AFRICA AND THE NEW WORLD ERA

FROM HUMANITARIANISM TO A STRATEGIC VIEW

EDITED BY
JACK MANGALA

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Preface

We are experiencing a fundamental shift in the global structure of power. While the configurations of this emerging era are still unsettled, there seems to be a broad intellectual consensus that the new era will mark the end of Western dominance in world affairs as we have come to know it for the past three centuries. First embodied in the glories and tragedies of the British Empire, the West as an epicenter of world politics was later reflected through U.S. unparalleled dominance, which reached its apotheosis in the post-Cold world era. This era is however, by many accounts, slowly coming to an end. Economically, culturally, politically, and to a certain extent militarily, the world is witnessing a diffusion of power marked, among other things, by the "rise of the rest"—to borrow from Fareed Zakaria—a shift of power whose magnitude represents, for the first time in three centuries, a real and significant challenge to Western hegemony.

According to projections by Goldman Sachs, the seven largest economies in the world by 2050 will be, in descending order of importance, China, the United States, India, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, and Indonesia. This reconfiguration of global power has been accompanied by a renewed interest in Africa. Many—among them the Council on Foreign Relations—have called for a new approach toward Africa, an approach that goes beyond the shallow humanitarianism of the past to embrace a strategic view of the continent. Africa has responded to this global power chess with a growing sense of its own agency in world affairs and a determination to carve out a different future as exemplified, inter alia, by the strengthening of regional governance through an increasingly assertive African Union and a pragmatic New Partnership for African Development.

To take a full measure of the meaning of this emerging new era for Africa and its implications for the continent's external relations, the African and African American Studies Program at Grand Valley State University in collaboration with the International Relations Program convened a conference that brought together a select group of prominent Africanists, from both the United States and abroad, to discuss various strata of Africa's evolving international relations. This book is a collaborative effort that reflects the range and breadth of discussions started at Grand Valley State University in September 2009.

I am first and foremost thankful to all the colleagues who have graciously lent their time and expertise to this scholarly project by contributing a chapter. Editing the book has been an intellectually refreshing and rewarding experience. I am also thankful to my colleagues in the Political Science Department and the African and African American Studies Program, especially Drs. Mark Richards and Polly Diven, for supporting this project. A special thanks to my friend and former colleague Dr. George Kieh, now at the University of West Georgia, for encouraging me to pursue this endeavor and his unyielding support along the way.

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I am most grateful to Elena, my wife, and my children, Alex and Maya, for allowing the personal working space and offering the emotional support necessary for carrying out this project. This book is theirs as well.

Jack Mangala
Jenison, April 2010

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACGS	African Center for Gender and Social Development
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific countries
AEC	African Economic Community
AFRICOM	U.S. African Command
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ANC	African National Congress
APF	African Peace Facility
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASA	Africa-South America Forum
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
CAHOSCC	Conference of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change
CEMAC	*Communauté économique et monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale*
CERLA	Centre for Regional Studies and African Legacy
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CFA	*Communauté Financière Africaine* (African Financial Community)
CII	Confederation of Indian Industry
COPS	European Union Political and Security Committee
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPI	Center for Public Integrity
CPLP	Portuguese Speaking Countries Community
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EC	European Community
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ECDPM	European Center for Development Policy Management
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EEC	European Economic Community
EESC	EU Economic and Social Committee
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
EPAs	Economic Partnership Agreements
EU	European Union
EUFOR RD	European Force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
EUROSUR	European Surveillance System of Borders

FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FBOs	faith-based organizations
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FDA	Food and Drug Administration
FDCs	Fixed Dose Combinations
FDI	foreign direct investment
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
FOMUC	*Force Multinationale en Centrafrique*
FRONTEX	European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GECF	Gas Exporting Countries Forum
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HIPCI	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative
IBDR	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOC	India Oil Corporation
ITEC	Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MAP	Multi-Country AIDS Program
MCA	Millennium Challenge Account
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MDRI	Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative
MEDSEA	Mediterranean Coastal Patrols Network
MINURCAT	UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINURSO	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MSF	Military Staff Committee
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCP	National Congress Party
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NSS	National Security Strategy
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ODA	Official development aid
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OGAC	Office Global AIDS Coordinator
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

PAP	Pan-African Parliament
PEPFAR	President's Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRSPs	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSO	Peace Support Operations
R2P	responsibility to protect
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SANDF	South African National Defense Force
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programs
TICAD	Tokyo International Conference on African Aid Development
UNAMID	United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNAVEM I	United Nations Angola Verification Mission I
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGA	UN General Assembly
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNMIL	UN Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	UN Mission in the Sudan
UN-NADAF	United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa
UNOCI	UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USAID	United States Assistance in Development
WHO	World Health Organizataion
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
ZPCAS	South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone
ZPCSA	Zone for Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic

Introduction

Africa and the New World Era: Context and Stakes

Jack Mangala

Ever since the emergence of newly independent African states in the community of nations in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the study of the continent's external relations has generated a great deal of scholarly attention at each important turn in world politics. In two earlier works, *Africa in World Politics* and *Africa and World Order,* respectively, Vernon McKay[1] and Norman Padelford and Rupert Emerson[2] attempted to capture the significance for world politics in general and for the United Nations (UN) in particular of the coming to political sovereignty of African people. The "rise of Africa in world politics," it was suggested for a time, might precipitate the decline of the UN. We know that this did not happen. On the contrary, the UN has provided African states with both limited political clout in world affairs due to their numerical advantage and a legal protection that has allowed some weak states to survive in the community of nations despite the odds.[3]

The demise of European colonial empires and the consolidation of U.S. superpower status after WWII did not fundamentally alter the structural conditions under which the new African states had to operate. They were soon engulfed in the struggle between Western and Soviet blocs as the global battle for ideological and economic control unfolded and was played out on the continent. In *Africa's International Relations,* Ali A. Mazrui[4] refers to African states' attempts to confront the structural conditions of the international system, navigate the meander of world politics, and carve out a destiny of their own as "diplomacy of dependency and change." This brilliant formula eloquently captures the ontological contradiction that has encapsulated, for the most part, Africa's relations with the rest of the world since independence. Mazrui casts these relations in terms of both class and caste structures. He writes, "It is because the international system shares these characteristics of heredity, separation, division of labor and hierarchy, that the system is more like a caste structure with its rigidities than a class system with potential social mobility."[5]

Of the few theoretical frameworks that have been offered in the study of Africa's standing in world politics, dependency remains the most advanced and influential in making sense of African states' patterns of behavior on the world stage. However, as Christopher Clapham poignantly argues in *Africa and the International System,*[6] those patterns of behavior also reflect the actions of local forces and genuine domestic interests in ensuring the survival of the African state in defiance of its Westphalian conception. Both Mazrui and Clapham underscore the fact that to fully understand the evolution and intricacies of Africa's relations with the rest of the world, one must take into account the international as well as domestic structures, actors, processes, dynamics, and motivations in the formulation of theoretical constructs.

The Theoretical and Conceptual Frameworks

In his seminal book *Politics Among Nations,* Hans Morgenthau, echoing the Hegelian notion of the "Dark Continent," describes Africa as a "politically empty space" that lacked a history of its own before WWI.[7] This view of Africa reflects classical realist as well as earlier neorealist canons, which posit that "a general theory of international politics is necessarily based on the great powers."[8] Within this framework, which is preoccupied primarily with power politics, Africa's peripheral position in the international system doesn't warrant any serious theoretical attention. This theoretical marginalization stands in clear contrast to the continent's "globalization"—understood as Africa's engagement in the global trade system since the beginning of the nineteenth century, a process that was strengthened in its economic, political, ideological, and cultural aspects by the formal "colonial system that connected African territories to an emerging global economy as sub-suppliers to the European economies."[9] For Ulf Engel and Gorm Rye Olsen, "This striking duality between marginalization and 'globalization' has had significant impact on the academic studies on Africa's place in international politics . . . [and] far-reaching consequences for how the region has been treated in international relations theory."[10]

To a large extent, the decolonization process only contributed to a further political and economic peripheralization of newly independent states in Africa due to a number of factors, among them the structural dependency inherited from colonization, the new bipolar confrontation, and deep-seated internal dysfunctionalities and unresolved societal contradictions that threatened, in some cases, the very legitimacy of the new state. Africa's position in the international system was primarily approached, throughout the Cold War, against the background and as function of the ideological competition between the two superpowers and their respective allies. This instrumental treatment of Africa was characteristic of some early works published by Vernon McKay[11] and William Zartman,[12] which offered an analysis of Africa's international relations and Africa policies of big powers that reflected core realist concerns centered on security issues. Africa was viewed only through the prism of geostrategic interests and objectives of the two competing parties. Even the study of pan-Africanism and the nonaligned movement was essentially conducted in the same perspective, as illustrated in the works of Colin Legum[13] and Patrick McGowan.[14] The crisis of classical realism in the 1970s and the subsequent theoretical insights of structural realism under Kenneth Waltz and economic realism under Robert Gilpin did little to alter the academic treatment of Africa in world politics or generate a genuine theoretical interest toward the continent's external affairs.

The dependency theory became the first critical perspective to gain acceptance in the African scholarly community during the 1970s. Emerging as a major alternative to liberal theories of development, the dependency theory was particularly concerned with understanding why modernization theory's optimistic projections did not materialize. Dependency theorists argued that external constraints, chief among them the domination of Africa by Western powers, were responsible for most of the continent's postindependence economic and political predicament. Africa's relations with Western countries, it was argued, were inherently exploitative and that the international capitalist system was the root cause of this exploitation. This interpretation of Africa's international relations is reflected in Walter Rodney,[15] Samir Amin,[16] and Ali Mazrui's[17] works, all of which stress the centrality of the exploitative nature of the structures of the international system in explaining Africa's place in world politics. Within this theoretical framework, Pan-Africanism, the push for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), and the Non-Aligned Movement were seen as various attempts by African states to confront or circumvent the exploitative structure of the international system. Of the Non-Aligned Movement in particular, Mazrui writes:

> The first major economic factor to enter the movement was the issue of foreign aid. A doctrine of balanced benefaction emerged, by which it was assumed that relative independence for poor countries lay in diversifying their benefactors. A country which was heavily dependent on the USA was less autonomous than a country which managed to get foreign aid both from the USA and the Soviet Union. Non-alignment became an exercise in balanced dependency—an assumption that a client with more than one patron was freer than a uni-patronized dependant.[18]

Departing from the traditional dependency approach, a group of scholars, among them Aforka Nweke[19] and Timothy Shaw[20], emphasized a more systemic view of Africa's international relations during the 1980s. Using an international political economy (IPE) approach, they demonstrated how the foreign policies of African states tend to mirror the political and economic interests of the developed countries as a function of shared interests between the elites in Africa and in Western countries. Thus the near impossibility for African states to develop autonomous foreign policies or define national interests on their own terms.

The emergence of interdependency approaches in liberal and neoliberal theories in the mid-1970s did not lead to a greater focus on Africa in international relations theories. Taking into account these approaches' key contention that states are not the only important actors, one would have expected a different treatment of Africa and other peripheral world areas. Assessing the place of Africa in theoretical debates within international relations during the 1960s and throughout most of the 1980s, Ulf Engel and Gorm Rye Olsen write, "Though the general theoretical paradigms changed quite significantly in this period, and though the theoretical debates between the different theoretical schools were often quite fierce, there was a striking consensus among scholars within IR that Africa was of limited interest for theoretical debates. Given this, it is quite obvious that Africa, its development and its special problems have had strikingly little impact on IR theory."[21] The end of the Cold War led to a further political and economic marginalization of Africa.[22]

The loss of Africa's ideological value and the continent's economic predicament in post-Cold War politics led to the emergence of a body of scholarly works that focused on the crisis of the state, the role played by international financial institutions (IFIs) in engineering Africa's neoliberal political and economic trajectory, the impact of the new globalization on African states' relationship with the rest of the world, and the emergence of nonstate actors and alternative sources of authority. All of these areas of scholarly emphasis opened new and exciting directions into the study of Africa's international relations.

In *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival,*[23] Christopher Clapham, drawing on Barry Buzam's version of neorealism, offers a vibrant analysis of the meaning and factors that have permitted the survival of the African state in the international system. Clapham argues that far from being always externally determined, the foreign policies of African states also reflect, in many fundamental ways, the actions of local forces and genuine domestic interests. He demonstrates in particular the instrumentalization of Africa's international relations in the service of private interests, chief among them those of African rulers. This theme has been echoed in Jean-Francois Bayart, Stephen Ellis, and Beatrice Hibou's *The Criminalization of the State in Africa,*[24] in which the authors underscore the importance of actions and decisions of African elites—who have manipulated the state in the pursuit of their personal enrichment and survival—in unlocking the continent's socioeconomic and politico-military situation and understanding its interaction with the world. A similar argument of elite pathology has also been advanced, in its extreme form, in Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Dalloz's *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument.*[25]

Another interesting research direction in the 1990s was aimed at exploring the ability of nonstate actors to form illicit networks at the intersection of the domestic and international systems that are beyond state control. William Reno's *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*[26] and *Warlord Politics and African States*[27] are two important works that demonstrate in particular how foreign actors, most notably multinational corporations (MNCs), are more than willing to enter into financial arrangements with local warlords as long as those warlords control access to the valued resource or territory in question. The control that nonstate actors exert over valuable local resources and the impact of such control on Africa's international relations is a question that had been overlooked in past studies.[28]

In the critical tradition, the end of the Cold War saw a number of important works that attempted to explore the growing power and influence of IFIs (the IMF and the World Bank) over African states' ability to independently formulate and pursue an economic and political agenda. In *The Silent Revolution in Africa: Debt, Development, and Democracy,*[29] Fantu Cheru casts this influence in imperialistic terms as foreign assistance and loans conditionality imposed on African states to cement the domination of Western neoliberal agenda under the so-called Washington Consensus. This argument was amplified and deepened by Thandika Mwandawire and Adebajo Olukoshi in *Between Liberalization and Oppression: The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Africa.*[30] The two scholars argue that structural adjustment programs (SAPs) often run counter to the legitimate needs of social forces and therefore undermine genuine efforts at creating responsive democracy in most African countries. The authors call on African states to reframe the debate over SAPs, a topic that dominated Africa's relations with IFIs in the first decade of the post-Cold War period.

The critical tradition also saw a reinvigoration of the imperialist approach in the study of Africa's evolving relationships with foreign powers. According to this neoimperialist view, the formal independence of African countries in the 1950s did not alter, in any way, the fundamental nature of economic, political, military, and cultural ties between African states and Western capitalist countries and their global corporate agents. These ties, argues, for example, Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo in *The Dynamics of Economic and Political Relations Between Africa and Foreign Powers: A Study in International Relations,*[31] have only perpetuated and increased Africa's exploitation in the post-Cold War era. This perspective was enriched by an alternative view, called postimperialism, which asserts that MNCs can play both positive and negative roles, the determining factor in each case being the nature of the relationships between the international wing of the corporate managerial bourgeoisie and the local indigenous African wing of that managerial bourgeoisie. This position has been articulated by Richard L. Sklar and David G. Becker in *Postimperialism and World Politics.*[32]

A neoimperialist/colonial view has also been the dominant discourse in some significant works that have attempted to capture the impact of the "new globalization" on the African state and its place in world politics in the post-Cold War environment. Korwa Adar and Rok Ajalu's *Globalization and Emerging Trends in African States' Foreign Policy-Making Process*[33] and *Africa and the New Globalization* edited by George Kieh are among the works in this rubric. This discourse has been eloquently rendered by George Kieh who writes,

> The "new globalization" has set into motion the second phase of neo-colonial domination, plunder, pillage and exploitation in Africa. Given its unbridled hegemony, the "new globalization" is rendering African states incapable of designing and implementing their own independent national development agendas, and controlling the various transactions—economics, etc.—that are taking place within their respective territories . . . Unchallenged and emboldened by the subservience of the ruling classes in Africa, the forces of the "new globalization" are succeeding in their efforts to re-colonize Africa.[34]

The end of the Cold War led to a renewed vibrancy of the African nationalist school of thought, which sought to offer a synthesis of the liberal and critical traditions by arguing, in substance, that the critical tradition's emphasis on the negative impacts of the international economic system and domestic economic classes be complemented and enriched by a growing recognition of the substantial political power and autonomy enjoyed by the African state. According to African nationalist scholars—who trace their intellectual roots to the Dar school, which originated among a group of scholars based at the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania—it is imperative that the study of Africa, in its multiple dimensions, reflect the indigenous power of African political institutions and actors in their relationships with domestic and international actors.[35]

These conceptual insights and theoretical frameworks have influenced, in many respects, studies of Africa's international relations that have been produced over the past decade. In *Africa in World Politics,*[36] Guy Martin takes a resolutely continent-centered view to demonstrate the contemporary relevance of the counter-ideology of Pan-Africanism as a response to the ideologies of Eurafrica and globalization. He forcefully argues that economic, political, and military unity among African states is necessary to enhance their power and status in the contemporary world system. Also of particular interest is Ian Taylor and Paul Williams' excellent volume, *Africa in International Politics,*[37] which—unlike some previous works that had tended to focus upon the foreign policies that few African states have employed in their dealings with the outside world—centers primarily the analysis on external involvement on the continent after the Cold War. One of the major contentions of the study, however, is that Africa must be seen and approached "as a player in its own right whose behavior and agency acts to define, in many cases, the policies and even identities of external agents."[38] Engel Ulf and Rye Olsen Gorm's *Africa and the North: Between Globalization and Marginalization* represents another important work in which the authors address the striking duality of Africa's position in international relations, a position marked by globalization (mainly economic penetration) and marginalization (the waxing and waning of security interest in Africa). The authors, in particular, explore how the Westphalian and post-Westphalian core of the international society deals with what they call "a non- or pre-Westphalian part of its periphery." In the final analysis, Ulf and Gorm resort to the concept of an "International Policy Community" to bridge the perceived gap between the "domestic" and "the international" in the study of Africa and explain why the latter retains a role in global politics out of any proportion to its economic weight.[39]

Africa in World Politics[40] by John Haberson and Donald Rotchchild is another volume that deserves special mention. Unlike the third edition, which emphasized the political and economic predicament of the African state at the turn of the new millennium, this new edition, published almost a decade later, sounds a cautious note of optimism in the face of the many challenges that Africa still has to overcome. Discussing what they call the "the intimations of an African renaissance," Haberson and Rotchild write,

> Sub-Saharan Africa has shown clear signs that it may emerge from its long night of chronic marginalization in world politics at the beginning of its second half-century of independence. Indications of the beginnings of real domestic economic and political progress combined with new sub-Saharan African prominence on the world stage have cast in sharp relief both the potential benefits and the costs of the continent's possibly diminished marginalization and the profound long-term challenges to sustainable and significant progress that continue to confront it.[41]

Set against the backdrop of Africa's enduring challenges, these new signs of hope—which seem to indicate a different political and economic dynamic in Africa—must be understood and their implications on Africa's international relations assessed within the larger context of the ongoing diffusion of power on the global stage. Far from being cut off from the world and the forces reshaping the existing global balance of power, Africa is right in the middle of it and has gained in strategic importance as a new world era unfolds. As Jean-Francois Bayart rightly points out, " . . . The discourse on Africa's marginality is a nonsense."[42]

This book seeks to expand on and enrich the aforementioned works by shifting the center of gravity of the question of Africa's place in world affairs from post-Cold War politics, which saw the consolidation of U.S. hegemonic status, to the politics of the emerging global order, which signals a gradual end to unipolarity. Before outlining the structure of the book and discussing its underlying themes, it is worth offering an overview of this emerging new world era and the dominant forces that are driving this power shift and reshaping Africa's position in the international system.

The Emerging New World Era

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has enjoyed an unprecedented hegemony in world affairs. Over the past decade, however, the world has been experiencing important economic, cultural, and political transformations whose implications for the global balance of power are still being discussed. There seems, however, to be a consensus that we are witnessing the end of the post-Cold War era—marked by unparalleled U.S. dominance—and the emergence of a new world era. Political analysts, strategists, commentators, and students of world affairs have tried to explore this new world reality and assess its significance and implications for the conduct of international relations.

In *The Post-American World,*[43] Fareed Zakaria puts the current restructuration of global power into a broader historical context. Coming after the "first tectonic power shift," which saw the rise of the Western world in the fifteenth century, and following the second shift, which witnessed the rise of the United States to global prominence in the late nineteenth century, this third shift will be marked by what Zakaria calls the "rise of the rest," which refers to the ongoing diffusion of power throughout the world. For Zakaria, this redistribution of power, expressed among other things through unprecedented economic growth in many corners of the world, including Africa, "is creating an international system in which countries in all parts of the world are no longer objects or observers but players in their own right. It is the birth of a truly global order . . . At the politico-military level, we remain in a single superpower world. But in every other dimension—industrial, financial, educational, social, cultural—the distribution of power is shifting, moving away from American dominance . . . We are moving into a post-American world, one defined and directed from many places and by many people."[44]

Concurring with Zakaria, Martin Jacques asserts that this new world marks "the end of the Western world and the birth of a new global order," to use the subtitle of his prodigiously researched and far-reaching book *When China Rules the World*, in which he argues in substance that China's rise as an economic superpower will alter the cultural, political, and ethnic balance of global power in the twenty-first century. As evidence of this "changing of the guard," Jacques refers to economic projections by Goldman Sachs that indicate that "the three largest economies in the world by 2050 will be China [which will overtake the United States as the world's largest economy by 2027], followed by a closely matched America and India some way behind, and then Brazil, Mexico, Russia and Indonesia. Only two European countries feature in the top ten, namely the UK and Germany in ninth and tenth place respectively. Of the present G7, only four appear in the top ten."[45]

The implications of this change in economic hierarchy for international relations have been assessed by Stephen Cohen and Bradford Delong in their excellent book, *The End of Influence: What Happens When Other Countries Have the Money,*[46] in which they concur with Jacques and Zakaria on the slow dislocation of the United States and the West as the center of gravity of world politics, a change marked by the gradual emergence of what the latter terms a "point-to-point routes system" in international relations in lieu of the post-Cold War "hub-and-spoke system," under which every country had to go through the United States to get to its destination.[47] What does the emerging international system entail for Africa? What kinds of opportunities and challenges does the global shift of power present for the continent? How is this new global order going to impact issues of war and peace, and the political and economic trajectories of Africa? What does this new world era mean for Africa's international relations and the overall standing of the continent in world politics?

From Humanitarianism to a Strategic View

During most of the post-Cold War period, Africa has been presented and approached in Western circles primarily as an object of humanitarian concern; a case for charity; a continent ravaged by wars and conflicts and plagued with diseases, poverty, and endemic corruption; a marginal part of the world ravaged by failed and weak states; a continent that seemed, for the majority of its states, stuck in chronic underdevelopment. All of these characterizations correspond to what Gilbert Khadiagala calls "the dynamic of Africa-as-a- problem."[48] While some of these characterizations are certainly true for some states, they tend to convey a monolithic and negative image of Africa that doesn't correspond, in many instances, with the general reality on the ground.

Over the past decade, however, the ongoing diffusion of global power has been accompanied by a conceptual shift that emphasizes the strategic importance of Africa in world affairs in general and in relations with individual countries in particular. From Washington, New Delhi, London, Paris to Beijing, external powers have reassessed and (re)formulated their Africa policies to underscore a new level of strategic engagement with the continent. As the Council on Foreign Relations puts it, "Americans must pause and reflect on how Africa has become a region of growing vital importance to U.S. national interests. It is outdated and counterproductive to assume that Africa is simply the object of humanitarian concerns or a charity case."[49] This conclusion has been echoed by the Commission of the European Communities, "Africa is now at the heart of international politics, but what is genuinely new is that Africa—and the African Union (AU) in particular—is emerging, not as a development issue, but as a political actor in its own right. It is increasingly clear that Africa matters—as a political voice, as an economic force and as a huge source of human, cultural, natural and scientific potential."[50] These are not just shallow cosmetic pronouncements as Afro-pessimists might think. They capture the evolving nature of Africa's relations with the world as we enter the second decade of the new millennium. What are the factors driving this conceptual shift to a strategic view of Africa?

A broad rationale has been put forward to explain what appears to be more than just a rhetorical exercise in framing Africa's new position in world politics. First, Africa has undergone significant institutional, economic, and political reforms that have, in many respects, diminished the prevailing Afro-pessimism of the first decade after the Cold War and helped strengthen the continent's own agency. The establishment of the African Union (AU) in 2002 and the homegrown instrument of economic and political good governance under the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) have significantly improved Africa's institutional capacity and the continent's bargaining position at the international stage. At the domestic level, a wide range of reforms undertaken by various governments have resulted in an improved economic outlook for the continent. From 2002 to 2008, annual economic growth in Africa was around 6 percent. Even though much of this recent growth is due to the rise in the price of raw materials, it is important to note that this performance has taken place in an overall improved economic and business environment on the continent, an environment increasingly marked by growing—but often overlooked—opportunities.

In *Africa Rising*,[51] Vijay Mahajan offers a compelling argument for waking up to the potential of a continent with a population of over 900 million and a high growth rate, and that "any global firm interested in growth must see . . . as an essential part of its portfolio." Mahajan highlights in particular the creativity of Africa's business in succeeding on the continent despite the many challenges still present and how the consumers, especially the "400 million people in the middle of the market," have responded and are for grab for those eager to look beyond the negativities that often obscure the discourse on Africa and that have been relayed by Afro-pessimists such as George Ayittey.[52] This renewed economic vitality has been accompanied by serious political reforms undertaken in many countries since the end of the Cold War, and which have firmly set the continent on a democratic trajectory, despite setbacks in some countries (Congo-Brazzaville and Congo-Kinshasa) and authoritarian entrenchment in others (Uganda, Zimbabwe). This overall encouraging democratic trend has enhanced Africa's position in the community of nations.

Second, the shift to a strategic view of the continent has to do with a high demand for Africa's energy and other natural resources, which is being fueled by the growth of countries such as China, India, South Korea, and Brazil, all of which are firmly engaged in the race to the top of global influence in the twenty-first century. To sustain their economic growth, these countries, along with traditional Western powers, are increasingly turning to Africa to meet their energy and other resource needs. In the energy sector alone, U.S. and Chinese oil imports from Africa stand respectively at 22 and 30 percent, and Africa's share in these countries' imports is expected to increase in the coming decades due to the sustained flow of foreign direct investments (FDIs) in the oil industry over the past few years.[53] Although there are legitimate questions surrounding the inflow of new oil money to Africa, especially whether this is going to consolidate or impede recent economic and political gains on the continent, one has, however, to take note of the fact that Africa's bargaining and strategic position vis-à-vis external powers has somewhat improved as a result of this growing interest toward its resources and the financial leverage it has provided to the continent. As Dambisa Moyo bluntly puts it in *Dead Aid,* "They've got what we want, and we've got what they need."[54]

Third, the shift to a strategic view of Africa reflects growing security concerns on the part of some external powers, in particular the United States and European Union (EU) countries. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, represented, in that regard, a turning point in the conceptualization of Africa as a potential source of security threats for these countries. This new strategic thinking goes beyond terrorism to frame some of Africa's most endemic and humanitarian problems—HIV/AIDS, diseases, and poverty—in security terms.[55] This new strategic thinking has led to an increased securitization of Africa's international relations. Even though there are great humanitarian needs on the continent, these needs are, however, increasingly approached within a security framework that emphasizes the strategic—not just moral—implications of Africa's humanitarian situation for external powers. These strategic connections are another indication that the discourse on Africa's marginality is outdated, for Africa is part of and will influence the world for good or for bad.

Fourth, the shift to a strategic view of Africa underscores the continent's growing importance in the structures of global governance and the imperative for external powers to secure Africa's support in advancing the global agenda on terms that better serve their national interests. This has been particularly true in trade negotiations. With 40 percent of the World Trade Organization's membership, Africa is demanding significant reduction of U.S. and European agricultural subsidies and tariffs in return for agreement on a new round of worldwide trade improvements. Aligning with India, Brazil, and other developing countries, Africa has essentially brought the current Doha Round negotiations to a standstill pending acceptable outcomes on these issues.

Fifth, there are social and demographic factors that are contributing to a shift to a strategic view of Africa. These social factors are part of what the EU calls "the globalization of socio-cultural norms," a phenomenon that underscores a dual dynamics. One, due in large part to its growing global diaspora, African sociocultural norms will increasingly impact and infuse societies and cultures in other parts of the world. This dynamic has been referred to, in its extreme expression, as the "Africanization of the world," a rather controversial thesis.[56] Two, Africa's cultural receptivity has allowed it to absorb foreign sociocultural norms that, once "Africanized," have gone back to influence the cultures of origin. Ali A. Mazrui refers to this double dynamic as "the paradox of counterpenetration and the cyclic boomerang effect in Africa's interaction with other civilizations."[57] Dissecting this dynamic he writes, "What has so often been overlooked is the third dimension of this equation [Africa's readiness to welcome new cultures]. Africa's cultural receptivity can over time make others dependent on Africa. There is a cyclic dynamic at play. Those who have culturally conquered Africa have, over time, become culturally dependent upon Africa. The biter has sometimes been bitten; the conqueror has sometimes been counterconquered . . . Africa has sometimes counterpenetrated the citadels of its own conquerors."[58] The demographic factors in the shift to a strategic view of Africa underscore the fact that the continent will soon have as many inhabitants as India or China. For a long time, the latter's standing in world affairs was largely a function of its demographic weight. With a growing share of the world population, Africa must be taken seriously and the old canon of marginality seems increasingly outdated.

Finally, the shift to a strategic view of Africa and the recent reconceptualization of major and middle powers' Africa policies is to a larger extent a reaction to China's growing influence on the continent. China has truly emerged as a game changer. A look at the Chinese (both public and private) FDI portfolio clearly illustrates the extent of its political and economic penetration. Between 2000 and 2005, Chinese FDI to Africa stood at U.S. $30 billion. As of mid-2007, the stock of China's FDI to Africa was U.S. $100 billion. Chinese FDI is both diversified (oil, copper, cobalt, iron, platinum, timer, textiles, railways, and retail developments) and geographically spread across all regions of the continent.[59] Another look at trade flows confirms this growing influence. Between 1990 and 2000, trade between China and Africa grew by 450 percent. From 2002 to 2003, it rose over 50 percent to almost U.S. $12 billion and then nearly quadrupled by 2007, jumping to U.S. $45 billion. In December 2005, at the Second Conference of Chinese and African Entrepreneurs, China's premier, Wen Jibao, pledged that his country's trade with Africa would rise to U.S. $100 billion a year within five years. China has already become Africa's third most important trading partner, behind the United States and France, and ahead of the United Kingdom.[60] Amidst objections to and criticisms of China's economic dealings in Africa, a growing segment of the African population would tend, however, to agree with Dambisa Moyo—a stringer critic of the traditional aid model long privileged by Western powers, which has only trapped the continent into poverty—that, under the current circumstances and on balance, "the Chinese are our friends." This growing influence has prompted the Council on Foreign Relations to declare that "China has altered the strategic context in Africa."[61] In the face of this new reality, the challenge for Africa is to develop alternative strategies to unclench its peripheral liberation; such a response requires, at a minimum, that Africa deepen and consolidate regional integration and cooperation to "drive a harder bargain" with various competitors and create the domestic and international conditions conducive to a genuine human development centered on the needs of its own people.

Structure of the Book

Each contributor has been asked to investigate Africa's evolving international relations and status in the international system against the backdrop of this new world reality. The underlying theme that transpires throughout the book is that, as the twenty-first century enters into its second decade, the balance of power symbolized by the West, which has been the epicenter of world politics for the last 500 years, is shifting to give birth to a new global order marked by the rise of countries that will increasingly challenge Western hegemony—on top of which is the United States—and dislocate the center of gravity of world politics. Africa is part of this emerging international system and must be approached as such. How would Africa navigate this new world era? What are the implications of this new world reality for Africa's international relations? These are some of the central questions that the book seeks to address. It is divided into four parts.

The first part, titled *Africa and the Old Balance of Power,* includes four chapters that analyze Africa's evolving relations with four Western powers, all of which are permanent members of the UN Security Council that have played a significant role in shaping Africa's trajectory over the past fifty years and seem determined to (re)assert their presence on the continent in light of the new developments affecting the international system.

In Chapter 1, George Kieh uses the theoretical framework of imperialism to probe U.S.-Africa relations. He argues in substance that the liberal and realist theories that dominate the scholarly literature on U.S.-Africa relations are ill equipped to explain the profound dynamics and patterns that characterize those relations, which reflect what he terms the "American imperial project." Departing from the dominant realist discourse on American national interests and challenging the liberal contention of American humanitarianism, Kieh offers a refreshing and critical assessment of the major economic, political, and security initiatives of the United States in Africa since the end of the Cold War. In the final analysis, and in line with the critical tradition's orthodoxy, he asserts that for a mutually rewarding relationship to develop, three "sea changes" must take place to address the "exploitative and unjust structures, processes and rules" that define the American domestic political economy, the political economies of African states, and the global political economy.

In Chapter 2, Paul Williams explores the contours of Britain-Africa relations in the twenty-first century. After noting "significant continuity in the broad objectives of British policy," Williams offers a detailed analysis of the inflections and core objectives of the policy (peace, good governance, and prosperity) under the New Labour, which has devoted greater attention to Africa than previous Conservative administrations. He addresses the domestic and international context in which Britain's Africa policy has been formulated and its core objectives pursued, and concludes by asserting that "successive British governments have often lacked sufficient leverage to fundamentally change the local political context" in Africa.

Daniel Mengara, in Chapter 3, focuses on President Nicolas Sarkozy's stated "rupture" policy in the context of France-Africa relations. Mengara argues that the issue of disengagement has been an enduring question in the recent history of France-Africa relations going back to General de Gaulle. From this broad historical view and a meticulous examination of France's dealings in Africa, Mengara concludes that Nicolas Sarkozy's "rupture" policy lacks substance and is no more than what he refers to as "normalization of the Françafrican curse," a continuation of the status quo rather than a break from complex and often tumultuous relations.

In Chapter 4, Peter Pham analyzes Russia's recent reengagement in Africa after the relative retreat following the end of the Cold War. Pham offers a broad overview of Russia's Cold War politics in Africa and discusses the current reassertion of its strategic interests on the continent (economic access to international markets, and the use of multilateralism to promote Russian geopolitical hegemony) in the broader context of the latter's rapidly evolving international relations and the former's changing status on the world stage. Pham contends that Russia's return to Africa doesn't signal the "often-tragic zero-sum competition" of the Cold War; this renewed interest can lead to a possible mutually beneficial relation, especially given the "residual good will that is the legacy of the former Soviet Union's support for many African liberation movements."

Under the title of *Africa and the New Balance of Power,* the second part of the book includes four chapters that focus on Africa's evolving relations with a group of countries that epitomize the ongoing shift of the international system's center of gravity from the West. The emerging new world era is marked by "the rise of the rest," a rest that will increasingly challenge Western hegemony. Relationships between Africa and these rising powers are rapidly developing, leading to the alteration of the strategic context on the continent.

In Chapter 5, Daniel Large offers a critical analysis of the depth and significance of Africa's relations with China. He contends that the latter's "accelerated engagement in Africa is arguably the foremost single factor that has elevated Africa's position in contemporary international relations." Probing the totality of this engagement in the realm of the political imaginary as well as in its economic and political ramifications, Large demonstrates how the need and ability of Africa to manage its relations with China has become a pressing question that will ultimately determine whether the "win-win" cooperation advocated by China would materialize, a situation, he argues, that "would be truly novel in African history."

Seifudein Adem, in Chapter 6, addresses the complexities of Japan's diplomacy in Africa. The first non-European country to successfully industrialize and achieve the status of a global economic powerhouse, Japan is neither historically nor culturally part of the West, although its ideology has been more in sync with the West in general over the past 50 years. Japan's relations with Africa thus deserve to be studied as part of the rise of the rest, even though Japan rose long before and hasn't, up to now, mounted any significant challenge to the Western center. Seifudein places what he terms the "four phases" of Japan's diplomacy in Africa in the context of Japan's shifting identities and interests. Although this diplomacy has been very consistent, he argues, it still could change in light of other international actors' growing strategic interests toward Africa.

In Chapter 7, Peter Pham focuses on the trends and implications of India's new engagement in Africa, which he locates in the context of the ongoing redistribution of global power that has seen China, India's regional competitor, reassert its vital and strategic interests in Africa. Although the motivations are similar in the case of these two emerging powers, Pham contends that "there is a need first for an appreciation of the unique historical experience which shaped the contours and continues to influence the ongoing development of Indo-African relations." Approaching these deepening and expanding relations from the perspective of the old vision of South-South cooperation, Pham argues in substance that they have the double potential to transform Africa's place in international relations and alter the contours of the emerging twenty-first-century global order.

Another important player in this emerging global order is represented by Brazil, which Gladys Lechini uses in Chapter 8 to probe Latin America's cooperation with Africa. Often overlooked in the scholarly literature on Africa's international relations, Latin America-Africa cooperation must be understood in the context of South-South cooperation with all its promises and potentials in determining Africa's place in the new world era. For Brazil in particular, asserts Lechini, its expanding relations with Africa represent not only a reflection of deep historical ties with the latter, but also an affirmation of the former's contention to global leadership.

The third part of the book, *Africa in Global and Regional Governance,* is aimed at discussing Africa's relationship with some institutions of global and regional governance that have played a key role in shaping the continent's trajectory and whose actions and policies are being challenged and revisited as Africa seeks to reassert itself in light of the emerging new world reality marked by diffusion of power and growing transnationalism.

In Chapter 9, Assefaw Bariagaber assesses evolving UN relations with Africa since the end of the Cold War. Bariagaber advances the proposition that the fundamental changes affecting the international system "will make the continent more relevant in international affairs, especially in the management of peace and security within the continent." While there has been a remarkable transformation of the role of the UN in conflict management in Africa over the last 50 years, notes Bariagaber, there has been no discernible transformation of UN's role in economic activities. As Africa builds its own structures of regional governance, he predicts a diminishing role for the UN, particularly in the area of peace and security.

The World Bank has come under sharp criticism, over the past years, for the cumulative impact of its policies on African countries. In Chapter 10, Paul Clements offers an assessment of the World Bank's aid policies and practices in shaping Africa's political and economic landscape. Clements observes that the World Bank has been failing Africa in two overlapping areas: first, by promoting free markets when it should have been building productive forces, particularly in agriculture; second, by displaying a startling lack of accountability in the quality of its operations. Clements calls on the World Bank to replace the current culture and practice of self-evaluation with professional evaluation for cost effectiveness. Such a shift from the World Bank, he argues, would lead to a focus on building productive forces that would greatly benefit African governments. The latter would also learn from the World Bank's example.

Jack Mangala, in Chapter 11, discusses Africa's relations with the EU. Placing these relationships within a broader historical context, he investigates the driving forces that are transforming the relationship and have led to the adoption of a Joint Africa-EU Strategy by the second EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon in December 2007. After reviewing the major theoretical explanations of the relationship, Mangala assesses the implementation of policies in four major areas of cooperation (trade and regional integration, peace and security, governance and human rights, and migrations). As EU-Africa relations enter the age of maturity, concludes Mangala, the AU must play a pivotal role in ensuring that these relationships reflect a genuine partnership that departs from the colonial modus operandi.

Since the establishment of the AU in 2008, African governments have significantly improved the regional institutional capacity to enable a more harmonious and coordinated interaction with the external world on issues of concern to the continent. The AU has thus become the major international interlocutor on behalf of the African continent. AU's role in that regard is analyzed by Tim Murithi in Chapter 12. Conceding that "the AU's role as an international actor is complicated by the difficulty of promoting consensus among African states and then maintaining that consensus in the face of often divergent national interests," Murithi shows, however, how the AU has served as a rallying vehicle for African interests, particularly in the field of peace and security, development and trade issues, as well as climate change.

The fourth part of the book, titled *Confronting Africa's Development,* incorporates four chapters that address various questions pertaining to the continent's development challenges as they relate to its external relations.

In Chapter 13, Rita Kiki Edozie offers a superb theoretical, historical, and comparative analysis of U.S. democracy promotion in Africa. She demonstrates how since the end of the Cold War and as part of U.S. democracy promotion in Africa, the United States has taken on "a resuscitated hegemonic, ideologically developmental and externally interventionist posture in its approach to foreign policy especially in Africa." If a true democracy ought to be pursued as a genuine foreign policy goal, it is important, observes Edozie in the final analysis, that "in a postmodern international arena even President Obama's soft power relations of democracy promotion—in Africa too—are informed by democratic principles of mutual respect; a respect for self-determination and agency; and an understanding of structural context and complexity that shapes actually existing democracy on the ground."

Polly Diven, in Chapter 14, discusses a controversial segment of U.S. foreign policy: the President's Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) launched by President Bush in 2003 and pursued by the Obama administration. Diven analyzes PEPFAR using the theoretical framework of hyperpluralism, which suggests in substance that a large number of competing interests, and efforts by policy makers to satisfy those interests, result in complicated, piecemeal policy that is neither efficient nor effective in achieving its multiple objectives. She demonstrates the relevance of hyperpluralism by providing evidence of the impact of two interest groups in particular—Christian conservatives and the pharmaceutical industry—on the conceptualization and implementation of the PEPFAR program.

The impact and significance of the recent global economic downturn on Africa are assessed by Kojo Quartey in Chapter 15. Using several macroeconomic variables such as gross domestic product, exports/imports, exchange rates, and balance of trade in Africa as a whole and six African countries (South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Egypt, and Liberia), Quartey demonstrates that while all of these nations have been negatively impacted by the global economic crisis, the impact varies by nation. He observes in particular that nations more integrated into foreign markets and those more dependent on foreign aid, trade, and FDI are likely to be more vulnerable. This observation forms the basis of the study's implications, which note, among other things, that African countries should not be too quick to integrate their financial markets with those of the developed world. If anything, concludes Quartey, the global economic crisis has made it highly unlikely that many African nations will meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

This challenge is addressed in detail in Chapter 16 in which Emmanuel Cleeve attempts to answer the question as to whether sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) can achieve the MDGs set forth in 2000 as a global commitment aimed at helping SSA meet most basic human development needs by 2015. Cleeve offers a historical and theoretical overview of the MDGs before assessing current progress and performance toward meeting them through the examination of key targets and indicators. His conclusion is rather negative: "The current performance trends of SSA countries clearly indicate that they urgently need a serious dramatic change in the pace of progress, as the majority of them are not on track toward the universal agreed targets. Countries seriously off track need to at least double their current rate of progress to achieve the development goals."

The depth and breadth of chapters included in this volume represent an intellectually challenging and refreshing invitation to the evolving field of Africa's external relations as the continent seeks to negotiate the constraints and opportunities of the new emerging world era.

Notes

1. Vernon McKay, *Africa in World Politics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963).
2. Norman Padelford and Rupert Emerson, eds., *Africa and World Order* (New York: Praeger, 1963).
3. See Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Judicial in Statehood," *World Politics,* vol. 35, no. 1 (1982): 1–24.
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5. Ibid., 9.
6. Christopher Clapham, *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
7. Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Peace and Power* (New York: Knopf, 1985), 369.
8. Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979), 72–73.
9. Ulf Engel and Gorm Olsen, "Global Politics and Africa- and Africa in International Relations Theory," in Ulf Engel and Gorm Olsen, eds., *Africa in Global Politics* (London: Routledge, 2005), 2.
10. Ibid., 1.
11. McKay, *Africa in World Politics*.
12. William Zartman, *International Relations in the New Africa* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1966).
13. Colin Legum, *Pan-Africanism* (New York: Praeger, 1962).
14. Patrick McGowan, "Africa and Non-Alignment: A Comparative Study of Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly,* 12 (1968), 262–295.
15. Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972.
16. Samir Amin, *Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism* (Hassocks: The Harvester Press, 1972).
17. Mazrui, *Africa's International Relations*.
18. Ibid., 6.
19. Aforka Nweke, *Harmonization of African Foreign Policies, 1955–1975: The Political Economy of African Diplomacy* (Boston: Boston University African Studies Center, 1980).
20. Timothy Shaw, "The Future of Great Powers in Africa: Towards a Political Economy of Intervention," in Olajide Aluko, ed., *Africa and the Great Powers in the 1980s* (London: Lanham 1987).
21. Engel and Olsen, "Global Politics," 5.
22. Africa's average economic output per capita in constant prices was lower at the end of the 1990s than it was 30 years before. The marginalization was also expressed in the sharp decline in official development assistance (ODA) to Africa, which accounted only for U.S. $13.8 billion in 2001, down from U.S. $17.7 billion a decade earlier.
23. Clapham, *Africa and the International System*.
24. Jean-Francois Bayart, Stephen Ellis and Beatrice Hibou, *The Criminalization of the State in Africa* (Oxford: James Currey, 1999).
25. Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Dalloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument* (Oxford: James Currey, 1999).

26. William Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
27. William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
28. In 1999, for example, the size of the so-called gross criminal product (GCP) of Africa, which measures the volume of all illegal transactions, was estimated at U.S. $1,000 billion. This amount surpasses several times the gross national product of sub-Saharan Africa.
29. Fantu Cheru, *The Silent Revolution in Africa: Debt, Development, and Democracy* (London: Zed, 1989).
30. Thandika Mwandawire and Adebajo Olukoshi, eds., *Between Liberalization and Oppression: The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Africa* (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1995).
31. Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo, *The Dynamics of Economic and Political Relations Between Africa and Foreign Powers: A Study in International Relations* (Westport: Praeger, 1999).
32. Richard L. Sklar and David G. Becker, eds., *Postimperialism and World Politics* (Westport: Praeger, 1999).
33. Korwa Adar and Rok Ajalu, *Globalization and Emerging Trends in African States' Foreign Policy-Making Process* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002).
34. George Kieh, ed., *Africa and the New Globalization* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 7.
35. For a discussion of this school of thought, see, inter alia, Naomi Chazan et al., *Politics and Society in Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992).
36. Guy Martin, *Africa in World Politics: A Pan-African Perspective* (Trenton: African World Press, 2002).
37. Ian Taylor and Paul Williams, eds., *Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004).
38. Ibid., cover summary.
39. Ulf Engel and Gorm Olsen, eds., *Africa and the North: Between Globalization and Marginalization* (New York: Routledge, 2005).
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41. Ibid., 3.
42. Bayart, Ellis and Hibou, *The Criminalization of the State,* 267.
43. Fareed Zakaria, *The Post-American World* (New York: Norton, 2008).
44. Ibid., 3.
45. Martin Jacques, *When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order* (New York: Penguin, 2009), 3.
46. Stephen Cohen and Bradford Delong, *The End of Influence: What Happens When Other Countries Have the Money* (Philadelphia: Basic Books, 2010).
47. Zakaria, *The Post-American World,* 36.
48. Gilbert Khadiagala, "Euro-Africa Relations in the Age of Maturity," in John Haberson and Donald Rotchchild, eds., *Africa in World Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2009), 315.
49. Independent Task Force, *More Than Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S. Approach Toward Africa* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2006), 127.
50. Commission of the European Communities, *From Cairo to Lisbon: The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership*, COM (2007) 357 final, 2.
51. Vijay Mahajan, *African Rising: How 900 Million African Consumers Offer More Than You Think* (Upper Saddle River: Pearson, 2009).
52. George Ayittey, *Africa in Chaos* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998).
53. See John Ghaznivan, *Untapped: The Scramble for Africa's Oil* (Orlando: Harcourt, 2007).

54. Dambisa Moyo, *Dead Aid* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), 111.
55. See, inter alia, Andrew Price-Smith, *The Health of Nations: Infectious Disease, Environmental Change, and Their Effects on National Security and Development* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).
56. C.L. Kamuzora, "Africanization of the World in the Third Millennium: A Prognosis of Population Dynamics," *African Journal of Political Science,* vol. 6, no. 1 (2001): 59–76.
57. Ali Mazrui, "Africa and Other Civilizations: Conquest and Counter-Conquest," in John Haberson and Donald Rotchchild, eds., *Africa in World Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2009), 100.
58. Ibid., 73.
59. Moyo, *Dead Aid,* 105.
60. Ibid., 120.
61. Independent Task Force, *More Than Humanitarianism,* 40.

Part I

Africa and the Old Balance of Power

1

Imperialism and U.S.-Africa Relations

George Klay Kieh, Jr.

Introduction

Since the 1940s,U.S.-Africa relations have expanded in terms of both the number of state actors on the African side and the modes of interaction. When the Cold War began, the United States' relations with Africa were limited to Egypt, Ethiopia, and Liberia. This was because the rest of the current states on the continent were under colonial rule. Similarly, interactions were confined to the economic, political, and security realms. However, following decolonization in Africa and the concomitant increase in the number of African states, the United States' relations encompassed several African states. The importance of the relationship was determined by their relevance, respectively, to its Cold War strategies. Correspondingly, the modes of interaction burgeoned to cover a broad range of cultural, economic, political, security, and social issues.

The resultant scholarly literature on U.S.-Africa relations has examined the nature and dynamics of the relationship within either the crucible of "American national interests" or the "bowels of American humanitarianism." In other words, scholars who employ the realist theory view the relationship in terms of the usefulness of both the African region and its various constituent states to the pursuance of American "national interests." Conversely, those who use the liberal paradigm seek to explain the relationship on the basis of American "generosity" toward Africa.

Against this background, I argue in this chapter that both the realist and liberal theories are inadequate frameworks for explaining U.S.-Africa relations. Alternatively, I posit that imperialism provides the best paradigm for framing our understanding of the nature and dynamics of U.S.-Africa relations—economic, political, and security. That is, I contend that U.S.-Africa relations must be placed within the broader context of the American imperial project, which is anchored on the search for hegemony and its attendant domination of the various spheres of the global political economy. Vassilis

Fouskas and Bulent Gokay provide a poignant summation of the American imperial project thus:

> The primary objective [of American imperialism] is to use the surplus American military power that remained after the breakup of the Soviet Union to impose a worldwide "Pax Americana" that, in turn would promote the political and economic interests of the United States . . . what the U.S. ruling class always desired, which is to impose a U.S. vision of the "free market and democracy" on the entire world, and in doing so secure economic resources and global markets under the control of U.S. authority. It is an agenda that can be themed as the "new American imperialism" in the era of the New American Century.[1]

Framing U.S.-Africa Relations: Theoretical Issues

The Literature Review

As stated earlier, realist and liberal paradigms dominate the scholarly literature on U.S.-Africa relations. In this section of the chapter, I examine some of the studies that have used those two theoretical frameworks. Next, I critique the two dominant paradigms, and then suggest the theory of imperialism as the alternative weltanschauung for interrogating the nature and dynamics of U.S.-Africa relations.

The Realist Paradigm

Lancaster argues that during the Cold War, the United States failed to accord attention to issues such as the violation of human rights and political mismanagement in some of its allied states such as Somalia, Liberia, and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC).[2] Accordingly, she observes that Washington may have inadvertently encouraged abuses through its symbolic political support of those governments by providing them with foreign aid, receiving their leaders at the White House, and extending other visible forms of cooperation. Importantly, she attributes such a policy approach to the fact that these autocratic regimes were important to the pursuance of American strategic and other interests both in Africa and globally.

Aka laments that because of the primacy of American "national interests," the United States has not pursued its goal of democracy promotion in Africa with any degree of consistency.[3] In other words, democracy promotion is situational, contingent upon the specificities of the cases vis-à-vis American "national interests." So, if a regime that is aligned with the United States violates human rights, for example, the latter does not demonstrate its commitment to the promotion of democracy by criticizing the former and taking other concrete actions. Conversely, when a regime that is considered an adversary violates human rights, the United States is quick to criticize that government and to often call for punitive measures such as economic sanctions.

In agreeing with Aka, Schroeder asserts that American "national interests" supersede any commitment to issues such as democracy and human rights. However, in instances in which moral issues do not clash with American "national interests," Washington has demonstrated the tendency to support those moral ideals. In other words, considering the centrality of "national interests" in the orbit of American foreign policy, the United States' support for moral ideals and principles is situational.[4]

Treading along the same path, Ohaegbulam posits that there is a contradiction between the rhetoric of American foreign policy that espouses such values as democracy and respect for human rights and praxis. He notes that since the promotion of American "national interests" is given primacy, moral language is used to cloak a traditional or concocted national security agenda.[5] In other words, the espousal of democratic and other ideals is designed to placate the American public, and cajoled Africans into believing that the United States is a champion of democracy and human dignity.

Lake and others argue that U.S. policy toward Africa in the post-Cold War era needs to transcend humanitarianism and accord primacy to the continent's growing economic and strategic importance to the United States.[6] Specifically, they pinpoint Africa's utility in helping to meet the energy needs of the United States and serving as a frontier in the U.S. "war on terror." Also, they stress that a "new strategic approach" to U.S.-Africa relations would help position the United States to compete with the growing influence of China on the continent.

Similarly, Cohen posits that Africa has become increasingly important to the United States in light of the continent's wealth of natural resources that are a premium in this time of commodity inflation.[7] In other words, according to Cohen, with continuing instability in regions like the Middle East on which the United States is dependent for its energy needs, Africa could emerge as a crucial actor, especially in view of the huge oil reserves discovered in the Gulf of Guinea region. Similarly, the region is important to the United States because it has virtually all of the minerals that are critical for the continual industrial development of the United States.

The Liberal Paradigm

Clough suggests that with the end of the Cold War, the United States is now well positioned to give priority to the promotion of democracy and economic development in Africa.[8] He observes that the United States was hamstrung from pursuing these lofty goals by the exigencies of the Cold War. In short, Clough does not see any obstacle that would prevent the United States from according priority to helping build democratic and developed societies in Africa now that the "superpower" rivalry has ended.

Clark asserts that the United States has demonstrated its commitment to the promotion of democracy in Africa by supporting the holding of regular multiparty elections on the continent. This is because elections constitute important markers in the democratization process.[9] She suggests that the support for elections should remain a cornerstone of American policy toward Africa, because it provides an important leverage for the United States.[10]

Rothchild argues that the United States has a commitment to the cause of democracy and good governance in Africa.[11] This resolve is reflected in the support for regular elections, representative political institutions, transparency and accountability in the management of government affairs, and a vibrant civil society.[12] In other words, the United States is interested in the building of a democratic Africa in which governments are accountable to the people, and citizens participate in the political process.

Carothers stresses the importance of putting the United States' democracy promotion project in Africa and other regions of the world on a better track, as a departure from the "road map" that was charted by the Bush administration.[13] Specifically, he suggests three critical components as the foundational pillars of the "new road map." First, democracy promotion must be what he called "decontaminated from the taint" it acquired under President Bush.[14] Second, it must be repositioned in the "war on terror."[15] Third, it must be recalibrated to account for broader changes in the international system.[16]

Farer argues that the United States' relations with Africa and the rest of the world should be anchored on a "liberal grand strategy."[17] Specifically, he suggests that American foreign policy should be framed by ideas such as the promotion of human rights. The rationale is that such an approach would enable the United States to contribute to the solutions of some of the vexing problems in Africa and elsewhere in the world.

Critique

The two dominant theories in international relations literature are inadequate frameworks for examining U.S.-Africa relations. Realism erroneously assumes that the citizens of the United States have a convergence of "interests" that the American state pursues in its relations with the various African states. Such an approach fails to take cognizance of the fact that the United States is segmented into classes and other identities. These identities, on the basis of their respective stations in the political economy, have different interests. Significantly, the American state pursues the interests of the dominant group that has control over the levers of state power. Hence, the notion of "American national interest" incorrectly conveys the sense that the citizens of the United States have monolithic interests.

The liberal theory also erroneously portrays the view that the United States is interested in the welfare of the peoples of Africa, as reflected, inter alia, in the so-called democracy promotion project. On the contrary, the repository of evidence shows that since the genesis of U.S.-Africa relations in the 1960s, the United States has viewed Africa as a region that can help supply the natural resources—oil and minerals—that are critical to the continual socioeconomic development of the United States. Thus, the use of pious rhetoric by the United States is simply designed to conceal the selfish economic motives of the American ruling class through its vehicle, the U.S. government.

The Alternative Paradigm: The Theory of Imperialism

I suggest the theory of imperialism as the alternative paradigm for examining the economic, political, and security relations between the United States and Africa. Using Michael Parenti's conceptual framework, imperialism is defined as "the process whereby the dominant politico-economic interest of one nation expropriate for their own enrichment the land, labor, raw materials and markets of another people, [by] transforming and dominating their economies, cultures, and political life, integrating their financial and productive structures into an international system of capital accumulation."[18]

The theory of imperialism is premised on several pillars. First, in terms of the foundation, as V. I. Lenin correctly postulated, "imperialism is the highest stage of capitalism."[19] Accordingly, capitalism is the epicenter of the imperial architecture.[20] That is, since capitalism has an insatiable appetite for expansion and accumulation, imperialism serves as the motor force for achieving this goal. Operationally, this entails the concentration of capital, the overwhelming predominance of monopolies, the increasingly important role played by financial capital, the export of capital, and the division of the world into different "spheres of influence." Globalization has increased the structural asymmetries of the imperialist structures that define the incorporation of the different countries in them.[21]

Second, the imperialist states exploit their client states through an assortment of economic instruments, including aid, debt, private investment, and trade. Bilateral aid from the imperialist powers is used, inter alia, to cement the dependent relationship between the metropolitan ruling classes through their respective imperial states and the local compradors through their various peripheral formations. In terms of debt, the imperialist powers use their control over the international financial system to shackle their client states in what Cheryl Payer poignantly refers to as "debt trap."[22] That is, pressured by crises of economic and social underdevelopment, the client states are enticed by the imperialist powers and the international financial institutions—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank—they control to contract bilateral and multilateral loans under conditions favorable to the lenders. Burdened by debt servicing, the client states often engage in the cyclical process of borrowing from one imperialist entity in order to service the debt of another. Private investments provide major conduits through which wealth is siphoned off from the client states to the imperialist ones. Specifically, this is done by direct plunder, by the expropriation of natural resources, and the payment of poverty wages to workers in the peripheral states.[23] As for trade, it is conducted under the aegis of what Alex Callinicos refers to as "asymmetrical free trade"—which is more about the imperialist states pressuring client states and others to open up their markets.[24]

Third, in order to impose and maintain their domination over their client states for the purpose of continuing the exploitative relationship, the imperialist powers pursue what A. P. Thorton calls an "imperial policy" that enables them to create and maintain an external system of effective control.[25] The control may be exerted by political, economic, strategic, cultural, religious, or ideological means or by a combination of some of those.

Fourth, imperialist penetration of and subsequent stranglehold on client states is contingent upon the existence of a patron-client relationship between the bourgeoisies in the core states and the compradors in the periphery, especially the state managers. As James Petras and others aptly observe, "Collaborator classes are formed through a complex process of internal class and political formation and external integration into subordinate but beneficial elite relations."[26] The crux of the resultant dependent relationship is that the compradors, especially the state managers, use state power in the client states to create propitious conditions for the purpose of the private accumulation of capital by the members of the metropolitan ruling classes through their multinational corporations (MNCs) and other businesses via exploitation. Importantly, in order to ensure this, the imperialist powers install and keep in power regimes in the client states that are friendly to transnational business interests.[27]

Fifth, the imperialist state is used by the bourgeoisies for promoting their interests. In so doing, the imperialist state forges asymmetrical relationships with various client states for the purpose of exploiting their resources for the benefit of the ruling class in the imperialist state. Additionally, the imperial state provides the financial and political backing as well as the threats and personal rewards that induce the privatization of lucrative enterprises and the one-sided elimination of foreign trade and investment barriers in the client states.[28]

U.S.-Africa Relations: A Background

U.S.-Africa relations have evolved in two major phases: the final stage of the "old globalization" (1946–1990) and the "new globalization" (1990 to the present). At the beginning of the final stage of the "old globalization," the totality of the African continent, with the exception of Ethiopia, Liberia, and Egypt, was under the imperial control of Britain, France, and other colonial powers. Based on the restrictions imposed by colonial imperialism, the United States used its influence as one of the emergent "superpowers" to pressure the comparatively weak colonial powers to grant "independence" to their colonies. American action was not driven by altruism and the associated concern for the welfare of Africans. Instead, it was propelled by the desire of the United States to make the continent's various natural resources available to the economic wing of the American ruling class for pillage and plunder. As Harry Magdoff asserts,

> American foreign policy is not designed to help improve the material conditions of ordinary citizens. Instead, it is driven by a desire to maintain as much of the globe as possible for private trade and private enterprise based on the prevention of competitive empires from acquiring privileged trading and investment preserves to the disadvantage of U.S. business interest, and wherever feasible, the attainment of a preferred trading and investment position for U.S. business, and the promotion of counter-revolution, which is hoisted on the abortion of incipient social revolutions and the suppression of social revolutions in progress.[29]

Against this background, the government of the United States took two major interrelated measures. First, over time, it forged patron-client relationships with some of the most tyrannical regimes on the continent, including arap Moi (Kenya), Barre (Somalia), Doe (Liberia), and Mobutu (Zaire). Washington ignored the increasing human rights abuses and political mismanagement by its various client regimes.[30] Instead, it provided them with, among others, weapons, which they used to suppress dissent.

The other major step taken by the United States was the undermining, and in some cases the removal, of regimes that sought to cater to the needs of the members of their respective subaltern classes. For example, American and Belgian imperialism collaborated in ousting the regime of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo. Similarly, American and British imperialism worked in tandem to encourage a military coup that removed Kwame Nkrumah from power in Ghana. Particularly, Nkrumah's call for the establishment of "United States of Africa" was antithetical to the United States' imperial agenda on the continent.

With the end of the "old globalization," including the Cold War, which constituted one of its major dimensions, the United States is now constrained to repackage its imperial agenda. One of the significant outcomes is the intensification of the democracy promotion rhetoric. That is, the United States is attempting to convince the subaltern classes in Africa that it is committed to the establishment of democracy on the continent, while continuing its policy of supporting various authoritarian regimes there—Kagame (Rwanda), Mubarak (Egypt), Museveni (Uganda), and Zenawi (Ethiopia), among others.[31] As Vassilis Foukas and Bulent Gokay observe, "Imperialism has often clothed itself in noble rhetorical garb, claiming to pursue its hegemony for the good of the nation or even the good of humanity."[32] Interestingly, the election of Barack Obama as the president of the United States has created the illusion among some Africans that the United States will abandon its imperial agenda and support the establishment of democracy and the promotion of socioeconomic development in Africa. On the contrary, the reality is that President Obama simply represents the "new face" of American imperialism, which is characterized by, among other things, the abandonment of the use of bellicose language that was a major hallmark of the Bush regime. However, substantively, American imperial policy toward Africa remains intact, and the Obama administration is not going to change it. In essence, under the suzerainty of the American ruling class, the imperial project will remain intact, irrespective of whether the incumbent president is a Democrat or a Republican; White, African American, or a member of another race; male or female. Thus, as Horace Campbell aptly asserts, "The American ruling class [will continue to view] Africa as a treasure trove to be plundered."[33]

The Nature and Dynamics of the Relationship

Background

The relations between the United States and Africa cover the broad gamut of cultural, economic, political, military/security, and social issues. However, in this section of the chapter, the focus will be on the economic, political, and security dimensions of the relationship. The objective is to locate the relations in these various areas within the crucible of the American imperial project.

Specifically, in the economic domain, the focus will be on aid, debt, private investment, and trade. The political dimension will revolve around the superficiality of the United States' "democracy promotion project." In the security realm, we will look at the African Command (AFRICOM) and the bilateral agreements between the United States and various African states that are designed to help enhance American war-making capacity.

Economic Relations

Aid

Foreign aid is seldom seen by bourgeois economics for what it actually is—one method by which capital and capitalism are internationalized, markets and resources are secured, and a climate conducive to worldwide private investment is created and strengthened.[34] Against this backdrop, American foreign aid to Africa is a form of compensation that is given to the compradors, who manage the state, for the services they provide to the U.S. ruling class. The central service is the use of state power to create the conditions that are propitious for the private accumulation of capital. In order to perform this overarching service, the African compradors, inter alia, suppress the rights of workers, which includes the use of brute force against them when they go on strike; permit metropolitan-based MNCs and other businesses to pay African workers very low wages; and provide an assortment of preferential treatment to the MNCs, including tax holidays, tax breaks, and the unfettered repatriation of capital.

American foreign aid consists of two major parts: economic and military. The former comprises concessional loans, budgetary subsidies, and grants that are designed to provide a modicum of "oxygen" for the various authoritarian client regimes that serve as "foot soldiers" in the promotion and protection of the economic interests of the American ruling class. The latter consists of equipment, munitions, and training. Collectively, they are intended to provide client American regimes with the arsenal they need to suppress the various domestic groups that agitate for democratic change. For example, the Kibaki regime in Kenya used American supplied weapons and American trained "antiterrorist units" within the military to unleash violence on thousands of Kenyans who protested the country's fraudulent presidential election in December 2007.[35]

Also, the distribution of aid is based on the importance of each client African state to the promotion of the interests of the American ruling class. In this vein, in 2009, for example, Egypt received a total of $1.5 billion in aid, representing about 33 percent of total American aid to Africa.[36] Of this amount, military assistance accounted for $1.3 billion, while $0.2 billion was allotted to economic matters.[37]

Debt

The provision of bilateral loans as well as directing the IMF and the World Bank to give loans to various African client regimes provide "umbilical cords" that tie these regimes and their respective states to the American ruling class and state. That is, the seemingly endless nature of the crisis of socioeconomic underdevelopment in Africa, coupled with the recurrence of contraction of loans, ultimately leads the borrowing African states into what Cheryl Payer poignantly calls a "debt trap."[38] As the amounts of the loans increase along with the associated debt servicing obligations, the indebted client regimes adopt the practice of contracting new loans to service the interests on "old loans." Ultimately, this becomes a cyclical process that forces the indebted African states to descend further into the abyss of debt. By the mid-1980s, for example, these states were plagued by the debt crisis and the vagaries of the broader crisis of socioeconomic underdevelopment. Accordingly, as Silvia Federici notes, "the debt crisis in Africa provided American capitalism with a golden opportunity to influence a wide-ranging re-organization of class relations, aimed at cheapening the cost of African labor, rising social productivity, reversing 'social expectations,' and opening the continent to a fuller penetration of capitalist relations."[39]

By the mid-1990s, various African client states were saddled with the burden of continuing to service and eventually paying off both the odious official debt owed to the United States and the multilateral loans from the IMF and the World Bank. During this period, sub-Saharan African states owed the United States over $5 billion.[40] Devastated by the cumulative effects of the dynamics of the global capitalist system, including the U.S.- and IMF-imposed Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), African states began to demonstrate their individual and collective inability to service the debt. Fearing the adverse ramifications, the United States and the other advanced capitalist states designed and implemented so-called bilateral and multilateral debt forgiveness plans. At the bilateral level, the United States began "canceling" the remaining principals on the debt owed by several of its client states, including Egypt. At the multilateral level, two schemes—the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPCI) and the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative—were designed.[41] Under both schemes, selected African countries have to meet a set of criteria, including a recommitment to peripheral capitalism, in order to qualify for "debt forgiveness." By the end of 2009, the United States had "forgiven" the official debt of some of its client regimes, including Kenya, Liberia, and Nigeria. Under the U.S.-controlled multilateral schemes, various African states, including Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ethiopia, Senegal, and Uganda, are undergoing the "debt forgiveness rituals," comprising various steps that are anchored on the twin requirements that these states acquiesce in the continuation of American imperialist plunder and pillage on the continent and pledge to continue on the peripheral capitalist path.

Private Investment

Like loans, since the final stage of the era of "old globalization," foreign investment has served as a major conduit for transferring wealth from Africa to the members of the American ruling class. This has been facilitated by the compradors, who ensure that there is no worry on the part of American MNCs and other businesses about overtime pay for workers, sick leave, holidays, worker safety, and other labor issues.[42] Furthermore, American MNCs in Africa make sure through the agency of the American state that there is always available in its system of client states an enormous and impoverished "reserve army" of unorganized workers, kept unorganized by force and uneducated by neglect.[43] In short, as Gerald Dumenill and Dominique Levy observe, "direct investment [in Africa] . . . contributes extensively to the remuneration of capital in the United States, under the form of interest, dividends and profits of transnational corporations retained abroad."[44]

Since the dawn of the epoch of the "new globalization" in 1990, American corporations have become interested in investing in Africa, with some regarding it as the "last big growth market."[45] Africa's energy and mining sectors have become the primary investment attractions for American capital. For example, Shell, Exxon, and Texaco have made major investments in the oil sector of various African oil producing states. Similarly, American Mineral Fields and Bechtel have invested in the mining sector of the DRC, which holds 80 percent of the world's coltan reserves, more than 60 percent of the world's cobalt, and is the world's largest supplier of high-grade copper.[46] In 2008, American corporations in Africa had estimated total assets of $116.6 billion, including $28.3 billion in Nigeria and $13.3 billion in South Africa.[47]

Trade

Like the other modes of economic interaction, U.S.-Africa trade relations are shaped and conditioned by the exploitative international capitalist system and its associated power asymmetries. The resultant trading system is based on two major pillars. Under the "division of labor," the United States manufactures goods such as machinery, which it sells to various African states. On the other hand, African states are assigned the role of producing raw materials such as crude oil, minerals, and agricultural commodities. And these primary products are used to feed the industrial and manufacturing machines of the United States. Similarly, under the "system of unequal exchange," the United States pays African states less for their raw materials while requiring them to pay more for American manufactured products. One of the resultant effects is that African states have perennially suffered from terms of trade problems. This is because African states have to produce increased amounts of raw materials to purchase the same quantity of American manufactured goods.

In terms of the volume of trade, in 2009, for example, the United States' exports to Africa totaled $22.2 billion, while imports from Africa stood at $55.2 billion.[48] The resulting American trade deficit with Africa is deceiving, because oil accounted for the bulk of the United States' imports from Africa. The latter now supplies the United States with roughly the same amount of crude oil as the Middle East.[49]

Political Relations

One of the enduring features of American imperialism has been (and continues to be) the disconnect between the United States' "pro-democracy rhetoric" and praxis. During the last phase (Cold War) of the "old globalization," the United States professed to be the "leader of the free world." However, the repository of evidence indicated that American imperialism was fundamentally interested in providing support for its various compradorial regimes on the continent that provided propitious conditions for the accumulation of capital by the members of the American ruling class through their various businesses operating in Africa. Several cases are instructive. In South Africa, the U.S. government supported the Afrikaner-based local ruling class and its apartheid system economically, politically, and militarily. This was because various American MNCs reaped tremendous profits from the slave-like labor of Africans who worked in the mining, industrial, and other sectors of the South African economy. In Zaire, the United States subverted the democratic process by being one of the major players in the overthrow of the regime of Patrice Lumumba, the democratically elected prime minister.[50] Subsequently, Lumumba was killed, and replaced by Mobutu Sese Seko, the quintessential autocrat, who served the interests of American imperialism in various ways. For example, the Mobutu regime created the enabling environment for American MNCs to plunder and pillage the reservoir of minerals. Similarly, in Liberia, the U.S. government facilitated the overthrow of the Tolbert regime and its replacement with a military junta headed by Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe.[51] The Doe regime served as a "point guard" of American imperialism in Africa. For example, it continued to ensure the reaping of profits by American businesses operating in Liberia. In short, as Henry Jackson argues, "the unrepresentative and even undemocratic character of [pro-American regimes was] not an insurmountable obstacle to good relations with Washington."[52]

Consistent with the imperatives of the "new globalization," American imperialism made the determination that authoritarianism could be sanitized through, inter alia, the liberalization of the "political space" and the associated holding of multiparty elections. The pivot for this shift was the increasing level of resistance to various authoritarian American and French client regimes across the continent. The opposition was reflected in, among other things, strikes by workers and demonstrations by students. So, fearing the possibility of the outbreak of mass-based revolutions and the implications for American imperial interests on the continent, Washington decided to press for procedural changes in the governance architectures of its various client regimes. Clearly, these changes were not designed to institute people-centered holistic democracy and bring about the required reconstitution of the state, its political economy, and the associated power relationships at various levels and sectors. Thus, neoliberal democratization emerged as the embellishment for authoritarianism, with the continual protection of private property at the domestic and global levels as its core.[53]

Against this background, various authoritarian American client regimes held multiparty elections: Mubarak (Egypt), Zenawi (Ethiopia), Kibaki (Kenya), Kigame (Rwanda), and Museveni (Uganda). However, in all these cases, the incumbent regime controlled the electoral process and ultimately the outcome of the presidential elections. In other words, although various opposition political parties were allowed to contest the presidential elections, the incumbent American client regimes engaged in what Andrea Schedler calls "electoral authoritarianism"—the manipulation of the various phases of the electoral process to the advantage of the incumbent regime.[54]

So, while these elections appeared to be democratic on the surface, they were authoritarian in substance. Also, despite the façade of democratic elections, the political performances of these American client regimes have been dismal. For example, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Rwanda have been classified as "authoritarian," and Kenya and Uganda as "semi-authoritarian" by Freedom House in its annual survey of world freedoms.[55]

Security Relations

AFRICOM

While U.S.-Africa security relations span a broad spectrum of issues, the focus in this section of the chapter will be on two major areas: AFRICOM, and Africa as a "bridgehead" for facilitating the United States' various military operations. AFRICOM was established in 2007 with the mission to conduct sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy.[56] In short, the propaganda being waged by the U.S. government is that AFRICOM is intended to promote development, democracy, peace, and stability in Africa.

Contrary to American propaganda, the overarching purpose of AFRICOM is to have a military force readily available to pursue and protect the interests of the American ruling class in Africa. One of the major interests is access to Africa's oil. For example, West Africa has some 60 billion barrels of proven oil reserves.[57] Its oil is the low sulfur, sweet crude prized by the U.S. economy.[58] It is projected that the Gulf of Guinea subregion will provide 25 percent of the United States' oil by 2015.[59] Another interest of the American ruling class is to counter China's growing influence in Africa, especially Chinese access to Africa's oil and minerals. Also, since the maintenance of client regimes is critical to the pursuance of the interests of the American ruling class, protecting these regimes from popular domestic uprisings is a key interest of the American bourgeoisies and their government.

Africa as a "bridgehead"

Africa serves as a "bridgehead" that enables the United States to employ military force to pursue its imperial agenda. As Daniel Volman notes, "The United States does not have its own bases in Africa, but relies on the agreement of African governments to use local bases and other military facilities in times of need."[60] For example, in 2002, the United States converted Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, which is strategically located in the "Horn of Africa," as the headquarters for its Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa. The task force monitors and interdicts possible terrorist travel routes at sea and suspected terrorist activities in adjacent countries, especially in Somalia.[61] Also, the United States was granted the right by the Algerian government to use the airfield at Tamarasset in the southern portion of the country, for the deployment of P-3 Orion aerial surveillance aircraft.[62] Similarly, the United States has arrangements with Ghana, Senegal, Gabon, Namibia, Uganda, and Zambia for its military aircrafts to refuel at local bases.[63]

The United States has established "lily pad facilities" in several African countries, including Uganda. At Entebbe Airport, the United States has built two "K-Span" steel buildings to house troops and equipment.[64] The United States has access to similar facilities in Mali, Morocco, and Tunisia.[65] These facilities provide pretext for American imperialism, because U.S. forces can hop in and out of them in times of crisis while avoiding the impression of establishing a permanent—and potentially provocative—presence.[66]

Breaking the Stranglehold of American Imperialism: Some Suggestions

How can the United States' imperial stranglehold on Africa be broken? This is both a complex and challenging task. However, it is imperative that ways be found to help liberate Africa from the vagaries of American imperialism. Fundamentally, the struggle must be anchored on what Vishanthie Sewpaul calls "a counter-hegemonic consciousness to neoliberal capitalism and a commitment to redistributive justice as we envision another world order."[67] This would require, among other things, the development of solidarity between and among progressive forces within African states; the development of a network of progressives forces across the continent; the building of solidarity between and among the progressive forces on the African continent and Africans in the Diaspora, progressives in other Third World states, and the United States. The emergent global progressive movement with branches in various African states, the United States, and the rest of the world will serve as the primary agency for leading the struggle to fundamentally change the relationship between the United States and African states in ways that make them mutually beneficial to the people.

Against this background, several strategies are suggested. First, fundamental changes need to be made in the American domestic political economy, including its relations of production. The restructuring of the American political economy would help change the class basis of American foreign policy. That is, if the bourgeoisies are no longer dominant, then the motor force of American foreign policy would no longer be the exploitation of Africans and their natural resources for the purpose of enriching the capitalists. While the transformation of the American political economy is the epicenter of the development of a mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and Africa, it would be a daunting task, given the entrenchment of capitalism in the psychology of Americans, even the subalterns.

Second, the domestic political economies of African states need to be transformed within the broader context of reconstituting the state, so that they serve the supreme interests of ordinary people. This would entail, among other things, changing the mission of the African state from serving the interests of the American and other metropolitan-based bourgeoisies and their dominant states to providing for the material well-being of the subalterns. The derivative should be the restructuring of the various domestic political economies and their attendant relations of production. The major resultant effect would be the termination of the central role played by the compradors as handmaids for fostering the agenda of American imperialism.

