions, has aroused the curiosity of many who wish to visit our Fatherland, anxious to see for themselves the reality . . . The reality demonstrates that these considerable contingents of tourists . . . constitute the most valuable spokesmen for hispanophile propaganda.

This passage, however, was omitted from the document's published version, which adopted a more subdued rhetoric. It proposed rather to "intelligently guide [the tourist's] steps, avoiding deceptions and inconveniences, given that . . . it is necessary not only to have tourists who visit us return, but also to have them become active propagandists for our Nation, thereby enhancing our prestige in the world."⁵⁶

Although aware of international trends in tourism, the planners confronted a set of obstacles specific to Spain. Unlike Europe's major tourism centers, Spain was an ostracized authoritarian country with scant experience in receiving European travelers and the unenviable

historical reputation of savage violence and backwardness. The Plan's authors were mindful, moreover, of their country's vulnerability to accusations of starchy traditionalism, ethnic inferiority, and antimodernism: "Spain needs to become known not only as an immense museum of the artistic treasures of our ingenious forefathers," they counseled, "but also as a modern people, open to all initiatives and receptive to all suggestions."⁵⁷ Concern to overcome foreign prejudice also inspired a 1953 proposal for the mass distribution of a *Folleto de Entrada* ("Entry Brochure") at frontier crossings, which would provide practical advice on travel in Spain, and "very discretely [attain] intellectual and conceptual influence over the tourist, who is in his own country a voter, a holder of opinions, and a propagandist. It is suggested, given the current historical circumstances, that the tourist have the impression that SPAIN IS THE COUNTRY OF PEACE."⁵⁸

Supplementary efforts were made in English-language publications produced in conjunction with official Spanish media. One example of this was Herbert Serra Williamson's *The Tourist Guide-Book of Spain* (1953), which included this curious section addressing common phenotypic preconceptions about Spaniards:

Southern Spaniards are known throughout the world for their dark complexion, but this apparently widespread conjecture is wrong, and 90 per cent in the Canary Islands and some 73 per cent in Zamora are not so brown as is generally thought. According to army statistics, the average height of the Spanish soldier is about 1.635 meters (5' 6"), and this also contradicts the general idea that the Spaniards are rather short in stature because they exceed the average height of the Frenchman, Roumanian and Georgian, although they remain below average height for northern European and Balkan people.⁵⁹

Efforts to attain any possible influence over tourists' impressions were spurred by fears that a kind of fifth column of "anti-Spanish" tour guides lurking within could infect the unsuspecting visitor. The DGT delegation in Seville, for example, reported the problem of "undesirable spontaneous 'guides' who practically assault tourists entering Seville and who, on top of being a mark against the city's prestige, also create police disturbances." Some of these unofficial docents possessed agendas bordering on the political, "providing reports and visits to [impoverished] suburbs, introducing them to beggars, and giving other material very useful for anti-Spanish propaganda."⁶⁰ State planners hoped to overwhelm such operations by presenting the country as modern, civilized,

open-minded, comfortable, unique, inexpensive, and hospitable. Tourism propaganda was therefore a necessarily holistic enterprise, comprising infrastructural modernization, meticulous regulation, and information. The remainder of this chapter examines the various components of this project.

Advertising

Advertising strategies reflected the new emphasis on building a high-volume, low-cost tourism industry centered on what were seen as “modern” tourist tastes. Appeals to attractions such as sunshine, beaches, and popular customs rapidly supplanted an older canon of more cultured themes, especially after 1952. Before 1936, tourist campaigns directed abroad had centered almost exclusively on historical and cultural monuments. Seaside resorts largely had relied on locally and privately funded publicity. A series of posters developed before 1929 formed the centerpiece of national campaigns: in these, the English word “Spain” was imposed over various images chosen, in the words of a subsequent critic, “with an erudite-artistic orientation of refined taste.”⁶¹ The DGT continued to employ such imagery after the Civil War. The continuity was personified by Rafael Calleja, who had worked as a state tourism publicist since the days of Alfonso XIII. Calleja had served the Second Republic as a DGT functionary and survived post-Civil War denunciations to become Luis Bolín’s first assistant.⁶² Though it is not known if Calleja invented the slogan “Spain is Different,” it was under his leadership as publicity director that the notion of difference became a central theme of tourism advertising. His 1943 *Apología turística de España* remarked, “Centuries of Muslim penetration left behind on the land and in the Spanish spirit highly visible traits, sufficient to distinguish this country from the rest of Europe for its essence of difference.”⁶³ A short-lived series appeared in September 1948 featuring the phrase, in English, “Spain is Beautiful and Different” together with three images—Madrid’s classically styled Plaza de Cibeles, River Tagus winding around the medieval city of Toledo, and a bucolic valley in the Pyrenean province of Huesca. These posters were not widely distributed, however, and the slogan would only resurface in 1957 in its more succinct and widely known form, “Spain is Different.”⁶⁴

After 1950, images of difference began to be tempered somewhat with allusions to Spain’s European heritage and embrace of the modern. A notable example was the introductory message to the 1950 British Railways guide to Spain, composed by the Spanish Chargé d’Affairs in

London, the Duke of Sanlúcar la Mayor. By his own admission, Sanlúcar la Mayor was naive about the business of tourism promotion, and therefore proceeded with only instinct and a certain sentimental patriotism as his guides. His message began:

You have a unique experience in store for you—because Spain is the country that is “different”; yet, at the same time, you will notice in the Spanish people characteristics which are remarkably similar to your own, as befits two very ancient peoples steeped in the same European culture. Courtesy, friendliness, dignity, pride in one’s own traditions and a great sense of personal values, allied with a lively sense of humour, are all there to be recognized.

Nevertheless, on entering Spain one has the feeling of having crossed the threshold into another world, there to be “seduced” into a new style and grace of living (which are very old ones), by a constant assault of beauty and grandeur.⁶⁵

Uncertain of his work, Sanlúcar la Mayor submitted his text to Luis Bolín for approval. Bolín received it with enthusiasm, calling it “stupendous, a model of tourism literature, a style which few command and which you have cultivated to a level which puts you at risk of becoming swamped with requests from us in the near future.”⁶⁶

Novice though it was, Sanlúcar la Mayor’s attempt anticipated the direction of Spanish tourism campaigns in the 1950s. For the next several years, advertising would highlight the Spain of the *pandereta*—literally a folk tambourine, but referring synecdochically to any and all traditional Spanish customs. A public call for proposals for a national advertising plan, issued by the Ministry of Information and Tourism in 1953, revealed a similar attitude among Spain’s tourism experts. A preponderance of entries emphasized the idea that selling difference was paramount. One entry, submitted by a ten-year DGT veteran, argued that where tourism was concerned, Spain had no alternative but to be different:

There is no doubt that the traveler comes to Spain in search of the colorful, something to contrast with his daily life. Skyscrapers or streets arranged in grid patterns are not exactly what attract the American . . . [T]he tourist wants amenities and ease of travel, comfort in hotels, good food at the restaurant, better wine, and *españoladas*: bulls, dance, Flamenco, singing, Gypsies . . . Seville, Córdoba, Granada . . . We must resign ourselves, where tourism is concerned, to being a country of *pandereta*, for the day we lose the *pandereta* we will have lost 90 percent of our attractiveness for tourism.⁶⁷

Another entry cited a Dutch promoter's observation that "Britons and Americans are more interested in windmills, dykes and scenery than in the Dutch people themselves," and observed, "A similar phenomenon seems to be occurring in Spain with folk culture, bulls, and the sun, which have come to seduce foreigners more than the Spaniards themselves."⁶⁸ Indeed, a British Workers' Travel Association announcement appeared to confirm this view, naming a "folk-dancing display by the villagers, . . . wild scenery and quaint little ports," as Majorca's chief attractions in 1949.⁶⁹

State planners considered advertising abroad the paramount priority. Sources from the United States sharpened such concerns: both the Senate Foreign Affairs committee and American Express urged countries to maximize expenditure on tourism advertising.⁷⁰ In 1953, Bolín issued a cautionary tale about underfunding promotional campaigns, citing sharp declines in tourism to Mexico after cuts in state advertising budgets there.⁷¹ Calls to intensify spending were heeded, though not to the degree the DGT perhaps hoped. In 1953 the DGT advertising budget was double the 1951 figure, though its proposals called for nearly six times more.⁷² At 23.1 million pesetas, this far exceeded the 13.8 million allotted for state credits to build or improve hotels.

The predominant media employed for advertising were posters and brochures. Regional and thematic diversity was thought to be among the strongest potential assets for tourism: In 1953, 45 percent of promotional materials drew attention to particular regions and attractions, the remainder intoning more broadly national imagery. Of the 18 regional themes employed, the most prevalent were Andalusia, the Costa del Sol, the Balearic Islands, the Costa Brava, Seville, and the Canary Islands—which together accounted for nearly three-fourths of specialized advertising in terms of budget allocations. Four of these six appealed to the "modern" tourist lure of the seaside, whereas Andalusia and its historic jewel Seville were the most culturally and visually distinctive part of Spain. These were targeted predominantly at Anglophone publics, with 72 percent of the materials produced in English. Advertisements for less lucrative interior regions and more traditional *españoladas* were distributed somewhat more equitably among the European languages, though the total quantity produced was far lower. The featured attractions included Galicia; Old Castile; Bullfighting; New Castile; Catalonia; "the North of Spain"; the Levant; Aragon and Navarre; León, Zamora, and Salamanca; Extremadura; the Fallas of Valencia; Winter Sports; and Hunting and Fishing. These were aimed proportionately toward continental Europeans, who were more likely to tour by car. (See table 3.1.)

Table 3.1 DGT production of tourism advertising literature by language and theme, 1952 (%)

<i>Spain, general</i>		<i>Beaches and Andalusia</i>		<i>Interior regions and Bullfights</i>	
English	63	English	72	English	41
Spanish	14	Spanish	12	Spanish	24
French	11	French	12	French	24
German	6	German	2	German	18
Swedish	6	Swedish	<1	Swedish	15

Source: AGA 3: 49.02/14416–14417.

In newsprint campaigns the DGT presented the British traveling public a picture emphasizing the *pandereta* images of “beaches and bull-fights,” “crumbling red castles,” “Flamenco singers, the ‘ting-tong-tang’ of the guitar,” all, of course, at “less than £1 a day.” Campaigns in America were qualitatively similar. Readers of *The New Yorker* were invited to enjoy Spain’s “every modern convenience and comfort” in a country of “time-mellowed charm and romance. You can stay at unsurpassed luxury hotels or charming wayside inns at a cost unbelievably low.”⁷³ Advertisements in travel industry journals evoked similar themes, if somewhat more candidly: “Beautiful profit potential for you! . . . Vividly beautiful, vitally different, inexpensive and unspoiled Spain has captured the spotlight of smart travel interest today.”⁷⁴ The formula juxtaposing old world charm with modern accessibility, incidentally, was applied in similar fashion to Greece.⁷⁵

The marketing formula coalescing around low cost and exoticism appeared to coincide with sharp increases in tourist arrivals. Between 1951 and 1953, the number of Britons and Americans to stay overnight in Spain increased by 73 percent.⁷⁶ More impressive was the apparent success of this formula in drawing American tourists from competing countries in Europe: the proportion of European-bound Americans to stay overnight in Spain jumped from 12 percent in 1951 to 16 percent in 1953 and fully one-fifth by 1956.⁷⁷ Yet advertising was at best only one of several factors luring British and American tourists to Spain. Interest in Spain among British tourists made its quantum leap before the 1952 redoubling of DGT advertising efforts. During the spring of 1951 the British press reported that Spain was among the favorite countries for continental tourism, second, according to the London daily *Star*, only to France. A Thomas Cook spokesman claimed that reservations to Spain had increased ten-fold from 1950 to 1951, following Anglo-Spanish agreements granting the British full access at a generous exchange rate.⁷⁸ The *Journal of*

Commerce of New York attributed the American tourist's growing interest in Spain to the dollar's strength there, the elimination of visa requirements, and the fact that "many tourists who visited France and Italy during the past few years are now looking for new travel destinations."⁷⁹

The impact of DGT advertising was therefore unclear, and a few industry observers in Spain ventured that improving the tourist experience was a sounder priority than raising the quantity of pamphlets and posters shipped abroad. One top submission to the national call for proposals dismissed poster campaigns highlighting monuments, folk culture, and art as a "waste of money, . . . inadequate for the majority of tourists who visit us thinking only of eating and passing down streets and highways and all at economical prices." Recent increases in foreign tourism were the result of "the low exchange rate of our currency, the counterpropaganda of our enemies, word of mouth from those who have visited us, and, in last place, the official publicity."⁸⁰ Rather than better advertising, this contributor reasoned that the best antidote to "counter-propaganda" was to improve the quality of tourist services. The young Luis Fernández Fuster, who was later to author several standard textbooks on tourism studies, maintained that Spaniards themselves must be pulled aboard the campaign to attract foreign tourists:

We must see to it that every Spaniard accepts tourism not as a passing fad but as an enduring and extremely valuable source of collective income. All acts to exploit the tourist, all abuses of price controls, . . . all discourtesy, are strikes against Tourism, and need to be punished just like any other offense of hoarding or sabotage . . . The way to avoid this is by educating the people to form a *touristic consciousness*. This education, as with civic education, should regulate the attitude of all Spaniards toward visiting foreigners. They must be made to understand that it is one thing to *exploit tourism*, and something very different to *exploit the tourist*, and that the latter winds up killing the hen that lays the golden eggs.⁸¹

Such statements recognized the dispersion and variegation of modern tourism. As a consequence, *what* was to be seen and enjoyed, no matter how sublime, was less the government's concern than *how* travel was to be experienced—inexpensively and in fulsome comfort. Bureaucratic control of the product was impossible without the host population's help in ensuring this.

Tourism Infrastructure

Transportation and hospitality formed the main loci of attention for tourism planners and investors. That the former was an issue of public

works, and the latter a preeminently private-sector affair, did not affect the considerations of the 1952 planning report, which made wildly fantastic calls for state-financed improvements in both. The document's prescriptions tended throughout to substitute selective precision for general accuracy. Its overall tenor suggested again that the Plan's intent was to reinforce the false impression that government planning was the vanguard force stimulating and guiding the process of tourism development. Regarding hospitality, emphasis lay in middle-range hotels, where, as in other matters, aspiration far outpaced achievement. Planners calculated that state credit would provide 74 percent of the financing for new hotel construction, yet private investment exceeded state financing on the order of a 10:1 margin between 1953 and 1957.⁸²

Patterns in private investment gradually began to respond to the pressures of the international travel industry. From 1951 to 1955, total hotel capacity in Spain increased by 34 percent, during which time tourist entries doubled. By category, the two extremes of luxury hotels and third-class pensions grew most rapidly, by 77 percent and 80 percent respectively, indicating the Spanish hotel industry's continuing failure to offer much middle ground between luxury and squalor.⁸³ A distinct pattern emerged, however, in the Mediterranean areas drawing the greatest new investment. In the four provinces where hotel construction was most intense from 1951 to 1955—Gerona and Barcelona (along the Costa Brava), the Balearic Islands (principally Majorca), and Granada (an emerging cultural and mountain tourist center in Andalusia, though significantly smaller than the other two)—construction was most intense among the middle-range hotels. Of the 74 hotels added in these areas between 1953 and 1955, all but seven were classified as “1B,” “2,” or “3” (between 1 and 3 stars).⁸⁴ These regions were the first in Spain to adjust to the high-volume tourism of moderate budget and creature comfort to predominate in postwar Europe.

Roadway modernization was the regime's overall transportation priority in the 1950s, conforming to an international trend favoring highway transport and putting the national rail services that had enjoyed more attention during the 1940s on the defensive.⁸⁵ The Ministry of Public Works presented a highly publicized plan in 1950 proposing the construction or improvement of over 11,000 km. of roads, mostly major existing routes, and supplementing the traditional radial system emanating from Madrid with a network of peripheral coastal highways.⁸⁶ Tourism interests appeared to confirm the wisdom of this approach to transportation policy. Between 1951 and 1956, about half of all foreigners entered Spain by road. As annual tourist entries to Spain by road more

than doubled from 1951 to 1956 to 1.3 million (about half the total), the number of those entering by train stagnated in absolute terms at roughly 250,000 per year.⁸⁷

Beyond the general highway plan, tourism planners sought an additional 5,979 km. of roads designated "of tourist interest" to create better access to scenic regions, castles, and towns of historic, cultural, or religious importance. The Ministry of Public Works, with whom such decisions rested, flatly opposed the principle of prioritizing specialized tourist itineraries. Severe budget constraints had prevented the completion of any single major project by 1953; minor tourist routes simply were out of the question.⁸⁸ Public works authorities correctly recognized that assigning special funds for tourist routes was an intrinsically political exercise, inviting local jockeying for state patronage. As the minister of public works put it, "It . . . is irresponsible to speak of capricious stretches of road arbitrarily designated for political purposes . . . Traffic volume does not justify increased investment in many of these cases."⁸⁹ Competition among municipalities for state attention revealed the paradoxes inherent to planning for mass tourism before tourists had arrived in large numbers to determine their own preferences. If generally it was agreed that road improvement was necessary to stimulate tourism, there existed neither objective criteria nor a market-driven mechanism for determining which routes might contribute touristic value. Local authorities from small villages nevertheless inundated the DGT with pleas for assistance in obtaining state funds. Leaders of the eastern Pyrenean village of Nuria made a typically hyperbolic appeal to international prestige and national heritage, but were unsuccessful in their bid to convince national authorities to extend a road to their village:

Nuria is the admiration and enchantment of all who visit it: In skiing, professors from Germany, Austria, and Switzerland have declared that the trails of Mount Puigmal are the best in Europe; and during the summer tourists and the devout are frequently surprised to find Nuria's landscape, lushness, and healthy climate to be a retreat the likes of which is not even found in Switzerland. The sanctuary at Our Lady of Nuria, being a center of tourism and sports, combines a venerated history, a millenarian style of eleventh-century Romanesque, and a rooted devotion in Spain and abroad. But the [transportation authorities] have decided to oppose this tourism, sport, and devotion. Unfortunately, they have succeeded. The tourist, above all the foreigner, does not come to Nuria, for to get here he must leave his car, and the wealthy are not capable of such a sacrifice.⁹⁰

The question of doling nonexistent funds was an academic exercise, but it foreshadowed how state intervention in tourism, as in other broad national goals, would come to spawn considerable interregional and interministerial competition.

As for the trains, long a major source of tourist anxiety and criticism in Spain, the government largely ignored them. French travelers discovered a marked disparity in the quality and comfort of rail service once transferred aboard Spanish trains at the Pyrenean frontier. A Spanish diplomat in southern France found it "difficult to justify this deficiency in our rail services . . . thirteen years after the Liberation," especially to foreign tourists, "given the intense publicity campaign inviting them to visit Spain."⁹¹ As traffic multiplied in the summer months, passengers found ticket windows operating on limited summer hours. As a result, express tickets to major Spanish cities were difficult to obtain and "frequent cases of clandestine and abusive reselling of tickets" reported.⁹² Cash to improve and expand rail service was unavailable. The reason, simply stated, was that revenue generated from tourists entering by train was to be redirected toward investment in roads.

Government planners became much more effective at articulating the political aspect of the project, detailing the relationship between improving the tourism infrastructure on the one hand and broader goals of obtaining revenue and fostering international goodwill. As in the 1920s, state tourism planners envisioned roadway modernization as a foundational element of both national prestige and economic development. A 1955 survey found that 90 percent of foreign motorists criticized the condition and navigability of Spanish roads. Arias Salgado, the minister more concerned with his information duties than with tourism, nevertheless acknowledged a need to reverse this attitude to ensure "that everyone who visits us serves as a good propagandist."⁹³ Frontier crossings and customs installations received particular attention "because it is certain that the initial impression that a country produces upon crossing its border can favorably or adversely predispose anyone crossing for the first time, and also that the last feeling the country leaves upon exiting can weigh decisively on the traveler's spirit."⁹⁴ Even the minister of public works, who opposed the privileging of tourism interests, advocated "tak[ing] special care of highways providing entry points to Spain." The motorist faced numerous other problems in Spain as well, ranging from poor road signage to the prevalence of low-grade fuel at Spanish service stations. The tourist industry could not compensate for these problems, in the words of the Royal Automobile Club director, "even with the customary Spanish amiability."⁹⁵

Effective hospitality indeed meant more than amiability. A major problem was the simple question of adequate hotel space, addressed with alarm in the 1952 report:

It is useless to attempt to bring 2 million tourists per year to Spain if we do not have the necessary facilities to house them. What is more, upon their arrival to our Nation, it would produce the catastrophic effect of a strongly unpleasant impression, as they would feel deceived by our official propaganda.⁹⁶

A subsequent report emphasized the qualitative aspect of the hotel's importance in the overall national propaganda efforts:

In tourism, contact and acquaintance among men of different countries, languages and even religions is established primarily through the Hotel . . . The establishment's cleanliness, comfort, and good taste will . . . shape [the tourist's] concept of the level of culture, civilization and prosperity of the country receiving him.⁹⁷

Ensuring these qualities proved a difficult challenge for regulators. Inspections became increasingly rigorous in principle, especially after rule changes in 1956 made private tourist lodgings subject to the inspection regime hitherto applied only to state-owned establishments. But the DGT in Madrid lacked the bureaucratic machinery to monitor effectively an industry the main centers of which lay on the Iberian periphery. Enforcement was therefore sporadic, and occasional severity tended to compensate for the lack of routine surveillance.⁹⁸ Although hundreds of hotels operated with substandard plumbing for years with impunity, one unlucky proprietor was fined 6,000 pesetas (\$143) for misinforming a North Carolina couple about a ferry departure time.⁹⁹ Provincial inspectors, though servants of the state bureaucracy, were often tied more closely to local interests than to Madrid. The extent to which they allowed their inspections to succumb to bias or corruption is unclear, but the great demands on their time in rapidly developing regions meant that many hotels operated openly without official inspection.¹⁰⁰ Authorities urged tourists to lodge complaints directly with the DGT, hoping to use clients as auxiliaries to the overextended inspection services.¹⁰¹ Often—and particularly in the emerging resort zones of Catalonia and Majorca—compliance with industry standards hinged more on the personal commitment of individual hoteliers and the incentive of obtaining better contracts with foreign travel agencies, who often became the *de facto* inspectors.

Keeping hotel prices down posed the other chief regulatory challenge. The Spanish authorities perceived this as a major factor in ensuring the satisfaction of the tourists, who liked “to know beforehand the cost of their lodging, not only to formulate a budget, but also to not have to go around suspicious that he is the object of abuse or fraud by locals.”¹⁰² Foreign interests maintained pressure as well; an American Express director in Madrid warned the DGT of “a general feeling around Europe that prices in Spain are going up,” and that “such increases in rates make a very bad impression on the traveling public.”¹⁰³

The DGT could not, however, ignore the interests of the Spanish hotelier, who formed the backbone of this emerging sector. In 1955, hotel rates legislated in 1948 remained in effect even though the overall price index had risen by 83 percent over the same period.¹⁰⁴ This left the hotelier, “in order to survive, to defend himself against the price freezes,” obligated illegally to add surcharges or omit services expected of hotels of his category.¹⁰⁵ Authorities were well aware of hotels’ illegal pricing, which was often practiced in their plain view. A Spanish diplomat in Sète, France, received complaints in 1952 that a large Barcelona luxury hotel advertised rooms “starting at 150 pesetas,” a figure 50 percent in excess of the legal maximum. He alluded to “the enormous problems that the rapacity and greed of these and other Spanish hoteliers can cause our economy,” and warned that price-gouging

could even neutralize the great efforts and sacrifices the Spanish government has made to promote better familiarity with Spain abroad . . . [and] to ensure that foreign visitors are the best propagandists for our country.¹⁰⁶

“Naturally,” the same diplomat later wrote, “these tidbits are employed to great effect by our enemies, who now count not only on our ideological adversaries but also on the [French] hospitality industry that has been watching nervously as the currents of tourists that until now have brought great profits have been diverted toward Spain.”¹⁰⁷ Regulators additionally worried that advertising official prices equaling one-third those of France and Italy would lead the would-be tourist “either to believe that he is exploiting us or to assume that the services must be very poor if they can be offered at such prices.”¹⁰⁸

The dishonest appearance of hotel pricing began to seem more prejudicial to the industry’s prestige than simply allowing some rate hikes. A 1957 law authorized hotel rate increases, and marked a significant shift in the responsibility for setting and enforcing rates from the Hotel Syndicate to the Ministry of Information and Tourism—that is, from the

state trade union, representing national-corporatist ideals, to the civil bureaucracy.¹⁰⁹ Legal hotel prices in Spain were permitted to double from 1955 levels; in France and Italy, average prices in the same period had increased by much less (roughly 50 percent at upper-range hotels but as little as 25 percent in more modest establishments).¹¹⁰ The ministry's decision to raise hotel prices signaled a maturing understanding of the role of regulation in promoting tourism. Earlier planning had promised undeliverable state construction credits while leaving the rigid price regime established in 1939 in place. Given the scarcity of state hotel credit, abuse of pricing laws became a self-fulfilling prophecy: hotel owners often had to break the law to repay their private creditors. Policy had been designed to attract foreign tourists at any cost, but not to encourage the industry itself to prosper.¹¹¹ The relationship among foreign currency, industrial regulation, and good propaganda in fact was more complex than national-corporatism recognized, and all three were mutually reinforcing. As the private sector of the tourism industry grew, hotels were increasingly less reliable and more necessary as servants of state policy. Though it continued fairly rigorous hotel price regulation after 1957, the regime was forced to give greater latitude to an industry of predominantly small and medium firms best positioned to provide the kind of consumer diplomacy upon which the entire enterprise depended.

Public Morality and Seaside Development

The main tourist draw was the beach, and thousands of miles of unspoiled coastline were becoming arguably Spain's most valuable natural resource. The DGT customarily highlighted the country's diversity as its main attraction, promoting tourist activities ranging from fishing to visiting monasteries, but by 1952 coastal resorts were receiving far the greatest share of attention from investors and the government. Authorities designated two main stretches of coastline in particular as priorities. The Costa Brava, spanning from Barcelona north to the French frontier, was poised to become the "natural prolongation of the Côte d'Azur," favorably located to catch spillover from the rapidly overcrowding French Riviera. The other designated region, Andalusia's Costa del Sol, though locals had struggled for half a century to attract nearby international enclaves at Gibraltar and Tangier, remained a tourist backwater. Much in the way Italian authorities of the era were envisioning tourism in their Mezzogiorno, Spanish planners hoped to exploit the "striking contrast of sharp mountains to one side and near tropical plains to the other, and the

human quaintness” of nearby historical-cultural monuments at Seville, Granada, and Córdoba. Unfortunately, most hotels, even in the regional capital of Málaga, were deemed “not to be adequate, due to their modesty, to receive tourists of any caliber.”¹¹² Both these *costas* had emerged as resorts in the early part of the century, mainly for the domestic market, but neither previously had rivaled the large concentrations of San Sebastián and the northern Atlantic coast. Already by 1952, however, postwar package tourism had begun to gravitate decisively to the Mediterranean, a tendency the Spanish, like British tour companies, stood ready to exploit. Several factors accounted for this development, chief among them being climate. As sun tanning became a primary focus of European beach holidays, San Sebastián, one of Europe’s rainiest cities, lost much of its appeal. The modest British package tourists for whom the new costas were being developed harbored no class anxieties about the Basque resorts’ posh history, but they did respond to the prospect of guaranteed sunshine during their annual two-week vacation. The Basque coast remained an important destination for many French trippers, as well as prosperous Spaniards, though the mass tourism of the mid-twentieth century did little to erode its *belle-époque* identity as a bourgeois resort.

Emphasizing Mediterranean seaside tourism was the pragmatic course for tourism development, but also the one most likely to create political problems. This “modern” form of leisure was penetrating Spain to an extent some of the regime’s ideologues found uncomfortable. A 1956 study, though its methods were left unclear, found that on average 52 percent of foreign travelers were concentrated in coastal areas whereas the cultural centers of Madrid, Barcelona, Seville, Córdoba, and Granada together accounted for only 28 percent.¹¹³ Increasingly popular beaches prompted debates over the limits of moral tolerance, especially in remote littorals unattuned to European fashions. Few Spaniards went as far as a legendary order of Ibiza nuns who enjoyed the seaside airs under seven layers of clothing, but foreigners’ extreme laxity nevertheless challenged the reigning visions of national virtue.

To Spanish audiences, the government initially claimed a steadfast commitment to moral autarky. Legislation required bathers “to duly cover the chest and back, and also that women wear skirts and men wear athletic pants,” and religious authorities close to the regime advocated separation of the sexes at the beach.¹¹⁴ The Directorate General of Security asserted in June 1953,

With the summer season approaching, it is appropriate to adopt measures to prevent and definitively impede any unhygienic bathing practices that

could threaten public decorum or attack the moral traditions of this country . . . The policing of good customs . . . depends on the most exact enforcement, without lapses, of the relevant laws.¹¹⁵

The Spanish press dutifully published the announcement, with one Catholic daily even adding the hopeful prediction that “in many cases these [European] countries . . . are experiencing a backlash against the daring practices of previous years.”¹¹⁶

Other observers, however, were unconvinced that foreign tourism ever could be reconciled to the austere dress codes of traditional Spain. J. J. Forns, a leading government expert on the tourist economy, opined in 1952 that a “fundamental problem is that people come to Spain to enjoy its sunny beaches, but [the authorities] demand they do it in a full robe (*‘albornoz’*).”¹¹⁷ The Catholic daily *¡Ya!* reported that the regime’s declarations confirmed for many foreigners that “Spain is the quintessential backward country, quaint and absurd, where even sun and sea-bathing become a moral problem.”¹¹⁸ The paper later cited a Manchester *Guardian* commentary entitled “How Spain Is Losing Tourists,” in which the question was posed, “Do they expect us to bathe in swimming costumes from 1900?”¹¹⁹

A certain level of permissiveness it appeared would benefit not only the industry, but the larger project of extending Spain’s good name in Europe as well. The travel industry and the Spanish authorities each moved to squelch impressions that tourists’ freedom was in any way curtailed. In London, the Spanish ambassador reported receiving “continual telephone calls and letters from tourists considering a trip to Spain . . . asking about the regulations on bathing suits.” The answer given to British inquirers was considerably softer than the regime’s domestic rhetoric implied. Spain’s London tourist office clarified in statement to the British press, “As many English tourists can personally attest, [the laws] refer more to those tourists who attempt to circulate on city streets in unseemly dress.”¹²⁰ One major British travel agent, responding to the widespread concern that “there would be no fun in the kind of bathing the [Spanish government] permits,” assured clients that “in most of the small seaside places, such as on the Costa Brava, one almost never sees a policeman. Possibly all that might happen would be a warning that a costume was unsuitable. Of course, to wear it after a warning might lead to trouble.”¹²¹ For those concerned with dress codes, one travel guide noted an important advantage of the newly developing Mediterranean beaches over the older resorts of the north Atlantic coast: “Beach authorities on the northern coasts are more severe than those of Catalonia and Andalusia.”¹²²

The Franco regime's reputation for moral austerity has led to the assumption that zoning laws were imposed to minimize contact between tourists and Spaniards.¹²³ Yet there is no evidence to suggest that the zoning laws, first proposed in 1955, were part of an agenda to limit interaction between tourists and Spaniards. The legislation was conceived, rather, to encourage the creation of a few concentrated resorts where infrastructural requirements would be satisfied more easily and internationally competitive standards of quality ensured. Even in private meetings, advocates of national tourism planning do not appear to have argued that the large resort zones they proposed would solve the problem of moral policing. Drafts of a "Law of Touristic Centers and Zones" suggested fiscal incentives and low-interest credits to encourage the concentration of tourism investment geographically. Arias Salgado defended the bill to Franco's cabinet on July 26, 1957, on pragmatic rather than moral grounds: to "stimulate tourism development in determined areas of the national territory, avoiding the dispersion of our efforts and activities and promoting individual initiatives."¹²⁴ The law failed to pass because of the technical ambiguities over ministerial jurisdictions, and did not gain the support among conservative ministers who might have considered it an effective mechanism for moral policing.

The government did virtually nothing to discourage the free and relatively liberal development of beaches for foreign tourism, nor did it conspire to hide this from ordinary Spaniards. Apprehensions about the effects of tourism on national morality instead were mollified with evidence that the Ministry of Information and Tourism was developing more refined attractions as well, notably the medieval pilgrimage to the supposed remains of Saint James the Apostle at Santiago de Compostela, and maintaining Paradors near cultural pearls such as the Alhambra. The INI became the major financier of the Hostal de los Reyes Católicos, a luxury Parador in Compostela's main square opened during the Saint James Holy Year of 1954. ATESA, an INI-financed company, continued to expand its operation of national cultural-historical itineraries, boasting forty-one buses by 1955 compared with nine in 1948, and entered the auto-rental business as well.¹²⁵ As beach development continued to be an affair of private initiative, the Ministry of Information and Tourism demonstrated the state's concern to maintain the more orthodox aspects of the national tourism offering.

The Ministry of Information and Tourism was, in this sense, discovering purpose in the second half of its name. The government information apparatus possessed the power to lend respectability to a potentially vulgar industry. This realization was reflected in the public pronouncements of

Gabriel Arias Salgado. Tourism, which until 1955 received only sparing references, became a featured part of the minister's repertoire of political themes after 1956. On the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Nationalist insurrection that sparked the Spanish Civil War, Arias Salgado told the daily *ABC*,

In addition to tourism having reached an annual volume totaling nearly 4 billion pesetas in various currencies, it can be said that the campaign of malice and falsehoods against our Fatherland . . . has been suffering death blows due to the foreigners who freely have circulated across our lands and have seen with their eyes our truths. This is why tourism figures on the front lines among information media in this century.¹²⁶

Large industrial projects remained at the center of the regime's modernization projects. But a traditionalist stalwart like Arias Salgado no longer hesitated to call public attention to the rewards to be gained from work in promoting tourism, which already by 1953 was Spain's largest commercial source of foreign currency after agricultural exports.¹²⁷

CHAPTER 4

Breakthrough, 1957–1962

The breakthrough came between 1957 and 1962, when foreign tourism to Spain not only expanded most rapidly in quantitative and economic terms, but began to make an imprint on the national consciousness as well. This coincided with a phase of economic policy liberalization brought on by an acute inflationary crisis in 1956 and pressure after 1958 to establish closer ties with the European Common Market. The regime did not hesitate to exploit the tourism economy to finance inflation and balance its foreign accounts—indeed, by the late 1950s, the tourism economy had emerged as Spain's most valuable collateral for mortgaging sudden and drastic reforms. Like warmed relations with the United States and ingress to the United Nations in 1955, tourism revenue helped to ease the regime's cardinal preoccupation over its own survival, opening the way for greater policy experimentation.¹

The centerpiece of economic reform was the so-called Stabilization Plan of June 1959, which devalued the peseta and pegged it to the dollar at a rate 29 percent below its previous official value. A long-standing overvaluation of the peseta had created a high trade barrier and was symbolic of the dictatorship's autarkist pride.² Although purely autarkic policies had withered on the vine over the course of the 1950s, industrial self-sufficiency remained the regime's nominal economic priority, in part to address lingering security concerns and in part to reward large Spanish investors with close ties to the government.³ But as the state of Spain's foreign currency reserves rapidly weakened in 1956, plummeting by one-third in that year alone, such monetary indiscipline was proving unsustainable.⁴ The Stabilization Plan marked the decisive step in Spain's economic reorientation, destroying residual myths of self-sufficiency.

Because it strengthened the purchasing power of holders of foreign currency, the Stabilization Plan made Spain an even more attractive

destination for tourists and provided an immense benefit to the tourism industry. Receipts increased 15 percent in 1959 and 57 percent in 1960.⁵ Data such as these have led some to conclude that the reforms of 1959 were the chief catalysts of the subsequent tourism explosion of the 1960s. As a major general history of the period has observed, "The devaluation in a spectacular way favored tourism, from that point a key factor in the economic transformation of the country."⁶ General public awareness of the importance of tourism in the balance of payments indeed increased after June 1959, largely because official news sources began emphasizing increases in tourism in order to bolster support for austerity.⁷ Yet tourism in fact had been a key factor in the Spanish economy for nearly a decade by 1959, albeit a poorly managed one below the radar screen of most ordinary observers.

A closer examination of the politics and economics of stabilization reveal that the growth of the tourism industry was among the causes of the economic reorientation rather than a secondary effect. A general recognition of tourism as a sizable "invisible export" already had crystallized by 1954, and now the government faced greater pressure to exploit it as efficiently as possible. Yet although it was an increasingly vital source of foreign currency, its full potential was constrained. The regime's insistence on maintaining an overvalued currency bred an underground market for Spanish pesetas to which foreign travel agents and tourists increasingly had ready access.

After 1957, a new government dominated by authoritarian Catholic self-styled technocrats began to view tourism with the singular objective of generating foreign currency in the short term, deemphasizing the notion that the industry also functioned as a form of national propaganda or quasi-diplomatic engagement. Policy makers considered tourism as a short-term—and nearly unmentionable—stabilizing agent to support more conventional industrial growth. The new minister of commerce, Alberto Ullastres, was emblematic of this mentality. Ullastres made few public references to tourism, preferring to emphasize the need for balanced development of commerce and industry. He told a trade convention in Murcia in 1958, "Some . . . [invisible] profits, such as those from tourism, are too inconstant for us to trust for the stability of the Spanish balance and economy."⁸ Arias Salgado's Ministry of Information and Tourism was the sole government advocate of state intervention to ensure the sustainability of Spanish tourism industry, but offered only uncreative solutions and by this time commanded scant respect within Franco's cabinet. As a result, during the five-year phase of economic liberalization initiated in 1957, the regime's urgent pursuit of

foreign currency overshadowed attempts to develop tourism as a long-term national asset.

Tourism and Economic Stabilization, 1957–1959

Although some kind of general monetary devaluation would likely have been necessary regardless, the tourism economy was largely responsible for its timing and political feasibility. By 1957 the regime's policy of offering a preferential tourist exchange rate of 42 pesetas per dollar was failing to produce the intended effect. Even though tourist rates were more favorable than rates for most exports, they still could not compete with the black market. Several OEEC countries had faced similar problems directly after the war, but by 1950, illegal currency markets elsewhere had been eradicated by the kind of liberal exchange mechanism the Franco regime had refused to adopt. Although the extent of the black market is difficult to quantify, rhythms of tourism development suggest a correlation between the growth of foreign travel to Spain and the prevalence of black-market currency. Official figures suggested a paradoxical state of affairs in 1957 and 1958: even as the numbers of foreign tourists steadily increased, national income from tourism stagnated and declined (see table 4.1). The erratic pattern of revenue per tourist indicates the extent to which commercial transactions took place outside official channels.

The apparent discrepancy in the years leading up to 1959 was of course misleading. According to an OEEC estimate, Spain's 1957 tourism revenues were approximately \$213 million, nearly triple the amount that landed in official reserves.⁹ Even official tourism income alone matched the revenue from mining, one of Spain's most lucrative raw export sectors. Had all foreign tourist transactions been carried out through legal channels, it likely would have surpassed agriculture as Spain's most important source of foreign currency by 1957 if not earlier.¹⁰

Spain had gone some distance toward offering market rates to British and American tourists, but even with these measures in place official rates remained a step behind those obtainable through illicit channels.¹¹ Over the course of the 1950s, British and other foreign tour operators became expert at avoiding not only Spanish travel agency commission fees, but official exchange rates as well. As routinization and *de facto* security relaxations streamlined tourist entry, individuals had little difficulty bringing in pesetas purchased illegally elsewhere.¹² None of this was lost on the authorities: the British ambassador to Madrid noted in 1958, "To an increasing extent, peseta notes are being purchased at

Table 4.1 Foreign tourist entries compared to national tourism revenue, 1949–1962

<i>Year</i>	<i>Foreign tourists</i>	<i>Official tourism revenue (\$ million)</i>	<i>Official revenue per tourist (\$)</i>
1949	283,890	16.2	57
1950	456,968	20.6	45
1951	676,255	29.6	44
1952	776,820	40.9	53
1953	909,344	94.2	121
1954	993,100	90.0	91
1955	1,383,359	96.7	70
1956	1,560,856	94.8	61
1957	2,018,687	76.9	38
1958	2,452,543	71.6	29
1959	2,863,367	159	56
1960	4,332,363	297	69
1961	5,495,870	385	70
1962	6,390,369	513	80

Sources: Carlos Barciela et al., *La España de Franco (1939–1975): Economía* (Madrid: Síntesis, 2001), 199; Luis Fernández Fuster, *Historia general del turismo de masas* (Madrid: Alianza, 1991), 830; Ángel Viñas et al., *Política exterior en España (1931–1975)*, Vol. 2 (Madrid: Banco Exterior de España, 1979), 689, 912.

unofficial rates outside Spain.”¹³ In 1960, Spain’s leading tourism industry journal accused British travel agents of “procur[ing] our currency on the black market.”¹⁴

Although all tourist expenditures, regardless of how the Spanish currency was obtained, increased the amount of money in circulation in Spain, black-market pesetas did not feed official reserves with the foreign currency needed to purchase goods from abroad and to enhance Spain’s credit-worthiness in international money markets. In this sense, while hotels and other tourist services gladly accepted any form of payment, injecting more pesetas into the economy without correspondingly increasing national purchasing power abroad carried the adverse effect of fueling inflation. Between 1953 and 1957, hotel rates rose by 20 percent, the annual number of foreign tourists more than doubled, yet in absolute terms tourism revenue actually declined. Countries that had begun allowing their citizens to travel to Spain in the late 1940s in order to expand trade were therefore increasingly reluctant to send tourists whose expenditures would not contribute to Spain’s ability to purchase their products. Pressure from Spain’s main commercial partners to

correct this situation pointed increasingly toward the decisive devaluation of June 1959.

American and European Pressures

Although it included some direct aid, American policy toward Spain centered on encouraging monetary liberalization and specialization within the international marketplace.¹⁵ Beginning in 1952, Spanish participation in the American-backed World Commerce Corporation facilitated dollar–peseta exchanges at free-market rates for certain kinds of commercial transactions, including travel.¹⁶ The account proved a lifeline for dollars, feeding Spanish currency reserves with \$253 million from 1953 to 1956.¹⁷ Over this period, 739,000 American travelers entered Spain; assuming expenditure per head of \$200, this amounted to \$147.8 million, or about 60 percent of the total obtained through the special account.¹⁸ The Franco regime's experiment with the Americans provided early evidence that free-market exchange rates served to maximize the amount of tourism revenue landing in official reserves.

In the broader context of American policy toward Spain, the significance of tourism becomes clearer. Repeated American refusals to grant significant nonmilitary aid sent the firm message that Spain would need to take full advantage of earned (nonaid) foreign revenue. In 1958, a U.S. State Department official considered Spain “dangerously dependent” on the limited American aid it already was receiving.¹⁹ It was clear that the regime's currency supports had reached a breaking point, and closer integration into the international economy now would require submitting the peseta to market rates. As a Spanish trade representative observed, “Substantial funds from tourist revenue have been lost through unofficial channels,” neutralizing an “item . . . of sizable importance [that] would help Spain to regain international creditworthiness in the money markets.”²⁰

With little direct aid forthcoming, Spanish commercial accounts increasingly would depend on the health of its most competitive exports—tourism, agriculture, and mining. From 1958 on, all three of these faced increasing pressure from the newly established European Common Market, encompassing West Germany, France, Italy, and the Benelux. Under this arrangement, France, Italy, and Algeria (which for the time being remained within the franc zone) gained a strong competitive advantage for Mediterranean products such as wine, cork, olives, and, the most lucrative, resort tourism, as Spain remained on the other side of tariff walls. Juan Sardá, a chief adviser to the Bank of Spain on

monetary policy, cautioned his government not to fall too far out of step with Western Europe's incipient economic integration. Sardá recommended implementing "an exchange rate capable of attracting the maximum revenue from abroad, capable of stimulating exports and attracting 'invisible' revenues (immigrant remittances, tourism, etcetera)." ²¹

Amid these changing circumstances, the underground peseta problem persisted and grew worse as it spread to the rapidly expanding West German tourist market. Revenue from West German tourists officially had passed from 11.2 million marks in 1953 to 47.1 million marks in 1957—but accounting for black-market exchanges, a more accurate figure may have approached twice that amount.²² According to Spanish consular officials, one Deutschmark fetched 11.50 pesetas in West Germany, a 20 percent in excess of the legal rate of 9.26.²³ The informality and confusion were revealed when Spanish border guards occasionally fined West German motor coaches for failure to show proof of authorization, a legal requirement for all West German tour groups that was complicated to obtain and rarely bothered with. The Spanish commercial counselor in Bonn did not even know whether participants in prepaid tours were legally permitted to carry additional pesetas purchased in Germany, though this practice was widespread.²⁴

West German and Spanish tourism interests favored the adoption of a protocol to end the informal situation detrimental to the industry at both ends.²⁵ The issue was subsumed within the larger framework of Spanish–West German commercial relations, which became strained early in 1957 when high inflation hampered Spain's ability to pay for West German imports. Both parties were aware that tourism could have done much to neutralize the deficit had all the revenue reached Spanish reserves, yet West German negotiators did not wish to broach this issue.²⁶ The British experience demonstrated that the existence of a formal tourism trade accord did nothing to prevent black-market currency exchange. The West Germans wished to prevent more tourist marks from reaching Spain until this money demonstrably was acting to offset the bilateral trade imbalance. A solution therefore would be difficult without first reducing the peseta's exchange value to levels more in line with international currency markets. Only after the devaluation did the West Germans reverse their attitude toward including tourism in bilateral trade agreements: in 1960 negotiators pushed the idea of an agreement by which additional increases in tourism to Spain could be traded for consumer goods such as German beer.²⁷

Additional pressure to rationalize monetary exchange came from France, Spain's largest source of tourism revenue and a major competitor

for the Mediterranean holiday market. France devalued its currency by 17 percent in 1958 and undid remaining restrictions on international currency exchange in accordance with OEEC mandates. The French devaluation, observed Sardá, “constitutes a danger for our tourism income as it improves the French competitive capacity in this area.”²⁸ Prices on the Côte d’Azur would now become more competitive relative to the Costa Brava, which already suffered disadvantages of distance, uneven quality, and complicated border procedures. In May 1959, France further dismantled its monetary protections by raising the annual foreign travel allowance for its own citizens from 50,000 francs to 150,000 francs, a considerable increase even taking into account the previous year’s devaluation. As the temperate southern neighbor, Spain was positioned to become the largest beneficiary of this measure. But the French also made clear that the policy only would be applied to Spain once the Spaniards offered a conversion rate for French tourists similar to the one enjoyed by the Americans.²⁹

Great Britain also exploited Spain’s growing dependence on tourism revenue as leverage in overall bilateral commerce. In 1957, the British intensified demands for tourist exchange rates equal to those available to Americans. British trade negotiators warned that the “the exclusion of the sterling . . . from this privilege was discriminatory and the large sterling earnings accruing to Spain from British tourists might decline if these were not given as good a rate as the U. S. tourist to offset the rising cost of holidaying in Spain.”³⁰ The British, like the Spanish, were acutely aware that low prices sustained Spain’s tourist industry. A Bank of England envoy noted that touring Spain was “not a pastime to be recommended for the queasy,” adding, “If all these delights are going to turn out to be expensive, it is possible that Spanish tourism may suffer. Spanish official circles are beginning to get worried about this.”³¹

In the event, British tourists often received the American rates because travel agents commonly routed their payments to Spanish tourist services through dollar accounts, a practice the Spanish regarded as illegal.³² More favorable rates for the British tourist were, in this way, a *fait accompli*, but the trickery required to gain them prevented sterling from landing in Spanish reserves. Great Britain, which by now perceived a considerable outflow of sterling in the pockets of subjects bound for a Spanish holiday, would refuse to grant the Spanish further import credits until the British tourist’s peseta was aligned with the American’s.

Although French and British negotiators might have been satisfied with a preferential tourist rate for their own citizens, the relentless inflation of the peseta could only be balanced with a general devaluation.

Though it might have helped neutralize the illegal trade in currency, the continual downward adjustment of preferential tourist rates would have amounted to institutionalizing a temporary solution. Illegal currency exchange originally engendered by tourism now had begun to penetrate other industries, notably shipyards and engineering plants.³³ In a plea to convince Franco of the urgency of sounder monetarism, his finance minister Navarro Rubio declared, "We're two steps from the breaking point."³⁴

The result of the devaluation of June 1959 was a dramatic improvement in the state of Spanish currency reserves, due largely to the elimination of clandestine tourist revenues. As the Foreign Ministry later explained,

This radical increase in tourism revenues was largely the result of the modification of the exchange rate and the subsequent entrance of these revenues through official channels, while before they had come through the black market.³⁵

In the 12 months leading up to the devaluation, \$73 million in foreign tourism revenue reached the reserves; in the 12 months subsequent, the figure was \$267 million.³⁶ This near quadrupling in revenue was quite disproportionate with the 51 percent increase in foreign visitors over the same period. Twenty-three percent more British tourists arrived in 1960 than in 1959, but nearly two-and-a-half times the sterling. American tourism increased by 54 percent but dollar revenues by 146 percent.³⁷ The principle that tourism contributed to balancing trade, advanced from the outset of postwar European reconstruction, at last applied to Spain.

The Stabilization Plan undoubtedly contributed to an acceleration of the industry's growth, though the impact here was far less singular and dramatic. From 1955 to 1959, the number of tourists increased on an average of 20 percent per year; from 1960 to 1963, the average annual increase was 30 percent. Though there was a spike between 1959 and 1960, this cannot be attributed to the serendipity of currency devaluation alone. Tourism across Europe accelerated most rapidly between 1958 and 1963. Spain's Stabilization Plan was part of a general wave of economic liberalization across Western Europe in this period, and just one of several factors fueling postwar Europe's second major take-off (the first having taken place on a much smaller scale in the second half of the 1940s). Spanish tourism also benefited from further measures to

Table 4.2 Tourist entries to Spain (with passport), by country of origin, 1957–1962

	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
W. Germany	153,575	195,455	200,936	304,538	448,157	637,448
Belgium	54,224	52,654	81,451	92,281	148,775	161,154
France	929,150	1,145,531	1,363,642	2,235,617	2,938,545	3,160,662
UK	271,295	299,693	361,390	445,239	699,497	723,857
Italy	55,164	59,930	80,418	140,629	138,716	144,035
Scandinavia	55,874	65,062	85,121	115,724	153,450	212,450
United States	123,671	158,809	162,932	251,224	255,863	270,210
Others	375,734	475,409	527,477	747,111	712,867	1,080,553
Total	2,018,687	2,452,543	2,863,367	4,332,363	5,495,870	6,390,369

Source: Rafael Esteve-Secall and Rafael Fuentes García, *Economía, historia, e instituciones del turismo en España* (Madrid: Pirámide, 2000), 135. Reprinted by permission.

open national frontiers and from the deregulation of the charter air industry, both of which are discussed later. These developments permitted Spain to participate disproportionately in this latest surge in international travel. French travel abroad increased by 93 percent from 1958 to 1962, and French travel to Spain increased by 181 percent over the same period. A similar pattern emerged among the British and West Germans: 32 percent more Britons traveled abroad in 1962 than in 1958, but British travel to Spain more than doubled; West German tourists trebled their presence in Spain even though their overall presence abroad overall grew only by one-fourth (see table 4.2). By contrast, travel to the other major Mediterranean destination, Italy, grew roughly parallel to the global pattern. Though total visitors to Italy still surpassed those to Spain, the latter was by 1962 the most formidable competition for Europe's traditional tourism receptors.³⁸

West European Border Liberalization: Cooperation and Competition

The OEEC Tourism Committee spearheaded a second wave of international border liberalization after 1958, the same year in which Spain formally joined Europe's most important intergovernmental economic club. That year the committee set the goal of "eliminating visa requirements and customs formalities [and] increasing currency allowances for travelers."³⁹ This recommendation precipitated a phase of currency liberalization in Western Europe: in 1959, France trebled its citizens' foreign travel allowance and Great Britain raised its limit from £100 to £250.

