


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Glenda Sluga



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
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The Nation, Psychology, and International Politics, 1870–1919

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Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2006 978-0-230-00717-8

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First published 2006 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010

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ISBN 978-1-349-28309-5

ISBN 978-0-230-62503-7 (eBook)

DOI 10.1057/9780230625037

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Sluga, Glenda, 1962–

The nation, psychology, and international politics, 1870–1919 / Glenda Sluga.

p. cm. – (Palgrave Macmillan series in transnational history)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Nationalities, Principle of. 2. Nationalism–Psychological aspects.

3. Nationalism–History–20th century. I. Title. II. Series.

JC311.S5352 2006

320.101'9–dc22

2006047463

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For Anna-Sophia

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Acknowledgements

I am one of those people who always reads the acknowledgements pages first, in the hope of some autobiographical titbit that might situate the whole book, or perhaps just the chance to eavesdrop on someone else's writing life. There will be none of that here. I do want to use this space, however, in the conventional manner of thanking the myriads of people who made this book possible. To begin with, there is the financial support of the University of Sydney, and the Australian Research Council. At Sydney, Stephen Garton, Ros Pesman, Richard Waterhouse, and Shane White have been impeccable colleagues, to whom I am intellectually and personally indebted. The History Department and Australian Centre at Melbourne University offered scholarly shelter at a critical moment. Thanks especially to Kate Darian-Smith, David Goodman, Charles Zika, Pat Grimshaw, and Stuart Macintyre there.

Most of this book has been written in the context of a transnational life. (Some autobiography is inevitable). One of the highpoints was my too brief time at the Charles Warren Centre at Harvard, under the mentorship of Akira Iriye, and its fellows, including Jonathan Hansen, Jim Campbell, David Armitage, Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Donna Gabaccia. At Harvard too, I had the chance to connect again with Robert and Mary Jo Nye. I thank them for their intellectual stimulation, and making me feel at home, wherever they are. At the EUI, Peter Becker and Bo Stråth were great supporters, and Angela Schenk made everything possible. Down the road, in Bologna, I always benefited from the friendship of the indefatigable Patrizia Dogliani. In Sydney, I relied on the kindness not only of the History department, but, for their phone conversations and more, Joanne Finkelstein, and Shane White. In the final stages of preparing the manuscript Bob Nye, Julia Horne, Cathie Carmichael, Ros Pesman, Clare Corbould, Chris Hilliard, Barbara Caine, Dirk Moses, and Kate Darian-Smith came to the rescue. The peripatetic Richard and Michal Bosworth were always supportive. At Palgrave I am most grateful for the attentiveness of Michael Strang.

I aired some of the ideas in this book at innumerable conferences and seminars, most memorably for me, the Fordham seminar on Comparative Histories, the Charles Warren seminar at Harvard, and the Institute for Historical Research at London. My gratitude extends also to the patient listeners in England, Jane Caplan, Nick Stargardt, and Chris Clark, and for early feedback Peter Mandler and Gordon Martel. And where would I have been without the astute book-changing comments offered by Geoff Eley?

I have also to thank a phalanx of research assistants, including Pat Fenech, Juliet Flesch, Lisa Lines, Denise Quirk, Tanja Schneider, Peta Stephenson, and

Liza Stewart. Of immeasurable help were the librarians at the National Archives at College Park, the Library of Congress, the Princeton University libraries, the Weidener, Houghton, and Schlesinger libraries at Harvard, and the New York Public Library in the United States; in London, the Fawcett Library, SSEES, the British Political Science Library, the Public Record Office, and British Library; in France, the archivists of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and Archives Nationales, the Bibliothèque Nationale, the Bibliothèque Marguerite Durand, the Bibliothèque historique de la ville de Paris, and the BDIC; in Geneva, the League of Nations archive.

I appreciate too the feedback I gained from the journals that published articles based on some of the material and arguments in this book, albeit in significantly altered form: 'What is National Self-Determination? Nationality and psychology during the apogee of nationalism', *Nations and Nationalism* 11(1) 2005; 'Narrating Difference and Defining Nation in Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Western Europe', *European Review of History*, 9(2) 2002: 183–97; 'Bodies, Souls, and Sovereignty: The Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Legitimacy of Nations', *Ethnicities* 1(2) 2001, pp. 207–32; 'Female and National Self-Determination: A Gender Re-Reading of the "Apogee of Nationalism"', *Nations and Nationalisms*, Special Issue on Gender, 6(4) 2000, pp. 495–521; and 'Masculinity, Nations and the New World Order', in K. Hagemann and S. Dudnik (eds), *Masculinity in Politics and War: Rewriting the history of politics and war in the modern era* (Manchester University Press, 2004).

The history of this book has coincided with the history of a daughter, whose own background is, to say the least, transnational. It is all for her.

Foreword

We are very pleased to publish this pioneering study of the idea of the nation in the Palgrave Macmillan Transnational History Series.

What is a nation? How did the idea of nationhood develop, and how, in particular, was it conceptualized at the end of the First World War when the principle of national self-determination seemed to have ushered in a new epoch of world history? Are all people entitled to have their own national entities? What differentiated more mature nations from others? When there were so many divergences among national groupings, what justification was there for conceptualizing a world order on the basis of the nationality principle?

Glenda Sluga explores these questions in the context of “transnational conversations” before and after the war in which intellectuals and statesmen from many countries took part so as to clarify the meaning of what was called the nation. She pays particular attention to the development of psychology as a discipline and shows how writings in this field gave scholarly authenticity to ideas about “national consciousness” and provided the basis for judging which nationality groups deserved to determine their own fate as independent nations. The nation was seen as a “psychological reality” whose validity was to be certified by science (in this instance psychology). If national consciousness could not be said to have been fully developed among some people, they presumably did not deserve to translate their nationality into nationhood. But for those with a clear national psychology, self-determination would equate with democratic self-governance. Modern nationhood was thus given meaning as a psychological reality, a product of a transnational science.

Because the principle of national self-determination was enshrined at the Paris peace conference (1919), the subsequent history of world affairs has tended to be understood as an interplay of national policies and ambitions. It is as if nations were the key to the “international community” – this very term reveals the centrality of nations. But we shall gain a fresh understanding of international affairs if we view nations as psychological constructs, as this book suggests. Whose psychology are we talking about? Men’s or women’s? Conservatives’ or liberals’? Nationalists’ or anti-nationalists’? These are fascinating questions that suggest the fragility, even the artificiality, of national entities. This is an important perspective and enables us to view nations, not as some immutable givens but as variable groupings just like many other

communities that exist in the world. Nations, in other words, become comprehensible as transnational phenomena.

Akira Iriye
Rana Mitter

Cambridge, MA
July 2006

Introduction

The history of the peace process that ended the First World War has become one of the great political stories of our time. Historians have attributed to this illustrious gathering in the war-weary Paris of 1919 the beginnings of modern international relations, the dawn of a more democratic age grounded in the principle of nationality, and, rather more notoriously, the causes of the Second World War. Few contemporaries, however, celebrated the achievements of peacemaking without registering some doubts not only about the allegedly unfair treatment of Germany, but also the procedures, premises, and outcomes. Among the critics was Walter Lippmann, one of the architects of Wilson's Fourteen Points that shaped the peace process. In 1919, a disillusioned Lippmann fled Paris, returned to the east coast of America, and wrote *Public Opinion* (1922), a study of the complexities of democratic representation in mass societies and of the deeper cultural significance of the principle of nationality enforced by the peacemakers. Lippmann singled out for special criticism the common resort to stereotypes of national difference drawn from the 'slums of psychology', and the prevailing assumption that 'collective minds, national souls, and race psychology' were the 'democratic El Dorado'.¹ According to Lippmann, this psychological perspective on nationality manifested a 'deeper prejudice' in the constitution of a new world order, in favour of advanced nations over those thought of as backward, and of men over women. Given the prevailing political and cultural climate on both sides of the Atlantic, these were radical claims. If true, they had similarly radical implications for the ways in which the political significance of nationality could be understood. Nationality did not take its force as a political ideal from really existing psychological propensities to national identification. Rather, those propensities were fictions that reflected 'the jungle of obscurities about the innate differences of men,' and 'the extraordinary differences in what men know of the world'.²

This book attributes to the peace process of 1919 a new international age of nationalism fortified not only in the democratic ideals of the peace

and its international setting, but also in what were changing psychological conceptualisations of nationality. In this study, I pursue a new cultural and political story of the idea of the nation, and of international politics in the early twentieth century, which situates both in the context of the history of psychology.³ That story begins with the Paris Peace Conference, and moves backwards in time to the history of the rise of scientific psychology, conventionally dated to 1870. It suggests that the formidable international authority attached to nationality by liberal-minded British, American, and French peacemakers was tied to the lingering popularity of a transnational discourse of psychology that had taken shape in the previous half century.

Throughout the trans-Atlantic world, the explosion of scientific interest in evolution, biology, and race, as well as the interiority of the self,⁴ helped popularise conceptions of the nation as psychological, of nationalities as forms of subjectivity, and of nationalism as a political force that could be explained by reference to the workings of the unconscious. In 1864, the French historian Hippolyte Taine proposed his well-known formula for understanding the formation of national character, ‘race, *milieu* and moment’, on the basis that nations were the products partly of their racial origins and partly of the psychological process of imitation. Imitation, in turn, was the product of the evolution of instincts.⁵ Complex theories of the psychological status of nations, of their psychological and physiological relationship to races and their debt to evolution, were in germination on both sides of the channel. Walter Bagehot’s *Physics and Politics; or Thoughts on the application of the principles of ‘natural selection’ and ‘inheritance’ to political society* (1872) added to the role of imitation the concept of ‘unconscious selection’. According to Bagehot, unconscious selection acted as a determinist psychological force, driving individuals to choose like-minded social and sexual partners, and thereby linking national communities to their biological past as well as their present geographical or social environments.⁶ Twenty years later, among both English and French-speaking scholars of nationalism, the crowd psychology of Gustave Le Bon consolidated this view of the nation as the manifestation of unconscious, albeit irrational, forces. By the turn of the twentieth century, popular publications on the topic of the nation confidently claimed that whereas once national patriotism was considered an expression of the territorial or political state of the ‘*patrie*’, it was now understood to be ‘a psychological reality, an affective disposition, such as filial or paternal love, which everyone could find in oneself and which it would be unnatural not to experience’.⁷ Variants of this idea of the nation as psychological echoed throughout the published works of numerous practitioners not only of psychology, but also of history and the social sciences, including Woodrow Wilson, the man who presided over the ideas as well as the processes of the peace of 1919.

It is true that from at least the eighteenth century Europeans had conceptualised nations as psychological in some form, whether as a spirit or *geist*, or as specific qualities of the mind. Enlightenment writers such as Montesquieu, Hume, Rousseau, and de Staël had expressed interest in the mental characteristics of nations, and 'the internal changes in the character and culture of a nation', its 'propensities and characters'.⁸ Early nineteenth century Romantics such as Fichte and Hegel had described nations as spirits that transformed into a conscious national will, or the manifestation of self-consciousness.⁹ However, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the association of nations with spirits, souls, wills, characters, and consciousness became entangled in new and pervasive assumptions about the nature of human psychology and how it might be studied, including 'the view that a person's character was determined by the physical structure of his or her brain – not by a spiritual entity'.¹⁰ In the fifty years that preceded the peace of 1919, theorists of the nation and liberal-minded proponents of the democratic credentials of the ideal of nationhood, used the language of psychology to make tangible the idea that individuals possessed national subjectivities, and that nationality was the expression of conscious and unconscious individual desires. In doing so, they drew upon and reinforced new scientific assumptions about the nature of the nation. Given the epistemological inflections of late nineteenth century science, the most influential psychological versions of the nation were indebted to evolution theory, and to the idea that acquired characteristics could be inherited, collectively as well as individually. They also echoed assumptions about the incommensurable status of specific races, and of the sexes.

The argument that the idea of the nation changed meaning in the late nineteenth century under the influence of science, and specifically of evolution and race theories is not in itself a radical departure from the accepted history. However, for many historians, the shifting conceptual orientation of the idea of the nation is proof of its conservative and right-wing credentials.¹¹ One of my motivations for writing this book is to tackle precisely the failure of this interpretation of the intellectual history of the nation to address the enthusiastic embrace of nationality in the name of a more democratic new world order. The points at which the history of international politics intersects with the history of psychology illuminate the fascination that psychological versions of the nation, and of nationality, held for liberal-minded intellectuals and scientists, and for enthusiasts of nationality as a political principle ever since.

Viewed from the perspective of the idea of the nation, and of 1919, the late nineteenth century was a cultural and political watershed, for a range of related if often contradictory reasons, not all of them subsumed by the history of race. It was a period when the 'nation question' emerged as an elusive and ineluctable factor in national and international politics, and when new scientific disciplines and educational institutions made

the nation the object of liberal as well as conservative inquiry. It was also a time when psychology gradually assumed the mantle of a science and, concomitantly, supplied the bulk of the methodologies utilised in those inquiries. From at least the 1870s, a variety of liberal-minded psychologists, philosophers, social scientists, historians, and intellectuals more broadly, were attracted to psychology as a basis for defining the special status of nations. They made nations expressions of individual agency, and of social and historical determinism. They adopted the nation as a category of difference that proved the limits of biological determinism and emphasised instead the role of social and historical factors in the formation of individual and collective psychologies.

The idea of the nation promoted by the supporters of a new more democratic world order also reveals the overlapping and mutual influence of race and gender categorisations in liberal-minded conceptions of normative selves and states. At the turn of the twentieth century, psychologists elaborated conceptions of men and women, like different races, as having different instincts and psychological propensities. Significantly, for my purposes, women, like the more backward peoples, were represented as lacking those same psychological characteristics regarded as pertinent to the political status of individuals and nations: a self, a personality, and the capacity to exercise will and self-determination. I argue that the intersecting histories of psychology and of the idea of the nation are the crucial context in which first-wave European and American feminists were inspired to bring their self-determination agenda to the peace process of 1919, alongside the claims of aspiring national groups.

This book also attempts to question the national framework that dominates most historical accounts of the idea of the nation. It emphasises, instead, intellectual and political networks developed across national borders and in the context of international relations. Transnational links were critical to the discursive elaboration of national differences, and the political legitimization of nation-states. Certainly, one of the difficulties in writing a history of the idea of the nation is that much intellectual history is written as if ideas are checked in, along with other quarantined goods, at national borders. This tendency is even further complicated by the fact that, in the period under study, ideas and theories about nations were embedded in comparative and stereotypical representations of European nation-states and peoples. Anglophone and francophone intellectuals and social scientists made comparisons between English and French, or Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic, and Eastern and Western European states, and made those comparisons central to their theories of the psychological nature of the nation, and of the intrinsic political tendencies of certain nations, and not others.¹² In this account of the history of the nation, psychology, and international politics, I have utilised a transnational context for understanding the cultural work involved in creating and maintaining the

political legitimacy of national sovereignty and nationality. The international privileging of nationality as the revelation of individuals' and peoples' inner selves (the 'democratic El Dorado') was not, could not have occurred as, the mere translation of any one nation-state's political concerns or priorities. The mapping of the relative relevance of the principle of nationality for some races/nations/peoples, men, and women that took place in 1919, that simultaneously disavowed racial hierarchy and affirmed instead a natural hierarchy of nations, was both an international and transnational phenomenon. The hegemony of specific nations and intellectuals in that international/transnational process was in itself a marker of the mutually reinforcing relationship between conceptions of a natural national hierarchy and international politics.

Curiously, the one domain where historians have been most disinclined to examine the idea of the nation is in the transnational realm of international history. Yet it seems to me that it is impossible for an historian of the idea of the nation not to reflect on the peace of 1919 in particular as a critical moment in the constitution of modern political life. Before 1919, nationality was a word that was utilised randomly by intellectuals, and politicians, on behalf of a range of political ideas. After 1919, nationality had achieved the status of an inevitable and necessary political ideal, as representative of the ambitions of liberalism and democracy. For all the historical attention that has been paid to post-First World War peacemaking and the principle of nationality that it was meant to uphold, very little interest has been shown in parsing out the meanings of nationality as they were understood at the time by those most in a position to implement the conceptual and practical terms of the new national world order. F. S. Marston's meticulous history, Lawrence Gelfand's comprehensive account of American preparations, and more recent studies by Michael Heffernan, Neil Smith, and Jonathan Nielson have fleshed out our understanding of the individuals and processes that shaped the peace.¹³ My contribution to this history of peacemaking in 1919 is to bring to the fore the endurance of psychological interpretations of the idea of the nation in international politics, their shifting resonances, and the persistence of conventionalised race and sex classifications in those interpretations.

By 1917, men as divergent in their liberalism, political views, and peacemaking tasks as Woodrow Wilson, Walter Lippmann, Raymond Poincaré, Leon Bourgeois, Arnold Toynbee, and Lloyd George, presented themselves as the architects of a new objective and scientific (and thus unassailable) world order. In this way, it was argued, the post-war world would reflect the natural aspirations of whole peoples and grant them democracy through 'self-determination'. Inevitably, this scientific approach to nationality was unable to establish consistent concrete factors for determining national peoples and borders. It is the ideological work – the resort to the tools of racial and gender stereotyping – that was required to sustain the

authority of the principle of nationality, of the experts involved, and of their liberal idealism, that I seek to describe and explain in this study.

My use of the term ‘liberal-minded’ in this book is meant to evoke the forms of liberalism articulated by men and women with sometimes the best democratic intentions, who also believed in the potential of science for their political quests. In England they were known in the main as ‘new liberals’, in France as ‘solidarists’, and in the United States as ‘progressives’.¹⁴ Ultimately, it is because of the intellectual acuity and daring of one of those liberal-minded men, Lippmann, that it has been possible for me to reflect here on the significance of the ‘deeper prejudice’ of race and sexual chauvinism in the history of psychology, in the international politics of peacemaking, and in the liberal idealisation of nationality.

This book begins then with the story of the peace of 1919. The chapters that follow travel backwards in time from that point, observing the political and cultural scenery as it recedes, in order to map out an intellectual genealogy for the history of peacemaking, as well as the idea of the nation. My first stop on this journey is the later stages of the First World War, and the visions of the new national world order delineated by American, French, and British experts in the formal preparations for a scientific peace. Most of these experts were historians and geographers, officially employed in the service of the state, whether in the United States’ Inquiry, the French *Comité d’études*, or the British Political Intelligence Department. I have concentrated on detailing the implicit as well as explicit assumptions about human nature and difference, science, and politics that were given voice by each of these bodies in the name of the principle of nationality. Chapter two takes us back to the earlier years of the war, focussing on those British, French, and American intellectuals, a majority of them historians again, who were drawn to psychological theories, and who were to influence the shaping of the peace. Some of them were connected through their participation in *The New Europe*, (a London-based wartime weekly that Lippmann reviewed enthusiastically), and organisations such as the English Union of Democratic Control, the French League for the Rights of Man, and the international Organisation for Permanent Peace. Chapters three and four take us back, farther in time, to the period before the First World War, to the history of the development of scientific psychology, and its application to the idea of the nation. These chapters provide the broader cultural context for understanding the conception of the nation as psychological that had become popular by the early twentieth century, especially among a transnationally-linked liberal-minded intelligentsia. In chapter four, I examine the gender dimensions of the pre-First World War history of psychology and the idea of the nation, and chapter five returns us full circle to the history of 1919, where I establish the relevance of gender analysis for the intersecting histories of the nation

and international politics. The epilogue moves forward in time again in order to survey the legacy of psychological theories of the nation and of the early twentieth century national view of the world.

Despite the threat of a teleological history that working chronologically backwards poses, I have tried to avoid the temptation of thinking of this historical account as progressive, continuous, or even consistent. Ideas, like nations, never evolve neatly, there is always forgetting, selective remembering, rejection and resumption. There are always individuals such as Lippmann laying out alternative intellectual landscapes and forgotten futures.

I came to Lippmann's post-First World War critique of the role of psychology in the politics of peacemaking only after I had already begun thinking about the problem why and how the idea of national self-determination, an idea dependent on the Enlightenment conception of individual autonomy, became so important in 1919, a time when new theories of human psychology destabilised assumptions about individual agency and will. Consequently, at the core of this study is the disjuncture between a modernist destabilising psychological self in crisis, and the aggressive positivism of a redoubtable liberalism drawn to the promise of the nation. I also have a larger less psychologically oriented quest in mind: a renovated understanding of how and why nations have remained pivotal to the purpose of political emancipation throughout the twentieth century and beyond. I do not offer tidy historical revelations of cause and effect in the history of the idea of the nation and its consequences for nationalism, nor, I think, do I achieve any psychological insights. My intention is merely to shed more light on the shades of the international history of the idea of the nation, and on how and why we think of the nation as a psychological phenomenon at all.

1

Science and the New National World Order, 1919

The process of international peacemaking began in earnest in Paris in 1919 under the auspices of the dominant victor states – Britain, the United States and France – and of the ideals of nationality and international government. These ideals were distilled from the American president Woodrow Wilson's 'Fourteen Points' speech, presented to the United States Congress almost exactly one year earlier, and committing his country to a crucial role in the war, and to a peace based on the principle of nationality.¹ Wilson described the war as having 'its roots in the disregard of the rights of small nations and of nationalities.' Consequently, so the argument ran, permanent peace would rely on an acknowledgement of 'the wishes, the natural connections, the racial aspirations, the security and the peace of mind of the peoples involved.'² Out of the war would emerge 'a new international order based upon broad and universal principles of right and justice', including 'self-determination,' 'an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.'³

For the first time in history the authority of a peace process was to lie not in the military force of its brokers but in its democratic claims. For the first time too, or at least so it was argued, the emphasis on nationality would allow the resort to empirically-based scientific methods, rather than national interests, in resolving the territorial disputes that often led to international conflict. From the perspective of American preparations the peace conference 'was to take on the appearance of a huge laboratory whose director would be the American president.'⁴ This theme of an overlapping national and scientific peace was reiterated at the first General Session of the Peace Conference in January 1919 by the French President, Raymond Poincaré, who proclaimed its importance for keeping at bay 'the ever-possible revivals of primitive savagery' evidenced in the war.⁵ He added:

The time is no more when diplomatists could meet to redraw with authority the map of the empires on the corner of a table. If you are to

remake the map of the world it is in the name of the peoples, and on condition that you shall faithfully interpret their thoughts, and respect the right of nations, small and great, to dispose of themselves, and to reconcile it with the right, equally sacred, of ethnical and religious minorities – a formidable task which science and history, your two advisers, will contribute to illumine and facilitate.⁶

In the almost hundred years since the Paris Peace Conference, historians have tended to embrace a view of the principle of nationality as giving political expression to really existing nations, and of scientific knowledge about national differences as divining popular political wishes. They have directed their analyses to the limited, inconsistent, or cynical application of national self-determination, when they have not focussed on the consequences of reparations.⁷ Yet, at least one contemporary was more critical of the assumption that scientific knowledge was the key to determining popular will and national difference. Walter Lippmann's 1922 publication *Public Opinion* condemned specifically the application of psychology to the determination of nationality.⁸

Lippmann's singling out and critique of the role of psychology in peace-making in 1919 was not the act of a convinced sceptic. Prior to the war, he had expressed enthusiasm for psychology as a tool that would reveal to men their desires and improve national governance.⁹ *Public Opinion* itself was devoted to the premise that the notion of democracy had to accommodate the psychological complexities of modern mass societies. But Lippmann's postwar perception of the appropriate analytical uses of psychology was driven by what he understood to be the ambiguities, inconsistencies, and bias of the Wilsonian program, especially its implicit hypothesis that 'adult electors taken together make decisions out of a will that is in them'.¹⁰ Liberal-democrats, Lippmann complained, had made 'collective minds, national souls, and race psychology' the 'democratic El Dorado':¹¹

The democratic El Dorado has always been some perfect environment, and some perfect system of voting and representation, where the innate good will and instinctive statesmanship of every man could be translated into action. [...] The democrat is hypnotized by the belief that the great thing is to express the will of the people, first because expression is the highest interest of man, and second because the will is instinctively good.¹²

Lippmann attacked not only this general idealisation of popular will and its conflation with nationality, but also the distorted outlook of the peace-makers, 'the great men who assembled at Paris to settle the affairs of mankind': 'Could anyone have penetrated the mind of M. Clemenceau,

what would he have found there? Did he see the Germans of 1919, or the German type as he had learned to see it since 1871?' Lippmann's own answer to these questions was that, particularly in the case of Germany, the peacemakers 'took to heart those reports, and it seems, those only which fitted the type that was in his mind.'¹³ For Lippmann, the peacemakers' attitudes towards national difference and its political significance were the result of 'a great sediment of stereotyped ideas accumulated and hardened in a long and pugnacious existence'. During the war, the force of these ideas had been revived in evocations of an eternal struggle between "'Teutons" on the one hand, and "Anglo-Saxons" and French on the other'.¹⁴ These stereotypes had settled in a range of practices and institutions, especially in the 'slums of psychology'. '[P]hrenologists, palmists, fortune-tellers, mind-readers, and a few political professors' were using the body to read the inner self: 'There you will still find it asserted that "the Chinese are fond of colors, and have their eyebrows much vaulted" while "the heads of Calmucks are depressed from above, but very large laterally, about the organ which gives the inclination to acquire; and this nation's propensity to steal, etc., is admitted"' ¹⁵

From Lippmann's perspective, racialised conceptions of collective psychology shaped the system devised at the peace conference to transform former German colonies into mandates under the supervision of victor states and the new League of Nations, as was apparent in the accompanying premise that 'the character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people'. A 'people's' 'stage of development', he argued, was interpreted in respect of the relative status of nationality, and that status, in turn, confirmed in the slums of psychology.¹⁶ Finally, Lippmann pointed to the exhibition of 'a deeper prejudice' in the principle of nationality, that is a preference for masculinity: 'Unless the female line happens to be especially remarkable descent is traced down through the males. The tree is male. At various moments females accrue to it as itinerant bees light upon an ancient apple tree.'¹⁷

Lippmann's criticisms highlight the intersecting histories of psychology and international politics at the end of the First World War. They also offer a provocative analysis of the potency of the idea of the nation and the principle of nationality at a moment in modern history often described by historians as the 'apogee of nationalism'. While many aspects of Lippmann's critique remain as exceptional now as when they were first offered, his claims are all the more enticing because of his vantage point as an architect of Wilson's Fourteen Points. In the final years of the war, Lippmann had hardly hesitated to celebrate a new democratic age in which scientific facts about nations would be drawn upon to transcend the destructive political influence of national self-interest. He had helped organise for the White House the formation of the Inquiry, a national body of experts who were to establish scientific truths about disputed questions

of nationality in anticipation of post-war peace-making. However, the Inquiry, like the other national expert bodies created at this time – the French *Comité d'études* (Committee of Studies) and the British Political Intelligence Department – was a key contributor to those very aspects of the peace that Lippmann would later deplore, not only the idealisation of collective will and collective psychology, but also their race and gender biases. Indeed, taken together, the scientific preparations for the peace – fully underway by 1917 – and the peace process, constituted a critical moment in the modern history of international politics. But before we can revisit the history of Lippmann's own role in the preparations for peace, and the points at which psychology and international politics intersected, we need to set the scene for the Paris of peacemaking in 1919.

Peacemaking

The Paris of the 1919 peace-making process was a city transformed by the idea of nationality and its racial resonances. Even locals jaded by the cosmopolitanism of modern urban life, recognised the extent of that transformation. As Paul Gordon Lauren has observed, the peace conference 'struck many contemporaries as a dramatic visual representation of the new age.'¹⁸ In the eyes of the young and ambitious Louise Weiss, the intellectual force behind *L'Europe nouvelle*, Paris had become the centre of world diplomacy alight with the colours of its negotiators: 'the amber of Arabia, the yellow of China, the black of India, the white of Scandinavia or America'; 'les Nègres' may not have been recognised as serious participants, but they too, according to Weiss writing from the perspective of the post-Second World War, were there.¹⁹ One of these, W. E. B. Du Bois, counted thirty-two nations and races: 'Not simply England, Italy, and the Great powers are there, but all the little nations... . Not only groups, but races have come – Jews, Indians, Arabs, and All-Asia.'²⁰ For the Irish-born *Daily Telegraph* journalist-cum-philologist Emile Joseph Dillon, this transformation meant that 'the Paris of the Conference ceased to be the capital of France'.²¹ Instead, Dillon exclaimed with poetic flourish, Paris had become

a vast cosmopolitan caravanserai teeming with unwonted aspects of life and turmoil, filled with curious samples of the races, tribes, and tongues of four continents who came to watch and wait for the mysterious tomorrow....it was also a trysting-place for the ghosts of sovereignties and states, militarisms and racial ambitions, which were permitted to wander at large until their brief twilight should be swallowed up by the night.

In keeping with his own philological interests, Dillon gave racial, tribal, and cultural names to some of those ghosts wandering the streets of Paris,

posed in its restaurants, and gathering in the residences of diplomats and ex-potentates. Some names seem as arcane now as they were evocative then: ‘Kirghizes, Lesghiens, Circassians, Mingrelians, Buryats, Malays ... Negroes and Negroids from Africa and America’.²²

These accounts of the peace are a good reminder not only of the diversity of the world’s cultures present at the peace, but of the fetishisation of perceptible difference. Even though representatives of the victor states mostly held themselves aloof from the *melée*, bestowing a sceptical eye on their supplicants, the setting of the peace encouraged the performance of their own national identities. The majority of the four hundred-strong British personnel ate and slept in the Hotel Majestic on Avenue Kléber and worked in the Hôtel Astoria, thereby setting a fashion. Each officially recognised nation felt it had ‘to fly its flag from a similar institution’.²³ While it was common for national delegations to congregate, the British delegation took cultural ghettoisation to a level remarked upon even by its members. They brought with them their own British cooks, food, and waiting staff, according to one member of the delegation, transforming their locale in Paris into ‘a little British colony ... to the utter exclusion of any “foreigner”’.²⁴ Ensnared in their respective national corners, the victors observed even each other as men and women of specific costume and colour. Infected perhaps by the general mood, the ever-perceptive Edith Benham, Wilson’s social secretary, remarked that Lloyd George had ‘one of the loveliest pink and white skins I have ever seen’.²⁵

The confidence of these visiting victors in their own national identities, in the palpable existence in Paris of ‘foreigners’ (unlike themselves), provided relatively firm foundations for the idea that nationality might be an effective principle of political organisation.²⁶ In a Memorandum written in March 1919, Lloyd George happily iterated the view that nationality was a guiding principle of the peace because of its status as a ‘human criterion’:

There will never ... be peace in South-Eastern Europe if every little state now coming into being is to have a large Magyar *irredenta* within its borders. I would therefore take as a guiding principle of the peace that as far as is humanly possible the different races should be allocated to their motherlands, and that this human criterion should have preference over considerations of strategy or economics or communications, which can usually be adjusted by other means.²⁷

Despite Lloyd George’s confident reference to the principle of nationality as the allocation of different races to their motherland, the variety of intellectual influences that converged on the making of a scientific peace meant the experts could not be so sure.

At the peace conference, the application of nationality was made the work of narrowly focused territorial committees organised around Alsace-

Lorraine, the Sarre, Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, and (in a series of political couplings) Romania/Yugo-Slavia, Greece/Albania, Belgium/Denmark, and, finally, Colonial Affairs.²⁸ These committees were chaired by the French diplomats, André Tardieu and Jules Cambon, both of whom had extensive experience in the French Foreign Affairs department, and in the United States. Predictably, these committees could never agree on what defined a nationality.²⁹ According to the historian of the organisation of the peace process, F. S. Marston, there was only 'an unwritten understanding that the experts were to endeavour to draw the frontiers in accordance with the principle of nationality and that the application of this principle did not constitute an incursion into the sphere of political issues; but the extent to which, if at all, other factors than the supposed wishes of the inhabitants were to be considered was not defined.'³⁰

Despite extensive preparations for the peace, the 1919 territorial experts seemed at a loss as to their role. One PID historian commented retrospectively that many of these experts 'were so only in name.'³¹ Some cynical participants took a dim view of the lack of guidance and of coordination of expertise and service, and the preference for making things up as the peace went along. They were less than inspired too by the sight of politicians bent over maps in scenes reminiscent of a diplomatic age that had supposedly been left behind.³² As other historians have pointed out, the ultimate organisation of the territorial committees was not even scientific in appearance. Marston argues that the work of the *ad hoc* expert committees was similar to the Statistical Committee of the 1814 Congress of Vienna. That earlier committee was established 'to provide reliable statistics of population in all the areas whose transfer was under consideration'.³³ Yet, one hundred years later the scientific bases for garnering such statistics and their mode of classification had radically altered. If anything they had become less stable. Despite the almost visceral sense of physical difference that marked contemporary commentaries on the peace, and the confidence in racial and national identification pronounced by its organisers, determining nationality in practice and in any absolutely empirical manner proved almost impossible.

Members of territorial committees disagreed about the criteria that could objectively decide nationality. For example, they conceded that language could not act as a reliable guide of national borders since there was no inevitable or natural correspondence between language and territory in the claims of aspiring nationality groups. Polish-speakers wanted Polish-speaking parts of Germany but would not relinquish non-Polish speaking parts of East Galicia, and Greek-speakers were claiming Albanian-speaking areas of northern Epirus. In the case of the Klagenfurt Basin, a terrain contested between the new Austrian and the South Slav states ('Jugo-Slavia'), a sub-commission that had spent ten days investigating and interrogating locals could not agree on the preponderant sentiment. Three of four

commissioners argued the population was pro-Austrian, the fourth that it was pro-'Jugo-Slav'.³⁴ Opinion was also divided on the 'Teschen question' – involving a coal-rich area on the border of the new Czecho-Slovakia and Poland – because of conflicting representations of local sentiment. Some reports spoke of the bitterness and hatred among the Czech and Polish speaking peoples of the region, others of the 'real community of tradition and custom' among the diverse population, and others still of the lack of a 'very clearly defined nationality'.³⁵ Eventually the 'question' was resolved by the Czecho-Slovak military, which utilised the well-worn strategy of changing facts on the ground and managed to keep large swathes of the territory they occupied. A similar strategy saw Italy retain rule over the so-called Free State of Fiume, one of the two cases in which the peace-makers forsook the principle of nationality for the idea of civic citizenship. The other, equally unsuccessful in the predominate climate of nation-building, was Danzig.

At times, evocations of the principle of nationality affirmed an ideal of elective nationality as the basis of individual rights, what Lippmann later described as the 'democratic El Dorado' view of nationality grounded in the subjective psychological version of nationality, as the expression of a person's inner self. Yet in the relatively few plebiscites actually undertaken (to decide some of Austria and Poland's new borders, as well as in South America) the question of who could vote, including which women if any, and over what terrain, remained points of theoretical dispute. The British Foreign Office Handbook offered the advice that the plebiscite process enacted self-determination and reflected a given rather than chosen nationality: 'Uncertainty as to what constitutes a nation makes it very necessary that there should be some recognised means of ascertaining whether populations that seem to be parts of one nation are really so to the extent of desiring to unite with one another as a political body... Man cannot in fact exist apart from his fellow men, and the nation is just the society by which the individual is *involuntarily* determined – it is a larger self'.³⁶ This determinist view of the psychological bases of collective identity might explain why those individuals who voted for a different nationality had to leave the forsaken nation's designated territory, and why the plebiscite process seemed to imbue the territory itself with the nationality in question.³⁷ Foreign Office advice also rendered plebiscites a 'clumsy way of discerning the will of the people' since they gave the masses a say, and the masses were allegedly easily swayed 'by passing considerations'.³⁸

The self-styled representatives of nationality groups applied rationales as randomly as the experts, even when they shared a discourse of nationality. Three criteria stand out in the otherwise catholic litanies of nationality rehearsed by supplicants: the significance of national 'consciousness', the politically evolved characteristics of national cultures, and the cultural and political homogeneity or coherence of politically viable national

groups. Official Italian delegates (Italy had the status of a representative of the Big Four/Ten as well as a supplicant nation) demanding the recognition of Italy's right to the ex-Habsburg Adriatic towns of Trieste and Fiume, plied the territorial committees with expressions of a national popular will. To this they added historical, linguistic, and racial evidence of their 'national consciousness', which they contrasted with the cultural status of the backward 'Slavs' of those regions. The Slovenes and Croats who claimed these same territories on behalf of the new Kingdom of South Slavs (later named Yugoslavia) in turn protested their psychological and cultural maturity.³⁹ The 'people of Murakoz', inhabiting territory that was to be assigned to Yugoslavia rather than the new Hungary, protested their Slavic fate by arguing that they differed from the Croats of the region 'in their songs, dances, in their manner of dressing, in their way of thinking and feeling'.⁴⁰ Pro-Hungarian inhabitants of other towns further south distinguished themselves from Serbs (also those of the new Yugoslavia) writing that the religious and national differences between the 'Roman-Catholic Bunyevac and Sokac nations and the Greek-Orthodox Servian nation' were evident in 'the language, feelings, thinking, spiritual life, productive power, dressing and customs of these nations'.⁴¹ Ultimately, they argued, '[t]he Bunyevac and Sokac is more faithful to the state, and more intelligent than the Servian; by his diligence and thrift he competes with the Germans'. In the face of ethnographic confusion, the Szépesseg pro-Hungarian lobby (like the self-proclaimed representatives of the Bunyevac and Sokac 'people', and the pro-Italians in the Slav-claimed lands) turned to the idea of racial hierarchy as a preferred solution to the question of their fate, situating themselves on a higher rung. As a finale they confirmed that status by reference to better-known hierarchies of the Allied world.⁴² As one member of the British delegation remarked,

[t]he general plea is that the Germans and the Magyars, who live in brotherly affection, represent a far higher stage of culture and literacy, which must inevitably be destroyed by less gifted and educated 'Balkan' races. The Roumanians, in this connection, are admitted to be on a higher plane than the Yugo-Slavs The Germans admit no kinship except that of language with the Austrian Germans, who always despised and scorned them as inferior caste, whereas the same story is told of the most perfect harmony and amity with their tolerant and easy-going Magyar brethren.⁴³

A memorial to the Allied and Associate powers from the Ruthenian Party of Hungary, which preferred a Hungarian political fate to incorporation into the new Czechoslovakia, referred to accounts of the Czech repression of Ruthenians, and the 'spiritual relations' that had for a thousand years tied Ruthenians to Hungary: 'We were brought close to each other in spite of

the differences of race, language and character' and by 'the consciousness of the necessary interdependence of the Hungarian and Ruthenian peoples, which in our considerations takes foremost rank.'⁴⁴ The Ruthenian version of gradual accommodation did not sit as well with its expert audience. The British expert H. W. Temperley's comment on the 'memorial' was that the Ruthenians were 'an even less attractive people' than the Slovaks.⁴⁵

Obviously, evidence put before the committees by representatives, or collected 'in the field' did little to dispel the air of uncertainty and unreality that accompanied the imperative of nationality. There were no guarantees that expert committees and victor delegates would accept the representatives of a 'people' as witnesses for a proclaimed nationality. Instead, the peace process established the standing of the expert. In April, the English historian Arnold Toynbee wrote in his capacity as 'technical expert' for the British delegation that a representative from the Lazistan district (an area on the Black Sea and part of Russia taken from Turkey, and in 1919 claimed by Turkey as well as Georgia and Armenia) was 'mistaken in thinking that he is a Turk'. Toynbee confidently exposed him as, instead, 'really a Moslem Georgian!'⁴⁶

Mandates and the evolution of nations

It is Lippmann who must be credited with linking the incorporation of mandates into the League of Nations' Covenant to the history of psychology. For Lippmann, the conception of the mandate system was the most damning illustration of how psychological and racial typing had been woven into a progressive and internationalist vision of a new national world order. Mandates affirmed that the principle of nationality had been plotted onto a world map according to the assumption that different political rules applied in different places, and that political status was determined by the relative evolution of local peoples and/or races. In January 1919, during discussions of the procedure of the Peace, the Council of Ten agreed that mandates would be applicable to countries where, as the British Prime Minister Lloyd George bluntly explained using the unusual example of 'Arabia', 'the population was civilised but not yet organised – where a century might elapse before the people could be properly organised':

In such cases it would be impossible to give full self-government and at the same time prevent the various tribes or units from fighting each other. It was obvious that the system to be applied in these territories must be different from that which would have to be applied in cannibal colonies, where people were eating each other.⁴⁷

The recorded accounts of discussions of mandates were not usually as vulgar as Lloyd George's comparison of Arabs and cannibals, but they made

a similar point. Mandates divided the world into nations and races with relative self-determining capacities, and into regions where distinctive political models reflected the people's stage of political evolution.⁴⁸ David Hunter Miller, the American Delegation's legal expert, put it that '[s]o far as the idea [of Mandates] involved the principle that the control of uncivilised peoples ought to mean a trusteeship or wardship under which the interests of the natives themselves should be paramount, it had long been advocated by various writers.'⁴⁹

Among those writers was the Inquiry historian Professor George Beer, a supporter of the view of imperialism associated with the journal *The Round Table*, and of the League as an English-speaking union, chief of the Colonial Division of the American Inquiry and the Peace Commission, an appointee to the Secretariat of the League of Nations, and then, just before his death, Director of the Mandates Section.⁵⁰ The author of numerous books on Anglo-American history, Beer was an historian of the old school.⁵¹ He believed that the recent history of the United States proved that 'the negro race' imitated civilisation rather than acquired it; that race had hitherto 'shown no capacity for progressive development except under the tutelage of other peoples', and 'according to many scientists, it is an established physiological fact that the cranial sutures of the negro close at an early age, which condition, it has been contended, prevents organic intellectual progress thereafter.'⁵² Beer took such scientific 'facts' as forceful arguments for tutelage over 'the negro race', rather than for their self-determination.⁵³ These assumptions are apparent in an American document dated February 1918, and attributed to Beer. It divided Africa into units of relative preparedness for national self-determination based upon a combination of cultural criteria and the 'relative suitability' of a region for European habitation.⁵⁴ These evolutionary tiers corresponded to the outlook of British advisors and representatives, and were summed up by the British-educated Afrikaner, Jans Christian Smuts. As an ardent supporter of the League of Nations, and thus 'hero' of peace progressives, Smuts argued that the German colonies in the Pacific and Africa were inhabited by 'barbarians, who not only cannot possibly govern themselves, but to whom it would be impracticable to apply any idea of political self-determination in the European sense. They might be consulted as to whether they want their German masters back, but the result would be so much a foregone conclusion that the consultation would be quite superfluous.'⁵⁵ Smuts' view of Palestine, and 'the Armenian Vilâyet, where Armenian, Turkish, and Kurdish populations co-exist in historic enmity' was similar. These were, he argued, heterogeneous and administratively dysfunctional and, as in the cases of the 'barbaric' colonies, they required mandate supervision under the ultimate authority and control of the League. Other regions of the Middle East, such as Upper and Lower Mesopotamia [Iraq], Lebanon, and Syria, which allegedly shared characteristics of homogeneity and development, were still probably 'deficient in the qualities of statehood and ...

whereas they are perhaps capable of internal autonomy, they will in one degree or another require the guiding hand of some external authority to steady their administration'.⁵⁶

Lord Alfred Milner, the president of an inter-Allied Committee appointed to prepare draft mandates, promulgated similar views on the basis of his own experience as a key figure in *The Round Table* group, as the former British High Commissioner to South Africa, and as the new British colonial secretary. Milner declared Class B and C mandates straightforward, '[w]e [the British] know all about them. We know exactly what they are'.⁵⁷ The question that required the greatest wisdom in statecraft, he argued, was to determine at what stage, and how far, a people of capacity but immaturity should have their rights of self-government admitted. Clarifying his views to an admiring Shotwell, Milner claimed that the dividing line seemed to be reached when the governed people began to express themselves in abstract terms, that is, 'in the demand for constitutions and institutional bodies, instead of in terms of personalities'.⁵⁸ Even though there was no exact way to define thinking in abstract terms, 'it was about when a people began to demand written or formal safeguards for their rights'. The turning point could sometimes arrive 'before the native people were really ready for the reform for which they were asking'.⁵⁹

The mandate system reflected in principle, if not in detail, both Beer and Milner's proposals – indeed the actual form of the mandate system was left unspecified, even after it was put into practice. Ex-German territories were parcelled out as mandates among the old and newly victorious Western European states and the fledgling British dominions eager to ape the mother country in establishing their imperial capacity. Each territory was accorded the status of either A, B, or C, reflecting its degree of 'backwardness'.⁶⁰ Despite the stipulation that there be consultation with Class A, there was none, since, as the historian William Keylor argues, 'their opinion in the matter was both predictable and unacceptable'.⁶¹ Smuts' suggestion that the League act as the power responsible for the mandates was ignored, and each territory was awarded to a state which was only then responsible to the League. Britain took responsibility for Mesopotamia and Palestine as Class A mandates, and Tanganyika as part of the Cameroons and Togoland as Class B. France became the mandatory power in Syria and Lebanon (Class A), and in the Cameroons (shared with Britain) and Togoland (Class B). The remainder of Germany's former colonies were doled out as Class B and C mandates among the victor states who clamoured for their fair share: Japan was to supervise the Japanese Mandate of the Pacific Islands, Belgium obtained the Class B mandate of Ruanda-Urundi, South Africa gained South West Africa (which it ultimately incorporated into its own state), Australia became the administrator for New Guinea and Nauru, and New Zealand was awarded former German Samoa.

In May 1919, Wilson supported the idea of creating Armenia and Constantinople as American mandates, so that the United States 'would be in a strategic position to control that portion of the world'.⁶² In the end, the United States did not assume responsibility for any mandates, (just as it did not join the League) and the Foreign Office noted, 'the Americans balked at permitting the use of the imperialist-sounding term [mandate] in the records'.⁶³ But what the United States government, like Britain, seems to have finally rejected was the idea that its overseas 'responsibilities' would be overseen or regulated by the League. The British government, for its part, was particularly concerned to use the system in order to regain control of the oil of Mesopotamia, now Iraq. In this objective it was more than successful. America demanded and received the right to proxy control over Liberia (already an independent state which had fought on the side of the Entente powers and had representation at the peace conference and at the Pan-African Congress), and the Philippines, which it had controlled for two decades, without having its role translated into a mandate with its concurrent, if limited, responsibilities and potential oversight by an international authority.

To be sure, some representatives of the Council of Ten, including France, supported a Japanese proposal to have a racial equality clause incorporated into the League's Covenant. There were also differences regarding the division of mandates, and the details of mandatory power and responsibility. But the racial equality clause was defeated by Wilson and an alliance of Commonwealth representatives, and there was no opposition among the delegations and their advisors towards the principle of mandates *per se*. On the eve of a new world order, in the sphere of international relations and the domain of politics, progressives and conservatives, imperialists and democrats, even the representatives supporting a racial equality clause, found themselves united around less than scientific assumptions about the uneven political evolution of nations, whether out of ideological conviction or political expediency. The Italian Prime Minister Orlando stated that 'Italy would readily accept whatever principles might be adopted, provided they were equitably applied and also provided that she could participate in the work of civilisation'.⁶⁴ The French representative to the League discussions agreed that the classification of mandates was important in order that 'backward countries like certain African colonies and countries which have a very ancient and very complete civilisation, but which have been oppressed by foreign domination' were not placed in the same category. The nuances of this argument may have reflected the political status of French colonials, particularly North Africans, who were represented in the French parliament.⁶⁵ But they made little difference to the realities of the mandate system and its institutionalisation of national hierarchies, or to the fundamental notion of backward races and nations.

Whether because of habit, lack of alternatives, or a determined chauvinism, in Paris, in 1919, portraits of the psychological incommensurateness of nations reigned. But how did consensus about the evolution of different peoples and about collective differences come about, where did it come from? Having outlined some of the key characteristics of the peace process and its fascination with nationality, we are now in a position to begin the journey back in time and tackle these questions. Our first stop is the wartime preparations for the peace itself.

Preparing for peace

Among the most intriguing aspects of the early twentieth century history of the idea of nationality is its political appeal to liberal-minded intellectuals, such as Lippmann himself, and the influence that those intellectuals managed to exercise over the design of the new national world order. That influence can be traced back most directly to 1916. Two years into 'the Great War', William Buckler, the special assistant to the American embassy in London, was making constructive use of his position and time befriending a cross-section of the representatives of the two most active local groupings of progressive intellectuals, one of them congregating around a new political weekly known as *The New Europe*, and the other inhabiting the more radical domains of the pacifist internationalist E. D. Morel's Union of Democratic Control, or UDC. Over the course of convivial dinners Buckler encouraged their plans for a scientific peace 'based on the disinterested findings of specialists whose work would reflect those principles acceptable to the nations participating in the peace'.⁶⁶ He communicated the content of these discussions with some confidence to the American Ambassador, who passed the information on to the Department of State and to Colonel House, Wilson's personal advisor. It was House who took responsibility for the creation of 'The Inquiry', the research body that was to bring to fruition the dream of a scientific peace.⁶⁷ Meanwhile a similar idea was gestating in the correspondence between Walter Lippmann in Washington where he was associate editor of the political weekly *New Republic* (which he had founded with Herbert Croly), and the UDC member Norman Angell in New York.⁶⁸ Within a year these two strands had come together. House took charge of organising the Inquiry and made Lippmann one of its key administrators. Its director, though, was Sidney Mezes, a philosopher of religion and more significantly, it has been claimed, House's brother-in-law. In September 1917, Lippmann wrote to House about the idea for a bureau tasked to provide facts for use in post-war peacemaking, making knowledge 'available and easily transferable'. 'It has also to be shaped and organised', Lippmann explained, 'so that the irrelevances of mere research and pedantry are cut away. ... there has to be a rigorous examination of abstract ideas like "freedom of the seas", "the principle of nationality" etc.

etc.⁶⁹ Lippmann persisted in his quest to introduce 'an element of exact science' into peace preparations by creating a secretariat for statistical and investigation purposes, gathering the latest information on political, economic, and social questions.⁷⁰ He assumed for himself control of the 'Politics and Government' division of the Inquiry, the scope of which included 'The Powers' and the 'debatable areas of unfortunate peoples'. These peoples populated territories divided for research purposes into Alsace-Lorraine, Schleswig, Trentino, the Baltic Littoral, Jews, Pacific Islands, Eastern Europe, and in the one category, China, Turkey and the Middle East.

The Inquiry was housed at the American Geographical Society headquarters in New York. It eventually accumulated more than 100 executives, research collaborators and assistants, all engaged in the pursuit of scientific facts about the territories and peoples whose fate, it was anticipated, would dominate peace discussions.⁷¹ Given its size, it was hardly an homogeneous group. Instead, the ideological tensions that shaped its practices mirrored those of intellectual trends at large. The young Lippmann came to the Inquiry from a position as assistant to the American Secretary of War on the recommendation of Wilson, even though House looked on him as a representative of 'the Liberals' (Lippmann was formerly a socialist), and as 'the least vocal of that crowd'.⁷² There were some women on the staff, including the geographer Ellen Semple from Clark University, and feminist lawyer Dorothy Kenyon.⁷³ Sometimes their responsibilities were scholarly, more frequently they were administrative. They did not figure as prominent voices, merely as expedient attachments where there was a dearth of knowledge. The overwhelming majority of 'Inquirers' were men, and they brought with them expertise in history and geography. Among these were Isaiah Bowman, Professor of Geography at Yale, Director of the American Geographical Society and eventually director of the Inquiry; James Shotwell from Columbia University and Chairman of the National Board for Historical Services, the Inquiry's librarian and history specialist;⁷⁴ Charles Seymour, from Yale, an alumnus of the universities of Cambridge, Freiberg, the Sorbonne, and the *École des hautes études*, historian of English political history and 'solid Democrat', and the coordinator of the Inquiry's research on Austria-Hungary;⁷⁵ Robert Kerner, a former Harvard student from the mid-West who had conducted research in Austria-Hungary and was teaching at Missouri; and Douglas Johnson, a boundary specialist with a more anomalous background as Professor of Physiology at Columbia. These men represented a breadth of transnational professional experience in history, but few of the Inquirers were experts in modern or contemporary history, let alone the history of the non-Western world.⁷⁶ Some historians were devotees of the 'new history', especially Shotwell and Seymour.

The significance of the new history was that it encouraged both the incorporation of social sciences such as psychology and geography into historical methodology, and accentuated the history of nation formation. In the case of the United States, the new history promoted a view of American national identity and its past as exceptional, an approach enshrined in Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis.⁷⁷ A similar methodological perspective influenced some of the geographers in the Inquiry, such as the Canadian-born US citizen Bowman, in the form of the new 'human geography'. Similarly interdisciplinary in its scope, human geography incorporated the social sciences, particularly ethnography, in its mapping of cultures and Turner-like frontiers onto physical (usually national) spaces.⁷⁸

Not all Inquirers were attracted to their disciplinary *avant-garde*, but for those who were, the theoretical and methodological preferences of the new history and human geography inevitably complicated the translation of the principle of nationality into actual borders. For human geographers, this process was no simple question of locating a physical border such as a river, or a mountain range. It entailed ethnological and sociological interpretations of how humans individually and collectively utilised those natural resources. For new historians, there could be no questioning of the national purpose of history, but neither could they coolly limit their discussions to the *Realpolitik* concerns of a political elite. Instead they felt obliged to account for the variety of factors that made a people. As designated experts they faced the problem of determining just which factors.

Neither the Inquiry's breadth and coordination, nor its sense of scientific purpose, were quite matched by its French and British counterparts. The body of experts organised by the French was the smallest in terms of organisational ambition.⁷⁹ In early 1915, President Poincaré had suggested to Charles Benoist, the Paris Deputy and professor at the *École des sciences politiques*, the idea of gathering together historians and geographers to study national questions in anticipation of a post-war treaty.⁸⁰ In 1917, Aristide Briand (the outgoing Prime Minister) took a further step and asked Benoist to create a formal group of advisors. Out of this initiative grew the *Comité d'études* (Committee of Studies) headed by the eminent republican historian Ernest Lavisse and bringing together academics from the *Collège de France*, Sorbonne and *École normale supérieure*. Amongst these were the historians Émile Bourgeois, Ernest Denis (the founder of the Institut d'Études Slaves and the journal *Le monde slave*), Alphonse Aulard (an expert on the French revolution), and Charles Seignobos (an historian of the French Republic), and geographers Paul Vidal de la Blache (the Committee's vice-president and the author of *Géographie universelle*)⁸¹, Jean Brunhès (the originator of human geography) and Emmanuel de Martonne (its secretary, and a specialist in frontier questions).⁸² The Inquiry expert Bowman was in close correspondence with Martonne and a staunch admirer of Brunhès' *La Géographie humaine*, which he eventually edited for an English edition.⁸³

Like the Inquiry, the *Comité* had its own allegedly fringe element. According to Benoist, political officials considered Aulard and Seignobos 'radicals' and appointed them in order that they might be kept under observation.⁸⁴

From 1917, the *Comité d'études* held meetings in the Map Room at the Sorbonne's *Institut de géographie de la faculté des lettres*, usually on late afternoons on a Monday. Here they presented the papers that were eventually published in two modest volumes for consultation by the French government.⁸⁵ Premising a *victoire complète* that would bring into review a number of related territorial questions, the *Comité* divided its research between 'France' and 'the Allies'. In the latter case, it concentrated on the status of Poland, Czech lands, Serbia, Romania, Italy, Syria, and Asia Minor.⁸⁶ The *Comité* spent little time deliberating general guidelines or approaches. When Lavissee as Chair reminded his group that its task was to decide 'what must be our North-East border', his only stipulations were that the border could not be lower south than before the 1870 Franco-Prussian war, when the contested territory of Alsace-Lorraine was still a part of France, but that it could indeed extend further north.⁸⁷ Indeed, in many ways the Alsace-Lorraine question shaped the *Comité's* overall approach. According to the historian Mike Heffernan, the composition of the *Comité* reflected Briand's decision to bolster French claims to Alsace-Lorraine 'by reference to "objective" and relatively stable geographical and historical evidence.' Certainly, given the primacy of the fate of the predominantly German-speaking region of Alsace-Lorraine, lost by France to Germany in 1871, social and linguistic factors were out of favour.⁸⁸ So too was the perspective of social scientists such as Émile Durkheim, whose political and professional activities should have made him a prime candidate for *Comité* membership, but whose sociological method was 'fundamentally at odds with the historico-geographical perspective championed by Vidal de la Blache'.⁸⁹

The *Comité's* general view of an objective French solution to the problem of Alsace-Lorraine lay in a very specific notion of the national purpose of historical research. Lavissee's own fame rested on his patriotic history textbooks, written for the children of the *patrie*. In the most enduring of these, *Histoire de France*, Lavissee portrayed the French fatherland (a mythical Gallic France) as preceding the existence of the French nation-state, and French wars as justified by the expansionist needs of the political nation.⁹⁰ In particular, Lavissee rendered nationality a question of cultural destiny, even for Alsace-Lorraine, the predominantly German-speaking population of which defied conventional linguistic precepts of Frenchness.