Third, the global political economy and its associated structures, processes, rules, and modes of interactions that perpetuate inequities, injustices, and exploitation need to be restructured on the basis of a new vision of redistributive justice. In other words, the global trading order and its associated "division of labor" and "system of unequal exchange," the predatory loan system, and the plundering and pillaging by core-based MNCs would need to be terminated. In their stead, a new global political and socioeconomic order based on mutual respect, equity, social justice, and fairness would need to be established as the overarching framework in which U.S.-Africa relations occur. Significantly, this would help resolve the dialectical tension between development in the United States and underdevelopment in African states.

Finally, the formation of a global network of progressive forces that is fundamentally opposed to neoliberal capitalism and its vagaries is crucial to the tasks of restructuring the political economies of the United States and the African states, and other countries. In other words, one of the fundamental tasks of the global network of progressives, as the agency of change, would be to struggle for the replacement of capitalism as the dominant mode of production. In turn, capitalism needs to be replaced with a system based on fairness and social justice.

Conclusion

The overarching raison d'etre of U.S.-Africa relations is to promote the American imperial project. That is, Africa is one of the major frontiers that the U.S. government uses to promote the interests of its ruling class. The core interest is the private accumulation of wealth by American bourgeoisies. In this vein, Africa's vast natural resources, including oil and minerals, are coveted by the American ruling class. In order to facilitate the process of the private accumulation of capital on the part of the American bourgeoisies, the American government forges a patron-client relationship with various compradorial regimes on the continent. In turn, these regimes used state power to promote the interests of the American ruling class. And this is reflected in the broad gamut of relations spanning from economic to security. As compensation, the members of Africa's various compradorial regimes receive economic, political, and military assistance from the United States to help protect them from domestic opposition, especially progressive forces that are deemed inimical to the interests of the American ruling class.

To make the relationship mutually rewarding, three "sea changes" are required. First, the American domestic political economy needs to be transformed, including the asymmetrical power relationships between the bourgeois and subaltern classes. Second, the political economies of African states need to undergo change as part of the broader process of people-centric state reconstitution. Third, the exploitative and unjust structures, processes, and rules of the global political economy need to be changed.

Notes

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2

Britain and Africa in the Twenty-First Century

Paul D. Williams

Introduction

Contemporary Africa contains huge variations across its many states: some states are relatively stable while others have endured protracted conflicts, some have rapidly expanding economies while others are in reverse gear, and some are stable democracies while others are among the most authoritarian on the planet. In such a varied continent it is not surprising that the British government does not have a single Africa policy. Instead, it has engaged with many different "Africas" and adopted a wide range of policy instruments—from military operations to budget support.

And yet for all the variation, there has been significant continuity in the broad objectives of British policy. Since New Labour's election to power in May 1997, Britain's policies toward Africa have been accorded greater prominence than under the previous Conservative administrations and have been articulated with persistent reference to promoting the three core objectives of peace, good governance, and prosperity.[1] These objectives are officially codified in public service agreements (PSAs)—the Treasury's attempt to devise targets intended to measure the impact and value for money of UK policies. The 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review set 30 PSAs for the period 2008–11. These applied across the UK government as a whole rather than on a department-by-department basis. In relation to Britain's Africa policies, the two most important are PSA 29—reduce poverty in poorer countries through quicker progress toward the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)—and PSA 30—reduce the impact of conflict through enhanced UK and international efforts.[2]

This chapter provides an overview and analysis of the UK government's attempts to achieve these goals during the first decade of the twenty-first century. After setting out some of the main contextual factors shaping contemporary UK-Africa policies, the chapter examines how the government sought to promote peace, good governance, and prosperity on the continent. I conclude that although successive Labour governments have paid greater attention to African issues than their Conservative predecessors, particularly in the field of development, they have also overestimated the amount of leverage Britain can exercise over local African politics and have failed to come up with a coherent and an effective strategy to reform the continent's most poorly governed states.

Context

Britain's attempts to promote peace, good governance, and prosperity in Africa have been influenced by both the domestic and international contexts. Domestically, the first point to note is that the Labour Party was in power for over 12 years. This helped ensure a significant continuity of objectives and relatively stable institutional machinery for policymaking.[3] Not surprisingly, African affairs have involved many arms of government, but the central players have been the Prime Minister's Office (especially during Tony Blair's premiership), the Department for International Development (DFID), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and the Ministry of Defence (MOD). Other actors have also had important niche roles including the Treasury, the Stabilization Unit,[4] the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA),[5] the Department of Health, and the intelligence services. Despite efforts to formulate a "whole of government" or "joined up" approach, differences in organizational culture and priorities across these bureaucracies have hampered the coordination and implementation of policy on a regular basis.

A second domestic factor is that the biggest issues on Britain's foreign policy agenda have not focused on Africa. Although some senior Labour Party politicians devoted unprecedented levels of attention to Africa, compared with the struggle against al-Qaida; the wars in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan; and efforts to counter nuclear proliferation, African issues played only a bit part in the United Kingdom's overall foreign and security policies. It was only in the area of development policies that Africa was at the forefront of UK concern. This hierarchy of priorities was reflected in the June 2009 publication of the Commission on National Security's document *Shared Responsibilities: A National Security Strategy for the UK*. Out of 109 recommendations, Africa was mentioned explicitly in only two of them.[6]

This does not mean that Africa has been invisible on the United Kingdom's national security radar. Rather, relative to other regions—notably Europe, the Middle East, and Asia—Africa has not been a priority for achieving Britain's "overarching national security objective": to protect "the UK and its interests, enabling its people to go about their daily lives freely and with confidence, in a more secure, stable, just and prosperous world."[7] Accordingly, only parts of the continent featured prominently in the United Kingdom's first-ever National Security Strategy (NSS): North and East Africa because of concerns about the threat of transnational terrorism; failed and fragile states because of their susceptibility to organized crime, such as the drug trade in West Africa; and states suffering under the continent's "prevailing political system"—autocracy—because of the potential for instability.[8] Overall, therefore, the United Kingdom's security strategy has focused on "those parts of Africa suffering from conflict . . . or extremism."[9] The 2009 update of the NSS continued this trend of seeing parts of Africa as significant because they posed maritime security challenges (especially around the Horn and the Gulf of Guinea) and offered sanctuary for al-Qaida (especially in North and East Africa).[10]

The increasing prominence of various nonstate actors has been a third significant feature of British domestic politics. In relation to African affairs, these have included development and humanitarian organizations such as Christian Aid and

Oxfam as well as advocacy groups such as International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International. There have also been social movements such as the Jubilee campaign to cancel odious debt in developing countries, the campaign to "Make Poverty History," and the coalition of various citizen groups trying to "save Darfur." Moreover, there are significant African diaspora populations within the United Kingdom, especially in Greater London. Indeed, the over 500,000 migrants from Africa (many of whom come from outside the continent's anglophone states) have long represented the fastest-growing black and minority ethnic group in Britain.[11]

In the international realm, recent debate over Britain's Africa policies has taken place against the backdrop of four crises: climate change, the global recession, energy supplies, and transnational terrorism. The first crisis arguably presents humanity with its biggest medium- and long-term problem: how to deal with the consequences of a hotter planet with more extreme and unpredictable weather patterns. Africa has featured prominently in these debates because although its states bear little responsibility for bringing about these changes, Africans are predicted to suffer a disproportionate share of the negative effects of climate change in terms of human suffering, environmental degradation, and political instability.[12]

The second crisis—the current global recession—posed a more immediate set of concerns for Africans and the British government alike. At home, the subsequent pressure on budgets raised the specter that Britain might renege on its commitments in relation to aid and military-related issues. As for effects of the economic downturn on Africa, the British government's analysis suggested that there were four ways in which the continent was badly hit.[13] First, there was a declining demand for, and prices of, a number of key commodities, the only real exceptions being gold and cocoa. Second, remittances fell by at least one-twelfth across the continent. In addition, those sent home by Africans were expected to drop by $800 million in 2009.[14] Third, there was a reduction in international private capital flows, including foreign direct investment and portfolio investment. Finally, aid flows fell, in part because of currency fluctuations. Although there were no easy solutions, the United Kingdom's minister for Africa, Asia and the UN, Mark Malloch Brown, suggested that the antidote to the recession lay first and foremost in greater regional integration—of markets, infrastructure, and institutions—across the continent.[15]

The third crisis revolves around the growing anxiety among industrialized states that there will be increased competition for energy supplies, especially oil and natural gas. While the search for sustainable alternatives continues, Africa's relative abundance of these and other crucial commodities such as coltan, diamonds, gold, uranium, cassiterite, and wolframite means that the continent is increasingly being framed as the site of competition between the major seekers of resources such as the United States, China, and India but including Britain and other advanced industrialized states.

The fourth crisis—fear of transnational terrorism—has abated somewhat since the measures taken immediately after the 9/11 attacks but it continues to exercise a significant influence on British policies, including with respect to Africa.[16] Not least because the four men convicted of the abortive July 21, 2005, bombs in London were all born in the Horn of Africa.[17] Overall, Britain's approach to African affairs has certainly not been as militarized as that of either the U.S. or French governments but London has continued to apply the counterterrorism lens to parts of the continent, notably North Africa and the Muslim belt (running from the Horn through the Sahel to West Africa). Taken together, these four crises have produced an increasingly complex and uncertain international context in which to pursue the objectives of peace, good governance, and prosperity.

Peace

Managing Africa's most destructive armed conflicts has been a central objective of UK policy. As PSA 30 concludes, "Where conflict exists, achievement of any other UK Government objective is harder to achieve. So preventing and managing international conflicts is core UK Government business."[18] More precisely, Britain's core goals are to reduce the number and impact of armed conflicts and develop more effective international institutions and UK capabilities that are better able to prevent and manage conflict and build peace.[19] Of course, not every African war has attracted significant British engagement, but the government has deployed various conflict management techniques in a range of settings, including mediation, peacekeeping, peacebuilding as well as unilateral military enforcement measures in the case of Sierra Leone.[20] Even in areas where it has undertaken significant conflict management initiatives, the UK government has been well aware that it "cannot determine outcomes on its own" and must therefore work "with and through our international partners," especially the UN, the African Union (AU), and the European Union (EU).[21]

According to the international development secretary, British policy in Africa's war zones is to "build peace and to build functioning states."[22] This means supporting lasting political settlements; addressing the underlying causes of conflict and building institutions to resolve them; establishing effective states that can survive on their own; and helping states deliver growth, jobs, and basic services to meet the expectations and demands of their citizens. In practice, however, the UK government has tended to frame its short-term goal in war zones as stabilization: "the summary term for the essential processes (military, humanitarian, political and developmental) that are required to establish peace and security and put in place a political settlement that produces a legitimate government in states that have experienced (and sometimes still are experiencing) violent conflict."[23]

With regard to mediation, Britain has recently played significant roles in peace processes in some of Africa's most destructive conflicts, including Sierra Leone, Sudan, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Arguably the most impressive diplomatic achievement was the United Kingdom's role in the process that ultimately produced the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in early 2005. Whether this will survive the hugely complicated implementation process remains to be seen, but it did succeed in stopping one of Africa's most deadly wars. The downside of the long process of talks which eventually produced this agreement appeared most visibly in the Darfur region of Sudan where, in 2003, rebels who were not involved in the negotiations leading up to the CPA felt compelled to take up arms in order to try and gain a say in the process of deciding Sudan's political future. In relation to this war—between the government and two main rebel movements, the Justice and Equality Movement and the Sudan Liberation Army—Britain's mediatory role was less impressive. Here, it played a backseat role until the final stages of the seventh round of peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria. At this late stage, the international development secretary, Hilary Benn, was rushed to the negotiations along with the U.S. deputy secretary of state, Robert Zoellick. By all accounts, Benn and Zoellick then presided over a rushed agreement that was signed by the government and only one rebel faction.[24] The so-called Darfur Peace Agreement of May 2006 quickly collapsed, and another agreement has yet to be concluded despite lengthy attempts to do so in the Qatari city of Doha. Critics have maintained that this type of problem is indicative of a general failure by the UK government to devote sufficient attention and resources to working out specific strategies that could support more effective peace processes in the world's war zones.[25]

With regard to peacekeeping, Britain has rarely sent many of its troops to Africa. Indeed, in the twenty-first century it has never deployed more than 50 uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations on the continent—in spite of the fact that almost all of the UN missions in Africa have been significantly underresourced. Nor has the United Kingdom been a major contributor to EU peace operations on the continent. It has instead played a distinctly backseat role when compared with France and Germany. It contributed only 88 soldiers to the French-led Operation Artemis, which was deployed to help protect civilians in the eastern DRC town of Bunia during 2003.[26] Although Britain did contribute personnel to the European Force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUFOR RD) operation in the DRC during 2006, it is unclear how many, and UK personnel were certainly not a major presence in the mission. A similar story was evident in relation to the more recent EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic mission: as of December 2008, the United Kingdom was contributing just four personnel, and by May 2009, this figure had dropped to just two personnel out of the authorized total of 3,700. It is also notable that in the wake of the crisis in the North Kivu region of the DRC in late 2008, Britain was strongly against the idea that an EU force temporarily reinforce the beleaguered UN peacekeeping operation, MONUC.

Beyond the usual worry with "body bags," official justifications for this poor showing have tended to express concerns about command, control, and competency within UN peace operations and emphasize that Britain regularly places its personnel in key strategic management positions within these missions. The main reason, however, is that the United Kingdom's strategic priorities have lain outside Africa, specifically in the Balkans, Iraq, and increasingly in Afghanistan. Instead of contributing uniformed personnel, Britain has focused on placing advisors in strategic positions within the continent's regional organizations and has set about training, equipping, and funding peacekeepers throughout the continent. It has also been playing a leading external role in supporting the Eastern Brigade of the African Standby Force and has contributed funds and materiel to the AU peacekeeping missions in Burundi, Darfur, and Somalia.

At the far end of the conflict management spectrum, Britain has also made some significant contributions to peacebuilding activities. By far the most intensive engagement has been in Sierra Leone where, among other things, British personnel tried to retrain the army and the police in the aftermath of West Africa's interrelated series of wars. Britain has also been one of the most generous funders of the UN Peacebuilding Commission established in late 2006. As of August 31, 2009, the United Kingdom had deposited nearly $53 million in the Peacebuilding Fund, more than any other state except Sweden, which had deposited approximately $54.5 million. Rather worryingly, however, despite the investment of a relatively large amount of time and resources in Sierra Leone since 2000, according to the UN Development Programme's Human Development Index (2008), the country ranked dead last of the 179 states included.

At the other end of the spectrum, conflict prevention has been taken more seriously than before, as evidenced by the establishment of the Africa and Global Conflict Prevention Pools in 2001, mechanisms funded jointly by the FCO, DFID, and the MOD; the use of regional conflict advisors across the continent; and the publication of an important document on preventive techniques by the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit.[27] However, the differences in organizational priorities and the plethora of ongoing crises on the continent have meant that it is difficult to point to concrete successes of wars that have been prevented because of such activities. Nevertheless, the British government has been a strong supporter of the "responsibility to protect" (R2P) principle, which aims to prevent governments from committing genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and war crimes against their citizens. Britain has also endorsed the three-pillar approach to R2P set out by the UN secretary-general that emphasizes the preventive aspects of the agenda.[28]

Good Governance

Since it was first used by the development community in the 1980s, governance has become an umbrella term covering a variety of issues related to the appropriate rules by which groups decide who rules and how they are to do so legitimately. For the British government, at the national level, governance is usually understood as referring to the institutional governing architecture, including the management of public funds (and sometimes service delivery), the transparency of governing procedures including the legal and judicial frameworks, the quality of a country's representative institutions, and the behavior of enforcement agencies.[29] Understood in this manner, Britain has regularly identified good governance as an essential ingredient in building a peaceful and prosperous continent, not least in Tony Blair's Commission for Africa.[30]

Rather than lecturing African regimes on how to govern, Britain has challenged African governments to live up to their own stated commitments. This approach was made significantly easier after the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was concluded in 2001. Under NEPAD, African governments have accepted their primary responsibility for delivering better governance to their people. Some African states have also signed up to the voluntary African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which is supposed to promote better governance in African states by having external panels review the self-assessments and plans of action made by the regime in question and determine whether they are being followed.

Britain's attempts to promote good governance in Africa have revolved around several issues but the heart of the matter is the nature of the contemporary African state and the patronage networks that are so often at its core. As Tom Porteous correctly noted, the very fact that donor governments such as Britain focused on governance "was a polite way of saying that African governments were themselves at the heart of the problem."[31] In more specific terms, British policymakers have had to engage with severe cases of incumbent regimes manipulating domestic law, instances of extraordinary and deeply rooted forms of corruption, and many badly flawed elections.

Outside donor governments like Britain faced a particularly difficult challenge when incumbent regimes changed the law to suit their own political purposes and weaken their opponents. Such political manipulation took all sorts of forms, but probably the most fundamental was the rewriting of Constitutions in order to remove or extend limits on the length of time an incumbent president or prime minister could hold office. This was especially troubling when carried out by an incumbent receiving considerable support from the United Kingdom. In Uganda, for example, President Museveni, a longtime favorite with many bilateral and multilateral donors, including Britain, gradually rolled back the democratic safeguards set out in the 1995 Constitution, which culminated in the 2005 amendments that repealed the ban on a third elected term in office for the president.

Another persistently contentious issue has been the extent to which multiparty elections should serve as a marker of good governance. In sum, while many African countries have now held lots of elections, opposition victories have been almost nonexistent, thus emphasizing the point that elections are not necessarily a reflection of genuine democracy. For British policymakers, the major headaches came when incumbent regimes in states considered to be important business partners or political friends engaged in intimidation and electoral fraud. According to Richard Dowden, this problem has been exacerbated by the fact that most African elections operate on a winner-takes-all basis.[32] Instead, Dowden suggests that what is needed is some form of African proportional representation. Among the many examples of "unfree and unfair" elections, those conducted in Nigeria in 2003 and 2007 stand out as particularly notorious. Nevertheless, the British government continued with business as usual, not least because Nigeria is an important source of oil and peacekeepers and because of concerns about exacerbating possible links between some of its Muslim population and transnational terror networks.

The issue of systematic and widespread corruption also raised important governance challenges. The principal problem was how to tackle it—a pressure that was felt particularly strongly in countries where Britain provided significant amounts of aid. In Sierra Leone, for example, in 2007, Britain cut its budget support because of concerns about the government's financial management and the lack of audited public accounts. The strategic problem for any donor state is that the patronage systems that dominate many African states are, by definition, an exercise in corruption. This makes it extremely difficult to tackle the issue because even if an incumbent regime decides to establish anticorruption mechanisms, they will almost certainly be targeted first and foremost against political opponents or members of the ruling elite who have fallen out of favor rather than those most guilty of malpractice.

Some of the difficulties of dealing with high-level corruption were evident in the case of former Zambian president Frederick Chiluba. In 2007, Zambian prosecutors won a London High Court civil case in which Judge Peter Smith ruled that Chiluba was guilty of stealing $46 million from Zambian state coffers during his ten years in office. The case was pursued in British courts because some of the money was allegedly laundered through British banks. Judge Smith ordered Chiluba to pay back 85 percent of the money, but Chiluba did not make any such repayments.[33] In August 2009, however, a court in Lusaka found Chiluba not guilty in what was widely considered a watershed case for African justice—the first to see a former president tried on criminal charges of corruption with respect to his own state's funds. After his release, Chiluba was quick to blame "imperialists" for bringing such charges against him, while anticorruption campaigners within Zambia worried about the negative signal the verdict would send to potential investors.[34]

In cases where incumbent regimes continued to govern badly, Britain and other Western states began to fund more civil society organizations in the hope that they might be able to tame some of the government's excesses. Although this approach had some successes, as Richard Dowden observed, civic groups were generally "not strong enough to hold governments to account when it comes to the big battles for power at election time."[35]

In several respects, the disastrous developments in Zimbabwe exemplified the whole basket of governance challenges—a savvy autocrat unwilling to leave power but able to manipulate his country's laws, elections characterized by violence and fraud, elite corruption both within and beyond the country's borders, and a relatively sophisticated and vibrant mix of opposition and civil society groups that were still largely unable to blunt the state's power. Given the close historical and contemporary ties between the two countries, the British government could hardly have ignored the terrible effects of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front's (ZANU-PF) policies. It did not, however, have the power to stop ZANU-PF policies; indeed, the harder and more publicly it tried, the more it played to Mugabe's depiction of Blair's government as imperialists and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change as a tool of British policy. Zimbabwe's plunge thus demonstrated the limits of Britain's leverage, not only with respect to the ZANU-PF regime but also because it failed to convince the other members of the Southern African Development Community to take a common stand against Mugabe's excesses. To make matters worse, Britain's efforts to isolate Mugabe's regime, in part through financial and travel boycotts involving the EU, were also undermined by China's decision to provide the country with a $1 billion credit line.

Prosperity

Despite the general global trend whereby more people have escaped poverty than ever before, in sub-Saharan Africa, in 2005, 92 million more people were living on less than $1.25 a day than had been the case in 1990 (391 million as compared with 299 million).[36] According to the British government, this can in large part be attributed to two main factors: poor governance and the negative effects of armed conflicts in Africa since 1990. As well as trying to address the problems of war and bad governance, British policymakers have attempted to promote a more prosperous Africa through two principal mechanisms: business and development.

In relation to business opportunities, Africa continues to provide knowledgeable investors and firms with some excellent returns. Traditionally, the United Kingdom's major commercial relationships have centered on South Africa (by far Britain's biggest African source of exports and imports), Nigeria, and other members of the Commonwealth. With growing concerns about energy, however, firms such as British Petroleum (BP) and British Gas have sought opportunities beyond these countries, perhaps most notably in the energy-rich states of Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Algeria, and, most recently, Libya. More generally, a significant proportion of the British government's activities on the continent is taken up by commercial diplomacy—the attempt to promote British business.

With regard to development, beyond the effort to increase commerce, Britain has made use of several instruments, most notably various forms of aid and debt relief schemes. The biggest obstacle has been how to promote development in conflict zones and in authoritarian states where the incumbent regime has little desire or incentive to care for all of its people.

Successive Labour governments have seen development as important for both moral and security reasons. In Gordon Brown's words, Britain should live up to its development responsibilities "because it is morally right. But also because our prosperity, security and health are increasingly inseparable from events far beyond our borders."[37] Britain's overarching international development objective is to "promote accelerated progress towards the Millennium Development Goals."[38] In most cases, this is to be achieved by building "effective states."[39] DFID clearly assumed the leading role in this process but was supported by other government bodies, notably the FCO, DEFRA, the Treasury, and the Department of Health. Indeed, one former British official observed that the government's Africa policies were gradually "taken over by a department whose main mission was not diplomacy but development policy."[40] This produced a significant clash of organizational cultures—particularly with the FCO and the MOD—as well as squabbles over which ministry should lead on particular issues such as security sector reform. But it also led to DFID underplaying creeping authoritarianism as long as the national development statistics kept rising.

In substantive terms, at least 90 percent of Britain's bilateral aid is earmarked for low-income countries (currently 30 of the 43 states classified by the World Bank as low income are African).[41] DFID also made it clear that its biggest challenge was "fragile states," defined as countries "where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people."[42] As the then international development secretary, Douglas Alexander, argued, "Fragile states don't just need more money, they need a different approach to help them tackle the root causes of their fragility."[43]

DFID's last White Paper under the Labour government was released in July 2009 under the shadow cast by the global recession, concerns about climate change, and worries about the need to ensure a pro-development global trade deal.[44] Its central theme was the complexities raised by increasing levels of international economic, security, and even climate interdependence.[45] The main lesson DFID drew from the economic downturn was that "if countries do not grow, and grow consistently, they cannot reduce poverty sustainably."[46] A particular priority was to double agricultural production in Africa over the next 20 years.[47] Britain's minister for Africa, Asia and the UN summarized the point by saying, "It is jobs, business and growth that will ultimately haul people out of poverty."[48]

This diagnosis has left the British government looking for ways in which the instruments of aid and debt relief can support sustained and sustainable growth. In relation to debt relief, the major developments occurred at the end of the 1990s with the World Bank's Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPCI), the stimulus for which was provided by the extraordinary efforts of the Jubilee 2000 campaign.[49] More recently, in 2006 the G8's Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) was implemented with the aim of canceling 100 percent of the remaining debts of HIPCs to the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and African Development Bank. Under the MDRI, the IMF, World Bank, and African Development Bank canceled the debts of 19 African states.[50] The largest single recipient was Nigeria. In this case, the British government played a leading role within the G8, which was important since London held 25.5 percent of Nigeria's Paris Club debt.

As far as aid is concerned, the International Development Act (June 2002) stipulates that the primary purpose of Britain's aid programs is to reduce poverty, including the achievement of the MDGs. The other two objectives (ostensibly shared with the recipient state) are respecting human rights and other international obligations and strengthening financial management and accountability in the recipient state.[51]

Between 1997 and 2009, Britain's aid budget more than tripled.[52] In absolute terms, by 2007–08, DFID's bilateral assistance to sub-Saharan Africa was £1,302 million and accounted for 46 percent of DFID's bilateral program, up from 36 percent in 2003–04.[53] These large sums partly disguise the fact that Britain is not among the world's most generous donor states: in 2008 it ranked fourteenth among the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance

Committee members in terms of net overseas development aid (ODA) as a percentage of gross national income (GNI) (at 0.36 percent). The Labour government has promised to reach the UN's declared target of ODA totaling 0.7 percent of GNI by 2013, a commitment that has also been endorsed by the Conservative Party.[54]

In deciding how to allocate aid, Britain says it will consider the extent of poverty in a country and its ability to use aid effectively.[55] British aid is also supposed to be guided by five principles: developing country ownership, participatory and evidence-based policymaking, predictability about how much aid will be given and the basis on which funds will be reduced or stopped, harmonization with other donors, and transparency and accountability.[56] The top recipients of DFID's bilateral aid budget during 2006–07 were Nigeria, Tanzania, Sudan, Uganda, Malawi, Cameroon, Ghana, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Kenya. Much of the aid, it appears, went to states that were poorly governed and could not be considered Africa's poorest. It is also notable that much of Nigeria's aid—£ 1,731m—came in the form of debt relief.

In terms of sectors, over 40 percent of British aid has been spent on humanitarian assistance and health, which in 2006–07 accounted for 22 percent and 21 percent of the total, respectively.[57] In recent years, Sudan and the DRC have been the major recipients of such humanitarian assistance. During 2007–08, for example, Sudan and the DRC received £91 million and £46 million, respectively, out of a worldwide total of £431 million.[58] Labour governments have also significantly increased funding for health issues, with the result that Britain is now one of the top donors in this area within the OECD's Development Assistance Committee. Health issues are a crucial part of Africa's underdevelopment problem because sub-Saharan Africa is home to only 3 percent of the global health workforce but suffers from about 24 percent of the global disease burden.[59] Major areas of concern are HIV/AIDS, malaria, TB, maternal health, and infant mortality. Since September 2007, the British government has framed its efforts in this sector within the International Health Partnership. While the increased spending on health is generally good news, the government has been urged to do far more to prevent the significant flow or "poaching" of skilled health workers from Africa to Britain.[60]

As Britain strove to develop "enhanced partnerships" with certain African states, it began dispersing a significant amount of its aid program through what it calls poverty reduction budget support, that is, direct financial support provided through the recipient state's own public finance and budgetary systems. By March 2004, Britain was providing budget support to Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Uganda.[61] Today, budget support accounts for approximately a quarter of all British aid.

There are three main reasons why this approach was preferred over traditional forms of aid dispensation.[62] First, it is based on the notion of partnerships between donor and recipient rather than donor-imposed conditions. Second, it is viewed as an efficient form of lending by reducing transactions costs. Third, when administered selectively, it is viewed as supporting "good" performers while denying or reducing aid to "poor" performers.

Of course, when aid is deposited directly into the coffers of the recipient government, local financial accountability is crucial. As Joel Barkan correctly observed, budget support amounts to "an expression of trust" on the part of the donor government that the recipient regime will live up to its stated objectives with regard to poverty reduction and financial accountability.[63] This leaves this form of aid susceptible to a number of limitations and problems. First, although promising macroeconomic conditions are an important part of ensuring poverty alleviation, they are not sufficient on their own. Second, such support can perpetuate aid dependency by reducing incentives for the recipient regime to generate revenue from other sources, such as through local taxation. This is more likely when the amount of aid constitutes a significant portion of the recipient's gross domestic product (GDP). Third, a major problem occurs when the recipient regime does not live up to its promises, that is, donor trust is betrayed. When this happens, budget support programs are left hostage to the local political context.[64] Where the commitments to democratic reform made by recipient regimes are genuine, as in Ghana and Tanzania, budget support can facilitate development.

But budget support can also help sustain bad governance. In Uganda, for example, budget support helped facilitate Museveni's gradual rollback of democracy. When, in 2005, Uganda's Constitution was amended to repeal the ban on a third elected term in office for the president, Britain shifted a portion of its budget support funds to conventional project assistance. This was in line with Britain's stated position that it will consider reducing or interrupting aid if African governments move away from their poverty reduction commitments, they are in significant violation of human rights or other international obligations, or there is a major breakdown in the state's financial management and accountability.[65] Britain was put in a similarly awkward position in 2005 with respect to Meles Zenawi's regime in Ethiopia. Here, the regime badly underestimated how unpopular it had become with its own population and in the subsequent postelection violence approximately 200 people were killed and thousands imprisoned for opposing the incumbent regime. It did not help Britain that Meles was at the time a member of Blair's Commission for Africa and pontificating about the importance of good governance. After the postelection violence, Britain stopped budget support and instead provided aid through the Protection of Basic Services grant aimed at supporting the provision of essential services to the poor.

Conclusion

As the preceding discussion illustrates, Britain has deployed a wide range of instruments to promote its overarching foreign policy objectives with respect to Africa. For such a diverse continent, this is not surprising. Nor is it surprising that the record of success has been distinctly mixed. While it would be unfair and unhelpful to draw a simple, general conclusion about Britain's Africa policies in the twenty-first century, it is worth concluding by reflecting upon what was, by far, the most high profile of Britain's attempts to come up with an overall strategy to achieve its objectives in Africa: Blair's Commission for Africa.

Published in early 2005—dubbed by British officials as "the year of Africa"—the commission's report was supposed to provide leverage for Blair's government at a time when it occupied the chairmanship of both the G8 and the EU.[66] At its heart, the commission was a call for international society, especially the G8, to provide Africa with a massive increase in aid, debt relief, trade, and investment—an additional $75 billion of resources by 2010—as the primary means of stimulating economic development. As the commission put it, what was required was "a big push on many fronts at once."[67] In return, African governments promised to do their part in pursuing better governance. Although the commission succeeded in gaining a good deal of media attention, in several respects it exemplified some of the problems and limitations of Britain's approach to Africa.

First of all, the way the commission was put together was problematic. Not only did it sideline the FCO and rely far too heavily on econometric studies, but it was, as one respected analyst observed, "far too dominated by the British government to have any credibility as an independent assessment of Africa's needs."[68] In hindsight, it was also unfortunate to have the commission represented by Ethiopian prime minister Meles Zenawi—touted by Blair as one of Africa's new breed of leaders—at the same time as his soldiers were shooting civilians in Addis Ababa. Second, Britain's leaders were unable to ensure that the other G8 members lived up to their part of the bargain, especially when the photo opportunities stopped and the difficult job of implementation began. The commission's third problem was thus a lack of sustained follow-up on the many recommendations and commitments made in its report. This should not have been a problem for Britain because Gordon Brown was one of the commissioners and one of his top economic advisors, Nicholas Stern, was the commission's director of policy and research. While Britain's aid flows did continue to increase, there was much less success with regard to improving Africa's terms of trade with the Western world, especially in relation to the subsidies provided to Western farmers. The fourth problem was that the commission failed to spell out a strategy for tackling the central problem of bad governance. Nowhere did the report go into detail about how badly governed states might be reformed. Britain's prevarications with Mugabe's regime in Zimbabwe suggest that there are no obvious answers, at least in the short term. Nor did the commission address the central contradiction at the heart of its approach, namely, how to ensure accountability without undermining African ownership of the reform process.[69] The net result was that for all its good intentions, Blair's commission represented a misguided push for "big aid" rather than "smart aid."[70]

In one way or another, similar issues have regularly appeared in Britain's other dealings with Africa. Although greater attention was paid to the problem of Africa's underdevelopment, successive British governments have often lacked sufficient leverage to fundamentally change the local political context on the ground. Moreover, the convergence of the four international crises identified earlier—climate change, economic recession, energy supplies, and transnational terrorism—may well mean that this task only becomes more difficult, especially as the zenith of Africa's time in the international spotlight may already have passed. If so, British policymakers are likely to revert to a long-standing tradition of damage limitation: preventing the worst problems over there ending up over here.

Notes

1. Rita Abrahamsen and Paul Williams, "Ethics and Foreign Policy: The Antinomies of New Labour's 'Third Way' in Sub-Saharan Africa," *Political Studies,* 49:2 (2001), 249–264; Paul Williams, "Britain and Africa after the Cold War" in *Africa in International Politics,* ed. Ian Taylor and Paul Williams (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), 41–60; Paul D. Williams, *British Foreign Policy under New Labour, 1997–2005* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
2. Other relevant PSAs include PSA 3: ensure controlled, fair migration that protects the public and contributes to economic growth; PSA 26: reduce the risk to the United Kingdom and its interests overseas from international terrorism; and PSA 27: lead the global effort to avoid dangerous climate change.

3. It is notable that the Conservative Party does not appear to be departing dramatically from Labour on any key issues related to African affairs. See William Hague, "The Future of British Foreign Policy with a Conservative Government," speech, IISS, London, July 21, 2009, at http://www.iiss.org/recent-key-addresses/william-hague-address-jul-09/.
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5. Since 2006, the DEFRA, not the FCO, is supposed to play the leading role in the United Kingdom's international work on climate change.
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9. Ibid., par. 4.51.
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14. DFID, *Eliminating World Poverty: Building Our Common Future* (London: The Stationery Office, Cm 7656, 2009), 24.
15. Ibid., 40–41.
16. Rita Abrahamsen, "A Breeding Ground for Terrorists? Africa and Britain's 'War on Terrorism,' " *Review of African Political Economy,* 32:102 (2004), 178–192, and "Blair's Africa: The Politics of Securitization and Fear," *Alternatives,* 30:1 (2005), 55–80.
17. Styan, "The Security of Africans," 1172.
18. HMG, *PSA Delivery Agreement 30* (London: The Stationery Office, 2007), par. 1.2.
19. Ibid., par. 2.1.
20. Williams, *British Foreign Policy,* chapters 4 and 8.
21. HMG, *PSA Delivery Agreement 30,* par. 3.45, 3.35.
22. Douglas Alexander, "Conflict, Fragile States and Security," speech in New York, April 27, 2009, at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Media-Room/Speeches-and-articles/2009/Conflict-fragile-states-and-security/.
23. Stabilisation Unit, *The UK Approach to Stabilisation* (London: Stabilisation Unit, 2008), p. 8 at http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/resources/Stabilisation_guide.pdf.
24. See Alex de Waal ed., *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace* (Harvard, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), chapters 8–11.
25. Catherine Barnes, *Bridging the Gap: Improving UK Support for Peace Processes* (London: Conciliation Resources Working Paper, 2007).
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31. Tom Porteous, *Britain in Africa* (London: Zed, 2008), 18.
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39. Ibid., par. 3.36.
40. Porteous, *Britain in Africa*, 20–21.
41. HMG, *PSA Delivery Agreement 29,* par. 1.5.
42. Ibid., par. 3.6. See also HMG, *PSA Delivery Agreement 30,* par. 3.52.
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45. Ibid., 15–17.
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52. DFID, *Eliminating World Poverty,* 13.
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54. Hague, "The Future of British Foreign Policy."
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3

Is France Disengaging from Africa? A Critical Look at Nicolas Sarkozy's "Rupture" Policy in the Context of France-Africa Relations

Daniel Mengara

This chapter looks at the question of France's purported disengagement from Africa and argues that President Nicolas Sarkozy's "rupture" promises in the context of France-Africa relations have been not only misleading but also short lived. I conclude that France is, in fact, reengaging in Africa and that Sarkozy's perpetuation of those very same paternalistic and "*Françafrican* habits" of the past that he set out to revoke has paradoxically led to a reinforcement, rather than a weakening, of France's neocolonial stance in Africa.

The question of France's disengagement from Africa is not new. It has been a rather thorny issue in France not only before but also during and after the era of decolonization. France's increasing imperialistic role in Africa had, according to Kazadi Ntole[1] been on the agenda of the French parliament since 1885, at the very time when the major European powers were, to use Pakenham's words, engaged in a fierce "scramble for Africa."[2] General de Gaulle himself had grappled with this question after the 1944 Brazzaville Conference when he had to face two major failures in his attempt to salvage what, in postwar France, was left of the French Empire. The eventual collapse of his *Union française* (French Union) and *Communauté française* (French Community) projects showed how hard it was going to be for France to preserve the integrity of an empire that, increasingly, had become ideologically difficult and politically controversial to maintain and/or justify.[3] General de Gaulle, in fact, went through a number of telling flip-flops that were indicative of France's inability to articulate and clarify its ambiguous imperial role in Africa. When addressing the French Constituent Assembly on November 1945, General de Gaulle was still trying, in all appearance, to salvage the Empire, going so far as to ask his colonial subjects whether it would not be preferable for them to accept, instead of full autonomy or outright independence, the status that had been conferred upon the French islands of the West Indies and Reunion.[4]

On June 30, 1955, while promoting what later became the short-lived *Communauté française* of 1958, de Gaulle made it clear in a speech delivered at the Intercontinental Hotel in Paris that his vision was still limited to the consolidation of an "association" between France and its colonies. Under this institutional arrangement, asserted de Gaulle, France and "the States and territories that we had opened up to civilization, in which we have accomplished and continue to accomplish magnificent work" (my translation),[5] would cohabit under the French protective umbrella because, pursued the General, "separated from us, [these States and territories] would either fall prey to disorder or become the victims of a totalitarian dictatorship" (my translation).[6] It is worth noting the irony in de Gaulle's statement, especially when considering the fact that it is his very appointment of Jacques Foccart as the shadow architect of France's neocolonial dominion on francophone Africa that, paradoxically, led France to adopt the deliberate policy of creating and/or supporting the African dictatorships that de Gaulle is warning about. Nevertheless, in an address to the French people that was carried on both radio and television on June 14, 1960, General de Gaulle finally conceded the inevitable and declared: "It is perfectly understandable that one should feel nostalgic about what the Empire once was, as is also natural that one should regret the softness of oil lamps, the splendor of the sailing marine, the charm of the era of the sailing crews. So What! Politics is worthless if one does not take into account the realities" (my translation).[7] General de Gaulle's 16-year procrastination (1944–1960) was, in fact, echoing the general debate within, and overall feelings of, a French society more than ever caught between the nostalgia of Empire and the realities of a "post-World War II period in which France's National Assembly was divided between those who advocated France's continuous influence and control over its colonies or former colonies, and those who opposed it for fear that France, if involved into an egalitarian association, might eventually find herself not only prisoner of, but also colonized by her own colonies. This fear even led one socialist parliament member to shout out during a parliament session: 'Je demande l'indépendance pour la France!' [I demand independence for France]."[8]

It is therefore interesting to note that, some five decades after a decolonization period in which France granted independence to most of its former colonies, François Mitterrand, the longest-serving French president in history (1981–1995), was still forced, in his La Baule speech of June 20, 1990, to grapple with the issue of France's disengagement. In political terms, Mitterrand's speech may indeed be viewed, as Jean-Pierre Foirry simplistically described it, as an invitation to his African counterparts "to engage themselves on the path to democracy" (my translation).[9] However, in historical terms, it may be regarded as the first major postindependence voicing of a "rupture" policy by a French president, especially because at the center of it stood an implicit acknowledgment by Mitterrand of France's ambiguous, if not debilitating, role in the political debacles that had stunted economic and human development in its former dependencies.

Mitterrand, Françafrique, and France's Geostrategic Flip-Flops in Africa

François Mitterrand's La Baule speech has been credited, as François Soudan implicitly suggests in his "Il était une fois La Baule" (Once Upon a Tine at La Baule) editorial published in *Jeune Afrique*,[10] with unleashing the major political upheavals that, in the 1990s, brought multiparty politics back to most of the former French colonies in

Africa. However, sticking to this explanation alone would be to ignore the facilitating role played by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union. As François-Xavier Verschave suggests in his *La Françafrique: Le plus long scandale de la République,* the socialist president may have simply validated or accompanied the movement as opposed to triggering it, shaken as he was by the sudden wind of change that had swept across the formerly "un-free" and undemocratic nations of the world.[11] Glaser and Smith further this view when they describe France as a country that, in the space of two generations, found itself "in the same—bad—contradictory posture: just as it did in the aftermath of World War II, the victory of the 'free world' in 1989 causes, in [France's] (neo)colonial backyard, an after-shock of emancipatory demands. France is once again on the defensive in the margin of the world in which it [still] asserts its 'rank.' The fall of the Berlin Wall forces it to concede to Africa, as the USSR was forced to concede to Eastern Europe, a '*Paristroïka*' of its policy of presence" (my translation).[12] Indeed, in such francophone countries as Benin, Madagascar, Gabon, and Côte d'Ivoire, political upheavals and demands for democracy had preceded the La Baule speech. In Benin, for instance, pressure from the street forced dictator Mathieu Kérékou to abandon his Marxist-Leninist ideology in December 1989 and to hold a National Conference between February 19 and 28, 1990 that led to a durable democratization of the nation.

Thus, when studied in the context of France's traditional dispositions in Africa, the aftermath of the La Baule speech would lead most observers, not so surprisingly, to agree that its effects were rather short lived, and Mitterrand did not live up to the promise of his groundbreaking exhortations. Verschave, for instance, dismisses the speech as *une ouverture sans lendemain* (a short-lived opening),[13] whereas Glaser and Smith conclude, rather bluntly, that more than half a century after General de Gaulle's speech at the Brazzaville Conference in 1944, "François Mitterrand, in turn, stops, at the La Baule France-Africa summit of June 1990, short of the emancipatory expectations [of the Africans] . . . He remains prisoner of the paternalism and clientelism of the past . . . In fact, his ambiguous forays into the emerging new world represented only a solitary endeavor, which itself was due to a few men of his inner circle, including Jacques Attali and writer Erick Orsenna, who are credited with producing the draft to the La Baule speech" (my translation).[14] In another book, Glaser and Smith explain that, "later on, the topic [of democratization in Africa] became an anathema or, to be more precise, a joke" (my translation).[15] They cite the information report issued in 2006 by France's Senate Commission on Foreign Relations, Defense, and the Armed Forces on the management of crises in Sub-Saharan Africa, a report that, interestingly, sums up the views of the military leaders of the French army as such: "The French military authorities interviewed by your rapporteurs [*sic*] note that the costs vs. advantages of denunciating or renegotiating these [defense or military cooperation] agreements [with Africa] would not be to the advantage of France" (my translation).[16] The Senate Commission's information report, in other sections, is even more incisive in its rejection of all possibility of French disengagement:

> The report by your rapporteurs [*sic*] observes that French presence and France's actions in Africa are raising debates not only in Africa itself, but also in our country. Awareness of the need to renovate France's relations with the African continent may at times lead to the temptation of rupture and disengagement. The multiplication of crises [on the continent] has contributed to "aid fatigue" and the subsequent desire to refocus France's interests beyond African horizons. Your rapporteurs [*sic*] note

> that disengagement not only is not possible, Africa being our "intimate alien," but also undesirable: the ties of our country with Africa are not the legacy of a past that has become too heavy to carry, but a chance for a multipolar vision of international relations; they are also at the heart of France's world vocation. These privileged ties are therefore not meant to be broken, but, on the contrary, to be consolidated on new grounds. A French disengagement would be somewhat paradoxical at a time when other actors are seeking to reinforce their positions.[17] (my translation)

This assessment of France's geostrategic interests in Africa by the French Senate is comforted by Christian Hoche, who, in a 1994 article in *L'Express* entitled "François Mitterrand: Le testament africain" (François Mitterrand: The African Testament), concludes that

> in spite of his promise of another policy, François Mitterrand satisfied himself with simply managing the existing status quo. He made use, as his predecessors did, of secret diplomacy. And although he called for the democratization of the black continent at the 1990 La Baule summit, he has continued to tolerate the dictatorships of both Marshal Mobutu and General Eyadema. . . . Ironically, as he opened his last France-Africa summit on November 8 [1994] in Biarritz, François Mitterrand was flanked by Marshal Mobutu and General Eyadema, the two heads of state whose demise the Socialist Party had sworn to seek.[18] (my translation)

Mitterrand, thus, after briefly allying himself with African public opinion against those African dictators and regimes that this very opinion saw as the result of France's neocolonial meddling on the continent, ended up embracing a more realist position. This policy shift was an acknowledgement of two fundamental realities: France's paternalistic fear that democratic change would lead to chronic political instability if not implemented gradually and the more implicit realization that democratic change, together with its corollary of potentially autonomous and sovereign decision making, would have inevitably meant the need for France to once and for all disengage politically and economically from its former colonies, especially at a time when young francophones were becoming more attracted to the "American dream" than to the "French nightmare."[19] Such a disengagement, however, would have ultimately been, as we saw earlier with the French Senate Commission's report, detrimental and counter to French national and geostrategic interests as shaped since the 1950s by General de Gaulle, the man whose *Françafrique* system and legacy, as masterminded by his faithful and dedicated Jacques Foccart, has, until now, conditioned the ongoing relationships of allegiance between France and its former colonies.

What is *Françafrique,* then? According to Verschave, the *Françafrique* system represents "a nebula of economic, political and military actors in France as well as in Africa who are organized into networks and lobbying groups, and bent on appropriating two sources of funds: natural resources and public development aid. The logic of this drain is to prevent any sort of initiative outside of the circle of the initiates. This system, which is self-regulating, recycles itself into criminalization. It is naturally hostile to democracy" (my translation).[20] This somber view of the *Françafrique* system is further clarified by Achille Mbembe, who sees it as having the workings, within francophone Africa itself, of

> a fraction of the ruling elite that confiscates the State apparatus and allies itself with the army. Built around a tribal nucleus, benefiting from solid [systemic] internal

> support and maintaining absolute control over the organs of repression (presidential brigade, secret police, special army forces, para-commando units, and paramilitary bodies), it further relies upon important external networks as well as connections woven in the context of privatizations, while furthering its own stakes in the international networks that control the "informal finance" sector (contraband, trafficking in precious minerals—diamond and emerald—arms, ivory, or drugs).[21] (my translation)

Mbembe adds that it is from this "advantageous position" that the ruling elite is able to create a *multipartisme administratif* (administrative multiparty system) whose function is simply to legalize political parties with a view to promoting and entertaining a façade of democracy while, at the same time, maintaining a system of corruption and intimidation and repression of those same political parties and their leaders, especially those that claim to be in the opposition.[22] To this picture, one must add a new phenomenon which has seen despotic African presidents, in Gabon and Togo, after promoting themselves into de facto presidents for life—thanks to constitutional manipulations and absolutist dictates—successfully ensured, upon their deaths, the transfer of power to their sons. This new trend in African politics is yet another indication of francophone Africa's failed democratic experiments; it signals the monarchization of presidential powers that Daniel Mengara describes in a recent online article entitled "Afrique francophone: L'ère des monarchies présidentielles" (Francophone Africa: The Era of Presidential Monarchies).[23]

If anything, therefore, is to be said about the *Françafrique* system in Africa, it is that the legacy of this system has left Africa with three major, and perhaps insuperable, problems: (1) parodies of democracy in which undemocratic multiparty politics is used as a disguise to cover rampant human right abuses, and this in the context of stunted African democratic experiments in which the complicit hand of France has often been seen; (2) criminalized state apparatuses and ruling classes, who, over the decades, have entertained and developed complicit and personalized relationships with France's presidents, businessmen, and ruling elites; and (3) failed states with stunted economic development. It is no secret that the regimes born out of these incestuous relationships (as Verschave would put it) never invested in development. Rather, they spent their time diverting large sums of the money needed for development toward the financing of political corruption and militarization, when it was not to prepare for themselves and their families well-garnished bank accounts and properties in France and/or other European destinations, just in case . . . Within francophone Africa, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaïre (deceased September 7, 1997), Omar Bongo of Gabon (deceased June 8, 2009), and Denis Sassou N'Guesso of Congo-Brazzaville, for instance, are notoriously known as dictators who managed to amass huge fortunes in foreign banks and properties. In fact, in 2001, the now deceased François-Xavier Verschave (1945–2005), who was then president of French NGO Survie, was sued by three African presidents—Omar Bongo of Gabon, Idriss Deby of Tchad, and Denis Sassou N'Guesso of Congo-Brazzaville—for the "crime" of "offense against a head of state," and this for having written the controversial *Noir silence: Qui arrêtera la Françafrique?* (Black Silence: Who Will Stop *Françafrique?*), a book in which he indicted several African presidents for crimes against humanity in complicity with a corrupt and indifferent French political class.[24] The complainants had based their suit upon an obsolete 1881 French law that accorded foreign leaders protection against libel in France.[25] The presidents lost their suit. The year 2007, however, saw a reversal after

French NGOs Sherpa and Survie, in collaboration with a Congolese association, the Fédération des Congolais de la Diaspora (Federation of Congolese in the Diaspora), sued several African presidents for misappropriation of public property, and lost. The suit was dismissed for lack of evidence. The year 2008 saw a new attempt by Sherpa and Transparency International France. This time, the NGOs specifically targeted the fortunes accumulated in France by Omar Bongo of Gabon, Denis Sassou N'Guesso of Congo-Brazzaville, and Theodoro Obiang Nguéma of Equatorial Guinea.[26] Even if this latest suit was also finally dismissed in 2009, and despite an unsuccessful attempt by the same organizations targeting the fortune accumulated in Monaco Banks by Edith Bongo(wife of Omar Bongo and daughter of Sassou N'Guesso), it is worth noting that French NGOs and African public opinion took comfort in the fact that the fortunes that had secretly been accumulated by a number of African leaders in foreign lands, and this to the detriment of their national economies, had now been made public.

The historical as well as systemic causes of the stunted political and economic progress that I mentioned earlier are certainly visible everywhere in francophone Africa today. Several books, beginning with the publication of Pierre Pean's seminal *Affaires africaines* (African Affairs) in 1983,[27] and continuing with the Verschave and Glaser and Smith multiple renditions,[28] have depicted the criminal practices inherent in the *Françafrique* system since General De Gaulle. This litany of books would also include, interestingly, Philippe Gaillard's *Foccart parle,* a volume that renders public a series of interviews the journalist had over the years with Jacques Foccart.[29] Foccart was not only universally considered the architect of the *Françafrique* system, he was also seen, as Péan graphically describes him in the title to another book, as *L'Homme de l'ombre . . . Jacques Foccart, l'homme le plus mystérieux et le plus puissant de la Ve République* (The Shadow Man . . . Jacques Foccart, the Most Mysterious and Most Powerful Man of the Fifth Republic).[30] One might as well add "the most dangerous man of the Republic" in view of the inhuman dealings that have characterized the inner workings of *Françafrique* over the past five decades, dealings that have included the physical elimination of most of the nationalist leaders of francophone Africa, who, from the independences onward, had wanted to bring their nations to an acceptable level of human dignity and political sovereignty. The desire by France to set up puppet governments with presidents who, after the independences, could be controlled economically, politically, and geostrategically had, obviously, led to the demise of promising figures such as Ruben Um Nyobé and Félix Moumié in Cameroon, Sylvanus Olympio in Togo, and Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso. They had all fallen victim to the *Françafrique* system.[31]

Outside of the French colonial backyard, the assassination of Patrice Lumumba in Belgian Congo, as finally clarified by Ludo de Witte, participates in the same logic.[32] Hence the opinion of de Witte, who writes that "true, the Belgians and Congolese actually killed Lumumba, but without the steps taken by Washington and the United Nations during the preceding months, the assassination could never have been carried out."[33] Lumumba's death only comes to add to the political "curse" of francophone Africa—Belgian and French alike. The Rwandan genocide of 1994, which occurred as a result of the postindependence ambiguities of both Belgium and France and triggered a durable civil war and instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaïre), confirms the debilitating consequences of the *Françafrican system* on the continent.[34]

Such crimes against the continent were bound to have dire consequences on the democratic evolution of francophone Africa. With the rare exception of just three countries, that is, Benin, Mali, and, in some relative and disputable measure, Senegal, where acceptable principles of democracy appear to have "stuck" for a while and some guarantee of durable democratic alternation relatively well-secured, the rest of the sub-Saharan African world that once subsisted under the French colonial dominion is mired in failed democratic experiments. The Central African Republic, Madagascar, Cameroon, Djibouti, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Conakry, Togo, Chad, Niger, Mauritania have all featured such failed experiments. None of the other former French colonies of the Maghreb and east Africa are democracies either, and the three francophone countries that once were under Belgian rule—Rwanda, Burundi, and Congo-Kinshasa—are stuck in never-ending political instabilities. What the *Françafrique* system, therefore, has managed to accomplish politically in Africa is the exploit of (1) producing new sorts of regimes that practice multiparty politics without such a practice translating into actual democracy and (2) inaugurating the era of "presidential monarchies" as well as dynastic successions whereby despotic presidents, after manipulating the legal and constitutional systems of their countries, become presidents for life and their regimes, upon their death, are able to ensure the straightforward transmission of power to their sons (as was briefly the case in Togo) and/or the safe transfer of power to such sons after façade elections (as was the case in Gabon).[35] These precedents were so successful that Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal is now rumored to be grooming his son Karim Wade for possible dynastic succession. So are also, outside of the francophone zone, Muammar al-Gaddafi of Libya and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt.[36]

What, Then, of French Disengagement? Nothing, Except the "Same Old-Same Old" Incestuous *Françafrican* Paradigm

In the past 16 years, three major developments led a number of observers of France-Africa relations to conclude that France had begun a subtle disengagement from Africa that would deal a deadly blow to the *Françafrique* system:

The first development was attested in the various political and financial scandals and lawsuits that, since *l'affaire Elf* (the Elf scandal) broke in 1994, saw the indictment of several key executives of the Elf-Aquitaine group, as well as the subsequent apparent dismantlement of the shadow government that, under and since General de Gaulle, virtually conducted France's foreign policy in Africa through the group's subsidiary in Gabon (Elf-Gabon) and *les réseaux Foccart* (the Foccart networks). The geostrategic and financial importance of Elf-Gabon in the context of France's shadow foreign policy in Africa has long been attested, not only in the various news reports that have fed on the Elf scandal since 1994, but also in the various books published on the subject, the most influential of which was certainly Pierre Péan's 1983 *Affaires africaines*.[37] Because Elf-Aquitaine remained a government-owned firm until it was privatized in 1994, precisely because of the scandal—and was finally merged into Total in 2000—the scandal's implications were both financial and political. Several key figures within the French government, such as Roland Dumas, were touched by the scandal, as were a number of African regimes, such as that of Omar Bongo of Gabon.

It is, perhaps, Verschave who, once again, sums up the historical importance of Elf-Aquitaine as a project initiated under General de Gaulle and perpetuated after him: "In 1965, de Gaulle had charged his former Minister of the Armies, Pierre Guillaumat, with the task of creating an oil company, Elf. The company is, in fact, conceived as a modern secret service structure with both a political-economic and, at times, crypto-military vocation" (my translation).[38] In other words, after a decolonization process that had, officially, lost France its empire, de Gaulle had to find a way of preserving France's status as a world power. In this equation, official loss of Empire did not have to mean officious loss of Africa. The broader strategy, therefore, simply consisted in finding ways to maintain political suzerainty over the former colonies while securing easy and cheap access to strategic resources such as oil and uranium. Elf-Aquitaine was, thus, an integral part of the *Françafrique* system that de Gaulle and Foccart had set up, playing a role that was, at once, one of intelligence, oil, finance, and politics. In fact, Loïk Le Floch-Prigent, one of the indicted former executives of Elf, described Elf, in an article he wrote in *L'Express* in 1996, as a company with such influence that "nothing happens in oil-producing countries, particularly in Africa, whose cause is not Elf" (my translation).[39] This is because, as Hervé Gattegno once explained in an article with the telling title of "L'étrange interpénétration des services d'Elf et de la France" (Of the Strange Interpenetration of the Services of Elf and Those of France), the affairs of Elf and the affairs of the state had become so intimately intertwined that one could no longer tell who was running who or what.[40] The president of the French republic had even become, in virtually every instance since de Gaulle, so dependent on the *Françafrique* system that France's foreign policy toward Africa was no longer decided at the Elysée palace as it should, but from the shadows, where Elf-Gabon and the Foccart network ruled.

But the temporary hiatus represented by the apparent dismantlement of the Elf and Foccart networks did not mean the end of *Françafrique*. If anything, the *Françafrique* system merely changed guards after the old guard had either died or become discredited by the Elf scandal. It redeployed and rejuvenated itself through new actors, new circuits, and new methodologies. It suffices to see the way lawyer turned political adviser Robert Bourgi publicly boasts of the "services" he has rendered his friend "Nicolas"[41] in the context of his dealings with African presidents.[42] In a recent *Liberation* article interestingly entitled "Quand Robert Bourgi, le 'M. Afrique' de Sarkozy, ne tient pas sa langue" (When Robert Bourgi, Sarkozy's "Mr. Africa," Is Unable to Hold His Tongue), Thomas Hofnung describes Robert Bourgi as the "occult adviser of President Nicolas Sarkozy on African affairs," and "the last of the guardians of Françafrique . . . very close with Claude Guéant, the Elysée's Chief of Staff."[43] Bourgi, who does not hide his influence over Sarkozy, is certainly seen as a new Foccart—who not only is "very listened to" by the president, but also is able to use his access to the center of French power to influence events in Africa. In 2009, for instance, he publicly implied that he (and therefore Nicolas Sarkozy) supported Ali Bongo in the Gabonese anticipated presidential election of August 30.[44] When Ali Bongo, son of recently deceased president Omar Bongo, finally won the election, African public opinion made the connection:

> On September 3 [2009], the results are proclaimed in Libreville: Ali Bongo, a man who is rejected by a very important portion of the Gabonese people, is officially elected with a little more than 41 percent of the votes. Incidents immediately erupt in Libreville, but also in Port-Gentil, the economic capital . . . The rioters, close to the opposition, accuse France and burn the [French] consulate in Port-Gentil, as well as gas-stations belonging to Total, the oil company that exploits Gabonese oil since independence [formerly known as "Elf-Gabon"] . . . In Paris, Bernard Kouchner [the

> French foreign minister] hammers that France has no candidate [in the Gabonese election], and that his country intervened in no shape or form in this election . . . thus echoing what Nicolas Sarkozy had already said at Omar Bongo funerals on June 16 in Libreville, where he was welcomed with boos. The audience the French president had given Ali Bongo . . . at the Elysée palace in June 2008, it seems, did not go unnoticed in Gabon, where—rightly or wrongly—it was read as official support from the former colonial tutor.[45] (my translation)

Notwithstanding the resurgence of the *Françafrique* system that the preceding two paragraphs suggest, the very fact that Elf-Aquitaine, as a result of the public outcry that followed the revelation of its scandalous political and financial dealings, was dismantled as a state-owned company and privatized was, in itself, a significant development. Among other things, the change in ownership led a number of observers such as Glaser and Smith to conclude, perhaps prematurely, that the *Françafrique* system had been dealt a deadly blow in 1994.[46]

The second major development that may have caused observers to think that the *Françafrique* system was taking its last breath was the announcement in 2005 by the French government that it was going to reduce its military presence in Africa.[47] This reduction included the withdrawal of a few thousand troops out of the 10,000 that France had positioned on the continent. It also entailed the suppression of two of its five military bases. But this announcement did not go without a debate. As Philippe Leymarie put it,

> The current network of French military bases—Djibouti (2,800 men), Dakar (1,100), N'Djamena (1,000), Libreville (800), and Abidjan (1,000), that is, approximately 10,000 men if one adds to it those currently serving as part of the Licorne operation in Côte d'Ivoire—is the only one of its kind. It has changed very little since the wave of independences of the 1960s; over the decades, it made France the "policeman" of the continent, especially during the "cold war"—a role that the Americans voluntarily left unchallenged. Times have changed, however: France . . . no longer has the means nor the will to maintain a dispositive that is sometimes harshly criticized, as has been the case in Côte d'Ivoire in recent years, a dispositive that no longer has the geopolitical relevance of the early years of the Fifth Republic—the Foccart era—and that, at any rate, has proven expensive to maintain.[48] (my translation)

Although this assessment by Leymarie in 2005 was bluntly belied, as we saw earlier, by the conclusions of the 2006 report by the French Senate's Commission on Foreign Relations, the announced decrease was, nevertheless, confirmed by Jacques Chirac's successor, Nicolas Sarkozy, in 2009.[49] The announcement, as Leymarie puts it, did indeed have, at the center of it, and among other reasons such as cost reduction and efficacy, a desire by France to do away with its image of *gendarme de l'Afrique* (Africa's policeman). Its bases in Africa had for years been understood not only as imperialistic tools, but also as political shields for the domestic survival of the regimes that France supported or aided to power. The reduction of French military presence, in this context, could only be viewed as a blow to the *Françafrique* system, a system that, according to Glaser and Smith, owed part of its success to military cooperation agreements contracted at the time of independence. These agreements, the authors maintain, often contained secret clauses hidden in annexes not published in the *Journal officiel,* annexes that provided for the possibility of a "French intervention also in case of 'domestic trouble,' thus a right of preemption—in fact, a stranglehold—by Paris on 'strategic natural resources' in its former colonies" (my translation).[50] These secret accords, the authors conclude, constituted a form of "geopolitical tutelage"[51] over the former colonies, a tutelage in which, of course, the French army played a paramount role. Dismantling the backbone of French military presence in Africa would thus seem like a revolution, and, to echo Nicolas Sarkozy himself, a real "rupture" in what Verschave liked to call the "incestuous" France-Africa relations.

The third, and final, development that led to the illusion of change and disengagement was the election on May 6, 2007, of Nicolas Sarkozy as the new president of France, an event that was welcomed with a certain degree of euphoria not only in France, but also in a number of African capitals, where public opinion was eager for the change that Sarkozy had promised. Journalists Jane L. O'Neill and Shyama Soondur of the Mauritian newspaper *L'Express,* for instance, saw in Sarkozy the French president who was going to put an end to the *Françafrique* system.[52] Nicolas Sarkozy, indeed, had campaigned since 2006 on the theme of "rupture," a theme that, within the context of French domestic politics, had seduced a French electorate that, itself, was apparently thirsty for reform, modernized governance, and economic dynamism. As far as *Françafrique* is concerned, Sarkozy, as minister of the interior, had, in his Cotonou speech of May 2006, advocated a new era of France-Africa relations that must be "more transparent" and "rid of the networks of another era, of unofficial emissaries who have no other mandate than the one they invent for themselves," an era that must turn the page from the "complacencies, secrets and ambiguities" of the past and do away with the types of personalized relationships that had traditionally characterized the interactions between African dictators and French presidents.[53]

But hopes for a real "rupture" vanished rather quickly with Nicolas Sarkozy's election. Soon after his election, the new president not only called the now deceased Omar Bongo of Gabon—who was then ruling over a 40-year regime—to thank him for his "advice" during the French presidential campaign;[54] but he also received Omar Bongo at the Elysée palace on May 25, 2007, that is, less than three weeks after his accession to the French presidency. The dictator Omar Bongo was, thus, one of the first foreign leaders to actually *receive* a call from Nicolas Sarkozy as well as among the very first three foreign leaders to visit the newly elected president of France at the Elysée palace.[55] Disillusion about a real "rupture" was at full display during Sarkozy' first tour of Africa in July 2007. While in Libreville and Dakar, the president made some controversial comments by referring to Africans as stuck in time and space and incapable of progress. It was clear, from the diplomatic outcome of Sarkozy's first Africa tour, that the *Françafrique* system still had good days ahead.[56] Glaser and Smith confirmed this trend in their *Sarko en Afrique* (Sarko in Africa), a book in which they described what appeared to be a revival, one might even say a resurgence, of the *Françafrique* system under President Nicolas Sarkozy. Omar Bongo of Gabon once even mocked the man he called *fiston* (sonny) on French television when he declared: "The problem with you French people at all levels, even at the level of Sarkozy, is that you want to go fast. Sarkozy knows what he means when he speaks of 'rupture.' Has Sarkozy said he wants to break with Africa? No. It is you [journalists?] who invent all that" (my translation).[57] Sarkozy himself agreed when he declared, while visiting Gabon in July 2007, that "rupture does not mean that one has to be angry with historic friends such as Senegal and Gabon" (my translation).[58]

What, then, had led to Sarkozy's about-face? Simply what Christophe Boisbouvier of Radio France International called "realpolitik." As he points out, "Nicolas Sarkozy does not seem to be at ease in his role as heir of the *Françafrique* system. But he probably acknowledges this is the price to pay if France is to maintain some influence on the African continent. France needs to ensure the support of a few dozen of African state voices, especially when it must face the United States or China at the UN Security Council. . . . Beyond big speeches, Nicolas Sarkozy in Africa is first and foremost about realpolitik"[59] (my translation).

Sarkozy's about-face, therefore, is fundamentally the expression of what, historically, has been a trademark of France's neocolonial policies in Africa: the words of its presidents have really never matched their deeds. At best, France's policy toward its former colonies has been full of ambiguities, which, over time, have led to mistrust and, at times, have caused resentment toward France.[60] When General de Gaulle, some 50 years ago, gave francophone Africans their independences, he had already prepared, thanks to Jacques Foccart, the blueprint for the neocolonization of France's former territories. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing notoriously became a friend of the likes of Jean-Bedel Bokassa, the deranged dictator of the Central African Republic who proclaimed himself emperor in 1977; the French president even found himself embroiled in a diamond scandal that tarnished his image. When Mitterrand spoke of democracy at La Baule, he quickly backtracked and downplayed what he had said, fearing loss of control and influence in Africa. Jacques Chirac the "African," as some ended up calling him,[61] became known not only for his unwavering conservatism in the context of the France-Africa relations, but also for his paternalistic declaration in Côte d'Ivoire in 1990 that democracy was some sort of luxury for the Africans.[62] When Sarkozy promised an end to the *Françafrique* system and a "rupture" from the old order of things between France and Africa, he had not, apparently, fully measured how intricate the relations between France and its former colonies had become; neither had he realized how deeply France itself had become dependent upon those same relations not only politically, but economically as well. So, when, while visiting Mali in May 2006 as minister of the interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, declared that France, economically, did not need Africa, and that trade with Africa represented only 2 percent of France's economy,[63] he had probably not fully understood, yet, the complexities of France's economic relations with Africa, both formal and informal, and both past and present. As Odile Tobner put it, "[Sarkozy], however, may have conveniently omitted to say what the nature of the exchanges was between Africa and France for such major French companies, some state owned, such as Areva . . . and some privately owned, such as Total, Bouygues, and Bolloré, which derive the essential of their profits from trade with Africa . . . France does not need Africa, but French billionaires need Africa, and, as a result, Nicolas Sarkozy bows before their interests and puts the State's diplomatic and military means at their service—while they endeavor to hide their profits in fiscal paradises" (my translation).[64]

Sarkozy may have also not realized how crucial Africa actually was for French economic interests, interests that were such that Alain Joyandet, his state secretary for cooperation, on his way to Congo-Brazzaville in May 2008, declared the implantation of French companies in Africa to be a priority for France.[65] Interestingly, one of the first major international contracts that France signed when Sarkozy came to power was with Libya, whose leader Muhammar Ghadafi was invited in great pump to Paris in December 2007, a visit that concluded with a triumphant announcement by the president's office that France had sold Libya military jets and Airbus planes worth 10 billion Euros, which meant that 30,000 jobs would be created in France.[66] But it suffices also to see the desperation of billionaire businessmen close to Sarkozy such as

Vincent Bolloré when, in October 2007, Senegal chose to award the concession of its new port terminal to Dubai Ports World, a contract worth 460 million Euros,[67] which represents close to 700 million dollars. Sarkozy himself restlessly, and notoriously, got involved in every major business dealing in which French companies engaged, becoming, as Glaser and Smith called him, no longer the president of France, but CEO of *l'équipe France* (Team France).[68] Sarkozy, thus, confirmed what Jean-Pierre Dubois had described as his hyper-presidential style.[69] He, obviously, had seemingly inaugurated an era of French foreign policy that was all about business, with no apparent concern for morality, human rights or democracy, as his opportunistic incursions into dictatorship-ruled Libya had clearly demonstrated.[70] What these Sarkozyan forays onto Libyan flowerbeds also showed was that France was now prepared to aggressively "fish" beyond its traditional francophone "pond." This is demonstrated by Sarkozy's own involvement in contract negotiations not only in Angola—where interest in Angolan oil prompted Total's CEO Christophe de Margerie to comment that the "recent visit by the president of the Republic in Angola constitutes a clear message: the political class has understood it has responsibilities toward the oil market and oil supply" (my translation)[71]—but also in South Africa, where the French president was able to influence the signing of contracts for the construction of twelve nuclear plants between 2010 and 2025.[72]

The corollary to the preceding is, therefore, that France's economic interests in Africa, contrary to what Sarkozy had asserted, are in fact quite vast, and have undoubtedly been so historically. After being hugely dependent upon the transatlantic slave trade and the subsequent sugar cane economy during the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries—at a time when 25 percent of "all French foreign trade derived from the colonies, and . . . the West Indies were by far the most profitable part of the empire"[73]—it is interesting to note that well into the 1920s, for instance, French economy still heavily relied on trade with its colonies, and, in 1927, 90 percent of France's total trade balance surplus of 2.372 billion came from its colonies. Albert Demangeon thus points out that "according to the statistics of 1927, France's purchases in its colonies generated 6.045 billions of francs. During the same year, France's sales to its colonies amounted to 8.185 billion francs. These figures reveal a favorable balance in our trade [with the colonies], that is, a surplus of 2.120 billion francs. Since France's overall foreign trade balance shows a surplus of 2.372 billion francs, one can see the weight of our colonies in our foreign trade; they generate 90 percent of the overall surplus" (my translation).[74] The 1931 report by the same Albert Demangeon states that "France's imports from its colonial empire represent, in 1929, and in value, 12.02 percent (7,010,567,000 francs). France's exports to its colonial empire represent 18.85 percent (9,440,385,000 francs). One notices a significant progress in exports. Our colonies hold an increasingly greater position in our foreign trade" (my translation).[75] These figures, of course, comport a certain degree of irony. Insofar as, in 1927, the colonies were still part of the French empire, discussing import and export appears as a rather antinomic proposition. It suffices to say, however, that trade relating to France and its colonies generated, back and forth, 14.210 billion out of the total 14.462 billion of foreign trade volume that was generated in 1927. In other words, only 252 million of that overall 14.462 billion came from trading with sources other than the colonies. In fact, up to the 1960s, France's foreign trade seems to have relied heavily on economic activities with its colonies and former colonies. An analysis by France's own foreign ministry confirms this trend when it writes that, at the beginning of the 1960s, "France did not have or had very little export vocation. For a long time turned toward the captive markets that its former colonies in Africa and Asia represented, its foreign trade with industrialized nations developed only gradually thanks to decolonization, before being enhanced by the suppression of protectionism and the advent of the European common market. But this happened rather painfully" (my translation).[76]

The intricate economic interdependencies between France and its former colonies were, thus, bound to lead to the sort of ambiguities that, ultimately, disrupted, and, later, completely stunted, Nicolas Sarkozy's stated "rupture" project toward Africa. Politically, Gabon and Congo-Brazzaville were the real first, but also last, true tests of Sarkozy's promised "rupture." They were equally the first true indicators of the state of France's purported disengagement from post-Mitterrand Africa. Both France and Sarkozy failed this test when they, while pretending to maintain neutrality, nevertheless appeared to take sides in the recent presidential elections in Congo (July 12, 2009) and Gabon (August 30, 2009). The case of Gabon is particularly preoccupying. Gabon, according to various observers (Péan, Glaser and Smith, Verschave, among others), had become the embodiment of everything that was wrong with France-Africa relations over the decades. Since 1967, the country had known only one president who, thus, remained in power for nearly 42 years before dying of cancer on June 8, 2009. Omar Bongo, as a consequence, had seen and interacted with all French presidents from de Gaulle to Sarkozy, which made him a central pillar of the *Françafrique* system and a living encyclopedia on France-African relations. The suggestion that he had been placed in power by France has been rampant, and was reiterated in several reactions to his death in June 2009, including that of Comi Toulabor, Research Director at Bordeaux's Black African Studies Center.[77] In the context of what appeared to the Gabonese people as a result of France's complicity, the son of Omar Bongo, Ali Bongo Ondimba, was declared the winner of a contested and fraudulent August 30, 2009 election. France, as usual, played a validating and supporting role when it acknowledged his victory, even as such victory consecrated a de facto "monarchical, dynastic presidency" in the country. The fact that Nicolas Sarkozy, in addition, seems to have, as we saw earlier, attached himself the services of Robert Bourgi, the notorious lawyer who is now seen as the heir apparent to the *Françafrique* throne, is indicative of Sarkozy's inability to rid France and the French presidency of the influence of the *Françafrican* shadow government. If anything, France's president and foreign policy continue to heavily rely on the lobbies and structures that have determined French policy toward Africa to date. Sure, the times, procedures, and actors have changed, or simply been *redeployed,* but the self-regenerating principles remain the same, and talks of disengagement, as Glaser and Smith put it, have been no more than a cosmetic public relations operation.[78]

In Guise of Conclusion: Nicolas Sarkozy and the Normalization of the *Françafrican* Curse

Whereas a number of analysts and observers, at some point in 2005, had begun to argue that the *Françafrique* system had died and that France was disengaging itself, some even going so far as to say that France had lost Africa,[79] they were, in the space of just three years, forced to revise their positions a little bit.[80] This is because recent developments across francophone Africa have pointed to a reinforcement, under Sarkozy's presidential watch, of the same old *Françafrican* ties that made Verschave call them "the longest scandal of the Republic."[81] Not only has Sarkozy been unable to accomplish the "rupture" from *Françafrique* that he promised, he himself seems to have become a prisoner of its influence, especially as he now understands that France cannot truly maintain its economic as well as geostrategic standing in the world without Africa. If anything, what Sarkozy has managed to do, is, in fact, desensitize French and African public opinions to the criminality of the *Françafrique* system. While under former French presidents, the workings of *Françafrique* remained illegal and secret, under Sarkozy, they have been brought to the open, and, therefore, normalized and decriminalized. Hence the ability of Robert Bourgi to openly and publicly boast of the type of influence he has on President Sarkozy, an influence that has inevitably led to a reinforcement of the types of personalized relations between the French president and African dictators that, precisely, Sarkozy had promised he would seek to sever. This trend is, in fact, no different from the style of governance that Sarkozy has managed to impose, domestically, on the French system of government. Not only has he brought about what Jean-Pierre Dubois and coauthors called the practice of *désinstitutionnalisation* (dis-institutionalization)—that is, the atomization of the forces of opposition (political parties and trade unions), and the reinforcement of the powers of the presidency to the detriment of the balance of power between the various branches of government[82]—he has also normalized behaviors which, morally, ethically or otherwise, previous French presidents would never have dared to display. Public displays of affection, overexposure of personal life in the media, gift to himself of a 172 percent pay raise, and unapologetic acceptance of "favors" from billionaire friends who have offered private jets, yachts, and villas for the vacationing(s) of the presidential couple, these have been some of the "transformations" that French society has experienced under Nicolas Sarkozy, who has never refrained from a certain twist of arrogance whenever confronted with questions on the morality of his style and manner of governing.[83] Sarkozy has certainly produced a "rupture," but not necessarily in the areas in which he was mostly expected to. And these salacious occurrences are just a few of those unusual attitudes that have led the French media to describe Sarkozy's reign as a "bling-bling" presidency.[84] Jean Peyrelevade certainly believes the election of Nicolas Sarkozy was a "historic mistake," and faults the French people for getting seduced by someone who is never going to be able to achieve the reforms aimed at the modernization of France that he promised.[85]

It suffices, therefore, to say that the normalization, under Sarkozy, of presidential behaviors that had been previously unacceptable to other presidents, has caused a societal desensitization over the *Françafrican* attitudes, which, in former French administrations, had been kept under the rug because of their potential criminality. If one is to talk of "rupture," therefore, one necessarily has to see this rupture, not in the destruction of the principles of *Françafrique* that have defined France-Africa relations since General de Gaulle, but, rather, in their normalization and foregrounding. Under Sarkozy, the questionable practices of *Françafrique* have simply been imported from the background to the foreground and turned into mainstream practices now justified openly as part of France's national strategic, economic and political interests. Because of Nicolas Sarkozy's unique style—unapologetically arrogant and outspoken, even if not always frank—it is anticipated that French and African public opinions will increasingly become desensitized to the neocolonialist anomalies, atrocities and criminalities which have been the hallmark of the *Françafrican* system. In embracing African dictators like no other French president before him, and in allying himself the various lobby networks that compromise the possibility of democratic change and economic development in Africa, Nicolas Sarkozy has made it clear his politics of "France first" have no concern for human rights and democracy. As he faced the same dilemma that Kazadi Ntole says General de Gaulle found himself confronted with at the time of decolonization—when he had to chose between France and an adventure, between France and the peoples of Africa,[86] a dilemma that Mitterrand was also forced to acknowledge when he backtracked from the geostrategic implications of his explosive La Baule speech—Nicolas Sarkozy, in turn, was forced to chose. He chose France and, therefore, the perpetuation of the status quo of a now fully resuscitated, unbridled, and unapologetic *Françafrique*.