Smaller countries confirmed the trend: Austria raised its limit from \$200 to \$275 and Denmark from \$100 to \$300.⁴⁰

The first OEEC recommendation to Spain with respect to tourism involved “the simplification of customs procedures,” which meant eliminating the notorious “pink triptych” for autos and recognizing foreign drivers’ licenses and insurance.⁴¹ This echoed the long-standing position of the Spanish tourism bureau, which continually had been ignored by the internal security directors of the Interior Ministry. In 1957, José M. Coll, director of Spain’s tourism office in New York City, urged his government to sign a 1952 International Motoring Treaty mutually recognizing foreign driving licenses, arguing, “Thirty nations (among them Portugal, Yugoslavia, etc.) have signed the pact. Now I’m told that RUSSIA—*sí señor*, even the Soviet Union—has just recognized it.”⁴² This did not dissuade most motorists from entering Spain, as all West European driving licenses were recognized, but Coll’s concern was not to alienate American drivers. Unlike other West European countries, Spain required an international driving permit from Americans, who had “more than a few times given up on visiting our country because of all the unnecessary difficulties.”⁴³

The thornier issue was centered on the pink triptych, which symbolized for many foreigners the ubiquity of Franco’s reputed police state. With a liberalizing wind at its back, the DGT revived its previous efforts to persuade Spanish customs authorities to eliminate the arcane documentation. In a missive to the customs authority, a DGT representative ventured,

Many individuals and travel agencies have indicated to us their perplexity that Spain does not eliminate visas and ease the rules for car entries, when France, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, West Germany, have eliminated even passport requirements for Italians; Switzerland, Austria, and France have eliminated international auto documentation requirements; France has abolished the *Carnet de Passage en Douanes* for foreign tourist automobiles; and [West] German tourists do not need a passport to visit Italy.⁴⁴

But the Spanish OEEC delegation was rather less hopeful about the undoing of security institutions. A delegate observed, “with regard to the elimination of the triptychs and *carnets de passage*, I suppose that the perspective of the Spanish administration will not be very favorable toward these types of measures considering that, if adopted, it would be difficult to prevent the clandestine entry of a series of vehicles into our country.”⁴⁵

Spain remained, along with Great Britain and Portugal, a complicated country to enter by car. The British argument for retaining automobile documentation requirements had centered, like the Spanish, on fears of contraband and smuggling. As automotive tourism increased in continental Europe, such concerns became overshadowed by the rising costs of scrutinizing travelers' documentation and the revenue lost through the dissuasive power of long border queues. Britain introduced a "British Visitors Card" in 1961, available free of charge at travel agents most everywhere in Western Europe; this served as an efficient substitute for the abstruse procedures for tourist auto entry, but the procedure was still more involved than crossing the disintegrating borders across much of continental Western Europe.⁴⁶ The French motoring club journal *L'Auto-Journal* offered this Bastille Day harangue on the subject:

In a Europe in full customs unification, England, Spain and Portugal still behave today like medieval powers. One cannot do anything against British customs, there not being a great current of French tourists toward England. But for Spain and in a lower degree, for Portugal, the French car driver is a capital element in the economy . . . On maintaining this useless, costly and humiliating "Pink Triptych" at their borders, Spain and Portugal are simply and literally mocking us! In this "Pink Triptych" business, as in many others, the last word to be spoken belongs to the consumer. He has a decisive argument to convince the Spanish and Portuguese customs to join the touristic customs community: It is to spend his money elsewhere! . . . We insistently request our readers who have not yet made arrangements for this summer in Spain or Portugal to systematically boycott these two countries. Let them choose other itineraries in Europe toward countries that prove to be more liberal and reasonable . . . Do not spend a pound-sterling, a peseta, or an escudo in those countries, who are enemies of free international tourism!⁴⁷

Spanish customs authorities at last rescinded the triptych requirement in February 1961. The Ministry of Finance conceded that the documentation requirements "cause delays and nuisances which are prejudicial to the development of foreign tourism in our country," adding that "sensitive shades of difference from other countries" had prevented the government from rescinding them sooner.⁴⁸

Rivalry and competition frequently upset the earnest internationalism of European tourist bureaus. The Spanish found themselves to be a particular target, and were especially sensitive to any "anti-Spanish" murmurings emanating from the tourist offices of competitor countries. As early as 1953, a Spanish diplomat in Washington accused French and

Italian tourism interests of waging a “tiresome campaign . . . against us . . . They attack us on all possible points . . . [and] attempt to make the American public our enemy.”⁴⁹ By the end of the decade—as American tourists receded in relative importance to European holiday-makers, borders opened, and transportation improved—the benefits to Spanish tourism generally came at the expense of France. This provoked active retaliation by the summer of 1958, when France introduced regulations requiring non-French tour buses bound for Spain to spend at least two nights in France even though the length of the voyage necessitated only one.⁵⁰ In early July, the French government reduced the number of permits for Spain-bound West German coaches allowed to operate in France from 300 to 100.⁵¹ Such measures struck Spanish diplomats as petty and contrary to “the spirit of friendship and understanding” they claimed their own policies represented.⁵²

Tourism remained a thorny issue in French–Spanish diplomatic relations during a period of intensive border liberalization and a blossoming French–Spanish friendship.⁵³ In 1961, Spanish diplomats additionally accused French interests of spreading misinformation regarding unusual viruses in Spain and vaccine requirements for travelers. According to the Spanish consulate at Sète, a French travel magazine called *L’Action Automobile* published a special issue highlighting Spain’s “least spectacular parts, denigrating it along the way with an abundance of pejorative epithets.”⁵⁴ The border crossing, where “lines of vehicles up to five kilometers in length produce[d] waits of about three hours,” was itself a point of French–Spanish tension.⁵⁵ The Sète consulate posited that “ideally, the difference between the French slowness and the Spanish expedience would be so marked that even the least observant [motorist] should directly accuse France for all the delays.”⁵⁶ Spanish grievances continued to accumulate in 1962, prompting the consul at Sète to conclude that a full-fledged French conspiracy was operating: “This new phase of French jealousy towards the great success of Spanish tourism confirms once more . . . [that French] organizations specializing [in tourism] are in charge of this campaign: *L’Action Automobile*, le Touring Club Français, and ultimately even the Foreign Ministry.”⁵⁷

The final major obstacle to full Spanish integration into the free world of cross-border mobility was the visa requirement for British travelers. The requirement irked British authorities, who calculated that visa sales to British tourists at £1 7s apiece amounted to the direct transfer of over £500,000 million per annum to Spain. For Spain, this meant a reliable if relatively minor sterling source, as well as leverage in the ongoing dispute over Gibraltar, which the Spanish considered a militarized zone

rather than a normal international boundary. Gibraltar earned considerable revenue as a hub for British travelers bound for southern Spain. Until 1958, air travel to Málaga was limited to small, short-range planes, making Gibraltar, which possessed a larger airport, Britons' most natural access to the region. As the Spanish initiated a major modernization of the Málaga airport in 1958, including a new runway suitable for large aircraft, they extended to Britain an offer to end visa requirements in exchange for the concession of direct flight authorizations to Málaga.⁵⁸

The Spanish bid to modernize air transportation to Málaga threatened Gibraltar's tourism industry, presenting the British government with the choice of improving relations with Spain or supporting the interests of its colony. British European Airways, which ran regular services to Gibraltar, along with Gibraltar's own tourism interests, pressed their case. The chairman of the Gibraltar Tourism Committee pleaded, "We are hoping . . . that . . . Gibraltar will not be put at a further disadvantage for the sake of gaining a limited benefit for the British traveling public."⁵⁹ British negotiators were unmoved by Gibraltar's appeal, which failed to trump metropolitan interests to eliminate visa costs and improve relations with Spain generally. A Foreign Office official commented, "In the long run it will be for decision whether the interests of Gibraltar should be allowed to outweigh the benefits of the visa abolition to the 100,000 or so [*sic*] British tourists who visit Spain annually."⁶⁰ The British ambassador to Spain noted "a difference between what Gibraltar wants and what is practicable," and feared "awkward pressure at home if, as a result of the breakdown in negotiations, British tourists had to continue to pay . . . for their visas, and if we remained the only Western European country which had failed to come to a Visa Agreement with Spain."⁶¹ Though British interest in reaching an agreement with Spain was fairly clear, Gibraltar remained a significant political liability: No British politician wished to be accused of "trying to improve relations with Spain at [Gibraltar's] expense."⁶²

Just before the 1959 summer tourist season, the Spanish took the unexpected step of unilaterally eliminating visa requirements for British tourists not entering through Gibraltar, and simultaneously restricted entry from the controversial colony. The aim was to accustom British consumers to the new convenience and lower cost of travel to Spain while maintaining the threat of reinstating visa requirements should the British continue to support Gibraltar. Reluctant to escalate what they considered a relatively trivial situation, Britain's Ministry of Trade and Industry encouraged British aviators to "make some limited use of Málaga so as to avoid creating an unnecessary source of trouble." Such

limited accommodation, it was hoped, would ensure that Britain would “continue to find that except where there is a direct conflict with Iberia, our airlines have a pretty free hand to develop their operations in Spain.”⁶³

Gibraltar itself would remain a contentious issue in Anglo-Spanish relations, and the Franco regime again would reveal its willingness to exploit the British addiction to Spanish holidays for leverage in this diplomatic struggle. In spring 1960, as though to confirm a growing cordiality of Anglo-Spanish relations, Spain eased restrictions on crossings at the Gibraltar frontier. In a personal meeting with Franco on April 30, 1960, Foreign Minister Fernando Castiella obtained the Caudillo’s approval of the plan over the objections of Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco’s right hand, who opposed any compromise on Gibraltar for the sake of tourism development.⁶⁴ Visa requirements in both directions were formally eliminated effective March 15, 1961.⁶⁵ The wave of liberalization would reverse, however, three years later. By November 1964 Spain ceased recognizing British passports issued in Gibraltar and over the following year, two-way automobile traffic across the Gibraltar–Spain frontier progressively was restricted. Concluding that “the cutting off of British tourists might not be a very effective sanction against General Franco,” British authorities permitted Gibraltar’s tourism industry to wither further in order to maintain good relations between London and Madrid.⁶⁶ Gibraltar experienced a reduction both in package tours and automobile ferry arrivals from Morocco, which fell from 25,263 in 1964 to 4,675 in 1965 as an INI-run Spanish ferry service grew precipitously. By June 1967, Spanish authorities triumphantly could report that “tourist visits to Gibraltar organized by travel agents virtually have been eliminated.”⁶⁷

The Charter Flight Take-Off

Although French motorists formed the largest block of tourists in Spain, British, West German, and Scandinavian package tourists were increasingly visible. These latter groups typically arrived by air and tended to stay in Spain longer than automotive tourists, usually in hotels or rental apartments. The efficiency of charter packages significantly reduced tourists’ transportation costs. The charter flight, Spain’s commercial attaché in Bonn observed, “created a new type of tourist whose value is considerable for the Spanish economy, for this is a higher-revenue tourist than the average and one who in Spain uses first-class or luxury hotels.”⁶⁸ Moreover, unlike individual travelers, package tours were

predictable operations, and agencies that sent them typically possessed financial interests in the continued development of coastal zones.

The dramatic expansion of charter air travel in Europe in the second half of the 1950s transformed the international tourism network. IATA, the international commercial aviation cartel, severely limited charter flights until 1956 in order to protect flag carriers, but gradually relaxed restrictions under pressure for consumer choice.⁶⁹ After this deregulation, their use expanded precipitously. By 1958, charter traffic accounted for 30 percent of all air passenger arrivals in Spain, reaching 35 percent in 1962.⁷⁰ An IATA director observed of charter flights that what ten years earlier had been “almost a custom-made business is now a mass production affair.”⁷¹ The result for the vacationer was readily perceptible: the scheduled IATA airfare from London to Valencia in 1957 was roughly \$115. Through a chartered package, by comparison, Londoners could purchase an all-inclusive two-week package in Majorca for an average of \$125 in 1959, or choose among various peninsular destinations (\$185) or the Canary Islands (\$135–300).⁷² This was somewhat less than similar tour packages in 1949, though wages in Western Europe had risen considerably in the intervening decade. By one measure, the cost of a package holiday to Majorca equaled roughly seven weeks’ pay for the average British industrial worker in 1949. By 1959, a similar package would cost the same worker less than four weeks’ earnings.⁷³ If these prices remained a bit high for industrial workers, the majority of whom continued to holiday on Britain, those slightly higher on the pay scale found Spain well within reach.⁷⁴

Charter air service had the significant effect of linking Mediterranean Spain directly with several European cities. Direct flights from northern European airports to Málaga, Valencia, and Majorca challenged the radial network, which for three centuries had required travelers to orient their journeys from Madrid. In the process, more remote regions became open to tourist traffic. The charter flight was, according to a DGT delegate, “especially useful, in view of its agility, for promoting intensity and geographic distribution of tourist currents in our country.”⁷⁵ Charter flights contributed significantly to Majorca’s dramatic growth as a tourist destination, though regular scheduled routes also had been available from Paris (1951), London (1952), Brussels (1956), Zurich (1956), and Stockholm (1957). By 1959, 57 percent of Majorca’s 277,000 visitors arrived by charter flight.⁷⁶ The Balearics received three-fourths of Spain’s foreign charter tourists (156,743 of 198,155 in 1959). As Majorca became saturated, the Swedish SAS and the Finnish Kar Air, once pioneers in charter services to Palma, extended their Mediterranean routes

to Málaga in 1960.⁷⁷ Within a year, 20 charter companies were operating at the Málaga airport; of the 28,395 foreigners to arrive by air, 16,000 employed charter services, mostly from Great Britain and Scandinavia. Five hundred and forty-four British passengers to Málaga in 1959 became 11,509 in 1962; Scandinavian package tourists there increased in number from 1,727 to 23,017 during the same period. In all, by 1962 the Balearics absorbed a similar proportion of package tourists—about 70 percent—though the overall total of charter air passengers had swelled to a half million.⁷⁸ By contrast, the older resorts of the northern Atlantic coast, where the major foreign travel firms had sunk few investments, remained untouched by the charter boom.

Northern European tour operators and their clientele were the main beneficiaries of the charter flight. The Ministry of Information and Tourism's Majorcan delegate recalled that that charter flights "cheapened inclusive tours, . . . which would contribute to the consolidation of large tour operators in their role as intermediaries with West European travel agents."⁷⁹ Having attained a dominant position in the European travel industry, tour operators could channel tourist currents to regions where their own subsidiaries had invested. This worked to the advantage of Spain's large-scale developers, who were now able to predict future needs for resort development with greater accuracy, but frequently compromised the position of small purveyors of tourist services. Multinational travel firms increasingly dictated prices and the geography of development, often supporting overdevelopment of hotel services in areas near their air routes.⁸⁰ As one OEEC report observed, "New hotels have been . . . built often to respond to indirect profit motives; for example, transport companies or travel agents could have interest in financing new hotels regardless of their profit potential."⁸¹

Acceleration of Seaside Development, 1957–1962

The stimulative and redistributive effects of charter air service on Spain's tourism geography were considerable. Hotel construction accelerated significantly in 1958: 168 new establishments opened across Spain compared with 30 in 1957. Total investment in hotel construction between 1958 and 1961 fluctuated between roughly \$10 million and \$15 million annually, of which probably 75 to 85 percent was privately financed.⁸² The most numerous new establishments were Category 3 (1 star) hotels, though these tended to be small. Category 1 (3 and 4 star) hotels accounted for 36 percent of new establishments added in 1958

but 46 percent of new capacity. Seven new luxury hotels accounted for 13 percent of new capacity.⁸³

As the concentration of air services quickly saturated Majorca and northeastern Spain, rapid resort construction began clustering around coastal cities further south along the Mediterranean littoral and later in the Canary Islands. This trend accentuated the industry's centrifugal character, heavily favoring the provinces of Madrid, Barcelona, Gerona, and the Balearic Islands. These four provinces contained 39 percent of the nation's hotels in 1958, the figure edging to 41 percent in 1961 and 45 percent in 1962.⁸⁴ The next three densest tourist areas were the coastal provinces of Alicante and Málaga on the Mediterranean, where construction mushroomed, and the North Atlantic Guipúzcoa (San Sebastián and environs), which would remain relatively stable throughout the 1960s (see table 4.3). These seven provinces combined accounted for 52 percent of the national total in 1958; 54 percent in 1961; and 57 percent in 1962. Hotel capacity (total number of rooms available) told an even more asymmetric story. The four major tourist provinces accounted for 56 percent of capacity in 1958 and 61 percent in 1962. For the seven largest tourist provinces, the figures were 72 percent in 1958 and 78 percent in 1962. From 1958 to 1962, hotel capacity in the seven largest tourist provinces grew by 55 percent whereas in the rest of Spain it rose by 17 percent. In 15 of Spain's 50 provinces, mainly those in rural interior regions, hotel capacity stagnated or even dropped.⁸⁵ The state Hotel Credit program reflected the primacy of a few coastal and insular provinces: through 1964, Gerona, Málaga, the Balearic Islands, and Barcelona together absorbed half of the state loans; adding Alicante, Santa Cruz de Tenerife (Canary Islands), Valencia, Tarragona, and Cádiz, 75 percent of state loans were accounted for.⁸⁶

The sources of capital for hotel development are difficult to quantify, largely because of the government's practice of concealing foreign investment during the 1950s. Until 1959, the Franco regime encouraged the illusion of Spanish self-sufficiency, nominally limiting foreign participation in any given firm to 25 percent. This led to a pattern of obscurantism with regard to the origins of hotel financing. Official sources concealed vast indirect participation by foreign tour operators in the form of loans to Spanish developers. The Syndical Organization's official bulletin claimed that in 1958 the average Spanish hotel netted a healthy 650,000 pesetas per year, an assertion totally incongruous with both OEEC reports and DGT preoccupations over meager profit margins in the hotel sector.⁸⁷ Because international loans generally implicated Spanish hotel owners in illegal direct arrangements with foreign

Table 4.3 Hotel capacity in selected provinces, 1958–1962

Province	Rooms built	Total rooms	% of national total		% of national population
	1958–1962	1962	1958	1962	1960
Barcelona	5,019	12,288	11	13	9
Gerona	4,613	9,632	7	10	1
Balearics	5,984	11,252	8	12	1
Madrid	335	10,727	15	11	9
Subtotal	15,951	43,899	41	46	20
Guipúzcoa	249	4,299	6	5	2
Málaga	2,398	4,228	3	5	3
Alicante	1,122	3,094	3	3	2
Subtotal	3,769	11,621	11	12	7
“Big seven”	19,720	55,520	52	58	27
Rest of Spain	6,380	39,008	48	42	73
National total	26,100	94,528	100	100	100

Source: Subsecretaría de Turismo, “Zonas y Centros de Interés Turísticos Nacional: Fundamentos de la Ley,” July 17, 1963, AGA 3: 49.03/15809; Subsecretaría de Turismo, “Estudios sobre índices de intensidad turística,” April 1964, AGA 3: 49.07/31802.

companies, they were rarely reported and never made public knowledge. An accurate assessment of the level of foreign participation in the Spanish hotel sector before 1959 remains impossible. The economic reform package of 1959 opened a floodgate of foreign investment, which overall rose from \$5.5 million in 1957 to \$82.6 million in 1960.⁸⁸ Yet despite the dramatic rise in foreign investment, the hotel sector operated in much the same fashion as before. Before and after the watershed reforms, foreign capital principally took the form of loans rather than direct investment, and Spaniards remained the proprietors. Large international hotels in Barcelona and Madrid, such as Madrid’s Castellana Hilton, formed exceptions to the general rule of Spanish ownership.

Direct foreign investment made its larger impact on coastal land ownership. Foreign firms developed land acquisitions into colonies of second homes, engendering a massive expansion of middle-class “residential” tourism. As early as February 1959, West German market studies indicated the presence of “numerous family groups who wish to remain for long seasons in a comfortable but not luxurious atmosphere at limited cost.”⁸⁹ Residential enclaves gave vacationers the option of avoiding many of the remaining costs and inconveniences of foreign travel, such as the heavy dependency on restaurants for food. Large stretches of the Spanish Mediterranean *Ferienparadies*, hitherto totally barren of tourist development, attracted massive investment, particularly from West Germany.

The first nuclei were located at Ionqueta (Majorca), Tossa de Mar (Costa Brava), Tarragona, and Alicante. By 1961, West German investors owned between 2 and 3 million chalets in Spain, topping the list of foreign land ownership even though West Germany only accounted for one-twelfth of all tourism to Spain, just one-sixth that of France, and two-thirds that of Great Britain.⁹⁰ There was an incalculable link between foreign investment and the attraction of foreign tourists. Spain was a highly desirable destination for West German tourists given to long stays in a single location.⁹¹ Foreign developers built sprawling resorts complete with cinemas, bars, and restaurants featuring cuisine suitable to less adventuresome palettes. The German tendency to “colonize” seacoasts with residential plots would become a major feature of Mediterranean tourism development in the 1960s and beyond.

The immediate benefits of the influx of foreign investment obscured the basic problem, addressed only piecemeal over the course of the next decade, of land speculation. Rumors that a stretch of virgin coastline might become the next fashionable *costa* routinely drove land values to levels far higher than those permitted by the regime’s increasingly unenforceable Terrains Law (*Ley del Suelo*). Inflated property values led developers to build rapidly, densely, and often shoddily, in order to maximize their investments. A 1963 Ministry of Information and Tourism study sardonically noted,

The high speculative price of land serves as a “moral” (!) basis to justify the density of inadequate construction. This is how these constellations of skyscrapers beside the best beaches in Spain come to mock the existing beauty and reduce and alter the views of other interior properties, which indirectly suffer the effects of unnecessary depreciation and continually diminish the potential quality of an entire tourist area.⁹²

Sudden degradation of the Spanish coastline’s natural attractiveness threatened the tourism industry’s future prospects, but most analysts preferred to notice the massive economic stimuli to construction and commerce. The concept of sustainable development had not yet entered tourism planners’ lexicon in Spain or anywhere else.

The onset of economic liberalization and reckless construction did, however, provoke incipient concerns about the future of this increasingly important industry. As early as 1957, the minister of information and tourism, Gabriel Arias Salgado, warned of “our deficient tourist facilities in many places, which create considerable difficulties . . . for visiting and enjoying many of the attractions we possess.”⁹³ Once skeptical of

the tourism industry, Arias Salgado had come to recognize high-quality tourism as an important form of national propaganda. He believed low-cost tourism to be a temporary phenomenon that would disappear once Spain reached higher levels of economic development. It was therefore

advisable to prepare ourselves . . . by improving quality so that tourists come to visit us not for the favorable currency exchange situation, but for our real and positive attractiveness as a country, and for our excellent and good levels of organization.⁹⁴

Though precocious in recognizing oncoming problems, Arias Salgado's ministry was not a source of innovative solutions. The backbone of the ministry's proposals to improve the quality of tourism development was state enterprise, through the INI. In 1960, the director general of tourism, Mariano de Urzáiz hailed Paradors and other state enterprises as "a fundamental pillar of tourism policy."⁹⁵ Arias Salgado pressed the government to concede more funds for Paradors and the establishment of a National Tourism Company (*Empresa Nacional de Turismo*, or ENTURSA). Both measures ran counter to the tenets of relative economic liberalism supported by Franco's current cabinet. In one of its final meetings before a major reshuffling of July 1962, the cabinet refused to authorize INI participation in hotel construction in spite of Arias Salgado's endorsement of the plan "as a touristic interest of the first order."⁹⁶

With little support from the cabinet, Arias Salgado's ministry pursued aid from the American International Cooperation Administration (ICA). Defending public sector involvement to the American committee, Urzáiz argued that state-owned tourism establishments "helped to regulate quality and prices, served as training sites for skilled workers, covered areas undeveloped by private initiative, and provided a stimulus for the development of tourist facilities in the region."⁹⁷ Though generally skeptical of state enterprise, the ICA mission greeted the Parador projects favorably, approving credit for 250 million pesetas (\$4.2 million).⁹⁸ This amount was sufficient to finance four of the twelve projects proposed by Urzáiz, plus four additional Parador projects subsequently agreed upon. By the end of 1962, construction had begun on Paradors in diverse settings across the peninsula: the coastal nuclei of Torremolinos, Benicarló, and Aiguablava; an undeveloped Atlantic beach at Ayamonte; the desolate interior towns of Bailén (Jaén), Santa María de Huerta (Soria), and Guadalupe (Cáceres); and a Pyrenean refuge in the Valle de Arán. Although it indulged the case for regional development, the

American mission restrained the project's overtly political content. It refused, for example, to fund a DGT proposal to establish a Parador in the African outpost of Ceuta, a Spanish city wistfully claimed by America's Moroccan ally, even though the Spanish government gave this project "absolute priority above all others included in the general plan."⁹⁹

Support for improving the quality of Spanish tourism was not limited to voices within the regime. In 1960, José Meliá, the Valencian proprietor of a pair of thriving hotels in Majorca, proposed creating a chain of ten motor inns along major tourist routes in Spain. Soliciting Arias Salgado for support in gaining state funding for his project, Meliá addressed the minister in language appropriate for the national cause: "If we wish to convert Spain into a center of world tourism," he declared,

the urgency of creating a number of adequate facilities is indisputable . . . There is no doubt that with substantial economic aid on the part of the Government, Spain can boast during the next tourist season ten motels of great prestige.¹⁰⁰

Another early advocate of greater attention to quality in tourism development was the Catalan promoter Jorge Vila Fradera, founder and publisher of *Editur*, the main industry journal. He declared in 1961, "The hour has arrived to enhance quality at all levels and in all enterprises and sectors with whom the visitor comes into contact," hopefully adding that Spain's "hospitality industry is indisputably the most modern in Europe and its new establishments are well-conceived—if we exclude the improvisations that have emerged in certain oversaturated areas."¹⁰¹

Though the Franco regime had gradually warmed to tourism, few within it were yet willing to concede that tourism actually might contribute to sustained economic development over the long term. When the DGT did advocate a state role in guiding the industry toward higher quality, its unimaginative turn to the INI was a backroom affair with little public affirmation of the industry's potential. Regardless, the industry developed to a considerable extent after 1957 due to progressive liberalizations of frontiers, air travel, currency exchange, and foreign investment. Only after 1962, when the ambitious and charismatic Manuel Fraga became head of the ministry, would tourism emerge as a more fully holistic and broadly conceived national cause. This would be difficult as long as the regime's dominant figures considered tourism as temporary collateral on which to mortgage the growth of conventional industries.

CHAPTER 5

Tourism and the Politics of Development, 1962–1969

The Ministry of Information and Tourism under Manuel Fraga

Three years into its most dramatic phase of growth, Spanish tourism experienced an important institutional stimulus when the 39-year-old political scientist Manuel Fraga replaced Arias Salgado as minister of information and tourism on July 10, 1962. Like Franco, Fraga was a native of Galicia, a region known for its conservatism, relative poverty, and the centrality of religious orthodoxy in public life. His was the first generation to come of age after the Civil War, and, unlike his predecessors, Fraga's decision to enter civil service reflected his ambition for a career in politics rather than a foundational connection to the Franco regime.¹

Fraga demonstrated exceptional aptitude for politics in theory and practice, receiving a doctorate in law in 1944 and winning his first post in the state administration in 1951 at the age of 28.² During the early stages of his political career, Fraga accepted the main principles of Francoist orthodoxy, but also regarded the Caudillo as a "Spanish Oliver Cromwell" who "restored the normality and order" from which political evolution and reform was possible.³ Fraga considered the traditional Spanish Right to be the most intransigent in Europe and identified his own political lineage with a conservative reformist strain stretching from the enlightened minister Jovellanos to the regenerationist Antonio Maura.⁴ The decisive period in Fraga's political formation came during his tenure as technical secretary of the Ministry of Education from 1953 to 1956. While there, his political outlook diverged from the emerging belief within the regime in this period that bureaucratic authoritarianism could function separately from politics. The influence of his boss,

Joaquín Ruiz Giménez, subsequently the founder of the Christian-Democratic opposition, and the outbreak of a student uprising in 1956, taught him “to accept the great principle that ‘politics come first.’”⁵ In 1956, Fraga became the assistant director of a comparatively reformist government think-tank, the Institute of Political Studies. Fraga’s appointment to the cabinet in 1962 was not a surprise, though he had expected the post of minister of education rather than highly political portfolio of information and tourism, where Franco admitted there was considerable need for reform.⁶ The main challenge and the most visible achievement of his tenure, which lasted until 1969, would be to significantly reduce government censorship of the press.

The new cabinet of 1962 was distinguished from its predecessors by a largely forward-looking orientation, motivated not least by the dictator’s advancing age. Its identity crystallized around the principle that national modernization and development should be the government’s fundamental objective. The confluence of social and economic goals was generally accepted—the formal title of the highly publicized economic plan was the “Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1964–1967.” Though it did not reverse the economic liberalizations begun in 1957, the new government sought to enhance state coordination of basic infrastructural services such as irrigation, sanitation, housing, and transportation. The development plan also strove to emulate postwar Western European experiences, suppressing inflation while maintaining full employment and sustaining rapid market-driven growth.⁷

If there was basic agreement on the economic model, cabinet members clashed over the extent and character of political change that ought to accompany economic growth.⁸ Several were disciples of the American modernization theorist W. W. Rostow; one, Laureano López Rodó, composed the prologue to a Spanish edition of Rostow’s work.⁹ The language of American development economics surfaced in numerous documents, including a major INI study that concluded, “to employ the terminology that has come into fashion,” the Spanish “economic take-off” was underway.¹⁰ The obvious paradox was that American social science correlated economic development with democratization. To sustain otherwise, as did much of the regime’s technical-bureaucratic elite, was to argue for Spanish exceptionalism, or that Spain was different. This characterized the position of the regime’s most entrenched economic directors—Alberto Ullastres (minister of commerce), Gregorio López Bravo (minister of industry), Mariano Navarro Rubio (minister of finance), and López Rodó (development commissar)—all of whom were members of the shrouded *Opus Dei* order of Catholic elite.¹¹ As the

Plan's main architects, these ministers would aim to modernize the economy, in the words of Mercedes Cabrera and Fernando del Rey, "only . . . to the extent compatible with the continuation of the regime."¹²

As chief guarantor of a payments surplus, foreign tourism necessarily was a major component of any Spanish plan for development. Nevertheless, the permanence of its role in the Spanish economy was by no means assumed at the outset of the developmentalist period, which saw a return to a muted statist interventionism biased toward industrial production and construction. Apart from a general concern among the *Opus Dei* clique over the negative social impacts of tourism, these ministers maintained close connections with large industrialists, and remained attached to the conviction that industrialization was more reliable as a basis for long-term economic growth than an "invisible" revenue source such as tourism.¹³ Their dismissals of tourism resembled the beliefs of French technocrats of the late 1940s, who had refused to divert funds away from heavy industry toward tourism development. Indeed, though there is no indication of a direct connection, the Spanish developmentalists might have drawn a lesson from France, where by the early 1960s the tourism industry was in a state of decline.¹⁴ (See tables 5.1 and 5.2.)

Fraga's belief in the primacy of politics positioned him in natural opposition to the technical-bureaucratic elite. As head of state information services and censorship, he held an eminently political post. Attuned to the regenerationist principles of the early twentieth century, Fraga also conceived of the tourism industry as a significant component of his reformist agenda. The Franco regime already had come to accept that foreign tourism possessed economic value as a feeder for national currency reserves and political value to the extent that freedom of movement and modern seaside resorts might demonstrate to vacationers that Franco's Spain was not an antimodern police state. Under Fraga, this dual interest in tourism would expand considerably: tourism continued to form "the foundation of the decisive failure of the recent derisive campaigns against our country," as he told the Cortes in 1963, and the sector also "respond[ed] perfectly to the demands of every process of growth."¹⁵ In the atmosphere of developmentalism, the distinction between politics and economic development largely blurred, as the "staging" of growth did much to legitimize regimes domestically and internationally—this concept indeed formed the essence of state modernization projects from Kemalist Turkey to Kubitschek's Brazil.¹⁶ Fraga and his staff would consider tourism not only as a source of

Table 5.1 Tourism in Spanish foreign trade, 1954–1973

Year	Tourists	Tourism receipts (\$ millions)	Trade deficit (\$ millions)	As proportion of total (%)	
				Imports	Exports
1954	993,100	90.0	150	19	22
1955	1,383,359	96.7	171	19	25
1956	1,560,856	94.8	323	17	23
1957	2,018,687	76.9	386	14	18
1958	2,452,543	71.6	340	12	14
1959	2,863,367	159	193	28	31
1960	4,332,363	297	57	41	43
1961	5,495,870	385	279	35	54
1962	6,390,369	513	634	33	70
1963	7,941,206	679	1,004	35	92
1964	10,506,675	919	1,056	41	96
1965	11,079,556	1,105	1,737	37	114
1966	14,442,934	1,209	1,964	34	96
1967	14,810,215	1,120	1,745	32	81
1968	16,237,966	1,213	1,548	34	76
1969	18,878,820	1,311	2,333	31	69
1970	21,267,384	1,681	2,360	35	70
1971	23,737,992	2,054	2,025	41	70
1972	30,947,199	2,486	2,911	38	69
1973	31,335,806	3,091	4,405	37	61

Sources: Joan Clavera, *Capitalismo español de la autarquía a la Estabilización* (Madrid: Edicusa, 1973); Joseph Harrison, *The Spanish Economy in the Twentieth Century* (London: Croom Helm, 1985); Ángel Viñas et al., *Política comercial exterior en España (1931–1975)*, Vol. 2 (Madrid: Banco Exterior de España, 1979); Carmelo Pellejero Martínez, ed., *Historia de la economía del turismo en España* (Madrid: Civitas, 1999).

Table 5.2 Balance of payments by item, Spain, 1962–1964
(\$ millions)

Item	1962	1963	1964
Trade	−637	−1012	−1094
Foreign travel	+465	+611	+852
Current balance	+50	−186	+18
Capital movements	+118	+219	+286

Source: Board of Trade (Great Britain), PRO FO 371/180144.

national revenue, but as a highly visible motor for regional economic development and social mobility as well. In addition to a source of exterior counterpropaganda, the presence of foreign tourism would provoke a “qualitative change in the psycho-social panorama of the community,”

simultaneously projecting a modernizing ambition to Europe and broadly engendering a mentality of progress and openness within Spain.¹⁷ Not least, it formed the basis of a large, new service sector, dominant in Spain's coastal periphery, with distinctive corporate and regional interests potentially antagonistic to the authoritarian centralization and moral asceticism of the regime's technical-bureaucratic elite.

Fraga's statements recalled the rhetoric of "revolution from above" of the early twentieth century, reflecting the conviction that state-led reform projects, properly conceived, could penetrate local life and alter deep-seated mentalities. These ideas had provoked numerous conflicts over the question of political decentralization during the early twentieth century, and intractable conflicts over the issue forestalled genuine progress before the Civil War and the onset of authoritarian centralism.¹⁸ But as Antonio Cazorla has observed, the Francoist bureaucracy never possessed the absolute authority frequently assumed, and was forced time and again to compromise with regional interests.¹⁹ This basic limit to the dictatorship's authority became more pronounced in an atmosphere of vigorous economic growth, as municipalities frequently chose to deal directly with investors and land developers rather than negotiate the regulatory maze and institutional favoritism of the central state. Fraga's standing on this question was complex. On the one hand, his ministry represented the interests of tourism developers, coastal municipalities, and landholders seeking to capitalize on postwar Europe's mass heliolatry. This expanding group held distinctly different interests from the military-industrialists hitherto dominating Francoist policy. On the other hand, most professional tourism planners feared unmediated encounters between interests in isolated seaside regions and relatively more cosmopolitan European tourists, and believed that a strong central state was necessary to ensure the proper management of the industry.

Fraga's regard for national tourism development far exceeded that of his predecessor, Gabriel Arias Salgado. Speaking to his staff, he likened the urgency of a new tourism policy to a "call to Crusade."²⁰ Within a month of assuming his post, Fraga made a well-publicized visit to Benidorm, a formerly sleepy Mediterranean fishing village that had developed during the 1950s into an asphalt monument to postwar Europe's resort culture. Three weeks later, the minister traveled to the similarly metamorphosed isle of Majorca.²¹ Another early indication of Fraga's commitment to tourism was the attention given to choosing a tourist bureau staff representing a new wave of professionalized administrators.²² To the post of director general of tourism, Fraga

appointed Antonio J. García Rodríguez-Acosta, who as provincial governor of Málaga had overseen development of the prestigious resort of Marbella, the redoubt of an elite set including members of the Caudillo's family. On assuming his new post, Rodríguez-Acosta proposed to "restructure the central Spanish administration in matters concerning tourism."²³ The proposal called for the creation of an Undersecretariat of Tourism (*Subsecretaría General de Turismo*, SGT), within which would operate two directorates general: one for promotion and another to regulate tourist enterprises and activities. Luis Bolín, now a World Bank consultant in Washington, endorsed the plan in a letter of support to López Rodó:

Tourism today is too important to depend on a single directorate general . . . Tourism is a highly complex issue and much more technical than generally thought . . . The moment is critical. Apparently everything is going well, but if we do not treat some problems in time, our touristic edifice could collapse like a house of cards.²⁴

The restructuring occurred that autumn, Rodríguez-Acosta receiving a promotion to become undersecretary of tourism. The DGT, which in Bolín's day had operated from a cramped office in old Madrid, now occupied an entire floor in a gigantic new building in the city's modern district. Rodríguez-Acosta hired León Herrera, a former Air Force general whom he knew from his home city of Jaen, to head the newly created Directorate General of Tourism Enterprises and Activities (DGEAT). The other significant hire was Juan de Arespachaga to head a twin agency, the Directorate General of Tourism Promotion (DGPT). A civil engineer whose expertise was road design, Arespachaga staffed his office with economists and engineers who would attempt to apply scientific models to tourism management. Finally, Fraga attained the creation of a new government think-tank, the Institute of Tourism Studies (*Instituto de Estudios Turísticos*, or IET), which would serve as an important central clearinghouse of information for the growing class of scholars, students, and entrepreneurs pursuing the tourism sector.

The principal challenge for the new tourism administrators was to reverse prevailing beliefs that tourism was an ephemeral phenomenon best suited for short-term exploitation. Arias Salgado belatedly had confronted questions of quality and sustainability after 1957, but altogether had been, in Franco's assessment, a "rather weak" minister.²⁵ The regime, guided from 1957 to 1962 by the imperatives of economic stabilization, had been more concerned with imbibing revenue than with developing a

sustainable tourism industry. The large quantities of ink dedicated to tourism planning during the 1950s, although they went some distance toward redefining the political ends of tourism promotion, had contributed little to the industry's recent rapid growth. This was, rather, the result of a general southward expansion of European travel and the Spanish government's willingness to permit "negative" integration, chiefly by eliminating or relaxing customs and currency exchange.

Loyalty notoriously was not a defining trait of international tourist markets, however, and any complacency about the industry's future in Spain was tempered with caution. Just as Spain recently had challenged the dominance of Italy and France, it now faced competition from other warm-weather seaside destinations in the region. Spain possessed no monopoly on sun, coastline, unfamiliar but comfortable environments, or low consumer prices. A World Bank report of October 1962 warned, "The continued expansion of the Spanish tourist economy will not take place automatically. Other Mediterranean countries are making very competitive efforts and continually developing new attractions."²⁶ The DGPT promptly recommended stepping up promotional efforts in Denmark and Sweden, where "major tourism campaigns are being prepared by Yugoslavia, Israel, Greece, and several Iron Curtain nations."²⁷ In 1963, the British tour operator Horizon Holidays, a trailblazer of package tourism to Majorca and the Costa Brava in the early 1950s, began selling vacation packages to Bulgaria. Appropriating the Spanish trademarks of difference, beauty, sun, and sea, Horizon promised clients that a visit to Bulgaria would provide a "glimpse of an entirely different way of life . . . where the [iron] 'curtain' is actually made of roses . . . with fertile plains, snow-capped mountains and a coast line consisting of 200 miles of sun drenched beaches on the Black Sea, which is actually as blue as the Adriatic."²⁸

The notion that Europe's thirst for meridional holidays was extending to the Soviet bloc indicated how strikingly apolitical resort tourists of the 1960s were in their preferences. Indeed, their lack of concern for politics also applied to Spain. Rodríguez-Acosta explicitly rejected the idea held by some Francoists that "unfavorable political conditions" formed a disadvantage for Spanish tourism.²⁹ International manifestations of anti-Francoist opinion, though numerous and loud, produced minimal impact on the tourist trade. Several protest campaigns centered in Scandinavia drew attention to the Franco regime's repression of striking miners and 118 Spaniards who declared their support for European federalism in 1962, and the execution of the Communist operative Julián Grimau in 1963. Oslo's socialdemocratic daily ran the headline,

Table 5.3 Scandinavian tourists to Spain (% change from previous year), 1960–1965

	<i>Sweden</i>	<i>Norway</i>	<i>Denmark</i>	<i>Europe total</i>
1960	66,159 (+47%)	9,929 (+19%)	29,310 (+39%)	3,847,339 (+50%)
1961	81,241 (+23%)	15,511 (+56%)	45,309 (+55%)	5,009,251 (+30%)
1962	102,506 (+26%)	20,128 (+30%)	78,371 (+73%)	5,758,959 (+15%)
1963	117,453 (+15%)	19,897 (−1%)	79,617 (+2%)	7,079,834 (+23%)
1964	163,207 (+39%)	23,622 (+9%)	95,742 (+20%)	9,487,951 (+34%)
1965	201,907 (+24%)	32,438 (+37%)	128,796 (+35%)	9,986,017 (+5%)

Source: AGA 3: 49.07/31804.

“Don’t Travel to Spain,”³⁰ and the Spanish commercial counselor in Sweden reported an “anti-Spanish political tempest” directed against tourism promotions; yet the measurable effects on tourism were limited to Scandinavia and were only temporary (see table 5.3).³¹ At most, the uproar may have contributed to a temporary deceleration in Norwegian and Danish, and to an even lesser extent, Swedish tourism to Spain. The decision by one Danish travel agent to boycott an industry convention in Spanish Galicia was a singular exception to a general lack of concern, and even isolated acts of boycott might have dovetailed conveniently with vendors’ attempts to promote package holidays to other destinations.³² By contrast, tourism officials trumpeted an apparent eagerness on the part of industrial Europe’s working classes to visit Spain: Rodríguez-Acosta cited a rumor that Swedish “factory employees and workers who take their vacations in Spain often lie about their destination to avoid reprisals from their comrades in the [Swedish Labor Organization]”; additionally, in 1965 the DGPT reported a “decision of extraordinary political importance” in which the largest West German trade-unionist travel cooperative “began organizing group trips to Spain for its members.”³³

In Italy, leftist opposition to the Franco regime coincided with the interests of the local tourist trade, which faced rising competition from less expensive, more exotic Spain. A wave of theatrical anti-Franco displays swept across the country in 1962 and 1963 as protesters urged Italians to boycott travel to Spain. A Munich daily reported a “cold war” over tourism between Madrid and Rome, adding, “It is no secret that the political agitations against Madrid that have taken place in Italy have been promoted not so much by Communist organizations as by economic organizations.”³⁴ But loud public manifestations appeared to resonate even less in Italy, Europe’s historic tourist Mecca, than they had in Scandinavia. As a Center-Right Roman daily opined, “Tourism,

whatever its goal, is based fundamentally on liberty. He who wishes to go to see with his own eyes the true conditions of a foreign country (whether it is Spain or the Soviet Union) should always be encouraged, not obstructed.”³⁵ Far from arousing the political passions of Italian tourists, the campaigns appeared to confirm the developmentalist postulate that social peace and economic growth were greater political goods than formal democracy. In a scripted interview about the affair with a sympathetic Italian journalist, Fraga commented,

Anti-Spanish campaigns are . . . a source of concern for the Italian, not the Spanish government . . . All the bombs in the anti-Spanish campaign have exploded in Italy, while in Spain we enjoy absolute peace . . . It is not difficult to see why even the Italian press is distancing itself from this anti-Spanish effort. Perhaps it is our serenity and the futility of their efforts that further irritates some sectors.³⁶

The serenity was disturbed only briefly in January 1966, when an accident involving an American B-52 left multiple thermonuclear devices afloat in waters near the tourist center of Palomares, in the Almería province. For some the incident proved the folly of permitting American military bases in Spain, though considerably more foreign and domestic concern centered on the possible contamination of tourist beaches. Fraga exploited his celebrity to diffuse the situation, going for a dip in the January water with a pair of aides before Spanish and American camera crews.³⁷

The apparently apolitical character of leisure travel benefited a government that most postwar Europeans found distasteful. Far the greater concern, according to Rodríguez-Acosta, was the need to keep prices down while also addressing “problems derived from the poor state of our infrastructure, particularly transportation and municipal services.”³⁸ Officials bristled at suggestions in the foreign press that prices in Spain were on the rise. New York’s *Journal of Commerce* reported that the “considerable increase in cost of living in Spain . . . will cause a reduction in tourism.”³⁹ A West German daily announced, “Spain is becoming more expensive.”⁴⁰ The accusations were correct, as the SGT was forced to permit hotel rate increases in order to keep the industry solvent, but after 1963 authorities took special care to “reduce to a bare minimum” any discussion of changes in price regulations, in order “to avoid provoking the foreign press to initiate an alarmist campaign about rising prices of Spanish hotels.”⁴¹ To offset perceptions, promotions authorities also settled on a new advertising slogan: “*España, país barato*” (Spain, an inexpensive country).⁴²

Hotel price reform was a key to the industry's sustainability. Although low prices were necessary to attract tourists, they made the hotel industry increasingly less attractive for entrepreneurs. By 1960, as legal hotel rates remained frozen at levels established before the major currency devaluation, construction costs had risen by 34 percent and overall the price index by 25 percent.⁴³ As they had in the 1940s, hotel operators began again to add unwritten surcharges and limit service in order to remain profitable. León Herrera remarked that such practices resulted in "irritation suffered by clients" and reinforced common stereotypes about the Spanish merchant's devious character.⁴⁴ After consulting the National Hotel Syndicate, Herrera concluded that individual hotel owners should be given some flexibility in setting their own prices within a framework of limits based on category. This would foster an atmosphere of "security and permanence" in which entrepreneurs confidently could "invest in new hotel establishments and in improvements, modernizations, and expansions of existing ones."⁴⁵ The ministerial order eliminating strict state price controls on hotels took effect on November 7, 1962, constituting the first major reform of the two-month-old SGT.⁴⁶ Under the new system, hotels were permitted to raise their rates by up to 10 percent so long as they but were committed to published and posted prices throughout the calendar year, with no added fees. Travel agents throughout Europe received the SGT's annual *Guía de Hoteles*, a listing of all hotels, their amenities, and rates. Tourists were encouraged to report any discrepancies, and the SGT announced it was "prepared to impose truly exemplary sanctions" against any establishment failing to conform.⁴⁷

The question of prices was closely related to overall strategies of development and modernization. More liberal price schemes made tourism more favorable for investors and strengthened the hand of an industry dependent on open exchange and traffic flow. For all the concerns on the part of moralists and conventional industrialists, tourism had become Spain's most internationally competitive good, a fact not lost on competitors. According to a Parisian daily, France, Europe's tourist paradise in the 1950s, had "lost the battle for tourism" to Spain by 1964.⁴⁸ Bordeaux's *Sud-Ouest* explained, "The battle for tourism has been won in Spain with prices alone."⁴⁹ Italian tourism faced similar problems. West German travelers began to abandon Italy, traditionally their favorite destination, in favor of the less expensive resorts of the eastern and western Mediterranean. By 1963, Spain nearly matched Italy in reception of West German tourists.⁵⁰ The Bundesbank reported that West Germans spent 7.4 percent more on summer tourism (April to

Table 5.4 Foreign arrivals (thousands) and % increase from previous year in six European countries, 1955–1963

	<i>Established receptor countries</i>			<i>New receptor countries</i>		
	<i>France</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Switzerland</i>	<i>Spain</i>	<i>Greece</i>	<i>Yugoslavia</i>
1955	4,010 (+11%)	6,200 (+13%)	3,704 (+8%)	2,522 (+29%)	195 (+24%)	485 (+51%)
1956	4,305 (+7%)	7,000 (+13%)	3,831 (+3%)	2,728 (+8%)	206 (+5%)	393 (–19%)
1957	4,310 (+0%)	7,900 (+13%)	4,146 (+8%)	3,187 (+17%)	249 (+21%)	497 (+26%)
1958	4,070 (–6%)	8,000 (+1%)	4,119 (–1%)	3,593 (+13%)	254 (+1%)	598 (+20%)
1959	5,051 (+24%)	8,600 (+8%)	4,586 (+11%)	4,194 (+17%)	301 (+19%)	833 (+39%)
1960	5,613 (+11%)	9,100 (+11%)	4,949 (+8%)	6,113 (+46%)	344 (+14%)	872 (+5%)
1961	5,800 (+3%)	9,600 (+3%)	5,368 (+9%)	6,641 (+22%)	440 (+28%)	1,079 (+24%)
1962	5,975 (+3%)	10,300 (+7%)	5,597 (+4%)	7,726 (+16%)	541 (+23%)	1,241 (+15%)
1963	6,500 (+9%)	10,600 (+3%)	5,471 (–2%)	8,795 (+23%)	672 (+24%)	1,754 (+41%)

Source: Walter Hunziker, "Vision générale des problèmes de croissance du marché touristique internationale," *Revue de tourisme*, 21:1 (Jan.–Mar. 1966). Reprinted by permission.