Lavissee had at his disposal academics from the best institutions in Paris, and many advocates of nationality causes. Charles Seignobos' view of French history incorporated the diversity of the French population, the idea of accidental frontiers, and, like Lavissee, a national past dating back to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.⁹¹ Seignobos was ultimately a Lavissee

disciple, an advocate of oppressed nationalities, and of a view of history oriented around evolutionary determinism and the indivisibility and inevitability of France as a nation-state.⁹² Despite the variation in approaches of *Comité* members to the conceptualisation of the past and of space, the continuity of the nation-state was the imperative around which they all organised their idea of France. Some of them also extended this orientation to activism on behalf of the national emancipation of ‘oppressed peoples’.⁹³ Like Seignobos, Ernest Denis, a historian of Bohemia and of the German empire, brought to bear on his work in the *Comité* his very public life outside the academy, in this case as President of the Paris-based International League for the Defense of the Right of Peoples, created during the war in order to defend cultural differences and influence public opinion in ‘civilised countries’, and in recognition that some countries had to take a mentoring role on behalf of other races.⁹⁴ The basis of his support for national causes was his understanding of the psychological realism of nationality. Just as Poincaré ascribed to the view of nations as the expression of ‘spirit and language’, which were in turn ‘the social, aesthetic, and moral representations of a country which conserved across the centuries the deep consciousness of its collective life and its national unity’,⁹⁵ Denis believed that there was no merit to being a patriot, because as a form of the instinct for self-preservation, patriotism was not only superior and ennobled, it was biologically and psychologically determined: ‘*La patrie, c’est la mère qui nous a nourris, la patrie c’est notre sang et nos muscles, notre âme et notre cœur*’.⁹⁶

The British government was last to organise its experts into a body devoted to preparations for a scientific peace. If Britain had no specific territorial interests as in the case of France, certainly the political gains promised by the coordination of scientific expertise were obvious early on to the classicists Arnold Toynbee and Alfred Zimmern. Together they advised the Foreign Office in February 1917 that the accumulation of information on questions involved in the future peace settlement would ‘largely increase the initiative (and thereby the power) of any party that possessed it, by whatever process the settlement might be made’.⁹⁷ Around this same time, the War Cabinet had begun contemplating a coordinating body to ‘consider the obvious factors regarding peace terms’, and the British Admiralty office had approached the *Comité d’études* about cooperating on an exchange of expert information.⁹⁸ A year later, the Political Intelligence Department [PID] of the Foreign Office was born as a special intelligence coordinating body. It linked the expertise of the Admiralty staff, the Foreign Office, and bureaucrat-cum-writer John Buchan’s propaganda-focused Intelligence Bureau. In contrast with the organisation of the American Inquiry, the PID was administered by imperial bureaucrats who answered to the Foreign Minister, Arthur Balfour.⁹⁹ There were fewer staff in the PID than in its American equivalent and the sense of mission was

less ambitious; its task was to provide short reports at call.¹⁰⁰ Yet, like the Inquiry, the PID featured historians and classicists. Arnold Toynbee, who would go on to take up the chair in Modern Greek and Byzantine History at King's College, London in 1919, took charge of the Middle East for the PID.¹⁰¹ James W. Headlam-Morley, classical scholar and modern historian turned educational administrator, was head of the German section and eventually the PID's director. Edwyn Bevan, another classical scholar, worked under Headlam-Morley. Captain H. W. Temperley, lecturer in History at Cambridge University, at Harvard from 1911 to 1912, and author of a history of Serbia, acted as an expert on Alsace-Lorraine, Armenia, and Romania. Of those historians who were to become well known in the years after the war we can add Lewis Namier, a student at the LSE of Graham Wallas the originator of political psychology, and a convinced Freudian in his own right.¹⁰²

The Foreign Office also oversaw a separate Historical Section, which it inherited in early 1918 from the Admiralty, and which was charged with preparing the confidential reports for use at the peace conference and the handbooks to be distributed to the future peace negotiators.¹⁰³ Its chief was another historian, George Prothero of the University of Edinburgh, formerly editor of the *Quarterly Review* and of the 1902 *Cambridge Modern History*. Even though it is difficult to categorise British historiography in this period, Prothero's approach to the study of the past was in many ways exemplary of the influence on history of the idea of the nation, as it occurred in British Whig history, in the Lavissonian school, and in the American new historians' interest in the politics of the present and the historical evolution of states. Prothero believed firmly in the patriotic function of history, and he was also, like all good Victorian liberals, an imperialist.¹⁰⁴ He drew into the work of the Historical Section PID men such as Toynbee, and experts from other branches of the government's war effort, such as Robert Seton-Watson, the founder of *The New Europe*, and key figure in the creation of the School of Slavonic Studies at Kings College.¹⁰⁵ Those men brought to the production of Prothero's Handbooks other kinds of intellectual experience, in particular an affiliation with the recast imperial ideals of *The Round Table* and of *The New Europe*.¹⁰⁶

For all the specificities of their political circumstances and concerns, British, French, and American experts were engaged in a transnational conversation about the importance of the nation, and of their own historical and geographical expertise. Those interested in the newer developments of their disciplines tended to be political progressives, so that if the imperative of a scientific peace drew them towards historical and geographical 'facts', the democratic promise of nationality made them sympathetic to the exceptions to such facts. The tendency to exceptionalism was also influenced by the discovery that the facts of history and geography were often contradictory and inconsistent. Consequently,

experts deployed convenient mixtures of investigative and inventive argument in their approach to nation questions. The precise mix usually depended on the national context, organisational requirement, or personal whim. The preference of French republicans, for example, for a territorial conception of nationality that allowed Alsace-Lorraine to be thought of as intrinsically 'French', even when the locals spoke German, meant that there was little patience among the *Comité* members for making language a criterion for deciding border controversies.¹⁰⁷ Instead, the *Comité* fed the scientific imperative of peace preparation with abstract evocations of the population's general will. The authors of reports on Alsace-Lorraine declared that, in the past, attempts at the Germanisation of the two provinces had been unable to defeat the will of its inhabitants.¹⁰⁸ The *Comité's* final and published report traced the region's history to ancient Gaul, and assured readers of the keenness of local French patriotic 'sentiment' in the crucial year of 1870.¹⁰⁹ In some instances, supporting evidence of a sort was supplied: the number of locals who in the previous half century of German rule had enrolled in the French Foreign Legion and deserted the German army, or the traces of French *esprit* to be uncovered in the minting of French medallions by locals during periods of non-French rule.¹¹⁰ When sceptics claimed that the people of Alsace-Lorraine had been asking not for union with France but for autonomy within the German Empire, the *Comité* countered that the absence of a quantifiable French essence merely meant that the French 'sensibilities' of the inhabitants of 'lost territories' had been suppressed and required redemption.¹¹¹ They added, more petulantly, that the French 'simply demand that the *patrie* recover that population which belongs to her, which was flesh of her flesh, blood of her blood'. They contrasted the organic quasi-physiological standing of France with the artificiality and incoherence of Germany, 'she can be no motherland, this Germany bristling with hundreds of interior frontier lines, a chaos of every different sort of State'. PID reports echoed the claims of the *Comité*: If more locals spoke German in Alsace-Lorraine than French, this was because since the German annexation of the territory French had never been given a chance to flourish. They also argued that the use of German as a 'mother tongue' 'is consistent with and, in the large majority of cases, implies as strong a devotion to France as that of the French speaking population.'¹¹²

In contrast to the *Comité*, the PID and Inquiry embraced the supposedly objective data of 'the stability of racial distribution' in as many instances as possible. Indeed, the task of the largest division of the Inquiry was to provide a 'racial map of Europe, Asiatic Turkey' showing 'boundaries and mixed doubtful zones'.¹¹³ These maps were to condense and visualise information on the 'racial and religious composition of the areas based on official statistics; where disputes exist, based on claims'.¹¹⁴ Despite their

best intentions, and although such data presupposed agreement on the classification of race and racial types, predictably there was none. How could racial borders be decided after all? On the basis of language? Individual claims? When Robert Kerner, the Inquiry historian responsible for Central and Eastern Europe, borrowed (as was common practice) British racial maps in order to put together his own racial representation of the Habsburg empire, he disputed the British quantification of the German populations because it included Jews.¹¹⁵ Even more confusingly, evidence from within the British Department of Naval Intelligence in the Admiralty Offices that prepared those maps indicates a preference among some experts for excluding Jews from national statistics.¹¹⁶ In May 1918, Mr. Wallis of the Geographical Section of Naval Intelligence reported to the Inquiry's Douglas Johnson that in order to represent the population of the Habsburg empire he had subtracted the Jewish population,

because they are neither German nor Roumanian nor Magyar but a separate people which quickly takes the name of the dominant race in the territory, in which they settle and becomes an integral part of it. Hence the Jews should not be allowed to figure in questions of nationality. In some places there are artificial German majorities due to the presence of Jews who call themselves Germans. Such an error is corrected by leaving the Jews out of consideration.¹¹⁷

Despite their similar position on the national status of Jews, Kerner, unlike Wallis, was a well-known pacifist and internationalist. But Kerner's conception of internationalism was complicated to say the least, and easily accommodated the increasingly common elision of bolshevism and internationalism. On the one hand, his designation of Jews as 'international' evoked a sense of their menace to liberal idealism and faith in a national new world order.¹¹⁸ On the other hand, when Kerner expressed criticism of an implicit bias in the same British 'racial contour map' of the Habsburg empire towards Italians and against 'Slavs', he argued that the people known as 'Jugo-Slavs' should be thought of as a 'natural evolution of the forces of antinationalism', which, in this case, he interpreted as benign forces.¹¹⁹

Not only was racial cartography notoriously ambiguous, but the race mapping of the Habsburg empire was the richest site for the production of doubts about the nationality venture. Some American experts suggested that where facts about that empire's component nationalities contradicted a scientific approach to the adjustment of nationality borders, those facts could be altered by 'realigning' populations according to 'some common bond of race or language'.¹²⁰ For those who contemplated the parity of the Habsburg empire's federal ideal with the United States, the empire's very division into national units stirred mixed feelings. Unlike their French

counterparts, many of whom publicly supported national claims made on behalf of the Habsburg empire's composite peoples, most of the Inquiry experts preferred the federalist rebirth of Austria-Hungary or the 'Dual Monarchy' (the empire's other names) along the lines of the American melting pot. The head of the Austro-Hungarian section Charles Seymour thought 'trialism' (German, Magyar and Slav cooperation) an alternative that would build on the psychological salience of nationality, as he wrote to Bowman in early 1918, '[i]n speech or writing, words give life to the emotion which nationality stirs in the heart or to the reasoning which it awakens in the mind'.¹²¹ In the context of Austria-Hungary, this meant, 'the language in ordinary use among the different peoples (*Umgangssprache*)' was 'generally the free expression of the nationality',¹²² and linguistic frontiers were 'consonant with the accepted principles of modern democracy'.¹²³ As a result, Seymour claimed, 'the languages of the monarchy are not mixed, as in a mosaic, but are agglomerated in blocks of considerable size – the natural cores of nationalist states.'¹²⁴

Seymour's conception of language as a bridge between the past and present, as an authentic palimpsest of the national self, and core of the nation, was directly influenced by the work of his colleague Leon Dominian. A native of Turkey who had come to live in the United States in 1912, Dominian was the author of *Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe*, published by the American Geographical Society (the home of the Inquiry) in 1917.¹²⁵ Echoing the claims of contemporary ethnopsychologists, Dominian argued that because language was emotional and unconscious before it was rational and self-conscious it offered the best evidence of an authentic nationality. He also had unflinching faith in the existence of objective borders, positing that 'an ill-adjusted boundary is a hatching-oven for war. A scientific boundary ... prepares the way for permanent good will between peoples.'¹²⁶ Accompanying his interest in unconscious forces was a conception of Europe as a continent of nations and races, and of the necessity for racial alliances, namely Teutons against Slavs.¹²⁷

Adding to the confusion of ideological aims and practical methods, PID and Inquiry guidelines offered history as a means of determining the national status and desires of a people, and as a supplement or alternative to the geographical plotting of race and language.¹²⁸ When researchers were confronted with 'any given problem area', they were to focus on public events, government, wars, treaties, religion, economic, social developments including 'popular opinion and national sentiment'.¹²⁹ For these purposes a list of prompts was provided: 'Is the area sovereign, federated, or subject?', 'Is it a civilised or a backward area?', 'Could it govern itself, if it does not?', 'How strongly is the principle of self-determination applicable to it?', 'Has it any national or political antipathies?' The PID was advised by the Foreign Office that its analyses of territorial questions were to be organised around factors such as the 'political desires of the population' (the effect of possible

changes in thwarting or fulfilling them), the capacity of the population for realising its desires, their 'capacity for self-government'. For both the Inquiry and the PID this popular political history was to date only as far back as 1815, the date of the Congress of Vienna, the last major European peace-brokering congress, 'unless earlier events or conditions are important', as was allegedly the case with Poland and Serbia.¹³⁰

Considerations of the status of 'popular opinion and national sentiment' were unimaginable in earlier state interventions in international territorial issues. Here they reflected the transnational changes wrought not only by democratic expectations and the prominence of the nation question, but also by developments in the natural and social sciences. The preference in these circumstances for the term 'people' suggests that 'nation' designated a group whose political claims had been verified and legitimated. For some members of the *Comité*, the process of transforming peoples into nations involved accounting for 'the imponderables... hatreds or national passions, which exercise such a powerful determining force on peoples.'¹³¹ However, in general, *Comité* experts were more concerned to determine the level of national consciousness rather than unconsciousness among the people under study. In practice, this still meant hypothesising and stereotyping rather than measuring, and conflating representations of conscious and unconscious forms of identification. When they agreed that in the case of Macedonia (the object of Bulgarian, Serbian and Greek claims), there was no evidence of a separate Macedonian national consciousness, they did not bother to expand on their decision.¹³² The French demand for Alsace-Lorraine and the Saar was based on 'the will of its inhabitants to once again become French', a will that *Comité* members presumed did not warrant, and even could not be tested by plebiscite.¹³³ By contrast, Ernest Denis argued that the Ukraine had to remain in Russia, and that Bulgaria had no claim on Macedonian Serbia on the basis that in both cases propaganda had aroused a superficial national sentiment among the populations. *Comité* member and Russian specialist Robert de Caix also argued that Ukrainian nationalism was the artificial result of propaganda, explaining that the illiterate Ukrainian masses had merely been manipulated by the literate few.¹³⁴ Albert Thomas, the leader of the moderate socialists in France and advisor to Prime Minister Clemenceau, believed that nationality required 'a sentiment of real unity', 'a profound desire for independence', and a demonstrated capacity for self-rule. On these grounds he recognised the nationality claims of Finns, Slovaks, and Poles, while dismissing 'Jugo-slavs', Lithuanians, and Letts because they had no developed capacity for self-government, and Egyptians, Irish, Moroccans, and Ukrainians because they had not demonstrated *any* of the three prime requirements.¹³⁵ When considering Albania, Brunhès advised the *Comité*, '[T]here can be no doubt about the existence of an Albanian race and language The sentiment of an ethnic community is unquestionable,

despite religious divisions; it has been overexcited by the events of the last few years. The Albanians are not incapable of discipline. They have political intelligence.¹³⁶ The *Comité* were not all convinced by Brunhès' claims, although they agreed with his criteria. Some members disputed the existence of a pure Albanian language, and others were sceptical of Albanian national sentiment, arguing that it was the artificial product of Habsburg/Teutonic manipulation. In all these examples, authenticity was not only an increasingly required aspect of nationality, it rested in the least tangible dimensions of psychology. For Denis, national self-determination was a 'force' responding to 'the state of our consciousnesses' [*consciencences*]. Given the intangibility of such forces, the problem of knowing when a people could be counted ready for self-determination was most often resolved, on paper at least, through conjecture and stereotyping.

Comité members and advisers designated nationality the expression of will, consciousness, and *authentic* sentiment, as if these characteristics accorded with a French republican tradition. Yet their claims of a normatively French conception of nationality echoed those made by their British and American counterparts about the forms of nationality indigenous to their own national cultures, and as a measure of the difference of other nations. The Inquiry's James Shotwell confidently described the spirit of nationality as inexistent in the territory ruled by Turkey; 'There was tribal, religious or local sentiment, not genuine nationality'.¹³⁷ He thought Arabs could only mimic being civilised. J. K. Birge declared those Turks 'who have shown the greatest tendencies to progress have been men whose blood was known to be chiefly Albanian or Jewish, or some other than Mongol kind ... the Turk is liable to be always inconsistent ... his lack of executive ability is one of his most conspicuous failings. Inconsistent reasoning is not conducive to justice or to fair and efficient administration of any kind'.¹³⁸ By contrast, another Inquiry expert assumed that in the case of the Arab states, it 'would be impossible to apply any theory of self determination'; this was 'because it would be impossible to discover what any large number of these people desire, and even if this were possible, it might easily turn out that they desired something which would soon be found to be disastrous to their well being'.¹³⁹ Arthur I. Andrews, a Harvard graduate working at Tufts, and Inquiry specialist for the Transcaucasus, claimed the 'original Koords' of the Middle East were 'descendants of the remnant of the ancient Medes', and like 'North American Indians. They have a tawny skin, high cheek bones, broad mouth, and black straight hair. Their mien too is rather quiet, morose, and dull. Their temper is passionate, resentful, revengeful, intriguing, and treacherous. They make good soldiers, but poor leaders'.¹⁴⁰ In an interview conducted in 1918 with the Inquiry's peripatetic Douglas Johnson, Toynbee simply dismissed the possibility that national feeling in Macedonia had any depth or authenticity, arguing that in the area which he preferred to call 'southern Serbia' 'the people care little to which country

they belong. If left in Serbia they will certainly become wholly Serbian in fifty years.¹⁴¹ Otherwise Toynbee happily defined the fixed character of the 'non-European world' as 'other civilised or semi-civilised countries that was India, Persia, some parts of Turkish Empire and Egypt,' and 'the backward nations', where 'a veritable cockpit of nationalities so mutilated' could 'have never even achieved that [kind of] unity which is the essential preliminary to a national life'. Temperley thought the Romanians of Transylvania (in Austria-Hungary) superior to the population of Romania as a whole because they were of Latin stock, 'keenly alive to the question of nationality', as evidenced in their long and able struggle for union with Romania.¹⁴² He also ascribed to the Czechs a fine character. He specifically approved of their 'remarkable unity', high standard of education, intense national patriotism, and skill 'in carrying on their propaganda for freedom.' The Slovaks were, in turn, more intelligent than the mass of Hungarians.¹⁴³

For all the Western experts, geographers and historians alike, representations of authenticity revolved around psychological conceptions of the subjectivity of nationality expressed in the mental evolution of groups, and their capacity to express national consciousness, will, sentiment or opinion. These representations were also embedded in and matched by conventional accounts of collective characteristics that too often took the form of racial stereotypes. There were very few contexts in which the idea of nationality was applied without any stereotypes coming into play. However, preparations for a scientific peace were marked also by the difficulties that experts had organising stereotypes into a consistent vision of the nature of nations and nationality, of the relationships between and across psychology and biology, history and politics, and between the individual and the collective. These difficulties were most apparent in the Inquiry study of Habsburg territory in the Adriatic region bordering the Italian nation-state, where, we might recall, the status of Yugoslavs and Italians was hotly contested, even by the assigned experts. A report written by James Shotwell explained that the arguments put by the self-styled Italian and Slav claimants to this territory was worthy of intensive study 'as it offers, as well, hints of how ready these people are to assume the role of self-determination'; those hints were to be interpreted alongside language tests and information on prior election activity in the region.¹⁴⁴ In June that same year, Lippmann wrote to Seymour asking for locally based 'nationality statistics' that he could use to assemble a block diagram of the region. He suggested too that 'studying the relative fertility of the different nationalities of Austria-Hungary' might help determine the relative status of national claims on its various regions.¹⁴⁵ Seymour's response was to recommend the *Gerichtsbezirke* 'indicated on the racial map of the Jugo-Slav area which I presented last week'. '[T]he racial minorities in the *Gerichtsbezirke* are so small', Seymour explained, 'that the latter serve the purpose very well.' He added that there was a plan to study the relative

fertility of different nationalities, but they were waiting to put such 'racial statistics upon cards.'¹⁴⁶ Only a few months later, the Director of the Inquiry, Mezes, warned Lippmann against race and in favour of topography as a more dependable criteria for deciding borders in confused regions such as 'the Balkans', where economic considerations might be more useful than nationality.¹⁴⁷ At this point, Seymour moved rather awkwardly between the criteria of language and race. He returned constantly to the themes of the salience of the German, Jew, Latin, and Slav races in the region, and the configuration of a linguistic frontier as 'a perfectly definite line as a basis for further work', as 'consonant with the accepted principles of modern democracy', even if 'entirely impracticable as a national frontier'.¹⁴⁸ Indeed the problem, he reflected, was that in practice language did not reflect an essential nationality, 'of those who at present call themselves Adriatic Italians and who are such from the linguistic point of view, there are many who are ethnologically Slavs.'¹⁴⁹

The same confused grappling with the shifting categorical orientations of national identity shadowed British efforts. In 1918, Toynbee and Namier (an active Zionist) wrote for the PID that '[t]he existence of a nationality cannot be proved or disproved except through the consciousness of its alleged members. If the vast majority of east European Jews consider themselves a separate nationality, as they do, no one has a right to question its existence. Moreover, it is patently absurd to question or deny it.'¹⁵⁰ However, during the preparations for the peace, Toynbee also proposed the other side of the argument he had put with Namier, confirming that it was the expert who could objectively determine the relative political status of such peoples: 'A Jew who, by process of emancipation and assimilation, attempts, in a social contract with his Gentile neighbours, to turn himself into a Dutchman or a Frenchman or an Englishman or an American "of Jewish religion" is simply mutilating his Jewish personality without having any prospect at all of acquiring the full personality of a Dutchman or whatever the Gentile nationality of his choice may be.'¹⁵¹

Cutting across ideological and disciplinary differences between and within each of the Inquiry, *Comité*, and PID bodies was the imperative of drawing an empirically indisputable map that could organise and legitimate a new more democratic international order. But the democratic and scientific ambitions of the anticipated peacemaking process did not sit well together at all. At the most, the mutability of national identity, and the privileged status bestowed on nationality as the most authentic foundation for democracy, became a reason for emphasising the scientific objectives of the peace and the role of expert opinion over and above the opinion of the individual or 'people' involved. Given the almost whimsical nature of expert evaluations, we cannot tell if the Inquiry, *Comité* and PID experts ever believed in the hierarchies of difference that they summoned up.¹⁵² But they applied their criteria of cohesion, consciousness, and will with

conviction. Their divergent views and stewing scepticism suggest that the production of knowledge about national differences and legitimate forms of nationality was not unreflective or closed to reinvention. But a stifling residue of determinism had settled on representations of the relative consciousness or authentic unconsciousness of specific nationalities. The national differences experts invoked were in practice the sum of prejudices, of specific ways of seeing, however wilful. Their focus on the subjective psychological status of nationality, whether as a form of 'consciousness' or 'unconsciousness', provided even more scope for the fabrication of national difference – and the resort to what Lippmann later described as stereotypes sedimented in the slums of psychology – even as it reinforced the realism of the nationalities subject to expert assessment.

Nationality, psychology, and the peace of 1919

Given the chronic confusion that surrounded the application of nationality as a principle we are left with the problem of how the specific outcomes of the peacemaking begun in 1919 were indeed decided. Not all the experts on the Paris territorial committees, including some of the most influential, had come up through the ranks of the Inquiry, *Comité*, or British intelligence services. Indeed, the French *Comité* experts had only an informal role in 1919.¹⁵³ However the Inquirer Charles Seymour was on the Czecho-Slovak and Romania/Yugo-Slav committees, Isaiah Bowman participated in all the territorial subcommittees, and the Inquiry's African specialist George Beer exerted his influence on the Mandates Commission overseeing the redistribution of German colonial possessions. As a technical expert for the United States, James Shotwell was privy to discussions of the Council of Ten, and he became a key figure in the institution of international labour laws, and in the formation of mandate and minority clauses. Of the PID, Toynbee, Leeper, and Prothero made it to Paris as technical experts, although only Headlam-Morley sat on a committee. But even the newest negotiator could consult the more than 170 Handbooks prepared by Prothero and the Foreign Office on almost all the regions of the world, and all sorts of topics, including, Islam and India, British West African Colonies, and the Pacific, but excluding Britain, France, and existing Italian territory. There they would be told that 'the Magyar' had 'a highly developed political sense', and was 'related to the Englishman, as his history shows, by his love of liberty, his practical outlook and his political sense ... [but] contemptuous of the democratic doctrine of racial equality, which violates his sense of reality.'¹⁵⁴ The Chinese were an easily governed race, and the Arabians were '[p]hysically ... one of the finest races in the world', which was not to say they were ready for self-determination, since their physical prowess was matched to 'a high degree of intelligence', but undermined by a deficiency in 'organizing power and capacity for combined

action, while they have an instinctive dislike of all kinds of governmental control.’¹⁵⁵ In the French case, diplomats could turn to the smaller published findings of the *Comité*. But the links between the French Foreign Ministry and the intellectuals of the *Comité* ran even deeper. The Quai d’Orsay was the easy destination of graduates of the *École sciences politiques*, established in Paris in 1872 by a number of eminent French intellectuals, including Ernest Renan, Hippolyte Taine, and Émile Boutmy, all of whom had published influential works on the significance of the psychological dimensions of nationality.¹⁵⁶

Certainly, expectations for a scientific peace did not diminish the occasions for informal and even arbitrary considerations of anticipated and actual territorial issues, outside the control and influence of experts. At the same time that Lippmann commended the utility of well-organised research early in 1917, Wilson and House made good use of the visiting British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour to plan for themselves the fate of the populations of Europe and Asia Minor. It is well known that they stood in the White House poring over maps, designating the preferences of the United States or the other Allies, confirming that ‘Alsace and Lorraine should go to France, and that France, Belgium, and Serbia would be restored.’¹⁵⁷

The juxtaposition of the casual and the organised, the pragmatic and the ideal, rehearsed rather well the peace process itself. Gelfand notes that the territorial arrangements advocated by the Inquiry in regard to Western Europe, Poland, parts of the Balkans, and the Middle East (but not the Russian provinces, Italy, or the Far East) prevailed in the peace treaties.¹⁵⁸ Another historian of this period, Seth Tillman, has argued that the territorial agenda was a consequence of conventional views about where the principle of nationality was applicable. But the relationship between convention and outcomes was hardly straightforward. For much of the war, Ruthenia was expected to constitute a separate political entity, and the Kurds’ ‘desire for unity’ was recognised by the Political Department of the British India Office.¹⁵⁹ In 1919, however, the pleas for self-determination by Kurd nationalists in Mesopotamia, Persia, Turkey and Syria, and by representatives of a Ruthenian cause were generally dismissed. Nor did concerted lobbying by the interested parties necessarily shift preconceptions. Individual delegations may have argued for the independence of Karlsbad as the heart of a German Bohemia, or the independence of Upper Silesia, but these regional forms of identification were certainly not on the peace agenda, despite the decisions to create Danzig and Fiume as independent cities. No hearing was given to the Egyptian national leader Aghlul Pasha or to the Vietnamese Ho Chi Minh. The inexhaustible Irish question too was excluded from official discussions.¹⁶⁰ The United States government, a potential supporter of Irish demands (thanks to its expatriate Irish population) was particularly sensitive to calls for improvement in the status of

'negroes'.¹⁶¹ British representatives sought rationales for denying representation to Irish and other colonial independentists within its empire and seemed more interested in assuming control of extant French possessions on the Indian peninsula.¹⁶²

Whatever their intentions, the political coupling of nationality and self-determination by liberal-minded intellectuals from both sides of the Atlantic established two versions of nationality, one relevant to Western European states, the other to elsewhere. This double standard was incorporated into the organisation of the peace, in the determination of nationality and the conceptualisation of the mandate system, and in the elaboration of a new international hierarchy of national powers. The Covenant that the victorious powers agreed upon for the new League of Nations enshrined a mandate system in overlapping images of the League as the defender of nationality and as the overseer of an international hierarchy of evolving nations. Even if the United States never formally joined the League, the peace process itself established the right of Britain and the United States in particular to decide the significance and limits of difference within their own territories and for other nations, or not-yet-nations. Thus even when British experts promoted minority rights as an issue, their efforts were constrained by the conflicting interests of the British empire. In December 1918 Headlam-Morley noted in regard to discussion of the Balkans that

[i]t will, I assume, certainly [*sic*] be a condition of our entering the League that questions such as that of Ireland or the French Canadians are purely internal problems in which the League has no right to interfere; but if we insist on this, then it will become very difficult to give national minorities in other countries the right of appeal to the League. The real hope for the future is that all the nations will see that it is for their own interest to grant full cultural freedom to their minorities.¹⁶³

The glimmer of idealism evident in Headlam-Morley's comments was certainly undermined by the peace in which he was a participant.

The anomalous situation did not go unnoticed by representatives of the lesser powers. When Queen Marie of Roumania visited Paris in 1919 and spoke with Wilson, she recorded of this meeting that '[h]e very sanctimoniously preached to me how we should treat our minorities.' To her suggestion that Wilson must be acquainted with the difficulties of minority rights because of the Negro and Japanese questions in the United States, 'the President responded by baring "his rather long teeth" and by declaring "that he was not aware there was a Japanese question in America."' ¹⁶⁴ It may not be difficult to imagine an American nationality being dissected and reconstructed on the same grounds as the Inquirers applied elsewhere, but it is difficult (and was difficult for Wilson) to imagine a similar emphasis on

cultural continuity and homogeneity in the American case, or to imagine that task being relegated to outside experts who would have the final ‘impartial’ say over the limits and nature of American nationality and the cultural and political map of its internal spaces.

No historical methodology can help us establish a law for the relationship between representations of nations, assumptions about human nature, and the territorial outcomes of the peace process. To a significant extent, much of the peace of 1919 appears to be a chapter in a longer story about the force of *Realpolitik* in world affairs. As Neil Smith has argued ‘Paris was also about the rationalisation of global space according to discrete national interests, economies, and states. It was about fixing the global geography of modernity’.¹⁶⁵ The intersecting histories of international politics and psychology suggest, at the very least, that the peace process had its origins in ideas, and that peacemaking had *ideological* outcomes that were not merely the consequence of political realism – rather peacemaking helped legitimate a particular modernist version of reality and the realism of nations. We can count amongst the ideological outcomes of peacemaking: the privileged political status awarded national difference, and national identification in international as well as domestic affairs; the new status of international relations as a vital site for the discussion and affirmation of national difference and national identification; the regulation of authority in this process of the international legitimation of nations and nationality. If not every individual or nation had an equal voice in shaping these outcomes, this was precisely the point of the new scientific peace. As Lippmann reminded his readers in 1922, this was particularly the case for women. As for the intellectual origins of the idea of nationality, we need to investigate farther back in time, using as our most useful clue Lippmann’s assertion that the slums of psychology and a naive psychological conception of the democratic El Dorado shaped and limited the application of science to the new national world order.

2

The Principle of Nationality, 1914–1919

There can be no historical dispute about the importance of the invocation of nationality and self-determination to the reorganisation of states and citizenship in the bloody and chaotic wake of the First World War. However there has been historical disagreement over their political significance. Some historians have presented Wilson's wartime attachment to nationality as a strategic appropriation of the ideal of self-determination from the Bolsheviks, intended in one instance to distract the disgruntled from the politics of class.¹ United States, British, and French government documents also show that toward the end of the First World War the idea of nationality was used by the Allied military as a ruse for undermining the strength of the Austro-Hungarian military, and for a strategic border realignment. The Western powers would provoke and assist the peoples of Central Europe to revolt under the banner of national self-determination in order to undermine Austria-Hungary's military strength.² To some extent the strategic concerns that lay behind official Allied interest in nationality rendered the question of the specific legitimacy of each national cause irrelevant. In 1918, Wilson's closest adviser Colonel House wrote in his diary that he did not care 'to go into the interminable question who does or who does not represent a majority of the Poles.'³

When it comes to the meaning of nationality and self-determination, rather than their *Realpolitik* purpose, historians have found themselves in as murky waters. Even if we are to accept John Breuilly's broad description of national self-determination in this period 'as a rather unclear mixture of ideas about cultural identity and individual liberty', we are left with the problem of describing those ideas.⁴ It should come as no surprise that contemporaries repeatedly found themselves facing the same problem. When, in late 1918, Robert Lansing, the American Secretary of State, found himself en route to France as head of the delegation to Paris, he recorded his perplexity in regard to the mission ahead: 'When the President talks of 'self-determination' what unit has he in mind? Does he mean a race, a territorial area, or a community?'⁵ Tomáš Masaryk, president from 1918 of

the new Czechoslovak state that had been carved out of the remnants of the Austro-Hungarian empire, and one of the great defenders of national self-determination, recognised that ‘in point of fact, [self-determination] has never been clearly defined. Does it apply only to a whole people or is it valid also for sections of a people?’⁶ Alfred Cobban, a later historian of the 1919 peace conference, reflected on this same aporia: ‘the basic problem of the whole policy of self-determination’ is ‘to what kind of community should it apply?’⁷ We might agree with an official French observer of American preparations for peace who declared that ‘the right of peoples to dispose of themselves had still hardly been defined, whether in popular consciousness or in international law.’⁸ Certainly Wilson’s social secretary, Edith Benham, felt compelled to ask how he got his impression ‘of what the new national ideals are, or what truths are to be presented to the people’. Her boss replied only that he got them ‘from different sources’, piecing them together ‘as one should a mosaic’.⁹

My aim in this chapter is to piece together the mosaic of the idea of nationality and its meanings during the First World War. It is clear is that by the time Wilson had officially allied the principles of justice to the principle of nationality, and nationality to the promise of self-determination, the nation had a privileged political status in mainstream trans-Atlantic thought. When in 1918 Wilson referred to ‘the wishes, the natural connections, the racial aspirations ... of the peoples involved’, he was invoking what had by the end of the war become a pervasive and trans-Atlantic, or even more broadly ‘Western’, view of modern political life and of liberal democracy that focused on the vitality of national identification in individual subjectivity and the psychological primacy of nationality. During the war nationality was ‘the subject of widespread discussion – by liberal peace societies, political writers, national governments and the political leaders of those nationalities who wished to be independent.’¹⁰ It is no coincidence that amongst the most influential of the wartime discussants of nationality were precisely those American, English, and French men and groups who played some part in preparations for the peace, and in the peacemaking theatre of 1919.

National will and new Europeans

In 1917, young intellectual progressives such as Walter Lippmann were absorbed not only by the seemingly endless European war, but by the thoughts of what peace might bring. These thoughts brought Lippmann to promote the political weekly *The New Europe* as ‘the one most indispensable periodical in the English-speaking world’. This widely influential London-based magazine was at the hub of European political propaganda advocating the principle of nationality as the expression of individual and collective consciousness and as the basis of a new world order.¹¹ Its transna-

tional status among liberal-minded intellectuals such as Lippmann make it an indispensable site for examining the wartime discussion of nationality, that idea's meanings, and the extent of its influence.

The New Europe had an earlier, less well-known existence as the *European Review: A Survey of Nationality*, published by the same editor, Robert Seton-Watson, before the war, in June 1914. Seton-Watson had by this time established a reputation as an expert on the Habsburg Monarchy and as a spokesperson for 'Slavs' as a racial/cultural group worthy of political recognition. During the war, his publishing projects were only one arm of his activities in this context, another was the foundation of Slavic Studies at King's College in London. As in his institutional efforts, Seton-Watson's aim in the *European Review* was to give voice to small nations and nationalities, to highlight the influence of '[c]ontinental racial struggles upon British foreign policy,' and 'to encourage national individuality'.¹² Drawing on his understanding of the mutual relationship between race and nationality, he employed Slav as a racially distinctive category, comprising a number of quite differently evolving slavic nations, including the South Slavs, the Czechs and Slovaks, and the Russians. Amongst the adherents of Seton-Watson's vision, this preference for recognising national individuality was considered a condition of the future for those parts of Central Europe under Austro-Hungarian (alternatively referred to as Habsburg) imperial rule containing Slavic and other oppressed racial/national populations, but was not always thought of as relevant to the British or French empires, or at least not in the same way.

Towards the ends of 1916, the national vision elaborated in the *European Review* was expanded within the framework of *The New Europe*, thanks at least partly to the financial contributions of the aspiring Czech politician-in-exile Tomáš Masaryk. *The New Europe* exerted a more international authority, inviting as it did French, Italian and Japanese, as well as Central European contributions. But its prominent figures were still mostly British, such as the historians Arnold Toynbee, H. W. Temperley, J. Holland Rose, and Ramsay Muir, the *Times* journalist Henry Wickham Steed, the Bloomsbury figure and Fabian Leonard Woolf, and the anthropologists Sir Arthur Evans and Sir J. G. Frazer. Toynbee and Temperley were at this same time working for the PID, while Seton-Watson and Steed were helping fill the ranks of Buchan's Propaganda Bureau. Its authority reinforced by the involvement of these well-known and politically influential intellectuals, *The New Europe* editorialised on the centrality of nationality in a democratic post-war settlement, and on the study of psychology as the 'first requisite of the diplomat or the statesman'.¹³

The New Europe's contributors bravely used its pages to expand on the nature and place of nationality in their vision of a liberal '*victoire intégrale*'. This was no simplistic version of ethnic or racial nationality. One vigorous collaborator, the Mancunian historian Ramsay Muir, proffered the idea of

nations unified by will as a realistic political alternative to what he presented as the deterministic and anti-liberal idea of national homogeneity grounded in race. Muir argued in an article on 'Europe and the non-European world,' '[i]f we mean by a "nation" merely a race, the principle will not help us at all, since all peoples are of a very mixed race; and the assertion that political frontiers must be determined mainly by race must lead only to endless and futile arguments and to greedy claims.'¹⁴ Accepting that Europe comprised a number of larger racial groupings, Muir described the racially heterogeneous nation as unified by a *common will*. Further, the nation 'united by unanimity of sentiment' was at a more advanced stage of evolution than the biologically defined nation. That meant for Muir that nationality, 'as the strongest basis of state-organisation', was 'a purely European conception', and among 'non-European' peoples democracy and national self-determination were inappropriate.¹⁵

Convinced of the inspirational status of his views, Muir expanded on his understanding of nationality in a number of wartime publications. In *National Self-Government*, published in 1918, he explained that England was the first state to develop a benign type of national spirit ('the British peoples alone had the habit and instinct of self-government in their very blood and bones'), a fact that naturalised the political influence exerted by the British empire over the non-European world.¹⁶ In a liberal revalidation of Britain's civilising mission, Muir claimed that wherever the British went as colonisers 'they carried self-government with them.'¹⁷ This outlook may have been influenced by his brief experience as an imperial representative in India.¹⁸ But Muir's language also echoed his broader intellectual interests. He was, for example, the author of an extensive introduction to the English translation of the Italian psychologist Eugenio Rignano's *The War and the Settlement*. As Muir described it, Rignano's 'main idea seems to be that it is necessary that the whole surface of the globe should be finally and definitively parcelled out, in order that there may remain no unallotted territory, no *res nullius*, to be the subject of quarrel between the powers.'¹⁹ But Rignano, like Muir, was determined that this principle had limits: 'Signor Rignano ... does not suggest that the Syrians, the Mesopotamians or the people of Asia Minor should be allowed to have any "choice of the state to which they wish to belong".'²⁰

The different status of the psychological evolution of peoples and nations was a theme commonly pursued by liberals in association with the idea that nationality presented a natural basis for a democratic post-war order. It was a theme that echoed the ruminations of nineteenth century English liberals who had reconciled their political ideals with a faith in the cause of empire by arguing that only some peoples or races were advanced enough to appreciate or warrant liberty.²¹ It was mirrored in the influence of other groups and journals, such as *The Round Table*, which under the patronage of the same Milner who would oversee the construction of man-

dates, advocated the transformation of the British empire into a Commonwealth of like-minded nations. *The New Europe's* arguments were premised both on the relative psychological capacities of different peoples to pursue national identity and to form a state, and the responsibility of the more mature peoples such as the English/British to nurture national will in 'backward' societies. The liberal-minded intellectuals contributing to *The New Europe* in the early twentieth century not only helped to spread these assumptions, they added to them a new analytical and discursive focus, the psychology of the self. For the classicist Edwyn Bevan – writing in *The New Europe* in early 1918 after the principle of nationality had already been put forward by Wilson – India (like Ireland) did not have the right to self-determination because of the absence of a developed self.²² 'The great difficulty which has to be overcome in realising self-determination for India', Bevan explained, 'is the difficulty of discovering the "self"'. India's immaturity was evident, according to Bevan, in that it had no unifying self.²³ The unification of multiple selves through the exercise of national will became the necessary condition of a nation and national self-determination. In this context, the British empire was represented as the mentor of nationality, as well as an example writ large of heterogeneous elements unified through 'free will'.

During the war, New Europeans 'set out to convert the government to the doctrine of national self-determination'; they established a presence in government organisations such as the War Department of the Foreign Office, and its main propaganda agency, Crewe House; in 1919 they would make themselves indispensable to the peace conference as official and unofficial experts on specific questions related to the practical application of the principle of nationality.²⁴ The versions of nationality promoted in *The New Europe* spread efficiently beyond diplomatic circles through social gatherings, study circles, and public lectures.²⁵ Seton-Watson created a New Europe Society open to both sexes, promoting the ideal of self-determination and the practice of trusteeship for 'semi-civilised' and 'uncivilised' parts of the world.²⁶ Muir busied himself providing a platform for 'men of eminence' in the Great Hall of the University of London and in the suburbs and neighbouring towns.²⁷ New Europeans such as Muir also published their own studies of nationality that, in many cases, became key scholarly and popular texts.

It was during the war that a still young Arnold Toynbee established himself as the most influential of *The New Europe* authorities on nationality. Having avoided military service, Toynbee devoted himself to the writing of *Nationality and War* (1915) and *The New Europe: Some essays in reconstruction* (1916). In these well-received studies he argued that the settlement of a new order would require experts to marshal knowledge of the psychologies of nations as well as history, geography, religion, and public opinion.²⁸ His more immediate aim however was 'to give an account of the

various national problems as they stand at present, and thereby to get at what Nationality means'.²⁹ In this task, psychology was the 'Queen of the sciences'.³⁰

Toynbee was particularly interested in the application to the meaning of nationality of the psychological theories of Henri Bergson and Gabriel Tarde. Bergson was both an important theorist of will as the expression of an unconscious *élan vital*, and a proponent of the chauvinist, and common in wartime, view that France was the expression of a natural or organic national will, and that Germany was by contrast an artificial nation.³¹ Tarde's late nineteenth-century theory of 'Psychological Sociology' had emphasised the importance of will in creating communities out of heterogeneous elements.³² On the one hand, Tarde had argued that '[t]he neat demarcation of *patries*, states, and classes, as well as religions, is a fictive discontinuity substituted for the continuity or the natural *imprecision* of social circles'. On the other hand, Tarde had also proposed a theory of 'inter-cerebral psychology' that involved imitation and allowed for the creation of a national 'us'.³³ In this latter process, the neurological imprints left by ancestors, language, and genes on individuals, determined the boundaries of nations.

Such intellectual influences may go some way to explaining Toynbee's conception of nationality as simultaneously elective and predetermined. He argued both that it is as easy for a group of people to will themselves 'to choose another group's language to be the vehicle for their culture as it is for them to choose political cooperation with people on the other side of a geographical barrier', and that the extent to which people were free to slot themselves into set categories of national difference is limited by their nationality.³⁴ Toynbee claimed nationality is 'a subjective psychological feeling in living people', nations have different psychological attributes, and these 'psychological facts' are 'the really important forces to which all concrete, mechanical manipulations of frontiers and institutions must be referred in the end'.³⁵ Among those facts, were the elemental differences between the English and Germans. The English, Toynbee declared, thought of nationality not as statistics of square miles nor as human units, but as self-determination expressed in will, 'the fleeting incarnation of a force infinitely vaster than itself. It is the will bequeathed by the past that gives its incalculable momentum to the will of the present', and as 'that inward will to cooperate which he [the pan-German] abjures'.³⁶ Toynbee's ideal of a self-determining English nationality involved the recognition that all nations possibly could evolve this capacity for self-determination, and the assumption that English nationality already expressed the pinnacle of that evolution. By contrast, German nationality represented authoritarianism and determinism. Nationality was 'the natural regimen of Europe', but only some peoples were 'ripe' enough, or had evolved 'social self-consciousness' and the 'will to cooperate' enough, to have their nationality politically

recognised; 'the great majority of living populations are undoubtedly unripe for it'.³⁷ It was in this evolutionary context that Toynbee imagined a proto-typical League of Nations as an international authority modelled on the federalism of the United States, comprising psychologically 'mature' nations that could supervise the psychological progress of the 'backward countries' into nations. 'Backward people', he theorised, 'accept and cherish alien culture': 'When Indians of diverse dialect meet to protest against British domination, the discussion tends to slip into the English tongue, because this is the common channel through which all of them have derived the ideas of democracy and self-government which they wish to communicate to one another and to assert against the nation that originally introduced them.'³⁸

Toynbee's presentation of nations or peoples as manifesting divergent propensities for the psychological expression of national self-determination echoed the familiar Victorian trope of advanced and backward societies.³⁹ He added to this image the picture of English and English-derived nations assisting 'would-be nations' and 'backward countries' to 'find their own souls', or 'find themselves'.⁴⁰ Toynbee's stress on the international role of more evolved nations underwrote his interest in the creation of an international government dominated by England and Englishness. It also heightened the role of experts from those more evolved nations, like Toynbee himself, in measuring and assisting the development of nationality as a subjective form of identification among other allegedly less evolved peoples.

Toynbee's attraction to psychological explanations of national difference and propensities was rehearsed in numerous publications about 'nationality' authored by other members of *The New Europe* circle. In a series of public lectures on nationality in modern history delivered in 1915 at Cambridge and historical associations in Birmingham and Bristol, the Cambridge historian J. Holland Rose described cosmopolitan British and American nationalities that, in each case, were the expression of a common national will and encouraged a benign national patriotism. However, German and Balkan nationalisms, Rose argued, were based on an 'intolerant and aggressive instinct'.⁴¹ While British and American versions of nationality also drew upon deep-seated sentiments, passions, and instincts, these were of an intrinsically democratic quality because they allowed for the expression of will, in comparison with German and Balkan instincts.⁴² In Britain and America it was the 'spiritual condition' or 'soul politic' that led to 'the founding of a polity on a natural basis'.⁴³ Because they were expressions of will, British and American nations offered individuals the prospect of self-realisation. National consciousness in these cases corresponded, said Rose, 'to the time in life when the youth *finds himself* [italics in the original]'.⁴⁴

Both Rose and Toynbee's representations of nationality drew on the language and motifs of instinct theory and the self. Their representations of an

‘Anglo-Saxon’ nationality as intrinsically expressive of autonomy, or democratic self-determination, conveniently reconciled America and England as the political and ideological antitheses of Germany and Austria-Hungary, and made the latter synonymous with biological determinism, and political authoritarianism. Despite the New European evocation of a singular English, British or ‘Anglo-Saxon’ culture of nationality, there was more than one version of nationality and its political significance articulated in England as ‘English’ during the war, and it had at its core a rather different preoccupation with psychology.

Unconscious nationality and the UDC

The New Europeans’ main progressive rival for political influence was the breakaway anti-war group organised in 1915 by E. D. Morel, known as the Union of Democratic Control (UDC). In its earliest incarnations, the UDC was regarded as representative of the Liberal party left, but it also comprised exiles from the labour movement. It included at certain times old Fabians such as Graham Wallas and Bertrand Russell. Its enduring members – among them, J.A. Hobson, Norman Angell, Helena Swanwick, Israel Zangwill, Charles Roden Buxton, Ramsay McDonald, Irene Cooper Willis, Violet Paget, and George Trevelyan – represented a broad affiliation of radical liberal and moderate socialist opinion. And like *The New Europe*, the UDC could boast an international character; writers as dissimilar as Rabindrinath Tagore, Romain Rolland, Francesco Nitti, and Edith Durham contributed to its journal *Foreign Affairs*, edited by Helena Swanwick.

The UDC was also not unlike *The New Europe* circle in its support for the principle of nationality (to which it added ‘provision for economic cooperation and international standards for the treatment of minorities’) and for the creation of an international government. Even before the war, many UDC members had been supporters of aspiring ‘small nations’, typically Boers, Finns, Persians, and Macedonians, on the basis that ‘the world advances by the free, vigorous growth of divergent types’. But during the war the UDC was, as Howard Weinroth has pointed out, the first to discard self-determination as an absolute principle and more likely to support the federation of states in south-eastern Europe.⁴⁵ Its members tended to argue for a modified version of national self-determination on the basis that ‘it was impossible to draw perfect frontiers.’ On the whole they favoured the program of ‘Home Rule’ for nationalities within Austria-Hungary – that is the self-determination of its constituent nations within the structure of the empire – and a negotiated peace rather than the New European vision of a *victoire intégrale* that would leave the British empire intact but dismantle the empires of the Central Powers.⁴⁶ Indeed, the UDC’s distaste for the demonisation of Germany stigmatised them within England as treacherously pro-German and made them subject to government surveillance and repression.

Unlike *The New Europe*, too, the UDC's charter pronounced equal male and female citizenship as a prerequisite for the ideals of nationality and international government, and passed a resolution to this effect in 1915. In her published history of the UDC, the feminist Helena Swanwick argued that this resolution reflected the high profile of 'women's suffrage agitation' when the war broke out and women's wariness of 'professions of democratic principles which did not, in practice at least, extend to women.'⁴⁷ As editor of *Foreign Affairs*, Swanwick oversaw the inclusion of articles on the subject of women, and a smattering of articles authored by women. It may have been precisely the extent of female involvement in the UDC that drove Toynbee to confess that, while he was sympathetic to UDC demands for democratic foreign policy processes, he found himself at odds with its 'screechiness'.⁴⁸

The UDC and New Europeans disagreed most fundamentally in their understanding of the psychological origins of nationality and the political weight of nationality as a principle. For UDC members, the political significance of the principle of nationality was usually understood in terms of the workings of the unconscious, and more specifically crowd psychology and herd instinct. Norman Angell, the man who, through his friendship with Lippmann, would play a key role in the conceptualisation of a scientific peace, wrote at the end of the war, '[n]ationality is a very precious manifestation of the instincts by which alone men can become socially conscious and act in some corporate capacity. The identification of "self" with society, which patriotism accomplishes, within certain limits, the sacrifice of self for the community which it inspires ... are moral achievements of infinite hope'.⁴⁹

Adherents of the UDC considered nationality, like patriotism, politically significant because it was a manifestation of unconscious and irrational forces such as herd instinct, gregariousness, or the crowd mind. As one of its most prominent authors, Israel Zangwill, explained, the latest psychological theories of the 'subconscious' threw 'lurid light upon ancient mythologies as well as on savage totems and taboos hitherto catalogued without adequate explanation by our Spencers, Reinachs, or Frazers.'⁵⁰ Irene Cooper Willis, who was connected to Vernon Lee's literary and lesbian circle, an author and barrister in her own right, conceived of the war as inducing 'an emotion known to psychologists as the herd instinct', which she equated with the calls for national unity.⁵¹ The Cambridge philosopher Bertrand Russell argued more openly that nationality needed to be taken into political account in the new world order because it arose from 'a sentiment of similarity and an instinct of belonging to the same group or herd. ... This group instinct, however it may have arisen, is what constitutes a nation, and what makes it important that the boundaries of nations should also be the boundaries of states.'⁵² Russell of course was not especially interested in theories of irrationalism, but he had enough faith in

the existence of group instincts to propose that ‘each nation should be “self-governing”, although this principle might not be applicable in less civilised communities – in the Balkans, in Africa or South America.’⁵³ His version of nationality was grounded in a recidivist understanding of human nature, ‘[o]ne had to recognise that, beneath the thin civilised crust of Western man, there were powerful, dangerous passions that were the residue of his primitive past’: ‘If civilisation – of an individual or of a society – were not to be threatened by these passions, they had to be brought under control, through the exercise of self-discipline (in the case of the individual) and through a process of education and international law (in the case of a nation).’⁵⁴

What made Russell’s conception of nationality meaningful was the same racial map of human nature and history that coloured *The New Europe* perspective on the world. Self-discipline might be possible in civilised nations such as Britain and Germany, but less likely in Slavic countries such as Russia. In a UDC pamphlet entitled ‘War, the Offspring of Fear’, Russell expressed his view of the war as a ‘great race-conflict, a conflict of Teuton and Slav, in which certain other nations, England, France and Belgium, have been led into cooperation with the Slav.’⁵⁵ In his case, unlike the New Europeans, his sympathy for the Teutonic race led him to a defence of Austria as ‘a highly civilised race’, over its Slavic population who were ‘in a relatively backward state of culture.’ Importantly, despite his view of nationality as evidence of a common herd instinct in humans, Russell returned to the theme of divergent racial capacities for the political expression of nationality in order to denigrate Slavic cultures rather than Germany, the more conventional wartime target of stereotyping.

The most eloquent wartime attempt by a UDC member to question *The New Europe*’s agenda was Zangwill’s 1917 study *The Principle of Nationalities*. By this time, Zangwill was already an established author, known for his ‘Jewish’ novels, and for his Zionist activism, as the founder of the radical Jewish Territorialists Organisation. Zangwill was committed to the creation of a Jewish homeland, and drawing on the same metaphor of the self that invaded New European arguments, thought the transfer of Arab populations was necessary in the Middle East in order to create this homeland. Yet, in 1919 he argued in *The International Review* that ‘the Palestine polity must be so framed that *Judæa Irredenta* shall ultimately disappear from the map, like every other *Irredenta*. The question of the Holy Places can be easily solved; the Holy Sepulchre can be guarded by Jews converted to Christianity and the Mosque of Omar by Jews converted to Mohammedanism.’⁵⁶ A similar ironic tone coloured his earlier war time study *The Principle of Nationalities* (1917). Here he took issue with the utopian view of nationality expressed by those whom he labelled *The New Europe*’s ‘Professors’.⁵⁷ ‘Our little difference with the Professor [Rose],’ Zangwill explained, ‘over the novelty of Nationality will have revealed that the concept has never yet been defined

or clarified, and that this famous principle on which “The New Europe” is to be founded is shrouded in fog.⁵⁸ Zangwill’s less than sympathetic account of nationality was based on his understanding that it was not so much a primordial psychological attribute as ‘a form of feeling’ or behaviour related to ‘the psychology of crowds.’⁵⁹

In England, it was not only fellow travellers of the New Europeans and the UDC who spoke up about nationality and promoted variations on the idea of its relative psychological realism. Gilbert Murray, described by one historian as ‘[t]he intellectual godfather of English liberalism’ was neither a member of the UDC nor a contributor to *The New Europe*. However, he had substantial links with both groups and helped popularise the psychological concepts of the unconscious and herd instinct, and the more general view of nations as psychological.⁶⁰

Murray, who in 1908 became Regius Professor of Greek at Oxford, had acquired his intellectual reputation as a classicist on the basis of having established the influence of ‘the deepest thoughts and emotions of the race’, including herd instinct, on Greek myths and rituals.⁶¹ In his spare time, he was a member, and during the war President, of the intellectually popular British Society for Psychical Research founded by Henry Sidgwick and Frederick Myers at Cambridge.⁶² Murray’s pre-war and wartime reflections on nationality echoed his encounters with psychology, particularly as channelled through Myers’ Freud-like notion of the subliminal or unconscious self. In a lengthy article in *The International Journal of Ethics* on ‘National Ideals’ (1900, reprinted in 1921), he argued that the conscious and unconscious were ‘the real forces that govern mankind.’⁶³ He described a ‘submerged self’ that “‘slumbers beneath the threshold,” and that counts for most in the movements of masses and of nations.’ That submerged self was also a primal self that took an individual back to their racial, and even species origins: ‘If you scratch a Russian, it is said, you find a Tartar. And I dare say if you scratch any civilised European pretty deep, you will find something much the same....you may look deeper still, and get glimpses of that wonderful creature on whom our being is based, the great Ape.’

In the course of the Great War, Murray decided that ‘liberal feeling in England should keep fully in touch with the war – not let patriotism get identified with Toryism or Militarism – for the sake of the settlement afterwards’.⁶⁴ He now explained to all who would listen that ‘[a]s all readers of psychology know, herd-union intensifies all the emotions which are felt in common ... Herd union often gives the suppressed subconscious forces their chance of satisfaction.’⁶⁵ In the contemporary context, he thought of herd-instinct and the compulsion to herd-union as ‘an innate psycho-physical disposition to notice objects of a certain class, to feel about them in certain ways and to act correspondingly’, and a source of unification for a Britain divided by the superficial interests of militant suffragists, socialist troublemakers, and opponents of British rule in India and Ireland.⁶⁶ On

this view, democracy was ‘a spirit’ that required the average citizen to feel ‘the same instinctive loyalty towards the whole people that an old-fashioned royalist felt towards his kind’.⁶⁷ Although Murray has been credited with encouraging Toynbee, his son-in-law, to write *Nationality and the War*, as we have seen, Toynbee emphasised the role of will in the formation of nations, and its implications for determining the particular relevance of nationality among different races and cultures, rather than accentuating the universal nature of national instincts.

While the permutations of the psychological nature of nations and their political significance were rarely neatly ordered, in general those English commentators who disagreed with herd-instinct as a concept for thinking about nationality emphasised instead the language of conscious will and, less often, personality. During a lecture delivered at University of London’s Bedford College for Women in 1918, the educationalist and philosopher Hilda Oakeley reminded her audience of the brilliant exposition in the previous year’s course by Professor Gilbert Murray on ‘the herd-instinct’ and then declared her own preference for seeking out not examples of instinct, but, alternatively, of will, ‘the secret and sufficient ground of a general will so the people shall remain true to it, recognising in it the real core of all the multiform will which are its components, an actual power as well as an ideal spirit’.⁶⁸ The essence of that general will and ideal spirit lay in the psychological concept of a ‘national personality,’ as the manifestation of self-determination, and the antithesis of herd instinct and of the rule of the unconscious and irrational.

