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War Volunteering in Modern Times

From the French Revolution to the Second World War

Christine G. Krüger

Sonja Levsen



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From the French Revolution to the Second World War

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1

Introduction: Volunteers, War, and the Nation since the French Revolution

Christine G. Krüger and Sonja Levsen

Historians have so far paid rather little attention to war volunteers in modern history. The phenomenon of the war volunteer has not been studied either in its comparative aspects or in terms of its development over time, and little is known about the numbers, motivations, and backgrounds of volunteers in many wars. While the relatively recent turn of military history towards the perspective of the common soldier, towards war experiences and war cultures, has generated a range of studies on conscription, conscientious objection, and desertion,[1] war volunteers have – except in the cases discussed below – rarely been studied in detail. This relative indifference of historians is particularly surprising in view of the central place accorded to volunteer movements in national myths of the 19th and early 20th centuries.

The introduction of conscription in many European countries during the 19th century is generally seen as an important development in the relationship between war and nation, and even as a constitutive factor in the nation-building processes of the 19th century. Following the "master narrative" of modern military history, the transformation of the early modern standing armies into citizens' armies, and thus the integration of the army into society, was achieved through universal service. With the emergence of the *soldat-citoyen*, the relationship between army and nation was transformed. War became a national affair.

Yet military service on the basis of conscription was an inherently contradictory practice, characterized by an "essential ambiguity", as Thomas Hippler has convincingly argued, because it exemplified two conflicting features. On the one hand, compulsory service

was associated with political and civic rights; on the other hand, it restricted individual liberty and the rights of the conscript, by subjecting him to strict discipline and authority.[2] In contrast, the volunteer's decision to offer his service – a decision ideally thought of as being made in the absence of pressure or coercion – could provide a degree of legitimacy to the nation and its wars that conscription could not. The willingness of considerable numbers of men to sacrifice their lives for their nation could be interpreted by contemporaries as an unquestionable proof of national unity, of a patriotism that saw in the nation an ultimate value. Volunteers became symbols for a complete identification of the individual with the nation. Therein lay the main importance of the French Revolutionary volunteers, or the German volunteer troops in the anti-Napoleonic wars. Among the German volunteer troops who fought against Napoleon, one unit in particular, the *Freikorps Lützow*, was singled out in national memory. Its colours were used from 1818 onwards by the nascent patriotic student movement (the *Jenaer Urburschenschaft*), the featured prominently at the patriotic rally at Hambach in 1832, and were finally adopted as the German national colours in 1848 and again in 1918 and 1945. The association of black, red, and gold with the volunteers' supposedly selfless sacrifice for the nation contributed to this history, even though it is not sufficient to explain it completely.[3] Examples such as this show that an exclusive focus on conscription necessarily neglects important aspects of the relationship between the individual, the military, and the nation since the 19th century. It is the aim of this book to show how a shift of perspective towards volunteering can add to – and in some aspects change – our understanding of this relationship.

Towards a history of war volunteering

In the current state of research it is impossible to give a comprehensive overview of volunteer movements in modern history and of where, when, how and why individuals volunteered to go to war. The authors in this book, however, discuss these and further questions for a wide range of 19th and 20th century wars. What made men, and sometimes women, go to war for their nation, or for other nations? What has voluntary enlistment meant in different wars; was it in the context of limited choice, or in the context of conscription? What roles did patriotism and other ideologies, individual conviction and peer pressure, material incentives and irrational, subconscious factors play in individuals' decisions to enlist in the armed forces? Which wars attracted large numbers

of volunteers, and from which social strata did they come? How did governments react to individuals who expressed the wish to fight in their armies, and how did nations remember volunteers? In what ways did the war experiences of volunteers, their ways of interpreting and justifying the war's causes and aims, differ from those of regular soldiers?

To date, these questions have not been researched from a long-term and comparative perspective. In the rest of this introduction we intend to sketch the current state of research on volunteers in modern history, to indicate where and how the authors of this book add new perspectives to existing debates, and to identify other themes and questions that are of interest for a history of war volunteering in general and for the authors of this book in particular. Instead of trying to develop an ex-post definition of the volunteer, the authors in this book look at groups that defined themselves or were defined by their contemporaries as war volunteers. In order to put this definition into context, we conclude our introduction with an analysis of the changing meanings and connotations of the term "volunteer" in modern history.

Volunteering and patriotism: myths and deconstructions

The role of patriotism in volunteers' decision to go to war, and its relative importance compared with other motives, has so far been discussed by historians primarily for two groups: the *volontaires* of the French Revolutionary Wars, and the First World War volunteers, with focus on the British "New Armies". It is certainly no coincidence that these two movements have attracted most historical attention, each for its own reasons.

Standing out as supposedly the first "national" volunteers in European history, the volunteers raised by the revolutionary government in 1791 and 1792 have since attracted the attention of a wide range of historians. Thomas Hippler analyses in this book the construction of the revolutionary volunteer as a mythical figure and the various reinterpretations and deconstructions of this figure in 20th-century historiography. In recent times, Annie Crépin, Alan Forrest, John Lynn and others have uncovered new facts regarding the line between myth and reality in the image of the revolution's volunteers.[4] The 19th-century myth of the *volontaires* embodying the best qualities of the nation, motivated by pure patriotism and idealism and thus being clearly distinguishable from both the line soldiers of the *ancien régime* and the conscripts of later years, has been replaced by detailed analyses of the volunteers' backgrounds and motivations. Patriotism, most recent studies agree, is

only one among many factors explaining the success of the *levées* of 1791 and 1792. It has, furthermore, been shown that the differences in recruitment between the revolution's volunteers and the *ancien régime*'s line soldiers are in many ways blurred. Both findings support Ute Planert's argument that the Revolutionary Wars should be seen less as a turning point in the history of European war and more as one piece in a chain of events transforming European armies and wars.[5]

Volunteer movements have not been researched in a comparable way for any other war of the 19th century. In recent years, several scholars have begun to deconstruct the myths surrounding the German volunteers in the anti-Napoleonic wars. Leighton James in this book takes an important step towards the historicization of this movement by asking whether the post-war accounts given by German and Austrian volunteers who fought against Napoleon support the idea that the anti-Napoleonic wars provoked a nationalization of the German population. Historians studying the second half of the 19th century in Europe have so far largely neglected questions of voluntary enlistment in wars. For example, no detailed research has been carried out on volunteers in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71.[6] Only for 19th-century North America, and especially for the American Civil War, is better information available.[7] Michael Hochgeschwender in this book analyses various historiographical schools that try to explain the motives and experiences of the Irish volunteers in the war, and stresses the complexities of political and national identities in the 19th century. In studying the turn of the century wars – the Spanish-American war in 1898 and the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902) – authors in this book investigate largely unexplored terrain. Matthias Speidel analyses the motivation and experiences of the more than 10,000 African-Americans who volunteered for the US army in 1898. Stephen Miller argues that British volunteers in the South African war hold an important place in British military history, because their perceived idealism and dedication created a "new, more positive image of the British soldier" and changed the image of the army in society.

Apart from the *volontaires* of the 1790s, the relationship between patriotism, nationalism, and volunteering has been investigated in most depth for the volunteer movement of the First World War. The British government's decision and strategy to fight a world war with an army almost half composed of volunteers can be considered as an apex in the historical development of war volunteering. This is most obvious when the numbers involved are considered: no other government in history has successfully raised and deployed more than 2.5 million volunteers

within a period of two years, a venture which has been studied in detail by several historians, although by no means exhaustively.[8] In Britain in 1914, volunteering appeared to be a patriotic duty, and, what is more, not as an exceptional commitment but as a social norm internalized even by children.[9] This was the message of recruiting postcards such as the well-known specimen showing a young girl asking her father "Daddy, what did YOU do in the Great War?" The diffusion of this ideal through all parts of the population – women handing white feathers to "shirkers", children reading stories of gallant heroes – can be interpreted as an aspect of the new "total" war of the 20th century. Recent research, however, has tended to emphasize a variety of motives for volunteering other than patriotism – peer pressure, economic conditions, ideals of masculinity, to name but a few – and to question the existence of real war enthusiasm among either the population or the volunteers.[10] This view does not treat the Great War as exceptional, but regards its volunteer movement, in motives if not in numbers, as being in line with earlier and later wars.

Research on volunteers in other combatant nations of the Great War is unfortunately much less substantial than on the British side. German volunteers have received some – not very detailed – attention; their French counterparts have so far been almost completely ignored by historical research. In the context of conscription, volunteering took on a different meaning: German volunteers, both during and in the aftermath of the war, were thought of and depicted as an elite, as for example in the famous Langemarck myth, rather than as representatives of the nation as a whole. While contemporary politicians and propaganda interpreted the volunteer movement as "the best indicator of a nation's enthusiasm",[11] the current state of research presents a more ambivalent picture. In parallel to studies on British volunteers, historians studying the German situation now stress factors other than patriotism.[12] Considering the important role the volunteer movement played in German self-image during and after the war,[13] it is still astonishing that it has only been addressed in a few articles by Bernd Ulrich and a short chapter in Jeffrey Verhey's book that sets out to deconstruct the myth of widespread war enthusiasm in Germany in 1914.[14] While it is clear that the numbers were much smaller than claimed by the authorities, a thorough study of motivation based on ego-documents is still missing. Alexander Watson's comparative essay in this book sets the groundwork for further studies in this field. Using the concept of "defensive patriotism", he argues against both simple "war enthusiasm" and an overemphasis on material incentives.

The trend to interpret the Great War's volunteers in terms other than "patriotism", "idealism" or "ideology" is not restricted to historians. The German novelist and Nobel prize winner Günter Grass included in his collection of short stories *My century* (1999) a story set in the years from 1907 to 1914, the message of which could hardly be more ironic. The story's main character, a young boy from a working-class family, listens on his father's shoulders to an anti-war speech by the German socialist Karl Liebknecht in 1907. As the speech goes on, the boy suddenly needs to pee, and, because his father is too absorbed in the talk to notice, pisses on his father's neck when he cannot hold it in any longer. For this misdeed he is spanked by his father in the middle of the political rally. The narrator – that boy, now a grown man – recounts after the war that "that is the reason why – the only reason why – the minute things came to a head I made a beeline for the local recruiting office and enlisted. I was even decorated twice for bravery and, after being wounded at Arras and outside Verdun, made it to N.C.O."[15] Never, however, he adds, did he doubt that Liebknecht was perfectly right in his anti-war attitudes.

Volunteering in this story appears to be an act of belated rebellion against fatherly injustice, a decision against one's own political conviction, irrational and impulsive, and certainly not motivated by patriotism. It seems not unlikely that Grass's literary interpretation was influenced by his own experiences as a youth in the Second World War. In the winter of 1944 he had joined the Waffen-SS. After he disclosed this in 2006, the extent to which this decision had been voluntary became the topic of heated public debates, and even judicial procedures. As Jean-Luc Leleu shows in this book, in the case of the Waffen-SS's recruitment towards the end of the war, it is "difficult to make a distinction between real volunteers and others". It is, however, undisputed that Grass volunteered for the submarine service, a decision that he was at pains to present in interviews as not having been motivated by ideological conviction or rational choice, but rather to be explained by the wish to "get away from home", "away from the family"[16] – an irrational decision made out of youthful naivety, in some ways akin to that of the boy in the short story, although Grass admits in his autobiography that he had a positive image of the army and saw the Waffen-SS as a kind of elite unit.[17] This is not surprising in view of the intense militarization of German society after the defeat in 1918, as discussed in Rüdiger Bergien's article on volunteers for the German border protection units during the 1920s and early 1930s. In a period when Germany's official army was reduced to 100,000 men following the Versailles treaty, paramilitary forces, such as the free corps and the home guards, continued

to idealize war and soldiering, and this social militarization did not decline with the stabilization of the Republic in the mid-1920s. By 1939, however, attempting to fight a total war without conscription would no longer have been a real option. Even though the Second World War again provided the possibility of, and propaganda for, volunteering, it saw European armies relying almost universally on conscription.

Volunteering and citizenship: integration and illusion

The high ideological esteem in which volunteers were held in public discourse during the 19th and early 20th centuries made volunteering appear to be a means of social integration. Not all volunteers who fought for the nation of their birth – their "own" nation – were acknowledged by this nation to be members of the national community or granted the rights of political participation. For religious and racial minorities, the hope of achieving integration, emancipation, equality, and acceptance was one of the central reasons for volunteering. During the 19th century citizenship became closely linked to military service, so that voluntary service, when possible, appeared to open up a way to achieve or at least strive for citizenship. Concepts of masculinity and soldiering became increasingly intertwined during the course of the 19th century; the nation was perceived as inherently male.[18] In this context military service served to justify the restriction of civil rights to men. Still, women could show their willingness for patriotic sacrifice, proving that they belonged to the nation, by working as volunteer nurses or by engaging in various forms of social work considered useful to the nation's war effort.[19] In some spectacular cases in the 19th century, women even dressed up as men and enlisted.[20] Especially during and after the First World War, women emphasized their contribution to the war effort in order to support their claim to suffrage, although this aim was not the primary motivation of most women who served in military units or enlisted for other forms of patriotic work.[21] As the article by Jutta Schwarzkopf in this volume on women in the British military in the Second World War shows, the motivations of women joining the military forces were diverse. Patriotism went hand in hand with the often prevailing wish to take advantage of the new possibilities that war work had opened up for individual women, and to escape from the narrow boundaries fixed by traditional gender roles.

Similarly, in some respects, European Jews looked on volunteering as a path to integration. They hoped by this means to refute the allegation that they were waiting for their return to Palestine, so that there

could be no confidence in their willingness to fight and die for their European country. This claim served as the main and most powerful argument for all those who opposed their emancipation. Therefore, in many European conflicts following the French Revolutionary Wars, a disproportionately high percentage of Jews joined up voluntarily. A comparable case, analysed in this volume by Matthias Speidel, is the large number of black Americans fighting in the Spanish-American War of 1898, although their decision to volunteer was disputed within the black community because of ongoing segregation. In his article on Irish volunteers during the American Civil War, Michael Hochgeschwender demonstrates that volunteering, for a minority, was not necessarily an integrationist experience. Rather, "complex notions of loyalty and a multi-faceted, fragmented patriotism" could also foster the development of a "double identity". In general, disappointment and disillusion seem to have been experienced by many volunteers who had hoped to be rewarded by esteem and integration. Surprisingly, however, it seems that volunteering still did not lose its attraction. The myth of volunteering was resistant to challenge by the actual experiences of volunteers. Even though, for instance, the German Jews' participation in the Franco-German War of 1870/71 did not bring the social integration they had eagerly hoped for, many Jews voluntarily rushed to the recruitment offices in 1914 with the same expectations that had already been voiced by the earlier generation of volunteers.[22]

Volunteering for foreign countries: individualism, idealism, ideology

Finally, volunteers in history have not always fought for their country of birth – their "own" nation. In various wars political émigrés volunteered for foreign armies, hoping in this way to support their home country. This was the case for many Polish expatriates during the period of the Napoleonic Wars, as is shown by Ruth Leiserowitz in this book. Others deliberately left their own country to support a foreign cause. An early example in modern times is the philhellenes from all over Europe who participated in the Greek war of independence.[23] The Spanish Civil War, whose international brigades are among the most famous volunteers of the 20th century, is the best-known example of large numbers of men fighting for another country.[24] The international character of these volunteer brigades, the large numbers of intellectuals fighting in them, and their subsequent idealization, primarily in communist countries, as well as their appearance in many literary works,

explain their relative prominence in historical research. Judith Keene's chapter in this book shows that individuals from foreign countries volunteered not only for the Republican side but also, if on a smaller scale, for Franco's troops. Many of them went to Spain to "fight communism", perceived less as a Spanish problem than as an international "threat". And their motivation for adhering to the Francoist cause was often first and foremost "the political frameworks that they had formulated in their own home contexts", as Keene puts it.

Volunteering in a foreign country could also have repercussions on debates and politics in the volunteers' home country, as Axel Jansen shows in this book. Motivated by individual conviction, a considerable number of American students, particularly of the elite universities on the east coast, volunteered for the Allied Forces in the First World War – at a time when the United States was still neutral. The debates concerning these volunteers, their motives, their legitimacy, and their commemoration give interesting insights into concepts of individual and national responsibility and autonomy.

The role of ideology – rather than patriotism – in explaining the motives of volunteers fighting for other countries is a central question pursued by several authors in this book. José-Manoel Núñez explores the background and motivation of the "Blue Division", the Spanish volunteer division that served in Russia from 1941 to 1944. The question of ideological motivation is also taken up by Jean-Luc Leleu's chapter on the Waffen-SS volunteers. While in this case "volunteers" were often forced to join the troops, the cases of Franco's Spain and the Boer War, analysed in this book by Fransjohan Pretorius, show that foreign volunteers were by no means always warmly welcomed. Particularly among combatant parties for which nationalism was a core ideology, such as the Spanish Falange and the Boer troops, the acceptance and integration of foreign volunteers could prove difficult.

War volunteering: the history of a concept

What is a war volunteer? Any attempt to provide an "objective" definition of which soldiers fighting in the wars of the 19th and 20th centuries can be defined as "volunteers" must necessarily prove futile. *Volunteer*, *volontaire*, and *Freiwilliger* are historical terms, which evolved and changed their meaning during the period covered by this book. The volunteer was defined by contemporaries as distinct from the mercenary, the conscript, and the professional soldier. All three differentiations carried, and in many ways still carry, normative judgements.

The evolution of these normative connotations, which can be traced back to the era of the French Revolution, and the historical uses of the term "volunteer" since that time in a military context, will be analysed in the rest of this introduction, referring to British, French, German, Italian, North American, and Spanish encyclopaedias from the middle of the 18th to the beginning of the 21st century. For this analysis we have studied entries for "volunteer", "mercenary", "soldier", "guerrilla", "conscription", and "army".

In the second half of the 18th century, the entries in most encyclopaedias for the terms "mercenary" and "volunteer" were short and rather basic. Whereas a mercenary was defined as a paid, sometimes foreign, soldier, "volunteer" referred to a soldier who served voluntarily at his own expense, often to learn the military profession.[25] The volunteer's motivation was sometimes mentioned, but was not yet an undisputed matter of praise. For example, the longest entry for volunteering in this period, two pages under the heading "Volonteur, Voluntair, Freywilliger" in the German *Zedlers Universallexicon*, highlighted as a common stimulus the aim of getting promoted. Some volunteers were driven only by the wish "to amuse themselves together with the officers, gambling, in crapulousness or otherwise".[26] On the contrary, *Zedler's* much shorter combined entry for soldier and mercenary ("Soldat, Soldner, oder Söldner") did not imply any judgement.[27]

An exception to these mostly neutral concepts in the 18th century is the definition given by Diderot's and D'Alembert's *Encyclopédie*, which contrasted a more or less positive notion of the "volontaire" with a clearly negative idea of the "mercenaire". The volunteer was defined as "the one who enlists of his free will, without pay, contract or fixed rank, just in order to serve his king or his country, and to learn the trade of war".[28] At the same time, the encyclopaedists of the Enlightenment condemned the use of mercenary armies by the absolutist state: "If the citizen does not want to be oppressed, he should always be ready to defend his goods and his liberty himself. For a century now, mercenary troops have increased to an excess unknown in history. This excess ruins the peoples and the princes, and keeps up a mistrust among the powers in Europe which, even more than ambition, provokes wars [...]."[29] Even if not present in earlier encyclopaedias, this discourse was not new. The idea that a soldier fighting of his own will and for his own goals is more reliable and in the end also more effective than a warrior who goes to war for money or under coercion is certainly not limited to modern times, but can also be found in antiquity.[30] This line of argument was taken up in the Renaissance period, its most prominent

theorist at the time being Machiavelli – who, in a chapter on the different military constitutions in *Il Principe*, put forward the view that "mercenary armies never achieve anything, and cause only harm."[31] The same discourse later fuelled the heated debates about the new military constitution during the French Revolution, and was reproduced in other encyclopaedias in the first half of the 19th century.[32]

While the entry for the term "mercenary" in many encyclopaedias remained neutral until the end of the 19th century, the recruitment of mercenaries was often negatively viewed in other articles, as for example in the article on soldiers.[33] The *Neues rheinisches Conversations-Lexicon* in 1835 distinguished "Soldaten" (soldiers), who "defend their fatherland", from "Söldner" (mercenaries), who "do not care for the cause they are fighting for".[34] French encyclopaedias mentioned that the term "mercenaire" is also used to describe an "egoistic person".[35]

Positive normative definitions of the volunteer, however, appeared with increasing frequency in the course of the 19th century. In 1816, for example, the *Encyclopaedia Perthensis* applauded the "laudable purpose" of the British during the Revolutionary Wars, when "in defence of their country" they voluntarily "rose as one man".[36] The Revolutionary Wars, which produced an unprecedented number of volunteers all over Europe, thus appear at first sight once again as a watershed in military history. The analysis of a larger number of encyclopaedias, however, shows that this change of perception was not a quick or linear process. Up to the middle of the 19th century we find encyclopaedias that confine the entry for "volunteer" to a basic definition or do not include the term at all.[37]

With the introduction of compulsory military service, volunteers, at least those who did not serve in the regular units, were sometimes viewed as ineffective. In 1870, at a time when conscription in Germany was held in high esteem and the German military system was a source of national pride, *Meyers Lexikon* was convinced that irregular volunteer units ("Freischaren") "due to the lack of tactical training and military discipline generally achieve little". Nevertheless, the author added that there had also been occasions in recent history when volunteer units "led by capable commanders distinguished themselves".[38]

But such ambivalent views became more and more the exception. In the second half of the 19th century, the term volunteering usually had a positive connotation, even in those countries that relied on conscription. Critics of professional armies thus tended to use the term "mercenaries" instead of "volunteers" when referring to recruits in these armies, as was noted by the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* in 1911: "The

name is sometimes used as a term of reproach by nations who raise their armies by conscription, of armies raised by voluntary enlistment whose members are paid a more or less living wage."[39] And, indeed, the entry "Söldner" of the German *Brockhaus* in 1934 described British and American soldiers before 1914 as mercenaries.[40] Interestingly, though, the encyclopaedias did not generally distinguish clearly between professional soldiers who enlisted voluntarily in a standing army and wartime volunteers who served beside the regulars for the duration of the war, but often conflated the two categories.[41]

Between the late 19th and the early 20th century, encyclopaedias paid more attention to volunteering and war volunteers than ever before. The articles grew in length and were no longer confined to mere definitions or brief judgements; rather, volunteering was now usually analysed as a historical phenomenon. Sometimes even traced back to ancient times, the evolution of the phenomenon in modern times and its particular features since the advent of national wars were recounted in detail.[42] French encyclopaedias continued to paint the most favourable picture of volunteers. Although a fundamental critique of the volunteer myth had been published by Camille Rousset as early as June 1870, shortly before the French-German war, neither his convincing analysis nor the crisis of 1870/71 destroyed or even significantly destabilized the myth of the *volontaires* in the Third Republic.[43] This is reflected in the *Grand Dictionnaire du dix-neuvième siècle*, which in 1876 indulged in praise of the Revolutionary volunteers: "But it is the national volunteers, the volunteers of the French Revolution, who have particularly shaped the image of their role and their character, an image that was even more pure as it was not the vain lust for glory that pushed a whole generation to the battlefields, but patriotism, the most heroic feeling that can raise a great people. It is well known what miracles these men achieved."[44]

In several cases, the raising of national volunteers was perceived as an indicator of universal progress. At the same time, the use of mercenaries appeared more and more outdated since the nationalization of war: "Since the Napoleonic Wars, the use of mercenary troops seems to have disappeared for ever," wrote the *Enciclopedia universal ilustrada europeo-americana* in 1917.[45] Interestingly, this encyclopaedia includes contradictory judgements on volunteer service in the articles on "ejercito" and "voluntariado" respectively. In the article on "ejercito", published in 1915, England is cited as the main example of an army based on volunteer recruitment, yet the British forces are criticized as weak and costly. In addition, volunteer recruitment is characterized as the recruitment system "dominant" before the French Revolution, and not clearly

distinguished from mercenarism. Due to the general "feminization" of modern societies, the author adds in this negative vein, it is too difficult to recruit volunteers in sufficient numbers. In contrast, the author of the 1929 article on "volontariados" exalts the great achievements of the 1808 volunteers in the Spanish uprising against Napoleon, quotes authors who idealize volunteers as "the best soldiers", and praises "the excellent results" of a military system that makes use of volunteer units in addition to the standing army.[46] England and the US are mentioned as examples of volunteer recruitment systems, this time without any negative implications, in spite of what one might have expected considering that Spain in the late 1920s was a dictatorship.

On the whole, only a minority of encyclopaedias linked the phenomenon of the volunteer to political constitution. Rather, a growing number of encyclopaedias strongly nationalized the definition of "volunteer" in the second half of the 19th century. In many encyclopaedias in Britain as well as in Prussia (in the German *Reich* after 1871), the definition of volunteering refers exclusively to a specific institution within the military system. In the British case, this was the Volunteer Force created in the second half of the 19th century and its antecedents.[47] In the German case, the encyclopaedias dedicated their entries to the so-called "Einjährig Freiwillige", a volunteer service of 12 months, which allowed more highly educated youths to reduce their compulsory service from three years to one if they paid their own expenses.[48] Moreover, the "Einjährig Freiwillige" enjoyed several other privileges. Here, what defined a volunteer was not the motivation, but money. This was in contrast to the general trend, as, since the establishment of universal conscription, the volunteer was usually no longer requested to equip himself. In a way, qualifying those soldiers as volunteers concealed the fact that the institution was a special concession to those who could afford it.

The nationalization of volunteering could be even more explicit; some authors portrayed it as a specific national feature. While the German *Brockhaus* in 1894, for example, characterized the German volunteers in the anti-Napoleonic period as being "inspired by the noblest spirit", it attributed patriotism to only some of the French Revolutionary volunteers and insinuated that others volunteered "in fear of the guillotine".[49] In 1892, *Chambers Encyclopaedia* distinguished the British volunteer movement as "unique in the history of nations". When Britain had been menaced by war in 1859, an "armed force rose up as if by magic. [...] It became apparent that the spirit was one inherent in the national character."[50] Similarly, the *Enciclopedia Italiana* from

1939 asserted that "what for other nations has been an episode, has remained a tradition in Italy, in fact, the volunteer spirit is perceived by the Italians as a tradition and the most objective foreign observers confirm it to be a traditional feature of the Italian soul."[51]

The quoted article on "volontarî" in the *Enciclopedia Italiana* from the period of fascism is worth further examination, as it demonstrates the high esteem in which the dictatorial regime held volunteering. The author describes war volunteering as a phenomenon known in "all periods which are characterized by deep contests about ideals". This statement is underpinned by a short historical sketch of war volunteering from antiquity to the 19th century. The article clearly distinguishes ancient, medieval, and early modern volunteers from modern Italian volunteers, reserving new and higher values for the latter: "But the real Italian volunteer spirit, which is perceived as volunteer spirit for nothing else than for the communal historical conscience, only rose when a genuine national sentiment awoke in the Italians' bosom: at that moment, the volunteer tradition of the adventurers from the first centuries of the modern era turned into the patriotic volunteer spirit of our time."[52]

Somewhat paradoxically, this article of the *Enciclopedia Italiana*, written under a dictatorship, appears to be the most euphoric of all the entries on "volunteering" we have considered for this analysis. While it is not surprising that a fascist encyclopaedia idealizes soldierly values and individual sacrifice for the nation, the exaltation of volunteers is still not self-evident in a system that relies upon compulsory military training from childhood onwards. It may be interpreted as a strategy to conceal the coercive character of the military system and the decreasing space for free will. On the other hand, it also points towards the question of individual agency in dictatorial regimes, which, for example, also lay behind the debates around Günter Grass's enlistment in the Waffen-SS. In fact, the author of the article in the *Enciclopedia Italiana* is aware of the ambivalence inherent in his eulogy. According to him, the volunteer spirit alone does not suffice to achieve the best results. Only under the Mussolini regime, when "national discipline and the volunteers' spontaneity" merged, did the volunteer spirit "reach its apex."[53] In National Socialist Germany in 1939, the entry "Freiwilliger" in *Meyers Lexikon* is much more factual, giving detailed instructions on how to apply for voluntary enlistment.[54]

After 1945, in the face of the enormous devastation and casualty numbers of the Second World War, and under the impact of demilitarization and Europeanization, war volunteering lost its appeal. The entries for

"volunteer" in encyclopaedias all over Europe quickly shrank in size.[55] Today the term "war volunteer" has all but disappeared from Western political discourse; it has been reduced to a historical term. "Volunteer" in 21st-century usage generally refers to civic engagement: thus, from its inception, the Wikipedia entry for "volunteer" has been almost entirely dedicated to civil volunteers. A short mention of military volunteers in Autumn 2007 gave only a rather sarcastic definition of volunteering not for, but within, the army: "In the armed forces 'volunteer' takes on a number of meanings. It can mean that the individual has actually consented to some dangerous mission. However more commonly it means that the officer [...] has picked you for something unpleasant/onerous/dangerous: 'I need three volunteers; you, you, and you'. Or 'dress forward one pace all those who want to volunteer', nearly the whole squad quickly dresses to the rear leaving only the dimmest 'dressed forward'."[56] Since then the article has been changed, and now does not include any reference to military volunteers; instead, there is a short and rather neutral entry for "military volunteer".[57] In the French version of Wikipedia, such an entry is absent: the headword "volontaire" refers exclusively to a long entry for civic volunteers ("bénévolat").[58]

Yet, even if the general term "volunteer" seems today to be associated primarily with civic volunteers, this trend should not lead to the conclusion that military volunteering has ceased to play a role. One of the latest examples that prove the opposite is the war in Iraq in 2003, when both Iraqi expatriates and volunteers from many Arab countries rushed to support Iraq "with something of the passion of young Europeans joining the Spanish civil war in the 1930s", according to a contemporary magazine.[59] The American and British forces were completely made up of professional soldiers, based on voluntary recruitment, and not a few young Americans volunteered with the specific wish to fight in this war.

The trend in Europe in recent years is clearly in favour of voluntary recruitment systems. Although the term "war volunteer" has gone out of fashion, public opinion favours voluntary recruitment systems over conscription. Great Britain returned to its traditional preference for a volunteer army in the 1960s; on the continent conscription was maintained much longer, but came under scrutiny in the 1990s. Belgium started by abolishing conscription in 1994, the Netherlands "adjourned" it in 1996, France followed in 2001, Spain in 2002, and Italy in 2005. Denmark decided in 2004 to recruit conscripts only when it was not possible to find enough volunteers.[60] Joining the forces today is generally portrayed as a career choice. The terms used for the

soldiers of volunteer armies are "professional soldier"/ "Berufssoldat"/ "soldat de carrière" and, although somewhat less often, "volunteer"/ "Freiwilliger"/ "volontaire". War has disappeared from the job title. Still, in the recruiting messages of both US and European armies, many of the motives ascribed to volunteers in this book are addressed – in changing combinations. Thus, the US Marine Corps first calls upon the recruits' patriotism, with its appeal "Answer the calling to serve our country" and its stress on the aim of "winning battles".[61] The US army's recruitment website, in a similar manner, and by way of emotional music and videos, combines the appeal to patriotism with the promise of adventure, and other arguments for a military career.[62] Neither internet site neglects the financial aspects or the attractions of adventure. The British army's short recruitment video on its internet site mainly evokes images of masculinity that are closely connected with physical fitness; it does not seem far-fetched to see this as a continuation of the British tradition of portraying the soldier as a sportsman, which reaches back into the 19th century.[63] The promise of adventure is not missing in this video; a new element is the fascination of modern weapon techniques. On the website, career paths and financial attractions ("Money matters") are outlined in detail; an appeal to patriotism is not among the central messages.

Compared with the American and British sites, the French army's recruiting sites are characterized by the relative absence of emotional messages and pictures, instead mainly providing information about the various possibilities and career paths within the army. A few pictures are included on the site, but these are small and do not attract attention; and, where the US marines tell stories of combat, the French army includes a link to the "typical day" of a soldier, which lists primarily meal and work times.[64] Indeed, the "battle" mentioned most prominently on the army's website is that against unemployment, in which it claims to play an important role.[65] Whereas the US-American sites make it clear that they may be recruiting volunteers to fight in wars, this is not the main message of the French site. And, while classical military values such as discipline, solidarity, and team spirit are mentioned on the recruitment sites of all three countries, the appeal to patriotism is less prominent on the European sites than on their American counterparts, although it is featured in phrases such as "missions entrusted to the [French] Republic". The site of the French marine force differs somewhat from that of the *force de terre*, as it uses more pictures and videos; even these, however, convey technical information rather than emotional messages, without the use of music. In an inconspicuous place, "servir

son pays" is included among the reasons for recruits to enlist.[66] Thus, on the whole, the French force's idea of how volunteers should be best addressed differs remarkably from the British and American concepts; these differences also reflect the respective images of the army, of war, and of military volunteers in British, French, and American societies.

The analysis of volunteering, whether for a specific war or for a professional standing army, offers insights into the relationship between the military, the nation, and society in modern history that would remain hidden if one were to concentrate exclusively on conscription. By focusing on volunteers, the following contributions evaluate the scope of individual agency in different wars and societies, discuss changing images of war, and open new perspectives on conflicts within nations, on the status of minority groups and their hopes for war's potential to effect change, as well as on war experiences and commemoration. Closely linked in many cases to ideologies, especially to nationalism, war volunteering is an indicator of norms and values, and the study of volunteering also yields information about the translation of these norms and values into action. The comparative perspective opened by the contributions in this book aims to provide an incentive for further research.

Notes

1. Experiences of war are the main focus of the German Research Council's Collaborative Research Center at the University of Tübingen. The research centre provided the intellectual context in which this book originated, and in 2007 financed a conference on War Volunteering that laid the foundations for this volume. Studies on conscription, conscientious objection and desertion include, among others, D. J. Stoker et al. (eds) (2008) *Conscription in the Napoleonic Era: A Revolution in Military Affairs?* (New York); M. Koch (2008) *Fahnenfluchten: Deserteure der Wehrmacht im Zweiten Weltkrieg-Lebenswege und Entscheidungen* (Paderborn); J. Leonhard and U. v. Hirschhausen (eds) (2007) *Multi-ethnic Empires and the Military: Conscription in Europe between Integration and Disintegration, 1860–1918* (München); W. Benecke (2006) *Militär, Reform und Gesellschaft im Zarenreich* (Paderborn); C. Jahr (1998) *Gewöhnliche Soldaten: Desertion und Deserteure im deutschen und britischen Heer 1914–1918* (Göttingen); U. Frevert (2004) *A Nation in Barracks: Modern Germany, Military Conscription and Civil Society* (Oxford); A. Crépin (2005) *Défendre la France: les Français, la guerre et le service militaire, de la guerre de Sept ans à Verdun* (Rennes). It is also revealing that, in the indexes of important compendiums on the history of warfare, the term "conscription" is to be found while the term "volunteer" is not; see, for example, C. Townshend (ed.) (2005) *The Oxford History of Modern War*, new updated edn (Oxford); G. Parker (ed.) (2005) *The Cambridge History of Warfare* (Cambridge).

2. T. Hippler (2008) *Citizens, Soldiers and National Armies: Military Service in France and Germany, 1789–1830* (London), p. 1.
3. The first exaltation of the *Freikorps Lützow* was the poem "Lützows wilde Jagd" by Theodor Körner, a member of the corps and patriotic poet, written in early 1813, shortly before his death in battle. See T. Körner (1859) *Leyer und Schwert*, 9th edn (Berlin), pp. 57–9. It was put to music by one of the representatives of romanticism in German music, Carl Maria von Weber, in 1814, and achieved longstanding popularity in Germany. In the 1920s, Kurt Tucholsky published a satirical version, drawing parallels with the freecorps movement of the Weimar Republic, *Die Weltbühne*, 6, 9 February 1926, p. 210. For the history of black, red and gold see P. Reichel (2005) *Schwarz-Rot-Gold: kleine Geschichte deutscher Nationalsymbole nach 1945*, Lizenzausgabe der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (Bonn), pp. 15–31.
4. Crépin (2005); A. Forrest (1989) *Conscripts and Deserters: The Army and French Society during the Revolution and Empire* (New York); Hippler (2008); J. A. Lynn (2006) *The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France, 1791–94* (Oxford).
5. Planert (2007) *"Der Mythos vom Befreiungskrieg": Frankreichs Kriege und der deutsche Süden. Alltag-Wahrnehmung-Deutung 1792–1841* (Paderborn), p. 151. See also U. Planert (forthcoming) "Old or New? The French Wars: towards a concept of evolutionary change" in R. Chickering and S.Forster (eds) *Wars in an Age of Revolution: The Wars of American Independence and the French Revolution, 1775–1815* (Cambridge).
6. See P. Brandt (1995) "Einstellungen, motive und Ziele von Kriegsfreiwilligen, 1813–14: das Freikorps Lützow" in J. Dülffer (ed.) *Kriegsbereitschaft und Friedensordnung in Deutschland 1800–1814* (Münster), 211–33; K. Hagemann (2002) "Männlicher Muth und teutsche Ehre": *Nation, Militär und Geschlecht zur Zeit der antinapoleonischen Kriege Preußens* (Paderborn), 406–15; and, with a focus on Southern Germany, U. Planert (2007), 596–13. Only a few hints are given by A. Seyferth (2007), *Die Heimatfront 1870/71. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft im deutsch-französischen Krieg* (Paderborn).
7. See, for example, the classic J. M. McPherson (1997) *For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War* (New York).
8. P. Simkins (1988) *Kitchener's Army. The Raising of the New Armies, 1914–16*, (Manchester), p. xiv; see also J. M. Osborne (1982) *The Voluntary Recruiting Movement in Britain, 1914–16* (New York); W. J. Reader, (1988) *At Duty's Call: A Study in Obsolete Patriotism* (Manchester and New York); I. Beckett and K. Simpson (eds.) (1985) *A Nation in Arms: A Social Study of the British Army in the First World War* (Manchester); J. M. Winter (1986) *The Great War and the British People* (Cambridge, Mass.).
9. See, for example, N. Gullace (1987) "White Feathers and Wounded Men: Female Patriotism and the Memory of the Great War", *Journal of British Studies*, 36:2, 178–206; L. Bibbings (2003) "Images of Manliness: The Portrayal of Soldiers and Conscientious Objectors in the Great War", *Social and Legal Studies*, 12, 335–58.
10. A. Gregory (2003) "British 'War Enthusiasm' in 1914: A Reassessment" in G. Braybon (ed.) *Evidence, History and the Great War. Historians and the Impact of 1914–18* (New York and Oxford), 67–85; C. Pennell (2008) *A*

Kingdom United: British and Irish Popular Responses to the Outbreak of War, July to December 1914 (PhD thesis Dublin).

11. M. Erzberger (1914) *Die Mobilmachung* (Berlin), p. 4.
12. Thus, for example, the short overview given by B. Ziemann (2003) "Kriegsfreiwillige" in G. Hirschfeld (ed.) *Enzyklopädie Erster Weltkrieg* (Paderborn), 640ff. The limited scope of this article, which covers only British and German volunteers, is indicative of the state of research on volunteering in the First World War.
13. See, for example, G. L. Mosse (1990) *Fallen Soldiers*: *Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (New York).
14. B. Ulrich (1989) "Kriegsfreiwillige. Motivationen – Erfahrungen – Wirkungen" in Berliner Geschichtswerkstatt (ed.) *August 1914. Ein Volk zieht in den Krieg* (Berlin), 232–42; B. Ulrich (1992) "Die Desillusionierung der Kriegsfreiwilligen von 1914" in Wette, Wolfgang (ed.) *Der Krieg des kleinen Mannes. Eine Militärgeschichte von unten*, München, 110–26; J. Verhey (2001) *The Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth, and Mobilization in Germany* (Cambridge).
15. G. Grass (1999) *My Century*, translated by M. H. Heim (London), p. 20.
16. *Time Magazine*, 14 August 2006; *Telegraph*, 12 August 2006.
17. G. Grass (2008) *Peeling the Onion*, translated by M. H. Heim (London), p. 110.
18. See, for example, N. Yuval-Davis (2003) *Gender & Nation*, repr. (London); I. Blom et al. (eds.) (2000) *Gendered Nations: Nationalisms and Gender Order in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Oxford); Hagemann (2002); U. Frevert (1996) "Nation, Krieg und Geschlecht im 19. Jahrhundert" in M. Hettling and P. Nolte (eds) *Nation und Gesellschaft in Deutschland* (München), 151–70; U. Frevert (2006) "War" in S. Berger (ed.) *A Companion to Nineteenth-century Europe: 1789–1914* (Malden) 417–31.
19. See, for example, A. Summers (1988) *Angels and Citizens: British Women as Military Nurses, 1854–1914* (London); J. Quateart (2001) *Staging Philanthropy, Patriotic Women and the National Imagination in Dynastic Germany, 1813–1916* (Ann Arbor).
20. R. M. Dekker and L. C. van de Pol (1989) "Republican Heroines: Cross-Dressing Women in the French Revolutionary Armies", *History of European Ideas*, 10:3, 353–64; Hagemann (2002), p. 383–93.
21. See, for example, M. R. Higonnet et al. (eds.) (1987) *Behind the Lines. Gender and the Two World Wars* (New Haven); N. L. Goldman (ed.) (1982) *Female Soldiers – Combatants or Non-Combatants? Historical and Contemporary Perspectives* (Westport); M. H. Darrow (1996) "French Volunteer Nursing and the Myth of War Experience in World War I", *The American Historical Review*, 101, 80–106; U. Planert (2000) "Zwischen Partizipation und Restriktion. Frauenemanzipation und nationales Paradigma von der Aufklärung bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg" in D. Langewiesche and G. Schmidt (eds) *Föderative Nation. Deutschlandkonzepte von der Reformation bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg* (München), 387–428; Frevert (1996); D. Platz (2005) *We had been the Women's Army – Womens' Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC). Kriegserfahrungen von Frauen im Hilfsdienst der britischen Armee des Ersten Weltkrieges* (Frankfurt/Main).

22. U. Sieg (2008) *Jüdische Intellektuelle im Ersten Weltkrieg*, 2nd edn (Berlin); C. G. Krüger (2006) *Sind wir denn nicht Brüder?*(Paderborn), p. 53–65.
23. See W. St. Clair (1972) *That Greece Might Still Be Free. The Philhellenes in the War of Independence* (London).
24. See, for example, V. Brome (1994) *The International Brigades. Spain, 1936–1939* (London); K. Bradley and M. Chappel (1994) *International Brigades in Spain, 1936–1939* (London); P. N. Carrol (1994) *The Odyssey of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade: Americans in the Spanish Civil War* (Stanford); J. McLellan (2004) *Antifascism and Memory in East Germany: Remembering the International Brigades, 1945–1989* (Oxford).
25. See, for example, "*Volontaire*" (1765) in D. Diderot (ed.) *Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers par une société de gens de lettres. Mis en ordre et publ. par M. Diderot et quant à la partie mathématique par M. d'Alembert*, vol. 17 (Paris), 454; "Volunteers" (1771), in *Encyclopaedia Britannica: or, A Dictionary of Arts and Sciences*; 3 volumes, vol. 3: M–Z (Edinburgh), repr. Enyclopaedia Britannica, New York 1968, 928; "*Volontär*" (1801) in J. J. Adelung *Grammatisch-kritisches Wörterbuch der Hochdeutschen Mundart*, vol. 4 (Leipzig), 1237; "Volunteer" in Moore (1805) *The Midshipman's Or British Mariner's Vocabulary: Being a Universal Dictionary of Technical Terms and Sea Phrases Used in the Construction, Equipment, Management and Military Operations of a Ship*, 2nd edn (London).
26. "Volonteur, Voluntair, Freywilliger" (1746) in *Johann Heinrich Zedlers grosses vollständiges Universallexicon aller Wissenschaften und Künste*, vol. 50: Vo–Vrh (Leipzig) column 636.
27. "Soldat, Soldner, oder Söldner" (1743) in ibid., vol. 38: Sk–Spie, (Leipzig), column 415.
28. "Volontaire" in Diderot (1765).
29. "Mercenaire" in ibid., vol. 10, p. 369. Michael Sikora stresses in a recent article on the history of mercenarism that "mercenaries have always had a bad press" and quotes further literature on the negative image of the mercenary in early modern Europe. At the same time, however, he clarifies that the negative connotation of the term in itself and the moral condemnation of the mercenary only developed in the late modern period.M. Sikora (2003) 'Söldner. Historische Annäherung an einen Kriegertypus', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 29, 210–38, pp. 227, 230, cf. also S. Percy (2007) *Mercenaries:The History of a Norm in International Relations* (Oxford), pp. 14–67.
30. See, for example, J. E. Lendon (2007) "War and Society", in P. Sabin et al. (eds) *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare* (Cambridge), vol. 1: Greece, the Hellenistic world and the rise of Rome, 498–516, p. 499f.; L. A. Burckhardt (1996) *Bürger und Soldaten, Aspekte der politischen und militärischen Rolle athenischer Bürger im Kriegswesen des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* (Stuttgart), pp. 143f.
31. N. Machiavelli (1988) *The Prince*, ed. by Q. Skinner and R. Price (Cambridge), p. 44. Cf. M. E. Mallett *Mercenaries and Their Masters: Warfare in Renaissance Italy* (Totowa, NJ) 1974; cf. N. Machiavelli (2003) *The Art of War* translated, edited, and with a commentary by Christopher Lynch (Chicago and London).
32. See, for example, "Heerwesen" (1839) in K. W. Rotteck (ed.) *Staats-Lexikon oder Encyclopädie der Staatswissenschaften: In Verbindung mit vielen*

der angesehensten Publicisten Deutschlands, vol. 7 (Altona), 574–607, and "Conscription" (1836), in ibid., vol. 3, 732–56; cf. Crépin (2005).

33. "Soldaten" (1827) in *Allgemeine deutsche Real-Encyklopädie für die gebildeten Stände. Conversations-Lexikon* (Leipzig), 7th edn, vol. 10, 337–60, pp. 337–45. This article is also an example of how vague the concept of volunteers could be at that time: whereas the definition of a soldier is clearly opposed to the definition of a volunteer who fights for his fatherland without being paid, the article classifies mercenaries as volunteers.
34. "Soldaten" (1835) in *Neues rheinisches Conversations-Lexicon: Oder encyclopädisches Handwörterbuch für gebildete Stände* (Köln), 997–1008, p. 997.
35. "Mercenaire" in *Dictionnaire de la conversation et de la lecture* (1853–1860), 2nd edn, (Paris), vol. 13, 76.
36. "Volunteers" (1816) in *Encyclopaedia Perthensis, or Universal Dictionary of the Arts, Sciences, Literature, etc.: Intended to Supersede the Use of Other Books of Reference*, 2nd edn, vol. 23 (Edinburgh), 23.
37. See, for example, "Volontaires" (1838) in *Encyclopédie du dix-neuvième siècle: répertoire universel des sciences, des lettres et des arts, avec la biographie de tous les hommes célèbres*, vol. 25: Veg–Zyr, (Paris), 483; "Freiwillige, Volontärs" (1854) in *Herders Conversations-Lexikon. Kurze aber deutliche Erklärung von allem Wissenswerthen aus dem Gebiete der Religion, Philosophie, Geschichte, Geographie, Sprache, Literatur, Kunst, Natur- und Gewerbekunde, Handel, der Fremdwörter und ihrer Aussprache etc. etc.*, vol. 2: Cardatur–Fyt (Freiburg i.B.), 797.
38. "Freischaren" (1870) in H. J. Meyer (ed.) *Neues Konversationslexikon*, 2nd edn, vol. 7 (Hildburgshausen), 78.
39. "Mercenary" (1911) in *The Encyclopaedia Britannica*: *A Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, Literature and General Information*, 11th edn, vol. 18 (Cambridge), 150.
40. "Söldner" (1934) in *Der Große Brockhaus*, 15th edn, vol. 17: Schr–Spu (Leipzig), 513.
41. For example, "voluntariado" (1929) in: *Enciclopedia universal ilustrada europeo-americana: etimologias sanscrito, hebreo, griego, latin, árabe, lenguas indigenas americanas, etc.; versiones de la mayoria de las voces en frances, italiano, inglés, alemán, portugués, catalán, esperanto*, (Madrid), 1102–05, p. 1103; "Freiwillige" (1930) in *Der Große Brockhaus*, 15th edn, vol. 6: F–Gar, (Leipzig), 587; this distinction is only to be found in the late 20th century, for example "volunteers" (1961) in *Encyclopaedia Britannica: A New Survey of Universal Knowledge* (Chicago), 23, 252.
42. Entries for "soldiers" and "armies" address the history of volunteering much earlier; see, for example, "Heerwesen" (1839), in *Staats-Lexikon*; "Soldier" (1835) in *Neues rheinisches Conversations-Lexicon*.
43. C. Rousset (1870) *Les Volontaires, 1791–1794* (Paris); see also J. Leonhard (2008): *Bellizismus und Nation. Kriegsdeutung und Nationsbestimmung in Europa und den Vereinigten Staaten, 1750–1914* (München), p. 539–45.
44. "Volontaire" (1876) in P. Larousse (ed.) *Grand dictionnaire universel du XIXe siècle: francais, historique, géographique, mythologique, bibliographique, littéraire, artistique, scientifique, etc.* (Paris), 147f., column 1174.
45. "Mercenario" (1917) in *Enciclopedia universal ilustrada europeo-americana*, 823f., p. 824.

46. "Voluntariado" (1929) in ibid., p. 1103.
47. "Freiwillige" (1858) in *Pierer's Universal-Lexikon*, 4th edn, vol. 6: Europa–Gascogne, Altenburg, 699; "Volunteers" (1892) in *Chambers's Encyclopaedia: A Dictionary of Universal Knowledge for the People*, vol. 10: Swastika to Zyrianovsk and index (London), 510f.; "Volunteers" (1911) in *The Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th edn, vol. 28 (London), 208f.
48. L. Mertens (1986) "Das Privileg des Einjährig-Freiwilligen Militärdienstes im Kaiserreich und seine gesellschaftliche Bedeutung", *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* 39, 59–66; Frevert (2004) passim.
49. ' "Freiwillige" (1894) in *Brockhaus' Konversations-Lexikon*, 14th edn., vol. 7: Foscari–Gilboa (Leipzig), 279.
50. "Volunteers" (1892) in *Chambers' Encyclopaedia*, p. 510.
51. "Volontarî" (1937) in *Enciclopedia italiana di scienze, lettere ed arti*, vol. 35: Veg–Zyg (Milano), 560–62, p. 560.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid., p. 561.
54. "Freiwillige" (1938) in *Meyers Lexikon*, 8th edn (Leipzig), column 679–80.
55. For example, "Volunteers" (1962) in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*; "Freiwillige" (1973) in *Meyers Enzyklopädisches Lexikon*, 9th edn, vol. 9: Jf–Gel (Mannheim and Zürich), 403.
56. http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Volunteer&oldid=152499538, 15 October 2008.
57. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_volunteer, 15 October 2008; this is similar for the German version of Wikipedia, where the headword "Freiwillige" leads to a short entry on military volunteers and a much longer one on civic volunteers ("Ehrenamt"); http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freiwillige, 15 October 2008.
58. http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volontaire, 15 October 2008.
59. "Volunteers for the war", *The Economist*, 29 March 2003, 366:8317, p. 28.
60. P. Joenniemi (ed.) (2006) *The Changing Face of European Conscription*, Aldershot.
61. http://www.marines.com/main/index/winning_battles, 20 October 2008.
62. www.goarmy.com, 13 October 2008.
63. http://www.army.mod.uk/join/join.aspx, 13 October 2008.
64. http://www.recrutement.terre.defense.gouv.fr/contenu.do?rid=123, 13 October 2008. The analysis of recruitment webpages was carried out in 2008. In 2010, the focus on the 'battle' against unemployment is still an important message, but the recruitment pages have considerably changed and now include a range of films, more pictures and even music. There thus seems to be a trend towards more emotional messages, although there are still wide differences between the style and content of French and American recruitment pages. The earlier versions cited here can be accessed in the Bibliothèque Nationale de France.
65. http://www.defense.gouv.fr/terre/votre_espace/recrutement_et_formation/recrutement_armee_de_terre/l_armee_de_terre_au_caeur_de_la_bataille_pour_l_emploi, 13 October 2008.
66. http://www.marinerecrute.gouv.fr/decouvrez_notre_horizon/partagez_l_esprit_d_equipage/partagez_l_esprit_d _equipage|5.htm, 13 October 2008.

2

Volunteers of the French Revolutionary Wars: Myths and Reinterpretations

Thomas Hippler

In 1822, Goethe published an autobiographical account of the *Campaign in France in 1792*, which he had eye-witnessed from the camp of the coalition troops waging war against revolutionary France.[1] Even if it was written 30 years after the events,[2] Goethe's narrative nevertheless gives an excellent insight into the construction of the volunteer of the French Revolution as a mythical figure.[3] The French military was, in fact, the subject of many publications during the time of the revolutionary wars, and Goethe's account can be said to correspond with general interpretative tendencies among those writers who were moderately favourable to the revolutionary achievements.[4] The Prussian defeat in Valmy on 20 September was commented on by Goethe with the famous dictum "here and now a new era of world history has begun." The success of the French had proven the inefficiency and the anachronism of both the military and the political system of the *Ancien Régime*. But how did Goethe and his contemporaries view the volunteers of the French Revolution? The vision was actually quite contradictory. The volunteers embodied indiscipline, and thus the brute animalistic force of the rabble, since soldiers were identified with disciplined behaviour.[5] However, a heroic sense of honour was also recognized in their behaviour[6] as the consequence of their "political enthusiasm".[7] It was exactly the ambiguous combination of these two characteristics – heroic enthusiasm and indiscipline – that was considered to constitute their particular power.

From very early on, the volunteers of the French Revolution become the subject of political stylizations, inasmuch as they constituted an object of mythical identification for various political purposes. In particular, they were a historical phenomenon in which republicans of the

19th century could recognize themselves and represent their example as a model for the nation to follow. And the volunteers were indeed particularly well suited to be constituted as such mythical figures for a French Republican nationalism, as it became hegemonic during the last third of the 19th century.[8] The reason for this was their ideological polyvalence: they combined different attributes which permitted different political groups to recognize themselves in their example. First of all, volunteers were depicted as enthusiastic republicans and revolutionaries. At the same time, however, their revolutionary "enthusiasm" was tempered by the fact that they were soldiers committed to discipline, military hierarchy, and a sense of duty towards the state and the nation. Conservatives could easily recognize themselves in these qualities. Finally, the volunteers were quite clearly depicted according to Christian stereotypes: "These fraternal legions which spread from the earth in 92, who, without bread and without shoes, hurried towards the north, these heroes of patience [...] who acted out of duty, not for glory or profit..." – this description by Jules Michelet clearly permitted the association of the revolutionary volunteers with Christian virtues such as poverty, humility, and abnegation.[9] At the same time, however, Michelet gives a particular twist to this Christian image of the volunteers: "who dares to make an impious distinction between the army and the people? who is this soldier disguised with a uniform? He is our child."[10] Michelet's "us" clearly refers to the nation, and the nation is constructed as the parent of the soldier. At the same time, however, the parent and the child are but one and the same thing, and any attempt to separate them would be an impious endeavour. Michelet's readers certainly grasped the allusion to the Christian trinity and the implicit reference to the third term: the Holy Spirit, the nationalistic enthusiasm of which the volunteers were the perfect incarnation and which they transmitted to their republican heirs.

In this paper I want to address the construction of the volunteer of the French revolutionary wars as a mythical figure, as well as the deconstruction of this figure in subsequent historiography. I will first recall the essentials of the story of recruitment of "national volunteers" during the French Revolution. This section will be followed by a brief discussion of how historical writing during the 20th century has interpreted and reinterpreted this phenomenon. To start with, I will consider the classical "Jacobin" current of Revolutionist historiography, before turning to the reinterpretation by social historians since the 1970s. Finally, I will hint at possible reinterpretations in the light of a cultural history of the military.

The first step towards a call for volunteers to the colours was the formation of the National Guard in 1789.[11] Torn between the threefold threat of an endemic lack of discipline in the regular army, of popular insurrections, and of the peril of a counter-revolutionary attack by the monarchy, the third estate, which dominated the National Assembly, decided to arm its main supporters, the petty bourgeoisie of the capital.[12] From mid-July 1789 onwards, a *milice bourgeoise* was formed in Paris under the command of La Fayette.[13] Its prime objective was to assure public order in the capital;[14] however, many of its members were armed the same day through the looting of gunsmiths' shops, which demonstrates an interesting conception of public order.[15] Moreover, the guard was instrumental in the storming of the Bastille a couple of days later.[16]

During the early years of the revolution, the question of participation in the armed forces was most closely linked to the question of the definition of active citizenship and the right to vote. Active citizenship was reserved to males over 25 years old who were wealthy enough to pay a financial contribution that equalled the pay of three working days. Service in the National Guard was actually reserved to active citizens, because it was considered that only the wealthy had a material interest in upholding the social order; arming the poor meant jeopardizing a well-ordered society. However, before June 1790, there was no nationwide legislation about service in the National Guard, and the decision about who had the right and the duty to serve was made on a local level. In most cases, the lower strata of society were excluded, and command was in the hands of local leading citizens.[17] In June 1790, a year after their formation, a unified legal status was conferred on the guards.[18] Finally, the 1791 Constitution established a direct link between active citizenship and service in the National Guard: not only was membership in the guard limited to the active citizenry, but also enrolment in its registers became a necessary condition to hold active citizenship. The link between citizenship and military service thus worked in two different directions. As the right to vote for the National Assembly was also restricted to active citizens, the exercise of civic rights and military service became inseparable qualities of the census definition of citizenship.[19]

In late 1789, the National Assembly discussed the issue of military recruitment for the army.[20] On 16 December 1789, the Assembly decreed that "French troops, of all kinds of arms, other than National Guards and Militia, will be recruited by voluntary engagement."[21] Conscription was rejected in favour of voluntary recruitment. The final outcome of

the debate was an attempt to "moralize" the recruitment of the army, without changing its structure or the general patterns of staffing. A long term of service was maintained, as well as the possibility of engaging in the army at the age of sixteen. Moreover, foreign corps of troops were maintained, and soldiers lost their civic rights for as long as they served in the army. All these measures were aimed quite explicitly at keeping the armed forces at a certain distance from civil society.

This legislation, however, lasted for less than one year, and it was war that rendered it obsolete. The structure of France's armed forces changed considerably when the Assembly decided, in June 1791, to organize battalions of "national volunteers" out of the members of the National Guard. This measure had become necessary after the failure of the attempt to incorporate 100,000 "auxiliaries" by voluntary service.[22] The government felt the need to raise more troops since relations with the other European powers had deteriorated: in the spring of 1791 the Pope had condemned the "civil constitution of the clergy"; the King of Spain had concentrated troops on the French border; the governments of Prussia, Russia, and Sweden were working actively on a European coalition against revolutionary France.[23] At the same time, the Assembly received alarming reports on the situation of the army, stating that France would face considerable difficulties in sustaining a major war. A decree was therefore published stating that "in each department a free conscription of national guards of good will" was to be made, in order to mobilize 5 per cent of the guard.[24] The objective was to reinforce the line army with politically reliable volunteers. As only members of the National Guard were involved, the call for volunteers was implicitly addressed to active citizens only, even if the decree did not distinguish explicitly between active and passive citizens, mentioning only "citizens and sons of citizens."[25] Soldiers were given the right to elect their officers and non-commissioned officers, and the decree affirmed clearly that these measures were limited to a time when "the situation of the state required an extraordinary service." For such an extraordinary military body, the forms of organization and military discipline obviously needed to differ considerably from those in force in the line army. In this respect the most important feature was certainly the question of officering. In 1791, the call to the colours was matched, at least partly, by the revolutionary ardour of the population, as many ego-documents from the period clearly display. Mony-Baudot, "captain" of a revolutionary society, wrote in October 1791: "We were in exhilaration: this is when the soul grows larger and one is penetrated by the truth that it is sweet and glorious to die for the fatherland."[26]

The situation in the army became even more critical after the declaration of war on 20 April 1792 and the emigration of many officers of noble birth.[27] This was the context in which the revolutionary government reiterated its call for volunteers. In the late 18th century, military operations were still conducted following a seasonal schedule and levies usually took place in spring. In contrast to the 1791 levy, which was arguably supported by revolutionary enthusiasm, the levy of 1792 was entirely imposed by government.[28] With the declaration of the "fatherland in danger" in early July 1792, every member of the National Guard who was able to carry arms was declared to be in "permanent activity".[29]

Moreover, military needs continued to grow. Despite its positive appreciation of the considerable efforts made by the country, the government decided on 24 February 1793 to raise another 300,000 men. This may be considered as the culmination of all such attempts made since 1791, as well as their contradictions. On the one hand, the decree about the "levy of 300,000 men" applied to all citizens, active and passive alike, and established a universal military requisition, even though replacement was allowed, so that the person designed for service had the right to provide a substitute. On the other hand, the military obligation was not conceived of as a direct consequence stemming from the quality of citizenship; rather, each individual was counted as a member of a community that was required to furnish a certain number of soldiers. The levy of 300,000 men was thus clearly along the same lines as the militia requirements in the *Ancien Régime*.

The evolution of military institutions and recruitment practices between 1791 and 1793 could thus give rise to quite different narratives. Nineteenth-century conservatives would insist on the "anarchic" character of the revolutionary enlistments, which jeopardized not only France's military strength, but also her internal security.[30] A mainstream interpretation, however, insisted on the progressive development towards a universal military service, which came later to be associated with the very essence of French republicanism.[31] And the role of the volunteers obviously turned out to be pivotal for ideological purposes, since they functioned as a historical proof that there had been a spontaneous popular movement in favour of the revolutionary wars. Could one not interpret the setting-up of conscription as being in continuity with the militia requirements of the *Ancien regime*? Was it not possible to denounce compulsory military service as "military slavery", the very opposite of political liberty? These were exactly the kind of arguments made by conservatives opposed to conscription. Thus, the Count

of Liancourt had already declared during the 1789 debate on military service that he was "astonished to see that liberty [was] invoked to support the hardest and the broadest of slavery"[32] – "it would be a hundred times better to live in Constantinople or in Morocco than in a country in which laws of this kind are in force."[33] Bonald and Chateaubriand added that conscription was at the same time democratic and despotic in character, whereas only a constitutional monarchy was able to guarantee political liberty.[34] While legitimists such as Bonald and Chateaubriand insisted on the link between military conscription and despotism, liberals and Orléanists insisted instead on another feature, which had been developed by thinkers such as Tocqueville and would serve as a historical underpinning of 20th-century reinterpretations of the French Revolution, especially in the works of François Furet and his followers. In his book *L'Ancien regime et la Révolution*, Tocqueville had developed the thesis that the French Revolution should be interpreted in continuity with the development of society and the state under the rule of French absolutism.[35] One could easily apply this analysis to the question of the military and argue that conscription – which was to become a cornerstone of the French understanding of republicanism – was in reality a legacy of absolutism.[36]

Reference to the volunteers of the French Revolution was used most effectively by the republican tradition to counter both arguments: the conservatives' and legitimists' assimilation of democracy and despotism and the liberals' and Orléanists' insistence on the continuity of state-construction. Referring to the volunteers of the French Revolution made it possible to pose the issue not in the pragmatic terms of liberty vs. constraint, nor in terms of institutional continuity of military obligations, but rather in terms of the popular will. The volunteers were, so to speak, the living demonstration that Rousseau's political theory was applicable; they were the incarnation of the "general will". They were an ideological cornerstone of the construction of French republicanism.

This republican understanding actually took shape under the Second Empire of Napoleon III. Points of view very similar to those of Michelet, though written in a much more prosaic style, can be found in another seminal work on the army of the revolution, Charles Louis Chassin's *L'armée et la Révolution* of 1867. Unsurprisingly, Chassin was a republican and a peace activist, who was engaged in the liberal-democratic "League for Peace and Liberty".[37] According to Chassin's depiction, revolutionary fervour was omnipresent, and people from all over France rushed to the colours in order to defend the revolutionary nation against the allied forces of despotism. The moral force of the French nation was thus able

to overcome material shortages and a lack of fire-weapons. The battle of Valmy was, therefore, not only a victory of one army over another: it was "the triumph of one principle against the opposite principle",[38] the triumph of the force of a nation and a people against the "mercenary armies" of the *Ancien Régime*.

However, these historians were not only nationalists but also republicans, and the agent of their narratives is thus not only a nation but more precisely "*le peuple*". As Hannah Arendt remarked, "The words *le* peuple are the key words for every understanding of the French Revolution, and their connotations were determined by those who were exposed to the spectacle of the people's sufferings, which they did themselves not share. For the first time, the word covered more than those who did not participate in government, not the citizens but the low people."[39] This amalgamation of the people as the whole of a nation and the people as the lower strata of society was successfully exploited by republicans, and later by socialists. The most important example is certainly the socialist leader Jean Jaurès and his book *L'armée nouvelle* of 1910, in which he tried to deduce lessons for France's military policy from her revolutionary past.[40]

A certain intellectual and institutional setting reinforces this historiographical view of the volunteers. The legacy of the French Revolution became politically pivotal after the foundation of the Third Republic, for which the Revolution became the essential point of reference, especially since the 1880s. The Republican tradition thus sought inspiration and ideological support in a tradition that has been constantly reinvented ever since.[41] In contrast, there was a consistent tendency for the various strands of French monarchism – legitimists and Orléanists – to discredit the legacy of the revolution. It was in this context that the chair for the history of the French Revolution was founded at Sorbonne University in 1885. Alphonse Aulard, who held the post from its inception until his retirement in 1921, was a republican and a socialist.[42] Moreover, he was the founder of an intellectual network of historians of the French Revolution that instigated the study of this period according to modern standards of "scientific" history. Aulard and his followers formed what was termed a "Jacobin" historiography, which was committed to the political left, as well as to a republican nationalism. In this respect, republican historians subscribed to the revolutionaries' own view of themselves: with the revolution, France had become the fatherland of human rights and of democracy. The aims and interests of the French nation were thus the aims and interests of humanity as opposed to the aims and interests of aristocratic oppression.

This was the ideological and institutional setting in which much of the early historiography on the subject was produced. According to socialist historian Albert Mathiez, writing in 1916, the volunteers were almost exclusively "des gens du peuple", whereas the bourgeoisie preferred to pay substitutes.[43] The war effort of the nation was thus in reality made by the lower strata of society. Whereas the bourgeoisie manipulated the ideals of the nation for their own class-interests, the true nation was incarnated in the heroic abnegation of those volunteers from the lower classes.[44] The interpretation by Albert Soboul is certainly more subtle than Mathiez' reading during the First World War; the basic framework of interpretation, however, remains the same. Soboul was a member of the French Communist Party from 1939 until his death in 1982, and his interpretation of the volunteers can be read in accordance with his political commitment.[45] Like Mathiez, Soboul emphasizes the fact that many "passive citizens", that is, people from the lower strata, enlisted in the volunteer battalions, thus creating "an armed force emanating directly from the nation, for whom *patrie* and revolution merged".[46] In some places the revolutionary *élan* was "remarkable", whereas in others "particular advantages" were needed in order to attract volunteers. The final outcome of the mobilization, however, was an original invention of the French Revolution, which was institutionalized under "popular pressure": the *nation armée*. Soboul concludes that "the organization of the armed sections reflected one of the most essential claims of the people: the power of arms constitutes one of the attributes of sovereignty, the sovereign people has to be armed."[47] The analysis thus proceeds in two steps. At the beginning was the spontaneous political action of the volunteers. Sociologically speaking, they came from the lower classes of society. In a second step, the revolutionary state followed their example by institutionalizing their action. The outcome was a compulsory military service.

A decisive shift in the historiography of the military of the French Revolution took place at the end of the 1970s. Within France, the most important event was the publication in 1979 of Jean-Paul Bertaud's *thèse* on the army of the French Revolution.[48] This work signalled the beginning of a social history of the soldiers of the French Revolution. Bertaud was the first author to systematically consider the social composition of the line army, the volunteer battalions, and the officer corps. One year earlier, Samuel F. Scott had already published a study about the regular army and its reaction to the Revolution.[49] However, Bertaud's work turned out to be more important for the subsequent historiography on the topic. On the one hand, he was capable of undoing a

certain number of myths about the revolutionary army. In particular, his work shed new light on the composition of the volunteer units of the army of the French Revolution. On the other hand, he instigated a certain number of studies that analysed the army of the Revolution in more detail, at the level of a particular *département*, whereas his own work looked at the army as a whole.[50]

Institutionally and intellectually close to the "Jacobin" school of historiography, Bertaud's approach as a social historian of military mobilization nevertheless contributed to further undoing a certain number of nationalistic myths concerning the volunteers of the French Revolution. Within the historiography of the French Revolution, a singular fate has thus been reserved for the study of the military. The historiography of the French Revolution as a whole can be summarized as a development in three steps. First was the hegemony of a Marxist paradigm of interpretation, which is associated with the names of Albert Mathiez (1874–1932), Georges Lefebve (1874–1959), Albert Soboul (1914–1982), Michel Vovelle (born in 1933) and their followers. Institutionally, this strand was established at the *Institut d'histoire de la Révolution française* at the Sorbonne. Second, this paradigm was challenged by the "revisionist school". The first attack on the Marxist interpretation was François Furet's and Denis Richet's *History of the French Revolution* (1965),[51] but the main work of this strand was undoubtedly Furet's *Interpreting the French Revolution*, which was first published in France in 1978.[52] Apart from François Furet (1927–1997) and Denis Richet (1927–1989), Mona Ozouf (born 1931) and British historian Alfred Cobban (1901–1968) can be counted as the major protagonists of this strand. Institutionally, this strand can be located at the *École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales* (*EHESS*). The Revisionists criticized two major assumptions of the classical Marxist paradigm: according to them, the French Revolution cannot be interpreted as a class struggle between a rising bourgeoisie and a conservative nobility; rather, it has to be considered as but one moment within a continuous movement of state-construction in French history. Third, a recent historiography has reconsidered certain questions in the light of a new paradigm of cultural history. Without necessarily putting into question the findings of social or political historians, the issue of cultural and political signification has moved to the centre of the stage. I will come back to this approach at the end of this chapter.

Concerning the historiography of the military in general and of military recruitment in particular, it is remarkable that the work of Bertaud and his followers actually played a similar role to that of the revisionists in other fields. This point needs to be stressed, since Bertaud can clearly

be identified as belonging to the "Jacobin" school. Until his retirement Bertaud was teaching at the Sorbonne; he was a member of networks of the "Jacobin" historiography, such as the "Société d'études robespierristes", and editing director of the society's journal, the *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*.

In his seminal work on the *Army of the French Revolution*, Bertaud was the first to systematically take into consideration the administrative records (*contrôles de troupes*) that the military administration kept, in theory, for each single soldier and volunteer. More than a thousand of these records have survived, containing information about the volunteers' age, geographical origin, profession, former military engagement, physical abilities, and so on. These sources are obviously of incomparable wealth for the social history of the soldiers and volunteers of the French Revolution.[53] The resulting thorough social analysis had an important impact on the understanding of the volunteers as a social phenomenon.

In particular, Bertaud convincingly showed that the structure of the standing army was changing profoundly between 1790 and 1792. The army was not exempt from the political crisis that affected the whole of France, and many soldiers deserted or emigrated during the early years of the Revolution. Others, in turn, newly enlisted. The outcome was that in 1792 more than a third of the rank and file had served for less than one year. This meant that traditional norms of instruction, and above all of military discipline, became more difficult to establish.[54] In addition to this, the composition of the officer corps changed profoundly, since many noble professional soldiers resigned and were replaced by common non-commissioned officers, many of whom had very limited military experience.[55] The result of this analysis was striking, because it turned out that the volunteers strongly resembled the soldiers in the regular army. Generally, both volunteers and soldiers of the regular army were very young men. According to Bertaud, 79 per cent of them were younger than 25.[56] In the Ain department 249 out of 544 soldiers raised in 1791 were younger than 20.[57] As to their social and professional origin, many of them were artisans or journeymen.[58] Since the legal framework stated that only members of the National Guard ought to be considered, the volunteers of the 1791 levy were traditionally considered to have been of bourgeois origin.[59] Regional studies, however, have shown that there were great differences among the regions in this regard; the legal dispositions were often not respected, and it seems that the social composition of these forces was more modest than it should have been according to the legal standards.[60] Geographically speaking,

a large proportion of the volunteers came from urban areas, particularly from those in which the economic crisis was at its worst.[61] Moreover, local authorities were often very lenient towards those who wished to enrol in these battalions, despite the legal dispositions. In the Seine-et-Marne department, soldiers were even paid by the local authorities before the Ministry of War deposited the necessary sums, in order to assure that the soldiers, most of whom did not possess any wealth, could survive until the pay arrived. This fact demonstrates clearly that drafting of combatants from popular strata was sometimes even encouraged by the authorities. One reason for this may have been the wish to get rid of a certain number of individuals who might potentially become involved in social conflicts.[62] Rather than depicting heroic defenders of the fatherland who were animated by the purest idealism and abnegation of the self, the social history of military conscription individuated a sort of *Lumpenproletariat* that joined the army in order to escape from economic misery and social unrest.

In exactly the same vein, social historians became interested in two other phenomena: the issue of discipline on the one hand, and of desertion and refusal of military service (*insoumission*) on the other. In both respects, an internal tension between the methods of social history and the ideological orientation of the authors becomes visible. Bertaud had already stressed the fact that military discipline was a delicate issue within the army of the Revolution: the volunteers were often not inclined to bow to an absolute and "passive obedience" as practised within professional armies. However, according to Bertaud, "in the school of war the volunteers understood the necessity of a willingly accepted discipline."[63] These passages confirm that Bertaud belonged to the "Jacobin" tradition of historiography. The outcome of the conflict between the "undisciplined" volunteers and the authoritarianism of military life is depicted as a synthesis that combines the best of the two worlds: liberty and military discipline thus coexist in the Jacobins' "willingly accepted discipline".

The seminal work on desertion, by British historian Alan Forrest, was published in 1989.[64] It was followed by a couple of other, more detailed, analyses that concentrated on one particular *département*.[65] These studies highlighted the fact that the desertion rates were extraordinarily high: up to 50 per cent of the soldiers deserted. There was little difference between the volunteers and soldiers in the regular army in this respect. In addition, deserters enjoyed at least tacit, if not active, support from their home communities. In other words, these studies showed that civil society was in many cases overtly hostile to the military demands of the

state. Though not surprising in themselves, these findings nevertheless further invalidated a republican reading of conscription as the very essence of citizenship. In spite of this difficulty, attempts were made to reconcile the two aspects. Frédéric Rousseau, for instance, after having shown in some detail the extent of refusal of military service and of desertion at the beginning of the 19th century, explains the decline of the desertion rate as a continuous process of patriotic education, and indeed as the awakening of a "national consciousness of the French people during the 19th century".[66] This last example clearly emphasizes a typical feature of revolutionist historiography in France. In comparison, for instance, with the recent historiography of the German "wars of national liberation" of 1813–15, it is clear that the undoing of nationalistic myths by German historiographers has been much more rigorous. From the publication of Rudolf Ibbekens' important study of the Prussian reform period in 1970[67] to recent works by Ute Frevert,[68] Karen Hagemann,[69] Ute Planert[70] and others, the deconstruction of the wars of national liberation in general, and the action of the German volunteers in particular, has been approached with a sometimes surprising amount of zeal. French historiographers, by contrast, seem much more hesitant to harshly criticize great national narratives such as the role of the volunteers of the French Revolution.

This can be interpreted as a greater persistence of nationalistic orientation among French historians, especially compared with German historiography. However, there is another possible interpretation at which I would like to hint in conclusion.

If one looks at the Anglo-Saxon literature on the French Revolution, it appears that, following the two paradigms of interpretation mentioned above – the Jacobin-Marxist approach and the revisionist school – a third current has recently emerged. Following a general trend among the historical profession, issues of cultural history have become more and more important, to the point of constituting a third paradigm of interpretation.[71] To cite but one example, Lynn Hunt's works, such as *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution* of 1984, or *The Family Romance of the French Revolution* of 1992, combine different approaches – from social to intellectual history, from collective mentalities to representations, literature, and law – in an overall framework of "political culture".[72] With regard to French historiography, this threefold structure of Jacobin-Marxist, revisionist, and cultural historiography seems much less pertinent, since both "Jacobins" and "Revisionists" began taking political culture into account early on. Michel Vovelle, one of the uncontested leading figures of the "Jacobin school", is the

author of seminal works on dechristianization[73] and on revolutionary mentalities,[74] whereas Mona Ozouf, one of the leading figures of the "revisionists", is the author of a classic work on revolutionary festivals.[75] Accordingly, cultural history, in the French context, has not constituted itself as a paradigm willing to challenge former paradigms of historical understanding. The very term "cultural history" refers to a set of cultural objects – mentalities, images, festivities, theatre, literature, or the like – rather than to a theoretically sustained approach. This is an important difference from "cultural history" as it is practised in the Anglo-Saxon and in the German contexts, for instance. As a result of this intellectual configuration, a certain number of questions have not yet been posed by French historical scholarship. In particular, the very rich records of ego-documents – both published and unpublished – have not yet been granted the attention they deserve.[76] Reopening these records, and interpreting them in the light of the cultural construction of political and social meanings, would enable historians to ask questions about a multitude of issues, including the political signification of the volunteers' experience in terms of a new definition of citizenship and political participation.

Notes

1. The Duke of Weimar, who was Goethe's employer and who commanded a regiment during the campaign, probably wanted Goethe to participate as an "embedded" writer for propaganda purposes. See K. O. Conrady (1994) *Goethe: Leben und Werk* (München) esp. pp. 559–73.
2. W. v. Bredow (1999) "Goethe in Valmy" in J. Kunisch and H. Münkler (eds.) *Die Wiedergeburt des Krieges aus dem Geist der Revolution: Studien zum bellizistischen Diskurs des ausgehenden 18. und beginnenden 19. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot) pp. 113–30.
3. The army of the French Revolution must be distinguished from the French "Revolutionary Army" (*armée révolutionnaire*): this latter was not properly an army, but rather an "instrument of terror" in the domestic realm. On the "revolutionary army" see R. Cobb (1961–1963) *Les armées révolutionnaires, instrument de la Terreur dans les départements (avril 1793 – floréal an II)* (Paris and La Haye) 2 vols. Originally written in French, Cobb's main work was subsequently translated into English as *The People's Armies, The Armées Révolutionnaires:. Instrument of the Terror in the Departments April 1793 to Floréal Year II*, tr. by Marianne Elliott (New Haven and London) 1987.
4. See E. Schneider (1983) Das Bild der Französischen Revolutionsarmee (1792–1795) in der zeitgenössischen Publizistik in J. Voss (ed.), *Deutschland und die Französische Revolution* (München and Zürich) pp. 194–213.
5. Anonymous (1794) *Die Frankenrepublik: Briefe über Frankreichs gegenwärtigen Zustand und den Feldzug von 1793 mit besonderer Rücksicht auf das Elsaß, von einem Augenzeugen* (Wihout place) p. 107.

6. J. W. v. Goethe (1949) *Kampagne in Frankreich 1792,* in: *Sämtliche Werke* (Artemis-Gedenkausgabe) (Zürich) vol. 12, pp. 262 and 264/65 (30 August and 3 September).
7. Anonymous [Samuel Christoph] (1984) *Über den Feldzug der Preußen gegen die Nordarmee der Neufranken im Jahre 1793. Von einem Beobachter, welcher die jetzigen Feldzüge der verbündeten deutschen Heere mitmacht* reprint (Bad Honnef), originally Stendal 1794, p. 385.
8. See A. Forrest (2004) "L'armée de l'an II: la levée en masse et la création d'un mythe républicain", *Annales historiques de la Révolution française* 335, http://ahrf.revues.org/1385, accessed 2 February 2010.
9. J. Michelet (1878) *Les soldats de la Révolution* (Paris), p. 76.
10. *Ibid*. p. 281.
11. On the French national guard, see S. Bianchi and R. Dupuy (eds.) (2006), *La Garde nationale entre nation et peuple en armes: mythes et réalités* (Rennes).
12. See J. Godechot (1965) *La prise de la Bastille* (Paris).
13. For the following paragraph see T. Hippler (2008) *Citizens, Soldiers and National Armies: Military Service in France and Germany* (London) pp. 47–69.
14. *Le Moniteur* du 14 Juillet 1789.
15. *Archives Nationales* D IV 46, n° 708.
16. A.Soboul (1982) *La Révolution française* (Paris) p. 152.
17. Arches (1986) "Aspects sociaux de quelques gardes nationales au début de la Révolution", *Actes du congrès national des sociétés savants* (Rouen and Caen) 255–66.
18. Décret du 12 juin 1790, *Archives parlementaires*, 16, pp. 14–15.
19. Article 1, Section II, Chapitre Premier, Titre III, see J. Godechot (ed.) (1979) *Les constitutions de la France depuis 1789* (Paris) p. 40.
20. For an analysis of the 1789–1790 debate on military recruitment, see T. Hippler, (2002) "Service militaire et intégration nationale pendant la Révolution française", *Annales Historiques de la Révolution Française* 329, 1–16.
21. *Le Moniteur* n° 116, 2, p. 400.
22. Cardenal (1911), *Du service par enrôlement volontaires au service obligatoire et personnel (Etude sur le recrutement de l'armée de 1789 à l'an VI)* (Paris) p. 16.
23. Soboul (1982), pp. 219–21.
24. Décret relatif à une conscription libre de gardes nationales de bonne volonté dans la proportion de un sur vingt, in E. Déprez (ed.) (1908), *Les volontaires nationaux (1791–1793): Etude sur la formation et l'organisation des bataillons d'après les archives communales et départementales* (Paris) p. 100.
25. Décret mettant la garde nationale en activité et réglant la formation des compagnies et des bataillons, ainsi que la solde des officiers et volontaires, *ibid*. pp. 100–101.
26. E. Maury (ed.) (1901) *Lettres de volontaires républicains (1791–1794)* (Troyes).
27. Between mid-September and the beginning of December 1792, some 2,169 officers emigrated, many of them joining the émigré army in Germany; see S. F. Scott (1978) *The Response of the Line Army to the French Revolution* (Oxford) p. 109.
28. The 1792 levies appeared to be somewhat confusing. This mirrors the fact that the government oscillated between various options to reassert its social basis. After having decreed the raising of 100,000 auxiliary soldiers, which turned out to be a difficult endeavour, the government ordered the creation of "legions" of mobile troops (*troupes légères*) and of "frank companies"

(*compagnies franches*), and tried to form soldiers into these corps. On the political level, however, the formation of units of "Federates" turned out to be even more important.