September) in 1964 than 1963, but 24 percent less in Italy (see table 5.4).⁵¹

While Spanish tourism faced the onset of low-cost competition to the east, the SGT also geared up for French and Italian renewal. The Italian minister of tourism announced an "Emergency Plan" in 1964 to improve infrastructure and advertising, while limiting prices. More comprehensive plans, including large fiscal investments, were unveiled the following year.⁵² French authorities initiated similar projects.⁵³ The Spanish alleged that French and Italian efforts to reinvigorate their tourism industries included publicity campaigns directed against Spain. Rodríguez- Acosta cited "numerous articles" published in the French press to "discredit our most dynamic and developed tourist zones."⁵⁴ In July 1965, he attacked an Italian study, published in the *Common Market Business Report*, which had claimed that the price of a Spanish holiday exceeded prices in Greece, Italy, Yugoslavia, and Austria. At his insistence, the journal later published Spanish-supplied figures suggesting quite the opposite.⁵⁵

With intensifying competition, the continued health of Spain's tourism industry increasingly appeared to require coordinated action to improve quality and maintain competitive prices. Jorge Vila Fradera, a leading industry figure, advocated the adoption of a more long-term outlook, noting in a 1964 interview, "from this moment we need to end improvisation and think about consolidating the profitability of this fabulous investment . . . We need to mature a good deal in this respect if we are to continue to progress with ease."⁵⁶ In order to gain support for the cause, Fraga harnessed the valuable political currency of internationalism,

social peace, and evidence of modernization at every level of Spanish life. In a 1965 interview, Fraga predicted that the “snobbish fad” of visiting Communist countries would be short-lived and that most tourists would continue to gravitate to places like Spain, where they could find “freedom of movement and maximum security.”⁵⁷ But Fraga’s public confidence belied the problems he would face within his own government in attaining support for an agenda to ensure long-term sustainability of the tourism economy.

Tourism and the Development Plan

The fundamental debate centered on whether the tourism industry should be treated as a situational windfall, or as an integral aspect of long-term growth. As a leading advocate for the latter point of view, Fraga scored a quick victory in attaining the creation of a state-financed National Tourism Company (*Empresa Nacional de Turismo, S.A.*, or ENTURSA), in November 1963. Fraga’s success in establishing ENTURSA is more notable for its political significance than for the firm’s actual achievements, which were largely corrupt and often counterproductive (see chapter 7). From the perspective of state enterprise, tourism long had shown promise as an area for investment. Plans for such a firm had been gestating within the INI since 1950, but twice had failed to gain cabinet approval in 1957 and again in 1962. The idea met resistance on the one hand from old-guard Francoists uncomfortable with any state involvement in tourism, and from economic reformers seeking to limit state enterprise on the other.⁵⁸ Odds scarcely seemed better in 1963 in light of a delicately phrased criticism in the recent World Bank report that the INI “creates certain motives that conflict with wise investment.”⁵⁹

Rather than persist with unconvincing economic arguments for creating ENTURSA, Fraga chose a strategy appealing to orthodox Francoist nationalism. In a missive to Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco’s most trusted and hard-line advisor, Fraga suggested three concrete projects for ENTURSA, each with religious and nationalist value: if established, the firm would develop the Camino de Santiago pilgrimage route, a foremost symbol of nationalist Catholicism, in addition to major resorts in “certain areas of political interest, like, for example, the Campo de Gibraltar and Ceuta,” the latter being one of two remaining Spanish outposts in North Africa.⁶⁰ Projects such as these would yield, admitted former INI director Juan Antonio Suanzes, “inevitably strong annual losses.”⁶¹ Yet these kinds of political objectives, combined with

demonstrations of ENTURSA's commitment to investing in areas untouched by private capital, proved more effective in obtaining approval than prior attempts to demonstrate financial solvency. In an atmosphere of unprecedented long-term development budgets reaching nine figures in dollar terms, the cabinet approved ENTURSA's creation with a modest billion-peseta (\$16.7 million) budget in November 1963.⁶²

Although the ENTURSA project indicated the growing momentum of Fraga's tourism agenda, his most important role would be as an advocate for private tourism interests in the overall framework of economic planning. The centerpiece of economic policy after 1963 was the Plan for Economic and Social Development, which became a wide battleground for the conflicting sectoral, regional, and ideological interests seeking allocations. The subsequent balancing act was a political struggle in which considerable power was concentrated in the hands of Laureano López Rodó and his Development Commissariat.

On balance, the Plan was partly an effort to channel large amounts of state and private investment into construction and infrastructure, and partly a vast political spectacle intended to demonstrate a link between rising Spanish living standards and the regime's institutionalization.⁶³ The Plan's public investments doubtless made significant contributions: vast sums were poured into the purchase of industrial and irrigation equipment, to improving road transportation, and to new urban developments. Priorities laid out in the Plan also shaped impressions about the form that development would take and how private investors might benefit.

The principal mouthpiece for tourism interests in López Rodó's commissariat was the Tourism Committee, headed by SGT directors Arespachaga, Herrera, and Rodríguez-Acosta. The committee also included leading industry figures, such as hotel magnate José Meliá and prominent travel agent Enrique Marsans.⁶⁴ The committee, not surprisingly, took the stand that "the solution to problems like sanitation and urban development . . . has an intimate connection to tourism development."⁶⁵ The basic goal was "to expand receptive capacity,"⁶⁶ which both would reduce the "appearance and increasing severity of the congestion typical of the areas most preferred by tourists," and enable "many areas of Spanish territory significantly [to] increase their share of reception of new tourist currents."⁶⁷ Rodríguez-Acosta, as a director of Spain's Local Credit Bank, promised to give priority approval to projects involving tourism development.⁶⁸

López Rodó did not share the Tourism Committee's enthusiasm for tourism as a central pillar of development. Infrastructural projects were

the domain of other administrative branches such as the Ministries of Public Works and Housing, who would likely protest any cession of their jurisdictional authorities to centralized tourism planning. López Rodó preferred to limit the SGT duties to allocating state hotel credit, promotion, inspections, and other basic regulatory functions. An internally circulated draft of the Plan referred to tourism as an “activity of temporary [*coyuntural*] character,” which “cannot by any means signify a permanent form of revenue.”⁶⁹ Moreover, contrary to the document’s overall tone of exaggerated optimism, it projected a 67 percent increase in tourism revenue by 1967, well below the 118 percent increase actually experienced.⁷⁰

López Rodó’s reluctance to concede a central place to the tourism economy was attributable to a combination of factors. These included a fear of reducing Spain’s impressive economic gains to the apparent wind-fall of tourism and a belief in cultivating a diversified economy. Though the doctrine of industrial self-sufficiency of the 1940s had largely faded, tourism was seen to leave certain regions—typically those with the weakest economic base—uncomfortably vulnerable to the caprice of international travel markets. López Rodó’s assertions also reflected the general skepticism among *Opus Dei* technocrats over the desirability of promoting a tourism economy. In a 1963 address highlighting the successes of the Stabilization Plan, Ullastres omitted to mention tourism even once, even though a Foreign Ministry report the same year stated, “The improved situation of our balance of payments owes fundamentally to the balance of services, and, above all, tourism.”⁷¹ In 1964, Navarro Rubio referred to “this flood” of tourists as “highly worrisome.”⁷²

Tourism officials reacted with ire to the evident contempt for their activities on the part of López Rodó and his allies. The Tourism Committee “register[ed] its disagreement with the qualification of ‘temporary’ assigned to tourism,” and declared to the entire bureaucracy its determination “to dispel all remaining skepticism about tourism as an economic activity.” León Herrera feared that the Plan’s lack of attention to tourism would give the public “the impression that investment in tourism is not only unadvisable, but possibly seriously risky.” The Plan was, he continued, “tinted with an evident pejorative feeling” against tourism, and “could seriously affect private sector plans for investment, considering that [investors] may deduce that the [government] is not particularly interested in a phenomenon which it considers transitory.”⁷³

The Plan’s published version, which appeared in October 1963, mollified SGT concerns only somewhat. Indeed, Rodríguez Acosta accused López Rodó of “practically ignor[ing]” the Tourism Committee’s recommendations.⁷⁴ On the other hand, López Rodó’s commissariat did

remove the controversial phrase, “temporary phenomenon,” previously used to describe the tourism economy. Following an irate telephone call from Rodríguez-Acosta, López Rodó also agreed to include this brief passage on the significance of tourism to the overall development project authored by the angry undersecretary:

[Tourism] also will impel the development of backward regions. Particularly in the Southeast and in certain regions of the interior, tourism will permit not only an increase in living standards, but also will underpin the profitability of external economies necessary for development.⁷⁵

To those who found Spain’s reliance on tourism shameful, the SGT responded, “The existence of a strong surplus in our tourism balance is not an extraordinary circumstance either, given our level of development and our geographic position.” Tourism revenue offset 90 percent of Spain’s trade deficit—the highest proportion in Europe, to be sure, but “comparable to other countries well disposed for tourism, like Yugoslavia (87 percent), Italy (80 percent), Austria (74 percent), Greece (70 percent), and Switzerland (61 percent).”⁷⁶ Indeed, the proportional contribution of tourism to the Spanish economy peaked between 1963 and 1967, declining steadily thereafter even though net receipts continued to rise.

The SGT also sustained that the fiscal code revealed a bias against the holiday industry. Although tourism was equivalent to a vital export, the government continued to tax hotels as luxury services until 1969.⁷⁷ The question of taxation was of considerable importance for Fraga’s tourism development strategy, which required maintaining low prices without alienating investors from the hope of profitability. In 1965, Fraga appealed to Navarro Rubio to eliminate the tax “in the conviction that this would benefit an industry which finds itself in difficult circumstances at a critical moment of its maturation.”⁷⁸ Fraga pled that French hotels were failing because they were “largely suffocated by taxes,” whereas rising competitors such as Yugoslavia were “adopting fiscal measures . . . with clearly competitive aims.”⁷⁹ But Fraga’s efforts, though they enjoyed the support of the prominent government economist and Costa del Sol financier Higinio París Eguilaz, met stiff resistance in the cabinet. Seen another way, the tax revenues from hotels funded the municipal infrastructural and service improvements necessary for a healthy tourist industry.⁸⁰

As data on foreign tourism continued its rapid upward trajectory, López Rodó began to grant the industry greater recognition. In 1966,

the development commissar revised his earlier stance, declaring in an interview with *Editur* that, as a source of revenue, tourism “had no reason to dry up.”⁸¹ López Rodó’s changing attitude toward tourism also likely was related to the participation of large construction firms and military figures-cum-investors close to the regime in the build-up of the Costa del Sol.⁸² The development commissar’s changing sentiments only belatedly assuaged SGT concerns that he ultimately sought to undermine investment in tourism. The second development plan, released in 1967, was more friendly toward the sector: “The expansion of foreign tourism will be promoted, promotion abroad intensified, and, . . . given their special importance of to the balance of payments, the incentives and benefits to tourism-related industries will be improved.” Rodríguez-Acosta greeted López Rodó’s warming with caution, calling it a “triumph, . . . though it appear[ed] rather tenuous and light.”⁸³

Extending Development

In addition to seeking a more visible role in economic planning, tourism authorities hoped to gain control over all aspects of the tourism industry, including development, financing, zoning, and regulation—responsibilities hitherto spread across numerous administrative bureaus. Franco’s cabinets already had thwarted two prior attempts to attain this, rejecting a proposed Law of Centers and Zones of National Tourist Interest in 1957 and 1960. The issue resurfaced at the outset of Fraga’s tenure, precipitating a dramatic clash among various economic and political interests—including conventional industry, foreign and local tourism developers, state ministries, and municipal authorities.

The conflict between resort tourism and conventional industry was the most fundamental and conspicuous. An increasingly confident tourism sector began to challenge “anti-touristic” industries, which Spain’s standard tourism textbook defined as those “whose presence near or within a receptor nucleus produces major or minor nuisances,” including “cement factories, certain fertilizer plants, petrochemicals, metallurgy, foundries, mining, fishing, and livestock raising.”⁸⁴ The issue reached intense levels by 1962, a period when some of Spain’s traditionally poorest regions, particularly along the southern and south-eastern littorals, encountered tourism and industrial development projects with equal force. Before 1963, disputes typically were resolved at the local level, often with ineffective compromises. The Andalusian town of Motril, lying at the western fringe of the Costa del Sol, found the “bright future” for its “handsome and well-conditioned beach”

threatened by an INI initiative to situate a cellulose plant there.⁸⁵ A Belgian and an American hotel developer both suspended their investments in Motril over the issue, failing to take comfort in the promise to build an undersea drainage system to flush contaminated waters from the plant beyond the reach of bathers.⁸⁶ INI trustees protested that protecting the beach at Motril implied “a complete forfeiture of any future industry,” and accused land speculators of waging a campaign to drive them out.⁸⁷ The company delegate was undoubtedly correct that Motril’s landed interests stood to gain more from tourists than from cellulose. Nearby, in the more established resort city of Málaga, another INI enterprise proposed an underwater oil pipeline terminating at the city’s main port. Though he acknowledged the potential benefits of such a project, the mayor cautioned,

Industrial growth lies in the future; and the present impressive reality—which we need to defend above all else—is the privileged place Málaga enjoys in today’s tourism market and the undeniable international resonance as the capital of the Costa del Sol . . . This great truth that nobody can deny has brought with it an indisputable rise in the standard of living and thousands of jobs today for Malagueños . . . Our obligation is the defense of the present good fortune against a future of which we are less certain.⁸⁸

The disputes in Motril and Málaga were resolved with arbitration in a manner fully satisfactory to no party. The Motril cellulose interests complained that obligations to build costly waste-removal systems would “hamper future investment” in industries other than tourism.⁸⁹ Perhaps the most arresting example, if less important in economic terms, occurred in Toledo, a living monument to Iberian history of millenarian proportions. In 1963, a prominent nationalist historian appealed to Fraga for assistance fighting a plan, drawn up by municipal authorities in the 1950s, to turn the town of 40,000 into an “industrial city of 250,000 inhabitants.”⁹⁰

In light of such episodes, the Ministry of Information and Tourism argued that effective resolution of such conflicts would require meticulous zoning on a national scale. Such zoning was attractive to Fraga and his staff for two reasons: first, it would resolve the perpetual conflict between tourist and “anti-tourist” industries in a manner generally favorable to the former; moreover, comprehensive zoning would expand state control over infrastructural quality and over the developers themselves. By 1963, Fraga’s ministry was preparing a framework for a

national tourism zoning law. Arguing in support of the law, ministry officials appealed to long-term economic strategy—befitting a government dedicated to framing development plans in four-year intervals—as well as to a growing sense that the period of economic liberalization begun in 1957 had run amok:

The State . . . must assume the defense of the common good in the face of the actions, in many cases irresponsible, of liberal capitalism, which seeks, fundamentally, to maximize private short-term profitability without consideration for the damage that individual actions can cause to the collectivity.⁹¹

According to the ministry, a *laissez-faire* regime had permitted the development of tourist cities of retrograde quality. Many new sanitation and hotel facilities were unacceptable, and the “unique character of agriculture and fishing villages” along the Costa Brava had given way to a “Babel of touristic constructions, which totally has erased the character of the town.” The law, therefore, was “not only about obtaining the maximum economic benefits,” but would also “help resolve social, political and ethical problems . . . In this way we can protect attractions and natural beauty, expand the mass tourist demand toward potentially favorable areas, [and] use the tourism sector as a factor propelling regional development.” Finally, the proposal noted that the problems it described were not specific to Spain—the Côte d’Azur was experiencing a similar problem—but “we believe, without guilt of presumptuousness, that we can be ahead of other countries in overcoming them.”⁹²

The chief argument for national zoning was that municipalities were powerless by themselves to combat speculation and unregulated development. Many lacked municipal ordinances for construction and land use, and occasionally even engaged in illegal land speculation themselves, “as they only seek short-term economic results, ignoring aesthetic value.” The Ministry of Information and Tourism called for a system whereby municipalities or private developments applied for status as a tourist center or zone rather than being so designated from Madrid, as in earlier proposals. Eligibility would be based on the concentration of tourist facilities and adequacy of municipal services. Designated “Zones and Centers of National Tourist Interest” would receive tax benefits, considerable tariff reductions on imported goods such as wine necessary for tourist accommodation, preference for state building credit, and fiscal amortization for five years. Moreover, “anti-tourist” industries in tourist zones would be subject to stringent safety, pollution, and noise

requirements. In return, participating municipalities would submit to tighter regulation of all aspects of urban development and rigorous inspection of tourist facilities.⁹³

The ministry's claim to holistic and exclusive domain over tourist zones piqued other ministers, who considered the law a challenge to their jurisdictional authority and were reluctant to cede excessive power to a single ministry. But Fraga enjoyed the tailwind of a growing preference within the regime for state-led developmentalism. Mass tourism had acquired considerable momentum, and, in view of the country's persistent trade deficit, was essential. The initial version of the proposed law was correspondingly ambitious, giving Fraga's ministry virtually total control of all construction, inspection, public works, and fiscal policy of tourist areas. All land development ventures in designated centers would be subject to approval by the Ministry of Information and Tourism, which also enjoyed the right to collaborate with the Ministry of Housing on all related urban planning. More expansive tourist concentrations, those possessing a lodging capacity of 5,000, qualified as Zones of National Tourist Interest, would be subject to thorough regulation and inspection by the Ministry of Information and Tourism.⁹⁴

The proposed law proved excessive for other cabinet ministers, who with some reason feared the disproportionate influence of a large tourism bureaucracy—and one headed by a powerful reformist—in some of Spain's most dynamic areas where population expansion and state investment were projected to be comparatively high. Some defended the right of municipal authorities to control their own tourism development, as was increasingly the case in France and Italy.⁹⁵ From the perspective of the Ministry of Housing, the law amounted to a slight to local urban planners "for the benefit of a set of very specific interests . . . in the face of the community."⁹⁶ The public works minister, Jorge Vigón, who generally was more favorable toward central coordination of tourism, warned that the law, as it stood, would lead to "redundancy, convoluted rationalizations and execution, and the expectation of administrative silence—a dangerous practice."⁹⁷

In its final version, approved in December 1963, the Law of Centers and Zones of National Tourist Interest was the result of extensive compromise. The Ministry of Information and Tourism ceded much of the control over tourism centers it had sought to consolidate. As León Herrera recalled, "It was a controversial and difficult law with a long parliamentary gestation, especially where it concerned the competencies of other departments, some of which acted as though these were primordial and untouchable."⁹⁸ Though the cabinet unanimously approved the law,

the intent of the project had been, in Fraga's judgment, "mutilated."⁹⁹ Nevertheless, the basic concept of tourist zoning was established and the ability to close "anti-touristic" establishments retained.¹⁰⁰ Final authority for approving applications rested with the cabinet, but endorsement by municipal, provincial, and syndical authorities and the Interior Ministry was a precondition for all aspirants. Once a center or zone was established, no fewer than seven ministerial authorities were implicated in monitoring the various aspects of planning and compliance.¹⁰¹ The process was therefore far more complex than the Ministry of Information and Tourism initially had envisioned.

The law's final version fell between the two stools of total centralization on the one hand, and the committed devolution of authority to local control on the other. The original legislation would have favored centralization, encouraging tourist municipalities to submit voluntarily to thorough state management of municipal services and development. The Ministries of the Interior and Finance, however, shared an interest in short-circuiting this provision, which they feared would hand too much power to the Ministry of Information and Tourism. Both wished to devolve more authority and revenue to municipalities, their chief clients, possibly in anticipation of a coming battle over the post-Franco succession.¹⁰² The Ministry of the Interior was simultaneously preparing a revised Law of Local Governance (*Ley de Régimen Local*), which would grant more not less authority to municipalities in all forms of coastal development. After its passage in 1964, the latter law would remain in unresolved cohabitation with the tourism zoning law down to the end of the dictatorship. The result of the ministerial clash was a compromise in which Ministry of Information and Tourism control was too limited to prevent poor development, yet municipalities remained unequipped to impose reasonable quality standards on developers.

Though center or zone status was in principle based on the objective criteria detailed in the 1963 law, the cabinet initially displayed a marked preference for proposals that would contribute to geographical diversification of tourist areas. By September 1964, the cabinet received 42 petitions for consideration as a tourist center or zone. Of these, it granted eight of twelve applications from interior regions and eight of thirteen from the less developed coastal provinces of the southwest Atlantic region. Only seven of fifteen from the heavily congested Mediterranean were granted and none from the northern coast was approved.¹⁰³ By 1969, the number of centers and zones had grown to 79, all but 17 being coastal or insular.¹⁰⁴

Although Herrera would later characterize the heavily amended Law of Center and Zones as “a frustrated opportunity that would have contributed to the prevention of much destruction of the countryside,” it was in fact effective where it was applied.¹⁰⁵ Probably without exception these met state standards for tourist zoning, including requirements for adequate green space, municipal services, and height restrictions for buildings.¹⁰⁶ The haste with which new tourist constructions were being realized during the 1960s, however, meant that most developments initially did not qualify for designation as a center or zone. For many that might have, the implied fiscal benefits of center or zone status provided insufficient incentive to submit to tighter regulation. As a consequence, numerous qualified petitions were therefore never put forth. In 1966, the DGPT estimated that only about 14 percent of Spain’s 40,000 hectares of tourist developments fell under the law’s jurisdiction.¹⁰⁷ The consequences of the regime’s failure to adequately regulate tourism development are discussed in detail in chapter 7, and indeed contributed greatly to subsequent disillusionment with the Franco regime’s ability to properly manage the industry. Despite the criticism, it is difficult to imagine how an effective regulation might have looked given the intensity of low-cost tourism development during this period and the deeply rooted political struggle over state involvement in its promotion.

Apart from offering zoning incentives, the SGT possessed two other mechanisms for extending the reach of tourism development: (1) by encouraging direct foreign investment, and (2) in unattractive areas where this was not forthcoming, by offering Spanish entrepreneurs inexpensive financing through the Hotel Credit program. Although foreign investment subsequently became one of the bogeymen of Spain’s uneven tourism development in the 1960s, direct foreign participation was in fact quite limited, and, where present, exercised a palliative effect on development imbalances. The SGT predicted that undeveloped areas would be most attractive to investors in view of lower land and labor costs.¹⁰⁸ Yet levels of direct foreign investment disappointed expectations, especially in hotels and short-term residences. Foreign participation amounted to less than 6 percent of Spain’s total hotel assets, accounting for 10,805 out of the country’s 218,455 hotel rooms. West Germans, Belgians, and the British were the largest sources, accounting for roughly one-fifth of foreign investment each, with other West European countries, Mexico, Lebanon, and the United States contributing smaller sums. As expected, foreign capital tended to concentrate in newly developed areas. Participation was well above the national average in the

provinces of Tenerife (24 percent), Cádiz (20 percent), Las Palmas (12 percent), and Alicante (9 percent). In the older resorts of the Balearic Islands, Gerona, and Barcelona, the combined figure was merely 3 percent. The exception to this pattern was Málaga, an older resort area where foreign capital owned 19 percent of hotel rooms.¹⁰⁹

The course would change somewhat over the next five years as a result of West Germany's Strauss Law of 1968, which entitled West German investors to substantial tax benefits for investing in "developing countries," among which Spain was classified. This law produced a considerable effect in the Canary archipelago, which was by this time in a rapid phase of resort development. By 1973, 40 percent of all capital there was foreign, predominantly West German, less in the form of large capital concentrations than in single-family second homes. Local lore claimed that when West German chancellor Willy Brandt vacationed in Fuerteventura in August 1973, land values on the tiny Atlantic island quadrupled.¹¹⁰

Where foreign investment failed to reach, the Hotel Credit program provided the state a tool to extend tourism development. This program had been more symbolic than real before 1963, but in the era of the Development Plans became a significant source for financing hotel construction, accounting for one-third in the period from 1963 to 1969.¹¹¹ Hotel Credit enabled the SGT to channel investment away from saturated zones. In 1965, the mayor of Benidorm complained to Fraga that not a single request for Hotel Credit for his district had been granted, whereas substantial amounts went to the less congested Canary Islands.¹¹² The SGT similarly earmarked Hotel Credit funds for other untouched regions, including 14 grants in areas specially designated as anchors for future tourism development.¹¹³ Considerable lip service was paid to developing alpine areas and cultural attractions in the interior, though such aspirations only began to be realized in the 1980s. As table 5.5 indicates, the hotel industry's disproportionate attraction to the seaside became even more exaggerated during the 1960s.

Despite the limited government and foreign intervention, the lion's share of investment in tourism still took the form of domestic and relatively small concentrations of capital. Its most lucrative activity was not to operate a hotel or restaurant, but rather to engage in land speculation, which was often carried out in blatant defiance of the Terrains Law (*Ley del Suelo*), and often by people with close ties to complicit authorities. As a result, although the sector possessed little direct political influence in comparison with large industrial firms or banks, it was quietly reshaping the peninsula's economic geography and in consequence the

Table 5.5 Hotel capacity (total beds), 1963 and 1969

<i>Province</i>	<i>1963</i>	<i>1969</i>	<i>% change</i>
Balearic Islands	38,391	107,070	+179
Madrid	27,387	61,958	+126
Barcelona	30,852	60,280	+95
Gerona	39,709	56,572	+42
Canary Islands ^a	12,048	29,202	+142
Málaga	10,902	21,232	+95
Alicante	8,127	17,794	+119
Rest of Spain	96,480	111,278	+15
Spain Total	263,896	465,386	+76

^a Includes provinces of Tenerife and Las Palmas

Source: *Guía de Hoteles*, various years.

regime's political priorities. With many more foreign tourists arriving in Spain's erstwhile backwaters, the task of demonstrating Spain's progress under Franco grew more challenging. Populations and regions that otherwise would have received little attention in the war on difference quickly became its most active and concentrated fronts.

Domestic Infrastructure and Image Abroad

If political embroilments rendered zoning initiatives ineffective, similar criticisms cannot be levied against efforts to improve sanitation and transportation. These two areas, both of which long had been considered Spanish deficiencies vis-à-vis European civilization, enjoyed a high level of government commitment to concerted interagency action. Consensus formed around the need for more direct state attention, since negative foreign impressions of public health and sanitation could severely damage the entire enterprise of tourism promotion, and, indeed, the Franco regime's gradual advances toward acceptance in Western Europe.

Until 1963, responsibility for coping with sanitation infrastructures rested with local and provincial authorities. The state provided funds and technical expertise to municipalities and provinces based on a formula devised in 1940 accounting for towns' permanent populations. This system proved inadequate for the challenge of accommodating populations that suddenly doubled or trebled in the summer. A 1960 law addressed the problem only in part, promising a 50 percent reimbursement for water-supply improvement projects to certain municipalities of the Costa Brava, Canary Islands, and Santiago de Compostela, with a slightly more generous allowance for the Costa del Sol.¹¹⁴

The new developmentalist government took more decisive action in 1963 with the creation of the Central Sanitation Commission (CCS), charged with aiding “many locales and districts to overcome traditional stagnation and the accelerating demographic growth . . . brought about by labor migrations, industry, and tourism.”¹¹⁵ Despite the inclusive language of its mandate, the CCS, a dependency of the Ministry of the Interior, was an instrument in the service of tourism development in all but name. In July 1963, CCS directors called for “the tightest collaboration with the DGPT.”¹¹⁶ In support of the CCS, Rodríguez-Acosta argued that “sanitation and tourism objectives perfectly coincide,” for improvements in sanitation made tourist areas “most attractive to foreign capital.”¹¹⁷ Despite their disagreements on several issues, the Ministries of Information and Tourism and the Interior jointly studied ways to improve sanitation. Interior Minister Camilo Alonso Vega told Fraga that he supported “the close collaboration of our ministries in coordinating solutions to the problems of urban sanitation in general and beaches in particular.” The creation of the CCS would permit, “in a relatively short period, our country to be among the best equipped with service and facilities, with the related benefits, especially for our tourism.”¹¹⁸ CCS director Enrique de la Mata believed that “the problems of water supply and sanitation in tourist areas . . . require special attention, principally because of the economic potential of their inhabitants and because of the dangers of all kinds that may result should we keep on with the present situation.”¹¹⁹

The situation to which Mata referred was one of marked unevenness. Sanitation improvements already were underway on the Costa Brava by 1964. As for Majorca, its urban sewers and water-supply system were good, but insufficient for the summer season when tourists colonized coastlines stretching far beyond urban centers.¹²⁰ Newer resorts were in worse condition. At Benidorm, the provincial CCS delegate reported in 1964 that sewers served only 18 percent of the population. A few resorts relied on septic wells or cesspools. Hotels all along the Mediterranean coast routinely flushed their wastewater directly into the sea, whence the tide frequently carried it back toward shore, occasionally to populated beaches.¹²¹ To blame was a system that permitted private tourism development to take place without simultaneous public urbanization. Experience was teaching that the private sector could not be relied upon to provide adequate municipal services even in its own developments.

The national water supply was similarly uneven. Samples collected by CCS delegates revealed troubling levels of contamination (see table 5.6). The Canary Island province of Tenerife reported that fewer than half the

Table 5.6 CCS survey results on water supply and sanitation in coastal municipalities, 1964

<i>Province</i>	<i>Municipalities surveyed</i>	<i>Number with sufficient water supply</i>	<i>Number with adequate sewage</i>
Gerona	16	7	0
Barcelona	33	18	4
Balearics	14	0	0
Sta. Cruz de Tenerife	11	8	1
Guipúzcoa	6	3	4
Vizcaya	14	3	1
Santander	16	2	3
Asturias	2	0	0
Lugo	6	0	0
La Coruña	34	0	0
Huelva	8	0	0
Cádiz	8	6	4
Málaga	6	3	1
Granada	17	8	2
Almería	6	1	1
Murcia	6	0	0
Alicante	12	3	2
Valencia	22	5	0
Castellon	12	1	2

Source: Dirección General de Promoción de Turismo, "Informe sobre el problema de abastecimiento de agua y saneamiento en las zonas turísticas," Nov. 1964, IET CDTE CM-38-I.

samples taken were free of contaminants. Almería and Granada respectively found 25 percent and 31 percent of their samples collected to be undrinkable; further up the coast, the Murcian delegation found 96 percent samples to contain unacceptable levels of bacteria. The exceptions were the Cantabrian provinces of Oviedo and Santander, both older tourist centers, which reported drinking water to be fairly safe. Despite repeated requests from the CCS directorate in Madrid, the major tourist provinces of Gerona, Alicante, Málaga, Madrid, and the Balearic Islands failed to return results. In all, the DGPT concluded that the situation was "frankly dangerous" and warned of "a possible epidemic . . . with disastrous consequences for the reception of the enormous masses of tourists which invade the coasts."¹²²

Sanitation inadequacies were the source of genuine preoccupation on the part of Spanish tourism promoters. Sewage management, according to the DGEAT, was deficient "in entire peninsular and insular littorals,

which are precisely the regions which receive the heaviest weight of tourist population and constitute the site of most large tourist urbanization and construction projects." Typhoid fever was common in Spain compared to other European countries: a 1959 report estimated 30,000 cases per year. Due to the disease's endemic nature, most Spaniards had acquired immunity to infected water, but, "by contrast, the virtual inexistence of such fevers in feeder countries for our tourism such as Germany, the Scandinavian countries, England, and France, makes visitors from these countries maximally susceptible to contracting these illnesses."¹²³ Fear was acute: the director of public health in the Gerona province admitted to a British diplomat in 1963 that "he draws a sigh of relief when each summer is over, as the water supply and sewerage systems on the coast are still primitive and there is always danger of an outbreak of typhoid."¹²⁴ A 1963 typhoid outbreak in Switzerland disrupted tourism there, an event that alarmed even Franco. The Caudillo told a confidant of his "worries that [his government] would neglect sewage and public health, causing a case of typhoid, as has happened in Switzerland, and that this would create a panic, causing a reduction in tourism difficult to overcome."¹²⁵

Mobilized to combat "anti-Spanish" propaganda, tourism authorities harbored a reflexive sensitivity to any intimation of poor or dangerous conditions. When the CCS delegate of Granada province announced plans to eradicate hepatitis and leprosy in 1964, he "counseled journalists to make only small reference to this, as not to publicize what might still constitute a danger for attracting tourism."¹²⁶ Rumors in the British press alleging that typhoid had afflicted five British girls on holiday in Blanes, on the Costa Brava, prompted the Ministry of Information and Tourism to issue an immediate denial to 17 British dailies. The statement claimed, probably falsely, that "there has not been, nor is there at the moment, any case of typhoid, paratyphoid, or intestinal infection in the town of Blanes." The ministry attempted to establish reasonable doubt of Spanish culpability in the girls' illness, submitting "that [the children] did not return directly from Blanes to England, but traveled through another country (France)." Finally, it entreated "foreign correspondents . . . to visit Blanes and inspect the sanitary installations, as well as to inspect the potability of the water."¹²⁷

Regardless of the accuracy of the Blanes allegations, Fraga and others recognized that typhoid was a major liability to Spanish tourism. Following the episode, Fraga and the Spanish ambassador to London shared the concern that inviting British technicians to inspect drinking water "carried the possibility of certain risks."¹²⁸ The ambassador

received several complaints from British tourists about intestinal difficulties in Spain, including one who reported:

In spite of prophylactic doses of Entro-Vioform tablets, and the usual precautions with water and all foodstuffs washed in water, all of us were to a greater or lesser degree infected. I think it is fair to say that at any one time during our visit, between 5 and 10 percent of the hotel residents were affected with this malaise. It was certainly the focus of conversation in the hotel, and amongst English people even took precedence over the weather! You may well judge by this how seriously they regarded it.¹²⁹

The Alicante provincial delegate confessed that complaints by a British couple of stomach sickness “have broken the chain of our tranquility.”¹³⁰

Worries that the entire edifice of Spain’s tourism economy could collapse under the weight of a parasite provoked the administration to act. Based on experience along the Côte d’Azur, the CCS concluded that direct sea dumping was not advisable, and that most Spanish towns would require the construction of sewage treatment facilities. Over the winter of 1964–1965, representatives from provincial governments and the Ministries of Information and Tourism and the Interior worked to devise a broad and rapidly attainable solution. In January 1965, Arespacochaga sought to take advantage of “the present climate regarding the issue of sanitation” to obtain state funds for other urban clean-up programs.¹³¹ On May 10 the Ministry of the Interior announced an “Urgent Plan for Sanitation Works in Tourist Locales,” affecting 73 municipalities in 15 provinces. The plan’s total budget reached 2.43 billion pesetas, nearly quadrupling the existing allocation for such projects.¹³² In the event, less than half of this amount was distributed in 1965, although nine provinces were added to the original list of those in urgent need.¹³³

Sanitation remained sporadically problematic, but the overall situation improved dramatically in heavy tourist areas. In a 1968 report on Spain’s tourism infrastructure, Rodríguez-Acosta considered remaining infrastructural deficiencies in coastal water supply and sanitation to be “small” and of the sort “that could be observed anywhere.”¹³⁴ Concerns moved inland: he observed of one historical village in Old Castile, “The problem with Miranda del Castañar is that its eighteenth-century character is not limited to architecture and art, but extends to its standards of hygiene and services.”¹³⁵ Though no longer commonplace, sanitary improvisations had not disappeared completely from seaside resorts. An Austrian resident in Alicante warned Fraga in 1969, “We cannot imagine

the damage if it became public knowledge abroad that numerous Benidorm hotels have been receiving their water from wells located less than eight meters away from cesspools.”¹³⁶ As late as 1974, an Irish travel writer charged, “Too many hotel toilets . . . are discharged directly into a sea area too small to permit natural purification of the discharge.”¹³⁷ In the judgment of Spain’s ambassador to Dublin, such complaints were “reasonably founded” and “should not be ignored.”¹³⁸

As with sanitation, state concern with transportation infrastructure was closely tied to tourism, and, moreover, deemed generally to be inadequate. The Falangist daily *Arriba* editorialized in 1963 that “we need to recognize that our highways and airports are not functional, proper, comfortable, nor accessible for the tourists who are visiting us.”¹³⁹ Three years later an Italian correspondent observed of Spain’s national and provincial highways, “The majority are narrow, disconnected, and poorly protected.”¹⁴⁰ Already behind schedule in ambitious plans for roadway modernization, the regime now also faced demands to expand capacity and improve the efficiency of air travel, as coastal resorts opened faster than regional airports could be built. Air travel was becoming a necessary component of the emerging model of tourist practice, by which tourists arrived by air to a coastal resort and then took short excursions either with tour groups or individually.¹⁴¹

In contrast to the administrative mayhem surrounding the Law of Centers and Zones of National Tourist Interest, coordinating transportation policy with tourism interests proved relatively easy. Coordination was simple not because of the newfound influence of the tourism economy, but because, broadly speaking, there was little conflict between tourism interests and the general needs of roadway improvement. Recommendations of the 1962 World Bank mission to Spain typically coincided with the major tourist itineraries along the Mediterranean and Cantabrian coasts and those linking Madrid to the periphery. The World Bank’s only major recommendation was the construction of a 750-km. limited-access highway stretching from the French border along the Mediterranean coast to Murcia, which matched the SGT desire to “complete the basic tourist itinerary from the French frontier to Murcia.”¹⁴² Like the tourism industry itself, priorities for highway development were disproportionately centrifugal. In 1965, the cabinet approved 78.9 billion pesetas for roadway improvement. Fifty-three percent of this amount was designated for Mediterranean coastal provinces, which accounted for 30 percent of the Spanish population. Atlantic provinces, accounting for 22 percent of Spain’s inhabitants, were to receive 35 percent of the highway budget. The remaining 12 percent would go to interior provinces, chiefly Madrid.

Where their interests did not overlap casually, transportation authorities were largely impervious to direct pressure from tourism advocates. Roadway planners refused to approve a modern highway from the Costa del Sol to Ronda, considered a priority by the SGT.¹⁴³ The SGT pressed for the improvement of several stretches of road along the northern coast and the Costa del Sol highway from Marbella to Estepona. Seeking to depict the urgency of their cause, the SGT warned, "Italy will spend 85 billion pesetas on highways over the next five years."¹⁴⁴ But frequent promises that "the problems of transportation . . . will be solved very soon," as the SGT announced in 1964, went unfulfilled.¹⁴⁵ Rodríguez-Acosta was also a tireless advocate of minor road projects to improve access to remote monuments that might lure motorists to otherwise obscure towns. He typically received negative replies, including this frank answer from the director general of roadways in 1968:

I think . . . it would be very interesting if we could dedicate our attention to these projects, which, if small, would enhance the touristic interest of many places in our country. Nevertheless, at the present stage the Radial Program for improving the major itineraries and access to cities completely absorbs our available credit and lamentably forces us to postpone local improvement projects.¹⁴⁶

Yet the assiduous undersecretary's persistence finally was obliged in 1968, when the Ministry of Public Works introduced a "Plan for Tourism Highways" providing a modest budget of 250 million pesetas (\$4.7 million) to undertake 15 projects in interior mountainous areas lying outside the main radial network.¹⁴⁷ Tourism only became an explicit criterion in highway priorities after 1970 under the direction of public works minister Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora. A celebrant of the *primorriverista* tradition of technocratic authoritarianism, Fernández de la Mora would later recall undertaking four major highway improvement projects from 1970 to 1973, elaborated "with the objective criteria of tourism."¹⁴⁸

In the new mass tourism, the "*camino y posada*" paradigm of travel known to Jovellanos and Primo de Rivera was supplemented with a third component, the chartered airplane. Like roadways, civil aviation improvements were linked directly to regional tourism development.¹⁴⁹ Emphasis was placed overwhelmingly on the coasts and islands, a small airfield at Santiago de Compostela being the sole exception. Three new airports at Alicante, Almería, and Gerona followed the broad SGT strategy to reduce congestion by diffusing the tourist traffic across a wider

stretch of Mediterranean coastline. The long-anticipated Gerona airport, opened in April 1967, at last allowed the bountiful British air charter industry to land its planes directly on Spanish soil rather than across the French border at Perpignan. By the time of its completion, Spanish civil aviation authorities had authorized 1,200 British, 47 Spanish, and 23 West German charter landings, though not a single noncharter flight. Six hundred kilometers southward down the coast, the Alicante airport opened the following month with 160 charter flights scheduled. Considerably less auspicious was the new airport at Almería, which was built only because ENTURSA was planning a major coastal development nearby. By the time of the Almería airport's opening, not a single flight had been scheduled to land there. Hoping to reduce potential embarrassment, Rodríguez-Acosta was moved to suggest, "Could not Iberia at least establish a regular Madrid-Almería line?"¹⁵⁰

Yet other projects could not be completed soon enough. This was particularly the case with the Ibiza airport, which was equipped only to receive small planes from the larger neighboring island of Majorca. Ibiza was the recipient of massive spillover from Majorca, which was actively shunned by Minorca, its nearest neighbor, already home to a prosperous leather goods industry and an active antitourism priest. Virtually unknown on the island before 1960, tourism grew in Ibiza proportionately faster than in Majorca from 1960 to 1970; in 1965 the island of 37,000 inhabitants received 103,000 visitors, increasing to 351,000 five years later.¹⁵¹ Ibiza's main client, the West German operator Touropa, cautioned that failure to expand the Ibiza airport promptly "would significantly worsen our product and be a poor recommendation for traffic to Ibiza."¹⁵² The Spanish response underscored the dominant position of Northern tour operators: Rodríguez-Acosta insisted to civil aviation authorities that "this matter is extremely important," and "the present circumstances are decisive in the competitive battle we are having with Italy to capture the [West] German tourist market," which by this time was "the only market from which Spain can extract new tourist currents."¹⁵³ Spain's airport officials answered Rodríguez-Acosta's pleas, ordering the Ibiza airport's rapid renovation. The expanded facility opened in July 1966, provoking a take-off in the island's tourism even more dramatic than Majorca experienced: in 1968, 160,000 foreign passengers arrived by air; in 1974 the island received 500,000.¹⁵⁴

In all, though political contests diluted some of Fraga's ambitions for tourism, the industry's growth and extension made basic infrastructural services impossible to ignore for a regime that increasingly staked its legitimacy on its capacity to reassert Spain's international prestige. When

Fraga joined the cabinet in 1962, the notion was generally accepted that tourism revenue was fundamental to the strength of the Spanish economy and a useful auxiliary to foreign policy. Yet the decision to encourage and perpetuate this situation was controversial, and one can imagine a plausible counterfactual scenario in which the tourist infrastructure were allowed to languish as tourists moved on in greater numbers to other Mediterranean destinations. Struggles in the cabinet and in the Development Commissariat over whether to consider sustainable tourism a priority indicated the degree to which Spain's developmentalist era was neither apolitical nor technocratic. Indeed, the urgent considerations of tourism were the source of considerable leverage for Fraga as he cultivated a liberal persona that would preside over major relaxations in press censorship laws and regional language restrictions.

The puritanical paternalism of the Catholic technocrats collided with Fraga's reformist liberality for a final dramatic time in 1969 when the so-called Matesa corruption scandal surfaced. A major Spanish textiles firm allegedly exploited connections with *Opus Dei* figures in the government to circumvent export restrictions. Fraga took the opportunity to countenance a press campaign denouncing his entrenched rivals, a move that led to his own downfall rather than theirs. But by the time Fraga left the Ministry of Information and Tourism in 1969, the bureaucratic-authoritarian vision of managed industrial capitalism, which attempted to combine liberal economic exchange with immutable political and social institutions, was increasingly untenable. Not only had government resources gone to improve the tourism infrastructure, but considerable private wealth, including that controlled by traditional elites, also had been poured into tourist urbanization and much entrepreneurial energy spent by municipalities and individuals seeking a share of the profit. The new coalition of interests that emerged in support of the tourism industry during this period harbored a commercial rather than industrialist disposition, which, as chapter 6 argues, favored a self-consciously open, liberal, and decentralized society over the protectionist authoritarianism of the 1940s and 1950s.

CHAPTER 6

Touristic Consciousness

Public awareness of foreign tourism as a transcendent aspect of Spanish life rose dramatically over the 1960s. The previous chapter chronicled its impact on economic geography and developmentalist politics, resulting in the reconfiguration and reprioritization of various political interests. Here, the project is to explore a parallel and more diffuse aspect of the tourist boom: a broad mobilization in Spanish society around the idea that tourism was the driving agent of rapid economic and social transformation and of Spain's improving standing in Europe. These attitudes informed the behavior of a new generation of government functionaries; sparked debates among journalists and clergy; and led countless entrepreneurs, laborers, and towns into a business about which they knew nothing. They fueled an obsession among Spaniards of the 1960s to accept and to present their country as unambiguously "European," to erase the stigma of difference, whether this meant refinement and technical ability or hedonism and unquestioning tolerance. Tourism acquired over the course of the 1960s a multidimensional political significance of which development economics was only one aspect.

The participation of ordinary Spaniards—both as hosts and, increasingly, as tourists themselves—was now fundamental, a sharp contrast from the invisible and largely abstract revenue source depicted in prior discourse. A ministry manual written to encourage youth to enter careers in tourism warned of a "danger" that "the explosive growth of tourism . . . should become incorporated into our national life without penetrating our collective consciousness." The manual's author, Ricardo de la Cierva, a committed young *franquista* working in the ministry and later a celebrated historian, well would have understood the transformative potential and potential problems of developing international resorts in isolated regions, he himself being a native of the desolate Mediterranean province of Murcia. He called for the cultivation of a "national touristic

consciousness,” arguing, “Spain has at this moment a very clear vocation of tourism.”¹ Fraga’s public pronouncements drew from a similar lexicon: he remarked to the trade union daily *Pueblo*, “we must create and invigorate an authentic ‘touristic consciousness,’ considering that tourism is a national enterprise or ‘task’ that demands citizens’ collaboration . . . and constitutes a responsibility of all Spaniards without exception.”² In his speeches, the minister frequently declared tourism to be “Spain’s European vocation” in an era when no single foreign policy goal eclipsed that of attaining tighter relations with the European Economic Community.³

Despite having become integral to Spanish economic policy during the 1950s, mass tourism was not yet a part of the regime’s or indeed the country’s public face. One indicator of the regime’s reluctance had been the official newsreel *Noticiarios-Documentales* (NO-DO), an important propaganda instrument shown before all cinema screenings.⁴ From 1950 to 1958, the NO-DO produced only 11 segments on tourism among over 800 reels. Tourism received somewhat greater attention in the reels in 1959 and 1960, with 7 related items screened in each of those years, but these deemphasized the mass aspect of tourism. Segments largely were restricted to news of international celebrities choosing vacation spots in Spain. Yet news of Charlie Chaplin’s 1959 *veraneo* in the “authentic paradise” of Majorca and the arrivals of Xavier Cugat and Elizabeth Taylor in the Costa Brava belied the massive and downmarket character of foreign tourism in both locations.⁵ The NO-DO hitherto avoided reducing the tourist boom to images of crowded beaches, reporting instead on items such as news of a travel agents’ convention held at the Valley of the Fallen, a gargantuan monument of National-Catholic architecture near Madrid, and a Barcelona exposition promoting cultural tourism in Spain and elsewhere.⁶ Tourism virtually disappeared from the reels in 1961 and 1962, surfacing only in one single segment featuring Franco inaugurating a new Parador.⁷

Despite official downplay, there were signs in the 1950s that nongovernment institutions had begun to accept the idea that foreign tourism was a significant component of society and economy. Throughout that decade, Spain’s only *bona fide* tourism industry expert was Luis Bolín, who in 1952 lamented “the unfamiliarity in this country with these kinds of international affairs, owing to the isolation Spain has experienced during recent years.”⁸ But what Bolín had once characterized as the “largely undefined” tourism educational system gradually developed, as a younger crop of civil functionaries took interest in the field. The first Spanish specialist to join an international tourism

organization came from outside the ranks of state administration. He was José Ignacio de Arrillaga, a young economist whose University of Madrid doctoral dissertation, "Tourism in the National Economy," was published in 1955.⁹ By 1957, Arrillaga had begun running a seminar in tourism studies at the University of Madrid and his colleague Luis Fernández Fuster taught "Tourism Theory" at the Official School of Journalism.¹⁰ Similar courses would be added at the University of Barcelona by 1961.¹¹

The press began to address the issue of foreign tourism as well; however, under scrutiny from Arias Salgado's restrictive Ministry of Information and Tourism, editorialists did not venture beyond generic platitudes about its moral value. A commentator in *ABC* mused in 1957, "Tourism opens a great breach in this wall of misunderstanding between non-communicating countries . . . The final result is a progressive spiritual opening between one and the other: rivals come to understand each other."¹² The Falangist *Arriba* extolled the "new postwar tourism, open to all ordinary people seeking spiritual fulfillment," which "unites us, ties us together, and makes us all a bit more like brothers."¹³ Others explored the motives of the modern tourist: "To exit the habitual for a few days, for a few weeks, is the object of massive tours of our time," opined another *ABC* editorialist.¹⁴

Abstract optimism in the Spanish press would gain shape and momentum only after Fraga took over the ministry from Arias Salgado in 1962. Coverage remained on balance favorable, following cues from the expanding state information apparatus dedicated to the subject, and added to this was an agenda to connect the tourism industry with a wider sense of national mission. Spaniards were encouraged to consider how tourism might benefit their own local districts, especially those lying beyond the reach of heavy tourist traffic; to embrace the values and customs associated with international leisure practices; and to consider their own diversity and idiosyncrasy in the context of a diverse European civilization founded on common principles, practices, and experiences.

The Erosion of "Difference"

Fraga's ministry recognized and exploited the close connection between its two functions—information and tourism policy. Having begun as an accidental appendage of the information ministry in 1951, tourism became a central feature of its overall information strategy in the 1960s. Official discourse began to link tourism with modernization and international peace

and present it increasingly as an issue of national interest. Tourism featured among the protagonists of a yearlong media campaign in 1964, engineered by Fraga, to commemorate “25 Years of Peace” since Franco’s victory. A radio message prepared by the SGT, aired nationally as part of the campaign, developed the themes of modern mass consumption, Rostowian modernization, contempt for romantic reductionism, and the emergence of a new Spain at the forefront of modern Europe’s mass leisure civilization:

These past years—so replete with profound transformations in Spanish life—have enriched our history with a phenomenon so new and peculiar that it continues to be the object of analysis and controversy: the phenomenon of tourism. We say that tourism is a new phenomenon because in its present form it is essentially distinct from the tourism our grandparents knew; it is a phenomenon of the masses, the keystone of the stage researchers of economic development have christened with the name “mass consumption.”

A large part of Western Europe already has reached this level of development, and this is why increasingly significant numbers of tourists flow in peaceful waves toward regions and countries other than those of their habitual place of residence . . . If we were asked to create a slogan, we could say: “the Spanish Sun at the Gates of Europe.” [The Sun] is the principal attraction, the new Golden Fleece of the age when man moves nearly at the speed of sound.

As a factor in tourism, peace should not be a term bandied about recklessly. It is not a cliché for export because its veracity must be proven each day by tourists on the ground. It must be a deeply-rooted peace, because if it is a cloak for underlying misery this doubtless will be discovered. It must be a peace in the realm both of deeds and of thought.