Notes

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2. Thomas Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa: White Man's Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876 to 1912* (New York: Avion Books, 1991).
3. Daniel Mengara, "Francophonie plurielle ou francophonie française? Enjeux et perspectives d'une francophonie à deux vitesses," in *Francophonie au pluriel* XIII, no. 2, ed. Justin K. Bisanswa and Michel Tétu (Québec: CIDEF-AFI, 2003), 25.
4. Philip Christian, "Le Général de Gaulle et l'institutionnalisation de la Francophonie," *Fondation et Institut Charles de Gaulle,* http://www.charles-de-gaulle.org/dossier/francophonie/textes/philip_plan.htm (June 2, 2001).
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6. Ibid.
7. Charles De Gaulle, *Discours et Messages 3: Avec le renouveau (mai 1958-juillet 1962)* (Paris: Plon, 1970), 228.
8. Daniel Mengara, "On the Nature of Francophonia and Its Consequences for Language Instruction," *Transculture* 1, no. 2 (1996): 43.
9. Jean-Pierre Foirry, *L'Afrique: Continent d'avenir?* (Paris: Ellipses, 2006), 118.
10. François Soudan, "Il était une fois La Baule," *Jeune Afrique,* March 15, 2004, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/LIN14034iltaieluaba0/Il-etait-une-fois-La-Baule.-Actualite_Info.html (January 14, 2010).
11. François-Xavier Verschave, *La Françafrique: Le plus long scandale de la République* (Paris: Stock, 1998; reprint Paris: Stock, 1999), 56.
12. Antoine Glaser and Stephen Smith, *Comment la France a perdu l'Afrique* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 2005), 107.
13. Verschave, *La Françafrique,* 56.
14. Glaser and Smith, *Comment,* 107–108.
15. Glaser and Smith, *Sarko en Afrique* (Paris: Plon, 2008), 154.
16. Ibid., 154–155.
17. Sénat français, Commission des Affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées. *Rapport d'information n 450 (2005–2006). La France et la gestion des crises africaines: Quels changements possibles?* Session ordinaire (2005–2006), 3 juillet 2006, edited by André DULAIT, Robert HUE, Yves POZZO di BORGO and Didier BOULAUD, Senators, 10, http://extranet.senat.fr/rap/r05-450/r05-4501.pdf (September 20, 2009).
18. Christian Hoche, "François Mitterrand: Le testament africain," *L'Express,* November 10, 1994 (Updated December 9, 2009), http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/afrique/le-testament-africain-de-francois-mitterrand_498735.html (January 14, 2010).
19. All along the civil war in Côte d'Ivoire, the youth had often brandished the American flag as a retaliatory stance against what it perceived as France's neocolonial meddling in the war. Survie, a French non-governmental organization (NGO), in an editorial published in its *Billets d'Afrique* (no. 112 of March 2003, p. 1) entitled "Enterrons la

Françafrique!" (Let's Bury *Françafrique!*), describes the Ivorian president as someone who, to gain leverage against France in the civil war-related political negotiations mediated by the former colonial power, often got his supporters to carry American flags during demonstrations.

20. Verschave, *La Françafrique,* 175.
21. Achille Mbembe, "Afrique des comptoirs ou Afrique du développement?" Quoted in François-Xavier Verschave, *La Françafrique: Le plus long scandale de la République* (Paris: Stock, 1998; reprint Paris: Stock, 1999), 289.
22. Ibid.
23. Daniel Mengara, "Afrique francophone: L'ère des monarchies présidentielles," *Bongo Doit Partir,* January 12, 2010 (Updated January 14, 2010), http://www.bdpgabon.org/articles/2010/01/12/afrique-francophone-l%e2%80%99ere-des-monarchies-presidentielles/ (January 14, 2010).
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25. François-Xavier Verschave and Laurent Beccaria, *Noir procès: Offense à chefs d'Etats* (Paris: Les Arènes, 2001), 11, 17.
26. David Servenay, "Biens mal acquis africains, nouvelle plainte," *Rue89,* December 2, 2008, http://www.rue89.com/2008/12/02/biens-mal-acquis-africains-nouvelle-plainte (January 14, 2010).
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28. See for instance, Verschave, *La Françafrique and Noir silence;* Verschave and Beccaria, *Noir procès;* Glaser and Smith, *Comment,* and *Sarko,* among others.
29. Philippe Gaillard, *Foccart parle: Entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard* (Paris: Fayard/Jeune Afrique, 1995).
30. Pierre Péan, *L'Homme de l'ombre: éléments d'enquête autour de Jacques Foccart, l'homme le plus mystérieux et le plus puissant de la Ve République* (Paris: Editions Fayard, 1990).
31. See, at least, François-Xavier Verschave and Pierre Péan, who have fully documented these dealings.
32. Ludo De Witte, *The Assassination of Lumumba,* trans. Ann Wright and Renée Fenby (London: Verso, 2001; reprint London: Verso, 2002), viii.
33. Ibid., viii.
34. See Roméo Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003), and Andrew Wallis, *Silent Accomplice: The Untold Story of France's Role in the Rwandan Genocide* (London: I.B. Tauris & Ltd Co, 2006; reprint London: I.B. Tauris & Ltd Co, 2007).
35. Daniel Mengara, "Afrique francophone: L'ère des monarchies présidentielles."
36. Ibid. Note, however, that the case of Congo-Kinshasa, which actually began the practice of sons ascending to power thanks to their presidential fathers, is seen as a bit different by Mengara, who argues that Joseph Kabila's succession was both unexpected and improvised by the Kabila regime upon Laurent-Désiré Kabila's sudden death by assassination. Joseph Kabila's ascension may have, however, inspired Eyadéma and Bongo to constitutionally and institutionally prepare their sons for succession, thus triggering the trend of "presidential monarchies."
37. Péan, *Affaires*.
38. Verschave, *La Françafrique,* 139.
39. Loïk Le Floch-Prigent, "La confession de Le Floch-Prigent," December 12, 1996 (Updated December 16, 2003), http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/justice/la-confession-de-le-floch-prigent_492602.html (January 14, 2009).
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41. Glaser and Smith, *Sarko,* 194–195.
42. Ibid., 184–186.
43. Thomas Hofnung, “Quand Robert Bourgi, le «M. Afrique» de Sarkozy, ne tient pas sa langue,” *Libération,* September 7, 2009, http://www.liberation.fr/monde/0101589352-quand-robert-bourgi-le-m-afrique-de-l-elysee-derape (January 14, 2010).
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Glaser and Smith, *Comment,* 266.
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50. Glaser and Smith, *Sarko,* 151–152.
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52. Jane L. O’Neill and Shyama Soondur, quoted in Daniel Mengara, “Lettre Ouverte du Dr. Daniel Mengara à Nicolas Sarkozy: ‘Non, Président Sarkozy: L’Afrique ne veut plus être “aidée” ’; l’Afrique a besoin qu’on lui fiche la paix,” *Bongo Doit Partir,* June 1, 2007, http://www.bdpgabon.org/articles/2007/06/01/lettre-ouverte-du-dr-daniel-mengara-a-nicolas-sarkozy-%c2%ab-non-president-sarkozy-lafrique-ne-veut-plus-etre-aidee-lafrique-a-besoin-quon-lui-fiche-la-paix-%c2%bb/ (January 15, 2010); See also: François Soudan, “Pourquoi Sarkozy fait peur,” *Jeune Afrique,* May 29, 2006, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/LIN28056pourqruepti0/Pourquoi-Sarkozy-fait-peur.html (January 15, 2010).
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69. Jean-Pierre Dubois, "Une démocratie asphyxiée," in Françoise Dumont, and Agnès Tricoire, eds., *Une démocratie asphyxiée: L'état des droits de l'homme en France, édition 2008* (Paris: La Découverte, 2008), 22.
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77. See "La mort de Bongo relance le débat sur la 'Françafrique,' " *Europe 1.*
78. Glaser and Smith, *Sarko en Afrique,* 154.
79. Glaser and Smith, *Comment.*
80. Glaser and Smith, *Sarko.*
81. Verschave, *La Françafrique.*
82. Jean-Pierre Dubois, Françoise Dumont, and Agnès Tricoire, *Une démocratie asphyxiée: L'état des droits de l'homme en France, édition 2008* (Paris: La Découverte, 2008).
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4

Back to Africa: Russia's New African Engagement

J. Peter Pham

Introduction

After receiving significant attention and resources as a major theater of the Soviet Union's Cold War-era competition not only with the United States, but with the People's Republic of China,[1] Africa largely lost its place in the Kremlin's foreign policy with the fall of Communism. While the successor to the former Soviet Union, the Russian Federation, never entirely withdrew from the continent, its engagement with African states was severely limited throughout the 1990s, as a result of both policy choices and economic constraints. This has changed over the course of the decade of the twenty-first century as a combination of strategic and economic factors have motivated a renewed interest in Africa on the part of the leaders of a newly resurgent—and increasingly assertive—Russia.

In order to understand the relations refreshed under former Russian president (and now prime minister) Vladimir V. Putin as well as the multiple economic, political, and military ties currently being forged under his handpicked successor, President Dmitry A. Medvedev, it is first necessary to review how Russia-Africa relations have evolved, especially in recent years. Then it becomes possible to appreciate the contours of and dynamics driving Moscow's new strategic approach to Africa and how this is likely to impact not just Africans, but their other partners.

Historical Background

Although current Russian dealings with African states share many of the relations being established by "new actors" on the continent like China[2] and India,[3] Moscow's interactions with Africa actually have a long history dating back to the very foundations of the Russian state.[4] In the modern period, Russia established diplomatic relations with Ethiopia and the South African Republic (Transvaal) in 1898, the same year that a consulate general was opened in Tangiers, Morocco. Some 200 Russian volunteers, including officers from the Tsarist army, even joined the Afrikaners in their fight against the British Empire during the Second Boer War (1899–1902).[5] One distinguished historian's description of the Kremlin's early interest in Ethiopia in particular is especially prescient vis-à-vis later Soviet and post-Soviet calculations: "To the farsighted Russians of pre-Soviet days, a peaceful penetration of Ethiopia meant not only a means of influencing and controlling the fate of the country, but a promising avenue by which to enter the interior of Africa, to exert influence on Egypt and the whole Nile area, to get a foothold on the Red Sea, and, last but not least, to keep a check on the British. Thus, the Russians saw Ethiopia as a most suitable postern gate into the African continent."[6]

After the Revolution of 1917, the Communist International (Comintern) became the primary vehicle for the Kremlin's contacts with Africa and its efforts to politically influence the continent's nascent anticolonial movements. For example, from its establishment in 1921, the South African Communist Party (SACP) was a member of the Comintern, with one of the SACP's founding members, David Ivon Jones, being appointed by Joseph Stalin to the Comintern Executive Committee in 1928. After African National Congress (ANC) deputy president Oliver Tambo visited Moscow in 1963, the Soviet Union undertook to train the leadership cadres of the ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Zizwe, and the ANC itself became the first African liberation movement to establish direct ties with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, rather than through one of the Kremlin's "solidarity committees." After the Soweto uprising of 1976, Soviet financial assistance was critical to the ANC's establishment of military training camps in the "frontline" states for the youth who fled South Africa. Perhaps even more important than the financial support was the flow of arms—ranging from thousands of AK-47s to a few dozen Strela antiaircraft missile launchers—and the scholarships for generation after generation of ANC students to study in the Soviet Union, both of which were tremendous boosts to the then-embattled movement.[7] Following South Africa's first democratic elections in 1994, in the view of Russian analysts, "the new government opened new prospects for the development of South Africa's relations with Russia," given that the deputy president, several members of the new cabinet, and dozens of parliamentarians "had first hand experience of Russia and other former republics of the USSR and [were] in a position to assess their potential."[8] While things did not quite turn out that way, the legacy of these connections still influences contemporary politics, as Irina Filatova, professor emeritus at the University of KwaZulu-Natal and former head of the Department of African Studies at Moscow State University, has noted:

> [Former South African president Thabo] Mbeki's support for [Robert] Mugabe's government as a fellow liberation movement, despite the detrimental effect of this solidarity on both South Africa and Zimbabwe; the attempts of the government to control too many spheres of public life; the attempts to micro-manage and control the economy; its attitude to the media and to criticism both within and outside the ANC: all this and much more is traceable to the way the movement operated during the cold war and the era of its attachment to the Soviet Union. While the ANC might have survived without the Soviet Union, it would have been a very different ANC. And the last decades of the history of South Africa would have been very different too.[9]

Similarly, the Soviet Union played an important role in supporting the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA, "Popular Movement for the Liberation of

Angola") not only in the period leading up to the Portuguese withdrawal in 1975, but in the long struggle against Jonas Savimbi's rival nationalist group, the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA, "National Union for the Total Independence of Angola"), which received backing from China, South Africa, Zaïre (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), and, especially after the election of Ronald Reagan, the United States. According to figures from the Moscow Institute of Military History, "up to 1 January 1991, 10,985 Soviet military advisors and specialists visited Angola, including 107 generals and admirals, 7,211 officers, 1,083 warrant-officers and midshipmen, 2,116 sergeants, petty officers and privates and 468 civilian employees of the Soviet Army and Navy," while some 6,985 Angolans were trained in Soviet/Russian military educational institutions up to 1995.[10] While Angolan troops and the Cuban expeditionary forces—of which there were 40,000 at the height of their deployment in 1985—bore the brunt of the fighting, Soviet military advisors and other personnel also took casualties, especially at the Battle of Cuita-Cuanavale (1987–1988).[11]

By the time the Soviet Union formally dissolved on Christmas Day 1991, more than 50,000 Africans from across the continent had been trained in Soviet universities and military and technical institutes, including the incumbent heads of state of Angola (José Eduardo dos Santos, an engineering graduate of the Azerbaijan Oil and Chemistry Institute) and Mali (Amadou Toumani Touré, who trained as a parachute commando in the Soviet Union). At least another 200,000 Africans had received Soviet training on African soil.[12] Some 359 projects, including 132 industrial developments, had been built across Africa either by the Soviets or with their support.[13] In the heyday of Moscow's activism on the continent, especially fervent Soviet clients like President Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea and President Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia imposed Marxist dictatorships on their countries that aped the Stalinist prototype down to the minutest details of oppression, including, in the case of the latter, a terror famine that took the lives of at least one million people (the Ethiopian foreign minister at the time candidly told the chargé d'affaires of the U.S. embassy that "food is a major element of our strategy against the secessionists"[14]).

In contrast, the 1990s saw a massive disengagement from Africa by Russian foreign policy, with the mantras of "socialist solidarity" replaced by the spectacle of politicians ranging from President Boris N. Yeltsin to ultranationalist leader Vladimir V. Zhirinovsky blaming Russia's economic ills to the cost of aid that the Soviet Union had bestowed on Africa and other developing regions. Yeltsin even declared in 1991 that the era of massive foreign aid—at the time that it ceased to exist, the old Soviet Union had technical and economic assistance programs active in some 37 African countries—had ended and even called upon African countries to repay their outstanding debts as soon as possible. The cutoff was so thorough and unrelenting that some projects were literally halted just shy of completion, including a multi-million dollar steel plant in Ajaokuta, Nigeria, which was 98 percent completed when work was halted.[15]

In fact, aside from a reception accorded to then South African president F.W. de Klerk in mid-1992, not one African head of state was welcomed to the Kremlin during Yeltsin's entire first term as president of the Russian Federation. And it was not until more than halfway through his second term that Yeltsin received another African leader, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. During this period, more than a dozen Russian embassies, consulates, and other diplomatic and commercial stations in Africa were shut down, while the number of diplomats posted remaining missions was decreased. Throughout the continent, Russian cultural centers were shut down. Most

Russian journalists left Africa and the national airline, Aeroflot, cancelled most of its African routes, including flights to such regional hubs like Addis Ababa and Nairobi.[16]

The Kremlin, it seemed, had challenges closer enough to home, both with the weakened Russian economy and with the expansions eastward of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), to contend with and could not afford entanglements in a region that appeared at best remote to these more immediate concerns. Vladimir Shubin, deputy director of the Institute for Africa Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences and onetime head of the Africa Section of the International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, acknowledged:

> In these circumstances, Russia's neglect of Africa was almost inevitable. Indeed, Africa became somewhat of a scapegoat for Russia's ills. Early on in his struggle for power Boris Yeltsin claimed that Soviet assistance to Africa and other developing countries was a major cause of the economic problems that the Soviet/Russian people faced in the late 1980s/early 1990s. The so-called "democratic" (read: pro-Western) mass media followed suit and did its best to shape an extremely negative image of Africa and its relations with Moscow. Africa was portrayed as a "black hole" which swallowed Soviet resources, and the myth that "Africa ate us out of house and home" was disseminated.[17]

Turning away from its former involvement in the global South in general and Africa in particular, Russian foreign policy during this period emphasized closer ties with the West—including the acceptance of Western transition assistance and cooperation with the G7, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and counterpart European institutions—in the hopes of gaining eventual admission into the World Trade Organization (WTO), NATO, and the EU.[18] During this period, Russia's economic relations with Africa were pretty much reduced to what one distinguished development economist dubbed "the new trade triangle" whereby Russia exported its suddenly surplus weapons systems and other arms to Africa, Africa exported raw materials to Europe, and Europe exported manufactured products to Russia in exchange for gas.[19]

The New Political Context

Since Vladimir Putin succeeded Yeltsin as president on New Year's Eve 1999, however, there has been a slow but steady renewal of Russian interest in Africa. Even before his accession was ratified by the electorate, Putin, as acting chief of state, promulgated by presidential decree changes to the *Concept of the National Security of the Russian Federation* that signaled a break with the previous period. Specifically the document affirmed that "Russia's national interests in the international sphere lie in upholding its sovereignty and strengthening its positions as a great power and as one of the influential centers of a multipolar world, in development of equal and mutually advantageous relations with all countries and integrative associations and primarily with the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States and Russia's traditional partners," in opposition to what it described as "attempts to create an international relations structure based on domination by developed Western countries in the international community, under U.S. leadership and designed for unilateral solutions (primarily by the use of military force) to key issues in world politics in circumvention of the fundamental rules of international law."[20] The *Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,* which Putin approved in June 2000, further elaborated the aims of the foreign policy that the Kremlin would henceforth pursue, pledging with respect to Africa that "Russia will expand interaction with African states" and "develop a political dialogue with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and with subregional organizations and to use their capabilities for enabling Russia to join multilateral economic projects in the continent."[21] In short, Putin's policy toward Africa would be "basically two-pronged: (i) economic access to international markets, and (ii) the use of multilateralism to promote Russian geopolitical hegemony."[22]

Putin did not lose time in making good on his promise to increasing diplomatic engagement with Africa. In 2001 alone, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, Omar Bongo Ondimba of Gabon, Lansana Conté of Guinea, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia made official visits to Moscow. During the visit by the Algerian head of state, he and Putin signed a strategic partnership declaration.[23] During Putin's eight years as president, the Russian diplomatic presence across Africa was expanded and currently the Russian Federation has diplomatic relations with all 53 African states and operates missions in 41 of them[24]—more than any country except for the United States.[25] Since October 2005, the Russian ambassador to Ethiopia has also been accredited to the African Union, while relations have been launched on the subregional level with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Russia has taken part in resolving conflicts in Africa, dispatching modest forces to join in United Nations peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Liberia, Sudan, and the Western Sahara. Currently some 362 Russian personnel participate in six UN missions: the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), and the UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI).[26] Russian combat personnel and four Mi-8MT helicopters also lent support to the European Union peacekeeping force in Chad and the Central African Republic (Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA). The Russian Foreign Ministry's 2008 summary of the country's foreign policy and diplomatic activities, released in 2009, chronicled how during the period covered by the report:

> African peacekeeper training assistance was built up. There were over 500 students enrolled in the Russian Defense Ministry's military training institutions from 17 African countries. More than 50 specialists from 11 African countries took a training course at the Peacekeeping Training Center of the All-Russia Refresher Training Institute (VIPK) for Interior Ministry (MVD) officers. In addition, over 150 law enforcement officers from African nations improved their skills in courses at the MVD St. Petersburg University, MVD Volgograd Academy, MVD Moscow University, MVD Administration Academy and VIPK.[27]

Moreover, in pursuit of commercial opportunities in Africa, the Russia-Africa Business Council was established in 2002 with the participation of firms representing a wide range of the natural resource, financial, and tourism sectors. The Russia-South

Africa Business Forum followed in 2006 in the wake of Putin's visit to South Africa in September of that year. That visit, which was part of a tour that also included stops in Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco, was historic for being the first by any leader of the Kremlin south of the equator (the only foray into Africa during the Soviet period was Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's visit to Egypt in 1964).

Unlike countries like China and India for whom Africa's natural resources, especially its hydrocarbons, are a strategic necessity if they are to continue to sustain the growth of their economies,[28] Russia is a major producer and exporter of oil and natural gas that does not need new supplies of energy from the continent. However, it has been noted that what the Kremlin did try to do under Putin was to attempt to "increase its control over energy sources throughout the world to strengthen its own economic and political power" and was "particularly interested in gaining control over the supply of oil and natural gas from Africa to European countries."[29] For example, in 2006, following a visit by President Putin to Algiers, the Russian natural gas monopoly Gazprom entered into an agreement with the Algerian state gas company, Sonatrach, to cooperate in exploration, extraction, and production of liquefied natural gas. While the gas deal was subsequently put on hold, it was revived in early 2008 when Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika returned Putin's visit with a call on Moscow. Combined, a Gazprom-Sonatrach partnership would control nearly 40 percent of Europe's gas consumption. Thus, "even though Russia and Algeria have thus far not joined forces in the natural gas sector . . . there is now a rivalry between European countries and Russia over cooperation with Algeria in this area. For the EU, Algeria is currently its most important non-Russian lifeline for its natural gas supplies, which it intends to expand in the future in order to reduce dependence on Russian gas. Russia for its part has been seeking cooperation with Algeria in this field inter alia in order to maintain, or possibly even strengthen, its grip over gas imports towards European countries."[30]

In addition to Gazprom, other Russian firms are active in the Algerian oil and gas sector. Stroitransgaz has completed a 403-kilometer gas pipeline running from Haud el-Hamra to Arzrev and is working on another, 273-kilometer-long, pipeline from Hadjret en-Nous to Sougher. Rosneft, in tandem with Stroitransgaz, pursues oil and gas exploration in largely untapped southern Algeria, while Soyuzneftegaz, another Russian oil and gas company, is pioneering the local use of advance technologies to enhance yield and rehabilitate older fields. Still other Russian firms are active in water resource development and telecommunications in the Algeria.[31]

In addition to Algeria, another North African country, Libya—to whom Gazprom made an arguably unprecedented offer in August 2008 to purchase, at market prices, all the oil and gas it had available for export[32]—has been receptive to a Kremlin proposal, thus far not adopted, to turn the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), founded in Tehran in 2001 as an informal club of major natural gas exporting nations, into an Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries-type cartel whose members would account for 73 percent of world gas reserves and 42 percent of production[33]—an idea Algeria's Bouteflika, among others, has declared should not be *a priori* excluded.[34] Gazprom has subsequently also signed a deal with Nigeria's state-owned Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) to invest in a $2.5 joint venture to build refineries, pipelines, and gas power stations in the West African country.[35] Analysts view the agreement as a prelude to the Russian energy giant's participation in the construction of a proposed pipeline to carry gas across the Sahara to Algerian terminals for export to Europe, thus giving Moscow at least partial control over what Western European countries had hoped would be an alternative to Russian sources of natural gas.[36]

Russia has also shored up its "soft power" outreach in Africa. Under Putin, the Kremlin resumed granting scholarships for African students to study in Russian universities and other institutions of higher education. Currently several hundred African students benefit from the program, which covers tuition and room and board, to study at the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia (PFUR) in Moscow, formerly the Patrice Lumumba University. In addition to the students receiving Russian government scholarships, several hundred other Africans are also currently enrolled at PFUR on fee-paying basis. Several hundred secondary school students from Africa also graduate each year from Russian institutions.

In another initiative aimed at increasing its influence in Africa, some of the activities of the old Soviet Association of Friendship with African Peoples, originally founded in 1959 with the mission of "arrang[ing] meetings, social events, talks, and exhibitions devoted to the national holidays of the African peoples, to anniversaries of people outstanding in the cultural field in Africa, and to other important events in the life of African nations,"[37] have been revived by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs-run Russian Center for International Scientific and Cultural Cooperation (*Roszarubeszhtsentr*). *Roszarubeszhtsentr* branches are currently operating in Congo (Brazzaville), Egypt (Alexandria and Cairo), Ethiopia (Addis Ababa), Madagascar (Antananarivo), Morocco (Rabat), Namibia (Windhoek), Nigeria (Lagos), Tanzania (Dar es Salaam), Tunisia (Tunis), and Uganda (Kampala). The Institute for African Studies within the Russian Academy of Sciences, also founded in 1959, was reorganized in 2007 and now embraces 13 research units, a working group, and an information center, employing a total of more than one hundred academic staff members—a substantial commitment of public resources that is unmatched by any other government. The Institute is currently directed by Alexei Vasiliev, a scholar of the Middle East and Africa who has authored nearly 30 books and over 800 articles over the course of a career spanning four decades. In addition to his academic and policy research, since 2006 Vasiliev has also doubled as special representative of the president of the Russian Federation for relations with African leaders.[38]

In a dramatic turnaround from the Yeltsin-era deprecation of foreign assistance, in 2008 Russia announced a $500 million aid package for Africa that included funding to fight hunger, poverty, and infectious diseases including HIV/AIDS, as well as to address development issues. Announcing the initiative, Russian ambassador to Ethiopia Mikhail Afanasiev did not detail any specific countries or programs, but did pledge that "assistance to African countries will be offered in accordance with the recommendations of the UN organizations, including the Economic Commission for Africa, international financial institutions, as well as upon individual requests from African countries themselves—without any political strings."[39]

A "Geo-Economic" Strategy

By the time Putin reached the Russian constitution's consecutive limit of two presidential terms and bequeathed the office to Dmitry Medvedev, assuming instead the premiership, it was clear that the driving force behind the Russian Federation's renewed engagement with Africa was no longer global revolution, but political economy. As the updated version of the foreign policy concept document promulgated by Medvedev in 2008 put it: "Priority attention will be paid to developing mutually beneficial economic cooperation, in particular in the energy sector, with countries of this region, which is of strategic importance to Russia's national interests . . . We will develop political dialogue with the African Union and subregional organizations taking advantage of their capabilities to involve Russia in economic projects implemented on the continent."[40]

This emphasis on the economic is a total inversion of the geopolitical Africa policy pursued by the Kremlin during the Soviet period when, as Khrushchev admitted in his memoirs, economic gain was not the point of the effort: "We would receive . . . repayment in the form of increased trust in us by all . . . the peoples of underdeveloped countries, especially in Africa. It would be evident that they could rely on the USSR, that ours was not a self-seeking country, that the USSR had an understanding attitude towards the needs of nations freeing themselves from colonial dependence. Of course the economic component was not the main one for us; the political component was."[41]

Of course, as China likewise has learned, the 53 African states make up the largest geographic bloc in any international organization in which they participate and thus can represent a considerable political "reserve" for Russian foreign policy, especially in cases where Moscow chooses to take a stand in opposition to the Western powers. But it is Africa's economic importance to Russian interests that has emerged as a major factor in the Kremlin's engagement across the continent. In part, the drive to acquire access to Africa's resource wealth is due to the often overlooked reality that, despite its own abundant energy and mineral deposits, Russia has a critical shortage of certain raw materials, including aluminium, chrome, manganese, mercury, and titanium, and faces the depletion of its reserves of others, including copper, nickel, tin, and zinc.

Against this backdrop, it is not at all surprising that the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry's annual reports should detail prominently how its diplomatic missions in Africa have provided political support for Russian firms operating on the continent. The 2008 report, for example, cites an impressive list of companies and sectors:

> Alrosa in Angola and the DRC (diamond mining), Gazprom and Lukoil in Angola, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, and Cote d'Ivoire (oil and gas sector), Technopromexport in Angola (hydroelectric plant construction), VTB Bank in Angola and Namibia (expanding the activities of its subsidiary in Luanda and branch in Windhoek), Rusal in Guinea (bauxite mining, alumina production) and in Nigeria (modernizing the Alscon aluminum smelter), Renova in Gabon and South Africa (developing manganese ore fields), Energiya and Rosoboronexport (a space communications joint venture in Angola), Evraz Group S.A. in South Africa (vanadium production) and Norilsk Nickel in South Africa (nickel production).[42]

Thanks, at least in part, to this effective advocacy, Russia's trade volume with Sub-Saharan Africa rose by 30 percent during the first ten months of 2008 over the same period a year earlier, totaling some $1.9 billion.[43] In the same period, Russian oligarch Viktor Vekselberg's Renova Group acquired a 49-percent stake in United Manganese of Kalahari (the rest of the firm is held by a business front for South Africa's ruling ANC[44]). The joint venture was, reportedly through an intervention by Putin, granted prospecting rights in the North Cape region where some 80 percent of the world's known commercially exploitable reserves of manganese, a metal with important industrial alloy uses including steelmaking, are located.[45] Another Russian firm, Norilsk Nickel, owned by billionaire partners Mikhail Prokhorov and Vladimir Potanin, made what was to date the largest foreign direct investment in South Africa by a Russian company when it acquired a 20-percent stake in Gold Fields, a South African mining corporation, for $1.16 billion cash. At the time of the purchase from Anglo-American, Norilsk was already the world's largest producer of nickel and palladium and a leading producer of platinum, copper, and cobalt, as well as the largest gold miner in Russia.[46]

That Africa has emerged as, in the words of one investment bank report, "the new destination for Russian investors,"[47] was visibly underscored in July 2009 when Medvedev took more than one hundred leading businessmen with him in his entourage when he toured Egypt, Nigeria, Namibia, and Angola in the longest tour of Africa ever by a Russian leader.

Russia is also using both debt relief—to date, some $20 billion—and arms sales as part of its campaign for access to African markets and resources. During Putin's 2006 visit to Algeria, for example, Russia agreed to write off some $4.7 billion in Cold War-era debt owed by the country in exchange for a new $7.5 billion arms deal that would include MiG-29SMT fourth-generation fighters, Su-30MKA multi-role strike fighters, Yak-30 military jet trainers, two *Varshavyanka*-class diesel-electric submarines, and two *Nanuchka*-class corvettes, as well as eight S-300PMU-2 "Favorit" surface-to-air (SAM) batteries and the Tunguska-MI air defense missile and cannon systems.[48] Similarly, the write-off of $4.5 billion in Libyan debt on the occasion of Putin's April 2008 visit led not only to Russian Railways has been given a $2 billion contract to build a 516-kilometer branch line between Sirte and Benghazi, but also opened the way for a Russian tender to upgrade the country's air capabilities with $3 billion worth of aircraft and other equipment.[49]

More troubling has been the Russian sale of arms to regimes like that of Sudanese president Umar Hassan al-Bashir, who has been indicted by the International Criminal Court on five counts of crimes against humanity and two counts of war crimes for his role in the humanitarian disaster in Darfur. In 2001, Moscow signed a $120 million deal to supply Khartoum with ten MiG-29SE fighters and two MiG-24UB dual-seat trainers; the delivery of the dozen MiG 29s was accelerated in order to get them in early in 2004 before an arms embargo then being debated in the UN Security Council could take effect. The first batch of fighters was followed by an additional 14 MiG-29SEs, delivered in 2006, and another dozen, delivered in 2008.[50] Nor has Russia shown any scruples about arming both sides in conflicts, in recent years selling six MiG-29s to Eritrea and eight Sukhoi Su-25 twin-engine jets to Ethiopia as the two countries, which fought a bitter 1998–2000 war, continued to square off over a disputed territory.[51] On the other hand, from the Kremlin's point of view, not only do sales like these help extend Moscow's influence in Africa, but they help the Russian arms industry at a time when sales to China, once the largest purchaser and now itself increasingly a significant supplier of weapons to Africa, are dropping off dramatically.[52]

While the economic component is now, more than ever, a significant component in Russia's engagement of and investment in Africa, it should not be forgotten that the ultimate motivation of the Kremlin's foreign policy, especially since the hydrocarbon-enabled resurgence under Putin, is strategic—as two of the most astute scholars of Russian political economy have put it succinctly, "there is scant reason to doubt that Russian essentials tomorrow will be much like yesterday's."[53] Russia's foray into the African natural gas sector is aimed at preventing its ability to leverage Europe's dependence on its gas deliveries from being undermined by a viable alternative. Its investments in other natural resources on the continent are aimed both at cornering the world commodities markets and ensuring access to raw materials of which its industries are running short. Its arms sales and diplomatic support, often for rogue regimes, are aimed at restoring its influence in Africa and assuring a "reserve" of votes at the United Nations and other international forums.

From the African perspective—at least that of the ruling elites with whose exponents Moscow treats—the relationship is largely beneficial. For many, it is dealing with a partner they are familiar with from the anticolonial struggle, one for which they have positive associations because it never had any African colonies. Moreover, Russia's current engagements enable them to diversify their sources of foreign investments so as to not become too dependent on the United States, France, China, Britain, India, or any other partner. Finally, and perhaps most attractively, the diplomatic and military support offered comes without the often noisome political conditions imposed by American and European governments who, in turn, will find their ability to impose reform agendas and other leverage diminished. This new reality was brought home, for example, when following the wave of violence surrounding the second round of the Zimbabwean presidential elections in 2008, Russia joined China in vetoing a proposed UN Security Council resolution that would have sanctioned Robert Mugabe and 13 of his closest collaborators as well as slapped an arms embargo on the regime.[54] While certainly there were other motivations for the veto, including Moscow's generally dim view of establishing a precedent of external oversight in internal matters like elections, it could not have also gone unnoticed that just months before the vote, while others were fleeing the Zimbabwean market, the Russian investment group Renaissance Capital bought the country's second largest bank—by snapping up shares sold by a more skittish group.[55]

Conclusion

In response to both the demands of its historic "Muscovite culture"[56] and the setbacks in the once-promising relations with the West, Russia finds itself seeking to construct global system wherein its "great power" status is recognized. To this end, the Kremlin can no longer ignore Africa, not only because by their numbers alone the states of the continent are destined to play a significant role in any multipolar world, but because their natural resource wealth complements that held by Russia. In the pursuit of its strategy, Russia will undoubtedly benefit from the residual good will that is the legacy of the former Soviet Union's support for many African liberation movements. While the web of strategic access and other ties that the Russians have been reconstituting and expanding across the continent does not necessarily presage a return to the Cold War era's often-tragic zero-sum competition, other international actors heavily invested politically, economically, and militarily there—including both old colonial powers like France and Great Britain and "new actors" like Brazil, China, India, Japan, and the United States—will have to take note that Russia has definitely returned to Africa.

Notes

1. See Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 431–470; also see Robert Legvold, *Soviet Policy in West Africa* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), and Vladimir Shubin, *The Hot "Cold War": The USSR in Southern Africa* (London: Pluto Press, 2008).
2. See, inter alia, Garth le Pere and Garth Shelton, "Afro-Chinese Relations: An Evolving South-South Partnership," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 13, no. 1

(2006): 33–55; J. Peter Pham, "China's African Strategy and Its Implications for U.S. Interests," *American Foreign Policy Interests* 28, no. 3 (June 2006): 239–253; Dennis M. Tull, "China's Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 44, no. 3 (September 2006): 459–479; Chris Alden, *China in Africa* (London: Zed Books, 2007); and Serge Michel and Michel Beuret with Paolo Woods, *La Chinafrique: Pékin à la conquête du continent noir* (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 2008).

3. See, inter alia, François Lafargue, "L'Inde: Une puissance africaine," *Défense nationale et sécurité collective* 63, no. 1 (January 2007): 111–117; J. Peter Pham, "India's Expanding Relations with Africa and Their Implications for U.S. Interests," *American Foreign Policy Interests* 29, no. 5 (September–October 2007): 341–352; Sanusha Naidu, "India's Growing African Strategy," *Review of African Political Economy* 35, no. 115 (March 2008): 116–128.
4. See Carlo Zaghi, *I Russi in Etiopia* (Naples: Guida, 1972).
5. See Sergius Yakobson, "Russia and Africa," *Slavonic and East European Review* 17, no. 51 (April 1939): 623–637; also see Maxim Matusevich (ed.), *Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa: Three Centuries of Encounters* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2007).
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7. See Vladimir Shubin, *ANC: A View from Moscow,* 2nd rev. ed. (Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2009).
8. Vladimir Shubin, "The Soviet Union/Russian Federation's Relations with South Africa, with Special Reference to the Period since 1980," *African Affairs* 95, no. 378 (January 1996): 29.
9. Irina Filatova, "South Africa's Soviet Connection," *History Compass* 6, no. 2 (March 2008): 401.
10. Vladimir Shubin and Andrei Tokarev, "War in Angola: A Soviet Dimension," *Review of African Political Economy* 28, no. 90 (December 2001): 614.
11. See ibid., 615–617.
12. Vladimir Shubin, "Russia and Africa: Moving in the Right Direction?," in *Africa and International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent,* ed. Ian Taylor and Paul Williams (New York: Routledge, 2004), 102.
13. Yazini Funeka April, "Russian-South African Foreign Policy in Africa," *African Insight* 37, no. 4 (March 2008): 223.
14. Tibebu Bekele, quoted in Alex de Waal, *Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa,* African Issues Series (Oxford: James Currey, 1997), 117; also see Robert D. Kaplan, *Surrender or Starve: Travels in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea* (New York: Vintage, 2003).
15. Tatiana L. Deich and Dmitry V. Polikanov, "Russian-African Political Relations: Contemporary State and Prospects," in *Africa in Russia's Foreign Policy Priorities* (Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences Institute for African Studies, 2003), 52.
16. See Vladimir Shubin, "Russia and Eastern Africa: Coming Back?," in *Globalization and Emerging Trends in African Foreign Policy,* vol. 2: *A Comparative Perspective of Eastern Africa,* ed. Korwa G. Adar and Peter J. Schraeder (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2007), 172–173.
17. Shubin, "Russia and Africa: Moving in the Right Direction?," 103.
18. See Steven Rosefielde and Stefan Hedlund, *Russia since 1980* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 211–214.
19. See Philippe Hugon, "Les nouveaux acteurs de la coopération en Afrique," *Revue internationale de politique de développement* 1, no. 1 (March 2010): 98–118.

20. *National Security Concept of the Russian Federation* approved by Presidential Decree No. 24, January 10, 2000, http://www.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/36aba64ac09f737fc32575d9002bbf31?OpenDocument (accessed April 1, 2010).
21. *Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation* approved by the president of the Russian Federation, June 28, 2000, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm (accessed April 1, 2010).
22. April, "Russian-South African Foreign Policy in Africa," 225.
23. See Mark N. Katz, "Russia and Algeria: Partners or Competitors?," *Middle East Policy* 15, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 153.
24. The only African countries currently without a resident Russian diplomatic mission are Burkina Faso, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, The Gambia, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Niger, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Togo. In addition to embassies, there are Russian consulates general in Algeria (Annaba), Egypt (Alexandria), Morocco (Casablanca), and South Africa (Cape Town). In Nigeria, the Russian embassy still remains in Lagos, while a more modest diplomatic mission operates in the federal capital of Abuja.
25. The United States has 48 embassies in Africa—in every country except Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, and Somalia—and five consulates general (Casablanca, Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg, and Juba).
26. United Nations Peacekeeping, UN Missions Summary Detailed by Country (February 28, 2010), http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2010/feb10_3.pdf (accessed April 1, 2010).
27. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, *The Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Activities of the Russian Federation in 2008,* March 2009, 92.
28. See Erica Strecker Downs, *China's Quest for Energy Security,* RAND Project Air Force Series (Santa Monica, 2000), 3–9; also see Ruchita Beri, "India and Africa: Towards an Energy Partnership," in *Africa and Energy Security: Global Issues, Local Responses*, ed. Ruchita Beri and Uttam Kumar Sinha (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2009), 49–57.
29. Daniel Volman, *China, India, Russia and the United States: The Scramble for African Oil and the Militarization of the Continent*, Current African Issues 43 (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2009), 12.
30. Derek Lutterbeck and Georgij Engelbrecht, "The West and Russia in the Mediterranean: Towards a Renewed Rivalry?," *Mediterranean Politics* 14, no. 3 (November 2009): 390.
31. Vladimir E. Titorenko, "Russia Comes Back to Algeria," *International Affairs* 52, no. 4 (2006): 163–169.
32. See Lutterbeck and Engelbrecht, "The West and Russia in the Mediterranean," 390–392.
33. Katz, "Russia and Algeria," 154.
34. See Hakim Darbouche, "Russian-Algerian Cooperation and the 'Gas OPEC': What's in the Pipeline?" (Policy Brief 123, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, March 2007).
35. "Gazprom Seals $2.5bn Nigeria Deal," BBC News, June 25, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8118721.stm (accessed April 1, 2010).
36. See Gawdat Bahgat, "The Geopolitics of Energy: Europe and North Africa," *Journal of North African Studies*15, no. 1 (March 2010): 39–49.
37. Quoted in John D. Skrentny, *The Minority Rights Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 60.
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43. Ibid.
44. See Roger Southall, "The ANC for Sale? Money, Morality and Business in South Africa," *Review of South African Political Economy* 35, no. 116 (2008): 281–299.
45. See "New Powers, New Policy," *Africa Confidential* 47, no. 18 (September 8, 2006): 4.
46. In a somewhat apposite development, in 2008 Prokhorov put down a $55 million deposit to acquire the Villa Léopolda near Cap Ferrat on the French Riviera, which was on sale for a record $750 million. The Belle Époque mansion was built in 1902 by King Leopold II of the Belgians, using the proceeds from his private African colonial enterprise, the Congo Free State. When he subsequently backed out of the deal, a French court ruled that he forfeited the deposit. See William Stolerman, "Russian Loses $55 Million Deposit on Villa Leopolda," *Luxury Insider,* March 4, 2010, http://www.luxury-insider.com/Current_Affairs/post/2010/03/04/Russian-Loses-2455M-Deposit-on-Villa-Leopolda.aspx (accessed April 1, 2010).
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50. See Andrew McGregor, "Russia's Arms Sales to Sudan a First Step in Return to Africa," *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, February 9, 2009, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34488 (accessed April 1, 2010).
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Part II

Africa and the New Balance of Power

5

Africa's International China Relations: Contending Imaginaries and Changing Politics

Daniel Large

Introduction

China's accelerated engagement in Africa is arguably the foremost single factor that has elevated Africa's position in contemporary international relations. Following decades of comparative obscurity, China's relations with Africa have become a regular feature of media coverage, academic research, and policy engagement, not to mention burgeoning business connections. Commentators from diverse quarters have ascribed varying perspectives about the nature and significance of the non-Western agency represented by China's involvement. One widely articulated theme is that the Chinese engagement is transformative not merely in potential but also in concrete actuality. If it may be premature to assert such grand proclamations as those that contend Africa is "undergoing a transformation as momentous as decolonization," it can certainly be said that "the Chinese are penetrating the imagination of an entire continent."[1]

This chapter contextualizes and presents a general appraisal of Sub-Saharan Africa's contemporary international China relations. It begins with an overview of China's current involvement, which is characterized as expansive but also involving the consolidation of gains. Following brief remarks about the state of research on Africa-China relations, it then considers how interest in Africa's relations with China has cascaded in recent years. In arguing that one integral dynamic to Africa's China relations is that playing out in the realm of the political imaginary, it suggests that much of the tremendous recent stimulation of attention toward Africa can be attributed to the rejuvenation of interest in China. Furthermore, it might even be said that external reactions to the perceived dramatic irruption of China into Africa are almost as revealing about the preoccupations of different involved actors concerning China's rise in world affairs, or indeed the track record of more established external actors there, as the nature of the Chinese engagement in the continent per se. The next section considers African states and sub-state actors in relation to China's engagement, and the important, growing micro-sociality of a more grounded, quotidian Chinese presence. The final section examines Africa's international China relations, including East Asian competition in Africa and European and American responses.

Consolidating Gains: Africa's China Relations

Despite being posthumously narrated in many Chinese sources as constant, China's historical engagement with Africa was episodic and, particularly in the postcolonial phase, marked by expanding and contracting relations.[2] China was received in Africa as threatening to displace the West in the Cold War,[3] only to be written off as having no serious prospects.[4] Today there is greater reason than at previous historical moments to argue that China's reengagement with Africa will persist, deepen, and be consequential as part of what is shaping up to represent a historical departure from China's previous involvement. Similar views have been expressed from the 1960s, and the contingent complexities in current relations should not be underestimated. The current Chinese involvement, however, is occurring as China's economic and resource interdependence in the world economy deepens, and it's relations with Africa appear to be predicated on medium- and long-term objectives.[5] The Chinese government itself has reiterated this objective in the face of the recent global economic downturn, including at the fourth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in November 2009.

China's "strategic partnership" with Africa has moved beyond its November 2006 moment of declaratory celebration into a period characterized by efforts to consolidate the gains made to date, negotiate challenges, and continue expansive economic elements. China's economic relations with Africa have continued to be dynamic, even in a changing economic climate. Overall China-Africa trade levels, although projected to decline in 2009, experienced robust increases: in 2007 total trade reached $73 billion, and in 2008 reached $107 billion, thereby achieving the trade target of $100 billion set at FOCAC 3 in 2006 and rendering China as Africa's second leading trading partner after the United States, surpassing France as one the continent's key investors. The expansion of a multifaceted Chinese engagement continued, involving a broader spectrum of activities beyond the previous dominance of resource extraction imperatives. It was evident, for example, in efforts to enhance educational and cultural exchanges, further develop agricultural cooperation and the emergence of new business areas like financial services, seen in the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China's $5.6 billion purchase of a 20 percent stake in Standard Bank in late 2007 as well as an expanding role of Chinese banks. The progress of the $5 billion Africa Development Fund, established by the Chinese government at FOCAC 3 in 2006 and overseen by the China Development Bank, was slower than expected but remains set to underwrite substantial investment by Chinese companies in Africa; amongst other aims, it seeks to encourage Chinese business to transfer manufacturing to Africa.[6] The establishment of the economic zones pledged in 2006 continues, the first being set up in Zambia, Mauritius, and Angola, with other China-backed free trade and export processing zones being established independently (including three in Nigeria).

The Chinese government's adaptive pragmatic approach has continued to characterize the practices of Beijing's Africa policy, codified as this otherwise is in a principled framework that has endured over generations of very different modern Chinese engagements. A greater realism has intruded into official exchanges. China's relations with African states have continued to be officially presented as harmonious, accompanied at times by the public admission of certain difficulties, but are nevertheless recognized as being subject to forces of political and economic gravity that have generated mounting problems. The broad trajectory of Chinese engagement has shifted from what might be summarised as an entry/start-up phase into a more routine, normalized business on the back of committed investments. Two trends demonstrating the realities of consolidation relate to this ongoing transition: investment protection amidst burgeoning economic activities has become more important to Beijing and Chinese companies and, concomitantly, in places the consolidation of Chinese interests has been accompanied by the logic of deepening political involvement. Thus far China has sought to use relations with African ruling elites and African-led multilateralism to manage problems rising from its deepening engagement but the cross-cutting interests of central state, provincial and private actors makes this increasing difficult to manage for Beijing, and even harder to control.

Popular notions of inexorable Chinese progress in Africa applied not just to China's rapid economic expansion but also its perceived political gains, have been somewhat undermined in the context of global economic difficulty. The exuberant optimism that initially accompanied the apparently relentless Chinese rise throughout the African continent has been tempered by recognition that as China's economy enters uncharted waters against the background of wider global economic turbulence, its relations with Africa, notwithstanding Beijing's political commitment to its African partnership, also face the same reality. The contingencies that accompanied the thickening of relations ought to be recognized: there is nothing inevitable or preordained about the continued expansion of China's own domestic development and its relations with Africa likewise. The challenges faced by the Chinese government in sustaining its own domestic development and achieving its goal of internal modernization continue, joined by the more recent pressure on Beijing to meet high expectations within Africa as a benevolent development partner and "all weather friend" that continues to deliver irrespective of global economic turbulence.[7]

Africa-China Relations: An Under-Researched Field

Despite a recent upsurge of academic and policy research interest,[8] Africa's China relations have remained an under-researched area overall[9] while African studies in China have "been more or less a mystery to Africanists in other parts of the world."[10] The study of Africa-China relations is probably too formal a description of what has hitherto proceeded in a rather ad hoc, limited fashion. It has been—and largely remains—disadvantaged by the longstanding divide between research on African and Chinese politics and foreign relations. China was rarely deemed sufficiently important in African politics and foreign relations to merit dedicated, sustained research. This might be attributed to the apparently ambitious and ideologically prominent postcolonial Chinese engagement in Africa, which in practice was limited and generally upstaged by the major vectors of colonial and postcolonial change: decolonization, the Cold War (China's rivalry with the Soviet Union—and Taiwan—tending to attract more attention than its actual conduct in Africa), and the structural adjustment period that coincided with a more inward focused, modernizing China. In a similar manner, Africa has not, until recently, been a mainstream subject in the study of Chinese foreign relations, being most often subsumed as part of the Third World (and even then as not an especially noteworthy constitutive member[11]). The most recent phase of Chinese engagement in Africa has, additionally, remained curiously immune to theoretical consideration.[12] This is changing as new scholarship seeks to deploy more explicitly theoretical frameworks.[13] Nonetheless, to date, much coverage has been imbued with an empiricist reflex, a prevailing tendency to empirically chart—often on the basis of weak evidence or secondary sources—general themes or country case studies. Such trends might be said to reflect the manner in which the subject has swiftly passed from relative obscurity to global prominence. One result, however, is that the way in which China as a "new" issue in African politics and international relations has cascaded through the academy, policy communities as well as governments is in itself revealing, including for what it shows about a passing period of ambitious but nonetheless self-introspective Western myopia about its African engagement,[14] or the ongoing impact of what has been perceived as competitive adversity that China has galvanised in challenging Westerns interests or the mainstream "international" development sector in Africa.

Reactions to Africa's China relations fall into a combination of familiar historical and more recently generated representations of, and projections onto, China. Chinese responses to Western responses concerning its Africa partnership, in turn, are also bound up in the wider politics of its own foreign relations. Prominent strands of media coverage following the third FOCAC in November 2006 evoked classic Cold War portrayals of the Communist China Dragon on a dangerous political safari in an African bush Beijing had declared "excellent" for world revolution. The menu of concerns and language of debate in Europe and America were revealing as a window onto domestic preoccupations, mainly concerning China, but less so about the concrete dynamics of what actually was unfolding in Africa. This had been seen before, most notably in Premier Chou Enlai's groundbreaking tour of Africa in 1963–64, which produced the last comparable burst of concerned interest at Red China's intentions regarding—and growing role in—an Africa undergoing its uncertain postcolonial transition. The recent external reception of China in Africa has, then, been intimately connected to—but nonetheless at the same time arguably removed from—the actual, more grounded processes of a developing Chinese engagement. If in 1975 there was "striking discrepancy between what China was actually doing and what her critics said she was doing" in Africa,[15] it could be argued that a similar dynamic has occurred with regard to the most recent episode of China's African engagement.[16]

The prevailing abstraction that characterized initial reactions to Africa's "new" China engagement combined problematically with the influence of a set of representational dynamics channeled through a historical prism of Africa's past. While constituting an entity in the very terms of China's engagement, the sheer abstraction of "Africa," itself a construct not far removed from what can easily slip into an essentialized continental character, clearly is somewhat incongruent with the complex diversity of the continent and its myriad external interventions. In a similar way, representational constructions of China (as, naturally, "the West") can easily fall pray to simplified abstractions or stereotypes. It is thus more helpful to approach this in terms of there being "many Chinas and equally, many Africas."[17] Such conundrums of the language and conceptual apparatus for considering Africa's contemporary relations with China are recognized, but analysis needs to go beyond what at times (as demonstrated here) remain necessary shorthand.

This is important at a basic level, without necessarily exploring possible motivations behind what has been termed a "campaign of suspicion."[18] Rather than circulating above or apart from relations, representational dynamics in debates and popular stereotypes concerning what are often misleadingly presented as a homogenous entity in "the Chinese" are a constitutive aspect of Africa's relations with China; these shape and can impact upon the materiality of relations. At the same time as historical narratives that positively promote China's relations with Africa are mobilized, for example, shadows of the past can intrude upon Africa's current China relations, including use of a misleadingly atavistic terminology. Such phrases as "scramble for Africa," imperialism, or neocolonialism are historically specific to a different phase of Africa's politics, and can constrain appreciation of current dynamics of Chinese engagement in its own terms. The use and discussion of such terms has, however, intruded into the content of China's African engagement and illustrate how perceptions can partly be influenced through a historical filter. No matter how much Beijing might wish otherwise, in Africa its engagement is approached through the powerfully instructional lens of history that, as a result of experience and regardless of whether honorable intentions are assumed from China, casts suspicion upon the rhetoric of mutual benefit or win-win cooperation.[19]

Contending Imaginaries: Contextualizing Reception of and Reactions to China

The extraordinary recent levels of interest in China-Africa relations demonstrate the compelling nature of the subject. Following the G8's Year of Africa in 2005, the comparative indifference toward the post-1989 Chinese engagement in Africa rapidly transitioned to widespread attention produced as a result of scaled-up, more visible Chinese diplomatic and commercial activity. This culminated in Beijing's FOCAC 3 in November 2006, the grand finale of China's own Year of Africa and the event that arguably did most to announce, and vividly embody, China's arrival in Africa to a global audience. The rise of China in world affairs could be most dramatically seen in Africa, where, despite deeper roots, China had seemed to explode into prominence. China's ascendancy in Africa, particularly as constructed by media and popular representation in Europe and North America,[20] or reactions by business and other development policy communities, subsequently assumed a dynamic of its own. There was, and remains, a palpable sense in which interest in Africa has been rejuvenated not as a result of interest in the continent per se so much as a result of interest within and without Africa in the Chinese interest, spliced with a certain disillusionment about the track record of Western engagement and concern at the ramifications for Africa's established external partners of this apparent unfolding geopolitical shift. In keeping with the historical tendency in the West to oscillate between extremes of "approval and dismay" when relating to China, and amidst considerable "heat and mystery,"[21] a series of notions about the Chinese role in Africa circulated in different ways in different theaters. Understood as a realm of speculative abstraction into which political associations and politics can intrude, contending political imaginaries could be seen in at least five areas: ideas about the zero-sum displacement of the West in Africa, the privileging of Africa in China's foreign policy, concern at governance impacts, "China Inc's" grand designs and expectations of future development.

Popular speculation about the displacement of Europe and America in Africa as a result of China's new position occurred amidst recrudescent optimism about the brighter future China was thought to be capable of delivering in the continent. Often expressed in zero-sum terms, the premature replacement of "the West" by China in Africa was heralded in contemporary articulations of historical Cold War slogans declaring that the East Wind was prevailing over the West. A new trend of competition opening up fresh opportunities through the arrival of a Chinese alternative is undoubtedly in motion, but clearly China has yet to displace Africa's more established external connections, nor is this likely to easily happen in the short term.[22] A key geopolitical factor here remains China relations with the United States in Africa.[23] The Obama administration's newly calibrated Africa policy places rhetorical emphasis on "mutual respect and mutual responsibility" and "partnership." President Obama's stated conviction of "a fundamental truth" that "development depends on good governance"[24] may herald a new period in which the rhetorical emphasis of the U.S. administration on the effective institutional basis of governance and development, with all that entails in terms of transparency, accountability or anticorruption, may continue debates concerning China's relation to governance. Given that the United States has reformulated its approach in order to appear, at least, to make Africa a more important foreign policy priority,[25] American-Chinese relations in Africa are located at an interesting juncture.

A related dynamic is the apparent but misleading construction of a uniquely privileged place for Africa in China's foreign economic and political relations. In parts of Europe, at least, Africa assumed a special position of treatments of China's emerging roles overseas, partly as a result of the particular geography of historically conditioned interest in Africa held in former colonial powers.[26] If Africa is contextualized in China's wider scheme of foreign policy concerns, however, the continent is less significant in China's hierarchy of global concerns or overall economic relations. At the same time it is important to underline that Africa remains important for China, and not merely in terms of resource extraction interests or business opportunities. China's efforts to build a strategic partnership with Africa form one pillar in Beijing's global foreign policy strategy and vision for the international system. Africa is thus integral to Beijing's strategic ambition to advance a "new security concept" that can ensure China's "peaceful rise" as a global power and strengthen its relations with key neighbors and regions. More concretely, through its global approach, the Chinese government seeks to sustain development and political stability in China, legitimise the benefits of China's rise in Africa and the world and achieve a multipolar, equitable, and more democratic international system. In this respect, China's strategic partnership with Africa represents one regional pillar of a broader strategy to promote multipolarity and ensure regional and international balance of power, within which China's relation with the United States categorically forms its most important, defining relation.[27]

Governance questions have been salient in causing controversy. Widely fingered as having a uniquely negative impact on African governance, a profusion of liberal discourses reacted with concern about China's deleterious political impact. Despite the binary language frequently used to address the issue ("threat or opportunity," "partner or predator"), this is not a zero-sum question. Nor can China be used as the sole, convenient explanation of choice. China complicates the existing situation. There is little doubt that its engagement increases the potential for authoritarian politics within some African states, dovetailing as it does with forms of patrimonialism and established state politics. In certain cases, notably certain resource-rich countries, Chinese engagement has assisted African elites with narrowly self-serving and, to varying extents, predatory agendas. In the process, "progressive" governance agendas have undoubtedly been undermined, at least in the short term. Rather than a uniquely Chinese illiberal impact, however, this represents the reinforcement of a preexisting political economy.[28] It has also become more apparent that mounting Chinese interest in effective African governance or governing apparatus is well founded, given the importance of this to sustaining longer-term investment relations.[29] Furthermore, that the existence of political pluralism in parts of Africa and the role of active civil society actors has influenced and posed unexpected challenges to the Chinese engagement.

Projections of a grand "China Inc." design for Africa has been a further area of contending meta-narratives circulating in the context of world attention toward China's "peaceful rise/development." A shift has been evident since 2006 in attitudes toward and representations of "Beijing." From a position foregrounding the centrality of a mostly unitary version of the Chinese state held to be implementing a strategic masterplan for Africa, more recent arguments emphasized the importance of a more complex, disaggregated understanding of the Chinese state at its different central, provincial and local levels of African engagement. This analytical trajectory has moved from overstating "China Inc." to arguably understating the importance of strategic central state involvement in China's African role; while the former image was misleading, the importance of a central-state backed process is fundamental in terms of strategic direction, policy management, or financial backing, even if the Chinese government is composed of different ministries that can have competitive as well as cooperative relations as part of routine intra-state bureaucratic politics.

A final area where contending imaginaries have circulated concerns the reinvigoration of debates about African development. Numerous notions of Chinese-driven development in Africa essentially offer reprised modernization narratives. These cumulatively represent the high expectations vested in the efficacy identified in visions of a Chinese-mediated globalized modernity and belief in Chinese agency in achieving African development.[30] A new optimism around reinvented notions of modernization abounds. Instead of modernity as "the object of nostalgic reverie,"[31] and in view of the combination of the at best mixed track record of organized development in Africa and China's own, mostly successful domestic modernization, China for some appears to represent the optimal means to realize development. This is questionable, though not entirely without some basis in current trends. At the very least, however, such ideas are indicative of a new imaginary of development, even if this does not square easily with various contingent aspects of and more structural challenges facing China's engagement, including the reality that its core economic relations replicate Africa's previous pattern of commodity-dependant external trade, new Chinese competition for fledgling African manufacturing sector and start of uncertain Chinese economic trade and manufacturing experiments in Africa.

State, Sub-State, and Social Drivers

African relations with China have tended to be presented as an interstate phenomenon involving neatly bounded national state entities engaging in new forms of clearly demarcated political and economic interactions. The ready use of aggregate unitary actors is clearly inadequate. Rather than this overly statist and unduly tidy model, Africa's emerging relations with China should be regarded as being importantly—though not exclusively—state-mediated, inherently transnational flows that reflect and give particular expression to the globalisation of China as manifest in Africa and China's broader role in the global economy as well as Africa's own reception, experience and responses. This is itself reflective of shifts in the global balance of power.

Despite these qualifications, an important dimension in Africa's relations with China remains that operating at the level of the state, which in Africa is in varying but important ways internationalized.[32] Beijing's official adherence to a policy of attaching no formal political conditions to its relations with all manner of its 49 current African government partners has been alternately welcomed or criticized, following a period of more intrusive Western conditionality. China has been widely received by African leaders as an empowering alternative, a positive contrast to relations with key Western allies, particularly when reinforced by Beijing's close linkage of rhetoric to rapid practical delivery. Rather than operating outside politics, as certain representations or literal extrapolations of China's rhetoric suggest, Beijing clearly operates a very effective informal fusion of symbiotic political and economic dimensions that, while avoiding, where at all possible, any direct public intrusion into the formal realms of African politics, has successfully enabled the widespread entry and expansion of its interests. This is reinforced by a policy framework for operating its African relations featuring unusually high diplomatic representation across the continent.

Beijing's public acceptance of myriad African state forms is embedded within and reinforced by its sovereignty doctrine and other key foreign policy principles. In some senses, in asserting the value of a sovereignty-based African political order together with noninterference in internal affairs and territorial integrity, Beijing's preferred conception of political order resonates with Africa's postcolonial moment, as well as aspects of China's own experience of the modern world order. China articulates a sovereignty-based order in its own desired political image as a matter of reciprocity. This framework doesn't easily square with African politics. One trend in Africa's changing China politics is the emerging tensions produced by the unconditional privileging of the central state in China's African relations. This issue might be condensed into the African state impact on China's engagement, or, generally, African state agency, and has been of particular importance in China's more difficult relations in Africa. The example of Sudan, China's most controversial engagement in recent years due to the ongoing conflict in Darfur, is worth noting in this regard. Beijing was willing to support Khartoum over Darfur for a mixture of reasons related to economic interests and political concerns, and China's assistance enabled Khartoum to pursue a course that would otherwise have been unlikely. By incorporating China into its foreign relations strategy as its key international sponsor, however, Sudan's ruling National Congress Party (NCP) was a somewhat less than passive recipient of Chinese support.[33] Instrumental in China's mostly reactive policy engagement over Darfur was the Khartoum's political agency in pursuing tactical, defensive diplomatic maneuvering in a path of resistance that at times ran contrary to China's interests, but in which China nonetheless remained vital. The principles that facilitated China's entry into Sudan came to constrain Beijing in the face of an uncooperative NCP under President Bashir pursuing a course of action damaging to China's international reputation. This required and prompted a new, mixed approach from Beijing: international diplomacy around its repositioned efforts to persuade Bashir to accept a UN peacekeeping mission for Darfur, bilateral efforts to reassure the NCP of its continuing support and an expansion of the Chinese economic engagement within Sudan.

Sub-Sovereign Dynamics and China's Engagement

A further vector of changing politics is emerging in different ways beyond and below the state. This might be said to be asserting the obvious given the nature of many African states, and one characteristic common to many is the inability of the central governing apparatus to extend effective control over its full territorial extent.[34] However, this area can be said to have been somewhat neglected from the perspective of African politics in particular, due to a privileging of Africa's China relations in statist terms, overattention to China's relations with governing African regimes as well as Beijing's public emphasis on dealing with African governments and preference for state-state bilateralism. The proliferation and behavior of sub-state Chinese actors, including provincially backed firms and small businesses, seems increasingly to suggest their own autonomy from Beijing. This dynamic can be said to cut to the heart of the problem facing the consolidation of sustainable Chinese ties with Africa. The central Chinese government's principal-agent dilemma has emerged as an overarching challenge in the consolidation and deepening of its African involvement.[35]

The trend of "sub-sovereign" African drivers in shaping China's engagement can be seen in different contexts. It arguably testifies to a less-central-state anchored engagement in practice, and is mirrored by Africa's own multilayered Chinese experience. This trend above all speaks of the growing political complexity of China's multifaceted engagement, and the need for more flexible adaptation to local political realities in diverse parts of the continent. In the process, this is creating new alliance patterns and political relations. While differentially experienced, in general it pertains most to sites of more important resource related Chinese investment, often subject to a prior and current status of political contention extending into armed conflict. Corresponding to the highly concentrated economic geography of China's resource-related investments, there have been notable incidents of threats to and at times the killing of Chinese workers in such places as Nigeria, Ethiopia, or Sudan. These illustrate the importance of localized conflicts between local groups and the state, and the positioning of Chinese investment in the midst of ongoing conflict where China's role in places has come to be seen as actively partisan, thus constituting a potential leverage mechanism for rebels to deploy against their government opponents. Greater immersion in the politics of consequential resource investments and the impossibility of actual noninvolvement in "internal affairs" is imposing strains on Beijing in ways that that bring attendant response dilemmas.

A further dimension is the growing importance of ordinary, everyday social relations as a more influential aspect of Chinese involvement. The wide dispersion and diversity of the activities and experiences of Chinese actors is increasingly important in shaping official relations from below. One aspect of this concerns the activities of small and medium Chinese enterprises engaged in a variety of business activities across Africa.[36] This is an overlooked driver of Chinese engagement given that attention has mostly been directed toward the larger Chinese state-owned enterprises, particularly the likes of CNPCC, Sinopec, CNOOC, or others engaged in high-profile energy security foreign policy imperatives. Africa remains a destination and operating space for a diverse array of Chinese entrepreneurial endeavor, often framed in terms of frontier imagery as the last open continent of strong economic opportunity and potential.[37] Rising African transnational trading flows with China are also important new connection arteries. This feeds into the new flows of Chinese migration, the most distinctive and potentially consequential strand of the growing Chinese role in Africa.[38] Chinese migration is also a driver on different local/state African responses to China, at times necessitating Chinese political responses.

Africa's International China Relations

Africa's relations with China have involved a combination of international and regional factors that connect with China's broader international relations. China's regional politics have continued to be transferred onto Africa, in new circumstances and with a new set of challenges. Most immediately, this is demonstrated by China's relations with Taiwan, which continue to feature in Africa's experience of—and relations with—China, albeit in diminishing form. The One China policy, Beijing's single explicit political conditionality, remains the fundamental exception to China's "no-strings attached" policy. The Chinese government has used African support in its cross-Straits campaign;[39] at times cross-Straits relations intruded into African politics.[40] Beijing's aim to deny space to Taiwan in Africa succeeded during the former Taiwanese administration under President Chen Shui Bien. Taiwan's bleak political prospects in Africa came to rest on four small, strategically insignificant states (Burkina Faso, The Gambia, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Swaziland) and its economic relations constituted a proportionally minor amount of its foreign trade.[41] However, with the new Nationalist (KMT) administration in Taipei enjoying better relations with Beijing after 2008, a transitional phase has seen a change of Taiwan's foreign policy on Africa. Though the subject remains sensitive for Beijing, and the possibility that African political actors can play the Taiwan card to exert leverage vis-à-vis Beijing continues, this is essentially hypothetical in a period of improved cross-straits relations.

China's relations with Japan are more important in Africa today than Taiwan since they involve more consequential foreign policy competition. The Japanese government, faced with a resurgent China in Africa, has sought to respond and continue its own African engagement, as demonstrated during and after the fourth meeting of the Tokyo International Conference on Trade and Development, held in Yokoyama in May 2008. China's strategic competition with Japan as manifested in Africa is seen particularly in the underlying objective of opposing Japan's UN Security Council aspirations, in which African state votes would play a role. Beijing's ability to marshal African support against Tokyo's aims was seen at the Asian African Summit in April 2005, where Chinese lobbying blocked an endorsement of a Japanese seat.[42]

Certain regional zones of Africa indicate the emergence and potential future of wider geopolitical dynamics. One area where eastern and the Horn of Africa, for instance, appear on course to become more important regional site of competition between China, India, and the United States concerns the Indian Ocean. Almost all China and India's imported energy requirements—whether oil from Africa and the Persian Gulf or coal from Mozambique and South Africa—are transported across the Indian Ocean. China's oil from Middle East (50 percent) and Africa (33 percent) pass through the Indian Ocean.[43] The deployment of Chinese naval frigates to police the waters off the Somali coast in December 2008 may presage a more active Chinese role. Maintaining access to African oil, gas, minerals, and timber is crucial to China's economic growth, and current trends would seem to indicate a new regional strategic triangle in formation between China, India, and the United States. While the latter's navy remains the largest and most powerful in the world, both India and China have made the expansion of maritime capacities a strategic priority.

Africa's emerging China relations are embedded in wider, historically conditioned international links. Africa is affected not only by different aspects of China's engagement in its own terms but importantly also in terms of how the United States and the European Union respond to China's role in the continent. China's aspirations to operate a form of direct, unencumbered bilateralism in its continental and individual state relations within the parameters of a South-South partnership have been mediated by Africa's externalized economic, political and multilateral connections. Africa's current and emerging international China relations have become more interlinked with China's global economic role. Africa is an expression both of changing resource demands within China (related to global demand by corporations operating in China together with China's own domestic development needs) and the internationalization of China.

Africa is a theater for the political negotiation of China's changing status in international politics. China's position in world affairs translates itself onto Africa's international relations in terms not merely of global economic interconnectedness but additionally in terms of how China's changing position in world political affairs relates to, and influences, its African role, and by extension Africa. The African continent has produced new challenges for Beijing's international relations bound up in the broader question of China's global ascendancy. As a site for the conspicuous internationalization of China, Africa is the location of an evolving encounter between African politics, the organizing principles China mobilizes in its African relations and other international political dynamics, most notably those of more established powers. Even if other external actors are also in the process of revising their own African engagements, the emerging African, Chinese, and Western triangular framework is prominent in the changing configuration of Africa's external relations.

Following historical precedents of China's experience of the modern world system,[44] and together with different African influences upon China, Africa is emerging as a site for international efforts to influence China's wider evolution and for China to assert its own principles. The premise that through a variety of mechanisms from dialogue, cooperation, or institutional co-option, China can be socialized into the norms of "international" development appear to have initially underpinned mainstream policy responses by the United States and European powers. More recently, amidst Beijing's promotion of the merits of its own alternative approach, there has been enhanced interest in the possible lessons of China's experience for Africa amidst debates about China as an alternative development partner or model. There have been a number of efforts to promote strategic dialogue (as with the United States) or trilateral cooperation initiatives (as with the European Union or the United Kingdom). The interest by these powers in working with China on Africa has given rise to complaints of a new paternalism and met with resistance in different African quarters. On the one hand, the aspiration directed toward socializing China is beset with political and practical tensions and challenges. On the other hand, China has sought to learn from other experience and has found aspects of its own predicament hardly unique. Thus in certain respects, China also quietly looks to the past track record of the West in framing its own future whilst also seeking to direct this according to its own distinctive principles.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of the changing politics of Africa's international China relations. It suggested that reactions to China's latest African role nexus fall into a more established patterns of external reactions connected with a form of geopolitical imagination based on a set of nations associated with China, some transhistorical, others the product of China's more recent development and ascendancy in world politics. Much concerned attention at the impact of China reprises that seen in the different, if connected, colonial and post-colonial contexts, in very different terms: instead of concern at the ideological subversion of Communist China in Africa, after the progressive displacement of ideology in China's foreign relations, concern has evolved into that directed toward governance impacts of more economics-in-command style role coupled with the deleterious impacts of the world economy on those more economically integrated African economies. The lineages of contemporary attention are thus instructive and can temper more exuberant reactions. China's own, officially mobilized understanding and framing of its role in Africa, as well as Chinese reactions to Western reactions, have also been characterized by forms of speculation, abstract critique, resentment toward the West's perceived Cold War mentality or persisting colonial attitude toward Africa and when China is blamed for Africa's problems.[45] Official Chinese interpretations of their experience in Africa suggests that China's relationship with Africa has demonstrated conformity to the continent's key aims, namely the political project of independence and the developmental project of economic welfare and nation building. China's own historiography of its African experience posits that it already represents a historical departure from the established African experience of the modern world and is coupled with a mobilized claim to China's distinctive uniqueness in being qualitatively different from previous external engagements in Africa.[46]

The need and ability of Africa to manage its relations with China has become a more important question at the level of African governments, regional, and pan-continental organizations together with civil society actors. One area concerns the ability of Africa to promote Chinese leadership in seeking to improve the terms of Africa's position in world affairs, coupled as that is to the willingness of Beijing to act more substantively in its accustomed role as first among equals. Africa sharpens China's "dual-identity syndrome of great power versus poor country,"[47] that is, the ambivalent coexistence of great power aspirations with a commensurate desire to be recognized as such, and a self-ascribed developing country identity. These two images may prove incompatible and prompt the question of how Africa's new-found elevation based upon the premise of hypothetical political equality with China will fare in view of the looming contradiction represented by China's continuing development and world power aspirations, accelerated as a result of recent world economic and associated political shifts. There is already a notable if unspoken distance, for instance, between Beijing's principle of sovereign equality and actual asymmetry of power evident in its relations with an immense variety of African states. By rendering political equality as a cornerstone of relations with all manner of African states, Beijing seeks to manage, and not be too constrained by, the coexistence of a formal principle and what are otherwise asymmetrical power relations. Beijing's willingness and ability to take a more proactive, applied lead in advancing Africa's interests in the international area remains to be seen.

One pressing issue for Africa as a whole, its diverse constitutive states and other political actors, is the challenging but fundamental goal of formulating more strategic China engagements in a manner that, from Africa's perspective, balances China's own clearly defined Africa policy by advancing forms of effective engagement aimed at maximizing wider and more lasting forms of African benefit. That an "African policy on China" seems desirable appears obvious but whether it is possible for the continent to formulate and agree one in a way that would accommodate its diversity is at best doubtful. The need for effective bilateral policy engagements, however, remains even if this priority remains beset with structural challenges related to a common lack of African policy management capacity.

The future of China's engagement in light of its changing encounter with Africa and the international context is intriguingly placed. China's future trajectory based on its rhetoric of "win-win" cooperation and set of commitments to "mutual benefit" and "common development" suggests that should these concepts actually materialize this engagement would redefine many of the established notions concerning African politics and international relations. In continuing to advocate "win-win" cooperation and "common development," the Chinese government appears to argue that with the establishment of economic strength and greater involvement in politics as part of a more complex, embedded and consequential Chinese engagement, there can be Chinese power in Africa without forms of exploitation, and the politics traditionally associated with this, at some point in the future. This proposition, should it materialize, would be truly novel in African history.

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6

Japan in Africa: Diplomacy of Continuity and Change

Seifudein Adem

Introduction

Japan's diplomacy in Africa has passed through four distinct phases. Using an "ideal-type" schema that would to some extent (and inevitably) suggests a more coherent Japanese diplomacy than was actually the case, this chapter identifies and explains these phases in the context of Japan's shifting identities and interests over the past 50 years.

But let us first put Japan's diplomacy in Africa in a wider comparative context so as to highlight the stark imbalance. Japan's trade with Africa constitutes only about 2 percent of the nation's overall trade,[1] Japan's foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa is only about 0.4 percent of its total,[2] and Africa's share of Japan's official development aid (ODA) is only about one-third of the total disbursement for Asia.[3] Also, consider these comparative figures. With a population of only 2 percent, Japan accounts for nearly 15 percent of world gross domestic product (GDP). With about 14 percent of the world's population, Africa accounts for only about 2 percent of world GDP.[4] Africa thus occupies a marginal place indeed in terms of its critical relevance to Japan and in comparative economic performance.

The question, then, is, why should we bother about Japan's diplomacy in Africa at all? The simple answer is that Japan is not only the world's third largest economy in its own right, it is also one of the key players in the global political economy. Japan enjoys what Susan Strange had called "structural power," which includes the power to determine what is produced, by whom and for whom, by what method, and on what terms.[5] Even if relations with Africa are less important for Japan in comparison with its relations with adjacent countries, the United States, and Europe, the same relationship is vital for Africa in absolute and relative terms notwithstanding the fact that it is Japan, as the stronger partner, that sets the tone and defines the terms of this relationship.

For understanding Japan's diplomacy in Africa, however, it is inadequate to focus only on tangible determinants. The realist paradigm, with its emphasis on material elements of national power for explaining external behaviors of states, should form only a part of the answer. The other part of the intellectual puzzle can be approached through a perspective that views external policies of states as the function of their definition of "self" and the "other." In our quest for some answers about the patterns of Japan's diplomacy in Africa over the past half a century, we shall therefore begin with the issue of identity formation in the wider context of diplomatic history of modern Japan. That will be followed by some insights concerning the worldview of the Japanese about the "international system." The final section outlines the four phases of Japan's diplomacy in Africa.

Diplomacy of Indifference

"When Menelik II (1844–1913), Emperor of Ethiopia, heard of Japan's victory over Russia," Jean-Pierre Lehmann wrote, "he expressed great satisfaction and stated that Ethiopia, in her own way, was trying to emulate Japan's example."[6] The decisive battle of the Russo-Japanese war took place at Tsushima in May 1905. Since Menelik presided over the defeat of Italy in 1896, it is a chronological impossibility for what happened in 1905 in the Far East to have inspired Menelik II nine years earlier. The larger point is nevertheless valid. Japan's successes, first militarily and then technologically, had inspired the non-Western world. But significant changes in Japan's own perception of "self" and the "other" were also just only about to begin.

