


palgrave
macmillan

Politics, Policy and the Discourses of Heritage in Britain

Emma Waterton



Politics, Policy and the Discourses of Heritage in Britain

Also by Emma Waterton

HERITAGE, COMMUNITIES AND ARCHAEOLOGY *(co-authored with
Laurajane Smith)*

TAKING ARCHAEOLOGY OUT OF HERITAGE *(co-edited with Laurajane Smith)*

CULTURE, HERITAGE AND REPRESENTATIONS *(co-edited with Steve Watson)*

HERITAGE AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT *(co-edited with Steve Watson)*

Politics, Policy and the Discourses of Heritage in Britain

Emma Waterton

palgrave
macmillan



© Emma Waterton 2010

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2010 978-0-230-58188-3

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission.

No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.

Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

The author has asserted her right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published 2010 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries

ISBN 978-1-349-36911-9 ISBN 978-0-230-29238-3 (eBook)

DOI 10.1057/9780230292383

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Waterton, Emma.

Politics, policy and the discourses of heritage in Britain / Emma Waterton.

p. cm.

1. Great Britain—Cultural policy. 2. Cultural property—Protection—Great Britain. 3. Cultural property—Political aspects—Great Britain. 4. Cultural property—Social aspects—Great Britain. I. Title.

DA655.W37 2010

363.6'90941—dc22

2010027567

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10

Contents

<i>List of Figures</i>	vi
<i>List of Tables</i>	vii
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	viii
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	x
Introduction	1
Chapter 1 Critical Discourse Analysis and Cultural Policy	18
Chapter 2 Heritage in the Wider World	36
Chapter 3 The Discursive Blueprint: A History of Heritage Policy	72
Chapter 4 New Labour, New Heritage?	107
Chapter 5 On Being Radical: The Heritage Protection Reform	148
Chapter 6 Turning the Trick by Itself: The Historic Environment and 'Community Cohesion'	183
Conclusion	206
<i>Appendices</i>	213
<i>Notes</i>	221
<i>References</i>	225
<i>Index</i>	251

List of Figures

1.1	Imagining the Dialectic	22
1.2	A Model of Social Life	23
3.1	The Heritage Sector	75
3.2	The Organizational Structure of DCMS	76
3.3	The Organizational Structure of English Heritage	79
3.4	The Heritage Cycle	80
4.1	A Timeline of the Government Review of Policies Relating to the Historic Environment	120
5.1	The Public Value Triangle	151

List of Tables

1.1	Key Aspects of CDA	21
2.1	World Heritage Site Distribution	60
2.2	A Comparison of International Policy	66
3.1	A Comparison of 'Canonical' Texts in Heritage Policy	92
4.1	Minutes of Evidence: The English Heritage Memorandum	117

Acknowledgements

The initial research for this book was funded by an AHRC doctoral studentship, which was later augmented by an RCUK Academic Fellowship from 2006–2010. In addition, pockets of funding were provided by the Research Institute for the Humanities, Keele University, for material discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.

I would like to acknowledge and thank the individuals and organizations that accommodated my requests for their time and input. From English Heritage, I thank Paul Barnwell, Laura Clayton, Ben Cowell, Keith Emerick, Jane Grenville, Rachel Hasted, Deborah Lamb, Miriam Levin, Adrian Olivier, Neil Redfern, John Fidler, James Stevens and Christopher Young. I thank them not only for their time but for their patience, extensive knowledge and enthusiasm as well. From DCMS, I thank James Burke, Claudia Kenyetta, Gary Mundy and Harry Reeves, and from the Select Committee for Culture, Media and Sport, I thank Ian Cameron and Fergus Reid. I would also like to acknowledge the time and input offered by Gill Chitty (CBA), Kate Clarke (HLF), Sean Creighton, Eliza Gore (YAT), Emily Kearney (IPPR), Ruth McDonald (Bayle Museum), Tim Mason (Arts and Heritage Consultancy), Roshi Naidoo, Kate Pugh (Heritage Alliance), Tim Schadla-Hall (UCL), Dawn Shelford (LHI) and Linda Smith (NYCC). A number of people from UNESCO, Paris, graciously offered me both their time and considerable understanding of the international heritage sphere: Francesco Bandarin, Giovanni Boccardi, Fernando Brugman, Guido Carducci, Cesar Moreno-Triana, Edouard Planche, Rochelle Roca-Hachem, Mechtild Rössler, Rieks Smeets and David Stehl. In addition, several people at the Smithsonian Centre for Folklore and Cultural Heritage lent both their time and knowledge to the research: Diana Baird N'Diaye, James Early, Richard Kurin, Frank Proschan and Dan Sheehy.

Many chapters and sections of this book were read and commented upon by a number of people. I would like to thank the following for their detailed and constructive comments: Steve Ashby, Gary Campbell, Emma Dawson, Jenny Smith, Laurajane Smith and Steve Watson. Collectively, they helped me clarify and develop the arguments I here seek to define and defend.

This research has benefited from the support I have received from family, especially the good times had with new boys about town Callum, Lucas and William. Encouragement from friends has also been invaluable.

In particular, I need to mention Steve Ashby, Horacio Ayestaran, Mick Atha, Emma Dawson, Michael Fradley, Charlotte Hawes, Karen Hunt, Sally Huxtable, Leslie Johansen, Fiona McDonough, Anna Marshall, Alex Mason, Aleks McClain, Lila Rakoczy, Kathryn Roberts, Hayley Saul and Helen Shield. Finally, although only my name appears on the cover of this book, its completion owes a considerable debt to two others: Laurajane Smith and Gary Campbell. Both offered me unlimited support and encouragement, as well as constructive advice on how best to structure, argue and develop my ideas. Maintaining their support cannot have been easy and I am grateful to them in ways I cannot adequately express – without them, this book would have been impossible.

List of Abbreviations

AHC	Australian Heritage Commission
AHD	Authorized Heritage Discourse
AMAA	Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act
BAA	British Archaeological Association
BMRB	British Market Research Bureau
CBA	Council for British Archaeology
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CIRCLE	Cultural Information and Research Centres Liaison in Europe
CLG	Communities and Local Government, UK
CMS	Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee
COBG	The Consortium of Black Groups
DCMS	Department for Culture, Media and Sport, UK
DEFRA	Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
DETR	Department for the Environment, Transport and the Regions
DfT	Department for Transport, UK
DNH	Department of National Heritage
DWP	Department for Work and Pensions
EFTEC	Economics for the Environment Consultancy
EH	English Heritage
HLF	Heritage Lottery Fund, UK
HPR	Heritage Protection Reform
ICCROM	International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property, Rome
ICH	Intangible Cultural Heritage
ICHC	<i>Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage</i> (Intangible Cultural Heritage Convention)
ICOM	International Council of Museums
ICOMOS	International Council on Monuments and Sites
IDF	Ideological Discursive Formations
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IPPR	Institute for Public Policy Research
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
MLA	Museums, Libraries and Archives Council
MORI	Marketing and Opinion Research International

NAO	National Audit Office
NAPincl	National Action Plan for Social Inclusion
NDPB	Non-Departmental Public Body
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NHA	National Heritage Act
ODPM	Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, UK
PAT	Policy Action Team
PPG	Planning Policy Guidance
PoP	Power of Place
PSA	Public Service Agreement
RCHME	Royal Commission on the Historical Monuments of England
SACH	State Administration of Cultural Heritage (China)
SEU	Social Exclusion Unit
SETF	Social Exclusion Task Force
SPAB	Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings, UK
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
WH	World Heritage
WHC	<i>Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage</i> (World Heritage Convention)
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WWW	World Wide Web

Introduction

This work is based on the argument that to presume that everyone can or should share in an elite, class-based and white vision of heritage is to take unwarranted liberties with many peoples' sense of identity, place and belonging. Many policymakers, professionals and academics have been complicit in this process whether they acknowledge it or not, and in this volume I come to terms with this predicament though attempts to illustrate how the way we talk, think and write about heritage issues *matter*. They matter because they influence, construct, reflect and constitute not only the ways in which we act, but how we identify and manage heritage in the first place. It is therefore important to understand discourse not only in terms of verbal communication, but in the way our talk materializes in concrete situations, where certain ways of conceiving of heritage bear the imprints of power. As these powerful ways of thinking gain dominance, so too will their enunciative capacities to undermine alternative perspectives. It seems crucial to me to focus upon this constitutive power of discourse when asking why, despite the complexities that surround the term, heritage has largely remained a policy phenomenon bathed with a patina of consensus? Why has it hitherto been taken as given? And why has it become an issue whose significance and meaning somehow goes without saying?

This volume offers a critique of the largely unreflexive ways heritage is understood within current public policy. In piecing together this critique, it seemed important to underscore the consequences enacting this circumscribed notion of heritage could have for any nation attempting to assert itself as multi-ethnic, multicultural and multi-religious. To this end, the volume uses Britain as a case study through which to say some specific things about the assimilatory nature of

recent Western heritage policy, particularly when paired with broader, nationalist-inspired discourses of inclusion. This book is not, however, solely about heritage debates and policy in Britain; there is a level of generality at play in here as well. Thus, while I use particular organizations and documents to illustrate my thoughts, the book is emphatically *not* about these cases alone. Instead, it is an offering that I hope will sit alongside more recent publications challenging us to produce new ways of thinking about heritage and the role it plays in our everyday lives. To get there, we need to understand *how* and *why* a particular way of thinking about heritage all too often elides the multiplicity of alternatives; this is the purpose of the volume.

Discourse-policy-heritage: Grounding the volume

Heritage entered the public policy radar as early as the late nineteenth century and since then it has been relatively easy to sidestep scrutinizing the role it plays in national debates. However, in the last few decades a very visible – thought not particularly clear – role has been staked out for heritage within debates positioned between nationalism and multiculturalism, where tensions over social justice and recognition of cultural diversity abound. A raft of ‘inclusion’ policies has emerged in this context, very few of which have been worthy of their name. Within them, the predictable melding of cultural diversity with tendencies towards assimilation remains implicit; but as this volume makes clear, closer inspection reveals the ideological workings of a discourse that is both hegemonic and regulating, sustaining a notion of heritage that privileges the cultural symbols of a particular social group – the white, middle- and upper-classes – to which other groups are strongly encouraged to gravitate. One explanation for this tendency, as Belfiore (2009: 348) bluntly states, is the significant absence of anything other than paltry evidence for understanding the relationship between heritage and inclusion within cultural policy. Thus, despite allusions to equality, work in the policy sphere has very little purchase not only on how the situation should be *tackled* but how the relationship *functions*, if at all, in the first place. As a consequence, the sector continues to take the archaeological sites, stately homes and monuments at the heart of current practices far too seriously, regardless of whether it is these ideas of heritage that generate ‘inclusion’. All too often, policy simply falls back on these traditional representations, thereby constraining the different ways heritage is imagined and articulated in social life. Significantly, this has allowed for the projection

of tangible reminders of an elite past *as universal and grounded in commonsense* – not only nationally but internationally as well. More worrying still is the projection of this vision into the future, as if by inevitable progression the same cultural symbols will be valued then as they supposedly are now.

As a starting point, the volume begins with an acknowledgment of the ubiquity of heritage matters at local, regional, national and international levels, which are linked to an astonishing range of institutions, voluntary and independent organizations, non-governmental and intergovernmental bodies, consultancy firms and community heritage groups. This pervasiveness has only increased within the context of calls for social inclusion, which are themselves related to growing debates sparked around the future of multiculturalism, an increase in heritage tourism and a renewed popularization of the past through various media. In order to carve a path through the enormity of the heritage sector, I have inevitably had to make decisions about what could and could not be included in the volume: to do so I developed a two-pronged focus: a policy-orientated focus and a discourse-orientated focus.

First, the volume takes up an explicit **policy-orientated focus**. There is, of course, already a strong presence of academic literature tackling the policy surrounding heritage, which largely offers in-depth descriptions of the technical processes of management alongside comprehensive lists of the laws, Acts and pieces of legislation involved. To my mind, this body of work is largely characterized by a desire to ask the wrong questions in the wrong way. As a consequence, it has left the challenging question of *how* heritage, both as a problem and solution, has become homogenized within the policy process under-explored. Instead, the bulk of this work simply accepts the authority of a particular representation of heritage, which Laurajane Smith (2006: 29) has labelled the *authorized heritage discourse* (henceforth AHD). This, she suggests, focuses attention on:

... aesthetically pleasing material objects, sites, places and/or landscapes that current generations ‘must’ care for, protect and revere so that they may be passed to nebulous future generations for their ‘education’, and to forge a sense of common identity based on the past.

Like Smith, this sits uneasily for me as I am uncomfortable with the way particular assumptions about what heritage *is* and what it *means*

are granted more importance than explorations of the way heritage interacts with everyday experiences (see also Hall 1999; Naidoo 2009; Crouch 2010). Yet, while this is only *one* of the discourses that surrounds the practice of heritage, it has become *the* discourse. Smith's own work charts the consequences this discursive naturalization has had for the uses of heritage, particularly in terms of the ways it works to exclude or marginalize alternative expressions of heritage. Aside from the work of Stuart Hall, Laurajane Smith and more recent publications building upon Smith's observations, most literature tackling heritage policy has ignored this ideological content. What this means is that our understanding of heritage has been so completely accepted as residing within the parameters of the AHD that we are simply left with the mundane task of debating its technical conservation.

While this reduction of complex social issues to simplified solutions is not unusual in the policy sphere, it does offer an opportunity to explore the discursive practices that work to solidify and enact *particular* modes of practice. This means providing an analysis of *how* (or *if*) the AHD reasserts its power, particularly in the face of discursive struggles that potentially leave it open to risk. One way in which this is achieved is through *hidden power*, or the ways in which power-holders are forced to utilize less visible mechanisms for wielding and exerting power, and maintaining the status quo that suits them. This leads me to my second point of focus, which is an explicit **discourse-orientated focus**. Heritage is not a fixed, unchanging *thing*, but something that is constructed, created, constituted and reflected by discourses. These may be historically situated or relatively new but, either way, they are mutable and changing across time and place. This contingency of heritage upon discourse means that policy is not simply a neutral domain within which heritage problems and solutions are mapped; rather, policy becomes a site for analysis or a means through which to explore the social realities of heritage engagements, particularly in terms of the power relations that monitor and sustain social hierarchies and social change.

This argument advances the notion that the concept of heritage inevitably found in policymaking and much of conventional academia and popular culture is not necessarily a reflection of a consensual view of heritage; rather, it is simply the 'way of seeing' that has found dominance and is sustained within the commonsense assumptions underpinning heritage policy. The 'way of seeing' I focus upon in this volume, Smith's AHD, emerged in the late nineteenth century and was formalized from the 1960s onwards, from whence it has been used to

mark out those things that can or cannot be thought of – in a policy sense at least – as heritage. While an historical overview of the nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries provides an understanding of how the character of the AHD developed (see Harvey 2001 and Smith 2006 for this), what is crucial for this volume are those points at which that characterization is explicitly and discursively *sustained*. Indeed, the crux of my argument emerges out of precisely this juncture. I argue that the most important, and perhaps most ardently *concealed*, attempts to sustain the AHD have occurred within the context of multiculturalism and calls for social inclusion. Here, heritage has visibly undergone a process of both denunciation *and* eulogization, prompting the production and dissemination of a suite of new policy directions within both the heritage sector and more widely. In Britain, the immediate response was to sponsor a move away from the vilified subjectivities and connotations caught up with the term ‘heritage’ towards what is presumed to be the more objective – and therefore more inclusive – term ‘the historic environment’. This was linked to a broader attempt to re-market heritage as social practice relevant to those groups crudely defined as ‘the excluded’. Together, these strategies take for granted that there is nothing intrinsically limiting about the *idea* of heritage (or ‘the historic environment, as it is now named’) that lies at the heart of the policy process. This, I will argue, is the implicit work of discourse.

Heritage as discourse

Discourse forms an active part of social action. By this I mean it *does* something – it creates and constructs a version of reality (Wetherell 2001a: 17). In imagining heritage as the subject of discourse, it follows that while it may take up a material form, it is nonetheless multi-sensual, multi-imaginative and multi-discursive. No longer are we required to accept dominant attempts to shape and define heritage as a particular material assemblage; instead, it is possible to argue that there are multiple ways of ‘seeing’ heritage. One reaction to this rejection of the materiality of heritage has been to propose, as Smith (2006; see also Harvey 2001; Graham 2002; Breglia 2006) amongst others has done, that heritage can be better understood as a *process*, a verb, or something that is done rather than a concrete entity. In much the same way as Crouch (2003: 24) suggests that ‘... space can be encountered in a process of spacing’ and nature in a process of ‘naturing’, so too can heritage be experienced and encountered in a process of ‘heritaging’ or as a social practice. An important consequence of this is that heritage becomes something that is reflexively constructed in – and about – the

present. This understanding of heritage is reflected in the work of Crang (1996), Hayden (1997), Dicks (1999, 2000a, b, 2003), Bagnall (2003), Macdonald (2003, 2005), Smith (2006) and Byrne (2009), who integrate a range of related concepts to flesh out a new area of debate for heritage studies, such as remembering, personal identity formation, intangibility, everyday and vernacular heritage, collective memory, embodied experience and acts of commemoration. Heritage sites, places, acts, experiences and monuments, through this re-imagining, become *devices* that are imbued with meaning and used to trigger and guide a self-conscious dialogue between personal and collective memories and experiences. Objects, places, landscapes, monuments and buildings, while implicated in many instances of heritage as mnemonic props, are therefore not forced to be present at all. Heritage, in this sense, becomes something that is produced by, and through, a range of objects, places and acts, becoming something akin to what Sturken (1996: 10) refers to as the technologies of memory. In this way, remembering, recollecting and forgetting all become part and parcel of the process of *doing* heritage – and critical self-reflection, by the same token, becomes a part of the reciprocal process by which memory is enacted and put to use (Suleiman 2006: 8).

However, Sturken (1991: 9) also points out that heritage, like memory, reveals ‘... the stake held by individuals and institutions in attributing meaning to the past’. Sturken develops this argument with the use of work by Myers (cited in Sturken 1991: 136–137), who observes that ‘[a] block of stone may be a powerful text with many subtexts, or it may be an inert simplification of historical reality that assuages memory – it depends on the readership’. There are two important points to be taken from this: first, power must be recognized within the realm of heritage; and, second, our attention needs to be drawn to issues of representation and readership. Importantly, this draws us back to the idea of heritage as discourse and raises the possibility of a *dominant* understanding of the past, which enacts what Sturken (1991: 118) refers to as a metaphoric screen. Through a process of naturalization, this screen can work to hide, dismiss, de-legitimize or side-line alternative narratives and identities, offering itself as a seemingly consensual substitute for what would ordinarily be a *range* of highly emotive and (likely) dissonant experiences. This is an important point, as it explicitly recognizes the existence of power *within* and *behind* discourse. The point I want to draw from this is that the process of heritage is never entirely unconstrained; it never goes on living within our minds, multi-sensually and multi-imaginatively, unchecked. In reality, it is monitored and organ-

ized by a variety of heritage opportunities and/or organizations, which regulate, influence and contextualize *through discourse*, but do not direct, unreservedly, each performance (Edensor 2001).

Any understanding of heritage both determines, and is determined by, a dialectic relationship between society and discourse. For each perspective on heritage, the uses and experiences talked about are done so in different and sometimes incompatible ways. It is not possible for everyone to piece together exactly the same understanding of heritage; instead, we all weave together different notions of identity, value, experience, emotion and memory within the discursive spaces it provides (see Wetherell 2001a: 25). The very notion of heritage is thus predicated around the idea of opposition – any idea of heritage is *always* operating against a range of alternative perspectives. This idea of ‘dissonant heritage’ was initially raised with the work of Tunbridge and Ashworth (1996) and has since been deployed by a number of scholars. Tunbridge and Ashworth (1996: 20) use the phrase to refer to the tensions, discordances or lack of congruence, whether active or latent, inherent to the nature and meanings of heritage. As Ashworth (2002: 363) points out, ‘[i]f all heritage is someone’s heritage and therefore logically not someone else’s, any creation of heritage from the past disinherits someone completely or partially’. With this sentiment, Ashworth conjures an image of a complex tapestry of heritages, with multiple and competing interpretations, perspectives and responses woven past or through each other. Subsequently – and inevitably – these competing perspectives collide, engaging together in conflict, agitation, frustration and contestation (Graham et al. 2005: 33).

While this recognition of dissonance is important for the volume, it does need qualification. This is a point reiterated by Smith (2006; see also Smith and Waterton 2009b), who takes issue with the idea that dissonance can be avoided or that something can be done to eliminate or manage its occurrence. Problematic, here, is the simple binary distinction that is implied between the two concepts, leaving us *two* overarching categories: ‘heritage’ and ‘dissonant heritage’. Following this logic, ‘dissonant heritage’ is the sort of thing found within literature dealing with difficult, dark or negative pasts, such as the holocaust, slavery, massacres, genocide and other aftermaths of violence. However, dissonance is something that occurs between individuals, groups and communities *each* time they engage with an act, place or experience of heritage. If we accept the more nuanced understandings of doing heritage offered by a discourse-orientated approach, dissonance becomes unavoidable. The momentum offered by dissonance therefore

lies not with its associations with difficult or uncomfortable heritages, as something that exists outside of comfortable and safe heritage, but something that is part and parcel of all heritage encounters.

The emergence of the volume: Current themes and debates

Before presenting the theoretical and empirical chapters in this volume, I first need to make a case for why I have positioned the volume within calls for social inclusion. Heritage, as Raphael Samuel (1994: 259) pointed out, has a history of damningly bad press. Characterized as a cult, a 'worthless sham' (cited in Lowenthal 1998a: xv), 'bogus history' (Hewison 1987) and the 'cuckoo in the historian's nest' (Davison 1991: 12; Taksa 2003: 13), it has been characterized as exclusive and pandering to the 'misreadings of the past' (Lowenthal 1998b: 7). This is an argument that emerged out of what is commonly referred to as the *Heritage Industry Critique*. Yet, it is also considered 'truly popular' (Cossons 2006b: 2), 'a calling' (Thurley 2006a) and something vital that '... touches our lives in many ways' (CMS 2006a: 3). In this guise, it has become a term that receives positive invocations in the policy arena, where it is frequently called upon to reduce disaffection and engender identity formation. This debate constitutes the second from which the volume arises: *The Agenda for Social Inclusion*. What is interesting about both debates is the considerable conceptual space they actually share – a space which I argue is regulated and sustained by the AHD. As such, while this volume *begins* from what appears to be two distinct debates, it also *ends* with those debates, in a manner that I hope adds to them significantly – by suggesting that they are far more similar than is often realized, differing only in rhetoric, rather than substance.

Regularly described in both ways, heritage is simultaneously a dirty word and an incantation called upon to produce solutions for a range of social problems. Nowhere is this disjuncture between 'good' and 'bad' heritage more pronounced than in the current policy climate of social inclusion, instigated by the election to government of New Labour in 1997. Since coming to power, New Labour has commenced two programmes of review and reform in the heritage sector – *The Government Review of Policies Relating to the Historic Environment* (1999–2001) and *The Heritage Protection Reform* (2003–present) – both carrying the aim of making heritage central to governmental agendas. As I will illustrate in the following chapters, both approached this task via the concept of 'social inclusion' and the instigation of a marketing process aimed at

cajoling and inviting 'excluded' groups over the threshold of traditional heritage properties. Here, policies of inclusion simply translated into more overt projections of a dominant version of history in an attempt to subvert and subdue the threatening crises of exclusion. My contention, at its simplest, is that in the clamour and rush to stack together a new and inclusive role for heritage, a more subtle sleight-of-hand was at work, which masked the *real* problem of heritage – that it is inherently exclusive. To combat this, the language of heritage was folded up and packed away, replaced by the alternative of 'the historic environment', which we are persuaded to think of as more inclusive. The task for this volume, then, is to map out and reveal the repeated mantras, nodal points and discursive framings that have been called upon – consciously or not – to mitigate this transition and facilitate its accomplishment. Perhaps most significant of all in this process is that it is scarcely acknowledged; indeed, it has simply been a *fait accompli*.

The heritage industry critique

This book, in many ways, arises out of a key debate originally instigated by Patrick Wright and Robert Hewison – the Heritage Industry Critique. This polemic was not just a slighting of heritage itself, but a reaction against the entire '... political project of Thatcherism', which initiated a range of different – and sometimes contradictory – social, cultural and economic strategies that for many were seen to revolve around the key concepts of 'enterprise' and 'heritage' (Hall 1988: 1, 274). This orientation targeted a need for an 'enterprise culture', fuelled by strong and interconnected ideals of consumerism, commodification, individualism and patriotism, and underpinned by a desire to promote internationally a sense of economic competitiveness (Abercrombie et al. 2000: 436). The character of this government offered up a strange disjuncture for heritage management. On the one hand, attempts were made to sponsor a new sense of value within society, while on the other – and at the same time – emphasis was placed upon tradition and continuity. Radical reform and the promotion of a regenerated economy were pitted against a conservative obsession with the past, a coupling designed around the concept of 'regressive modernization', or an attempt to 'educate' and 'discipline' society by '... dragging it backwards through an equally regressive version of the past' (Hall 1988: 2).

As Lumley (2005: 19) points out, the critique was also a response to the 'marked boom' in the commercialization of the past (Walsh 1992: i), the '... growth in the cult of the country house' (Mellor 1991: 97), increased National Trust membership (Barthel 1996; McGuigan 1996: 122) and a

fear that Britain was just a 'loathsome collection of theme parks and dead values' (Paulin, cited in Lammy 2006b: 67). Although a far broader debate than I have the space to go into here, the critique also embodies initial attempts to grapple with issues of power and the elitist nature of heritage, as Hewison, writing in 1987, made clear:

[t]he definition of those values must not be left to a minority who are able through their access to the otherwise exclusive institutions of culture to articulate the only acceptable meanings of past and present. It must be a collaborative process shared by an open community which accepts both conflict and change (Hewison 1987: 144).

Thus, while ostensibly a backlash against the popularization of heritage, the debates were also critical of attempts to 'recover' a lost, bucolic and authentic image of England that privileged '... the edifices and cultural symbols of the powerful' (Wright 1985: 78). Wright's construction of 'Deep England', the archetypal English landscape (Baxendale 2001: 93), as something of a communion, is also a commentary on the falsity of the images privileged by the heritage industry. Baxendale (2001: 93) reinforces his point by arguing that:

[s]ince the personal experience of 'Deep England' is vouchsafed to only a few, and most of the English can only share in it by proxy or as despised day-trippers, the myth of Deep England allows a small and privileged class to control an important segment of the national imagination.

On one level, this was evidence of the colonization of the past by a deep sense of nostalgia or escapism. On another level, however, not only was there something 'aristocratic' about such appeals to the aesthetic allure of the past, these imaginings inevitably conjured up the metaphoric powers of the country house (Corner and Harvey 1991: 52). As Crang (1996: 2) argues, it is this coupling of assumed aesthetic charms with a superficial image of the past that works to naturalize and sustain the '... the pastoral myth of the British past', materially resulting in '... the disproportionately large percentage of resources devoted to preserving country and manor houses'. Implicitly tied up in this criticism is a reaction to the desire to present a past that is 'safe' and sanitized, shorn, as Urry (1996: 52 – see also 1990: 99) points out '... of danger, subversion and seduction'. This 'safeness' was criticized

alongside its construction as 'timeless' and 'monumentalized', '... frozen solid, closed down and limited to what can be exhibited as a fully accomplished "historical past"' (Wright 1985: 78).

As a number of scholars have recently pointed out, however, to assume that heritage is little more than an exercise in idealizing nostalgia overlooks the more complex ways with which the past is engaged with in the present (Dicks 2000a: 47). This fetishism with nostalgia characterizes the 'act' of heritage as something tied up with the past, rather than explicitly acknowledging the relationship heritage has with the present. Thus, by drawing on nostalgia as an explanatory concept, Wright and Hewison were also drawing a distinct line between an idealized and bogus past and a dubious present (Strangleman 1999: 727; Dicks 2000b: 63; Macdonald 2005). This overlooks the flexibility and ability – indeed, the *desire* – of what the tourism literature identifies as the 'mindful' or 'insightful' tourist, with the heritage visitor instead assumed to accept, naïvely and simplistically, the nostalgic representations and re-enactments set before them (Moscardo 1996; Abercrombie and Longhurst 1998; Aitchison 1999: 63; McIntosh and Prentice 1999; Bagnall 2003: 94). Moreover, the notion of 'bogus history' (Hewison 1987: 44) implies that the nature of heritage is malleable and fraudulent. For Hewison, authenticity presents a way out of this predicament, becoming something of a fine line, with heritage assumed to fall on one side of that line or the other. Anything located on the 'right' side of the line is legitimized, with all heritage falling to the 'wrong' side labelled 'bogus'. This is, of course, based upon the assumption that there is an either/or. This, it seems to me, is based on the impression that there is a *right* way to perceive the past amongst many competing, but ultimately wrong, ways to think about it. These criticisms of the heritage industry, levelled at the idea of a 'bogus' history, or something that is inauthentic, deficient in 'fact' or 'truth', simplistic and, of course, conservative in their nostalgia (Dicks 2003: 32), miss the point, and should perhaps focus not so much on authenticity, but empowerment and identity (Crouch 1990: 13). To focus on a static notion of authenticity, and lament the 'mindless' tourist, is to underestimate the self-consciousness and flexibility of heritage users as they pick their way through the possibilities of many heritage places (Cohen-Hattab and Kerber 2004: 61).

An agenda for inclusion

Despite these shortcomings, the heritage industry critique has been remarkably influential within heritage policy in England. Perhaps the most

visible aspect of the debate in contemporary policy is the lingering distrust of heritage as being 'bogus' and 'elitist' in nature, thereby prompting a range of users to either disassociate with heritage or harbour feelings of exclusion. It is difficult to overstate quite how pervasive this concern has been, a point epitomized, it seems to me, by formal attempts to change the label 'heritage' to 'historic environment'. While initially commencing in the 1970s, this rebranding of heritage *in response to calls for social inclusion* achieved prominence in the late 1990s. Importantly, as Morris (2000: 2–3) points out, the term 'historic environment' also emerged at a time when heritage was being vilified for making us forget what it is to be 'British'. From that point onwards, the term was adopted aggressively by English Heritage and has materialized in policy ever since. As Symonds (2004: 34) optimistically observes, this new materialization was seen as no longer pandering to 'atavistic and sentimentalized form[s] of comfort and nationalistic pride but, rather, serves as a mechanism for advancing contemporary cultural creativity and self-awareness'. In this reflection, however, Symonds fails not only to critically interrogate the consequences of this rebranding of heritage, but also leaves unclear the precise changes implicated. What is interesting is that both heritage and 'the historic environment' continue links with nationalism and national identity, yet with this lexical sleight-of-hand, heritage, characterized as '... prim, static ... [something] which would appeal to the casual tourist but not to anyone seriously interested in past realities ...' (Symonds 2004: 34), could be discounted and replaced by a seemingly holistic approach fostered by 'the historic environment'. The issue of precisely what precipitated the change in name will be explored further in later chapters.

This second area of debate lies at the core of this volume. For Britain, debates surrounding social inclusion, while emerging out of French social policy, are associated with the establishment of the Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) in August 1997 by the then recently elected New Labour government. This was a theme that would become firmly entrenched within all arms of government before New Labour's first term came to an end, and the heritage sector was no different in its response:

[i]f having nowhere to go and nothing constructive to do is as much a part of living in a distressed community as poor housing or high crime levels, culture and sport provide a good part of the answer to rebuilding a decent quality of life there. Such communities have not had their fair share in the past (DCMS 2000b: 4).

Since then, as Richard Sandell (2003: 47) points out, social inclusion within the heritage sector has come to be perceived as 'another term to

describe the need to engage with, and attract, those audiences that have traditionally been underrepresented'; audiences that have largely been imagined as ethnic minority groups, persons from lower socio-economic groups and those with disabilities (cf. DCMS 2001a, b). This is an important point to note, as it is a union often drawn upon to legitimize the notion that it is these groups – all of which translate as different in some way from the White middle- and upper-classes – that require the proactive attention of heritage professionals to foster inclusion. Ultimately, this has generated a passive conceptualization of the problem, in which the power of social and civil rights are obscured – indeed, *deferred* – in favour of the discretionary judgements of outside, professional opinion. This rendering of social inclusion has translated readily into a conceptualization of the 'deviant other' and their propensity to exclude themselves from the 'normal majority' (Evans and Harris 2004: 70). For Grainge (1999: 623), citing Joan Wallach Scott's conceptualization of the 'fetishizing of tradition', this rendering has also triggered attempts to mobilize and privilege the assumed legitimacy of a homogenous national identity *against* recent calls for social inclusion, multiculturalism and diversity. In short, he suggests that the continued survival of a defence of, and nostalgia for, 'traditions' and authenticity may well be part of a wider defensive move towards reclaiming a singular national past.

Within this conceptual space, the AHD has masked its ideological underpinnings and utilized the tropes of 'diversity' and 'integration' to realign inclusion policies around targeting specific, underrepresented social groups: this realignment occurred without ever examining the 'way of seeing' privileged by the AHD. As Hall (1994) points out, social inclusion has thus become a process that is inevitably destructive and exclusionary. Even the more theoretically robust research continues to consider what people may *get out* of heritage, in terms of cultural, human, identity or social capital, education, wellbeing and identity. Collectively, what this conceptualization of inclusion fails to do is take account of what 'the marginalized' are being invited to 'access' or 'participate' in. Instead, inclusion is relegated, as Corsane (2005: 8 and 10) illustrates, to those '... issues relating to heritage outputs', how heritage is perceived, or '... the development of new audiences' (Sandell 2003: 47). The way heritage is understood continues to be framed by the AHD, and the overall project of 'social inclusion' is to encourage 'the marginalized' to view heritage, and thus its relevance, through the parameters of the AHD already accepted in a policy sense. The process of inclusion is thus conceived of in three parts: the established heritage; those with the cultural 'gaze' (Urry 1990) necessary to *see* and *appreciate* that heritage; and those

who need to be educated and cajoled into the fold. Within these divisions, a hegemonic sense of heritage is brokered and sustained in line with dominant class interests, which are re-imagined as consensual interests available to all: it is, in any guise, selective. These divisions have tended to be replayed both in policy, practice and research terms, which for the large part remain oblivious to the social competencies required to 'appropriately' read, perform and consume a particular sense of heritage. Moreover, those who fall outside of the selective grouping, those who are therefore emphatically *not* those who have acquired the appropriate cultural 'gaze', are re-characterized as 'the have nots'. The assumption is that they will not have white skin, they will not enjoy economic security and they will not have good health (Jones 2005: 95). As Jones (2005: 95, citing Hall 2000: 221) goes on to argue:

The result of these combined strategies is that a core underlying homogenous national heritage is maintained ... 'the norm against which "difference" ... is measured'.

As Young (2002), Littler (2005) and Smith (2006) suggest, this emphasis on inclusion actually skates considerably closer to assimilation than it does anything else: it simply says 'come and be like us' (Young 2002: 211). Caffyn and Lutz (1999: 218) make a similar point in drawing attention to the extent to which 'the marginalized' may be indifferent or antagonistic towards traditional or dominant conceptualizations of heritage. As such, the point Jones is making above is an important one for this volume, as it draws us once again towards the critical notions of power and discourse, concepts inevitably missed within the literature dealing with inclusion. The inferences Jones (2005) makes are thus as much to do with the unconscious opacity of discourse as they do with social inclusion itself. Simply 'opening the doors' fails to acknowledge the 'hidden power', or 'hidden agenda', of discourse utilized to sustain subject positionings and practices, or, as Fairclough (1989: 40) argues, maintain: '... the reproduction of class relations and other higher-level social structures'.

An overview of the book and its organization

The volume is organized into six chapters. In the first of these, I identify and explain the philosophical, theoretical and methodological choices I have made for this study of heritage, whilst also elaborating upon the dialectical relationship between semiotics and broader social practices.

As such, the chapter serves primarily as an introduction to the social perspective and analytical techniques specifically associated with Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). The second chapter in the volume has as its aim the establishment of a representative characterization of the authorized heritage discourse as it has materialized at the international level of heritage policymaking. It is structured chronologically, beginning with an analysis of the *Venice Charter* and the *World Heritage Convention* (WHC) and their emphasis on iconic materiality, which sits in contradistinction to the convention I close the chapter with – the 2003 *Intangible Cultural Heritage Convention* (ICH). Chapter 3 offers the volume's first empirical chapter, which, along with Chapters 4, 5 and 6, is based upon original research conducted through a number of fieldwork initiatives. Drawing primarily on public policy material and supplemented with in-depth interviews, this chapter offers a critical examination of the historical development of the authorized heritage discourse within policy in Britain. Drawing on a selection of core policy documents, legislative codes and parliamentary debates, the chapter presents the first part of a chronologically-organized argument. Focusing primarily on the 1970s and 1980s, a history of the AHD is outlined, with particular emphasis placed upon *how* and *why* the ideological undercurrents of this timeframe found such strong synergies within the heritage sector. The arguments established in this chapter revolve around themes of nationalism, the popularization of heritage and the assumed physicality of the past. Chapter 4, informed by the analytical framework developed in Chapter 3, traces the enduring dominance of the AHD. It commences with the election of New Labour government and their commitment to overcoming issues of social exclusion, charting how this discursive injection has influenced the heritage sector. Reflecting upon the analysis of the AHD in Chapter 3, and paying particular attention to its naturalization and nationalization, this chapter explores the increasingly familiar project of social inclusion, both in terms of its rhetoric and ultimate operationalization. The assimilatory nature of this project remains the central theme for the chapter, in which concepts of 'participation', 'education' and 'visitation' are exposed for the discursive work they do in achieving consent and a nationalized sense of heritage.

Chapter 5 presents a third argumentative strand for the volume in its analysis of more recent policy developments in the heritage sector. With a focus on debates surrounding 'public value' and their links to discourses of multiculturalism, this chapter examines the sacralization of an inherently *good* 'historic environment' as a means of overcoming

the lingering criticisms levelled at the supposedly malign nature of heritage. Despite a discursive re-jigging of heritage terminology, this chapter reveals that nothing has substantially changed in terms of the definitions and operations espoused by the AHD. What emerges, instead, is the strange discursive hybridization of heritage and 'social inclusion', resulting in what amounts to the new brand name 'historic environment'. The covert suggestion of cultural governance, implicit within the rhetoric of inclusion, is focused upon and is used to further substantiate the argument that inclusion is a product of discursive persuasion, rather than a reality. The final empirical chapter, Chapter 6, explores the re-occurrence of a dominant and excluding discourse across the face of public policy in England, and draws conclusions about what is driving the process. The seemingly refreshing importation of social inclusion initiatives is revealed to be surprisingly limp, and more circumspect than originally anticipated, in turning their agendas, as they do, towards assimilating people rather than developing a more inclusive understanding of heritage. Agendas of inclusion, belonging and promoting Britishness thus transpire as being part of a wider mechanism of governance called upon to achieve consent and consensus and, in the process, subdue the crises of exclusion, intolerance and cultural difference. As such, what at first may appear to be a struggle over language and the choice of words masks a reality within which there is a lot more at stake. Indeed, it reflects a more insidious conflict of interest that carries implications for wider debates concerned with socio-economic, ethnic and racial inequalities.

In exploring these issues, my purpose is not to vilify particular actors or institutions as wilfully excluding people from engaging with heritage; rather I seek to demonstrate what *investments* lay behind dominant understandings of heritage and for whom. Not only does this mean understanding Smith's AHD, it also means grasping its importance politically and recognizing what risks it brings in terms of cementing inequalities and injustices. It also means taking a position myself. As a white, female academic, I inevitably satisfy much of the criteria defining the 'heritage user' as imagined within the AHD: I am positioned within its parameters. I am not grounded in experiences of exclusion, nor have I ever really felt, tasted or *lived* injustice. Yet I do not find this topic of interest solely from a scholarly point of view – indeed, I hope I am explicit in my desire to make sense of this approach to heritage and perhaps prompt some element of change in the policy terrain in favour of currently excluded groups. And I want to believe that things *can* change. It is for this reason that I plug the volume, particularly its latter chapters, into the vivid and emotionally-charged subject of national identity. This

is a debate to which we are all 'clued in', whether we are academics, policymakers or citizens, and here it becomes easier to understand – on some level at least – the issues at stake. Simply accepting that state-sanctioned notions of heritage are anything other than inclusive poses significant challenges, not only for the identity of heritage *but for the broader identity of 'Britishness' bound up in its management*. Thus, the management of heritage in Britain can no longer be considered a partisan point but part and parcel of a much bigger, and global, shift in political thought as it grapples with ever-transforming societies.

1

Critical Discourse Analysis and Cultural Policy

In the previous chapter, I brought the idea of ‘discourse’ to the forefront of the volume. This is a term that makes frequent appearances across a range of literature, so much so that it is often difficult to tell if its users are actually talking about the same thing. It is not, however, the usual kind of term to be found in texts about heritage. Its prominence in this volume therefore reflects only very recent attempts to move towards new understandings of heritage, which are based upon the belief that social phenomena are socially constructed in discourse. It is thus a term that requires an introduction of its own; in this chapter I will therefore make a case for the notion of ‘discourse’, particularly the notion of discourse that figures in the scholarly movement of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which has been associated with heritage studies via the work of Smith (2004, 2006), Waterton (2007, 2009) and Waterton et al. (2006). In doing so, I will simultaneously make some specific links with the dimensions of power I see as being discursively reproduced within the heritage sector. This, it seems to me, is a big issue. Indeed, there is no shortage of evidence that reveals heritage to be – in all its various forms – ideological.

After fleshing out the volume’s theoretical underpinnings, the chapter provides a way into the terminology and techniques used within CDA, and the ways in which it can be linked to some of the qualitative approaches to data collection germane to the wider social sciences, such as participant observation and in-depth interviewing. In conforming to the interplay of theory, method and analysis proposed by CDA, it is hoped that the chapter will have something constructive to say about how language and discourse are *used*, so that this understanding may then be applied to the context of heritage policy. This will require a departure away from the literature more commonly associated with

heritage studies towards a range of perspectives developing within the disciplines of linguistics, social psychology, cultural studies, critical theory, anthropology and sociology – all of which will be touched upon in the following pages.

A critical realist approach to discourse analysis

Taking the lead from Norman Fairclough (2004, 2005b; see also Fairclough, Jessop and Sayer 2004), I want to align my approach to CDA with the type of thinking associated with British philosopher Roy Bhaskar and his notion of critical realism. What follows may in some ways seem an unnecessary detour into the detail of a particular philosophical stance, but the fact remains that critical realism has guided the selection of methods used for this analysis and thus goes some way towards exploring and justifying the approaches I have taken. Perhaps the most obvious motivation for adopting a critical realist position lies with my interest in studying how discourse, in many ways, *literally* shapes our approaches to heritage and its management. However, while such an interest renders the separation of the ‘cultural’ and ‘social’ from the ‘material’ somewhat problematic, I do want to reinforce Bhaskar’s (1989a, b) claim that there is a material world that is independent of our talk about it (Wetherell 2001b: 392; see also Benton and Craib 2001). The key is not to think in terms that are so simplistic as to render discourse descriptive. Instead, we need to remember that discourse also *does* things, a point that will become clearer as this chapter unfolds. For the moment, however, I want to pay a little more attention to clarifying the relationships between discourse and reality, for which I find critical realism instructive.

Proponents of critical realism generally agree that while the social world is socially constructed – that is, *dependent* on human action – the same cannot be said for the natural world. As a consequence, a firm, conceptual line is drawn between *our knowledge* of reality and the *nature* of reality (Fairclough 2005b: 922). This brings with it an important ontological acceptance of the materiality of consequences, or, as Wetherell (2001b: 391) remarks, carries a focus on the ‘material efficacy of discourse’. This is not to say that any given person constructs reality for her- or himself; rather, individuals author *versions* of reality. Social reality is thus understood as both context and people dependent, but neither people nor context exhaustive (Harré and Bhaskar 2001: 28). In short, there are underlying – and *real* – causes and patterns that are separate from the ways in which we talk, write, represent and communicate (Wetherell

2001b: 393, 2001a). This distinction is for Bhaskar (1986; 1998) the basis of two types, or 'sides', of knowledge, which comprise the social activities of knowledge production on one hand, and the knowledge *of* things that are not socially produced on the other. The first of these 'knowledges' is labelled *transitive objects of knowledge*, while the latter is referred to as *intransitive objects of knowledge* (Bhaskar 1989a, 1998). From here, we are left with two different dimensions of reality: one that is fashioned by our own conceptualization and one that would not cease to '... act and interact', regardless of whether we speak for it or not (Bhaskar 1998: 17). Subsequently, while all 'knowledge of' becomes partial, layered, fallible and ultimately subject to social creation, this does not detract from an independently existing reality (Potter 2001: 189).

The significance of this observation for the wider analysis at hand is the suggestion that there is a difference between 'reality' and 'appearance' (Marsh and Furlong 1995: 30). As such, notions of 'common-sense', 'face value' and 'appears to be so' can be seen to be masking something else, and while this may rest with a difference between 'real' and 'perceived', it is nonetheless a difference which might be characterized, constrained or facilitated by power and ideology in society (Marsh and Furlong 1995: 31). It thus inspires a critical interest in how certain problems or issues are perceived, or discursively constructed. For research tackling public policy, as is the case here, what this means is an acceptance not only of the real consequences and affects of discourse, but also that those 'policy affects' reflect a dominant discursive construction and constrain the resonance of alternative narratives (Marsh and Furlong 1995: 35). As such, while there are many real processes at work that affect heritage, they are approached through discourse and thus it is the discursive constructions *of* those 'real' processes that shape policy (Marsh 1995: 161).

The parameters of critical discourse analysis

As Michael Stubbs (1997) notes, since the 1990s CDA has quickly developed into a mature and influential approach to the study of language organized around issues of class, gender, racism, identity, ethnicity and disability, and commonly associated with scholars Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, Theo van Leeuwen and Ruth Wodak. It is also invariably linked, in ways that are not always transparent, with the work of Michel Foucault, Ernesto Laclau and Jürgen Habermas, all of whom have played prominent roles in theorizing the notion of 'discourse'. Although it is quite easy to make such general links between

Table 1.1 Key Aspects of CDA

Key aspects of critical discourse analysis
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A focus on social and discourse structure • A focus on social issues and problems • Aims to show how discourse figures in social problems/change • Multi-, inter- and trans-disciplinary approach • Explanatory/interpretive • Takes an explicitly political stance • Self-reflective research • An emphasis on power and ideology • Includes non-verbal communication

these scholars and CDA, it is important to note that there is no one typical CDA approach *per se*. Nonetheless, there are a few general comments that can be made about what essentially defines this *framework* for analysis before the specific theories and linguistic-analytical tools adopted are laid out (see Table 1.1).

Primarily, CDA attempts to link sociological questions with the empirical analysis of language in use, thereby necessitating a combined focus on (a) social structure and (b) discourse structure (Fairclough et al. 2003). It is not, however, this combination of textual and social analysis alone that defines CDA. A far more central characteristic of the framework requires introduction, signalled by the use of the word ‘critical’ in its title. This privileging of ‘critical’ research means taking account of productive power, along with its uses and abuses (see van Dijk 2009). More than that, however, it requires the researcher to *take a position*, politically and socially, and therefore advocate for a topic they see as not simply interesting but as having implications for social change (van Dijk 2009: 7). This is, of course, inherently political but, as van Dijk (2009) goes on to argue, so too is the choice *not* to take a position. The point, then, is to produce something akin to what Bhaskar calls ‘explanatory critique’, in which a social problem is identified along with an attempt to solve it (Phillips and Jørgensen 2002; Fairclough 2009).

Often, the identification of a social problem begins by questioning the ideological function of discourses associated with in-group members, with the specific aim of studying the relations of power and domination *from the perspective of dominated groups* (van Dijk 2009: 6). This means considering the often latent or unquestioned ideological effects of discourse, particularly in terms of the relative positions of power different social groups are afforded. To augment this sociological flavour

of enquiry, the analysis takes up a textual edge in its attempts to reveal the work of discursive practices in *maintaining* particular – and dominant – views of social reality. In short, then, a project in CDA takes as its focus (1) a set of discursive practices used to represent the world and (2) the material and symbolic affects of those discursive practices, particularly their ability to secure power. This does not mean that CDA is concerned simply with the negative impacts of discourse, although it often is; to the contrary, it also attempts to trace its positive effects (see Fairclough 2010 for an example).

Theoretical underpinnings

Of the many different approaches to CDA available, this work is most closely aligned with Norman Fairclough's dialectical-relational approach. This framework assumes that social life has a semiotic element (the processes of meaning-making); these are separate but not distinct, and the purpose of analysis is therefore to focus upon the dialectical relationship between the two. Rather than taking discourse as a straightforward vehicle of meaning, which is reflective and neutral, the adoption of Fairclough's model means re-jigging how we think about discourse so that it becomes something that is powerful, affective and situated (Taylor 2001: 6–7; Blommaert 2005: 2). Much of the overview that follows is informed by this understanding, particularly that put forward in his 2003 monograph *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*, his 1999 co-authored volume *Discourse in Late Modernity* (with Lille Chouliaraki), and the sole-authored *Language and Power*, published in 1989. A key concept within this framework is the idea of *social practice*, which basically encompasses the various – and relatively stable – ways in which people utilize material and symbolic resources to live their lives (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 21). Each social practice interweaves complex collections of types of activities, values, forms of consciousness, types of people and different sorts of semiotic resources, all of which internalize




Figure 1.1 Imagining the Dialectic




Figure 1.2 A Model of Social Life (adopted from Fairclough 2009)

and affect each other (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 21). The attraction of 'social practices' as an analytical concept is their positioning between two other levels of social reality: *structures*, which are durable and abstract ('society'), and *events*, which are concrete, immediate occurrences or 'people living their lives' (Fairclough 2009: 164) (see Figure 1.1).

All three have their own associated symbolic (including semiotic and discursive) elements (see Figure 1.2).

Social life thus becomes dialectical in two ways: between structures, practices and events, and between the semiotic and other elements found within each, all of which jostle with, negotiate, modify or work to sustain individual texts and events, as well as social practices. A key function of this dialectical understanding of discourse is that it is always both constitutive and constituting. Discourses are thus not only *constituted* by certain knowledges, values, identities, consciousnesses and relationships, they are also *constitutive* in the sense of not only sustaining and legitimizing the 'status quo', but in transforming it (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258). Taking up a definition such as this makes clear that the way we 'talk about' things also defines the identities and subject positions from which we make our 'talk'; it constructs and mediates the ways

we act and organize; and produces and maintains the knowledges and beliefs that in turn work to sustain and legitimize that way of 'talking' (Fairclough, Graham, Lemke and Wodak 2004: 2; Marston 2004: 36). In short, the means by which we create, discuss, talk about and assess heritage issues *matter*.

If we think of structures as comprising of a semiotic element that operates at the broad level of language, and events comprised of semiotic elements imagined as texts, then practices need to be imagined as having semiotic elements that fall somewhere between the two. Fairclough deliberately assigns semiotic elements to these sociological concepts and linguistic counterparts: Discourses/Representation (or ways of representing the world), Action/Genre (or ways of acting/ interacting) and Identity/Style (or ways of constructing the self) (Fairclough et al. 2003; Fairclough 2009: 164). A three-dimensional model emerges from this framework, taking into account the linguistic features of a text, or discourse-as-text (including grammar, modality, transitivity, nominalization etc., all of which will be discussed in the following pages), the production and consumption of texts, or discourse-as-discursive practice (specific texts circulated and consumed, with reference to coherence and intertextuality) and the social practice(s) to which a communicative event belongs, or discourse-as-social practice (the ideological and hegemonic effects) (Phillips and Jørgensen 2002: 68; Blommaert 2005). In this way, discourse becomes much more than simply speaking and writing; it includes imagery, design, music, artwork, layout and so forth. At a more complex level, it also encompasses ways of representing, or the positions, perspectives or platforms from which an area of the world is represented or envisioned, as well as embodied representations, or 'ways of being' (Fairclough 2003: 26), such as performances, identities, expressions, styles, reactions, behaviours, responses and impressions.

In taking up an interest in both the 'social' and 'linguistic', a methodological framework is required that operates at macro and micro levels respectively. This framework needs to allow the researcher to take up an interlocutory role divided between fine-grained analyses of texts and broader sociological projects (Fairclough 2001b: 229; Fairclough 2003: 3). In this type of analysis, CDA research examines the lexico-grammatical choices made within texts as a means of exploring how these realize (or not) social change (Benwell and Stokoe 2006: 108). CDA analyses thus work between 'text' and 'society' and surmise that what is going on socially is both constituted by, and constitutes, that which is going on discursively (Fairclough 2001c: 235–242). In other words, CDA uses language as a means to interpret social contexts, but in order to do so it

takes up an explicit and detailed account of linguistics, semantics and grammar. Or, as Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 140) more eloquently put it, '... the social is built into the grammatical tissue of language'. As such, the micro-analysis of discourse is used as a mechanism to engage with the macro-analysis of wider societal contexts, the level at which discourses become closely intertwined with the legitimation and maintenance of power (Marston 2004: 38). This duality it is not an either/or, but a *must*, and seeks to incorporate both the significance of social theoretical issues and the social effects of discourse (Fairclough 2003: 3).

Four concepts need to be introduced at this point: *intertextuality*, or the presence of different 'voices' within a text; *interdiscursivity*, the mixing of genres, discourses and styles within a text; *re-contextualization*, the colonization of one social practice by another, recognizable in the re-contextualization of discourse; and *hybridization*, the transformation of one discourse by another (Fairclough 2003: 218–222; Fairclough 2005a; Benwell and Stokoe 2006: 107). The first of these roughly aligns with the ways in which what is said and done relates to other events and texts. The second, interdiscursivity, refers to ways in which people creatively fashion together different discourse, genres and styles in any given context, with the latter two concepts referring to the ways in which this re-fashioning flows through social networks. In varying degrees, these concepts examine the naturalization of discourses and draw attention to the hidden effects of power and ideology (Wodak 2001a: 3, 2001b). For Fairclough (1995), these obscured effects can be better understood in relation to Ideological Discursive Formations (IDF), which are associated with institutional settings. As Niemi (2005: 488; see also Fairclough 2010: 27) points out, this analytical category combines Pêcheux's concept of 'discursive formation' with Althusser's notion of 'ideological formation' through which the prominence of particular ideologies is sustained. A number of IDFs may compete for dominance, and thus the process is inevitably caught up in struggles, impositions and resistance.

A concept closely linked to the notion of domination is that of hegemony. Unchallenged and dominant IDFs can achieve hegemony within their institutional and social settings, where they work to maintain ideological investments by rearticulating a particular discourse, or hybridization, through the production, dissemination and consumption of a range, or chain, of texts (Fairclough 1992: 93). This conceptualization of hegemony originally emerged out of the work of Antonio Gramsci and allows focus to settle on the subtle ways in which power is able to manifest itself. Gramsci's understanding of hegemony recognized that power

is not always operated through physical forces, but also entails subtle attempts to dominate through social psychological means or by winning consent from subordinate groups (Jackson 1985; Kincheloe and McLaren 2003: 439). Importantly, this does not mean that all those subordinate groups are *actively* participating in the legitimization of a particular set of practices (Jackson 1985). As Jackson (1985: 569) goes on to argue, for Gramsci these struggles often revolved around those components most commonly associated with the distribution of goods, but there are areas of import beyond his original focus. For instance, it allows us to think through the ways in which power relations may be naturalized within a range of contexts and articulated as self-referential acts of 'commonsense', simply 'the way things are', or, as Fairclough (1989: 91) notes, citing Pierre Bourdieu, '... recognition of legitimacy through misrecognition of arbitrariness'. What this is often taken to mean within the specific parameters of CDA is that one particular construction of reality will become *the* reality – it will appear natural, justified, legitimate, unquestionable and inevitable, to the point that it appears to *lose* all ideological content and become 'the norm' (Fairclough 1989: 92). For a study concerned with the cultural sphere, this conceptualization of hegemony offers a point of departure through which a researcher can identify the specific elements 'in the dominant culture that serve existing power relations and those that subvert them' (Jackson 1985: 572). This is a central idea for CDA and is one that will be recurrent within the analysis undertaken in this volume as I attempt to critically *denaturalize* the naturalization process that underlies the practice of heritage.

Methods and terminology

Inevitably, specialized language is used within CDA, and some of that terminology needs explaining here, particularly the more linguistically-orientated terms. Earlier, I briefly mentioned three key dimensions that are heuristically imagined as having both sociological and linguistic counterparts:

Discourses (Representation): ways of representing the world or aspects of it.

Genres (Action): ways of interacting or acting.

Styles (Identity): ways of constructing the self, or ways of being.

The ways in which different combinations of discourses, genres and styles are collected together are called *orders of discourse*. There is, for example, an order of discourse associated with the heritage sector; this includes

both the AHD and alternative ways of thinking about heritage, along with the forms of domination and marginalization this engenders. In other words, orders of discourse are social practices in their discursal elements (Fairclough 2005b: 925). While these can be realized more readily in a social analytical sense, they are also observable in the semantic, grammatical, lexical and phonological elements of a text (Fairclough 2003: 67). This convergence between the two provides insight into: (a) the selection of particular discourses used to interpret events or legitimize actions; (b) how these are then enacted as modes of conduct within both semiotic and non-discursive practices (Fairclough, Jessop and Sayer 2004); (c) how these are potentially inculcated within the identities of social agents, such that those actors position themselves *within* the discourse and see themselves in terms of it (Fairclough 2001a); (d) how discourses may be objectified in organizational practices, perhaps through *technologization* – the training of institutional personnel in ‘standardized’ techniques – through which discourses are materialized (Jaworski and Coupland 1999a: 34–35); and, finally, (e) how discourses can be reflexive, evidenced in the ways in which people’s activities can be interpreted and represented by experts and academics (Fairclough 2001a). The relationships between discourses, genres and styles are realized through semantic relations, such as *passivization/activation* and *inclusion/exclusion*, and are loosely expressed in grammatical terms such as *transitivity*, *nominalization*, *mood*, *modality* and *theme* (Benwell and Stokoe 2006: 109). I say ‘loosely’ because these relationships, while durable, are also flexible and dialectic.

It is also worth revisiting the concept of intertextuality as a methodological concept, and juxtaposing this against the term ‘assumption’. Policy documents, for example, often incorporate ‘bytes’ or ‘snatches’ of different texts through intertextuality and assumption, which are used to connect, inform, bolster and legitimize the messages found across a range of documents (Fairclough 2003). They do so not only in terms of assumptions about what heritage *is* and what it may be in the future, but also in a manner that attempts to promote this particular version of heritage over alternative constructions, in order to persuade and convince. In setting about these tasks, heritage policies exercise a significant amount of social control, implicit though it may seem, in terms of the degree to which they shape the nature and content of dominant discourses. An important analytical concept that will be drawn upon frequently in this volume is therefore *intertextuality*. Framing a text in relation to other texts implies *choice*, and thereby highlights a sense of what is being excluded and insulated against, and what is being worked into the interaction. Importantly, intertextuality provides a trigger for

examining attempts to assert a new hegemony through the restructuring and resultant hybridization of a number of discourses (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 271). This concept will be critical in examining the interplay of the AHD and social inclusion and multiculturalist discourses, in conjunction with attempts to assert a more populist tone into heritage debates through a focus on 'public value' and 'community cohesion'.

Intertextuality operates in a similar way to the linguistic concept *assumption*, which alludes to the judgements and backgrounds against which decisions and choices are made. Unlike the category of intertextuality, assumptions are rarely attributed in the text and remain vague allusions to information gathered 'elsewhere' (Fairclough 2003: 40). As a sign of 'fellowship' and solidarity (Fairclough 2003: 55), assumptions provide a cohesive attempt at postulating 'common ground' intertextually. Fairclough (2003: 55) identifies three main types of assumption: existential (what exists), propositional (what is, can, or will be), and value (what is good). The utility of recognizing different assumptions, particularly value assumptions, is that they ultimately belong to different discourses, and do quite a bit of the discursive work involved in making things appear 'natural', 'legitimate' or 'common sense' (Fairclough 2003: 58). It is only a short step from the extraction of such assumptions to making analytically robust statements about universalization, which is relevant here in terms of the way a very definite discourse about heritage has worked to universalize certain management practices and meanings at the global level. Policy documents thus play an important role in achieving and maintaining this dominance, becoming, in a sense, ideological and hegemonic tools that work to enact and sustain certain understandings in the service of a dominant discourse (Fairclough 2003: 9).

These two concepts differ in outcome: for the former, intertextuality, difference is opened up with the injection of external voices, and for the latter, assumption, difference is overlaid and closed down through claims of 'common ground' (Fairclough 2003: 41). Both concepts, however, make reference to *dialogicality* – the extent to which other voices are incorporated in (or excluded from) the text – but operate at different ends of a sliding scale, with one end (intertextuality) purposefully engaging in conversation with other texts and the other end (assumption) silencing or diminishing that conversation through claims to commonsense or inevitability (Fairclough 2003: 41). In essence, it demonstrates a text's orientation to explorations of difference, or the degree to which a text is expressive of a willingness to negotiate and interact in the fullest sense of the word 'dialogue'. Fairclough (2003: 41–42) schematically differentiates this willingness as the following: (a) an openness to dialogue; (b) an accentuation

of difference; (c) a resolution of difference; (d) a bracketing off of difference in favour of solidarity; and (e) consensus. Here, the absence of dialogicality becomes illustrative of a completed process of naturalization, in which conflict and difference is suppressed and the resultant 'voice' is both authoritative and absolute.

Orientations of dialogicality can be assessed through an analysis of vocabulary – in particular with reference to *modality* – as a means of examining the extent to which other possibilities are allowed for or not. At essence, modality expresses the commitment, affinity or obligation a person or text has for a particular proposition of truth. As Verschueren (1999, cited in Fairclough 2003: 165) points out, modality:

... involves the many ways in which attitudes can be expressed towards the 'pure' reference-and-prediction content of an utterance, signalling factuality, degrees of certainty or doubt, vagueness, possibility, necessity, and even permission and obligation.

For example, modality can be expressed as a modal adverb (possibly, certainly), a modal verb (should or must), modal adjectives (probable), participle adjectives (required), verbs of cognition or mental process clauses (I think, I believe), verbs of appearance (appears, seems), and copular verbs (is) (Fairclough 2003: 171; Benwell and Stokoe 2006: 112). Fairclough (2003: 171) adds to this list with markers (obviously, in fact) and hedges (kind of). In expressing a range of meanings in terms of what people think, are doing and how they identify themselves, modality can be seen to straddle all three internal categories (actions, representations and identifications) discussed earlier, revealing its dialectic nature.

It can also be further categorized in terms of the work that it is doing, or the modal meaning it imparts, along the lines of *statement*, *question*, *demand* and *offer* (Fairclough 2003: 167–168). The standard classifications for modal meaning are 'epistemic' knowledge or 'deontic' activities (Fairclough 2003: 167; Edwards 2006: 177). Here, 'epistemic' knowledge may be either a statement (author's commitment to truth indicated through is, may be, and is not) or question (elicitation of another's commitment to truth indicated through is?, couldn't?, and isn't?), and relates to 'what we can know' (Edwards 2006: 477). 'Deontic' activities may be either a demand (author's requirement or obligation indicated through do, you could and don't) or offer (author's commitment to action indicated by I will, I might and I won't) (Fairclough 2003: 168). The variation within these grammatical forms allows for the expression of scale, such that within modalized clauses, commitment to truth may be high or low, with

highly modalized forms such as must and will implying lesser scope for dialogical possibility than may and could. Here, the latter are open to alternative suggestions or possibilities, whereas the former are categorical assertions.

Modality is also a textual indicator of self-identity. If one *commits* oneself wholeheartedly to one thing and not another, a picture of how that individual understands the world begins to emerge (Fairclough 2003: 166). The choice in how to communicate a judgement or commitment becomes tied up not only with actions, representations and identifications, but extends, also, beyond particular texts. Modalized language is also used to distinguish between different styles of presentation and identification. Thus, we can see that genres and styles constitute particular ways of acting and identifying, and make suggestions about social hierarchies that have resonance with the patterns constructed through broader social analysis (Fairclough 2003: 75). In this way, institutional policy documents communicate sets of interests that are exercised through the positioning of particular actors and the communication technologies they are afforded. Likewise, the *representation* of social actors is important. Who is excluded and/or included? Are they recognized as pronouns? Is the social actor prominent as a participant or a beneficiary? Who is signalled as active and who is made passive?