And the prolonged and solid Spanish peace has been and is the yeast that has given rise to our “geographic omnipotence.” In the face of the Hemingways, the Dos Passos, the Koestlers, the Ehreburgs, and other decadent or revolutionary aesthetes who were only interested in the wounds of our martyrs or our villains, 12 million tourists this year will see first hand the truth about our peace. It is a different Spanish society that attracts them, it is another social circumstance which is making Spain the promised land for the foreign tourist.¹⁵

Messages to this effect increased considerably in number after Fraga’s arrival and, moreover, were qualitatively distinct from those produced up to that time. Between 1950 and 1962, tourism formed the subject of one of every fifty NO-DO clips. From 1963 to 1969, it was featured in one of eleven, often every week during the summer.¹⁶ If this increase

reflected the industry's expansion, thematic emphasis shifted in parallel fashion. In contrast to the serene and elite vacation paradise depicted in earlier segments, newsreels of the Fraga era emphasized the mass aspect of Spanish tourism, its relationship to broad processes of modernization and international relations, and, rather more misleadingly, the decisive role of government intervention in its success. A 1963 reel depicted Rodríguez-Acosta unveiling "Operation Tourism 1964" to journalists and discussing "the successes achieved in the past year in which the creative capacity of [the SGT] was fully demonstrated."¹⁷ Another from 1964 informed cinema viewers that "Spain is on pace to break all known records on tourist flow across its frontiers . . . Customs personnel are working without interruption . . . The tourist authorities are on alert to ensure that lodging and souvenirs from our country are in full supply," adding mindfully, "Spain is a country open to all and where foreigners feel at home."¹⁸

Another principal motif of the NO-DO features was the links among tourism, urbanization, modern infrastructure, and economic development. One segment narrated,

Until a few years ago, Benidorm was a small Alicante locale asleep in its own history . . . Today it is an important population center which we have seen grow by the year and by the day, and now we admire the liveliness of its streets and the splendor of its buildings. A dynamic city, with a spirit of initiative supported by the beauty of its location on the Mediterranean coast, created a miracle.¹⁹

Another international tourist center, Palma de Majorca, was "an aircraft carrier" that "would not function if not for its expertly designed transport system." A new highway linking the city to the airport boasted "three surface-level interchanges and two more at other levels, one of which is the most important of its kind, revealing the beauty of the new public works . . . The phenomenon of tourism on this gentle island has attained proportions unknown anywhere else on the planet."²⁰ Another international resort, the Costa del Sol, was likened to "a freeway with no speed limit."²¹

Publicists found other creative ways to depict the tourism industry as a broadly national phenomenon. Television producers occasionally turned a "millionth" arriving tourist into a temporary celebrity, greeting him or her at the airport with cameras and reporters. Not surprisingly, such selections were too significant to leave to fate; in 1969, Fraga ordered "that the next 'millionths' be carefully selected both for their country of

origin and their destination in Spain so that all regions may participate and nobody is left without a millionth tourist." To accentuate the affair, Fraga would "personally receive the 20 millionth" in 1969.²² In addition, the SGT designated an annual "Day of the Tourist" in which film crews documented a day in the journey of a handful of foreign tourists.²³

Other campaigns aimed to combat foreign impressions of Spanish incivility. A series of radio announcements in 1964 reminding listeners to "Keep Spain Clean" (*Mantenga limpia España*) was, in the judgment of the DGPT, successful in reducing litter and other unsanitary practices. The following year, the office staged a similar assault against unseemly street noise. The DGPT outlined a media campaign entitled, "Spain, a country of silence and repose," which would combine frequent repetition of the slogan with firmer municipal enforcement of noise ordinances.²⁴ A more sensitive issue involved the use of bulls in bloodsport, an ancient Iberian practice that in equal measure fueled foreigners' intrigue and contempt toward Spain. In 1965, the ministry explored the issue of animal cruelty practices in traditional celebrations throughout the country. *Capeas*, or informal rounds of bull baiting, had been outlawed at proper bullfights by the Primo de Rivera dictatorship, but the practice survived in numerous local festivals. The ministry was cautious about eliminating popular festivals, which it considered "a strong motivation for tourism" and important for "the conservation of the national folklore."²⁵ Authorities identified 17 festivals featuring *capeas* or similar practices, recommending modification or "softening" (*dulcificación*) rather than outright prohibition for all but two "Bulls of Fire" festivals that were deemed immitigably cruel. They opted to call attention to similar rituals in southern France and Latin America rather than to broach the politically sensitive questions of outlawing local customs.

Government efforts to make Spaniards more conscientious of their role as popular diplomats occasioned one other intriguing episode of self-reflection. In 1966, Fraga received an anonymous letter warning of the prejudicial effects of the *piropo*, a flirtatious comment commonly directed by men toward female passersby, for the country's civilized image. A law created during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship prohibiting such gestures, even when made "courteously," had fallen into disuse. The correspondent ventured,

The authorities' leniency in punishing these acts . . . compromise[s] the good civic customs of which we Spaniards so often boast—such as

chivalry, *hildagüía*, and hospitality . . . [and] returns us to times past of flamboyance, coquetry, and the old ways of the *España de pandereta*.

Women are constantly bothered by this legion of the poorly mannered. Above all, it is foreign women who are bothered by the practice. If we want to increase tourism, we ought to be a bit more proper.²⁶

Ministry officials took these comments to heart, taking note of the vigilance their Italian counterparts claimed to exert in this regard. Rodríguez-Acosta soon urged the Ministry of the Interior to stem such offenses. "It is not a bad thing," he commented, "that two undersecretariats should address such a serious matter. Perhaps it would be convenient to give instructions—not too severe—to the police to reprimand those who display such crudeness."²⁷ The extent and manner of any such incidents must be left to speculation.

If authorities worked to curb Spaniards' untoward habits, they were visibly tolerant of those imported by tourists, mainly to avoid appearing "different" in their moral standards. Confrontations between Spanish Civil Guardsmen and impudent beachgoers over standards of permissible behavior were unusual but news of them was highly diffused. This was largely a reflection of British yellow journalism, which for at least a century had made routine practice of sensationalizing isolated stories of misunderstanding between Spain and Britain. London's *Daily Express* reported, for example, that a 20-year old British woman spent two nights in prison for public kissing, though "the police said she'd been fined for 'gross immorality in a public place' and suggested there was more to it than a kiss."²⁸ Some in Spain interpreted such items as only the latest manifestations of a canonical anti-Spanish conspiracy. Ministerial archivists classified them as "direct attacks against tourism."²⁹ In 1963, the SGT accused West German sources of spreading "tendentious information about norms of dress on Spanish beaches" and referring "in a notoriously inexact manner [to] certain prohibitions on sunbathing in swimsuits." The result, officials feared, was "a general disorientation of public opinion" toward the belief "that Spain oppresses the tourist, a notion completely out of line with reality."³⁰ The Falangist daily *Arriba* responded aggressively to what it labeled, "The Legend of the Kiss":

The sensationalist press resorts to anything in order to discredit the attractiveness of Spanish tourism. But the direct testimony of the multitude of tourists who visit us provides the best refutation of the fabrications about our "Inquisitorial Customs."

Taking as pretext isolated incidents in which Spanish authorities have intervened against spectacles of nudism, shameful street scenes, and even attacks against national and religious symbols of the country, they have tried to create a hostile attitude toward Spain.

Their motive is, purely and simply, the traditional animosity that certain people hold toward us and the goal of undermining what is one of Spain's most prosperous industries and the best vehicle for mutual understanding that we possess.³¹

Spanish law formally restricted displays of naked arms and legs both on and off the beach, but enforcement of public decency laws remained a subjective exercise. The most potent symbol of foreign permissiveness was the ubiquitous bikini, the zenith of French seaside fashion upon which balanced fundamental questions concerning the outlook for a rapidly modernizing and increasingly open Spanish society. Though prohibited, it was generally though not always tolerated by the later 1950s. The mother of a Lancashire bikini model reported that for three weeks in Benidorm "we had no complaint about [my daughter], or about any other people on the beach wearing a bikini," and was therefore surprised when a Civil Guardsman later arrested her daughter for her choice of beach apparel.³² Ángel Palomino, a Nationalist civil war veteran turned tourism promoter, recalled that in the early 1960s, "a full bathing suit was required on our beaches, although in places frequented by [northern Europeans], laws began to be overlooked with regard to the bikini."³³ According to a Stuttgart daily in 1963,

Anyone familiar with Spanish beaches, from San Sebastián to Huelva, from Tossa to la Toja, will know that in all of these places women wear bikinis and nobody causes a fuss about it, nor does the Civil Guard respond with a scolding bayonet. Not only tourists, but also Spaniards like to bathe with two pieces.³⁴

If the Civil Guard was largely unconcerned, responsibility for the "policing of customs" fell to provinces and municipalities, which were left generally to their own initiative.³⁵ The government informed local police that it wished to intervene only in matters concerning "industrial abuses" such as price gouging and the improper employment of unqualified personnel.³⁶ Although it generally sought to limit municipalities' authority over coasts, the central tourist bureau made an exception in matters of "local policing of morality, health . . . and the good government of beaches and places for bathing and recreation."³⁷ By the early 1960s, a rough consensus materialized that revealing swimwear could be

tolerated on the beach but not on city streets. The SGT and the Ministry of the Interior jointly ordered all mayors to “demand the use of proper attire in public places and situations, distinguishing between the use of scant outfits in bathing zones and normal urban activity.”³⁸

What appeared to be an amenable compromise of tourists’ desires and local mores proved difficult to maintain. The Catholic daily *¡Ya!* commented, “Even within the wide margin of tolerance,” tourists customarily violated the rules with practices that were “anathema to healthy Spanish custom but often tolerated by owners and employees of establishments who depend on [tourists].”³⁹ A Catholic sociologist discovered that locals in Costa Brava communities frequently complained that police “neglect[ed] to enforce laws” governing public morality.⁴⁰ A small handful of church leaders directed their outrage specifically toward “indecent tourism.” The bishop of the Canary Islands attacked “the use of the bikini, which has become the symbol of the delinquency and degeneration of today’s woman.”⁴¹

Notwithstanding one state-sponsored study’s wishful prediction that the bikini was going out of style, the French fashion would continue to penetrate Spain and Spanish consciousness.⁴² Indeed, the rudimentary raiment was no longer limited to the foreign and fair skinned. Ángel Palomino wrote that the term *sueca* (Swedish woman) commonly referred to “any woman who is rather blonde, with a nonchalant air and behavior free of prejudice, repression, reserve, and at times, manners,” adding, “these ‘suecas’ are not, in Spain, always foreigners.”⁴³ Another revealing indicator was a 1969 NO-DO feature on the Costa del Sol depicting an exemplary *andaluza* outfitted in a wispy two-piece swimsuit stirring a bowl of gazpacho.⁴⁴ Spanish youth embraced increasingly libertine activities in this regard—a series of “Bikini Wars” contests at municipal swimming pools during the summer of 1970 being an especially striking example—and it appears that among the older generation, habituation led most often to a resigned acceptance of public displays of nearly naked female bodies.⁴⁵ It is not a little ironic that the columnist Francisco Umbral could later equate Fraga’s conservatism with the traditional Spanish “*Gran Señora*,” considering that Fraga presided over—and indirectly, encouraged—the erosion of hitherto dominant codes of feminine decorum.⁴⁶

The correlation between tourism and sexual permissiveness formed the topic of a subgenre of Spanish cinema that flourished between roughly 1965 and 1973. Mostly light musical comedies, these films met scant critical acclaim but continued to detain viewers of late-night Spanish television into the twenty-first century. Most emblematic was

Ramón Torrado's *Un beso en el puerto* (1965), in which a young peasant called Manolo comes to Benidorm for work and quickly learns to capitalize on his Don Juan act to seduce Nordic females on holiday. In the end, Manolo finds ultimate virtue in family life rather than the "dangerous game" he played in Benidorm. The leading actor in this and other similar films, Manolo Escobar, became an icon of Iberian masculinity and himself possessed an apposite biography, having migrated from rural Andalusia to Barcelona as a child and later marrying a German tourist. Interestingly, Swedish youth comics adopted a similar formula from the opposite perspective: after being courted by mustachioed, olive-complexioned natives, the young Swedish tourist returns home with a fair-haired fellow traveler she meets on holiday.⁴⁷

Such films reflected the early phases of the broader *destape*, or uncorking, of sexual permissiveness that would reach its boiling point in the years following Franco's death. There was a close correlation between European tourism and the increase in behaviors considered untoward in conservative society. Ángel Palomino's novel *Torremolinos Gran Hotel* portrays the Costa del Sol as a noisy and decadent enclave of cosmopolitanism in which every participant, from immigrant Moroccan taxi driver to glamorous English heiress, seems to be involved in one or another form of corruption or vice.⁴⁸ Palomino, a luxury hotel director who witnessed first-hand the kinds of episodes that he fictionalized, received Spain's National Prize for Literature in 1971 for the book. Distinguished by their cosmopolitan anonymity, the costas lie at the vanguard of the moral liberalization that would flourish in democratic Spain. Spain's first openly homosexual taverns operated in Torremolinos, where the presence of an international clientele prompted regime authorities to turn a blind eye. Such communities existed in other tourist areas as well by the early 1970s, whereas in obsessively modernist Barcelona and megalopolitan Madrid, homosexuals remained subject to arrest under delinquency laws.⁴⁹ James Michener's 1971 narrative *The Drifters* documented the international reputation of the Costa del Sol as a bastion of free love and recreational drug use, another reflection of a new social reality that spawned genuine fears among the older generation that imported hedonism was corrupting Spanish youth.⁵⁰

Debates over the limits of tolerance in such matters increasingly tilted in favor of indulgence and inclusiveness. In his treatise on the benefits of foreign tourism, Ricardo de la Cierva dismissed concerns over moral degradation as a "false problem." La Cierva maintained that, although "there is always a minimum of decency, . . . it is clear that the concrete limits of morality are relative and changing," and enforcement therefore "must be discreet and as invisible as possible."⁵¹ Most religious leaders

adopted a more accommodating and even relativistic posture as well, based on the principle, set down by Pius XII in 1952, that tourism had the power to convert “the strange, or even the irritating and ridiculous” into customs merely “different, often understandable, and even very prudent.”⁵² The increasing openness reflected a general tendency within the Spanish Church to adopt a more optimistic view of human nature and its ability to cope with freedom, especially after the reforms of the Second Vatican Council of 1962–1965.⁵³ Even the Bishop of Minorca, who had allied with the island’s industrialists to block tourism development in the 1960s, decided by 1972 that rather than keep them out he personally would greet arriving passengers with a “Tourist’s Prayer.”⁵⁴ Others courted tourists in less dramatic ways, posting multilingual mass schedules in local hotels indicating that Christians of all denominations were welcome, while overlooking more untoward tourist behaviors. Manuel Fraga recalled the cognitive dissonance of listening to the archbishop of Granada extol the benefits of tourism in plain view of an establishment called “The Sexy Nightclub” on a main tourist strip.⁵⁵

Fraga’s handling of the issue was guided by a pragmatic pluralism rather than the hope that religion and modern seaside leisure customs might achieve some kind of synergetic transcendence. Rather than stamp out the bikini, the Ministry of Information and Tourism encouraged religious groups to claim a share of the national tourist enterprise for themselves. The most significant initiative was the revival of the medieval pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela, discussed at length later. The SGT also designated a modest budget for “church-related activities and projects of touristic interest,” such as apostolic museums and monument restorations, available at the request of local diocese. The combined budget for 1964 and 1965 was 7.8 million pesetas (\$130,000); the same amount again was put toward the production of tourism posters and information promoting religious tourism.⁵⁶ As a matter of policy, national tourism assemblies always featured one or two sessions related to piety, such as “On Religion and Tourism” and “The Study of Moral and Social Issues Arising from Tourism.”⁵⁷

Fraga himself displayed limited sympathy for puritanical protesters. The minister advised one such critic to

keep in mind that certain positions are easy to maintain when one does not bear the burden of administrating the general interests of a country, but the situation turns around when one has to keep in mind all currents of opinion and reconcile the State’s responsibility to enforce good customs with the principle of liberty, the natural birthright of the human being.⁵⁸

Ministerial staff held privately that “the distention of the limits of traditional morality . . . would have occurred naturally even without tourism” as a result of mass communications and trade.⁵⁹ The enforced tolerance and tolerated assimilation of these habits was nevertheless associated above all with the arrival of tourism, long heralded as Spain’s modernizing and “Europeanizing” force *par excellence*.

Concern to present a civilized and modernizing Spain penetrated beyond the coasts and the question of public seaside morality. This attitude signaled the decline of the pastoral romanticism embodied in the slogan “Spain is Different.” As early as 1959, one Europeanist banker from Madrid lauded tourism for its ability to produce the very opposite effect: visitors “will no longer believe that we all go around dressed as bullfighters” and “will consider us a serious country.”⁶⁰ The major industry journal *Editur* encouraged travel agencies to reconsider their often singular emphasis on reductionist *españoladas* and develop sightseeing tours highlighting “contemporary themes, [such as] an impressive creation of modern architecture, . . . a great industry, a new distinctive neighborhood emerging in the city.”⁶¹ By 1963, the governor of Barcelona province could claim that “tourism industrialists are contributing to showing the real, true, and current face of Spain, leaving aside once and for all the Spain of the Zarzuela and the *pandereta*,” adding that “those who do not know how to do this should be barred from the tourism industry.”⁶² The daily *Madrid* editorialized that a few years of mass tourism had challenged “the mania abroad for imagining us as a people living in huts, resistant to comfort and modern life,” and revealed in “the stupefaction experienced by those who see . . . our Paradors, the great hotels, the traffic on our highways, and the high category of our women.”⁶³

In a country whose leaders staked their claim on economic growth and national prestige, quaint exoticism and sunny beaches hardly formed an appropriate image. As a DGT study on the development of pilgrimage tourism observed in 1962,

In recent years, the majority of the [promotional] efforts have been based on climate, beaches, sun and sea, Andalusian folklore, and other such motifs that, though they continue to be effective and relevant, are becoming a cliché.

The concern now is to change the face touristic Spain presents to the world. The concern is to present in a massive and dignified way attractions of another type, in order to compete with the countries of central Europe, which, perhaps for their lack of attractive climate, have capitalized on more cultural themes.⁶⁴

Some voices associated with the Institute of Tourism Studies, an official think-tank established early in Fraga's tenure, also called for the promotion of special itineraries featuring the Spanish master painters, namely Velázquez, El Greco, and Goya, though these were slower to emerge.⁶⁵

Generational change within the Ministry of Information and Tourism bolstered changing attitudes. In contrast to the patronage system characteristic of the civil bureaucracy in the 1940s and 1950s, all functionaries placed in the ministry after 1961 possessed university law degrees and had to demonstrate a breadth of training in languages, culture, sociology, and economics. As a general rule, the tourism departments attracted those less interested in the politically sensitive jobs related to censorship and information policy, possibly including some who were secretly opposed to the regime.⁶⁶

Salvador Pons, a product of this new system, replaced the retiring Rafael Calleja in 1961 and quickly departed from his predecessor's singular emphasis on the exotic. The slogan "Spain is Different" disappeared from all new poster series after 1961. New creations bore more neutral phrases such as, "Have you ever seen Spain?" Several important exceptions, including government-produced documentaries and guides, sustained the life of the prior slogan, but allusions to exoticism, particularly Andalusian folklore, were reduced dramatically during the first half of the 1960s. The diversity of themes and subjects featured in state tourism publicity grew dramatically and regional particularisms received broader representation.⁶⁷ Andalusia, the region of Flamenco dancers and Gypsies, had commanded 37 percent of advertising in 1952, but only 20 percent of the poster series produced from 1964 to 1969 (27 of 136 posters). Of these, only one depicted Flamenco dancing. Another contentious "Spanishery," the bullfight, was portrayed in only four. Receiving greatest emphasis were items of regional distinctiveness, principally popular architecture, local festivals and customs, and art. Fifty-one posters highlighted a specific region or locale. Religious imagery was also present, occupying 17 posters, compared with only two depicting beaches. Only after 1970 would the beach become more prominent in tourism advertising. Summer and winter sports, mainly sailing and skiing, comprised the content of 15 posters in the period 1964–1969.

A similar pattern was discernible in the informational brochures distributed in tourism offices in Spain and abroad. Like the poster series, these portrayed Spain as a "tourist's continent," each region worthy of a special visit. Regional distinctiveness replaced Andalusian folklore as the main theme: "Each [Balearic] island has its own features"; Murcia possessed an "unfathomable originality," and with respect to its Andalusian

and Levantine neighbors was “quite different.” Most striking was the treatment of the Basque country, where regional separatism has posed an intractable problem for Spanish nationalists. Despite the protests of one censor, a brochure produced for the 1964 season claimed that the region “not only constitutes a distinct and original region for its geographical traits, but also for its ethnic and cultural character. Expert ethnologists consider the Basque race to be the oldest in Europe, and its language reaches back to the Stone Age.”⁶⁸

Advertisements ostensibly aimed at foreign audiences, such as the poster and brochure series, made their greater impact domestically. The SGT promotional budget was small in comparison with the sums foreign tour operators spent on selling their packages to Spain.⁶⁹ Promotional materials were often scarce abroad, even at state tourism offices, but their introduction was well publicized in Spain. The production of a new tourism poster featuring a town or region always made local news and frequently occasioned the visit of a government official. Featuring a variety of regions and themes across the country, the corpus of posters indicated a broad national inclusiveness sensitive at once to strong regional identities and to growing objections that Spanish tourism was little more than sea, sex, and sun.

The Spanish exhibition at the 1964 World's Fair in New York City reinforced efforts to cast the image of a country quite at home in post-1945 Europe. The Ministry of Information and Tourism prepared a balanced and inclusive portrait of contemporary Spain. One section, entitled “Spain in Its History,” cited passages from eminent historians, including some, such as Claudio Sánchez Albornoz and Salvador de Madariaga, who had openly opposed the Franco regime. Likewise, the Communist poet José Hierro, banned in Spain, appeared beside the Catholic intellectual Florentino Pérez Embid in a booklet on “Arts and Letters in Today's Spain,” again demonstrating the primacy of renown over ideology as the decisive factor in such inclusions. “Spanish Man and Life” was to feature not only “spectacles, religious life, and diversions,” but also “sports, working life, the university, and the diversity of professions.” On more political themes, propagandists emphasized similarities rather than differences with respect to the postwar Western paradigm. Brochures highlighted welfare policy and the tightening relations between “Spain and the Common Market.”⁷⁰

The same year brought the release of a new official tourist guide book, *España para usted*, in eleven European languages.⁷¹ Authored and illustrated by the editorial cartoonist Máximo, the guide's playful appearance and frank tone sharply contrasted with the dense informationals

associated with the DGT in the 1950s. The guide adopted a studied Victorian elitism, “differentiat[ing] between ‘tourist’ and ‘traveler,’ ” inviting the latter to explore a country both proud of its traditions and eager for rapid change. It portrayed a dynamic country striving to shed legacies of isolation and backwardness: “Spain is currently suffering from a kind of language fever . . . a new language academy opens every day”; in reference to Spain’s long tradition of mendicancy, “Because of climate, habitat, or peculiar urges, perhaps, there are some Spaniards—very few, and fewer every day—who feel a holy horror at the thought of work. If you’re curious, stop and listen to them. They can be highly amusing.”

Although the phrase “Spain is Different” was inscribed on the lower portion of the booklet’s inner jacket, the text betrayed a more nuanced message. Of the most celebrated Iberian peculiarity, the bullfight, the guide posited “that boxing and foxhunting are crueler still.” And for skeptics who might protest that the bull is defenseless: “We advise you not to get in the way of his horns to prove your point.” Cuisine was presented in its regional diversity, unified only by the *tortilla española* available everywhere. Indeed the theme of “unity and diversity” surfaced throughout; the guide even acknowledged that “Catalan, Basque, and Gallego are spoken in their respective regions,” though it went unmentioned that this practice was formally outlawed until 1967. The modern Spanish state was described as a kingdom, which was formally correct although no dynastic heir to Franco had been named, and its political system a studiously vague “organic democracy.” The guide proceeded to define the main aspects of the Spanish character—pride, honor, affability, religion—and debase the stereotype of intolerance: “We don’t believe that we mount an *auto de fe* to burn at the stake all those who wear shorts in the city, or those disturbing bikinis at the beach.” Finally, the guide offered a candid statement of discontent over tourist reductionism and, simultaneously, a new direction in the regime’s propaganda strategy:

Something that irritates most Spaniards is corny “Spanishery” . . . [D]on’t say “toreador” for torero or matador, or keep on about Carmen and all that just to show how well up you are on things Spanish. “Spanishery” is a business mounted by certain Spaniards with an eye to the more ingenuous tourist.⁷²

As a counterpoint to well-known stereotypes, the ministry subsidized the production in 1965 of the glossy *España de Hoy* (Today’s Spain), a collection of color photographs depicting new highway constructions, aviation, factories, and modern urban developments. Though the book

promoted no particular regions or attractions, the DGPT deemed the project of “great usefulness for the promotion of tourism.”⁷³ Captions mingled astronomic growth statistics with evocations of social and industrial progress. The country’s transportation network was likened to a modern marvel in which “millions of tourists and millions of Spaniards circulate each year”; the construction of a Madrid–Barcelona highway relied on “highly modern machinery.” Five million air passengers annually bore witness to the “perfection [Spain has] reached in this modern mode of transport.” Expansive seaside hotels cast in modernist uniformity demonstrated the “highly modern installations cover[ing] the territory of our Fatherland for the recreation of all Spaniards.”⁷⁴

Efforts to update and diversify Spain’s tourist image penetrated foreign audiences more slowly. Although SGT materials had limited reach, package-tour vendors continued to churn out images of beach parasols, flamenco, and bullfights to sell Spanish holidays to their clients.⁷⁵ The very presence of Andalusian flamenco in Catalonia, coupled with its notoriously amateur quality, indicated the extent to which images of exotic Spain continued to be manufactured for foreign consumption.⁷⁶ Although soccer rapidly was supplanting the bullfight as the national pastime, foreign tourists provided a giant new audience for the latter. The number of *corridos* nationwide trebled between 1950 and 1975, and the number of professional *toreros* approached 300, compared with 149 during the entire nineteenth century.⁷⁷ In 1974, an American travel industry journal issue dedicated to “Selling Spain” featured a Spanish official’s lament that “most North Americans think of Spain only in terms of bullfights, flamenco, fiestas, and sunshine.”⁷⁸ Artistic treasures of Toledo, Madrid’s Prado museum, and Seville commanded some specialized interest, though art would not become a massive attraction until the Socialist governments of the 1980s invested considerably toward returning modern works of erstwhile dissidents such as Picasso and Dalí to their homeland. The Alhambra, the jewel of Islamic architecture in Iberia, was a consistent draw, possibly owing to its proximity to the Costa del Sol.⁷⁹ Survey after survey determined that European tourists still overwhelmingly came to Spain for climate, sun, and beaches. One compiled in 1970 concluded that 87 percent of foreign holidaymakers came to Spain for the beach, sun, and climate, whereas only 4 percent came to admire monuments and art.⁸⁰ Yet given the sheer numbers of tourist arrivals, even the small sliver of them interested in cultural attractions created a noticeable presence at the gates of the Prado.⁸¹ By the mid-1970s, some foreign advertisers had begun to recognize that tourists sought diverse attractions, ranging from some vanishing authenticity to

the vibrancy of Spain's urban life to the popular beach resort. Whereas promotions from the mid-1960s portrayed Majorca to Britons as "Blackpool with sun," a decade later analogous packages were expressly not for those who "only like English habits."⁸²

Reviving the Pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela

The theme of national resurrection, possibly the only discernible thread of ideological continuity over the life of the Franco dictatorship, again surfaced in the revival of the medieval pilgrimage route to Santiago de Compostela. This remote Galician town was home to the supposed remains of Saint James the Apostle, Spain's patron saint, and had become one of Europe's major pilgrimage sites between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries before undergoing steady decline thereafter. During the early stages of the Franco dictatorship, nationalist organizations began to reenact the pilgrimage as a component of Francoist political theater, but as a living pilgrimage for Spanish and other European Catholics the route remained an all-but-forgotten inkling of its golden age in the high Middle Ages.⁸³ The DGT also began to dedicate some attention to promoting pilgrimage tourism along this route stretching from the French frontier at Roncesvalles across the northern Iberian corridor to Galicia. The opening of a luxury Parador at the route's terminus Santiago de Compostela in 1954 coincided with a Holy Year, in which Saint James Day fell on a Sunday and the pilgrimage historically commanded greater interest. Participation in the pilgrimage, and interest in Santiago de Compostela as a tourist destination in general, grew steadily over the course of the 1950s. One guide book estimated that Santiago received a half-million visitors in 1962, though figures did not differentiate between pilgrims and other tourists; more conservative government figures stood at 350,000, but predicted a doubling to 700,000 for the Holy Year of 1965.⁸⁴

Opportunities for economic development in towns along the pilgrimage route otherwise untouched by tourism did not escape the attention of Fraga's team nor of numerous local commercial interests. Although the risks in exploiting religion for profit were self-evident, the nationalist-religious motive for investing in the pilgrimage route was easily adaptable to the immediate Europeanist concerns of the 1960s. A merchants' association calling itself the "Friends of the Route of St. James" asserted in a 1961 open letter to *ABC* that the pilgrimage "united Spain to Christian or European civilization, as it was the counterweight to the

influence of Islam that dominated almost the entire peninsula,” and hoped to promote the theme of “Pan-Europeanism and the Route of Saint James.”⁸⁵

With its combination of religious symbolism and commercial possibilities, the Camino de Santiago simultaneously represented opportunities for cultural diplomacy, regional economic development, and the establishment of a more respectable face for Spanish tourism. In 1963, the SGT announced its intention to “turn the Camino de Santiago into a living and current itinerary.” The goal, as Rodríguez-Acosta explained it to Franco’s conservative undersecretary Luis Carrero Blanco, was to “diversify the attractiveness of our country for tourists, and, as a consequence, attract a type of visitor with characteristics independent . . . of those who constitute the massive tourism on our coasts and beaches.” Moreover, he added, “by its very nature, the Camino is also a bond of European union, a political factor which in these times should not be sold short.”⁸⁶ Fraga emphasized similar themes in a 1965 essay:

In Medieval times, the route of the pilgrimage became not only the major commercial road of the North of Spain, but also the new profile of European unity . . . We must make it a national enterprise to update with modern means the ancient route.⁸⁷

Preparations for the 1965 Holy Year began in 1963. Work began on the second luxury Parador along the route, in León, even though the first at Santiago de Compostela continued to operate in the red. Minor road improvements were undertaken as well in the hopes that private investors would capitalize on the arising opportunities. The Falangist daily *Arriba* reported, “It is hoped that by 1965 the old Route of St. James will be in perfect conditions for transportation, and strategically situated Paradors and hostels will have emerged along the route for the convenience of the pilgrims.”⁸⁸ Spanish embassies in Paris and Rome were enlisted as well, charged with the delicate task of promoting the *Año Santo*, in the words of Rodríguez-Acosta, “with the appropriate discretion, to assure that a lay organization such as is a government ministry is not seen to be exploiting an eminently religious event for profit.”⁸⁹ Structural funds were even devoted to installing more mailboxes along roadways to facilitate the maximum diffusion of post cards.

Private interests responded to the revitalizing pilgrimage to a considerable degree. The provinces of León, Lugo, and Burgos, where the pilgrimage route represented the main tourist attraction, witnessed an 80 percent increase in hotel capacity from 1963 to 1969—somewhat

higher than the national figure of 76 percent and far in excess of the 15 percent aggregate for interior provinces outside Madrid during this period.⁹⁰ It was nevertheless the case that pilgrims spent neither as fulsomely nor as reliably as package tourists. During the summer of 1965, an SGT envoy reported that 5,000 pilgrims arrived in Santiago daily, but most “br[ought] their own snacks and lunches, including drinks,” then “abandoned the city at mid-afternoon.”⁹¹ Despite the massive influx of visitors, hotel occupancy barely reached 20 percent at its peak. The Paradors at León and Compostela also failed to surpass 20 percent occupancy throughout the 1960s, though this later increased among both foreign and Spanish clientele, so that by 1971 the two establishments became profitable.⁹²

Spanish and foreign, religious and secular, participants in the pilgrimage were now taking part in an event the government propagandists tried to associate with peace, internationalism, and the dynamic unity of European civilization—a sharp about-face from the “harmonic synthesis of the military and the religious” a Galician daily had described in 1948.⁹³ A pamphlet distributed in 1964 informed pilgrims that “the Route of St. James initiated the most fecund spiritual contacts among the Occidental peoples.” Such discourse associating the Camino de Santiago with Europeanism survived the Franco dictatorship, and later was adopted by the European Union and the Spanish crown’s preeminent cultural institution, the Prince of Asturias Foundation.⁹⁴

Diversification and Local Participation

The Camino de Santiago was just one among several programs to expand the geographic and thematic diversity of Spanish tourism. The Spanish state’s oldest tourism project, the Paradors, formed another, also proving to be a highly effective and visible means of expanding the presence of tourism in Spanish national life. Their bucolic settings and cultivated architecture diverted attention from the industrialized resorts of the coasts and islands, and it was generally assumed that Paradors attracted a more sophisticated type of traveler interested in seeing *la España profunda*. The 1960s and 1970s were a boom age for Paradors: 60 inaugurations took place between 1963 and 1977, events at which high-level government officials, camera crews, and occasionally even Franco himself, were present. Of these, 35 were placed in interior locales, all but three (Seville, Córdoba, and Granada) in areas lacking major monumental or cultural attractions. Only 5 of the 25 new coastal Paradors lay near existing resorts. By 1977, there were 95 Paradors in Spain, and 44 of the

50 provinces could claim at least 1.⁹⁵ It is impossible to know if Paradors would have functioned more efficiently as private establishments, but state management was not inept. The SGT netted a profit from the Paradors each year down to 1974, though a majority of individual establishments lost money. Altogether, Paradors received roughly one million visitors per year, just under half of them foreigners.⁹⁶ Though minor compared with the profound demographic and economic transformations of much of the Mediterranean coast, Paradors permitted a wider assortment of regions and tastes to participate in the tourist boom.

However praiseworthy the Parador program, it was a centralized state project that revealed little about municipalities' growing ambition to play a greater part in tourism promotion and development. By 1960, some 80 communities had established Centers for Initiative and Tourism (CITs), though these received no institutional recognition from the state.⁹⁷ Descendents of the nineteenth-century *syndicats d'initiatif* movement of Alpine Switzerland and France, CITs were local coalitions of merchants, civil administrators, and developers. Despite frequent national assemblies (the twenty-fifth was held in 1960), they were inconsequential in state-level policy making and typically possessed paltry budgets for promotion and development.

Soon after taking charge of the Ministry of Information and Tourism, Fraga and his staff envisioned the CIT network as a means to increase a sense of local inclusion in the national tourism project. The SGT began systematically to register such organizations, granting state funds to those able to submit complete records of activities and expenditures. During the second half of 1962, Juan de Arespacochaga of the DGPT paid visits to several local chambers of commerce to discuss local plans for tourism promotion and prod the creation of more CITs.⁹⁸ The spatial distribution of CITs across Spain reflected not the geography of existing tourist movement but the extent of local aspirations to capture a share of it. By 1966, 102 had been registered. CITs represented most of Spain's periphery, coastal and inland, but virtually none of the central Castilian plain. They did not tend to appear in saturated areas—there was not one on the Costa del Sol—but rather more often on the margins of major tourist areas: two inland Malagueño towns opened centers to catch excursionists venturing inland from the Andalusian coast.⁹⁹ The SGT kept reins on the extent of CITs' activities, limiting them to the role of planning minor attractions and local publicity. Local organizations with greater ambitions than this were denied recognition, as was the case with a group of tourism interests in Tarragona that sued for greater local control.¹⁰⁰ CITs were permitted to administer small local

tourism information offices, the management of more important tourist offices being left to provincial authorities or the SGT.¹⁰¹

Beginning in 1964, the DGPT availed funds to CITs to develop diverse projects related to local tourism promotion. Programs such as this formed the essence of the participatory mentality Fraga's Ministry of Information and Tourism sought to cultivate. Grants were given for a wide range of activities, many of which displayed little promise of capturing foreign revenue or enhancing international prestige, but all of which mingled civic improvement with leisure. The tiny Cantabrian village of San Vicente de la Barquera received 5,000 pesetas (\$83) to use as prize money for a local singing contest. More significant amounts, though rarely in excess of 300,000 pesetas (\$3,333), went to an array of projects including foreign-language courses for taxi drivers, equestrian competitions, golf tournaments, monument and harbor restoration, street lighting, school trips, and, in an increasing number of instances after 1966, the construction of public exhibition spaces at local churches. The program expanded each year: in 1967, 59 grants of over 15,000 pesetas, and many considerably higher, were awarded; by 1969, grants numbered in the hundreds, and were distributed in every province.¹⁰² In no case did the DGPT fund a project redolent of Bizet's *Carmen*, preferring to discourage such stereotypes, and in any case new bullrings and flamenco taverns in tourist areas already enjoyed copious private financing.

Villages in which even a viable CIT was impractical could take advantage of other new SGT programs to encourage local participation. The annual "National Tourism Prize for Town Beautification and Improvement" carried a prize of 100,000 pesetas (\$1,667) when first awarded in 1963, and was increased in 1967 to 250,000 pesetas (\$4,167) for two winners (one coastal and one interior) and runner-up awards of 50,000 pesetas (\$833).¹⁰³ Though modest, the purse was a considerable windfall for towns like the 1968 winner Concorbi6n, in La Coru6a province, which possessed a total annual budget of 638,000 pesetas.¹⁰⁴ Still, the prize money was often small recompense for the effort spent vying for the award, which spawned a modest display of competitive municipalism based on criteria reflecting current modernization attitudes. Judges were drawn from among highway engineers, urban planners, local administration liaisons, and cultural affairs directors within the government. Judging was based on road improvements, town lighting, scenic lookout points, parking lots, gardens, road signs, beautification of building faades, water supply improvement, and street cleaning.¹⁰⁵ Towns financed their bids largely from private donations

and state grants, which in some cases accounted for 90 percent of the 5–10 million peseta improvement budgets involved.

In 1966, the SGT added a third program aimed at bringing touristic consciousness to the remotest areas. A “Commission on Monumental and Typical Cities” selected 105 towns to participate in a program to produce individualized promotional brochures to distribute at tourism offices and travel agencies both in Spain and abroad. The cost of 110,000 pesetas (\$1,833) per town was shared roughly equally between municipalities and the DGPT. Interior towns displayed particular interest in this modest project, accounting for 70 of the 105 participating municipalities, and for most the program represented their first opportunity for wider publicity.¹⁰⁶

State efforts to promote positive attitudes toward foreign tourism met some limited resistance, though this was notably exceptional. Several towns dotting the northern Atlantic coast in Asturias and Cantabria feared large resorts would jeopardize the revenue they earned from local industry and the vacation homes of numerous national elites. The town of Comillas went so far as to register a CIT “whose objective was not to promote tourism, but rather to prevent it for the comfort of the traditional summer vacationers.”¹⁰⁷ As the major Balearic resorts became saturated, local interests in neighboring areas braced for spillover. The anthropologist Jacqueline Waldren cites the example of local residents of Deya (Majorca) impeding tourism by removing signs indicating the turn-off for a new road down to the local inlet. Others in the town were less hostile to tourist penetration, but became increasingly vocal in their demands that road and water improvements not be limited to districts of their town frequented by tourists.¹⁰⁸ Also notable was the Mediterranean island of Minorca, the next natural target for investors as neighboring Majorca became saturated. Although some Minorcan land interests did court tourism investment, the higher overall living standard was due largely to a thriving leather industry, and citizenry, with the aid of the island diocese, resisted the massive investment experienced in Majorca and Ibiza.¹⁰⁹ Outright resistance against tourism was rare, but the growing intensity at all levels of groups dedicated to tourism promotion inevitably led to a multiplicity of views on how the industry should be run. The proliferation and reconfiguration of tourism interests in this period indeed reflected a growing independence among non-state organizations in Spanish society generally in the 1960s, a trend that increasingly challenged the tenability of technocratic development.

Labor, Entrepreneurship, and Professionalization

As the government, investors, and municipalities mortgaged their economic futures increasingly on tourism, long-standing concerns over the sector's professionalism became sharper. Over the course of the 1960s, perhaps a million Spaniards landed jobs in the sector or started small enterprises usually with little or no preparation. The seasonal and informal nature of most jobs and firms eschewed official data gathering: a census carried out in December 1965, for example, revealed almost no tourism-sector employment in two of Majorca's largest summertime resorts.¹¹⁰ A more reliable overall picture was available only in 1971, when an independent estimate calculated the total number of Spaniards earning their livelihood directly from tourism at 700,000, or about 5 percent of the active population.¹¹¹

Tourism revolutionized the labor market in some regions. On the Costa Brava, Costa del Sol, Majorca, and other centers, the tourism-related activities, including hotel construction, accounted for half of the total labor force during the peak seasons. Most work available required no previous exposure to or preparation in the tourism industry. According to the 1973 state trade union registry, two-thirds of tourism workers were unskilled, compared with slightly under half in the overall labor force. Women represented over one-fourth of the tourism labor syndicate rolls, compared with one-fifth overall. Even these figures were probably low because many unskilled workers neglected to register with their syndicate. Labor demand typically was filled by seasonal migrants from nearby interior regions, though tourism jobs also contributed significantly to the broader migration from rural Andalusia to northern centers. Of those who migrated to tourist centers, about half found work in construction and the remainder in tourism-related services such as hotels and restaurants.¹¹² Unskilled construction pay was 120–150 pesetas per day, far superior to rural day-labor wages. The hourly wage of cleaning staff was reported at 10–12 pesetas in 1960 and 22–25 in 1964, rates hitherto “unheard-of for an Andalusian, or even a Catalan.”¹¹³ In relatively poor regions of Andalusia, including the Costa del Sol, the lack of skilled and experienced labor meant that high-wage jobs such as management positions in large hotels were filled almost exclusively by imported workers, whereas locals filled low-wage seasonal positions.¹¹⁴ Migration and inflation caused family separations and demographic dislocations especially difficult for small growers dependent on a cheap

supply of rural labor. In the atmosphere of rapid agricultural modernization and urbanization, however, these problems would likely have occurred in any case. The tourism economy acted as a modest cushion to absorb much of the excess rural labor supply and provide small coastal landholders the option of selling unprofitable land to developers.¹¹⁵

The industry's entrepreneurial class, like the workers it employed, was largely unprepared. Despite a tendency among the industry's celebrants to mythologize rags-to-riches tales, many of the more successful hoteliers had been born into the commercial bourgeoisie while neophytes often struggled.¹¹⁶ The eminent industry analyst Jorge Vila Fradera would "attribute many failures" to a widespread belief that opening a hotel "was an easy and risk-free business."¹¹⁷ The handicap of inexperience was exacerbated by high debts and operations costs fueled by foreign lenders and rampant land speculation.¹¹⁸ Until 1963, accredited professional training in hotel management and related fields was available only in Madrid, Seville, and Barcelona, and most graduates found employment at the larger hotels. As late as 1977, a sociological study estimated that 70 percent of hoteliers in Majorca had no preparation in hotel management, and, as a consequence, many smaller establishments fell into a cycle of dependency on loans from foreign tour operators given in exchange for guarantees of room availability at extremely low rates.¹¹⁹

Entrepreneurship in the tourism sector was characterized by small, informal ventures. The modest rise in registered tourism firms over the 1960s—from 93,568 firms in 1960 to 158,071 in 1971—indicated only that many or most went undetected by authorities. Absent from official censuses, but probably most emblematic of the age, was the *chiringuito*, a beachfront "improvisation based on a roof, a counter, and a few drinks and snacks."¹²⁰ Even registered firms tended to be very small. In 1966, more than half of them reported zero unionized employees; only 8 percent employed more than five.¹²¹ Most restaurants in tourist areas did not retain a formally trained kitchen staff. "International cuisine," in the words of one observer, "meant nothing more than a group of stereotypical concoctions."¹²²

Inexperience among management and labor aggravated authorities' long-standing insecurities over the inferior standards of quality and culture by which foreign travelers would judge Spain. In 1963, León Herrera instructed the hotel inspection service to probe more rigorously for inadequate standards of quality and abandon a hitherto singular obsession with catching price gougers.¹²³ The new emphasis quickly turned up results. On a November 1963 trip to the Costa Brava, Herrera's chief hotel inspector concluded that 10 of 18 hotels he visited

were “overclassified.” Of one Category 1-A (four-star) establishment, he recorded,

Its general aspect is that of a Category 2 [two-star] hotel. To reach the dining room, it is necessary to pass through a roadside bar. The hotel's entrance is very poor, like a Category 3 [one-star] hotel. The rooms have bathrooms, but lack furniture adequate for their category. Dirty. The kitchen is a disaster; the scrub brushes need to be changed immediately . . . It will be reclassified immediately.¹²⁴

Even at the luxury Parador of León, an SGT informant reported a “low level of preparation among the service personnel [and] lack of refinement and tact among some of the wait staff,” adding, “the service personnel lacks the category and discipline appropriate to a grand hotel.”¹²⁵ Herrera's attention to quality standards conformed to the wishes of a demanding clientele. The Tarragonese provincial delegate informed him in 1965 that “the tourist generally concedes far greater importance to the toilets, cleanliness, and hygiene of the facilities, in which filth and flies abound, than to the price.” An official in Algeciras confirmed, “Tourists complain more about filth than about prices.”¹²⁶

To supplement the formal inspection service, Herrera initiated a practice of informal plain-clothes inspections that frequently resulted in stern warnings to guilty establishments rather than punitive fines.¹²⁷ Joaquín Juste, a close associate of Herrera who, as the ministry's technical secretary was not a recognized face, spent the latter part of 1965 visiting tourist establishments along the coast between Valencia and Málaga. Juste's reaction conveyed the gap between the expectations of the Spanish elite, and, for that matter, much of the European traveling public, and the prevailing standards of provincial establishments:

The hygienic services in all the service stations are truly shameful, as are those in a majority of restaurants. Filthy, foul smelling, with no running water, and lacking all the essential elements of this kind of facility. I realize that the clientele who frequent these services are generally rather base and leave them in their deplorable state, but I believe it is fundamental that we demand more from service stations. Although I may be mistaken, I believe this is fundamental for the good name of Spain's tourism . . . because I am acquainted with the irreproachable state of sanitary services in service stations in many European countries.¹²⁸

Under Herrera's direction, the inspection service became both less punitive and more effective. The spotty data available on inspections

reflect a decline in fines levied.¹²⁹ The SGT continued to impose occasional fines for price abuses, but became more concerned with violations such as lack of uniformed personnel, poor hygiene, hiring non-Spaniards as guides and employees, and, enigmatically, “discotheques functioning however they please.” Nationwide by 1970, one-fourth of inspections resulted in a fine—typically minor—though in the much newer resorts of the Canary Islands the figure reached 70 percent.¹³⁰

Inspections were increasingly effective as coercive mechanisms, but the SGT also sought more positive methods to professionalize the sector. In the belief that “only with well-trained personnel can the continuation of foreign tourists’ current preference for Spain be guaranteed,” the ministry opened the Official Tourism School in Madrid in 1963.¹³¹ The school would train an elite of industry professionals, produce standard textbooks, and dictate curriculum for private and provincial tourism academies across the country. In the years to follow, academies providing three-year degrees in tourism studies proliferated, training guides, interpreters, promotion and marketing specialists, and hotel managers. Despite the expansion, professional training failed to keep pace with the sector as a whole. Management graduates could expect placement in the sector’s most desirable jobs whereas underqualified labor predominated elsewhere.¹³²

Domestic Tourism

From the early days of the dictatorship, “social tourism” programs were trumpeted, as they were throughout Europe, as a means “to broaden the somber old horizons of the working classes.”¹³³ As was the case elsewhere in Europe, however, social tourism was at best a tertiary interest to entrepreneurs and government officials seeking to promote the industry. The main concerns, of course, had been to maximize the aggregate income earned from foreign tourists and do whatever possible to keep prosperous citizens spending their holiday budgets domestically.

With Spain’s rising prosperity of the 1960s, the possibility that Spaniards might participate to an unprecedented extent in European travel culture was significant economically and politically. Domestic tourism could expand the booming industry even further, particularly in new regions initially unprepared to receive foreign tourists on any scale, and also help mitigate seasonal imbalances in existing resort areas. The political significance was potentially even greater. In postwar Europe’s paradigmatic tourist country, Spanish participation in this modern custom was a potent sign of a national catching-up, and represented a

consummate challenge to the myth of national difference. By 1963, the Ministry of Information and Tourism identified domestic tourism as “a means to demonstrate upward mobility, in keeping with the trajectory of Spanish standards of living,” but also recognized “the pressures on our balance of payments caused by a sudden increase of Spaniards traveling abroad.”¹³⁴ As the national income grew, the government faced the danger that Spaniards increasingly would take their holidays abroad, offsetting the revenue earned from incoming foreigners. From 1956 to 1961, the number of Spaniards taking holidays abroad rose from 471,000 to 2.7 million, and in 1962 the figure leapt to 3.5 million.¹³⁵ The rapid increase alarmed the Spanish government, which had witnessed France lose the benefits of being a major tourism receptor during the 1950s through a similar process.

Measuring levels of domestic tourism was never the precise exercise that border customs posts made possible for foreign entries. Tourism authorities also gathered information on hotel occupancy according to national origin, but Spanish tourists were more likely to lodge with relatives or friends. Though incomplete, available statistics suggest that commercial domestic tourism began to increase more rapidly during the second half of the 1950s. Nationwide, the proportion of hotel occupants who were Spanish remained fairly constant—roughly one-third at luxury hotels, half at mid-range hotels, and two-thirds at one-star hotels. This suggests that Spanish tourists kept pace as the presence of foreigners swelled by a factor of five.¹³⁶

By the second half of the 1960s, industry analysts paid closer attention to currents of interior tourism than they had previously, though according to one, “Our statistical understanding is still rather imperfect, as is the case in most countries.”¹³⁷ In 1966, one estimate claimed that nearly one-third of the Spanish population (9.1 million) engaged in domestic tourism, rising to 12 million in 1971. The increase was largely due to automobile ownership, which grew from 4 percent of households in 1960 to 24 percent by 1969.¹³⁸ By 1970, official statistics indicated that domestic tourists’ total expenditure slightly exceeded that of foreign tourists.¹³⁹

Contrary to fears, Spaniards’ increased mobility within their country far outpaced their propensity to take their holidays abroad. The annual number of Spanish international departures doubled at two-year intervals between 1956 and 1962, but would not double again until 1973. Thus, although the amount Spaniards spent on foreign tourism rose steadily, reaching \$99.4 million in 1967, it was never significant in comparison to the inflow of currencies to Spain (\$1.1 billion in 1967),

making for the largest net balance in the world. The vast majority (84 percent) who did leave Spain did so by automobile, overwhelmingly limiting themselves to neighboring France and Portugal. Overnight tourists probably accounted for only one-third of Spanish departures abroad.¹⁴⁰

Several factors kept Spaniards within the “tourist’s subcontinent” of the Iberian Peninsula. Principal among these was cost. Currency devaluation cut Spaniards’ already weak purchasing power elsewhere in Europe in 1959 and again in 1967. Moreover, as a predominantly receptor country, Spain possessed a relatively feeble corps of travel agencies. Spanish travel agents dedicated virtually all of their resources to travel services within Spain, and the sale of international travel packages indeed was illegal until 1966. Prevailing wisdom held that because Spanish tourism was founded on reception and hospitality, any encouragement of foreign travel was prejudicial to the national economy. There was therefore considerable opposition within the industry to proposed legislation to permit the sale of package tours abroad, though the government recognized that in the long term this represented an important area for investment, expansion, and further integration into the Common Market.¹⁴¹ Facing vehement criticism from the industry, a chief advocate of opening Spain to international tour operations was obliged to “deny the idea that what has inspired us to propose this regulation . . . is to encourage Spaniards to travel abroad.”¹⁴²

Though Spanish holidaymakers were increasingly numerous, particularly inside Spain, they remained largely segregated from foreign tourists. This long-standing pattern, similarly observed in Barke and Towner’s study of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century tourism in Spain, tempers the hypothesis that Spaniards’ emerging European identity was forged while mingling with foreigners on the beach.¹⁴³ A 1961 DGT survey found that Spaniards and foreigners visited the Costa del Sol in roughly equal numbers, yet one or the other group tended to predominate in individual towns. In Ronda and Málaga foreign tourists were more prevalent, more than doubling the Spanish tourist contingent in both cases; Spanish tourists outnumbered foreigners elsewhere by large margins. Only in the relatively more upscale town of Marbella was the distribution somewhat equal.¹⁴⁴

The traditional Costa Brava and Balearic resorts remained the domain of foreigners, though access to cosmopolitanism was closely identified with upward mobility. One enterprising salesman from seaside Lloret traveled through interior Castile declaring, “Spaniards are taking their summer vacations on the Costa Brava just like everybody else.”¹⁴⁵

Table 6.1 Foreign and Spanish tourists as percent of total tourist population in the Balearic Islands, 1950–1974

	<i>Spanish</i>			<i>Foreign</i>			<i>Combined</i>	
	<i>Number</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Index</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Index</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Index</i>
1950	66,525	68	100	31,556	32	100	98,081	100
1953	49,829	38	75	82,661	62	261	132,453	135
1956	61,082	27	91	161,171	73	510	222,253	226
1959	65,042	20	97	256,180	80	811	321,222	327
1962	97,419	18	146	444,695	82	1,408	542,114	552
1965	176,338	16	265	904,498	84	2,866	1,080,836	1,101
1968	199,760	8	300	1,409,855	92	4,468	1,609,615	1,641
1971	266,703	9	401	2,646,830	91	8,789	2,913,533	2,971
1974	391,131	12	588	2,797,874	88	8,866	3,189,005	3,251

Source: *El turismo en Baleares. Datos informativos, año 1975* (Palma de Majorca: Ministerio de Información y Turismo, Delegación Provincial de Baleares, 1976).