Redefining its identity after defeating Russia in 1905, Japan saw itself as a nation on a par with European powers. The shift in identity also reshaped the nation's interests and necessitated a new foreign policy approach. The reasoning involved was that if Japan was now a major power, it ought to act also as one. The Japanese subsequently embarked upon imitating the West in every major sphere of life. Japan's self-image as a major power and its needs for raw materials whetted the colonial appetite of its political class, which eventually launched an imperial project known as Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere by annexing Taiwan in 1895 and by colonizing weaker countries in the region. On the other hand, Western powers viewed Japanese imperialism as illegitimate, unlike their own, and challenged it. Japan fiercely fought back, but Japanese colonialism came to an abrupt end when the nation surrendered after atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Within a span of less than half a century, Japan saw in this way its image mutate from one of a victor to a villain and to a victim.

Not long after its crushing defeat in the Second World War, Japan joined again the club of industrialized nations. It was against such a background that Africans and people of African descent, who were under one or another form of European domination for significant part of the century, looked to Japan for inspiration. In fact, W. E. B. Du Bois, the great African-American thinker, saw Japan as the "logical leader of all colored peoples."[7] But, as it turned out, this was a role that Japan neither assumed nor aspired for.

Japan's diplomacy toward postcolonial Africa was thus informed by such historical experiences that have created specific but variable Japanese identities and interests over time.

We shall demonstrate in this chapter that Japan pursued its diplomacy in Africa on an *ad hoc* basis and that it was a diplomacy which, even though it was firmly rooted in a worldview that inevitably generated a perpetual sense of vulnerability and engendered an external behavior designed to minimize the risk and reduce the cost of external engagement, also sometimes boiled down to one of indifference. Let us briefly explore the Japanese worldview that anchors this type of foreign policy and diplomacy.

Theory of the "International System" in the Japanese Worldview

The Japanese conceptualize international relations in a certain way. It may indeed be almost axiomatic to say the same about Americans, or the British or the French. But because Japan is one of the few relatively more homogeneous nation-states in the world,[8] generalizations about the Japanese should be more valid than those about other people. Political scientist Kosaka Masataka spells out the Japanese worldview in this way: "Japanese conception of the international system is hierarchical: at any given time, there is a desirable rank order between any two nations, whereby one is higher, the other lower. Such a concept also manifests itself in the Japanese attitude towards themselves and other people . . ."[9]

We can accept Mastaka's reading about the Japanese worldview, with the proviso that the Japanese also recognize that the international system is anarchic, as there is no world government capable of providing protection, order, and security for states. What is more, the Japanese see no contradiction between the hierarchy and anarchy assumptions. In the words of the noted Japanese psychiatrist Takeo Doi, "Japanese usually do not make an issue of the fact that there is a lack of logical consistency between [two points of view]."[10]

Further, the Japanese assume that the undesirable effects of the anarchic international system can be ameliorated through international institutions. They generally believe in "cooperation under anarchy" and in the possibility of constructing a reasonably harmonious and stable world order under the circumstances.

Partly due to the variable and seemingly contradictory conceptions of the Japanese about the international system, and the behaviors based upon these conceptions, Japan's foreign policy has sometimes posed serious challenges for mainstream international relations theories. If one relies on standard textbooks of the discipline, the Japanese would qualify as realists given their core belief that anarchy is a pervasive feature of the international system. The Japanese would qualify as liberals, too, because of the significant role institutions and norms play in the Japanese paradigm. They would pass as social constructivists because what they also see in the international scene is a set of identities, interests, and behaviors that are fluid, changing, and changeable. These patterns of thought, in combination, underpin Japanese foreign policy and have given rise to a system of "diplomatic" practices that sanctions seemingly convenient parts of different, and sometimes contradictory, values.

Culture and Diplomacy

In addition to the link that has been suggested between how Japan sees the world and how it conducts its foreign policies, culture and diplomacy are intertwined in Japanese diplomatic thought and practice. The role of culture in Japan's diplomacy becomes more evident in situations involving some degree of conflict.

Japan was one of the few countries in the world that had refused to sever economic ties with apartheid South Africa. Although the official justification cited the principle of separation of politics and economics, or *seikei bunri,* the cultural logic behind continuation of business as usual with South Africa lay in the Japanese approach to conflict resolution.[11] The Japanese tradition of conflict resolution emphasizes the formula of "victor without vanquished."

Tokyo believed that apartheid could not be brought to an end just by imposing economic sanctions on Pretoria and by isolating the regime. As it continued to trade with South Africa, it also sought to pursue better relations with the rest of Africa.[12] It was this dualistic approach of Japan that many Africans saw as a cynical attempt on the part of Japan to please both sides in a conflict. But such a reading arguably gives less than full account of the issue, as it ignores the cultural given of the society that sanctions this form of diplomacy in the first place.[13] For the Japanese, the best approach to conflict involving two sides is conflict resolution without a loss of face by either side.

The same diplomatic approach of *Seikei bunri* also enabled Japan to avoid active involvement in the East-West rivalry. After the Arab oil embargo of 1973, however, *seikei bunri* was replaced with what was called the principle of comprehensive security or *sogo anzen hosho.* The new principle paved the way for Japan's greater involvement in low-intensity diplomatic issues. But the factors that prompted this diplomatic transformation had more to do with external pressures and domestic needs than with cultural imperative.

What are the nature, manifestations and ramifications of this transformation in the context of Japan's diplomacy in Africa?

Changes and Continuities

Japan's diplomacy in Africa began in earnest in 1961 when the Division of African Affairs was established in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[14] The 1960s were also when most of the sub-Saharan African countries achieved political independence. And yet, Japan's economic interactions with Africa in this period were still rather weak.

Since the 1960s, the diplomatic objectives of Japan in Africa have changed periodically, but the changes have never been clear-cut. However, the pursuit of strategic, economic, and political objectives has remained a cornerstone of Japanese diplomacy in Africa. The shades of emphasis in Japan's diplomatic priorities have also varied from time to time. One useful way for dealing with issues of change and continuity in Japan's diplomacy toward Africa is therefore to classify them into different phases. Although such a schema would inevitably suggest a more coherent diplomacy than was actually the case, it is also suitable for highlighting which variable was emphasized and when. That way, we hope, we can make better sense of the nature of Afro-Japanese relations in the last 50 years.

Cold War Diplomacy (1961–1973)

Strategic objective was considered most important in the opening years of Japan's diplomacy in Africa. The immediate priority was that Japan's diplomatic interactions with the newly-independent African states were in line with the geopolitical strategy of the West toward the continent and that it was meaningfully contributing to America's Cold War policies.

We may also note that this historical juncture marked the accelerations Japan's own economic development. In the same period, Japan laid the institutional foundations that would prove instrumental in the next phase of its diplomacy in Africa and beyond when it joined the Development Assistance Committee in 1961 and the

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1964, and when it inaugurated the Japan Overseas Cooperation Agency in 1965.

Also, important international events that provided the background for Japan's Cold-War diplomacy in Africa included the Cuban missile crisis (1962), the Vietnam War (1965), and the "Nixon shock" (1971). Needless to say, Japan did not completely disregarded its economic interests in this period even though such considerations had in any case never been the primary driving force of Japan's diplomacy in Africa.[15] But whatever economic motive inspired Japan, it took the backseat as diplomatic orientation became more about playing along with the West than anything else. Japan was to support the West in curbing the spread of communism in Africa. In the words of Shintaro Abe, former foreign minister of Japan, the major diplomatic objective of Japan was "to help entrench African countries in the Western camp."[16] To gain and solidify its own legitimacy in the Western camp was, of course, the ultimate goal of Japan's overall international diplomacy.

Resource Diplomacy (1974–1992)

This phase came into existence after the 1973 oil crisis, which was triggered when the ministerial meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) decided to raise the posted price of crude oil. Following the decision by OPEC to quadruple oil prices and hold the capitalist economy hostage in this way, Tokyo realized that it was imperative for Japan to diversify its energy sources and other raw materials critical to its industries. The event became a catalyst, in the words of Dennis Yasutomo, for "a globalization of Japan's Asia-centric aid policy, becoming the centerpiece of a 'resource diplomacy' that frantically sought new sources of oil and other energy resources throughout the third world."[17] A noticeable shift also occurred in Japan's diplomacy in Africa, with more Japanese economic assistance going to African countries deemed important from the point of view of the nation's economic interests.

By 1975, Africa's share of Japan's crude oil import had already risen to a peak of 2.9 percent from virtually nil until 1970.[18] William Nester has thus observed: "With OPEC's quadrupling of oil prices and the fears that similar cartels would emerge among other mineral producing countries, Tokyo doubled its Africa aid to over 5 percent."[19] In the 1980s, the major recipients of Japanese aid in Africa were those countries considered to be important sources of raw materials vital to Japanese industry, such as Zambia and Zaire (copper), Niger (uranium), and Madagascar (chromium), potential sources of such raw materials, including the Sudan (chromium) and Gabon (oil), or major economic markets (such as Kenya and Nigeria) capable of absorbing Japanese exports.[20]

Japan's growing interest in the resources Africa had to offer was also evident from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) active involvement in "natural resources diplomacy" in the early 1970s with the formation of the Diet Association of African Economic Development in April 1970."[21] Neither was it a coincidence that the first ever visit to Africa by a Japanese foreign minister, Toshio Kimura, took place in 1974. Foreign Minister Kimura's successor, Keiichi Miyazawa, who was subsequently to become prime minister of Japan, later described the visit as one of "epoch-making importance in our diplomacy."[22]

Japan's resource diplomacy in Africa did not completely deflect the nation's attention from the geostrategic interest of the West in the continent just as Japan's sensitivity to the West's Cold War strategy in the previous phase did not lead to an abandonment of the nation's economic interest in Africa altogether.[23] But there was no doubt that Japan was now relatively less concerned about anti-communism than about diversification of the sources of its raw material supplies. Of course, by now, Japan had also established itself more firmly in the Western Camp.

TICAD Diplomacy (1993–2005)

What is TICAD? The Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) is an international forum launched by Japan in 1993 to deliberate about how the human condition can be improved in Africa. The forum is based on the twin premises that "Africa needs the partnership of the developed nations" and "Africa needs to help itself."

TICAD diplomacy began after the end of the Cold War even though, as indicated, Japan's post-Cold War African diplomacy commenced 25 years before the Cold War actually ended.

If Japan's Cold War diplomacy was primarily motivated by the nation's need for legitimacy in the Western camp and if its resource diplomacy was fed by the quest for economic security, TICAD diplomacy was an outcome of the Japanese desire for greater acceptance and leadership in the wider international community.

Japan's aspiration for permanent membership in a reformed UN Security Council and its overwhelming desire to garner the support of the African voting bloc to this end were both aspects of its continuing quest for international legitimacy and leadership. What this also meant was that Japan had to be able to take diplomatic initiatives and show some degree of independence from the West.[24]

Just as the transition from Cold War diplomacy to resource diplomacy did not engender a complete disregard of geostrategic considerations in Japan's African diplomacy, Japan did not turn a blind eye to either its pro-Western policy or its economic interest after the launching of TICAD.

TICAD diplomacy reflected Japan's international status as well as its aspirations at that particular moment. In fact, TICAD was an initiative born out of Japan's self-confidence. In the early 1990s, Japan looked at itself as the "aid power," as it became the world's largest donor of economic development assistance.[25] Considering also Japan's progress and achievements at the time in different areas such as industrial production and the service sector, some analysts had already floated the idea of a strong probability of *Pax Nipponica*.[26] "In the late 1980s and early 1990s," writes Gilbert Rozman, "overconfidence tilted Japanese nationalism toward expectations of becoming a great power."[27] Japan also saw itself and was seen by others as a "civilian power."[28]

Between 1993 and 2005 Tokyo had hosted four TICAD conferences in five-year intervals. However, TICAD diplomacy was not limited to the holding of mega-conferences. Japan also diversified its economic assistance to Africa. From 1993 to 2003, the sectoral breakdown (in percentage) of Japan's economic aid to Africa was as follows: manufacturing (26.2), water supply (16.0), education (7.7), health (6.4), infrastructure (40.9), and debt cancellation (2.8).[29]

Furthermore, Japan began to exhibit a measure of independence from the West by taking certain initiatives. On the occasion of the G8 Okinawa summit of July 2000, Japan extended invitations to the leaders of South Africa, Algeria, and Nigeria for "outreach dialogue" with industrialized nations. Never before had African leaders been given such an opportunity to consult with the leading industrialized nations at a G8 summit. This diplomatic initiative by Japan has become virtually institutionalized; a handful of African leaders annually receive "invitations" for consultations at the G8 summits.

This diplomatic phase also coincided with the first-ever Africa visit by a Japanese prime minister, Yoshiro Mori, who went to South Africa, Kenya, and Nigeria in 2001. Prime Minister Mori's successor, Junichiro Koizumi, visited Ethiopia and Ghana four years later. In short, the TICAD phase of Japan's diplomacy in Africa had ushered in a period of fairly reinvigorated Japanese diplomatic activities with regard to Africa.

Post-TICAD Diplomacy (2006～)

TICAD IV was inaugurated with a lot of fanfare in Yokohama, Japan, in May 2008, attracting some 1,300 journalists, including 1,000 from the local media and 300 from foreign ones.[30] This high-profile conference notwithstanding, Japan's diplomacy in Africa after 2006 seemed much less vigorous than in the previous phase.[31] By 2006, the conditions that enabled TICAD diplomacy at the beginning of the last decade had for the most part dissipated or were nonexistent. One of these conditions was the relative position of Japan in the world. "By the end of 1990s," writes David Arase, "Japan was not an economic superpower, or even the dominant economic actor in Asia by some measures."[32]

Japan lost its status as top ODA donor in dollar terms in 2001.[33] Japan was no longer the major creditor nation. Neither was Japan the number one aid donor it used to be. And no one was seriously espousing a theory of *Pax Nipponica* anymore; if anything, the discourse today is sometimes about, to use the title of a recent cover story in *Time,* "fading Japan."[34]

It is also instructive that none of the three prime ministers, who succeeded Junichiro Koizumi after 2005, visited Africa. Not even Prime Minister Taro Aso, who was the first prime minister of Japan to have lived and worked in Africa for a relatively extended period, found the time to travel to Africa.[35] Granted, Prime Minister Taro Aso and his successors were at the helm of government for much shorter period than Koizumi. But, still, to say that Japan's diplomacy in Africa is in the Post-TICAD phase and that it lacks dynamism is perhaps only to state the obvious.

Japan and China in Africa

Japan's diplomacy in Africa in recent years has been taking place against the background of stepped-up Chinese activities in the continent. In 2005, China replaced Japan as the second major importer of African oil.[36] In 2007, China's trade with Africa was almost three times that of Japan.[37] From Angola to Burundi, from Cameroon to the Central African Republic and Chad, China has become one of the principal trading partners for several countries in Africa.[38]

Compared with Japan, China is behaviorally less constrained in Africa. China pursues its goals often in disregard and at times in opposition to Western powers. Surely, Japan and China are not rivals in the same way as, for instance, China and the United States are. In addition, Japan and China are not on a par with each other in terms of economic power. Relations with Africa, especially in economic terms, are less important for both China and Japan vis-à-vis their respective relations with adjacent countries, the United States, and Europe.

Japan and China also elicit variable attitudes in Africa. China is more respected in the continent among Africa's political class, but this is not surprising since China has demonstrated greater determination to forge stronger ties with African countries than Japan has. Moreover, Afro-Chinese relations are historically deeper than Afro-Japanese relations. And yet, there are indications that China's greater involvement in Africa could give renewed impetus to Japan's diplomacy in Africa.

There is a sense in which it can be said that some aspects of Japan's post-TICAD diplomacy in Africa was partially a reaction to China's growing presence in Africa. Considering the seemingly less attention African leaders were paying to Japan compared to China, Tokyo was relieved when more African leaders showed up for TICAD IV in Yokohama in May 2008 compared to those who had gone to Shanghai for the Afro-Chinese summit two years earlier.

Despite the apparent lack of public enthusiasm for massive Japanese aid to Africa, the Japanese government also declared at the 2008 TICAD IV meeting that Japan would double its aid to the continent by 2012. China had made a similar pledge in 2006 at the first Sino-African summit in Shanghai.[39]

Japan's ODA White Paper 2007 declares this with regard to Africa: "Japan is considering a plan for advancing infrastructure development [in Africa] covering a wide area such as a roadway network."[40] The message in Japan's official government report in 2008, too, was as clear as it was consistent: "In order to stimulate accelerated growth in Africa, it is important to develop regional infrastructure focused on roads and power networks."[41] In 2007, Japan was partially justifying its development assistance to Africa on the grounds that Africa is a continent "blessed with beautiful nature, energy-filled people, and abundant resources" with "a great potential for the future."[42] This was a new type of rhetoric.[43] It is not unreasonable in general to expect that Japan could become more active in Africa as a result of China's increased activism in the continent.

But the divergence between Japanese and Chinese diplomatic approach toward Africa cannot also be overstated. For instance, a recent Japanese government report reaffirms, "Japan plans to focus on cooperation with international organizations and developed nations."[44] Specifically, with respect to TICAD IV, the report states, "Japan . . . consulted donor countries and aid organizations as well as multilateral organizations to a great extent in making outcome such as the Yokohama Declaration."[45] The Declaration of TICAD II issued in 1998 also reads in part, "African countries will agree on and implement economic and structural reform programs supported by the Bretton Woods institutions."[46] It will be remembered that the United Nations Development Program [UNDP], the UN Office of Special Advisor on Africa, and the World Bank were the principal organizers of TICAD I.

It can be reiterated that the Japanese and the Chinese diplomatic approaches toward Africa could not be more different. It would suffice to say in the limited context of the issue under discussion that China sees the Bretton Woods institutions as less than legitimate because of the way they were created, because of what were created, and because of by and for whom they were created. Japan does not.

Conclusion

Japan's activities in Africa are circumscribed both by its national interest and by its being an integral part of the so-called Western bloc. Despite these facts, or because of them, Japan's diplomacy in Africa has shown consistency in its patterns of continuity and change.

As the only non-European nation to successfully industrialize, as an active participant in, at least initially, and a sympathetic supporter of the Afro-Asian group, it was only natural that Japan was looked to by postcolonial African states not only as an example-setter but also as a genuine partner in development. At times, however, Japan's drive for economic security and international legitimacy in a Euro-centric world has inevitably run in the opposite course with the wishes of many African states.

Until now, or until very recently, Japan has been not only the first non-European country to successfully industrialize, but it has also been the only non-European economic powerhouse. Modern Japan has also hitherto closely aligned itself with the West, with its policies toward Africa dovetailing that of the West.

The rise of China adds to the ranks of successfully industrialized nations of non-European stock but it adds one whose ideology is not in sync with that of Japan and the West in general. Whether this is to be celebrated or lamented, of course, it depends on one's perspective.

In the meantime, a debate is taking place in Africa over whether China is a neocolonial power in the making or a genuine partner in Africa's development.[47] Less intense though it was, Afro-Japanese relations had also posed a similar question in the past.[48] The tentative answer we get from studying Japan's diplomacy in Africa over the past fifty years is that it is the degree of convergence of interests rather than the intentions of states which determine outcome of interactions between states.

On August 30, 2009, half a century of virtually uninterrupted rule of the LDP in Japan came to an end. It was then expected that the change would have major repercussions for Japan's foreign policy in general, including its diplomacy in Africa. And there were some early signs to that effect. The vice president of the victorious Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) said this as early as two weeks before the election, "US President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton have both visited Africa. Chinese President Hu Jintao has also visited Africa four times [since becoming president]. We would like to increase the attention paid by Japan to Africa."[49] Although DPJ is still in power, however, the new government has proven too weak so far, and too preoccupied with other domestic and international issues, to launch any major diplomatic initiative in Africa. And yet, we can fairly take for granted that the trajectory of Japan's diplomacy toward Africa would continue to be subject to the periodic change and continuity.

Notes

1. Youko Ishida, *Afurika ni gensuteraru nihon* (Tokyo: Soseisha, 2008), 124.
2. The data is for 2002–2004. See N. N. Gouede, "Trade between Japan and Africa in the Context of Follow-up to TICAD IV," UNDP, New York, November 2008. http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Knowledge/30760201-EN-1.2.3-GOUEDE.PDF.
3. Ishida, *Afurika ni gensuteraru nihon*, 227.
4. UN, *United Nations Demographic Yearbook 2006* (New York: UN Publications, 2008), 49, 62; also http://www.theworldeconomy.org/statistics.htm.
5. Susan Strange, *State and Markets* (London: Pinter, 1988).
6. Jean-Pierre Lehmann, *The Roots of Modern Japan* (London: Macmillan, 1982), 312.
7. Quoted in Marc Gallicchio, *The African-American Encounter with Japan and China* (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 71.

8. See David B. Willis and Stephen Murphy-Shingematsu eds., *Transcultural Japan: At the Borderlands of Race, Gender and Identity* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 12.
9. Masataka Kosaka, "The International Economic Policy of Japan," in *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan,* ed. Robert A. Scalpino (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977), 223.
10. Takeo Doi relates the attitude in regard to dichotomous and opposing concepts in the Japanese worldview to two Japanese cultural words, *Omote* (visible side) and *Ura* (invisible side). See Takeo Doi, *The Anatomy of Self: The Individual Versus Society* (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1985), 29.
11. William Nester, "The Third World in Japanese Foreign Policy," in *The International Relations of Japan,* ed. K. Newland (London: Macmillan, 1990), 72.
12. "Japan's statements at the UN," observed Sunday Agbi, "reveals, undoubtedly, a revulsion of feelings against racism and apartheid in South Africa, but she was not willing to do anything that would injure the sensibilities of the South African government." See Sunday O. Agbi, *Japanese Relations with Africa, 1868–1978* (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1992), 32.
13. Heiginbotham and Samuels called the latest version of *seikei bunri* the strategy of "double hedging." See Eric Heiginbotham and Richard F. Samuels, "Japan's Dual Hedge," *Foreign Affairs* 81 (2002): 111.
14. For a detailed and an authoritative account of the institutional evolution of Japan's diplomacy in Africa see Jun Morikawa, *Japan: Big Business and Diplomacy* (London: Hurst, 1997).
15. "Before 1973," writes William Nester, "Japanese aid to Africa was never as much as 3 percent of its total foreign aid." Nester, "The Third World in Japanese Foreign Policy," 94.
16. Quoted in Morikawa, *Japan,* 10.
17. Dennis T. Yasutomo, "Why Aid? Japan as an 'Aid Great Power,'" *Pacific Affairs* 62 (1989–90): 492–493.
18. Asahi Shinbunsha, *Japan 1988* (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1989), 65.
19. Nester, "The Third World in Japanese Foreign Policy," 94.
20. Peter J. Schrader et al., "Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows," *World Politics* 50 (1998): 301.
21. Morikawa, *Japan and Africa,* 63.
22. Quoted in J. Oweye, *Japan's Policy in Africa* (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), 37.
23. Inada has observed, for instance, that "the increase in the Japanese economic aid to Sudan and Somalia [in the 1980s] was a reaction to the growing activities of the Soviet Union in Ethiopia." Juichi Inada, "Japan's Aid Diplomacy: Economic, Political or Strategic?" in *The International Relations of Japan,* ed. Kathleen Newland (London: Macmillan, 1990) 106.
24. Seifudein Adem, "Emerging Trends in Japan-Africa Relations," *Africa Studies Quarterly* 5, no. 2. http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v5/v5i12a4.htm.
25. Yasutomo, "Why Aid?" 490–503. Japan became the world's largest bilateral aid donor in 1989. Japan remained the top ODA donor in dollar terms from 1991 to 2001. See David Arase, "Introduction," in *Japan's Foreign Aid: Old Continuities and New Directions,* ed. David Arase, (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 1.
26. Ezra Vogel, "Pax Nipponica?" *Foreign Affairs* 64 (1986): 752–767.
27. Glibert Rozman, "Japan's Quest for Great Power Identity," *Orbis* 46 (2002): 73–91.
28. See, for instance, Hanns W. Maul, "Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers," *Foreign Affairs* 69 (1990): 91–106.
29. Youko Ishida, *Afurika ni gensuteraru nihon* (Tokyo: Soseisha, 2008), 138.

30. Tomohiko Taniguchi, deputy press secretary of the Japanese foreign ministry, told Xinhua Tuesday, "Conference for African development to start in Japan." Source: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-05/27/content_8264369.htm.
31. This is the case despite the fact that some statistics seem to indicate not only the continuation but even the consolidation of the "spirit" of TICAD, such as the rise in Japan's bilateral ODA to sub-Saharan Africa from U.S. $849.91 million in 2001 to U.S. $2,544. 54 million in 2006, and to U.S. $ 1,753 million in 2007. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Japan's Development Assistance White Paper 2008* (Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2009), 110.
32. Arase, "Introduction," 3.
33. Arase, "Introduction," 1.
34. See Rana Foroohar, "Japan is Fading," *Newsweek,* August 24 and 31, 2009, 29–31.
35. Taro Aso, *Jiyu to Hanei no Ko* (Tokyo: Gentosha, 2007), 252.
36. Hisane Msaki, "Japan Takes on China in Africa," *Asia Times Online,* August 15, 2006. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/HH15Dh01.html.
37. N. N. Gouede, "Trade between Japan and Africa in the Context of Follow-up to TICAD IV," UNDP, New York, November 4, 2008. http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Knowledge/30760201-EN-1.2.3-GOUEDE.PDF.
38. *Africa South of the Sahara 2009,* 38th ed. (London: Routledge, 2008), various pages.
39. See Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Japan's ODA White Paper 2008* (Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2009), 16. Also see "Japan to Double Development Aid to Africa over 5 Years as China Raises Profile," *International Herald Tribune,* May 20, 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/05/20/asia/AS-GEN-Japan-Africa-Development-Aid.php.
40. Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Japan's ODA White Paper 2007* (Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2008), 63.
41. Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Japan's ODA White Paper 2008,* 29.
42. Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Japan's ODA White Paper 2007,* 61.
43. It needs to be noted, however, that in reality Japan's record in the infrastructure sector in Africa, too, is not much different from China's. More than 40 percent of Japan's official economic aid to Africa between 1993 and 2003 was invested in the infrastructure sector. Ishida, *Afurika ni gensuteraru nihon,* 138.
44. Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Japan's ODA White Paper 2007,* 63.
45. Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Japan's ODA White Paper 2008,* 25.
46. See The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo 1998. "African Development towards the 21st Century: The Tokyo Agenda for Action." As adopted on October 21, 1998. www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad2/agenda21.html.
47. See, for instance, Kweku Ampiah and Sanusha Naidu eds., *Crouching Tiger and Hidden Dragon? Africa and China* (Cape Town: University of KwaZulu Natal Press, 2008).
48. Seifudein Adem ed., *Japan: A Model and Partner* (Leiden: Brill, 2006).
49. Shingetsu Institute, News Release from the DPJ Website, e-mail received on August 30, 2009.

7

India's New Engagement of Africa: Trends and Implications

J. Peter Pham

Introduction

While the extensive network of economic, political, and military ties which the People's Republic of China (PRC) has constructed across Africa has been the subject of increased scrutiny on the part of African policymakers, businesspeople, scholars, and activists as well as their counterparts in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere.[1] India's rapidly expanding network of relations on the continent have gone largely unexamined with the exception of a small number of relatively short essays.[2] However, as Africa, long marginalized in international relations, is increasingly recognized as strategically, diplomatically and economically vital to both the emerging multipolar global order and the individual national interests of the major powers, India's burgeoning public and private investments in the region as well as its diplomatic strategy vis-à-vis African regional organizations and individual states needs to be better understood.

While to a certain extent, New Delhi's approach to Africa can be viewed as driven by many of the same motivations as Beijing's better-known efforts—including the quests for the resources, business opportunities, diplomatic initiatives, and strategic partnerships, which will be duly examined in this contribution—there is a need first for an appreciation of the unique historical experience which shaped the contours and continues to influence the ongoing development of Indo-African relations.

The Background of Indo-African Relations

Contacts between India and Africa date back to ancient times with Indian merchants conducting a relatively extensive trade along the eastern littoral of the African continent—a point recalled when one leading Indian strategist, C. Raja Mohan, who served on his country's National Security Advisory Board, describes India's "near abroad" as including "parts of Africa, the Persian Gulf, Central and Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean region" in that order.[3] Thus the historian Basil

Davidson noted: "What the Phoenician-Berber connection had achieved in northwestern Africa . . . the traders and mariners of Greek-ruled Egypt, southern Arabia, East Africa and India largely repeated in the last centuries before the Christian era. By then the steady winds of the western half of the Indian Ocean, blowing back and forth between West India and East Africa in regular seasonal variation, were used by sailors who had learned how to trim their sails."[4]

The period of European colonial expansion brought an end to this long-range trading system. On the other hand, the incorporation of both the Indian subcontinent and large swathes of Africa into the British Empire facilitated the establishment of substantial communities of people of Indian origin in Africa.[5] No less a figure than Mohandas K. Gandhi, the future father of Indian independence, was part of this movement, accepting a position with an Indian law firm in Natal in 1893 and remaining in South Africa until 1914, a period during which his leadership of the Indian community's struggle for civil rights saw the first flowering of what would become his hallmark approach of *Satyagraha,* or nonviolent resistance to tyranny. In turn, Gandhi's philosophy, which he successfully put into practice to achieve India's independence in 1947, was to inspire a generation of African leaders—including Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Obafemi Awolowo of Nigeria, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia—in their own national liberation campaigns.[6]

It bears recording that when India became independent, there were only four sovereign states in all of Africa: Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and South Africa. India quickly established diplomatic relations with the first two, while it had difficulty with South Africa due to the latter country's treatment of persons of Indian origin. For the rest of Africa, especially those under British colonial rule, India availed itself of its privilege as a member of the Commonwealth to post commissioners, often also accredited as consuls-general, who not only looked after the interests of their fellow citizens but also established ties with local African leaders. In fact, the first Indian commissioner in British East Africa, the Nairobi, Kenya-based Apasaheb Balasaheb Pant, was so supportive of the nationalist aspirations of the African population that the colonial authorities demanded his recall. The solicitude of diplomats like Pant and his Accra-based counterpart for British West Africa was appreciated by the leaders of the eventually independent African states. After Ghana's independence, for example, one of Nkrumah's first forays overseas was an official visit to India and, while Ghana was still getting its foreign service organized, the West African country entrusted the protection of its political interests in the Middle East to the Indian diplomatic legations in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.

If Mahatma Gandhi laid the moral foundations for Indo-African relations, it was Jawaharlal Nehru who gave the relationship its political structure during his long tenure as India's first prime minister (1947–1964). Declaring that Africa "though separated by the Indian Ocean from us [is] in a sense our next door neighbor" and that "in historical perspective, Indian interests are likely to be bound up more and more with the growth of Africa,"[7] Nehru pursued a policy of supporting African national struggles against colonialism as well as against apartheid in South Africa. Together with the China's Zhou Enlai, Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ghana's Nkrumah, Indonesia's Sukarno, and Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh, Nehru played a leading role in convening the first Asian-African Conference, which brought representatives of 29 African and Asian countries in the Indonesian city of Bandung and gave rise to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).[8] Unlike the PRC, which hoped to use the NAM to advance Mao Zedong's revolutionary ambitions worldwide, or Egypt, which saw it as a vehicle for promoting Nasser's pan-Arabism in the Middle East, India's nationalist leaders were intently committed to blazing a truly independent path in international relations. As Nehru wrote on the eve of India's independence, "India could not be a mere hanger-on of any country or group of nations; her freedom and growth would make a vital difference to Asia and therefore to the world."[9]

However, early hopes of a more intensive Indo-African partnership were dashed when China and India came to blows over border disputes and the Sino-Indian War of 1962 left the PRC in possession of the contested areas. The result was not only a set-back for India's standing among the NAM nations (only Egypt stood firmly behind India), but also led policymakers in New Delhi to adopt a less ambitious national policy, focusing instead on building their country's defense sector and securing its immediate neighborhood. (In contrast, at least until the Cultural Revolution decimated the ranks of their experienced diplomats, the Sino-Soviet schism gave leaders in Beijing added impetus to pursue engagements with the "non-aligned" countries of Sub-Saharan Africa in order to counter the ideological influence of their rivals in Moscow.[10]) Nonetheless, India continued to generously support national liberation movements in Africa, both financially and politically. New Delhi even accorded formal diplomatic recognition to South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) in 1967 and future Namibia's South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) in 1985 during the premierships, respectively, of Pandit Nehru's daughter Indira Gandhi and his grandson Rajiv Gandhi.[11]

Even if official Indian policy paid less attention to Africa, however, it should be noted that the India diaspora was always present on the continent and played an important part in the economic life of the countries where they settled. In some cases, they were victims of their own success, attracting the malevolent attention of despots like Uganda's Idi Amin who found them useful scapegoats for an economy wrecked by his squandering on military hardware and personnel and, in 1972, ordered the expulsion of an estimated 45,000 individuals of South Asian descent—thus tragically collapsing what remained of his economy.[12] Nevertheless, through time and the vicissitudes it brought, these communities endured as a bridgehead for Indian interests—cultural, economic, and political—in Africa. Former Indian foreign secretary Salman Haidar, for example, has even hailed the *felix culpa* that people of Indian origin "went through the constraints and indignities of the apartheid era and joined in the fight against it." Now, as he noted on the occasion of a visit several years ago by External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee to the Africa Union, "their ties with the mother country are strengthening and they can be regarded as a significant base for expansion of trade and commerce."[13]

In short, while the India's foreign policy during much of the Cold War did not have significant direct impact on the unfolding of developments in Africa, its political commitment to the NAM and its at least rhetorical emphasis on South-South cooperation, especially coupled with its consistent diplomatic support for African nationalist movements, nonetheless left it well positioned to take up its engagements across the continent and forge new ties, as it has done in recent years. One researcher at the Institute for Defense and Strategic Analysis, a think tank funded by the Indian Ministry of Defense, has even laid out a succinct road map for such a policy:

> The people of Africa have acknowledged India's support in the past and there is a lot of goodwill towards India. They are attracted towards the image of India in the 21st century as the new center for technology and commerce in Asia.

> India should reciprocate and follow the EU and the Japanese examples for cooperation to mutual benefit. Economically, this partnership with Africa would entail working closely with Africa on [the New Partnership for Africa's Development, NEPAD]. Culturally, it would entail greater interaction with people of Indian origin in Africa. Similarly, it involves the task of bringing Africa closer to the people of India through events like the Festival of Africa in India. Educationally, it would involve greater bilateral interaction between the two regions at all levels—school, college and university. Internally, it should lead to popularizing African studies in our country. Diplomatically, it should involve looking at ways and means to garner support for India's strategic interests.[14]

India's Quest for Natural Resources

India's economy is projected to grow a rate of somewhere between 8 and 10 percent annually over the next two decades[15] and is the only major economy predicted to record growth rates significantly above 3 percent by 2050.[16] The country, home of the world's fourth-largest national economy, became a trillion-dollar economy in early 2008.[17] The country's population of 1.1 billion accounts for one-sixth of humanity, with more than half of Indians under the age of 24.9, compared to rapidly aging population in other major countries, including China.[18] Despite the dynamism that these data imply, with its proven petroleum reserves remaining stagnant at less than 0.5 percent of the world total, India faces a potentially serious energy crisis. Currently, the country is the fifth largest consumer of energy in the world, accounting for some 3.7 percent of the total global consumption. A third of this, moreover, came from traditional sources of fuel, including wood, dung, crop residue, biogas, and waste. However, with increased development, India is expected to double its energy consumption by 2030, overtaking Japan and Russia in the process to become the world's third largest consumer (after the United States and China)—and these new needs can hardly be expected to be met by the traditional sources used by many households on the subcontinent.[19]

According to data from the International Energy Agency, India currently imports about 75 percent of its oil, a foreign dependence projected to rise to over 90 percent by 2020.[20] Given that most of these imports are coming from the volatile Middle East, where political conditions can easily give rise to temporary disruptions that would nonetheless jeopardize the country's economic security, it is more than understandable that India would seek an alternative supply of energy in the burgeoning African oil sector. Thus, for example, the overseas division of India's state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), ONGC Videsh (OVL), has aggressively sought stakes in exploration and development across the continent. In 2005, teaming up with the world's largest steel maker, Mittal (now Arcelor Mittal), owned by London-based Indian billionaire Lakshmi Mittal, OVL formed a new entity, ONGC Mittal Energy Ltd. (OMEL), which agreed to a $6 billion infrastructure deal with Nigeria in exchange for extensive access to some of the best production blocks in the West African country. More controversially, in 2006, OVL also plunked down $690 million to acquire a 25 percent stake in Sudan's Greater Nile Oil Project, despite the resistance of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which has a 40 percent ownership in the enterprise. OVL subsequently acquired minority interests in two other blocks in Sudan, although the subsequent laggard implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the regime in Khartoum and the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement as well as the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Darfur—to say nothing of the lack of democracy and good governance in Sudan as a whole—have posed challenges to Indian interests there.[21] Meanwhile, another Indian state-owned entity, the India Oil Corporation (IOC), has invested $1 billion in an offshore block in Côte d'Ivoire. ONGC has obtained permission to conduct geological studies in the exclusive economic zone of Mauritius. Other African countries being courted by Indian oil companies include Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, and Senegal. In 2009, ONGC Videsh initiated a bid to buy U.S.-based Kosmos Energy's 30-percent stake in Ghana's offshore Jubilee oilfield. The deal, if consummated, would likely cost between $3 billion and $4 billion.[22] In total, Africa currently accounts for about 20 percent of India's oil imports, a figure that will only rise in coming years. Not surprisingly, energy researchers have found that "India has focused development lending initiatives on the resource-rich countries of West Africa whose [national oil companies] are keen to gain deals."[23]

It should be noted, however, that unlike China and a number of other countries with which it in competition for access to Africa's petroleum resources, India has "stressed that it [is] interested not just in buying Africa's oil but in participating in all phases of oil production, refining, storage, and transport."[24]

Hydrocarbons are not the only natural resources being sought by the growing Indian economy. Vedanta Resources, a publicly traded metals conglomerate founded in Mumbai in 1976, has invested over $750 million in Zambian copper mines, while Liberia entered into a 25-year deal for Arcelor Mittal to launch a $1 billion iron ore mining project that will eventually employ 20,000 and is expected to begin exports next year after the company refurbishes train tracks damaged during the West African country's long civil conflict. In Senegal, a joint public-private Indian group has invested $250 million in exchange for a stake in colonial era enterprise, Industries Chimiques du Senegal, with rock phosphate mines and plants to produce phosphoric acid used in agriculture. Indian firms are also beginning to see in Africa a possible solution to their country's food security challenge as formerly agricultural lands are lost to urbanization and industrialization. A few years ago, for example, two Indian firms, Ms Mashuli Gashmani Ltd. and Angelique, invested a total of $12 million in Uganda to establish, respectively, a commercial prawn fishery and turnkey aquaculture development. Uganda has become something of a favorite for Indian agricultural investment. At the end of 2009, Jay Shree Tea & Industries, a part of the B.K. Birla group of companies that has extensive tea-growing holdings in Assam, Darjeeling, Jalpaiguri, Uttar Dinajpur, and Tamil Nadu, announced plans for its first overseas acquisition in Uganda as well as plans to establish itself in Kenya.[25] Such enterprises like these will undoubtedly proliferate as India, where the average food energy intake per person is still below 2500 kcal and the population is set to grow at an average of over 1 percent per year over the next three decades, overtakes China as the major driver of growth in world demand for agricultural products.[26]

The Allure of Business Opportunities

One report published by Chatham House (formerly the Royal Institute of International Affairs), noting that African countries are proving to be very attractive to Indian investors, observes that "India has sought to gain a foothold in these countries by writing off debts owed under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries [HIPC] Initiative and restructuring commercial debts. At the same time, the Export-Import (EXIM) Bank has extended lines of credit to governments, commercial banks, financial institutions and regional development banks."[27] India has cancelled the debts of five HIPCs in Africa—Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia—while its EXIM Bank has extended lines of credit to institutions in a number of African countries, including Angola, Djibouti, Ghana, South Africa, Sudan, Togo, and Zambia.

Since the launch of the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program in 1964, New Delhi has leveraged its human capital strengths to forge ties with developing countries, providing assistance to some 154 states since then.[28] As a farewell tribute to outgoing president A.P.J. Abdul Kalam as he left office in July 2007, the Indian cabinet approved an initial $100 million for the Pan-African E-Network he proposed to bridge the digital divide on the continent through a network of satellite, fiber optics, and wireless connections that would also highlight India's strengths in the technological and medical sectors. As a first phase of the initiative, seven universities and 12 advanced hospitals in India are to be linked to five universities, 53 clinics, and 53 distance education centers in Africa.[29] Of course, this type of scientific and technical cooperation, over time, can mature into economic ties. Within the framework of the Techno-Economic Approach for Africa-India Movement (TEAM-9) it launched in 2004, India has extended over $500 million in highly favorable credit to eight African countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Senegal) linked to the purchase of Indian goods and services; a number of other African countries have lined up to join the program. Cumulatively, these initiatives highlight the increasing maturity of the effort to integrate India's commercial and political diplomacy.[30]

Major private sector Indian industrial conglomerates like the Tata Group and the Mahindra Group have made considerable headway in Africa—the former's Nano automobile, considered the world's cheapest car, seems almost tailored for the cohort of Africans just joining the middle class—as have infrastructure-building concerns like KEC International, the overseas arm of Kamani Engineering Corporation, which has projects in Algeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Mozambique, South Africa, Tunisia, and Zambia. Government-owned concerns are also profiting from large-scale projects, especially where official Indian development assistance is involved. For example, Senegal used a grant from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs to hire the RITES consultancy owned by the Indian Ministry of Railways to conduct a feasibility study of constructing a railroad linking the Dakar-Tambacounda line with Ziguinchor in the economically disadvantaged Casamance region. RITES has also had consulting contracts in Kenya and Mozambique and been involved in road design work in Ethiopia and Uganda. Another enterprise owned by the Ministry of Railways, Ircon International, has built railways in Algeria, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sudan, and Zambia.

Leading exports from India to Africa currently include machinery, transport equipment, paper and other wood products, textiles, plastics, and chemical and pharmaceutical products. With HIV/AIDS and other diseases ravaging the continent and driving up demand for lower-cost generic anti-retrovirals and other drugs, Indian pharmaceutical firms like Cipla and Ranbaxy have opened entirely new markets. According to the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), trade between the subcontinent and Africa has been growing at the annual rate of 25 percent in recent years. In October 2006, a CII-sponsored "Conclave on India-Africa Project Partnership" in New Delhi attracted over 750 delegates and produced business deals worth $17 billion.[31] The CII subsequently followed up in the summer of 2007 with a series of "regional conclaves" held in Kampala, Uganda, Maputo, Mozambique, and Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, which drew representatives of the public and private sectors from a total of 42 African countries to meet with their counterparts from India.

The Diplomatic Game

Over the last decade, India foreign policy establishment has endeavored to overcome the institutional neglect to which it was constrained to consign Africa after the promising start of the immediate postindependence period. Until 2003, the Ministry of External Affairs had only one joint secretary with responsibility for the singular Africa division; nowadays, three joint secretaries manage three regional divisions covering the continent. During the last decade of the twentieth century, India was closing down diplomatic missions in Africa as an economy measure; in contrast, at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, New Delhi maintained 26 embassies or high commissions on the continent in addition to honorary consuls-general in 15 countries where there is no resident ambassador or high commissioner.[32] A multilateral India-Africa summit consciously modeled on the October 2006 historic Beijing summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which brought nearly 50 African heads of state and ministers to the Chinese capital, the Africa-India Forum, was held in New Delhi in April 2008 and led to the adoption of a "Joint Declaration of the Africa-India Partnership" as well as its articulation of an "Africa-India Framework for Cooperation."[33] The Indian government subsequently allocated $6 billion to implement the promises of cooperation forum.[34] The diplomatic attention has already paid off. In 2006, for example, the chair of the Council of Ministers of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Foreign Minister Aïchatou Mindaoudou of Niger, threw the weight of the 15-member subregional group behind India's bid for a seat on the United Nations Security Council.

Unlike their Chinese counterparts who have made travels through Africa an almost seasonal ritual, however, India leaders have been strangely reluctant to visit the continent despite its growing importance: before Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's October 2007 visit to Abuja, the last time an Indian head of government paid a visit to Nigeria, India's second largest source of oil, was 1962(!). This pattern, however, is quickly changing. Three months before the prime minister's visit to Nigeria (from which country he continued onward to South Africa), External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee visited Ethiopia not only to meet with then-African Union Commission chairperson Alpha Oumar Konaré, but also signed a series of wide-ranging bilateral economic and political agreements with his Ethiopian hosts. During his sojourn in the Ethiopian capital, Mukherjee convened a conference of the heads of India's diplomatic missions in Africa to announce a more active policy toward the continent.

On a more ambitious global level, a loose political alliance of India, Brazil, and South Africa, formally called the "India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum," was launched in 2004 with the goal of achieving common positions at the UN, the Doha Rounds, and other multilateral settings for the three major "southern" nations.[35] Annual summits of the leaders of the IBSA states have so far been held in New Delhi (2004), Cape Town (2005), Brasilia (2006), Pretoria (2007), and New Delhi (2008). The cornerstone of this grouping is clearly the important historical links between India and the ruling African National Congress. At the end of talks in July 2007 between the foreign ministers of the three countries, the nations agreed to strengthen their mutual ties by increasing their trade 50 percent by 2010 from its current level of $10 billion.

Commerce between India and South Africa is expected to account for most of the boost.[36]

Military Stratagems of an Emerging Power

The shadow of the nonviolent Mahatma Gandhi notwithstanding, India's leadership has recognized that a rising power also needs the ability to project "hard power" in proportion to its economic and other elements of its "soft power."[37] India today has the world's third-largest army, fourth-largest air force, and seventh-largest navy.[38]

Although New Delhi has played an active role in United Nations peacekeeping since the first mission to the former Belgian Congo in 1960, it is particularly since the end of the Cold War that, as befits a responsible stakeholder in the international system, India has put its military at the service of global order, participating in numerous UN peacekeeping operations, many in Africa. Among other deployments, Indian forces have been involved in "blue helmet" missions in Mozambique, Somalia, Angola, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Eritrea, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Liberia. The Indian contingent serving in the DRC represents the largest national contribution to the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), while the contingent which originally deployed in January 2007 to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) under Commander Seema Dhundia enjoys the distinction of being the first (and still only) all-female UN peacekeeping unit ever deployed in international peacekeeping.

Overall, India is the third-largest contributor of manpower to UN peacekeeping, its 8,759 military and police personnel just a little less than the numbers deployed by its neighbors on the subcontinent, Pakistan and Bangladesh.[39] However, most significantly, the overwhelming majority of Indian peacekeepers were, as of mid-2009, deployed to operations in Africa, with some 7,483 people in the blue-helmeted missions in Côte d'Ivoire, the DRC, Liberia, and Sudan, making it the largest single contributor to peacekeeping operations in Africa.[40]

In addition, drawing on its own long experience, India has also helped trained the South African National Defense Force (SANDF) for peacekeeping missions now that the end of apartheid has made it possible for South Africa to do its part in regional security efforts.[41] While not all of these Indian deployments to Africa have been stunning successes—the contretemps of Major-General Vijay Jetley's tenure as commander of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) are legendary in the annals of peacekeeping[42]—they nonetheless represent an extraordinary commitment to collective security burden sharing despite not-insignificant domestic and international constraints. Of course, from the point of view of its own national interests, India's track record with UN peacekeeping operations has its own strategic, operational, and tactical value. Moreover, it allows the Indian defense staff, even in times of economic belt-tightening, to make the case for continued investment in the reach capabilities of its air force and navy.[43]

As part of its defense diplomacy, India has also invested in future African military leaders, over the years training thousands of officers from a number of African countries in the academies of its three service branches as well as the postgraduate National Defence College in New Delhi and Defence Services Staff College in Wellington. Among the beneficiaries of this type of advanced training was Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo, who, in turn, during both his tenures in the presidency (military ruler, 1976–1979; civilian president, 1999–2007) hosted Indian military chiefs of staff for talks aimed at strengthening defense cooperation. As a result of these ties, India was involved in the transformation of the Nigerian Defence Academy in Kaduna into the tertiary-level degree-granting Nigerian Military University.

In February and March 2007, Vice-Admiral J. Mudimu, chief of the South African Navy, paid an extended visit to his Indian counterpart, Admiral Sureesh Mehta, chief of the Naval Staff of the Indian Navy, to work out the mechanisms for cooperation between the two countries for regional security in the Indian Ocean, particularly for dealing with terrorism and piracy. The two officers also explored the possibility of creating a naval component to the IBSA alliance and discussed the first IBSA Joint Naval Exercises (IBSAMAR), held off the Cape coast of South Africa in May 2008, which was aimed at establishing commonalities of tactical approaches and aim for procedural interoperability of their forces. Whatever becomes of this South-South military cooperation exercise, it remains that the Indian navy is a particularly important part of its engagement in the Indian Ocean and a vital force of stability in the region—as evidenced by its ability to quickly deploy after the tsunami at the end of 2004 where it joined Australia, Japan, and the United States to form the "core group" that coordinated the initial international response. As the threat of piracy continues to rise in the western Indian Ocean off the coast of Somalia, it is likely that India will play an increasing role in ensuring the safety of the sea-lanes, especially since the naval resources of the United States and the European Union are stretched by other operations, even as senior naval officers of these countries publicly express reluctance to continue supporting the extended deployments of their task forces in the region.

The relatively small Indian defense industrial sector has also made some forays recently into Africa, supplying patrol vessels (SDB Mk-2 seaward defense boats) and light helicopters (SA-316B Alouette III and SA-315B Lama craft) to several African states.[44] India has also become a major customer for South Africa's arms exports according to one assessment by the U.S. intelligence community.[45] Relations between the South African arms industry and the India Ministry of Defense became so tight at one point that Denel, the spun-off armaments manufacturing unit of South Africa's state-owned ARMSCOR (Armaments Corporation of South Africa Ltd.), for example, was implicated in the procurement scandals which were exposed earlier this decade.

Implications for Africa and Other Stakeholders

While the growing influence of any other major non-African actor on the continent bears very careful watching, there are a number of reasons why New Delhi's increased engagement in Africa, unlike that of some others, ought to be cautiously welcomed, not only by Africans, but also by other stakeholders, including the United States.

First, there is no doubt that Africa stands to benefit from the addition of India to the list of countries seeking access to the continent's natural resources and markets as well as political and strategic partnerships African states. This is especially true if African leaders are able to develop a strategic approach that leverages their strengthened bargaining position. In recent years, for example, it was revealed that India pays the highest prices for South African spot coal.[46]

Second, in general it could be said that India's *modus operandi* on the continent not only benefits Indians, it also benefits Africans. As Karen Monaghan, then National Intelligence Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, has observed, India can teach Africa a few things about the "importance of entrepreneurship" for "driving and generating jobs, and generating income, and generating growth," noting that "Indian companies are much more integrated into African society and the African economy," hiring locally and emphasize training Africans on how to maintain and repair the plants they build.[47] Unlike China, which is often viewed, not without some justification, as a predator interested only in extracting commodities, India has encouraged technology transfers to its African partners,[48] gearing its projects in Africa, according to one former secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, toward "creating value-addition for its natural resources, generating local employment, transfer of technology, and developing its human resources."[49]

Third, the lessons that India learned while freeing itself from the oppressive "Hindu rate of growth"—the 3.5 percent annual rate of economic growth that just barely kept pace with the population increase[50]—with the economic liberalization begun in the 1990s under then-finance minister (now prime minister) Manmohan Singh are precisely those African states need to study for their own development, rather than the "no strings attached" blandishments that are offered to them by China's mercantilist mandarins. Moreover, for African states, many of which are plagued by instability, autocracy, and ethnic and religious strife, India offers the example of a successfully developing country where speakers of 22 different official languages (in addition to English) as well as an estimated 1,652 mother tongues have coexisted largely peacefully for six decades, acquiring ever greater national consciousness while building the world's largest democracy. Despite its difficult birth as an independent nation in the midst of the religious partition that created Pakistan, India is home to what, by most measures, is the second largest Muslim population of any nation in the world and, from 2002 until 2007, the president of India, Abdul Kalam, was a Muslim. The prime minister, Manmohan Singh, is, as his name indicates, a Sikh, while the chair of the ruling coalition, Sonia Gandhi, *née* (born) Sonia Antonia Maino, is the Italian-born Roman Catholic widow of assassinated former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi, a Hindu. As Prime Minister Singh has noted: "If there is an 'idea of India' by which India should be defined, it is the idea of an inclusive, open, multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual society. I believe that this is the dominant trend of political evolution of all societies in the 21st century. Therefore, we have an obligation to history and mankind to show that pluralism works. India must show that democracy can deliver development and empower the marginalized. Liberal democracy is the natural order of political organization in today's world. All alternate systems, authoritarian and majoritarian in varying degrees, are an aberration."[51]

Africans have not failed to pick up on this. For example, Greg Mills, head of the Johannesburg-based Brenthurst Foundation, a think tank devoted to strengthening economic performance in Africa, has argued: "This is the India which has allowed 100 percent foreign ownership where previously it was forbidden, the free repatriation of profits and capital investment, tax holidays for infrastructure projects, the lifting of controls in capital markets, and the slashing of import tariffs. That and its democratic dividend is especially what the India of today can lend and teach the Africa of tomorrow."[52]

Fourth, the burgeoning Indian-African relationship presents good prospects for security and stability in Africa. India has enormous political capital from its cofounding and longtime leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement as well as its support of anticolonial and antiapartheid movements on the continent. On the other hand, no country has lost more of its citizens to Islamist violence than India, which, even today, remains one of the states most targeted by *jihadis* and thus has a direct stake in countering terrorism and defeating (or at least pacifying) radical Islamism that threatens the peace across a wide swathe of Africa. India's history enables its government to articulate the anti-extremism, pro-democracy message credibly in places where, quite simply, the credibility of the United States and other Western nations is very limited.

Of course, the West can hardly expect a proud and democratic nation like India to be its simply its messenger boy, much less its lackey. As one scholar told a congressional hearing, the country's large size, ancient history, and great ambitions ensure that "India will likely march to the beat of its own drummer."[53] Furthermore, with respect to India's burgeoning profile in Africa, political and other opinion leaders in the West ought to take care to avoid the temptation to give rein to the alarmism that has characterized the overwhelming plurality—if not the absolute majority—of their hitherto policy discussions about the PRC's political and commercial investments in the continent. On the other hand, India not likely to present a direct challenge to core U.S. and European interests in what is now the geostrategically vital region of Sub-Saharan Africa.[54] In fact, as it plays commercial catch-up (India's exports amount to just 10 percent of China's), the subcontinental country's economic interests are more likely than not to clash with those of the Middle Kingdom[55]—an development that some might be excused for greeting enthusiastically given the serious challenge that China's approach to Africa has posed not just to Western companies and aid agencies, but the entire reform agenda for the continent.[56]

Conclusion

India's new engagement with Africa shows every sign of not only expanding, but deepening. Over time, the network of relations being forged has every potential to not only affect those immediately involved and transforming Africa's place in international relations, but, as arguably one of the most significant demonstrations to date that the old vision of South-South cooperation can be realized, also of altering the contours of the emerging twenty-first century global order.

Notes

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2. See, inter alia, François Lafargue, "L'Inde: Une puissance africaine," *Défense nationale et sécurité collective* 63, no. 1 (January 2007): 111–117; J. Peter Pham, "India's Expanding Relations with Africa and Their Implications for U.S. Interests," *American Foreign Policy Interests* 29, no. 5 (September-October 2007): 341–352; Sanusha Naidu, "India's Growing African Strategy," *Review of African Political Economy* 35, no. 115 (March 2008): 116–128.
3. C. Raja Mohan, "India and the Balance of Power," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 4 (July/August 2006): 17–18.
4. Basil Davidson, *Africa in History: Themes and Outlines,* rev. ed. (1966; New York: Touchstone, 1995), 78.

5. See Robert G. Gregory, *India and East Africa: A History of Race Relations within the British Empire, 1890–1939* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).
6. See Ali A. Mazrui, *Africa's International Relations: The Diplomacy of Dependency and Change* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1977), 117–118.
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8. See Richard Wright, *The Color Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference* (1956; Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 1994).
9. Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (1946; New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994), 464.
10. See Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 439–444.
11. See Ajay Dubey, "India-Africa State Relations (1972–1997)," *Africa Quarterly* 37, no. 1–2 (1997): 43–57.
12. See Thomas and Margaret Melady, *Idi Amin Dada: Hitler in Africa* (Kansas City, Kan.,: Sheed, Andrews & McMeel, 1977), 70–93. (Thomas Melady was the U.S. ambassador to Uganda from 1972 until 1973, when he persuaded the State Department to close the American embassy in the aftermath of the expulsion of the South Asians.)
13. Salman Haidar, "Focus on Africa: India Gears Up For a More Active Policy," *Statesman,* July 12, 2007, http://www.thestatesman.net/page.arcview.php?clid=3&id=189853&usrsess=1 (accessed December 31, 2009).
14. See Ruchita Beri, "India's Africa Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: An Assessment," *Strategic Analysis* 17, no. 2 (April–June 2003): 228–229.
15. See Tushdar Poddar and Eva Yi, *India's Rising Growth Potential,* Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper No. 152 (New York: Goldman Sachs, 2007), 9–13.
16. See Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, *Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050,* Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper No. 99 (New York: Goldman Sachs, 2003).
17. See Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet S. Pardesi, "India Rising: What is New Delhi to Do?" *World Policy Journal* 24, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 9–18.
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24. Rajesh Pillania, "India's Interest in Africa Oil," *Africa Age* 1, no. 2 (January 2008): 35.
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26. Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), *The Rise of China and India: What's In It For Africa?* (Paris: OECD, 2006), 94.

27. Sushant K. Singh, *India and West Africa: A Burgeoning Relationship,* Chatham House Asia Programme Briefing Paper (London: Chatham House, 2007), 6.
28. See Gareth Price, *India's Aid Dynamics: From Recipient to Donor?* Chatham House Asia Programme Working Paper (London: Chatham House, 2004), 12.
29. "Government Makes Kalam's Dream Come Alive," *The Hindu,* July 5, 2007, http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/002200707051440.htm (accessed December 31, 2009). (Thanks to Dr. Ram Narayanan of Pennsylvania State University for originally calling this development to the author's attention.).
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31. Confederation of Indian Industry, "CII India-Africa Project Partnership Conclave to Generate $17 Billion Business," October 11, 2006, http://www.ciionline.org/news/newsMain11-10-2006_1.html (accessed December 31, 2009).
32. There are Indian embassies or high commissions in Algeria, Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Honorary Consulates General are found in the following countries without a resident diplomatic mission: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Djibouti, Gabon, The Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
33. The documents are available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Conferences/2008/april/India-Africa/India-Africa.html (accessed December 31, 2009).
34. "Indian Government Allocates $6 Billion for Implementation of India-Africa Cooperation Forum Decisions," *Nazret.com,* December 6, 2009, http://nazret.com/blog/index.php?title=indian_gov_t_allocates_6_bln_usd_for_imp&more=1&c=1&tb=1&pb=1 (accessed December 31, 2009).
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39. United Nations Peacekeeping, Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations (November 30, 2009), http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2009/Nov09_2.pdf.
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41. See Ruchita Beri, "Indo-South African Defense Cooperation: Potential and Prospects," *Strategic Analysis* 23, no. 10 (January 2000): 1681–1705.

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55. In 2004, for example, the PRC used its diplomatic and financial leverage with the government of Angola to get the latter's state-owned oil company, Sonangol, to exercise its pre-emption rights to prevent a move by India's ONGC to purchase the half-ownership of a major production block from the Anglo-Dutch energy giant Shell. India has yet to achieve significant access to Angolan petroleum sector. See Alex Vines, Lillian Wong, Markus Weimer, and Indira Campos, *Thirst for African Oil: Asian National Oil Companies in Nigeria and Angola,* Chatham House Report (London: Chatham House, 2009).
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8

Latin America-Africa Cooperation: Brazil as a Case Study

Gladys Lechini

There is a cultural, aesthetic, and genetic connection between Brazil and Africa

Gilberto Gil, singer and former minister of culture of Brazil (2003–2008)

Back 2 Black Festival, Rio de Janeiro, 28 de agosto de 2009

For the last 400 years, the relations between Latin America and Africa have gone through periods of rapprochement and mute stages. These ups and downs were—and still are—closely related to domestic situations and also influenced by regional and international frameworks. These so-called horizontal relations started in the sixteenth century with the slave trade. During this shameful period, Latin America and the Caribbean received Africans, together with their culture and values, which consequently became part of the heritage and the identity of the different nations in the region.

Since the Latin American countries' independence during the nineteenth century, the two regions were connected through European countries, and relations between the two had a very low profile. This situation began to change in the twentieth century as African states gained independence. Their inclusion in the post-Second World War international system had a strong impact in multilateral regimes and especially in the UN, where Latin America supported the incorporation of the new African partners. This began a new type of relationship within the context of the so-called South-South cooperation.

The pattern of relations established between Latin America and Africa shows that Latin American countries had been the main initiators. For the last 50 years, Latin American states' approach to Africa has been characterized by various models that reflect its political and economic diversity. African response has been lukewarm as African states were preoccupied by regional political instability, and economic problems. South Africa, on the other hand, reacted to this pattern by approaching Latin American countries during different periods, with the same objective: to improve its international insertion through the diversification of political, economic and strategic relations.

Within this framework, the purpose of this paper is to describe and analyze the relations of Brazil with the African countries, making some references to Argentina's approach and Venezuela's recent policies towards the African states in the broader context of South-South relations. The inclusion of Argentina and Venezuela serves as a mirror instrument to contextualize and clarify the central points of this work, allowing a "relocation" of Brazil's foreign policy toward the African countries within the Latin American environment. A brief comment on some similarities between Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa as well as some characteristics of the horizontal relation will also serve to contextualize this work.

Africa and Latin America: Between Similarities and Diversities

Despite the mutual lack of knowledge of the other and the absence of communications for various periods, as well as the different timing to achieve independence, it is interesting to note that the two regions have remarkable similarities. They both comprise a group of developing countries, belonging to the periphery, which share similar situations of vulnerability and many of the same challenges. Both regions have suffered from colonialism, both have fought strongly for their independence, both have dependent and asymmetric relations with the industrialized countries (the North) and dependent economic structures, and both have undergone the economic hardships caused by structural adjustment programs (SAPs) albeit at different time frames.

Regardless of these analogous circumstances, Latin American and African countries are not a homogeneous group. They have their own particularities and specificities. They differ in terms of local contexts, socioeconomics, politics and culture and in terms of a colonial legacy left by diverse colonial powers of the North. Indeed, the Spanish and Portuguese colonial enterprise was not the same as the British, the French, the Dutch, or the Belgian.

Once independent, during the 1960s and 1970s, the African countries participated actively in international fora together with the Latin American group to defend their interests through coordinated actions. The Non Aligned Movement, G 77, and the UN General Assembly (UNGA) were the privileged meeting places. The potential for cooperation among raw material producing countries became clear in 1973, after the oil shock, and in 1974, when the UNGA adopted the Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.

These successful efforts made the leaders believe there were and would be many opportunities to change their unfavorable and unfair situation, and that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) model might be replicated in other arenas. However, this type of cooperation failed due to its loose nature and broad scope: the fallacy of the argument was its basic assumption that all underdeveloped countries had more commonalities that they actually had and that all solutions could be applied uniformly to each of them with equal success.

During the 1980s, a new period of silence covered the relations. The bilateral synergy was weakened by the serious problems concerning external debt, which affected development and democratic stability in the South. Although the resulting debt crisis offered a good opportunity to develop cooperative actions, the policies implemented by developing countries together with private creditors undermined the attempts for multilateral cooperation. Nevertheless, Latin American governments were still able to develop agreements around common policies directed to solve the different conflicts affecting the region, like the Cartagena Consensus, the Contadora Group, the Contadora Support Group, and the G8.

The end of the Cold War in the 1990s brought the end of bipolarity and diminished the alternatives for Latin America and Africa to solve their problems and improve their international insertion. Furthermore, the expansion of globalisation, the implementation of neoliberal policies, and the severe economic problems faced by developing countries dissolved any solidarity. South-South cooperation was not in the priorities of the foreign policy agendas of the countries in both regions. It was not included in the speeches of leaders, let alone present at the decision making level or in academic analysis.

The effects of globalization made it clear that there were new winners and losers, but also that very few winners belonged to the countries involved in our study. This awareness, along with the disappointment regarding the possibility that a new global system based on the so-called IFIs (international financial institutions) and the WTO (World Trade Organization) might contribute to establish a fairer international order, led the governments of the Global South to rethink the idea of horizontal cooperation. This time the governments sought to learn from past experiences and adopt a more selective approach in terms of players and issues.

This new South-South cooperation intends to create cooperative awareness in Southern countries to jointly tackle their common dilemmas in the international arena. Indeed, cooperation among peers, among those enduring the same dependency situations, would help the South underpin their negotiating capacity vis-à-vis the North, through collaborative efforts aimed at solving issues on trade, development, and the new international economic order. Within this framework, some countries in Latin America and Africa have been promoting multi-regional and bilateral cooperation. At the multilateral level, for example, a number of initiatives have recently been taken to create adequate international political forum to collaborate on better alternatives to solve South-South problems. For example, the South America-Arab Countries Forum, with the First Summit held in Brasilia, Brazil, in May 2005 and the second one in Doha, Qatar, on March 31, 2009; the Africa-South America Forum (ASA) with two Summits (in Abuja, Nigeria, on November 30, 2006, and in Margarita Island, Venezuela, September 26–27, 2009), and the relaunching of the Zone for Peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic (ZPCSA) in Luanda, in June 2007. Likewise, in the area of multilateral trade within the WTO, some Latin American and African countries are looking to build common positions and joint negotiations among G20 and NAMA-11 countries.[1]

At the bilateral level, for example, trade between Argentina, Northern Africa, and South Africa has been growing and bilateral relations improving despite the low profile of Africa in Argentine foreign priorities. Brazil, on the other hand, preferred interacting with different countries through a much more coherent foreign policy, under the umbrella of a cultural diplomacy. Venezuela, the new player, is learning how to move towards Africa within the various aspects of its petro-diplomacy and South-South cooperation. Still, Cuba's approach in the 1960s and 1970s privileged the ideological dimension and technical cooperation.

Argentina and Africa: A Relation Shaped by Impulses[2]

The analysis of the evolution of Argentine-African relationship since the independence of these states reveals that Africa holds a low profile in Argentine foreign priorities, given the scarce links established and the lack of continuity by successive Argentine governments.[2] It may be described as an impulse-driven policy, which has varied in intensity with the years, governments, and projects of international insertion and shows a particular decision-making process. Owing to its low priority, the decisions made by impulse were regarded as "routine" procedure at Palacio San Martin (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Moreover, many of the bilateral or multilateral initiatives (within the framework of the Non-Aligned countries or the UN) often relied on the good will and imagination of the Argentine officials who managed to have leeway in advancing actions or missions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' monolithic and hierarchical structure.

The impulses may be measured through a set of indicators such as opening embassies, sending and receiving diplomatic or trade missions and signing agreements. These impulses have ideological, political or commercial objectives, according to the current needs of the decision-making units. Commercial objectives were present in almost all impulses as a result of Argentina's need for new markets. The resultant ups and downs of trade relations are due to the level of activism of private actors, and almost never to a political decision on trade policy, as the different Argentinean governments have never been keen on drawing up trading strategies.

Nevertheless, during the 1980s, this policy shaped by impulses seemed to change with the reestablishment of democracy in Argentina. Alfonsín's government (1983–1989) began to implement an African policy within the Non-Aligned Movement, launching a period of increased contact with Africa. It was believed that an alliance among the countries of the South could help to secure areas of relative power on the basis of policies of cooperation. Foreign Minister Dante Caputo began to shape an African policy under the assumption that increasing both bilateral and multilateral political relations would also enhance trade relations and foster South-South cooperation. His interest was also shown through diplomatic actions, such as sending missions to Africa, opening new embassies, signing agreements, and developing activities in the sphere of scientific and technological cooperation. In that context, though trade and military relations continued, Argentina broke off diplomatic relations with Pretoria, putting an end to a dual policy toward African states and an ambiguous policy toward South Africa.

However, in the 1990s, with President Menem at the helm (1989–1999), Argentina's African policy vanished. The main features of his foreign policy showed an "un-critical alignment" with the United States and the acceptance of the requirements of the Washington Consensus. Belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement was considered irrelevant, as was the association with African countries. A period barren of strategies or actions intended for African countries—with the exception of North Africa—started, followed by the closure of embassies (Tanzania, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Zaire, and Gabon) under the argument of budgetary constraints. Yet, despite the low profile of African countries, diplomatic relations with South Africa were reestablished in 1991.

With the coming of Fernando de la Rua to the presidency in Argentina (1999) and despite the set of proposals of the Alianza that took him to power, substantial changes were not observed either in the foreign policy or in the relations with the states of the African continent and South Africa.[3] With President Eduardo Duhalde (2002–2003), certain internal stability was attained. Foreign Affairs Secretary Carlos Ruckauf sought to innovate and spoke of conducting a foreign policy of "polygamy with the different continents." This odd diplomatic expression attempting to identify MERCOSUR, Europe, Asia, and Africa as the targets of the national government's foreign policy was used, above all, to be distinguished from the "carnal relations" with the United States, fostered by Menem.

Since President Néstor Kirchner took office (2003), the idea of South-South cooperation can be spotted in his discourse on foreign policy. After more than a decade of foreign policy based on neoliberal principles, where the economy prevailed over politics and values, multilateral sectors have called for South-South cooperation as a space to seek new ways for promoting development and autonomy. However, regarding bilateral relations, the South-South option is still driven by a commercialist/pragmatic perspective. Although Latin America's regional economic conditions favor an increase in South-South cooperation, it seems that President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are having difficulty developing policies beyond the Atlantic. The missions sent and received show a more commercial than political content, which proves there are still many changes to be made.

Venezuela, the Newcomer

Regardless of having a relevant and visible African population, no census concerned with racial origin has taken place in Venezuela. Nevertheless and because of the mentioned afro descendent visibility, the African legacy in Venezuela is an important argument in President Hugo Chavez's African policy. Chavez, elected for the first period in 1988, has a multipolar conception of the international system. In a world with U.S. primacy, Chavez seeks to change the present power relations through the development of new alliances with the African states using the tools provided by South-South cooperation. For Chavez's foreign policy, the African countries are fundamental actors in the international system and Venezuelan strategic allies for the anti-imperialist fight.[4]

Even though he was elected president in 1988, this approach to African countries is recent. The revalorization of Africa shows an important shift in Venezuelan foreign policy. Indeed, Chavez created the Vice-Ministry of Foreign Relations for Africa in 2005 and chose a well-known scholar to be at the helm, Reinaldo Bolívar. To show his commitment, that same year the new vice-minister paid a visit to Senegal, Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, and Benin and presented the "Agenda for Africa," which redefined the relationship with African countries. The Agenda proposed to increase the diplomatic representations in the continent, establish relations with regional and sub regional organizations of cooperation and integration, promote high level visits, and to advance the signing of memorandums of understandings and commercial agreements.

New measures showing a great deal of dynamism were taken in accordance to this Agenda. Additional to updating diplomatic structures, the president traveled to Africa, opened new embassies[5] and signed several agreements, showing the results of the so-called petro-diplomacy. Petro-diplomacy means that Venezuela, as an oil producing country, can use the power it gains through its energy resources to expand its margins of maneuver in the international scenario. Thus, Chavez's diplomacy has been successful in promoting its interests throughout the world by means of different strategies.

From the multilateral perspective, Venezuela has actively participated in all meetings and summits involving states of both regions. Chavez was present in the South America-Africa Summit in Abuja and was the hosting president of the second summit in Margarita's Island in 2009. He also participated in both Arab-South American Summits, in Brasilia and Doha. Further, Venezuela has been an observer of the African union since 2005 and Arab League, in which ten African countries have participated since 2006.

Presidential visits have also been useful tools in strengthening political ties with potential African allies, developing petro-diplomacy and increasing bilateral trade and cooperation. With his trips to Africa, Chavez has become the first Venezuelan president to step on African soil. In August 2006, Chávez accomplished his first African tour. He visited Angola to negotiate cooperation between their respective oil industries, and Mali and Benin, two countries normally neglected by international diplomacy, to implement socioeconomic cooperation. Mali and Venezuela signed cooperation agreements in 2004 and the first bilateral commission discussed issues such as science and technology, education, energy, agriculture and social programs. This presidential visit served to reinforce the relationship, together with the announcement of Venezuelan's compromise to sell oil and help with the financing of a program for the development of Mali's middle size enterprises.

On September 2, 2008, and as a result of Chavez's visit to South Africa, the two countries signed several agreements for energy cooperation. A year later, he visited Libya and Algeria, to broaden the scope of bilateral cooperation in issues concerning not only energy, but trade, finance and military collaboration. In Libya, he assisted at a meeting of the African Union and at the celebrations of the fortieth anniversary of the First of September Al Fateh revolution, which allowed Gaddafi's accession to power. Chavez has signed a number of agreements since 2005 that relate to his petro-diplomacy, like those with Angola, Mali, Chad, Camerun, Equatorial Guinea,[6] and South Africa.[7]

Apart from the mentioned activities, the petro-diplomacy does not neglect the ideological and cultural aspects of the South-South cooperation. Concerning cultural and educational issues, it can be noted that Chávez inaugurated the pilot plan "Be the Godfather of an African School," through which governmental and nongovernmental actors collaborate on the basic education of African children. It was also proposed the creation of "National African Chairs" at different Venezuelan universities, to complement the "African Chair" of the Ministry of Foreign Relations and the Centre for Regional Studies and African Legacy (CERLA). Another innovative initiative is the Cultural Festival for the African People, which has been organized in Venezuela for three years and has contributed enormously to the promotion of mutual knowledge.

In face of this strong and sudden Venezuelan impulse toward African states, one could ask about the possibilities that it could be transformed into a permanent objective of the Caracas' foreign policy or if it will vanish with the next change of government.

Brazil's African Policy

Brazil is one of the Latin American countries with a colonial history full of "South Atlantic encounters." Nevertheless, during its negotiations for independence, it was explicitly forbidden by Portugal to maintain any contact with Portuguese colonies in

Africa. This involuntary separation began to change, gradually due to the Africa's independence process and to a slow policy of rapprochement built up by Brazil. African heritage is part of the Brazilian social corpus and although African roots and influence are evident in terms of ethnicity, culture and language, this existence was not enough to give shape to a Brazilian African policy. Thus, political will and political decisions were needed.

Since the 1960s, Brazil has constructed an African policy in the framework of a global strategy of Brazil's integration into the world. Brazil designed and implemented a set of political and diplomatic actions aiming at building a "critical mass" of interests with the African nations. Though Brazil's African policy was characterized by Brazilian academics as a diffusion process, its impulses were "cumulative" and made possible the existence of certain density of relations between Brazil and Africa in what can be considered an "incremental policy." Unlike Argentina, these impulses were generated at the upper levels of the decision making process. Despite different forms of government and the logical changes between democratic and military regimes, Brazil's foreign policy shows a remarkable degree of continuity. This allows the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) to maintain a great level of independence. The coherence between the designs and the execution of Brazil's foreign policy was the result of the implementation of a domestic project of national development through import substitution.

The fact that African states had a place in Brazil's foreign design explains the higher density of diplomatic and, later, commercial relations between the two. The rapprochement had a political nature—in the context of South-South relations—and a pragmatic commercial character, due to the interest in diversifying trading partners. It was justified by South-South solidarity principles and was part of a global strategy: to have an international presence through the diversification of external relations and the building of alliances with the new states in the South. In this way Brazil would have a say in global issues. Perhaps these new relations can also be explained due to the impossibility, at that stage, to have better ones with Latin American states and particularly with Argentina, owing to the hypothesis of conflict between both countries' military governments.

Even though Brazilian officials resorted to a "cultural speech"[8] or "cultural diplomacy"[9] that used the memory of Brazil's African heritage, new actions were necessary in order to convince the African states of Brasilia's intentions. Embassies were opened and high-level missions were sent. Technical and academic cooperation was developed and research centers were opened. The 1970s were called the "golden period" of Brazilian-African relations.

This political and diplomatic approach was closely related to a plan of insertion of Brazil into the international scenery. The principal agent was Itamaraty, together with the president of the Federative Republic. The military intervened during some periods, mainly the authoritarian ones, and further participation came from the state bureaucracy (Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento, Petrobras), congressmen, businessmen (Vale do Rio Doce, Odebrecht, Camargo Correia, Mendes Junior), and academics in what was called "the foreign policy community."[10] In those times, Brazilian elites aspired to participate in the emerging multipolarism under the assumption that Brazil was an emerging power. The approach to the African countries meant the promotion of the idea of solidarity among the southern countries, and the need to diversify external relations and international alliances. Brazil's African policy was a policy of "what was possible" within domestic restrictions and external determining factors, like the privileged relationship with Portugal. This explains the ambiguities developed with the Portuguese colonies in Africa, until Brasilia decided to recognize their independence from Lisbon in 1975.