From here, it is possible to question what it is about language that allows us to make some sort of mental picture about 'goings on' – of what can be done and what cannot be done (Janks 1997: 56). This line of questioning brings in patterns of *transitivity*, or the relationships between participants, processes and circumstances (Benwell and Stokoe 2006: 109; Richardson 2007: 54), in which verbs, as *doing* words, start to make revelatory allusions about the textual and social constructions of different participants and their positionings. A transitive process will include an 'actor', 'process' and 'affected', and may be either passive or active, whereas intransitive processes will include *either* an 'actor' and 'process' or an 'affected' and 'process' (Fairclough 2003: 142). An important aspect of this is the manipulation of agency through which those *doing* something are masked out of the text. This occurs both through abstraction and generalization, in which activities and process are removed, as are references to precise facts and figures (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999: 97). This can be achieved with the use of *nominalization*. This concept sees the entire activity of 'doing' re-contextualized as a noun, such that processes simply become things. In these cases, the transparent links between a process and agent are subsumed within a nominal

verb: with 'destruction', for example, the people or acts of nature that have destroyed something are bound up and converted into a noun-like word or entity (Fairclough 2003: 143). This requires a shift from understanding actions and processes in the 'here and now' to 'an abstract representation of them as applicable "wherever, whenever and involving whoever"' (Fairclough 2005b: 926). This obfuscation of agency is a means of generalizing and making something appear inevitable through a metaphorical process that simultaneously diminishes responsibility and accountability. As Fairclough (2000: 26) succinctly states:

Nominalisation involves abstraction from the diversity of processes going on, no specification of who or what is changing, a backgrounding of the processes of change themselves, and a foregrounding of their effect.

An extension of this argument lies with the concept of institutionalization and impersonalization (van Leeuwen 1999: 92f; Fairclough 2003). This sees subject positioning developed to such an extent that an actor *becomes* the institution to which he/she is attached, or begins to impersonate, to an extent, that institution. In this way, an individual's words or views are represented as that institution's words or views, and personal agency is diminished. This is a persuasive practice that acts as an *externalizing device* used in attempts to conjure up seemingly 'factual' accounts of an event or perspective. It is an attempt to make a tentative reality *the* reality, and is a strategy employed when attempting to assert one discourse over the discourses of others.

Subject positioning is also reinforced through the choices made in relation to semiotic elements. These devices will often start with things such as *reactions* and *purpose*. Here, particular participants' feelings and emotions will be alluded to and re-contextualized in line with distinct purposes and aims. These two aspects will lend credence to various attempts of legitimization, and of which is constructed in discourse (van Leeuwen 1999: 98). Legitimization strategies have been enunciated by van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999, see also van Leeuwen 1999), and include *authorization*, *rationalization*, *moral evaluation* and *mythopoesis*. The first of these seeks justification through appeals to authority, be that of tradition, custom, law or those people with institutional authority vested within them (Fairclough 2003: 98). This does not necessarily play out in terms of Because I say so or Because so-and-so says so, but will also make reference to the Law, the rules or the Act, such that authorization appeals may be either personal or impersonal (van Leeuwen and Wodak

1999: 104). In conjunction, authorization can also be invoked in terms of conformity – if everybody is doing it, then it is legitimate. The second form of legitimization, rationalization, makes appeals to the cognitive validity or utility of institutionalized action, and follows maxims such as It is the facts of life or commonsense (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999: 105). It may include reference to instrumental rationalities, or the positive effects of such social practices (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999: 105), such as the agreement to conserve material remains of the past for the benefit of future generations. The moral logic that underpins this rationalization is hidden from view and is left on the surface as an appearance that *seems* straightforward. The third form of legitimization, moral evaluation, appeals to a pre-established discourse of values and includes economic value, public value, objective value and wellbeing values (van Leeuwen 1999: 109). In this instance, an example might be the conservation of material remains based upon an assumption of the value of ‘age’ and ‘rarity’. Finally, mythopoesis seeks legitimation through narrative and appeals to ‘moral tales’, ‘cautionary tales’ or success stories (Fairclough 2003: 99). These stories or narratives might not be explicit within a text but instead may subtly permeate the text, gently telling a tale of how things *ought* to be and how people *ought* to act.

A more fine-grained analysis of texts requires the incorporation of tighter linguistic concepts that examine the semantic and grammatical relations between sentences and their clauses, and include the following forms of relations: *causal*, *conditional*, *temporal*, *additive*, *elaboration* and *contrastive/concessive* (Fairclough 2003: 89). These are fairly straightforward and use the identification of particular words to indicate different types of relation. For example, but indicates a contrastive statement, if a conditional statement, and in order to is indicative of a causal relationship (Fairclough 2003: 89). Added to this is the distinction between grammatical relations or clause complexes, in which clauses are seen to be paratactic (or equally prominent, indicated with and), hypotaxic (or in a subordinate/prominent relationship, indicated with because) or embedded (indicated with so that, or in order to) (Fairclough 2003: 92; Golebioskw 2006: 260). Paratactic or hypotaxic relations are used to construct lists, either as those things that are equivalent, or things that exist in some sort of hierarchical order. Fairclough (2000: 28–29, 2003: 94) also identifies what he terms ‘logic of appearances’, in which disparate processes, participants or things are strung together and made to *appear* connected. What is missing from these lists is an explanation as to *why* they are linked. These clause combinations are important for revealing the relative importance of different activities, processes or participants

reflected upon in a passage of text. The ordering of words thus plays an interesting role in relaying potentially ideological messages embedded within a text. Equally important are those words or assumptions that are *not* explicit within a text but, rather, are presupposed. *Presupposition* is thus revelatory of a naturalized relationship, and assumes that a reader can make the necessary links between what is *said* and what is *meant*.

In addition to these grammatical and semantic areas of inquiry comes what Benwell and Stokoe (2006: 115) refer to as 'the pronoun system', through which notions of inclusion/exclusion, power/submission, active/passive may be realized. Subtle switches between the use of different pronouns have dramatic effects in terms of ambiguity, confusing the boundaries between those actively included and those included in appearance only (Fairclough 2000: 164). The use of pronouns also has an effect on constructions of social groupings (particularly 'Self' and 'Other'), not only in terms of how we negotiate the boundaries of each group, but in terms of how we identify *ourselves* in relation to different social groups (Bloor and Bloor 2007: 20). Do all readers of a piece of text feel they belong to the 'we' constructed or do some place themselves in opposition to the groups prioritized by pronouns such as 'we' or 'our'? Irrespective of how readers choose to respond, questions also need to be asked about *why* particular pronouns are chosen – is the text attempting to elicit trust and familiarity, for example, and thus uses the first-person plural pronouns 'us' or 'we'? Does that sense of familiarity also denote a sense of authority to speak on behalf of others (Benwell and Stokoe 2006: 115)? The point of asking these sorts of questions is to reinforce the role played by identity in any analysis that explores issues of exclusion and to acknowledge that identity is '...neither structurally determined, nor freely chosen': it is always socially and discursively constructed and mediated (Marston 2004: 43).

The data in brief

The data drawn upon to investigate the discursive constructions of heritage analysed in this volume derive from two areas of social and qualitative research: textual analysis using CDA and in-depth interviewing. Texts drawn include policy documents, White Papers, consultation texts and legislative Acts, all of which are freely available either in hard copy or online. The analysis also draws upon a number of unpublished sources, including internal letters, historical records, consultation responses, reports, memos and policy drafts, all gathered from both online and institutional

archival sources. With a timeframe bounded by those policies and pieces of legislation that are still prevalent today, the choices made regarding the textual material to be examined were relatively straightforward. A number of key events were used as signposts for directing the accumulation of data, including the enactment of the 1979 *Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act*, the *National Heritage Act* of 1983 and two policy review periods – the 1999–2002 *Review of Policies Relating the Historic Environment* and the ongoing *Heritage Protection Reform*, which commenced in 2003.

In addition to providing a textual analysis, the volume is also based on the results of efforts to capture an insiders perspective via in-depth interviews with key practitioners employed within the heritage sector. In my own field of research on heritage policy, few publications have emerged that are based on access to high-placed bureaucrats within prominent heritage institutions and thus able to reveal how a raft of experts – particularly those plugged into the policy process – speak and write about heritage. For this research, a total of 36 in-depth interviews were carried out for this purpose (see Appendix A). These took place with employees and practitioners concerned with heritage management, policy formulation and heritage research in Britain and were supplemented by interviews undertaken with professionals working at the World Heritage Centre, Paris, the Division of Cultural Heritage (UNESCO), Paris, and the Smithsonian Centre for Folklore and Cultural Heritage in Washington DC. The interviews were used to generate qualitative data useful for the analytical tradition of CDA and, as a consequence, were semi-structured and relatively non-directive. Most interviews were carried out within organizational or institutional settings, thus providing opportunities to observe and contextualize the corporate identity of the material interpreted, as well as tap into the range of narratives and storylines each individual used to construct a sense of heritage.

Conclusion

Drawing on a range of critical social theories, CDA presents an approach that successfully negotiates the divide between linguistic and social research by making a case for using changes in language to understand social change. This, in itself, is an attractive proposition for anyone doing research that attempts to examine policy and documentary archives and the social practices they plug into. Through the application of discourse-analytical techniques, this particular piece of research is able to access the discourses animating the heritage sector, not simply in terms of their

potentiality, but in terms of their material and ideological consequences, which can be drawn out of the *very language* characterizing the policy field. Not only, then, can CDA be used to identify the occurrence of the AHD within and across a range of policy documents, it can also be used to trace the social effects of its enactment and longevity.

This chapter provides the framework for analysis adhered to by the remainder of the volume, which, as a whole, considers the discursive construction of heritage. The thrust of my argument works to suggest that the 'commonsense' view of heritage we see in related policy – nationally and internationally – is not quite as straightforward as it might at first appear, despite its relative stability. Nevertheless, certain ideas about heritage have arisen, and many of the people in positions to implement and influence the policies and practices that surround heritage appear to have drifted towards thinking about heritage in particular ways – so much so that, from a policy perspective at least, we seem to have forgotten that there are alternative ways of understanding the nature of heritage and the uses it is put to. Throughout the volume I argue that this fact, along with its attendant consequences in terms of power, domination and control, needs to be fully taken into account in any discussion of heritage, but particularly those situations within which new or external discourses are re-contextualized. To adhere in this statement means, to borrow from Fairclough (2005b), that attention should be placed upon both the emergence of the AHD and the problem of its hegemony. For the heritage sector, this means examining the problems surrounding the re-contextualization of inclusion, multiculturalism and cohesion, as well as their operationalization within a suite of contemporary policy documents dealing with such issues, new styles of cultural governance and new genres of participatory engagement.

Critical discourse analysis, to me, seems to provide many of the tools necessary for developing a more nuanced and critical approach to heritage; one that is no longer willing to countenance traditional ideas of heritage as 'neutral'. With a firm interest in unpacking the social processes of power, exclusion, subordination and a lack of parity in participation, CDA shares a philosophical and theoretical affinity with the aims of this volume. It is for this reason that I suggest that the techniques, theories and concepts central to CDA, already used widely in the social sciences, should now be moved more concretely into the cultural sphere.

2

Heritage in the Wider World

This chapter adds to an argument already developing in the heritage literature, which frames international policy – charters, conventions, declarations, recommendations, resolution and so forth – as something of an ‘offshore’ resource for domestic policymakers in a range of countries. As such, it is utilized and drawn upon by many different nations, thereby creating a process through which an institutionalized and limited representation of heritage is reproduced, disseminated and universalized. It is at the international level that many of the ‘rules of the game’ are set in place, whether in the form of texts delineating ‘best practice’, the enunciation of norms and principles, or the creation of regulatory systems of penalty and consequence. Like others before me, such as Denis Byrne (1991) and Laurajane Smith (2006), I do not wish to frame this as a deliberate or mindful ploy. Rather, I suggest it is a consequence of the discursual phenomenon described in the previous chapter, wherein we were required to abandon the idea of language as simple communication. Instead, I want to examine the discursive modes operating at the global level in which dominant representations of heritage find favour – global spaces wherein it becomes possible to locate countries such as Australia, the United Kingdom, France, Spain and Italy as ‘knowing’ and influential subjects. Here, the authorized heritage discourse fixes structures of authority and control not only to particular modes of knowledge (see Smith 2004), but nations and certain international organizations as well. Yet, despite this, the politics of heritage as it operates at the international level – including the many big players such as UNESCO, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) and nations promoted as prominent in the field of heritage – are often reduced to a case by case analysis, with any understanding of the systemic issues underpinning it marginalized.

The roles and legitimating functions of such key players, along with the understandings of heritage they espouse, are taken as natural, as something that simply 'exists'.

This chapter takes as its focus the special authority afforded to organizations like UNESCO and ICOMOS, and considers the re-scaling of the AHD at the international level, a policy domain that has, for some time now, been envisioned as a singular polity or unitary social system (Boli and Thomas 1999: 14). This singular polity, or so the theory goes, is constituted by a distinct culture. In this context, it can be argued that individual nations actively draw upon and modify cultural meanings and identities, with '... actors everywhere defining themselves in similar ways and pursuing similar purposes by similar means' (Boli and Thomas 1999: 18). It is thus within this mix that Smith's authorizing discourse is able to shift from a *representation* of heritage to something that has *transformative* effects on social life (see Fairclough 2001b). It becomes a site of remarkable confluence, where consensus is captured by the mainstreaming of now ever-present words like 'tangibility', 'authenticity', 'sustainability', 'integrity', 'patrimony' and 'universality'. Thus, despite the emergence of newer discourses regarding the nature and role of heritage (concerned with issues of diversity and intangibility, for example), their ability to supplant what Maguire and Hardy (2006) refer to as 'legacy discourses' – and here I am conceptualizing the AHD as a legacy discourse – is compromised. Essentially, this is because international policies, at the same time as being reinforced by legacy discourses, are also in a position to project influence *back towards* national policy, thereby reinforcing existing structures of power and control in what amounts to a recursive loop.

In essence, then, this chapter argues that the discursive activity that goes into the creation and dissemination of international standards is often geared towards privileging not only certain cultural symbols, but particular actors deemed capable of discerning value, meaning and significance. The interface between the two is punctuated by assumptions that are both descriptive and prescriptive, simultaneously providing the language used to mediate the management of heritage at the international level. Central is the concept of patrimony, along with the assumption that value lies *within* the fabric of sites, monuments and buildings: innate and universal. This sense of intrinsic value continues to constitute the idea that monuments are witnesses to human history (Choay 2001). To illustrate these points, the chapter takes as its focus the *International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites* (the *Venice Charter*) (ICOMOS 1964), the *Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Natural and Cultural Heritage*

(UNESCO 1972a) and the *Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage* (UNESCO 2003). Collectively, the texts began, and continue, to pare and shape the discourses arbitrating heritage and its management. Of these, the *Venice Charter* (ICOMOS 1964) is particularly relevant, as it continues to be the primary document upon which many succeeding international charters and conventions base their claims, including the ICOMOS *Nara Document on Authenticity* 1994, *The Burra Charter: The Australia ICOMOS Charter for Places of Cultural Significance* 1999 (Australia ICOMOS 1999) and *The Principles for the Conservation of Heritage Sites in China* (China ICOMOS 2002), all three of which will also be considered in this chapter. Although inevitably something of a caricature, what follows is an attempt to offer up the bones upon which to flesh out a more nuanced and complex understanding of the AHD within proceeding chapters.

Formalizing the AHD

Linked with the emergence of various lobby groups, such as the British Association for the Advancement of Science and the Society of Antiquaries in the UK, the Mt Vernon Ladies Association and the Society for the Preservation of New England Antiquities in the US and the Royal Australian Historical Society and the National Trust movement in Australia for example, the recognition of monuments as tangible reminders of the past can be documented in the passing of a range of legislation (Murray 1989; Barthel 1996: 19–23; Smith 2006). While a version of heritage protection can be detailed as early as the seventeenth century with the Swedish Royal Proclamation of 1666 (Cleere 1989: 1), the formal documentation of the authorized heritage discourse occurred later, materializing in the writing, re-writing and implementation of a suite of national legislation, policies and guidelines. This process is regularly cited as beginning in the 1880s, with real vigour infusing the cause in the mid-twentieth century. Nationally, such texts include the *Ancient Monuments Protection Act* of 1882 in England, the *American Antiquities Act* of 1906, the *Regolamento* of 1909 in Italy, the *Oldenburg Monuments Protection Law* of 1911 in Germany, the *Loi du 31 Decembre 1913 sur les Monuments Historiques* of 1913 in France, and the first *Nature Conservation Act* of 1937 in Denmark (d'Agostino 1984; Kristiansen 1984: 22; Reichstein 1984: 39). An important similarity occurring across this timeframe was the upholding of physical, material remains as those 'bits' assumed worthy – and *capable* – of connoting 'fact'. Indeed, this period is characterized by nothing short of the fetishization of materiality and an overpowering

belief in the cultural value of objects. Like works of art, the 'great' examples of heritage came to be imagined as '... sealed books to the full majority of men [sic], inaccessible to them, separated from them by a wide gulf, just as the society of princes is inaccessible to the common people' (Schopenhauer 1891, cited in Carey 2005: xii). It was this propensity towards tangibility that allowed the AHD to become hidden and sustained within ideas of pastoral care and moral responsibilities, undertaken on behalf of both future generations and for the sake of the nation (Whiteley 1995: 222).

The huge loss of buildings and monuments in the First World War led the first International Congress of Architects and Technicians of Historic Monuments, held in Athens in 1931, to devise the first international charter concerned with heritage. This charter built upon the philosophies of John Ruskin and William Morris, particularly the SPAB manifesto (The Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings, 1877), and resulted in the *Athens Charter for the Restoration of Historic Buildings*. The charter privileged the 'fabric' and materiality of historic buildings, espoused a 'conserve as found' ethos, and rested on a belief in aesthetic and historical verities. It was also underpinned by a very strong sense of patrimony, in which ideas about carrying heritage forward and for future generations were seen as paramount. These assumptions embedded in the *Athens Charter* later influenced a number of other texts, including the 1954 *Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict* (the Hague Convention) and the 1964 *Venice Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites*. In turn, this promulgation of a handful of internationally-pitched policy documents soon went on to ignite the development of a conservation ethic on a global scale, disseminated primarily through the disciplines of archaeology, art history and architecture, and highlighting, as Denis Byrne points out, a deep interest in emblems, materiality and fabric:

... 'authentic' material fabric is valorised by archaeologists and art historians because it constitutes the evidence on which they base their studies; it is valorised by the state because the fabric constitutes the emblem (1994: 14).

The aftermath of World War II is also significant for this discussion, as it is a timeframe that witnessed unprecedented changes in terms of expansion, increasing demands for economic and/or technological transformations, and societies responding to a shifting world, notwithstanding the apparent decline of the nation-state. It was also at this time that

attention was drawn to the fragile state of the Earth's resources, including both cultural and natural heritage. Terms such as 'sustainable development', 'fragile earth' and the origins of 'environmentalism' emerged at this time, and the environment '... quite suddenly became a political topic in Western society' (Hajer 1995: 73). International cooperation became an important goal, evidenced by the establishment of the United Nations (UN) in October 1945, with the aim of '... maintaining international peace and security, developing friendly relations among nations and promoting social progress, better living standards and human rights',¹ followed shortly thereafter by the creation of UNESCO in November 1945² and the Council of Europe in May 1949. By the 1960s, development and globalization had triggered a new sense of urgency regarding both the environment and, in conjunction, the past. Together, these concerns prompted the arrival of a conservation ethic based upon the fear that heritage may disappear under the threats posed by present and future generations (Cleere 1989; Willems 1998; Ashworth and Howard 1999). The 1960s were thus witness to a politically aware and vocal group of people who lobbied for greater concern regarding the state of natural and cultural environments. It was, if nothing else, a decade characterized by 'crises': warnings of global shortages, acid rain, ecological collapse, spectacular nuclear accidents, threats to Nubian sculptures from the flooding of the Nile, the restoration of Florence and threats to India through dam projects all added to this rising wave of concern (UNESCO 1970b; Cleere, 1989, Hajer 1995, 1996; Wainwright 2000; Graham et al. 2000; Dryzek 2005). Lobby groups, protestors and demonstrators became increasingly active in response and from this context a concern for the future of 'heritage' came to the fore, culminating in the formation of non-governmental heritage committee(s), increased membership to heritage groups, a number of Earth Summits, conferences, new journals and increasing tourism, amongst others (see Lowenthal 1985; Wright 1985; Prentice 1993; Graham et al. 2000).

Discourses of industrialization and globalization had an immense effect on shaping both professional and public attitudes towards heritage, its management and its uses as touristic capital for a range of international agencies. Many scholars (see Haas 1992: 3; Chabbot 1999) attribute this period to the emergence of governmental agencies, analysts and experts within what Maarten Hajer (1995) terms 'secondary policy institutes'. In order to deal with the increasing complexity of issues, governments summoned these communities of experts or specialists to help resolve a myriad of issues, allowing such communities to settle into a comfortable role in the creation and maintenance of policy (Fischer 2003: 33). This

notion of like-minded people working together to transmit and maintain beliefs about the verity and applicability of particular forms of knowledge finds synergy with Peter Haas's more famous conceptualization of 'epistemic communities' (Haas 1992, 1998, see also Gough and Shackley 2001). For Haas, such a coalition would involve a broad collection of actors (from NGOs, governments, the public sector, politicians, scientists and so forth) coalescing around a particular issue and collectively coordinating the transmission of consensual knowledge deemed to offer a suitable solution. In this instance, the problem under analysis is the perceived crisis of heritage and, as in the more cited example of tackling climate change, the role of many of the players in these communities is not to challenge the basic premises inherent to the debate, but to encourage responses in the form of precaution (Gough and Shackley 2001). Irrespective of exactly how we conceive of and label these secondary policy institutes or epistemic communities, the point remains that this was a time in which the quite sudden recognition of a global heritage problem led not only to the development of a number of expert committees that convened at an international level, but the dissemination of a particular discourse that talked about heritage as a problem and proposed mechanism for bringing about a solution.

The Venice Charter re-contextualized

Although the 1904 Madrid Conference and the *Athens Charter* of 1931 are the earliest articulations of a need to tackle conservation issues on a global scale, my interest begins with the *International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites*. This charter was crafted at the second meeting of the International Congress of Architects and Technicians of Historic Monuments in Venice, 1964, where a group of heritage experts pushed forward thirteen resolutions, thereby founding not only what has become a key document in the field of heritage management, but the organization ICOMOS itself, created in 1965, which was established to support and disseminate the philosophy behind the charter (Gregory 2008). ICOMOS is an international NGO that brings together a network of heritage and conservation experts from a range of disciplinary backgrounds including architecture, archaeology, history, art history, geography, anthropology, engineering and town planning (ICOMOS 2005). Other NGOs within the cultural sphere include the International Council of Museums (ICOM) and the Cultural Information and Research Centres Liaison in Europe (CIRCLE). In addition to its own General Assembly, Advisory Committee and Executive Committee, ICOMOS is also supported by over 110 National Committees

(ie. ICOMOS Argentina, ICOMOS Costa Rica, ICOMOS Pakistan, ICOMOS Portugal, ICOMOS Togo and ICOMOS Zimbabwe, to name a few) who work to implement the aims and objectives of ICOMOS. It is, as Smith (2006) points out, a powerful lobbying group with c. 7500 members who agitate for the conservation and enhancement of architectural and archaeological heritage. Consequently, it has been granted significant political weight on the international stage.

My reasons for prioritizing the *Venice Charter*, as others have done before me (see Smith 2006; Harrison 2010), are not simply a consequence of the document's association with ICOMOS. Instead, they rest on the fact that, despite its date of 1964, it continues to be seen as a canonical text within national and international settings, and has thus proved vital in disseminating an authorized way of thinking about heritage (Waterton et al. 2006: 341). In many ways, the charter works simply to extend the principles laid down by the *Athens Charter*, but attempts to do so by creating a succinct and straightforward framework of sixteen Articles for the protection, conservation and restoration of architecture, monuments and sites, within which the scientific nature of preservation is taken as axiomatic, as is the notion of authenticity. Its themes are unsurprising; the charter came out of a specifically Western European understanding of heritage, wherein the utterance 'heritage management' conjured up a storyline that revolved around notions of materiality and the primacy of science in managing the values assumed to be inherent within any tangible reminder of past people, events or nations. Notions of patrimony and inheritance are also dominant within the charter's text, neither of which is out of step with the type of thinking about heritage ongoing at the time of its creation. Indeed, picking out many of the core characteristics of Smith's AHD from the text itself is a straightforward task. What is significant, however, is the pattern of re-contextualization we see within subsequent official definitions of heritage from this point forward, a point that will become clearer as the volume progresses.

In the opening preamble of the *Venice Charter*, an implicit rhetorical structure, crafted around a concern with the 'problem' of safeguarding heritage for future generations, is apparent, to which is added a series of statements that propose solutions as the document unfolds (in the form of utterances about what 'must' be done):

Imbued with a message from the past, the historic monuments of generations of people remain to the present as living witnesses of their age-old traditions. People are becoming more and more conscious of the unity of human values and regard ancient monuments as a common heritage. **The common responsibility to safeguard them**

for future generations is recognized. It is our duty to hand them on in the full richness of their authenticity (Preamble, the *Venice Charter*, emphasis added).

In large part, these sentiments are an expression of anxieties festering since the destruction of World War II, which were coupled with the burgeoning of an interest in protecting symbols of nationhood (Ruggles and Silverman 2009; see also Sullivan 2004). The sentences above are accumulative, such that each subsequent sentence adds to or elaborates the initial sentiment expressed (that monuments are living witnesses of age-old traditions) in such a way that the sentences could not easily be re-ordered. There is little in the way of explanatory logic here; instead, we are left to assume that this rise in consciousness regarding the past has its origins in a rapidly changing social and cultural world. We are, however, offered a handful of existential statements of 'fact', particularly in relation to the character of heritage and what our duties to it involve. Of key importance are the AHD's preferences for tangibility, permanence, inheritance and authenticity, all four of which are explicitly established in the opening sentences of the charter and rehearsed in later Articles:

The concept of a historic monument embraces **not only the single architectural work but also the urban or rural setting** in which is found the evidence of a particular civilization, a significant development or a historic event. This applies not only to great works of art but also to more modest works of the past which have acquired cultural significance **with the passing of time** (Article 1, the *Venice Charter*, emphasis added).

Conditional within the entire document is the notion that heritage is tangible and irreplaceable. The possibilities for heritage to be anything other than a monumental form, most likely in the form of an architectural work, are diminished from the outset, as set down by Article 1. Some concessions are observable, but these are limited to simply tangible forms that are 'more modest', but still bear the potential to acquire significance with the passage of time. Key, then, is the assumption that time, or more clearly 'age', will play an important role in signifying a monument as worthy of management. As Smith (2006: 90) has already argued, this rhetorical structuring implies something of a divide between those 'great works of art' already assumed to hold an obvious and inherent value, and '... those things from more modest contexts, presumably non-Western cultural contexts or less grand Western social contexts [which] can, in certain circumstances, acquire [value]'. A theme that has become

increasingly familiar within the language used to talk about ‘the best of the best’ in terms of heritage can thus be found lurking within the text of this charter: the apparent desirability or obviousness that certain cultural symbols (great works of art, architectural work), most often associated with a particular social class (‘grand’ Western social contexts), are considered more important than other representations of heritage. This is not as transparent if we focus upon each specific word individually (although the adjectives ‘great’ and ‘modest’ do provide indications of what Fairclough (2003: 172) refers to as a ‘scale of intensity’), but it becomes much clearer when considered as a *discourse-related* assumption that appeals to the familiarity of the reader with an already established value system:

The conservation and restoration of monuments must have recourse to all the sciences and techniques which can contribute to the study and safeguarding **of the architectural heritage** (Article 2, the *Venice Charter*).

A deontic modality is at play here, a sense of obligation, which reinforces not only a belief in the materiality of heritage (‘architectural’), but the requirement of a suite of expertise to be placed at the centre of the management process, where it can fulfil an overarching duty to safeguard heritage for future generations *on behalf of us all*. This suite of expertise is commonly understood to consist of archaeologists, art historians and architects, all of whom can claim to tap into a knowledge framework that is geared towards understanding historical and aesthetic values, as applied to monuments, buildings and archaeological sites. Moreover, they are regarded as doing so in such a way as to sidestep subjectivity and impress upon the wider public a sense of measured consensus, and are thereby granted a particular position of power.

The document also goes some way towards articulating precisely the types of values regarded as central to the management process – and essential to ideas of heritage framed by the AHD. The following extract, for instance, indicates the intent of the authors with the modalization of the following bolded words:

The intention in conserving and restoring monuments **is to** safeguard them no less as works of art than as historical evidence (Article 3, the *Venice Charter*).

These markers of modality are shortly thereafter linked to two assumed values: aesthetic value and historical value, both of which are linked

together as equivalent. This commitment to historical and aesthetic values assumed to lie inherent with monuments is further implied by Article 7, which makes strict statements about the *undesirability* of 're-construction' or 're-location', sentiments echoed in Australia ICOMOS's earlier versions of the *Burra Charter* (1976, 1981 and 1988) and ICOMOS Canada's *Appleton Charter* (1983). The Article then goes on to include implicit assumptions regarding experts, who are assumed to be those most able to decide what is best for these 'living witnesses':

A monument **is inseparable** from the history to which it bears witness and from the setting in which it occurs. The moving of all or part of a monument **cannot be allowed** except where the safeguarding of that monument demands it or where it is justified by national or international interest of paramount importance (Article 7, the *Venice Charter*, emphasis added).

... monuments **must be** the object of special care in order to safeguard their integrity and ensure that they are cleared and presented in a seemly manner (Article 14, the *Venice Charter*).

Again, these Articles contain high instances of modalization ('is inseparable', 'cannot be allowed' and 'must be'). These are authoritative statements predicated on a strong commitment to two realis statements of fact: 'a monument is inseparable from the history to which it bears witness' and 'the moving of all or part of a monument cannot be allowed', although there are some exceptions to be made. These exceptions, however, bring with them their own implicit assumptions, here related to Articles 2 and 14, regarding those in a position to take such decisions – those experts deemed capable of studying and safeguarding the past and, importantly, rendering the *special care* required to ensure their longevity.

The *Venice Charter*, as the above observations attest, effortlessly traces the core characteristics of the AHD. While these observations could be commented upon further, the articulation of this discourse within the charter is, I think, already obvious (see Smith 2006 for a deeper analysis). Instead, the strategic goal of this chapter is to map the re-contextualization of that discourse within a broader range of charters, particularly those that specifically refer to the 'spirit' of the *Venice Charter*, such as *The Nara Document on Authenticity* (ICOMOS 1994), *The Burra Charter: The Australia ICOMOS Charter for Places of Cultural Significance 1999* (Australia ICOMOS 1999), *The Principles for the Conservation of Heritage Sites in China* (China ICOMOS 2002) and the *Vienna Memorandum on*

World Heritage and Contemporary Architecture – Managing the Historic Urban Landscape (UNESCO 2005b) to name a few. The *Nara Document* is a useful starting point, formulated in Japan in November 1994, and often heralded as the first international declaration presumed to have the scope to tackle the diversity of heritage. As Gregory (2008: 123) points out, it is ‘essentially a plea for authenticity built on the Venice Charter’, but one that tackles, ostensibly at least, fears of homogenization. Although, as Ruggles and Silverman (2009: 5) argue, the *Nara Document* ‘gently but firmly criticized’ the *Venice Charter*, the document is nonetheless based upon the same attempt to diagnose *the* problem of heritage and offers its own proposed mechanisms for solving it:

In a world that is increasingly subject to the forces of globalization and homogenization, and in a world in which the search for cultural identity is sometimes pursued through aggressive nationalism and the suppression of cultures of minorities, the essential contribution made by the consideration of authenticity in conservation practice is to clarify and illuminate the collective memory of humanity (preamble, the *Nara Document*).

What it offers, by way of contrast to the *Venice Charter*, is an engagement with cultural *context* and the implications this can have for understanding heritage and its significances, with authenticity used as a concept by which such meanings can be judged. Thus, in addition to the safeguards already set out in the *Venice Charter*, this document attempts to lend credence to the notion of authenticity already affirmed in the aforementioned charter:

Authenticity, considered in this way and affirmed in the Charter of Venice, appears as the essential qualifying factor concerning values. The understanding of authenticity plays a fundamental role in all scientific studies of the cultural heritage, in conservation and restoration planning ... (Values and Authenticity, Point 10, the *Nara Document*).

Efforts to ensure assessments of authenticity involve multidisciplinary collaboration and the appropriate utilization of all available expertise and knowledge (Appendix 1, Point 2, the *Nara Document*).

The centrality of authenticity is signalled by statements of truth (‘plays a fundamental role’), which are once again enmeshed with notions of

expertise, scientific knowledge and a concept of universality. Thus, while this is undoubtedly an *attempt* to mitigate the homogenizing qualities of the AHD, it nonetheless funnels all decisions about heritage into the hands of disciplines that share the same core values and are presumed to hold a universal validity. In effect, then, the document acts more as a persuasive device that cajoles groups that perhaps think about and value heritage differently to accept what is argued to be a more 'valid' way of doing things. Despite allusions to the ideal of 'diversity', the document is therefore unable to make any real attempts to move beyond the messages enshrined in the *Venice Charter* – they have simply been re-contextualized to accommodate the newer emphasis on authenticity. Aesthetic and historical values remain central – yet such is the commitment to these that they remain unspoken, implicitly invoked by usage of the more generic term 'values':

Efforts to ensure attributed values are truly representative of a culture and the diversity of its interests, in particular monuments and sites (Appendix 1, Point 2, the *Nara Document*).

Thus, in a document ostensibly devised to deal with the diversity of cultural identities and collective memory it becomes clear that that 'diversity' is to be imagined as concerned with the limited idea of heritage as monuments, groups of buildings and sites of cultural value (Appendix 2). No attempt is made to establish a broader remit for heritage, or to elaborate on the types of values or interest groups that may be considered vital to the management process. Instead, relations of equivalence continue to be textured between a discrete notion of 'heritage' and the broader trope of 'safeguarding' established by the *Venice Charter*.

Although this chapter is largely framed by references to international organizations, heritage, as Breidenbach and Nyíri (2007) point out, remains a national preoccupation. The Australia ICOMOS *Burra Charter* of 1999 therefore offers a second case study for examining the re-contextualization of the AHD. Originally drafted in 1979 in the mining town of Burra, South Australia, the *Burra Charter* has, like the *Venice Charter*, emerged as an integral component of the international perspective on heritage. Minor revisions were made in 1981 and 1988, with more substantial changes occurring in 1999 that attempted to incorporate changing attitudes to community inclusion, participation and consultation. Like the *Nara Document*, it is a document that aims explicitly to broaden the focus of heritage discourse by introducing concepts of 'cultural significance', 'social value', 'place' and 'fabric', all of which,

interestingly, have been adopted by the UK's more recent policy *The Conservation Principles* (discussed in Chapter 4). Laudable though the introduction of these terms is, the *Burra Charter* was rendered almost helpless against the colonizing tide of the AHD within the re-contextualization process. Admittedly, new elements were worked into existing discursive arrangements, in part transforming it as the adoption of terms such as 'place' testifies, but this hybridity could stretch only so far. Thus, despite attempts to introduce a newer discourse of plurality to the mix, the arguments and explanations put forward in the document inevitably adopt a formal tenor recognizable across the full spectrum of international charters and conventions. Highly modalized language is employed, along with realis statements of truth and dialogically-closed utterances, all of which contribute to an explicit evaluation of the ways in which heritage *ought* to be managed: via the skills and knowledge of expertise. A collection of assumed values punctuate the document (especially in relation to fabric), which steers away from the setting of a more cautious tone for discussing the difficult terrain of value and significance. Instead, the general framing is one of authority and regulation (Waterton et al. 2006).

The text, somewhat unsurprisingly, reads as a series of statements that signal authority and expertise in an explicitly unidirectional flow of information. Although some aspects of the text are dialogized – and therefore allow for some semblance of dissonance – many of the key elements are not (such as the meaning of significance, fabric and place). The preamble to the *Burra Charter* introduces the reader to the now familiar ideals of inheritance, tangibility, patrimony and fragility, all of which are found in the introductory section 'Why conserve?', which serves up this neat collection of categorical statements:

Conservation is an integral part of the management of places of cultural significance and is an ongoing responsibility ... these places of cultural significance must be conserved for present and future generations (preamble, the *Burra Charter*).

Australia ICOMOS is hereby committing itself to a number of desirable values, which can be summarized as follows: committing to conservation, the primacy of inheritance and acting on the basis of cultural significance. By contrast, one can assume that it would be *undesirable* for heritage to alter, change or fade away, now or in the future. The reality, it is assumed, is that conservation, as a process, is central to our engagements with heritage. Acceptance of the tangibility of heritage is

also adhered to as an essential ingredient within the document, extended via the centrality of 'fabric' in the opening sections of the charter:

Places of cultural significance enrich people's lives, often providing a deep and inspirational sense of connection to community and landscape, to the past and to lived experiences. They are historical records, that are important tangible expressions of Australian identity and experience (preamble, the *Burra Charter*).

Place means site, area, land, landscape, building or other work, group of buildings or other works, and may include components, contents, spaces and views (Article 1, the *Burra Charter*, emphasis in original).

Cultural significance is embodied in the *place* itself, its *fabric*, *setting*, *use*, *associations*, *meanings*, records, *related places* and *related objects* (Article 1, the *Burra Charter*, emphasis in original).

Fabric means all the physical material of the *place* including components, fixtures, contents and objects (Article 1, the *Burra Charter*, emphasis in original).

The *Burra Charter* thus sets up definitions of heritage and cultural significance that work to contradict the avowed changes to respect plurality and multi-vocality in the conservation process, and instead offer up an almost antiquarian veneration of the aesthetic and romantic material remains of the past. Like the *Venice Charter*, the processes of validating and conserving the above appeal to ideals of expertise and firm scientific evidence, as well as 'unbiased' thinking, objectivity and rationality (Waterton et al. 2006: 348). Immediately, it is possible to see that, by contrast, those interest groups that profess an emotional connection to a place or experience will undoubtedly be placed in a less secure position than those that can assure a sense of distance. Non-expert groups are thus granted a position in the management process that is uniquely different to that of expertise and, importantly, significantly less powerful:

Groups and individuals with *associations* with a place as well as those involved in its management should be provided with opportunities to contribute to and participate in understanding the *cultural significance* of the place. Where appropriate they should also have opportunities to participate in its *conservation* and management (Article 26.3, the *Burra Charter*, emphasis in original).

Competent direction and supervision should be maintained at all stages, and any changes should be implemented by people with appropriate knowledge and skills (Article 30, the *Burra Charter*, emphasis in original).

With these insertions, issues of expertise, if anything, have become *more* pronounced with the introduction of the *Burra Charter*, which is explicit in its division between expertise and all other interest groups. It is not dissimilar to the *New Zealand Charter for the Conservation of Places of Cultural Heritage Value* (ICOMOS New Zealand 1993) in this regard, which also struggles to afford the same degree of commitment to non-expert groups (see Article 3), aided in large part by an over-riding assumption in favour of materiality. Both charters draw attention to the point at which non-expert groups are allowed to enter the management process (once cultural significance has been determined), and on whose terms. Needless-to-say on both counts it is limited. Made manifest instead is a significant concession to the subject positions originally alluded to in the *Venice Charter*, which allow for autonomous agency on the part of heritage and/or conservation experts, but relatively little space for other groups to argue for a different, perhaps conflicting, sense of heritage. Admittedly a national strategy, the *Burra Charter* finds significantly more in common with the legitimizing and rationalizing tendencies of a raft of older charters than it does with the types of debates regarding multiculturalism and diversity ongoing at the time of its final inception.

A third case study, reflecting briefly upon China, is also instructive of the re-contextualization process of the AHD into nationally-orientated documents, and here I reflect upon the *Principles for the Conservation of Heritage Sites in China* (China ICOMOS 2002). It should be noted from the outset that China is not alone in defining principles specific to its own national context that borrow from the international level. Germany, for example, proposed the *Principles of Monument Conservation* in 1992 (German National Committee of ICOMOS 1992), which is a document heavily reliant on the Venice Charter for framing notions of conservation and 'best practice', as does the *Decree of the President of the Lao PDR on the Preservation of Cultural, Historical and Natural Heritage* (1997) borrow from terminology and definitions found with the World Heritage Convention. In 2010, China boasted 27 cultural heritage sites inscribed on the World Heritage List, with a further four mixed sites and seven natural sites. Heritage is, one could argue, big business in China, with the nation ranking third on the list of countries with the

highest number of sites on the World Heritage List, behind only Italy and Spain; with a further 51 sites listed on their tentative list, China shows no signs of slowing down either. Like the *Burra Charter*, China's *Principles* intertextually call upon the *Venice Charter* – indeed, much of the rhetoric I have already linked to the AHD is brought into the *Principles* in very explicit ways. The *Principles* also make mention of Australia's *Burra Charter*, although these influences are less obvious in the language employed. Written in 2000, printed in 2002 and reprinted in 2004, the *Principles* were instigated by the State Administration of Cultural Heritage (SACH) and authored by China ICOMOS, who were aided by the Getty Conservation Institute and the Australian Heritage Commission (AHC). They are printed as both a Chinese-language and an English-language document, and, like all three of the documents already touched upon in this chapter, begin with arguments around the problems faced by the heritage sector, with the *Principles* offered as a form of solution:

Thus it is the responsibility of all to bequeath these sites to future generations in their full integrity and authenticity (preface, *Principles for the Conservation of Heritage Sites in China*).

Although China is unquestionably understood as having its own specific cultural characteristics and history, it has nonetheless implemented a programme for heritage conservation that is explicit in its links to what is an essentially Western construct of 'heritage'. Remarkably, such are its similarities to many other contemporary texts in framing heritage, and so vehemently does it cling to many of the grounding assumptions underpinning those texts, that it perhaps comes closest to representing the AHD. Existential and propositional assumptions, triggered by definitive articles and certain verbs, are abundant, all of which belong to the notion of an authorized heritage discourse as defined by Smith (2006). What heritage *is*, for example, is defined as follows:

... the immovable physical remains that were created during the history of humankind and that have significance; they include archaeological sites and ruins, tombs, traditional architecture, cave temples, stone carvings, sculpture, inscriptions, stele, and petroglyphs, as well as modern and contemporary places and commemorative buildings, and those historic precincts (villages or towns), together with their original heritage components, that are officially

declared protected sites (Article 1, *Principles for the Conservation of Heritage Sites in China*).

It is assumed that the best way to manage the above definition of heritage is to engage with a process of conservation that aims to:

... preserve the authenticity of all the elements of the entire heritage site and to retain for the future its historic information and all its values (Article 2, *Principles for the Conservation of Heritage Sites in China*).

The conservation process lies at the heart of the management of heritage sites and should be accepted as authoritative (Article 3, *Principles for the Conservation of Heritage Sites in China*).

Explicit in the above is the belief that the fundamental significance of heritage lies both in its materiality and historical content, with its ultimate worth assumed to reside 'in its inherent value' (Article 3, *Principles for the Conservation of Heritage Sites in China*). This value, unsurprisingly, is comprised of the historical, artistic and scientific, and represents the universalization of a discrete set of assumptions regarding heritage and its place within social life. Somehow, these core characteristics of the authorized heritage discourse, carefully illustrated as representative of a distinctly Western notion of heritage by Smith, have come to be imagined as those considered necessary within the international domain. Those notions of heritage that might be considered 'unthinkable' within the framework of the AHD are thus being reworked and sorted, such that the diversity of ways in which we may engage with and use our pasts are being pared down into those things deemed 'thinkable' – in this case, a comprehensive list of material resources. The distinction implied between those things that are thinkable as heritage and those things that are not is thus reinforced with the very act of 'conserving' heritage: in the act of doing.

From these short forays into the world of charters, documents and principles operating at the international and national levels, we can see that the AHD has, indeed, achieved a level of dominance, and that a series of written texts have played a key role in doing the ideological work necessary for sustaining that dominance. The global sphere, despite its diversity of players, is thus punctuated by asymmetry, to borrow from Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (2006). Quite simply, this asymmetry refers to the enormity of the *humanity* to whom heritage is considered meaningful

when weighted against the slimness of *diversity* encompassed within the notion of heritage operating at the international level. It does indeed seem, as Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (2006: 161, citing Maxim Gorki) points out, that 'being most characteristic shall enable one to be universal'. Here, it is to those who construct themselves as most characteristic of the AHD to which I refer.

The World Heritage Convention revised

There are two types of international organizations of relevance to this chapter: international NGOs, already introduced via ICOMOS, and inter-governmental organizations, examples of which are UNESCO, the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM), the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the Council of Europe. Of primary interest here is UNESCO, the organization that oversees the World Heritage Centre, based in Paris, which holds overall responsibility for the operationalization of the World Heritage Convention – policy, like the *Venice Charter*, that is conceived of as being one of the foundational texts of the heritage movement within the contemporary global sphere. UNESCO's challenge of establishing a global approach to heritage can be traced to World War II and the turmoil and anxiety that pervaded the world immediately following its cessation, which consequently triggered the development of the United Nations (UN) in November 1945. As the successor to the League of Nations, the UN, through the specialized agency of UNESCO, has come to champion 'global' or 'common' heritage, which it sees as a powerful mechanism for fostering international security (Graham et al. 2000: 236), a sentiment underpinned by UNESCO's own constitution, which states:

Since wars begin in the minds of men [sic], it is in the minds of men [sic] that the defenses of peace must be constructed.³

The timeframe from which the organization emerges thus shares much in common with the development of ICOMOS, and this background is instructive in terms of understanding the political, social and cultural assumptions that are embedded within its conception. Since its inception, the history of UNESCO has not been without conflict. Indeed, several Member States have withdrawn from the organization, including the United Kingdom, the United States and South Africa. South Africa left in 1956, citing interference from UNESCO regarding its apartheid policy as the cause for withdrawal; they rejoined

under Nelson Mandela in 1994. The United States left in 1984 under the Reagan administration, and were quickly followed by the United Kingdom, under Thatcher, and Singapore in 1985. The United Kingdom returned in 1997, with the United States returning in 2002 (Joyner and Lawson 1985–1986; Donnachie 2010).

Like ICOMOS, UNESCO can be understood as both a lobbying body and a powerful interest group that carries the ability to influence national and international practices with regard to moveable, immoveable, natural and intangible heritage. It communicates both with and on behalf of a huge range of other interested parties, including Member States (of which there are 193) and non-governmental bodies (especially ICOMOS and International Union for Conservation of Nature), as well as national governmental heritage experts and non-governmental experts. Key policy documents associated with UNESCO include the *Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage* (1972a), as well as the *Recommendation Concerning the Protection, at National Level, of the Cultural and Natural Heritage*, also adopted in 1972 (UNESCO 1972b; O’Keefe 2004: 193). Four years after devising the World Heritage Convention, and in the same year as it came into force (once ratified by 20 signatories), UNESCO also adopted the *Recommendation on Participation by the People at Large in Cultural Life and their Contribution to It* (1976), which recommends that Member States ‘adopt legislation or regulations ... in order to ... protect and enhance the heritage of the past, and particularly ancient monuments’ (Article 4) (cited in O’Keefe 2004: 194). More recently, UNESCO has adopted the *Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity*, 2001a, the *Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage*, 2003, and the *Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions* in 2005a.

Space precludes a detailed discussion of all policies associated with UNESCO (but see Appendix B for an exhaustive list). Instead, this segment will take as its primary focus the *Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage*, or the World Heritage Convention as it is more commonly known, which today enjoys almost universal membership (Terrill 2008). The Convention was founded on the belief that:

... certain places on Earth are of **outstanding universal value** and as such should form part of the common heritage of humankind ... Whilst fully respecting the national sovereignty, and without prejudice to property rights provided by national legislation, the States Parties to the Convention recognize that the protection of the World

Heritage is the duty of the international community as a whole (UNESCO 2004, emphasis in original).

Two explicit messages enshrined by the World Heritage Convention are thus clear: (1) there is a universal definition of heritage of relevance and interest to the international community as a whole; and (2) the preservation of this common heritage concerns us all. In signing, or ratifying, the Convention, each country places credence upon these sentiments. Additionally, each country makes a pledge to conserve the sites situated within their territory *for future generations*, thus sharing the responsibilities set down by the Convention, which is weighted equally across the backs of the international community as a whole. As of 2009, 186 State Parties had ratified the Convention, making it one of the most widely ratified instruments at the international level (Vinsrygg 2009). At any given time a combination of 21 of those State Parties makes up the World Heritage Committee, the central decision-making organ of the Convention, with each Party serving a term of up to six years (although this is often reduced to four years) and meeting as a collective in June/July of each year. The Committee is currently comprised of: Australia, Bahrain, Barbados, Brazil, Cambodia, China, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, France, Iraq, Jordan, Mali, Mexico, Nigeria, Russian Federation, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates⁴ – despite arguments to the contrary, the Committee is undeniable in its current leanings towards non-Western countries.

Creating the List: The World Heritage process

The structuring of the Convention revolves primarily around the categories 'cultural' heritage and 'natural' heritage, a division also reinforced by the organizations assisting in the decision-making processes central to the Convention, which includes ICOMOS and ICCROM for assessments and evaluations concerned with the 'cultural' and IUCN for those things considered 'natural' (Cleere 1995; Vinsrygg 2009). The decision-making process, which has as its end result inscription on the World Heritage List, moves through four stages: listing, nomination, evaluation and inscription. To begin the process, State Parties first compose a Tentative List or an inventory of those cultural or natural features considered most important within their geographic boundaries. From there, State Parties are invited to select sites from their Tentative List that are to be included in a Nomination File, which provides a comprehensive and exhaustive description of the properties put forward. Once completed, and with approval from

the World Heritage Centre, Nomination Files are forwarded to the appropriate advisory body (based upon whether the proposed heritage is considered 'cultural', 'natural' or 'mixed') for evaluation. Once evaluated, the reports and Nomination Files are forwarded to the World Heritage Committee, which is presented with the ultimate challenge of deliberating inscription onto the World Heritage List for each nominated site.

In addition to the Convention itself, which lists 38 Articles, the provisions enshrined within its text are elaborated in a set of *Operational Guidelines* (devised in 1977 and periodically revised since then with the current version formulated in 2008). These, Vinsrygg (2009) asserts, are crucial for any attempt to engage with the Convention. Thus, while the Convention itself contains no direct references to external documents, the explicit cues for intertextuality can be found within its accompanying Guidelines, which make mention of the *Hague Convention* (UNESCO 1956), the *Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property* (UNESCO 1970a), the *Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage* (UNESCO 2001b), the *Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage* (2003) and the *Man and the Biosphere Programme* (1977). Both textual aspects of the Convention are framed with the familiar rhetorical structuring of problem/solution, and note as their starting points issues of 'decay', 'deterioration', 'disappearance', 'threats' and 'changing social and economic conditions'. What follows from that point onwards is a list of proposed ways in which the 'best of the best', those things with 'outstanding universal value', can be identified and protected. This begins with first defining cultural heritage:

1. monuments: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and painting, elements or structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave dwellings and combinations of features, which are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science;
2. groups of buildings: groups of separate or connected buildings which, because of their architecture, their homogeneity or their place in the landscape, are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science;
3. sites: works of man or the combined works of nature and of man, and areas including archaeological sites which are of outstanding universal value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or

anthropological points of view (Article 1, the *World Heritage Convention*).

Each monument, group of buildings or site is assessed in terms of the concept of 'outstanding universal value', which is described as meaning '... cultural and/or natural significance which is so exceptional as to transcend national boundaries and to be of common importance for present and future generations of all humanity' (II.A 49, *Operational Guidelines*, 2008). This concept, as Jokilehto (2006: 3) asserts, is based on the types of value already encountered in this chapter and embedded within the AHD, such as historical, aesthetic and scientific – applied to buildings and monuments – and historical, aesthetic, ethnological and anthropological value, as applied to sites. As Smith (2006: 96) points out, there is something strikingly odd about this demarcation between monuments and buildings on the one hand, and sites on the other, with only the latter presumed to have been created by 'man' and thus it is only this category that warrants the inclusion of anthropological and ethnological values. Ultimately, however, the evaluation process is conducted against a set of criteria designed to test for 'outstanding universal value' (Vinsrygg 2009). These criteria, originally comprised of a set of six for cultural heritage and a set of four for natural heritage, were recently merged into the following set of ten criteria (i–vi relate to 'cultural' inscriptions and vii–x relate to 'natural' inscriptions) at the 6th Extraordinary Session of the World Heritage Committee. The criteria are used to judge whether a nominated 'property' (which itself denotes physicality) is able to:

- (i) represent a masterpiece of human creative genius;
- (ii) exhibit an important interchange of human values, over a span of time or within a cultural area of the world, on developments in architecture or technology, monumental arts, town-planning or landscape design;
- (iii) bear a unique or at least exceptional testimony to a cultural tradition or to a civilization which is living or which has disappeared;
- (iv) be an outstanding example of a type of building, architectural or technological ensemble or landscape which illustrates (a) significant stage(s) in human history;
- (v) be an outstanding example of a traditional human settlement, land-use, or sea-use which is representative of a culture (or cultures), or human interaction with the environment especially

- when it has become vulnerable under the impact of irreversible change;
- (vi) be directly or tangibly associated with events or living traditions, with ideas, or with beliefs, with artistic and literary works of outstanding universal significance (*the Committee considers that this criterion should preferably be used in conjunction with other criteria*);
 - (vii) contain superlative natural phenomena or areas of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic importance;
 - (viii) be outstanding examples representing major stages of earth's history, including the record of life, significant ongoing geological processes in the development of landforms, or significant geomorphic or physiographic features;
 - (ix) be outstanding examples representing significant ongoing ecological and biological processes in the evolution and development of terrestrial, fresh water, coastal and marine ecosystems and communities of plants and animals;
 - (x) contain the most important and significant natural habitats for in-situ conservation of biological diversity, including those containing threatened species of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science or conservation (II.D 77, *Operational Guidelines*, 2008, emphasis added).

Although the above are framed in what appears to be a direct and straightforward form of delivery, a sense of vagueness also permeates the criteria, which works to ensure that the casual reader is never really sure who or how one determines if something is a 'masterpiece' or an 'exceptional testimony'. The assumption, it seems, is that such questions can be answered by appeals to 'commonsensical' understandings of heritage. It is therefore worth considering what rhetorical purpose this 'vagueness' actually serves, as while it may be largely unintentional it is very revealing of an important set of key phrases that have assumed a sense of shared familiarity and thus continue to go unexplored. These criteria propose a fairly limited array of terms and concepts, yet it is these that define the legitimate framework against which all expressions of heritage vying for international recognition are determined – both in terms of what *will* count as heritage and what *will not*. Tests of authenticity and conditions of integrity, both of which can be found in the *Venice Charter*, are also applied to any example of heritage proposed for inscription and much of the discussion about authenticity borrows from the *Nara Document*. Authenticity is assumed to combine four attribute areas: design, setting, material and workmanship, all of

which, as Stovel (2007: 22) points out, require that the test of authenticity is tied to something tangible. The second qualifying concept, integrity, makes an interesting qualification about the ability (or not) of heritage to be intangible:

Integrity is a measure of the *wholeness* and *intactness* of the natural and/or cultural heritage and its attributes ... (II.E 88, the *Operational Guidelines*, 2008).

For properties nominated under criteria (i) to (vi), the physical fabric of the property and/or its significant features should be in good condition (II.E 89, the *Operational Guidelines*, 2008).

Three elements are striking about these qualifications, all of which are interlinked: the terms 'wholeness' and 'intactness' inevitably refer to 'physical fabric'. The decision-making process, in adhering to the criteria listed above, as well as accommodating appeals to authenticity and integrity, is accomplished with reference to objectivity and science, fixtures that became familiar with the writing of the *Venice Charter*:

Committee decisions are based on objective and scientific considerations, and any appraisal made on its behalf must be thoroughly and responsibly carried out (I.E 23, the *Operational Guidelines*, 2008).

Collectively, then, it is possible to argue that the same discrete set of philosophical, practical and discursive frameworks that were seen to be influential in early parts of this chapter have again been drawn upon to establish the ideas of heritage and its management at the core of the World Heritage scheme.

To date, the convention has produced a steadily increasing number of sites/places/areas that slot into the criteria and guidelines established to determine a 'newly institutionalized global heritage profile' (Graham et al. 2000: 242). The notion of heritage held at the heart of the World Heritage Convention is represented by the World Heritage List, which pulls together all properties that have been nominated for, and have achieved, World Heritage Status. As of April 2009, 890 properties had been inscribed on the list; of these, 689 are cultural, 176 are natural and 25 are mixed (see Table 2.1).⁵

Collectively, these properties are scattered across 148 of the 189 State Parties that have ratified the Convention, although just shy of a quarter of them are found within the borders of a mere seven countries – almost

Table 2.1 World Heritage Site Distribution

Region	Cultural	Natural	Mixed	Total	%
Africa	42	33	3	78	9
Arab States	60	4	1	65	7
Asia and the Pacific ⁶	129	48	9	186	21
Europe and North America	375	56	9	440	49
Latin American and the Caribbean	83	35	3	121	14
Total	689	176	25	890	100

Source: UNESCO

three quarters of which are located in Western Europe.⁷ Yet, to describe the List here as *Eurocentric* or as heavily balanced in favour of European countries would come as no surprise – this is an observation long since established in the heritage literature (see Byrne 1991; Arizpe 2000; Cleere 2001; Sullivan 1993, 2004; Karlström 2005; Smith 2006, 2009; Holtorf 2009). Indeed, as Smith (2009: 188) has argued, this asymmetry towards Western European countries owes much to the central role key European countries played in constructing the definitions found in the Convention. This, Smith goes on to argue, is very much a consequence of the acceptance of Western Europe as ‘central players or “actors” in human culture and history’. Such a position has allowed other observers, such as Herb Stovel (1998: 3; see also Rao 2010), to assert that the Convention has for quite some time been conceived of as a powerful instrument, one that provides significant and transferable lessons from the highest level of conservation standards to ensure adequate care. It is no coincidence, then, that those countries considered to be world leaders in the field of conservation are strongly represented by the distribution of sites. It is also indicative of the power of the AHD to discursively fix structures of authority and control onto particular nations and forms of knowledge – in this instance Western European nations with a strong history of engaging with archaeology, architectural and art history as forms of knowledge capable of deciphering meaning from heritage. This is a problem acknowledged within the World Heritage Centre as well, and a caveat has been incorporated into the *Operational Guidelines* that attempts to amend this asymmetry by asking State Parties to ‘consider whether their heritage is already well represented on the List and if so to slow down their rate of submission of further nominations’ (II.B 59, the *Operational Guidelines*, 2008). This, however, has not enabled a complete circumvention of the problem, as the aspiration for global recog-

nition is inevitably also tangled up in issues of status and has a strong political character:

INTERVIEWEE [24]: It is starting to change but it will never fundamentally change, because you have a problem in the definition [...] The other part is that those countries that signed early won't give up on World Heritage and that is a political issue; it is not a heritage issue. It is a political issue that Italy, France, Germany and the UK don't want to give up their one seat or one nomination per year you see, so that is an issue ... Look ... the UK is just out of the Committee, they have left the Committee. But the UK has not stopped nominating, on the contrary ... They have not stopped nominating during their time on the Committee, but there are other countries who take it more seriously and stop nominating. So, the focus on Western Europe is not in principle to do with the Committee itself – it has to do with those State Parties which have beyond 30 [world heritage] sites, and that is Spain, Italy, the UK, Germany and France, and they don't stop nominating ... they don't stop nominating ... because it is a prestige issue (10 January 2006, the World Heritage Centre).

As Smith and Waterton (2009a: 293) have argued, this allows us to see heritage as something intimately tied up with expressions of identity, not only in terms of reinforcing an identity *within* a group, but externally, as a projection of status, position and power. Interesting too, then, is the idea that the AHD not only feeds *into* heritage discussions at the global level, but is as tangled up in its subsequent dissemination via the vehicle of 'best practice'. This has to do with the AHD being understood as a legacy discourse, such that its ultimate manifestation at the international level also allows it to consequently feed *back towards* national policy, thereby reinforcing existing structures of power and control:

INTERVIEWEE [24]: In general, we have in UNESCO also countries that don't have national legislation. Recently, Romania and Namibia, you name it, they didn't have cultural national legislation and UNESCO assisted in preparing the cultural heritage legislation (10 January 2006, World Heritage Centre).

A cursory glance at recent Romanian cultural legislation (Law No. 422, 2001) reveals the following definition, with all three components of

sites, monuments and buildings exact replicas of those found in the Convention itself:

1. constructions or parts of construction – monuments, together with the installations, the artistic components, interior or exterior movable furnishings belonging to these, as well as works of commemorative art, funerary, public forum ones, together with the corresponding land delimited topographically, that represent cultural historical testimonies, of architectural, archaeological, historical, artistic, ethnographic, religious, social, scientific or technical interest;
2. groups – assemblies of urban or rural constructions, coherent from a cultural, historical, architectural, town planning or museum points of view, that together with the corresponding land make up a topographically delimited unit standing for a cultural historical testimony of architectural, town planning, archaeological, historical, artistic, ethnographic, religious, social, scientific or technical interest;
3. site – land topographically delimited including the natural human creations that stand for cultural historical testimonies of architectural, town planning, archaeological, historical, artistic, ethnographic, religious, social, scientific, technical or cultural landscape interest (Article 3, *Law No. 422*).

The difference, here, is that a broader collection of interests are catered to, with ethnographic, religious and social points of view adding to the usual suspects of archaeological, historical, artistic, scientific and technical. The assistance of UNESCO in the formulation of this legislation can thus be seen as an added tool in the colonizing tendencies of the AHD. Likewise, the Namibian *National Heritage Act* of 2004 contains definitions reminiscent of those found in the United Kingdom, which seem here to have been disseminated at the international level. The *National Heritage Act*, for example, provides for the establishment of the Namibian Heritage Register in order to manage both heritage places and heritage objects, which are further defined as protected places, listed buildings and protected objects, with heritage defined as ‘places and objects of heritage significance’ (Part 1, definitions). These sorts of scenarios in which core components of the AHD can be traced as they move from one context to the next go somewhat towards illustrating the discursive power it wields, particularly in its ability to reform a distinct and exclusive way of conceptualizing heritage into a

'common sense' approach that constitutes best practice. Through mechanisms such as the World Heritage Convention, other nations – and the discourses of heritage that may operate in such disparate contexts – are inducted into a 'shared' political universe.

But what does this tell us about dominant modes of representing heritage within global spaces, and how does the idea of discourse introduced in the previous chapter help make sense of the situation documented throughout this one? Essentially, it is the dynamics of discourse that have brought about a hegemonic situation that operates at a global level, and here I have attempted to illustrate such dynamics by tracing the transferal of a distinct perception of heritage across a range of secondary policymaking institutions such as ICOMOS and UNESCO. This particular section examines the global picture emerging from the World Heritage Convention, in which we can see that it is not simply the traditional vanguards of 'heritage' that have adopted a perception of heritage in line with Smith's AHD. Indeed, a specific conceptual language of heritage has been enmeshed into a process that some 186 countries have signed up to, which is no mean feat. Here, UNESCO, and the World Heritage Committee housed within it, has come to operate as a 'macro actor', to borrow from Hajer (1995: 271), which has acquired the almost sole responsibility of '... passing judgment on the true state of affairs'. These articulations are seen to travel in two directions – both *into* the global sphere via the work of the Eurocentric AHD and *out of* the international sphere via tropes of best practice. The concept of hegemony helps make this point, along with Chouliaraki and Fairclough's (1999) concept of 'nodal points', which achieve a sense of dominance and permanency within contexts of struggle. The review of the World Heritage Convention offers one such instance within which the AHD has come to operate as a nodal point, with many other ways of thinking about heritage closed down and/or rearticulated along the lines prescribed by the AHD.

A broadening international perspective?

Despite the rather bleak picture of an international level dominated by a restrictive and proscriptive way of seeing heritage, UNESCO does have a history of debating heritage, much of which has added, in some way, to the more dominant notions of 'tangible' and 'natural' heritage. One such example is the adoption of UNESCO's *Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folklore* in the late 1980s. More recent attempts to broaden the scope of heritage at the international level have occurred through the *Convention for the Safeguarding of*

Intangible Cultural Heritage (UNESCO 2003), as well as via instruments such as the *Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity* (UNESCO 2001a), the Council of Europe's (2005) *Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage in Society* (Faro) and the *Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions* (UNESCO 2005c). The second in this list, known informally as the Intangible Cultural Heritage Convention (IHC), entered into force on Friday 20th January 2006 after receiving 30 ratifications, with the thirtieth coming from Romania. This convention, in many ways, was a response to growing calls to accommodate cultural identity and diversity in international policies, and represents a concrete example of an attempt to recognize cultural manifestations largely absent from the 1972 Convention. Heralded as '...a major step forward in the international efforts to protect the world's cultural heritage', this convention now sits alongside, and is designed to complement, UNESCO's 1972 convention, and brings with it an intention to develop two formal lists: 'the List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding' and the 'the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity' (Matsuura 2004: 1; Interviewee [24], 10 January 2006, World Heritage Centre).