Though indicative of a growing sense of social and physical mobility, this particular campaign apparently had little effect: by 1967, Spanish nationals still accounted for just 11 percent of hotel clients on the Costa Brava.¹⁴⁶ In Spain's largest tourist region, the Balearic Islands, Spanish nationals may have felt the most foreign of anybody (see table 6.1).

Domestic seaside tourists tended to gravitate to newer resort developments. By 1968, foreigners outnumbered Spanish tourists at Alicante's older resorts (those developed before 1960) by a rate of two to one, whereas in the nascent developments of neighboring Murcia and Almería, Spaniards outnumbered foreigners three to one. A similar pattern held in Andalusia: foreigners dominated hotels in the Málaga province in 1968 by a margin of nearly five to one; the much smaller and newer developments in eastern Andalusia attracted a majority of Spaniards.¹⁴⁷

Planners hoped to extend this pattern to interior regions where tourism development hitherto had faltered. Despite numerous attempts to lure foreigners to the interior, a Spanish holiday remained nearly synonymous with the beach. Spanish travelers were judged more likely to seek a less conventional itinerary, either to visit relatives or simply to see more of their country, a tendency upon which SGT planners and interior entrepreneurs hoped to capitalize. They began by attempting to breathe new life into the *Rutas Nacionales*, the nationalist propaganda tours that had declined precipitously from their peak in the late 1940s. The *Rutas* remained negligibly profitable and continued to operate

ten week-long itineraries per year.¹⁴⁸ Long having shed their original political function, the tours encouraged citizens to “Get to Know Spain” (*Conozca Usted España*), and indeed, as promotion efforts were again stepped up in 1962, a ministry press release even claimed, apocryphally, that the program was “created in 1938 by the Head of State himself so that every Spaniard could know his Fatherland.”¹⁴⁹ If this was a somewhat false memory, it was true enough that the program had evolved into a service for Spaniards and resident foreigners over the course of the 1950s “in large part [as] a means of popular education.” The more important didactic element lay, however, on the receiving end, where host towns and villages became acquainted with the demands of modern tourist reception. The Rutas “promot[ed] the improvement of hotel services in these places . . . [and] encourag[ed] the improvement, clean presentation, and illumination of monuments and other points of interest.”¹⁵⁰

By the end of the decade, the SGT had spun several related projects from this theme. “Get to Know Your Province” (*Conozca Usted su Provincia*) subsidized regional excursions for school children and military personnel. Another, “Get to Know the Sea” (*Conozca Usted el Mar*), helped 41,686 travelers from rural interior regions to visit the coast in 1970.¹⁵¹ The most sizable endeavor was a scheme established in 1967 to encourage rural property holders to convert rustic houses into tourist lodgings. In a kind of specialized version of the Hotel Credit program, the state provided low-interest loans for such enterprises. By 1970, 4,162 such “Plantation Dwellings” (*Casas de Labranza*) were registered throughout Spain, predominantly in interior Andalusia, Castile, and Extremadura. If the funding was modest, reaching 26.7 million pesetas (\$399,000), the intention was clear: in the words of the program’s architect, to “contribute to the elevation of standards of living of rural people through tourist promotion . . . [and] promote greater understanding between the people of the country and the city.”¹⁵²

Programs such as these, along with Paradors, CITs, new promotional and professionalization campaigns, and the increased presence of the tourism phenomenon in general public discourse, all formed part of the mobilization of a national touristic consciousness. With massive annual increases in tourists and revenue, general public awareness of the phenomenon was likely to have increased anyhow, especially as press restrictions loosened during Fraga’s tenure. Yet for citizens to become aware that foreign resort tourism is supporting their nation’s economy is one matter; this process has taken place in numerous tropical republics in which tourist revenue has contributed neither to political change nor even to very much class mobility for the vast of majority of the population.

It is far a different matter to apply this awareness to a project reaching well beyond the question of trade balances into fundamental questions of national identity. Europe's celebrated postwar leisure civilization that penetrated Spain in the 1950s not only became an important part of the regime's grand political project of modernization and international acceptance, but also came to touch the lives of most ordinary Spaniards by 1970. Fraga's expansive ministry encouraged them, though not always successfully, to embrace their participation in this process, whether as a rural migrant-turned-waiter demonstrating Spanish courtesy and good taste to foreign customers, a mayor seeking a village face lift, or a Madrid motorist bound for a seaside holiday. To link this process to some kind of proto-democratization is to overreach, but only slightly. It should be sufficiently clear that, against the wishes of much of the Francoist elite, discourse surrounding tourism encouraged Spaniards to consider the rapid modernization of the 1960s as a national effort, not merely the achievement of a benevolent technocracy. Expectations were not always matched by results, however, and one of the most visible manifestations of the new touristic consciousness was the resulting disillusionment, which the next chapter examines.

CHAPTER 7

Disillusionment and Reorientation

Disillusionment

A sharpening feeling that Spain was becoming a decadent playground for Europe's popular classes tempered enthusiasm for the tourist boom. Coasts were plainly in a state of decay by the mid-1960s, European holidaymakers having converted countless picturesque fishing villages into overcrowded concrete enclaves. The government's eagerness to assume credit for the progress of mass tourism also left it open to singular blame, though not always warranted, for the resulting problems. As the decade closed, the regime's management of tourism was becoming the target of increasingly daring criticism from several angles. Municipalities and regions fought with increasing audacity for more local control over promotion and regulation, arguing that state mismanagement had attracted too many tourists too quickly to some areas for the sake of financing development in others. Tourism industry investors and managers again complained, as they had in 1948 and 1962, that rigid price controls were undermining profit and driving their sector into a state of stagnation. Even the Development Commissariat, the regime's preeminent economic planning agency, lamented in a 1967 report that multinational tour operators "control the most important portion of world tourism" and "utilize our 'raw materials' for profit without much benefit to our country."¹

Virtually all of the mounting criticism could be distilled into a single problem: a misalignment of quantity and quality among the clientele. By the late 1960s, the industry's principle concern was to modify a system the Balearic tourism syndicate deemed "adequate only for one-pound-a-day tourists."² Critical commentary increased during the latter years of

the decade, due in part to major censorship reforms and a gathering confidence among industry and regional leaders to speak critically of government policy. Citing the comments of a major Barcelona tourism developer in 1967, the daily *El Eco* of the Costa Brava resort town of Sitges declared, "What interests us today is not the quantity of tourists that can cross our borders but the quality."³ If this lacked the defiant tone common to press commentary in democratic societies, it did imply a critical attitude toward the familiar published statistics routinely depicting astronomic growth in tourists and revenue. In a 1971 article, the noted sociologist Amando de Miguel aired a similar concern, telling readers that critical analysis of statistical data "contradicts the more optimistic ideas that triumphalist propaganda has impressed on the general public." De Miguel proceeded to declare the tourist boom over—"Do not expect any new tourist miracles"—and lamented, "Spain has opted for a 'cheap' tourism, increasingly cheaper and largely controlled by foreign capital."⁴ The sociologist provided numbers of his own to reveal that although gross receipts from tourism continued to climb, expenditure per tourist fell. In 1972, another distinguished sociologist, Guillermo Luis Díaz-Plaja, echoed such criticisms of tourism-based regional development in a treatise entitled, "Turismo, ¿un falso 'boom'?"⁵ (See table 7.1.)

Correspondingly, the social composition of Spain's mass tourism shifted to reflect the widened distribution of leisure time and disposable income in Western Europe. It is impossible to quantify the shift with precision, as the limited number of available surveys differed in their scope and gathering methods. Nevertheless, discrepancies between data gathered in 1965 and 1975 suggest a general trend. The earlier survey indicated that 40 percent of foreign tourists in Spain were drawn from the upper-level management, professional, and employer classes, compared with 25 percent in the latter survey. Representation of the vaguely defined lower middle classes rose from 40 percent to 50 percent, and

Table 7.1 Expenditure per foreign tourist in Spain, 1959–1973

1959	\$56	1964	\$87	1969	\$69
1960	\$69	1965	\$100	1970	\$79
1961	\$70	1966	\$84	1971	\$87
1962	\$80	1967 ^a	\$76	1972	\$84
1963	\$86	1968	\$75	1973	\$104

^a Peseta devalued 18 percent with respect to the dollar.

Source: Calculations derived from data on total tourism revenue and tourist entries given in table 5.1.

those with "limited incomes," a category that included unskilled laborers, students, retirees, and the unemployed, rose from one-fifth to one-fourth of the total.⁶ Though overseas travel remained a minority and disproportionately middle-class activity among the British population as a whole, the dramatic rise in holidays abroad from 1.5 million in 1951 to 5.8 million in 1969 owed primarily to lower-middle-class and youth package tourism to Spain.⁷ In her study on popular British tourism, Susan Barton offers anecdotal evidence to a similar effect. In the early 1960s, even the humbler foreign guests impressed Spanish hotel staff as "ladies and gentlemen in plastic shoes," whereas by the end of the decade the former were known best for their drunkenness and utter lack of respectability.⁸ A Ministry of Information and Tourism study of the Costa Brava prepared in 1974 corroborated this impression:

The English clientele is generally modest: they arrive in organized trips and stay in 3rd-class hotels or pensions. Secretaries and workers predominate. The Germans are also from a modest social category, and often come . . . in organized trips. The French tourists are more varied: the most modest remain in the north, where prices are lowest. They prefer renting a modest apartment to staying in a mediocre hotel.⁹

The causes were diverse, originating on both the demand and supply sides. Wages increased for European workers, but the cost of travel remained stable. By 1970, the travel firms of Northern Europe had consolidated into a few large conglomerates enjoying enormous volume and increased efficiency.¹⁰ Such conglomerates were Spain's most important supplier of tourists: by 1972 the DGPT estimated that half of Spain's visitors purchased package tours from tour operators, which possessed increasing leverage in setting rates.¹¹ A growing sense of entitlement for inexpensive holidays added further pressure. In the summer of 1968, the British press featured a flurry of investigations into the urgent question, "Is the government making your holiday needlessly expensive?"¹² By 1971, Great Britain, which supplied a leading 41 percent of charter air traffic to Spain, dismantled the remaining price floors for package tours. In 1969, a British vendor of economy package holidays sold two-week trips to Spanish resorts for between £38 and £83, prices virtually unchanged from 1961 fares despite significant wage rises over the same period.¹³ Overall, the proportion of air passengers traveling to Spain on charter flights rose from 30 percent in 1958 to 58 percent in 1967.¹⁴

The other cause of stagnation in revenue per tourist was the expanding supply of inexpensive tourist accommodations. Seemingly limitless

potential for expansion on Spanish coasts and competition from other Mediterranean countries exerted strong downward pressure on prices. Although the number of tourists expanded, available lodging grew even faster. The rapid and largely unchecked proliferation of “residential” tourist complexes made the extent of the imbalance difficult to quantify. The oxymoronic term “residential tourism” referred not to full residents, but to the practice of owning or renting seaside apartments for stays of several weeks.¹⁵ Outfitted with kitchens, such apartments eliminated the expense of dining out. Rates were also considerably lower for occupants, as the establishments required a smaller staff, and, unlike hotels, were not subject to inspection. The authorities in Madrid often were unaware of their existence. The official registry of tourist lodgings of 1967 counted fewer than half of the residential complexes that were believed to exist.¹⁶

Tourism became increasingly residential in the later 1960s, especially along the inexpensive coasts of eastern Andalusia and Alicante, and consequently more economical for the consumer. Accounting only for hotels, for which there was reliable data, total capacity grew in proportion to tourist entries, preserving a ratio of roughly 40 tourists per hotel bed from 1966 to 1971. But as growth in hotel capacity leveled off in the latter half of the 1960s, residential tourist developments were experiencing unbridled growth. Based on rough government estimates, the relationship between supply and demand clearly shifted in favor of the consumer. Accounting for beds available in hotels and residential complexes, the ratio of foreign tourists dropped from 18 per bed in 1963 to 13 in 1969.¹⁷

The main regulatory measure for such developments was the Law of Centers of Zones of National Tourist Interest, which, as seen in chapter 5, created a convoluted system of responsibility and enforcement that easily was eschewed. A 1964 study by provincial authorities in Málaga concluded that “legal norms and administrative intervention have had truly minimal influence on the entire phenomenon of residential developments [*urbanizaciones*].”¹⁸ A surfeit of pressures, such as inflated land prices and the potential for immediate profit, led builders and municipalities to act as quickly as possible rather than await legal approval. One urban planning study concluded that legal norms “were burdensome for the promoter . . . because of the implied dependence on the whim of municipal planners.”¹⁹ Municipalities desiring tourist development typically had little leverage to insist on proper planning and authorization. When faced with such inconveniences, development firms easily could move on to the next underemployed town.

The mid-1960s witnessed the zenith of lawlessness. Construction almost always began before government authorities were notified. However poorly designed, a completed development was an economic asset, leaving authorities little choice but to approve it retroactively. Of 57 residential tourist complexes in the Málaga province, only three met building and zoning codes in 1964. Another 27 were approved despite not meeting legal requirements, and the remaining 27 simply were parceled and sold to individual buyers without any formal paperwork.²⁰ Uncontrollable land speculation was most marked in newly developing areas, such as the coasts of the Granada and Alicante provinces. In portions of Granada, residential tourism dominated development from the beginning. Generally developments were small and numerous, tending, unlike large concentrations of capital investment, not to attract government attention. For their part, municipalities were unable or unwilling to enforce zoning laws.²¹ A 1964 Civil Guard report from Alicante informed the SGT:

Everything has been completed through improvisations and without following a rhythm set out in a general plan. Everyone has built wherever they have pleased, and anyone who had a small or medium sized plot aiming to maximize profit has built a skyscraper and then sold it off floor by floor without concern for proper sanitation, running water, or zoning. This has created truly foul odors in some places.

Builders circumvented laws by providing complicit authorities with false blueprints and, in an extreme case, “offering photographs of European skyscrapers taken from the top down” to conceal the location. The Ministry of Information and Tourism attempted to punish one province for tolerating such practices, withdrawing all state construction credits from Alicante. This tactic only worsened the problem because it forced builders to rely even more heavily on sources of financing that provided *ad hoc* credit “based on their own criteria.”²²

Justifications for unauthorized tourist developments were abundant. Consider the case of Cullera, a desolate Valencian village in which, according to its mayor, “the uncultivable, rocky land . . . produced no wealth besides a few isolated quarries.” By 1962, residential tourism resembled an ideal solution. The mayor recalled, “It could be said that the only productive use was, and continues to be, residential tourist development.” In June 1963, the municipality of Cullera granted a private firm the rights to develop, parcel, and sell adjacent barren lands as vacation residences. The firm was responsible for providing roads,

public lighting, electricity, and securing adequate water supply and sewage, all of which it carried out in defiance of the 1956 Terrains Law (*Ley del Suelo*), which established zoning codes, or the 1964 Law of Local Governance (*Ley de Régimen Local*), which required state approval of all municipal development plans. Over the next several years, Cullera became a prosperous minor resort, its mayor even claiming to have achieved the “laudable social goal” of “eradicating shanty-towns” encircling the town.²³ Ministerial authorities in Madrid competent to enforce development laws turned a blind eye until 1970, when a process of partial legalization of the Cullera developments began. Commenting on the initial contract drawn up nearly a decade earlier between the town and the developer, an Interior Ministry functionary noted, “How easy it is to make a farce” of legal norms.²⁴

Older tourist regions, where hotels were already prevalent before the residential tourism boom of the 1960s, proved only somewhat more resistant to the pressures of land speculation. According to a major socio-geographical study of the Costa Brava, published in 1966, only 3 of 143 tourist complexes were “spontaneous,” but warned that these were “spreading generally much more rapidly” than their legal counterparts.²⁵ This was prophetic: by 1972, another study found that 71 percent of the tourism developments in metropolitan Barcelona had been built since 1966, only 18 percent of them legally. For neighboring Gerona, “an analogous level of illegality [was] supposed.”²⁶ In Majorca, one survey claimed in 1964 that 50 percent of the island’s tourist developments failed to meet legal codes.²⁷

Over the next decade, the immense problem was rectified slowly and only partially, if only because municipalities had come to see more clearly their own interest in regulating the quality of resort development. Local and state authorities gradually imposed administrative order, compromised and limited though it often was. By 1972, the proportion of undocumented tourist urbanizations in Málaga had declined (21 out of 108), and even fewer (15) were approved without meeting legal standards. The majority had acceded to legal recognition: 23 were now subsumed by recognized Centers or Zones, with an additional 49 pending.²⁸ Málaga and the surrounding Costa del Sol formed the vanguard of trends in residential developments, and newer regions such as Alicante and the Canary Islands obeyed a similar pattern of rapid unplanned construction followed by partial legalization.²⁹ By 1975, 118 of Alicante’s 270 tourism developments still remained outside the legal framework, but, as elsewhere, these tended to be small, accounting for only 15 percent of the land area developed for tourism.³⁰ Retroactive legalization of

undocumented developments could only slow the pace of overcrowding and lessen some flaws. Substandard features such as oversized buildings, narrow sidewalks, and inadequate green space often were uncorrectable.

The unfortunate juxtaposition of cheap constructions with bucolic natural settings might have been less acute with more effective government oversight, but, like any industry, the business of mass resort tourism required inevitable incursions into the natural setting. The desire to generate masses of clientele to see, spend, and be seen beside as many modern constructions as possible was the ferment of Spain's tourist boom, but even the authorities promoting it began to recognize the hazards of this paradigm. As early as 1965, Rodríguez-Acosta sensed that "the great proliferation of buildings . . . lacking in character create a situation in which the tourist who goes from Stockholm to Majorca or Almería will not even notice any differences, for one encounters the same skyscrapers and the same impersonal structures." He urged local leaders to take measures to "salvage the picturesque and artistic features," but there scarcely was hope in the face of immense pressures to continue rapid building.³¹ Photographs of the massive resorts at Benidorm and Torremolinos provide an excellent illustration of the inherent paradox in tourism-driven modernization. The Spanish tourism office director in London alerted the SGT that such photographs "are the origin of bad propaganda among the English, who often reproduce them when they write disfavorably about Spanish tourism and the poor organization of [Spanish] authorities." The photographs had a "counterproductive effect . . . on the English tourist" and "should never be used." Yet the same correspondent was keenly aware that "in the Spanish press, . . . the same photograph is usually shown to express the expansion and creative potential of our tourism."³² By 1974, a government report regretted that the disappearance of local flavor in Spain's tourist centers was virtually complete:

Bars and restaurants have dedicated themselves to "international cuisine," even though tourists more and more are registering their appreciation for regional specialties, particularly paellas and fish and seafood dishes . . .

The "international" [architectural] style continues to gain ground in villa and hotel construction, and, above all, tourist apartment blocks, even though there is a live resistance to this on the part of the defenders of the traditional style . . . who oppose the international banality of so many of these constructions.³³

Industry leaders had begun to take note of the same paradox. A prominent Spanish travel agent, writing in 1966, questioned the

wisdom, “in order to demonstrate our progress to the Spanish public, [of] emphasizing repeatedly that 200 planes per day land in the Majorca airport.” Although effective as domestic political propaganda, this spawned the perception abroad “that Majorca is no longer a tranquil island,” but rather “a giant construction site.” The travel agent continued,

If we were selling a drink or a refrigerator, this would make sense, but to attract tourism, I think this is negative, considering that nowadays Europeans suffer eleven and a half months per year from the consequences of congestion, asphalt, stress, and traffic, and dreams of fleeing this enslavement to be able to relax in a calm place.³⁴

As a result, he concluded, international package tour vendors had begun discouraging clients who were willing to spend a bit more from visiting Spain at all. In 1968, the prominent industry analyst Jorge Vila Fradera similarly concluded, “By all indications . . . we are beginning to pay the price for excessively rapid growth of our supply of tourist goods and services.”³⁵

Impressions that cheap tourism was contributing to the degradation of Spanish coasts were sharpened by distressing stories of foreigners’ conduct on beaches. By 1967, the governor of the Gerona province blamed foreign-owned bars and nightclubs for a “decline in morality,” positing that “such customs and ways of life . . . in themselves constitute an attraction for a large part of our foreign clientele.” Nighttime noise levels, moreover, “entail[ed] a considerable nuisance for others, and a genuine nightmare for the autochthonous population.”³⁶ British travel agents who had invested in the Costa Brava locale of Lloret de Mar, if unconcerned with the welfare of the natives, feared that the resort into which they had sunk so many fixed assets was in a state of rapid decay. One London agent reported receiving numerous complaints about loud street noise late into the evening, adding,

Apparently there is a complete lack of order or surveillance from the authorities regarding decent behavior, both from the tourists and the locals, and offensive conduct in front of decent people goes on without any action being taken against them.³⁷

Lloret’s mayor insisted he was powerless to crack down on delinquent tourists, having received “concrete orders from the Civil Governor of Gerona not to harass any tourist in the slightest” for fear of generating unfavorable press coverage abroad. In response, several Lloret travel

agents petitioned the Director General of Security in Madrid to take “the necessary measures to put a stop to such practices so prejudicial to the development of tourist activity.”³⁸ The situation, however, continued only to worsen. One disgruntled local travel agent described the scene in 1972:

On any night during the high season, to take a stroll down some streets of Lloret de Mar is to encounter a very disagreeable spectacle: drunks vomiting on every corner, bloody fights, the atmosphere of a low-class neighborhood. This factor, together with the quality of services, has caused a large part of the old clientele to flee.³⁹

Of related concern were foreign “hippy elements,” who, according to the Balearic governor’s complaint, “constitute a nucleus of undesirables who live here, not just in housing that is totally lacking the slightest hygiene, but also in the open air and with maximum promiscuity and immorality.”⁴⁰ The above-cited London agent declared he was “most surprised that the ‘Hippies’ have arrived in Lloret,” and declared that “the sooner they are turfed out the better.”⁴¹

Clamping down on tourist behavior was a barbed proposition. The older and more traditional North Atlantic resort of Santander generated almost no controversy when in 1966 it began expelling foreigners from beaches “because of their uncared-for aspect.” A local spokesman regarded this measure as part of “a common campaign among the pre-eminent tourist countries disgusted by the prevalence of certain uncivil attitudes.”⁴² New popular resorts, however, were more vulnerable to international scrutiny, as when the Swedish press reported the arrests of several Swedes in the Canary Islands in April 1968 for public drunkenness. The Canary governor claimed the Swedish reports were “filled with the classic ‘candor’. . . that weaves our perpetual Black Legend, . . . rife with exaggeration, inexactitude, and pure fantasy.”⁴³ West Germans, Britons, and Swedes accounted for the vast majority of tourists, and, not surprisingly, delinquency. In any given local setting, mutual resentment was just as likely an outcome of international tourism as mutual understanding.

The present government increasingly appeared unequipped to manage tourism as an auxiliary of national modernization and prestige. Rivalries among government ministries and struggles between national regulators and local interest groups left basic gaps of responsibility and bred considerable resentment. The Ministry of Information and Tourism complained that the cabinet had left it a weak mandate to regulate

tourism construction. Rodríguez-Acosta argued in 1967 that strong central control was necessary in order to avoid the proliferation of “inadequate constructions,” and, paradoxically, “the disappearance of characteristic ambience and local flavor (*tipismo*).”⁴⁴ To this end, he attempted, unsuccessfully, to have the entire island of Majorca declared a National Tourist Zone in order to stem the “appearance of anarchic constructions prejudicial to all tourism planning.”⁴⁵ Spain’s Supreme Court agreed on the necessity of centralized management, observing that not “bad faith, but rather simply a lack of artistic taste” on the part of municipal authorities might put the quality of the tourist plant at risk.⁴⁶ But the SGT enjoyed little support from authorities from other administrative departments at all levels. Urban planners and architects typically resented any SGT oversight, which they considered to be “state intrusion” (*estatalización*) into a fundamentally local prerogative.⁴⁷ On behalf of municipalities, the Ministry of Finance leveled the most direct challenge to centralized tourism planning in January 1967, urging the cabinet to assert “rigorously and unequivocally that municipalities possess jurisdiction over their entire territory . . . as well as in seaside zones and beaches of interest to tourism”—in effect, that the Law of Centers and Zones of National Tourist Interest itself was illegal. The ministry also contended that since the burden of maintaining clean streets and a generally attractive aspect lay with municipalities, their budgets should receive a larger share of tax revenue: “It seems fair that if Municipalities contribute with their efforts to attract tourism to the benefit of the national economy, they should be compensated for the expenditures they find themselves obligated to make.”⁴⁸

The political acuity of state versus local jurisdiction was sharpened by the fact that foreign tourism was most prevalent on Spain’s geographical periphery, particularly the Catalan-speaking regions of northeastern Iberia and the Balearics, and traditionally left-wing Andalusia. From these regions emanated the loudest voices in protest of what was seen as overcentralized management of tourism development. Local leaders, though loyal to Franco, demonstrated their sensitivity to mounting concerns that regional economic health was being sacrificed for the sake of the national foreign currency reserves. In a public address with Franco in attendance in 1965, the Balearic governor warned,

We do not want to fall in a dangerous touristic monoculture. We do indeed wish to preserve our tourism, . . . but we feel that the moment has arrived for tourism to pay back to industry and agriculture that which it has received from them . . . For wealth to create wealth is our legitimate concern.⁴⁹

In an open letter to the dictator the same year, the provincial governor of Málaga similarly argued,

If it is natural that each region should possess certain specialties—like tourism in the case of Málaga—it is no less the case that this tendency needs to be moderated. Excessive speculation creates a dependency . . . that can result in insecurity.⁵⁰

More radical calls for more regional power soon would follow. A headline in the main Majorca daily in 1967 asked, “Are the Balearic Islands Financing Competition from other Provinces?” The newspaper criticized state policies that redistributed tourism revenue to less prosperous regions, concluding, “Of the many millions of pesetas . . . that the Balearic hotel industry sends to the [state], a large chunk goes toward promoting . . . the construction of hotels in Almería (to cite one province), and it is clear that eventually the hotel industry of Almería will emerge as a competitor to the Balearics.”⁵¹ Local CITs, the creation of which Fraga’s ministry had encouraged, also became critics of what they considered the overbureaucratization of tourism development. The national federation of CITs generated the first comprehensive regionalist grievance in 1968, expressing boldly and exhaustively many of the complaints that local and regional voices timorously had begun airing. The organization rejected the usual justification for state activism—that local authorities were incompetent and compromised by pressure from land developers. The CITs instead turned this argument on end, positing that “this local incompetence is a result of state *dirigisme*.” The assembly characterized the central regulatory system as a “jungle of authorities” that had caused “an acute crisis of municipalism.”⁵² As it stood, it argued, municipalities controlled only about 2.3 percent of all state revenue, making it “difficult to ‘keep Spain clean.’”⁵³ The assembly insisted that only when more tourism revenues were returned to municipal budgets would they be able to develop better municipal services and stand up to builders unwilling to submit proper plans.

The decentralization question was a delicate matter for the Franco regime, which considered itself the main bulwark against Spain’s dissolution into regional particularism. After a decade of gradual concessions of independence to numerous institutions and organizations, the regime retreated to its “bunker” in 1969 with the installation of a new and more conservative cabinet. Ceding greater authority to municipalities would be out of the question for the remaining life of the dictatorship.⁵⁴ Yet, underneath the surface, dissenting state agencies and academic observers

were aligning with coastal municipalities in their criticism of the centralized management of tourism. The Institute for Studies of Local Administration (IEAL), a government think-tank established in 1950, became a main advocate for decentralization by 1969. The institute's glossy quarterly journal, *Ciudad y Territorio*, devoted considerable attention to highlighting the failures of coastal tourism development. It advocated more local control as the solution and, in conjunction with Costa Brava business interests, sponsored a conference in 1970 to this end.⁵⁵ The same year, Mario Gaviria, whose *marxisant* leanings were already well in evidence, became the institute's head sociologist. With the support of the IEAL and the philanthropic Juan March foundation, Gaviria authored numerous studies on Spanish tourism development, including three particularly critical titles appearing before Franco's death.⁵⁶

Critiques rested on the notion that foreign "neo-colonial" practices reduced the benefits of tourism to the regional and national economies. By the end of the 1960s, dense tourist regions had experienced marked urbanization, higher living costs, and the sudden pervasiveness of outside financial interests. Although the tourism economy did provide new opportunities for employment and entrepreneurship, critics charged this failed to compensate for the accompanying social and economic dislocations. Hospitality and construction engendered an urban working class that was somewhat more prosperous, but also dependent on a singular industry with an uncertain future. Most hotel owners and other small entrepreneurs subsisted with difficulty, often induced by multinational tour operators "to make deals below reasonable rates by being offered full bookings for long periods."⁵⁷

Studies of the Costa del Sol generated the most critical commentary on tourism and its adverse social effects. This was largely due to Andalusian underdevelopment, which accentuated the disruptiveness of both rapid land development and the creation of a modern service economy. Over the course of the 1960s, all 14 coastal municipalities in Málaga province gained population whereas the 86 interior municipalities declined.⁵⁸ The resulting loss of inexpensive agricultural labor to coastal construction firms translated into financial calamity for small growers, who could not afford to mechanize production, but also often faced difficulty selling their small inland plots to resort developers.⁵⁹ Virtually all investment capital in the province went toward tourism development projects, leaving other industries in a state of neglect. As a result, construction and hospitality came to monopolize local labor markets, permitting myriad abuses of poorly enforced social legislation and an unhealthy dependency on the sector. The attractive salaries sought in

construction and hospitality were largely offset by higher living costs in tourist centers. Housing shortages for migrant workers required many to leave their families behind during the peak tourist season and subsist on small agricultural operations the remainder of the year.⁶⁰

The bleak picture thus presented provided a necessary corrective to triumphalist accounts of a modernization miracle on the Costa del Sol, yet tourism was not singularly to blame for the social dislocations of the period. The dramatic social impact of Málaga's tourism economy was only one component of a larger series of concomitant ruptures. From 1961 to 1970 the province lost roughly 90,000 souls to emigration either to Catalonia or abroad, whereas Costa del Sol resorts absorbed perhaps 50,000 rural migrants over the same period.⁶¹ The advent of a prosperous construction industry in some ways might have forestalled greater social dislocations; as the anthropologist Jacqueline Waldren observed in her ethnography of Deya (Majorca), the construction boom permitted many young workers who might have emigrated in earlier periods to remain.⁶²

A general devolution of government authority being out of the question, proposals to address regional grievances were confined to limited administrative restructuring. Various schemes were advanced to create "tourist municipalities" entitled to additional state credits, extra privileges, and a specially appointed mayor.⁶³ Fraga's successor as minister of information and tourism, Alfredo Sánchez-Bella, opposed general decentralization, but members of his staff increasingly saw fit "to impose a regional perspective."⁶⁴ In 1971, in a move that turned out to have only symbolic significance, the ministry designated nine tourist regions and an additional eight tourist itineraries, each with a special commission representing a combination of central authorities and local interests.⁶⁵ The existence of regional committees permitted more specialized attention to local infrastructural problems and provided larger budgets to address them, but the central foundations of national tourism policy remained in place. Under current fiscal laws, hotel tax revenues in dense tourist centers continued to finance construction elsewhere. Hotel owners received no tax incentives to improve their establishments, despite protests from the Balearic tourism syndicate that this was "a requirement of the business in order to become competitive with similar establishments in other countries."⁶⁶ Instead, fiscal policy did the inverse, providing incentives to develop nontourist industries in regions unfit for tourism, which had the effect of exacerbating the monocropism of tourist regions without helping their competitiveness.⁶⁷ Of the major tourism centers, only Catalonia, where industrial centers existed before

the tourist boom, enjoyed a more balanced economy.⁶⁸ This situation would remain in place until the Constitution of 1978 made possible the creation of 17 Autonomous Communities, to which the powers to regulate and tax the industry were devolved.

Reorientation

Confronting the challenges of raising the quality of the tourist experience for guests and hosts and reducing regional dependency on foreign travel firms was a delicate matter. Spain's tourism industry had been staked on quantity since 1948 for a locus of economic and political reasons. Quality improvements in infrastructure and service along the way were always conceived to expand the quantity of foreign tourists, not to limit it. Earlier on, this approach fueled expansion and served as important stimulus for the construction and service sectors. With the high volume of lodging now available and a service sector dependent on massive tourist flows, exiting this paradigm would prove difficult.⁶⁹

The hotel magnate José Meliá became the industry's premier advocate for shifting to a regulatory model aimed at raising quality and "value per tourist unit" rather than quantity of tourist entries. Meliá's solution was a liberal one, proposing the deregulation of high-category establishments, including several he owned, in order to increase the international competitiveness of Spain's luxury resorts. Price restrictions and heavy tax burdens on hotels, he argued, were predicated on a misguided government obsession with "the principle of 'the more tourists, the better,' " which was valid "not even for political reasons, the only area in which the contrary might even be arguable." A better principle, he believed, was: " 'The more tourists of a certain socio-cultural-economic level, the better.' " As for the troubling penetration of foreign capital, Meliá argued Spain ought to join in the game rather than claim victimhood. "The state should support the expansion of Spanish tourist enterprises abroad, finance them if necessary, . . . provide them material and even moral encouragement, and eliminate barriers on exporting capital."⁷⁰ Indeed, Meliá later would become one of the biggest names in Caribbean and South American resorts.

Meliá's neoliberalism was undeniably self-serving, but others feared that allowing luxury prices to rise might lead to *de facto* price increases across the board with no improvement in the quality of services. The colorful industry observer Ángel Palomino imagined a vivid and wretched scenario:

The owner of some low-class restaurant, where the kitchen staff consists of a retiree and the owner's two cousins, where the menu is a single dirty

carbon-copied sheet placed in a pathetic plastic sleeve, where the pork chop is nothing but a retrograde stew . . . will happily rise to 80 percent of his superiors—but in price only: the garnishes, the tablecloths, and the uniforms will remain unaltered.⁷¹

The resulting dilemma would not have surprised nineteenth-century travelers to Spain, who regularly remarked on the striking gap between high-grade urban hotels, worthy of any European capital, and appallingly rustic lodgings found elsewhere. But two decades of centralized regulation and overwhelming emphasis on tourist services and infrastructure after World War II had gone considerable lengths to close this gap. The low price regime itself had contributed indirectly to a general improvement in overall quality, as Spain's low prices were behind the initial boom that financed infrastructural modernization. Moreover, Spain's tourist accommodations were as modern (if often highly flawed) as ever—by 1972, three-fourths of Spanish hotels had been built since 1960. Yet the convergence of discontent over this model on the part of industrialists like Meliá, foreign travel agents, and overwhelmed coastal residents and local authorities indicated that the industry must enter a new phase.

The government was sensitive to the growing disillusionment with the tourism industry, signaling by 1970 at least a shift in rhetorical emphasis toward improving quality over increasing quantity. The Development Commissariat released a treatise on the "transformation and restructuring" of the tourism sector, citing among its objectives the need for tourism to "bring to the community the highest volume of revenue with the lowest possible socio-economic cost." The report resolved to "attract a more selective tourism" by "creating and developing more up-market facilities [and] promoting tourism of high per capita expenditure."⁷² To maintain competitive prices, the Commissariat resolved to improve subsidies for tourism firms, enabling the latter to provide better service and earn more profits while holding down consumer prices.

It was clear, however, that state capitalism and bureaucratic cronyism were to be the protagonists of all plans for adjustment. Juan de Arespachaga, former head of the DGPT and now the influential head of ENTURSA, argued in 1970 that the growing importance of air travel required greater INI participation through his own firm in partnership with the national airline Iberia.⁷³ Since its creation in 1963, ENTURSA had been characterized by poor management and had created more problems than it solved. The firm's poor results prompted it, under cabinet pressure, to contract Hilton, the American hospitality firm, to take up its management operations in 1965.⁷⁴ A project to build a large luxury

hotel in Madrid's rapidly growing northern district found difficulty attracting a corporate partner, as one foreign firm after another between 1965 and 1968—including Hilton, TransWorld Airlines, and Pan American—concluded that the venture was unlikely ever to become profitable. Moreover, ENTURSA largely disregarded the INI mission to invest in areas private capital had failed to penetrate. By 1965, the firm dedicated 70 percent of its budget to the already booming business of residential tourist urbanizations. The Ministry of Agriculture vociferously objected to ENTURSA's many land acquisitions on undeveloped coastline, claiming they amounted to illegal speculation—a practice so routinely condemned as “anti-touristic.” Even when ENTURSA acted in good faith, its looming presence provoked land speculation on the part of others. For this reason, ENTURSA land purchases in principle had to be negotiated secretly, but insiders frequently purchased nearby land at low prices, setting off a series of speculation booms.⁷⁵

ENTURSA's new mission to build luxury hotels in major resorts was similarly misguided. Over the 1970s, the firm opened six large high-end (four- and five-star) hotels, adding to the three in this category it already possessed. Its hotels were large and extravagant, with an average capacity of 340 guests compared with the national average of 84.⁷⁶ Pressure from the cabinet to curb its profligacy prompted the state enterprise to build hotels in high-density areas, where profitability was ensured, but where private hotels were in direct competition. This signified ENTURSA's virtual abandonment of the INI mission of opening underdeveloped areas and supporting monument preservation. Its new purpose was to develop large luxury hotels to lodge loads of package tourists arriving on Iberia's 747s. Not surprisingly, ENTURSA experienced its growth spurt in the 1970s, increasing its ownership of luxury hotel beds from 3 percent of the national total in 1970 to 9 percent by 1979 (table 7.2).

This high-profile emphasis on quality did little to change the routine of mass construction established in the 1960s. The Development Commissariat called for 265,601 additional hotel beds and 385,556 new residential tourist spaces between 1972 and 1975.⁷⁷ As it turned out, only 173,001 hotel beds were added over this period, but this still represented the largest absolute increase over any four-year span to that time. Nevertheless, with the added emphasis on luxury accommodations, expenditure per tourist returned to the levels of the mid-1960s. Meliá received the deregulation of luxury hotel rates he had sought, but the heavy inflation of these years offset any real increase in the average “quality” of Spain's foreign tourist.

Table 7.2 ENTURSA hotel openings, 1965–1982

<i>Year</i>	<i>Location (name of establishment)</i>	<i>Capacity</i>
1965	León (San Marcos) ^{a,b}	530
1967	Ceuta (La Muralla) ^b	162
1970	Jerez (Jerez) ^b	120
1971	Sierra de Guadarrama (El Paular) ^a	71
1975	Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (Iberia)	581
1975	Barcelona (Sarrià)	599
1978	Sta. Cruz de Tenerife (Mencey)	568
1979	Seville (Alfonso XIII)	298
1982	Madrid (Chamartín)	549

^a Restored monument.^b Location underdeveloped for tourism.

Source: Carmelo Pellejero Martínez, *El Instituto Nacional de Industria en el Sector Turístico* (Málaga: Universidad Málaga, 2000), 150, 159.

Government action was more effective in expanding the industry into more profitable commercial ventures. The INI was again the protagonist of this effort, this time through its transportation services firm, ATESA. ATESA's 1963 purchase of Viajes Marsans, Spain's oldest independent travel agency, marked Spain's first bid to launch an internationally competitive package tour operator. The results were slow to materialize in the 1960s, a reflection of the inherently disadvantaged position of a primarily receptor country in this branch of the tourism sector.⁷⁸ ATESA nevertheless began to grow considerably during the first half of the 1970s. Its rental car division attained a counter in every Spanish airport by 1974, a position that the American firm Avis had enjoyed since 1970.⁷⁹ More significant was the expansion of ATESA abroad. The company's four foreign branches in 1970 at New York, Lisbon, Mexico City, and Buenos Aires grew to ten by 1976 with the opening of counters in Miami, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Montreal, Paris, and Caracas. The company's main goals were to sell vacation packages to Spain and to participate in the promotion of inter-American tourism. Not all branches were profitable, but overall the international division finished in the black due to particular success in Mexico, Argentina, and, more surprisingly, Great Britain. Abroad, ATESA met more success than at home: from 1976 to its privatization in 1981, operating losses in Spain more than offset profits abroad.⁸⁰

Charter air services formed another channel to diversify the tourism sector. Spanish Air Taxi (changed to Spantax in 1963), a small private

aviation firm, had been established to this end already by 1959. Spantax encountered difficulty breaking the dominance of West German and British air services flying passengers to their Mediterranean holidays, even with the active support from the Spanish Ministry of Civil Aviation in negotiating landing rights.⁸¹ West Germany opened its airports to limited Spanish charter traffic in 1963, enabling Spantax to grow from its original fleet of 6 aircraft to a total of 31 by 1970. During that time, 6 other Spanish aviation firms, possessing a combined total of 33 planes, also became involved in charter air traffic, including the INI-owned *Aviación y Comercio* (AVIACO).⁸² Spanish firms remained a minority amid the 40 foreign carriers authorized to land passengers in Spain. Based on DGPT estimates, the Spanish-owned charter air fleet at full capacity in 1970 could transport roughly 365,000 passengers annually, or one-tenth of the total number of charter passengers to Spain.⁸³ The actual number transported was probably much less, but Spain again applied pressure wherever possible to force major markets to use more Spanish planes. The Ministry of Civil Aviation restricted package holidays of less than 7 days on the grounds that "the short-stay tourist does not spend enough money in the country," permitting such low-yield tourists only when Spanish carriers were contracted to shuttle them.⁸⁴ In this way, the Spanish government hoped to expand tourism revenue beyond the stagnating base of hotel fees. Though critics charged that Spain possessed no negotiating leverage with multinational travel firms, this approach yielded some results. A Bonn tourism analyst conceded in late 1972 that Spanish pressure "has already led to the fact that for the summer season 1973 the share of Spanish air carriers in the . . . [West] German tourist market has considerably increased."⁸⁵

Spanish tourism authorities also worked to gain influence over emerging non-European tourist economies in the way foreign operators had come to control their own. In 1965, the INI acquired a 50 percent interest in the main Spain–Morocco car ferry operation. The same year, a bilateral agreement was reached by which Spanish capital invested in Moroccan tourism development was easily repatriated. Moreover, the Moroccan government frequently contracted the services of Spanish tourism experts, putting Spain "in a position to influence and, to an extent, control the touristic future of its African neighbor in a form consistent with its own interests."⁸⁶ Control of ferry routes from Northwest Africa to Spain also ended Gibraltar's monopoly on car ferry passengers, a political achievement of some consequence for the Franco regime.

Though to a lesser extent, a similar approach was taken with respect to several Latin American, African, and Middle Eastern countries

seeking to develop their tourist industries. During a visit to Argentina, Luis Bolín boasted,

The South Americans consider Spain to be the leader in tourism expertise among the European nations. This leads them to conclude that Spain—Spain, and not France, Italy, or Switzerland, as was previously the case—is the ideal country from which to acquire badly needed technical training.⁸⁷

At least seventeen countries sought direct technical or financial aid for tourism development from Franco's Spain.⁸⁸ Most amounted to little more than small acts of symbolic benevolence, publicly presented as evidence of Hispanic fraternity or Spanish–Arab friendship. Though they coincided neatly with the regime's overall foreign policy, such tokens were not necessarily welcomed by technocrats. Arespacochaga complained that providing such aid was “not always effective for later exploitation . . . from the standpoint of potential commerce.”⁸⁹ This assertion was generally correct, as such arrangements did not, with the exception of the Moroccan case, result in direct financial advantage for Spain. Nevertheless, the numerous training programs and technical consultations provided to Latin American countries later helped provide a skilled labor base for large Spanish hotel firms that invested there in the 1980s and 1990s.

Tourism in Transition

Franco's death in November 1975 occasioned numerous changes in state administrative organization, including in areas related to tourism, but major realignments in the industry and its regulation already were underway. The first post-Franco government dismantled the Ministry of Information and Tourism in 1977. Administrative control over tourism regulation and promotion eventually was devolved to the 17 newly formed regional Autonomous Communities of post-Franco Spain's federal structure. After more than three decades of nationalist authoritarianism, the political symbolism of high-profile advertising campaigns for Andalusian, Galician, and Basque tourism was considerable.⁹⁰ Under the Franco regime, opponents of decentralization had argued that this would breed destructive competition among regions at a time when the competitive Mediterranean marketplace demanded industry unity. To allay these concerns under the new system, the Institute of Tourism Studies helped coordinate marketing strategies and, after 1978, encouraged the

Autonomous Communities to specialize according to season, type of tourist attractions, and cost.

Calls originating in the 1960s to slow the pace of new tourism development and emphasize quality also took hold. León Herrera, an original Fraga appointee who later headed the Ministry of Information and Tourism from 1974 to its dissolution in 1977, advocated “anchoring tourism” in areas where it already thrived and concentrating on improving quality. Though probably more the result of long-term trends than administrative action, this is more or less the way things worked out. Construction did indeed taper: from 1974 to 1987, capacity increased by 27 percent, compared to the 400 percent increase from 1960 to 1973.⁹¹ After a period of stagnation due to the oil shocks and global recession between 1974 and 1981, foreign and domestic tourism resumed a high rate of increase in the 1980s, but emphasis shifted away from opening new resorts to making existing tourist zones more profitable. This, again, was more the consequence of a maturing industry than a dramatic policy about-face.

The post-Franco constitutional regime encountered some success in diversifying the industry. The Socialist governments of the 1980s devoted considerable attention to promoting modern and contemporary Spanish art, with Madrid and Barcelona emerging as major international art centers, and to designating national parks. The dominance of anchored coastal mass tourism remained intact through the end of the twentieth century, though during the 1980s and 1990s interior regions managed to keep pace proportionately with coastal growth as they had not during the seaside boom years of the 1960s. According to a 1997 European Travel Monitor survey, two-thirds of European tourists came to Spain for beaches and sun, a proportion significantly reduced from the overwhelming draw of beach resorts (upward of 90 percent) in the 1960s. Although the belief diminished that tourism alone was a panacea for regional development, tourism remained vital to the national payments balance. The commercial deficit continued to grow through the 1980s (except for a slight decline from 1984 to 1986), with tourism revenue consistently offsetting at least two-thirds of the imbalance. If to some this reveals a problematic dependency on tourism, to others it is proof that the industry is a legitimate and dependable niche in the international economy. Tourism remained fundamental to the Spanish economy at the close of the twentieth century: though proportionately less important as a revenue source than during its peak between 1963 and 1967, annual increases in total tourist

entries continued unabated, reaching 62 million in 1995. It is perhaps more revealing that tourism in democratic Spain was exclusively a subject for development planners and business interests. As an emblem of international acceptance or national regeneration, the Spanish tourism industry had outlived its usefulness.

Conclusion: Tourism and the European Challenge

In popular usage, the phrase “Spain is Different,” typically uttered in English, evolved over the second half of the twentieth century from a tourist slogan into a byword for any sign of lingering backwardness vis-à-vis Europe. The trajectory of this slogan-cum-cliché illustrates the convergence of tourism with broader questions surrounding modernization and the meaning of Europe in modern Spain. Although Spain is unambiguously European in the geographical and historical senses, millennial ambivalence toward outside influence formed a central dilemma of modern Spanish identity.

The curious word “Europeanize” became an important term in the national lexicon and a major source of angst throughout the twentieth century. Commitment to “Europeanization” has functioned therapeutically for several nations in the postwar era, coming to imply normalization with respect to some composite ideal type. The European ideal is frequently regarded as having presented Germany with an escape from the horrific ghosts of recent history and France with the prospect of restoring national *grandeur*. From the Spanish perspective, normalization with respect to “Europe” required an end to dictatorship, but also reached much deeper in a country whose modern history was plagued by apparent stagnation, instability, marginalization, and contempt from its neighbors.¹ This process of assimilating more fully the main economic, political, and cultural aspects of European civilization presented to some the solution to national decadence and to others the root cause.

The rising prominence of travel and tourism in modern Europe presented Spaniards the opportunity to expand the scope of their interaction with the outside world, stimulate commerce, and dispel the Black Legend with a combination of modern facilities and ageless charm. The dominant regenerationist view in the early twentieth century therefore regarded tourism as a national economic and cultural benefit and a choice opportunity to promote infrastructural modernization without

sacrificing *lo español*. The labors of the Marqués de la Vega Inclán and his cohort of tourism promoters mark one of the first efforts to project Spain outwardly to the world and in the process to overcome the frequent implosions of particularist conflict that plagued the country over the long course of its imperial decline. The perversion of this mission during the Spanish Civil War into a purely propagandistic activity helped to define the foundational myths of the Nationalist cause, but could not survive in the world that emerged after 1945. Once it became clear in peacetime that foreign tour groups were uninterested in Francoist propaganda, but instead demanded free personal movement, liberal currency exchange, and lax codes of public decorum, most regime leaders came to view tourism as a threat and a distraction from the important work of rapid industrialization and re-evangelization. Yet the Franco regime never fully abandoned an inherited belief in the constructive potential of foreign tourism, which formed a valuable resource for its mission of national redemption from “anti-Spanish” forces. Tourists’ consumer preferences for Spanish coasts helped considerably in mitigating the Franco regime’s diplomatic problems, and, as we hope to have demonstrated, toward reconfiguring the country’s economic, cultural, and political realities.