29. Décret qui fixe les mesures à prendre quand la Patrie est en danger, Déprez (1908) pp. 208–10.
30. See, for instance, A. de Chamborant de Perissat (1875) *L'armée de la Révolution: Ses généraux et ses soldats 1789–1871* (Paris).
31. See A. Crépin (1998) *La conscription en débat ou le triple apprentissage de la nation, de la citoyenneté, de la République (1798–1889)* (Arras).
32. *Le Moniteur* n° 116, 2, p. 397.
33. Liancourt (1789) *Opinion sur le mode de recrutement pour l'armée Par M. le Duc de Liancourt, député de Clermont en Beauvoisis* (Paris) p. 7.
34. See Chateaubriand (1818) *Opinion de M. le vicomte de Chateaubriand, Sur le projet de loi relatif au recrutement de l'armée* (Paris) p. 3; Bonald (1818), *Opinion de M. de Bonald, député de l'Aveyron, Sur le projet de loi relatif au recrutement de l'armée* (Paris) pp. 14–15; for an analysis of the 1818 debate on conscription in which these arguments were developed see T. Hippler (2006) "Conscription in the French Restoration: The 1818-Debate on Military Service", *War in History*, 13:3, pp. 218–98.
35. A. de Tocqueville (1966), *The Ancien Regime and the French Revolution*, tr. by Stuart Gilbert (London).
36. For the French understanding of a republican nation see R.Brubaker (1992) *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge and London).
37. See M. Sarfatti (1981) *La nascita del moderno pacifismo democratico ed il Congrès international de la paix di Ginevra nel 1867* (Milan).
38. Ch. L. Chassin (1867) *L'armée et la Révolution* (Paris) p. 143.
39. H. Arendt (1990) *On Revolution* (London) p. 75.
40. J. Jaurès (1992) *L'armée nouvelle*, reprint (Paris) 2 vols.
41. See E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (1984) *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge).
42. G. Belloni (1949) *Aulard, historien de la Révolution française* (Paris).
43. On Mathiez, see J. Friguglietti (1974) *Albert Mathiez, historien révolutionnaire (1874–1932)* (Paris).
44. "Presque partout aussi, les enrôlés étaient des gens du people. La levee de 1792 ne comprit que très peu de bourgeois. Ceux-ci se faisait remplacer en masse. Ils étaient la classe dirigeante et dominatrice. Le people les suivit parce qu'ils surent confondre leur intérêt de classe avec l'intérêt national. La résistance des volontaires de Valmy devant la vieille armée prussienne, obligee de reculer, étonna le monde. Leur intrépidité à l'assaut des redoutes autrichiennes devant Mons, à Jemappes, fut la prevue éclatante de la supériorité de l'armée nationale sur l'armée mercenaire." A. Mathiez (1916) *La victoire en l'an II: Équisses historiques sur la défense nationale* (Paris) pp. 78–9.
45. On Soboul see C. Mazauric (2004) *Un historien en son temps, Albert Soboul (1914–1982). Essai de biographie morale et intellectuelle* (Nérac).
46. A. Soboul (1959) *Les soldats de l'an II* (Paris) p. 75.
47. *Ibid*. 82–6.
48. J. P. Bertaud (1988) *The Army of the French Revolution: From Citizen Soldiers to Instrument of Power*, tr. by R. R. Palmer (Princeton), initially published as *La Révolution armée: Les soldats-citoyens et la Révolution française*, Paris: Robert Laffont, 1979.

49. See Scott (1978).
50. See in particular A. Crépin (1989) *Levées d'hommes et esprit public en Seine-et-Marne de la Révolution à la fin de l'Empire (1791–1815)*: Doctorat nouveau régime sous la direction de Monsieur le Professeur Michel Vovelle (Dissertation Université de Paris 1). Only the first part of this massive dissertation has recently been published: A. Crépin (2008) *Révolution et armée nouvelle en Seine-et-Marne (1791–1797)* (Paris).
51. F. Furet and D. Richet (1992) *The French Revolution*, tr. by Stephen Hardman (London) initially published as *La révolution*, Paris: Hachette, 1965, 2 vols.
52. F. Furet (1981) *Interpreting the French Revolution*, tr. by Elborg Forster (Cambridge) initially published as *Penser la Révolution française*, Paris: Gallimard, 1978.
53. See Bertaud (1988), appendix 1: A Note on Archival Sources, pp. 355–66.
54. *Ibid*. p. 63–4.
55. *Ibid*. pp. 63–4 and 72.
56. *Ibid*. p. 53.
57. J. M. Lévy (without date) *La formation de la première armée de la Révolution française: L'effort militaire et les levées d'hommes dans le département de l'Ain en 1791*, Thèse de doctorat 3ème cycle, Ecole Pratiques des Hautes Etudes – IVème section, p. 115.
58. Bertaud (1988), p. 54.
59. Soboul, (1959) p. 69.
60. "La levée de 1791 est une levée d'hommes jeunes, voire très jeunes et surtout d'un niveau social modeste, alors que cette levée a été considérée, en général, comme une levée bourgeoise. [...] La majorité des enrôlés se compose d'artisans ruraux et urbains et la plupart ont le rang de compagnons. [...] Ceux qui, en effet, travaillent dans les branches en crise fournissent 35% du total des enrôlés." Crépin (1989) pp. 69–70.
61. P. G. Jacquot (1980) *Les Bataillons de volontaires en Haute-Marne (1791–1799)*, Thèse soutenue à l'Université de Dijon, UER de Sciences Humaines, pp. 84–94. Jacquot, too, stresses the relatively modest social origins of the soldiers (p. 94).
62. Crépin (1989) p. 83.
63. Bertaud (1988), p. 57.
64. A. Forrest (1989) *Concripts and Deserters: The Army and French Society during the Revolution and Empire* (New York and Oxford).
65. L. Bergès (2002) *Résister à la conscription, 1798–1814: le cas des départements aquitains* (Paris) and F. Rousseau (1998) *Service militaire au 19e siècle: . de la résistance à l'obéissance: un siècle d'apprentissage de la patrie dans le département de l'Hérault* (Montpellier).
66. Rousseau (1998) p. 193.
67. R. Ibbeken (1970) *Preußen 1807–1813 : Staat und Volk als Idee und in Wirklichkeit (Darstellung und Dokumentation)* (Köln).
68. U. Frevert (2004) *A Nation in Barracks: Modern Germany, Military Conscription and Civil Society* (Oxford).
69. K. Hagemann (2002) *"Mannlicher Muth und Teutsche Ehre': Nation, Militär und Geschlecht zur Zeit der Antinapoleonischen Kriege Preussens* (Paderborn).
70. U. Planert (2007) *Der Mythos vom Befreiungskrieg: Frankreichs Kriege und der deutsche Süden: Alltag-Wahrnehmung-Deutung (1792–1841)* (Paderborn).

71. For a discussion of the paradigms of interpretation see, for instance, J. M. Smith, (2000) "Social Categories, the Language of Patriotism, and the Origins of the French Revolution: The Debate over Noblesse commerçante", *Journal of Modern History*, 72, 339–74; and J. Shovlin (2000) "Toward a Reinterpretation of Revolutionary Antinoblilism: The Political Economy of Honor in the Old Regime", *Journal of Modern History*, 72, 35–66.
72. Other examples of this current include Sergio Luzzatto's works, such as (1994) *L'autunno della rivoluzione: lotta e cultura politica nella Francia del Termidoro* (Torino) and (2000) *Il Terrore ricordato: memoria e tradizione dell'esperienza rivoluzionaria*, (2n ed. Torino) or D. Schöpflug (2003) *Der Weg in die Terreur: Radikalisierung und Konflikte im Straßburger Jakobinerclub 1790–1794* (München).
73. M. Vovelle (1976) *Religion et Révolution: la déchristianisation de l'an II* (Paris).
74. M. Vovelle (1986) *La Mentalité révolutionnaire: société et mentalités sous la Révolution française* (Paris).
75. M. Ozouf (1988) *Festivals and the French Revolution*, tr. by Alan Sheridan (Cambridge and London); originally published as *La Fête révolutionnaire, 1789–1799*, Paris: Gallimard, 1976.
76. In the British context, Alan Forrest has been working in this direction; see his (2002) *Napoleon's Men: The Soldiers of the Revolution and Empire* (London and New York) as well as A. Forrest, K. Hagemann and J. Rendall (eds.) (2008) *Soldiers, Citizens, Civilians: Experiences and Perceptions of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1790–1820* (Basingstoke). Some hints can also been found in Hippler (2008). pp. 97–102.

3

For the Fatherland? The Motivations of Austrian and Prussian Volunteers during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars

Leighton S. James

"Leb' wohl! leb' wohl!/ Mit dumpfen Herzensschlägen";[1] these were the opening lines, taken from Theodor Körner's poem *Abschied von Wien*, in Carl Ernst Eduard Pfitzner's diary of his military service in the war of 1815. On 16 June 1815 Napoleon had won what was to be his final military victory. He had returned in triumph from his exile on Elba in March, and, after gathering his forces, struck at the Allies in Belgium. While Marshall Ney held Wellington's army at Quatre Bras, Napoleon attacked and inflicted a heavy defeat on the Prussian army under General Blücher at Ligny. Four days earlier, Carl Ernst Eduard Pfitzner had begun his journey from Königsberg to Berlin. News of Napoleon's return had spread quickly in the German states, and Pfitzner, determined to volunteer for the new war against the French, served as a ranger (*Jäger*) in the Prussian army despatched to France.

Pfitzner actually saw very little combat. By the time the Prussian reinforcements arrived in France, Napoleon had already been defeated at Waterloo. Despite this, Pfitzner's quotation from Körner's poem clearly suggests that he understood his own motives for volunteering as deriving from a sense of patriotism, duty, and a willingness to sacrifice "for *Volk* and freedom", the very same themes that suffused Körner's poem. Indeed, Körner provided a model for such patriotic sentiment, and had himself made the ultimate sacrifice. The Saxon playwright had been employed as a court theatre poet in Vienna since 1811, but had joined Major Lützow's famous volunteer force in March 1813. Seriously wounded in combat in June, he eventually succumbed to his injuries

in August 1813. Following his death he became the "prototype of the German heroic youth (*teutschen Heldenjünglings*)". His image was cultivated by his father, Christian Gottfried Körner, who was responsible for the posthumous publication of a volume of his son's poems, including *Abschied von Wien*, in 1814.[2]

Körner's "heroic death" while fighting the French no doubt added to Pfitzner's excited reception of the poem, and he claimed that his soul was deeply stirred by Körner's *Abschied von Wien* as he left Königsberg.[3] He clearly identified with the sentiments of the poem, which recounted Körner's own decision to volunteer in the struggle against the French. The German Wars of Liberation saw an explosion of such patriotic, Francophobic propaganda aimed at consolidating support for the war effort. As Karen Hagemann has persuasively argued, the motif of the "hero's death for the fatherland" was an integral part of a patriotic-national discourse that flourished between 1813 and 1815. This discourse, disseminated through the poetry and writings of diverse individuals, such as the poets Körner and Ernst Moritz Arndt, the philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte, and the founder of the nationalist gymnastic movement (*Turnerschaft*), Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, propagated a new ideal of masculinity, one that was both valorous and martial. This vision of masculinity centred on three aspects: a man's willingness to bear arms, his vigorous defence of his home and hearth against foreign invaders, and the cult of the hero's death.[4]

The role of this patriotic propaganda and its relationship to nationalism has long interested historians of Germany. Debate has often focused on the extent to which the wars contributed to a heightened sense of German national identity, which found expression in an uprising of the German nation during the campaigns of 1813/1814. The precise nature of this "uprising" was contested in the period immediately after Napoleon's final defeat. A conservative interpretation termed the campaigns of those years Wars of Liberation (*Befreiungskriege*) and placed the Prussian monarchy at the centre of the movement to free Germany from the French yoke. In the years after 1815 this version, in which the Prussian King called and people came, was memorialized in stone across Prussia and former battlefields. A more radical version, however, saw the struggle as Wars of Liberty (*Freiheitskriege*), in which the German *Volk* itself brought about Napoleon's defeat. It was the people who called and the Prussian King who came.[5] Despite these differences, both liberal and conservative interpretations were similarly worked into a nationalist master narrative, which portrayed the period as a heroic era, in the decades after the war. During the Second Reich it was reworked into a

pan-German myth from which Austria was excluded. Since the 1970s this myth of national uprising has been deconstructed.[6] Generally, however, these works have continued to focus on the role of the state or the public discourse produced by the intelligentsia. Campaign histories abound, but the motivations of volunteers, as presented in their diaries, letters, and memoirs, continue to be largely neglected.[7] While the war experiences (*Kriegserfahrungen*) and autobiographical writing of 20th-century German soldiers have been extensively studied, those of Austrian and German soldiers of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars are only now being examined.[8] Ute Planert's monumental study of the southern German states combines both the civilian and the military experience, while Julia Murken's more focused work looks at the Bavarian army in the context of the Russian campaign. Austria is more poorly served, despite the vast number of soldiers it committed to the wars. Recent work, however, has examined the relationship between mobilization and religion in the Tyrol in the 1790s.[9]

These works are largely focused on one region or a single campaign. This chapter examines the war experiences of volunteer soldiers from both Austria and Prussia, and the "Third Germany", across the period between 1792 and 1815. This spatial and temporal comparison allows examination of whether there was a qualitative difference between volunteering in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and across the German states. It examines the autobiographical writings of Austrian and German volunteers, who are broadly understood here to be soldiers who enlisted rather than being conscripted. It asks to what extent patriotism, rather than other motives, was presented as a factor behind their decision to volunteer. The upsurge of propaganda designed to invoke patriotic and nationalist sentiments during the Napoleonic Wars has been extensively examined elsewhere,[10] but how far did this discourse find an echo in the ego-documents of volunteers?

As already noted, the role of patriotism in motivating men to enlist is usually seen within the context of Prussia and the 1813/1814 Wars of Liberation. In this interpretation the weakening of French power in the wake of the catastrophic Russian compaign allowed patriotic-nationalist sentiments to rise to the surface. These sentiments had been fuelled by years of economic exploitation and the burden of supporting the occupying French army. Work has generally tended to focus on the Prussian territories.[11] Certainly, in the decades after the war the majority of volunteer memoirs were written by Prussians. Similar processes were at work in other parts of other German regions, particularly the Rhineland.[12] Despite this emphasis on the later period of the

war, some soldiers' autobiographical writing suggests that patriotism played some role prior to 1813. Indeed, some soldier-authors involved in earlier campaigns cited patriotism as a reason for enlisting as early as in the 1790s. Cole has argued that a sense of German identity was already a factor in the popular mobilization against the French invader in the Tyrol in the 1790s.[13]

Lorenz Rangger, a Tyrolian farmer, who volunteered to fight the French in 1797 at the age of seventeen, was self-conscious about his own status as a volunteer and patriot, recording in his memoir, "I was then seventeen and a half when I marched as a patriot against the French". Indeed, his war memoir has a narrative structure that is strikingly similar to later accounts of Prussian volunteers during the Wars of Liberation. "Forty-five men marched out of our village (Völs) on 27 March and abandoned our domestic business and our fields. It should admittedly have been difficult for us to so merrily leave our distressed mothers and wives behind and go to the place of danger. But to fight for God, for the Emperor, for religion, and Fatherland was our purpose, and it set aside all impediments."

Rangger, therefore, portrays himself and his fellow volunteers as men faced with tough choices. Despite his youth, Rangger was aware of the emotional and economic difficulties volunteering meant for the families left behind. Yet he believed that the volunteers had a higher calling, an obligation to the trinity of God, the ruling house and the Fatherland. Fulfilling their duty to these forces would ultimately provide the volunteers with the conviction to overcome all obstacles.[14]

Religion played a crucial role both in legitimizing and encouraging volunteering and in providing comfort for the Tyrolian soldiers. Rangger wrote: "the revered priesthood encouraged as much as possible only through prayer and prepared for the coming struggle by granting blessings. In many places we visited the Churches, where the clergy offered many prayers."[15] A renewal of religious fervour in the province, which had its roots in resistance to Joseph II's religious reforms coupled with the publication of anti-revolutionary tracts, reinforced a fluid identity that simultaneously encompassed allegiance to the Tyrol, the Habsburgs, and a wider sense of "Germanness" that pre-dated the patriotic propaganda accompanying the 1809 and 1813/1814 wars.[16]

On the other hand, the behaviour of the militia during the Revolutionary wars suggests that the militia's strongly developed sense of regional identity, tightly bound to Catholicism, ultimately trumped wider feelings of "Germanness", since the *Schutzencompagnie*

(sharpshooters) of the county of Tyrol were notoriously unhappy about serving outside their own province. Moreover, when the militia remobilized during the 1809 uprising, they spent as much time fighting against the Bavarians as the French.[17] Clearly, there were distinct limits to the "German" patriotism of the Tyrolean volunteers.

Despite this, the mountainous Tyrol represents an illuminating case study, for it revealed the different facets of patriotism. In Rangger's view, patriotism was characterized by both loyalty to the ruling house and identification with the Fatherland. The latter was, however, rather ambiguous, because it could equally refer to the Tyrol alone or to German-speaking central Europe as a whole. The two were certainly not mutually exclusive, and were often merged into each other. As Joachim Whaley has argued, this ambiguity, whereby the Fatherland or nation could simultaneously refer to a specific German state and Germany as a whole, had its roots in the 18th-century *Aufklärung*.[18] Rangger's account was therefore regarded as representative of the attitude many soldiers expressed regarding patriotism in their narratives, whether contemporary or retrospective. They reflected the various strands of 18th-century discourses on the nation, which encompassed both the wider German cultural nationalism of Herder and the narrower dynastic nationalism, or *Landespatriotismus*, promoted by such works as Thomas Abbt's *Vom Tode für das Vaterland* (On Death for the Fatherland, 1761) in Prussia and Josef Sonnenfels's *Ueber die Liebe des Vaterlandes* (On Love of the Fatherland, 1771) in the Habsburg Monarchy. These authors challenged the idea propounded by the Swiss writer and doctor, Johann Georg Zimmermann, that true patriotism could only exist in a republic. Patriotism, Abbt and Sonnenfels argued, could also exist within a monarchy and was demonstrated by the subject's loyalty to the ruling house. In return, the monarch protected the subject's rights and freedom. Meanwhile other intellectuals, such as Carl von Möser, advocated a wider form of patriotic identification, a *Reichspatriotismus* centred on the Holy Roman Empire and the Imperial constitution.[19] These various conceptions of patriotism meant that it could be conceived alternatively, but also simultaneously, as loyalty to one's prince, state, and/or "Germany". This elision of patriotic objects characterized both the rhetoric that accompanied the Austrian attempt to lead a war of liberation in 1809[20] and the attitude of Prussian military reformers before and during the 1813 campaign.[21] In the case of the nobility, appeals to mobilize could also play upon traditional ideas of noble honour, as well as allegiance to their "engeren Vaterland" and national patriotism.[22] Moreover, given that soldiers' accounts lack the programmatic

coherence of works by professional writers, scholars, and poets, the elision of these various understandings of patriotism is often all the greater, although not always consistently expressed.

Patriotism was certainly not limited to the members of the Tyrol militia in the Habsburg Monarchy in the 1790s. The threat posed to Vienna by Napoleon's armies in 1797 led to a heightened sense of patriotism in the Habsburg capital. Public appeals for volunteers emphasized the defence of the fatherland against the cruelty of the French invaders.[23] Brigades were raised from among the citizens and student body and endowed with a new anthem, *Gott erhalte Franz den Kaiser.*[24] Among the student volunteers was the future Austrian bureaucrat Karl Fredrick Kübeck. He recorded the enthusiasm with which the volunteers participated in their military exercises and the respect they were afforded by the regular army captains assigned to lead their companies, who addressed them as *Herr* and in the polite *Sie* form.[25]

Other contemporary observers of the conflict suggested that some form of patriotism, be it state or "German", played some role among other German military forces in the early stages of the conflict. For example, even though the majority of soldiers he observed were undoubtedly conscripts, the anonymous author of the *Reminiscences from the campaign on the Rhine from 1792 to 1795* claimed that in Mainz "everything had a warlike appearance. Soldiers from different armies mingled – the Prussian, the Austrian, Saxon, and the soldiers of the smaller princes. In their expressions one saw national pride (as it is understood among the mass of people as obedience to a prince), which marked them out as clearly as their uniforms." The author's disdainful coda to his description of the soldiers' national pride suggests that his own conception of patriotism was rather broader. However, the author too appeared to fall prey to a narrower *Landespatriotismus* when he claimed that his fellow Prussians distinguished themselves "among other nations" through their discipline.[26] Whether they were Prussian or not, the author understood the soldiers as having some higher motive than simply their *Sold* (pay). Similarly, the editor of a slim volume of letters written by the Prussian soldier, Andreas Christoph Glantz, to his wife during the Revolutionary wars enthused over the character of the author, praising his devout nature, Prussian patriotism, and love of family.[27]

The appeal to a mixture of God, ruling house, and Fatherland that appeared in the above works was to become a staple of the patriotic propaganda that flowed from the pens of writers and poets after the turn of the century.[28] The exhortations of writers, such as Körner and Arndt, were often replicated in much autobiographical writing by

volunteers, be it in the form of letters, diaries or memoirs. Thus the Prussian volunteer, Theodor Janke, wrote to his wife in 1813 that the chaotic, almost comic, scenes that initially accompanied his enlistment were eventually lost in the "great thought of the holy duty which I practiced and the great purpose, which each individual act of love of freedom, fatherland, and prince served". Like Rangger, Janke emphasized the sacrifice that he and others like him were making in leaving their families and homes. But, he speculated, the whole of Germany would be delighted and enthused to see an army composed of "honourable youths and sturdy men, excited by God and Truth, happily leaving the parental house, homely hearth, and beloved bride to win freedom from the yoke of tyranny". Instead of an army of mercenaries (*Söldner*) they were an army of free men prepared to fight and to die, not for money or to extend tyranny over foreigners, but to free an entire people from its clutches. Amidst his fears and pain at separation from his family, the author found such thoughts comforting and wrote that "this idea occupied from now on one's entire soul, and relieved the painful feeling of bitter separation."[29]

Karl August Köhler, a pastor who volunteered to serve as a field chaplain, expressed very similar feelings in his letters. In his first letter he sought to explain his reasons for laying down his civilian career and taking up arms. He claimed he had carried hopes for a resurgent Prussia and a Germany free from foreign exploitation since 1806. The emphasis Köhler placed on both Prussia and Germany in his account is representative of the mixture of state patriotism and German cultural nationalism that appears in many volunteers' narratives.

In Köhler's case there was also a personal dimension, since his sons had enlisted as rangers (*Jäger*). But again, as in the accounts of Rangger and Janke, religion, allegiance to the ruling house and patriotism were given as the prime motivations. Köhler conceived of his participation in the war as a religious duty. He was to take part in a crusade against the French oppressor. The same uncompromising desire for death or glory expressed in Janke's writing also permeates Köhler's letters. He wrote "victory or death, there is nothing else for me. I have no place any more in a subjugated Fatherland ... Life is nothing; King and Fatherland everything."[30]

Those who volunteered for the Wars of Liberation, therefore, often explained the decision to sign up using the language of the patriotic-nationalist public discourse that had developed in the aftermath of Jena.[31] The novelist Georg Wilhelm Heinrich Häring, who wrote under the pseudonym Willibald Alexis, was clear on the link between the

propaganda and the desire to serve in the army. He was only seventeen when he volunteered in 1815, and claimed in his semi-autobiographical account that teenagers like himself were still full of the spirit of 1813/1814. They were stirred by the speeches of their teachers – Fichte, Schleiermacher, Arndt, and others.[32] These Romantic writers had had an important influence on Alexis's contemporaries in encouraging the conflation of religion and patriotic sentiments, leading Alexis to claim that "The mood of the young was absolutely serious and religious. [It was also] Christian and, through the influence of Romanticism somewhat catholic."[33] In their emphasis on the emotional attachment of the individual to the Fatherland, the monarch and God, the volunteers were drawing upon a Romantic discourse to make explicable their motivations and to construct the narratives of their wartime experience. Alexis illustrated this point when he wrote that he took a copy of the *Nibelungen* with him on campaign for his spiritual nourishment. He drew a direct parallel between the epic tale and his own experiences. The book, he believed, was a "German national reading" and the "war of the Saxons and Burgundians seemed [...] to fit our [war] with the French".[34]

Alexis might be accused of idealizing his motives and those of other volunteers in his retrospective account. However, the letters and diaries of other volunteers suggest that they too saw patriotism as a motivation. Jakob Hintz, a volunteer with the National Cavalry Regiment, wrote to his parents of the "terrible struggle for the just cause of the Fatherland" that he and his fellow volunteers faced.[35] In a later letter he sought to assuage his own fears with the knowledge that he was serving his "beloved Fatherland".[36] *Oberjäger* Werckmeister also regarded the struggle against the French as a patriotic and religious act, referring to it in his diary as a "holy issue".[37]

It was not only Prussian volunteers who ascribed to such narratives of their own involvement. Some volunteers in the Hanseatic Legion and Hamburg's Citizens' Militia used much the same language as the Prussian *Freiwillige*. The Prussian *Vaterland* was replaced with the Hamburg *Vaterstadt*, but the appeal to cultural nationalism was much the same.[38] Karl Sieveking, a volunteer to the Citizens' Militia, emphasized the "power and nobility" of the souls of the volunteers, while the merchant Johann Joachim Hanfft was praised for his patriotic sacrifice in equipping and leading a cavalry squadron.[39]

Volunteers to fight Napoleon also came forward in the other German states in 1813/1814. However, although there were differences between regions, the patriotic and national rhetoric that flourished in the north

did not find the same degree of support in the south. The armed forces of Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden continued to rely on recruitment and the use of replacements.[40] In the Habsburg case there is a lack of information on the number of volunteers.[41] The Monarchy had attempted its own War of Liberation in 1809, and the propaganda during that conflict foreshadowed that of the 1813/1815 campaigns.[42] The 1809 campaign had ended in defeat, despite a generally enthusiastic response to the newly formed Austrian *Landwehr*.[43] Certainly, there appears to be no equivalent in Austria to the large numbers of Prussian "volunteer memoirs" published in the 19th century.

Yet, although patriotism is often cited by Prussian and other volunteers, other less idealistic motives for enlistment can be detected. Pfitzner, for example, was also clearly motivated by a simple desire for adventure. Service as a volunteer not only allowed him to do his duty to his state, but also offered the opportunity to see something of the world beyond Prussia's borders. Indeed, in many respects his diary reads much like a travelogue, an aspect shared by many soldiers' writing.[44] It includes relatively few accounts of combat, but he wrote often and at length about the customs, culture, and architecture of the various regions through which he passed.[45]

Of course, a desire to serve the state and a lust for adventure were by no means incompatible, and Pfitzner's interest in local customs and dress can be regarded as part of the wider Romantic movement's interest in traditional cultures. The travel opportunities offered by military service often meant that the volunteers could reaffirm their own self-identity and cultural superiority.[46] Alexis, for example, commented that the people of Brunswick were "admirably German" in their attitudes, but the Hanoverians were prone to vacillation and lacked the same intensity of Francophobia, something he put down to the numerous changes of regime the Hanoverians had experienced during the wars.[47]

Pfitzner, therefore, recognized the double motive behind his decision to volunteer. Patriotism blended easily with the excitement and new opportunities. Indeed, for some, volunteering had also an instrumental value. The Jewish volunteer, Löser Cohen, hoped that his and his co-religionists' participation in the war would lead to recognition of the Jews as full citizens.[48] Yet in his view both motivations were honourable. The same, he wrote, could not be said of the motivations of several fellow volunteers. He divided them into two classes, the "educated" and "uneducated" (*Gebildete* and *Ungebildete*). The former were in the minority. Pfitzner wrote of the second class, "I do not want to say much, since I spoke with them only in matters of urgency or not at all." Implicitly

contrasting these men's motives for enlisting with his own, he wrote that they had joined up merely to enrich themselves and indulge their more violent passions, rather than to gather "salutary experiences". One in particular he castigated as "a model of hatefulness, paltriness, and insufferable manners". Following this less than complimentary description, Pfitzner recounted the rough treatment several volunteers meted out to a French peasant. The unfortunate man's life was saved only by Pfitzner's intervention.[49] Indeed, Köhler suggested that the war had a hardening effect on the volunteers, who soon participated in the looting and the maltreatment of enemy soldiers and non-combatants.[50] Similarly, Janke wrote in a letter of the looting of German territories conducted by soldiers in the Allied army as they advanced towards the Rhine.[51] Tensions also appear to have emerged between volunteers from different German regions and states. The Cologne novelist, Eberhard von Groote, volunteered in both 1814 and 1815. He recorded a growing disillusionment with the behaviour of the Prussian volunteers. This attitude was heightened when a Prussian sergeant who had beaten his brother escaped punishment.[52] In fact, the discipline of the volunteers' units appears to have been an enduring problem. For example, Heinrich Jordan, another member of the National Cavalry Regiment, recorded the discontent among the volunteers when the Prussian military sought to impose military discipline upon them.[53] Both in the 1790s, and later during 1813/1814, the hardship of military life and the dangers of battle also led to disillusionment among some volunteers with things military.[54]

Clearly, not all volunteers fitted Janke's model of "noble youths". Pfitzner's criticism of his comrades was aimed more at their moral character than their social status, but, in fact, the "educated" volunteers were in a minority in the Prussian volunteer movement. In fact, contrary to the desire of Prussian military reformers, the majority of the Prussian volunteers appear not to have come from the educated, propertied elite.[55] Instead around 40 per cent of the 30,000 or so volunteers were drawn from the urban, artisan groups. However, the educated elite and students were over-represented in the ranks of the volunteers. More significantly, it was this group who most shaped the perceptions of the 1813/1814 war against the French through their letters, diaries, and memoirs.[56]

Pfitzner's division of his fellow *Jäger* into the educated and the uneducated, therefore, neatly encapsulates the difficulties inherent in using autobiographical writing as a source for examining volunteers' motivations. All the volunteers presented here were educated men

and were familiar with the canonical works of the Enlightenment and Romanticism. Since they were part of the aristocratic and middle-class elite, it is perhaps no surprise that they drew upon such literature when they set down their own experiences on paper. Indeed, the patriotic-nationalist propaganda appears to have found little support outside the said elite prior to the Wars of Liberation. Although Wilhelm von Dörnberg and Major von Schill were later transfigured as patriotic heroes in Arndt's poetry, there was little support for their abortive uprisings in 1809.[57] Even in 1813 reaction to the Prussian *Landwehr* decree was mixed. Some regions recorded high levels of mobilization and volunteering, while in others there was resistance to military service. The numbers of volunteers might have been greater in Prussia than elsewhere, but, given that the vast majority remained silent about their motivations, it is difficult to assess to what extent they shared the patriotic feeling that had fired men like Pfitzner and Rangger.[58]

There is, however, evidence from other soldier-writers suggesting that patriotism often played little or no role. A particularly apposite example of this is provided by the humorous memoirs of Carl Schehl, the son of a paper merchant in Krefeld. In contrast to the examples given above, Schehl volunteered to serve not against the French, but in Napoleon's army, specifically a Cuirassier regiment. Passionate appeals to God, Fatherland or patriotism have no place in Schehl's account. Instead, he wrote that he joined the regiment out of a simple desire to ride horses and took great pride in the smartness of his new uniform.[59] Schehl seems to have had little difficulty with the idea that he was serving in the armies of Germany's oppressors, despite the disbelief expressed by other Germans he encountered on the march to Russia. He wrote that one host found it "incomprehensible that I as a German already at the tender age of 14 years and four months should voluntarily enlist in a French Cuirassier regiment purely out of a fancy for horses".[60] However, Schehl's service in a French regiment did not mean that he identified with the French nation. Instead, his affection and feelings of belonging were directed towards the military itself, which he compared favourably with German armies.[61]

This identification with the military was also cited by other soldier-writers as a motivation for their enlistment, as illustrated by the memoirs of two Austrian officers. Karl Johann Nepomuk Ritter von Gruber, Bavarian by birth, was seduced by the pomp and ceremony of the Habsburg army while studying at Regensburg. He joined up against his father's wishes and served for several years before forced, much to his

chagrin, to return to his home and join the Bavarian army in 1813.[62] Michael Freiherr Pauliny v. Köwelsdamm, while admiring the zeal of the Prussian patriots, did not cite patriotism as a motive for his decision to enlist many years earlier. Instead, he offered a similar rationale to Gruber, despite the horror stories he had been told of a soldier's lot, writing "my heart resisted the shiver inducing tales of blood soaked war scenes, overlooked the woeful picture of the corporal's staff, and fastened upon the decision to become a Hussar, and thereby to voluntarily join the army."[63] Other volunteers acquired a taste for military life after initially serving in the militia or *Landwehr*. For example, the Swiss German, David Karl von Ziegler, abandoned his apprenticeship as a watchmaker to volunteer for the French army after serving in the Swiss Civil War (*Bockenkrieg*) in 1804. Similarly, Ignaz Berndt enlisted in the Habsburg military after serving in the *Landwehr* during the 1809 campaign.[64]

None of these individuals cited patriotism as a strong motivation for their behaviour. They had either had an obsession with the military from a young age or acquired it later. For many others there were more pragmatic reasons that drove them to the military – the prospects of an alternative career. Both Gruber and Ziegler were seeking to escape from an unwanted future planned for them by their parents. On the other hand, Berndt believed that his career as a *Hofmeister* had reached a dead end and that his prospects for advancement in the Habsburg army were far better.[65] Indeed, during the course of the war many officers and soldiers were faced with the choice of volunteering to serve in different armies or changing career, the military of their own states having been dissolved or reduced in size following Napoleon's redrawing of the political map. In his memoir Ludwig Wilhelm von Conrady, a former Hessian officer, claimed he agonized over his decision to join the Westphalian army, but was ultimately forced to join due to his poor financial situation. He comforted himself with the belief that he would at least be serving a successful commander: Napoleon.[66] Meanwhile, Karl von Suckow was cashiered as part of the reduction of the Prussian army following the Peace of Tilsit. He refused to join the French army, claiming that he could not serve Prussia's enemies. For a time he considered joining the Russian military, before eventually enlisting in the King of Württemberg's army. Of course, the emphasis that Suckow placed on his refusal to join the French army might have been coloured by hindsight. Despite this, however, he was clear that his enlistment in the Württemberg army sprang from financial and career motives. He conveniently skirted over the fact

that the kingdom was allied to the French and he was therefore *de facto* serving Prussia's erstwhile opponents.[67]

Again these men were members of an educated elite. All these officers were exceptional in that they chose to record their military service in some form, but administrative documents and statements offer an insight into the motivations of those lower down the social scale, those unable to record their experiences themselves. For these men pragmatic factors were of even more importance. Christian Oschatz was an illiterate Prussian conscript from Marienburg. Arrested for some unspecified infraction and fearful of being punished, he deserted. However, rather than abandon military life altogether, he travelled to Stettin, where he expressed his desire to join the French army and was duly enlisted.[68] It is possible that Oschatz had harboured a desire to join the French army for some time, but it seems more likely that he enlisted as the only means of maintaining himself. That many soldiers volunteered as a means of providing for themselves is made clear by the case of Julius Rashing, a deserter from the Westphalian army. The seventeen-year-old Rashing appeared before the police authorities in Frankfurt (Oder) in August 1813 and requested permission to join the Major von Lützow's volunteers. Yet under questioning Rashing did not betray any sense of patriotism or nationalism underlying his actions. He claimed he had deserted to the Allies simply because "in the village there is no food, I did not get much to eat and must go hungry."[69] For these men, and thousands like them, volunteering had little to do with patriotism and everything to do with subsistence. Military service had its obvious dangers and inconveniences, but it also offered the chance for adventure and enrichment. By acting as a replacement for some rich man's son those lower down the social hierarchy could receive a substantial sum of cash. For example, in the Grand Duchy of Berg the cost of replacements ranged from 600 and 1,000 *Reichstaler*. To put this in perspective, a day labourer (*Tagelohner*) might hope to earn 57 *Reichstaler* per annum.[70] Similar inflationary pressures were evident in other southern German states as recruits became scarcer and local communities were forced to dig deeper into their coffers.[71]

For these individuals patriotism played only a supporting role, if any, to the basics of subsistence. For officers like Conrady and Suckow the high ideals of patriotism, nationalism, and loyalty to the ruling house had to take a back seat to the continuation of their careers. Indeed, Conrady's soul-searching before joining the Westphalian army appears insincere when, later in his memoir, he claims to have preferred his service in that army to the Hessian military. He even ridiculed the

old-fashioned attitudes and affections of his old ruler, the *Kurfürst* of Hesse-Kassel, upon his restoration in 1813.[72] There is a clear difference in the autobiographical accounts of these career soldiers and the volunteers of 1813 and 1814, such as Pfitzner. Pfitzner entitled the section of his diary that dealt with the 1815 campaign "my military career," suggesting that for him and the other *Jäger* their military service was merely an interlude in their life, a chance to demonstrate their loyalty to the state and experience some adventure.[73] Influenced by the Romantic, patriotic-nationalist literature that flourished in 1812 and 1813, they couched their explanations of their reasons in the same language.

The diaries and memoirs examined in this chapter reveal a complicated picture of the role of patriotism and nationalism in motivating men to enlist during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. Both appear to have played a variable role in soldiers' ego-documents. The autobiographical writings of some soldiers often present both as the primary motivations behind their decision to volunteer. However, for many others they appear to play a mere supporting role or were absent altogether. Despite this ambiguous picture, an examination of autobiographical writing does allow some conclusions.

First, patriotism was not limited to the Wars of Liberation. Some soldiers and observers cited it as a factor in earlier stages of the conflict. In fact, the discourse of 1812/1813, which combined religious motifs, an allegiance to the ruling house and a wider German nationalism, existed prior to the Wars of Liberation. It was foreshadowed by the propaganda surrounding the 1809 campaign, and elements of it are already identifiable in the 1790s. Both the propagandists and the volunteers drew upon the various 18th-century discourses on patriotism to elide *Landespatriotismus* with a German nationalism. The experience of exploitation at the hands of the French led to increasing Francophobia and provided a boost to languages of patriotism. They were expressed through the patriotic-nationalist literature, which provided a model for the memoirs of educated, predominantly Prussian volunteers of 1813/1814. The publication of these memoirs fed in turn into the Prussian-German mythology of the wars constructed in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Second, despite some soldier-writers' clear allegiance to the notions of heroic self-sacrifice and national freedom, other autobiographical literature illustrates that, for the majority of officers and soldiers, patriotism played a minor role. Instead a whole host of other reasons were given – the desire for adventure or recognition, the seductive and dashing image of the army, the need to find and maintain a career and, most

compelling, simple subsistence. Of course, none of these were mutually exclusive of patriotism. But to focus on the letters, diaries, and memoirs of the Prussian volunteers of the Wars of the Liberation overemphasizes the role patriotism played in motivating people to fight. During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars patriotism was just one reason among many why men volunteered to serve. It is also evident that many of the volunteers quickly became disillusioned with service in the military. Some were disappointed to find that many of their fellow volunteers did not appear to be motivated by the same high ideals. Many were disgusted by the looting they observed, not only in France but in the German territories. Like Köhler, they saw war as having a hardening effect on an individual's sensibilities, making him increasingly indifferent to the suffering of others. Furthermore, Groote's diary suggests that, although their goal was ostensibly the same, to liberate Germany from the French yoke, tensions existed between volunteers from different German states. Finally, virtually all volunteers found that their patriotic enthusiasm was soon tempered by the harsh reality of military life and discipline. It is, therefore, perhaps unsurprising that, despite the martial, aggressive rhetoric of poems and pamphlets, many of the most ardent patriots soon found themselves wishing for, as Janke put it, the "sunshine of peace".[74]

Notes

1. Carl Ernst Eduard Pfitzner, Mein Tagebuch während des Feldzugs 1815 auf denn Wege von Königsberg in Preussen über Danzig durch West-Preussen, Pommern, Berlin, Düsseldorf, Cöln, Paris, Rennes in der Bretagne, an denn la Manche, caen und nun da zurück über Paries, Mezieres, Coblenz, Cassel and Magdeburg, Berlin bis Breslau, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka we Wrocławiu, Manuscript Department, IV 0 48, p. 1.
2. The volume was entitled *Lyre and Sword*. K. Hagemann (2002) *Mannlicher Muth und Teutsche Ehre. Nation, Militär und Geschlecht zur Zeit der Antinapoleonischen Kriege Preußens* (Paderborn), p. 331.
3. Pfitzner, p. 1.
4. K. Hagemann (1998) "Of 'Manly Valor' and 'German Honor': Nation, War, and Masculinity in the Age of the Prussian Uprising against Napoleon", *Central European History*, 30:2, 187–220, p. 219. Karen Hagemann has written extensively on this and related issues. See, for example, Hagemann (2002); K. Hagemann (2000) 'A Valorous *Volk* Family: The Nation, the Military, and the Gender Order in Prussia in the Time of the Anti-Napoleonic Wars, 1806–15' in I. Blom et al. (eds.) (2000) *Gendered Nations: Nationalisms and Gender Order in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Oxford), 179–205.
5. C. Clark (1996) 'The Wars of Liberation in Prussian Memory: Reflections on the Memorialization of War in Early Nineteenth-Century Germany', *Journal*

of Modern History, 68:3, 550–76. See also C. Clark (2007) *Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600–1947* (London), pp. 378–85. Throughout this article the term War of Liberation will be used.

6. For a concise overview of the historiography of the Wars of Liberation see K. Hagemann (2006a) 'Occupation, mobilization, and politics: The anti-Napoleonic wars in Prussian experience, memory, and historiography', *Central European History*, 39, 580–610. See also the introduction to this special issue of *Central European History*, 384–416. On the deconstruction of the nationalist narrative see, for example, H. Carl (2000) 'Der Mythos des Befreiungskrieges: Die "martialische Nation" im Zeitalter der Revolutions- und Befreiungskriege 1792–1815' in D. Langewiesche and G. Schmidt, *Föderative Nation: Deutschlandkonzepte von der Reformation bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg* (Munich), 63–83.
7. A notable exception is P. Brandt (1995) 'Einstellungen, Motive und Ziele von Kriegsfreiwilligen 1813/14: Das Freikorps Lützow', in J. Düffler (ed.) *Kriegsbereitschaft und Friedensordnung in Deutschland*, (Münster), pp. 211–33.
8. See, for example, K. Latzel (1998) *Deutsche Soldaten – nationalsozialistischer Krieg? Kriegserlebnis, Kriegserfahrung, 1939–1945* (Paderborn); B. Ziemann (1997) *Front und Heimat: ländliche Kriegserfahrungen im südlichen Bayern 1914–1923* (Essen). The experiences of French soldiers between 1792 and 1815 have received considerable attention. See A. Forrest (2002) *Napoleon's Men: The Soldiers of the Revolution and Empire* (London); A. Forrest (1998) *Conscripts and Deserters: The Army and French Society during the Revolution and the Empire* (Oxford).
9. J. Murken (2006) *Bayerische Soldaten in Russlandfeldzug 1812: Ihre Kriegserfahrungen und deren Umdeutungen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich); U. Planert (2007) *Der Mythos vom Befreiungskrieg: Frankreichs Kriege und die deutsche Süden: Alltag – Wahrnehmung – Deutung, 1792–1841* (Paderborn); L. Cole (2000) 'Nation, Anti-Enlightenment and Religious Revival in Austria: Tyrol in the 1790s', *The Historical Journal*, 43:2, 475–97; L. Cole (2003) 'Religion und patriotische Aktion in Deutsch-Tyrol (1790–1814)' in O. Dann et al. (eds) *Patriotismus und Nationsbildung am Ende des Heiligen Römsichen Reiches* (Cologne), 345–77.
10. On the development of patriotic literature in the German states see E. Weber (1991) *Lyrik der Befreiungskriege (1812–1815). Gesellschaftspolitische Meinungs- und Willensbildung durch Literatur* (Stuttgart); W. C. Langsam (1930) *The Napoleonic Wars and German Nationalism in Austria* (New York); Hagemann (2002).
11. See Hagemann (2006a). The extent of the Prussian mobilization was indeed striking. From 1812 to 1813 the Prussian army increased from 67,000 men to 245,000, almost 50,000 of whom were volunteers. Ibid., 605.
12. For example, Tim Blanning writes of the Rhineland: 'However strange that may sound to ears tuned to the refrain that German nationalism is a phenomenon of the next century, the evidence allows no other conclusion. For while there was no call for a unified nation state, there was plenty of strident opposition to the French deriving from a sense of separate nationality'. T. C. W. Blanning (1983) *The French Revolution in Germany: Occupation and Resistance in the Rhineland, 1792–1802* (Oxford), p. 248.
13. Cole (2000), p. 496.

14. L. Rangger (1902), *Kriegserlebnisse des Bauermannes und Patrioten Lorenz Rangger, genannt Stubacher, von Völs bei Innsbruck, in den Jahren 1796 bis 1814*, ed. by P. Ferdinand von Scala (Innsbruck), p. 11.
15. Ibid, pp. 11f.
16. Cole (2000), pp. 482–91.
17. See D. Gates (1997) *The Napoleonic Wars, 1803–1815* (London), p. 112; C. Esdaile (1995) *The Wars of Napoleon* (London), pp. 132–34.
18. Joachim Whaley has also argued that 'the combination of the two levels – the 'German' and the territorial in characteristic of most German national or patriotic writing well into the nineteenth century'. See J. Whaley (2007) 'The transformation of the *Aufklärung*: from the idea of power to the power of ideas' in H. Scott and B. Simms (eds) *Cultures of Power in Europe during the Long Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge), 158–79, p. 176.
19. On *Reichspatriotismus* see A. Waldman (2003) 'Reichspatriotismus im letzten drittel des 18. Jahrhunderts', in O. Dann et al. (eds), *Patriotismus und Nationsbildung Am Ende Des Heiligen Römischen Reiches* (Köln), 19–61; W. Burgdorf (2000) '"Reichspatriotismus" gegen "Territorialnationalismus". Phasen der Intensivierung des nationalen Bewußtseins in Deutschland seit dem Siebenjährigen Krieg' in D. Langewiesche and G. Schmidt *Föderative Nation: Deutschlandkonzepte von der Reformation bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg* (Munich) 157–90.
20. K. Hagemann (2006b) '"Be Proud and Firm, Citizens of Austria!" Patriotism and masculinity in texts of the 'political romantics' written during Austria's Anti-Napoleonic Wars', *German Studies Review*, 29:1, 41–62.
21. Brandt (1995), p. 218.
22. See M. Kreutzmann (2008) 'Adel, Nation und ständische Identität im Umbruchsjahr 1806', in A. Klinger et al. (eds) *Das Jahr 1806 im europäischen Kontext: Balance, Hegemonie und politische Kulturen* (Köln), 307–28, p. 322.
23. Niederösterreiche Landesarchiv, N. Ö. Reg. L Akte 1799, Karton 3086.
24. M. Hochedlinger (2003) *Austria's Wars of Emergence: War, State and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1683–1797* (London), p. 441.
25. M. v. Kübeck (ed.) (1909) *Tagebücher des Graf Friederich Freiherrn Kübeck von Kübau*, vol. 1 (Wien), p. 20.
26. Anon. (1802) *Reminiszenzen aus dem Feldzuge am Rhein in den Jahren 1792 bis 1795, von einem Mitgliede der damaligen preuss. Rhein-Armee* (Berlin and Leipzig), p. 70 and 90.
27. Glantz's letters were first published in the *Neuen Gemeinnütigen Blättern zu Halberstadt*, then subsequently released as A. C. Glantz (1794) *Auszüge aus Briefen von Andreas Christoph Glantz aus Harsleben während des Franzoösischen Krieges in den Jahren 1792 – 1794 an seine Frau und Verwandte in Harslben geschrieben* (Halberstadt), p. 38.
28. See Weber (1991).
29. T. Janke (1901) *Feldbriefe eines Kriegsfreiwilligen von 1813*, ed. by E. Janke (Berlin), p. 18.
30. K. A. Köhler (1912) *1813/14. Tagebuchblätter eines Feldgeistlichen* (Berlin-Lichterfelde), p. 11.
31. See Hagemann (2002).

32. W. Alexis (1915) *Als Kriegsfreiwilliger nach Frankreich 1815: Blätter aus meinen Erinnerungen*, ed. by A. Heilbron (Leipzig), p. 9. Alexis later wrote two historical novels about the Napoleonic age, entitled *Ruhe ist die erste Bürgerpflicht oder vor fünfzig Jahre* (1852) and its sequel *Isengrimm* (1854).
33. Ibid., p. 11.
34. Ibid., p. 24.
35. GStaPK, Rep. 12, Nr. 227, Jacob Hintz to his parents, 24 November 1813.
36. GStaPK, Rep. 12, Nr. 227, Jacob Hintz to his parents, 13 January 1814.
37. Werckmeister cited in T. Hippler (2006) *Citizens, Soldiers and National Armies: Military Service in France and Germany, 1789–1830* (London), p. 180.
38. Some 14,000 men volunteered for the Legion. K. B. Aaslestad (2005) *Place and Politics: . Local Identity, Civic Culture, and German Nationalism in North Germany during the Revolutionary Era* (Leiden), pp. 275–95.
39. Ibid. See also K. B. Aaslestad (2006) 'Paying for War: Experiences of Napoleonic Rule in the Hanseatic Cities', *Central European History*, 39, 641–75.
40. Around 6,000 men volunteered in Bavaria. Planert (2007), pp. 596–613.
41. Gunther E. Rothenberg does not mention volunteers during the 1813 and 1814 campaigns in his work on Austrian involvement in the wars against France. See G. E. Rothenberg (1982) *Napoleon's Great Adversaries: The Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army, 1792–1814* (London).
42. Hagemann (2006b).
43. E. Zehetbauer (1999) *Landwehr gegen Napoleon: Österreichs erste Miliz und der Nationalkrieg von 1809* (Wien).
44. Samuel Hynes acknowledges some of the similarities between travel and war writing. See S. Hynes (1998), *Soldiers' Tales: Bearing Witness to Modern War*, (London), pp. 4f.
45. Pfitzner, p. 42.
46. For more on Romanticism and travel literature see Amanda Gilroy's introduction in A. Gilroy (ed.) (2000) *Romantic Geographies: Discourses of travel, 1775–1844* (Manchester).
47. Alexis (1915) *Als Kriegsfreiwilliger nach Frankreich* (Leipzig), p. 53.
48. Brandt (1995), p. 128.
49. Ibid, pp. 185f.
50. See Hagemann (2006a), pp. 608–90.
51. Janke (1901), p. 77.
52. J. Herres (2006) '"Und nenne Euch Preußen!". Die Anfänge preußischer Herrschaft am Rhein im 19. Jahrhundert', in H. Schnabel-Schüle and A. Gestrich (eds) *Fremde Herrscher – Fremdes Volk: Inklusions- und Exklusionsfiguren bei Herrschaftswechseln in Europa*, (Frankfurt a.M.), 103–37, p. 129.
53. K. A. Jordan (1846) *Zur Geschichte des ehemaligen ostpreußischen National-Kavallerie-Regiments in den Feldzügen von 1813 und 1814: Mittheilungen aus den Tagebüchern und Erinnerungen eines Freiwilligen* (Leipzig), pp. 8f.
54. See Kübeck (1909), p. 21; GStaPK, Rep. 12, Nr. 227, Jacob Hintz to his parents, 17 July 1814.
55. On the military reforms see M. Sikora (2008) 'Militarisierung und Zivilisierung. Die preußische Heeresreformen und ihre Ambivalenzen', in

P. Baumgart et al. (eds), *Die preussische Armee zwischen Ancien Régime und Reichsgründung* (Paderborn), 164–95, p. 192.

56. Brandt (1995), p. 214; R. Ibbeken (1970) *Preußen 1807–1813. Staat und Volk als Idee und in Wirklichkeit* (Köln), pp. 443–44.
57. Gates (1997), p. 126.
58. See Hagemann (2006a), p. 605–6.
59. C. Schehl (1957) *Vom Rhein zur Moskwa 1812: . Erinnerungen des jüngsten niederrheinischen Veteranen der Großen Armee an seine Krefelder Jugendjahre, den russischen Feldzug, seine dreijährige Kriegsgefangenschaft, glückliche Heimkehr und an seine anschließende Dienstzeit als preußischer Artillerist, von ihm selbst erzählt*, ed. by J. Olmes (Krefeld), pp. 41–4.
60. Ibid., p. 51.
61. Ibid., p. 54. See also M. Rowe (2006) 'France, Prussia, or Germany? The Napoleonic Wars and Shifting Allegiances in the Rhineland', *Central European History*, 39, 611–40.
62. J. N. Ritter von Gruber, *Merkwürdige Lebensperiode des k. k. Kameraden und Bezirksvorstehers von Gruber vom Jahre 1783 bis incl. 1849 zusammengetragen. Ein Lektüre für meine Kinder, wenn ich einstens im Grabe modern werde*, Österreichische Kriegsarchiv (ÖKA) B618.
63. ÖKA B 1505, M. Freiherr Pauliny v. Kowelsdamm *Historisch-Militär Tagebuch der Jahre 1788 to 1800*, Erster Theil, p. 15.
64. ÖKA B 683, I. Berndt, *Bemerkungen aus dem Leben eines Pensionierten Stabsoffiziers der oesterreichischen Armee*, pp. 173–75.
65. Ibid, p. 161.
66. L. W. v. Conrady (1907) *Aus stürmischer Zeit. Ein Soldatenleben vor hundert Jahren. Nach den Tagebüchern und Aufzeichnungen des weiland kurhessischen Stabskapitans im Leibdragoner-Regiment* (Berlin), pp. 148f.
67. K. v. Suckow (1862) *Aus meinem Soldatenleben* (Stuttgart), p. 104.
68. (GStPK) Sig. III HA Ministeriums der auswärtigen Angelegenheiten (MdA) Nr. 507, Des Buergermeister Boehl allerunterthaenische Anzeige wegen eines auf der hiesigen Militars-Strasse durch Kaiserlich Französische Truppen nach Stettin transportirten Preussische Deserteurs, Pyritz, 13 February 1812. (GStPK) Sig. III HA Ministeriums der auswärtigen Angelegenheiten (MdA) Nr. 507.
69. GstPK I HA Rep. 91 a, Nr. 203, An königlich allerhöchst verordnetes Hohes Militar-Gouverment des Landes zwischen der Elbe und Oder zu Berlin, Der Polizey-Raths Meyer übersandet den Westphälsichen Desertuer Julius Rashing zür beliebigen Einstellung bey der Cavallerie per Transport, Frankfurth a. Oder, 14 August 1813.
70. W. D. Sauer (1995) 'Das französische Militärsystem im Großherzogthum Berg unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Munizipalitäten Hilden und Haan' in Ernst Huckenbeck (ed.), *Hilden und Haan in der Franzosenzeit (1806–1813)* (Hilden), pp. 70–3.
71. See Planert (2007), pp. 437–42.
72. Conrady (1907), p. 400.
73. Pfitzner, p. 5.
74. Janke (1901), p. 55.

4

Polish Volunteers in the Napoleonic Wars

Ruth Leiserowitz

> so that people talk about Poland out loud again in the world today!
>
> Adam Mickiewicz, *Pan Tadeusz*

The Napoleonic Wars had a new character; they were "national wars" in which mass armies fought. This new mode of warfare, as well as influencing civilian societies, led to a great number of military volunteers across Europe.[1] Up until now, the period of the Napoleonic Wars has had different connotations in Poland's cultural and political history than in most European countries, both temporally and in terms of content. For one thing, the three Partitions of the Polish state (1772, 1793, and 1795) dictated other temporal breaks, which exerted direct and indirect influences on the period of investigation.[2] On the other hand, the period of the Napoleonic Wars in Poland has been described as *międzypowstaniowy* [between the rebellions], as it occurred between the Kosćiuszko Rebellion of 1794 and the November Rebellion of 1830.[3] Poland was only present on the political map as a skeleton state in the shape of the Duchy of Warsaw (1807–1815).[4] Nonetheless, numerous Polish troops took part in the Napoleonic Wars. The figure of the volunteer from this time has become established in the Polish literature of remembrance.

There is a wealth of information sources about the time between 1797, the year of the founding of the Polish volunteer associations, the legions, and 1815, when the wars ended. War veterans composed a great number of autobiographies and war memoirs. These included, for instance, Stanisław Broekere (1789–1860),[5] Wincenty-Leon Szeptycki (1782–1836)[6] and also Kajetan Wojciechowski (1786–1848),[7] who had fought as officers in Spain; Józef Grabowski (1791–1881), who joined the

Grande Armée in 1812 and became one of Napoleon's field officers;[8] and Dezydery Chłapowski (1788–1879), who had only completed a course at the Berlin artillery academy at the wish of his father,[9] had joined the French army in 1806 as a volunteer, and also took part as a General under Napoleon in the Russian campaign of 1812.[10] Furthermore, the works of the author-legionary Cyprian Godebski (1765–1809),[11] as well as those of a participant in the combat in Santo Domingo, Jakub Filip Kierzkowski (1771–1862),[12] also became famous.

This article reveals how the Polish volunteer developed into a figure of remembrance of the 19th century. It also investigates the role of the volunteer in Polish remembrance in the *longue durée*, and what kind of symbolic value was assigned to him, as well as how the figure of the volunteer soldier is presented on the one hand in media of remembrance, that is in diaries and memoirs, and on the other hand in Polish literature, here primarily in the historical novel. Numerous experiences of the war campaigns which had been captured by diaries and notes were processed into memoirs and autobiographies after the wars. They formed products of remembrance that achieved wide spatial distribution through the high number of copies sold. Some titles, in French editions, also circulated in European spheres.[13] Some of these remembrances eventually entered into the literature.[14] The epic poem *Pan Tadeusz*[15] by Adam Mickiewicz (1798–1855) and Stefan Żeromski's (1864–1925) novel *Ashes*[16] are significant examples of historical novels which were published in great numbers over a long period. *Pan Tadeusz*,in the opinion of many Poles, was the "most important Polish work of the 19th century" and was published in Polish, in Poland and abroad, a total of 135 times between 1834 and 1914.[17]

During the 19th century alone, the work was translated into five languages (German, English, French, Russian, and Spanish). By the First World War Żeromski's *Ashes* had been translated into five languages (German, English, French, Czech, and Russian).

These media of remembrance, discovered in joint research by the collaborators of the research project mentioned at the outset, formed a canon within the national framework, and sometimes beyond, and were perceived by contemporaries as being important. Here particular attention is given to the historical novels as the "most centralised of all genres."[18] They acted as storage media for remembrances, and were received as collective texts into the memory of the nations.[19]

Of particular importance for the formation of the volunteer as a figure of remembrance in the Polish context were the volunteer's motives for joining, their verbalisation and their factual realisation. The reactions

of the volunteer's family and friends to his decision, as well as the possible resulting conflicts, similarly contributed to fixation in the collective memory, as decision processes of this kind were to be enacted repeatedly in Polish families for the next 100 years. The images and figures fixed in the media of remembrance developed into a role model, encouraging imitation.

After the Third Partition of Poland in 1795, many Polish citizens fled into different European states. A committee was formed that assumed the task of saving, or rather restoring, the statehood of the fatherland. Particularly in France, where on the one hand the watchwords of the revolution — freedom, equality, and brotherhood – were still resounding, and on the other hand Napoleon Bonaparte repeatedly forced the European coalition to its knees, the situation seemed favourable towards finding a lobby for political interests. Hence, among the Polish emigrants who had gone to France, the idea arose of forming a Polish army under the aegis of the French, which would be in a favourable position to fight for Polish freedom.[20] The Polish politician and author Józef Wybicki[21] developed a concept of volunteer Polish troops in the French army, which was accepted by Napoleon.[22] Following this, the Polish legions were founded under General Jan Henryk Dąbrowski (1755–1818).[23] The first formation began in 1796 in Milan. Young Poles flocked from all regions to the banners of the legion. From the time of the Partitions onwards, France was seen by the Poles as an opponent of the partitioning powers Prussia, Austria, and Russia, and was idealised as a land in which freedom and fraternity ruled and where – the Poles believed – support could be found for Polish independence.[24] Further units, the so-called Danube legion, were set up by General Karol Kniaziewicz (1762–1842)[25] in 1798 in Strasbourg. After the successful battles of the Italian campaign of 1799, however, Napoleon refused the requests of Dabrowski to allow the legionaries, who now numbered 13,000, to go to Poland, since this idea did not fit with his strategic plans after the Treaty of Lunéville (1801) with Austria.[26] At this the majority of the Poles left military service in disappointment. Part of the remainder of the legions, some 6,000 strong, received the order in 1802 to go to the French colony in Haiti. On arrival it emerged that Napoleon had sent the troops for them to put down a slaves' rebellion.[27] There were sustained battles with the rebels overseas, which led to the Polish units being largely decimated. Many soldiers died from illness. Only about 350 legionaries returned to Europe.[28] After the founding of the Duchy of Warsaw after the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807, many former legionaries joined the newly formed army. Dąbrowski, who had been entrusted with

the deployment of the army, was able to fall back on a great number of patriotically minded soldiers with military experience.[29] Hence the Polish Legions proved to be training grounds for the Polish national army that was now being formed. Many volunteers fought in the Polish war of 1809 against Austria under the War Minister of the time, Józef Poniatowski (1763–1813),[30] in the associations of the *Grande Armée* in the Russian campaign of 1812, and in the Battle of the Nations in 1813, as well as defending Paris in 1814 until the capitulation.

There were various motives for volunteers to join the army. Above all, the Polish volunteers had a patriotic wish to contribute to the restoration of their homeland. Other, more general, wishes included the desire to start a career, to have adventure, and at the same time to make a living. In this mixture, the general European motives were greatly reinforced by the particular situation of a home country that no longer existed. Inside the partitioned areas there were no opportunities to try for political or military careers without compromising oneself. Only a few officers entered the service of the Prussian, Austrian or Russian dividing forces. To these motives were added the difficult economic situations resulting from the occupation. The prolonged politically hopeless situation and the desire to flee from occupation also played a role. In summary, there were stronger motivations in Poland than in other European countries to go into the field as a volunteer.

The first Polish legionaries were soldiers who had already served in the army in their home country, but had been obliged to leave their country after the Third Partition of 1795. They returned to the army both because they wanted to fight for the restoration of Poland, and because they wanted to pursue their original career. These were then followed by young people from Poland who came from an entirely civilian background.

The legionaries knew the stories of their army comrades, and they knew under what circumstances the others had found their way into the army. For instance, they spoke about which of them had left against the will of their fathers.[31] Among young people it was seen as a heroic deed to make an independent decision and emancipate oneself from domestic attachments. On the other hand, through this kind of personal decision these volunteers had caused a genuine family conflict and often discord lasting several years, which was also a burden for them. To compensate for this, they often demanded of themselves that they had to prove themselves in a particular way, in order to justify their lonely decision, at least retrospectively, to their fathers. One major motive for joining the legions was given as patriotic reasons.[32]

The young men wanted to make an active contribution towards the restoration of Poland. "I would like to have rescued my country!" was a common description of the motive.[33] A second significant motive was the unattractive situation in their home town under foreign occupation, which also offered no kinds of job prospects, as the authors of the memoirs describe again and again in very unambiguous terms.[34] The legions offered the opportunities of travel, of adventure and of a military career. The authors of these memoirs rarely expressed their feelings, and instead reproduced them in a subliminal manner through descriptions of the landscape and nature.

On one hand, this travel abroad was highly educational, but on the other hand it required great capabilities. Those Polish legionaries who brought knowledge of languages with them were quickly able to become useful in the army. There were many Poles who spoke several languages and could speak German fluently: they were practised in this language as inhabitants of the divided area under Prussian administration. Particularly at the time when the Napoleonic army was sweeping through Germany, military couriers were required who spoke German and were not conspicuous as the French enemy and so in danger of death. If an important order of Napoleon had to be conveyed, it was often said: "A Polish officer will get this mission."[35] Józef Grabowski, who was active as a field officer of Napoleon in the army and took on a great many assignments of this kind, speaks very extensively of these in his memoirs.[36] He and other Polish officers who had mastered German generally carried out these activities very skilfully and efficiently.[37] They frequently managed to wriggle out of situations by telling fairy tales to distrustful post office officials and guards.[38]

Military service abroad, however, also brought many difficulties. The language problem was uppermost. There were many young volunteers who came into the legions with none of the education or language ability that they needed in Western Europe.[39] Grabowski, for instance, speaks of the officer Jurgaszko, who was barely able to speak French and hence had numerous difficulties with communication.[40] Those who arrived with hardly any education from home had to learn to read and write.[41] Some attention was paid to this, as the units insisted on a certain standard. In Mantua, Cyprian Godebski published a newspaper for the legionaries under the title *Dekada Legionowa*.[42]

Another problem was material provision, which was not continuously guaranteed. Numerous young men had borrowed money in Poland in order to get to the legions. They had assumed that the army there would feed them.[43] This kind of departure was registered in the literature, for

instance, in the speech of the young Cywinskis: "I also have a horse, but you don't get far on horseback, on the other hand I have a few gulden in my purse, and I don't want to take anything from my parents.[...] When you just get to Italy, you don't need a purse any more. The soldier gets food and weapons, and nothing else concerns me."[44] However, the financial situation was very tight from time to time, and the pay was frequently very irregular.[45]

Deprivation, sometimes also phases of hunger, physical, and mental exertions, challenged the volunteers. However, they also fused the men together. At this time many friendships were made which lasted into advanced age and represented the foundations of a network which was particularly useful in the later emigration after 1831.[46] These close relationships between men in the period of the legion were very valuable.

This appraisal of their value was also retained in Polish society. Hence it was only natural that the formation of Polish volunteer associations became a tradition among the Polish emigrants. A further Polish Legion was formed by the British government in 1854 from Poles living in England and France, under Count Zamoyski and comprising two cavalry regiments. They took part in the Crimean War in the corps of General Vivian, and after the peace agreement they were almost entirely assumed into Ottoman service. In France in 1870 a Polish Legion was formed under Jaroslaw, comprising a battalion of infantry and a squadron of uhlans which had joined Garibaldi's Army of the Vosges. In the First World War Polish legions consisting of three brigades were formed once again. The first was commanded by the later Polish President Józef Pilsudski.[47]

The figure of the Polish volunteer, which had developed from the end of the 18th century onwards, was retained in remembrance and passed on beyond the Second World War into the middle of the 20th century.

An effective medium of remembrance of the legions was and is formed by the "Song of the Polish Legions in Italy". It was composed in 1797 by Józef Wybicki in Italy. The text, among other things, states: "Poland 'tis not perished yet/ So long as we still live. / That which foreign force has seized / We at swordpoint shall retrieve./ We will pass Vistula and Warta / We shall be Polish./ Bonaparte has shown us / How to win. / March, march Dabrowski! / From Italy to our Polish land. / Let us now unite the nation / Under Thy command."[48] It was a song that made the call to fight for the freedom of Poland, and expressed unshakeable belief in the victory of the just cause and the restoration of the independence of Poland, like no other that came into being at this time. Adam Mickiewicz, who held lectures at the University of Paris in the 1840s on Slavic literature, explained to his

listeners that this text contained "current history".[49] The song spread out quickly across Europe. Its words were soon translated into French, English, and German, and in later years as well, particularly during the European rebellions of 1848, it was often sung in various places in Europe.[50] In the partitioned areas under the Russian and Prussian administration the song was strictly forbidden.[51] Nonetheless, the song was very widespread among the people, and with it the stereotype that the Polish volunteers had selflessly gone into battle in order to fight for the freedom of Poland.[52] In 1927 this song was declared the national hymn of Poland under the name *Mazurek Dąbrowskiego*.[53]

Since all literature was censored in the occupied Polish partitioned areas, only a small amount of patriotic literature appeared during the 19th century. Hence there was very little opportunity for the publication of reports of personal experience and remembrances of the Polish legionaries. It is for this reason that the figure of the volunteer was retained in Polish fiction, although here, too, the censors often intervened.[54] Objects of examination here are extracts from the epic poem by Adam Mickiewicz, *Pan Tadeusz*, and the novel by Stefan Żeromski, *Ashes*. These two works were chosen despite their difference in their form, their time of appearance and their message, because they belong to the Polish literary canon, and shaped Polish cultural remembrance for a long period.[55] The novel in verse by Mickiewicz, which was written very early on, traces a picture of events which only just belonged to the past, but were still in living memory.[56] Mickiewicz, who had been living in Paris for several years, began writing his novel after the November Rebellion was crushed in 1830. As a representative of the generation having personal experience, he situated the plot exclusively in the area on the Polish-Lithuanian border, his own home region, and centred it on the early summer of 1812.[57] Here he drew primarily on his own formative memories of the Napoleonic troops passing through, among them the Polish units. It could be maintained that the author here assembled a memorial image for those involved, which both temporally and spatially was strongly fed by Mickiewicz' own personal remembrance. Stefan Żeromski, on the other hand, who belonged to the generation of the grandchildren of the legionaries, published his work 70 years later, at a time when there were no longer any eyewitnesses alive. At this time in the partitioned areas there were great debates about the Polish history of the 19th century, and, as well as historical novels, various representations of history were composed by historians, which appeared primarily in Galicia, in the Austrian partition area, where censorship had been relaxed. Stefan Żeromski, who

created the novel *Ashes* as the first part of a trilogy about the history of Poland in the 19th century, opened a wide temporal and geographical panorama.[58] In his studies for this work in the Kosćiuszko archive in Rapperswill he clearly benefited, for instance, from the research of the historian Tadeusz Korzońs,[59] who was researching at the same time for his new biography of Kosćiuszko.[60] Żeromski had based his novel on a critical study of sources, and he kept strictly to the military facts, creating an interesting synthesis between historically real figures and the author's own inventions.[61] In doing so, he succeeded in constructing paradigmatic images of the volunteers which displayed a synthesis of many experiences and remembrances, not only from the point of view of those who were active, but also from the perspective of civilians, so that the volunteer became a multi-perspective image of remembrance and a model for several generations.

In the literary work of 1834, Adam Mickiewicz' main hero Tadeusz makes the decision in the early summer of 1812 to go to the war. He justifies this decision to his girlfriend Telimene in the following manner: "Tadeusz said, seeing her flood of tears, what would people say about a youth of my age, in good health, on who prefers, country romance over honor and truth? So many married men have had to leave their wife and child behind, just to defend their homeland, to fight for what they believe."[62] First of all the young man, having decided to leave, places his reputation and his national duty above private ties. In order to justify this motive to his loved one, he draws upon the testament of his father, who in his day had desired that his son would fulfil his patriotic duty. Similarly, the attitudes of male family members are used as an argument: "I'd like to stay, but this is not the end – according to my father's testament, I am to serve in the Polish army. And now that my Uncle's given consent, I ride at dawn; nothing can deter me."[63] In this concrete case no conflict with his father is shown, but an assignment is repeated. Hence at this point the ideal of a patriotic family is shown, in which there is agreement that at least one member is to defend the honour of the country. Mickiewicz also depicts the volunteer's route to the army.

"You must escape to the Duchy of Warsaw, Maciek the Baptist, the Bucket, Razor; Tadeusz too, for there the Russian law, cannot reach cross the Nieman's sandy shore, where friendly Poles await with open arms."[64] However, he does not forget the consequences of the decision for those who stay: "We'll cast the blame on those who fled our land, the rest of us will stay here on our farms. I bid farewell, your country will demand this much from you, but our hopes are certain freedom will come, and you who leave, exiles, will shortly see a savior in this domain, an end to

Lithuania's trials. Now let the Judge prepare our men to go, and I'll supply the gold for the journey."[65] The family members could often reckon with bitter consequences if it reached the ears of the tsarist gendarmes that a family member had secretly gone to the legions, which of course represented an opposing army for the Russian authorities. At another point Mickiewicz describes the exceptional gripping feeling of the battle, this state which former soldiers can recall for a long time: "Just like a soldier who with gun and pack spent a lifetime waging war but now has stayed in a hospital for too many years, a bed-ridden invalid in his old age – If distant drum or trumpet he might hear, dragging himself from bed he yells in rage, 'Kill the Moscovite dog!' He leaps to the hall, wooden leg clunking; he runs, despite his age, so fast attendants can't catch him at all."[66] All in all, Adam Mickiewicz values the legionaries very highly. A symbol of this is the song of the Polish legions, the Mazurek Dąbrowskiego, which forms the framework of the whole epic poem and is played six times in total. At the beginning of the plot the song rings out from a musical box, and at the end Jankel the Jew plays it in front of the audience.[67]

Barely 70 years later, Żeromski depicts corresponding moments of free choice for the army with the help of roughly sketched personal profiles.[68] In this way he leaves more room for doubts, counter-arguments, and even opposing decisions. The Prince Sułkowski, who has already functioned as an *aide de camp* of Napoleon, asks his compatriot Prince Gintułt, who is visiting him in Paris, as early as the first few minutes of his conversation whether he has the intention of joining the army.[69] When the latter, after a moment of embarrassment, responds decisively in the negative, Sułkowski persists further and expresses his regret that he did not agree with the same decisiveness, as he, after all, has had a superb military training. However, he immediately adds that he does not wish to recruit him. This addition is, however, no doubt primarily due to the fact that Sułkowski is considerably the younger of the two interlocutors, and he would feel it to be presumptuous towards the older man to make a clear attempt to recruit him. In the dialogue that then follows, the older man argues with the younger that he has lost his belief in war as an effective means. The author is not, like contemporary witnesses, gripped with the emotion of remembrance, which clearly highlights the motives for volunteering for the army. He analyses the decisions and knows how to differentiate according to the age and maturity of the protagonists, and also takes their level of education into account. After this mature Polish noble, a representative of the intelligentsia, has expressed these doubts, Żeromski shows

a scene featuring volunteers from the poorer nobility: they are sons of two neighbouring tenants from Galicia, who, after a call in 1807, immediately swing onto their horses and set off.[70] They say of themselves that they are not rich people, but that they can both serve with a good, strong horse each; even if they have no genealogy, they each have a curb, a comb, a curry-comb, and a horse blanket. Now they have spent their last pennies on uniforms and valets and are waiting for everything to begin. They correspond exactly to the prototype of the young man who is concerned with honour, his fatherland, but also adventure. The attitude of their parents' house to their decision is not explored. In another scene, however, Żeromski movingly portrays the despair of a father who has to watch as his son goes on his way to the army. The aged Cedro, an old man, tries to stop his son Krzysztof.[71] He tries to pull his son from the horse, and says that he will call the servants to tie him up and lock him away. This act unsettles Krzysztof Cedro for an instant; he presses the hands of his father for a moment, and then pushes him to the side with a hard expression of determination and rides away, accompanied by his friend Rafał Olbromski. This December morning is formative for the whole remainder of the life of Krzysztof Cedro.[72] The friends arrive together in Cracow, where they witness how three young men are to be publicly executed because they wanted to creep over the border "to the Poles".[73] A patrol had caught them at the border, brought them to Cracow and condemned them within a few hours. The execution is to take place publicly in order to scare off "hundreds and thousands". Here Żeromski allows the crowd to reflect on the light-headed plans of the three young men. It is said that the life of a soldier lured them, "the donkeys liked the braided uniforms."[74] They had no brains, they were spoilt youths who were getting high-spirited. And it is also commented: "They wanted to parleh fransä," which no doubt alludes to the fact that they were simply striving for a different life than Polish day-to-day life under Austrian occupation. Although the onlookers in front of the gallows reflect in this and similarly superficial ways about the motives of the captured volunteers, all of them nonetheless breathe a sigh of relief when the majority of those already condemned are pardoned.

Żeromski incorporates the viewpoint of the civilians to a large extent. He shows that it is never easy for the families to deal with the departure. The discussion on the decision is continued even in the absence of the volunteer. The old Cedro moans: "All of this is his, he had all of this. This cereal grows for him, for him the fruit ripens and the flowers smell. The ground belongs to him, and the whistling of the wind. The whole

earth is waiting for him here, the inheritance of his ancestors. What else did he want? What did he go looking for?"[75] Nonetheless, there are always people in the neighbourhood who defend these decisions. Trepka, for instance, says to the father Cedro: "The young dream of a great change which belongs to nobody, and the old dream of a small one which belongs only to them."[76] Here, too, the difference between generations is explored.

Finally, the panorama of decisions which Żeromski displays here shows that the decision for voluntary military service is dependent to a great degree on people's respective ages. The young man of around 20 years saddles his horse as quickly as possible. The man over 40, as shown here by the example of Prince Gintułt, hesitates. The paths of his life have already formed; numerous experiences have already led to firm views. Not everybody becomes an eternal soldier like Krzysztof Cedro, about whose eyes, fixed on Napoleon, the last chapter says: "eyes frozen in soldiers' faithfulness, eyes which swear".[77]

Cedro had not intended a long military career in the beginning, but after the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 the order was that "the whole troop was to have its quarters in Kalisz for a long time. So it would be peace and an end to adventures, so thought the young Cedro. He was to be quartered in this Kalisz, or rather settle down as a soldier and loitering officer in a time of peace. He could see in advance that his days would be spent with games of cards, pool, and dominoes, with idleness, debauchery in the mess of some pescari, in the company of comrades, as he had seen so many before."[78] Now he has to weigh up precisely how he wants to shape his life. For one thing, he is plagued by his conscience: "Had he left his old father on his own because of this kind of ideal? Had he trampled on his hopes and dreams for this? Had he experienced that day in December for this?"[79]

Finally, Krzysztof Cedro, like many other volunteers who were surprised by the sudden peace, decides to go to Spain with the other legions. "His insurmountable distaste with the falseness of life in Vienna, where the depressed pride would have mauled his soul, drove him into the kingdom of primitive soldiers' dreams."[80] He crosses Germany and France on a lengthy journey with new comrades. When he has reached the Pyrenees with his unit, his emotions break free: "Krzysztof's heart shook. In his breast there was a burning longing for deeds [...], deeds which formed the subject of immortal and eternally beautiful songs, deeds around which the ivy of legends spread and which the sighs of generations transformed into legends. He sat on his horse and dreamed with open eyes."[81]

The intoxicating feeling of the fight also comes at appropriate moments: " 'Hit them, kill them!' cried Krzysztof, happy to be riding at the forefront. He felt the sabre in his hand, his golden, beloved, strong sabre, which was mightier than the fire of a thousand carbines in an ambush. He flew onwards and felt more and more great, giant, without limits, like an angel throwing lightning. Another bolt of golden yellow lightning. A long, quivering, undulating, zig-zag-shaped lightning bolt. The joy and feeling of power took his breath away."[82] His entire stay in Spain is filled with emotional high as well as low points.

The motif of proficiency in languages plays an important part both in the literature of remembrance and in the novels. For instance, Żeromski mentions emphatically and repeatedly that Krzysztof Cedro, since he "spoke French excellently, [was] assigned to this requisitioning company".[83] And soon afterwards the fact is underlined that "Krzysztof was chosen for the engineering and artillery company because of his knowledge of French."[84] The author further shows the degree to which money and relationships play a part in the future position of the volunteer. Captain Jarzymski demonstrates to Cedro and Olbromski how much it would cost if they did not want to go to the simple infantry, but to the artillery: "For a private's uniform, even the most simple, you need thirty-seven ducards, not counting the washing and the requisites. Let alone the officer's uniform!"[85] The volunteers soon come back to earth, but, since they often left their surroundings and their family with difficulty, they cannot, or do not want to, go back so easily, and have to deal with the difficulties of enrolling, including the fact that posts are distributed in an underhand manner. For instance, Captain Jarzymski advises his old acquaintance Olbromski to stay. He will "make sure that [he] would immediately get an officer's rank and an assurance of promotion". In order to underline his words, he adds: "Look at me, my friends! Enrolment has only lasted one month, and I'm already a captain and a commander."[86] Here it is only a question of the cutting smart uniform with the "braids fresh from the lacemaker", and not at all of ideal values. On the other hand, the volunteers from the petty nobility, who crossed the Galician border illegally in great danger, complain: "When we arrived here, all of the places were already taken, every officer's post. [...] We came into the patrol as simple riders. But they know that it will become clear on the battlefield who is really born for war and who is only any use for wearing a shiny uniform."[87] The novel displays again and again the tension between the homeland, embodied by observations of the landscape, and the decisions of the volunteer. In order to deconstruct emotions to some extent, experiences

are filtered by being virtually recounted third-hand. At one point we read: "The comrade told me [...]. They come out of Welshland to Poland, my uhlans, and they come to the homeland Silesia, to Lignica. Six hundred strong, they ride over the highway, one night in May. After so many years they smell the earth of their homeland again. In this area there was quite a hill, the comrade said, and from there they saw the whole wide land for the first time. The man could hardly speak when he remembered, even though he's as tough as a rock."[88] The emotions and tensions shown here cannot be found at this intensity in the literature of remembrance, in which the authors stress facts more than feelings, and the latter remain rather encrypted. However, the friendships that arise between men, and endure even across great divides of time and space, are just as important in the literature of remembrance.

In the summer of 1812 the mature Krzysztof Cedro, who has been fighting for years in the Pyrenees, comes to the property of Rafał Olbromski, with whom he initially joined the army, and with whom he fought in 1807, in order to take him to the Russian campaign. The feeling for the close relationship which the men had on the way to and during the battles is immediately revived. However, Rafał's joy to see his friend again is no longer as hearty when he learns that his friend wants to take him to the war. He defends himself with the argument that he has a lot of work to do and is in the middle of building a house. Krzysztof laughs about this. Rafał is seized by anger on the one hand, but shame on the other. Krzysztof argues: "You work while we are going to the great war? Seventy thousand of us have marched out."[89]

Here, at the end of the book, the author brings the situation to a head. He creates a collision of values between Rafał's manly friendship and his connectedness with his homeland. Rafał Olbromski, Żeromski writes, is "close to tears. Suddenly he [is] unspeakably sad to lose this new country, the fields, the fences. He [looks] to the house, which shimmers white in the distance between the overhanging trees."[90]

Even if the main aim of the Polish volunteers in the Napoleonic Wars, that of regaining statehood, could not be realised, the legionaries and the other volunteers had nonetheless made an enormous contribution for their homeland. It can be summarised that the Polish volunteer genuinely succeeded in becoming a widely known figure in the European history of the 19th century.[91] On the one hand he had become well known as a real figure through the volunteers' travels across Europe and their fighting on numerous international fields of battle, and on the other hand there was the literary figure in various media. The existence of the legionaries in domestic Polish literature,[92] because of strict

censorship in the partition areas,[93] was frequently only hinted at with the mentioning of the *Mazurek Dąbrowskiego*. However, they were constantly present in memory, and in the *longue durée* of Polish remembrance they became important figures. They had considerable roles in Polish literature, and particularly in the historical novel. The predominantly individual images of the volunteers in the literature of remembrance had been developed in the novels into composed depictions of profiled characters, which went beyond a focus on day-to-day soldiers' life and warfare, and were intricately entwined in Polish life and society. Here the authors also tried to reflect the world of feelings of the volunteers and to display facets which the generation experiencing the events had refrained from mentioning in their own reports. Hence, for civilian readers there were far greater opportunities to identify with the characters by reading novels than on the basis of the literature of remembrance. The interest in this topic endured for a long time: a filming of *Ashes* by Andrzej Wajda (born in 1926) reached the cinemas in 1965, and a first filming of *Pan Tadeusz* by the same director was realised in 1999.

The example of the legionaries served as a model for political activities for a long time. The efforts to construct Polish groups of volunteers during the Crimean War, the formation of Polish groupings in 1870, the Polish legions in the First World War and the volunteer armed forces in the Second World War all tied in with the concept of the legion of 1797. Their volunteers were united by the common goal to restore the Polish fatherland and its honour, according to the wish that had already been expressed by the protagonists of Mickiewicz's *Pan Tadeusz*.

The legionaries became a myth in the sense of a "burning" memory, from which a pattern for action was derived and the horizon of hope – of the renewed founding of a Polish state – was founded.[94]

Notes

1. The following essay, which is concerned with the Polish volunteers of this period, was written as part of the International Research Project "Nations, Borders, Identities. The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in European Experiences and Memories (1815–1945)" in project section 4, which is dedicated to the investigation of Russian and Polish remembrances. Four sub-projects analyse war memories published between 1815 and 1945 in commemorative texts (mainly war memories and historical novels as well as biographies, commemorative books, plays and lyrics). Further information is available at: http://www.unc.edu/nbi. Project board: Prof. Karen Hagemann (project director), Prof. Arnd Bauerkämper, Prof. Etienne François and Prof. Hartmut Kaelble. The published results will include monographs and anthologies with selected workshop and conference papers. The first

volume of the new Palgrave Macmillan Series "War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850" A. Forrest, K. Hagemann and J. Rendall (eds.), *Soldiers, Citizens and Civilians. Experiences and Perceptions of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1790–1820,* will be published in December 2008.