As both Ahmad (2006: 298) and Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (2004: 52) have pointed out, the addition of the 2003 Convention represents an attempt to formalize a third sense of heritage at the international level, positioning 'the intangible' alongside the more dominantly established conceptualizations of heritage as 'tangible' and 'natural'. Importantly, however, as Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (2004: 57) goes on to argue, '... making a special place for those left out of the other two World Heritage programmes, UNESCO has created an intangible heritage programme that is also exclusive in its own way'. Thus, while the issue of intangibility has certainly received significant recognition, it is not without its problems. Indeed, as Smith and Akagawa (2009; see also Smith 2006) observe, significant tensions are apparent in the hesitancy of a handful of Western nations to ratify the Convention, due in part to an uncertainty regarding (a) the implications it may have for internal relations with Indigenous populations; and/or (b) the Convention's universal relevance. Some of the nations expressing such concerns went on to abstain from casting a vote on the Convention, such as Australia, the United States of America, New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom and Switzerland, with the latter being the only one – to date – to have since ratified. The same reticence has not been applied to the two documents pertaining more generally to cultural

diversity, with UNESCO's (2001a) *Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity* ratified by 185 State Parties and (2005c) *Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions* ratified by 108 countries (although this does not include the United States of America). As Blake (2000: 76; see also Munjeri 2004) points out, it is in this area that most advances have been made in terms of broadening the concept of heritage, beginning with the recognition that material culture is 'symbolic of cultural identity on a deeper level' than previously acknowledged in a policy sense.

What, then, is intangible heritage, and why has it been met with varied levels of enthusiasm within the global sphere? William Logan (2007: 33) defines intangible heritage as that '... embodied in people rather than in inanimate objects', and is a statement that fits quite comfortably with the understandings of heritage used to frame this volume. The Convention, however, adopts an understanding of intangible heritage that is somewhat more restrictive, proposing that it is:

... the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage. This intangible cultural heritage, transmitted from generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their environment, their interaction with nature and their history, and provides them with a sense of identity and continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity. For the purposes of this Convention, consideration will be given solely to such intangible cultural heritage as is compatible with existing international human rights instruments, as well as with the requirements of mutual respect among communities, groups and individuals, and of sustainable development (Article 2, *Intangible Cultural Heritage Convention*).

Unlike the 1972 Convention, these practices, representations, expressions and so forth, are *not* required to satisfy and represent the concept of 'outstanding universal value', nor are tests of authenticity and integrity paramount to the process of inscription (see Table 2.2).

Instead, the Convention introduces concepts of cultural 'community', 'groups', 'individuals' and 'active' participation (Blake

Table 2.2 A Comparison of International Policy

	The Venice Charter	The World Heritage Convention	The Intangible Cultural Heritage Convention
Purpose	The laying down of principles for the preservation and restoration of ancient buildings on an international basis.	Safeguarding the unique and irreplaceable cultural and natural heritage as a common heritage.	Preparing an international instrument aimed at safeguarding intangible cultural heritage.
Key concepts	Monumentality; authenticity; permanence; living witnesses; conservation; restoration; aesthetic value; historic value.	Outstanding universal value; authenticity; integrity; cultural heritage; natural heritage; safeguarding; monuments; sites; buildings.	Intangible cultural heritage; safeguarding; diversity; participation.
Key subject positions	Expertise; traditional technicians; future generations.	State Parties; World Heritage Committee; expertise (from the point of view of art, history and science); future generations.	State Parties; the General Assembly; groups; communities; individuals.
Inter-textual links	The Athens Charter (1931)	The Hague Convention (1954); The Venice Charter (1964); the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (1970); the Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage (2001); the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003); and the Man and the Biosphere Programme (1977).	The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); the Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folklore (1989); the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001); and the Istanbul Declaration (2002).

2009: 49f). Another striking difference within the rhetorical structuring of this document and others reviewed in this chapter is that the Convention pulls away from a focus on the 'problem' of heritage and explicitly plugs into a much wider and more positive debate concerning cultural diversity and notions of cultural identity. Notwithstanding this rhetorical structuring and the advent of a new suite of concepts, Smith (2006) still detects an implicit hesitancy within the document – a hesitancy that makes a more decisive move away from the AHD, particularly the power and authority this discourse affords select Western European nations as forerunners in debates concerned with conservation and best practice, problematic. Blake (2009), too, lists some of the problems inherent in the 2003 Convention, pointing to the difficulties it creates for the identification of specific spokespersons for particular aspects of heritage, selection processes and determining ownership, as well as noting concerns about the transmutability of intangible heritage. These are concerns borne from the AHD itself and the framing of heritage it sustains. It is thus with a sense of irony that Smith identifies the role played by many Western European players in identifying, and ultimately *legitimizing*, the initial international steps towards recognizing a different sense of heritage before then falling short of ratifying the Convention itself.

Although recognition is due to international attempts to broaden the scope of heritage, it is not yet clear what level of impact it will have in the longer term, especially if the demarcations between those countries involved and those who absent themselves continues to grow. This volume, for example, is forced to deal very little with issues of intangible heritage as associated with the UNESCO Convention – this is a consequence of the United Kingdom's failure to ratify the Convention and see the relevance it may have in the British context:

INTERVIEWEE [2]: It is what X [Ancient Monuments Inspector] and I are battling against all the time, saying 'No, we are not archaeologists, we are cultural heritage managers, and we deal with as much above ground as we do below ground, and most of the time we are actually dealing with intangible heritage ...

INTERVIEWER: So who in English Heritage is dealing with the intangible heritage you just mentioned?

INTERVIEWEE [2]: No one, nobody deals with intangibles (25 November 2004, English Heritage).

This is not simply a case of intangible heritage being neglected, however, as the following extract from an interview with another employee of English Heritage attests:

INTERVIEWEE [15]: The UK has not said that it will ratify that convention [The 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage] and I think it will be quite a long time before it does.

INTERVIEWER: What are the reasons for that?

INTERVIEWEE [15]: It is just difficult to see how you could apply a convention of that sort in the UK context ... it is not relevant ... it just does not fit with the UK approach ... I think it would be very difficult to bring in a convention that says we are actually going to list this sort of stuff and protect it. What are the obvious examples you come up with? Morris Dancing? As intangible heritage and so on? The UK has no intangible heritage (4th July 2005, English Heritage).

In an explicit reaction to the possibility of importing intangible heritage into the UK, interviewee [15] expresses ridicule and derision, employing a reactive discourse that reinforces the dominance of materiality and dismisses the validity of engaging with heritage in ways that deviate from dominant understandings. The author of this extract also works to relegate this 'different' sense of heritage to ethnic minority groups and other groups who do not share in a monumental view of the past. This subtle deployment of ridicule was also observed by key players involved in the formulation of the 2003 Convention:

... it was the making of much-ado-about nothing for them ... all this intangible cultural heritage. It was like 'who is this, what is this about, for what, for who? Do you want us to go out and collect, like stories from Gypsies or something? Who? Where? ... At that time is was just, it was like ... what is this? It was unfathomable to be talking about something like this, there was, kind of, no sense of relevance. Here you have what was looked at in many countries as giving pride to the unrepresented as a matter of course, which for many people are the major cultures in those countries. Whereas I think for the

folks in the UK, this was marginal, not very important stuff, for people who don't, aren't and can't encapsulate the identity of *our* cultural heritage (17 April 2006, Smithsonian Institute, cited in Smith and Waterton 2009a).

In the above extract, the issue within the UK context is manifested as a conceptual one, in which the idea of intangibility is treated as almost alien. This is a discourse-related problem, in which a strong adherence to the AHD is here used to undermine the possibility of a sense of heritage that deviates from materiality. In short, heritage, from the perspective summarized in these extracts, is imagined as *unchangeable*. It is tangible or monumental, and to suggest otherwise is unfathomable:

INTERVIEWEE [24]: We have intangible heritage and indigenous heritage exists all over the world. It is the way they [England] see their own heritage which is the problem, because they don't consider rituals and traditions, for example, with the mining industry in the UK as being both tangible and intangible heritage – then it is a problem in their own view (10 January, UNESCO World Heritage Centre).

INTERVIEWEE [28]: Intangibles are relevant to every country – the intangibles ARE heritage ... that is what heritage is. We have trouble communicating this idea to Western countries who want to see things in a different way. We have trouble with England, who resist very strongly this way of thinking. They are stuck in their own mindset (13 January, UNESCO Intangible Heritage Section).

A more in-depth detour into the intricacies of the Convention is thus not necessary, as any of the subtle discursive shifts that may have been achieved will not have translated easily into the UK context. The problem, as Smith and Waterton (2009a: 299–300) have argued elsewhere, is a symptom of the degree to which the AHD has been naturalized and embedded within the heritage framework in the UK, where so staunchly is it adhered to that it 'cannot, and will not, allow new conceptual or theoretical insights to permeate its core'.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to illustrate the arrival of the now well-established concept of heritage on a global stage, making explicit

reference to its dissemination via charters, declarations and conventions. Through an analysis of several key pieces of international policy, the chapter has documented the privileging of a Western European perspective of heritage, which has since been cast as 'best practice' and henceforth translated into a range of non-Western contexts. Enshrined within its core are a series of assumptions regarding expertise, authenticity, integrity and value, all of which are cemented within a technical process of management that aims to safeguard and render 'permanent' a very specific set of cultural symbols. The suite of policy documents at the heart of this discussion were seen to play a significant role in sustaining this image of heritage – not only at the international level, but at the national level as well, with the two at constant and recursive play with each other. Such is the power of this colonizing process – based as it is on the tenacity of the AHD – that while some of the language of heritage and its management has changed over the 50 years covered by this chapter, very little has altered in terms of the core assumptions animating the heritage sphere, particularly in the UK. Instead, Western Europe is imagined to have *discovered* heritage, almost as if there were no other cultures or groups already conceiving of the past and its role in the present. As a consequence, the dissemination of 'best practice' (often imagined as descending *down* from Europe – see Smith 2006: 111), well-intentioned though it may be, is perhaps better understood as a form of conceptual imperialism, through which a limited understanding of heritage has been used to provide the terms by which the rest of the world must come to identify and manage heritage. Even in the more recent instantiations of international policy dealing with cultural identity and diversity, 'intangible heritage' was, from the outset, defined in relation to the ways in which it was emphatically *not* tangible or nature heritage. It was already, and perhaps always will be, conceived of as a counterpart or an alternative *to* monumentality. We have, it would seem, no notion of heritage outside of this dominant conceptualization.

There are three consequences of this that warrant exploration in the following chapters. First, ideas of inheritance and moral obligation have seen the emergence of a management process that has systematically erased the relevance and legitimacy of present generations. Second, they have prompted – and continue to sustain – an understanding of heritage as something that belongs to us all, collectively, as a 'common heritage', rendering access by interest groups outside of expertise impossible, lest their interaction compromises an apparently democratic corpus of heritage (Smith 2007). Amplified by the above

two points is a third implication, which works to further alienate non-experts from the decision-making process and, importantly, naturalizes the privileged position of 'experts' within that process. The next four chapters in the volume will tackle the way in which the AHD has been made concrete in a range of domestic settings, taking the United Kingdom as a primary focus. Although the points they make are thus inevitably limited to a British context in many instances, the insights and lessons gleaned from this global overview remind us that many of the broader issues touched upon may not be all that different no matter which nation we take as our starting point.

3

The Discursive Blueprint: A History of Heritage Policy

In order to understand the heritage sector's current configuration of politics, policy and power it is necessary to go back at least three decades to the 1970s, as it is in these decades that commentators on heritage identify a significant increase in public debate, policy activity and touristic interest in heritage (Wright 1985; Hewison 1987; Walsh 1992; Prentice 1993; Samuel 1994; Lowenthal 1998a; Graham et al. 2000). Since then, the idea of heritage has endured a constant prodding and testing, shaped in part by changes in government from Conservative to New Labour, and the steadily increasing requirement for culture to provide value for money. This chapter is used to illustrate characteristics of the historical formulations of heritage that directly link with the concept we find in contemporary political life. My reasons for doing so should, I hope, already be clear; most of the issues I deal with have a significant historical dimension, and its analysis will contribute enormously to the development of a more complete picture of heritage policy today. There is, however, another reason for pursuing a detour into the 1970s and 80s. Notwithstanding its relatively long history, heritage policy seems to have lost its way. A particular image has held it captive for far too long, one that is based on selective understandings of a good, grand and monumental past 'owned' and monopolized by the white upper- and middle-classes. Other ideas of heritage – what it means, how we engage with it and the uses it should be put to – certainly exist, but they are yet to have an impact in a political sense, thus leaving virtually no physical trace of their existence in the architecture of public policy. A central challenge for this volume is to ask why and how? Why is the heritage sector so captivated by this particular conceptualization of heritage, and how, despite increased calls for inclusion, diversity, multiculturalism and equality, has it come

to be repeatedly expressed, defended, legitimized and shared within the policy process?

To answer this, it seems necessary to move beyond general discussions about the history of heritage and look more closely at the idea of 'discourse'. This means looking not only at the use of language (both spoken and written), but how particular discursive events (parliamentary debates and the formulation of policy) in the 1970s and 80s continue to affect the practices of heritage management. While the debates I focus on in this chapter were undoubtedly shaped by the cultural contexts and particular social actors of the time, they have had a surprising impact upon present-day practices and meanings. In so doing, they continue to influence the production and reproduction of power relations by sustaining and subtly transforming a specific representation of heritage (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 5–6). I am thus rather less interested in providing a complete engagement with the historical dimensions of heritage policy; instead, I concretely examine some of the central properties of discourse, which are themselves expressions of an overarching political cognition regarding heritage.

The chapter presents in-depth examinations of the syntactical, grammatical and lexical constructions of 'heritage', which are internalized in two key historical texts and their associated parliamentary debates in an attempt to empirically account for what I label the 'Blueprint for Policy': a blueprint that formalized a language that will become increasingly familiar as the book progresses. Structurally, the chapter begins with a brief contextualization of the heritage sector, including a short résumé for both English Heritage and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport. The chapter then charts the arrival of this blueprint through parliamentary debates and legislation developing in the 1970s, which tended to focus upon questioning *whether or not* heritage should be conserved (Pendlebury 2009: 82). To do so I will look closely at the *Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act* of 1979. From there, the chapter examines its subtle transformation and legitimization in the 1980s, when debates started to revolve around *how* heritage should be conserved through the *National Heritage Act* of 1983 (Pendlebury 2009: 82; see also Pendlebury 2000). This detail will largely be relayed at the intermediate level through the analysis of policy debate and outputs. At either side of this lies what van Dijk (2009: 156) calls the base level (or individual actors) and the top level (or political systems, orders of discourse and historical frameworks). What I focus upon is the argumentative interplay between these levels, where negotiations between the state and a range of heritage experts

and institutions allowed for the crystallization of the AHD in public policy.

(Re)creating heritage through policy

There is an unmistakable irony to the argument constructed in this book: policies ostensibly about social inclusion are effectively reducing ideals of participation, involvement and plurality to mere rhetoric, or empty words. The upshot is that they are fostering their polar opposite – exclusion. In an attempt to hone in on the properties of heritage discourse that have allowed this slippage to occur, we first need a clearer picture of the key players and organizations involved at the precise junction where policy intentions translate through texts into modified policy realities.

Two heritage institutions need introduction: English Heritage and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). Together, they mediate the social order of heritage and its associated order of discourse. In many obvious ways, they play key roles in controlling the authorized selection of possibilities for the management process. DCMS does this through its responsibility for policy relating to heritage and the historic environment. English Heritage, as the non-departmental public body (NDPB) sponsored by the Department, does so via its responsibilities for managing heritage in England (Cowell 2004: 33). Both institutions also form part of what is commonly referred to as the heritage sector, which is comprised of an expanse of organizations and interest groups, including: the Heritage Lottery Fund (HLF); Historic Royal Palaces; the Royal Parks Agency; the Museums, Libraries and Archives Council (MLA); Visit Britain; the National Trust; the Churches Conservation Trust; Occupied Royal Palaces; the Historic Houses Association and the Church of England (DCMS 2006e) (Figure 3.1).

These groups exist in a dialectical relationship with both DCMS and English Heritage, with many of them monitored by Public Service Agreements (PSA), or something Gordon Brown refers to as ‘money for modernization’ (cited in Fairclough 2000: 121). Thus, while the heritage sector undoubtedly influences the machinations of policy, it always does so in a circular fashion, with resultant policy and texts shaping the viewpoints of the heritage sector in return.

The Department for Culture, Media and Sport

The Department for Culture, Media and Sport (Figure 3.2) was established in July 1997 and is the government department responsible for




Figure 3.1 The Heritage Sector

formulating policy relating to heritage and the historic environment. The department, however, does not hold this responsibility alone, as strategic priorities for heritage come also from the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and Communities and Local Government (CLG, formerly the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister¹). Prior to 1997, heritage, along with other areas including the




Figure 3.2 The Organizational Structure of DCMS (adopted from the DCMS website in 2009)

arts, museums, galleries, libraries, film and export, tourism, broadcasting, press and sport, were united under the rubric of the Department of National Heritage (DNH), formed in April 1992 by John Major's Conservative government (Torkildsen 1999: 208). The change in government to New Labour in 1997 saw the renaming of the DNH in an attempt to move away from the heavily criticized notion of 'heritage' (Pendlebury 2009). Prior to the establishment of the DNH, responsibilities for heritage were spread across a variety of government departments, including the Department of the Environment (Ross 1991: 53).

The overall aim of DCMS is to '... improve the quality of life for all through cultural and sporting activities, support the pursuit of excellence, and champion tourism, creative and leisure industries' (DCMS 2009a). In terms of the heritage sector, this aim is achieved primarily through the institution's authority over the identification and conservation of heritage and the historic environment for present and future generations, to which it endeavours to ensure access and enjoyment (DCMS 2009a). In its own words, the department works to '... support and promote the widest access to excellence in culture – in the arts, in museums and galleries, in architecture and in the built and the historic environment and libraries' (DCMS 2009a). As the DCMS website goes on to make clear, this principally refers to historic buildings, ancient monuments, world heritage sites and conservation areas, all of which are promoted and conserved via a combination of English Heritage's activities, Heritage Open days, the Heritage Protection Reform and funding provided by the Heritage Lottery Fund and the National Heritage Memorial Fund (DCMS 2009a). DCMS's responsibilities also incorporate the specific task of scheduling (or registering) Scheduled Ancient Monuments and ensuring their protection, along with the listing of historic buildings. Through this process, some 19,717 archaeological sites and monuments have been granted the status of 'nationally important', and are thus subject to legal protection (DCMS 2009a; English Heritage 2009). Likewise, an estimated 372,038 historic buildings have been listed, which demonstrates that they are believed to hold special architectural or historic interest (DCMS 2007b). Historic parks, gardens and battlefields are categorized in a similar manner, but are not afforded the same level of protection, or the same level of control via DCMS. There were, in 2009, 1,600 registered historic parks and gardens, 43 registered battlefields, 28 World Heritage Sites (17 in England, four in Scotland, one in Northern Ireland, three in Wales and three in overseas territories) and some 9,374 conservation areas (DCMS 2007b; English Heritage 2009), all of which are designated by English

Heritage, with the exception of World Heritage sites, which are inscribed by UNESCO.

English Heritage

English Heritage (officially titled the Historic Buildings and Monuments Commission for England) (Figure 3.3) was established under the remit of the National Heritage Act of 1983 (returned to later in this chapter), which outlines its powers and responsibilities, and is one of a number of NDPBs sponsored by the DCMS involved with managing heritage. The formation of English Heritage saw the dissolution of a number of previously influential groups in England, whose functions were incorporated into the new NDPB. These groups included the Ancient Monuments Board, the Historic Buildings Council for England and the Royal Commission on Historical Monuments of England (RCHME), with the latter merging into English Heritage in 1999 (Cowell 2008). Primarily, English Heritage acts as the government's lead statutory adviser on issues to do with heritage. Three areas are covered by the organization's key objectives, as set down by the *Review of the Structure of Government Support for the Historic Environment in England* (DCMS 2004b: 12):

- Improving understanding of the past by research and study;
- Promoting the historic environment by opening up our properties and increasing access through education; and
- Protection of our historic places and ensuring change is managed sensitively.

The organization is structured around five areas: Properties and Education; Planning and Development; Conservation and Protection; National Advice and Information; and Resources. It is headed by a Chief Executive, currently Simon Thurley, and is overseen by a panel of 16 commissioners, who together are advised by a committee consisting of a further 13 people. English Heritage, in its role as one of the central national bodies championing heritage, advises the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport on scheduling and listing applications and issues, provides advice on archaeological projects, works to protect places of worship and conservation areas, and maintains the Register of Parks and Gardens. In addition, English Heritage houses an archive called the National Monument Record. It is perhaps best known for the role it plays in maintaining the 400-plus historic properties in their care, which are opened to the public. Not only, then, does English Heritage play a lead role in

both initiating policy reform and responding to DCMS's own initiatives, it also taps into the tourist industry as owner and guardian of these historic sites. For example, in 2007/08, English Heritage had 665,000 members, with 5.3 million people visiting staffed English Heritage properties (English Heritage 2008a). The opportunity for English Heritage to therefore reach beyond the heritage sector and intersect with




Figure 3.3 The Organizational Structure of English Heritage (adopted from the English Heritage website in 2009)

a wider range of public needs to be understood within the context of authority, as the organization that – through promotion and marketing functions – affects the longevity of its associated order of discourse (van Dijk 2001: 309).

A larger number of people are exposed to the promotional medium of custodianship brochures and English Heritage membership handbooks, along with paraphernalia produced by tourism bodies such as *VisitBritain* and *EnjoyEngland*. This, along with the general understanding that it is English Heritage that operates as the public face of heritage, should not be understated. Indeed, our understanding of heritage is inevitably conditioned by this series of authoritative acts, each stamped with the identity of a dominant heritage organization, which maximizes the effectiveness of their assumptions and evaluations (van Dijk 2001: 310). This reinforces a position established earlier in the book about the centrality of identity when we talk about discourse. The identity of English Heritage and DCMS as authority figures in communicative events surrounding decisions about heritage shapes, in other words, our own understandings of heritage. From here, English Heritage and DCMS are able to shift meaning not just from one social practice into another, but from one scale to another, and quite quickly we find ourselves convinced of not only *who* is actually responsible for heritage but *how* we should understand it (after Richardson 2007: 12). For English Heritage, this will be aided by the Heritage Cycle, a concept set to underpin the future strategy for the organization (Interviewee 36, English Heritage, 5th August 2009) (Figure 3.4):




Figure 3.4 The Heritage Cycle (adapted from Interviewee [36])

Parliamentary debate

It is worth noting a third 'body' that holds sway in the processes of formulating heritage legislation and policy: parliament. For the period in focus throughout this book, parliament witnessed four key changes: the election of a Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher in 1979–1990, followed by John Major from 1990–1997; and the election of New Labour government, led by Tony Blair, in 1997 and followed by Gordon Brown in 2007. Aside from considering obvious party shifts, a significant part of this analysis will comprise an assessment of how politicians speak about heritage and how this contributes (or not) to dominant understandings. Thus, an introduction to some accepted theoretical thoughts about general parliamentary discourse is necessary.

Within the literature concerned with discourse studies, Teun van Dijk is particularly active in formulating ideas about the access and control held by politicians generally, and the discourse genre of parliamentary debate more specifically (see van Dijk 2009). He suggests that there are a number of characteristic textual properties and contextual triggers, all of which form part of a role that is much larger than simply speaking about heritage and the heritage sector. It is something germane to the wider political sphere, which is always cross-cut with people carrying out different roles: proposing a bill, opposing an agenda, supporting the government, defining an issue or attacking current policy. Parliamentary debate is also held in check by the elaborate balance held between formal and polite speech and enacting specific forms of 'impoliteness' (van Dijk 2004: 339). It is not so much an act of individual expression, but a performance monitored by the fact that each Member of Parliament, when speaking, acts as a representative of a particular political party and associated party-line (van Dijk 2004: 357). This context spills far and wide when we think about recipients and audiences, as parliamentary debates are 'for the record', official and published. This means the audience often includes journalists, voters and interested groups as well as the Opposition. Resultant speeches are thus inevitably carefully structured and prepared in advance, intertextually engaging (where possible) with discourses authored by authoritative sources (van Dijk 1997: 34; van Dijk 2009: 118). They are also, as van Dijk (1997) points out, typically geared towards self-glorification and grandiose, nationalistic posturing.

The blue print for policy

Early roots: Parliamentary debates and legislation in the 1970s

Although the turn to heritage and its management has antecedents beginning in the Renaissance and Enlightenment, the clearest emergence

of an intent to manage heritage can be traced to the mid-nineteenth century. In England, this timeframe saw the establishment of the British Archaeological Association (BAA) (1843), the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings (SPAB) (1877), and the campaign for the first *Ancient Monuments Protection Act* of 1882, originally introduced by John Lubbock in 1873. It is also a timeframe associated with more general European desires and aspirations, which Andreas Huyssen (2003: 41) regards as a 'nineteenth-century obsession with origins and their mythic grounding'. This desire for monumentality, he argues, can be read as '... fulfilling the culturally legitimizing needs of the post-revolutionary bourgeois nation-state in the grip of accelerating modernization'. During this time, the search for monuments embedded in classical antiquity was guided by concepts of race and cultural superiority, and an absolute belief in the scientific status of prehistoric archaeology's ability to make statements about a nation's worth and identity (Murray 1989: 66). Ideas of cultural (and racial) superiority, which shared conceptual space with European voyages of discovery and expansion, colonialism and imperialist enterprises, were also prevalent at the time, sowing seeds of doubt regarding the ability of *all* people to benefit from a 'good' and 'better' society. These sentiments are etched within Lubbock's 'tireless advocacy' aimed at instigating formal mechanics for protecting material from the past, which was based upon the belief that '... archaeological remains could be used to write the prehistory of Britain' (Murray 1989: 56). Notions of 'blood', 'homeland' and 'territory' were increasingly thrown together and developing social, political and cultural projects became inextricably linked with notions of national identity and nationalism as a consequence. As part of this process, the material remains of the past became imbued with utmost importance, and saw Britain, France and Germany vying for prominence (Emerick 2003). These material remains, it was assumed, represented narratives of progress, reinforcing European superiority and providing '... global registers of modernity' (Nash 1999: 22). Monuments, in particular, were irrefutably seen as 'a testimony of the culture and continuity of the entire nation' (Glendinning 2003: 362).

The eventual Bill inspired by John Lubbock, emerging in 1882 as the *Ancient Monuments Protection Act*, is important here in so far as it provided a template for the 1979 *Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act*. It is also important because it is this idea of the 'monument' that has since become strangely synonymous with heritage ever since, and not just in the British context. A separate campaign spearheaded the arrival of protection for historic buildings, which

came into force with the *Town and Country Planning Act* of 1947 (Cowell 2008: 99). While the legacy of both Bills and their chronology is important, the detail has been covered elsewhere, most notably by Murray (1989), Carman (1996) and Cowell (2008) and need not be repeated here. The first step in this analytical attempt to engage with inter-textuality instead requires us to fast-forward to the 1970s and the establishment of the *Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act* of 1979.

The *Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act* of 1979 is a key piece of legislation underpinning the management of heritage in England. It superseded the *Ancient Monuments Consolidation Act* (1913) and the *Ancient Monuments Protection Act* (1882), signalling a renewed interest in the 'problem' of heritage. This 'problem' had transformed from an avid, popular interest in the British past, as evidenced by the television programmes *Buried Treasure* (1954–1959), *Chronicle: Silbury* (1969) and *Living in the Past* (1978), into something that was receiving significant media and academic attention, culminating in a number of protest books, such as: *Rescue Archaeology* (Rahtz 1974), *The Rape of Britain* (Amery and Cruikshank 1975) and *Heritage in Danger* (Cormack 1976). Alongside these came the political signalling of an interest in heritage in the form of policy documents such as: *Conservation in Action: A Progress Report on What is Being Done in Britain's Conservation Areas* (Civic Trust 1972) and *Conservation and Preservation* (Department of the Environment 1973). The establishment of the lobbying groups *Rescue: The British Archaeological Trust* (1971) and *SAVE Britain's Architectural Heritage* (1975), the recognition of the *European Architectural Heritage Year* in 1975, and the Victoria and Albert Museum's exhibition, *Destruction of the Country House*, also in 1975, similarly attest to the heightening and obsessive concern for heritage at this time (Merriman 1996):

INTERVIEWEE [15]: I mean the 70s, looking back, was a time of widening the perception of what heritage was, which was driven partly by the rescue archaeology stuff and by all the headlines of there being an archaeological site every half mile or so down the M5 (English Heritage, 4th July 2005).

INTERVIEWEE [17]: Heritage in the 1970s was the sort of issue around which people kind of coalesced at the local level and became a kind of civil action ... (English Heritage, 18th July 2005).

INTERVIEWEE [18]: The 1970s is characterized by a reaction to the wholesale clearance of areas of towns that had been left over since the Second World War. The building of tower blocks and the wiping away of terraced housing, and what everybody thought was a brave new world kind of highlighted in part something that quickly became sort of desolate places (English Heritage, 3rd August 2005).

It was the stately homes, churches and great estates that found prominence on the heritage agenda, becoming, in Cormack's (1976: 28) words, 'a special public possession for it is in them [country houses] and in our churches that we perhaps come closest to the soul and spirit of England'.

However, while the emergence of the 1979 AMAA forms a key episode – or tipping point to borrow from While (2007: 647) – for British central government, it also formed part of a wider operation happening on a global scale (see Table 3.1 – see also Chapter 2). In what follows, I list some of those universalized characteristics. While the material drawn upon is British in germination, it nonetheless gives a flavour of the intentions and arguments utilized on an international (and unprecedented) level in an attempt to grapple with, and consolidate, a concern for heritage. Interestingly, it is also part of the machinery of management that has enabled the country to conceive of itself as a model envied by its international partners in terms of statutory protection (English Heritage 2003b: 1; see also Smith and Waterton 2009a).

Tangibility, inheritance and nationhood

Discussions regarding heritage began in parliament in 1979 and were framed in terms of a need to revamp legislation. Three characteristics weave their way explicitly through these initial discussions: tangibility, inheritance and nationhood, with archaeology and historic buildings earmarked as central to the debate. The opening of the debate by Baroness Stedman is useful for defining the situation and opening up an introduction to these three concepts:

My Lords, the first legislation in this country, which began the process of safeguarding the **physical** survivals of our past was enacted in 1882, and the principal Ancient Monuments Act dates from 1913. There have been amendments and additions in 1931, 1953 and 1972. The legislation is now fragmented and, if I may use the term in this context, is now in need of modernisation. This Bill

consolidates, modifies and extends the present provisions, taking account particularly of the increased pace and scale of modern development and the destructive capacity of modern agricultural methods, which together have **resulted in the loss of a large proportion of our archaeological inheritance**. It also takes account of the great increase in recent years of public interest in monuments, which, welcome as it is, also brings with it new problems of management (Baroness Stedman, House of Lords, Hansard, Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Bill [H.L.], 5th February 1979a: 454, emphasis added; see also Hansard 1979b).

The first characteristic obvious to these debates is the idea of *tangibility*. Heritage is imagined as a static and monolithic object from the past, understood as dead – ruinous or a survival of the past – valuable in terms of its ability to communicate a specific kind of knowledge to future generations. The following statement, made by the same speaker, more explicitly reinforces this perceived linkage between a tangible, distant past and ideas of ‘heritage’:

Perhaps I should explain that an ancient monument may be any man-made structure or work, whether buried or upstanding, of archaeological, historical or architectural importance. In practice, the structures with which this legislation is concerned are usually ruinous, or at any rate no longer of much use for current social or economic purposes ... Ancient monuments range from pre-historic settlements and burial mounds, through the survivals of Roman military occupation to Norman castles and medieval abbeys. It may not be so well known that ancient monuments in State care also include a number of unoccupied and mostly ruinous country houses of the 16th and 19th centuries, as well as several industrial monuments and fortifications of the 18th to 19th centuries. **This illustrates our policy of attempting to preserve a representative sample of our heritage** (Baroness Stedman, House of Lords, Hansard, Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Bill [H.L.], 5th February 1979a: 454, emphasis added).

The list strung together in this extract works to elaborate precisely what the idea of an ancient monument (and thereby ‘heritage’) entails, particularly with the addition of the final sentence, which creates a discursive correlation between this list of ancient monuments and a representative sample of our heritage; something that is realized

specifically through the grammatical structuring of the statements. This correlation is set up through a relation of equivalence, in which the meaning of our heritage derives from, and is equivalent to, the illustrative list outlined in the preceding sentences. Of importance here are the ways by which heritage assumes an authoritative equivalence with sites, monuments and buildings of a defined timeframe, which has since become a naturalized, and almost intractable, assumption. It would be disingenuous to make too much of the occurrence of references to 'monuments' alone in a debate specifically designed to engage with such a category, but what is important are the lengths to which these argumentations have since been drawn upon to equate this category to that of 'heritage'.

We believe that it strikes an acceptable balance between the need to preserve, or at least record, **our heritage** and the requirements of developers, landowners, farmers, mineral operators and others whose business **must inevitably involve a measure of archaeological damage** (Mr Kenneth Marks, House of Commons, Hansard, Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Bill [H.C.], 4th April, 1979c: 1360, emphasis added).

The protection of **our heritage** is a subject which is of great interest. It is widely supported. The number of people who visit **historic sites, historic houses and National Trust properties is a clear indication** of the widespread interest on the part of our own people and visitors to this country (Mr Arthur Jones, House of Commons, Hansard, Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Bill [H.C.], 4th April 1979c: 1370, emphasis added).

The speakers in these extracts move through the debate as if the two notions, 'monument' and 'heritage', are one and the same, and these statements become representative of a wider tendency to reduce heritage to a highly selective list so as to materialize a particular identity for Britain. The elaborations of heritage listed above tend to be grand, large, ancient and, above all, tangible reminders capable of commemorating significant events in British history, such as the Civil War, Industrialization or Roman occupation, and stand in as symbols of power and progress, or the Golden Ages of British history. They provide, to borrow from Anthony Smith (1991: 16), "sacred centres", objects of spiritual and historical pilgrimage, that reveal the uniqueness of their nation's "moral geography".

The basic strategy for reinforcing a belief in this particular idea of heritage combines paternalism, permanence and patrimony. It harks back to assumptions championed by John Ruskin and William Morris,

both of whom imparted a strong sense of duty: 'They are not ... our property, to do as we like with. We are only trustees for those who come after us' (Morris 1889). This effort to preserve the past for future generations is highlighted in the following passages:

The preservation of **our** heritage for **future generations** is a duty **that we are all agreed upon** (Lord Mowbray and Stourton, House of Lords, Hansard, Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Bill [H.L.], 5th February 1979a: 463, emphasis added).

The Bill makes better provision for preserving **our** past, or at least **our** knowledge of the past, **for the future** (Mr Kenneth Marks, The Under-Secretary of State for the Environment, House of Commons, Hansard, Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Bill [Lords] 4th April 1979c: 1364, emphasis added).

Here, the absolute and explicit rights of future generations are drawn upon as a commonsense principle; a point alluded to by the reoccurrence of ideas of guardianship and custodianship, introduced in the form of compulsory acquisition or compulsory purchase, throughout the debate. The physical remains of the past, notions of intrinsic merit, and aesthetic or documentary values are not only prioritized, but close down other potential considerations. One means of achieving this is evident through the use of value assumptions triggered by words such as safeguarding, which posits physical survival at the centre of heritage management issues, and is a duty, which semantically reinforces the priority of future generations. Heritage protection thus becomes a process that is ostensibly driven by a responsibility to 'act for' and 'steward' a national past made up of grand, tangible and aesthetically pleasing sites, monuments and buildings. Furthermore, the phrases is of great interest and widely supported make explicit value assumptions about the worth of protecting heritage and its *inheritability*. Both set up clear and self-sufficient notions of heritage protection, and work to undermine alternative views that might contest the sentiment of these statements: alternatives will be competing against a claim that already boasts both offensive and defensive resolve:

We must educate the public to take care to preserve these monuments and the countryside. We must educate our children and their parents to look after them and not to leave litter about. During the coming summer I hope that there will be an improvement in the care of ancient monuments, not only by the Government but by the people

themselves (Mr Marks, House of Lords, Hansard, Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Bill [H.L.], 4th April 1979c: 1375).

This recourse to inheritance is important for two reasons: first, a leap is made from the past to the future, thereby ignoring the value heritage carries in the present; and second, in smoothing away the active cultural work done in the present, and focusing instead on more passively constructed responsibilities for future generations, particularities are generalized. Heritage is assumed to bridge an unbroken relationship between past and future, with little negotiation allowed for an active engagement in the present. This idea of distancing the uses of heritage from present generations is repeated throughout the debates:

Perhaps I should explain that an ancient monument may be any man-made structure or other work, whether buried or upstanding, of archaeological, historical or architectural importance. In practice, the structures with which this legislation is concerned are usually ruinous, **or at any rate no longer of much use for current social or economic purposes** (Baroness Stedman, House of Lords, Hansard, Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Bill [H.L.], 5th February 1979a: 454, emphasis added).

Here, assessing the social relevance, value and purpose of heritage in no way offers a sense of legitimization or justification for the existence of a heritage management framework in legislation. Rather, the values or explanations underpinning this legislation are based upon the authority of academic understandings of archaeological, historical and architectural importance. It may also be an implicit reminder of the most popular objections to its predecessor, the *Ancient Monuments Protection Act (1882)*, which were fuelled by a fear that the bill might pose a very real attack on private property rights (Murray 1989: 62). Indeed, the arguments continued that if monuments lay on private property and ‘... were not protected by interest and reverence **then the monuments in question clearly were not important enough**’ (Murray 1989: 62, emphasis added). Importance, remarks Murray (1989: 62), refers to aesthetic or historical association. Further, only the ‘relic’ and the ‘dead’ would be preserved in perpetuity. The semantic relations organizing these sentences set up a classification, or oppositional relationship, between the positive logic of archaeology, history and architecture and the negative concepts of social and economic purpose. The present need not be acknowledged outside of the process of *inheritance*

because the persuasive thrust of debate has already established a focus solely on the rights of the future, and previous debates had already responded to the apparent indelibility of private property rights in the present. It is thus these 'future' rights that assume relevance in this argumentative construction, such that the point can be pushed that *present social and economic purpose* becomes a criterion in itself for determining what does or does not qualify as heritage. The phrase ... at any rate, as a marker of an additive and contrastive semantic relation, makes it clear that in no eventuality – indeed, no matter how you look at it – will heritage yield much in the way of current social or economic value, and thus, by corollary, anything that *does* have much in the way of social or economic value *will not* meet the criteria for heritage. Heritage thus becomes ruinous, something firmly located in the past that needs to be preserved, rather than something that is generated and engaged with continuously in the present.

The idea of consensus is particularly striking in setting up ideas of inheritance, and opens up the possibility of examining different repertoires of persuasion for a nationalistic slant; acts that allow a series of claims to achieve a platform of inevitability, or rhetorical self-sufficiency. In particular, I want to draw attention to the move made by Lord Mowbray and Stourton to invoke a very strong sense of consensus and thus bolster a particular vision's factuality, expressed through his contention that:

... the preservation of **our** heritage for future generations is a duty **that we are all agreed upon** (Lord Mowbray and Stourton, House of Lords, Hansard, Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Bill [H.L.], 5th February 1979a: 563, emphasis added).

In this utterance, he draws upon the authoritative legitimizing technique of appealing to conformity – in other words, what he proposes is legitimate because 'everybody says so' (van Leeuwen 1999: 105). There is no sense of uncertainty or unease surrounding his statement; rather, it is simply the case that the preservation of heritage for future generations – the idea of inheritance and patrimony – *is* a duty. Once he establishes the unquestionable nature of this duty, Lord Mowbray and Stourton is able to make equally categorical statements about what ought to be the subject of that duty:

Thus from our distant past we have the Iron Age fort at Figsbury, Wiltshire, the famous Broch of Mousa in Shetland; Wideford Hill

– that famous cairn – in Orkney, and the Roman theatre at Verulam, and hundreds of other ancient monuments (Lord Mowbray and Stourton, House of Lords, Hansard, Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Bill [H.L.], 5th February 1979a: 563, emphasis added).

Here, we return immediately to the tangible, material remains of the past – particularly those with archaeological significance. Of particular relevance, then, is the discursive work undertaken by the utterances our heritage, we are all agreed upon and thus. In this case, the elaboration of the second part of the claim made by Lord Mowbray and Stourton asserts a high level of commitment to the idea of heritage as confined to the distant past in the guise of tangible and monumental remains. This level of commitment is explicit in the first sentence, and is implicitly reinforced through the usage of the conjunctive adverb thus to join the semantic relations between the two sentences together. Our heritage thus becomes a list of tangible and ancient monuments.

The use of the possessive, plural pronoun ‘our’ (and also the definitive article ‘the’) is a key marker of *nationhood*, triggered by the use of a collective public categorized at the level of nation.

Protecting ‘our’ national heritage produces an image of unity and consensus. It also, as Augoustinos et al. (2002: 115) point out, albeit in an Australian context of debating difficult histories, becomes a linguistic practice used to ‘... reinforce the speaker’s position as spokesperson for “the nation”’. The idea of our heritage or our past thus becomes an interesting analytical point, especially when utilized as part of a logic of equivalence. While our may at first appear to be an indication of inclusivity, it is important to bear in mind that the *type* of heritage privileged in this exchange is not necessarily inclusive in and of itself. As such, it is important to be wary of any subtle opposition at play between ‘them’ and ‘us’, ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’, especially in any debates attempting to draw boundaries between different groupings. These initial musings would eventually scupper calls for social inclusion. Indeed, in a paper delivered at the Arts Council’s *Whose Heritage? Conference* in 1999, Stuart Hall (1999: 4) made the point that ‘those who cannot see themselves reflected in its [heritage] mirror cannot properly belong’. A very deep division is thus set up between our (white, upper- and middle-class visions) and their (alternative ways of envisioning ‘heritage’). Further, our is left under-explored and unchallenged, remaining elusive and vague, thereby becoming an appropriate pronoun to cater for equally elusive and seemingly homogenous white middle- and upper-classes. In short, it becomes a textually enacted

universal, itself an important repertoire in the construction of an appearance of consensus, but also in terms of allowing a distinct and exclusionary impression of 'heritage' to become natural and representative of an illusory our.

An important consequence of this idea of consensus has been the association of heritage with the cultural symbols of a particular social group: the white, upper-middle and upper-classes. This locates the analysis within the complicated terrain of class and ethnicity, not only in the sense of an implicit persuasion through the above use of our, but also in debates that more explicitly touch upon existential assumptions as well as value assumptions:

Lower income houses survive which, it is arguable, should be preserved as illustrating social conditions of their time, being, as such, a basic if lamentable contribution to our cultural history. But are they? Have they the validity required of a document? Re-condition them, bring them up to date and they may have a certain vicarious charm ... but do not let us fool ourselves into thinking that they are any longer illustrative of the national historic heritage or that they have any validity as historic documents (Faulkner 1978: 455–456).

The issue here does not rest with the tangibility of houses themselves as an entity of heritage. Indeed, *Country Life* in 1937 highlighted the urgency of preserving country houses, as did *The National Trust* with their launching of the 'National Trust Country House Scheme', in 1936 (Hunter 1996: 10; Mandler 1997: 256). What is at issue is the potential intrusion of lower income housing onto the heritage agenda, a point highlighted by contrastive semantic relations between sentences in this extract: But are they? and ... but do not let us fool ourselves. The juxtaposition of an implicitly class-bound discussion with an explicit commitment to a national historic heritage viewed as a valid documentary source reinforces this important evaluative work and reiterates the point that heritage did not begin its political life as a level playing field. Indeed, the two statements above judiciously combine to undermine the ability of working-class culture to inform a nationally-based heritage discourse, which is rationalized through arguments of validity and, ultimately, truth. This type of housing, it is asserted, will not tell the 'truth' about our cultural history (the upshot being that country houses *will*, somehow, tell that 'truth'). Again, the 'our' performs telling discursive work of exclusion. The discourse emerging throughout this debate is thus enacting only a particular version of heritage, but at

Table 3.1 A Comparison of 'Canonical' Texts in Heritage Policy

Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act	The Venice Charter	The World Heritage Convention
Definition (Part 1, Section 1(3)):	Definition (Article 1–3):	Definition (Article 1):
... any monument which appears to him [the Secretary of State] to be of national importance	The concept of a historic monument embraces not only the single architectural work but also the urban or rural setting in which is found the evidence of a particular civilization, a significant development or an historic event. This applies not only to great works of art but also to more modest works of the past which have acquired cultural significance with the passing of time.	For the purposes of this Convention, the following shall be considered as 'cultural heritage':
This includes (Part 3, Section 61(7)): (a) any building, structure or work, whether above or below the surface of the land, and any cave or excavation; (b) any site comprising the remains of any such building, structure or work or of any cave or excavation; and (c) any site comprising, or comprising the remains of, any vehicle, vessel, aircraft or other movable structure or part thereof which neither constitutes nor forms part of any work which is a monument within paragraph (a) above.	The conservation and restoration of monuments must have recourse to all the sciences and techniques which can contribute to the study and safeguarding of the architectural heritage. The intention in conserving and restoring monuments is to safeguard them no less as works of art than as historical evidence.	(a) <i>monuments</i> : architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and painting, elements or structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave dwellings and combinations of features, which are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science; (b) <i>groups of buildings</i> : groups of separate or connected buildings which, because of their architecture, their homogeneity or their place in the landscape, are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science; (c) <i>sites</i> : works of man or the combined works of nature and man, and areas including archaeological sites which are of outstanding universal value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological point of view.
<i>Source</i> : AMAA 1979	<i>Source</i> : The Venice Charter (1964)	<i>Source</i> : Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972)

the same time is attempting to create a homogenous and collective identity assumed to be representative of the wider nation. Tangible reminders of past golden ages are taken to be paramount, to be preserved and protected for future generations on behalf of – and for – the nation.

The Emergence of Heritage: The National Heritage Act 1983

As one strand of the argument upon which this chapter is based draws upon the idea of intertextuality, part of the purpose of this chapter is to identify themes, commonalities and differences that can be realized in the linguistic features that occur across a number of texts. Table 3.1, for example, draws attention to the similarities across and between canonical texts developed during the 1960s and 1970s (Starn 2002). The above section, *Early Roots*, began the analysis by examining the semantic and linguistic features of parliamentary debate surrounding the enactment of the *Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act* of 1979. This section also uses parliamentary texts, with emphasis on discussions surrounding the passing of the *National Heritage Act* of 1983 (NHA). The NHA adds to the discursive framing of heritage, and functions to define in a legalistic sense what McGuigan (2004: 35) refers to as the ‘real world’ of heritage, positioning agents, producers, consumers, facilitators and citizens within its discursive spaces. It therefore provides another layer for this historical overview, not only because it is a major defining platform for English Heritage and its operations (see DCMS 2002b), but also because it represents a significantly similar outlook to that outlaid in the above section. Indeed, the NHA principally lays out the powers and purposes of English Heritage, guided explicitly by the statutory framework established by the AMAA. It is in this instance that we see the political merging of ‘heritage’ into sites, monuments and buildings.

The NHA’s starting point in the area on which I want to concentrate revolves around one of two issues: (1) to change the governance of four national heritage institutions;² and (2) to establish a new Commission (Lord Kennet, 16th December 1982c: 930). This section focuses primarily on the second of these, as it is here that the particular characteristics identified in the previous section are expanded and given the authoritative role to legislate in the form of English Heritage. In taking this focus, I make three claims that further develop the foundational concept of heritage set out in the AMAA and its tendency towards exclusion. Firstly, I claim that each additional Act or piece of policy since the AMAA has worked to hypostasize a distinct and limited view of heritage. Consequently, big gaps are bound to emerge between such

policies and everyday experiences. Second, the legislative mechanisms put in place in the 1970s accentuated a tendency to reduce heritage to *things*, privileging tangibility over everything else. Third, this blueprint set in place a preponderance towards a particular idea of heritage that has since come to efface and obscure certain experiences while celebrating others.

Nationhood, expertise and commodification

During the 1980s the use of the term 'heritage' was accepted as a catchall term. Although it was often used in ways that were both vague and devoid of specifics, it nonetheless continued to rely upon, and conjure up, images of material remains from the past that were shrouded in something akin to universalized and romanticized holism. Close examination of initial parliamentary debates within the context of the NHA reveal this tendency:

The general tenor of this debate is that this is something which is not adequately done at the moment and that we ought to try and put right. In that context I turn to the business of recording the heritage because this, after all, is the fundamental thing lying behind the overall care of it. We must start by knowing of what the heritage consists, and the most important characteristics **of the buildings that comprise it** (Lord Sandford, House of Lords, Hansard, National Heritage Bill [H.L.], 25th November 1982a: 1035–1036, emphasis added).

We have achieved much. It is a century since the passing of the Ancient Monuments Protection Act 1882. In that time we in this country have built up a network of legislation and organizations for the protection of ancient monuments and historic buildings, and **a tradition which is envied throughout the world**. I should like to explain why I support this Bill's central issue, which is the preservation of our nation's heritage, **whether the exhibits of our most famous museum institutions, or the ancient monuments which are all that remain of our most distant past, or the historic buildings with which our land is so richly endowed** (Lord Mowbray and Stourton, House of Lords, Hansard, National Heritage Bill [H.L.], 25th November 1982a: 1025, emphasis added).

Significant common elements are interwoven across the above statements: both adopt elaborative techniques to pad out the information

they provide, and in so doing reveal the dominant storyline of heritage. This is bound up with recurrent ideas of sites, monuments and, in one case specifically, buildings, and in them, to quote Smith (2006: 11), we see the ‘... rounding up of the usual suspects’. Like many other instances of speech cited in this chapter, the speakers are calling upon a ‘... blueprint metaphor of discourse’ (Tomlin et al. 1997: 64) that belies the conceptual understanding of heritage upon which they base their argument. Without calling up a great amount of detail, both speakers are able to easily convey their own conceptual representation – or blueprint – of heritage through the referents they select for their audience to hear. Nobody responds with demands for elaboration, and nobody queries the limits of the blueprint. It is a shared storyline of heritage that allows the parliamentary debate to move away from discussions regarding what heritage *is*, thereby reducing the discursive complexity of the issue. The assumption is clear – there is only one way of thinking about heritage, and that is illustrated by the permanence of that particular heritage storyline in the debates.

The Act itself does provide clear definitions, which mark the strengthening of the discursive affinity of that particular storyline. This is exemplified by the following suggested amendment:

We feel strongly that it is necessary for something to be in the Bill to direct the commission on its duties to pull everything together on the heritage front, and make sure that all the appropriate bodies are working together [and therefore propose the following amendment]:

The commission shall be responsible for the overall management and presentation to the public of the national heritage of England of **ancient monuments, archaeological areas, and buildings, areas and designed landscapes of special historical or architectural interest** either alone or together with the Secretary of State or any other appropriate body (Lord Montagu of Beaulieu, House of Lords, Hansard, National Heritage Bill [H.L.], 16th December, 1982c: 830, emphasis added).

In the above we can see that the idea of heritage has broadened in scope in the intervening years to include designed parks and gardens, and battlefields. The inclusion of these concepts has since continued in the widening of statutory protection,³ in which the powers of the Commission are outlined to include the compilation of a Register of Gardens, later referred to as the *Register of Parks and Gardens of Special*

Historic Interest in England. Likewise, the inclusion of battlefields most likely reflects the *Proposed Battlefields Register* consultation process, which was formalized by English Heritage in 1995 (Foard 2001: 87). This inclusion of a broader 'set' of heritage categories is reproduced, for example, in *Protecting our Heritage* (1996), jointly prepared by the Department of National Heritage and the Welsh Office:

Moreover, it is now generally recognized that the heritage is not simply a matter of individual buildings and monuments. Many other specific elements are of great importance too – for example, historic parks, gardens and battlefields (DNH and TWO 1996: 2).

However, the categories of historic parks, gardens and battlefields certainly do not differ significantly in concept from those of buildings, monuments, sites and conservation areas; indeed, they are arguably based upon the same set of assumptions regarding intrinsic value, tangibility and a 'dead' past. Thus, while there has been an injection of a broader heritage base, the tendency remains to make these additions feel exactly that – like additions that only make sense in relation to buildings and monuments.

In addition to tentatively broadening the idea of heritage itself, the emphasis of the NHA also works to extend the uses, or functions, of heritage by acknowledging the commercial, touristic and educational ends it might be put to:

... the Government look for an imaginative approach to the presentation of our national heritage and the development of the commercial and tourist opportunities which they present, and a new approach to the educational use of the heritage (The Earl of Avon, House of Lords, Hansard, National Heritage Bill [H.L.], 25th November, 1982a: 987).

... the commission will contain valuable expertise, both on archaeological and historic matters, and also on the development of tourist potential and educational issues for heritage properties generally (The Earl of Avon, House of Lords, Hansard, National Heritage Bill [H.L.], 25th November 1982a: 1048).

While this offers an overt indication of a broadening of heritage uses, questions need to be asked as to how consistently this plays out in a given *sequence* of speech acts? For example, in this instance, the speaker is proposing the desirability of something new, imaginative

and innovative. What makes that statement worthy of note, however, are the justifications, authorizations and expansions utilized to substantiate it. Throughout the debate, the speaker draws upon historical references, collective memories or already embedded assumptions – a revelatory act for discourse analysis – to perform justificatory or explanatory work, something that is referred to as the ‘immanentist view’ (Hajer 1996: 55 – see also Fischer 2003: 85). This is used to ‘position’ a concept or idea within historical continuity, in which past situated speech acts provide resources for speakers to call upon in order to situate themselves in the present (Davies and Harré 1990: 43). Here, the historical continuity of existential, propositional and value assumptions, along with their logical implications and appeals to legitimization, are uttered, reproduced and upheld through discourse. The subtle conceptualization that links the ‘immanentist view’ with ideas of ‘discursive formulations’ is that of the storyline, ‘... which suggest[s] unity in the bewildering variety of separate discursive component parts of a problem’ like heritage, then routinized into ‘... “the way one talks” on this sort of occasion’ (Hajer 1996: 56–57). A consequence of this routinization is that heritage debates are often argued in terms set by routine, rather than on the specific terms of alternative perspectives (Hajer 1996: 57).

Exploring the routinization of heritage becomes, by implication, an exploration of discursive hegemony, an apt point when discussing an Act that sets up the functions and powers of a heritage institution; perhaps *the* heritage institution in England. Of specific interest here are the definitions and parameters of function that have translated from debate into policy.

It is in the interest of all those concerned with the heritage to make quite sure that this commission works. Above all, let us remember the **interests of the future generations** of this country and of many people all over the world. It is for their benefit that **museums, historic sites, buildings and gardens** must have sufficient resources and should be administered and preserved with imagination, dedication and skill – qualities which we as a nation claim to have pride in possessing (Lord Montagu of Beaulieu, House of Lords, Hansard, National Heritage Bill [H.L.], 25th November 1982a: 1007, emphasis added).

What the Service does now and what the commission will have to do is **to record our architectural heritage, to inspect, maintain,**

manage and present them – that is the parts of it that are not covered by other bodies – and to use the formidable authority (I was very glad to see this in the Bill) that it should develop to encourage greater understanding of our heritage among the public, and particularly, I hope, to develop a love of architecture and an understanding of it among children in schools (Lord Gibson, House of Lords, Hansard, National Heritage Bill [H.L.], 25th November 1982a: 1022).

While the above quotes transmit messages about a number of things, one of the more marked points that emerges is what appears to be a form of discursive closure surrounding 'heritage'. Here, we see that the nature of heritage, a complex and conflict-ridden cultural practice, has been successfully reduced and distilled to a specific collection of tangible remains, resulting in a remarkable loss of meaning by utilizing a storyline that sees it as a physical, immutable object to be preserved for and presented to future generations. What 'heritage' *is* emerges from the discursive labour that both manufactures, and is manufactured by, that imaginative process. As a form of justification, crucial emphasis is placed on notions of nationhood, which is explicitly summoned by Lord Montague of Beaulieu, and implicitly implied by the language employed by the second speaker, through references to 'our heritage'. There is a sense of a more modernist proclamation of nationalism, in which preservation becomes a marker of a civilized and dedicated nation, or, borrowing from Benedict Anderson (1983), an imagined community. This community is devoid of complexity, inequality and differentiation, and is subtly represented by an equally oversimplified and homogenous heritage, along with an idealized and romanticized historical experience (Smith and Waterton 2009b).

A key point embedded in policy via parliamentary debate is the notion of *expertise*. The second statement above demonstrates a very strong commitment to a particular style considered necessary for managing heritage. The entirety of Lord Gibson's statement shows a strong commitment to what he thinks the Commission should and will do; signalled with certainty and finality. This, in large part, is the work of modality, marked out by the archetypical modal verbs such as will have, it is and must have, which reveal Lord Gibson's stance, or affinity, with what he is talking about (Fairclough 2003: 166; Hodge and Kress 1988). These modal verbs are attached to an epistemic knowledge exchange associated with asserted, positive statements (Fairclough 2003: 168–169), which together provide textual clues regarding Lord

Gibson's propensity towards architectural forms of heritage, and his avid belief in the role of the 'expert' or 'authority'. This is illustrated explicitly by his declarative statement regarding formidable authority, and reinforced by his ability to make such statements on behalf of we and us – as echoed by Lord Montagu's reference to people all over the world. The power of prediction offered by Lord Gibson, particularly in terms of the functions of the formidable authority, suggests an assumed value not specifically triggered in the text, but maintained as an implicit undercurrent. This undercurrent draws parallels with notions of stewardship and public heritage, explicitly revealed in the deontic modality prescribed by let us remember the interests of spoken by Lord Montagu, in which accountability to the public becomes paramount. The questions this statement triggers can be usefully elaborated by drawing on arguments put forward by Zimmerman (1998) regarding the past as public heritage. Here, perceived universal rights and patrimony work in perfect tandem with the idea of a formidable authority, whose function is to encourage greater understanding of our heritage among the public and inspect, maintain, manage and present it. People – different interest groups and stakeholders – along with the cultural processes of engaging with heritage, are abstracted from the management process, and experts (or the Commission) are assumed to hold the legitimate position of authority for asserting control over heritage, particularly in terms of arbitrating which meanings and values become socially permissible and socially relevant (Gosden 1992: 806; Smith 2004). Thus, while the label 'the public' is frequently banded about, there is no distinct role designated for them within the management process. Rather, this ostensibly homogenous group is the delegated recipients of the management process in the form of education, understanding and information (Waterton 2005: 318–319). The axiom that 'heritage' acquires value '... because of, and through our desires' (Lahn 1996: 4) is quickly naturalized into the belief that 'heritage' is valuable because 'our' experts tell us so:

... 'ancient monument' means any structure, work, site, garden or area **which in the Commission's opinion** is of historic, architectural, traditional, artistic or archaeological interest (The *National Heritage Act* 1983: 21, emphasis added).

This process of filtering heritage through the privileged hands of a few finds legitimacy in both the extract above and those indented earlier, through an appeal to authorizations, rationalizations and moral

evaluations as constructed in discourse. ... let us remember, for example, refers to an already determined sentiment that, while not explicitly explored, is granted authority. It is for their benefit signals the use of instrumental rationalization (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999: 105), in which the needs of future generations – patrimony – becomes the generalized, moral logic behind the means of management proposed, or a fully accepted and enacted aspect of the heritage blueprint:

The Government's first priority is to preserve and protect monuments for future generations (The Earl of Avon, House of Lords, Hansard, National Heritage Bill [H.L.], 25th November 1982a: 1047).

The 'rights' of future generations are thus reinforced as a commonsense principle, and are used to legitimate the directions taken by management principles.

While this moral logic of patrimony is appealed to on numerous occasions, the NHA debates do differ from those unpacked in relation to the AMAA. For example, a tension is introduced in the 1980s between the rights of future and present generations, which is also reflected in the eventual text of the NHA Bill:

The preservation of the heritage for the future does not and must not rule out its enjoyment and appreciation by the present generation (Lord Mowbray and Stourton, House of Lords, Hansard, National Heritage Bill [H.L.], 25th November 1982a: 1026).

... [I]t shall be the duty of the Commission (so far as practicable) ... to promote the public's enjoyment of, and advance their knowledge of, ancient monuments and historic buildings situated in England and their preservation (The *National Heritage Act* 1983: 20).

This optimistic shift in the texturing of patrimony needs qualification, however, as while present generations are referred to, they are still not afforded active roles in the management process. Instead, they remain excluded from debates surrounding what *goes into* the management process, and are considered only in terms of *outcomes*, as beneficiaries of the process, to be educated and informed:

It is felt especially by the archaeologists that, since the public at large and local authorities and developers in particular **need** education and instruction, or perhaps we should now say 'educational facil-

ities', with regard to the meaning and significance of archaeological sites, this should be put in now ... In this context there is a **special need** to include both 'archaeological areas', a new concept to the public, and 'sites' which is a concept of great richness and a true indication of the extraordinary wealth of the archaeological heritage in England (Baroness Birk, House of Lords, Hansard, National Heritage Bill [H.L.], 16th December 1982c: 829–830, emphasis added).

I have highlighted the 'needs' that characterize this statement, which revolve around the meaning and significance of archaeological sites. The modal verb 'need' is here used to convey the degree of commitment the speaker feels for what she is uttering, distinguished by the deontic (obligational) modality (Fairclough 2003: 173) linked to her evaluation of heritage. The modality is high in the above extract, and is coupled with an assumed unidirectional flow of 'instruction' regarding the assessment of significance and meaning of heritage, taken here to be the remit of an overarching authority. The public are to be 'instructed' and 'educated': they are to be taught or shown. This unproblematically assumes that the significances, meanings and values tied up with heritage are of a nature that is more readily accessible by experts (i.e. archaeologists), and are thus not necessarily apparent to 'the public' at large. It is not necessary to point out again the recurrence of sites and archaeological areas in this blueprint metaphor, even in terms of their semantic relations. That they fall within the boundaries of a national heritage narrative is clear. What does need highlighting is the assumption that allows 'need', 'educate', 'instruct' and 'archaeological heritage in England' to hang so seamlessly together. The connotation here is that there is no conceptualization of heritage outside of those boundaries: there is no room allowed for public issues; there is no allowance for the negotiation of a sense of place and identity; and there is no place for alternative constructions of heritage that may begin with communities themselves. Against this structuring of heritage, alternative and quite different ways of understanding and using the past are silenced by a centred and singular storyline.

Within the context of public participation it is also worth noting how concerns for the *commodification* of heritage are handled, both in terms of its negative and positive effects.

But the public is knocking at the door. We now have to defend not only the keeper's scholarship and passion for acquisitions which, in a modest way, I share myself, but to add a growing range of services

to the world outside the museum (Viscount Eccles, House of Lords, Hansard, National Heritage Bill [H.L.], 14th December 1982b: 503).

I do not think that those who fear hoards of trippers and hundreds of children scampering round these precious buildings need be alarmed, because good promotion, good management of visitors, good behaviour by visitors, higher income from takings and a deeper appreciation of **the** heritage, all go hand in hand (Lord Sandford, House of Lords, Hansard, National Heritage Bill [H.L.], 25th November 1982a: 1037, emphasis added).

The recurrence of the definite article *the* heritage, reminiscent of arguments developed earlier, reinforces the idea that 'heritage' is singular, homogenous and already defined. As suggested at the outset of this chapter, the debates move away from questioning *what* heritage is towards considering *how* it ought to be managed. Appeals illustrated earlier to the enjoyment of the 'visitor', both from Britain and overseas, signal recognition of the contribution that specific and definitive 'heritage' is able to make to the tourist industry. It also firmly places 'the public' in the role of consumer and 'the heritage' in the role of consumed. The sense of instruction and education discussed above is still recognizable in the accounts of tourism offered by Viscount Eccles and Lord Sandford. For Viscount Eccles, this commodification is represented in a manner similar to Kopytoff's (1986: 64) notion of the 'rights' of 'the public', however begrudgingly these are acknowledged, and the use of 'heritage' is redefined from an acquisition for acquisition's sake to a range of services that spill far beyond museums. For Lord Sanford, this commodification is much more tangible and is almost entirely explained through the language of visitor management and exchange.

The work of this notion of commodification, along with the distinct and limited involvement of 'the public', conveniently leads us to discussions of the relationships between the commodified past, the public and 'the expert'. The NHA began the process of pencilling in the role of heritage as a consumable product best understood by experts. This dual role is replicated throughout both the NHA itself and the parliamentary debates that surrounded its enactment. Indeed, the Commission was to be *the* 'heritage expert' on *the* heritage', both advising and informing all other interested parties about its meanings and uses. As the expert body, the Commission was imagined as follows:

The commissioners have to be able to cover historic houses, archaeology, ancient monuments and a number of other subjects (Baroness

Birk, House of Lords, Hansard, National Heritage Bill [H.L.], 16th December 1982c: 802).

We have here a very detailed list of the qualities which are to be represented on the commission; namely, archaeology, architecture, the history of architecture, the preservation or conservation of monuments or buildings, tourism, commerce and finance (Lord Kennet, House of Lords, Hansard, National Heritage Bill [H.L.], 16th December 1982c: 810).

If the commission is to do its job properly, **it is essential** that it has at its disposal experienced staff expert in **all** branches of research work. In the archaeological field it must have archaeologists; with monuments it must have the equivalent of the inspectorate of ancient monuments, and with buildings it needs to have architectural historians. **All of these kind of people** are needed to study and advise on research into the past, **so that mistakes are not made** in the care of archaeological areas and monuments, nor in identifying buildings that are genuinely outstanding for their historic or architectural interest (Baroness Birk, House of Lords, Hansard, National Heritage Bill [H.L.], 16th December 1982c: 833, emphasis added).