The relation with South Africa also showed varied edges and contradictions,[11] as a consequence of the difference between principles and specific interests. Within these oscillations, Brazil tried to separate its approach to Black Africa from the traditional friendship with South Africa. This policy was redefined with the return to democracy in Brazil, when Sarney's government passed the so-called Sarney Decree of 1985. This decree gathered new prohibitions with previous ones, banning cultural and sports exchanges, along with oil, arms and military equipment exports. This decision was an answer to the aggravation of repressive tendencies of the white South African government, not only within the country itself, but also within the Southern African region.

During the nineties, the Brazilian-African "honeymoon" showed its limits. The foreign policy suffered changes, particularly because of the "declared end" of the import substitution model and the new neoliberal orthodoxy implemented by Brasilia. Even though diversification of external relations continued to be a policy objective, the scenario moved from Africa to Latin America and Mercosur (Common Market of the Southern Cone). Furthermore, economic domestic problems in Brazil and in the African states, contributed to the decline in the transatlantic relationship and the cooperative dreams vanished, due to "afropesimism."

At that time, the "grand strategy" turned into a "selective policy"—which promoted relations with those countries in condition to reply to Brazil's new requirements—and the South-South cooperation of the 1970s turned into "strategic partnership."[12] Brazil's options showed a restricted African policy with a limited scope: few countries and issue-areas. The preferred countries were the new democratic South Africa, Angola, and Nigeria. At the multilateral level, cooperation with the countries belonging to the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) under Mercosur's umbrella, the Portuguese Speaking Countries Community (CPLP),[13] the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZPCAS),[14] and those participating in Africa's Peace Keeping Operations[15] were the priorities. This selective process is evidenced by presidential tours and high level visits,[16] as well as the agreements signed with South Africa, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Sao Tomé e Príncipe, and Nigeria.

Within this framework, diplomatic and political relations with the new South Africa and cultural relations with the Portuguese-speaking countries became increasingly relevant. Indeed, Brazil moved from having no policies toward Pretoria, to the consideration of South Africa as a Strategic Partner in varied issue areas and particularly in the multilateral arena. The greater relevance granted to the bilateral relationship is shown by the increased level of exchanged visits.[17] President Cardoso's trip to South Africa (1996) and the subsequent signing of eight bilateral agreements showed the increasing importance of these new ties.[18] The new strategy had two legs; the political dimension referred to the possibility of developing cooperative efforts in multilateral negotiations, while the economic dimension[19] aimed to foster the existing commercial potentialities.

Despite the increased attention paid to South Africa, most African countries rated low on Brazil's priorities for about a decade.[20] It was not until President Lula da Silva (2003) and his Foreign Minister Celso Amorim promoted the deepening and expanding of Brazil's African policy, not only at the level of discourse but also in terms specific actions, did this trend change. In all statements the relaunching of Brazil's African policy was emphasized, and the eight visits paid to African countries by Lula and Amorim are proof.

In addition to this political decision, it is worth it to remark that Lula's government received as inheritance the necessary structures and experience to relaunch Brazilian African policy, combining political, economic, and cultural interests. Thanks to decades of transatlantic connections, Brazil has built a remarkable network of governmental and nongovernmental contacts. Brazil now has 31 embassies in Africa[21] and has received 27 African diplomatic missions in Brasilia.[22] As regards Itamaraty, the ministry has an African department, with three areas, which include African countries and multilateral regional institutions.[23]

Lula's active presence in Africa is only one sign of Brazil's African policy. Since the beginning of his administration, he has received more than a dozen African heads of state[24] and top-level African officials. Also, more than 160 bilateral agreements with African states have been signed.[25] On the economic front, Brazil's trade with Africa has increased dramatically during the "Lula years," from $5 billion in 2002 to $20 billion in 2007.[26] Brazil's present foreign trade with Africa represents 7 percent of its trade with the entire world.

This new emphasis given to the African policy could also be a result of the new found coherence between the domestic and the foreign policy, as the new government responds to the local demands of the Brazilian afro descendents. On January 10, 2003, federal decree 10639 was passed. This regulation makes the study of African history as well as African and Afro-Brazilian culture mandatory at all academic levels.[27] It also created the Special Secretariat for Policies for the Promotion of Racial Equality[28] on March 21 of the same year, to encourage the protection of the rights of any racial group that could be affected by discrimination with special attention to the black population.[29]

In the context of this revitalized policy, South Africa still occupies the most important place, as a "spearhead" to develop a more solid relation with the other states of Africa. This was proven by Lula's first trip in 2003, when he chose Pretoria for a visit. The identification and establishment of synergies and the managerial and political strategic convergence between both countries were indicated.[30] In February 2006, during Lula's fourth tour to Africa, he went to South Africa again.[31] Then in October 2007, during his seventh trip to Africa, he stopped again in South Africa to participate at the IBSA Summit (India, Brazil, and South Africa). What it is also interesting to note is that giving priority to the relations with South Africa, Brazil combines its bilateral diplomacy with its multilateral one, in terms of Mercosur-SACU and IBSA.[32]

Brazil's Commercial Multilateralism

Together with the intensification of bilateral relations with South Africa, the negotiations for the signing of a Free Trade Agreement between Mercosur and Southern African Development Community (SADC)—though finally it was signed between Mercosur and the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU), integrated by Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland—started during Cardoso's administration. From the South African point of view, the association across the South Atlantic was part of its foreign agenda, and this interest was proven with actions like the visit of president Mandela to Ushuaia, during a Mercosur Summit on July 24, 1998.

Furthermore, on the occasion of a new Mercosur Summit on December 14, 2000, in Florianopolis, Brazil, the Project for an Agreement for the Creation of a Free Trade Area between Mercosur and South Africa was signed, with the new South African president, Thabo Mbeki, in attendance.

As a proof of Latin America's intentions, the first combined Mercosur commercial mission of businessmen was sent to South Africa to promote products abroad.[33] At the same time, this mission constituted a challenge and a "test case" for the process of regional integration, as the combined commercial promotion offers a window of opportunities that would fulfill Mercosur's foundation aim to integrate in order to compete in the world.[34]

However and despite the strong initial step, the following negotiations have been slow due to the difficulties in agreeing which sectors would benefit from reductions. Finally, and after nine years, Mercosur and now the SACU have arrived at a Preferential Trade Agreement while meeting in Maseru, Lesotho, on April 3, 2009. This agreement, which must now be ratified by their respective parliaments to come into force, includes more than a thousand products from each region.

By selecting South Africa as an important partner, the Brazilian government went a step further from the traditional strategies adopted in its quest for a new African policy and a strengthening of the foreign relations established by Mercosur. Such choice suggests the inclusion of South Africa in a trilateral strategy (known as South-South-South diplomatic encounter) that includes India as well. Several international meetings attended by representatives from the three countries at the highest level have led to the creation of IBSA in Brasilia on June 6, 2003. Since then, the heads of state of the three countries have met in Brasilia (2006), Pretoria (2007), New Delhi (2008),[35] and again in Brasilia (2009) to further their relationship.

Final Reflections

In this new century, the automatic and exclusive alignment with the central countries is beginning to show its flaws. The debate over a new development model for the countries of the South should not be postponed, despite domestic problems. The Washington Consensus imposed in the 1990s brought about, at least in Latin America, a tendency in the academic works on international relations to marginalize options in relation to, for example, African issues, which were labeled idle, not pertinent, weak, or of no avail. Two factors contributed to consolidating such a trend: (a) the association between knowledge and power, that is, "let us produce knowledge for the ruling power," and (b) the conditioning of the financial facilities that support these works. With this particular orientation, the doors to new ways of thinking about Latin America's and Africa's international insertion were closed.

Therefore, this is a work with the pretension of addressing a cluster of different issues and proposing fresh perspectives for the development of various new research directions; the international scenarios where the regionalization and globalization processes occur should be more profitably used. A Strategic cooperation developing partnerships should be built by Latin American and African governments, supported and shored up by the interweaving of interests in civil society. This cooperation built on policies resulting from shared values, ideas, and principles should produce a spill over effect on other areas such as trade and investment, defense and security, and civil society institutions.

The case of Brazil and in a smaller proportion some other Latin American countries can show the way for the promotion of better and more fluent relations between the two regions. For the last 40 years, Brazilian governments have argued that Africa is in Brazil due to the legacy of African slaves. This is true, but one could wonder whether it could also be true that Brazil wants to land in Africa as an emergent power. The near future will show what Brazil could do in Africa and the limits and scope of South-South cooperation.

Notes

1. María Gisela Pereyra Doval, "De Cancún a Potsdam," *Colección* (Año XIII, Nº 18/19, 2008): 199–210.
2. The opinions expressed in this paper are the outcome of my research at CONICET and have been discussed in greater depth in: Gladys Lechini, *Argentina y África en el espejo de Brasil. ¿Política por impulsos o construcción de una política exterior* CLACSO, Buenos Aires (2006).
3. Gladys Lechini, "África desde Menem a De La Rúa: continuidad de la política por impulsos," in *La política exterior argentina 1998–2001. El cambio de gobierno ¿Impacto o irrelevancia?* (Rosario: CERIR, 2001): 227–250.
4. "Editorial Revista Política Exterior y Soberanía," *Instituto de Altos Estudios Diplomáticos* 3, no. 4 (Caracas, Venezuela, 2008): 6.
5. After 2005, new diplomatic representations were added to the existing ones in Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, Namibia and Kenya. Thus, new embassies were opened in Ethiopia, Senegal, Mali, Gambia, Benin, Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Mozambique, Congo and Sudan.
6. In 2003, Equatorial Guinea was visited by a Venezuelan delegation integrated by officials from the Ministry of Foreign Relations, PDVSA (Petróleos de Venezuela SA) and businessmen.
7. Maria Auxiliadora Hernández-Barbarito and Victor Aaron Liendo, "La cooperación energetica entre Venezuela y los países emergentes petroleros del Occidente Africano," *Política Exterior y Soberanía* (October-December 2008): 43–52.
8. José Flavio Sombra Saraiva, *O lugar da Africa. A dimensão atlantica da politica externa brasileira* (de 1946 a nossos dias) ed. UNB (Brasília, 1996).
9. Fernando Mourão and A. Albuquerque, "O Brasil e a Africa," in *Temas de Política Externa Brasileira II,* ed. Gelson Fonseca Júnior and Sergio Henrique Nabuco de Castro (São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1994), 137–154.
10. Amaury de Souza, *A agenda internacional do Brasil: um estudo sobre a comunidade brasileira de política externa* (Rio de Janeiro, CEBRI, 2009).
11. Saraiva, *O lugar da África*.
12. Luiz Lampreia, *Ministério das Relaçoes Exteriores do Brasil,* "As perspectivas da Situação mundial e a Política Externa do Brasil."
13. Brazil contributed to lay the foundations of the CPLP in 1996, as a new mechanism of cooperation among lusophone countries like Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Cabo Verde and Sao Tome e Principe.
14. It was in 1992 when Brazil had the political will to refresh the cooperation in the South Atlantic, which had lost its interest with the end of the cold war.
15. Brazil participated in Angola in UNAVEM I, II y III and in MONUA, Uganda and Ruanda (UNOMUR), in Liberia (UNOMIL), in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and in South Africa (UNOMSA) to help supervise the April 1994 elections.

16. In 1991, president Collor de Mello visited four countries in Southern Africa: Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Itamar Franco's Foreign Relations Minister, Celso Amorim traveled to Pretoria to be present when Mandela assumed power. Foreign Minister Lampreia visited South Africa in three opportunities (1995, 1996 y 2000), went to Angola (1998) and to Mozambique for a CPLP meeting (2000), with president Cardoso. Cardoso had already travelled to South Africa and Angola, on November 1996, with an important group of businessmen, officials and scholars.
17. From the South African end traveled to Brasilia Foreign Affairs Minister Alfred Nzo (1995), Deputy Minister Aziz Pahad (1996), Vice-President Thabo Mbeki and Industry and Trade Minister Alec Erwin (1997), President Nelson Mandela (July 21–22, 1998), and President Mbeki (December 12–15, 2000).
18. Brazil's bilateral relations with South Africa did not end with the visit of Cardoso. Moreover, they were deepened to conclude on December 13, 2000, during Mbeki's state visit to Brazil, with the signing of the South Africa and Brazil's joint commission agreement.
19. Brazil is South Africa's biggest trading partner in Latin America. Major South African exports to Brazil include precious and semi-precious stones and metal, anthracite and coal, iron and steel, miscellaneous chemical products, organic chemicals, aluminum, nickel, synthetic fibers, machinery and mechanical appliances, paper and paperboard. Brazilian exports to South Africa have steadily increased. Major Brazilian exports consist of vehicles and components, aircraft, machinery, mineral fuels, electrical machinery, animal and vegetable fats and oils, meat, ores, slag and ashes, organic chemicals and tobacco.
20. José Flavio Sombra Saraiva, "Política exterior do Governo Lula: o desafío africano," *RBPI* (Ano 45, Nº 2, 2002): 5. Del art.
21. Angola, Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Libya, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Congo Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Senegal, Santo Tomé e Príncipe, South Africa, Soudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
22. Angola, Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania. Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Congo Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Senegal, South Africa, Soudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
23. DAF-1: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Congo Republic, Senegal, Sierra Leona, Togo. International Organizations CEDEAO/ECOWAS, CEMAC, NEPAD, UEMOA, UMA, UA, ZOPACAS. DAF-2: South Africa, Angola, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Comores, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauricio, Mozambique, Namibia, Sao Tomé e Príncipe, Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe. International Organizations: CPLP, SADC, NEPAD, UA, ZPCSA. DAF-3: Algeria, Burundi, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, Kenya, Centroafrican Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ruanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda. International Organizations: IGAD, CEMAC, NEPAD, UA, UMA.
24. In 2004, Lula Da Silva met Mohammed VI, from Morocco and Joaquim Chissano.from Mozambique. In 2005 Brasilia was visited by the presidents of Algeria, South Africa, Congo, Gambia, Nigeria and Cabo Verde, in 2007 by the president of Senegal and by Libya's prime minister and in 2008 by the president of Equatorial Guinea.
25. Between 1960–2002, 172 agreements were signed.
26. SECEX, Development, Industry and Foreign Trade Ministry, Brazil.

27. This law is connected with some other measures of affirmative action that have been taken as a clear recognition of the existence of racial discriminations in the country that should be overcome (Nunes Pereira, 2008: 253).
28. This office coordinates the policies of all governmental agencies concerning racial equality and is in charge of the developing of affirmative action strategies with other countries and international organizations.
29. Brazil was one of the leading actors to promote articulation between African-descendent-congressmen of the Americas and the Caribbean with the realization of the first Meeting of Afrodescendent Parlamentarians held in Brsilia in November 2003.
30. The cooperation comprises specific areas such as agricultural processing, industrial technology, biodiversity, biotechnology, energy, clean technologies, information and communication technologies, material research, space science and astronomy.
31. In November of the same year he attended the Heads of State Summit Africa-South America, in Abuja.
32. An updated version of Brazil and Africa can be read in Lechini, 2008.
33. Representatives of 35 Brazilian enterprises, 24 Argentinean and 15 Uruguayan traveled to South Africa, while there was a minimal participation of Paraguay, with the presence of its chargé d' affaires. Mercosur's delegation totalized 74 companies, ten institutions and 91 people.
34. It should be highlighted that Argentine exports to South Africa consist mainly on food and agricultural products which are generally commercialized by multinational companies that decide where and how to sell according to their analysis of global markets. But, in Brazilian exports industrialized products prevail, with an important participation of enterprises such as Embraer (airplanes) and Daymler Benz (automobile industry).
35. For more on IBSA see Gladys Lechini, "Middle Powers: IBSA and the new South-South Cooperation," *NACLA Report on the Americas* 40, no. 5 (New York, 2007): 28–32.

Part III

Africa in Global and Regional Governance

9

The Evolving UN-Africa Relations since the End of the Cold War

Assefaw Bariagaber

Introduction

The international system is in transition, and the stability, predictability, and indeed the near certainty the bipolar structure had provided for about five decades no longer exists. As a consequence, many countries and the United Nations (UN) have responded to the ongoing transition in various ways, of which the following are some of the most visible. First, seizing what appeared to be a rare opportunity, the UN has moved to fill in the vacuum created as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Second, some countries are now boldly calling for an expanded Security Council of the UN, and the power of veto for countries such as India, Germany, Japan, Brazil, and South Africa. Third, many countries are openly challenging (United States) leadership and behavior. These include some of its allies, such as Germany and France; rapidly rising countries, such as China and India; and nuclear-aspirant countries, such as Iran and North Korea. Fourth, some countries in the developed world have declared threats from violent transnational organizations, such as al Qaida and al Qaida – affiliated groups, as serious and are now providing support to many developing countries, some in Africa, in an attempt to deprive them of sources of support to conduct their operations. Last, Americans have now elected a multilateral-minded African American to serve as their president, partly in response to the challenges the United States faced to its more unilateralist policies during most of the 2000s. This is expected to give the UN more latitude to manage international peace and security, especially in Africa. All of these, coupled with increased resolve within Africa to shoulder more responsibility for its security, call for a fresh look at UN-Africa relations. The specific questions this chapter attempts to answer are, what is the expected trajectory of the UN-Africa relations in the management of conflicts in Africa, and what explains this? Are changes to the existing UN-Africa economic relations to be expected?

This (chapter) advances the proposition that the fundamental changes occurring around the world, including Africa, will make the continent more relevant in international affairs, especially in the management of peace and security within the continent. The increasing complexity and costs of managing conflicts in Africa are expected to make major powers more willing to give the UN and the African Union (AU) an added role in this area. At the same time, having seen the readiness with which major – Western powers intervened in the former Yugoslavia in the first half of the 1990s but not in Rwanda and other long-lasting conflicts in Africa, African leaders have now established a more robust AU and have shown increased resolve to play a more active role in managing security in the continent. Therefore, there exists a convergence of UN and AU interests, and this will coalesce around UN-AU hybrid peace operations, as in Darfur at present. In the economic realm, however, the role of the UN will remain as marginal.

This chapter briefly discusses the international relations of African states in the years immediately following their independence, including their relations with the UN, Great Britain, and France; examines change and continuity in Africa's relations with these and other actors in the 1970 and the 1980s; explains why fundamental changes in Africa's relations with such actors occurred after the end of the Cold War; and discusses prospects for UN-Africa relations in the 2010s.

UN-Africa Political and Security Relations in the Decades before the End of the Cold War

World War II had an indelible impact on the international system, the colonizers, and the colonized. First, the structure of the international system changed from multipolar to bipolar, and the United States and the Soviet Union became undisputed global leaders and, along with this, the UN was established to maintain international peace and security. Second, Great Britain and France, hitherto major colonial powers, were greatly weakened as a result of the war. They were relegated to secondary power status because they lost the will and the ability to conduct their relations with the colonized as well as with the rest of the world in the manner they had done before the war. Third, the colonized, who enlisted in the British and French armies in order to help thwart German ambition of world domination, found reasons to question their status as colonized, to challenge British and French rule, and to demand independence.[1] Moreover, with the changes in the structure of the international system and the establishment of the UN, increased pressure was brought to bear upon Great Britain and France to cooperate with the UN's newly formed body—the Trusteeship Council of the UN—to lead colonial peoples toward independence.[2] Indeed, it was imperative for the dominant powers to accept the UN as a partner in international governance, provided the latter behaved in a way that advanced their interests.

The convergence of the above factors, including the weaknesses of Great Britain and France, the international climate that favored freedom of all peoples, and the resolve of the colonized to be free brought about the independence of many countries, many of which were in Africa. It must be understood, however, both Great Britain and France were reluctant to relinquish their colonial possessions, and made every effort to frustrate the wishes of the people for immediate independence. These entailed a lengthy process of decolonization, which included the drafting of constitutions similar to that of the Great Britain or France, creating favorable conditions for compliant individuals and political parties to win, and creating roadblocks when less compliant individuals and parties became sufficiently popular to win. And when this did not work, the colonial state did not hesitate to suppress opposition and imprison noncompliant leaders. The imprisonment of Jomo Kenyatta, the first president of Kenya, is a case in point. But above all, Great Britain and France each made sure that the postcolonial state remained tied to the metropole through associations such as the British Commonwealth and the *Communauté Financière Africaine* (African Financial Community) (CFA *franc*), respectively, to ensure a continuation of their dominant position vis-à-vis their former colonies. Indeed, they had economic interests to defend, political influence to maintain, and prestige to safeguard.

The economic imperative to maintain close relationship between the metropole and its former colonies was important not only for the metropole but also for the newly independent countries. As Richard Grant and John Agnew have noted, Britain and France were the top two trading partners in Africa by total value of exports and imports in 1960,[3] and the historical ties between the European countries and their colonial counterparts "... undoubtedly structured African trade and dependency in the 1960s .... " A. L. Adu also argues that African countries benefitted from such a relationship,[4] and writes that the economic importance of Britain to African states, such as Ghana, was such that "... in 1959 ... 85 percent of all of Ghana's trade was in British hands" and "the same could be said of other states in eastern and western Africa." Britain also maintained what James Barber calls "an historical and persistent interest" in South Africa.[5] Margaret Thatcher's efforts in the 1980s to help end apartheid peacefully and release Nelson Mandela, and implementation of aid programs to help the oppressed black majority was borne out of its persistent economic interests in that country.[6]

Although the Commonwealth of Nations was created mainly to symbolize British historical ties to its former colonies and to emphasize the now-diminished British grandeur, it was also politically beneficial to its former colonies. As A. L. Adu has noted all of the former British colonies in Africa became members of the Commonwealth not only because of their need to "... keep alive the British connection but because, through the Commonwealth, they inherit ready-made links with a wide variety of countries in all parts of the globe and with people of different races and cultures."[7] The leaders of the member countries meet periodically at summits to discuss common interests, and attendance at summits provided the newly independent countries with an important forum (second only to that provided by the UN) of "equal" partners. As symbolic as this is, it was important for the leaders of newly established nations, perhaps as important as having a national anthem or a flag. Nonetheless, compared with that of French ties to their former colonies, British ties (to their former colonies) were not as strong. Great Britain did not see much to be had in terms of its prestige by a closer association with its former colonies, perhaps because of its close ties to the United States and the prominent role the English language played internationally.

For historical as well as other reasons, continued French ties to its former colonies have been firmer. First, France was comparatively less prepared than Great Britain to let the colonies go.[8] After all, how could the colonized choose independence from France—understood to mean dissolution of the colonial relationship—when they have the good fortunes to access a supposedly superior French culture; a more representative political system, where even the colonized can join in and become members of the French National Assembly, and a much-advanced economic system compared to the system the colonies had before French arrival? How could they choose to separate from France, which gave the entire world the lofty ideals of the French Revolution, expressed in terms of "liberty, equality, and fraternity?" Be that as it may, France had to bow to the will of the colonized to establish their sovereign entities. Thus, when the time to formally hand over power came, France "... maintained most of the agencies responsible for colonial policy towards the region into the postcolonial period and a series of accords, such as the defense and military assistance agreements, established the basis for the more or less seamless transition from colonialism to cooperation ...."[9] The establishment of the CFA *franc* was a key element of this.

Second, the prevailing Cold War atmosphere prevented the UN from active involvement in African affairs. The rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union was mostly played in Europe and East Asia and this took their attention away from possible involvement in African affairs. At the same time, this situation created conditions conducive for France and Great Britain to maintain their respective "spheres of influence" in their former colonies. French and English continued influence in Africa suited the United States in particular because of its influence on both and also because France and Great Britain were gatekeepers, which kept possible Soviet entry into Africa in check. They supported the 1960 UN intervention in the Congo crisis only because of the determined efforts of its charismatic head, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold. However, the UN mission was frustrated because of lack of total support from each of the superpowers and secondary powers, such France and Great Britain. Indeed, each had pursued particularistic interests that were inconsistent with that of the UN. Partly because of this, the UN stayed clear of involvement in African security affairs for almost 30 years despite increased frequency and intensity of conflict in the continent up to the end of the Cold War.[10] It must be understood, however, the United States was ready to engage the Soviet Union and thwart its ambitions on the continent, especially in regions with strategic importance, as in the Horn of Africa and southern Africa.

Third, France valued highly the prestige to be had from its presence in Sub-Saharan Africa. M. Aurillac, the French minister of cooperation in 1987, remarked that that "France can today still claim world power status because of its possession of an independent nuclear deterrent, its permanent seat on the UN Security Council and its *continuing presence in sub-Saharan Africa*."[11] Indeed, in a fast globalizing world and where English has become the "language of the Internet," is one able to find profound French political, economic, and cultural influence elsewhere other than its former colonies in Africa, with the possible exception of Haiti?[12] A fourth source of continuity in French African policy is that France never had a single source of policymaking authority, because "Different ministries and agencies deal with different aspects of policy ...," and this made it difficult to have a coherent policy.[13] In the absence of a coherent policy, it is hard to imagine how to implement policy change when there was no tangible policy to change. Also, bureaucratic rigidity and infighting made changes in policy difficult, especially because there were several claimants to French African policy. A fifth variable is the divided authority between the president and the prime minister of the Republic, where the former has kept French African policy as part of his responsibility mainly because it contributed to his power base in the *cohabitation* arrangement that is the distinguishing feature of the French political system.[14] All of these, along with the fact that many French politicians depended on African leaders to finance their election campaigns, ensured continued French interest in Africa.[15] Thus, French policy in Africa is understood mainly in terms of its continuity rather than its change.

Therefore, during the first few years of independence, UN engagement in Africa started on a positive trajectory with its attempts to solve the 1960 Congo crisis but was short cut because of the Cold War rivalry between the superpowers, the unwillingness of the former colonial powers to see their influence diminished, and the convergent interest of all major powers not to see the UN succeed. Indeed, a successful superstate in the form of the UN on the international scene was seen as detrimental to their interests.[16] As a result, the UN remained disengaged from African security matters until 1988, despite "a fairly constant increase in the magnitude of warfare in Africa during the Cold War/decolonization period, 1946–1989."[17]

Africa's Attempts to Break Out of a Dependent Relationship

It may not be quite right to state that African leaders were entirely content in their relations with the metropole during the Cold War. Indeed, they had looked for alternatives to the prevailing overarching political and economic dominance of the West. One such effort culminated in the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961. The NAM is a "multilateral trans-national organisation [*sic*] made up of states with differing ideologies and purposes . . ."[18] solely brought together to help ". . . prevent its members from becoming pawns in Cold War power games . . ." between the West and the East.[19] Participating countries shared beliefs on the ". . . right of independent judgment, the struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism, and the use of moderation in relations with all big powers."[20] As such, the NAM provided African nations with a forum to address political and economic development issues within the broader international community. As Cedric Grant has pointed out, "many advances achieved by the UN in the 1960s and 1970s were due to collective action and moral pressure by the developing countries, through the NAM and its twin institution, the Group of 77."[21] These countries were responsible for the promotion of many issues in the international arena including ". . . apartheid, decolonization, development, disarmament, and the Law of the Sea."[22]

A second effort to break the economic dominance of the West was Africa's critical role in a 1974 UN resolution calling for the establishment of New International Economic Order (NIEO). The intention was to revise, modify, and/or replace the Bretton Woods system that laid the foundations of post WWII international economic architecture, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBDR), also known as the World Bank. Many developing nations, African states among them, felt that the system did not take their interests into account and, therefore, it was time to establish a more fair system instead. The need for the NIEO became even more urgent after the 1972 ". . . world food crisis, resulting from simultaneous crop failures in Russia, India, Sahelian Africa, and poor or moderate production elsewhere."[23] The UN resolution declared that "the gap between the developed and the developing countries continue[d] to widen in a system which was established at a time when most of the developing countries did not even exist as independent states and [this had] perpetuate[d] inequality."[24] Therefore, African countries supported the NIEO because it would have given them some say in international economic governance.

The NIEO and the NAM were both attempts to address the lopsided relationship between developed and developing nations, but they had particular relevance to the dependent relationship of African states on their former colonial rulers. It seems that the NAM has been more successful than the NIEO. Almost seven years after the initial resolution on NIEO in 1974, leaders from the developed and the developing countries met in Cancun, Mexico but failed to make any progress in establishing a new global economic regime. As Cedric Grant states, "The developed countries made it clear that they were not prepared to engage seriously in North-South dialogue on key global issues such as debt, monetary stability, and international resource transfers in UN fora."[25] The UN was thus unable to help in laying the foundation of a new economic order. This was left to the IMF and the World Bank, both of which were controlled by major powers to a significant degree, and the movement for NIEO lost steam in the early 1990s.

UN Peace Operations in a Changing World

As explained, the main stumbling block on the way of UN involvement in Africa has been the prevailing Cold War rivalry between the East and the West that effectively made world organization irrelevant. This was welcomed by ex-colonial powers, which were content to maintain exclusive influence in Africa. The ascension to power of Michael Gorbachev in the Soviet Union in 1985 and his expressed interest to end the decades-old rivalry with the United States, however, introduced a new spirit of cooperation between the two and a readiness to end the long-standing conflicts in Africa, of which the Namibian conflict was one. As a consequence, the UN established the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in 1978, "to assist [the special representative of the secretary-general] . . . to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations."(Comment: This is a direct quotation and must be left unchanged).[26] The resolution was never implemented until 1989 because of South African opposition to Namibian independence.[27] When the mission was implemented in 1989, it included some 7,500 armed personnel to oversee the transition to independence. As such, it constituted the first robust UN involvement in Africa since 1960, although the UN had earlier approved the much less robust United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I), which consisted about 70 military observers and local and international civilian support staff.[28]

Thus, after almost 30 years of noninvolvement, "the near paralysis of the UN . . . ended, and nations of the world—the powerful and the not so powerful—looked [up] for the UN to help solve issues [that] individual states were not capable of solving."[29] By the time Boutros Boutros-Ghali became secretary-general of the UN in January 1992, the UN had been involved in five peace operations on the continent, including those in Angola, Western Sahara, and of course, Namibia. The momentum to send more UN peacekeepers continued well into the mid-1990s, partly because Boutros Boutros-Ghali implored the major powers to do more in Africa through their support of UN peace operations. As a consequence, the UN approved seven peace operations in Africa during Boutros-Ghali's term between 1992 and 1996. Unlike the traditional peacekeeping, where full consent of the parties to monitor agreed upon cease-fire was required, these types of missions required a more extensive UN involvement to consolidate peace. This includes monitoring elections, demobilization and disarmament of combatants, repatriation of refugees, and so on.[30] Thus, the UN entered into an era of what is referred to as the "second-generation" peacekeeping.[31] It also undertook to protect civilians from combatants, as in as in Somalia in 1993 and the DRC at present. This is referred to as "third-generation" peacekeeping.

The momentum to approve additional peace operations in Africa continued after Kofi Annan became the secretary-general of the UN. During his tenure as secretary-general from January 1997 to December 2006, the UN approved 11 peace operations. Thus, the UN approved a total of 18 peace missions, between January 1992 and December 2006. This represents a quantum leap in the frequency of UN peace operations on the continent, especially since the UN did not approve a single mission for nearly 30 years after its mission in the Congo in 1960, even when faced with increases in the frequency and intensity of conflicts in Africa. The second aspect of UN peace operations in Africa deals with their qualitative transformation. Whereas pre-1988 peace operations were "first-generation" peacekeeping, post 1990 peacekeeping were "second-generation" and "third-generation" peacekeeping, and included not only monitoring cease fires agreed upon by the conflicting parties but also reconstruction and reconstitution of the state, and protecting civilians from combatants. In addition, the UN was no longer an impartial entity: it was and is now involved in direct armed hostilities against opposition groups in support of the state and its armed forces, as in the DRC at present and Sierra Leone a few years back. As Letitia Lawson and Donald Rothchild have stated, "The mission today [has become] state (re)formation."[32]

A third recent development in the nature of UN peace operations in Africa has been the active involvement of African forces. While earlier peace operations on the continent were exclusively conducted by the UN, recent peace missions were taken over, or handed to, the UN from peace missions conducted by the AU or the Economic Community of West African states (ECOWAS), as in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Burundi, and Darfur (Sudan). In the latter, the mission evolved into the current hybrid AU-UN peace mission. At present, there exists an exclusively AU mission in Somalia, and the UN has refused to take over or to consider a hybrid force. Therefore, the trajectory of UN peace operations in Africa points in the direction of gradual reduction of the role of the UN and a gradual increase of the role of the AU or regional forces, such as those of ECOWAS.

It is important to emphasize that increases in the frequency and scope of UN peace operations in Africa coincided with decreases in the "magnitude of war after 1993."[33] Wallensteen and Sollenberg have also noted that there was no increase in the number of armed conflicts in Africa between 1993 and 2000,[34] a time period that coincided with the rapid increase in UN peace missions. What accounts for this behavior, especially since the frequency of UN intervention and the frequency and intensity of conflicts in Africa were independent of each other in the 30 years before 1990? I have explained this elsewhere in detail.[35] They are the (1) end of the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union induced by the Cold War, (2) ripeness for resolution of conflicts in Africa and the increased resolve within the continent to address conflicts, and (3) personality traits of the secretary-general of the UN, especially Kofi Annan.

The impact of the secretary-general of the UN on peacekeeping operations is quite significant. The UN 1960 Congo peace mission was approved only because of Hammarskjold's "conviction that the UN was uniquely positioned to contribute to international peace."[36] Indeed, he "personally flew to the Congo and escorted several units of Swedish infantry . . . " into the country.[37] Similarly, Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, presided over the UN peace mission to El Salvador, the first to Latin America by the first UN secretary-general from the region. Indeed, he gave the Salvadoran peace negotiations the ". . . priority, backing and the degree of political commitment they required."[38] It is also argued that "with a different cast of personalities the United Nations may not have been able to play such an effective role" to end the intractable Salvadoran conflict.[39] And when he received a "private signal" from the incoming secretary-general that the conflict in El Salvador will not be a priority, he pursued the negotiations with an added urgency to reach a negotiated end to the war.[40] It is interesting to observe that Secretary-General de Cuellar, who helped resolve a domestic conflict in El Salvador, refused to consider a request by African diplomats at the UN to do something when the Liberian Civil War started, because "he was not authorized to intervene in domestic matters."[41] Consequently, it is critical to consider the role of Secretary-General Annan in peace operations in Africa.

Annan has been described as having acted more as "General" during his tenure.[42] He was "willing to take chances and move the normal bounds in the interest of peace."[43] One such example is when he made a speech that questioned the sovereign noninterference in the affairs of a state, a clause upon which the UN was founded. Even though this was heretical and many rose to denounce the speech, he not only "survived unscathed," but succeeded in putting the issue on the global agenda.[44] Annan is particularly credited with having "personally ensured the unanimous vote . . . " in the Security Council to support a U.S.-sponsored resolution that called Iraq to provide unrestricted access to UN weapons inspectors.[45] Indeed, he has been described as "persuasive" and "skilled builder of consensus on the Security Council."[46] Therefore, Annan "had what it took to get major powers support peace missions [in Africa], perhaps his top priority during his tenure."[47]

It is also important to note that Annan had served as head of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) at the time Srebrenica massacre and the Rwandan genocide occurred, and has always regretted at his (and the UN's) inability to help stop these acts. After he became secretary-general, he apologized for this and remained committed not to see this happen during his tenure and perhaps beyond. His readiness to recommend timely UN intervention in conflict areas, even if it meant violation of state sovereignty, was his way of making sure that serious violations of human rights did not occur. And Africa was a natural choice because of the disproportionately higher number of conflicts in the region and also because of major power reluctance to intervene, as contrasted with their timely intervention in the former Yugoslavia. Therefore, there was a rare convergence of systemic, continental, and individual level variables that account for more resolute UN peace operations in Africa.

UN Economic Involvement in Africa: Post-Cold War

A look at the economic activities of the UN in Africa as the Cold War was about to end demonstrates that while UN attention has increasingly turned toward development issues on the continent, much of the financial assistance continued to come from the IMF and World Bank. There were a few declarations on Africa the UN made and each dealt in some way with the development crisis on the continent. However, while these declarations served as a call to action for the international community, they did not result in tangible economic assistance or action from the UN. One such declaration was the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF), adopted in the 1991 by the UN General Assembly in its Resolution 46/151. The declaration in part deals with the involvement of the IMF and the World Bank in their capacity as part of the "United Nations System." These institutions raised official development finance from $5.3 billion in 1989 to $8.5 billion in 1990, while aid from other UN agencies was limited to $1.5 billion in financial assistance, disbursed to assist in meeting the 1986–1990 Program Action goals.[48] As the declaration has stated, "This limitation flowed from the financial stringency confronting most United Nations agencies, . . . , during the period 1986–1990."[49] This demonstrates that much of the economic assistance for Africa came from the World Bank and the IMF, as the western powers have always preferred, and not from the UN or its agencies, whose capacity to provide financial assistance was much more limited.

It is also important to emphasize that there existed significant disagreements between the World Bank and the UN on how to deal with African development crises. As Paul Lubeck has stated, ". . . both the World Bank and the United Nations programs, *emphasizing markets and states, respectively,* now openly admit their failure to stem the tide of rising human misery [in the continent] in the 1980s."[50] After the failure of these efforts, the UN left the financial aspects almost exclusively in the hands of the IMF and World Bank and focused on structural issues through its United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). In 1989, the ECA initiated the African Alternative Framework in an attempt to address structural problems, which it said were ". . . resolvable not by short-term shock treatments but rather by democratic institutions and a revitalized (*sic*) though streamlined public sector."[51] The ECA still embraces this approach to development. This puts the UN more or less with western powers in attributing Africa's underdevelopment to internal factors rather than the external international economic order.

Another UN declaration regarding Africa was the 2000 Millennium Declaration. It established development benchmarks Africa should meet by 2015. In the section regarding development and poverty eradication, the declaration stated that success in this area depended ". . . on good governance within each country . . . . good governance at the international level and on transparency in the financial, monetary and trading systems."[52] Hence, there has been a continuation of UN emphasis in promoting economic development through structural changes by and for African countries instead of a direct role by the world organization. This was reiterated in 2002, when the UN General Assembly announced the New Partnership for African Development as a joint endeavor of the international community and the AU. The resolution, however, made clear that the partnership was ". . . an African Union-led, -owned and -managed initiative."[53]

While a few differences in UN and IMF/World Bank approaches to solving African economic problems have persisted, there were cases of cooperation and coordination of activities between the UN and the World Bank. These deal with assistance in the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants in countries during their "transitional post-conflict period." For example, the World Bank successfully organized donor conference to help in the post-conflict reconstruction in Liberia, where more than $500 million was pledged.[54] It also approved a $33 million to support demobilization of combatants in Burundi after the war ended.[55] The latter is especially noteworthy because it does not seem to have much in common with the mandate of the World Bank. So there may continue some coordination between the UN and international financial institutions, especially to stir away post-conflict countries from endemic conflicts.

Thus, UN resolutions and actions at the end of the Cold War and in the new millennium point in the direction of a continued marginal role for the organization in the economic affairs of the continent. The UN has passed several resolutions and has made repeated calls for domestic structural changes but has left much of the financial and development assistance to be channeled through the IMF and the World Bank.

What Does the Future Hold for UN-Africa Relationship?

There has been a remarkable transformation of the role of the UN in conflict management in Africa over the last 50 years. As the guardian of international peace and security, the UN began its role in Africa on a positive note when it intervened in the Congo crisis in 1960. However, it soon became almost irrelevant in the management of security in Africa. It resumed its role with renewed commitment in the late 1980s and continued until about 2006. That level of commitment may be difficult for the UN to maintain, however. This is in part due to African countries' increased readiness to take a larger share of the commitment needed to manage the security needs of the continent and in part due to its inability to cover the high cost associated with "second-generation" and "third generation" peacekeeping.

On the other hand, there was no discernible transformation in the role of the UN in economic activities in Africa and not much is expected to change. There are at least two reasons for this: (1) the UN was founded mainly to protect international peace and security, and any possible UN economic activity is secondary; and (2) most of the major powers will continue to insist that any financial and development assistance to Africa be channeled through the IMF and the World Bank, as that would provide them with optimal political and economic returns. China's (and India's) economic rise and their bilateral assistance to African countries may, however, provide enough reasons for the IMF and the World Bank to continue their economic involvement in Africa with renewed determination.

In the realm of security, however, the UN is expected to continue to take an active but a reduced role compared to its role at present. The need for more peacekeepers in Africa will undoubtedly persist because some countries are fragile; they need external support to resolve their problems. The UN and other major powers will likely assist in this endeavor because Africa's stability will ensure steady flow of oil and other strategic minerals they desperately need. As the trend over the last few years have indicated, however, their assistance will focus more on UN-AU joint peace operations. There may even develop some resistance to that, as in Somalia at present,[56] in part based on the priorities of the secretary-general of the UN. For example, during the three years after Ban Ki-Moon became secretary-general, the UN approved only two peace missions to Africa, of which one was in the works during Kofi Annan's tenure. This represents 0.667 peace missions per year. However, during the 15 years of Boutros-Ghali and Annan were secretaries-general, the UN approved 18 missions, or 1.2 missions per year. Hence, it is expected a gradual reduction in the level of UN commitment, and concomitant with this, UN-AU security partnership is expected to gradually evolve in the direction of a more AU-dominated UN-AU hybrid missions. Indeed, Africa is increasingly showing it can do the job if it gets the resources. The UN is one of the resource providers.

Notes

1. The right to be free and to govern—and indeed misgovern—oneself has been central in K. Nkrumah, J. Kenyatta, and S. Toure's leadership in the struggle for independence.
2. The Trusteeship Council of the UN suspended its operations in 1994, when Palau, the last remaining UN trust territory became independent.

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11. Chafer, "French African policy," 40, emphasis added.
12. For rather obvious reasons, I have excluded entities such as Quebec and Martinique.
13. Chafer, "French African policy," 39.
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15. Ibid.
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25. Grant, "Equity in international relations," 577.
26. United Nations, S/Res/435(1978), September 29, 1978.
27. United Nations, S/Res/629(1989), January 16, 1989.
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47. Bariagaber, "United Nations peace missions in Africa," 846.
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10

The World Bank for Africa or the World Bank for the World Bank?

Paul Clements

Introduction

Sub-Saharan Africa saw faster economic growth in the years immediately preceding the 2009 world economic crisis than ever before in history. From 2003 to 2008 the economies of Sub-Saharan Africa grew at an average annual per capita rate of 4 percent,[1] compared with averages in the preceding decades (going back in time) of −0.5 percent, −0.8 percent, 0.9 percent, and 1 percent.[2] Nevertheless, in 2009 there were 265 million hungry people in Africa,[3] 32 percent of the region's population,[4] also more than ever before in history. The region's per capita gross domestic product (GDP) was only $669 a year, or $405 excluding Nigeria and South Africa.[5] Moreover, the continent was maintaining a reputation for terrible atrocities and enormous human suffering—from Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda in the 1990s to the Ivory Coast, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sudan in the 2000s. In two of Africa's leading economies, Botswana and South Africa, 24 percent and 18 percent of their respective adult populations were infected with the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) virus,[6] and Africa's most populous country, Nigeria, with 150 million people, had squandered a fortune in oil revenue through corruption and mismanagement.

In the broad sweep of history it is clear that Africa's hardships are significantly due to the legacy of colonialism. Colonialism left most African countries with barely competent governments oriented to extracting natural resources, tiny educated classes, arbitrary borders, and little to no experience of democratic accountability.[7] By the same token, the key to Africa's future lies in competent and responsible governance. If Africa is to escape from poverty, its economies need to be transformed from exporters of natural resources into producers of industrial goods, and this has nowhere been achieved without significant support from government. Moreover, many African countries will face increasing challenges in the future. Climate change is likely to hit tropical and Sahelian countries particularly hard. Most Africans are small-holder farmers, and with Africa's annual population growth rate at 2.4 percent, the world's highest by far, fertile land holdings are increasingly stressed in many countries. Africa switched from being a net food exporter to a net food importer in 1973, and since then per capita food production has continued to decline. Climate change will push many farming families over the edge, increasing migration to urban slums and dependence on food imports.

Since the end of colonialism, the greatest external influence on governance in Africa has come from official development agencies, particularly from the World Bank. Over the last 30 years, official development aid to Sub-Saharan Africa has averaged about 10 percent of the average country's GDP,[8] and many governments receive more from aid than from all domestic revenue sources combined. It stands to reason, then, that over time, the way aid is organized has an enormous influence on African governments' behavior. The World Bank is far and away the largest donor to Africa, and it is the lead donor in half of all Sub-Saharan African countries.

Unfortunately, the cumulative impact of the donor community on African governments has been to undermine their accountability to their people and their organizational coherence, and all too often aid projects are superficial and ineffective. The World Bank in particular has been failing Africa in two overlapping areas. First is in basic strategy: the World Bank has been promoting free markets when it should have been building productive forces, particularly in agriculture. Second is in the quality of operations. The World Bank (like other donor agencies) suffers from a startling lack of accountability—it is answerable mainly to itself—and this has had the predictable results.

One of the challenges in understanding official aid institutions comes from their situation between the governments of wealthy donor countries and those of African countries. As the main agents of the wealthy governments in these relationships, aid agencies are inevitably caught up in their politics, but it is often in the nature of such political agendas to be masked and covert. Donor agencies normally present themselves in terms of their development agendas; it is not clear how far they are driven by wealthy country interests. On the other hand, when it comes to their lack of accountability, aid agencies *could* build institutions that would protect the integrity of their development agendas. If the World Bank and other donor agencies established routine, independent, and professional evaluation of their programs and projects in terms of cost effectiveness, and if evaluations routinely assessed development strategy, in due course these measures could dramatically improve the quality of their operations.

The World Bank in Africa

Studies of international relations are often presented as dialogues between realist and liberal perspectives. While *realpolitik* emphasizes national interests and power politics, liberals emphasize an ethical approach and common long-term interests. The United States and other industrialized countries presumably want unimpeded access to Africa's natural resources, predominantly oil and minerals, and access to African markets for their own manufactures. It is a well-known fact that in the 1980s the Bank shifted its agenda from poverty reduction to structural adjustment, pushing governments to adopt policies conducive to free trade and limiting governments' powers of economic intervention.[9] In the 1990s, poverty reduction returned to the Bank's official agenda, but this was to be achieved in substantial measure through structural adjustment policies. Even in the 2000s when the Bank has promoted strategic cooperation on national development plans between governments and donors through Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), these have usually included provisions such as demanding few restrictions on imports, exports, and foreign investment and privatization of state-owned enterprises—stipulations similar to those of the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s.[10] For an African government to get project money for roads and clinics it usually has to agree to national economic policies like these.

Structural adjustment is supposed to support economic growth in the private sector. Overall, structural adjustment failed to meet this objective during its heyday in the 1980s and 1990s, considering Africa's economic decline in that period. It had some partial success in the 2000s, but only after accepting a larger role for government. However, the interpretation of structural adjustment is confused by the fact that it directly promotes Western economic interests. Structural adjustment pushed African (and also Latin American) countries to increase their commodity exports all at once, which pushed down prices for things like cocoa, coffee, and copper. It opened African markets to multinational corporations, whether to sell them manufactured goods or to invest in their mines and farms. In 2006, the top five U.S. imports from Africa were crude oil ($48 billion), precious stones and metals ($4 billion), apparel ($1 billion), iron and steel ($1 billion), and cocoa ($0.5 billion), together making up 93 percent of total imports. The top five U.S. exports to Africa were machinery ($3 billion) and aircraft, vehicles, electrical equipment, and cereal (each around $1 billion).[11] In 2007, Africa's principal trading partners (in order of value of total trade) were the United States, China, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Japan, the Netherlands, Italy, and Spain.[12] Many Africans think it is no coincidence that structural adjustment supports Western economic interests.

Although the World Bank presents itself as the foremost and technically most accomplished agent promoting poverty reduction in Africa, from a realist perspective we should view claims like these as largely rhetorical. Once the West has gained access to African resources and markets and achieved a degree of influence with African governments over their external relations, aid's main "real" objectives are secured. For the sake of appearances, the Bank needs to maintain project activities and protect its reputation, but that World Bank investments should carry through the hard work of development is radically devalued in this view. To be sure, it is among the West's interests for African countries to become prosperous democracies, but this is not important enough to warrant the oversight and investments that would be needed for the Bank to become an effective agent of development.

The World Bank and Chad

The World Bank's recent fiasco with Chad over the management of its petroleum revenues can be interpreted as supporting this view. Chad is one of Africa's least developed countries, with a long history of warfare among its tribes and ethnic groups and a troubled legacy from French colonial rule.[13] It is also a land-locked country, and although Chad has long been known to possess significant oil resources, the major oil corporations were unwilling to make the investments needed to get the oil to a port without the Bank's seal of approval. World Bank support was critical in three areas: political risk mitigation, credit mobilization, and as a "moral guarantor" that oil production would aid the poor majority in Chad, as such resources were known to have fostered corruption, environmental degradation, and civil war in other African countries.[14]

Using its own loan for the project as a vehicle, the Bank negotiated an agreement with a consortium of oil companies and the government of Chad. This agreement required the government to adopt a Revenue Management Law stipulating that oil income would be used "for poverty reduction in priority sectors such as health and education, including requirements that 10 percent of this income be set aside in a fund to meet the needs of future generations and that another 5 percent be set aside for regional development in the oil-producing region itself."[15] The Bank also established external advisory and monitoring groups and required Exxon-Mobil, the leader of the consortium, to improve its environmental impact assessment. "Despite these efforts, African NGOs pleaded with the World Bank to postpone the project until there was real evidence of governmental reforms. Yet the World Bank refused to wait, claiming that the risks had largely been addressed and that the project would serve as a model for public-private partnerships to reduce poverty in one of Africa's neediest regions."[16] The project went forward with reasonable environmental safeguards, but once oil was flowing, the government of Chad reneged on its commitments. It marginalized the external monitoring groups; squandered much of the new revenue on patronage, corruption, and excess; and amended the revenue law (in violation of the loan agreement), giving it access to oil revenues to cover government salaries and military expenses.[17] The World Bank tried to force the government to honor at least part of the spirit of the original agreement, but its efforts were largely frustrated.[18]

Interpreting this affair, Scott Pegg argues that "the World Bank grossly overestimated its ability to alter . . . existing institutional patterns and it failed to appreciate the extent to which oil wealth would amplify many of Chad's pre-existing problems such as corruption and political instability."[19] It is equally plausible, however, that securing the flow of oil was more important for the World Bank than ensuring that oil revenues were used effectively from a development standpoint. This is not to suggest that the Bank's efforts in this latter regard were insincere. Only they were not robust enough to address challenges that might have been anticipated (e.g., if the Bank itself faced consequences of failure on a par with those suffered by the people of Chad).

The World Bank's Development Projects

Most of the Bank's direct spending in Africa is on development projects. Projects are funded by loans to governments, but for poor African countries, the repayment terms usually work out to about an 80 percent subsidy. Projects are implemented by national governments, foreign contractors, and/or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), with occasional visits from World Bank supervision teams. The Bank has an evaluation unit in Washington, D.C., that carries out *ex post* evaluations on about one project in four, but these are usually two to ten years after project completion.

If people involved in planning and implementing a project are to be held accountable, the key moment is at project completion. However, it is project managers who are responsible for the completion reports for World Bank projects. Project completion reports are reviewed by the evaluation unit, but, unlike *ex post* evaluations, these reviews are not public documents. We should note that aid agencies lack most of the standard forms of accountability. Unlike private firms, they are not accountable to consumers through the market, and unlike most government agencies, they are not answerable to clients through the ballot box. Neither tax payers in wealthy countries, who provide their money, nor intended beneficiaries in Africa can possibly hold them accountable for the quality of their work. This places the burden of accountability mainly on evaluation.

Project completion reports, however, tend to be framed quite narrowly. In the 1970s and 1980s, they usually included an estimate of the project's economic rate of return, a measure of cost effectiveness. Research has found that these self-reported economic rates of return are often inflated.[20] This should not come as a surprise. By 2009 (at this writing), only a minority of completion reports included estimates of economic returns. Projects are usually rated on a satisfactory/unsatisfactory-type scale, but this scale is applied inconsistently across projects and provides no measure of efficiency. Without accountability to the market or to voters, however, some kind of consistent and reliable measure of cost effectiveness is particularly important. Also, because projects are planned in the context of broader strategies, evaluations need to engage at the strategic level as well.

To see the significance of evaluations estimating cost effectiveness and being strategically engaged, we can consider projects in African agriculture and those addressing the AIDS epidemic.

As early as 1954, economics Nobel Laureate Sir Arthur Lewis wrote in a famous essay: "Industrial and agricultural revolutions always go together . . . economies in which agriculture is stagnant do not show industrial development."[21] In the immediate aftermath of independence in the 1960s, most African governments made agriculture a high priority, but investments in agricultural research and extension began to decline in the 1970s and have not recovered. Beginning in the 1970s the World Bank subsumed agriculture within a framework of integrated rural development, and in the 1980s the Bank's insistence on structural adjustment reversed previous investments in peasant agriculture. Since 1990, the Bank has been the largest donor to African agriculture, but agriculture's importance continued to decline, and the Bank has generally ignored agriculture in its policy dialogues with governments.[22]

From 1991 to 2006 the World Bank found 60 percent of its agricultural projects in Africa to have satisfactory outcome ratings. Instead of forming an interconnected strategy, however, these projects were " 'sprinkled' across an array of diverse activities."[23] Moreover, according to the evaluation unit, "M&E at the project level has been of limited value in answering fundamental questions about outcome, impact, and efficiency, such as who has benefited, which crops received support and how, what has been the comparative cost effectiveness, and to what can one attribute gains."[24] So while the Bank's agricultural projects have, according to the Bank, been mostly satisfactory, their cost effectiveness is uncertain and the sector as a whole has performed poorly. Insofar as there has been a guiding idea it is the free market "fundamentalism" that informs so much of the Bank's work, but this tends to favor better off farmers. Hence,

> in global agricultural commodity markets, African small-holder producers have been losing market share continuously over the last three decades. Africa's traditional export crops, the beverage crops: coffee, cocoa, tea, as well as cotton, tobacco, cashew, etc. have steadily declined to now quite negligible export levels. The comparative advantage that African smallholders held in these crops has been undermined by far more efficient producers elsewhere. . . . Large-scale producers, on the other hand, composed of small African rural elites of capitalized farmers and relatively limited numbers of foreign-owned plantation and estate owners are likely to not only cope but also flourish.[25]

Another domain of World Bank operations in which weak planning and a lack of accountability have led to widespread suffering in Africa is the management of resources for addressing AIDS. In 2000, the Bank committed $1 billion to a Multi-Country AIDS Program (MAP) to fight AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa. Subsequently, the U.S. government and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria provided greater sums, but the MAP was the first major multilateral commitment to fighting AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa.[26] By 2009, however, it was evident that this effort had failed. According to the Bank's self-evaluations, only 18 percent of MAP projects had satisfactory outcomes.[27]

The Bank had a National AIDS Authority established within the Office of the President or Prime Minister in each country that implemented a MAP project. These national authorities were supposed to play a coordinating role; however, they soon began to take direct responsibility for various aspects of implementation, placing them in competition with ministries of health, which usually manage implementation of government health programs. The U.S. government subsequently allocated its funds mainly through the health ministries, and the Global Fund established country coordinating mechanisms similar to the national AIDS authorities but sometimes separate from them.[28] International NGOs, often second only to health ministries in their health management infrastructure, were initially excluded from the MAP process but were subsequently often contracted by the national AIDS authorities to channel funds to national NGOs.

The result was a combination of interagency mistrust and confusion. National NGOs lacked the institutional capacity to respond to the enormous challenges arising from the growing AIDS pandemic, as many countries, for example, faced severe shortages of trained health personnel. In the meantime, the national AIDS authorities and ministries of health failed to generate such institutional capacity while large parts of their budgets for AIDS went unspent. The policy documents of the national AIDS authorities read like World Bank documents, but, as one study found, "when problems of institutional capacity, funding disbursement, and ministry competition occur, the World Bank becomes benevolent under the rhetoric of state ownership . . . distancing itself from any notion of failure."[29]

The cases of agriculture and AIDS present examples of weak strategy and weak evaluation. The World Bank and its staff pay no discernable price for such failures, but the consequences for the people of Africa are harsh indeed. Moreover, as well as yielding few gains on the ground, these strategies have probably left African governments worse off rather than better off. Under the current Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper approach, the donor community aims to achieve better coordination at the country level between the national government and donor agencies. Given the lack of substantive accountability for results and for cost effectiveness, however, weak strategies and implementation are likely to persist.

Improving the World Bank's Accountability

It is notable that evaluation is not significantly better in the other donor agencies (with the possible exception of the new Millennium Challenge Corporation, although like other donors, it too manages its own evaluations[30]), and there is considerable overlap in the areas in which donors carry out their projects. The common lack of independent and consistent evaluation provides an opportunity. As long as evaluations fail to estimate cost effectiveness and to analyze projects in strategic terms, there cannot be an adequate basis for accountability and learning. Yet, the analytic requirements for reliable impact estimates and strategic judgments are the same no matter who pays for the project. This suggests that standards for professional evaluation could be developed around requirements for estimating impacts and cost effectiveness and for strategic assessments, probably initially on a sectoral basis (in areas such as health, agriculture, roads, etc.). Then a professional evaluation association that promotes and defends these standards could train evaluators, who would assess projects from all the different donor agencies.

Independent and strategically engaged evaluations for cost effectiveness would dramatically change the culture of aid management. For the first time in history, there would be a reliable basis for accountability in development aid. In due course, the incentives facing aid managers would be transformed. Managers would be much more likely to identify failing strategies early and to make appropriate mid-course corrections. The learning process within development agencies would also be enhanced. Since evaluations' units of cost effectiveness and judgments would be consistent, evaluations would provide a much sounder basis for learning about more cost-effective approaches.[31]

The World Bank has often tried to guide national agendas, whether government economic strategies or donor community approaches to reducing poverty. It would do better if it could set an example of effective management with its own projects. Replacing self-evaluation with professional evaluation for cost effectiveness would lead to a focus on building productive forces, whether in agriculture or AIDS, since projects become cost effective only when they improve conditions for people. The enhanced strategic focus would also increase the emphasis on building productive forces. Independent and professional evaluation would yield a new professionalism in aid management, grounded in a discourse with stronger analytic foundations. It would not do away with the politicization of aid—governments would still try to use aid to support their political agendas—but in the context of such manipulation, aid managers would discover a new integrity on the basis of their focus on impacts. And, as aid strategies and projects improved, African governments would learn from the World Bank's example.

Unfortunately, many of the lessons African governments are learning from the World Bank's example today are not helping them.

Acknowledgement

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Notes

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11

The European Union and Africa: Old Partners in a Changing World

Jack Mangala

Introduction

EU-Africa relations represent, in many respects, a unique experiment in international relations. Over the past 50 years, the two partners have intensely engaged each other and developed a dense and complex web of institutional, economic, political, social, and cultural ties. This unique experiment in interregionalism has however, for the most part, not been studied in its totality. Most scholarly endeavors tend to approach the relationship from the perspective of a single issue, for example, trade, development cooperation, and human rights. Deeply rooted in history, the relationship between the EU and Africa has gradually evolved from fragmented and "often painful colonial arrangements" into a comprehensive, multilayered, and multifunctional "strategic partnership" that seeks not only to address issues of common interest but also to allow the EU and Africa to "face with confidence the demands of our globalizing world."[1] The adoption of a Joint Africa-EU Strategy by the second EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon in December 2007 attests to this changing partnership and its centrality in the relationship between Africa and the EU.

The EU-27 has emerged as Africa's most important trading partner with a total value of imported goods from Africa reaching €158 billion in 2008, against EU exports to Africa worth €120 billion. In 2007, the total value of EU-27 foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks in Africa amounted to €146 billion. EU-27 official development assistance (ODA) accounted for 60 percent of the total ODA going to Africa in 2008. Against this background, the EU has unequivocally stressed that "African economic prosperity is essential for European prosperity."[2]

The two partners have also, in recent years, strengthened their political and technical cooperation in areas such as peace and security, democratic governance and human rights, regional integration, energy, climate change, migration and mobility, and science, information society, and space. For example, in response to a 2003 request from the African Union (AU) Summit in Maputo, the EU has established the African Peace Facility (APF), a €300 million development instrument in support of African peace support operations (PSO) and capacity building in the area of peace and security.

While recent developments seem to indicate a significant shift—at least conceptually—in EU-Africa relations, they also raise some pressing questions: what are the forces driving this new phase of EU-Africa relations? Would this proclaimed new "strategic" partnership be fundamentally different from the unequal, fragmented, sometimes incoherent, and donor-recipient type relationship of the past? How can we, theoretically, explain the two partners' past and current patterns of behavior? What are the guiding principles of EU-Africa partnership and how have they been institutionalized and operationalized into concrete areas of cooperation?

These are the central questions that this chapter seeks to address. It is structured into three sections. The first section offers a broad historical perspective that captures the evolution of EU-Africa relations over the past 50 years while discussing its major conceptual, institutional, strategic, and policy frameworks. The second section reviews the major theoretical explanations of the relationship with a particular emphasis on the contribution of interregionalism—which needs to be related both to globalization and the restructuring of the nation-state—to the general theory of international relations. The third section discusses the implementation of policies in the areas of trade and regional integration, peace and security, governance and human rights, and migration and mobility. It assesses the implementation of the vision, principles, strategies, and policies outlined in the first section.

Historical Perspectives on and General Frameworks of EU-Africa Relations

In the negotiations preceding the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, France made a *sine qua non conditio* for signing the Treaty of Rome that its overseas dependencies would be accommodated in the new Common Market. France's position was backed by Belgium and other founding members that had colonies in Africa. This concern from colonial powers led to the establishment of the "Association of Overseas Countries and Territories", which was listed in Annex IV to the Treaty of Rome. This association marked the beginning of "privileged" relations between the EEC and Africa. Over the past 50 years, these relations have evolved from a mere "unilateral associationism" to a multifaceted strategic partnership embedded in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted at the second EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon in 2007, which heads of states and governments would like to "be remembered as a moment of recognition of maturity and transformation in our continent to continent dialogue, opening new paths and opportunities for collective action for our common future."[3]

This section will discuss the various frameworks of EU-Africa relations as well as the vision and guiding principles that define the relationship. It will also discuss the objectives, approaches, and strategies pursued by the two partners as well as the institutional architecture in charge of this complex and deepening relationship.

Multiple Frameworks of EU-Africa Relations

Over the last few decades, the EU and Africa have adopted various arrangements of different nature that reflect the intricacies of their common history as well as evolving geostrategic considerations and policy priorities and needs.[4] These fundamental dynamics have led to a fragmented framework of relationship within which coexist four bodies of agreements and political processes that speak to the complexity and density of EU-Africa relations: the Cotonou Agreement, the Barcelona process, the Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement with South Africa, and the Cairo process. This network of agreements and political processes has often raised issues of consistency that the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy seeks to address.[5]

The Cotonou Agreement

Formally known as the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, the Cotonou Agreement was signed in 2000 to regulate various aspects of the relationship between African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) and the EU. It combines a political dimension with trade and development issues in a single and comprehensive instrument. All Sub-Saharan African countries are parties to this agreement.[6] The Cotonou Agreement is the latest in a succession of trade agreements and arrangements between the European Community (EC) and former European colonies in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific that can be traced back to the negotiations leading up to the creation of the EEC in March of 1957.

On France's insistence, and backed by other founding members who had an interest in maintaining trade flows with their overseas dependencies and keeping their economic presence in those countries, the Treaty of Rome (Part IV) provided for the "Association of Overseas Countries and Territories," listed in an annex. The core elements of the association centered on free trade, the right of establishment of firms, and development assistance. The Association stressed the "privileged" nature of the relationship between the EEC and its overseas associates and called for "solidarity," which was materialized with the establishment of the European Development Fund (EDF) in 1958. While African colonies' accession to national sovereignty compelled their progressive exclusion from the provisions of Part IV of the Treaty of Rome, the two sides expressed the desire to maintain "privileged links" that had existed. Hence the conclusion, in 1963, of the first Yaoundé Convention, which shifted the relationship from "unilateral associationism" to a contractual and negotiated agreement based, on the part of the EC, on Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome. Trade preferences and aid constituted the main conventional benefits.[7]

In the 1970s, Euro-African relations reached a turning point under Yaoundé II due to a number of changes affecting the international system and the EC's integration process. The deepening of European integration and the United Kingdom's accession to the Common Market in 1972 led to a redefinition of the geographical scope of the EC's foreign aid and trade relations aimed at accommodating British dependencies and former colonies in Africa and in the Caribbean and the Pacific. Some EC members, mainly Germany and the Netherlands, were advocating for an overhaul of EC's development policy and its delinkage from the colonial past of certain member states.

It is worth noting that this internal debate was taking place against the backdrop of an international system in which the call for a change in North-South relations was gaining momentum. It suffices to mention the work of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and discussions at the UN General Assembly calling for a New International Economic Order. It was within this international environment, considered by many as "favorable to Southern countries," that the EC and ACP countries adopted the first Lomé Convention in 1975—a new and broad framework of relationship intended to replace the Yaoundé Convention. The adoption of the Lomé Convention was accompanied by the globalization of EC's development policy.

The EC did in fact engage in a balancing act of promoting a world-scale development policy while preserving "privileged relations" with former ACP countries.[8]

The Lomé Convention was primarily intended to promote the development of the signatory ACP states via trade, economic assistance, and technical assistance. The "privileged" status of relations between the EC and Africa was reflected in the nonreciprocal duty-free arrangement,[9] the provision of economic assistance to ACP countries via the European Development Fund,[10] and the provision of industrial and technical cooperation that would enable the utilization of the EU's know-how for the industrial development of ACP countries.[11] This "generous" outcome was indicative of Sub-Saharan Africa's (SSA's) relative bargaining power and the EU's geostrategic interests in the region based, as the European Commission put it, on the "concern to defend (. . .) economic and geopolitical interests in the age of the Cold War (. . .) the international situation (. . .) European anxiety at the first oil crisis, i.e., a fear of raw material shortages and a desire to hold on to valued overseas markets, united with geostrategic interests."[12]

Between Lomé's inception in 1975 and its expiration in 2000, successive conventions were agreed upon with increasing conditionalities on human rights, democracy, and the rule of law—and little development success in Africa.[13] The Lomé Convention, often described as a model for North-South cooperation, did not live up to its expectations. It has been convincingly argued that "all it did was to perpetuate dependency links towards former colonial powers."[14] In the 1990s, the accumulation of a number of forces compelled the two sides to seek profound changes to the Lomé Convention. Chief among them were the push toward international trade liberalization,[15] the evolving position of the EU in the world economy,[16] the end of the Cold War, and the widening and deepening of the EU.[17] At the turn of the century, a fundamental overhaul of the Lomé Convention had become virtually unavoidable.

Signed in 2000, the Cotonou Agreement differs from the Lomé Convention in many fundamental ways. First, while the latter were self-contained rule systems, the former is a framework agreement consisting of objectives, principles, and options for instruments. Second, by stressing the reduction and eventual eradication of poverty as its central goal, the Cotonou Agreement is consistent with the objectives of the EU's development cooperation policy as formulated in Article 177 of the EC Treaty. Third, the principles of cooperation have been refined in order to account for the new political dimension of EU-ACP relationship, which calls for the respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law in advancing the objectives of the Agreement.[18] Cotonou also insists on participation of other sections of society (civil society and private sector organizations), dialogue and fulfillment of mutual obligations and differentiation and regionalization in the implementation of the cooperation. Fourth, unlike the nonreciprocal preferences granted to ACP countries under Lomé, the Cotonou Agreement introduced the prospect of reciprocal trade preferences to be negotiated between the EU and African subregional entities, leading to the establishment of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) by 2008. The least developed ACP countries can opt for the continuation of nonreciprocal preferences under EU's preferences for least developed countries. These trade regime options are intended to make EU-ACP trade relations compatible with WTO rules, especially the nondiscrimination principle. Fifth, the distribution of resources under the EDF will be based on more explicit criteria than in Lomé, chiefly need and performance. We will discuss more in depth various dimensions of the Cotonou Agreement when we analyze EU-Africa sectoral trade cooperation in the third section of the chapter. The intent here has been to present an overview of the evolution of this first framework of EU-Africa relations.

The Barcelona Process

EU relations with Northern African countries are partly organized under this second framework, which was launched in Barcelona in 1995 as a platform for political dialogue and partnership between the EU and countries around its southern Mediterranean borders. The Barcelona Declaration identified three main objectives to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: (1) establishing a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political and security dialogue; (2) creating an area of shared prosperity through an economic partnership and the gradual establishment of a free-trade area; and (3) bringing people together through a social, cultural, and human partnership aimed at promoting understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies. The Partnership is implemented through bilateral Association Agreements between the EU and each of the partner countries.[19]

The challenges posed by EU's enlargement in 2004 and the subsequent redefinition of EU's external borders led to the development of a new instrument, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which offers a general framework that applies to all EU's immediate neighbors by land or sea. The ENP is predicated on the premise that "the EU has a vital interest in seeing greater economic development, stability and better governance in its neighbourhood. Spreading peace and prosperity across the borders of the EU prevents artificial divisions and creates benefits for the ENP partners and the EU alike. The ENP is a partnership for reform that offers 'more for more': the more deeply a partner engages with the Union, the more fully the Union can respond, politically, economically and through financial and technical cooperation."[20] The ENP offers EU's immediate neighbors a "privileged" relationship, built upon "mutual commitment to common values" that should result into a deeper political relationship and economic integration.[21] The central instrument of the ENP is the bilateral ENP Action Plans agreed upon between the EU and each individual partner. Each ENP Action Plan outlines an agenda of political and economic reforms with short and medium-term priorities.[22]

The Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement with South Africa

Although a signatory of the Cotonou Agreement,[23] South Africa has concluded a separate, parallel, and ambitious Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with the EU. The 1999 TDCA represents the legal basis for the overall relations between South Africa and the EU. It covers political dialogue, trade, development cooperation, economic cooperation as well as cooperation in a whole range of other areas. South Africa's separate deal with the EU reflects the fact that the latter is the former's most important economic trade partner, accounting for over 40 percent of its imports and exports, as well as for 70 percent of FDI. European exports to South Africa have risen by 9.5 percent per year on an average since the TDCA came into force in 2004. Taking into account these deepening links and South Africa's particular position on the regional and global stage, the two sides agreed, in a 2005 "Joint Report," that "new steps need to be taken to ensure that South Africa-EU relations develop into a truly strategic partnership that (. . .) would do justice to the role of South Africa as an anchor on the continent and key player on the international scene."[24]

South Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, which is seen as an "important further building block in the overall EU-Africa partnership," is intended to upgrade EU-South Africa relations "by bringing the Member States, the Community and South

Africa together in a single and coherent framework, with clearly and jointly defined objectives, covering all areas of cooperation and associating all stakeholders; by moving from political dialogue to strategic political cooperation and shared objectives on regional, African and global issues; by enhancing existing cooperation, developing stronger and sustainable economic cooperation, fully implementing the TDCA provisions on trade-related areas and extending cooperation to the social, cultural and environmental fields."[25] South Africa has clearly emerged as a pivotal actor whose status and role have been recognized by the signing of additional and specific instruments of cooperation that add to the complexity of the framework for EU-Africa relationship.

The Cairo Process

Held in Cairo in 2000, the historic first EU-Africa Summit set in motion a more structured continent-to-continent political dialogue that culminated into the adoption of a new strategic partnership and a Joint Africa-EU Strategy at the second summit in Lisbon in 2007.[26]

The Cairo Summit launched a comprehensive framework for political dialogue between the EU and African states along four priority areas: (1) regional integration in Africa; (2) integration of Africa into the world economy (trade, private sector development, investment, development resources, industrial infrastructure, research and technology, debt, cooperation international fora); (3) human rights, democratic principles and institutions, good governance, and rule of law (including the role of civil society, migration, and refugees); (4) peacebuilding, conflict prevention, management, and resolution; (5) development issues (sustainable development challenges and poverty eradication, health, environment, food security, drug consumption and trafficking, and culture—including the export and removal of African cultural goods).

While Cairo's ambitious agenda was translated into an increasing convergence of interests in the years following the summit, its practical implementation however ran into difficulties due to differences between the EU and African states with regard to the primacy given to the identified priorities. As noted by the European Center for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), "Europeans by and large [were] putting the accent particularly on peace and security issues, and Africans more and more on the trade and economic aspects of the partnership, including the need to address the debt problem. On the African side, many still consider that some of the issues set out in the Cairo agenda have not been really addressed or at least not had the attention they deserved (e.g., debt issue and the return of African cultural goods, and these are, to some extent, still a source of frustration)."[27]

In response to the aforementioned situation as well as a number of other changes affecting both the EU (the deepening of the European integration, the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the subsequent push for a European Security and Defense Policy) and Africa (the launching of NEPAD in 2001, the transformation of the Organization of African Unity into the African Union in 2002, and the subsequent reinforcement of trends toward greater regional integration and pan-African cooperation), the EU developed its own strategy for Africa in 2005. In presenting the Strategy, the European Commission stressed that

> for too long the EU's relations with Africa have been too fragmented, both in policy formulation and implementation between the different policies and actions of

> the EU Member States and the European Commission; between trade cooperation and economic development cooperation; between more traditional socio-economic development efforts and strategic political policies. Neither Europe nor Africa can afford to sustain this situation. The purpose of this Strategy for Africa is, therefore, to give the EU a comprehensive, integrated and long-term framework for its relations with the African continent.[28]

The formulation of the EU Strategy for Africa was predicated on three central assumptions outlined as follows by the European Commission: "(i) without good governance, rule of law, security and peace, no lasting development progress is possible; (ii) regional integration, trade and interconnectivity are necessary factors to promote economic growth; (iii) if Africa is to achieve the MDGs, more support is needed on issues with a direct impact on living standards, such as health, education and food security."[29]

The dual concept of "One Africa and One Europe" was the centerpiece of this strategy in that, for the first time, the EU wanted to "address Africa as one entity" and act toward it in a more unified manner than before.[30] But the EU also made it clear that the principal objective of its strategy toward Africa was to promote the achievement of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).[31]

Unilaterally formulated by the EU, the Strategy for Africa was, from its inception, received with skepticism and a great deal of criticism by key African players. Criticisms centered on the fact that the Africa Strategy had been developed without sufficient consultations and retained elements of a traditional, unilateral donor-client approach. It was also pointed out that the Strategy reflected a "too biased European priority agenda, which would not be conducive to creating African ownership."[32]

In response to these criticisms, the two sides agreed, during the fifth EU-Africa Ministerial meeting in December 2005 in Bamako, "to take their partnership to a new, strategic level and develop a Joint EU-Africa Strategy—a partnership *with* Africa, rather than a strategy *for* Africa."[33] The EU and Africa were determined to make a quantum leap to their relationship by gradually transforming it into a more political, more global and more equal partnership. They also agreed on the need to seek the input of a wide range of stakeholders and key actors (members of the civil society, trade unions, entrepreneurs and simple citizens) on both sides in the formulation of the Joint Strategy,[34] which was finally adopted by the second EU-Africa Summit in December 2007 in Lisbon.

The Joint Strategy epitomizes EU-Africa newly declared "strategic partnership." It is intended to bring a measure of coherence to a largely fragmented system of interaction. The remainder of the section will succinctly address the vision, guiding principles, objectives, approaches and strategies as well as the institutional architecture that support the Joint Strategy, which seeks to provide "an overarching long-term framework for EU-Africa relations."

Vision and Guiding Principles

The vision of the EU-Africa Strategic Partnership—projected in the Joint Strategy—stems from a changing regional and international context that has been captured as follows by the European Commission.

> Africa is now at the heart of international politics, but what is genuinely new is that Africa—and the African Union in particular—is emerging, not as a development issue, but as a political actor in its own right. It is becoming increasingly clear that *Africa matters*—as a political voice, as an economic force and as a huge source of human, cultural, natural and scientific potential (. . .) Meanwhile, the EU too has changed—its membership has expanded to 27 States, its role in the world has developed and it has adopted ambitious common policies on security, energy, climate change and innovation. Europeans have recognized that African economic prosperity is essential for European prosperity (. . .) The world has changed with the forces of global capital and financial markets, climate change, global media and information and communications technology, trans-national terrorism and organized crime, and global pandemics all making the world smaller by the day. The need for common global responses is therefore more vital than ever before. The EU and Africa are old partners, but in a world transformed.[35]

This transformed world is also one in which traditional European dominance in Africa is being fiercely challenged by newcomers.[36] Taking into account this highly competitive environment, the European Commission has candidly admitted that if it "wants to remain a privileged partner and make the most of its relations with Africa, it must be willing to reinforce, and in some areas reinvent, the current relationship—institutionally, economically and culturally."[37]

The shared vision formulated in the Joint Strategy is to strengthen EU-Africa political partnership and enhance cooperation at all levels. The new strategic partnership is based on a "Euro-African consensus on values and common interests" and should strive to bridge the development gap between the two continents. It is worth investigating those stated common values and interests before venturing further into the study.