2. Primary recent works on this are: T. Cegielski, Tadeusz and Ł. Kądzieła (1990): *Rozbiory Polski 1792–1793–1795* (Warsaw); A. Nowak (1995): *Jak rozbićrosyjskie imperium? Idee polskiej polityki wschodniej (1773–1921)* (Warsaw).
3. M. G. Müller (1996) "Der Kościuszko-Aufstand und die Teilungen Polens" in H. Haumann (ed.): *Der letzte Ritter und erste Bürger im Osten Europas. Kościuszko, das aufständische Reformpolen und die Verbundenheit zwischen Polen und der Schweiz* (Basel and Frankfurt a. M.), pp. 133–44; N. Davies (1982) *God's Playground: . A History of Poland* (New York); M. G. Müller (1984) *Die Teilungen Polens 1772–1793–1795*, (Munich); P. Kieniewicz et al. (eds.) (1994) *Trzy powstania narodowe: . kościuszkowskie, listopadowe, styczniowe* (Warsaw); A. Nowak (1995); J. Łukowski (1999) *The Partitions of Poland* (London); R. Kołodziejczyk (1996) "Die polnischen Aufstände und die Entwicklung der modernen Gesellschaft", in H. Haumann (ed.) *Der letzte Ritter und erste Bürger im Osten Europas. Kościuszko, das aufständische Reformpolen und die Verbundenheit zwischen Polen und der Schweiz* (Basel and Frankfurt a. M.), pp. 363–70.
4. C. A. Blackburn (1998) *Napoleon and the Szlachta* (New York); J. Czubaty (2003) "The Attitudes of the Polish Political Elite towards the State in the Period of the Duchy of Warschau, 1807–1815" in M. Rowe *Collaboration and Resistance in Napoleonic Europe* (Basingstoke), pp. 168–85.
5. P. Broekere (1883) *Memoiren aus dem Feldzuge in Spanien (1808–1814)* (Posen).
6. W. L. Szeptycki (1862) *Sommosierra* (Warsaw).
7. K. Wojciechowski (1845) *Pamiętniki moje z Hiszpanii* (Warsaw).
8. J. Grabowski (1905) *Pamietniki wojskowe Jozefa Grabowskiego oficera sztabu cesarza Napoleona I.* (Warsaw).
9. R. Bielecki (2002), *Encyklopedia wojen Napoleońskich* (Warsaw), p. 114.
10. D. Chłapowski (1832) *Lettres sur les événements militaires en Pologne et en Lithuanie*, (Paris); D. Chłapowski (1910) *Als Ordonnanzoffizier Napoleons in den Kriegen 1806–1813; Erinnerungen von General Baron Dezydery Chlapowski* (Berlin).
11. C. Godebski (1805) *Grenadier-filozof* (Warsaw); C. Godebski (1805) *Wiersz do Legiów Polskich* (Warsaw).
12. J. F. Kierzkowski (1903) *Pamiętniki Jakuba Filipa Kierzkowskiego kapitana wojska francuskiego, kawalera Krzyża Legii Honorowej, a na ostatku majora wojska polskiego 1831 roku* (Warsaw).
13. See the edition of Dezydery Chłapowski under Fn. 6, L. B. Chodzko (1829) *Mémoires sur les opérations de l'avant-garde du 8e corps de la grande armée, formée de troupes polonaises, en 1813; par un témoin oculaire* (Paris); J. Sułkowski (1832) *Mémoires historiques* (Paris); W. Chrzanowski (1857) *Quelques considérations sur la campagne de* 1812 (Paris); J. Grabowski (1907) *Mémoires militaires de Joseph Grabowski, officier à l'Etat-major Impérial de Napoléon Ier 1812–1813–1814* (Paris).
14. Best-selling novels on this topic were also written by Wacław Gąsiorowski (1869–1939), who wrote in the best manner of Scott. From him came such

titles on the topic as: *Huragan*, Lwów 1902, *Rok 1809. Powiesć historyczna z epoki napoleonskiej,* Lwów 1903. Others who wrote included: A. A. Kosiński (1845) *Powiastki i opowiadania żołnierskie z wojen od 1799 do 1812 r.* (Leipzig); W. Przyborowski (1902) *Na San Domingo* (Warsaw); W. Przyborowski (1904) *Bylo to pod Jena*: *opowiadanie legionisty* (Warsaw); p. N. Ostrowski (1912) *Sladami legionów* (Warsaw); P. N. Ostrowski (1902) *Wierny do ostatka. Powiesc z wojen napoleonskich* (Warsaw).

15. A. Mickiewicz (1834) *Pan Tadeusz czyli ostatni zajaz na Litwie Historja szlachecka z r. 1811 i 1812 we dwunastuksięegach, wierszem* (Paris). Despite its different literary form, *Pan Tadeusz* is evaluated as a historical novel. On this see also: J. Malinowski (1968) "Zarys rozwoju powieści historycznej w Polsce do 1939 r." in H. Dubowik et al. (eds.) *Polska powieść historyczna. Wybrane zagadnienia z dziejów recepcji i warsztatu twórczego* (Bydgoszcz), pp. 7–31, here p. 13.
16. P. Żeromski (1903) *Popioły* (Cracow).
17. M. Rowicka (2004) *O neurotycznym cenzorze, przebieglym wydawcy i manipulowanym czytelniku czyli Pan Tadeusz w Warszawie w okresie zaborów* (Warsaw).
18. F. Moretti (1999) *Atlas des europäischen Romans. Wo die Literatur spielte* (Ostfildern), p. 215.
19. On the concept of collective text, see: A. Erll (2005) *Kollektives Gedächtnis und Erinnerungskulturen* (Stuttgart), pp. 158–61. As part of the project, databases on historical novels about the Napoleonic Wars were created. These recorded, among other things, the main figures dealt with, as well as translations into other languages, their circulation within Europe, etc.
20. For more details on the legions: R. Bielecki (2002) *Encyklopedia wojen Napoleońskich*. (Warsaw), pp. 356–62.
21. Józef Wybicki, a Polish poet and politician. He took part in the Kościuszko Rebellion in 1794, and then fled to France and later was active in the founding of the Duchy of Warsaw in 1807.
22. Fedosova (1998), E. I. "Polish Projects of Napoleon Bonaparte", *Napoleonic Scholarship*, 1:2, http://www.napoleon-series.org/ins/scholarship98/c_polish.html
23. Jan Henryk Dąbrowski, general, first served in the Saxon army and in 1796/1797, together with Józef Wybicki, organized the military formations of the Polish volunteers within the Napoleonic Army. In 1806 he was assigned by Napoleon to the formation of the armed forces in the newly created Duchy of Warsaw, which he then commanded as commanding general. See: E. Luninski (1911) *Napoleon* (Warsaw) p. 43ff.
24. A. Nieuważny (1998) "Napoleon and Polish Identity", *History Today*, 48, May.
25. Karol Kniaziewicz was already an officer and general in the Polish army, and at the battle of Maciejowice (1794) he fell into Russian captivity, from which he was released in 1796, upon which he went to Italy and fought in the legion. After 1801 he left military service. In 1812 he returned to military service and commanded the 18th division of the *Grande Armée* in the Russian campaign.
26. A. Nieuważny (2005) "Szcześćie patrioty przezornego. Jan Henryk Dąbrowski (1755–1818)" in t. Jeziorowski and J. H. Dąbrowski, *Marsz, marsz Dąbrowski- w 250. rocznice urodzin Jana Henryka Dąbrowskiego* (Poznań), p. 7–17, here p. 11.

27. J. Pachoński and R. K. Wilson (1986) *Poland's Caribbean Tragedy* (New York).
28. Jeziorowski (2005), p. 12.
29. J. Cytowski (1970) "Generał Jan Henryk Dąbrowski w tradycjach wychowania wojskiego" in *Generał Jan Henryk Dąbrowski* (1755–1818). *Materiały z Międzyuczelnianej sesji naukowej UAM i WAP odbytej w Poznaniu 28 III 1969* (Poznań) p. 55–69, here p. 64f.
30. Józef Poniatowski became War Minister in 1806, defeated the Austrian army in the Battle of Raszyn in 1809, took part in the Russian campaign in 1812 and in the Battle of the Nations of 1813, was made a Marshal there, and died in the rearguard of Napoleon.
31. For instance, adjutant Edward Potworowski: Grabowski (2004), p. 106.
32. E. g. also Jano Leon Kozietulski, see Luninski (1911), p. 141.
33. Grabowski (2004), p. 107.
34. See, above all, S. Broekere (1883).
35. J. Grabowski (2004) *Pamiętniki wojskowe 1812–1814* (Warsaw), p. 58.
36. Grabowski (2004), p. 58.
37. Grabowski (2004), p. 16ff.
38. Grabowski (2004), p. 44.
39. See Grabowski (2004), p. 108.
40. Grabowski (2004), p. 90.
41. Nieuważny (2005), here p. 12.
42. J. Lerski (ed.) (1996) *Historical Dictionary of Poland 966 – 1945* (Westport, Conn.)., p. 166.
43. For instance, see also the depictions in: H. Sienkiewicz (1917) *Die Legionen. Historischer Roman* (Munich).
44. Sienkiewicz (1917), p. 5.
45. Grabowski (2004), p. 92.
46. Grabowski (2004), p. 188ff.
47. Józef Pilsudski (1867–1935)
48. As quoted in: A. Nieuważny (1998) "Napoleon and Polish Identity" in *History Today*, 48, May.
49. A. Mickiewicz (1952) "Literatura słowiańska. Kurs drugi" in A. Mickiewicz *Dzieła* (Warsaw), p. 243.
50. Z. Lewinówna (1984) "Mazurek Dąbrowskiego" in *Literatura polska. Przewodnik encyklopedyczny,* t.1. (Warsaw) p. 646–48.
51. For this reason, Żeromski also avoided mentioning this song in his novel *Ashes*. On the ban, see: S. Zabierowski (1977) "Twórca Popiołów wobec Mickiewicza" in Z. Golinski (ed.) *Stefan Żeromski* (Warsaw), pp. 203–26, here 206f.; J. Orłowsicki (1998) "Motywy *Mazurka Dąbrowskiego* w poezji rosyjskiej", *Slavia Orientalis,* XLVII:3, pp. 405–13, here 405.
52. M. Konopnicka (1906) *Śpiewnik historyczny 1767–1863* (Lwów), p. 111.
53. T. Jeziorowski (2005) *Marsz, marsz Dąbrowski- w 250. rocznice urodzin Jana Henryka Dąbrowskiego [Wystawa zorganizowana w ramach obchodów 250. rocznicy urodzin gen. Jana Henryka Dąbrowskiego]; Muzeum Narodowe w Poznaniu, 5 listopada 2005–22 stycznia 2006 ; [katalog]* (Poznań).
54. M. Rowicka (2004) *O neurotycznym cenzorze, przebiegłym wydawcy i manipulowanym czytelniku czyli Pan Tadeusz w Warszawie w okresie zaborów* (Warsaw).
55. M. Jaroszewski (1995) *Literatur und Geschichte* (Warsaw).

56. M. Kula (2004) *Krótki raport o użytkowaniu historii* (Warsaw), p. 221; S. Falkowski (2000) *23 tajemnice "PanaTadeusza" czyli centrum polszczyzny* (Wrocław); S. Pigoń (2001) *'Pan Tadeusz* (Warsaw); E. Stachurski (2005) *Słownictwo "Pana Tadeusza" Adama Mickiewicza na tle tekstów innych poematów romantycznych* (Kraków).
57. Pigoń (2001), p. 124.
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64. Mickiewicz (2006), Book 10.
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69. Żeromski (1988), p. 260ff.
70. Żeromski (1988), p. 608ff.
71. Żeromski (1988), p. 540ff.
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75. Żeromski (1988), p. 892.
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81. Żeromski (1988), p. 668.
82. Żeromski (1988), p. 759.
83. Żeromski (1988), p. 669.
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85. Żeromski (1988), p. 605
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91. Z. Libera, (2004) *Od Sejmu Czteroletniego do Napoleona* (Warsaw).
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5

Fág an Bealeagh: Irish Volunteers in the American Civil War

Michael Hochgeschwender

Fredericksburg, 13 December 1862. Over and over again, dozens of regiments of the Union Army of the Potomac kept assaulting the trenches of Robert E. Lee's famed Confederate Army of Northern Virginia. At that point, the Northern Irish Brigade, led by General Thomas F. Meagher, started a desperate last attempt to seize the Confederate fortifications on the slope of Marye's Height: "A bold, distinct Gaelic voice – loud enough to be heard above the noise of battle – yelled out: 'Irish Brigade, advance!' The afternoon sun glittered on the frozen ground and the long lines of bayonets as the Irishmen rushed up the hill with wild huzzahs. The 28th Massachusetts had been chosen to the centre of the brigade because it carried the green flag of Ireland. The banner, decorated with a golden harp, a sunburst, and a wreath of shamrocks, bore the Gaelic motto *Faugh a Ballagh*, translated as 'Clear the Way'. [...] Partially hidden in a sunken road and protected by a stone wall across their front, the soldiers of Brig. General Thomas R.R. Cobb's Georgia brigade prepared to loose a devastating volley into the faces of their enemy. Ironically and tragically, many of these Georgians were Irish immigrants. A few recognized the green flag of the 28th Massachusetts and the green sprigs of boxwood which every man of the Irish Brigade wore in his cap. They spread the word. 'Oh God, what a pity! Here come Meagher's fellows!' Despite their ties of nationality, Cobb's veterans stood and opened fire with their rifles, shredding the ranks of the Irish Brigade. [...] The intense fire from Cobb's Georgians splintered the fence, spattered mud in all directions, and decimated those men moving up behind it. But still, the Irish came on. A strange and macabre sound was heard above the exploding artillery shells and pathetic screams of the wounded. The Confederates were cheering and applauding, overcome by the bravery of their Irish foe. Maj."[1] Finally,

the Irish had to fall back. Within less than 20 minutes, the brigade had lost more than 2,000 men, dead or wounded, nearly 35 per cent of its initial entire number.[2]

Marye's Height was just another of many battles and skirmishes in which the Irish Brigade lost significantly more soldiers than other Union brigades. Together with the gallant defence of the Angle of Cemetery Ridge during Pickett's famous last charge at Gettysburg, Marye's Height became the single most important event of the whole Civil War to be remembered by Irish Americans. First and foremost, it fulfilled all possible requirements to be moulded into their ethnic mythology, because it highlighted the ideas of a specifically Celtic ferocious bravery, of Irish loyalty to the Union's cause, of personal sacrifice, and a certain amount of tragic, yet heroic, futility.[3] In so far as the Marye's Height incident during the battle of Fredericksburg emphasized the already established values of both Irishness and American Irish identity,[4] it became a landmark of Irish-American debates on integration, identity, and patriotism, and it is still commemorated for this reason. Furthermore, predominantly in popular and folk culture, this Irish commemoration was quite successful beyond the boundaries of Irish America. In songs and poetry, in TV shows, and in movies such as *Gettysburg*, *The Fighting Irish*, and even Martin Scorsese's *Gangs of New York*, the idea of Gaelic heroism is still present.

In American historiography, however, the contribution of the Irish to the Civil War has always been somewhat conspicuously contended. There were, and still are, five competing historiographical schools, each trying to come to terms with the motivations and activities of Irish volunteers during the War between the States: first, the Irish-Catholic or Irish-Nationalist school, emphasizing the traditional interpretation of Gaelic bravery;[5] secondly, the nativist school, represented by Ella Lonn, denouncing Irish bravado and particularism;[6] thirdly, the Consensus school, stressing the American values mutually shared by all Union and Confederate soldiers;[7] fourthly, the ethnocultural school, focusing specifically on the integrational problems of the Irish;[8] and, finally, the neo-consensus school, as represented by William Burton and others, claiming that the Irish volunteers, like other ethnic volunteers, were predominantly Americans, sharing American values.[9] According to Burton, the Irish were "good" Americans, because they used ethnic politics to become an integral part of the American body politick and society.[10] I will, nonetheless, focus on the ethnocultural quest for a specific Irishness within the broader framework of the American political and social situation during the war.

Who – to begin with – were the Irishmen who joined the Union army during the Civil War? Some of them were recruited directly in Ireland. Despite the growing anger of the British government, the Americans, both Unionist and Confederate, sent a number of envoys to Ireland in order to enlist volunteers. These were, however, but a tiny minority among the Irish in the Union army. The nationalist Irish Republican Brotherhood in 1863 even castigated news releases about alleged masses of Irishmen from Ireland joining the US army as British lies.[11] The vast majority of the Irish volunteers had already put down some roots in American society since having arrived earlier at the shores of the new world.

But they were not in any way a coherent group, since they were alienated from each other along the lines of region, religion, class, party politics, culture, and even Irish identity. There were unbridgeable differences between a middle-class Scotch-Irish Presbyterian, who was living in the US as a second or third-generation immigrant,[12] a well-established Anglo-Irish Episcopalian from the Dublin region, and a Roman Catholic migrant from Tipperary, Limerick or Cork who had just emigrated to the US due to the Great Potato Famine in Ireland.[13] Unlike the Scotch-Irish and the Anglo-Irish, the Roman Catholic Irish experienced harsh and violent forms of anti-Catholicism and anti-Irish sentiments that sometimes even denied the Irish their whiteness.[14]

This mixture of anti-Catholic and anti-Irish sentiments was an integral part of the dominant Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture that at the time shaped the American understanding of national identity. Contrary to Burton's suggestion that anti-Catholic nativism lost its impact with the sudden decline of the American party, it is important to note the deep roots and long-term effects of social and cultural anti-Catholicism and anti-Irish sentiments in American society as a whole. Nor, again contrary to Burton's suggestions, does the existence of wealthy and well-established Roman Catholic Irish in the US diminish the impact of anti-Catholicism. Since the Democrats, the hitherto revolutionary party of Jefferson and Jackson, had, during the 1840s, turned into a conservative, racist party that propagated a *herrenvolk* democracy accepting the whiteness of every European ethnicity, including the Celtic race, a 90–95 per cent majority of Roman Catholic Irish voted Democratic, while a majority of the Protestant middle-class Irish tended to vote Republican.[15]

This difference in party affiliation shaped the social, political, and cultural life of the Irish in a society that was deeply committed to politics. This included the hotly debated issue of slavery, which served as

a sort of political litmus test in the Antebellum era. Thus, the Roman Catholic Irish became predominantly anti-abolitionist (as they identified abolitionists with British Protestantism and capitalism), yet not necessarily pro-slavery.[16] Only a small group of second-generation middle-class Irish Catholics shared sympathies for the Republican Party and a moderate, gradualist abolitionism, though they generally shied away from immediatist abolitionism and radical Republicanism.[17]

This social, generational, and religious segmentation of the Irish shaped their expectations and attitudes toward the war. It was, likewise, those crucial distinctions that actually dictated what American patriotism really meant, not only for the Irish but for mainstream Americans as well.[18] According to all sources, there was something like a patriotic rush in the first months of 1861. The election of Abraham Lincoln, the subsequent secessions of South Carolina and other slave-holding states of the South, and the first gunfire at Fort Sumter had heated the political atmosphere. A wave of Unionist patriotism ran through the North and the Northwest. Union and Constitution were its slogans. "Old Glory," the star-spangled banner of the Union, was hoisted everywhere, yet often under pressure.[19] Thousands of young Americans voluntarily joined the armed forces of the "great republic". Yet those actions and slogans had different meanings for those who used them. Most northern Democrats, and many Republicans too, still hated or at least scorned Lincoln, and, while a small minority of Radical Republicans wanted to wage war in order to free the slaves, the majority of Northerners were not at all interested in ending slavery. "Union and Constitution" for the Democrats, both the pro-Lincoln War and the conspicuously anti-Lincoln Peace Democrats, predominantly meant the reconstruction of the Union as it had been before 1860, including slavery and states' rights – no social, liberal, and capitalist revolution in the South as envisioned by the Radicals.[20] At that point the Irish were split between the Peace Democrats, who showed strong sympathies for the Confederate cause,[21] and the War Democrats, who were willing to ally with the Republicans to keep the Union together.[22] However, both Democratic factions were under massive propaganda pressure. The patriotic campaign launched by the Republicans forced them into a situation in which they had to choose sides.[23] Thus predominantly Democrats, and among them the Irish, volunteered *en masse* for the Union army. Many Republican politicians were quite happy to build up an army dominated by War Democrats. This would strengthen their power back in the state capitals. It was this specific situation, already at the beginning of the war, that gave room to rumours and suspicions that Republican politicians

wanted to establish a universal Republican powerhouse in the states and the Union, while the poor and the Democrats would bleed in the trenches.[24] Structurally this was quite correct. Only very few middle-class abolitionists, for example, joined the forces; many of them were German volunteers, the so-called forty-eighters.[25] There were some hotbeds of army abolitionism and radicalism, for instance the New Hampshire regiments, but there was in general a structural gap between what leading Republicans saw as war aims and what the troops were actually fighting for.[26] President Lincoln was quite aware of this gap. He and the Republicans launched propagandistic efforts to form an ideologically coherent army that would share a common understanding of patriotism and the war aims. With the help of formally non-partisan, yet strongly Republican, institutions, such as, for instance, the Union Leagues, the United States Christian Commission (an evangelical, anti-Catholic stronghold), and the United States Sanitary Commission, they were quite successful.[27] Starting from 1863, and especially during the elections of 1864, the Union army had become a unified instrument in the hands of the Republican Party.[28] As we shall see, this was exactly the point at which the Irish tried *en masse* to escape the very army they had joined so happily in 1861.

Due to circumstances, the Union army of 1861 was a rather unprofessional army consisting of neighbourhood bands and patronage. The US Army of the 1850s had been a very small, demoralized force of fewer than 20,000 soldiers, ridden by alcoholism, and lacking discipline and public support.[29] Moreover, in 1861 many of those soldiers, predominantly experienced officers, chose loyalty to their Southern state and its peculiar culture over loyalty to the Union. Therefore, the Union was in need of a totally new army. The existing state militias, highly partisan units, served as the institutional backbone of this new army.[30] Whole neighbourhoods poured into the militia regiments as volunteers. Sometimes they elected their non-commissioned officers and their officers; sometimes the latter were installed by the state governor. In either case, the vast majority of them were rather inexperienced War Democrats, and some of them failed miserably in the first battles. This military disaster of the Democratic generals greatly helped the Republicans to gain control over the army and to denounce the Democratic war efforts. In the beginning, nevertheless, this structure was also used by the Irish. Patronage was always at the heart of their ethnic regiments. Well-known community leaders, such as Thomas Francis Meagher[31] (perhaps the archetypical Irish drunkard – he finally drowned drunk in the Missouri), Michael Corcoran, St Clair Mulholland,

James A. Mulligan, Thomas Cahill, or Robert Nugent, who were well connected with the War Democratic leadership, and the Irish press started initiatives to bring the Irish to arms. And they were rather successful. Compared with the German minority, the Irish were in general less willing to sacrifice their lives for a cause that was not necessarily theirs. Quite a few Irish Peace Democrats remained sceptical about the whole war. However, about 150,000 of approximately 1.9 million Irish became army volunteers, while 200,000 out of approximately 2 million German immigrants rallied around the flag.[32]

Besides the Irish nationalist middle-class leadership, it was the Roman Catholic clergy, led by a predominantly Irish episcopate, that very much supported the idea of distinct Irish regiments. Sometimes they even pressured Lincoln or the governors to appoint specifically Catholic officers.[33] This was their only chance to gain spiritual control and to compete with the influence of Irish secular nationalism within the armed forces. As a result, the Irish regiments somehow mirrored the internal differentiations among the Irish: middle-class nationalists, ardent Catholics, some few Protestants of different denominations, and a lot of poor people searching for bread, money, and adventure. To a certain extent, the clergy achieved their goal. The Irish Brigade in particular was famed as a centre of Roman Catholic piety.[34] The Catholic chaplains were regarded as trusted leaders. They served as spiritual guides, as bankers, as scriptors and readers for the illiterate. They fought the traditionally high consumption of whisky and rum, and played an important role during the annual celebration of the St Patrick's Day ceremonies.[35] It would, nevertheless, be an exaggeration to think that the Irish regiments were priest-ridden. They were dominated by neighbourhood comradeship[36] and by the interests of Irish-Democratic politicians.

Many of the Irish regiments were based on Irish Catholic militia units that had been established during the heydays of nativism in the 1840s and 1850s. But they served only as the initial institutional framework for many more Irish regiments, reflecting the regional distribution of the Irish in the US, such as, for instance, the 9th Connecticut, the 9th Massachusetts, the 15th Massachusetts, the 28th Massachusetts, the 63rd New York, the 88th New York, the 155th New York, the 164th New York, the 170th New York, the 184th New York, the 69th Pennsylvania, the 116th Pennsylvania, the 7th Wisconsin, the 23rd Illinois, the 90th Illinois, and finally the 35th Indiana. Corcoran and Meagher formed even larger units, Corcoran's Legion (155th, 164th, 170th, and 184th NY) and the famous Irish Brigade (28th MA, 63rd, 69th, and 88th

NY, and the Protestant-"American" 116th PA under the leadership of Mulholland). Some of them were led by moderate Protestants or Episcopalians, but the majority of the officers were Irish Catholics and Nationalists. Corcoran's Legion and Meagher's Irish Brigade were centres of Catholic influence. In some units, for example in the 10th Ohio, 9th Connecticut, and Mulligan's Wild Geese Regiment, the 23rd Illinois, many of the officers were Fenians, the most radical Irish nationalists who were even excommunicated by the Catholic Church because of their membership of a secret, freemason-like society.[37]

As it is certainly true that the Irish regiments fought for the Union cause (at least in their understanding of this cause) like all the other Union regiments, as Burton states, the impact of Irish ethnic identity as an important part of the regimental culture should not be underestimated. Attendance of the Holy Mass and the celebration of St Patrick's Day were an important part of it. Yet there were several other symbolic elements that altogether formed a specific culture and atmosphere within the Irish units. The most prominent was the Green Flag with the Harp, the very symbol of Irish independence. The constant use of the Green Flag was important in so far as it decisively distinguished the Irish regiments from other Union regiments. It was even more important if we take the Unionist flag cult of 1860/1861 into consideration. The use of the Green Flag manifested on a symbolic level the will of the Irish leadership to maintain a specific Irishness within a framework of Unionist loyalty. Its symbolic value was, likewise, different from the use of other regimental flags that displayed loyalty to a state. Ireland was not like Pennsylvania, Illinois or Wisconsin. Other important means of establishing group cohesion inside the units were specifically Irish anti-British and more general Democratic-Catholic anti-abolitionist sentiments. What the leadership of the ethnic Irish regiments did, therefore, was to create a specific double identity, combining a conservative Democratic Unionist patriotism and loyalty to the Unionist cause with strong elements of preserving Irish identity and Irish political aims. Yes, they were effectively fighting for the victory of the Union, as were the other regiments of the Northern army. But they were not fighting for one single cause. The Irish, unequivocally, had their own agenda, culturally, politically, and symbolically.

This thesis may best be proven if we take a closer look at the underlying motives for the Irish to join the Unionist armed forces, for it was not only Unionist patriotism that guided their actions in spring 1861. They can be found on two different, yet closely connected, levels, one predominantly Irish-American, the other exclusively Irish. The

first level was deeply connected with the nativist suspicions toward the patriotic loyalty of the Irish, both as Roman Catholics and as Irish. Those suspicions had had a certain basis in reality: the *San Patricios* of 1846.[38] This battalion had consisted of several hundred deserters who had left the American army during its attack on Mexico in order to collaborate with the Mexicans. It was a well-established opinion at that time that the *San Patricios* had been Roman Catholic Irish who had abandoned their loyalty to their new fatherland because they wanted to fight together with their Catholic brethren from Mexico. In 1860–1861, therefore, many Irish were afraid of the consequences of a lack of patriotism, and they desperately wanted to prove that they were patriotic, reliable, and brave.

The other point was Ireland. As I have already mentioned, atleast many officers were members of the Fenian Brotherhood. The Fenians were a secret organization, based in Ireland and the US, where it existed within the established Ancient Order of the Hibernians. The Ancient Order was a predominantly Catholic middle-class institution that was responsible, along with charities, for the celebration of the St Patrick's Day ceremonies. Those middle-class Fenians had their own agenda.[39] They thought that the Irish regiments might be rather valuable in a future struggle with Britain. After the War Between the States (from 1866 to 1871) the Fenians therefore carried out several raids against Canada in order to destabilize the British Empire.[40] These raids were futile, yet they marked the origin of what would later become the Irish Republican Army. Burton is quite right in stating that only a very few members of the Irish Civil War regiments would later become Fenian militiamen. According to his estimates, about 150 former officers, many of them middle-class Irishmen, joined the Fenian troops. However, nationalism at that time was a middle-class phenomenon, in the US as in Ireland. As Kevin Kenny has convincingly shown, the ethnicization of the Irish working class and peasantry as Irish and not as men from Tipperary, Mayo or Sligo started only in the 1870s.[41]

The most important issue stemming from all three reasons to voluntarily join the Union army in 1861 – Unionist patriotism, the struggle against the memory of the *San Patricios*, and the agenda of the Fenian Brotherhood – was the myth of a specific Celtic heroism. It was deeply rooted in Irish history. The Wild Geese of the 17th and 18th centuries, the Papal Irish Brigade, the heroism of the Irish Guard during the battle of Culloden, all these events had been integrated into the Irish collective memory.[42] They served as a central reference point for Irish ethnic identity, yet within an ambiguous framework. On the one hand, the Irish

tended to construct themselves as the victims of world history, especially of Anglo-Saxon dominance in recent history. On the other hand, the Irish celebrated – astonishingly, without any significant connection with the victim stereotype – the idea that Gaelic or Celtic peoples, led by the Irish, were by ethnic heritage much braver than any other people in the world. This was a rather American form of boosterism, yet it was functionalized to stabilize the typically Irish double identity. Thus, the bloodshed in Fredericksburg, Rappahannock, and Gettysburg could easily be transformed into this mythology. And, again, it served two different purposes: it was – in the patriotic memory of the Civil War that finally established a unified idea of American identity in the 1880s and 1890s – used as an argument for the integration of the Irish into the American society, and it was used to prove the right of the Irish to gain independence from Britain.

Loyalty was but one of the Irish interests during the Civil War. The other was the survival of the Irish minority on the basis of still existing anti-British and anti-bourgeois sentiments. Thus, when the general pro-war enthusiasm declined because it took much longer to whip Southern secessionism than many people had expected, Irish Unionist patriotism largely vanished, and turned into a violent and riotous dissatisfaction with the Republican war efforts. This is perhaps the strongest argument against the idea that the Civil War was about American patriotism. The reasons for the rapid decline of Irish voluntarism in 1862 and 1863 are fairly clear. It started with the high mortality rate of Irish and other Union regiments in the early battles of the war, and became more evident after the bloody disaster at Marye's Height. Not only the Irish, but many Democrats, especially from the working class and from rural areas, who had earlier shown sympathies for the Confederate cause and a class-based bias against evangelical middle-class abolitionism, turned against the war. They shared the idea that this was but a rich man's war. Again, the ambivalent ideas of Irish bravery and Irish victimization were actualized. This intensified the common criticism of the Republican administration among the Irish. They became much more radicalized than any other group inside the Union.

This radicalization grew more significant when President Lincoln in September 1862 gave in to the pressure of his party's radicals and uttered the abolitionist Emancipation Proclamation. *Encore*, the Irish joined the Democratic response to this step, and *encore*, they acted out more radically than the other Democrats. Anti-black racism had been at the core of the Democratic ideology since the election campaign of 1840. For the Irish, however, the emancipation of the slaves was not

only a social catastrophe or the end of racial superiority of the white peoples of the US, as it was for the Democrats. It was but another relentless threat undertaken by the abominable and reckless British to wipe the poor Irish people from the face of the earth. Abolitionism, according to this understanding, was a part of the British conspiracy against the Irish. By the time the Emancipation Proclamation was made public, for the overwhelming majority of the Catholic Irish the Lincoln administration had become nothing less than a puppet of British anti-Irish activities.

Things were made worse by the fact that the administration had to compensate for the general unwillingness to voluntarily serve in the Union armies. Thus, the government took action and invented the draft. Yet the draft involved two striking deficits. First, it was a sort of lottery, and secondly, and more importantly, it was possible to pay $300 for a substitute in order to evade the service. While the middle-class were able to pay the $300, it was impossible for working-class people. This injustice of the draft led to a public outburst. The Irish reacted much more aggressively than any other group in the Union. Only in situations where, as for instance in Boston, the Roman Catholic clergy acted instantly and firmly against an outbreak of violence, did the Irish Catholic minority remain relatively quiet.[43] Things were different in New York in the hot summer of 1863.[44] What started on 13 July 1863 as a combined action of Democratic protesters, mostly working-class Germans and Irish, against the predominance of middle-class Republicanism in New York City, soon turned into a bloody riot led by angry Irishmen (and women) against everyone and everything they utterly hated: Republicans, Abolitionists, Negroes, the police, and – in the end – even Irish regiments coming back from Gettysburg. As Iver Bernstein has shown, the Draft Riot "dwarfed the figures for ethnic and anti-abolitionist mobs" of the antebellum era.[45] In 1863 105 persons were killed, five times more than in the bloodiest antebellum riot. And even after 1863 violence was still significant in New York, especially Irish ethnic violence. In the 1870s, for instance, the denominational violence between the Ulster loyalists, the "Orange Boys", and the "Green" Catholics, many of them members of the Ancient Order of the Hibernians, regularly swept from Ulster to New York City and exploded in the Orange Riots recurring almost annually.[46] All this was definitely not about integration.

With the Draft Riots of 1863 the short era of Irish voluntary service in the Union army ended abruptly. There were still some ethnic Irish regiments, but more and more they lost their distinct ethnic, religious,

and political identity. In many of them, the Irish became a minority. The Irish leadership withdrew from the war. By 1864 not a single one of the Irish leaders, once so famous, was still on active duty. To sum up, the Civil War experience was in no way an integrational experience for the Irish, not even for those who voluntarily joined the Union forces. But it was not single-mindedly anti-integrationist either. It provided the Irish with an integrationist-patriotic framework that would eventually become useful in later decades, when the American majority society had established its own sense of an inclusive national identity. And it provided the Irish with a functional alternative to the idea of the unified nation state: double identity. They were the first really hyphenated Americans, and thus became a distant cause of the modern identity politics of the US. This is far less than many modern historians are willing to concede; it is, nevertheless, more than could have been expected in the antebellum era. This is perhaps the single most important lesson the voluntary service of Irish soldiers in the Civil War era may teach us. War voluntarism was not necessarily about a unified concept of the nation state, especially not in the 19th century. It could also involve more complex notions of loyalty and a multifaceted, fragmented patriotism. Yet this was a specific phenomenon of war volunteers whose motivation differed greatly from the ordinary drafted grunt of the civil strife.

Notes

1. K. O'Brien (ed.) (1996) *My Life in the Irish Brigade: The Civil War Memoirs of Private William McCarter, 116th Pennsylvania Infantry* (Cambridge), pp. v–vii, cf. pp. 164–86; L. F. Kohl (ed.) (1996) *St. Clair A. Mulholland, The Story of the 116th Regiment: Pennsylvania Volunteers in the War of the Rebellion* (New York), pp. 56–69, 240f. See furthermore J. G. Bilby (1997) *The Irish Brigade in the Civil War: The 69th New York and Other Irish Regiments of the Army of the Potomac* (Conshohocken), pp. 66–70.
2. Cf. J. McPherson (1996) *Für die Freiheit sterben: Die Geschichte des amerikanischen Bürgerkriegs* (München), p. 560–74, R. F. Weigley (2000) *A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 1861–1865* (Bloomington), pp. 193–97; A. C. Guelzo (1995) *The Crisis of the American Republic: A History of the Civil War and the Reconstruction Era* (New York), pp. 258–68; H. S. Stout (2006) *Upon the Altar of the Nation: A Moral History of the Civil War* (London), pp. 194–98.
3. M. Hochgeschwender (2002) "Zwischen Milieukohäsion und nationaler Integration: Zur Funktion katholischer Militärseelsorge im Amerikanischen Bürgerkrieg", *Theologische Quartalsschrift* CLXXXII:4, 350–59.
4. Cf. especially B. Blied (1945) *Catholics and the Civil War* (Milwaukee); J. T. McGreevy (2003) *Catholicism and American Freedom: A History* (New York),

pp. 43–90; B. Kelly (1996) "Ambiguous Loyalties: The Boston Irish, Slavery, and the Civil War", *Historical Journal of Massachussetts*, XXIV:2, 165–204; D. T. Knobel (1986) *Paddy and the Republic: Ethnicity and Nationality in Antebellum America* (Middletown); N. Ignatiev (1991) *How the Irish Became White* (New York).

5. L. J. McCaffrey (1997) *The Irish-Catholic Diaspora in America* (Washington), pp. 63–137; Bilby (1997); with regard to the Southern Confederacy E. Gleeson (1993) *Rebel Sons of Erin: A Civil War Unit History of the Tenth Tennessee Infantry Regiment (Irish), Confederate States Volunteers* (Indianapolis); E. Gleeson (1997) *Erin Go Gray! An Irish Rebel Anthology* (Carmel).
6. E. Lonn (1965) *Foreigners in the Confederacy* (Gloucester); E. Lonn (1969) *Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy* (Westport); E. Lonn (1966) *Desertion during the Civil War* (Gloucester).
7. Cf., for instance, H. S. Commager (ed.) (1973) *The Blue and the Gray*, 2 vols. (New York); J. I. Robertson (1998) *Soldiers Blue and Gray* (Columbia), and – a consensus historian *avant le letter* – B. I. Wiley (1995) *The Life of Billy Yank: The Common Soldier of the Union* (Baton Rouge); B. I. Wiley (1996) *The Life of Johnny Reb: The Common Soldier of the Confederacy* (Baton Rouge).
8. K. A. Miller (1985) *Emigrants and Exiles: Ireland and the Irish Exodus to America* (New York); J. McCormack (1991) "Blue, Grey, and Green: The Fighting Irish", *Civil War History* IX:2, 17–23; M. Hochgeschwender (2006) *Wahrheit, Einheit, Ordnung: Die Sklavenfrage und der amerikanische Katholizismus, 1835–1870* (Paderborn), pp. 285–480; S. U. Bruce (2006), *The Harp and the Eagle: Irish-American Volunteers and the Union Army, 1861–1865* (New York).
9. W. L. Burton (1998) *Melting Pot Soldiers: The Union's Ethnic Regiments* (New York).
10. Ibid., pp. 3–32.
11. Bilby (1997), pp. 96f.
12. These Scots-Irish even tended to use anti-Catholic and therefore traditional anti-Irish sentiments among the Anglo-Saxon majority to position themselves socially and culturally as a part of the majority; cf. D. A. Gerber (1989) *The Making of an American Pluralism: Buffalo, New York, 1825–1860* (Urbana), pp. 92–109.
13. Cf. with regard to the postwar situation K. Kenny (1998) *Making Sense of the Molly Maguires* (New York), pp. 3–44.
14. J. M. Roy (2000) *Rhetorical Campaigns of the Nineteenth-Century Anti-Catholics and Catholics in America* (Lewiston); R. A. Billington (1964), *The Protestant Crusade, 1800–1860* (Chicago); D. Grimsted (1998) *American Mobbing, 1828–1861: Toward the Civil War* (New York).
15. Cf. in general B. H. Reid (1996) *The Origins of the American Civil War* (London); P. Kleppner (1919) *The Third Electoral System, 1853–1892* (Chapel Hill); R. L. McCormick (1974) "Ethno-Cultural Interpretations of Nineteenth-Century Voting Behaviour", *Political Science Quarterly* 89:2, 358–77.
16. Hochgeschwender (2006), pp. 110–33.
17. Ibid., pp. 356–88.
18. Cf. C. E. O'Leary (1999) *To Die For: The Paradox of American Patriotism* (Princeton), pp. 10–69; N. Pickus (2005) *True Faith and Allegiance: Immigration and American Civic Nationalism* (Princeton); J. M. McPherson (1997) *For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War* (New York); J. A. Frank

(1998) *With Ballot and Bayonet: The Political Socialization of American Civil War Soldiers* (Athens).

19. Republican mobs, for example, forced Catholic priests or well-known Democrats to raise the flag atop churches and private homes, cf. M. Hochgeschwender (2001) "Totaler Krieg und nationale Integration: Der US-amerikanische Katholizismus im Umfeld des amerikanischen Bürgerkriegs" in D. Beyrau (ed.) *Der Krieg in religiösen und nationalen Deutungen der Neuzeit* (Tübingen), 140–64; M. Hochgeschwender (2003) "Union und Konstitution: Die Erfindung der USA im Spiegel moderner Propagandatheorien" in G. Weber und M. Zimmermann (eds.,) *Propaganda-Selbstdarstellung-Repräsentation im römischen Kaiserreich des 1. Jahrhunderts nach Christus* (Stuttgart), 103–24.
20. Cf. R. H. Abbott (1986) *The Republican Party and the South, 1855–1877* (Chapel Hill); see in general L. E. Ambrosius (1998), *A Crisis of Republicanism: American Politics in the Civil War Era* (Lincoln).
21. F. L. Klement (1999) *Lincoln's Critics: The Copperheads of the North* (Shippensburg), and F. L. Klement (1994) "Catholics as Copperheads during the Civil War", *Catholic Historical Review*, LXXX, 36–57.
22. C. Dell (1975) *Lincoln and the War Democrats: The Grand Erosion of Conservative Tradition* (Rutherford).
23. Of specific importance were the fraternal secret societies of the so-called *Union Leagues*, which favoured, instead of the traditional unionism of the early republic, a more modern form of nationalism; cf. M. Lawson (2002) *Patriot Fires: Forging a New American Nationalism in the Civil War North* (Lawrence). With regard to the reconstruction era activities of the *Union Leagues* in the South, see S. Hahn (2003) *A Nation under our Feet: Black Political Struggles in the Rural South from Slavery to the Great Migration* (Cambridge), pp. 178–204.
24. *Boston Pilot*, 10 August 1861, 17 August 1861, 24 August 1861; *Metropolitan Record*, 4 April 1863.
25. W. Helbich und W. D. Kamphoefner (eds.) (2002) *Deutsche im Amerikanischen Bürgerkrieg: Briefe von Front und Farm, 1861–1865* (Paderborn); Burton (1998), pp. 72–111.
26. This did not change with the draft; cf. James W. Geary (1991) *We Need Men: The Union Draft in the Civil War* (DeKalb).
27. J. Attie (1998) *Patriotic Toil: Northern Women and the American Civil War* (Ithaca), pp. 55–78.
28. McPherson (1996), pp. 790–96. Cf. furthermore *Boston Pilot*, 23 July 1864; *Der Wahrheitsfreund*, 24 August 1864.
29. Cf. M. Matloff (ed.) (1996) *American Military History*, vol. I: *1775–1902* (New York), pp. 148–83.
30. Burton (1998), pp. 15–32.
31. Paul R. Wylie (2007) *The Irish General: Thomas Francis Meagher* (Norman).
32. Burton (1998), pp. 72–160.
33. Ibid., p. 116.
34. R. M. Miller (1998) "Catholic Religion, Irish Ethnicity, and the Civil War" in R. M. Miller et al. (eds.) *Religion and the American Civil War* (New York), 261–96; Hochgeschwender (2002). The rather contradictory account of Private William McCarter in O'Brien (1996), pp. 49–50 [where he denies a

specific strength of Catholic influence] and p. 58 [in favour of the Calvinist anti-slavery activist and abolitionist terrorist John Brown; cf. D. S. Reynolds (2005), *John Brown, Abolitionist: The Man Who Killed Slavery, Sparked the Civil War, and Seeded Civil Rights* (New York)] is due to the fact that McCarter himself was a Protestant and that he served in the 118th Pennsylvania, the least Catholic of all Irish regiments.

35. M. Cronin and D. Adair (2002) *The Wearing of the Green: A History of St. Patrick's Day* (London), pp. 108–10.
36. With regard to the sources, I concur with James McPherson in his opinion that the single most important cohesive factor in the Civil War armies was camaraderie and not politics.
37. Cf. J. Morgan (2006) *Through American and Irish Wars: The Life and Times of General Thomas W. Sweeney* (Dublin).
38. P. F. Stevens (1999) *John Riley and the St. Patrick's Battalion, 1846–48* (Washington); M. Hogan (1998) *The Irish Soldiers of Mexico* (Guadalajara).
39. W. S. Neidhardt (1975) *Fenianism in North America* (University Park); W. D'Arcy (1974) *The Fenian Movement in the United States* (New York).
40. H. Senior (1978) *The Fenians and Canada* (Toronto).
41. Kenny (1998).
42. Bilby (1997), pp. 145f.
43. Cf. T. H. O'Connor (1997) *Civil War Boston: Homefront and Battlefield* (Boston).
44. I. Bernstein (1990) *The New York City Draft Riots: Their Significance for American Society and Politics in the Age of the Civil War* (New York).
45. Ibid., p. 5.
46. Cf. E. G. Burrows (1999) *Gotham: A History of New York City to 1898* (New York).

6

"A Race That Is Thus Willing To Die For Its Country": African-American Volunteers in the Spanish-American War 1898

Matthias Speidel

The so-called "splendid little war"[1] was fought between the USA and Spain in the summer of 1898 when the USA occupied Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippine Islands.[2] Among the 250,000 soldiers in the American forces, there were 3,300 African Americans serving in regular army regiments, and more than 10,100 African Americans enlisted voluntarily.[3] Considering the time and the number of black soldiers involved, this was more than a minor issue in African-American history, and has been far too often neglected. For the black soldiers, as well as the African-American community in the United States, military service was intimately linked with the hope of freedom and full social integration into the American nation.

However, confronted with increasing discrimination and oppression at the end of the 19th century, African Americans had to decide whether they should support the white dominant culture or articulate forms of protest concerning their social status. The *Colored American*, a newspaper which was published by the African-American editor John E. Bruce under his pseudonym "Bruce Grit", noticed that the African American was facing a dilemma.[4] As this article shows, both strategies were to be found in the debates of blacks in 1898.

Firstly, the article outlines some basic aspects and pre-configurations relating to African Americans at the end of the 19th century, and the way in which the Spanish-American War carried the hopes of African Americans regarding the anticipation of integration. Secondly, it summarizes some basic characteristics of the volunteer black soldiers and

the organization of black volunteer regiments in the USA during the war. Finally, it focuses on the loyalty conflicts African Americans experienced at that time and in this context. This aspect is best expressed in the debates of the Black Press about the participation of African Americans in the Spanish-American War. At the time, many African Americans expressed their attitudes towards the war in public statements, editorials or articles. The Black Press played a crucial role in African-American communication, and claimed, at least, to be an opinion leader in terms of black concerns. In times of war, it was the Black Press's agenda to make the "Negro Soldier" publicly known. As main sources, five newspapers were chosen, which are also representative of other black newspapers. The *Richmond Planet*, which was published in Virginia by John Mitchell, and the *Cleveland Gazette*, published by Harry C. Smith, were among the most prominent black papers in the 1890s. In addition, the *Afro-American Sentinel* from Omaha, Nebraska, which was published by Cyrus D. Bell, a supporter of the Democrats in Kansas, the *Indianapolis Freeman*, the *Colored American* from Washington and the *Parsons Weekly Blade* published in Labette County, Kansas, are further references.[5]

African Americans and military service

The Spanish-American War was the first war the United States waged against a foreign power after the emancipation of the African Americans, who considered it to be a catalyst in their struggle for black equality. In this respect, the Spanish-American War was a paramount issue.

All the more importantly, the war against Spain was waged during a period of increasing segregation and discrimination against black Americans. In fact, for African Americans, the situation was very precarious at the end of the 19th century. Blacks had gained at least a little success in terms of civil and voting rights during the Reconstruction period – for example the 13th, the 14th, and the 15th Amendments. A British observer, James Bryce, remarked in 1891 with regard to the civil rights of blacks that "equality is complete in the public as well as in the private sphere [...]. But although this equality has existed on paper for more than twenty years, the benefits, which it had actually secured to the Blacks, had been insignificant".[6] Moreover, he doubted whether African Americans had substantially gained "by those famous amendments of the federal constitution" which "should have secured these active civil rights".

As a matter of fact, African Americans experienced even more discriminatory and racist attitudes in their daily life towards the end of the century. They were confronted, for example, with the restriction of their voting rights by literacy tests and other so-called Jim-Crow laws, which caused their social status to deteriorate rapidly.[7] This series of state and local limitations of black freedom established a formal system of segregation, which was sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court. The notorious "separate but equal" decision in *Plessy v. Ferguson* in 1896, which initially affected public transportation accommodations, soon enabled racial segregation in every field of public life.

African Americans had to live under life-threatening conditions not only in the southern but also in the northern part of the United States. The number of blacks killed by lynching or by mob violence increased by the hundreds towards the end of the century. According to a study commissioned by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, more than 1,100 African Americans were lynched in the USA between 1889 and 1898.[8]

In the face of such conditions, the symbolic meaning of military service and of being a soldier was crucial to African Americans. Their motivation for joining the military only in times of war demonstrates, in its purest sense, their conviction to die willingly for "their" country. At the same time – and this is of fundamental interest – the demonstration of loyalty and patriotism offered African Americans the opportunity to articulate forms of protest concerning their social status. Despite their display of loyalty, black soldiers were not treated equally, which frequently led to protests. Therefore, blacks realized at the end of the war that their social status would by no means improve in the near future.[9]

African Americans in the state militia organizations of the 19th century

There had been black soldiers in the army before the Spanish-American War. During the Civil War nearly 190,000 African Americans had served as Union volunteer soldiers in the so-called United States Colored Troops (USCT), and a small number of blacks even fought in the Confederate Army.[10] In 1869, after the Civil War, the leftovers of the USCT were transformed and consolidated into the segregated 24th and 25th Infantry Regiments and the 9th and 10th Cavalry Regiments of the Regular Army, which were commanded by white officers.[11]

Prior to the Spanish-American War, the US military forces were in a rather unprepared condition to handle the situation of larger military hostilities. While the regular army did play an important role in controlling the South during Reconstruction, its main objective shifted to constabulary duties at the frontier in the last two decades of the 19th century, and on the verge of the conflict with Spain the army comprised only some 28,000 soldiers and officers.[12] This small number was nothing unusual, though. Throughout the whole 19th century, a small peacetime regular army was normal rather than the exception. Military historian Jerry Cooper pointed out that in the War of 1812, as well as in the war against the Seminoles, in the Civil War and in the Spanish-American War, the regular army always failed to recruit its wartime strength.[13] In the wars of the 1800s the USA relied primarily on volunteer militia movement in the states rather than on the regular army.[14] Mainly due to the rising importance and the professionalization of the state militia organizations after the Civil War, African-American military units did play a significant role in some of the volunteer regiments.[15] Nevertheless, these men were still part-time soldiers, and the regiments received no, or very little, state supervision. In 1898 the term "National Guard" referred to the various state militia organizations which were governed by the amended Militia Act of 1792. Every state handled, funded, and organized its units differently. The aftermath of the Spanish-American War led to the Militia Act of 1903, professionalizing the volunteer organization system according to Army regulations and establishing the National Guard of the United States.

On 23 April 1898, two days prior to the official declaration of war against Spain, President William McKinley issued a call for raising 125,000 volunteers.[16] According to the president's instructions, the regiments had to be drawn from already existing militia regiments on state-based quotas which depended on each state's population.[17] This number roughly matched the present strength of the National Guard units. So all the enlisted men had to be taken into the Volunteer Army. McKinley thus complied with the demands of the politically influential National Guard Association, which was lobbying for the guardsmen.

The constitutional requirements mandated that the existing units of state militias were to be recruited to wartime strength and then to be transferred to Federal control. The process of "mustering in" the regiments required regular army or state officials in active Federal duty to assemble each unit, "inspect it to ensure that all men met Federal standards, and administer a Federal oath to each officer or enlisted man".[18] Alabama, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Ohio were able to organize

black volunteer units under the president's first call.[19] One month later, on 25 May, McKinley called for 75,000 additional volunteers. After this second call Alabama, North Carolina, and Ohio expanded their black volunteer units. The states of Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, and Virginia mustered in their black militia groups for the first time. Like their counterparts in the regular army, these units were segregated from the white volunteer regiments. In addition to these volunteer regiments, the federal government raised 10 volunteer regiments "possessing immunity from diseases incident to tropical climates".[20] Among these so-called "immune" regiments there were four regiments of African-American soldiers, who were supposed to be immune to tropical diseases.

The main obstacle for African Americans was that only few states had black militias in their state troops by 1898.[21] At that time, historian Charles Johnson argues, the growth of these military units had "reached its zenith" and had already begun to decline before the Spanish-American War.[22] Most states had actually reduced or disbanded all their units, whether they were white or black, by the early 1890s due to the lack of assigned militia funds by the federal government.[23] But, lacking financial support, black militia units suffered most in training quality and equipment efficiency.

At least 25 states maintained one or more companies with African-American militiamen after 1870.[24] These units were segregated from the white military units, but they were commanded by black officers. Among them were, surprisingly, nine of the former Confederate states, with Georgia and South Carolina maintaining the largest African-American militia forces.[25] Primarily raised "to protect Republicans from white Democratic violence" between 1869 and 1875, the black militia was retained by southern Democratic politicians after they regained control in the 1870s.[26] This strategy was intended to work as an example of white tolerance in the "New South", as the historian Alwyn Barr suggests. Altogether, 4,000 black militiamen had been recruited in the South between 1870 and 1890.

Due to the lack of material it is not possible to draw an accurate picture of the social background of black volunteers or of their individual motivation to join the units. One of the few surviving descriptive books of a Virginian volunteer unit, the *Flipper Guard*,[27] states that for the years between 1883 and 1885 all men were skilled or semi-skilled blue-collar workers, except for the commanding captain, who worked as a clerk.[28] This corresponds with Barr's findings that mainly black labourers joined the militia units and Cooper's conclusion that farmers, in general, did not serve in the state militia units.[29]

At least the appointment as an officer required some basic education, because a commission test had to be passed and in most cases these officers were socially high-ranking citizens within the African-American community. William I. Johnson, for example, a First Battalion Master during the 1890s, was a successful undertaker and one of the wealthiest black citizens in Richmond.[30] The commander of the *Second Battalion* was William H. Johnson, a Hampton Institute graduate and a school principal in Petersburg.[31]

The state did provide the militia with arms and other equipment, but in times of racial tensions it was quite difficult for the black military groups to convince state officials to equip their units with arms and ammunition.[32] The black regiments recognized this as blatantly discriminatory treatment, as most of the weapons that were issued were old or not even functional.

In order to be prepared at all times, the militia units received financial support from the state. However, the financial distributions varied by region. The northeastern states supported their units with $36.79 per soldier in 1895, whereas the southern states spent only $3.87.[33] Therefore, states such as Virginia were only able to grant a minimum of funding to their militia units, whether they were black or white. William H. Johnson estimated that, after the state of Virginia approved financial subsidies, the black units received at least $8,500 for armoury expenses between 1884 and 1898.[34] Despite these general contributions, being a militiaman was an expensive undertaking for the individual member. Although the military fund of Virginia also supported the purchase of personal equipment such as uniforms, by 1885 half the members of the units were still drilling in non-regulation uniforms because they could not afford new ones. So it might have been an impossible undertaking for the average African-American labourer to rise above the rank of an ordinary soldier, simply because, in addition to uniforms, the officers as well as the non-commissioned officers had to acquire their own weapons. But, despite all obstacles, as historian Roger D. Cunningham sums up, by 1898 those who served in the Virginian African-American volunteer companies were dedicated citizen soldiers.[35]

To ease their financial predicament to some extent, the volunteer units depended largely on public contributions by the black community. Therefore, a very popular way to raise money was to organize excursions to larger cities in the East. The units bought wholesale train tickets, which they sold cheaply to their neighbours or friends. These occasions were important social events within the community,

because on their trips to New York or Boston they met other black militia units and joined together in parading on festivities. Furthermore, the militia units performed representative functions such as parading, drill and sham battle performances on celebration days or at African-American fairs, which were also intended to promote black economic activities.[36] This kind of "camaraderie, collective identity, and enhanced self-esteem that fraternal organizations provided" attracted many African Americans by the 1890s to join the militia.[37]

On the other side of the commanding hierarchy, one of the main functions of the militia units was to be brought into action in cases of public disorder. However, state officials objected in general to the idea of using their African-American militiamen in this context because they feared to offend the white population. Nevertheless, the alarm went out to the black guardsmen of Virginia, for example, on at least five occasions between 1873 and 1888 – three times in 1887 and 1888: once, during a strike of black longshoremen in Newport News in 1887, another time to support the local police of Petersburg in 1887, and then during Richmond's state penitentiary fire in 1888.[38] Altogether, the state of Virginia used the black units from the mid-1870s to the late 1890s on 74 occasions.[39]

The motivation to raise African-American volunteers for the war came not only from the need to fill the states' quota but also from party policy. For example, at the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, African Americans organized black volunteer units in several cities of North Carolina and offered their service to Republican Governor Daniel L. Russell. Russell was inclined to muster in a black military unit because his political basis relied heavily on black voters.[40] As a result, North Carolina was one of the first states to authorize a black battalion with a black commanding officer. The Midwestern African-American elite, which lived in cities such as Chicago, Ohio or Cleveland, was also a significant (Republican) power in the political landscape.[41] In 1890, for example, some prominent black Chicago citizens established a new African-American battalion on their own. With the financial support of an African-American citizens' association they acquired weapons from the Chicago police and uniforms from the state adjutant general. By the time of the Spanish-American War, the Governor of the state, Republican John R. Tanner, supported the mustering in of this military unit as part of the Illinois National Guard.

Populist Governor John E. Leedy from Kansas did not fall back on the established (white) National Guard units, and was able to muster in black volunteer companies which were organized at short notice.[42] As in

Illinois and North Carolina, political considerations played a major role in the decision to accept black volunteer regiments in Kansas. Governor Leedy, who faced re-election in the fall of 1898, was especially keen not to lose those African Americans who supported the Populist platform in Kansas.[43] This might also explain why the 23rd Regiment in Kansas, besides the regiments from Illinois and North Carolina, was one of the few black military units with solely black officers, from the commanding colonel down to the lieutenants.

The Governor of Indiana, James A. Mount, was also inclined to authorize a black military unit with black officers, because it "would be a great stroke" of policy for the Republicans in Indiana. But he gave in when faced with the resistance of Secretary of War Russell Alger, who, officially, did not support the idea of a whole African-American regiment with black officers and acted accordingly.[44] Nevertheless, the examples of Kansas, Illinois and North Carolina showed that there was some flexibility in the interpretation of the War Department's regulations. Privately, Alger stated that African Americans might be commissioned to the rank of captains "if suitable men ... could be found".[45] Another peculiarity was the black company from Massachusetts. The "L"-company of Massachusetts' 6th Regiment was the only black military unit to be integrated into a white regiment.[46]

The military duty of the African-American regiments during the Spanish-American War was limited mainly to drill exercises and the men's adaptation to camp life. Like most of the volunteers – black or white – they did not leave the United States. Besides the service of the 6th Massachusetts regiment in the expedition to Puerto Rico, only the 23rd Kansas and the 8th Illinois were transported to Cuba in early September 1898. After the end of the major combat operations, those regiments performed garrison duty or rebuilt the infrastructure of the island until they were sent back in March 1899.[47]

The Black Press's perception of the African-American volunteer soldier

Black newspapers displayed a tremendous interest in the African-American volunteer soldiers to emphasize their loyalty. The newspapers not only published lists of names of blacks who had enlisted as volunteer soldiers recently, or mentioned the names of African Americans who lived nearby and were already part of the state's volunteer regiment, but also printed speeches in which the loyalty of blacks in all US wars had been stressed.[48] Article headlines like *"Patriotic city*

meetings", *"Young men go to Oswego next Wednesday and enlist if you can"* or *"Colored Men, to Arms"* were typical examples of the papers' war coverage.[49] The Black Press thus presented the image of thousands of African Americans offering their service to the nation. The reports of the blacks' eagerness to enlist voluntarily for military service were intended as evidence of their extraordinary love for the American nation. Under these circumstances, African-American editors referred especially to the volunteer black soldier, since it seemed more favourable to their cause to draw attention to the volunteers as an outstanding proof of reliable citizenship rather than mentioning blacks in the regular army who had enlisted earlier and for other reasons. "Of course the four regiments, two cavalry and two infantry of regulars, are in the service, but they are not volunteers," emphasized editor Harry Smith in the *Gazette*.[50] Furthermore, African-American editors accentuated the fact that blacks were even more enthusiastic to serve as volunteer soldiers than white Americans were, especially where whites living in the South were concerned. Smith pointed out that white volunteers even from as far away as Chicago had to be recruited for Mississippi's regiment. A fact which – in his opinion – illustrated "the lack of martial spirit in the south".[51]

The hopes of African Americans pinned to the efforts to muster in black volunteer regiments were overshadowed in the spring and summer of 1898 by the murder of Frazier Baker, a black postmaster in Lake City, South Carolina. On 15 February 1898, Baker and his youngest child were killed by mob violence, his wife and three children seriously injured.[52] Referring to the sinking of the armoured cruiser USS *Maine* in the harbour of Havana, the *Indianapolis Freeman* noted: "Men are dying every day, but they are not dying for such reasons as Baker of Lake City died. His death is as momentous as the death of the ill-fated seamen of the Maine. [...] He died serving his country, for which he was a patriot – and a martyr to his race."[53] The investigation of this incident was closely observed by the black community during the next months and the newspapers reported frequently on the further developments. Harry C. Smith, editor of the *Cleveland Gazette*, still perceived military service as an obligation for African Americans, despite Baker's fate. Under the headline "Let Afro-Americans Prove Their Loyalty," Smith wrote on 26 March: "We hold to the conviction that in the event of a war with Spain, Afro-Americans will find resting upon themselves a responsibility equal with that of every other citizen of this republic. The interest [sic] involved in the issues of war are important with the Afro-American as with anyone else, because however much proscribed

and circumscribed in the exercise of his personal and political immunities, his rights PER SE are as sacred and dear to himself as to any other citizen."[54]

He emphasized and condemned "the terrible injustice done [to] the Afro-American under his own government", but he felt the obligation "of the fact that this country and government are his rightful and inalienable heritage, and despite our murmurings we have deemed it our duty that every citizen should respond to the demands of the national defence". Smith reminded his readers that this would be their opportunity. "Let us not stand upon the asking, but show ourselves ready to maintain intact the government from which we derive our hopes for life, liberty and happiness."[55]

But, despite the African Americans' efforts, the part the black volunteer soldiers were to take in the war changed completely. They quickly became a symbol for the discriminatory treatment of African Americans as a whole. Soon, black editors protested against the recruiting policy in the states, because blacks had not been enlisted as they should have been. Smith wrote in his editorial of 7 May 1898 that the Illinois National Guard seemed to be the only African-American military organization that had been able to get under the cover of the president's call for volunteers. He continues: "In every other state in the Union our military organizations have been barred. In the South they are told to enlist in the regular army and thus get 'in it.' The 'color line' won't down [sic] in this country even in the face of war, it seems. It was so in 1861. If this 'war' lasts long enough, the Afro-American will be too welcome, just as he was in 1863."[56]

Still, as mentioned above, most of the volunteer regiments that comprised black soldiers were now commanded by white officers – despite the tradition of black officers for black soldiers. The Black Press perceived the service of black soldiers under white officers as an insult not only to the African-American soldiers but to the black community as a whole. The officer, with his special responsibility for his subordinate men, symbolized leadership qualities, intelligence, a higher social status and more acceptance than an ordinary soldier ever received. Obviously, the role of the officer and his qualities were even more connected to the right for citizenship than the basic "right to fight". African-American newspapers stuck to their demand to enlist African Americans as officers for black military units. For example, Populist Governor Leedy's decision to muster in black officers was highly praised by the editor of the *Parsons Weekly Blade*, Monroe Dorsey.[57] This was even more remarkable because Dorsey was actually a strong supporter

of the Republican Party. But Dorsey's enthusiasm was limited, because he knew that the black militia units in other states had always been commanded by African-American officers. Therefore he concluded: "[N]ot that the Negro received anything new, but that a God-given right had been recognized". The non-acceptance of black officers in some of the states caused much indignation within the black community. The editor of the *Richmond Planet*, John Mitchell, coined the phrase "No officer, no fight" in his article "The Promotion of Colored Officers", which gained considerable impact within the black community throughout the nation.[58] Mitchell protested against the mustering in of the black guardsmen under the command of white officers in Virginia. He objected especially to the removal of the renowned officers Joseph B. Johnson and William H. Johnson, who had been in command of their battalions since 1882 and 1888.[59] Mitchell feared that state authorities would replace the black officers despite the long tradition of independent African-American militia battalions. "The idea is to deprive them of the honors to which they are justly entitled," complained Mitchell, bearing in mind the officers' many years of service.[60] Moreover, William H. Johnson declared that his men explicitly stated "that they would do service any where within this country or outside of its boundaries under their colored officers".[61]

The decision of Virginia's Governor James Hoge Tyler to authorize black officers as battalion and company officers in the 6th Virginia volunteer regiment, and the appointment of the 32-year-old Richard Clayborne Croxton (white) as its regimental commander under the president's second call, was finally accepted not only by Mitchell but also by Virginia's white population and President McKinley. Above all, the president had "expressed particular anxiety to give colored men an opportunity to enter the service" in this case.[62]

McKinley had every reason to attempt reconciliation with the hostile objections of the Black Press, and also with black voters.[63] An alleged "deadline" issued by the president and the War Department, which would have prevented the commission of black officers above the rank of lieutenant in the volunteer regiments, brought severe criticism from black editors.[64] "We cannot understand McKinley" or "Keep this in mind and when the next Presidential election comes, use your ballot" were among the softer-spoken judgements to be found in black newspapers.[65] To improve his reputation, McKinley recommended that the War Department and the states, as seen in regard to the black officers of the Virginian regiment, should accept more African-American officers and soldiers. McKinley himself appointed the prominent

African-American lawyer and politician John R. Lynch as paymaster of the "immune" regiments, with the rank of major;[66] a step that was appreciated by many African-American editors.

How closely the Black Press observed the further developments and the status of the African-American volunteer regiments regarding black officers was illustrated by the oncoming crisis in which the second battalion of the 6th Virginian regiment refused to drill under white officers in November 1898. After two months of drilling exercise, Croxton held the black officers responsible for the slow development of the second battalion.[67] He called Major William H. Johnson and several other black captains to a board of review to have their competency inspected. The black officers resigned in protest against this treatment, which they considered to be part of a plot to discredit them and replace them with white officers. Following this, Croxton did indeed convince Governor Tyler to replace the African-American officers with white officers, which caused considerable deterioration in the morale of the battalion's men. The situation reached a climax when the men refused to obey the officers' orders on 2 November. It was only through the encouragement of Major John B. Johnson that discipline was restored again. As a matter of fact, the mutiny of the 6th Virginia became proverbial. After a short time the regiment was nicknamed "The Mutinous Sixth". Nearly 60 years later, Sergeant John H. Allen of the 6th Virginia still recalled the events of those days: "Looking backward, I can call myself 'lucky'. We had sworn 'to obey the Officers appointed over us.' The 6th Va. had disobeyed. That was MUTINY. Why didn't they shoot us or give Dishonorable discharges?"[68] The army solved the problem by mustering out the regiment in January 1899.

However, the Black Press supported and even celebrated the boycott by the black soldiers. On 5 November 1898 the *Cleveland Gazette* commented under the headline "Hurrah! They Refused to Drill" that black soldiers of the 6th Virginia Regiment had disobeyed their newly assigned white officers' orders.[69] The newspaper even applauded the conduct of the soldiers: "The soldiers say that if they do not get Afro-American officers in the places of the whites recently and unfairly appointed, they will not obey orders from anyone. Good!"[70]

The encouraging reports of the mutiny of a Southern regiment were partly symptomatic of the Black Press's perception. During the war they slowly (re-)discovered the backwardness of the South. The Black Press started to equate the South with Spanish oppression: "In the South today exists a system of oppression as barbarous as that which is alleged to exist in Cuba, and yet those in authority in Washington could declare

war, spend one hundred million of dollars, muster in one hundred and twenty-five thousand troops, and offer to spend a million of dollars to feed foreigners, while more than a hundred thousand people, white and colored, are starving in this country."[71]

Black newspapers began to shift their focus increasingly from the importance of liberating Cubans to the liberation of their Southern kin. Therefore, the genuine military and political aspects of the war were more and more neglected in the articles. In the eyes of the black newspapers, the volunteer black soldier had to fight against the "South" as his real enemy. For example, the *Richmond Planet* referred to the situation in the Southern states as simply "As Bloody as War" and urged the US government to protect its own citizens, not Cubans.[72] "From the way white men have been lynching Negroes in different parts of the country for the past few weeks it appears to us that Spain doesn't treat her Cuban subjects a bit worse than America does her Negroes", claimed an article in the *Martinsburg Pioneer Press*, which was republished by the *Cleveland Gazette*.[73] Such arguments struck at the very heart of the war's ostensible cause, and here the African-American war experience might differ from "traditional" (white) military history perspectives.

There were even some radical views. For example, the *Afro-American Sentinel* called upon the enlisted blacks in South Carolina to wage war "on these vile pests of civilized society". The paper appealed for revenge against the lynchings and other "crime[s] too cruel and infamous for Indian savages to commit" which were carried out by the "American-born Caucasians". In the opinion of this newspaper, blacks were better off if they killed these "drunken, cut-throat neighbors".[74]

Conclusion

At the beginning of the Spanish-American War most of the black volunteer units were recruited from the states' black militiamen. Some of these military groups looked back on a history of over a quarter of a century and were an integrated and proud part of the African-American community. For Jerry Cooper it even seems remarkable "that black Guardsmen managed to sustain even the few companies still active in the late 1890s".[75] However, in times of war African Americans considered enlisting and fighting as soldiers an opportunity to achieve their full integration as American citizens. Some of the black volunteer units were not mustered in until the main hostilities against Spain in Cuba had virtually ended. But this still had its effects. To reach war strength,

new recruits joined the regiments because some of the national guardsmen were too old or physically unfit for military service. Therefore, the war against Spain actually prevented the mustering out of some of the regiments and worked as an incentive to modernize the existing units. On the administrative level, these military units were raised primarily out of (state) political consideration but with much support and agitation by prominent African Americans.

For the individual African-American blue-collar workers, wearing a uniform might have strengthened their self-respect – especially as a non-commissioned officer or commanding officer.[76] The symbolic meaning of a black officer for black regiments was also of importance to the African-American community. After all, it was thanks to prominent black Republicans and John Mitchell's "No officer, no fight" campaign that McKinley finally supported black officers in the 6th Virginia regiment and himself appointed prominent African Americans despite the regulations of the War Department. The departments' ambiguous approach to this issue can be shown further by the examples of North Carolina, Kansas and Illinois, which mustered in black regiments with black commanding officers.

Despite the military success of the war against Spain, blacks realized that their social status could not improve as a result of the war. The equation that military participation would mean full integration into the American nation was not satisfied. This was especially illustrated by the treatment of the black volunteer soldiers and the deteriorating race relations in the South, which caused African Americans to pose the question of who their real enemy was. In this situation, the case of the black volunteers offered an opportunity to articulate loyalty and protest.

Notes

1. F. Freidel (1958; reprint 2002) *The Splendid Little War* (Boston); this expression is attributed to US ambassador and later Secretary of State John Hay in a letter to Theodore Roosevelt.
2. W. Millis (1931) *The Martial Spirit* (Cambridge); G. A. Cosmas (1971) *An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War* (Shippensburg); D. Trask (1981) *The War With Spain 1898* (New York).
3. First Endorsement, War Department Adjutant General's Office to Mr. James Howard, 3 August 1916. List of Negro volunteer units organized for the War with Spain, in: M. J. MacGregor and B. C. Nalty (eds.) (1977) *Blacks in the United States Forces: Basic Documents*, Vol. III: *Freedom and Jim Crow, 1865–1917* (Wilmington), p. 159; on African Americans in the Spanish-American War

see M. Fletcher (1974a) *The Black Soldier and Officer In the United States Army 1891–1917* (Columbia); J. D. Foner (1974) *Blacks and the Military in American History: A New Perspective* (New York); W. B. Gatewood (1975) *Black Americans and the White Man's Burden* (Urbana); P. Gleijeses (2001) "African Americans and the War Against Spain" in E. Jenkins and D. C. Hine (eds) *A Question of Manhood: A Reader in U.S. Black Men's History and Masculinity*, Vol. 2, *The 19*th *Century: From Emancipation to Jim Crow* (Bloomington), 320–46.

4. *Colored American*, "African Americans and the War Against Spain", 12 March 1898 quoted after Gleijeses (2001) p. 320.
5. H. L. Suggs (ed.) (1996) *The Black Press in the Middle West, 1865–1985* (Westport), p. 219.
6. J. Bryce (1891) "Thoughts on the Negro Problem", *North American Review* CLIII, 421, p. 645.
7. For the Jim-Crow system see, for example, C. V. Woodward (1955, reprint 2002) *The Strange Career of Jim Crow* (New York); C. V. Woodward (1951, reprint 1995) *Origins of the New South, 1877–1913* (Baton Rouge); E. L. Ayers (1992) *The Promise of the New South: Life After Reconstruction* (New York), 132–60.
8. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (ed.) (1919) *Thirty Years of Lynching in the United States* (New York), p. 39.
9. *Cleveland Gazette*, "A Vain Hope", 20 August 1898; Gatewood (1975), 322f.
10. Foner (1974) 48–51; B. C. Nalty (1986) *Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military* (New York), 44–46.
11. Nalty (1986), p. 50f.
12. Trask (1981) p. 155.
13. J. Cooper (1978) "National Guard Reform, The Army, and The Spanish-American War: The View from Wisconsin", *Military Affairs*, XLII:1, 20–23, here p. 20. In the Mexican War the Army did approach full strength, but only with the entry of 15,000 additional men from state regiments.
14. J. Cooper (1997) *The Rise of the National Guard: The Evolution of the American Militia, 1865–1920* (Lincoln); D. R. Segal (1989) *Recruiting for Uncle Sam: Citizen and Military Manpower Policy* (Lawrence), p. 17.
15. Cooper (1997) p. 23 and p. 70; M. Fletcher (1968) "The Negro Volunteer in Reconstruction, 1865–1866", *Military Affairs*, XXXII:3, 124–31.
16. Trask (1981) p. 155.
17. Ibid. p. 155; Cosmas (1974) p. 100.
18. Quote from "*Spanish-American War: Volunteer Forces*", US Army Center of Military History Historical Research Branch, replication of the Adjutant General's Office (1899) *Statistical Exhibit of Strength of Volunteer Forces Called Into Service During the War With Spain; with Losses From All Causes* (Washington).
19. Massachusetts organized a black company within the all-white *6th Regiment*. Mustering-in dates: *3rd Alabama Volunteer Infantry*: 4 June – 5 August 1898 at Mobile, Alabama; *8th Illinois Volunteer Infantry*: 12–21 July 1898 at Springfield, Illinois; *Companies A and B, 1st Indiana Volunteer Infantry*: 15 July 1898 at Indianapolis, Indiana; *23rd Kansas Volunteer Infantry*: 2–19 July 1898 at Topeka, Kansas; *6th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry*: 12–13 May 1898 at South Framingham, Massachusetts; *3rd North Carolina Volunteer Infantry*: 12 May–19 July 1898 at Fort Macon, North Carolina; *9th Ohio Volunteer*

Infantry: 14 May – 8 July 1898 at Columbus, Ohio; *6th Virginia Volunteer Infantry*: 9 July – 11 August 1898 in Virginia.

20. War Department General Orders No. 55, 26 May 1898, in: MacGregor and Nalty (1977) p. 157; M. Fletcher (1974b) "The Black Volunteers in the Spanish-American War", *Military Affairs*, XXXVIII:2, 48–53; Gatewood (1975) 87–92.
21. Cooper (1997) p. 71. On African-American militia units in general see, for example, C. Johnson Jr (1992) *African American Soldiers in the National Guard: Recruitment and Deployment During Peacetime and War* (Westport).
22. Johnson (1992) p. 33.
23. Cooper (1997) p. 71.
24. Johnson (1992) 19–43.
25. Cooper (1997) p. 70; W. B. Gatewood (1971a) "Virginia's Negro Regiment in the Spanish-American War: The Sixth Virginia Volunteers", *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, LXXX, 193–205, here p. 194; W. B. Gatewood (1972) "Alabama's 'Negro Soldier Experiment', 1898–1899", *The Journal of Negro History*, LVII:4, 333–51, here p. 335; R. D. Cunningham (2002) "They are as Proud of Their Uniforms as Any Who Serve Virginia': African American Participation in the Virginia Volunteers, 1872–1899", *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, CX:3, 293–338, here p. 295; B. T. Muskat (2004) "Mobile's Black Militia: Major R.R. Mims and the Gilmer's Rifles", *The Alabama Review*, LVII:3, 183–205, here p. 184.
26. A. Barr (1978) "The Black Militia of the New South, Texas as a Case Study", *The Journal of Negro History*, LXIII:3, 209–19, here p. 209.
27. Named in honour of Henry O. Flipper, who was the first African-American West Point graduate.
28. Cunningham (2002) 308–309.
29. Barr (1978) p. 215; Cooper (1997) p. 70.
30. Cunningham (2002) p. 309.
31. W. H. Johnson (1923) *History of the Colored Volunteer Infantry of Virginia, 1871–1899* (Richmond) p. 5; Gatewood (1971a) p. 194.
32. Cunningham (2002) p. 310; Cooper (1997) p. 71; Johnson (1992) p. 33.
33. Cooper (1997) p. 41.
34. Johnson (1923) p. 28.
35. Cunningham (2002) p. 332.
36. Gatewood (1972) p. 335.
37. Cunningham (2002) p. 333.
38. Cunningham (2002) 322–6; Johnson (1992) p. 57.
39. Cooper (1997) p. 46.
40. W. B. Gatewood (1971) "North Carolina's Negro Regiment in the Spanish-American War", *North Carolina Historical Review*, XLVIII , 370–87, here 372–75.
41. W. B. Gatewood (1990) *Aristocrats of Color: The Black Elite, 1880–1920* (Bloomington) 121–32.
42. W. B. Gatewood (1971b) "Kansas Negroes and the Spanish-American War", *Kansas Historical Quarterly*, XXXVII, 300–13, here p. 306.
43. Gatewood (1971b) 303–304.
44. W. B. Gatewood (1973), "Indiana Negroes and the Spanish American War", *Indiana Magazine of History*, LXIX, 115–39, here p. 123.

45. Quote from Gatewood (1975) p. 91.
46. F. E. Edwards (1899) *The '98 Campaign of the 6th Massachusetts, U.S.V* (Boston), p. 124; G. E. Braxton (1900) "Company 'L' in the Spanish-American War", *Colored American Magazine*, I:1, 19–25.
47. Gatewood (1971b) 307–10; Fletcher (1974b) 51–2.
48. *Parsons Weekly Blade*, "Parsons Company", 25 June 1898.
49. *Parsons Weekly Blade*, "Patriotic city meetings", 25 June 1898; *Parsons Weekly Blade*, "Other Locals", 2 July 1898; *Parsons Weekly Blade*, "COLORED MEN, TO ARMS!" (Reverend W. L. Grant), 9 July 1898. In the issue of 16 July Monroe Dorsey wrote in its editorial with reference to the "Colored Men, To Arms" article: "The article by Rev. W.L. Grant in The Blade of last week should be read and considered thoroughly by every [sic] in Kansas and acted upon in due; if not for this special opportunity then for the next."
50. *Cleveland Gazette*, "Shame! Shame!", 21 May 1898.
51. *Cleveland Gazette*, Editorial, 30 July 1898.
52. *The New York Times*, "Murder in South Carolina", 23 March 1898.
53. *Indianapolis Freeman*, "Bloody Murder", 5 March 1898.
54. *Cleveland Gazette*, "Let Afro-Americans Prove Their Loyalty", 26 March 1898.
55. Ibid.
56. *Cleveland Gazette*, Editorial, 7 May 1898.
57. *Parsons Weekly Blade*, "All Honors to Gov. Leedy", 25 June 1898.
58. *Richmond Planet*, "The Promotion of Colored Officers", 30 April 1898.
59. Johnson (1923) p. 17 and p. 25.
60. *Richmond Planet*, "The Promotion of Colored Officers", 30 April 1898.
61. Johnson (1923) p. 45.
62. Quote from *Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Virginia for the year, 1898–1899*, p. 48, in: Gatewood (1971) p. 198.
63. Gatewood (1975) p. 90.
64. *Cleveland Gazette*, "A Dead Line", 16 July 1898.
65. *Florida Evangelist* and *Patterson's Weekly* quoted in *Colored American*, "Want Negroes in Command", 2 July 1898.
66. J. R. Lynch (1970) *Reminiscence of an Active Life: The Autobiography of John Roy Lynch,* (Chicago), 404–406, [edited by John Hope Franklin].
67. Gatewood (1971a) p. 202.
68. Letter of John H. Allen, United States Military and Historical Institute, *Spanish American War Survey – Virginia Infantry 6th Infantry,* Box 306, Folder *6th Virgin Vol. Inf.*
69. *Cleveland Gazette*, "Hurrah! They Refused to Drill!", 5 November 1898.
70. Ibid.
71. *Parsons Weekly Blade*, "The Eagle and Mitchell", 11 June 1898.
72. *Richmond Planet*, "As Bloody as War", 2 July 1898.
73. *Cleveland Gazette*, Editorial, 25 June 1898.
74. *Afro-American Sentinel*, "Please be Consistent", 2 April 1898.
75. Cooper (1997) p. 72.
76. See also Cunningham (2002) p. 308.

7

British and Imperial Volunteers in the South African War

Stephen M. Miller

P.T. Ross's story, *A Yeoman's Letters*, published in 1901 before the South African War was even over, is very similar to other British soldiers' accounts of that conflict.[1] In February 1900, Ross enrolled in the 69th (Sussex) Company Imperial Yeomanry. After passing a variety of loosely supervised physical and medical examinations, he attended some preliminary drills in Eastbourne, and then went into quarters at Shoreditch, where he continued to train until the last week of March. Then, on a cold dark morning, accompanied by the sounds of drums and fifes, his company marched to the nearby train station and proceeded to London's Royal Albert Docks. An uneventful 25-day journey aboard the *S.S. Delphic* brought Ross to Cape Town, and less than a month later he had crossed the Vaal River into the South African Republic. For the next year, like so many other young Britons, he was engaged in a guerrilla struggle against the Boers.

During that time, Ross wrote a number of letters to his friends and family back home, and when he returned to Sussex he reclaimed those letters, edited them, and produced a wonderfully detailed and interesting account of his trials and tribulations. Like so many other contemporary war narratives, it reads mostly like an adventure tale. Ross went here; Ross went there. He saw this; he saw that. He fired at the Boers; they fired at him. And, like the others, the author rarely tells the reader about the emotions he felt, the friendships he made, and the hardships he suffered. In many ways, war is depersonalized in these accounts. Indeed, the first chapter in *A Yeoman's Letters* begins with Ross and his company, described in a matter-of-fact way, hurrying to catch Lord Roberts, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in South Africa, as British forces converged on Johannesburg.

Readers who decided to skip Ross's preface would not even learn why he was in South Africa fighting the Boers. After all, the Imperial Yeomanry was a voluntary force. Ross was not drafted; he did not have to be there. A careful reading of the preface, however, still gives little insight into why he enlisted. "Then came the dark days of November and December," Ross writes. "Who will ever forget them? And who does not remember with pride the great outburst of patriotism, which, like a volcanic eruption, swept every obstacle before it, banishing party rancour and class prejudice, thus welding the British race in one gigantic whole, ready to do and die for the honour of the Old Flag, and in defence of the Empire which has been built up by the blood and brains of its noblest sons."[2] If we take Ross at his word, his decision to go to war was not part of a long, careful introspective process, which may have also included talks with his parents, his employer, his pals, and perhaps a girlfriend. Ross seems confident that the reader will understand his action, and will not challenge his motivation. The country was in danger, and he, like so many around him, leaped to defend it. This chapter will investigate why half a million British and Imperial subjects like Ross volunteered to fight in the South African War, and will also explore some elements associated with their experiences and contributions to the war effort.[3]

Why was it that so many Britons were using words like "dark days", "upset and discomfiture", and "doom and gloom" in the winter months of 1899 and 1900?[4] The South African or Anglo-Boer War[5] erupted in October 1899 after a fairly lengthy period of failed negotiations between the British High Commissioner in Cape Town, Sir Alfred Milner, and the president of the Transvaal, Paul Kruger. It is safe to say in hindsight that these talks were destined to fail from the start. The British tried to force the Boers to incorporate certain economic, political, and social changes to bring about policies which they deemed beneficial. Since it was the British who challenged the status quo, it was quite easy for the Boers to cast them as the aggressor and themselves as the victim. Despite the best efforts of a pro-Imperial and often jingoistic press, the British had a difficult time convincing their public, and in particular the working classes, that war was necessary. This all changed, however, when, in a bad strategic move, Kruger's government decided to issue an ultimatum rather than waiting for a British one. The Salisbury government took advantage of this miscue and refused to comply with Boer demands. This forced Kruger's hand. The ultimatum lapsed, war was declared, and the British Press pounced. The arguments they had used throughout the summer to gain support for the war were immediately

altered. The British would now be fighting a "defensive" conflict; they would not allow themselves to be pushed around by an aggressive foreign power, and needed to uphold their honour.