Particular phrases and words have been highlighted in the above extracts to indicate the non-mediated style of expertise desired. Communicating, entering into dialogue, pursuing participation and deliberation are not high on the list of priorities for managing heritage. Indeed, the utterance in all branches of research work, coupled with the additive statements outlining the requirements of each area of research work, as the speaker sees it, omits any mention of the social and cultural dimensions of heritage. Heritage, in the above, brings forward a specific ensemble of things: things that can be most usefully understood through research into the past that is driven by historians, archaeologists and the inspectorate of ancient monuments. While research is only one of a number of values placed upon such things, for Baroness Birk, it is *the* value. Likewise, while the *product* is only one part of the process, for Baroness Birk, it is *the* part. For the Commission to do its job properly, these sentiments need to be absorbed without question, a point exemplified by the conditional semantic relation it is essential and the consequential, causal semantic structuring of so that mistakes are not made. It is not simply the mere words that Baroness Birk chooses that are important, but the implicit sentiment upon which they are based,

which reflects the argument that ‘... the world is given; we are inheritors, not producers of value here’ (Steward 1984: 164, cited in Lahn 1996: 15). In valorizing this assumption, heritage becomes a universal and uniform given that can be preserved ‘as is’ for future generations. The justification and legitimization used for such an approach appears to be the idea of innate and immutable value, assumed to be genuinely and self-evidently important for everyone.

Despite allusions to the incorporation of a new, broader understanding of heritage, the underpinning assumptions that bind this parliamentary process together are largely reminiscent of those found in the AMAA. As with the immanentist view referred to in the previous section, the re-utterance of these storyline ‘bytes’ becomes a discursive strategy that works to reinforce itself. While the scale of heritage increased within this document to include battlefields, gardens and parks, this broadening occurred in line with an already embedded assumption about the nature of heritage. As a consequence, the discursive development of heritage in policy during this timeframe continued to replicate the cognitive commitments of an already established blueprint. While it is important to point out that this document represents a re-lexicalization of heritage, this acts – to this point, anyway – more as a rhetorical ploy that does nothing of significance to transform dominant ways of thinking about heritage. Rather, the pre-eminence of historic building as an end in itself continued to be maintained, as did the hierarchical ordering of importance from local, via national to international. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the idea of heritage as given rather than produced recurred with frequency. Following from this, precedence was given to ideas of inherent or intrinsic value, rather than the importance of ascribed, social values. The problem, here, becomes one of discourse. This is not so much a questioning of ‘facts’, but a questioning of deeply held assumptions held up as ‘facts’ and naturalized in the policymaking process.

National narratives and their discursive organization

This quick sampling of parliamentary debates and policy developing in the 1970s and 80s is not meant to be a full, historical account of the rise of heritage on the political agenda. Quite the contrary, this chapter is merely part of a larger analytical process aimed at charting the development and naturalization of a dominant heritage discourse; the point being that we have to start somewhere for such a project and the 1970s is as good a place as any. The debates undertaken at this

time point to a particular way of thinking about heritage; sometimes this blueprint was subtly invoked and at other times it was more blatant. Either way, the basic underlying pattern or narrative to have emerged had the following elements:

1. The rich history of Britain has produced an impressive collection of sites, monuments, buildings, parks, gardens and battlefields: 'the' or 'our' heritage;
2. The/our heritage speaks of great achievement, epic heroes, power, longevity, tradition and exceptional, creative skill;
3. The/our heritage is something from the past that is great, safe, accumulating over time and innately valuable – it is thus something that should (and can) be preserved;
4. The initiation of policy and practices to protect and conserve 'heritage' is something we are all responsible for;
5. High standards of protection will enable the/our heritage to be enjoyed by future generations as a touristic experience and source of pride, identity and education;
6. Those best placed to uphold the highest standards of conservation are experts – their central role in the management of the/our heritage is essential;
7. Through exceptional standards and attention to expertise, Britain can come to occupy a position at the pinnacle of heritage management practices globally.

Significantly, 'the/our heritage' has all too easily come to mean tangible products from the past, and with it, heritage management has just as easily come to mean conserving that physicality. Moreover, this was not a slow drift towards tangibility despite the countless other ways in which heritage could have been imagined; it was a mandate made visible immediately and one that has since been used to inform and justify the various other principles used to underpin the management of heritage. Collectively, this putatively authoritative view was also in the service of constructing an image of both the past and contemporary identities in the image of the middle- and upper-classes, at the same time as excluding other experiences and understandings of heritage. Membership, at this point of discursive developments, is highly class-specific, religiously determined and ethnically limited, thus paradoxically tied to a notion of heritage that sees itself firmly fixed to the past and the future, yet understood in the context of the present. Importantly, the 'present' under question in this analysis of the British

political environment was characterized by Conservative policy agendas, particularly Margaret Thatcher's pessimistic pronouncements regarding the future of society. As Paul Gilroy (1987: 49; see also Rhodes 2010) points out, this context meant that any minority group was '... constructed as a problem or threat against which a homogenous, white, national 'we' could be unified'; one means of mustering the front against the 'other' was through the management of cultural expression. Thus, this storyline, strongly reminiscent of that envisaged by Hall (1999) and described by Littler (2005: 1) as a '... bounded entity unquestioningly representing the interests of the white, English upper- and middle-class great and the good', gained prominence. Delores Hayden (1997) observes a similar situation in the United States, as does Denis Byrne (2004) in the context of Australia, in which the lives of minority groups – ethnic minorities, low income families, people with disabilities and certain age groups – the 'underclasses', tend to be underrepresented in heritage policy and practice. The implication this has once it spills away from the internal workings of a text is profound, as the use of this discourse – consciously or not – works to sustain an effective indelibility by which core discursive features continue to determine the object and outcome of policy formulations regarding heritage (see Chapter 6).

A worrying consequence of this narrative has been, to borrow from Denis Byrne, the deformation of heritage. Indeed for Byrne (2009: 231), this over-emphasis on tangibility, in tandem with a hollowing out of social values, engagements and meaning, has effected a situation in which we are '... left with things minus feelings'. The problem here is that such practices do not simply describe an already existing and consensual view of heritage; they enact it into being. Subsequent legislative devices have thus since been organized by – and in turn organize – particular, and inevitably obdurate, perceptions of heritage. This one construction of heritage has been sustained and legitimized in policy, and from there it can, and has, gone on to *insist to all people that this is their heritage* (Braden 1978: 153–154) in a way that borrows from Raymond Williams' term 'selective tradition', whereby *a* tradition is passed off as *the* tradition, or *the* significant past (cited in Apple 1990: 6 – see also Hall 1999). The documents studied here thus bind themselves together by utilizing a storyline that allows their agendas and objectives to *sound right*. As more governmental departments and heritage organizations united around this storyline, it began to take up an institutionalized edge that shifted abstract notions into concrete operations, and the exclusionary nature of heritage, from this point onwards, became nothing short of inevitable.

4

New Labour, New Heritage?

They can never be the body, they can only be incorporated,
contained, 'assimilated', taken into the body, eaten up
(MacCannell 1992: 170).

The previous chapter documented the emergence of a particular way of seeing heritage. While the analysis emphasized the recurrence of a tight set of assumptions, invoked by the continued repetition of a common storyline, I was careful to make no suggestion that it would, or could, remain uncontested or unchanged. Indeed, the broader language of heritage has changed markedly since the *Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act* of 1979, and in 1997, with the promise of '... a nation united, with common purpose, shared values, with no-one shut out or excluded', Tony Blair signalled that it was about to change again, picking up a theme that would become increasingly familiar: social inclusion (cited in Levitas 2005: 1). Since then, New Labour's emphasis on inclusion has in many ways simply signalled the rediscovery of a series of broadly familiar social and political concepts. Of particular note are those that tend to emerge whenever governments grapple with issues that dance along the lines of identity, and here I am referring to things like 'cohesion' and 'belonging', both of which nestle so comfortably with images conjured by that of 'inclusion'. While these concepts are widely regarded as forming part of a new political and international language developed to deal with complex issues of immigration and diversity, and thereby contribute to the formation of non-racist and multicultural nations, their framing within a range of contexts has often masked a more insidious process of cultural assimilation. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the realm of culture.

The question raised by these broader issues to which heritage is now attached strikes an obvious, yet interesting, chord with a vein of argument associated with David Lowenthal, and his observation that '... confining possession to some while excluding others is the *raison d'être* of most heritage' (1998a: 230). It works for us primarily, he goes on to argue, when '... it is withheld from others' (Lowenthal 1998a: 230). My question for this chapter, then, is influenced by Lowenthal's position in that I ask, quite simply, is it in the nature of heritage to *be* inclusive? Are debates about the nation's heritage the natural spaces in which to look for answers to combat racism, reconcile differences and overturn cultural, political and social exclusion? Or do the ideological workings of a dominant discourse mean that particular organizational forms of power are sustained? In other words, are dominant groups (representing a supposed 'majority') in a position to maintain their dominance by *persuading* subordinate groups that a particular understanding of heritage is natural and inevitable? Irrespective of my own skepticism in answering these questions, it was indeed to the heritage sector that the British Government, amongst others, turned to look for much of the social and cultural glue needed to hold together a multi-ethnic, multicultural and multi-faith nation. It was also, I argue, to heritage that government turned for a fixed and essentialized identity against which to define and obfuscate the 'other'. That this was done with a disregard for the possibility that heritage is something that is territorialized by dominant social groups and cultural symbols is a point that will be returned to as the chapter unfolds.

The purpose of this chapter is thus two-fold, with both parts carrying equal weight. Firstly, I will continue firming up the content of the authorized heritage discourse by making reference to the specific, defining claims of that discourse that enabled it to rhetorically justify one trajectory of management over others. I'll do this by analysing the intersection of this discourse with the broader political discourse of social inclusion. Here, the AHD will be seen as being animated by, as well as animating in turn, that specific political discourse, with both drawing on the other in a pattern of mutual reinforcement. Secondly, I want to question the means by which groups of people in this partial and structured idea of heritage are included, when its limited definition is responsible for excluding those people in the first place. Given the argument I have been developing so far, this would immediately require us to turn our attention to *anyone* who is not white, male and from the middle- or upper-classes. It also presumes that it is possible, indeed advisable, for us to search out a common version of heritage in

which multi-ethnic and multi-faith communities can all share values, identities and senses of place. In taking up this particular focus, my aim is to advance the argument that the AHD has far greater tenacity than first appearances might suggest. Indeed, my intention is to illustrate the ways in which the AHD has ostensibly been emptied out of all ideological content, such that it *appears* to present a natural conceptualization of 'heritage' in which dominant and disenfranchised groups can somehow equally share. To make this so, the heritage sector in the UK began to change the language associated with heritage with the introduction of the 'historic environment'. Yet the vision of the past and collective memories it would invoke (along with a sense of community and belonging) did not, on the whole, move much beyond the deceptively sophisticated notion of an elite, and ultimately white, national narrative first introduced in the 1970s. Instead, the 'historic environment' is strenuously peddled as the solution, dressed up as an apparently democratic and inclusive term drawn upon to quieten the criticisms that plagued dominant ideas of heritage; it was to this newly coined term that the sector turned as the panacea for social exclusion.

The social and political context

The current chapter continues the use of the British context as a case study; however, the compressing together of cohesion and multiculturalism is something that has occupied many national governments and their agendas since the 1970s (Lewis and Neal 2005: 423). A number of European states, such as Norway and the Netherlands, have been particularly vociferous in their attempts to adjust to issues of cultural plurality and tolerance, creating situations that tell us rather more about how tropes of 'multiculturalism' can be used in defense of national narratives that offer only partial recognition of the full spectrum of citizens. Other countries, such as Canada, Australia and the United States, have gone to considerable lengths to promote national identities entrenched in the affirmation of multiculturalism as the wealth of material published on these issues suggest, ranging from Nathan Glazer's *We are All Multiculturalists Now*, published in 1997 to *The Multiculturalism of Fear* published in 2000 by Jacob Levy. Even these countries most often equated with the term have not escaped the rawness of public and political responses to recent issues of asylum, migration, segregation, 'Islamophobia' and political parties pushing agendas of 'One' nation (Amin 2002). Sizeable disturbances in these so-called 'multicultural countries' lend added skepticism to the modes of recognition

and 'tolerance' often tangled up in political projects of cohesion and integration. In Australia, we can trace examples through the rise of the One Nation Party in the late 1990s and incidents such as the turning away of 438 asylum-seekers in the Tampa Affair of 2001 and the Cronulla riots in 2005 (Poynting 2006). More subtle reactions to these issues can be read in the European context through, for example, the defeat by France and the Netherlands in 2005 of the proposed European Constitution due to widespread social anxiety and a fear of 'too much tolerance' (Delanty and Millward 2007: 145). More blatantly, Italy's Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, in 2001, revealed a potent undercurrent of anxiety with his comment that '[w]e must be aware of the superiority of our civilization, a system that has guaranteed well-being, respect for human rights – and in contrast with Islamic countries' (cited in Rehman 2007: 199). In the UK, these anxieties took the form of rioting in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley in 2001, a rising affiliation to the British National Party, and the vociferous backlash against 'unfairness' within right-wing media in response to the public enquiry into the murder of Stephen Lawrence, which made a series of statements about institutional racism in Britain (Wetherell 2008; Rhodes 2010: 81). This was almost immediately followed by the publication of the Report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000), chaired by Bhikhu Parekh, which was greeted by intense public debate. Primarily, this report was seen to give a negative assessment of Britain as a multicultural society, particularly through its calls for a politics of reckoning with its imperial past (Fortier 2005). Here, explicitly, Britain's history and heritage were scrutinized and drawn into debates about multiculturalism. Like many politicians and members of the public, the media retaliated with talk of pride in Britishness and the nation's past.¹ As Knauer and Walkowitz (2009: 1) point out, the political stakes in tensions like these are high and 'can be seen in the struggles over the representation of the nation in its monuments, museums and other public history sites where the various interested parties cannot agree on what the proper tone or the overarching narrative should be'. It should therefore come as no surprise that these debates had a profound affect on the pursuit of diversity and inclusion in the heritage sector.

The 'career' of social inclusion in Britain

The concept of social inclusion is typically said to have emerged out of French social policy in the early 1970s, where it combined with Pierre Bourdieu's formulation of 'cultural capital' (see Bennett and Savage

2004). From here, this conceptual coupling spread throughout the European Union, recreating distinct versions of the partnership in a range of national discourses. Regardless of the subtle differences of texture between each national discourse, they have all contributed to a common end: the prominence of social inclusion on the political agenda both nationally and supranationally. By the turn of the millennium, social inclusion had become a pivotal aspiration, as revealed by themes at subsequent European Council summits such as that in Lisbon, March 2000, which examined economic, social and environmental renewal, and in Nice, December 2000, which examined the risks of exclusion (Micklewright and Stewart 2001; Levitas 2004: 191). Speeches such as *The EU Strategy for Social Inclusion and the Role of Local and Regional Government*, delivered by Dave Simmonds, director of the Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion, London, and policy documents including *The Role of Culture in Preventing and Reducing Poverty and Social Exclusion*, authored by the European Communities in 2005, likewise reveal the extent of this commitment. Nationally, it has taken the form of biennial National Action Plans for Social Inclusion (NAPincl)² and a pledge to co-ordinate attempts to eradicate exclusion, both of which are overseen by a Network of Independent Social Inclusion Experts, originally convened in December 2002, who monitor national attempts to tackle exclusion and implement new policy (European Commission 2009: 4).

Although the first explicit attempt to address issues of exclusion arrived with Peter Townsend's study *Poverty in the United Kingdom* in 1979, it was not until the election of New Labour in 1997 that any real vigour was applied to these issues in Britain (Lister 1998; Bennett and Savage 2004). Policies developed since then have attempted to balance the articulation of pride in traditional images of Britishness with recognition of multiculturalism, in particular by appealing for subordinate groups to assimilate themselves with an essentially exclusive, nationalist mentality. This is perhaps best exemplified by the establishment of the Social Exclusion Unit (SEU, now the Social Exclusion Task Force (SETF)³) in the Cabinet Office in December 1997, whose central aim was to produce '... joined up solutions to joined up problems' – unsurprising, given that this was a government whose Big Idea was 'joined-up thinking' (Belfiore 2002: 93; Atkinson and Savage 2001). Shortly after setting up the SEU, Tony Blair, in his 1998 manifesto entitled *The Third Way: New Politics for the New Century*, stated that:

We seek a diverse but **inclusive** society, promoting tolerance with agreed norms, promoting civic activism as a complement (but not a

replacement for) to modern government. An **inclusive** society imposes duties on individuals and parents as well as society as a whole ... Strong communities depend on **shared** values and a recognition of the rights and duties of citizenship – not just the duty to pay taxes and obey the law, but the obligation to bring up children as competent, responsible citizens (p. 131, emphasis added).

In highlighting the strong links between ideals of inclusion and New Labour government, this analysis on some level needs to acknowledge the 'double regime' of its politics. However, while acknowledging this relationship as important, I do not want to complicate the issues at hand by going too far into the history and policy of New Labour (for fuller details see Levitas 2004; Coates 2005). Nonetheless, a short distillation of the motivations and assumptions underpinning their agenda does afford a level of clarity in attempting to understand why links between heritage and social inclusion became such a priority. A key point highlighted by other cultural analyses in this regard is the continued combination of a social-democratic tradition with strands of an international neo-liberal politics (Clarke 2004; Levitas 2004, 2005). The hybrid regime resulting from this combination sets up what Hall (2003: 19–21) refers to as a 'two-step shuffle', which sees the monitoring or measurement of inclusion arrived at through attempts to improve the delivery of public services, themselves managed by means of top-down 'managerialists'. As Hall (2003) goes on to argue, the neo-liberal politics in this two-step shuffle always remains dominant with social-democratic traditions systematically subordinated and dependent. Taken at face value, the project of social inclusion finds synergy with social democratic quests for equality and social solidarity achievable through redistribution, where it blends almost seamlessly with wider attempts to deal with issues of globalization, the politics of identity and multiculturalism. At the same time, it stands at odds with New Labour's neo-liberalism, which speaks past ideas of cohesion, aspirations and feelings (Fairclough 2003: 128). In this scenario, social inclusion becomes understandable via a vocabulary that attempts to bring these two regimes together, and here the phrases 'human capital', 'human quality' and 'cultural capital' can be seen as attempts to construct workable semantic relationships between the two (Fairclough 2003: 128).

This vocabulary can be seen in terms of the impact 'social inclusion' has had upon discussions of poverty, where the focus – both in terms of the construction of the problem and resultant solutions – is dis-

tinctly framed by references to 'the marginalized'. With such a strong focus on 'them' and little attention on 'everyone else', the assumption carries that there is nothing inherently *wrong* with 'everybody else' (Fairclough 2000: 65) – the problem, in short, is seen to lie with 'the marginalized'. Here, the idea of cultural capital remains an implicit underpinning, although the analytical capacity of this concept is compromised, thereby delimiting the explanatory power afforded by the concept of inclusion. This is because New Labour's attempts to deal with poverty have tended to obscure the power, privilege and position of 'the rich', as Levitas (2004: 49) points out:

The dominant causal model of exclusion informing policy is a cultural one, in which the poor/excluded have the wrong values and attitudes that they pass on to their children, and fail therefore to acquire the appropriate skills and qualifications to succeed. It simultaneously obscures and legitimates wider social inequalities, and provides a lens through which the rich become virtually invisible.

The cultural barriers identified in this model of exclusion are thereby limited to the working-classes, unemployed and ethnic minorities, rather than examining overall class structures. By reducing the issue in this manner, the critical roles played by discourse and ideology are ignored and the issues are subjected to a gross simplification. Here, the dominant discourse of social exclusion *itself* plays a role in obfuscating the underlying processes that cause exclusion in the first place: it '... contributes to the symbolic erasure of actually existing class relations, rather than shedding light on how class domination is sustained' (Levitas 2004: 53). As such, inclusion runs the risk of an overly saturated alliance with the individual, becoming something that people can 'gain' through participation or consumption. The problem with this scenario is that in order to participate or consume, 'something' already has to have assumed a position of meaning or importance, a point that becomes more pronounced when turning to the heritage sector.

'You cannot invite me into my house'⁴: Inclusion and the heritage sector

As Gail Lewis (2005: 553) points out, it is often on the terrain of 'culture' that anxieties over social differences play out in a policy sense. As such, part of the exercise involved in the process of incorporating social inclusion into the broader language of government was to lay out a

perceived problem of governance and, along with it, a proposed solution. In line with the valorization of multiculturalism and the crafting of identity and belonging around core white and middle-class values, it proposed a collection of people who were the 'problems' to be managed. As such, in the heritage sector quests for social inclusion were frequently dressed up as attempts to promote '... equitable patterns of participation in those forms of cultural activity that have historically been ranked as high culture and which, in terms of demographic profiles of their publics, have been markedly socially exclusive' (Bennett and Savage 2004: 8). This focus on participation is more generally assessed in terms of 'access', whereby physical barriers and charging policies are amended in order to provide equalized access to cultural resources; a case in point would be the implementation of free entry policies for publicly funded museums and galleries, both of which have been granted central roles in the fight to resolve social problems (Bennett and Savage 2004: 9; see also West and Smith 2005).

Key to this is the idea that '[b]eing cut off from key aspects of our culture is part of what drives social exclusion' (Jowell 2002: 3). Indeed, such is the nature of culture, Jowell goes on to argue (2004: 3), that it, alone, '... can give people the means better to understand and engage with life'. It is through this route, however, that concepts of cultural capital were implicitly sewn into inclusion policies, as art and culture were given key parts to play in the delivery of social order by linking them to the combating of crime and the creation of safe and cohesive communities (DCMS 2003c: 3). The utility of cultural capital has, in these instances, been misapplied as these projects focus upon trying to better re-focus the lenses of 'the excluded' so that they can fulfil their opportunities to accumulate '... the capital relevant to, and necessary to decode', heritage places and experiences (Mason 2004: 65). The assumption, crudely, is that excluded groups need to acquire the cultural literacy to 'read' and 'appreciate' the cultural meanings embedded in heritage icons such as the country house. Moreover, as Roshi Naidoo (2009: 68), drawing on the work of James Early, points out, '... when museums or other institutions seek to include the marginalized through outreach to specific communities or people as an act of magnanimity, they are not acknowledging our democratic rights, or their responsibility to make sure we are all represented in public culture. As he said, "you cannot invite me into my house – I am a citizen"'. While it will not yet be clear what the heritage sector did beyond reassessing its policies of access, it should, at least, seem obvious that they had to do something; and that something had to go somehow towards balancing

a recognition of diversity with an alleviation of the apparent violation of Britain's highest values and principles by minority groups, as the following quote from parliamentary debate indicates:

This country is Britain, and the best service that we can do for all our children is to give them a thorough knowledge of the history and cultural heritage of these islands ... Britain is a tolerant country. We need to keep working at good race relations, but it is time that those with ethnic minority backgrounds, who represent just 6 per cent of the population, tried to be more understanding of us and our centuries old culture (Hansard House of Commons Debates 29th March 1999 c819 [Mr Howarth]).

In what follows, I isolate three discourses of social inclusion, all of which, in some way, rehearse a desire to '... help, cajole, or coerce the outsiders over some perceived hurdle into the mainstream' (Levitas 2004: 47). The first of these discourses is a straightforward division between 'them' and 'us', and an attempt to mitigate the problems this division poses for cohesion by focusing upon the apparent 'therapeutic' nature of culture and a truncated adaptation of Bourdieu's cultural capital (Bennett and Savage 2004: 9). The second discourse pays closer attention to the urges of social democracy and offers democratic access to equal opportunities across all members of society. Inclusion, following this perspective, is envisioned as a natural consequence of equality in participation and access, and therefore audience development based upon the notion of entitlement takes precedence (Sandell 2003: 47; Bennett and Savage 2004: 10). The third discourse skates considerably closer to a politics of assimilation; indeed, some argue that in this guise it becomes a tool of social control (Sandell 2003: 45). Here, those who sit outside the majority (whether by choice or circumstance) are coerced inside through education, persuasion and information. While this is never explicitly stated it remains a textual suggestion. What all three discourses fail to do, however, is call into question the very nature of heritage itself. Instead, heritage remains framed by the cultural symbols and values of the majority and presupposes a *desire* or *need* by the homogenous 'excluded' to access that idea of heritage. My purpose here, is not to argue *against* the union of social inclusion and heritage in any guise, but to suggest a rethinking of the direction in which these concepts are travelling. It should not be the role of 'mainstream' heritage institutions and organizations to take the hand of the excluded and lead them into the fold, so to speak. Instead, genuine

inclusion policies need to reconsider the nature of heritage and propose new understandings that do not inhibit non-conventional heritage users.

The changing terrain of heritage policy, 1999–2003

The usefulness of the above discussion for this chapter lies with the wholesale transferral of the cultural capital/social inclusion dyad into the heritage sector, and specific attempts by DCMS and English Heritage to understand how cultural preferences, tastes and knowledges mediate the consumption of heritage. Allin and Selwood (2004: 2) suggest that the most significant attempt to fold social inclusion discourses into the cultural sphere came with reports associated with Policy Action Team 10 (PAT 10) such as the DCMS-authored *A Report to the Social Exclusion Unit: Arts and Sports* (1999), which later prompted *Count Me In* (2002a). Likewise, a research project conducted for English Heritage by Market and Opinion Research International (MORI) between April and June 2000, with the aim of investigating *Attitudes towards the Heritage*, was underpinned by a need to respond to calls for inclusion. By far the most obvious example of a commitment to tackle exclusion in the heritage sector came, however, with the Government's Review of Policies for the Historic Environment, first voiced by the House of Commons Committee on Culture, Media and Sport in 1999. To make my case, then, I take as my data an archive of documents linked to this review: the publication of *Power of Place* (English Heritage 2000r) and *The Historic Environment: A Force for our Future* (DCMS 2001a), two policy documents pitched as blueprints for defining the historic environment and communicating the sector's position on issues of inclusion.

An invitation to participate: The first consultation

In 1998, the Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport (CMS) considered the objectives and priorities of DCMS, published in the Fifth Report (CMS 1998). In the following year, the same committee issued a press release welcoming written evidence for a complementary report examining the Department's relationships with associated Quangos, resulting in the Sixth Report (CMS 1999a) and the Sixth Special Report (CMS 1999b) authored by the Government in response. Collectively, these three reports provide a useful starting point for sketching out an understanding of the lead governmental body charged with implementing the broader agendas of social inclusion in the cultural sector immediately following the election of New Labour. At this point, it is

probably fair to say that explicit discussions of 'inclusion' or 'exclusion' were still scarce. This is the case not only for the positioning of DCMS in the reports emerging at this time, but for memorandums received as part of the process as well. For example, explicit mention of exclusion was raised only twice, both times in memorandums submitted by English Heritage. What is interesting about these specific references are the ways in which the vagueness of statements regarding social exclusion and/or inclusion were transferred from DCMS objectives into equally vague strategic plans *specifically designed* for the heritage sector (see Table 4.1), which mirrors tabulated data submitted by English Heritage on Wednesday 16th June 1999.

The materialization of DCMS objectives into specific English Heritage strategic programmes for 1999/2000 to 2001/2002 is apparent. For example, the first DCMS aim tabulated above was translated into an English Heritage programme to 'conserve' and 'enhance' the historic environment for present and future generations. Likewise, attempts to '[d]evelop the educational potential of the nation's cultural resources and encourage

Table 4.1 Minutes of Evidence: The English Heritage Memorandum

DCMS Objectives	English Heritage's Programme
Promote the role of the Department's sectors in urban and rural regeneration/economic development in pursuing sustainability and in combating social exclusion. Broaden access to our distinctive built environment for this and future generations.	Conserving and enhancing the historic environment for present and future generations.
Develop the educational potential of the nation's cultural resources and encourage the take up of educational opportunities.	Encouraging physical and intellectual access to the historic environment.
Ensure that everyone has the opportunity to achieve excellence, and to develop talent, innovation and good design.	Increasing the understanding of the historic environment.
The DCMS will seek maximum value for money in using its human and financial resources, through applying the principles of efficiency and effectiveness, and in encouraging partnerships with others.	Maximizing resources where they are most needed for the historic environment.

Source: English Heritage 1999: 4

the take up of educational opportunities' emerged as a desire to increase 'understanding of the historic environment'. The notion of social inclusion is touched upon only fleetingly in oral evidence offered during this process of assessing and examining DCMS. However, the significance attributed to social inclusion here was heightened, and a drive to harness the heritage sector to broader governmental agendas is made clearer:

It is particularly disappointing in that one of my hopes ... and no doubt shared generally was that with the new administration there would be a rethinking about the contribution of the historic environment to the quality of life. These much broader terms about social inclusion, about healthy living and so on, seem very promising and **the historic environment contributes to the day to day quality of life of the vast majority of people**. To find ourselves still being seen as a pigeon-hole, a minority interest, is very disappointing this long into the new administration (CMS 1999c – Questions 137–162, paragraph 141, emphasis added).

The comprehensive spending review also resulted in a much stronger recognition of the DCMS's role **in taking forward the Government's social and economic agendas as well as being responsible for so many things which are essential for the nation's quality of life**. I firmly believe that the arts, sport, tourism, museums, libraries, broadcasting and the built heritage can **play a major part in the regeneration of our communities**, whether urban or rural (CMS 1999d – Questions 318–339, paragraph 319, emphasis added).

The end point for the above enquiry, announced on 2nd February 2000, was the much-publicized and '... first ever comprehensive review of the nation's historic environment', which attempted to take account of, and accommodate, changing perceptions of heritage and issues of exclusion (English Heritage 2000s).

In a letter to Sir Jocelyn Stevens (the then Chairman of English Heritage) in which this review was commissioned, Alan Howard, the then Minister for the Arts, asserted that:

The physical survivals of the past **have a huge contribution to make to contemporary life**, both in terms of their inherent qual-

ities and because of their relevance to other Government objectives ... (DCMS 2000a, emphasis added).

Howarth also drew attention to a number of policy areas that were considered central to the review phase, of which two related specifically to inclusion:

- the role of the historic environment in promoting regeneration and social inclusion;
- The use of the heritage as an educational resource and the promotion of appreciation and involvement of the heritage, especially among young people and ethnic minorities (DCMS 2000a).

In these two aims, the initial mobilization of the three discourses of inclusion discussed earlier becomes apparent. With the launch of this review, Alan Howarth further remarked that:

Our built heritage is of extraordinary quality. Too much of it, however, is fragile and vulnerable. We must take the best care possible of it. All who have a responsibility for its stewardship must work vigilantly and imaginatively for its preservation and enhancement. **We need to be confident in enabling the heritage to play its part in creating a better environment and a better society in the new century** (DCMS 2000a, emphasis added).

Unsurprisingly, given the nature of government, wider agendas aimed at building a 'multicultural' Britain provided the discursive resources for the development of inclusion/exclusion discourses within the heritage section, as well as attempts to celebrate diversity and combat racism. Indeed, in the setting up of this review (and similar reviews, such as the *Inclusion in English Heritage* project) it is possible to see the incorporation of the language of one element within a network of social practices into another or, in other words, the appropriation and re-contextualization of 'social exclusion' and 'cultural diversity' from wider government into the social practices of culture. The initial review process outlined was, of course, more complicated and extensive than the slim set of statements I have incorporated suggests; but their inclusion is an important contextualization for this analytical exercise. What they offer is a sense of the embedding of inclusion into the discourse established in Chapter 3, where an explicitly *social* perspective (inclusion) began to form a relationship with a distinctly *material* perspective

(the AHD). The overwhelming projection of heritage we see coming out of this contextualization coalesces around a new range of social roles: it is an enabler, a promoter, a contributor and a player – heritage itself is metaphorically being *allowed to act*. Who is allowing this, and why, needs to be examined, as does the overall significance of making these linguistic and semantic choices.

Before inspecting these issues more closely, I first want to pull into the frame and clarify the related events leading to the publication of *Power of Place* and *Force for our Future* (see Figure 4.1).

Following Howarth's letter, *An Invitation to Participate* was extended to a number of individuals, comprising the first part of the consultation process. Two points are highlighted in this invitation: first, the need to identify the broadened '... aspirations for the heritage and the role it plays in modern life' with explicit links made to social inclusion agendas; and, second, the need to recognize the broadened definition of heritage, extended to include '... the material remains of the past in England', which knows no chronological, thematic, geographical, scalar or ethnic limits (English Heritage 2000a: 1). The intended result, as noted in the invitation, was to '... help all communities to define and value what is important to them' (English Heritage 2000a: 1). Here, the material remains of the past are offered as an entitlement of all, and the role of the heritage manager is to assist with the nurturing of what is an apparently natural relationship. The problem, it seems, is that any lack of an engagement with those material remains has arisen as a consequence of an inability to recognize and value them. It is this belief that forms the central core of my argument developed in this chapter, and is thus something to bear in mind as the analysis unfolds.

The invitation to participate resulted in the creation of five working groups, overseen by a Steering Group chaired first by Sir Jocelyn Stevens




Figure 4.1 A Timeline of the Government Review of Policies Relating to the Historic Environment

Source: English Heritage

and then Sir Neil Cossons (English Heritage 2000a: 2). The Discussion Papers produced by these working groups were the end result of the first round of consultations, and from there were put forward to the public in the second round of consultations (English Heritage 2000a: 2). A number of principles and objectives were listed in the invitation as expected outcomes, including:

- a long-term vision;
- an agenda for action;
- a broad, holistic definition of the historic environment;
- the role played by the historic environment in terms of cohesion, regeneration and inclusion;
- an understanding of its economic potential;
- ways of increasing access; and
- the formulation of efficient instruments for its protection (English Heritage 2000a: 3).

The five working groups were organized around these key objectives, culminating in:

Working Group 1: The Historic Environment: Condition, Trends and Future Contexts

Working Group 2: Public Involvement and Access

Working Group 3: Tourism

Working Group 4: Regulation, Statutory Procedures, Protection and Characterization

Working Group 5: Sustainability, Economic and Social Growth

It would be impossible to provide a close analysis of the discussions undertaken by all five groups; what follows, then, involved examining a selection of documents and exchanges taking place primarily between members of Working Group 1, which was given the remit of developing a new definition of the historic environment:

This final definition will be **a leading element** of the Report to Ministers, and it must therefore be the foundation for a compelling case that a well-protected, publicly-appreciated and sensibly-used historic environment is **central to a healthy and prosperous modern society** ... It will need to consider the meaning of England within a British and European context, and to reflect regional and local diversity; it must also be **fully open to new and emerging perspectives**

and feeling of ownership from **non-dominant social and ethnic groups** (English Heritage 2000c: 6, emphasis added).

Some readers, justifiably, may question this selectivity but it was difficult to avoid. My justification is that it was this group, as the emphasis in the above quote intends to illustrate, that provided the foundations for a new definition that the remaining groups – and subsequent policies – would adopt for rethinking the nature and uses of heritage.

Working Group 1: The historic environment as 'Pure Wind'

Working Group 1 was made up of individuals affiliated with various university archaeology departments, the Countryside Agency, the Victorian Society, the English Historic Towns Forum, the World Heritage Forum, English Nature, the Heritage Lottery Fund, National Parks, the National Trust, the Black Environment Network, DCMS, DETR and English Heritage. In their first meeting, group members were given three general background documents to foster discussion: a background paper, *About the Review* (2000b); a briefing for each working group, and; *Canvassing Ideas* (2000d), along with a document that specifically summarized the remit of Work Group 1, *Outline Discussion Paper* (English Heritage 2000e: 1). In addition to those finding expression in the *Invitation to Participate*, three further themes were highlighted in these documents:

- The past's crucial role in the future: why is the historic environment so important?
- The significance of local-ness and the commonplace, for its own sake and as the context for the special and the outstanding;
- Thinking about England's not English Heritage: Encompassing the need to look at the historic environment in England, rather than at the English historic environment (English Heritage 2000b: 5, emphasis in original).

Taking place within the context of severe scrutiny in response to charges of institutional racism in the 1990s, the definitions used to craft a new sense of belonging through culture and heritage were extremely important. At the same time that policymakers were attempting to loosen the grips of social, political and economic exclusion, they were also appealing for an inclusive national identity and a set of traditional, core values, which, for the heritage sector, would prove to be a particularly challenging ask. National 'identity' and 'cohesion' are, crucially, the likely markers around which other aspirations for identity revolve;

how, then, could the sector promote a sense of identity emblematic of an inclusive society by drawing on an understanding of heritage that is evidently exclusive? Whether it was conscious or not, what follows in this chapter is the piecing together of a discursive sleight-of-hand that allowed the subtle re-framing of the nation's past to stand in for a new discourse of cultural inclusion. Primarily, this saw 'heritage' re-labelled the 'historic environment', and a shift away from affirmations of genuine inclusion towards an implicitly crafted policy of assimilation. The first task in this process was to step away from criticisms that had been hounding dominant framings of 'heritage' since the early 1980s and suggest that what was on offer, the newly termed 'historic environment', was in essence democratic and universal. Any instances of exclusion could then be framed as rooted in unadapted difference or a failure to become more 'like us' (Young 2002), both of which could be structurally tackled with the introduction of the new product. What I am suggesting, quite boldly, is that the incorporation of social inclusion triggered a need to change *something*, or to be *seen* to change something; meanwhile, the weighty traditions of British 'heritage' were shored up and shipped out under a different name. Eleonora Belfiore (2009) puts this more bluntly in her recent paper, 'On bullshit in cultural policy practice and research: Notes from the British case', in which she cites what Lutz (1988) refers to as doublespeak:

What is doublespeak? Doublespeak is language which pretends to communicate but really doesn't. It is language which makes the bad seem good, the negative appear positive, the unpleasant appear attractive, or at least tolerable. It is language which avoids or shifts responsibility, language which is at variance with its real or purported meaning. It is language which conceals or prevents thought. Doublespeak is language which does not extend thought but limits it (p. 40, cited in Belfiore 2009: 347).

The term 'historic environment' is one such form of doublespeak; or, to borrow from George Orwell, is a form of political language designed '... to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind' (1946: 120, cited in Belfiore 2009: 347). But how was this done?

To begin the task of re-crafting heritage as the historic environment the two terms were defined as follows:

'Historic environment' appears to be the more objective. Simply, it means the historic dimensions of the current environment, those

parts which derive from the past and from human activity (English Heritage 2000e: 2; see also 2000f, j).

Heritage conversely primarily carries a strong sense of being culturally significant, even of being cherished. It is certainly subjective and it raises the clear (but difficult) issue of ownership (English Heritage 2000e: 2).

If, as the textual relationships suggest, there is a purposeful, discursive distinction taking place between 'heritage' and 'the historic environment', we need to ask why? What does this distinction achieve or mask? While it may seem inevitable to suggest that there is an issue of power and control hidden amongst the textual workings here, it is a suggestion I want to make nonetheless. This is because I see it as an instance of what Fairclough refers to as 'hidden power', in which the construction of a neutral historic environment and a subjective heritage brings with it a certain level of implicit control and power precisely because this transference from neutral to subjective is a *mediated* one. And it is mediated by elements of the AHD discussed in Chapter 3, whether they are muted or obvious, and authorized, as we shall see, but those already accepted within the heritage management process.

This assertion that heritage is subjective and thus open to conflict, debate and contestation in a way that the historic environment is not was the first of many important steps in this process, for from this point onwards the latter could be assumed to mean '... what it says on the box' (Interviewee [23], English Heritage, 8th September 2005). By contrast, the subjectivity of heritage in the above statement is used to legitimize, or is perhaps *legitimized by*, the clarification of the two terms. The former is to be approached with scepticism, while the latter is a far more trustworthy concept, a move that has had long-lasting effects:

INTERVIEWEE [12]: I am not sure how you are defining heritage for your purposes, but we talk about the historic environment rather than heritage, which is quite a cultural concept. The historic environment is a lot easier to define ... (Council for British Archaeology, 8th June 2005).

INTERVIEWEE [16]: It has been felt that the historic environment more accurately captures what we are trying to talk about in a way that heritage doesn't, because heritage has very strong connotations in peoples' minds. (DCMS, 18th July 2005).

INTERVIEWEE [1]: Unfortunately, as I said earlier, what seems to be happening is that rather than changing the way we think, we've just changed the title of what we do ... and we just pay lip-service to it (English Heritage, 10th November 2004).

From this point onwards the term 'historic environment' is conceptualized as the *historic* components of the world we see around us. It is projected into the sector at a point above the idea of heritage, where it is able to account for *any* aspect of the past, irrespective of class, gender, race, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, and so forth.

INTERVIEWEE [14]: ... at DCMS they have taken on board that certainly English Heritage now **insist** on the [term] historic environment, and they specifically changed the name of their division [referring here to the Architecture and Historic Environment Division] ... Probably in terms of what we do 'historic environment' is a **safer term** ... (English Heritage, 4th July 2005, emphasis added).

In this position, the historic environment can be envisaged as all-encompassing, making it very difficult to argue a case for exclusion or conflict. This is not simply a rejection of conflicting points of view, however; it is a rejection of the idea that the historic environment can *ever* be unpleasant or difficult. Underpinning these statements is the idea that this switch in terms somehow has the potential to tame 'the past' and render it amenable. Old scars will fade away and past tensions eradicated, leaving us with the aesthetics of age. This is a linguistic strategy employed to separate those things that are too difficult so that they fall beyond or outside of the social practice of management and is inevitably guided by the notion that our engagements with the past should be positive: it is 'our inheritance', after all.

The introduction of the concept historic environment did not, however, mean jettisoning 'heritage' altogether. Indeed, a lot of energy was spent establishing the binaries and working through the ways in which the former contrasts to, or can be distinguished from, the latter, with heritage meaning '... very different things to different people', while 'the historic environment' was seen as '... a more neutral term' (English Heritage 2000g: 5).

Names are powerful – once something is named, ideas about it become fixed. Once a building is listed, when it is called heritage, for example, responses to it change rapidly (English Heritage 2000g: 4).

Wide acceptance that the new philosophy will be founded on a holistic definition of the historic environment, within which heritage sits (i.e. those things that we choose to try to keep and which one or more parts of the community regard as special) (English Heritage 2000h: 1–2).

Recognizing this and forming a view on which parts of the historic environment are most precious is the first step to deciding what should be kept or modified, and in what form – in other words, to sustaining our heritage for the future (G. Fairclough 1997: 16).

Setting up the two terms in this way allowed for a feeling of progression to permeate the relations binding the two together. This progression suggests a transition from neutral to subjective (or historic environment to heritage) and, moreover, this transition appears to occur within a distinct phase of the management process. What is striking about this alignment is the suggestion that people ascribe value and meaning – subjectivity – only once it has been signalled as heritage – only once *the management process* has plucked something out as worthy. ‘Things’, as is pointed out by the statements above, are re-framed by an authority. It is only from this point onwards that different parts of the community can begin to ascribe or attach meaning. This has important consequences for notions of inclusion in its combining of paternalism and assimilation. As the first quote in the sequence above suggests, names are powerful, as is the process of *naming*. Those in a position to *name* something as heritage are thus also in a position to ultimately control meaning and value, and as a consequence render redundant those organic meanings and values developing outside of expertise or the dominant majority. This, in turn, will have significant implications for any attempts to develop ideas of heritage independent of the management process. Three notable points can be extracted from this: first, those involved in the review are far more comfortable with the notion of ‘historic environment’; second, this notion shares considerable conceptual space with Handler’s (1988: 14) notion of ‘things’ or materiality; and finally, these ‘things’ are somehow symbolically removed from the sticky area of ownership in a way that heritage is not. Possession, it must be assumed, enters at the national collective level, which is similarly naturalized as objective and unproblematic.

To explore these ideas further it is worth reflecting on the discursive work undertaken by the remaining working groups, which by this

point had ‘... moved away from the idea of heritage to the wider idea of the historic environment, which encompasses all of the **physical remains of the past**’ (English Heritage 2000q: 5, emphasis added). This would allow discussions undertaken by Working Group 2 to centre upon an idea of the historic environment, and I quote, ‘in its broadest sense’ (English Heritage 2000i: 3), encompassing:

- All the physical evidence which form today’s landscape ...;
- Every aspect of the built environment ...;
- Any objects which either survive in situ or which have been removed to a museum environment; and
- Sites, buildings and landscapes which are not protected by law as well as those which are protected (English Heritage 2000i: 3).

Immediately obvious is the fact that ‘in its broadest sense’ is a default position. Beyond the theorizing and questioning ongoing within group one, there is simply a reversion to the norm, or the naturalized category of ‘things’ characterized in Chapter 3. The familiarity of sites, monuments and buildings does have the more recent addition of landscapes in tow, but this collective simply rehearses assumptions developed in the 1970s and 80s. Moreover, the privileging of these key elements became part of a widespread attempt to regulate the idea of heritage to the public – for this is the working group dealing with public involvement and access.

Working Group 2’s discussions elicited the following remarks, which raise a number of points pertinent to this chapter:

The significance of the historic environment derives from our need to engage with and celebrate our collective inheritance and to share what we most value with future generations. Participation with the historic environment nurtures individual and collective identities and provides inspiration, delight, knowledge and a sense of belonging (English Heritage 2000v: 3).

By promoting the culturally diverse nature of heritage we can achieve:

- recognition of the role of other cultures and what cultures owe to each other;
- the relevant inclusion of different cultures, therefore situating members of the community in a shared history that can be a revelation; and

- recognition that the outlook and behaviour of each of us affects the future of the world (English Heritage 2000v: 4).

First and foremost, the discourse of cohesion woven throughout this extract borrows heavily from the exclusive language of the AHD, and the way it frames and understands heritage (or the historic environment in this case). Despite nods to diversity there is still a desire to trudge towards 'demands for cultural sameness and articulations of assimilation around core values that provide the syntactical glue that both founds social cohesion and marks out that which is distinctively British' (Lewis and Neal 2005: 437). Most striking is the unrealistic picture the above paints of Britain and the ability of a mono-cultural and monolithic understanding of the past to promote feelings of belonging and shared values amongst the diversity of cultures living within the country. Let me be clear about this: in 2007, attempts were made to celebrate – those were the terms used (see Blair 2006) – the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade, a year-long celebration that was unequivocally divisive in its reception. Asking, for example, African Caribbean groups to 'delight' in the history and heritage of slavery is absurd. Two questions therefore need to be asked: who are the we and our drawn upon in the opening of this extract, and who determines the relevant inclusion of their histories? The answers to those questions appear to be that first, talk of heritage needs to be done in such a way as to avoid naming those groups to which the stories relate and refer. Such avoidance will simultaneously reinforce notions of 'us' and 'them' whilst prompting little focus on the hegemonic constructions of a white and middle-class national narrative. Second, in borrowing from the broader and cosier concept of 'cohesion', these extracts imply that relevant histories, in common with generic depictions of community, must stress that heritage is 'good', safe and consensual (Smith and Waterton 2009b). As Wohl et al. (2006: 7) point out, this positioning of positive aspects of a national past (the feel-good factor) presents an example of 'ingroup glorification', though which one group is characterized as 'better' or 'more worthy' than others (Wohl et al. 2006; see also Baumeister and Hastings 1997). Particular narratives (those deemed relevant) can therefore be used as mechanisms that will promote a particular ideal of Britishness and consensus (Waterton et al. 2010). What is constructed, however, is an idea of Britishness that denies the realities of conflict and dissonance between different social groups, along with the realities of racism, class and other forms of inequality.

What, then, was meant by 'inclusion' in this context? For Working Group 4:

Inclusiveness was important but it needed to be realized that the more lay people became involved, the more issues that were important or features which were valuable to them needed to be catered for (English Heritage 2000l: 4).

Inclusiveness, it was noted, could '... become obtrusive' (English Heritage 2000l: 4). Here the issue of hidden power is raised again, such that the pervasiveness of the term 'historic environment', in tandem with the emergence of a serious agenda to combat social exclusion, no longer seems believable in terms of *coincidence*. Instead, it seems to have quite a bit more to do with an implicit struggle for control over heritage and the corporate identity of a number of prominent heritage institutions battling the lingering accusations of institutional racism. The following extract puts this into sharper terms, emphasizing that appeals to inclusion very much trade in acts of assimilation:

INTERVIEWEE [20]: ... [there are] perceptual barriers – 'heritage is not for me, you are not covering my heritage', because of what you are using and because of the stories you tell within those buildings ... it is the story of an elite, it is the story of a white, upper-class elite, and that is irrelevant to most of us in many ways ... So, 'that is not heritage that we understand as part of our culture so why would we come to visit you in your stately home'. But **it is**, so there is the perceptual barrier (English Heritage, 25th August 2005, emphasis in interview).

For this interviewee, it simply boils down to the fact that the relevance of the dominant idea of heritage has not yet been communicated beyond a particular social group. How best to manage this situation came down to a question of marketing or modification:

INTERVIEWER: It strikes me that there are two tasks and one is to market what you have already got, so that new 'audiences' are 'achieved', but at the same time, shouldn't you be trying to develop a new understanding of what it is you actually do, what heritage is?

INTERVIEWEE [19]: Those are two very different tasks and the organization is really only going to do the former. They will only really worry about the former (English Heritage, 25th August 2005).

Ultimately, the assumption on offer from this exchange is that a particular notion of heritage has been naturalized and accepted as commonsense. The impulse behind social inclusion thus becomes entirely about encouraging 'others' to accept, enjoy and, fundamentally, *visit* that particular notion of heritage:

... that is, can we re-package our product (ie the definition) so as to sell it more effectively, or should we go further and modify it so that it fits the needs of a wider section of the population. This can be achieved by taking three broad themes ...:

- Our cultural environments as seen by foreign visitors;
- Meanings of Englishness; and
- So-called minority and counter cultures (English Heritage 2000e: 3).

Immediately, it is obvious that 'so-called minority and counter cultures' are, by definition, the 'other', as much positioned outside the narratives of Englishness as tourists from overseas. Two further points are important: first, the possibility that social inclusion may well be satisfied through a process of re-branding and, second, that the re-branding appears to be taking place at the level of the nation. However, if the idea of Englishness alluded to in other parts of the consultation process is woven into broader discussions of social inclusion we are left with a very questionable idea of belonging. As Gail Lewis (2005: 539) points out, these attempts at inclusion plug into the 'longevity of symbolic struggles "for" the nation', in which the limits of Englishness, belonging, inheritance and inclusion are negotiated. As a consequence, the past becomes a central possession of an identity project fuelled by nationalism, or Englishness, and a very distinct manufacturing of commonality comes to mediate the processes of 'fitting in' (Fortier 1999: 42). These are not the processes of a genuine mixing of cultures; they are attempts to accommodate 'so-called minority and counter cultures' within what Naidoo (2009: 68) calls 'a broadly assimilationist view of overarching British values'. Think, for a moment, of the consequences were a minority group, in any guise, to agitate for something more than minority recognition in the heritage sector. What if, for example, as Amin (2002: 21) puts it, theirs was 'a bid for the centre ... a

claim of *full* citizenship – a tacit exposition and rejection of the assumption that to be British/English is to be White or part of White culture'? What we would get – indeed, what we have got – is the rising visibility of a backlash against the perceived threat to national cohesion and a shared national identity:

They came, they've stayed, and too many want to remake Britain in their image! And they will succeed, unless you stand up and protect the heritage handed down to you by your forbearers (The British National Party, 28 February 2009).⁵

This idea of England being a multicultural centre for community has served only to dilute our sovereignty and our national identity. As Britons, we have our own culture, our own society, our own language and our own lifestyle ... We are happy with our culture and have no desire to change, and we really don't care how you did things where you came from. This is OUR COUNTRY, OUR LAND AND OUR LIFESTYLE, and we will allow you every opportunity to enjoy all this (FG001, 22 February 2009).⁶

The second quote above reappears with unnerving regularity on internet discussion boards in the UK, America, France and Australia, with the words 'England' and 'Britons' simply adapted for each national context.

The second consultation, identity and the role of expertise

The discussion papers that emerged from the deliberations of the five working groups formed part of a second consultation process, which saw the debates thrown over to the public. Some 3500 people and organizations were asked to participate in this element of the review (of which c.630 responded) and were sent an envelope entitled *Review of Policies Relating to the Historic Environment: We Want Your Viewpoint* (English Heritage 2000t). Inside, participants found six individual pamphlets: *Our Questions for You* (English Heritage 2000m), *Understanding* (English Heritage 2000n), *Belonging* (English Heritage 2000u), *Experiencing* (English Heritage 2000o), *Caring* (English Heritage 2000p) and *Enriching* (English Heritage 2000q). In these pamphlets, the desire to distinguish 'heritage' from the 'historic environment' is evident in the introductory paper, *Our Questions for You*:

The historic environment is not the same as heritage, although some of the historic environment undoubtedly forms part of the

heritage ... Some parts of the historic environment, such as World Heritage Sites, are of such value that their conservation and management are matters of international concern; there are others which few would consider worth preserving. This is where the idea of heritage comes in. We use the word 'heritage' to mean those things inherited from the past that people wish to pass on to the future (English Heritage 2000m: 6).

The question of 'worthiness', as raised in the previous section, is evident. The inevitable implication of expertise and possession radiates from the use of the pronoun 'we', and a reiteration of a kind of transformative power to turn parts of the 'historic environment' into 'heritage', via the detection of worthiness and expertise, is implied. Interesting, also, is the primacy put upon the notions of inheritance and patrimony as a point of distinction between the two concepts, where the primacy of the AHD mediates an acute sense of reverence and perpetuity. This idea of patrimony works only to reinforce the idea of expertise, and ensures that the transformative power of 'the expert' is shackled not only to the process but the end product of heritage as well. Following from this, heritage becomes those *material* aspects of the historic environment that particular experts have deemed worthy of conserving for future generations:

It [the historic environment] has a crucial role to play in shaping the future, contributing to our sense of cultural identity, and reinforcing a sense of place and local and regional identities. Underlying all this is the belief that a well-understood, well-protected, publicly-appreciated and sensibly-used historic environment is central to a healthy and prosperous modern society (English Heritage 2000n: 6; see also 2000k).

INTERVIEWEE [23]: I think English Heritage's real responsibility is to devote what resources it can to the care and understanding of the historic environment to make its management better, to increase access to it and to pass it on to future generations better than we found it ... (English Heritage, 8th September 2005).

The value judgements that radiate from the above statements express notions of 'doing things better'. In various ways, the idea I am developing here pursues a variety of scholars who have theorized identity, although not always in terms of heritage, such as Sharon Macdonald,

Paul du Gay, Stuart Hall and Michael Keith. In particular, I am drawing on the work of Macdonald (2002, 2003, 2005), who deals with identity work in relation to the nation, museums and the public. Here, Macdonald (2003: 3) develops the argument that '[j]ust "having a museum" was itself a performative utterance of having an identity, and this formula was "pirated" or replicated at other levels of local governance ...'.

With a close borrowing of Macdonald's work, I want to suggest that having 'the historic environment', which is transformable into a safe and carefully guarded 'heritage', is likewise 'a performative utterance of having an identity'. In the above, identity is paratactically related to regional and local identity, in that 'cultural' is coordinated by the additional identities of 'regional' and 'local' – the latter exist as part of a collective of identities, but are not reducible to that of 'cultural identity'. As such, this cultural identity is assumed to operate at the level of the nation, an idea reinforced with the addition of the preceding sentence, which discusses 'modern society', again operating at the national level. Taken as a whole, the above excerpts have interesting things to say about the particular shaping of identity being rehearsed and performed. This identity is based upon the qualities of being 'well-understood', 'well-protected', 'publicly-appreciated' and 'sensibly-used', which combine to create a 'better managed' historic environment. This statement finds synergy with the ideas of preservation and Englishness developed by Schwyzer (1999: 58), who remarks that: 'Today, it is upkeep itself, not what is being kept up, that expresses the spirit of the nation'. While Schwyzer is referring specifically to the scouring of a White Horse on an Oxfordshire hillside, the point he is making certainly carries relevance:

... what makes the heritage specifically English is not the origin of the objects in question, but the way they are preserved for present and future generations by conscientious scouring (Schwyzer 1999: 58).

This sentiment was presented in recent parliamentary debates concerning the conservation of Stonehenge, where the following statement was made:

Thirteen years ago it was described as a national disgrace. If anything, it is worse now. We have the chance to address the problem and the sooner we put it right the better. It would end

a shameful period for our country (Hansard House of Commons Debates 25th January 2007 c535WH [Mr John Whittingdale, Heritage]).⁷

It is Englishness, personified, the ability to effectively and conscientiously protect and preserve the past and foster a desire to continue that act, or performance, of a very sterile sense of preservation. In research on country house visiting in England, Smith (2006: 136, emphasis in original) identifies a similar sense of Englishness as tied to conservation: 'Here the Country House, and more specifically **its conservation**, was something that set England apart and defined its identity.' This idea is exemplified further in *Viewpoint: Experiencing*, which begins with the assertion that:

We could claim that:

tourism in the historic environment should be built upon the achievement of world-class standards in the promotion, interpretation, accessibility, management and sustainable care of the historic environment for the benefit of everyone living in and visiting England (English Heritage 2000o: 5).

This conceptualization of 'tourism in the historic environment' is *entirely* built around the *act* of preservation and interpretation, as it is that act itself that is regarded as English heritage, or '... historically transcendent Englishness' (Schwyzer 1999: 58). National identity thus becomes explicitly harnessed to the ability of organizations, tourist site operators and members of the general public to efficiently communicate preservation *par excellence* to their visitors, audiences and users. The relationship almost becomes circular: particular objects, sites and places are selectively presented and ostentatiously preserved to world-class standards as 'heritage', while at the same time, that very act of preservation – again to world-class standards – itself *creates* heritage and a distinct sense of Englishness.

However, it is in the fifth document in the suite that one finds the clearest attempt to bracket the right to name and define heritage away from 'them' to 'us'. In much of the debate showcased in this consultation document, those not seen as experts – and those not seen as part of the 'majority' – were bracketed as guests, audiences or recipients of signifiers of a particular (read here white, national and middle-class) culture, history and identity. The historic environment, as understood

through such a singular and consensual view, was the notion that needed to be peddled to wider audiences:

If we are to argue that the conservation of the historic environment brings social benefits, then it is **important to demonstrate** that benefits accrue to as many people as possible (English Heritage 2000q: 8, emphasis added).

77% of people polled by MORI recently did not identify the heritage as 'who we are/part of our identity'. Clearly, more **work needs to be done to demonstrate** that the historic environment provides a **universal social benefit** (English Heritage 2000q: 8, emphasis added).

If we are to pass on to future generations what we value, we will need to **recognize that** the historic environment **is relevant to us all** (English Heritage 2000q: 17, emphasis added).

There is something implicitly patronizing about these quotes, which suggest that 'guests', users and audiences are passive and uncritical in their engagements. The two-pronged manoeuvre that resonates in this final paper, *Enriching* (itself an interesting title), is justified and legitimized through explicit forms of moral evaluation, or moralization that interweaves with rationalization, with both types of legitimization strongly foregrounded. This combination evokes, and appeals to, a value system that appears universal and self-justified, with a singular idea of heritage (marked as 'the heritage') imagined at its core. Conditional semantic relations tie these extracts together and counter-balance the need to achieve social inclusion with the desire to attract, recruit or assimilate more people into existing heritage conceptualizations. Indeed, this conditional construction makes it appear that the 77% of people unable to identify with heritage are at a moral disadvantage, and need to be encouraged to take their place alongside the 23% of people who can identify. This is a distorted reaction to Hall's (1999: 44) remark cited earlier that '... [t]he National Heritage is a powerful source of such meaning. It follows that those who cannot see themselves reflected in its mirror cannot properly belong', which is impeded by its placement of emphasis not on the mirror itself, but on the ways people attempt to *look into* that mirror.

At this point in the consultation, the content of the historic environment has already been validated and seems more or less beyond reproach.

What remains to be done, in terms of the government's agenda, is to piece together the strategies that will enable the *demonstration* and *recognition* of the relevance of the historic environment by a wider constituency.

INTERVIEWEE [10]: ... the other way of trying to do it [social inclusion] is through promoting tourism ... If they see it and can understand it because you present it in that way, they will begin to, well ... to put it crudely, they will value it more and take a greater interest in its preservation (English Heritage, 23rd May 2005).

INTERVIEWEE [2]: The government, um, economic value is the one they are bound to understand ... If you can put a number on it, then turn those numbers into pounds, the government understands ... well, you can reduce it to numbers of non-white people who visit places. It is almost racist. But that is the kind of way you have to do it. And you can do it by economic group. It is terribly crude ... It is understood. We [...] it is the game we have to play (English Heritage, 23rd November 2005).

This, however, is not an approach that has met with blanket acceptance within the organizations under discussion:

INTERVIEWEE [20]: I am very worried about the discussions of relevance and I think it is a very patronizing notion in some ways, that disadvantaged groups or socially excluded groups can't actually appreciate mainstream or high culture (English Heritage, 25th August 2005).

INTERVIEWEE [23]: ... one of the things that I have always held is that if you get a lot of the historic environment specialists standing around they always talk about how they can make what they do relevant, and actually it is the wrong way round. If you just take what you do and try to add on a social inclusion dimension and make it relevant, you will fail (English Heritage, 8th September 2005).

At this point, I would like to reflect on earlier discussions, and pull in a number of concepts that make greater analytical contributions when taken together than they do in isolation. These concepts include the

idea of the nation, selective traditions, the transformative power of worthiness and the cultural significance [note the singular] of 'things'. All of these concepts are tied to an implicit requirement to draw upon the role of expertise in order to confer authority and rest upon a presumption of material facticity. Moreover, it is only when inspected in relation to each other that the insipid nature of the power relations maintaining this cultural logic becomes apparent. Here, the concept of 'inalienable possessions' as developed by Weiner (1992) and later by Lahn (1996) offers a useful reminder of the underlying specifics of that cultural logic. Three of the above concepts demonstrate this logic immediately: (a) the existence of a selective tradition that infers and anchors (b) the cultural significance of 'things' specifically at the (c) level of the nation. Operating in and around this is the inflection of power that allows a select few to clip, shape, define and label this collective idea *heritage* and make it *matter*; moreover, they make it matter in terms of possession through the transformative power of worthiness. Arbitrating between the historic environment and heritage, and holding the power to make one shift and turn into the other – or at least *saying* that that is the case – significantly boosts the power held by expertise and heritage institutions. This is because the 'peopleless' heritage constructed in the 1970s remains people-less for the majority of the management process; it remains people-less until it is already transformed into heritage and only then is it possible for people to enter the process and ascribe meaning (see Waterton 2009). This also finds synergy with Weiner's (1992) notion of 'keeping-while-giving', also explored by Lahn (1996), although I want to shape the notion a little further. What I want to suggest is that this very careful structuring of heritage is itself an inalienable possession, and thus subject to the intricacies of keeping-while-giving, an idea that is particularly visible within the context of multiculturalism. Heritage and the management process have traditionally been withheld from the public, certainly in a productive sense and to some degree in a consumptive sense. Both have been defended by appeals to objectivity, rationality and universality (Smith 2004, 2006), re-imagined as subjective, embodied and experienced only through the mediation of expertise. Moreover, as Weiner (1992: 10) points out, '[t]he person or group that controls (and thus defines) the movement and meaning of such objects inherits an authority and a power over others'. In this regard, the hidden powers I have discussed at various points throughout this chapter gain greater clarity with the addition of Weiner's theorization.

Accounting for the power of place

If the barriers to involvement can be overcome, the historic environment has the potential to strengthen the sense of community and provide a solid basis for neighbourhood renewal. This is the power of place (English Heritage 2000r: 23).

Power of Place: The Future of the Historic Environment is an important product of the consultation processes reviewed in the preceding sections, as is also *The Historic Environment: A Force for our Future*.⁸ Both documents share in common a similar timeframe and impetus. The first of these, *Power of Place*, was the culmination of over 200 letters from the first consultation, c.630 responses to the second consultation, and the deliberations of over 180 experts, all of which were supplemented by a commissioned MORI poll (English Heritage 2000r). As such, the document, while compiled and published by English Heritage, is not, as English Heritage itself points out 'an English Heritage report' (English Heritage 2000r: 1). The second publication, *A Force for our Future*, is the government's 'vision of the historic environment' (CLG 2004: 1) and a continuation of the consultation process embodied by *Power of Place*.⁹ Both documents arose as a direct response to the arrival of discourses of social inclusion and were developed in a political context still anxious over accusations of institutional racism.

Statements defining the historic environment¹⁰ can be found in both documents:

The historic environment is what generations of people have made of the places in which they live. It is all about us. We are the trustees of that inheritance. It is, in every sense, a common wealth (English Heritage 2000r: 4).

The past is all around us. We live our lives, whether consciously or not, against a backdrop formed by historic buildings, landscapes and other physical survivals of our past. But the historic environment is more than just a matter of physical remains. It is central to how we see ourselves and to our identity as individuals, communities and as a nation (DCMS 2001a: 7).