In its opening paragraph, the Joint Strategy lists the following as forming the "community of values" between the EU and Africa: the respect for human rights, freedom, equality, solidarity, justice, the rule of law, and democracy. Without dismissing Africa's progress on several of these elements over the past decade, it is only fair to mention that this community of values is still far from being a tangible reality in Africa. These values are more present on the European side than they are on the African side. Their affirmation seems more to correspond to a declaration of intent—a value agenda—than any political reality on the ground. As for the "common interests," they are not as clearly stated as the common values. They must therefore be inferred from selected priority areas and objectives pursued by the two partners in their political dialogue.

The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership is to be guided by a number of fundamental principles: unity of Africa; interdependence between Africa and Europe; ownership and joint responsibility; respect for human rights, democratic principles, and the rule of law; and coherence and effectiveness of existing agreements.[38] In addition to these basic principles, a strong emphasis is also placed on the working principles of political dialogue: comanagement and co-responsibility, burden sharing and mutual accountability, solidarity and mutual confidence, equality and justice, common and human security, respect for international law and agreements, gender equality and nondiscrimination, and long-term approach. Some of these principles are new, for example, long-term approach, mutual confidence, and coherence and effectiveness of existing agreements, while others, for example, ownership, equality, and partnership have been restated over time through multiple frameworks that govern specific aspects of

EU-Africa relations. Three years after the adoption of the Joint Strategy, the former need still to be tested while the latter are more settled.[39]

Objectives, Approaches and Strategies

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy identifies four main objectives of the long-term strategic partnership:

> (i) to reinforce and elevate the Africa-EU political partnership to address issues of common concern (peace and security, migration and development, and a clean environment); (ii) to strengthen and promote peace, security, democratic governance and human rights, fundamental freedoms, gender equality, sustainable economic development, including industrialisation, and regional and continental development in Africa, and to ensure that all MDGs are met in all African countries by the year 2015; (iii) to jointly promote and sustain a system of effective multilateralism, with strong, representative institutions, and the reform of the UN system and other key international institutions, and to address global challenges and common concerns; (iv) to facilitate and promote a broad-based and wide-ranging people-centered partnership.[40]

The formulation of these central objectives underscores the desire to transform EU-Africa relationship into a political partnership that goes beyond the issues that have traditionally dominated their relations (trade and development cooperation) and embraces a broad range of problems of interest to the international community. Deepening the relationship and jointly engaging the world community are the two fundamental dynamics that drive the current phase of EU-Africa relations. To that end, the two partners have identified ten key political challenges that need to be addressed to achieve the success of the new partnership:

> (a) to move away from a traditional relationship and forge a real partnership characterized by equality and the pursuit of common objectives; (b) to build on positive experiences and lessons learned from our past; (c) to promote more accurate images of each other; (d) to encourage mutual understanding between the peoples and cultures of the two continents; (e) to recognize and fully support Africa's efforts and leadership to create conducive conditions for sustainable social and economic development and the effective implementation of partner-supported development programmes; (f) to work together towards gradually adapting relevant policies and legal and financial frameworks; (g) to ensure that bilateral relations, dialogue and cooperation between one or more European and African countries contribute to the achievement of the objectives set out in this Joint Strategy; (h) to integrate in our agenda common responses to global challenges and strengthen our dialogue and cooperation in multilateral context; (i) to encourage the full integration of members of migrant communities/diaporas in their countries of residence; (j) to bear in mind that we can only achieve our objectives if this strategic partnership is owned by all stakeholders.[41]

This new approach should guide EU-Africa relations in four defined "strategic interrelated priority areas": peace and security, governance and human rights, trade and regional integration, and key development issues. These areas of sectoral cooperation will be discussed more in detail in the third section of this chapter. For now, it suffices to mention the importance that the two partners attach to the principle of coherence for development, whose goal is to promote "interactions and positive complementarities between sectoral policies and strategies" and to ensure that "measures taken in one policy area do not undermine results in other areas."[42] The affirmation of this principle is aimed at addressing one of the criticisms of EU-Africa relations, which seem to sometimes indicate a low level of coherence between the overall objectives of the partnership and the formulation and implementation of specific policies.

Institutional Architecture

Relations between the EU and Africa are conducted through a complex institutional setup that reflects different levels (continental, subregional, and national) and frameworks (the Cotonou Agreement, the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement with South Africa) of interaction between the two partners. This institutional framework has long been characterized as lacking coherence.[43] The new EU-Africa Strategic Partnership is to be implemented through "an institutional architecture, which allows and promotes intensive exchange and dialogue on all issues of common concern."[44] While recognizing the involvement of a large number of institutional and noninstitutional actors into the partnership, the Joint Strategy stresses the central role of the AU and EU—as continental organizations—in advancing its objectives.[45] The overarching partnership formalized in the Joint Strategy is structured around five mechanisms of political dialogue. First are regular Africa-EU Summits at all levels of responsibility (heads of states and governments, and leaders of major EU and AU institutions). Second are Africa-EU Troikas, which are regular meetings of senior EU and Africa officials and ministers aimed at maintaining the political dialogue between the Summits. Third is the Commission-to-Commission dialogue, supported by the Joint EU-Africa Task Force, which serves as an instrument of permanent working level dialogue. Fourth is the collaboration and political dialogue between "institutions that represent the people of the two continents," mainly the European Parliament; the Pan-African Parliament (PAP); the EU Economic and Social Committee (EESC); and the AU Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOC). Fifth, in accordance with the principle of ownership, the Joint Strategy reserves a special place to various segments of the civil society in advancing the objectives of the EU-Africa partnership. While the civil society is encouraged to get involved and take an active role in the implementation and monitoring of the Joint Strategy and its Action Plans, the concrete modalities of this participation in the political dialogue are yet to be defined.

EU-Africa partnership represents the most complex and dense continent-to-continent relations in modern international relations. As we have seen, the two partners have developed a multilayered and multifaceted cooperation that has been carried out through an evolving complex web of institutional and legal frameworks. What are the theoretical approaches through which we can explain EU-Africa relations and the actors' patterns of behavior?

Theoretical Approaches to EU-Africa Relations

Various theoretical approaches have been offered to explain the contours and dynamics of EU-Africa relations and the actors' behaviors. The vast bulk of these theoretical efforts fall under the realist, liberal, and international political economy (IPE) approaches to international relations. While each individual theory cannot adequately explain the totality of EU-Africa relations, a cross-reading of these theoretical approaches do however offer insight into the fundamental dynamics driving the relationship and help make sense of it beyond sporadic events and specific actions that have marked its evolution. This section will bring the conversation between contending theoretical approaches up to date by discussing their relevance in explaining EU-Africa relations under conditions of increasing globalization. Although the underlying arguments within each approach remain constant, there have been discernable shifts in the political purposes to which those arguments have been utilized.

The Realist Approach

In considering general approaches to explaining European motivations regarding international commercial policy in general and interregionalism in particular, some have advanced a standard realist approach to international relations, which holds that the EU as a unit responds to the structure of the international system in formulating its international economic policies, pushing those policies that promote EU's collective economic security as well as its global structural power (via the use of relational power) in ties with individual countries and regions. This view contends that continuities are more important than changes in EU-Africa relations and that the patterns of intercourse between the world's poorest continent and one of the leading economic powers have remained constant over the past 50 years. They point out that, beneath the rhetoric of universalistic sentiments and equal partnership, the past 50 years seem to show patterns of political and economic control and domination aimed at maintaining Europe's sphere of influence in Africa. The interplay of national interests is thus the best guide in understanding the evolution of EU-Africa relations. Mary Farrell writes: "EU-Africa relations have, from the beginning, been characterized by the realist tendencies of individual European states (. . .) The earlier phase of EU-Africa relations was initiated because certain member states wished to retain formal links with former colonial dependencies in order to ensure continued access to raw materials and natural resources, and to protect economic investment already made or being contemplated in what were now newly independent states."[46]

Contemporary EU-Africa relations seem to indicate continuity in the pursuit of national interests by the EU and its member states, a situation that has been perpetuated due to the asymmetric bargaining strengths of both partners. Reflecting on the ongoing negotiations, under the Cotonou Agreement, of EPAs, Mary Farrell stresses that

> the EU is promoting a model of regional integration that is far removed from the model of regional integration that has evolved within the EU itself. In fact, what the EU is promoting is a model of economic liberalization across the African continent and, in the process, attempting to secure for itself continued market access and privileged economic status in the continent's emerging markets. However, the European policy is much less active in addressing the real problems of poverty and instability that are likely to place severe limitations on either achieving economic liberalization or securing broad-based societal benefits in the long term.[47]

Even the normative agenda (promotion of democracy, good governance, and the rule of law)embedded in the political dialogue under both the Cotonou Agreement and the Joint Strategy is seen as "one effective way by which the EU can seek to impose its values" upon other African countries and promote "the objectives of economic liberalization more than any fundamental support for democratization." In that regard, the realist approach doesn't see EU-Africa partnership as a genuine alliance that would seek fundamental changes in the international system because "the current neo-liberal hegemony of ideas sits broadly compatible with the self-interest of political elites and the outward-oriented fraction of capitalist class in the EU member states."[48] Beyond the rhetoric on equal partnership and common values, it is argued, EU policy toward Africa is strongly realist in tone.

The Liberal Approach

Contrary to the realist approach, a liberal lecture of EU-Africa relations underlines the fact that cooperation is necessary and desirable not merely in pursuit of self-interest but as part of a wider agenda for peace, justice, and equality, in which power and politics are supplanted by an institutionalized framework to support dialogue and enhance the achievement of core values, including democracy and the rule of law. The liberal ideological underpinning of EU-Africa relations is believed to reflect the liberal nature of the European integration project itself, which emerged after WWII.

The European project struck a compromise between the principles of integration and autonomy and emphasized interdependence and transnational cooperation in order to resolve common problems, as well as "consciously devised machinery" to serve the imperatives of peace and prosperity. It has been argued that the same liberal institutional ideas and assumptions that served as catalyst of integration theory in Europe continue to define EU's actorness in world politics and guide its interaction with other world regions. The nature of the EU as "political animal" is presented in the following terms by Jeremy Rifkin:

> Recent events on the world stage have thrown into sharp relief the apparent differences between the US approach to international cooperation, and its reliance upon military power and the creation of *ad hoc* coalitions of the willing to support international policy. By contrast, the European Union represents itself as the supporter of a world based upon the rule of law, where multilateralism rather than unilateralism is the driving force behind collective actions to solve common problems and resolve disputes. In contrast to the hard power which is the basis of US influence, the European Union favours the use of soft power in order to exert influence on the international stage, with an agenda that is considered much more normative in tone.[49]

Important aspects of EU-Africa relations have thus been analyzed through the lenses of core liberal and neoliberal concepts. For example, the neoliberal institutional concept of "democratic peace" has been used to justify the increased centrality of conditionality—which has expanded from the requirement to liberalize and privatize the economic sector to include targets on good governance and compliance to human rights—in EU-Africa relations. Conditionality policies are thus seen as needed institutional leverage aimed at widening the zone of peace by embedding formally nonliberal states into the liberal world, guarantee of peace and security. This globalization of liberalism is being pursued on the liberal internationalist assumption that liberal values are universally shared. A more critical view, however, sees this expansion of liberal values, underneath of conditionality, as no more than a convenient fiction for promoting the commercial interests of European firms.

The same liberal lecture has also been applied to explain the increasing importance reserved to the civil society and noninstitutional actors in advancing the objectives of the EU-Africa partnership. This trend is seen a direct response to the neoidealist contention that encouraging or even coercing nonliberal states to become more democratic is only part of what is required in order to bring about a truly liberal order. A more radical approach should seek democratization at the "grass roots" by bringing civil society and other social movements into the decision-making structures since they are closer to the ordinary people than their own governments. The embedment of the EU parliament and the PAP into the institutional framework of EU-Africa relations is also regarded as an illustration of the "cosmopolitan" model of democracy advocated by neoidealists.

The liberal theory of complex interdependence has also been used to explain EU-Africa growing sectoral cooperation on a number of issues (migration, environment, and peace and security) that have compelled the two sides to find commonly agreed upon solutions that don't necessarily correspond to the realist logic of immediate self-interest. Koulaimah-Gabriel writes: "The end of the Cold War clearly deprived the African continent of its strategic position in international politics and of its bargaining power in relation to the Northern donors. There is, however, another entry point for Africa in the international arena as it is an important stakeholder in the so-called 'new interdependencies.' There has been a growing awareness that certain problems have a global reach and that they cannot be solved at a country or regional level (. . .) The geographical proximity between Africa and Europe makes the common management of these interdependencies all the more desirable."[50]

The liberal approach echoes the notion that Europe is a Grand experiment that, as Rifkin says, "is articulating a bold new vision for the future of humanity," a vision that attempts "an accommodation between the new forces of individuation and integration that are stretching human consciousness inward to the multiple identities of the post-modern persona and outward to the globalizing forces of the economy," and emphasizes "cooperation and consensus over got-it-alone approaches to foreign policy."[51] EU's relations with Africa are ultimately seen as a reflection of this vision, which projects a path that departs from traditional power politics in international relations.

International Political Economy Approach

A number of interesting explanations to EU-Africa relations have been advanced from the international political economy perspective. Some are rooted in the radical tradition, while others represent new approaches to IPE. It has been advanced that to truly understand the nature and character of EU-Africa relationship and its development, one needs to investigate the interplay between economies and politics at the global stage and adopt a historical perspective that places the relationship within a much broader context of the origins and evolution of North-South relations more generally. This politico-economic context shows wider patterns that are reflected in the particular EU-Africa relations as it has responded and adjusted to global forces and trends.[52]

Against this background, William Brown argues that development cooperation must be seen and approached "as encapsulating particular political and economic relationships rather than constituting some kind of 'apolitical' or 'technical' endeavor." EU-Africa relationship mirrors the shapes and contours of North-South relations as it has evolved and can be observed through four periods.[53]

First, the origins of AU-Africa relations must be situated in the context of decolonization, which saw the accession of African states to independence under conditions of "negative sovereignty" that set the stage for to the development of a dependent relationship and the "multilateralization" of postcolonial ties under the Yaoundé Conventions of 1963 and 1969.[54] By granting particular and favorable treatment to ACP products, the Yaoundé Conventions also represented, in some respects, a departure from the liberal and multilateral order that emerged after WWII.

Second, while the signing of the first Lomé Convention in 1973—in replacement of the Yaoundé Convention—seemed to have given some limited accommodation to Southern countries' attempts to redefine North-South relations through the demands for a new International Economic Order (NIEO),[55] it also retained the same dependent nature that had been characteristic of North-South relations in that, as William Brown puts it:

> The more "political" aspects of the agreement reflected the "negative sovereignty" pattern of post-colonial relations in the explicit, formal recognition of equality between the parties, recognition of "sovereign rights" of the ACP states, in particular over their development strategies, and in the formality of the agreement as one conducted between equal, independent states. That all these formal declarations of equality were included in an agreement that was based on one side granting financial and trade support to the other is a perfect illustration of the Convention as an example of this wider pattern of North-South relations.[56]

Third, the limited advances made in the Yaoundé Convention toward an NIEO would be progressively eroded in the 1980s and 1990s through successive renegotiations of the Lomé Convention. These decades were a time of restructuring of North-South relations through a reassertion of political and economic liberal principles.[57] This restructuring is reflected in the place that these instruments reserved to the political dialogue and the principle of conditionality, elements that were deepened and consolidated in the 2000 Cotonou Agreement, which replaced the Lomé Convention and represented a "wholesale reform" aimed at adapting EU-Africa relations to the imperatives of the global economy as mandated in particular by the WTO.

Fourth, the 2007 Africa-EU Joint Strategy can be seen as an attempt to solidify the neoliberal changes made to the relationship since the 1990s while reasserting the centrality of EU-Africa relations at a time when the dialectic interactions between the two partners are being transformed due to a number of internal and external factors, chiefly the increased international competition for Africa's resources and political and economic reforms on the continent, all of which have—although in a limited way—increased Africa's actorness and bargaining power in a relation that still functions, very much, on a client-donor mode that perpetuates dependency.

In contrast to the aforementioned traditional IPE approach, a new approach highlights social constructivist concepts of ideas and identity. From this vantage point, EU external commercial policies are believed to be determined by the overarching need to construct "Europe" by defining its internal and external identity through relations with non-Europeans. Identity building has been identified as one of the systemic functions of interregionalism as exemplified in the case of EU-Africa partnership.[58] Against this background, it is argued that the ideas, norms and values embedded in various legal and institutional frameworks of EU-Africa relations don't necessarily respond to the "rational" calculations of long-term economic advantage and benefits from cooperation. They contribute to foster regionalism through interregionalism by sharpening differences between self and other and thus helping galvanize regional solidarity on the basis of shared norms. From this perspective, Europe and Africa are said to build their respective collective identity by interacting with each at different levels of their extensive sectoral cooperation.

Sectoral Cooperation

After offering a broad historical and institutional overview of EU-Africa relations and discussing the main theoretical approaches through which to understand these complex relations, we turn now to sectoral cooperation, which has been organized into four main interrelated areas by the parties themselves: trade and regional integration, peace and security, governance and human rights, and key development issues. The intent here is not to cover in details each of these policy clusters. Rather, this third section will highlight the general conceptual framework and discuss major challenges as well as key operational initiatives that give substance to each area of cooperation. This exercise will be conducted with a particular reference to the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and its first Action Plan.

Peace and Security

Over the past years, EU-Africa relations have seen a multiplication of policy and operational initiatives in the area of peace and security as part of the political dialogue between the two partners. The 2003 EU Security Strategy, the 2005 EU Strategy for Africa, and the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy all contain major policy initiatives in this area. Conceptually, a number of core ideas and principles have been formulated in or can be inferred from these instruments. It is fair to say that the EU partner has played the leading role in shaping the discussion of what is slowly emerging as the EU-Africa peace and security doctrine.

First, is the understanding and recognition of "the importance of peace and security as preconditions for political, economic and social development."[59] Peace and security are considered "the first essential prerequisites for sustainable development." Second, the two partners are promoting a holistic approach to security, which encompasses conflict prevention and long-term peacebuilding, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, with a view to addressing both structural and root causes of conflicts, "including poverty, degradation, exploitation and unequal distribution and access to land and natural resources, weak governance, human rights abuses and gender inequality." Third is the reiteration of the principle of African ownership in that cooperation in the area of peace and security should support "African-led, owned and implemented peace—support operations." To that end, the goal is to help build an effective and functioning African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) with the AU and its Peace and Security Council at the center. Fourth, EU-Africa peace and security partnership is expected not only to address common security threats (terrorism, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, illegal export of arms) but also to serve as the hub for jointly identified responses and strategies to new global, human and security challenges (climate change, environmental degradation, water management, toxic waste deposits, and pandemics). Over the past years, the two partners have taken some concrete steps toward the implementation of this comprehensive and holistic approach to peace and security.

In 2004, in response to a request from the 2003 AU Summit in Maputo, the EU established a €250 million development instrument in support of African PSO and peacebuilding in the area of peace and security. Funded initially from the resources of the ninth EDF, the APF is now a key instrument that has been instrumental in financing some of the costs incurred by African peacekeeping forces used to support, among others, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), the AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and the *Force Multinationale en Centrafrique* (FOMUC) of the *Communauté économique et monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale* (CEMAC).[60] The APF has also been used to fund a smaller short-term AU-led mission in Comoros and to provide capacity building support for the AU.[61] In April 2006, the EU agreed to provide an additional amount of €300 million under the tenth EDF to continue the APF for an another three-year period (2008–2010).[62]

Through a growing interaction between the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the EU Political and Security Committee (COPS), the AU and the EU have also worked to coordinate their position on a number of crisis situations, such as in Madagascar in 2009, and more recently in Guinea.[63] The first action plan for the implementation of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership has identified three priority actions for the 2008–2010 period: to enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security, to achieve full operationalization of the APSA, and to secure predictable funding for African-led PSO.

Governance and Human Rights

Promotion of good governance and human rights has become as central feature of EU-Africa relations. Good governance and respect for human rights figure prominently in all the major frameworks of the partnership concluded since the mid-1990s. What is the general conceptual and operational approach to governance and human rights promotion that emerges from these various frameworks of cooperation?

In line with the international consensus on development, the parties have recognized that "democratic governance and human rights are key for sustainable development and for cooperation between the partners, and are an integral part of both the EU and AU's core values."[64] The parties have also adopted a broad approach to governance that calls for "an open, intensive and comprehensive dialogue on all aspects and concepts of governance, including human rights, children rights, gender equality, democratic principles, the rule of law, local governance, the management of natural resources, the transparent and accountable management of public funds, institutional development and reform, human security, security sector reform, the fight against corruption, corporate social responsibility, and institution building and development."[65]

The EU and Africa have also stressed the principle of ownership, which recognizes that the "primary responsibility for building democracy lies in the hands of Africa's people and of its ruling class (. . .) democracy cannot be created or imposed by domestic elites or external actors (. . .) the appropriate role of external actors is therefore instead to support and encourage domestic efforts to build, strengthen and sustain democratic norms, procedures and institutions."[66] Consequently, the partnership is aimed at supporting Africa-owned governance reform programs and democracy-building efforts, such as the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. In particular, the EU Commission has emphasized that "respecting ownership also means respecting the pace and schedule of reform processes, which are intrinsically complex and long-term, as they go to the very heart of the organization of a state and a society."[67]

At the operational level, EU-Africa sectoral cooperation in the area of governance and human rights is expected to follow an "incentive-based approach," by which the EU will grant additional financial support to "countries adopting or ready to commit themselves to a plan that contains ambitious, credible measures and reforms."[68] How are these principles and approaches being implemented?

The political dialogue enhanced in to Cotonou Agreement and consolidated in the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership distinguishes between "essential" and "fundamental" elements of cooperation. According to Article 9 of the Cotonou Agreement, "respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law are essential elements of the partnership," while good governance is considered to be a "fundamental element." Article 96, which gives teeth to the political dialogue, allows for the suspension of cooperation in the result of serious violations of the essential elements by the State Parties. The suspension of cooperation is, however, a last resort measure. In the event of serious breaches of human rights and democratic principles in ACP countries, political dialogue—consultations—is the first step that should be taken to avoid sanctions. Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement has been regularly activated over the past years. For example, in 1998, consultations were initiated with Togo and, in the following year, with Niger, Guinea-Bissau and Comoros for breaches of the democratic process and violation of the essential elements clause.[69] In 2000, consultations were conducted in the aftermath of the military coup in Ivory Coast. In 2001, measures were taken against Zimbabwe under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement and aid was suspended to all areas except social assistance.

EU-Africa relations in the area of governance and human rights have attracted a mixed response ranging from skepticism to cautious optimism. Grye Olsen questions European motives in promoting democracy and human rights in Africa by asserting that "When implementing the policy, the 'non-declared' interests of the donor countries themselves were decisive and not the official ones found in treaties and public statements, irrespective of the fundamental changes of the international system which followed the ending of the Cold War."[70] In the same vein, Mary Farrell argues that the neoliberal agenda being promoted under cover of the normative agenda—particularly the model of a weak state—doesn't correspond to what most African states need at this stage of their development.[71] The focus of a genuine democracy promotion agenda, contends Richard Youngs, should be on consolidating the foundations of any democracy and building the deliberative, legislative, and executive capacity of state institutions.[72] For May Farrell, the inclusion of a normative agenda in the political dialogue may appear to support the objectives of economic liberalization more than any fundamental support for democratization.[73] While EU's inconsistencies in promoting democracy and human rights in Africa seem to lend some credential to these criticisms, they don't however reflect the whole picture and the intricacy of competing interests in formulation of EU's foreign policy.

Trade and Regional Integration

The EU and Africa have had special trade relations since 1975. EU's trade relations with Sub-Saharan Africa are organized under the Cotonou Agreement, while relations with North Africa countries are covered by specific instruments. The EU-27 has emerged as Africa's most important trading partner with a total value of imported goods from Africa reaching €158 billion in 2008, against EU exports to Africa worth €120 billion. The volume of trade between the partners has been steadily increasing over the past years. This increased in the volume of trade has taken place within an interregional environment characterized, on the one hand, by renewed calls by African leaders for continental regional integration and, on the other hand, by profound changes to EU-Africa trade regimes mandated by the WTO's liberalization imperatives. Overall, the two sides seem to express slightly different views on the dual issue of trade and regional integration. While African leaders tend to consider trade liberalization and regional integration as necessary yet far from sufficient conditions to fostering development and alleviating poverty, the EU emphasizes that regional integration is a key requirement for Africa's development.[74]

The recently agreed upon Africa-EU Strategic Partnership takes stock of these changes and tensions by restating the fundamental principle of ownership, which calls for the respect and support of Africa's integration processes on the basis of the 1991 Abuja Treaty establishing African regional economic communities (RECs) as the building blocks of the African Economic Community (AEC). But the Strategic Partnership also identifies the key goals that will be pursued by Africa-EU cooperation on trade and regional integration as follows: "(i) private sector development, supported by foreign investments, to strengthen the supply side of African economies; (ii) the development and strengthening of physical infrastructure networks and related services, which are needed for the movement of persons, goods, information; and (iii) trade integration, which is essential to increase both South-South and North-South trade flows."[75] The aforementioned principles, approaches, and goals must be assessed against the backdrop of the fundamental changes introduced to EU-Africa trade relations by the Cotonou Agreement. One such change is the regional economic integration agreements—also known as Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)—to be negotiated between the EU and groups of countries within the ACP bloc. The EPAs must be WTO compatible, which requires the signatory states to ensure liberalization of trade (remove tariffs) affecting substantially all products and services, and covering all sectors. The second important departure from the previous policy is the shift away from treating the ACP as a unified bloc, and instead resorting to negotiations with groups of countries with a view to creating regional economic agreements.[76]

May Farrell contends that the new policy (EPA) represents a direct threat to existing subregional organizations in Africa, thus contradicting the stated principle of supporting and respecting the autonomous regional integration agenda of Africa. She goes on to assert that "From the perspective of the European Union, the Cotonou Agreement and the policy activities that arose out of the agreement allow the European Union to protect European interests, while also facilitating a mini "regime change" in the African countries, in accordance with EU values and standards."[77] Other commentators have underscored the economic effects of EPA's and EU's use of leverage to bring the ACP countries to agree to the new policy.[78] While welcoming liberalization, the Economic Commission for Africa has however cautioned that it (EPA) "must not be forced on Africa through trade or aid conditions" because "forced liberalization will not work."[79]

Analyzing the potential impact of EPA policy on existing RECs, Christopher Stevens has concluded that EPAs being negotiated under Cotonou will weaken African regionalism by encouraging countries "to reinforce rather than eliminate barriers to free circulation of goods between them because of the choices they make in the details of their trade regimes with Europe."[80] These are legitimate concerns that underline the tensions between trade and regional integration and unveil the disjunction between stated goals and principles and the actual impact of policy implementation.

Migration

Migration is another hot topic that has dominated EU-Africa political dialogue in recent years. The amount of agenda space given to the migration question reflects the growing common understanding of its strategic, economic, security, social, political, and humanitarian importance in the relationship between the Europe and Africa. About 4.6 million African migrants live in Europe. But the Migration Policy Institute believes there are between 7 and 8 million irregular African immigrants living in the EU.[81] Some highly publicized tragic events in which dozens of illegal migrants from Africa died in their journey to Europe have also helped put the issue of migration on top of the political agenda within the various frameworks of EU-Africa relations.

Under a joint initiative of Morocco, Spain, and France, the Euro-Africa Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development was organized in Rabat on July 10–11, 2006. This conference brought together West, Central, and North African states with EU member states to discuss common responses to migratory flows along the West African migration route to Europe. The Rabat conference was followed by an EU-Africa Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development held in Tripoli on November 22–23 of the same year. This conference was particularly significant in that, for the first time, the EU and the whole Africa came together to make a political commitment to working together on migration. It was, in many respects, recognition of the interdependent nature of the issue and an acknowledgment of the limitations of unilateral solutions and approaches to the problem. The final Declaration of the conference rightly emphasized "the need to work together in a spirit of mutual respect and partnership for better management of migration for our two continents in a comprehensive, integrated and holistic manner."

On a bilateral level, political dialogue on migration has been pursued between the EU and key states of origin of migrants in Africa (Mauritania, Senegal, and Mali) on the basis of Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement, which covers a wide range of topics in the area of migration and development. Where relevant, every Country Strategic Paper for ACP countries now contains a migration profile that identifies priorities, activities, and projects. It is worth noting that EU-Africa political dialogue on migration has been developing against the backdrop of an international context marked by a renewed interest in the issue as shown by the UN General Assembly High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development.[82]

What are the core principles, approaches, goals, and policy priorities that emerge from the different EU-Africa processes on migration? First is the affirmation of the conceptual link between migration and development. The overall goal is to better "manage legal migration" so as to support "the socio-economic development of both countries of origin and countries of destination."[83] To that end, the parties have adopted a balanced and holistic approach that seeks, on the one hand, to combine restrictive and controlling measures with actions supporting legal mobility and the integration of migrants; and, on other hand, to comprehend the migration phenomenon in all its complexity as it relates to issues of development, peace and security, human resources and brain drain, human rights and refugee protection (Tripoli Declaration on Migration and Development). The central principles of ownership, solidarity, and adherence have been reaffirmed as well as the belief "that the management of migratory flows cannot be achieved through control measures only, but also requires a concerted action on the root causes of migration."[84]

The Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment agreed upon during the 2007 EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon identifies three priority actions for the 2008–2010 period: the implementation of the 2006 Tripoli Declaration on Migration and Development, the implementation of the EU-Africa Plan of Action on Trafficking of Human Beings, and the implementation of the 2004 Ougadougou Declaration and Action Plan on Employment and Poverty Alleviation in Africa. Along these lines, a number of concrete activities have been proposed or are already being implemented, such as the creation of a network of migratory observatories to collect, analyze, and disseminate data on migratory flows; the establishment of a 25 million intra-ACP migration facility to focus in particular on the management of South-South migration; and the facilitation of safer, faster, and cheaper remittances from Africans living in Europe.[85]

It is important to note that EU-Africa political dialogue and partnership on migration has evolved against the background of profound changes in EU's own migration policies and approaches. In fact, many of the concepts and ideas that have been incorporated into the EU-Africa dialogue had originally been formulated within the EU's own internal debate. The strategic decision to abolish systematic controls on movements of people (and goods) across internal borders of the common space, operated under the Schengen Treaty and later, by way of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, has in fact brought about a radical rethinking of the forms of traditional security controls (and of migration controls in particular). One important aspect of this policy change has been the "outsourcing" of migrant controls to Africa and the reinforcement of controls on EU external borders. Over the past years, the EU has been developing its operational capabilities in the area of border controls with, among other things, the establishment of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX) in 2002, the Mediterranean Coastal Patrols Network (MEDSEA), and the European Surveillance System of Borders (EUROSUR). All these measures will be implemented through the EU External Borders Fund.[86] The development of these operational capabilities is a clear indication that the EU is determined to seal its borders while engaging in a "frank and constructive" dialogue on migration with Africa. It remains to be seen how these two policy objectives will play out.

Conclusion

The EU and Africa have developed a rich and complex relationship that is deeply rooted in their common history and reflects the density of cultural, geographic, economic, and human bonds between Europe and Africa. This relationship has evolved from fragmented arrangements in the 1960s into a multilayered, multifunctional, comprehensive, and strategic partnership pursued through a web of legal, institutional, and policy frameworks.

In surveying the historical and institutional development of EU-Africa relations, the first section of the chapter has demonstrated how different changes in the relationship could be linked to major forces and dynamics impacting either EU's own integration process or the broader North-South relations, such the demand for a New International Economic Order in the 1970s and the current political and economic neoliberal agenda under the forces of globalization.

The second section has attempted to put the relationship into some coherent theoretical framework by resorting to both traditional theoretical canons of international relations and other innovative approaches. From the perspective of the dominant partner, EU-Africa relations can be seen either as expressing classical realist tendencies of member states that seek to secure and preserve their interests or as a reflection of the EU's liberal integration project, which emphasizes interdependencies, cooperation, and shared values in the pursuit of the common good. In substance, a liberal lecture of EU-Africa relations contends that the EU represents a grand experiment whose core liberal values are being translated into its relationship with other regions. To this theoretical view, an approach grounded on IPE has responded by stressing the dependent nature that has only been amplified by economic globalization processes. The growing importance of the normative agenda in EU-Africa relations is seen as lacking substance and serving to perpetuate dependency in the relationship. It has been shown that, while each of these theoretical perspectives provides insight into the relationship, they all carry limitations and cannot, taken separately, adequately explain EU-Africa relationship in all its complexities and manifestations.

This theoretical approach has been complemented by a more pragmatic approach in the final section of the chapter, which has analyzed and discussed cooperation in the areas of peace and security, governance and human rights, trade and regional integration, and migration. Each of these sectoral areas of cooperation seems to indicate that the parties have adopted a more pragmatic and functional approach. They have identified and are implementing a host of concrete and incremental measures, and appear to be committed in developing a "strategic partnership" that addresses "common contemporary challenges" of the two continents, whose relationship has been historically marked by dependency but also increasingly by change as reflected in the rejection by African partners of the unilaterally formulated EU Strategy for Africa in 2005 and the subsequent adoption of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy in 2007.

Notes

1. *Lisbon Declaration,* EU- Africa Summit, Lisbon, December 9, 2007.
2. European Commission, *From Cairo to Lisbon-The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership,* COM (2007) 357 final, 2.
3. *Lisbon Declaration,* op. cit.
4. The only African country that is not party to any contractual agreement with the EU is Libya.
5. Mary Farrell, "A Triumph of Realism over Idealism? Cooperation between the European Union and Africa," *European Integration* 27, no. 3 (2005): 263–283; A. Andrea Koulaimah-Gabriel, "Beyond Lomé IV: Future Challenges to EU-Africa Relations," *Rectel* 6 (1997): 14–22.

6. Although a signatory of the Cotonou Agreement, South Africa has concluded a separate parallel and ambitious Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement with the EU.
7. Article 238 provides that "the Community may conclude with one or more States or international organizations agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedures." Eighteen Associated African and Malagasy States (AAMS) were parties to the agreement. EDF remained the financial source of assistance under the Yaoundé Convention.
8. See Andrea Koulaimah-Gabriel, op. cit.; William Brown, *The European Union and Africa: The Restructuring of North-South Relations* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002).
9. More than 90 percent of ACP exports, predominantly primary commodities, qualified to enter the EU duty-free.
10. The EDF also financed two commodity insurance schemes, STABEX and SYSNIN, respectively for countries that were dependent on agricultural exports and on the exports of mineral products. These insurance schemes responded to a demand from the South in the context of the NIEO.
11. Other major concessions of the Lomé conventions included special protocols for bananas, sugar and rum.
12. European Commission, *Green Paper on Relations between the European Union and the ACP Countries on the Eve of the 21st Century* (1996), 9.
13. Despite two-and-a-half decades of EU privileges, 40 of 63 countries in the World Bank's unenviable category of least-developed countries (LDCs) in 2000 were ACP member states.
14. Andrea Koulainah-Gabriel, op. cit., 16.
15. A compelling argument for not renewing the Lomé Convention was the recognition that any new ACP-EU arrangement had to be fully compatible with GATT/WTO rules.
16. Since the 1990, trade between the EU and "preferred" partners in Africa and the Middle East had become rather marginalized.
17. The end of the Cold War broadened the horizon and scope of the external economic relations of EU with countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This resulted to an increase of economic assistance toward these countries and a drop in total EU's assistance to ACP countries.
18. The European Commission, for a long time, had argued that EU-ACP cooperation was nonpolitical, stating boldly that "the ideological neutrality of Lomé rules out the possibility of the Community living by doctrines" (CED-DG VIII, 1992, p. 16).
19. In North Africa, Association Agreements exist with Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt; Libya has observer status in the Partnership.
20. European Commission, *A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy,* COM (2007) 774 final, 2.
21. Democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development have been identified as common values. It must be noted that the ENP remains distinct from the process of enlargement although it does not prejudice, for European neighbors, how their relationship with the EU may develop in the future, in accordance with Treaty provisions.
22. For Northern African Countries, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt have already concluded ENP Action Plans. Algeria, having only recently ratified its Association Agreement with the EU has chosen not to negotiate an ENP Action Plan yet. Libya has no contractual agreement with the EU.
23. South Africa doesn't have access to Cotonou's financial instruments or preferential trade regime.
24. European Commission, *Towards an EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership,* COM (2006) 347 final, 6. South Africa is the political, economic, financial, human resources and

trade hub of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, representing close to 75 percent of its total GNP. At the continental level, South African has been one of the driving forces behind the AU and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). At the international level, South Africa has consolidated its standing by speaking on many occasions on behalf of the emerging and the developed world in international fora.

25. European Commission, *Towards an EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership,* op. cit., 6.
26. Originally scheduled for 2003, the second summit had to be postponed, on EU's request, due to opposition to the political and human rights situation in Zimbabwe.
27. European Centre for Development Policy Management, "Towards a Joint Africa-Europe Partnership: Setting the Agenda," Issue Paper II (2006), 2.
28. European Commission, *EU-Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African Pact to Accelerate Africa's Development,* COM (2005) 489 final, p.2.
29. European Commission, *From Cairo to Lisbon: The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership,* COM (2007) 357 final, 4.
30. For the EU, acting in a more unified way became crucial given the challenges posed by the enlargement process that saw a sharp increase of EU members from 10 to 25.
31. The centrality of MDGs in EU's objectives toward Africa is reflective of a larger effort of redefinition of EU development policy that led to the adoption of the European Consensus on Development by the European Community and the Member States in 2006. See European Parliament, Council and Commission, The European Consensus on Development, 2006/C 46/01.
32. European Centre for Development Policy Management, op. cit., 4.
33. European Commission, *From Cairo to Lisbon: The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership,* op. cit., 5.
34. A large-scale consultation was carried out (including via a special website http://europafrica.org, which was managed on behalf of the EU and the AU by an independent foundation, the European Center for Development Policy Management) to collect input for the drafting of the Joint Strategy from a broad range of non institutional stakeholders in Europe, Africa and beyond. Regular consultations have also taken place with representatives from the European Parliament and the Pan-African Parliament.
35. European Commission, *From Cairo to Lisbon: The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership,* op. cit., 2.
36. China, for example, has rapidly emerged as Africa's most important trade partner, with total amounting to about €43 billion in 2006 (up from €30 billion in 2005) and with 23 percent of all Chinese oil imports now coming from Africa.
37. European Commission, *From Cairo to Lisbon: The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership,* op. cit., 3.
38. *A Joint Africa-EU Strategy,* Lisbon, December 9, 2007, §6.
39. For an in-depth analysis of these principles, see Mary Farrell, op. cit., 271–274.
40. *A Joint Africa-EU Strategy,* op. cit.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. European Centre for Development Policy Management, op. cit., 2.
44. *A Joint Africa-EU Strategy,* op. cit., §92.
45. To facilitate this continent to continent dialogue, the EU has opened a Delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa. For its part, the AU has been strengthening its representation in Brussels.
46. Mary Farrell, op. cit., 265–266.
47. Ibid., 266.

48. Stephen Hurt, "Co-operation and Coercion? The Cotonou Agreement between the European Union and ACP States and the End of the Lomé Convention," *Third World Quarterly* 24, no. 1 (2003): 161–176.
49. Jeremy Rifkin, *The European Dream* (New York: Tarcher/Penguin, 2004).
50. Andrea Koulaimah-Gabriel, op. cit., 19.
51. Jeremy Rifkin, op. cit., 282.
52. William Brown, op. cit.
53. Ibid., 368.
54. The multilateralization of postcolonial ties refers to the idea that post colonial agreements were concluded with the whole EU rather than simply the former colonial power.
55. Elements of the managed trade projects of the NIEO campaign were incorporated into Lomé particularly the STABEX scheme for the stabilization of export earnings.
56. William Brown, op. cit., 373.
57. Ibid.
58. Vinold Aggarwal and Edward Fogarty, "Explaining Trends in EU Interregionalism," in V. Aggarwal and E. Forgarty (eds.), *European Union Trade Strategies: Between Globalism and Regionalism* (London: Palgrave, 2004).
59. *A Joint Africa-EU Strategy,* op. cit., §13.
60. Under no circumstances can AFP money be used to cover direct military and arms expenditure.
61. In the 9th EDF, €35 million were earmarked for capacity building purpose.
62. This decision followed an evaluation of the APF—carried out by independent consultants in the fall of 2005—which assessed that, overall, the instrument had proved to be very relevant and generally effective, and that the core APF principles of African ownership, African-European partnership and African solidarity had contributed to its success.
63. See Thomas Muehlmann and UmbertoTavolato, "The Cooperation between the AU PSC and the EU's Political and Security Committee: State of Play and Prospects," Paper presented at the ISS Expert Roundtable on the AU Peace and Security Council, Addis Ababa, April 29–30, 2010.
64. Africa-EU Partnership on Democratic Governance and Human Rights.
65. *A Joint Africa-EU Strategy,* op. cit., §27.
66. European Commission, *EU-Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African Pact to Accelerate Africa's Development,* COM (2005) 489 final, 24.
67. European Commission, *Governance in the European Consensus on Development: Towards a Harmonized Approach within the European Union,* COM (2006) 421 final, 6.
68. Part of the financing (€2.7 billion) allocated to ACP countries under the 10th EDF (2008–2010) has been set aside to support this incentive-based policy.
69. The legal basis for these consultations was Article 366a of Lomé IV.
70. Grye Olsen, "Europe and the Promotion of Democracy in Post Cold War: How Serious Is Europe and for What Reason?" *African Affairs* 97, no. 388 (1998): 345.
71. Mary Farrell, op. cit.
72. Richard Youngs, "Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU's External Indentity," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 42, no. 2 (2004): 415–439.
73. Mary Farrell, op. cit.
74. European Centre for Development Policy Management, "How to deliver on the EU-Africa Partnership's ambitions? Adapting the institutional framework for EU-Africa relations," Issue Paper (2006).
75. See Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, §39.

76. The regional economic communities (RECs) and other organizations involved in the EPA negotiations are: ECOWAS, UEMOA, ECCAS, CEMAC, COMESA, SADC, SACU, EAS, EAC and IOC.
77. Mary Farrell, op. cit., 270.
78. A. Keek and R. Piermartini, "The Economic Impact of EPAs in SADC Countries," *Staff Working Paper,* Geneva: World Trade Organization, ERSD 2004–2005.
79. Economic Commission for Africa (2005).
80. C. Stevens, "The EU, Africa and Economic Partnership Agreements: Unintended Consequences of Policy Leverage," *Journal of African Studies* 44, no. 3 (2006): 441–458.
81. Data available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Europe.
82. More information about the dialogue can be found at http:// www.un.org/migration.
83. *A Joint Africa-EU Strategy,* op. cit., §68.
84. Preamble, *Rabat Declaration on Migration and Development*.
85. First *Action Plan for the Implementation of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership*.
86. European Commission, *Reinforcing the Management of the European Union's Southern Maritime Borders,* COM (2006) 733 final. The External Borders Fund has received a total of €1.82 billion for the period 2007–2013.

12

The African Union as an International Actor

Timothy Murithi

Introduction

This chapter will assess the role of the African Union (AU) as an international actor. The continental body has a dual role of forging unity among its member states and advocating for their interests internationally. The AU's role as an international actor is complicated by the difficulty of promoting consensus among African states and then maintaining that consensus in the face of often divergent national interests. There are a selection of issues in which the AU has served as a rallying vehicle for Africa interests, particularly in the field of peace and security, on development and trade issues as well as on climate change. This chapter will assess the role of the AU in articulating collective and joint policies and in making interventions in international decision and policymaking circles.

The International Relations of Africa

To a large extent, efforts to ensure sustainable peace and development in Africa have always been undermined by the dominant international and geopolitical agendas of the day. After colonialism, it was the Cold War. In the post-Cold War world the pressures of globalization are impacting Africa's peace and development efforts. However, the continental ability and capacity to promote peace has also been undermined by the lack of political will among African leaders to find ways to address their differences. African leaders have to take responsibility for the lack of peace and development on the continent.

The fuel that adds to the flame of conflict in Africa is the role that globalization plays in perpetuating and sustaining wars. The biggest challenge in trying to resolve disputes in Africa is to effectively deal with the role of international actors in fuelling conflict. Transnational corporations, with the collusion of some of the continent's corrupt leaders, are extracting mineral resources in areas where there is conflict, and these resources are being used to finance endless wars and postpone development. Examples of these include multinational oil companies extracting oil in the south of Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Nigeria and Congo-Brazaville, and the Cabinda Enclave in the Congo; the global diamond cartels that operated in Sierra Leone and Angola; the timber conglomerates culling and extracting trees in Liberia and Guinea; and industrial giants extracting copper, chromium, and coltan from Central Africa. These resources, whether they go to a corrupt government that is not often legitimate or an armed militia, are all adding fuel to the fire of conflict and feeding into illegal small arms trading and drug dealing networks that make the situation very difficult for one country to control or manage by itself. This situation has been made possible or easier by the emerging global networks of trade and instant financial transactions, the ability to shift huge amounts of capital at the click of a button to offshore accounts beyond the investigative reach of unsuspecting citizens and civil society organizations. Private military companies, or what we used to call "mercenaries" flourish in this new environment and can operate undetected, unidentified and out of sight. In 2008, there was an unfolding drama of an attempted coup plot in Equatorial Guinea, which just happens to have the third-largest oil deposits in Africa, after Nigeria and Angola. To be fair, one cannot situate all the blame on global business, external actors can only succeed with the collusion of corrupt leaders on the continent, who are also denying their people resources that are badly needed for development.

The point is that the promotion of peace, security and development in Africa is no longer the task of an individual nation-state, in the context of globalization. It is at the very least a continent-wide challenge. At the very most, it is a global responsibility and implicates the citizens and governments of multinational companies that are making a profit from the exploitation and misery of people in war-affected and underdeveloped parts of Africa.

The Case for a Pan-African Approach to Peace and Security Issues

The conflicts that afflicted the African continent from the end of the Cold War to the first decade of the twenty-first century demanded that urgent changes be made to the way of doing things.[1] So it became increasingly clear to many leaders on the African continent that it was necessary again to find a way to revive the spirit of Pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanism is the expression of this spirit of solidarity and cooperation among African leaders.[2] Pan-Africanism is an idea that has been around for centuries. Ever since the period of slavery, people of African descent have written, thought about, and acted in solidarity with each other. The overall and primary aim of Pan-Africanism is simply to end racial discrimination against people of African descent, wherever they may be, whether in the diaspora or on the continent, and to create the conditions that are necessary to protect their right to take part and control their social, economic, and political affairs and achieve peace and development.

Pan-Africanism was again taken to another level with the launching of the AU, first as an idea at, a Summit of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in Sirte in Libya in 1999. Subsequently, the Constitutive Act of the AU was signed, in Lome, Togo, on July 11, 2000. This led to the official inauguration of the AU, as the successor to the Organization of African Unity, in July 2002 in Durban, South Africa. So in effect, the AU replaced the OAU and took on all its assets and liabilities.

Again, the vision of the AU remains consistent with the spirit of Pan-Africanism, which was to end the discrimination and international marginalization of Africa and to ensure its peaceful socioeconomic and political development. The primary task for the AU in this regard is to promote peace and security so that the development can flourish across the continent. It is now evident that key issues related to Africa's peace, security, and development need to be articulated in international fora. Globalization has become a force to be reckoned with as mentioned earlier, and African countries and societies working individually still remain vulnerable to global manipulation and exploitation, which is why they need to work together.[3] Therefore, the changing context of international relations makes the existence of the AU a necessary unifier of continental opinion and policy positions.

It is clear that in order to attain genuine peace and development and to reverse some of these statistics and conditions that African people are living in, there is a need to move rather urgently into a condition of sustainable peace, which is a prerequisite and a vital ingredient for development. It is much harder for individual African states to make this transition individually. So the strategy of coming together in the spirit of solidarity and cooperation is viewed by most of the leaders as the only way forward, particularly in the context of a globalizing world.

In this regard, the AU has established a continental African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which incorporates a 15-member Peace and Security Council established in 2004 through the *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the African Union Peace and Security Council* of 2002.[4] The Protocol also established an African Standby Force (ASF), a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), a Military Staff Committee (MSF), a Panel of the Wise and an AU Peace Fund. The AU has undertaken a series of international interventions on the continent including in Burundi (2003–2004), Darfur (2004 to the present), Somalia (2007 to the present), and Comoros (2008 to the present). The AU has also adopted a much more robust stance on a range of issues related to international peace and security.

The Africa Group as an Actor at the United Nations

Since the era of decolonization and the establishment of the OAU, African countries have organized themselves in the General Assembly through the Africa Group at the UN. Morocco attends the meetings of the Africa Group even thought it withdrew from the OAU, and is currently not a member of the AU, due to its disapproval of the recognition of Western Sahara as an independent African state, by both continental organizations. The Group has a rotating monthly chairperson drawn from one of the African members of the United Nations. The chairperson convenes meetings of the Group and establishes the negotiation agenda on key issues of vital Pan-African interest. In terms of the record of the Africa Group, on some issues African countries often find consensus, for example, on development, trade, debt cancellation, infectious diseases, small arms and light weapons, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, climate negotiations, transnational crime prevention, and the election of Africans to various UN activities and bodies.[5] For example, the official statement of the Africa Group on the draft 2005 Outcome Document was issued through the office of the Permanent Observer Mission of the AU to the United Nations.[6] On some of these issues, the Africa Group occasionally aligns itself with the Group of 77 (G-77) countries and China to increase its negotiation strength. On other issues, particularly where there is a strong national interest such as security issues and conflict situations, African countries have not always maintained a united position or a common front for negotiations and voting.[7]

Eight years after the launch of the AU, it is appropriate to interrogate the relationship between Africa and the UN. There is an emerging UN-AU partnership, particularly in peace operations. In Sudan, a Joint AU/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was operationalized in 2007. Given the confluence of mandates that the UN and the AU share, there is no question that there needs to be greater policy coherence and partnership between the two bodies. The Africa Group at the UN has to remain vigilant to ensure that "hybrid peacekeeping" is not used by the UN system as a means to perpetuate paternalism toward Africa, particularly with respect to peace operations.[8] Ultimately, African countries form a significant subset of the UN membership and the relationship should be based on a reciprocal respect if the UN is to succeed in achieving the noble objectives which it set for itself, and humanity, at its inception.

The AU on the Reform of the UN Peace and Security Council

In the early decades of the UN, there was an asymmetrical partnership between the body and Africa. Newly independent African states were just beginning to establish their political, social, and economic footing. As a collective, African countries were not in a position to influence policy at the UN. In most instances, postcolonial African states were beholden, and still are, at least economically, to their former colonial powers. These colonial powers maintained an attitude of paternalism toward their postcolonies, which was a logical progression from the era of colonialism. It is therefore not surprising that the UN system, particularly in its attitudes, would adopt a similar stance, given the fact that it was, and still is, politically, economically, and financially dominated by former colonial powers and Cold War superpowers.

Given the asymmetrical relationship that the UN had with Africa, particularly in the early years, a culture of paternalism developed between the organization and the continent. Since then, Africa has been trying to challenge and dispense with paternalistic attitudes from, and within, the UN system.

According to James Jonah, the former UN under-secretary-general for political affairs "over 60 percent of the Security Council's agenda in 2008 related to African problems, and about 80 percent of the 85,000 UN peacekeepers deployed around the globe in early 2008 were in Africa, at an annual cost of close to U.S. $5 billion."[9] This suggests that it is vital to establish a genuine partnership based on equal respect, reciprocity, and dialogue. Ideally, such a partnership would have to be predicated on a coherent voice emerging from Africa.

This was demonstrated in the debates surrounding the reform of the UN Security Council. In February 2005, the AU convened a Committee of 15 foreign ministers, in Mbabane, Swaziland, to craft a common African response to the UN High-Level Panel report of 2004. In March 2005, the AU issued a declaration known as *The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: The Ezulwini Consensus,*[10] which was a statement in response to the Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and was issued in December 2004. In this Common African Position, the AU highlighted issues pertaining to HIV/AIDS, security, poverty, debt, environmental degradation, trade negotiations, the responsibility to protect, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding.[11] In addition, the AU issued a position on UN reform and in particular on the reform of the Security Council by noting that "in 1945, when the UN was formed, most of Africa was not represented and that in 1963, when the first reform took place, Africa was represented but was not in a particularly strong position."[12] The AU goes on to state that "Africa is now in a position to influence the proposed UN reforms by maintaining her unity of purpose," furthermore it notes that "Africa's goal is to be fully represented in all the decision-making organs of the UN, particularly in the Security Council."[13] The Common Position enumerates what "full representation" of Africa in the Security Council means by demanding "not less than two permanent seats with all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership including the right to veto" and "five non-permanent seats."[14] This decision subsequently locked the AU into trying to maintain this position in the face of tremendous pressure from other members of the international community, notably by the Group of Four (G4) Brazil, Germany, Japan, and India and the Uniting for Consensus coalition. This was in effect a bold move for the AU to have taken, which was informed more by principle than by *realpolitik,* as indicated in the Ezulwini Consensus document, which states that "even though Africa is opposed in principle to the veto, it is of the view that so long as it exists, and as a matter of common justice, it should be made available to all permanent members of the Security Council."[15] At least on paper, the AU was endeavoring to establish and maintain a common position. However, due to internal dissension some African countries, particularly Egypt and South Africa, effectively broke rank with the Ezulwini Consensus and sought ways to individually ascend to become permanent members of the Security Council. This in effect undermined efforts to demonstrate African "unity of purpose." This is further reinforced by the fact that time and again, African countries have shown that they are unlikely to vote as a collective on matters before, or pertaining to, the Security Council. Governments generally tend to adopt positions that best serve their interests or positions that enable them to receive certain benefits from more powerful countries that pick and choose which African countries they want to work with. Therefore, the logic of "national self-interest" and political realism still prevails among African countries, and other member states, at the UN.

Following the meeting, the AU issued a report that advanced the "Ezulwini Consensus," which called for "an expansion of the Security Council from fifteen to twenty-six members, with two permanent seats holding veto power from Africa, as well as two additional rotating seats to add to Africa's existing three rotating seats."[16] However, subsequently disputes "emerged in Africa as to which countries would fill the permanent African seats. Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa all declared their candidacies. Kenya, Libya, and Senegal also expressed interest."[17] Ultimately, this disunited approach weakened Africa's hand in advocating for Security Council reform. Therefore, it is evident that the problems and competing state interests within the Africa Group pose a fundamental challenge as far as efforts to forge a common identity are concerned. As the competition relating to Security Council reform demonstrates the Africa Group is yet to function with a continental identity, when the national interests triumph over maintaining a principled and unified stance at the UN.

The Challenges of Consolidating AU Consensus at the UN

The AU's role as an international actor is complicated by the difficulty of forging consensus among African states and then maintaining that consensus in the face of often divergent national interests. Today, Africa is attempting to forge an identity as a collective entity capable of functioning as an equal partner in the international sphere. Some would question whether African countries have sufficiently coalesced as a group and developed a coherent identity to effectively influence policy development at the UN. As noted earlier, the Africa Group expresses itself through the auspices of the AU.

The contradiction in the relationship between Africa and the UN is that there is often dissension among African countries and the organization. On issues, particularly where there is a strong national interest such as security issues and conflict situations, African countries have not always maintained a united position or a common front for negotiations and voting. The problems and competing state interests within the UN Africa Group pose a fundamental challenge as far as efforts to forge a common identity are concerned. African Governments generally tend to adopt positions that best serve their interests or positions that enable them to receive certain benefits from more powerful countries that pick and choose which countries they want to work with. Therefore, the logic of "national self-interest" and political realism still prevails among African countries, and other member states, at the UN. Essentially, this is the dominant modus operandi in international politics and it seems that it is unlikely to change in the short term.

The AU's Role in Advocating for Development

Walter Rodney defined development at the level of the individual as "increased skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility, and material well-being."[18] Societal development is "the progress all peoples make throughout their existence in developing social structures, regulating both internal and external relationships and working towards economic and other improvements in their lives."[19] Rodney also defines "underdevelopment" as the disruption of this natural and ongoing process of development.[20] In this context, European colonialism had the net effect of promoting development in Europe and fostering underdevelopment in Africa as well as other colonized regions of the world. This logic of development and underdevelopment replicates itself with the onset of the twenty-first century.

Linked to this issue is Africa's need to once again regain control of its economic policies, because only the people on the ground know what is best for them in terms of their immediate needs to improve their access to education and health care. So the external control of the economic policies of African countries is a situation that has to be addressed. The Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPS) and so-called Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) promoted and enforced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank have had a negative impact on Africa's development. By the IMF and World Bank's own admission, these programs did not achieve what they planned to. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates that IMF/World Bank policies dictated since 1980 have led to 10 percent decline in economic growth in Africa. There is therefore a need for Africa and the AU to redeclare its economic independence and identify programs that will bring genuine development to the people who need it most.

The AU New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)

The African Union's New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was conceived as the means to enable Africa to accelerate its active participation on equal terms in the international economic sphere.[21] NEPAD is a program of the AU. It is not a separate institution. It was designed by African leaders and adopted in Abuja, Nigeria, in October 2001. Key objectives of NEPAD included developing a viable Pan-African market economy, through infrastructure development and promoting intra-African trade. NEPAD proposes ways to advance and accelerate Africa's peace and security by building a strong foundation for development and economic growth. NEPAD proposes to do this through improved access to education and training, access to health care, the building of the infrastructure necessary to make Africa an equal partner in global trade and economic development.[22] The Group of Eight (G8) countries duly pledged to support NEPAD at their meeting in Kananaskis, in June 2002. One of its criticisms is that it did not include the views of African civil society and since then the AU has made efforts to consult with civil society.

At the African Union's Assembly in 2002, held in Durban, the Declaration on the Implementation of NEPAD was adopted, which included a more specific Declaration on Democracy, Political Economic and Corporate Governance. Within this latter Declaration, the African Peer Review Mechanism was established. The objectives of this Mechanism are to enhance African ownership of its development and governance agenda; to identify, evaluate, and disseminate best practices; and to monitor progress toward agreed goals. Member states are invited to voluntarily join the African Peer Review Mechanism for the purpose of participating in a self-monitoring program with a clear time frame for achieving certain standards of inclusive governance. The African Peer Review Mechanism, which is a positive element of NEPAD, is a commitment to self-monitoring and accountability for promoting inclusive governance and constitutional government by relying upon peer pressure in which governments monitor each other.[23]

NEPAD has developed an African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework through a broad consultative process with civil society and key stakeholders.[24] This framework stresses the link between the peace, security, humanitarian, and development dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. The NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework aims to coordinate and guide the efforts of the AU Commission, the NEPAD secretariat, the RECs, civil society, the private sector, and other internal and external partners in the process of rebuilding war-affected communities. This plan is based on the premise that each country should adopt a post-conflict reconstruction strategy that responds to its own particular needs.[25] In most countries, there is a need to develop a post-conflict reconstruction process that addresses the needs of vulnerable groups such as women and children who are increasingly the targets of violence in conflict situations. NEPAD's peacebuilding policy stresses the importance of factoring the needs of these groups into planning and programming in order to have an effective overall post-conflict strategy. The disabled, ex-combatants, child soldiers, and victims of sexual violence also need to be provided with appropriate care and attention since an inadequate post-conflict program can actually increase the vulnerability of these groups.

Criticisms of NEPAD

However, it has become clear that since its inception in 2001, NEPAD is facing a crisis of credibility and some of its key supporters are questioning whether any real progress has been made toward transforming the vision into reality. Some critics of NEPAD argue that the program cannot succeed because it tries to integrate Africa into a global framework of neoliberal laissez-faire economics, which is part of the reason why Africa is in the situation it is in in the first place. These critics argue that Africa is in its current situation precisely because of the neoliberal economic framework in which richer countries preach free trade but protect their own industries and put pressure on developing countries to open up their markets. Liberalized African markets give the green light to larger global corporations to extract primary commodities at low prices and buy up industries and production in Africa and repatriate profit out of Africa back to their global shareholders, thereby denying Africans the benefit of these profits, which are vital for building schools and hospitals. As an illustration, in agriculture alone, developed Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries spend U.S. $320 billion per year on subsidies. This situation is currently undercutting cotton production in Mali and Burkina Faso and restricting their competitiveness in global markets. Critics argue that at the very least African governments should be allowed to strengthen and protect their local industries. In addition, profits need to remain on the continent to support development. The basic argument is that adopting a neoliberal framework for development is like adopting a violent strategy for peacebuilding.

Programs that compel governments to repay their unsustainable and odious debts instead of investing in the health care and education of their people will only serve to reinforce Africa's dependency and underdevelopment.[26] NEPAD, while a welcome initiative in terms of its Pan-African scope, cannot fulfill its objectives because it is written largely in the language of neoliberal economics. In this regard, it may only fulfill the objective of making Africa more pliant to the plundering of its resources, albeit under the guise of aid and development. In this regard, it would contribute to, rather than militate against, aid colonization. For NEPAD to overcome this perception, it will need to strengthen local African industries and make them globally competitive as well as enhance intra-African trade by encouraging the free flow of labor across the continent, which means establishing greater freedom of movement for African citizens.

On the issue of debt cancellation, many African countries are spending more money in servicing multilateral debt than the combined amount they spend on providing health care and education to their people. More money is going out of Africa and back to the foreign bankers than is spent on school children and sick people. If we are talking about genuine development to consolidate peace, then clearly this situation has to change. The issue of governance and corruption of course has to be addressed and efforts are underway to achieve this through the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which is a component of NEPAD.[27] African governments are voluntarily agreeing to be monitored by their peers for human rights and improved governance.

The AU and Trade Promotion

Underdevelopment also persists in Africa because its member states are constantly competing among themselves for the limited access to international markets rather than working in concert to dictate to the global economy. Furthermore, African countries do not effectively trade with each other for a host of reasons, not least the fact that there is a limited continental infrastructure to achieve this. In particular, the road, railway, and telecommunication networks across Africa are in their nascent stage. Even though plans have been designed to construct these networks across countries, cumbersome bureaucratic procedures and a lack of political willingness to accelerate their establishment have hampered the development of transcontinental infrastructure. In addition, almost every region of the Africa is beset by conflict situations, a situation that further undermines the regular transportation of goods and services across countries.[28] Corruption within the extractive industries (oil, timber, and minerals) in collusion with pseudo-democratic African governments also deprives Africa of vital resources that can fund development. Profit made by transnational corporations in these industries is exported out of the continent and the corporate taxes generated are used to develop the global north at the expense of local African people.

With regards to trade issues, the AU has not had a successful record of forging continental consensus. The AU does not function as a coherent unit at the World Trade Organisation (WTO), even though African countries often combine their collective weight to prevent being overwhelmed by the trade diplomacy of more developed economies. African countries have had a moderate success in staving off trade policies which would be detrimental to their economic development. However, the EU Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) have more recently been deployed to effectively secure bilateral agreements with individual states. The AU has not as yet adopted a common position on EPAs, however, it is increasingly evident that this is an urgent necessity if the interests of African citizens in terms of trade relations are to be secured.

The AU and Climate Change

Perhaps one of the most coherent collective positions that the AU has adopted has been with regards to climate change. In February 2009, the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government met during their twelfth Ordinary Summit, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and adopted a decision on Africa's common position on the proposed international agreements on climate changes.[29] Subsequently, at the thirteenth Ordinary Summit, held from July 1 to 3, 2009, in Sirte, Libya, further endorsed this decision and established the Conference of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC).[30] CAHOSCC includes Algeria, the Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Uganda, chairperson of the AU, chairperson of the AUC, and chairperson of the Conference of African Ministers of Environment (AMCEN). The prime minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, was appointed as the coordinator of this group. CAHOSCC was ostensibly established to advance the prior Algiers Declaration of May 2009 on the African Common Platform to Copenhagen, which was approved by African negotiators in a Special Session of AMCEN. These meetings were in anticipation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP), which took place from December 7 to 18, 2009, in Copenhagen, Denmark.

The AU sought to establish a common position going into the UNFCCC conference in order to ensure that Africa's views are articulated during the negotiations. Climate change remains an un-quantified dimension of peace, security, and development in Africa. However, there is increasing qualitative evidence that climate change has negatively impacted upon the availability of water resources. This has a knock-on effect on the ability to irrigate land and provide adequate pastures for agrarian and pastoralist societies. In turn, this can exacerbate food insecurity, foment sociopolitical tension, and precipitate violent conflict. There is also the threat of coastal erosion, which might affect a number of African countries. The paradox is that while Africa has played a minimal role in global warming by virtue of its low production of greenhouse gases, it is likely to experience some of the most adverse effects climate changes.

CAHOSCC is significant in the sense that it is the first time that Africa sought to express a common position on climate change. During the negotiations, CAHOSCC argued for embracing a shared global vision in terms of how to deal with climate change. The body also called for climate financing, in addition to ongoing development assistance, as well as technology transfer to enable African countries to effectively mitigate against the effects of climate change on their environments as well as on their industries. Africa's climatic vulnerability is compounded by a low capacity to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change.

While Africa took the unprecedented step of adopting a unified position, this position was severely tested during the COP talks. In particular, Zenawi found it difficult to maintain the African position in light of the intransigence of the developed world to commit to climate financing. Ultimately, the outcomes of the COP did not live up to the expectations in terms of achieving a binding and equitable agreement that would decrease the levels of carbon emissions and begin to reverse the worst effects of climate change. The complexity of the negotiations was exploited by a number of countries to avoid making substantive agreements. African countries were compelled to accept a last minute agreement, which was brokered by a small group of influential countries including the United States, China, Brazil, Russia, and South Africa. Even though the Copenhagen COP agreed to hold the increase in global temperatures to below two degrees centigrade, the commitments on climate finance did not meet the CAHOSCC negotiating position.

In effect, CAHOSCC did not maintain a unified position in the face of a difficult negotiating posture by international partners. This illustrates that while the AU can act to forge a consensus on international issues, it is still burdened by the challenge of maintaining the collective position of its members in the face of difficult global negotiations.

Beyond the Rhetoric to Achieving the Reality: The Challenge of the AU's Internal Normative Transformation

While there is a role for external actors in encouraging countries to make the transition to more open and democratic societies, genuine change can only be brought about when domestic, subregional, and Pan-African institutions like the African Union and its actors make it their personal responsibility to entrench transparency. A lack of transparency in democratic governance means that Africa's resources have systematically been mismanaged because dictators, oligarchs, and pseudo-democrats, who tend to ignore human rights, the rule of law, and citizen participation in political affairs, tend to hoard the national wealth of their countries. This in turn has undermined the continents ability to speak with one voice at the international level. The lack of transparency in democratic governance gives rise to a host of side effects, including the inadequate ability to collect and manage local economies, which would be a natural and sustainable source of developmental funds. It also leads to the closing down of the political space for associations, civil society, educational institutions, and think tanks to contribute to national and continental policy development, due to a suppression of their ability to highlight the problems afflicting their communities and mapping out potential solutions. A lack of democratic governance can also undermine the rule of law by co-opting the judiciary and constraining the freedom of the legislature to keep the executive branch of government in check. In the cloak of darkness fostered by undemocratic rule, financial corruption and economic mismanagement flourish and development is deterred. Paradoxically, when aid is injected into such a situation it can sometimes postpone the attainment of genuine democratic reforms.

In terms of remedying the effects of undemocratic rule in Africa, a more proactive AU could provide the means to establish and consolidate a continent-wide process to ensure the self-monitoring of governance conditions within countries as well as enhance the global posture of the regional organization toward international issues. The AU's voice as an international actor has to be premised on principles, norms, and policies that have to be negotiated with the African people. African presidents, prime ministers, governments, and societies then have to commit to uphold these principles and elevate the standards of democratic governance so that the promise of continental integration can be fulfilled.

Conclusion

The AU can play a role in enabling the African continent to overcome its dependence on external actors. For the AU to serve as an effective international actor, there is a need to advance continental integration and increase the role of the organization. There are enough resources within the African continent to operationalize and fund an indigenous peacebuilding, recovery, reconstruction, and development program. However, access to these resources is often distorted by the forces of globalization and external interests. For the time being, these resources cannot be managed and disbursed to fund development exclusively on a national level. An African-centered and sustainable development would require resources to be harnessed through a framework of continental integration to which African countries voluntary agree and subscribe. The AU in and of itself will not assure an indigenous-driven peacebuilding and development program. It has to be premised and buttressed by a commitment by African governments and societies to a number of principles, norms, and policies. Primarily, these would include economic transparency and democratic governance.

In the final analysis, the AU has made practical efforts to function as an international actor. The major problem facing the AU is the lack of integrity among some of the leaders of African countries, who have committed themselves to principles, norms, and values of human rights and democratic governance, but continue to practice suppression, dominion, and exploitation of their own people. In terms of its limitations, not all of Africa's heads of state and government are taking the African Union seriously. The norms and values that they have signed up to should be enough to encourage them to change their behavior. However, many leaders are behaving as though the AU does not exist; they continue to commit human rights atrocities, which form the basis for conflict escalation, with impunity.

African continental integration is not yet a concrete reality, and it remains a promise to be fulfilled. Therefore the efficacy of the AU in international relations remains substantially constrained. Specifically, the AU needs to develop a more proactive stance on key matters at the UN that affect its constituent members. The absence of which will continue to permit the marginalization of Africa's interests at the UN. However, the inability of African countries to forge a much more coherent identity and consistently maintain a united stance on a wide range of issues means that African countries are at a disadvantage when it comes to promoting the continent's interests. This further contributes toward the perpetuation of a "paternal" attitude by the UN system toward Africa. In the interests of achieving peace, security, and development it is important for African countries to maintain sufficient discipline so that they can act as a unified block at the UN. It is the only way that the AU can dispense with any paternalism toward Africa, which still lingers in the UN system. In terms of the future prospects for the AU, the organization has all the necessary policy institutions to function as an effective international actor on behalf of the continent. It is necessary to mobilize political will at the level of African leaders through exerting peer pressure on fellow leaders to ensure that they maintain their unified positions in the global fora.

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Part IV

Confronting Africa's Development

13

New Encounters in U.S.-Africa Democracy Relations: Less of the Same?

Rita Kiki Edozie

Introduction

Rita Abrahamsen and Paul Williams have argued that contemporary democracy promotion emerges as a product of a hard-won Cold War struggle fought in the name of democracy and freedom. These values, they say, reemerged in the post-Cold War era at a time of capitalism's historic triumph over communism. As a result, the promotion of democracy became an intrinsic part of Western-led globalization in the millennium and the focus of a new liberal development ideology.[1]

The authors are right; in 2010, discourses and policy practices about the globalization of democratization dominate the international arena. Leading global powers (the UN, the EU, the United States, the G-8 (now G-20), Amnesty International, Freedom House, etc.) and a host of other actors now govern the international order as if the only type of legitimate national government were "liberal democracy." Multiparty democratic elections have become the test of political legitimacy as international relations is now devoted to using democratization, elections, and democracy promotion of this genre in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Former Soviet Union and its successor states (FSU), and more recently in the larger Middle East as vehicles for achieving global stability.

For Africa, the iconic international NGO—Freedom House—that tracks this new spread of liberal democratic regimes around the world classifies 21 percent of the continent's countries as full, liberal democracies.[2] An even larger 45 percent are categorized as electoral democracies whose civil liberties require much more deepening and consolidation.[3] Only 34 percent of governments are classified as nonelectoral authoritarian, "not free" regimes. Surprisingly, the status of democracy in Africa reveals a more positive state of affairs than is reported by the mainstream literature. Africa has nonetheless suffered serious democratic reversals, including a 2008 coup in Mauritania, a 2009 coup in Guinea, and a 2010 coup in Niger; but so have similar reversals occurred in Thailand (2006), Fiji (2008), and Honduras (2009).

Curiously, this variegated experience of democracy in Africa is a secret to international relations theory and practice, especially in current U.S.-Africa democracy promotion relations. Instead, successive U.S. regimes from Wilson to Obama have utilized democracy as a representational signifier that has in effect misrepresented, marginalized, and introduced subtle means to limit the autonomous agency of self-determined democratic development in African nations. In this respect, the democracy phenomenon is used as a foreign policy tool to distinguish "the good guys" from the "bad guys," those regimes worth supporting from those not, and it has become the remedy for countries whose practices are disliked (Venezuela, Iran, Zimbabwe).[4]

There exists a historical explanation for this contemporary posture for conducting democracy relations with developing world nations as it has emerged in the United States. Examine, for example, the actions of the late U.S. Democratic Party senator Paul Tsongas in 1976. In defending the rationale of disbursing U.S. foreign aid assistance using the benchmark of human rights, but significantly *not* "democracy," Tsongas argued that the Third World did not have "a democratic tradition; there are very few John Lockes, Rousseau's or Magna Cartas" in their legacy. "Third World institutions are mostly authoritarian, based on tribalism, religion and the extended family."[5] The pessimistic and paternalistic tone toward developing world democracy exhibited by U.S. politicians and policy makers like Tsongas is replicated in recent events with regard to democracy promotion in Africa; it reflects a reality that underscores the suggestion that U.S. sentiment toward cultures in the continent differs little from the contexts that were established 30 years ago. For example, in May and July of 2009 in Egypt and Ghana, respectively, President Barack Obama gave two marked speeches related to democracy and human rights. Ironically, the speech in Cairo, Egypt, targeted at the Middle East and the Arab world, appeared less paternalistic than the one in Ghana, aimed at Africa (Sub-Saharan). In Cairo, President Obama's speech acknowledged the tendentiousness and complexity of democratization efforts in non-Western regions. The speech especially also acknowledged that democracy could not be exported[6] and emphasized that its development required self-determined, indigenous, and grassroots mechanisms that are evolved at the national level.

Democracy rating body Freedom House classifies only Israel and Lebanon as democracies in the Middle East. Curiously, in sub-Saharan Africa with at least 11 countries having been classified with the same democracy rankings as the United States and Europe, "free"—showing that democracy is much more present and vibrant there than in the Middle East—President Obama's speech was less nuanced. Addressing the Ghanaian parliament after having selected Ghana because the country had signified "good governance" and emerged as a "beacon of democracy" compared with the rest of the continent, President Obama's speech appeared simplistic and paternalistic. Before the speech leading up to his visit to Africa, for example, in justifying his choice of Ghana and not his country of heritage, Kenya, for his first official visit to Africa, the president said that he was using Ghana to "lift up a successful model of democracy." "Countries that are governed well . . . where leadership recognizes that they are accountable to the people and that institutions are stronger than any one person have a track record of producing results for the people . . . the kinds of democratic commitments that ensure stability in a country. And we want to highlight that . . . but, in my father's own country of Kenya, I'm concerned about how political parties do not seem to be moving into a permanent reconciliation that would allow the country to move forward. And Kenya is not alone."[7]

President Obama's rhetorical pronouncements about democracy in Africa guide the current chapter. There is no doubt that contemporary democracy promotion has many motivations—objectives that range from idealism to economic and strategic interests.[8] Yet, how is one to understand the significance and viability of U.S.-Africa democracy relations in Africa in this context? Why are the majority of African countries still represented simplistically in U.S. foreign policy instruments? What impact does the liberal framework of political and economic reform used as a basis for democracy promotion have on the existing democratic developments in the continent—and what are those developments? Will—and should—the Obama Administration's democracy relations with Africa be different from its predecessor regime's policies?

In addressing these questions, the current chapter critically analyzes U.S.-Africa relations via its democracy promotion platform. The chapter will examine the issues- theoretical and policy debates- and interactions that have informed the socio-political construction of U.S.-Africa democracy relations. Using a constructivist theory of international relations, the objective is to gain critical insight into the countervailing power relations that inform, shape, and construct ultimate policy outcomes. In *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity,* justifying his use of a postmodernist infusion into normative international relations theory, David Campbell began his preface with the adage, "Uncertain times demand uncertain analysis."[9] Today, in the context of a "War on Terror," a global financial crisis, and the intensification of both economic and political global governance interventions in Africa, my methodology for this chapter broaches into a similar trajectory of uncertain analysis to examine the domain of democratization with respect to the current volume's objective—"Africa and the New World Era."

To adequately scaffold the deep terrains of this complex topic, I borrow from post-structural international relations scholars[10] who examine the relationship between "democracy and development" and reveal the subtextual usage of "democracy" by a so-called international development industrial complex. They demonstrate the ways that democracy, in this regard, is employed as a "representational" tool of a hegemonic U.S. foreign policy and international politics. For these scholars, democracy—used by Northern foreign policy toward the South—has become a nodal point, an idea accepted as indisputably true and used as an anchor for creating a much broader framework that facilitates making predictions about the behavior of democracy without having fully understood it.[11] In her book *Imperial Encounters* Roxanne Doty has said that democracy promotion tied to foreign aid has been—and continues to be—part of a "meticulous ritual of power played and replayed with various twists, turns and modifications; that have not changed since North-South colonial encounters."[12]

The subsections that follow similarly examine U.S.-Africa democracy relations in the context of these debates, histories, and new policy issues in order to gain insight into the countervailing power relations that both influence the development of these relations and structurally shape the way such relations are manifest in practice. Disillusioned with the normative international relations paradigms of analysis—realism and liberalism especially—I will use a post-structural framework so as to reveal subterranean, subtextual intimacies and nuances that are usually invisible in normative assessments of international politics. In doing so, I hope to demonstrate the ways in which democracy promotion has been—and continues to be—part of a discursive ritual of asymmetrical power relations embedded in a complex network of symbolic and historical interactions between the United States and Africa. Doing so will illustrate ways that this relationship has culminated in a given set of democracy public policy implications manifest in the contemporary Obama Administration's foreign policy stance toward Africa.