Despite some serious challenges in the 1970s posed by historians of the left, most of the historical community has now come to accept that the South African War was, at least at the beginning, a popular war in Great Britain.[6] It is true that, as the war began to drag on, casualties grew, costs rose, and stories about the hardships suffered by Boer women and children increased, more and more Britons either turned against it or, more typically, did not show open support for it as they once had. If there was an apex of popular support, it came just after the first week of December 1899 in the wake of three successive defeats at Stormberg, Magersfontein, and Colenso, in what was immediately labelled by the British press as Black Week.

For late Victorian military history, Black Week is a very significant moment. The British Regular Army was very busy during this period of imperial expansion and consolidation. For example, in 1879, the same year that Lord Chelmsford infamously led British forces into Zululand against Cetshwayo, four different expeditions were launched against the tribes of India's Northwest Frontier, a fifth went into Nagaland, and British forces continued to fight in Afghanistan. In 1898, the year before the South African War began, the British were busy in the Tochi Valley, near the Khyber at Tirah, and in Uganda. Depending on how one counts these military campaigns, between 1870 and 1900 there were anywhere between 60 and 80.[7] And what almost all of them had in common was a relatively easy time in achieving victory. Now, of course, there were exceptions. General Sir Garnet Wolseley's failure to save Charles Gordon at Khartoum was one. The Battle of Isandhlwana during the Anglo-Zulu War was another. Majuba Hill, the stunning Boer victory in February 1881 during the first Anglo-Boer War, naturally comes to mind. But Black Week was something apart from all of these. The British public had been convinced by an effective mass media campaign that victory against a "bunch of farmers" was going to be quick and painless. But not only had its army been brought to a standstill, there was no immediate success in sight. The Natal Field Force and the two divisions in the Cape Colony were going nowhere, and the two key towns of Ladysmith and Kimberley, along with the less important frontier town of Mafeking, were still beleaguered and in danger of falling to the Boers. For most Britons the winter of 1899 was a truly dark time.

It was in this atmosphere of uncertainty and despair that the British government permitted the recruitment, training, and dispatch overseas

of volunteer troops, the first time since the French Wars that large numbers of British volunteers had been called upon to serve their country overseas. Since the start of the war, Salisbury and his Secretary of State for War, Lord Lansdowne, had refused to allow the use of such men, believing they had more resources in the field than they needed to defeat the enemy, and also because of scepticism with regard to the value of auxiliary troops. Now, however, because of the need for more troops and, just as important if not more so, the necessity to harness the public's restless energy, they consented. That restless energy, which "swept every obstacle before it", is what P.T. Ross spoke of. He called it patriotism, but what he was speaking about was a sense of urgency, a sense of need, a sense that he personally had to do something; he had to be part of something that would return order to his world. This sense largely transcended class, ethnicity, and age.[8] In that moment, for so many men like Ross, there was no need to think about their actions. They were reared in an environment that equated the well-being of kith and kin with the health of the nation and the empire. If one was in danger, than all were.[9]

John Paterson, who volunteered in the wake of Black Week and served in the 17th (Ayrshire) Company Imperial Yeomanry, echoed these thoughts. "I think far too much has been made of our volunteering," he told a crowd in Ayr. "I don't think we have done anything but what we ought to have done in the circumstances, and I think every young man with the necessary qualifications, in a crisis such as this, when the country is in danger, ought to rally round the old flag, and show the whole world that the ancient military spirit of Britain is not dead."[10] And Trooper Jonas of the 43rd (Suffolk) Company Imperial Yeomanry did not even bother to put his own thoughts down in his diary. Instead, he simply pasted in someone else's words, which he had heard spoken to his unit. "There was a feeling everywhere that in undertaking the position they had assumed they were doing the duty of every Englishman in maintaining the honour and pre-eminence of their great Empire. They were going to fight on behalf of that civilisation which was found wherever the flag of England floated ..."[11]

It would be very easy to take these men at their word when we are searching for motivation for enlistment. And certainly, most of the men who volunteered for the war, particularly after Black Week, were motivated strongly by patriotism, or at least they convinced themselves that the need to defend their country was their primary factor for signing up. But the decision to go to war was much more complex than many would have wanted to let on. Most did not share in the written

records that have been left behind, whether published or unpublished, other reasons that shaped their decision-making process. But some did. Rennie Stevenson, an Imperial Yeoman, wrote that he had signed up because he had a "desire to see the pomp and circumstance of war on the veldt".[12] Frederick Barnado temporarily abandoned medical school and joined the Fife and Forfar Imperial Yeomanry to experience some excitement and fulfil his "call to adventure".[13] Another trooper in the Fife and Forfar Imperial Yeomanry, Thomas Dewar, wrote that a few men in his company had joined to learn a new livelihood.[14] A City of London Imperial Volunteer told one of his officers that the only reason he came out was because "women kept asking him why he hadn't gone yet."[15] And C.S. Jarvis, a 19-year-old Middlesex Volunteer who joined a company of Montgomeryshire Imperial Yeomanry, probably summed up the feelings of many when he wrote in his chronicle of the war: "Life in England was very humdrum, Victorian and prosaic in the 'eighties and nineties'; it was so entirely uneventful and supremely commonplace that one could with safety make plans for one's holiday five years ahead and feel complacently secure that nothing whatsoever would arise in the interim to upset these plans. Abroad, however, in our Colonies and Dependencies there were opportunities for a young man of spirit and enterprise to lead the sort of life of which every youth dreams – or should."[16]

There were many reasons why Britons chose to serve during the South African War, but most of these reasons supplemented, rather than took precedence over, the call to defend the interests of home and empire.[17] Patriotism was a stronger motivational device than the search for job opportunities, peer pressure, or finding an escape from boredom. P.T. Ross makes this point in his account of the war. As stated above, he began *A Yeoman's Letters* with a seemingly hackneyed reason for enlisting. But when he was done recounting his story he found the space to include a short appendix, which he entitled "Why I Joined the Yeomanry".[18] In it, he lists 40 reasons why he or anyone else might have agreed to risk their lives in South Africa. Now clearly, in 1901, he had had the benefit of talking to a lot of men over the years who had done what he had done. It is also fair to say that a year spent chasing an elusive enemy across the veldt left Ross rather cynical about his entire experience, and so he may have been more open to reasons other than patriotism. Here are a few of the reasons he listed:

> "To escape my creditors
> Because I was sick of England

> Could always ride, could always shoot. Thought of duty,
> thought of loot;
> Married in haste
> To kill Time and Boers
> Drink and Drink
> To become acquainted with Colonials before settling
> For Sport
> To escape the Police at home
> Thought I would get the Victoria Cross."[19]

Ross demonstrates that there were many factors determining whether or not one chose to enlist. And yet, for Ross, patriotism still remained by far the most important motivator. Of the 40 reasons given, just under half could be interpreted as an expression of patriotism: for example, Because I thought it was my duty; Patriotic Fever; My Country's call; Duty; and so on.

If English, Scottish, Welsh, and Anglo-Irish volunteers were motivated by patriotism, can the same be said of Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders, and English-speaking South Africans? Over 50,000 volunteers were recruited in South Africa and fought alongside British troops.[20] Although some of these men went there during the war to find employment, the majority of them had made their homes in the Cape Colony and Natal or had worked in the Rand before the outbreak of the war. The war began with Boer advances into the British colonies, and so naturally the linkage between voluntary recruitment and defence of the homeland in South Africa was very real. Stories of Boer atrocities and allegations of farm burning were numerous, many were substantiated, and no doubt the livelihoods of those on the frontier were directly threatened.[21] Of course, the relevance of the war to the other English-speaking colonies was not as strong, there was no immediate threat to their homes, and yet more than 30,000 men made the arduous journey to South Africa and even more offered to go. National self-identity certainly played an important role for some of these men. Local notables used this opportunity both to show Great Britain their commitment to empire and to forge emerging national ties at home. But imperial patriotism should not be dismissed. It proved to be a powerful impulse, and many Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders fought because they understood that British interests and their interests were one and the same.[22]

With the exception of drafts of what were called Volunteer Service Companies, which were directly incorporated into under-strength

regular army units, British and British Imperial volunteers served as stand-alone companies, battalions, in the case of the Militia, or a regiment, in the case of the City of London Imperial Volunteers. Not only were the volunteers, in particular the Imperial Yeomanry and Colonials, left to themselves, but as the war progressed through its early stages they were increasingly assigned very different tasks from their Regular Army counterparts. There was no organizational attempt to bring the regular forces together with the voluntary forces. This was the result of poor planning at the War Office. Volunteer troops, after all, were seen as a temporary expedient to stop the Boer advances and then to bring the war to a swift conclusion. It was never expected that they would be needed past the single year for which they signed up.[23] But civilians alone do not bear sole responsibility for the separation of the troops. Many in the army did not expect much from the volunteers. And hyperbolic pronouncements by Lord Roberts in the summer of 1900, which assured the British public that the war was all but over, ensured that the *ad hoc* nature of the Volunteers would continue.[24] Lord Kitchener as Commander in Chief in 1901 did not improve the situation when he usurped control over the mobilization and training of the force. He insisted that the Second Contingent of Imperial Yeomanry raised in 1901 should be brought to South Africa for its training. Large numbers of men were found to be wanting in riding and shooting skills, not to mention all the health problems that had not been weeded out in Great Britain. Under these circumstances, officers at training camps in the Cape Colony and Natal had very tough decisions to make – whether to send these men back to Britain, at a high cost, and be forced to use under-strength units in the field, or to try to make due with these sub-par recruits. Kitchener, who was loath to admit mistakes, made an exception in this case and returned control of the volunteer force to London for the raising and training of the Third and last Contingent. But by then the war was coming to its end, and the distance between Regulars and Volunteers remained.[25]

The Regular soldier held the volunteer in contempt. Although in part this was due to the responsibilities the volunteers were assigned, usually secondary tasks like guarding lines of communication, escorting prisoners, or manning blockhouses, it would be unfair to say that overall it was due to their service. The Volunteers performed admirably during the South African War.[26] If there were Regulars who felt the volunteers were just plain bad soldiers, it was because their perception was shaped by two important things – neither of which had to do with actual work in the field. The first was, for lack of a better word, jealousy. City and

county newspapers actively promoted the cause of local volunteer units. Many newspapers directly contributed funds to raise companies; they set up pensions for the families of dead and wounded soldiers, and most importantly, covered the comings and goings of the local troop from inception to return. No unit received more coverage and public support than the City of London Imperial Volunteers. The CIV were treated like celebrities. No doubt, the high class standing of many of its recruits and its contacts in London society played an important role.[27] While Regular soldiers were doing their work mostly unnoticed, Roberts and others were heaping accolades onto the CIV. Certainly, the regulars resented this attention. The other thing they deeply resented was the high wages the Volunteers, and in particular the Imperial Yeomanry, were earning. Five shillings a day might not seem like much, but to a late Victorian soldier it was a lot. It was cavalry pay, and a much higher rate than line regiments were getting. To reflect this disparity, Fred Cape's popular Music Hall song "The Tin Gee Gee" was adapted:

> "Then that little tin soldier he sobbed and sighed,
> So I patted his little tin head,
> 'What vexes your little tin soul?' said I,
> And this is what he said:
> 'I've been on this stall a very long time,
> And I'm marked '1/3' as you see,
> While just above my head he's marked '5 bob',
> Is a bloke in the Yeoman-ree.
> Now he hasn't any service and he hasn't got no drill,
> And I'm better far than he,
> Then why mark us at fifteen pence,
> And five bob the Yeoman-ree?' "[28]

Although structural organization and strained relations kept regular army soldiers and volunteers from bonding in any meaningful way, the experiences they shared in South Africa were quite similar. Historians often divide the South African War into three phases. The first phase includes the initial Boer advances and the British failures that culminated in Black Week. The second phase was Lord Roberts' steamroller drive through the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, which led to the occupation and the annexation of the two Boer Republics. The third phase was the guerrilla phase: a gruelling two-year struggle in which the British, at a very high cost, broke the Boers' resistance through a counter-insurgency campaign, which included the erection of a series of

blockhouses designed to limit Boer mobility, the burning of Boers' farms and confiscation of their property, and the removal of Boer women and children to concentration camps. Although most volunteers missed the first phase, and regular officers preferred seasoned soldiers to volunteers in the second phase of set-piece battles, during the third phase, as the nature of the war changed and as officers increasingly were strapped for manpower, the duties and responsibilities of the two forces came to mirror one another.

So what did Volunteers do in the South African War? There is a certain pattern one sees when reading the letters or diaries of a Boer War veteran. In the first month or two, the soldier is writing long and detailed passages about everything he does and sees. As the novelty of war wears off and the surroundings become more familiar, the entries shrink considerably. The one constant throughout is that soldiers write about their battle experience. But in the South African War battle experiences were few and far between after August 1900. William Grant signed up for the Second Contingent of Imperial Yeomanry, joining the 17th (Ayrshire) Company Imperial Yeomanry. In April 1901, his first month in South Africa, he saw combat. In his diary, he wrote in great detail about the experience. "My first impression of being under fire, was that there was a hole in my stomach and I very much required a good tuck in, and my first thoughts were to crouch down on my horse's back as closely as I could, but on second thoughts I resolved to sit as I was not to show the white feather."[29] But the uniqueness of the experience wore off quickly. Grant had little to say about outpost duty, grazing guard, making barbed wire entanglements, and patrol. By July, his daily observations had been reduced to the name of the nearest village and a few details about the weather. Similarly, at the start of his year of service, John Paterson wrote to his brother sometimes more than once a week. But the letters became more infrequent and shorter in length as Paterson headed to the northern frontier of the Orange Free State. Matter-of-fact statements, such as "We are still burning farms as we go along," replaced the detailed descriptions of thatched houses in Stellenbosch.[30]

Volunteers did a lot in the Boer War, but they did not view most of their work as work befitting a soldier. Their perception of war was largely heroic and exciting. That was the way it had been sold to them for the last 30 years. It did not include guarding lines of communication, burning farms, forcing women and children from their homes, and trying to stay awake on cold and rainy nights while on sentry duty. The reality, of course, is that they were doing the same work as regular soldiers. Major General Henry Mackinnon, who commanded the CIV, was quite bitter

that by August 1900 his regiment seemed to have been completely forgotten by Roberts. "Our principal duties," he wrote, "were to put out of their misery the many dying animals left behind by the column, and to awaken all the exhausted men who had dropped asleep on the veldt."[31] But what Mackinnon had not yet come to appreciate was that officers in regular battalions were thinking and writing the same things.

It was the successful completion of these duties, monotonous as they may have been, that was essential in bringing the war to its conclusion. However, it was difficult to lure more volunteers to South Africa with the promise of guarding supply lines and escorting prisoners. Britons were losing interest in the war as the guerrilla phase slogged on without any end in sight. The cost of the war seemed to outweigh any progress to which even its most zealous proponents could point. By 1901, the thrill of relieving Mafeking and the celebrations that followed the fall of the Boer capitals, Bloemfontein and Pretoria, had long since passed. Newspapers continued to remind the public that it had to support the war and see it to its end, but a few were breaking ranks and the message for fighting seemed lost and very distant. The tactics employed during the guerrilla war were coming under fire, and growing numbers were openly questioning what future Liberal Prime Minister Henry Campbell-Bannerman labelled "the methods of barbarism".[32]

In the frenzy that followed Black Week, tens of thousands of men had volunteered for overseas service. Many were turned away. The Government had capped the number because it did not think it needed so many men. In late 1901, there was a noticeable shift in rates of volunteering. The mayors of major urban centres, including London and Glasgow, warned the War Office that it should look elsewhere because they expected that only a few men would be interested.[33] Only a small minority considered re-enlisting for a second year, and only in the rarest cases did a volunteer choose to remain in South Africa for the duration of the war for the purpose of "finishing what he had started".[34] By 1902 it was clear to most that the war had to be ended, and that Britain could not sustain its war effort without turning to a radical solution.

At the start of the South African War, Great Britain was the only major power in Europe that had yet to implement some form of national service. A 40-year history of conflict since the Crimean War, resulting in easy imperial victories, dictated that there was no reason to change the status quo. Despite regular failure in meeting annual army projections, voluntary enrolment more or less satisfied the needs of home defence and Empire. And, equally importantly, it did so at a cost that pleased

the Treasury. For some, however, the South African War challenged the idea that voluntary enlistment could continue to uphold the safety and the security of the empire. The National Service League (NSL), formed in the closing months of the war, proved to be the most vocal and powerful advocate of compulsion during the Edwardian era. Lord Roberts, who initially rejected compulsory service, came to embrace it and was later chosen president of the NSL. It was no coincidence that, as his views about the nature of military service and need changed, so did his stance on the performance of the volunteers in the South African War. Although the NSL's advocacy of conscription won over many Conservatives, it achieved little success among the ruling Liberal party, and the shrewd and talented R.B. Haldane, the Secretary of State for War, was able to find an alternative to compulsion through the creation of the Expeditionary Force, the Special Reserve, and the Territorial Force, the latter two of which absorbed the Militia, Volunteers and Yeomanry. Britain's military needs at home and abroad would still rest on the back of its navy, but now, it was hoped, the army could play a more significant role.

Overall, from the military point of view, the recruitment, deployment, and performance of volunteers in the South African War have to be viewed in positive terms. More men than anyone could have predicted in 1899 turned up at recruiting offices and offered to risk their lives for their Queen and country. The services they rendered to the war effort were essential to bringing the war to its conclusion. In most cases, they did what they were trained to do and they did what was expected of them. At times they failed, but when they did it was usually the fault of hurried and inadequate training, poor leadership, or faulty administration in maintaining proper numbers and morale. They were, after all, hastily organized, their health, size, and age were often substandard, and they were not properly trained for a lengthy conflict such as a guerrilla war.

But the volunteer force employed in South Africa did more than contribute to the defeat of the Boers. They helped redefine military service and create a new, more positive image of the British soldier. Unlike the mid-Victorian career soldier, who would never be invited over for dinner and who was often locked out of pubs and restaurants, the Volunteer was in most cases a neighbour, a co-worker, a friend or a family member. He represented all classes, religions, and ages, he held any number of occupations, he came from the country and town, and he made his home in Scotland, Ireland, Wales, England and in the empire. He made it acceptable for future Britons to volunteer.

In this view, William Home, 1st King's Own Scottish Borderers Volunteer Service Company, concluded emphatically in his memoir, *With the Border Volunteers to Pretoria*: "We are glad that, as part of the army of 100,000 volunteers who served in the war, we have been able to show to those who have hitherto made it their business to sneer at our 'citizen' army as a 'paper' force, that, in the hour of national danger, the volunteer can take his place shoulder to shoulder with the soldier of the line, and that he can endure the same hardships, and face the same dangers, and die the same death, if need be, in his country's cause."[35] Their motivations, backgrounds and beliefs varied, but the impact that the volunteers had on the course of the war, the army and Britain itself was singular.

Notes

1. P. T. Ross (1901) *A Yeoman's Letters* (London).
2. Ibid., p. viii.
3. Return of Military Forces. 1900: cd421 xlix, p. 277; 1902: cd462 xxxix, p. 639; cd578 xxxix, p. 643; 1903: cd892 lviii, p. 17; cd990 lviii, p. 21.
4. See for example, C. E. Playne (1928) *The Pre-War Mind in Britain* (London), p. 188; and, S. Peel (1901) *Trooper 8008 I.Y.* (London), p. 1.
5. For a general discussion of events leading up to the war and details of the war itself, see e.g. A. N. Porter (1980) *The Origins of the South African War: Joseph Chamberlain and the Diplomacy of Imperialism 1895–99* (Manchester); I. R. Smith (1996) *The Origins of the South African War, 1899–1902* (New York); S. M. Miller (1999) *Lord Methuen and the British Army: Failure and Redemption in South Africa* (London); D. Judd and K. Surridge (2003) *The Boer War* (New York); T. Pakenham (1979) *The Boer War* (New York); B. Nasson (1999) *The South African War* (New York).
6. See, for example, R. Price (1972) *An Imperial War and the British Working Class: Working-Class Attitudes and Reactions to the Boer War 1899–1902* (London); H. Pelling (1968) *Popular Politics and Society in Late Victorian Britain* (New York); E. Hobsbawm (1989) *The Age of Empire 1875–1914* (New York).
7. For accounts of many of these conflicts, see B. Bond, ed. (1967) *Victorian Military Campaigns* (New York); B. Farwell (1972) *Queen Victoria's Little Wars* (New York).
8. For more on the social and economic backgrounds of the volunteers, see S. M. Miller (2007) *Volunteers on the Veld* (Norman, OK).
9. For more on patriotism and cultural linkages to the military, see S. M. Miller (2005) "In Support of the 'Imperial Mission'? Volunteering for the South African War", *Journal of Military History* LXIX, 691–713; J. M. Mackenzie (1984) *Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion 1880–1960* (New York).
10. Paterson Papers, National Army Museum (NAM) 7208-8, Chelsea.
11. The words are those of Alfred Haldinstein and were published in the *Norfolk Daily Standard* (undated), Jonas papers, NAM.

12. R. Stevenson (1901) *Through Rhodesia with the Sharpshooters* (London), p. 9.
13. F. Barnado (1963) *An Active Life* (London), p. 75.
14. T. F. Dewar (1901) *With the Scottish Yeomanry* (Arbroath), p. 28.
15. Belfield Papers, Letter to his wife, 3 August 1900, NAM 8111-29.
16. C. S. Jarvis (1943) *Half a Life* (London), p. 64.
17. Miller (2005).
18. Ross (1901), p. 180.
19. Ibid.
20. L. S. Amery (ed.) (1900–1909) *The Times History of The War in South Africa 1899–1902,* 7 vols. (London); as cited in D. Hall (ed.) (1999) *The Hall Handbook of the Anglo-Boer War* (Pietermaritzburg), p. 79.
21. Amery (1900–1909); F. Maurice and M. H. Grant (1906–1910) *(Official) History of the War in South Africa, 1899–1902* (London).
22. For further reading on Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand volunteers in the South African War, see P. Dennis and J. Grey (eds) (2000) *The Boer War: Army, Nation and Empire* (Canberra); C. Miller (2000) "Loyalty, Patriotism and Resistance: Canada's Response to the Anglo-Boer War, 1899–1902", *South African Historical Review,* XLI, 312–23; C. Wilcox (2002) *Australia's Boer War: The War in South Africa, 1899–1902* (New York); I. McGibbon and J.Crawford (eds) (2003) *One Flag, One Queen, One Tongue: New Zealand and the South African War* (Auckland).
23. Imperial Yeomanry and Volunteer service could, and often did, last longer than one year, but this was not the original intention of the War Office. Legally, the recruits were bound to serve one year *or* the duration of the war.
24. For a discussion of Roberts' and Kitchener's differing approaches to the war and of changing British counter-insurgency strategies, see S. B. Spies (1977) *Methods of Barbarism* (Cape Town).
25. For more on Regular Army – Volunteer relations see Miller (2007).
26. Ibid.
27. (1900) *Report on raising, organising, equipping and despatching the City of London Imperial Volunteers to South Africa* (London), pp. 39–41; G.Moore (1986) *Pickman's Progress in the City Imperial Volunteers in South Africa, 1900* (Huntingdon), appendix E.
28. F. Cape (1890–1899) "The Tin Gee-Gee", Revised and sung by M. B. Spurr (London); as cited in Ross (1901), p. 157.
29. Diary entry, 13 April 1901, Grant papers, NAM.
30. John Paterson to his brother, 5 October 1900, Paterson papers, NAM.
31. W. H. Mackinnon (1901) *The Journal of the C. I. V. in South Africa* (London), p. 168.
32. Speech delivered at the Holborn Restaurant to the National Reform Union, 14 June 1901. J. A. Spender (1924, 1968) *The Life of The Right Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman*, Reprint (New York), p. 336.
33. Lord Roberts to Lord Kitchener, 21 November 1901, PRO 30/57/20, The National Archive, Kew.
34. For trends in volunteering, see Miller (2007), Chapter 7.
35. W. Home (1901) *With the Border Volunteers to Pretoria* (Hawick), pp. 176f.

8

Welcome but Not That Welcome: The Relations between Foreign Volunteers and the Boers in the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902

Fransjohan Pretorius

A number of foreign volunteers joined the Boer forces in the Anglo-Boer War or South African War of 1899 to 1902.[1] The majority of them had been living in the Transvaal before the war. Others hurried to the scene of action in South Africa and joined the Boers via Lourenço Marques (today Maputo) when the war was already under way. Their exact number is uncertain, but estimates range between 2,000 (historian J.H. Breytenbach)[2] and 3,700 to 4,000 (Michael Davitt, former British Labour MP).[3] The American, Howard C. Hillegas, correspondent of *The New York World* with the Boers, was probably not too far off the mark when he estimated that there were 2,675 foreign volunteers with the Boers (see Table 8.1).[4]

This study looks at the motives of the foreign volunteers for joining, and proceeds to discuss their relations with the Boers,[5] including their views on the Boer character in general.

Although there are many published and unpublished memoirs and diaries available, a number of which have been consulted for this study, not much secondary literature exists. Two useful MA dissertations were completed in the middle of the twentieth century – van Dalsen's study on the Hollander Corps in 1943,[6] and that of Melt van Niekerk on the German Commando and their commander, Comdt Adolf Schiel, in 1951.[7] Van Niekerk also wrote a chapter – the first general survey on the foreign volunteers – in a work of 1949, under the editorship of J.H. Breytenbach, which commemorated the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War 50 years before.[8] These works were written in the Afrikaner

Table 8.1 Foreign volunteers in the Boer forces (Anglo-Boer War or South African War of 1899 to 1902)

Nationality	In Military Corps	In Commandos
French	300	100
Hollander	400	250
Russian	100	125
German	300	250
American	150	150
Italian	100	50
Scandinavian	100	50
Irish	200	–
	1,650	1,025

nationalist paradigm. In recent years Brian Pottinger and Claus Nordbruch have written popular histories of the foreign volunteers.[9]

Why did these foreigners volunteer to fight for the Boers? Not all reasons weighed equally heavily for all volunteers, and in most instances it was a case of a combination of factors. At bottom, the decision to assist the Boers reflected their personalities and personal preferences.

First of all, for many this meant joining the Boers out of boredom or a desire for adventure. Some of these men were professional officers in European armies, bored because of a lack of active service elsewhere; others were ordinary soldiers or civilians, restless at home and tempted by the vision of adventure in "dark mysterious Africa".[10] As Davidson and Filatova put it, many "felt a romantic desire for military glory, hoped for fame, [and they] wanted to test and assert their courage and simply to experience the exotic adventure of 'wild Africa', so much spoken about in Europe."[11] The Russian Prince Nikolai Bagration-Mukhransky, in fact, jotted down in his memoirs: "I had never known or heard anything about the Boers. Where were they? Who were they? But it felt, nonetheless, very much like my motherland and I felt I must protect it."[12] For another nobleman, the Austrian Count Sternberg, his participation as a volunteer for the Boers was purely opportunistic. It started in 1896 when he heard of the Jameson Raid. He set out for the Transvaal to see for himself "that which had kept the world breathless for a year," hoping, moreover, that he "might see a little fighting". When he arrived in South Africa, the Raid had been quelled. After the

outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War more than three years later, he offered his services to the British, and when these were refused he again travelled to South Africa and joined the Boer forces in a rather detached advisory capacity.[13]

A second reason for the foreign volunteers joining the Boer forces is found in Cornelis de Jong's succinct argument that among the elite in Europe there were those who were dissatisfied with society in their respective countries, men who felt an uncomfortable *fin-de-siècle* mood. It was a rejection of their own time with its unfolding capitalism and imperialism full of profiteering and lust for power. Many of these men saw the Boers as part of an unspoilt, ethical, simple nation without materialistic ambitions.[14]

Thirdly, a large number of the foreign volunteers were inspired by a noble, albeit naïve, idealism. They regarded the Boers as a small, brave nation, manfully opposing the most powerful state in the world to defend their independence and identity against British imperialism and a craving for gold.[15] Scandinavians living in the Transvaal generally belonged to this group. On 23 September 1899 they accepted with acclamation a motion in a meeting in Pretoria to show not only sympathy, but the greatest possible active support, for the Boers by forming the Scandinavian Corps to serve with the Boers.[16]

An interesting case of the second and third reasons given above was the Frenchman Col. Count Georges de Villebois-Mareuil. He was driven by an anti-British sentiment, French patriotism and a feud with the ruling French politicians. In 1895 he briefly commanded the 1st Regiment of the Foreign Legion, but when another officer was sent to Madagascar with his regiment he protested and requested that he be put on the reserve list of officers. Through publications and public lectures he campaigned against French politicians who, according to him, were destroying France and its army at a time when the country had been humiliated by Britain at Fashoda and the French were divided because of the Dreyfus affair. Then the looming war in South Africa provided him with an opportunity to act. In the preface to his diary, published posthumously, he wrote: "My whole ambition is limited to remaining what I have ever been – a soldier." In September 1899, therefore, he offered his services as a strategist to the Boers in the case of war against Great Britain. He was of the opinion that if he could assist the small Boer nation against France's arch-enemy, England, it could restore French prestige and serve his own political ends. He joined the Boer forces at the end of November 1899.[17]

A feeling of kinship with the Boers, combined with some of the factors mentioned above, was a strong motivation for Dutch, German, and Flemish volunteers to join the Boer forces. This was probably the main reason for volunteering for the Boers, as the majority came from the Netherlands and Germany. Most of them were men who had been working as miners, teachers or civil servants in the Transvaal before the war.

Hendrik ver Loren van Themaat, a Dutch jurist who joined the Boers in December 1899, explained in his memoirs: "My heart burned of hatred against the slander, the hypocrisy, the arrogant blustering of the rabble that was dominating across the North Sea, and my heart swelled at the thought of that tough Boer people who were forever pressing forward in the wilderness, conquering place after place for our Dutch race."[18] This notion of the Boers as pioneers, gaining more land to spread Dutch influence and culture in competition with the British political and cultural influence in the world, was a common characteristic of the strong Dutch support for the Boers during the Anglo-Boer War.[19]

Another staunch pro-Boer Dutchman, Cornelis Plokhooy, who had been in the Transvaal for a number of years before the war and who joined the Hollander Corps, argued: "This we saw as our duty: To be faithful under all circumstances to the Transvaal government that had treated us so mildly and generously, despite the cries of oppression of the jingoistic press."[20] Similarly, the Dutchman Leendert Ruijssenaers declared without much ado: "Most of the non-English Uitlanders [foreigners in the Transvaal] are for the good and just cause of the Boers." And the Austrian Franco Seiner simply explained that he departed for South Africa, full of enthusiasm for his hard-pressed clansmen – "the small Boer people, who, claiming their cause as just, were fighting for their independence against a superior enemy".[21]

Oskar Hintrager's subsequent activities on behalf of the Boers and his lifelong interest in the Afrikaner probably indicate that the ties of kinship between Germans and Afrikaners, combined with a sense of justice against Britain's imperialistic motives in the Boer republics, weighed most heavily in his decision to leave Germany and join the Boer forces as a volunteer. In fact, his pan-German thoughts are reflected in the original German edition of his published diary, where he quoted from Tacitus' *Germania* on how the Germans had been under conquest (read: threat) for many years. Hintrager's decision to go to the Transvaal was probably also influenced by the fact that his sister had been teaching at a school near Potchefstroom since 1896. This must have made him more

receptive to the wave of pro-Boer sentiment sweeping over Germany as the Anglo-Boer War became imminent. But Hintrager had an extra incentive. He had undergone his compulsory military service in the 1st Wurttemburg Field Artillery Regiment, and he was aware of the fact that the Free State Artillery Corps was issued with the same C/73 Krupp guns with which he had done his service.[22]

Karel van den Berg, a Dutch volunteer living in the Transvaal, was not without reservation in his support. Foreigners living in the Transvaal could not, according to him, have sympathy for the Boers personally, because of their continuous scheming and the superficiality and stupidity with which they treated serious matters. On the other hand, a British administration would be a severe setback to the Dutch element. And there was something ignoble in the fact that an independent state should cease to exist because of the perfidious abuse of power by another state. Therefore, van den Berg decided, "I have sympathy enough for the Boer cause to fight for them out of pure indignation at the clear driving of [British Colonial Secretary] Chamberlain and the Jingoes and the false British nation."[23]

Interestingly enough, a week after the outbreak of the war van den Berg revealed peer group pressure as another reason for volunteers joining the Boers in great numbers, when he confessed in a letter to his parents that he had seen all his Dutch friends in Pretoria departing successfully for the front, full of enthusiasm, to defend the just cause of the Boers, and that he felt lonely to be left behind.[24]

If a Pro-Boer sentiment almost automatically meant an anti-British stance, the opposite was also true. This was particularly the case with the Irish and American members of the "Irish Brigade" who had been living in the Transvaal at the time of the outbreak of hostilities. His anti-British sentiment led American John Blake to side with the Boers at the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War, whereupon he was appointed a colonel and head of the "Irish Brigade". Fighting alongside him was Maj. John MacBride, whose anti-British feelings were eventually to lead to his execution by the British in the Irish rebellion of 1916. Significantly, the manifesto of the "Irish Brigade" which appeared in the *United Irishman* on 28 October 1899, referred to England as "the vampire that drained Ireland's life blood for centuries, now her difficulty is Ireland's opportunity".[25]

For the French volunteers, too, "anti-British" meant "pro-Boer", as was seen in the case of de Villebois-Mareuil. Sharing the latter's aversion to British imperialism, and admiring the brave Boer resistance in their unequal struggle ("dans leur lutte inégale"), Robert de Kersauson

de Pennendreff, from the staunch pro-Boer town of Nantes, arrived, full of enthusiasm, in the Transvaal in June 1900. There was also a family link there, as his uncle was, in fact, the brother of Col. de Villebois-Mareuil.[26]

The official arrangement of the two Boer governments was that foreign volunteers would support the war effort of the Boer forces without pay in the various foreign volunteer corps.[27] Individuals arriving from abroad were assigned to commandos, particularly after the Hollander and Scandinavian Corps had been virtually wiped out at Elandslaagte in October 1899 and Magersfontein in December 1899, respectively.

On 10 March 1900, soon after the various Boer fronts had collapsed, Gen. Piet Joubert appointed French volunteer Col. Georges de Villebois-Mareuil as combat-general with the task of uniting all foreign volunteers into an international legion. While harassing Lord Methuen's line of communication in the western Free State, his corps was intercepted near Boshof on 5 April 1900 and de Villebois-Mareuil was killed. Although the international legion continued to function for a couple of months, now under Gen. de la Rey's brother Adriaan, most volunteers left South Africa after the fall of Pretoria in June 1900, as they believed that the war was over. A small number stayed on until the end of the war in May 1902.

On the whole, relations between the Boers and the foreign volunteers were not good. The Boer leaders were not impressed with the problems these men created for them. Early in March 1900 the Commandant-General of the Transvaal, Piet Joubert, complained to State Secretary F.W. Reitz that the volunteer corps were making life impossible for him. Many volunteers, he said, were sent to the front with no knowledge of the Boers' language or morality and were unsuited to his style of warfare. They were costing the country quite a lot, and some were killed without really furthering the cause of the war. By far the greatest trouble and burden, Joubert continued, landed on his shoulders. He was pestered with all sorts of inquiries about accommodation, food, means of transport, horses that went missing and rifles that were stolen.[28]

In reply, Reitz assured him that the Transvaal government was doing its best to equip the foreign corps properly before sending them to the front. Their arrival was causing him a great deal of trouble as well, he admitted, but what could they do – after all, they could not turn them away![29]

A week after the British occupation of Pretoria in June 1900, President Paul Kruger requested the Transvaal consul general in Lourenço Marques from Machadodorp on the Delagoa Bay railway line to inform

foreigners who wished to assist the Boers that the government was no longer in a position to provide them with horses and saddles. As for food and clothing, it could no longer look after them as well as before. Present circumstances were such that the burghers had to endure great hardships, and as the struggle continued these were likely to get worse. If, notwithstanding all this, the foreigners still wanted to assist the Boers, their help would be welcome.[30]

By and large the rank and file of the Boers had nothing but contempt for foreign volunteers. According to a Norwegian volunteer, Ingvald Schröder-Nielsen, the Boers inquired sceptically about the usefulness of the foreign volunteers' erudition if they did not even know how to ride a horse, shoot or run a farm – all skills at which the Boers were adept and which had seen them through all manner of dangers and trouble.[31] Accordingly the burghers were scornfully derisive of the volunteers' initially maladroit attempts at horse riding.[32] Particularly in the beginning, the burghers did not take individual volunteers on commando under their wing and, with no experience of the situation, they had to either sink or swim. The subdivision of field cornetcies into closed sections did nothing to ease the lot of volunteers.[33]

Generally, foreign volunteers also received little or no thanks from the burghers for their assistance in the war effort. After the peace, J. Wierema, a Dutch volunteer who had taught in the Marico district for the last two years before the war, complained to Gen. Louis Botha about the burghers' attitude towards their contribution to the struggle: "I really cannot boast of the goodwill and gratitude of the Boer towards foreigners who gave their blood for the righteous cause of the republics. I do not want to be paid for my loyalty, but one does feel a need for some cordiality."[34]

Dutch volunteers in particular incurred the contempt and suspicion of the rank and file. Indeed, there had been some animosity towards the Hollanders in the Transvaal even before the Anglo-Boer War of 1880–1. In a fine exposition of the reasons for this phobia, G.J. Schutte points out that culturally the Afrikaner and the Hollanders differed far more radically than most eager discoverers of Dutch consanguinity realized. Afrikanerdom and its culture had originated in a remote corner of the world in circumstances that differed greatly from those in Europe. The Great Trek into the interior in the 1830s had reinforced this isolation and powerfully enhanced the Afrikaners' sense of identity and independence. Their world view was thoroughly rustic, patriarchal, and conservative. Their isolated, hazardous life among non-Western, non-Christian peoples of colour had intensified their aristocratic sense of

superiority, their mistrust of foreigners and their stubbornness.[35] This was what Dutch volunteers came up against.

By contrast, as Schutte indicates, Dutch immigrants in the latter half of the nineteenth century (like the Dutch volunteers in the Anglo-Boer War) were urbanites rather than country folk. They had had better schooling and possessed more theoretical worldly wisdom, but were inclined to judge local conditions in the Transvaal sweepingly according to their own criteria and conceptions. They might be Christians, but even then the ecclesiastic practice and traditions of Dutch and Afrikaner Calvinism diverged. They might also be agnostics or confirmed atheists. Often they were characterized by priggishness, presumption and an excessive sense of superiority which was not always proportionate to their actual accomplishments. Many things in Transvaal society and in the behaviour of the Boers (also on commando) irritated them, and they did not always have the patience to gain the Afrikaners' confidence or the insight to discriminate between their strengths and weaknesses.[36]

In September 1900 an erudite burgher, Jan Celliers, launched a scathing attack on the Hollanders. He felt that, among many good things, the Netherlands had also sent the Boers some petty spirits, "nobodies who had become somebodies", people who in outlying areas were big fish in a small pond. Unable to take the disillusionment that preconceptions suffer when they come up against reality, they immediately adopted the extreme opposite position. Whereas they had expected everything to be perfect and then found it otherwise, they now saw no goodness at all; where they had expected an ardent welcome and humble respect for their "erudition", they found a silent handshake and a quietly critical scrutiny. And, because such foreigners lacked the common sense and insight to discern the reasons for this painful surprise, they "barricaded themselves behind a wall of pedantry and a moody, false superiority", from where they hoped to assert themselves by using their "better judgement" to ride roughshod over every area of Afrikaner life. Far from achieving this goal, Celliers felt, they made themselves "ridiculous and objects of righteous contempt".[37]

The anti-Dutch sentiments that were apparent during the Anglo-Boer War probably came from the same two groups of Boers who, according to Schutte, resented Dutch immigrants in the latter half of the 19th century. Each of these two groups had its own social and political connotations. The first were the old Voortrekkers or their children, some of them *takhare* (country bumpkins), mostly staunch supporters of Paul Kruger. They knew full well that as civil servants and schoolteachers the Hollanders were indispensable. They had a sense of consanguinity

with the Hollanders and some appreciation for the sympathy and support that the Republic had received from them in the past, especially during the Anglo-Boer War of 1880–1. Where were the Cape colonials, they asked, when the Hollanders were sending Bibles, ministers, and teachers during the 1840s and 1850s? Yet from their ranks came complaints about the drunken, foul-mouthed Hollanders who were such wiseacres and never went to church. In fact, humanly these Transvalers were furthest removed from modern, urbanized Dutch people. They found it hardest to adjust to rigidly bureaucratic treatment from young Dutch upstarts who dared tell them – the rulers of the land – how things ought to be done and who made it quite clear that they felt themselves far superior to uneducated, hidebound Boers.

As Schutte has shown, much the same social differences from the Hollanders applied to the more progressive, slightly more liberal Transvalers, only they were less convinced than the first group about the indispensability of the Hollanders. They considered themselves perfectly capable of occupying the same public positions and, in fact, insisted that these positions be given to "the sons of the land". In addition, they saw Cape colonials almost as compatriots; all Afrikaners were kinsfolk; to them the Vaal River was not a boundary. Kruger's striving for independence was confined to the Transvaal and his concomitant Dutch appointments did not suit these Afrikaners, whose leanings were South African rather than pro-Transvaal. Accordingly many of them supported Piet Joubert, Kruger's political antagonist.[38]

Anti-Dutch feeling sometimes manifested itself quite vehemently on commando. Although some burghers referred good-naturedly to the Dutch volunteers as *Kase* or *Kaaskoppe* (lit. "Cheeses" or "Cheeseheads"), others did so contemptuously.[39] At best the Hollanders were more or less ignored,[40] and often they were overtly insulted. According to a Norwegian volunteer, "as dumb as a Hollander" was a common expression, despite the fact that they were the schoolmasters of the Boer children.[41] In January 1900 four Dutch volunteers in the Wakkerstroom Commando complained to the Commandant-General that they had to put up day and night with "malice and imprecations" from some burghers, directed not just against them personally but against the entire Dutch people. That very morning they had listened to the following comment: "We shall chase the accursed Hollanders away once we're through with the British."[42] A few days earlier the Dutch station chief at Modderspruit had complained to his boss that a burgher who could not trace a parcel had threatened to his face and those of two other Hollanders that "the bunch of dirty Hollanders" should be beaten up.[43]

It is not known whether the Commandant-General took any action in these specific instances.

Some officers unfailingly took action against any manifestation of anti-Dutch feeling. On the southern front in December 1899 Comdt. Robert Preller summarily tried a burgher when a few Hollanders complained that he had insulted their nation, commenting that, while he hated the British, he detested the Hollanders "like the plague". The commandant pointed out the folly of his attitude, since he was insulting all Hollanders for the fault of one of them, and on top of that he was being offensive to a sympathetic nation to whom they were greatly indebted. The burgher apologized to the complainants, fetched a bottle of liquor and had a drink with them, which settled the matter amicably.[44] In June 1900 an Afrikaner in Theron's Scouting Corps also made some offensive remarks about the Hollanders, whereupon the irate Hollanders in the corps, headed by Henri Slegtkamp, decided to leave. Danie Theron managed to persuade them to stay on. Like Preller, he hauled the offender over the coals and pointed out how much the Hollanders were helping them in the war. The burgher had to apologize. The Hollanders, satisfied that justice had prevailed, requested that he be absolved from his punishment – 15 lashes with a stirrup strap.[45]

Sometimes foreign volunteers were maligned even in death. Outside Mafeking on Christmas Day 1899, Hollander Abraham Stafleu indignantly noted in his diary that, when casualties among the foreign corps were discussed, one often heard the burghers remark superciliously: "Fortunately they were not our own people."[46] After the battle of Spioenkop on 24 January 1900 Dr E. van Rijckevorsel, a doctor of the Dutch-Russian Ambulance, overheard a field cornet inquiring how many casualties there were. "Thirteen," was the reply. "But there are fourteen bodies," he interjected, surprised. "Sure, but the fourteenth is a Hollander."[47]

Some foreign volunteer corps made themselves thoroughly unpopular with the burghers because of their occasional disorderly conduct and looting of Boer property. The German Corps, which had earned the burghers' disfavour on this account even during the set-piece battle phase, persisted with such behaviour under Comdt Krieger in the eastern Transvaal. In mid-1900 they were encamped close to the Transvaal government commissariat at Machadodorp, where they were reputed to be enjoying abundance while the Boer commandos further afield were suffering want. According to J.C. Zijp, a Hollander who fully identified with the Boer cause, the German Corps was a "disorganised gang without any leadership or authority."[48] Just before the battle of Dalmanutha

in August 1900, Comdt G.H. Gravett of the Pretoria Rand Commando complained to Gen. Louis Botha about the behaviour of the German Corps. One day they slaughtered one of the draught oxen of his commando and the next day they killed 20 sheep. He requested Botha either to remove Krieger and his men from his commando's trenches or to relocate his commando. He expressed his fear that there would be murder one day, since the Germans were firing in all directions all day long and the feeling among his burghers was not altogether satisfactory. That very afternoon the Germans had threatened to kill one of his shepherds, Gravett stated apprehensively.[49] Botha's response is not known.

In July 1901 relations between a group of Germans in Comdt Walter Mears' scouting corps and some burghers of the Heidelberg Town Commando reached breaking point. For some reason they quarrelled and, according to Marthinus Viljoen, there was an ugly fight. The magistrate of Heidelberg sentenced the eight Germans to a fine of £3 (£5 for the lieutenant) or one week in prison, and the burghers to £2 or a week in prison. "The Germans were incensed about this. They decided there and then to return to Germany," Viljoen noted in his diary.[50] Seventeen of them duly requested the government to discharge them and, after State Secretary Reitz had courteously thanked them for their services, they left for Delagoa Bay.[51] And a good thing too, Viljoen observed: "they were in danger of the Boers opening fire on them if they persisted with their destructive behaviour."[52] According to his brother Henning, Gen. Coen Brits had informed them that he would shoot the Germans on sight. "For my part they are welcome to go; however well they might fight, they are even better at vandalism," Henning Viljoen decided.[53]

And yet some foreign volunteers, individuals in the Boer commandos, got on extremely well with the burghers and enjoyed their goodwill. The key to such mutually cordial relations was usually the attitude of the foreigner. He had to have sufficient sensitivity and insight to act tactfully and with restraint towards the Boers. He also had to have the magnanimity to focus on what he considered positive in the other person's culture and not allow the negative to dominate his evaluation of his situation. He had to guard against the slightest semblance of superiority. On the southern front in February 1900 a group of Boers offered the Austrian volunteer Franco Seiner a much wanted cup of coffee, warning him not to tell the other foreigners about it; why should they share with people who regarded them as inferior, they said.[54] The Norwegian volunteer Ingvald Schröder-Nielsen was extremely proud of the fact that he was elected corporal by the Boers while fighting under

Gen. De la Rey in the western Transvaal in the guerrilla phase – a singular testimony that he had been accepted by them.[55]

In fact, to be accepted, a foreign volunteer had to sever all ties with his own corps. He had to become "a true Boer" ["un vrai Boer"] as quickly as possible, the French volunteer Robert de Kersauson de Pennendreff realized.[56] This unspoken condition by the Boers was obviously a strong reaction to the perceived attitudes of superiority of most European volunteers, but it also followed from a general reluctance to accept foreign help.

It was a mistake to keep to themselves and isolate themselves from the Afrikaners, Steuerwalt explained to a fellow Hollander, Hendrik ver Loren van Themaat, in September 1900. According to him isolation easily led to unpleasant friction or overt quarrels, either through misunderstanding or lack of mutual trust, through conflicting interests or ill-will on the part of individuals.[57] In addition the foreigner had to learn Afrikaans in order to facilitate communication, establish trust, and make friends. He had to sort out any inadequacies in his military demeanour and become a Boer in his general conduct.[58] Also, a foreigner who could physically compete with a Boer on an equal footing or outclass him compelled the Boers' admiration and was fully accepted in their ranks. The Russian Col. Yevgeni Maximov discovered this when he proved his superior marksmanship by felling a springbok at 800 metres with his rifle from a moving train after a few burghers had tried and failed.[59]

It was particularly important for foreign volunteers, ver Loren van Themaat realized, not to be daunted by early disillusionments; on commando the saying "unknown, unloved" applied more than anywhere else in South Africa. What fun life could be among the Boers, he remarked, once you had won their trust and friendship. You soon made friends among the better educated ones, and there was sufficient common ground to get to understand and value one another. In many respects foreigners fell short in accomplishments that were familiar to small Afrikaner boys; on the other hand, foreigners brought their own superior knowledge and education with them from Europe, so that the interaction was beneficial to both parties. Afrikaners enjoyed educating foreigners in areas where they were at home. When an uncultured Boer saw that the foreigner was friendly with a fellow burgher whom he knew well and esteemed, he was less quick to ridicule the foreigner when he committed some *faux pas*. Then the foreigner no longer had any trouble with disagreeable persons, who were to be found among the Boers as among any other people. After a while the Boers no longer regarded the foreigner as an alien, but treated him as one of their own, ver Loren found.[60]

Oskar Hintrager, a German volunteer with the Free State Artillery, made several observations in his diary on the relations between the Boers and the foreign volunteers. The day after his arrival in the Transvaal in May 1900, he noted with disgust how several foreign volunteers allegedly on leave from the front and at government cost were hanging about in the Pretoria hotels, boasting about their deeds and running down the Boers and their government. On the other hand, Hintrager was upset that neither the government nor the burghers were considerate to the foreign volunteers. It remained "the damned Uitlander!"[61]

In July 1900 Hintrager got the opportunity of a closer view of the relations between Boer and foreign volunteer. It had to do with the fact that the Free State Artillery Corps was, by nature of its former commander, Maj. F. Albrecht, Prussian in character with European officers in command. After the Danish Lt Christian Andersen was wounded in May 1900, Gen. Paul Roux placed a Boer, Cpl Van der Merwe, in command of his two guns. When Andersen had recovered, Van der Merwe refused to step down. Andersen thereupon appealed to his men, but they chose the Boer before the Uitlander, because, as Hintrager was told, "the brave Andersen with his European approach was insistent upon efficacy rather than cover," and the Boers preferred caution to bravery. In "typical Boer fashion" Roux did not want to offend, and referred the matter to Free State President Martinus Theunis Steyn. Without prejudice towards Uitlanders, Steyn discharged Van der Merwe and reappointed Andersen. Indignant, the Boer artillerists laid their case before Gen. C.R. de Wet. The latter defused the issue by giving Van der Merwe one gun and Andersen the other. In their discussions with de Wet, the Boer artillerists expressed strong prejudice against the foreign volunteers, with remarks like "We don't want to have anything to do with the Uitlanders," and "There can be no peace in the Corps before the Uitlanders are out of it!"[62] – which, according to Hintrager, corresponded with similar sentiments elsewhere among the Boers on commando.[63]

Hintrager came to some important conclusions. In the first place he felt that the Boers had blundered by giving command to a foreigner, because he did not know the language, the land, and the people, and because a customary prejudice existed towards him. The Boer, who trusted only himself and distrusted everybody else, would never entrust his holy possessions to a foreigner. Secondly, the foreign volunteer who did not want to fight with rifle or gun had the choice of giving advice to the Boer leaders or commanding some compatriots or other foreign volunteers. Advice, he felt, should be treated circumspectly in order not to offend the mistrustful and obstinate Boers, and command over foreign

volunteers created problems because of a deficient knowledge of the country. Therefore Hintrager came to the important conclusion that the value of foreign volunteers in this war was rather small. The Boers in any case did not want their assistance and did not appreciate it.[64]

And yet from time to time Hintrager experienced gratitude towards the foreign volunteers. In July 1900 he was present when de Wet praised Theron's Scouting Corps, with its large contingent of foreign volunteers, for making the crossing of the railway possible for the Free State forces. With gratitude de Wet mentioned the "European foreigners who had come to help". According to Hintrager, de Wet was far too sensitive to use the word "Uitlanders" for the people who had been such a factor in contributing to the war.[65]

More gratitude towards the foreign volunteers followed. In August 1900 a young burgher from Pretoria by the (German) name of Dürr became the first Boer to confess to Hintrager that the Boers had made a mistake with their treatment of the foreign volunteers. They had simply left them to themselves without advice and support in the shape of arms, horses or supplies; they therefore hung about the railways and left when the tide turned against the Boers in February 1900. And when he bade farewell to Lt P.J. Strydom, with whom he had been on commando for three and a half months, Hintrager was grateful for Strydom's words "God bless you!", because it meant a lot if a Boer said that to a foreigner.[66]

As can be expected, the foreign volunteers were keen commentators on the quality of the Boer leaders. De Villebois-Mareuil was struck by the inefficient military skills and stubbornness of the Boer leaders.[67] The arrogant French Colonel, of course, had to do with men from the old Boer school, who had little claim to military competence and were not inclined to be prescribed to, like Comdt.-Gen. Piet Joubert and Gen. Schalk Burger.

Of Joubert, de Villebois-Mareuil commented: "The chief command is trusted to the chance of circumstances and the currents of opinion," and: "I shall be glad to leave General Joubert, who is essentially a politician, knows nothing about war, and may continue to vegetate around Ladysmith."[68] Of Schalk Burger, de Villebois-Mareuil remarked: "I found him embarrassed with his authority,"[69] and Gen. Daniël Erasmus' claim to military honours was thrown out with de Villebois-Mareuil's decision that he "succeeded, in spite of himself" to capture an English detachment at Dundee.[70]

Interestingly enough, the French Colonel's assessment of Cronjé – who was to surrender with 4,000 men at the end of February 1900 – was positive: Cronjé's activity was "extraordinary". He visited his positions every

day, reprimanding for faults, and was very strict. De Villebois-Mareuil decided: "He is a soldier who sees clearly and appears sure of himself."[71] However, for the Swede Hjalmar Janek, Cronjé was the "cautious general", who "stubbornly refused" to take the besieged Mafeking by storming.[72]

De Villebois-Mareuil was impressed with the qualities of Gen. Louis Botha, leader of the younger generation of officers. He was "young, intelligent, and doing his utmost", "ever charming and amiable". In January 1900 the Frenchman lamented: "With the one exception of General Botha, who continually visits his positions and understands the importance of observations made to him, I have been unable up to now to obtain anything but approbation – never a decision!"[73]

De Villebois-Mareuil was not alone in his negative assessment of the old school. With one sweep Franco Seiner condemned the quality of Erasmus, who was "the cause of many accidents", and Burger and Lukas Meyer, who "had acquired for themselves the name of 'fleeing generals' ". Seiner felt that if Gens. Louis Botha, Christiaan de Wet and Koos de la Rey had stood at the head of the Boer forces from the beginning, the course of the war would have been totally different and in favour of the Boers.[74]

Neither ver Loren or Hintrager had any contact with Joubert, Burger, Erasmus, Cronjé or Botha. They both were, however, immensely impressed by the military skills and acumen of de Wet. Hintrager noted in his diary that the Boers often said that they needed a few more leaders like de Wet.[75] Hintrager himself sang de Wet's praises when he parted from the general in September 1900 after three and a half months of close contact. He considered himself lucky to have got to know de Wet and to have fought under him. Whenever he was in his presence he always felt that this was a truly great man, born and bred to the greatness of the times. His supreme merit was that he had shaken the Boers from their lethargy and gradually made them realize the true meaning of the struggle. He had great vision and knew the art of communicating it to the Boers in simple language. And he knew how to use a little guile to get them where he wanted them to be.[76] Having expressed his admiration at de Wet's modesty – "he does not want to be more than any other" – ver Loren remarked that the Boer leaders felt themselves the servants of God, and would not render themselves guilty of haughtiness towards their own people. "What immeasurable service they do to their people by upholding good principles!" he exclaimed.[77]

Hintrager and ver Loren were joined by other volunteers in their praise for de Wet. Prince Nikolai Bagration-Mukhransky spoke highly of his qualities[78] and, when Seiner recorded de Wet's conduct during the

first de Wet hunt, he assessed: "Indeed, the honour of the struggle is not only that of the English. Who would not sing the praises of de Wet?"[79]

All volunteers who had had contact with President Steyn had the highest respect for the Free State president. To ver Loren he was the father of the fatherland, like his country's own Prince William the Silent. Hintrager saw him as powerful, noble, modest, full of confidence in the Boer cause, a man who would persevere despite all danger and privation.[80]

Other volunteers echoed these words. A Belgian nursing sister with the Boers recorded how the Russian volunteer, Col. Yevgeny Maximov, had told her that Steyn was "the noblest, finest, and most disinterested figure" in the war, and that he was "the incarnation of bravery, self-sacrifice, and stainless honesty [...] he is a *savant*, his heart is in the right place, and he is as brave as a lion".[81] Seiner also talked of him as "a noble man",[82] while Count Sternberg decided that he was "a model of sincerity and candour".[83]

Often ver Loren experienced how capable Boer leaders aroused the confidence of their people. In July 1900 Danie Theron's Scouting Corps was encircled by the Free State forces. In his diary he jotted down: "Does this not make us anxious? No, we have confidence in our leaders. We might not have a clear perspective of the future, but even if it looks dark, we remain to have confidence in the policy of de Wet and above all in the unflinching steadfastness, the iron will-power that defies all danger, of Danie Theron."[84]

After the death of Theron in early September 1900, ver Loren expressed his infinite sorrow at the great loss: "How insecure, how difficult, and full of grievance does the future appear without our forceful leader. Never did our captain let himself be discouraged by setbacks, he always knew what to do. His presence alone gave men calm and confidence [...] There are brave men aplenty in our corps, but who has his insight and knows where one could take strong action and where one should be careful, what the weak points of the enemy are?"[85]

Apart from their criticism of some prominent Boer leaders of the old school, the foreign volunteers also did not spare the image of some lesser-known officers. After meeting Comdt Maree of Kroonstad in October 1901, ver Loren ascribed the pessimistic mood in the laager to the commandant's lack of inspiration.[86] Hintrager was clearly not taken with Gens. Piet de Wet ("moody and despondent") and Marthinus Prinsloo ("endowed with little initiative").[87] They were not the only ones subject to criticism. Hjalmar Janek was of the opinion that Gen. S.P. du Toit of Wolmaransstad was "a brave man, but he had a bad reputation and did not have the confidence of his men".[88] The Norwegian Paul

Schultz found Comdt J.F. Froneman "a hard and callous man", and he was not surprised to learn later that Gen. Manie Maritz had relieved him of his rank.[89]

The volunteers made close observations of the Boer character. Towards the end of his stay Hintrager found himself in agreement with what a Russian doctor had told him: the Boer was polite and ready to please and did not want to offend. Nature had determined his character. He was "quiet, simple, monotonous, dry as the land, hard as the rock of South Africa, difficult to move and to influence, and he fought with resignation".[90] Ver Loren found the Boer calm under pressure and calm in victory, completely phlegmatic; however, he was never despondent, made the best of the moment, and was always cheerful and full of jokes. When he had to act, he had a calm resoluteness, a practical outlook that boosted confidence.[91] For Karel van den Berg, too, the "calm and slow Boer nature" was a striking feature.[92] And both de Villebois-Mareuil and Sternberg agreed with ver Loren that the Boers were astonishingly calm in time of success. To Sternberg's surprise, Pretoria remained calm when the resounding victory at Colenso in mid-December 1899 became publicly known: "No jubilation, no outward joy, nothing to show the real excitement."[93]

There was admiration for the Boers' sympathetic treatment of their prisoners of war. Hintrager found it amusing that a British officer who had been captured by men from the Kroonstad Commando was walking freely through de Wet's laager, shouting – the way the Boers did – "Where is the Kroonstad laager?!"[94] Both de Villebois-Mareuil and Sternberg were struck by the Boer treatment of the captured soldiers after the Battle of Colenso, de Villebois-Mareuil remarking: "There was something very touching in the sympathetic silence of the Boers in the presence of their prisoners. Some held out their water-bottles for them to drink."[95] According to a Russian volunteer, the British soldiers who captured the Boers with Cronjé at Paardeberg in February 1900 were surprised to find that the Boers had hidden their prisoners of war in the burrows of the Modder River together with the Boer women and children, to protect them from the horrors of the shelling.[96] Seiner had a similar experience near Colesberg in February 1900, when he saw to his amazement how some Boers after the battle were protecting British prisoners of war against the blazing sun by holding erect their rifles, to which they had tied horse blankets to form a roof.[97]

Several volunteers commented on the important role of religion in the lives of the Boers. According to Kandyba-Foxcroft, the Russian volunteers were deeply impressed by the Boers' "unswerving faith in

God".[98] Sternberg noted that religion played the most important role in the country, and that the book of books was the Bible, particularly the Old Testament.[99] Hintrager was intrigued by the Boers' knowledge of the Bible, the Bible education by the older men of the younger, and their Calvinistic belief in the sovereignty of God.[100] Sternberg observed that the Boers were by nature very obedient, and never opposed their lawful superiors, taking their cue from the precept of the Bible: "Let every soul be subject to higher powers, for there is no power but from God."[101] Seiner recorded how Gen. Hendrik Schoeman ascribed their victory in February 1900 near Colesberg to the work of God,[102] and de Villebois-Mareuil remarked that Cronjé, like his comrades, attributed to God everything he did or conceived.[103] To him they were "fervent Huguenots";[104] ver Loren compared them with the Swedes of Gustavus Adolphus marching through Germany in the seventeenth century;[105] and they reminded Sternberg of Cromwell's Puritans and of the Dutch Protestants under William of Orange.[106] The Dane William Baerentzen, on the other hand, declared that the Boers were "very religious", but that they should not be compared with Cromwell's Puritans as they were "not religious pessimists".[107]

Schröder-Nielsen commented on the naïve, uncritical outlook of the Boers. Most, he said, thought he was merely telling stories that the sun never set and that the earth was round and revolved around the sun. He caused much laughter when he tried to prove his point – after all, they had seen with their own eyes that the sun was moving and not the earth and that the sun was smaller than the earth. He noted some superstition when he recorded how the appearance of a comet – Viscura, which was visible in the southern hemisphere in April and May 1901 – caused both fear and joy. Many Boers thought that God was warning them that the Day of Judgement was near, but most saw it as an omen that peace was at hand.[108]

As with other observers,[109] Hintrager and ver Loren noted that politics and religion were cut from the same cloth and often intermixed. Because the Boers believed that their cause was just before God and that He was fighting on their side, they felt that traitors were betraying God's cause. This meant that treason against the Afrikaner nation was a mortal sin. Hintrager mentioned a proclamation by President Kruger in June 1900, in which he claimed that the war was a struggle between darkness and the light, the lie against truth, Mammon versus God.[110] Hintrager also related a speech by de Wet in August 1900, wherein he stated that the war was a sifting of the faithful from the unfaithful.[111] Ver Loren, too, quoted at length a speech by de Wet in August 1901,

in which he freely mixed politics and religion. To de Wet, deliverance meant a military victory.[112]

The volunteers were unanimous in their assessment of discipline on commando. On the one hand, they were full of praise for the independent actions of the Boers. Seiner remarked that the commandants would bring the men to their positions and then everybody would act as he thought fit.[113] Both ver Loren and Hintrager remarked that often the burghers did not need orders from their officers to act correctly, as some Free State commandos proved in August 1900 when they were surprised by the British while crossing the Vaal River.[114]

It was widely accepted that each burgher was his own general.[115] Dr D. Romeyn, a volunteer physician of the First Dutch Ambulance with the Boer forces, pointed out that this might not be all that bad in a country where virtually everyone was a good horseman and a crack shot, where social distinctions were basically unknown, where nobody had made any specialized study of warfare to elevate him above his neighbour, and where men did not fight for riches or fame but purely for independent survival, in which every right-minded person had an equal stake. It also had the advantage, he argued, that every individual who acted more or less independently in battle was not a machine but could use his intellect, "and is therefore better able to exploit all sorts of minute circumstances for self-preservation, and also for combating the enemy more effectively, than is the case among disciplined troops".[116]

On the other hand, the foreign volunteers did not close their eyes to some weaknesses in the Boer character, particularly the lack of discipline that was so harmful to the Boer cause. A serious problem was obstinacy and selfishness, the desire of each individual just to care for his own possessions – almost a kind of "local patriotism". When Hintrager asked an old Boer, who was roaming in the bushveld with his cattle instead of fighting, what he was doing there, he was told: "We must make sure that the English don't come in here and take our stuff!"[117] It struck Hintrager that even President Steyn did not dare to intrude upon the private rights of the individual.[118] In July 1900 Hintrager came to the conclusion that without sacrifice one could not wage war, and that the Boer did not want to make any sacrifices, particularly not big sacrifices.[119]

Some volunteers were dumbstruck by the phenomenon that many Boers simply gave no ear to calls to take position for a battle. When little more than half of the Bethlehem Commando left the laager to take positions in order to defend their town in early July 1900, Hintrager jotted down the excuses: "One had to slaughter a sheep, another had to

make coffee and the third was not well."[120] The next day, when the first British onslaught came, 60 men rode in little groups to their positions, while 150 men calmly remained behind the ridge.[121]

Regarding this issue, Seiner was witness to an amazing dialogue in mid-February 1900 near Colesberg between Gen. Schoeman and Comdt Preller, when the latter arrived at the scene of battle with only three men:[122]

> " 'Where are your men, Commandant?'
> 'In the laager.'
> 'So, we are fighting here and the men do not help us? Why haven't you brought them along?'
> 'I have ordered them to come with me, but apart from these three they all had excuses. The one was ill, the other tired, but most just did not want to get up so early.' "

Both Seiner[123] and Hintrager were surprised to see how burghers could leave their positions during a battle simply, as Hintrager put it, "because it looked ridiculous to them to remain there much longer",[124] or leave their commandos and go home without permission, particularly when the British were operating in their home districts.[125]

On a number of occasions de Villebois-Mareuil was struck by the inability of the Boers to come to a decision or to act swiftly and take the initiative. It was in the first few months of the war that he observed this "tenaciousness for inaction in which the Boers excel".[126] The situation improved markedly in the guerrilla phase of the war,[127] but by then de Villebois-Mareuil was no longer there to experience it.

Despite the above-quoted negative observations, Hintrager did notice an important change in the Boer attitude towards discipline from July 1900. Although the improvement in discipline was never such that all officers could at all times rely on all burghers, he did remark in September 1900:[128] "This was indeed the most important thing that I have seen in this struggle, namely that many a Boer gradually sacrificed his personal interests for the well-being of country and nation and that their feeling of togetherness as a nation of brothers in the struggle was awakened. In June it was for many still defending their own possessions, but as this conscience grew, things got better for the Boers and worse for the English. In this way a nation is born."

Ver Loren, too, observed some weaknesses of the Afrikaner, but eventually, he, like Hintrager, was positive about the future of the Afrikaner. When he arrived in Pretoria in early December 1899 he was amazed at

the many Boers hanging around the town with pseudo-excuses for not being at the front. He had thought that every young Transvaler would be desirous to take up his Mauser and go and defend his fatherland at the front.[129] At the end of February 1900 he estimated that, of the 150 men at their disposal near the Orange River, they could reckon on only 50 good fighters; many Boers "of a lesser sort" – poor whites – but also some wealthy burghers, who had experienced little danger, were clearly no heroes.[130] And the common saying that every Boer was his own general was not always true – to this he could testify, as many burghers would leave their positions to the detriment of all if good leadership was absent.[131] However, because ver Loren was experiencing life on commando within the framework of his pro-Boer feelings, it was the better qualities of the Boers that mattered to him and that – in his view – gave direction to the Boers' struggle for independence. He did not have concerns about the future of the Afrikaner. Already in July 1900, at the beginning of the guerrilla phase of the war, he noted that, while the Afrikaner admittedly could not hold out against the British as in the days of the early set-piece battle victories, the enemy could not cut him off from the wide African veld. "The Englishman will conquer the land, but he will never defeat the Boers," he decided.[132] By November 1900 the British scorched earth policy had dramatically changed the nature of the war. Guerrilla warfare was in full swing. But still ver Loren was convinced that the Boer remained master of the land: "This ancestral right cannot be taken away from him, no matter how much the destructing cohorts of the enemy traverse the country."[133] When peace came in May 1902 and the Afrikaner had lost his independence, ver Loren expressed the conviction: "Let nobody mourn or become despondent, let nobody say that might had now triumphed over right for ever and that the history of the world knows no justice: 'Hang on, my friend, do not be in such a hurry, everything will be all right in this land.' "[134]

Seiner also felt positive about the future of the Afrikaners. The war was a radical remedy, he decided. A young generation had taken the lead, and the world was looking with admiration on the heroic deeds of de Wet, Botha, de la Rey, Beyers, and others. The glorious deeds of these men and the perseverance with which the last 20,000 Boers had fought with the sacrifice of wives and children, against a superior power, outshone any of the darker sides that he had pointed out. "With pride we may recognize in these Boers kinsmen who in every respect are worthy of our sympathy."[135]

During the war Afrikaner leaders realized already that the war was making a nation of the Boers, or, to use the words quoted by Hintrager,

that a nation was being born. A striking example was the sermon by the Reverend Paul Roux to the Free State burghers gathered in the Brandwater Basin on Sunday 15 July 1900. Roux's text was Isaiah 66, verse 8: "Did ever a land bring forth its people in a single day?" He exhorted the burghers to set aside personal concerns and think of their country and their people. Without painful suffering and sacrifice, he said, no nation could be born. And what the burghers had hitherto endured was nothing compared with the trials that lay ahead.[136] His words were to prove prophetic, as the suffering and deaths of 26,000 Boer women and children still lay more than a year in the future. Subsequently Afrikaner leaders in the first half of the 20th century used the suffering and deaths – which were burned into the memories of Afrikaners – to promote Afrikaner nationalism and the birth of the Afrikaner nation.[137]

Most of the foreign volunteers with the Boers left South Africa when the military tide turned against their hosts in the period from February to June 1900 and the war seemed to be over. Some remained a few months longer, and a small number stuck it out to the end in May 1902.[138] According to Kandyba-Foxcroft, most of the Russian volunteers who were returning were sad to leave South Africa. She quotes one stating: "Leaving the Transvaal for good, we wished with all our hearts the Boers to re-establish their independence and to return to their peaceful occupations as soon as possible."[139]

For the volunteers the adventure was over. But a few, such as Hendrik ver Loren van Themaat and Robert de Kersauson de Pennendreff, settled in South Africa and remained loyal to the Afrikaner cause. Ver Loren died in 1966 in Stellenbosch[140] and de Kersauson five years later in Fransch Hoek.[141]

Thus ended the assistance given by 2,000 to 4,000 foreign volunteers to the Boer struggle for freedom against the British empire. We have seen that their decision to join the Boer forces at bottom evolved around their personal sentiments. Factors such as the desire for adventure, a *fin-de-siècle* mood, a naïve idealism, a feeling of kinship with the Boers, an anti-British sentiment, among other considerations, all played their part to a varying degree in making the decision.

Although the Boers in general were not keen to accommodate the foreign volunteers,[142] and the relations were not always cordial, they were remembered after the war by the joint efforts of their countrymen and the Afrikaners. Through the initiatives of Scandinavian committees, money was raised in both Scandinavia and South Africa for two monuments that were erected on the battlefield of Magersfontein

to the members of the Scandinavian Corps killed in the battle. At the first, unveiled on 25 April 1908, the Boer generals Louis Botha and J.B.M. Hertzog delivered speeches, and at the second, unveiled on 16 December 1927, Gen. J.C. Smuts was the keynote speaker. Those of the Hollander Corps who fell at Elandslaagte are remembered by a monument erected by the South African Monuments Council on the battlefield, and by a tablet containing their names against the outer wall of the old Nederduits Hervormde Kerk in Pretoria. There is also a memorial in the old cemetery in Heidelberg for the German Count von Zeppelin killed at Elandslaagte. The Russian Capt. Leo Pokrovsky, who was killed in battle at Utrecht over Christmas 1900, was remembered by his Boer comrades, who on 10 April 1938 reburied his remains under a marble plate installed for him on the burgher war memorial in the church square in Utrecht. In 1966 the Freedom Memorial for the Irish Corps was unveiled in Auckland Park, Johannesburg, funded by the Irish and South African governments. It has since been moved to Orania, a post-apartheid Afrikaner stronghold in the northern Cape. The Senator Chris van Niekerk Museum in Boshof (where de Villebois-Mareuil was killed) is the only place where the foreign volunteers on the Boer side are remembered collectively. The de Villebois-Mareuil Room in the museum is dedicated to them.

Notes

1. For a discussion of the name of the war, see Fransjohan Pretorius (2009) *Historical Dictionary of the Anglo-Boer War* (Lanham, Md), pp. xi–xii.
2. J. H. Breytenbach (1969) *Die Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog in Suid-Afrika, 1899–1902*, I (Pretoria), p. 68.
3. Michael Davitt (1902) *The Boer Fight for Freedom* (New York), p. 65.
4. Howard C. Hillegas (1904) *With the Boer Forces*, 3rd Impr. (London), p. 257.
5. Although Afrikaner is a variant of Boer, Boer refers to the Afrikaner republicans of the second half of the 19th century. Afrikaner is the term used for the 20th-century white inhabitant of South Africa who speaks Afrikaans.
6. J. van Dalsen (1943) "Die Hollander-korps tydens die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog", *Historiese Studies*, IV:2, 63–107.
7. M. van Niekerk (1951) "Adolf Schiel en die Duitse Kommando", *Archives Yearbook for South African History*, II (Pretoria), 35–208.
8. M. van Niekerk (1949) Die Vreemdelinge-Vrywilligerkorpse in die Stryd' in J. H. Breytenbach (ed.) *Gedenkalbum van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog* (Cape Town), pp. 279–301.
9. B. Pottinger (1987) *The Foreign Volunteers: They Fought for the Boers, 1899–1902* (Johannesburg); C. Nordbruch (1999) *The European Volunteers in the Anglo-Boer War 1899–1902* (Pretoria).

10. C. de Jong (1984) *Skandinawiërs in die Tweede Anglo-Boere-Oorlog 1899–1902*, II (Amsterdam), p. 2; E. Kandyba-Foxcroft (1981) *Russia and the Anglo-Boer War 1899–1902* (Roodepoort), p. 214.
11. A. Davidson and I. Filatova (1998) *The Russians and the Anglo-Boer War 1899–1902* (Cape Town), p. 60.
12. Davidson and Filatova (1998), p. 113.
13. A. Sternberg (1901) *My Experiences of the Boer War* (London), pp. 3–4 and 23–4.
14. De Jong (1984) II, p. 2.
15. De Jong (1984) II, p. 2.
16. De Jong (1983) *Skandinawiërs in die Tweede Anglo-Boere-Oorlog 1899–1902*, I (Amsterdam), p. 8.
17. G. de Villebois-Mareuil (1902) *War Notes: The Diary of Colonel de Villebois-Mareuil from November 24, 1899, to April 4, 1900* (London), *passim*; R. Macnab (1975) *The French Colonel: Villebois-Mareuil and the Boers 1899–1900* (London), *passim*.
18. H. ver Loren van Themaat (1903) *Twee Jaren in den Boerenoorlog* (Haarlem), pp. 1f. (our translation).
19. See M. Bossenbroek (1996) *Holland op Zijn Breedst: Indië en Zuid-Afrika in de Nederlandse Cultuur Omstreeks 1900* (Amsterdam).
20. C. Plokhooy (1901) *Met den Mauser: Persoonlijke Ervaringen in den Zuid-Afrikaanschen Oorlog* (Gorinchem), p. 2 (our translation).
21. F. Seiner (1902) *Ervaringen en Herinneringen van een Boerenstrijder op het Slagveld van Zuid-Afrika* (Doesburg), pp. 1f. (our translation).
22. [O. Hintrager] (1902) *Steijn, de Wet und die Oranje-Freistaater* (Tübingen), preface; J. J. Oberholster (ed.) (1973) "Dagboek van Oskar Hintrager: Saam met Christiaan de Wet, Mei – September 1900", *Christiaan de Wet-Annale*, 2 (Bloemfontein), p. 6.
23. G. J. Schutte (ed.) (1999) *Beste Ouders! Brieven uit de Transvaal van Karel van den Berg 1896–1900* (Amsterdam), Letter, 20 August 1899, p. 291 (our translation).
24. Schutte (1999), Letter, 19 October 1899, p. 304.
25. Quoted in D. P. McCracken (1989) *The Irish Pro-Boers 1877–1902* (Johannesburg), pp. 141–2.
26. B. Lugan (ed.) (1989) *Robert de Kersauson: Le Dernier Commando Boer* (Paris), p. 53.
27. Breytenbach (1969) I, pp. 62–8.
28. Transvaal Archives Depot, Pretoria (TAD), Leyds Archives, 781 (II), Report by Capt. Ram and Lt Thomson re the Anglo-Boer War, p. 835.
29. TAD, Leyds Archives, 781 (II), Report by Capt. Ram and Lt Thomson re the Anglo-Boer War, p. 836.
30. TAD, Leyds Archives, 781 (II), Report by Capt. Ram and Lt Thomson re the Anglo-Boer War, p. 843.
31. C. de Jong (1987) *Skandinawiërs in die Tweede Anglo-Boere-Oorlog*, III (Pretoria), p. 104.
32. See, for example, TAD, A240, H. E. Udgren Accession, H. E. Udgren, "Die Helde van Magersfontein", p. 9.
33. Oberholster (1973), 24 May 1900, p. 19 and 25 May 1900, p. 21; R. de Kersauson de Pennendreff (1960) *Ek en die Vierkleur* (Johannesburg), p. 9.

34. TAD, Preller Collection, 2, Letter, J. Wierema – L. Botha, 14 February 1903, p. 221. See Oberholster (1973), 11 July 1900, pp. 65–6 (our translation); R. W. Schikkerling (1964) *Commando Courageous (A Boer's Diary)* (Johannesburg), 12 June 1901, p. 218.
35. G. J. Schutte (1986) *Nederland en de Afrikaners* (Franeker), pp. 117, 119.
36. Schutte (1986), p. 119.
37. A. G. Oberholster (ed.) (1978) *Oorlogsdagboek van Jan F.E. Celliers* (Pretoria), 28 September 1900, pp. 140–1.
38. Schutte (1986), p. 119.
39. Plokhooy (1901), pp. 65 and 13.
40. A. P. Smit and L. Maré (eds.) (1985) *Die Beleg van Mafeking: Dagboek van Abraham Stafleu* (Pretoria), 27 November 1899, p. 124.
41. De Jong (1987) III, p. 104.
42. TAD, Kommandant-Generaal (KG), 820, Letter, A. J. Paul et al. – P. J. Joubert, 31 January 1900, p. 79 (our translation).
43. TAD, Kommandant-Generaal (KG), 820, Letter, D. Hendriks – J. van Stipriaan, 26 January 1900, p. 53 (our translation).
44. TAD, Kommandant-Generaal (KG), 820, 924, Letter, No names – R. Preller, n.d., p. 39; A. G. Oberholster (1978), 7 November 1899, pp. 41–2.
45. D. Mostert (1935) *Slegtkamp van Spioenkop: Oorlogsherinneringe van Kapt. Slegtkamp* (Cape Town), pp. 87–8.
46. Smit and Maré (1985), 25 December 1899, p. 169 (our translation).
47. TAD, WHA 61, Dr D. H. van der Goot Accession, Letter, E. van Rijckevorsel, 9 May 1900, Newspaper cuttings, *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*, n.d. (probably July 1900) (our translation).
48. TAD, A1126, J. C. Zijp Accesssion, Reminiscences of Zijp, p. 6 (our translation).
49. TAD, Leyds Archives, 759, Letter, G. H. Gravett – L. Botha, 19 August 1900, p. 63.
50. TAD, W81, Viljoen Accession, 3, M. J. Viljoen, Diary No. 6, 17 July 1901. See also TAD, W81, Viljoen Accession, 4, H. P. N. Viljoen, Diary No. 5, 17 July 1901 (our translation).
51. TAD, W81, Viljoen Accession, 3, M. J. Viljoen, Diary No. 6, 17 and 18 July 1901; TAD, W154, T.A.H. Dönges Collection, 2, Diary of Dönges, 18 July 1901.
52. TAD, W81, Viljoen Accession, 3, M. J. Viljoen, Diary No. 6, 17 July 1901 (our translation).
53. TAD, W81, Viljoen Accession, 4, H. P. N. Viljoen, Diary No. 5, 16 July 1901 (our translation).
54. Seiner (1902), p. 60.
55. De Jong (1987) III, p. 104.
56. De Kersauson de Pennendreff (1960), p. 7. See also Lugan (1989), p. 56.
57. Ver Loren van Themaat (1903), p. 192.
58. De Kersauson de Pennendreff (1960), pp. 7, 10 and 11.
59. S. Izedinova (1977) *A Few Months with the Boers: The War Reminiscences of a Russian Nursing Sister* (Johannesburg), pp. 64–5.
60. Ver Loren van Themaat (1903), pp. 192–93.
61. Oberholster (1973), 4 May 1900, pp. 15–16 (our translation).
62. Oberholster (1973), 11 July 1900, pp. 62–4 (our translation).

63. F. Pretorius (1999) *Life on Commando during the Anglo-Boer War 1899–1902* (Cape Town), pp. 247–51.
64. Oberholster (1973), 11 July 1900, pp. 65–6.
65. Oberholster (1973), 24 July 1900, p. 89 (our translation).
66. Oberholster (1973), 26 August 1900, p. 130 (our translation).
67. G. de Villebois-Mareuil (1902), *Carnet de Campagne* (Paris), 27 December 1899, p. 91, 28 December 1899, p. 91, 4 April 1900, pp. 114–6, 5 January 1900, p. 117, 7 January 1900, p. 128, 8 January 1900, p. 135, 9 January 1900, pp. 138–140, 15 February 1900, pp. 262–266. See also Macnab (1975).
68. De Villebois-Mareuil (1902) *War Notes*, 4 January 1900, p. 101 and 7 January 1900, p. 118.
69. De Villebois-Mareuil (1902) *War Notes*, 8 December 1899, p. 47.
70. De Villebois-Mareuil (1902) *War Notes*, 13 January 1900, p. 142.
71. De Villebois-Mareuil (1902) *War Notes*, 29 January 1900, pp. 190–1.
72. De Jong (1984) II, p. 87.
73. De Villebois-Mareuil (1902) *War Notes*, 14 December 1899, p. 50, 1 January 1900, p. 87, and 12 January 1900, p. 139.
74. Seiner (1902), p. 36.
75. Oberholster (1973), 22 July 1900, p. 88.
76. Oberholster (1973), 26 August 1900, p. 116.
77. Ver Loren van Themaat (1903), pp. 325–26 (our translation).
78. Davidson and Filatova (1998), p. 115.
79. Seiner (1902), p. 182.
80. Ver Loren van Themaat (1903), p. 252.
81. Davidson and Filatova (1998), p. 182.
82. Seiner (1902), p. 157.
83. Sternberg (1901), p. 86.
84. Ver Loren van Themaat (1903), p. 136.
85. Ver Loren van Themaat (1903), p. 189 (our translation).
86. Ver Loren van Themaat (1903), pp. 333–34.
87. Oberholster (1973), 20 June 1900, p. 43, 23 June 1900, p. 44, and 26 Augsut 1900, pp. 125–27.
88. De Jong (1984) II, p. 112.
89. De Jong (1984) II, pp. 138 and 150n.
90. Oberholster (1973), 17 August 1900, p. 115.
91. Ver Loren van Themaat (1903), pp. 12, 44, 57 and 168.
92. Schutte (1999), p. 312.
93. De Villebois-Mareuil (1902) *War Notes*, 24 November 1899, p. 4; Sternberg (1901), p. 70.
94. Oberholster (1973), 30 Julie 1900, p. 95.
95. De Villebois-Mareuil (1902), *War Notes*, 15 December 1899, pp. 53–4; Sternberg (1901), p. 81.
96. Kandyba-Foxcroft (1981), p. 233.
97. Seiner (1902), p. 74.
98. Kandyba-Foxcroft (1981), p. 232.
99. Sternberg (1901), p. 79.
100. Oberholster (1973), 5 June 1900, pp. 26–7, 15 August 1900, p. 111, and 28 August 1900, p. 135.
101. Sternberg (1901), p. 76.