Conceptions of the unconscious characteristics of nationality, and the political significance of national self-consciousness also inevitably overlapped, as in the wartime intellectual interventions of Alfred Zimmern. With Murray, Zimmern presided over the process Martel describes in the English context as ‘the new fusion of liberalism and imperialism’, and which, I want to argue, underpinned British debates about heterogeneity and nationality, and the cultural language of differential psychology and subjectivity. Involved from the outset with the *European Review* and *The New Europe* (as well as the New Europe Society), Zimmern knew Toynbee from his Oxford days, was encouraged in his work by Murray, held the first British Chair in International Relations (at the University of Wales), and organised wartime worker study-circles on foreign policy and nationality.⁶⁹ In recounting Zimmern’s influence on his own views of the lessons of Social Darwinism, Toynbee recalled Zimmern’s pessimistic theory of society carrying ‘within itself the seeds of decay: individuality was being crushed, the mental and moral fibre of the race was being sapped, and progress was out of the question’.⁷⁰ In turn, the older Zimmern took from his student Toynbee the conception of nationality as an ‘intimate subjective’ and ‘psychological sentiment’ that ‘embodies the momentum of an ancient tradition’ and acts as a source of resistance against that mental and moral racial decline.⁷¹

For Zimmern, nationality was 'an instinct which has been stung into acute and morbid self-consciousness by political oppression ... an instinct which, if left to itself, would slowly die of inanition, smothered beneath the pressure of the material forces which are the dominating feature in modern trans-Atlantic life.'⁷² As an instinct, nationality was the opposite not of governmental oppression but of spiritual atrophy. Nationality implied 'a country, an actual strip of land associated with the nationality, a territorial centre where the flame of nationality is kept alight at the hearth-fire of the home', and a 'peculiarly intimate' corporate self-consciousness 'in which the element of common race is perhaps the most important factor'.⁷³

Zimmern oscillated between acceptance of the primordial nature of nationality and enthusiasm for Zionism, and distrust of nationalism and of the homogeneous nation as a political model. He was against the drawing of borders on national lines, because 'our whole object should be to break down natural barriers.'⁷⁴ But he was also quick to declare that nationalism could only be dismissed at perilous risk because it was '*in excelsis* – a raging, tearing hatred of the alien,' springing from 'deep roots in man's inherited nature' – 'not ... "a fact alterable by human will".'⁷⁵ Like many of his peers, Zimmern presented 'consciousness of nationality' as dependent on a race/culture's evolutionary progress. Thus he thought that no task was 'more urgent among the backward and weaker peoples than the wise fostering of nationality and the maintenance of national traditions and corporate life as a school of character and self-respect.'⁷⁶ He maintained too that since English nationality reflected the primacy of will and was responsible for the soundness of English democracy, it was the English who could assist those backward peoples to progress.⁷⁷

Zimmern's support of 'non-political Nationalism' was shaped by his faith in the Anglo-Saxon basis of the British Commonwealth, and his sense of being 'racially' Jewish and, by virtue of environment, English.⁷⁸ This personal experience informed his faith in the British empire as a model for the management of 'the chief political problem of our age – the contact of races and nations with wide varieties of social experience and at different levels of civilisation.' In general, empires were exemplary of inclusiveness, they 'transcended and absorbed nationalities', and, at their best, 'as in the imperial entity Zimmern preferred to refer to as the British Commonwealth, 'they stood for 'mingling' "the vigour, the knowledge, and the capacity" of the portions of mankind'.⁷⁹ According to Zimmern, British Imperialism was 'the greatest instrument the world has ever seen for good government. It is, in fact ... the greatest *political* instrument for human happiness that the world has ever seen.'⁸⁰ The empire was indeed the equivalent of a nation moulded out of diverse and divergent elements. The limits of that experiment were, for Zimmern, determined by race, a reality figured for him most clearly not in Britain but in the United States and 'the

presence amid the American citizen body of some twelve million Negroes and descendants of slaves'.⁸¹ The United States provided a useful example of the ways in which, in a world that had been substantially remade by European colonialism, matching cultures (however they were defined) with national borders was less than pragmatic: 'if the sentiment of Nationality were admitted as a sole and sufficient claim for a change of government, French Canada would have to pass to France, Wisconsin to Germany, and part of Minnesota to Norway, while the New York police would become the servants of the new Home Rule government in Ireland.'⁸²

Trans-Atlantic networks and nationality as a liberal ideal

The links between British and American intellectuals around the topic of nationality and race were well established by the war, and the appearance of the United States in British literature on nationality was not merely coincidental. Rather, London-based discussions about nationality among a specific group of British democratic-minded intellectuals reflected the themes and motifs of thought among a trans-Atlantic élite, brought together by military as well as ideological alliances, and the free movement of intellectuals that had been typical of the pre-war world. Graham Wallas, the English author of *Human Nature in Politics* (1908), which was said to have wrought something akin to a revolution in political thought by emphasising the importance of psychology, used the American experiment in immigration in order to establish that 'racial and class feeling' was 'unexpectedly resistant to the dissolving force of national consciousness'.⁸³ As one critic describes, Wallas posited that 'the past experience of the race, and not the present experience of the individual, was the fundamental determinant of political behaviour'.⁸⁴ In other words, races made nations, and not nations races. Nationality, like nationalism, was to be explained in the language of unconscious impulses, 'that automatic selection by the mind of some thing of sense accompanied by an equally automatic emotion of affection'.⁸⁵

The first professor of political science at the London School of Economics (1914), Wallas was connected personally to American debates about the nature of nationality through his friendship with Lippmann, whom he had taught before the war in his capacity as visiting lecturer at Harvard. Over the same period that Wallas was to become known for his contribution to the psychology of politics, and the development of 'behavioural' political science, (his other best known publication, *The Great Society*, was published in 1914) he began a friendship with the student Lippmann that focused on their shared intellectual passion for the new theories of Sigmund Freud.⁸⁶ During the war, Lippmann, an avid reader of *The New Europe* at this time, utilised his position as editor of *New Republic* to provide a forum for the views of other British liberal intellectuals whom he had come to know

through his connection with Wallas, and through this broader reading. In particular, Lippmann began a separate correspondence with Zimmern on, amongst other topics, the principle of nationality, and Zimmern brought him into contact with the Fabians, the Bloomsbury set, the UDC, and Toynbee's writing on nationality.⁸⁷ What were Lippmann's own views on nationality during the war? Insofar as he put them to paper, he confirmed the view that '[n]ationality ... is at bottom a cluster of primitive feelings, absorbed into a man and rooted within him long before conscious education begins in the opening environment the directions of taste and prejudice are given, each person takes on his "national" character.' He argued that '[t]he fierce power of national feeling is due to the fact that it rises from the deepest sources of our being. It is the primitive stuff of which we are made, our first loyalties, our first aggressions, the type and image of our souls. It is fixed in the nursery, and the spell of it is never lost.'⁸⁸ In his discussions with Zimmern, however, Lippmann toed a more moderate line, criticising what he saw as Zimmern's failure to oppose 'over-nationalised groups' and the excesses of nationalism in both America and Germany.⁸⁹

Impressed by Lippmann's work and ideas, Norman Angell sought the young American's contributions to the English literature on nationality, internationalism and the League of Nations. Lippmann in turn cultivated Angell's support for American involvement in the war 'on liberal and international grounds ... to crystallise and make real the whole league of peace propaganda.'⁹⁰ When Lippmann assumed responsibility for drafting The Fourteen Points as a member of the Inquiry, Angell was able to use Lippmann to communicate to Wilson support for both the creation of an international government in the form of a League of Nations, and the ideal of national self-determination.

British and American intellectuals also encountered each other through the efforts of the Organisation for a Permanent Peace (*Organisation de la paix durable/Anti Oorlogs Raad*), as I will refer to it, the OPP. The OPP grew out of the Hague peace conference of 1915, and was based in the premier international Dutch city, the Hague. Its spokespersons included well-known white American liberal internationalists such as Emily Greene Balch, Jane Addams, Fannie Fern Andrews, Edward Krehbiel, and David Starr Jordan. The OPP's existence encouraged liaisons between these Americans and like-minded English intellectuals such as the PID's Toynbee, the UDC's Angell and J.A. Hobson, the New European Leonard Woolf, the French *Comité's* Charles Seignobos and Theodore Ruyssen, and the Swedish feminist Ellen Key, all of whom made substantial and transnational contributions to the wartime discussion of nationality under the auspices of the OPP as well as their own intellectual and political networks.⁹¹ Given this eclectic membership it is perhaps unsurprising that the OPP's program repeated many of the aims of both *The New Europe* and the UDC – the abolition of secret treaties, popular control of foreign policy, reduction of armaments, freedom of the

seas, guarantees of religious freedom and equality, the creation of a League of Nations, the rights of nationalities, and the use of plebiscites to decide borders. From 1915, the OPP's English-language magazine *War and Peace*, edited by Angell, competed for political influence with *The New Europe*.⁹² In these issues, OPP writers presented 'self-determination' as a 'new conception' which had been 'added to practical politics' and which implied 'some conception of a single and separable self.' Poland was offered as only one example of the practical problems involved with this conception – it was inhabited 'by two or more hostile racial groups', whereas in Finland, 'the groups are economic classes with contradictory policies'.⁹³ Articles also discussed the ways in which the war had normalised the abnormal psychology of the masses.⁹⁴

Like *The New Europe*, the OPP was active in bringing American intellectuals and activists into contact with the representatives of nationality causes. In 1916, the OPP's women's branch, the International Women's Committee for Permanent Peace, organised the Conference of Oppressed or Dependent Nationalities in Washington D.C., in order to provide a platform for Irish, Belgian, Serbian, Jewish, Albanian, Armenian, Syrian, Russian Jewish, Croatian, Lett (or Latvian), Lithuanian, Polish, Ukrainian, Slovak, Bohemian and Finn causes, and to develop an American international policy in respect to each of those nationalities. It was at this conference that the Chicago sociologist William I. Thomas offered his unexpected statement that nationality was 'that form of organisation' that can best utilise enmity as a force, and expressed the belief that the smaller nationalities would prove just as bad as the great ones, 'if they grew to power also'.⁹⁵

By the time Thomas stated his cynical view of nationality he was in the minority, nationality's star was on the political rise. As Alfred Zimmern wrote, a change had taken place in the outlook of the future of 'the oppressed nationalities of Eastern Europe'.⁹⁶ Zimmern was making an optimistic point about the rising stakes of the principle of nationality, a situation due in no small part to the efforts of influential British and American intellectuals, and not merely their published discussions. Before and during the war, London – as well as the eastern-board cities of the United States – was home to numerous nationality and race conferences organised by liberals concerned with the political implications of nationality as a principle. Gilbert Murray chaired the 1910 London Conference on Subject Races and Nationalities, which hosted representatives of Indian, Egyptian, Moroccan, Irish, Polish, Finnish, Persian, and Georgian national movements, and which declared nations the expression of consciousness, personality, and individuality.⁹⁷ Seton-Watson was able to ensconce Masaryk and the cause of Slav nationalisms at the University of London. Paris was similarly home to the aspiring nationality causes that would dominate the peace agenda. Charles Seignobos, the French historian, *Comité* and OPP figure, and con-

tributor to *The New Europe*, had created a post at the *École des hautes études* for Joseph Gabrys, a hero of the Lithuanian independence movement and an important figure in the Lausanne-based Union of Nationalities. Another French historian and *Comité* member Ernest Denis was President of the Paris-based International League for the Defense of the Right of Peoples, created to defend cultural differences and influence public opinion in 'civilised countries'. The Paris home of the *Comité*, the *Société de géographie*, acted as a clearing-house for the national representatives of the Romanian, Polish, and Serbian causes. In France, as in England and the United States, nationality was a carefully considered topic in the discussions of scientific, cultural, and political circles.

France and *le droit de disposer de soi-même*

The historian Martha Hanna has shown how extensively scholars and writers 'from across the political spectrum' mobilised during the war in response to the French President's 'invitation to wage war with their pens and their words,' to produce publications that 'addressed intellectual and cultural issues raised by the war,' amongst which was national self-determination.⁹⁸ The Republican (and Dreyfusard) *Ligue des droits de l'homme et du citoyen* or League of the Rights of Citizen and Man, which claimed to have about 75,000 members, had close connections to English Labour and feminist groups, particularly the UDC.⁹⁹ The *Ligue* identified strongly with Wilson's program, and its members acted as advisors to the *Comité d'études*.¹⁰⁰ The *Ligue*, like the UDC, emphasised the existence of an alternative Germany, the Germany of Kant, although they could not agree in 1916 on whether to fight the war to its end, or to end it as soon as possible at all costs. Ferdinand Buisson, its President, who was also a member of the *Association française pour la Société des nations* [The French Association for the League of Nations], shared the view that nations like individuals had the same capacities and right to '*disposer de soi-même*' [self-determination], if they had reached an appropriate stage of political evolution.¹⁰¹ The *Ligue's* members claimed not to support national sentiment unthinkingly at the same time that they argued that more evolved countries had to take a tutoring role in respect to lesser races. In pamphlets published in France and in England on the principle of nationality, the *Ligue's* Theodore Ruyssen (Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bordeaux and OPP figure) discussed the desire of nationalities to rule themselves, and portrayed this desire as the manifestation of 'the basic character which heredity and history have given them.'¹⁰² Ruyssen rendered the unconscious an important part in the moral life of nations, but he also thought a general national will was superior to the sum of individual wills. What he shared with other *Ligue* members was a view of the principle of nationality as both political or territorial, and French by definition.

Supporters of the *Ligue des droits de l'homme et du citoyen* were not the only proponents of the premise that the democratic version of nationality was intrinsically French, or English, and the antithesis of all things German. The prominent French, Italian, Belgian, Eastern European, and English contributors to the volume *Le droit des nationalités* highlighted the dichotomy between, on the one hand, the German preference for a state based on instinct and the unconscious, and, on the other, the English/French preference for giving expression to will and personality.¹⁰³ None of these intellectuals betrayed any sense that such presumptions might themselves be akin to the alleged German tendency to make essentialist qualities the bases of national identification. Instead they identified the German threat to Western liberalism with a propensity to place the collective good above individual interest.

Edited by the Belgian historian Eugène Baie, *Le droit des nationalités* reflected some of the premises of Baie's earlier historical studies. In *L'épopée Flamande: histoire de la sensibilité collective*, originally published in 1903, and reprinted in 1917, Baie had emphasised the psychological reality of the Flemish race and the legitimacy of the Belgian nation. He had also placed great faith in the capacity of comparative psychology to replace anthropology in the study of difference. A psychological approach would allow the dissection, '*frisson par frisson*', of the physiological basis of emotions and sensations that were the source of national identification.¹⁰⁴ In *Le droit des nationalités*, Baie argued that non-German science had shown that there was more to a people than its political constitution and its racial origins: 'The social phenomena that are the signs of a national life, are only the exterior signs of its psychology. Pursuing the development of a moral person and a collective psychology together is at once the principle and the character of nationalities'.¹⁰⁵ He stressed the primal nature of the sentiment of '*selbst, du self-feeling*' as described by English theories of psychology, '[d]e l'intelligence et du respect de ces forces inconscientes est né le principe légitimiste du *self-government*. ... Toute nation n'a qu'un moyen de les réaliser, et c'est de se constituer en corps legal, en individualité politique, en État'.¹⁰⁶ On Baie's view, the correct view of nationality was to be found in the French program of *Égalité, Fraternité, Liberté*. It was also the opposite of the German view of nationality, which focused on race and the principles of *Sélection, Survivance, Déterminisme*. The philosopher, French translator of William James' works, and New European, Émile Boutroux's contribution to the same volume similarly presented the war in terms of a contest between the German notion of 'the unconscious as the essence of human nature and as the basis of rights', and the concept of nationality as 'personality'. Boutroux argued that according to the French conception of nationality, persons were distinguished by 'the possession of the self, the aptitude to act in an original manner and conform to an ideal ... in so far as nations are themselves too persons, they possess all the attributes which follow from personality'.¹⁰⁷

The most enigmatic and at the time best known French study of nationality, René Johannet's *Le principe des nationalités* (1918), was sceptical of such blatant contrasts between French and German theories of nationality, regardless of their theoretical underpinning. A lawyer and contributor to well-known Paris reviews, Johannet had connections with the republican philosopher Henri Bergson, and conservative nationalists such as Paul Bourget and Charles Peguy. As a result, he is ideologically a rather elusive figure. Although we know that during the war he became close to the right-wing *Action Française* and Charles Maurras, his version of nationality was an intriguing combination of constructivist and essentialist thought. In *Le principe des nationalités*, a study lauded by the French Academy, Johannet surveyed and dismissed the ideas of nationality propagated by the likes of Zangwill, Muir, Toynbee, Boutroux, Woodrow Wilson, the social psychologists Gabriel Tarde and Gustave Le Bon, Ernest Renan and the mid-nineteenth century English writer Walter Bagehot.¹⁰⁸ He arrived at the conclusion that the idea of nationality itself needed to be thought of as historical.¹⁰⁹ Johannet reminded his readers that just as the so-called purity of nations was a historical fiction (his example was the historical expurgation of Germans from the British monarchy), so too the allegedly fundamental differences in French and German intellectual thought had changed over time.¹¹⁰ In particular there had been a shift in the French intellectual mood from earlier criticisms of the idea of nationality as the emanation of German culture, to the embrace of nationality as a French principle under threat from Germany.¹¹¹ During the war, a French conception of the nation had emerged that defined it as a fact of consciousness or the will of peoples, in contrast to the German view of it as a fact of nature, which science had *pour mission de dégager*.¹¹² He mocked those definitions of nationality as applying the idea of Kantian consciousness to the consciousness of national collectivity.¹¹³

Borrowing from the French sociologist Alfred Fouillée, Johannet preferred to think of nationality as an '*idée-force*', that is nationality had a 'psychic force' and could express many different meanings and significance depending on context.¹¹⁴ It was on the basis of this combined historical and psychological understanding of nationality that Johannet derided the fantasies of those *nationalitaires* – progressive supporters of the principle of nationality – who were self-styled anti-nationalists and, yet, simultaneously thought they could determine nationality by colouring maps, counting, measuring and organising plebiscites. But he, himself, regarded psychology as one of the sciences that could help explain how nationality was the 'equivalent of the consciousness of nationality' in the sense that it '*is the idea of a collective personality, variable of inspiration, consciousness, intensity, and of grandeur relative to the State... which searches for the justification of its identity, like its pretensions, in the natural characteristics of origin*'.¹¹⁵

Johannet's cynicism was inspired by a core political conservatism that allowed him to interrogate and embrace the existence of a collective national personality that mirrored the elements and aspirations of an individual self. While sceptical of the political potential of nationality as a principle, Johannet held to a theory of the core Gallic nature of French nationality, and to the view that Germany had stolen Alsace-Lorraine's 'French self'. He depicted France (just as some English intellectuals portrayed England) as the oldest, most stable, continuous, national 'personality'.¹¹⁶ He found the predominant French liberal account of nationality as elective unacceptable because it erroneously made the free individual the constitutive *cellule* of society, a concept that, on his view, could only lead to anarchy and dissociation. In particular, he seemed to fear the impact of the elective principle of nationality on the status of French regions and colonies.

Ultimately, the connections between French and British and American intellectuals were not as strong as those between the anglophones. As James Kloppenberg has pointed out, the similarities in Anglo-American liberalism in this period do not translate easily into the political and intellectual developments in France among democratic radicals.¹¹⁷ Yet there were politically significant intellectual connections and correspondences in the development of attitudes towards nationality, established in some cases in the context of the political alliances between these states. During the war, the philosophy of Henri Bergson was not just a vague intellectual influence on individuals such as Toynbee. Bergson was a member of official French commissions on political and social issues. In 1917 and 1918, he undertook two political missions to the United States on behalf of the French government, with the aim of influencing American foreign policy. While there he established a close friendship with Wilson's personal adviser, Colonel Edward Mandell House. (In September 1917, Gilbert Murray was similarly invited by the British government to lecture in the United States as a means of motivating American intervention in the war.)¹¹⁸ During the second mission, Bergson produced a short pamphlet on self-determination putting forward the view that plebiscites were central to the idea of nationality, and that some peoples were not developed enough to participate in such a process.¹¹⁹ Indeed he was apt to describe the war as 'a conflict between two different and irreconcilable conceptions of government, society and progress', which correlated to the psychological differences between the French nation and Germany.¹²⁰ He thought of these European differences in the context of the competition between the 'white and yellow races', and the incapacity for self-determination of the 'warring tribes' of Algiers and Morocco (French 'possessions') who lacked 'solidarity' and 'national consciousness'.

The war drove Bergson to political positions not only in support of France but also of the naturalness of nationality. He was full of praise for

his peer Gustave Le Bon's *The Psychology of the Great War* (1915/16). Although Bergson and Le Bon were fundamentally ideologically opposed – Bergson was a liberal in his conception of the freedom of the individual – in the context of war they could agree that 'the man whom the earlier theories artificially endowed with a fixed personality' was a mere figment and had been replaced with the conception of '[t]he unconscious will', which originated 'in the necessities, desires, and aspirations of the race, group, or environment by which our personality is surrounded'.¹²¹ Le Bon was located 'at the hub of a network linking philosophers like Bergson and politicians such as Clemenceau, as well as senior military figures,' including the diplomat who presided at the peace of 1919 alongside Clemenceau, Gabriel Hanotaux.¹²² Le Bon's correspondence with Aristide Briand, who initiated the creation of the *Comité*, indicates an intellectual intimacy, and even Le Bon's keenness to impart to his 'cher ami' the view that it is 'impossible to change the soul of a race.'¹²³ Le Bon was influenced too by the important New European, Henry Wickham Steed, to the extent of drawing on the *Times*' editor's assertion that life was 'compounded of energy, which is often blind, and which springs from sources that lie below what psychologists call "the threshold of consciousness"', in order to articulate his understanding of nationality.¹²⁴ In his own reflections on empire, Steed had stated that the English male represented a personal self instinctively and unconsciously in tune with a national self; 'Englishmen' were 'guided above all by instinct'.¹²⁵ Le Bon drew on this same representation of the instinctively 'individual conscience' of the Englishman or American 'which surrenders only a very small part of itself to the collectivity', in order to criticise the unconsciously-determined German 'collective conscience ruled by the State'.¹²⁶

The French discussion of nationality exhibited an awareness and accommodation of anglophone theorists, intellectuals, and perspectives, just as the anglophone commentary drew on French psychological theories. There were always politically contingent dimensions to these national discussions. What empire was to the fashioning of progressive English conceptions of British nationality, the unredeemed territory of Alsace-Lorraine was to the cultivation of a French view of nationality.¹²⁷ The relative scope of these discussions is also indicative of differences: the French liberals privileging of national personality and consciousness, and English interest in the unconscious of herd instinct and crowd theory. It could be argued too that the particular inflection in American discussions of nationality during the war reflected the United States' proclaimed status as a 'melting pot' – a concept that Zangwill's 1908 play *The Melting Pot*, about immigrants in America, had helped entrench. The United States was of course distinguished by its distance from the territorial questions associated with the principle of nationality in Europe, and by sedimented perceptions of the 'negro problem'. At the same time, the United States' role as a refuge for

European migrant groups guaranteed lively interest there in the fates of new and old nationalities on the continent, and in the principles according to which those fates might be decided by the victorious powers. Studies of diasporic populations invited scientific discussion not only of cultural adaptability but also (as Wallas had argued) of the salience of nationality. Emily Greene Balch of the OPP was among those American intellectuals eager to document the situation of immigrants in the United States for empathetic reasons, proving both the shared humanity of the groups she studied and their contribution to a dynamic American nationality – even though her application to work in the Inquiry was turned down.¹²⁸ William I. Thomas, whose research was used by the Inquiry, and whose approach to social psychology was intended to dispute the idea of racial or sexual inequality, showed how Polish immigrants formed ‘a *new Polish-American society* out of these fragments separated from Polish society and embedded in American society’.¹²⁹ Walter Pillsbury, a Michigan-based professor of psychology and author of *The Psychology of Nationality and Internationalism* (1919), wrote in his introduction to that book that he had been inspired to reflect on the topic of nationality by the pre-First World War phenomenon of American Greeks returning to Greece to fight in the Balkan War. That reflection brought him to argue that new scientific methodologies were required for the study of migrants that tested ‘how far may one develop the mental qualities that constitute the nation in individuals of a different race’.¹³⁰ He had in mind the government endorsed and systematic mental intelligence testing that was being imposed on American soldiers (Russians, Italians, Polish, and ‘Negroes’), and its immigrants (particularly Russian Jews and Italians) with the aim of discovering the cultural and racial limitations of national assimilation.¹³¹ Of course, in the American case too, the NAACP and W. E. B. DuBois did not hesitate to emphasise the relevance of the ideal of national self-determination for the American ‘negro’, but they were largely ignored by the key writers on nationality who preferred to focus on ‘oppressed or dependent nationalities’ in Eastern Europe, and occasionally in the British empire.

If, by the end of the war, ‘the right of peoples to dispose of themselves had still hardly been defined, whether in popular consciousness or in international law’,¹³² the idea that nationality was a natural and intrinsic element of human psychology and political man, in ways that were distinctive for different races, nations, and sexes, had certainly found a receptive scholarly and popular audience. Participants at a conference organised by Seignobos in 1915 at the *École des hautes études* declared that the right of nationalities to live, develop, and determine themselves was primordial and rested on the same principles as the fundamental rights of man himself; only a free nationality could create the necessary environment for man to fully exercise his faculties as an individual. The ‘Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities’ drafted at this conference also linked the nationality

question to 'the race question' by comparing self-conscious forms of nationality with allegedly unconscious nationalities that could not understand their own destinies and indigenous primitive or decaying populations incapable of raising themselves to the level of civilised nations without supervised education and protection.¹³³ The Congress of Oppressed Nationalities held on 8–10 April 1918 in Rome and organised ostensibly by the 'Committee for the Liberation of the Oppressed Nationalities of Austria-Hungary', may have been a strategic ploy by the Italian government to uphold irredentist claims against the Austro-Hungarian empire, but it too authorised the view that the attributes of legitimate, vital, and triumphant nations were 'consciousness of their aims' and the existence of a will 'adequate to the needs which impel them and to the ideals which justify those aims.'¹³⁴ Significantly, the key figures at this conference were not only the representatives of Italians, Czechoslovaks, Romanians, Poles, Jugo-Slavs and Serbs in the Austro-Hungarian empire, but Steed, Seton-Watson, Seignobos and Denis. The course of this Congress is indicative of the ways in which the principle of nationality had become a self-fulfilling discourse, in spite (or even because) of the concept's vagueness, or even of its *Realpolitik* manipulation by the Allied governments, and thanks to the efforts of idealistic liberal-minded intellectuals from those same Allied states.¹³⁵

What is glaringly obvious in hindsight is that by the end of the war, the message about nationality being sent out by Western intellectuals clashed in fundamental ways with the status of nationality in the nation-states of which they themselves were citizens. This state of intellectual and political affairs also provoked the perplexity of a contemporary, the American philosopher John Dewey. In an article on 'The Principle of Nationality' (1917), Dewey remarked on 'certain curious anomalies', pointing out that the great advocates of 'the principle of nationality' came from states that exemplified heterogeneity, without corresponding cultural borders, and with no political space for any such principle.¹³⁶ Great Britain was actively representing the rights of so-called small nationalities who claimed self-determination on the basis of their singular homogeneity, but the British Empire exhibited 'from the standpoint of its own internal composition, the greatest heterogeneity of nationalities'. In the United States, there was what Dewey called 'a distinct situation', 'for we are perhaps the only national state wherein the principle of nationality has no political standing – except as political parties find it expedient to place upon their tickets representatives of various nationalities in order to secure votes. But excepting in an informal way, the principle of nationality receives no recognition in the constitution of a state like ours, where citizenship and nationality are independent.' We might add to Dewey's list France as a state that at the end of the First World War had a marked influence on the defence and enactment of nationality as a political principle invoked in

the interest of matching national borders, cultures, and selves. Yet, as in the case of Britain and the United States, the pronouncements of French liberal-minded élites associated France with an ideal of elective nationality that rendered heterogeneity a cultural and political virtue.

It was no mere coincidence, or simple irony, that in 1919 anomalous liberal political ambitions for a new more democratic world order actually augmented the scope of cultural determinism, and along the way, oriented the particular direction of twentieth century international relations and its historiography, namely its white Western European, and masculine biases.¹³⁷ In the following two chapters I trace the intellectual discussion about nationality, its political virtues, and its roots in a psychological conception of the nation, further back in time to the pre-war period. I will argue that it was the intersection of science and international politics, and of the study of psychology and the idea of the nation, that shaped even Woodrow Wilson's mosaic-like understanding of national self-determination, and the anomalous authority of the United States and Britain in the new national world order.

3

Psychology, Race, and the Nation Question, 1870–1914

The tracking of a psychological language of the nation back in time could lead us at least as far back as the eighteenth century, to the ideas of Hume and Herder, or the early nineteenth-century writings of de Staël, Fichte, and Hegel. But in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the weight of evolutionary and racial thought imposed a quite specific political burden on the idea that the nation was a psychological form and that national differences were the products of psychological processes and characteristics. Intellectuals who tackled the nation question in the latter half of the nineteenth century wrote in the midst of distinctive debates about the biological and historical origins of human psychology and human differences.¹ The rise of psychology ‘as a coherent and individuated scientific discourse’, conventionally dated to the 1870s, signalled the emergence of an authoritative discourse of psychology that embraced to varying degrees racial and evolutionary thought, and that was regarded as specifically relevant for explaining the processes of nation-formation.² This new scientific understanding of psychology emphasised the compounded influence of racial and historically accumulating cultural characteristics on nations, on their psychological features, and on their political destinies. It also fortified the view that the answer to what contemporaries referred to as the ‘nation question’ lay in psychology.

Evidence that, in the decades leading up to the First World War, changes in science had renovated the language of psychology and reoriented the idea of the nation is not difficult to find. We need only look as far as the classic statement on that idea famously presented by Ernest Renan, the French historian, philologist, and moral philosopher, in 1882, at the Paris Sorbonne. Renan’s evocation of the nation as ‘a soul, a spiritual principle’ offers a useful vantage point for an examination of how, increasingly in the latter decades of the nineteenth century, posing the question ‘what is a nation?’, and contemplating the nation’s political significance, compelled intellectual engagement with a changing conception of human psychology.³

In the aftermath of the 1848 revolutions, Renan had already propounded what he termed the scientific lessons of psychology as fundamental for comprehending the idea of the nation and developing national policies.⁴ As a materialist perspective on psychology began to prevail over the philosophical characteristics of the psychology of old, Renan's answer to the nation question in 1882, its emphasis on the role of 'man, with his desires and his needs', on the nation's 'soul', as 'the result of the profound complexity of history', and on the role of memory and of the human will, resonated a biological understanding of evolution borrowed from the 'fathers' of a new scientific psychology, such as Herbert Spencer, and Théodule Ribot, Spencer's French translator. Renan was not only aware of these developments in the study of psychology, in the 1880s he was a key supporter of Ribot's appointment to a Chair in Experimental and Comparative Psychology at the *Collège de France*.⁵ Under the influence of Ribot, Renan's notion of will could be understood only problematically as the expression of individual subjectivity. As Ribot described it, 'will' drove 'its roots into the depths of the unconscious and beyond the individual into the species and the race. It comes not from above, but from below; it is a sublimation of the lower instincts.'⁶ The conceptual trajectory of Renan's other key term, memory, was similar. Even though scholars of the nation have pointed out that in *Qu'est ce qu'une nation* Renan's notion of memory allowed for conscious collective forgetting, under the star of the new psychology, memory was theorised as a process of physiological 'recapitulation'. This theory had been given its force by Spencer, a figure who sits on the threshold of the old and new psychology, and who posited that the psychical characteristics of an organic society added up to its national character. National character was stored in the individual's nervous system as an organic memory and passed on as visceral experience and in collectively inherited instincts, traceable in an individual's involuntary habits.⁷ Memory revived the racial origins of national psychologies, whereby 'the present organism contained its past within it'.⁸ Given these increasingly conventional interpretations of concepts such as memory, and will, and Renan's own role in the institutionalisation of a new scientific conception of psychology, the claim made in *Qu'est ce qu'une nation* that '*les ancêtres nous ont faits ce que nous sommes*' [our ancestors have made us what we are] is as evocative of the lessons of the body as of an abstract notion of the legacy of the past.

Renan presented nations as manifestations of psychological differences shaped by their racial pasts. Indeed, the Bulgarian philosopher Tzvetan Todorov has confidently described Renan as replacing the role of physical race in the constitution of national differences with 'linguistic, historical, or psychological race'.⁹ *Qu'est ce qu'une nation* bears all the hallmarks of the popular neo-Lamarckian view of heredity applied to the workings of the collective mind.¹⁰ The premise that acquired characteristics could be inherited was infinitely drawn upon for explaining the allegedly distinctive psy-

chological characteristics of nations, as well as the fundamental difference between nations and races.¹¹ In the general climate of empirical enthusiasm for the material evidence supposedly offered by the embodied mind, even Darwin's claim that 'instincts may be actions originally conscious, but now become mechanical, and they may be inherited habits'¹² was evoked by psychologists to account for the formative influence of historical and social change on collective national differences, so that even 'knowledge taught from one generation to the next' could be collectively inherited.¹³

Across the Channel, similar influences were being wrought on the idea of psychology, and on its significance for explaining the nation. Exactly a decade before Renan, Walter Bagehot, the English political economist and moral philosopher penned his own answer to the nation question in the influential tome *Physics and Politics: Thoughts on the Application of the Principles of 'Natural Selection' and 'Inheritance' to Political Society* (1872). The subtitle of *Physics and Politics* is indicative of Bagehot's debt to Darwin's theory of evolution as an environmentally driven process of natural selection, even though, like Renan, Bagehot was more partial to the views of Spencer and the neo-Lamarckian premise that acquired characteristics could be inherited.¹⁴ Indeed, Bagehot's argument makes evident that, by the 1870s, by virtue of the influence of race and evolution theory, bringing psychology to bear on the idea of the nation meant clarifying the nation's debt to biology. For the purposes of my argument, the claims made in *Physics and Politics* usefully illuminate a complex of popular assumptions about psychology, race, and the nation question that, a decade later, Renan could take for granted.

In *Physics and Politics*, Bagehot sought to answer the question 'what are nations?' and settled on the idea that nations are 'a like body of men, because of that likeness capable of acting together, and because of that likeness inclined to obey similar rules'.¹⁵ He had two explanations for the development of this 'likeness' over time, both fundamentally psychological. The first drew on the popular psychological concept of 'imitation', that men imitate 'what they see, and catch the tone of what they hear,' and thereby form 'a settled type – a persistent character'. The novelty of Bagehot's understanding of imitation is apparent in his second related theory of 'unconscious selection', which he described as 'this unconscious imitation and encouragement of appreciated character, and this equally unconscious shrinking from and persecution of disliked character'.¹⁶ Although Bagehot did not elaborate on the mechanics of the 'unconscious' as the seat of the psychological impulse to sexual selection, the increasingly dominant view of the unconscious in the later nineteenth century saw it as 'heritable, largely collective, and only in part derived from the experiences of the individual'.¹⁷ In some cases, the collective character of the unconscious was presented as the racial site of the national past, in others it explained a determinist impulse to nation-formation. In Bagehot's view,

‘unconscious selection’ drove individuals to choose nationally like-minded social and sexual partners, and linked national communities to their racial past through atavism, ‘the return, in part, to the unstable nature of their barbarous ancestors’.¹⁸

On the view of both Renan and Bagehot, nations added to the raw material of the racial unconscious new historically evolved moral and intellectual traditions and forms of social organisation that could be psychologically inherited. This process lay the grounds for political progress, but only among those nations with racially designated psychological aptitudes.¹⁹ For Bagehot, race explained the fact that ‘Oriental nations’ were static, while Aryan and Teuton nations were dynamic. For Renan, the inferior (‘non-perfectible’) races were unable to move up the ladder of civilisation, superior races were able to avoid physiological determinism, and the Semitic and Aryan races were destined to conquer the world and unify it.²⁰ Critical to interpretations of the psychological characteristics of nations and their relationship to races, was an historical narrative about the evolutionary characteristics and significance of political progress.

The similarities between Renan and Bagehot’s interest in the nation question do not end with race or evolutionary determinism. Rather, they both established reputations as spokespersons for a liberal ideal of the nation. This was partly built on their preference for maintaining the nation as a category distinctive from race. Like Bagehot before him, Renan was keen to argue that the racial origins of nations did not dictate their fate, even as he confirmed that racial origins did determine the uneven psychological progress of certain (other people’s) nations. They both insisted that nations are the expression of individual subjectivities, of moral consciousness rather than a collective racial unconscious, and the evidence of human evolution, improvement, and the possibility of politics. As Renan put it, nations were the expression of ‘the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that one has received in an undivided form.’²¹ Neither of these men were constructivists. Instead, *Physics and Politics* and *Qu’est-ce qu’une nation* record the tensions between biology and history that structured contemporary liberal perspectives on psychology, and on the idea of the nation.

Of course, contemporary political developments bundled together under the rubric of the nation question heightened the relevance of psychology, and the relative significance accorded biology and history in the conceptualisation of nations – from the formation of two new major states Italy and Germany, to the contestation of borders within Europe among the major powers, the intensification of the nationalist ambitions of Western states through imperial competition, and the demands by groups within those empires for greater representation on the basis of their national status. At a time when the political ramifications of the nation question became a defining feature of the *fin-de-siècle*, Renan’s lecture *Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?*

(‘What is a Nation?’) was quickly published, widely translated and disseminated. All who attended that lecture on the nation or who read it published would have been acutely aware of its pertinence for the status of Alsace-Lorraine, a territory that France had lost to the new German state a decade earlier as a consequence of the Franco-Prussian war. But if the pragmatic concerns of *Realpolitik* spurred reflection on the nature of the nation, it was the newly scientific status of psychology as a field of knowledge that provided the conceptual framework. That framework gave to race a primary place in the study and conceptualisation of psychology and of the psychological nature of nations. While some historians have focused on the impact of this shift in the idea of psychology on the scientific categorisation and confirmation of racial difference,²² I want to argue that psychology had quite distinctive consequences for the idea of the nation.²³ It was precisely at a time when race claimed ‘precedence over all previous formulations of nation and state’, that liberal-minded scientists and scholars were drawn to psychology as a science anchored in biology but not reducible to biological determinism, as a means of divining the complex historical and subjective characteristics of the nation and national differences.²⁴

As ideas, psychology and the nation reinforced each other’s authenticity and elusiveness. The same questions that intellectuals put as the nation question were integral to the study of psychology: Should the origins of nations/human psychology be attributed to primal or social forces, to the determinist laws of biology, or to the less predictable course of history? Indeed, the uncertainty that surrounded the future of psychology as a discipline made the idea of the nation an important test case, particularly in regard to where the line between the respective influence of biology, as fixed and predetermined, and history, as more randomly occurring in time, might be drawn. Psychologists such as Ribot emphasised that knowledge of evolution had given psychology a distinctive place, ‘above biology and below history, accounting for the character not just of individuals but of entire peoples’.²⁵ It was not only psychology’s obligation to the study of peoples, but also their mutual obligation to the methods of both biology and history, that designated their similar and overlapping conceptual locations, in an ambivalent space somewhere between the truths marked inside the mind by the body and the past.

Psychologies of difference

In the latter decades of the nineteenth century, the study of national differences constituted an important strand in the articulation of scientific psychology. Unscientific ‘ordinary psychology’, Théodule Ribot complained in his overview of English psychology (1870), had assumed that mankind was indeed ‘man, adult, civilized, and white’ and had ‘taken no heed of the inferior races (black and yellow)’.²⁶ Consequently, the new psy-

chology should account for the facts (as he saw them) of inequality. Further to this end, Ribot proposed the study of ethology, a concept borrowed from the English political philosopher John Stuart Mill. Ribot's later version of ethology is indicative of how, from its beginnings, the conception of psychology as scientific was applied to the nation question, and to the cultivation of a psychological definition of the nation. In the early nineteenth century, Mill had referred to ethology as the philosophical study of the character of individuals, nations, and races. Mill assumed races were biological, but he had only a vague impression of nations as cultural and political entities that might have racial origins. By contrast, in 1870, Ribot portrayed ethology as a necessary branch of the psychological study of difference unequivocally based in biology.²⁷ Nations were undoubtedly the products of a process of heredity that 'transmits and fixes certain psychological characters in a people as in a family'.

Despite Ribot's early interest in ethology as the study of collective difference, it was only from the 1890s that the idea of the nation began to entrench itself in psychology, and then in the specific branch known as social psychology. The 'fathers' of social psychology included sociologists such as Gustave Le Bon and Gabriel Tarde, who developed distinctive theories of the collective psychological constitution of societies, and whose influence was acknowledged by the generation of intellectuals and politicians presiding at the peace of 1919. The solidification of the disciplinary face of social psychology after the turn of the twentieth century was accompanied by the appearance of numerous journals and textbooks, which incorporated nations and races as natural objects of study. The first issue of the Paris-based *Revue de psychologie sociale* (1907) actually featured psychological studies of what it called the great nations, Germany, Russia and Japan, in order to examine 'the actual mental frontiers created by the differences of race and milieu that exist between nations'.²⁸ The creation of the Collective Psychology section of the *Institut de psychologie* in Paris occurred as late as 1911, and it was primarily thought of as a contribution to the study of nations alongside races.²⁹

Among the most important of the first textbooks in this new field was William McDougall's *Introduction to Social Psychology* (1908). The most popular pre-First World War English-language publication in psychology, it described the ability to adapt instinctive behaviours as a characteristic of nations.³⁰ McDougall came to social psychology by way of anthropology, and the Society for Psychical Research, the Cambridge based group whose membership reached deep into contemporary political and cultural life – from Gilbert Murray to Arthur Balfour. For McDougall, who also stressed the importance of race in the constitution of national differences, instinct theory explained the importance of imitation for the unique processes of nation-formation.³¹ Race determined some psychological differences, but (as in Bagehot's much earlier formulation) McDougall's schema rendered

imitation the process by virtue of which a group *became* a nation. Conceptualised as both a lesser instinct and as a social process occurring in time, imitation allowed a group to change its character, and to collectively pass on those changes as inherited instincts or 'habits'.³² McDougall also concocted an account of an adaptive instinctive process he named 'contra-imitation'. On this version of instinct theory, most Englishmen 'would scorn to kiss and embrace one another or to gesticulate freely, if only because Frenchmen do these things; they would not wear their hair either long or very closely cropped, because Germans do'.³³ Such theorising was convincing only in that it confirmed existing prejudices, not because it explained them.

While there had been many varied disciplinary incursions into the study of both individual and social psychology by this time – including the arrival of psychoanalysis – there were marked continuities in the kinds of themes that had developed in the scientific study of the nation as a social psychological phenomenon, some of which echoed Bagehot. For example, the author of *Psychology of Race-Prejudice* (1904), the Chicago sociologist William I. Thomas, portrayed 'race-prejudice' as a normal affect leading to nation formation, 'connected to instinct and the tribal stage of society' and situated in the 'growing consciousness of kind' that human beings developed 'as they are attracted and repelled by the similarities of blood, brotherhood, kinship, dress, speech, social practice and habit'.³⁴ Thomas expanded on this theory in a paper entitled 'Nationalism, Individualization of Function, and the Creation of Values', a copy of which the American delegation to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 took with them. In it, he described enmity as 'a primitive reflex, temporary and limited form of efficiency, based on the instincts and emanating from the spinal cord'.³⁵ As humans progressed, consciousness of kind became rarefied to its national dimensions, and an individual's race-prejudice became elemental to and decided by the constitution of social and national consciousness.³⁶ A conscientious anti-racist, Thomas proposed that even though the inclination towards 'race-prejudice' was inevitable while 'mankind is diverse', the specific objects of that prejudice were superficial, and race-prejudice would gradually diminish 'with increased intercommunication, common interests and standards, similar education, equal access to knowledge, mental and social parity.' Along with Renan and Bagehot, he believed evolutionary progress dictated that eventually ever-enlarging forms of social and political organisation would supersede the nation.

The last decade of the nineteenth century also saw the emergence of a number of specialised sub-fields of social psychology specifically concerned with the study of group difference, usually referred to together as differential social psychology, and framed by conceptual tensions between biology – as race or blood – and history – as culture or language. Ethnic psychology and ethnopsychology, the psychology of peoples, and folk psychology, in

particular, each added in important ways to the available vocabulary for explaining the nature of nations.

The biological inflections of theories of the nation are most apparent in the case of ethnopsychology, which the English-based *Dictionary of Psychological Medicine* (1892) optimistically forecast as the very future of the science of psychology.³⁷ Certainly it had made a strong appearance in Paris through the efforts of the Inquiry and the work of Dominian. Ethnopsychology took institutional shape within the framework of the relatively new discipline of anthropology, which, with its readymade status as a science of observed differences in the present world, provided the empirical fodder for the most reflexively racist contributions to the conceptualisation of psychology and nations.³⁸ The influence of that same discipline also decided ethnopsychology's focus on language as a palimpsest of enduring collective differences. Thus for Daniel Garrison Brinton, Chair of Archaeology and Linguistics at the University of Pennsylvania, 'ethnic psychology' was the study of 'psychical endowments' traceable in language through the methodologies of linguistic ethnography. This new psychological understanding of linguistic ethnography manifested a biological bent, including the idea that 'mixture of languages, especially in grammatical structure' equated to the 'mixture of blood'.³⁹ In *Races and Peoples: Lectures on the science of ethnography* (1890), Brinton argued that biologically-determined psychological features (instincts) and socially-acquired psychological characteristics (habits) could be inherited, and that these were passed on through language. Although the nation was a product of history, there were biologically, psychologically, and geographically determined limits to ethnographic difference, which, in turn, limited the capacity of nations for mixing differences.⁴⁰ In another example, Charles Le Tourneau, the general secretary of the French Anthropological Society, and Professor at the *École anthropologique* in Paris (a critical figure in the disciplinisation of psychology), described ethnic psychology as providing a means of explaining the historical dimension of collective heredity, and the missing link between races and peoples.⁴¹ In *La psychologie ethnique* (1901), Le Tourneau's aim was to characterise the psychic nature of races and peoples and measure their moral and mental development. Le Tourneau took for granted that nations evolved psychologically in ways that were simultaneously biological and historical; most importantly, the individual's nervous system was the living archive of racial development that determined the evolution of ethnic groups into nations.⁴²

Ethnopsychology was among the most conservative of contemporary approaches to the study of the nation as psychological. By contrast, the psychology of peoples, a field with its roots in another new discipline, sociology, was less concerned with the problem of heredity than the relationship of the unconscious to consciousness, and allowed a greater variation of interpretations of collective difference. Yet, developments in this field

too gave prominent display to the limits of liberal-minded perspectives on the nation question.

The unconscious and consciousness

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Gustave Le Bon, Ribot's own protégé, played a critical role in establishing the debt of the 'psychology of peoples' to race-thinking. Le Bon's psychology of peoples was intended to demonstrate 'the psychological characteristics which constitute the soul of races, and to show how the history of a people and its civilisation are determined by these characteristics'. Psychology revealed what 'anatomy, languages, environment, or political organisation' could not: 'behind the institutions, arts, beliefs, and political upheavals of each people lie certain moral and intellectual characteristics that determine its evolution. It is the whole of these characteristics that form what may be called the soul of a race.'⁴³ In *Lois psychologiques de l'évolution des peuples* (1894, translated as *The Psychology of Peoples* in 1898), Le Bon maintained that science had 'proved the vanity of the theories of equality and shown that the mental gulf created by the past between individuals and races can only be filled up by the slowly accumulating action of heredity. Modern psychology, together with the stern lessons of experience, ... demonstrated that the institutions and the education which suit some individuals and some races are most harmful to others.'⁴⁴

Le Bon is usually considered a theorist of race psychology rather than nation psychology, since he presented psychology as the key to the soul of a race and, only by extension, to a people. He was interested, however, in social psychology as a way of explaining how peoples and races became nations. *The Psychology of Peoples* focused on 'minor nationalities' with no existing separate state identity, including Picards, Flemish, Burgundians, Gascons, Bretons, and Provençals, and the story of their transformation into a French people, as well as groups identified interchangeably as races or peoples or nations, such as English, Egyptians, Chinese, Japanese, Mongolians, and Semites.

The slipperiness with which Le Bon utilised the categories of peoples and races reflected his own preference for understanding nations as the progeny of races, so that the *âme* or 'soul', or 'mind' of a people referred to 'the total complex of sentiments comprising a race or nation'. A people, he maintained, was shaped by an inherited racial identity, the seat of which was the unconscious. Reiterating the premises of recapitulation theory and echoing the claims of Renan whom he admired, Le Bon claimed that '[a] race may be compared to the totality of the cells that constitute a living being...[a] people is guided far more by its dead than by its living members'. Inherited sentiments, traditions, and beliefs form the national/racial souls that are compositions of the unconscious and consciousness,

they also make patriotism possible. 'We are', Le Bon asserted, 'the children at once of our parents and our race', so that '[o]ur country is our second mother for physiological and hereditary as well as sentimental reasons.'⁴⁵

In weighing up biology and history, Le Bon 'clearly favored the power of "blood" over education', so that '[a] negro or Japanese may easily take a university degree or become a lawyer; the sort of varnish he thus acquires is however quite superficial, and has no influence on his mental constitution. What no education can give him, because they are created by heredity alone, are the forms of thought, the logic, and above all the character of the Western man.'⁴⁶ In support of his claims regarding the physiological and unconscious basis of national heredity, he could do little more than offer observation ('long journeys through the most varied countries'), and his enthusiastic study of skulls, anecdotes, and evolution theory.⁴⁷ As with many of his peers, Le Bon's perspective on the incommensurate nature of nations did not reflect experience or observation so much as insist on the salience of national differences.

To be sure, Le Bon's most influential contribution to the idea of the nation was his later publication, *The Crowd: A study of the popular mind* (1896), with its emphasis on the role of the unconscious in nation formation.⁴⁸ For Le Bon, and the multitude of Le Bon enthusiasts, crowd psychology encouraged a conception of the nation as the manifestation of the unconscious dimensions of collective psychology. Le Bon portrayed the crowd mind as an expression of an organic memory, reflecting "'atavistic" traits or "primordial sentiments" deeply embedded in the primitive heritage of the race'.⁴⁹ This understanding of the workings of the crowd mind tied *The Crowd* intimately to the assumptions expounded in his psychology of peoples, including the view that '[a] nation does not choose its institutions at will any more than it chooses the colour of its hair or its eyes. Institutions and governments are the product of the race. They are not the creators of an epoch, but are created by it.'⁵⁰

Le Bon's version of the crowd mind was only one of many psychological approaches to the idea of the nation in this period that built an anti-democratic national politics out of a portrayal of masses as irrational and uncontrollable, and requiring management by elites and leaders. Yet his political conservatism was not representative of the field of the psychology of peoples as a whole. Indeed, one of the most stringent of contemporary critics of Le Bon's racial and biological determinism took up the genre with the specific intent of challenging its potentially conservative conclusions, and of reconsidering the balance between biology and history in the making of nations. This was Alfred Fouillée, who, like Le Bon, is regarded by historians of science as a key figure in formalising the discipline of psychology in France. Like Le Bon too, Fouillée was best known as a sociologist, and deeply engaged with French political life. Both men easily exploited the ambiguities in Renan's conception of the nation to suit their

own political intentions. Nevertheless, unlike Le Bon, Fouillée was a committed democrat and republican, and his version of the psychology of peoples was presented in the context of his philosophical aim to prove the existence of a will that was consciously expressed and to establish the nation as the incarnation of human consciousness and agency.

Fouillée elaborated his liberal-minded conception of the psychology of peoples in *Esquisse psychologique des peuples européens* (1903). This study grouped European peoples according to existing political states, namely Greek, Italian, Spanish, English, German, Russian, and French, and included a consideration of the differences between racial groupings such as Slav, Latin, German, and Anglo-Saxon.⁵¹ For Fouillée, there was no French race, only a French type. However, Fouillée also accepted that national character was biologically and environmentally determined in that it was 'intimately linked to temperament, which itself [was] linked to hereditary constitution and to ethnic traits, not less than to a physical *milieu*'.⁵² Building on Hippolyte Taine's mid-nineteenth century formulation of national difference, Fouillée maintained that, under certain conditions, *milieu* could change the way people looked as well as what they thought. For Fouillée, the abstract nature of ideas meant that an exertion of will could bring about physical and psychological changes in national identity. Even as Fouillée's 'peoples' had fixed national characteristics that corresponded to their respective national consciousness, their psychological features were shaped by objective historical and social circumstances fashioned from and manifest in *idées-sentiments* or *idées-forces* – the concept that René Johannet would cling to in his own explanation of the force of the idea of nationality. Every idea was the conscious form in which feelings and impulses were cast, so that 'every idea contains within it not merely an intellectual act, but also a certain orientation of sensibility and will', and 'every idea is a force which tends to realise its own object more and more fully'.⁵³

For Fouillée, then, the nation was an important site for the expression of will as a form of consciousness (rather than the unconscious), and of consciousness (rather than heredity) as the manifestation of individual agency or autonomy. Yet, even in Fouillée's able hands, psychology's mounting status as a science, and the foundations of late nineteenth century science in biology, meant there were definite limits to any anti-determinist presentation of national differences or of nation-formation. In this context Fouillée's psychology of peoples usefully marks the borders of liberal-minded depictions of nations as manifestations of consciousness and will. If Fouillée departed significantly from Le Bon in his conceptualisation of the nation as a freer combination of psychological processes of heredity, imitation, and adaptation, he clung to Le Bon's faith in skull shapes as determinants of fundamental biological differences, and even as harbingers of racial decline.⁵⁴ Fouillée the anti-determinist could not agree with Le

Bon's opinion that European physiognomies were resistant to their environment or *milieu*. But when Fouillée described the English who went to America as slowly taking on the hue of Red Skins, he interpreted this physical process as a sign of regressive adaptation. The ideological parameters of Fouillée's answer to the nation question are obvious too in his criticism of another field of differential social psychology prominent in this period, *Völkerpsychologie*, or folk-psychology. For Fouillée, a self-styled representative of French intellectual liberalism in the pre-war period, folk-psychology was fundamentally flawed because of its exaggerated emphasis on culture, and on the subjective dimension of nations.

Although the brunt of my discussion of the psychological idea of the nation promulgated by intellectuals in the international setting of 1919 and in the scientific setting of the late nineteenth century is predominantly British, French and American, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, developments in psychology were transnational to the extent of unavoidably touching on work undertaken in Germany. Since one of my broader aims is to investigate the limits of the liberal conception of the nation, and since Germany is usually represented in this period as the origins of an anti-liberal idea of the nation, it is worth a brief excursion into the territory of early *Völkerpsychologie*. Indeed, its practitioners intentionally rejected the kinds of biological and racial determinism that shaped the evolutionary psychology, ethnopsychology, and psychology of peoples taking root elsewhere. Even more curiously, one of the most important figures in early *Völker* or folk-psychology was Wilhelm Wundt, the psychologist also credited with the establishment in 1875 in Leipzig of the first experimental laboratory in psychology and, with it, the new psychology.⁵⁵

Culture and race

Between 1900 and 1920, Wilhelm Wundt began a series of psychological studies that examined cultural artefacts, rather than the individual minds that were of empirical interest to many of the new psychologists. In this work, Wundt built on an earlier tradition of folk-psychology established in Berlin in the 1860s by Moritz Lazarus and Heymann Steinthal, the editors of the journal *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*.⁵⁶ Historians have referred to Lazarus and Steinthal as 'cultural psychologists'. Both were Jewish, at home in the great cities of Europe, and keen to articulate alternatives to the increasingly influential determinist theories of the biological transmission of collective differences. Their notion of the *Volk*, carried on by Wundt, was of a malleable and inclusive locus of identity shaped by the accumulation of historical experience and traceable in culture rather than race.⁵⁷

Wundt, unlike his predecessors Lazarus and Steinthal, was a Lutheran with a background in medicine. He was trained as a physiological psychologist, and had developed experiments for the study of sensation and perception in individuals. Yet his ten volumes on folk-psychology earned him a reputation among his contemporaries as 'perhaps the first among the historians of culture' setting 'an example for psychologists and anthropologists by drawing psychological and epistemological conclusions from an analysis of primitive languages'.⁵⁸ This was not the physiological understanding of language promoted by Brinton. In the volume *Elements of Folk Psychology* (1912), Wundt argued that the individual mind was situated in its remote social, rather than racial, origins, and these were reflected in language, art, religion, myth, and custom.⁵⁹ It was cultural evidence that shed light on the processes of thinking, 'mythology, on the workings of the imagination; custom, on the nature of will'.⁶⁰

Wundt's folk-psychology replaced the dominant emphasis on the evolution of races with a theory of cultural evolution divided into four eras: the Era of Primitive Man, the Totemic Era, the Era of Heroes and Gods, and an incipient Era of Humanity, which, he predicted, would accentuate the international rather than national. He described the soul as 'a collective consciousness that outlived its bearers', and affirmed the existence of a non-metaphysical folk-soul, a kind of 'social soul' that was the interplay of many minds, a social product rather than (as Spencer had emphasised) an organic entity that produced society.⁶¹ As one admiring American contemporary claimed, Wundt had expanded an older tradition of philology with an eye to emphasising 'the importance of diffusion of culture and the mixture of peoples'.⁶²

The political significance of folk-psychology's cultural emphases seems obvious enough when it is compared with the biological and racial inflections of ethno-psychology and even some aspects of the psychology of peoples. But although Wundt self-consciously attempted to exclude race from assessments of group difference, the notion that folk-psychologists exaggerated the subjective characteristics of nations seems itself rather exaggerated. Indeed, it has been argued that Wundt too remained 'haunted' by evolutionary thought.⁶³ The historian Laura Otis suggests that while Wundt did not believe 'that individuals inherited their ancestors' memories in the biological sense', 'he did view cultural development as a cumulative, teleological process based on the interaction between traditions and individual perceptions of them'.⁶⁴ Based on Wundt's own definition of instinct, cultural values, like habits, could be psychically transformed at a collective level and passed on.⁶⁵ This was not the biological determinism of ethnopsychologists' understanding of psychological heredity, but it was a culturally determinist understanding of difference. It was also a form of psychology that gave prominence to the collective contours of dangerously ambiguous *volkisch* groups.

One way of thinking of the ambiguities of early folk-psychology's emphasis on culture and the *Volk* is to consider the historian George Stocking's claim that in this period "culture" took over the sphere of determinism that had been governed by "race", explaining the same sorts of (presumed) psychological uniformities in very different terms'.⁶⁶ This certainly was not how Fouillée understood the limitations of folk-psychology. From his perspective folk-psychology was not determinist enough. However, from a late twentieth century perspective, we might want to argue that while folk-psychology offered some contemporaries a way of accentuating the role of history and individual agency in the psychological processes of nation-formation, it also consolidated the psychological realism of national differences fixed in and over time.

The national politics of psychology

In his entry for 'Psychology' in that seminal text of the early twentieth century, the eleventh edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* (1911), the British psychologist James Ward, whose own education in that field was forged by early German laboratory work on physiological-psychology, wrote that the language of psychology underlay and 'to a great extent' shaped 'the rest of our intellectual furniture'.⁶⁷ It is hardly surprising then that in the critical decade preceding the outbreak of the First World War, as the rumblings of military and economic competition grew fiercer, and the sense of their costs to civilisation more inevitable, there was little argument about and much interest in the nation's fundamentally psychological status.⁶⁸ As the French historian Claude Liauzu has described too, at the turn of the twentieth century, psychology 'could not help but encounter nationalism'.⁶⁹ Neither could the empirical aims and methods of scientific psychology help but be influenced by national political goals. If we think back to Renan, the formulation of nations as the sum of inherited traditions and psychologically-sedimented national characters gave him a basis for asserting that the predominantly German-speaking region of Alsace-Lorraine that had been absorbed into the new German state in 1871 should naturally be part of an 'elective' French nation. If the new psychology drew Renan towards biological determinism, the problem of Alsace-Lorraine moved him closer to an historical or social/cultural conception of the nation, 'always providing more and more evidence of the mixture of languages and races which occur in nations'.⁷⁰ Renan found no better model of this historical tendency than multilingual Switzerland. What defined the French, German, and Italian-speaking Swiss as one nation, Renan argued, could not be language or for that matter race. Rather, the heterogeneous Swiss were a nation by virtue of a unifying soul, memory, and will. Alternatively, according to Renan, the similarly heterogeneous Austria-Hungary was not a nation precisely because it did

not manifest a common soul, memory, or will that could transcend its polyglot composition.⁷¹ For Renan's purposes, nations could not be purely subjective, or only constituted by historical processes, otherwise why not a German Alsace-Lorraine as much as a French one, particularly since the prevailing language of the territory remained German? His final coup was to give different formulations of nations a nationality of their own, so that the elective or subjective criterion of nationness was rendered a particularly French (rather than German) psychological proclivity, and German *Kultur* was defined as having an instinctive political preference for the laws of biological determinism.