Both definitions use the definite reference 'is', but while these are markers of existential assumptions and epistemic modality, they lose leverage in both statements due to the commitment to a very broad – and vague

– notion of something that ‘... is all about us’ and ‘all around us’. While the first statement draws attention to the primacy of physical surroundings, it also makes concessions towards more ephemeral notions. In so doing, the ‘historic environment’ appears to lose the safeness gathered around the term in the consultation period, and becomes a more tenuous ‘everything’. In this instance, the careful cultivation of a term designed to possess objectivity and distance from the emotional and subjective content of heritage collapses. Thus, a process designed to challenge past perceptions of heritage has resulted in an open-ended understanding of what *might* constitute the historic environment. This, in itself, is not necessarily a problem. What I am interested in is ascertaining whether this notion is fleeting (or not). However we look at this apparent openness, it is also apparent that what has remained intact is the dominant idea that ‘the past’ is inherited and held in trust for future generations. As we are reminded in *A Force for our Future* (DCMS 2001a: 33), the task is ‘to protect and sustain the historic environment for the benefit of our own and future generations’. This notion of patrimony has a pervasive hold, becoming something akin to fetishism in which it is the duty of care that is sought after and revered as a source of identity. Again, it is worth remembering that *this* is the central and core assumption of any nuance of the AHD. As Choay (2001: 165) remarks, it is ‘... [a]s if an image of human identity could be constructed by the accumulation of all these accomplishments, all these traces’.

Tied up with the notion of patrimony are the inevitable notions of hierarchy and ranking – if there is an accepted duty of care, alongside the acknowledgement that we do not have the resources to care for everything, then only some things will be selected: and those things will be ‘the best’. The ‘everything’ included in earlier discussions has all but evaporated:

The historic environment is as fragile as it is precious. It is not renewable. If we fail to protect and sustain it we risk losing permanently **not just the fabric itself**, but the history of which it is a **visible expression ... the best of our past** (DCMS 2001a: 33, emphasis added).

Keeping **the best from the past** provides a powerful justification for gracing our surroundings with the very best of the new (English Heritage 2000r: 4, emphasis added).

Claims that the historic environment is the visible expression of history allow those elements of the past selected as worth narrating to be

presented and imagined in an unmediated way. Such objects become ciphers for that past; a past that is validated by those considered expert in the care and management of physical remains. In a process in which only 'the best' is imagined, perhaps the most essential elements involved will be the machinery that ranks and selects the 'best' and those operators with the knowledge and expertise to manage the machinery. Who, in these statements, is doing the *keeping*? Who is the 'we' acting to *protect* and *sustain*? Who dominates the value systems that work to legitimize the entire – and seemingly inevitable – process? What is interesting is that tenacity with which these assumptions continue to cling to overall ideas of heritage as sites, monuments and buildings, and permeate new framings of the historic environment:

England's historic environment is one of our greatest national resources. From prehistoric monuments to great country houses, from medieval churches to the towns of the Industrial Revolution, it is a uniquely rich and precious inheritance (Jowell and Byers 2001: 4).

Jowell and Byers (2001: 4), cited above, lend credence to the existence of the value system respected for its salience with the AHD. In the two sentences authored by the then Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Jowell) and the then Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions (Byers), a narrative that weaves nationalism, materiality and patrimony is revealed.

So far, it has been possible to comment briefly upon the texturing of social inclusion with heritage discourses by examining some implicit changes in the latter, but it is far more revealing to explore this articulation head on. To do so, it is necessary to examine those instances within which these discourses are more explicitly – and extensively – bound together. Quite what is meant by social inclusion across the heritage sector is difficult to assess, as the term is used in disparate ways. For *Power of Place* and *A Force for our Future* it means:

No-one should be excluded from benefiting from the historic environment (English Heritage 2000r: 28).

The task: to make the historic environment accessible to everyone and ensure that it is seen as something with which the whole of society can identify and engage (DCMS 2001a: 25).

In these statements, a somewhat patchy narrative is woven, the warp and weft of which attempts to sew together contradictory notions of

nationhood, exclusion, wellbeing and 'the historic environment'. Essentially, this is because the above notions of social inclusion are being fused with the proposition that the historic environment is 'safe', 'conflict-free', 'objective' and 'omnipresent', something that quite naturally asserts these values universally – in part because it is validated by experts who deal with the very physicality of the past. Yet, if this is the case, surely there is already inclusion? If the historic environment is by *its very nature inclusive*, why, then, do we need policies to make it so?

The historic environment **should** be seen as something which all sections of the community can identify with and take pride in, rather than something valued only by narrow specialist interests (DCMS 2001a: 30, emphasis added).

The study of history is incomplete if it does not take into account the way the historic environment reflects the multi-cultural and many-layered development of England (English Heritage 2000r: 23).

The above quotes go some way towards more honestly recognizing the inequity caught up in the management process, although there still appears to be some hesitancy in acknowledging the contested nature of the past. This hesitancy is signalled by the use of the word should, which signals a weakened commitment to the sentiment expressed. Indeed, as Interviewee [1] points out, this commitment is not just weak, it is almost entirely absent from operations:

What is really interesting is the new agenda of facilitating, enabling and advocacy ... I become a facilitator for the community to explore their heritage and an enabler to assist in the legitimization of **their** points of view, of what **they** find significant and what **they** find valuable, and then, you know enable or facilitate a balance being struck. Whereas, in my colleagues, a lot of them, I have just said ... what I have just said is heresy (English Heritage, 10th November 2004, emphasis added).

The notion of social inclusion thus remains a difficult and uncomfortable concept for the heritage sector to accommodate, as it brings to the surface an assumption that it is not always safe or good. It can also be threatening to the identity of expertise. More than that, it can be excluding, and in that sense, cruel – a notion that does not sit well with the dominant understandings of heritage. What is surfacing here is an implicit recognition that social inclusion, as it stands, is assimilatory, rather than

inclusive, as there is far less risk involved in that approach. The acceptance of values outside of expertise, or outside of a single-cultural and single-layered discourse of heritage is not yet possible. Instead, social inclusion, in this assimilatory guise, will continue to create and operate around the same exclusionary sense of 'heritage'.

The primary evidence underpinning social inclusion policy was the qualitative and quantitative data gathered from the MORI survey (c. 3000 participants) conducted as part of the *Power of Place* consultation process. It was this survey that highlighted – in a language decipherable by government and institution alike – the reality of the level of exclusion felt by a large proportion of the population:

In the MORI survey, many people expressed interest in the heritage but nevertheless felt excluded from it ... Only a quarter of Black people said they had made a special trip to the countryside in the past year, and both Black and Asian people were less likely than White people to visit stately homes (English Heritage 2000r: 25).

Particularly noteworthy in the above statement is the somewhat non-chalance with which the author remarks upon the disinterest of 'Black' and 'Asian' people in stately homes. Work by Smith (2006: 160–161) demonstrates the degree to which stately homes and country houses conform to the authorized heritage discourse, engendering feelings of social and cultural comfort and security, and negotiating a sense of social legitimacy of '... what it means to be middle class' – a White middle-class. As such, it is hardly surprising that these symbols of a very particular idea of heritage work to exclude and alienate. What *is* surprising is their mention in the above quotation at all. What it demonstrates is the naturalization of the AHD. The inequalities already tied up with the idea of 'the stately home' are completely missed through this process of naturalization, so that the overall tenor of the statement seems to revolve around *why* Black and Asian people are not visiting this heritage. That this form of heritage, as the dominant idea of English heritage, might be exclusionary or irrelevant escapes the author(s) of the document *as well as those interpreting it*. Indeed, it does not appear a possibility that stately homes *might not* engender a sense of place, feelings of belonging or inclusion to those groups who are not incorporated within its image. If nothing else, it is a first glimpse of the way in which the inclusion discourse

is mixing with the existing heritage discourse, and a clue as to the eventual shape their amalgamation would take, skating considerably closer to assimilation than is often recognized. Premature though it may be in the context of this chapter, it can also be read as a cautionary note that borrows from Hall (1999: 7, see also Young 2002), who warns that the heritage debate ‘... has so far stopped short of the frontier defined by that great unspoken British value – ‘whiteness’’. The reason for this, I suggest, is because it *didn’t have to go any further*; the adoption of the term ‘historic environment’ proved action enough within the clamour to demonstrate responsiveness to issues of exclusion, as the following vaguely worded extract from *A Force for our Future* makes clear:

Surveys such as the one conducted by MORI during the *Power of Place* consultation confirm that, while most people acknowledge the significance of the historic environment, there are none the less a substantial number who do not see it as having any relevance to them (DCMS 2001a: 25).

‘Most people’, in the above, do not see a problem with the historic environment; the solution, simply put, is to encourage those who do take issue with its conceptualization to change their minds: a moral evaluation based upon the actions of ‘the majority’. The following extracts all share this theme in common, painting a picture of a dialogically closed relationship in which knowledge exchanges are predominantly one-way:

Visits to heritage sites can also **help people to find out** about diverse aspects of England’s history, society and multicultural heritage and **help people to understand** how the past influences the present (DCMS 2002a: 12).

INTERVIEWEE [14]: ... there is a responsibility on organizations like us **to explain what it is** about the historic environment that is of importance and significance, to be accountable for those decisions, and to make the opportunities that the HE presents as open to as many different people as possible (English Heritage, 4th July 2005).

INTERVIEWEE [14]: ... [the social inclusion agenda of the Labour Government] ...**it means explaining to** all sorts of stakeholders

what is significant and why we have protected a particular site or place (English Heritage, 4th July 2005).

As the implications of inclusion are probed even further, a series of clarifying statements are introduced:

Find out what people value about their historic environment and **take this into account** in assessing significance (Recommendation 9) (English Heritage 2000r: 47, emphasis added).

While take this into account is already a palpably weak statement, it is only when reading the response document produced by DCMS – *A Force for our Future* – that a clearer sense of this weaknesses becomes apparent.

... by learning about their own environment and how they can participate in its evolution, people feel a greater sense of belonging and engagement. On another level, preserving the fabric of the past requires knowledge and expertise (DCMS 2001a: 17).

The elaboration offered by the second sentence in the above quote makes note, for the first time, of the delicate balance threatened by the unification of inclusion discourses with any permutations of the AHD. Preserved within the final ten words of this utterance lies the authority of the AHD, promoting a certain sense of ‘preservation’, ‘fabric’ and ‘expertise’ detected in Chapter 3. The combined sentences also bring forth a purpose (to inspire belonging and engagement), which itself works to legitimize these notions of the AHD. In foregrounding this liberal and humanitarian purpose, the additive belief in expert knowledge is rationalized, legitimized and rendered ‘commonsense’. In much the same way as conservators and heritage managers tend to the physical remains of the past, they now extend their responsibilities towards mentoring and mediating the ways in which the past intersects with the public. The line between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is firmly drawn, with ‘us’ carefully and snugly slotting the ‘them’ in amongst the sites, monuments and buildings that make up the historic environment. Admittedly, this adds a layer of complexity to the narration of heritage favoured by the AHD, but it is a layer easily soothed by notions of expertise. It is further assuaged with the melding of marketing language to the discourses of inclusion:

INTERVIEWEE [14]: They [the government] have set a target, um, for us to increase among our visitors the diversity of the social

profile of **our audiences**. And so we need to find ways of meeting that target and that will, I think, involve sort of **marketing initiatives** ... (English Heritage, 4th July 2005).

INTERVIEWEE [17]: It [social inclusion] means that we need to think more carefully about, um, **making the assets** that we have pretty much available to everyone (English Heritage, 18th July 2005).

The language employed further delineates the assumed differences between 'them' and 'us'; indeed, it constructs for both groups – and the subject binding them together – different names and relationships. With the injection of this new language, germane to the world of marketing, all three players ('them', 'us' and the 'historic environment') are re-housed and re-legitimized. 'Our assets', 'our customers' and 'our audiences' are re-articulated so as to share the same discursive positioning, which is diametrically opposite, as is always the case, to its binary other, in this case 'us'. The performative utterance of identity discussed earlier takes up a sharper focus here, in an instance through which we realize whose performance it really is. This is not, as earlier assumed, necessarily a performance confined to that of national identity, but is one also designed to establish and sustain the corporate identity of the heritage sector as a whole. The separation of 'the expert' and 'the public' is no longer a simple line in the sand, but a rigid and naturalized relationship that is operationalized through the language of policy.

The hybridization of social inclusion and heritage discourses is a complex one, which draws in promotional genres alongside genres of governance (Fairclough 2003: 33), re-contextualizing heritage as a resource or commodity to be branded, re-branded and sold. As Fairclough (2003: 33) points out, this is reflective of the wider colonization of social life by markets, and does not characterize the cultural sector alone. The historic environment, defined by the AHD as physical objects or a 'thing', falls naturally within what Kopytoff (1986: 64) has labelled the '... natural universe of commodities', and both are instrumental to the current biographical shaping of heritage. Through this pairing, heritage becomes a transactional object with social inclusion acting as its counterpart: both are structured into an exchange between 'customer' and 'owner'. While at first this implicit commoditization may seem contradictory (if we are to imagine that appealing for inclusion renders the commodity redundant), it must be remembered that the exchange travels beyond heritage organizations. The entire process is de-personalized into a set of numerical social classes, figures and

monetary amounts. This level of abstraction has heritage re-packaged as things, alongside (and here we have the discursive subject positionings reinforced) people, who similarly become things or numbers. As Interviewee [14] (English Heritage, 4th July 2005) remarks:

DCMS's policies are very much built around participation, so actually visiting heritage sites, which is perhaps, you know, a worthwhile way of looking at these issues. You can count it. You can count it so therefore it counts. Exactly what these measures measure, and what is measured counts ...

In this statement, people undergo a very significant degree of nominalization in which their activities and experiences are categorized within the nominal group 'participation'. This is a process of '... turning activities into things' (Martin 2003: 28), so much so that the memory-work, performativity and acts of remembrance identified by Smith (2006) as central to the heritage process are re-drawn simply as visitor numbers. Semantically, we know that participation *refers* to a lot more than simply crossing the threshold of a site, property or building, but it has somehow become what Martin (2003: 30) refers to as a 'grammatical metaphor' for something else – something that is far less demanding.

Conclusion

The examples used to construct the argument advanced in this chapter all drew from policy documents or interview material. Although the chapter primarily dealt with the British context, it mirrors a broader pattern of assimilationist patterns internationally as different states attempt to deal with and accommodate the consequences of mass migration. In every instance, as Young (2002: 455) points out, 'a social and spatial process of exclusion has occurred in the host country and, concomitant with this, the cultural 'othering' of the immigrant population'. It is against this othering that the real project of inclusion occurs, in conjunction with the much more subtle project of shoring up a core set of traditional values and beliefs. Thus, ethnic minority groups are encouraged to retain their distinctiveness and append ethnic labels to their persons, remaining visible and distinct from 'the majority' and celebrated for their representational ability to project an image of cultural diversity. They are encouraged, at the same time, to acquiesce and assimilate to dominant ideologies but they can never, in this

context, *be* 'the body', to borrow from MacCannell (1992: 170). They are there only to 'be incorporated, contained, "assimilated", taken into the body, eaten up'. Never do they, nor their cultural repertoires, symbolically stand *for* the nation; they merely provide 'the terrain upon which the "host" nation can make its claims to tolerance, civilization and indeed modernity itself' (Lewis 2005: 546–547).

Of course, it is not solely ethnic minority groups who find themselves entangled in this project of inclusion. *Any* group that currently stands outside of the dominant heritage narrative and the cultural symbols that support it is asked to acquiesce. It needs to be remembered that this narrative also makes statements about certain class, religious and gender experiences, with a strong tendency towards the White, male, heterosexual and Christian middle-classes (see, for example, Aitchison 1999; Smith 2008). Although not all are pressed into the same position of 'other', they are, nonetheless, assumed to *be inclined* to form part of, and buy into, the dominant heritage discourse, should they be granted the appropriate social and cultural tools to do so. This type of policy scrambling, as Belfiore (2009: 348) powerfully points out, 'is the type of bullshit', to her mind, that 'has become orthodox in much of contemporary public and policy discourse around the social impacts of the arts'. Belfiore goes further and suggests that political bullshit is 'a proactive strategic communication, meant not to hide a truth or reality or to divert from a particular responsibility, but to create or manage an impression' (p. 351). In this context, that impression came about as a response to criticisms of institutional racism and a need to be seen to be responding, as a sector, to issues of social, cultural, economic and political exclusion. Where the language of social inclusion *has* been taken up in the sector, there has been a tendency towards assimilation rather than presenting an opportunity for equitable dialogue and involvement. It might no longer be delivered with the singular, authoritative voice of the expert, or, as Holden (2004: 24, emphasis in original) puts it, '*[w]e will decide what has intrinsic merit and you will take two teaspoons a day*'; rather, it is expressed with a dialogicality that is slightly less pronounced and with a focus upon commonality and education. In essence, however, 'we' still decide what is heritage, and 'you' – and 'the other' – will be encouraged and appropriately educated to take your two teaspoons voluntarily, rather than simply being instructed.

5

On Being Radical: The Heritage Protection Reform

We in the Government are being radical. We are reforming the way we designate and protect the nation's heritage
(Lammy 2006b: 68).

To this point I have argued that while the introduction of inclusion marked a concession of power within traditional heritage management practices, it was not a shift that signalled total surrender; indeed, the organizational power of the AHD remained something that was continually re-asserted and sustained, albeit in more sophisticated ways than seen in the 1970s and 80s. Through a number of examples, the last chapter told a tale of transformations, ending with the publications of *Power of Place (PoP)* and *Force for our Future* at the turn of the millennium. Here, the transformation of the exclusive term heritage into the seemingly democratic and all-encompassing concept of historic environment was particularly striking.¹ Within this weave was a narrow construction of expertise, a tight line drawn between 'us' and 'them', and a subtle move away from any attempt to re-configure traditional understandings of heritage.

Despite the somewhat truncated outcomes of this first review, a commitment to both public participation and reform took hold, such that, as Hewison and Holden (2004: 6) remark, the policy environment in its aftermath can almost *entirely* be summed up by 'public value' debates and the government's *Heritage Protection Reform* (HPR). Although these deliberations were in large part insular, they were also informed by a range of external political influences raging at the time, such as the retreat from multiculturalism. To avoid overcomplicating this analysis, however, I have opted to focus upon these broader debates in the following chapter, and will focus here upon the notion of public value

and its concretization, using English Heritage's *Conservation Principles* as a case study, followed by an examination of the documents surrounding the HPR.

Although this chapter picks up where the last chapter left off – at the end of 2001 – I want to start slightly out of sequence with a short observation. In 2006, DCMS overhauled its website. The date here is important. One government review of heritage policies (see Chapter 4) was complete and a second, the focus of this chapter, was already well under way. Heritage, at this point, was relocated within the wider web-pages dedicated to the historic environment and emerged from this overhaul with the following definition: '... properties and artefacts of cultural importance handed down from the past' (DCMS 2006a). The historic environment, as the catch-all concept, was defined to comprise historic buildings, ancient monuments, conservation areas and World Heritage Sites (DCMS 2006b). What is notable about this is that with the culmination of the first review, the corpus of 'potential heritages' was supposedly broadened, so much so that '... everyday experiences of streets, buildings, parks, gardens, places of worship, fields, factories, offices, transport, schools, shops and homes registered as an engagement with heritage just as surely as a visit to a country house or a trip to a museum' (Cowell 2004: 24). Indeed, '... even intangible heritage such as language and memory' (Clark 2006: 2) were supposed to find their way into definitions of heritage. Yet, almost three decades after the enactment of the *Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act* (1979), the changes in these definitions seem remarkably circumspect.

In addition to the obvious material focus that continues to dominate, it is also important to note that these definitions work to reinforce the notion that heritage consists of those things plucked out of the historic environment as an important inheritance for future generations (see English Heritage 2005d; UKHERG 2005). Organized in this way, the historic environment simply and objectively *is*, while heritage becomes those aspects of the historic environment that have been deemed *worthy* of positive and protective recognition. This division implied between the two concepts, which tends to map onto a division between expert valuations of the past and what the public may value, is significant for this chapter as it means that debates concerned with the concept of public value could *parallel* discussions regarding the defining and management of heritage. The two areas of debate would never really intersect. The former type of discussion in this pairing is only relevant, it would seem, *once* something has been 'objectively' valued as worthy of protection. As such, the HPR and debates about

public value show little in the way of overlap. Instead, they appear to have trundled along at their own paces in roughly the same period: 2001–2009.

The 'public' value triangle

McGuigan (2004: 35) identifies three discourses of cultural policy: state, market and civil/communicative. As discursive formations, McGuigan (1996: 53), citing Young, argues that these affect situations within which it is '... virtually impossible to think outside of them'. This rudimentary breakdown of cultural policy is somewhat inviting for this volume as the policy documents utilized have progressed through similar discursive imaginings, from the prevailing 'nationalized' heritage of the 1970s, to the 'commercialized' heritage of the 1980s and 1990s, and, more recently, signs of a shift towards a more 'civil society' understanding of heritage triggered by the wider residual crisis of value currently plaguing the cultural sphere, both nationally and internationally (McGuigan 1996: 30). For the heritage sector, attempts to come to grips with this crisis were in part tackled by the commissioning of a report by English Heritage, the DCMS, the DfT and the HLF into the existing valuation of the historic environment in July 2005 (EFTEC 2005). It is also evidenced by the 2003 conference *Valuing Culture*, the 2006 conference *Capturing the Public Value of Heritage*, Tessa Jowell's personal essay *Government and the Value of Culture* (2004), and the National Trust and Accenture's (2006) recent policy document *Demonstrating the Public Value of Heritage*. Similarly, a flurry of publications from a number of influential think tanks – such as *Capturing Cultural Value* (Holden 2004), *Cultural Value and the Crisis of Legitimacy* (Holden 2006), *Challenge and Change: HLF and Cultural Value* (Hewison and Holden 2004), *From Access to Participation: Cultural Policy and Civil Renewal* (Kearney 2006), and *Culture Shock: Main Report* (Wood and Gould n.d.) – substantiates this observation. If any doubt remains about the prominence of 'public value', a quick glance at the webpages for English Heritage should allay those misgivings, as the term can be found almost immediately.

The idea of public value is often credited to Mike Moore and his 1995 publication *Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government*, which, on the whole, was an attempt to comment on and improve managerial thought and practice in the American context. Moore starts from the premise that organizations within the public sector have to create and produce something that is *demonstrably* worth

pursing: they have to prove or justify their purpose. To make this claim, Moore bases his argument on the following assumption:

Because individuals do not choose individually to purchase or contribute to discrete governmental activities, we cannot be sure that individuals want what the government supplies. And if we cannot be sure that individuals want what the government produces, then, by some reckoning at least, we cannot be sure that the government produces anything of value (p. 30).

Public value, then, becomes the tool by which a range of public sector organizations justify their expenditure, not only to government but to the wider community. Although developed particularly with reference to the American context, public value is an idea that is gaining increasing currency beyond the US and has been taken up elsewhere, including Britain, where New Labour has paired it with a managerialist approach to public policy. Key to the British context was the 2002 publication by Kelly et al., *Creating Public Value: An Analytical Framework for Public Service Reform*, which, like Moore's version, seeks to address accountability for the public as well as for government. In a subsequent report sponsored by DCMS (amongst others), Blaug et al. (2006: 27) argue that public value 'remains something that can only be discovered, made and confirmed by the public themselves'.

Stripped back to its crudest, public value is often envisaged as a triangle made up of intrinsic,² instrumental³ and institutional⁴ value (see




Figure 5.1 The Public Value Triangle (adopted from Hewison and Holden 2006: 15)

Figure 5.1). A wealth of literature focusing upon 'public value' can be found across the cultural policy sector, but precisely what the concept means, as Gray (2008) points out, is something entirely open to question. Indeed, for Gray (2008: 210), public value has become a policy catch-term that means virtually 'everything and nothing'. Notions of 'public' value have become crucial nodal points within the new language of heritage, and it is important to qualify these concepts a little further. The idea of 'public' or 'cultural' value, as something opposed to 'expert' or 'economic' value, found its first elaboration in *Power of Place*. Since then, in tandem with attempts to modernize the heritage protection process, significant efforts have been made to both define and apply the concept.

Kate Clark (2006: 2) defines the term as follows:

It starts from the premise that such organizations are there to add or create value for the public, and that therefore the best way of measuring their success is to look at it in terms of what the public cares about.

As Clark continues,

Heritage is very broad – it can cover everything from land and biodiversity, to buildings and landscapes, collections and even intangible heritage such as language and memory. In fact what makes something part of our heritage is not whether it is a building or landscape, but the value that we place on it (2006: 3).

The advent of public value sees intangible heritage (language and memory) as an addition (albeit somewhat of a stretch ('even')) to the concept of heritage. It seemingly allows heritage practitioners and policy-makers to begin to think of heritage as a process rather than an inanimate object. Importantly, however, this re-conceptualization is understood, as I will go on to demonstrate, not so much as a re-definition of heritage, nor as a fleeting discursive presence, but as something that stands in opposition to an already established definition of heritage; in other words, notions of public value arise as a counterpoint, or gesture of goodwill, to the more commonplace assumptions of materiality and tangibility (see Waterton and Smith 2009). The disjuncture between these notions can best be understood by looking for indications of a hierarchy. Hewison and Holden (2006: 17), for example, suggest:

There will be occasions when the public interest – and particularly the interests of future generations – will be best served by profes-

sionals using the authority of their expertise to contradict the short-term public will.

Likewise, hints of a hierarchy can be discerned from discussions with practitioners:

INTERVIEWEE [18]: We have administrative systems that help us to prioritise and act legally upon various assets, **and yet** we are also being **helpful** to the general public that wants more of what they cherish to be preserved and enhanced, **not destroyed** (English Heritage, 3rd August 2005, emphasis added).

These statements rather obliquely intimate that there are different levels of 'value', within which public value has the more limited legitimacy. Notable here is the semantic work undertaken by the phrases bolded in the second quote. The additive contrastive and yet is suggestive that a concession is being made – a concession that revolves around the apparently altruistic extension of English Heritage's responsibilities towards 'the general public'. This extension towards they/them (as opposed to us/we) implicitly acknowledges the disjuncture that exists between what is legally considered worthy of protection and what 'the public' deem as worthy. Interestingly, that disjuncture is seen to operate around that which is preserved and that which is destroyed. At the risk of repetition, we can once again see a strong characterization of the AHD at work here. Room is made for present 'publics', but these are not the intended beneficiaries of the management process. Public value, simply put, is seen as more easily manageable if it is imagined as something that stands outside of established values, in much the same way as the public stands outside of expertise.

This disjuncture between 'public' and 'expertise' is more readily observable in the following transcribed recording from the *Capturing the Public Value of Heritage* conference, held in January 2006 (see also Cook et al. 2004):

Experts have a vital educating and mediating role in developing refined public preferences (Thurley 2006a: 97).

And,

The difference is that experts 'think' and 'know', whereas people 'feel' and 'believe' (Anon. 2006: 97).

It was also observable in the context of in-depth interviewing:

INTERVIEWEE [21]: There are conflicts around that [community-led approaches to heritage], there inevitably are, about what is saved and what is deemed as important, and if we hand over responsibility we will lose things that are valuable (IPPR, 26th August 2005).

In the above, we can see these institutional roles carved out more explicitly. Perhaps an unfortunate choice of words,⁵ Thurley's description of expertise as the *refinement* of public preferences through education and mediation draws attention to a collection of antonyms: impurity, vulgarity, coarseness, roughness and impoliteness. Without the requisite tools to 'think' and 'know', the public, along with their unsubstantiated 'values', are subjected to a process through which abstract notions are transformed into something concrete. Indeed, the more vulgar and underdeveloped notions of heritage held by the public are subtly freed of their impurities. This borrows from arguments developed by Tony Bennett (1995: 21) and his discussion of museums as civilizing instruments, drawn upon as mechanisms tasked with the 'cultural governance of the populace' (see also Hall 1999; Smith 2007). It is not so much that Thurley refers to 'refining' in a policy sense so as to reflect a reality, but that he talks about this refinement in the context of education. Value, for him, becomes a learning exercise that is monological and one-way, a wisdom imparted to 'non-experts' by 'experts':

Surely all of us involved in protecting and explaining the nation's heritage believe the beauty, inspiration and education it provides can be enjoyed by everyone ... Crucially, though, we need to remain confident about the value of the expert in informing and educating people about the significance of the physical remains of the past (Lamb 2007: 38).

Moreover, it verges on something akin to liberal governance, through which 'the public' have embedded in them a sense of what constitutes *proper* values and sensibilities, or a *proper, established* and *professionally accepted* platform from which to make proper, established and acceptable decisions about heritage. Again, this recalls arguments made by Bennett in 1995, and his argument that museums are part of the suite of technologies the state draws upon to 'govern' the values and conduct of 'good' citizenship. A similar argument has also been made

more recently by Smith (2004, 2007), who applies this idea to the heritage sector more generally –work which can be drawn upon here to usefully reinforce the argument that the conduct of ‘the public’ is regulated through this embedding of a certain sense of ‘proper’, ‘established’ and ‘accepted’ values.

The Conservation Principles

A range of policy documents, narratives, arguments and debates has arisen around the concept of public value. This section offers a close examination of the incorporation of ‘public value’ within English Heritage’s *Conservation Principles, Policies and Guidance for the Sustainable Management of the Historic Environment* (published in April 2008b), which was also designed to forge links with the *Heritage Protection Review* (or the *Heritage Protection Reform*) (Harry Reeves, Head of Architecture and Historic Environment, DCMS, pers. comm., 16th August 2005; English Heritage 2005a). Commenced in 2004, some four years of discussion and debate – both within English Heritage and in a process of wider consultation – went into the *Principles* in a bid to provide a philosophical foundation for work within the sector (English Heritage 2008b). This is something that had been lacking within the English Heritage policy artillery, and was an important consideration behind the genesis of the *Principles*:

INTERVIEWEE [17]: It is surprising, but there isn’t [currently a unified framework for making decisions about heritage]. There are assumptions that people make, um, depending upon which particular philosophy or approaches they are following, but there isn’t anything like that certainly set down by English Heritage that has any kind of authority behind it. It [the Conservation Principles] is a really important step (English Heritage, 18th July 2005).

The *Principles* are explicit in their intertextual relationships with many policy documents of both national and international origin, including SPAB’s Manifesto, *Power of Place*, Planning Policy Guidance note (PPG) 15 *Planning and the Historic Environment*, the World Heritage Convention, the Burra Charter, the European Landscape Convention and the Council of Europe’s *Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society*. Perhaps more than any, however, it is *Power of Place* and the Burra Charter that had the greatest influence. Implicit within the deliberations, drafts and final document lies, also, a recourse to the

public value triangle introduced earlier and an attempt to steer a clearer path between instrumental, intrinsic and institutional value. Although their primary purpose is to ensure a corporate identity for the organization as well as the ability to offer a consistent and credible approach to the historic environment, the *Principles* are also intended as guidance for the wider sector, and thus carry the aim of:

[setting] out a logical approach to making decisions and offering guidance about all aspects of the historic environment, and for reconciling its protection with the economic and social needs and aspirations of the people who live in it (English Heritage 2008b: 13; see also Bee 2009).

Like many policy documents emerging within this timeframe, it is not surprising to see elements of New Labour's discourse of modernization intertextually incorporated within the *Principles*. Primarily, this is evident in English Heritage's attempts to re-brand itself as both 'modern' and 'relevant', underpinned by democratic and effective foundational principles that find synergy with New Labour's policy agenda. A central outcome of the *Principles* (indeed, more time and space is devoted to this issue than that of policy outcomes in the draft communications plan for the *Principles*) is the 'image outcome' for English Heritage, which focuses upon projecting an image demonstrating that 'EH is progressing with and responding to the times' (English Heritage 2005a: 2). The two intended messages flagged up at the outset, visible as discursive markers throughout the text, are those of *progression* and *constructive change*, with this project perceived as an opportunity to: (a) re-negotiate the face of English Heritage; (b) invent a 'new English Heritage'; (c) claw back a more 'positive' and 'sensitive' perception; and (d) re-introduce themselves to the 'person on the street' (English Heritage 2005a: 4). The production of a modernized set of conservation principles was, in more ways than one, as much to do with articulating and affirming a new identity for English Heritage. This re-branding strategy allows English Heritage to consider itself as the provider of a conceptualization of heritage that people should be willing to pay for. In this sense it is aligned with entrepreneurial imperatives that are characteristic of New Labour thinking, albeit in this scenario it is the built heritage that is seen as under-utilized capital (see Barbour and Turnbull 2002). English Heritage, as the entrepreneurial and modernized body responsible for heritage is thus able to position itself as crucial in the process of seeking out strategies that will appeal to a wider audience. Through the production of these principles, specifically, the institution is also attempting

to discursively carve out a more defined and credible place within the sphere of heritage, whilst simultaneously sustaining a particular ideological understanding of 'the past'. By asserting an identity that is steeped in both action and entrepreneurial imperatives, albeit through rather vague notions of reform, English Heritage is able to suggest that heritage *needs* the organization.

At least two versions of the *Principles* were released and a number of drafts formulated, with a first publicly available draft released for consultation in 2006 (see also English Heritage 2005c, 2008b). As one proceeds through this initial document, it is unsurprising that a handful of nodal points associated with the AHD are readily apparent, including notions of inheritance, authenticity, integrity, materiality, cultural democracy and patrimony. The following extract, for example, embeds a high degree of modality, or confidence, in these characteristics of the AHD:

The 'historic (dimension of the) environment' includes all aspects of the environment resulting from the interaction between people and places through time, and therefore embraces all surviving remnants of past landscapes ... The seamless cultural and natural strands of the historic environment are a vital part of everyone's heritage, held in stewardship for the benefit of future generations (English Heritage 2006c: 18).

Themes of stewardship, assumptions of permanence and universality, and implied moral obligations abound, such that the document can be seen as an attempt to inculcate or socially *enact* the durability of the AHD within heritage practitioners, owners and policymakers. As Sir Neil Cossons (2006a) suggests in the document's *Foreword*,⁶ this focus is to be updated with reference to themes of holism, transparency, multiplicity and inclusivity. Indeed, the entire tone of the document might be described as supplementary, a point exemplified by a report outlining the aims and objectives of the Principles (English Heritage, 2005f, EHAC/ 2005/17E, 23rd June 2005: 3–4), which suggests it is about providing support, helping people understand, explaining rationale and ensuring consistency. These patterns of transitivity set up the intellectual and behavioural capacities of different interest groups and stakeholders, but make no attempt to scrutinize or assess the nature of value that is actually being worked upon:

The development of conservation policy and principles is designed to ... enable, reinforce, but not undermine the 1970s meanings

of terms ... (English Heritage 2005f, EHAC/2005/17E, 23rd June 2005: 4).

Likewise, the sense of ethics instilled in the document points to a sensitivity aimed at buildings and materiality themselves, in terms of authenticity and the integrity of fabric, rather than human ethics. What is particularly interesting to note is the continued co-occurrence of heritage and the 'historic environment', which are woven together in a way that suggests that heritage is one component, or subset, of the historic environment, as argued in Chapter 4. Indeed, the definitions included in the glossary to the front of the first draft (or at the rear of the final draft published in 2008b) highlight this distinction:

Heritage – All inherited resources which people value for reasons beyond mere utility (English Heritage 2006c: 2; see also English Heritage 2008b: 71); and,

Historic Environment – All aspects of the environment resulting from the interaction between people and places through time, **including all physical remains of past human activity, whether visible or buried, and deliberately planted or managed flora** (English Heritage 2006c: 2, emphasis indicates additions found in the later *Principles* published in 2008b, p. 71).

Despite this and attempts by DCMS to insist that only the term 'historic environment' be used in the paradoxically named 'Heritage Sector' (H. Reeves, Head of Architecture and Historic Environment, DCMS, pers. comm., 16th August b), the two terms continue to be used throughout the text, with 'heritage' used quite self-consciously to imply value and significance applied to, or recognized within, a place, with 'heritage value' itself comprised of: evidential value, historical value, aesthetic value and communal value. Woven through the *Principles* is a vaguely defined process that moves from the historic environment, to ideas of place, to those of fabric *before* encountering ideas of value and thus, according to the division implied between the two terms, heritage. Indeed, by the time users are encouraged to think about heritage and value, the process set in place before them dictates that those values be applied to tangible aspects of the historic environment. Notwithstanding more formal attempts to distinguish between the two terms, there is still a tendency to use them interchangeably – a

tendency that is replicated in practice. An extended representation of the confusion surrounding the terms and their definition is presented below in the form of extracts from a number of interviews conducted for this project in an attempt to adequately capture the depths of inconsistency:

INTERVIEWEE [14]: ... the terms are often conflated or you know ... they are not synonymous but they are often used in that way (English Heritage, 4th July 2006).

INTERVIEWEE [15]: I use the terms interchangeably. I noticed the other day when I was writing something that I was using heritage and historic environment interchangeably (English Heritage, 4th July 2005).

INTERVIEWEE [19]: We should be using ... no, um, if I use the term heritage then sometimes I am slipping into ... we should be using the expression historic environment. Although Emma, I think sometimes people within English Heritage do use them interchangeably, I think even our Chief Executive has sometimes used heritage on occasion, but I am not sure on that, but we, as far as I am aware, we should be using historic environment now (English Heritage, 25th August 2005).

INTERVIEWEE [20]: I personally don't actually like the word historic environment but it has become an acceptable catch-all phrase for us because it defines everything from below ground to the above ground, to the site specific to the landscape context and the broader non-material environment as well ... Heritage has that sort of historic dimension that presupposes that you are actually inheriting something, there is the assumption that you are actually passing things on to future generations. Heritage works in that sense. But they are all interchangeable ... (English Heritage, 25th August 2005).

INTERVIEWEE [35]: We recognize that wider heritage matters and it's one way that you can increase participation and get people more interested. But our ultimate aim is to preserve and encourage participation in the fixed sort of, um, historic environment [...] so that would be listed buildings, archaeological sites, historic landscapes ... (English Heritage, 5th August 2009).

INTERVIEWEE [16]: I mean, in my view it is, to a certain extent, a matter of fashion, and I am not particularly bothered whether we call things heritage or historic environment. It has been felt that the historic environment more accurately captures what we are trying to talk about in a way that heritage doesn't, because heritage has very strong connotations in peoples' minds (DCMS, 18th July 2005).

INTERVIEWEE [19]: I am confused by the terms because I use them interchangeably ... I really hate the word heritage, I think it is an awful word ... because it goes on about commoditization, it is like a packaged thing and it is heritage and we are going to dress it up nice ... I prefer history to heritage ... I have never seen official definitions of the terms heritage and historic environment so I don't know if they are the same thing. I don't really know ... and how interesting that not one of us really knows. We all work for English Heritage and have a statutory responsibility for heritage or the historic environment and yet we don't know if they are the same thing or how they are defined! Isn't that awful? I am sure somebody knows ... (English Heritage, 25th August 2005).

What is interesting about these extracts as a whole is the implicit crisis of uncertainty that permeates, along with a sense of embarrassment or unease at having to explicitly acknowledge this. It is indeed a strange acknowledgement in the face of the 1999–2001 *Government Review of Policies Relating to the Historic Environment*, which resulted in the publication of the government's apparently definitive position on the historic environment (DCMS 2001a).

The *Conservation Principles* revolve around six principles, which are used to organize the final document and are worded as follows (English Heritage 2008b, with epistemic modality indicators emphasized):⁷

- Principle 1: The historic environment **is** a shared resource
- Principle 2: Everyone **should** be able to participate in sustaining the historic environment
- Principle 3: Understanding the significance of places **is** vital
- Principle 4: Significant places **should** be managed to sustain their value

- Principle 5: Decisions about change **must** be reasonable, transparent and consistent
- Principle 6: Documenting and learning from decisions **is** essential

All but Principles 2 and 4 are characterized by an exceptionally strong affinity with, and/or commitment to, a particular expression of 'truth' about the historic environment, marked by notions of what it *is* or *must* be the case – which Dunmire (2005: 502) terms as markers of 'absolute modality'. Principles 1, 3 and 6, for example, are third-person *realis* statements of fact and thus display very strong commitments to ideals about the historic environment. Likewise, Principle 5 is marked by a strong sense of obligation by the modal verb 'must'. None of these particular principles are subjectively marked, and thus appear to be making statements of truth on behalf of us all – the historic environment *is*; *it is essential*; *is vital*; *must be*. Occasionally, this assertion of 'fact' loosens, which is evident, for example, in Principles 2 and 4, which use the softer modal verb 'should'. This loosening of a commitment to 'truth' can also be found in the vaguer introductory discussion of the *Principles*. An earlier draft of the document suggested that:

Understanding the ways in which people value places **should** inform all public decisions about how change in those places **will** be managed (English Heritage 2005b: 1).

This is mirrored in the principles themselves as:

... an understanding of the heritage values a place **may** have for its owners, the local community and wider communities of interest **should** be seen as the basis for making sound decisions about its future (English Heritage 2008b: 14).

The implication here is that while the ways in which people value places *should* inform all decisions, it is not necessarily the case that it will. Quite how and why those views may *or may not* be taken into account, and who is making those 'sound decisions', is not volunteered. The process of *naming* something as heritage, as identified in Chapter 4, is again an important issue left unspoken. This argument was developed further in a draft

version of the document informally produced prior to consultation:

Of course, not all of the historic environment is equally valuable or worth conserving; some of it indeed has a negative impact on all who experience it (English Heritage 2005b: 1).

For the *Conservation Principles*, the inherently dissonant nature of heritage remains underdeveloped and is subjected to a very subtle mutation of nominalization through the very weak acknowledgement of its existence. Two issues are arresting about this statement: first, the utterance of course is used to convey a sense of inevitability about the decisions made to recognize some things, acts or experiences as heritage and some as falling short of that evaluation. Second, that evaluative process is hinged *entirely* upon the idea of dissonance, without recourse to the idea that heritage, as Tunbridge and Ashworth (1996) argue, is *inherently* dissonant. The concept of dissonance drawn upon in the above extract differs substantially from the conceptualizations adhered to by Graham et al. (2005) and Smith (2006) in its assertion that dissonance can somehow be avoided: Ashworth's (2002) logic that heritage dis-inherits either completely or partially is all but lost. Moreover, it brings with it the assumption that negative experiences derived from heritage render that heritage unworthy of conservation. By this reckoning, the Holocaust, slavery, massacres and the aftermath of other acts of violence are by definition struck from the list of those things that can be considered heritage. This is because the very possibility of dissonance is being organized and structured by the AHD, which has significant consequences for people and groups who attempt to define themselves and their past around senses of heritage that stand outside of the dominant discourse. The latter clause in the extract *does* draw attention to negativity surrounding heritage, a novel emphasis in comparison to much of the other documents reviewed so far, which have tended towards the positive (i.e. 'good', 'safe' and 'sanitized') aspects of heritage. However, this novelty was short-lived and was removed from later versions.

It is worth pursuing the idea of agency a little further by examining the textual relationships that are set up in the document, particularly between 'experts' and 'non-experts'. Statements couched around particular verbs (communicate, understand, sustain – as emphasized

below) and their transitivity were particularly revealing in both the first consultation document and the final version:

Communicating that significance to everyone concerned with a place, particularly those whose actions may affect it, is then essential if all are to act in awareness of its heritage values ... (English Heritage 2006c: 14).

Everyone ... should be encouraged to **participate** in understanding and sustaining ... (English Heritage 2006c: 22).

Practitioners should ... encourage people to **understand**, value and care for their heritage ... (English Heritage 2006c: 23).

Education at all stages should help to **raise** people's awareness and understanding ... (English Heritage 2006c: 23).

Experts should use their knowledge and skills to **encourage** and **enable** others to learn about, value and care for the historic environment (English Heritage 2008b: 20).

They [experts] play a crucial role in **discerning, communicating** and sustaining the established values of places, and in **helping** people to refine and articulate the values they attach to places (English Heritage 2008b: 20).

Here, communication is distinctly one-way, with practitioners imparting knowledge *to* 'the public' and 'people' and, in effect, offering a metaphorical 'leg-up' into the fold, a sentiment rehearsed in more recent communications regarding the relationship between public and private interests in a recent edition of the *Conservation Bulletin*:

The second [step] is to show people that the historic features of their locality are not just curiosities from the past, but have a relevance to their own sense of belonging, and to the value of the property they live in (Bee 2010: 2).

The latter are discursively shunted into the more passive role of audience or beneficiary, with the former activated as subjects capable of (or, indeed, obliged to) *doing things*. The 'Explanatory Notes and Questions for Principle Four' go into further detail regarding value and how this

may be understood. The value categories identified here are inter-discursively linked with those utilized by Tessa Jowell (2006) in her presentation for the *Capturing the Public Value of Heritage* conference, and find their way into the final publication of the *Principles*. Evidential, historical, aesthetic and community values are specifically listed and defined, and once again I draw attention to the fact that the first three of these are a comfortable part of the core assumptions of the AHD, and are therefore intertextually mapped across a range of existing policy documents and Acts of Parliament. This is an important point when read against the following caveat offered by the accompanying explanatory note:

However, the fact that a place fails to meet current criteria (either national or local) for formal designation does not negate the values it may have for particular communities (whether geographical or linked by a common interest), nor the desirability of taking **some account** of those values in making decisions about its future (English Heritage 2006c: 24).

With evidential, historical and aesthetic values already formally recognized in designation and listing criteria, it is only really 'community' values that are truly put at risk here, a point further exemplified by the first consultation document:

To identify and appreciate those values [**associative**], it is essential first to understand the structure and ecology of the place [**evidential**], how and why that has changed over time [**historical**], and its present character [**aesthetic**] (English Heritage 2006c: 25, my bolded inclusions).

A clear hierarchy is established, and it is one that conjures up a dependent relationship, or the *invariance of conjunctures of events* (López and Potter 2001: 10), in which *x* (associative values) can only occur as a result of, or after, *y* (evidential, historical, aesthetic values), from which one should infer that *y* always causes *x*. This is more obliquely stated in the 2008b (p. 21, emphasis added) version, in which the following is found:

In order to identify the significance of a place, **it is necessary first** to understand its fabric, and how and why it has changed over time; **and then to consider:**

- Who values the place, and why they do so
- How those values relate to its fabric
- Their relative importance
- Whether associated objects contribute to them
- The contribution made by the setting and context of the place
- How the place compares with others sharing similar values

Couched in the above is the assumption that significance is tied to physicality, with fabric, in particular, being read as a cipher for visuality (see Waterton and Watson 2010; Watson and Waterton 2010; see also Watson and Waterton forthcoming). Only once the significance and value of that physicality has been determined does the process move on to consider other options. At one point in the *Principles*, this dependency on physicality is broken specifically with reference to a subset of communal value: social value. Here, the document states that:

Compared with other heritage values, social values tend to be less dependent on the survival of historic fabric. They may survive the replacement of the original physical structure, so long as its key social and cultural characteristics are maintained; and can be the popular driving force for the re-creation of lost (and often deliberately destroyed or desecrated) places with high symbolic value, although this is rare in England (English Heritage 2008b: 32).

According to the previous statement, however, instances in which social values are at play will find it difficult to assert arguments of significance without first demonstrating an ability for understanding 'fabric'. Of course, physicality itself is not really put at risk in the above – it is assumed that the physical structure will be replaced and thus be rendered visible by other means. The point, to borrow from Watson (2010), is that visuality goes beyond the tangible and extends into the domain of the culturally significant as metaphor. In the above, then, it is ideas of age and authenticity that appear to be implicitly weakened. However, a conceptual analysis of authenticity and how it is used within the document stands at odds with this weakened concession, as later in the document *demands* are made for any action that compromises authenticity to provide careful justification (English Heritage 2008b: 55). What we are left to ponder is how, exactly, social values will ever be given the space to guide decision-making when other concepts of significance (physicality, visuality and authenticity) are given clear priority.

A cruder method of establishing the relative worth of each value (evidential, historical, aesthetic and communal) can be determined by accounting for how many times each is specified in the document. Evidential value, for example, is three times more likely to be the value under discussion than communal value, which appears only nine times in the entire 73-page document. Similarly, historical and aesthetic values appear 50% more often than their 'communal' counterpart. Undeterred, or perhaps unconvinced, by injections of public value, the gap between such values and those previously privileged as important (evidential, historical and aesthetic) is as wide as it ever was.

The spaces for dialogue, wistfully projected by wider discussions of engagement and participation are not quite so apparent in the concrete form of the *Conservation Principles*, where the spaces for decision-making in heritage management terms are heavily mediated by 'expert' and 'established' perspectives. Thus, while the dominant structures of the AHD are at times displaced by a veneer of liberalization, it is a veneer that is only skin deep; a closer examination of the document reveals a discursive space that continues to alienate 'public' and 'community' values. What is interesting is that the *Principles* do display a willingness to engage with Moore's conceptualization of public value, but do so on very specific terms. As Blaug et al. (2006: 59) point out in more general terms:

This new approach encourages public managers to look at the capacity of an organization and listen to and engage with the public as users and as citizens who may derive a benefit from a service even though they may not use it but from the fact that others are able to.

This they refer to as an important component of the 'refinement of preferences', a term that is reminiscent of an utterance examined earlier in this chapter by Simon Thurley. What this means is surely assimilatory as it refers to the active shaping of what the public wants, particularly in terms of desired outcomes (Blaug et al. 2006: 59). From this perspective, it is possible to argue that there is nothing inherently wrong with the way English Heritage is pursuing public value – but that is the case only if we agree on the nature of heritage, the role of English Heritage and the services they are ostensibly supposed to provide.

Rupturing the seams? The Heritage Protection Reform

Concomitant with the development of the *Conservation Principles* was the wider – but complementary – reform of legislation, policy and prac-

tice relating to the historic environment, known within the sector as either the *Heritage Protection Review* or the *Heritage Protection Reform* (with the acronym of HPR used for either). The HPR was announced by Tessa Jowell in November 2002 and launched by the then Minister for Heritage, Andrew McIntosh, in July 2003, when it was described as being prompted by a desire to create ‘... a better system for protecting the historic assets that make this country’s heritage so unique’ (DCMS 2003a: 1). It was a drive for modernization and drew heavily on the language of New Labour in its attempts to render heritage policy ‘fit for purpose’ (DCMS 2003b; English Heritage 2006d; see also Waterton and Smith 2008):

There is much that works well in these systems but taken as a whole the Government believes that there is scope for improvement to ensure the law is fit for purpose for the twenty-first century, with benefits for all those involved (DCMS 2003b: 4 – see also DCMS 2005a).

It was also another arm in the fight against social exclusion, and was pursued within the same timeframe as things such as the *Taking Part Survey* (discussed in Chapter 6) and the establishment of English Heritage’s *Outreach Department*. For this volume, however, it is the HPR that provides the case study through which I will explore not only the longevity of the AHD but the implications of ‘public value’ debates, particularly in terms of whether this newer term is ever actually engaged with in practice.

The review process was driven by DCMS, but also implicated the ODPM,⁸ DEFRA and English Heritage as well. Like many policy initiatives, it was under the guise of incorporating a sense of inclusion (West 2005: 8), and with the promise of instigating ‘radical change’ (Beacham 2006: 3), that the *Heritage Protection Reform* commenced. The review was welcomed by Simon Thurley, Chief Executive of English Heritage, who remarked that, ‘[t]oday’s proposals envisage a better way of protecting and managing this rich inheritance and taking it safely with us into the future’ (DCMS 2003a: 2). More broadly it was promoted as a fundamental opportunity to ‘... unlock the full potential of England’s historic assets for the benefit of our communities, for the economy and for quality of life, education and regeneration’ (Cowell and Kane 2003: 16 – see also Heritage Link et al. 2007). At its driest, the purpose of the review was to create a new system for protecting heritage; one that is transparent, open and flexible, and grouped around the priorities of designation, management and regulation (CMS 2006a: 2).

Fleshed out a little further, the review process was also about generating a better understanding of heritage, as well as engendering involvement, ownership and participation at community levels (CMS 2006a: 2–8). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, on a conceptual level it was meant to be about reinvigorating both the word itself, and the meaning of heritage (Hewison and Holden 2004: 9).

The review process has passed through several stages, ending prematurely with *The Draft Heritage Protection Bill* published on the 2nd of April 2008. Despite being subjected to pre-legislative scrutiny by the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee, and responded to in the subsequent publication in 2008 of the document *Government Response to the Culture, Media and Sport Committee Reports on the Draft Heritage Protection Bill and Draft Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Bill – Cm 7472*, the draft Bill has progressed no further. Initially, it was expected to be part of the government's legislative programme for the 2008/9 Parliamentary Session. The Queen's Speech associated with the State Opening of Parliament for that session did not, however, include mention of the Heritage Bill; neither did the Queen's Speech outlining the Government's policies and proposed new legislation for the 2009/10 Parliamentary Session. While its inclusion was anticipated on both occasions, the Bill was removed from the programme due to a focus on the global economic downturn. In response, English Heritage and DCMS announced that they would push ahead with the reform process, implementing as much as possible from the 2007 White Paper, aiming to develop the policy framework developed by *Power of Place* and *A Force for Our Future*, and amplify '... the key messages of what government thinks about the historic environment' (Interviewee 16, DCMS, 18th July 2005; see also DCMS 2008b).⁹ Thus, while the review process ostensibly began in July 2003 with the circulation of the consultation document, *Protecting our Historic Environment: Making the System Work Better* (DCMS 2003b), it has its origins in the debates documented in the previous chapter, starting as it did from the proposition that it had absorbed, wholesale, the altruistic aims supposedly embedded in *Power of Place* and *A Force for our Future* concerned with inclusion and diversity (Waterton and Smith 2008: 198).

The first leg in the review process entailed the production of the consultation document, *Protecting our Historic Environment*, in 2003, which garnered in the region of 500 responses. These responses formed the basis of a second document, published in June 2004 (DCMS 2004a), *Review of Heritage Protection: The Way Forward*. In addition, a series of pilot projects and internal consultations were launched in order to gauge the

merits and difficulties of proposed changes, with English Heritage overseeing 15 projects that tested initial recommendations arising from the review. This subsequently prompted a parliamentary select committee inquiry into heritage policy, announced on 15th November 2005, culminating in the *Protecting and Preserving our Heritage* report (CMS 2006a, b) and the Government response, CM 6947 – *Government Response to the Culture, Media and Sport Committee Report on Protecting and Preserving our Heritage* (DCMS 2006d). The Heritage White Paper, *Heritage Protection in the 21st Century*, published in March 2007 offers an attempt to incorporate all of these responses, including written evidence and the results of public consultation programmes.

Re-enacting the AHD

With a focus upon statutory protection and associated non-statutory schemes, the review process began with an acceptance of the naturalized understandings of heritage and the historic environment as developed throughout this volume, and sought to focus upon the processes of designating, listing and registering the various ‘parts’ of the historic environment selected as worthy of protection (cf. DCMS 2003b: 10, 11). The following statements are indicative, and typical, of this limited focus, in which implicit assumptions are made about what can and does exist within the field of heritage:

The List¹⁰ would include the most important sites and items from the past, according to certain broad statutory criteria, including sites valued for their archaeological importance [**evidential**], their architectural significance [**evidential and aesthetic**], their association with major historical events [**historical**] or because they represent a type of building or social use from a particular period (DCMS 2003b: 12, my bolded inclusions).

The Review covers the designation of ancient monuments, listed buildings, registered parks and gardens, registered battlefields, World Heritage Sites and conservation areas and how the land-use planning system protects the historic environment (DCMS 2003b: 6).

Indeed, it was imagined that this reformulation of separate processes of scheduling, listing and registering different aspects of the historic environment into one system would render the process ‘... understandable to the public’ (Burke *pers. comm.* 2004). What this focus suggests, particularly with the emphasis on the types of value privileged (evidential,

aesthetic and historical), is the continued acknowledgement that the debates regarding public value stand apart from debates underpinning the review process, a point that is reinforced when we think of the values prioritized in the previous section on the *Conservation Principles*. Indeed, there is a continued and unspoken distinction implied between the point at which 'expertise' is accepted within the management process versus the stage at which non-expertise is accommodated:

English Heritage believes this first part – the designation stage – should be strictly confined to assessing significance against tightly drawn archaeological, architectural and historic criteria (English Heritage 2003b: 2).

English Heritage believes it is essential that statutory criteria of architectural, archaeological and historic importance should continue to be the sole basis of what parts of the historic environment should be added to the new list (English Heritage 2003b: 5).

While this was mirrored by many of the 500-plus responses received, it was also questioned by some:

A public debate about designation criteria might be helpful, specifically to gauge the support there is for the inclusion of intangible values, such as the role of a place in memory, in forging identity and in contributing to our quality of life ... (Heritage Consultancy Services 2003: 1).

The 'powers that be' should be re-assessing their attitude towards the whole question of conservation. The electorate's concern for protecting the historic environment is certainly not limited to the so-called 'backward looking precious middle classes'. My experience shows that it runs throughout all levels of society, in particular the forward looking majority, who are becoming increasingly exasperated at the pernicious erosion of our local heritage (Moyra McGhire, personal response to the consultation document 'Protecting our Historic Environment, Making the System Work Better, Letter, 3rd November 2003b: 1).

This questioning, however, did not materialize in the subsequent document, *Review of Heritage Protection: The Way Forward*. Instead, a focus on archaeological remains, buildings, underwater heritage assets,

landscapes, battlefields and historic areas was perpetuated, as was a belief in the appropriateness of evidential, historic and aesthetic criteria (see DCMS 2004a: 7–14). The singular concession made to this was expressed with such low levels of modality as to lose all credibility:

... **further down the line** a full statement of significance **might** need to be drawn up which probed the item's importance more fully [and] took other specialist and non-specialist and – including community – values into account ... (DCMS 2004a: 15, emphasis added).

The explanatory power of the AHD, and the 'best practice' it promotes, was thus adopted wholesale across the documents published in association with the review process, including the *Heritage White Paper* and the *Draft Heritage Protection Bill*. This was not a variation of the AHD under influence from social inclusion and public value debates; rather, it was the AHD in perhaps its most essentialized form since the 1990s. Much of the textual work incorporated within this review phase reverts back to that characterization of heritage, and further fuels the argument that alternative values are separated from the process of identifying heritage and are considered only in terms of outcomes and benefits. As the AHD is overtly expressed throughout these documents, I will move away from developing an understanding of *how* it is invoked towards extracting a sense of *why* and to what end.

In the Foreword to the first consultation document, *Protecting our Historic Environment: Making the System Work Better* (DCMS 2003b), Tessa Jowell outlined the aspirations and motivations behind the review. Within this discussion, Jowell used a range of pronouns that are particularly revelatory, and exactly how these pronouns – 'them', 'us', 'we', 'their' – are related is an important question:

This consultation paper marks a further step in engaging **wide public interest** in the systems **we** use for deciding what **we** value most in **our** historic environment. The statutes which protect ancient monuments and historic buildings have stood the test of time but they need refreshing (Jowell 2003: 2, emphasis added).

With this utterance, Jowell begins to mark up a number of choices in relation to subject positionings and the representation of social actors. First and foremost, a distinction is implied between the 'wider public'

and 'we', with the former mentioned as a noun and the latter (heritage organization, government, etc.) realized with pronouns. This offers a basic, and quite obvious, indication of the breakdown between 'them' and 'us'. The use of the pronoun 'we' is thus revelatory in terms of what Fairclough (2003: 149) labels 'identificational meaning', representing the construction of exclusionary groupings. The pronouns, for example, are activated, while the backgrounding of wide public interest is passivated. As such, the main social actors flagged up by Jowell are those included within the pronouns 'we' and 'our', which are marked out as distinct from wide public interest. This is also achieved through the use of the word 'interest', which evokes distance and passivity, something less personal than familiarity, at the expense of more active words such as 'deciding' and 'valuing', which are suggestive of a more engaged commitment. Subsequently, what 'we' want and believe is translated and communicated in a manner that suggests it is what the 'public' want and believe, itself an assimilatory discursive technique (Fairclough 1989: 180). It is directive and signals the parameters of inclusion, which are drawn entirely around what 'we' think is valuable in our historic environment. Moreover, the final use of 'our' is possessive and is used to demark a sense of ownership and duty on behalf of those included within the 'we' over the historic environment. In this utterance, Jowell makes clear that certain heritage professionals and departments operate *outside* of the wider public. At this point, social inclusion becomes a paradox: how is the wider public ever going to be able to join 'us' and 'our' heritage for the purposes of inclusion, if they are – by default of the AHD – perpetually constructed as existing on the outside? The sense of ownership, duty and the exclusive fellowship of heritage professionals (see Jaworski and Coupland 1999b: 495; Fairclough 2003: 55; Smith 2006: 93), is found replicated on the payslips for English Heritage employees, which read:

Thank you for helping to protect the historic environment for future generations. Without us, heritage could just be history.

A related point worth noting about the above statement is the occurrence of this sense of heritage at the banal levels of the routine familiarity of employee payslips. In the same vein as Billig (1995: 93f) proposes that nationalism is discursively remembered in 'prosaic, routine words' that are 'constant, but barely conscious', so too is this sense of heritage reinforced and put to regular use. In the

same instance, the common values of the exclusive stewardship outlined above are also implicitly reinforced, further highlighting the division between 'us' and 'them'.

In Jowell's extract cited earlier and the statement found on English Heritage payslips emerges an evaluative, albeit implicit, belief not only in the apparent validity of the current system of heritage protection, but in the desirability of that system, an evaluation that is *entirely* discourse-related. To believe in its desirability is to believe in the assumptions underpinning it regarding the nature of heritage. Both the system and AHD are legitimized through implicit appeals to a history of 'success'. This was more explicitly reinforced by responses offered by English Heritage to the first consultation and the response of DCMS to the overall consultation:

[I]t [the current system] is a system that commands wide public support, not only for preventing the wholesale destruction of our history but enabling many positive contributions to the continuous remaking of our national life. And to our international partners, it is a model: the envy of the world (English Heritage 2003b: 1 – see also Hansard House of Commons Debates, 25th January 2007, c529WH [Heritage, Mr John Whittingdale]).

Our current system of protection is second to none. If it did not exist, the landscape of England today would be a vastly different, and infinitely poorer one (DCMS 2004c: 1).

The Government's Vision for the historic environment is to provide people with a real sense of our history, one that the citizens of England are proud of and is the envy of the world (DCMS 2009b: 5).

Despite overwhelming support, a review was proposed nonetheless, but it was one that sought to improve (rather than overhaul) existing law in a bid to modernize, while also publicly espousing a belief in cultural democratic underpinnings and making radical overtures towards public value and social inclusion. Yet, debates around 'public value' concurrent with the review of heritage policy do not figure at all within the document, outside of the subject positionings attributed by Jowell in the Foreword, where the government is activated and externalized. This is because a truncated version of the public value debate was envisioned, one that is coupled

with the cementing of 'the public' as beneficiaries, rather than contributors or creators:

Any system for protecting heritage must have a respected and robust means of determining what is worthy of protection. To be respected and robust it must use knowledge and skill recognized by others in the field and **understood by the public** ... (DCMS 2003a: 4).

The overall introduction of the first consultation document, from which the above comes, displays very strong commitments to a number of truth claims, triggered by the modal verb 'must'. This allows the list the author is forming to take the shape of a sequence of demands, poised between positive prescriptive and negative proscriptive demands (Fairclough 2003: 168). These are not predictions for the proposed system but are assertions. Within the sequence of demands, the 'value' of engaging, enthusing and involving non-experts is re-configured into a need to ensure they 'understand' the process. Once again, the process of assimilation becomes uncomfortably transparent. Through this structuring, it also becomes clear that 'the public' are not expected to participate in the judgement of 'worthiness'; and by worthiness, I do not simply refer to the worthiness of the mechanisms called upon, but the worthiness of what is considered heritage in the first place.

Beyond this introduction, references to the debates occurring in tandem with the review all but disappear. To the contrary, the entire review process may well read more like a re-hash of my earlier chapter on the 1970s, in which concepts such as 'architectural interest', 'historic importance', 'archaeological importance', 'national importance', 'aesthetically rich' and 'original form' (see DCMS 2003a: 6f) are thought to signify the values and meanings of heritage. In addition, the sector is now riddled with aspirations for a service that is 'fit for purpose', 'accountable' and 'justifiable'. Thus, while the two projections of the heritage sector remain distinct, with little evidence of integration, it is still possible to argue that the sector is guided by a hybrid discourse. This hybrid discourse effectively and seamlessly combines the rhetoric and reality of heritage policy in a manner that keeps them parallel, but exclusive, based upon the understanding that 'public' value only enters the management equation *once* something has been legitimized as heritage through recourse to the AHD. This allows those in a position of power to have it both ways. They can make discursive *overtures* towards recognizing the necessity of inclusion and public

value, but these issues are not foregrounded in specific discussions about reformulating heritage policy. It is thus an uneasy alliance that does not hold up to scrutiny, and it is arguable that it is for this reason that specific agents, subject positions and representative processes are left vague and unspecified (Fairclough 2000: 25). Indeed, this sense of disjuncture between heritage policy and inclusion is recognizable both outside and within heritage institutions, as one interviewee working at English Heritage as part of the *Properties and Outreach* section, *Education and Outreach Department* notes:

INTERVIEWEE [19]: To an extent it is actually ... the organization being what it is ... we are very [...] we are actually very separate, and I actually don't know ... I wouldn't be able to comment on those [HPR and Conservation Principles] because I don't know enough about the HPR ... I know it is happening, but I don't know enough about it (English Heritage, 25th August 2005; see also the National Audit Office Report (NAO) 2009).