102. Seiner (1902), p. 77.
103. De Villebois-Mareuil (1902) *War Notes*, p. 163.
104. De Villebois-Mareuil (1902) *War Notes*, p. 65.
105. Ver Loren van Themaat (1903), p. 57.
106. Sternberg (1901), p. 21.
107. De Jong (1983) I, p. 131.
108. De Jong (1987) III, pp. 101–2, 137–8, and 180.
109. De Jong (1987) III, p. 97; Seiner (1902), p. 168.
110. Oberholster (1973), 5 June 1900, pp. 26–7.
111. Oberholster (1973), 28 August 1900, p. 135.
112. Ver Loren van Themaat (1903), pp. 316–18.
113. Seiner (1902), p. 35.
114. Oberholster (1973), 6–7 July 1900, pp. 103–107; Ver Loren van Themaat (1903), pp. 166–70.
115. Pretorius (1999), pp. 195–6.
116. D. Romeyn (no date) *Met de 1e Nederlandsche Roode Kruis-ambulance naar Zuid-Afrika: Particuliere Correspondentie* (no place), Smaldeel, 23 April 1900, p. 2.
117. Oberholster (1973), 26 August 1900, p. 121. See also p. 122 (our translation).
118. Oberholster (1973), 26 August 1900, p. 123.
119. Oberholster (1973), 10 July 1900, p. 62.
120. Oberholster (1973), 5 July 1900, p. 54 (our translation).
121. Oberholster (1973), 6 July 1900, p. 56.
122. Seiner (1902), p. 77.
123. Seiner (1902), p. 35.
124. Oberholster (1973), 22 July 1900, p. 88 (our translation). See also 29 August 1900, p. 136.
125. Oberholster (1973), 10 July 1900, p. 61; Seiner (1902), p. 35.
126. De Villebois-Mareuil (1902) *War Notes*, p. 240. See also pp. 79, 200 and 259–60.
127. Pretorius (1999), pp. 210–217.
128. Oberholster (1973), 6 September 1900, p. 142 (our translation).
129. Ver Loren van Themaat (1903), pp. 11–12.
130. Ver Loren van Themaat (1903), pp. 31–2.
131. Ver Loren van Themaat (1903), p. 183.
132. Ver Loren van Themaat (1903), p. 153 (our translation).
133. Ver Loren van Themaat (1903), p. 213 (our translation).
134. Ver Loren van Themaat (1903), p. 354 (our translation).
135. Seiner (1902), pp. 3–4.
136. F. Pretorius (2001) *The Great Escape of the Boer Pimpernel* (Pietermaritzburg), p. 32.
137. A. Grundlingh (2001) "The Anglo-Boer War in 20th-Century Afrikaner Consciousness" in F. Pretorius (ed.) *Scorched Earth* (Cape Town), pp. 242–64; F. Pretorius (2001) "Reflection" in F. Pretorius (ed.) *Scorched Earth*, (Cape Town), pp. 267–81.
138. Nordbruch (1999), p. 162.
139. Kandyba-Foxcroft (1981), p. 236.

140. Biographical information obtained from Mr Hendrik ver Loren van Themaat, Pretoria, about his grandfather.
141. C. J. Beyers and J. L. Basson (eds.) (1987) *Dictionary of South African Biography*, V (Pretoria), p. 174.
142. See also Davidson and Filatova (1998), p. 61.

9

Heroes or Citizens? The 1916 Debate on Harvard Volunteers in the "European War"

Axel Jansen

After the outbreak of war in August 1914 and while their own country remained neutral, thousands of Americans decided to join the European Armies and to work in hospitals and relief organizations. England attracted the highest number of American volunteers, with about 6,000 Americans serving in her armies in 1916. France drew about 1,000 American men and women, who served in various capacities before the United States entered the war in April 1917. These numbers – which are difficult if not impossible to certify today – were smaller than those of Americans volunteering in later European wars. About 4,000 Americans participated in the Spanish Civil War, and during the Second World War many thousands of Americans volunteered in the Canadian army and air force (perhaps more than 30,000 in the air force alone).[1]

Such numbers, of course, do not explain the particular significance of American participation in the European War before 1917. World War I was different in a number of ways. In the early 1940s, American involvement in a war that originated in Europe had a precedent and was imaginable to everyone, particularly to those who sought to prevent it; and participation in the Spanish Civil War was tied to a particular political perspective. Neither was true for the period from 1914 to 1917, when it could hardly be foreseen that the United States would question or give up its traditional isolationist policy. European war volunteers who joined their country's army were fulfilling their duty as citizens. Before 1917, however, American citizens had no such obligation. As I will try to show in this chapter, it is essential to distinguish between volunteers who chose to support their own country at war, on the one hand, and volunteers who chose to join a war at a time their country

was neutral, on the other. The number of European war volunteers occasionally serves as comparative evidence to prove or disprove loyalty, citizenship, and the legitimacy of their respective nation states. It is important to point out that, in the case of American volunteers prior to 1917, such comparisons are impossible because these volunteers, by going to war, were not supporting their country's military. This phenomenon suggests instead that the particular quality of European national loyalty and legitimacy – frequently taken for granted in discussions on war volunteers and extrapolated for the American case[2] – may come into sharper focus when compared with the very different American experience.

More Americans volunteered to join the British than the French forces between 1914 and 1917, but they mostly disappeared from public consciousness. It was comparatively easy to take a train across the Canadian border and, in a time before the universal use of passports, pretend to be a Canadian citizen. A much larger budget was required to volunteer to be an ambulance driver, soldier, fighter pilot, nurse, or medical doctor with or in the French forces, or in hospitals along the front in France. Transatlantic passage had to be paid for, and, in the case of American ambulance drivers, equipment such as helmets had to be acquired. Sometimes families even paid for their sons' ambulance cars. Perhaps it is no surprise that, while American volunteers in the British forces received little attention, those serving on behalf of France were celebrated in newspapers, movies, and at Allied Bazaars in major East Coast cities. This went hand in hand with the upper-middle-class background of some volunteers who had chosen to aid France. American colleges and universities played a significant role in this "war effort". Seventy-six per cent of American volunteers serving in the American Ambulance Field Service (AAFS) – before 1917 the largest ambulance service operating under French command – were college men. The University of California in Berkeley sent volunteers to drive ambulances, and so did other elite universities throughout the country, but Harvard and Yale sent men earlier in the war and in higher numbers.[3] Urban and intellectual centres along the East Coast provided the leadership and the rationale for Americans going abroad to risk their lives. Initially, these activities had little to do with a political or cultural appreciation of England or the Allied cause. Unlike students at British universities such as Oxford or Cambridge, furthermore, American volunteers took their country's traditional neutrality for granted and did not anticipate that the United States would come to play a role in the war. The conflict in Europe provided American volunteers with a welcome opportunity

for reasserting their elite status by successfully "testing themselves" in the dangerous conditions of war. Their aims remained apolitical. While English students considered themselves to be leading their country, American volunteers had little interest in compromising their exclusivity by having everyone else join them.[4]

These remarks go hand in hand with the following observation. During the period of American neutrality, activities such as serving in a relief organization abroad or fighting in one of the European armies were frequently compared to other activities that had nothing to do with the war. In the *Harvard Alumni Bulletin*, for example, football as well as riding and hunting in the West were now measured up to "soldiering" in Europe, and joining a private military training camp during the summer – an immensely popular activity after war had broken out in Europe – seemed a poor second to the real fighting in the trenches.[5] However, an issue distinct from these activities, and related only to crossing the Atlantic and serving as a volunteer in one of the ambulance organizations or in one of the European armies, was this: as an American citizen, how did one justify engagement in war at a time when the United States was neutral? How did Americans joining Allied forces – especially those who considered themselves to be part of an American "elite" – legitimate going abroad contrary to their country's political stance? In this chapter, I will address such questions by focusing on a discussion that took place at Harvard University in 1916, which provides clues to help explain why Americans volunteered to go to Europe and what this meant for the legitimacy of their nation state. The value and meaning of going to war were usually taken for granted in the American press, which reported it affirmatively.[6] The discussion that ensued in the *Harvard Alumni Bulletin* in 1916 was unique because it revealed a number of critical implications of "privately" joining the war.[7]

Questions about the legitimacy of volunteering in Europe took centre stage after it was suggested in a letter to the *Bulletin* that the university should erect a monument to Norman Prince. Prince was a Harvard alumnus who had become a fighter pilot in a French airplane squadron known as "Lafayette Escadrille" – a unit under French command, which was composed of American citizens and sponsored by private American funds. Prince had died in October 1916 while trying to land his plane after a sortie.[8] The idea of honouring Prince was soon expanded by readers of the *Bulletin*, who proposed that the monument be dedicated not only to Prince, but to all Harvard volunteers fighting or otherwise engaged in the European war.[9]

It is significant that the monument, according to this evolving idea, was to honour those fighting in the European armies as well as those serving in "humanitarian" organizations, such as the ambulance services or hospitals along the front: these types of activities were understood to be of a similar character to those of the fighting units. All these activities, "peaceful" or otherwise, were considered to be prompted by the same impetus, but the "Lafayette Escadrille" was a particularly fine example of the ambition to stand up in the face of danger. Unlike nurses and ambulance drivers, who worked at the rear, American pilots exposed themselves to the perils of fighting. Unlike their countrymen who joined the British or French infantry, furthermore, these pilots stood out as individual fighters. Once they were in the air, they had only themselves to rely on. One contemporary observer explained that the "air service appealed with especial force to the sporting instincts of the young Americans".[10] For these reasons, they became icons of a "heroic challenge".[11]

Soon the proposal to erect a monument was criticized by Edward T. Lee, a Harvard alumnus and Dean of the John Marshall Law School in Chicago.[12] It is remarkable that the political implications of individual citizens deciding to go to war at a time when the United States was neutral received little or no attention in the American press. Even historians focusing on this subject today do not usually consider its political implications. This underlines the significance of Lee's comments and the debate he initiated. "It strikes me that such a memorial can have no appropriate official place on Harvard grounds," Lee wrote in his letter to the *Bulletin*, "[...] it does seem that it would be a bad precedent to commemorate in an official way graduates who have seen fit to take part in a war to which the United States is not a party. Indeed, it may be queried whether the dead whom it is proposed thus to commemorate have deserved this distinction, as their conduct in leaving the United States and taking up arms against a country friendly to the United States, is not only a breach of the spirit of the president's neutrality proclamation, but is clearly bound to work ill will towards us in the future."[13]

Lee wonders in what way Harvard volunteers in Europe served their country. He suggests that because they ignored their country's neutrality they are not eligible for public recognition and he takes for granted that American volunteers engaged in war for apolitical reasons. In another section of his letter, Lee discusses what he considers to be the motivation for serving abroad in the European War. His criticism of American volunteers, when compared with other contemporary comments, is

surprisingly clear and to the point: "[W]hile one would not disparage the valor of Americans who have enlisted in the European War," he wrote, "yet there is every evidence to sustain the belief that very many from this country who have enlisted abroad have done so from the new feeling that war is only a great game, and that no real sportsman should keep out of it. [...] The mere fact of their death," Lee concluded, "can hardly be held to entitle them to this distinction over the rest of us who may, eventually, die in our beds."

No political demands were attached to the movement of going to war. Lee acutely observed that war seemed to have become "fashionable" through bazaars, publications, and movies. He points out that volunteers travelled to Europe for other than political reasons. These Americans did not consider the war a necessary means of preserving ideals of national integrity (such as a responsibility for the protection of Belgium) but welcomed it as an opportunity for a personal test of stamina. Though he does not state this specifically, Lee implicitly raised the issue of the individual citizen's relationship to the nation state.

Others writing in the *Bulletin* supported Lee's views. One alumnus wrote that a "large, perhaps the largest, part of intelligent American opinion is gradually crystallizing in a belief that the present European war is a stupid criminal nightmare for which all the large European nations are responsible and of which all will shortly be ashamed". American volunteers, this Harvard alumnus argued, could not be regarded as "heroes". Their significance was limited to having "died on a foreign battle-field in a foreign army".[14] Another graduate took a comparable position. He wrote that "the Allied soldiers are not our soldiers, nor is it fitting that they should have the same memorial. [...] Soldiers Field should be shared with none."[15] How did defenders of the proposed memorial react to these poignant attacks?

American volunteers, proponents argued, based their decision to go to war on personal conviction matched by committed action. Supporters of the memorial criticized its detractors for neglecting the individual achievement of volunteers in Europe. In response to the criticism that American volunteers betrayed their country's neutrality, they argued that personal sovereignty – the individual's freedom to choose to go to war – should not be limited by a political decision. "Any other point of view assumes that an individual's responsibility is lost in whatever organization he belongs to," argued one supporter in the December 1916 issue of the *Bulletin*.[16] American citizens, in other words, should not be bound by political decisions, because any such adherence would compromise their individual independence. Other supporters took

the stance that American neutrality provided certain legal limitations, outside of which one was free to do as one pleased. One Harvard alumnus suggested that "American neutrality ... is a strictly national matter, involving the individual only as our national laws forbid certain specified acts such as fitting out vessels for belligerent service."[17]

Thus, two divergent attitudes towards personal valour and integrity conflicted in the debate over the memorial. Would such valour be recognized only if (and because) it was independent of political decisions (as suggested by the memorial's supporters), or if it kept within limits set by official United States policy (as implied by Lee and other critics)?

Before this question could be resolved, however, Lee's criticism was increasingly ignored as another problem came to occupy the attention of the *Bulletin*'s readers: if the memorial was dedicated to *all* Harvard men engaged in the war in Europe, did this include those fighting on behalf of Germany as well as those fighting for France or England? Would a memorial that had originally been intended to honour Americans willing to give their lives for France turn into a memorial also honouring those who had chosen to fight for Germany? Only one out of several hundred Harvard men had decided to join the German army.[18] Nevertheless, this was an issue Harvard graduates wished to address.

Some tried to defend the memorial even if it honoured Harvard men fighting on behalf of Germany as well as those fighting for the Allies. One believed that the memorial should be dedicated as initially suggested so as to pay tribute to the personal heroism of men like Norman Prince who "risk and sacrifice their lives 'for a cause', no matter what that cause may be".[19] Many other letters to the editor, however, expressed concern about the university endorsing Germany. Would not the monument lose all significance? One such critic was John Jay Chapman, who argued that the war in Europe was a contest between "good and evil", that the Allied cause was just, and that the monument, if dedicated to all volunteers, "would become a symbol to zero. No matter what you intended to express by your monument," he wrote, "it would express zero on the issue."[20]

Chapman was a lawyer and well-known essayist who had graduated from Harvard in 1884. He had two sons, both of whom, like Norman Prince, served as pilots in the French army. While a law student, Chapman had beaten a supposed rival for the love of his future wife. In order to punish himself for this act, he deliberately burned his left hand, which then had to be amputated.[21] With this same uncompromising conscience he demanded that his sons follow up their decisions to participate in the war. One of the two, Victor Emmanuel Chapman, had joined the French Foreign Legion in 1915. Chapman later wrote that,

before his son had enlisted, he had argued with him, trying "only [to prevent] the lad from doing something which was not fundamentally his duty".[22] He then agreed to Victor joining the French army, and, when his son was in low spirits soon thereafter, and considered abandoning the army, his father advised: "You know…well that you may have to stick it out and that this may be the best thing for you to do. After all, what difference does it make whether you have a sense of being bored + useless during the next few months or years. So many unpleasant things are happening to so many people just now.…The thing I feel at the bottom is that I wish you would get the knack of accepting in your life whatever comes."[23] So Victor "stuck it out". He served in the Foreign Legion and then joined Prince's Lafayette Escadrille. In June 1916, he lost his life during an engagement with the enemy near Verdun.[24] The discussion about the memorial to Harvard volunteers, which Chapman now entered, related to the issue of justifying his son's death and the principles he had advised his son to uphold.

Chapman's letter, in which he criticized a monument to all volunteers in Europe as a "symbol to zero", altered the focus of the debate. The issue was no longer simply whether these volunteers violated their country's non-aligned stance. The debate shifted from a consideration of the country's neutrality to discussing whether the university should take a particular position in the conflict. The issue now became whether the university was to honour an engagement in war that reflected the individual's personal belief, or whether it should honour such an involvement only if it was in line with particular cultural commitments that Harvard – not the United States – chose to stand for.

The difference between a political and a cultural consideration of the conflict in Europe is critical, and I want to briefly consider what Chapman could have done. Chapman agreed with Lee that a memorial should not honor personal valour alone. Lee had limited his criticism to attacking the volunteers' motivation for going to war. But, while Lee had not indicated a preference for one side of the conflict or the other, Chapman had a definite opinion. He had supported his sons' decision to fight on behalf of France. One would, therefore, not be surprised had Chapman drawn the conclusion that the United States ought to intervene on behalf of the Allies: a monument to Americans who gave their lives as soldiers in an American army, after all, would not have been a "symbol to zero". While Chapman had called for an official protest against the German violation of Belgian neutrality in 1914, he did not call for American intervention.[25] He suggested that the Harvard community should decide which side it favoured. He took for granted

that the monument would represent a cultural (and not a political) preference for the cause of the Allies.

To consider the war strictly in terms of what it meant for Harvard bore added significance because the proposed monument implied an evaluation of American history. It was an important implication that, if Americans who fought for Germany were to be celebrated for standing up for their personal beliefs, such honour could equally be claimed by former Confederate soldiers who had fought for secession. If the monument, therefore, honoured volunteers on all sides in the European war, it would – by implication – weaken Harvard's commitment to the United States. Had not those Harvard students who had fought for the secessionist states fought bravely for what they believed to be right? "I agree with Mr. Chapman that neutrality in monuments is an absurdity," one graduate argued in the *Bulletin*. "Is every assassin to be given a monument simply because he gave his life for what he believed to be right?...When the Harvard Corporation is prepared to erect tablets in Memorial Hall to Harvard men who gave their lives for the cause of the Confederacy, *which they believed to be right*, then, and then only, will it be appropriate to erect a monument in Cambridge to those who fall on both sides in the Great War."[26]

These questions concerning the memorial's implicit re-evaluation of the Civil War did not seem academic, because it was to be erected on Soldiers Field. These grounds had been given to the university by Henry L. Higginson in memory of classmates who had lost their lives in the Union army.[27] Higginson had been among the "Secret Six", a small group of radical abolitionists who provided financial support for John Brown's raid against the federal armoury at Harpers Ferry in 1859 (in the hope of starting a slave insurrection). Higginson had later commanded the first black regiment during the Civil War, the 1st South Carolina of African Descent.[28] A memorial had been erected on Soldiers Field to commemorate Harvard students who had lost their lives fighting in the Spanish-American War.[29] The University had then built a baseball stadium on the grounds in 1898.[30] Commemorating Harvard volunteers in the European War – at a time when the United States remained neutral – was symbolically linked to the idea of fighting for the country when it had declared war.

While many Harvard graduates showed support for a memorial to volunteers in Europe, few favoured its proposed location. It took several months, however, for these implications to be unravelled. Once Chapman had explicated the monument's symbolic connotations in the January issue of the *Bulletin*, the controversy was not merely about

an evaluation of the current war in Europe and the citizen's relationship to the state – it also evoked a re-evaluation of the nation's past and of its future. To pay tribute on Soldiers Field to American volunteers in Europe would imply that such honour could also be claimed for those who had fought for secession, and it would thus have implicitly brought into question the very essence of American nationhood.

Let me briefly summarize the debate about a memorial to Harvard volunteers in the "European War". Lee's criticism of the idea had initiated the discussion. He argued that Harvard volunteers should not be honoured, because they had ignored American neutrality. Chapman also criticized the monument. Yet his grounds for protest were that it was to honour all volunteers, rather than just those fighting for the Allies. Because of his dedication to the Allies, Chapman could have called for the United States to enter the war. Despite his strong conviction that France defended justice against an evil German onslaught, however, Chapman did not do so. We have to assume that even those who strongly supported the Allies – Americans who would have had every reason to wish for more effective support for France and her allies – were unable or unwilling to conceive of the United States as a relevant political agent for engaging in the "European War".[31]

Chapman's involvement in the discussion, however, shows that it was a big step for him and his contemporaries to call for national political action, because they were reluctant to consider an idea that implied any curtailment of the authority of their "sub-national" communities, such as Harvard. It is important to remember that Chapman's suggestion to restrict the monument (to honouring those who fought for the Allies) was based on cultural, not political, considerations. This leads to the conclusion that Chapman sought to integrate ideals of personal independence with cultural values because individuals are free to adopt or dismiss them. A political decision is often binding and allows no such leeway. Once a country has declared war, it is the citizen's duty to help win it (whether as a volunteer or as a conscript). Going to war is no longer a personal choice, as it had been for Americans prior to 1917, and for Harvard men this implied that the war in Europe would lose its appeal as a "testing ground". Chapman's call for a "cultural decision" with respect to the monument's dedication, therefore, promised to preserve an ideal of personal sovereignty that lacked the rational coherence and integrative opportunities attached to political citizenship.

The debate on Harvard volunteers in the European War was cut short by political events. Chapman's letter in the *Bulletin* in January 1917 was followed by the renewal of unrestricted submarine warfare by

Germany and the prospect of American entry into the war. How did Harvard graduates react? In January 1917, it was unresolved whether the American army would rely on volunteers or on conscripts. Among Harvard graduates, this led to the suggestion that – given the possibility of a draft – a future monument should not honour all Harvard students who served their country in war, but should exclude those who had been drafted and commemorate only those who had "volunteered" to fight. The meaning of this term had changed, of course, as it was now used to distinguish between those who lived up to their duty as citizens (dismissed by former volunteers as "mere privates"), on the one hand, and those who had "freely" chosen to participate in war independent of such obligations, on the other.[32] The "vanguard of volunteers", in other words, now dismissed "regular" American soldiers as newcomers. "The take-over by the Army is an inevitable step…," the founder of one American ambulance service wrote to his parents from France in September 1917, "given [...] the fact that we have now to compete with the army, which has unlimited authority and money." He considered this the end of the "freedom and distinction" of pre-1917 volunteers.[33] In the context of a consolidating nation, Harvard students and alumni struggled to find new opportunities for proving that they were worthy of laurels of individual achievement.

In the late 1920s, the university decided to erect in the centre of campus a Memorial Church dedicated to Harvard men who had fallen in the war. It was taken for granted that the memorial would honour those who went to Europe before the United States had entered the war as well as those who later fought in the American army. Plans for the memorial prompted a renewed discussion about the inclusion of names of four Harvard men who had fought for Germany. While the university ultimately decided that these names would not be omitted, it also installed in the church a tablet that reads (in Latin): "'Harvard University has not forgotten its sons who under *other* flags gave life for country.'"[34] One implication of this arrangement was that any American engagement in the European war was subsumed under the political legitimacy provided by the entry of the United States into that war in 1917. Another implication was that the university no longer took for granted that Harvard men, in times of war, would serve countries other than the United States. These countries were summarily referred to as "other". In this way, the university tried to strike a balance between a commitment to transnational universality and individual sovereignty (folkloristically detached from federal political authority), on the one hand, and a *de facto* commitment to the United States, on the other.[35]

Notes

1. In this paper, I am drawing on research for my book (2003) *Individuelle Bewährung im Krieg: Amerikaner in Europa 1914–1917* (Frankfurt and New York), ch. 10, p. 251–82. For the number of American volunteers engaged in wars other than the First World War, see 16 f. Numbers are drawn from D. Riesman (1940) "Legislative Restrictions on Foreign Enlistment and Travel", *Columbia Law Review*, XI, p. 807, and F. Gaffen (1995) *Cross-Border Warriors: Canadians in American Forces, Americans in Canadian Forces, From the Civil War to the Gulf* (Toronto and Oxford), p. 50. Numbers for the Second World War include Americans who volunteered before and after the United States had entered the war.
2. Some studies on American volunteers during the First World War do not distinguish between volunteers who travelled to Europe before the United States had entered the war, and others who chose to go abroad after the United States had done so. However, it is important to make this distinction. See, for example, L. MacDonald (1980) *The Roses of No Man's Land* (London).
3. On American ambulance services in France, see Jansen (2003), p. 82–151, 287–99; A. Jansen (1995) *"The Incorporation of Sacrifice: The American Ambulance Service and the American Volunteer Motor-Ambulance Corps, 1914–1917"* (M.A. thesis, University of Oregon); A. J. Hansen (1996) *Gentlemen Volunteers: The Story of the American Ambulance Drivers in the Great War* (New York).
4. Some volunteers would later claim that they had been a "vanguard" leading the country into war. Edwin W. Morse dedicated his book (1922) *The Vanguard of Volunteers: In the Fighting Lines and in Humanitarian Service, August 1914–April 1917* (New York), p. v, to "the memory of those heroic American youths who by their self-sacrificing devotion pointed out the path of duty and honor to their fellow countrymen." But this was an *ex post* interpretation which had little to do with the motivation of volunteers prior to 1917. At that time, it remained difficult for anyone to believe that the United States would enter a war in Europe with which it had little to do. More on this in Jansen (2003), p. 300–11.
5. The *Harvard Illustrated* implicitly compared football and going to war by pointing out in November 1914 that "Harvard has enough troubles, football and otherwise, of her own to take care of without borrowing any of those three thousand miles away" (reprinted in the February 1915 issue of the *Harvard Alumni Bulletin*, 16, no. 5, p. 220). Military camps had first been organized in 1913 by Leonard Wood. Catering to American university students and businessmen, these camps drew more than 10,000 participants in 1916. Before 1916, the private Military Training Camp Association and its predecessors had financed the camps through fees paid by participants; after 1916, the United States government assumed these costs. J. G. Gifford (1972) *The Citizen Soldiers. The Plattsburg Training Camp Movement, 1913–1920* (Lexington, Kentucky), p. 117. One Harvard student who participated in such a camp complained that "while we were crawling and shooting, and finding it sport, men in Flanders and Poland and Austria and the Dardanelles were crawling and shooting, and slaying and

being slain." *Harvard Alumni Bulletin*, 18:2 (6 October 1915), p. 31. Military camps in the United States, in other words, were considered a tame copy of European reality and the relevance of war. When compared with the military camps, riding and hunting in the west seemed attractive because "a man could learn to ride, to shoot and acquire all the fundamental essentials of the soldier far more thoroughly than by plodding through the gyrations of a daily drill." In Western Camps' *Harvard Alumni Bulletin*, 18:4 (June 1916), p. 128.

6. Jansen (2003), ch. 11, p. 283–99. In this chapter, I describe, among other things, newspaper coverage of charity events ("Allied Bazaars") held in cities along the east coast in 1916. Newspapers including the New York Times did not question the way in which politicians and other public figures, such as former American ambassador to France and president of the American Hospital in Paris, Robert Bacon, seemed to represent French interests in America rather than taking a consciously American stand to help support France.
7. The following discussion is mentioned in R. B. Hovey (1959) *John Jay Chapman: An American Mind* (New York), p. 230.
8. G. F. Babbitt (1917) *Norman Prince: A Volunteer Who Died for the Cause He Loved* (Boston), p. 9f.
9. *Harvard Alumni Bulletin* 19:5 (26 October 1916), p. 76.
10. E. W. Morse (1918) *The Vanguard of American Volunteers in the Fighting Lines and in Humanitarian Service* (New York), p. 207.
11. There were no female pilots, but women volunteers in such organizations as the American Fund for French Wounded shared these ideals, even though this was frequently ignored in contemporary debate.
12. *New York Times*, 15 December 1943, p. 27; W. Wleklinski (1998) A Centennial History of the John Marshall Law School (n.p.), p. 15–18.
13. *Harvard Alumni Bulletin*, 19:7 (9 November 1916), p. 120f.
14. Letter to the editor by Edward F. Alexander, ibid., p. 121.
15. Letter to the editor by Russel Gray, ibid.
16. Letter to the editor by Edward Eyre Hunt, *Harvard Alumni Bulletin*, 19:11 (7 December 1916), p. 213.
17. Letter to the editor by Henry Copley Greene, ibid., p. 211.
18. M. A. DeWolfe Howe (1916) *The Harvard Volunteers in Europe. Personal Records of Experience in Military, Ambulance, and Hospital Service* (Cambridge, Mass.), p. vii, 243–63.
19. Letter to the editor by Henry S. Sturgis, *Harvard Alumni Bulletin*, 19:13 (21 December 1916), p. 251.
20. Letter to the editor by John Jay Chapman, *Harvard Alumni Bulletin*, 19:14 (4 January 1917), p. 270.
21. R. B. Hovey (1959), p. 4.
22. M. A. DeWolfe Howe (1937) *John Jay Chapman and His Letters* (Boston), p. 279 f.
23. John Jay Chapman to Victor Chapman, 9 June 1915, John Jay Chapman papers (bMS Am 1854.1 (882)), by permission of the Houghton Library, Harvard University.
24. Chapman was the first American pilot killed in Europe. "Chapman is Killed in Aeroplane Fight" *New York Times*, 25 June 1916, p. 8. H. M. Mason, Jr.

(1964) *The Lafayette Escadrille* (New York), p. 298; D. Gordon (2000) *The Lafayette Flying Corps: The American Volunteers in the French Air Service in World War One* (Atglen, PA), p. 96–103.

25. "Regarding Our Neutrality", *New York Times*, 13 November 1914, p. 10.
26. Letter to the editor by Winslow H. Herschel, *Harvard Alumni Bulletin*, 19:16 (18 January 1917), p. 310. The emphasis is Herschel's.
27. H. L. Higginson (1902) *Addresses by Henry Lee Higginson on the Occasion of Presenting the Soldiers Field and Harvard Union* (Boston); S. E. Morison (1936) *Three Centuries of Harvard* (Cambridge), p. 411 f.; D. W. Blight (2001) *Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory* (Cambridge), p. 206–10.
28. W. S. Poole, "Memory and the Abolitionist Heritage: Thomas Wentworth Higginson and the Uncertain Meaning of the Civil War" (2005), *Civil War History*, 51:2, p. 205.
29. This was implied by the suggestion to erect the new monument between these existing ones. *Harvard Alumni Bulletin*, 19:5 (25 October 1916), p. 76.
30. *Harvard University Gazette*, 8 May 1997. The stadium had been renamed O'Donnell Field.
31. While historians have long been aware of the significance of changes in American foreign policy in this period, and while they have pointed to the new role of the American federal state after 1917, they have, in my assessment, underestimated the novelty of a legitimate "national political perspective". Consider, for example, D. M. Kennedy (1980) *Over Here. The First World War and American Society* (Oxford). A recent study by Christopher Capozzola may point in a direction similar to the one suggested here, but I have been unable to consult this recent book in preparation of my article. See C. Capozzola (2008) *Uncle Sam Wants You. World War I and the Making of the Modern American Citizen* (Oxford).
32. The derogatory reference to citizen soldiers is Richard Norton's. Norton had organized in France the American Volunteer Motor-Ambulance Corps, an exclusive private American ambulance unit under French command. In 1917, he chose to dissolve this organization rather than merge it into units of the official United States Army Ambulance Corps (USAAS). Richard Norton quoted in Hansen (1996), p. 169. Also see, Jansen (1995), ch. 3.
33. A. Piatt Andrew to his parents, 1 September 1917, A. Piatt Andrew Estate, Gloucester, Mass.
34. The emphasis is mine. H. A. Yeomans and W. P. Metzer (1948) *Abbott Lawrence Lowell, 1856–1843* (Cambridge), p. 242. Another source suggests that three names are listed. See Morison (1936), p. 460.
35. Yeomans and Metzer (1948), p. 242f. Also see W. T. Foster's chapter, "Should the Harvard War Memorial Honor the Dead on Both Sides?" in his (1932) *Argumentation and Debating* (Boston), p. 366ff.

10

Voluntary Enlistment in the Great War: a European Phenomenon?

Alexander Watson

The outbreak of the First World War was marked throughout Western Europe by a flood of volunteers wishing to enlist in their countries' armed forces. The hundreds of thousands of young men who queued around barracks and outside recruiting stations across the continent during the first month of hostilities formed a defining feature of the legendary "August experience". For decades, historiography cited their existence as evidence of a widespread "war enthusiasm" propelling belligerent populations to battle in 1914.[1] Recently, however, more detailed research has demonstrated that Europeans' reactions to war were far less euphoric and more complex than previously assumed. Jean-Jacques Becker's ground-breaking *1914: Comment les Français sont entrés dans la guerre* sensitively gradated the French populace's varying reactions at the outbreak of hostilities, highlighting the mood swing away from predominantly negative emotions, such as anxiety and consternation, to patriotic resolution once mobilization actually began.[2] In Germany, too, Jeffrey Verhey, Benjamin Ziemann, and Wolfgang Kruse have demonstrated that only a minority felt "war enthusiasm" as conflict loomed; depression and apprehension were far more common, especially among industrial workers and countrymen.[3] British responses to the approaching crisis were equally unenthusiastic. Adrian Gregory has noted the existence of much pro-neutrality sentiment and argued that most Britons were cognizant of modern conflict's perils. Public support coalesced only once war had been declared and, as on the continent, was based on grim patriotic resolve rather than jingoistic "war enthusiasm".[4]

While a remarkable degree of accord exists between the historiographical accounts of different peoples' reactions to the approach and outbreak of war in 1914, judgements of the volunteers' place and significance

within the new narrative are starkly divided along national lines. British scholars have long regarded their country's volunteering movement as a unique phenomenon representative of the quintessentially Edwardian liberal mix of individual responsibility, strong civic pride, patriotism, and imperial self-confidence. For Jay Winter, it was the British working-class culture "of deference, respectability, chauvinism, and swagger" that lay at the heart of the mass enlistments between 1914 and 1916.[5] The stirring tones of Whig history resonate in other accounts: John Keegan eulogizes the British volunteers as "unsurpassed" "in readiness for self-sacrifice", and describes the formation of their "Pals battalions" as "a story [...] which has no counterpart in the modern, English-speaking world and perhaps could have none outside its own time and place".[6] Historiography on the *Kaiserreich* reveals that volunteering was not, in fact, confined to the United Kingdom in August 1914, yet its portrayal of those Germans who rushed to enlist differs greatly from the image of their counterparts across the Channel. Rather than presenting them as representative of wider Wilhelmine society, most recent literature argues instead that they were an exceptional "war enthused" group composed of the "educated elite".[7] Influenced by the infamous *Sonderweg* debate, particular emphasis has been placed by historians on the alleged majority who were naïve schoolchildren or members of "neo-national student fraternities [who] had already clearly been on the war path for a long time".[8] In contrast to the attention received by the British and German movements, French historians have largely ignored the existence of mass voluntary enlistments in their country at the outbreak of war.[9]

In light of the general agreement about popular reactions to the onset of hostilities in Europe, it is surprising that interpretations of the various national volunteering movements diverge so greatly. This chapter will focus principally on the British and German volunteers, but will also cast a comparative glance at their neglected French counterparts, in order to test these judgements and reassess the movements by placing them for the first time within their international context. By drawing on surviving statistical evidence, the first section will analyse the size, composition, and pattern of volunteering in each country. It will evaluate the external factors influencing enlistment and ascertain how far the structure and development of the movements actually differed. The second section will then turn to more personal sources, such as letters, diaries, and memoirs, in order to establish volunteers' reasons for joining the army. It will contend that, despite differences in the structure of their movements, volunteers on both sides of the Channel in fact possessed similar attitudes towards the war and motives for enlisting.

Far from highlighting belligerents' ideological diversity, the mass volunteering during the First World War represented the fruition of late 19th-century nation-building. The crisis spectacularly demonstrated that Western European states had won an authority and allegiance so strong that citizens across the continent were prepared to offer their lives in the defence of their homelands.

Volunteer movements

The mass volunteering witnessed across Western Europe during the First World War was unprecedented in scale and speed. By as early as 11 August in Germany, after only 10 days of hostilities, 143,922 volunteers had been accepted by Prussian army units alone, and by the end of the month probably at least 250,000 men had enlisted across the whole country.[10] Volunteering in Britain, which entered the war three days after Germany, initially began more slowly, but steadily increased before a sudden surge at the end of the month, resulting in a total of 298,293 volunteers being accepted for service in August, and a further 462,901 during September.[11] In France, voluntary enlistments took place on a more modest scale than in other western belligerents: no information exists for the first month of hostilities, but it is known that 45,775 men enrolled in the army during 1914.[12] Belgium, despite its small population and almost immediate and near-total occupation, produced between 12,000 and 20,000 war volunteers.[13]

Although national volunteering movements are often treated by historians as a phenomenon limited to the opening months of hostilities, surviving statistics testify to their longevity (see Table 10.1).

Volunteering continued throughout the war, albeit on a lesser scale than in 1914, in all the major Western European belligerents. As the statistics indicate, however, not all peoples demonstrated an equal readiness to enlist. Historiographical claims about the exceptional nature of volunteering in the United Kingdom are far from unjustified, given the propensity of Britons to join up: until June 1917, after which records cease, 2,675,149 came forward. In contrast, although French volunteering was more consistent than elsewhere, hovering at around 40,000 men per annum, at 187,905 men in total it was on a far smaller scale, which may explain its neglect in the literature.[14] The German figures are most problematic. No statistics exist for volunteering throughout the *Kaiserreich*, and estimates have therefore been extrapolated from the records of the Württemberg army, whose state contained 3.76 per cent of the German population and produced 18,194 volunteers by February

Table 10.1 Volunteers joining Western European armies, 1914–18

Year	British	German (estimate)	French
1914	1,186,357	354,100	45,775
1915	1,280,362	98,000	36,810
1916	184,762	21,100	38,341
1917	23,668	10,700	26,960
1918	–	–	40,019
Total	2,675,149	483,900	187,905

Sources: British: The Army Council (1920) *General Annual Reports of the British Army (Including the Territorial Force from the Date of Enlistment) for the Period from 1st October, 1913 to 30th September, 1919* (London), p. 60. German: Extrapolations from figures for volunteering in Württemberg (August 1914–February 1918) recorded in Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, M 77/2/ 4: Stellv. Generalkommando XIII. A. K. Nr. 4. Abteilung II b. (Kriegsarbeits-u.Ersatzwesen-Abteilung), "Denkschriften über die Erfahrungen bei der Mobilmachung im Jahre 1914 und während des Krieges betr. Vorbereitung der Mobilmachung, Organization usw. Juni 1918", pp. 106–11. French: M. Huber (ed.) (1932) *La Population de la France pendant la Guerre* (Paris and New Haven), p. 95.

1918. Unfortunately, other fragmentary evidence from the smaller state of Baden (in which 3.30 per cent of the population lived) suggests that Württembergers may have been especially reluctant to enlist. By the end of July 1916, 27,225 volunteers had come forward in Baden, in contrast to 17,444 in Württemberg. If Baden's pattern was representative of enlistment across the nation, extrapolation would suggest that approximately 826,000 Germans had joined the army by July 1916, an estimate far in excess of that provided by the Württemberg figures.[15]

To interpret the scale and pattern of volunteering movements as a direct reflection of nations' relative willingness to fight would be a serious error. The variation was principally a consequence of the different population sizes and military organizations of the belligerent states. Germany's ability to produce many more volunteers than France was hardly surprising, given the fact that its 68 million inhabitants were far more numerous, and younger, than its enemy's 40 million people.[16] The systems of peacetime conscription utilized by both nations further exaggerated the difference. Although the systems were similar in structure (France having copied the Prussian model after its 1870–1 defeat), the French had attempted to offset their numerical inferiority before 1914 by drafting a far higher proportion of their

young men: whereas about 280,000 German 20-year-olds were conscripted each year, representing only just over 50 per cent of each annual group, the 250,000 youths recruited annually in France comprised more than 80 per cent.[17] The result was that, although the fully mobilized armies of the Kaiser and the Third Republic were of similar size (3,502,700 and 3,794,000 soldiers respectively) in August 1914, far more Germans than Frenchmen remained out of uniform, and were therefore available to volunteer. This situation was exacerbated later in the year, as French reserves were very quickly drafted: already by the end of September older reservists and the 1914 class had been conscripted, an extra 1,099,000 men in total.[18] Later, however, as Britain mobilized and the Entente was joined first by Italy and later the USA, German manpower reserves came under increasing pressure. By the war's end, 64.9 per cent of military-aged male Germans had undertaken military service, outstripping the 59.4 per cent which France called to its armed forces.[19] While growing demoralization on the home front may well have been influential, it was primarily the thorough drafting of military-aged manpower that led to the great decline in German volunteering during the war's later years.

It was, however, the United Kingdom that produced by far the largest volunteering movement, despite the fact that its population of 45 million was less than three-quarters the size of the population in Germany. The reason for this was that, unlike the continental powers, the British possessed only a small professional army and had no system of conscription at the outbreak of war. These circumstances acted in two ways to encourage volunteering. Firstly, and most obviously, they resulted in far more men being available to volunteer in Britain than elsewhere. For the first 18 months of war, only 725,489 professional, reserve and part-time Territorial soldiers possessed military obligations; the remaining 13 million eligible males were free to enlist or remain in civilian life.[20] The fact that well over two million volunteered testifies to the readiness of a large section of the population to fight. Only after full conscription was introduced at the end of June 1916 did volunteering become insignificant.[21]

Secondly, the absence of conscription in Britain before 1916 forced its authorities to promote volunteering far more vigorously and innovatively than in the case of continental powers that relied principally on the draft. In France, the willingness of men to enlist appears to have taken the army by surprise; French recruits were not allowed to sign on for the war's duration before 21 August 1914.[22] The Germans acted

more quickly, accepting "war volunteers" (*Kriegsfreiwillige*) immediately at the outbreak of hostilities and, on 13 August, calling for pilots, skilled mechanics and fitters to enlist.[23] It appears, however, that no request for volunteers for the land forces was issued until later in the month, and at the end of August volunteering was temporarily halted by the Prussian War Ministry on the grounds that all units were full.[24] In Britain, by contrast, the Minister of War, Lord Kitchener, called for volunteers to enlist in the army as early as 7 August, and again three weeks later. Emergency recruiting stations were quickly set up across the country, patriotic meetings were organized and, at the end of the month, the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee (PRC) was established to help coordinate the volunteering campaign. Composed of the political parties' whips, some professional workers and War Office representatives, the PRC co-opted the canvassing machinery of Britain's democracy for the recruitment effort and produced an enormous quantity of literature – two million posters and 20 million leaflets by the end of March 1915 – to promote volunteering.[25] Local authorities and influential private citizens were permitted to raise units, a measure that enabled community pride to be exploited for recruitment and led to the proliferation of so-called "Pals battalions", in which men from the same streets, associations and professions served together.[26] Finally, intense moral and social pressure was applied. Professional sportsmen who did not provide an example by volunteering were lambasted in the press. Young women, adopting with gusto a suggestion made by Admiral Charles Penrose Fitzgerald in the first month of the war, publicly humiliated men still in mufti by presenting them with a mark of cowardice – the notorious white feather. Even the PRC was not averse to such manipulative forms of recruitment: in the winter of 1914, it sent forms requesting personal details and a promise to enlist to 4,400,000 householders.[27]

What type of people volunteered for military service? The social composition of the British volunteering movement is best known, thanks to estimates formulated during the war by the Board of Trade from returns concerning more than four million employees in a sample of businesses and government institutions. These statistics are not perfect: the sample was not entirely representative, but focused on state-run enterprises and larger firms; some occupational sectors, notably domestic service, the merchant marine, Irish agriculture and the self-employed, were not sampled; finally, men outside the labour market in July 1914, such as the unemployed and students, were excluded.[28] Nonetheless, the figures provide a reasonable estimate of the occupational backgrounds of Britain's volunteers (see Table 10.2).

Table 10.2 Occupational distribution of British volunteers, August 1914–April 1916

Occupational group	Estimated number of volunteers	Percentage of total
Industry	1,720,000	59.07
Finance and commerce	436,000	14.97
Transport	215,000	7.38
Agriculture	213,000	7.31
Local government	121,000	4.16
Central government	75,000	2.58
Professions	67,000	2.30
Entertainment	65,000	2.23

Source: The National Archives, London, RECO 1/ 832: "Report on the State of Employment in the United Kingdom in April 1916", p. 2.

The Board's statistics reveal that the British volunteering movement was a truly national phenomenon. All social groups were represented, with the urban working classes ("industry" and "transport"), who comprised 69.23 per cent of the employed in July 1914, also forming the majority (66.45 per cent) of volunteers. Enlistment rates were not identical across society, however. Middle-class occupations were most likely to lose men to the army: in the "professions", "finance and commerce" and "entertainment," more than 35 per cent of the male workforce enlisted.[29] In "industry" the equivalent figure was 27.30 per cent; "central" and "local government" gave up 24.83 and 25.37 per cent respectively, while agriculture and transport registered the lowest rates of enlistment, 23.96 and 20.83 per cent of workers respectively.[30] Various structural explanations have been put forward to account for these variations. Peter Simkins attributes the high enlistment rates in the service sector to its flexibility: it would have been easier for commerce than for industry to operate with a reduced staff and replace male employees with women.[31] P.E. Dewey has highlighted how age distributions and protection influenced recruiting. He argues that the contributions of both agriculture and transport to volunteering were limited by the relatively high age of their workforces, and by anti-enlistment policies on account of both sectors' essential role in the war effort.[32] No less important, however, were class-based expectations: Janet Watson is almost certainly correct in arguing that the norms and values of the social *milieu* of middle-class men made it almost imperative that they enlist.[33]

Less information is available on the social composition of the German volunteering movement. Regimental historians after the war insisted that "representatives of the most varied social strata" and "all levels of society and age groups, all occupations and classes" were among the volunteers.[34] Early in the conflict, newspapers also carried stories illustrating the diversity of recruits.[35] There has been no official analysis to test these claims, but examination of muster rolls belonging to 36 units recruited mainly in Württemberg, Bavaria and Baden does broadly confirm their veracity (see Table 10.3).

Although the sample confirms that all classes were present among the volunteers, it also indicates that their composition was both very different from that of the British movement and by no means fully

Table 10.3 Occupational distribution of 2,576 German volunteers, 1914–18[36]

Occupational group	**Number**	**Percentage of sample**
Tradesmen and craftsmen	435	16.89
Skilled waged urban manual workers	429	16.65
Businessmen and property owners	342	13.28
Unskilled waged urban manual workers	330	12.81
White-collar workers	313	12.15
Students	262	10.17
Pupils (and school leavers)	189	7.34
Professionals and academics	174	6.75
Farmers	63	2.45
Waged agricultural workers	35	1.36
Without occupation	4	0.16

Sources: Muster rolls in: (a) Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv München, Abteilung IV: Kriegsarchiv: Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment Nos. 16/i (*KrStR 3039–41*), 17/i and ii (*KrStR 3102–6, 3110–14*), 18/i (*KrStR 3187–9*) and 20/i (*KrStR 3280–1*); Bavarian Reserve Field Artillery Regiment No. 6/i, iii, iv, vii (*KrStR 13404–5, 13409–10, 13411, 13415–6*); lists of war volunteers in the replacement squadrons of 1 and 2 Bavarian Heavy Rider Regiments (*KrStR 12568–9* and *12585–9*). (b) General-landesarchiv Karlsruhe: Reserve Infantry Regiments Nos. 110/i-iv and men fit for garrison duty (*456 Res.-Inf.-Regt. 110, Bd. 2–11*) and 249/i-iv (*456 Res.-Inf.-Regt. 249, Bd. 1–6*); Reserve Field Artillery Regiment No. 52, regimental staff (*456 Res.-Feldart.-Regt. 52, Bd. 1*), staffs of sections I–III (*456 Res.-Feldart.-Regt. 52, Bd. 2–4*) and i, iii and ix batteries (*456 Res.-Feldart.-Regt. 52, Bd. 5, 9* and *22–3*). (c) Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart: Landwehr Infantry Regiment No. 120/ii (*M 484/ 4*); Landsturm Infantry Battalions Calw. XIII/1/iv and Stuttgart. XIII/2/i (*M 493/ 11–12* and *M 493/ 19–20*); list of war volunteers in the replacement squadron of Dragoon Regiment "König" (2.10) No. 26 (*M 511/ 33*); Württemberg Landwehr Field Artillery Regiment No. 1/ii (*M 530/ 4*); Württemberg Reserve Field Artillery Regiment No. 54, regimental staff (*M 529/ 1*), staff of (Saxon) section I (*M 529/ 2*), iv battery (*M 529/ 8–9*), light munitions column no. 1265 (*M 529/ 20*); list of war volunteers and wartime recruited reservists in 2nd Recruit Depot of Replacement Pioneer Regiment No. 13 (*M 533/ 125*).

representative of the German nation. Most striking is the over-representation of elites, especially academics and professionals. Despite making up only 0.5 per cent of the pre-war working population, this group supplied 6.75 per cent of the volunteers.[37] Businessmen and property owners were also keen to volunteer; together with the intelligentsia, they formed less than 5 per cent of the peacetime workforce but 20 per cent of the volunteers.[38] White-collar workers were also over-represented, although to a lesser degree, while students and secondary school pupils comprised about 17 per cent of the total.[39] German volunteers were thus considerably more socially elevated than their counterparts across the Channel: although the different sampling methods allow only a rough comparison, the evidence suggests that just under half of the Kaiser's volunteers worked in non-manual occupations during peacetime, in contrast to little more than one-quarter of their British opponents.[40]

Nonetheless, the far higher proportion of upper and middle-class men among the German volunteers was to a large extent a by-product of the *Kaiserreich*'s mobilization at the outbreak of hostilities, rather than indicative of an exaggerated belligerence among the country's elites. Students, the group most commonly associated in the historiography with "war enthusiasm", were available to volunteer in large numbers because so many had deferred their military service until after their studies during peacetime, and were therefore not drafted in August 1914.[41] It is noticeable that their enlistment rate, at around 40 per cent, was comparable to that of middle-class Britons.[42] Other groups' participation was also influenced by the conscription system. Secondary school pupils were below military age, and therefore excluded from the draft. On the other hand, youths in the agricultural population, which had comprised one-third of the gainfully employed, were favoured as recruits by the peacetime army due to their superior physique and alleged obedience, and were therefore disproportionately affected by the mobilization.[43] The disappearance of so many young men from the farms just as the harvest season was beginning probably discouraged those remaining from enlisting, resulting in the agricultural population being vastly under-represented among the volunteers, at only 3.81 per cent of the total.[44] The reluctance of rural men to come forward for service reflected enlistment patterns across Europe, and may help to explain why France, still a predominantly agricultural country in 1914, produced fewer volunteers than its more industrialized neighbours.[45] Evidence of the popular, rather than elite, nature of volunteering can be seen, however, in the readiness of urban populations to enlist. In Germany, craftsmen and traders belonging to the "old" lower middle

classes were over-represented in the sample by 200 per cent (in relation to their share of the Wilhelmine workforce), and, surprisingly, given their involvement in essential war work, skilled industrial workers were only marginally under-represented, comprising just under one-fifth of the peacetime employed and 16.65 per cent of the volunteer sample. As in Britain, unskilled workers registered lower enlistment rates, yet were by no means absent: comprising 18.5 per cent of the workforce, they totalled 12.81 per cent of volunteer strength.[46]

Conscription not only influenced the social composition of the volunteers, it also affected their age distribution. Unfortunately, no age statistics exist for British volunteers, but it seems likely that they comprised a mix of generations, albeit dominated by the more youthful sections of male society. Enlistment was initially open only to men aged between 19 and 30, but the upper age limit was gradually raised, first at the end of August 1914 to 35 and later, on 19 May 1915, to 40 years.[47] Muster roll analysis indicates that German volunteers were composed overwhelmingly of the very young. Among those in the sample who volunteered during the first five months of the war, 64.84 per cent were aged below 21, 34.98 per cent between 21 and 46 and only 0.18 per cent above 46 years old.[48] Given the mass mobilization of 3.5 million active soldiers and reservists aged between 20 to 45 at the outbreak of war and the unfitness of older year groups for military service, the predominance of men too young to have undertaken peacetime military service is unsurprising. Nonetheless, comparison with French figures suggests that Wilhelmine youth was especially keen to volunteer. Although the Third Republic conscripted a much higher proportion of its 21 to 45-year-olds, the 25,000 17 to 20-year-olds who were too young for the draft, but nonetheless enlisted, comprised only 54.72 per cent of French volunteers in 1914. French volunteers of drafting age composed 39.87 per cent of the total, and the remaining 5.42 per cent of men enlisting were over 46 years old.[49]

An examination of voluntary enlistment throughout Western Europe reveals that national movements varied considerably in size, pattern, and composition. Britain's 2,675,149 volunteers were by far the most numerous, comprising a cross section of the nation, and were therefore principally working-class. The existence of conscription in Germany and France ensured that their movements were smaller, totalling perhaps 500,000 and 187,905 men, respectively, during the war. It also heavily influenced the composition of the Wilhelmine volunteers, at least, who possessed a higher proportion of urban middle-class men

and were, on average, probably younger than their counterparts across the Channel. Allowing for the different recruiting systems operated by the belligerents, however, national volunteering movements were not so very dissimilar: throughout Western Europe, elites in particular, but also many men lower down the social spectrum, demonstrated an impressive readiness to come forward for service. Whether the movements were as alike in their motives for fighting as they were in their apparent willingness to come forward will be investigated in the next section.

Volunteer motivation

Although men in all Western European countries demonstrated remarkable readiness to come forward for military service during the First World War, the smaller size, younger age, and socially superior nature of the German volunteering movement may well have meant that its ethos was very different from that of its British counterpart. Research has consistently argued that, throughout Europe before 1914, the middle classes were especially belligerent and nationalistic. The historian John Cruickshank has cited Henri Massis and Alfred de Tarde's pre-war poll of French students, *Les Jeunes Gens d'aujourd'hui*, to argue that these educated young men were guided by patriotism, actionism, and a belief in the inevitability of armed conflict.[50] Peter Parker claims similarly that the cult of athleticism, intense house loyalty, and classical education promulgated by British public schools before 1914 militarized their upper-class pupils by inculcating an exaggerated patriotism, idealizing self-sacrifice and manly company, and instilling a naïve, romanticized view of war.[51] In the *Kaiserreich*, middle-class youth groups such as the *Wandervogel* glorified the "hero's death" in battle, while Protestant students and academics looked forward to a "German apocalypse", in which their people would be chosen by God to bring justice to the world.[52] Moreover, recent research has demonstrated that whatever "war enthusiasm" was manifested in August 1914 was limited to "the better classes, especially the educated youth".[53] It is, therefore, hardly surprising that historians have asserted that the German volunteers were the "most visible expression and result of the war enthusiasm".[54] While the muster roll sample examined in the previous section demonstrates the falsity of the common historiographical assumption that the Wilhelmine volunteers were dominated by youths from the upper middle classes, there is no doubt that they were far more prominent than in the British

movement: whereas perhaps 37.5 per cent of German volunteers came from elite middle-class backgrounds, such men probably comprised far fewer than 20 per cent of the British volunteers.[55]

Examinations of German volunteers' letters, diaries, and memoirs confirm that some men were indeed "war enthused". Young intellectuals such as the poet Otto Braun considered the conflagration to be "a challenge for our time and for each individual, a test by fire, that we may ripen into manhood".[56] As the Germanist Bernd Hüppauf has noted, others joined the army because they were eager to defend and advance the cause of German culture within Europe.[57] Such idealism appears to have been limited to a minority even within the middle classes, however.[58] More often, the emotion usually described as "war enthusiasm" was really "war excitement". Many youths were thrilled to be part of the momentous events taking place at the end of July 1914. For Herbert Sulzbach, a 20-year-old bank trainee from Frankfurt am Main, these days were "incredibly exciting". He absconded from work in order to stand in the crowds outside the press offices and was overwhelmed by news of mobilization, praising "the splendid spirit and wild enthusiasm that has come over us all".[59] Others also found the sense of national unity heady: 16-year-old Kurt Keller made the decision to volunteer himself after spending the first days of war at the local railway station, serving food and drink to reservists travelling to the front.[60] Others welcomed the conflict as an opportunity to escape the boredom of everyday life behind desk or work bench: a study of the mobilization carried out by the Württemberg Army cited "thirst for adventure" as an important factor motivating the "large influx of war volunteers".[61]

Nonetheless, while "war enthusiasm" and, still more, "war excitement" were certainly felt by some men, other evidence indicates that their significance to the German volunteers has been overestimated. In particular, a survey of volunteer motivations undertaken during the first year of the war by the *Institut für angewandte Psychologie* in Klein Glienicke, near Potsdam, found little evidence that jubilation at the war's outbreak had influenced enlistments: all those interviewed recorded "war enthusiasm never felt".[62] Even supposedly belligerent student communities included men who regarded the approach of hostilities with horror. Franz Blumenfeld, for example, studying in Freiburg at the outbreak of war, found himself "absolutely unable to take part in the enthusiasm".[63] For Gotthard Gruber, happily enrolled in Berlin, the tension of the last days of July was so unbearable that he fled to his family holidaying in the Tyrol. Excitement and enthusiasm seem to have played little part in his decision to enter the army on 25 August.[64]

Moreover, there appears to have been very little naïvety about the hardships and dangers that armed conflict would entail. Only one man interviewed in the Klein Glienicke survey expressed admiration for "the joy and honour of a romantic warrior life", and even he insisted that he had "known from the beginning that a modern war is an unparalleled tragedy and a crime against humanity".[65] Men enlisted willingly in the full knowledge that war was "the most dangerous of all illnesses".[66]

In fact, despite their different compositions, comparison of the British and German volunteering movements suggests that the vast majority of enlistments on both sides were rooted principally in feelings of defensive patriotism. Great Britain's entry into the war was precipitated by the German invasion of Belgium and quickly came to be presented as an idealistic crusade intended to liberate the country, crush "Prussian militarism" and guarantee French security and the independence of small states.[67] For middle-class commentators, therefore, the volunteering movement was inspired, above all, by high-minded principles. T.H. Procter, an academic and former soldier who analysed after the war why men had enlisted, emphasized how indignation about Belgium's invasion had united Britons, who, he claimed, had thus been motivated to fight by "altruistic and chivalrous motives".[68] The war correspondent Philip Gibbs similarly described "a simple, boyish idealism" which inspired "young soldiers [...], not only of officer rank but of 'other ranks' ". In his opinion, "they believed that they were fighting to dethrone militarism, to ensure the happiness and liberties of civilized peoples."[69] Shaken by the gruesome atrocity stories spread by Belgian refugees and exaggerated by the press, memoir evidence does indeed suggest that many Britons believed themselves to be fighting a barbarous regime. As George Calverley, a 16-year-old member of the Church Lads' Brigade, later recalled, "there was a great feeling of indignation and patriotic fervour, and hate for the Germans for what they had done, or had been reported to have done to 'Little Belgium' ".[70]

Nonetheless, had Britons truly been fighting for Belgium's liberation or in defence of France, the rush to the colours should have taken place immediately. Many men did, of course, enlist during the first half of August, although not necessarily to uphold these causes: Procter considered some of the men "born scrappers" who were simply looking for a fight.[71] As on the German side, others joined the army out of a sense of adventure, unaware of quite how awful the fighting would be: a 41-year-old British sergeant captured at Passchendaele in 1917 ruefully informed his interrogator that "had I known how long the war would last and how much more than in the Boer War would be demanded

from the men, as an old man and father of seven children, I would not have enlisted once again."[72] Unemployment was also a factor, albeit a comparatively minor one: as has been seen, enlistment rates were highest among the middle classes and skilled working classes, occupational groups least affected by the economic disruption caused by the outbreak of war. Nonetheless, it is not without significance that, where unemployment relief was denied to men of military age, many volunteered: in Bristol, for example, 90 per cent of redundant workers joined the army.[73] Most important, however, was the widespread belief from the end of August that Britain itself was threatened. The infamous "Mons Despatch" published in *The Times* on 25 August was, as Gregory has emphasized, the turning point. The report's presentation of the Battle of Mons, just across the Channel, as a valorous but severe defeat for the British army prompted an enormous surge in enlistments: the partial recruitment statistics which survive suggest that the number of volunteers coming forward leapt from 49,415 in the seven days before 25 August to 83,330 in the subsequent week, and again to 188,327 between 1 and 7 September. Men responded to the call to defend their nation: as the Londoner, Jack Ashley, remarked in his diary on 1 September, "bad news from France, and another appeal for men which set me thinking it was time to get along."[74]

It is easy to forget, after the influential Fischer controversy over German war guilt, that in August 1914 most of the *Kaiserreich*'s population believed that their government had been driven into hostilities through the belligerence of other countries, especially Russia.[75] The Kaiser himself insisted that "the sword has been forced into our hand," and this claim was given credence by the subsequent political truce known as the *Burgfrieden* (fortress peace), in which even the Social Democrats took part.[76] It is, therefore, hardly surprising that defensive patriotism also proved a strong motivator for German volunteers. After remarking on the "enthusiasm" at the war's opening, Sulzbach, for example, explained the reason why his countrymen were so willing to fight: "we feel we've been attacked," he wrote, "and the idea that we have to defend ourselves gives us unbelievable strength."[77] Eugen Mortler, another bank trainee who volunteered, considered himself and his comrades to be "young Fatherland defenders", while 17-year-old Heinrich Genscher saw Germany's protection as his "solemn duty".[78] Such sentiments appear to have been felt by the majority of volunteers, and, indeed, most Germans. The psychological study of volunteer motivations concluded that "patriotic feeling [...] was there to a great degree – as an impulsive, categorical imperative: we have a

duty to protect the Fatherland. War has been declared, weapons are our only remaining resort."[79] Far from signifying "war enthusiasm", the greater speed and spontaneity with which German volunteers rushed to enlist at the beginning of August 1914 was in fact a reflection of their country's comparative vulnerability. Whereas Britons, protected by the Channel and the Royal Navy, could afford to wait, Germany, surrounded by enemies, was at immediate risk of invasion.[80]

Of course, as the historian Bernd Ulrich has pointed out, not all men were filled with a patriotic love for the Fatherland or a strong desire to defend King or Kaiser. Rather, social coercion and peer pressure often prompted even the reluctant to enlist.[81] With so many men either volunteering or already in the army, life for military-aged males still in mufti became increasingly awkward. One German volunteer interviewed for the aforementioned psychological study felt it impossible to stay at home when not only his contemporaries but also much older men were being called up to the army: "I volunteered on the first day," he told the psychologists, "in order not to have to wear civilian clothes any longer."[82] A Briton who enlisted in the French army at the war's opening also recorded feeling "like a pariah owing to the marked coolness of the concierge's wife and the charwoman" at his Paris apartments as he waited for his offer of service to be answered by the military authorities.[83] If close friends or family members departed, refusing to volunteer became even more difficult. Gruber's younger brother Harald, who, unlike his three siblings, did not enlist on 25 August 1914, did volunteer a few days later because he could "no longer endure [being] alone at home".[84] While social pressure to volunteer was probably most intense in Germany and France during August 1914 due to the immediate perception of danger and mass call-up of reservists, thereafter it was probably most pronounced in Britain, where efforts to shame men into enlisting were to some extent encouraged and coordinated. Procter remarked that the handing out of white feathers reached "extraordinary intensity" in the second year of the war, and believed this method of coercion to be extremely effective.[85] Many personal testimonies support this assessment: although only 16, Fredrick Broome, for example, went straight to a recruiting office after being publicly humiliated by four girls who had handed him white feathers.[86]

To emphasize the effect of social coercion on men, however, is to miss societies' primary role in generating and sustaining volunteering. The prolonged nation-building undertaken during the 19th century through the spread of universal primary schooling, mass media and, on the continent, compulsory military service had bound both

individual and community identities intimately to the nation state.[87] Those most integrated through their particularly large emotional and material stake, the middle classes, naturally displayed the greatest readiness to volunteer. Yet even comparatively lower-class men immediately identified with their polities when told that they were in danger: C.R. Smith, a pub barman, needed no external pressure to be inspired by the "stirring appeals" to "rally and save the prestige of our own Flag and Empire" and not to feel like "a coward walking about, while our brave soldiers were fighting for their lives, homes, and liberty".[88] Similarly, in Germany, many a worker "discovered [...] how dear and beloved his Fatherland already was to him" in the national emergency and joined the army.[89] Moreover, it was crucial to the success of volunteering movements that enlisting was widely recognized as not only the duty of a patriot but also an action necessary for the fulfilment of other roles cherished by men. Joining one's local regiment or "Pals Battalion", for example, was an expression of civic or regional loyalty, as well as a patriotic gesture.[90] Face-to-face relationships were also extremely important: indeed, the historian D. Fitzpatrick has gone so far as to suggest that "the readiness of individuals to join the colours was largely determined by the attitudes and behaviour of comrades – kinsmen, neighbours, and fellow-members of organizations and fraternities."[91] Respected employers could exert a moral influence and facilitate enlistment: Keller was given leave by his boss so that he could queue to enlist, while Smith joined up after his "Guvnor" [sic] offered to keep his job open for him and top up his army pay.[92] The volunteer who received "loud verbal instructions" from his mother "to use his bayonet in a way that would make it a difficult matter for the Kaiser to sit down" was not only fulfilling his patriotic duty by enlisting but also reaffirming his role as a good son.[93] Loyalty to friends was also extremely important: as other authors in this book also argue, volunteering was very often not an individual decision but one made collectively. Robert Cude, a London factory worker, joined the army with three of his work colleagues, after discussing the matter with them.[94] Calverley also attempted to enlist with two friends, and was downcast when they were accepted and he was turned away.[95]

The mass volunteering that took place during the First World War thus primarily reflected the high level of societal integration possessed by Western European nations and the seriousness with which their peoples viewed the danger of invasion. Despite their differing social and generational compositions, evidence from letters, diaries, and memoirs suggests that in both Britain and Germany volunteering movements

were similarly motivated, principally by feelings of defensive patriotism. Other factors, nonetheless, also played a role: men were encouraged to enlist by "war enthusiasm", excitement, unemployment, social and moral pressure, or very often by a combination of all these influences. Indeed, the highest enlistment rates were registered where various factors converged: a combination of patriotic education, youthful excitement, loyalty to friends and peer pressure all explain, for example, why 4,000 members of the middle-class *Wandervogel e.V.* youth group, one-third of its complement, volunteered for the army at the beginning of the war.[96] For men of all social classes in every Western European country, albeit especially elites, volunteering in 1914–18 was very often not only an expression of patriotism but also a demonstration of loyalty to local community, friends and loved ones, and a desire to defend these strongly personal connections against the horrors of invasion.

Conclusion

A comparative examination of European volunteers during the First World War sheds light on their very different positions within national historiographies. Given the exceptional scale and broadly representative nature of British volunteering, it is unsurprising that the movement has been viewed by scholars as a unique expression of a truly national readiness to fight. In contrast, German volunteering, although by no means inconsiderable, took place on a smaller scale than in the United Kingdom, and, unlike its British counterpart's predominantly working-class composition, was dominated by the middle classes. The association of the movement with "war enthusiasm" is understandable, given that the group most associated with this emotion – educated youth – formed a major, if by no means overwhelming, part of its membership. The fact that French volunteers were far less numerous than those in Britain and Germany may explain why these men have received little attention within the historiography of the Third Republic. Nonetheless, surviving statistics reveal that this neglect is hardly justified: while volunteers comprised only a fraction of those who served, nevertheless enough men came forward to fill no fewer than 62 regiments. Volunteering movements across Western Europe were indeed of different sizes, patterns, and compositions, yet in every country the readiness of men to enlist was impressive.

Moreover, a closer analysis of Western Europe's volunteers suggests that assumptions about enlistment motivations inferred from the different characteristics of the national movements are misleading. Recruitment

mechanisms, particularly the existence or absence of conscription, were more influential in determining the varying sizes and compositions of volunteering movements than differing motivational or ideological factors. A comparison of German and British volunteering reveals that similar patterns of enlistment can be identified across national borders: middle-class elites were especially ready to join the army. The industrial working classes were slightly under-represented among the volunteers, while rural populations were the least inclined to offer their services to the military. Additionally, although the younger age and high proportion of elites among the German volunteers may indeed indicate that "war enthusiasm" or "war excitement" was more influential in their decisions than in those of British recruits, an examination of personal testimonies in letters, diaries, and memoirs suggests that the differences have been exaggerated. Most volunteers, regardless of class, age or nationality, enlisted principally because they wished to protect their countries, homes, and families from invasion.

Indeed, although nation-specific factors shaped enlistment patterns, volunteering across Western Europe had its roots in the universal growth of national consciousness during the 19th century. By 1914, individuals and local communities identified themselves so closely with the nation that volunteering was not merely an expression of patriotic sentiment but also of local pride, respect for parents or employers and loyalty to friends. Enlistment was therefore widespread, because in every country the various roles comprising men's identities – patriot, subject, citizen, good friend or son – very often could only be fulfilled in a time of national emergency by joining the army and participating in the nation's defence. Volunteering movements may have differed in shape and size across Europe, yet their common motivations were also those that prompted the continent's population to fight so very hard and long in awful conditions for four extremely bloody years.

Notes

1. See, for example, R. Rürup (1984) "Der 'Geist von 1914' in Deutschland. Kriegsbegeisterung und Ideologisierung des Krieges im Ersten Weltkrieg", in B. Hüppauf (ed.), *Ansichten vom Krieg. Vergleichende Studien zum Ersten Weltkrieg in Literatur und Gesellschaft* (Königsten), 1–30 and W. J. Reader (1988) *At Duty's Call. A Study in Obsolete Patriotism* (Manchester).
2. J. J. Becker (1977) *1914: Comment les Français sont entrés dans la guerre* (Paris). For an English-language summary of this work's findings, see idem (1992) "*'That's the Death Knell of Our Boys ...'*", in P. Fridenson (ed.), *The French Home Front 1914–1918* (Providence and Oxford), 17–36.

3. See J. Verhey (2000) *The Spirit of 1914. Militarism, Myth, and Mobilization in Germany* (Cambridge), W. Kruse (1991) "Die Kriegsbegeisterung im Deutschen Reich zu Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges", in M. van der Linden and G. Mergner (eds), *Kriegsbegeisterung und mentale Kriegsvorbereitung. Interdisziplinäre Studien* (Berlin), 73–87 and B. Ziemann (1997) *Front und Heimat. Ländliche Kriegserfahrung im südlichen Bayern 1914–1923* (Essen), particularly pp. 39–49.
4. A. Gregory (2003) "British 'War Enthusiasm' in 1914. A Reassessment", in G. Braybon (ed.), *Evidence, History and the Great War. Historians and the Impact of 1914–18* (New York and Oxford), 67–85. For an excellent summary of responses to war throughout Europe, see also H. Strachan (2001) *The First World War. To Arms* (3 vols, Oxford), i, pp. 103–62.
5. J. Winter (1985) "Army and Society: the Demographic Context", in I. F. W. Beckett and K. Simpson (eds), *A Nation in Arms. A Social Study of the British Army in the First World War* (Manchester), 193–209. Cf. also idem (1986) *The Great War and the British People* (Basingstoke and London).
6. J. Keegan (1983) *The Face of Battle. A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo and the Somme* (Harmondsworth), pp. 221–23. The seminal study on the British "New Armies" remains P. Simkins (1988) *Kitchener's Army. The Raising of the New Armies, 1914–16* (Manchester and New York).
7. Verhey (2000), pp. 98–9. Cf. also B. Ulrich (1989) "Kriegsfreiwillige. Motivationen-Erfahrungen – Wirkungen", in Berliner Geschichtswerkstatt (ed.), *August 1914. Ein Volk zieht in den Krieg* (Berlin), 232–41.
8. "Neonationale Studentenverbindungen[, die] schon seit langem deutlich auf Kriegskurs [waren]". A. Gestrich (1998) "'Leicht trennt sich nur die Jugend vom Leben' – Jugendliche im Ersten Weltkrieg", in R. Spilker and B. Ulrich (eds), *Der Tod als Maschinist. Der industrialisierte Krieg 1914–1918. Eine Ausstellung des Museums Industriekultur Osnabrück im Rahmen des Jubiläums "350 Jahre Westfälischer Friede" 17. Mai-23. August 1998. Katalog* (Bramsche), 36.
9. The only nationwide study appears to be an unpublished conference paper: J. Maurin, "Les engagés volontaires français pendant la Première Guerre mondiale", presented at the conference "Le soldat volontaire en Europe au XXe siècle" at the Universite Paul-Valéry-Montpellier III, 3–5 April 2003.
10. Figures for Prussian enlistment to 11 August are in Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv Freiburg [hereafter BA-MA Freiburg], W-10/50902: "Denkenschrift über die Ersatzstellung für das Deutsche Heer von Mitte September bis Ende 1914", p. 53. The estimate for volunteering throughout the country is extrapolated from Württemberg statistics contained in Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart [hereafter HStA Stuttgart], M 77/2/ 4: Stellv. Generalkommando XIII. A. K. Nr. 4. Abteilung II b. (Kriegsarbeits- u. Ersatzwesen-Abteilung), "Denkschriften über die Erfahrungen bei der Mobilmachung im Jahre 1914 und während des Krieges betr. Vorbereitung der Mobilmachung, Organization usw. Juni 1918", pp. 106–11. It is supported by British intelligence sources, which variously estimated that there were 250,000 or 300,000 volunteers in August 1914. See The National Archives, London [hereafter TNA], WO 157/ 10: "Note on recruitment of German classes during the war". Annexe to General Head Quarters Summary, 20 June 1916 and Anon (1921), "Notes on the Man

Power and Fighting Strength of Germany: 1st August–1st November, 1914", in *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, LXVI:46, 150.

11. See War Office (ed.) (1922) *Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War. 1914–1920* (London), p. 364. The pattern of daily volunteering can be gleaned from records in TNA, WO 162/ 3: New Armies, 1914 and 15 – "Approximate number of recruits raised day by day". Despite having been quoted widely, the estimates in this rough document should be treated with caution: when added together, the figures it provides for volunteering in August fall short of the total published by the War Office by more than 100,000 men.
12. M. Huber (ed.) (1932) *La Population de la France pendant la Guerre* (Paris and New Haven), p. 95.
13. J. Stengers (1990) "La Belgique", in J. J. Becker and S. Audoin-Rouzeau (eds), *Les sociétés européennes et la guerre de 1914–1918. Actes du colloque organise à Nanterre et à Amiens du 8 au 11 décembre 1988* (Nanterre), 85.
14. This figure may be inflated by the inclusion of French colonial subjects, including 2,434 Somalis and 41,000 Moroccans, who enlisted in the French army during the war. It excludes the 28,728 Frenchmen who joined the navy. See Huber (ed.) (1932), p. 95 and pp. 102–3.
15. For volunteering in Baden, see Verhey (2000), p. 95, fn 97. Württemberg enlistment statistics are in HStA Stuttgart, M 77/2/ 4: Stellv. Generalkommando XIII. A. K. Nr. 4. Abteilung II b, "Denkschriften über die Erfahrungen bei der Mobilmachung", pp. 106–11. For state populations, see H. U. Wehler (1995) *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte. Von der "Deutschen Doppelrevolution" bis zum Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges. 1849–1914* (4 vols, Munich), iii, p. 494.
16. Huber (ed.) (1932), p. 110.
17. See M. Ingenlath (1998) *Mentale Aufrüstung. Militarisierungstendenzen in Frankreich und Deutschland vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg* (Frankfurt and New York), p. 155.
18. Germany held back 1,398,000 trained and a further 5,594,000 untrained men as reserves at the war's outbreak. See Heeres-Sanitätsinspektion des Reichskriegsministeriums (ed.) (1934) *Sanitätsbericht über das Deutsche Heer (Deutsches Feld- und Besatzungsheer) im Weltkriege 1914/1918 (Deutscher Kriegssanitätsbericht 1914/18). Die Krankenbewegung bei dem deutschen Feld- und Besatzungsheer im Weltkriege 1914/1918* (3 vols, Berlin), iii, p. 12 and Huber (ed.) (1932), pp. 90–1.
19. Huber (ed.) (1932), p. 111.
20. M. Samuels (1995) *Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888–1918* (London), p. 119 and I. F. W. Beckett (1985) "The Territorial Force", in I. F. W. Beckett and K. Simpson (eds) *A Nation in Arms. A Social Study of the British Army in the First World War* (Manchester), 128–30. The figure of 725,489 soldiers includes Regular and Special Reservists but not a further 215,451 National Reservists, who were under no obligation to re-enlist. Britain's military-aged male population in 1914 is estimated from figures in Huber (ed.) (1932), p. 110.
21. Although the first Military Service Act was passed on 27 January 1916 and came into effect from the beginning of March, it was not until the second Military Service Act, which took effect from 24 June, that full conscription was introduced. See P. E. Dewey (1984) "Military Recruiting and the British

Labour Force during the First World War", *Historical Journal*, XXVII:1, 206. For a monthly breakdown of recruiting figures, see The Army Council (1920) *General Annual Reports of the British Army (Including the Territorial Force from the Date of Enlistment) for the Period from 1st October, 1913 to 30th September, 1919* (London), p. 60.

22. Huber (ed.) (1932), p. 94. This did not stop volunteers coming forward as soon as the war broke out, but they therefore presumably had to commit themselves for a certain number of years. Diary evidence suggests that some had already been sent into action by mid-August. See J. Roujon (1916) *Battles and Bivouacs. A French Soldier's Note-Book* (London), p. 20 (entry for 17 Aug. 1914).
23. See the poster in BA-MA Freiburg, PH 2/ 54: "Ausbildung von Flugzeugführern oder Einstellung von Hilfsmonteuren-Ausruf für Kriegsfreiwillige".
24. For the halting of recruitment, see BA-MA Freiburg, W-10/50902: "Denkenschrift über die Ersatz-stellung für das Deutsche Heer von Mitte September bis Ende 1914", p. 54. An examination of the *Berliner Tageblatt* suggests that the first official advertisements for volunteers only appeared on 22 August, and a central recruiting station for volunteers was only set up in Berlin three days later. See *Handels-Zeitung des Berliner Tageblatts. Abend-Ausgabe. 43. Jahrgang, Nr. 425*, 22 August 1914 and *Berliner Tageblatt. 43. Jahrgang, Nr. 430*, 25 August 1914.
25. Simkins (1988), p. 39, pp. 52–5 and p. 60 and R. Douglas (1970) "Voluntary Enlistment in the First World War and the Work of the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee", *The Journal of Modern History*, XLII:4, 566–69.
26. See Simkins (1988), pp. 79–100.
27. See, respectively, C. Veitch (1985) "'Play up! Play Up! and Win the War!' Football, the Nation and the First World War 1914–15", *Journal of Contemporary History*, XX:3, 369–78, N. F. Gullace (2002) *"The Blood of Our Sons". Men, Women, and the Renegotiation of British Citizenship during the Great War* (New York and Basingstoke), pp. 73–97 and, for the household circular, Douglas (1970), 572.
28. For more information on the Board of Trade Employment Surveys, see Dewey (1984), 200–3 and 221–2.
29. The professions provided proportionally the most men, with 38.51 per cent of the workforce enlisting, while 35.91 per cent of the "entertainment" workforce and 35.28 per cent of those employed in "finance and commerce" volunteered. Calculated from figures in TNA, RECO 1/ 832: "Report on the State of Employment in the United Kingdom in April 1916", p. 2.
30. Ibid.
31. Simkins (1988), p. 110.
32. Dewey (1984), 220.
33. J. S. K. Watson (2004) *Fighting Different Wars. Experience, Memory, and the First World War in Britain* (Cambridge), pp. 298–9.
34. "Vertreter der verschiedensten Volksschichten". BA-MA Freiburg, PH 10 II/ 227: "Geschichte des Reserve Infanterie-Regiments 219 von der Gründung bis zu seinem Ausrücken in Feindesland", (c.1928), p. 3 and "alle Volksschichten und Altersklassen, alle Berufs- und Standesarten". F. Rubenbauer (1932) "Der Sturm auf Ypern, Freiwillige vor!", in F. Solledor (ed.), *Vier Jahre Westfront. Geschichte des Regiments List R.I.R. 16* (Munich), 4.

35. For German (and also similar French) press reports testifying to volunteers' diversity, see T. Raithel (1996) *Das >>Wunder<< der inneren Einheit. Studien zur deutschen und französischen Öffentlichkeit bei Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges* (Bonn), pp. 456–7.
36. This table was originally published in A. Watson (2005) "For Kaiser and Reich': The Identity and Fate of the German Volunteers", *War in History*, XII:1, 52. Three volunteers, two of whom enlisted on 7 August 1914 and one on 13 October 1914, who were categorized erroneously as two businessmen and a white-collar worker, respectively, have now been more accurately reclassified as farmers. For more details of the sample and sampling method, see ibid., p. 52, fn 29 and pp. 71–3.
37. According to Wehler (1995), p. 732, the number of people working in Bildungsbürgertum (educated elite) professions was just over 135,000 in the years before World War I. This was approximately 0.5 per cent of pre-war Germany's 28.11 million-strong workforce.
38. T. Nipperdey (1990) *Deutsche Geschichte 1866–1918. Arbeitswelt und Bürgergeist* (2 vols, Munich), i, p. 425 states that in 1907 there were 1.3 million employed in the educated and property-owning classes ("Bürgergebildete und -besitzende"). This comprised 4.62 per cent of the working population. "Professionals and academics" and "businessmen and property owners", the two categories roughly corresponding to these classes, together represented 20.03 per cent of volunteers in the sample.
39. White-collar workers and middle-ranking officials numbered 3–3.5 million in 1907, approximately 10.5 per cent of the employed, and represented 12.15 per cent of volunteers in the sample. The high proportion of female white-collar workers (Wehler estimates that about a quarter of white-collar workers were female in 1907, in contrast to about one-sixth of all industrial workers) suggests that, when compared with their proportion of the male working force, white-collar workers may in fact have been even more over-represented among the volunteers. See Nipperdey (1990), p. 425 and Wehler (1995), p. 759 and p. 774.
40. This conclusion is based on the combined percentages of (on the German side) "businessmen and property owners", "white-collar workers", "students", "pupils" and "professionals and academics" (together 49.69 per cent of total volunteers) and (on the British side) "finance and commerce", "local government", "central government", "entertainment" and "professions" (together 26.24 per cent of total volunteers).
41. Thus, although the army called over 50 per cent of each year group nationally, only 17.6 per cent of Heidelberg students had completed or were undertaking (simultaneously with their studies) their military service in 1904–5. See T. Weber (2008) *Our Friend "The Enemy". Elite Education in Britain and Germany before World War I* (Stanford, CA), p. 113.
42. See Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt (ed.) (1915) *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich. Sechsunddreißigster Jahrgang 1915*, ed. (Berlin), pp. 312–16, which estimates that 40,943 of Germany's 105,286 students had joined the armed forces by 1915.
43. See U. Frevert (2004) *A Nation in Barracks. Modern Germany, Military Conscription and Civil Society* (Oxford and New York), pp. 191–93.