I argue throughout the chapter that the use of "democracy" as a hegemonic "representational" tool by U.S. foreign policy actors leads to a negative and an instrumental construction of the African democratic experience. Misrepresentation of actually existing democratization processes is the inevitable fallout. In concluding, therefore, through a comparative analysis of U.S. democracy promotion efforts in Honduras and Zimbabwe, I deduce that U.S.-Africa democracy relations have little capacity to influence significant democratic change in the continent. The reality is that democratization in Africa will continue to evolve as a complex phenomenon. This will occur variably and comparatively and be based on the socioeconomic and cultural contexts of the continent's national environments.

Democracy and Development: Beyond the Modernization Paradigm

Modernization Theory in Development and Democracy

International democracy promotion in Africa is underlay by the development discourse of modernization theory. The idea of development is a product of the postcolonial world, but was borne and has been driven by the industrial world to culminate into a humungous and complex industry and paradigmatic platform for North-South relations. Launching the U.S. Peace Corps and inscribing the concept of development into the country's foreign policy discourse, in the 1960s, President John F. Kennedy proclaimed, "To those people in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bounds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves."[13]

In the post-World War II era, modernization theory was considered a suitable framework for examining the decolonizing transformations occurring in the newly independent world and especially in Africa. Development was a tool that would help the newly independent countries of the post-World War II period to become modern—like their former colonial powers. Modernization theory presumes the universality and superiority of Western rationalism and institutions; according to Richard Peet and Elaine Hartwick, it claims that "if you want to develop, be like us."[14] Modernization falsely constructs a dualism between tradition and modernity and when incorporated into development theory calls for a break in tradition toward a linear trajectory to modernity. To achieve this, the paradigm recommends that certain modern (liberal) attitudes and values—already developed in the West—must be in existence for development to occur.

Democratization is regarded as an important vehicle and a crucial mechanism integrally related to modernization theories about development. There can be no development without democracy argues this point of view. In the post-World War II environment, in debating the democracy-development circularity—which comes first—the development industry privileged development. Attaining development would foster democratization. Dankwart Rustow would argue that democratization emerges from the modernization stage of development.

Recent global events and processes such as the end of the Cold War have ushered in new intellectual perspectives and approaches to development and democracy that have reversed the democracy-development conundrum to reverse the equation and thereby prioritize democracy as key to development. Democracy became a first logical step toward development. Nonetheless, modernization remained an undercurrent in new democratization as development theories. Indeed, modernizationists merely transitioned to neo-modernizationists, who since the 1990s have begun to tie development to democratization in more significant ways.

Neo-modernization theses form the intellectual roots of contemporary discourses and international development theories and practices in the developing world. The most widely recognized theory of this genre is the good governance theory, which is built on the premise that developing world political systems at the end of the Cold War are characterized by the personalization of power, widespread corruption, unelected governments, and the denial of fundamental human rights to citizens.[15] In this regard, good governance development discourse stressed the need for leaders to receive training in effective governance strategies that would enhance their political regimes' legitimacy and draw citizens into the formal political and economic spheres of the polity.

Postmodern liberals have also appropriated the neo-modernization approach to democracy and development by incorporating the core tenets of these concepts into the paradigm of human rights discourse. Focusing exclusively on political rights and civil liberties struggles, democratic development has become incorporated into a new human security framework in which democratic mobilization at the margins of societies, conflict and security, and economic development are all tied together.[16] Taking its cue from Amartya Sen's classic thesis in *Development and Freedom,* this approach sees democracy and development as complexly interwoven with each other. Development in this respect is manifest through individual opportunity and freedom to participate in local, national, and global political-economic processes that will enhance individual human welfare (Sen, 1999?).[17]

Poststructuralist Critical Reinterpretation

Post-structuralist postmoderns reject modernization and neo-modernization democratic and development frameworks. Alternatively, they utilize representational discourses to critique normative development theories. Constructivist discourses of this genre eschew what they consider Western hegemonic representations that present developing world political-economic processes as abnormalities to be treated clinically. Modernization development theories limit the Third World subject to a duality between two cultural heritages that traps peoples of the developing world in Western imitation; thus, scholars of this theoretical persuasion are critical of the use of development as a rationale for external intervention into the local-national arenas of developing countries.[18]

Post-structural radicals believe that modernization theory's Eurocentric bias uses development theory as a strategy of modern power and social control that eschews the alternative—and particularly the self-determined—political, economic, and sociocultural processes of developing world regions. They argue for the dismantling of a development industry that has become institutionalized by the formation of a network of sites of power and knowledge that bind people in the developing world into certain behaviors and rationalities.

Arturo Escobar's *Encountering Development* thoroughly chronicles the manner in which development had achieved the status of a certainty in the social imaginary by the end of the 1970s. Indeed, referring to the emergence of "development" as a "colonization of reality," Escobar's classic study further proceeds to show how such representations as "development" became dominant and began to shape ways in which this reality was imagined and acted upon by the North in relation to the South.[19] Escobar argues that the development discourse has created an efficient apparatus for producing knowledge about the exercise of power over the Third World; it has successfully deployed a regime (the North) over the Third World, a "space for subject peoples," which ensures control over it.[20]

Roxanne Doty extends the radical critique of development to contemporary discourses of democracy and human rights. In *Imperial Encounters,* Doty illustrates ways in which "democracy and human rights" discourses and practices in the South were constructed by British and U.S. colonial authorities. Colonial overrule made possible new techniques within a context of global power with respect to North-South relations. This process allowed for the possibility of the "Third World" to be monitored, classified, and placed under continual surveillance.[21] In reviewing the archival conference proceedings of key U.S. politicians and policy makers in the 1970s who began to promote democracy and human rights as a hallmark of U.S. foreign policy, Doty concludes that despite their recent history with colonial and imperial violence in the Third World, the United States and Britain set up policy pronouncements that constructed themselves as superior subjects who embodied the ideals of democracy and human rights. Despite widespread practices in which both countries had denied self-government to millions of people in the Philippines and in Kenya, respectively, both Britain and the US retained an identity as the exemplars of democratic values in the promotion of liberty.[22] The colonized subjects of the developing world were discursively represented by the Northern colonialists as not being ready for the responsibility of democracy: they were uncivilized, violent, and lazy.[23]

Rita Abrahamsen makes one of the most damning critiques of development and democracy with regard to Africa in her book *Disciplining Democracy*.[24] Like Escobar and Doty, Abrahamsen acknowledges the impasse reached by development theory: it is trapped within its own meta-narratives and is unable to capture the diversity of the Third World in any relevant and constructive manner.[25] Her own study demonstrates the ways in which the international community's good governance agenda constitutes an intrinsic part of the hegemony of the development paradigm employed by the North to legitimize continued intervention into Africa.

The good governance agenda, argues Abrahamsen, legitimizes a skewed, superficial form of democracy that is mercantilist and imperial in its promotion of economic reform. Good governance theory displaced mass-based, sovereign, and self-determined struggles for democracy in a number of nations in the continent during the 1990s third wave of democratization era in Africa. As a result, in Zambia, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, and Kenya, democratization and economic reform emerged at the whims of the IMF and the World Bank; in effect, what were produced were not liberal democracies at all but "exclusionary democracies." Exclusionary democracies, according to Abrahamsen, are client regimes dependent on and obligated to international finance institutions but that are unable and unwilling to deliver the democracy dividend to their mass electorates.[26]

Democracy, Development, and Socioeconomic Struggles

There is a lively debate over whether the critique of development and democracy by the post-structuralist school represents a rejection of development and its prospects for addressing many of the political-economic challenges that pervade the developing world, including the challenge of democratization. That is why Arturo Escobar argues that he and his cohorts are interested in alternatives to the conceptualization of development. They advocate democracy and development processes that are rooted in local culture and knowledge and that defend and promote localized, grassroots social movements.[27]

Alternative models believe that development processes should not be based on how the "first world *observes*" but how the "third world *experiences*." Hybridization and self-determined collective mobilization give social movements and political processes space to achieve welfare improvement; the struggles for development provide growth with a "new direction," an opportunity and the agency to "modify, appropriate and re-appropriate" contextual democratic spaces.[28]

The aforementioned theoretical discussion of development and democracy underscores the ways in which African affairs' democracy promotion foreign policy is still subverted under the Eurocentric lens of the modernization development theory. Based on this model, current international affairs policy with its humanitarian focus toward the continent absorbs Africa into a global, transnational, cultural, and economic reality and thereby reduces the continent's agency, complexity, plurality, positivism, and a critical examination of an alternative array of resolutions of its development challenges. Alternatively, the post-structuralist critique of development and democracy has significant positive implications for democracy promotion in Africa. Valentine Mudimbe, the Congolese scholar, wants post-structuralism to be used as a way to critically reinterpret Africa as it has been seen from Africa's epistemological, historical, and geographical exteriority.[29] Such critical reinterpretations of development and democracy are important, according to Mudimbe, because they provide Africans with greater autonomy over how they are represented and how they can construct their own social and cultural models in ways that are not mediated by Western episteme.[30]

Wilsonian Values and U.S. Democracy Promotion: Navigating between Instrumentalism and Humanitarianism

In 2010, like many other advanced industrial countries, the United States promotes its democratization foreign policy ideals through what post-structuralist scholars might refer to as a "democracy-development industrial complex." Much of democracy policy is organized through the State Department, which has a Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. The objective of this department is to "promote democracy as a means to achieve security, stability, and prosperity for the entire world." Through congressional bills and initiatives, the democracy promotion foreign policy complex has launched GONGOs (Government-owned NGOs) such as the National Endowment of Democracy and the National Democratic Institute to carry forth its goals through cross-continental civil society initiatives.[31]

However, underlying contemporary U.S. pronouncements about its democracy objectives around the world is a complicated history that combines idealistic discursive rhetoric with both humanitarian and realist foreign policy strategies in practice. Both the complexity and the duplicity of this trajectory have been played out since the Wilsonian era when democracy began to be used as a rhetorical value that embodied a superior identity for the United States (as an exemplar of democracy) vis-à-vis "old Europe" and certainly against the formerly colonized and enslaved peoples of the developing world. On the other hand, however, during this post World War I and II period, U.S. ideals about democracy also began to reflect the contradictions that emerged from America's hegemonic status as a world superpower containing communism and securing global stability.

The principles of democracy and human rights have consistently underlain the rhetoric of American foreign policy in Africa since this period. President Woodrow Wilson himself advocated for the pursuit of democracy and human rights when calling for self-determination for colonized peoples.[32] Wilsonian values were defined in terms of the idea of universal morality, the establishment of people-oriented democratic institutions at the national level as well as internationally.

Wilsonian democracy foreign policy supported decolonization processes in Africa in the 1960s; however, given the context of the Cold War, Wilsonian values that would have fostered substantive and genuine democracy promotion in the continent were displaced by *realpolitik* and national interest foreign policies that sought to support client authoritarian leaders rather than democratic ones in the name of "communist containment." For example, while a 1961 Foreign Assistance Act linked economic and military aid to democracy and human rights, the United States propped up nondemocratic regimes, including Congo's Mobutu, Kenya's Moi, and even Ethiopia's Selassie.[33] Other strategic national interests in U.S. foreign policy prevailed over sincere democracy promotion in the continent as well. For instance, the United States did not support the late anticolonial struggles in Portuguese-Africa (Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau & Cape Verde) because of its (the United States') and Portugal's membership in NATO. As a result, both Angola and Mozambique weren't to experience decolonizing democratic transitions until two decades later, in the 1990s. Similarly, both the Johnson and the Nixon administrations supported human rights violations in Rhodesia and South Africa, contributing to the perpetuation of authoritarian rule in Southern Africa for decades to come.

In the 1970s, by making democracy and human rights central to international diplomatic discourse, the Carter Administration resuscitated genuine democracy promotion into its foreign policy, especially with respect to Africa. For a short while the Carter Administration based economic and military aid on human rights violations in places like South Africa, Uganda, and Ethiopia.[34] However, even Carter's Wilsonian democracy promotion strategy was reversed after the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis as Carter negotiated military bases in Kenya, Somalia, and the Sudan in 1980 despite the rampant human rights violations at the time in these countries.[35]

In the 1980s, the Reagan Administration's policy toward Africa was well known for its aggressive realist ideology—it viewed democracy and human rights as tools for containing communism. The administration's naked support for Angola's UNITA—describing it as a freedom-fighting group in contrast with the terrorist label considered for South Africa's ANC—is a case in point. In the 1990s post-Cold War environment, it was the Bush I administration that is credited with having formally adjusted U.S. foreign policy to the pro-democracy universalist trends of the period. George Walker Bush's policy emphasized—through his emissaries—that the new division of the world had moved from "East to West, to those committed to democracy and liberty."[36]

It was the Clinton administration, however, that more fully resuscitated Wilsonian democracy ideals by using Wilsonian principles strategically for his new globalist manifestation of African foreign policy. Bill Clinton's secretary of state, Warren Christopher, emphasized that "promoting democracy and human rights is a pillar of American foreign policy."[37] In still an emerging post-Cold War order at that time, Clinton's multilateral internationalist approach which sought foreign policy alliances with the UN, the IMF, and the World Bank formed the cornerstone of the administration's foreign policy. Uniquely, the policy emphasized the promotion of democracy and free markets as a means to foster global stability.

The markers of Clinton democracy promotion included good governance, accountability, free and fair elections, and the need for African governments to provide democratic space.[38] No differently from President Obama's current rationale for targeting Ghana to symbolize the preferred direction for democratization in Africa, Clinton's 1995 initiatives used Ghana, South Africa, Botswana, Senegal, and Rwanda as launching pads for democracy promotion since they were considered to be democratizing and advancing rapidly toward market economies. Nevertheless, Clinton's democracy promotion could also be considered mercantilist as it promoted U.S. economic interests through the 1988 African Growth and Opportunity Act. Because the act—a bilateral-regional trade agreement between the United States and Africa—imposed IMF and World Bank "conditionality," including open markets, privatization, and tariff cuts, it was considered a violation of African sovereignty and thus a contributor to the reversal of democracy in the continent.

By 2000, the George W Bush II administration's democracy promotion rhetoric had raised Wilsonian values to the fore of U.S. foreign policy. Yet, contradictorily, the undercurrents of realism and national interest that lay behind such policies in the past were now made more overtly apparent. In a January 2005 speech, two years after the controversial invasion of Iraq, former president Bush stated that "promoting the freedom of other countries was an urgent requirement of our nation's security and the calling of our time. . . . So, it is the policy of the U.S. to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world."[39]

In addition to the national strategic exercises in Iraq, however, in Africa, the Bush administration's democracy promoting policies were mercantilist. This could be seen from the administration's launching of the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). The MCA is a bilateral development fund established by the Bush administration in 2002. The former president called for a new compact for development with accountability for both rich and poor countries and pledged to increase development assistance to the developing world through this body by 50 percent by Fiscal Year 2006. Countries that participate in the MCA are selected on a competitive basis through a set of 16 indicators designed to measure a country's effectiveness at ruling justly, investing in people, and fostering enterprise and entrepreneurship.

The program emphasizes good economic and good governance policies in recipient countries. The Bush Administration stated its belief that development aid works better in countries with good governance principles such as free markets and low corruption. Five of the 16 MCA accountability criteria are aimed at helping countries "rule justly." The criteria include civil liberties, political rights, voice and accountability, government effectiveness, control of corruption and rule of law. Eligible African countries have been Ghana, Benin, Mozambique, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, and Senegal.

Indeed, by 2010, U.S. democracy policy had incorporated the *postmodern* liberal *discourse* of democracy—into its democracy promotion lexicon. That is to say, with the reemergence of Wilsonian democratic universalism in the millennium, U.S. foreign policy now sees democratization as a platform for civil societies all over the world to opt for democratic government, overthrow dictators, and roll back the state to make room for the market economy. U.S. policy makers consider democratization to be a bottom-up movement, a celebration of freedom in which people—who were otherwise modern but who lived under tyrannies—managed to cast off the yoke of dictatorship.[40]

As a result, contemporary U.S. democracy promotion encounters with Africa continue to represent as mixed a bag and conundrum of idealist, realist, and discursive contradictions as its historical encounters. Significantly, however, "democracy and development" remains a cultural production tool of U.S. foreign policy embedded with the modernization theory and used to produce a certain kind of Western human subject and liberal social order in the developing world regions such as Africa.

Consider, for example, the way that the "democracy" signifier has been incorporated into U.S. development organizations such as the United States Assistance in Development (USAID) and egregiously into security organizations such as the U.S.-Africa Command, AFRICOM. This style of democracy promotion made up the dominant organ for U.S. foreign policy toward the developing world in the 1990s with the advent of the Bush administration (George Bush Sr.); development for USAID would now target democracy promotion in four areas: rule of law, civil society, elections, and political processes and governance while AFRICOM, an institution of the U.S. Department of Defense, designed to run all U.S. military operations in Africa with the acclaimed goal of improving the continent's security, as well as promoting its health, education, *democratization,* and economic growth would use democracy foreign policy to target Africa's security relations.

Democracy and Alternative Modernity in Africa: The Democracy-Development Conundrum

Democracy's Own Path in Africa

While U.S. democracy promotion privileges liberal Western values and civic elite behavior drawn from Western democratic development, like other regions of the developing world, Africans prefer to construct democratic systems that have been adapted to their own historical and sociocultural contexts. These structural contexts, including colonialism, anti & postcolonialism, global dependency and inequality, late economic development and poverty, late nation-state formation and regime stability, and cultural pluralism, have all influenced a divergent Western, liberal trajectory toward democratization for Africa.

Africans have hybridized democratic modernity; they have done so in ways that negate the normative, linear modernization and neo-modernization theoretical constructs that reduce the continent's experience with democracy to an authoritarian cultural tradition that requires the acquisition of "good" liberal values like the West to democratize. Defying the dualisms of tradition versus modernity, democracy in Africa has been much more complex; Africans have experimented with and adapted democratic institutions and ideas in ways that are reflective of the socioeconomic and cultural environments that they live in. Different African states and diverse sectors of African societies have organically evolved ideas of freedom and conferred as well as struggled for rights that are meaningful in their given environments. Many times, rather than political rights and civil liberties, cultural and economic rights dominate democratization struggles in the continent. The reality is that by 2010, democracy in Africa remains poised with several progressive challenges, problems and self-determined organically constructed solutions to democratization pitfalls.

Freedom in Africa

Part of this experience with hybrid forms of democracy, despite the continent's structural challenges, has been the homegrown emergence of liberal democracy, with its precepts of freedom and human rights. Liberal democracy surprisingly has been relatively successful in Africa. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that Africans have not been able to liberalize, Africans have indeed been able to organically establish liberal norms of freedom.[41] Africans believe in government based on competitive principles and generally have been satisfied with the performance of democratic regimes. African states and societies have done relatively well in the area of human rights and democracy.[42] As a matter of fact, many African countries perform much better than non-African transitional and developing counterparts:

For example, 11 African nations, most European nations, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, an increasing number of South American nations, India, and Japan are accorded the status of free, liberal, representative democracies by the international rating body, Freedom House. Mali and Senegal's *free* ratings are significantly higher than most other predominantly Muslim countries. Nigeria and Kenya's *partially free* rating compares favorably when considering the *not free* ratings of these countries' counterparts in Russia and much of central Asia. South Africa's *free* ratings also compare well to those of Turkey, India and Brazil.

What's more, most African countries are electoral democracies, if not liberal democracies. Countries classified as *partially free* tend to be constrained by structural elements that limit the full extension of rights; however, in this category of democracies, rights generally are not deliberately violated. Moreover, even *not free* regimes in Africa practice some semblance of liberal democracy by holding elections and nominally extending rights to their citizens in democratic constitutions; this way these states at least provide a platform for democratic struggle.

The *partially free* rating in political rights and civil liberties goes to many African democracies. These countries have distinctive features of what liberal democrats refer to as the electoral democracy and the illiberal democracy. Partly free countries tend to qualify as electoral but not liberal democracies due to their many violations in providing substantive civil liberties to their citizens. Most of Africa's *partially free* democracies could be considered representative democracies in a procedural sense, yet they also display serious constrictions on citizenship rights. Structural challenges emerging from these countries national histories, such as militant insurgencies and ethnic tensions, cause stressed governments in this category to violate human rights in ways inconsistent with the principle of liberal democracy. Some *partially free* democracies—Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia—are classified as full democracies by other rating bodies.[43] This subgroup represents Africa's largest and most diverse state-societies. Their inability to fully incorporate political rights and civil liberties offers insights into how liberal democracy poses challenges for pluralistic and underdeveloped social contexts.

As with the partially free category, *not free* countries range in governing type from electoral democracies such as Cote D'Ivoire, Rwanda and Zimbabwe, to the nondemocratic authoritarian regimes of the Sudan, Egypt and Algeria. These democracies could be classified as electoral or pseudo-democracies by objective standards. That is to say, for example, each of the six conducts multiparty elections. While Zimbabwe has one of Africa's worst freedom scores, the country has had systematic, regularly scheduled, multiparty elections since the end of the colonial period.

The Structural Limitation

Nonetheless, Africa's record of democratic freedom indicates that despite successes in many areas, there still remains a range of deeply structural, residual elements that constrain countries from developing ideal liberal democracies on the continent. This reality underscores the hybrid nature of democratic development in the continent. Here is where the element of radical critique of the human rights postmodern liberal democracy promotion discourse in Africa becomes especially relevant. Most importantly is the inability among outsiders to understand that developing regions sometimes need to look to the problems associated with under-and-uneven development as a higher immediate priority than political and civil rights.[44]

Performance among many of Africa's new democracies demonstrates that seeming paradoxes emerge as a result of the structural factors emanating from the condition of un-development. The challenges that engulf these new democracies center in the quality of democratic freedom that can be maintained given social and economic realities. Will new democracies remain fledgling—with minimal political rights—while unable to provide extensive civil liberties? Human rights abuses are always close by when societies feel insecure. These issues cross out of the area of democracy discourse and into structural dynamics, sovereignty over boundaries, and issues of cultural pluralism and ethnic identity. The realities involve capitalist production, the accumulation and distribution of goods and services, and other pressures that can cause weak states to overload into ungovernability and corruption.[45]

Due to the deep structural limitations of these democracies, states can have good intentions yet fall into practices and conceptions about the exercise of democratic authority that are incompatible from liberal rights.[46] Liberal modernization constructs of democracy employ a particular set of ideals for what makes a successful democratic performance in granting political rights and civil liberties yet their criteria minimize the salience and importance of security rights, socioeconomic rights; and cultural group rights.

This suggests that there is not so much a cultural bias against liberal politics as a structural bias. Real, existing sociopolitical and economic structures, by which democratic rights and ideas will be achieved beyond nominal rhetoric, are often difficult to transition to and maintain in the developing world. The deep structures that influence the behavior of these democracies when compared to Western liberal democracies are influenced by the nation building process that has been a result of decolonization. Decolonization and postcolonialism have thrown up legacies such as economic development and dependency in a global economy—factors that contribute to the challenges of building sustainable liberal democracies in the continent.

Democracy & Development in Africa and the International Community: Revisited and Applied

International democracy promotion in Africa suffers from the reliance of the neo-modernization good governance discourse. This fact is revealed when democracy is seen to be a political framework for successful economic development. International donors who are inclined to promote economic reform have adopted the language of political reform and associated it with democratization. Constructed this way, democratization in the form of good governance or what some have begun to refer to as a new public management (NPM) approach to politics (political-economy) viewed democracy as an important vehicle that would foster more efficient economic reforms. With these reforms, the new democratic state could remain an important force for economic and social development. The properly governed state would no longer act merely as a provider of economic goods and welfare. It would be, instead, a catalyst, partner, and facilitator of development and democracy.[47]

In international institutions, democracy and economic liberalism have become conceptually linked to the extent that good governance equals democracy and economic reform and bad governance equals state intervention in the economy.[48] With its discourse rhetoric of claiming to want to reduce corruption among the African elite leadership, internationalist good governance proponents claim to speak on behalf of the Africa's democratic constituents to help them equitably distribute their respective nations' wealth. International institutions deceptively charge that African civil societies are the rightful agents of economic-reform-led wealth distribution. In reality however, the good governance as democracy thesis may be seen as the latest derivation of what Rita Abrahamsen has called Western development theory's hegemony of "seduction."[49] That is to say that rather than the progressive ideals that the discourse posits, in reality, good governance democracy forces African democratic leaders to implement society-harmful and poverty-inducing economic reforms, for which the democratic constituents bear the burden.

It is important to understand that the full implementation and sustenance of rights-based liberal democracies is much more difficult to achieve than is usually envisioned by the international rights organizations and democracy promoters. It is easier to make rhetorical pronouncements about democratic rights than it is to make them a reality, as the continent's national state-societies are increasingly being compelled to do. In effect, the globalization of a human rights construction of liberal democracy has very particular implications for the politics and economics of Africa, often fostering democracies that are "choiceless"[50] and "exclusionary."[51]

"Choiceless democracies" are African democracies in which the IMF/World Bank's political-economic policies restrict the domestic democratic autonomy and agency at the national level.[52] As a result, these democracies find it difficult to enact social welfare policies in accord with the requests and desires of their new constituencies. This is why Rita Abrahamsen classifies Africa's new democracies as "exclusionary" because neoliberal development deliberately blurs the distinction between past development and current democratization. During the development era, political regimes had forged legitimacy with their societies by offering public goods and services, such as health, education and infrastructure. However, in contemporary African governments, the democratic state acts merely as a political framework for economic reform.[53]

The consequence of having choiceless and exclusionary democracies is that emerging, unstable democracies face intractable dilemmas. Governments are pressured by the donor community to implement economic adjustment and reform, yet their constituencies expect development to improve their quality of life. The reality is that economic adjustment has caused discontent and electoral rejection. Economically dependent national democracies on the continent have little choice but to capitulate; they need foreign resources to achieve even a semblance of economic security. As a result, they devise ways to manipulate and subvert the demands of their constituencies, so as to remain in good standing with the international benefactors. Democracy erodes and authoritarian practices are resuscitated.

Despite this reality, international policy analysts continue to promote the advancement of democracy in Africa by encouraging political elites, including civil societal groups, to change their behavior and learn democratic values. Such a requirement assumes that Africans' values are autonomous to the individual and not grounded in historical, economic and political processes. Misrepresentations of this sort lead those that promote democracy and human rights to aim their prescriptions in the wrong direction. They overestimate the role and will of leadership—state and civil society. They are too caught up in demanding that these countries assimilate Western cultural ideas and values. By abstracting "democratization" processes from economic and political processes that are crucial to understanding the societies and national regimes, international democracy analysis blurs important nuance in predicting the democratization paths of African countries.

Public Policy Implications: Obama's Democracy Policy, Honduras and the Zimbabwe Democracy Act of 2001

Obama's Democracy Promotion Strategy

The tensions surmounted when a U.S. democracy promotion policy based on a liberal rhetoric and a realist underbelly directly "encounters" the self-determined structuralist and hybrid trajectory of democracy in Africa described above are underscored in the Obama Administration's U.S.-Africa democracy relations. In this regard, these policies run into conflict in Africa as well as in other parts of the developing world as can be seen from the administration's equivocating response to the July 2009 Honduran democracy crisis. Especially in Africa, by retaining the core principles of the 2001 Zimbabwe Democracy Act in its promotion of democracy and development in Zimbabwe, the Obama Administration resuscitates a now decade-old, inflexible approach to democratization by the United States. toward Africa. This is a liberal, neo-modernization approach, while the Southern African Development Corporation (SADC) and the African Union (AU)'s response to the Zimbabwe crisis may be characterized as a structuralist-hybridized consensus approach.

Given the reality that President Obama's administration is barely two years old at the time of conducting the current study, it is difficult to discern the core strategies of U.S. foreign policy in his regime; and it is particularly difficult to assess the full range of his administration's democracy promotion activities at this time. The limited tenure of President Obama's regime is not the only factor inhibiting greater clarity on this question; a more important problem is the ambiguity and pluralism of President Obama's leadership style. Regarding democracy promotion, for example, some pundits have concluded that President Obama's regime will be one that represents the abandonment of a long-standing U.S. foreign policy with democracy promotion at his core.[54] Alternatively, others suggest that President Obama's foreign policy in itself embodies a style of democracy promotion that employs humanitarianism, developmentalism and the respect for cultural difference as its core principles.

Nonetheless, President Obama's democracy promotion posture towards Africa seems particularly ambivalent when one considers those same relations in other parts of the world, including the Middle East and more recently in Latin America (Honduras particularly). In July of 2009, President Obama seemed to minimize the centrality of democracy promotion when in a pre-inaugural interview with the *Washington Post,* the U.S. president said that he is more concerned with "actually delivering a better life for people on the ground and less obsessed with form . . ."[55] He elaborated on this thought during his April visit to Strasbourg, France: "We spend so much time talking about democracy—and obviously we should be promoting democracy everywhere we can. But democracy, a well-functioning society that promotes liberty and equality and fraternity, does not just depend on going to the ballot box. It also means that you're not going to be shaken down by police because the police aren't getting properly paid. It also means that if you want to start a business, you don't have to pay a bribe. I mean, there are a whole host of other factors that people need . . . to recognize in building a civil society that allows a country to be successful."[56]

In forging a post-Bush administration foreign policy relationship with Egypt, for example, the Obama administration similarly minimizes the importance of democracy, which it felt had been overplayed by the Bush administration; instead in dealing with Egypt, the Obama administration underscores the importance of maintaining friendly diplomatic relations. To the consternation of pro-democracy groups in the country, President Obama seemed to equivocate on the question of democracy in that country when he stated, "there is no straight line to realize the promise of democracy . . . and that each nation gives life to this principle in its own way, grounded in the traditions of its own people. America does not presume to know what is best for everyone."[57]

In 2009, at face value, President Obama's July speech in Ghana might have marked a stylistic shift in U.S. foreign policy toward Africa compared with the Bush administration's policy.[58] Liberal U.S. pundits quickly characterized the administration as exhibiting a humanitarian policy toward Africa in which the continent was seen as intrinsic to the security and development of the global community of nations. According to this thesis, the implication is that in an Obama administration, Africa is finally being recognized as key to the achievement of globally shared goals such as food sufficiency, sustainable energy, human security and environmental management—all achieved through the pillar of democracy and good governance.[59]

A deeper, more critical introspection of the administration's democracy relations in Africa thus far using the post-structural framework however diverges significantly from such a conclusion. For Zimbabwe—and for the rest of Africa—democracy promotion under the Obama Administration seems to receive less of the complex reflection and nuanced engagement compared with other developing world regions. Ghana is simplistically constructed as a beacon of good governance and thus deserved of the U.S. president's engagement, while Zimbabwe is posited with all the same negative "nondemocracy" signifiers that the president's predecessor—George W. Bush—used to construct Venezuela's Hugo Chavez and ousted Honduran president Manuel Zeleya's "bad" behavioral tendencies.

Inequality and Restructuring Democracy in Honduras

President Obama's cautious approach to democracy promotion in Egypt where there seems to be an emphasis on respectfully engaging with the country's political elites is similarly reflected in the regime's relations with Hondurans whose recent coup presents the Latin American country as an important benchmark for understanding the complexities involved in developing world democratization on the one hand and on U.S.-democracy relations on the other.[60]

On June 04, 2009, Honduras' former president Zelaya was unceremoniously ousted from office and forcibly exiled to neighboring Cost Rica in a military coup sanctioned by the country's Supreme Court and Congress. The military's expulsion of the president sought to preempt a nonbinding public consultation that was scheduled to be held later that day on whether to add a ballot box, to the November election that would have asked about convening a constituent assembly to change the country's Constitution.[61]

The domestic and international response to Honduras' democratic reversal presents the country as an interesting comparative counterpoint for examining the ways that deep structures of diseconomy, socioeconomic inequality and globalization influence hybridized democratization trends in the developing world. Domestically, Hondurans are divided by a socioeconomic class war; Honduran elites who control the Congress and the Supreme Court have pronounced Zelaya's removal as a legal, constitutional act to "save" Honduras democracy from the ousted president's alleged unconstitutional referendum measures to change the Constitution. On the other side are the Honduran poor who supported the populist initiatives of the president and his attempts to embark upon structural reforms in a country that it hoped would redistribute income and provide greater political access and empowerment to the many disadvantaged.

Internationally, in the United States, for example, realist foreign policy journalists appeared to have supported the coup on liberal procedural grounds—Zelaya, who was seen as left leaning, was criticized for having attempted to unconstitutionally reform Honduras' Constitution. Manuel Zelaya proposed reforms for Honduras that focused on land redistribution, an increase in the minimum wage, and new rights for women and the poor. However, with the rest of the world, including, the UN, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the EU, the Obama Administration at first condemned the coup in Honduras as illegal, unconstitutional and demanded a resuscitation of democracy with the return of President Zelaya. At this time, President Obama seemed to recognize the complexities of the relationship between poverty, inequality, previous U.S. Cold War policies and democratic development in Latin America. At his first OAS summit—ironically held in Honduras less than a month before the coup—President Obama appeared to set a new tone in relations with Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez. Rather than demonize and caricature Chavez as a "dictator," the president intimated that Chavez's referendums had been democratic.

Since then, however, U.S. democracy policy toward the Honduras crisis has been duplicitous. Despite having called for Zelaya's reinstatement, the U.S. president never overtly nor publicly condemned the Honduran coup-makers; nor did he recall the U.S. ambassador. Ousted president Zelaya was repeatedly refused a meeting with the U.S. president, who recently approved an IMF loan of $164 million to the coup-installed regime. Remarkably, the Obama regime chose to deploy a unique set of democracy promotion principles to foster mediation between the aggrieved parties in Honduras—President Zeleya and the coup-installed president, Michilett—brokered by the Costa Rican President Arias. However, the negotiations failed and the coup-administration arranged for elections at the end of November while refusing to allow for the return of ousted President Zelaya to the country and to the presidency. Curiously, despite the criticism by Honduran pro-democracy forces who opposed the elections, the Obama administration supported the elections and the electoral victory of the right-wing candidate, Porfirio Lobo.[62]

Ousted president Zelaya and a new pro-democracy opposition movement in Honduras have interpreted the administration's actions as implicit support for coup-led regime change of left-leaning democrats in Latin America's era of democracy.

The Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act, 2001: The 2009 Redux

As the Honduran case presents for Latin America, for Africa, Zimbabwe presents provocative public policy implications for U.S. democracy promotion and relations in the continent particularly underscoring the essential attributes that contribute to its misrepresentation in democracy discourse and in the advancement of democracy in practice. For almost a decade now, Zimbabwe stands at the cross-roads representing a tension between Western and African approaches to democratization and development. The international community (the EU, the U.S. and Britain) privilege a liberal competitive approach in engaging with the Zimbabwe crisis as they push for economic sanctions and regime change; the African Union, SADC and South Africa prefer a consensus democracy model in the form that has brokered the current national unity government. The African continental position recognizes the structural challenges of Zimbabwe's recent colonial legacy and the hybrid development of democracy in the region.

The structures of settler colonialism, land inequality, as well as economic and political underdevelopment manifest as challenges to the country's democratic consolidation. Since its independence from Britain and from White minority settler rule in 1980, Zimbabwe has conducted six regularly scheduled presidential multiparty elections at five year intervals; yet President Mugabe's Zimbabwe African Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) remains the dominant party in power and President Mugabe himself has held onto power by repressing the country's political opposition. For much of the 1980s and 1990s, President Mugabe and the ZANU-PF remained relatively legitimate. However, the 2001 election shrouded in the country's enmeshed and controversial land question where less than 1 percent of white settlers own 70 percent of the arable land, structural issues thrown up as a result of the country's recent colonial legacy propelled the country's politics into the forefront of what is now considered the "Zimbabwean democracy crisis."

In the 2001 election, President Mugabe was reelected in presidential elections that were condemned as seriously flawed by the opposition and by foreign observers. The alleged flawed elections led to the country's worsening relations with Britain and the U.S., resulting in Zimbabwe's suspension by the British Commonwealth of Nations. The more recent 2008 electoral process was similarly flawed and contested when opposition MDC claimed victory in both the presidential and parliamentary elections. The official electoral body claimed that Tsvangirai won most votes in the presidential poll, but not enough to avoid a run-off against Mugabe. A run-off election went ahead despite the Movement for Democratic Change's (MDC's) opposition and boycott; subsequently. President Mugabe was declared the winner as Tsvangirai had pulled out days before poll, complaining of opposition intimidation. In September, 2008, ZANU-PF and the MDC opposition forged a government of national unity.

Despite the coalition agreement between the aggrieved parties (Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF and Morgan Tsvangirai's MDC), brokered by the SADC and the former South African president Thabo Mbeki, the Obama administration's response indicated that its democracy policy toward the ten-year old Zimbabwe democracy crisis would differ little from its predecessor's. In March 2009, President Obama turned down Prime Minister Tsvangirai's request for support for a "New Zimbabwe" initiative based on the mutually agreed upon power-sharing agreement. Justifying his decision, while commending the new Zimbabwean prime minister, President Obama argued that he would extend U.S. sanctions established with the 2001 U.S. Zimbabwe democracy and economic recovery act. The president declared that the sanctions would continue to be aimed at President Robert Mugabe and members of his government—excluding the MDC—because the political crisis in Zimbabwe remained unresolved and was a "threat" to U.S. policy.[63] President Obama is quoted to have said, "I obviously have extraordinary admiration for the courage and the tenacity that the prime minister has shown in navigating through some very difficult political times in Zimbabwe." But admonishing President Mugabe, he added, "I think I've made my views clear, [Mugabe] has not acted oftentimes in the best interest of the Zimbabwean people and has been resistant to the kinds of democratic changes that need to take place."[64]

During the meeting with the prime minister and the Zimbabwean parliamentary delegation, White House officials excluded certain people in the delegation from the meeting with President Obama, who were members of President Mugabe's ZANU-PF. The U.S. president claimed to have been also acting on behalf of a U.S. congressional resolution the day before the meeting at which the Senate had been passed to maintain "targeted sanctions and its existing ban on most non-humanitarian government assistance to Zimbabwe until there is progress toward restoring the rule of law, civilian control over security forces and respect for human rights."

More recently (October 2009), Zimbabwe's national unity government has been under stress of breakdown due to the growing rift between the ZANU-MDC coalition. The rift is attributed to the ZANU-PF regime's frustration over the lack of support by the U.S. and other international actors (EU)—to engage the country in a reformulated democracy promotion strategy in Zimbabwe that conforms to the country's structural transformations—particularly given the reality that the self-determined brokering of the power sharing agreement stands to foster a penultimate democratic transition in Zimbabwe.

Incidentally, we have seen how the Obama Administration prides in its policy of diplomatic engagement and gradualist democratization with Egypt, which unlike Zimbabwe has never really transitioned to at least the basic institutional tenets of an electoral democracy.[65] Given that the domestic parties to the democracy crisis had agreed to transcend the conflict through what Huntington once called a "pact" transition[66]—the unity government—the Zimbabwean case represents several crucial prospects for consolidating and deepening democracy than does the Egyptian non-transition and the resistance of the Honduran hardliner elites where U.S. democracy promotion policy utilizes a complex and nuanced strategy that involves diplomatic engagement, mutual partnership and respect and structural facilitation.

Yet, President Obama's continued criticism of the "behavior" of President Mugabe and his refusal to recede the 2001 Zimbabwe democracy act represents for his regime a continuum of a U.S. foreign policy that maintains a position of non-communication with selected world leaders while keeping an open door of dialogue with their political opponents. Furthermore the policy demonstrates that U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe is the same as it always was, "regime change" and the toppling of the ruling ZANU-PF led by President Mugabe.

The paternalism and simplification surrounding the discourse and representation of democracy and democratization in Africa can be explained by the fact that the Obama administration, like its predecessors, relies on a democracy-promotion discourse signifier that continues the humanitarian-realist behavioral liberal tradition while eschewing an engagement of the structures that contribute to democratization's major challenges as well as denying the reality that democratic development in African countries may occur differently from the Western liberal genre. In dealing with

Zimbabwe, President Obama who is a self-proclaimed change agent, a symbolic son of African heritage and a Nobel Peace Prize Laureate is exhibiting signs that he will deploy little of sophisticated foreign policy engagement in Africa that he so willingly uses in Egypt and Honduras.

Instead by continuing to construct Zimbabwe as a "threat" to U.S. security interests and in maintaining targeted sanctions against the Mugabe-Tsvangirai regime as if that national union government had not happened, President Obama invokes a hegemonic, culturally superior posture in addressing democracy relations in Zimbabwe that limits the rapid advancement of democracy in the country on its own terms.

Conclusion

This chapter's theoretical, historical and comparative analysis of U.S. democracy promotion in Africa demonstrates that liberal, humanitarian and realist philosophies and ideologies premised on colonialist modernization development theories constitute policy guidelines that continue to be reflected in contemporary U.S.-Africa democracy promotion relations. Democracy continues to be pursued as a universal ideal by both U.S. progressives and by the myriad, medley of African pro-democracy and civil society organizations alike. But so has democracy been promoted instrumentally (imperial and mercantile) in Africa as an essential triumph by the West in the Cold War. That is to say, with the U.S. and the EU at the helm of Cold War victors, democracy promotion in Africa takes on a resuscitated hegemonic, ideologically developmental and externally interventionist posture in its approach to foreign policy in the continent.

Evidenced by the focus on the good governance agenda, democracy promotion also continues to be used as a tool for promoting free market economies and consolidating global capitalism and liberal global governance; it has also become a tool to foster sound administration and political stability functions and global order and security interests in the global south. Such a reality presents paradoxical contexts for U.S. democracy promotion around the world: in Afghanistan where the U.S. hesitates over support for a fraudulent election in the name of security, in Pakistan where the U.S. colludes with a newly emergent democratic regime to militarily suppress terrorism, and in Honduras, where the U.S. equivocates over whether a coup can be legitimated to foster democracy.

Nonetheless, it is in Africa, more so than in other developing world regions that despite the relative successes and challenges of the third wave democracy movement, for U.S. foreign policy, democracy remains discursively represented negatively in a way that inscribes the continent's inferior status and marginalized agency as having a failed experience with democracy in the contemporary global order.[67] In referring to the Zimbabwe National Unity government in 2009 as a "threat" to U.S. interests, the Obama Administration's democracy promotion policy vindicates the value of the current chapter's post-structural analysis of international relations. David Campbell's formulation of U.S. foreign policy's use of an "evangelism of fear" to protect Americans from a "dangerous Third World Other" seems to be at play in the U.S. posture toward Zimbabwe.[68] Using "democracy promotion" in the same way as the "war on terror," President Obama serves to legitimize U.S. hegemonic sovereignty and reinforce an inferior identity construction of Robert Mugabe as a "bad guy" who deserves continued punishment from the United States. In the Obama Administration's engagement with other African countries as well, on Zimbabwe democracy, rather than engage their views as equal partners, the U.S. sidetracks continental decisions (SADC, AU, and South Africa) that have brokered alternative development and democracy policy decisions for the continent.

In this regard, the extent to which U.S. democracy promotion has contributed to—and will foster—the successful building of democracy in Africa is difficult to determine. If democracy promotion in Africa is to avoid being characterized by the pessimistic subtitle of the current chapter ("less of the same"), it is important that in a postmodern international arena that even President Obama's soft power relations of democracy promotion—in Africa too—are informed by democratic principles of mutual respect, a respect for self-determination and agency; and an understanding of structural context and complexity that shapes alternative hybrid forms of an actually-existing democracy on the ground.

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14

U.S. AIDS Policy in Africa: Balancing Competing Interests in PEPFAR Policymaking

Polly J. Diven

Introduction

In the last decade, foreign aid funding for HIV/AIDS in Africa has grown from millions to billions of U.S. dollars. One of the most important steps in this direction was taken during his State of the Union Address in January 2003, when President George W. Bush announced his intention to initiate a five-year, $15 billion program to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa. This program launched the largest international health program by one country to address a single disease. This initiative is now widely known as the President's Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief, or PEPFAR. At first glance, PEPFAR appears to be a foreign policy program purely targeted to meet humanitarian objectives. Upon closer examination, we find that while the overall program objectives are humanitarian, the implementation of the PEPFAR program was strongly influenced by a number of influential interest groups in the United States. The resultant program reflects the interests of these lobby groups and compromises the humanitarian objectives of PEPFAR. Although it is true that African countries have reaped enormous benefits from PEPFAR, some features of the program have limited the ability of PEPFAR to fulfill its potential for HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment in Africa.

This chapter begins with a discussion of pluralism and hyperpluralism, using HIV/AIDS policy to illustrate the theory of hyperpluralism. Next, I introduce the PEPFAR program as it was designed and implemented in the first five years.[1] The third and fourth sections of this paper provide evidence of the impact of (a) Christian conservatives and (b) the pharmaceutical industry on the PEPFAR program. Reflecting on the impact of these groups, I assess the relevance of the theory of hyperpluralism as an avenue to understand the impact of special interests on the implementation of PEPFAR.

Pluralism and Hyperpluralism

Classical theories of pluralism emphasize the impact of nongovernment groups in the formulation of public policy.[2] For the most part, traditional pluralists emphasize the positive elements of the policy compromises that arise from the struggle among competing groups. In *The Governmental Process,* David Truman quotes directly from James Madison's Federalist Paper 10, and stresses the positive functions of interest groups or factions in the formulation of policy.[3] According to pluralists, policy does not arise at the behest of the citizens (as representative democracy suggests), but instead results from the push and pull of groups who are operating in their own interests, applying influence on various "pressure points" within the U.S. political system.

In contrast to the extensive literature on pluralism,[4] the theory of hyperpluralism is much less developed. Hyperpluralism is best understood as a condition whereby program efficacy is severely hampered by the multiple and sometimes contradictory objectives of a policy initiative. The theory of hyperpluralism suggests that a large number of competing interests, and efforts by policy makers to satisfy those interests, result in complicated, piecemeal policy that is neither efficient nor effective in achieving its multiple objectives. McConnell and Lowi describe hyperpluralism as a form of exaggerated pluralism in which groups establish networks of mutual support in key policy sectors.[5] This phenomenon is very different from the pluralist view of open competition for political access and influence. Hyperpluralism creates a policy environment in which it is increasingly difficult to address questions of common purpose, and it nearly impossible to eliminate programs that have outlived their usefulness. Hyperpluralism provides a powerful explanation for the policy gridlock that is evident in contemporary American politics.

A number of authors have used this term to describe the difficulties in achieving policy objectives. Rauch has used the term "demosclerosis" to describe the collective impact of multiple competing objectives on the creation of coherent policy.[6] Bykerk and Johnson use the theory of hyperpluralism to describe legislative efforts to address U.S. pension policy in the period from 1974 to 1990.[7] With regard to the U.S. food aid program, Diven demonstrates that the multiple objectives of this program helped maintain support for the program, even when it repeatedly failed to meet its humanitarian objectives.[8] Meeting the demands of agricultural interest groups to reduce "surplus production" through overseas distribution is crucial to both the maintenance and the "sclerosis" of food aid. Callahan uses the theory hyperpluralism to explain the lack of a rationale health care policy in the United States.[9] He argues that in policy debates over health care reform, "just about everything possible gets thrown into the pot, mixed together in impenetrable and inextricable ways." He argues that hyperpluralism can be used, "to describe this awful, confusing, obnoxious, and unpalatable mix of ingredients that makes health care reform of any serious kind almost impossible."

What factors distinguish pluralism from hyperpluralism? Is hyperpluralism simply pluralism in the extreme? Traditional accounts of pluralism describe the positive influence on interest groups on the political system, while hyperpluralism typically focuses attention on the negative effects of special interests. Authors of elitist or corporatist theories of interest groups correctly note that interest group resources and connections are far from equal and demonstrate an upper-class bias.[10] Typically there are a large number of interest groups in hyperpluralist policy areas. One critical point is that in hyperpluralism, there is an indirect connection between the demands of the interest groups and the policy outcomes. The demands of interest groups affect the implementation and character of the policy, but they do not undermine the program overall. In fact, the fact that these policies satisfy domestic interests contributes to their longevity. Only in extreme cases of hyperpluralism do a large number of countervailing pressures undermine the purpose of the original policy. In the case of the school lunch program, some food industry groups that lobby in favor of continued funding for school meals are lobbying for a "piece of the action," and insisting that their food products be included in the program. Satisfying their interests is not central to the policy debate over whether or not to provide school lunches, thought their lobbying can influence the content of the lunches themselves.

HIV/AIDS Policy and Hyperpluralism

There are specific elements of the current U.S. foreign aid programs in Africa that make them susceptible to hyperpluralist tendencies. These characteristics include (a) a reliance on contractors and subcontractors to implement programs, (b) a popular presumption of humanitarianism as a justification for spending, and (c) a lack of public knowledge that contributes to diminished accountability. In sum, special interests are exercising influence in a policy environment that is ripe with economic opportunities for special interests. This is also a policy environment in which the public is generally poorly informed and/or happy to assume good intentions on the part of policymakers.

Hyperpluralism also has potential benefits. Although the potential impact of PEPFAR funds may be undermined by special interests, many cases of HIV/AIDS are prevented by the program and many afflicted people receive treatments. It is notable that the PEPFAR initiative has been supported by "odd bedfellows," including AIDS advocacy groups, pharmaceutical companies, and Christian evangelicals. While many public health advocates applaud this effort to stem the spread of HIV/AIDS, other policy analysts question the tactics and effectiveness of the program as it has been implemented in its first five years. As is the case with food aid,[11] there are a variety of audiences that support some component of PEPFAR program. Their combined efforts created the legislative support necessary to establish (and reauthorize in 2008) PEPFAR. In a hyperpluralist policy environment, a program with great humanitarian potential has been created. However, the contradictory demands of the interest groups that backed PEPFAR have also limited the ability of this program to meet its humanitarian potential.

Background on the PEPFAR Program

On January 28, 2003, President Bush announced his intent to allocate $15 billion to a new initiative that he dubbed the Presidential Emergency Plan for AIDS relief, or PEPFAR. The five-year plan was met with widespread approval across the political spectrum, and in May 2003, President Bush signed the legislation that created PEPFAR. The original PEPFAR program set ambitious goals to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic through prevention, treatment with anti-retroviral medications (ARVs), and palliative care. In 2003, PEPFAR's stated goals were to prevent 7 million new infections, to provide ARV treatment for 2 million afflicted with HIV/AIDS, and to care for 10 million people already sick with AIDS. Fourteen African countries were chosen to become the first focus countries of the PEPFAR program: Botswana, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guyana, Haiti, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Vietnam was designated a focus country in June of 2004.

Achievements and Concerns

Much attention has been given to the success of the PEPFAR program during its first five years. President Bush frequently referred to the program's achievements in public speeches. During a visit to four PEPFAR focus countries in February 2008, President Bush was frequently thanked and congratulated for the success of the program. In August 2008, President Bush noted, "When we launched the initiative in 2003, only 50,000 people in Sub-Saharan Africa were receiving antiretroviral treatments. Today we support treatment for nearly 1.7 million people in the region . . . PEPFAR has also supported care for nearly 7 million people, including millions of orphans and vulnerable children. To date, PEPFAR has allowed nearly 200,000 children in Africa to be born HIV free."[12]

Most media coverage of the PEPFAR program has been positive, generally citing the treatment and spending figures provided by U.S. government sources. It is not surprising, therefore, that Congress voted in favor of a reauthorization of the PEPFAR program in the summer of 2008. PEPFAR was reauthorized for five additional years ($39 billion dollars for 2009–2013). The sum of $48 billion has been allocated for combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis outside of the United States during the next five-year period.

Still, government and independent agencies have found fault with some elements of PEPFAR implementation in the first five years. While all acknowledge the positive results of PEPFAR, others emphasize that given the vast funds that were allocated, even more could have been achieved. Congressionally mandated reports in 2007 from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Institute of Medicine found that the abstinence-until-marriage provisions of the PEPFAR prevention program limited the ability of the prevention goals from being met. In August 2006, the president-elect of the International AIDS Society, Julio Montaner, blamed political leaders for permitting the "genocide" of the AIDS pandemic. Another AIDS specialist at the annual meeting, Cristina Pimenta, noted that the number of new infections—4.1 million in the past year—is far outpacing the number of infections prevented or treated. She notes, "We are moving backwards every day."[13] Scott Swenson, in 2008, wrote: "The reality is this: as successful as PEPFAR has been getting life-saving treatment to nearly two million people, it has failed to slow the infection rate because it has been hampered by unnecessary ideological restrictions. For every two people who receive treatment, five are newly infected with HIV."[14]

In addition to these criticisms, skeptics note that U.S. government credit claiming for PEPFAR's achievements is exaggerated by the fact the United States had already been undertaking large-scale AIDS funding in Africa so that not all PEPFAR funding is new. Furthermore, U.S. funding for PEPFAR has reduced U.S. contributions to the UN Global Fund for AIDS and undermined the authority of the UN Global Fund. Also, it is important to note that in many African countries, PEPFAR and UN Global Fund programs are indistinguishable, as are their achievements. A number of editorials and opinion pieces have strongly urged an increase for the Fund . . . and have accused the [Bush] Administration of a "deliberate, concerted action" to undermine the Fund."[15] As Swenson notes, "PEPFAR, as successful as it has been in part, is a go-it-alone strategy that has alienated much of the rest of the world's public health community."[16] Thus, data on PEPFAR's successes during the first five years must be eyed skeptically. Indeed, the Center for Public Integrity (CPI) has called into question the validity of much of the PEPFAR results data and funding reports and found it impossible to follow the funding from authorization to allocation in 2004 and 2005.[17]

Christian Conservative Groups, Faith-Based Organizations, and PEPFAR

During the first five years of PEPFAR, evangelical groups based in the United States and Africa had a significant impact on at least three controversial elements of the PEPFAR program. First, U.S. Christian conservatives were able to convince lawmakers of the importance of the "ABC Approach" to AIDS prevention. This approach earmarked funds for abstinence education and thus reduced the funds available for condom distribution. Second, the Bush administration, presumably at the behest of U.S. religious organizations, insisted that faith-based organizations (FBOs) be given a prominent role in PEPFAR contracting and subcontracting. This practice reduced the ability of the PEPFAR program to take advantage of the experience of secular organizations in focus countries. Third, evangelical Christian groups insisted that PEPFAR should not do anything to support sex workers in the focus countries. PEPFAR program workers were often required to formally pledge that they would not provide AIDS prevention and treatment support to prostitutes. Although PEPFAR officials argue that this was not intended to deny condom distribution to prostitutes, enough confusion surrounded this issue many workers at the local level did not allow condom distribution to sex workers. The executive director of the Global AIDS Alliance, Dr. Paul Zeitz, argues that PEPFAR is "failing to stop the global spread of AIDS." Zeitz identifies the source of PEPFAR's failure as two policy features backed by the Christian fundamentalists—the discouragement of condom use and a prohibition against HIV/AIDS prevention to commercial female sex workers.[18]

The ABC Approach—Earmarks to Promote Abstinence Education

The cornerstone of PEPFAR's prevention strategy is the "ABC approach." This is described as A for abstinence, B for being faithful to one's partner, and C for condom use.[19] Probably the most controversial aspect of the PEPFAR legislation, this earmark to the House bill (H.R. 1289) added by Congressman Joe Pitts (R–PA). In its final form, the PEPFAR bill specified that one-third of all funds set aside for HIV/AIDS prevention must be used to support abstinence-until-marriage programs."[20] This 33 percent constituted approximately 6.6 percent of the entire PEPFAR fund and equaled $200 million dollars per year between 2003 and 2008, for a total of approximately $1 billion.

The earmark for funding abstinence programs has been criticized by observers, including AIDS activists and the medical community which support evidence-based policymaking. Although FBOs involved with PEPFAR emphasized the abstinence message, others note that this spending earmark limited the amount of funds that could be spent on distributing condoms. Rosen notes that "while they [FBOs] aggressively champion 'Abstinence' until marriage and 'Being faithful' to one's partner, the traditional reliance on the use of 'Condoms' has assumed a small 'c' status."[21] In 2006, the GAO reported on the spending requirements for prevention funding under PEPFAR.

This report was derived from interviews with many U.S. and international representatives of the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC), the organization responsible for administering PEPFAR. The report notes that several international teams, "told GAO that the [ABC] spending requirement can limit their efforts to design prevention programs that are integrated and responsive to local prevention needs."[22] This situation was cited in interviews with 17 of the 20 country teams.[23] Crucially, several teams reported that in order to meet the 33 percent, funding for condom distribution had to be reduced. Varsalona argues that the requirements are, "out of touch with the realities of the AIDS epidemic."[24] The author also notes that FBOs have tried to limit the extent to which condoms are used and promoted, suggesting that some government publications have intentionally misrepresented the success of condoms.[25] Medical authorities argue that limitations on condom education and distribution put populations in the focus countries at risk. The Institute of Medicine argues that the AB approach is not based on scientific evidence and that abstinence education to prevent AIDS has been widely discredited in medical community. Since PEPFAR was approved in 2003, the British medical journal *Lancet* has published several articles criticizing the earmarks in the earmark for prevention.[26]

In at least one PEPFAR focus country, Uganda, the emphasis on abstinence and led to condom shortages. The UN secretary general's special envoy for HIV/AIDS in Africa, Stephan Lewis, told the *Guardian* in 2005 that the United States' abstinence-based programs and condom budget cuts contributed to a condom shortage in Uganda and set back the struggle against AIDS in Africa. "There is no doubt in my mind that the condom crisis in Uganda is being driven by [U.S. policies]. To impose a dogma-driven policy that is fundamentally flawed is doing damage to Africa," Lewis noted.[27]

A similar tale is told about the overemphasis on abstinence education in Ethiopia, where condom distribution programs were underfunded. Rawls cites a government survey that found that 70 percent of the sex workers in the capital city, Addis Ababa, were HIV-positive in 1998.[28] Nonetheless, only $110,000 was allocated in 2006–2007 for condom promotion among sex workers, truck drivers, and other high-risk groups along road to Djibouti corridor—an area where sex work is widespread. Rawls notes that almost five times that amount was allocated for abstinence and fidelity activities. Clearly, the problem with the ABC approach is not abstinence education, but the related reduction in funding available for condom promotion and distribution.

Focusing Funding on Faith-Based Organizations

During the first five years of the PEPFAR program, FBOs were frequently chosen to implement the "Abstinence and Be Faithful" portions of prevention programs. For example, of the 74 centrally funded grants awarded under the PEPFAR program in the years 2004–2005 directed toward Abstinence and Be Faithful programs, 71.6 percent went to FBOs.[29] According to one government report on PEPFAR, Abstinence and Be Faithful programs made up 58.7 percent of the PEPFAR prevention funding in fiscal year2008.[30] Some critics have questioned whether FBOs could differentiate between the AIDS prevention messages and their religious messages. In one case in South Africa, a religious organization with no known expertise in public health received PEPFAR funding to train clergy members about HIV/AIDS. At the same time, secular groups saw their share of international AIDS funding decrease in recent years. CARE, a secular, nongovernment organization, received $138 million in government funds to treat HIV/AIDS in fiscal year 2001. In fiscal year 2005, CARE received $96 million in U.S. government funds to treat HIV/AIDS. During this time, Senator Rick Santorum (R-PA), publicly criticized CARE for being, "out of touch with religious values," "anti-American," and "promoting a pro-prostitution agenda."[31] People close to the situation have suggested that the pressure on PEPFAR from evangelical groups was immense. Kristin Kalla, overseeing AIDS contracts for CARE, said she found herself in the middle of a war over politics, religion, and money.[32]

In other cases, FBOs were favored for PEPFAR funds even when their qualifications were weak. For example, Bush administration's global AIDS program awarded a grant to promote abstinence in African youth to a politically connected Washington advocacy group, the Children's AIDS Fund, even though the expert committee reviewing requests for government money judged the request "not suitable for funding." In October 2004, the global AIDS program awarded grants totaling $100 million to 11 applications in the category titled "HIV/AIDS Prevention through Abstinence and Healthy Choices for Youth." Ten of these organizations are faith based. The Children's AIDS Fund was ranked number 12 by the expert panel employed by USAID to review the merits of applications, but the organization later received funding as well.[33] Thus, the result of the focus on FBOs as recipients of PEPFAR funding both denied funding for highly qualified organizations such as CARE, and provided funding for organizations with less experience and expertise.

Prohibitions of PEPFAR Funding for Care and Treatment of Sex Workers

Assistance to prostitutes in focus countries proved to be another contentious issue in the implementation of PEPFAR. Conservative members of Congress and leaders of faith-based organizations argued that all aid recipients must denounce prostitution and they imposed a rule that insisted that all recipients of PEPFAR funding agree pledge not to support sex workers. The intent of the rule, it seems, was to ensure that PEPFAR would not be seen as abetting the practice of prostitution in the focus countries. Local subcontracting agencies were required to sign a pledge that they would not provide assistance to prostitutes, although it is clear that "providing assistance" was not given the same meaning by all local workers. In an interview with PBS' *Frontline,* AIDS Administrator Tobias noted that "organizations [involved with PEPFAR], in order to receive money, need to have a policy opposed to prostitution and sex trafficking."[34] Jodi Jacobson, executive director for the Center for Health and Gender Equity, claims that the Bush administration's policy led to the closure of numerous programs that had been teaching job skills to sex workers, forcing many prostitutes into the street.[35]

International public health organizations were upset by the provisions against support for sex workers and filed lawsuits against several U.S. government aid agencies. One key issue pertained to the interpretation of the antiprostitution pledge. The wording of the pledge forbid organizations from supporting sex workers by providing assistance. The pledge did not prohibit condom distribution or the provision of medication. However, some implementing organizations interpreted the prohibition against support to mean that they could not help sex workers at all. Confusion about the implementation of congressional and administrative earmarks has been the norm for PEPFAR. A 2004 GAO report cites a range of implementation problems, including misunderstandings between PEPFAR teams in the field, contractors in the United States, and the policymakers. This report calls on the AIDS administrators to strengthen communication among the various groups and to better delineate roles and rules.[36]

Overall, Christian conservative organizations have had a significant impact on the shape of PEPFAR policy. The abstinence and be faithful message of many evangelical groups in the United States was globalized in the PEPFAR prevention program. Many observers agree that this emphasis has interfered with funding of a more evidence-based condom distribution program. In addition, the emphasis using faith-based organizations as PEPFAR contractors and subcontractors satisfies the agenda of the Christian right. Finally, the impetus for the required antiprostitution pledge among PEPFAR program fund recipients has its origins among Christian conservatives in the United States.

The Pharmaceutical Industry and PEPFAR

Whereas the evangelical groups appeared to be ideologically motivated, the pharmaceutical industry has had a strong economic incentive to shape PEPFAR it its own interest. The PEPFAR program clearly favored policies that protected the interests of pharmaceutical companies, particularly those producing ARV drugs. One early indicator of the issue's importance was the creation of two lobby groups, the Corporate Council on Africa's Task Force on AIDS and the Coalition for AIDS Relief in Africa, which brought together major pharmaceutical companies such as Bristol-Myers Squibb, Abbott Laboratories, Pfizer, and others, to lobby Congress in support of PEPFAR funding.[37] Still, the impact of the pharmaceutical industry on the development and implementation is difficult to assess. While it is easy to identify PEPFAR policy implementation that suited the interests of "big pharma," it is difficult to trace the process from the interest group to the policy. Some key linkages between the pharmaceutical industry and the policy that emerged are presented below.

The Tobias Appointment

In 2003, President Bush selected former Eli Lilly chief executive Randall Tobias to head PEPFAR. Having served as CEO of Eli Lilly from 1992 to 1999, Tobias became the first U.S. global AIDS coordinator ("AIDS Czar") in July 2003. As AIDS Czar, Tobias was charged with distributing the $15 billion allocated to PEPFAR. In 2006, he became the first U.S. director of foreign assistance, and served concurrently as the administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), with the rank of ambassador. Thus, by 2006, Tobias was responsible for overseeing all foreign assistance activities of the U.S. government. (Mark Dybul took over as the chief administrator of AIDS and PEPFAR when Tobias was promoted.) Tobias reported directly to Secretary of State Rice and held the rank of deputy secretary of state.

AIDS activists and African leaders were immediately skeptical of the appointment of Tobias as AIDS Czar. Jeffrey Sachs, Columbia professor and special advisor to then UN secretary general Kofi Annan on the AIDS crisis, called the appointment "surreal." "This is an emergency that requires someone who's worked in the field and knows it thoroughly. We don't need someone who raises all sorts of questions about commitment and agenda," Sachs argued.[38] Many people questioned whether Tobias would work to maximize AIDS prevention and treatment or whether he would work to promote the interests of the pharmaceutical industry. "This decision is another deeply disturbing sign that the president may not be prepared to fulfill his pledge to take emergency action on AIDS," noted Paul Zeitz, executive director of the Global AIDS Alliance. "It raises serious questions of conflict of interest and the priorities of the White House."[39] Indeed, Tobias had no background in public health or experience in developing countries. Many were concerned that Tobias' background in the pharmaceutical industry would bias him in favor of policies that prohibit the use of cheaper, generic anti-retroviral drugs in Africa. Tobias resigned from his post after being linked to the "DC Madam" in 2007.

Opposition to Generic Drugs

Introducing the PEPFAR initiative in 2003, President Bush noted that the falling costs of antiretroviral drugs, which are vital for the treatment of people with HIV/AIDS, from "$12,000 a year to under $300 a year."[40] This reduced cost of ARVs is most certainly related to the development of generic drugs. Nonetheless, the PEPFAR program was very slow to allow the use of cheaper generic drugs as part of the HIV/AIDS treatment regimen. Although major pharmaceutical companies had cut the cost of anti-retroviral drugs for countries in Africa before PEPFAR was implemented, generic ARVs from Thailand, India, and Brazil were still available at a much lower cost than the U.S. drugs. It is clear that the United States delayed the approval of generic ARVs during the early years of the PEPFAR program. In fact, the United States pressured its bilateral trade partners in Africa to sign agreements committing them to respect international patent laws that, from a practical viewpoint, would make importing generics much more problematic.

The initial PEPFAR policy toward generic ARVs stated that drugs purchased with PEPFAR money may be "bioequivalent versions of branded ARV and other medications," meaning that lower priced generic drugs could, in theory, be purchased. However, the requirement for approval by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) precluded the inclusion of internationally produced generic ARVs, although these medications were prequalified by the World Health Organization (WHO. U.S. policy at that time totally excluded the purchase of Fixed Dose Combinations (FDCs), none of which were approved by the FDA.[41]

The use of generics was delayed in two ways. First, almost no non-U.S. preparations were FDA approved. Second, PEPFAR providers were discouraged from using non-U.S. ARVs even after some were approved. Estimates released by the U.S. government reveal that in 2004 and 2005, its first two fully funded years, the plan allocated only about 5 percent of its overall ARV drug budget—less than $15 million—for generic drugs.[42] In 2004, almost all ARVs administered through the program were from well-known companies that make name-brand drugs. Even when generic preparations were approved, they were not widely used. By mid-October 2005, the FDA had approved 26 generic ARVs for use under PEPFAR. All but one of these drugs was manufactured by foreign firms. Still, according to a 2005 report submitted to Congress, in FY 2005 generic ARVs only amounted to 11 percent of the program's drug procurement budget.

Why didn't PEPFAR use more generic drugs at a lower cost? Sources provide two different explanations for the reluctant inclusion of generic ARVs into the PEPFAR program. U.S. government spokespersons attribute the slow adoption of generic ARVS to safety concerns. There was a fear that foreign drug manufacturers would not impose the same safeguards as U.S. companies. Other experts believe that slow acceptance of generic ARVs was a direct result of the U.S. government protecting the interests of the U.S. pharmaceutical companies. Congressman Henry Waxman (D-CA) wrote this passage in a 2003 letter to President Bush: "I strongly oppose the efforts to block the use of low-cost generic drugs through the imposition of unnecessary and onerous drug approval standards. It is no secret that U.S. pharmaceutical companies, which make brand-name drugs, do not want funds to flow to generic drug companies in India."[43]

This controversy clearly pitted the interests of U.S. pharmaceutical companies against the large number of HIV sufferers in Africa, for whom the availability of ARVs are a matter of life or death. Failure to protect the interests of U.S. pharmaceutical companies would cost them millions of dollars. On the other hand, purchasing expensive brand name drugs meant that only a fraction of the number of HIV cases in the focus countries could be treated with the ARVs necessary to prevent the development of full-blown AIDS. ARV medications are also essential to prevent the transmission of HIV/AIDS from pregnant women to their unborn children. In a 2005 article in *The Lancet,* Frost writes that, "If generic drugs turn out to be largely equivalent to their brand-name counterparts, the enormous sums that PEPFAR is still spending on brand-name drugs will have been a monumental waste of resources, paid for with far too many lives." The Partnership for Supply Chain Management, a consortium of for profit and nonprofit organizations that received PEPFAR funds to help administer the program, published a report in 2007 that examined how FY 2005 funds were spent. They based their report on a survey of the focus countries. They found that six of the 15 focus country programs—those in Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, and Vietnam—procured virtually no generic ARV drugs during that year. Three other target countries—Guyana, Kenya, and Namibia—each spent about 1 percent or less of their ARV drug money on generics.[44]

An August 2004 PEPFAR report to Congress stated that the program's policy is to "provide drugs at the lowest possible cost, regardless of origin, as long as the safety, efficacy, and quality of the drugs can be assured." However, skeptics argue that the administration's overly cautious approach toward generic drugs was a function of big pharmaceutical companies' influence with the Bush administration. "Every step of the way, roadblocks were put up to [ensure that generics were not used]," said William F. Haddad, CEO of the generic biotechnology firm Biogenerics Inc. Haddad attended a meeting in Botswana in March of 2004 at which PEPFAR administrators (including Tobias and his deputy, Lange) argued the position of the pharmaceutical companies. At the meeting, the group eventually agreed to improve the usage of generic ARVs over time. Haddad notes that U.S. officials at the meeting, including Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, were troubled by Lange's stance against generic drugs. "Holbrooke . . . accused Lange, Tobias, HHS and the State Department team of fronting for the pharmaceutical industry."[45]

Yusuf Hamied, chairman of the Indian pharmaceutical company Cipla, put the blame for failure to use cheaper generic preparations squarely on PEPFAR administrator Tobias. Hamied said that Tobias " 'worked out a scheme' to 'hoodwink' the generics. They put in a lot of hurdles [to ensure] that the PEPFAR money wouldn't go to the generics."[46] In 2001, Cipla was the first company to produce generic ARVs at a fraction of the cost of U.S. pharmaceutical companies. Its formulation, Triomune, reduced the number of pills to as few as two per day, and lowered the cost of the regimen dramatically. In 2006, Hamied noted that if PEPFAR used generics such as Triomune in place of brand-name drugs, it could treat ten times the number of HIV-infected patients that now receive treatment. PEPFAR's own study in 2006 noted some examples of generic

ARVs costing as little as one-tenth of the price of their brand-name counterparts. In addition, a 2005 U.S. GAO report noted that other global HIV/AIDS initiatives were providing a larger selection of ARVs to patients than were available under PEPFAR—and at lower prices. According to the GAO (2006), these differences in the price of a regimen could translate into millions of dollars of additional expense.[47]

Eventually generics have worked their way into PEPFAR programming and in 2005, PEPFAR funds were used for the first time to purchase a large number of generic ARVs. By December 2007, the FDA had approved 57 generic antiretroviral drugs.[48] Finally, in 2007, a sea change occurred in the use of generic ARVs through PEPFAR. Whereas only 27 percent of PEPFAR-funded medication purchases in FY 2006 were generics, by the end of 2007, 73 percent of ARVs distributed under PEPFAR were generic.[49]

Dietrich notes that pressure to change U.S. policy came from a host of players.[50] AIDS activists argued that the president's comments on human dignity would seem insincere if the United States did not take every action possible to increase treatment numbers. Indeed, in protest against U.S. ARV policy, representatives of the European Union's drug regulatory authority refused to attend a U.S.-led conference on generic medications in 2004. U.S.-based service providers, who hoped to buy drugs at the lowest available price, also pushed for policy change. AVERT, an HIV/AIDS watchdog group, estimates that purchasing generics in FY 2007 saved PEPFAR partners an estimated $64 million.[51] In theory, those funds could have been used to purchase additional generic ARVs and treat more people.

Assessing the Hyperpluralism of PEPFAR

At first glance, the PEPFAR program appears to be a humanitarian program that provides U.S. foreign aid funding for an enormous health crisis in Africa. Clearly, the program has helped thousands of people to prevent becoming infected with HIV and treated many who are already in the throes of the disease. Equally importantly, PEPFAR has helped provide anti-retroviral drugs to thousands of HIV-positive people in poor countries who could not otherwise afford the drugs to prevent them from developing AIDS. Clearly, PEPFAR has had positive results. On the other hand, there are serious problems that have arisen with the implementation of PEPFAR in Africa. Through closer scrutiny, one discovers that the success of the PEPFAR program likely has been exaggerated. Implementation PEPFAR has suffered from the competing demands of numerous interests groups. The theory of hyperpluralism appears to be an apt description of the internally inconsistent policy that has arisen to address the demands of AIDS activists and humanitarian organizations while still addressing the demands of domestic interest groups. Specific earmarks were added during the implementation of the first phase of PEPFAR. These restrictions reflect the input of Christian conservatives, including the program's emphasis on abstinence education as a key component to the HIV/AIDS prevention program. Faith-based organizations have also profited from their involvement with PEPFAR, even to the detriment of secular organizations that are normally well respected in the aid community. Another major set of interests that influenced the PEPFAR program was the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. Corporations which are financially invested in brand-name ARVs worked to delay the entrance of generic drugs from being included in the program.

Two factors seem to help distinguish between special interest group influence that is considered "pluralist" and special interest group influence that is considered "hyperpluralist." In hyperpluralism, the number of interests is greater and the influence these groups wield is tangential to the crux of the policy debate. This clearly seems to describe the impact of special interests on PEPFAR. In the case of PEPFAR, the humanitarian goals of the program were preserved but the "devil was in the details." Evangelical groups were able to ensure that abstinence education was a prominent part of the program, and this stipulation compromised the ability of HIV/AIDS workers to distribute condoms. Because of the relative success of condoms over abstinence education in combating HIV/AIDS, it is clear that the actions of evangelical groups undercut the humanitarian goals of the program. Similarly, the actions of the pharmaceutical companies did not interfere with the laudable goal of using U.S. foreign aid funds to provide live-saving anti-retroviral drugs, but when the U.S. groups were given a "piece of the action" and cheaper medications were omitted, fewer Africans could be given access to ARV medication. Meeting the requests of special interest groups did not imperil the program; in fact, their support of PEPFAR made its creation and survival more likely. Still, the demands of these groups compromised the ability of PEPFAR to meet its full potential.

At least three characteristics of foreign aid programs such as PEPFAR render them particularly vulnerable to hyperpluralism. First, and not uniquely, there are enormous sums of money that are being distributed to contracting firms by the government. Foreign aid contracting and subcontracting is big business, and firms, large and small, stand to profit from government aid contracts. Second, lack of media coverage and public awareness of the specific elements of these programs means that policy implementation frequently gets a "free pass" from public scrutiny, at least in the short term. The vast majority of Americans assume that programs such as food aid and HIV/AIDS assistance are purely humanitarian. In this policy environment, the demands of special interest groups are more likely to be met. Thus, it seems that foreign aid programs, including PEPFAR, have been especially susceptible to the hyperpluralism.

PEPFAR II and the Obama Administration

During the 2008 presidential election campaign, Senator Obama pledged to increase PEPFAR funding to provide $50 billion to fight global HIV/AIDS by 2013. He also pledged to increase PEPFAR funding by $1 billion each year; these funds would be in addition to the money authorized by Congress in July 2008 through PEPFAR II. During the presidential election campaign, Senator Obama also frequently noted that HIV/AIDS programming would be based on "best practice, not ideology." This was interpreted to mean that the Christian conservative agenda would no longer be able to have the same impact on PEPFAR policy. This might include ending restrictions on treatment for sex workers, ending the restrictions on any possible needle exchange program, and moving away from the emphasis of the ABC/abstinence approach.

Thus, some HIV/AIDS activists are thus disappointed that President Obama's first budget proposal included just $366 million in new money for PEPFAR in FY 2010. International AIDS activists have expressed concerns over the president's budget request, saying that the shortfall in funding will have severe health consequences, including significantly reducing the numbers of people receiving vital HIV and AIDS treatment.[52] On the other hand, earmarks for abstinence funding as part of prevention were lifted in the 2008 authorization of PEPFAR II, and Christian conservatives are not as able to influence the African aid agenda in the Obama administration. President

Obama appointed a new coordinator of the PEPFAR program soon after taking office, Eric Goosby, who was the director of U.S. HIV/AIDS programming during the Clinton administration. Dr. Goosby is an M.D. with 25 years experience working on AIDS related programs; has no apparent ties to the pharmaceutical industry.