Tourism indeed formed an important aspect of postwar reconstruction everywhere in Western Europe, both as a form of commercial exchange and as a basic entitlement of citizenship. That Spain should have taken part in this process should surprise only those who persist in denying Franco’s Spain any direct relevance, other than as a vestigial tumor, to the broad picture of postwar European history. The little known and oft-slandered peninsular nation possessed the vast stretches of virginal coastline that would allow Europe’s unprecedented leisure civilization to flourish with Fordist efficiency and prove profoundly transformative for the host country. Incessant tourist migration might be viewed as an aspect of a vast international network of material exchange, and one that tended almost without exception to follow southward vectors. Thus considered, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the seventeenth-century “northern invasion” of the Mediterranean, famously identified by Fernand Braudel, had evolved by the late twentieth into a process of absorption into Europe’s prosperous, secure, and democratic consumer society.²

But is it appropriate to liken foreign tourism to invasion and colonization when the result, at least in the short term, appeared to be the strengthening of Spain’s national sovereignty? This paradox is a reflection of Spain’s paradigmatically Southern European character. Southern

Europe—referring to the Iberian nations, the Italian Mezzogiorno, Greece, and Turkey—straddles a geographical, economic, and psychological frontier separating the imperial powers of the modern period from their colonized subjects. Its unique position led theorists of an earlier generation to describe the region as “semi-peripheral”—partially developed, economically speaking, partially dependent on finance from wealthier countries, and, perhaps most significant, harboring both resentment of the “core” nations and strong ambitions to join them. It also has led to a bifurcation among the Southern European nationalisms, which have tended both toward enthusiastic Europeanism and strong assertions of independence and difference.³ Radical expressions of the latter attitude thrived during the early Franco regime. Spanish nationalists of the twentieth century believed that a strong Castile—and a strong Madrid bureaucracy—were required to prevent the peninsula’s balkanization into fragments each infinitely more vulnerable to imperial domination by the reputedly amoral peoples of Northern Europe.

The penetration of European tourism furthered this agenda to an extent, enhancing the economic and political vitality of the nationalist model the regime represented, but in another sense it produced a countervailing effect. Madrid was increasingly cut out from the basic processes of investment and commerce, which coastal provincials often negotiated directly with foreign interests. The air transportation network bypassed Madrid’s radial network familiar to rail and roadway users, as charter routes linked Stockholm with Majorca, London with Málaga, and dozens of other new permutations of the newly continentalized Spanish Mediterranean. Large tour operators bearing German and English names controlled the terms of exchange and the flow of clientele. Conglomerations of large, soulless buildings and lowbrow entertainment, superimposed on otherwise pristine coastline, testified to the pillaging of Spain, and autochthonous populations increasingly took jobs in the service of foreign clients. This scenario accounts for the growing belief by the late 1960s among an anticolonial Left and old-guard Right that the Franco regime had compromised its independence and permitted the sabotage of the integrity of the laborer, the small entrepreneur, local economies, common decency, and indeed the nation.

Yet, despite such grievances, colonial anxieties did not frame the politics of tourism promotion nearly to the effect commanded by the allure of “Europeanization.” The dominance of Northern tour operators indeed limited the profits of many coastal proprietors, but these same proprietors illegally had chosen to engage directly in the international economy in order to circumvent national-corporatist regulation, which

had been designed to prevent exactly this type of foreign intrusion into the industry. Spaniards soon perceived changing standards in the national infrastructure and behavioral mores in direct correlation with European tourist presence. Although other less visible industries provided more employment and drew more private investment, it was mass tourism that defined the era. Mobility and leisure supplanted billowing smokestacks as the modern markers of prosperity, making the imported factories dotting the Spanish interior, though critical to economic growth, retrograde as icons of progress. The modernizing ethos of the age prized a people's ability to exert its dominance over nature. There is little evidence to suggest that the different national enclaves of tourists on Spain's coasts competed over the infrastructural or cultural qualities of their settlements, as they had in the African colonies, but there is much to indicate that these visitors based their judgments of Spain on their holiday experience. For all its vulgarity and structural flaws, the tourist boom provided a compelling emblem for a European Spain, modernizing and fully absorbed in the carefree *zeitgeist* of postwar life in Western Europe.

Tourism was a political rather than administrative issue in Franco's Spain from the beginning, and this feature accounted for its significance well beyond that of a revenue source. A tourism bureau placed directly under the aegis of Franco's office, rather than a separate ministry, might have shielded the industry from cabinet struggles and provided better administrative oversight, avoiding many unfortunate urban improvisations. But it is unlikely that technocrats of any kind would have been equipped to channel the dramatic and inexorable impacts of foreign tourism into a constructive force. The growth of mass resort tourism engendered a tawdry atmosphere of the sort that accompanied numerous modern revolutions, a trend that caused particular concern as Franco advanced in age and the question of succession loomed. In a society known for prohibitive asceticism, Spanish youth negotiated a new world of exaggerated freedom. Manuel Fraga and other reformist conservatives helped redefine this as a standard challenge of modern life rather than an unwelcome intrusion of foreign decadence. Fraga's Ministry of Information and Tourism spearheaded numerous projects to extend the industry's reach well beyond the established Mediterranean coasts, whence the vast majority of its economic value, into the interior and the broad public consciousness. The wider neo-regenerationist reform project to which tourism became attached after 1962 included censorship relaxation and greater tolerance of cosmopolitan values and regional identities. This was the birth of a new Center-Right far more suited than

the old-hand Francoists to a post-Franco Spain characterized by pluralism and a notably strong feeling of xenophilia.

The reputedly internationalist forces of tourism, Europeanism, and the myth of modernization, acted in concert to strengthen the sovereignty of the Spanish nation-state. But in the course of this process, the latter emerged altered. Spain's regions came to possess new modes of self-assertion, economic, cultural, and institutional. The neo-regenerationist paradigm that came to define post-Franco conservatism sought to balance regional diversity with national unity, not through empire or religion, as in previous nationalist models, but with confident expressions of Spanish presence in modern European and world affairs. From the early twentieth century, tourism promotion was a foundational aspect of this model. Although the decadence of the *costas* by 1970 signaled its end as a political good, the obsession to overcome a history of marginalization and difference remains a powerful drive across the Spanish political spectrum. The perception that Spain now looks and behaves like a normally functioning European democracy has not totally erased lingering memories of stagnation, division, and ostracism, possibly explaining why in the early twenty-first century its support for the European project is among the strongest.

Notes

Introduction

1. Marc Boyer, *Histoire du tourisme de masse* (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1999), 28; Lina Lenček and Gideon Bosker, *The Beach: The History of Paradise on Earth* (New York: Viking, 1998), 185–195; Alain Corbin, *The Lure of the Sea* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994).
2. The figure for Spain is given in Carmelo Pellejero Martínez, “Antecedentes históricos del turismo en España (1900–1950),” in ed. Pellejero Martínez, *Historia de la economía del turismo en España* (Madrid: Civitas, 1999), 74. The figures for France and Italy are taken from Luis Fernández Fuster, *Historia general del turismo de masas* (Madrid: Alianza, 1991), 588.
3. Spain’s tourism receipts totaled \$1.2 billion in 1968, whereas Spanish tourists spent \$102 million abroad (a balance of +\$1.1 billion); the United States received \$1.8 billion, but its citizens spent \$3.0 billion abroad, yielding a balance of −\$1.2 billion). Italy’s tourism revenue reached \$1.5 billion, whereas its citizens spent \$363 million on travel abroad (+\$1.1 billion). The next leader was France, which earned \$954 million from tourism but spent \$1.1 billion. See International Monetary Fund, *Balance of Payments Yearbook*, Vols. 19–20 (New York: International Monetary Fund, 1969).
4. This perspective owes a good deal to the important revisionist thesis of Fernando Guirao, *Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–1957* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), which demonstrates that the Franco regime’s autarky and international isolation in the early postwar have been exaggerated. Also see Julio Crespo MacLennan, *Spain and the Process of European Integration, 1957–1985* (New York: Palgrave, 2000).
5. According to Spain’s Ministry of Commerce, tourism accounted for 31% of national income in 1962, compared to 19% for Austria, 16% for Ireland, and 14% for Switzerland (*Editur*, 232, Aug. 21 1964). Also see Walter Laqueur, *Europe since Hitler: The Rebirth of Europe*, 2nd. ed. (New York: Penguin, 1982), 263–265.
6. According to J. A. Martínez Serrano et al., *La economía española, 1960–1980* (Madrid: H. Blume, 1982), 208, annual tourism receipts during this period averaged \$744 million, whereas the trade deficit averaged \$1,104 million. Emigrants’ remittances (averaging \$244 million per year) and foreign

- investment (\$300 million per year) covered the remainder of the commercial shortfall.
7. Oriol Pi-Sunyer, "Tourism in Catalonia," in ed. M. Barke, J. Towner, and M. T. Newton, *Tourism in Spain: Critical Issues* (Wallingford, U.K.: CAB International, 1996), 237.
 8. See, for example, Manuel Fraga, *Memoria breve de una vida política* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1980), 225. This and all other translations, unless otherwise noted, are the author's.
 9. Rafael Esteve-Secall, *Turismo: ¿democratización o imperialismo?* (Málaga: Secretariado de Publicaciones e Intercambio Científico de la Universidad, 1983); Francisco Jurdao Arrones, *España en venta* (Madrid: Ayuso, 1979); and Mario Gaviria, *España a go-go* (Madrid: Ediciones Turner, 1974). A similar critique is made in Ramón Tamames, *Estructura económica de España* (Madrid: Guadiana, 1974), Vol. 2, 485.
 10. See Rosalie Schwartz, *Pleasure Island: Tourism and Temptation in Cuba* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 164–179.
 11. Gonzalo Álvarez Chillida, "Monarquía y cambio democrático: reflexión sobre un debate historiográfico," *Spagna Contemporanea*, 13 (1998), 147–148; Ángel Viñas, "Breaking the Shackles from the Past: Spanish Foreign Policy from Franco to Felipe González," in eds. Sebastian Balfour and Paul Preston, *Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Routledge, 1999). Another similar appraisal can be found in Edward Malefakis, "Spain and Its Francoist Heritage," in ed. J. H. Herz, *From Dictatorship to Democracy* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), 218.
 12. José Álvarez Junco, "España: El peso del estereotipo," *Claves de Razón Práctica*, 48 (Dec. 1994), 11.
 13. José Álvarez Junco and Adrian Shubert, eds., *Spanish History since 1808* (London: Arnold, 2000), 9.
 14. Luis Lavaur, "El viaje a la Rusia soviética en los años treinta," *Ayeres: cuadernos de historia*, 4:8 (June 1994), 36.
 15. Hervé Poutet, *Images touristiques de l'Espagne* (Paris: Éditions L'Hartmann, 1995), 13–14.
 16. In addition to Carmelo Pellejero Martínez, ed., cited in note 2 above, the best examples are Rafael Esteve-Secall and Rafael Fuentes García, *Economía, historia, e instituciones del turismo en España* (Madrid: Pirámide, 2000); Fernando Bayón Mariné, ed., *50 años del Turismo Español* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Ramón Acero, 1999); Fernández Fuster, *Historia general*; Jorge Vila Fradera, *La gran aventura del turismo español* (Barcelona: Editur, 1997); and María Velasco González, *La política turística: gobierno y administración turística en España (1952–2004)* (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2005).
 17. Letter to Lord Sheffield, Oct 1, 1785, in ed. J. E. Norton, *The Letters of Edward Gibbon*, Vol. 3 (London: Cassell and Company, 1956), 33, cited in Ricardo de la Cierva, *Turismo: teoría, técnica, ambiente* (Madrid: Editorial River, 1963), 24. On English attitudes toward middle-class tourism, see James Buzard, *The Beaten Track: European Tourism, Literature and Ways to*

- "Culture," 1800–1918 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), chapter 2; Roy Porter, "Les Anglais et les loisirs," in ed. Alain Corbin, *L'Avènement des loisirs, 1850–1960* (Paris: Flammarion, 1995); and Edmund Swinglehurst, *Romantic Journey: The Story of Thomas Cook and Victorian Travel* (London: Pica Editions, 1974).
18. These points formed the conclusion of the First International Conference of National Tourism Organizations, which was held in London, Oct. 1–4, 1946. A summary of the conference is given in *Revue de Tourisme*, 4 (Oct. 1946).
 19. For a full account, see Charles S. Maier, *Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 159–161.
 20. Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (New York: Wiley, 1953); Akira Iriye, *Global Community* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 122–123.
 21. Daniel Boorstin, *The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1961).
 22. Orvar Löfgren, *On Holiday: A History of Vacationing* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), 155–209. For an alternative, more differentiated view of the package tourist, see Sue Wright, "Sun, Sea, Sand, and Self-Expression: Mass Tourism as an Individual Experience," in ed. Hartmut Berghoff, Barbara Korte, Ralf Schneider, and Christopher Harvie, *The Making of Modern Tourism: The Cultural History of the British Experience, 1600–2000* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 181–202.
 23. Alan Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation State*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2000), 13.
 24. This idea is developed in Rudy Koshar, *German Travel Cultures* (Oxford: Berg, 2000).
 25. See Susan Barton, *Working-Class Organizations and Popular Tourism, 1840–1970* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005); and John K. Walton, *The English Seaside Resort, 1750–1914* (New York: St. Martin's, 1983).
 26. Ellen Furlough, "Making Mass Vacations: Tourism and Consumer Culture in France, 1930s to 1970s," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 40:3 (1998). On the *Kraft durch Freude* of Nazi Germany, see Shelley Baranowski, *Strength through Joy: Consumerism and Mass Tourism in the Third Reich* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). The main study of organized leisure in Fascist Italy is Victoria De Grazia, *The Culture of Consent: Mass Organization of Leisure in Fascist Italy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
 27. Alon Confino, "Dissonance, Normality, and the Historical Method: Why Did Some Germans Think of Tourism after May 8, 1945?" in ed. Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann, *Life after Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe During the 1940s and 1950s* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 323–347.

28. Joffre Dumazedier, *Vers une civilisation du loisir?* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1962), esp. 85–92.
29. See Christopher Endy, *Cold War Holidays: American Tourism in France* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); and Neal M. Rosendorf, “The Life and Times of Samuel Bronston, Builder of ‘Hollywood in Madrid’: A Study in the International Scope and Influence of American Popular Culture,” Ph.D. Diss., Harvard University, 2000, esp. chapter 7.
30. OECD Tourism Committee Report, May 17, 1961.
31. On the concept of Fordist tourism, see John Urry, *The Tourist Gaze* (London: Sage, 1990). For a general description of Fordist consumption regimes and their introduction in Europe, see Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2005). On precedents in Victorian England, see Barton, *Working-Class Organizations*, esp. 41–72.
32. OECD Tourism Committee Report, May 17, 1961.
33. European Travel Commission, *Draft Report on European Travel Statistics: Present Data and Future Needs* (Dublin: European Travel Commission, 1972), 2.
34. “The Outlook for International Tourism in 1969 and the Record for 1968,” *OECD Observer*, 42 (Oct. 1969), 34–36.
35. Including Spain, Italy, Yugoslavia, and Greece (calculated from data in Fernández Fuster, *Historia general*, 682–684).
36. Ellen Furlough notes that the so-called “entitlement–access gap” in vacations became a preoccupation of French social policy as it became clear in the 1950s that legislating vacations and wage increases alone had merely provoked inflation. As government intervention concentrated on expanding supply and improving distribution, commentators on the Communist Left cited the vacation gap as evidence of enduring class divides (see Furlough, “Making Mass Vacations,” 260, 268). Also see Barton, *Working-Class Organizations*; and Hartmut Berghoff, “From Privilege to Commodity: Modern Tourism and the Rise of Consumer Society,” in Berghoff et al., *The Making of Modern Tourism*, esp. 172–176.
37. Pat Thane, “Family Life and ‘Normality’ in Postwar Britain,” in Bessel and Schumann, *Life after Death*, 198; A. H. Halsey, ed., *Trends in British Society Since 1900: A Guide to the Changing Social Structure of Britain* (London: Macmillan, 1972). 549.
38. Ian Littlewood, *Sultry Climates* (Cambridge, Mass.: Da Capo Press, 2001), 208–209.
39. See Koshar, *German Travel Cultures*, 186.
40. See Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); and David Engerman et al., eds., *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003).

41. Carlos Seco Serrano, *Historia del conservadurismo español* (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 2000); and Javier Tusell and Juan Avilés, *La derecha española contemporánea* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1986).
42. On the eighteenth-century Spanish interest in increasing international social and cultural contact, see Julián Marías, *La España posible de Carlos III* (Madrid: Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1963), 121–168.
43. Jorge Vila Fradera, *Hoteles hoy* (Barcelona: Editur, 1961), 32, reports that Spain received 187,220 foreign tourists in 1931, the earliest date for which reliable figures are available. By comparison, France received 1 to 2 million tourists annually during the 1920s, and Italy often more; Louis-Michel Jocard, *Le tourisme et l'action de l'État* (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1965), 258.
44. See Sandie Holguín, “‘National Spain Invites You’: Battlefield Tourism during the Spanish Civil War,” *American Historical Review*, 110:5 (Dec. 2005), 1399–1426.
45. On the role of tourism in the construction boom, see Serrano et al., *La economía española*, 126–127.
46. Manuel Jesús González González, *La economía política del franquismo, 1940–1970* (Madrid: Tecnos, 1979), 284.
47. Juan J. Linz has provided the classic theoretical formulation of modern semi-plural authoritarianism. See, for example, “An Authoritarian Regime: Spain,” in ed. Erik Allardt and Yrjö Littunen, *Ideologies and Party Systems* (Helsinki: The Academic Bookstore, 1964).
48. This point is developed in Poutet, *Images touristiques de l'Espagne*, 44.
49. On other aspects of non-state Spanish foreign relations within Europe, see Petra María Weber, “El CEDI: Promotor del Occidente cristiano y de la relaciones hispano-alemanas de los años cincuenta,” *Hispania*, 54:3 (Sept.–Dec. 1994), 1077–1103; and Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, “Neoconservadurismo e identidad europea (una aproximación histórica),” *Spagna contemporanea*, 13 (1998), 41–60.
50. Cited in Pedro Tedde de Lorca, “Economía y franquismo: a propósito de una biografía,” *Revista de Historia Económica*, 4:3 (1986), 627.
51. Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas con Franco* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1976), 380.
52. On another aspect of civic remobilization in this period, see Pamela Beth Radcliff, “Citizens and Housewives: The Problem of Female Citizenship in Spain's Transition to Democracy,” *Journal of Social History*, 36:1 (2002), 77–100.
53. The political aspect of the Franco regime's development programs of the 1960s and 1970s is discussed in Rosa Alsina Oliva, “Estrategia de desarrollo en España 1964–1975: planes y realidad,” *Cuadernos de Economía*, 15 (1987), 337–370; Juan-Pablo Fusi, “La década del desarrollo, 1960–1970,” in ed. José María Jover Zamora, Guadalupe Gómez-Ferrer, and Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpúrua, *España: sociedad, política, y civilización (siglos XIX–XX)* (Madrid: Editorial Debate, 2001), 746; González, *La economía política del franquismo*, 299–300.

54. Cristina Palomares, *The Quest for Survival after Franco: Moderate Francoism and the Slow Journey to the Polls, 1964–1977* (Brighton, U.K.: Sussex Academic Press, 2004). The phrase “Estado de Obras” was coined by Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora’s book of the same title (Madrid: Doncel, 1976), and describes the political theory behind supposedly apolitical technocracy. Fernández de la Mora was Spain’s minister of public works from 1970 to 1974.
55. See, for example, Paul Preston, *The Triumph of Democracy in Spain* (London: Methuen, 1986); and Raymond Carr and Juan-Pablo Fusi, *Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1979), 59.
56. Carolyn P. Boyd, *Historia Patria: Politics, History and National Identity in Spain, 1875–1975* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 304.
57. Amando de Miguel, “Una revisión de las ideas sobre el turismo,” *Mundo Internacional*, Jan. 9, 1971.
58. An exemplary work is Ronald Fraser, *Tajos: The Story of a Village on the Costa del Sol* (New York: Pantheon, 1973).
59. Elisa Chuliá, *El poder y la palabra* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2001), 157.
60. See, for example, Gregorio López Bravo’s comments in *Cambio* 16, Apr. 24, 1972, quoted in Mary Kate Barker, “The European Economic Community, the Catholic Church, and the Transition to Democracy in Spain,” Ph.D. Diss., Columbia University, 2004, 130–131.
61. Barker, “The European Economic Community,” 130–149.

Chapter 1 Travel and Tourism in Spanish History

1. A classic exposition of this theme is Claudio Sánchez Albornoz’s essay “Spain and Europe,” in *Spain: A Historical Enigma*, Vol. 2, trans. Colette Joly Dees and David Sven Reher (Madrid: Fundación Universitaria Española, 1975), 1137–1210. Boyd, *Historia Patria*, 284–285.
2. Luis Vázquez de Parga, Juan Uría, and José María Lacarra, *Peregrinaciones a Santiago*, Vol.1 (Madrid: CSIC, 1948), 41.
3. Elías Valiña Sampedro, *El Camino de Santiago: estudio histórico-jurídico* (Madrid: CSIC, 1971).
4. Quoted in Valiña Sampedro, *El Camino de Santiago*, 24.
5. Examples of the major French imports associated with the Reconquest, Camino de Santiago, and resulting upturn in international commerce in Christian Spain included the introduction of Roman liturgy, the French alphabet in lieu of the Visigothic, and the growing influence of the Benedictine order. See Parga et al., *Peregrinaciones a Santiago*, 455–456; Luciano Huidobro, *Las peregrinaciones jacobeanas* (Madrid: CSIC, 1950); Yves Bottineau, *Les Chemins de Saint-Jacques de Compostelle* (Paris: Arthaud, 1964).
6. Parga et al., *Peregrinaciones a Santiago*, 466.
7. J. N. Hillgarth, *Mirror of Spain* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), 7–8, 51–52.

8. Valiña Sampedro, *El Camino de Santiago*, 70–79.
9. Hillgarth, *Mirror of Spain*, 71–72. Fairer-skinned travelers in Spain “had to assume they would rouse the suspicions of the Inquisition, for which German and Lutheran were practically synonymous”; Parga et al., *Peregrinaciones a Santiago*, 114.
10. In addition to Hillgarth, a good introduction to the origins of the Black Legend is Julián Marías, *España inteligible: razón histórica de las Españas* (Madrid: Alianza, 1985). In English, see Philip W. Powell’s more polemical *Tree of Hate* (New York: Basic Books, 1971).
11. Hillgarth, *Mirror of Spain*, 241; Mario Ford Bacigalupo, “Spain and Europe in Eighteenth-Century Travel Literature: An Aspect of the ‘Leyenda Negra,’ ” Ph. D. Diss., Brown University, 1973, 112–131.
12. New British consuls opened in Bilbao, Barcelona, Alicante, and La Coruña and the old colonies in Seville, Cádiz, and Málaga revived (Hillgarth, *Mirror of Spain*, 38–39, and, on the reopening of Rome, 71–72).
13. Jeremy Black, *The British Abroad: The Grand Tour in the Eighteenth Century* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), esp. 76–80; John Towner, *An Historical Geography of Recreation and Tourism in the Western World, 1540–1940* (London: J. Wiley, 1996, 107–109).
14. Bacigalupo, “Spain and Europe in Eighteenth-Century Travel Literature,” 13–15.
15. Bacigalupo, “Spain and Europe in Eighteenth-Century Travel Literature,” passim. A similar point is advanced in Manuel Fernández Álvarez, *Aportaciones a la historia del turismo en España* (Madrid: Ministerio de Información y Turismo, 1956), 94. Also see José Álvarez Junco, *Mater Dolorosa* (Madrid: Taurus, 2001), 107–116.
16. Bacigalupo, “Spain and Europe in Eighteenth-Century Travel Literature,” 185.
17. Hillgarth, *Mirror of Spain*, esp. 40–51.
18. Quoted in Francisco Xavier de Cabanes, *Guía general de Correos, Postas y Caminos del Reino de España* (Madrid: D. Miguel de Burgos, 1830), 11.
19. Minister of Commerce Bernardo Ward, quoted in Pablo Alzola y Minondo, *Las obras públicas en España* (1899; reprint, Madrid: Turner, 1979), 272–273. On general improvement of European roads, see Henry Kamen, *Early Modern European Society* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 206–208.
20. David Ringrose, *Transportation and Economic Stagnation in Spain, 1750–1850* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1970), 14–15; Gonzalo Menéndez Pidal, *Los caminos en la historia de España* (Madrid: Cultura Hispánica, 1951).
21. Widespread availability of hired carriages in France, Poland, Central Europe, and Russia is known from the memoir of a 1727 voyage by the Duque de Liria from Madrid to Moscow, cited in Alzola, *Las obras públicas en España*, 270.
22. José Ignacio Uriol Salcedo, *Historia de los caminos de España*, Vol. 1 (Madrid: Colegio de Ingenieros de Caminos, Canales, y Puertos, 1990), 343–350; Alzola, *Las obras públicas en España*, 299.

23. Quoted in Uriol Salcedo, *Historia de los caminos de España*, Vol. 1, 386, 391.
24. Several such accounts are given in J. García Mercadal, ed., *Viajes de extranjeros por España y Portugal*, Vol. 3 (Madrid: Aguilar, 1952–1962). Specifically, see the impressions of J. Townsend, J. B. Labat, Dalrymple, Bourgoing, and A. Ponz, also cited in Uriol Salcedo, *Historia de los caminos de España*, Vol. 1, 384–390.
25. In 1782, after much improvement over the preceding three decades, travelers along major French routes covered between 60 and 100 miles per day (Alzola, *Las obras públicas en España*, 300).
26. Alzola, *Las obras públicas en España*, 339.
27. Alzola, *Las obras públicas en España*, 343–346, 367–368.
28. On the relationship among industrialization, rail networks, and tourism, see József Böröcz, *Leisure Migration: A Sociological Study on Tourism* (Oxford: Pergamon), 1996.
29. John Pemble, *The Mediterranean Passion: Victorians and Edwardians in the South* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 48–49, 87; Enrique Obregón, “El turismo rancio en España,” *Historia y vida*, 21:245 (1988), 110.
30. Quoted in Luis Lavaur, *Albores del turismo moderno (1850–1870)* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Turísticos, 1976), 38.
31. Uriol Salcedo, *Historia de los caminos de España*, Vol. 1, 107; Pemble, *The Mediterranean Passion*, 25–28; on Spanish railroad construction, see Antonio Gómez Mendoza, *Ferrocarriles y Cambio Económico en España (1855–1913)* (Madrid: Alianza, 1982).
32. Lavaur, *Albores*, 43; M. Barke and J. Towner, “Exploring the History of Leisure and Tourism in Spain,” in Barke et al., *Tourism in Spain*, 12.
33. A lively inquiry into the origins of this Iberian peculiarity is Ricardo Zamacois, *El tercer rail: aislamiento ferroviario español* (Barcelona: Ariel, 1965). Illustrating an enduring Spanish preoccupation with French power, Zamacois recalls how his boyhood pals in Restoration Spain had speculated that the Spanish rail width was deliberately altered to prevent French invasion by train. Also see Uriol Salcedo, *Historia de los caminos de España*, Vol. 1, 42–43.
34. Cited in Obregón, “Los hoteles y el turismo,” *Historia y vida*, 22:258 (1989), 5.
35. Quoted in Uriol Salcedo, *Historia de los caminos de España*, Vol. 1, 134.
36. Richard Ford, *Gatherings from Spain* (1846; reprint, London: Pallas Athene, 2000), 157.
37. Barke and Towner, “Exploring the History of Leisure and Tourism in Spain,” 11. For an overview of tourism in nineteenth-century Spain, also see Carlos Larrinaga Rodríguez, “El turismo en la España del siglo XIX,” *Historia Contemporánea*, 2 (2002), 157–179.
38. On the English migrations to Mediterranean coasts, see Pemble, *The Mediterranean Passion*, esp. 48–49.
39. Sea bathing culture first emerged in England around 1730, in France and Germany toward the end of the eighteenth century, and in Spain in the

- 1830s (Towner, *Historical Geography*, 172). On the cultural origins of sea bathing, see Corbin, *The Lure of the Sea*.
40. Pemble, *The Mediterranean Passion*, 39–42, 84–96, 242–243; “Che pazzia affidarsi al mare! Per una storia del turismo balneare sull’Adriatico,” *Risorgimento*, 45:2 (1993), 235–241; Pieter Judson, “‘Every German Visitor Has a völkisch obligation He Must Fulfill’: Nationalist Tourism in the Austrian Empire,” in ed. Rudy Koshar, *Histories of Leisure* (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 169–190.
 41. See Marc Boyer, *L’Invention de la Côte d’Azur* (La Tour d’Aigue: Éditions de l’Aube, 2002).
 42. John K. Walton and J. Smith, “The First Century of Beach Tourism in Spain: San Sebastián and the Playas del Norte from the 1830s to the 1930s,” in Barke et al., *Tourism in Spain*, 35–62; Alet Valero, “Oriente, playas y castillos: Pratiques, images et politiques touristiques en Espagne, 1830–1928,” Ph. D. Diss., Université de Provence, 1993; José Fernando Vera Rebollo, *Turismo y urbanización en el litoral alicantino* (Alicante: Instituto de Estudios “Juan Gil-Albert,” 1987), 47–84.
 43. Ramón Mesonero Romanos, *Recuerdos de un viaje por Francia y Bélgica en 1840 à 1841* (Madrid: Oficinas de la Ilustración Española y Americana, 1881), quoted in Obregón, “Turismo rancio,” 106.
 44. Diputación Provincial Foral de Madrid, “Madrid en la mano o el amigo del forastero en Madrid y sus cercanías” (Madrid: DPFM, 1850), quoted in Lavaur, *Albores*, 226.
 45. Quoted in Obregón, “Turismo rancio,” 108.
 46. Jocard, *Le tourisme et l’action de l’Etat*, 60–61.
 47. Obregón, “Turismo rancio,” 107–108.
 48. M. Barke and L. A. France, “The Costa del Sol,” in Barke et al., *Tourism in Spain*, 267.
 49. Valero, “Oriente, playas y castillos,” 277, 297.
 50. Barke and Towner, “Exploring the History of Leisure and Tourism in Spain,” 8.
 51. Karl Baedeker, *Spain and Portugal: Handbook for Travelers*, 4th ed. (Leipzig: Karl Baedeker, 1913), 383–384.
 52. Barke and Towner, “Exploring the History of Leisure and Tourism in Spain,” 9–13.
 53. See, for example, Jordi Maluquer Motes, *España en la crisis de 1898: de la Gran Depresión a la modernización económica del siglo XX* (Barcelona: Península, 1999); José Luis García Delgado, *La modernización económica en la España de Alfonso XIII* (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 2002).
 54. Amando de Miguel and Roberto Luciano Barbeito, *El final de un siglo de pesimismo (1898–1998)* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1998), 23.
 55. See Luis Jiménez Moreno, “El hispanismo unamuniano y la europeización,” in ed. José Luis Abellán, *El reto Europeo: identidades culturales en el cambio de siglo* (Madrid: Trotta, 1994), 151; José María Beneyto, *Tragedia y*

- razon: Europa en el pensamiento español del siglo XX* (Madrid: Taurus, 1999), where the Ortega–Unamuno polemic is treated at length.
56. Pedro Laín Entralgo, “La reacción de los intelectuales,” in ed. Pedro Laín Entralgo and Carlos Seco Serrano, *España en 1898: las claves del desastre* (Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg, 1998), 295–322, offers an excellent summary of the birth of Spanish “regenerationism” in a political and historical context.
 57. Tusell and Avilés, *La derecha española contemporánea*, 21; José Varela Ortega, *Los amigos políticos: partidos, elecciones y caciquismo en la Restauración (1875–1900)* (Madrid: Alianza, 1977), 319–322.
 58. Esteve-Secall and Fuentes García, *Economía, historia, e instituciones del turismo en España*, 18.
 59. Bartolomé Amengual, *La industria de los forasteros* (Palma: Amengual y Muntaner, 1903). Amengual calculated that France earned 25 million francs from tourism in 1899 and Italy 350 million lire in 1900. It is likely that for Amengual, a Balearic Islander, the term “foreigner” (*forastero*) referred to mainland Spaniards as well as non-Spaniards.
 60. Pellejero Martínez, “Antecedentes,” 23; Valero, “Oriente, playas y castillos,” 529–530.
 61. Pellejero Martínez, “Antecedentes,” 24.
 62. Given in Pellejero Martínez, “Antecedentes,” 40. The case of Palma de Majorca again must be qualified, as islanders considered mainland Spaniards to be “*forasteros*,” and hoped to capitalize on new steamer service from Barcelona; Bartolomeu Barceló Pons, *Evolución reciente y estructura actual de la población en las Islas Baleares* (Madrid: CSIC, 1970), 226–227. Also see Enrique de Obregón, “Los promotores del turismo,” *Historia y vida*, 24:282 (1991), 24–28; Vila Fradera, *La gran aventura*, 52.
 63. See Vicente Traver Tomás, *El Marqués de la Vega Inclán* (Madrid: Fundación Vega Inclán, 1965); and Ana Moreno Garrido, “Turismo y Nación. La definición de la identidad nacional a través de los símbolos turísticos España 1908–1929,” Ph. D. Diss., Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 2005.
 64. Marqués de Marianao, *Consideraciones acerca de la necesidad del Fomento del Turismo, fuente de riqueza nacional, mediante la formación del gran “Círculo Español”* (Barcelona: Imprenta de Juan Vidal, 1910), 8.
 65. Exposition of the Royal Decree of June 20, 1911, quoted in Tomás, *El Marqués de la Vega Inclán*, 113.
 66. Jocard, *Le tourisme et l’action de l’Etat*, 20–24; René Duchet, *Le tourisme à travers des âges: sa place dans la vie moderne* (Paris: Vigot, 1949), 161.
 67. On the Italian case, see R. J. B. Bosworth, *Italy and the Wider World, 1860–1960* (London: Routledge, 1996), 159–181; Fernández Fuster, *Historia general*, 228; *Documentación Turística*, 18 (Jan. 13, 1971).
 68. On the economic development policies of the Primo dictatorship, see Shlomo Ben-Ami, *Fascism from Above* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 240–281; James Rial, *Revolution from Above: The Primo de Rivera Dictatorship*

- in Spain, 1923–1930* (Fairfax: George Mason University Press, 1986); and García Delgado, *La modernización económica*, 148–149.
69. Duchet, *Le tourisme à travers des ages*, 189; Boyer, *L'Invention de la Côte d'Azur*, 357–361.
 70. Marqués de la Vega Inclán, “Solicitud y Proyecto para el progresivo desarrollo y organización del Turismo nacional, que el Comisario Regio, Marqués de la Vega Inclán, somete al Gobierno de S. M.” (Madrid: Publicaciones de la Comisaría Regia del Turismo, 1925), 140, AHN FC-PRESID-GOB-PRIMO-DE-RIVERA.
 71. John K. Walton, “The Waters of San Sebastián: Therapy, Health, Pleasure, and Identity, 1840–1936,” in ed. Susan C. Anderson and Bruce H. Tabb, *Water, Leisure, and Culture: European Historical Perspectives* (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 46.
 72. *Gaceta de Madrid*, Jan. 5, 1926.
 73. Real Decreto-Ley, Feb. 9, 1926, quoted in Pellejero Martínez, “Antecedentes,” 62; and Uriol Salcedo, *Historia de los caminos de España*, Vol. 1, 239–241.
 74. *El Peregrino y el Turista*, 29 (Jan. 15, 1926).
 75. *El Peregrino y el Turista*, 30 (Jan. 31, 1926).
 76. *El Peregrino y el Turista*, 29 (Jan. 15, 1926).
 77. *El Peregrino y el Turista*, 32 (Feb. 27, 1926). The citation and comment on Bermúdez Cañete’s general renown are taken from Juan Velarde Fuertes, *Fraga, o el intelectual y la política* (Barcelona: Planeta, 2001), 157. On Bermúdez Cañete’s association with Ramiro Ledesma’s Spanish fascist movement, see Stanley G. Payne, *Fascism in Spain, 1923–1977* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999), 58–59. Incidentally, this connection may explain why the Royal Tourism Commission provided Ledesma’s first publishing subsidy.
 78. *El Peregrino y el Turista*, 33 (Mar. 15, 1926).
 79. *El Peregrino y el Turista*, 33 (Mar. 15, 1926).
 80. José Herrero Anguita, “Estudio del Turismo y Proyecto para su desarrollo en España mediante la creación de un Consejo Nacional y constitución de la Compañía Hispano-Americana de Turismo,” 1926. The author later produced a 68-page registry of all the positive responses from his readers entitled, “Algunos juicios y adhesiones sobre la obra ‘Estudio del Turismo y Proyecto para su desarrollo en España mediante la creación de un Consejo Nacional y constitución de la Compañía Hispano-Americana de Turismo.’ ”
 81. State bodies involved included the Directorates General of Public Works, Fine Arts, Geography and Statistics, Public Instruction, and Customs; the Ministries of State and of the Interior; and the Industrial Credit Bank (Pellejero Martínez, “Antecedentes,” 26).
 82. Patronato Nacional de Turismo, “Nota sobre el Fomento del Turismo Español,” 1928, AHN FC-PRESID-GOB-PRIMO-DE-RIVERA, 140.
 83. AHN FC-PRESID-GOB-PRIMO-DE-RIVERA, 140, Exp. 13; Pellejero Martínez, “Antecedentes,” 26–35.

84. The restoration of the palace at Gredos had been a project of Vega Inclán. Unlike most other Paradors, it was intended not for foreigners, but to attract bourgeois Madrileños to hunting reserves in the impoverished region (Barke and Towner, "Exploring the History of Leisure and Tourism in Spain," 28).
85. On the origins of state Paradors, see María Matilde Ceballos Martín, "Aspectos histórico-jurídicos de la entidad estatal empresarial Paradores de Turismo," *Documentación Administrativa*, 259–260 (Jan.–Aug. 2001), 355–368; José Luis Meilán Gil, *Empresas públicas y turismo* (Madrid: Estudios Administrativos, 1967); and Luis Fernández Fuster, *Albergues y paradores* (Madrid: Publicaciones Españolas, 1959).
86. A historical overview of public enterprise in Spain can be found in Francisco Comín, "La empresa pública en la España contemporánea: Formas históricas de organización y gestión (1770–1995)," Working Paper #9505, Fundación Empresa Pública, 1995.
87. Pellejero Martínez, "Antecedentes," 30.
88. Luis Lavaur, *Turismo de Entreguerras*, Vol. 2 (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Turísticos, 1980), 62.
89. Undersecretary of the PNT, AMAE R-802, Exp. 19.
90. Patronato Nacional de Turismo, AGA 3: 49.06/29607; Vila Fradera, *Hoteles, hoy*, 32; Fernández Fuster, *Historia general*, 277. Lavaur, *Turismo de Entreguerras*, 50, has claimed that the number of tourists decreased from 440,000 in 1930 to 190,000 in 1934. The drop was actually not quite so precipitous: the figure of 440,000 counted all travelers passing through Spain, including many Moroccans in transit to France. Total overnight travelers dropped from 278,000 (1930) to 190,000 (1934), with arrivals from Germany, Great Britain, and the United States registering the sharpest declines. Worldwide depression, which hit these countries more immediately than Spanish tourism's largest customer France, explains the decline.
91. "Evolución del Turismo en la Costa Brava," in "Plan de Promoción Turística de la Costa Brava," internal DGT Report, 1974, AGA 3: 49.22/59882; Yvette Barbaza, *Le paysage humain de la Costa Brava* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1966), 566–568. These resorts began as the domain on the Barcelona bourgeoisie, attaining a more international clientele after 1928. Tossa became home to an exile community of German dissidents after 1933.
92. Barton, *Working-Class Organizations*, 199.
93. Barke and Towner, "Exploring the History of Leisure and Tourism in Spain," 12.
94. Esteve-Secall and Fuentes García, *Economía, historia, e instituciones del turismo en España*, 41–42.
95. The phrase belonged to Cardinal Isidro Gomá, later a prominent supporter of Franco, and appeared in his treatise on the subject, *Las modas y el lujo ante la ley cristiana, la sociedad, y el arte* (Barcelona: Librería Tipográfica y Católica, 1913). Also see Walton, "The Waters of San Sebastián," 44–45; and Carmen Martín Gaité, *Usos amorosos de la posguerra española* (Barcelona: Editorial Anagrama, 1987).

96. Beatriz Parra, "La mujer y el traje de baño a lo largo del siglo XX," *RS: cuadernos de realidades sociales*, 57–58 (2001), 189–218.
97. Lavaur, "El viaje a la Rusia Soviética en los años treinta," 35–45; Paul Hollander, *Political Pilgrims: Western Intellectuals in Search of the Good Society*, 4th ed. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1998).
98. Quoted by R. Hodgson, British agent at Burgos, to British Foreign Office, June 10, 1938, PRO FO 371/22626, Reg. 7822/29/41.
99. For a full treatment of battlefield tourism in Nationalist Spain, see Holguín, " 'National Spain Invites You,' " 1399–1426.
100. Bolín's wartime experience directing battlefield tours is recounted in his memoir, *Spain: The Vital Years* (London: Cassell, 1967), 302–306.
101. Apart from Bolín's own partisan accounts, see Beatriz Correyero Ruiz, "Las rutas de guerra y los periodistas portugueses," *Historia y Comunicación Social*, 6 (2001), 123–134; and Judith Keene, *Fighting for Franco* (New York: Leicester University Press, 2001), 46, 263.
102. Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs to Spanish Embassy in Washington, June 5, 1939, AGA 10: 26.02/12625.
103. Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs to Spanish Embassy in Washington, May 24, 1939, AGA 10: 26.02/12625.
104. Esteve-Secall and Fuentes García, *Economía, historia, e instituciones del turismo en España*, 68.
105. "Instrucciones y Recomendaciones de la Dirección General del Turismo a los Señores Dueños o Directores de los Establecimientos Hoteleros de España," DGT circular, Aug. 8, 1939, AGA 3: 49.02/14415.
106. Ibid. The interested reader may find similar opinions on Spanish cuisine reflected in Gregorio Marañón's "Ensayo apologético sobre la cocina española" (1951), in ed. Marañón, *El alma de España* (Madrid: Herederos de Manuel Herrera Oria, 1951).
107. Bolín, *Spain*, 306.
108. Lavaur, *Turismo de Entreguerras*, 128.
109. Bolín, *Spain*, 305–306.
110. AGA 3: 49.02/12093. There apparently were some foreign participants. Records from 1940 indicate the gross receipt of 100,000 French francs and 50,529 pounds sterling.
111. AGA 8: 25.01/3319.
112. Directorate General of Architecture, "Plan Decenal de Resurgimiento Nacional. Estudios Preliminares. Memoria," 1940, AGA 8: 25.01/3311.
113. Carlos Ibáñez de Ibero, *La personalidad internacional de España* (San Sebastián: Editorial Española, 1940), 236–237.
114. Internal DGT circular, n.d., 1942, AGA 3: 49.03/14419.
115. DGT, "Memoria sobre los trabajos extraordinarios a realizar por la DGT durante el año 1940," AGA 3: 49.02/12094.
116. *Hostal*, 1:1 (July 1950).
117. "Agencias de Viajes en España," DGT Circular, Apr. 1961, AGA 3: 49.06/30005; Bayón Mariné, *50 años del Turismo Español*, 57.

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1. Excluding passengers in transit through Spanish ports. Directorate General of Tourism, *Movimiento Turístico en España, 1956* (Madrid: Ministerio de Información y Turismo, 1956), 9.
2. Italian figures taken from *Bollettino tecnico trimestrale dell'Ente Nazionale Industrie Turistiche*, 12 (Dec. 1952), and *Revista Sindical de Estadística*, 14:60 (Oct.–Dec. 1960), 52–55; French figures are given in Jocard, *Tourisme et l'action de l'État*, 260; and Duchet, *Le tourisme à travers les âges*, 172.
3. On French policy toward Spain following World War II, see David Messenger, “France, the Allies, and Franco’s Spain, 1943–1948,” Ph.D. Diss., University of Toronto, 2000.
4. On the Republican guerrilla rebellions in the Pyrenees, see Secundino Serrano, *Maquis: Historia de la guerilla antifranquista* (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 2001), esp. 127–148; David Wingeate Pike, *In the Service of Stalin* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993).
5. Luis Carrero Blanco [Juan de la Cosa, pseud.], *España ante el mundo (proceso de un aislamiento)* (Madrid: Ediciones Idea, 1950); Ernesto Giménez Caballero, *La Europa de Estrasburgo* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1950); Alberto Martín Artajo’s speech delivered to the Cortes, December 14, 1950, published as *La política de aislamiento de España seguida por las naciones aliadas durante el quinquenio 1945–1950* (Madrid: Oficina de Información Diplomática, 1950).
6. Miguel Ángel Ruiz Carnicer, “La idea de Europa en la cultura franquista, 1939–1962,” *Hispania*, 58:2 (1998), 679–701; Stanley G. Payne, *The Franco Regime, 1936–1975* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), 356–357.
7. The relationship among industrial policy, state enterprise, and national defense is developed in Elena San Román, *Ejército e industria: El nacimiento del INI* (Barcelona: Crítica, 1999).
8. *The New York Times*, Oct. 19, 1947.
9. See Guirao, *Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe*; and Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, “El ingreso de España en la Organización Europea de Cooperación Económica,” *Arbor*, 669 (Sept. 2001), 147–179.
10. Fernando Guirao, “The United States, Franco, and the Integration of Europe,” in ed. Francis H. Heller and John R. Gillingham, *The United States and the Integration of Europe: Legacies of the Postwar Era* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1996).
11. These were Britain, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, Ireland, and Greece.
12. Antonio Gómez Mendoza, *El “Gibraltar económico”: Franco y Riotinto, 1936–1954* (Madrid: Civitas, 1994), 212.
13. Javier Tusell, *Franco y los Católicos* (Madrid: Alianza, 1984), esp. 84–92. On other aspects of Spanish foreign relations in Europe within the parameters of

- National-Catholic cultural politics, see Weber, "El CEDI," 1077–1103; and González Cuevas, "Neoconservadurismo e identidad europea," 41–60.
14. José Luis Neila Hernández, "The Foreign Policy Administration of Franco's Spain," in ed. Christian Leitz and David J. Dunthorne, *Spain in an International Context, 1936–1959* (New York: Berghahn, 1999), 277–298; Alejandro Nieto, "Selección y perfeccionamiento del personal del Servicio Exterior," *Documentación Administrativa*, 205 (1985), 165–178.
 15. Paul H. Gore-Booth, British Delegate to OEEC, July 9, 1948, PRO FO 371/71974.
 16. Quoted in E. W. Wimble, "Memorandum for Submission to the Executive Committee of the IUOTO," Oct. 1947, PRO FO 371/68865.
 17. Juan Pablo Fusi, "La cultura," in ed. José Luis García Delgado et al., *Franquismo: el juicio de la historia* (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 2000), esp. 171–184.
 18. Quoted in DGT translation of Doré Ogrizek, *Spanien* (Saarbrücken: Verlag West-Ost, 1951), filed at AGA 3: 49.03/16065.
 19. Quoted in letter from José Luis Ochoa, Spanish Ambassador to Uruguay, to Alfredo Sánchez-Bella, Minister of Information and Tourism, Apr. 21, 1970, AGA 3: 49.13/62125.
 20. Manuel Fraga, interview by author, Santiago de Compostela, Mar. 8, 2002. Despite the importance of tourism in the Spanish economy and enduring social and political questions it raised, the topic was largely absent from the dictator's public agenda in this period; see Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones Privadas con Franco*, passim; and Agustín del Río Cisneros, ed., *Discursos y mensajes del Jefe del Estado* (Madrid: Publicaciones Españolas, 1968), passim.
 21. Vila Fradera, *La gran aventura*, 23.
 22. IEME Circular #91 (Aug. 23, 1946), AGA 10: 77/7461.
 23. AGA 10: 26.02/8994.
 24. The 1941 regulation dictating the 200-peseta minimum is derived from IEME Circular #2161, AMAE R-5283, Exp. 6. Prejudicial effects were discussed in a letter from Bermejo to Martín Artajo, Jan. 9, 1948, AGA 10: 97/11446.
 25. John Walker, Commercial Secretary to British Embassy in Madrid, to IEME, Mar. 18, 1948, AMAE R-5283, Exp. 6.
 26. Warren Barrien to José A. Sobrino, Delegate to the Spanish Committee on Cultural Relations, Feb. 2, 1948, AMAE R-5283, Exp. 6.
 27. AGA 10: 97/11446 and 10: 97/11643.
 28. According to simple arithmetic, this would have yielded nine million pesetas. The Industrial Credit Bank lent five million pesetas for hotel construction of 22 million requested in 1947; Joaquín Bru, *El Crédito Hotelero en España* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Turísticos, 1964).
 29. José María Bermejo, Spanish Commercial Attaché in Paris, to Martín Artajo, Jan. 9, 1948, AGA 10: 97/11446.

30. M. de Madrazo, Spanish Consul in Bayonne, to Martín Artajo, Mar. 3, 1948, AGA 10: 97/11446.
31. Spanish Embassy in Paris to Consul General in Paris, May 18, 1948, AGA 10: 97/11446; *Cambios de moneda extranjera en España* (Madrid: Banco Exterior de España, 1951).
32. Barbaza, *Le paysage humain de la Costa Brava*, 694.
33. Barton, *Working-Class Organizations*, 179–195.
34. Roger Bray and Vladimir Raitz, *Flight to the Sun* (London: Continuum, 2001), 31–32.
35. C. T. Gandy, Economic Minute, Oct. 3, 1947, PRO FO 371/62685. According to the British Treasury, from January to September, 1947, British tourists had spent £6 million in Switzerland, £4.5 million in France, £2.6 million in Belgium, £1 million in Italy, and over £2 million in other European destinations.
36. J. E. Coulson, British Embassy in Paris, to John Wilson, Foreign Office, Oct. 3, 1947, PRO FO 371/62685.
37. Hubert Penton, British Embassy in Paris, to Mr. Rowe-Dutton, Foreign Office, Apr. 9, 1946, PRO T 236/3876.
38. Jaime Alba, Spanish Commercial Attaché in London, to Undersecretary of Foreign Economy and Commerce, Apr. 12, 1948, AMAE R-5104, Exp. 6.
39. Paul H. Gore-Booth, Foreign Office, to John Bridges, British Travel and Holiday Association, Sept. 13, 1946, PRO FO 371/60471.
40. Foreign Office Minute, Jan. 25, 1952, PRO FO 371/102054.
41. Foreign Office Minute, H. Trevelyan, Feb. 24, 1948, PRO FO 371/68865.
42. Jaime Alba, telegram to Mariano de Yturralde, Director General of Economic Policy, Mar. 1, 1948, AMAE R-3214, Exp. 12; DGT memo to Spanish Embassy in London, Aug. 13, 1948, AGA 10: 77/7461.
43. Item 15, First and Third Drafts of “Spanish and British Trade Negotiations in Madrid Agreed between 27 April and 11 May 1948,” AMAE R-5104, Exp. 6.
44. John Walker to Mariano de Yturralde, Director General of Economic Policy, June 19, 1948, AMAE R-5104, Exp. 6.
45. This was the Law of Monetary Infractions (*Ley de Delitos Monetarios*). The procedures for executing and reporting transactions with foreign merchants were specified in a law regulating travel agencies of Feb. 19, 1942. The DGT periodically affirmed importance of travel agents’ obligations, as, for example, in a circular of Dec. 20, 1951 entitled “Aviso a las Agencias de Viajes” (AMAE R-5183, Exp. 3).
46. Walker to Yturralde, June 19, 1948, AMAE R-5104, Exp. 6.
47. José Coll, Director of Spanish National Tourist Office in New York, to DGT, n.d., 1948, transcribed in dispatch from Spanish Embassy in Washington, Commercial Office to Undersecretary of Foreign Economy and Commerce, Feb. 7, 1948, AGA 10: 26.02/8994.
48. Dispatch from Commercial Office of Spanish Embassy in Washington, Feb. 7, 1948, AGA 10: 26.02/8994.