44. Information on the size of the agricultural population can be found in Wehler (1995), p. 828. For farmers' fears about their ability to bring in the harvest in August 1914, see Ziemann (1997), p. 44.
45. No statistics on the social composition of French volunteers have been published, but the agricultural population was under-represented among the volunteers of Britain, as has already been noted, and of Belgium. See Stengers (1990), p. 85.
46. For population statistics, see Wehler (1995), pp. 773–4 and p. 759, Nipperdey (1990), p. 425 and Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt (1913) *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich. Vierunddreißigster Jahrgang 1913* (Berlin), p. 18. For the higher enlistment rates among British skilled workers, see J. Winter (1977) "Britain's 'Lost Generation' of the First World War", *Population Studies. A Journal of Demography*, XXXI, 453.
47. Simkins (1988), p. 39, p. 60 and p. 127. It should be noted that, despite these nominal age limits, under-age (and some over-age) men were allowed into the army. See especially R. van Emden (2005) *Boy Soldiers of the Great War* (London).
48. Calculated from the 2,264 volunteers in the muster roll sample who enlisted in 1914.
49. Calculated from statistics in Huber (ed.) (1932), p. 95.
50. J. Cruickshank (1982) *Variations on Catastrophe. Some French Responses to the Great War* (Oxford), pp. 18–24.
51. P. Parker (1987) *The Old Lie. The Great War and the Public-School Ethos* (London), particularly pp. 69–105.
52. See, respectively, G. Ille (1989) "'Von andrer Art gibt's jetzt 'ne Fahrt! Die bürgerliche Jugendbewegung an der Schwelle des Ersten Weltkriegs", in Berliner Geschichtswerkstatt (ed.), *August 1914. Ein Volk zieht in den Krieg* (Berlin), 49–59 and K. Vondung (1976) "Deutsche Apokalypse 1914", in K. Vondung (ed.), *Das wilhelminische Bildungsbürgertum. Zur Sozialgeschichte seiner Ideen* (Göttingen), 156–9.
53. Verhey (2000), p. 112. Cf. the similar findings for Britain in Gregory (2003), p. 73.
54. "Sichbarster Ausdruck und Ergebnis der Kriegsbegeisterung". B. Ulrich and B. Ziemann (1997) "Das soldatische Kriegserlebnis", in W. Kruse (ed.), *Eine Welt von Feinden. Der Große Krieg 1914–1918* (Frankfurt am Main), 128.
55. These figures have been reached by adding the percentages of (on the German side) "businessmen and property owners", "professionals and academics", "students" and "pupils" and (on the British side) "finance and commerce", "central government" and "professions". Comparison is difficult due to the different methods of categorization used, and it is likely that many men categorized under the British "finance and commerce" heading may have come from the lower middle classes.
56. O. Braun to father, quoted in G. L. Mosse (1990) *Fallen Soldiers. Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (New York and Oxford), p. 64. For European intellectuals' generally enthusiastic reactions to the war, see Strachan (2001), pp. 133–41.
57. See B. Hüppauf (1984) "'Der Tod ist verschlungen in den Sieg'. Todesbilder aus dem Ersten Weltkrieg und Nachkriegszeit", in B. Hüppauf (ed.),

Ansichten vom Krieg. Vergleichende Studien zum Ersten Weltkrieg in Literatur und Gesellschaft (Königsten), 68–9.

58. References to such men generally refer to extracts in Philipp Witkop's highly selective compilation of student letters (see P. Witkop (ed.) (1928) *Kriegsbriefe gefallener Studenten* (Munich)). For the biases and difficulties of this source, see M. Hettling and M. Jeismann (1993) "Der Weltkrieg als Epos. Philipp Witkops 'Kriegsbriefe gefallener Studenten'", in G. Hirschfeld, G. Krumeich and I. Renz (eds), *Keiner fühlt sich hier mehr als Mensch… Erlebnis und Wirkung des Ersten Weltkriegs* (Essen), 175–98.
59. H. Sulzbach (1973) *With the German Guns. Four Years on the Western Front 1914–1918* (London), p. 22 (diary entries for 25–31 July and 1 Aug. 1914).
60. Account by K. Keller, reproduced in P. Knoppe (1936) *Die Geschichte des Königlich Sächsischen Reserve-Infanterie-Regiments Nr. 241* (Dresden), pp. 18–19.
61. "Abenteurerlust" and "starke[r] Zustrom von Kriegsfreiwilligen". HStA Stuttgart, M 77/2/ 68: "Denkschrift der 2. Ersatzabteilung. 3. Württemb. Feldart. Rgt. No. 49", in "Inspektion der Ersatzabteilungen der Feldartillerie; Ers. Abt. der Felda. Regter. 13,29,49 und 65. Denkschriften über die Erfahrungen bei der Mobilmachung im Jahre 1914 und während des Krieges betr. Vorbereitung der Mobilmachung, Organization usw." (July 1918), p. 43.
62. "Kriegsbegeisterung nie verspürt". Statement of "L.", quoted in P. Plaut (1920) "Psychographie des Kriegers", in W. Stern and O. Lipmann (eds), *Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für angewandete Psychologie. 21. Beiträge zur Psychologie des Krieges* (Leipzig), 12. Cf. the statements of "G. B.", "E. B.", "H. Th.", who also denied feeling "war enthusiasm" but in some cases did mention the excitement at the outbreak of hostilities.
63. F. Blumenfeld, letter of 1 August 1914, quoted in Witkop (ed.) (1928), p. 19.
64. Deutsches Tagebucharchiv, Emmendingen [hereafter DTA], 138a: G. Gruber, letter to cousin, 9 January 1915. Due to German privacy laws, the surnames of German archival sources have been replaced with pseudonyms.
65. "Freud[e] und Ehr[e] eines romantischen Kriegslebens"; "Ich war mir von Anfang an darüber klar, daß ein moderner Krieg ein Trauerspiel ohnegleichen und ein Verbrechen an der Menschheit ist". Statement of "H.Th." in Plaut (1920), p. 11.
66. "Der gefährlichsten aller Krankheiten". DTA, 260: E. Mortler, diary entry, 5 August 1914. Mortler enlisted on the following day.
67. These war aims were outlined by the Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith, at the Guildhall in London on 9 November 1914. See V. H. Rothwell (1971) *British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy 1914–1918* (Oxford), p. 19.
68. T. H. Procter (1920) "The Motives of the Soldier", *The International Journal of Ethics*, XXXI:1, 34–5.
69. P. Gibbs (1920) *Realities of War* (London), p. 336.
70. Imperial War Museum, Department of Documents, London [hereafter IWM], 02/30/1: G. Calverley, memoir, p. 2. For the German atrocities in Belgium, which did take place but were then exaggerated by British propaganda, see J. Horne and A. Kramer (2001) *German Atrocities, 1914. A History of Denial* (New Haven and London).
71. Procter (1920), 28.
72. "Hätte ich gewusst, wie lange der Krieg dauern würde und wieviel [sic] mehr von den Mannschaften verlangt würde als im Burenkriege, so

wäre ich als alter Kerl und Vater von 7 Kindern nicht noch einmal Soldat geworden". BA-MA Freiburg, PH 3/ 585: Interrogation of one sergeant and four men of 6/Somerset Light Infantry captured on 24 August 1917 in "Vernehmungsprotokoller französischer & englischer Kriegsgefangener im Bereich des AOK 4, Bd. 3 Aug.–Sept. [1917]", pp. 2–3.

73. I. Beckett (1985) "The Nation in Arms", in I. F. W. Beckett and K. Simpson (eds), *A Nation in Arms. A Social Study of the British Army in the First World War* (Manchester), 10. Cf. also Simkins (1988), pp. 107–8.
74. R. S. Ashley (1982) *War-Diary of Private R.S. (Jack) Ashley 2472 7th London Regiment 1914–1918* (London), p. 1 (diary entry for 1 September 1914). Cf. Gregory (2003), p. 80. For the recruitment statistics (and their problems) see note 11.
75. For the war guilt question, see especially F. Fischer (1975) *War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914* (London). A recent major work on this subject is R. F. Hamilton and H. H. Herwig (eds) (2003) *The Origins of World War I* (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid and Cape Town).
76. See the Kaiser's speech of 31 July 1914, reproduced in R. Haswell Lutz (1932) *Documents of the German Revolution. Fall of the German Empire. 1914–1918* (2 vols., Stanford, CA, London and Oxford) i, p. 4 and, for the SPD, see W. Kruse (1993) *Krieg und nationale Integration. Eine Neuinterpretation des sozialdemokratischen Burgfriedensschlusses 1914/15* (Essen).
77. Sulzbach (1973), p. 22 (diary entry for 1 August 1914).
78. "Jung[e] Vaterlandsverteidiger"; "Schwer[e] Pflicht". Respectively, DTA, 260: E. Mortler, diary entry, 8 August 1914 and BA-MA Freiburg, MSg 2/ 2735: H. Genscher, letter to father, 6 November 1914.
79. "Das Vaterlandsgefühl [...] war im starken Maße da – als impulsiver, kategorischer Imperativ: wir haben die Pflicht, das Vaterland zu schützen. Der Krieg ist erklärt, also bleibt uns nur die Waffe als Mittel übrig". Plaut (1920), p. 13.
80. Indeed, enemy armies did briefly occupy German territory: the French army broke into Alsace and briefly took Mulhausen at the beginning of August, and the Russian army entered East Prussia later in the month.
81. Ulrich (1989), pp. 233–4.
82. "Ich meldete mich am 1. Tage als Kriegsfreiwilliger, um ja nicht länger Zivilkleider tragen zu müssen". "H. Th." quoted in Plaut (1920), p. 12.
83. M. MacDonald (1917) *Under the French Flag. A Britisher in the French Army* (London), p. 9.
84. "Nicht mehr aushielt, allein zu Hause [zu sein]". DTA, 138a: G. Gruber, letter to cousin, 9 January 1915.
85. Procter (1920), 28–32.
86. See the extract from Broome's Imperial War Museum audio recording reproduced in M. Arthur (ed.) (2002) *Forgotten Voices of the Great War. A New History of WWI in the Words of the Men and Women Who Were There* (Haydock), p. 65. For other examples, see p. 19, pp. 62–3 and also Gullace (2002), p. 77, who notes that "in a disproportionate number of cases (even when the gesture was highly resented) men went to the recruiting office directly after the incident".
87. For nation-building, see B. Anderson (1983) *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London) and also C. Tilly (ed.) (1975) *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, NJ).

88. IWM, 99/56/1: C. R. Smith, memoir, p. 62.
89. "Entdeckte [...] wie lieb und wert ihm sein Vaterland schon gewesen war". J. E. Hottenroth (ed.) (1923) *Sachsen in großer Zeit in Wort und Bild. Gemeinverständliche sächsische Kriegsgeschichte und vaterländisches Gedenkwerk des Weltkrieges* (3 vols., Leipzig), iii, p. 180.
90. For the importance of tapping local loyalties rather than merely relying on patriotic or paternalistic calls to arms, see especially K. Grieves (1993) "'Lowther's Lambs': Rural Paternalism and Voluntary Recruitment in the First World War", *Rural History*, IV:1, 55–75. Although "Pals Battalions" did not exist in Germany, regiments there were organized on a regional basis and volunteers could therefore find themselves serving with people they already knew: Sulzbach, for example, found that many of his school friends had also been accepted by his local unit, *Feldartillerie-Regiment Nr. 63*. See Sulzbach (1973), p. 23 (diary entry for 8 August 1914).
91. D. Fitzpatrick (1995) "The Logic of Collective Sacrifice: Ireland and the British Army, 1914–1918", *The Historical Journal*, XXXVIII:4, 1030.
92. Account by K. Keller, reproduced in Knoppe (1936), p. 18 and IWM, 99/56/1: C. R. Smith, memoir, p. 62.
93. IWM, 86/32/1: S. T. Fuller, diary / memoir, 1 Sept. 1914.
94. IWM, Con Shelf: R. Cude, memoir, p. 2.
95. IWM, G. Calverley, memoir, p. 2.
96. G. Fiedler (1989) *Jugend im Krieg. Bürgerliche Jugendbewegung, Erster Weltkrieg und sozialer Wandel 1914–1923* (Cologne), p. 38.

11

Paramilitary Volunteers for Weimar Germany's "*Wehrhaftmachung*": how Civilians were attracted to serve with Irregular Military Units

Rüdiger Bergien

Strictly speaking, what happened in Berlin in the early morning hours of 13 March 1920 was not so much a putsch staged by anti-democrats as a mutiny of war volunteers. Only one year earlier, most of the Ehrhardt Brigade, which had marched in front of the Brandenburg Gate behind the black, white, and red flag to the applause of Berlin's citizens, had volunteered to support the new republican order.[1] Most of these volunteer soldiers of the German post-war period had not taken up arms for reasons of idealism, but they had expected their military service to result in a different post-war order. This included the hope of finding service in the new army, the *Reichswehr*. The republican state, however, was unable to meet these expectations, and at the beginning of 1920 the existing volunteer formations were disbanded under pressure from the Allies. The Ehrhardt Brigade became the radical nucleus of German post-war volunteers who rebelled against a state that they had helped stabilize at its inception.

Twelve years after March 1920, those events – a mutiny of military volunteers in the service of the Weimar state – came close to being repeated. In March 1932, during an extended raid of National Socialist establishments, the Prussian police uncovered extensive plans for a Stormtroopers' (SA) putsch against the Brüning government. The plans were based on the idea of using the arms from the border protection ("Grenzschutz") units – a paramilitary militia scattered around parts of eastern Germany as a key element of German rearmament. The plan to take the weapons stored in depots along the eastern borders was

obvious because this militia group was dominated by the SA, many of its leaders were also SA members and they had access to the arsenals. The Treaty of Versailles had banned any military formations apart from the *Reichswehr*, but the border protection units, although illegal in terms of international law, were led by the *Reichswehr* itself and funded by Germany's legitimate governments, so a putsch put into practice on the basis of those weapons could again be interpreted only as mutiny. The remarks made by Otto Braun, the Prussian Prime Minister, that the SA's plans could be viewed as nothing short of "military treason" indicate that Weimar political and military elites considered this a serious challenge to the state's existence.[2]

Historiography has interpreted the events of 1920 and 1932 as similar, yet unconnected, manifestations of right-wing radicalism, which is viewed as having been especially dangerous in the post-war period and in the early 1930s. However, this essay argues that these events were connected by those volunteer formations that had their roots in the free corps movement of 1918–19 and persisted in the frame of the "national protection organization" ("Landesschutzorganisation") – a parallel military organization for the purpose of national defence.[3] This chapter explores the reasons why these formations persisted even after the "small wars after the Great War", and will demonstrate how they built a bridge between post-war right-wing radicalism and the National Socialist radicalism of the early 1930s. It is therefore intended to contribute to the discussion about the specific belligerent character of Weimar Germany's political culture.

The first part of this chapter analyzes what motivated volunteers to serve in the paramilitary organizations of 1918–20, and explains why certain volunteers refused to lay down their arms and return home. Since this self-mobilization in the post-war years was due to the general fear of an external threat and internal turmoil, as external threats became less imminent after 1920, the political and military elites had to look for new ways to mobilize volunteers for the newly established national protection organization, which they saw as the solution to the problem of achieving a minimum of military security in a radically disarmed state. The second part of this contribution will examine the crucial factors for ordinary peasants, craftsmen or students spending their leisure time on military activities, and will look at the specific ways in which these war volunteers were mobilized[4] *after* the post-war period. It will analyse how and why the East Elbian border protection units, with several thousand members the most important formation of volunteers, developed into a refuge of the radical-nationalist SA, and

why in 1932 volunteer units once again attempted to raise arms against the Weimar state.

Self-mobilization

In a remarkable reaction to the self-dissolution of the Wilhelmian army, which has been characterized as a "concealed military strike",[5] after November 1918, the most extended military self-mobilization of more recent German history took place.[6] Up to May 1919, at least 400,000 men served with almost 150 different "Freikorps (Free Corps)," roughly 100,000 men served with self-protection formations in Prussia's East and, at the turn of the decade, from 1919 to 1920, about one million men took up arms with the militia-like "Home Guards" ("Einwohnerwehren").[7]

The effect of this self-mobilization is well known, if still debated in respect of its significance: on the one hand, the volunteer movement of the post-war period made the survival of the Weimar state possible during its critical founding period.[8] On the other hand, it was an additional cause of political polarization and blocked the further democratization of society.[9] However, what is interesting here is not so much the question of whether, and to what extent, the exploitation of this volunteer movement by the new political elites was a crucial mistake.[10] In this study, two aspects are of interest, which until now have been neglected by research, yet were essential preconditions for the mobilization of volunteers after the post-war period: *firstly*, the different motivations of the volunteers of the post-war period, which cannot all be subsumed under a reactionary "anti-chaos reflex";[11] *secondly*, the fact that this volunteer movement consisted of several groups, which had specific motivations and which, depending on these different motivations, stayed "mobilized", that is, under arms, for different periods of time. As an analysis of personal documents as well as of administrative and military reports about the post-war volunteer movement has shown,[12] three essential sets of motivations can be distinguished, which applied to three distinct groups of volunteers.

The *first* and largest group comprises a series of motivations consisting of feelings of being under threat, of both concrete and diffuse fears: fear of Bolshevism; of occupation by the enemy; of material need; and of political chaos. This set of motivations affected the most socially diverse group, and ultimately was the most important in the recruitment of the home guards.[13] It can be taken as a basic mobilizing force. The *second* group is defined by a set of motivations that can be described as a reflex of self-defence. It consisted of those people

who not only *felt* threatened, but whose possessions and lives *were* directly threatened by the troubles of revolution, the end of the war and the post-war period. Here, the political left must be given as an example. The trade unions and the council movement, under pressure from the "paramilitary counter-revolution",[14] particularly on the Ruhr and in the industrial areas of Central Germany, raised self-protection formations ("Sicherheitswehren", which, after a process of radicalization, were partly assimilated into the "Roter Frontkämpferbund"). Over-represented in these groups were the inhabitants of the eastern provinces of Prussia, such as, for example the agricultural worker Otto Wegener from the Stolp District in Farther Pomerania, who, like thousands of other agricultural workers and small farmers, joined the self-protection formations and guards that were founded everywhere in the East after November 1918 in order to fight against the Polish paramilitaries who were advancing to the West in the course of the war over the formation of the Polish state.[15]

The *third* and most important group for our topic, however, was motivated by more or less concrete expectations of being rewarded by the representatives of the new order, or, better still, of being able to influence the post-war order. Among this group were the East Elbian large estate owners known as the "Junkers", who, with the help of their self-protection units and guards, intended firstly to defend their possessions (and therefore also count among the second group), but also expected to preserve the territorial integrity and specific social order of Prussia's East in the post-war period.[16] However, expectations of this kind were also shared among the Free Corps, or rather – as, indeed, a considerable number of Free Corps soldiers were mercenaries, soldiers of fortune, and criminals[17] – the members of the activist core of the Free Corps.

Thus, both the self-protection formations in the East and the Free Corps were not initially rooted in hostility to the Republic and in radical nationalism. However, many of the young officers serving with the Free Corps understood the raising of volunteer formations to be a kind of promise by the republican state to react to the challenges of the post-war period according to their intentions – that is to say, by means of violence. Accordingly, the East Elbian estate owners must have understood the establishment of the East Border Guards to be at least a definite indication that the government would not voluntarily allow any square kilometre of "original German soil" to be taken by "the Pole".

Disillusionment had to come, since the republican government had no realistic alternative to the signing of the Versailles Treaty and the acceptance of territorial losses and radical disarmament. In the East,

in the early summer of 1919, this disillusionment became manifest in separatist movements, through plans to found an "Eastern State",[18] and, in the case of the Free Corps volunteers, through the "mutiny" of the Baltic Free Corps in October 1919[19] as well as by the previously mentioned march by the Ehrhardt Marine Brigade in Berlin in March 1920. As initially stated, therefore, the Kapp-Lüttwitz putsch may be termed a "mutiny" of war volunteers.[20]

Readiness for defence in the Prussian East

However, let us revisit the different sets of motivations for voluntary military service after the defeat of November 1918. As mentioned above, even when the experience of the Great War might have nurtured a general disposition to take up arms in order to create new structures of order and to perpetrate violence, more specific and imminent motivations were necessary to move men to volunteer for military service.[21] These different sets of motivations influenced distinct groups of volunteers who stayed mobilized for varying periods of time (in the following, I will distinguish among three main groups). In fact, with the exception of the Bavarian Escherich Organization,[22] there was no great difficulty in disbanding the home guard movement, which indicated that diffuse feelings of being under threat were losing their mobilizing effect due to a general sense that home policy was becoming stabilized. In contrast to this, the left wing and, most of all, the East Elbian self-defence formations remained active beyond the spring of 1920, until the Allies issued an ultimatum that all paramilitary formations must be disbanded. This was true everywhere apart from Upper Silesia, where the German-Polish border wars lasted into the summer of 1921;[23] given the great fear of the Poles in this region, as also in wide parts of the other eastern provinces, the disbandment of the regional "Schutzwehren" was completely out of the question. The retreat of regular troops from some border regions, which had become necessary as a result of the reduction of the *Reichswehr* to 100,000 men, was usually accompanied by massive public protest.[24] Accordingly, these voluntary self-defence formations simply stayed active, particularly in East Prussia and Silesia, in Pomerania and in the border district of Posen-West Prussia. Against this background, the decision by a group of government politicians centred around the Reich's Finance Minister, Joseph Wirth, and the Minister of the *Reichswehr*, Otto Geßler, to maintain this self-defence as a permanent border protection ("Grenzschutz") beyond 1920[25] was – as Wirth, the Reich's Finance Minister, expressed it in retrospect – not so

much the "foundation" of border protection[26] as the acceptance of the status quo.

Nevertheless, the self-protection units that remained in place after 1920 were still an expression of the shock waves following the defeat in 1918. After the stabilization of the Republic, in 1923/1924 at the latest, even fear of the Poles would probably not have been enough to motivate thousands of young men to do paramilitary exercises on their weekends had it not been for the third group of post-war volunteers. The deep disappointment felt by estate owners, such as Freiherr von Zitzewitz from the Stolp District or Count Dohna from the Meseritz District, about the loss of wide areas of Prussia's East contributed considerably to some of the East Elbian Junkers becoming aggressive anti-Republicans. Long after 1923, they remained of the opinion that they could guarantee their safety only by being armed themselves. For these estate owners to give up on the arsenals that had been on their property since the first months after the war, as the governments of the "Länder" had been demanding since 1920, was out of the question. Since the early 1920s, they had been among the protagonists of the flourishing scene of the "Wehrverbände" (Paramilitary Associations) – Count Dohna, for example, as the leader of the "Stahlhelm" (Steel helmet) Regional Association of the Ostmark – and they were the *Reichswehr's* natural allies when it came to building up volunteer formations in the context of the organization of border and national protection.

Possibly even more important for the mobilization of volunteers after the post-war period were the former activist officers of the Free Corps movement. By the end of the 1920s they would play a key role in the *Reichswehr*-led national protection organization, yet their inclusion in national defence had already begun at a time when, due to disappointment, political radicalization and the fact of having been accustomed to extreme violence during the post-war period, they had become fundamental opponents of the republican state. The retired Navy Lieutenant Karl Siebel, for example, was declared a "District Officer" ("Kreisoffizier") of the national protection organization in July 1923, even while he was still on trial for having been involved in Rathenau's assassination as a member of the radical nationalist "Organization Consul".[27] However, in the years of political terrorism from 1920 to 1923, *Reichswehr* officers and politicians were already able to direct the paramilitary activism of this group outwards, for example during the "Third Polish Rising" in Upper Silesia in May 1921, when the still existing Oberland Free Corps was transported from Bavaria to Upper Silesia, financed by the Reich funds, to become active against Polish

insurgents.[28] This was most true, however, at the time of the occupation of the Ruhr, when anti-French sabotage was not only independently led by right-wing extremist activists such as Albert Leo Schlageter, but was financed and coordinated by the Reich's government.[29] Thus, it was definitely logical after 1923 to include an even larger number of these activists in national defence and to employ them as "national protection employees" (*Landesschutzangestellte*) contracted for private service, who were supposed to be in charge of building up and organizing a military organization in parallel with the border and national protection, which, due to the Allied Military Control, had to be kept strictly secret. Thus, after 1923 the retired Lieutenants Karl Siebel, Gustav Richter, Kurt Treuhaupt, and dozens of their former Free Corps comrades found themselves becoming national protection employees who were given the task of acting as "movers," mobilizing volunteers for formations that the Reich's government had decided to raise.[30]

The mobilization of volunteers after the post-war period

The problem with mobilizing volunteers after the post-war period was that the previously most important motivating factors – fear of the Poles and revisionism – had to be replaced by other incentives, which would also be effective in times of peace. Starting out from the social practice of "Wehrhaftmachung", in the years after 1923 we can identify three primary methods of mobilization practised by active and retired officers as well as by the eastern landowners: *firstly*, mobilization by way of developing an elite consciousness; *secondly*, mobilization using the binding power of existing social entities (the East Elbian estates); and *thirdly*, mobilization by way of militarist ideologies. While this last method of mobilization includes the Border Protection Stormtroopers ("Grenzschutz"-SA) already mentioned in the introduction, the two former methods belong instead in the tradition of the action patterns of the post-war period. We will, therefore, talk about these first.

Formations such as the "Feldjägerdienst" – an organization established as early as 1922, which was intended to unleash a war of terror behind the enemy's lines in the case of enemy occupation – or the "Pommerntreue" ("Faithful to Pomerania") and the "Oberschlesischer Landesschützenbund" (Upper Silesian Association of Riflemen),[31] regional militia formations which kept a certain degree of independence into the early 1930s within the state's border protection, were founded on communicating an elite consciousness. This was based on the conviction of belonging to a small group of men who were "ready to defend"

and who would be of vital importance in case of war. Communicating such an elite consciousness was one of the essential tasks of the national defence employees who were in charge of organizing these units.

How did they fulfil this task? Firstly, they emphasized that the respective formation was following in the tradition of the soon mythically inflated struggles of the post-war period.[32] For example, the organizer of the "Feldjägers", retired Lieutenant Richard Koch, used every opportunity to explain to potential "Feldjägers" that the "Feldjägerdienst" had already had its baptism of fire during the "Ruhrkampf", the resistance against the French occupation of the Ruhr region in 1923.[33] Similarly, the "Landesschützenbund" found its legitimation in claiming to have saved Upper Silesia for Germany in the time of the "Polish risings". They also communicated elite consciousness by using certain forms and rituals. Thus the inaugural meeting of the "Feldjägerdienst"'s Hessian branch, taking place in an officers' mess in Kassel in 1924, was concluded by all participants taking an oath to be ready to contribute to building up the organization.[34] New members of "Pommerntreue" had to take a "holy oath" "to be available for the protection of the eastern border",[35] and platoons of the "Landesschützenbund" marched annually on the Annaberg, the central *lieu de mémoire* of Upper Silesian paramilitarism.[36] Finally, and this cannot be considered unimportant, national defence employees created an atmosphere of conspiracy and secret societies which seemed to be most attractive to potential volunteers. The "Feldjäger", for example, met at remote places such as lonely foresters' houses, developed a system for communicating secret messages, and sometimes threatened "traitors" from their own ranks with "vehme" ("Fehme")[37]. Here the continuities from the post-war mobilization are particularly obvious.[38]

This symbolic loading of the paramilitary activities was probably necessary, for a "Feldjäger"'s daily life was unspectacular. "Feldjäger" units met about once or twice a month, usually in the backrooms of pubs, where they brooded over tasks given to them by their "instructors" – for example, how much explosive would be needed to blow up a specific bridge.[39] In the long run, this was not very exciting, and highlights of a "Feldjäger"'s life, such as a trip taken by retired Lieutenant Richard Koch with his group from Speckswinkel to the *Reichswehr's* drill ground at Ohrdruf in Thuringia in mid-1927[40] – where the miller Heinrich Bosenberger, the master rope-maker Heinrich Niepoth, and others were instructed by Reichswehr soldiers on how to shoot with a machine gun or throw hand grenades – were rare occasions. Thus, there was considerable fluctuation in membership figures among "Feldjäger"

units, secrecy was permanently threatened, and in 1927/1928 it became obvious that the group identity of the "Feldjäger" had been based too much on the experiences of the occupation of the Ruhr, and that it was in fact a relic of the post-war period. The formations were already disbanding when the Prussian Prime Minister Otto Braun enforced their abolishment in 1928.[41]

In contrast, "Pommerntreue" and the Upper Silesian "Landesschützenbund" proved to be more attractive and were able to mobilize 5,000–6,000 men into the early 1930s. In contrast to the "Feldjägers", their *esprit de corps* was mainly based on their regional identity. Their ability to further their members' social standing in the local community may be considered one of the essential motivating factors for enlistment. In the cases of both the "Landesschützenbund" and "Pommerntreue", this "social capital" found its expression in the right to wear the respective formation's uniform, which in the case of "Pommerntreue" consisted of field cap and field jacket. On the field cap, there was "the Siegrune [the SS-shaped S] and the Pomeranian griffin [was] worn on the upper arm".[42] How essential this privilege was for the cohesion of the units becomes obvious with the vehement resistance to the ban on uniforms decreed by the Reich government at the end of 1931. In a letter to the president of the province of Upper Silesia, the First Chairman of the "Landesschützenbund", von Dunant, called this ban on uniforms a "breach of faith" which might result in the "Landesschützen" "turning towards most radical tendencies due to their bitterness"[43] – an open threat to join the SA.

No matter how effective "Pommerntreue", "Landesschützenbund" and similar organizations may have been at a regional level, because they were restricted to the regions they were unsuitable *per se* to mobilize broad swathes of the population, not to mention the 450,000 men whom the *Reichswehr* planners in the second half of the 1920s intended to raise with the help of the border protection units in case of war.[44] However, if not exactly 450,000, then at least some tens of thousands of volunteers could be recruited through the second of the three mentioned mobilization strategies, using the social binding power of social entities, in this case the East Elbian estates.

The attraction of border protection service

The East Elbian border protection belonged to the tradition of those self-defence units and rural home guards who were led by estate owners during the post-war period. Between 1920 and 1923/1924,

self-defence, which had so far been privately organized, developed into quasi-state-organized border protection. At a local level – at Zipkow Estate in the Stolp District, for example, or at Hiller-Gaertringen Estate in the Meseritz District in the border district of Posen-West Prussia – the initial changes resulting from the transformation of self-defence into border protection units were hardly noticed. The arsenals that had been at the distillery of Zipkow Estate since the end of the war,[45] and in a barn at Hiller-Gaertringen Estate, stayed where they were. The self-defence leaders Count Dohna and Freiherr von Zitzewitz had now become border protection leaders – this meant that the *Reichswehr* intended to let each of these "Junkers" lead a border protection company in case of war.

Nevertheless, other things did change, and the bearers of this change were once again the former Free Corps officers who, as national protection employees and thus organizers of "Wehrhaftmachung", now developed their specific activism also into the field of border protection. It was primarily under their influence that the intensity of making border protection "ready to fight" was increased in the late 1920s. Organized by retired First Lieutenant von Blankensee and retired Lieutenant Wedde – both of them veterans of the post-war period and both national protection employees[46] – at Zipkow as well as at dozens of other estates in Pomerania, in the Border Province of Posen-West Prussia, in East Prussia and Silesia, military drills had taken place not only sporadically but at regular intervals since the mid-1920s, and were said to be frequently well attended.[47] As to why these drills were attractive, it is notable that, at the estate level, the drills were organized in an "event-oriented" way; for example, on Zipkow Estate in June 1928 a night drill took place with "98 rifles[48] as well as blanks and dummy machine guns".[49] The several-week-long courses on border protection, which took place every year after the end of the harvest period, may be supposed to have been even more event-oriented.[50] Sometimes several hundred men took part, and in this case it is the frequency of these drills that is most remarkable: in one single district, Schlochau in Farther Pomerania, between 1926 and 1931, a total of 39 courses on border protection were held, each of them lasting three weeks, with a total of 1,153 men attending.[51] These figures show that, in Prussia's East, border protection was not just a matter for a few fanatic militarists, as might be argued in the case of the "Feldjägers", but for the population as a whole.

Another difference between post-1923 border protection and self-defence units in the post-war period was the respective recruitment mechanisms. As already mentioned, fear of the Poles, which had

concerned all inhabitants (of German origin) of the eastern provinces in the post-war period, had had an integrating effect. For example, in the Meseritz District under Count Dohna, who showed strong support towards the monarchy, a Social Democrat craftsman could also serve with a self-defence unit. After fear of the Poles subsided, the structure of the border protection units became more homogeneous, and in many places units were completely restricted to those agricultural workers who were employed at the estate of the respective border protection leader in the eastern borderlands. Estate and border protection militia became identical. Thus the outward appearance, at least, of this militia in the period between the 20th-century wars was astonishingly similar to the system of the so called "company organization" of the 18th century.[52]

However, it would be wrong to conclude that the agricultural workers of the border protection units were recruited by force, as had been the case with the members of the regiments in the period of Frederick the Great.[53] For example, from the point of view of the above-mentioned agricultural worker, Otto Wegener from Muttrin in the Stolp District – a "politically uneducated community being who was deeply rooted in his work and 'Lebenswelt' "[54] – border protection was on the onehand part of his rural social system. He questioned neither collective anti-Slavism nor the obligation of national defence as postulated by interpreting elites, estate owners, and administration.

On the other hand, service was an attractive change from normal daily work; like most agricultural workers in Prussia's East, Wegener enjoyed paid leave, at least for longer border protection drills.[55] Then, as already stated, drills themselves, with shooting blanks, huge firecrackers (to imitate artillery shelling), signal flares and shooting exercises, were definitely entertaining. Last but not least, the social elements of the event were not without their significance: for example, a border protection drill at Zipkow on 23 June 1929 was followed by "a banquet with Mrs von Blankensee at Zipkow for every participant".[56] Events like this seem to have been common, as the national protection employee in Lauenburg, retired Lieutenant Kurt Treuhaupt, also said that a border protection drill was "always" rounded off with "a gigantic concluding party, for which one of the [local] breweries donated the beer".[57] This particular aspect was undeniably an important source of motivation: participating in border protection made it possible for the volunteers to take part in a kind of "militant sociability",[58] as, particularly in rural East Elbian regions, border protection dominated the social daily life of village communities. It was without doubt more attractive to join it than to stay away.

Until the end of the 1920s, this voluntary border protection based on the system of the estates was the essential pillar of German national defence in Prussia's East, apart from the Reich's army itself. Thus, the social binding power of the estates proved to be a reliable mobilization factor, which additionally had the considerable advantage of implying no direct threat to the republican order. The estate/border protection militias may have been politically right-wing and may have excluded republicans; however, insofar as the cohesion of border protection was primarily based on the East Elbian "Lebenswelt" and not on an anti-republican ideology, it was definitely compatible with the existing form of government.

Against this background, the world economic crisis brought the collapse of the East Elbian estate system, for the owners of large estates were "no longer able to grant their people paid leave" for border protection,[59] and the workers at those estates went under forced administration by state and "were not at all available for our service", as an officer of Military District No. 2 (*Wehrkreis II*) in Stettin lamented. The world economic crisis thus put an end to the, at least halfway loyal, volunteer formations. Now, from the early 1930s onwards, there remained only one effective mobilizing agent of volunteers for national defence: the radical-nationalistic paramilitary associations.

Defence associations and party armies

Since the early 1920s, paramilitary associations such as "Steel Helmet", "Wehrwolf" or "Young Teutonic Knights" ("Jungdeutscher Orden") had been the most important agents of "Wehrhaftmachung" apart from the East Elbian estate owners. Inner-association hierarchy, collective interpretations of reality and shared ideologies were able to offer what in the eastern provinces was constituted by the social system of the estates and in the case of the "Feldjägers" by an elite corps identity: a social cohesion that kept the individual volunteer with the respective organization even if revisionism, affinity towards the armed forces, and thirst for adventure had been exhausted as motivating factors.

If the various paramilitary organizations in the Weimar Republic[60] had one thing in common, it was the "Wehrgedanke", the idea that only readiness for war ("Wehrhaftigkeit") constituted a "real man" and a sovereign country. In practice, this idea implied most of all military exercises ("Wehrsport"), shooting with small-bore weapons, and field practice.[61] Unsurprisingly, these exercises were often dominated by volunteers of the post-war period looking back on a Free Corps past.

Only a small number of "lucky" activist Free Corps fighters were able to join the national protection organization built by the army from the core formations of the post-war self-mobilization after 1920. The larger part had been forced to return to civilian life and had become involved in paramilitary associations, as for example retired Lieutenant Otto from Perleberg on the Prignitz (in Western Brandenburg), who in the small town of Perleberg led the Steel Helmet's youth organization ("Jungstahlhelm"). Citizens of Perleberg proudly spoke of this "Jungstahlhelm", stressing that Otto was "drilling them hard" and that they were "tougher than the soldiers".[62]

Relationships between the *Reichswehr* or the border and national protection units on the one hand and the paramilitary associations on the other developed at both regional and local levels, primarily because of personal relations reaching back to the post-war period – as, for example, the friendship between Navy Lieutenant Siebel and Lieutenant Otto.[63] These relationships, therefore, cannot be interpreted as a medium-term strategy for rearming the "*Reichswehr*". Typical results of this network were the use of Reichswehr shooting ranges by members of "Stahlhelm" and "Jungdeutsche". Often the Reichswehr invited members of these associations to "sports courses". Equally typical were close personal ties between national protection employees and defence associations, as exemplified by retired Navy Lieutenant Karl Siebel – a veteran of both the Ehrhardt Brigade and the "Organization Consul" – who in Perleberg served simultaneously as a national protection employee and as the "Stahlhelm" 's "Gau (District)" manager.[64]

From the point of view of the paramilitaries, the close connection with the national protection organization was highly attractive, as it was a *carte blanche* for paramilitary activities,[65] which could be disguised to the authorities as "exercises in the context of national defence" if necessary. The latter was generally supported by national protection employees such as Siebel, who would persuade the responsible district administrator of the "national necessity" of the particular exercises. Thus, the decision by the Reich government and the leadership of the *Reichswehr* at the beginning of the 1920s to base the secret mobilization preparations on volunteers created spaces for paramilitary activism. The decision became a starting point for the amalgamation of volunteer formations into the national protection organization and for right-wing extremist paramilitarism, which gathered momentum to the same degree as the previously central mobilizing factors were losing effect, as the shockwaves of the post-war period were subsiding and the system of estates in the East was no longer able to support border

protection companies. Gradually, from 1929/1930, the function of the paramilitary associations changed from being reservoirs of volunteers to providing the organizational basis of national defence. In the early 1930s these associations became the fighting arms of "national opposition", which was a radical change in character since the mid-1920s.

To safeguard the republic, the *Reichswehr* at this point would have had to abandon the system of volunteer recruitment for national defence. However, neither the *Reichswehr* leadership nor the presidential government of Chancellor Heinrich Brüning put a stop to a development that became apparent at both local and regional levels at this time, and in December 1930 was even legitimated by an explicit Cabinet decision:[66] the infiltration of border protection by the SA.

National Socialist border protection

This infiltration must be imagined less as a purposeful intrusion by the SA into border protection than as a gradual transformation.[67] Most border protection militias may be supposed to have become dominated by the SA simply by their members leaving the "Stahlhelm" and joining the SA. Yet, in those regions where the border protection units were threatened with dissolution due to a lack of volunteers – as was the case in the district of Posen-West Prussia – the border militia was quickly taken over by the SA when whole SA *Stürme* became involved in border protection. The result of this transformation process was clear: at the beginning of 1932, the majority of border protection units in most East Prussian provinces consisted primarily of SA and NSDAP members.

Usually, the men who joined border protection were not motivated by intentions of preparing a putsch – at first their motivations may be supposed to have been similar to those of "Stahlhelm" members: the hope of improving their social standing and an affinity with paramilitary practices. Nevertheless, with the integration of members of the National Socialist organizations a new factor appeared: an ideology that openly and radically rejected the existing order. Despite its tough right-wing orientation, the "Stahlhelm" had been too much part of rural life to be an actual threat to the Republic. Also, the medium-ranking SA leaders may have considered participation in national defence as a privilege and – like the members of the Free Corps 12 years before – interpreted it as an indication of an incipient transformation of the existing order. However, when this transformation had not come by early 1932 – the "system" seemed, if anything, to have stabilized – the leaders of SA border protection in the East were not ready to wait any longer for an order

that seemed worthy of their service. In early 1932 they began to prepare their coup, which, as mentioned above, was then thwarted by the Prussian Police.

What is remarkable here is the reaction of the state, and, since this is true for the "mutinies" of both 1932 and 1920, we have come full circle. After the Kapp-Lüttwitz putsch, the members of the Ehrhardt Brigade, who had been transported to the military training area at Döberitz, were even paid their "Kapp bonus" of 7.50 Reichsmarks for each day of the putsch,[68] and, with the exception of their leader, Ehrhard, were unpunished. Similarly, the ban on the SA that was passed by the Brüning/Groener government as a reaction to the 1932 putsch plans lasted for just six weeks before it was lifted again by the von Papen/Schleicher government. At no point was there any consideration of excluding the SA from border protection. Thus the Müller government of 1920 and the von Papen government of 1932 both appeared unable to deny the ambitions of the Ehrhardt Brigade and the SA respectively, and gave them a certain degree of legitimacy. In particular, the lack of persecution might suggest that they considered themselves to be in a relationship of mutual loyalty, which could not easily be terminated, even through rebellion. Thus the political elites to some extent accommodated the political forces behind the revolt. This accommodation became manifest in the gradual transition from the "Socialist" to the "conservative Republic" in 1920, as well as through the transition from presidential rule to presidential dictatorship in 1932. It must be stated that the volunteer formations in the Weimar Republic contributed to these transitions to a certain degree, but more important was the decision by the political and military elites to try to increase security by using volunteers whose motivations came from ideas of order and society, the references of which were located beyond a parliamentarian democracy.

At no time could the motivations of Weimar Germany's military volunteers be thought of as the protection of the current order, nor did they merge into the preservation of the peace. Instead, experiences, expectations and social environment pushed young men into volunteer formations after the immediate threats had declined. The experiences of the Great War and the following small wars motivated the East Elbian border protection units as well as relics of the Free Corps movement such as the "Feldjägerdienst". Yet, during the 1920s, mutual consent to creating a militarily prepared people's community – the expectation of becoming a "Wehrgemeinschaft"[69] – outstripped war experiences as the primary mobilization factor. Weimar Germany's paramilitary volunteer units can be considered an institutional "link" between the

self-mobilization of the post-war period and the radical nationalist paramilitarism of the early 1930s.

Notes

1. On the background and course of the Kapp-Lüttwitz putsch, see J. Erger (1967) *Der Kapp-Lüttwitz-Putsch* (Düsseldorf). On the role of the Marine Brigade II during the Kapp-Lüttwitz putsch, see G. Krüger (1971) *Die Brigade Ehrhardt* (Hamburg). This chapter presents some insights and results from my PhD thesis submitted to the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Potsdam, which will be published under the title *Die bellizistische Republik, Wehrkonsens' und Wehrhaftmachung' in Deutschland 1918–1933* (*The Belligerent Republic, Consensus on Defense and Rearmament in Weimar Germany*).
2. Braun made this remark at a huge demonstration of the republican "Eiserne Front" on 11 April 1932 at the Berlin Sportpalast. H. Schulze (1977) *Otto Braun oder Preußens demokratische Sendung* (Frankfurt a.M., Berlin and Wien), pp. 722f.
3. This "frame" was opened by a broad consensus on defence of the political, military and administrative elites. On the the national protection organization and the whole complex of mobilizing people for Weimar Germany's national defence, see especially M. Geyer (1978), "Der zur Organisation erhobene Burgfrieden" in K. J. Müller and E. Opitz (eds.) *Militär und Militarismus in der Weimarer Republik* (Düsseldorf). See furthermore M. Geyer (1980), *Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit. Die Reichswehr in der Krise der Machtpolitik 1924–1936* (Wiesbaden). On the consensus on defence, see R. Bergien (2008) "The Consensus on Defense and Weimar Prussia's Civil Service", *Central European History*, 41, 179–203.
4. The interpretation of the paramilitary volunteers of the 1920s and the early 1930s as "war volunteers" is based on an analysis of volunteers' personal documents, such as letters, testimonies and memoirs made in the course of my PhD research. See also R. Bessel (1978) "Militarismus im innenpolitischen Leben der Weimarer Republik: Von den Freikorps zur SA" in K. J. Müller and E. Opitz (eds.) *Militär und Militarismus in der Weimarer Republik* (Düsseldorf).
5. W. Deist (1992) "Verdeckter Militärstreik im Kriegsjahr 1918?" in W. Wette (ed.) *Der Krieg des kleinen Mannes. Eine Militärgeschichte von unten* (München).
6. The self-mobilization of 1918/1919 is comparable in its extent and dynamic character to the Peasants' War in the Holy Roman Empire in the years 1524/1525, which involved at its height in the spring and summer of 1525 an estimated 300,000 peasant insurgents; see P. Blickle (1998) *Der Bauernkrieg. Die Revolution des Gemeinen Mannes* (Berlin). On the other hand, the mobilization of volunteers in the course of the Napoleonic Wars between 1813 and 1815, which was so important for the collective interpretation of the 1918/1919 situation in Germany, was much more state-led than the mobilizations of 1524/1525 and 1918/1919.
7. Figures according to W. Wette (1987) *Gustav Noske: eine politische Biographie* (Düsseldorf), pp. 551–54.

8. Argued in H. Schulze (1966) *Freikorps und Republik 1918–1920* (Boppard a.Rh.).
9. On this, see especially Wette (1987); for the effects of political violence on the further development of Weimar Germany, see B. Weisbrod (1992) "Gewalt in der Politik. Zur politischen Kultur in Deutschland zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen", *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, 43, 391–404, and D. Schumann (2001) *Politische Gewalt in der Weimarer Republik. Kampf um die Straße und Furcht vor dem Bürgerkrieg* (Essen).
10. As pointedly argued by S. Haffner (1969) *Die verratene Revolution; Deutschland 1918/19* (Bern and München).
11. While focusing on the German Revolution of 1918/1919, it is R. Löwenthal (1979) "Bonn und Weimar. Zwei deutsche Demokratien" in H. A. Winkler (ed.) *Politische Weichenstellungen im Nachkriegsdeutschland: 1945–1953* (Göttingen), p. 11, who speaks of an "anti-chaos reflex" of "industrial populations in times of crisis".
12. This analysis is documented in my forthcoming PhD thesis *Die Bellizistische Republik* (see above, fn. 1). It has been based on the assumption that the different ways in which the German participants of the Great War behaved in the post-war period – ranging from radical pacifism to the perpetration of extreme violence in one of the Free Corps units – cannot be adequately deduced from specific forms of war experiences (in a comparative perspective, this argument is also used by D. Schumann (2003) "Europa, der Erste Weltkrieg und die Nachkriegszeit: eine Kontinuität der Gewalt?", *Journal of Modern European History*, 1, 24–43). Speaking literally, the experiences of war constituted a space enabling a paramilitary self-mobilization as well as the perpetration of violence. To explain the specific ways in which men mobilized and became perpetrators (or victims) of violence, additional factors have to be identified and analysis made of the identification of such factors.
13. On the home guards, see the still relevant publication by P. Bucher (1971) "Zur Geschichte der Einwohnerwehren in Preußen, 1918–1921", *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen*, 9, 15–59.
14. For this interpretation of post-war mobilization, see R. Gerwarth (2008) "The Central European Counter-revolution: Paramilitary Violence in Germany, Austria and Hungary after the Great War", *Past and Present*, 200, 176–209.
15. Information on Otto Wegener from: Report by the Teacher Hermann Becker on the Activities of the "Steel Helmet" in the Stolp District, 5 December 1929. Secret, Copy. Central Archive of the Former Prussian State ("Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz", hereafter GStA PK), Rep. 77 Tit. 4043, vol. 331, 337–46. On the "Greater Polish Uprising" of 1918–1919, see A. Czubiński (1978) *Powstanie wielkopolskie. Geneza – character – znaczenie* (Poznań); D. Vogt (1980), *Der großpolnische Aufstand 1918/19* (Marburg).
16. On the Prussian nobility's perception of the socio-political changes of 1918–1920, see S. Malinowski (2003) *Vom König zum Führer: sozialer Niedergang und politische Radikalisierung im deutschen Adel zwischen Kaiserreich und NS-Staat* (Berlin), pp. 198–282.
17. B. Barth (2006) "Die Freikorpskämpfe in Posen und Oberschlesien 1919–1921. Ein Beitrag zum deutsch-polnischen Konflikt nach dem Ersten

Weltkrieg", in D. Neutatz (ed.) *Die Deutschen und das östliche Europa: Aspekte einer vielfältigen Beziehungsgeschichte* (Essen).

18. H. Schulze (1970) "Der Oststaat-Plan", *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 18, 123–63.
19. B. Sauer (1995) "'Vom Mythos eines ewigen Soldatentums'. Der Feldzug deutscher Freikorps im Baltikum im Jahre 1919", *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 43, 869–902.
20. This is not meant to relativize or downplay either the political motivations for the attempted coup or the political radicalization of members of the Ehrhardt Marine Brigade. It is, however, worth pointing out that research so far has hardly taken this dimension of the Kapp-Lüttwitz putsch into consideration, as it did not fit into interpretation patterns – based on the guiding image of the German "special path" – of a republic that innocently fell victim to the superior strength of its enemies. The interpretation of the "Kapp-Lüttwitz putsch" as a mutiny calls attention to the connections between the republican elites and the republic's enemies, and thus contradicts the basic binary understanding of Weimar Germany, which is based on the assumption of several dichotomies, for example between democrats and anti-democrats, between progressive and reactionary movements, between civilians and the military, and so on. For the place of Weimar Germany in the thesis of the "special path", see H. Grebing (1986) *Der "deutsche Sonderweg" in Europa 1806–1945: eine Kritik*, (Stuttgart and Berlin).
21. The idea that certain forms of war experience might have "brutalized" the participants of the Great War, and that the "small wars after the Great War", with their remarkable levels of violence, can therefore be seen as a direct continuation of the First World War, is unsustainable when Germany's post-war volunteers are analysed. Often the most ferocious free corps members had spent their wartime at home, at school or, as was the case of the retired Lieutenant Karl Siebel, whom we will encounter below, on board a warship in the port of Wilhelmshaven. For the thesis of a "brutalization" of the European societies by the Great War, see: G. L. Mosse (1990) *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars*, (New York); for a critical discussion of the "brutalization thesis", see G. Krumeich (2002) "Einleitung: Die Präsenz des Krieges im Frieden" in ibid. and Jost Dülffer (eds.) *Der verlorene Frieden. Politik und Kriegskultur nach 1918* (Essen); see also D. Schumann (2004) "Gewalterfahrungen und ihre nicht zwangsläufigen Folgen. Der Erste Weltkrieg in der Gewaltgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts", *Zeitgeschichte Online*, 3, http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/histfor/3_MetaDB/HTML/Schumann_523.html, 15 October 2008.
22. On the "Organisation Escherich", see particularly H. G. W. Nusser (1973) *Konservative Wehrverbände in Bayern, Preußen und Österreich, 1918–1933; Mit einer Biographie von Forstrat Georg Escherich, 1870–1941*, (München).
23. Barth (2006); on the violent conflicts between nationalities in Upper Silesia after the First World War, see P. Leśniewski (1998) "Three Insurrections: Upper Silesia 1919–21" in P. D. Stachura (ed.) *Poland between the wars, 1918–1939* (Basingstoke).
24. For example, for the border district of Posen-West Prussia, see: The District President in Schneidemühl to the Prussian Minister of the Interior,

ref: Protection of the Border Province against internal and external enemies, 16 February 1920. Draft. Voivodeship Archive (hereafter WAP) Poznan, Oberpräsidium Schneidemühl, vol. 90, pp. 30–8.

25. As a matter of fact, these decisions were made by civilian politicians and not independently by the Reichswehr as stated in Carsten (1964), T. Vogelsang (1962) *Reichswehr, Staat und NSDAP. Beiträge zur deutschen Geschichte 1930–1932* (Stuttgart), but also still in Nakata (2002). From the point of view of then Minister of Finance, Joseph Wirth, one of the civilian protagonists of the "Wehrhaftmachung", this decision is described by U. Hörster-Philipps (1998) *Joseph Wirth: 1879–1956. Eine politische Biographie* (Paderborn), pp. 90–2.
26. Parliamentary Debate, 16 December 1926, on the Clandestine Financial Transactions and Arrangements of the *Reichswehr.* d) From the Speech by *Reichstag* Member Dr. Wirth (Centre Party), *Ursachen und Folgen*, 7:1611, p. 499.
27. B. R. Kroener (2005) *"Der starke Mann im Heimatkriegsgebiet". Generaloberst Friedrich Fromm. Eine Biographie*, (Paderborn), p. 140, fn. 188.
28. P. C. Witt (1973) "Zur Finanzierung des Abstimmungskampfes und der Selbstschutzorganisationen in Oberschlesien 1920–1922", *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen*, 13, 59–71.
29. On the state's influence on sabotage fighting, see G. Krüger (2000) "Ein Fanal des Widerstandes im Ruhrgebiet": Das "Unternehmen Wesel" in der Osternacht des Jahres 1923; Hintergründe eines angeblichen "Husarenstreichs", *Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für Soziale Bewegungen*, 24, 95–140, here pp. 102f.
30. The *Reichswehr*'s so-called "Landesschutzoffizierkorps" (National Protection Officers Corps) – that is, the entirety of former officers dismissed in the course of German Army reduction in 1918–1920, employed with the aid of private service contracts and in charge of "Wehrhaftmachung" outside the *Reichswehr* – consisted only partly of young officers. The leadership of the *Reichswehr* preferred "experienced" officers, those who had been professional officers before 1914 and who were considered easier to control and had higher qualifications. (T 2 [Weser], betr. Offizier-Ersatz für die Landesschutz-Organisation (ref. Replacements for Officers of the National Protection Organization), 4 November 1925. Central Military Archive ("Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv", hereafter BA-MA), RH 12–1/3, 38–45). However, it is clear that motivation among these young "activists" was particularly high, that they were ready in larger numbers, and that they found it easier to approach young men who were to be recruited for border and national protection. At least during the period of building up border and national protection, they were indispensable to the *Reichswehr.*
31. For the "Feldjägerdienst" and the "Oberschlesischer Landesschützenbund" see Nakata (2002), pp. 276–81, and 366–74. For the "Pommerntreue" see the Report by Kurt Treuhaupt on "Grenzschutz Ost", including accompanying letter to Ewald von Kleist. 20 February 1955, BA-MA, N 70/1, 52–8.
32. Focusing on the Free Corps, see the recent publication, M. Sprenger (2008) *Landsknechte auf dem Weg ins Dritte Reich? Zu Genese und Wandel des Freikorps-Mythos* (Paderborn).

33. For Koch's argument, see Protokoll der Vernehmung des Mühlenbesitzers Heinrich Bossenberger, 15.11.1928, Abschrift. GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77, Tit. 4043, vol. 112, 119–20, here 120.
34. The following statements on service with the "Feldjägers" come primarily from police records in the context of investigations on the "Kirchheimer Affäre". On the "Kirchheimer Affäre" see R. Bergien (2008) " 'Bürokratischer Militarismus' in der preußischen Provinz. Die Kirchhainer Affäre von 1928 und die Zivilbehörden", *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, 59, 476–491. The description of the founding meeting of the "Feldjägerdienst" in: Records of the Interrogation of the Police Officer ("Landjägermeister") Friedrich Wagler, Copy, 2 December 1928. GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77, Tit. 4043, vol. 112, 157f.
35. Report by Kurt Treuhaupt on "Grenzschutz Ost" (see above, fn. 32), p. 53 (reverse side).
36. On this, see J. Bjork and R. Gerwarth (2007) "The Annaberg as a German-Polish Lieu de Mémoire", *German History*, 25, 372–400.
37. "Fehme" means murder for reasons of honour.
38. On the practice of "vehme" in the irregular military units, especially between 1920 and 1923, see I. Nagel (1991) *Fememorde und Fememordprozesse in der Weimarer Republik* (Cologne and Vienna).
39. For plans, see: Interrogation of the Blacksmith Georg Jäger from Haina-Kloster, 1 December 1928. GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77, Tit. 4043, vol. 112, 162–63., here 162 (reverse side).
40. On this trip see: The District President in Kassel to the Prussian Minister for the Interior, ref.: National Socialist German Workers' Party in the Kirchhain District, 17 November 1928. Top Secret, Draft. GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77, Tit. 4043, vol. 112, 111f., here 111.
41. Bergien (2008), p. 490.
42. Report by Kurt Treuhaupt on "Grenzschutz Ost" (see above, fn. 32), p. 55.
43. The First Deputy Chairman of the Upper Silesian Riflemen's Association to the President of the Province of Upper Silesia, Lukaschek, 20 December 1931. WAP Opole, Oberpräsidium zu Oppeln, vol. 1006, Bl. 81–83, here Bl. 83.
44. J. Hürter (1993) *Wilhelm Groener. Reichswehrminister am Ende der Weimarer Republik (1928–1932)* (Munich), p. 129, fn. 231.
45. This statement in: The District President in Köslin, Curt Cronau, to the Prussian Minister of the Interior, ref.. Behaviour of the Steel Helmet-Association. Secret. 28 January 1930, GStA PK, Rep. 77 Tit. 4043, vol. 331, 333–36, here 334.
46. On von Blankensee and Wedde see the Report by the Teacher Hermann Becker (see above, fn. 15).
47. Impacts of the Economic Development in the Borderland on Readiness for Defence, Report by the Second Cavalry Division with an accompanying letter by the Minister of the *Reichswehr*, Wilhelm Groener, to the Chancellor of the *Reich*, Heinrich Brüning, 8 May 1931. BA Berlin, R 43 I, vol. 725, 191–200, here 192.
48. Here: Carbine Type 98.
49. Report by the Teacher Hermann Becker (see above, fn. 15), p. 338.
50. Impacts of Economic Development (see above, fn. 48).

51. Ibid., p. 193. This frequency of border protection drills and courses is representative at least of the immediate border regions of Prussia's East.
52. The concept of the "*Kompaniewirtschaft*" was developed by Otto Büsch and interpreted as the start of the "social militarization" of Prussia-Germany. See O. Büsch (1962) *Militärsystem und Sozialleben im alten Preußen 1713–1807. Die Anfänge der sozialen Militarisierung der preußisch-deutschen Gesellschaft* (Berlin).
53. As Geyer (1978), pp. 78f, assumes.
54. This characterization of East Elbian agricultural workers in W. Pyta (1996), *Dorfgemeinschaft und Parteipolitik 1918–1933: die Verschränkung von Milieu und Parteien in den protestantischen Landgebieten Deutschlands in der Weimarer Republik,* (Düsseldorf), p. 72.
55. Impacts of Economic Development (see above, fn. 48), here p. 192 (reverse side).
56. Report by the Teacher Hermann Becker (see above, fn. 15), p. 343.
57. Report by Kurt Treuhaupt on "Grenzschutz Ost" (see above, fn. 32), p. 55.
58. This term is taken from F. Bösch (2005) "Militante Geselligkeit. Formierungsformen der bürgerlichen Vereinswelt zwischen Revolution und Nationalsozialismus" in W Hardtwig (ed.) *Politische Kulturgeschichte der Zwischenkriegszeit 1918–1939* (Göttingen).
59. Impacts of Economic Development (see above, fn. 48), p. 192.
60. On Weimar paramilitarism, see the still relevant study: J. M. Diehl (1977) *Paramilitary Politics in Weimar Germany* (London).
61. On the appeal of military exercises during the 1920s, see C. Eisenberg (1999) *English Sports und deutsche Bürger. Eine Gesellschaftsgeschichte 1800–1939* (Paderborn), p. 329.
62. This quotation from the report by two detectives from Berlin who investigated the Perleberg "Jungstahlhelm" in March 1929. Report on the Official Journey to Perleberg – Observation of the Steel Helmet Association regarding Military Education, 13 March 1929, With an Accompanying Letter to President of the Berlin Police, Federal Criminal Investigation Department ("Landeskriminalpolizeistelle", IA), to the District President in Potsdam, Secret, Brandenburg Federal Archive in Potsdam ("Brandenburgisches Landeshauptarchiv" = BLHA), Rep. 2A I Pol, vol. 1098, pp. 101–11, here p. 106.
63. On this friendship, see ibid.
64. Kroener (2005), p. 158.
65. For the defence associations, these paramilitary activities were sometimes of existential importance, as they made them attractive to young people who had little interest in the hierarchically organized "war society organization" of the "Stahlhelm", for example. On these conflicts, see J. Tautz (1998) *Militaristische Jugendpolitik in der Weimarer Republik. Die Jugendorganisationen des Stahlhelm, Bund der Frontsoldaten: Jungstahlhelm und Scharnhorst, Bund deutscher Jungmannen* (Regensburg).
66. Cabinet Meeting, 19 December 1930, Agenda Item 2: Political Affair. Akten der Reichskanzlei (AdR), Die Kabinette Brüning I and II, pp. 751–54.
67. This infiltration of a quasi-official organization by public enemies like the Stormtroopers has not yet been given its due attention in historiography. It is only partially described in R. Bessel (1984) *Political Violence and the Rise of*

Nazism. The Storm Troopers in Eastern Germany 1925–1934 (New Haven and London), pp. 67–74.

68. Krüger (1971).
69. The term "Wehrgemeinschaft" was frequently used by protagonists of the "conservative revolution"; see, for example, H. von den Steinen (1927) "Wehrgemeinschaft", *Gewissen*, 9:26, pp. 2f.

12

Fighting for God, for Franco and (most of all) for Themselves: Right-Wing Volunteers in the Spanish Civil War

Judith Keene

Outside the Iberian Peninsula, many observers saw the Spanish Civil War as the first round in a looming Europe-wide civil war. The belief that the outcome in Spain would influence the larger conflict prompted a number of foreigners to cross the Pyrenees and lend their support either to General Franco and the Nationalists or to the Spanish Republican government. Best-known among these foreign volunteers, and by far the largest in number, were the International Brigades who fought with the Spanish Republic and whose exploits have been studied in great detail.[1] By contrast, whether in their roles as individuals, ideologues or soldiers, and in relation to their reception within Nationalist Spain, very little has been written about the foreigners who became volunteers for Franco.[2] It is these individuals with whom this chapter is concerned.

Between 1936 and 1939 the cause of General Franco and the Nationalists galvanized large sections of the European Right. With their military challenge to the Republican government framed in terms of a crusade to defend "traditional Spain against the Reds", Franco and the Nationalists became a powerful symbol that was embraced by pious Catholics, old-style conservatives, aspiring fascists and anti-Semites of every stripe. Drawn from an array of groups that had emerged ebullient on the European scene after World War I, these pro-Francoists shared a rejection of what, in their view, were the discredited democracies that had been created from the post-war Versailles Settlement. Instead, these right-wing activists advocated the "New Europe", a shorthand

term for an imprecise political entity in which Communists, feminists, Freemasons, and Jews would have no place.

To the individuals who took their ideological commitment to the point of enlisting with Franco, Nationalist Spain appeared to offer the promise of this "New Europe": the venue where these non-Spaniards would be able to carry forward the political battles in which they were engaged at home. In short, for many of the foreigners who crossed the Pyrenees to volunteer with Franco, Nationalist Spain was a mythologized space where they imagined that they would be welcomed as brothers in arms in a shared political endeavour. The perceptions of Franco's Spain by these foreign volunteers, or, more accurately, their misperceptions, are only one part of the picture. The reciprocal Spanish view of Franco's foreign supporters is equally germane. While high-profile visitors were mostly accorded a lavish welcome, ordinary foreign sojourners were more often greeted in Nationalist Spain with distrust, if not outright hostility. In any full assessment of the role of pro-Franco foreign volunteers in the Spanish Civil War, it is also necessary to ask the questions that are important for foreign volunteers in all wars: who benefited from these foreigners' involvement; did their presence make any difference to the military or political outcome of the war itself; and what was the effect of their participation abroad on the state of the political movements that they had left on their own home ground?

Who and how many were the volunteers for Franco?

It is not possible to know precisely how many foreigners volunteered in Franco's forces. The individuals and groups discussed here are separate from the German, Italian, and Portuguese soldiers and technicians despatched to Spain by their respective governments. Also excluded are the Moroccan mercenaries utilized by Franco's Army of Africa.[3] Probably, in total, the genuine volunteers comprised about 2,000 men (there were also a dozen or so foreign women, mostly in frontline medical service).[4] They were to be found, in the main, within the ranks of the Spanish Foreign Legion, which, in mid-1936, comprised approximately four and a half thousand soldiers, a number that would double in the course of the war.[5] In the August 1938 muster of foreigners in the Legion, there were 1,248 legionnaires recorded as coming from 37 different countries.[6] This number is probably an understatement. No identity papers were required for enlistment in the Spanish Foreign Legion, and it was common for recruits to register under assumed names. For example, in the 1938 listing there is a French volunteer

who has given his name as "Mauricio Chevalier" and another listed as "Francisco Ferrer Illich", an unlikely moniker that conjoins the heroes of Spanish anarchism and the Bolshevik revolution. The nationality indicated for recruits, however, is more likely to be authentic, as it signified the language spoken. In addition, there were foreigners in other sectors of the Spanish military.

The largest contingent of separately led foreigners, and the most studied, was the 700-strong troop of Irish Blueshirts who arrived in Spain in November 1936.[7] They had joined Franco's crusade in order to defend the "faith of their fathers". In making a commitment to Franco's Nationalists, they were maintaining a long Irish tradition whereby Irish Catholic intellectuals and priests had headed to Spain as a refuge from the perfidious and Protestant England. In 1936, they were ineptly commanded by Eoin O'Duffy, who had been an activist in the proto-fascist Irish Blueshirt movement and, in Spain, relished the attention and the perks that his post brought.[8] Irish involvement came to an abrupt and inglorious end after the unit's first engagement at the Jarama front in February 1937.

Between 250 and 500 French volunteers, as near as it is possible to estimate, came to Nationalist Spain, a good number being placed in the designated French company, *La Bandera de la Juana de Arco*. It included a few other Swiss and Belgian French speakers, and a single stray Australian whose schoolboy French landed him with Gallic comrades. In the main composed of men whose political allegiances came out of the right-wing anti-parliamentary leagues, the French volunteers were not an internally united group, comprising, as they did, recruits from the *Camelots du Roi*, the *Croix de Feu* and its later reformation, the *Parti Social Français* (PSF), and Jacques Doriot's *Parti Populaire Français* (PPF), all of whom were bitter rivals for their home turf in France. However, their leaders were unanimous in the conviction that in striking a blow against the Popular Front government of the Spanish Republic they would simultaneously harm the hated Popular Front in Paris, which they referred to as the "Jew Blum and his communist confrères". Ordinary French volunteers, however, were often taken aback by the Francophobia they encountered in Nationalist Spain, where there was little distinction made between "Real France", as the French nationalists saw themselves, and what these Frenchmen considered to be the tawdry "Red France" that had backed the Popular Front.[9]

There were between 50 and 100 White Russians in Spain, the majority ending up in the Foreign Legion.[10] Their countrymen also served in the Carlist Requetés with a small number in the regular Nationalist

Infantry. Trained in the Tsar's Imperial Army and veterans of World War I, these men mainly came from the Paris émigré community. They brought with them to Spain the romantic and unrealizable aspiration that in crossing the Pyrenees they were taking the first step in regrouping the Tsar's army. Their most fervent hope was that in Nationalist Spain they would re-galvanize the Russian army, and that, after striking a decisive blow against the Bolsheviks on the Iberian Peninsula, the imperial officer corps would lead the Tsar's troops across Europe to take back the Russian Motherland.

The smallest unified national group were the eight members of the Romanian Iron Guard, who were accompanied to Spain and later up to the front by their Romanian Orthodox priest, dressed in full clerical regalia and with an enormous silver cross on his chest. The Iron Guard, founded in 1927 by Zelea Corneliu Codreanu, were Christian revolutionaries whose ideology conjoined intense nationalism and eastern orthodox Christianity with militant anti-Semitism, anti-communism and the belief in the redemptive power of violence. The movement's leaders looked first to Mussolini and later to Hitler for pointers in their own crusade to create a Romanian state based on Romanian ethnicity and language.[11] They were drawn to Nationalist Spain because Franco was, in the Legionnaires' graphic parlance, "on a worldwide crusade to defeat Satan and his Judeo-Masonic henchmen".[12] And, as the Romanians saw it, when the Spanish leader was "battling with the Red Beast of the Apocalypse" to defend the Spanish church, he was also striking a blow for Romanian Christians.[13] With a broad brush that painted over the traditional differences that divided Roman Catholicism and Orthodox religion, the Romanians perceived the Nationalists in Spain as fellow crusaders. Certainly, it was true that the Nationalist castigation of the republican enemy as "los rojos" [the Reds] found ready resonance with the Iron Guard, whose ideology included a similar, hold-all category of "Reds" that were to be extirpated. In both franquista Spain and Iron Guard Romania, Communists, Freemasons, Jews, atheists, feminists and those favouring a secular and cosmopolitan life were considered undesirable. That these "Reds" were inimical to traditional Spain – Catholic, rural, patriotic and united – echoed the Romanians' own deeply held beliefs, in which Old Kingdom Romania was a sort of Castile of the Balkans. Just as Spanish nationalists feared that *Hispanidad*, the essence of Spanishness, was threatened by states on the Spanish periphery, Romanian nationalists imagined that Old Kingdom values were under siege from the new territories that had been added to form Greater Romania after the Treaty of Trianon. In

the same way that Spanish Francoists rejected the language and the autonomist aspirations of Catalans, Basques, and Galicians, Romanian nationalists decried the "dissolvent elements" of Jews, Hungarians, Ruthenians, Russians, and Bessarabians who had become equal citizens in an expanded, interwar Romania.[14]

General Moscardó and the siege of the Alcazar

Without a doubt, outside Spain, the most potent figure in attracting volunteers and foreign supporters for the Nationalist cause was General José Moscardó. Far more important than Franco himself (and indeed the full elaboration of the cult of the caudillo would come later), "General Moscardó and the heroic cadets of the Alcázar", as their supporters invariably described them, became mythic figures that embodied the old world qualities of military valour and Christian stoicism. Moscardó had been the military governor of Toledo and, on 17 July 1936, when Franco and the Spanish generals staged the military uprising, he declared for the insurgents. The city of Toledo and its administrators remained with the Spanish Republic, while Moscardó and some 1,300 like-minded anti-republicans withdrew into the Alcázar, the military fortress that still looms over Toledo. Until the end of September 1936, when they were relieved by Franco's Army of Africa, Moscardó and his comrades sat out the republican siege in the catacombs and corridors deep within the dungeons below the thick walls of the fortress. The Toledo Alcázar housed the Infantry Academy, hence the cadets of the Alcázar, though in reality only a handful of students were in residence at the time. Moscardó's anti-republicans had been joined inside the fortress by about 800 Guardia Civil from the surrounding region, some 100 military officers and various right-wing party members, with their families, though – curiously perhaps – not Moscardó's wife and children. There were about 500 women, mostly wives, and some 50 children, two babies having been born during the siege.[15] As well, a small number of republicans and their families had been taken into the Alcázar as hostages when the siege began.[16]

Whether in Sydney, Paris or Bucharest, Moscardó's devotees venerated him as a martyr who had suffered for his convictions. And his was a particularly reassuring example for the future, as he had survived the siege and seen off his enemies. Much like the breviaries of the Christian saints, the fable of Moscardó and the Alcázar was reprinted in pamphlets in the languages of a whole range of countries outside Spain.[17] It found immediate response among those who saw themselves

as putative Moscardós, that is, virtuous people struggling to uphold traditional morality and Christian values in what they perceived to be the heartless, modern world. The detail of Moscardó's relationship with his son, Luis, further burnished his fame. This clinching incident was purported to have taken place on 23 July, when the Toledo militia telephoned the Alcázar to inform Moscardó that they had captured his son and he would be executed forthwith unless those in the fortress surrendered immediately. The father had then spoken to the son, ordering him to commit his soul to God and die like a man for Spain, after which austere advice the youth was shot.[18]

Herbert Southworth and more recently Isabelo Herreros have robustly challenged the scholarly information on which the franquista version of the Moscardó story is based.[19] However, whether or not the details were embellished, once the legend was propounded it carried a potent message that no longer relied on evidence as it was repeatedly recalled and retold. For example, Christian de la Mazière, an important figure in the pro-Nazi movement in Occupied France during World War II, nominated Moscardó and the siege of the Alcázar as the prime determinant in the formation of his politics. As a boy, Mazière, profoundly moved by the Toledo story, had fervently wished to share the adventure of the "heroic cadets of the Alcazar". In reviewing the course of his life, Mazière observed that, within "the interior mental theatre" in which people rehearse their dreams, the siege of the Alcázar had defined for him the benchmarks of good and evil and, as a consequence, in 1942, in Occupied France, Moscardó's example had led him to join a French unit of the Waffen SS.[20] In a much more benign outcome, Frances Letters, a distinguished Australian classicist and a Catholic, who had followed the siege as a young man in Sydney, sought the opportunity to visit Spain in the 1960s to pay his respects to the "noble patriot" General Moscardó.[21]

Almost without exception, foreign volunteers for Franco mention the relief of the Alcázar as spurring their decision to depart for Spain. The delegation from the Romanian Iron Guard is typical. Events in Spain had been closely watched by political groups in Bucharest. The Spanish ambassador, the Marqés de Prat de Nantouillet, had declared for Franco in July 1936, and henceforth the red and yellow flag of Nationalist Spain shared pride of place beside the banners of Italy and Germany on the rostrums of the Romanian Right.[22] News that the siege had been lifted was greeted with jubilation by the Iron Guard, and General "Zizi" Gheorgio Cantacuzino, a leader of the movement, came up with the idea that they should present Moscardó with a ceremonial sword. The

group arrived in Toledo early in December and were part of an elaborate military parade before Moscardó. At a subsequent Falangist reception, Cantacuzino spoke with great emotion about the ties between Nationalist Spain and the "old Christian lands of Romania". It was immediately after the Toledo ceremony that the younger Romanians, and the priest, decided to stay in Spain and offer themselves as soldiers for Franco.[23]

In a similar desire to mark the lifting of the siege of the Alcázar, the conservative French daily, *Echo de Paris*, raised a subscription to honour Moscardó with an inscribed ceremonial sword. So popular was the *Echo*'s call that the fund was quickly oversubscribed, leaving enough money with which to strike a commemorative medal to present to each of the Toledo survivors.[24]

The Alcázar transformed Moscardó into a celebrity figure for the Right within and outside Spain. Before Franco's *pronunciamiento*, he had been living quietly – "on the shelf" as one contemporary described him – and contemplating retirement. Post-siege he was cast in an important ceremonial role and Toledo became the most sought-after stop on the itinerary of foreign visitors who came to Spain to show solidarity with Franco.[25] Similarly, an encounter with Moscardó signified official favour, or the reverse. Senior members of *L'Action Française*, on their several trips to Franco's Spain, were the recipients of both sorts of franquista welcome.

Maxime Réal del Sartre, the French Catholic sculptor, founder – and by 1936 the leader – of the *Camelots du Roi*, the bully-boys of *L'Action Française* in the Paris streets, visited Nationalist Spain and Moscardó on a number of occasions. As well as a fervent supporter of Charles Maurras, the leader of *L'Action Française* and a devotee of the cult of Jeanne d'Arc, Réal del Sartre was the most prolific monumental sculptor in France between the wars. His first trip across the Pyrenees in February 1937 was made during a break in sculptural work on his monument to General Joffre at Les Invalides. And, while in Spain, Réal del Sartre measured General Franco for a bust to be part of the Paris exhibition of anti-communist art.

In May 1938, Réal del Sartre and Georges Massot, a Spanish-speaking *Camelot du Roi* and the head of *L'Action Française* in the south-west of France, accompanied Charles Maurras to Nationalist Spain. Massot had close ties to Franco's headquarters and was the go-between delivering money raised in public appeals, such as that for Moscardó by the *Echo de Paris*. Franco accorded the French visitors full military honours and provided them with a driver and a large car. With Moscardó as their

guide, they made a whistle-stop tour through Aragon and the provinces recently captured by Franco's troops. Réal del Sartre, enchanted by everything in Nationalist Spain, eulogized about the "youth of the leadership" in the New Spain in contrast with the "gerontocracy" of Republican France. What the 70-year-old Maurras thought on this matter is not recorded. In western Aragon, Moscardó turned on a full military salute for the Frenchmen, using several hundred soldiers pulled from front line duty. And, after an excellent lunch, as Maurras and Moscardó sauntered through a town that had recently been a stronghold of the "Reds", Maurras was confronted with what in his own narrative he described as an "unforgettable" (and one must say highly unlikely) "example of Franco-Spanish communion". A wounded Spanish peasant had recognized the leader of *L'Action Française* and insisted on "kissing the hand that had written so much about Latin civilization".[26]

In his own narrative of the trip, Maurras confessed that he had previously had little curiosity about Spain and, apart from Cervantes, knew next to nothing about Spanish literature or culture. Like Réal del Sartre, Maurras saw Nationalist Spain as a backdrop against which to play out his own ideological scenario, which was based on his perception of the importance of the monarchy in French politics. That there was a profound dissonance between a Maurrasian and a franquista world view was made clear in October 1939, when Maurras and Réal del Sartre were preparing for another trip to Spain and Toledo, this time to celebrate Franco's victory. The French ambassador, General Pétain, whom the French government had appointed in an attempt to build bridges with the new, Franco government, counselled against their journey. By this time, Spanish monarchists had been frozen out of Franco's inner circle because they had advocated a restoration of the monarchy now that the Republic had been defeated. In this environment Maurras and Réal del Sartre, with their royalist connections, were no longer welcome.[27] Perhaps unable to accept that the previous Spanish warmth had chilled, Réal del Sartre, in January 1940 when he was made a Companion of the *Légion d'Honneur*, insisted that his investiture should take place in Madrid. Entirely cold-shouldered by Franco and his circle and unable to contact any of his previous Spanish acquaintances, the Frenchman was honoured at a small, closed ceremony in the French Embassy and, in disconsolation, returned to Paris.[28]

General Franco and foreign volunteers

All the foreign volunteers for Franco fitted the Nationalist cause into the political frameworks that they had formulated in their own home

contexts. Although most assumed that they would be welcomed by the Nationalists as fellow crusaders, the following examples demonstrate that this rarely happened. General Franco was first and foremost a soldier running a military operation that was aimed at winning a war. Neither he nor the military men around him had any interest in furthering the success of the variegated rightist movements outside Spain, except where they could aid the Nationalist victory.

For a short period towards the end of 1937, when it appeared that the Non-Intervention Committee in London would insist on linking the recognition of Franco's belligerent right to the withdrawal of foreign troops, Franco needed identifiable, but militarily unimportant, foreign units. The Non-Intervention Committee had been set up ostensibly to contain the Spanish Civil War on the Iberian Peninsula, specifically by forbidding the involvement of non-Spanish citizens in the conflict and by proscribing the sale of arms to either side. In February 1937, the Committee had agreed to ban all future foreign volunteers for Spain, but had not been able to agree on how to deal with the foreigners already in Spain, whether fighting for Franco or the Republic. In July 1937, the British government suggested that the granting of belligerent rights to both sides in the Civil War should be tied to an agreement to withdraw all volunteers already on the ground. In November 1937, Franco informed the English Ambassador at Hendaye that he would accept the British plan, in principle. Probably, it was the urgency of needing a designated unit of foreigners – which could be named and expelled – that was behind the Nationalists' push to form what became the French *Bandera de Juana de Arco*.[29] Similarly, it was the London Committee's requirement to have a precise listing of foreigners in the Spanish Foreign Legion that probably prompted the Legion's muster of foreigners in 1938. However, as the Non-Intervention Committee was without powers to enforce its decisions and there was no real will among the majority of members to recognize the legitimacy of the Spanish government's claims, Franco was able to achieve belligerent status without needing to make any concessions at all. Effectively, belligerent rights denoted that both parties to the conflict were equal, despite the fact that one was the elected Spanish government and the other was a group of generals leading a putsch. Once Franco had achieved what he wanted, he paid no further attention to foreign volunteers.

The foreign volunteers' experience in Spain

Nationalist Spain was not a welcoming place for ordinary foreign volunteers. Even the Irish, undoubtedly the most favoured of the foreign

volunteers who came to Nationalist Spain, found themselves at cross purposes with local Spaniards. In the town of Cacéres, where they were initially billeted, there were the predictable difficulties that came from cultural misunderstandings. The prodigious drinking and carousing of Irish troops in bars around town often offended the inhabitants; Spanish customs, in general, were more abstemious and behaviour in public more circumspect than in Ireland. The bullfight that the municipality put on to welcome the Irish left the visitors unimpressed. Many of the Irish volunteers were conspicuous in leaving early, and those who stayed cheered loudly for the bull rather than the matador, which again did not endear them to their hosts.[30] In the end, though, it was a far more fateful misunderstanding that ended the Irishmen's Spanish sojourn.

In February 1937, after marching out of Cacéres with flags flying and heads held high, the unit moved up to the Jarama front in readiness for their first engagement in combat. On the way to take up their position, the Irish were fired upon by Nationalist troops who mistook Franco's fighting Irish for their countrymen with the International Brigades.[31] Not surprisingly, the details about the incident are confused. At that time, the Irish had left the main road to seek better cover, while the formation of troops that approached them were inexperienced Falangists from the Canary Islands. The latter, not unlike the Irish, were newly arrived at the front. Though the Irish brigade's Spanish interpreter saluted and called out to identify his troops as members of a *bandera* of the Spanish Foreign Legion, and the senior Irish commander also attempted to explain their identity, though in halting Spanish, the Falangist officer drew his revolver and took a point blank shot at very close range at the Irish commander. Extraordinary as it seems, the bullet missed, but its report set off a fusillade from both sides in which, according to contemporary accounts, some five Irishmen and between 11 Falangists and half of their contingent were killed. A few days later, after the Irish brigade had moved up to the line, they suffered a brief and disordered engagement that ended in a rout under fire, and the unit as a group voted to return to Ireland. The brigade was disbanded and the individuals who stayed on in Spain were integrated into the regular Nationalist Army.

The French backers for the formation of a separate French military unit for Franco had great hopes that Spain would be the venue in which the French could display their military prowess on a real battlefield. The anti-parliamentary leagues had been banned in France, whereas in Spain they could operate openly and, it was hoped, use Nationalist

Spain as a training ground for a future French insurgency along the lines of Franco's uprising against the Republican government. The military correspondent of *L'Action française*, Captain Henri Bournville de Marsagny, who became the first commander of the French unit, encouraged his readers to enlist for Franco. Several industrialists, who shared the National Front's apocalyptic view of an imminent communist takeover in France, put up funds, as did members of the French expatriate community in Lisbon. Named after France's most famous Christian warrior, Jeanne d'Arc, the unit incorporated all French speakers already in the Foreign Legion as well as the recruits in a cohort of new volunteers.[32]

Joan of Arc's warriors were plagued by constant problems from the outset. Not only were there fewer recruits than the organizers had anticipated, but those who enlisted were of poor calibre. The organization of the company was inept, and the first commander, Bournville de Marsagny, a First World War veteran who led a Parisian section of the *Croix de Feu*, privileged his own interests over those of his men. He was succeeded by Major Victor Monnier and then Captain Jean Courcier, neither of whom provided any more effective leadership. Even more unsettling for the French volunteers was their Spanish reception. Once they had crossed the Spanish border they were regarded with deep suspicion by most of the Spaniards they encountered. The Irish journalist and committed Francoist, Francis McCullagh, who travelled widely through Franco's Spain, noted that a French accent evoked immediate hostility, so that French volunteers were often warned to keep their mouths shut in public.[33]

The French government had no diplomatic relations with Nationalist Spain, and during the Civil War the French Embassy was located across the border in Saint Jean-de-Luz. French officials were driven to distraction by the need to disprove the exaggerated reports made by Franco's military headquarters about the numbers and activities of Frenchmen they claimed were fighting on the Republican side.[34] In addition, a good deal of the energy and time of the Ambassador and the French consular staff was spent handling requests from French families trying to locate and retrieve husbands and sons who had enlisted with Franco. As well, there were demands for repatriation from Frenchmen themselves who had come to regret the decision to join up with Franco's forces.[35]

France upheld the long-standing international conventions that foreign nationals were entitled to have access to their consular representatives, and diplomatic regulations stipulated that any French national who appeared before a consular official and requested repatriation

was to be immediately taken into diplomatic protection. In practice, though, it was easier said than done. With no formal diplomatic ties in Nationalist Spain, France was forced to work through informal channels. The problem was made more complicated, as well, because French volunteers in the Nationalist military could rarely obtain permission to leave their units in order to seek out the nearest consul. Also, according to French law, all military recruits under 20 years of age needed parental permission prior to enlistment, and it was this legal requirement that French consular representatives most often raised when trying, usually without success, to find the minor when parents, or even the recruit himself, had asked for repatriation.[36] In a voluminous file dealing with these matters, the Ambassador wrote several confidential minutes based on information from consular staff, which pointed out that the intransigence of Nationalist headquarters meant that Spanish officers in the field neither "complied with the elementary principles of humanity" nor observed the international conventions of war that "even Germans in the First World War had respected". In another communication the Ambassador stated gloomily that his staff had had little success in extricating French prisoners because in Nationalist areas a great many prisoners were executed on the spot. And, he opined, French prisoners suffered particularly because of the "widespread perception in Nationalist Spain that France was pro-Communist and committed to the triumph of Communism in Spain".[37]

Although the members of the Romanian Iron Guard had chosen to remain in Spain and had fervently embraced battle as an opportunity in which to show their Christian mettle, their experience in combat was brief and disorienting. From the beginning, they found life hard as ordinary enlistees in the Spanish Foreign Legion. They spoke no Spanish and their only experience of combat had been street fighting in Bucharest. The Legion provided only the most cursory military training. Furthermore, the Romanians were without proper pack and kit, having come to Spain for no more than a brief visit, and were expected to scavenge what they could from republican trenches. As part of a Foreign Legion unit, they were sent to the Majadahonda front on 13 January 1937. Two hours into their first military engagement, the two leaders, Ion Motza and Vasile Marin, were killed and several of the others wounded. The Romanians as a group asked to be withdrawn from the line, and there followed frantic telegraphed negotiations from Bucharest to Burgos. As General Cantacuzino cabled to Franco, a "symbolic gesture was sufficient": he did not wish to lose in Spain "the flower of the Iron Guard leadership", and therefore he argued that Franco should permit

him to bring the whole group back to Romania.[38] Surprisingly, Franco agreed. In the normal course of events it was extremely difficult to leave the Legion once a soldier had enlisted. Eventually, the remnant of the Iron Guard unit accompanied the bodies of their two fallen comrades to a military ceremony in Toledo and then in a cortege to Irún and finally via Berlin to Bucharest. Back in the Romanian capital, the funeral of Motza and Marin provided the centrepiece of a massive rally in which the Iron Guard travelled from across the country to close down the capital in a show of strength that would presage their future role in Romanian politics.