In quite different ways, the interest shown by national governments and organisations in the utility of psychology for social planning also encouraged the use of psychology as a means of categorising racial/cultural differences and determining their political significance. As Pillsbury's 1919 study of the psychology of nationality noted approvingly, by the turn of the twentieth century, tests of individual memory aptitude, motor coordination, reaction time, susceptibility to suggestion, sensibility studies, and free association, were commonly employed as a means of classifying individuals according to measurable and standardised indices and sorting them into national and racial categories indicative of inherent political capabilities. When Ribot's colleague Alfred Binet created a mental intelligence test in response to a request from the French Ministry for Education, he may not have expected that it would be used as a tool for the study of national psychologies. Yet in one example, those tests were applied over the course of three years to the Russian Jews and Italians who entered New York, and were interpreted as evidence 'that at least 40 per cent of the adults of each race were below normal intelligence'.⁷² In the United States more generally, intelligence testing was anticipated as a popular means of managing diversity (imagined as both racial and cultural) within the political nation. When such testing was applied to 'negroes', 'mulattoes', white and 'Indian' children, its conclusions offered conveniently uniform proof of the 'evident considerable superiority of the whites'. These scientifically authorised claims could then be integrated into national policy-making in areas such as welfare and education. Similar stories can be told about the attempts by social scientists and intellectuals in Britain and France to cultivate the utility of psychology for managing national societies, and enhancing national imperial ambitions.⁷³

In 1905, the Italian President of the Fifth International Psychology Congress, held that year in Rome, announced that psychology had an enormous contribution to make to the governance of national life.⁷⁴ Giuseppe Sergi's professional interest in psychology as a science that involved the collaboration of anatomists, physiologists, psychiatrists, naturalists and sociologists may have influenced his vision of the achievements and possibilities of psychology. But Sergi was echoing a commonplace

assumption: Psychology had uncovered the political significance of instincts and the unconscious, and provided the resources for managing and exploiting them for national purposes. *The Crowd* had popularised the assumption that social psychology had the potential to diagnose and prevent national degeneracy. Le Bon thought social psychology particularly useful for inducing French patriotism among the masses, while keeping class revolution at bay. His was no argument for granting the masses more power, or assuming their greater national authenticity. Alternatively, the famous practitioner of abnormal psychology, Morton Prince, waxed lyrically to an audience of Japanese in 1916 on the potential of psychology to explain the nature of nations and the motivations of just such nationalism:

The newer Western psychology is giving us a deeper insight into the human mind than was possible by the older psychology. It is laying bare the hidden yearnings and aspirations and strivings of human beings whether as individuals, or collectively as families, civic communities or nations. And therefore it enables us to discover the real, the true motives which, underlying the superficial motives and apparent motives, determine human conduct, whether that conduct be an individual striving to accomplish ambition, or a nation striving for World Empire.⁷⁵

In the aftermath of the war, Prince's peer, Pillsbury, wrote that the most important political contribution psychology could make was to the management of the politically resonant force of nationalism. The nation, he argued, 'is a center about which develop such emotions as these which constitutes it a real force, perhaps the strongest force in the modern world. While the glow is due to the changes in the body of each individual, the cause of the response is to be found in the community of ideals and in the inherited nervous connections of each individual.'⁷⁶

Before the First World War, not everyone, not even enthusiasts of crowd psychology, would have agreed with the educational psychologist Cyril Burt – McDougall's student and Lecturer in Experimental Psychology at the University of Liverpool – who argued in 1912 that 'inherited mental difference moulded not only the life of the individual, but the "destiny of nations"'.⁷⁷ Often disagreement with the kinds of elitist claims promoted on such bases was inspired by political idealism as well as scientific incredulity. William James, for example, criticised the application of theories of evolution in support of American expansionism.⁷⁸ In anthropology too, Franz Boas provided sceptics with sound foundations for debunking the pretensions of the popular and populist versions of a natural hierarchy of nations.⁷⁹ Other anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists rose against bland assumptions about racial and national characters by rejecting the view that a nation exhibits a group or collective mind, whether conscious or unconscious. Mary Whiton Calkins used the first issue of the

British Journal of Psychology, to make her point that ‘it is simply impossible that a self should transmit its characters to another self’: ‘Every self, on the other hand, has a certain independence and self-identity, which is quite incompatible with a transmission of characters. The traditional conception of psychical heredity, as set forth, for example, by Ribot, is nothing more nor less than an empirical observation of the psychical likenesses between children and their parents.’⁸⁰ The Princetonian psychologist James Mark Baldwin was encouraged by developments in the new psychology to pursue the view that it is ‘through intercourse with others, thus established, that the individual self-thought or “ego” is attained, along with its correlative term, the social fellow or “alter”.’⁸¹ When he was not pondering the role of reflexes in the provocation of nationalism, William I. Thomas thought that nations were partly the product of the self-definition of a group through contrast with a ‘not-self’. The French sociologists Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss (like the German *Völkerpsychologists* before them) promoted the concept of a social rather than racial collective unconscious. Prior to the First World War, they argued that all civilisations were susceptible to nationalisation, but the process that occurred ‘in the interior of each people’ and took on a particular character in each state, was the product of cultural exchange and self-definition.⁸²

Criticisms of scientific trends in the study of psychology focused not only on the feebleness of theories of nation-formation, but also, as in Lippmann’s later critique, on the role of stereotypes. In the 1890s, Jean Finot, the energetic Jewish editor of the Paris journal *La revue*, published a series of inquiries into and essays on the idea of nationality, eventually re-published in Baie’s *Le Droit des nationalités*.⁸³ In the first decade of the twentieth century, in the midst of escalating militarism and national competition among European powers, he complained that psychological theorising had contributed to the reification and dissemination of the idea that nations exhibited collective identities or differences and that these were a consequence of natural and universal tendencies:

One people is designated as possessing a bilious temperament, proud and cruel, feeble in will power, lacking tenderness and goodness, and non-moral, though strongly religious. Another people adds to its sanguine temperament a realistic and practical genius, a lust of conquest, an unscrupulous spirit, criminal aspirations ... this scientific plaything aspires to higher things. It is especially used as a weapon in the relations between one people and another. Certain sociologists, and [Renan, Le Bon, and Fouillée] not the least, even see in its teaching positive indications for the guidance of public affairs.⁸⁴

An article by Dr. Caroline Hill in the same vein, published in the seminal American-based journal *Psychological Bulletin* in 1907, focused on a range of

minor English language authors who exhibited a glib tendency to describe individuals in terms of specific social categories, whether 'the masculine mind and the feminine mind, the Jewish mind and the Greek mind, the metropolitan mind and the rural mind'.⁸⁵ A review of 'national psychology' in that same journal five years later declared that psychological studies of nations were written in a 'popular' fashion and suffered from a variety of defects. The reviewer, R. S. Woodworth from Columbia University (whose own work sought to discredit racist psychology), was particularly critical of one author's propensity for assuming the physiological basis of psychological heredity in nations.

Unfortunately, such criticism showed up the extent of scientific work being undertaken in what Walter Lippmann would later come to dismiss as 'the slums of psychology'. In an article on '[t]he present problems of social psychology' published in *The American Journal of Sociology* in 1905, Edward Alsworth Ross, an American sociologist who had by this time authored an important study on social control (1902), and who would go on to write key social psychology texts that competed with McDougall's own,⁸⁶ discussed his genuine confusion about the relative utility of biology and sociology for the psychological study of nations. Ross was in general happy to refer to the 'knobby crania' of Italians, or 'undisciplined primitive passions' of Slavs.⁸⁷ He was also convinced that there was no simple race answer to the nation question, and that that question had implications for the psychology profession. In deciding whether 'national characteristics should be dealt with by social psychology or handed over to ethnology', he was also implying that the nation question taught that the study of psychology itself should have two separate branches, one focused on culture, the other on race.⁸⁸

Described by historians as a 'spokesman for Progressive Era racialism', Ross was around this same time ostracised from Stanford for his progressivism (from 1906 he was professor at Wisconsin). Even as a sociologist interested in psychological heredity and in crowd psychology, Ross was no simple biological determinist: 'The Chinaman', he declared, 'is not born a conservative, the Turk a fatalist, the Hindoo a pessimist, the Semite a monotheist. Notions and beliefs do not become fixed race-characters, nor do the emotions and conduct connected with them become congenital':

It is certain that 'blood' is not a solvent of every problem in national psychology, and that 'race' is no longer a juggler's hat from which you can draw explanations of all manner of moral contrasts and peculiarities. Nowadays no one charges to inborn differences the characteristic contrasts between Englishmen and Russians, between Jews and Christians, between Javanese and Japanese. The marvellous transformation, today of Japan, tomorrow perhaps of China and Siam and the Philippines, makes one doubt if even the impassive oriental is held fast in the net of race.⁸⁹

Ross's well-intentioned conception of the importance of 'societal origin' over racial heredity betrayed a rather fuzzy – but by now conventional – sense of heredity as cultural transmission, that is 'the capitalization of centuries of experience in unlike situations, and ... the injection and saturation of individual minds with these transmitted products by means of social circumpressure.'⁹⁰ As conventionally, on Ross's view, racial heredity played a defining role in this social and cultural schematic: 'The negro is not simply a black Anglo-Saxon deficient in schooling,' Ross explained, 'but a being who in strength of appetites and in power to control them differs considerably from the white man . . . those who imagine that by imparting to Hindoos or Cinghalese our theology the missionary endows them with our virtues and capacities certainly fail to appreciate how much these depend on certain elementary motor reactions.'⁹¹ Ross concluded that a division of analytical tasks was required: The social psychologist would 'account for the cultural differences between peoples and for the moral differences that hinge on some cultural element', and the race-psychologist would be left with the task of explaining 'the simple undecomposable reactions involving no conceptual element'. Indeed, Ross' dilemma is evidence that even as specific aspects of the psychological study of nations remained contentious among social scientists – whether the 'facts of national behaviour', the role of heredity, or the relationship of nations to races – at the turn of the twentieth century, efforts to arrive at a resolution remained focused on the psychological realism of nations and races themselves.

The psychological reality of nations

By 1914, the historically specific patois of new psychology had become indispensable for thinking about the nation, nationality, and, increasingly, nationalism. It was not only old conservatives such as Le Bon who referred to the idea that 'race-hatred' lay beneath 'the threshold of consciousness' as one of the lessons of the new psychology.⁹² Even psychoanalysts who encouraged an immaterial conceptualisation of the unconscious, expressed interest in the determinist role of repressed race memories in the formation of collective identities. Freud's pre-First World War publications indicate he had little interest in the nation as a psychological concept, but he was fascinated in the possibility that a repressed folk/race memory (the core of Jewishness) could somehow be traced in the makeup of the unconscious.⁹³ And it was in the work of Carl Jung, Freud's dissenting protégée, that the unconscious was rendered more fundamentally the key to a psychology that bound individuals to 'the race' and 'united them backwards' with 'the peoples of the past and their psychology'.⁹⁴ Even when stereotypes were eschewed, 'the facts of national behaviour' were affirmed. The same R. S. Woodworth who was

critical of the role of psychologists in the stereotyping of nations, conceded the general utility of psychology for explaining 'these facts in the national environment and heredity, and in the social transmission to later generations of what has been acquired in the history and experience of the nation'.⁹⁵

The historian Roger Smith claims that the social psychologist William McDougall gave the public what it 'wanted and expected from psychologists, and it made McDougall – who was himself an unqualified political elitist – into a spokesman for the commonplaces in terms of which ordinary people voiced their views on human differences.'⁹⁶ While the question of 'the public's' wishes requires its own separate investigation, we can say that even as the study of the nation was plagued by conceptual and empirical ambiguities and aporias, it was compelled by the professional and ideological acceptance among the theorists and practitioners of psychology of the existence of collective differences and the belief that each individual bore the psychological markings of the nation. Thus in a series of public lectures given in 1911, the American psychologist James Rowland Angell asserted the reality of national identities expressed as belief, sentiment, and feeling, despite some misgivings about the evidence at hand. Angell was an established figure who had been inspired in his work on psychology by John Dewey, trained by William James at Harvard, and who was himself the author of the influential textbook *Psychology* (1904). A close friend of the Inquiry figure Sidney Mezes, Angell was the head of the Psychology Department at the University of Chicago, and had a wealth of experience in European laboratories, where he had sought out the great men of psychology such as Wundt. Angell argued that even, and especially, in the absence of observable differences it was at an unconscious pre-social level that the mental differences (as a 'racial mind or group mind') between German, French, and American men revealed themselves:

It is difficult to say exactly where in the mind of the young German differs from that of the young Frenchman and both from that of the young American. Each studies the same mathematics and assents thereto; each studies the same physics and chemistry and subscribes to them; each accepts certain doctrines of political economy as essentially true And yet, somewhere in their attitude toward social usage, in their conception of government, in their conception of good taste, they may be indefinitely far apart Perhaps the most striking psychological fact about the case is that whereas the logical processes are substantially identical among all the members of the various groups, we meet differentiation and divergence the moment we touch upon matters of belief, of sentiment, and of feeling – all those influences which make most immediately for the establishment of habit and social tradition.⁹⁷

The tension between the determinism of biology and the accidents of history in the study of psychology and of the nation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, reflected the ultimate elusiveness of both the idea of the self, and of difference. Historians such as Deborah Cohen have shown that at the turn of the twentieth century even racial categorisations were subject to uncertainty.⁹⁸ However, in the case of race at least contemporaries felt they knew where to look for evidence – on the body and, through the body, in the mind. In the case of national categorisations, a quite different if parallel and often overlapping discourse had developed that privileged not only the psychological nature of national differences and the objective racial characteristics of nations, but also the subjective psychological processes of nation-formation, of the individual's inscription in that nation, and of nationalism. The tensions between the empirical aspirations of psychologists, and the intangible subjectivity of national difference led Walter Bowers Pillsbury, Professor of Psychology at the University of Michigan, to caution: 'If you are to know to what national group an individual belongs the simplest way is to ask him, and while his answer cannot always be trusted, but must be interpreted in terms of his general behaviour, it is, if he speaks the truth, a better criterion than history, or racial descent, or physical measurements. Nationality is first of all a psychological and sociological problem; only indirectly can it be determined by anthropometry or even by history.'⁹⁹

As a Professor of Psychology, and author of *The Psychology of Nationality and Internationalism*, Pillsbury may have exposed his self-interest in making this case for the primacy of psychology in the study of nationality. Yet, psychology had become a widely accepted and seductive tool that promised to bring form and order to the intangible and inconstant. To some extent it delivered on that promise, rendering the collective subjectivity of nations and the interiority of national subjectivities easier to imagine and locate, even if their location 'inside' individuals was in itself imaginary. This might explain why in 1905 *La femme nouvelle* (The New Woman), a Paris weekly that aimed to educate and stimulate the modern young woman, could publish an educational article claiming that because of Renan's influence national patriotism was no longer considered an expression of the territorial or political state of the '*patrie*'. National patriotism was now understood to be 'a psychological reality, an affective disposition, such as filial or paternal love, which everyone could find in oneself and which it would be unnatural not to experience'.¹⁰⁰

In the decade prior to the outbreak of war, three theoretical approaches to the study of the nation, each psychological and presupposing the existence of national differences, and each focused on understanding the processes of nation-formation, had come to prominence: instinct theory, crowd psychology, and theories of the self. Instinct theory comprised discussions of prejudice as a natural determinant of communities, of imitation

as a quasi natural-social factor in the formation of nations. In the early 1900s Wilfred Trotter, for example, built a successful theory of the nation (admired by Walter Lippmann amongst others) on 'herd instinct'. This particular instinct was tendered as an explanation for the alleged psychological homogeneity of groups, on the foundations of crowd psychology and psychoanalysis.¹⁰¹ Herd instinct drew together individuals instinctively in search of sociability. It accentuated their suggestibility and produced 'instinctive truths', or ideas taken as the absolute truth, and absolutely defended. Trotter added to herd instinct the instinct of 'gregariousness', 'an instinct as powerful and as primitive as the sexual, the nutritive, and the self-preserving', as the source of patriotism and a good nationalism.¹⁰² A medical doctor who married into British psychoanalytic circles, Trotter popularised his theory in the well-received book *Instincts of the Herd in War and Peace* (1916).¹⁰³

Despite the popularity of instinct theory, Pillsbury claimed that the best and most widely known theory of the nation was Le Bon's crowd psychology.¹⁰⁴ At a time when Renan continued to hold an enormous sway over the idea of the nation as the obligatory reference in almost all studies of the nation, including Le Bon's own, it was crowd psychology that captured contemporary imaginations. Le Bon's lack of academic status and his flamboyant conjecturing hardly hindered the extent of his influence. This was due partly to the receptive political climate, and partly to the fact that he was a great promoter of his own publications. A more than able networker, Le Bon regularly presided at Ribot's monthly banquet association where he mingled with guests of the political stature of Poincaré, Clemenceau, and Briand, each of whom would have a formal hand in the post-First World War peace conference.¹⁰⁵ As importantly, Le Bon's evocations of the racial unconscious of nations, and of irrational and unconscious forces driving group behaviour struck chords of recognition through much of the European world, new and old, liberal as well as conservative.¹⁰⁶ In 1914, during a visit to Paris, Theodore Roosevelt told Le Bon that while President of the United States, *Lois psychologiques de l'évolution des peuples* had been constantly at his side; his political nemesis, Woodrow Wilson, preferred the more subtle and intentionally liberal tones of Bagehot.¹⁰⁷

If Wilson would not have Le Bon, some progressive American and English figures were drawn to crowd psychology as a means of addressing elusive aspects of human behaviour without resort to biological determinism, and in support of their ideals of social progress. The English economist and OPP activist J.A. Hobson turned to crowd psychology in *The Psychology of Jingoism* (1901), as an explanation for what he termed 'inverted patriotism', 'whereby the love of one's own nation is transformed into the hatred of another nation.'¹⁰⁸ Hobson even repeated Le Bon's anti-democratic bias by claiming that inverted patriotism featured among the

working classes.¹⁰⁹ Norman Angell, the journalist and UDC pacifist who would become an important go-between during the First World War for American and English politicians and intellectuals interested in bringing about a more democratic nation-based new world order (and no relation to the psychologist James Angell), drew on the ideas of Le Bon in order to explain the ills of the Boer War and American expansionism.¹¹⁰ His worldwide bestseller *The Great Illusion* (1909) condemned the view (held, he argued, by Renan, McDougall, and even William James, among others) that man's instincts inclined to war. When it came to the nation, however, Angell utilised Le Bon's understanding of the crowd mind to argue that nationalism was an irrational force in international relations, and that, as a result, it had to be managed.¹¹¹ Angell also separated out bad from good national patriotism by differentiating between, on the one hand, normal love-based patriotism and, on the other, hatred of another nation, which he declared to be an abnormal or pathological form of patriotism.

On the eve of the First World War, Lippmann, who had studied with James and Wallas at Harvard, predicted that psychology was the tool that would help 'shape the world nearer to the heart's desire'.¹¹² By that time, the nation had been given a central place in the determination of that desire. If race was thought of as constitutive of the psychological differences among humans, both psychology and the nation were also thought of as realms that were rooted in and transcended the determinist laws of biology, as expressive of subjectivity or an inner life. As one historian has summarised, the Enlightenment notion of the 'man of reason' had become 'that richer but more dangerous mercurial creature, psychological man ... not merely a rational animal, but a creature of feeling and instinct'.¹¹³ Just as nations could have collective psychologies, 'psychological man' was also more likely to be thought of as having a national subjectivity – his feelings and instincts predisposing him to national identification.

4

The Gendered Self and Political Nations, 1870–1914

At the heart of peacemaking in 1919 was not any individual, or group of men, or even mode of organisation; it was the term ‘principle of nationality’ that lent legitimacy and lifeblood to a process often mired in ideological confusion and bedevilled intentions. So far I have argued that contemporary interest in the ‘psychological reality’ of the nation, as the turn-of-the-century French journal *La femme nouvelle* had put it, was implicit in the conception of nations as political entities or states. The history of science, and psychology more specifically, was critical to the political and cultural purchase of the principle of nationality, and its hearkening to a democratic new world order. The theories of the self that Walter Pillsbury described in 1919 as among the three main approaches to the study of the nation are of particular interest in this context, given that they bestowed political nations with psychological characteristics normally associated with an individual’s capacity for political agency, also termed self-determination. In spite of the view stated in *La femme nouvelle*, that national patriotism was a disposition that ‘everyone’ could find in oneself, it was precisely the application of theories of the self to the idea of the nation that privileged masculinity and rendered women’s place in the political nation problematic.

These last chapters return us finally to the theme the ‘deeper prejudice’ in psychological conceptions of nationality, and the ideas of will and personality popularised by the *New Europe* and its circle. In this chapter I concentrate on the impact of theories of the self on the idea of the nation and its gender dimensions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Over this period, scientific and philosophical works rarely imbued women – or the feminised working-class and non-Europeans – with any of the qualities requisite to contemporary conceptions of self-determination, namely a self, personality, and will. Gendered representations of these psychological attributes had a variety of implications for the imagining of nations as political communities, and for the status of individuals within those communities. As Jean Finot noted disapprovingly in the 1890s,

images of ‘womanish souls’ were the tools made use of by intellectuals such as Renan and Fouillée for demoting the political status of certain nations.¹

The equation of womanish souls with inferior nations is but one illustration of the ways in which even liberal-minded contemporaries made connections between the woman question and the nation question. These questions had much in common. They were similarly provoked by the promise that the liberal language of autonomy and rights or self-determination held out to the disenfranchised or discriminated against. At the same time that the language of self, personality, and will was employed against certain national and female groups, this same language was used by those groups to articulate their demands for self-determination. In cases where feminist demands for the recognition of the capacity of women for self-determination were commonly depicted as a threat to national cohesion and to the self-determination of men, the nation question even defined the status of the woman question. Nowhere was this more in evidence than in the pre-First World War thought of the American political scientist/historian-*cum*-President, Woodrow Wilson. In the last section of this chapter I trace the intersections of the woman and nation questions in Wilson’s historical and political writings, by comparing his views with those of a notoriously conservative contemporaneous writer on the nation, the French political figure, Maurice Barrès. My aim in making this comparison is to bring to the fore the limits and extent of a transnational consensus regarding the gendered psychological dimensions of the idea of the nation, and to excavate the source of the deeper prejudice that beguiled the liberal idealisation of the principle of nationality.

The woman question

If anything highlights the normative masculinity of the individual under study by psychologists, it is the sudden appearance in the 1890s of studies devoted explicitly to ‘woman’ and the nature of their normative psychological as well as physiological difference from men. Masculinity was a stated subject of scientific analysis in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century only in cases where a society or nation’s military weaknesses were in question.² At the same time, the new and rapidly expanding field of the ‘psychology of woman’ – or ‘the psychology of sex’ – consolidated a particular view of ‘woman’s’ difference that drew on a well-stocked store of stereotypes, and imbued those stereotypes with a new scientific authority and determinism.³ Psychologists in general presented women as ‘weaker, more emotional, less rational, more fickle, more dogmatic, more infantile, more aesthetically sensitive, more prone to hysteria, much less or far more sexual, more suggestible, superficially more spiritual and talked too much.’⁴ It was no secret to women who lived through these

developments that psychology imbued women with a series of contradictory characteristics that shared one attribute, the scientific affirmation of woman's unequal difference. In 1910 the educational psychologist Helen Woolley summarised this phenomenon in her own carefully caustic style: 'Women exhibited both an innate tendency to lie and ethical superiority over men; they were supposedly dominated by emotions to a greater extent than men while also, it was generally claimed, exhibiting patience, self-control, and "the much smaller share in the grand passion".'⁵

Common to even the most contradictory representations of women's psychological difference were depictions of woman as the product of evolutionary forces over which she had no control, and as emblematic of the racial dimensions of nations. In 1887 George Romanes, Darwin's protégé, repeated Francis Galton's belief that women shared a common psychological ancestry with the female butterfly.⁶ Cesare Lombroso's *The Female Offender* (1893) popularised the representation of women as naturally deviant personalities who had much in common with degenerate and primitive males; women's sexual appetites were checked only by convention and motherhood, while evolved men had their reason and will.⁷ The ethnopsychologist Charles Le Tourneau was derisive in his assumption that woman was 'always in general, more given to reflexive and impulsive action. More than man, she is subject and apt to form intuitive judgments, occasionally very certainly, but instinctively, independently of reasoning.'⁸ Gustave Le Bon premised that the mental distance between 'civilised man' and woman was an illustration of the 'abyss' that existed between 'the mental constitution of different races'.⁹ Alternatively, in an article in the *American Journal of Sociology* (1907) that took to task popular equivalences between 'The Mind of Woman and the Lower Races', William I. Thomas supported the view that psychological differences were social constructs rather than inborn attributes. Yet, even he felt that any answer to the question '[w]hether the characteristic mental life of women and the lower races will prove to be identical with those of the white man or different in quality' was destined to be 'problematical' because '[c]ertain organic conditions and historical incidents have, in fact, inclosed her in habits which she neither can nor will fracture'.¹⁰

Descriptions of 'woman' as the manifestation of a stalled, primitive, or racial stage in human development and an earlier phase in individual maturation, corresponded to the representation of women's biological capacity for reproduction as definitive of their unchangeable 'habits' and preternaturally instinctive life. Darwin, for example, argued that 'women are more tender and generous, and motherhood allows women to reinforce their instincts along this line and pass them on to their daughters at conception'.¹¹ This emphasis on women's emotional and instinctive life, their reproductive capacity, and their influence on heredity, was complemented by the idea that women exhibited little capacity for exercising will or

could, at most, only make claim to an inferior will relative to men. According to Ellen Kennedy, it was Nietzsche, writing in the latter decades of the nineteenth century, who broke from other philosophers by rendering women ineligible for citizenship on the basis of this inferior will. Previous arguments had focused on women's lesser intellect or ability to reason.¹² Nietzsche embedded the idea of 'the strong and healthy will to power of the highest and healthiest life-forms' in imagery of male sexual energies – will to power was a masculine attribute.¹³

While Nietzsche fits less than comfortably into the intellectual framework of the new psychology, or the national contours of English and French philosophy, his emphasis on will corresponds to the gendered discourse of psychology in this same period. Certainly the great figures of late nineteenth century psychology, such as Romanes, Spencer and Galton in England, and Stanley Hall in the United States, reiterated the theme of will as an attribute of power and civil status. Each also set out arguments for women's weakened political and legal claims on the basis of women's psychological difference and their 'comparative feebleness of will' in the context of the imposing woman question.¹⁴ They cited women's overly 'instinctive' nature, 'affectability', irrational or, alternatively, inadequately emotional nature, relative insensitivity, intellectual shortcomings, lack of energy and lack of self-control, as evidence of women's different political status. By contrast, Henri Bergson postulated that women lacked will because of their inferior emotional capacity.¹⁵ Thomas of course thought that women neither could nor would escape their biological and historical destiny.

Disagreement about the details of women's psychological difference did not mar the potency of descriptions of their lack of agency and general inferiority relative to the psychological norms and political prerogatives of masculinity. As Nikolas Rose has argued, 'since its invention the apparently sex-neutral subject-with-agency was a model applied to one sex and denied to the other; indeed it was dependent on this opposition for its philosophical foundation and political function'.¹⁶ Nietzsche emphasised what other late nineteenth and early twentieth century philosophers, psychologists, and social scientists in Western Europe and the United States at least implied: The characteristics of the masculine self were dependent on representations of the relationship *between* men and women. Even in psychoanalysis – the increasingly popular form of psychology that offered social explanations for the status of women's will and from which contemporary feminists took some heart – will to power, self-mastery, and sublimation were all characteristically masculine.¹⁷ Freud was hardly unique in defining the capacity for self-mastery and the exercise of sublimation as masculine attributes.¹⁸ Although these views can be interpreted as attempts at social diagnosis rather than prognosis, they helped perpetuate a transnational consensus about gendered individual and

national subjectivities, and about biologically and politically functional natural/national orders.

When we insert the history of gendered theories of the self into the specific context of the idea of the nation we find that representations of women as instinctively maternal, as the literal embodiment of organic memory, and as enclosed in unchanging habits, connected them with a racial pre-political stage of evolution, and with a racial rather than national past.¹⁹ This positioning could have made them more authentically national, however, it tended to situate them conceptually, and practically, outside the historical and political evolution of nations. The English Darwinists Patrick Geddes and J. Arthur Thomson argued that females lacked 'the energy required to participate actively in society; their energy, such as it is, is entirely required for reproduction'. Thus, the argument ran, females contributed to social and racial progress by their 'reproductive sacrifice'.²⁰ Spencer, and Spencerians, pursued the view that hysteria was symptomatic of the celibate woman denying her duty to the race.²¹ Women who became more intelligent also placed the 'race' at threat.

In the early twentieth century, the related rhetoric of maternalism played a critical symbolic role in more specific theorisations of the nation and of women's racial role. The British psychoanalyst Ernest Jones, for example, described national patriotism as the 'transference' of affection from the mother to the (feminine) country/nation.²² Alternatively, for Thomas, the mother nurtured the male child's 'consciousness of kind'. In many ways, such views were extensions of the mid-nineteenth century celebration of the mother as a distinctive kind of national hero(ine), as proposed by Giuseppe Mazzini and Jules Michelet, except that half a century later they were given a scientific polish, of a kind. Thus, even the Marxist Otto Bauer, the Austrian author of *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie* (1908) placed unconscious sexual patriotism at the root of 'consciousness of one's own kind', and made mothers the determinist force that influenced a man's choice of partner. Bauer named this process 'sexual selection'. He explained, using himself as an example, that sexual selection dictated that '[t]he beautiful women of Italy might attract me for the moment with their unusual charms, but I will soon yearn again for the blonde beauties of my own land.'²³ Bauer even bothered to consider the impact of his theory on his attraction to Jewish women. In this case, Jews who were citizens of his 'own land' could not be attractive to him, nor he to Jewish women, because Jews could not be integrated into another cultural or natural national community. Although Bauer cannot be included in the spectrum of intellectual developments in Britain, the United States, and France, his comments are all the more remarkable given that he (like the early folk psychologists) is still noted for conceptualising the nation as a future-oriented community of destiny rather than of racial descent.

Just as political and scientific discourses intersected and sustained one another, representations of women's psychological difference buttressed women's lack of political rights as national citizens. By the early twentieth century, representations of women's psychological difference were integral to the political and legal structures of the major West European nation-states, and the differentiation of the political values of those nation-states from the '*ancien*' political world identified with the Habsburg empire. In France, women were refused any intrinsic right to French nationality on the assumption that it conflicted with patrilineality and with men's roles as husbands or fathers exercising authority over wives and families. According to the precepts of the Napoleonic French Civil Code of 1804, a French woman lacked any self that could guarantee her rights as a full legal person, or national citizen. If she married a foreigner, she immediately assumed his nationality.²⁴ Although such gender-based constrictions on rights to nationality existed prior to the late nineteenth century and endured well into the twentieth, it was precisely in the late nineteenth century that they became compelling. While English Common Law had imposed nationality on both men and women as an irrevocable 'obligation', it was only from 1870 that women born in England who married foreigners lost their nationality, and patrilineal nationality was reinforced.²⁵ In the 1810s, the German philosopher Fichte had purposely excluded women from his view of the right to self-determination and the importance of that right for the realisation of a German national identity; women, he claimed, 'could not posit their own desire, will it, and act upon it'.²⁶ After 1870, the new German federation belatedly brought Fichte's vision into uniform practice in a radically new political and cultural context. It established the pre-eminence of the patriarchal family structure as national law, and nationally-unified its resident women by stipulating that those who married foreign men lost their nationality. Such laws are indicative of how scientific conceptions of sexual difference propped up, or at least coincided with, the growing political significance of the idea of the nation for the elaboration of power relations and the meaning of citizenship, and the gendered arrangements of political power.²⁷

Representations of women's difference could be manipulated to suit a range of political arguments. For some men as well as feminists, maternalism was an important basis for asserting women's political and social rights within nations. The American ethnopsychologist Daniel Garrison Brinton supported access to education for women – a demand definitive of the woman question – on the grounds that unusual mental ability in a man was inherited from the mother, and, consequently in cultures where women had a prominent place, the level of evolution was higher. '[A] nation', he proposed, 'which studies to prevent women from acquiring an education and from taking an active part in affairs, is preparing the way to engender citizens of inferior minds.'²⁸ Taking a different tack to make the

same case, Henri Marion, the author of a study published in France as part of a series on the psychology of women, suggested that although psychologists had exposed women's weaknesses, women were still able to be persons. Women, he wrote, had less will than men, but they could be educated to take responsibility for themselves, and to act in solidarity with the nation – even if at some risk to their femininity. The objective of this education was the creation of maternal women who could responsibly raise the men and citizens of France.²⁹ For Jean Finot, the duties of motherhood earned women the same citizenship rights that military service earned men. Since the principle of rights in return for national defence was accepted as a criterion for male citizenship even though not all men are soldiers, maternalism should in principle act as a similar criterion for female citizenship even though not all women are mothers.³⁰

For all their good intentions, such arguments further entrenched women's political status as reproducers of the race and of a nation's citizens. The same logic made even men who were sympathetic in principle to women's demands for increased political rights anxious about the consequences for national order and social cohesion. In Hugo Munsterberg's study of the American nation, *The Americans* (1905), the Harvard Professor of Psychology hypothesised that the self-assertion characteristic of 'American woman' was injurious to the nation:

from whatever side we look at it, the self-assertion of woman exalts her at the expense of the family – perfects the individual, but injures society; makes the American woman perhaps the finest flower of civilization, but awakens at the same time serious fears for the propagation of the American race.³¹

The professor, who was otherwise known for his professional generosity to his female psychology students (including Mary Whiton Calkins), insisted on the contradictions characteristic of women's psychological nature, 'tactfulness and aesthetic insight, sure instincts, enthusiasm, and purity ... a lack of logical consecutiveness, a tendency to over-hasty generalisation, under-estimation of the abstract and the deep, and an inclination to be governed by feeling and emotion'.³² On the basis of this representation of women's difference, Munsterberg cautioned that should women's public influence become too extensive it augured ill for the United States. Women, he declared, 'have not the force to perform those public duties of civilisation which need the harder logic of man. If the entire culture of the nation is womanised, it will be in the end weak and without decisive influence on the progress of the world.' Le Bon was more aggressive in his statement of the French case, but his prediction in the *Psychology of Peoples* conveyed a similar message, that 'modern rights and higher education for women would confuse a women's primitive maternal instincts, cause her to

bear neurotic offspring, and turn France into a charnel-house of nihilistic chaos':³³

It is in the name of this idea [equality] that ... the modern woman, forgetting the deep lying mental differences that separate her from man, claims the same rights and the same education as man, and will end, if she be triumphant, in making of the European a nomad without a home or a family.³⁴

The depiction of the nation as a symbolic 'home' or 'family' spoke a common metaphorical language and found its way into the political outlook of more liberal-minded intellectuals who made it a grounds for their own concerns about the threat posed by feminist demands to national societies. The English economist and UDC member J.A. Hobson supported the idea of female suffrage in principle, but he could not assuage his fears of the consequences for the social good, which he interpreted in terms of racial and national well-being. 'The self-assertion of a sex,' he remonstrated, 'and of individuality within the sex is no solution of this, the most perplexed of all our social problems.'³⁵ For Hobson, that social problem was excessive individualism.³⁶ Hobson, who was interested in the insights that psychology could lend to politics, thought that one antidote to this problem was a conceptualisation of the individual as an amorphous self uncontained by what he called 'skinhood', but bound by the nation. Another was Eugenics, which would secure the 'well-being and the progress of the race', and 'restore a salutary order to the march of feminism, by the stress it lays upon the peculiar and dominating contribution to Nature's work which she requires from women.'³⁷ Nature's work was biological reproduction, and it required, Hobson maintained, that women chose maternity over individuality, that they repudiated the kind of feminism that pursued self-interest over maternal and domestic life, and that they acknowledged a racial duty to the nation.

It is no overstatement to say that such arguments effectively placed women who were demanding political, legal, or even sexual autonomy, in a bind, as Helen Woolley pointed out in 1910:

The cry is no longer that woman will injure herself by the mental and physical over-strain involved in the higher intellectual training, but that she will injure society by reducing her own reproductive activity (later marriages, fewer marriages, fewer children, opposition between intellectual and sexual functions) and thus lessen the chances of the best element to perpetuate itself The conclusion seems to be that it is the highest duty of woman to refrain voluntarily from developing her own intellectual capacities for fear of injuring society – a form of asceticism to which it is hard to subscribe.³⁸

What was a woman to do? Some women agreed with the conclusion that women should subjugate their own needs for the social good, others appropriated the language of psychology in order to demand the political and legal recognition of their selves, their will, and their personality. Indeed, pre-war feminist and internationalist tracts are flecked with references to the individual and national self as they corresponded to the problem of female and national political autonomy. At the turn of the century, the wife of the Austrian ambassador to Stockholm, Frau Behr, moved effortlessly from the woman question to the question of national autonomy in a discussion with the Austrian peace activist Bertha Von Suttner about Scandinavian nationalism. Von Suttner recorded in her autobiography parts of that discussion:

the progress of the women's movement has already started in Norway; [Behr] said that they were not far from the attainment of suffrage. Everyone, from the wives of statesmen down to the peasant women, was taking an active part in political life. I asked if it were true that Sweden and Norway were living like quarrelsome brethren. 'No', replied Frau Behr, 'the relationship is that of a marriage in which the man has everything, the wife nothing, to say; and according to modern ideas, that can be no kind of a happy marriage. Norway, in this union, plays the part of the wife without authority, and what she wants is what today the woman with equal privileges demands in marriage – the right to her own personality'.³⁹

In 1904 the Swedish feminist and OPP activist Ellen Key, one of the most influential of the women who attempted to reconcile intellectually woman's maternal role with demands for female autonomy, argued that the racial quality of nations would improve if women were given more control over their bodies and the means for greater independence. She also equated the question of 'woman's personality' with the quest for national identity, and argued that the proportions of the former far outweighed the latter:

We are here face to face with the profoundest movement of the time, woman's desire of freedom as a human being and as a personality, and in this we are confronted with the greatest tragic conflict the world's history has hitherto witnessed. For if it is tragic enough for an individual or a nation relentlessly to seek out its innermost ego and to follow it even to destruction – how tragic will it not be, when the same applies to half of humanity? [...]. If Shakespeare came back to earth, he would now make Hamlet a woman, for whom the question 'to be or not to be' would be full of a double pathos: the eternal terror of the human race and the new terror of the female sex before its own riddle.⁴⁰

In Key's view, national and female aspirations for personality both overlapped and clashed. Similarly in her study *The Future of the Women's Movement* (1913), the UDC author and editor Helena Swanwick compared the woman question with the ambitions of the 'people' in order to explain the broader implications of women's political ambitions:

women's day is coming too, and the people of the future will deride those Liberals of the early twentieth century who talked of the Will of the People and forgot the mothers; who boasted of their intention to enfranchise every person 'of full age and competent understanding' and left out half the people; who declared that 'citizenship' should be the basis of voting rights and denied these rights to all women, thereby admitting (what the women had been rebuked for asserting) that Britons, when they happened to be female Britons, *were* slaves.⁴¹

In a period during which nationality was increasingly a feature of citizenship, women challenged existing discourses of sexual difference and the nature of women's selves in relation to representations of women's status within nations and the international sphere. In 1916, the American feminist Katharine Anthony reflected on the accepted rule that 'woman' was 'without a country', and the influence this political and social condition had on shaping women's 'international unconscious'. She argued that the origins of women's denationalisation in '[t]he convenient fiction that women's knowledge is based on instinct, intuition, and divination deprives her even of the power to control her own mental life.'⁴² Writing with the aim of reconciling feminists whose nations were by then at war, Anthony claimed that all feminists aimed to emancipate 'woman as a personality,' in 'the struggle for self-consciousness.'

The problem was, of course, that the language of psychology reinforced a conception of the political nation as the culmination of human evolution, and abandoned women in a more primal stage in the nation's development, as the embodiment and vehicle of biological determinism. The themes of women's intrinsic right to personality, or to a self, or will, received little positive publicity in societies preoccupied with national survival, progress, and cohesion, and in which women, like 'the lesser races', were 'critical to the elaboration of a natural social and political order which situated white, European, men, and virile masculinity, at the top'.⁴³ Moreover, it was generally assumed that women who demanded rights as individuals in public domains and in respect of marriage and inheritance laws, went against 'their nature' at the expense of men's will and a natural family order that was the model of an indivisible national/social order. Even Swanwick, who criticised the recognition of a national-popular will that left out women, identified women collectively as 'the mothers', although she was herself childless. Indeed, despite the use by some feminists of the language of

psychology as a tool of empowerment, this same language had powerful resonances when used against feminism and in support of social and political order within nations. The more feminists complained about the situation of women, the more even liberal-minded men associated these complaints and demands with the political and social chaos to which they believed the nation offered the ultimate answer.

The heterogeneous self and the homogeneous nation

Given the gender implications of theories of the self, and terms such as the self, personality, and will for imagining, and constituting, national communities and national subjectivities, it is worth examining the more specific pertinence of theories of the self to the idea of the nation at this time. Although there is no evidence of a 'self question' in the late nineteenth century, historians regard debates about the nature of the self as definitive of the *fin-de-siècle* and early twentieth century. Just as the French historian Jacques Le Rider has found that in *fin-de-siècle* Vienna the search for new forms of personal identification provoked a destabilising preponderance of 'doubt in the self' – 'the "cult of the ego" went hand in hand with the discovery of the vacuity or fragility of that very ego' –⁴⁴ Patrick Joyce has argued that in late nineteenth century England, psychology situated responsibility 'not outside the self, but buried so far within it as to be almost beyond either control or recognition'.⁴⁵ In particular, revelations of the heterogeneity of the self, had brought to the fore 'the question of what is the unifying principle in personality', and jeopardised the existence of the Enlightenment idea of 'a being with inner ideal ends, to which it freely acknowledges responsibility'.⁴⁶ In the 1890s, William James traced this understanding of the heterogeneity of the self to Pierre Janet's experiments with female hysterics, which had demonstrated the somatic consequences of psychic illness and proven that 'one human body may be the home of many *consciousnesses* and thus, in Locke's sense of many *persons*'.⁴⁷ Janet's probing of the unconscious had set conceptions of the self adrift from their once secure idealised moorings, contributing to what historian Jan Goldstein has described as 'the *fin-de-siècle* rupture in psychology ... the revelation that the self had deep fault lines and fissures'.⁴⁸ Janet's revelation fed a more general 'crisis of subjectivity', and gave it a gendered guise. His work with female hysterics helped entrench a conception of the irrational or dysfunctional self as feminine, even if not necessarily female.⁴⁹ Of course, that same conception was encouraged in other areas of psychology, whether the image of womanish souls, or Le Bon's feminisation of the menacing 'masses',⁵⁰ or English psychiatrists' diagnosis of the alleged disorder of some nations (not England, but France for example) as a form of feminised hysteria or dissociation, and as symptomatic of a failure of will and the self amongst its male population.⁵¹ It also

penetrated early twentieth century transpositions of the fractured and fragmented self onto the imagining of nations, whether India's many selves, or the England overwhelmed by 'wills'.

In the uncertain political environment prior to the First World War, the decentralised core of 'psychological man' was regarded by some philosophers and psychologists as potentially liberating and conducive to heterogeneous and pluralist social and political models and gender relations.⁵² But as Joan Scott points out, 'while some theorists of individualism extolled the unconscious as a "vital force" others reviled its pathological influences and feared its political manifestations'.⁵³ In particular, it was the spectre of the heterogeneous self that cast the concept of personality into political and philosophical prominence. As the historians Warren Susman and Philip Rieff have described, this period saw a general shift in interest from the idea of character to the concept of personality, which encouraged 'another vision of self, another vision of self-development and mastery, and another method of the presentation of self in society'.⁵⁴ Janet not only prised apart the many selves that constitute the individual, he put great store in the idea of personality as 'the reunion of presentations'.⁵⁵ James too thought of personality as unifying the multiple socially-determined selves of men.⁵⁶ Political theorists, as well as psychologists, contemplated the ramifications of the conception of the heterogeneous self for Enlightenment political idealism and the notions of 'continuous memory', and 'homogeneous character'.⁵⁷ The prominence of the heterogeneous self cast personality as the key to cohesion and coherence. Transposed onto the nation question, the concept of personality encapsulated the nation's unique political potential for evolving unity out of diversity, homogeneity out of heterogeneity, and for developing a self and enacting national self-determination. The older, and persisting, concept of national character suggested a fixed and unique national identity; appended to the idea of the nation, and the question what is the unifying principle in the fundamentally heterogeneous nation, personality stood for a collective political self constituted of plural and mutable elements that could evolve over time into a unified and unique national self.⁵⁸

The spectre of heterogeneity also made will an increasingly important, and vulnerable, aspect of the conceptualisation of the self and of the nation. But, in contrast to the meanings attributed to personality, psychologists commonly portrayed will as an instrument of unconscious and racial determinism. In the late nineteenth century, in the overlapping contexts of changing definitions of psychology and the nation, the concept of will too offered a convincing palliative to perceived social and national dysfunctionality and disorder. As Elaine Showalter has shown, in late Victorian sexual codes and economic policies 'a well-fashioned will' was the highest phase – after passing through the stages of sensation, passion, emotion, and reason – in the evolution of a race as

well as development of the individual.⁵⁹ The English psychologist Henry Maudsley situated will in an evolutionary context – the lower the race the less ability to exercise will over ‘individual egoistic desires and energies’.⁶⁰ Evolutionary psychologists elsewhere, including Ribot in France, located the will in a racial unconscious, and made a healthy will the measure of national well-being.⁶¹ Ribot conceived of will as a socially inhibitive force requisite for progress, much as in Freud’s notion of sublimation.⁶² Ribot sourced will to the unconscious origins of the self, describing the correspondence between the will’s material force and levels of energy, which were in turn determined by racial, national and individual differences. Le Bon described an ‘unconscious will’ originating ‘in the necessities, desires, and aspirations of the race, group, or environment by which our personality is surrounded.’⁶³ On these grounds he explained that the quality of racial will decided which nations (and individuals) were able to develop a successful political form and cohesion. Italy had failed where the United States had succeeded because of the quality of the latter’s will, determined by its Anglo-Saxon racial stock.⁶⁴ The superior capacity for will of the English (Anglo-Saxon) nation was similarly the basis of the success of the British empire and its ability to maintain in subjection 250 million Hindus, many of whom, Le Bon, argued, were otherwise the intellectual equals of the English.⁶⁵

For the next generation of social psychologists such as William McDougall, it was national sentiment that assumed the status of a primordial passion and force making for cohesion. In a pre-war essay that addressed ‘The Will of the Nation’, McDougall transformed ‘general will’ into a more ‘scientific’ psychological conception of national will, arguing that in both cases ‘self-consciousness’ was ‘essential to volition’, and ‘self-knowledge promises to become the dominating factor in the life of nations’.⁶⁶ Nations could only exist in the political sense of the word, McDougall argued, when ‘the idea of the people or nation as a whole is present to the consciousness of individuals and determines their actions’.⁶⁷ That process was in the hands of the unconscious force of cultural and racial inheritance that shaped national sentiment: The paths of English history illustrated the influence of an hereditary aristocracy ‘in securing homogeneity of national thought, sentiment, and custom’ made possible through ‘attempts to imitate aristocracy’. McDougall assured his readers that this process had brought England ‘farther than any other along the path of evolution of a national self-consciousness and a truly national will.’⁶⁸ The superiority of English national will was (predictably) shaped by racial heredity.⁶⁹ Driven by his own anxiety about ‘rampant determinism,’ the quite differently motivated Alfred Fouillée made conscious will a determinist component of identity-formation. Like Le Bon and McDougall, he proposed that the potency of a nation’s will was dependent on the quality of racially- and historically-determined national character.⁷⁰ The successful

self-determining will was a prerogative of the English and German nations, and not the French. As of 1912, in the context of increasingly antagonistic political relations between France and Germany, Henri Bergson proposed that genuine will was the expression of an unconscious *élan vital*, and of predetermined national identification – so that the French could exercise will nationally, the Germans could not.⁷¹

By 1914, psychologists had added to the process of inscribing difference a grammar of the mind. They had elaborated the inner self as a sexually, racially, and culturally differentiated entity, and extended the sexed body into neurological, neuro-physiological, psycho-physiological, and intangibly interiorised realms with fundamental political ramifications. Theoretical and conceptual developments in psychology deepened the ‘interiors’ of men and women. Psychologists and political philosophers assembled their conflicting versions of the nature of ‘psychological man’, and the virtues of the political nation, in the context of the apparent fragility of the self, its integrity and masculinity potentially under threat from the role of the unconscious – whether conceptualised as unpredictable, or as the vehicle of racial, national, and gender determinism – and from mechanistic world views of sociological and biological determinism. They evoked overlapping sex and race differences in order to embroider the positivist authority of science, and the legitimacy of self, will, and personality, conceptions that were, ultimately, ideologically at risk. At the same time as they made consciousness and self-determination the crux of the association of liberty with nationality, they moved women, the working classes, and certain specified peoples and races to the fringes of that emancipatory discourse. They made self-determination the normative provenance of white (and often specifically Western) European men, and masculine nations.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, in France, Britain, and the United States, the question of what held the social fabric together in the face of cultural heterogeneity and the threat of political disorder, and the relative success of European states at integrating, or assimilating, multiple selves, intrigued a wide range of intellectuals with varying political and ideological motivations.⁷² The motif of a self unified through will recurred throughout *fin-de-siècle* scientific and philosophical literature. Given what I have been arguing, we should not be surprised to find that when Woodrow Wilson sat down to write about the nature of democracy, politics, states, and societies that he too would turn to the truths offered by this new view of the role of the past and present in the constitution of nations. Wilson was, after all, an aficionado of Walter Bagehot. In this final section, I want to turn to the impact of the pre-war intellectual climate on political writing about the nation, first by looking at the idea of the nation outlined in the work of Maurice Barrès, and then Wilson. A contemporary of Le Bon, Barrès was a maverick political figure who gained

some notoriety for his definition of nationalism as the ‘acceptance of determinism’.⁷³ He was a member of the French Chamber of Deputies from the 1880s to the First World War, (1889–93, 1906–1910, 1914), first as deputy for Nancy on a Boulangist program, then as deputy for Paris as a Republican Patriot liberal, then as a republican independent. He was best known for his personal and fictionalised reflections on the nation rather than any ‘scientific’ work on the subject. Significantly for our purposes, however, Barrès drew on the psychological concept of dissociation to describe ‘the absence of a national consensus’ and ‘the decomposition of authority’ that had come about because of the fragmentation of the nation into thousands of individual ‘wills’ and ‘imagination’.⁷⁴

Maurice Barrès

There are many inconsistent and contradictory dimensions to Maurice Barrès’ idea of the nation, but there is little doubt that developments in psychology exerted a critical influence on his work. Historians have tried to understand Barrès’ perspective on the nation and nationalism in the context of the psychological impact of his early childhood experiences, in particular that he was from Lorraine and an impressionable young boy when his village was occupied by and then ceded to Germany.⁷⁵ Barrès himself, however, was more interested in the utility of psychology for understanding the history of the French nation, and its depletion of energy, which he traced to the Dreyfus controversy and its pitting of French men one against the other.⁷⁶ In these endeavours he was inspired by Jules Soury, the psycho-physiologist and Director of the *École des hautes études*, who described all living beings as automatons regardless of whether they act consciously or unconsciously. Barrès attended Soury’s courses in Paris from 1893–1897, and helped publish his works.⁷⁷ He interpreted Soury’s study of the central nervous system as particularly significant for comprehending French identity: France and Frenchness were phenomena as real as nerves and neurons, and were perpetuated through the determinism of psychological heredity.⁷⁸ Each individual’s instincts, reflexes, and spinal cord were the source of their regional and national identification. Mind and body were in turn the products of ‘a series of exercises multiplied across the previous centuries’.⁷⁹ Historical destiny and evolution – forces greater than individual will – rendered nations and national consciousness fundamental realities.⁸⁰ For Barrès, Soury’s was a science adaptable even to analyses of the unconscious nationalist reverberations of an anthem like the *Marseillaise*. What did singing the *Marseillaise* do for a real Frenchman? Like the influence of a good woman, it excited a mass of unconscious emotions that allowed him to augment the energy inherited from his ancestors.⁸¹ The unconscious represented not the individual but the collective, and it was inherited in a Lamarckian sense.

In a series of essays and lectures published between the 1890s and early 1900s, Barrès emphasised the duty of the French nationalist to return France to its deepest sense of self, to rediscover its 'internal sentiment' – a spontaneous neuro-psychological force – through the reunification in French society and culture of the thought of its élite and the unconscious instincts of its masses.⁸² The will of each individual Frenchman was merely an extension of his national unconsciousness, compelling him to continue to value and express his national heritage.⁸³ When an individual realised his national identity he became *conscious* of his inherited national character.⁸⁴ Thus a true (French) nationalist was 'a Frenchman who had come to consciousness of his formation'.⁸⁵ But it was an individual's '*patrie psychique*', his national psychological inheritance, which determined whether he could be integrated into the nation.⁸⁶

The national significance of the existence of will (even a will subordinate to a racial unconscious) and a coherent self was explicit in Barrès' theory of the '*culte du moi*'. The '*Moi*', or self, was the opposite of the dissociated self, and its implicit masculinity was defined against a retinue of menacing female figures. Woman was the enemy preventing man from the full development of his spiritual self, his *moi*.⁸⁷ For one critic, dispersion and instability are characteristic of the majority of images of women deployed by Barrès.⁸⁸ Women act as mirrors for man's individual development; they represent intuition, intoxication, animal instinct, and a lower physical order of being. Transposed onto a national setting, the *Moi* affirmed the univocal national body, particularly in nations such as France where regional identities were also important. The counterpoint to national heterogeneity and the remedy for national dissociation was the recovery of a single indivisible national will that transcended class and region and unified the national self. The antithesis of the coherent self was the deracinated female, often figured as a 'transient, female cosmopolite', not unlike the nomadic figure that threatened European identity in Le Bon's contemporary idea of the nation.⁸⁹ Women and femininity had an exceptional role in Barrès' schematisation of nationalism: Femininity was equated with 'dysfunctional national identity',⁹⁰ 'those who deplete, dissipate, or otherwise squander their nationalist energy'.⁹¹ In the single exception to this rule, Barrès celebrated Joan of Arc as a woman intimate with the ancient racial well-springs of the nation.⁹² Overall women's status within nations, and in the conception of the national *Moi*, was as demons or deities, and in both cases their contribution was defined in respect of their racial role.

Woodrow Wilson

Despite the different national contexts, and political and intellectual interests that distanced Maurice Barrès and Woodrow Wilson, their respective versions of the idea of the nation, and of nationality, each offer evidence of

the influence exerted in the pre-war period by the language of the heterogeneous self unified through personality or will. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Barrès was a figure of decreasing individual significance. By 1913, Woodrow Wilson had become the president of the United States. During the First World War, President Wilson introduced the principle of nationality and the ideal of national self-determination in his plans for instituting a more democratic world order. But he had not yet begun this political career when Barrès achieved celebrity as a theorist of nationalism. At that time Wilson was a graduate of law, and a postgraduate in history and political science, teaching at the women's college Bryn Mawr. By 1902 had achieved the rank of President of Princeton University.

A native of Virginia, Wilson grew up in an atmosphere haunted by the civil war, by the clashes between organised labour and capital in the north, by the threat of full citizenship extended to blacks as well as whites, and by the prospect of social and familial divisiveness posed by women's demands for equal political rights.⁹³ In sum, as one biographer reminds us, the late nineteenth century political thought of Woodrow Wilson was shaped by the 'fear of political disintegration'. By the 1870s Wilson saw as a 'primary duty' the task of renewing 'the power of unity' and redeeming 'the resources of patriotic love'.⁹⁴ According to Niels Aage Thorsen, Wilson's 'aim was to explore the vast resources of social sentiment that had been stored in the popular consciousness over the course of the development of political civilisation. ... [to] concentrate upon the social energies and the psychological needs of the population.'⁹⁵

Wilson was interested in the potential of patriotism and nationality for securing social cohesion, but he was no Barrès. He did not consume himself with theories of nationalism, and his particular academic interest lay in the details of history, rather than the laws of human psychology. An observer of the present and past in a nation-state where construed racial and cultural differences were treated as facts of national life, he could be no simple biological determinist. Yet it was under those very conditions of racial and cultural heterogeneity within the nation, underscored by his experience of the North/South divide in the United States, that Wilson's work consistently tackled the question of what held such 'states' together. He answered that question by equating 'the political notion of the people with the idea of nationality'.⁹⁶ In this context, Thorsen has noted 'the close connection between "nation" and "personality", which seems to imply that the movement toward nationhood was at the same time a movement toward a social or political psychology'.⁹⁷ The nation that could claim a personality 'had overcome its childhood', achieved 'maturity' as 'self-consciousness', and had attained social cohesion. In Wilson's thought nations were most fully a sign of evolved human consciousness, and personality was at the heart of a coherent nationality, of which American nationality was the prime example.⁹⁸

Wilson's conception of the nation exhibits many of the elements of the psychological discourse of nations we have surveyed in this and the previous chapters. For Wilson, a critical factor in the ability of the United States as a heterogeneous state to mature and to combine multiplicity into a political unity or national personality was its English or Anglo-Saxon core, or 'the spirit of English life' which had made 'comrades of us all to be a nation'. That spirit had brought ordered political evolution to England, rendering England 'the mother of liberty and self-government.' By contrast, the failure of French heterogeneity was due to France's character as 'a nation frenzied, distempered, seeking it knew not what'. Has it not taken France a century', Wilson argued rhetorically, 'to effect the combination; and are all men sure that she has found it even now?'⁹⁹ Wilson attributed the political success of the United States to the quality of the English who had arrived there, 'for the most part picked men: Such men as have the energy and the initiative to leave old homes and old friends, and go to far frontiers to make a new life for themselves. They were men of a certain initiative, to take the world into their own hands.' Until 1890 the American frontier, Wilson supposed, acted 'in the way that the colonies did for England,' creating opportunities 'for the expression and expansion of masculine or virile energies, and creation of the spirit of initiative and practical expediency, that builds national feeling'.¹⁰⁰ Implying the existence of both fixed cultural differences (even if those differences became fixed at specific historical moments) and the adaptability of peoples, Wilson reconciled notions of determinism and autonomy, cultural and political identity, and heterogeneous origins and homogeneous endings. The frontier not only schooled Americans in a shared national masculine culture, it unveiled, he argued, 'the deepest of all secrets, the genesis of nationality, the play of spirit in the processes of history'.¹⁰¹

There is no evidence that Wilson ever thought of the idea of personality in anything more than a metaphorical sense, or that his neo-Lamarckism was anything more than culturally based. Thorsen argues that 'Wilson had no psychological or sociological language with which to express himself on such topics as political "responsibility", "trust", and "character"'. He had conceived a project for which there was hardly any vocabulary available'.¹⁰² To be sure, Wilson's pre-war view of nationality did not overtly draw on psychology. Unlike Roosevelt who hung on the ideas of Le Bon, Wilson was more interested in the political theories of Bagehot and the sociological sensibility of Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis.¹⁰³ Yet even if we accept that Wilson was uninterested in scientific method, there is in his *fin-de-siècle* writing evidence of a discourse that corresponds to developments in science and psychology, more specifically the racial and biological nuances of contemporary definitions of culture. From the late 1870s, Wilson employed terms such as 'political habits,' 'the character of the people,' and the inner life of the nation in his historical and political

writing.¹⁰⁴ As Thorsen acknowledges, Wilson's thinking in the 1880s on the state used 'the doors of the self and family to imagine the development of national life.'¹⁰⁵ From the 1890s, Wilson indicated his interest in patriotism as 'a sort of energy' with its springs in character.¹⁰⁶ Patriotism in Wilson's understanding of politics was 'a basic human urge that is amenable to improvement by the examples of civil behaviour and social duties inherent in the political order.'¹⁰⁷ Thorsen attributes to Burke Wilson's use of the notion of political habit as 'the process of internalised behaviour' showing 'that social and political behaviour take on a fixed character through frequent repetition and that acquired dispositions and tendencies had become instinctive impulses'.¹⁰⁸ But Wilson's intellectual predecessors – including Spencer and Bagehot – shaped his interest in psychological man and its implications for political theory.¹⁰⁹ His conception of the racial origins of nations, even heterogeneous ones, was grounded in the contemporary influence of science, particularly trends in ethnopsychology. 'I fancy', Wilson stated in 1904 in an address delivered at the St. Louis Universal Exposition, 'that the historian who intimately uses the language of the race and people of which he writes somehow gets intimation of its origin and history into his ear and thought whether he be a deliberate student of its development or not'.¹¹⁰ Language was the mirror of national genius and of the 'data of organic life' and a means of deciphering racial origins. As a result, for Wilson, the great advocate of the liberal and liberating political principle of nationality, racial origins were not only the key to the quality of the nation, they marked the limits of assimilation and national cohesion.