Here, the department leading on issues relating to outreach and inclusion is operating in isolation from the wider review. Noteworthy, as well, is the discursive texturing of 'education', 'outreach', 'properties' and 'interpretation' within the organizational structure of English Heritage. This adds credence to arguments developed earlier in this chapter, which saw the textual and social melding of inclusion and education into a project that is essentially assimilatory. The difficulty in analysing this review process thus emerges from this strange hybridization of the discourses. On the one hand, the sector is rife with notions of inclusivity, broadening the definition of heritage, incorporating a greater sense of 'value' and seeking 'public' approval, but at the same time, it dismisses these concerns in its explicit focus on '... the current levels of protection for our rich heritage of historic buildings, monuments, battlefields and gardens' (Reeves and Beacham 2005: 1). Simultaneously, it is welcomed by various stakeholders and is epitomized by the National Trust (2003: 1) as an opportunity to achieve both:

In particular, it [HPR] offers a much needed opportunity to reinforce the central role the historic environment plays in defining our sense of identity and culture, to recognize the economic benefits that it provides and to challenge the misconception that protection of the historic environment is a barrier to progress ... It is critical, therefore,

that the subsequent Heritage White Paper provides more than the legislative mechanics to implement the final reforms and instead sets the historic environment within a wider context of its role in contributing to the equality of life and sustainable development.

These responses, particularly that of the National Trust, suggest that the review process is not simply a matter of 'improving' the existing system, but engages in a critical reflection of what it is that system is intended to do. Notions of a 'modernizing' system, attempting to negotiate and integrate newer discourses of social inclusion and public value are left with little to work with.

The second and third documents produced within the reform, *Review of Heritage Protection: The Way Forward* (DCMS 2004a) and *Heritage Protection in the 21st Century* (DCMS 2007a), do not read substantially differently to the first consultation document. Nor, for that matter, does the *Draft Heritage Protection Bill*, which was ostensibly framed in a way that would enable modernization provisions enabling the sector to:

- Develop a unified approach to the historic environment;
- Maximize opportunities for inclusion and involvement;
- Deliver sustainable communities by putting the historic environment at the heart of an effective planning system;
- Increase capacity at local level to deliver these reforms; and
- Improve the system of marine heritage protection (DCMS 2008a: 4).

The 'Heritage Register for England' enclosed in the draft Bill, for example, revolves around the concept of 'heritage assets', which are divided into four component parts: (1) heritage structures; (2) heritage open spaces; (3) world heritage sites; and (4) maritime heritage sites, all of which are registerable in terms of 'special historic, archaeological, architectural or artistic interest' (Smith and Waterton forthcoming). The first of these categories, heritage structures, is limited to:

- (a) a building or other structure;
- (b) an earthwork, field system or other work;
- (c) a part of a building or of any other structure, or of anything within paragraph (b);
- (d) a cave or excavation;
- (e) a site comprising the remains of anything within any of paragraphs (a) to (d);

- (f) a site comprising, or comprising the remains of, the whole or part of a vehicle, vessel or aircraft;
- (g) a site (other than one within paragraph (e) or (f)) comprising any thing or group of things that evidences previous human activity;
- (h) a group of things each of which is within any of the preceding paragraphs, whether or not they are within the same paragraph.

Registerable heritage open spaces are limited to:

- (a) a park or garden;
- (b) a battlefield;
- (c) a part of anything within paragraphs (a) or (b).

This slight modification to ideas of heritage, combined within the catch-all term of 'heritage assets', is very much reminiscent of those proposed in the 1970s. Importantly, it is this idea of heritage that has recently found its way into the drafting of the *Government's Vision Statement on the Historic Environment in England*:

Those elements of the historic environment that have significance are called heritage assets, these include buildings, monuments, sites, or landscapes of historic, archaeological, architectural or artistic interest whether designated or not (DCMS 2009b: 3).

Wherever they are used, it seems that the discursive markers remain virtually unchanged, and the contrasting terms historic environment and heritage are slightly re-worked and accepted. As well, and this is true of all documents concerned in this section, the historic environment is seen as playing a 'key role', instrumentally promoting regeneration and inclusivity:

The historic environment brings in tourism to towns, it promotes education and learning, it brings social inclusion and it engages local communities, giving them a pride of place (DCMS 2004a: 4).

It [the historic environment] has an important role to play in helping to prevent climate change and has the potential to contribute to a wide range of its policy objectives (DCMS 2008a: 5).

... thinking of how the historic environment can contribute to improved health – through the sense of wellbeing that the historic

environment can bring and the opportunities for recreation ... (DCMS 2008a: 11).

... reducing anti-social behaviour – by improving the quality of the environment and giving people a sense of real pride of place, something they feel they want to ‘own’ and take care of (DCMS 2008a: 11).

This is a link that has not been missed by heritage professionals working in the area:

INTERVIEWEE [34]: I think it is based on the idea that certain people are excluded from the cultural life of Britain; that being involved in the cultural life of Britain will stop you committing crimes and stop you doing other things that are going to be anti-social and that somehow you have to bring in those people who are excluded from that under the wing of a largely unchanged heritage agenda linked to very specific ideas about what national culture should be (Arts and Heritage consultant, 31st March 2009).

The majority of text, however, makes little reference to these wider social issues, albeit for a smattering of statements, usually either in the introduction or concluding sections of the documents. What this reaffirms is that the AHD has been naturalized to such an extent that it, along with the idea of heritage it privileges, does not need re-thinking. Instead, it is left unquestioned, where it continually legitimizes and frames the narrow experiences, assumptions and identities associated with a particular sense of heritage. What the social work heritage is assumed to *do* in terms of economic and cultural revival will, from that point onwards, it is presumed, simply happen. Whether this happens for a select group of people or for a wider number of the population is not at issue as a consequence of the work done by the AHD.

The seeming inevitability of the review process was established as early as the second stage in the process, in which a language that is definitive and closed is drawn upon:

The Government based its final decisions ... (DCMS 2004a: 7).

The decisions for change fall into ... (DCMS 2004a: 7).

The Government has decided ... (DCMS 2004a: 10).

It was at this juncture, mid-way through the review process, that the consequences of the review programme emerged as a foregone conclusion. There is an implicit anticipation in the following documents

regarding the end result or outcomes, but this only works to mask what had already been taken as given. Despite the rhetoric that runs rampant across the heritage sector regarding 'public value' and 'social inclusion', very little is being subjected to questioning and change within the established process of management itself. The nature of the historic environment, naturalized as it is, is taken for granted, pre-supposed and given. It is imagined as problem-free and inherently 'good', and this pressing out of dissent and conflict acts to mark out the decisions following as 'factual' and 'accurate' by overlaying the divergent debates regarding public value with a consensual veneer. The narrative remains vague and positive, thereby downplaying the reality that at one level, at least, the structuring and relationships between the different orders of discourse are under threat (see Fairclough 1996: 81). A crucial part of this process of naturalization has been the incorporation of a *very* active 'anthropomorphism' (Smith 2006: 91) of the historic environment, such that it becomes personalized and nominalized, externalized and abstracted, allowing people to be marginalized within a process that assumes that heritage *will do the work*.

In an internal report authored from within the Outreach Department at a time contemporary with the initial proposal for a review of heritage policies, the following remark was made:

... one of the greatest challenges facing the sector is the perception that heritage is elitist and irrelevant to many sections of society (English Heritage 2003a: 2).

This is a remark further qualified by the recognition that heritage sector, on the whole, has tended to appeal to a particular social group:

INTERVIEWEE [19]: ... our traditional audience has been white, middle aged, middle class, and we do that audience really, really well (English Heritage, 25th August 2005).

INTERVIEWEE [18]: ... it is white, middle class, Oxbridge educated people ... (English Heritage, 3rd August 2005).

INTERVIEWEE [10]: ... they are primarily the interest of white, middle classes (English Heritage, 23rd May 2005).

Two years on, and with plenty in the way of rhetoric but very little in terms of reality under their belts, English Heritage issued the following

statement as part of their *English Heritage Strategy 2005–2010* (English Heritage 2005e – see also Impey 2005):

The historic environment is not an exclusive place, nor is it a kind of reserve to be visited only in our leisure time (English Heritage 2005e: 13).

INTERVIEWEE [20]: I think to a large extent, the way that we term the ‘historic environment’ most people embrace anyway, I think it is understandable to everybody (English Heritage, 25th August 2005).

INTERVIEWEE [34]: I think there is a sense in which people use those titles to imply that heritage is difficult and ideological but there are certain things that you don’t have to worry about politically like, you know, the historic environment. It is just the historic environment (English Heritage consultant, 31st March 2009).

Despite the wealth of debate, review and consideration that has taken place since 2003, very little has changed since the Outreach Department flagged up its concerns regarding charges of ‘elitism’ and ‘relevance’ – very little, that is, apart from the shift in terms from ‘heritage’ to the ‘historic environment’. Attempts to instigate a genuinely inclusive agenda for heritage, which acknowledges and integrates the disparate ways in which heritage can be defined, understood and valued *should* have been the institutional response to the recognition of the above social imbalances. Rather than address the complexities and difficulties caught up by the definition of heritage legitimized by the AHD, the heritage sector travelled a more subtle, less costly and less effective path towards inclusion, and as a result, nothing substantially changed. The various institutional activities reviewed in this chapter revealed, instead, the enormous amount of discursive work committed to the construction of a ‘safer’, ‘more inclusive’ term capable of ‘objectively’ smoothing over the fissures and fractures that were beginning to surround the established notion of heritage (e.g. Heritage Link et al. 2007: 8). Thus, in a discursive sleight-of-hand, heritage was re-branded and emerged as the experts’ selection of *those things worthy of protection* from the wider remit of the historic environment. The remit, itself, however, never changed. The historic environment continues to exist within the parameters of the AHD, and is thus defined by its tangibility and universality. Established criteria of evidential, aesthetic and historic value are still employed to make pronouncements regarding

which elements of the historic environment might come to be considered heritage and thus worthy of protection in perpetuity. The process has become a lot more complicated and the professionals working within it have become a little less certain. However, with this broadened conceptualization of the historic environment, coupled with the belief that it is somehow set apart from political, social and economic influences, social inclusion policies became rather more surmountable. Indeed, with the newly coined 'historic environment' assumed to be already 'inherently' inclusive by virtue of its definition (English Heritage 2003c: 75; Thurley 2006b), inclusion projects need only be applied to that point at which the historic environment *becomes* heritage. Perhaps the most fascinating part of this discursive re-structuring is that the two concepts inevitably mean the same thing. What emerges from this process as something considered to be heritage is precisely the same thing that entered the process in 2003, when the Outreach Department, along with a range of other commentators, noted its elitist nature. This time, however, it is legitimized through an appeal to rationalization. Through this construction, the authority of the AHD is never compromised, and the process of assimilating 'the public' into that conceptualization, through education, information and demonstration, becomes a palatable form of social inclusion.

Conclusion: Review and reform?

The revolution has transformed our very understanding of what heritage and the historic environment is. No longer do the caricatures of before ring true.

(English Heritage 2004a: 4)

Just over a decade has passed since concepts of inclusion and diversity entered the British lexicon. With an influence that promised to renew a range of governmental departments under the guidance of Third Way politics, the incorporation of these influences within the heritage sector has remained clumsy. Indeed, while the discourse of inclusion has enjoyed a considerable level of synchronicity with traditional discourses at a macro level, it appears to be marking out its own discrete territory – with a significant *lack* of overlap – at the discursive, or micro, level. This chapter examined the blossoming debates that surround the struggles to integrate two spheres of heritage policy in England: public value and the heritage protection reform. The disjuncture, I argued, is the perpetuation of a failure to recognize the

constructed, contested and contradictory nature of heritage. To examine this disjuncture, the chapter continued to map the development of the AHD, particularly in terms of how it has responded to current debates regarding the notion of 'public' value. An important response established in this chapter was the compartmentalization of heritage issues into (a) those things that are considered a central part of the process of management and (b) those issues that are re-defined as peripheral to the nuts and bolts of management. Indeed, this latter category is the realm within which the majority of debate and discussion has taken place. Here, the AHD has been tested and reformulated throughout the course of debate, and has hybridized to a certain degree with notions of cultural governance. Heritage has become a means to something else, and has become tightly woven into policy agendas that have taken up a distinctive ritualistic edge. It has become a saviour, with the inherent 'good' and 'beauty' of heritage formulated in Chapter 4 and enhanced here, harnessed to wider social policies concerned with the reduction of crime and poverty. In conjunction, this chapter saw a re-branding process that sought to not only re-identify heritage, but also market a modernized and corporate identity of English Heritage. Through this dual process, a firmer position for 'expertise' and 'established' value was carved out.

In teasing out this process of categorization, this chapter is able to make two concluding points. Firstly, as a continuation of arguments developed in Chapter 4, this chapter has argued that the dominant understanding of inclusion remains one that asserts a need simply to fold, or assimilate, more people into the AHD. Indeed, the failure of a range of people to 'make up the numbers' at existing heritage sites, monuments and attractions has become, to borrow from Clarke (2004: 9) a failure attributed to the morally questionable and *wilful* 'self-exclusion' of that range of people. Setting up a situation in which excluded groups can be seen as 'choosing' *not* to assimilate means that no damage is done to the core ideal of having cultural rights. This is because the AHD, in teasing out the new concept of 'historic environment', has attempted to construct a sense of the past that is inherently inclusive. Secondly, rather than relax the limitations of the AHD, its hybridization with discourses of social inclusion has worked to achieve the opposite. The separation of debates into 'issues of public value' on the one hand and 'the technical management of heritage' on the other has seen a tightening of the AHD's core assumptions. This is because the AHD is able to negotiate a sense of what heritage *is* within what amounts to a discursive vacuum, and thereby includes the public in those discussions *only* at its end point and *only* in terms of outcomes.

6

Turning the Trick by Itself: The Historic Environment and ‘Community Cohesion’

During the same timeframe covered by the previous two chapters – roughly 2001 until 2009 – vigorous attempts to revise public policy took place in a range of national contexts. Such efforts were influenced by the events of 9/11, the subsequent ‘war on terror’ and a fear of home-grown terrorism, along with other acts of violence across the globe (now flanked by anti-terrorism Acts), all of which had profound affects on the ways in which we frame and understand diversity (Message 2009). Collectively, these events also go some way towards explaining the widespread retreat from multiculturalism currently occurring on an international scale. This apprehension is also, in part, a response to fears that traditional national memories are under threat of being swept away by continuing tides of diversity (Ang 2001). It is within this context – and not necessarily in its aftermath – that politicians and policymakers have conjured up what Kundnani (2007) refers to as an integrationist agenda, a preoccupation tantalizing not only to the usual suspects from the right-wing, like the British National Party or the Danish People’s Party, but those from the centre and left of the political spectrum as well. Thrown into the mix as a consequence have been strident political discourses trumpeting ‘Frenchness’ or ‘Australianness’ and so forth, along with ideals of national rights and obligations, in which core values and a shared heritage have come to be seen as those things that should be prioritized if push comes to shove in debates over cultural diversity (Wetherell 2008: 302; see also Amin 2002; Burnett 2007). Herein lays a significant issue, as sustaining the idea of heritage currently accepted as self-evident and naturalizing it within a wider corpus of public policy – such as those concerned with issues of citizenship, equality and national membership – will simultaneously deny a sense of ownership and belonging to those marginalized by its representations.

To tackle these issues, I use this chapter to narrate a theme of transformation, but I do so in two ways. First, I chart the cultural sector's responses to claims that we now need post-multiculturalist forms of citizenship and political interaction in the UK. Second, I consider what is at stake when a limited sense of heritage spills out into broader politics, where it is granted allegedly transformative powers (drawn upon to overcome poverty, poor health, crime, domestic instability, political insecurity and so forth) and is closely allied with tropes of cohesion through which the 'British people' are re-packaged and re-branded in an attempt to integrate 'the excluded' (McGhee 2003: 377; Message 2009). Shared values are looked for in this national story, with history and heritage, long since considered fertile grounds upon which claims to nationhood can be made, earmarked as those tools capable of binding the nation together. This union is made concrete within the heritage sector's most recent PSA Delivery Agreement 21 (Indicator 6), which aspires towards building 'more cohesive, empowered and active communities' via participation in the historic environment (HM Government 2007). It is, however, by no means new. What is significant is the renewed vigour it has been granted *now*, as it moves out of the heritage sector and into broader policy, where an acceptance or acknowledgement of a limited set of cultural symbols also presents itself as 'the true test' of belonging, to borrow from Hall (1999: 24). As Hall goes on to argue, '[i]t is through identifying with these representations that we come to be its [Britain's] "subjects" – by "subjecting" ourselves to its dominant meanings' (1999: 25). It is therefore of concern that we find implicit gestures to a politicized discourse on heritage and community developing within policy documents belonging to different sectors, such as *Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain* (Home Office 2002), *Strength in Diversity: Towards a Community Cohesion and Race Equality Strategy* (Home Office 2004), *The End of Parallel Lives? Report of the Community Cohesion Panel* (Community Cohesion Panel 2004) and *Strong and Prosperous Communities: The Local Government White Paper* (CLG 2006), all of which can be related to PSA 21 by the analytical category of assumption. From here, history and heritage become central to the notion of belonging implicitly sewn into government attempts to diminish instances of 'self-segregation' through the pursuit of a sense of Britishness, more often than not directed towards Black and ethnic minority communities and particularly British Muslims. Ignored within this mix, however, is the growing cleavage between the social classes and a range of other groups whose sense of self may stand outside of the image of Britain sought after. As such,

I hope to highlight the ways in which these same policies of 'cohesion' and 'inclusion' work instead to obscure ethnicity, cultural difference and other axes of social differentiation via the privileging of 'national belonging'.

The demise of multiculturalism/The rise of integrationism

The last chapter made connections between the popularity of multiculturalist sentiment and subsequent policy impulses felt within the cultural sector, many of which were specific to the UK context. Other countries have dealt differently with the rhetoric of multiculturalism. Perhaps the most obvious examples come in the form of recognition of Indigenous cultural groups in settler-societies such as Australia, the United States, Canada and New Zealand. Second to this is the effect multiculturalism has had on immigration policies and the associated implementation of a 'right to difference' approach, which has played out in various ways in a range of national settings (Mitchell 2004: 642). Some countries, like France, adopted a *de facto* form of multiculturalism, confining expressions of diversity to the private realm rather than the public, evidenced, for example, by the banning of veil-wearing in public schools (Fukuyama 2006). The Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and the US, by contrast, tended to encourage displays of diversity in *both* public and private settings, but all of whom do so in ways that were more tentative than the efforts of Canada and Australia (Pilkington 2008). However it was approached, it was a theme that cropped up with regularity on the global stage.

Since the turn of the millennium, however, and irrespective of the direction taken, multiculturalism has become the subject of sustained criticism. Not only have the policies themselves been critiqued, but so too have the people associated with their messages. A significant component of the counter-narrative sizing-up against recipients of multiculturalist policies have thus come from politically powerless white working-class communities who also felt excluded from mainstream representations (Hewitt 2005). Civil unrest in France and racially motivated riots in Australia, both in 2005, are examples often held up as illustrative of the failure of multiculturalism or, as Brubaker (2003: 40) puts it, a sign that it has 'exhausted itself'. In the UK, the political retreat from multiculturalism occurred in response to the summer riots in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford in 2001. The government-commissioned

investigation into those events was one of the first to signal this retreat, concluding that:

Separate educational arrangements, community and voluntary bodies, employment, places of worship, language, social and cultural networks, means that many communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives. These lives often do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges ... Whilst respect for different cultures is vital, it will also be essential to agree some common elements of 'nationhood' (The Cattle Report 2001: 9 and 19).

From that point onwards, multiculturalism came under attack not only from those sections of the political spectrum where one has come to expect such opposition – the centre-right:

State multiculturalism is a wrong-headed doctrine that has had disastrous results. It has fostered difference between communities ... it has stopped us from strengthening our collective identity. Indeed, it has deliberately weakened it (David Cameron 2008, cited in Sparrow 2008).

but from their political antagonists on the left as well, as the following recent statement reveals:

It is an irony that this is happening just as we are waking from a once-fashionable view of multiculturalism, which, by emphasizing the separate and the exclusive, simply pushed communities apart. What was wrong about multiculturalism was not the recognition of diversity but that it over-emphasized separateness at the cost of unity (Brown 2007).

The last extract comes from Gordon Brown just months before becoming Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and Leader of the Labour Party, with the former uttered by David Cameron, Leader of the Conservative Party. Commentators in the media such as John Lloyd ('The end of multiculturalism', *New Statesman*, 2002), Howard Jacobson ('It's the end of multiculturalism as we know and despise it', *The Telegraph*, 2004) and Tom Baldwin and Gabriel Rozenberg ('Britain must scrap multiculturalism', *The Times*, 2004) have all struck a similar chord. A central sticking point in this mix is the complaint that multi-

culturalism prompted different communities to live 'parallel lives', resulting in a 'ghettoization' of minority cultures rather than unity, a critique that has fuelled a widespread retreat from official policies touting the term, which have since inserted the concept of civic integration in its place (Joppke 2004: 244; see also The Cattle Report 2001; Khan 2005). Joppke (2005) goes on to argue that this is the case not only for the UK but for policymakers across the Western world, a trend he labels the civic-nationalist turn.

Paralleling political and media discouragements are the large quantities of academic work that have surfaced that likewise take issue with multiculturalism. Scholars such as Nathan Glazer (1997), Jacob Levy (2000), Brian Barry (2001) and Christian Joppke (2004, 2005) have vilified the notion, offering liberal critiques that document its failures. Principally, they highlight the fact that multiculturalism implies recognition, but not on reciprocal terms, thereby 'denoting an act [of recognition] that goes from the majority to the minority' (Joppke 2004: 242). At the same time, writers including Ghassan Hage (1998), Yasmin Alibhai-Brown (2000), Back et al. (2002) and Arun Kundnani (2007) have offered more radical critiques of its implementation and institutionalization, questioning the way responses to 'diversity' have been dictated by the centre and have thus worked to prolong the subordination of minority groups. Theirs is a critique that takes issue with what Kundnani (2007: 35) calls the 'contact thesis', or the desire to encourage direct contact between disparate groups as a way of fostering integration. Examples of this have been policy moves through which:

... schools with large numbers of non-white students are 'twinned' with schools that have large numbers of white students, and youth groups are encouraged to meet their counterparts across the colour lines of divided cities (Kundnani 2007: 35).

As Kundnani goes on to argue, this requirement for contact does not include deliberate mixing between almost exclusively white schools; instead, what is suggested is that 'mixing' should be used in those circumstances where it will quicken the dissolving of minority cultures into an overarching White vision of Britishness. In a similar vein, the requirement for ethnic minority groups and those from lower socio-economic backgrounds to participate in, and visit, predominantly White and middle- to upper-class cultural symbols and heritage sites, *and not vice versa*, similarly advocates a concept of inclusion that is

both 'contact' driven and assimilatory (Smith and Waterton 2009b: 12). This is because it hinges on the ability of one group, the majority, to arrogate the terms and conditions of social and cultural inclusion. As Pilkington (2008) points out, Britishness, alongside cohesion and integration, has thus become a particularly noticeable concept within this context:

... cohesion can be understood as a euphemism for integration; integration a euphemism for assimilation. As such, while assimilation suggests a form of 'hyper-inclusion' of certain forms of diversity, it also tells us equally about the forms of diversity that will not be recognized or accepted (Burnett 2007: 355).

From here, it should come as no surprise that culture has become a key tool through which a nation can reinforce a set of core values, with particular emphasis placed upon promoting a national story punctuated with the 'host' or 'majority' communities' cultural symbols and myths. Several key policy documents have since emerged expressing this integrationist strategy, most of which do so through the language of *cohesion* – particularly cohesion at the level of the community.¹

Building cohesive, empowered and active communities

Recent policy has seen the refocusing of responsibilities for tackling exclusion devolved to a new level: that of the community. This turn to 'community' is by no means a new strategy. Since the 1960s it has been a constant feature pulsing away within sociological, anthropological, historical and political writings; so much so that, as Day and Murdoch (1993: 85) point out, it is often thought of as 'a term that just will not lie down'. Indeed, its most recent instantiation is simply something of a revival within the broad and colourful ebb and flow of the term (see Smith and Waterton 2009b: 22f for a fuller exploration of this history). In specifically political terms, it has been part and parcel of New Labour's policy platform since their election in 1997, introduced through policies such as the *New Deal for Communities* and the establishment of the Government department *Communities and Local Government* (formerly the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister), which also houses the *Communities Group*. From there, it has since been threaded through a range of policies, including the 2005 *Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society* strategy, and the *Commission on Integration and Cohesion*, set up in 2006. In the heritage sector, where community is seen as being at 'the forefront of the work in the sector' (English Heritage 2006a: 2, 2006b), measures have included the *Bringing Communities Together through*

Sport and Culture in 2004 and the 2006 *Where We Live* collaboration. It is hardly surprising, then, to find the notion front and centre of the most recent Public Service Agreements, which set out New Labour Government's priority outcomes for the period 2008 to 2011. The thirty PSA targets that make up this period's Agreements are bundled into four main parts²:

- Sustainable growth and prosperity (PSAs 1–7)
- Fairness and opportunities for all (PSAs 8–17)
- Stronger communities and a better quality of life (PSAs 18–26)
- A more secure, fair and environmentally sustainable world (PSAs 27–30)

The target for the heritage sector is plugged into the third set of these bundles, which houses PSA Delivery Agreement 21: *Build More Cohesive, Empowered and Active Communities*, and is, as a whole, 'owned' by the Department for Communities and Local Government. This particular Agreement is predicated on the belief that:

[a]ctive communities are associated with people being able to make the most of their talents and to enjoy the talents of others. The cultural and sporting sectors play a key role in creating active communities, in which people are able to improve their well-being (HM Government 2007: 6).

In adhering to a policy bounded by ideals of 'community', New Labour government is able to promise a raft of social benefits *once a sense of community has been achieved*, including the ability to:

- help young people from different communities grow up with a sense of common belonging;
- help immigrants to integrate into our communities;
- help people from all sections of society to understand and celebrate the contribution made by a range of cultures to Britain;
- increase opportunities for all to participate in civic life;
- help ensure that racism and religiously motivated hate crime is unacceptable, marginalizing extremists who stir up hatred; and
- promote cohesion at a local level (HM Government 2007: 7).

Unlike those associated with the previous period (2005–2008), which highlighted three priority groups – black and minority ethnic groups, those with limiting disabilities and those in a lower socio-economic

group – this PSA Delivery Agreement is significantly vaguer, both in terms of its explicit references to heritage and/or the historic environment, which occur via Indicator 6, and the measurable targets it sets out:

As part of Public Service Agreement 21, it [DCMS] now has a broader target to increase participation in sport and culture, including the historic environment, across the population as a whole (NAO 2009: 4).

This broader focus was similarly reflected by professionals responsible for implementing the new target agreement within English Heritage:

INTERVIEWEE [35]: In the last funding agreement, 2005–2008 ... we significantly increased participation among Black and ethnic minorities and people from lower sort of economic groups and ... we hit the 3% target ... But this year, now, in 2008–2011, there is no priority group emphasis. It's just increasing participation (English Heritage, 5 August 2009).

INTERVIEWEE [36]: If you look PSA 21, DCMS is still responsible for a continued focus on under represented groups, but there is no longer a measurable target (English Heritage, 5 August 2009).

INTERVIEWEE [35]: So we're ... culture and sport fit within PSA 21 and the target is to increase participation ... They've changed it so there are much less indicators ... I mean ... I guess when we're talking about English Heritage we place an emphasis on the historic environment rather than intangible heritage ... We recognize that wider heritage matters and it's one way you can increase participation and get more people interested, **but our ultimate aim is to preserve and encourage participation in the fixed sort of environment** (English Heritage, 5 August 2009, emphasis added).

What it does make clear, however, is a shared assumption – or rather a combination of existential, propositional and value assumptions – that posit 'community' as key to cohesion and national unity. The Agreement sets out six indicators, of which the Department for Culture, Media and Sport holds the lead on one, Indicator 6, which focuses upon increasing 'the percentage of people [adults] who participate in culture and sport' by 2010/11 (HM Government 2007: 6). Participation

is understood as 'taking part in two or more different cultural or sport sectors at the required frequency of participation' – for culture, this threshold is indicated by at least *two* visits to 'historic environment sites' and at least *one* visit to a museum, gallery or archive (DCMS 2009c: 2). *Taking Part: England's Survey of Leisure, Culture and Sport*, a continuous national survey commissioned by DCMS and its partner NDPBs and conducted by BMRB Social Research,³ is the data set used to monitor the sector's achievements in relation to PSA21, particularly Indicator 6, offering a sample size of 97,670 interviews (DCMS 2005b; DCMS 2010: 11). The survey commenced in 2005 and produces annual results and statistical outputs. The latest results available draw from the 2008/09 data collection phase (conducted between April 2008 and April 2009), although there are rolling estimates currently available for the 2009/10 dataset. These findings suggest that 59.2% of adults visited at least two historic sites and 45.8% visited a museum, gallery or archive at least once between April 2008 and April 2009 (DCMS 2010: 2). 'Historic sites' are here comprised of:

- a city or town with historic character
- a historic park, garden or landscape open to the public
- a monument such as a castle, fort or ruin
- a historic building open to the public (non-religious)
- a historic place of worship attended as a visitor
- a place connected with history or historic transport system
- a site of archaeological interest
- a site connected with sports heritage (DCMS 2009c: 8).

A close reading of the twenty-two-page document reveals what Clive Gray (2007) has referred to as the increasing need for cultural policies to spread themselves across a wider range of 'fronts', and demonstrate an ability to generate benefits that extend beyond the cultural. This sense of 'attachment' to wider policy concerns within economic and social realms relocates heritage to an instrumental policy framework, where heritage is effectively posited as a tool *used* to realize a range of tangential goals (Gray 2007: 203). Although heritage has always carried an instrumental logic of sorts, in recent policy documents this has taken up a particular form; quite aside from its more obvious economic impacts, most often cited in terms of tourism and community regeneration (cf. Cossons 2004; Jowell 2004, 2005a; Thurley 2004), it is now also linked to discourses of social and community cohesion, which are themselves underpinned by a belief in the transformative

and ameliorative powers of culture. This causal link is a trend reflective of wider cultural policy initiatives (e.g. Trotter 2002; Johannisson 2006), and offers a potential nodal point for revealing a very enlightened notion of heritage previously unknown in a policy sense. This 'enlightened' notion sees a twist in the instrumental entwining of heritage and economics, promoting instead a more complex notion of heritage capable of bringing, and *doing*, 'good' for society. This was a significant outcome of the two review periods detailed in the previous chapters, in which the nascent and inherently good 'heritage' became a means to something else, re-contextualized in line with ideas of cultural governance. Nowhere was this more clearly stated than in a series of recent speeches and personal essays authored by Tessa Jowell, Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport from 2001–2007:

Culture alone can give people the means better to understand and engage with life, and as such is a key part in reducing inequality of opportunity, and which can help us slay the sixth giant of modern times – poverty of aspiration (Jowell 2004: 18, emphasis added).

This historic environment and wider heritage contributes to a wide range of Government ambitions to cut crime, promote inclusion, improve educational achievement, but is worth supporting in itself, for the way it can encourage people better to understand and engage with their history and their community, and help slay that poverty of aspiration which holds so many people back from fulfilling their potential (Jowell 2005a: 24).

Government has long understood and championed culture at the heart of regeneration ... There has been a strong recognition that such regeneration can bring economic benefits, as revitalized areas attract both people and businesses. And help to tackle key issues as crime, education, health and unemployment (Jowell 2005b: 2).

In these extracts, heritage takes up a nominalized representation, such that agency is removed and the process of doing heritage is abstracted and made passive, with agents or people absented from the text. Instead, something perceived to be an inanimate object is attributed as the agent of a verb: 'heritage creates', 'heritage provides', heritage contributes', 'heritage adds', and so on. This nominalization allows resultant policy documents to present a situation within which heritage is able to *make*

people better understand life, deny the impulse to commit crimes, strive for greater educational achievements, live healthier lives and appreciate who they are. Ironically, in this guise a conceptualization of heritage devoid of conflict and social inequities is being utilized to overcome such inequalities, and it is arguable that the same lenses that allow us to 'see' heritage as conflict-free are being employed to once again mask, rather than challenge, social inequalities. This sees the almost complete evisceration of heritage, with all ascribed meaning removed. Instead, it becomes a *thing* with significant levels of agency, capable of '... turn[ing] the trick all by itself' (Marquand 1998: 10).

The idea of heritage drawn upon in these extracts thus revolves around a number of discursive markers suggestive of the combining of 'therapeutic' and 'social democratic' discourses, and include terms such as: 'wellbeing', 'the welfare of people', 'the generation of benefits', 'revitalization', 'equitable opportunities' and the 'social impact of heritage'. In each example, every sentence can be read as an elaboration of, or addition to, the fragment bolded in the first extract. They do not offer an explanation of causal links, but establish, more or less in list form, a diverse (and naturalized) range of the changes, effects and benefits from engaging with culture and/or heritage. What these lists signify is the inevitability of the relationship between heritage and positive social effects. Indeed, no cause and effect need be mentioned, as the deeper relationship between the two can simply be assumed from their recurrence (after Fairclough 2000: 28). Most of the clauses within Jowell's extracts are parataxically related, so as to convey equality within each list. Semantically and grammatically, this provides an example of the 'logic of appearances' (Fairclough 2000: 23, 2003: 95). Here, instead of presenting an explanation, the links between heritage and the nodal markers of the therapeutic/social democratic dyad are taken as given and the consequences of re-centring culture as a means of better understanding life are implicitly taken as desirable. Likewise, culture and heritage, together, take on the form of the 'good', the 'enabler' and the 'fulfiller'. In building this representation, Jowell's speeches rely upon both moral evaluation and mythopoesis as forms of legitimization. Thus, while no real vigour is lent to understanding *how* culture and heritage operate in these ways, they nonetheless build a picture of a past that will make 'lasting contributions'. To fail to harness this power is to invite the continuance of the 'poverty of aspiration'. This, the legitimating techniques implicitly – and perhaps disingenuously – suggest, will lead to the long-term material and psychological disadvantages of social exclusion.

In the previous chapter, the merging of instrumentality into the dialectics of cultural policy, in conjunction with the firming up of heritage as morally good, was illustrated. At no stage within this process was the limited idea of heritage that currently animates policy held up to any sustained scrutiny. The same can be said for PSA Delivery Agreement 21, in which the instrumentality aligned with heritage is implicitly accepted and pushed out into a wider agenda of community cohesion, where culture, heritage and the historic environment are considered to be one arm in a broader machinery creating cohesive communities:

- that maximize the benefits of diversity rather than fear it;
- where individuals are empowered to make a difference both to their own lives and to the communities and wider environment in which they live; and
- where individuals are enabled to live active and fulfilled lives (HM Government 2007: 3; see also DCMS 2006c, d).

Implicitly connected to these notions of 'community' are the legitimizing strategies drawn upon in previous chapters, in which the assumed material and psychological outcomes of community cohesion, along with the implicitly implied transformative powers of heritage, are prioritized. Looking at or seeing this ameliorative heritage – its visibility – transforms *us*, thereby allowing us to centre ourselves, gain confidence and live fulfilled lives. It is entirely reminiscent of the committed statements emerging within the heritage sector at a similar time:

We want to engage local communities in shaping their environment so that regeneration and renewal is enriched by the best of the past as well as welcoming creativity and change (Lammy 2006a: 1).

The historic environment puts quality, variety and meaning into people's lives and gives them the opportunity to understand and engage with life (Cossons 2004: 3).

Buildings and their settings are important because of the stories they tell, and the connections they make; who we are, why, and where we came from. In many ways this clear sense of national identity is more important now than ever (Jowell 2005a: 3).

The final sentence also utilizes nationalizing and aestheticizing tendencies, as identified in Chapters 4 and 5, to reinforce the point. Here, it is pushed by a new injection of urgency (is more important now

than ever), which brings with it a strong moralistic undertone that borrows from the fear of difference and self-segregation festering at the political and social level. This is a sentiment reserved not only for those groups culturally or ethnically dissimilar to the status quo of a White, middle- to upper-class, but for those who are economically dissimilar, such as the working classes. It is a sentiment thus also found in a range of policy utterances reflecting upon socio-economic dimensions:

A building that is not a pleasant or interesting place to be, that does not engage the people who use it, is likely to have a short life due to neglect or vandalism born out of indifference or outright hostility (Jowell 2005a: 18).

At the end of the day, areas such as mine [Newcastle-under-Lyme], which are affected by industrial decay, need well-designed things for people to talk about (Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 25th January 2007 c562 WH [Heritage] Mr Paul Farrelly).

Where the historic environment is nurtured and harnessed for good it creates real social and economic benefits offering everyone characterful, desirable and distinctive places to live. Where people fail to see its potential, do not attempt to harness its power, where it is neglected and ignored, degraded and destroyed, poverty, crime and economic failure follow (Cossons 2004: 4).

As a form of mythopoesis, the narrative under construction in the above extracts appeals to both 'morality' and 'caution', thereby creating a strongly constructed sense of right and wrong that is assimilatory both in tone and its attempts at legitimization. It is also a sentiment inherent to recent heritage policy recognized in interview:

INTERVIEWEE [34]: I think it's based on the idea that certain people are excluded from the cultural life of Britain; that being involved in the cultural life of Britain will stop you committing crime and stop you doing other things that are going to be antisocial and that somehow you have to bring those people who are excluded from that under the wing of a largely unchanged heritage agenda linked to the very specific ideas what national culture should be (Arts and Heritage Consultant, 31 March 2009).

In recognizing and protecting the 'pleasant', 'interesting' and 'characterful' we are able to make a contribution to the wellbeing of both indi-

vidual and community. By contrast, failing to implement such policies – indeed, failing to harness the historic environment for *good*, whatever that means – runs the risk of inciting ‘vandalism’ or ‘indifference’, which in turn will promote poverty and crime, particularly in those areas affected by industrial decay. Indeed, failure to *appropriately* harness heritage or the historic environment ultimately condemns a range of people to exclusion, surrounded by places that are ‘ugly’ and ‘soulless’ (Cossons 2004: 4). In these instances, it is possible to glimpse the magnificent role reserved for a distinct sense of heritage to intervene and overcome the maligned tendencies of ‘the Other’ social groups and classes to jeopardize our chances of cohesion.

Røyseng’s (2006: 5) insights into what she has termed ‘ritual cultural policy’, or, as P. Pels (2003: 35) characterizes it, modernity’s ‘enchantment’, have considerable import here. Røyseng suggests there are two meanings to ritual cultural policy. Like Fairclough’s (2000: ix) ‘mere words, empty rhetoric’, Røyseng’s first notion of ritual cultural policy refers to the repetition of policy principles that hold no real substance and are at odds with what happens in practice. This sense of ‘ritual’ has obvious connotations for the heritage sector, where the phrase ‘social inclusion’ is uttered ritualistically, regardless of how meaningless this phrase may appear in practice. Of specific interest, however, is Røyseng’s (2006: 6) second interpretation, which is based on the reification of culture as *something* that possesses ‘magical powers’, or *something* within which to seek solace (Magelssen 2002). It is magical because, as Nakamura (2005: 21) points out, it lies beyond our reach and we are not quite able to invoke an explanation as to *why* that something (in this case heritage) should be capable of such potential. In this guise, ritual cultural policy draws attention to the transformative nature of culture and heritage, which, Røyseng argues, rests on:

... a confidence in the potential of change inherent within art and culture. Something positive happens to people exposed to art and culture, and something positive happens to the societal sectors where art and culture are introduced (Røyseng 2006: 5).

These links between heritage and positive social effects are certainly paramount to the sentiments expressed in the extracts above. It is simply ‘something that happens’ – despite the fact that, as Belfiore (2009: 348) convincingly points out, this assumption is based on the availability of only the most paltry of evidence and thus can be likened to an instance of political doublespeak, or bullshit. Nonetheless,

heritage, from this point onwards, is granted magical, transformative powers, with little clarity afforded to how it came to possess and dispense those powers. It is revered and almost sacralized because of the power vested within it through policies focusing upon inclusion and cohesion, which make a particular idea of heritage appear extraordinary and unique. The conceptual space shared with ritualized policy and the AHD means that ideas of a 'good', 'grand' and 'exceptional' heritage become regular discursive markers, or nodal points, for a particular representation of heritage: one capable of unifying a nation and providing the 'shared history' and 'shared values' so desperately needed in the face of political anxiety. Underpinning these nodal markers is the implicit message that one does not 'indulge' in the ordinary or the everyday. Instead, heritage is envisioned as something that is marvelled at, from a distance, as a detour from the familiar. This idea of heritage as a public good, something that is civilizing and 'good for the soul' is shared by David Hesmondhalgh and Andy Pratt (2005: 7) in their article examining the cultural industries and cultural policy. As Hesmondhalgh and Pratt argue, this is a sentiment that can be found across a broad spectrum of cultural policy, whether implicitly or explicitly. It has, for example, materialized in bold form in a statement issued by Neil Cossons (cited in Girling 2005: 2), Chairman of English Heritage (1999–2007), who remarked, '[i]f you sideline our heritage, you sideline the nation's soul'.

A defensive national heritage and cultural assimilation

In many ways, the rendering of heritage discussed in the previous section reflects the heightened significance of identity politics and discourses of recognition (Misztal 2004: 76), which, while on the one hand are encouraging of plurality and multiculturalism, are, on the other hand, often implicitly defensive and repressively tolerant. In terms of broader heritage policy, this means that despite discursive attempts to democratize the management process, or render it more inclusive, nationalizing discursive elements are mobilized and enacted within the same policy process. In recent policy outputs, and specifically within PSA 21, this is dressed up in terms of 'sense of place', making a number of links with critical work ongoing in the wider social sciences, such as in human geography and sociology and their engagements with issues of race, liberalism, migration and the politics of identity. Here, a racialized construction of 'Whiteness' and 'Otherness' has been the focus of sustained critical work, in which the problem of segregation clusters around distinct groups, such as British Muslims. Other aspects of segregation – those occurring *within* 'White'

suburbs and towns and *between* social classes remain invisible. This particular fear of difference is framed as being manageable by imparting the set of shared values already assumed to be understood by the remainder of Britain:

The Government's aim is to create thriving places in which a fear of difference is replaced by a shared set of values and a shared sense of purpose and belonging (HM Government 2007: 3).

As I have said in other areas the community cohesion issues will be different. At a national level we need to emphasise the glue that holds us together. **Our shared British values and heritage** (Kelly 2007, emphasis added).

Embedded as this is within the specific policy identified in the previous three chapters, it becomes possible to argue that the seemingly universal assumptions of a 'tangible', 'grand' and largely Christianized notion of heritage, developed earlier as essential for the formation of 'sense of place', remain unchallenged by these calls for a shared set of values. Indeed, because these cultural symbols embody and represent only a limited number of the diverse groups that make up Britain, the remainder – the working classes, migrants, ethnic minority groups and so forth – are exiled from the sphere of 'belonging' they engender. Quite what Britishness *is*, including the shared set of values or sense of purpose that upholds it, never receives elaboration. Like heritage itself, the idea of 'Britishness' appears to be a given. In a speech delivered recently by Gordon Brown (2007), however, a little more detail was forthcoming, which suggested that:

... we are a country united not so much by race or ethnicity but by shared values that have shaped shared institutions. Indeed, when people are asked what they think is important about being British many say our institutions: from the monarchy and the national anthem to the Church of England, the BBC and our sports teams. But when people are also asked what they admire about Britain, more usually says it is our value: – British tolerance, the British belief in liberty and the British sense of fair play. Even before America said in its constitution it was the land of liberty and erected the Statue of Liberty, I think Britain can lay claim to the idea of liberty.

As Mitchell (2004: 644) points out, one of the ways in which the retreat from multiculturalism has played out in many European nations has

been through concerted moves away from official acknowledgements of pluralism towards a renewed affirmation of liberalism and its core values, much of which is observable in Brown's utterance. It is, to borrow from McPherson et al. (2001: 419), a sort of 'value homophily' based upon shared values, attitudes and beliefs. First and foremost, we see this through Brown's equation of British shared values with a range of institutions – the Church of England, the monarchy, the national anthem, the BBC and sporting teams, none of which tell particularly diverse tales about the make-up of Britain. Second, he lists a selection of values, all of which share the prefix 'British': tolerance, liberty and a sense of fair play. This collection of values can also be found in the earlier Government publication *Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Britain* (Home Office 2002: 34; see also the PSA Delivery Agreement, p. 7), where its authors, presumably from the Home Office, set out the 'fundamental tenets' of Britishness, which, as Joppke (2005: 56) points out, hold nothing 'particularly "British"' at their core. They might then be better understood as a more insidious form of nationalism that is ultimately exclusionary, or assimilatory, but pretends to be otherwise, a point that gels well with Brubaker's (2001: 543) assertion about the 'return of assimilation'. This, he bluntly insists:

... has involved a shift from an overwhelming focus on persisting difference – and on the mechanisms through which such cultural maintenance occurs – to a broader focus that encompasses emerging commonalities as well. Normatively, it has involved a shift from the automatic valorization of cultural differences to a renewed concern with civic integration.

Much of this has occurred in response to *The Cantle Report* introduced earlier in this chapter, and the charge that many communities in Britain 'do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap' and are subsequently seen as culturally exclusive (Cantle Report 2001: 9). To combat this, Mitchell (2004: 654) argues that a much limper sort of multiculturalism has developed, which places emphasis upon establishing a common language and core values, both of which, she suggests, may combine into 'even greater assimilative policies in the future' (see also Alexander 2007).

For scholars like Stuart Hall (1999), Laura Jane Smith (2006), Andrew Pilkington (2008) and Roshi Naidoo (2009), those values *discovered* as essentially British have been excavated by a hand wont to skip over difficult or painful histories, which obscures the tensions and acrimony

surrounding them (see also Waterton et al. 2010, Waterton forthcoming). Notwithstanding the perception that Englishness is not necessarily to be conflated with Britishness, my purpose here is to examine some core signifiers of identity that apply to both, one of which being that their histories have become bathed in a language of celebration. This is not a distinctly British phenomenon; as Heisler (2008: 205) points out, identities will inevitably hook into narratives of the past that are in some way positive:

I agree that **we must do more to celebrate our shared values and heritage**. Values like:

- respect for the rule of law
- freedom of speech
- equality of opportunity
- respect for others and
- responsibility towards others.

And distinctly British traditions like – respect for difference, recognizing all faiths, the importance of voluntary organizations a deep sense of fairness. All traditions steeped in history, but all relevant for today (Kelly 2007: 2, emphasis added).

... the cultural sectors do offer the chance to create the kinds of safe public spaces where we can explore difference, ask the awkward questions, test the boundaries or simply satisfy that healthy curiosity about those who don't look like us. [...] ... **it is about celebrating our shared heritage wherever and whenever we can** (Hodge 2008, emphasis added).

... the days of Britain having to apologize for the British Empire are over. We should celebrate (Gordon Brown 2005, cited in Burnett 2007: 354).

This union between 'celebration' and 'cohesion' pares down the availability of a range of values and heritages to those more closely aligned with the AHD, prompting a re-scripting of British history in order to tell those stories that are emphatically positive. Any other response, it would seem, would threaten the sought-after self-image of a just and fair Britain. The repertoire of offerings that could add to the shared values unifying the nation are thus considerably truncated, particularly

any narratives that deal with issues of trauma or oppression. Indeed, any injustice or sense of loss, experienced either by individuals or groups, is effectively wiped from the national narrative, earmarked as divisive and fuelling segregation. It then becomes difficult to imagine how struggles for recognition by minority and subaltern groups can proceed, with no process of acknowledgement allowed for through which to bring their pasts to bear on the present (Novick 1999: 21). Instead, a 'predatory' form of heritage, to borrow from Appadurai (2008: 215), emerges, in which a particular retrieval of the past or act of sustaining a collective memory 'becomes animated by the idea that there is only room for one of them'. In this political space, White, Christian and *male* middle- and upper-classes, along with their cultural symbols, are brought to the fore and cast in a role that it is perceived as fit to *represent*. Here, an unequally empowered interest group correlates with an unequally valued notion of heritage (after Pía Lara and Fine 2007: 38).

This is a form of structural exclusion made all the more visible by the work of alternative interest groups agitating not only for their claims to heritage but their representation within the national narrative *precisely* because their stories are currently not included (Hall 1999; Khan 2005; Mack 2009; Smith and Waterton 2009b). A case in point is the national attempt to commemorate the bicentenary of the abolition of the transatlantic slave trade in 2007. Although encompassing profoundly traumatic memories, this offers a moment in which British politicians attempted to bolster a *national* identity assumed to be safe, good, heroic and stable. Although various cultural institutions across the sector grappled with this history in many different ways, political directives sought to assert images of consensus, unity and shared value, promoting a particular ideal of Britishness to be celebrated (Smith and Waterton 2009b; Paton 2009: 279):

This anniversary is a chance for all of us to deepen understanding of our past, celebrate the richness of our diversity and increase our determination to shape the world with the values we share. I hope you will get involved in some way. There should be something for everyone. This is everyone's bicentenary (Blair 2007: 1).

As Smith and Waterton (2009b; see also Waterton and Wilson 2009) have argued, rather than emphasizing diversity, the acts of commemoration surrounding the Bicentenary offered a context within which to assert ideals of Britishness and gloss over inequities in existing social

relations, *even though* the Bicentenary was explicitly opposed by a number of interest groups.⁴ This is because the form of commemoration taken up at the national level was one that remembered a primarily benevolent and morally just Britain, rather than the highly-organized and predatory violence of the exploitation of African people. As such, the commemoration became a project that affirmed and promoted a positive self-image of contemporary Britain; one that called upon and ultimately *expressed* the shared values alluded to so often in political speech. As Paton (2009: 285) points out, what was demonstrated by this commemorative year was the ease within which isolated stories of Black resistance and abolition, along with individual attempts by stately homes to explore the role of slavery in their emergence, could be subsumed within a broader narrative emphasizing a generic form of liberal humanitarianism. Other stories, as Paton goes on to argue, emphasizing 'the damage done by enslavement, the problematic outcomes of anti-slavery governmental action and the power relations that remained in place after slavery in its Atlantic form was left behind have proved much harder to present as public history'.

It is, to borrow from social theorist Nancy Fraser (2000, 2001), in exactly these political and cultural contexts that issues of power need to be drawn to the surface. Without doing so, we will be left operating around the assumption that all groups enmeshed within processes of negotiating cultural legitimacy have reached a level of equal status – and they patently have not (see Pía Lara and Fine 2007 for a broader discussion of justice in the public sphere). Nonetheless, somewhere in this mix history and heritage have been re-formulated as inherently *good* and an instrumental part of the process by which the disparate range of community groups within the UK can achieve integration. A first step towards achieving this goal was stripping away any charges of elitism aimed at the concept of heritage animating British cultural policy, a process documented in Chapters 4 and 5 of this volume. In a related step, the newly minted and 'inclusive' sense of heritage was granted the power to *do* things: here, it entered the nomenclature as the seemingly plausible 'historic environment', which is now often turned to as the political animal capable of alleviating crime and poverty, creating senses of place and belonging and, ultimately, fostering a national sense of purpose and cohesion. From here, to borrow from Hall (1999: 23–24), heritage has been projected onto a much wider political stage, where it has become 'the material embodiment of the spirit of the nation, a collective representation of the British version of *tradition*, a concept pivotal to the lexicon of English virtues'.

There is plenty of evidence to support this drift towards a new sense of assimilatory policy in Britain, beginning with the increasing visibility of talk about 'British values' and 'our way of life' to the oath of allegiance, first introduced in 2004 and the introduction of the citizenship test, 'Life in the UK', in 2005. All of these are posited as important for generating a sense of cohesion, as rehearsed in PSA21:

Effective integration of those who do make the UK their home, including embracing a common language and an understanding of life in the UK, is also important to community cohesion ... (HM Government 2007: 12).

It is thus in conjunction with creating a national culture that moves towards a newer assimilatory policy are being pursued, through the *ownership* of a particular and specific sense of heritage – perhaps the natural terrain for exclusion – at the cost of recognition for all other senses of heritage. This was partially achieved as a consequence of the nationalization of 'heritage' as described in previous chapters, which is now positioned as a cultural baseline against which to nationalize and homogenize British society more generally. Thus, it ceases to matter that heritage is limited to a combination of '[a]rts, architecture and historic environment, museums and archives, libraries' within the broader corpus of policy government cultural and social life (HM Government 2007: 22). Likewise, when the NAO report identified issues of relevance or expressions of 'not really interested' and a feeling of discomfort or being 'out of place' as key reasons cited by lower socio-economic groups and Black and minority-ethnic groups for not visiting heritage sites (p. 9),⁵ the response was simply to work harder to increase participation at the same select categories of 'heritage':

A particular challenge is to **influence the behaviour** of those people **who say that they are not interested** in heritage, which is a reason given by a high proportion of those who do not visit historic sites (NAO 2009: 5, emphasis added).

Similarly, lack of engagement by lower income groups was highlighted as problematic in several interviews, although here the issue of 'lack of interest' was described as something that could be tackled with better marketing:

INTERVIEWEE [36]: ... we have identified that we are making the least impression on lower income, lower education families and that

a key priority for us must be tackling that ... So I think there's a big priority there around how we can best let people know what our offer is because in many cases there is nothing wrong with it – it's just that we are not telling people, we are not reassuring them that we can give them what they want (English Heritage, 5 August 2009).

The implication implicit in the above extracts is, of course, that particular social groups *say* they are not interested, but somehow that is not *really* the case – perhaps these are the groups who are 'self-segregating' and therefore require a change in behaviour? Certainly, the previously tolerated enclaves of the culturally diverse are no longer seen as acceptable, for it is here that the fear of crime, division and, indeed, terrorism is seen to fester. What is particularly interesting is that these statements are aimed not only at the supposedly culturally-bounded Black and minority ethnic groups, but at those individuals from lower socio-economic brackets as well. Indeed, in this retreat from multiculturalism towards a process of integration references to the discourses of social inclusion identified earlier in the volume can be traced, in which official policy was seen to be driven by a commitment to familiarize all those groups labelled as 'social excluded' with the cultural norms of acceptability via a process of marketing, re-education and patronizing process of reassurance.

Conclusion

What I have offered here is speculative, a first approximation; much more work still needs to be done in unpacking the intertextuality between expressly cultural policy and wider policies concerned with migration, citizenship and belonging. Admittedly, the last three chapters carried a focus contained to heritage policy specifically, but it is in the policy moments documented in this chapter that we can glimpse the ways in which Smith's naturalized AHD migrates out of the heritage arena and spills into wider policy. In Chapter 2, this discourse was illustrated as being highly mobile, colonizing beyond its original borders of Western Europe. In this chapter, this movement was witnessed in terms other than geography, in which the AHD moved beyond the boundaries of heritage policy and into an arena where it aids in the re-imagining of the nation at the level of 'community'; a 'community' identified by a unified adoption of a particular culture and identity. Here, particular cultural knowledges and forms of cultural governance illustrated in early chapters can be seen to be trading, still, in the same limited idea of her-

itage but on a much wider scale. Alongside the rhetoric of 'cohesion' and 'shared values', this unreflexive notion of heritage is implicitly and uncritically drawn upon to help reinvigorate and legitimize a nationalist discourse of belonging and inclusion – from which position it can easily be drawn upon by official policies to govern the conduct of British citizens. At its core, and particularly when conjoined with the euphemistically uttered 'historic environment', lies an ignorance of the permeability of the boundaries within and between social and cultural groups (Phillips 2006: 30). It is unfeasible to expect a multicultural nation to receive and cling to a limited and exclusionary idea of its heritage, history and culture – no matter the title it is given. Instead, cultural and public policymakers should be looking towards an attenuation of the authority of the AHD, bolstered by the hybridization of a national culture by a fuller range of intersecting social groups. Nonetheless, it was in the guise of an 'uncontaminated' notion of culture that the national community was identified and defined. From this point, the project of inclusion could be problematized as the failure of multiculturalism, witnessed by episodes of self-segregation. Here, the AHD lends credence to a more insidious cohesion discourse *and vice versa*; taken together, particular constructions of the past, heritage and community can be objectified as part of a wider, normalized practice. In much the same way that 'excluded' groups were cast as wilfully self-excluding themselves from what was proposed as an inherently inclusive historic environment, so too can the AHD be seen to mingle with a broader rhetoric of cohesion that places emphasis on the need for excluded citizens to *opt into* a narrow image of Britishness rather than opt out (Phillips 2006; Alexander 2007). The problem, of course, is that this image of Britishness, and the ideas of heritage and culture that sustain it, play down the multiple historical, social, ethnic and cultural communities that are present within the country, thereby denying the similarly numerous identities, values and meanings that may be prominent in the heterogeneous make-up of the population. The bounded core values drawn upon to sponsor a national sense of community cohesion thus dissolve into fiction – even for the equally messy and unbounded collections of the White middle- and upper-classes.

Conclusion

Throughout this volume, I have focused upon the relationships between heritage, public policy and power in an attempt to develop a critical understanding both of heritage and the way it is utilized as a tool of cultural governance. My intention was to add to the small, but growing number of publications that challenge us to produce new ways of thinking about heritage and rework our awareness of the role it plays in our everyday lives. This area of study is certainly promising, but we are still a long way from declaring that the field of critical heritage studies has arrived; and until there is greater clarity in this area of research, heritage studies will struggle to find productive and creative things to say about cultural politics. With this in mind, my purpose has been to argue that the links between heritage, language, ideology, power, identity formations and the emotive uses of the past are *more* fundamental to the emerging field of heritage studies than are the technical issues of identifying and managing buildings, sites and monuments, and protecting their fabric (Logan and Reeves 2009: 13). They are also more important than devising strategies to increase the number of 'excluded' bodies at already recognized heritage sites and places. For if we are to take the issues of diversity *seriously*, we need also to develop the analytical tools necessary to reflexively recognize not only the processes of marginalization already implicit within heritage organizations and associated policy, but that the very definition of heritage is something that we cannot as yet set aside. This has been the challenge of the volume.

At its core, the volume held two clear aims. First, it mapped discursively the dominant heritage discourse within public policy, placing emphasis on the nexus between Smith's authorized heritage discourse, the pervasiveness of New Labour's agenda of social inclusion and wider

international discourses of multiculturalism, cultural diversity and tolerance. Second, and at a more complex and sociological level, I have tried to understand what can only be described as a patently uncomfortable point of contention within the heritage sector: the staunch defence of an exclusive notion of heritage in the face of calls for inclusion. At this level of analysis, the dominant representation of heritage emerged as a symbolic accumulation of certain values and cultural norms, through which broader attempts to construct 'Britishness' and national cohesion are enacted. It is *against* this imagining that excluded groups – primarily those defined as 'ethnic minorities', 'the working classes' and 'people with disabilities' – are positioned; a point from which they are envisioned as problems to be governed by the included (after Hage 1998). In further developing Hage's argument for the heritage context, this crafting of inclusion/exclusion was seen to create an image of a benevolent 'included' working to create better policies for the passively positioned 'excluded'. That this occurred while policy-makers overlooked the fact that it was the struggles of marginalized groups that sponsored changes in policy in the first place is particularly ironic.

My goal, then, has been to develop a more critical account of the discursive spaces within which debates about heritage occur – nationally and internationally – while remaining constantly aware of the exercise of power in creating, sustaining and inculcating the values and identities prioritized by dominant cultural practices of heritage. In taking Britain as my primary focus, this has meant reflecting on the consequences this has not only for negotiations between ethnically different groups, but in and between social classes as well as those defined by gender, religion, disability and so forth (after Fairclough 2010). Of course, in doing so I am contributing to an alternative discourse of heritage, and the trick has been to justify my approach over the one I have been critiquing. The grounds for this justification have rested with the emancipatory aspects of critical discourse analysis, and my desire to expand the critique beyond confirming the characteristics and features of the AHD towards an exploration of the various (and limited) strategies of inclusion currently circulating the sector. This meant highlighting that the many institutional assumptions and practices underpinning the sector are manifestly no longer capable of doing what it is they are supposed to do: they do not provide a shared sense of belonging; they do not sponsor an equitable source of identity; nor do they recognize the validity of a full range of experiences and meanings in cultural life.

The upshot of making these links between heritage, policy and power is that there is still tremendous work to be done. For my part in this process there are three significant points or themes I would like to reiterate. The first of these points is that heritage is always constructed and understood through discourse. Here, discourse ceases to be a simplistic and descriptive facet of language and becomes instead something with the power to *do* things; any expression of heritage that achieves dominance is thus also inevitably ideological and power-laden. My explanation of this relationship borrowed heavily from the theoretical and methodological contributions of Norman Fairclough and the dialectics of discourse (Chapter 1) and focused primarily upon the distinct articulation of heritage held at the core of public policy – the AHD (Chapters 2 and 3). Working within the parameters of critical discourse analysis, I was thus able to make the claim that, contrary to what dominant perspectives would have us believe, there is no heritage *out there* awaiting our discovery; rather, traditional forms of heritage (sites, monuments, buildings) simply conform to a dominant way of seeing. It is against this benchmark that many alternative ways of understanding heritage are misrecognized as something *other than heritage* and are thus summarily dismissed from the management process. There are, as the latter chapters in the volume sought to illustrate, a range of social, political and ideological effects of this misrecognition, particularly in terms of ownership, control and belonging. My focus on discourse thus inevitably led to an exploration of hegemony in an attempt to reveal the strategies utilized to encourage ‘the excluded’ to acquiesce to the institutional legitimacy of the AHD. These included the development of free admission policies, more vibrant marketing campaigns and an internationally disseminated tendency towards ‘community’-directed policies of education and information. This acquisition was demonstrated to occur on behalf of ‘the nation’, though it is ultimately guided by the values and interests of the white, middle- and upper-classes. While instances of compromise are undoubtedly made during the course of this process, these concessions of power can hardly be touted as systemic. Instead, the dominance of the white middle- and upper-classes within the management process is more realistically understood as being enmeshed within implicit processes of assimilation, undertaken in the guise of education, access and sponsoring community cohesion.

This theme of discourse has significant consequences for the two other themes discussed in this conclusion: transformation and belonging. Both are entangled with the complex relationship between the subject categories of ‘the white middle- and upper-classes’ and ‘the nation’,

and therefore contribute to the framework of exclusion developed in this volume. In Chapters 4 and 5 the AHD was posited as having achieved dominance in a policy sense. At this point, I also suggested that it privileges the tangible reminders of a past used to construct a range of discrete contemporary identities *in the image of* the white middle- and upper-classes. The development of this selective tradition, charted through Chapter 6, was argued to provide a sound-byte or blueprint that emphatically sounds *right* as a consequence of discourse. There are self-evidently a range of risks involved in pursuing an obviously exclusive notion of heritage (and thus identity), and so, although these have become the naturalized identity groupings held in place within the policy process, they have not been without their critics. A sense of crisis was thus seen to permeate the sector, documented in Chapters 4 and 5, at which policymakers threw a proliferation of strategies in a bid to repair the damage done by the widespread condemnation that 'heritage' was both elitist and excluding. At the centre of this was the newly minted notion of the 'historic environment', selected to sanitize, and in many ways replace, the concept of 'heritage'. Importantly, this new categorization was explicitly constructed in the singular. It is always *the* historic environment. There is only one of them, the definite article asserts, and that single conceptualization is so broad and so encompassing it arguably includes *everything*, or so the logic goes. However, beneath the overt, political power that enabled the change in name, Chapter 5 documented a lingering and covert power tangled up with the label of historic environment, which performs the ideological work of masking the lack of parity between representations of white, middle- and upper-class identities and other groups defined by a different combination of class, race and ethnicity. If a collection of sites, monuments and buildings can be signalled as 'inclusive', a full range of consumers and visitors, the logic asserts, will enter those sites and properties in a bid to overcome exclusion and feel included. What is particularly striking about this arrangement is that tangible objects are granted more power to act, do and make things happen than are people. In a strange twist of instrumentalism, the 'historic environment' is discursively given the power to *do* good, rather than simply *be* good. This outcome is important, as the idea of cultural governance developed in the volume is henceforth imagined as delivered *by* heritage and the historic environment themselves. By extension, they will supposedly also provide wellbeing, welfare, identity and belonging, and from this will flow a reduction in crime, poverty and exclusion.

Discourses of social inclusion thus triggered a remarkably transformative re-branding of heritage. The sense of heritage and 'historic environment' that emerged was something granted iconic status as a life-giving 'thing'. In effect, the re-branding is continuous. It is now part-and-parcel of the management process and operates at the nexus between the two concepts. The interlocutory role of 'the expert', who re-frames, renders safe and *signals* something as worthy of heritage status is granted the power to objectify the nation's identity in an overarching act of patrimony. The problematic, of course, emerges because what is objectified and branded as an inclusive marker of identity is, in fact, simply *one* identity amongst many. The entire process is a gross simplification of the complexity of processes through which people express, create and assert identities, and amounts to what Levitas (2004: 53) calls 'symbolic erasure'. Moreover, through this construction of events, the problem of exclusion is re-orientated and now becomes something that needs to be attended to by 'the excluded', themselves. This, I argued, was thus not an attempt by English Heritage and the DCMS to belatedly recognize that theirs was a remit limited to the built and tangible environment. Had that been the case they would surely have ceased to issue the rallying-call of 'heritage in its broadest sense'.