The White Russian volunteers came almost entirely from the émigré communities in France, and had been part of a military caste under the Russian Tsar. The Spanish Civil War seemed to offer a way in which to put aside the despondency and dislocation of civilian life and take up a military vocation once again. The Russian Armed Services Union (ROVS), created in 1924 to hold together the remnants of the White Army, was the institution that recruited the first 38 Russians for Nationalist Spain.[39] All had been career imperial officers and were veterans of the First World War and the Russian Civil War. On 12 February 1937 Generals Fok and Shinkarenko made a preliminary voyage to Spain, crossing through the Pyrenees on foot, much like many International Brigaders who made a similar crossing into Spain on the east coast of the country. As the Russians explained to the military recruiters at Franco's headquarters in Burgos, they had come on a mission to defeat the "Godless no-gooders" of Bolshevism in Spain.[40] There, they faced several initial setbacks. Franco's authorities rejected General Fok, at 57 years of age, as too old for combat. He was the White Russians' senior military figure, but only after he had proved his fitness before the startled Spaniards by performing a series of Russian acrobatics with a rifle did they relent and accept him. Initially, Franco's people tried to place the Russians with the French speakers in the *Juana de Arco* battalion, but so vehement were Fok and Shinkarenko in their refusal to be with the "Godless French" that eventually the Russians were shunted into a Carlist regiment, whose rallying cry of "God, Fatherland and King" was close enough to their own "Faith, Tsar and Motherland".

The Spanish authorities refused to recognize Russian ranks, and therefore all Russian officers began again as ordinary soldiers. This was particularly galling, as Shinkarenko noted in his diary, when the Russians were sure that their imperial training and their experience in two recent major wars was superior to that of the Spaniards (who had not participated in World War I), though he fails to mention

that the Russians were defeated in both conflicts. Particularly dispiriting to the Russians was that most of the Spaniards they met had never heard of Russians of any colour other than red: in Nationalist Spain the term "Russian" was used interchangeably with "reds" and "Communists". Russians were similarly chagrined to find that Spaniards were ignorant of the fact that Russia's religious and imperial traditions were as long and glorious as Spain's own. A correspondent for the ROVS' paper *Chasovoi* urged Russians in Nationalist Spain to show by military prowess that Russian exiles were not "empty talkers who can only be effective after a few vodkas" but "military people who crave to translate their hatred of Bolsheviks into real action". And, he urged, by these actions they should demonstrate that Spain is one element of the "Judeo-Bolshevik plot" that *Chasovoi* readers were fighting worldwide.[41] Indeed, for these White Russians the road to Moscow would pass through Madrid.

As well as slights of rank, matters of pay weighed heavily on the Russians. In Nationalist Spain, where only volunteers in the Foreign Legion received a stipend, Russians with Carlist regiments faced penury. On a number of occasions, but without success, Shinkarenko wrote personally to Franco about the need for funding.[42] He explained that, as the Russians had no families and indeed no home country to fall back on, it would only be fair if Franco would provide them with special funds. Shinkarenko's own private appeal to Franco, writing as one fighting man to another, for a small amount to tide him over until he reached better times, was also to no avail. In another long and carefully argued petition, Shinkarenko promised that, if the caudillo would permit a separate Russian unit to be recruited and run by ROVS, there would be White Russian officers flocking to Nationalist Spain from across the world. Even the final flourish, in which Shinkarenko reminded Franco that White Russia and Nationalist Spain shared the "noble cause of defending European Christian culture" and the Russians had been doing it since 1917 whereas the Spaniards had only begun in 1936, produced no joy. Less than a week later Franco replied, politely declining the request.

Shinkarenko had unsuccessfully sought a meeting with Franco ever since arriving in Spain. In mid-1937 he had received a head wound; the Russians, who maintained ramrod posture at all times and considered it unmanly to crouch in the trenches, were prone to such injuries. (Fok committed suicide in October 1937 rather than withdraw when Republican forces overran his trench). It was announced that Franco would visit the hospital, and, this being a few weeks after Shinkarenko's petition had been refused, the Russian looked forward with great

anticipation to the opportunity of a chat, man-to-military-man, with the Spanish leader. In his diary record of the meeting, Shinkarenko noted that Franco was "thinner than the photographic likeness but still chubby" and added that, like many Spaniards, the caudillo was "prone to baldness". They spoke in Spanish, which would have put Shinkarenko at a disadvantage as his Spanish language was poor. When he asked for a promotion on the grounds that he was, after all, a Russian general, Franco had replied coldly that it was an aspiration that Shinkarenko should work for while in Spain. When Shinkarenko pressed on that he wished he were in a more "distinguished regiment", Franco called over his Chief of Staff and ordered that the Russian be moved immediately to the Foreign Legion. Shinkarenko was disappointed by the caudillo's coldness, noting in the diary that if their roles had been reversed and Shinkarenko had been meeting a distinguished general like himself, he would have immediately taken a medal from his own breast and pinned it to the tunic of the other.[43]

At the end of the war Russians marched in Franco's victory parade as a distinct formation under the Imperial Russian flag. A number of White Russians who remained in Spain went on in the Second World War to join up with Franco's Blue Division on the eastern front. There were also ex-Spanish Civil War veterans among the White Russians in France who volunteered in 1941 to join Doriot's French Légion. The Jeanne d'Arc unit of foreign volunteers, created to aid Franco's victory, provided the model that Doriot adopted in mid-1941 in forming the *Légion des Volontaires Français Contre le Bolchevisme* to fight as part of the German offensive against the Soviet Union. It included many individuals who had been volunteers with the Jeanne d'Arcs in Spain and had gone on to throw in their lot with the next French anti-Bolshevik initiative. Like the White Russian soldiers who joined them, they continued to fight their "Red Nemeses" on the eastern front.[44]

Overall, who benefited from the foreign volunteers' involvement in the Spanish Civil War? Undoubtedly the leaders of the rightist groups in Spain gained more from their Spanish sojourn than did the ordinary men who became volunteer footsloggers in Franco's army. But this inequality in treatment would reflect the status hierarchy in most armies, in peace or in wartime. From Franco's point of view, he gained little in military terms from the presence of these foreigners in Nationalist Spain, though they could have been important cannon fodder in a trade-off for belligerent rights if the Non-Intervention Committee had been willing to give teeth to the demand for the repatriation of foreigners from the Iberian peninsula. Franco probably achieved propaganda

value from the narratives of the war, especially those written about Moscardó and the siege of the Alcázar. But the military contribution of the foreign volunteers was negligible and, in any event, post-war, their presence in Spain was rendered invisible. In the official Francoist version of the Spanish Civil War, written after the event, foreigners all fought for the "Reds", while patriotic Spaniards alone were responsible for Franco's victory.

Notes

1. In a large literature, see the recent studies, M. Lefebyre and R. Skoutelsky (2003) *Las Brigadas Internationales: imágenes recuperadas* (Barcelona); R. Stradling (2003) *History and Legend: Writing the International Brigades* (Cardiff).
2. The material in this paper is based on my published work: J. Keene (2001) *Fighting For Franco: International Volunteers in Nationalist Spain During the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939* (London and New York); J. Keene (2002a) Luchando por Franco: Voluntarios europeos al servicio de la España fascista, 1936–1939 (Barcelona); and on subsequent research, for which I am glad to acknowledge financial support from the Australian Research Council and the Arts Faculty Research Scheme at The University of Sydney.
3. There were some 19,000 Germans, 80,000 Italians and 10,000 Portuguese as well as 70,000 Moors who joined Franco's forces; see F. Romero Salvadó (2005) *The Spanish Civil War: Origins, Course and Outcomes* (London), pp. 82–91. As foreign combatants, sent at the behest of their governments, or as paid fighters in the case of the Moorish regulars, they cannot by any definition be considered to be volunteers.
4. J. Keene (2002b) "Foreign Women in Spain for General Franco during the Spanish Civil War" in P. Bachetta and M. Power (eds) *Right Wing Women Around the Globe*, (London), 183–96.
5. R. Proctor (1982) Historical Dictionary of the Spanish Civil War (Westport Conn.), p. 212.
6. Servicio Histórico Militar, Ávila, 2/168/30/5, Cuartel General del Generalísimo Estado Mayor, Sección 1. "Secreto. Despacho número 15.773. Relaciones con el número de extranjeros alistados a la Legión antes y después de iniciado del Glorioso Movimiento Nacional. Proyecto de Organización de dos banderas del Tercio". "El número de extranjeros alistados en la Legión con anteriordad a la fecha de iniciación del Movimiento Nacional", 28 August 1938. 2/168/31/27 Cuartel General del Generalísimo, Estado Mayor, Sección 1.29 Div,10. "Relativo a que remita con urgencia relacionados por bandera los legionaries extranjeros que existen en ese Cuerpo haciendo constar la nacionalidad." Desp. 13331. "Relación nominal del personal extranjero filiado en la Legión a partir de la iniciación del Glorioso Movimiento Nacional, con indicación de la nacionalidad de cada uno y unidades en que se encuentran encuadrados," 21 August 1938.
7. See, for example, F. McGarry (1999) *Irish Politics and the Spanish Civil War* (Cork); R. Stradling (1999) *The Irish and the Spanish Civil War 1936–1939* (Manchester).

8. E. O'Duffy (1938) *Crusade in Spain* (Clonkskeagh). For a critical contemporary account of O'Duffy and the Irish, see F. McCullagh (1937) In *Franco's Spain: Being the Experiences of an Irish War Correspondent during the Great Civil War which Began in 1936* (London) chapters 20 to 25; and for more recent evaluations, McGarry (1999), and Stradling (1999).
9. See the comments by the Doriotist fighting for "Latin spirit and western civilization" and the two volunteers with the Carlists who were worried that Spaniards would not realize that they were part of Maurras' "Real France", in G. Oudard (1938) *Chemises noires, brunes, verte en Espagne* (Paris), pp. 59–61; and E. Bauer (1938) *Rouge et or, chroniques de la "Reconquête Espagnole", 1937–1938* (Neuchatel).
10. Anton Nikolai Shinkarenko *I Vsevolovich* [Typescript Memoirs] 7 Pamphlet boxes, Hoover Archives IDCSUZ68020-A Stanford University, Part 4 Chapter 4. The voluminous diaries range over many issues and events. The sections that relate to Spain are in Part 4 Chapters 1 to 11 and are arranged partly chronologically and in part by topics. See also Anton Prokof'evich Yaremchuk (1983) *Russkie dobrovol'tsy v Ispanii 1936–1939* [Russian Volunteers in Spain] (San Francisco) provides biographies of 53 volunteers in an appendix, 365–73.
11. S. Payne (1995) *A History of Fascism, 1914–1945* (Wisconsin), pp. 277–89; F. Veiga (1989) *La mística del ultranacionalismo: historia de la Guardia de Hierro Rumania 1919–1941* (Bellaterra); E. Weber (1965) "Romania" in H. Rogger and E. Weber (eds) *The European Right: A Historical Profile* (Berkeley), 501–74; and, for a succinct introduction to interwar nationalism and Romanian intellectuals, see K. Verdery (1991) *National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceaucescu's Romania* (Berkeley).
12. See Vasile Marin's letters from Spain to his wife, 26.11.1936 in (1941) *Los legionaries rumanos, Ion Motza y Vasile Marin: Caídos por Dios y por España*. Prologue by J. Aoaricio (Madrid) [Biblioteca Legionaria Rumana, No 1], p. 47; and Motza's "En la Navidad del Señor" from Spain, in *Libertatea*, nos 37 and 38, Christmas 1936, *Los legionaries*, p. 56.
13. See the Iron Guard leader Zelea Corneliu Codreanu's comments in (1938) *La Garde de fer: pour les Légionnaires* (Paris), p. 237.
14. Minorities and new citizens were not threatening the existence of Romanian; in fact, quite the reverse. The Romanian government in the twenties and thirties undertook a programme of intense Romanization of the bureaucracy and the education system that disadvantaged non-ethnic Romanians. In the ideological panoply of Romania's extreme nationalists, however, polemic always trumped historical accuracy.
15. Major Geoffrey McNeill Moss entered Toledo in the first weeks after the siege. His narrative appeared in a number of editions and languages, as (1937) *Siege of the Alcazar: A History of the Siege of the Toledo Alcázar, 1936* (New York); and R. Brasillach and H. Massis (1936) *Les Cadets de l'Alcázar* (Paris). Paul Preston cites the relief of the Toledo siege as an important indicator that Franco's political agenda determined his military strategy, in his (1995) *Franco: A Biography* (London), pp. 173–84.
16. W. Miller, "Little World War in Spain" in (1937) *We Cover the World, by Sixteen Foreign Correspondents* (London), p. 424.
17. See, for example, Dr R. Timmerman (Nov. 1936 [1943]) *Alcázar*, traducere din limba Germana de Roland Radler (Bucharest).

18. In the ramshackle museum of the Toledo Alcazar, until quite recently, it was possible to pay a few coins and hear what was supposed to be a scratchy recording of Moscardó giving the fateful advice to his son. It was followed by the report of the executioner's gun.
19. Both scholars have shown the inconsistencies in the detail and the dates and even the political affiliations of Luis Moscardó, whose liberal leanings were a source of tensions between father and son; see H. R. Southworth (1986) *El mito de la cruzada de Franco* (Barcelona), pp. 92–120 and I. Herreros (1995) *Mitología de la Cruz de Franco: El Alcázar de Toledo* (Madrid).
20. C. de la Mazière (1975) *Le rêveur casqué* (Paris) and M. Ophuls's interviews of him in his (1969) *The Sorrow and the Pity* and his (1972) *The Sorrow and the Pity: A Film* (New York), pp. 53–5; 83–4; 145–53.
21. K. Letters (1997) *History Will Out: F J Letters at the New England University College* (Armidale), p. 146.
22. P. de Prat y Soutzo (1963) "Effectul revolutiei nationale Spaniole en Romania", in *Ion Mota y Vasile Marin 25 ani de la moarte* (Madrid) p. 19.
23. A. Cantacuzino ([1941]/1969) *Opere Complete, Colectia "Omul Nou"*, (Munich), 1–30; *Los legionarios rumanos Ion Motza y Vasile Marin: Caídos por Dios y por España*. [with prologue by J. Aparicio] (Madrid), (Biblioteca Legionaria Rumana, no 1).
24. The details of the Moscardó presentation are included in British consular correspondence from Hendaye, in Public Record Office, London FO 371/21285/47815, No 106 Hendaye 16.02.1937, 193; 08 March 1937, p. 70; and *L'Echo de Paris*, September to October 1936.
25. For example, greeting Charles Maurras with a full military salute and a fine lunch near the Ebro in May 1938, in C. Maurras (1943) *Vers l'Espagne de Franco* (Paris), p. 212, p. 224.
26. Maurras (1943), p. 212, p. 224.
27. See Maurras on the need for a strong monarchy in Spain, in Maurras (1943), 188–91.
28. A. André Glandy (1955) *Maxime Réal del Sartre, sa vie-son oeuvre*, Preface by H. Bordeaux (Paris), pp. 198–201; and M. Catalá (1997) *Les Relations franco-espagnoles pendant la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale* (Paris), p. 97.
29. The French ambassador in Spain claimed that a source close to Franco's military staff had told him that the aim was to head off the Non-Intervention Committee by creating a unit of the Spanish Foreign Legion that would be the equivalent of the Republican International Brigade. Franco would benefit from the publicity that the Frenchmen in his White International would be far fewer than the "Red" French in the International Brigades, where the French comprised the largest category of volunteers. That these troops were immaterial to Franco's military effort was so much the better, and would appear to have complied with the Non-Intervention while evading the much more militarily significant Italian, German and Portuguese troops. See Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, [Centre des Archives Diplomatiques, Nantes] Direction des Affaires Politiques et Commerciales, Espagne, Guerre Civile, Volontaires, Vol 236, July-November 1937, Saint Jean de Luz, 19.07.1937, "Secret, Volontaires français dans l'Armée du Général Franco", pp. 21–24.

30. O'Duffy (1938), p. 116.
31. Among versions of what happened, some Irish volunteers complained that they had been given threadbare uniforms that made it easy to mistake them for the International Brigades; others complained that because Spaniards had never been in the Great War they had never learned to dig defensive trenches, though it is not clear what relevance this had for the incident, even if it were true. See S. O'Cuinneagáin, "The jottings of an Irish legionary", *The Echo* (Enniscorthy), Marx Memorial Library, Clerkenwell Green, Box A-1 File A/10, 10; Seamus Mackee (1938) *I Was a Franco Soldier* (London), 22–9. O'Duffy, who was off visiting officers at Franco's high command, was not present at either of the unit's fateful engagements but has discussed them in O'Duffy (1938), 133–64.
32. "Síntesis histórico de la XVII Bandera" from "Publicación del año 1983 para el uso didáctico de la Academia de Formación de Mandos Legionarios". I am glad to acknowledge the generosity of Colonel José Espartero Nievas, Comandancia General de Ceuta, Tercio Duque de Alba 2 de la Legión, for this material.
33. McCullagh (1937).
34. For example, Nationalist Radio in Saragossa announced that at the battle of Teruel Franco's headquarters had identified the majority of the hundreds of bodies that had been "abandoned in the snow" as belonging to French Freemasons. The broadcasts had produced ugly anti-French demonstrations in Saragossa, despite an official denial of the statement by the French Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos in L'Agence Havas of such "blatant untruths", in MAE Nantes, Direction des Affaires Politiques, Espagne, Guerre Civile, "Volontaires" Vol 238, St-Jean-de-Luz 10 January 1938, 49–51; Vol 239, 28 July 1938, 32. Jean Herbette, France's Ambassador from 1931 until his resignation in October 1937, was accused of being pro-Franco, but his despatches reveal a profound distrust of Nationalist headquarters; see Keene (2002), p. 167–72.
35. See MAE Nantes, Direction des Affaires Politiques, Espagne, Guerre Civile, "Volontaires" volumes 238–40.
36. Equally, the French ambassador contacted the consuls in dealing with requests for assistance for French International Brigaders who had been taken prisoner in Nationalist Spain. These are included in MAE Nantes, Madrid Série C, Ambassade, la Légion Étrangère; and Direction Politique et Commerciale (1930–1940), Espagne, Guerre Civile, "Volontaires".
37. In a large correspondence dealing with requests for assistance to French volunteers with Franco, see MAE Nantes, Direction Politique et Commerciale (1930–40) Espagne, Guerre Civile, "Volontaires", for example Vol 235, 122; vol 236 April–June 1937; Série C, Ambassade, la Légion Étrangère October 1934.
38. A. Cantacuzino (1969) *Opere Complete, Colectia "Omul Nou"* (Munich), pp. 1–30; *Los legionarios rumanos Ion Motza y Vasile Marin*.
39. *Chasovoi* [The Sentinel], the ROVS monthly journal, carried heroic stories of Franco and his troops and horrific descriptions of life under the "Spanish Reds" from mid-1936 until the end of the war. The problem of being a White Russian among Spaniards who had only ever heard of Red Russians was a source of frequent references in letters to *Chasovoi*.

40. Shinkarenko *I Vsevolovich* [Typescript Memoirs] 7 Pamphlet boxes, Hoover Archives IDCSUZ68020-A Stanford University, Part 4 Chapters 1 to 11; and Prokof'evich Yaremchuk, *Russkie dobrovol'tsy v Ispanii 1936–1939* [Russian Volunteers in Spain].
41. *Chasovoi* [The Sentinel] mid-1936 until April 1939.
42. AGM Ávila 2/168/18/12 Cuartel General del Generalísimo-Estado Mayor. Sección1a, Organización unidades Rusas. "Petición del ex-general ruso Nicolas Schinkarenko para que se forma una unidad a base de oficiales y soldados rusos que hoy sirven a nuestro lado como volontarios", 8–12; and Cuartel General del Generalísimo, "Salamanca 16 July 1937 a General Nicolas Schinkarenko", p. 6; and refusal, 07 June 1937 to another letter of request, p. 1.
43. Shinkarenko *I Vsevolovich* [Typescript Memoirs] Part 4 chapter 4.
44. O. A. Davey (1971) "The Origins of the Légion des Volontaires Français contre le Bolchevisme", *Journal of Contemporary History* 6, 29–45.

13

From the Nazi Party's Shock Troop to the "European" Mass Army: The *Waffen-SS* Volunteers

Jean-Luc Leleu

Is it still useful to talk about the *Waffen-SS*? No other military corps in contemporary history has gained such terrible notoriety. In the social memory of European nations the image of the "fanatic" SS soldier prevails, associating him with the bloodiest crimes on the front and in the occupied territories.[1] But who really were the volunteers who joined this troop? Except for the officers' corps, this question has so far not been systematically addressed by historical research.[2]

As a "parallel army" (E. Neusüss-Hunkel), the *Waffen-SS* was a paramilitary organization whose status obliged it, at least in theory, to recruit only volunteers – in contrast to the *Wehrmacht*, a state institution composed of professional soldiers and conscripts. While it would be impossible to present the profiles of all the approximately 800,000 men who served in the ranks of the military branch of the SS during the conflict, this chapter will try to give in outline a collective portrait of these men. To this end, I will first discuss how the *SS-Hauptamt* – the main SS office in charge of the recruitment – organized recruiting channels. Inside the Reich this was mainly done by establishing partnerships with the National Socialist youth organizations (*Hitlerjugend* and *Reichsarbeitsdienst*). In the occupied territories the strategies were (1) organizing the so-called *Volksdeutsche* communities (ethnic Germans living outside the Reich's borders); (2) addressing more or less artificially constructed "Germanic" groups, and; (3) targeting the "non-Germanic" with specific measures. I will then try to determine the social background of the volunteers and to explain the evolution of their motivations before and during the war. Finally, the role of coercion in the enlistment of *Waffen-SS* volunteers during the war, which has been the topic of intense historical debates, will be assessed.

Recruiting SS soldiers in and outside the Reich

The perception of the *Waffen-SS* oscillates between two extremes. It is considered by some as a body of enthusiast "fanatic" National Socialists, by others as an organization of conscripts more or less pressured to join its ranks in the second half of the war. Neither perspective is wrong, but neither picture is complete on its own. For the development of recruitment within the Reich, the measures introduced by SS General Gottlob Berger were decisive.[3] As soon as he became head of the SS Recruiting Office in summer 1938, he concluded agreements with the Hitler Youth to organize a Patrol Service (*Streifendienst*) and a Rural Service (*Landdienst*). The ranks of both organizations were filled with young Germans who met the racial and physical SS criteria, and who were therefore a target for SS recruiting commissions as soon as they arrived at an age to bear arms (17 years old). In the same way, an agreement was concluded in December 1941 with the Reich Labour Service (*Reichsarbeitsdienst*) to facilitate the entry of SS recruiting commissions into the camps in which young men had to serve for a period of three to six months before joining the army. In addition to the establishment of these institutional links, Berger targeted the countryside, employing "honourable", locally well-known personalities who had a strong influence on their fellow-citizens, such as teachers, landowners or civil members of the SS.[4]

When, from 1941/1942 onwards, the army started to enlist ever younger men, Berger's main objective became to recruit candidates as early as possible – primarily before they were called up by the army, since after this point it was generally no longer possible to join the *Waffen-SS*. This strategy reached its full effect in 1943, thanks to the full powers given by Hitler, with the creation of three "teenager" SS divisions (9th, 10th, and 12th SS divisions, of which two were filled by young men from the Labour Service – born in 1925 – and the third by young men serving in the Hitler Youth and born in 1926). Finally, this policy found its apogee in a large but clandestine census of the age group born in 1927 and 1928, carried out by the SS under the cover of a general detection of tuberculosis during the winter and spring of 1943/1944. This elaborate and secret census helped Berger to find SS recruits during the growing manpower shortage in the Reich. The SS was thus copying the increasingly aggressive recruiting strategy of the army, which from 1943 onwards started pressuring young men to join the army as early as possible. Yet, despite some successes, none of these measures resolved the manpower problem of the SS; not enough young men were persuaded to join the *Waffen-SS* until the end of the war.[5]

As in Germany, the SS strove to create recruitment channels abroad. An obvious target of recruitment campaigns were the *Volksdeutsche*, the German communities settled in the Balkans, Eastern Europe and Nordschleswig (southern Denmark). Before recruiting operations began, Himmler ordered large censuses of those communities. In this case, among others, the statisticians of the Third Reich became real "scientific soldiers", as has been pointed out by Götz Aly and Karl Heinz Roth.[6]

Results were impressive. By June 1944, about 150,000 *Volksdeutsche* were serving in the *Waffen-SS*.[7] In September 1944, 60,000 Romanian *Volksdeutsche*, about 12 per cent of the whole German community in Romania, had enlisted.[8] In Hungary, this figure reached 13 per cent.[9]

In the "Germanic" lands – the Netherlands and Scandinavia – the absence of organized recruiting channels led to poor results at the beginning. This proved the need for such channels. As an interim solution, it was decided to recruit men from the paramilitary groups of the local fascist parties. After Himmler's order in January 1941 to pursue this avenue, the SS, for example, undertook negotiations with the Dutch Anton Mussert's NSB (*Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging*) and obtained about 1,000 men in five weeks – a number to compare with the 786 "Germanic" volunteers from the Netherlands, Flanders and the Scandinavian area that the SS had been able to recruit in the five months between August and December 1940.[10]

In comparison to the large number of *Volksdeutsche* who joined the ranks of the *Waffen-SS*, the numbers of "Germanic" volunteers always remained very low, showing the inability of the SS to convince these populations of a "community of destiny" with the Reich. Nonetheless, some increase was noted from the summer of 1943, after Berger's *SS-Hauptamt* had introduced in all "Germanic" countries a card index system to register all citizens who manifested a certain sympathy for the Reich, or at least an absence of hostility: militants of fascist or pro-German organizations; students who had received a scholarship to study in the Reich; workers who had volunteered to work in Germany; and members of territorial units in service with the German armed forces (e.g. "Landwacht Niederlande" or *SS-Wach-Bataillon* 3 in the Netherlands).[11]

From 3,000 men at the beginning of the war against the Soviet Union in June 1941, the number of "Germanic" volunteers rose to 12,021 in January 1942, 19,331 in June 1943, and 34,887 (37,367 including the French) in January 1944. Many of these men did not meet the SS's high physical standards and racial criteria (in particular, the minimum height of 1.70 m), but only the military service criteria.[12] This total is

far below the exaggerated estimates given in the tendentious literature written during the Cold War by former SS officers in order to rehabilitate the *Waffen-SS* and to present it as a NATO *avant-garde* seeking above all to fight communism on the Eastern Front.[13] The number of Dutch volunteers, for example, could never have been as high as 50,000 to 60,000 men, as former SS General Steiner maintained in his book in 1958, since we know that the exact number was 21,908 on 1 January 1945.[14]

In the second half of the war, POW camps and factories in the Reich became common recruiting grounds for the SS, especially after Hitler's order of March 1944 giving Himmler the authority to liberate any POW who volunteered for armed service in the *Waffen-SS* or for service in the Security Police (*Sicherheitspolizei* or *Sicherheitsdienst*).[15] This procedure became *de facto* the only possibility for the SS to recruit foreigners after the evacuation of the occupied territories in 1944, but results were nevertheless poor.[16]

Of course, all these strategies encountered numerous obstacles. The SS experienced frequent problems due to National Socialist leaders, German institutions such as the army, the German Foreign Minister, and satellite states such as Romania and Hungary, among other things.[17]

The background of volunteers

In spite of the Nazi propaganda's efforts to portray the *Waffen-SS* as a European formation, it was actually and primarily a German organization. During the war, its "best" divisions were recruited inside the Reich's borders and were more or less completed with *Volksdeutsche* from 1942 onwards. Thus the division "Wiking", set up in autumn 1940, which was presented as the first "Germanic" unit with Dutch and Scandinavian soldiers, had no more than 6 per cent "Germanic" volunteers in its ranks in June 1941 (1,142 out of 19,377 men).[18] The recruitment of "non-Germanic" volunteers did not begin until 1942 (Baltic, then Bosnian and Ukrainian legions or divisions) and, on a larger scale, from spring 1944, as soon as the *Reichsführung-SS* launched its "cultural revolution" and agreed to enlist volunteers without integrating them as SS members.[19]

Inside the Reich, the Black Order's success in finding volunteers was subject to significant regional variations. It is impossible to draw a unified profile of regions that provided particularly large numbers of volunteers. The common picture of a *Waffen-SS* recruiting on a large scale in the Protestant Northern German provinces is, if not actually wrong,

too one-sided. The relative number of enlistments depended above all on social environment.

Two socio-economic patterns gave the SS recruiters their best results. Recruitment was particularly fruitful in rural, mostly Protestant regions such as Pomerania and Eastern Prussia, as well as in some Catholic rural regions such as the Austrian mountain provinces. But the best results were achieved in the provinces where a majority of the population lived in medium-sized towns (between 2,000 and 100,000 inhabitants) shaped by commerce, such as the *SS-Oberabschnitte* (SS Main Districts) "Südwest" (south-western Germany) and "Mitte" (corresponding largely to today's Lower Saxony). Between the small rural communities (so-called *Dorfgemeinschaften*), which were led by their elites, and the working class of the industrial regions impregnated by a trade-unionist culture, there existed a middle tier of clerks, artisans and salesmen ready for enlistment in the *Waffen-SS*.[20]

Four further comments complete this analysis. First, the regional recruitment numbers for the year 1940 – the only figures we have – are the result of a selection process in which more than 80 per cent of candidates had been rejected after a moral, physical, and racial examination.[21] Only the initial number of candidates would be pertinent to analysing the more "enthusiastic" regions inside the Reich, and, unfortunately, we do not have these figures.[22] The small percentage of candidates accepted proves, however, that the SS had a strong appeal, at least at the beginning of the war (450,000 men were examined in 1940, for example, and only 82,833 were accepted into the SS and police).

Secondly, we have to remember that SS ideology differentiated between the respective "racial values" of the inhabitants of the Reich itself. Thus the SS discriminated against people from some regions (such as the SS main regions "Elbe", "Südost" or "Main" – that is, the military districts of Dresden, Breslau, and Nürnberg) and favoured people from regions such as "Mitte", "Nordwest" or "Südwest" (that is, the military districts of Hanover, Hamburg and Stuttgart), whose inhabitants were usually judged "racially better".[23] Thirdly, the disparity of the Hitler Youth's different branches in various regions can explain at least part of the campaigns' regional variations. The Patrol Service – in which teenagers were selected following SS criteria – often found no competition in rural regions, while in and around the cities other attractive pre-military branches of the Hitler Youth (such as those who prepared for service in the Air Force, the Signals or as drivers) were available.[24] Fourthly, the human factor could also be decisive, as shown by the example of Bavaria, which illustrates many typical difficulties: bad relationships

between the regional SS leaders and the other Nazi leaders, internal opposition among the SS chiefs, and, finally, a long tradition of enlistment in the army's mountain infantry, which created a strong competition, reduced the *Waffen-SS*'s success.[25]

It is important to note that by the end of the war the impossibility of finding enough Germans to fill its ranks led the SS to make up the losses of its oldest "German" units with *Volksdeutsche*. During the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944, about half of the 2nd and 9th SS Armoured Divisions were composed of so-called *Volksdeutsche*, for the most part coming from Hungary for the 2nd, and from the Ukraine for the 9th.[26]

Ages

The age of the SS soldiers reflected the policy of the *SS-Hauptamt*, which constantly anticipated the roll-call of the young conscripts in the army.[27] More than 76 per cent of the volunteers recruited in 1940 were under 21 (37,612 out of 48,894).[28] This policy was continued and even extended during the war. The German SS units created in the first half of 1943 were very homogeneous, and the median age of the members was very low: 18½ years for the 9th and 10th SS divisions (officers and non-commissioned officers included), 18 years for the SS brigade "Reichsführer-SS", and probably less for the 12th SS division.[29]

During the last 18 months of the war, the German SS units lost their homogeneous character. During the Battle of the Bulge, for example, soldiers of all ranks aged from 16 to 45 fought side by side.[30] This was certainly also the case in other Wehrmacht units – except the paratroops – but it was also the price paid for the *Reichsführung-SS*'s short-sighted policy of using its new recruits to swell the number of the SS divisions, rather than managing a manpower reserve of quality in anticipation of battle losses. Breaking point was reached during the summer of 1944.[31]

Political affiliation

Following the image of the "fanatical" SS soldier created by contemporaries and post-war literature, one might be tempted to think that the SS volunteers all came out of the same mould, and even that most of them had political responsibilities in Nazi Germany. The reality, however, is more complex. The ratio of SS soldiers involved in National Socialist organizations fluctuated strongly depending on the units, the moment and the National Socialist organizations considered. For instance, the "Death's Head" regiments at the beginning of the war were composed

of more than 60 per cent Nazi militants – especially members of the *Allgemeine SS*, the civil branch of the SS. This proportion was only half as high in the police and army units that have been analysed (the 101st Reserve Police Battalion and the 253rd Infantry Division, for instance).[32]

In fact, because of the rivalry between the National Socialist organizations (such as Sturmabteilung, Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrkorps, etc.), the SS did not receive many of their militants.[33] With the conversion of the *Waffen-SS* into a mass army from 1943 onwards, the proportion of Nazi militants among its members decreased markedly – due on the one hand to the massive incorporation of German teenagers who had not had the opportunity for political commitment, and on the other hand to the integration of "ethnic Germans" who were not members of the Hitler Youth or the Labour Service.[34]

Motivations

To understand the motivations that led men to volunteer for the *Waffen-SS*, the historian has to face a double problem concerning sources and methodology. Contemporary sources tell us very little about motivation, and the personal accounts given after the war by SS soldiers are, for obvious reasons, difficult sources. One way of ascertaining possible motives for enlistment is to study the SS recruitment propaganda. This allows us to understand the messages to which German recruits responded. Regarding propaganda strategies, three different phases can be distinguished. Until 1941, the call for a "new type of political combatant"[35] prevailed. The reasons given for a candidate to enlist were ideological: need of a Lebensraum for Germany; to fight not in a "classical" war between States but in a war against opposed ideologies, such as liberalism and communism.[36]

Whereas men had enlisted before the conflict for ideological or opportunist reasons, the volunteers in the war years 1939–1941 joined above all a political paramilitary elite, and not – as they said or wrote later – a military elite organization. Indeed, the *Waffen-SS* was in no way a military elite – nor was it presented as such – at this time.

From 1941 onwards, however, the SS recruiting propaganda changed completely, now using very attractive posters showing SS soldiers. Furthermore, the rational approach that addressed the candidates' political or ideological convictions gave place to a subjective and emotional message about the possibilities of military elitism. The posters were meant to seduce men into volunteering without conveying any political or ideological statements.[37] In 1943, this approach changed

once again, as now German teenagers became the main target of the SS. The propaganda was directed at them, and enlistment in the *Waffen-SS* was presented as a rite that permitted teenagers early entry into the adult world: the "best" poster in this sense presented in a low-angle shot a proud teenager in the uniform of the *Hitlerjugend* and, in the background, the same person in SS uniform, markedly taller.[38]

Regarding the motivations of the *volksdeutsche* volunteers, we can discern three different types: 1) the "enthusiasts" who joined the *Waffen-SS* at the beginning of the war in order to serve Germany and because they did not feel a strong connection towards their countries of residence; 2) men who were attracted by the material advantages offered by the SS, by the pay and financial help for their families. These incentives were particularly attractive because of the economic difficulties in the occupied countries; 3) finally those who, in the second half of the war, were enlisted like conscripts by the SS, following diplomatic agreements.

In the case of "Germanic" volunteers, the call for a "racial community" had little echo. When the SS recruiting operations were intensified, from 1943 onwards, they attracted primarily men from the lower classes motivated by material advantages or the desire to flee from a taxing or difficult situation.[39] From this point of view, the case of the Walloon Legion is certainly interesting, because it was highly paradoxical. The degree of political or ideological affiliation (mostly anti-communism) of its soldiers was far higher at the beginning, in 1941–2, when the unit was created to participate in the "Crusade against Bolshevism" and belonged to the *Wehrmacht*, than after its transfer to the *Waffen-SS* in summer 1943. In October 1944, the unit's commander wrote a stern report about this problem:[40] "[...] since April 1944, recruitment for the SS Brigade Wallonie gets more and more difficult. A great number of recruits does not show any social or even moral value: they are young workers from the Reich's factories who enlist in order to escape from the too harsh and dull life in the industry, and have no kind of care for idealism; many are even not Walloons but belong to nations rotten by democracy."

Spontaneous, suggested or enforced enlistment?

In theory, the *Waffen-SS* was forced because of its status to recruit only volunteers. In reality, an increasing number of men were pressured into joining the *Waffen-SS* during the conflict. The question is, therefore, when and by what means the SS overrode its own principles and broke both German and, in the case of foreigners, international laws by

enlisting non-volunteers. Contrary to preconceived ideas, the pressure on "volunteers" did not evolve in a linear fashion during the conflict. The application of coercion fluctuated, depending both on SS needs and on available manpower. As early as spring 1940, when the SS wanted to complete its "Death's Head" regiments, civil SS members, teenagers of the Patrol Service and the Hitler Youth, and even members of the SA were pressured to enlist in the *Waffen-SS*.[41] A rise in enforced enlistments occurred again one year later, just before the invasion of Russia, when the SS had to fill up its active and reserve units, in the form of a "20,000 men campaign" within a period of seven weeks.[42]

The transformation of the *Waffen-SS* into a mass army in the years 1942–3 certainly marked a clear breach of earlier practices.[43] From this point onwards, coercion was no longer applied only to men who were more or less closely connected with a SS or Nazi organization, but also to common conscripts. The recruiting methods did not change, but the population affected by them did.[44]

The increasing scarcity of manpower in the Reich also contributed to this evolution. The growing need for soldiers, particularly due to the *Wehrmacht*'s losses in Russia, obliged the army to enlist ever younger age groups. From the end of 1942, the number of age groups available for enlistment was reduced to only one (year class 1925), while there had been three at the beginning of the year. Consequently, constraint took on a cyclic form: each time a new age group was available to be enlisted, the SS and *Wehrmacht* had no difficulty in finding a certain number of enthusiastic young volunteers. But these volunteers did not suffice. For the *Wehrmacht*, the problem was easily solved by conscription. The SS, however, had to increase the pressure on the passive members of each age group to fill its ranks.

With regard to enlistment, the SS was not as powerful within the Reich as is believed in current secondary literature. A number of cases prove that it was possible to avoid enlistment in the SS, at least by enlisting in the *Wehrmacht*.[45] The existence of complaints proves, also, that it was possible to oppose an arbitrary decision. In February 1943, for example, 2,500 teenagers who had been coerced to enlist in the *Waffen-SS* were released and handed over to the police.[46]

Enforcement sometimes took radical forms, including the death penalty at times. Still, this was only possible by consent of both Hitler and the *Wehrmacht* high command.[47] On the other hand, the SS found in the army an increasingly dangerous competitor for recruits, since in summer 1943 the army started to use the same methods as the SS, only on a larger scale.[48] The figures speak for themselves: enforcement

did not lead to an increase in SS enlistments. In fact, the number of new recruits in the *Waffen-SS* diminished in 1944 in favour of recruitment into the army.[49] Nonetheless, since both air and sea were controlled by Allied forces, the course of the war necessitated the dispatch of *Luftwaffe* and *Kriegsmarine* soldiers to ground-battle units. If the Army (*Heer*) received the greatest part of them, the *Waffen-SS* received, for its part, about 40,000 men, because Himmler had meanwhile been designated Chief of Army reserve, after the assassination attempt on Hitler of 20 July 1944, and so could give some advantages to "his" *Waffen-SS*. As these men had no choice, it is hard to say whether or not they accepted their transfer willingly. Some of them were satisfied;[50] others protested in vain – not always for political reasons, but also due to being "loathe to become common infantry."[51] Hence, as has recently been shown by the case of the German Nobel prize winner Günter Grass, who confessed to having belonged to the *Waffen-SS* after having volunteered for the submarines, towards the end of the war it became increasingly difficult to make a distinction between real volunteers and others.[52]

This is also true for the *Volksdeutsche*. While the SS took much care to stress the voluntary character of the enlistment of "ethnic" Germans at the beginning of the war,[53] it began to use more forceful tactics when it failed to achieve its recruiting objectives in 1942, at the time of the formation of the "Prinz Eugen" division with men of the former Yugoslavia. Himmler even decreed the conscription of the Balkans' *Volksdeutsche* from 17 to 50 years old, "if necessary to 55 years old". They had, according to him, the duty to serve "not by formal law, but by the brazen law of their *Volkstum*".[54]

This unilateral decision complicated the matter rather than resolving it. It was, in fact, very hard to enforce, for many reasons. Himmler's main chiefs of staff were opposed: for the chief of SS recruitment, the results would be counterproductive, because enlistment into the SS would be seen as a punishment; for the military chief of staff, the results on the battlefield would be poor with such conscripts; finally, it would be impossible to publish this decision, for propaganda and diplomatic reasons.[55] Consequently, the issue of general conscription for the *Volksdeutsche* remained unresolved until the end of the war.[56] In itself, it had no more importance. As the SS judge in Himmler's office wrote in February 1945, "the SS and police courts had always taken care of the *Reichsführer's* point of view, even without such legal basis, and [...] used it as fundament of their decisions with all consequences which proceeded from it."[57]

During the war, the SS paid much more attention to the voluntary character of enlistments of "Germanic" foreigners in the occupied countries than of Germans in the Reich. More than the will to adhere to the international laws of war, the racial conceptions of the SS can explain this choice. The SS, for example, respected its engagements and liberated its "Germanic" volunteers who had enlisted for a short six-month service. Even men who wanted to go home before the end of this period were released in March 1941.[58] In October 1942, more than 20 per cent of the "Germanic" SS volunteers had been released from armed service since the beginning of the war, while 2,404 out of 10,821,509 had been killed (4.7 per cent).[59] Of course, there were cases of constraint, especially from 1943 onwards.[60] But these remained at a very low level. And, although Himmler considered introducing conscription in the "Germanic" countries, he did not do so.[61] By contrast, the SS dealt otherwise with "non-Germanic" volunteers. In fact, it rounded up the young male inhabitants of some countries when it needed men, for example in Zagreb when the Bosnian Division was set up in summer 1943.[62] Men were also rounded up to fill the ranks of the Second SS Armoured Corps in Ukraine, in spring 1944.[63] Such operations were not, however, a "*Waffen-SS* exclusivity".[64] Finally, conscription was introduced in 1944 in Bosnia, Estonia, and Latvia.[65]

Conclusion

To sum up, it has become clear that the profiles of the *Waffen-SS* volunteers are much more complex than is usually believed. Even more important, independently of their profiles or their motivations, these volunteers came to serve as an example after which the *Reichsführung SS* and the government intended to model the *Wehrmacht*. In the competition created by the Nazi leaders between the "conservative" German army and the "revolutionary" *Waffen-SS*, the latter gradually became the model of reference regarding efficiency on the battlefields – or so, at least, it was successfully represented by propaganda. The ideological conviction of these "new types of political combatants" was declared as more important than their professional value. Furthermore, through the successful enlistment of foreigners, the *Waffen-SS* gave the illusion that patriotism was henceforth transcended by ideological education. Given this example, the German Army was intended by the government to evolve in the same direction. The army's *Volksgrenadier-Divisionen*, which were set up under the aegis of the SS even before the

attempt on Hitler in July 1944, and later the *Volkssturm* were means of copying this ideological "success". They were a direct extension of the social model of the *Waffen-SS* to the regular army, and by the end to a whole society at war.

Notes

I would like to thank Karen Weilbrenner for proofreading the English.

1. For a general perspective: G. H. Stein (1967) *La Waffen-S.S.*, American edn 1966 (Paris); B. Wegner (1997) *Hitlers politische Soldaten. Die Waffen-SS, 1933–1945*, 5th edn (Schöningh); J. L. Leleu (2007) *La Waffen-SS. Soldats politiques en guerre* (Paris).
2. B. Wegner (1997); G. C. Boehnert (1978) *A Sociography of the SS Officer Corps, 1925–1939* (Ph.D., University of London), V; H. F. Ziegler (1989) *Nazi Germany's New Aristocracy. The SS Leadership, 1925–1939* (Princeton/New Jersey), XX. A sociological study about NCOs and all ranks of the *Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS* units is available in M. Cüppers (2005) *Wegbereiter der Shoah. Die Waffen-SS, der Kommandostab Reichsführer-SS und die Judenvernichtung 1939–1945* (Darmstadt).
3. For bibliographical accounts about Berger, see G. Rempel "Gottlob Berger – 'Ein Schwabengeneral der Tat' ", in R. Smelser and E. Syring (eds.) (2000) *Die SS: Elite unter dem Totenkopf, 30 Lebensläufe* (Paderborn), p. 45–59; J. Scholtysek (1997) "Der ‚Schwabenherzog". Gottlob Berger, Obergruppenführer' in M. Kiβener, J. Scholtysek *Die Führer der Provinz. NS-Biographien aus Baden und Württemberg* (Konstanz), p. 77–110. See also H. Höhne (1995) *Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf. Die Geschichte der SS*, 1st edn 1967 (Augsburg), p. 420.
4. J. L. Leleu (2007), p. 118f. See too G. Rempel (1971) *The Misguided Generation: Hitler Youth and SS, 1933–1945* (Ph.D., University of Wisconsin).
5. Ibid., p. 129–135 and chapter 6.
6. G. Aly and K. H. Roth (2000) *Die restlose Erfassung. Volkszählen, Identifizieren, Aussondern im Nationalsozialismus*, 1st edn 1984 (Frankfurt/Main), p. 19.
7. Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde (later BABL), NS 19/370: Der Reichsführer-SS, 11.6.1944.
8. BABL, NS 19/3987 (fol. 13): "Auf dem Weg zum germanischen Reich", Ansprache des Chef des SS-Hauptamtes [Tagung auf der Plassenburg, 26.2.1944–1.3.1944]; NS 19/2859: Reichskommissar für die Festigung dt. Volkstums/Hauptamt VoMi an Reichsführer-SS/Pers.Stab, IX/13/III/22 g.Rs., betr: Unterstützung der z.Zt. unter rumänisch-sowjetischem Bereich lebenden Deutschen in Rumänien, 26.9.1944.
9. L. Tilkovszky (1974) "Die Werbeaktionen der Waffen-SS in Ungarn", *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, XX, 1–2, 137–181, p. 180.
10. Vojensky Historicky Archív, Prague (later VHA), SS-Nachrichten-Stelle "Nordwest", 9/3: Fernschreiben (FS) 2216, SS-Standartenführer Jungclaus an Reichsführer-SS, 14.2.1941, 11.00 Uhr; SS-Nachr.Stelle "NW", 10/3: FS 2604, Ergänzungs-Stelle Nordwest an Chef des SS-Hauptamtes, 28.2.1941, 11.35 Uhr; SS-Nachr.Stelle "NW" 12/4: FS 2958, Ergänzungsstelle Nordwest an Chef des SS-Hauptamtes, 13.3.1941, 16.25 Uhr; SS-Nachr.Stelle "NW"

14/5: FS 3531: Ergänzungsstelle Nordwest an Ausbildungs-Bataillon Sennheim, 7.4.1941, 17.30 Uhr. M. P. Gingerich (1997) "Waffen SS Recruitment in the 'Germanic Lands', 1940–1941", *The Historian*, 59, 826.

11. J. L. Leleu (2007), p. 177–78, 186–89.
12. BABL, NS 19/1735 (fol. 37–39): Chef des SS-Hauptamtes an den Reichsführer-SS, Betr: Germanische Freiwillige, 28.7.1943; NS 19/3987 (fol. 12–13): "Auf dem Weg zum germanischen Reich". Ansprache des Chefs des SS-Hauptamtes [Tagung auf der Plassenburg, 26.2.1944–1.3.1944].
13. See G. Stein (1967), chap. 6, p. 155 (the numbers given by Stein are nevertheless wrong).
14. G. Stein (1967); p. 155–164. F. Steiner (1958) *Die Freiwilligen. Idee und Opfergang* (Göttingen). The total of Dutch SS soldiers is derived from their number in January 1944 and the recruitments during the year 1944. See BABL, NS 19/2429 (fol. 126): SS-Obergruppenführer Rauter an Reichsführer-SS, betr: SS-Werbungen 1944, 11.1.1945, 19.45 Uhr. P. Pierik (2001) *From Leningrad to Berlin. Dutch Volunteers in the Service of the German Waffen-SS 1941–1945. The Political and Military History of the Legion, Brigade and Division Known as "Nederland"* (Soesterberg), p. 56f.
15. BABL, NS 19/1480: Reichsführer-SS an Chef des SS-Hauptamtes, 23.3.1944. See too J. R. Stovall (1976) *Gottlob Berger and Waffen-SS Recruiting Policies* (Ph.D., Boulder, University of Colorado), p. 101f.
16. See, for instance, the case of the SS brigade (then division) "Wallonie" at the end of the war. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin-Mitte (later PA/AA), Inl II/D, R 100658 (n.f.): A.A./Pol II (Inf II c), betr:Flämisch-Wallonische Befreiungskomitees und die Lage in Belgien, 18.12.1944. E. De Bruyne (1994) *Dans l'étau de Degrelle. Le Service du Travail Wallon 1944–1945 ou de l'usine à la Waffen-SS* (Jalhay); E. De Bruyne (1998) *Le recrutement dans les Stalags et Oflags en faveur de la Légion Wallonie*, Housse, dact., 41 p.
17. J. L. Leleu (2007), p. 179–86.
18. M. P. Gingerich (1997), p. 829.
19. J. L. Leleu (2007), chapter 3.
20. Ibid., chapter 8.
21. Ibid., p. 224–25.
22. We only know the number of candidates in Bavaria in 1941. BABL, NS 31/145 (fol. 9): Ergänzungsstelle Süd (VII) an SS-Hauptamt/II, betr:Rassische Statistik für 1941, 14.7.1942.
23. BABL, NS 19/218 (fol. 84–85): Arbeit des Ergänzungsamtes, 5.6.1942.
24. BABL, NS 19/3517 (fol. 154): Chef des SS-Hauptamtes an Reichsführer-SS, 43/41 g, betr: HJ/Luftwaffe, 26.2.1941.
25. BABL, NS 19/1863 (fol. 23): Chef des Ergänzungsamtes der Waffen-SS an Stabsführer des SS-Oberabschnittes Süd, 4.5.1940; NS 19/2651 (fol. 24–25): Chef des SS-Hauptamtes an Chef des SS-Personalhauptamtes, 536/43 g, betr.: Beförderungen, 29.1.1943.
26. J. L. Leleu (2007), p. 201f.
27. Age of roll-call for the young conscripts in the Services varied considerably during the war (officially from 22 to 16). At the beginning (i.e. August 1939), age groups born in 1918 and 1919 were called. But, between February 1941 and October 1942, four age groups born between 1921 and 1924 were incorporated in order to prepare for the war against Russia and then to fill

the losses of the army on the Eastern Front. See B. R. Kroener (1988) "Die personellen Ressourcen des Dritten Reiches im Spannungsfeld zwischen Wehrmacht, Bürokratie und Kriegswirtschaft 1939–1942", in B. R. Kroener et al. (eds.) *Organisation und Mobilisierung des deutschen Machtbereichs. Kriegsverwaltung, Wirtschaft und personelle Ressourcen*, 1. Halbband: 1939–1941 (Stuttgart), 693–986, p. 727.

28. BABL, NS 19/3517 (fol. 245): Einberufungen bei der Waffen-SS im Jahr 1940.
29. Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv Freiburg im Breisgau (later BAMA), RH 20-7/105: Bericht über die Fahrt des Chefs des Generalstabes in Bereich des LXXXVII. A.K. u. XXV. A.K. v. 27–29.3.1943, 30.3.1943, § II, p. 3. H. Heiber (ed.) (1962) *Hitlers Lagebesprechungen. Die Protokollfragmente seiner militärischen Konferenzen 1942–1945* (Stuttgart), p. 335 (26.7.1943).
30. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland, USA (later NARA), RG 492/Entry ETO-MIS-Y Sect/Box 63: First Army Special Report, Facts and Figures about the 9 SS Div "Hohenstaufen". A statistical Survey, 15/16.1.1945, p. 4; RG 165/Entry 179/Box 719: PWIS (H)/LDC/219 & 223; Box 721: PWIS (H)/LF/397.
31. Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa (PAC), RG 24, C 17, vol. 13651: First Canadian Army, Intelligence Summary Number 236, 21.2.1945, § II, p. 2. See too NARA, RG 492/Entry ETO-MIS-Y Sect/Box 63: First Army Special Report, Facts and Figures about the 62 VG Div, a statistical survey, 6/7.1.1945, p. 3. Service Historique de la Défense-Terre, Vincennes (later SHD-Terre), 7 P 149-3, Front Ouest: Situation des forces allemandes au 31.1.1945 (annexe 1). B. R. Kroener (1999) "Menschenbewirtschaftung, Bevölkerungsverteilung und personelle Rüstung in der zweiten Kriegshälfte 1942–1944", in B. R. Kroener et al. (eds.) *Organisation und Mobilisierung des deutschen Machtbereichs: Kriegsverwaltung, Wirtschaft und personelle Ressourcen*, 2. Halbband: 1942–1944/45, (Stuttgart), 777–1001, p. 997f.
32. M. Cüppers (2005), p. 83f.
33. SA = *Sturmabteilung* (Storm Group); NSKK = *Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahr-Korps* (National Socialist Motor Corps). BABL, NS 31/299 (fol. 2): Oberste SA-Führung/Hauptamt Führung, Briefb. Nr. 11159, 28.10.1939; Ausführungsbestimmungen zur Anordnung des Stellvertreters des Führers v. 19.1.1940, betr: Ergänzung der Waffen-SS (Auszug); NS 19/3901: Reichsführer-SS, SS-Befehl, 27.11.1939; ibid., 13.12.1939; NS 19/1863: Lieber Pg. Hess !, Lieber Pg. Dr. Ley !, 26.1.1940; NS 31/366 (fol. 81–83): Ergänzungsamt der Waffen-SS/I an alle Ergänzungsstellen, betr: Einstellung von Werkscharmännern und Politischen Leitern, 16.1.1940; NS 19/3510 (fol. 149–151): Mob-Personal-Bestand der NSDAP, ihrer Gliederungen und angeschlossenen Verbände, 5.2.1940; NS 19/3521 (fol. 282): Chef des Ergänzungsamtes der Waffen-SS an Reichsführer-SS, 45/40 g.K., betr: Übersichtsliste, 2.4.1940; NS 19/218 (fol. 74): Arbeit des Ergänzungsamtes, 5.6.1942.
34. NARA, RG 492/Entry ETO-MIS-Y Sect/Box 63: First Army Special Report, Facts and Figures about the 9 SS Div "Hohenstaufen", 15/16.1.1945, p. 2 ; Box 64: ibid., 12 VG Div, 1/2.3.1945, p. 2.
35. Der Reichsführer SS – SS-Hauptamt (1943) *Dich ruft die SS* (Berlin-Grünewald and Leipzig), p. 6f.

36. BABL, NS 19/3520 (fol. 23): Chef des Ergänzungsamtes der Waffen-SS an alle Leiter der Ergänzungsstellen, 13/40 g., 1.2.1940.
37. Bundesarchiv Koblenz (later BAKO), Plakate 3/25/13, 3/25/20, 3/25/22, 3/25/25.
38. BAKO, Plakat 3/25/11. BABL, NS 31/154 (fol. 105): Ein Wille: Sieg! For more details and examples of some placards, see J. L. Leleu (2007), p. 232–41 and colour inset after p. 304.
39. Ibid., p. 255–60.
40. Franz Hellebaut to Léon Degrelle, in E. De Bruyne (1991), *Les Wallons meurent à l'Est : La Légion Wallonie et Léon Degrelle sur le Front russe 1941–1945* (Brussels), p. 130. See too A. Luyckx (1946–1947) "La répression de l'incivisme en Belgique. Aspects judiciaire, pénitentiaire et social. Les porteurs d'armes", *Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie*, 843–55.
41. See the reports of the XXth Military District (Wehrkreis) of Danzig (Gdansk) dated of 10th and 18th June 1940, in BAMA, RH 14/44 (fol. 141–168). BABL, NS 19/979: Oberster SA-Führer/Stabschef an Stellvertreter des Führers, betr: Übertritt zur SS, 26.6.1940. Tribunal Militaire International (vol. XLII), SS-28, p. 481. B. R. Kroener (2005), *"Der starke Mann im Heimatkriegsgebiet": Generaloberst Friedrich Fromm. Eine Biographie* (Paderborn), p. 907/n 144.
42. BABL, NS 19/3517: Chef des SS-Hauptamtes an Reichsführer-SS, Aktion 20.000 Mann, 1. Meldung, 14.5.1941; 2. Meldung, 20.5.1941; 3. Meldung, 24.5.1941; NS 19/3518: Chef des SS-Hauptamtes an Reichsführer-SS, betr: 20.000 Mann-Aktion (Zusammenstellung der Einberufungen 15.4.41–9.6.41), 6.6.1941; NS 19/3518 (fol. 151–165); NS 19/2652 (fol. 2–3): NSDAP/Gauleitung Halle-Merseburg/Gauleiter, Schnellbrief an Reichsverteidigungskommissar Dresden, 27.5.1941. B. Wegner (1997), p. 275/n 57, 276/n 64. P. Witte et al. (1999) *Der Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers 1941/42* (Hamburg), p. 428/n52.
43. B. Wegner (1997), p. 277.
44. J. L. Leleu (1999) *10. SS-Panzer-Division "Frundsberg"* (Bayeux), p. 10–13. H. Höhne (1995), p. 338–40. G. Rempel (Januar 1980) "Gottlob Berger and the Waffen-SS Recruitment, 1939–1945", *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen*, 27, 107–22, p. 114–15.
45. BABL, NS 31/148 (fol. 8): betr: Angehörige der Allgemeine SS, die eine Dienstleistung in der Waffen-SS ablehnen, 31.7.1941; NS 19/3665 (fol. 56): Chef des SS-Hauptamtes an Reichsführer-SS, 228/41 g.K., betr: Besprechung OKW, 8.12.1941. H. Buchheim (1994), "Befehl und Gehorsam" in H. Buchheim et al. (eds.) *Anatomie des SS-Staates*, 6th edn (Munich), p. 213–320, here p. 314–18.
46. BABL, NS 19/229 (fol. 3 & 5): Chef des SS-Hauptamtes an Reichsführer-SS, 931/43 g, betr: Nachersatz, 11.2.1943; SS-Hauptamt/II an Reichsführer-SS, 12.2.1943, 12.40 Uhr; NS 19/3871 (fol. 32): Chef des SS-Hauptamtes an Reichsführer-SS, 390/43 g.K., betr: Vortrag General Schmundt bei Reichsführer-SS, 18.4.1943. See too VHA, SS-Ausb.Btl. z.b.V., 11/3: SS-SS-Führungshauptamt/V/IE (A/VIII) an SS-Ausbildungs-Bataillon z.b.V., SS-Tr. Üb.Pl. "Heidelager", II/3854/43 g, betr: Beschwerden gegen Einberufung, 29.5.1943.
47. G. Weisenborn (2000) *Une Allemagne contre Hitler*, 1st edn 1953 (Paris), p. 150f. NARA, RG 165/Entry 179/Box 712: M.I.19(a)/PWIS/366, Report

on the interrogation of SS-Mann S. Alfred of "SS-Reichsführer", -.4.1944; RG 165/Entry 179/Box 719: PWIS (H)/LDC/108, Consolidated Report on 21 Alsatians of SS PGR 4 "DF", 13.7.1944. SHD-Terre, 10 P 141, chemise 1re Armée Française/2e bureau/Section PG (États numériques): Direction du Service des PG de la Zone Avant de l'Armée, n°361, Note de service concernant les Alsaciens et les Lorrains incorporés de force dans les Waffen "SS", 8.3.1945.

48. BABL, NS 19/4 (fol. 57): Chef des SS-Hauptamtes an Reichsführer-SS, 5199/43 g, betr: Untersuchung des Jhrg. 1927 (später 28 u. 29), 17.8.1943.
49. B. R. Kroener (1999), p. 858.
50. As in this case described by a US intelligence report: "PW[,] a former G[erman] A[ir] F[orce] man[,] volunteered for the SS because he admired both the SS and Himmler." NARA, RG 492/Entry ETO-MIS-Y Sect/Box 63: First US Army, Prisoner of War Report, 20/21.1.1945 (#12).
51. SHD-Terre, 10 P 142-2: Mobile Field Interrogation Unit N° 2, PW Intelligence Bulletin N° 2/26, 12.1.1945, § 12, p. 16.
52. NARA, RG 165/Entry 179/Box 716: Mobile Unit N° 1 Field Interrogation Detachment, Prisoner of War Intelligence Bulletin 1/14, 4.12.1944; ibid. 1/19, 26.12.1944, p. 8. PAC, RG 24, C 17, vol. 13648: First Canadian Army, Intelligence Summary Number 153, 30.11.1944, § II, p. 6. SHD-Terre, 10 P 141, chemise 1er CA/EM/2e bureau: 1re Armée Française/EM/2e bureau/Section PG, Compte Rendu N° 240, 9.4.1945. A. Míšková and V. Šustek (2000) *Josef Pfitzner. A Protektorátní Praha V Letech 1939–1945*, Tome 1: *Deník Josefa Pfitznera : Úřední korespondence Josefa Pfitznera sKarlem Hermannem Frankem* (Prague), p. 197 (7.10.1944).
53. BABL, NS 31/366 (fol. 120): Ergänzungsamt der Waffen-SS/II, betr: Untersuchung der Volksdeutschen aus den russischen Umsiedlungsgebieten auf Tauglichkeit für die Waffen-SS und Allgemeine SS, 2.10.1940.
54. BABL, NS 7/91 (fol. 2–6 & 9): Leiter der Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle an Reichsführer-SS, 18.6.1942; Reichsführer-SS an SS-Obergruppenführer Lorenz, AR 36/24/42, 13.7.1942 (cit.); Reichsführer-SS, AR 36/41/42, Lieber Lorenz, 10.8.1942. V. O. Lumans (Sept. 1989) "The Military Obligations of the Volksdeutsche in Eastern Europe toward the Third Reich", *East European Quarterly*, XXIII:3, 305–25, p. 312.
55. BABL, NS 7/91 (fol. 26–28 & 34): SS-Führungshauptamt/B 12f/V/IIb (1) an Pers.Stab/Reichsführer-SS, II/3817/43 g, betr: Wehrpflicht der Volksdeutschen, 27.5.1943; Chef des SS-Hauptamtes an Reichsführer-SS/Pers.Stab, 3706/43 g, betr: Wehrpflicht der Volksdeutschen im Südosten, 16.6.1943; Hauptamt SS-Gericht an SS-Richter beim Reichsführer-SS, Ia 155 35/42, betr: Völkische Wehrdienstpflicht von Volksdeutschen ausländischer Staatsangehörigkeit, 11.11.1943. P. Witte et al. (1999), p. 351/n 67, 534/n 2. G. Stein (1967), p. 186.
56. BABL, NS 7/91 (fol. 1 & 29): SS-Richter beim Reichsführer-SS an Hauptamt SS-Gericht, 198/43, betr: Völkische Wehrdienstpflicht von Volksdeutschen ausländischer Staatsangehörigkeit, 19.6.1943; Aktenvermerk für SS-Obf. Bender, betr: Wehrpflicht der Volksdeutschen aus dem Südost-Raum, 14.2.1945.
57. BABL, NS 7/91 (fol. 64): SS-Richter beim Reichsführer-SS an SS-Standartenführer Dr. Brandt, II-1318/4[5], betr: Wehrpflicht der Deutschen aus den Volksgruppen, 19.2.1945.

58. VHA, SS-Nachr.Stelle "NW", 10/3: Spruch 2458, Ergänzungsstelle Nordwest an SS-Hauptamt/SS-Ergänzungsamt, 22.2.1941, 14.45 Uhr; SS-Nachr.Stelle "NW", 11/4: FS 2826, SS-Standartenführer Jungclaus an Reichsführer-SS, 6.3.1941, 18.50 Uhr; SS-Nachr.Stelle "NW", 12/4: FS 3046, Ergänzungsstelle Nordwest an Chef des SS-Hauptamtes, 18.3.1941, 18.15 Uhr; FS 3065, Ergänzungsstelle Nordwest an Chef des SS-Hauptamtes, 19.3.1941, 9.30 Uhr.
59. The SS respected in the same way its volunteers who enlisted into its "Germanic legions" (these legions were composed of "Germanic" foreigners who presented a good "racial value" for the SS, but did not conform to its strict physical requirements – such as minimum height – and therefore could not be SS members). So at the same time, October 1942, 2,154 of the 9,773 volunteers serving in the "Germanic legions" had been released (22.0%) and 747 killed (7.6%). BABL, NS 31/455 (fol. 34): SS-Hauptamt/VI, Statistische Aufstellung über zur Waffen-SS und Legion eingestellte, entlassene und gefallene germanische Freiwillige, Stand: 30.10.42, 14.12.1942.
60. Facing the accusations, the *SS-Hauptamt* of course denied such doings. PA/AA, Inl II/D, R 100658 (n.f.): Königl. Schwedisches Konsulat Düsseldorf/Niederländische Schutzmachtangelegenheit an Kgl. Schwedische Gesandtschaft/Abt. B, 193/12a, 11.3.1943; SS-Hauptamt/Germanische Leitstelle/Amtsgruppe D, Herrn Konsul Dr. Ashton, A.A., 2.4.1943; Königl. Schwedische Gesandtschaft/Abteilung B an A.A., B N 167/3, Mi/J, Verbalnote, 9.6.1944; SS-Hauptamt/Amtsgruppe D/D II 2 an A.A., betr: Werbung von Niederländern für die Waffen-SS, 8.11.1944.
61. BABL, NS 19/3650: Reichsführer-SS an SS-Obergruppenführer Rauter, 23.2.1945. N.K.C.A In 't Veld (1976) *De SS en Nederland: Documenten uit SS-Archieven 1935–1945* ('S-Gravenhage, Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie/M. Nijhoff), 2 vol., 1692 p., vol. II, p. 1481 (doc. 647).
62. BABL, NS 19/2117 (fol. 2–3): Chef des SS-Hauptamtes an Reichsführer-SS, 2042/43 g.K., betr: Reise nach Kroatien, 13.7.1943; NS 19/2601 (fol. 169): 13.SS-Div., Flugblattentwurf Nr.2. BAMA, MSg 175/55: 13e Division de Montagne "Handschar" des Waffen SS, p. 2. M. D. Grmek and L. L. Lambrichs (1998) *Les révoltés de Villefranche: Mutinerie d'un bataillon de Waffen-SS à Villefranche-de-Rouergue, septembre 1943* (Paris), p. 158–60, 166. G. Lepre (1997) *Himmler's Bosnian Division. The Waffen-SS Handschar Division, 1943–1945* (Atglen), p. 37. H. Sundhausen (1971) "Zur Geschichte der Waffen-SS in Kroatien, 1941–1945", *Südost-Forschungen*, 30, 176–196, p. 193.
63. NARA, RG 165/Entry 179/Box 716: Mobile Unit N° 1 Field Interrogation Detachment, Prisoner of War Intelligence Bulletin 1/19, 26.12.1944, § 4, p. 7.
64. PAC, RG 24, C 17, vol. 13645: First Canadian Army, Intelligence Summary Number 27, 26.7.1944, § II, p. 2.
65. BABL, NS 33/31 (fol. 10): Rede des SS-Obergruppenführers Jüttner auf der SS-Führer-Tagung in Prag am 13. April 1944, p. 9. PA/AA, Inl II g, R 100998, 2577 (fol. 393393): 13.SS-Div./Ic 77/44 g.K., Richtlinien für die Sicherung des Landfriedens in Bosnien, 9.3.1944.

14

An Approach to the Social Profile and the Ideological Motivations of the Spanish Volunteers of the "Blue Division", 1941–44

Xosé-Manoel Núñez Seixas

The Spanish Division of Volunteers (*División Española de Voluntarios*), as it was officially called, was set up by the Franco Regime in the early summer of 1941 to take part in the Russian campaign within the German *Wehrmacht*. From 24 June through the first week of July 1941, hundreds of volunteers joined what was to become the "Blue Division", initially composed of around 17,000 soldiers. They were recruited by both the Spanish Fascist Party (the *Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las JONS*, known as Falange), which provided most of the rank-and-file soldiers, and the Spanish Army, which provided the officer and non-commissioned officer corps. High casualties on the harsh Eastern front created the need for replacements, and nearly 23,000 more volunteers were sent from Spain to Russia until the late autumn of 1943. More than 4,700 volunteers died on the Eastern front, and around 500 became prisoners of the Red Army. Many more returned wounded, disabled or affected by some kind of psychological damage.

Existing academic research on the Blue Division has focused either on the operational history of the Division or on the diplomatic aspect of the "adventure" of Spaniards on the Eastern Front, that is, the Spanish Division representing Franco's involvement in World War II on the Axis side. However, crucial questions such as *who* those volunteers were and *why* they volunteered have mostly been skipped over, or have been answered generically, based on limited evidence such as eyewitness accounts, veterans' memoirs or personal interviews with former

volunteers. The samples have not been truly representative, and the criteria used to distinguish "true" from "false" volunteers have often been rather simplistic.

To put it in a nutshell, research has oscillated between two extremes. At one extreme is the idea of the Blue Division as an exclusively Falangist-based enterprise for the most radical "first hour" Falangists. These had joined the Fascist Party when it was a minority organization (1933–6), before the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, and had given the best of their lives to establish a truly fascist regime without any agreement with the Catholic Church, the traditionalists, and the Army generals who helped bring General Franco into power. For those radical Falangists, the Division and the Russian campaign were seen as a continuation of the Spanish Civil War and of their anti-communist involvement since 1933–4. The influx of such enthusiastic, radical fascists peaked in the summer of 1941, and then declined after the spring of 1942, when news from the Russian front indicated that Blue Division involvement was more than a military parade alongside a victorious German Army. Volunteers who joined the Division after March 1942 have been unanimously catalogued as forced conscripts, released political prisoners or mercenaries, creating a sharp contrast between the "idealist" first wave of volunteers and the "materialist" second wave. Nevertheless, in spite of this gap, the overwhelming majority of soldiers who arrived on the Russian front from 1942 onwards would have been indoctrinated in some way as "Falangists", and performed militarily on a par with the first volunteers.[1]

The other extreme consists of those who see the Blue Division as a sort of conscripted expeditionary corps, or even as a punitive army. According to this interpretation, most of the 1941 Spanish volunteers were not really "idealistic" soldiers – quite the opposite. The bulk of the rank-and-file membership of the Division would have consisted of a mixture of mercenaries, conscripted soldiers forced by their officers and commanders to join the Blue Division, people with a Republican and leftist background who wanted to "erase" their political past by showing their courage in what was seen as a chance to redeem their lives and their family's reputation, and particularly unemployed workers and peasants.[2] This last group joined the Spanish expeditionary corps in Russia, attracted by the possibility of earning a double salary: from the German Army and the Spanish Army. They were eager to escape the economic situation of post-war Spain, characterized by high unemployment rates, poor living conditions, and severe shortages of food, clothing, and other consumer goods.

In fact, there is evidence to support both points of view without apparent contradiction. A third perspective views the "first" Division as a mixture of professional soldiers, particularly officers and commissioned officers (COs), who left Spain in search of adventure and war merits, and a rank-and-file mass of soldiers who were overwhelmingly fascist-oriented. According to this perspective, from mid-1942 onwards this first "idealistic" element was progressively replaced by adventurers, income-seekers, conscripted soldiers forced to join and replace the veterans and the fallen in Russia, and even hidden supporters of the Republican side defeated in 1939 who were searching for an opportunity to cross the lines and desert to the Soviet side.[3] In spite of the fact that the number of deserters among the Spanish soldiers in Russia remained relatively low, some authors hypothesize that the number of volunteers who were seeking to cross over to the Soviets was much higher. And so the Intelligence Staff of the German Army Corps, who oversaw the Intelligence services of the Blue Division, was encouraged to pay special attention to the political reliability of the new recruits arriving after March 1942.[4] It is estimated that three to five per cent of the new volunteers after early 1942 were rejected on political and social grounds, mostly because of their links to the Republican side during the Spanish Civil War.

The question of who volunteered, and why, is a matter that should be examined from a fresh perspective. The sources available to us are not especially helpful, particularly the records of the Blue Division kept at the Spanish General Military Archive [*Archivo General Militar*]. The personal files of the soldiers include almost no information on their recent past in political and social terms.[5] To answer the first question, we will offer a very preliminary sample of a database that is under construction, composed of short biographies of the fallen volunteers that were either published in the press or collected by military and political authorities. This may give us a first look at the various personal paths that converged in the Blue Division in and after 1941. The second question, of why people volunteered, will be approached primarily by using post-war autobiographies and memoirs, a source that usually tends to overestimate the importance of fascist idealism among the motivations of the fighters.[6] Other diverse sources will include personal accounts, war diaries, and memoirs (many of them unpublished), soldiers' letters from the front, and reports written by German and Soviet officers who were in contact with the Spanish soldiers.

The result is a more nuanced picture of the volunteers, their motivations, and their social and political background. The fascist element

in the Blue Division was not as strong as imagined; while the incentives of being a "war veteran" in Franco's Spain led many Catholics in the 1940s, as well as many wartime commissioned officers of the Francoist Army who had become "professional" soldiers in 1936–9, to consider the Russian adventure as a real investment in their careers. The contrast between the "first" and "second" wave of volunteers is not as sharp as was previously supposed; generational, familial and political experiences of the volunteers during the Spanish Civil War played a very important role in their decision to join the Blue Division. War volunteering can be considered as a decision faced within a framework of incomplete information, limited options and shifting expectations, all of which condition the rationality of the personal choice. Emotional factors such as enthusiasm, group solidarity and "accumulative eagerness" to fight also play a great role in the decision. They give shape to the "I don't know why I did it" answer that often emerges in interviews with war veterans.[7] However, many questions remain unresolved for the historian. Remembering his own move to cross the Pyrenean border in the summer of 1936 and his attempts to join the Spanish Republican Army in Northern Catalonia, Eric J. Hobsbawm writes that 65 years later it was difficult to really answer the question: "why did I do it?"[8]

The "Fever" of June–July 1941

The outbreak of World War II, and in particular the invasion of the Soviet Union by the German and Romanian Armies on the morning of 22 June 1941, seemed for many rank-and-file members and supporters of the Spanish Falange to be the beginning of a new opportunity. In their view, if Spain was to become a truly fascist state in the near future, then it had to join the winning side. Most members of the Spanish Falange were strong Germanophiles. However, admiration for the legendary German *Wehrmacht* and the view of Adolf Hitler as a kind of "defender" of Western and Christian civilization against communism, liberalism, and international freemasonry fostered by the Jews was shared by most supporters of the anti-republican coalition that was formed around the insurgent army generals in July 1936. This included many traditionalists, Catholics, conservatives and anti-communists with no particular fascist inclinations. The German Embassy in Madrid received dozens of congratulatory letters on the occasion of Hitler's birthday in 1940 and 1941, in addition to letters sent by individuals from all possible political backgrounds – from Catholic middle-class ladies to conservative village pharmacists – after the occupation of France in May 1940. Enthusiastic

demonstrations of solidarity with the Third Reich peaked after the outbreak of the German-Soviet War.[9] Devoted Catholics, rural priests and full-fledged fascists alike tended to see the *Wehrmacht* divisions as a kind of instrument chosen by God to defeat the "Antichrist", that is, atheistic communism. For them, Hitler was a new Saint Michael the Archangel, taking vengeance on Western democracies and Great Britain, all of which had previously been enemies of the Spanish Empire. These letters also expressed their firm belief that the German war against the Soviet Union could help redeem the excessively "materialistic" and atheistic Nazism from its own original sin. Conversion of the Third Reich to the Christian faith was expected to take place once the *Wehrmacht* had smashed the Communist *Beast*.[10]

This way of thinking and admiration of Nazi Germany was shared by many of those who volunteered, especially the intermediate and lower-level officer corps of the Spanish Army, which included the very influential category of non-commissioned officers. These *alféreces provisionales* ("wartime ensigns") had been trained at new military academies created by the rebel army during the Civil War. It is not difficult to understand their enthusiastic identification with a seemingly "invincible" military machine and a perceived model of palingenetic revival, a "national rebirth" of anti-Marxist and authoritarian character, and a sense of gratitude for the German military support of the Nationalist Army during the Civil War.[11] Sergeant Ángel Salamanca wrote that by the beginning of the 1940s "I felt fascinated by the overwhelming German victories during the first campaigns of the war, and [...] in 1940 I sought to be admitted as a volunteer in this Army that had scored a victory over those who had supported the Popular Front during our Civil War." This feeling motivated him to write to the German Embassy in Madrid, asking to be admitted as a soldier in the *Wehrmacht*.[12]

Seen from the outside, anti-communism acted as a homogenizing characteristic that helped to erase internal quarrels and the existing ideological differences among the diverse sectors that had shaped the anti-republican coalition of July 1936. Even Catholic Carlists, who openly rejected Fascism for fear that it emphasized the importance of concepts such as nation and state over religion and God, expressed their equally enthusiastic support for Germany in June 1941. The fact that the Third Reich was the only European power that dared to oppose Communism was sufficient reason to support the Germans.[13] Finally, a certain amount of anti-Semitic rhetoric, even though its ideological characteristics, inherited from Catholic integralism, were different from biological anti-Semitism, made it possible for wide sectors of what could

be labelled as "sociological Francoism" to openly voice their praise for Hitler and the Nazis.[14] In fact, some of the poems published in July 1941, dedicated to the Spanish volunteers who were departing for the Russian front, were explicitly anti-Semitic in tone.[15]

How did the members of the Spanish Falange respond to this call? This single party undertook the recruiting of volunteers and was in charge of providing the bulk of the soldiers for the Division. The response of the Falangist rank and file to the huge wave of nationwide propaganda deployed by the Falange apparatus seems to have been quite enthusiastic in most of the Spanish provinces. However, there were some very important nuances. Two variables must be taken into account:

1. Territory. The fact that many Spanish provinces and towns, including the cities of Madrid and Valencia, remained under the control of the Republican Government until March–April 1939 left many supporters of the Francoist army with no real opportunity to fight in the Spanish Civil War under the flag they would have chosen.[16] Members of the Falange and sympathizers of the insurgent army had been surviving underground for almost three years, while hiding from the Republican police and the workers' militias, or had even been forced to enlist in the Republican People's Army. In Madrid and other towns, many of them joined the "Fifth Column", an underground Falangist organization devoted to sabotage.[17]

In fact, prior to mid-1942 most civilian volunteers from the cities of Madrid and Barcelona belonged to the Falange.[18] Many Falangists and supporters of the rebel side suffered during the 1936–9 period due to persecution of their families and friends by left-wing militias. They carried a sense of vengeance and anger against *Russian* Communism, and felt obliged to demonstrate that they too were eager to take up arms "for Spain", that is, against the enemies that had been defeated in 1939 by many of their fellow comrades from other provinces. Above all, this could bring about material advantages. During the early 1940s any "former combatant in the Francoist Army" had, along with privileges in many aspects of daily life, better access to public sector jobs, from schoolteacher to porter (a fixed percentage of these jobs were reserved for war veterans and disabled soldiers). Those who did not enjoy this status had good reason to seek it. In addition, Francoist neighbours, friends, relatives, and comrades who had fought for "Spain" during the Civil War exerted a moral pressure in local communities, and could become an important factor in motivating people to join the cause seeking the final defeat of the hated spectre of Communism.