Wilson's late nineteenth century writing offers evidence of the importance of the model of the heterogeneous self for understanding the nation and the problem of cohesion. In this sense, the impact of psychology on Wilson's thought in this period is not only of speculative interest, it had real political implications. In 'The Ideals of America', published in *The Atlantic Monthly* in 1902, Wilson made the case for a form of benign American imperialism in the Philippines by emphasising the multiplicity of selves in that south Asian region as a problem, or at least as a sign of the immature level of the Philippines' national evolution. He contrasted this situation to an American experience, determined by its culturally inherited links to English tradition:

You cannot call a miscellaneous people, unknit, scattered, diverse of race and speech and habit, a nation, a community. ...No people can form a community or be wisely subjected to common forms of government who are as diverse and as heterogeneous as the people of the Philippine Islands. They are in no wise knit together. They are of many races, of many stages of development, economically, socially, politically disintegrate, without community of feeling because without community of life,

contrasted alike in experience and in habit, having nothing in common except that they have lived for hundreds of years together under a government which held them always where they were when it first arrested their development. You may imagine the problem of self-government and of growth for such a people, – if so be you have an imagination and are no doctrinaire.¹¹¹

Wilson's understanding of the role of the raw material of identity and history in the making of nations rendered nationality a culturally and historically specific rather than universal conception, 'some peoples may have it, therefore, and others may not.'¹¹² In this case, the haves and have nots corresponded to the Victorian trope of advanced and backward societies, according to which societies evolved from animal or unconscious entities to increasingly civilised and conscious states. This evolutionary framework allowed for the progress of the latter as 'wards' according to an unspecified timetable: 'We shall teach them [the people of the Philippines] order as a condition precedent to liberty, self-control as a condition precedent to self-government'.¹¹³ Wilson did not hesitate to draw attention to the unfinished status of American nationality in the face of its own heterogeneity, complaining that '[I]f there is difficulty in our own government here at home because the several sections of our own country are disparate and at different stages of development, what shall we expect, and what patience shall we not demand of ourselves, with regard to our belated wards beyond the Pacific'.¹¹⁴ But he made the relative capacity of nationalities to manage diversity, to assert 'self-control' and establish 'self-government' the basis of a hierarchy of evolving nations and of America's international and imperial role.¹¹⁵

In Wilson's view, women were by nature in the category of the 'have-nots'. Even though women did not populate Wilson's texts in the same manner as in the writings of Barrès – as the literal threats to (or at times idealised saviours of) the nation – his conception of individual subjectivity and the nation resonated his general concerns about the social importance of separate sex spheres. Wilson's concept of the organic nation resonated not only a social Darwinist and biological understanding of society and a preference for masculinity, but also his interest in the family as 'a genetic explanation of origins of the state', as 'an analogy or model of interconnections between members and function', as 'a metaphor suggesting emotional bonds between citizen and state', and 'an association greater than the sum of its members'.¹¹⁶ Wilson had a pre-Freudian understanding of family relations, but he accommodated the same notions of biologically transmitted predispositions, of the political significance of the unconscious, and more particularly of the passions of nationality that coloured contemporary thinking about individual and collective psychology, and that situated men on the frontier, and women at the domestic hearth and

the national margins. The gender implications of the family metaphor are evident in Wilson's appreciation of the social order inherent in the patriarchal model of family and the sexual separation of spheres, whereby women complemented men's lives and careers.¹¹⁷ If the role of the family was 'to transmit the skills that would lead the individual toward self-control and self-development', the role of women was handmaiden, mirror, and even manager of the masculine individual's psychological and political evolution.¹¹⁸

A gendered transnational discourse?

For even ambiguously liberal intellectuals such as Wilson, the idea of the nation drawn on the map of the self provided a simple, at times simplistic, political restorative in a climate of social crisis. At a general conceptual and imaginative level it offered a powerful alternative to fractured social orders coping with new demands for representation from colonial subjects, the working classes, and women. In so far as the idea of the political nation involved the possession of will or personality, and a normatively homogeneous self, it was implicitly the prerogative of men, white races, and Western nations. Lippmann might not have agreed with these views, but on the eve of the First World War, he acknowledged the extent to which the assertion of 'the personalities of women' was commonly associated with rampant sexuality, and with the decline of the bourgeois family.¹¹⁹ In his first major political study, *Drift and Mastery: An attempt to diagnose the current unrest* (1914), he proposed optimistically that the study of psychology would 'shape the world nearer to the heart's desire'.¹²⁰ But he also warned that given the importance of the status of women to national self-definition, 'rights' such as the vote would not be enough for women to achieve real emancipation. Indeed, the post-war would prove Lippmann right. At the moment that women in some nations gained the vote – in Britain, for example, but not France, and as a reward for war work, or in order to exercise a moral influence, and as an exceptional rather than intrinsic right – the terrain of citizenship itself shifted to nationality, and made the rights of married women to nationality a central feminist cause in the interwar period.¹²¹

To be sure, neither the woman question nor the nation question had the same complexion in every national setting. The French debate about social cohesion, as typified in Barrès' own thinking, occurred in the context of ideological antagonism between republicans and monarchists, the state and the church; in England it was the heterogeneity of the empire and the creeping instability of the existing class-based social order that made national cohesion so pertinent; the American concern for national cohesion was driven by memories of slavery, the civil war, and by the nation's roots in colonialism and immigration, as well as the burgeoning imperial

aspirations of its élites. Regardless of the distinctiveness of these national debates, in each case feminist demands were represented as a major threat to national cohesion. Liberal-minded British, French, and United States men keen to define, and restrict, the democratic possibilities of a new world order readily employed assumptions about the implicitly gendered self. As we will see, in the course of war and peacemaking, some internationalist women attempted to challenge just these assumptions and relate the cause of female self-determination to the ideal of national self-determination. Together, the actions of these men and women in preparations for and during the peace process of 1919, knit the discursive threads of the nation, psychology, and international politics ever more tightly together.

5

Gender and the Apogee of Nationalism, 1914–1919

‘The state has never really admitted the existence of women as human beings...’

A. Maude Royden, 1917.¹

On the afternoon of February 13, 1919, representatives of the Council of Ten – including Woodrow Wilson, Georges Clemenceau, the British Foreign Minister Arthur Balfour, Vittorio Orlando and Sidney Sonnino (the Italian Premier and Foreign Minister respectively), Baron Makino (the Japanese Foreign Minister), the Maharaja of Bikaner, and a number of government experts and secretaries – gathered in the rooms of M. Pichon, the French Foreign Minister at the Quai d’Orsay. Although their meeting was a routine part of the peace process, some of the participants recorded this occasion as atypical. Wilson had brought to it a request for permission ‘to make a statement on the question of women representation [*sic*]’:

He [Wilson] had recently received a visit from a group of ladies, representing the suffrage associations of the Allied countries who had assembled here in Paris, under the Chairmanship of Mrs Fawcett of Great Britain. These ladies had brought him a resolution, and had asked him to bring it to the notice of the Conference. The resolution contained a proposal to the effect that a conference of women should be appointed to consider the conditions of children and women throughout the world. He sincerely desired to give effect to the views expressed by the representatives of the Suffrage Associations of the Allied countries. He wished, therefore, to enquire whether the Conference would agree to the appointment of a Commission consisting of one representative of each of the five Great Powers and four representatives of the Smaller Powers to report on the conditions and legislation concerning women and children throughout the world, and to determine whether any international relations should be issued.²

Shotwell, the historian and former Inquiry expert present at the meeting as a member of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, recollected that at this point Wilson's tentativeness was palpable. Wilson 'hardly knew whether they would think he was justified' in bringing to the Council's attention the 'problems of especial interest to women'.³ Before the American president had even finished, Clemenceau interrupted with, 'Ah, it's the suffrage?' The other Council members quickly followed suit, much to Shotwell's bemusement. Each of them 'seemed to feel it was his duty to say something'. Clemenceau suggested the problem be shunted to the Inter-Allied Commission on International Labour Legislation, 'he had no objections to offer an enquiry being carried out into the conditions of woman and child labour: but he would strongly object to any enquiry being held into the political status of women'. When Wilson pointed out that 'the women were chiefly interested in the latter question', Balfour replied that 'he had long been in favour of woman suffrage, but he felt considerable alarm at the thought that the Peace Conference should extend its activities to a consideration of that question'. Sonnino 'pointed out that the Inter-Allied Commission on International Labour and Legislation had already enquired into matters relating to women and children, with the exception of the Suffrage question. He, personally, was in favour of woman suffrage, but he did not think it would be good politics to take up this question at the present moment. He thought interference by the Peace Conference would hardly lead to good results.' Baron Makino remarked that there had been a suffrage movement in Japan, but it was insignificant. The Maharaja believed that this request would present difficulties 'in all oriental countries for reasons which it would be unnecessary for him to explain at the present moment'. In the face of the shared Eastern and Western anxiety about the women's demands, and a presumption about the national dimensions of women's political status, Wilson, himself only a late convert to women's suffrage, agreed not to press the matter and withdrew his proposal.⁴

This brief episode is one of the few pieces of explicit evidence that in 1919 the 'new world order', that phrase that blithely intrudes on the history of the twentieth century, had distinctive consequences for women. On the whole, national archives record the peace of 1919 as an exercise in the scientific evaluation of the limits of national borders decided by the Entente political élite and their teams of experts; as if the application of the principle of nationality was sex-neutral; and as if international relations had little or nothing to do with gender.⁵ To be sure, the phrase 'both sexes' made its way seemingly unobtrusively into the constitutions of the new states sanctioned by the peace brokers, and into the plebiscite process of 'self-determination' that was intended to decide the most problematic of the new national borders. Sarah Wambaugh, one of the few female technical experts to the League of Nations secretariat, remarked in her history

of the use of plebiscites in the peace process that '[t]he principle of women's suffrage in all the plebiscites' appeared to have been adopted by the Entente powers at Paris as 'a matter of course'. Yet, given that this development was in stark contrast to the uncertain status of women's suffrage in most European states at this time, including Britain and France, and given also the attitudes expressed by the Council of Ten, we can hardly assume its inevitability.⁶ Peacemaking was a process with both explicitly and implicitly gendered implications, as hinted in the brief episode on February 13 at the Quai d'Orsay.

Wambaugh's tentative explanation for the introduction of women's suffrage in the plebiscites, as 'a matter of course', was offered in the context of her own membership of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom [Women's League], an organisation that attempted to intervene in the peace process in order to remind its negotiators of the importance of the woman question to any formulation of a new more democratic world order. The Women's League was only one of a number of international organisations, populated in the main by British, French, and American liberal-minded feminists, that attempted during the war to overcome the limits of women's agency within nations. In 1919, they eagerly coupled their democratic ambitions for women with the promise of national self-determination, a trend remarked upon by the New European Alfred Zimmern:

the sense of fresh life, of initiative, of new-won self-respect conveyed by the term 'self-determination' applies not only to nationalities but to social classes, to corporate groups of all kinds, and above all, to individuals. How many women or girls for instance, who had never thought of 'Sinn Fein' or 'self-determination' as mottoes with any bearing on their own lives, have felt the call to a new freedom as a result of their experience in the last few years?... Nations, classes, individuals are filled with a sense that they have grown up and can stand on their own feet.⁷

Zimmern noted with obvious enthusiasm the significant overlap in the woman and nation questions in the general anticipation of a post-war new world order. As I have been arguing, crucial to this overlap was the language of self-determination, and with it the normative conceptualisation of gender and national subjectivities. As the UDC's Maude Royden complained, women had yet to be thought of as 'human beings', or as having wills that could be exercised in international, let alone national, political domains.

Women prepare for peace

In the political, cultural and scientific climate of the years just prior to the First World War, the relationship between female and national self-determination

was at best uneasy. This was the coming together of a number of factors, including the marred history of women's claims to autonomy and nationality, the influence of eugenics, and the anxiety exhibited in most European societies about the threat to social order posed by women's political demands. Women's difference, whether prescribed by their physiology, their 'maternal instinct', or their weakened capacity for sublimation, defined the boundaries of their political agency within the nation and as national citizens. Additionally, the sacrifice by most bourgeois women's movements of their suffrage campaigns to the war effort bolstered the association of woman with the nation in regard to her social rather than political role. In sum, the idealisation of the nation during the war and in its aftermath rendered the familiar nineteenth century social role of woman emblematic of the national good itself.

During the war, liberal-minded internationalist feminists (and by these I mean, orthodox, socialist, or even radical) explicitly tackled the relationship between such representations of women and their political status. Some of these feminists intervened in the preparations for post-war democracy by promoting internationalism and by addressing the disjuncture between conceptions of the nature of women and nationality. They did so by imaginatively reconceptualising the relationship between women and nations. At other times, they challenged representations of 'woman' by exploiting the concepts of personality and will that were so pervasive in discussions of the principle of nationality. In particular, American, British, and French feminists who during the war associated themselves with bodies such as the Organisation for Permanent Peace resolutely drew parallels between their status and the aspirations of latent nations, as if women embodied repressed selves or personalities. They also identified with 'weak nations' requiring equal legal status with men or, to continue the analogy, stronger nations. In 1916, the British pacifist feminist Helena Swanwick proposed that there were mental links between repressed nations – the colonised peoples of India and Ireland in particular – and women.⁸ Certainly such analogies did not secure the unqualified support of British feminists for the political self-determination of either India or Ireland. But they did empower women. At the same time that Swanwick stressed the correspondence between 'pugnacity in men' and women's lack of political power, she emphasised women's distinctive point of view 'towards this matter of peace and war'.⁹ As an executive member of the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies, and other notable feminist and Labour Party organisations before the war, Swanwick went on to become a key figure in the Union of Democratic Control.¹⁰ While the principle of nationality was being forcefully promoted among liberal-democratic English and American intellectuals as the basis for the postwar peace, Swanwick insisted that the causes of national and female self-determination were inextricably bound.

Similar themes informed the wartime writings of Ellen Key, whose ideas impressed Western European and North American feminists. Drawing on Swanwick's arguments, Key extrapolated the political and national significance for both men and women of what she referred to as 'the new philosophy of personality.' Her essays on this theme were published in American newspapers and then as the book *War, Peace and the Future: A Consideration of Nationalism and Internationalism and of the Relation of Women to War* (1916). Tellingly, her discussion began with a description of the history of women's subjugation. 'Woman's will', she claimed, 'was for a long time directed toward one end only: To find a way of fulfilling the eternal destiny allotted to her, to become a wife and a mother and to exercise her womanly power within the home.'¹¹ War had helped redefine that domestic domain as part of the nation:

In Sweden as in other countries they now claim that the 'new' youth will have to turn away from the 'outlived ideas' of the philosophy of evolution and determinism, away from religion and social radicalism, cosmopolitanism, and individualism, to the new philosophy of personality that lays stress on the right of the individual to freedom, power of will, and initiative, but, only so that their will and power may be placed at the service of the nationalistic state.¹²

On the basis of her history of the female experience of citizenship, Key argued that a balance was required between social responsibilities towards the nation and the cultivation of self, in contrast with the complete self-abnegation required by 'passionate' nationalism, for which the ego of the nation merely replaced the ego of the self.¹³

Feminists not only gave voice to the problematic relationship between representations of female subjectivity and nationality, they posited alternatives. Despite their ideological and national 'differences, Key, like Anthony and Swanwick, exploited the possibility that women's historical experience of being 'without country', and their alleged innate maternalism, predisposed them to act on behalf of the social good, pacifism and internationalism. Anthony believed that '[t]he program of feminism is not the mere imitation of masculine gestures and motions.'¹⁴ Since maternalism made women important to nations and races, it did not make national or racial identification redundant. Rather by giving women a more prominent political role, the forms of nationalism and racism that predominated in the masculine world would be tempered. Key even posited a salient feminine will that, when given political expression, would have 'as its last and greatest aim: to humanize humanity'.¹⁵ She also supported a 'sound nationalism' based in 'the concordance between people of kindred race and language' and eugenicism.¹⁶

Key's complex vision of the non-nationalist future required the expansion of what she regarded as a feminine 'soul-culture' – to counter the existing 'race-culture' – and of the democratic state which 'seeks to preserve and protect national unity, but wants the nation's growth in power first of all to be the result of inner development and creativeness.'¹⁷ This version of non-nationalism, like the non-nationalism of male internationalists, accepted the elemental place of nations and of nationality in the constitution of an international order. Key's vision of an improved world order, however, extrapolated from the idea of woman's maternalism a feminist argument: racial quality would improve if women were given greater control over their bodies and the means for greater independence. Swanwick likewise related modern woman's urgent need 'to be a complete person' to 'the scientific knowledge [that] was now proving woman's maternal racial instinct.' 'Racial instinct' was, she claimed 'of tremendous importance to the welfare of the race' and to women's special international role.¹⁸

In their efforts to remake the relationship between women and nations, internationalist feminists, English, German, American and Swedish alike, struggled to sustain their social and political commitment to the nation, even as they rejected the position of feminists who had surrendered the question of women's rights to the national wartime effort. They invested women's futures in the principle of nationality by bringing to the fore representations of women's distinctive racial duty. References to race were, however, often ambiguous, and, indeed, often implied the nation. This complex discursive and conceptual interdependence of nationality, internationality and race, of feminism, pacifism, and nationalism were perhaps most clearly articulated in Key's work:

It is because woman feels a greater solidarity with the *race* that she denies the right of the State to set itself a goal and to use means, that are believed to further the welfare of the State, but which ruin the lives and the prospects of the individuals. It is not from a lack of social and national feeling that the most highly developed women of the present day are opposed to war and are friends of peace....it is just because of their social work as life conservers that women realize the utility of motherhood as well as of all the work they share with men for the uplift of the race.¹⁹

Conventional representations of national, racial, and sexual differences constituted inseparable strands in feminist thinking about self-determination. Certainly, during the war all sides took up the language of national will for their own feminist ends. In 1914, Gertrude Baumer, the president of the German Women's Movement, evoked the ambition 'of wanting to be one people' when she said that 'Germany spoke, felt

and wanted through us [women]'. Baumer exclaimed 'our own souls became one with the souls of the people [in the] great and momentous drawing together of all national energies into a powerful common will.'²⁰ The American internationalist, pacifist, and feminist Jane Addams wrote that European women from warring countries who attended the celebrated 1915 Hague International Women's Congress, organised by the women's branch of the OPP, the International Women's Committee for Permanent Peace, against the war and nationalism, had left 'home', 'at a moment when the individual, through his own overwhelming patriotism, fairly merges his personal welfare, his convictions, almost his sense of identity, into the national consciousness. It is a precious moment in human experience, almost worth the price of war, but it made the journey of the women leaving home to attend the Congress little short of an act of heroism.'²¹

Addams' admiration for the collective 'national consciousness' contrasted with her praise for the women who, like herself, had detached themselves from the national body to question the point of the war. But she also proposed that the peaceful organisation of the world would require the utilisation of an instinctive feminine self of 'emotion and deep-set racial impulses,' of 'those primitive human urgings to foster life and to protect the helpless, of which women were the earliest custodians.'²² In her autobiography, Swanwick similarly recalled the spirit that inspired the women at the 1915 Hague Congress as 'that heroism of gentleness which longs for the service of the higher ideals without jeopardising true national instincts.'²³

In their discussions of internationalism and of the need for female intervention in international relations, even OPP feminists such as Emily Greene Balch expressed anxiety about the depletion of 'racial stocks' and the prestige of the 'white race'.²⁴ In a letter written from the Hague just after the outbreak of war, the English anti-war socialist and feminist Emmeline Pethick Lawrence outlined to Rosika Schwimmer, the Hungarian feminist and Secretary of the International Women's Suffrage Association based in London, her idea that women undivided by race or class should appeal 'to the great Community of men and women of our blood and race in the United States of America to come forward and to save western civilisation in Europe – and prevent the white races of an older world from the crime and folly of race suicide.' What was needed, Lawrence argued, was a policy that presented the value to the world of race preservation and race development, '[n]o mission could be more worthy of a great people that within its own Confines has settled the problem of the proximity of races, and has accomplished the union of self-governing States.'²⁵

During the war, women, like their male peers, were busy discussing the nation, the new Europe, and the principle of nationality. Internationalist feminists, some of whom belonged to the same organisations as male intel-

lectuals who were able to influence the national shaping of the new world order, reinvented the relationship between women and nations by taking on dominant scientific and philosophical representations of women's maternalism and racial role. The most significant examples of this conjunction of internationalism, nationalism, and feminism occur in the history of the wartime peace groups, including the OPP, which eventually coalesced as the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.

The seedbed of the Women's League was the United States' Woman's Peace Party created in 1915 by the indomitable Jane Addams with the overt aim of extending the principle of 'self-government' to women 'as human beings and the mother half of humanity'.²⁶ A Woman's Peace Party pamphlet argued that women's distinctive contribution to the nation meant that the role of women 'in the settlement of questions concerning not alone the life of individuals but of nations be recognised and respected./ We demand that women be given a share in deciding between war and peace in all the courts of high debate; within the home, the school, the church, the industrial order, and the State'.²⁷ Later that year, the party's leaders took their program to the Hague Congress, an international congregation of women from throughout Europe and the United States who, under the auspices of the OPP, promoted mediation as a means of ending the war, and planned for the restoration of a democratic post-war order that included equality for women as well as nations.²⁸ As a result of the Hague Congress, the Women's Committee for Permanent Peace [Women's Committee] was born. It was this organisation that, within a short time, was reinvented as the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom or Women's League.

Despite the political and cultural diversity of its members, in 1915 the Women's Committee was able to agree on a platform that included the creation of a League of Nations to arbitrate international law and monitor international disputes, 'respect for nationality', 'the right of the people to self-government', and the enfranchisement of women. The Hague resolutions were then delivered to Wilson by a delegation from the Women's Committee led by its President, Addams. This act was intended to signal the seriousness with which its members took their international intervention, and women's place in international relations in the anticipated postwar. Confident of their distinctive feminine influence, the Women's Committee followed their visit to Wilson with other high-profile delegations that targeted the Entente, Central Powers, and neutral governments. Rosika Schwimmer, one of the chief organisers of the Hague Congress, argued that the governments visited by these delegations considered women 'as the moral power to which they could defer without humiliating themselves'.²⁹

The activities of the international women's organisations mirrored a general international trend in wartime female political activism. In 1916,

Swanwick, who was by this time president of the newly formed British branch of the Women's Committee, described the new political focus of feminists:

Women have been used to think foreign politics outside their scope. In spite of this, some women had thought a good deal about them. The suffrage agitation had set very many thinking, and the outbreak of the war gave a great impulse to study. A great number of books on diplomacy and on economic and strategic questions connected with international relations have lately appeared and have been eagerly read by women in addition to older historical works. Enormous numbers of study circles have been formed by the Workers' Educational Association, the Association for the Study of International Relations, the Union of Democratic Control, the Women's International League and the Women's Cooperative Guild, and a large proportion of the students have been women.³⁰

The feminists who allied in their fervour for a new world order had close connections with the mainly male organisations busily promoting similar platforms of national self-determination and the creation of a League of Nations. As we have seen, Swanwick personally pursued the correspondence between female and national self-determination by assuming key positions in both the Women's Committee and the UDC.³¹

In this same period, French women nurtured similar ideological connections between feminism and a new world order. The French national archives offer the striking case of the members of the *Groupe d'Action des Femmes* who, by October 1917, had infiltrated the weekly dinners of the Paris branch of the French League for a Society of Nations. Irma Perrot, Mme Leper³² and Anna Leal – all employees of the *Postes* and members of the *Association Professionnelle des Agents des PTT* – interrupted the diners' discussions of internationalism, patriotism, the Rights of Man, and the League, with their own views of feminism. Whereas liberals advocated a '*Victoire intégrale*', these women defended a '*féminisme intégral*', or a new world order in which a principled answer to the Woman Question was as important as the principle of nationality and the formation of a League of Nations.³³ Jeanne Melin, a young working-class woman from the Ardenne who made a striking last-minute appearance at the Hague Conference in 1915 speaking on behalf of peace, a few years later attempted to make the French League for the Rights of Man recognise the important place of women in their overall support for a League of Nations and self-determination. At a meeting of the League for the Rights of Man held on 15 August, 1918, Melin proposed an amendment to its proposal that the French government support the creation of a '*Société des Nations*'.³⁴ This proposal had been put by Alphonse Aulard, the president, and respected historian of the

French revolution and member of the *Comité d'Études*, who was by this time in his seventies. Melin demanded the political right of women to participate in a future *Société des Nations* on the basis that the right of peoples or nations to self-determination had to make provision for women and women's suffrage. It was in the end Aulard himself who successfully stifled Melin's amendment.

The problematic place of women in respect of the principle of nationality and international idealism was occasionally recognised by some men in the wartime groups advocating nationality as a principle. The *Congrès de l'Humanité* proposed that the Conference for Peace and the League of Nations should accept that recognition of the equality of the sexes was more important than establishing the equality of races.³⁵ Some UDC men took up the idea that feminist prescriptions for gender equality provided an admirable model for relations between nations of unequal strength. In a volume dedicated to 'a lasting settlement', Charles Roden Buxton proposed,

We must do in the international sphere what the woman's movement demands that we shall do in the national sphere – recognise that inferiority in physical strength shall be no reason for any kind of disability. Just as inter-individual war, or the possibility of it, precludes the equality of women with men, so international war, or the fear of it, precludes the equality of small nations with large.³⁶

In his UDC pamphlet 'Memorandum on Territorial Claims and Self-Determination', Buxton acknowledged that '[n]ot the state only, but society as a whole, follows the curious plan of recognising the existence of women only now and then'. He added his own view that the State is only sovereign, 'when she aims at the good life for all her citizens'.³⁷ Even Seton-Watson, an antagonist of the UDC, compared *The New Europe's* ideal mode of international relations to a superior form of femininity, suggesting that women stood 'for that spirit of sympathy and comprehension upon which intercourse between the nations must be founded'.³⁸ He failed to mention that the woman who inspired this comparison, his good friend Elsie Inglis, a Scottish doctor who led a contingent of nurses into war-ravaged Serbia on behalf of Seton-Watson's ideals, was also a feminist who in correspondence gently mentioned that planning for a new Europe should not ignore female suffrage.³⁹

Given the focus of men like Seton-Watson on national emancipation, women's inclusion in planning for peace could hardly be taken for granted, and feminists such as Inglis focused on bringing this point to the attention of those men who were already influential in the shaping of a more democratic post-war. Millicent Garrett Fawcett – the president of the British National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies who broke with Swanwick

and other pacifist feminists over their objections to Britain's involvement in the war – wrote to high profile intellectual figures and British Foreign Office advisers urging them to support women's rights as well as the principle of nationality. Two of the most notable recipients of these letters were Gilbert Murray and Seton-Watson.⁴⁰ We know too that the liberal hero of the peace process, Smuts, was in correspondence during the peace with Alice Clark, the author and executive member of the Union of Suffrage Societies. Smuts seems to have enjoyed a sporting friendship with Clark, writing on his arrival in Paris, 'I found the Hotel Majestic full of typists and other females. I don't know what all these people are wanted for. I suppose their male friends in the Departments wanted to provide them with an agreeable outing at the public expense after their arduous war labours in London! It is a great nuisance'.⁴¹ Clark kept Smuts well abreast of feminist aims in the peace, and Smuts wrote to his friend in February 1919: 'There is a committee of international women here to look out for trouble where there is already so much, and Mrs [M.] Fawcett has written to me that a deputation of six is coming to see me – I do not know about what in particular. I am sorry I have not you at my elbow to prompt me what to say to these dear ladies, whom the electors most inconsiderately declined to send to Parliament....We might solace them with a committee or commission, though I don't believe in such things, as they are too cynical'.⁴²

Once the Entente powers initiated the peace process in 1919, international women's groups began their interventions. In 1914, the relatively conservative International Council of Women and the International Women's Suffrage Association had temporarily abandoned their demands for suffrage. With the war over, they regrouped. Sections of the Suffrage Association reorganised as the exclusive Allied Women Suffragists and began to capitalise on their support for women's patriotic participation in the Entente's war effort. In the second week of February 1919, the French branch of the Allied Women Suffragists organised a conference at the Lyceum Club in Paris to coincide with the male peace conference being held in that same city. With Carrie Chapman Catt, the president of the International Women's Suffrage Association, unable to attend, the leaders of the national branches of the new Allied Women's Suffrage Association presided: Millicent Fawcett represented Britain, Madame De Witt Schlumberger and Madame Brunschweig, France.⁴³ The conference participants drew up resolutions for presentation to Wilson demanding 'a commission of women of the Allied nations composed of delegates nominated by their respective countries...[that] would inquire and report on the claims of women, which it would then present to the Peace Conference'. Those claims were specified as the 'conditions and legislation concerning women and children throughout the world', namely Labour, Hygiene, Morals, Suffrage, Law, and Peace.

Similar resolutions for women's involvement in the peace process and in setting the terms of the peace were iterated at the Labour and Socialist International Conference also held in February 1919, but in the neutral Swiss city of Berne, rather than Paris. The women attending, some of them members of the Women's Committee, decided to hold a special meeting under the auspices of the Women's Committee's Swiss branch.⁴⁴ This meeting was organised with the assistance of Rosika Schwimmer, who by this time had been appointed 'plenipotentiary' to Switzerland by Hungary's short-lived liberal and pro-Wilson Karolyi government. (This made her the world's first official female diplomat.) The Berne agenda included plebiscites, the League of Nations, the right to vote for women as a guarantee of peace, protection for working mothers and children, and women acting as advisors at the Paris peace conference.⁴⁵ The gathering resolved to support a democratic League of Nations and emphasised that women should be participating in the peace conference. It also demanded enfranchisement for women and equal rights in employment and social service as conditions of the peace.

In the following weeks, the international executive of the Women's Committee began to put into action the plan formulated at the 1915 Hague congress, 'to hold its next meeting at the same time and in the same place as the peace conference of the governments'.⁴⁶ Confident that their Hague resolutions had inspired Wilson's Fourteen Points (even though Wilson never explicitly referred to the efforts of the Women's Committee or to the place of women in the new world order), between 12 and 17 May 1919, the Women's Committee organised their own conference, again choosing a neutral city for symbolic reasons, this time Zurich. It was at this meeting, attended by one hundred and fifty women from sixteen countries, that the Women's Committee became the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom or Women's League.⁴⁷

Opening intentionally on the same day that the terms of the Versailles treaty were made public, the Women's League conference provided an important forum for criticisms of the punitive nature of the treaty and the exclusivity of the League of Nations.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, the criticisms made by the Women's League were grounded in support of Wilsonian ideals, not in contradiction of them. For example, under pressure from its Irish wing, the Women's League supported the inclusion of Irish 'self-determination' as an issue for discussion at the peace – a condition that the British government would not accept.⁴⁹ The meeting's resolutions also encompassed points similar to those proposed by the Allied Women Suffragists, but the resolutions of the Women's League were more broadranging, just as they transcended the Allied Suffragists nominal identification with the wartime alliance of the 'Great Powers'.

The Women's League championed national self-determination and the creation of a League of Nations that could supervise the world economy,

plan for the necessities of life, control mandates, and grant equal suffrage and the complete political, social and economic equality of women with men. It demanded an end to the blockade against the conquered states and the consequent famine.⁵⁰ Its 'Woman's Charter' included specific provisions for female suffrage and the right of women to vote in plebiscites to decide disputed national territory. It urged that 'a married woman should have the same right to retain or change her nationality as a man'.⁵¹ A Women's League delegation went to the official Paris talks armed with these recommendations, determined to claim a place for women in the national reshaping of Europe, and in the new international sphere.⁵²

The reception of the women by individual governments was, in the historian Mary Degen's words, 'subdued'.⁵³ But there were other women's groups that felt even more put out at their treatment. The executive of the International Council of Women were somewhat taken aback by their lack of status at the peace. In January 1919, Countess Aberdeen, the President of the International Council of Women wrote to Maurice Hankey, the British Secretary to the Peace Conference, to make the case for the status of her organisation and women's possible role in the peace:

I understand that a delegation from the Suffrage Societies in the countries of the Allies is to be received and I would point out that the International Council of Women is a Federation of National Councils composed not only of Suffrage Societies, but of all others of National importance with which women are connected and representing some 20 millions of women, bound together by a common desire to render national and international service to the human race, and believing that opportunities for women of all countries to meet and confer together on questions relating to the welfare of the Commonwealth, the family and the individual will promote good understanding and effective action for the welfare of humanity....Believing that your Conference realises that the hearty cooperation of the Women Citizens of the world is required to make your decisions effective, I submit my request with confidence.⁵⁴

Although Aberdeen argued that her delegation deserved to be received because of its wartime work, the Foreign Office was uninterested, and the Peace administration stalled. When Fawcett wrote on behalf of the Allied Suffragists to Wilson asking for a Commission of Women to be created, she was similarly put off. Wilson's reply to Fawcett blamed the lack of interest on the non-European contingent: 'I found practically all of the conferees entirely sympathetic with the cause of woman suffrage, but if I may say so confidentially, very much embarrassed by the objections raised by representatives of India and Japan to a world wide investigation, which would raise questions most unacceptable to them. It was evident that to press the matter would lead to some unpleasant controversies and I concluded that I

might be doing the cause more harm than good by insisting.⁵⁵ Wilson's representation of the secret meeting held on 13 February 1919 by the Council of Ten, and of his own role, was at the least disingenuous.

Nearly a month after Wilson first broached the issue of women's representation in the peace process, a new request from the 'Suffrage Association of the Allied Countries' was considered at a similar meeting of the Council of Ten. The records of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace show that the Allied Women Suffragists' delegation had forwarded to the President of the United States, and to the Commission for the League of Nations, a 'memorial' asking that women be allowed to play a part in the permanent commissions organised by the League of Nations 'with the same right or entitlement as men' – '*au même titre que les hommes*' – as part of the bureaux and official delegations, arguing that individuals as well as 'peoples' had a right to self-determination – '*disposer librement d'eux-mêmes*'.⁵⁶ The memorial staked out women's place in the international sphere by invoking the authority of 'the people' of the nations that were to be represented in the League of Nations:

Considering that no-one can believe themselves authorised to speak in the name of the peoples while women, who represent half humanity, are excluded from the political life of nations.

Considering that those women who are deprived of suffrage are without influence over the government of their country; it is profoundly unjust that they cannot intervene in the decisions which lead to war or peace, decisions which determine a future, the consequences of which they have to submit to without have taken responsibilities for those consequences.⁵⁷

Among the women's demands was the creation of Hygiene and Education *bureaux* in the League of Nations. These *bureaux* would consider 'moral questions', prostitution and the traffic in women and children. They also reiterated their request that women be included in the strategies for recognising the rights of peoples to self-determination. Fannie Fern Andrews, the American educationalist and feminist who was part of the female delegation, recalls that they were given half an hour and they managed to get through in the scheduled time:

Colonel House attached great importance to this also, for at the close of the meeting, as we were leaving, he came hurrying after me and almost shouted: 'Mrs. Andrews, that is the finest thing that women ever did!' Everyone seemed happy. Even the members of the League of Nations Commission were smiling approval, and each stood and cordially shook hands with all of us; although it was a noticeable fact that when we entered the room all were seated and no one made any gesture toward

greeting us with the exception of President Wilson and the other American members, who stood immediately upon our arrival and remained standing until each lady sat down.⁵⁸

Andrews may have wished to portray her own countrymen in a favourable light, but accounts of the peace by its male participants only record that when the deputation of Allied Women Suffragists was received by the Commission on the League of Nations the American legal expert David Hunter Miller handed Wilson a note pointing out that as far as he could tell every referendum had a provision for equal suffrage, which the President then announced to the delegates.⁵⁹

While the status of the female delegates was much like that of the national deputations that regularly sought out the Council of Ten, women and so-called women's issues were regarded as outside the domain of the key concerns of the peace and of its international ambitions, and even in conflict with them. The two arenas in which the 'group of ladies' was to be allowed to influence the peace were in the Commissions for International Labour Legislation and the League of Nations, where their representatives might be heard.⁶⁰ The International Labour Legislation Commission was the most accessible to women of the 'international' forums.⁶¹ The Commission's discussion of labour regulations and legislation to cater for women's difference – questions of equal pay, the physical impact of work on their reproductive capacities – is evidence of a consensus among the Great Powers about the appropriateness of 'international' legislation to make women's labour status within nations uniform, and of some concession to women's involvement in certain areas of the League of Nations. Miller's diary recounts a meeting of men held prior to the women's delegation, on 26 March, at which Lord Robert Cecil proposed adding to the draft Covenant of the League of Nations a new article stating that all the offices of the League of Nations, including the Secretariat, would be open to women. Cecil explained that this specificity was necessary because English law only recognised the case of women when they were explicitly nominated.⁶² Of course, it was their awareness of just this exceptional legal and political status that motivated attempts by feminists of all persuasions to intervene in the peace with the aim of presenting women's intrinsic equality as an issue of *international* relevance, on a par with national issues at the peace talks, which had been organised in the interests of a more democratic new world order. It was also an issue that the Council of Ten preferred to ignore.

Women and the League of Nations

By 1919 a majority of international women's organisations thought of the League as their particular cause, and as their special political organ,

whether because of the view that women were unconsciously drawn to internationalism, or because of the space that was made available to women within the League. Aberdeen considered her own organisation 'a Women's League of Nations', and a training ground for women in the purposes and workings of such a League. Such was the optimism regarding the place of women in the League of Nations that in 1920, the journalist Constance Drexel, a supporter of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, wrote in a draft article intended for *The Times* 'there is now no further doubt that women have been given the right of creating a leading part in the new world organisation'.⁶³ What will they do with it?

Although feminist histories of the League of Nations show there was little agreement among the women's movements regarding the best means of having a voice in 'the new world organisation' – whether through participation in the main body of the League or by creating a special women's branch; by engaging in broad international concerns or by addressing 'women's issues' – many women looked to the League of Nations to offer them the political representation that their own nations did not provide. As Rupp describes, international women's organisations 'did win an official hearing before the commission on the League of Nations, where ... they called for the admission of women into all permanent bodies of the League, the granting of woman suffrage "as soon as the civilisation and democratic development of each country might permit", the suppression of the traffic in women and children, and the establishment of bureaus of education and hygiene'.⁶⁴ But they did so in the context of the civilising missions of their own nations, and as representatives of the more advanced races. For the Allied Women Suffragists, women's suffrage was to be recognised as a principle 'that it may be applied throughout the world as soon as the civilisation and the democratic development of each state may permit'.⁶⁵ Education was to be taken up by the League for similar reasons: 'An educated native population would go far towards solving the problem of the backward races. Education is the key to the progress of those organised and civilised communities, which under protection, are capable of self-development.' These claims echoed the themes of the Leagues of Nations' societies, which saw the role of the League as the moral guardian 'of uncivilised races'.⁶⁶

For the most part, feminists viewed the League of Nations as a means by which women could represent their nations. Women unsuccessfully demanded places not only in the League of Nations' bureaucracy and what they considered the appropriately 'feminine' department of 'Social Questions', they keenly (yet unsuccessfully) sought representation on all its Commissions, including the Permanent Advisory Commission for Military, Naval and Air Questions and the Permanent Commission on Mandates.⁶⁷ British, French, Czech, and Italian suffrage and peace groups, representatives of both the International Women Suffrage Association and the

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, demanded that the League of Nations' Council install a female representative on the Permanent Commission on Mandates. They argued that women with colonial experience could more effectively oversee the maintenance of racial purity in protectorates than men who might themselves be sexually seduced or act as sexual predators amongst an alien race. The Lombard branch of the 'Comitato Internazionale Femminile per Una Pace Durevole' (an adjunct of the Women's Committee) described European women familiar with the tropical regions as better able to supervise relations between white men and black women in Africa, and to prevent the abuse by white men of indigenous women and their '*meticci*' (half-caste) children.⁶⁸ In February 1921, the London branch of the IWSA wrote to the Council of the League recommending that at least one woman sit on the Permanent Commission on Mandates because '[s]uccess in administration must lie in developing what is already good in a race, and since women are the prime guardians of its traditions, we believe the addition of a suitable woman representative would be of essential and immense value to the Commission':

In all countries inhabited by races of different colours the relations between the men of the governing race and the women of the other are a source of difficulty, and often an actual hindrance to good understanding. Unfair pressure may be put on men themselves through their family life, while again, questions of variation in standards of morals and customs call urgently for the representation of the woman's standpoint.⁶⁹

Women would exercise their 'distinctive contribution' to nations in the mediation and defence of morals and 'the race'. If this was a 'nobler conception of empire', then it was to ensure women's place in the international sphere as the overseers of the colonialisms of respective European nations.

Ironically, European women agitating for places on the Permanent Commission on Mandates had more in common with their male nationals than with the women who participated in national organisations in order to challenge their colonial rulers. Kumari Jayawardena has shown how political agitation and action on the part of Egyptian women, for example, began with their participation in the nationalist movement against the British after the First World War.⁷⁰ By contrast, for European women, the international sphere being shaped by the 'Great Powers' became a base from which to launch campaigns for their particular feminist aims. Those aims were entangled in the denial of national self-determination to non-European states, support for the imperial role of their own nations in what they considered to be 'backward' societies, and the maintenance of racial purity within Europe. In an address to the Women's League in London in

April 1920, Swanwick was ready to blame white men for their treatment of black men and women in the colonies and to insist that the introduction by the French of coloured troops into the Rhine demilitarisation zone contravened the League of Nations Covenant, which did not allow natives of mandated territories to be used for military purposes outside their own countries.⁷¹ However, the concerns she articulated related not only to the effect on 'natives', but also to the threat to British colonial possessions raised by the prospect of a militarised Africa. Swanwick rejected being construed as a racist, but she was perturbed by the consequences of bringing into close conjunction in Europe what she called the black and white races. She maintained that in the interest of 'good feeling between all the races of the world and the security of all women', it was best if 'primitive peoples' were not brought into Europe.

Female and national self-determination

During 'the apogee of nationalism', attempts to exclude women from the processes of the peace – whether physically, or through the construction of women's rights as a 'domestic' or national concern rather than a universal principle – were neither consistent nor explicit. As far as some of the members in the American Inquiry and delegation to the peace were concerned, the question of women's political place in the new world order, like the meaning of nationality and its implications for conceptions of citizenship, required little discussion. The status of married women's citizenship was acknowledged as a domestic or national aspect of the implementation of the principle of nationality, but it was never explicitly discussed at the peace.⁷² Sarah Wambaugh has shown that, technically, 'both sexes' were to be included in the plebiscite process, but that in the cases of Vilnia, Chile and Peru, League representatives excluded women because in these places women did not already have the right to vote.⁷³ Records of the Plebiscite Commissions provide evidence that although the phrase 'both sexes' came to describe the right of women to participate in all League of Nations' supervised plebiscites, in all cases the 'option' of a married woman was legally her husband's. Indeed, we have seen in the example of the Council of Ten that assumptions about women's different political subjectivity as nationals provided a transnational basis for a masculine consensus.

Alternatively, the provision within the League of Nations' Covenant for the opening of all positions within the League to women as well as men made it seem to contemporaries that the wartime agitation of international women's organisations had borne some fruit. Within the League of Nations' institutional structure, women were to be employed on the same grounds as men, and were to be the objects of special conferences and lobbying. In practice, however, the only woman who held a post of high responsibility, Dame Rachel Crowdy (renowned for her war work and in

charge of 'Social Affairs') was never given official director status. In an interview with Mrs Ogilvie Gordon, Sir Eric Drummond, the League's first secretary, stated that there were two commissions on which women ought definitely not to sit, one of which was the Boundary Commission, the other 'a permanent commission of purely technical experts, soldiers, sailors, and airmen to advise on military and naval questions generally'.⁷⁴ These exceptions made it difficult to apply a general rule about women's equal status in the League. When Gordon retorted that, as a geologist, she should be able to sit on the Boundary Commission, and that even military discussions would involve some consideration of the usefulness of women, Drummond resisted.⁷⁵ As a result, women's involvement remained restricted to health or hygiene and social questions, or in the rare case mandates, and the League became the main locus in the interwar period of ongoing agitation by women's organisations for international consideration of prostitution and the traffic in white women and children. The League also became the most useful site for discussions of the question of married women's nationality, although no resolutions promulgated under its auspices were ever enforced. Even the powers of the League's Advisory Commission for the Traffic in Women and Children to discuss the abolition of state-regulated prostitution were ultimately challenged, particularly by the French government and its representative Leon Bourgeois, the great proponent of a League of Nations and a Nobel Peace Prize recipient. Bourgeois argued that such issues concerning women's status, including prostitution, were 'exclusively national, interior, and not international', they were questions of 'unique relevance to territorial authority' and of a state's 'nationality itself'.⁷⁶

Nationality was the prerogative of masculinity by virtue not only of the normative status of men as citizens and self-determining subjects, but of a range of definitions of masculinity operating in the processes of peace-making. The acceptable bases for political agency in the context of international relations included images of masculine chivalry that established the male as protector and patron, as well as arbiter of peace, the latter a function that feminists, by contrast, had been eager to associate with women's especial qualities. The English Fabian and co-founder of the British League of Nations Society, Leonard Woolf, contributed to wartime discussions of how problems of international relations were to be resolved in the post-war by comparing the competition between nations to that of men fighting over women: 'Thus two men may each desire exclusive sexual relations with a single woman; two men may each desire exclusive possession of a single material object; or two national groups may each desire exclusive control of a single portion of the material earth.'⁷⁷ Woolf outlined the need for an International Court of Arbitration and International Government of the kind that would translate into a League of Nations by likening the ways in which 'primitive man' in the past and 'stags' in the present 'fought for

the exclusive possession of a female,' to the manner in which 'nations to-day fight to 'impose their wills' upon one another'. Following the analogy through to its logical conclusion, he argued that just as in modern society courtship was regulated by custom or general social rules, international relations too could be remade to operate on the principle of arbitration rather than force, as a more 'gentlemanly' option.

When it came to the actual peace, similar evocations of a primal masculinity and gentlemanly codes of honour were deployed to a contrary purpose. The British Under-Secretary of State, Sir Eyre Crowe argued on behalf of the British Delegation to the peace conference *against* the idea of international arbitration by also drawing on an example of gentlemanly behaviour:

The national honour would be involved in issues which raise consideration of the moral law, religious convictions or general principles of political conduct. There are in private life things which a free man will not allow to be questioned or discussed, things to which he will not submit, even if it cost him his life – religious coercion, the honor of his wife for instance. These [*sic*] are analogous matters in international relations. ... a proposal to join Ireland to the French republic would violate an English vital interest.⁷⁸

The differences between Crowe and Woolf highlight the range of representations of masculinity and ways in which the consequences of representations of difference and identity were not always predictable. But the fact that representations of the distinctive roles of men and women and the relationship between them were used to support contrary political arguments and practises, indicates the legitimacy of the representations themselves, the conceptualisations of difference that they insinuated, and their political potency.

On the whole, the peace process tended to reaffirm women's different political subjectivity and the normative masculinity of self-determination. It also undermined feminist attempts to negotiate conventional representations of women's difference as a basis upon which women could claim the right to participation. There were other anomalies. In a published account of his peace diary, Harold Nicolson, a junior British delegate to the Paris conference, refers to the elation he shared with his expert colleagues in their task of creating and fortifying 'the new nations whom we regarded, with maternal instinct, as the justification of our sufferings and of our victory.'⁷⁹ Nicolson goes so far as to add that 'the Paris Conference will never properly be understood unless this emotional impulse is emphasised at every stage'. Ironically, while women were sidelined from any substantial role in the peace process, or in determining national self-determination, male experts at the peace had appropriated

both peacemaking and ‘maternal instinct,’ rendering the latter a fundamental ‘emotional impulse’ among men in their task of creating, or literally giving birth to new nations through their unprecedented roles as scientific experts. The historian Marilyn Lake has pointed out that in the post-French revolutionary era of citizenship, national reproduction was a masculine preoccupation, placing men in competition with the regenerative and reproductive powers of women; ‘all men, not just fathers, can generate political life and political right. Political right is defined in terms of sex-right. Political creativity belongs not to paternity, but masculinity. Men give birth to nations.’⁸⁰ In the Nicolson example, we can see the idea of masculine responsibility for the reproduction of nations actually being transposed onto the international responsibility of a certain intellectual class representing the Great Powers.

Where did women fit in the new national world order, and why? Although the ILO and League of Nations were regarded as appropriate international domains for female participation and for introducing international legislation involving women, women’s demands for equal participation and democratic rights, often categorised as self-determination, were treated differently from the demands of men and national lobbyists. Women agitated for those same features of democratic representation or self-determination that were being put forward as important for nationalities, but their activities were not perceived, invited, or documented as internationally significant in the same ways as all-male lobby groups seeking recognition for their particular version of national self-determination. The more that nationalist groups agitated for political representation on behalf of national groups, the more recognition they gained for what negotiators and experts referred to as a heightened and evolved sense of nationality or national consciousness. The women who organised collectively to demand rights in terms similar to those of nationalities were, at the most, only tolerated. Advocates of national self-determination and the creation of a League of Nations, like Seton-Watson, who had based himself at a Paris hotel in an advisory capacity for the duration of peace proceedings, were made aware by close female friends of the correspondence between the situation of subject nations and of women, and of the need for the new world order to encompass rights for women. But they did not make public references to the place of women in the new world order. In the case of the UDC, the historian Marvin Swartz argues that after women’s equality was made part of their manifesto, the ‘woman question’ became no more than a footnote to the UDC’s main concerns.⁸¹

Ingrained attitudes towards the presence of women in the public sphere, and to their potential political menace, did not help improve women’s status at the peace, as is clear in Lloyd George’s own memoir of Paris in 1919: ‘The suffragette campaign was then at its height. All meetings attended by Ministers were interrupted by female shrieks and screechings

about 'Votes for Women'. The interruptions were indiscriminate. ... To avoid disturbance all women were now being excluded from functions of this kind.'⁸² Colonel House's wartime diary reveals a fundamental dismissiveness towards female actors in international relations, rather than any recognition of the 'moral power' that Rosika Schwimmer believed men recognised in women. In an entry for 21 November 1915, House tells us Addams and Schwimmer paid him a visit, as he records, 'to get the President to appoint a peace commission jointly with other neutral nations to sit at the Hague and to continue making peace proposals until accepted'.⁸³ Rather than argue, House preferred to '[get] them into a controversy between themselves which delights me since it takes the pressure off myself'. For House, the pacifism of these women compromised the possibility of American military intervention in the war. But the demands of the Women's Committee/Women's International League were so intrinsically Wilsonian in spirit that House's trivialising seems churlish. Women like Addams and Schwimmer were among the most enthusiastic supporters of the League of Nations' movements and national self-determination in this period. Schwimmer was particularly well-informed, she had even translated Wilson's ideas for Hungarian and German readers. If, in 1915, these women confronted House with issues of more relevance to international relations than to the woman question, he was on other occasions made aware of feminist concerns. In June 1917, Vira Whitehouse (then chair of the New York State Woman Suffrage party, and, in 1919, a member of the support staff for the American Delegation in Switzerland) wrote to House 'I know the war absorbs all of everyone's interest and attention, and I wish it were not my particular duty to have to say constantly to everyone, but you must think of Woman Suffrage too.'⁸⁴

House, like the 'experts' gathered around him, ignored such imperatives. Even Shotwell, who was quick to mock his colleagues at the secret meeting of the Council of Ten discussing women's representation, responded conservatively to the question of women in the new world order. When Edward Krehbiel, a junior Inquirer, suggested that if women were included in a plebiscite for Alsace-Lorraine the outcome would favour France over Germany, since 'in each district more women than men are French speakers (mother tongue) even though by far more men and women are German speakers', Shotwell's response was scornful.⁸⁵ Krehbiel had an open sympathy for including women within the political domain, at least because he believed that women were by virtue of their less combative nature among the miscellaneous forces working for the improvement of international relations; Shotwell was of the opinion that '[t]he question of women voting is irrelevant. Neither the French nor the Germans are accustomed to woman suffrage and it would be foolish to propose it in this kind of a special election'. His response indicates that democratic-minded peace negotiators and experts did not expect that women would

vote in any plebiscites held in the post-war, or that any international decision-making regarding women's political status should override national precedents. Shotwell questioned the relevance of women to plans for post-war democratisation by maintaining that 'women probably hold to old traditions longer than men. For an analogy consider the feeling in the southern [American] states to-day'.⁸⁶

While men were able to make choices about the place of women at the peace, women's exclusion and their uncertain national status in the inter-war period reflected available and prevailing representations of femininity and women's 'selves' in relation to nations – that is the specific contribution of women to the status of the imagined national community. It was because of the importance of these representations that a new Berlin-based journal, *Die Frau im Staat*, (published in Munich) appeared during the peace process under the auspices of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom leaders, Lida Gustava Heymann and Anita Augspurg. In particular, it featured discussions of the psychological aptitude of women for political participation, and the ability of women to exercise their will. In a post-war discussion in *Die Frau im Staat* of women's special role, Dr. Lucy Hoesch-Ernst addressed the question of women's supposed psychological difference:

There are many catch phrases that one can hear about the soul of women in contrast to the souls of men. We have all experienced it often enough, that is also those that prefer not to believe in the 'psychological feeble-mindedness of the female', that the rights of women to equal rights in the state and for some twenty years, to the same education, was disputed on this point, because it was argued that women didn't have the necessary objectivity and logic. Doctors and psychiatrists have tried to prove it scientifically, but from time immemorial, many a representative of the female sex has actually shown that a lack of logic and objectivity of the gender, as such, can no longer be claimed.⁸⁷

Women's place in the new national and international order was delimited by pointedly negative representations of woman's difference and national roles – sometimes women were excluded on the basis that they were, in the abstract, too traditional, as Shotwell had implied, at other times they were too subversive. For some critics, the 'internationalism', unconscious or otherwise, of the Women's International League in particular, allied them with bolshevism, even though the League was not allied to marxist groups; and bolshevism symbolised the dangers of feminism. The New Europeans, like the National Council of French Women and the Union of Russian Women in Switzerland, imagined Bolshevik Russia as a place where the overthrow of marriage and the institution of 'free love'

characterised an essential social disorder.⁸⁸ The historian Mary Louise Degen argues that in some North American circles the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom was labelled a 'separatist' organisation – in the sense that class-based movements were seen as separatist or anti-national – because of its failure to condone women's patriotic involvement in the war and its reconceptualisation of the gender order, even if not of sexual difference. Thus, despite Schwimmer's active support for the so-called Wilsonian principles of the peace, American diplomats undermined her position as Hungarian plenipotentiary (appointed by a liberal pro-Wilson Hungarian government) *because* she was a woman, and Schwimmer was branded a bolshevik partly because of her wartime involvement with the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, and partly because she was a Jew from Central Europe.⁸⁹

Western/European women, and men, did not all take the same position regarding women's appropriate national role. One North American women's anti-suffrage group even warned the peace negotiators against giving women the vote because any change in the political status of women was the prerogative of nations.⁹⁰ However, the outbreak of war intensified the engagement of international women's organisations with the difficult juxtaposition of women and nations. These international women's organisations tended to invoke a common will as definitive about national sovereignty, of the psychological reality of nationality, and of the anti-determinist basis of democracies. They articulated these themes within the accepted parameters of predetermined differences of political capacity – enmeshed in the well-defined cultural and psychological presumptions about racial and gender hierarchy. In other words, women participated on the fringes of the peace process by appropriating the language of nationalism and the concepts of 'peoples' and 'self-determination'. When they tried to evoke imaginative representations of the place of women in nations, they highlighted the intersections between questions of national and sexual difference. Like nationalists who rehearsed historical and geographical narratives to authenticate their national identities, women prominent in internationalist feminist organisations identified themselves with nations desiring and deserving recognition and the right of 'self-determination'. Even though their aim was to subvert the view that women had no national or international political functions, they too commonly drew on conventional representations of sexual difference, of the especial maternal inclination of women to protect their race, or of the pacific qualities of femininity. In 1919, the Women's League's 'Feminist Committee' reinforced a correspondence between feminism, maternalism, and nationalism by stipulating that its 'national sections' should study 'population problems' since women had 'special responsibility' for birth-rates.⁹¹ According to Degen, 'the necessity of arguing for woman's rights led Miss Addams as well as other suffragists to give much thought and stress to those specially

developed feminine traits of intellect and moral sentiment which, even if they did not make women superior to men, at least gave them opportunity for a distinctive contribution to social reform'.⁹²

There is no question that internationalist (non-marxist) women made explicit the issue of sexual difference implicit in the peace process, that Western women used sexual difference as a rationalisation for their participation nationally and internationally, or that European women invoked and employed a national and racial hierarchy in their attempts to delineate a new international order that included them. Adding women to the history of the peace process reminds us both of their exclusion, and of the considerable ideological work that women undertook in order to alter their situation. It also underscores the relatively unspoken masculinity of the international sphere forged in the peace process and the principle of nationality that underlay its design.