Following from these observations, my task in Chapters 4 and 5 was to question the origins of the 'historic environment', in terms of who were its creators, what was it promoting, how would it transform the practices of heritage management and, most importantly of all, whether this was a progressive and genuine strategy capable of instigating *real change* by tackling the systemic social and cultural mis-recognition within national heritage narratives? The significance of these questions, while touched upon in earlier chapters, was not completely developed until Chapter 6, in which I argued that the social and political stakes for belonging would only increase when these strategies of inclusion were deployed within broader policy agendas. Here, such strategies became increasingly toxic. Thus, despite the time and effort devoted to these new concepts, behind them continued to lie the images and symbols of the white middle- and upper-classes, along with the same derisory marginalization of working class and ethnically different senses of heritage. This is not a vision of the past capable of accommodating multiculturalism or critical class commentary. Nor, ironically, is it one capable of conceiving of active engagements with the past *by anyone* other than experts. Instead, the sort of 'historic environment' on offer, hailed as the arbitrator of inclusion, was the result of a convenient, perhaps subconscious,

manipulation of a situation in which *things* – not in themselves capable of actively *being* racist, classicist or discriminatory – were pushed forward as markers of inclusion. Indeed, if inclusion is explicitly tied up with these inanimate objects, the logic surely follows that issues of race, ethnicity and class will slowly disappear. And if the complexity wrapped up in *how* heritage is identified and explored by people can be overridden, so too can the differences of opinion expressive of diverse social groupings be consciously ignored.

Perhaps the most influential category to have emerged from this study, though, is that of the 'nation', through which conceptualizations of 'us' and 'them' were proposed and since linked to ideals of national 'cohesion' and belonging: in these instances, the melding together of 'us' and 'Britishness' bears out a distinctly exclusionary sense of heritage and identity. Stately homes, fortified palaces, ecclesiastical buildings, prehistoric, Roman and medieval sites, battlefields and dramatic ruins have thus come to provide '...the full historic panoply' (English Heritage 2004b: 7). Fixed within the forefront of heritage and related policy, this limited collection of tangible objects has consolidated into a form of commonsense regarding national identity. Here, it is no easier to side-step the insidious role played by limited representations of heritage than it is to avoid considering the role of language in everyday life. Recipient roles constructed for 'the public', especially the un-included public, were argued to be moving towards a form of cultural governance through which any number of people could be instructed and educated, taught and shown. To bolster this discursive move, attempts were made to mask conflict and eradicate uncertainty, often achieved through correlations made between lists of heritage 'assets', an appearance of consensus and media-touted ideals of a 'shared heritage'. This fear of difference and an apparent desire to obfuscate any attempt to construct identities *within* the discursive grouping of 'the nation' were drawn upon in Chapters 5 and 6 as potent indications of an attempt to assimilate. Endless lists of heritage, the built environment, the historic environment – call it what you like – fed into a selective cultural performance occurring around notions of 'cohesion' and 'us' that crystallized the prioritization of white, middle- and upper-classes. Those social groups earmarked as 'them' or 'excluded' were encouraged to display their distinctiveness *only* in those spaces where a celebration of cultural diversity would add to the identity of Britain as a multicultural nation; in all other contexts they were encouraged to imitate or acquiesce to dominant understandings of British culture and its meaning (Lewis 2005). Never, as Gail

Lewis (2005: 547) so eloquently remarks, were their cultural values and identities asked to stand *for* the nation; they are merely the 'terrain upon which the "host" nation can make its claims to tolerance, civilization and indeed modernity itself'.

These findings raise as many questions as they do answers. First and foremost, more research needs to be done that can move the assumed relationship between heritage and inclusion beyond the paltry evidence we currently have circulating the heritage sector. Second, more work is required that demonstrates, in no uncertain terms, the political and ethical dangers of continuing to shore up ideals of cohesion and Britishness against a racially coded and class-based sense of heritage and belonging. This should not, as Amin (2002) points out, be the sort of project that reinforces the demarcation of different sorts of British subjects – between those who represent 'diversity' and those who represent 'us'. This should be the sort of research that powerfully and empirically asserts the rights of *other* groups to claim the nation and negotiate its meaning, values and symbols. As a starting point, I have used this book to chart the institutional and discursive environments of heritage in an attempt to link language and power with social realities. I have not proposed to offer an understanding of how these linkages are greeted and disputed in practice *outside* of heritage institutions, nor have I presented alternative constructions of heritage. While these alternatives are certainly available, I have chosen to limit my analysis to those constructions and interpretations that are visible in policy. As such, I do not deliver an analysis that unearths distinctly new ways forward in terms of management policy and strategies. What I have done, however, is stress the importance of *critically thinking about* what we already do in terms of management and policy. To get past that point, the discursive structurings of 'cohesion', 'safe heritage' and a 'passive public' need to be both acknowledged and dismantled, in tandem with a concerted move away from disguising difference and dissonance. That point will only ever be reached once the heritage sector fully comes to terms with the salience of language, and renders transparent the role the AHD plays in legitimizing and sustaining a *particular* way of seeing heritage. Until that point, the overarching failure of the heritage sector to sponsor and implement genuine and successful policies of inclusion and diversity will continue more or less unabated.

Appendix A

Interview Schedule

Interviewees will be cited in the text of the volume by interview transcription number to accommodate the need for anonymity.

INTERVIEWEE 1

10th November 2004, English Heritage Yorkshire and the Humber Region, Team Leader – North Yorkshire, Inspector of Ancient Monuments, The King's Manor, York.

INTERVIEWEE 2

25th November 2004, English Heritage Yorkshire and the Humber Region, Team Leader – North Yorkshire, Inspector of Ancient Monuments, The King's Manor, York.

INTERVIEWEE 3

25th November 2005, English Heritage Yorkshire and the Humber Region, Inspector of Ancient Monuments, The King's Manor, York.

INTERVIEWEE 4

11th January 2005, University City London (UCL), Reader in Public Archaeology, Institute of Archaeology, London.

INTERVIEWEE 5

13th January 2005, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee, Clerk, 7 Millbank, Westminster, London.

INTERVIEWEE 6

13th January 2005, Heritage Link, Secretary, Albert Embankment, London.

INTERVIEWEE 7

13th January 2005, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee, Second Clerk, 7 Millbank, Westminster, London.

INTERVIEWEE 8

14th January 2005, Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Architecture and Historic Environment Division, Cockspur Street, London.

INTERVIEWEE 9

2nd February 2005, Local Heritage Initiative, Local Heritage Initiative (LHI) Advisor, Sovereign Street, Leeds.

INTERVIEWEE 10

23rd May 2005, English Heritage Yorkshire and the Humber Region, Head of Medieval and Later Rural Research Policy, The King's Manor, York.

INTERVIEWEE 11

25th May 2005, The Yorkshire Archaeological Trust, Community Archaeologist,
47 Aldwark, York.

INTERVIEWEE 12

8th June 2005, The Council for British Archaeology, Conservation Co-ordinator,
St Mary's House, York.

INTERVIEWEE 13

10th June 2005, The Heritage Lottery Fund, Deputy Director of Policy and
Research, Telephone interview, The King's Manor, York.

INTERVIEWEE 14

4th July 2005, English Heritage, Policy and Communications, Head of Social and
Economic Research, Fortress House, Savile Row, London.

INTERVIEWEE 15

4th July 2005, English Heritage, Policy and Communications, Head of World
Heritage and International Policy, Fortress House, Savile Row, London.

INTERVIEWEE 16

18th July 2005, Department of Culture, Media and Sport, Architecture and
Historic Environment Division and HPR Project Team, Tottenham Court,
London.

INTERVIEWEE 17

18th July 2005, English Heritage, Policy and Communications, Head of Policy
and Communications, Fortress House, Savile Row, London.

INTERVIEWEE 18

3rd August 2005, English Heritage, Conservation Department, Director of
Conservation, Fortress House, Savile Row, London.

INTERVIEWEE 19

25th August 2005, English Heritage, Properties and Outreach, Head of Outreach,
Fortress House, Savile Row, London.

INTERVIEWEE 20

25th August 2005, English Heritage, Conservation Department, Research and
Policy Officer, Conservation Department, Fortress House, Savile Row,
London.

INTERVIEWEE 21

26th August, Institute for Public Policy Research, Research Assistant, Covent
Gardens, London.

INTERVIEWEE 22

8th September 2005, Department for Culture Media and Sport, Principle
Research Officer, Cockspur Street, London.

INTERVIEWEE 23

8th September 2005, English Heritage, Strategy Department, Director of Strategy,
Fortress House, Savile Row, London.

INTERVIEWEE 24

10th January 2006, UNESCO – World Heritage Centre, Chief of Europe and
North America Unit, place de Fontenoy, Paris.

INTERVIEWEE 25

10th January 2006, UNESCO – World Heritage Centre, Chief of Asia and Pacific
Unit, place de Fontenoy, Paris.

INTERVIEWEE 26

13th January 2006, UNESCO – Intangible Heritage Section, Assistant Programme
Specialist, rue de Miollis, Paris.

INTERVIEWEE 27

13th January 2006, UNESCO – Intangible Heritage Section, Assistant Programme
Specialist, rue de Miollis, Paris.

INTERVIEWEE 28

13th January 2006, UNESCO – Intangible Heritage Section, Programme
Specialist, rue de Miollis, Paris.

INTERVIEWEE 29

11th April 2006, Smithsonian Institute, Centre for Folklife and Cultural Heritage,
Director and Curator, Washington D.C.

INTERVIEWEE 30

13th April 2006, Smithsonian Institute, Centre for Folklife and Cultural Heritage,
Cultural Specialist, Washington D.C.

INTERVIEWEE 31

13th April 2006, Smithsonian Institute, Centre for Folklife and Cultural Heritage,
Project Director of Save our Sounds, Washington D.C.

INTERVIEWEE 32

17th April 2006, Smithsonian Institute, Centre for Folklife and Cultural Heritage,
Director of Centre, Washington D.C.

INTERVIEWEE 33

17th April 2006, Smithsonian Institute, Centre for Folklife and Cultural Heritage,
Director of Cultural Heritage Policy, Washington D.C.

INTERVIEWEE 34

31st March 2009, Arts and Heritage Consultant, Cardiff.

INTERVIEWEE 35

5th August 2009, English Heritage, Social and Economic Research, Waterhouse Square, London.

INTERVIEWEE 36

5th August 2009, English Heritage, Policy and Communication, Waterhouse Square, London.

Appendix B

International Cultural Policy

Charters, Conventions, Declarations, Recommendations and Resolutions

(Adopted from The Getty 2009¹)

1877–1904

- The Principles of the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings as Set Forth upon its Foundation (The SPAB Manifesto) (1877)
- Recommendations of the Madrid Conference (1904)

1930–1939

- General Conclusions of the Athens Conference (1931)
- Athens Charter for the Restoration of Historic Monuments (1931)
- Roerich Pact: Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments (1935)

1950–1959

- The Hague Convention: Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (1954)
- European Cultural Convention (1954)
- Recommendation on International Principles Applicable to Archaeological Excavation (1956)
- Recommendation Concerning International Competitions in Architecture and Town Planning (1956)

1960–1969

- Recommendation Concerning the Most Effective Means of Rendering Museums Accessible to Everyone (1960)
- Recommendation Concerning the Safeguarding of the Beauty and Character of Landscapes and Sites (1962)
- The Venice Charter: International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites (1964)
- Recommendation on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (1964)
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)

- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)
- Norms of Quito: Final Report of the Meeting on the Preservation and Utilization of Monuments and Sites of Artistic and Historical Value (1967)
- Recommendation concerning the Preservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or Private Works (1968)

1970–1978

- Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (1970)
- Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972)
- Recommendation Concerning the Protection, at National Level, of the Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972)
- Resolutions of the Symposium on the Introduction of Contemporary Architecture into Ancient Groups of Buildings (1972)
- European Charter of the Architectural Heritage (1975)
- Declaration of Amsterdam (1975)
- Resolutions of the International Symposium on the Conservation of Smaller Historic Towns (1975)
- The Charter on Cultural Tourism (1976)
- Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations, Convention of San Salvador (1976)
- Recommendation Concerning the Safeguarding and Contemporary Role of Historic Areas (1976)
- Recommendation on Participation by the People at Large in Cultural Life and their Contributions to It (1976)
- Recommendation Concerning the International Exchange of Cultural Property (1976)
- Man and the Biosphere Programme (1977)
- Recommendation for the Protection of Moveable Cultural Property (1978)

1980–1989

- Recommendation for the Safeguarding and Preservation of Moving Images (1980)
- The Florence Charter on Historic Gardens (1982)
- Deschambault Charter for the Preservation of Quebec's Heritage (1982)
- Tlaxcala Declaration on the Revitalization of Small Settlements (1982)
- Declaration of Dresden on the Reconstruction of Monuments Destroyed by War (1982)
- The Appleton Charter for the Protection and Enhancement of the Built Environment (1983)
- Declaration of Rome (1983)
- European Convention on Offences Relating to Cultural Property (1985)
- Convention for the Protection of the Architectural Heritage of Europe (Granada)(1985)

- First Brazilian Seminar About the Preservation and Revitalization of Historic Centres (1987)
- The Washington Charter: Charter on the Conservation of Historic Towns and Urban Areas (1987)
- Archaeology and Planning Strasbourg: Council of Europe (1987)
- Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folklore (1989)
- The Vermillion Accord on Archaeological Ethics and the Treatment of the Dead (1989)

1990–1999

- Charter for the Protection and Management of the Archaeological Heritage (1990)
- Québec City Declaration (1991)
- Charter for the Conservation of Places of Cultural Heritage Value (1992)
- A Preservation Charter for the Historic Towns and Areas of the United States of America (1992)
- Charter of Courmayeur (1992)
- European Convention for the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage of Europe (Revised) (Valetta)(1992)
- European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992)
- New Orleans Charter for the Joint Preservation of Historic Structures and Artefacts (1992)
- The Living Treasures Programme
- Declaration of Rio (1992)
- Declaration of Oaxaca (1993)
- The Fez Charter (1993)
- Guidelines for Education and Training in the Conservation of Monuments, Ensembles and Sites (1993)
- UN General Assembly Resolution (A/RES/48/15) on the Return or Restitution of Cultural Property to the Countries of Origin (1993)
- Buenos Aires Draft Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (1994)
- The Nara Document on Authenticity (1994)
- Resolution on Information as an Instrument for Protection against War Damages to the Cultural Heritage (1994)
- Unidroit Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (1995)
- Bergen Protocol on Communications and Relations among Cities of the Organization of World Heritage Cities (1995)
- Charter for Sustainable Tourism (1995)
- Secretary of the Interior's Standards for the Treatment of Historic Properties (1995)
- Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995)
- Charter for the Protection and Management of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (1996)
- Final Communiqué of the NATO-Partnership for Peace Conference on Cultural Heritage Protection in Wartime and in State of Emergency (1996)

- Declaration of Valencia (1996)
- Declaration of San Antonio on Authenticity in the Conservation and Management of the Cultural Heritage (1996)
- Declaration of Quebec (1997)
- Document of Pavia (1997)
- Evora Appeal (1997)
- The Stockholm Declaration: Declaration of ICOMOS marking the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1998)
- Declaration of Melbourne (1998)
- Recommendation on Measures to Promote the Integrated Conservation of Historic Complexes Composed of Immovable and Moveable Property (1998)
- The Burra Charter: The Australia ICOMOS Charter for the Conservation of Places of Cultural Significance (1999)
- Charter on the Built Vernacular Heritage (1999)
- International Wood Committee Charter: Principles for the Preservation of Historic Timber Buildings (1999)
- International Cultural Tourism Charter: Managing Tourism at Places of Heritage Significance (1999)
- Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (1999)

2000–2009

- Convention on Biological Diversity (2000)
- European Landscape Convention (Florence) (2000)
- Guidance on the Development of Legislation and Administration Systems in the Field of Cultural Heritage (2000)
- Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001)
- Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage (2001)
- Proclamation of Masterpieces of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity (2001)
- Istanbul Declaration (2002)
- Principles for the Conservation of Heritage Sites in China (2002)
- Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003)
- Charter on the Preservation of Digital Heritage (2003)
- Indonesia Charter for Heritage Conservation (2003)
- UNESCO Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage (2003)
- ICOMOS Principles for the Preservation and Conservation-Restoration of Wall Paintings (2003)
- Xi'an Declaration on the Conservation of the Setting of Heritage Structures, Sites and Areas (2005)
- Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society (Faro)(2005)
- Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005)
- Charter for the Interpretation and Presentation of Cultural Heritage Sites (2008)
- ICOMOS Charter on Cultural Routes (2008)

Notes

Chapter 2 Heritage in the Wider World

- 1 As stated on the United Nations website, available at: <http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml> (Accessed 13 March 2010).
- 2 Further information regarding the establishment of UNESCO can be found on the following website: <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/about-us/who-we-are/history/> (Accessed 13 March 2010).
- 3 The full constitution can be found on the ICOMOS website, available at: http://www.icomos.org/unesco/unesco_constitution.html (Accessed 15 March 2010).
- 4 Information regarding the World Heritage Committee is available at: <http://whc.unesco.org/en/committee> (Accessed 15 March 2010).
- 5 World Heritage List information was acquired from UNESCO's World Heritage Centre Website, available at: <http://whc.unesco.org/en/list> (Accessed 9 March 2010).
- 6 The property 'Uvs Nuur Basin' is a trans-regional property that straddles both Europe and Asia, as well as the Pacific – for the purposes of this table, UNESCO has counted it as falling within the Asia and the Pacific region (see the World Heritage List webpage for further details, available at: <http://whc.unesco.org/en/list> (Accessed 9 March 2010).
- 7 Italy has the most World Heritage Sites with 44 inscribed properties, followed by Spain, who boasts 41 sites, China with 38, France and Germany with 33 a piece, Mexico with 29 and the United Kingdom with 28 Sites.

Chapter 3 The Discursive Blueprint: A History of Heritage Policy

- 1 The ODPM became Communities and Local Government on 5th May 2006, with Ruth Kelly taking ministerial responsibility for its portfolio (Communities and Local Government 2006).
- 2 The Victoria and Albert Museum, the Science Museum, the Armouries and the Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew.
- 3 Specifically, Schedule 4, paragraph 10, which refers to Section 8C of the *Historic Buildings and Ancient Monuments Act 1953*.

Chapter 4 New Labour, New Heritage?

- 1 The *Telegraph* ran a story on 10 October 2000 with the headline 'Straw wants to rewrite our history', as did the *Daily Mail*, whose headline ran as 'British is racist, says peer trying to rewrite our history'. On 12 October 2000, Jack Straw, then Home Secretary, tried to distance himself from the report in a story for the *Telegraph* that headlined as 'Straw attacks 'unpatriotic' left'.

- 2 The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) recently produced *Working Together: United Kingdom National Action Plan on Social Inclusion 2008–2010*, the fourth NAPincl on social exclusion.
- 3 Currently, the Task Force website makes the claim that '[t]he role of the Task Force is to coordinate the Government's drive against social exclusion, ensuring that the cross-departmental approach delivers for those most in need. The Task Force champions the needs of the most disadvantaged members of society within Government, ensuring that as with the rest of the public service reform agenda, we put people first', available at: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/social_exclusion_task_force.aspx.
- 4 James Early, cited in Naidoo (2009: 68).
- 5 Available at: <http://landandpeople.bnp.org.uk/?m=200902> (Accessed 22 February 2010).
- 6 This quote is found on several online discussion forums in the UK, often posted under different usernames. For example, it is found on the *Forces Reunited* webpage, the *Wigan Warriors Rugby* fan pages, the *Popular Alliance* discussion pages, the *Army Rumour Service*, and the *British Democracy Forum*, to name a few. Since then, it has resurfaced on numerous occasions, particularly from 2005–2010. The text originally formed part of a chain letter originating in America but has surfaced in a range of other countries, albeit with a different country or city highlighted (ie. America or Australia or London). Online discussion forums include the *Breakthechain.org* in 2002. It has also appeared in print in newspapers such as *The West Australian*.
- 7 This quote is a response to a British government report in the mid-90s that disparagingly remarked that Stonehenge and its visitor experience had become a 'national disgrace', due to a variety of issues including the lack of a serious visitor centre, the encroachment of major roads and access to the monument itself (Mason and Kuo 2006: 192; Pendlbury 2009: 154).
- 8 Both documents were highlighted as key policy documents by a number of interviewees: 'The government's policy is set out in a document called *A Force for our Future*' (Interviewee [10], English Heritage, 18th July 2005); 'The overarching policy framework ... is the *Power of Place* and *Force for our Future*' (Interviewee [11], DCMS, 18th July 2005); 'Well, English Heritage has produced the definition of historic environment, you know, in *Power of Place*, um, it works for us' (Interviewee [14], English Heritage, 8th September 2005).
- 9 A third document, *People and Places* (DCMS 2002c), developed as an offshoot of *A Force for our Future* (DCMS 2001a), provides a more closely developed overview of this document's Section Four (entitled Including and Involving People).
- 10 Negotiations undertaken in the review process ensured that 'the historic environment' was the term of choice, something also noted by the majority of interviewees (see Chapter 5).

Chapter 5 On Being Radical: The Heritage Protection Reform

- 1 This transformation is acknowledged, albeit uncritically, by a number of key heritage organizations in the publication *Valuing Our Heritage*, in which the following remark can be found: 'Through the publication of *Power of*

Place in 2000 the heritage sector has promoted a vision of heritage as inclusive not exclusive' (Heritage Link et al. 2007: 8).

- 2 Intrinsic value is: 'Value inherent in heritage, the benefit derived from heritage products for their existence value and for their own sake' (The National Trust and Accenture 2006: 10), or, as Cowell (2008: 141) suggests, value as 'objects or places of beauty or historical significance'.
- 3 Instrumental value is: 'The benefit of the heritage product in terms of visitors, volunteers and wider social, economic, environmental and educational benefits at a community level' (The National Trust and Accenture 2006: 10), or things that can 'deliver a range of benefits to citizens' (Cowell 2008: 141).
- 4 'The processes and techniques used to create value, organizational legitimacy, public trust in the organization, accountability and public trust in the fairness and equality of organizational processes' (The National Trust and Accenture 2006: 10).
- 5 This statement is drawn from the published proceedings of the discussion session at the *Capturing the Public Value of Heritage Conference* within which Simon Thurley made this remark.
- 6 This, incidentally, is largely reproduced from a report pulled together for the English Heritage Advisory Committee, authored by Fidler and Embree (2005).
- 7 The first draft of the *Principles* had seven principles, which were as follows: (1) The historic environment is a shared resource; (2) It is essential to understand and sustain what is valuable in the historic environment; (3) Everyone can make a contribution; (4) Understanding the value of places is vital; (5) Places should be managed to sustain their significance; (6) Decisions about change must be reasonable and transparent; (7) It is essential to document and learn from decisions (English Heritage 2006c).
- 8 The ODPM is now known as Communities and Local Government (CLG).
- 9 One such example of this push came with the merging of Policy Position Guidance Notes 15 and 16 – now called Policy Position Statement 15: Planning for the Historic Environment – which was still in the consultation phase of the redrafting process at the time of publication.
- 10 'The List' is the proposed replacement regime for Scheduling and Listing, which will see a simplification of the current systems into one List (DCMS 2003a: 10; see also 2003b).

Chapter 6 Turning the Trick by Itself: The Historic Environment and 'Community Cohesion'

- 1 The Home Office (2002) White Paper *Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain* is able to emblemize this rhetoric of 'community cohesion' at the national level best.
- 2 The Public Service Agreements can be found on the HM Treasury website, available at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/pbr_csr/psa/pbr_csr07_psaindex.cfm (Accessed 25 March 2010).
- 3 BMRB Social Research has recently been amalgamated with Taylor Nelson Sofres Social Research. The organization now operates under the name TSN-BMRB.

- 4 See, for example, expression of opposition vocalized by the Ligali Organization (Ligali 2005), Bristol's black community (Gabriel 2007), Operation Truth (2007), communities of African British (Bona Sawa 2007) and the Consortium of Black Groups (COBG).
- 5 The report includes the following quotes to support such arguments: '... cultural relevance is the key – if it's not relevant to people's personal lives then they won't want to engage with the site' (NAO 2009: 9); 'When we walk into these properties we get a sense of rejection and omission' (NAO 2009: 9) and '[It's] like you don't belong there. The staff attitude and even the attitude of certain general public on certain sites they look at you like you don't belong there ... It's almost like 'how did they let you in?' (NAO 2009: 9).

Appendix B

- 1 http://www.getty.edu/conservation/research_resources/charters.html (page consulted 10 March 2010).

References

- Abercrombie, N. and Longhurst, B. (1998) *Audiences: A Sociological Theory of Performance and Imagination* (London: Sage Publications).
- Abercrombie, N. and Warde, A., with Deem, R., Penna, S., Soothill, K., Urry, J., Sayer, A. and Walby, S. (2000) *Contemporary British Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press).
- Ahmad, Y. (2006) 'The scope and definitions of heritage: From tangible to intangible', *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 12 (3), 292–300.
- Aitchison, C. (1999) 'Heritage and nationalism: Gender and the performance of power' in D. Crouch (ed.), *Leisure/Tourism Geographies: Practices and Geographical Knowledge* (London: Routledge).
- Alexander, C. (2007) 'Cohesive identities: The distance between meaning and understanding' in M. Wetherell, M. Laflèche and R. Berkeley (eds), *Identity, Ethnic Diversity and Community Cohesion* (London: Sage Publications).
- Alibhai-Brown, Y. (2000) *After Multiculturalism* (London: Foreign Policy Centre).
- Allin, P. and Selwood, S. (2004) 'Editorial', *Cultural Trends*, 13 (2), 1–5.
- Amery, C. and Cruickshank, D. (1975) *The Rape of Britain* (Levittown, NY: Transatlantic Arts).
- Amin, A. (2002) *Ethnicity and the Multicultural City: Living with Diversity. Report for the Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions and the ESRC Cities Initiative* (Durham: University of Durham). Also available online at: http://www.aulaintercultural.org/IMG/pdf/ash_amin.pdf.
- Anderson, B. (1983) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso).
- Ang, I. Australian Humanities Review (2001) 'Intertwining histories: Heritage and diversity (Sixth annual history lecture for the History Council of NSW, delivered 24 September 2001 at Government House)', available online at: <http://www.australianhumanitiesreview.org/archive/Issue-November-2001/ang.html>. Page consulted 24th November 2009.
- Anon. (2006) 'Whose values matter' in K. Clark (ed.), *Capturing the Public Value of the Heritage: The Proceedings of the London Conference, 25–26 January 2006* (London: The Heritage Lottery, DCMS, English Heritage and the National Trust).
- Apple, M. (1990) *Ideology and Curriculum* (London: Routledge).
- Appadurai, A. (2008) 'The globalization of archaeology and heritage: A discussion with Arjun Appadurai' in G. Fairclough, R. Harrison, J. H. Jameson Jr and J. Schofield (eds), *The Heritage Reader* (London: Routledge).
- Arizpe, L. (2000) 'Cultural heritage and globalization' in E. Avrant, R. Mason and M. de La Torre (eds), *Values and Heritage Conservation* (Los Angeles: The Getty Conservation Institute). Also available online at: <http://www.getty.edu/conservation/resources/valuesrpt.pdf>.
- Ashworth, G.J. (2002) 'Holocaust tourism: The experience of Krakow-Kazimierz', *International Research in Geographical and Environmental Education*, 11 (4), 363–367.

- Ashworth, G. and Howard, P. (1999) *European Heritage Planning and Management* (Exeter: Intellect Books).
- Atkinson, R. and Savage, S. (2001) 'Introduction: New Labour and "Blairism"' in S.P. Savage and R. Atkinson (eds), *Public Policy Under Blair* (London: Palgrave).
- Augoustinos, M., LeCouteur, A. and Soyland, J. (2002) 'Self-sufficient arguments in political rhetoric: Constructing reconciliation and apologizing to the Stolen Generation', *Discourse and Society*, 13 (1), 105–142.
- Australia ICOMOS (1999, revised edition) *The Burra Charter: The Australian ICOMOS Charter for the Conservation of Places of Cultural Significance*, <http://www.icomos.org/australia/burra.html>. Page consulted 22nd May 2003.
- Back, L., Keith, M., Khan, A., Shukra, K. and Solomos, J. (2002) 'New Labour's white heart: Politics, multiculturalism and the return of assimilation', *The Political Quarterly*, 73 (4), 445–454.
- Bagnall, G. (2003) 'Performance and performativity at heritage sites', *Museum and Society*, 1 (2), 87–103.
- Baldwin, T. and Rozenberg, G. (2004) 'Britain must scrap multiculturalism', *The Times*.
- Barbour, S. and Turnbull, A. (2002) 'Dreams, schemes and castles: Can entrepreneurial input benefit a heritage tourism resource?', *Journal of Research in Marketing and Entrepreneurship*, 4 (1), 70–100.
- Barry, B. (2001) *Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press).
- Barthel, D. (1996) *Historic Preservation: Collective Memory and Historical Identity* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press).
- Baumeister, R.F. and Hastings, S. (1997) 'Distortions of collective memory: How groups flatter and deceive themselves' in J.W. Pennebaker, D. Paez and B. Rimé (eds), *Collective Memory of Political Events: Social Psychological Perspectives* (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates).
- Baxendale, J. (2001) "'I had seen a lot of Englands": J.B. Priestley, Englishness and the people', *History Workshop Journal*, 51, 87–111.
- Beacham, P. (2006) 'Transforming heritage protection: English Heritage and the Heritage White Paper', *Conservation Bulletin*, 52, 3–4.
- Bee, S. (2009) 'Codifying conservation: A credo for consistency', *Conservation Bulletin*, 60 (Spring), 3–4.
- Bee, S. (2010) 'Editorial: People and places', *Conservation Bulletin*, 63 (Spring), 2.
- Belfiore, E. (2002) 'Art as a means of alleviating social exclusion: Does it really work? A critique of instrumental cultural policies and social impact studies in the UK', *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 8 (1), 91–106.
- Belfiore, E. (2009) 'On bullshit in cultural policy practice and research: Notes from the British', *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 15 (3), 343–359.
- Bennett, T. (1995) *The Birth of the Museum: History, Theory, Politics* (London: Routledge).
- Bennett, T. and Savage, M. (2004) 'Introduction: Cultural capital and cultural policy', *Cultural Trends*, 13 (2), 7–14.
- Benton, T. and Craib, I. (2001) *Philosophy of Social Science: The Philosophical Foundations of Social Thought* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Benwell, B. and Stokoe, E. (2006) *Discourse and Identity* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press).
- Bhaskar, R. (1986) *Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation* (London: Verso).

- Bhaskar, R. (1989a) *Reclaiming Reality: A Critical Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy* (London: Verso).
- Bhaskar, R. (1989b) *The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf).
- Bhaskar, R. (1998) 'Philosophy and scientific realism' in M. Archer, R. Bhaskar, A. Collier, T. Lawson and A. Norrie (eds), *Critical Realism: Essential Readings* (London: Routledge).
- Billig, M. (1995) *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage Publications).
- Blair, T. (1998) 'The third way: New politics for the new century' in A. Chadwick and R. Heffernan (eds), *The New Labour Reader* (Cambridge: Polity Press).
- Blair, T. (2006) 'The shame of slavery', *New Nation*, 27 November.
- Blair, T. (2007) 'A message from the Prime Minister', in HM Government *Bicentenary of the Abolition of the Slave Trade Act 1807–2007* (London: HM Govt Publications).
- Blake, J. (2000) 'On defining the cultural heritage', *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 49 (1), 61–85.
- Blake, J. (2009) 'UNESCO's 2003 Convention on intangible cultural heritage: The implications of community involvement on "safeguarding"' in L. Smith and N. Akagawa (eds), *Intangible Heritage* (London: Routledge).
- Blaug, R., Horner, L. and Lekhi, R. (2006) *Public Value, Politics and Public Management: A Literature Review* (London: The Work Foundation).
- Blommaert, J. (2005) *Discourse: A Critical Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Bloor, M. and Bloor, T. (2007) *The Practice of Critical Discourse Analysis: An Introduction* (London: Hodder Arnold).
- Boli, J. and Thomas, G.M. (1999) 'INGOs and the Organization of World Culture' in J. Boli and G.M. Thomas (eds), *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press).
- Bona Sawa (2007) 'African Remembrance Day' <http://bonasawa.blog4ever.com/blog/lirarticle-31178-399348.html>. Page consulted 30th April 2008.
- Braden, S. (1978) *Artists and People* (London: Routledge).
- Breglia, L. (2006) *Monumental Ambivalence: The Politics of Heritage* (Austin: University of Texas Press).
- Breidenbach, J. and Nyíri, P. (2007) 'Our common heritage: New tourist nations, post-"socialist" pedagogy, and the globalization of nature', *Current Anthropology*, 48 (2), 322–330.
- Brown, G. (2007) 'We need a United Kingdom', *The Telegraph*, 13 January 2007.
- Brubaker, R. (2001) 'The return of assimilation? Changing perspectives on immigration and its sequels in France, Germany, and the United States', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 24 (4), 531–548.
- Brubaker, R. (2003) 'The return of assimilation? Changing perspectives on immigration and its sequels in France, Germany and the United States' in C. Joppke and E. Morawska (eds), *Towards Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Burnett, J. (2007) 'Britain's "civilising project": Community cohesion and core values', *Policy and Politics*, 35 (2), 353–357.
- Byrne, D. (1991) 'Western hegemony in archaeological heritage management', *History and Anthropology*, 5, 269–276.

- Byrne, D. (1994) 'The past of others: Archaeological heritage management in Australia and Southeast Asia', unpublished PhD thesis, Australian National University.
- Byrne, D. (2004) 'Partnerships in the heritage of the displaced', *Museum International*, 56 (4), 89–97.
- Byrne, D. (2009) 'A critique of unfeeling heritage' in L. Smith and N. Akagawa (eds), *Intangible Heritage* (London: Routledge).
- Caffyn, A. and Lutz, J. (1999) 'Developing the heritage tourism product in multi-ethnic cities', *Tourism Management*, 20, 213–221.
- Cantle Report, The (2001) *Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team* (London: The Home Office).
- Carey, J. (2005) *What Good are the Arts?* (London: Faber and Faber Ltd).
- Carman, J. (1996) *Valuing Ancient Things: Archaeology and the Law* (Leicester: Leicester University Press).
- Chabbott, C. (1999) 'Development INGOs', *Constructing World Culture: International NonGovernmental Organizations since 1875* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press).
- China ICOMOS (2002) *The Principles for the Conservation of Heritage Sites in China*, http://www.getty.edu/conservation/publications/pdf_publications/china_prin_2english.pdf. Page consulted 22nd March 2010.
- Choay, F. (2001) *The Invention of the Historic Monument* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Chouliaraki, L. and Fairclough, N. (1999) *Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press).
- Civic Trust, The (1972) *Conservation in Action: A Progress Report on What is Being Done in Britain's Conservation Areas* (London: Civic Trust).
- Clark, K. (2006) 'Introduction' in K. Clark (ed.), *Capturing the Public Value of Heritage: The Proceedings of the London Conference, 25–26 January 2006* (Swindon: English Heritage).
- Clarke, J. (2004) 'Changing welfare, changing states: The deconstruction of the welfare state', paper prepared for the Political Studies Association Conference, University of Lincoln, 6–8 April.
- Cleere, H. (1989) 'Introduction: The rationale of archaeological heritage management' in H. Cleere (ed.), *Archaeological Heritage Management in the Modern World* (London: Routledge).
- Cleere, H. (1995) 'Cultural landscapes as World Heritage', *Conservation and Management of Archaeological Sites*, 1, 63–68.
- Cleere, H. (2001) 'The uneasy bedfellows: Universality and cultural heritage' in R. Layton, P.G. Stone and J. Thomas (eds), *Destruction and Conservation of Cultural Property* (London: Routledge).
- Coates, D. (2005) *Prolonged Labour: The Slow Birth of New Labour Britain* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Cohen-Hattab, K. and Kerber, J. (2004) 'Literature, cultural identity and the limits of authenticity: A composite approach', *International Journal of Tourism Research*, 6, 57–73.
- CLG (Communities and Local Government) (2004) 'Government response to ODPM housing, planning and local government and the regions', available online at: <http://www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1143399>. Page consulted 13th August 2006.

- CLG (2006) *Strong and Prosperous Communities: The Local Government White Paper* (London: The Stationery Office).
- Community Cohesion Panel (2004) *The End of Parallel Lives? Report of the Community Cohesion Panel*. Also available online at: <http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/153866.pdf>. Page consulted 22nd March 2010.
- Cook, G., Piere, E. and Robbins, P.T. (2004) '“The scientists think and the public feels”': Expert perceptions of the discourse of GM food', *Discourse and Society*, 15 (4), 433–449.
- Cormack, P. (1976) *Heritage in Danger* (London: Quartet Books).
- Corner, J. and Harvey, S. (1991) 'Mediating tradition and modernity: The heritage/enterprise couplet' in J. Corner and S. Harvey (eds), *Enterprise and Heritage: Crosscurrents of National Culture* (London: Routledge).
- Corsane, G. (2005) 'Issues in heritage, museums and galleries: A brief introduction' in G. Corsane (ed.), *Heritage, Museums and Galleries: An Introductory Reader* (London: Routledge).
- Cossons, N. (2004) *People and Places: A Response to Government and the Value of Culture* (London: English Heritage).
- Cossons, N. (2006a) 'Foreword' in English Heritage (ed.), *Conservation Principles for the Sustainable Management of the Historic Environment* (London: English Heritage).
- Cossons, N. (2006b) 'Heritage counts 2006: Executive summary' in English Heritage (ed.), *Heritage Counts: The State of England's Historic Environment 2006* (London: English Heritage).
- Council of Europe (2005) *Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage in Society* (Faro), available online at: <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=199&CM=8&CL=ENG>. Page consulted 27th March 2010.
- Cowell, B. (2004) 'Why heritage counts: Researching the historic environment', *Cultural Trends*, 13 (4), 23–39.
- Cowell, B. (2008) *The Heritage Obsession: The Battle for England's Past* (Stroud: Tempus Publishing).
- Cowell, B. and Kane, R. (2003) *Heritage Counts 2003: The State of England's Historic Environment* (London: English Heritage).
- Crang, M. (1996) 'Living history: Magic kingdoms or a quixotic quest for authenticity?', *Annals of Tourism Research*, 23 (2), 415–431.
- Crouch, D. (1990) 'Culture in the experience of landscape', *Landscape Research*, 15 (1), 11–19.
- Crouch, D. (2003) 'Spacing, performing, and becoming: Tangles in the mundane', *Environment and Planning A*, 35, 1945–1960.
- Crouch, D. (2010) 'The perpetual performance and emergence of heritage' in E. Waterton and S. Watson (eds), *Culture, Heritage and Representations: Perspectives on Visuality and the Past* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing).
- CMS (Culture Media and Sport Select Committee) (1998) 'The Fifth Report', available online at: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmcumeds/742/74202.htm>. Page consulted 5th February 2007.
- CMS (1999a) 'The Sixth Report', available online at: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmcumeds/241/24102.htm>. Page consulted 5th February 2007.

- CMS (1999b) 'The Sixth Special Report', available online at: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmcmums/888/88802.htm>. Page consulted 5th February 2007.
- CMS (1999c) 'The Sixth Report – Volume II: Evidence and Appendices. Examination of Witness Mr David Lambert, Conservation Officer, Garden History Society, 16th June 1999, Questions 137–162, paragraph 141', available online at: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmcmums/506/9061606.htm> Page consulted 14th July 2005.
- CMS (1999d) 'The Sixth Report – Volume II: Evidence and Appendices. Examination of Witness the Rt Hon Mr Chris Smith MP, 30th June 1999, Questions 318–339, paragraph 319', available online at: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmcmums/506/9063004.htm> Page consulted 14th June 2005.
- CMS (2006a) *HC 912–1 – Protecting and Conserving our Heritage: Third Report of Session 2005–2006*. Vol. 1 (London: House of Commons).
- CMS (2006b) *Protecting and Preserving Our Heritage* (London: The Stationery Office).
- d'Agostino, B. (1984) 'Italy' in H. Cleere (ed.), *Approaches to the Archaeological Heritage* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Davies, B. and Harré, R. (1990) 'Positioning: The discursive production of selves', *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 20, 43–63.
- Davison, G. (1991) 'The meaning of heritage' in G. Davison and C. McConville (eds), *A Heritage Handbook*, 1–13 (Sydney: Allen and Unwin).
- Day, G. and Murdoch, J. (1993) 'Locality and community: Coming to terms with places', *Sociological Review*, 41 (1), 82–111.
- DCMS (1999) *Policy Action Team 10: A Report to the Social Exclusion Unit: Arts and Sports* (London: Department for Culture, Media and Sport).
- DCMS (2000a) 'Press release: Government review of policies relating to the historic environment', available online at: <http://www.britarch.ac.uk/info/ehreview1.html>. Page consulted 12th May 2004.
- DCMS (2000b) 'Centre for social change: Museums, galleries and archives', available online at: http://www.culture.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/ekht45cgur-3lmnoz73h4v3hp7tdb6jp7sazcskfmqerngp6r22yqeak6u64axs4hizenzt-nix6jo6rscrcalhb45ea/centers_social_change.pdf. Page consulted 5th April 2004.
- DCMS (2001a) *The Historic Environment: A Force for our Future* (London: Department for Culture, Media and Sport). Also available online at: www.culture.gov.uk/global/publications/archive_2001/his_force_future.htm. Page consulted 3rd July 2003.
- DCMS (2001b) *Making It Count Through Culture and Sport*, available online at: http://www.culture.gov.uk/cgi-bin/MsmGo.exe?grab_id=412&page_id=16388864&query=socialinclusion&hiword=social+SOCIALLY+inclusion+INCLUSIVE+SOCIALISM+SOCIALIST+. Page consulted 5th April 2004.
- DCMS (2002a) *Count Me In: Research Project on Social Inclusion through Culture and Sport*, available online at: <http://www.culture.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/ethztg6e7ynj-hvtulmhrlzpujs45zvup4shd6i6qpbht5esq3a5wxcoubsqxh2qxfgjb56gsbtinrgati-bhxczenqtd/CountMeSum.pdf>. Page consulted 5th April 2004.
- DCMS (2002b) *English Heritage Quinquennial Review: Stage One Report*, available online at: <http://www.culture.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/FA4BB7C0-D2EA-4072->

- A9DF-FAFD1CAC4971/0/ EHQuinquennialstage1.pdf. Page consulted 1st November 2005.
- DCMS (2002c) *People and Places: Social Inclusion Policy for the Built and Historic Environment*, available online at: http://www.culture.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/ejeviot6kt5wvcz2osn5dbafmfunonotnqasogvrmbjsjj3tyuuhyxvmmso-pvcbmvehgqiwsz4cfta7e6jhjhjnfqbqh/peoples_and_places.pdf. Page consulted 5th April 2004.
- DCMS (2003a) "Review heralds improvements for heritage protection" says Heritage Minister Andrew McIntosh', available online at: http://www.culture.gov.uk/Reference_library/Press_notices/archive_2003/dcms82_2003. Page consulted 1st November 2006.
- DCMS (2003b) *Protecting our Historic Environment: Making the System Work Better* (London: Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Architecture and Historic Environment Division).
- DCMS (2003c) *Annual Report 2003 Review*, available online at: <http://www.culture.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/B4DECFOF-AFCB-4DBF-AE482FE86B76C45A/0/Section1-forward.pdf>. Page consulted 8th June 2006.
- DCMS (Department for Culture, Media and Sport) (2004a) *Review of Heritage Protection: The Way Forward* (London: Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Architecture and Historic Environment Division).
- DCMS (2004b) 'Review of the structure of government support for the historic environment in England', available online at: <http://www.culture.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/ADC689D0-F5AC-4929-829986B7EE3FA615/0/DCMSHeritage-Review-PKFreport.pdf>. Page consulted 1st November 2005.
- DCMS (2004c) 'Press Release: Looking forward to the past: Heritage Minister sets out the future of heritage protection', available online at: http://www.culture.gov.uk/Reference_library/Press_notices/archive_2004/dcms081_2004.htm. Page consulted 5th February 2005.
- DCMS (2005a) *Implementing the Heritage Protection Review: Evaluating the Impact on the Local Delivery of Historic Environment Services* (London: Architecture and Historic Environment Division, DCMS).
- DCMS (2005b) *Taking Part: England's Survey of Leisure, Culture and Sport*, available online at: <http://www.culture.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/510AF732-CDBE-4709-A4B9-D84B962530E1/0/TakingPartleafletjan07.pdf>. Page consulted 5th February 2007.
- DCMS (2006a) 'What we do: Heritage', available online at: http://www.culture.gov.uk/what_we_do/Historic_environment/heritage. Page consulted 2nd November 2006.
- DCMS (2006b) 'What we do: Historic environment', available online at: http://www.culture.gov.uk/what_we_do/Historic_environment/. Page consulted 2nd November 2006.
- DCMS (2006c) 'Memorandum submitted by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport', available online at: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmcmds/912/>. Page consulted 29th April 2006.
- DCMS (2006d) *CM 6947 – Government Response to the Culture, Media and Sport Committee Report on Protecting and Preserving our Heritage* (London: The Stationery Office).
- DCMS (2006e) 'Homepage', available online at: <http://www.culture.gov.uk>. Page consulted 13th December 2006.

- DCMS (2007a) *Heritage Protection for the 21st Century* (CM 7057) (London: The Stationery Office).
- DCMS (2007b) *Government Response to the House of Lords Science and Technology Select Committee Report on Science and Heritage (HL 257), Session 2005–2006, Cm 7031* (Norwich: The Stationery Office).
- DCMS (2008a) *Draft Heritage Protection Bill* (London: The Stationery Office).
- DCMS (2008b) *Government Response to the Culture, Media and Sport Committee Reports on the Draft Heritage Protection Bill and Draft Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Bill – Cm 7472* (London: The Stationery Office).
- DCMS (2009a) 'Homepage', available online at: <http://www.culture.gov.uk/>. Page consulted 10th July 2009.
- DCMS (2009b) *The Government's Vision Statement on the Historic Environment for England – Draft 1.0*.
- DCMS (2009c) 'Taking Part: The National Survey of Culture, Leisure and Sport. PSA21: Indicator 6 – Final baseline results from the 2008/09 Taking Part survey', available online at: http://www.culture.gov.uk/reference_library/publications/6307.aspx. Page consulted 30th March 2010.
- DCMS (2010) 'Taking Part: The National Survey of Culture, Leisure and Sport. PSA21: Indicator 6 – Rolling annual estimates from the Taking Part survey', available online at: http://www.culture.gov.uk/images/research/PSA21_IN6_Rolling-annualdataset_StatisticalRelease_March2010.pdf. Page consulted 30th March 2010.
- Decree of the President of the Lao PDR on the Preservation of Cultural, Historical and Natural Heritage (1997).
- Delanty, G. and Millward, P. (2007) 'Post-liberal anxieties and discourses of peoplehood in Europe: Nationalism, xenophobia and racism' in R.C.M. Mole (ed.), *Discursive Constructions of Identity in European Politics* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Dicks, B. (1999) 'The view of our town from the hill: Communities on display as local heritage', *International Journal of Cultural Studies*, 2 (3), 349–368.
- Dicks, B. (2000a) *Heritage, Place and Community* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press).
- Dicks, B. (2000b) 'Encoding and decoding the people: Circuits of communication at a local heritage museum', *European Journal of Communication*, 15 (1), 61–78.
- Dicks, B. (2003) 'Heritage, governance and marketization: A case-study from Wales', *Museum and Society*, 1 (1), 30–44.
- DNH & TWO (Department of National Heritage and The Welsh Office) (1996) *Protecting Our Heritage: A Consultation on the Built Heritage of England and Wales* (London: Department of National Heritage and The Welsh Office).
- DoE (Department of the Environment) (1973) *Conservation and Preservation* (London: Department of the Environment).
- Donnachie, I. (2010) 'World heritage' in R. Harrison (ed.), *Understanding the Politics of Heritage* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
- Dryzek, J. (2005) *The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses*, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Dunmire, P.L. (2005) 'Preempting the future: Rhetoric and ideology of the future in political discourse', *Discourse and Society*, 16 (4), 481–513.
- DWP (Department for Work and Pensions) (2003) *United Kingdom National Action Plan on Social Inclusion 2003–2005: Implementation Report* (London: Department for Work and Pensions). Also available online at: <http://www.dwp.gov.uk/publications/dwp/2003/nap/nap.pdf> Page consulted 14th July 2005.

- DWP (2008) *Working Together: United Kingdom National Action Plan on Social Inclusion 2008–2010* (London: Department for Work and Pensions). Also available online at: <http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/uknationalactionplan.pdf>. Page consulted 27th March 2010.
- Edensor, T. (2001) 'Performing tourism, staging tourism: (Re)producing tourist space and practice', *Tourist Studies*, 1 (1), 59–81.
- Edwards, D. (2006) 'Facts, norms and dispositions: Practical uses of the modal verb would in police interrogations', *Discourse Studies*, 8 (4), 475–501.
- EFTEC (Economics for the Environment) (2005) 'Valuation of the historic environment' (London: EFTEC).
- Emerick, K. (2003) 'From frozen monuments to fluid landscapes: The conservation and preservation of ancient monuments from 1882 to the present', unpublished PhD thesis, University of York.
- English Heritage (1999) 'Memorandum submitted by English Heritage to the Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport: Minutes of evidence', available online at: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmcumeds/506/9061607.htm>. Page consulted 18th December 2006.
- English Heritage (2000a) *An Invitation to Participate* (London: English Heritage).
- English Heritage (2000b) *About the Review* (London: English Heritage).
- English Heritage (2000c) *Briefing for the Working Groups* (London: English Heritage).
- English Heritage (2000d) *Canvassing Ideas* (London: English Heritage).
- English Heritage (2000e) *Outline Discussion Paper* (London: English Heritage).
- English Heritage (2000f) *Working Group 1: Minutes of the First Meeting Held on Monday 10 April 2000* – At Room 422, 23 Savile Row, London. Unpublished document, English Heritage.
- English Heritage (2000g) *First Draft of Discussion Paper for WG1* (London: English Heritage).
- English Heritage (2000h) *Executive Group: High Level Ideas for Integrating Discussion Papers* (London: English Heritage).
- English Heritage (2000i) 'Discussion papers for working groups 2–5'. Unpublished document, English Heritage.
- English Heritage (2000j) 'Working group 3: Minutes of the third meeting, Wednesday 21 June 2000, Kensington Palace, London'. Unpublished document, English Heritage.
- English Heritage (2000k) 'Working group 1: Final draft of the discussion papers – Annex'. Unpublished document, English Heritage.
- English Heritage (2000l) 'Working group 4: Minutes of the third meeting, Friday 16 June 2000, Savile Row, London'. Unpublished document, English Heritage.
- English Heritage (2000m) *Viewpoint: Our Questions for You* (London: English Heritage).
- English Heritage (2000n) *Viewpoint: Understanding* (London: English Heritage).
- English Heritage (2000o) *Viewpoint: Experiencing* (London: English Heritage).
- English Heritage (2000p) *Viewpoint: Caring* (London: English Heritage).
- English Heritage (2000q) *Viewpoint: Enriching* (London: English Heritage).
- English Heritage (2000r) *Power of Place: The Future of the Historic Environment* (London: English Heritage). Also available online: www.english-heritage.org.uk/filestore/policy/government/mori/finalreport/11.pdf. Page consulted 3rd July 2003.

- English Heritage (2000s) 'Making sense of place: Press release'. Unpublished document, English Heritage.
- English Heritage (2000t) *Review of Policies Relating to the Historic Environment: We Want Your Viewpoint* (London: English Heritage).
- English Heritage (2000u) *Viewpoint: Belonging* (London: English Heritage).
- English Heritage (2000v) *Working Group 2: Public Involvement and Access – First Draft for Discussion at Second WG Meeting, 5th May 2000*. Unpublished document, English Heritage.
- English Heritage (2003a) *Executive Board: Agenda Item 5 – Outreach Summary*. Unpublished document, English Heritage.
- English Heritage (2003b) *DCMS Consultation Paper: Protecting the Historic Environment – Making the System Work Better. The English Heritage Response*. Unpublished document, English Heritage.
- English Heritage (2003c) *Heritage Counts: The State of England's Historic Environment* (London: English Heritage).
- English Heritage (2004a) *Heritage Counts: The State of England's Historic Environment* (London: English Heritage).
- English Heritage (2004b) *2004 Members' and Visitors' Handbook* (London: English Heritage).
- English Heritage (2005a) 'Conservation principles: Draft communications plan'. Unpublished document, English Heritage.
- English Heritage (2005b) 'Principles for the sustainable management of the historic environment – Draft 02'. Unpublished document, English Heritage.
- English Heritage (2005c) 'Conservation principles: The sustainable management of the historic environment, working draft 04'. Unpublished document, English Heritage.
- English Heritage (2005d) *Heritage Counts: The State of the Historic Environment* (London: English Heritage, with the support of Farrer and Co., Cowley Manor, NFU Mutual and C. Hoare and Co).
- English Heritage (2005e) *English Heritage Strategy 2005–2010: Making the Past Part of our Future* (London: English Heritage).
- English Heritage (2005f) 'English Heritage Advisory Committee – Conservation principles, policy and guidance', EHAC/2005/17E. Unpublished document, English Heritage.
- English Heritage (2006a) *Heritage Counts: The State of England's Historic Environment* (London: English Heritage).
- English Heritage (2006b) *Heritage Counts: The State of Yorkshire and Humber's Historic Environment* (London: English Heritage).
- English Heritage (2006c) *Conservation Principles for the Sustainable Management of the Historic Environment* (London: English Heritage).
- English Heritage (2006d) *Annual Report and Accounts 2005/06 (HC 1084)* (London: The Stationery Office).
- English Heritage (2008a) 'Draft Heritage Protection Bill: Commentary by English Heritage', available online at: http://www.english-heritage.org.uk/upload/pdf/English_Heritage_Commentary_on_the_Heritage_Protection_Bill2.pdf. Page consulted 10th October 2008.
- English Heritage (2008b) *Conservation Principles, Policies and Guidance for the Sustainable Management of the Historic Environment* (London: English Heritage).
- English Heritage (2009) 'Who we are', available online at: <http://www.english-heritage.org.uk/server/show/nav.1665>. Page consulted 20th July 2009.

- European Commission (2009) 'Peer review in social protection and social inclusion and assessment in social inclusion – Operational Guide 2009', available online at: <http://www.peer-review-social-inclusion.eu/network-of-independent-experts>. Page consulted 20th February 2010.
- Evans, T. and Harris, J. (2004) 'Citizenship, social inclusion and confidentiality', *British Journal of Social Work*, 34 (1), 69–91.
- Fairclough, G. (1997) 'New perspectives on sustainability', *Conservation Bulletin*, 32 (16–17).
- Fairclough, N. (1989) *Language and Power* (London: Longman).
- Fairclough, N. (1992) *Discourse and Social Change* (Cambridge: Polity Press).
- Fairclough, N. (1995) *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language* (Essex: Pearson Education Limited).
- Fairclough, N. (1996) 'Technologisation of discourse' in C.R. Caldas-Coulthard and M. Coulthard (eds), *Texts and Practices: Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis* (London: Routledge).
- Fairclough, N. (2000) *New Labour, New Language?* (London: Routledge).
- Fairclough, N. (2001a) 'The dialectics of discourse', *Textus*, XIV, 231–242. Also available online at: <http://www.ling.lancs.ac.uk/staff/norman/2001a.doc>. Page consulted 12th March 2004.
- Fairclough, N. (2001b) 'Critical discourse analysis as a method in social scientific research' in R. Wodak and M. Meyer (eds), *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* (London: Sage Publications).
- Fairclough, N. (2001c) 'The discourse of New Labour: Critical discourse analysis' in M. Wetherell, S. Taylor and S.J. Yates (eds), *Discourse as Data: A Guide for Analysis* (London: Sage Publications).
- Fairclough, N. (2003) *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research* (London: Routledge).
- Fairclough, N. (2004) 'Critical discourse analysis in researching language in the new capitalism: Overdetermination, transdisciplinarity and textual analysis' in L. Young and C. Harrison (eds), *Systemic Functional Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis* (London: Continuum).
- Fairclough, N. (2005a) 'Blair's contribution to elaborating a new "doctrine of international community"', *Journal of Language and Politics*, 4 (1), 41–63.
- Fairclough, N. (2005b) 'Peripheral vision: Discourse analysis in organizational studies – The case for critical realism', *Organization Studies*, 26 (6), 915–939.
- Fairclough, N. (2009) 'A dialectical-relational approach to critical discourse analysis in social research' in R. Wodak and M. Meyer (eds), *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* (London: Sage Publications).
- Fairclough, N. (2010) *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language* (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited).
- Fairclough, N., Pardoe, S. and Szerszynski, B. (2003) 'Critical discourse analysis and citizenship' in A. Bora and H. Hausendorf (eds), *Constructing Citizenship* (Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins). Also available online at: <http://www.ling.lancs.ac.uk/staff/norman/2003d/doc>. Page consulted 12th March 2004.
- Fairclough, N., Graham, P., Lemke, J. and Wodak, R. (2004) 'Introduction', *Critical Discourse Studies*, 1 (1), 1–7.
- Fairclough, N., Jessop, B. and Sayer, A. (2004) 'Critical realism and semiosis' in J. Joseph and J.M. Roberts (eds), *Realism Discourse and Deconstruction* (London: Routledge).
- Fairclough, N. and Wodak, R. (1997) 'Critical discourse analysis' in T.A. van Dijk (ed.), *Discourse as Social Interaction* (London: Sage Publications).

- Faulkner, P.A. (1978) 'A philosophy for the preservation of our historic heritage: Three bossom lectures', *The Royal Society of Arts Journal*, CXXVI, 452–480.
- Fidler, J. and Embree, S. (2005) English Heritage Advisory Committee – Conservation Principles, Policy and Guidance. Unpublished Report: English Heritage.
- Fischer, F. (2003) *Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Foard, G. (2001) 'The archaeology of attack: Battles and sieges of the English Civil War' in P.W.M. Freeman and A. Pollard (eds), *Fields of Conflict: Progress and Prospects in Battlefield Archaeology* (Oxford: BAR International Series 958).
- Fortier, A.-M. (1999) 'Re-membling places and the performance of belonging(s)' in V. Bell (ed.), *Performativity and Belonging*, 41–64 (London: Sage Publications).
- Fortier, A.-M. (2005) 'Pride politics and multiculturalist citizenship', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 28 (3), 559–578.
- Fraser, N. (2000) 'Rethinking recognition', *New Left Review*, 3 (May/June), 107–120.
- Fraser, N. (2001) 'Recognition without ethics?', *Theory, Culture and Society*, 18 (2–3), 21–42.
- Fukuyama, F. (2006) 'Identity, immigration, and liberal democracy', *Journal of Democracy*, 17 (2), 5–20.
- Gabriel, D. (2007) 'International day for the remembrance of slavery must be about action not nostalgia', <http://www.iamcolourful.com/articles/Comment/details/2144318321/World/>. Page consulted 6th May 2008.
- German National Committee of ICOMOS (1992) *Principles of Monument Conservation*. Also available online at: <http://www.icomos.de/poc.php>. Page consulted 12th March 2010.
- Gilroy, P. (1987) *There Ain't no Black in the Union Jack* (London: Hutchinson).
- Girling, R. *The Sunday Times* – Magazine (2005) 'Rack and ruin', available online at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/newspaper/0,,2772-1658095_1,00.html. Page consulted 1st July 2005.
- Glazer, N. (1997) *We are All Multiculturalists Now* (Harvard: Harvard University Press).
- Glendinning, M. (2003) 'The conservation movement: A cult of the modern age', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 13, 359–376.
- Golebioskw, Z. (2006) 'The distribution of discursial salience in research papers: Relational hypotaxis and parataxis', *Discourse Studies*, 8 (2), 259–278.
- Gosden, C. (1992) 'Endemic doubt: Is what we write right?', *Antiquity*, 66, 803–808.
- Gough, C. and Shackley, S. (2001) 'The respectable politics of climate change: The epistemic communities and NGOs', *International Affairs*, 77 (2), 329–345.
- Graham, B. (2002) 'Heritage as knowledge: Capital or culture?', *Urban Studies*, 39 (5–6), 1003–1017.
- Graham, B., Ashworth, G.J. and Tunbridge, J.E. (2000) *A Geography of Heritage: Power, Culture and Economy* (London: Arnold).
- Graham, B., Ashworth, G.J. and Tunbridge, J.E. (2005) 'The uses and abuses of heritage' in G. Corsane (ed.), *Heritage, Museums and Galleries: An Introductory Reader* (London: Routledge).

- Grainge, P. (1999) 'Reclaiming heritage: Colorization, culture wars and the politics of nostalgia', *Cultural Studies*, 13 (4), 621–638.
- Gray, C. (2007) 'Commodification and instrumentality in cultural policy', *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 13 (2), 203–215.
- Gray, C. (2008) 'Arts Council England and public value: A critical review', *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 14 (2), 209–214.
- Gregory, J. (2008) 'Reconsidering relocated buildings: ICOMOS, authenticity and mass relocation', *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 14 (2), 112–130.
- Haas, P. (1992) 'Introduction: Epistemic communities and international policy coordination', *International Organization*, 46 (1), 1–35.
- Haas, P. (1998) 'Compliance with EU directives: Insights from international relations and comparative politics', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 5 (1), 17–37.
- Hage, G. (1998) *White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society* (Annandale: Pluto Press).
- Hajer, M. (1995) *The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
- Hajer, M. (1996) 'Discourse coalitions and the institutionalisation of practice: The case of acid rain in Britain' in F. Fischer and J. Forester (eds), *The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press).
- Hall, S. (1988) *Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left: The Hard Road to Renewal* (London: Verso).
- Hall, S. (1994) 'Cultural identity and diaspora' in P. Williams and L. Christmas (eds), *Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial Theory: A Reader* (Essex: Pearson Education).
- Hall, S. (1999) 'Whose heritage? Un-settling "The Heritage", re-imagining the post-nation', *Third Text*, 49, 3–13.
- Hall, S. (2003) 'New Labour's double-shuffle', *Soundings*, 24, 10–24.
- Handler, R. (1988) *Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press).
- Hansard (1979a) *Parliamentary Debates, Weekly Hansard 5th–8th February 1979 No. 1065, House of Lords, 'Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Bill [H.L.]', 5th February 1979*. Vol. 398 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office).
- Hansard (1979b) *Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords January 30th to February 22nd, 'Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Bill [H.L.]', 20th February 1979*. Vol. 398 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office).
- Hansard (1979c) *Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, March 26th to April 4th, 'Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Bill [H.L.]', 4th April 1979*. Vol. 965 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office).
- Hansard (1982a) *Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords Weekly Hansard 21st–25th November 1982, No. 1202, 'National Heritage Bill', 25th November 1982*. Vol. 437 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office).
- Hansard (1982b) *Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords Weekly Hansard 13th–16th December 1979 No. 1203, 'National Heritage Bill', 14th December 1982*. Vol. 437 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office).
- Hansard (1982c) *Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords Weekly Hansard, 13th–16th December 1982, No. 1203, 'National Heritage Bill', 16th December 1982*. Vol. 437 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office).