49. *Cambios de moneda extranjera en España* (Madrid: Banco Exterior de España, 1949). Under the new system, those repatriating capital, sending remissions to family members in Spain, and paying Spanish workers from foreign accounts also received the preferential rate. The endorsements of Martín Artajo and Suanzes are found in AGA 10: 26.02/8994, folder PE 3/7.
50. *Daily Telegraph*, Apr. 26, 1949; AMAE R-5283, Exp. 6.
51. The Foreign Ministry reported 12,314 American entries at Spanish ports, including those in transit elsewhere.
52. Walter Bing, "Liberalisme financière et ingrss touristiques en France," *Revue de L'Hôtellerie Internationale*, 3:11 (Nov. 1951).
53. Carmelo Pellejero Martínez, *El Instituto Nacional de Industria en el Sector Turístico: Atesa (1949–1981) y Entursa (1963–1986)* (Málaga: Universidad de Málaga, 2000), 30–34; Pablo Martín Aceña and Francisco Comín, *INI: 50 años de industrialización en España* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1991), 30–31.
54. Foreign Office Minute, Oct. 3, 1949; G. C. Pelham, British Embassy in Madrid, to Board of Trade, Oct. 15, 1949, PRO FO 371/79730.
55. Telegram from Foreign Ministry to Spanish Embassy in Washington, Aug. 7, 1950, AGA 10: 26.02/8994; On exchange rate controls in Spanish foreign commerce in the early 1950s in general, see Ángel Viñas et al., *Política comercial en España (1931–1975)*, Vol. 2 (Madrid: Banco Exterior de España, 1979), esp. 709.
56. IEME Circular, Dec. 12, 1951, AGA 3: 49.03/16456.
57. *Boston Sunday Globe*, July 5, 1953. The Spanish embassy protested that the newspaper failed to take account of the more favorable exchange rate recently implemented putting the official conversion at \$253.80 (José Aragonés Vilá, Spanish Commercial Attaché in Washington, to the *Globe*, July 14, 1953, AGA 10: 26.02/8994).
58. J. J. Forns, "Necesidades que impone el turismo," *Gaceta Financiera*, 52:9 (July 1952), 28.
59. Quoted in *Información Comercial Española*, 9:405 (Jan. 6, 1955).
60. Manuel Figuerola Palomo, "La transformación del turismo en un fenómeno de masas: la planificación indicativa (1950–1974)," in Pellejero Martínez, *Historia de la economía del turismo en España*, 88 (figures exclude those passing through ports in transit elsewhere); Velasco González, *La política turística*.
61. In 1949, American tourist expenditure in OEEC countries offset nearly 10% of member countries' trade deficit with the United States; *Tourism and Economic Recovery* (Paris: OEEC, 1951), 12, 15.
62. United States Department of Commerce Circular FC 56–92, filed in "Información Turística—Estados Unidos de América," AMAE R-5183, Exp. 3; *Información Comercial Española* (9: 433, July 21, 1955) reported that American tourists spent \$20 million in Spain in 1954 (\$206 per head).
63. Figures on American tourist expenditure in Europe are taken from a study by the British Travel and Holiday Association and Gallup, presented in SGT,

- "Nota sobre el informe confidencial referente al turismo estadoünidense hacia Europa en 1963," Oct. 7, 1964, AGA 3: 49.07/31811. The *Financial Times* claimed as late as 1959 that the average British tourist expenditure in Europe was £55 (Oct. 20, 1959), or \$158.
64. Because France and Spain did not agree on a common rate of exchange between their currencies until 1959, attempting to estimate with any great accuracy how many francs were converted into pesetas is a meaningless exercise. In 1950, for example, one franc could be exchanged for three pesetas in Spain whereas in France seven pesetas were required to purchase one franc (*Hostal*, 1:1, July 1950, and *Le Monde*, July 1, 1950). Conflicting data from the French Office des Changes and the Banco de España provide an indication of the discrepancy: the former claimed the French converted 2.8 billion francs to pesetas in 1951, the latter put the figure at 1.6 billion; Robert Hollier, *L'Espanne et les problèmes du tourisme* (Geneva: Institut International de Recherches Touristiques, 1956), 79.
 65. Gabriel García Loygorri, Director General of Tourism, to Martín Artajo, Sept. 19, 1952, AMAE R-5183, Exp. 2. Spanish–West German trade accords were established and modified Feb. 1, 1949; Apr. 1, 1950; Oct. 14, 1952; Nov. 10, 1953; and May 16, 1955 (AMAE R-2839, Exp. 1; R-3238, Exps. 3, 6, and 7; R-5098, Exps. 2–3; R-4629, Exp. 1).
 66. OEEC, "Joint Trade and Intra-European Payments Committee Report," Nov. 3, 1953, PRO FO 371/105924.
 67. Johann Heinrich to Spanish Foreign Ministry, Jan. 14, 1952, AMAE R-5183, Exp. 2.
 68. Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs to Spanish Ambassador in Bonn, Jan. 31, 1952, AMAE R-5183, Exp. 2.
 69. Gabriel García Loygorri, Director General of Tourism, to Martín Artajo, Sept. 19, 1952, quoting prior letter (n.d.) from Viajes Norda, AMAE R-5183, Exp. 2.
 70. *ABC*, Jan. 1, 1949.
 71. Archives du Ministère d'Affaires Étrangères de France, Séries Z, Subséries Espagne (1944–1960), Vol. 64, Telegram 312.
 72. John Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 147; Daniel C. Turack, *The Passport in International Law* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1972). A complete rendering of Western and Southern European visa treaties are provided in Recommendation 51 of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, Document 201, Sept. 22, 1953, 15–16.
 73. British Embassy in Ankara to Foreign Office, Aug. 24, 1950, PRO FO 371/87999. With regard to Argentina, a skeptical British consul remarked, "it remains to be seen whether in fact the terms of this decree will be put into operation." PRO FO 371/81232.
 74. The complete official requirements are given in Herbert W. Serra Williamson, *The Tourist Guide-Book to Spain*, 5th ed. (Madrid, London, and New York: The Times of Spain, 1953), 31.

75. Preamble to Law of Dec. 22, 1949, AGA 10: 97/11446.
76. DGT to Interior Ministry (n.d., July 1949), AGA 3: 49.03/14419; Director General of Security to Interior Minister, July 19, 1949, AGA 3: 49.03/14419; DGT to Interior Minister, Mar. 28, 1950.
77. Quoted in Turack, *The Passport in International Law*, 70.
78. Laqueur, *Europe since Hitler*, 65.
79. DGT to Interior Minister, Sept. 18, 1951, AGA 3: 49.03/14419.
80. "Información Turística—Francia," AMAE R-5183, Exp. 2.
81. Luis Fernández Fuster, *Teoría y técnica del turismo*, Vol. 1 (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1981), 224.
82. AGA 3: 49.03/14419.
83. Report prepared by the International Tourism Alliance, summarized by DGT to Directorate General of Customs, July 9, 1953, AGA 3: 49.08/34927.
84. Directorate General of Commerce and Tariff Policy, Circular #35, Aug. 18, 1950 (AGA 10: 26.02/8994).
85. Fernández Fuster, *Teoría y técnica*, 222.
86. French Embassy in Madrid, Verbal Note to Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Feb. 13, 1952, AMAE R-7748, Exp. 1. The agreement to permit free cross-border circulation of tourism propaganda in fact anticipated one measure of the 1954 UN accord.
87. "Información Turística—Alemania," AMAE R-5183, Exp. 2.
88. Account from John McDonnell, remitted from Spanish Chargé d'Affairs in London to Martín Artajo, Sept. 10, 1956, AGA 10: 77.02/6871.
89. *The Sunday Times*, Sept. 16, 1951.
90. F. R. H. Murray, British Embassy in Madrid, to Foreign Office, Jan. 15, 1953, PRO FO 371/107726.
91. PRO FO 371/117908.
92. "Plan Nacional de Turismo. Estudios Preliminares," AGA 3: 49.02/14415.
93. Vila Fradera, *La gran aventura*, 22.
94. Noticiarios-Documentales #452B, "Turistas en España" (n.d., 1951), FilMOTECA de Madrid.

Chapter 3 From Nationalist Propaganda to Consumer Diplomacy

1. The DGT was located at Duque de Medinaceli, 4, Madrid. The Ministerio de Gobernación was at Fernando el Santo, 22.
2. AGA 3: 49.07/31798.
3. On the 1940 episode, in which American Express executive Max Widmer unsuccessfully approached Bolín about reestablishing his firm's Madrid office, see Rosendorf, "The Life and Times of Samuel Bronston," 182–183.
4. Bolín to José Félix Lequerica, Spanish Ambassador to United States, Oct. 24, 1950, AGA 10: 26.02/8915.

5. Rosendorf, "The Life and Times of Samuel Bronston," 205–209, quoting Temple Fielding, *Fielding's Travel Guide to Europe*, 5th ed. (New York: William Sloane, 1952), 607–608.
6. Director General of Foreign Policy to Martín Artajo, Oct. 7, 1950, AGA 10: 26.02/8915.
7. Jaime Alba to Undersecretary of Foreign Economy and Commerce, Apr. 12, 1948, AMAE R-5104, Exp. 6.
8. See Urry, *The Tourist Gaze*.
9. E. Caruso, Spanish consul in Boston, to Eduardo Propper de Callejón, Spanish chargé d'affaires in Washington, Dec. 22, 1949, AGA 10: 26.02/8915. On the American push for moderate hotel pricing in Europe, also see Endy, *Cold War Holidays*, 85.
10. "Anejo al Acta de la Reunión 18a del Comité Delegado del Grupo de Agencias de Viajes del Sindicato Nacional de Hostelería y Similares," Jan. 28, 1954, AGA 3: 49.03/16456.
11. DGT Consultative Commission on Travel Agencies meeting, Mar. 31, 1954, AGA 3: 49.03/16456.
12. Data on hotel construction between 1950 and 1955 given by the National Hotel Syndicate in 1955 do not correspond with those given by the Ministry of Information and Tourism in 1975, probably because many hotels initially went unregistered. Unfortunately, the latter source does not provide a regional breakdown. At least 175 of the 562 new hotels opened in Spain from 1950 to 1955 were in the provinces of the Balearic Islands, Gerona, and Barcelona.
13. Bray and Raitz, *Flight to the Sun*, 55–67.
14. Bray and Raitz, *Flight to the Sun*, 60–67.
15. Bray and Raitz, *Flight to the Sun*, 68–69. For a description of the relationship between Spanish hotels and foreign tour operators from a neo-Marxist perspective, see Gaviria, *España a go-go*; and Esteve-Secall and Fuentes García, *Economía, historia, e instituciones del turismo en España*, 149–152.
16. C. Fladgate, British Consul at Barcelona, to Foreign Office, Feb. 7, 1955, PRO FO 371/117909.
17. DGT Circular, n.d., 1961, AGA 3: 49.06/30005; Ricardo Jaspe, in Consultative Commission on Travel Agencies, meeting of Jan. 28, 1954, AGA 3: 49.03/16456.
18. DGT Consultative Commission on Travel Agencies meeting, Jan. 31, 1957, AGA 3: 49.03/16456.
19. Letter to DGT, May 7, 1959, AGA 3: 49.02/13235.
20. AGA 3: 49.03/16461. Content of the exams emphasized the natural and geographical characteristics of Spain and history and culture up until the time of Alfonso X. Significant emphasis was placed on the period of Arab domination after the eighth century. The only contemporary topic addressed was the Franco regime's agricultural reform program.
21. This estimate is derived from data in Figuerola Palomo, "La transformación del turismo en un fenómeno de masas," 85; *Hostal*, 5:62–63 (Nov.–Dec. 1955);

- Bru, *El Crédito Hotelero en España*; and *Revista Sindical de Estadística*, 2 (Apr.–June 1946). Records indicate that Hotel Credit financed the construction of 2,025 rooms. Since the average hotel built in this period had approximately 45 rooms, it can be estimated that between 7,000 and 8,000 new rooms appeared.
22. Compiled with data from Gabriel Tortella and Juan Carlos Jiménez, *Historia del Banco de Crédito Industrial* (Madrid: Alianza, 1986), 94; Bru, *El Crédito Hotelero en España*, 37. From 1943 to 1947, the annual average hotel credit was 2 million pesetas (fixed 1941); for the triennium 1948–1950, the annual average reached 11.5 million.
 23. Pellejero Martínez, “Antecedentes,” 52–53.
 24. John Turner, of Bank of England, “Visit to Spain, May 1957,” PRO FO 371/130355.
 25. *Hostal*, 1:1 (July 1950).
 26. Quoted in *Hostal*, 1:1 (July 1950).
 27. *Hostal*, 1:1 (July 1950) and 2:9 (April 1951).
 28. *Hostal*, 2:16 (Nov. 1951).
 29. *Hostal*, 2:8 (Mar. 1951). On the topic of American tourists, Bolín continued, “the American loves noise. Do not expect to please him by offering a cozy and isolated corner away from the other travelers. On the contrary, it is no exaggeration to say that he likes nothing more than to be at the center of things . . .”
 30. *Hostal*, 1:1 (July 1950) and 5:55 (Feb. 1955). The figure of 11,699 hotels included roughly 1,300 proper hotels, the rest being *pensiones* or *posadas*, generally of a lower standard.
 31. On the Parador program, see Meilán Gil, *Empresas públicas y turismo*; and Fernández Fuster, *Albergues y paradores*.
 32. “Paradors, Wayside Inns, etc. in Spain,” *Revue de Tourisme*, 11:2 (Apr.–June 1956), 75–76.
 33. Provinces claiming a Parador or Albergue accounted for a total of 31% of the Spanish population but possessed only 22% of Spain’s hotels; by contrast, none of the five largest tourist provinces possessed a Parador or Albergue, however, they claimed 43% of the privately owned hotels and 19% of Spain’s population. The five largest tourist provinces in 1955 were Madrid, Barcelona, Gerona, Guipúzcoa, and the Balearic Islands.
 34. Ceballos Martín, “Aspectos histórico-jurídicos,” 355–368.
 35. Eugene Fodor, ed., *Spain and Portugal, 1953* (New York: David McKay Company, 1953), 23.
 36. Doré Ogrizek, *McGraw-Hill Pocket Travel Guides—Spain* (London: McGraw-Hill, 1955), 20.
 37. Meilán Gil, *Empresas públicas y turismo*, 127; Ceballos Martín, “Aspectos histórico-jurídicos.”
 38. José Ignacio de Arrillaga, “II Curso de Diplomados del Minsiterio de la Gobernación,” Jan. 1961, AGA 8: 22.05/689.

39. The 21 establishments received 118,570 overnight guests, of whom almost half were foreign. The DGT did not publish the breakdown of *Parador* clientele by nationality until 1958. In 1958, 81,779 of 180,645 guests (45%) were Spanish; in 1968, 117,600 of 264,111 guests (44%) were Spanish; DGT, *Establecimientos turísticos del Estado, años 1951–1961* (Madrid: Ministerio de Información y Turismo, 1962), 3, 26.
40. DGT, *Establecimientos, passim*. All money losers—Baneza, Puerta de Sanabria, Quintanar, Gredos, Pajares, Pontevedra, Santa Cruz de la Palma, and Teruel—received a predominantly domestic clientele.
41. See, for example, Francisco Franco Bahamonde, in Río Cisneros, *Discursos y mensajes del Jefe del Estado*; and *Extractos de discursos* (Madrid: FET-JONS), 1958.
42. Miguel Primo de Rivera, son of the former dictator and ambassador to London, recalled in 1951, “It was the initiative of this Office with the British Treasury that in 1948 brought to London our General Director of Tourism and the honor befell me to sign on behalf of Spain the so-called ‘tourism accord’ ” (Primo de Rivera, telegram to Martín Artajo, May 30, 1951, AMAE R-3214, Exp. 12).
43. Alberto Martín Artajo, speech to Cortes, Dec. 14, 1950, published as *La política de aislamiento de España seguida por las naciones aliadas durante el quinquenio 1945–1950* (Madrid: Oficina de Información Diplomática, 1950), 42–44.
44. Fernández Fuster, *Albergues y paradores*, 9.
45. Fraga, *Memoria breve*, 43.
46. Gabriel Arias Salgado, “Declaraciones a Don Francisco Casares publicadas en el diario ‘Pueblo,’ 14 dec. 1952,” and “En la inauguración del Hotel Castellana Hilton, July 31 1953,” in *Textos de doctrina y política de la información* (Madrid: Ministerio de Información y Turismo, 1955), 16, 25–29.
47. Preamble to Decree-Law of July 19, 1951, creating the Ministries of Information and Tourism and of Commerce, and the Undersecretary of the Presidency (reproduced in *Arriba*, July 20, 1951).
48. Esteve-Secall and Fuentes García, *Economía, historia, e instituciones del turismo en España*, 55, 95. A similar hypothesis is offered in Poutet, *Images touristiques de l’Espagne*, 90, though the author appropriately disclaims that no analysis of Franco’s exact motives here can go beyond speculation.
49. Oriol Pi-Sunyer, “Tourism in Catalonia,” in Barke et al., *Tourism in Spain*, 237.
50. Meilán Gil, *Empresas públicas y turismo*, 117. The firm formally was called the Red de Alojamientos Turísticos Propiedades del Estado.
51. John Balfour, of the British Embassy in Madrid, to Foreign Office, Dec. 23, 1952, PRO FO 371/107726.
52. José Luis Ballesteros, “El Camino de Santiago,” in Bayón Mariné, *50 años del turismo español*, 210.
53. J. J. Forns, “Turismo y divisas,” *Gaceta Financiera*, 52:8 (June 1952), 14.

54. Juan Plaza Prieto, *Turismo y balanza de pagos* (Madrid: Ministerio de Información y Turismo, 1954).
55. The committee included four delegates from the Ministry of Information and Tourism: Eduardo del Río, Rafael Calleja, Ricardo Jaspe, and Julián Juárez.
56. "Plan Nacional de Turismo. Estudios preliminares," 1952, AGA 3: 49.02/14415.
57. "Plan Nacional de Turismo. Estudios preliminares," 1952, AGA 3: 49.02/14415.
58. Note distributed to DGT by Eduardo del Río, Undersecretary of Information and Tourism, n.d., 1953, AGA 3: 49.23/82175.
59. Serra Williamson, *The Tourist Guide-Book of Spain*, 14.
60. Ministry of Information and Tourism Provincial Delegation of Seville to DGT, Nov. 9, 1953, AGA 3: 49.03/16463.
61. This was the judgment of José Maristani González, whose submission to a 1953 Ministry of Information and Tourism contest for an advertising study was selected as a top entry, AGA 3: 49.04/18520. On early Spanish tourism propaganda techniques, see Secretaría de Estado de Comercio, Turismo y de la PYME, *Catálogo de Carteles Oficiales de Turismo del Centro de Documentación Turística de España, Tomo I (1957–1979)* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Turísticos, 2000), vi; and Bayón Mariné, *50 años del Turismo Español*, 427.
62. AGA 8: 25.01/3319.
63. Rafael Calleja, *Apología turística de España* (Madrid: Dirección General de Turismo, 1943), 12.
64. Bayón Mariné, *50 años del Turismo Español*, 431.
65. Text of letter in AGA 10: 54/7464.
66. Bolín to Duque de San Lucar la Mayor, Spanish Chargé d'Affairs in London, Mar. 31, 1950, AGA 10: 54/7464.
67. Submission by Carlos González Cuesta, AGA 3: 49.04/18520.
68. Submission by Justo Ros Emperado and Rafael Corral Saez, AGA 3: 49.04/18519. The Dutchman referred to was J. Nikerk, director of the Dutch National Tourist Office.
69. Barton, *Working-Class Organizations*, 199–200.
70. American Express, 17, AGA 3: 49.02/14413. Ministry of Information and Tourism, "Plan Nacional de Turismo," 1953, 88. The recommendation of the Senate Foreign Affairs committee is cited in the Comisión Interministerial de Turismo, "Acto de la Primera Reunión de la Comisión Ejecutiva para el Estudio y Redacción del Anteproyecto de Ley de Fomento y Propaganda del Turismo," May 1955, AGA 3: 49.02/14416.
71. Bolín, "Informe del Consejero de Información y Prensa en Washington sobre vicisitudes recientes del turismo norteamericano en Méjico," Report to DGT, Sept. 15, 1953, AGA 3: 49.23/82175.
72. The advertising budget for 1950–1951 was roughly 24 million pesetas, only slightly higher than the 1953 figure alone, though inflation was negligible (AGA 3: 49.02/14416–14417).

73. Copies of advertisement samples catalogued at AGA 3: 49.05/23562–23563.
74. *Travel Trade Gazette*, Oct. 1954.
75. For example, a TWA advertisement in conjunction with the Greek national tourist office in the *ASTA Travel News* (June 1954), portrayed Greece as a balance of “ancient glories and modern pleasure . . . and appealing dollar values.”
76. Calculated from data compiled in DGT, *Movimiento turístico en España* (Madrid: Ministerio de Información y Turismo, 1956); the figure excludes tourists passing through Spanish ports or with 24-hour authorization. The combined British and American proportion of Spain’s total tourist volume increased less dramatically, from 18% in 1951 to 25% in 1953 to 26% in 1956.
77. Report from OECD Tourism Committee, May 17, 1961, AGA 3: 49.08/34928.
78. Miguel Primo de Rivera (the younger) to Martín Artajo, May 30, 1951, AMAE R-3214, Exp. 12.
79. *Journal of Commerce*, Feb. 1952.
80. Submission by José Maristano González, AGA 3: 49.04/18520.
81. Submission by Luis Fernández Fuster and Antonio Ranz Olmo, AGA 3: 49.04/18518.
82. This figure is derived assuming an average construction cost of 100,000 pesetas per room, as estimated by the National Hotel Syndicate (E. Escoriheula Mezquita, “El Hospedaje como factor del Turismo,” *Revista Sindical de Estadística*, 10:38 [Apr.–June 1955], 62–66), and the construction of 11,715 additional rooms between 1953 and 1957 (Figueroa Palomo, “La transformación del turismo en un fenómeno de masas,” 85). Total investment reached roughly 1.2 billion pesetas, about ten times the amount of state credit. For data on state credits, see Bru, *El Crédito Hotelero en España*, 16–17. Government predictions are given in Plan Nacional de Turismo, 48–51.
83. *Hostal*, 5:59 (June–Aug. 1955), 3. Luxury accommodations increased by 642 rooms; Class 1-A by 617; Class 2 by 556; Class 3 by 378; and luxury pensions by 257.
84. Data is given in *Revista Sindical de Estadística*, 10:38 (Apr.–June 1955), 62–66.
85. Uriol Salcedo, *Historia de los caminos de España*, Vol. 2, 279.
86. Uriol Salcedo, *Historia de los caminos de España*, Vol. 2, 273–276, 280.
87. DGT, *Movimiento*.
88. J. Lee Schneidman, ed., *Spain & Franco, 1949–59* (New York: Facts on File, 1973).
89. Comisión Interministerial de Turismo, “Acta de la Primera Reunión de la Comisión Ejecutive de Carreteras,” June 26, 1955, 22, AGA 3: 49.02/14416.
90. Guardian Chaplain of Nuestra Señora de Nuria to DGT, n.d., AGA 3: 49.02/14416.

91. Eduardo Ortega Núñez, Spanish consul in Sète, to Director General of Economic Policy, Sept. 24, 1952, AMAE R-5183, Exp. 2–3. “Liberation” was employed in reference to the 1939 Nationalist victory.
92. Urzáiz to Martín Artajo, Jan. 7, 1953, AMAE R-5183, Exp. 2–3.
93. Comisión Interministerial de Turismo, “Acta,” 8, 34.
94. “Plan Nacional de Turismo. Estudios preliminares,” n.d., 1952, AGA 3: 49.02/14415.
95. Guillermo Gil de Reboleño, speaking in Comisión Interministerial de Turismo, “Acta,” 22, 25.
96. See note 94.
97. Interministerial Tourism Commission, Hospitality Committee, n.d. 1955, AGA 3: 49.02/14416. The committee consisted of Mariano de Urzáiz (Director General of Tourism), José Sirvent (Managing Director of the INI), José Carralde (Director of the Bank of Industrial Credit, charged with disbursing hotel credit), Manuel Llorent (of the Commerce Ministry), Baldomero Carbó (of the National Hotel Syndicate), and José Romeo (General Secretary of the Commission).
98. Ángel Palomino, *El milagro turístico* (Esplugas de Llobregat: Plaza y Janés, 1972), 119.
99. *Noticiero Turístico*, Oct. 1962.
100. This is evident from frequent complaints of rampant “overclassification” on the part of Madrid authorities, and corroborated by León Herrera Esteban, interview by author, Madrid, May 15, 2002.
101. See, for example, Serra Williamson, *The Tourist Guide-Book of Spain*, 16.
102. Interministerial Tourism Commission, Hospitality Committee, n.d. 1955, AGA 3: 49.02/14416.
103. Richard Henry, Director of American Express in Madrid, to Urzáiz, June 16, 1954, AGA 3: 49.03/16065.
104. Bru, *El Crédito Hotelero en España*, 69.
105. Interministerial Tourism Commission, Hospitality Committee, n.d. 1955, AGA 3: 49.02/14416.
106. Eduardo Ortega Núñez, Spanish Consul in Sète, France, to Martín Artajo, July 24, 1952, AGA 10: 97/11486.
107. Ortega Núñez to General Director of Economic Policy, Sept. 24, 1952, AMAE R-5183, Exp. 2.
108. Interministerial Tourism Commission, Hospitality Committee, n.d. 1955, AGA 3: 49.02/14416.
109. Article 1 of Order of the Ministry of Information and Tourism, June 14, 1957, *BOE*, Aug. 3, 1957.
110. Hotel price data taken from E. Escorihuela, “Precios de los hoteles de España y del extranjero,” *Revista Sindical de Estadística*, 13:49 (Jan.–Apr. 1958).
111. Carmelo Pellejero Martínez, “La promoción del Turismo en España durante la primera mitad del s. XX: el papel del estado,” *Información Comercial Española*, 730 (June 1994), 143.

112. Ministry of Information and Tourism, "Plan Nacional," 113, 114, 117. A parallel strategy in southern Italy is outlined in Luciano Merlo, "La intervención dello stato nei settore turistiche e la attività della 'Cassa per il Mezzogiorno' in Italia," *Revue de Tourisme*, 7:3 (July–Sept. 1952).
113. Study by Luis Fernández Fuster published in *Hostal*, 6:66 (Apr.–May 1956).
114. Ministry of the Interior Circular #5, n.d., 1951, AGA 10: 77.02/6870. Also see Rafael Abella, *La vida cotidiana bajo el régimen de Franco* (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1996), 110–111; and Gaite, *Usos amorosos de la postguerra española*, 131–132.
115. Directorate General of Security, June 15, 1953, AGA 10: 77.02/6870.
116. *Ecclesia*, June 27, 1953.
117. Forns, "Necesidades que impone el turismo," 28–29.
118. *¡Ya!*, June 25, 1953.
119. *¡Ya!*, June 28, 1953.
120. Manuel Primo de Rivera, Spanish Ambassador to London, to Alberto Martín Artajo, Foreign Minister, June 22, 1953, AGA 10: 77.02/6870.
121. Quoted in *Daily Express* (London), June 18, 1953.
122. Ogrizek, *Spanien*, 20.
123. See, for example, Löfgren, *On Holiday*, 174.
124. Cabinet meetings under Franco were unrecorded, leaving the historian to rely on personal accounts and archived documents circulated within individual ministries. A description of the 1957 presentation of this law is given in a document distributed to ministers in Oct. 1960, filed at AGA 3: 49.09/38662.
125. Pellejero Martínez, *El Instituto Nacional de Industria en el Sector Turístico*, 48.
126. *ABC*, July 18, 1956, quoted in Arias Salgado, *Doctrina y política de la información* (Madrid: Ministerio de Información y Turismo, 1960), 227.
127. The Bank of Spain reported official tourism revenue for 1953 at \$94.2 million. By comparison, Spain received \$280 million in foreign currency from agricultural products and \$90 million from raw and unfinished materials. Tourism revenue data are taken from Carlos Barciela et al., *La España de Franco (1939–1975): Economía* (Madrid: Síntesis, 2001), 199; data on other industries are taken from Viñas et al., *Política comercial exterior en España*, Vol. 2, 720.

Chapter 4 Breakthrough, 1957–1962

1. The relationship between political security and economic flexibility is observed in Viñas et al., *Política comercial exterior en España*, Vol. 2, 638–639.
2. Franco remarked, "We must not forget that one of the arguments used against Primo de Rivera was that the pound sterling was nearly at 40 pesetas" (Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas con Franco*, 202).

3. See San Román, *Ejército e industria*.
4. According to an OEEC mission to Spain in April 1957, IEME reserves fell from \$196 million in January 1956 to \$130 million in December (PRO FO 371/130355); on the monetary policy and the crisis of 1956, also see Fernando Eguizadu, *Intervención monetaria y control de cambios en España, 1900–1977* (Madrid: Información Comercial Española, 1978), 257.
5. Barciela et al., *La España de Franco*, 190.
6. Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpúrua, “La década del desarrollo (1960–1970),” in Zamora et al., *España*, 745.
7. Vila Fradera, *Hoteles, hoy*, 49.
8. Alberto Ullastres, *Discurso del Excmo. Sr. Ministro de Comercio en el Acto Inaugural de la Feria Oficial y Nacional de Muestras de Murcia* (Madrid: Ministerio de Comercio, 1958), 21; Alberto Ullastres, *Discursos y Declaraciones, 1957* (Madrid: Ministerio de Comercio, 1958).
9. OEEC, “Report on Tourism” 1959, cited in Vila Fradera, *Hoteles, hoy*, 54.
10. Mining exports accounted for \$63 m. in 1955, \$78 m. in 1956, and \$77 m. in 1957. Agriculture accounted for \$218 m. in 1955, \$207 m. in 1956, and \$223 m. in 1957 (Viñas et al., *Política comercial exterior en España*, Vol. 2, 916).
11. A special arrangement establishing market-rate dollar–peseta exchange for noncommercial exchange (tourism, immigrant remittances, etc.) was arranged through the World Commerce Corporation, a Panamanian firm, in 1955 (Viñas et al., *Política comercial exterior en España*, Vol. 2, 804–830).
12. The laxity of border agents with regard to currency is described anecdotally in Jacques-Laurent Bost, *L’Espagne au jour le jour* (Paris: Éditions Paul Morihien, 1951), 9–11.
13. Sir Ivo Mallet, British Ambassador to Madrid, to British Foreign Office, Jan. 16, 1958, PRO FO 371/136674.
14. *Editur*, 21 (Aug. 5, 1960).
15. Although the United States provided Spain with some military aid, the bulk of it was confined to strictly military purposes, and had little impact on the overall economy; see Guirao, “The United States, Franco, and the Integration of Europe.”
16. A full description of the project is given in Viñas et al., *Política comercial exterior en España*, Vol. 2, 801–830.
17. Viñas et al., *Política comercial exterior en España*, Vol. 2, 824.
18. The figure of \$200 is approximated from 1954 data published in *Información Comercial Española*, 9:433 (July 21, 1955), indicating that 97,000 American travelers spent \$20 million in Spain that year.
19. Quoted in Núria Puig, “La ayuda económica de Estados Unidos y la americanización de los empresarios españoles,” in ed. Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla and María Dolores Elizalde, *España y Estados Unidos en el siglo XX* (Madrid: CSIC, 2005), 204–205.

20. "Several Reasons in Favor of a Larger Defense Support Administration for Spain," Report presented by Spanish embassy in Washington, June 1, 1959, AGA 10: 26.02/54-8848.
21. Juan Sardá Dexeus, "Respuesta del Banco de España a un cuestionario del Gobierno sobre el Plan de Estabilización," in *Escritos (1948-1980)* (Madrid: Banco de España, 1987), 371.
22. Barciela et al., *La España de Franco*, 199.
23. Directorate General of Commercial Policy, Dispatch #114, Mar. 20, 1957, AMAE R-5183, Exp. 2. The DGT provided no statistical elaboration of mode of entry by nationality.
24. Miguel Paredes, Spanish Commercial Counselor in Bonn, to Ullastres, Mar. 14, 1959, AMAE R-5183, Exp. 2.
25. Dirección General de Política Comercial, Dispatch #114, Mar. 20, 1957, AMAE R-5183, Exp. 2; Miguel Paredes, Spanish Commercial Counselor in Bonn, to Ullastres, Mar. 14, 1959, AMAE R-5183, Exp. 2.
26. "El Comercio Hispano-Alemán: Boletín de la Cámara Española de Comercio en Alemania," Oct. 30, 1957, estimated 100 million; the Bundesbank provided a figure of 55 million DM in 1960 (i.e., after the peseta devaluation). AMAE R-5098, Exp. 2-3; AMAE R-4629, Exp. 1.
27. Acts 13 and 15 of Spanish-West German commercial negotiations, May 20, 1960, AMAE R-10031, Exp. 2.
28. Sardá Dexeus, "Respuesta del Banco de España," 357-358.
29. A. Mosquera y Losada, Spanish Commercial Counselor in Paris, to Ullastres, May 28, 1959, AMAE R-5183, Exp. 2. Mosquera y Losada reported that in 1959, 11.75 pesetas could be purchased clandestinely for 100 (old) francs, though the legal rate was 8.5.
30. Mallet Report on meeting with Ullastres of Apr. 9, 1957, dispatched to British Foreign Office Apr. 13, 1957, PRO FO 371/130355.
31. John Turner of the Bank of England, in notes from a May 1957 visit to Spain, PRO FO 371/130355.
32. Ivo Mallet telegram to British Foreign Office, Feb. 5, 1958, PRO FO 371/136674.
33. "Several Reasons in Favor of a Larger Defense Support Administration for Spain," Report presented by Spanish Embassy in Washington, June 1, 1959, AGA 10: 26.02/54-8848.
34. Quoted in Pablo Martín Aceña, "¿Qué hubiera sucedido si Franco no hubiera aceptado el Plan de Estabilización?" in ed. Nigel Townson, *Historia virtual de España (1870-2004): ¿Qué hubiera pasado si...?* (Madrid: Taurus, 2004), 231.
35. Directorate General of International Organizations, "Rte. Nota Informativa sobre 'Evolución española desde el Plan de Estabilización hasta la actualidad,'" Jan. 30, 1963, AGA 10: 26.02/12671.
36. *Información Comercial Española*, Aug. 25, 1960.
37. Fernández Fuster, *Historia general*, 621.
38. Figures compiled from data in Fernández Fuster, *Historia general*, 646-648.

39. E. de la Iglesia to Castiella, Mar. 6, 1958, AMAE R-5881, Exp. 18. On Spanish entry into the OEEC, see Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, "El ingreso de España," 147–179.
40. AMAE R-5183, Exp. 2.
41. "Acta de la Primera Reunión Para el Estudio del Turismo en España," July 23, 1958, AMAE R-7433, Exp. 3.
42. José Coll to Mariano de Urzáiz, Sept. 4, 1957, AGA 3: 49.03/14419.
43. Coll to DGT, Mar. 27, 1961, AGA 3: 49.03/14419.
44. Ricardo Jaspe to Directorate General of Customs, Sept. 18, 1958, AGA 3: 49.03/14419.
45. E. de La Iglesia to Castiella, Mar. 6, 1958, AMAE R-5881, Exp. 18.
46. Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport*, 149.
47. *L'Auto-Journal*, July 14, 1960, AGA 3: 49.03/14419.
48. Resolution of the Ministry of Finance, Feb. 20, 1961, *BOE*, Feb. 27, 1961.
49. Unsigned, undated letter from Commercial Office of the Spanish Embassy in Washington to José Meliá, AMAE R-5183, Exp. 2.
50. Aide Memoire, Spanish Embassy in Paris, May 14, 1959, AGA 10: 97/11486.
51. German Minister of Tourism to Spanish National Tourism Office in Frankfurt A. M., July 11, 1958, AGA 10: 97/11486.
52. Spanish Embassy Note #328 (July 31, 1958), AGA 10: 97/11486.
53. France and Spain, for example, had forged a friendship based on Spanish support for French actions in Algeria in the UN in exchange for French support of closer Spanish association with West European multilateral organizations.
54. Report prepared by Spanish Consulate at Sète for Spanish Embassy in Paris, n.d., May 1962, AGA 10: 97/11486.
55. *ABC, Edición Semanal*, Apr. 26, 1962.
56. See note 54.
57. Carmelo Matesanz Rojo, Spanish Consul in Sète, to Spanish Embassy in Paris, July 3, 1962, AGA 10: 97/11486.
58. Luis Utrilla Navarro, *El aeropuerto de Málaga: ocho décadas de historia del transporte aéreo* (Málaga: Aena, 1999), 92–93.
59. J. J. Gaggero, Chairman of Gibraltar Tourism Committee, to MP Alan Lennox-Boyd, Apr. 8, 1959, PRO FO 371/144982.
60. J. M. Addis, Foreign Office Minute, Apr. 8, 1959, PRO FO 371/144982.
61. Ivo Mallet to John Addis, British Foreign Office, May 29, 1959, PRO FO 371/144982.
62. A. D. M. Ross of British Foreign Office, June 18, 1959, PRO FO 371/144982.
63. "Report on Discussions with Spanish Civil Aviation Authorities, Madrid, January 1960," British Ministry of Trade and Industry internal document, PRO BT 245/1305.
64. British Chargé d'Affairs in Madrid to MP Selwyn Lloyd, Apr. 30, 1960, PRO FO 371/153276.
65. PRO FO 93/99/99.

66. Foreign Office Minute, Feb. 22, 1965, PRO FO 371/180144; Foreign Office Minute, Oct. 6, 1966, PRO FO 371/185813.
67. Manuel Fraga to Luis Carrero Blanco, June 10, 1967, AGA 3: 49.22/50092; AGA 49.08/35232.
68. J. Gutiérrez Cano, Spanish Commercial Attaché in Bonn, Dispatch #404 to Directorate General of Commercial Policy, Aug. 7, 1957, AMAE R-518, Exp. 2.
69. "Nota Sobre Vuelos Charters a Alemania," internal SGT memo, Jan. 29, 1963, AGA 3: 49.11/42620; Rafael Chacon Stela, *Apuntes de aviación comercial* (Madrid: Instituto Aeronáutico ADIA, 1970), 151.
70. "Nota sobre vuelos charters a Alemania," internal DGT memo, Jan. 29, 1963, AGA 3: 49.11/42620.
71. John Brancker, quoted in Bray and Raitz, *Flight to the Sun*, 52.
72. Monique Dacharry, *Tourisme et Transport en Méditerranée Occidentale* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964), 101; Bray and Raitz, *Flight to the Sun*, 49.
73. Calculated from figures given in Barton, *Working-Class Organizations*, 199; and Roger L. Bowlby, "Union Policy toward Minimum Wage Legislation in Postwar Britain," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 11:1 (Oct. 1957), 72–84.
74. Julian Demetriadi, "The Golden Years: English Seaside Resorts 1950–1974," in ed. Gareth Shaw and Allan Williams, *The Rise and Fall of British Coastal Resorts* (London: Pinter, 1997), 53–57.
75. "Nota Informativa acerca de diversos aspectos de la campaña promovida en Alemania Occidental en contra de los intereses turísticos de España," internal DGT memo, n.d., 1963, AGA 3: 49.06/29655.
76. Calculated from figures in Vila Fradera, *Hoteles, hoy*, 139; and AGA 3: 49.11/42620.
77. Victor M. Mellado Morales, ed., *Historia de la Costa del Sol* (Málaga: Diario Sur, 1998), 61.
78. Calculated from figures in Mellado Morales, *Historia de la Costa del Sol*, 61; and "Nota sobre vuelos charters a Alemania," internal DGT memo, Jan. 29, 1963, AGA 3: 49.11/42620.
79. Francisco Soriano Frade, *Pequeña historia del turismo en las Baleares* (Palma de Mallorca: Los Íconos de Ferrón, 1996), 31.
80. *Revista Sindical de Estadística*, 16:64 (Oct.–Dec. 1961), 44.
81. OEEC Conseil Investissements dans l'Industrie Hôtelière, "Rapport du Comité du Tourisme," June 13, 1959, AMAE R-5881, Exp. 18.
82. Based on an estimated average building cost of 140,000 pesetas (\$2,333) per room, derived from Bru, *El Crédito Hotelero en España*; and Figerola Palomo, "La transformación del turismo en un fenómeno de masas," 85. State hotel credits averaged \$2.2 million per year.
83. *Revista Sindical de Estadística*, 14:54 (Apr.–June 1959).
84. This and subsequent data is compiled from Subsecretaría de Turismo, "Zonas y centros de interés turístico nacional: Fundamentos de la Ley,"

- July 17, 1963, AGA 3: 49.03/15809; and Oficina Técnica de la Subsecretaría de Turismo, "Estudio sobre índices de intensidad turística," Apr. 1964, AGA 3: 49.07/31802.
85. These were Álava, Albacete, Almería, Ávila, Burgos, La Coruña, Guadalajara, Huelva, Huesca, Palencia, Segovia, Valladolid, Viscaya, Zamora, and Zaragoza.
 86. Bru, *El Crédito Hotelero en España*, 50.
 87. *Revista Sindical de Estadística*, 15:58 (Apr.–June 1960).
 88. Figures given in *Deutsche Zeitung (Mit Wirtschaftszeitung)*, Feb. 10, 1962.
 89. *Il Sole* (Rome), Feb. 27, 1959. Also see Löfgren, *On Holiday*, 205–206.
 90. *Der Volkswirt*, Nov. 25, 1961; *Deutsche Zeitung (Mit Wirtschaftszeitung)*, Feb. 10, 1962.
 91. Directorate General of Commercial Policy to Directorate General of Interior Commerce, Dispatch #478, May 21, 1963, AMAE R-9623, Exp. 2.
 92. SGT, "Zonas y centros de interés turístico nacional: Fundamentos de la Ley," July 17, 1963, AGA 3: 49.03/15809.
 93. Arias Salgado to Luis Carrero Blanco, Minister of the Undersecretary of the Presidency, Oct. 3, 1957, AGA 3: 49.07/31797.
 94. Arias Salgado to Luis Carrero Blanco, Minister of the Undersecretary of the Presidency, Oct. 3, 1957, AGA 3: 49.07/31797.
 95. Urzáiz, "Memoria," Oct. 3, 1960, AGA 3: 49.23/71–11911.
 96. Council of Ministers meeting, May 11, 1962, described in Report by Managing Committee of ENTURSA, submitted to DGT, Aug. 1962, AGA 3: 49.08/35190.
 97. AGA 3: 49.08/35190.
 98. AGA 3: 49.10/48055.
 99. Fortuno Jerace, Consulting Architect, to ICA, June 26, 1961, AGA 3: 49.10/48055.
 100. Meliá to Arias Salgado, Sept. 29, 1960, AGA 3: 49.23/71–11916.
 101. Vila Fradera, *Hoteles, hoy*, 59–60, 69.

Chapter 5 Tourism and the Politics of Development, 1962–1969

1. He recalled, "For a [lawyer] with no inherited position and without political standing gained during the 1930s or the war, there were only two paths: either private practice of the profession oriented toward the business world; or the traditional path of qualifying for the great careers of the State, to enter public life," Fraga, *Memoria breve*, 25. Other useful biographies include Fuertes, *Fraga, o, el intelectual y la política*; John Gilmour, *Manuel Fraga Iribarne and the Rebirth of Spanish Conservatism, 1939–1990* (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen, 1999); and Pilar Cernuda, *Ciclón Fraga* (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1997).
2. *Perfil biográfico de Manuel Fraga* (Santiago de Compostela: Xunta de Galicia, 1993), 7–12.

3. See Manuel Fraga, *Así se gobierna España* (Madrid: Oficina de Información Diplomática, 1949), 36.
4. Pedro Carlos González Cuevas, *Historia de las derechas españolas* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2000), 412; Manuel Fraga, *Pensamiento conservador español* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1981).
5. Fraga, *Memoria breve*, 26.
6. Cernuda, *Ciclón Fraga*, 67–70.
7. Comisaría del Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social, Hoja Informativa #15, May 3, 1962, AGA 3: 49.06/29652. Indicating the extent to which the regime had abandoned economic nationalism, López Rodó circulated to all planning subcommittees the text of a 1962 speech given by the liberal French politician Valéry Giscard-d'Estaing describing the importance of interdependence in modern European economic policy.
8. For a full rendering of alliances and rivalries in the 1962 cabinet, see Payne, *The Franco Regime*, 503–506.
9. Laureano López Rodó, prologue to *Política y etapas de crecimiento*, by W. W. Rostow (Barcelona: Dopesa, 1972).
10. José González Paz and Juan Plaza Prietos, *Regiones Económicas Españolas* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Económicos de Información y Síntesis del INI, 1964), 90.
11. Notoriously elusive to scholarly analysis, *Opus Dei* can be considered a sort of Catholic homologue to the Masons, a secret society ostensibly dissociated from politics but that frequently has functioned as a club for political and financial elites, particularly in the Hispanic world. The principal study is Joan Estruch, *Saints and Schemers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
12. Mercedes Cabrera and Fernando del Rey Reguillo, *El poder de los empresarios: política e intereses económicos en la España contemporánea (1875–2000)* (Madrid: Taurus, 2002), 322.
13. Carlos Moya, *El poder económico en España (1939–1970)* (Madrid: Ediciones Tucar, 1975), 127–142.
14. Endy, *Cold War Holidays*, 66.
15. Speech to Cortes, Dec. 23, 1963, published as *El turismo en España, balanza y perspectiva* (Madrid: Ministerio de Información y Turismo, 1963), 8–9.
16. See Engerman et al., *Staging Growth*.
17. Fraga, *El turismo en España*, 17.
18. The debate over reform of local administration during the reign of Alfonso XIII is detailed in Javier Tusell and Diego Chacón Ortíz, *La reforma de la administración local en España (1900–1936)* (Alcalá de Henares: Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública, 1987).
19. Antonio Cazorla-Sánchez, *Las políticas de la victoria: la consolidación del Nuevo Estado franquista (1938–1953)* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2000), 37–38.
20. Bayón Mariné, *50 años del Turismo Español*, 76; León Herrera, interview by author, Madrid, May 15, 2002.

21. Fraga, *Memoria breve*, 43, 47.
22. On administrative reform in this period, see Luis Fernando Crespo Montes, *Las reformas de la Administración Española (1957–1967)* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2000).
23. “Notas sobre la conveniencia de reestructurar la administración central española en lo que se refiere al turismo,” Aug. 13, 1962, AGA 3: 49.07/31797.
24. Luis Bolín to López Rodó, July 28, 1962, AGA 3: 49.03/17071.
25. Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas con Franco*, 349.
26. *Resumen del Informe del Banco Mundial* (Madrid: Banco Exterior de España, 1962), 79.
27. “Memoria de la Dirección General de Promoción de Turismo,” n.d., Nov. 1962, AGA 3: 49.04/20661.
28. From a 1963 Horizon Holidays advertisement reproduced in Bray and Raitz, *Flight to the Sun*, 89.
29. Minutes of the Tourism Committee, Mar. 5, 1963, AGA 3: 49.06/29653.
30. *Arbeiderbladst* (Oslo), May 10, 1963.
31. Electo García Tejedor, Spanish Commercial Counselor in Sweden, to Alberto Ullastres, Minister of Commerce, Nov. 14, 1963, AMAE R-10516, Exp. 1.
32. Ministry of Information and Tourism Provincial Delegation Report, May 16, 1963, AGA 3: 49.04/20661; Rodríguez-Acosta to Arespacochaga, Feb. 25, 1964, AGA 3: 49.06/27270.
33. Rodríguez-Acosta to Arespacochaga, Feb. 25, 1964, AGA 3: 49.06/27270; DGPT to SGT, Jan. 26, 1965, AGA 3: 49.06/27271.
34. *Munchner Merker* (Munich), Nov. 28, 1962.
35. *Il Tempo* (Rome), May 14, 1963.
36. “Cuestionario hecho por el periodista italiano Sr. Romano F. Catteneo al Excmo. Sr. Ministro del Departamento,” Apr. 3, 1963, AGA 3: 49.03/17073.
37. Fraga, *Memoria Breve*, 153, 157.
38. Minutes of the Tourism Committee, Mar. 5, 1963, AGA 3: 49.06/29653.
39. *Journal of Commerce* (New York), Nov. 26, 1962.
40. *Bonner Rundschau* (Bonn), Dec. 6, 1962.
41. Jorge Vila Fradera, speaking at a meeting of the Tourism Committee, Feb. 11, 1963, AGA 3: 49.08/29652.
42. Tourism Committee, “Moción sobre regulación de precios en la hostelería,” n.d., 1962, AGA 3: 49.06/29655.
43. Bru, *El Crédito Hotelero en España*, 69.
44. Herrera to Rodríguez-Acosta, Nov. 5, 1962, AGA 49.06/29655.
45. Tourism Committee, “Moción sobre regulación de precios en la hostelería,” n.d., 1962, and “Recomendación de la Junta Nacional de Hoteles y Pensiones del Sindicato Nacional de Hostelería sobre el proyecto del nuevo ley sobre precios hoteleros,” n.d., Oct. 1962, AGA 3: 49.06/29655.
46. *BOE*, Nov. 17, 1962.