National self-determination and peacemaking in the early twentieth century were overwhelmingly masculine affairs. The rights, privileges and representation of discursively imagined ethnicised and racialised communities, like responsibility for the 'birth of nations' remained markedly masculine prerogatives. Where Wilson and Makino may have disagreed on the idea of racial equality, they could agree on the definitively national or domestic nature of the woman question. In Lippmann's words, the peace process exhibited 'a deeper prejudice'. Men more able to influence the peace were aware of the demands of women's organisations for direct political representation in new and old nations and in the realm of international relations, and of the extent to which the decisions and decrees made at the peace conference had different consequences for men and women. But in the personally-organised records of André Tardieu, the French peace delegate and overseer of the peace process, which can be found in the French Foreign Affairs Archives, the written interventions of the Allied Women Suffragists and the International League are classified together in a relatively slight file labelled '*féminisme*', and grouped with documents on '*bolschévisme*', '*socialisme*' and '*églises*' (churches).

There are still many questions to be asked about the significance of sexual difference to the history of nationalism during a period that the historian Eric Hobsbawm has described as 'the apogee of nationalism'. The examination of peacemaking in the light of broader cultural developments, particularly the fascination with nations and psychology, offers us one scenario of how that situation had come about. Answers to the nation question implied conceptualisations of subjectivity that had distinctive implications for men and women as well as for racial/cultural groups assigned relative positions on the evolutionary ladder of political progress towards nationhood. Since the latter half of the nineteenth century liberal-minded intellectuals, scientists and scholars had espoused psychological definitions of the nation that affirmed the self-determining capacities of

the Enlightenment democratic subject, and repudiated biological determinism. However, even attempts by liberals to distinguish between race as a deterministic category and nation as a site in which individual sovereignty and self-determination are manifest, were marked by an insistence on predetermined categories of unequal differences, on the different psychological characteristics of Teuton or German, Latin and Anglo-Saxon nations, the white, yellow and black races, and the sexes. While this insistence might be explained by the political crises to which psychological controversies about the nature of individual subjectivity contributed (or indeed psychological crises provoked by political events), it cannot be explained away. Rather, the underlying preference for the subject of national rights, over and against women's rights, that marked the Paris Peace of 1919, needs to be understood in terms of this broader cultural context, as well as for its influence on how the history of the peace process has continued to be written, as a fundamentally ungendered affair.

Epilogue, 1919–

‘before we involve ourselves in the jungle of obscurities about the innate differences of men, we shall do well to fix our attention upon the extraordinary differences in what men know of the world’

Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (1922).

Since the late nineteenth century, psychologists, social scientists, historians, and theorists of the nation, have redefined the idea of the nation around assumptions about collective psychologies or psyches, gender-specific national subjectivities, and the universal psychological tendency to national forms, even as they have attributed to different peoples and races historically – and biologically – specific capacities for evolving into political nations. Science and philosophy did not imbue women (nor the working-classes and non-Europeans) with personalities or the capacity to exercise will, or, by extension, self-determination. Rather, it was their difference that designated the particular role of men and of the European world in the task of civilisation. Before, during, and after the First World War, these assumptions were the seemingly solid ballast that allowed the suspension of disbelief in the realism of nationality. As they were used in preparations for peacemaking and at the Paris conference, psychological terms such as consciousness, sentiment, and will had been almost emptied of precise meaning, but they were replete with political significance, naturalising the interiority of nationality, and national subjectivities. Despite the banality of these terms, they were used by newly-fashioned experts to establish nationality as the key to democracy, to limit the political purchase of female self-determination, to order the hierarchy of nation-states, and to mark out the boundaries of authority in the international domain – themes corroborated at the peace by diplomats, politicians, lobbyists, and the representatives of nationality causes themselves.¹

There is another point to be made too about the kind of experts employed to decide the terms of nationality in preparations for the peace.

The process of peacemaking was, in theory at least, beholden to the psychological truths of nationality and nations gleaned from the professional perspectives of geographers and historians and by public intellectuals such as Lippmann.² Under the authority of the peace of 1919, and of the democratic ambitions for a new world order, the thematic repertoires of geography and history in particular were expanded: from geographic determinism to a social account of space, and from narrow constitutional and political history to the histories of peoples as coherent national entities comprised of gendered national individuals.³ The close links between history and geography forged in the research centres of New York, London, and Paris, rehearsed the new history of the *Annalistes*, and the methodologies of historians who, in their determinedly national interpretations of the past, preferred to balance the fixed elements of environment and biology, and the narrow political obsessions of the old history, on the one hand, with the dynamics of national cultures and societies, on the other hand. But the preference for history was no simple abandonment of biology. The peace had affirmed the significance of evolution and heredity in the constitution of collective national identities – regardless of whether those identities were cast as conscious and historical, or unconscious and biological.

Recent historians such as Paul Gordon Lauren and Lawrence Gelfand, have noted as Lippmann did nearly a century ago, the significant role of reductive racial stereotypes in the peace process, even if they have not placed the same emphasis on the influence of psychology. Did the psychological underpinnings of nationality contribute to the propagation of race stereotypes among experts, so many of them historians, as well as progressives? Certainly, in their preparations for peace, and then in the peacemaking deliberations, British, French, and American experts eagerly described populations motivated by naturalised psychological instincts and desires, and their own roles as objective analysts and supervisors of the nationality principle. If we are to take the evidence offered by the comments of the American ‘new historian’ James Shotwell on his formal encounter in Paris with ‘the variety of racial types calling themselves Poles’, our answer must be yes:

There was a minister of the gospel with a white tie and grey whiskers and a look of constant denunciation of sin in his rather mirthless face; he was a Lutheran superintendent from Polish Prussia. There was another type of Lutheran minister from another section who tried to make for godliness by unctuous hand-rubbing and a lack of self-confidence. The one had a square, hard head and the other a round head and a melted butter countenance. Both these gentlemen were much pained when Bowman ventured to challenge their figures as they pleaded the cause of ‘the vast majority of Poles in those regions.’ Then there was a blond, blue-eyed, round-faced Saxon with a Polish name, but

unmistakeably Germanic in type. He had been in business in New York. The man beside him came from the Czech frontier, bewhiskered, vivacious, and irrepressible. Romer, the great geographer from Lemberg, has aquiline features, prominent eyebrows, a thin mouth, and carries out further the accentuation of an artistic temperament by leonine hair and bristling goatee. The financial expert, a tall man with a quiet, businesslike manner, might have come from Carolina, or wherever the drawl develops in the voice. Pulaski himself has a high forehead and high cheekbones, with penetrating dark eyes. Some others present were of obviously pure Russian blood and some again with a touch of Tartar. Yet all were fairly vibrant with Polish nationalism. History is more important than anthropology.⁴

Shotwell's conclusion that history was more important than anthropology (where anthropology represented biology) in the determination of nationality is somewhat disingenuous given his attention to the importance of physiognomy. But his comments provide a clue to the ways in which, for historians, the past was in thrall to the body. Similarly, the principle of nationality evoked an epistemology of emancipation and of the past, both reliant upon and at odds with a fascination for the colours, shapes, and costumes of physical differences and their psychological emanations.

The idea that individuals were ruled by the overlapping truths of biology and history, riddled the perspectives of the peacemakers and their advisors. In a Draft for the P.I.D. written about December 1917, Toynbee explained that '[n]o one contends that the black races can govern themselves or will be able to do so within a measurable period of time'.⁵ With some sense of bad faith, he added that what these races could do was complain to their European governments about the 'specific evils' from which they desired to be liberated: 'We see no reason why the natives should not be given self-determination in this admittedly limited sense'; he was generous enough to add that this should be the case for the natives in all colonies, not just those administered by Germany. Colonel House openly repudiated race prejudice, particularly in the context of self-determination claims made from within the British empire. In a diary entry for April 1918, he recorded an Indian caller, Rajput Rai, who had brought him two books, *England's Debt to India* and *Young India*: 'He said the liberals of the world were looking to me for help. I tried to encourage him in the hope that the world will be a better place for the weak people when this war is over. I am without race prejudice and have no sympathy with the arrogance which the West displays in its dealings with the East. We object to Germany's attempt to force her civilisation upon us, and yet we try to force our civilisation upon those whom we consider our inferiors.'⁶ If House believed himself to be without prejudice, this dimension of his world-view did not rub off on Wilson, whose own reaction to the claims of African Americans

at the peace is even better known. Wilson dismissed the demands for equality put by W. E. B. DuBois and the Paris Pan-African Congress that ran parallel to the Paris peace conference (despite attempts by British and American governments to prevent their citizens from attending). For Wilson, 'the American negro returning from abroad would be our greatest medium in conveying bolshevism to America.' According to his physician, Wilson 'called attention to the fact that the French people have placed the negro soldier in France on an equality with the white man, and "it has gone to their heads"'.⁷

That race and nation stereotypes, like those pertaining to gender, could be used to decide or legitimate policy is clear not only in expert assessments of national claims, but also in the relations among individuals representing the Allied states. At the end of 1918, the French *Comité* geographer Martonne was busy trying to work out which Inquiry members would be sent to France for the peace conference. A driving concern was the extent of German-Jewish influence on the American view of the Alsace-Lorraine question, particularly as embodied by 'Lipman', whom Martonne described as a young New York Jew and supporter of the idea of a plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine, and thus identified as a pro-German pacifist. Some French experts argued that they could and should intellectually influence Americans because the United States was too young a nation 'to be able to understand, the finesse and the delicacy of the Latin race.'⁸ Similarly, in a paper on 'Our policy at the peace conference', Smuts (who had been given responsibility by Lloyd George to prepare British proposals for the conference) advised that Britain should ally with the United States rather than France, because the latter was unreliable. Support for Wilson 'as far as is consistent with our own interests', was underwritten by the premise that '[l]anguage, interest and ideals alike mark them out for political comradeship in the great developments of the future'.⁹ At the same time, the peace process entrenched a 'European' identity, as Western European, set off from German and 'Central European' experiences. 'In Europe,' the 'Balkans expert' and UDC member H. N. Brailsford wrote to Arnold Toynbee in August 1919, in the context of peacemaking, 'we do think alike and feel alike. Euripides, Isaiah, Paul, Shakespere (*sic*) are in people's bones even though they have never read a line of them. But the Mahomedan has different bones altogether.'¹⁰

All these examples only reinforce Walter Lippmann's emphasis on the role of 'sedimented stereotypes' in the peace process. I would add to that argument an emphasis on the role of the scientific aims of the peace, its expert bodies, and the psychological versions of nationality and nations canvassed in the preceding chapters. Of course, Lippmann described not only the role of stereotypes, but also of the 'democratic El Dorado' of collective minds and national souls, the notion of a collective will within people that corresponded to their national identity. The most sincere democratic intentions associated with the principle of nationality were ultimately

confounded not only by stereotypes sedimented in psychology, but also by the psychological assumptions about human nature and collective agency that were embedded in the predominant conception of democracy.

Dorothy Ross's description of 'the stabilising effects of scientific law and historical progress' in this period, provides a useful framework for considering the ways in which, in 1919, science was used in the international arena to quell anxieties about social and political change, cultural relativism, and democratic impulses.¹¹ But it is also true that the end of the war ushered in the decline of the scientific model of comprehension, unambiguous truth, and certitude more generally. In the course of the peace process, historical and geographical experts were as confused by the criteria of racial origins and cultures, national maturity, authenticity, and subjectivity. Some may even have had their relativist and sceptical sensitivities heightened by the contradictory and inconsistent use of these criteria. For others, such as the liberal geographer Isaiah Bowman, the failures of peacemaking – including the introduction of minority treaties – insulted his sense of scientific order. Bowman dreaded the impact of the concessions made by the peacemakers on the proliferation of racial, religious, and other differences. His response was to retreat not merely to stereotyping, but to a conservative albeit mainstream view of the relationship between difference and sovereignty, and between individual and group nationality. His views also brought the significance of the principle of nationality in the international arena back home to roost in the most perverse manner possible. As one of his biographers notes, '[f]orced assimilation and ethnic dissolution were Bowman's proposals precisely at a time when the United States struggled with domestic racial violence and large numbers of European immigrants from the very lands carved up in Paris.'¹² Bowman was not alone. The English UDC radical Noel Buxton argued for the principle of nationality as the expression of democracy, while warning that 'no Balkan race can be trusted to govern another', and unofficially advising the peace negotiators that 'further adjustments on ethnological lines should be made by means of a scheme for transmigration under the direct auspices of the League of Nations'.¹³ Israel Zangwill spoke in 1919 of 'race redistribution in the interests of the general world-happiness' as 'one of the functions of the League of Nations, and one that must be executed in many parts of Europe'.¹⁴ These bizarre, but all too common, dystopian visions were formalised in the Neuilly-sur-Seine Treaty of November 1920, the first to include a formal convention for the voluntary exchange of populations, in this case between Greece and Bulgaria,¹⁵ and the Lausanne Convention of January 1923, which ordered the compulsory exchange of Greek and Turkish populations as a formal recognition of mass refugee movements that had already begun.¹⁶

I have been arguing in this book that the scientific conception of the peace depended, at least in part, on an existing corpus of theories about the

nation and nationality. For all its variety, this body of work had raised expectations, even as it renewed anxieties, about the prospects for empirically observing, measuring and classifying national difference. To be sure, some of the same individuals responsible for making the nationality principle work paid homage to international ideals that might manage the partiality of nation-states. Among these was Walter Lippmann, and another Inquiry advisor, the American historian Frederick Jackson Turner, whose frontier thesis, much admired by Wilson, had helped confirm the exceptional nature of American nationality. When he turned his attention to the peace, Turner observed that the principle of nationality fed natural chauvinistic tendencies and required a counterbalance in the creation of an international political body.¹⁷ He was now interested in the validity of the American experience of heterogeneity for the rest of the world.¹⁸ In 1919, Turner argued that the United States, like Europe, was the product of an amalgam of national influences, and the 'sections' that comprised America mirrored those that only superficially divided Europe, a continent no bigger in size. The American example provided the perfect model for the creation of a supra-national Europe. Even though Turner's memorandum on the creation of a truly international League was among the papers Wilson eventually took to Paris, it was precisely Turner's view of the need to limit national 'urges' that Wilson evoked at the peace in order to limit the League's power to override national sovereignty. When Wilson infamously blocked the incorporation of a clause on racial equality into the League Covenant, he argued it was because he preferred 'to quiet discussion that raises national differences and racial prejudices. I would wish them, particularly at this juncture in the history of the relations of nations with one another, to be forced as much as possible into the background.'¹⁹

Walter Lippmann's critical analysis of the peace of 1919 was only one of many strikingly divergent post-war assessments of nationality and psychology. In 1920, two years before the publication of *Public Opinion*, Charles Seignobos, the French historian and *Comité* member who had played an important role in the promotion of East European nationality causes during the war, declared in the *Journal de psychologie* that 'pre-war interest in and study of the psychology of collectivities' was vindicated.²⁰ Seignobos was thinking most certainly of collectivities as nations, and he was not alone in his appraisal of the utility of psychology. William McDougall's *The Group Mind*, also published in 1920, evoked the connections between the nation, psychology and international politics even more candidly. 'Europe is being remoulded by the Paris Conference' he claimed, and 'the need for clear notions and some working definition of nationhood has acquired a most urgent importance'. In this context, the 'crowning tasks of

psychology' were '[t]o investigate the nature of national mind and character and to examine the conditions that render possible the formation of the national mind and tend to consolidate national character.'²¹ For McDougall, as the new Chair in Psychology at Harvard University contemplating the psychological essence of American society, a nation was 'a people or population enjoying some degree of political independence and possessed of a national mind and character, and therefore capable of national deliberation and national volition'.²² McDougall repeated this and other familiar enough formulae regarding the psychological status of nations, so that the national mind was an 'organised system of mental or psychical forces'. National differences were expressed in the behaviour and consciousness of the group (or individual), as intellect, character, and affect, and originated partly in a natural human instinct for conflict.²³

McDougall's views were not exemplary of longterm developments in the discipline of psychology, but his perspective on the peace process was indicative of the broad intellectual interest in the interwar period in the relevance of psychology for the theoretical and political consideration of the nation question, and the creeping scientific and political conservatism connected with that interest.²⁴ Lippmann himself described how theories about the 'making of a man's characters' were shifting once again from a concentration on 'outward behaviour and the inner consciousness to the physiology of the body'.²⁵ He may have been thinking of *The Group Mind*, which he detested. In this book, McDougall abandoned the neo-Lamarckian view that acquired characteristics could be inherited in favour of the gene-based theory of 'hard heredity'.²⁶ The political impact of this theory is evident in McDougall's depiction of the United States' 'negro' population as a 'foreign body' that could not be assimilated to the English stock of the original settlers and even required territorial segregation.²⁷

In the intellectually fecund post-war year of 1920, the social scientist Marcel Mauss penned a series of essays on '*La nation*', which also took as their inspiration the practical challenges of peacemaking.²⁸ Before the war, Mauss had emphasised the social and inter-subjective nature of national communities. In the immediate aftermath of the peace process, Mauss, now a supporter of the League of Nations, and the Vice-President of the French Psychology Society, iterated the psychological realism of nationalism. Mauss was no eugenicist, but he tended to think of nations in a more essentialist manner after the war than before. In his pre-war work he had presented the 'Typology of Races and Peoples' in constructivist terms; now he discussed the practical genius of the 'Anglo-Saxon'. For Mauss, the conception of man as a citizen of the world was a consequence of a naive theory of men as identical monads with no *patrie* other than humanity.²⁹ He argued that a more complex psychological and sociological view of men as individuals and social animals required an acceptance of the force of nationalism: the principle of nationality, as Western European by

definition, was difficult to achieve in Asian, African, Oceanian, and Eastern European, especially Slavic, societies. Mauss' claims were dotted with the motifs of, by this time, a hardened discourse shared by liberals and conservatives alike and affirming the established distinctive collective psychologies and historically evolving nature of political nations.

For many of the intellectuals who had lived through the First World War and contributed to the scientific aspirations of peacemaking in 1919, psychological truths about nations, human nature, and difference continued to underline the political significance of nationality.³⁰ Arnold Toynbee's post-war history of the peace process began with the announcement of the 'psychological conditions', and 'the psychological devastation' evident at the end of the war, the '[s]ymptoms of nervous derangement ...apparent in almost all the great communities of the world'.³¹ For Toynbee, nationality acted in subconscious ways. During the war national movements had broken through a thin crust of existing repressive and artificial regimes such as the Habsburg monarchy, and had shown nationalism to be a more powerful factor than class. These events, Toynbee believed, had also proven that nationalism was the psychological extension of a primal racial struggle, the precise features of which were dependent on geographical settings.³²

For his part, Lewis Namier, also of the P.I.D., attributed the demise of the Habsburg monarchy to the logic of nationalism, akin to the laws of crowd psychology.³³ In a later reflection on the peace and his own life as an historian, Namier was explicit about the political implications of his view of the psychological nature of nations: Given the psychological sources of national difference, it was evident (supposedly) that '[t]he way of life of a nation, *les mœurs*, cannot be transformed by an act of will or an edict; ... internal freedom is best secured where the communal consciousness coincides with the territory of the State, ...the politically-minded cannot feel truly free except in a State which they acknowledge as their own, and in which they are acknowledged as indigenous: that is, in their own national State.'³⁴ Théodore Ruyssen's substantial postwar study *Les minorités nationales d'Europe et la guerre mondiale* (1924) combined a variety of pre-war views of the psycho-sociological nature of national consciousness and of the role of elementary psychological instincts, including the sexual and maternal. Nations, Ruyssen argued, were a consequence of the sympathy produced by 'likeness', imitation, and a natural hatred towards the stranger. Again, nationality was relevant to Europe, elsewhere it was unknown or unevolved.

It was not only this peacemaking generation of social scientists and historians who contributed to the ongoing confirmation of the geographically and racially differentiated psychological reality of the nation. The interwar was marked by the intellectual contributions of a new generation of scholars, most of them based in North American modern history

departments. In general, they perpetuated the existing interest in psychology as the key to the nation question, and brought to this interest a focus on nationalism, rather than the nation or nationality, as the object of scholarly inquiry. Thus, in the most resounding of early contributions to this field, *Essays on Nationalism* (1926), the young Columbia history professor Carleton Hayes placed nationality, an unconscious psychological force ‘akin to love’, at the core of nationalism.³⁵ For Hayes the ‘national mind’ was ‘a psychological force which impels the members of a nationality-group toward some community of thought and action’. As a form of the instinct of gregariousness, which ‘cannot be suppressed’, nationalism could only ‘improbably’ be ‘transmuted into gregariousness by class or by race.’³⁶ As a progressive, Hayes had no blinding faith in the value of psychology for interpreting nationalism and expressed some wariness of ‘racial, geographic, or human nature explanations, as well as any notion of the “soul of the people,” “national character,” or inherent mental or spiritual differences between human groups’. However, drawing on the psychological definitions of nationality proposed during the war by Israel Zangwill and René Johannet, Hayes concluded that ‘some degree of national consciousness’ was ‘ubiquitous and universal, and ... will in all probability continue so to be’.³⁷

Hayes’ post-First World War essays are still considered definitive of the modernist interpretation of nations as historical, rather than perennial. Yet, the post-Second World War Hayes was more keenly constructivist in his explanation of nationalism and rejection of essentialist psychological explanations. In *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (1948) Hayes proposed that ‘[n]ationalism is certainly but one expression of human instinct and not a bit more natural or more “latent” than tribalism, clan-nishness, urbanism or imperialism’. It was also this post-Second World War Hayes who blamed the force of nationalism on the mainly middle-class male intellectuals who privileged the nation as an object of study.³⁸ Hayes had by this time become nostalgic about the lost opportunities for real internationalism, an idea that he feared was espoused only by a relatively small intellectual élite (in which category he included himself) and by a separate group identified somewhat dismissively as ‘ladies of leisure’. These were the same ladies, of course, who had tried to convince the peacemakers of 1919 to add women’s self-determination to the nation agenda, and who, in the interwar, had made the League of Nations the headquarters of their struggle for nationality rights for married women.

Despite Hayes’ growing scepticism, by the mid-twentieth century little had changed in the ways in which theorists of the nation, and particularly historians, thought psychology useful for understanding the reality of nationalism, even in the wake of another world war and the Holocaust. Rather, both those events were interpreted as further proof of the utility of psychology for the study of what was conceived of as ‘national behaviour’.

Even more anomalously, there was little reflection on the racial and determinist character of the arguments supporting the most popular psychological interpretations. In 1945, Hans Kohn, the man most often designated the 'father' of the academic study of nationalism in the place of Hayes, published *The Idea of Nationalism: A study in its origins and background* (reissued in 2006). This book repeated the view that nationalism had emotional or psychological origins, as 'some of the oldest and most primitive feelings of man, found throughout history as important factors in the formation of social groups'.³⁹ In other words, the nation was a product of social forces, but nationalism was rooted in 'unconscious and inarticulate' feelings of nationality that pre-existed the birth of modern nations. An American immigrant who had witnessed the demise of the Habsburg empire from within, Kohn listed Nietzsche, Bergson, and Schopenhauer as key influences on his idea of nationalism as 'first and foremost a state of mind, an act of consciousness', that is of group-consciousness, which drives the creation of 'a conformity and like-mindedness' within the group.⁴⁰ He explicitly rejected biological and racial versions of nationality, and embraced a definition of the psychological, sociological, and historical characteristics of nations not unlike that promoted by West European liberals in the early twentieth century. Kohn's debt to that earlier tradition was also evident in his geographical bias. He regarded nationality as a natural political principle in Western Europe, and England as the model and earliest example of the evolution of national sentiment.

If by the mid-twentieth century Hayes had his doubts about the significance of psychology for the study of nationalism, another transnational historian Louis Snyder was more confident. Snyder came to his work on nationalism by way of the study of history as a postgraduate in Germany in the late 1920s – a little after Kohn had abandoned Europe – and a position in political science at Columbia University, where he had come under the influence of the young Hayes. Snyder's debt to his teacher is evident in *The Meaning of Nationalism* (1954), which contains a survey of the early twentieth century publications of Pillsbury, McDougall, Oakesmith, Toynbee, Rose, and Muir. Snyder's enthusiasm was reserved for a new generation of scholars who were, he argued, 'busily at work creating what amounts to a new science of national character'.⁴¹ He repeated the point that psychology was necessary for understanding 'the nature of national character, the content and function of tradition, and kindred problems involving psychological processes'.⁴² But he also heralded the arrival of a scientific era distinct from the period that had closed with the First World War.⁴³ 'The old McDougall-Freudian theory of attributing national differences to instincts on a biological basis' had fallen into disrepute, 'because it is said to describe something mystical and intangible,' as had the 'survival school' which understood nationalism to be atavistic.⁴⁴ They had made way for a new model of acculturation.⁴⁵ According to Snyder, the new trend was 'towards

a modified Freudian approach, utilising Freud's studies on the unconscious, on child behaviour, and on personality, but considering these characteristics in their social setting.⁴⁶

In *The Meaning of Nationalism*, Snyder invoked the utility of Freud's post-war study '*Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse*' (1921). In this work, Freud had revisited, and found wanting, the theories of Le Bon and Trotter amongst others, and even raised the problem of how to prove the correspondence between the individual and the group. For Snyder, Freud, more importantly, 'inferred that the group sentiment typical of the nation is the product of the libido focused on a leader.'⁴⁷ Snyder claimed that this theoretical development was supplemented by a 'new' focus on 'the science of measuring the human body, its parts, and its functional capacities' and understanding the 'complex emotional dispositions' at the heart of nationalism.⁴⁸ The long-term project of determining the true nature of nations involved the creation by psychologists, biologists, ethnologists, and anthropologists of a vast body of knowledge about group behaviour through experiments in 'group intellectual testing. ... agglutinative reactions of the red corpuscle, body temperatures, respiration, susceptibility to disease, basal metabolism, the time and effects of puberty and menopause, color vision, reaction of the endocrine glands, constitutional types, brain size and structure, mental types, speed of nerve conduction, nature of the sense of smell, body odors, etc.'⁴⁹ Ironically, Snyder's faith in the scientific sophistication of psychological approaches to the nation question, and his conception of a science of national character constituted a return to the experimental psychology of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which had looked to biology as much as history as the key to the study of nations.

More than a century after the discovery of the unconscious, it is difficult to contemplate the nature of human difference without recourse to psychology. Yet, the point of this book has been to show that however tempting it is to think of nations as 'real things, of whom you love one and feel for the rest indifference – or hatred',⁵⁰ in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, similar descriptions of the psychological nature of nations, nationality, and nationalism reflected not so much truths about human difference, as controversies about the nature of liberty and democracy, and their relative value for specified nations, races, and the sexes. The post-First World War peace process provided the conditions under which race and gender based assumptions about the psychological realism of nations and nationality, and of nationalist tendencies were integrated into international relations, and into the making of a new national world order whose legacy is still with us.

Even though there have been radical changes since the mid-twentieth century in the study of psychology and psychoanalysis, and in approaches to the conceptualisation of the nation as a psychological phenomenon, and of its historicity, any random survey of the contemporary field of nationalism studies shows the extent to which in the realms of nation studies as well as international politics, early twentieth century psychological definitions of the nation and national identification, and their cultural prejudices, have largely stuck.⁵¹ Recently, the political scientist Alan Finlayson drew attention to the pervasiveness in academic discourse of the ‘common, casual’ resort to the ‘assumption that nationalism is a manifestation of the “dark” parts of the human psyche which derive from some natural, atavistic urge’, to ‘the widespread belief that it is “natural” for humans aggressively to defend their territory, their family or “kin group”; that xenophobia, even ethnic hatred, are intrinsic parts of human nature barely held at bay by the fragile institutions of civilisation.’⁵² In the 1990s, it was still easy to encounter academic as well as popular explanations of the wars in the ‘Balkans’ and other parts of former Communist Europe as inevitable results of the psychological force of nationalisms previously repressed by totalitarian regimes, and of the intrinsic nature of irrational psychological behaviour in non-Western European regions.⁵³ Some scholars have argued that these representations shaped the arguments for non-intervention made by the United States President and foreign policy experts. Explanations that focused on psychology encouraged a complacent looking away, rather than towards the problem. They also authorised a peacemaking process that separated Bosnia into separate ethno-national mini-states that, since then, have undermined the quality of the everyday lives of their inhabitants.

It should be obvious by now that I am arguing that how historians, and other intellectuals, use psychology to explain nations, nationality, or nationalism, matters. Even as the procedures of peacemaking in 1919 did not dictate a single perspective on the political significance of nationality, they did encourage a fascination with the racial underpinnings of difference (the ‘slums of psychology’), the marginalisation of gender inequalities, and the privileging of nationality and race as the foundations of political life. The consequences of these particular ways of thinking about the idea of the nation are manifest in the post-First World War historiography of the peace of 1919, and in the translation of ideas into rationales for national immigration and foreign policies. (Even Lippmann, the ‘New York Jew’, indicated his intolerance of religious ‘Jews’ by drawing on stereotypes of their primitiveness).⁵⁴ Lippmann also argued that the notion of advanced and backward communities built into the psychological model of evolving nations underwrote the exploitive developmentalism of the mandate system. I would argue too, that the normative image of homogeneous nations built out of this language of psychology provided the rationale for the assimilationist model of the nation-state.

Should we throw the baby out with the bathwater? Finlayson, who is critical of the ways in which theories of nationalism have failed to ‘excise ideas about “human nature” or psychologistic assumptions from their margins’, discusses a number trends in psychological theories of the nation that he thinks more critical and useful, including discursive psychology, and Lacanian psychoanalytic theory. I can think of numerous examples of psychological analyses of the breakup of Yugoslavia that used a gender focus to question complacent assumptions about the psychological nature of national identification.⁵⁵ If we look back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in this period too we can find traces of alternative, albeit often marginalised, psychological theories of human nature and difference that were less reliant on essentialism or existing chauvinisms. There are the *fin-de-siecle* Viennese social theorists that the French historian Jacques Le Rider has written about in *Modernity and Crises of Identity*,⁵⁶ and there is Lippmann’s own interest in the institutional production of knowledge about nations and national stereotypes, in ‘the nursery, the school, the church, not in that limbo inhabited by Group Minds and National Souls.’⁵⁷ In the post-war, Lippmann emphasised the psychological significance of the ‘pictures in our heads’. Such was the psychological force of these stereotypes, he explained, that they could be perceived as physically real: ‘In putting together our public opinions, not only do we have to picture more space than we can see with our eyes, and more time than we can feel, but we have to describe and judge more people, more actions, more things than we can ever count, or vividly imagine’.⁵⁸ In *Public Opinion*, Lippmann used a conception of the mind that has since been abandoned by psychologists, but his point remains relevant to contemporary theorising of imagined communities; ‘the real environment’ was ‘altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance. ... To traverse the world men must have maps of the world. Their persistent difficulty is to secure maps on which their own need, or someone else’s need, has not sketched in the coast of Bohemia’.⁵⁹

The point, or joke, about the really-existing political entity known as Bohemia was, of course, that as a land-locked region (its capital was Prague), the appearance of a coastline there could only have resulted from politically motivated mapping; Lippmann implied that maps were almost unavoidably ideological and subjective, the products of pictures in our heads, rather than traces of objective scientific facts. Curiously, it was also the mental mapping of Bohemia, and of its connections to other parts of the Austro-Hungarian empire, that in the interwar period brought Freud to reconsider the lessons that the peace of 1919 offered the study of psychology. On the eve of the rise of Nazism, and more than a decade after the Austro-Hungarian empire had disappeared from view, an essay in Freud’s *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (1932) invoked

a picture of the socio-economic internal borders of the old empire and its 'mixed population' as a means of dissecting the psychological components of 'personality'. Instead of focusing on the psychology of the group, as in *Massenpsychologie*, here Freud's own imagination was captured by the power of the social imaginary in the constitution of group identities. Analogies, Freud began,

it is true, decide nothing, but they can make one feel more at home. I am imagining a country with a landscape of varying configuration – hill-country, plains and chains of lakes – and with a mixed population: it is inhabited by Germans, Magyars and Slovaks, who carry on different activities. Now things might be partitioned in such a way that the Germans, who breed cattle, live in the hill-country, the Magyars who grow cereals and wine, live in the plains, and the Slovaks, who catch fish and plait reeds, live by the lakes. If the partitioning could be neat and clear-cut like this, a Woodrow Wilson would be delighted by it; it would also be convenient for a lecture in a geography lesson. The probability is, however, that you will find less orderliness and more mixing, if you travel through the region. Germans, Magyars, and Slovaks live interspersed all over it; in the hill-country there is agricultural land as well, cattle are bred in the plains too...

In 'Dissection of the Personality', Freud took up the concept at the modern heart of the self-determining individual, and described a composite of components of consciousness and the unconscious that could not be pictured in terms of the 'artificial' 'sharp frontiers' drawn in political geography, 'but rather by areas of colour melting into one another as they are presented by modern artists.'⁶⁰ Freud's analogy between the workings of the mind and the drawing of national borders evoked the heterogeneous state, with a modernist confusion of boundaries and borders, as the most realistic way of mapping political communities.⁶¹ Rather uncharacteristically for Freud, it drew psychology and the nation together in a way that openly questioned conventional political practices.

The potential of this text becomes even more apparent when it is juxtaposed with the one other text example of the penetration in Freud's published output of a blatant *ressentiment* regarding Austria-Hungary's ignominious political fate in 1919 at the hands of the peacemakers. This was the widely panned *Thomas Woodrow Wilson: Thirty-Eighth President of the United States, A Psychological Study* (1967). A biography co-authored on the instigation of William Bullitt, the American diplomat and former Peace 'expert', it is marked by Bullitt's controlling collaboration. Made public only after Freud's death, it blamed the failures of the 1919 peace on Wilson's fixation with his father, and the impact of that relationship on Wilson's overly feminine lack of resolve.⁶² Whatever the extent of Freud's influence, *Thomas*

Woodrow Wilson presented a conventional view of the difference between masculine and feminine subjectivities in order to bring home its denunciation of Wilson and of the principle of nationality. By contrast, the 'Dissection of Personality' adopted an alternative imaginary of the complexity of individual subjectivity in order to question normative conceptions of the political expression of nationality.

We must not confuse good intentions with consistency in these counter-narratives, particularly when it comes to the intersections of the woman and nation question. In an essay on the 'riddle of femininity' collected in *The New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, Freud asserted 'that women were less able than men to sublimate their sexual instincts, including their "penis envy"'.⁶³ In a similar vein, Lippmann brought to his analyses of the workings of stereotypes in state relations a conception of the racialised masculine self determined by social relations, and exercising agency, and authority, over 'woman', as he wrote in *Public Opinion*:

There is no one self always at work. And therefore it is of great importance in the formation of any public opinion what self is engaged. The Japanese ask the right to settle in California. Clearly it makes a whole lot of difference whether you conceive the demand as a desire to grow fruit or to marry the white man's daughter. If two nations are disputing a piece of territory, it matters greatly whether the people regard the negotiations as a real estate deal, an attempt to humiliate them, or, in the excited and provocative language which usually enclouds these arguments, as a rape. For the self which takes charge of the instincts when we are thinking about lemons or distant acres is very different from the self which appears when we are thinking even potentially as the outraged head of a family.

Lippmann, who otherwise alerted his readers to the 'deeper prejudice' of nationality as a prejudice against women, imagined the operation of national prejudice in the realm of international relations as a dilemma of quasi-instinctive and overtly racial patriarchal authority. In making this point my intention is not to condemn either Lippmann or Freud, but to point to the ways in which even when the nation's psychological underpinnings were subject to question, the nation remained entangled in questionable presumptions about gender and race, as it is still now. However, the ambiguities in Lippmann and Freud's ideas of difference present, I think, useful evidence that psychological studies of the nation did not always lead to the same determinist conclusions, even in the first half of the twentieth century. Other ways of seeing and understanding difference were possible. Ultimately it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that, despite the efforts of individuals such as Lippmann and Freud, and sometimes because of them, the mixture of psychological conceptions of identity and liberty that

underlay the nation question throughout the twentieth century was more often exclusivist than liberating.

If psychology, like the intellectual history of the nation, comes with its own tainted history, what are we to do with the nation question that has not gone away? I would suggest that some of the most useful work at the intersections of psychology and the nation has begun to concentrate on the concept of subjectivity and its history. As the sociologist Katharine Verdery has argued, '[n]ot all human societies have thought of people as having a separate realm of the inside'.⁶⁴ Once we accept this historical point, then we establish that the process by which national identities have been internalised has its own history. The historian Dror Wahrman has recently added to our understanding of this process a history of 'the inside' that traces to the early nineteenth century a transition in the idea of the self in Britain. Importantly, for Wahrman the idea of the nation constitutes an anomaly in this history of the idea of the self and its impact on subjectivity. He argues that in the early nineteenth century the idea of the nation travelled in the opposite direction to the idea of the self; as the self went from being thought of as mutable to being thought of as immutable, national identity went from being described as immutable to being thought of as constructed and invented, as all surface rather than depth.⁶⁵ In this book, however, I take a different perspective on the relationship of the idea of the nation to the idea of the self, and subjectivity, namely that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, conceptions of the constructed and immutable nature of national identity were an irresolvable and implicit dimension of the discourse of the psychological self. In 1919, the adoption of nationality as a principle of peacemaking affirmed the inevitable correspondence between the desires of the inner self and the characteristics of the political nation. The emplacement of nationality in the domain of the study of psychology, and in the sphere of international politics, influenced the ways in which individuals spoke about their inner selves as embracing nationality and as part of a collective national self.

There is another almost counter-intuitive point to be made about this history of national subjectivity. It was precisely at the time that the peacemaking process affirmed the status of nationality as the expression of an individual's inner self or natural subjectivity, and, consequently, as the foundation of a more democratic ordering of political states, that the authority of state institutions and experts became critical to the legitimisation of individual nationality. The presentation of nationality as a political principle led to an emphasis on the objective and immutable forms of national difference and national self-determination, and on the role of experts in determining those forms. After the First World War, it was no good merely declaiming one's national identity, it had to be proven, corroborated, categorised, whether for an audience of peacemakers, or for the public servants of nation-states. In her interwar autobiography, Ethel

Snowden the English feminist, pacifist, and prominent Women's League and Labour party activist, described her surprise at the difficulty she encountered as she tried to obtain a passport in 1919. Her intention was to attend to a conference in Switzerland, a gathering of women radicals determined to critique the Treaty of Versailles and the Paris peace process *in toto*:

To get a passport you filled in a long form requiring answers to all sorts of impertinent questions about yourself and your immediate ancestors, including offensive queries about your personal appearance! You had to attach to the form a photograph of a particular sort and size. This had to be endorsed, and your passport signed by a magistrate or some other worthy person who knew you, and who would guarantee your character and the truthfulness of your replies. Two other persons of recognised social positions and personal rectitude had to permit the use of their names as guarantors. You handed the completed passport form to the clerk at the passport office, and were generally told to call again in three or four days.⁶⁶

Snowden's account is definitive of a general twentieth century experience of the translation of the self into the sphere of national politics, and of the transportation of the nationalised self across the threshold of transnational travel and into the realm of international relations. It casts a specific hue on the place of the idea of the nation in 'the mode of functioning of the psychological sciences, and their linkages with more general social, political and ethical transformations' described by Nikolas Rose, an historian of psychology. Rose has argued that the psychological sciences became '*techniques for the disciplining of human difference*: individualizing humans through classifying them, calibrating their capacities and conducts, inscribing and recording their attributes and deficiencies, managing and utilizing their individuality and variability.'⁶⁷

Snowden's autobiography should also remind us of the prominent place of women in this history of nationality and subjectivity. In the interwar period in particular, the exceptional status of women vis-à-vis nationality and the nation were exemplified in the anxiety that surrounded the prospect of women travelling alone across national borders (and evident in the discussions among men in League of Nations sessions), the greater difficulty faced by women in obtaining passports, and the pressing problem of women's statelessness.⁶⁸ By 1920, experts engaged in the ongoing formulation of the details of peacemaking were driven by the logic of nationality to marginalise the relevance of women's demands for self-determination, and to recommend the transfer of whole populations.⁶⁹ The consequences of such thinking did not end with the Second World War, whether we recall the views of nationalism substantiated by Snyder, or the practices of peacemaking in 1945 and their renewed faith in nationality, or the ever-

growing historical evidence of the stereotypes of overlapping national and racial difference nurtured in the realm of international relations during the Cold War.⁷⁰

Overall, the intersecting histories of the nation, psychology, and international politics tell a critical story of the ways in which scientific attempts to apply the study of psychology to the study of the nation have been deeply mired in the disciplining of human differences, and in the privileging of national difference in the sphere of international relations. They tell of how psychological accounts of nationality and nationalism have been no less ideological than the idea of the nation itself, not least, for their inscription of gender differences in national differences, and for the subordination of the woman question to the nation question. They also return us to Lippmann's reminder that 'before we involve ourselves in the jungle of obscurities about the innate differences of men' we should 'fix our attention upon the extraordinary differences in what men know of the world'. This caution sums up rather neatly the argument of this book, and the point of this epilogue. I would only add that the international history of the nation, psychology, and international politics I have begun to outline here is intended as an historical reconsideration of the political legacy of knowledge about psychology and the self, and of the extent to which gender, racial, and national preferences have lain at the root of attempts to answer the question, what is a nation?.

Notes

Introduction

- 1 W. Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York: Macmillan, 1947 [1922]), p. 26.
- 2 Lippmann, *Public Opinion* p. 24.
- 3 Indeed, I know of no historian of the peace of 1919 that has discussed Lippmann's 'opinion'.
- 4 For general studies of this phenomenon see: D. Wahrman, *The Making of the Modern Self* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004); C. Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 459; H. S. Hughes, *Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of European Social Thought 1890–1930* (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1959), p. 66; C. E. Schorske, *Fin-de-siècle Vienna: Politics and culture* (New York: Vintage, 1981), p. 4; N. Rose, *Inventing Our Selves: Psychology, power and personhood* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and J. Le Rider, *Modernity and Crises of Identity: Culture and society in fin-de-siècle Vienna*, trans. R. Morris (New York: Continuum, 1993). For a rare reference to its possible impact on the idea of the nation, see P. Mandler 'The Consciousness of Modernity? Liberalism and the English National Character, 1870–1940' in M. Daunton and B. Rieger (eds.), *Meanings of Modernity: Britain from the late-Victorian era to World War II* (Oxford: Berg, 2001), p. 134.
- 5 J. W. Burrow, *The Crisis of Reason: European thought 1848–1914* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000) pp. 84, 86; H. Taine, *History of English Literature*, trans. H. Van Laun (Edinburgh: Edmonston and Hughes, 1872).
- 6 W. Bagehot, *Physics and Politics; or Thoughts on the application of the principles of 'natural selection' and 'inheritance' to political society* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1999), pp. 89, 137.
- 7 D. Cabane, 'Éducation et patriotisme', *La femme nouvelle* (1 October 1905), p. 794.
- 8 See C. J. Berry, *Hume, Hegel, and Human Nature* (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982), pp. 40, 97.
- 9 See for example, J. G. Fichte, *Addresses to the German Nation* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968 [1807]), and G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975 [1822–8]); and the comments on the anthropological aspect of Hegel's ideas in particular by E. C. Eze, *Race and the Enlightenment: A reader* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1997).
- 10 P. J. Bowler, *The Mendelian Revolution: The emergence of hereditary concepts in modern science and society* (London: The Athlone Press, 1989), p. 153.
- 11 This is usually contrasted with the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century, when the nation conjured up a new expansive humanism and, consequently, was taken up as the cause of democrats. Among the more important of existing studies of the idea of the nation in this period, each of which pursue this narrative, are E. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: programme, myth, reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); G. Eley and R. G. Suny, 'Introduction', in G. Eley and R. G. Suny (eds.), *Becoming National: A reader*, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); and A. D. Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, ideology, history* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001).

- 12 For an elaboration of this idea see G. Sluga, 'Bodies, Souls, and Sovereignty: The Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Legitimacy of Nations', *Ethnicities* I (2001) 207–32.
- 13 F. S. Marston, *The Peace Conference of 1919: Organisation and procedure* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981); L. Gelfand, *The Inquiry: American preparations for peace, 1917–1919* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963); M. Heffernan 'History, Geography and the French National Space: The Question of Alsace-Lorraine, 1914–1918', *Space & Polity* 5 1 (2001) 27–48; N. Smith, *American Empire: Roosevelt's geographer and the prelude to globalization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); J. M. Nielson, *American historians in war and peace: Patriotism, diplomacy, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1919* (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt Pub. Com., 1994).
- 14 I focus particularly on those liberals who brought their concerns about individual autonomy, on the one hand, and the evils of exaggerated individualism, and the need for social responsibility, on the other, to the renovation of liberalism in the victor states, France, Britain and the United States of America.

Chapter 1 Science and the New National World Order, 1919

- 1 Speech before the US Congress, 8 January 1918 in which Wilson espoused 'the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities', cited in A. S. Link (ed.), *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, vol. 45 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966–1994), p. 539.
- 2 Speech before the US Congress, 11 February 1918, cited in Link (ed.), *op.cit.*, vol. 46, pp. 320–1.
- 3 Gelfand, *The Inquiry*, p. 188.
- 4 *Ibid*, p. 158.
- 5 Cited and translated in American Association for International Conciliation *Documents Regarding the Peace Conference*, no. 139, New York, June 1919, p. 812.
- 6 Raymond Poincaré. *Welcoming Address at the Paris Peace Conference, 18 January 1919* http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/parispeaceconf_poincare.htm. Accessed 27 March 2006.
- 7 For more discussion of this point, see chapter 6.
- 8 Lippmann, *op.cit.*, p. 26.
- 9 *Ibid*, p. 146.
- 10 *Ibid*, pp. 214, 216, 379.
- 11 *Ibid*, p. 93.
- 12 *Ibid*, p. 311.
- 13 *Ibid*, p. 81.
- 14 *Ibid*, p. 145.
- 15 *Ibid*, pp. 93, 147, 176.
- 16 *Ibid*, p. 147.
- 17 *Ibid*, p. 146. For more discussion of this point about gender, see chapters 4 and 5.
- 18 P. G. Lauren, *Power and Prejudice: The politics and diplomacy of racial discrimination* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), p. 77.
- 19 L. Weiss, *Mémoires d'une Européenne, tome 1: 1893–1919* (Paris: Payot, 1968), p. 278.
- 20 Cited in Lauren, *op.cit.*, p. 77.

- 21 E. J. Dillon, *The Inside Story of the Peace Conference* (New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1920), p. 4.
- 22 *Ibid.*, p. 6.
- 23 H. W. V. Temperley, *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, vol. 1 (London: H. Frowde, 1920), p. 244.
- 24 [One Who Knows Them] *Makers of the New World*, (London and New York: Cassell, 1921), p. 161. See also A. Sharp, 'Some Relevant Historians – the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office 1918–1920', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 34 (1989) 363.
- 25 'The Diary of Edith Benham', March 31, 1919, in Link (ed.), *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, vol. 56, p. 443.
- 26 Nielson, *American Historians in War and Peace*, p. 135.
- 27 Cited in A. Cobban, *National Self-Determination* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 25.
- 28 Marston, *The Peace Conference of 1919*, p. 95.
- 29 On the institutional organisation of the peace process, see A. Toynbee, 'The main features in the landscape', in L. Riddell *et al.*, *The Treaty of Versailles and After* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1935), p. 49.
- 30 Marston, *op.cit.*, pp. 111, 117.
- 31 Temperley, *op.cit.*, vol. 1, p. 244.
- 32 Nicolson describes going to a meeting of the Big Four in President Wilson's private flat and finding the representatives of the new world order crawling about over the floor studying maps and discovering places they had never heard of before, of which they were going to decide the fate; H. Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919* (London: Constable and Co., 1945), p. 112. See also J. Haslam, *The Vices of Integrity: E. H. Carr, 1892–1982* (London: Verso, 1999), p. 25. 'Lloyd George would pull apart the reports of the specialists and reach decisions with the other leaders that paid scant attention to the territorial and ethnic realities which lay behind the maps they spread out over the floor at their feet.'
- 33 Marston, *op.cit.*, p. 116.
- 34 Clive Day, Charles Seymour, Colonel Miles, Douglas Johnson, To: The Commissioners, Subject: Klagenfurt Basin, 27 May, 1919; 185.2132/1, American Commission to Negotiate Peace, RG 256, United States National Archive, College Park.
- 35 Public Record Office, London [PRO] Foreign Office [FO]608/58 126/2/6, 'Report on the Solution of the Teschen Question', April 2 1919, p. 129.
- 36 FO373/7 7/35, Handbooks prepared under the Direction of the Historical section of the FO., vol. 163, pp. 56, 59.
- 37 FO608/161 513/4/1, Nationality Questions, Hurst, April 9 1919, p. 62. Hurst was a member of the drafting commission assisting the Council of Four 'A question of principle on the subject of nationality has arisen', Hurst wrote to his masters, 'with regard to the Treaty of Peace as to which I should be glad of instructions.' He could not understand why, unlike German citizens, ethnic Austrians, Hungarians, and Bulgarians were not to be allowed to remain in the new Czecho-Slovakia unless they chose to be Czecho-Slovak.
- 38 FO608/161 513/4/1 'Nationality Questions.' p. 64.
- 39 See R. Albrecht-Carré, *Italy at the Peace Conference* (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1966 [1938]), appendices; and G. Sluga, *The Problem of Trieste and the Italo-Yugoslav Border* (Albany: State University of New York, 2000), chapter 1. For examples of other national testimonials see, 'Statement by M. Chekri Ganem, Chief Representative of Central Syria Committee',

- February 17, 1919, 186.03101/38; 'The Ruthenian Party of Hungary: Memorial to the Allied and Associated Powers', August 1919, 864.014/15; all in American Commission to Negotiate Peace, RG 256.
- 40 Memorandum: 'About the deliverance of the Murakoz from the South Slav Occupation and the leaving of the same under the Supremacy of Hungary. Budapest, 3rd. October, 1919, In the name of the people of Murakoz.'; Paris Peace Conference, American Commission to Negotiate Peace, RG 256.
 - 41 'Memorandum of the Bunyevac and Sokac inhabitants of the county of Báce-Bodrog/Bácska/ in the interest of leaving them to Hungary', Paris Peace Conference, American Commission to Negotiate Peace, RG 256.
 - 42 'Memorandum concerning the state appertinence of the "Szepeesség"', Paris Peace Conference, American Commission to Negotiate Peace, RG 256.
 - 43 Percy Loraine to Leeper, 12 November 1919, Paris Peace Conference. 864.014/18, American Commission To Negotiate Peace, RG 256.
 - 44 The Ruthenian Party of Hungary Memorial to the Allied and Associated Powers, August 1919.
 - 45 FO371/3558/192251, 'Austria-Hungary, 1919', Temperley note, 16/4/20; see also Memorandum of Conversations with Captain H. W. Temperley in London, April 16, and May 3, 1918. Document 992, M1107 *Inquiry Documents* (Special Reports and Studies) 1917–1919, RG 256, United States National Archive, College Park.
 - 46 FO608/89, Toynbee note to Greek Claims to Lazistan District, 4 April 1919. See also J. T. Shotwell, *At the Paris Peace Conference* (New York: Macmillan, 1937), p. 186: Wednesday, February 19, 1919.
 - 47 FO608/153 511/1/2, January 13 1919, Quai d'Orsay, 'Procedure of the Peace Discussions'.
 - 48 See Seton-Watson Papers, School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies, University of London, SEW/2/2/1, 1916–1920, *New Europe* 2/2/2, 'New Europe Society. Common knowledge of Boas' critique of 'The Primitive Mind' would suggest that the claim made by the historian Derek Heater, that mandates had their origins 'in the sensitivity of the liberal conscience about the exploitation of colonial peoples' particularly among Americans, is overly generous, see D. B. Heater, *National Self-Determination: Woodrow Wilson and his legacy* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), p. 89.
 - 49 D. H. Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. 1 (New York: Putnam, 1928), p. 101.
 - 50 Accentuating the relation between colonialist precedents and mandates, Seymour argued that Beer 'was able to bring to the attention of the President those aspects of the old colonial system which could be fitted into Wilson's personal philosophy in the light of twentieth century conditions.' C. Seymour & H. B. Whiteman (eds.), *Letters from the Paris Peace Conference* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. xxix.
 - 51 Beer also supported the idea of the League as an English-Speaking Union.
 - 52 G. L. Beer, 'Middle Africa: The Economic Aspects of the Problem', in L. H. Gray (ed.), *African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference with Papers on Egypt, Mesopotamia, and the colonial settlement* (London: Dawsons, 1968 [1923]), p. 179.
 - 53 W. R. Keylor, 'Versailles and International Diplomacy', in M. F. Boemeke, G. D. Feldman and E. Glaser (eds.), *The Treaty of Versailles: A reassessment after 75 years* (German Historical Institute, Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 494.
 - 54 G. Beer, 'The German Colonies in Africa, written for the Inquiry, Feb. 1918', in Gray, *op.cit.*, Annex A.

- 55 Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. 3. Document 110; J. C. Smuts, *The League of Nations. A Practical Suggestion* (New York: Hodder and Stoughton, 1918), pp. 40, 50.
- 56 Smuts, *op.cit.*, p. 41.
- 57 Shotwell, *op.cit.*, p. 170: 'Monday, February 10, 1919. Morning'. In a conversation with Shotwell, Milner made clear the imperial framework he had in mind for the League of Nations model of mandates: 'Milner said that Britain had succeeded well where it had really tried hard in handling primitive peoples, but that was an entirely different job in colonial administration from the co-operation in government necessary where the people governed were of about the same grade of intelligence as their governors... The strange paradox of their [British] success in colonial administration is not so inexplicable after all, for both by position and by racial prejudice they naturally take a position of aloofness and have an innate sense of their own superiority which primitive peoples readily recognize as a sign of leadership.'
- 58 Shotwell, *op.cit.*, p. 172.
- 59 FO509/1/1, 26 June 1919, 'Memorandum by Lord Milner, Mandates. Under Clause XIX of the Draft Covenant of the League of Nations, March 8 1919, p. 17. The draft Covenant of the League agreed upon by the British Empire and Dominions formalised three categories of trusteeship: i. 'peoples who were not sufficiently organised to govern themselves without assistance' (including Arabs); ii. 'the wholly uncivilised, such as the populations of tropical Africa'; iii. 'those which, owing to geographical or other reasons' could not be dealt with in the second category, such as Samoa, German South West Africa, where 'the laws and institutions of the community entrusted with the government would have to be applied.' See PRO: Cabinet Office [CAB] 21/217 War Cabinet, 4 June 1923, 'History of the British Empire delegation and its work in Paris during the peace conference', p. 116.
- 60 Shotwell, *op.cit.*, p. 142.
- 61 Keylor, *op.cit.*, p. 495.
- 62 David Magie Papers, Mudd Library, Princeton University, Box 1: 'Interview of Magie and Westerman with President Wilson on May 22, 1919'.
- 63 FO608/219, 'Proposed United States protectorate over Liberia', FO comment on Memo, Feb. 1919: 'Shortly stated the argument would appear to be that the United States Government should be given an opportunity of learning from actual experience that backward races must necessarily be controlled by some more highly civilised Power and, secondly, that equality of trade conditions should be instituted in all backward countries so controlled, including by implication those administered by the U.S. itself.'
- 64 FO608/240 Commission of the League of Nations, 8 Feb. 1919, 6th meeting, #134.
- 65 *Ibid.*
- 66 Nielson, *op.cit.*, p. 55.
- 67 Gelfand, *op.cit.*, p. 16.
- 68 Edward M. House Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, Series 1, Box 70 folder 070 2324: Lippmann to House, August 1917.
- 69 Edward M. House Papers, Series 1, Box 70 folder 070 2324: Lippmann letter to House, September 1917, p. 2.
- 70 Edward M. House Papers, Series 1, Box 70 folder 2325; Memo on origin of the term 'Freedom of the Seas'; June 28 1918 Lippmann letter to House.

- 71 Gelfand, *op.cit.*, p. 49.
- 72 'Notes on the Inquiry, November 30, 1918', these words were attributed to Colonel House by Isaiah Bowman, Shotwell MSS, Columbia, cited in Gelfand, *op.cit.*, p. 352.
- 73 Others included Margaret Marsh, Bertha Ehlers, Nora Horney, Margaret Howe, Bertha Henderson, and Sibyl Baker.
- 74 Nielson, *op.cit.*, p. 59.
- 75 *Ibid*, p. 61.
- 76 Gelfand, *op.cit.*, p. 36.
- 77 Nielson, *op.cit.*, p. 56. For further discussion of the new history view of the national past, see D. Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 273. Ian Tyrrell has nuanced the historical view of Turner's influence and of the national obsessions of the new historians in an important article, 'Making Nations/Making States: American Historians in the context of empire', *Journal of American History*, 86 (1999) 1015–44.
- 78 Geoffrey J. Martin, *The Life and Thought of Isaiah Bowman* (Hamden: Archon Books, 1980), p. 91.
- 79 M. Heffernan 'History, Geography and the French National Space: The Question of Alsace-Lorraine, 1914–18', *Space & Polity*, 5 (2001) 31.
- 80 Jacques Bariéty, 'Le "Comité d'études" du quai d'Orsay et la frontière Rhénane (1917–1919)' in C. Baechler and C. Fink (eds.), *The Establishment of European Frontiers after the Two World Wars* (Berne: Peter Lang, 1995).
- 81 This was left unfinished on his death in 1918.
- 82 Bariéty, *op.cit.*, p. 253. See also C. Benoist, *Souvenirs de Charles Benoist: tome III 1902–1933* (Paris: Plon, 1934), p. 324.
- 83 Martin, *op.cit.*, pp. 28, 93; J. Brunhès, *Human Geography: An attempt at a positive classification principles and examples*, I. Bowman and R. E. Dodge (eds.) (London, Calcutta, Sydney: George Harrap, 1920 [1910]).
- 84 Benoist, *op.cit.*, p. 326.
- 85 *Travaux du comité d'études 1917–1918*, 2 volumes (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1918–19).
- 86 Bibliothèque de sciences politiques, Paris, *Comité d'études (sur la préparation du dossier des futures négociations 1917–1919) Ordre du Jour procès verbaux des séances. Fol. 727. Séance 30 avril 1917*, 329.
- 87 *Comité d'études (sur la préparation du dossier des futures négociations 1917–1919) Ordre du Jour procès verbaux des séances. Fol. 727. Lavissee, Séance 30 avril 1917*.
- 88 Heffernan, *op.cit.*, p. 45.
- 89 *Ibid*, p. 36.
- 90 E. Lavissee, *Histoire de France contemporaine depuis la révolution jusqu'à la paix de 1919* (Paris: Hachette, 1922).
- 91 S. Citron, *Le mythe nation, l'histoire de France en question* (Paris: Études et Documentations Internationales, 1989), p. 166.
- 92 P. den Boer, *History as a Profession: The study of history in France, 1818–1914*, trans. A. J. Pomerans (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 177, 201.
- 93 See P. Carrard, *Poetics of the New History: French historical discourse from Braudel to Chartier* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), p. 18.
- 94 *Ligue internationale pour la défense du droit des peuples: Cahiers mensuels* (Paris: Siège de la Ligue, 1916).
- 95 R. Poincaré, 'Enquête sur l'esprit français', *La revue* (1898) 21.