- Hansard (1983) *Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Session 1982/1983, 'National Heritage Bill [Lords]', 24th February 1983*. Vol. 37 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office).
- Hansard (1999) *Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Session 1998/1999, 'Stephen Lawrence Enquiry', 29th March 1999*. Vol. 508 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office).
- Hansard (2007) 'Westminster Hall, House of Commons written answers, "Heritage White Paper", 25th January 2007', available online at: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070125/hall-text/70125h0001.htm#070125109000387>. Page consulted 29th January 2007.
- Harré, R. and Bhaskar, R. (2001) 'How to change reality: Story v. structure – A debate between Rom Harré and Roy Bhaskar' in J. López and G. Potter (eds), *After Postmodernism: An Introduction to Critical Realism* (London: The Athlone Press).
- Harrison, R. (2010) 'What is heritage?' in R. Harrison (ed.), *Understanding the Politics of Heritage* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
- Harvey, D. (2001) 'Heritage pasts and heritage presents: Temporality, meaning and the scope of heritage studies', *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 7 (4), 319–338.
- Hayden, D. (1997) *The Power of Place: Urban Landscapes as Public History* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press).
- Heisler, M.O. (2008) 'Challenged histories and collective self-concepts: Politics in history, memory and time', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 617 (1), 199–211.
- Heritage Consultancy Services (2003) *DCMS Consultation Paper: Protecting the Historic Environment – Making the System Work Better. The Heritage Consultancy Services Response*. Unpublished document, DCMS.
- Heritage Link, English Heritage, National Trust, T., Historic Houses Association and Heritage Lottery Fund (2007) 'News Release – On behalf of Britain's Leading Heritage Organisations – Valuing our Heritage: The Case for Investment', available online at: <http://www.heritagelink.org.uk/docs/VoHPress.doc>. Page consulted 29th January 2007.
- Hesmondhalgh, D. and Pratt, A.C. (2005) 'Cultural industries and cultural policy', *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 11 (1), 1–13.
- Hewison, R. (1987) *The Heritage Industry: Britain in a Climate of Decline* (London: Meltuen London).
- Hewison, R. and Holden, J. (2004) *Challenge and Change: HLF and Cultural Value* (London: DEMOS).
- Hewison, R. and Holden, J. (2006) 'Public value as a framework for analysing the value of heritage: The ideas' in K. Clark (ed.), *Capturing the Public Value of Heritage: The Proceedings of the London Conference 25–26 2006* (Swindon: English Heritage).
- Hewitt, R. (2005) *White Backlash and the Politics of Multiculturalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- HM Government (2007) *PSA Delivery Agreement 21: Build More Cohesive, Empowered and Active Communities*, available online at: http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/pbr_csr07_psa21.pdf. Page consulted 22nd March 2010.
- Hodge, M. (2008) 'Should cultural institutions promote shared values and a common national identity?', available online at: <http://www.culture.gov.uk/>

- reference_library/minister_speeches/2002.aspx/. Page consulted 31st March 2010.
- Hodge, B. and Kress, G. (1988) *Social Semiotics* (Cambridge: Polity Press).
- Holden, J. (2004) *Capturing Cultural Value* (London: DEMOS).
- Holden, J. (2006) *Cultural Value and the Crisis of Legitimacy* (London: DEMOS).
- Holtorf, C. (2009) 'Comments on Terje Brattli: "Managing the archaeological world cultural heritage: Consensus or rhetoric?"', *Norwegian Archaeological Review*, 42 (1), 196–200.
- Home Office (2002) *Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain* (Norwich: The Stationery Office).
- Home Office (2004) *Strength in Diversity: Towards a Community Cohesion and Race Equality Strategy* (Norwich: The Stationery Office).
- Hunter, M. (1996) 'Introduction: The fitful rise of British preservation' in M. Hunter (ed.), *Preserving the Past: The Rise of Heritage in Modern Britain* (Stroud: Alan Sutton).
- Huyssen, A. (2003) *Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory* (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
- ICOMOS (1931) 'Athens Charter for the Restoration of Historic Monuments', available online at: http://www.icomos.org/athens_charter.html. Page consulted 5th February 2007.
- ICOMOS (1964) 'International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites (The Venice Charter)', available online at: www.international.icomos.org/venice_e.htm. Page consulted 22nd May 2003.
- ICOMOS (1994) 'Nara Document on Authenticity', available online at: http://www.international.icomos.org/charters/nara_e.htm. Page consulted 2nd April 2004.
- ICOMOS (2005) 'About us', available online at: <http://www.international.icomos.org/about.htm>. Page consulted 22nd March 2010.
- ICOMOS New Zealand (1993) 'New Zealand Charter for the Conservation of Places of Cultural Heritage Value', available online at: http://www.icomos.org.nz/NZ_Charter.pdf. Page consulted 25th March 2010.
- Impey, E. (2005) 'Speech delivered to a preview of the English Heritage Strategy 2005–2010, on Tuesday 28th June 2005 at English Heritage, 23 Saville Row, London'.
- IPPR (Institute for Public Policy Research) (2005) *Culture, Community and Civil Renewal: Exploring the Role of Culture and Heritage Policy in Generating Social Capital* (London: IPPR).
- Jackson, T.J. (1985) 'The concept of cultural hegemony: Problems and possibilities', *The American Historical Review*, 90 (3), 567–593.
- Jacobson, H. (2004) 'It's the end of multiculturalism as we know and despise it', *The Telegraph*.
- Janks, H. (1997) 'Critical discourse analysis as a research tool', *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education*, 18 (3), 329–342.
- Jaworski, A. and Coupland, N. (1999a) 'Introduction: Perspectives on discourse analysis' in A. Jaworski and N. Coupland (eds), *The Discourse Reader* (London: Routledge).
- Jaworski, A. and Coupland, N. (1999b) 'Editor's introduction to part six' in A. Jaworski and N. Coupland (eds), *The Discourse Reader* (London: Routledge).

- Johannisson, J. (2006) 'A ghost in the difference machine: Local cultural policy in Sweden', *Paper Presented at the Discourse Analysis and Cultural Policy Workshop*, University of Warwick, 3–4th November.
- Jokilehto, J. (2006) 'World heritage: Defining the outstanding universal value', *City and Time*, 2 (2), 1–10.
- Jones, S. (2005) 'Making place, resisting displacement: Conflicting national and local identities in Scotland' in J. Littler and R. Naidoo (eds), *The Politics of Heritage: The Legacies of 'Race'* (London: Routledge).
- Joppke, C. (2004) 'The retreat of multiculturalism in the liberal state: Theory and policy', *The British Journal of Sociology*, 55 (2), 237–257.
- Joppke, C. (2005) 'Exclusion in the liberal state: The case of immigration and citizenship policy', *European Journal of Social Theory*, 8 (1), 43–61.
- Jowell, T. (2002) 'Forward by the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport' in DCMS (ed.), *People and Places: Social Inclusion Policy for the Built and Historic Environment* (London: DCMS).
- Jowell, T. (2003) 'Foreword' in DCMS (ed.), *Protecting Our Historic Environment: Making the System Work Better* (London: DCMS).
- Jowell, T. (2004) *Government and the Value of Culture* (London: DCMS).
- Jowell, T. (2005a) *Better Places to Live: Government, Identity and the Value of the Historic and Built Environment* (London: DCMS).
- Jowell, T. (2005b) 'Speech to IFA Conference, Winchester 23 March 2005', available online at: http://www.archaeologists.net/modules/icontent/inPages/docs/conference/TJ_Speech.doc Page consulted 6th November 2006.
- Jowell, T. (2006) 'From consultation to conservation: The challenge of better places to live' in K. Clark (ed.), *Capturing the Public Value of Heritage: The Proceedings of the London Conference 25–26 January 2006* (Swindon: English Heritage).
- Jowell, T. and Byers, S. (2001) 'Foreword' in DCMS (ed.), *The Historic Environment: A Force for Our Future* (London: DCMS).
- Joyner, C. and Lawson, S. (1985–1986) 'The United States and UNESCO: Rethinking the decision to withdraw', *International Journal*, 41, 37–71.
- Karlström, A. (2005) 'Spiritual materiality: Heritage preservation in a Buddhist world?', *Journal of Social Archaeology*, 5 (3), 338–355.
- Kearney, E. (2006) *From Access to Participation: Cultural Policy and Civic Renewal* (London: IPPR).
- Kelly, R. (2007) 'Interim statement of the Commission on Integration and Cohesion', available online at: <http://www.communities.gov.uk/speeches/corporate/integration-cohesion>. Page consulted 24th March 2010.
- Kelly, G., Mulgan, G. and Muers, S. (2002) *Creating Public Value: An Analytical Framework for Public Service Reform* (London: Cabinet Office).
- Khan, N. (2005) 'Taking root in Britain: The process of shaping heritage' in J. Littler and R. Naidoo (eds), *The Politics of Heritage: The Legacies of 'Race'* (London: Routledge).
- Kincheloe, L. and McLaren, P. (2003) 'Rethinking critical theory and qualitative research' in N.K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln (eds), *The Landscape of Qualitative Research: Theories and Issues*, 433–488 (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications).
- Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, B. (2004) 'Intangible heritage as metacultural production', *Museum International*, 56 (1–2), 52–63.

- Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, B. (2006) 'World heritage and cultural economics' in I. Karp, C. Krantz, L. Szwaja and T. Ybarra-Frausto (eds), *Museum Frictions: Public Cultures/Global Transformations* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press).
- Knauer, L.M. and Walkowitz, D.J. (2009) 'Introduction: Memory, race and the nation in public spaces' in D.J. Walkowitz and L.M. Knauer (eds), *Contested Histories in Public Space: Memory, Race and Nation* (Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press).
- Kopytoff, I. (1986) 'The cultural biography of things: Commoditisation as process' in A. Appadurai (ed.), *The Social Life of Things* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Kristiansen, K. (1984) 'Denmark' in H. Cleere (ed.), *Approaches to the Archaeological Heritage* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Kundnani, A. (2007) 'Integrationism: The politics of anti-Muslim racism', *Race and Class*, 48 (4), 24–44.
- Lahn, J. (1996) 'Finders keepers, losers weepers: A "social history" of the Kow Swamp remains', *Ngulaig*, 15, 1–61.
- Lamb, D. (2007) 'Towards a more open heritage', *Conservation Bulletin*, 55, 38–39.
- Lammy, D. (2006a) 'Keynote address to the National Historic Environment Champions Conference, Royal Aeronautical Society, 4 Hamilton Place, London, 12th July 2006', available online at: http://www.culture.gov.uk/Reference_library/Press_notices/archive_2006/david_lammy_12july06.htm. Page consulted 8th November 2006.
- Lammy, D. (2006b) 'Community, identity and heritage' in K. Clark (ed.), *Capturing the Public Value of Heritage: The Proceedings of the London Conference 25–26 January 2006*, 65–69 (Swindon: English Heritage).
- Levitas, R. (2004) 'Let's hear it for Humpty: Social exclusion, the Third Way and cultural capital', *Cultural Trends*, 13 (2), 41–56.
- Levitas, R. (2005) *The Inclusive Society? Social Exclusion and New Labour*, 2nd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Levy, J.T. (2000) *The Multiculturalism of Fear* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Lewis, G. (2005) 'Welcome to the margins: Diversity, tolerance and politics of exclusion', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 28 (3), 536–558.
- Lewis, G. and Neal, S. (2005) 'Introduction: Contemporary political contexts, changing terrains and revisited discourses', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 28 (3), 423–444.
- Ligali (2005) Declaration of protest to the 2007 commemoration of the bicentenary of the British parliamentary abolition of the transatlantic slave trade. London: The Ligali Organisation. Available at: <http://www.africanholocaust.net/articles/Declaration%20of%20protest%20to%20the%202007%20Abolition%20Commemoration.pdf>. Page consulted 23rd June 2008.
- Lister, R. (1998) 'Fighting social exclusion ... with one hand tied behind our back', *New Economy*, 5 (1), 14–18.
- Littler, J. (2005) 'Introduction: British heritage and the legacies of "race"' in J. Littler and R. Naidoo (eds), *The Politics of Heritage: The Legacies of 'Race'* (London: Routledge).
- Lloyd, J. (2002) 'The end of multiculturalism', *New Statesman*.

- Logan, W. (2007) 'Closing Pandora's box: Human rights condundrums in cultural heritage protection' in H. Silverman and D.F. Ruggles (eds), *Cultural Heritage and Human Rights* (New York: Springer).
- Logan, W. and Reeves, K. (2009) 'Introduction: Remembering places of pain and shame' in W. Logan and K. Reeves (eds), *Places of Pain and Shame: Dealing with 'Difficult Heritage'* (London: Routledge).
- López, J. and Potter, G. (2001) 'Introduction' in J. López and G. Potter (eds), *After Postmodernism: An Introduction to Critical Realism* (London: The Athlone Press).
- Lowenthal, D. (1985) *The Past is a Foreign Country* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Lowenthal, D. (1998a) *The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Lowenthal, D. (1998b) 'Fabricating heritage', *History and Memory*, 10 (1), 5–24.
- Lumley, R. (2005) 'The debate on heritage reviewed' in G. Corsane (ed.), *Heritage, Museums and Galleries: An Introductory Reader* (London: Routledge).
- MacCannell, D. (1992) *Empty Meeting Grounds: The Tourist Papers* (London: Routledge).
- Macdonald, S. (2002) 'On "old things": The fetishization of past everyday life' in N. Rapport (ed.), *British Subjects. An Anthropology of Britain* (Oxford: Berg Publishers).
- Macdonald, S. (2003) 'Museums, national, postnational and transnational identities', *Museum and Society*, 1 (1), 1–16.
- Macdonald, S. (2005) 'A people's story: Heritage, identity and authenticity' in G. Corsane (ed.), *Heritage, Museums and Galleries: An Introductory Reader* (London: Routledge).
- McGhee, D. (2003) 'Moving to "our" common ground – A critical examination of community cohesion discourse in twenty-first century Britain', *The Sociology Review*, 51 (3), 376–404.
- McGuigan, J. (1996) *Culture and the Public Sphere* (London: Routledge).
- McGuigan, J. (2004) *Rethinking Cultural Policy* (Maidenhead: Open University Press).
- McIntosh, A.J. and Prentice, R.C. (1999) 'Affirming authenticity: Consuming cultural heritage', *Annals of Tourism Research*, 26 (3), 589–612.
- McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L. and Cook, J.M. (2001) 'Birds of a feather: Homophily in social networks', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 27, 415–444.
- Mack, S. (2009) 'Black voices and absences in the commemorations of abolition in north east England', *Slavery and Abolition*, 30 (2), 247–257.
- Magelssen, S. (2002) 'Remapping American-ness: Heritage production and the staging of the Native American and the African American as other in "Historyland"', *National Identities*, 4 (2), 161–178.
- Maguire, S. and Hardy, C. (2006) 'The emergence of new global institutions: A discursive perspective', *Organization Studies*, 27 (1), 7–29.
- Mandler, P. (1997) *The Fall and Rise of the Stately Home* (London: Yale University Press).
- Marquand, D. (1998) 'The Blair paradox', *Prospect*, 20 (May), 1–10.
- Marsh, D. (1995) 'Marxism' in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds), *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

- Marsh, D. and Furlong, P. (1995) 'A skin, nor a sweater: Ontology and epistemology in political science' in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds), *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Marston, G. (2004) *Social Policy and Discourse Analysis: Policy Change in Public Housing* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing).
- Martin, J. (2003) 'Making history: Grammar for interpretation' in J.R. Martin and R. Wodak (eds), *Re/Reading the Past: Critical and Functional Perspectives on Time and Value* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins).
- Mason, R. (2004) 'Conflict and complement: An exploration of the discourses informing the concept of the socially inclusive museum in contemporary Britain', *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 10 (1), 49–73.
- Mason, P. and Kuo, I.-L. (2006) 'Visitor management at Stonehenge, UK' in A. Leask and A. Fyall (eds), *Managing World Heritage Sites* (Burlington, MA: Elsevier).
- Matsuura, K. (2004) 'Preface: Views and visions of the intangible', *Museum International*, 221/222, 4–5.
- Mellor, A. (1991) 'Enterprise and heritage in the dock' in J. Corner and S. Harvey (eds), *Enterprise and Heritage: Crosscurrents of National Culture* (London: Routledge).
- Merriman, N. (1996) 'Review article: Understanding heritage', *Journal of Material Culture*, 1 (3), 337–386.
- Message, K. (2009) 'New directions for civil renewal in Britain: Social capital and culture for all?', *International Journal of Cultural Studies*, 12 (3), 257–278.
- Micklewright, J. and Stewart, K. (2001) 'Poverty and social exclusion in Europe: European comparisons and the impact of enlargement', *New Economy*, 8 (2), 104–109.
- Misztal, B.A. (2004) 'The sacralisation of memory', *European Journal of Social Theory*, 7 (1), 67–84.
- Mitchell, K. (2004) 'Geographies of identity: Multiculturalism unplugged', *Progress in Human Geography*, 28 (5), 641–651.
- Moore, M. (1995) *Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
- MORI (Market Opinion Research International) (2000) *Attitudes Towards the Heritage: Research studies conducted for English Heritage* (London: MORI).
- Morris, W. (1889) *Address at the Twelfth Annual Meeting – SPAB*, available online at: <http://www.marxists.org/archive/morris/works/1889/spab16.htm>. Page consulted 25th January 2007.
- Morris, R. (2000) 'On the heritage strategy review', *Conservation Bulletin*, 37, 2–5.
- Moscardo, G. (1996) 'Mindful visitors: Heritage and tourism', *Annals of Tourism Research*, 23 (2), 376–397.
- Munjeri, D. (2004) 'Tangible and intangible heritage: From difference to convergence', *Museum International*, 56 (1–2), 12–19.
- Murray, T. (1989) 'The history, philosophy and sociology of archaeology: The case of the Ancient Monuments Protection Act (1882)' in A. Wylie and V. Pinsky (ed.), *Critical Traditions in Contemporary Archaeology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Naidoo, R. (2009) 'Back to the future: Culture and political change', *Soundings*, 43 (Winter), 65–76.
- Nakamura, C. (2005) 'Magical sense and apotropaic figurine worlds of Neo-Assyria' in L. Meskell (ed.), *Archaeologies of Materiality* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing).

- Nash, C. (1999) 'Historical geographies of modernity' in B. Graham and C. Nash (eds), *Modern Historical Geographies* (Harlow: Prentice Hall).
- NAO (National Audit Office Report) (2009) *Promoting Participation with the Historic Environment* (London: The Stationery Office).
- National Trust, the (2003) *Protecting Our Historic Environment: Making the System Work Better – A National Trust Response to the DCMS Consultation Paper*. Unpublished document, DCMS.
- National Trust, the, and Accenture (2006) *Demonstrating the Public Value of Heritage* (London: Accenture and The National Trust).
- Niemi, N.S. (2005) 'The emperor has no clothes: Examining the impossible relationship between gendered and academic identities in middle school students', *Gender and Education*, 17 (5), 483–497.
- Novick, P. (1999) *The Holocaust and Collective Memory: The American Experience* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc).
- O'Keefe, R. (2004) 'World cultural heritage: Obligations to the international community as a whole?', *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 53 (1), 189–209.
- Operation Truth (2007) 'Homepage – Operation Truth 2007'. Available online at: <http://www.operationtruth2007.co.uk/index.htm>. Page consulted 23rd June 2008.
- Parekh, B. (2000) *The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain: The Parekh Report* (London: Profile Books Ltd).
- Paton, D. (2009) 'Interpreting the bicentenary in Britain', *Slavery and Abolition*, 30 (2), 277–289.
- Pels, P. (2003) 'Introduction: Magic and modernity' in B. Meyer and P. Pels (eds), *Magic and Modernity: Interfaces of Revelation and Concealment* (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
- Pendlebury, J. (2000) 'Conservation, conservatives and consensus: The success of conservation under the Thatcher and Major governments, 1979–1997', *Planning Theory & Practice*, 1 (1), 31–52.
- Pendlebury, J. (2009) *Conservation in the Age of Consensus* (London: Routledge).
- Phillips, L. and Jørgensen, M. (2002) *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method* (London: Sage Publishers).
- Phillips, D. (2006) 'Parallel lives? Challenging discourses of British Muslim self-segregation', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 24 (1), 25–40.
- Pía Lara, M. and Fine, R. (2007) 'Justice and the public sphere: The dynamics of Nancy Fraser's critical theory' in T. Lovell (ed.), *(Mis)recognition, Social Inequality and Social Justice* (London: Routledge).
- Pilkington, A. (2008) 'From institutional racism to community cohesion: The changing nature of racial discourse in Britain', *Sociological Research Online*, 13 (3), 1–15.
- Potter, G. (2001) 'Truth in fiction, science and criticism' in J. López and G. Potter (eds), *After Postmodernism: An Introduction to Critical Realism* (London: The Athlone Press).
- Poynting, S. (2006) 'What caused the Cronulla riot?', *Race and Class*, 48 (1), 85–92.
- Prentice, R. (1993) *Tourism and Heritage Attractions* (London: Routledge).
- Rahtz, P.A. (ed.) (1974) *Rescue Archaeology* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin).

- Rao, K. (2010) 'A new paradigm for the identification, nomination and inscription of properties on the World Heritage List', *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 16 (3), 161–172.
- Reeves, H. and Beacham, P. (2005) *Letter – Heritage Protection Review: Changes to the Listing System in April 2005*. Unpublished document, DCMS and English Heritage.
- Rehman, J. (2007) '9/11 and the war on terrorism: The clash of "words", "cultures" and "civilisations": Myth or reality' in M.N. Craith (ed.), *Language, Power and Identity Politics* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Reichstein, J. (1984) 'Federal Republic of Germany' in H. Cleere (ed.), *Approaches to the Archaeological Heritage* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Rhodes, J. (2010) 'White backlash, "unfairness" and justifications of British National Party (BNP) support', *Ethnicities*, 10 (1), 77–99.
- Richardson, J.E. (2007) *Analyzing Newspapers: An Approach from Critical Discourse Analysis* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Ross, M. (1991) *Planning and the Heritage: Policy and Procedure* (London: Chapman and Hall).
- Røyseng, S. (2006) 'The instrumentality discourse in cultural policy research', *Paper Presented at the Discourse Analysis and Cultural Policy Workshop*, 3–4th November, University of Warwick.
- Ruggles, D.F. and Silverman, H. (2009) 'From tangible to intangible heritage' in D.F. Ruggles and H. Silverman (eds), *Intangible Heritage Embodied* (New York: Springer).
- Samuel, R. (1994) *Theatres of Memory. Volume 1: Past and Present in Contemporary Culture* (London: Verso).
- Sandell, R. (2003) 'Social inclusion, the museum and the dynamics of sectoral change', *Museum and Society*, 1 (1), 45–62.
- Schwyzer, P. (1999) 'The scouring of the white horse: Archaeology, identity, and "heritage"', *Representations*, 65, 42–62.
- Smith, A. (1991) *National Identity* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin).
- Smith, L. (2004) *Archaeological Theory and the Politics of Cultural Heritage* (London: Routledge).
- Smith, L. (2006) *The Uses of Heritage* (London: Routledge).
- Smith, L. (2007) 'General introduction' in L. Smith (ed.), *Cultural Heritage: Critical Concepts in Media and Cultural Studies*, Vol. 1 (London: Routledge).
- Smith, L. (2008) 'Heritage, gender and identity' in B. Graham and P. Howard (eds), *Ashgate Research Companion to Heritage and Identity* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing).
- Smith, L. (2009) 'Comments on Terje Brattli: "Managing the archaeological world cultural heritage: Consensus or rhetoric?"', *Norwegian Archaeological Review*, 42 (1), 187–190.
- Smith, L. and Akagawa, N. (2009) 'Introduction' in L. Smith and N. Akagawa (eds), *Intangible Heritage* (London: Routledge).
- Smith, L. and Waterton, E. (2009a) 'The envy of the world: Intangible heritage in the United Kingdom' in L. Smith and N. Akagawa (eds), *Intangible Heritage* (London: Routledge).
- Smith, L. and Waterton, E. (2009b) *Heritage, Communities and Archaeology* (London: Gerald Duckworth).

- Smith, L. and Waterton, E. (forthcoming) 'Constrained by commonsense: The authorized heritage discourse in contemporary debates' in J. Carman, R. Skeates and C. McDavid (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Public Archaeology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Sparrow, A. (2008) 'Cameron attacks "state multiculturalism"', *The Guardian*, 26th February 2008.
- Starn, R. (2002) 'Authenticity and historic preservation: Towards an authentic history', *History of the Human Sciences*, 15 (1), 1–16.
- Stovel, H. (1998) *Risk Preparedness: A Management Manual for World Cultural Heritage* (Rome: ICCROM).
- Stovel, H. (2007) 'Effective use of authenticity and integrity as world heritage qualifying conditions', *City and Time*, 2 (3), 21–36.
- Strangleman, T. (1999) 'The nostalgia of organisations and the organisation of nostalgia: Past and present in the contemporary railway industry', *Sociology*, 33 (4), 725–746.
- Stubbs, M. (1997) 'Whorf's children: Critical comments on critical discourse analysis' in A. Ryan and A. Wray (eds), *Evolving Models of Language* (Clevedon: Multilingual Matters).
- Sturken, M. (1991) 'The wall, the screen, and the image: Monumental histories', *Representations*, 35, 118–142.
- Sturken, M. (1996) *Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, the AIDS Epidemic, and the Politics of Remembering* (Berkeley: University of California Press).
- Suleiman, S.R. (2006) *Crises of Memory and the Second World War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
- Sullivan, S. (1993) 'Cultural values and cultural imperialism', *Historic Environment*, 10 (2 & 3), 54–61.
- Sullivan, S. (2004) 'Local involvement and traditional practices in the world heritage system' in E. de Merode, R. Smeets and C. Westrick (eds), *Linking Universal and Local Values: Managing a Sustainable Future for World Heritage. A Conference Organized by the Netherlands National Commission for UNESCO, in Collaboration with the Netherlands Ministry of Education, Culture and Science* (Paris: UNESCO World Heritage Centre).
- Symonds, J. (2004) 'Historical archaeology and the recent urban past', *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 10 (1), 33–48.
- Taksa, L. (2003) 'Machines and ghosts: Politics, industrial heritage and the history of working life at the Eveleigh workshops', *Labour History*, 85, available online at: <http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/lab/85/taksa.html#FOOT48>. Page consulted 24th November 2005.
- Taylor, S. (2001) 'Locating and conducting discourse analytic research' in M. Wetherell, S. Taylor and S.J. Yates (eds), *Discourse as Data: A Guide for Analysis*, 5–48 (London: Sage Publications).
- Terrill, G. (2008) 'Climate change: How should the World Heritage Convention respond?', *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 14 (5), 388–404.
- Thurley, S. (2004) 'Foreword' in J. Cannon (ed.), *Changing Places: What the Historic Environment can do for 21st Century England* (London: English Heritage).
- Thurley, S. (2006a) 'Whose values matter' in Clark, K. (ed.), *Capturing the Public Value of the Heritage: The Proceedings of the London Conference, 25–26 January 2006* (London: The Heritage Lottery, DCMS, English Heritage and the National Trust).

- Thurley, S. (2006b) 'Pod cast – English Heritage: Q and A with Simon, CEO, English Heritage', available online at: <http://yourplaceormine.org.uk/2006/12/12/english-heritages-boss-responds-to-your-questions-on-inclusiveness/>. Page consulted 11th December 2006.
- Tomlin, R.S., Forrest, L., Pu, M.M. and Kim, M.H. (1997) 'Discourse semantics' in T.A. van Dijk (ed.), *Discourse as Structure and Process*, 63–111 (London: Sage Publications).
- Torkildsen, G. (1999) *Leisure and Recreation Management* (London: SPON Press).
- Townsend, P. (1979) *Poverty in the United Kingdom* (Harmondsworth: Penguin).
- Trotter, R. (2002) 'Cultural policy', *The Year's Work in Critical and Cultural Theory*, 10 (1), 202–225.
- Tunbridge, J.E. and Ashworth, G.J. (1996) *Dissonant Heritage: The Management of the Past as a Resource in Conflict* (Chichester: Wiley).
- UKHERG (2005) *A Framework for Policy Research* (London: UK Historic Environment Research Group).
- UNESCO (1956) *Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict* (the Hague Convention). Available online at: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13637&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. Page consulted 27th April 2010.
- UNESCO (1970a) *Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property* (Paris: UNESCO).
- UNESCO (1970b) *The Protection of Mankind's Cultural Heritage* (Paris: UNESCO).
- UNESCO (1972a) *Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage*, available online at: http://whc.unesco.org/world_he.htm#debut. Page consulted 7th August 2003.
- UNESCO (1972b) *Recommendation Concerning the Protection, at National Level, of the Cultural and Natural Heritage*, available online at: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13087&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. Page consulted 27th April 2010.
- UNESCO (1976) *Recommendation on Participation by the People at Large in Cultural Life and their Contribution to It*, available online at: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13097&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. Page consulted 27th April 2010.
- UNESCO (2001a) *Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity*, available online at: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/diversity.htm>. Page consulted 27th April 2010.
- UNESCO (2001b) *Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage*, available online at: <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001260/126065e.pdf>. Page consulted 27th April 2010.
- UNESCO (2003) *Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage*, available online at: <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001325/132540e.pdf>. Page consulted 2nd April 2004.
- UNESCO (2004) 'Our World Heritage', available online at: <http://whc.unesco.org/uploads/activities/documents/activity-568-2.pdf>. Page consulted 15th March 2010.
- UNESCO (2005a) *Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions*, available online at: <http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev>.

- php-URL_ID=31038&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. Page consulted 27th April 2010.
- UNESCO (2005b) 'Vienna memorandum on world heritage and contemporary architecture – Managing the historic urban landscape', available online at: <http://www.google.co.uk/search?q=Vienna+Memorandum+on+World+Heritage+and+Contemporary+Architecture+%E2%80%93+Managing+the+Historic+Urban+Landscape+&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-GB:official&client=firefox-a>. Page consulted 22nd March 2010.
- UNESCO (2005c) *Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions*, available online at: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=31038&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. Page consulted 10th April 2010.
- UNESCO (2008) *Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention*, available online at: <http://whc.unesco.org/archive/opguide08-en.pdf>. Page consulted 27th April 2010.
- UN (United Nations) (1948) *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, available online at: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/>. Page consulted 10th April 2010.
- UN (United Nations) (1992) 'Agenda 21', available online at: <http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/publications/publications.htm> Page consulted 22nd February 2006.
- Urry, J. (1990) *The Tourist Gaze: Leisure and Travel in Contemporary Society* (London: Sage Publications).
- Urry, J. (1996) 'How societies remember the past' in S. MacDonald and G. Fyfe (eds), *Theorizing Museums* (Oxford: Blackwell).
- van Dijk, T. (1997) 'Discourse as interaction in society' in T.A. van Dijk (ed.), *Discourse as Social Interaction* (London: Sage Publications).
- van Dijk, T. (2001) 'Principles of critical discourse analysis' in M. Wetherell, S. Taylor and S.J. Yates (eds), *Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader* (London: Sage Publications).
- van Dijk, T.A. (2004) 'Text and context of parliamentary debates' in P. Bayley (ed.), *Cross-cultural Perspectives on Parliamentary Discourse* (Amsterdam: John Benjamin Publishing).
- van Dijk, T.A. (2009) *Discourse and Power* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- van Leeuwen, T. (1999) 'Discourses of unemployment in New Labour Britain' in R. Wodak and C. Ludwig (eds), *Challenges in a Changing World: Issues in Critical Discourse Analysis* (Wien: Passagen Verlag).
- van Leeuwen, T. and Wodak, R. (1999) 'Legitimizing immigration control: A discourse-historical analysis', *Discourse Studies*, 1 (1), 83–118.
- Vinsrygg, S. (2009) 'The global dynamics of UNESCO world heritage', *Norwegian Archaeological Review*, 42 (2), 191–196.
- Wainwright, G. (2000) 'Time please', *Antiquity*, 74 (286), 909–943.
- Walsh, K. (1992) *The Representation of the Past: Museums and Heritage in the Post-Modern World* (London: Routledge).
- Waterton, E. (2005) 'Whose sense of place? Reconciling archaeological perspectives with community values: Cultural landscapes in England', *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 11 (4), 309–326.
- Waterton, E. (2007) 'An institutionalised construction of the past in the UK' in D. Hull, S. Grabow and E. Waterton (eds), *Which Past, Whose Future? Treatments of the Past at the Start of the 21st Century* (Oxford: British Archaeological Reports).

- Waterton, E. (2009) 'Sights of sites: Picturing heritage, power and exclusion', *Journal of Heritage Tourism*, 4 (1), 37–56.
- Waterton, E. (forthcoming) 'Humiliated silence: Multiculturalism, blame and the trope of "moving on"', *Museum and Society*.
- Waterton, E. and Smith, L. (2008) 'Heritage protection for the 21st century', *Cultural Trends*, 17 (3), 197–203.
- Waterton, E. and Smith, L. (2009) 'There is no such *thing* as heritage' in E. Waterton and L. Smith (eds), *Taking Archaeology out of Heritage* (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press).
- Waterton, E., Smith, L. and Campbell, G. (2006) 'The utility of discourse analysis to heritage studies: The Burra Charter and social inclusion', *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 12 (4), 339–355.
- Waterton, E., Smith, L., Wilson, R. and Fouseki, K. (2010) 'Forgetting to heal: Remembering the abolition act of 1807', *European Journal of English Studies*, 14 (1), 23–35.
- Waterton, E. and Watson, S. (2010) (eds) *Culture, Heritage and Representations: Perspective on Visuality and the Past* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing).
- Waterton, E. and Wilson, R. (2009) 'Talking the talk: Policy, popular and media responses to the bicentenary of the abolition of the slave trade using the "abolition discourse"', *Discourse and Society*, 20 (3), 381–399.
- Watson, S. (2010) 'Constructing Rhodes: Heritage tourism and visuality' in E. Waterton and S. Watson (eds), *Culture, Heritage and Representation: Perspectives on Visuality and the Past* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing).
- Watson, S. and Waterton, E. (forthcoming) 'Reading the visual: Representation and narrative in the construction of heritage', *Material Culture Review*.
- Watson, S. and Waterton, E. (2010) 'Introduction: A visual heritage' in E. Waterton and S. Watson (eds), *Culture, Heritage and Representations: Perspective on Visuality and the Past* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing).
- Weiner, A. (1992) *Inalienable Possessions – The Paradox of Keeping – While Giving* (Berkeley: University of California Press).
- West, C. and Smith, C.H.F. (2005) '"We are not a government poodle": Museums and social inclusion under New Labour', *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 11 (3), 275–288.
- West, J. (2005) 'England's heritage: The changing role of government', *Conservation Bulletin*, 49, 7–8.
- Wetherell, M. (2001a) 'Themes in discourse research: The case of Diana' in M. Wetherell, S. Taylor and S.J. Yates (eds), *Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader* (London: Sage Publications).
- Wetherell, M. (2001b) 'Debates in discourse research' in M. Wetherell, S. Taylor and S.J. Yates (eds), *Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader* (London: Sage Publications).
- Wetherell, M. (2008) 'Speaking to power: Tony Blair, complex multicultures and fragile white English identities', *Critical Social Policy*, 28 (3), 299–319.
- While, A. (2007) 'The state and the controversial demands of cultural built heritage: Modernism, dirty concrete, and postwar listing in England', *Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design*, 34, 645–663.
- Whiteley, N. (1995) 'Modern architecture, heritage and Englishness', *Architectural History*, 38, 220–237.
- Willems, W. (1998) 'Archaeology and heritage management in Europe: Trends and developments', *European Journal of Archaeology*, 1 (3), 293–311.

- Wodak, R. (2001a) 'What CDA is about – A summary of its history, important concepts and its development' in R. Wodak and M. Meyer (eds), *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* (London: Sage Publications).
- Wodak, R. (2001b) 'The discourse–historical approach' in R. Wodak and M. Meyer (eds), *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* (London: Sage Publications).
- Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. (2009) 'Critical discourse analysis: History, agenda, theory and methodology' in R. Wodak and M. Meyer (eds), *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* (London: Sage Publications).
- Wohl, M.J.A., Branscombe, N.R. and Klar, Y. (2006) 'Collective guilt: Emotional reactions when one's group has done wrong or been wronged', *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 17 (1), 1–37.
- Wood, C. and Gould, H. (n.d.) *Culture Shock: Main Report – Tolerance, Respect, Understanding ... and Museums* (Cornwall: CLMG).
- Wright, P. (1985) *On Living in an Old Country* (London: Verso).
- Young, L. (2002) 'Rethinking heritage: Cultural policy and inclusion' in R. Sandell (ed.), *Museums, Society, Inequality*, 203–212 (London: Routledge).
- Zimmerman, L. (1998) 'When data becomes people: Archaeological ethics, reburial and the past as public heritage', *International Journal of Cultural Property*, 7 (1), 69–88.

Index

- abolition of the transatlantic slave trade, 128, 201–2
- agency, 30–1, 50, 162–3, 192–3
- AHD *see* Authorised Heritage Discourse
- Amin, Ash, 109, 130, 183, 212
- ancient monuments, 42, 54, 67, 77, 85, 87, 90, 94, 95, 100, 102–3, 149, 169, 171
- Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act 1979*, 34, 38, 73, 82–93, 92, 93, 100, 104, 107, 149
- Ancient Monuments Protection Act 1882*, 38, 82–4, 88, 94
- Anderson, Benedict, 98
- Appleton Charter 1983*, 45, 218
- archaeological sites, 2, 44, 51, 56, 77, 92, 101, 159
- archaeology, 39, 41, 60, 82, 83, 84, 88, 102–3, 122
- Ashworth, Gregory, 7, 40, 162
- assimilation, 2, 14, 107, 115, 123, 126, 128–31, 143, 146–7, 163, 174, 188, 197–9, 208
 - see also* cultural assimilation
- assumption, 33, 37, 39, 43, 33, 45, 51, 70, 60, 86, 87, 91, 96–7, 101, 104, 113, 139, 140, 152, 164–5, 182, 184, 190, 198, 207
- definition of, 27–8
- existential, 28, 51, 91, 97, 138, 169
- heritage, 3–4, 52
- propositional, 28, 51, 97
- value, 28, 87, 97, 173, 190
- Athens Charter for the Restoration of Historic Monuments 1931*, 39, 41–2, 66, 217
- Australia ICOMOS, 48
 - The Burra Charter: The Australian ICOMOS Charter for the Conservation of Places of Cultural Significance*, 38, 45, 47–51, 155, 220
- authorized heritage discourse (AHD), 3–5, 8, 13, 15–16, 27, 37, 42, 47, 57, 60, 69, 71, 108–9, 124, 128, 132, 140, 145, 148, 153, 157, 164, 181–2, 197, 200, 207, 208, 212
- authenticity, 43, 157
- Burra Charter, 47
- colonizing tendency, 48–53, 60–3, 70
- conservation principles, 157
- critique of, 166
- definition of, 3–4, 38–41
- dialogicality, 143
- dissonant heritage, 162
- English Heritage, 173–4
- expertise, 47, 145, 153, 166
- heritage narrative, 105
- heritage reform, 173–4
- identity, 61–3
- intangible heritage, 67–9
- international policy, 36, 37, 44–5, 66, 70
- materiality, 43, 69, 120, 157
- multiculturalism, 28
- naturalization, 142, 169, 178
- patrimony, 43, 139, 157
- public policy, 35, 74, 93–4, 204, 208–9
- public value, 167, 182
- sites, buildings, monuments, 95, 169
- social inclusion, 12, 28, 144, 174–6, 207
- stately homes, 142
- World Heritage Convention, 63
 - see also* dominant heritage narrative
- authority *see* expertise
- authenticity, 11, 13, 37, 42–3, 46–7, 51, 52, 58–9, 65, 66, 70, 157, 158, 165
- battlefields, 77, 95–6, 104, 105, 169, 171, 175, 177, 211

- Belfiore, Eleanora, 2, 111, 123, 147, 198
- belonging, 1, 16, 62, 107, 109, 114, 122, 127–8, 130, 142, 144, 163, 183, 184–5, 189, 198, 202, 204, 205, 207, 208, 209, 211–12
- Bennett, Tony, 110–11, 114–15, 154
- Bhaskar, Roy, 19–21
- bicentenary *see* abolition of the transatlantic slave trade
- Blair, Tony, 81, 107, 111, 128, 201
- bogus history, 8, 11–12
- Bradford, 110, 185
- British National Party, 110, 131, 183
- Britishness, 16–17, 110–11, 128, 184, 187–8, 198–201, 205, 207, 211–12
- exclusion, 201–4, 207
- Brown Gordon, 74, 81, 186, 198, 199, 200
- Burnley, 110, 185
- The Burra Charter: The Australian ICOMOS Charter for the Conservation of Places of Cultural Significance*, 38, 45, 47–51, 155, 220
- dialogicality, 48
- expertise, 48–50
- fabric, 47–51
- modality, 48–9
- buildings, 6, 37, 39, 44, 47, 49, 51, 56–7, 62, 66, 77, 82, 84, 86–7, 92, 93, 94–7, 100, 102–4, 105, 119, 125, 127, 129, 138, 140, 144, 146, 152, 158, 159, 169, 170, 172, 175–7, 184, 191, 194–5, 206, 208, 209, 211
- Byrne, Denis, 6, 36, 39, 60, 106
- Cameron, David, 186
- Canada, 45, 64, 109, 185
- Cantle Report, 186, 187, 199
- China, 50–2, 55, 221
- China ICOMOS, 38, 45, 50
- The Principles for the Conservation of Heritage Sites in China*, 38, 45, 50–2, 220
- class, 1, 2, 10, 13, 14, 20, 44, 72, 90–2, 105–6, 108, 113–14, 125, 128–9, 134–5, 142, 145–6, 147, 170, 179, 184, 195, 187–8, 195–6, 198, 201, 205, 207, 208–12
- CLG (Communities and Local Government), 75, 75–6, 138, 184, 188–9, 221, 223
- CMS (Culture Media and Sport Select Committee), 8, 116–17, 118, 120, 167–8, 169
- cohesion, 35, 107, 109–10, 112, 115, 121, 122–3, 128, 131, 184–5, 188, 189, 190, 196–7, 200, 202–3, 205, 207, 211–12
- Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, 110
- commodification, 9, 94–104, 145–6, 150
- commonsense, 3, 4, 20, 35, 87, 100, 130, 144, 211
- community, 10, 12, 47, 49, 98, 109, 126–8, 121, 138, 141, 154, 161, 164, 168, 183–205, 208, 223, 224
- heritage groups, 3, 65
- values, 164, 166, 171
- community cohesion, 28, 183–205, 208, 223
- conservation principles, 48, 149, 155–66, 170, 175
- AHD, 166
- modality, 161
- Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage* 1972, 15, 50, 53–63, 60, 66, 76, 92, 155, 221
- authenticity, 58–9, 60, 155
- integrity, 59, 37, 45, 51, 58–9, 65, 66, 70
- intertextuality, 56
- Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict* 1956 (the Hague Convention), 39, 56, 66, 217, 220
- Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions* 2005, 54, 64, 65, 220

- Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage* 2003 (Intangible Cultural Heritage Convention), 38, 54, 56, 63–4, 64–7, 66, 220
and AHD, 67–9
- Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property*, 1970, 56, 66, 217, 218
- Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage* 2001, 56, 66, 220
- Cossons, Neil, 8, 79, 121, 157, 191, 194, 195, 196, 197
- critical discourse analysis, 15, 18–35, 207
and AHD, 3, 207, 208
commonsense, 20, 26, 28, 31
definition of, 20–6, 21, 23
dialectical-relational approach, 14, 22–3
framework, 21–2
hidden power, 4, 14, 124, 129, 137
ideological discursive formations (IDF), 25
ideology, 20–2, 25–6, 113
intertextuality, 24, 25, 27–8, 51, 56, 81, 83, 93, 155–6, 164, 204
language, 16, 18, 20–1, 23, 24–5, 34–5, 36–7, 48, 51, 63, 70, 73, 98, 107, 113–14, 119, 144–5, 147, 152, 178, 206, 208, 211–12
legitimization, 24, 26, 27, 31–2, 51, 63, 73, 88, 89–90, 97, 104, 106, 124, 135, 141, 144, 173–4, 178, 180, 181, 193–5, 212
methods, 23–6
modality, 24, 29–30, 44–5, 48–9, 98–9, 101, 138, 157, 160–1, 171
nominalization, 24, 27, 30–1, 146, 162, 192–3
representation, 3, 6, 23, 24–5, 26–7, 29–31, 36–7, 44, 73, 171–2, 183, 192, 197, 207, 209
semiotic elements, 14, 22, 23, 23–4, 27, 31
semiotic resources, 22
social events, 22, 23
social life, 23
social practice, 22
terminology, 26–33
theoretical underpinnings, 22–6
transitivity, 24, 27, 30, 157, 163
way of seeing, 4–5, 13, 107, 208, 212
- critical realism, 19–20
- Crouch, David, 4, 5, 11
- cultural assimilation, 107, 163, 197–204
- cultural capital, 110–15, 116
- cultural diversity, 2, 65, 67, 119, 146, 183, 207, 211
- cultural governance, 16, 35, 114, 154–5, 182, 192, 204, 206, 209, 211
- DCMS (Department for Culture, Media and Sport), 12, 13, 74–80, 75, 76, 93, 114, 116–19, 117, 120, 122, 124, 145, 138, 140, 141, 143, 144, 146, 149, 151, 155, 158, 160, 167, 168–9, 171, 173–4, 176–8, 194, 210, 222, 223, 225
- Draft Heritage Protection Bill*, 2008, 168, 171, 176
- Heritage Protection for the 21st Century* (Heritage White Paper), 168, 171, 176
- The Historic Environment: A Force for Our Future*, 116, 138–9, 140, 143–4, 168, 222
- People and Places: Social Inclusion Policy for the Built and Historic Environment*, 222
- Protecting our Historic Environment: Making the System Work Better*, 168, 170, 171
- Review of Heritage Protection: The Way Forward*, 168, 170, 176
- see also Government Review of Policies Relating to the Historic Environment
- Decree of the President of the Lao PDR on the Preservation of Cultural, Historical and Natural Heritage* 1997, 50–1

- DEFRA (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs), 75, 75, 167
- Department of the Environment, 77, 83
- DETR (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions), 120, 122
- DfT (Department for Transport, UK), 150
- Dialogicality, 28–9, 48, 143, 147
- discourse, 1, 2–5, 15–16, 37–8, 44, 61, 67–9, 91–2, 95, 97, 99–100, 104, 106, 108, 113, 128, 140, 143, 147, 156, 183, 184, 191–2, 193, 197, 204–9
- analysis, 18–35, 73, 97
- commonsense, 20, 26, 28, 31, 144
- definition, 5–8, 18, 23–4, 73–4
- orders of, 26, 73–4, 80, 179
- parliamentary, 81
- performativity, 7, 81, 133, 145, 211
- policy, 20, 40–1, 45, 47–8, 63, 147, 150
- reality, 19–20
- representation, 26
- routine, 97–8
- social inclusion, 14, 113, 115–19, 123, 138, 142–3, 144–5, 162, 173–6, 181–2, 193, 204, 210–12
- social practice, 24
- see also* Critical Discourse Analysis
- dissonant heritage, 7, 48, 162
- diversity, 2, 13, 37, 46, 47, 50, 52–3, 64–5, 66, 67, 70, 72, 107, 110, 115, 119, 121, 128, 144–5, 146, 168, 181, 183, 185–8, 194, 199, 201, 211–12
- DNH (Department of National Heritage), 77, 96
- dominant heritage narrative, 105, 147
- Draft Heritage Protection Bill 2008*, 168, 171, 176
- economic value, 32, 89, 136, 152
- English Heritage, 12, 73–4, 75, 78–81, 79, 96, 149, 153–4, 173, 188, 211, 212, 223
- AHD, 149
- conservation principles, 149, 155–6, 157, 161
- corporate identity, 156–7, 173–5, 173, 182, 188
- elitism, 179–80
- expertise, 170
- heritage protection reform, 166–9
- historic environment, 124–6, 132
- intangible heritage, 67–9
- Modernization, 156
- National Heritage Act 1983*, 78, 93–4
- Power of Place*, 116, 138–46
- public value, 150
- rebranding, 156
- social inclusion, 116, 119–20, 128–30, 136, 175
- tourism, 134–5
- Englishness, 130, 133–4, 200
- Ethnicity, 16, 20, 91, 125, 185, 198, 209, 211
- excluded groups, 5, 9, 16, 106, 113–15, 136, 178, 182, 204, 205, 206–7, 210–11
- exclusion, 9, 12, 13, 15–16, 74, 90–1, 93, 106, 108–9, 111–13, 114–19, 122–3, 125, 129, 136, 141, 142–3, 146–7, 167, 172, 178, 182, 188, 201–4, 205, 206–7, 210–11, 222
- Social Exclusion Unit, 12, 111
- expertise, 44, 46–7, 48–50, 66, 70, 94, 98–100, 103, 126, 135, 137, 140, 141–2, 144, 148, 153, 170, 182
- and the Burra Charter, 48–50
- and the National Heritage Act, 94–104
- and public value, 153–4
- explanatory critique, 21
- Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property 1970*, 56, 217
- Fairclough, Norman, 14, 37, 44, 63, 74, 98, 101, 112–13, 124, 145, 172, 174, 175, 179, 193, 196, 207, 208
- critical discourse analysis, 19–35, 23
- fear of difference, 110, 183, 195, 198, 211
- France, 36, 38, 55, 61, 82, 110, 131, 185, 221

- Fraser, Nancy, 202
- French social policy, 12, 110–11
see also social inclusion
- German National Committee of
 ICOMOS, 50
Principles of Monument Conservation
 1992, 50
- Germany, 38, 50, 61, 82, 221
- globalization, 39–4, 46, 112
- Government Review of Policies
 Relating to the Historic
 Environment, 8, 120, 118–38,
 149, 160
 expertise, 131–7
*The Historic Environment: A Force
 for Our Future*, 117, 138–40,
 143–4, 168, 222
Power of Place, 116, 120, 138–46,
 152, 155, 168, 222
 working groups, 120–1, 120, 126,
 131
- Graham, Brian, 5, 7, 40, 53, 59, 72,
 162
- Gramsci, Antonio, 25–6
- Hage, Ghassan, 187, 207
- Hague Convention *see* *Convention for
 the Protection of Cultural Property
 in the Event of Armed Conflict*
 1956
- Hall, Stuart, 4, 9, 13, 90, 106, 112,
 133, 135, 143, 154, 184, 199,
 201, 202
- Harvey, David, 5
- hegemony, 25–6, 28, 35, 63, 97,
 208
- heritage
 agency, 120, 192–3
 anthropomorphism, 179
 assets, 145, 170, 176, 177
 assumptions, 3–4, 90–2
 audience, 13, 114–15, 129, 134–5,
 145, 156–7, 179–80
 commodification, 101–2, 145–6,
 150
 common, 42, 53–5, 70, 108
 definition of, 4, 7–8
 discourse, 2, 5–8, 206–7
 dissonant heritage, 7, 48, 162
 elitist, 10, 12, 179, 181, 209
 exclusion, 9, 90–1
 ideological, 18
 industry, 8, 9–11
 intangible, 54, 59, 64–9, 70, 149,
 152, 170, 190
 marketing, 145
 memory, 6, 7, 47, 146, 152, 170,
 201
 orders of discourse, 26–7
 peopleless, 137
 process, 137, 146, 152
 re-branding, 12, 123
 tourism, 3
 transformative power, 132, 137,
 184, 194, 196–7
 values, 158, 160, 161, 163, 164–6,
 169
 visibility, 139, 165
 white paper, 168, 169, 171, 176
- heritage industry critique, 8, 9–11
 and nostalgia, 11
see also bogus history
- Heritage Protection for the 21st Century*,
 168, 169, 171, 176
- Heritage Protection Reform, 34,
 148–82, 222–3
 AHD, 169–81
 social inclusion, 171, 180
- Heritage Register for England,
 176–7
- heritage sector, 2–3, 5, 8, 12–13, 15,
 18, 26–7, 34–5, 51, 72, 73, 74–7,
 75, 76, 79, 81, 112–13, 116–17,
 118, 130, 135, 140, 141, 145,
 150, 155, 156, 158, 167, 174–6,
 179–80, 184, 199, 191, 194, 196,
 201, 207, 209, 212, 223
 discourse, 26–7
 re-branding, 108, 109, 110
 social inclusion, 113–16, 147
- Hewison, Robert, 8, 10
- hidden power, 4, 14, 124, 129,
 137
see also critical discourse analysis
- Historic Buildings and Monuments
 Commission for England
see English Heritage

- historic environment, 74, 76, 77, 80, 109, 117, 119, 134, 136, 140, 141, 144, 156–8, 168, 175, 177–8, 203, 205, 210, 211, 222
- Conservation Principles, 160–2
- discursive sleight-of-hand, 9, 12, 123, 137, 181
- expertise, 163–4, 171–2
- origin of term, 5, 9, 12, 109, 121–2, 122–31
- PSA 21, 191, 194–6
- re-branding, 16, 118, 123, 131–2, 134–5, 145, 149, 209
- safeness, 141, 144, 192, 209
- social inclusion, 138–9, 140, 141, 143, 145, 148, 180–1
- terminology, 159–60
- worthiness, 131–2
- The Historic Environment: A Force for Our Future*, 117, 138–40, 143–4, 168, 222
- historic parks and gardens, 77, 78, 95–6, 169
- inalienable possessions, 137
- ICCROM, 53, 55
- ICHC *see* *Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage* 2003
- ICOMOS, 36–7, 41–2, 45, 50–1, 53–4, 55, 63, 75, 221
- Athens Charter for the Restoration of Historic Monuments* 1931, 39, 41–2, 66, 217
- International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites* (The Venice Charter) 1964, 15, 37–8, 39, 41–7, 49, 50–1, 53, 58, 59, 66, 92, 217
- Nara Document on Authenticity* 1994, 38, 45, 46–7, 58–9, 219
- see also* Burra Charter; Australia ICOMOS; China ICOMOS; ICOMOS Canada; ICOMOS New Zealand; German National Committee of ICOMOS
- ICOMOS Canada, 45
- Appleton Charter*, 1983, 45
- ICOMOS New Zealand, 50
- New Zealand Charter for the Conservation of Places of Cultural Heritage Value* 1993, 50
- ideological discursive formations, 25
- identity, 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 11, 16, 46, 61–3, 64, 65, 67, 80, 101, 107, 108, 114, 131–8, 139, 145, 209
- AHD, 105
- Britishness, 16–17, 107, 110, 111, 128, 130, 184, 187–8, 197–202, 204, 205, 207, 208, 211
- CDA, 23, 24, 26, 30, 33
- national, 12, 16–17, 47, 82, 93, 122–3, 130–1, 134, 145, 186, 194, 210–11
- politics of identity, 197–8
- imagined community, 98
- immigration, 107, 185
- inclusion *see* social inclusion
- inheritance, 42–3, 48, 70, 93–4, 97, 100–1, 125, 127, 130, 132, 138, 140, 149, 157, 167
- future generations, 3, 32, 39, 40, 42–3, 44, 48, 51, 55, 57, 66, 77, 85, 87–9, 93, 97–8, 100, 104, 105, 117, 117, 127, 132, 133, 135, 139, 149, 152–3, 157, 159, 172
- see also* patrimony
- ingroup glorification, 128
- instrumentality, 151, 151, 156, 177, 192, 194, 209
- intangible heritage, 54, 59, 65–9, 70, 149, 152, 170, 190
- AHD, 67–9
- English Heritage, 67–9
- Intangible Cultural Heritage
- Convention see* *Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage* 2003
- integration, 13, 110, 174, 183, 184, 187, 188, 199, 202–4, 223
- International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites* (The Venice Charter) 1964, 15, 37–8, 39, 41–7, 49, 50–1, 53, 59, 66, 92, 217
- modality, 44–5

- international policy, 36–71, 66
 - colonizing tendency, 36–71
 - globalization, 39–41
 - see also ICOMOS, UNESCO
- intertextuality, 24, 25, 27–8, 51, 56, 81, 82, 93, 155–6, 164, 204
- Jowell, Tessa, 76, 114, 140, 150, 164, 167, 171–3, 191–5
- Kelly, Ruth, 189, 200, 221
- keeping-while-giving, 137
- Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, Barbara, 52–3, 64
- Kress, Gunther, 20, 98
- Kundnani, Arun, 183, 187
- Lahn, Julie, 99, 104, 137
- Lammy, David, 10, 76, 148, 194
- Lao, 50
- Lawrence, Stephen, 110
- legitimization, 24, 26, 27, 31–2, 51, 67, 73, 88, 89–90, 97, 104, 106, 124, 135, 141, 144, 173–4, 178, 180, 181, 193–5, 212
 - definition, of 31–2
 - see also critical discourse analysis
- legitimizing technique, 89–90
- Levitas, Ruth, 107, 110, 111, 112, 113, 115, 210
- Lewis, Gail, 109, 113, 128, 130, 147, 211–12
- Lowenthal, David, 8, 40, 72, 108
- Lubbock, John, 82
- Macdonald, Sharon, 6, 11, 13, 203
- Man and the Biosphere Programme*, 56, 66, 218
- managerialism, 112, 150–1
- marginalized, the, 13–14, 113, 114, 183, 207, 210
- materiality, 5, 15, 19, 38–9, 42, 44, 50, 52, 68, 69, 126, 140, 152, 157–8
- memory
 - collective, 6–7, 146, 149, 152, 170
 - heritage, 6
 - technologies of memory, 6
- minority groups, 13, 68, 106, 115, 130–1, 146–7, 184, 187–9, 199, 201, 203–4
- modality, 24, 44–5, 98–9, 138, 157, 160–1, 171
 - definition of, 29–30
 - see also critical discourse analysis
- monumentality, 66, 70, 82–4
- monuments, 2, 6, 37, 39, 42–5, 47, 54, 56–8, 62, 66, 77, 82, 85–6, 87–8, 90, 92, 93, 94–6, 100, 102–3, 105, 110, 127, 140, 144, 149, 169, 171, 175, 177, 182, 205, 208, 209
- MORI, 116, 120, 135, 138
- Morris, William, 39, 86–7
- multiculturalism, 2–3, 5, 13, 15–16, 35, 50, 72–3, 109–12, 114, 131, 137, 148, 183, 185–8, 197, 198–9, 204–5, 207, 210–12
- Naidoo, Roshi, 4, 114, 130, 199, 222
- Namibian National Heritage Act 2004*, 61, 62–3
- NAPinCl (National Action Plan for Social Inclusion), 111, 222
 - see also social inclusion
- Nara Document on Authenticity 1994*, 38, 45, 46–7, 58–9, 219
- Venice Charter, 46–7
- National Heritage Act 1983*, 34, 73, 78, 93–100, 102
 - expertise, 94–104
- national identity, 12, 13, 16, 82, 122, 131, 134, 145, 194, 201, 211
- National Trust, 9, 38, 74, 75, 86, 91, 122, 150, 175–6, 223
- nationalism, 2, 12, 15, 16, 46, 82, 98, 130, 140, 172, 199
- nationhood, 84, 90–1, 98
- Netherlands, the, 109, 110, 185
- New Labour, 8, 12, 15, 72, 77, 81, 107–47, 151, 156, 167, 188, 189, 206, 221
 - Third Way politics, 111, 181
- New Zealand, 50, 64, 185
- New Zealand Charter for the Conservation of Places of Cultural Heritage Value 1993*, 50

- Nominalization, 24, 27, 146, 162, 192–3
 definition of, 30–1
see also critical discourse analysis
 nostalgia, 10–11, 13
- ODPM (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister), 75, 167, 188, 221, 223
- Oldham, 110, 185
- Othering, 146–7
- parallel lives, 184, 186–7
- participation, 15, 35, 47, 54, 65, 66, 74, 101, 103, 113, 114, 115, 127, 146, 148, 150, 159, 166, 168, 184, 190–1, 203, 218
- PAT 10 (Policy Action Team), 116
- patrimony, 87–9, 100–1, 157
see also inheritance
- People and Places: Social Inclusion Policy for the Built and Historic Environment*, 222
- Planning Policy Guidance Notes, 155
- PoP (*Power of Place*), 116, 120, 138, 146, 148, 152, 155, 168, 222
see also English Heritage
- power, 1, 4, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 18, 20, 21, 21–2, 25–6, 33, 35, 37, 44, 60–1, 70, 73, 105, 108, 124, 137, 148, 197, 202, 206, 208, 209–10
 hidden power, 4, 14, 124, 129, 137
 public, 101
 transformative power, 132, 137, 184, 194, 196–7
- The Principles for the Conservation of Heritage Sites in China*, China ICOMOS, 38, 45, 50–2, 220
 assumptions, 51
 intertextuality, 51
 operational guidelines, 56
- Protecting our Historic Environment: Making the System Work Better*, 168, 170, 171
- PSA Delivery Agreement, 21 184, 189–91, 194
- public participation, 101, 148, 146
- public value, 148, 150–5, 173–4, 182
 expertise, 153–4
 public value triangle, 150–1, 151
- race, 16, 82, 125, 184, 197, 198, 209, 211
- racism, 20, 108, 110, 119, 122, 128, 129, 138, 147, 189
 institutional racism, 110, 122, 129, 138, 147
- recognition, 202
- Recommendation Concerning the Protection, at National Level, of the Cultural and Natural Heritage 1972*, 54, 218
- Recommendation on Participation by the People at Large in Cultural Life and their Contribution to It*, 1976, 54, 218
- Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folklore*, 63, 219
- Register of Parks and Gardens of Special historic Interest in England*, 78, 95–6
- Review of Heritage Protection: The Way Forward*, 168, 170, 176
- rhetorical self-sufficiency, 87, 89
- riots, 110, 185
- ritual cultural policy, 182, 196–7
- Røyseng, Sigrid, 196–7
- Ruskin, John, 39, 86
- Samuel, Raphael, 8, 72
- Sandell, Richard, 12, 13, 115
- Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, 76, 78, 140, 192
- selective tradition, 106, 137, 209
- self segregation, 184, 195, 205
- SETF (Social Exclusion Task Force), 111
- SEU (Social Exclusion Unit), 12, 111, 116
- social democratic politics, 112, 115, 193
- social democratic tradition, 112
see also social democratic politics

- social inclusion, 8, 9, 11–16, 107, 110–16
 AHD, 12, 28, 144, 174–6, 207
 discourse, 14, 113, 115–19, 123, 138, 142–3, 144–5, 162, 173–6, 181–2, 193, 204, 210–12
 English Heritage, 116, 119–120, 128–30, 136, 175
 French policy, 12, 110–12
 Heritage Protection Reform, 171, 180
 heritage sector, 113–16, 147
 historic environment, 138–9, 140, 141, 143, 145, 148, 180–1
see also NAPincli; SEU; SETF
 social justice, 2
 Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings (SPAB), 39, 75, 82, 155, 217
 Smith, Laurajane, 3–5, 6, 7, 14, 16, 18, 36, 37, 38, 42, 43, 45, 51, 52, 57, 60, 61, 63, 67, 69, 70, 84, 95, 98, 99, 128, 134, 137, 142, 146, 154, 155, 162, 172, 176, 179, 188, 199, 201, 204, 206
 stately homes, 2, 84, 142, 202, 211
 Sturken, Marita, 6

 tangibility, 37, 39, 43, 48, 84–93, 94, 96, 105, 106, 152, 180
 technologies of memory, 6
 Thatcherism, 9, 54, 81, 106
 Thurley, Simon, 8, 78, 79, 153, 154, 166, 167, 181, 191, 223
 tolerance, 109–10, 111–12, 147, 198, 199, 207, 212
 tourism, 3, 11, 41, 102, 103, 118, 121, 134–5, 136, 177, 191
 tourists, 130
 insightful, 11
 mindfulness, 11
 transformative power, 132, 137, 184, 194, 196–7
 transitivity, 24, 27, 30, 157, 163
 definition of, 30
 see also critical discourse analysis
 Tunbridge, John, 7, 162

 UNESCO, 34, 36, 37, 38, 40, 46, 53–69, 60, 75, 78, 221
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 1972 (World Heritage Convention), 15, 50, 53–63, 60, 66, 76, 92, 155, 221
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 1954 (the Hague Convention), 39, 56, 66, 217, 220
Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage 2003 (Intangible Cultural Heritage Convention), 38, 54, 63–4, 64–7, 66, 220
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property 1970, 56, 66, 217, 218
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions 2005, 54, 64, 65, 220
Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage, 2001, 56, 66, 220
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property 1970; *The Protection of Mankind's Cultural Heritage* 1970, 65, 217
Recommendation Concerning the Protection, at National Level, of the Cultural and Natural Heritage 1972, 54, 218
Recommendation on Participation by the People at Large in Cultural Life and their Contribution to It 1976, 54, 218
Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folklore 63, 219
Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity 2001, 220

UNESCO – *continued*

- Vienna Memorandum on World Heritage and Contemporary Architecture – managing the Historic Landscape*, 46
- United Nations, 40, 53, 221
 - Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The*, 1948, 220
- United States of America, 38, 60, 64–5, 131, 150–1, 198, 219, 222
- Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity* 2001, 220
- values, 154
 - assumptions, 28, 87, 97, 173, 190
 - community, 164, 166, 171
 - core, 188
 - economic, 32, 89, 136, 152
 - heritage, 158, 160, 161, 163, 164–6, 169
 - hierarchy, 153–4
 - public, 148, 150–5, 173–4, 182
 - shared, 198–201
 - social, 165
- van Dijk, Teun, 20, 21, 73, 80, 81
- van Leeuwen, Theo, 20, 30, 31, 32, 89, 100
- Venice Charter *see* *International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites*
- Vienna Memorandum on World Heritage and Contemporary Architecture – managing the Historic Landscape*, 46
- visuality, 139, 165, 194
- Waterton, Emma, 7, 18, 42, 48, 49, 61, 69, 84, 98, 99, 128, 137, 152, 165, 167, 168, 176, 188, 200, 201
- Watson, Steve, 165
- Weiner, Annette, 137
- wellbeing, 13, 32, 141, 177, 193, 195–6, 209
- Wetherell, Margaret, 5, 7, 19–20, 110, 183
- WHC (World Heritage Convention)
 - see* *Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage* 1972
- whiteness, 143, 197–8
- Wodak, Ruth, 20, 23, 24, 25, 28, 30, 31, 73, 100
- world heritage, 53–63, 70
 - common heritage, 70
 - list, 50–1, 55–65, 221
 - sites, 60, 77–8, 132, 149, 169, 176, 221
- World Heritage Centre, 34, 64, 221
- World Heritage Committee, 55, 63, 221
 - see also* UNESCO; World Heritage Convention
- Wright, Patrick, 9, 10, 11, 40, 72