47. Rodríguez-Acosta, Nov. 8, 1962, AGA 3: 49.06/29655.
48. *L'Aurore* (Paris), Sept. 7, 1964.
49. *Sud-Ouest* (Bordeaux), May 5, 1964.
50. According to the *Nürnberger Zeitung*, May 30, 1964, 18.1% of West Germans who traveled abroad went to Italy and 17.8% went to Spain.
51. *La Stampa* (Turin), Jan. 9, 1965.
52. Spanish National Tourism Office in Rome, "Informe sobre la situación turística italiana durante los primeros ocho meses de 1964," Oct. 1964, AGA 3: 49.07/31798. The 1965 initiative was detailed in an address by the Italian Minister of Finance to the Italian Cabinet, Jan. 29, 1965, translated by the Spanish National Tourism Office in Rome, AGA 3: 49.06/29607.
53. "Rapport fait au nom de la Commission des Finances, de l'Économie Générale et du Plan (1) sur le projet de Loi de Finances pour 1966, Annexe No. 22," Oct. 2, 1965, 22, AMAE R-9623, Exp. 5.
54. Rodríguez-Acosta to Arespacochaga, Dec. 15, 1965, AGA 3: 49.06/27270. According to the Spanish National Tourism Office in Rome, similar campaigns were being carried out in France against Italian tourism.
55. Rodríguez-Acosta to *Common Market Business Report*, July 2, 1965, AGA 3: 49.05/23563; *Common Market Business Report*, June 1965 and July 1965. For first/second-class accommodations per day, Rodríguez-Acosta cited the following figures: France, \$29/\$20; Italy \$22/\$15; Greece, \$17/\$10; Yugoslavia, \$17/\$11; Brazil, \$12/\$8; Spain, \$11/\$7.
56. *La Vanguardia Española* (Barcelona), Apr. 11, 1964.
57. *Editur*, 304 (Jan. 7, 1966).
58. Internal memo circulated among ENTURSA Managing Committee, n.d., 1963, AGA 3: 49.10/40132; Fernando Moreno Barberá, "Nota sobre la Comisión Gestora de la Empresa Nacional de Turismo, del INI, y sus actividades," submitted to Fraga, Aug. 14, 1962, AGA 3: 49.03/17071.
59. *Resumen del Informe del Banco Mundial*, 16.
60. Fraga to Carrero Blanco, Aug. 23, 1962, AGA 3: 49.03/17071.
61. Suanzes to Rodríguez-Acosta, Aug. 22, 1963, AGA 3: 49.08/35199.
62. Pellejero Martínez, *El Instituto Nacional de Industria en el Sector Turístico*, 133–136.
63. On the political aspect of the Development Plan, see Cabrera and del Rey Reguillo, *El poder de los empresarios*, 283–331; and Alsina Oliva, "Estrategia de desarrollo en España," 337–370.
64. AGA 3: 49.06/29652.
65. Rodríguez-Acosta to López Rodó, Sept. 26, 1962, AGA 3: 49.08/35190.
66. AGA 3: 49.06/29652.
67. Tourism Committee, "Aspectos locacionales del fenómeno turístico," n.d. 1962, AGA 3: 49.13/62117.
68. Rodríguez-Acosta to López Rodó, Sept. 26, 1962, AGA 3: 49.08/35190.
69. León Herrera's comments at the Development Plan meeting of Sept. 13, 1963, AGA 3: 49.06/29652.

70. "Informe de la Ponencia de Comercio Exterior sobre la evolución de la balanza de pagos durante el período del Plan de Desarrollo," May 1963, AGA 3: 49.06/29653.
71. Directorate General of International Organizations, "Rte. Nota Informativa sobre 'Evolución española desde el Plan de Estabilización hasta la actualidad,'" Jan. 30, 1963, AGA 10: 26.02/12671. The full text of Ullastres's address to an International Monetary Fund meeting is given in *Arriba*, Oct. 2, 1963.
72. Fraga, *Memoria breve*, 111.
73. SGT to López Rodó, Sept. 20, 1963, AGA 3: 49.06/29652.
74. Rodríguez Acosta to López Rodó, Oct. 25, 1963, AGA 3: 49.08/35199.
75. Commission on the Plan for Economic Development, *Resumen del Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social, 1964–1967* (Madrid: Presidencia del Gobierno, 1964), 17, 47.
76. SGT, *El turismo en 1964* (Madrid: Ministerio de Información y Turismo, 1965), 24–25.
77. *El Economista*, Oct. 8, 1966; Higinio París Eguilaz to Rodríguez-Acosta, Jan. 28, 1967, AGA 3: 49.08/35232.
78. Fraga to Navarro Rubio, Mar. 1, 1965, AGA 3: 49.06/29646.
79. Fraga to Navarro Rubio, July 1, 1965, AGA 3: 49.09/38834.
80. Camilo Alonso Vega to Fraga, Sept. 17, 1965, AGA 3: 49.09/38834.
81. *Editur*, 330 (July 8, 1966).
82. Cabrera and del Rey Reguillo, *El poder de los empresarios*, 284–285.
83. Rodríguez-Acosta to Higinio París Eguilaz, Feb. 6, 1967, AGA 3: 49.08/ 35232.
84. Fernández Fuster, *Teoría y técnica*, Vol. 2, 265.
85. Municipal Corporation of Motril to Ministry of Public Works, June 10, 1962, AGA 3: 49.06/28001.
86. Rodríguez-Acosta to Fernando Rodríguez Pérez, Director General of Ports, Dec. 11, 1962, AGA 3: 49.08/35189.
87. Alberto de León, Board Member of the Empresa Nacional Celulosas de Motril, S.A., to Arespacochaga, Feb. 13, 1963, AGA 49.06/28001.
88. Report from the Mayor's Office of Málaga, n.d., Apr. 1963, AGA 3: 49.08/35191.
89. Alberto de León, Board Member of the Empresa Nacional Celulosas de Motril, S.A., to Arespacochaga, Feb. 13, 1963, AGA 49.06/28001.
90. Julio Guillén, Secretary in Perpetuity of the Royal Historical Academy of Toledo, to Fraga, June 28, 1963, AGA 3: 49.03/17071. There is no evidence to suggest that this plan was ever close to being carried out.
91. SGT, "Zonas y Centros de Interés Turístico: Fundamentos de la Ley," July 17, 1963, AGA 3: 49.07/31797.
92. AGA 3: 49.07/31797.
93. AGA 3: 49.07/31797.
94. SGT, "Nota sobre Centros y Zonas de Interés Turístico Nacional," AGA 3: 49.06/28001.

95. Ramón Martín Mateo, "La eclosión de nuevas comunidades," in *Problemas técnicos, económicos, y jurídicos de urbanización de zonas turísticas*, Vol. 2 (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Turísticos, 1965), 78.
96. Enrique Serrano Guirado, *Planificación territorial y planificaciones sectoriales. Consideración especial del sector turístico* (Madrid: Editorial del Ministerio de Vivienda, 1965), 56.
97. Research Section, Ministry of Public Works, "Asunto: Anteproyecto de Ley de Zonas y Centros de Interés Turístico Nacional," July 22, 1963, AGA 4: 54/15733.
98. Bayón Marín, *50 años del Turismo Español*, 81.
99. Fraga, *Memoria breve*, 84, 96–97.
100. Ministry of Information and Tourism, Decree 4927/1964 (Dec. 23, 1964).
101. Apart from Information and Tourism, these were the Ministries of Housing, Finance, Public Works, Navigation, Commerce, and the Interior.
102. On the position of the Ministries of the Interior and the Finance on local administration laws, see Javier Salas, "El tema de las competencias," in Sebastián Martín-Retortillo, *Decentralización administrativa y organización política*, Vol. 2 (Madrid: Ediciones Alfaguara, 1973), esp. 401–403.
103. Private promoters conceived 30, municipal mayors 11, and 1 was a joint public–private effort. Half the applications (21) were approved, all but 2 of which were private. The 2 public initiatives approved were submitted by the mayors of Tarazona and Moncayo, both in Zaragoza province (AGA 3: 49.04/20661).
104. Luis Casanova Vila, *Urbanismo y turismo, la experiencia española*, Vol. 1 (Madrid: Consejo Superior de los Colegios de Arquitectos, 1970), 51.
105. Bayón Marín, *50 años del Turismo Español*, 82.
106. Rafael Nassaré, *Las urbanizaciones particulares* (Madrid: Montecorvo, 1972), esp. 44–54.
107. Juan de Arespacochaga, "La especulación del suelo en las zonas turísticas," in *Enonomía Financier a Española* (Madrid: n. p., 1966), 39–50.
108. José Bono, "Memoria sobre la Zona Turística de Tarifa y su situación actual," Report to Rodríguez-Acosta, Sept. 8, 1963, AGA 3: 49.06/28001.
109. DGEAT, "Las inversiones extranjeras en hotelería," AGA 3: 49.10/40132.
110. *Pueblo*, Aug. 17, 1973.
111. Estimate for total investment is based on estimates for construction costs given in Carmelo Abellán, *Tratado práctico de la administración local española*, Vol. 1 (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios de la Administración Local, 1971), 451. Hotel Credit data in *10 años de turismo español* (Madrid: Ministerio de Información y Turismo, 1971).
112. Alcaldía de Benidorm to Fraga, May 13, 1965, AGA 3: 49.06/29646; "Informe acerca del desarrollo turístico en el archipiélago canario, con singular referencia a la político de fomento en la construcción de alojamientos," Feb. 10, 1964, AGA 3: 49.09/38833.
113. *El turismo en 1967*, 143–144.

114. DGPT, "Informe sobre el problema de abastecimiento de agua y saneamiento en las zonas turísticas," Nov. 1964, IET CDTE CM-38-I. The Balearic Islands, already near tourist saturation, did not receive this distinction because private developers bore the cost of sanitation works; the Canaries, on the other hand, had barely been penetrated by tourists, yet their touristic potential induced the state to provide special attention.
115. "Proyecto de Decreto por el que se crea la Comisión Central de Saneamiento," May 31, 1963, AGA 8: 23.01/386.
116. Meeting of CCS, July 23, 1963, AGA 8: 23.01/643, Carpeta 6.
117. DGEAT, "Informe sobre la situación sanitaria de España y su repercusión sobre el turismo," n.d. May 1963, AGA 3: 49.10/40132.
118. Camilo Alonso Vega to Fraga, Feb. 20, 1964, AGA 3: 49.06/28001.
119. Mata to Arespacochaga, Nov. 10, 1964, AGA 8: 23.01/643.
120. DGPT, "Informe sobre el problema de abastecimiento."
121. "Sugerencias de Jefes Provinciales de Sanidad," n.d., 1964, AGA 8: 23.01/644.
122. DGPT, "Informe sobre el abastecimiento."
123. DGEAT, "Informe sobre la situación sanitaria."
124. B. C. A. Cook, British Consul at Barcelona, to Sir George Labouchere, British Ambassador to Madrid, Mar. 5, 1963, PRO FO 371/169474.
125. Quoted in Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas con Franco*, 380.
126. Rafael Ibáñez, Chief of the CCS of Granada Province, to Enrique de la Mata, Mar. 13, 1964, AGA 8: 23.01/644.
127. Ministry of Information and Tourism to Marqués de Santa Cruz, Spanish Ambassador to London, May 2, 1964, AGA 10: 54/7464, Carpeta B-250-16.
128. Marqués de Santa Cruz to Fraga, May 4, 1964, AGA 10: 54/7464, Carpeta B-250-16.
129. J. S. Rickards to Marqués de Santa Cruz, Jan. 23, 1964, AGA 10: 54/7464, Carpeta B-250-16.
130. Provincial Delegate of Information and Tourism of Alicante to SGT, n.d., Aug. 1964, AGA 8: 23.01/644.
131. Arespacochaga to Mata, Jan. 20, 1965, AGA 8: 23.01/643.
132. Luis Rodríguez de Miguel, Undersecretary of the Interior, to Rodríguez-Acosta, May 10, 1965, AGA 3: 49.08/35213.
133. Eduardo Roca Roca, *Estudio turístico de la Costa del Sol de Granada* (Granada: Consejo Económico Sindical Provincial, 1967), 150.
134. Report presented Feb. 20, 1968, AGA 3: 49.22/48975.
135. Rodríguez-Acosta to Directorate General of Water Works, Apr. 28, 1967, AGA 3: 49.08/35234.
136. Ernst H. Doerpinghaus to Fraga, Sept. 29, 1969, AGA 3: 49.08/35252.
137. *Evening Herald* (Dublin), Aug. 10, 1974.
138. Joaquín Juste to Foreign Ministry, Aug. 12, 1974, AGA 3: 49.22/56821. Juste had formerly served in the Ministry of Information and Tourism.

139. *Arriba*, Oct. 2, 1963.
140. Pier Francisco Listri, "Il perchè di un boom," *La vie del mondo* (Rome), Feb. 1966.
141. The 1966 Costa del Sol survey indicated that 85% of tourists stayed in a single location throughout their vacation, and 65% took at least a one-day trip ("Estudio sobre estrangulamiento-saturación de municipios turísticos de la Costa del Sol," prepared by the Tourism Commission of the Plan de Desarrollo, June 17 1966, 28, AGA 3: 49.09/38833). The 1965 National Statistical Institute survey indicated that 58% of foreign tourists in Spain preferred fixed holidays to itineraries.
142. SGT internal memo, n.d., 1965, AGA 3: 49.07/31808; Salcedo, *Historia de los Caminos de España*, Vol. 2, 292.
143. SGT to Director General of Highways, Feb. 5, 1966, AGA 3: 49.08/35223.
144. "Los Principales Problemas del Turismo en España," Feb. 1966, AGA 3: 49.07/31803.
145. *Documentación*, 9 (June 1964), 8–9.
146. Director General de Carreteras to Rodríguez-Acosta, May 20, 1968, AGA 3: 49.08/35243.
147. Projects were designated in the provinces of Gerona (2), Granada (5), Huesca (1), Lérida (3), Madrid (2), and Segovia (2). Documentation filed at AGA 3: 49.08/35243.
148. Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, *Río Arriba: Memorias* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1995), 196–200.
149. Vicente Mortes, "Los Transportes en el Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social," July 20, 1964, AGA 3: 49.06/29645.
150. Javier Laviña, Undersecretary for Civil Aviation, to Rodríguez-Acosta, Mar. 7, 1967, AGA 3: 49.08/35232.
151. Soriano Frade, *Pequeña historia del turismo en las Baleares*, 142.
152. Walter Vogel, Director General of Touropa, to Rodríguez-Acosta, Jan. 10, 1965, AGA 3: 49.08/35211.
153. Rodríguez-Acosta to Laviña, Jan. 10, 1965, AGA 3: 49.08/35211.
154. Jean Bisson, *La terre et l'homme aux Îles Baléares* (Aix-en-Provence: Edisud, 1977), 256.

Chapter 6 Touristic Consciousness

1. Cierva, *Turismo*, 3.
2. *Pueblo*, Dec. 6, 1965.
3. Poutet, *Images touristiques de l'Espagne*, 94.
4. The principal study of the NO-DO is Saturnino Rodríguez, *El NO-DO, Catecismo social de una época* (Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 1999).
5. Noticiarios-Documentales #864B, "Turismo en Mallorca" (July 2, 1959); #869B, "Turismo en la Costa Brava" (Aug. 31, 1959), Filmoteca de Madrid.

6. Noticiarios-Documentales #843A, "I Congreso Nacional de Agencias de Viajes" (Mar. 2, 1959); #908A, "Recorra el mundo y conozca España" (May 30, 1960), Filmoteca de Madrid.
7. "Catálogo de Noticiarios-Documentales," Filmoteca de Madrid.
8. Bolín to A. Haulot, President of IUOTO, May 24, 1952, AGA 3: 49.08/34929.
9. Mariano de Urzáiz, Director General of Tourism, to F. Morin, of IUOTO, Mar. 14, 1955, AGA 3: 49.08/34929.
10. *Piel de España*, 12 (Oct. 1957).
11. "Informe sobre Centros de Estudios de Turismo en España," n.d., 1964, AGA 3: 49.09/38662.
12. *ABC*, Nov. 2, 1957.
13. *Arriba*, Aug. 15, 1957 and Oct. 16, 1959. Several other citations from the Spanish press in a similar vein can be found in José Ignacio Arrillaga, *Ensayos sobre turismo* (Barcelona: Editur, 1962).
14. *ABC*, Sept. 27, 1958.
15. Aired on Radio Nacional de España, n.d., 1964. Full text is archived at AGA 3: 49.08/35208.
16. It bears noting that the NO-DO production studio was not a component of the Ministry of Information and Tourism, though its producers were closely tied to the public information apparatus.
17. Noticiarios-Documentales #1104 C, "Operación Turismo" (Mar. 21, 1964), Filmoteca de Madrid.
18. Noticiarios-Documentales #1129 B, "Afluencia turística en España: desde la Costa Brava a la del Sol" (n.d., 1964), Filmoteca de Madrid.
19. Noticiarios-Documentales #1126 B, "Benidorm: Ciudad internacional turística" (Aug. 3, 1964), Filmoteca de Madrid.
20. Noticiarios-Documentales #1369 B, "España en desarrollo: Palma de Majorca" (Mar. 31, 1969), Filmoteca de Madrid.
21. Noticiarios-Documentales #1394 A, "La Costa del Sol a dos velocidades" (Sept. 20, 1969), Filmoteca de Madrid.
22. León Herrera to Rodríguez-Acosta, July 17, 1969, AGA 3: 49.08/35251. Extensive press coverage of "millionaire" tourists of 1965 is archived at AGA 3: 49.05/25687.
23. Noticiarios-Documentales #1185 B, "Día del turista en Barcelona" (Sept. 20, 1965), Filmoteca de Madrid.
24. Circular 10/1965 (Mar. 2, 1965), AGA 49.13/62119; DGPT internal memorandum, Nov. 9, 1965, AGA 3: 49.06/27271.
25. "Informe sobre algunos festejos que pueden implicar crueldad con los animales," AGA 3: 49.06/27270.
26. "Un español" to Fraga, n.d., 1966, AGA 3: 49.08/35222.
27. Rodríguez-Acosta to Luis Rodríguez de Miguel, Undersecretary of the Interior, Feb. 23, 1966, AGA 3: 49.08/35222.
28. *Daily Express* (London), Aug. 10, 1962; AGA 9: 10.01/8773.
29. AGA 9: 10.01/8773.

30. AGA 3: 49.06/29655.
31. *Arriba*, Sept. 26, 1962.
32. Letter to Marqués de Santa Cruz, Spanish Ambassador to London, Aug. 21, 1959, AGA 10: 77.02/6871.
33. Ángel Palomino, *Carta abierta a una sueca* (Madrid: Ediciones 99, 1974), 17.
34. *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, Apr. 11, 1963.
35. Camilo Alonso Vega, Minister of the Interior, to Fraga, June 11, 1964, AGA 3: 49.06/29645.
36. Rodríguez-Acosta to Victor Hellín Sol, Governor of Gerona province, Aug. 25, 1962; "Nota de los principales problemas que tiene planteados la Provincia en relación con el turismo," remitted to Rodríguez-Acosta, Nov. 7, 1962, AGA 3: 49.08/35188.
37. "Notas sobre el Anteproyecto de Ley de Ordenamiento Jurídico de la Zona Marítimo-Terrestre," Mar. 12, 1965, AGA 3: 49.07/31808.
38. Circular 10/1965 (Mar. 2, 1965), AGA 49.13/62119.
39. *¡Ya!*, Nov. 7, 1963.
40. Jesús María Vázquez, *Estudio socio-religioso de la Costa Brava en relación con el turismo*, Vol. 3 (Madrid: Barriada y Vide, 1964), 22.
41. Antonio Pildain, *El turismo y las playas, las divisas, y los escándolos* (San Sebastián: M. Torres, 1964).
42. Vázquez, *Estudio socio-religioso de la Costa Brava*, 25.
43. Palomino, *Carta abierta*, 19.
44. Noticiarios-Documentales #1394A, "La Costa del Sol a dos velocidades" (Sept. 20, 1969), Filmoteca de Madrid.
45. Fraser, *Tajos*, 182.
46. *El País*, Sept. 22, 1976, quoted in Radcliff, "Citizens and Housewives," 88. See also José-Carlos Mainer, "Apuntes sobre la vida cotidiana," in eds. José-Carlos Mainer and Santos Juliá, *El aprendizaje de la libertad, 1973–1986* (Madrid: Alianza, 2000), 140–146.
47. Justin Crumbaugh, "'Spain Is Different': Touring Late-Francoist Cinema with Manolo Escobar," *Hispanic Research Journal*, 3:3 (October 2002), 261–276; Löfgren, *On Holiday*, 174.
48. Ángel Palomino, *Torremolinos Gran Hotel* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1971).
49. Arturo Arnalte, *Redada de violetas: La represión de los homosexuales durante el franquismo* (Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2003).
50. See James Michener, *The Drifters* (New York: Random House, 1971); Fraser, *Tajos*, 225.
51. Cierva, *Turismo*, 113–114.
52. Quoted in José Ignacio Arrillaga, "Turismo y cristianismo," in ed. José Ignacio Arrillaga, *Ensayos sobre turismo* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Turísticos, 1962), 119.
53. Barker, "The European Economic Community," 45.
54. Iglesia Católica de Menora, "Mensaje del Señor Obispo a los Turistas," June 23, 1972, IET CDTE CP-31-I.

55. Manuel Fraga, interview by author, Santiago de Compostela, Mar. 8, 2002.
56. Rodríguez-Acosta to Undersecretary of Justice, Mar. 3, 1966, AGA 3: 49.13/62118.
57. Ministry of Information and Tourism, internal memo, Jan. 10, 1964, AGA 3: 49.04/20661.
58. Fraga to Alberto López de Arriba, Apr. 28, 1968, AGA 3: 49.10/40132.
59. "Consideraciones sobre los 'informes' de los secretariados doctrinal y moral de la Comisión Episcopal para la Doctrina de la Fé y Costumbres," AGA 3: 49.10/40132.
60. Pedro Suárez Pinillos, *Beneficios económicos derivados de incrementar el turismo* (Madrid: Cámara Oficial de Comercio, 1959), 41–42.
61. *Editur*, 25 (Sept. 2, 1960)
62. Comments given at the First Provincial Assembly on Tourism of Barcelona, reported in *¡Ya!*, Nov. 10, 1963.
63. *Madrid*, Jan. 5, 1963.
64. DGT, "Ruta de Santiago: Estudio Turístico Preliminar," n.d., 1962, AGA 3: 49.05/22599.
65. For example, a proposal by Bernardino de Pantorba, "Los Grandes Pintores españoles en la Ruta del Turismo," *Estudios Turísticos*, 4 (1964), 38–55.
66. Francisco Girón Tena, interview by author, Mar. 12, 2003.
67. Centro de Documentación Turística de España, *Catálogo de Carteles Oficiales de Turismo del Centro de Documentación Turística de España*, Vol. 1 (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Turísticos, 2000).
68. SGT, "La Cornisa Cantábrica" and other tourism promotional brochures. Accompanying edits and censorship reports in AGA 3: 49.05/22601.
69. Manuel Tomás de Carranza, of the Spanish Embassy in Paris, noted the scarcity of publicity material at tourist sales points abroad in a dispatch, summarized by the Technical Secretary of the Ministry of Information and Tourism, Aug. 25, 1962, AGA 3: 49.23/71-11916. State spending on propaganda increased thereafter, reaching \$3.1 million in 1964 and \$3.9 million in 1967.
70. Preparations and draft versions of "España es así" series found in AGA 3: 49.11/42620 Exp. M-206.
71. Máximo, *España para usted* (Madrid: Junta Interministerial para la Conmemoración del XXV Aniversario de la Paz, 1964).
72. Máximo, *Spain for You* (Madrid: Ministerio de Información y Turismo, 1964), 5, 24–25, 36, 53–55, 62, 70.
73. DGPT, internal memo, May 26, 1965, AGA 3: 49.06/27271.
74. *España de hoy* (Madrid: Editorial Rollán, 1965).
75. Arseni Gibert, *El Crac turístico de la Costa Brava* (Gerona: Cámara Oficial de Comercio e Industria de Gerona, 1972), 13.
76. For more on this aspect, see Oriol Pi-Sunyer, "Tourism and Its Discontents: The Impact of a New Industry on a Catalan Community," *Studies in European Society*, 1:1 (July 1973), 1–20. Discussion of the poor quality of tourist flamenco shows is found in Gaviria, *España a go-go*. A frank interview of one

- flamenco performer on the subject can be found in *Cicerone* (Costa Brava), June 15–21, 1970.
77. Eduardo de Guzmán et al., *Historias de Madrid* (Madrid: Penthalon, 1981), 212.
 78. *Travel Weekly*, Sept. 10, 1974.
 79. A government study reported slightly under one half million visitors to the Alhambra in 1961, though it made no distinction between foreign and Spanish visitors nor did it indicate patterns or trends over time; Gratiniano Nieto Gallo, "Los monumentos y museos como centros de atracción turística," *Estudios Turísticos*, 5 (1965), 19.
 80. Instituto Nacional de Estadística, "Encuesta de Turismo Receptivo, 1970," cited in Joan Cals, *Turismo y política turística en España* (Barcelona: Ariel, 1974), 44. The survey revealed that Spain's art and monuments were a larger motivation for Italian and Portuguese tourists than for tourists from northern countries.
 81. Miguel Flores Sédek, "Las motivaciones turísticas," *Estudios Turísticos*, 43 (1974), 519–539; Trinidad Manchado, "Cultural Memory, Commerce, and the Arts: The Valencian Institute of Modern Art (IVAM)," in eds. Barry Jordan and Rikki Morgan-Tamosunas, *Contemporary Spanish Cultural Studies* (London, Arnold, 2000), 92–100.
 82. Wright, "Sun, Sea, Sand and Self-Expression," 181–202.
 83. *Voz de Galicia*, June 12, 1948. On the uses of the Santiago de Compostela as political spectacle in the early Franco regime, see Giuliana Di Febo, *Ritos de guerra y de historia en la España franquista* (Bilbao: Desclée de Brouwer, 2002).
 84. Janine Ducrot, *Vers Compostelle. Grandes routes et petits chemins touristiques* (Paris: Nouvelles Éditions Latines, 1962), 8; León Herrera, "Nota-Informe sobre el Camino de Santiago" (1963?), AGA 3: 49.08/35208.
 85. *ABC*, Apr. 18, 1961.
 86. Rodríguez-Acosta to Carrero Blanco, Mar. 8, 1963, AGA 3: 49.08/35199.
 87. Manuel Fraga, *Cinco Loas* (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1965), 34, 37.
 88. *Arriba*, Oct. 4, 1963.
 89. Rodríguez-Acosta to Carlos Robles Piquer, Spanish Ambassador to Paris, Feb. 20, 1965, AGA 10: 97/11526.
 90. Though Lugo is not entirely landlocked, its short coastline was not developed for tourism.
 91. Salvador Pons to Fraga, July 16, 1965, AGA 3: 49.08/35210.
 92. ENTURSA, "Memoria, ejercicio, Oct. 1971," AGA 3: 49.22/46567.
 93. *Voz de Galicia*, June 12, 1948.
 94. See Sharon R. Roseman, "Santiago de Compostela in the Year 2000: From Religious Center to European City of Culture," in ed. Ellen Badone and Sharon R. Roseman, *Intersecting Journeys: The Anthropology of Pilgrimage and Tourism* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 68–88.
 95. The Balearic Islands, Burgos, Madrid, Oviedo, Palencia, and Vizcaya did not.

96. Francisco Soriano Frade, "Estudio comparativo sobre los Paradores de Turismo, 1976–1984," 1985, IET CDTE 4519; *El turismo en 1967* (Madrid: Ministerio de Información y Turismo, 1968), 69.
97. *Editur*, 27 (Sept. 16, 1960).
98. These included Salamanca, Cádiz, La Coruña, Huesca, León, Palma de Majorca, and Tarragona; L. Santiago Díez Cano, *Las cámaras de comercio en el franquismo: el caso salmantino* (Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 1992), 240–241.
99. CITs for 1963 listed in Ministerio de Información y Turismo, *Memoria, julio 1962—diciembre 1963* (Madrid: Ministerio de Información y Turismo, 1964), 527; the 1967 list is taken from *Noticiario turístico*, 8 (Apr. 1967).
100. AGA 3: 49.04/20661.
101. Order of the Ministry of Information and Tourism, Aug. 11, 1967 (*BOE* Sept. 14, 1967).
102. AGA 3: 49.08/35827–35829.
103. *Noticiario Turístico*, 32, Sept. 1967. For the 1963 competition, only towns on the Costa del Sol were eligible. Thereafter, the competition was open to the entire country.
104. Ministerial Order of the Ministry of Information and Tourism, Feb. 23, 1963.
105. Contest documents filed in AGA 3: 49.05/26155, 3: 49.09/38114, 8: 21/985.
106. Nine Atlantic coastal towns, 19 Mediterranean coastal towns, and 7 insular towns joined the program (AGA 3: 49.07/31101).
107. Fraga, *Memoria breve*, 178.
108. Jacqueline Waldren, *Insiders and Outsiders: Paradise and Reality in Mallorca* (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1996), 222–223.
109. Juan Victory Manella, president of Fomento Turismo de Menorca, to SGT, n.d., 1964, AGA 3: 49.06/27270; Bisson, *La terre et l'homme aux Îles Baléares*, 254.
110. Barceló Pons, *Evolución reciente*, 176.
111. Palomino, *El milagro*, 45. (Based on O.S. figure of 11,080,036 workers and proprietors in 1971.)
112. Barceló Pons, *Evolución reciente*, 116, for example, estimates that just 6% of Majorcan rural migrants entered industries unconnected to tourism or construction.
113. Barbaza, *Le paysage humaine de la Costa Brava*, 655–656, 675.
114. Carmen R. García-Ruiz, *Franquismo y transición en Málaga, 1962–1979* (Málaga: Universidad de Málaga, 1999), 44.
115. Bisson, *La terre et l'homme aux Îles Baléares*, 254, 388. On the social impact of agricultural modernization under Franco, see Eduardo Sevilla Guzmán, *La evolución del campesinado en España* (Barcelona: Ediciones Península, 1979).

116. See, for example, Palomino, *El milagro*, 217.
117. Vila Fradera, *La gran aventura*, 34, 37–60.
118. Juan de Arespachaga y Felipe, “La especulación del suelo en las zonas turísticas,” *Economía Financiera Española*, 3 (1966), 39–50.
119. Bisson, *La terre et l’homme aux Îles Baléares*, 390.
120. M. Costa-Pau, *Turistas, sirenas e indígenas* (Barcelona: Dima, 1967), 90.
121. Syndical census data for 1966 compiled from AGA 6: 64/3447.
122. Costa-Pau, *Turistas, sirenas e indígenas*, 105.
123. “Nota del Servicio de Inspección para el Viaje del Excmo. Sr. Ministro a las provincias de Granada, Sevilla, Córdoba y Almería,” Oct. 23, 1963, AGA 49.07/31799.
124. Chief of Hotel Inspection Service of DGEAT to Herrera, Nov. 23, 1963, AGA 3: 49.09/38833.
125. Provincial Delegate of Information and Tourism of León, in “Resumen de los Informes Reservados correspondientes al mes de septiembre de 1965,” AGA 3: 49.23/71–11911.
126. Herrera, Report from meeting with Provincial Delegates of Information and Tourism and Directors of Tourism Information Offices, Nov. 9, 1965, AGA 49.22/48975.
127. Herrera, interview by author, May 15, 2002.
128. Report by Juste, Jan. 2–11, 1966, AGA 3: 49.11/42644.
129. SGT, “Estudio sobre índices de intensidad turística,” Apr. 1964, AGA 3: 49.07/31802; *El turismo en 1967*, 84.
130. *Editur*, 588 (June 18, 1971).
131. Rodríguez-Acosta, “Informe justificativo del decreto de creación de la Escuela Oficial de Turismo y reconocimiento de centros no oficiales de enseñanza turística,” Aug. 31, 1963, AGA 3: 49.10/40132.
132. León Herrera, “Nota informativa sobre la Asamblea Nacional de Agencias de Viajes,” n.d., Mar. 1965, AGA 3: 49.06/29646. All data for 1973 is compiled from “Censo nacional de trabajadores y técnicos según clasificación electoral por agrupaciones, Sindicato Nacional Hostelería y Actividades Turísticas,” 1973, AGA 6: 64/3421.
133. Nemesio Garde López, National Secretary of the Syndical Project for Education and Leisure, Address to I Congress on Social Tourism, Bern, May 28–June 1, 1956, AGA 3: 49.08/34929.
134. Tourism Committee, “Medidas de política económica precisas para el desarrollo de turismo,” July 22, 1963, AGA 3: 49.06/29652.
135. Cierva, *Turismo*, 79; *Boletín de información estadística del Ministerio de Información y Turismo*, 26 (Dec. 1968), 77.
136. *Revista Sindical Estadística*, 11:42 (Apr. 1956) and 18:70 (Apr. 1963).
137. Casanova Vila, *Urbanismo y turismo*, 25.
138. Casanova Vila, *Urbanismo y turismo*, 26, 40.
139. “Libro Blanco del Turismo Español,” *Estudios Turísticos*, 108 (1990), 1–60. Spaniards’ consumption on domestic tourism reached 124 billion pesetas; foreign tourists, 118 billion pesetas.

140. *El turismo en 1968* (Madrid: Ministerio de Información y Turismo, 1969), 129; *Boletín de información estadística del Ministerio de Información y Turismo*, 26 (Dec. 1968), 77.
141. Alberto de Uribe, President of the Travel Agents' Group of the National Hotel Syndicate, to Presidencia del Gobierno, Feb. 11, 1966, AGA 3: 49.22/50092; Enrique Cortina, Section Chief of Travel Agencies, to León Herrera, Feb. 14, 1966, AGA 3: 49.22/50092.
142. León Herrera to Jorge Vila Fradera, Dec. 31, 1965, AGA 3: 49.22/50092.
143. Barke and Towner, "Exploring the History of Leisure and Tourism in Spain," 3–34.
144. *Revista Sindical de Estadística*, 16:64 (Oct.–Dec. 1961).
145. Barbaza, *Le paysage humaine de la Costa Brava*, 688.
146. *El turismo en 1967*, 148.
147. *El turismo en 1968*, 105.
148. AGA 3: 49.03/17070; the routes in operation in 1962 were: Fallas de Valencia, Semana Santa en la Costa Blanca, Semana Santa en la Costa del Sol, Feria de Sevilla, Primavera en la Costa del Sol, Galicia y sus Rías (2), La Ruta Cantábrica, and El Fin de Año en Gredos.
149. AGA 3: 49.04/19678.
150. Internal SGT memo, Sept. 8, 1962, AGA 3: 49.03/17070.
151. The SGT dedicated 1.7 million annually (1968–1970) to subsidize leisure travel for military personnel; 300,000 pesetas for tourism promotion in primary schools (1969); and 1.5 million to support regional tours. The budget for "Conozca Usted el Mar" increased from 200,000 pesetas in 1967 to 1 million pesetas in 1970 (AGA 4: 73.04/1380).
152. AGA 4: 73.04/1380.

Chapter 7 Disillusionment and Reorientation

1. Comité de Turismo, "Organización del sector y servicios turísticos," n.d., 1967, AGA 3: 49.09/38838.
2. Sindicato de Hostelería y Actividades Turísticas de la Diputación de las Islas Baleares, División Empresarial, "Comentarios y consideraciones acerca del Libro IV del proyecto de Ley de Régimen Local, Base 83/2," AGA 8: 11.02/2411, Exp. 25.
3. *El Eco* (Sitges), July 30, 1967.
4. Miguel, "Una revisión de las ideas sobre el turismo."
5. Guillermo Luis Díaz-Plaja, *El turismo, ¿un falso 'boom'?*, Cuadernos para el diálogo, Vol. 29 (Madrid: Edicusa, 1972).
6. Lower-middle classes included skilled workers, independent tradesmen, and office workers. The two surveys cited here are Instituto Nacional de Estadística, *Encuesta sobre turismo receptivo en España* (Madrid: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 1965), and Mario Gaviria et al., *Turismo de playa en España* (Madrid: Ediciones Turner, 1975).

7. Demetriadi, "The Golden Years," 53–57.
8. See interviews of Spanish tourism personnel in Barton, *Working-Class Organizations*, 206–207.
9. "Aspectos Sociológicos del turismo en la Costa Brava," AGA 3: 49.22/59882.
10. The exception was France, where travel vending remained a fragmented industry offering little advantage to the tourist over self-organized itineraries. André Rauch, *Vacances en France de 1830 à nos jours* (Mesnil-sur-l'Estrée: Hachette), 1996, 167; "Memorandum de la reunión celebrada en Madrid, Ministerio de Información y Turismo, el día 7 de abril de 1972, para tratar del tema 'Política nacional de Comercialización Turística,'" AGA 8: 11.38/1805.
11. This estimate excluded the large number of "excursionists" arriving from France by automobile. "Sugerencias en torno al establecimiento de una política nacional de comercialización turística," internal DGPT document, n.d., Mar. 1972, AGA 8: 11.38/1805.
12. PRO AVIA 106/5; Barton, *Working-Class Organizations*, 206.
13. The fares of Clarkson's Tours, Britain's largest- and lowest-price tour operator in 1969, are listed in PRO AVIA 106/6. Dacharry, *Tourisme et transport en Méditerranée occidentale*, 101, reports fares to the Balearics ranging from £44 to £66 in 1961.
14. "Nota sobre vuelos charters a Alemania," internal DGT memo, Jan. 29, 1963, AGA 3: 49.11/42620; Dirección General de Promoción de Turismo, *El Turismo en 1968* (Madrid: Ministerio de Información y Turismo, 1969), 143.
15. The number of foreign residents in Spain did increase most in tourist areas such as Málaga and Alicante during the 1960s—largely owing to the permanent arrival of retired pensioners from northern countries and assorted expatriates arriving to work in foreign tourist communities. Still, the number of actual foreign residents (164,078 in 1973) remained a small fraction of residential tourist capacity. One useful contemporary study of foreign residents in Spain in the 1960s and their relationship to the tourism industry is Mario Gaviria, *El turismo de invierno y el asentamiento de extranjeros en la provincia de Alicante* (Alicante: Instituto de Estudios Alicantinos, 1976).
16. "Nota sobre Centros y Zonas de Interés Turístico Nacional," n.d., 1964, AGA 3: 49.06/28001.
17. "Nota sobre Centros y Zonas de Interés Turístico Nacional," n. d., 1964, AGA 3: 49.06/28001; Manuel Figuerola Palomo, "Valorización de la riqueza turística nacional. Formación del inventario de recursos turísticos. Ventajas y utilización," 1973, IET CP-89-I; Alfredo Sánchez Bella, "El turismo en España, y el financiamiento de las empresas turísticas," in *El turismo y su financiación en España, Caribie, y Centroamérica* (Madrid: Instituto de Crédito Oficial, 1972), 96.
18. Gabinete de Coordinación y Desarrollo del Gobierno Civil de Málaga, *La Costa del Sol y sus problemas* (Málaga: Gobierno Civil de Málaga, 1964), 65.

19. Manuel Hercé Vallejo, "El consumo del espacio en las urbanizaciones de segunda residencia en Cataluña," *Ciudad y Territorio*, 4 (1975), 50.
20. Nassaré, *Las urbanizaciones particulares*, 44.
21. José M. Álvarez Perla, Javier Elizalde, and Josefa Rios Ivars, "El proceso de ocupación turística del espacio rural: el caso del litoral granadino," in *VI Coloquio de Geografía, 1979* (Palma de Majorca: Universidad de Palma de Mallorca, 1983), 291–299.
22. Directorate General of the Civil Guard to Fraga, May 8, 1964, AGA 3: 49.09/38834.
23. "Memoria-resumen que presenta el Alcalde-Presidente del Muy Ilustre Ayuntamiento de la Ciudad de Cullera (Valencia), sobre los antecedentes, constitución y posteriores actuaciones de la Empresa Municipal Urbanizadora de Cullera, S. A. (EMUCSA) a efectos de la convalidación y simultánea municipalización de esta empresa, si así procediera, por el Ministerio de la Gobernación," Mar. 24, 1970, AGA 8: 21.00/984.
24. "Dictamen sobre la posibilidad legal de que se constituya una Sociedad Anónima Municipal para la Urbanización del Monte de Cullera," Aug. 1962, AGA 8: 21.00/984.
25. Barbaza, *Le paysage humain de la Costa Brava*, 617–624, 640.
26. Hercé Vallejo, "El consumo del espacio," 48.
27. Martín Mateo, "La eclosión de nuevas comunidades," 76.
28. Nassaré, *Las urbanizaciones particulares*, 44.
29. Nassaré, *Las urbanizaciones particulares*, 43.
30. Gaviria, *El turismo de invierno*, 191.
31. Antonio J. Rodríguez-Acosta, meeting with León Herrera and several provincial delegates of information and tourism, Nov. 9, 1965, AGA 49.22/48975.
32. Head of Spanish National Tourism Office, London, to SGT, Aug. 17, 1966, AGA 3: 49.06/28001.
33. "Aspectos Sociológicos del turismo en la Costa Brava," Ministry of Information and Tourism Report, n.d., 1974, AGA 3: 49.22/59882.
34. J. Miret, Director of Madrid branch of Viajes Ultramar Express, to José A. López de Letona, Subdirector General of Tourism, Apr. 12, 1966, AGA 3: 49.09/38833.
35. Jorge Vila Fradera, "Nuevas ideas sobre la promoción turística," *Información Comercial Española*, 421 (Sept. 1968), 71–76.
36. Civil Governor of Gerona to Fraga, Feb. 17, 1967, AGA 3: 49.13/62119.
37. Director of Panorama Holidays, Sussex, to Panorama Holidays branch office in Lloret de Mar, Sept. 20, 1967, AGA 3: 49.08/35233.
38. The petition, signed by ten Lloret agents, was annexed to a correspondence from Enrique Jiménez Asenjo, Subdirector General of Security, to Rodríguez-Acosta, Sept. 28, 1967, AGA 49.08/35233.
39. Gibert, *El Crac turístico de la Costa Brava*, 14.
40. Civil Governor of the Balearic Islands to Director General of Security, June 9, 1969, AGA 3: 49.08/35253.

41. See note 35.
42. Santander Delegation of Information and Tourism Report to SGT, June 1966, AGA 3: 49.23/71–11911.
43. Civil Governor of the Canary Islands to Rodríguez-Acosta, n.d., May 1968, AGA 3: 49.08/35245. Rodríguez-Acosta alluded to the Swedish press accounts in a missive to the Canary Governor of April 30, 1968.
44. Rodríguez-Acosta to Council of Ministers, Jan. 25, 1967, AGA 3: 49.07/31809.
45. Rodríguez-Acosta to Arespachoga, Sept. 22, 1966, AGA 3: 49.06/27271.
46. Abellán, *Tratado práctico de la administración local española*, 446–452, 581.
47. Nassaré, *Las urbanizaciones particulares*, 171–172.
48. Proposal for reform of the Law of Local Governance, presented by the Ministry of Finance to the Council of Ministers, Jan. 20, 1967, AGA 3: 49.07/31809.
49. Álvarez Buylla, Civil Governor of the Balearic Islands, to Syndical Economic Council of the Balearics, quoted in *Editur*, 280 (July 23, 1965).
50. Diputación Provincial de Málaga, “Málaga a Franco y su gobierno,” pamphlet, Oct. 1965, AMM.
51. *Diario de Mallorca*, Sept. 2, 1967.
52. *Acción de las Corporaciones Locales, Provinciales, y Cabildos Insulares en el fenómeno turístico* (Tarragona: Sindicato de Iniciativa y Turismo de Tarragona, 1968), 7.
53. *Acción de las Corporaciones Locales*, 18.
54. Payne, *The Franco Regime*, 578.
55. Luis Xifra Riera, “Las II Jornadas de Urbanismo a la Costa Brava,” *Ciudad y Territorio*, 2:3 (July–Sept. 1970). The journal also devoted its second number of 1972 (Apr.–June) to the theme of reforming the tourism industry.
56. See Mario Gaviria, *Campo, urbe, y espacio libre* (Madrid: Siglo Vientiuno de España Editores, 1971); *Libro negro sobre la autopista de la Costa Blanca* (Valencia: Editorial Cosmos, 1973); and *España a go-gó*.
57. Quoted in *Travel Trade Gazette*, Aug. 16, 1968.
58. Casanova Vila, *Urbanismo y turismo*, 13.
59. Francisco Jurdao Arrones, *España en venta*, 2nd ed. (Madrid: Endymion, 1990), esp. 184–190. On agricultural mechanization, see Sevilla Guzmán, *La evolución del campesinado en España*, 203–230.
60. Carmen García Ruiz, *Franquismo y transición en Málaga, 1962–1979* (Málaga: Universidad de Málaga, 1999, 43–44).
61. Damián López Cano, *La población malagueña en el siglo XX* (Málaga: Universidad de Málaga, 1985), 544–549, 573.
62. Waldren, *Insiders and Outsiders*, 221.
63. Juan Fuster Lareu, “El municipio turístico español,” *Información Comercial Española*, 421 (Sept. 1968), 77–82; Gabinete de Estudios del Sindicato Nacional de Corporaciones Locales, “Proyecto de la Ley de Bases del Estatuto de Régimen Local,” Sept. 1974, AGA 8: 11.02/1993, Exp. 7.

64. Ministry of Information and Tourism, "Informe sobre determinación de zonas y rutas turísticas," 1971, IET CDTE CM-23-I.
65. AGA 8: 11.38/1805. The zones were Costa Brava and Costa Dorada (together forming the entire extension of the Catalan coast); Costa del Azahar and Costa Blanca (Castellón, Valencia, Alicante, and Murcia); Costa del Sol and Costa del la Luz (the length of the Andalusian coast); Cornisa Cantábrica and Rías Gallegas (the entire northern coast); the Pyrenees; the Balearic Islands; the Canary Islands; Madrid; and Western Castille (including Zamora, Valladolid, Salamanca, and the Extremaduran provinces of Cáceres and Badajoz). The itineraries: Camino de Santiago; Ruta del Quijote; Ruta del Arte Hispano-Musulmán; Ruta de los Conquistadores; Ruta del Arte Románico; Ruta del Gótico; Ruta de la Fé; and Ruta Colombina.
66. Sindicato de Hostelería y Actividades Turísticas de la Diputación de las Islas Baleares, División Empresarial, "Comentarios y consideraciones acerca del Libro IV del proyecto de Ley de Régimen Local, Base 83/2," AGA 8: 11.02/2411, Exp. 25.
67. This criticism is elaborated in Manuel Román, *The Limits of Economic Growth in Spain* (New York: Praeger, 1971), 51.
68. Pere Campistol and Ernest Lluch, *Les conseqüències comarcals del turisme a la Costa Brava (de Sant Feliu de Guíxols a Palamós)* (Barcelona: Banca Catalana, 1972), 104.
69. Spain was not alone in this predicament. According to *The Economist*, May 8, 1971, some holiday centers in the Caribbean had recently begun establishing price floors to stem the flow of low-budget American vacationers.
70. The text of the speech is reproduced in *Editur*, 584 and 585 (May 21 and 28, 1971).
71. Palomino, *El milagro*, 112–113.
72. Subcomisión de Turismo, "Objetivos, problemas, líneas de política económica y acciones que afectan a la transformación y reestructuración del sector," Dec. 1970, AGA 8: 11.38/1805.
73. Juan de Arespacochaga y Felipe, "Transporte aéreo y gasto turístico," *Estudios Turísticos*, 25 (Jan.–Mar. 1970), 37–50. Compared to the overall average expenditure of \$60 per tourist, air passengers spent \$126 each (excluding transportation) in Spain, for a total of \$570 million, surpassing boat and automotive arrivals combined by \$10 million.
74. Rodríguez-Acosta to Barberá, Oct. 20, 1964, AGA 3: 49.10/40132.
75. ENTURSA Consejo de la Administración, Daily Minutes, Feb. 18, 1965, AGA 3: 49.07/31836.
76. Pellejero Martínez, *El Instituto Nacional de Industria en el sector turístico*, 138–161.
77. Asesoría Económica del Ministerio de Información y Turismo, "Objetivos del desarrollo turístico en el III Plan de Desarrollo," 1972, AGA 3: 49.23/48686.

78. Rodríguez-Acosta to Administrative Council of the INI, May 21, 1969, AGA 3: 49.08/35251.
79. Pellejero Martínez, *El Instituto Nacional de Industria en el sector turístico*, 79.
80. Pellejero Martínez, *El Instituto Nacional de Industria en el sector turístico*, 86–102.
81. “Nota sobre vuelos charters a Alemania,” Undersecretary of Tourism circular, Jan. 29, 1963, AGA 3: 49.11/42620; “Nota Informativa acerca de diversos aspectos de la campaña promovida en Alemania Occidental en contra de los intereses turísticos de España,” 1963, AGA 3: 49.06/29655; Enrique Domínguez Passier, Spanish Commercial Consul in Bonn, to Alberto Ullastres, Nov. 22, 1962, AMAE R-9623, Exp. 2; *Rutas del Aire*, 62 (Mar.–Apr. 1963), 21.
82. Chacon Stela, *Apuntes de aviación commercial*, 155.
83. Based on the estimate that seven planes (totaling 724 seats) could transport 40,000 per year, given by Joaquín Abril Martorell, Apr. 21, 1972, at a meeting hosted by the DGPT on the theme “Comercialización turística nacional,” AGA 8: 11.38/1805.
84. Paraphrased by British Ministry of Trade Press Office, May 4, 1971, PRO BT 245/1305.
85. Civilair (Bonn) to British Board of Trade, n.d., 1972, BT 245/1305. A typical critique can be found in Gibert, *El Crac turístico de la Costa Brava*, 13–14.
86. Herrera to Fraga, Feb. 10, 1965, AGA 3: 49.06/29646.
87. Bolín to Fraga, Dec. 23, 1964, AGA 3: 49.06/29646.
88. These were Ethiopia, the Philippines, Morocco, Syria, Peru, Guatemala, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Brazil, Paraguay, Colombia, Venezuela, and, notably, Mexico, with which Spain had not yet established diplomatic relations.
89. Arespacochaga to Fraga, May 21, 1968, AGA 3: 49.22/46566.
90. Venancio Bote Gómez et al., “La descentralización autonómica y la diversificación de la estrategia de desarrollo turístico (1974–1998),” in Pellejero Martínez, *Historia de la economía del turismo en España*, 156–158.
91. Bote Gómez et al., “La descentralización autonómica y la diversificación,” 149.

Conclusion: Tourism and the European Challenge

1. See Pablo Jáuregui, “‘Europeanism’ versus ‘Africanism’: ‘Europe’ as a Symbol of Modernity and Democratic Renewal in Spain,” in ed. Mikael af Malmberg and Bo Stråth, *The Meaning of Europe: Variety and Contention within and among Nations* (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 77–100; Juan Díez Medrano, *Framing Europe: Attitudes to European Integration in Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
2. Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, Vol. 1 (London: Collins, 1972), 640.

3. Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Relevance of the Concept of Semiperiphery to Southern Europe," in ed. Giovanni Arrighi, *Semiperipheral Developments: The Politics of Southern Europe in the Twentieth Century* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1985); Silvana Patriarca, "Indolence and Regeneration: Tropes and Tensions of Risorgimento Patriotism," *American Historical Review*, 110:2 (Apr. 2005), 380–408.

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Section 4 (*Obras Públicas*)

Section 6 (*Sindicatos*)

Section 8 (*Gobernación*)

Section 9 (*Presidencia*)

Section 10 (*Asuntos Exteriores*)

AHN: *Archivo Histórico Nacional*, Madrid

AMAE: *Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores*, Madrid

AMM: *Archivo Municipal de Málaga*, Málaga

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Hemeroteca de Madrid, Madrid

IET: *Instituto de Estudios Turísticos*, Madrid

PRO: Public Record Office, Kew Gardens (London)

FO: Foreign Office

T: Treasury

BT: Board of Trade

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