- 96 'Discours prononcé par M. Ernest Denis au dîner organisé par la Ligue en l'honneur de MM. Soderhjelm et Torngren', *Ligue internationale pour la défense du droit des peuples*, p. 373.
- 97 CAB/21/62 War Cabinet, Peace Terms Intelligence II. Zimmern and Toynbee, 13/2/17. See also D. L. George, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, vol. 1 (London: Victor Gollancz, 1938), pp. 31–50. Goldstein adds that '[w]here the PID was most successful was in determining various solutions to specific crises, which were then debated at cabinet level, with priorities or preferences being assigned'; E. Goldstein, 'The Foreign Office and Political Intelligence 1918–1920', *Review of International Studies*, 14 (1988) 275–88, 282.
- 98 CAB21/62 War Cabinet, 'Suggested body to consider the obvious factors regarding peace terms', 31.1.17.
- 99 These included Lord Hardinge (Viceroy in India from 1910, then Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office) and Sir William Tyrell (Foreign Office stalwart and Private Secretary to Sir Edward Grey, then Foreign Secretary).
- 100 According to Goldstein, 'the original purpose of what became the PID had been propaganda – though propaganda of an apparently academic and high-minded character'; Goldstein, *op.cit.*, pp. 275–88, 280; see also Sharp, *op.cit.*, p. 359.
- 101 In 1919 Toynbee took up the Chair of Byzantine and Modern Greek Language, Literature, and History at London University.
- 102 Post-war, Namier's approach to history was a clear example of the influence exerted by the social sciences and psychology on interpretations of the past, see chapter 6.
- 103 Major Douglas Johnson, N.A. To: Colonel E. M. House, London, May 1, 1918; Subject: Confidential Report on Arrangements made by the British Government for Collecting Data for the Peace Conference; Document 987, p. v, M1107, RG 256. See also A. Williams, *Failed Imagination? New World Order of the Twentieth Century* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), p. 26; Williams argues that '[t]he most detailed preparation for the minutiae of the negotiating position of specific areas of the world, and especially of Europe, was done by what came to be called the "Historical Section" (transferred from the Admiralty in early 1918) and the Political Intelligence Department (PID), both in the Foreign Office.'
- 104 During the war, Prothero published *A Lasting Peace. A conversation between X (a neutral) and Y (an Englishman)*, in which he has 'Y' describe nationality as being 'to a group of human beings what individuality is to the individual. The sense of nationality is to a nation what self-consciousness is to a man', G. Prothero, *A Lasting Peace. A conversation between X (a neutral) and Y (an Englishman)* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917).
- 105 Seton-Watson was a member of the Intelligence Bureau of the War Cabinet (1917) and the Enemy Propaganda Department (1918).
- 106 Johnson described Prothero as 'an honorary LL.D. of Harvard and Edinburgh, editor of the *Quarterly Review*, formerly professor of history at the University of Edinburgh, now chief of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office. Prothero also edited the guide to war publications and books on the war in 1917; Major Douglas Johnson, N. A. To: Colonel E. M. House, London, May 1, 1918; Subject: Confidential Report on Arrangements made by the British Government for Collecting Data for the Peace Conference; Document 987, p. v.

- 107 Jacques Bariéty has argued that because of its republican sympathies the *Comité* emphasised popular support in debatable regions for the more modern and egalitarian France, a sentiment embedded since the revolution; Bariéty, *op.cit.*, p. 253.
- 108 General Bourgeois and Christian Pfister, 'La vie publique en Alsace-Lorraine depuis 1871', in Comité national d'études sociales et politiques, *Enquête sur les buts de la guerre et les conditions d'une paix durable* (Paris: Comité national d'études sociales et politiques, 1916), p. 441.
- 109 The English-language version was published as E. Lavissee and C. Pfister, *The Question of Alsace-Lorraine* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1918).
- 110 *Comité d'études (sur la préparation du dossier des futures négociations 1917-1919) Ordre du Jour procès verbaux des séances. Fol. 727, Séance 14 mai and 2 juillet, 1917.*
- 111 D. Johnson, 'Memorandum of two conversations with H. W. C. Davis, of the War Trade Intelligence Department', April 23 and May 7, 1918, p. 3; Document 992, M1107, RG 256-3.
- 112 FO371/4355 PID (Peace Conference Series) 1918-19 War Office PC115 'Alsace-Lorraine' 'Notes on the Question of Alsace-Lorraine', 10 May 1918.
- 113 'A Preliminary Survey'; Document 893, M1107, RG 256.
- 114 'Memorandum Regarding the Organization of the Inquiry, Nov. 13, 1917', cited in Gelfand, *op.cit.*, p. 344.
- 115 The British only included Jews inconsistently, see R. J. Kerner and Charles Seymour, 'General Criticism of the British Government Racial Contour Map of Austria-Hungary'; Document 319, M1107, RG 256.
- 116 These same maps were included in Prothero's handbooks. Major Douglas Johnson, N. A. To: Colonel E. M. House, Subject: Confidential, Report on Arrangements made by the British Government for Collecting Data for the Peace Conference, p. 12.
- 117 Douglas Johnson, Memorandum of a Conversation with B. C. Wallis, at Hertford House, May 3, 1918, Document 992, M1107, RG 256.
- 118 Gelfand, *op.cit.*, 201; Kerner described '[t]he International Jews, who will now become still more German than they have been, wish to save Austria in order to save their securities and to exploit the Yugoslav territories'.
- 119 Jugo-Slavs, South Slavs, and Yugo-Slavs, were common and interchangeable appellations at this time; R. J. Kerner, 'Resumé of the Political movements among the Jugo-Slavs toward the federalization or dismemberment of Austria-Hungary' [subtitled "In explanation of the social and eco bases of nationalism"] March 25 1918, Document 310, M1107, RG 256.
- 120 A. K. Kuhn, 'Austria-Hungary', Document 324, M1107, RG 256.
- 121 Seymour to Bowman, January 15 1918, Box 9, General Correspondence, American Commission to Negotiate Peace, RG 256.
- 122 Charles Seymour, 'Report on Austria: Population Studies. Racial Distribution,' February 1, 1918, 1. (12); Document 504, M1107, RG 256.
- 123 Charles Seymour, 'Epitome of Reports on Just and Practical Boundaries within Austria-Hungary'; Document 514, M1107, RG 256.
- 124 *Ibid.* Seymour preferred to see Austria-Hungary federalised (on the American model) rather than dissected into constituent national bits, but concluded that it was 'impossible to discover such lines, which would be at the same time just and practical', and that language was an imprecise marker of identity and of frontiers; *Ibid.*, pp. 88-90.

- 125 Seymour to Bowman, January 15 1918, Box 9, General Correspondence, American Commission to Negotiate Peace, RG 256.
- 126 L. Dominican, *Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe* (New York: American Geographical Society, 1917), p. vii.
- 127 These themes were partly reinforced in the decision to use Madison Grant, the author of *The Passing of the Great Race* (1916), to formally recommend the book. Grant was also chairman of the New York Zoological Society, trustee of the American Museum of Natural History and the National Geographical Society. The flavour of Grant's eugenicism and racialism, and its relevance to Dominican's work, was clarified in his introduction. This explained that modern Europe was racially mixed and there was no such thing as a Latin, Germanic or Slavic race, indeed there was a 'lack of race consciousness in Europe', and as a result it was not useful as a test for nationality, M. Grant, 'Introduction', in Dominican, *op.cit.*, p. xvii.
- 128 Mezes to Lippmann, cited in Nielson, *op.cit.*, p. 75.
- 129 FO371/3476/56911 'Confidential Handbooks for the Peace Congress, Instructions to Historical Writers', March 30 1918.
- 130 'Test outline for any given problem area', Document 737, M1107, RG 256. See also FO371/3476/56911 'Confidential Handbooks for the Peace Congress, Instructions to Historical Writers', March 30 1918.
- 131 Comité national d'études sociales et politiques, *op.cit.*, p. 3.
- 132 J. Brunhès, *Comité d'études (sur la préparation du dossier des futures négociations 1917-1919) Ordre du Jour procès verbaux des séances. Fol. 727, Séance 8 juin 1918.*
- 133 MAE, Direction des Affaires Politiques et Commerciales, Series A. Paix, 220. A-1154-1A – Conditions de la Paix, États Unis, Rapports et Memoires sur l'Inquiry, décembre 1918, 'Notes d'Aubert sur les travaux de l'Inquiry et sur les solutions de paix américaines, 11 dic. 1918', p. 4.
- 134 Douglas Johnson, 'Memorandum of conversation with E. Denis'; Document 992, M1107, RG 256.
- 135 Douglas Johnson, 'Memorandum of conversation with Albert Thomas'; Document 992, M1107, RG 256. For his part Emile Boutroux described the real national sentiment and democratic spirit of the Serbians and the Romanians as deserving of Allied support. Douglas Johnson, 'Memorandum of conversation with Emile Boutroux'; Document 992, M1107, RG 256.
- 136 Brunhès, *Comité d'études (sur la préparation du dossier des futures négociations 1917-1919) Ordre du Jour procès verbaux des séances. Fol. 727, Séance 18 mars 1919*; Boyer believed that the Albanian language only contained 10 original words, and Fallex reminded them that Albanian independence was invented by Austria in order to exploit the Eastern question. For Paul Deschanel (President of the Chamber of Deputies, member of the French Academy; President of the Commission of External and Colonial Affairs, 1905-1909) there were limits to the rights of nationalities 'to govern themselves', and the Albanians were not fit to do so, while other nationalities, such as the Austrian Germans, posed too great a threat. Douglas Johnson, 'Memorandum of conversation with Paul Deschanel'; Document 992, M1107, RG 256.
- 137 J. T. Shotwell, 'Critique on the Preliminary Report on the Balkan Question', 6; Document 40, M1107, RG 256.
- 138 Gelfand, *op.cit.*, p. 246.
- 139 Howard Crosby Butler, 'Report on the Proposals for an Independent Arab State or States'; Document 79, M1107, RG 256.

- 140 Cited in Gelfand, *op.cit.*, p. 243.
- 141 Douglas Johnson, 'Memorandum of a conference with J. W. Headlam and A. J. Toynbee in the Oxford and Cambridge Club, London, April 30, 1918, p. 1; Document 992, M1107, RG 256. Johnson also remarked that 'Toynbee spoke rather critically of Lippmann's book on "World Problems", as betraying considerable self-assurance on the author's part.'
- 142 Douglas Johnson, 'Memorandum of conversation with Temperley', p. 2.
- 143 Howard Crosby Butler, 'Report on the Proposals for an Independent Arab State or States', p. 36; Document 79, M1107, RG 256.
- 144 James Shotwell, 'Critique on Report on Trieste and the Dalmatian Coast', Feb. 18, 1918, p. 1; Document 870, M1107, RG 256.
- 145 Lippmann to Seymour, June 7 1918, Box, 38, *General Correspondence*, M1107, RG 256.
- 146 Yale University Manuscripts and Archives. Walter Lippmann Papers, Group 326, Series I Selected Correspondence 1906–1930, Box 38 folder 1357, Seymour to Walter Lippmann, June 10 1918.
- 147 Walter Lippmann Papers, Series I, Box 38. folder 1357, Letter from Mezes to Lippman 16 Nov. 1918. See also J. T. Shotwell, 'Critique on the Preliminary Report on the Balkan Question', p. 6; Document 40, M1107, RG 256.
- 148 For Seymour, Slavs were the most vital on a scale of the 'Comparative Vitality of Races'. Seymour, 'Epitome of Reports on Just and Practical Boundaries within Austria-Hungary'.
- 149 Charles Seymour, 'Report on Austria: Population Studies. Racial Distribution, Feb. 1, 1918'.
- 150 FO371 3414 Political Turkey, Files. 1918, LBN and AJT, 'Jewish National Rights in Central Europe', 181911; 15/11/18, #167.
- 151 A. J. Toynbee, *Turkey: A past and future* (New York: G. H. Doran Co, 1917), p. 6, cited in I. Friedman, 'Arnold Toynbee: Pro-Arab or Pro-Zionist?', *Israel Studies*, 4 (1999) 80.
- 152 We have some evidence that at times these criteria were openly manipulated with propaganda aims in mind, as when the British Prime Minister Lloyd George instructed John Buchan to discredit the 'Turk' and the Ottoman empire: 'When you take in hand the question of Allied and Neutral propaganda, I am anxious you should pay special attention to the futility and iniquity of the Turk ... How the Turk, by his rule, made all the arts of industry and husbandry impossible, and how once rich lands have become a wilderness ... Emphasize his incapacity for good Government, his misrule, and above all, his massacres of all the industrious populations; his brutality ... in Armenia and Syria'; Friedman, *op.cit.*, p. 76.
- 153 See also Heffernan, *op.cit.*, p. 42. Martonne commented rather proudly on how useful the Committee's experts were at the conference, 'and how many of us are called to provide the notes that have played an important role in certain deliberations, or to take a personal part in the discussions of the different commissions'.
- 154 FO373/1 1/3 *Handbooks*, nos. 1, 2, 3. p. 57.
- 155 G. Prothero (ed.), *Peace Handbooks*, Great Britain Foreign Office Historical Section (London: H.M.S.O., 1920): no. 67 *China*, in Vol. XII, p. 109, and no. 61, *Arabia*, in Vol. XI, p. 10. The American delegation utilised the Inquiry reports, but, as Gelfand has pointed out they took only about half of the reports produced. The most important recommendations were brought together as the 'Black Book', and a companion red-bound volume on colonial

- matters. These books existed in a number of versions, but in general reflected the combination of altruism and stereotyping that afflicted Inquiry reports. Gelfand, *op.cit.*, p. 183.
- 156 See J. Keiger, 'Patriotism, Politics and Policy in the Foreign Ministry 1880–1914', in R. Tombs (ed.), *Nationhood and Nationalism in France: From Boulangerism to the Great War, 1889–1918* (London, New York: Harper Collins Academic, 1991), p. 260. Boutmy's *Essai d'une psychologie politique du peuple anglais* (1901) had followed in the footsteps of his predecessor Taine in drawing on examples of English history and politics to show that 'for the English nation, external nature has been a school for initiative, activity, foresight, and self-control'. Boutmy's theoretical aim was to restore the importance of the physical environment and race to explanations of national psychology; E. Boutmy, *Essai d'une psychologie politique du peuple anglais au XIXe siècle* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1901), p. 9. See also his *Éléments d'une psychologie politique du peuple américain: La Nation-La Patrie-L'État-La Religion*.
- 157 Edward Mandell House, Edward Mandell House papers, 1885–1938 inclusive, MsGR466, HM236. Yale University Library, [also known as: Edward M. House diaries.] 466, III, p. 122: April 28, 1917. They also agreed that the outcome of the war would involve a settlement of Poland's boundaries, but were less certain about the national fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Romania, Hungary, and Austria, of cities such as Danzig, Constantinople, and Trieste, or any nationality cause that involved their own secret treaties in respect to the Adriatic region and the Middle East. CAB29/1, Committee of Imperial Defence, Peace, P Series, Vol. 1. October 1916: 'The Peace Settlement in Europe', Memo by Mr. Balfour', p. 7.
- 158 Gelfand, *op.cit.*, p. 329.
- 159 FO371/4356 PID (Peace Conference Series) PC. 150, 'Kurdistan, Dec. 14, 1918'.
- 160 S. P. Tillman, *Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 200.
- 161 FO502/1/1, The Irish Republic. Pamphlet on the Irish Race Convention in the US in 1919.
- 162 FO608/211 642/1/4, Self Determination for India, February 12 1919.
- 163 FO371/4355, P.I.D. 1918–19, P.C. 68, 'South Eastern Europe and the Balkans' (27/12/18, note to Paget's report), p. 3.
- 164 H. W. Temperley, cited in M. Burns, 'Disturbed spirits: Minority rights and new world order,' in S. F. Wells, Jr. (ed.), *New European Orders, 1919 and 1991* (Washington, D. C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1996), p. 47.
- 165 Smith, *American Empire*, p. 143.

Chapter 2 The Principle of Nationality, 1914–1919

- 1 See A. J. Mayer, *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), and Heater, *op.cit.*
- 2 Princeton University Library, Robert Lansing Papers, Series I Official Papers, Box 2: 'Letter to Wilson, May 19, 1918' and 'Memorandum on the policy of the United States in relation to the nationalities included within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, June 24, 1918.'
- 3 *Diary of Colonel E. M. House*, August 5, 1918, p. 199.

- 4 J. Breuilley, *Nationalism and the State* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982), p. 373.
- 5 R. Lansing, *The Peace Negotiations, a Personal Narrative* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921), p. 97.
- 6 T. Masaryk, *The Making of a State: Memories and observations, 1914–1918* (1927), cited in Heater, *op.cit.*, p. 107.
- 7 Cited in Heater, *op.cit.*, pp. 20, 24.
- 8 'Notes d'Aubert sur les travaux de l'Inquiry et sur les solutions de paix américaines: 11 déc. 1918', p. 8.
- 9 'Diary of Edith Benham' in Link ed., *op.cit.*, January 14, 1919, pp. 54–61.
- 10 Heater, *op.cit.*, p. 29. Some historians have sought the origins of the status of nationality in the wartime aims of British radicals, others in 'the interplay between American and British reflection'. See L. W. Martin, *Peace without Victory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), Tilman, *op.cit.*, Gelfand, *op.cit.*, p. 3; Nielson, *op.cit.*, p. 57.
- 11 See Seton-Watson Papers, Correspondence between Nicolson and Seton-Watson in 1918 and after, and with Holland Rose in 1916. For more on Seton-Watson and the Habsburg empire see, Sluga, 'Bodies, Souls and Sovereignty: The Austro-Hungarian Empire and the legitimacy of nations'. For an account of the interwar influence of the New Europe, see L. Passerini, *Europe in Love, Love in Europe: Imagination and politics between the wars* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), p. 53.
- 12 Seton-Watson Papers, SEW/2/1/1, *European Review*.
- 13 Editorial, 'The Fate of Austria', *The New Europe*, (1917) 225.
- 14 Editorial, 'Europe and the nonEuropean world', *The New Europe* (1917) 323.
- 15 *Ibid.*
- 16 R. Muir, *National Self-Government: Its growth and principles* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1918) p. 4.
- 17 R. Muir, *The Character of the British Empire* (London: Constable, 1917), p. 9; R. Muir with S. Hodgson (ed.), *An Autobiography and Some Essays* (London: Lund Humphries and Co., 1943), p. 108.
- 18 Muir with Hodgson (ed.), *op.cit.*, p. 110.
- 19 Muir, 'Introduction', in E. Rignano, *The War and the Settlement: An Italian view*, trans. A. M. Sanderson Furniss (London: Council for the Study of International Relations, 1917).
- 20 Muir, in Rignano, *The War and the Settlement*, p. 18.
- 21 See U. Singh Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire: A study in nineteenth-century British liberal thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
- 22 Bevan also wrote on Indian nationalism, and translated important contemporary German works.
- 23 E. Bevan, 'India: Self-determination and the British Commonwealth', *The New Europe*, 67 (1918), p. 39.
- 24 K. J. Calder, *Britain and the Origins of the New Europe: 1914–1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 18. Walter Lippmann Papers, Series I, Box 30, Folder 1113, 'Letter to Walter Lippmann in Paris from Seton-Watson', 25 November 1918.
- 25 G. Martel, 'From Round Table to New Europe: Some intellectual origins of the Institute of International Affairs', in A. Bosco and C. Navari (eds.), *Chatham House and British Foreign Policy, 1991–1945: The Royal Institute of International Affairs during the inter-war period* (London: Lothian Foundation, 1994), p. 24.

- 26 See Seton-Watson Papers, SEW/2/2/1 *New Europe* and SEW2/2/2 'New Europe Society'.
- 27 'I was thrilled to realise,' Muir recorded in a brief memoir, 'how all the great movements in modern history – nationalism, internationalism, the growth of popular self-government and the expansion of European influence over the non-European world – seemed to have come to a culminating point in the war.' Muir with Hodgson (ed.), *op.cit.*, p. 108.
- 28 A. Toynbee, *Nationality and the War* (London: J. M. Dent, 1915), p. 16.
- 29 Bodleian Library, Oxford, Toynbee Papers, Box 39, Letter to his Uncle Paget, dated 20 April 1915. Toynbee was particularly interested in the theories of Bergson and Tarde at this stage, see: W. H. McNeill, *Arnold J. Toynbee: A life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 76, 267, and K. W. Thompson, *Toynbee's Philosophy of World History and Politics* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985), p. 221.
- 30 C. Brewin, 'Arnold Toynbee, Chatham House, and research in a global context', in D. Long and P. Wilson (eds.), *Thinkers of The Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-war idealism reassessed* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 294.
- 31 H. Bergson, *The Meaning of the War: Life and matter in conflict* (London: T. F. Unwin, 1915), pp. 18–47, and M. Antliff, *Inventing Bergson: Cultural politics and the Parisian avant-garde* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 105.
- 32 G. Tarde, *Études de psychologie sociale* (Paris: Giard & Brière, 1898), p. 1.
- 33 Tarde, *op.cit.*, pp. 47, 51, 295: 'Si les divers moi étaient aussi hétérogènes qu'on le suppose quelquefois, ... comment pourraient-ils s'associer, former un nous? ... La psychologie collective, donc, la psychologie *inter-cérébrale*, renferme des éléments, transmissibles et communicables d'une conscience à d'autres, ... pour former des forces et des quantités vraiment sociales, courants d'opinion ou entraînements de passion populaire, énergie tenace des traditions ou des coutumes nationales.'
- 34 Toynbee, *Nationality and War*, p. 56.
- 35 *Ibid*, pp. 13, 20.
- 36 A. Toynbee, *The New Europe: Some essays in reconstruction* (London: Dent, 1916), pp. 17, 20.
- 37 *Ibid*, p. 62.
- 38 *Ibid*, p. 49.
- 39 Paul Rich has argued, '[t]he Victorian notion of 'advanced' and 'backward' had been initially applied to the question of individual and family behaviour as a biological metaphor derived from Darwinian notions of 'fitness'; P. B. Rich, *Race and Empire in British Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 21.
- 40 Toynbee, *The New Europe*, pp. 16, 63, 73.
- 41 J. Holland Rose, *Nationality in Modern History* (London: Rivington, 1916), p. iv.
- 42 Rose, *op.cit.*, p. 137.
- 43 *Ibid*, p. 148.
- 44 *Ibid*, p. 137.
- 45 H. Weinroth, 'Radicalism and Nationalism: An increasingly unstable equation', in A. J. A. Morris (ed.), *Edwardian Radicalism, 1900–1914: Some aspects of British radicalism* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), p. 219.
- 46 L. W. Martin, *op.cit.*, p. 74. Kenneth Calder has distinguished the liberal nationalism of 'the New Europeans' from the pacifism and internationalism of the UDC.; K. J. Calder, *Britain and the Origins of the New Europe: 1914–1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 6.

- 47 H. Swanwick, *Builders of Peace, Being Ten Years History of the Union of Democratic Control* (London: Swarthmore Press, 1924), p. 56.
- 48 Cited in Martel, 'From Round Table to New Europe', p. 25.
- 49 N. Angell, *The Fruits of Victory* (London: Collins, 1921), pp. xiv, 209, 254.
- 50 I. Zangwill, 'War-Shock', in *U.D.C.*, 2 (1917) 79.
- 51 I. Cooper Willis, 'Freedom in Wartime', *Foreign Affairs*, 2 (October 1917) 2–3.
- 52 B. Russell, 'National Independence and Internationalism', *Atlantic Monthly*, (1917) 622–3.
- 53 R. Monk, *Bertrand Russell: The spirit of solitude* (London: Vintage, 1997), p. 372. Similarly, Charles Roden Buxton argued that the nationality principle was 'merely another form of the democratic principle', that could not be transplanted easily onto the different terrain of India, Egypt and Persia. C. Roden Buxton, 'Nationality', in C. Roden Buxton and G. Lowes Dickinson ed., *Towards a Lasting Settlement* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1915), p. 40.
- 54 Monk, *op.cit.*, pp. 372, 382.
- 55 B. Russell, *War, the Offspring of Fear* (London: U. D. C., 1914).
- 56 I. Zangwill, 'Palestine regained', *The International Review*, 69 (New Series 6) (1919) 451.
- 57 I. Zangwill, *The Principle of Nationalities* (London: Watts, 1917).
- 58 *Ibid*, p. 32.
- 59 *Ibid*, p. 53.
- 60 Martel, 'From Round Table to New Europe', p. 23. G. Murray with J. Smith and A. Toynbee (eds.), *An Unfinished Autobiography* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1960). See G. Murray, 'The Herd Instinct and the War', in *The International Crisis in Its Ethical and Psychological Aspects: lectures delivered in February and March, 1915, by Eleanor M. Sidgwick [and others], under the scheme for imperial studies in the University of London, at Bedford college for women* (London, New York: H. Milford, 1915).
- 61 S. Brown, 'The Herd Instinct', *Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology*, 16 (1921) 234.
- 62 Postwar, Murray (like Bergson) was an influential member of the League of Nation's Organisation for International Intellectual Cooperation.
- 63 G. Murray, 'National Ideals; Conscious and Unconscious', *The International Journal of Ethics*, (1900) 160.
- 64 Cited in Martel, 'From Round Table to New Europe', p. 23.
- 65 Murray, 'The Herd Instinct and the War', pp. 31, 33.
- 66 As Gordon Martel explains, 'it was Murray who was to serve as a vital link between Wellington House and the British liberal-intellectual community in the propaganda side of the war effort.' According to Martel, 'Murray was prepared to embrace imperialism if it could be fused with liberalism.' Martel, 'From Round Table to New Europe', pp. 21, 32.
- 67 G. Murray, 'The League of Nations and the Democratic Idea' in *The League of Nations*, Viscount Grey (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1918), p. 126.
- 68 H. D. Oakeley, 'The Idea of a General Will', in L. Creighton (ed.), *The International Crisis: The theory of the State: lectures delivered in February and March, 1916, at Bedford College for Women* (London and New York: H. Milford and Oxford University Press, 1916), pp. 145, 147, 155. Murray's views of nationality were in broad agreement with those of the New Europeans, see G. Murray, 'Self-Determination of Nationalities', *Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs* 1 (1922) 6–13.
- 69 Martel, 'From Round Table to New Europe', p. 24.

- 70 Cited in Martel, 'From Round Table to New Europe', p. 1.
- 71 A. E. Zimmern, 'Nationality and Government' (1915) in A. E. Zimmern, *Nationality and Government, with Other Wartime Essays* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1918), p. 54. Both Zimmern and Toynbee found inspiration in Graham Wallas' *Human Nature in Politics*, in R. W. Seton-Watson's championship of nationalist causes in Central and Eastern Europe, and in Gilbert Murray's liberalism. For a useful description of Zimmern's political ideas, see H. Hanak, *Great Britain and Austria-Hungary during the First World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).
- 72 A. E. Zimmern, 'True and False Nationalism' in Zimmern, *Nationality and Government*, p. 74.
- 73 Zimmern, 'True and False Nationalism', p. 84: 'National sentiment is intimate: whether it be mainly compounded of influences of heredity (as in Europe), or of environment, as in the older Americans, or whether it be something newly acquired and deliberately cherished as among the new arrivals, it is something that goes deep down into the very recesses of the being. ... The nationality of a European and the nationality of a recent American may perhaps be compared to a man's relations to his parents and his relation to his wife. Both sentiments are intimate; both can be legitimately compared, in the sphere of personal relations, to the sense of nationality in the wider sphere of corporate relations. But the one is hereditary, the other is elective. The European and the older American are born into their nation; the recent American has chosen his nationality and attached himself to it as to a wife. And, as parentage and marriage both go to make up a complete personality, so nationality, even among members of the older nations, will not be complete without an element of election and deliberation, or, to use a more appropriate term which the war brought home to so many, re-dedication', p. 85.
- 74 A. E. Zimmern, 'The Passing of Nationality', in Zimmern, *Nationality and Government*, p. 87.
- 75 *Ibid*, p. 87.
- 76 Zimmern, 'Nationality and Government', p. 54: 'In the world, as it is today, as educated India is discovering, consciousness of nationality is essential to individual self-respect, as self-respect is essential to right living'.
- 77 *Ibid*, p. 57.
- 78 A. E. Zimmern, 'Review of Race and Nationality by John Oakesmith', *The International Review*, 2 (1919) 201–2.
- 79 A. E. Zimmern, 'German Culture and the British Commonwealth' (1914), in Zimmern, *Nationality and Government*, p. 21: 'Cut a section through mankind, and in every layer there will be British citizens, living under the jurisdiction of British law.'
- 80 Zimmern cited in Martel, 'From Round Table to New Europe', p. 18.
- 81 Zimmern, 'The Passing of Nationality', p. 81.
- 82 Zimmern, 'Nationality and Government', p. 50.
- 83 G. Wallas, *The Great Society: A psychological analysis* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1914), p. 10. A socialist and Fabian, Wallas was concerned with rethinking the model of human nature implicit in political theory, and contemplating how individual psychologies might be alterable. He happily synthesised the ideas of Darwin, James, Trotter, and G. Stanley Hall. See M. J. Wiener, *Between Two Worlds: The political thought of Graham Wallas* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 43, 73, 86.
- 84 Wiener, *op.cit.*, p. 90.

- 85 From 'Comment on J. A. Thomson's "The Sociological Appeal to Biology", delivered 14 March 1906 before the Sociological Society', cited in Wiener, *op.cit.*, p. 88.
- 86 Walter Lippmann Papers, Series I, Box 2, Walter Lippmann to Graham Wallas, Letter October 30 1912. Lippmann's preference was for Freudian psychology (unlike Wallas), as he declared in this same letter: 'I went back and read some of James with a curious sense that the world must have been very young in the '80s!'. See also C. T. Wellborn, *Twentieth Century Pilgrimage: Walter Lippmann and the public philosophy* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), p. 48.
- 87 Martel, 'From Round Table to New Europe', p. 60.
- 88 W. Lippmann, 'Patriotism in the rough', *The New Republic* (16 October 1915) 277-8.
- 89 Walter Lippman Papers, Series I, Box 35 Folder 1323: Lippmann to Zimmern, June 7 1915, 'You do not quite make strong enough your opposition to the over-nationalized groups. I should have liked for instance to have it made clearer where nationalism ceases to be worth cultivating. Is every little language worth reviving? Ought we to advocate Gaelic revivals in Ireland and dialect revivals all over India, etc.? Ought we to be sympathetic only to the larger and simpler groupings?'. Zimmern replied, 'I regard the European variety, which sets up the National State as its ideal, as a passing phase, and an anachronism at that. ... Granted that political nationalism is an anachronism one need not be afraid of smaller national movements. It is not for you and me to say whether Gaelic is worth reviving. If your people understood what nationality was you would not be so alarmed at the U. S. Germans. ... I have never felt less English than since the war began.' Zimmern to Lippmann, 23 June 1915.
- 90 Walter Lippmann Papers, Series I, Box 2, Folder 66, Correspondence with Norman Angell, January 18 1917.
- 91 The OPP's key figures were Jan Van Beek en Donce and Paul Otlet (Secretary-General of the Union of International Associations in Brussels), and its professed aim was to study questions about individual and national rights. W. F. Kuehl, *Seeking World Order: The United States and international organization to 1920* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1969), p. 218. See also E. Balch, *Approaches to the Great Settlement* (New York: American Union against Militarism, 1918), pp. 242-3.
- 92 In May 1917, *The Nation* began carrying *War and Peace* as a supplement. It advertised the publications of Le Bon as well as L. T. Hobhouse, and published UDC and New European writings, including the reflections of Russell, Hobson, Morel, and Toynbee.
- 93 'Self-determination', (no author cited), *War and Peace - The Nation Supplement*, (1918) 253.
- 94 As a result, OPP member Starr Jordan, President of Stanford University and Chief Director of the World Peace Foundation, wrote that national rights were only relevant in homogeneous civilised areas, designated civilised by virtue of racial status. Jordan, a member of the Immigration Restriction League of Boston since the mid-1890s believed the sources of decline in the US were 'emigration of its stronger stock', 'immigration of inferior stock,' and 'war killing off the more virile strains.' D. S. Jordan, 'Biological effects of race movements', *Popular Science Monthly*, 87 (1915) 267-70.
- 95 Prof. William I. Thomas, University of Chicago on 'Nationalism and the Creation of Values', MAE, Série A. Paix t.6 Fragments: U.S. Conference

- 1916/17, Washington DC, Conference of Oppressed or Dependent Nationalities, 11/12/16. For more discussion of Thomas' scientific work on nationality, see chapter 3.
- 96 Zimmern, *Nationality and Government*, p. xii.
- 97 Its organiser was the sociologist L. T. Hobhouse, the first professor of Sociology in England (1907), at University of London, and whose *Mind in Evolution* (1901) referred to the great changes that had occurred in 'comparative psychology' and showed that the mind was 'the essential driving force in all evolutionary change'; L. T. Hobhouse, 'Preface to the 2nd edition', *Mind in Evolution*, (London: Macmillan, 1915 [1901]), pp. ix, x.
- 98 M. Hanna, *The Mobilization of Intellect: French scholars and writers during the Great War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 74–5.
- 99 Buisson was Director of Primary Education, Sorbonne Professor of Pedagogical Science, Radical Party Deputy for the Seine, and eventually a Nobel Peace Prize Winner.
- 100 F. Buisson, 'France and the League of Nations: Wilson's Programme as Interpreted by the French Groups of the Left', *The International Review*, 64 (1919) 19.
- 101 *Le Congrès de 1916 de la Ligue de l'homme: compte rendu sténographique 1er et 2me novembre 1916* (Paris: Ligue des droits de l'homme et du citoyen, 1917), p. 3.
- 102 T. Ruysen, *The Principle of Nationality* (New York: American Association for International Conciliation, 1916), p. 25.
- 103 J. M. Baldwin, 'France and the War', *Sociological Review*, 8 (1915) 72.
- 104 E. Baie, *L'épopée Flamande: histoire de la sensibilité collective* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1917), p. lxxiv.
- 105 E. Baie (ed.), *Le droit des nationalités: consultation de MM. Émile Boutroux, Carton de Wiart, L. Luzzatti, (et al)*, (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1915), p. 15.
- 106 *Ibid*, p. 102.
- 107 E. Boutroux, 'Les nations', in Baie (ed.), *Le droit des nationalités*, p. 26.
- 108 For more on Bagehot, see chapter 3.
- 109 R. Johannet, *Le principe des nationalités* (Paris: Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, 1918) pp. xxxi, 237.
- 110 *Ibid*.
- 111 *Ibid*, p. 256.
- 112 *Ibid*, pp. xxv, 212.
- 113 *Ibid*, p. 407.
- 114 *Ibid*, p. 70. For more on Fouillée, see chapter 3.
- 115 *Ibid*, pp. 389, 405.
- 116 *Ibid*, p. 424.
- 117 J. T. Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory: Social democracy and progressivism in European and American thought, 1870–1920* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 175.
- 118 Martel, 'From Round Table to New Europe', p. 27.
- 119 Bergson was adamant that these underdeveloped populations were the 'oriental masses', Papiers d'agents Henri Bergson (PA-AP 207), t. 3, 2^{ème} mission aux USA; mars–juillet 1918 (4/7/18).
- 120 H. Bergson, Gifford Lecture on 'The Problem of Personality', *Mélanges* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972), Lecture VIII, 1065; see also Bergson, interview with A. Beveridge, typescript, 'What is Back of the War' in Correspondence and Notebooks, Vol. 2, 1914, p. 5, Albert Beveridge Papers, Library of Congress.

- 121 G. Le Bon, *The Psychology of the Great War* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1916), pp. 41, 45, 48.
- 122 G. Richards, 'Race', *Racism and Psychology: Towards a reflexive history* (New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 25.
- 123 MAE, (PA-AP 335), Papiers d'agent Briand, t. 24; Le Bon à Briand, 8/9/14, my translation.
- 124 Le Bon, *The Psychology of the Great War*, p. 146.
- 125 *Ibid*, p. 48.
- 126 *Ibid*, p. 146.
- 127 Heffernan, *op.cit.*, p. 30.
- 128 See for example, E. Greene Balch, *Our Slavic Fellow Citizens* (New York: Charities Publication Committee, 1910).
- 129 Thomas' innovative study *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (1918), claimed to show that Polish-American society was 'slowly evolving from Polonism to Americanism' as a group phenomenon. D. Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 352.
- 130 W. B. Pillsbury, *The Psychology of Nationality and Internationalism* (New York: Appleton, 1919), p. 150.
- 131 *Ibid*, p. 150.
- 132 'Notes d'Aubert sur les travaux de l'Inquiry et sur les solutions de paix américaines. 11 déc. 1918.', p. 8.
- 133 A preamble to the 'Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities' described nationalities as 'natural facts, due to biological, geographic and historical factors.' *Conférence des nationalités organisée par l'Union des nationalités à l'École des hautes études sociales de Paris les 26–27 juin 1915*. The declaration insisted, however, that European and non-European ('Oriental') races had the same claim to individual, if not collective, rights, p. 74.
- 134 FO395/242 74932 PID, memo Congress of Oppressed Nationalities, Appendix, April, 25, 1918.
- 135 Andrew Williams has argued that 'British and French official policy from late 1916 on was to try and manipulate Wilson's ideas into a form that would suit their national interests. In this they were in the short run successful; in the longer term they were forced to accept his initial logic', Williams, *op.cit.*, p. 35.
- 136 J. Dewey, 'The Principle of Nationality', *Menorah's Journal*, 3 (1917) 203–8, republished in *John Dewey, the Middle Works 1899–1924*, J. A. Boydston (ed.) (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1983), pp. 286–7.
- 137 J. M. Baldwin in C. W. Murchison *et al.* (eds.), *A History of Psychology in Autobiography*, vol. 1 (Worcester: Clark University Press, 1930), p. 27. During the war, Baldwin authored *The Super-State* (Herbert Spencer Lecture, Oxford, 1916), *French and American Ideals* (1914), *France and the War* (1916), *American Neutrality* (1916).

Chapter 3 Psychology, Race, and the Nation Question, 1870–1914

- 1 J. Ward, 'Psychology', *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911), p. 598.
- 2 Psychology at this time stood for a tangle of methodologies – drawn from philosophy, medicine, souls, ethics, telepathy, sensations, and neuro-physiology – and sub-fields, including analytic, genetic, comparative, experimental, pathological,

individual, and ethnic. The first issue of the French *Bulletin de l'Institut psychique*, later the *Bulletin de l'Institut général psychologique* (1900), edited by Pierre Janet, the French expert on hypnotism and hysteria, counted philosophers, psychologists, spiritualists, anthropologists, criminologists, and general philanthropists from across Europe and the Atlantic amongst its contributors. Prior to the *Bulletin's* appearance the *American Journal of Psychology* (1887) and the *Psychological Review* (1894), had been established. The editor of the *British Journal of Psychology* (1904), James Ward, affirmed the importance of promoting 'Psychology in all its branches'; *The British Journal of Psychology* 1 (1904). Joseph Jastrow, chair of psychology at the University of Wisconsin from 1888 to 1923, the first secretary of the American Psychological Association, and its president in 1900, recalls in his professional autobiography that the developments in psychology during this time were 'so rapid and in such varied directions that those who stood in the center of the movement at times failed to sense rightly the changing perspective of interests and problems.' [J. Jastrow in Murchison, ed., *op.cit.*, p. 143.] Even as psychology took on the status of an independent discipline, its methods and agendas were characteristically 'porous', and 'influenced by ... everything from consumer demand for personal advice to the quest for a philosophically grounded pantheism'; G. Eghigian, 'Review of C. D. Green, M. Shore, and T. Teo (eds.), *The Transformation of Psychology: Influences of 19th century philosophy, technology, and natural science*' in *Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences*, 38 (2001) 420. For further discussion see G. Richards, *Putting Psychology in its Place: An introduction from a critical historical perspective* (London, New York: Routledge, 1996); G. Richards, *Mental Machinery: The origins and consequences of psychological ideas, Pt. 1: 1600–1850* (London: Athlone Press, 1992); W. R. Woodward and M. G. Ash (eds.), *The Problematic Science: Psychology in nineteenth century thought* (New York: Praeger, 1982); C. E. Buxton (ed.), *Points of View in the Modern History of Psychology* (Orlando: Academic Press, 1985); K. Arens, *Structures of Knowing: Psychologies of the nineteenth century* (Dordrecht, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989); J. Brozek and L. J. Pongratz (eds.), *Historiography of Modern Psychology* (Toronto: C. J. Hogrefe, 1980), and J. Brozek, 'History of Psychology: Diversity of Approaches and Uses', *Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences*, 31 (1969) 115–27; N. Rose, 'Assembling the Modern Self', in R. Porter, *Rewriting the Self: Histories from the Renaissance to the present* (London: Routledge, 1997); N. Rose, *Inventing Our Selves: Psychology, power and personhood* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); K. Danziger, *Naming the Mind: How psychology found its language* (London: Sage Publications, 1997).

- 3 E. Renan, 'Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?', in *Idem, Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? et autres essais politiques* J. Roman (ed.) (Paris: Agora Pocket, 1992), p. 54.
- 4 E. Renan, *L'Avenir de la science – pensées de 1848* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1890), pp. vii, ix. Renan proposed that the psychology of the uncivilised races would reveal the secrets of human nature and of evolution, Renan, *L'Avenir de la science*, p. 174.
- 5 Ribot was awarded the Chair in 1888. See S. Nicholas and A. Charvillat, 'Introducing Psychology as an Academic Discipline in France: Théodule Ribot and the Collège de France (1888–1901)', *Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences*, 37(2001) 143–64, and D. C. J. Lee, *Ernest Renan: In the shadow of faith* (London: Duckworth, 1996), p. 248, for more on Renan's awareness of the new psychology.
- 6 R. Théodule, *Maladies de la volonté* (1884), cited in R. Nye, *The Origins of Crowd Psychology: Gustave Le Bon and the crisis of mass democracy in the Third Republic* (London, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975), p. 31.

- 7 From *Principles of Psychology* (1855), cited in R. Smith, *The Norton History of the Human Sciences* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), p. 462.
- 8 L. Otis, *Organic Memory: History and the body in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), p. 7.
- 9 T. Todorov, *On Human Diversity: Nationalism, racism and exoticism in French thought* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 157. For more orthodox renderings of Renan as a constructivist see in particular, G. Eley and R. Suny, 'Introduction', in G. Eley and R. Suny (eds.), *Becoming National: A reader* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
- 10 Smith, *The Norton History of the Human Sciences*, p. 392.
- 11 In *Race and Nationality* (1919), the English writer John Oakesmith referred disapprovingly to a popular vogue for employing 'the highly controversial term "soul"', as if it were 'the best means of expressing what is meant by the character of a nation.' J. Oakesmith, *Race and Nationality: An inquiry into the growth of patriotism* (London: William Heinemann, 1919), pp. 20–1. Oakesmith's critique was supplemented with an idealisation of the British empire's own plurality grounded in the idea of its historically-determined Anglo-Saxon cultural core. See also W. McDougall in Murchison *et al.* (ed.), *op.cit.*, p. 208.
- 12 See, for example, W. Wundt, *Lectures on Human And Animal Psychology* (London: S. Sonnenschein & Co., 1894), p. 393, and J. R. Angell, 'The influence of Darwin on Psychology', *Psychological Review*, 16 (1909) 152. See also C. Darwin, *Origin of Species*, vol. 1 (New York: D. Appleton and company, 1892), p. 321.
- 13 T. Ribot, *L'hérédité: Étude psychologique sur ses phénomènes, ses lois, ses causes, ses conséquences* (Paris: Librairie Philosophique de Ladrangue, 1873); Nye, *op.cit.*, p. 32.
- 14 M. Hawkins, *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought, 1860–1945: Nature as model and nature as threat* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 81.
- 15 W. Bagehot (ed.) R. Kimball, *Physics and Politics: Or thoughts on the application of the principles of 'natural selection' and 'inheritance' to political society* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1999), p. 21.
- 16 *Ibid*, pp. 35, 89, 130.
- 17 J. Burrow, *The Crisis of Reason: European thought 1848–1914* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 165. The classic study of the scientific and cultural significance of the unconscious in this period is H. Ellenberger, *The Discovery of the Unconscious: The history and evolution of dynamic psychiatry* (London: Allen Lane, 1970).
- 18 Bagehot, *op.cit.*, p. 137. Thus, according to Bagehot, an English immigrant might live 'in the same climate as the Australian or Tasmanian [by which he meant the indigenous Aboriginal groups], but he has not become like those races; nor will a thousand years, in most respects, make him like them', *ibid*, p. 78. Similarly the experience of the English in India showed 'that a highly civilised race may fail in producing a rapidly excellent effect on a less civilised race, because it [the civilised race] is too good and too different.' *Ibid*, p. 129.
- 19 *Ibid*, pp. 79, 80. During an earlier pre-historic race-making period 'the Negro, or the red man, or the European' were made. But during the historic nation-making period distinctions between groups such as 'Spartan and Athenian, or between Scotchman and Englishman' flourished. Bagehot believed that the role of historians, statisticians, biologists, and anthropologists was to gather 'data' 'for a science of society whose sure indications will enable us deliberately to guide the further evolution of the nation towards the highest ideal of a nation that we can conceive.'
- 20 Todorov, *op.cit.*, pp. 107, 159.

- 21 From 'What is a nation?', trans. M. Thom, in Eley and Suny, *op.cit.*, p. 52.
- 22 The history of psychology in this period and its relationship to race-thinking is a story that has only just begun to be told, see for example Graham Richards' *Race Psychology* and *Putting Psychology in its Place*. Richards covers forms of collective and individual psychology that were not referred to as race psychology specifically, and that I include in this analysis of nation psychology. On the general significance of race in this period, see I. Hannaford, *Race: The History of an Idea in the West* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1996), pp. 275, 323, 327. See also C. Liauzu, *Race et civilisation: l'autre dans la culture occidentale, anthologie historique* (Paris: Syros, 1992), pp. 108–10.
- 23 Here I am also thinking of Frederick Hertz, who argued that psychological understanding of 'the development and role of ... traditions, ideals and mental dispositions' was critical to the development of 'a more scientific and systematic treatment of the problems of national character' in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, F. Hertz, *Nationality in History and Politics: A study of the psychology and sociology of national sentiment and character* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1944), p. 39.
- 24 One of the best discussions of the ideological dimensions of developments in psychology, and their implications for liberalism is R. Nye, *Anti-Democratic Sources of Elite Theory: Pareto, Mosca, Michels* (London, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977), p. 9.
- 25 Ribot, *English Psychology*, p. 12.
- 26 *Ibid*, pp. 12, 17.
- 27 *Ibid*, p. 328. Otis, *op.cit.*, pp. 96–7.
- 28 Editors, *Revue de psychologie sociale*, 1 (1907) 1–2.
- 29 Nye regards the heyday of collective psychology as dating from the 1890s, *Anti-Democratic Sources of Elite Theory*, pp. 9–11.
- 30 McDougall began his career in Britain, where he was a co-founder of the British Psychological Society and the *British Journal of Psychology*. McDougall described himself as representative of 'that blend of the Mediterranean and Nordic races which has produced the English people.' McDougall in Murchison ed., *op.cit.*, p. 211. For more on McDougall, see chapter 6 of this book.
- 31 W. McDougall, *Introduction to Social Psychology*, 23rd edn. (London: Methuen, 1936), p. 29. See also R. Smith, *op.cit.*, pp. 757–8.
- 32 The idea of imitation of course has a long heritage. In this period, its incorporation into the scientific study of psychology was accompanied by an emphasis on the role of élites in the process of imitation. For a discussion of this trend, see Nye, *Anti-Democratic Sources of Elite Theory*, *passim*.
- 33 McDougall, *The Group Mind*, p. 297.
- 34 W. I. Thomas, 'The Psychology of Race-Prejudice', *American Journal of Sociology*, 9 (1904); see also Hannaford, *op.cit.*, p. 341, and G. Stocking, *Race, Evolution and Culture* (New York: The Free Press, 1986), pp. 250–8. Stocking argues that Thomas' views change considerably over this period, as he came to reject physiological determinism and neo-Lamarckism.
- 35 Yale University, Sterling Library, *Inquiry Papers* Group 8 Series III Box 16. Folder 236 Nationalism/Thomas; typescript copy of paper 'Nationalism, individualization of function and the creation of Values' by W. I. Thomas.
- 36 For a discussion of the significance of the naturalisation of race-prejudice in the progressive view of American national identity see G. M. Fredrickson, *The Black Image in the White Mind: the debate on Afro-American character and destiny, 1817–1914* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 283ff.

- 37 W. C. Coupland, 'Introduction', in D. H. Tuke (ed.), *Dictionary of Psychological Medicine: Giving the definition, etymology and synonyms of the terms used in medical psychology with the symptoms, treatment and pathology of insanity and the law of lunacy in Great Britain and Ireland*, vol. 1 (London: J. A. Churchill, 1892), p. 30. The first issue of *Psiche* (1912) singled out Ethnic Psychology as a separate category of study alongside collective, social and character psychologies. For a further discussion of 'ethnopsychology' see Gilman, *Freud, Race and Gender*, pp. 27–9.
- 38 Otis, *op.cit.*, p. 95. See also A. Kuper, 'Psychology and Anthropology: The British experience', *History of the Human Sciences*, 3 (1990), 397–413; G. Stocking, *Victorian Anthropology* (New York: The Free Press, 1987), pp. 287–9; and also P. Rich, 'The Long Victorian Sunset: Anthropology, eugenics, and race in Britain, c1900–48', *Patterns of Prejudice*, 18 (1984) 4.
- 39 D. G. Brinton, *Races and Peoples: Lectures on the science of ethnography* (Philadelphia: David McKay, 1890), p. 51. See also D. G. Brinton, *An Ethnologist's View of History: An address before the Annual Meeting of the New Jersey Historical Society, at Trenton New Jersey, January 28, 1896* (Philadelphia: New Jersey Historical Society, 1896), p. 18.
- 40 Brinton, *Races and Peoples*, p. 94; Borrowing from the French zoologist-cum-ethnologist Jean de Quatrefages, Brinton described nations as the products of 'like physio-geographical conditions prevailing over a given area inhabited for many generations by the same peoples' that 'have impressed upon them certain traits, physical and psychical, which have become hereditary and continue indefinitely, even under changed conditions of existence.' See, J. L. Quatrefages, *Histoire générale des races humaines* (Paris: A. Hennuyer, 1886–89).
- 41 C. Le Tourneau, *La psychologie ethnique* (Paris: Schleicher Frères, 1901), p. vii.
- 42 *Ibid*, pp. 53, 64.
- 43 G. Le Bon, *The Psychology of Peoples* (London: T. Fisher, 1898), pp. xvii, 5. This book was based on a series of essays in the *Revue scientifique* entitled 'Ethnographie: Rôle du caractère dans la vie des peuples'. It has appeared in 17 French editions, and been translated into 16 foreign languages. Nye has categorised Le Bon's psychology of peoples as a version of racial typology, Nye, *Origins of Crowd Psychology*, p. 52. See also Morris Ginsberg, *The Psychology of Society*, 9th edn. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1964 [1921]), p. 60.
- 44 *Ibid*, p. xv.
- 45 Le Bon, *The Psychology of Peoples*, pp. 7–8, 34–5.
- 46 *Ibid*, pp. 37, 53; and Nye, *Origins of Crowd Psychology*, p. 49.
- 47 *Ibid*, pp. xviii, 7.
- 48 'The psychological crowd', Le Bon claimed, 'is a provisional being formed of heterogeneous elements, which for a moment are combined, exactly as the cells which constitute a living body form by their reunion a new being which displays characteristics very different from those possessed by each of the cells singly.' G. Le Bon, *The Crowd: A study of the popular mind* (London: Fisher Unwin, 1910 [1896]), p. 30.
- 49 Nye, *Origins of Crowd Psychology*, p. 62. Those sentiments were most fully preserved amongst the 'masses', who, as a result, controlled '[t]he destinies of nations'. Le Bon, *The Crowd*, p. 15.
- 50 Le Bon, *The Crowd*, p. 97. See also Catherine Rouvier, *Les idées politiques de Gustave Le Bon* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1986), pp. 97–100.
- 51 A. Fouillée, *Esquisse psychologique des peuples européens*, 3rd edn. (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1903), pp. xix, 107, 137.

- 52 *Ibid*, p. 77. See also A. Fouillée, 'Le caractère des races humaines et l'avenir de la race blanche', *Revue des deux mondes*, 124 (1894) and *Tempérament et caractère selon les individus, les sexes et les races*, 3rd edn. (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1901), p. 117.
- 53 A. Fouillée, 'Race from the Sociological Standpoint', in G. Spiller (ed.), *Papers on Inter-racial Problems Communicated to the First Universal Races Congress held at the University of London, July 26–29, 1911* (London: P. S. King and Son, 1911), p. 24. On the doctrine of *idées-forces*, see Kloppenberg, *op.cit.*, p. 35, and Logue, *op.cit.*, p. 132.
- 54 Fouillée, *Esquisse psychologique des peuples européens*, p. 18; Hannaford, *op.cit.*, p. 338.
- 55 For more on this influence see Baldwin in Murchison, *op.cit.*, pp. 5ff.
- 56 First published in 1860, this journal's intellectual reach extended across the borders of the German states to, among other places, France, Britain, and North America.
- 57 R. Smith, *op.cit.*, p. 349.
- 58 A. A. Goldenweiser, 'Folk-psychology', *Psychological Bulletin*, 9 (1912) 373–80, 378.
- 59 W. Wundt, *Elemente der Völkerpsychologie: Grundlinien einer psychologischen Entwicklung der Menschheit* (Leipzig: Kröner, 1912). For a thorough discussion of the relationship of this work to Wundt's experimental psychology, and their interdependence, see Otis, *op.cit.*, pp. 108–12.
- 60 A. A. Goldenweiser, 'Special reviews: *Elemente der Völkerpsychologie: Grundlinien einer psychologischen Entwicklung der Menschheit*, Wilhelm Wundt. Leipzig: Kröner, 1912,' *Psychological Bulletin*, 11 (1914) 387.
- 61 W. Wundt, *Völkerpsychologie: eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgesetze von Sprache, Mythos und Sitte*, vol. 1 (Leipzig: W. Englemann, 1911), pp. 9–15, and Otis, *Organic Memory*, p. 109.
- 62 This was the American anthropologist A. A. Goldenweiser. He also argued that in this instance Wundt was working more in the capacity of a cultural historian than a psychologist. Goldenweiser, 'Special reviews', 391. The American psychologist James Mark Baldwin described in his autobiography the influence of Wundt's folk psychology on his own conception of cultural heredity: 'Social heritage' and/or 'tradition' were the 'the body of acquisitions resulting, in each generation, from the progressive integration and re-absorption by each individual of all the transmitted culture.' Baldwin in Murchison *et al.* (ed.), *op.cit.*, p. 5ff. Freud's *Totem and Taboo* was also significantly influenced by Wundt, see Otis, *op.cit.*, p. 108.
- 63 Otis, *op.cit.*, p. 98.
- 64 *Ibid*, pp. 98, 107.
- 65 Roger Smith explains that Wundt thought of instincts – even social instincts – as inherited mental structures, and 'considered that these structures have been affected by the experience and history of particular peoples, and in this context he referred to the *Volksgeist*.'; R. Smith, *op.cit.*, p. 762.
- 66 G. W. Stocking (ed.), *Malinowski, Rivers, Benedict, and Others: Essays on culture and personality* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986), p. 5.
- 67 Ward, 'Psychology', p. 598.
- 68 The transition in scientific investigations of human difference was not only from an emphasis on physical race to psychological race, but also, as the psychology historian Jaap van Ginneken has described, from 'a strictly physiological emphasis on race toward a more psychological emphasis on nationhood';

- J. Van Ginneken, *Crowds, Psychology and Politics, 1871–1899* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 135.
- 69 Liauzu, *op.cit.*, p. 110.
- 70 J. Roman, 'L'introduction', in Renan, *op.cit.*, p. 21.
- 71 Renan, 'Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?', p. 43.
- 72 Pillsbury, *op.cit.*, p. 150: He added, 'This low state of intelligence is not transmitted to the offspring as measurements of their children in the schools show no such prevalence of mental defectiveness.' See also R. S. Woodworth, 'Comparative sociology of races', *The Psychological Bulletin*, 13 (1916) 388. Nancy Stepan dates the explosion in intelligence testing to the period 1900–1930, *The Idea of Race in Science: Great Britain, 1800–1960* (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 131.
- 73 Rich, *Race and Empire in British Politics*, p. 18 and G. Villa, 'La Psicologia e le scienze sociali', *Psiche: Rivista di studi psicologici*, 2 (1913) 109.
- 74 G. Sergi, *Atti del V Congresso Internazionale di Psicologia* (Rome: Forzani, 1906), p. 48; G. Cesare Ferrari, 'Fifth International Congress of Psychology', *Bulletin de l'Institut général psychologique*, 5 (1905) 500–1.
- 75 M. Prince, 'A World Consciousness and Future Peace', *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, 11 (1917) 287. Prince was the author of *The Dissociation of a Personality* (1905) and founder of the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology* in 1906. He was trained as a neurologist, but his interest in the subconscious and personality led him to experiment with hypnosis.
- 76 Pillsbury, *op.cit.*, p. 164.
- 77 C. Burt, 'The Inheritance of Mental Characters', *Eugenics Review*, 4 (1912) 168–200, 134. Burt connected economic disadvantage with genetic disadvantage, and despite the controversy surrounding his elitist findings, he had an illustrious career, and was the first psychologist to be knighted.
- 78 D. J. Singal, 'Towards a Definition of American Modernism', *American Quarterly: Special issue, Modernist culture in America*, 39 (1987) 7–26.
- 79 I take the term 'liberal environmentalist' from Fredrickson, *The Black Image in the White Mind*, pp. 330–2.
- 80 M. Whiton Calkins, 'Limits of Genetic and Comparative Psychology', *British Journal of Psychology*, 1 (1904) 265.
- 81 Baldwin in Murchison ed., *op.cit.*, p. 5. See also G. H. Mead, 'Social Psychology as Counterpart to Physiological Psychology', *Psychological Bulletin*, 6 (1909) 402: 'that an organized intelligence in the form of a self could arise only over against other selves that must exist in consciousness as immediately as the subject self.'
- 82 M. Mauss and E. Durkheim, 'Note sur la notion de civilisation' *Année sociologique*, 12 (1913), pp. 46–50. Reprinted in M. Mauss, *Œuvres, 2. Représentations collectives et diversité des civilisations* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1969), pp. 451–5.
- 83 See chapter 2.
- 84 J. Finot, *Race Prejudice*, trans. F. Wade-Evans (London: Mensomyne, 1969 [1902]), p. 179.
- 85 C. M. Hill, 'Voluntary organisations, a proposed study of social psychology', *Psychological Bulletin*, 4 (1907) 375.
- 86 These included *Social psychology: An outline and source book* (1908), and *The Principles of Sociology* (1920).
- 87 D. L. Herzberg, 'Thinking Through War: The social thought of Richard T. Ely, John R. Commons, and Edward A. Ross during the First World War', *Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences*, 37 (2001) 135.