2. Age. The "moral pressure" of the Francoist community of comrades and supporters of the regime also had an effect on Falangists who were too young to have enlisted during the Civil War, and who now saw that their hour had arrived, a chance to prove their eagerness to fight before older comrades who in many cases were their own brothers and relatives.[19] This was particularly important in the Single Party's youth organizations, such as the high-school and university students' organization SEU (*Sindicato Español Universitario*), which had grown significantly since 1939. The leaders of the SEU were among the first to join the Division, and in the winter of 1939 there had already been some initiatives to recruit SEU members to help the Finnish Army in the Winter War against the Soviet Union.[20] Some contemporary testimonies estimated the percentage of SEU members among volunteers in the summer of 1941 to be 10 per cent of the Division, and this percentage was even higher among the recruits from the city of Madrid.[21] Some memoirs published in the early 1950s pointed out that, among the Party volunteers concentrated in Madrid, it was quite unusual to find soldiers from peasant or working-class backgrounds, as most were "students, employees or shop assistants", an image which has been initially confirmed by historical research.[22]

Individual motivations ran parallel to ideological and generational factors: many of the younger Falangists had lost relatives to extra-official Republican repression during the Civil War. This wave of younger, radicalized Falangists gave some continuity to the first replacement battalions dispatched to the Eastern Front throughout 1942 and 1943. As late as 1943, a German liaison officer wrote that many of the volunteers were motivated by "a desire for retaliation" against "Russian communism".[23]

There can be little doubt that, for many members of the Falange, the Russian adventure seemed to be a good investment. First, they were joining what appeared to be an invincible army, whose progress on the Eastern front seemed unstoppable. Many war diaries and soldiers' letters from July to September of 1941 echoed the increasing impatience of the Spaniards and their desire to reach the front, as they feared arriving too late to parade through the streets of Moscow. The enlistment was seen as a temporary trip that could provide substantial personal and political dividends. Second, for radicalized Falangists the possibility of returning home in the near future with the prestige of having taken part in the defeat of the Soviet Union was seen as a way of forcing the Francoist regime to become increasingly fascistized.[24] For some Falange leaders who joined the Division, such as the former head of State

propaganda, Dionisio Ridruejo, and the student union leader Enrique Sotomayor, participation in the Russian campaign would also give Spain the chance to regain an active role in restructuring the map of Europe after the victory of the Nazi "New Order".[25] Many also sought to cultivate a self-image of Falangist moral perfection: these had presumably not taken part in the post-war repression.[26]

For many others, participation in the Russian campaign meant overturning the power of the Catholic Church in the *new* Spain that would be built upon their return. This could be seen as a way of compensating for the fact that the Falangist "hardliners" had lost power within the Single Party after José Luis de Arrese became General Secretary in May 1941. Arrese was seen by many as an opportunist whose only loyalty was to General Franco.[27] However, almost none of these Falangist volunteers can be seen as representatives of a Spanish variant of a Quisling-like movement. They did not go so far as to advocate the removal of Franco as Head of the State, even though some of them asked for help from Germany, in July 1941, when a memorandum signed by Falangist "crusaders against Russia" and "parents of crusaders" was received by the German Ambassador in Madrid. It requested the support of the Third Reich in order to force the State, the Army and the administration to take a more actively Falangist direction, giving "true believers" of the Falange key posts in all spheres of government. However, apart from aiming at a more radical enforcement of the "imperial style of the Falange", the memorandum also emphasized the "Christian character" of Spanish fascism, which did not question Franco's leadership.[28] Some clandestine groups, recruited from among Falangist rank-and-file members, actually received German support and adopted Nazi symbols and slogans, and radical Falangists were behind the founding of some associations to support the "Great Germany" in provinces such as Valencia.[29] However, in these cases there was a kind of *a priori* identification of the fascist creed with the German model, which was not really well understood. The victorious shadow of the Third Reich was used as a means to re-legitimize the imperialist dreams of Spanish fascists. Despite this, most held fiercely to Catholicism as a value to be preserved in the face of the atheistic tendencies observed in German Nazism, a resolve that was reinforced when the volunteers who stayed in Germany had real contact with everyday life in the Third Reich.[30]

Who were the Falangists? This question has many answers. The members of the Single Party established an unofficial hierarchy among themselves. There were those who had joined the organization during

the "hard times" of the Spanish Second Republic, between October 1933 and July 1936, and who were usually labelled as the "old shirts". They were a select minority who occupied the leading offices and posts both in the party and in sections of the administration that were put under the control of the Falange. But most of the Party was composed of "new shirts", those who had filled the ranks of the organization from 18 July 1936 onwards. "Old shirts" usually despised the new members, considering most of them to be sheer opportunists, disguised "reds" or traditional conservatives. It is a fact that a number of former supporters of left-wing organizations joined the Falange in the first months of the Civil War, seeking refuge from repression and perhaps attracted by the "revolutionary" Falange rhetoric, at least when compared with conservative Catholic organizations.[31] The internal heterogeneity of the party was further increased by younger members who had joined the Falange between 1939 and 1941 and had not taken part in the Civil War. However, as a provincial leader of the party reported in July 1941, it was the mobilization that took place around the dispatch of volunteers to Russia that formed a sense of "union", reinforcing the links among the different "comrades from diverse political backgrounds".[32] In other provinces, such as León, the wave of enthusiasm of June and July 1941 increased party membership.[33] This would later be reinforced by hero-worship of soldiers fallen in Russia.

It becomes evident that referring to the first and most enthusiastic volunteers of the Blue Division as "true Falangists" hides the complexity of that label. In fact, many became "Falangists" through the war experience of 1936–9. Participation in the Civil War had been decisive in turning Spaniards into fascists, according to the biographies of many June 1941 volunteers and Army NCOs who joined the Division.[34] Many of these "war fascists" were not particularly concerned with the fine ideological distinctions and quarrels that occupied the minds of the intellectuals on the winning side, such as the disputes on the preeminence of God, the State or the Nation in the "new Spain". Likewise, these supporters of the regime, whose mindset had been forged in the confrontation against "Communism" during the Civil War, were even less anxious to take sides in the internal disputes of the Single Party. In fact, there was a common trait among all war biographies of NCOs, wartime ensigns, sergeants, and lieutenants: most of them had a Conservative and Catholic background, and often their only experience with militancy prior to 1936 had been in the Catholic Youth (*Juventud Católica*), a non-political organization under the tutelage of the parish priests. Many were from smallholding peasant families or

more notable circles (local pharmacists, doctors, schoolteachers...) in rural areas and small villages. During the Civil War, they joined the rebel side on an impulse to defend their endangered social status, their religious beliefs, and their nationalist sentiments.[35] It was not unusual for many of these "new" Falangists, and in a broader sense for the new supporters of Francoism, to have had extensive wartime experience; some had even been wounded in combat several times, or had been awarded military honours. Last but not least, a good number of them had joined the "wartime ensigns", a group formed by the insurgent army as a way of training loyal officers for the rebel cause, who could be re-mobilized in case of need. Many of them had remained active in the army after the war. Though the extremely low Spanish Army salaries granted them no privileged standard of living, they at least had room and board.[36] This had made the army a "refuge" for survival during the economically harsh post-war years in Spain.

Although these rank-and-file supporters of the Franco regime were the key to its stability, they were not perceived as real fascists by the Falangist "old-shirts". However, they tended to share quite a similar world view, particularly with regard to identifying Spain's enemies. These enemies could be gathered into one composite "satanic" vision that included Communism, regional separatism and Freemasonry fed by the "international Jewry", all of whom were epitomized in one word: *Russia*, the embodiment of all that had been fought against during the Civil War.[37] Many of them regarded the Eastern campaign as a good opportunity to increase their chances of a successful military career. Ideological motivations also influenced some officers and NCOs to join the Blue Division, but it is almost impossible to offer a complete quantitative picture of how many "Falangists" and "non-Falangists" volunteered. It is possible to get some vague ideas of numbers by carrying out very detailed research on a provincial basis. For example, the provincial organization of the Falange in Ourense reported in October 1941 that, among the 97 volunteers recruited by the party, 35 were "Falangists" and 45 were "non-Falangists".[38]

Within the Blue Division there were also frequent disputes and a current of underlying tension between "party" and "professional" volunteers. The fact that many Falangist volunteers came from middle-class backgrounds or had university training, had been decorated during the Spanish Civil War or had risen to the rank of wartime ensign, made it difficult for them to coexist peacefully with the officers, and particularly with professional NCOs. In some units there was even a kind of double hierarchy: one military and one political.[39] However, the

difference between "pure" Falangists and "opportunists" is rather dubious and unclear in practical terms. The same could be said of the significance of the usual distinction that is made between "civilian" and "military" volunteers. Many NCOs and wartime ensigns volunteered at the Falange headquarters and, conversely, many professional soldiers were not motivated solely by career objectives; these two aspects are intimately linked. This touches on a typical misconception among existing studies of the Spanish Civil War, which primarily focus on the study of the attitudes of political and military leaders and do not give sufficient weight to the experiences and motivation of the soldiers. This is why, for example, there is still no satisfactory explanation of the phenomenon of mass volunteering during the first weeks of the Civil War.[40]

The importance of the mobilizing context of June 1941 must not be underestimated. As accurately portrayed in many post-war biographies and some novels written by former soldiers of the Blue Division, the decision to "go to Russia" was not always addressed in the same way. Many volunteers who decided to join the new *Crusade* were "hypnotized" by the enthusiasm of their fellows-in-arms, political comrades, fellow students, and so on. This enthusiasm was fuelled from above, and in many Spanish provinces the Falange leadership had made considerable efforts to hold public events and to distribute propaganda. The results of this propaganda effort were disappointing in some regions, particularly in Catalonia and certain traditionally "red" areas where most of the population had remained loyal to the Republic until 1939. In the Basque provinces, and also in Navarre, the strong presence of Catholic traditionalism with its hostility to this particular recruitment resulted in lower numbers of volunteers.[41] But even in provinces such as Teruel internal reports of the Falange suggest that war enthusiasm among party members was limited. This forced some provincial leaders, such as Teruel's chief Luis Julve, to volunteer themselves.[42]

However sceptical one may be about information provided by the party organizations and regime newspapers, it is undeniable that in other areas – such as Madrid, Valencia, and some Eastern provinces as well as in "Old" Castile – the social bases of the regime and its supporters strongly encouraged volunteering. This may have created a kind of "chain reaction", which also influenced young students and former supporters of the Republic, who became part of the "wave". The well-known left-wing film director Manuel García Berlanga, whose father was imprisoned for having been a prominent member of a Republican Party, stated years later that he joined the Blue Division to "clear" his

family honour and get his father released from prison. But he also admitted that his primary motivation for volunteering came from the influence of "some Falangist friends I had at the University of Valencia".[43] Enthusiasm was also transmitted by soldiers from clearly Republican backgrounds, who in their letters from the German instruction camp at Grafenwöhr during August 1941 expressed an eagerness to "smash the Russians"[44]. In the weeks following the Blue Division's baptism of fire at the Wolchow front (second half of October 1941), it was not wholly unusual to hear an entire section of volunteers from different political backgrounds singing the Falangist anthem.[45]

The lust for adventure may also have played a part in the decision of many volunteers, but most autobiographies and diaries shed little light on the nature of the decision. Sometimes, the move to volunteer was a collective one. Ideals of masculinity linked to a self-perception as "fighters for the Fatherland" were intrinsically related to this and may have played a conditioning role. Once the group had decided to step forward, it was difficult for the individual to retreat without being accused of "cowardice".[46] This gave a strong sentiment of cohesion to the Division: it was relatively easy for volunteers to meet old friends, relatives, and comrades in the trenches, distributed among the various companies and regiments.[47] To a certain extent, the early Blue Division seems to fit as an example of "primary group" cohesion *sui generis*.

Ironically, we have been able to access a random selection of volunteers due to the bullets of the Red Army. The only more or less systematic source for reconstructing a series of biographies of Blue Division soldiers is from the obituaries of "fallen soldiers in Russia", published by the main Spanish newspapers through the beginning of 1942, and the confidential reports written by the local and provincial services of the Falange on the occasion of a volunteer's death. Here we can only offer a very small sample, consisting of the first 147 fallen soldiers, and for this reason the results can only be considered approximate. Thirty-eight of them (25.8 per cent) were conscripted soldiers, while 56 (38 per cent) were officers and wartime ensigns and NCOs, and 43 (29.25 per cent) were volunteers recruited by the Falange, mostly civil servants, clerks, and students. Among the fallen soldiers, 30.6 per cent (45) were Falange party members and 33 of them (22.4 per cent) were "old shirts". A majority of the fallen (70.7 per cent) were veterans of the Civil War who had voluntarily joined the rebel army, and 27.2 per cent (40 cases) had become "wartime ensigns" during the Spanish conflict or had reached the status of NCO, wartime ensign, or even officer, due to military merits between 1936 and 1939. The number of former Carlists was small but

significant (eight cases, 5.4 per cent), and 11 soldiers (7.8 per cent) had belonged to some kind of Catholic organization before or after the Civil War. In 35 cases (23.8 per cent) the fallen soldiers had suffered imprisonment, repression or some kind of persecution by Republican authorities or left-wing militias between 1936 and 1939, as they had spent most or all of that period in territory that was under Republican control.[48]

The general picture confirms in a provisional way what has been suggested by qualitative sources. Though the Falangists did not constitute a majority of the Blue Division membership, their percentage of the total was far from negligible. And the fact that 25.8 per cent of the sample was made up of conscripted soldiers does not mean that all of them were necessarily forced to volunteer. Many of them showed a real eagerness to join the Division, and the same could be said of most non-commissioned and commissioned officers.

Certainly, there were also hundreds of volunteers and recruits with a strictly materialist motivation, who may even have been forced to volunteer because of poverty.[49] The double salary offered to the soldiers by the Spanish and German Armies, along with the subsidy offered to the volunteer's family during his stay at the front, may well have acted as a factor that encouraged unemployed workers and peasants to join the expedition. People who were in trouble with the Francoist justice system may also have regarded participation in the Russian campaign as a form of reparation, which was in fact taken into account by military and civil tribunals. There were also some cases in which supporters of the Republic and sympathizers of left-wing organizations saw in the Blue Division a golden opportunity to flee from Franco's Spain and join the Soviet Army.[50] Still, the number of deserters remained quite low, although when the Blue Division was deployed to the North front there was a proportionally higher number of deserters [*Fahnenflüchtige*] who did not return to their posts after being given a leave, or who stayed in the rear.[51]

The replacements of 1942–3: mercenaries or volunteers?

The number of enthusiastic volunteers with Falangist membership decreased dramatically throughout 1942 and particularly during 1943, until November, when the Blue Division was released from the front. Reports from provincial organizations of the Single Party, such as that of León in July 1943, explicitly referred to the "difficult conditions and scant eagerness to volunteer" among the local Falangists.[52] Consequently, the number of "coerced" volunteers increased. These

were conscripted soldiers who had been more or less obliged by their commanders to stand up and volunteer to join the replacement expeditions that were sent regularly by train to the Russian front.[53] Among them, however, there was also a significant number of professional soldiers, particularly from the Spanish Foreign Legion deployed in the Protectorate of Northern Morocco, who were now dispatched to Russia in order to make up for casualties and shortages caused by the return home of former volunteers. Most of these legionaries agreed to go to Russia. In practice, they already were mercenaries, since they had joined the Foreign Legion because of the attractive salaries it paid, and on the Eastern front could accumulate war merits and double salaries. Their biographies were similar to those of the wartime ensigns: many had volunteered for the rebel army in 1936–7 and after the Civil War decided to stay in the finest army corps, which offered them some prestige and chances of economic survival.

However, it is impossible to offer a statistical evaluation of how many they were. According to the reports of the German liaison officers, the "new human material" that was now filling the ranks of the Blue Division was good enough, but lacked the ideological enthusiasm of the "early Division". Though the number of desertions had significantly increased, they never represented a serious concern for the Spanish officers on the front lines.[54] All in all, the main problem for the Germans was the lack of appropriate training for incoming recruits, and not necessarily their political reliability. According to the reports sent by British consuls during 1943, the Falange leaders of some provinces, such as Granada, were so desperate to bring volunteers to Russia that they even visited the provincial prisons and promised convicts that they would be released and economically rewarded if they volunteered. Pressures from the highest circles of the Single Party to mobilize the rank-and-file Falange members, and even the confidential instructions issued to local leaders to volunteer, met with little success.[55] In contrast, it was certainly no coincidence that in some Southern provinces characterized by high rates of unemployment, and scant support of the Francoist regime, the number of volunteers to Russia during 1942 and 1943 was extremely high. This was the case in the Andalusian province of Huelva, where most volunteers were from working-class and peasant backgrounds and were to a large extent illiterate.[56] Something similar can be observed in the social origins of a sample of 707 volunteers from the province of Badajoz (South-western Spain) between June 1941 and September 1943. Among them, 41.4 per cent (293) were seasonal labourers, 26.8 per cent (190) were semi-qualified urban workers and craftsmen, and 12.6 per cent

were non-qualified urban workers. A high percentage of these were also illiterate.[57] In other areas, such as the Canary Islands, attracting volunteers for the Russian front remained difficult throughout 1942 and 1943, and the majority of those who joined the Blue Division seem to have been motivated by economic reasons.[58]

Professional army officers who had been too young to fight during the Civil War constituted another regular and important source of recruits. They basically regarded their stay at the Eastern front as a kind of training experience that gave them the chance to encounter new strategies and techniques. They were no less anti-communist than the officers who had preceded them. The surplus of officers and NCOs volunteering for Russia in July 1941, who were not admitted at that time, provided the Blue Division with continuous replacements at these levels. According to the impressions transmitted by a German liaison officer in August 1943, up to 30 per cent of the youngest officers of the Spanish Army had spent some months at the Russian front.[59] In fact, a very significant percentage of the Spanish Army commanders during the late Franco years and the transition to democracy had served in the Blue Division, where they had ascended in rank and received war decorations. This included seven General Commanders of the *Guardia Civil* between 1962 and 1983.[60] Of the officers who reached the rank of general during those years, no fewer than 300 had been on the Russian front.[61] In their memoirs, these officers tended to adopt a mainly "professional" and technical bias, presenting their willingness to join the Blue Division as a step towards greater professional development. But they left no doubt that they had also felt obligated by the atmosphere in the Spanish military barracks and officers' casinos to play their part in what was seen as a duty of their entire generation: to fight communism and return the "visit" that the Soviet Union had allegedly made to Spain in 1936–9, thus adopting all the arguments put forward by Nazi propaganda to justify Operation Barbarossa.[62]

Yet even during 1942 and 1943 there were signs of anti-communist enthusiasm and ideological motivation among many NCOs in the Spanish Army, as well as among some officers and soldiers who volunteered for the Russian front. Lieutenant Benjamín Arenales, who had participated in the Civil War and joined the Blue Division in April 1942, noted shortly before crossing the French border that "I'm inaugurating this diary because I've been admitted as a member of the Spanish Volunteers' Division, which fights at the Russian front along with the German comrades, in the war which is being waged by European civilisation" on behalf of "the same principles that moved me during Spain's

war". As Arenales spent more time on the front, he adopted a more Falangist poetic vocabulary, replete with rhetorical imagery.[63] Similarly, Medical Officer José Manuel de Cárdenas, a firm Catholic believer who could be considered a traditionalist Conservative, stated in his war diary in February 1942 that he felt himself to be part of a "great enterprise" on behalf of God and the Fatherland.[64] Other war memoirs and autobiographies written after 1950 reflect a mixture of nihilism, adventure-seeking and vague ideas reflecting typical Nazi and Francoist propaganda slogans ("defence of European civilization", anti-communism, and so on).[65]

These motivations were shared by most members of the Falange during the crucial years of the war in the East. A detailed analysis of the sentiments expressed by the Falange rank-and-file between 1943 and 1944, including many local and provincial leaders, reveals that most of them still believed in the necessity of fighting alongside Germany in a war on behalf of "European civilization".[66]

Fanatics, adventurers, and nihilists: the last Spanish defenders of the "New Order" (1944–5)

As the Blue Division and its short-lived successor unit, the "Blue Legion", retreated from the Eastern front between October 1943 and March 1944, many local and provincial leaders of the Single Party expressed their disagreement with what they considered to be a betrayal of their "German comrades". Some ultra-Falangist intellectuals even sought German support, but were turned down by the German diplomats, who opposed the independent plans of the SS and the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht* to recruit a kind of "Spanish legion" incorporated into the *Waffen SS*. Several dozen Spaniards did knock at the doors of the German embassy in Madrid, volunteering to join the Reich's army. Many of them managed to cross the border and reach the battle front again.[67]

To what extent did the last 400 or 500 men who fought under the German flag until the very end of the Third Reich share the Nazi creed advocated by the periodical *Enlace* [Liaison], the public voice of the *Iberoamerikanisches Institut* in Berlin after October 1944? *Enlace* has been considered the most ambitious attempt to shape a kind of "Spanish National Socialism", independent of the Falangist party and of the Franco Regime.[68] The same evaluation of motives can be applied to the colony of Spanish workers (*Fremdarbeiter*) who were still employed in Germany after the final months of 1944. Similarly, a focus on motivation sheds light on the attitudes of the radical Falangists, including many Blue

Division veterans, who from the safety of Spain had expressed sympathy for the German "resistance" to the Soviet invasion,[69] while exhibiting an inability to adapt to civilian life in the isolated and impoverished Spain of the 1940s.[70]

The last Spanish soldiers to serve the Third Reich may be considered a marginal phenomenon, a group of adventurers that included thieves, murderers and a few desperate war veterans unable to shift back to civilian life.[71] Some authors see them as the tip of the iceberg, as the seeds of a collaborationist Nazism within the ranks of Spanish fascism, which could fit the Quisling model.[72] However, there is no reason to suppose that their motivations were essentially different from those that drove other West European volunteers to join the *Waffen SS* units, beginning in 1943.[73]

The members of what has been exaggeratedly called "the Ghost Battalion", due to its coverage by Francoist post-war propaganda, left few traces of their experiences and even fewer written memoirs, usually full of mistakes and fantasy. And, of course, they all denied sharing the main tenets of German National Socialism, beginning with anti-Semitism. The last Spaniards to serve Hitler preferred to present their fight as an example of what the Western Allied powers should have done in 1945: stop the Soviet invasion of Europe.

However, there is enough evidence to allow an attempt at creating a social and ideological profile of the members of the "Ghost Battalion". Miguel Ezquerra, a former officer during the Spanish Civil War and later a volunteer of the Blue Division who allegedly took part in the defence of the *Reichskanzlei* in Berlin, and other veterans of the "Ghost Battalion" who published their memoirs after their return from Soviet captivity in 1954, depicted their decision to join the final war effort of the Third Reich as simply an extension of the motives that had led them to take up arms on 18 July 1936. They claimed to have been motivated by anti-communism, by the defence of Christian and Western civilization, by loyalty to the principles of the original Spanish fascism… All this was also shrouded in a light layer of lust for adventure and of generational non-conformism. Many appeared as angry young men of the Falange, but on their return to Spain after Soviet captivity a number of them were also labelled "complete gangsters".[74] This impression was more or less confirmed by the German officers in charge of organizing assistance in Southern France for the dozens of Spaniards who managed to cross the Pyrenean border.[75]

A sample of the letters sent by Spanish volunteers in the ranks of the *Wehrmacht* and the *Waffen SS* between November 1944 and March 1945, as recorded by Martín de Arrizubieta, the editor-in-chief of *Enlace*, may

provide some insight as to the motivation of these last volunteers. Most of them saw little difference between the Falangist and anti-communist creed they had embraced in 1936 and in 1941 and the motivation for their final resolve to fight to the death in German military units. The final-hour volunteers presented themselves as "true" Falangists, that is, as loyal keepers of the traditions of early Spanish Fascism before it "surrendered" to the power of the Catholic Church and the Army. This belief was cloaked in a general appeal to the "destiny of Europe", but they gave no sign of having adopted any National Socialist creed that could be considered mimetic of the German model. Juan M. Pons, a volunteer enlisted in the *Wehrmacht*, stated in October 1944 that "we are now within the ranks of the German Army, and [...] continue the fight we began for the sake of Spain on the 18 July 1936", though forced to make war far away from Spain and "under another flag".[76] *Wehrmacht* soldier José-Luis Ibáñez wrote in November 1944 that the Spaniards loyal to the Falangist legacy were fighting alongside, rather than for, Germany. They were still defending the slogan "for God, Spain and the national-syndicalist revolution". Blue Division veteran Manuel Díaz-Tella, when enlisted in the *Waffen SS*, stated that he was fighting for all that he had defended in 1936, but also for the sake of "European civilization".[77] Six Spanish workers manifested their wish to join the *Waffen SS*, with the objective of continuing "the great task that we initiated in our country on the 18 July [1936], and that we have not yet given up, which we began in arms and later continued with our work".[78] The Basque Falangist José-Ignacio Imaz, who was at that time a medical volunteer at a hospital in Braunschweig, said in December 1944, while "raising my arm" in a Fascist salute, that he saw in the National Socialist pages of *Enlace* that "there are still true Falangists: long live the Old Guard!"[79] There were even some isolated cases of former Spanish Republican Army soldiers who, after experiencing French refugee camps during 1939–40 and later years of forced labour in Germany, explained that they had been convinced by the "social revolutionary orientation" of National Socialism. Thus, Adolfo González-Almenara wrote that he saw in the Third Reich the "real Fatherland" of all workers, in contrast with the disappointment that he felt upon entering France in 1939.[80]

Faith in the "Europeanist" propaganda of the Third Reich, and a belief in the project of a New Order, seemed to be more than just slogans for many Spanish volunteers. This was the case with David Gómez, who had crossed France with two veterans of the Blue Division after leaving Spain on 15 August 1944. They managed to reach German territory and were working in a factory in Chemnitz, but also expressed their

eagerness to "again wear the grey uniform and take part in the new European order".[81] Similarly, worker Antonio Lucena saluted the editors of *Enlace* with the slogan "*Arriba España*" and wrote that "the victory of the Great Reich must be a victory for all of us."[82] He was fascinated by "this great German country", as were many other unknown Spaniards who were also members of the *Waffen SS* and would fight to the end.[83] Galician volunteer Pedro Portela – a candidate for the *Falange Española* in the province of Pontevedra as recently as the 2004 Spanish parliamentary elections – defined himself as a "young warrior for the new Europe", and signed with "*¡Heil Hitler! ¡Arriba España! ¡Viva Alemania!*".[84] In other letters, anti-communism appears to have been the main motive for joining the German Army.[85] Lorenzo Ocañas, an ensign who took part in the defence of Berlin and was captured by the Red Army, identified the images of bombed German towns with "memories of my country", imagining "what Spain would have been like if the Moscow monster had managed to root itself in our soil [...] I closed my eyes and saw my own village in flames, and Spanish culture destroyed by the red bombs". Ocañas, who was not an "old-shirt" Falangist but had been a volunteer in the insurgent army of 1936, was a firm believer that the cause begun in the Spanish Civil War had been fought in a different scenario until 1945. Even after returning from Soviet captivity in 1954, he wrote that the war was not yet over.[86]

All these examples clearly suggest that even the most fanatic Spanish soldiers, who fought as volunteers in the *Wehrmacht* and *Waffen SS* during the final desperate months of the war, were driven by the same principles that had motivated many of them eight years before. In fact, some of the volunteers who were subscribers to *Enlace* disagreed with its editor, Martín de Arrizubieta, because they found the anti-Catholic and "National Socialist" articles published in the journal too far removed from the key element of authentic Spanish tradition, which they felt should permeate any purely Spanish fascism.[87] Beyond adopting a "Europeanist" rhetoric, it is clear that involvement in the German Army and even the *Waffen SS* did not lead these volunteers to embrace a new world view. Ideological motivations remained true to a few simple and fairly effective key tenets: the fight was between Good and Evil, between God and the Godless, between "civilized Europe" and "Asiatic barbarism"... These images of the enemy were already present during the Spanish Civil War. Apart from anti-Semitic rhetoric of religious origin, there was no new biological racism, even though the agonizing fight to the death with the communist "hordes" could have offered a favourable atmosphere for the diffusion of such a message. But the

potential social basis for "National Socialist Falangism" was extremely limited in its final hour. It only reached a few hundred Falangist adventurers, Spanish workers in Germany, and some second-rank leaders and intellectuals of the Falange in Spain. The last Spanish fascists disliked the conservative general who was Chief of State, but their own political survival was tied to Franco's survival, which helped to temper Falangist radicalism. After 1945, the regime ensured that the Blue Division was only remembered as an anti-communist and Catholic enterprise.

Some conclusions

1. In the case of the Blue Division, the line between "voluntary volunteering" and "compulsory volunteering" is unclear. In many cases, the decision to volunteer was influenced by a variety of factors that applied in varying degrees. Volunteering was not a unidirectional act, and nor was it motivated by a single cause. An ideological propensity could be combined with economic necessity, and in turn with a lust for adventure. Furthermore, there was often a degree of political disaffection towards the Franco regime and a desire to display masculinity to friends and relatives. Volunteers probably shared a great range of different motivations that set in motion the final decision to enlist for the Russian front.
2. Similarly, there was not always a clear demarcation between "careerism" and "ideological" motivation. Both were intimately linked and heavily dependent on the existing connection between the volunteer's world view and his personal expectations. "Idealism" as a pure motivation may have existed among a minority of Fascist volunteers, but those who joined the Blue Division were most often compelled by the necessity of making a military or professional career, though they may also have had additional ideological motives. In the end, all of them shared a similar world view.
3. The role played by the community or the group of reference, to use Robert Merton's term, may have been a crucial factor for many individuals in deciding to volunteer.[88] It acted in several different ways, which were linked to the various modalities of voluntary/compulsory volunteering. If a platoon of fellows-in-arms was compelled to go to Russia in 1943, the individual members felt obliged to join the adventure due to the strength of the social network built around the group of comrades. In other words, if the group decided to go, or at least not to oppose volunteering, the individual could feel somewhat "protected" by the group. Yet the fact remains that many of these

"primary groups" were later broken when each of their members was ordered to a different unit on the battlefront.

4. Widespread poverty, which was a permanent feature of post-Civil War Spain, proved to be an important factor behind the enrolment of dozens of volunteers. They saw the Russian adventure as a means to improve their own and their families' living conditions. Although the reduced social background of many of them can be reconstructed, there is not necessarily a direct connection between the evidence of economic disadvantage and the action of "compulsory" volunteering. There also were many among the popular classes who subscribed to the values espoused by the Franco Régime, and indeed many of the "wartime ensigns" and Civil War veterans came from the lower middle classes of the countryside.
5. The Spanish experience of volunteering for the Blue Division between 1941 and 1944–5 cannot be understood except in the context of the previous experience of the Spanish Civil War of 1936–9. The Spanish conflict had also been for many of them a volunteer experience; they had joined the insurgent army of their own free will. In a way, for many members of the Blue Division, volunteering for Russia in 1941 seemed easier than volunteering in 1936: they already knew what war was like; they believed that the fall of Moscow was only a matter of weeks away; and they also firmly believed that the German Army was an invincible machine. They got a supplementary wage and had the chance of living an adventure. To join the conquest of the Soviet Union was seen as a simpler decision than the choice they faced in 1936. Obviously, what came after October 1941 did not correspond to the volunteers' expectations, but that is another story.

Notes

1. See, for example, R. Proctor (1972) *Agonía de un neutral: Las relaciones hispano-alemanas durante la segunda guerra mundial y la División Azul* (Madrid); G. R. Kleinfeld & L. A. Tambs (1979) *Hitler's Spanish Legion: The Blue Division in Russia* (Carbondale, Ill.), and W. Bowen (2000) *Spaniards and Nazi Germany: Collaboration in the New Order* (Columbia).
2. See, for example, J. L. Rodríguez Jiménez (2007) *De héroes e indeseables. La División Azul* (Madrid).
3. See K. J. Ruhl (1986 [German edn 1975]) *Franco, Falange y III Reich. España durante la II Guerra Mundial* (Madrid); X. Moreno Juliá (2004) *La División Azul. Sangre española en Rusia, 1941–45* (Barcelona).
4. See, for instance, Armee-Oberkommando 16 to Heeresgruppe Nord, 7 February 1942, and report by Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW),

Berlin, 8 April 1942, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv Freiburg im Breisgau [BA-MA], RH 19 III/493. On the measures adopted against the deserters, see also J. L. Rodríguez Jiménez (2007) "Propuesta de revisión de la historia oficial de la División Azul. Los temas ocultos" *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, special issue, 321–32.

5. All volunteers recruited by the Falange offices were required to fill in a card on which they listed their political affiliation, the organizations they had belonged to, and their profession. These cards have almost completely disappeared; only a few examples are to be found in the personal files kept at the Spanish Military Archives. This makes it very difficult to attempt any systematic reconstruction of the social and political profiles of the soldiers of the Blue Division, and forces historians to look for alternative sources.
6. See X. M. Núñez (2006) "'Russland war nicht schuldig': Die Ostfronterfahrung der spanischen Blauen Division in Selbstzeugnissen und Autobiographien, 1943–2004", in M. Epkenhans et al. (eds.) *Militärische Erinnerungskultur. Soldaten im Spiegel von Biographien, Memoiren und Selbstzeugnissen* (Paderborn), 236–67.
7. I am here borrowing concepts from J. Elster (1999) *Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions* (Cambridge) and J. Elster (2002) *Ulysses unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraints* (Cambridge).
8. E. J. Hobsbawm (2003) *Interesting Times. A 20th century life* (London).
9. See abundant examples of this in Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin [PAAA], Akten Deutsche Botschaft Madrid, Reg. Pol. Allg., 555/1, Boxes 764 and 766.
10. See A. Lazo (1998) *La Iglesia, la Falange y el fascismo (un estudio sobre la prensa española de posguerra)* (Sevilla), 165–75. To give an example, in the small town of Monforte de Lemos (Lugo), the German vice-consul reported that, after Operation Barbarossa was launched, even rural Catholic priests, who had so far remained hostile towards Nazism, now changed their view and greeted the Third Reich with enthusiasm. See Report of the German vice-consul in Monforte de Lemos, 24 June 1941, PAAA, Deutsche Botschaft Madrid, Reg. Pol. Allg., 555/1, Box 766.
11. See G. Cardona (2003) *El gigante descalzo. El ejército de Franco* (Madrid), 59–64. Sergeant José Grande, who had become an NCO during the Spanish Civil War, remembered in 1988 that he had liked the German Army because of its excellent organization: "they were very clean and efficient, I had met many of them during our Civil War" (Interview with the author, Ourense, 22 December 1987, in Archive HISTORGA, University of Santiago de Compostela).
12. See Á. Salamanca Salamanca and F. Torres García (2002) *Esclavos de Stalin: el combate final de la División Azul (memorias de un prisionero en la URSS)* (Madrid), 125f.
13. See the multiple and diverse letters of support sent to German consulates by Basque and Navarrese traditionalist leaders between June and July 1941 in PAAA, Geheimakten Deutsche Botschaft Madrid 6 / 9, Box 796.
14. On Spanish anti-Semitism during the 1930s and 1940s, see M. Böcker (2000) *Antisemitismus ohne Juden. Die Zweite Republik, die republikanische Rechte und die Juden. Spanien 1931–1936* (Frankfurt a. M.); G. Álvarez Chillida (2002) *El antisemitismo en España. La imagen del judío (1812–2002)* (Madrid), especially pp. 381–420.

15. See, for instance, A. Cuartero (1941) *Los que se marchan. La División Azul* (Madrid), pp. 23–5; D. Carrión (1941) *¡Voluntariado español!* (Quintanar de la Orden).
16. To give an example, the "monthly report" sent by the Falange's organization office for the province of Murcia in July 1941 mentioned that more than 2,000 members of the party and supporters of the régime flew to the headquarters of the party in that province to volunteer. *Parte mensual de FET, 1-30.6.1941*, Archivo General de la Administración, Alcalá de Henares [AGA], 51/20557.
17. See J. Cervera (1998) *Madrid en guerra: La ciudad clandestina, 1936–1939* (Madrid).
18. Data in Moreno Juliá (2004), pp. 395f.
19. This was the case with the Conservative Catholic student Enrique Sánchez Fraile (1921–81), who spent the Civil War years in his village, which remained under the control of the Republic until March 1939. After that date he felt that his parents were humiliated by neighbours who accused them of not being "sufficiently Spanish", since no members of the family had fought with the insurgent army during the Civil War. Enrique, who in 1942 was a student in Almería, decided in March of that year to join the Blue Division following the advice of a priest. War diary of Enrique Sánchez Fraile, quoted by L. Ruiz, "Anotaciones de un soldado sobre la campaña de Rusia", unpublished paper, University of Sevilla, March 2006.
20. See M. A. Ruiz Carnicer (1996) *El Sindicato Español Universitario (SEU), 1939–1965. La socialización política de la juventud universitaria en el franquismo* (Madrid), pp. 143–47.
21. See J. G. Landero, "El Sindicato Español Universitario. Su labor presente y sus anhelos futuros", *ABC*, 2 November 1941, p. 15; likewise, J. L. A. Bellogín, "De un camarada de la División Azul", *Haz*, 14 October 1941, p. 3; "Ruta", *Haz*, 4 November 1941, p. 3.
22. F. Ramos (1953) *División Azul* (Madrid), p. 6; Moreno Juliá (2004), p. 395 concludes that 17 per cent of all volunteers coming from Madrid were students, and 25 per cent had a university background. According to an official of the German Foreign Office in February 1943, most of the Falangist students of the University of Barcelona had joined the Blue Division (Report by Weizsäcker, 5 February 1943, in PAAA, R-29743).
23. Rittmeister Dr. Haxel, "Zustandbericht über die span. Freiw. Div.", 11 August 1943, in BA-MA, RH 24-50 / 59.
24. See, for instance, the series of articles published in the trench journal of the Division (*Hoja de Campaña*) with the generic title "Mañana" (tomorrow): see, for example, *Hoja de Campaña*, 17 February 1942, p. 1; 25 February 1942, p. 1; 9 March 1942, p. 1. See also R. Royo [Masía] (1956) *El sol y la nieve* (Madrid), pp. 71, 77–80.
25. See D. Ridruejo (1978) *Los cuadernos de Rusia* (Barcelona); J. Beneyto, "Paralelo oriental", *Haz*, 19 August 1941, p. 3.
26. Thus, the Falangist volunteer José-Manuel Castañón wrote in his war diary on his leave that "because I want nothing to do with the crimes and horrible things of the rear [...] I came again to the front, dreaming of a future reordering of Europe which also reorders Spain". He believed himself to be one

of "many noble Falangists who enlisted in the adventure in order to avoid getting poisoned by peace". J. M. Castañón (1991) *Diario de una aventura (con la División Azul 1941–1942)* (Gijón), pp. 81, 100.

27. See J. M. Thomàs (2001) *La Falange de Franco* (Barcelona).
28. Memorandum to the German ambassador in Madrid, 13 July 1941, in: PAAA, Akten Deutsche Botschaft Madrid, Reg. Pol. Allg., 557 / 2, Box 766.
29. See details in PAAA, Akten Deutsche Botschaft Madrid, Reg. Pol. Allg., 557 / 2, Box 766.
30. See X. M. Núñez (2006), "Als die spanischen Faschisten (Ost)Europa entdeckten: Zur Russlanderfahrung der 'Blauen Division' (1941–1944)", *Totalitarismus und Demokratie*, 3:2, 323–44.
31. The extent to which the "revolutionary" character of Falange may have attracted members coming from left-wing backgrounds is subject to discussion. See A. Lazo and J. A. Parejo (2003) "La militancia falangista en el suroeste español. Sevilla", *Ayer*, 52, 237–53.
32. Monthly report of July 1941, Murcia, AGA 51/20557.
33. See J. Rodríguez González (2003) *León bajo la dictadura franquista (1936–1951)* (León), 251–5.
34. According to our sample of some 500 biographies of war veterans, collected from obituaries published in newspapers and bulletins of war veterans during and after the Second World War, as well as from autobiographical accounts and memoirs.
35. See, for example, L. Riudavets de Montes (1960) *Estampas de la Vieja Rusia (recuerdos de un voluntario de la Divisíón Azul)* (Madrid).
36. To give an example of this type of autobiography, see J. Meliá Vila (2003) *Bajo 6 banderas con la muerte en los talons Año 1936 a Diciembre de 1943* (n. p. [Valencia]).
37. On the emergence of the icon of "Russia" and "the Russians" during the Spanish Civil War as a symbol of the enemies of Spanish reactionary nationalism, see X. M. Núñez (2006) *¡Fuera el invasor! Nacionalismos y movilización bélica durante la Guerra Civil española (1936–1939)* (Madrid), 245–61.
38. Report by the provincial chief of Falange, Ourense, 16 October 1941, in AGA, 21/20558.
39. See, for example, the confidential report on the Blue Division before its departure to Russia, Madrid, 7 July 1941, in AGA, *Presidencia*, 54/18950, as well as Ridruejo (1978), pp. 18f., 116; J. E. Blanco (1954), *Rusia no es cuestión de un día* (Madrid), pp. 8f., 34.
40. See recent reviews on the extensive literature on the Spanish Civil War in C. Ealham (2007) "Myths and the Spanish Civil War", *Journal of Contemporary History*, 42, 365–76; T. Kössler (2007), "Mobilisierung, Gewalt, Erinnerung. Neue Ansätze in der Forschung zum Spanischen Bürgerkrieg", *Neue Politische Literatur*, 52, 431–55.
41. See, for example, the reports of the German ambassador in Madrid and the German consulates of Barcelona, Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Bilbao, Alicante, Málaga, Almería, and other towns, in PAAA, Deutsche Botschaft Madrid, Reg. Pol. Allg., Box 766. In the Catalan province of Girona, just 63.8 per cent of volunteers were born in Catalonia: see J. V. Gay (2002), "Els gironins de la División Azul", *Revista de Girona*, 215, 39–47. See also Moreno Juliá (2004), pp. 98–100.

42. See G. J. Sánchez Brun (2002), *Instituciones turolenses en el franquismo 1936–1961. Personal y mensaje políticos* (Teruel), p. 81.
43. Manuel García Berlanga's testimony is reproduced in Javier Rioyo's film *Extranjeros de sí mismos* (2001).
44. For instance, see the letter of volunteer Alfredo Rodríguez Pérez to his parents, Grafenwöhr, 25 July 1941 (Private archive of Mr. F. X. Fernández Naval, Santiago de Compostela).
45. War diary of the NCO Juan Romero Osende, *Diario de Operaciones. Campaña de Rusia*, entry of 29 October 1941 (p. 12), Private Archive of Mrs. Ana Romero Masia, A Coruña.
46. See, for instance, T. Salvador (1962 [1st edn 1954]) *División 250* (Barcelona).
47. See, for example, letter from sergeant José Salazar Melcón to Maruja Schütze Alonso, 3 November 1943, in *Museo del Pueblo de Asturias* (Gijón), R. 4453/12/4-4.
48. Data regarding the fallen soldiers of the Blue Division up to mid-November 1941, collected from: obituaries published by the newspapers *ABC* and *Informaciones*; the data collected from Falange, kept in different files at AGA; and the data collected by the Spanish Army, Archivo General Militar, Ávila [AGM], C.3762/1 and C.3762/5. The database is still under construction, so the percentages presented here may only be considered as approximate.
49. See J. Mª Sánchez Diana (1993) *Cabeza de puente. Diario de un soldado de Hitler* (Granada), 95f., as well as Enrique Murillo's unpublished memoirs, quoted by F. Gragera and D. Infantes (2007) *Rumbo a Rusia. Los voluntarios extremeños de la División Azul* (Madrid), pp. 146f.
50. See examples in F. González (1976) *Memorias de un fascista español* (Madrid), 95–162; V. Linares (2000), *Más que unas memorias. Hasta Leningrado con la División Azul* (Madrid); E. Sánchez Salcedo (2002), *Framan (de Serrablo a Leningrado)* (Sabiñánigo). See also some accounts by former soldiers of the Blue Division in C. Agustí Roca (2003) *Rùssia es culpable! Memòria i record de la División Azul* (Lleida); as well as in F. Garrido Polonio and M. A. Garrido Polonio (2002) *Nieve Roja. Españoles desaparecidos en el frente ruso* (Madrid).
51. See, for example, reports of Abwehrstelle Ostland, to O.K.W. Amt Ausland/Abwehr, 24.1.1942 (BA-MA, RH 19 III/493), and by Generalkommando XXXVIII AK, Ic, *Unerlaubte Entfernungen-Fahnenflucht 1.4.42–31.12.42* (BA-MA, RH 24–38/187).
52. Quoted by Rodríguez González (2003), p. 291.
53. According to some memoirs and oral interviews, the mechanisms of recruiting "forced volunteers" in the military garrisons included directly ordering a whole company or platoon to stand up and volunteer, or asking those who "did not want to go to Russia" to take a step forward. In theory, soldiers were given the option of refusing to volunteer. In practice, the atmosphere became oppressive, and the context of the act led many soldiers to "volunteer" without really knowing why they did not dare say no. Once again, the group dynamics were a very powerful conditioning factor.
54. See reports by Colonel Knüppel, 9 May 1943, and by Lieutenant Förster, 9 July 1943, in BA-MA, RH 24-50/59.
55. Notes of the British Vice-Consul in Granada, 28 February 1943, in National Archives, Kew Gardens, FO 371/34813.
56. According to the findings of Huelva's local historian J. Ramírez-Copeiro del Villar (2001), *Huelva en la II Guerra Mundial: Espías y neutrales* (Valverde del

Camino); J. Ramírez-Copeiro del Villar (1999) "La II Guerra Mundial y la División Azul. Beas", in *Historia de la provincia de Huelva* (Huelva), vol. III.

57. Data reproduced by Gragera and Infantes (2007), p. 40f.
58. See J. J. Díaz Benítez (2005), "Voluntarios de la zona aérea de Canarias y África Occidental en la *Wehrmacht*", *Historia Social*, 53, 47–62.
59. Dr. Haxel, *Zustandbericht über die span. Freiw. Div.*, 11 August 1943, in BA-MA, RH 24-50/59.
60. See J. García Hispán (1991) *La Guardia Civil en la División Azul* (Alicante), 77–80.
61. Data obtained from "Los generales de la División Azul. Investigación a cargo de Paco Grau", *Blau División*, 539 (June 2004), p. 6.
62. See, for example, T. Luca de Tena and T. Palacios Cueto (1955) *Embajador en el infierno: memorias del Capitán Palacios: once años de cautiverio en Rusia* (Madrid); G. Oroquieta Arbiol and C. García Sánchez (1958) *De Leningrado a Odesa* (Barcelona); R. García de Ledesma (1996) *Encrucijada en la nieve. Un Servicio de Inteligencia desde la División Azul* (Granada); J. Díaz de Villegas (1967) *La División Azul en línea* (Barcelona); J. Martínez Esparza (1943) *Con la División Azul en Rusia* (Madrid); E. Esteban Infantes (1956) *La División Azul: Donde Asia empieza* (Barcelona).
63. See *Diario de Operaciones e impresiones del Teniente Provisional Benjamín Arenales En la Campaña de Rusia,* n. d. [1942], p. 1 and 32 (Private archive of Mr. Carmelo de las Heras, Madrid)
64. War diary of medical captain Manuel de Cárdenas Rodríguez (Private archive of Mr. José Manuel de Cárdenas, San Sebastián), p. 1.
65. See, for example, R. Castaño Doña (1991), *Legionario en Rusia* (Alicante); Ramos (1953), pp. 28f.; J. Miralles Güill (1981) *Tres días de guerra y otros relatos de la División Azul* (Ibi), pp. 74–8.
66. See, for example, S. Montero Díaz (1944) *Mussolini 1919–1944* (Madrid), pp. 43–5.
67. See report by *Sonderstab* F, 7 July 1944, in BA-MA, RW 5 / 431.
68. On this aspect, see X. M. Núñez (2005), "Un nazismo colaboracionista español? Martín de Arrizubieta, Wilhelm Faupel y los últimos de Berlín (1944–45)", *Historia Social*, 51, 21–47; Bowen (2000), pp. 196–219.
69. See report of the Spanish ambassador in Berlin, 18 August 1944, Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Madrid [AMAE], Madrid, R-2299/2. On the practices of recruiting Spanish workers in Germany by the Waffen SS, which used a mixture of pressure and attractive economic conditions, see the report by the Spanish ambassador in Slovakia, Bern, 21 April 1945, in AMAE, R-2192/36, as well as some details in J. L. Rodríguez Jiménez (2002) *Los esclavos españoles de Hitler* (Barcelona), 213–21.
70. Examples of the difficulties faced by the "Russian veterans" in adapting to post-war Spain may be found in C. Urgoiti y Bas (1987) *Prólogo al tema Amistad* (Madrid); A. J. Hernández Navarro (1971 [1946]) *Ida y vuelta* (Madrid), pp. 245f.; R. Royo Masía (1944) *¡Guerra! Historia de la vida de Luis de Pablos* (Madrid), pp. 157–9.
71. See K. W. Estes (2003) *A European Anabasis – Western European Volunteers in the German Army and SS, 1940–1945*, available in: www.gutenberg-e.org/esk01/main.html.
72. See W. Bowen (2001) "The Ghost Battalion: Spaniards in the Waffen SS, 1944–1945", *The Historian*, 63:2, 373–85.

73. See J. L. Leleu (2007) *La Waffen-SS. Soldats politiques en guerre* (Paris), pp. 261–77, as well as his contribution to this volume.
74. See M. Ezquerra Sánchez (1947) *Lutei até ao fim: memórias dum voluntário espanhol na Guerra 1939–1945* (Lisbon), pp. 22f.; M. Parrilla (2002) "Pedro Portela Ovalle. Un combatiente europeo superviviente del asanto [*sic*] al tren de repatriados en Chambery – Alto Saboya", *Boletín Informativo de la Hermandad Nacional de Sargentos Provisionales en los Tres Ejércitos y Guardia Civil*, 113, 7–16; M. Puente (1954), *Yo, muerto en Rusia (Memorias del alférez Ocañas)* (Madrid), 16–22; R. P[érez]. Eizaguirre (1955), *En el abismo rojo: memorias de un español, once años prisionero en la U.R.S.S.* (Madrid), 32–48. See also the biographies of some of them collected in the report *Nota informativa sobre repatriados pendientes de abono de diversas cantidades y pendientes de licenciamiento, por tratarse de presuntos desertores al frente del enemigo*, 24 September 1954, in AGM, C.3770/2.
75. See the records of the meeting of Colonel Rudolf Major, Major Umé (ag. Ausland-Abwehr) and *Sonderführer* Keller (Sonderstab F), 5 August 1944, BA-MA, RW 5 / 431.
76. J. Mª Pons Mascaró "Españoles...!", *Enlace*, 29 January 1945, p. 3.
77. J. L. Ibáñez Pajares "Horas decisivas", *Enlace*, 23 November 1944, p. 6.
78. Letter signed by Jesús Ochoa Miranda and six more Spaniards, St. Valentin (Vienna) 8 January 1945, Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin [GstA], I. Ha 318 / 586.
79. Letter of José Ignacio Imaz, Landeskrankenhaus Braunschweig, 29 December 1944, in GStA, I. Ha 318 / 586.
80. Adolfo González Almenara to Martín de Arrizubieta, Kratzan, 7 January 1945, in GStA, I. Ha 218 / 586.
81. David Gómez to Martín de Arrizubieta, Spanier Lager [*sic*], Chemnitz Auto-Union, 25 December 1944, in GStA, I. Ha 318 / 586.
82. Antonio Lucena to Martín de Arrizubieta, Kornwestheim, 7 January 1945, in GStA, I. Ha 318 / 586.
83. Letter of the Spanish volunteer of the Waffen SS Felipe?, Berlin, 28 April 1945, reproduced in M. Vázquez Enciso (1995) *Historia postal de la División Azul. Españoles en Rusia* (Madrid), pp. 261f..
84. [Pedro] Portela to Martín de Arrizubieta, Stockerau, 10 January 1945, GStA, I. Ha 318 / 586.
85. Letters by Juan Sánchez Peñalver, *Reservelazarett* Rinteln, 15 March 1945, and by Jesús Corral Martín, 6 January 1945, to Martín de Arrizubieta, in GStA, I. Ha 318 / 586.
86. Puente (1954), *Yo, muerto en Rusia*, 20f. On Ocañas' biography, see AGM, C. 3770/2 and C. 3770/3.
87. "Amigos de Enlace", *Enlace*, 23 November 1944, p. 6.
88. See R. K. Merton (1970 [English ed. 1949]) *Teoría y estructuras sociales* (Mexico), pp. 228–386.

15

Women in Combat: Female Volunteers in British Anti-Aircraft Batteries in the Second World War

Jutta Schwarzkopf

In the Second World War, some belligerent states tapped, to different degrees, the reserve armies made up of each nation's womanhood,[1] thereby enabling women to volunteer for service in the military. This chapter, which focuses upon those British women who volunteered for service in anti-aircraft batteries, begins by outlining the development of female involvement in the British military between 1939 and 1945. Firstly, I will consider women's reasons for volunteering for the military services in general and Anti-Aircraft Defence in particular. It will be shown that patriotism played no significant role in motivating women to volunteer. The term "patriotism" is applied here, somewhat loosely, to sentiments expressed as "the wish to help one's country", "to be involved in the war", "to do one's bit". Secondly, the tensions between contemporary notions of femininity and combat are highlighted. I will argue that these were resolved largely by emphasizing in a number of ways the temporary and exceptional nature of women's involvement in the military, necessitated by the exigencies of warfare, and by quickly obliterating women's role in the military from official commemorations of the war.

The development of women's involvement in the military

The Second World War witnessed the involvement of women in the British military on an unprecedented scale, with their number peaking at 453,200, 9.39 per cent of the country's military strength, in September 1943.[2] Each branch of the military had its own female auxiliary: the Women's Royal Naval Service (WRNS), the Women's

Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF), and the Auxiliary Territorial Service (ATS), which was attached to the Territorial Army, devoted to the defence of Britain. The ATS was the first female service to be formed and by far the largest, comprising 214,420 women at its peak strength in June 1943.[3]

When, following the Munich crisis, the British government began to prepare for the possibility of war, provisions were made for the deployment of women behind the lines on the precedent set by the First World War.[4] Then the offer of help from numerous female voluntary organizations had only been accepted when shortages of manpower, in the literal sense, made themselves felt. The approximately 57,000 members of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, renamed Queen Mary's Army Auxiliary Corps in April 1918 in recognition of good service, were all volunteers and were deployed overwhelmingly on clerical and domestic duties behind the lines.[5] In a similar vein, the Royal Warrant of 9 September 1938, creating the ATS, stated: "[...] WE deem it expedient to provide an organization whereby certain non-combatant duties in connection with Our Military [...] may from time to time be performed by women ...".[6] Thus men were to be set free for combat.

The creation of the ATS met with an overwhelming response. By December 1939, 43,000 women had come forward, far in excess of the government's target of 20,000 women between the ages of 18 and 43 to be enrolled for four years.[7] Yet, once the initial administrative confusion had been overcome and the Service was capable of adequately dealing with such large numbers of volunteers, the ATS began to suffer noticeably from a lack of appeal. By percentage of members, it had the highest wastage rate and one of the lowest rates of recruitment.[8] While there was much disapproval among the general public of women joining the military, many of those eligible were deterred by an organizational structure heavily biased in favour of titled ladies and by the gender-based restrictions on the types of employment available.[9] As the war dragged on and the shortage of manpower, in a literal sense, was increasingly making itself felt, the government tightened up regulations in April 1941 by bringing all the women's services under the Army Act. This ruled out the possibility of women leaving their service at will and enabled the expansion of female occupations into "operational areas". A charter issued on 19 May 1941 provided for the employment of ATS members in heavy anti-aircraft batteries[10] as instrument numbers. Women's duties were to comprise locating the targets and aiming, though not firing, the guns. Therefore no need was seen to change the terms of the Royal Warrant.[11]

Although the wastage rate was reduced, the tightening up of discipline failed to have any effect on the shortfall in ATS recruitment numbers.[12] Therefore, in December 1941 the National Service (No. 2) Act was passed, introducing the conscription of all young, unmarried women between the ages of 20 and 30. This was extended to nineteen-year-olds in 1943.[13] The decision to introduce the conscription of women had been made by the Cabinet after much anguished debate,[14] and against Churchill's objections. The Prime Minister was most concerned about the adverse response by men in the forces to their womenfolk being conscripted into the Auxiliary Services.[15] Yet conscription still left women with some degree of choice. Once called up, they could opt for work in the munitions industry, in agriculture or forestry, in civil defence, or in one of the military services. Furthermore, no female recruit was to be directed into any operational role; performance of these roles was to be strictly voluntary, with each volunteer signing a statement to the effect that she agreed to handle instruments with potentially lethal effects.[16] Moreover, regulations did not rule out volunteering by women not subject to conscription. Once the Act was implemented, approximately 50 per cent of new ATS recruits chose to work in Anti-Aircraft Defence.[17] Having passed various aptitude tests, the 56,000 women employed in anti-aircraft batteries formed the largest occupational group in the ATS.[18]

Reasons for volunteering

The reasons why women volunteered for military service in general, and for Anti-Aircraft Defence in particular, can be gleaned from two types of sources. The first group comprises official or semi-official investigations into women's attitudes towards the ATS in general, while the second consists of 16 personal memoirs of female anti-aircraft veterans. Fourteen of these have been deposited with the Imperial War Museum,[19] while two, one article and one monograph, have been published.[20]

The first type of source illuminates some of the reasons for the greater appeal of the WAAF as compared with the ATS. Mass Observation findings, made up of statements collected by trained observers,[21] show that the WAAF's perceived proximity to action, particularly during and after the "Battle of Britain", was one important reason why this service was preferred. The ATS, by contrast, being attached to the Territorial Army, was seen as working rather more in the background. Involvement in the WAAF gave women the feeling of "doing more", of being "more in the war".[22]

Such indications of a lack of enthusiasm inspired by the ATS heightened government concern about the fall in numbers of women volunteering for this service. In 1941 the government commissioned a systematic investigation into the "Attitudes of Women, the General Public, and A.T.S. Personnel to the Auxiliary Territorial Service", again in comparison with the other services.[23] While confirming the greater popularity of the WAAF, the survey listed the reasons given by possible female entrants for joining the ATS, not all of them specific to that service. Some of the women mentioned keenness to leave home or an unpromising, boring job, others had a male relative in the army, which could either make a respondent more familiar with conditions in the army or give rise to the wish to support that relative more directly by joining the ATS. Also stated were the anticipation of a greater chance of promotion than in civilian life; qualifications that fitted respondents for the ATS; and the need for paid work in order to support dependants. This need could, of course, have been satisfied by joining any of the women's services. However, given its lack of exclusiveness, opting for the ATS would have been the surest answer to a woman's financial problems. The wish to learn to drive, finally, must be placed in the context of an advertising campaign launched by the ATS in May 1941, promising to teach recruits to drive.[24] The wish to help their country only appeared under "miscellaneous" reasons, along with women's expectations of finding the work interesting, their liking for army life, having a friend in the ATS, and the appeal of the uniform.[25] Given its general unpopularity,[26] only very few women would have found the ill-fitting, khaki-coloured ATS uniform at all appealing. According to the survey, their number was roughly on a par with those giving patriotic reasons for considering joining the ATS.

The statements collected by this official investigation show that women's motives for volunteering grew overwhelmingly out of the social condition of their gender group. Only by joining the military while everyone was called upon to "do their bit" for the nation at war could a respectable young woman hope to escape from the restrictive protection of her parental home, or any woman hope to take up employment entailing pay, promotion prospects and inherent interest so markedly absent from the jobs open to the large majority of women at the time. The preponderance of these motives is borne out by the finding that the wish to help the country at war and the attraction of army life ranked on a par with rather more frivolous reasons, such as doing the same as a friend or feeling attracted by the uniform.[27] This contrasts markedly with ATS personnel interviewed for the same survey, 49.4 per cent of whom cited patriotic reasons for volunteering.[28]

The authenticity of the replies given by interviewees in the course of an official investigation may well be doubted, especially in the case of those who were already members of the ATS and may therefore have been concerned about possible repercussions of answers deemed inappropriate for a member of the services. This would account for the marked difference between members of the ATS and potential entrants regarding the relevance of patriotism as a motive for joining the service. Conversely, this difference would underpin the frankness with which potential entrants had replied. Furthermore, the official evidence is largely corroborated by female anti-aircraft veterans' personal testimonies. True, these women may likewise have felt concerned about the opinions of potential readers, especially as the memoirs are signed in full. Yet, being free of the constraints imposed by a standardized questionnaire, these women's writings allow their motives to be probed more deeply. With very few exceptions, the wish for some "excitement" is stated as the reason for volunteering. "Excitement" may best be understood as being generated by anything as different as possible from women's civilian lives. Thus it may translate simply into the wish for some geographical mobility. Hence the keen disappointment felt at finding herself posted to her home town, Belfast, that comes across in the words of one woman, who writes: You "join the army to see the world and get posted to your home city".[29] On the whole, however, the services offered unprecedented opportunities in terms of geographical mobility and job satisfaction, particularly for women from the working class.

In those memoirs mentioning the wish for some excitement, most of the authors appear to be at pains to avoid the impression that they had been devoid of any patriotic feelings at the time. Therefore the desire to contribute to the war effort is usually cited as having been on a par with, or more important than, the wish for some excitement. Thus one woman states that she volunteered "to help my country and have some excitement",[30] while another writes that she joined up "for a little excitement, maybe, but in the main to contribute to the war effort. ... On reflection, I think I must have felt a desire to be involved in some way."[31] In the former case, the writing conveys the impression that the unexceptionable reason is mentioned only to allow the personal motive to be stated at all. In the latter case, some reordering of priorities appears to have occurred retrospectively. While the decision to volunteer may well have been prompted by the wish for some excitement, by the time of writing the author would have been fully aware of the hardships that her decision had entailed and might well have felt that only her patriotism could have sustained her endurance. The

difference in perception induced by retrospection may also account for the higher proportion of ATS members giving patriotism as a reason for joining as compared with non-members. Moreover, women's attitudes changed over the course of the war. A 17-year-old, desperate to leave her job in a munitions factory, joined the ATS when told about employment being available in Anti-Aircraft Defence. Retrospectively, she flatly denied having been motivated by patriotism, claiming that she had been too young at the time to give the wider implications of the war much thought. Only when the number of enemy air attacks increased did she become "a little more patriotic" as she realized that everyone was needed for the defence of Britain.[32]

Accounts that emphasize patriotic reasons over personal ones contrast markedly, not so much with any claims made, but rather with the behaviour displayed by female volunteers primarily driven by patriotic feelings. Thus one woman falsified her age because, at 44, she was no longer eligible. Though she passed the officers' test, a clear indication of her middle-class background, she was rejected again on grounds of age. At this point she opted for Anti-Aircraft Command, where any volunteer was welcome[33] provided she had the right kind of aptitude. Another woman had been working in the Civil Service, only becoming eligible to join up when her grade ceased to be a reserved occupation. Her first choice of Service had been the WRNS, which only wanted cooks and orderlies. Presumably deeming these employments no match for her dedication to her country, she applied to work in a barrage balloon team, yet was turned down by the WAAF for lack of physical strength. The ATS, her last option, being short of personnel, accepted her straight away. The rigour of the health checks volunteers had to undergo appears to have varied with the ATS' strength. Due to some problems with her back, this woman usually wore a surgical corset, which she concealed in a bag. Nevertheless, she was passed physically fit without any reservation. Yet her wish to train for work in an anti-aircraft battery threatened to be thwarted by the results of her IQ test, an indication of her middle-class background, and on the strength of which she was allocated to a psychology unit. However, she developed a technique of not being available to report as ordered on successive posting days until the authorities gave in.[34]

Two things are noteworthy in this woman's testimony. First, her joining up was less an individual decision than a familial one; she had been singled out by her family as the member best fitted to serve the country. As she explains in her memoir, there were no men in the family eligible to join up. Her mother, aged 59, did duty as an air-raid warden,

while the author herself was the only family member young enough "to do her bit" by joining the military.[35] Secondly, the ATS had come right at the bottom of her list of preferences; she had turned to it as a last resort. This ties in with the contemporary image of the WAAF, and particularly the WRNS, being preferred by "a better class of girls".[36] The ATS, by contrast, was made up largely of working-class women, who stood no chance of being accepted by the far more selective WAAF, not to mention the WRNS, which required three references from potential entrants.[37] Partly because of its social composition, there was a public belief that women in the ATS were of a low moral standard, and this was also a major reason for parents or relatives to try to dissuade the young women of their families from volunteering for this particular service.[38]

The impression conveyed by this sample of personal memoirs, that those women volunteering for patriotic reasons were most likely to be middle-class and older than the majority of recruits, is supported by Mass Observation findings.[39] Moreover, the women in question were unmarried, their status as single women being an important precondition for joining the military, because they had no dependants requiring their presence. Given that they are biased in favour of middle-class women anyway, the memoirs therefore point less to class variations in the prevalence of patriotism and more to the dominance of gender status in accounting for women's decision to volunteer.

Furthermore, the memoirs confirm the impact of the colour and the cut of the respective uniform on women's choice of service.[40] It also transpires from these personal writings that the resolve to join up was not always all that firm. Thus one woman, who had tried to enlist with the WRNS or the WAAF for the reason just mentioned, was placed on a waiting list because both services were oversubscribed. Only then did she turn to the ATS, partly from impatience, but partly also from concern that, if she delayed, her family might succeed in changing her mind.[41] Again, the importance of the family in shaping the decision of which service to volunteer for is apparent. This was even more obviously the case with women from the youngest age bracket, 18 to 20, who were minors and needed their fathers' permission to join up.[42]

By far the largest number of women in the, admittedly small, sample of memoirists state as their reason for enlisting not only the rather vague wish to be involved in their country's war effort, but quite specifically their desire to be as close to combat as was possible for women at the time.[43] Thus one of them recounts that all the women in her battery had volunteered specifically to serve in anti-aircraft units, "not in clerical or domestic roles as hitherto had been largely the function

of the women's services, but operationally in combatant units [...]".[44] Another woman is even more explicit on that point. Her brief sketch of how mixed anti-aircraft batteries came into being culminates in the following statement: "Thus, British girls were the first to take their place in a combatant role in any army in the world. When I learned that fact I knew exactly where I wanted to be – on a gunsite."[45] Several things are noteworthy about this passage. First, the author is in no doubt about women on gunsites fulfilling a combatant role. Secondly, her, admittedly inaccurate, statement about the pioneering role of British "girls", made presumably in complete ignorance of Soviet practices,[46] betrays her excitement about this opportunity opening up for women. Thirdly, there is not even an attempt to give her attraction to Anti-Aircraft Defence any patriotic gloss. She was keen to try herself out in a way that had not been possible before.

The preference for Anti-Aircraft Command is thus explained as offering an opportunity of being more immediately involved in the war within the framework of the ATS as well as performing acts of heroism,[47] reasons similar to those quoted above as inducing women to opt for the WAAF. New recruits to Anti-Aircraft Defence were left in no doubt as to the toughness, courage, and endurance they would need to hold out. Having been warned of what lay ahead of them, the women were given the opportunity to change their minds and to be seconded to their next choice of job.[48] The fact that hardly any did would indicate that these requirements acted as inducements rather than deterrents to join.[49] After all, Anti-Aircraft Defence had been sought out specifically by women looking for a military employment as different as possible from their civilian jobs,[50] regardless of the risks involved.[51] Accordingly, the women in the mixed batteries took great pride in all the military insignia their employment in Anti-Aircraft Defence entitled them to, such as battledress and the Royal Artillery badges,[52] regarding these, precisely because of their masculine connotations, as tokens of recognition of their service. Moreover, one of the objections to involvement in the military voiced by respondents in the official investigation, that women did not wish to have anything to do with killing,[53] was not shared by anti-aircraft women. Many women who did feel this way felt so strongly as to seek official recognition as conscientious objectors.[54]

Tensions between femininity and combat

Anti-aircraft women's wish to avail themselves of the opportunity offered by the war to break free from some of the restrictions imposed

by femininity caused great concern to government, which consistently tried to maintain gender boundaries under the conditions of expanding warfare. From the outset, the formation of the female branches of the military was marked by the tension existing between combat, seen as a natural ingredient of masculinity, and femininity, crucially defined in opposition to combat. Initially, that tension was resolved by confining women in the military to non-combatant duties, chiefly of a domestic or clerical nature. Yet, under the exigencies of warfare, the transgression of gender boundaries entailed by women's recruitment into the military proved increasingly difficult to contain. As more and more men were needed for front line service, so more and more masculine employments were opened up to women.[55] With women's integration into anti-aircraft batteries, it is argued here, the line clearly demarcating femininity from combat had been crossed. This transgression, in any case confined to the duration of the war, was successfully concealed from the public. Officially, these women continued to be designated "non-combatant", because they were expressly prohibited from handling guns. Moreover, the Army Act applied to women only in modified form to spare them the full rigours of military life. Most significantly, members of the ATS on each rung of the hierarchy received only two-thirds of the pay of men of equivalent rank.[56] This signalled to the public at large that women were of less value to the military than men, the implication being that the pay differential mirrored each gender group's position relative to combat.

Yet the distinction made between male combatant and female non-combatant duties in anti-aircraft batteries was purely academic, as everybody involved was aware. The weapons technology employed made "combat" a multi-task operation.[57] The effect of allegedly non-combatant women spotting an enemy aircraft, determining its height and performing the necessary calculations to bring the guns on target was indistinguishable from that of combatant men firing the guns: the destruction of an enemy aircraft and the potential death of its pilot. Upholding the official designation served chiefly to allay the nation's fears about the potentially defeminizing effects of women's involvement in this kind of work, but had serious implications for their safety. They were given no arms to defend themselves, despite being exposed to machine-gun fire from low-flying aircraft.[58] Ultimately, women had to risk their lives for the benefit of demonstrating by their deaths that their status as non-combatants had not been violated.

Given their wish, referred to above, to be as close to the war as possible, and their keenness not to be outshone by the men in their batteries,

the women took pride in their effective military performance, which showed the result of their training to the best effect.[59] This extended to the potentially lethal effects of their work. Thus one woman, who had worked as a Plotting Officer, recalls: "One of my proudest moments was at the beginning of my time as a Plotting Officer. I had to take the bearing and range given to me verbally from the predictor operators and G[un] L[aying] set and work out the estimated bearing, angle of sight for the guns and work out the fuse length – we shot down a plane and I had worked it all out!"[60] Rather than pride in her achievement, another woman stresses the satisfaction each hit engendered: "I never worried about killing when I was on the guns: I wasn't actually killing the Germans, I was killing those that were flying with their bombs. I thought that was good, I really felt that."[61] This feeling of satisfaction and justification was in some cases engendered by the loss of a male friend or relative through enemy action.[62]

As in civilian life, women entering a masculine domain needed consistently to prove their fitness for the task adopted. Gender competition pervaded virtually every aspect of life on a gunsite[63] and ultimately accounted for the success of the mixed batteries. Pervasive gender competition made both men and women do their best, the women because they felt they had to prove themselves in their unusual gender position of near-combatants, the men because the presence of women precluded the show of any weakness which might detract from their own masculinity. The real test came with the first raid women experienced. Not every woman proved able to withstand the noise of gunfire. Some broke down and had to be removed.[64] Those who coped with the noise recalled never feeling frightened when in action.[65] The women were simply too busy performing their various tasks. This is how one veteran describes women in action: "[...] none of us showed any fear whatsoever while a raid was in progress when on duty on the Command Post. Guns could be thundering beside us, the enemy threatening in the skies above us, but so totally immersed in our individual tasks were we, that the only emotion felt by us was the desire to destroy that which we had been trained to destroy as quickly as possible. Soldiers down to the last shiny button [...]".[66] As this passage demonstrates, the military drill and the training they had received had succeeded in turning the women into efficient performers of their jobs, into soldiers indeed, who did not give any thought to possible dangers. It was not until a raid was over that women felt the effects of the stress they had been under while in action.[67]

The downside of women's aspiration to equal treatment with men was the need to put up with adversities without complaint.[68] Yet complaining about harsh conditions was taboo. "[...] pride prevented that", writes one woman, "we'd joined the army and we could take it. It seemed to be our unspoken resolve."[69] Some male officers felt in any case that if women intruded into the male business of warfare they must be prepared to put up with wartime conditions.[70] Insisting on any privileges, and thereby emphasizing gender difference, was not a strategy that would have met with any success.

Yet anti-aircraft women did not see their military efficiency and endurance as conflicting with femininity. They appear to have fashioned for themselves a femininity that combined many of its peacetime features, such as a liking for make-up and smart hairdos,[71] with elements of masculinity, such as the efficient performance of their duties in action. Most women saw this femininity as enriched and certainly superior to the peacetime variety, shorn of all military ingredients with their masculine overtones.

Some women valued this kind of femininity only "for the duration", and were apparently happy after the war to take up a lifestyle fully in accordance with civilian conceptions of femininity. They married and devoted themselves full-time to looking after their families, occasionally at a husband's explicit wish.[72] Yet their emphasis on satisfaction with this kind of life, including submission to male wishes, indicates the degree to which these women saw the gender hierarchy as having become unsettled by female involvement in anti-aircraft batteries. Moreover, their perfectly conventional post-war lifestyle is highlighted to lay to rest any allegations about the defeminizing effects of the war. The long-term repercussions of eroding peacetime femininity became particularly apparent in those women who found themselves quite unsuited to civilian life after the war. They missed the uniqueness of their wartime experience in Anti-Aircraft Command, with the strong bonds[73] developing between the members of a team who had to collaborate smoothly in order to be efficient and preserve their own lives.[74] This sustained predilection for a military lifestyle with its masculine connotation demonstrates the extent to which gender boundaries had become blurred in anti-aircraft batteries. Some such women joined the military permanently once this became possible upon the formation of the Women's Royal Army Corps in 1949.[75] Regardless of the shape these women gave to their lives after the war, many female anti-aircraft veterans have kept fond memories of their wartime service and the

friends they made. They have kept in touch with each other, meeting regularly to share memories of what was for them a formative period of their lives.[76]

As the opening up of the military to women had been occasioned by the exigencies of warfare, once the victory of the Allied Forces had become just a matter of time, the military began to close its ranks against women again. Anti-aircraft women were increasingly reallocated to clerical and domestic work, which they loathed.[77] Final demobilization was experienced by many as demeaning; they felt that having to hand in their battledress and change back into civilian clothing symbolized being stripped of all that had made them exceptional.[78]

The enforced re-transformation into civilians, which many anti-aircraft women felt diminished their specific contribution to the war, has likewise characterized official commemorations of the Second World War. True, the service they had rendered their country was acknowledged by the Commander in Chief of Anti-Aircraft Command, General Sir Frederick Pile,[79] who had been instrumental in bringing about the recruitment of women.[80] When the wartime mixed anti-aircraft batteries were dissolved in 1945, he thanked the women most warmly in his farewell address,[81] not least, one suspects, because he had put his career on the line by promoting the recruitment of women into Anti-Aircraft Defence. Some of the women also took part in the VE Day Parade, which marked the end of the war in Europe.[82] Yet women's involvement in any of the female services, and in Anti-Aircraft Defence in particular, was quickly obliterated from official commemorations of the war.[83] Nor has the Women's War Memorial, unveiled in 2005, done much to undo this obliteration. It has been placed in Whitehall, opposite the Cenotaph commemorating the British men who fought in the two world wars. Opposition to the Women's War Memorial is particularly vociferous among the female military veterans, who feel that their specific contribution to the war has become submerged in the large variety of female wartime employments represented by the memorial.[84] Being reminded of the country's perilous condition during long periods of the war, which caused the country to resort to desperate measures that threatened to dissolve gender boundaries, sits too uneasily with the revelling in Britain's glory that characterizes commemoration of the years 1939 to 1945.

Conclusion

For many women in Britain, the Second World War, despite the hardship and bereavement it entailed, was a period of unprecedented

opportunity to engage in activities that were extraordinary when measured against the standards of femininity. This was particularly true of the women involved in mixed anti-aircraft batteries, where gender boundaries had become blurred by the surreptitious integration of combat into femininity. This enabled women to experience warfare not as the passive victims of male fighting, but as agents actively protecting their country from enemy attack, and, in the process, to discover qualities in themselves that had lain concealed under the shield of peacetime femininity. Whether born of their ability to operate the highly intricate anti-aircraft instruments or their efficiency in bringing down enemy aircraft, indistinguishable as they had become, a feeling of deep satisfaction, unknown to most in civilian life, pervaded them. This feeling derived as much from the particular demands of their employment, stretching as it did women's skills and faculties, as from the realization that they did possess the stamina and endurance that mark a good soldier. It was the wish to avail themselves of the extraordinary opportunities afforded by the war to overcome the limitations imposed on women's potential by the boundaries of femininity that lay behind many women's decision to volunteer.

Notes

1. Cf. D'Ann Campbell (1993) "Women in Combat: The World War II Experience in the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and the Soviet Union" *Journal of Military History,* LVII, 301–23.
2. Cf. Goldman, N. Loring and Stites, R. (1982) "Great Britain and the World Wars" in N.Loring Goldman (ed.) *Female Soldiers – Combatants or Non-Combatants? Historical and Contemporary Perspectives* (Westport, CT), 21–45, p. 31.
3. Cf. R. Terry (1988) *Women in Khaki: The Story of the British Woman Soldier* (London), p. 135; cf. also L. Noakes (2006) *Women in the British Army: War and the Gentle Sex* (London), p. 125. By September 1943, numbers had begun to fall off, the ATS comprising 212,475 women, whom Bidwell erroneously claims to represent the service's peak strength; cf. S. Bidwell (1977) *The Women's Royal Army Corps* (London), p. 81.
4. Cf. for example D. Platz (2005) *We Had Been the Women's Army. Die Geschiche des Women's Army Auxiliary Corps* (Frankfurt a. M.); cf. also Terry (1988).
5. Cf. Noakes, L. (2001) "War and Peace" in I. Zweiniger-Bargielowska (ed.) *Women in Twentieth-Century British History* (Harlow) 307–20, p. 308.
6. Quoted in H.Gwynne-Vaughan (n.d.) *Service with the Army* (London), p. 91.
7. Cf. Terry (1988), p. 96.
8. The discharge rate rose from 26 per cent in August 1940 to 29.9 per cent in December of that year; cf. Terry (1988), p. 118. Between June and August 1941, only 6,647 new members were enrolled, while 15,827 women applied

to join the much smaller WAAF; cf. National Archives (henceforward NA), Department of Labour and National Service, LAB 76/3, p. 3.

9. Cf. Noakes (2006), pp. 106–7.
10. Cf. General Sir F. Pile (1949) *Ack-Ack: Britain's Defence Against Air Attack During the Second World War* (London), p. 189.
11. Cf. The Auxiliary Territorial Service, compiled by Controller J. M. Cowper, A.T.S., The War Office, 1949, NA, WO 277/6, p. 33.
12. This had in fact been the sole objective of extending conscription to women; cf. NA, Women's Services (Welfare and Amenities) Committee; recruiting of womanpower, LAB 26/63, p. 3.
13. Cf. A. Calder (1969) *The People's War: Britain, 1939–45* (London), p. 268.
14. Cf. Calder (1969), p. 267.
15. Cf. W. S. Churchill (1971) *The Second World War*, III: The Grand Alliance, 5th edn (London), p. 455.
16. Cf. Noakes (2006), p. 115.
17. Cf. Noakes (2006), p. 119.
18. Cf. Bidwell (1977), p. 119; cf. also Terry (1988), p. 152. On p. 81, however, Bidwell gives their number as 57,000.
19. Cf. Muriel Barker, Freddie Pile's Popsies, Imperial War Museum (henceforward IWM) 73/3/1; Mrs. K. P. Mannock, IWM 75/121/1; Mrs. I. Burchell, IWM 88/50/1; Mrs. Williams, IWM 88/51/1; Mrs. E. Hunter, IWM 93/30/1; Mrs. B. M. Holbrook, IWM 95/27/1; Mrs. M. R. Mills, IWM 97/25/1; Junior Commander Josephine Esdaile Peyman, IWM 99/76/1; Mrs. Herterich, Cotton-Waste Soldier Girls, IWM 99/86/1; Theresa Roberts, transcript of interview, IWM 11786-1; Miss J. C. Petrie, IWM P 182; Miss Anne Laws, IWM P 347; Miss G. Morgan, IWM PP/MCR/115; Alice Joyce Bell, IWM MISC 156/2422.
20. Cf. Carr, J. (1995) "Just Like William" in: M. Nicholson (ed.) *What Did You Do in the War, Mummy? Women in World War II* (London); V. Robinson (1996) *Sisters in Arms: How Female Gunners defended Britain against the Luftwaffe* (London).
21. Mass Observation was founded in 1937 by a group of young, male, upper-class intellectuals aiming to carry out an "anthropology of ourselves", that is explore the British social character by using a blend of anthropology, US-influenced sociology, and psychoanalysis; cf. D. Sheridan (1990) *Wartime Women: A Mass-Observation Anthology* (London), p. 4.
22. Cf. Mass Observation Archive (henceforward MOA), Women in Wartime 1939–1945, TC 32, Box 2: F 25 C, 16.10.1941.
23. Central Office of Information, A.T.S. An Investigation of the Attitudes of Women, the General Public, and A.T.S. Personnel to the Auxialiary Territorial Service, October 1941, p. i.
24. Cf. Women's Services Committee, LAB 26/63.
25. Cf. Central Office of Information 1941, pp. 6, 8.
26. Cf. Terry (1988), p. 130.
27. Cf. Central Office of Information 1941, p. 8.
28. Cf. Central Office of Information 1941, p. 30.
29. Cf. Mrs. E. Hunter, n.p.
30. Cf. for example Carr 1995, p. 107.
31. Cf. for example Mrs. I. Burchell, pp. 1, 2.

32. Cf. Theresa Roberts, pp. 22, 29, 33.
33. Cf. Mrs. K. P. Mannock, pp. 3, 28.
34. Cf. Miss J. C. Petrie, p. 5.
35. Cf. Miss J. C. Petrie, p. 4.
36. Cf. Central Office of Information 1941, pp. 8, 9.
37. Cf. G. Braybon and P.Summerfield (1987) *Out of the Cage: Women's Experiences of Two World Wars* (London), p. 165.
38. Cf. Women's Services Committee, p. 21; cf. also Report of the Committee on Amenities and Welfare Conditions in the Three Women's Services, presented to Parliament August 1942, Cmd.6384.iv.793, p. 798.
39. Cf. MOA, TC 32 Box 1/E.
40. Cf. Mrs. I. Burchell, p. 2; Junior Commander Peyman, pp. 7, 9.
41. Cf. Mrs. I. Burchell, p. 1.
42. Cf. for example Robinson (1996), pp. 20, 24.
43. Cf. for example Carr, p. 109. A similar desire motivating a number of her interviewees was found by P. Summerfield (1998) *Reconstructing Women's Wartime Lives* (Manchester), p. 83; see also the same argument made with reference to women serving in the WAAF by T. Stone (1999), "Creating a (Gendered?) Military Identity: the Women's Auxiliary Air Force in Great Britain in the Second World War", *Women's History Review,* VIII , 605–24, p. 613.
44. Miss G. Morgan, p. 1.
45. Robinson (1996), p. 24.
46. For Soviet women's involvement in the military during the Second World War cf. Campbell (1993).
47. Cf. for example dedication in Muriel Barker.
48. Cf. Muriel Barker, pp. 25–6.
49. Cf. for example Miss G. Morgan, p. 1; Mrs. I. Burchell, p.6; Mrs. M. R. Mills, p. 6; Mrs. Williams, p. 3; Carr (1995), p. 112.
50. Cf. Mrs. I. Burchell, p. 6; Mrs. M. R. Mills, p. 6; Miss G. Morgan, p. 1.
51. 67 members of the ATS were killed, another nine died of their wounds, 313 were wounded and 16 were posted as missing, making a total of 405 war casualties from a variety of causes; cf. Terry (1988), p. 164.
52. Cf. for example Miss G. Morgan, pp. 5, 38; Robinson (1996), p. 45.
53. Central Office of Information 1941, p. 10.
54. Cf. H. Nicholson (2007) "A Disputed Identity: Women Conscientious Objectors in Second World War Britain", *Twentieth Century British History*, XVII, 409–28.
55. Cf. Auxiliary Territorial Service 1949, p. 32.
56. Cf. Auxiliary Territorial Service 1949, p. 3.
57. Cf. Bidwell (1977), p. 127; cf. also T. Stone, The Integration of women into a Military Service: The Women's Auxiliary Air Force in the Second World War, PhD, Cambridge University, 1998, pp. 213–4.
58. Cf. Mrs. L. White, p. 14.
59. CF. for example Robinson (1996), p. 179; Miss Morgan, p. 45; Mrs. E. Hunter, n.p.
60. Alice Joyce Bell, p. 10.
61. Carr (1995), p. 112.
62. Cf. for example Carr (1995), p. 112.

63. Cf. Carr (1995), pp. 38–9; Mrs B. M. Holbrook, p. 66.
64. Cf. Muriel Barker, p. 53.
65. Cf. Mrs L. White, p. 14.
66. Robinson (1996), p. 179.
67. Cf. Miss J. C. Petrie, p. 15.
68. Cf. Miss J. C. Petrie, p. 99.
69. Cf. Robinson (1996), p. 26.
70. Cf. Mrs. B. M. Holbrook, p. 115.
71. Cf. for example Mrs. Herterich, pp. 6, 19; Miss J. C. Petrie, p. 9.
72. Cf. for example Carr (1995), p. 112.
73. Cf. Muriel Barker, p. 79.
74. Cf. for example Muriel Barker, p. 150.
75. Cf. Terry (1988), p. 177.
76. Cf. for example Mrs. B. M. Holbrook, p. 137; Mrs. E. Hunter, n.p.
77. Cf. for example Muriel Barker, p. 141.
78. Cf. for example Mrs. B. M. Holbrook, p. 130.
79. Cf. Muriel Barker, p. 1; cf. also Robinson (1996), p. 156.
80. Cf. Pile (1949).
81. Cf. Muriel Barker, p. I; Pile (1949).
82. Cf. Terry (1988), p. 165.
83. Cf. J. Schwarzkopf (2007) "Remembering Victory Without Discomfort: The Obliteration of British Women's Involvement in the Military in Official Commemorations of World War II", *Journal for the Study of British Cultures*, XIV, 41–52.
84. Cf. J. Bone (2007), "The Memorial to the Women of World War 2", *Women's History Magazine*, 55, 28–31.

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