Limits on the use of generic ARV medications have gradually lifted as a larger number of these less expensive drugs have become FDA-approved. As noted, generic drugs accounted for 73 percent of the antiretroviral drugs distributed through PEPFAR in 2007 and 2008. However, critics note the fact that one-fourth of ARVs are purchased from U.S. producers means that thousands of people still cannot have access to treatment. Given these changes, it would be unfair to characterize the program as suffering from terminal "demosclerosis" at this point. Important policy changes were made in the process of reauthorizing PEPFAR in 2008. In the end, it is safe to conclude that the impact of special interest groups in the first phase of PEPFAR undermined the effectiveness of the program. Whether changes in the 2008 authorization and the new administration will have important lasting effects is yet to me seen. Due to the magnitude of the HIV/AIDS crisis in Africa, there will continue to be strong support for PEPFAR from recipient governments and AIDS action groups at home and abroad. The type of "donor fatigue" that public support for older programs (such as food aid) is still years off in the case of PEPFAR. Thus, although the range of interests that support PEPFAR seems to indicate that the theory of hyperpluralism applies to this case, it is too early to tell whether in the final analysis, PEPFAR continues to cater to special interests or responds more appropriately to its overarching humanitarian objectives.

Notes

1. In July 2008, a second five-year congressional authorization renewed and increased funding for PEPFAR. In spite of changes in the 2008 program, the merits and impact of the first five years, 2003–2008, warrant investigation.
2. Robert Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).
3. David Truman, *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1951).
4. The pluralism literature includes many subcategories of the political pluralism, such as corporate pluralism and neopluralism. Pluralism has also been applied to a variety of political and social contexts, including religious pluralism and cultural pluralism.
5. Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States,* 2nd edition (New York: Norton, 1979); Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1966).
6. Jonathan Rauch, *Government's End: Why Washington Stopped Working* (New York: Public Affairs Press, 1999).
7. Loree Bykerk and James B. Johnson, "Private Pensions and [U.S.] Public Policy," *Southeastern Political Review* 28, no. 1 (2000): 55–76.
8. Polly J. Diven, "A Coincidence of Interests: They Hyperpluralism of U.S. Food Aid Policy," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 2 (2006): 361–384.
9. Daniel Callahan, "The Perils of Hyperpluralism," *The Bioethics Forum* (March 8, 2006) http://www.thehastingscenter.org/Bioethicsforum/Post.aspx?id=128 (accessed October 4, 2008).
10. E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc, 1960).

11. Diven, "A Coincidence of Interests."
12. White House Press Release, July 2008 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/07/20080730-12.html (accessed September 1, 2009).
13. Andre Picard, "Political Leaders Accused of AIDS Genocide," *The Globe and Mail* (April 18, 2006) http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20060818.aids-leaders18/BNStory/AIDSCon/home (accessed October 8, 2008).
14. Swenson cites a letter from leading public health advocates circulating on Capitol Hill. His account is contained in a public health website, http://www.rhrealitycheck.org/blog/2008/07/10/fix-pepfar-prevent-hiv-infections.
15. R. W. Copson, CRS Report, p. 10.
16. Scott Swenson, "Fix PEPFAR Now to Prevent HIV Infections, Save Lives," *RH Reality Check* (July 10, 2008) http://www.rhrealitycheck.org/blog/2008/07/10/fix-pepfar-prevent-hiv-infections.
17. The current PEPFAR website does provide more clear information on funding allocations to contractors and subcontractors. In the first years of the program, however, journalists argued it was impossible to "follow the money trail." In fact, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) filed two dozen Freedom of Information Requests and filed lawsuits against the State Department, Agency for International Development and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) during itsinvestigation of PEPFAR allocations.
18. Rosen, David, "Bush's Foreign Sex Policy," *Counterpunch* (December 22, 2006) http://www.counterpunch.org/rosen12222006.html (accessed December 28, 2009).
19. www.pepfar.gov (accessed October 15, 2009).
20. P.L. 108-25, H.R. 1289 (2003), Provision 11.
21. Rosen, "Bush's Foreign Sex Policy."
22. GAO Report 2006, Executive Summary.
23. Although there are only 15 PEPFAR focus countries, the same prevention allocation requirements apply to all countries receiving HIV/AIDS assistance from the United States.
24. Devin Varsalona, "Divine Intervention: Academy for Educational Development," Center for Public Integrity (December 13, 2006) http://projects.publicintegrity.org/aids/org.aspx?id=2 (accessed October 9, 2008).
25. Sheetel Doshi, "Divine Intervention: Sex Workers on the Front Line—of Prevention," Center for Public Integrity (November 30, 2006) http://projects.publicintegrity.org/aids//report.aspx?aid=803 (accessed August 15, 2009). PEPFAR rates condom effectiveness in preventing the spread of AIDS as lower than four other U.S. agencies. According to the CPI, PEPFAR reports the effectiveness of latex and less effective lambskin condoms, even though PEPFAR only distributes latex condoms at its clinics (Doshi 2006).
26. A comprehensive look at the *Lancet*'s position can be found in, "HIV Prevention Policy Needs an Urgent Cure," *Lancet* (April 2006), 367: 9518.
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28. Wendell Rawls Jr., "Bush's AIDS Initiative: Too Little Choice, Too Much Ideology," *Divine Intervention: U.S. AIDS Policy Abroad,* Center for Public Integrity (2007).
29. www.publicintegrity.org (accessed August 15, 2009).
30. "The Power of Partnerships: Fourth Annual Report to Congress on PEPFAR," February 2008.

31. Michael Kranish, "Religious Right Wields Clout; Secular Groups Lose Funding Amid Pressure," *Boston Globe* (October 9, 2006) http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/10/09/religious_right_wields_clout/ (accessed December 28, 2009).
32. Ibid.
33. Rita Beamish, "Religious Groups Get a Chunk of AIDS Money," *Associated Press* (January 30, 2006); The Children's AIDS Fund has become a leading proponent of abstinence-based AIDS prevention. The organization is headed by Anita Smith, a writer and researcher whose views on strategies for reducing risky behavior by teenagers were promoted by President Bush during his tenure as Texas governor. In 2002, she was named to the President's Advisory Council on HIV and AIDS.
34. John Donnelly, "Ex-AIDS Chief in Escort Flap Called Hypocritical—Backed U.S. Policy That Forbids Aid to Help Prostitutes," *Boston Globe* (April 29, 2007); In this same interview, Tobias advocates abstinence and discounts the importance of condom use. "Statistics show that condoms really have not been very effective," he said. Tobias resigned his position in April 2007, following revelations that he was linked to a prostitution investigation (the so-called DC Madam scandal). He confirmed to ABC News that he had been a customer at "Pamela Martin and Associates" escort service for massage but that there had been "no sex" (ABC News 2007).
35. Ibid.
36. General Accounting Office, "Global Health: U.S. AIDS Coordinator Addressing Some Key Challenges to Expanding Treatment, But Others Remain," GAO-04-784 (July 2004).
37. More information about these organizations is available at: http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/politics/cara03272003.html.
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39. http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/politics/cara03272003.html (accessed August 15, 2009).
40. Asif M. Ismail, "PEPFAR Policy Hinders Treatment in Generic Terms," The Center for Public Integrity (December 3, 2006) http://projects.publicintegrity.org/aids/report.aspx?aid=836 (accessed December 28, 2009).
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42. www.pepfar.gov.
43. Waxman letter to AIDS Administrator Randall Tobias, February 15 2005.
44. Jamie Sepulveda et al., *PEPFAR Implementation: Progress and Promise* (Institute of Medicine, National Academies Press, 2007).
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50. John W. Dietrich, "The Politics of PEPFAR: The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief," *Ethics and International Affairs* 21, no. 3 (2007): 277–292.
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15

The Impact of the Global Economic Crisis on Africa

Kojo Quartey

Introduction

Someone once said “when the United States sneezes, the rest of the world gets a cold.” So what would happen if the United States got a cold, or worse still, if the United States got pneumonia? This is the context in which we undertake this study: to determine how the economic woes of the United States, the world’s largest economy, have affected the ever-dependent African economies—the world’s poorest economies.

The current global economic crisis is about an ailing U.S. economy, and how it is affecting the rest of the world. The global economic crisis, or recession, was precipitated by the bursting of the housing market bubble. The housing market, which for many years had sustained the U.S. economy, simply burst. This was due primarily to questionable lending practices to uncredit-worthy individuals who could, in the long run, not afford to pay mortgages on overpriced houses. The decline of the housing market led to a foreclosure crisis of staggering proportions, a declining stock market, numerous corporate failures, high unemployment and what is now called the global economic crisis, recession, or “meltdown.”

On the Global Issues Website, Anup Shah calculated that the global crisis has led to a world credit loss of $2.8 trillion and that U.S. taxpayers will spend $9.7 trillion in bailout packages and plans. In addition, $14.5 trillion or 33 percent of the value of the world’s companies has been evaporated by the crisis, and other countries in Europe have spent over $2 trillion in rescue and bailout packages.[1]

The impact of the global crisis has been felt by all sectors of the economy globally. The ripple effect has impacted every nation in the world and every industry imaginable. Africa has not been spared.

Literature Review

Many organizations and scholars have carried out preliminary research on the economic crisis’ impact on Africa. Findings from the research show that the economic crisis has impacted Africa more severely than commonly perceived. Indeed, numerous African economies and multiple economic sectors have been adversely affected by the crisis.

When oil prices started peaking in summer 2007, the World Bank estimated that the high oil prices would increase poverty in some regions by up to 6 percent. To cope with high oil prices, African countries invested their efforts in producing renewable energy to reduce their dependence on oil.[2] These efforts are threatened by shortages of investment and declining official development aid due to the global economic crisis.

As the economic crisis reached every corner of Africa, the African Development Bank Group's report predicted that the crisis might have a greater impact on Africa's medium-term prospects. The continent's growth drivers are most affected by the crisis due to declining oil and commodity prices, and decreasing financial aid and investments. The Committee of African Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors estimated that Africa's economic growth rate in 2009 will fall to below 3 percent.[3] It is estimated that Sub-Saharan Africa might grow as slowly as 2.5 percent. According to reliable estimates, when the growth rate is reduced 1 percent, the poverty headcount increases by 2 percent.[4] The causes of the wearisome growth rate in Africa are considered to be falling exporting commodity prices, unbalanced trade flows, weak national and international demand, and reductions in both domestic and foreign investments. The African Development Bank projected that the financial and economic crisis will decrease foreign direct investment to Africa in 2009 and that remittances will be significantly diminished.[5] A number of serious additional aftermaths of these causes are project delays, rising unemployment, and all the progress in poverty reduction and economic development that could be derailed if Africa and the international community cannot find a solution for the crisis soon.

A recent study from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stated that even nations that were shielded from the international banking problem would be no longer be immune as the crisis drags on. When major African donors extend themselves to cope with crises in their countries, there is a natural tendency to reduce their international aid.[6] As a consequence, the Africa Economic Development Institute is concerned that most United Nations agencies in Africa could face financial problems when the main funding source for these agencies, the official development aid, is unexpectedly cut.

Besides the impact on African economies, the African Center for Gender and Social Development (ACGS) is gravely concerned about the impact of the crisis on healthcare in Africa. In the report "African perspective of the global economic and financial crisis, including the impact on health," the ACGS expressed its concern about the decrease in exports caused by falling commodity prices and weak demand for African exports. The unstable economic conditions have increased volatility on the African stock market, thereby damaging the regional financial sector. Another concern of ACGS is the depreciation of African currencies. ACGS assumes that depreciation against the U.S. dollar will place heavier burdens on African countries with high external debts and negatively impact imported input costs, production, output, and employment. Based on its data, ACGS foresees declines in tourism revenue, foreign direct investment, official development assistance, and remittances to Africa as a result of the economic crisis. Regarding African healthcare, ACGS concludes that the economic crisis has direct impact on the sector by influencing health supplies, governmental health expenditures, and healthcare investment. In the final analysis, the millennium development goals, which appeared difficult to achieve in prosperous times in Africa, now become even more difficult to attain.[7]

ActionAid, an antipoverty campaign group, estimated that Africa's income would drop by $49 billion dollars between 2007 and 2009 as a consequence of significant reductions in export earnings and aid. In "Africa to Weigh Impact of Global Economic Crisis" posted on the Voice of America News Website, the author reported that thousands of miners have been laid off in South Africa because of the weak demand for minerals. According to the United Nations Development Program, the situation was even worse in the Democratic Republic of Congo where about 300,000 people have lost their jobs.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded that the unstable global economy will affect the region by lowering foreign financial inflows and weakening banking systems which somehow remained shielded from the initial financial crisis. The IMF's outlook showed that in spite of noticeable pressure on Sub-Saharan African countries' money, currencies, and capital markets, the regional financial system has been resilient and functional despite the effects of the financial and economic crisis. This favorable situation was a result of the loose linkage of the regional financial system to the global one, constrained financial services and instruments, high bank liquidity relatively independent of foreign funding, and low leverage in financial institutions. Nevertheless, the IMF cautioned Sub-Saharan countries that if the crisis lasts too long, the regional financial system might turn out to be less stable because investors would be resistant to financial risk. In this situation, credit risk will increase while domestic liquidity will be lower.[8] Another challenge that further exacerbates the problem for export-dependent Sub-Saharan Africa is that demands for its exports seem to be dropping even as commodity prices are dropping, according to the IMF. A study by the IMF found that a 10 percent reduction in nonfuel commodity prices tends to reduce export growth in Sub-Saharan Africa by 1.5 percent after two years.

A United Nations' study, *World Economic Situation and Prospects 2009,* cites the complex interrelationships among countries, and, especially, international financial institutions due to the fragility of the global economy and the vulnerability of every economy. The United Nations (UN) forecasted that the gross domestic product growth of developed countries would be the worst in more than 70 years, a negative 1.5 percent; while that of developing countries could decelerate to 2.7 percent on average. The UN also found that the number of countries that experienced gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 3 percent or higher declined from 106 in 2007 to 83 in 2008, and could fall to 52 in 2009. For developing countries, the number is expected to be 29 in 2009 after dropping to 57 in 2008 from 70 in 2007. Losing the fast pace of economic development, above 7 percent for almost a decade, the least developed countries (LDCs) are to suffer a slower growth pace of about 5.3 percent this year. At this forecasted rate, least developed countries will be unable to escape from their group and the vision of poverty reduction will be delayed for several years.

The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) conducted a study monitoring the impact of the global financial crisis on ten developing countries. The countries are: Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Cambodia, Ghana, Kenya, Indonesia, Nigeria, Uganda, and Zambia. The institute concluded that of the African countries, Ghana and Zambia are highly vulnerable to the effects of the global crisis, followed by Benin, Nigeria, Kenya, and Uganda. While the study is still ongoing, the severest of the shocks thus far are in the areas of export values, remittances, foreign aid and employment in the export-dependent sectors.

The Global Crisis: The Genesis

We begin our study by examining the genesis of the global economic crisis: how did it all begin?

In September 2008, the financial crisis that began in August 2007 became an economic crisis. Many U.S. banks and financial institutions faced failure as a result of questionable loan practices on subprime mortgages. A subprime loan is any loan made to an applicant with questionable credit. Many of these applicants could not really afford the mortgages they were taking out. Application oversight and false information helped create the situation. Many of those loans were adjustable rate mortgages, so when rates rose, payments became too expensive for homeowners to afford. Many of these homes went into foreclosure; the banks were forced to take back these houses causing the insurance companies that backed them to incur significant financial losses. The banks now held "toxic assets"; these are the mortgages that homeowners had defaulted on. Loans that once made up a large part of these banks' assets were now worth pennies on the dollar. Along with the bad mortgages, the banks were sitting on empty houses, and without buyers or mortgage payers, they were unable to recoup their losses. Once this began to happen, investments in these financial institutions decreased significantly. Experts thought this was a temporary problem, but as time went on, foreclosures increased and many individuals lost not only their homes, but also their jobs.

This situation affected the rest of the economy. Financial institutions continued to incur losses and consumer confidence continued to decline. The stock market began to feel the burden of the mortgage crisis and stocks prices began to drop. As time went on the problem only worsened. The stock market went through one of the worst declines in U.S. history. The United States, being the world's largest economy, has an enormous effect on the rest of the world, because many U.S. companies operate overseas, and many foreign companies market their products in the United States. So, unfortunately, as the economy U.S. economy declines, the rest of the world starts down the same path.

Countries that are more financially liberalized and big enough to attract significant amounts of capital from rich countries, will be most affected by the financial crisis. The fact is that many countries have based their development strategies on attracting various types of external investment in the shape of capital flows. Many developing countries have essentially entered into a Faustian pact with financial markets—they were promised funds if they opened up their financial sectors. Sub-Saharan African countries are forecasted to witness a sharp drop in financial flows and export earnings of approximately $49 billion between 2007 and 2009, about 6 percent of the entire continent's pre-crisis GDP, according to ActionAid.

Impact on Other Nations

Of all the money that flows into developing countries, bank lending has been most severely impacted by the crisis. International traders have increasingly eschewed stocks that look risky—many of which are in developing countries. Losses from the recession in the industrialized countries are mainly from trade revenue, and will depend on each country's mix of exports and main trading partners. Those earning less externally will start to spend less within developing countries, investments will decline and unemployment will rise. Government revenues from international aid, taxes, and borrowing are also likely to fall. This in turn will have an impact on government spending, which will disproportionately affect the poorest who tend to be most dependent on social spending in areas such as health and social protection.

The United States has a significant impact on the other nations of the world, due especially to the operations of U.S. multinationals in other nations and the operations of many foreign firms in the United States. The decline of the U.S. economy and companies then tends to have a multiplier effect on the rest of the world.

Some of the impact areas are: 1) firms overseas that export to the United States export less; they then lack sufficient foreign exchange to import from the United States; 2) U.S. multinationals with declining incomes and stocks are unable to afford to buy from or maintain investments in these nations; those that invested in failed U.S. companies lose their investments; those that have invested in the U.S. stock market see declining stock prices and revenue; failed multinationals or those dealing with declining values are not able to invest in other nations; due to low demand, prices of commodities such as oil, cacao and coffee, which buoy developing nations economies, begin to decline; those that rely on tourism experience foreign exchange declines; the value of their currencies begin to decline against the U.S. dollar: they cannot afford to buy as much from the United States; with limited foreign exchange reserves, they are unable to service their debts; they get deeper into debt; remittances from abroad decline as those who remit lose their jobs, homes, and incomes; as stock prices decline there is capital flight from emerging market stocks; banks are reluctant to lend to firms in developing nations; foreign direct investment in developing nations declines; some foreign companies begin to fail; unemployment, inflation, GDP and other macroeconomic variables worsen.

Table 15.1 provides GDP growth in selected countries and regions around the world for 2007–2009. The table shows negative growth in all the developed nations (the United States, Japan, and Germany) and positive, albeit declining growth, in the developing nations. The developing nations have experienced phenomenal growth over the last few years; the ripple effect of the decline in the developed nations has caused dramatic growth rate declines in the 40 percent range for the dependent developing nations.

Real Per Capita GDP *in U.S. dollars, at 2000 prices, using 2000 exchange rates*
Consumer Prices*, Annual average, percent change*
Real Effective Exchange Rates *(Annual average; index, 2000 = 100)*
Sources: *Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa—Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2009—(World economic and financial surveys, 0258-7440 ISBN 978-1-58906-838-4)*

Table 15.1 Real GDP growth in selected countries and regions, 2007–2009

	2007	*2008*	*2009(estimated)*
United States	2.0%	1.1%	−2.8%
Germany	2.5%	1.3%	−5.6%
Japan	2.4%	−0.6%	−6.2%
Africa	6.2%	5.2%	3.4%
China	13.0%	9.0%	6.5%
India	9.3%	7.3%	4.5%
Middle East	6.4%	5.9%	2.5%

* Note: This information applies to all tables in this chapter.
Source: World Economic Outlook (2009), IMF (2009).

The Impact on Africa in General

It has been said that the poor would not be impacted in an economic crisis because they have nothing but their lives and that starved people remain starved no matter how good economic conditions are. This is a rather cynical and pessimistic view of economic development. If the losses of the rich in a bad economy are apparent and instant, those of the poor are hidden and gradual. Such is the African plight. Indeed Africa is not immune to the losses in exports, balance of payments, remittances and overall government credit. With this global recession, the Millennium Development Goals are threatened and the grim specter of poverty will continue to stalk Africa well into the millennium.

Until recently, various organizations provided different forecasted figures for the growth of African economies. There are two commonalities among all reports: no African economy is immune to the global crisis, and African economies will grow more slowly in 2009. The African Union's development agency indicates that both large and small Africa economies are hurt by the crisis. The IMF's *World Economic Outlook 2009* projected Africa to fall from a GDP growth of 5.25 percent last year to 2 percent this year. As a result of the recession, falling commodity prices, weak demand for exports, less remittances, high unemployment, and currency depreciation, are common challenges confronting these economies. Of course, the impact is both nation- and time-dependent.

The IMF's report indicated that African oil exporters, emerging and frontier nations are affected the most by the economic crisis. On one hand, falling commodity prices deteriorate African nations' revenues; on the other hand it helps curb inflationary pressure. Due to falling commodity prices and weak demand, the IMF forecasted that African nations' account balances will slide from a 1 percent surplus in 2008 to a 6.5 percent deficit in 2009. Presumably, a prolonged global economic crisis would severely impact Africa by negatively impacting foreign direct investments, financial assets, and remittances and generally increase poverty.

The sliding commodity prices on the international market coupled with the depreciation of some African currencies have reduced those nations' foreign exchange reserves, which might lead to potential threats on governmental funding capacity, and project delays. Unlike the financial markets in Western and developed countries, those of most African countries have low integration in the international financial market. Thus, the impact of the crisis on the African banking system is limited. Thanks to the limited impact, some foreign banks' subsidiaries in Africa achieved increases in their market capitalization while their parent banks were facing multiple difficulties in their home countries, according to the International Monetary Fund.

Tables 15.3 to 15.5 are instructive in providing us with information on real GDP growth rates, exports, and trade balance. The IMF divides the nations into four categories: oil exporting, middle income, low income, and "fragile countries." We select at least one nation in each category for our case studies. The specific countries selected for our study are based primarily on geographic representation. The nations selected are Egypt, Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa, and Liberia. Table 15.2 provides a compendium (from various sources) of the impact of the crisis on various factors.

Table 15.3 shows that real GDP growth rates in 2006, the year prior to the global recession, were at a high of 7.4 percent for the oil exporting countries and a low

Table 15.2 Summary of the impact of the global economic crisis on Africa

Affected Factors	*Rating*	*Notes*	*Source*
1 Growth	U	A 1 percentage point slowdown in GDP in the rest of the world leads to an estimated ½ percentage point slowdown in Sub-Saharan Africa countries.	*International Monetary Fund 2009*
2 Inflation	F	Between January 2007 and July 2008, LICs faced a food price shock, which peaked in mid-2008, of almost 1 percent of GDP, and a fuel price shock averaging almost 3½ percent of GDP. Thanks to the impact of the crisis inflationary pressures are receding in most countries	*International Monetary Fund 2009*
3 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)	U	Decreased foreign direct investment flows due to tightening of liquidity in global financial markets, could constrain economic growth.	*United Nations 2009*
4 Overseas Development Aid (ODA)	U	Potential decrease in Official development assistance (ODA) for the financing of government programs.	*United Nations 2009*
5 Official Development Aid	U	Official Development Aid to Africa is likely to see cuts across the board as the global financial crisis continues to spread throughout the globe.	*Africa Economic Development Institute 2009*
6 Banking Sector	U	Currency depreciations affect bank balance sheets directly when there are currency mismatches.	*International Monetary Fund 2009*
7 Finance Sector	U	The tighter global credit conditions and increasing risk aversion are likely to combine to affect financial systems in Sub-Saharan Africa.	*International Monetary Fund 2009*
8 Remittances	U	Capital inflow and migrant remittances are declining because of the weakening economies in the West and advanced African economies	*Committee of African Finance Ministers, Central Bank Governors and African Development Bank Group 2009*
9 Employment	U	Experience from previous financial crises shows that in developing countries the macroeconomic impacts translate into a negative shock to demand for labor and hence to wages and employment.	*International Monetary Fund 2009*

Table 15.2 (Continued)

Affected Factors	*Rating*	*Notes*	*Source*
10 Consumption	U	Lower global growth reduces demand for African exports, pushes commodity prices and government revenues down, and curtails the flow of remittances from abroad, thereby reducing domestic consumption.	*International Monetary Fund 2009*
11 Oil Export	U	Oil exporters' growth would decline sharply by about 5½ percentage points to just under 1½ as production expands only moderately amid falling oil prices and the deceleration of non-oil sector growth.	*International Monetary Fund 2009*
12 Non-oil Export	U	A 10 percent reduction in income from a non-fuel commodity price decline tends to reduce growth in Sub-Saharan Africa by about 1.5 percentage points after two years.	*International Monetary Fund 2009*
13 Oil Import	F	A net oil importer in SSA (with oil imports of some 20 percent of GDP), facing a decline in oil prices of say 50 percent, could expect an increase in its growth rate by some 0.3-0.4 percentage point.	*International Monetary Fund 2009*
14 Food	F	Food taxes decreased in four African countries in 2007, but in 28 in 2008. As a result of decreasing food prices, the fiscal costs of responses to the food and fuel crisis are expected to drop by an average of 0.4 percent of GDP in 2009.	*International Monetary Fund 2009*
15 Sovereign Debt	U	More than half of low income countries' public debt remains external, depreciation in exchange rates will aggravate the ratios of debt to GDP and fiscal revenues.	*International Monetary Fund 2009*
16 Government Revenue	U	The global financial crisis will reduce government revenues.	*International Monetary Fund 2009*

17	Government Spending Pressure	U	For oil importers fiscal deficits (excluding grants) are projected to increase by 2¼ percentage points to about 5¾ percent of GDP in 2009, in part because governments are spending more.	*International Monetary Fund 2009*
18	Infrastructure Projects	U	A lack of resources could set Africa back by several years in terms of reducing poverty and providing infrastructure.	*International Monetary Fund 2009*
19	Poverty Reduction	U	When mean growth declines by 1 percentage point, the poverty head count increases by 2 percent	*International Monetary Fund 2009*
20	Health Care	U	The global financial and economic crisis is affecting the health sector directly by affecting the supply of health services, manifested mainly through government cutbacks in expenditure as a result of reduced revenues due to falling exports and as a result of potential reduction in ODA.	*United Nations 2009*

**Note: U = Unfavorable F = Favorable.*

Table 15.3 Real GDP Growth for African Regions and Selected Representative Countries from 2006–2010

	Percentage Real GDP Growth					*% Change in GDP Growth 2006–2009*
	2006	*2007*	*2008*	*2009*	*2010*	
Oil-exporting countries	**7.4**	8.9	6.9	1.4	4.0	−81.08
Nigeria	6.2	6.4	5.3	2.9	2.6	−53.23
Middle-income countries	**5.4**	5	3.1	−0.8	2.5	−114.81
South Africa	5.3	5.1	3.1	−0.3	1.9	−105.66
Egypt	6.8	7.1	7.2	3.6	3.0	−47.06
Low-income countries	**7.3**	7.3	6.9	4.5	4.8	−38.35
Ghana	6.4	6.1	7.2	4.5	4.7	−29.68
Kenya	6.4	7	2	3	4	−53.12
Fragile countries	**3.0**	3.3	3.7	3.1	4.4	3.33
Liberia	7.8	9.5	7.1	4.9	7.5	−37.17

Source: Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, IMF (2009).

Table 15.4 Exports as a percentage of GDP for African areas and selected representative nations from 2006 to 2010

	Exports as % of GDP					*% Change from 2006 to 2009*
	2006	*2007*	*2008*	*Est. 2009*	*Est. 2010*	
Oil-exporting countries	51.4	51.5	52.2	35.7	37.5	−30.54
Nigeria	42.4	40.5	38.8	28	29.5	−33.96
Middle-income countries	32	33.7	37.1	36.5	37.4	14.06
South Africa	29.7	31.5	35.4	35.4	36.2	19.19
Egypt	30.7	29.5	32.9	23.4	N/A	−23.78
Low-income countries	24.9	24.9	24.2	20.9	20.8	−16.06
Ghana	40.2	40.1	45.2	44.4	48.3	10.44
Kenya	25.9	26.1	27.2	24.6	21.9	−5.01
Fragile countries	41.6	44.8	43	32.9	33.1	−20.91
Liberia	81.5	75.4	92.4	76.3	76.4	−6.38

Source: Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, IMF (2009).

of 3 percent for the fragile economies. By 2007, the year the financial crisis began; growth was at a high of 8.9 percent and 3.3 percent for the oil-exporting and fragile economies, respectively. The numbers indicate that by 2008, growth had slowed, and by 2009, the impact of the global recession was being felt by these nations. The last column shows that from 2006 to 2009, the growth rate for the oil-exporting, middle-income, low-income, and fragile economies declined by 81.1 percent, 114.8 percent, 38.4 percent and grew by 3.3 percent, respectively. While the overall growth for these nations is still positive, the financial crisis certainly had a negative impact.

As indicated earlier, one of the variables most affected by the global crisis is exports. As may be gleaned from Table 15.4, exports as a percentage of GDP have declined for most of the nations. For the oil-exporting countries, exports as a percentage of GDP declined by 30.5 percent from 2006 to 2009. This was primarily due to declining oil prices and consequently declining oil revenues. The middle- income countries saw their exports as a percentage of GDP rise. This may be a result of increases in commodity prices such as gold. There were double-digit declines for the low-income and fragile nations.

Table 15.5 shows the declines in trade balance as a percentage of GDP—the difference between exports and imports. The negative trade balances which prevailed in almost all nations are a result of these nations importing more and exporting less, even as foreign exchange rates declined. Some nations went from surplus trade balances to deficits as a result of the global crisis. Between 2006 and 2009, trade balances for the oil-exporting, middle-income, low-income, and fragile countries declined by 53.4 percent, 69.6 percent, 10.8 percent and 130.8 percent, respectively. These declines and the concomitant declines in exports indicate the grave nature of the economic impact on all African nations.

Table 15.5 Trade balance as a percentage of GDP for African areas and selected representative nations from 2006 to 2010

	Trade balance as a % of GDP					*% Change in Trade Balance 2006–2009*
	2006	*2007*	*2008*	*2009*	*2010*	
Oil-exporting countries	28.1	26.7	27.3	9.6	13.1	−65.88
Nigeria	19.2	15.6	13.6	0.3	5.7	−98.44
Middle-income countries	−2.3	−2.4	−2.9	−3.7	−3.9	−60.87
South Africa	−2.3	−2	−1.6	−1.7	−2	26.09
Egypt	−4.84	−4.91	−6.04	−8.24	N/A	−80.25
Low-income countries	−12	−13.6	−15.2	−14	−13.3	−16.67
Ghana	−23.7	−25.9	−30.9	−22.7	−25.6	4.22
Kenya	−15.1	−16.4	−17.5	−13.3	−12.9	11.92
Fragile countries	6.5	5.4	3.2	−0.4	−2	−106.15
Liberia	−45.7	−39.5	−48.7	−64.8	−71.1	−41.8

Source: Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa, IMF (2009).

Country Analysis

The nations chosen for analysis are, oil producing: Nigeria, middle income: South Africa and Egypt, low income: Ghana and Kenya, and fragile: Liberia. We focus on GDP growth and trade balance/exports for these nations. The numbers are summarized in tables 15.3, 15.4, and 15.5.

Nigeria

Nigeria has been severely impacted by the collapse of oil prices. Its domestic financial system, which was precarious, at best, has suffered. The Nigerian currency, the naira, has fallen 25 percent against the dollar in two months and has also depreciated as the global crisis worsened. As a consequence, external reserves have dwindled immensely. Nigeria's stock market has lost significant value and there is a loss of confidence in the financial institutions. The economy depends on oil, which accounts for 40 percent of the GDP. The United States is its largest foreign investor.

Nigeria's GDP growth rate, which was at a pre-crisis level of 6.2 percent, is just below 3 percent in 2009, a decrease of over 53 percent. As the crisis wears on, the exchange rate has deteriorated by over 10 percent from 2006 to 2008. Couple the decreasing oil prices with decreasing exchange rates, we can conclude, unequivocally, that the Nigerian economy is in dire straits. This is borne out by the drop in exports as a percent of GDP of over 33 percent and the drastic decline in trade as a percent of GDP by over 98 percent.

South Africa

South Africa achieved the fastest economic growth rate and possessed a GDP of $277 billion in 2008;[9] South Africa is the leading economy in the Sub-Saharan region. One of the key factors contributing to the success of South Africa is its early and sound integration into the global economy. If global integration brought prosperity to the country during its economic heyday, it is now making South Africa more vulnerable during this economic crisis in comparison to the other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.

As in most developing countries, exports are the key source of foreign exchange and have been a significant factor contributing to the impressive growth of South Africa for more than a decade. The role of exports in South Africa's gross domestic product has increased continuously from 26.8 percent in 2004 to 35.4 percent in 2008.[10] South Africa's major exports are gold, diamonds, metals, minerals, cars, and machinery.[11] Precious metals (such as gold and platinum) account for up to 65 percent of South Africa's exports.[12] However, as the world economy declines, South Africa's commodity prices have also been declining since demand from its major importers, such as the United States, European Union, and Japan have contracted. Note that approximately 60 percent of South Africa's exports were shipped to the United States, the European Union, and Japan.[13] As a consequence of declines in exports from various sources, South Africa has incurred sharp reductions in its revenue. Export earnings combined with financial inflows dropped 19 percent in 2008 and are predicted to fall 47 percent in 2009 in comparison to 2007, according to ActionAid, an international antipoverty organization.

The significant decreases in exports, weak domestic and global demand, and falling commodity prices have forced many factories in South Africa to limit their production, reduce their labor force, or temporarily shut down. Statistics South Africa (SSA) found that 90 percent of manufacturers in South Africa decreased production in May 2009. SSA also reported that the unemployment rate in South Africa was as high as 23.6 percent in the second quarter of 2009. This means more than 4 million people in South Africa have lost their jobs or could not find jobs.

According to ActionAid, the shares of foreign investors in the South African stock market were as high as 20 percent in 2005, and foreign lending was 20 percent of total bank credit in 2007.[14] Those facts indicate that South Africa's financial and banking systems are very fragile and riskier under the current economic crisis. Although the Johannesburg stock exchange (JSE) index has partially recovered since its deepest plunge, it is still approximately 8,000 points lower than it was in June 2008, according to Bloomberg's historical data. Growth will continue to decline along with exports, due to weak world demand.

Egypt

Egypt is the only country in this study not located in Sub-Saharan Africa. We include Egypt in this study to show that all African nations, not just those in Sub-Saharan Africa, are negatively impacted by the global crisis. Egypt's economy grew by 7.2 percent in 2007–2008. The primary growth engines were industry, tourism, revenues from the Suez Canal and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Tourism, which represents 8.5 percent of the GDP, has declined and unemployment is expected to rise to 8.7 percent.

As indicated in Table 15.3, Egypt's real GDP growth rate declined by 47.06 percent from 2006 to 2009. This was a result of the fallout from losses in tourism and revenues from the Suez Canal, among other things. For the same period, exports as a percentage of GDP declined by 23.8 percent. Egypt's real GDP growth rate, which had peaked at 7.2 percent before the global recession hit, declined by a drastic 50 percent from 2008 to 2009 and 40 percent from 2006 to 2009. Growth will remain slow through 2010.

Ghana

Ghana's economy was growing at 6.4 percent in 2008. Ghana's economic growth is primarily based on exports of agricultural products and increases in industrial production. From 2006 to 2009 the real GDP growth rate declined by over 47 percent.

The Ghanaian economy has felt the impact of the financial crisis through a tightening of inter-bank credit. As a result, those firms seeking loans from smaller banks, which tend to be more customer friendly, now have difficulty accessing such credit. Additionally, international funding for various organizations and projects has also declined as funds have been diverted to support programs in other parts of Africa.[15]

As shown in Table 15.5, exports as a percentage of GDP have increased by over 10 percent from 2006 to 2009. This may be due to various export promotion programs. Trade balance as a percentage of GDP remains dismal at over negative 20 percent. This essentially means that Ghana imports significantly more than it exports. As the country continues on the road to economic development, it continues to be heavily import dependent—this places a severe strain on its foreign exchange reserves. Economic reforms, along with the recent discovery of oil, will boost the nation's growth rate in 2010.

Kenya

The Kenyan economy grew at a rate of 7 percent in 2007 and over 6 percent in the year prior to that. There were significant improvements in reducing poverty until the crisis began. The global crisis caused larger current account deficits, high debt levels, and declining foreign exchange reserves. Kenya relies heavily on exports of products such as tea (down 11 percent in 2008) and coffee (down 29 percent in 2008). The depressed prices of these products, along with lower demand, have had adverse effects on Kenya's economy. Tourism, another mainstay of the Kenyan economy, is also down (35.2 percent decline during the first ten months of 2008). Remittances have also decreased.

Kenya's real GDP growth rate was down in excess of 53 percent from 2006 to 2009; it went from 7 percent in 2007 to 2 percent in 2009—a 71 percent decrease. The trade balance has remained negative for years; however, there was an 11.9 percent improvement from 2006 to 2009. Exports, which comprised over 27 percent of GDP in 2008, are expected to be down to 24.6 percent of GDP in 2009, based on IMF forecast. While this may seem like a small decrease, it amounts to millions of dollars of foreign exchange earnings. As the global recession abates, the Kenyan economy will slowly turn around.

Liberia

Liberia, the representative "fragile" economy in this study, continues to make progress. The economy grew by 7.8 percent and 9.5 percent in 2006 and 2007, respectively. This growth is expected to slow to 4.9 percent in 2009. The decline in growth from 2006 to 2009 was 37.2 percent. The global recession caused one of Liberia's principal exports, rubber, to drop by 63 percent between October 2008 and January 2009, according to the African Economic Outlook 2009 published by the IMF. Unemployment continues to be high; there is a huge debt burden and high poverty levels, among other challenges.

Remittances have declined and the Central Bank of Liberia has incurred income losses as a result of reduced interest on its deposits abroad. The trade balances as well as exports have declined; however, the trade balance as a percentage of GDP has continued to rise over the years. The country is heavily dependent on imports, which amounted to 280 percent of GDP in 2006 and over 230 percent of GDP in 2009. So, even as exports have grown over the years, imports dominate the Liberian economy.

Implications

While this study has numerous implications, we focus on a few general ones here: 1) African nations should not be too quick to integrate their financial markets with those of the developed world; 2) an overreliance on trade with the developed world does not bode well for Africa; 3) African nations need to focus on internal growth policies by doing a better job of mobilizing resources—fiscal stimulus plans may be necessary; 4) it was an uphill battle to meet the Millennium Development Goals, now it is highly unlikely that many African nations will meet these goals; 5) it will take concerted efforts on the part of the African nations and their partners for them to get back on the growth trajectory; 6) African nations must focus on producing the products in which they have a comparative advantage—agriculture and minerals; 7) African nations must realize that entrepreneurial innovation, through the continued growth of medium and small sized businesses, is critical to economic development and growth.

Conclusion

African countries, although relatively isolated from the direct impact of the global financial crisis, have not escaped its repercussions. The immediate effect of the financial crisis was the global recession it created; this has impacted all African nations. The economic impact has been felt more through trade than anywhere else. Be the nation oil exporting, middle income, low income, or fragile, the effect has been negative; the magnitude of the impact varies by nation and economic sector. This study provided an assessment of how the global recession has impacted specific macroeconomic variables in Africa. The variables considered included exports, trade balance, exchange rates, tourism, FDI, and remittances, to name but a few.

While economic growth in the African nations has slowed, the outlook is still better than that for the developed nations. Africa's growth rate is expected to fall below 3 percent for the first time since 2002. The key to continued economic development for these nations is the mobilization of resources to finance growth in order to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.

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Can Sub-Saharan Africa Achieve the Millennium Development Goals?

Emmanuel Cleeve

Introduction

Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has come full circle to a position of promise four decades since most countries in the region attained political independence. At independence, there were great expectations of rapid economic and social progress. These were broadly realized in the 1960s, when production grew and real per capita incomes increased appreciably. After this initial period of growth, however, most economies stagnated in the 1970s and went into decline in the 1980s. Although a number of countries undertook far-reaching adjustment and reform programs with considerable success, the region's aggregate economic performance remained disappointingly weak, with falling real incomes per capita and increasing poverty throughout the continent. Now, in the new millennium, renewed signs of economic progress and a broader commitment to reform augur well for the future. These reform efforts need to be sustained, strengthened, and directed toward the attainment of the millennium development goals (MDGs) and targets.

In September 2000, world leaders set out an original blueprint for humanity in their "Millennium Declaration," in which they recognized their "collective responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality and equity at the global level."[1] With this in mind, they pledged to "spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty to which more than a billion of them are currently subjected."[2]

The MDGs are a set of numerical and time-bound targets that address key elements of human development. According to Kofi Annan and others, "The goals are set in precise terms—measured in numbers to ensure accountability. The openness and transparency of such numbers can help us chart a course to achieve the goals and track progress."[3]

In total, there are eight MDGs that provide a framework for the entire UN system and allow each agency to contribute according to its comparative advantage in a coherent and complementary manner toward a common end. The eight goals are halving extreme poverty and hunger; achieving universal primary education and gender equality; reducing under-five mortality by two-thirds and maternal mortality by three-quarters; reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; halving the proportion of people without access to safe water; and develop a global partnership for development. Within each goal there are a number of targets, monitored using a set of quantifiable indicators, that need to be achieved by 2015, from their 1990 baseline levels.

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: the second section outlines the history behind the MDGs, It shows their importance by providing an overview of their origins, and presents a theoretical analysis of the MDGs. The third section evaluates the current progress of the main MDGs, through the examination of key targets and indicators. It also assesses and analyzes SSA's performance toward meeting the MDGs. The fourth section concludes the chapter by highlighting the main points.

The Evolution of the MDGs

The MDGs were born out of the many international conferences that took place during the 1990s. It is important to note that the negotiations and decisions made at these conferences were arguably grounded on certain theoretical positions, many of which may have had a greater or lesser impact on international development policies. First, we cast a historical eye over development theories and policies, particularly those which have been fundamental in shaping the MDGs, and second, we highlight some of these influential conferences.

One of the first influential development theories was the linear-stages-of-growth theory of the late 1950s/early 1960s. W. W. Rostow believed that development should be seen as a process, since all countries can be placed in a hierarchy of development stages. He identified the five stages as the traditional society; the transitional stage: the preconditions for take off; the take off; the drive to maturity; and the stage of high mass consumption. Hence, in order for economic growth to take place, a country must pass through each successive stage of development. In keeping with this doctrine, therefore, developed countries would be classed as being at stage four or five of the development hierarchy, whereas less developed countries (LDCs) would be at stage one or two.

The Harrod-Domar growth model, and its variants such as the Mahalanobis model, is the analytical tool used to demonstrate the linear-stages-of-growth theory. This model can determine the mixture of savings, investment, and foreign aid that LDCs must attain if they are to achieve steady economic growth. In addition, the model shows that it is the rate of savings and investment in an economy that determines how fast it grows. However, this theory did not have a major influence on the development process since it failed to recognize that LDCs do not have the same institutional and structural conditions as those found in developed countries.

The 1970s gave rise to two other influential development theories, that of structural change and neocolonial dependency. Structuralists believe that changes need to take place in the underlying structure of the economy if they are to generate and sustain economic growth. They assume that LDCs have various institutional features and weaknesses and that markets operate imperfectly, and try to identify specific rigidities, lags, and other characteristics of LDCs that affect economic adjustments and the choice of development policy. Two well-known examples of structuralism are the Lewis's "two-sector surplus labor" theoretical model and the "patterns of development" empirical analysis of Hollis Chenery. They believe that economic growth is driven by sectoral shifts—for instance, manufacturing firms replacing traditional agriculture—and analyze the sequential process through which the economic, industrial, and institutional structure of an underdeveloped economy is transformed over time.

Neocolonial dependency theories attribute "the existence and continuance of underdevelopment primarily to the historical evolution of a highly unequal international capitalist system of rich country-poor country relationships."[4] This relationship makes attempts by poor nations to be self-reliant and independent difficult and sometimes even impossible. It was colonization that exposed many LDCs to the capitalist mode of production, which may have been traditionally dominated by feudal or peasant systems, before becoming engulfed into the capitalist system. This automatic "incorporation" into international capitalism created distributional struggles between rich and poor nations and, ultimately, resulted in dualistic economies and societies.

The neoclassical counterrevolution of the 1980s ushered in supply-side macroeconomic policies, rational expectations theories, privatization of public corporations, and the liberalization of national markets. These neoliberal principles were founded on the belief that failure to develop was due to too much government intervention and the regulation of the economy. To create economic efficiency and growth, LDCs must allow free markets to flourish, the privatization of state-owned enterprises, the expansion of free trade and exports, and greater inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI). All analyses in this chapter are fundamentally based on neoclassical doctrines and analytical techniques.

The late 1980s and the 1990s saw the birth of growth theories such as endogenous growth theory and new institutional economics (NIE). According to the endogenous growth theory, a mixture of neoclassical and dependency principles are needed for sustained economic growth to take place. Hence, the theory concedes that in a neoclassical world of private markets, it is highly likely that a government may still have an important role to play in the development process. Thus, the models of endogenous growth are unique in that persistent gross national product (GNP) increases is determined by the system governing the production process and not by forces outside that system.

The NIE is more than just an amalgamation of the neoclassical and structuralist doctrines, in that it builds on, modifies, and extends previous development theories in order to incorporate the theory of institutions into the analysis. Hence, NIE theory goes beyond the previous simplistic assumptions made by many other development theories and focuses on the belief that institutions govern the performance of an economy and, as such, are intrinsic to the development process.

However, it is important to note that, despite the criticisms of the former development theories, each of them has its advantages and disadvantages. The linear-stages-of-growth model, for example, emphasizes the crucial role of savings and investment in promoting sustainable long-term growth; the Lewis's two-sector model of structural change underlines the importance of analyzing the many linkages between traditional agriculture and modern industry, while the neoclassical theories bring to the fore the importance of free markets and the need to foster an economic environment within which firms can compete. Thus, it is easy to see that the MDGs are the collective result of theoretical compromises that took place between advocates of the various theoretical perceptions that ordinarily may have favored one particular ideological stance to another. The theory that appears to capture and represent this compromise is the

NIE theory, simply because it tries to amalgamate many of the different development ideologies into an eclectic framework.

Poling's summary of the evolution of the international conferences that took place throughout the 1990s highlights the contribution that each made to the MDGs. The UN Conference on Environment and Development held in 1992, for instance, made a contribution to six out of the eight MDGs, in areas such as education, health, and sustainable development.[5] For certain goals, numerical targets were specified at the conference, for instance, a 10–40 percent improvement, by 2000, in the rates of child mortality, maternal health, and malaria. The Education for All conferences that took place in 1990 and 2000 and the Fourth World Conference for Women held in Beijing in 1995 focused primarily on ensuring access to education and gender equity in education. Unlike the MDGs, these narrowly defined goals were not underpinned with numerical and time-bound targets. The Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development and the Habitat II conferences that took place in 1995 and 1996, respectively, covered all eight aspects of the MDGs.

A highly influential policy paper, "Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation," recommended a collaborative approach to the development process; at its core was the aim to realize seven fundamental goals, from which quantifiable targets and measurable indicators for each MDG were conceived.[6] These goals came under three main headings: Economic well-being—the proportion of people living in extreme poverty in LDCs should be reduced by at least one-half by 2015; Social development—there should be substantial progress in primary education, gender equality, and basic health care and family planning; and Environmental sustainability and regeneration—there should be a current national strategy for sustainable development in the process of implementation in every country by 2005, in order to ensure that by 2015 current trends in the loss of environmental resources (forests, fisheries, fresh water, climate, soils, biodiversity, stratospheric ozone, the accumulation, and other major indicators) are effectively reversed at both the global and national levels.

Achieving the MDGs in SSA

The four main goals of the MDGs will be analyzed here, with significantly more emphasis placed on goal 1, the eradication of extreme poverty, which should aid both the understanding and achievement of goals 2, 3, and 4, and in turn, the rest of the MDGs.

Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger (goal 1)

The progress of this goal is monitored by using two main targets: first, the reduction of poverty by half between 1990 and 2015, and second, the reduction in the number of people suffering from hunger by half. Each target uses a number of indicators in order to quantify progress. Target one, for instance, uses the poverty ratio as one of the monitors of changing living standards, and target two uses the prevalence of underweight children (under the age of five) to measure hunger levels.

The total number of people in the "poverty trap" is approximately 1 billion.[7] Even though this number has declined and continues to do so, it remains a high statistic. Between 1990 and 2005, in Southern Asia, and Eastern and South-Eastern Asia, there has been a noticeable decline in the percentage of the population living on less than $1 per day. Conversely, in the regions of North Africa and West Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), SSA and the transition economies of South-Eastern Europe, poverty appears to have deepened in 1999, with the proportion of people living on less than $1 per day increasing, and this proportion fell in 2005.

The figures also show that the poverty rate in SSA had hardly declined in the ten years prior to the end of the trend period.[8] In 1990, the proportion of people in SSA whose income was less than $1 a day was 55 percent. To meet the first poverty target in 2015, this proportion should halve to 28 percent. In 2005, however, the proportion stood at 50 percent, just 5 percent down on the 1990 level. The second poverty target is to halve the proportion of people who suffer from hunger. For SSA countries, this proportion stood at 32 percent in 1990 and 31 percent in 2005. A few countries are progressing slightly better, including Botswana, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Mauritius, Senegal, Seychelles, and South Africa.

The historical reasons for SSA's poverty provide an insight into the hunger problem there and could be seen to explain much of the results in the analysis. The countries most affected by these events are also the worst performers in terms of achieving the poverty and other targets. SSA countries have been more prone to catastrophic natural events such as floods and droughts. Sixty percent of SSA is vulnerable to drought, and 30 percent is extremely vulnerable. Niger, Sudan, and Ethiopia are examples of such major disaster areas associated with drought. The analysis provides a clear picture of the poor performance of Sudan, Chad, Eritrea, Angola, and Niger. SSA suffers the most compared to other regions from food shortages, because rodents, insects, mould, and spoilage destroy 40 percent of grain crops and more than 50 percent of fruits and vegetables each year. Such losses are largely prevented in industrialized countries. Famines are still occurring in SSA even when national food supplies are adequate, because parts of the population lack the capacity to produce or purchase food.

Traditional societies and rural communities in SSA are thought to embrace values that impede their development. For example, the high fertility rates in most SSA countries have led to a high level of poverty. However, it is important to note that having a large family in SSA is often a rational response to poverty. The basic necessities of food, water, and fuel require large inputs of labor, and an extra pair of hands can increase rather than decrease a family's chance of survival. Thus, a vicious cycle of poverty exists.

Poverty in SSA is often the outcome of the operation of national and global economic structures under capitalism. There is a large academic literature that sees this as the root cause of inequalities not only in SSA but globally. There is no country in SSA that is now removed from the influences of globalization. However, globalization is a label covering a whole diversity of processes and it is important to distinguish between them since they impact on SSA countries in different ways.

Analyses and data from the World Bank suggest two important sources of finance to SSA; FDI and official development assistance (ODA) declined in 2000, even to those countries who are adhering to sound economic and social policies.[9] The ODA to SSA countries fell to $12.3 billion in 2000 from $17.2 billion in 1990. While aid flows have declined most sharply to SSA countries at war, assistance to governments recognized as having sound policies has also dwindled. Net ODA to Ghana, for example, dropped by almost $100 million in 2000 from the year before. Mozambique, one of SSA's poorest countries, but regarded as a strong policy performer, saw aid fall to $804 million from $1.04 billion over the same period. Both these countries are offtrack in achieving the poverty targets. Since 2000, however, total net ODA consistently increased to a record $39 billion in 2006, but declined by 10.8 percent to $38.7 billion in 2007. Similarly, SSA's share in total aid also declined to 36.9 percent in 2007 from 41.2 percent in 2006. The drop in ODA flows to SSA in 2007 was mainly due to decline in debt relief.

Those regions that seem to have fared best in terms of their absolute poverty also seem to have fared best in their relative poverty. Hence, not only does it appear that certain regions were able to decrease the percentage of people living below the poverty line, but also they were able to narrow the poverty gap between the richest and the poorest of their society. At the same time, however, there were a number of regions where the living conditions of the poor either remained unchanged or worsened over the sample period, such as SSA and Southern Asia.

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) states that one in three people in SSA, or 236 million in 2007, are chronically hungry, making the figure the highest proportion of undernourished people in the total population.[10] Most of the increase in the number of hungry in the region occurred in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as a result of widespread and persistent conflict, from 11 million in 2003 to 43 million in 2005. Overall, SSA has progressed in reducing the proportion of people suffering from chronic hunger, down from 34 percent in 1995–7 to 30 percent in 2003–5.

The strong relationship between growth and poverty reduction is well documented in the literature. Figure 16.1 shows changes in poverty, using the $1 a day headcount for a large number of LDCs, over the last two decades.[11] The figure also indicates wide variations around the average. Like other LDCs, most SSA countries are clustered in the top left quadrant (with negative growth and rising poverty) or bottom right quadrant (with positive growth and declining poverty). SSA countries have a median per capita growth rate of 0.8 percent a year, substantially lower than the overall median of 2.1 percent, and most SSA countries in the sample fall above the regression line, indicating worse poverty reduction performance than for a typical LDC with similar growth experience.

There are also important differences across countries in the rate at which poverty declines for a given growth rate. Take two groups of countries with similar growth rates: Ghana and Uganda, and Kenya and Burundi, for example. The first group had similar



Figure 16.1 Relationship between income growth and poverty reduction.

positive annual growth rates (1–3 percent), but the rates of annual change in poverty ranged from about −8 percent to +2 percent. The second group have similar negative growth rates, but the change in poverty ranged from −9 percent to +3 percent.[12] The mixed results show Kenya and Uganda are below the line, implying reduced poverty, but different growth experiences, while the opposite is true for Burundi and Ghana, above the poverty line, with increased poverty for different growth experiences. Two reasons suggested for such differences are cross-country variations in the sensitivity of poverty to growth and in how the distribution of income changes over time.

In SSA, reaching the poverty goal will require a substantial acceleration in income growth or a significant increase in the poverty elasticity of growth (see table 16.1). While the recent pickup in growth has improved prospects, the economic stagnation of the early 1990s caused poverty rates—already the highest in the world in 1990—to increase even further by 2001. Household surveys, which are available for 28 countries (accounting for 78 percent of the region's population and 87 percent of its GDP), suggest that the weighted average annual growth in per capita income required to achieve the income poverty goal is about 5 percent. Of these countries, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Senegal, South Africa, and Swaziland have a required per capita growth rate of less than 3 percent a year, leaving them well positioned to meet the poverty goal. Also close are Mauritania and Mozambique, where the required per capita growth rate is less than 3.5 percent a year. But together these seven countries contain less than a quarter of the population of SSA. This pattern did not change much in 2008.[13]

Although there has been some improvement in SSA's performance recently, its overall economic record over recent decades has been dismal and volatile.[14] Of the 45 SSA countries, only five have consistently recorded real per capita growth rates above 2 percent a year: Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Swaziland. Moreover, economic disruptions have been widespread, with nearly three-quarters of the region's countries recording at least one year of per capita growth lower than -10 percent. Consequently, Africa's real income per capita has steadily declined relative to other regions and is roughly the same as in the mid-1970s. Botswana is the only SSA country that can claim to have achieved structural transformation during the period 1990–2000. In addition, the World Bank shows that income distribution has not improved, with the incomes of the poorest deteriorating while those of the richest, at least, have not

Table 16.1 Many SSA countries require rapid growth to achieve the income poverty MDG

Required growth of per capita GDP 2005–15	*Number of countries*	*Population 2000 (millions)*	*Share of Sub-Saharan population (percent)*	*Share of Sub-Saharan GDP 2000 (percent)*
<2 percent	1	9.5	1	2
2–3 percent	4	124.5	19	52
3–4 percent	2	20.2	3	1
4–6 percent	4	44.4	7	5
>6 percent	17	315.4	46	27
Total	28	514.0	76	87

Note: For the 28 countries in this sample, the weighted average required growth in per capita GDP is 5.2 percent a year.
Source: World Bank Staff Estimates (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005.).

declined.[15] Most of this inequality in SSA is within countries, rather than between countries.

Negligible improvements in productivity have been the primary source of Africa's slow growth. Since the 1960s, the private investment rate has consistently been lower in SSA—even when the comparison is restricted to low-income countries in other developing regions. In the 1990s and early 2000s, a small number of major oil-producing countries received the bulk of the increase in such investment, including Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Nigeria.

Similarly, modest increases in education enrollments have implied a smaller contribution from increased human capital than for most other developing regions. But the key source for the region's weak economic performance was that total factor productivity growth was nonexistent between 1960 and 2002—unlike in other developing regions, where such efficiency improvements played an important role in supporting growth.[16]

Firms in SSA consider high taxes and poor access to finance to be among their most significant constraints.[17] In countries with small tax bases, firms often bear a disproportionate share of the tax burden, particularly small- and medium-size firms. Many firms in the region do not pay any taxes by remaining in the informal sector, which represents more than 70 percent of the nonagricultural employment, and do not see many benefits from becoming formal. Most firms lack confidence that courts will uphold their property rights, and most have little access to finance due to shallow financial systems and the difficulty of obtaining collateral.

Corruption and policy uncertainty are also significant constraints in SSA. In particular, the discretion that many officials enjoy in implementing complex regulations creates opportunities for bribes and uneven application of requirements. More than 95 percent of firms in the region report that corruption and policy uncertainty are problems, with most firms calling them major or very severe constraints on their ability to operate and expand.

Unreliable electricity supply is reported as a constraint by 52 percent of firms in SSA, compared with 42 percent in South Asia, 24 percent in East Asia and Latin America, and less than 10 percent in Europe and Central Asia. Moreover, a much larger share of African firms report frequent power outages and serious production losses stemming from such interruptions in production.

There is considerable cross-country variation in the ranking of constraints reported by SSA firms. For example, policy uncertainty is reported as a major or severe constraint by 27 percent of firms in Uganda but by 57 percent in Zambia. Similarly, unpredictable interpretation of regulations is a problem cited by 40 percent of firms in Uganda but by 70 percent in Zambia (see table 16.2). In Kenya, more than 75 percent of firms report paying bribes, averaging more than 5 percent of sales. Losses from power interruptions average 6–7 percent of sales in Ethiopia and Zambia, and 10 percent or more in Eritrea, Kenya, and Senegal.

This picture, derived from the World Bank's Investment Climate Surveys, is corroborated by its Doing Business indicators. The business environment, as measured by the regulatory burden, is weakest in SSA. Among the 20 countries with the most debilitating regulatory obstacles to doing business, 16 are in SSA—with Angola, Burkina Faso, Chad, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo ranking among the worst five worldwide. On an average, starting a company in SSA costs the equivalent of 224 percent of national per capita income, compared with 45 percent in South Asia and only 7 percent in high-income countries.

Table 16.2 Investment climate constraints vary across SSA (percentage of firms citing problem)

Country	*Unpredictable interpretation of regulations*	*Lack confidence that courts will uphold property rights*	*Management time spent dealing with officials (percent of time)*	*Average number of days to clear customs*	*Finance a major constraint*	*Infrastructure a major constraint*	*Skills a major constraint*
China	33.7	17.5	19.0	79	22.3	29.7	30.7
Kenya	45.5	51.3	13.8	89	58.3	48.1	27.6
Mozambique			11.3	119	78.0	64.0	33.5
Senegal	42.5	40.5	13.8	65	60.0	30.7	18.5
Tanzania	58.6	55.1	16.2	175	53.0	58.9	25.0
Uganda	40.0	30.1	5.0		52.8	44.5	30.8
Zambia	70.1	36.0	14.1	48	67.7	39.6	35.7

Sources: World Bank, World Development Report (2005); World Bank Investment Climate Surveys.

Nigeria has some of the world's most cumbersome regulations for registering property, requiring 21 procedures, 27 percent of the property value in fees, and a registration period of 274 days. Other African countries present similar obstacles to registering property: completing the transfer process takes more than a year in Ghana and 354 days in Rwanda, and costs 34 percent of the property value in Senegal and 23 percent in the Republic of Congo. Moreover, Africa's property registries tend to be poorly organized and provide little security of ownership.

Universal Primary Education and Gender Equality (goals 2 and 3)

The progress of universal primary education (UPE) is monitored by one main target—the completion of a full course of primary school education for all children, whether boys or girls. The three measurable indicators for this target are (1) the net enrolment ratio in primary education, (2) the proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade 5, and (3) the literacy rate of 15–24-year-olds.

To achieve gender equality and the empowerment of women, the principal target is the elimination of gender disparities in both primary and secondary education by 2005. In addition, by 2015, the eradication should have filtered through to all levels of education. Four indicators are used to quantify progress toward the goal: the ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary, and tertiary education; the ratio of literate females to males among 15–24-year-olds; the share of women in wage employment in the nonagricultural sector; and the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments.

Over the period, developed countries had, on an average, a net enrolment ratio of over 95 percent and a completion ratio of almost 100 percent. In contrast, LDCs had, on an average, an enrolment ratio of about 85 percent and a completion ratio of approximately 82 percent. The statistics for LAC and East Asia are worth noting because these regions seem to have enrolment and completion rates similar to those found in any developed country. The poor showings in SSA and South Asia could be put down to certain economic, social, and environmental conditions that might lead to problems with primary school retention.

Achieving UPE by 2015 remains one of the greatest development challenges facing SSA. The World Bank estimated that around 40 million children of primary school age are outside the education system in SSA, that is, more than 40 percent of the school age population.[18] The challenge is especially great because of rapid population growth and the high dependency ratio. The high rate of population growth is also expected to increase the region's school age population by 30 percent by 2015. Fifty-one percent of the SSA countries are offtrack toward meeting the 2015 UPE target. However, the growing concern with this data is that these offtrack countries are expected to account for over 70 percent of SSA's school age population by 2015. Those that are on track to achieve this target are, unsurprisingly, the wealthiest countries in SSA: Botswana, Gabon, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland.

The 80 percent primary completion target was adopted to complement the 2015 goal of UPE. Improving student retention and completion rates is an urgent priority in many SSA countries. Almost 60 percent of SSA countries are seriously offtrack toward meeting the target and 65 percent of these are in Central and West Africa.

About half of SSA countries had less than 70 percent of children of primary school age enrolled in school in 2001. Niger, Burkina Faso, Eritrea, and Ethiopia appeared to have less than 50 percent of children of primary school age enrolled in school. However, substantial improvements were seemingly made in both Eritrea and Ethiopia, who were amongst the top ten countries that experienced at least a 50 percent increase in primary school enrolment between 1990 and 2002. In fact, in Eritrea, primary school enrolment rates seemed to have increased by nearly three-fold, from 16 percent in 1990 to 49 percent in 2006.[19]

Improvements in primary school enrolment ratios seem to be evident from 1990 to 2006. Nevertheless, in many LDCs, some children still appear not to have access to educational facilities. The worst affected group is females, who, due to a plethora of reasons such as early marriage, gender insensitive curricula, or simple gender bias, are prevented from benefiting from a basic education.

Over the period 1990–2006, in developed countries, the enrolment ratio of girls to boys was about equal. In contrast, particularly in Southern and Western Asia, and SSA, girls were less likely to have access to basic primary education. This disadvantage appears to have contributed significantly to more than 40 percent of LDCs' women being illiterate. Over the period 1990–2004, countries in North Africa, SSA, and Southern Asia had very low literacy rates, especially among women. Overall, there has been a marked improvement in literacy throughout the developing world, from about 81 percent in 1990 to almost 85 percent in 2004.

It is important to note that a lack of primary education might result in women having fewer economic and social opportunities, such as access to decent jobs and good healthcare facilities. This could lead to a vicious cycle of impoverishment, whereby the children of uneducated women are also denied fundamental economic and social benefits, such as education. On a positive note, all regions appear to have experienced increases in the ratio of girls to boys' enrolment. In certain regions, however, such as SSA, Southern Asia, and Western Asia, the ratio of girls to boys enrolled in primary school is below 90 percent.

Gender parity index in 2000–2006 for countries with less than 75 percent ratio of girls to boy in primary education shows that Chad, Yemen, the Central African Republic, Niger, Benin, and Ethiopia had the lowest gender parity index in primary education in 2000.[20,21] Apart from Yemen, all other countries in this category are in SSA. As expected, the inequalities of the gender parity index appear to be borne out in the ratio of literate women to men. Although there was a general increase in literacy rates from 1990 to 2004, fewer women in LDCs seem to have gained a level of literacy in comparison with their male counterparts. The only region with the ratio of literate women to men greater than one is LAC. In developed countries, as expected, there was a level of gender literacy parity over the period. In 2006, a number of SSA countries recorded some of the lowest women to men literacy parity indices of less than 75: Niger (48), Mali (62), Benin (65), and Burkina Faso (71).

In LDCs, the average returns to education are, in general, greater for women than for men.[22] Alain Mingat and Barbara Bruns (2002) held that primary education is the most profitable educational investment opportunity and there exists a substantial productivity differential between primary school graduates and those who are illiterate. Furthermore, an educated female population seems to have an impact on infant and child mortality rates as well as overall family welfare. In fact, "gains in women's education made the single largest contribution to declines in malnutrition from 1970–95, accounting for 43 percent of the total progress."[23] For Vandemoortele, "an educated girl is also the best guarantor that her children attend school, thereby ending the inter-generational transmission of poverty."[24] Of the estimated 10 million children absent from school, 60 percent are females.[25]

Reduce Child Mortality (goal 4)

To reach this goal by 2015, the target is to reduce, by two-thirds, the under-five mortality rate. The three measurable indicators are the under-five mortality rate, the infant mortality rate (IMR), and the proportion of one-year-old children immunized against measles.

There are many reasons for infant and child mortality, such as diarrhea, pneumonia, vaccine-preventable diseases, malaria, poor sanitation, and the lack of clean water. In a study of 63 LDCs, Alderman and others found that there is an inverse relationship between income and child malnutrition.[26] Therefore, as income levels increase, malnutrition levels decrease proportionately—that is, child mortality rate is directly linked to poverty. We can conclude that a sustained growth in per capita income could be a major contributory factor to halving child malnutrition levels.

Health is another major factor associated with education and poverty. As such, SSA faces its greatest development challenge in reducing infant and child mortality rates. In no other area of human development does the region fall so far behind other parts of the world, and in no other indicator is SSA so markedly offtrack toward attaining the MDGs. Ill health in SSA results much more from infectious diseases and nutrition deficiencies than it does elsewhere.[27]

The potential income loss from adult illness in SSA is about 6.5 percent, two to three times that in other regions, confirming cross-country evidence that poor health is associated with slow growth. Strauss argues that surveys in Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Mauritania show potential losses of almost 6.4 percent of normal earnings from illness.[28] Every three seconds an African child dies—in most cases from an infectious disease. Indeed, the burden of disease is dramatically higher in SSA than elsewhere.

From the analysis, the overwhelming majority of countries are seriously offtrack for meeting the infant mortality rate (IMR) goal by 2015. IMR eased to just over 100 deaths per 1,000 children born in the early 2000s, but this rate remains well above other parts of the developing world, with LAC on 26 and Asia on 54. The IMR actually increased between 1990 and 2006 in Botswana, Congo, South Africa, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. Population growth is causing a rapid increase in the absolute number of underweight children, keeping the proportion stable at 28 percent over the period between 1990 and 2005. The current infant and child mortality rates in SSA, and the prospect that these rates rising in many countries as a result of AIDS, are significant because mortality rate is one of the most sensitive and multidimensional indicators of social and economic progress.

Eighty percent of the world's cases of malaria occur in SSA, accounting for 11 percent of the disease burden in SSA, and malaria is estimated to cost many SSA countries more than 1 percent of their GDP—one estimate for Kenya puts it between 2 and 6 percent.[29] Every day 3,000 people die from malaria—three out of four of them are children.

According to the World Bank, across Africa, more than 24.4 million people (two-thirds of the world's cases) were living with HIV/AIDS at the end of 1999 and more than 2.2 million people had died of it.[30] AIDS has orphaned more than 8 million children. In 1982, Uganda was the only SSA country that had an adult HIV prevalence rate above 2 percent. Today there are 21 countries in SSA where more than 7 percent of adults live with HIV/AIDS. HIV thus hits people in their prime productive years, profoundly reducing national income.

Life expectancy rates continue at low levels, particularly in countries faced with prolonged civil wars. Sierra Leone's life expectancy rate was just 37 in 2000, roughly half that of someone living in Tunisia or the Seychelles. The average life expectancy at birth in Malawi was 39 years in 2000 and is declining, whereas those born in Japan in the late 1990s can expect, on an average, to live for 80 years—and this is increasing. Most SSA nations had life expectancy rates below 50 in 2000, with the average for SSA just 47 in the 1990s and 45 in the early 2000s. Thus, at the extremes, the wealthy can expect to live more than twice as long as the poor.

Analysis shows that three-quarters of SSA countries, which are home to 85 percent of Africa's population, are offtrack, with the majority of them seriously offtrack. Between 1990 and 2005, SSA countries recorded some of the lowest improvements in under-five mortality of 1.8 percent, or an annual improvement of 0.1 percent, placing most countries seriously offtrack to achieving this goal.[31] Data also suggest very little improvements in reducing infant and maternal mortality in many SSA countries. Most SSA countries are showing signs that HIV prevalence has either stabilized or is declining, but AIDS remains the leading cause of death. The trend in tuberculosis incidence, prevalence, and morbidity has been on the rise in SSA, and malaria is the leading cause of child mortality and of anemia in pregnant women. The analysis also shows almost similar results for the situation toward the 2005 target of access to safe drinking water and sanitation for at least 80 percent of the population.

The nutritional challenge facing SSA is enormous. Over 80 percent of countries in the region are seriously offtrack for reaching the 2015 target, and, of these, only eight countries registered child malnutrition rates less than 30 percent and improving between 1990 and 2005. Eritrea has made substantial progress but must double the rate of reduction if it is to reach the 2015 goal. South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Tanzania have achieved a remarkable reduction in child malnutrition rates between 1990 and 2005.

Tracking the MDGs in Sub-Saharan Africa

Van De Walle and other economists have evaluated and assessed the economic performance of SSA by comparing the GNP of each country over several periods of time to assess their performance during a particular period.[32] In this section, the GNP ratios of SSA countries for the period between 1990 and 2005 are used to assess the economic performance of each country. Each SSA country's GNP per capita for 2005 is divided by the same statistics (in constant 1995 terms) for 1990 to determine the GNP ratios over such period.

Data available from various sources, mainly the UN statistical database, on SSA are used to identify individual countries that are either on track or off track in terms of reaching the poverty, education and health targets. We measure progress towards the MDGs as the ratio of the annual rate of change required between the current year, that is, end of the trend period or nearest available year, and the target year, against the annual rate of change achieved during the trend period, that is, between the start year and the current year. This ratio could be expressed as follows:

$$\rho_t = x_0(x_T - x_t)/x_t(x_t - x_0)$$

Table 16.3 Overall performance toward the MDGs for selected SSA countries (1990–2006)

Poverty & Hunger			*Education*			*Health*		
$\rho \leq 1$	$1 < \rho \leq 2$	$\rho > 2$	$\rho \leq 1$	$1 < \rho \leq 2$	$\rho > 2$	$\rho \leq 1$	$1 < \rho \leq 2$	$\rho > 2$
Ca Verde	Botswana	Angola	E Guinea	Botswana	Angola	–	Gambia	Angola
Cd Ivoire	Benin	CA Repub	Namibia	Ca Verde	Benin		S. Africa	Benin
Mauritius	Cameroon	Chad		Gabon	Bu Faso			DR Congo
Senegal	Ghana	DR Congo		Gambia	Cameroon			Ethiopia
Seychelles	Kenya	Eritrea		Mali	CA Repub			Niger
S. Africa	Mozambique	Ethiopia		Swaziland	Chad			Nigeria
	Namibia	Niger			DR Congo			Zambia
		Nigeria			Ethiopia			Uganda
		Mali			Somalia			S Leone
		S. Leone			Zimbabwe			Ghana

Source: UN Statistical Database (2008).

Where: x_0, x_t and x_T represent the value of the indicator (poverty, education, health) in the start year, the current year and the target year, respectively.

When $\rho_t \leq 1$, that country is on-target, when $1 < \rho_t \leq 2$, that country is moderately off-target and when $\rho_t > 2$, that country is seriously off-target.

Finally, the two poverty and hunger targets, all five education targets, and the five health targets are grouped into three ratios; poverty and hunger, education, and health ratios. For the GNP ratios, a high number suggests rapid growth while a number less than one indicates negative growth. For the poverty and hunger, education, and health ratios, a high number suggests poor performance towards the targets while a small number (close to one) indicates a very good performance towards the goals and targets. These are summarized in Table 16.3.

The table shows the progress of SSA countries in terms of being ontrack ($\rho \leq 1$), offtrack ($1 < \rho \leq 2$) and seriously offtrack ($\rho > 2$) for the two poverty and hunger targets, and for all five of the education and health targets respectively. It confirms that the majority of SSA countries are either off track or seriously off track. The health situation is particularly dismal for the majority of SSA countries—being seriously offtrack in at least three of the five targets. Only six of these countries are on track in two or more health targets, and only one, the Gambia, is on track in four of the five targets.

The majority of SSA countries are off track to halve the 1990 illiteracy rates by 2005. Similar to the primary completion target, these offtrack countries are concentrated in Central and West Africa. Because of the historical neglect of girls' education in many of these countries, illiteracy rates are especially high for women. Once again nine of the sixteen ontrack countries are in Eastern and Southern Africa, including the wealthier countries in SSA.

The majority of SSA countries were off track (74 percent) and (85 percent) for achieving gender equality in primary and secondary enrolment by 2005 respectively. As countries approach UPE, it is necessary to close the gender gap in enrolment. Countries that did not achieve gender equality in its intake since 1999 were unable to attain the 2005 target. Moreover, given the extreme gender inequalities in secondary education in SSA, the task of reaching the 2005 goal was commensurately greater than at the primary level. It is not surprising therefore, that the majority of the 85 percent offtrack countries were seriously off track, and needed to more than double their rate of progress if they were to attain the target by 2015. The results also show that Kenya was the only country in SSA that was on track to reach the 2005 target for both primary and secondary education.

Conclusions

To achieve the poverty target, SSA economies must grow at an annual average of 7 percent per year, fuelled by much higher domestic savings, and external flows of loans, grants and investment. The poor performance of SSA countries can be attributed to three principal factors: a lack of openness to trade, a lack of market incentives, and a lack of national saving. The current performance trends of SSA countries clearly indicate that they urgently need a serious dramatic change in the pace of progress, as the majority of them are not on track towards the universal agreed targets. Countries that are seriously off track need to at least double their current rate of progress to achieve the development goals. No country in SSA is on track for all the targets, and every country is seriously off track in at least one of the targets and slightly fewer than half the countries in SSA are off track for all targets where data are available. SSA countries are making the most progress on the education targets; yet even here progress is limited, with fewer than half of the countries being on track for achieving UPE by 2015.

Developed country markets still remain closed in many areas to SSA countries' goods. The empirical analysis showed that protectionist policies are still heavily levied against goods that are of strategic importance to developing economies, such as textiles and agricultural commodities. In order for trade to flourish and developing nations to take full advantage of competitive markets, developed countries need to reduce and, at best, remove tariffs and other trade barriers imposed on LDC imports.

According to the linear-stages-of-growth theory, SSA countries need to increase their savings ratio if they are to increase levels of investment. Indeed, the growth that has taken place in East Asian countries has mainly been due to high rates of saving. However, many SSA countries are caught in a vicious circle of poverty and living standards are at or near subsistence levels, meaning that it is impossible to divert sufficient resources from current consumption in favour of investing in future consumption. Nonetheless, this diversion is essential if more domestic capital is to be created by a country's own efforts.

External aid plays a vital role in supporting development, especially in the poorest countries. Empirical studies have shown that the rate of growth increases as aid inflows increase.[33] These studies also show that there is a sustained increase in the aid ratio caused by an equal increase in the investment ratio. In addition, Hansen and Tarp[34] found a positive aid-growth link similar to those of Levy,[35] that is, in the majority of countries; there is a one-to-one relationship between increased aid flows and increased investment.

Structural change can be the most difficult obstacle for SSA countries to overcome. The deregulation of markets, increased capital mobility and privatization can cause institutional problems for countries that are ill-prepared for change. SSA countries should have a high return to capital and a fast growth rate in transition to the steady state, however, due to the presence of institutional and policy distortions in these economies, the return to capital and transitional growth rates may be significantly reduced. Burnside and Dollar concluded that "aid might have more impact on growth in these countries if it were systematically allocated toward good policy environments."[36] A similar result by Collier and Dollar show that providing assistance with no consideration of the policy environment leads to an inefficient allocation of resources, and that an improvement in national policies and institutional environments results in an increase in poverty-efficiency.[37]

Achieving the MDGs in a diverse setting as SSA requires very different strategies and interventions in each country that reflect national conditions, needs, and priorities. Several countries in the region have achieved significant progress towards particular targets, demonstrating the feasibility of progress in even the most resource-constrained environments. Therefore, the positive lessons that can be drawn from these countries' experiences should be disseminated and, where relevant, applied by other countries in the region as a first step towards ensuring that the collective status of SSA's performance improves. At the same time, it is equally important that the international community continue to deliver its promises and commitments to Africa on debt relief, generous aid, opening markets for wider trade opportunities, and increasing investment.

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