- 88 E. A. Ross, 'The Present Problems of Social Psychology', *The American Journal of Sociology*, 10 (1905) 468; Herzberg, 'Thinking Through War', p. 135.
- 89 Ross, 'The Present Problems of Social Psychology', p. 468.
- 90 *Ibid.*, p. 468.
- 91 *Ibid.*, p. 470.
- 92 G. Le Bon, *Enseignements psychologiques de la guerre européenne* (Paris: Flammarion, 1915), pp. 45, 146.
- 93 See S. Freud, *Totem and Taboo: Some points of agreement between the mental lives of savages and neurotics*, trans. J. Strachey (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1950 [1913]), p. 64. In the early years of the twentieth century, Freud's *Totem and Taboo* with its evocations of the unconscious as 'the realm of the wild, brutish instincts that cannot find permissible outlets, derive from earlier stages of the individual and of mankind, and find expression in passion, dreams, and mental illness' provided a firm grounding for the possibility and significance of a collective psychology prone to national formations and its hereditary basis, Ellenberger, *op.cit.*, p. 277.
- 94 C. Jung, *Psychology of the Unconscious*, trans. B. M. Hinkle (London: Kegan Hall, 1919), p. 31. See also C. Douglas, 'The Historical Context of Analytical Psychology' in P. Young-Eisendrath and T. Dawson (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Jung* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 22. Jung used as his evidence 'culture', as illustrated in the abundant anthropological literature on 'primitive man', and the mythologies of Hindoos, Egyptians, Greeks, as he found them in James Frazer's *Golden Bough* and other sources. Jung, *Psychology of the Unconscious*, pp. 34, 199. For all their differences, Hughes has pointed out that *Totem and Taboo* 'with its story of the slaying of the primeval father, was almost as fanciful as Jung's speculations; in assuming a universal sense of guilt, it implied the inheritance of collective memory traces. Indeed, Freud wrote quite specifically of a "collective mind". In what respect, the uninitiated might wonder, was this different from Jung's "collective unconscious"?'. Hughes, *op.cit.*, p. 124.
- 95 R. S. Woodworth, 'National Psychology', *Psychological Bulletin*, 9 (1912) 397–9. Woodworth was reviewing two specific books, Maurice A. Low's *The American People* (1911), which he thought particularly good, and A. L. André's *Ética Española* (1910).
- 96 R. Smith, *op.cit.*, p. 758.
- 97 J. R. Angell, *Chapters from Modern Psychology* (New York: Longmans Green and Co., 1921), pp. 236–67.
- 98 See D. Cohen, 'Who was who? Race and Jews in turn-of-the-century Britain', *Journal of British Studies*, 41 (2002) 460–83.
- 99 Pillsbury, *op.cit.*, pp. 20–1.
- 100 D. Cabane, 'Education et patriotisme', *La femme nouvelle* (1905) 794.
- 101 W. Trotter 'Psychological Factors in Social Transmission', 'The Tutelage of Races', and 'Herd Instinct and its Bearing on the Psychology of Civilised Man', *The Sociological Review*, 1 (1908) 227–48, and 'Sociological Application of the Psychology of Herd Instinct', *The Sociological Review*, 2 (1909) 36–54. The idea of herd instinct was taken up in a broad range of wartime writing, including the popular and polemical literature produced by John Buchan and Ian Fleming.
- 102 W. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War* (London: Oxford University Press, 1953 [1916]), p. 115, R. Smith, *op.cit.*, p. 759, and L. Snyder, *The Meaning of Nationalism* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1954), p. 89.

- 103 Trotter was the son-in-law of the Ernest Jones, and Freud's physician during his English exile.
- 104 Fouillée's influence on the idea of the nation never came close to matching that of Le Bon (or for that matter Renan). To begin with Fouillée died of a debilitating illness in 1912, relatively early in his career, while Le Bon lived on until 1931, by which time he was 90 years old.
- 105 Nye, *The Origins of Crowd Psychology*, pp. 84, 86.
- 106 The prominent essayist Geoffrey Faber explained that crowd psychology had increasingly come into favour since the outbreak of war because it explained nationality in its 'crude embryonic form – shapeless and unprincipled'; G. Faber, 'The War and Personality in Nations', *Fortnightly Review*, CIII (1915), pp. 538–46.
- 107 Nye, *The Origins of Crowd Psychology*, p. 88.
- 108 As Bernard Porter has shown, Hobson presented Le Bon's *Psychology of Peoples* as evidence that 'races could only absorb some characteristics of alien civilisations, and these only very gradually', yet, 'deeply marked characters of historic race, physical and psychical' tended 'to express themselves firmly and constantly in widely divergent types of civilization', Porter, *Critics of Empire*, pp. 181, 183.
- 109 Hobson argued that popular assumptions about human nature were fundamentally flawed and had been challenged by 'modern economics, politics, and psychology', see J. A. Hobson, 'Character and Society', in P. L. Parker (ed.), *Character and Life: A symposium by Alfred Russell Wallace, John A. Hobson, Walter Crane, Harold Begbie, Emil Reich* (London: Williams and Northgate, 1912), p. 71.
- 110 N. Angell, *The Great Illusion: A study of the relation of military power in nations to their economic and social advantage* (New York: Arno, 1972 [1909]).
- 111 *Ibid*, p. 100.
- 112 W. Lippmann, *Drift and Mastery: An attempt to diagnose the current unrest* (New York: Macmillan, 1914), p. 318. Lippmann wrote that, 'Men's desires are not something barbaric which the intellect must shun ... the great triumph of modern psychology is its growing capacity for penetrating to the desires that govern our thought'; *Ibid*, p. 316.
- 113 C. E. Schorske, *Fin-de-siècle Vienna: Politics and culture* (London: Vintage, 1981), p. 4.

Chapter 4 The Gendered Self and Political Nations, 1870–1914

- 1 Finot, *Race Prejudice*, p. 182.
- 2 See B. Caine and G. Sluga, *Gendering European History* (London: Leicester University Press, 2000), chapters 4 and 6.
- 3 See J. Finot 'La psychologie de la femme', *La revue*, 11 (1911) 577–96.
- 4 Richards, *Putting Psychology in Its Place*, pp. 151–2.
- 5 H. T. Woolley, 'Psychological Literature: A review of the recent literature on the psychology of sex', *Psychological Bulletin*, 7 (1910) 341.
- 6 S. Sleeth Mosedale, 'Science Corrupted: Victorian biologists consider "the woman question"', *Journal of the History of Biology*, 11 (1978) 5.
- 7 C. Lombroso and W. Ferrero, *The Female Offender* (New York: Philosophical Press, 1958 [1893]); For more discussion of Lombroso, see also C. Battersby,

- Gender and Genius: Towards a feminist aesthetics* (London: Women's Press, 1989), pp. 171–2.
- 8 C. Le Tourneau, 'La femme à travers les âges', *Revue de l'École Anthropologique de Paris*, 11 (1901) 286.
 - 9 G. Le Bon, 'Ethnographie: Rôle du caractère dans la vie des peuples', *Revue scientifique*, 2 (1894) 38.
 - 10 W. I. Thomas, 'The Mind of Woman and the Lower Races', *The American Journal of Sociology*, 7 (1907) 469. See also W. I. Thomas, *Sex and Society: Studies in the social psychology of sex* (Boston: Gorham, 1907), p. 51. Thomas admired Darwin's anthropological images of parading sexuality, and was also not averse to drawing on truisms, such as Alexander Pope's eighteenth century 'hard saying' that 'Women have no characters at all', *Ibid*, p. 238.
 - 11 Cited in C. E. Russett, *Sexual Science: The Victorian construction of womanhood* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 41. Russett argues that Darwin was loathe to draw dogmatic conclusions regarding women's natural role or capacities from these assumptions, p. 101.
 - 12 Echoing Schopenhauer's view that men had direct mastery over themselves, women only indirect mastery, which they often tried to exert through their physical influence over men, Nietzsche maintained that '[w]hatever women write about woman, we may in the end reserve a healthy suspicion whether woman really *wants* enlightenment about herself – whether she *can* will it'. See E. Kennedy, 'Nietzsche: Women as Untermensch', in E. Kennedy and S. Mendus (eds.), *Women in Western Political Philosophy: Kant to Nietzsche* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1987), p. 197; Battersby, *op.cit.*, p. 167.
 - 13 Battersby, *op.cit.*, p. 175.
 - 14 See for example, G. Romanes, 'Mental Differences between Men and Women', *The Nineteenth Century*, 21 (1887) 663. Russett regards these men as 'the core of the scientific consideration of sex differences in psychology', Russett, *op.cit.*, p. 42.
 - 15 H. Bergson, 'The Problem of Personality: University of Edinburgh, Gifford Lectures (1914)', in H. Bergson, *Mélanges*, A. Robinet (ed.) (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1972), pp. 1055, 1065. Bergson thought that nationality could be acquired 'par un effort de libre volonté', but was as ambiguous about the limits of this free will when it came to women as he was unambiguous about its inapplicability among non-European peoples.
 - 16 Rose, *Inventing Our Selves*, p. 6. Richards argues that '[o]ne difficulty in focusing on "Psychology and Gender" as a specific topic is that discipline and subject-matter levels are fused even more than usual'; Richards, *Putting Psychology in Its Place*, p. 151.
 - 17 J. Le Rider, *Modernity and Crises of Identity: Culture and society in fin-de-siècle Vienna* (Cambridge: Polity, 1993), p. 118.
 - 18 For Alfred Adler, the individual will to power was equivalent to 'the desire to be a man'. Cited in Le Rider, *op.cit.*, p. 118. Christine Battersby situates Jung firmly in the 'Aristotelian tradition', Battersby, *op.cit.*, p. 71. On psychoanalysis see A. Levy, *Other Women: The writing of class, race and gender, 1832–1898* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 108.
 - 19 S. A. Shields, 'Functionalism, Darwinism, and the Psychology of Women', *American Psychologist*, 30 (1975) 742.
 - 20 L. Duffin, 'Prisoners of Progress: Women and evolution', in S. Delamont and L. Duffin (eds.), *The Nineteenth Century Woman: Her cultural and physical world* (London: Croom Helm, 1978), pp. 63, 74.

- 21 *Ibid*, p. 76; See also Shields, 'Functionalism, Darwinism, and the Psychology of Women', p. 742.
- 22 E. Jones, 'War and Individual Psychology', *The Sociological Review*, 8 (1915) 173.
- 23 O. Bauer, *The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy*, trans. J. O'Donnell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000 [1908]), pp. 123, 308. When he thought of his nation, Bauer recalled 'my familiar homeland, the parental house, the first childhood games, my old schoolmaster, the girl whose kiss once made me happy.'
- 24 See Caine and Sluga, *op.cit.*, chapters 3 and 5.
- 25 See B. Bicknell, 'The Nationality of Married Women', *Grotius Papers: Problems of peace and war*, 20 (1935) 498.
- 26 I. Hull, *Sexuality, State, and Civil Society in Germany, 1700–1815* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 410.
- 27 For more discussion of this earlier period and the significance of the later nineteenth century, see G. Sluga, 'Identity, Gender, and the History of European Nationalisms', *Nations and Nationalisms*, 4 (1998) 87–111.
- 28 Brinton, *Races and Peoples*, p. 58.
- 29 H. Marion, *Psychologie de la femme* (Paris: Colin, 1900), pp. 14, 22, 296.
- 30 Finot, 'La psychologie de la femme', p. 584.
- 31 H. Munsterberg, *The Americans* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1905), p. 583.
- 32 *Ibid*, p. 586.
- 33 Nye, *The Origins of Crowd Psychology*, p. 50.
- 34 Le Bon, *Psychology of Peoples*, 16.
- 35 J. A. Hobson, 'The Sex War', in Hobson, *A Modern Outlook*, p. 142.
- 36 *Ibid*, p. 142. For general discussions of this concern in British and French contexts, see B. Caine, *Victorian Feminists* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), chapter 7; K. M. Offen, 'Exploring the Sexual Politics of Republican Nationalism', in Tombs (ed.), *Nationhood and Nationalism in France*.
- 37 Hobson, 'The Alarm of Motherhood', in Hobson, *A Modern Outlook*, pp. 126, 132. On the similarities in European attitudes towards national degeneration and policies of reproduction in the early twentieth century see M. S. Quine, *Population Politics in Twentieth Century Europe: Fascist dictatorships and liberal democracies* (London: Routledge, 1996).
- 38 Woolley, *op.cit.*, 342. C. W. Saleeby's volume *Woman and Womanhood* (1912) proposed that 'women must indeed give themselves up for the community and the future ... the right fulfilment of Nature's purpose is one with the right fulfilment of their own destiny. There is no antinomy.', cited in Duffin, *op.cit.*, p. 274.
- 39 B. von Suttner, *Memoirs of Bertha von Suttner: The records of an eventful life* (Boston: Ginn, 1910), p. 328.
- 40 E. Key, 'Love and Marriage, 1904', cited in S. G. Bell and K. M. Offen (eds.), *Women, the Family and Freedom: The debate in documents* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983), p. 198.
- 41 H. Swanwick, *Future of the Women's Movement* (London: Bell, 1913), p. 51. Swanwick refers to Liberals here specifically as the antagonists of the British Labour Party, of which she was a member; Swanwick also argued that there were mental links between the colonised peoples of India and Ireland and women, see J. Vellacott, 'Feminist Consciousness and the First World War', *History Workshop Journal*, 23 (1987) 85–6.
- 42 K. Anthony, *Feminism in Germany and Scandinavia* (New York: Holt, 1915), p. 230. This image of women without a country was further popularised by Virginia Woolf in her *Three Guineas* (London: Hogarth, 1938).

- 43 Russett, *op.cit.*, p. 14.
- 44 Le Rider, *op.cit.*, pp. 40, 44.
- 45 P. Joyce, *Democratic Subjects: The self and the social in nineteenth-century England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 17. Cynthia Eagle Russett describes the anxieties provoked in Victorian England 'by the encroachment of science on that bastion of human distinctiveness, the mind ... [which] at worst threatened to annihilate the human soul.' Russett, *op.cit.*, pp. 196–7. The cultural theorist Stuart Hall has argued it was no longer possible (as it had been in Enlightenment thought) for the self to be thought of as something that can 'reflect and know completely its own identity since it is formed not only in the line of the practice of other structures and discourses, but also in a complex relationship with unconscious life.' S. Hall, 'Ethnicity: Identity and difference', in Eley and Suny (eds.), *Becoming National*, pp. 339–40.
- 46 W. James, 'The Self', in W. James, *Essays in Psychology* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 128.
- 47 W. James, 'Person and Personality', in *Johnson's Universal Cyclopedia* (1895) reprinted in James, *Essays in Psychology*, pp. 318–20.
- 48 J. Goldstein, 'The Advent of Psychological Modernism in France: An alternative narrative', in Ross (ed.), *Modernist Impulses in the Human Sciences*, p. 190.
- 49 See for example James' description of the individual self that was the object of this philosophical inquiry in gendered terms. It was the male subject's relation to his property, family and wife, which delimited the parameters of his selves and his masculine personality, and were offered as evidence of that masculine personality's agency, James, 'The Self', *Essays in Psychology*, p. 125.
- 50 According to Joan Wallach Scott, Le Bon viewed the crowd as a 'teeming, homogeneous feminine mass, [in which] men lost not only their reasoning capabilities but their very selves. This loss of self was equated with a loss of masculinity'; Scott, *op.cit.*, p. 131. See also Pick, 'Freud's Group Psychology', p. 57. As Ellen Herman has remarked, 'Le Bon pointed to the unreason and intolerance of collective behaviour and mass attitudes as the hallmark of contemporary society and as alarming threats to civilization.' *The Romance of American Psychology: Political culture in the age of experts* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), p. 23. In a different example, the historian Sander Gilman has argued that by rendering female sexuality as 'the sphere less accessible to science', 'Freud was able in his scientific writing to efface his own anxiety (which he expressed in private) about the limitations ascribed to the mind and character of the Jewish male', Gilman, *Freud, Race and Gender*, p. 37.
- 51 E. Showalter, *The Female Malady: Women, madness and English culture, 1830–1980* (London: Virago, 1985), p. 106; M. Micale, 'Hysteria male/Hysteria female: Reflections on comparative gender construction in 19th century France and Britain', in M. Benjamin (ed.), *Science and Sensibility: Gender and scientific enquiry, 1780–1945* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). Micale's study of the reception in Europe of Charcot's redefinition of hysteria as a male as well as female propensity shows that the resistance of English psychologists to this theory before the First World War was based on their portrayal of male hysteria as a non-British infliction.
- 52 Havelock Ellis questioned the assumptions of male superiority in psychology, in H. Ellis, 'The Mental Differences of Men and Women', *Essays in War-time: Further studies in the task of social hygiene* (Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries, 1969 [1917]). Ellis associated the Nietzschean image of a 'deep' desiring personality with woman, who, he claimed, had a 'deeper, more primitive, more

- elusive' self, 'more complex than man': Levy, *op.cit.*, p. 119. See also G. Richards, *Putting Psychology in its Place: An introduction from a critical historical perspective* (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 155–6.
- 53 Scott, *op.cit.*, p. 128.
 - 54 W. Susman, "'Personality" and the Making of Twentieth-Century Culture', in J. Higham and P. K. Conkin (eds.), *New Directions in American Intellectual History* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), p. 363. Roger Smith has shown how in British and American psychology the idea of personality was used in spiritualistic and psychic studies 'to refer to what makes for the wholeness of an individual, the wholeness that believers held persists after bodily death', Smith, *op.cit.*, p. 600. By contrast Kurt Danziger argues that the premise underlying the new concept of personality was 'the belief that human conduct is the expression of some essence within the individual, an essence that remains the same irrespective of the conditions under which the conduct occurs and is observed.' *Naming the Mind: How psychology found its language* (London: Sage, 1997), p. 128.
 - 55 Janet cited in Daniel N. Robinson, *An Intellectual History of Psychology* (New York: Macmillan, 1976), p. 320.
 - 56 James thought of 'a man' as having 'as many social selves as there are individuals who recognise him and carry an image of him in their mind', McDougall claimed less subtly, and somewhat circuitously, that 'the normal human personality is an integrated system of monads' 'each monad being in its own sphere a unitary soul, and the whole a hierarchical system in which subordinate monads were controlled by a supreme monad, myself'. W. McDougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, 23rd edn. (London: Methuen, 1936), pp. 224–6. He also proposed that the evolution of the mind of the race and of the individual involved the increasing ability to control instincts through will, 'towards complete self-determination, and realisation of the "self"'. In England such ideas were spread by the Society for Psychical Research, which counted amongst its most active members not only McDougall, but Arthur Balfour, and Gilbert Murray.
 - 57 F. Myers cited in J. Oppenheim, *The Other World: Spiritualism and psychical research in England, 1850–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 256.
 - 58 Stocking, *Malinowski, Rivers, Benedict, and Others*, p. 5. "'Culture and personality" was not without its own stereotyping potential, and its political implications in fact varied depending on the relative weight given to the particularistic/pluralistic and universalistic/assimilationist potential of cultural determinism in different ideological contexts.' This concept could be pursued further in an examination of the Austrian Karl Renner's 'personality principle', although it is beyond the scope of the material I am dealing with in this book. See N. Stargardt, 'Origins of the constructivist theory of the nation', in S. Periwal (ed.), *Notions of Nationalism* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995).
 - 59 Showalter, *op.cit.*, p. 106.
 - 60 H. Maudsley, *Body and Will: Being an essay concerning will in its metaphysical, physiological and pathological aspects* (London: Kegan Paul, 1883), p. 154.
 - 61 'Volition', Ribot explained in his *Maladies de la volonté* (1884), 'is not an event coming from no one knows where; it drives its roots into the depths of the unconscious and beyond the individual into the species and the race. It comes not from above, but from below; it is a sublimation of the lower instincts.' Cited in Nye, *The Origins of Crowd Psychology*, p. 31.

- 62 *Ibid*, pp. 165, 173. See also A. Rabinbach, *The Human Motor: Energy, fatigue, and the origins of modernity* (New York: Basic Books, 1990), pp. 43, 165.
- 63 Le Bon, *Psychology of the Great War*, p. 45.
- 64 Le Bon, 'Ethnographie: Rôle du caractère dans la vie des peuples', 78.
- 65 *Ibid*, 37.
- 66 McDougall, *The Group Mind*, p. 157 and McDougall, 'The Will of the Nation', *Sociological Review*, 5 (1912) 89–104.
- 67 McDougall, *The Group Mind*, pp. 160–1.
- 68 *Ibid*, p. 296.
- 69 See Snyder, *The Meaning of Nationalism*, p. 89 and McDougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, pp. 224–6.
- 70 See A. Fouillée, *La liberté et le déterminisme*, 3rd edn. (Paris: Alcan, 1890), pp. viii, 2; Fouillée, *Esquisse psychologique des peuples européens*, p. 74; and A. Fouillée, *Psychologie du peuple français*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Alcan, 1898), pp. 13, 477.
- 71 Bergson, *The Meaning of the War*, pp. 18–47. Antliff, *Inventing Bergson*, p. 105. One of Henri Bergson's admiring reviewers, the conservative English politician Arthur Balfour, explained that Bergson's 'élan vital' showed that 'not reason, but instinct, brings us into the closest touch, the directest (sic) relation with what is most real in the Universe'. Consciousness, by contrast, was merely 'a more or less fantastic commentary on an unconscious, perhaps unknowable, but felt text'. A. Balfour, '1911', in W. M. Short (ed.), *The Mind of Arthur James Balfour: Selections from his non-political writings, speeches and addresses 1879–1917* (New York: George H. Doran, 1918), p. 56.
- 72 Freeden, *op.cit.*, p. 115. Freeden argues that for liberals biological theory bridged the gap between science and ethics.
- 73 Although the precise nature of Barrès' national thought has evaded categorisation, Sternhell suggests that there are significant points of continuity between Barrès' determinist thought and Renan and Taine's understanding of the nation as physiologically rooted in its past, so that all three need to be considered as fundamentally conservative in their political outlook.
- 74 Cited in Z. Sternhell, *Maurice Barrès et le nationalisme français* (Paris: Fayard, 2000 [1972]), p. 315; Barrès also referred to 'decerebration' [*décérébrée*] to evoke both the physiological image of the removal of the brain and the more figurative notion of depriving an entity of its intelligence and reason. One historian has described the dissociated self as 'la désorientation et la tension de la conscience dissociée, l'abîme de la différenciation entre sujet et objet', Ruthard Stablein, 'Dissociation du sujet et culte du moi: La réception de la décadence Barrésienne par Hugo von Hofmannsthal et Hermann Bahr', in F. Latraverse and W. Moser (eds.), *Vienne au tournant du siècle* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1988), p. 221.
- 75 See for example C. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 189.
- 76 M. Barrès, 'L'affaire Dreyfus', in *idem*, *Scènes et doctrines du nationalisme* (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1925), p. 37.
- 77 Sternhell, *Maurice Barrès et le nationalisme français*, p. 56; Linda Clark describes Soury as an archivist-cum-physiologist who believed in the existence of separate Aryan and Semitic races for biological reasons. She contrasts Soury's interest in races with Barrès' emphasis on cultural heritage rather than biology. L. Clark, *Social Darwinism in France* (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1984).
- 78 Soury, 'Le système nerveux central', cited in Sternhell, *Maurice Barrès et le nationalisme français*, p. 289.
- 79 Barrès, 'L'affaire Dreyfus', pp. 67, 189.

- 80 Sternhell, *Maurice Barrès et le nationalisme français*, p. 17.
- 81 Barrès, 'Nationalisme, déterminisme', in Barrès, *Scènes et doctrines du nationalisme*, p. 9.
- 82 Barrès, 'L'affaire Dreyfus', p. 115.
- 83 *Ibid*, p. 114. On Barrès' view, interestingly, the unconscious was the realm of stability and control. Consciousness was unreliable and incoherent.
- 84 Barrès, '1899', in R. Girardet (ed.), *Le nationalisme français: anthologie 1871–1914* (Paris: Seuil, 1983), p. 185.
- 85 Barrès, 'Nationalisme, déterminisme', p. 10.
- 86 *Ibid*, p. 10 and Sternhell, *Maurice Barrès et le nationalisme français*, p. 90.
- 87 A. Greaves, *Maurice Barrès* (Boston: Twayne, 1978), p. 36.
- 88 J. Foyard, 'Images de la femme chez Barrès', in A. Guyaux, J. Jurt and R. Kopp (eds.), *Barrès, une tradition dans la modernité* (Paris: Champion, 1991), p. 89. Foyard adds that 'woman' renders the same services as a session with the psychoanalyst, as a vehicle for the man's introspection, Foyard, 'Images de la femme chez Barrès', p. 82.
- 89 E. S. Apter, *Continental Drift: From national characters to virtual subjects* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 27.
- 90 *Ibid*, p. 27.
- 91 L. Constable, "'Ce bazaar intellectuel": Maurice Barrès, Decadent Masters, and Nationalist Pupils', in L. Constable, D. Denisoff, and M. Potolsky (eds.), *Perennial Decay: On the aesthetics and politics of decadence* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), p. 303.
- 92 M. C. Bancquart, 'La Jeanne d'Arc de Barrès', in Guyaux, Jurt and Kopp (eds.), *Barrès, une tradition dans la modernité*, p. 13. My translation.
- 93 N. A. Thorsen, *The Political Thought of Woodrow Wilson, 1875–1910* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 3.
- 94 *Ibid*, p. 13.
- 95 *Ibid*, p. 102.
- 96 *Ibid*, p. 234.
- 97 *Ibid*, pp. 99–100.
- 98 W. Wilson, 'The Ideals of America,' *Atlantic Monthly*, 88 (1902) 734.
- 99 *Ibid*, 728, 730.
- 100 *Ibid*, 728. See also H. Notter, *The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1965 [1937]), pp. 48, 75.
- 101 Cited in Thorsen, *The Political Thought of Woodrow Wilson*, p. 176
- 102 *Ibid*, p. 223.
- 103 Stocking discusses the importance of the implicit Lamarckism in Wilson's views, in Stocking, *Race, Evolution, and Culture*, p. 253.
- 104 Thorsen, *op.cit.*, p. 36.
- 105 *Ibid*, p. 112.
- 106 *Ibid*, pp. 162, 168.
- 107 *Ibid*, p. 170.
- 108 *Ibid*, pp. 38, 40.
- 109 Cited in Thorsen, *op.cit.*, p. 103.
- 110 Woodrow Wilson, 'The Variety and Unity of History: Address delivered at St. Louis Universal Exposition, September 20, 1904', in Link (ed.), *op.cit.* vol. 15, p. 480.
- 111 Wilson, 'The Ideals of America', *Atlantic Monthly*, xc, December (1902), 732. Wilson's equivalence between military adventure, patriotism, and nationality was clarified in an address on 'Civic Patriotism' in which Wilson pinned down

- patriotism as an instinct with the strongest feeling, but not merely sentiment, and as a principle of action, an energy of character. 'A News report of an address on Civic patriotism: December 3 1903', in Link (ed.), vol. 15, p. 61.
- 112 Wilson, 'The Ideals of America', 728.
- 113 'Democracy and Efficiency: March 1901', pp. 289–99, reprinted in R. Stannard Baker and W. E. Dodd (eds.), *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, College and State: Educational, literary and political papers (1875–1913)* (New York: Kraus, 1970 [1927]), p. 414.
- 114 Wilson, 'The Ideals of America', 728.
- 115 For a fuller exposition of this article, see J. Hansen, *The Lost Promise of Patriotism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).
- 116 Thorsen, *op.cit.*, p. 61.
- 117 R. M. Saunders, *In Search of Woodrow Wilson* (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1998), pp. 6, 35.
- 118 Thorsen, *op.cit.*, p. 113.
- 119 While acknowledging Nietzschean, Jamesian and Freudian conceptualisations of the unconscious, Lippmann believed that civilisation was all about mastery, of 'the substitution of conscious intention for unconscious striving'; the 'disciplined imagination alone' he argued, 'can say, "I will"', see Lippmann, *Drift and Mastery*, pp. 202, 205–269, 323. See also W. Lippmann, *The Stakes of Diplomacy* (New York: Holt, 1915).
- 120 Lippmann, *Drift and Mastery*, p. 318.
- 121 Of course states in the United States had already introduced suffrage for women. See F. Llewellyn-Jones, 'The Nationality of Married Women', *Grotius Papers: Problems of peace and war*, 15 (1930) 133. On the French discussion of married women's nationality see M. Sauteraud, *Du maintien de la nationalité de la femme française qui épouse un étranger* (Paris: Tenin, 1919); H. Le Noble, *La nationalité de la femme mariée* (Paris: Librairie de Droit Usuel, 1921); and Llewellyn-Jones, 'The Nationality of Married Women', 134, and for a more recent account, C. Lewis Bredbenner, *A Nationality of her Own: Women, marriage, and the law of citizenship* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

Chapter 5 Gender and the Apogee of Nationalism, 1914–1919

- 1 A. Maude Royden, *Women and the Sovereign State* (London: Headley Bros., 1917), p. 63.
- 2 'Secretary's notes of a conversation held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, 13th February 1919 at 3.00pm present Wilson, Lansing, Balfour, Clemenceau, Orlando, Sonnino, Matsui', 180.03101/38, American Commission to Negotiate Peace, RG 256.
- 3 Shotwell, *At the Paris Peace Conference*, p. 179.
- 4 For Wilson's views of female suffrage see C. McFarland and E. Nevin, 'The reluctant reformer: Woodrow Wilson and woman suffrage, 1913–1920', *The Rocky Mountain Social Science Journal*, 11 (1974) 33–43.
- 5 For a discussion of a similar theme in the postwar from a different perspective, see Marilyn Lake, 'From Self-Determination via Protection to Equality via Non-Discrimination: Defining Women's Rights at the League of Nations and the United Nations', in P. Grimshaw, K. Holmes and M. Lake (eds.), *Women's Rights and Human Rights: International historical perspectives* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001).

- 6 S. Wambaugh, *Plebiscites since the World War: With a collection of official documents*, vol. 1 (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1933), p. 477.
- 7 A. Zimmern, 'The International Settlement and Small Nationalities' (1919), in *The Prospects of Democracy, and Other Essays* (New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1968 [1929]), p. 117.
- 8 Swanwick, *The War and its Effect upon Women*, p. 4.
- 9 *Ibid*, p. 5.
- 10 During the war, Swanwick helped pioneer the League of Nations Society.
- 11 E. Key, *War, Peace and the Future*, trans. H. Norberg (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1916), p. 140.
- 12 *Ibid*, pp. 135–6.
- 13 *Ibid*, p. 246. Key added that the extent of women's wartime effort in support of the national cause was proof that the vote would do little of itself to encourage the exercise of a feminine will that was the expression of a cultivated self: 'even if woman gains the vote, its value for human evolution depends on woman's making herself free from passionate nationalism to which she during the war has succumbed just as much as man.'
- 14 Anthony, *op.cit.*, p. 251.
- 15 Key, *op.cit.*, p. 142.
- 16 *Ibid*, p. iv.
- 17 *Ibid*, p. 59. The image of a feminine soul-culture is reminiscent of Freud's identification of femininity with Eros as the antidote to masculine individualism. It also evokes Jane Addams' idea of 'the nourishing of human life' as a moral alternative to war and the desire for adventure associated with masculinity. According to Linda Schott, Addams expressed her vision of cultural pluralism in terms of a 'will for "self-surrender" or "self-forgetting"', see her 'Jane Addams and William James on Alternatives to War', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 54 (1993) 243.
- 18 Swanwick, *The War and its Effect upon Women*, p. 23.
- 19 Key, *op.cit.*, p. 241. Key propitiously cited Swanwick's work in support of her own arguments. But not all feminists were supporters of Key's version of maternalism. Anthony thought of Key as the 'wisefool' of the feminist movement and used the example of Key's popularity among German feminists to illustrate the differences between Anglo-American and Teuto-Scandinavian feminism, the former associated with 'political liberty,' the latter with 'moral autonomy', Anthony, *op.cit.*, p. 3. Havelock Ellis by contrast referred to Key as 'a woman whose personality is one of the chief moral forces of our time', see H. Ellis, 'Introduction' in E. Key, *Love and Marriage*, trans. A. G. Chater (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1911), p. xv.
- 20 G. Baumer cited in U. Frevert, *Women in German History: From bourgeois emancipation to sexual liberation*, trans. S. McKinnon-Evans (Oxford: Terry Bond and Barbara Nordern; New York: Berg, 1989), p. 151.
- 21 J. Addams, E. G. Balch, and A. Hamilton, *Women at the Hague: the International Congress of Women and its results* (New York: Garland, 1972), p. 124. Addams was a publicist for the new psychology, and its application to social problems. In *Jane Addams and the Liberal Tradition* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1980), p. 93, Daniel Levine discusses the psychological assumptions underlying her thought, including the idea of instincts as innate drives that had to be sated in some way before they became destructive.

- 22 Addams, *Women at the Hague*, pp. 129–30.
- 23 H. Swanwick, *I Have Been Young* (London: Gollancz, 1935), p. 259. After a wartime visit by Addams to London, Swanwick was drawn into the creation of a British section of the Women's League. Her publications in this period recall those of Emily Balch and Addams, both for their commitment to internationalism, and for their validation of women's political role in safeguarding racial instincts and 'race survival'. See Swanwick, *The War and its Effects upon Women*, p. 142.
- 24 E. Greene Balch, 'The Time for Making Peace', in Addams, *Women at the Hague*, p. 122.
- 25 New York Public Library, New York, Schwimmer-Lloyd Collection, 1852–1980, Rosika Schwimmer Papers A465 Subject File 464 International Congress of Women, The Hague 1914, letter from E. Pethick Lawrence to Schwimmer, 25 August 1914.
- 26 M. Degen, *The History of the Woman's Peace Party* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 1939), Appendix F.
- 27 Woman's Peace Party pamphlet n.d., in the Rosika Schwimmer Papers.
- 28 Key did not attend the congress but sent a supporting telegram which was read out; Balch, 'Journey and Impressions of the Congress' in Addams, *Women at the Hague*, p. 13. A few women attended the peace in individual capacities. The American educationalist Fannie Fern Andrews, for example, had links to the Women's Suffrage Alliance and the International Council of Women and had been at the Organisation for Permanent Peace's Hague conference.
- 29 Microfilm of The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom Papers, 1915–1978 (Microfilm Corporation of America, 1983), Reel 35: Rosika Schwimmer, 'To Mme Duchêne, The Hague', 28/9/1917.
- 30 Swanwick, *The War and Its Effect Upon Women*, p. 30.
- 31 Other women in the UDC included Mrs Phillip Snowden, Mrs Charles Trevelyan, Lady Margaret Sackville and Mrs Morel.
- 32 This Mme Leper was probably Émile Arnaud, the founder of the first French association for the League of Nations and president of the International League for Peace and Liberty. *Archives Nationales*, Fonds Divers, Séries Modernes et Contemporaines F/7/13146 (Société des Nations), 24/10/17 and 31/10/17, meetings of the Ligue pour une Société des Nations at Bld St. Michel, restaurant.
- 33 *Ibid.* 'féminisme intégral' evoked the title of a feminist newspaper published during this same period by Mme Remember.
- 34 *Bulletin des droits de l'homme* 15 août 1918, discussion re: Société des Nations, 450, Manuscrits Jeanne Melin Brochures Boîte 25, Fonds Bouglé, Bibliothèque historique de la ville de Paris.
- 35 Hersant, 'Congrès de l'Humanité', *Féminisme Intégral*, juillet 2, 1919, p. 2.
- 36 Buxton (ed.), *Towards a Lasting Settlement*, p. 52.
- 37 C. Buxton, *Memorandum on Territorial Claims and Self-Determination* (London: Union of Democratic Control, 1919) Pamphlet 29a, p. 74. He also argued that '[t]he determination to use certain members of the State as mere conveniences to the others has induced us to use women as though they were bodies only, without souls...And the result of this violation is a disease which threatens the race itself.' pp. 141–2.
- 38 R. W. Seton-Watson, 'Elsie Inglis', *The New Europe*, December–January (1917–1918).
- 39 Letter from E. M. Inglis to R. W. Seton-Watson dated 3 May, 'Correspondence with Elsie Inglis (1914–1917)', SEW/17/10/9, Seton-Watson Papers.
- 40 Gilbert Murray Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford, Letter from Fawcett to Gilbert Murray, 1916, Reel 32, fol 91. Swanwick urged the UDC to gain the cooperation

of the British National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies (NUWSS, associated with the IWSA) but much to her chagrin, the gesture was rejected by Fawcett, who stalled the NUWSS' suffrage campaign in consideration of the patriotic responsibilities of wartime.

- 41 Document 881 To A. Clark, Hotel Majestic Paris, 12 January 1919, in W. K. Hancock and J. Van der Poel (eds.), *Selections from the Smuts Papers*, vol. 4 (Berkeley: California University Press, 1966), p. 39.
- 42 Document 906 To A. Clark, 12 Feb. 1919, in Hancock and Van der Poel, *op.cit.*, p. 68.
- 43 'Women at the Peace Conference', *Jus Suffraggi*, March (1919), 71–2.
- 44 P. Snowden, 'Two International Conferences at Berne', *Jus Suffraggi*, March (1919) 73–4.
- 45 Schwimmer Papers, A115, Berne Conference, January 29–February 8 1919.
- 46 Degen, *op.cit.*, p. 217.
- 47 *Ibid*, p. 225.
- 48 See L. Rupp, *Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women's Movement* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 213.
- 49 Microfilm Papers of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Reel 1: 'Resolutions for Women's Education'. The Women's League supported Irish independence under pressure from the Irishwomen's International League.
- 50 Microfilm Papers of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Reel 18: 'International Congress of Women', May 1919, 'Resolutions to be presented to the Peace Conference of the Powers in Paris'.
- 51 C. Macmillan, 'Deputation to the Peace Conference', *Towards Peace and Freedom*, (1919) 17–19.
- 52 The delegation included Jane Addams, Charlotte Despard and Chrystal Macmillan, Gabrielle Duchêne, Rosa Genoni, and Clara Ragaz, see M. M. Randall, 'Introduction', *Women at the Hague*.
- 53 Degen, *op.cit.*, p. 237.
- 54 FO608/149; 489/2/1, International Council of Women in its relation to the Peace Conference – ICW letter signed by Countess Aberdeen to Hankey, January 28 1919.
- 55 Wilson to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, Feb. 14 1919, Link (ed.), *op.cit.*, vol. 55.
- 56 D. H. Miller, *My Diary* (1924), vol. vii, Document 744, Conseil international des femmes, 'Memorial of the Women', 10 April 1919.
- 57 This was the same demand Melin had put before the League for the Rights of Man. My translation.
- 58 F. F. Andrews, *Memory Pages of My Life* (Boston: Talisman Press, 1948), p. 116.
- 59 Miller, *My Diary*: Thursday, April 10th, 1919.
- 60 'Secretary's notes of a conversation held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on 11th March 1919', 180.03101/38, American Commission to Negotiate Peace, RG 256.
- 61 The British and French records of peace yield the same examples of these representations as the American archives.
- 62 Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. 1, p. 348, and vol. 2, p. 537.
- 63 League of Nations Archives, Geneva, Women's Questions, Section 23: R1356 23/289/289, C. Drexel, 'Women's Part in the League of Nations, Article 1 For London Times', p. 5.
- 64 Rupp, *op.cit.*, p. 211.
- 65 Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe College, Harvard, Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, A 95 Box 18, Folder 263.

- 66 See Pamphlet: *Proceedings of the Conferences of Delegates of Allied Societies for a League of Nations, Paris, Jan. 26–Feb. 3 1919 and London, March 11–13 1919* (New York: League to Enforce Peace, n.d.).
- 67 League of Nations Archives, Geneva, Women's Questions, Sections 23: R1356, International Women's Suffrage Alliance, 'Letter to Council of the League of Nations', 18/2/21.
- 68 League of Nations Archives, Geneva, Women's Questions, Section 23: R1356 'Comitato Internazionale Femminile per Una Pace Durevole', n.d.
- 69 League of Nations Archives, Geneva, Women's Questions, Section 23: R6 1/1102/248 'The London International Woman Suffrage Alliance to the Council of the League', February 1921.
- 70 K. Jayawardena, *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World* (London: Zed Books, 1986, p. 52).
- 71 Helena Swanwick, *Women's International League: Coloured troops in Europe*, May 1920.
- 72 Miller, 26 Feb. 1919. Telegrams from Polk to Miller and Scott, February 25 1919; and Outgoing Dispatch, from Miller and Scott to Woolsey; 184.83/29, American Commission to Negotiate Peace, RG 256.
- 73 Wambaugh, *op.cit.*, p. 477.
- 74 League of Nations Archives, Geneva, Women's Questions, Section 23: R1356 23/99/84 'Informal Interview with Sir Eric Drummond, 21/7/1919' with Mrs. Ogilvie Gordon; Mrs Corbett Ashby; Miss Fraser; Mrs Ross; Mrs Swanwick.
- 75 Maria Matilda Ogilvie was one of the first female geologists. She had studied at UCL.
- 76 MAE, Société des Nations. I-M Protection des femmes et des enfants, t. 1709. 'Note de M. Bourgeois sur la question de la Réglementation de la prostitution', 1922, pp. 60–2.
- 77 L. S. Woolf, *The Framework of a Lasting Peace* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1917), p. 13.
- 78 FO608/240 Peace Conference British Delegation 1919, Sir Eyre Crowe, 'Memorandum on Compulsory Arbitration', 9 January 1919, p. 13.
- 79 H. Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919* (London: Constable and Co., 1945), p. 26.
- 80 M. Lake, 'Mission Impossible: How men gave birth to the Australian nation – Nationalism, gender and other seminal acts', *Gender and History*, 4 (1992) 312.
- 81 Swartz, *The Union of Democratic Control*, pp. 57–8.
- 82 George, *The Truth about Peace Treaties*, p. 258.
- 83 *Diary of Colonel E. M. House*, 21 November 1915, p. 296.
- 84 Papers of Colonel E. M. House, Group 466, Box 118, Folder 4159, N. Whitehouse, 1917. After the war, Whitehouse went as part of an American delegation to Switzerland where she acted as Director of Public Information, gathering intelligence for the peace process.
- 85 Edward Krehbiel, 'Proposal for a plebiscite in Alsace Lorraine', Doc. 321, American Commission to Negotiate Peace, RG 256 p. 8. Krehbiel was professor of European History at Stanford; his major assignments with the Inquiry concerned possible plebiscites in Western Europe. Gelfand, *op.cit.*, pp. 53–4.
- 86 Shotwell, 'Proposal for a plebiscite in Alsace Lorraine', Doc. 321, American Commission to Negotiate Peace, RG 256 p. 8.
- 87 Dr. Phil. Lucy Hoesch-Ernst, 'Die neue Missions des Weibes', [The new mission of the female] *Die Frau im Staat* I, iv, juni 1919: 'within real internationalism...a deep personal love for and closeness to the fatherland can continue to exist – just like an important statesman is also capable of being a good family man...

I want to because I speak as a Psychologist (here) to women, approach the subject of the psychology of women compared to the psychology of men.' [trans. L. Stewart]

- 88 National Council of French Women, 17 February 1919, 861.1151/1 and National Council (sic) of Women of Hungary, 185.313/4, American Commission to Negotiate Peace, RG 256; H. W. Steed, 'Lecture, Kings College, 8 December 1917 to London County Council teachers', *New Europe*, December, 1917, p. 359.
- 89 This Bolshevik taint foiled Schwimmer's post-war attempts to gain American nationality, even though she was a long time resident in the United States.
- 90 *Bulletin of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace*, March 1, 1919.
- 91 Microfilm of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom Papers, 1915–1978, Reel 17: 'Report of the Feminist Committee', Resolution 7, 1919,
- 92 Degen, *op.cit.*, p. 328.

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- 1 See Lauren, *op.cit.* and Gelfand, *op.cit.* for more on the racism of the peacemakers.
- 2 Even the German government got into the act, enlisting on their side Max Weber, who in the last year of his life forewent his professional scepticism and threw his expertise into the fight for German national interests, collaborating on a 'professional memorandum' against the surrender of Germany's eastern territories; W. J. Mommsen, 'Max Weber and the Peace treaty of Versailles', in M. F. Boemeke, G. D. Feldman and E. Glaser (eds.), *The Treaty of Versailles: A reassessment after 75 years* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
- 3 Cited in A. Marwick, *The Nature of History* (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 53, and A. Mayer, 'Historical thought and American Foreign Policy in the Era of the First World War', in F. L. Loewenheim (ed.), *The Historian and the Diplomat: The role of history and historians in American foreign policy* (Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1968), p. 86.
- 4 Shotwell, *At the Paris Peace Conference*, p. 186.
- 5 FO800/430, Toynbee, Draft, no heading, December 1917, p. 7.
- 6 *Diary of Colonel E. M. House*, April 25, 1918, p. 111.
- 7 Diary of Dr. Grayson, March 9 1919, in Link (ed.), *op.cit.*, vol. 55, p. 471.
- 8 Papiers d'agents Philippe Berthelot (PA-AP) Propagandes Etats-Unies et Canada, Nov. 1915–1916. Aubert despaired that Americans were all pacifists who did not understand hate and were not interested in the past; 'Notes d'Aubert sur les travaux de l'Inquiry et sur les solutions de paix américaines. 11 déc. 1918.', p. 17, my translations.
- 9 CAB24, Committee of Imperial Defence, Peace, 'P' Series papers 35–117. Vol. II. doc. 39, War Cabinet: Our Policy at the Peace Conference (Note by Gen Smuts), 3/12/18, p. 35.
- 10 Toynbee Papers, Box 83, Norman Brailsford to Toynbee, 16 August 1919.
- 11 Ross, 'Modernist Social Sciences in the Land of the New/Old', p. 173.
- 12 N. Smith, *op.cit.*, p. 171.
- 13 FO608/30 *British delegation, correspondence and papers relating to South and South Eastern Europe (Political): Albania, Austria, Aegean Islands, Armistice with Turkey, Banat, Balkans, Bessarabia, Boundaries, 1919*: Noel Buxton, Outlines of a Balkan Settlement, May 16 1919. Comments, Buxton p. 372.
- 14 Zangwill, 'The Voice of Jerusalem', 1921, cited in Keylor, *op.cit.*, p. 47. See also his comments on February 1919, cited in J. B. Schechtman, *Postwar Population*

- Transfers in Europe 1945* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1955), p. 23.
- 15 75 per cent of the Bulgarian Greek minority were to move to Greece, and 40 per cent of the Bulgarian minority in Greece transferred to Bulgaria; Schechtman, *op.cit.*, p. 23.
 - 16 189,916 Greeks (Orthodox) were to be sent to Greece, added to the million it was estimated had already left Turkey, and 355,635 Turks (Moslem) were to go to Turkey.
 - 17 From 1918 Turner acted as an advisor to the Inquiry through the National Board for Historical Services.
 - 18 Nielsen, *op.cit.*, p. 139
 - 19 Cited in Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. 1, p. 462.
 - 20 C. Seignobos, 'La méthode psychologique en sociologie', *Journal de psychologie*, 17 (1920) 496–514.
 - 21 W. McDougall, *The Group Mind: A sketch of the principles of collective psychology with some attempt to apply them to the interpretation of national life* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920), pp. 98, 100.
 - 22 By this time McDougall had subjected himself to self-analysis with Jung, and 'was not convinced of the latter's theory that the racial origins of patients can be discovered by the particular symbolism of their dreams.' Jung had convinced him, however, that Freud's theory was really about Jews or 'true of the Jewish race'; McDougall in Murchison, (ed.), *op.cit.*
 - 23 McDougall, *The Group Mind*, p. 101. Apart from his own instinct theory, the definitional framework McDougall had in mind included Renan's description of the nation as 'a soul, a spiritual principle', Le Bon's *Psychology of the Crowd*, and Ramsay Muir's claim that nationalism is one of most powerful factors in modern history.
 - 24 Examples of this interest in British, North American, and French writing include J. H. Parsons, *Mind and the Nation: A précis of applied psychology* (London: Bale & Co., 1918); M. P. Follett, *The New State: Group organization the solution of popular government* (New York: Longmans, 1920); G. P. Gooch and G. Lowes Dickinson, *Nationalism* (New York: The Swarthmore Press, 1920); G. Murray, 'The Problem of Nationality', *The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 20 (1920) 257; S. Herbert, *Nationality and its Problems* (London: Methuen, 1920); T. Masaryk, *The Making of a State* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1927); L. Le Fur, *Races, nationalités, états* (Paris: Alcan, 1922).
 - 25 Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, p. 75.
 - 26 McDougall, *The Group Mind*, pp. 98 and 100. See also W. McDougall, *National Welfare and National Decay* (London: Methuen, 1921).
 - 27 McDougall, *The Group Mind*, p. 118. By contrast McDougall's attribution to the United States of an exceptional capacity to evolve advanced national consciousness and homogeneity out of heterogeneous elements, which it derived from in the character of its original English settlers, resonated the late nineteenth century thought of Wilson.
 - 28 M. Mauss, 'La Nation', (1920) in *Oeuvres* 3. Mauss was a supporter of the League of Nations, and the vice-president of the French Psychology Society in 1923. V. Karady, 'L'introduction', in Mauss, *Oeuvres* 2 (Paris: Minuit, 1969), p. xxxvii. Karady notes that Mauss had been invited by a political friend to undertake work 'sur le trace de nouvelles frontières d'un pays européen'.
 - 29 Mauss, 'La Nation et l'internationalisme', from *The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 20 (1920), reprinted in *Oeuvres* 3. *Cohésions sociales et divisions de la socio-*

- logie (Paris, Éditions du Minuit, 1968), p. 629. Cf. M. Mauss, 'Typologie des races et des peuples' (1901) in Mauss, *Œuvres* 3.
- 30 In his famous critique of the peace, John Maynard Keynes, a key figure on the Supreme Economic Council at Paris until 7 June 1919, when he resigned, wrote that understanding what happened during the peace process required a consideration of character and psychology: 'to suggest to the President that the [Versailles] treaty was an abandonment of his profession was to touch on the raw a Freudian complex. It was a subject intolerable to discuss, and every subconscious instinct plotted to defeat its further exploration.' J. M. Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (Cambridge University Press, 1971) p. 3. After the peace, Wilson's loyal press secretary the journalist Ray Stannard Baker speculated on a similar basis, but to quite different ends, that his employer's vigour, his bearing up, might be explained by 'the mysterious formula for unlocking the hidden energies, about which Professor William James wrote so persuasively in his essay on the "Energies of Men"'. R. Stannard Baker, *What Wilson did at Paris* (New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1919), p. 90.
 - 31 A. J. Toynbee, *The World after the Peace Conference: Being an epilogue to the 'History of the Peace Conference of Paris', and a prologue to the 'Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1923'* (London: Oxford University Press, 1926), p. 61 ff.
 - 32 *Ibid*, p. 64.
 - 33 L. B. S. Namier, 'The Downfall of the Habsburg Monarchy, in Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, pp. 59, 70, 90. Namier of course had read and translated Freud before the war while at the LSE.
 - 34 L. B. S. Namier, *Avenues of History* (London: H. Hamilton, 1952), pp. 3, 4, 20.
 - 35 C. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1926), p. 6. He was citing A. van Gennep, *Traité comparatif des nationalités*, t. 1 (Paris: Payot, 1922), pp. 12-13. Hayes thought that the psychological and emotional, rather than historical and political, form of nationalism had prevailed in the twentieth century, or at least as much as he had lived of it.
 - 36 *Ibid*, p. 247.
 - 37 R. Suny, 'History', in A. Motyl (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Nationalism vol. 1* (London: Academic Press, 2000), p. 27 and R. Girardet, *Nationalismes et nation* (Bruxelles: Editions Complexe, 1996) confirm the place of English language texts such as those by Carr, Hayes, Kohn, Snyder, in this intellectual history. By this time too, Norman Angell had shifted his focus to nationalism. Angell warned that analogies between nations and persons were false, and preferred to think of national identities as fluid and subject to trans-national communication and interests. Yet he too thought about nationalism in terms of the force of instincts, in this case gregariousness; Angell, *The Fruits of Victory*, pp. xiv, 209, 254.
 - 38 C. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), pp. v, 292. Hippolyte Taine, Hayes complained, had confused biological races with linguistic groups, while Barrès had developed a theory of nationalism as psychological determinism, p. 189.
 - 39 H. Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its origins and background* (New York: Macmillan, 1945), p. 4.
 - 40 *Ibid*, pp. 10-11.
 - 41 Snyder, *The Meaning of Nationalism*, p. 174.
 - 42 *Ibid*, pp. 12-13.
 - 43 Snyder argued that previously scholars had thought of people all over the world as basically the same. His appreciation of the history of the study of the nation did not recede far enough into the nineteenth century to make him aware of the

echoes in his own claims of the views of nineteenth century theorists such as Théodule Ribot, or even John Stuart Mill.

- 44 *Ibid*, p. 86.
- 45 *Ibid*, p. 54, cf. p. 71.
- 46 *Ibid*, p. 174.
- 47 *Ibid*, p. 50.
- 48 *Ibid*, p. 69.
- 49 *Ibid*, p. 71.
- 50 Keynes, *op.cit.*, p. 20. Keynes used this description to attack Clemenceau's national chauvinism.
- 51 My own list of examples of this legacy would include Montserrat Guibernau's statement that nationalism is 'a psychological phenomenon involving felt needs and disposition, in contrast to the nation-state, which is an institutional one', M. Guibernau, *Nationalisms: The nation-state and nationalism in the twentieth century* (Cambridge: Polity, 1996), p. 44; James Kellas' claim that '[a]n integrated theory of the politics of nationalism and ethnicity must begin with human nature, for there is strong evidence that innate and instinctive forces are at work in ethnic identification and ethnocentric behaviour.' J. Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), p. 160. Kellas adds that social psychology reveals that at the heart of the relationship between ethnocentrism and human instincts (as he sees it) are the instinctive biological and linguistic divisions which create strong feelings of group loyalty. p. 61; Similarly, Derek Heater's account of national self-determination, which condemns the fallacy of the assumption that 'a cultural entity, a nation, has the need, the right even, to be a political entity, a state', while it affirms the view that human beings 'have a psychological need to adhere to a group which shares certain traditions and mores', Heater, *National Self-Determination*, p. 210.
- 52 A. Finlayson, 'Psychology, Psychoanalysis and Theories of Nationalism', *Nations and nationalism* 4 (1998) 145; see also Suny, 'Why We Hate You: the Passions of National Identity and Ethnic Violence', Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper (University of California, Berkeley) 2004, p. 22. In a similar vein, Anthony D. Smith, the extraordinarily prolific theorist of the nation, offers as his examples of this implicit adoption of psychological theorising Elie Kedourie's conception of nationalism as an extension of the 'need to belong', Walker Connor's ethnic perennialism, which renders nationalism a fundamentally non-rational phenomenon with its core in mass psychology, the idea of class *ressentiment* in Liah Greenfeld's work, and Benedict Anderson's emphasis on the social imaginary as the field of national identification. Smith has also singled out late nineteenth century crowd psychology as one of four major streams of influence on the classical modernist paradigm of nationalism, (the other three are Marx, Weber, and Durkheim). Importantly, Smith is critical of this 'paradigm'. Smith adds that '[i]t would be difficult to point to particular theorists of national identity and nationalism who have made explicit use of the crowd psychology of Le Bon or the herd instinct of Trotter, or even the analyses of Simmel, Mead, Adorno or later theories of Freud. ... On the other hand many of their insights have permeated the thinking of recent scholars of nationalism.' Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, p. 12.
- 53 See the telling examples cited by Cathie Carmichael in the chapter on 'Ethnopsychology' in C. Carmichael, *Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans: Nationalism and the destruction of tradition* (New York: Routledge, 2003).
- 54 See Steel, *op.cit.*, pp. 154–5.

- 55 See for example the work of Z. Eisenstein, *Hatreds: Racialized and sexualized conflicts in the twenty first century* (New York: Routledge, 1996), and the work of Alenka Puhar, and Sabrina Ramet.
- 56 See Le Rider, *op.cit.*
- 57 As Lippmann's biographer notes, this did not put him above anti-Semitism.
- 58 *Ibid*, p. 148.
- 59 *Ibid*, p. 16.
- 60 S. Freud, 'Dissection of the Personality', in *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, vol. 2 (London: Penguin, 1973), p. 112.
- 61 D. Pick, 'Freud's *Group Psychology* and the History of the Crowd', *History Workshop Journal* 40 (1995) 160.
- 62 See S. Freud, and W. Bullitt, *Thomas Woodrow Wilson: Thirty-eighth president of the United States, a psychological study* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967). For a useful discussion of the ideas and production of this text see P. Gay, *Freud: A life for our time* (New York: Norton, 1988), pp. 553–62.
- 63 See P. Ferris, *Dr. Freud: A Life* (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1997), p. 354.
- 64 Verdery describes this process as 'how the homology between the nation and the individual becomes internalised and is assimilated by the individual, entering his or her "inside"'; K. Verdery, 'Whither "Nation" and "Nationalism"', in Balakrishnan, *op.cit.*, p. 229.
- 65 D. Wahrman, *The Making of the Modern Self* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).
- 66 P. Snowden, *A Political Pilgrim in Europe* (New York: G. H. Doran Co., 1921), p. 55.
- 67 N. Rose, 'Calculable Minds and Manageable Individuals', *History of the Human Sciences*, 1 (1988) 187.
- 68 The controversy that surrounded women travelling internationally is a story that comes out of the League of Nations archive and is still waiting to be told; for an approximation, see G. Sluga, 'Female and National Self-Determination: A Gender Re-Reading of the "Apogee of Nationalism"', *Nations and Nationalisms*, 6 (2000) 495–521.
- 69 We could also add that the government of the United States – the epitome of liberal states and the main political force behind that principle – responded to the exigencies of the new national world order by implementing an overtly xenophobic immigration policy.
- 70 See for example Sluga, *The Problem of Trieste and the Italo-Yugoslav Border*, chapters 4 and 5.

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